

Erfahrung und Analyse Experience and Analysis

Abstracts

27. Internationales
Wittgenstein Symposium
8. – 14. August 2004
Kirchberg am Wechsel

27th International
Wittgenstein Symposium
August 8 – 14, 2004
Kirchberg am Wechsel

Distributors

Die Österreichische Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft
The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

Markt 63, A-2880 Kirchberg am Wechsel
Österreich/Austria



niederösterreich kultur

Gedruckt mit Unterstützung der
Abteilung Kultur und Wissenschaft
des Amtes der NÖ Landesregierung

Redaktion: Maria Elisabeth Reicher und Johann Christian Marek

Visuelle Gestaltung: Sascha Windholz

Druck: Druckwerker, 1050 Wien

IS EVERYTHING NAMEABLE?

C. Anthony Anderson, Santa Barbara, California

Seeking a foundation for intensional logic, arguments bearing on whether everything is nameable are examined and all are found to be without force. These include Frege's on unsaturated functions, an Intuitionistic argument, a Leibnizian argument, and Graham Priest's Berkelian argument. The reasoning of the Zermelo-König paradox leading to the conclusion that all ordinals are nameable is stated within a theory of possible languages and found wanting. It is concluded that the question is entirely open.

GESTALT UND ZEIT. HISTORISCH-SYSTEMATISCHE ANALYSEN ZUR GESTALTTHEORIE

Mauro Antonelli, Milano, Italien

Die Gestalttheorie stellt historisch einen der fruchtbarsten Versuche dar, eine Wissenschaft der Wahrnehmungsgegenstände zu begründen. Indem allerdings die Gestalttheorie jeglichen Verarbeitungsprozess in der Wahrnehmung prinzipiell ausschließt, kann sie nicht über eine rein deskriptive Experimentalphänomenologie der schon formierten Perzepte hinausgehen. Dies macht eine genetische Ergänzung erforderlich, die den Konstitutionsprozess des Gegebenen in der Zeit untersucht. Denn jeglicher Wahrnehmungsgegenstand weist nicht nur eine räumliche und qualitative Einheit, sondern auch eine, wenn auch minimale, zeitliche Dauer auf – sei es, dass der Gegenstand mit sich selbst identisch bleibt, sei es, dass er kontinuierlich seine räumlichen und/oder qualitativen Bestimmungen wechselt. Eine genetische Experimentalphänomenologie, die den zeitlichen Innenhorizont des Wahrnehmungsprozesses hervorhebt und die passive, präattentive Genesis des Gegebenen untersucht – wie sie in etwa Vittorio Benussi parallel zum gestalttheoretischen Modell entwarf –, könnte die traditionelle Gestalttheorie der zeitgenössischen kognitiven Psychologie annähern und neue Forschungshorizonte eröffnen.

WITTGENSTEIN'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF PREDELUSIONAL STATES

José María Ariso, Madrid, Spain

The emphasis Wittgenstein placed on ungrounded ways of acting led him to consider those events in which he would be torn away from the sureness of the game. In this paper I weigh up the possibility that some delusions are due not only to events which might throw us entirely off the rails, but also to the loss of the confidence which allows us to take part in language-games.

ANALYSIS AS THE VANISHING OF VALUE?

Brian Armstrong, University Park, Pennsylvania

Although the Tractarian notion of value has recently begun to receive more scholarly attention, there is still no clear account of this notion. While I can hardly offer such an account here, I do believe that our theme of experience and analysis can be used to shed new light on the issue. This new light results from the interesting paradox that opens up in the *Tractatus* with respect to value and our theme: the value that we experience seems to vanish upon analysis. I will question whether this is so, asking why it is that we are tempted to speak of value, how value arises in a logical-philosophical treatise, and what a philosopher can do about it. My conclusion will be that the Tractarian project depends on a dynamic and paradoxical relation to value: we must experience value that vanishes upon analysis if analysis is itself to be possible.

PHÄNOMENALISMUS UND SKEPTIZISMUS

Alexander Bagattini, Leipzig, Deutschland

Hat das empirische Wissen eine Grundlage? Können wir Wissen über die Gegenstände unseres Alltagsverständnisses alleine auf der Basis unserer Sinnesdaten begründen? Der Skeptiker beantwortet zumindest die zweite Frage negativ: Nein, Sinnesdaten alleine sind nicht hinreichend zur Begründung des empirischen Wissens. Er führt hierfür als Argument an, dass es keinen gültigen rationalen Schluss von den internen Sinnesdaten auf die vermeintlichen externen, physikalischen Gegenstände gibt. Phänomenalisten greifen dieses skeptische Argument mit der These an, dass physikalische Gegenstände nichts anderes sind als Akkumulationen von Sinnesdaten. Die versierteste Form des Phänomenalismus – der linguistische Phänomenalismus – versucht diese These dadurch zu begründen, dass ein definitorisches Verhältnis zwischen Propositionen über physikalische Gegenstände und Propositionen über Sinnesdaten behauptet wird.

Es soll gezeigt werden, dass es nicht möglich ist, Propositionen über physikalische Gegenstände definitorisch auf Propositionen über Sinnesdaten zurückzuführen, weshalb eine phänomenalistische Antwort auf den Außenwelt-skeptizismus scheitert.

THE PRACTICAL RELEVANCE OF PHENOMENOLOGY

Sorin Baiasu, Manchester, Great Britain

Contemporary approaches to ethical issues confine the practical relevance of phenomenology to the exploration of meta-ethical questions. From this perspective, moral philosophers interested in questions of normative ethics may seem justified in denying the significance of phenomenology; moreover, phenomenologists interested in meta-ethical questions may seem justified in rejecting the philosophical importance of normative ethics. In this paper I focus on the descriptive character of the phenomenological method as one of the main reasons for these views regarding phenomenology's practical relevance, and I argue for the central role that phenomenology can play in an adequate approach to questions of normative ethics.

INDEXIKALITÄT, KOGNITIVE DYNAMIK UND PRAKTISCHES ÜBERLEGEN

Johannes D. Balle, Berlin, Deutschland

Gedankendynamische Argumente erweitern das Spektrum der Debatten um indexikalische Gedanken mit Blick auf Verstehens- und Verhaltensklärungen über die Zeit. Es wird argumentiert, dass kognitive Dynamik gerade auch für die Analyse *praktischer Überlegungen* eine ganz zentrale Rolle spielt. Hierzu wird eine Rekonstruktion der kognitiven Inhalte notwendig, die in dynamischen Einstellungen involviert sind und mit denen wir es immer dann zu tun haben, wenn wir kontextbezogene Informationen in kontext-unabhängiger Weise und über Kontexte hinweg in unsere praktischen Überlegungen miteinbeziehen.

SEARLE ÜBER DEN ZUSAMMENHANG ZWISCHEN INTENTIONALITÄT UND BEWUßTSEIN

Wolfgang Barz, Berlin, Deutschland

Ich untersuche ein Argument, das Searle zur Begründung seiner These des begrifflichen Zusammenhangs zwischen Intentionalität und Bewußtsein vorgetragen hat. Dieses Argument stützt sich auf den Begriff der Aspektgestalt und auf die Rede von „irreduzibler Subjektivität“. Nachdem ich jeweils zwei Lesarten von „Aspektgestalt“ und „irreduzibler Subjektivität“ herausgearbeitet habe, komme ich zu dem Ergebnis, daß Searles Argument in jeder möglichen Kombination dieser Lesarten von mindestens einer falschen Prämisse Gebrauch macht.

MIND AND (BRACKETED) WORLD (COULD THERE BE AN EXTERNALIST EPOCHÉ?)

Hilan Bensusan, Brasília, Brazil

This work investigates the internalist assumptions of a method of proceeding in the analysis of experience (and thinking) that makes an appeal to the idea of an epoché. It contrasts these assumptions with externalist theses about

knowledge and mental contents. It discusses the work of Beyer concerning Husserlian epoché and argues that both universal and local epoché are to be rejected from an externalist perspective.

A PLAUSIBLE ELIMINATIVISM?

José Luis Bermúdez, St. Louis, Missouri

This paper starts from the premise that Paul Churchland's "official" arguments for eliminative materialism are unsatisfactory. My aims are, first, to refocus the debate on what I take to be more interesting and fruitful arguments for eliminativism and, second, to explore how far those arguments might take us. The most promising strategy for the eliminativist has two components. The first is to put pressure on what I have elsewhere called the broad construal of the scope of commonsense psychology. The second is to try to establish a fundamental mismatch between the model of representation implicated in just about all ways of thinking about commonsense psychology and the family of models of representation that seem to provide the best general picture of how the brain can be representational. Standard ways of understanding the putative mismatch are unhelpful. New ones are proposed.

EXPLAINING EMOTIONAL ACTION

Monika Betzler, Göttingen, Germany

According to a standard model of rational agency emotional actions are either arational, or they are rational to the extent that emotions can be captured by beliefs and desires rationalizing the action. In this paper, I propose an alternative way to explain emotional actions. Some emotional actions are rational in that they are done for reasons ensuing from what an agent has come to value, but cannot value any longer in light of newly acquired information. Such actions serve the function to enhance evaluative coherence and re-adaption to new circumstances. Emotions motivate such actions to reduce perceived incoherences.

ÜBER DEN WERT DER GEFÜHLE

Christian Beyer, Erfurt, Deutschland

Im ersten Teil des Beitrags wird der Gefühlsbegriff als Familienähnlichkeitsbegriff bestimmt. Als paradigmatische Gefühle erweisen sich dabei die aktuellen Gefühlserebnisse. Diese werden im zweiten Teil mit den Wahrnehmungserlebnissen verglichen. Ausgehend von der Beobachtung, daß Gefühlsergebnisse – ebenso wie Wahrnehmungsergebnisse – manchmal veridisch sind, wird im dritten Teil schließlich für die These argumentiert, daß auch Gefühlsergebnisse als unmittelbare Rechtfertigungsmotive für Urteile und Überzeugungen fungieren können. Insofern bietet die Belief/desire-Psychologie durchaus einen geeigneten theoretischen Rahmen, innerhalb dessen die Frage nach der Rationalität gefühlsbedingter Handlungen zu beantworten ist.

DAS VISUELLE ZIMMER PHÄNOMENOLOGISCHE FRAGEN IN WITTGENSTEINS SPÄTPHILOSOPHIE

Elisabeth Birk, Aachen, Deutschland

Der folgende Beitrag skizziert anhand einer Analyse der § 398ff. der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*, in welchem Sinn man von phänomenologischen Fragen in Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie sprechen kann. Das Beispiel des „visuellen Zimmers“ verbindet die Kritik an einem solipsistischen Subjektbegriff mit der Frage nach der Möglichkeit einer phänomenologischen Sprache. Phänomenologische Beschreibungen – so die hier vertretene These – sind für die Spätphilosophie nicht von solchen des Sprachgebrauchs zu trennen, da sie nicht die Beschreibung besonderer Gegenstände (wie Sinnesdaten) darstellen, sondern auf den Gegenstand selbst Bezug nehmen.

ANALYSIS AND THE ELUCIDATORY INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN'S TRACTATUS

Andreas Blank, Berlin, Germany

In her “elucidatory” interpretation of the *Tractatus*, Marie McGinn has suggested to exclude Wittgenstein’s view of logical analysis from the elucidatory core of the work. However, her suggestion depends strongly on Wittgenstein’s later critique of his earlier view of analysis, which partially distorts the content of his earlier ideas. In particular, the *Tractatus* explicitly excludes a type of analysis that leads to particular forms of elementary sentences and simple objects from the realm of logic. Rather, the early Wittgenstein connects the idea of analysis with the idea of the purely descriptive nature of philosophy. Because the type of analysis leading to purely descriptive insights only makes implicit knowledge explicit, and thus does not have to do with explanation or theory construction, it should be seen as forming a part of an elucidatory strategy.

LOGIC AND THE NOTHING: CARNAP'S CRITIQUE OF HEIDEGGER AND THE ANALYTIC/CONTINENTAL DIVIDE

Jon Rostgaard Boiesen, Aarhus, Denmark

Philosophy in the latter half of the 20th century was marked by a split between analytic and continental philosophy. In this paper I will argue that one of the most important origins of this split is to be found in Carnap’s critique of Heidegger in his 1932-article “The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language”, and that the reason for Carnap’s critique of Heidegger is not confined to what both Carnap and Heidegger considered strictly philosophical issues, but is connected with Carnap’s self-understanding as being part of a progressive socialist movement, and the fact that Heidegger in this period showed sympathy for Nazism. Further I argue that the advent of Nazism plays an important causal role for the establishment of the analytic/continental-divide.

DOES METAPHOR FORCE US TO STUDY THE NATURE OF THOUGHT?

Ewa Bolińska, Krakow, Poland

To reveal the nature of metaphor, to explain why it is an important part of our creativity and cognition, it is necessary to turn from studying the matters of language and language use to studying the nature of thought. The aim of this article is to present how semantics and pragmatics fail to provide a satisfactory description of the nature of metaphor. The discussion on metaphor is very complex, thus I would like to appeal to just one of the possible connections between semantics and pragmatics of metaphor, namely the concept of metaphor introduced by Davidson and a possible response to it as given by Grice.

IS NAGEL DAVIDSONIBLE?

Cristina Borgoni and Makmiller Pedroso, Brasília, Brazil

Nagel (in “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, 1991) argues that while inner experiences of organisms are always from their particular points of view, physical explanations are beyond whatever standpoint. Departing from these assumptions Nagel concludes that physical descriptions are always objective and, therefore, will never grasp the subjective character of inner experiences. Or, in other words, physical explanations will always leave out phenomenological factors. The legitimacy of this Nagelian view depends on the rejection of two Davidsonian convictions. The first is the monism or the idea that all that exists can be explained by physical laws. The second is the idea that we cannot separate out empirical facts on the one side and conceptual schemes on the other. The central aim of this paper is to investigate the possibility of maintaining a phenomenology even after the Davidsonian criticisms.

EXPERIENCE, THOUGHT, AND LANGUAGE. SOME REFLECTIONS ON BERMÚDEZ'S APPROACH TO NONLINGUISTIC COGNITION

Johannes L. Brandl, Salzburg, Austria

This paper deals with the problem of how to account for the specific nature of nonlinguistic thinking by contrasting this type of cognitive activity with sensory experiences on the one hand and language-based reasoning on the other. It agrees with Bermúdez that nonlinguistic thoughts cannot generally be denied to have a propositional content. It argues, however, that propositional content can be ascribed to nonlinguistic thoughts only if one regards creatures entertaining these thoughts as using genuine concepts, not just protoconcepts as the minimalist theory would have it.

BIOLOGICAL KINDS AND THE CAUSAL THEORY OF REFERENCE

Ingo Brigandt, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

This paper uses an example from biology, the homology concept, to argue that current versions of the causal theory of reference give an incomplete account of reference determination. It is suggested that in addition to samples and stereotypical properties, the scientific use of concepts and the epistemic interests pursued with concepts are important factors in determining the reference of natural kind terms.

LEIBNIZ UND WHITEHEAD ÜBER PERZEPTION

Hans Burkhardt, München, Deutschland

Gewöhnlich wird das lateinische Wort *perceptio* ausschließlich mit Wahrnehmung übersetzt vor allem von schlichten deutschen Epistemikern. Dass diese Übersetzung meist nicht stimmt, zeigt schon die Leibniz'sche Widerspiegelungstheorie nach der jede Monade die Gesamtheit aller Monaden widerspiegelt. Da kann offensichtlich von Wahrnehmung keine Rede sein.

Wenn man bisher der Ansicht war, dass Leibniz diese abstrakte und wahrnehmungsferne Auffassung von Perzeption in die Philosophie eingeführt hat, wird man durch einen Text von Francis Bacon, der von Whitehead zitiert wurde, eines Besseren belehrt. Perzeptionen sind nach diesem Text gerade keine Wahrnehmungen, sondern garantieren nicht nur eine wahrnehmungsfreie und damit oft präzisere Erfahrung und tragen zur Konstitution und Individualität aller Körper bei. Sie gewährleisten gleichzeitig die Beziehung und die Abgrenzung von Körpern jeglicher Art gegenüber anderen Körpern.

Für Whitehead ist dieser Text grundlegend, denn die *prehensions* sollen in seiner Metaphysik dasselbe leisten wie die Bacon'schen und Leibniz'schen Perzeptionen. Legt man diesen Begriff von Perzeption zugrunde, dann drängt sich eine Neuinterpretation alter und bekannter Texte auf, so z.B. des *esse est percipi* von Berkeley.

CHILDREN'S PHILOSOPHIZING (AND REASONING JUDGMENT AS ITS CONSTITUTIVE ELEMENT) AS A SOURCE OF TOLERANT CONSCIOUSNESS FORMATION

Marina Chebakova, Ekaterinburg, Russia

This work is devoted to one of the interesting themes of modern philosophy that is connected with the problem of children's philosophizing. The special importance of this theme is also in its topical practical value; it involves the educational reforms according to the humanization and humanitarization of education, which are being in progress in Russia now.

Modern education seeks for the new concept of its own development at every level. The beginning of this search was connected with the global changes of Russian social and political history and reflected the interest of Russian education to reach the world tendency of the open

education model formation. At that time, the importance of such educational principles as humanization and humanitarization, the necessity of the connecting of educational content with social, historical and national features of the region were coming to life.

EXPLAINING THE SEEMINGLY SELF-INTERPRETING CHARACTER OF A FORMULA

Kai-Yuan Cheng, Min-Hsiung, Taiwan

In his *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein convincingly argues against the proposal that rule-following consists in a person's having a verbalized formula in mind, by pointing out the interpretation regress problem. However, a verbalized formula, such as $f(x) = 2x + 2$, is *seemingly* self-interpreting. Phenomenologically, it specifies for a person a certain procedure of deriving the number $f(x)$ for any value of x . However, Wittgenstein points out that the formula fails to *fix* the rule being followed. In this paper, I offer a dispositional account of rule-following which can explain why a formula seems self-interpreting, when in fact it isn't. I argue that rule-following consists in a person's having a disposition to behave in a certain way, rather than having a verbalized formula in mind. Supplemented with a Dennettian functionalist account of introspection, I explain why phenomenologically there seems to be no gap between the verbalization of a formula and its interpretation.

THE NECESSITY OF THE ETHICAL OR WHY MURDER *MUST* BE WRONG

Anne-Marie Christensen, Aarhus, Denmark

In the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* we find Wittgenstein's first published investigation of ethics. Furthermore, together with the "Lecture on Ethics", this is the last time he makes any longer investigation into this subject, as the *Nachlass* reveals only a few, scattered remarks on ethical matters after 1929. I will argue that if the ethical sections of the *Tractatus* are seen in connection to the concept of showing, they then reveal a coherent and radical alternative to traditional conceptions of ethics; an alternative which sheds light on the necessity of ethics.

BRENTANO UND ARISTOTELES ÜBER DIE ONTOLOGIE DER INTENTIONALEN BEZIEHUNG

Arkadiusz Chrudzimski,
Zielona Góra, Polen – Salzburg, Österreich

Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos war in mehrfacher Hinsicht von Aristoteles abhängig. Auch an den Stellen, wo er seine Intentionalitätstheorie bespricht, beruft er sich auf Aristoteles, und zwar oft in der Form, als ob beinahe alles, was man heute als Verdienste der Brentano'schen Intentionalitätstheorie betrachtet, im Grunde schon bei Aristoteles latent vorhanden wäre. Ich will indessen zeigen, dass es zwischen der Aristotelischen und Brentano'schen Ontologie der Intentionalität doch beträchtliche Unterschiede gibt. Die Aristotelische Ontologie der intentionalen Beziehung sieht auf den ersten Blick viel einfacher und eleganter aus. Es zeigt sich allerdings, dass die größere Komplexität, die Brentano in Kauf nimmt, durch gewisse theoretische Vorteile aufgewogen wird.

WITTGENSTEIN'S CRITICISM OF HUSSERL'S SYNTHETIC A PRIORI PROPOSITIONS

Roberto Ciuni, Genoa, Italy

The aim of this paper is to show the inadequacy of Wittgenstein's criticism of the definition of a synthetic a priori proposition provided by Husserl. I shall attempt to demonstrate that such a criticism is valid only on condition that exactly the Tractarian conception of a *synthetic proposition* is shared. Unfortunately, Husserl does not include these assumptions in his theories. After exposing the Tractarian equivalence *analytic* \equiv *a priori* \equiv *necessary*, my paper will focus on the Tractarian conception of "*synthetic*", since the equivalence *synthetic* \equiv *depictive* constitutes the main (although implicit) assumption in the criticism Wittgenstein addresses to Husserl.

IS A NATURALISTIC THEORY OF REFERENCE DEFENSIBLE?

Andrea Clausen, Konstanz, Germany

In this paper, I argue that even the most promising version of a naturalistic theory of reference, Millikan's evolutionary approach, does not always avoid indeterminacy of reference. In consequence, an evolutionary approach must at least be amended by non-naturalistic elements such as elements that build upon Brandom's social-inferential approach. Furthermore, I argue that his version of a social conception of reference, just like an evolutionary one, does not imply that a linguistic community is at liberty to fix reference. In consequence, a completely social-inferential position is as convincing as the combination of an evolutionary and a social-inferential approach. But even if one opts for the former position, naturalistic aspects – more precisely, causal-counterfactual relations between stimuli and observation reports – are important in order to guarantee that these reports serve as preliminary regress-stoppers in the social-inferential process that determines reference.

IS PERCEPTION INFERENTIAL?

William Cornwell, West Point, New York

Applying Kent Bach's "take-for-granted principle" to Jerry Fodor's faculty psychology, I argue that perception usually is non-inferential, but I also indicate how and under what circumstances perceptual processes are and ought to be inferential. The epistemological consequence is that some perceptual knowledge is basic or foundational (hence, coherentism and confirmation holism are false) but some perceptual knowledge has inferential justification.

GENERIC ESSENCE

Fabrice Correia, Tarragona, Spain

I distinguish two kinds of essentialist statements, the *generic* and the *objectual*, reject a number of accounts of generic essence, and (tentatively) suggest that the notion (i) is primitive, and (ii) can be used to define objectual essence, metaphysical necessity and analyticity.

THE TRACTATUS AND THE NEED OF NON-TRUTH-FUNCTIONAL OPERATIONS

João Vergílio Gallerani Cuter, São Paulo, Brazil

The *Tractatus* is bound to recognize that not every operation is a truth-functional one. Non-truth-functional operations are essential in applied arithmetic, although arithmetical series can be defined in independence of them.

WHAT WE CANNOT SAY, WE CAN AND MUST SPEAK ABOUT

Darlei Dall'Agnol, Florianópolis, Brazil

This paper seeks to show that Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* can be interpreted as a criticism of two views, namely that ethics can be a science and that philosophy can establish the foundations of morality, but not as a defense of quietism. In the first section, the limits of what can be said (science) are reconstructed. In the second, the relationship between *to say* and *to show* is clarified and a new distinction between *to say* and *to speak* is introduced. The following section makes another distinction between 'be silent' in a *trivial* way and in a *logical-philosophical* one. This subsequently is used to show that Wittgenstein is prohibiting any kind of foundationalism. The last section shows how morality, free from philosophical confusions, can be expressed. A final distinction between *moral* and *immoral silence* is drawn in order to show that what we cannot say, we can and must speak about.

COLOUR SPACE: PHENOMENAL OR PHYSICAL?

Lieven Decock, Tilburg, Netherlands

Colours can be regarded as properties of phenomenal experiences, and as properties of physical objects. They can accordingly be ordered in a phenomenal colour space, or in a physical colour space. It is often believed that colour is in the first place ordered in a phenomenal colour space, and that the various psychophysical colour spaces are physical models of this internal space. However, at closer scrutiny, there is no reason to believe in the existence of a unique phenomenal colour space, determined by a hue, brightness, and saturation dimension. A multitude of colour spaces has been proposed, and this reveals a real problem for the phenomenal colour space; namely, that it is impossible to characterise its metrical properties. Psychophysical colour spaces, characterised by spectrometric parameters, are unproblematic from a mathematical point of view.

ON WITTGENSTEIN ON MATHEMATICS

J. W. Degen, Erlangen, Germany

The theoretical or just philosophical status of Wittgenstein's remarks about mathematics is still very controversial. His remarks are almost always hard to understand with respect to their precise meaning and/or their theoretical (or merely philosophical) significance. However, there are also many perfectly intelligible statements that are plainly false and often even absurd.

THE WITTGENSTEINIAN IDEA OF ANALYSIS AS A BASE FOR CONSTRUCTIVE CONTEMPORARY SCEPTICISM

Aleksandra Derra, Torun, Poland

Examining Wittgenstein's remarks from *Philosophical Investigations* about the philosophical idea of analysis, I argue that his view of philosophy can be treated as a useful base for constructive contemporary scepticism. In order to enrich the understanding of the matter, I will first call your attention to the more general idea of philosophy understood as a special kind of descriptive analysis. Trying to show that scepticism can be seen as a useful and fruitful philosophical approach, I will shortly present such a form of scepticism and demonstrate how it can be derived from the Wittgensteinian idea of analysis. I will conclude expressing the conviction that the Wittgensteinian idea of philosophising is a good starting point and a rich source for pluralism in philosophy – a position Wittgenstein exhorted us to take in his late philosophy.

THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE IN LIFE AND LITERATURE: CAN AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE EXPAND OUR EMOTIONAL REPERTOIRE?

Ronald de Sousa, Toronto, Canada

Philosophical reflection has historically claimed to improve our individual lives. The claim is seldom made today; on the other hand, philosophers and psychologists (e.g. Nussbaum, Oatley) have argued that art and literature, by means of simulations running on the virtual machine implemented by our brains, can expand and refine our repertoire of emotional responses and thereby our ethical sensibility. Others (Posner) have been skeptical. What is certain is that fictional literature can be thought of as an exploration of possible worlds. I propose to identify a sense of possibility, "individual possibility," suitable to make sense of the idea that the possible is part of the reality in which we make life choices, and to suggest some specific conditions under which we can hope for our own lives and our ethical responses to be enlarged and improved by the experience of art and literature.

WITTGENSTEIN ÜBER MUSIKVERSTEHEN UND DIE UNTERBRECHUNG DER INNEREN STIMME

Nicolas Dierks, Hamburg, Deutschland

In diesem Papier gehe ich von einer Interpretation verschiedener Stellen des Briefwechsels Wittgensteins mit Rudolf Koder aus. Nach einer Rekonstruktion von Aspekten von Wittgensteins Musikauffassung um 1930 (Meinen, Verstehen, „innere Stimme“) wird diese mit späteren Motiven aus den PU konfrontiert (Erlebnis, Absicht, Inspiration). Wie weit hat sich Wittgenstein von früheren Auffassungen entfernt und spielten seine musikalischen Vorlieben dabei eine Rolle?

VALUE-PREDICATES AND VALUE-PROPERTIES

John F. Drummond, Bronx, New York

Husserl's moral theory stands on two pillars: an account of evaluative intentionality and an analogy between formal logic and formal axiology. This paper explores Husserl's account of the analogy between formal logic and formal axiology in order to reveal features of evaluative intentionality. The analogy appeals to the similarity between the grammar of "cognitive" judgments and "evaluative" judgments. However, this grammatical similarity masks important logical differences that point in turn to important phenomenological and ontological differences. The paper attempts to discern these differences by investigating a series of logical distinctions regarding adjectives, the "predicates" belonging to the judgments. This investigation will point to some conclusions about the ontological status of "value-properties." More important, these logical and ontological differences necessarily point to differences in the manner in which "cognitive" and "evaluative" experiences disclose their objects. The affective dimension of meaning involved in judgments of value introduces new structures into the objectivity, the normativity, and the "truth" of evaluative experiences and judgments. The affective dimension of experience transforms not only our experience but the ontological possibilities at work in the experienced world.

METZGER, KANT AND THE PERCEPTION OF CAUSALITY

Maurizio Ferraris, Turino, Italy

Allow me to tell you a true story, related to me by Paolo Bozzi.

In 1943-1944, Wolfgang Metzger was serving in the army in Cassino, Italy. One day he went to the toilet in the barracks where his company was quartered, and when he was done he flushed the toilet. At that very moment a grenade hit the barracks, so that Metzger got the impression that by flushing the toilet he had been the cause of the disaster. Metzger saw such causality, just as one sees a chair or a color.

One way to straighten out the whole matter would be to claim that Metzger had been victim of some kind of optical illusion. But if we try to look into it more carefully, we realize that deep in Metzger's toilet lies a radical attack against the last stronghold of Kant's transcendental philosophy namely the fact that there is at least one thing which is not in the world but which is supplied by thought, namely causality.

EINGEBILDETE EMPFINDUNGEN: WITTGENSTEINS ANALYSE EINES PHILOSOPHISCHEN ‚TRIEBES‘

Eugen Fischer, München, Deutschland

Der späte Wittgenstein behandelt philosophische „Probleme, die durch ein Mißdeuten unserer Sprachformen entstehen“ (PU 111), durch Fehlinterpretationen, zu denen wir systematisch getrieben werden von verschiedenen „Trieb[en], das Arbeiten unserer Sprache mißzuverstehen“

(PU 109). Anhand einer Analyse von Wittgensteins Untersuchung des ‚Lesens‘ (PU 156-78) soll dieser Aufsatz erklären, was ein solcher Trieb ist, und wie er den Eindruck von Problemen erzeugen kann, wo keine sind. Diese Erklärung der Entstehung und Natur der von Wittgenstein behandelten (Schein-)Probleme wird die ‚therapeutischen‘ Aspekte seines Ansatzes erhellen, die derzeit im Mittelpunkt der Diskussion stehen (Creary & Read, *The New Wittgenstein*, 2000; Ammereller & Fischer, *Wittgenstein at Work. Method in the „Philosophical Investigations“*, 2004).

ULTIMATE JUSTIFICATION IN HUSSERL AND WITTGENSTEIN

Dagfinn Føllesdal, Oslo, Norway

Husserl is often regarded as a fundamentalist in epistemology, holding that we can obtain a priori, infallible knowledge. Wittgenstein is known for his advocacy of the opposite view, arguing in *Über Gewissheit* and other places that there are no infallible foundations for knowledge. Wittgenstein proposed instead another way of rebutting scepticism.

In this paper it will be argued that Husserl was not a foundationalist in the above sense, but had a view similar to, but also interestingly different from that of Wittgenstein. In Husserl's position, the *Lifeworld* plays a role similar to that of a *form of life* in Wittgenstein. But here, too, there are interesting differences. It will be argued that several of these differences go significantly in Husserl's favor.

IDENTIFYING, DISCRIMINATING OR PICKING OUT AN OBJECT: SOME DISTINCTIONS NEGLECTED IN THE STRAWSONIAN TRADITION

Martin Francisco Fricke, Coyoacán, México

In a strict and philosophically adequate sense of "identification", to identify means to say or realise that two things are *the same*. Several quotes in Strawson's *Individuals* suggest that Strawson wishes to use the strict notion of identification where he explains what is necessary for the understanding of reference. However, it is artificial and implausible to interpret Strawson's notion of speaker-hearer identification in the strict sense. Moreover, there seems to be an incoherence in the fact that a strict identification introduces a new reference which has to be understood in order to understand the identification. Evans does not use the strict notion of identification. This enables him to claim that understanding reference requires identification in the sense of discriminating knowledge. Picking out is generally equated with distinguishing. However, this might be wrong. A picking out constitutes a distinguishing fact; but the picker does not have to be aware of this fact in order to do the picking.

ZEITLICHKEIT UND BEWUSSTSEIN BEI FRANZ BRENTANO

Eduardo Fugali, Graz, Österreich

In diesem Beitrag wird Brentanos Auffassung der Verbindung zwischen Bewusstsein und Zeitlichkeit dargestellt, wie sie sich in der mittleren Phase (ca. 1878-1900) des Denkwegs des Philosophen entwickelt hat. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit wird dem Phänomen der Phantasie bzw. der ursprünglichen Assoziation geschenkt, indem sie die zeitliche Synthese leitet und dadurch das Bewusstsein als inneren Sinn kennzeichnet.

ÜBER DIE PHÄNOMENALITÄT INTENTIONALER ZUSTÄNDE

Martina Fürst, Graz, Österreich

In dem vorliegenden Artikel wird die These vertreten werden, daß ein qualitativer oder phänomenaler Gehalt allen Arten mentaler Zustände zugesprochen werden muß. Meine Analyse wird mit einer kurzen Darstellung dessen beginnen, was ich unter dem Begriff des *qualitativen Gehalts* verstehe, welcher als die Essenz sogenannter phänomenaler Zustände ausgewiesen werden muß. Sobald eine Charakterisierung der Qualia erarbeitet worden ist, wird eine spezifische Form mentaler Zustände – nämlich die intentionalen Zustände – hinsichtlich eines möglichen phänomenalen Aspekts untersucht und für das Vorliegen desselben argumentiert werden. Die Signifikanz phänomenaler Eigenschaften für intentionale Einstellungen wird sowohl aufgrund einer speziellen Form des Inhalts – des *bewußtseinsimmanenten Inhalts* – als auch anhand der Phänomenalität der *Einstellungsmodi* zum Ausdruck kommen.

SHARED VALUES AND SOCIAL UNITY

Margaret Gilbert, Storrs, Connecticut

There is considerable reference to “shared values” in the literature of contemporary political philo. At the same time there has been little esophy as well as in other disciplines and practical contexts exploration of what it is to share values. This paper considers two accounts of sharing values in relation to a thesis that has partisans on both sides – the thesis that sharing values unifies those involved in a substantial, society-constituting way. One of the accounts considered, the simple summative account, is likely to come to mind first. The other is what I call the plural subject account. I argue that those who deny the unifying quality of shared values are right, if they have in mind the simple summative account. Those who accept the unifying quality of shared values are right, if they have in mind the plural subject account.

INTENTIONALITY DENATURALIZED

Edwin Glassner, Durham, North Carolina

In my paper I investigate the ways in which Intentionality can be understood as (1) influenced by a social context and (2) becoming the property of language or collectives. A constructed dialogue between Putnam (“Why Reason

Can't Be Naturalized” 1983) and de Man (*Allegories of Reading* 1979) introduces the problem of methodological solipsism and the related problem of an intentional subject as the origin of utterances. Analyzing the critical tradition which rejects Intentionality as part of the condition of language production, I describe the inverse of the critique of a naturalization of Putnam (Putnam 1983), showing that the problem of collective Intentionality hinges on how strong a notion of individual Intentionality is acceptable, since the strength of this delineation from some social predetermination is central to the problem. Finally, I will try to illuminate that almost any higher-order notion of Intentionality is more problematic than tolerable, since the new “subject” of this sort of Intentionality cannot be specified.

A NATURALIZED APPROACH TO THE TURING TEST: IS DNA COMPUTING A WAY OUT OF THE CHINESE ROOM?

Rodrigo González, Leuven, Belgium

The Turing Test involves an instrumentalist approach to the assessment of intelligence by the emulation of intelligence rather than the verification of its creation. In this respect, Searle's Chinese Room conclusion is that Artificial Intelligence is doomed to failure if it does not replicate the causal properties that engender mental life. I will argue that DNA computing can bridge the gap between simulating and creating mental life, for DNA can be regarded as the encoded program of life able to self-reproduce and from which adaptive and intelligent behavior arises.

DIE ROLLE EINER MULTIPLIKATIVEN WAHRSCHEINLICHKEITSMETHODE (MPE-METHODE) BEI DER GESTALTWAHRNEHMUNG

Rainer Gottlob, Wien, Österreich

Es wurde die Rolle der Multiplikation der Fehlerwahrscheinlichkeiten (MPE-Methode) für die Gestaltwahrnehmung untersucht. Diese Methode ist unbewusst, aber nur größenordnungsmäßig durchführbar. Für die Gestaltwahrnehmungen von Personen und von einer Melodie gelangt man durch die (unbewusste) Multiplikation zu *Sicherheiten für alle praktischen Zwecke*, das sind Fehlerwahrscheinlichkeiten in Größenordnungen zwischen 10^{-10} und 10^{-80} .

EMOTION AS PERCEPTION OF BODILY CHANGES: ARE SOMATIC FEELING THEORIES' EFFORTS IN REUNIFYING THE EMOTION CATEGORY FORLORN HOPE?

Verena Gottschling, Mainz, Germany

My focus is on theories that understand emotion as perception of bodily changes. The question I am concerned with is whether these James-Lange accounts to reunify the emotion category can be successful or not. Paul Griffiths presented a challenging argument that emotions do not form a natural class, because some basic emotions are modular and others have an essentially different structure. For this reason James-Lange accounts cannot be successful. I argue that this argument does not succeed.

THE SELF-PRESENTATIONAL NATURE OF PHENOMENAL INTENTIONALITY

George Graham, Winston-Salem, North Carolina
 Terry Horgan, Tucson, Arizona
 John Tienson, Memphis, Tennessee

The thesis of *phenomenal intentionality* asserts (1) that all mental states, events, and processes that are immediately accessible to the cognitive subject – including occurrent thoughts and desires that are thus accessible – are *phenomenally conscious*, and (2) that virtually all phenomenally conscious mental phenomena – including sensory-experiential phenomena – are *intentional*. We briefly rehearse some considerations that have previously been advanced in support of each component of the phenomenal intentionality thesis, by ourselves and by others. We then consider a potential form of Cartesian skepticism, directed toward one's own immediate beliefs about which mental phenomena one is currently undergoing. Why, we ask, does this form of radical Cartesian skepticism get no grip upon people (Descartes himself included)? The answer we propose is that phenomenal consciousness has a *self-presentational* nature, and thus that a constitutive feature of one's phenomenally intentional mental phenomena is that one is directly acquainted with them in experience. Immediate beliefs about matters of direct experiential acquaintance are not susceptible to radical Cartesian doubt.

ASYMMETRICAL PRACTICAL REASONS

Patricia S. Greenspan, College Park, Maryland

I want to defend a conception of practical reasons that assigns a different force for action to positive and negative reasons, or what I call "qualifying" and "disqualifying" reasons. A positive or "qualifying" reason, understood as a consideration in favor of some option, does not in itself yield a rational requirement, even in the absence of competing reasons. So reasons as such do not compel, rationally speaking. It is only a serious negative or "disqualifying" reason, as a reason against some option, that it would be irrational to acknowledge as undefeated and yet make no attempt to act on. The positive/negative asymmetry can be explained by a picture of practical reasons as primarily serving to offer or answer criticism of action. I

the present paper I shall attempt to answer objections to this critical conception of practical reasons that charge it with misrepresenting the phenomenology of ordinary rational choice.

MEANING WITHOUT INTENTION

Hajo Greif, Graz, Austria

According to the programme of teleosemantics, all intentional phenomena are to be subject to a naturalistic explanation in terms of an evolutionary history. A certain version of that programme is defended in the light of a non-deterministic reading of evolution. The thesis is that, firstly, the intentionality – as the meaning – of linguistic forms is not determined by the intentionality – as purposiveness – of the speakers' minds; speakers' intentions are one among other environmental conditions for the selection of the functions of linguistic forms. Secondly it is argued that the functions of mental representations and language in general, albeit historically and environmentally correlated, are subject to different regimes of selection, thus to be accounted for each in their own right.

WITTGENSTEIN ON MUSICAL EXPERIENCE AND KNOWLEDGE

Eran Guter, Haifa, Israel

Wittgenstein's thinking on music is intimately linked to core issues in his work on the philosophy of psychology. I argue that inasmuch musical experience exemplifies the kind of grammatical complexity that is indigenous to aspect perception and, in general, to concepts that are based on physiognomy, it is rendered by Wittgenstein as a form of knowledge, namely, knowledge of mankind.

CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE CONCEPT OF NEGATION IN HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY

Leila Haaparanta, Tampere, Finland

In the analytic tradition, logic has been both a central field of research and a source of tools for philosophical practice. Phenomenologists have usually had a reserved attitude towards using logical tools in philosophy. The present paper pays attention to some of the roles that logic played in early phenomenology. It takes a closer look at the phenomenological roots of intuitionistic logic and studies Husserl's way of seeking the origin of negation in consciousness. Some remarks are made on the relations between Husserl's phenomenological analysis and Kant's transcendental logic. It is concluded that there is no clear answer to the question of whether Husserl wished to revise logic in such a way that it would attend to his transcendental excavations. Still, it seems that analysing consciousness by means of a formal system that has cut off its ties to consciousness would not fulfil the requirements that a phenomenologist sets to philosophy.

HINGES AND FRAMES: WITTGENSTEIN'S SURROGATES FOR MODALITY

Rom Harré, Washington DC

Wittgenstein's metaphors of 'hinge' and 'frame' base modality on the concept of 'rule'. However, this concept covers both instructions and verbal formulations of nonverbal constraints. Neither hinges nor frames can be wholly propositional.

KRIPKE'S FINITENESS OBJECTION TO DISPOSITIONALIST THEORIES OF MEANING

Jussi Haukioja, Turku, Finland

It is often thought that Blackburn and Boghossian have provided an effective reply to the finiteness objection to dispositional theories of meaning, presented by Kripke's Wittgenstein. In this paper I distinguish two possible readings of the sceptical demand for meaning-constitutive facts. The demand can be formulated in one of two ways: an A-question or a B-question. Any theory of meaning will give one of these explanatory priority over the other. I will then argue that the standard reply only works if B-questions are seen as prior, while the dominant dispositionalist theories of meaning see A-questions as prior.

ONE DOGMA OF EMPIRICISM

Claire Ortiz Hill, Paris, France

Willard Van Orman Quine's famous criticisms of the analytic-synthetic distinction are studied in connection with Edmund Husserl's criticisms of the same and his theories about axiomatization, the foundations of arithmetic, sets, and manifolds. Reference is made to Bernard Bolzano, Karl Weierstrass, Franz Brentano, Gottlob Frege, and David Hilbert.

DID WITTGENSTEIN FOLLOW THE RULES? (OR WAS HE GUIDED BY THEM?)

Jaakko Hintikka, Boston, Massachusetts

In *The Blue Book* Wittgenstein recognized two possible accounts of what it means to follow a rule: (1) acting in accordance with it; (2) the rule's playing a part in my activity of following it. Wittgenstein initially rejected (1) because it seems to provide only a causal account of rule-learning and rule-following. He opted for (2), which posed a problem because he had given up his earlier belief in the direct accessibility of rules in experience. Hence Wittgenstein's problem was not an epistemological problem of how to follow a rule, but the question as to how a rule as an external object can guide my actions. This is essentially the same as to how the blueprint of a machine determines its movements. Wittgenstein never solved his problem, and reverted back to the account (1).

ARE THERE CHARACTERISTICS AND THINGS?

Herbert Hochberg, Austin, Texas

In a once celebrated controversy, Moore and Stout both took for granted (1) that there were things and their characteristics, and (2) the latter were "predicables," the former not. The debate concerned whether characteristics were *universals* or what are now commonly called "tropes." Taking characteristics to be tropes is a "moderate" form of nominalism, by contrast with the extreme nominalism, going back to a view attributed to Rocelinus and promulgated by Quine and his progeny, that takes predicates to replace properties and thereby denies that there are characteristics, whether universal or particular. F. MacBride has recently exhumed a further twist in the dialectic – Ramsey's argument in "Universals" challenging the distinction between what is predicable and what is not – while Armstrong has contributed a purportedly new analysis of predication. Ramsey's challenge, MacBride's arguments and Armstrong's proposal are analyzed. All are found wanting. The discussion suggests a way to give our experience – of objects, characteristics, relations and facts – its due.

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ROLE OF CONSCIOUSNESS FOR INTROSPECTIVE SELF-KNOWLEDGE

Frank Hofmann, Tübingen, Germany

Recently, some philosophers have claimed that consciousness has an important epistemological role to play in the introspective self-ascription of one's own mental states. This is the thesis of the epistemological role of consciousness for introspective self-knowledge. I will criticize BonJour's account of the role of consciousness for introspection. He does not provide any reason for believing that conscious states are epistemically better off than non-conscious states. Then I will sketch a representationalist account of how the thesis could be true. Conscious states are available to the subject in a very special way in which non-conscious states are not available. This is the first part of the explanation. The crucial further element in the representationalist account is what I would like to call the 'introspective mode of mind'. A mind can operate in certain ways or modes – modes of mind. Introspection normally takes place in the introspective mode of mind, judgments about one's environment in the mode of 'taking one's appearances at face value'. And there probably are other modes of mind. The introspective mode of mind is characterized by the special way or framework in which cognitive capacities are employed.

EMOTIONALE AKTE UND MORALISCHE WERTE

Rafael Hüntelmann,

Heusenstamm bei Frankfurt am Main, Deutschland

In dem Vortrag soll aufgewiesen werden, daß moralische Werte objektiv sind, daß sie zum Bestand unserer realen Welt gehören wie Handlungen. Moralische Werte sind aber nicht wahrnehmbar. Bei Ihrer Erkenntnis spielen emotionale Akte eine besondere Rolle. Die Nichtwahrnehmbarkeit moralischer Qualitäten spricht aber nicht gegen deren Objektivität. Damit wird dem Non-Kognitivismen insofern Recht gegeben, als er die Auffassung vertritt, daß moralische Qualitäten nicht wahrnehmbar sind, es wird ihm aber widersprochen, sofern er die Auffassung verteidigt, daß moralische Eigenschaften überhaupt nicht erkennbar sind. Ein emotionaler Akt hat einen Gegenstand, der ebenso wenig subjektiv ist wie der Gegenstand eines Wahrnehmungsaktes, bzw. der keine bloß mentale Entität ist. Wahrnehmungsakte können emotionale Akte verursachen, die angemessen oder unangemessen sein können. Allein Akte des Glaubens erkennen aber moralische Tatsachen.

DIE AUTOBIOGRAPHISCHEN BEMERKUNGEN VON LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN: ZWISCHEN REPRÄSENTATION UND KONSTRUKTION. KULTURWISSENSCHAFTLICHE BETRACHTUNGEN ZUM (AUTO-) BIOGRAPHISCHEN SCHREIBEN.

Nicole L. Immler, Graz, Österreich

Bereits in den 1950er Jahren war seine Biographie „Legende“ (Ingeborg Bachmann), und spätestens nach den Jubiläen, hundertster Geburtstag (1989) und 50-jähriger Todestag (2001), wurde das Bedürfnis laut, den Mythos Ludwig Wittgenstein entkräften zu wollen. Dazu sei aber „weder eine Sammlung von Erinnerungsstücken, noch ein biographisches Unternehmen im vertrauten Sinne (erlaubt), wo nach der Illusion der ‚Einheit von Werk und Leben‘ gefahndet wird“, sondern vor allem *Beteiligte*, der Protagonist selbst, wie Zeitzeugen heranzuziehen. Kann dieser Ruf nach den sogenannten Primärquellen helfen, gewissen Stilisierungen der Biographen auf die Spur zu kommen bzw. den ‚wahren‘ Wittgenstein zu entdecken? In diesem Diskussionskontext sind Wittgensteins autobiographische Bemerkungen in Bezug auf *Selbstwahrnehmung* und *Selbstdarstellung* interessant.

WHAT ARE PROPER NAMES FOR?

Frank Jackson, Canberra, Australia

Critics of the description theory of reference for proper names often say that we can refer using a proper name N when we do not know descriptions that serve to pick out what N refers to. Supporters of the description theory point out that this isn't correct. What is correct is that certain candidates to be the identifying descriptions do not fill the bill. Critics then reply that the sense in which this is true doesn't really blunt the substance of their criticism.

We are all familiar with this to-ing and fro-ing. I will revisit the debate from the perspective of an enquiry into why we have proper names in natural languages in the first place. I will use this enquiry to motivate a style of description theory that meets some recent objections made by its critics including some by Scott Soames.

WHO HAS GOT OUR GROUP-INTENTIONS?

Ludger Jansen, Bonn, Germany

There are group-actions, and if actions are intentional, there should also be group-intentions. Who has got these intentions? The groups? This seems to be the natural answer. But then: Groups do not have a mind or brain of their own to form any mental attitude. Different kinds of individualistic analyses of group-intentions have been suggested in the literature. On the one hand there are suggestions to reduce group intentions to a complex of different I-attitudes. John Searle, on the other hand, suggests a special social kind of attitudes, namely we-intentions. We-intentions are being had by individual persons, though they have the form "We intend to do such-and-such". However, because of the fallibility of Searlian we-intentions and the possibility of ignorance this concept is of no help: We-intentions are neither necessary nor sufficient for group-intentions. In this respect, Margaret Gilbert's approach is much more successful, though it covers only a special case, namely small-scale informal groups. I suggest a generalised solution in order to cover also large-scale and formal groups.

TRUTHMAKING: A COGNITION-INDEPENDENT INTERNAL RELATION WITH HETEROGENEOUS RELATA

Ingvar Johansson, Saarbrücken, Germany

For many assertions, the correspondence theory of truth seems intuitively to give the best account of the difference between truth and falsity, but one of its problems is how to explicate the notions of "correspondence" and "truthmaking". In conformity with the view of David Armstrong, it is claimed that truthmaking is an internal relation between a truthmaker and a truth(-value-)bearer. The truthbearer (a token proposition) can exist without the truthmaker (an object or a state of affairs), and vice versa, but when both exist the truthmaker necessarily makes the truthbearer true and correspondence obtains. Contrary to Armstrong's reductionist analyses of internal relations and propositions, however, it is argued that internal relations can have a mind-independent existence and "add to being", that truthbearers and truthmakers are categorially different, and that the correspondence theory of truth requires a distinction between internal relations with heterogeneous and homogeneous relata, respectively.

TOWARD A SYNTHESIS: MUNSON AND THE PROBLEM OF “WITTGENSTEIN’S PHENOMENOLOGY”

Matthew P. Johnson, Millersville, Pennsylvania

In 1962, frustrated with the rancor that marked the debate between continental and analytic philosophy, Thomas Munson offered the then-radical theory that the Wittgenstein of the *Philosophical Investigations* was practicing a type of phenomenology. The problem, however, is that his account of Wittgenstein’s phenomenology is vague, provides inadequate support, and fails to make relevant comparisons to continental literature. This paper intends to provide Munson with adequate support for his claim vis-à-vis a comparison of the methods of Wittgenstein and Heidegger, as well as proposes an explanation for why Munson failed to do so.

KÖNNEN SICH DINGE ÄNDERN?

Christian Kanzian, Innsbruck, Österreich

Im Alltag scheint es uns klar zu sein, dass Dinge, Lebewesen und menschliche Personen eingeschlossen, *dieselben* bleiben, obwohl sie sich *ändern*. M.E. gehört es sogar zum Kern unseres Selbstverständnisses, dass dem so ist. Wir ändern uns. Wir bleiben dennoch dieselben. Warum soll es schwierig sein, das zu verstehen? – Diese Frage können wir u.a. beantworten, wenn wir uns auf Leibniz’ Gesetz berufen, demzufolge Dinge genau dann identisch sind, wenn sie in *allen* Eigenschaften übereinstimmen: Ändert sich ein Ding, stimmt es, vor der Änderung, nicht mit ihm, nach der Änderung, in allen Eigenschaften überein. Also scheint es nach Leibniz’ Gesetz auch nicht *dasselbe* bleiben zu können. Wie, so lässt sich unser Problem formulieren, soll Leibniz’ Gesetz mit dem Phänomen der Änderung und der Annahme diachroner Identität zusammengehen?

In meinem Beitrag möchte ich einen neuen Lösungsansatz vorstellen, die diachrone Identität von Dingen sowie deren Änderung zu verstehen, ohne Leibniz’ Prinzip aufgeben zu müssen. (Und ohne die von Lewis und Simons aufgewiesenen Probleme der zeitlich relativierten Prädikation von Eigenschaften aus den Augen zu verlieren.)

DER INHALT INNERER REPRÄSENTATIONEN IM LICHT VON PEIRCES ZEICHENBEGRIFF

Stefan Kappner, Idstein, Deutschland

Teleosemantic theories are based on the idea that the normative notion of *content* can be explained with the equally normative notion of a biological *proper function*, applied to (internal) *representations*. But the problem of how to determine the specific content of a given biological representation remains unresolved. According to Peirce’s semiotics, the determination of content must proceed from the (proper) *interpretation* of a given sign, not from its (proper) effects. In order to speak of biological representations it is therefore necessary to use an extremely broad notion of interpretation or *semiosis*. This approach yields two results: First, that the indeterminism problem can be solved. Second, that it is doubtful that we can meaningfully

speak of “internal representations” while using “internal” in a strictly biological sense.

EXPRESSIVISM, NORMATIVITY, AND MEANING

Antti Kauppinen, Helsinki, Finland

Expressivism is the view that in spite of appearances, evaluative and normative judgments are not factual but rather express attitudes toward non-normative facts. In this paper, it is argued that expressivism and other forms of non- or quasi-factualism cannot coherently be generalized to cover all areas of normative discourse. This is because non-factualism about one kind of normative talk, meaning-talk, would efface the distinction between factual and non-factual discourse in general, as Crispin Wright has argued, and so undermine expressivism as a position distinct from realism. Wittgensteinian considerations are invoked to show why an objection to Wright by Simon Blackburn fails. This means that it has to be possible to account for at least one kind of normative discourse, meaning-talk, in factual terms. Since explaining normativity as such does not require adopting expressivism, doubt is cast on the need for more local forms of it, such as moral expressivism.

MUSIK-PHÄNOMENOLOGIE: ZUR WAHRNEHMUNG VON EMOTION UND BEDEUTUNG KULTURELLER GEGENSTÄNDE

Annekatri Kessler, Graz, Österreich

In diesem Paper soll versucht werden, Implikationen der Husserl’schen Phänomenologie, insbesondere seiner Konzeptionen der *Person* und der *geistigen Welt* (*Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie...*), auf die Musikpsychologie herauszustellen.

MusikpsychologInnen machen – vor allem im Bereich der Erforschung von Emotion und Bedeutung in der Musik – den Fehler, Methode, Begriffsdefinition/Gegenstandsbereich und Interpretation der Ergebnisse nicht aufeinander abzustimmen. So kommt es in diesem Forschungsgebiet zu Kategorienfehlern, die es erforderlich machen, die traditionellen – insbesondere naturwissenschaftlichen aber auch geisteswissenschaftlichen – Methoden der Musikpsychologie und deren Anwendungsgebiete neu zu überdenken. Eine solchermaßen kritische Positionierung gegenüber der traditionellen Musikpsychologie muss sich vor allem die Frage stellen, inwieweit ästhetische Erfahrungen objektivierbar sind. Des weiteren soll die Bedeutung der intersubjektiven und subjektiven Erfahrungswelt für die ästhetische Erfahrung herausgestrichen werden.

Husserls Ausweisung der verschiedenen Seiten des Subjekts – *Körper, Leib, Geist/Person* – bietet nicht nur die Möglichkeit, die ästhetische Erfahrung zu beschreiben, sondern beinhaltet auch ein wissenschaftskritisches Potential. Letzteres findet zwar Umsetzung im Bereich der Kultur-Psychologie (Allesch, ed. *Perspektiven der Kulturpsychologie*, 1990) oder der Musiktherapie (Decker-Voigt, *Aus der Seele gespielt. Eine Einführung in Musiktherapie* 2000), nicht aber innerhalb der Musikpsychologie.

A DRETSKEAN PREDICAMENT OF INTENTIONALITY

Youngjin Kiem, Buffalo, New York

In opposition to the Brentanian perspective on the intentionality of the mind, Fred Dretske proposes that there are different levels of intentionality, and that even a simple physical system could have a certain degree of intentionality. At least in part he succeeds in separating the notion of the mark of the mental from the traditional idea of intentionality. When it comes to the proper role and function of high-level intentionality, however, the idea of intentionality as the mark of the mental seems to reappear. I call this a Dretskean predicament of intentionality. I argue that one way to overcome the difficulty is to avoid defining intentionality in terms of intentionality.

WITTGENSTEINS THERAPEUTISCHE BEHANDLUNG VON BEDEUTUNGSTHEORIEN

Michael Kohler, Frankfurt am Main, Deutschland

Wittgensteins Vergleich seiner Methode mit einer Therapie wird oft so aufgefaßt, daß er weder in seiner Sprachphilosophie noch anderswo philosophische Aussagen um ihrer selbst willen verfochten hat, sondern lediglich, um uns die Inhaltslosigkeit philosophischer Ausdrucksformen zu demonstrieren und uns so von unserem Bedürfnis nach Philosophie zu heilen. Ich möchte in diesem Papier die alternative These vertreten, daß Wittgensteins Therapie darauf abzielt, uns zu zeigen, wie wir eine bestimmte Form von Bedeutungstheorie akzeptieren können, wenn wir uns von falschen Erwartungen frei machen. Dazu werde ich auf Wittgensteins Vergleich der Sprache mit einer Technik eingehen und zwei Konzeptionen normengesteuerten Verhaltens unterscheiden, in deren Konfusion eine der Ursachen unserer verzerrten Selbstwahrnehmung liegt, die Wittgenstein diagnostiziert.

ON SOME METAPHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF QUINEAN NATURALISM

Heikki J. Koskinen, Helsinki, Finland

The nature and role of philosophy in relation to science is problematic, especially within the analytic tradition. This paper tries to find a place for the discipline by charting certain metaphilosophical implications of Quine's position. It is argued that Quinean naturalism results in a metaphysical turn which enables philosophy to study general ontological issues that do not belong to the sphere of any of the special sciences.

SUBJECTIVIST VS. OBJECTIVIST THEORIES OF GOODNESS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A COMBINED STRATEGY

Michael Kühler, Erlangen – Nürnberg, Germany

One might say that a conflict between subjectivist and objectivist theories lies at the core of the debate about understanding goodness. So the first question is what

exactly is meant by a subjectivist and an objectivist account of goodness. After that, the question arises which side should be favoured, given their respective arguments. However, if both sides are compelling in some ways and show weaknesses in some others, a combined strategy, if possible, seems to be attractive.

In my paper I will mention some main features of both subjectivist and objectivist theories first and then point out that neither a subjectivist nor an objectivist theory can be spelled out without implicitly leading to positions of the other. At this point, a quick look at some useful distinctions in goodness can help to clarify the debate and to sketch the possibility of a combined and thus more convincing strategy.

LIMITS AND POTENTIAL OF POLITICAL CONTRACTARIANISM

Jörg Kühnelt, Konstanz, Germany

Many modern societies justify their political norms by referring to a consensus of values that does not necessarily exist in plural states. Therefore it should be examined, whether the means of analytical philosophy are systematically able to justify legal coercive power in such a context. Contractarianism appears to be interesting, because it legitimizes norms without recourse to a contentious moral base. These norms are legitimate if it can be shown that they increase the utility of *each* participating individual. In the first section this argument is introduced briefly and it is shown why it is systematically limited to a narrow cooperation enabling less than the status quo of many states. In the following section an idea is presented facilitating further gains of cooperation within a framework of so called metanorms. The final part of this paper briefly discusses the structure and function of these metanorms.

ANALYTICITY AND LOGICAL TRUTH: FROM BOLZANO TO QUINE

Wolfgang Kühne, Hamburg, Germany

'In Kant's Critique of Pure Reason I was at once attracted by the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements, although I could never put up with Kant's explanation of that distinction.' Thus Bernard Bolzano who gave his own explanation of analyticity in general and of logico-analytic truth in particular in 1837. When Quine recapitulated in the mid-fifties his 1936 demarcation of logical truth, he added an acknowledgement: 'Substantially this formulation is traced back, by Bar-Hillel, to Bolzano.' I shall try to determine the exact relation between Quine's and Bolzano's accounts and to evaluate their respective (de)merits.

In the course of this, I shall examine Bolzano's assessments of Locke and Kant and have a glance at Frege's and the Logical Positivists' readings of 'analytic'. In the end we shall see that the struggle with the notion of logical truth gives us some incentive for being friendly to 'Sätze an sich' alias propositions.

HORWICH AND THE GENERALIZATION PROBLEM

Klaus Ladstätter, Albany, New York

In order to be complete, Horwich's minimalist theory must be able to deal with generalizations about truth. A logical and an epistemic-explanatory level of the generalization problem are distinguished, and Horwich's responses to both sides of the problem are examined. Finally some persistent problems for minimalism are pointed out.

UNDERSTANDING LINGUISTIC SIGNS. A NOTE ON HUSSERL AND FREGE

Sandra Lapointe, Montréal, Canada

Analogies between Frege's and Husserl's respective theories of meanings are well known, but comparisons are often unfair to Husserl's philosophy of language. I am here interested not in what these two philosophers have to say about meaning *per se*, but about what they say about signs, the way in which they can be said to *signify*, as well as in their conceptions of the conditions under which linguistic signs can be identified and understood. In particular, I show how Husserl's theory may help us understand a set of idiosyncratic remarks Frege makes in the *Grundgesetze* which vouches for an interpretation of his philosophy of language which is both more plausible and epistemologically more acceptable than the standard interpretation will allow.

DETERMINISM, RANDOMNESS AND DESERT-VALUE

Noa Latham, Calgary, Canada

This paper offers a thought experiment to show that values embodied in what I call desert principles should be abandoned if one believes either in determinism or in probabilistic indeterminism. Desert principles are those entailing that the intrinsic goodness of a person's receiving pleasure or pain depends on the virtue or vice of the person. I also offer two reasons for preferring to examine the relation between values and determinism directly rather than doing so in terms of free will or moral responsibility.

INSTINCTS AND CONSCIOUSNESS IN REID

Marion Ledwig, Santa Cruz, California

I relate Reid to Tinbergen's *The Study of Instinct*. Taking Freud as a starting point, I consider the question whether instincts are conscious in Reid.

EXPERIENCE AND ANALYSIS OF A WORK OF ART

Keith Lehrer, Tucson, Arizona

Arnold Isenberg, in an article of remarkable longevity, "Critical Communication", claimed that the discursive analysis of a work of art required the experience of the work of art to fill in the meaning of the critical description. Other aestheticians have proposed that there is something ineffable about the content of a work of art which one can only understand in the particular experience of the work of art. These reflections, if they contain an insight, leave us with something of a paradox. How can the content of the work, or even what the work of art is like, be both particular to experience, in some way ineffable, and the subject of critical discourse? How can the content, or what the work of art is like, be at the same time general enough to be part of the meaning of critical discourse and at the same time be particular and unique to the experience of the work? The problem intensifies when one attempts to understand the relationship between the experience of art and the theory of art. I argue that the solution to the problem is contained in an understanding of how the particular exemplar becomes representational in a process I have called "exemplarization" which makes the particular part and parcel of the content of the work or what it is like.

SCIENCE AND VALUE-JUDGEMENTS

Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik, Lublin, Poland

The paper defends the claim that value-judgements are essential for science. They cannot be restricted to purely epistemic ones, if we take seriously both everyday scientific practice and the nature of our language. For moral and methodological values are entangled, as much as are facts and values. I attempt to demonstrate this by considering cases of scientific practice where moral considerations are necessary for (a) formulating a scientific problem and evaluating a solution; (b) choosing a research method; (c) accepting a hypothesis; (d) evaluating the correctness of fact description and explanation; (e) justifying a hypothesis. Admitting the presence of moral values in science does not threaten the objectivity of science but forces us to rethink our post-Humean understanding of values and value-judgements.

EXPERIENCING THE MEANING OF A WORD

Dorit Lemberger, Ramat-Gan, Israel

In the second part of his book, *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein integrates a number of extraordinary terms: "aspect perception", "aspect blindness" and "word significance experience". These terms are extraordinary since they incorporate a type of judgment that can be applied upon a person's ability to comprehend a word's meaning. The use of these terms is strange since Wittgenstein declaratively avoids using any judgment and focuses on describing examples as a guiding methodology.

Even for the process of defining these terms he uses examples, however, this is done by integrating terms from various fields that express the idea of body and soul unification. This very unification is what enables Wittgenstein's methods break the boundaries of analytical philosophy in order to research additional fields in which body and soul are integrated as well as in fields in which visual and verbal aspects are integrated such as: literature, art and psychology.

INTRINSIC VALUE AND THE NOTION OF A LIFE

Jerrold Levinson, College Park, Maryland

In this paper I explore the concept of intrinsic value, but from a particular angle. I am interested in the general shape or form of sustainable judgments of intrinsic value. My main suggestion is that the notion of a life provides the key to what that shape or form is. I claim, in particular, that such judgments must have as subject *that a sentient life is a certain way*. This life-based conception of intrinsic value is contrasted throughout with object-based and experience-based conceptions. At the end of the paper I offer some reflections on whether aesthetic value is intrinsic, and on the idea of value in general.

INTERNALIST REPRESENTATIONALISM AND THE VEIL OF PERCEPTION

Caleb Liang, Taipei, Taiwan

Shoemaker has recently proposed a version of internalist representationalism that aims to reconcile the possibility of inverted spectrum with the transparency of experience and to give an essential role to qualia in experience. This view is criticized by Michael Tye, and defended by Kriegel and by Shoemaker himself. In this paper, I investigate this debate and contend that neither Kriegel's nor Shoemaker's defenses are satisfactory.

DIE BEDEUTUNG DES SPRACHSPIELS FÜR EINE NEUFASSUNG BIBLISCHER THEOLOGIE: DIE SPRACHSPIELE JESU

Markus Locker, Manila, Philippinen

Obwohl die sprachphilosophischen Konsequenzen von Wittgensteins zentralem Begriff seiner Spätphilosophie, dem *Sprachspiel*, weitreichende Folgen für die allgemeine Theologie hatten, blieb jene theologische Disziplin, die sich letztlich mit Sprache befasst, die Exegese und die dazugehörige biblische Theologie, davon fast unberührt. Dieser Aufsatz zeigt, dass ein Versuch, biblische Sprache im Sinne eines Sprachspiels zu beschreiben, nicht nur neue Einsichten in die Bedeutung biblischer Texte bringt, sondern auch der bestehenden Crux dieses Faches, der Distanz zwischen Auslegung und Anwendung von Texten, entgegenwirkt. Somit können die dem Sprachspiel zugehörigen Begriffe wie *Lebensform* und *Grammatik* zu zentralen Bausteinen einer fundamentalen Neuformulierung der biblischen Theologie werden.

"ESPERANTO. THE FEELING OF DISGUST": WITTGENSTEIN ON PLANNED LANGUAGES

Winfried Löffler, Innsbruck, Austria

Wittgenstein's radical aversion against planned languages like Esperanto and Basic English has found little attention so far. But maybe the phenomenon deserves more interest, since it may give a clue to another point of continuity between his early and later philosophy. After some information on planned languages, I will put together the directly relevant texts. An analysis shows that Wittgenstein's statements on planned languages were based on superficial knowledge only, and that they were rather misguided from an interlinguistic point of view.

WOULD WITTGENSTEIN APPROVE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN INVENTED AND NATURAL LANGUAGE-GAMES?

Lin Ma, Leuven, Belgium

The standard reading of the *Philosophical Investigations* as represented by Baker & Hacker's work makes a distinction between invented and natural language-games. According to this reading, the invented language-games are considered as genuine ones which consist in imaginary language-involving activities designed for the purpose of illuminating particular philosophical confusions. Natural language-games result from applying this "language-game method" to parts of our actual linguistic practices. In this paper I undertake to show that both naturalness and inventedness belong together as two inseparable elements inherent in the very conception of language-games. It goes against Wittgenstein's intention to set apart these two integrally united factors and projects them out as different types. The misleading distinction between invented and natural language-games constitutes one of the sources for an opposition between a conceptualistic construal and a sociological interpretation concerning the more general orientation of Wittgenstein's thought.

MEINONGS FRÜHE WAHRNEHMUNGSLEHRE

Marina Manotta, Bologna, Italien

Vor dem Aufbau der Gegenstandstheorie ist Meinongs Wahrnehmungslehre durch zwei Spannungen gekennzeichnet: (1) die zwischen Rezeptivität und Produktivität und (2) die zwischen elementaren und komplexen Bewusstseinsinhalten. Seit 1891 schließt die Wahrnehmungslehre in ihrem Bereich auch die Gestaltqualitäten (in Meinongs Terminologie: die fundierten Inhalte) ein und wendet sich beträchtlich von der klassischen Psychologie des 19. Jahrhunderts ab. Ziel des Aufsatzes ist es, die oben erwähnte Spannung darzulegen und einige der Schwierigkeiten zu beschreiben, die die Einführung von Gestaltqualitäten mit sich bringt.

VALUES AND VALUE-JUDGMENTS

Johann Christian Marek, Graz, Austria

In the paper I argue against the thesis of the existence of objective values and try to defend the subjectivity of values in an important sense, namely as a kind of intersubjectivity. Despite its linguistic form a value-judgment rather expresses a value-attitude (evaluation, appraisal) than it describes things as having special objective value properties. It is the movement of the mind that determines the constellation of the values, and not the other way around, where there would be objective, absolute, impersonal values governing our mind.

Values are mental facts; they are mainly constituted and maintained by our evaluations (value attitudes) and, behind them, by our value feelings. Evaluations are a special kind of mental activity, such as assuming, judging, wishing and feeling are. Since subjects usually belong to groups, values generally are social facts, and value attitudes have a collective character (we-intentionality). The linguistic expressions of evaluations are value-judgments (which have to be distinguished from statements about values and value-attitudes, i.e. descriptions and explanations of values). Essential to an evaluation is its normative, emotional-volitive aspect, but value-attitudes always contain cognitive components as well.

This approach will be confronted with a view according to which a value feeling has the function of presenting values in an objective sense, just as our senses present sensory properties like color and taste. Meinong, for example, takes value properties analogously to secondary properties, and, moreover, interprets them as complex qualities similar to "Gestalt"-qualities which involve sense qualities as their foundation. This assimilation to our Gestalt perception has its plausibility, but it seems not to do justice to the phenomenologically normative and demanding character of value judgments.

ON THE REDUCIBILITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND INTENTIONALITY

Ausonio Marras, London, Canada

It has widely been claimed that the reduction of phenomenal consciousness is confronted by an "explanatory gap" not confronted by other kinds of theoretical reductions in science, or even by the reduction of intentional properties. This claim presupposes a "functional" model of reduction requiring an *a priori* entailment from the facts in the reduction base to the facts to be explained – a requirement that the reduction of consciousness is in principle unable to satisfy. I argue that the requirement in question is one that *no* reduction in science should be expected to satisfy, and that the question of the reducibility of either phenomenal or intentional properties is, like any other case of reduction in science, a thoroughly empirical question, not one to be settled on conceptual grounds alone.

HUMAN SOUL, HUMAN BODY AND HUMAN BEING

Asha Maudgil, Chandigarh, India

After 1930, Wittgenstein started questioning his earlier views. Attack on the Cartesian subject for some years became his obsession. The Cartesian subject is undoubtedly to be rejected, but it has to be rejected with due respect. The human body seems to have obtained a greater significance in Wittgenstein's later life. By saying that the human body is the best picture of the human soul Wittgenstein's view on the relation between the human soul and the human body comes very close to the view of Aristotle. Wittgenstein's metaphor of the body as the best picture of the soul can easily be substituted for Aristotle's metaphor of the body as the dress of the soul. The concept of thinking is tied to language. According to Wittgenstein, it is only in the primary sense thoughts and experiences can be ascribed only to human beings. It is only in the secondary derivative sense that animals have thoughts and experiences.

**„NICHT ALLES, WAS HUND GENANNT
WIRD, MACHT WAU-WAU“ –
ERFAHRUNG UND ANALYSE ALS
GRUNDLEGENDE KOMPONENTEN DES
FREMDSPRACHENUNTERRICHTS**

Annelore Mayer, Wien, Österreich

Am Beispiel einer typischen Situation im Fremdsprachenunterricht soll gezeigt werden, wie die zu lernenden Wörter im Kontext ihre Bedeutung und ihren Gebrauchswert erhalten.

Es wird davon ausgegangen, dass jede Sprache ein eigener „Fluss des Lebens“ ist, wo jedes Wort seine eigene konkrete und symbolische Bedeutung hat und dadurch nicht ohne Verlust in eine andere Sprache übergeführt werden kann.

Eine analytische Untersuchung des Gebrauchs der Wörter in der Muttersprache und der Lernsprache soll es ermöglichen, deren Erfahrungswert für das Erlernen einer anderen Sprache nutzbar zu machen.

Analyse und Erfahrung können so zu wechselseitigen Bedingungen im Unterrichtsgeschehen werden. Sie ermöglichen einen individuellen Direktzugang zur Lernsprache, weil die Erfahrungen aus der Muttersprache überlegt in den Lernprozess eingebaut werden können. Durch die Konfrontation mit den Inhalten und Wertigkeiten der Lernsprache im Vergleich mit der Muttersprache wird auch ein reflektierender Umgang mit den Erfahrungen aus der eigenen Sprache provoziert. So entsteht ein individuelles Bewusstsein für beide Sprachen, die den Lerner vor falschen Analogien und dem inadäquaten Umgang mit den Symbolgehalten der Lernsprache bewahren können.

**QUESTIONING THE ADEQUACY OF
ORDINARY LANGUAGE:
A GLIMPSE AT WITTGENSTEIN, RICOEUR
AND CREATIVE METAPHOR**

Ryan Mays, Lexington, Kentucky

The later Wittgenstein attempts to dispel the difficulties inherited from critiquing the language of everyday against the standard of the logically ideal by getting us to see the adequacy of ordinary language. Yet, some, such as Paul Ricoeur, have objected that in so doing Wittgenstein confines meaning to the success of using words already in a language game and thus ignores the poetic side of language which is capable of producing new meaning which was not formerly a part of the language game. What can Wittgenstein offer the poet who is restless within ordinary language and hopeful to create meaning through the intersection of different language games? Does Wittgenstein's brand of 'ordinary language philosophy', meant as a cure for Russell's and his own early logical atomism, too hastily overlook the creative power of poetic language in its drive to bring ideal logical theories of meaning to their knees?

**AN APPROPRIATION, INSPIRED BY THE
EARLY WITTGENSTEIN, OF EARLY
DERRIDA ON ARISTOTLE ON TIME**

Denis McManus, Southampton, Great Britain

This essay identifies two strands in Derrida's early deconstructive reading of Aristotle on time. The first – the 'deep' strand – is that our philosophical thinking presupposes hitherto unrecognized structures to which that thinking is committed but with which it cannot contend. The second – the 'shallow' strand, which echoes an understanding of philosophy that is presented most vividly in the early Wittgenstein – is that our philosophical thinking is given illusory substance by confusions that arise out of superficial grammatical similarities. Though my suspicion is that both strands are essential to a full appreciation of Derrida's thinking, my paper suggests a way of appreciating some of his readings of philosophical texts – through their shallow strand – which does not commit us to the reality of the problematic structures to which – through their deep strand – those readings appear to lead us.

**DER TOTALE SKEPTIZISMUS:
EINE KONSEQUENTE AUSWEITUNG DES
AUßENWELTSKEPTIZISMUS**

Guido Melchior, Graz, Österreich

Ich werde folgendes zeigen: Wenn man von ganz grundlegenden erkenntnistheoretischen Thesen über die Rechtfertigung und das Zutreffen von Annahmen ausgeht und diese Thesen konsequent auf alle Annahmen, insbesondere auch auf Annahmen über Rechtfertigung selbst anwendet, dann führt dies unmittelbar zu einem totalen Skeptizismus, dem zufolge es für jede Annahme gleichermaßen möglich ist, daß sie zutrifft bzw. gerechtfertigt ist.

**INTRINSIC VALUES AND
HUMAN EVALUATION**

Kirsten Meyer, Regensburg, Germany

In some areas of applied ethics or political philosophy, one is confronted with disputes about "intrinsic values". In political philosophy some argue against others that equality is no intrinsic value. In environmental ethics many philosophers claim that nature has an intrinsic value and should thus be preserved. As the term "intrinsic value" is not common in ordinary language, one might wonder what this talk is all about. Many philosophers use the concept of intrinsic value without explaining it. Others do explain it, but their explanations are often rather confusing. The following remarks show how the concept of intrinsic value is employed and how it is connected with human evaluation.

NONSENSE, GRAMMAR, AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: WITTGENSTEIN ON MOORE

Thomas Andrew Meyer, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

The current ‘therapeutic’ reading of Wittgenstein considers *On Certainty* as committed to the nonsensical character of Moore’s response to skepticism. However, in this text Wittgenstein makes sense of Moore’s anti-skeptical remarks as acknowledgements of the grammar. Wittgenstein therefore does not treat Moore’s ‘nonsense’ after the manner the therapeutic reading would suggest. Instead Wittgenstein here opens a distinctive question of the phenomenology of Moore’s seeming acknowledgements, that of the relation between acknowledging grammar and avowing an individual’s subjectively certain beliefs, and of the proper placement of Moore’s remarks within the *On Certainty* account.

HUSSERL AND RUSSELL, 1911–1913

Nikolay Milkov, Bielefeld, Germany

The objective of the paper is to compare Russell’s work from 1911–13, a period in which he was most creative, to that of Husserl in the same period. I propose to discuss five topics on which the two philosophers came to astonishingly similar results.

(1) Russell believed that the prime task of philosophy is to discover and describe logical forms; Husserl claimed that it is to describe phenomena. Logical forms/phenomena are a priori and radically different from natural facts. (2) Logical forms/phenomena are to be arrived at through logical analysis/eidetic reduction. (3) Both Russell and Husserl accepted the kind of philosophy which criticizes the “natural attitude”. (4) Russell was indirectly influenced by Husserl’s attempt to classify all the elements that can occur as constituents of mental phenomena. (5) Both Husserl and Russell made analyses of common sense objects in terms of their perspectives and profiles.

INTENTIONALITY AND (UN)CONSCIOUSNESS: FREUD’S DEBT TO BRENTANO

Fábio Jesus Miranda, Goiás, Brazil

This paper emphasizes the role of intentionality as an essential property of human mental life. So, intentionality surpasses the conscious domain and questions the absolutism of a rationality that claims the existence of an internal link between consciousness and intentionality.

IS CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS A POSTERIORI?

Nenad Miscevic, Maribor, Slovenia – Budapest, Hungary

There are important a posteriori elements in conceptual knowledge and conceptual analysis. The paper critically examines Horgan’s diagnosis of those and then offers a brief taxonomy of possible sources of aposteriority at two levels of justification, spontaneous and reflective. At the first level, the individual deep aposteriority infects the origin of legitimacy, deriving from (1) the empirical origin of many referentially correct concepts. (2): more deeply, our innate categories might derive from evolutionary trial-and-error learning. (3) and (4): beliefs analytical in referentially incorrect concepts and categories lack immunity from empirical revision.

The reflective level involves general coherence. (5): the positive support might be one of wide reflective equilibrium with empirical elements, and (6): the negative support, i.e. absence of undermining, might be sensitive to empirical data. The last source concerns explanation of having conceptual beliefs and of their reliability. (7): if causal explanation is part of reflective justification and is a posteriori then justification is partly a posteriori.

INTENTIONALITY AND THE ANTINOMY OF THE LIAR

Krystyna Misiuna, Warsaw, Poland

Mental acts are most important constituents of truth-bearers. This insight underlies the article by Simons (2003), and it has been accepted in the present paper. This view enables us to formulate generalisations of Tarski’s T-schema for different Liar-type sentences and to solve certain types of the antinomy of the liar. Among six types of the Liar-sentence considered in this paper four of them do not lead to the antinomy of the liar. In particular, Tarski’s formulation of the antinomy may be solved on our view. However other forms of Liar-type sentences may be constructed which still lead to paradoxes.

TRANSCENDENTAL APPERCEPTION IN A WITTGENSTEINIAN PERSPECTIVE

Karel Mom, Amsterdam, Netherlands

The paper elaborates Powell’s functional approach to the doctrine of transcendental apperception by making use of a phenomenological amendment of its higher order theory of consciousness. It is argued that the private language argument fits well in the phenomenological project. This has the advantage that the inherent ambiguity of the doctrine of transcendental apperception, which is manifest in the way the first-person personal pronoun is used in it, disappears.

AGAINST WITTGENSTEIN

Kevin Mulligan, Geneva, Switzerland

Wittgenstein attempts to show that philosophical ascent and so philosophical theory are doomed to failure by making a startlingly original use of a number of distinctions and grammatical reminders. Philosophical ascent is ascent from ordinary talk and the language of science to talk of *truth, propositions, states of affairs, objects, existence, values, norms, certainty, essence, possibilities* and *properties*. Philosophical theory sets out the super-order between these formal super-concepts and super-properties (*PI* §97). One type of philosophical theory is provided by formal theories of such entities. Wittgenstein attempts to undermine ascent by displaying the variety of the starting points for such ascent. Like many of his German contemporaries, he takes *Geist* to be a ghost thrown up by *Leben – geistige* or *seelische* processes and such *geistige* entities as propositions and concepts are philosophical myths but also enemies of life. Once the irreducible variety of human life is brought into focus we will no longer be tempted by philosophical ascent and hence by philosophical theory, we will come to see that “truth” etc. are just words, like other words. But Wittgenstein’s attempt fails. First, because he often makes use of what are in fact philosophical theories in all but name. Second, because reflection on ascent and on the types of modification it involves shows that “truth” etc. are not in fact words like other words.

ADEQUACY AND METHOD

Dieter Münch, Berlin, Germany

In order to clarify the relation between phenomenology and analytic philosophy, the paper distinguishes between two approaches in philosophy. The one claims the primacy of method, the other the primacy of adequacy. This correlates to the distinction between an epistemological methodism and particularism, which has been introduced by Roderick Chisholm. Phenomenology and the analytic philosophy of the Vienna Circle exemplify these two orientations.

The following aspects have, however, to be taken into account.

- In the analytical tradition there is a movement, which tries to overcome established methods. Example: John Austin, Gilbert Ryle.
 - In phenomenology the primacy of adequacy has become a rejection of methods. Example: Heidegger, Gadamer.
 - There are well established methods which are perfectly adequate for certain fields of objects and problems. Example: The determination of the relation between logic and mathematics.
 - The two orientations can be related to different phases in the development of sciences. When appropriate methods are not yet available the primacy of adequacy will be chosen. This shall lead to the development of methods and a change in the primacy. The question arises, however, whether the primacy of adequacy approach does not remain to be justified, if only because we have to avoid blind spots.
-

PHENOMENOLOGY AND LANGUAGE. SOME REMARKS ON WITTGENSTEIN’S MIDDLE PERIOD

Volker A. Munz, Graz, Austria

Returning back to philosophy in the late twenties, phenomenology played an important part in Wittgenstein’s writings, although only for a few months. In his *Some Remarks on Logical Form* probably held in summer 1929, he introduced fundamental changes of his *Tractarian* philosophy. Faced with the problem of colour incompatibility, Wittgenstein thereby had to concede major errors of some central ideas, he had elaborated in the *Tractatus*. These mistakes were mainly connected with his conception of elementary propositions as well as with the role logical analysis played in his early work. In his new approach, Wittgenstein now stipulated a logical analysis of our actual phenomena, but only for a short time. After about six months, he rejected his idea of a phenomenological language based on the relation between so called ‘primary propositions’ and hypotheses and argued that expressions concerning our given experience are really grammatical rules concerning the use of particular words included in those expressions. This paper tries to reconstruct some of the main arguments, Wittgenstein worked out in 1929 and shall contrast them with certain ideas, he introduced in his *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*.

REFERENCE AND MEANING OF ‘I’

Jose Nandhikara, Warwick, Great Britain

Wittgenstein claimed that as a referring expression, ‘I’ is redundant. Philosophers were confused to look for a referent to ‘I’ in body, brain, mind, soul or in other substantive entities. He wanted to resist the idea that the self or subject is an entity bodily or ethereal. Wittgenstein was wrong, however, to assert that ‘I’ does not refer at all. Because how ‘I’ refers is different from how other words refer, one cannot claim that ‘I’ does not refer at all. The referent of ‘I’ is the human being who is speaking or writing the word ‘I’. ‘I’ is in a class by itself (*Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge, 1932-35*, pp. 35, 21). Its uniqueness is shown by its grammatical position, first-person pronoun singular. Though its use is different from proper names and other personal pronouns, it is interwoven with them. It is distinctive of living human beings that we can use first-person reference in our thought and language.

WAHRNEHMUNG UND WAHRNEHMUNGURTEIL

Katrin Nolte, Berlin, Deutschland

Die Erklärung der Vermittlung zwischen Wahrnehmunggehalten und propositionalen Gehalten hat in der Geschichte der Philosophie zu problematischen Positionen geführt. Entweder wird der sinnliche Gehalt als unaussprechlich und das sprachliche Urteil damit als Akt der Entfremdung interpretiert, so dass sich zwischen beiden eine Kluft auftut. Oder aber der Gehalt von Wahrnehmungen wird vorgängig mit dem propositionalen Gehalt identifiziert. Als Voraussetzung solcher extremen Alternativen möchte ich die Identifizierung der Wahrnehmung mit dem Sinnlich-Einzelnen und des Wahrnehmungsurteils mit dem Sprachlich-Allgemeinen darstellen. Aus dieser Projektion einer kategorialen Unterscheidung (Wahrnehmung – Wahrnehmungsurteil) auf ein ursprünglich logisches Wechselverhältnis (Einzelnes – Allgemeines) ergibt sich das Problem, eine Bedeutungsentität postulieren zu müssen, auf die ein allgemeiner Begriff sich bezieht, der verschiedene einzelne Gegenstände charakterisiert. Wird diese Projektion aufgegeben, kann Gleichartigkeit in der Wahrnehmung als eine Grundlage der Allgemeinheit von Begriffen angesehen werden, so dass zugleich die Souveränität von Wahrnehmunggehalten als auch ihre begriffliche Vermitteltheit verstanden werden können.

SOME REMARKS ON THE EDITING AND PUBLISHING OF ZETTEL

Masahiro Oku, Osaka, Japan

Examining the editing and publishing process of Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* TS 233 as *Zettel* gives us a good chance for practicing Wittgenstein scholarship. It also gives us a valuable insight into Wittgenstein's own thinking and writing. I will make the following points:

- 1) Although the efforts of the editors of *Zettel* should be appreciated, there are some problems, in view of the standard principle of text studies.
- 2) Publication of *Zettel* in 1967 is historically very significant.
- 3) The remarks printed in *Zettel* are useful; some of them have variants in other works of Wittgenstein.
- 4) The extant copies of TS 228 and TS 230 were not used to compile TS 227 (*PI* Part I).
- 5) In Wittgenstein studies, cross-references of variant remarks are very important: a typical case is *Philosophical Investigations* #580.

ZUR THEORIE DER INTENTIONALITÄT BEI FRANCE WEBER

Tanja Pihlar, Graz, Österreich – Kranj, Slowenien

Im Vortrag wird Webers Intentionalitätstheorie aus „Problem predstavne produkcije“ (1928, „Über das Problem der Vorstellungsproduktion“) behandelt. Er hat hierin seine frühere Intentionalitätstheorie mehrfach modifiziert. 1928 meint er, dass gewisse intentionale Erlebnisse, nämlich die intentionalen Vorstellungen, nicht einfach vorgegeben sind, sondern durch psychische Tätigkeit zustandekommen, welche die Grazer Schule „Vorstellungsproduktion“

nannte. Weber spricht von *intentionaler* Vorstellungsproduktion (die er u.a. neben inhaltlicher und aktmäßiger Vorstellungsproduktion anerkennt). Unter derlei Produktion versteht er ein ursprüngliches Übergehen vom passiven intentionalen zum entsprechenden aktiven intentionalen Vorstellen. 1928 nimmt Weber nicht-intentionale Vorstellungen an, auf welchen intentionale Vorstellungen aufbauen, wobei Weber mehrere Intentionalitätsstufen unterscheidet: Auf das nicht-intentionale Vorstellen auf unterster Stufe sind aufgebaut: (a) Ein Vorstellen mit präsentierender Intentionalität, (b) ein isolatives und (c) ein rationales intentionales Vorstellen. Diese Unterscheidung ergibt eine neue Einteilung der Erlebnisse, und zwar in animalische und in geistige, wobei sich erstere ferner in nicht-intentionale bzw. in vegetative und präsentierende intentionale Erlebnisse, die geistigen hingegen in isolative und rationale intentionale Erlebnisse aufspalten. Diese Abhandlung von 1928 ist für das Verständnis seiner weiteren philosophischen Entwicklung von erheblicher Bedeutung.

THE ANOMALOUS CHARACTER OF EXPERIENCE

Manuel de Pinedo, Granada, Spain

Davidson conceives of experience as a brutally causal bottleneck between thought and reality, with no epistemic role. This paper recommends to extend anomalous monism to experience and, also, to replace token-identities for nothing short of a truly holistic correspondence between intentional and physical characteristics.

INTENTIONAL HORIZONS AND EPISTEMIC PERSPECTIVITY

Martina Plümacher, Bremen, Germany

For Husserl, intentionality is a complex cognitive structure which includes implicit knowledge. This concept of intentionality, called 'horizon intentionality', goes beyond the Fregean distinction of *Sinn* and *Bedeutung* which differentiates the representation of an object under certain aspects and its reference function. In this paper it is argued that the term 'horizon' refers to the thematic frame to which the object's aspectivity belongs. For that reason Husserl's phenomenology can be considered as the counterpart of theories of epistemic worlds or viewpoint dependent descriptions of worlds. For the phenomenological approach to knowledge it is characteristic that it does not adopt an 'externalized' vantage point like analytic epistemology; its methodological individualism leads to a theory of personal knowledge and a theory of meaning that emphasizes the constitutive role of implicit knowledge.

NORMATIVITY AND SPEECH ACTS: ON ALSTON ON ILLOCUTIONARY RULES

Christian Plunze, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Robert M. Harnish, Tucson, Arizona

The utterance of a sentence in a context is not sufficient for the performance of a speech act. Hence, theories of speech acts can be organized in terms of what must be added. First, there are more or less Gricean approaches, which rely on the intentional states of the speaker. Here we find, for example, Strawson, Schiffer and Bach and Harnish. Second, there are more or less Austinian approaches which rely on rules and/or conventions. Here we find Searle, Vanderveken, and Alston (*Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning*, 2000). According to Alston, speech acts are constituted by illocutionary rules whose existence is assumed to be necessary in order to explain the 'normative stance' of these acts. In this paper we argue against this claim and suggest that intentional states of the speaker play a more important role than Alston is willing to admit.

NONCONCEPTUAL CONTENT, PERCEPTION, AND VALUE

Peter Poellner, Warwick, Great Britain

This paper offers a defence of nonconceptual content at the level of conscious intentionality. It argues that even on a wide construal of the conceptual sphere, allowing for demonstrative concepts, perception often involves non-conceptual components, quite irrespective of the issue of the fineness of grain of perceptual content. Nonconceptual content is an indispensable explanatory concept, not only in the philosophy of perception, but also in moral and more generally evaluative psychology.

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE AS A FOUNDATION FOR THE BELIEF IN GOD

Agnaldo Cuoco Portugal, Brasília, Brazil

Richard Swinburne and William Alston are leading thinkers in contemporary English-speaking philosophy of religion who assign to religious experience an important place in the discussion about the rational foundations of the belief in God. In this paper, I intend to suggest that although Alston's approach to the matter (read in a minimalist way) is more immune to criticism than Swinburne's, the probabilistic method suggested by the latter gives a better account of the role played by the phenomenon of religious experience in the process of justification of the belief in God. However, in order to work properly in this case, the probabilistic method should consider a different concept of probability than the one proposed by Swinburne.

PHENOMENOLOGY IN OBJECT CONSTITUTION

Matjaž Potrč and Vojko Strahovnik, Ljubljana, Slovenia

Ordinary objects or Middle Sized Dry Goods (MSDGs) have phenomenology intrinsically built into their constitution. They belong to the category of regional ontologies whose elements are not constituents of ultimate reality. The constitution of objects in the regional ontology involves both the world and the power of language and thought. Language and thought as normative practices belong to the area of cognition. Cognition too has phenomenology intrinsically built into it (and so do objects). The constitution of objects or MSDGs is usually misrepresented by metaphysicians since they start with objects as brute existent facts. Accordingly they add ultimate normative standards to the constitution of objects. In this manner objects such as a cat obtain the status of language- and thought-independent reality. Because metaphysicians apply generalist patterns to objects (patterns that are proper just to the world) they cannot recognize objects with their intrinsically constitutive phenomenology.

The first argument concerning object constitution addresses the question: how are objects or MSDGs built? The second argument looks at the question: how is the constitution of objects or MSDGs usually represented by metaphysicians?

EMOTION, MEANING, AND THE STRUCTURE OF EXPERIENCE

Christoph Prainsack, Wien, Austria

In this paper, I draw a line from the role of meaning in the psychology of emotion to problems of meaning and reference in the philosophy of mind. I will show that emotional experience reflects the meaning of a situation for a person, which captures the relationship between person and environment. Incidentally, emotional meaning shares this relational aspect, the conjunction of personal state and environmental objects, with intentional mental states, and I suggest that the former may inform the discussion of the latter. I explore this conjecture by claiming that the structure of relational meaning, as defined, applies to all forms of subjective experience, and that important problems associated with mental representations do not arise if one clearly distinguishes between first-person experience and third-person ascription of meaning.

PROPOSITIONALER GEHALT UND SOZIALE NORMEN

Bernd Prien, Münster – Wuppertal, Deutschland

Ich beschäftige mich in meinem Beitrag mit dem propositionalen Gehalt von Sprechakten. Aufgrund der Konventionalität natürlicher Sprachen gehe ich dabei davon aus, dass dieser Gehalt dadurch zu erklären ist, dass es gewisse soziale Normen über die Verwendung von Sprechakten gibt. Für eine solche Erklärung besteht allerdings folgende Schwierigkeit: Eine Handlung genügt dann einer sozialen Norm, wenn alle Mitglieder der Gesellschaft glauben, dass die Handlung dieser Norm entspricht. Für die Extension zumindest mancher Begriffe gilt aber die entsprechende Eigenschaft nicht. Es gibt Begriffe *F*, für die nicht gilt, dass ein Objekt *O* unter *F* fällt, wenn alle Mitglieder der Gesellschaft glauben, dass *O* unter *F* fällt. D.h., die Extension zumindest mancher Begriffe ist unabhängig von der Anwendungspraxis der Gesellschaft. Ich möchte in meinem Beitrag nun einen Vorschlag unterbreiten, wie die Existenz sozialer Normen erklären kann, dass Sprechakte einen propositionalen Gehalt aufweisen, der von der Anwendungspraxis der Gesellschaft unabhängig ist.

NON-REDUCTIVE THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND PHENOMENOLOGY

Marek Pyka, Krakow, Poland

In the paper I attempt a comparison of non-reductive analytic theories of consciousness (T. Nagel, J. Searle) with phenomenological theories. These two kinds of theories share the fundamental assumption that consciousness is most important for the understanding of the nature of the human mind and it cannot be explained in some more elementary terms. I discuss some of the differences in the conceptualizations of mental phenomena between them in order to gain a better insight and to find some more points of convergence. In particular, I analyze the concept of 'subjectivity' of the mental and the problem of the subject of consciousness.

FACTS AND VALUES IN HOLISTIC PHILOSOPHY

Leszek Pyra, Krakow, Poland

When one looks at the *is-ought* question from the point of view of some historical debates, one notices that the opinions widely differ, from accepting to totally rejecting the possibility of a shift from *is* to *ought*. The holistic environmental philosophy, as understood by Leopold, Callicot and eventually Rolston, approves of the possibility of drawing values (norms) from facts. It is shown that Aldo Leopold *de facto* commits the *naturalistic fallacy* in ethics, when constructing his famous *imperative*, expressing the essence of a holistic eco-philosophy.

It is also shown how Callicot, analysing the problem of facts and values, refers to Hume's and Darwin's views on the nature of ethics. Using Hume's philosophical assumptions, Callicot tries to construct an environmental ethical argument which allows him to overcome the discrepancy between facts and values by bridging it by a premise referring to passions. Next Holmes Rolston III's discussion

of the problem is presented and evaluated. Rolston's theory is based on the assumption that facts are inseparable from values as such, therefore a shift from facts to values is not possible in formal logic, but the situation looks different in physical sciences.

INFERENTIALISMUS UND ERFAHRUNG

Michael Raunig, Graz, Österreich

Robert Brandom hat in *Making It Explicit* (1994) eine systematische Neubegründung philosophischer Sprachbetrachtung vorgeschlagen. Im Wesentlichen zielt sein Ansatz darauf, repräsentationalistische semantische Grundbegriffe zu verabschieden, um sie im Rahmen eines „semantischen Inferentialismus“ durch eine funktionalistische Betrachtungsweise der Bedeutung von Ausdrücken zu ersetzen, die sich auf deren inferentielle Rolle in Praktiken des materialen Schlussfolgerns konzentriert.

Neben einer Präzisierung dieses weitreichenden Vorhabens soll eine immanente Kritik seiner Durchführung geleistet werden, indem das in *Making It Explicit* erarbeitete inferentialistische Alternativmodell auf seine Plausibilität hin geprüft wird. Zu zeigen ist, dass Brandom aufgrund seiner (von Wilfrid Sellars übernommenen und weitgehend überleiteten) Absage an empirische Merkmale der Begriffsverwendung nicht imstande ist, ein adäquates Modell des alltäglichen Sprachgebrauchs zu etablieren. Anhand des Kontrasts zu intuitiven Aspekten der normalen Sprache sollen jene Schwierigkeiten aufgezeigt werden, die eine Ausgrenzung jeglicher begrifflichen „Empirizität“ zugunsten einer strikt inferentialistischen Bestimmung des Begrifflichen zur Folge hat.

WIE WIR KIPPFIGUREN SEHEN KÖNNEN

Andrea Anna Reichenberger, Konstanz, Deutschland

At the beginning of the 20th century Gestalt psychology tried to clarify how objects like the “vase of Rubin” or the “duck-rabbit” are recognized in an image. In the course of the renaissance of Gestalt theory these pictures were rediscovered by cognitive and computer sciences. One example is Haken's computer model for the simulation of the gestalt switch, i.e. how perception changes when we first see one object and then another. It is disputed whether this simulation actually corresponds to our perception process. With Wittgenstein in mind, one might ask: “Do you see the duck-rabbit like this?” And one could answer: “This is a question of the language-game you play!”

WITTGENSTEIN'S COLOUR BLINDNESS

Frank A. Renders, Leuven, Belgium

The contemporary gene-centric model of colour and colour blindness still owes much to John Dalton's (1794) standard framing of the topic. The contemporary model defines colour blindness as a defect or aberration or error of underlying 'pigments' in the retina of the eye. I shall suggest instead that networks of historical-technological constitution account for those features. That is, gene-centric colour and colour blindness belong to a particular grammar of reality. When Wittgenstein talks about colour and colour blindness he is also inadvertently caught in this self-same grammar. I shall be arguing instead that colour and colour blindness belong to a whole body of thought which has been crafted so as to avoid acknowledging the regimes that sustain its legitimacy and the legitimacy of the describers. In particular I shall concentrate on Dalton's role in establishing these regimes.

PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AND REALISTIC ONTOLOGY

Nicholas Rescher, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

Our knowledge of the world comes via experience. But experience is personal and subjective – anyone's experience is a mere psychological episode in their life. The theoretical difficulty is to get from there to an objective reality. Reasoning and inference alone cannot carry us over the chasm from the personal to the objective. An entirely different recourse is needed – but one that involves postulation and presumption. But these in turn can be validated only in the practical order reflection. Here alone can an adequate – and ultimately pragmatic – legitimation of our cognitive practices be provided.

WITTGENSTEIN'S DIRECTED DISCONTENT CLARIFYING THE ROLES OF EXPERIENCE AND APPRECIATION IN SKILLFUL COPING

Erik D.W. Rietveld, Amsterdam, Netherlands

In this paper I give an interpretation of Wittgenstein's descriptions of involved skillful coping by expert craftsmen (tailors and architects). I clarify the roles of appreciation and lived experience in skillful coping. Wittgenstein stresses the necessity to differentiate between detached value judgements and involved appreciation. The coping craftsman is an appreciator. While a person is directed at the object he/she is working on, lived experience provides coping with a sense of orientation towards improvement or rightness. Wittgenstein uses the term 'directed discontent' for this sense of how things are going in the flow of actions in the specific context of craftsmen. I argue that directed discontent also is an intrinsic aspect of involved coping of other types of (everyday) expertise, such as searching the right word. Moreover, I note that Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of (everyday) experts in concrete situations suggest a similar orienting role for lived experience in adequate coping.

EXPLODING THE MYTH OF THE GIVEN. ON PHENOMENOLOGY'S BASIC DISCORD WITH EMPIRICISM

Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl, Graz, Austria

It is a widespread view that phenomenology is committed to a naive concept of the intuitively given. Despite the obvious understanding of the dictum "back to things themselves", it is a methodically mediated immediacy which is characteristic of a phenomenological account of the given. This will be shown with regard to Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and Heidegger's hermeneutic-phenomenological approach in *Being and Time*. Husserl and Heidegger both undermine the opposition of intuitional givenness and interpretation. Husserl argues that what is intuitively given already underlies a theoretical interpretation insofar as its appearance presupposes a functional correlation of intuition and attitude. Heidegger points out that intuition is secondary compared to interpretation, though the latter, since it is an existential characteristic of being-human, must not be considered a theoretical behaviour.

ANOTHER BRENTANIAN THESIS: "DIE INNERE WAHRNEHMUNG HAT DAS EIGENTÜMLICHE, DASS SIE NIE INNERE BEOBACHTUNG WERDEN KANN"

Robin Rollinger, Leuven, Belgium

Brentano put forward the thesis that inner perception cannot become inner observation. I discuss this thesis by elaborating on what it means and considering three cases in which it was either rejected or ignored, namely in the work of Husserl, Stumpf, and Schlick.

EXTERNALIST VERSUS INTERNALIST MORAL REALISM

Jacob Rosenthal, Bonn, Germany

For more than twenty-five years now there is a vivid debate on moral realism in analytic philosophy. I would like to argue that this debate is to a certain extent misleading and its significance for ethics overestimated. The reason for this is that if you deny the existence of a necessary ("internal") connection between moral truth and rational motivation, then it is all too easy to adopt a realist stance on morals. No matter what your moral theory is, you can always fix the reference of moral terms realistically and claim that there are objective moral truths – provided that you do not make the claim that every rational person acquainted with such a truth will be motivated to act in accordance with it. In fact, many contemporary moral realists do not make such a claim, they are so-called "externalists". This position misses the point of moral realism. Only an internalist realism that upholds the mentioned claim is interesting for ethics.

ZUR BEGRIFFSANALYSE DES UNBEWÜßT-PSYCHISCHEN

Heiner Rutte, Graz, Österreich

Für die Diskussion des Themas bieten sich einige Freud'sche Bestimmungen des Unbewußt-Psychischen an, die von einem recht einfachen Schema Gebrauch machen: Danach gibt es neben den aktuellen bewußten psychischen Zuständen, die innerlich wahrgenommen sind (dem Bewußtsein), aktuelle unbewußte psychische Zustände, und zwar solche, die vom betreffenden Subjekt nicht innerlich wahrgenommen, aber einer inneren Wahrnehmung zugänglich sind („Vorbewußtes“), und solche, die (im allgemeinen, besondere Situationen ausgenommen) einer inneren Wahrnehmung nicht zugänglich sind, aber starke kausale Wirkung auf das Bewußt-Psychische ausüben können (das eigentliche „Unbewußte“). Innere Wahrnehmung (bzw. Beobachtung) besteht ebenso wie die äußere Wahrnehmung logisch unabhängig vom wahrgenommenen Zustand und umgekehrt (kommt zum Zustand hinzu oder fehlt); sie ist u.a. ein unmittelbares Bemerkens- und Erinnerungsmittel und hat durchaus hypothetisch-irrtumsfähigen Charakter.

Die Diskussion kann nun bei folgenden Problemen ansetzen: (1) Die Gleichsetzung von Bewußtsein und bewußtem Zustand führt offenbar zu einem endlosen Regreß oder zur Leugnung der Unabhängigkeit von innerer Wahrnehmung und innerlich Wahrgenommenem. (2) Man ist gezwungen, so etwas wie reines, selbstvergessenes Objektbewußtsein in kontraintuitiver Weise dem Unbewußten (Vorbewußten) einzugliedern. (3) Die innere Wahrnehmung, welche die bewußten Zustände kennzeichnet, muß zur Regreßverhütung *letztlich* gleichfalls als unbewußt (vorbewußt) aufgefaßt werden; bewußte Zustände scheinen also ohne unbewußte gar nicht denkbar zu sein. (4) Freuds Theorie setzt überdies offenbar eine eigentlich unbewußte innere Wahrnehmung voraus, welche aber die so wahrgenommenen Zustände gerade nicht zu bewußten machen kann (so bei der „Zensur“, beim „Widerstand“ und ähnlichen Abwehrformen, oder bei eigentlich unbewußten Erinnerungen an eigene unbewußte Zustände). Die hier angezeigte Revision des Begriffsschemas („nur eine *bewußte* innere Wahrnehmung macht den wahrgenommenen Zustand zu einem bewußten“) würde jedoch wieder zum endlosen Regreß führen. – Bei alledem fragt es sich ganz allgemein, welche Funktion die Bewußtmachung des Psychischen bzw. des vorher Unbewußt-Psychischen durch die innere Wahrnehmung hat und worauf die Vorzugsstellung des Bewußt-Psychischen gegenüber dem Unbewußt-Psychischen beruht.

GEWALT ALS SOZIALER GEGENSTAND

Alessandro Salice, Graz, Österreich – Torino, Italien

Mein Vortrag verfolgt das Ziel, eine umfassende Beschreibung des komplexen Phänomens der Gewalt vorzulegen, welche aufzeigen soll, wie bzw. inwiefern Gewalt Teil unserer Welt ist. Neben einer Analyse von sozialen Akten, durch welche Gewalt erzeugt wird, wird in Anschluss an Adolf Reinachs Ontologie der sozialen Gegenstände die These vertreten, dass Gewalt ein Gegenstand spezifischer Art ist. Aufgrund ihrer zeitlichen Natur ist sie weder ein Sachverhalt noch ein idealer Gegenstand. In den Klassen realer Gegenstände findet Gewalt jedoch ebenso wenig Platz, weder als physischer Gegenstand (Kann man die Gewalt anfassen?) noch als psychischer Gegenstand (Wenn das Gewaltopfer schläft, hört die Gewalt auf zu

bestehen?). Die Gewalt erweist sich somit als ein besonderer Gegenstand höherer Ordnung und zwar als ein sozialer Gegenstand, auf dessen nähere Erörterung sich diese Arbeit konzentriert.

QUINE ON NAMES: SOME QUESTIONS

Werner Sauer, Graz, Austria

In point of view of the apparatus of quantification, Quine determines a name to be a constant expression that can replace, and can be replaced by, a bindable variable. On the other hand, in point of view of, *inter alia*, ontological issues pertaining to *Plato's Beard*, Quine views names as descriptions, i.e., as constant expressions formed from open sentences by means of the description operator.

These two accounts, one may suspect, ascribe rather different properties to names: thus, some questions concerning Quine's view of names seem worth to be raised.

IS THE IMAGE OF COLOUR SCIENCE USED BY COGNITIVE SCIENTISTS AND PHILOSOPHERS PATHOLOGICAL?

Barbara Saunders, Leuven, Belgium

The standard account of 'seeing colour' concerns a domain of species-specific information-processing concerning surface reflectancies, metameric lights, and so on (Byrne and Hilbert 2003; O'Regan and Noë 2001; Koenderinck and van Doorn 2003). This standard account reinforces the attempt to give a purely physical account of perception (MacLeod 2003). It then transposes 'colour' into the qualitative dimensions of a conceptual space (Hurvich and Jameson 1955; Hardin 1988; Clark 1993). On this basis the 'natural properties' of hue, saturation and brightness are adduced. These are claimed to support representations of basic categorisations which maximise the information per unit of perceptual integration (Fodor 1983, Gardenfors 2000). In contrast I shall show this to be a 'floating model' (Brill 1997; Wyszecki and Stiles 1982) concerning primarily the detection of colour 'differences', almost wholly disconnected from the lifeworld, even though it is claimed by many to be an explanation of 'seeing colour'. It runs by downplaying counterevidence, treating evidence as more favourable than it is, selective focusing/attending, and selective evidence gathering. It exemplifies a two-level breakdown in critical inquiry: Firstly its hypotheses are accepted as true without serious attempts to examine them philosophically; secondly this deficiency is ignored, so that the first breakdown is not acknowledged. It is this that I refer to as its 'pathology', following Mitchell (2000).

**EVIDENCE AS A CRITERION.
A CRITICISM OF MEINONG AND HÖFLER'S
NOTION OF EVIDENCE**

Maria van der Schaar, Leiden, Netherlands

Within the school of Brentano the notion of evidence plays an important role in logic and epistemology. In Höfler and Meinong's logic (1890) evidence is a psychological state on which logic is founded. Attempts given by Meinong and Höfler from the perspective of the later *Gegenstandstheorie* do not escape the problem of evidence as formulated by the Neo-Kantian Leonard Nelson and the logical positivist Moritz Schlick. Either evidence is accessible to consciousness, in which case the evidence of our judgement can give no guarantee for (absolute) truth; or evidence is a guarantee for (absolute) truth, but then it cannot be accessible to consciousness. In Höfler and Meinong's writings, as in those of Brentano and Husserl, the term 'evidence' glides between the phenomenological and the transcendent meaning: evidence as a characteristic of judgement accessible to consciousness, and evidence as a guarantee for truth. A solution to the problem of evidence is presented by choosing systematically for a phenomenological notion of evidence.

**DIRECT REALISM, DISJUNCTIVISM AND
THE COMMON SENSORY CORE**

Richard Schantz, Siegen, Germany

The author defends a direct realist view of perception. His own position is contrasted with the disjunctive theory of perception, in particular with McDowell's version of it. According to the latter theory, we must once and for all reject the traditional assumption that perception and illusion share a highest common factor. The author tries to save precisely this assumption and to show that it is compatible with direct realism. Hence we do not have to be afraid of the drastic epistemological consequences emphasized by advocates of disjunctivism. Direct realism is combined with the adverbial theory of sensory experience, which instead of misconstruing sensory experiences as peculiar inner objects blocking our cognitive access to the physical world, conceives of them as epistemically significant subjective states with an objective representational content.

**NORMBEGRÜNDUNG OHNE
REKURS AUF WERTE?
EINIGE KRITISCHE BEMERKUNGEN ZUM
PROJEKT DES KONTRAKTUALISMUS**

Stephan Schlothfeldt, Konstanz, Deutschland

Bekanntlich lässt sich über (moralische) Werte trefflich streiten, und solche Debatten führen in der Regel nicht dazu, dass ein Konsens erzielt wird. Zu unterschiedlich scheinen die wertprägenden Erfahrungen und Lebensverläufe, als dass eine Einigung zu erwarten wäre. Auf der anderen Seite gibt es aber Probleme, die auf gesamtgesellschaftlicher Ebene gelöst werden müssen; wie sollte das unter Bedingungen eines Wertpluralismus in legitimer Weise möglich sein?

Eine scheinbar attraktive Lösung bietet der Kontraktualismus: Rechtliche oder moralische Normen sollen nicht auf Werte, sondern allein auf das rationale Eigeninteresse der Akteure gestützt werden. Diese spätestens seit Hobbes bekannte Strategie erfreut sich seit einiger Zeit einer erstaunlichen Renaissance – man denke an Buchanan, Gauthier oder (im deutschen Sprachraum) Stemmer und Hörster.

Ziel des Vortrags ist es nachzuweisen, dass eine Normbegründung dieser Art nicht gelingen kann. Eine genauere Analyse zeigt, dass auch Kontraktualisten implizit mindestens auf den Wert der Fairness zurückgreifen, um ihr Projekt zu realisieren.

**CONSCIOUSNESS: CENTRAL FOR
INTENTIONALITY, BUT NOT ESSENTIAL**

Michael Schmitz, Konstanz, Germany

For a long time the topic of consciousness was suppressed in analytic philosophy of mind, relegated to the collective unconscious as it were. Many accounts of intentionality were proposed that made no essential reference to experience, frequently enough even avoided mentioning it. When consciousness entered into the picture at all, it was often thought to be definable in terms of unconscious intentional states. Along with recent critics of unconscious intentionality like John Searle (e.g. 1992) and Galen Strawson (1994) I believe this turns things upside down. But counter to Searle and Strawson, I do not think the notion of intentionality necessarily has to be restricted to consciousness or to dispositions to cause conscious states. Drawing on some remarks of Wittgenstein, I argue for a more liberal middle position.

**EIN DRITTER WEG IN DER THEORIE
SOZIALER NORMEN?
PRAXISTHEORIEN ZWISCHEN
KAUSALEN ERKLÄRUNGEN UND
HERMENEUTISCHEM IDEALISMUS**

Ralph Schrader, Jena, Deutschland

Der Vortrag diskutiert neo-wittgensteinianische Ansätze innerhalb der Philosophie der Sozialwissenschaften anhand der Arbeiten von David Bloor und Michael Lynch und widmet sich insbesondere dem Gegensatz zwischen dem kausalistischen und dem hermeneutischen Verständnis der Sozialwissenschaften. In Bezug auf die Theorie sozialer Normen wird für ein zweistufiges Modell plädiert, welches Koordinations- und Kooperationsnormen kausal erklärt, während konstitutive Regeln hermeneutisch rekonstruiert werden.

NATURALIZING INTENTIONALITY VIA ISOMORPHISMS: A CRITICAL DISCUSSION OF CUMMINS' THEORY

Jürgen Schröder, Karlsruhe, Germany

Robert Cummins' proposal of naturalizing intentionality is briefly sketched and the idea of basing the representation relation on isomorphisms instead of causal relations is exposed. It is shown that Cummins' theory, as it stands, suffers from an analogue to the problem of misrepresentation or the disjunction problem. This shortcoming can be salvaged, however, by a natural constraint on the decomposition of the representation vehicles. Further, it is argued that Cummins' critique of causal theories of mental representation, viz. that they suffer from the problem of misalignment (Fodor's coordination problem) is equally applicable to his own theory and that on this count it doesn't really fare better than causal theories.

ON ATTRIBUTING COLOUR PERCEPTIONS

Ralph Schumacher, Berlin, Germany

The world as we see it is a world populated by coloured objects. To share information about the colours of things with others, we must be able to attribute perceptions of the colours of things to ourselves and to other people. In this paper I am going to examine the epistemic conditions for attributing colour perceptions: What do we have to believe in order to be able to ascribe perceptions of the colours of things to other persons? I intend to show that – contrary to Barry Stroud's view - attributing predicational colour perceptions to other persons does not require believing in the reality of the colours of things.

FANTASIE, FAKTIZITÄT UND FAKTEN – DIE ROLLE DES IMAGINÄREN IN KOGNITIONSWISSENSCHAFT UND PHÄNOMENOLOGIE

Eva Schwarz, Graz, Österreich

Vertreter naturalistischer Theorien sprechen häufig von einer Revolution unseres Selbst- und Realitätsverständnisses. Der Gegenstandsbereich der Naturwissenschaft gäbe uns den Rahmen dafür vor, was wir als „real“ zu verstehen haben. Der Mensch als informationsverarbeitendes System erfülle seine naturgegebene Aufgabe, Informationen über externe Strukturen mittels Repräsentationen intern abzubilden. Input-unabhängige Informationen wie Imagination und Vorstellung werden als „Sonderfunktion“ unseres Erkenntnisapparates verstanden, dessen funktionale „Realität“ uns aufgrund seiner Verarbeitungsgeschwindigkeit nicht zugänglich sei. Demgegenüber gehen phänomenologische Konzeptionen davon aus, dass jede Vorstellung von Realität an die Jemöglichkeit unserer Erfahrungen gebunden ist. So stehen wir gar nie vor der Frage, wie „interne“ und „externe“ Strukturen Wissen voneinander erlangen. Bewusstsein wird vielmehr als relationaler, dynamischer Prozess verstanden, in dem Imagination und Wahrnehmung, Mögliches und Tatsächliches sich gegenseitig bedingen. Während für die Phänomenologin jede Vorstellung von Realität in einen intersubjektiv zugänglichen Bedeutungszusammenhang eingebettet ist, müssen Naturalisten, so

die These dieser Arbeit, erst erklären, wie wir ihre erfahrungsmäßig unzugängliche „Realität“ als die eigentliche verstehen können.

THE LIMITS OF PHENOMENOLOGY

John Searle, Berkeley, California

The central question in contemporary philosophy is: How, if at all, can we give an account of the human reality – of language, mind, society, rationality, free will, etc. – that is consistent with what we know about the more basic reality as described by physics and chemistry. One might think that phenomenology, with its emphasis on human reality, would provide a powerful tool. Closer inspection, however, reveals that the actual practices of phenomenologists reveal limitations that are apparently intrinsic to the methods. There is a kind of idealism implicit in the actual practice of phenomenologists, and I want to expose its limitations.

SACHVERHALTE BEI ARISTOTELES UND ADAM WODEHAM

Kristë Shtufi, Graz, Österreich – Stanford, California

In diesem Beitrag vertrete ich die These, dass Aristoteles' *pragma* und Wodehams *complexe significabile* ontologisch und der logischen Form nach gleich zu stellen sind. Ich stelle zuerst Aristoteles' *pragma* und dann Wodehams *complexe significabile* vor, um dann auf die gemeinsamen Merkmale dieser Begriffe hinzuweisen und so meine These zu untermauern. Hiermit zeige ich indirekt auch, dass es bei Aristoteles den Begriff des Sachverhaltes gibt.

REFERENCE TO ABSTRACT OBJECTS IN A MEINONGIAN SEMANTICS

Anna Sierszulska, Geneva, Switzerland

The paper proposes to analyse reference in Meinongian-style semantics as a two-step pattern, with reference to abstract sense-objects as basic, and with reference to existent individuals as a mediated one. Instead of senses and referents, objects of reference of two kinds are introduced: objects of intensional reference and objects of denotational reference, essentially on the ground of a non-modal semantics. A Meinongian semantics of this kind can provide a uniform theoretical treatment of all traditionally nonextensional linguistic contexts without a recourse to possible worlds interpretations.

PLAIN PHENOMENOLOGY

Charles Siewert, Miami, Florida

“Plain phenomenology” as an approach in philosophy of mind is outlined. One takes this approach if one explains theoretically salient distinctions in mental phenomena via examples of the types of cases to which they would or would not apply, with appeal to first-person warrant that is underived from the third-person perspective. Some of the work of classical phenomenologists, such as Brentano and Husserl, as well as that of contemporary analytic philosophers of mind, such as Block, fits this description. This approach is contrasted with Dennett’s *heterophenomenology* and defended against the objection that it wrongly assumes first-person judgments enjoy some kind of invulnerability to error or criticism.

BOLZANO ON FINDING OUT INTENTIONS BEHIND ACTIONS

Arto Siitonen, Helsinki, Finland

Bolzano’s large heuristics in the fourth part of his *Wissenschaftslehre* contains 13 general and 33 special rules. The special rule 28 is meant to help observers and researchers to trace intentionality in phenomena and to identify the intentions of given actions. Bolzano’s concept of intention presupposes the concepts of causality and judgment, and in his view the interpretation of signs presupposes that intentions are considered. When are we justified to suppose the existence of purposes? To whom and to which actions to ascribe a purpose, and what the purpose is? Bolzano gives advices which help one to answer these questions, and he locates possible sources of mistaken reasoning concerning intentions.

IS LEWIS A CONVENTIONALIST ABOUT MERELOGICAL SUMMATION-TALK?

Jonathan Simon, Saarbrücken, Germany – New York City

Although David Lewis’ use of the mereological concepts relevant to the definition of ‘summation’ appears to be realist, in that he seems to use them to reflect ontologically significant characterizations of reality, his argument for universally unrestricted composition is based on premises which may only be understood as conventionalistic about summation-talk, if not parthood-talk generally. I shall explain the relevant sense of conventionalism, demonstrate why it is implicit in Lewis’ argument, and discuss the relevance of my point to more general historical and metaphysical considerations.

AGAINST SETS

Peter Simons, Leeds, Great Britain

Set theory was invented by Cantor as a vehicle for transfinite arithmetic, and its serious use in mathematics continues that inquiry. In the wake of the paradoxes its naive form engendered, it came to play two other roles: that of Zermelo’s post-logician axiomatic foundation for arithmetic and analysis, preferred by mathematicians to the complexities of type theory, and that of a common dialect in

which mathematical theories of all kinds may be formulated. In each of these roles, set theory is relatively uncontroversial. The exaggerated prestige of philosophy of mathematics in analytic philosophy has however led to indiscriminating misuse of set theory as a tool in philosophy, with detrimental effects for ontology and the philosophy of language. These include, but are by no means exhausted by: an impoverished ontology consisting solely of individuals and sets; mistreatment of concrete classes and other collectives; impoverishment of taxonomy in the philosophy of biology and aesthetics, for example treating as sets biological species and other taxa or symphonies and novels; extensionalism in logic; mistreatment of meanings as sets; and the substitution of set-based model theory for serious ontology. As examples of all these abuses will show, the effect of set theory on philosophy has been almost wholly negative, consisting in a spurious simplification of ontological and phenomenological variety for the sake of misplaced economy. When set theory is properly understood, as a theory of pure structural containment, it reverts to its proper role, that of a mathematical theory of moderate interest and wide mathematical application. Unencumbered by the compulsion to see sets everywhere, ontology, phenomenology and semantics are then freed to return to the things themselves.

AGAINST PREDICATE LOGIC

Barry Smith, Buffalo, New York – Saarbrücken, Germany

Frege’s signal achievement in inaugurating the era of logical rigour is unfortunately associated with a conception of logic whose deleterious consequences have cast a dark shadow over much of contemporary philosophy. These consequences include the neglect of the different varieties of universals distinguished by the metaphysical tradition and the substitution of nominalistically inspired conceptions of properties and relations as (at best) sets of ordered tuples. They include the view according to which all generality belongs to the predicate (*F*, *R*), so that constant terms (*a*, *b*) are ‘pure designators’, this leading in its turn to an unhealthy predominance in exact philosophy of metaphysically atomistic views (including the noumenalistic atomism of the *Tractatus*). They include the presumption that all form is logical form, so that the formal mereologies and formal ontologies of time and space which could do so much to bolster realist tendencies within exact philosophy are still minor players in the field. And above all they include Booleanism – the doctrine that, if *F* and *G* are properties, then so also are $\neg F$, $\neg G$, $F \wedge G$, $F \vee G$, $F \rightarrow G$, $F \wedge \neg G$, and so on – as if establishing the invariant structures of reality was a matter not of empirical science but of logic. So powerful is the force of this Booleanism, that even the valiant efforts of Lewis and Armstrong to fight against it with their ‘sparse theories of universals’ have thus far borne little fruit. The solution to all of these problems, however, lies at hand. It consists of freeing ourselves from predicate logic.

FORMS OF LIFE

Barry Smith, Buffalo, New York – Saarbrücken, Germany

Recent developments in the life sciences, of which the sequencing of the human genome is just one conspicuous example, call for a new philosophical examination of the fundamental categories of biology. The results of this examination are of intrinsic theoretical interest. But they can also serve practical purposes, in light of the fact that the systems for information management used to master the continuously growing flood of biomedical data are marked by a series of deep-seated problems in the handling of these fundamental categories. These problems lead to errors in coding, and they also serve as obstacles to the integration of life science data. Using the Gene Ontology (<http://www.geneontology.org/>) as my example, I will show they can be solved by means of formally rigorous theories of basic concepts such as species, individual, function, malfunction, process, fragment, sequence, expression, environment, and system. Such concepts belong to the implicit stock-in-trade of every biologist. Computerized information systems, however, demand explicitly formulated theories and definitions. To provide such theories and definitions is a task for philosophy, which is thus called upon to play an important role as intermediary between biology and informatics.

TRUTH AND EXPERIENCE: TARSKI VIS-À-VIS HUSSERL

David Woodruff Smith, Irvine, California

What is the relation between truth conditions and the intentionality of thought? Integrating elements of Tarski's theory of truth with elements of Husserl's theory of intentionality, we can model truth as a recursively structured relation of successful intentionality. Assume a statement or thought is true if and only if its content, a proposition, intentionally represents an existing state of affairs. For Wittgenstein only atomic propositions represent states of affairs. But what about logically complex propositions? Tarski showed how to define, recursively, conditions of truth for increasingly complex forms of sentence. In a Tarskian definition, what makes a complex sentence true is just the individuals (and perhaps sets) correlated appropriately with names, variables, and predicates in the sentence. Given a logically complex proposition or thought content, however, there must be some structure *in the world* that makes the proposition true – something beyond the various individuals its truth involves. That structure, I suggest, is what Husserl elusively called a "manifold": a complex *form* of things in the world, the form of a *possible world*. And that form, I want to propose, can be recursively defined in a mirror image of Tarski's model of truth definition.

BRENTANO ON INNER PERCEPTION, EVIDENCE AND INTRINSIC TRUTH

Gianfranco Soldati, Fribourg, Switzerland

Brentano is known for having introduced a notion of evidence as an epistemic quality of certain mental states, such as inner perceptions. It appears that Brentano's notion of evidence corresponds to the idea of a form of knowledge that does not presuppose belief. In order to make this form of knowledge coherent, Brentano needs to admit

the possibility of intrinsic truth, the truth a mental state can have by virtue of its mere existence, and the availability of a nominal theory of judgement, a theory that suggests that judgement, perception and desire can have one and the same content. In this talk I shall introduce the notion of a cognitively responsive judge in order to defend Brentano's position against some well-known objections.

DER MENSCH IN DER ROTEN GLASGLOCKE. EIN GLEICHNIS VON LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN

Ilse Somavilla, Innsbruck, Österreich

In einem Brief-Fragment beschreibt Wittgenstein das Dasein der Menschen mit dem Dasein in einer roten Glasglocke. In einer Metapher wird das religiöse Ideal – als das „reine, geistige Ideal“ – mit weißem Licht verglichen, die Ideale der verschiedenen Kulturen hingegen mit den gefärbten Lichtern, die entstehen, wenn das reine Licht durch das rote Glas scheint.

Anhand von Vergleichen mit Platon, Spinoza, Ferdinand Ebner und anderen Denkern soll in diesem Beitrag Wittgensteins Einstellung gegenüber Religion und Kunst nachgegangen werden.

ERLEBT UND ZUGESCHRIEBENER WILLE

Thomas Splett, München, Deutschland

Das Paper untersucht Willensvorkommnisse im Spannungsfeld zwischen erlebnishaft-introspektiver Zugänglichkeit und Analyse ihrer handlungspraktischen Rollen. Von zentraler Bedeutung hierfür ist, ob personal geleitete Handlungsinitiierung überhaupt ins Bewußtsein fällt. Libets und Wegners experimentell-kognitionswissenschaftliches Material wird gegen ihr Dafürhalten als Argument nicht für die Eliminierung personalen Willens, sondern für die Trennung von Willen und Willenserlebnis herangezogen. Die daraus folgende Ablehnung des Introspektionsansatzes scheint allerdings zu implizieren, daß zumindest unmotiviertes, arationales, spontanes Wollen epistemisch unzugänglich und seine Annahme ungerechtfertigt ist. Denn alternativ zum Zugang über Introspektion charakterisiert man Willensvorkommnisse üblicherweise anhand ihrer Rolle im rationalen Profil ihres Trägers, ausgehend von dessen Inventar an Absichten, Wünschen und Überzeugungen. In Gegenstellung hierzu umreißt das Paper Grundzüge einer Charakterisierung von Willensvorkommnissen anhand ihrer Rolle in der normativen Praxis der Zuschreibung voluntativer Einstellungen so, daß auch arationales Wollen Berücksichtigung findet und ein entsprechender Aspekt der Vorstellung von der Autorität der ersten Person bewahrt bleibt.

A. D. SMITH'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL REFUTATION OF THE ARGUMENT FROM ILLUSION

Alexander Staudacher, Magdeburg, Germany

The Argument from Illusion questions our common sense assumption that the immediate objects of perceptual awareness are physical objects. The central premise of this argument claims that whenever something appears to a subject to possess a sensory quality, there is something of which the subject is aware which does possess that quality. A. D. Smith tries to refute this premise with the help of what he calls the "phenomenological constancy" of perception. This strategy is criticized because ultimately it can't cope satisfactorily with perceptual illusions and leads to implausible consequences.

LESSONS FOR MARY

Pär Sundström, New York City – Umeå, Sweden

What could you learn if you saw a colour after being confined from birth to a black-and-white room? It turns out that this is surprisingly hard to say. I suggest that reflection on this question teaches us that colour perception has a richer content than we might have thought.

HOW IS IT POSSIBLE THAT A MENTAL REPRESENTATION CARRIES INFORMATION?

Bartłomiej Świątczak, Torun, Poland

Informational semantics faces the problem of explaining how it is possible that information is carried by a mental representation. The aim of this paper is to show potential solutions to this problem. Carrying informational content is not understood here literally as a transport of certain elements from sender to receiver but it is understood as the power of internal states to preserve their intentional properties regardless of the circumstances in which the states are instantiated.

I try to show that the only promising direction for informational semantics in its attempt of explaining how it is possible that a mental representation carries its content is appealing to factors that transcend the here-and-now of a cognitive system.

SAVING THE DISTINCTIONS: DISTINCTIONS AS THE EPISTEMOLOGICALLY SIGNIFICANT CONTENT OF EXPERIENCE

Konrad Talmont-Kaminski, Lublin, Poland
John Collier, Durban, South Africa

To account for a perceived distinction it is necessary to postulate a real distinction. Our process of experiencing the world is one of, mostly unconscious, interpretation of observed distinctions to provide us with a partial world-picture that is sufficient to guide action. The distinctions, themselves, are incorrigible (they do not have a truth

value), directly perceived, structured, and capable of being interpreted. Interpreted experience is corrigible, representational and capable of guiding action. The two aspects are present in experience together so that it is difficult to separate them out.

THE GOOD AND THE OUGHT

Christine Tappolet, Montréal, Canada

What is the relation between our value judgments and judgments about what we ought to do? According to Thomas Scanlon (1998), to judge that a thing is good is to judge that given its non evaluative characteristics, we have reason to value it positively, that is, we ought to value positively. This means that we have reasons to feel certain positive attitudes towards it or to act in certain ways with respect to it. The important point is that on this view, value concepts are reducible to the concept of *ought*. Scanlon's view contrasts with a quite natural conception, according to which our normative reasons and more generally our deontic judgements are based on value concepts. My aim is to clarify the relation between value concepts and the concept of reason, and more generally between value judgements and deontic judgements.

BRENTANO'S REVOLUTION, MEINONG'S PROGRESS AND WITTGENSTEIN'S SETBACK

Erwin Tegtmeier, Mannheim, Germany

The bane of modern philosophy is representationalism, the view that we are acquainted only with (mental) representations. It was initiated by Descartes and led via British Empiricism into German Idealism. Brentano's revolution in the 1870ties was to overcome representationalism. His keys were the discovery of the intentional relation and a clarification of the distinction between the physical and the mental, which had been blurred by empiricists and idealists. Brentano's pupil Meinong made the progress of distinguishing between the content and the object of mental acts and, more importantly still, of turning the intentional relation into a genuine connector between mind and its objects. Wittgenstein seems to have been unaware of Brentano's revolution and lapses back into representationalism (although a linguistic version) and with him all of mainstream analytical philosophy.

MEINONG ON THE EVIDENCE OF MEMORY

Mark Textor, London, Great Britain

The paper discusses Meinong's argument for the thesis that memory conjectures have a special form of immediate evidence (conjectural evidence). Meinong's view is compared with Brentano's and defended against two objections from Brentano.

CARNAP'S NOTION OF EXPLICATION AFTER WITTGENSTEIN AND STRAWSON

Paolo Tripodi, Turino, Italy

The aim of this paper is to investigate possible applications of Carnap's procedure of explication today, after the implicit criticism represented by the novel philosophical practice introduced by the later Wittgenstein and after the explicit criticism put forth by Strawson in discussing two alternative methods in philosophy: the description of the logical behaviour of actual words and the construction of axiom systems for purposes of explication. Three possible lines are drawn. According to the first, the choice of explication today is just a question of taste. According to the second, philosophy gets closer to explication when an investigated conceptual field of ordinary language has gaps to be filled out, areas without usages. The third conception of explication concerns science: the procedure is seen as an antidote for conceptual confusion in some recent scientific attempts.

DAS „FRUCHTBARE SCHWEIGEN“: DIE SPRACHKRITIK VON F. MAUTHNER, DER SPRACHTRANSCENDENTALISMUS VON L. WITTGENSTEIN UND DAS INTERPRETATIONSPROBLEM IN DER PHILOSOPHIE VON K. JASPERS

Ekaterina Tscherepanova und Jana Malkova, Ekaterinburg, Russland

Die Autorinnen des Vortrags versuchen, das Problem des „Schweigens“ in der Sprachphilosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts vorzustellen.

Die These, der hier nachgegangen werden soll, lautet: „Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen“ (TLP). Aber wir möchten diesen berühmten Satz Wittgensteins sprachphilosophisch rekontextualisieren und im Aspekt des „fruchtbaren Schweigens“ zeigen. Dabei soll v. a. die Sprachphilosophie aus der Perspektive des Schweigens in der Philosophie von L. Wittgenstein, F. Mauthner und K. Jaspers gezeigt werden.

TOLERATION AS A SPECIFIC VALUE EXPERIENCE IN LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY

Ekaterina Tscherepanova und Jana Malkova, Ekaterinburg, Russia

In the context of Ludwig Wittgenstein's moral philosophy the notion of toleration has never been studied before. That's why we attempt to investigate this value category with special reference to its applicability to the current situation of our civilization. L. Wittgenstein, in his Lectures on Ethics, states that ethics works only as a personal prospect; therefore, experience of absolute value is entirely unique and individual. It is because of that plurality of volitions that the solution of an ethical conflict implies change in a person's attitude. Hence, moral philosophy has to deal with the general relation of a person to the world rather than person's diverse actions.

In this perspective the notion of toleration may be conceived as a universal value category that is rooted in personal responses to moral values.

THE NATURE OF NONCONCEPTUAL CONTENT

Michael Tye, Austin, Texas

The thesis that experiences (most notably) perceptual experiences have nonconceptual content is quite widely accepted today. However, it is still not fully clear just what the thesis amounts to, nor why we should accept it. The purpose of this talk is to lay out a proposal about the nature of nonconceptual content, to present a variety of motivating considerations for the general nonconceptualist view, and to defend the proposal I make against one significant objection.

WARUM MAN MIT EINEM UNSINNIGEN SATZ NICHTS MEINEN KANN: ERLÄUTERUNGEN ÜBER „DAS ALTE MISSVERSTÄNDNIS, DEN BEGRIFF 'MEINEN' BETREFFEND“

Céline Vautrin, Paris, Frankreich

In *Über Gewissheit* (§ 393) wird von einem fiktiven Gesprächspartner Wittgensteins erwidert, dass er mit diesem Satz, den Wittgenstein scheinbar als Unsinn betrachtet, doch etwas *meinte*. Sein Satz solle als sinnvoll erkannt werden. Das Missverständnis besteht darin, dass das 'Meinen' als etwas Vorsprachliches verstanden wird. Wenn dieser Begriff aber auf seinen gewöhnlichen Sinn zurückgeführt wird, wird klar, dass das, was mit einem Satz *gemeint* werden kann, nichts anderes ist als das, was man als Erläuterung dieses Satzes angeben kann. Der Hinweis auf irgendein 'Meinen' kann also nicht den Mangel an einem Zusammenhang beheben, der allein dem Satz einen Sinn geben könnte.

CONSCIOUS SUBJECTS

Philippe Vellozzo, Paris, France

I defend a simple view of consciousness according to which consciousness just is phenomenal consciousness and the concept of accessibility is not a concept of consciousness. I define accessibility as a simple disposition to be used in voluntary control of action and thought. On this definition, the only inaccessible states are subpersonal states and their equivalents in non-human animals and infants. I argue that consciousness is not conceptually reducible to accessibility, because unconscious accessible states are conceivable, but that accessibility is necessary for consciousness. It follows that consciousness is basically a property of whole systems, not of states. I try finally to reinforce this conclusion by considering how the concept of a conscious subject is related to that of a person.

WITTGENSTEIN'S WAY OF WORKING AND THE NATURE OF EXPERIENCE

Nuno Venturinha, Lisbon, Portugal

This paper aims to analyse the fundamental relation between Wittgenstein's working method and his conception of philosophy as an *activity*. The Wittgenstein papers are peculiar, holding an uncommon formality. First of all, they are written in short remarks, in an aphoristic style. But there are many other significant elements along the *Nachlass*, such as the continuous undecided alternatives (open variants) or the pasted-in cuttings. These literary strategies have an unavoidable philosophical meaning, which lies in the (*in*)*determinability* of experience. I will try to set out this essential feature, inquiring into some exemplary (groups of) manuscripts and typescripts. The analysis focuses upon the "earlier" and the "later" Wittgenstein, in order to consider the different processes of *indirect communication* in both speculative stages. My purpose is to point out that Wittgenstein's writing constitutes a notable attempt to *express* the limits of an understanding about our *situation*.

MEANING AND PRACTICE

Claudine Verheggen, New York City

I argue that a proper understanding of Wittgenstein's motivations for the claim that meaning depends on linguistic practices entails that these practices must be social. However, *contra* many (if not all) commentators who attribute to Wittgenstein a social view, I further argue that this understanding suggests that the relevant practices do not have to be communitarian but can be merely interpersonal. So having a language does not essentially depend on meaning by one's words what members of one's community mean by them; it essentially depends only on having had (many of) one's words, whatever one means by them, understood by others.

DEFLATING MEINONGIANISM

Wen-fang Wang, Min-Hsiung, Taiwan

Meinong believed that if mental acts were characteristically intentional, then some of them would be about unrels. Those who agreed with Meinong on intentionality but disagreed with him on ontology believed that all cases apparently involving non-beings could be so paraphrased that no commitment to unrels is involved. The intent of this paper is to adapt and apply one of Putnam's famous model-theoretic arguments to show that such a faith in the existence of appropriate paraphrase is justified. Specifically, I will show that, under suitable assumptions, it is very easy to prove that, for every ideal Meinongian theory, there are infinitely many unintended deflationist interpretations of it whose domains contain only existents objects. I will also consider several moves possible for Meinongians to make the presumed distinction between the intended interpretation and the unintended ones, and will argue that none of them are plausible.

ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY: TWO VIEWS ON THE RELATION BETWEEN SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY IN THE ANALYTIC TRADITION

Chuck Ward, Millersville, Pennsylvania

The methods of analytic philosophy have been associated with those of science by some of its earliest and most prominent practitioners. This paper distinguishes two different conceptions of the way that philosophical analysis relates to science inquiry. The philosophy as meta-theory view is associated with Russell and Carnap and sees philosophy as distinct from empirical enquiry. This is the view most commonly associated with the early analytic tradition. An alternative, philosophy as hyper-theory view can be found in various forms in the work of Whitehead, Woodger and Quine (and perhaps others). The latter view sees philosophical analysis as a part of scientific enquiry. Or, more precisely it sees both as parts of a complex activity aimed at the proper understanding of the natural world.

WHERE AFTER ALL ARE THE MEANINGS? A DEFENSE OF INTERNALISM. SEARLE VERSUS PUTNAM

Christian Helmut Wenzel,
Munich, Germany – Nantou Hsien, Taiwan

There has been a recent dispute between Putnam and Searle over whether meanings are "in the head". Putnam makes use of Twin Earth thought experiments to show that our mental states alone cannot determine what we refer to (and thus "mean") and that we also rely on external factors, which are not "in the head". This suggests to me that in some way we mean more than we actually know. Searle on the other hand makes use of what he calls "Intentional contents", "conditions of satisfaction" and "self-referentiality" to show that meanings can be said to be in the head. It seems to me that an internalist account as we find it in Husserl or Searle is closer to what is going on when we mean something.

EIN BEITRAG ZU EINER SYSTEMATOLOGIE DES WISSENSCHAFTSSYSTEMS

Harald A. Wiltsche, Graz, Österreich

Die wissenschaftstheoretische Diskussion des 20. und frühen 21. Jahrhunderts erweckt den Eindruck, ein Kampf zweier Wissenschaftskulturen zu sein, ganz so, wie dies C.P. Snow 1959 konzediert hatte. Die Auseinandersetzungen im Bereich der Psychologie, der Ökonomie, der Soziologie und der Geschichtswissenschaft gehören inzwischen zu den Klassikern der Wissenschaftstheorie und noch immer haben wir es mit einem Feld höchst unterschiedlicher Konzeptionen zu tun, die allesamt für sich in Anspruch nehmen, mehr oder minder große Teile dessen, was wir das Wissenschaftssystem nennen wollen, erklären und ordnen zu können.

Der Autor möchte einen Theorieansatz vorstellen, der sich selbst nicht als eine weitere Facette im Dickicht wissenschaftstheoretischer Positionen versteht, sondern die Pluralität bestehender Theorien als Faktum akzeptiert und vom systematologischen Standpunkt aus hinsichtlich struktureller Implikationen analysiert.

Zu diesem Zweck wird das 1929 erschienene Werk *Die Anarchie der philosophischen Systeme* des österreichischen Philosophen Franz Kröner vorgestellt, das einen zentralen Ausgangspunkt für die geplante Systematologie des Wissenschaftssystems darstellt. Auf dieser Basis wird nach einer möglichen Kompatibilität zur Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls und zur Sinntheorie Niklas Luhmanns gefragt.

SEARLE, BURGE AND INTENTIONAL CONTENT

Maciej Witek, Zielona Góra, Poland

In his *Intentionality* John R. Searle develops an internalistic account of the intentional content of perceptual acts. Tyler Burge in his essay "Vision and Intentional Content" argues that the account is incoherent because there is a mismatch between Searle's direct realism and his alleged claim that we are able to experience our inner experiences. Responding to Burge, Searle points out that he has never embraced the latter claim.

In my paper I analyse arguments developed by Searle and Burge. The conclusions I draw are methodological rather than substantive. First, there is a general pattern behind Searle's responses to Burge and to the scepticism about perceptual knowledge. What justifies the pattern is the externalist account of knowledge. Second, Searle's account of intentional content seems to conflict with the doctrine of privileged self-knowledge.

THE NORMATIVITY OF INTENTIONALITY

Julie Yoo, Easton, Pennsylvania

Davidson has been instrumental in dampening the prospect of reductively explaining the mind. The core of his arguments turns upon his insistence that contentful mental states, the bread and butter of folk psychology, have a "normative element." In spite of its pivotal role, as well as its intrinsic interest, the concept is very poorly developed and understood. This paper attempts to discern four different strands of the normativity of intentionality and to spark a long overdue systematic examination of a fascinating and significant thesis.

A MINIMALIST ONTOLOGY OF ACTION

Leo Zaibert, Parkside, Wisconsin

Traditional theories of action tend to presuppose a rather complicated ontology. Some contemporary attempts succeed in simplifying the overcrowded ontology. One such attempt, John Searle's is defended here, as better than its alternatives. On Searle's account, 'actions' are simply states of affairs which satisfy one specific type of intentional states, intentions. While I applaud Searle's ontological parsimony, his theory of action is as incapable of solving some important problems associated with the normative assessment of actions as are other theories of action.

WITTGENSTEIN ON THE FALLACY OF THE ARGUMENT FROM PRETENCE

Edoardo Zamuner,
Edinburgh, Great Britain – Bologna, Italy

This paper is concerned with the answer Wittgenstein gives to a specific version of the sceptical problem of other minds. The sceptic claims that the expressions of feelings and emotions can always be pretended. Wittgenstein contrasts this idea with two arguments. The first argument shows that other-ascriptions of psychological states are justified by experience of the satisfaction of criteria. The second argument shows that if one accepts the conclusion of the first argument, then one is compelled to accept the idea that pretence is justifiably ascribed on the same evidential basis, which justifies any other-ascriptions. The two arguments show that other-ascriptions of psychological states and pretence-ascriptions share the same evidential basis. This allows Wittgenstein to say that the sceptic's appeal to the possibility of pretence implies a contradiction.

**ON THE RELATION BETWEEN
METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY.
FROM HUSSERLIAN ANTIREALISM TO
ANALYTIC ANTIMETAPHYSICALISM
AND THE ALTERNATIVE OF
EPISTEMIC EXTERNALISM**

André Zdunek, Basel, Switzerland

I argue that the philosophical systems of Husserlian phenomenology and of important strands of analytic philosophy are shaped by solutions to the problem of knowledge that metaphysical realism poses. This reveals continuity between phenomenology and analytic philosophy in form of a common systematic issue. The Husserlian solution is antirealism, the analytic solution is antimetaphysicalism. I start with the systematic exposition of the relation between metaphysics and epistemology and derive the problem realism poses for knowledge. Then I introduce the antirealist solution of Husserlian phenomenology and the antimetaphysical solutions of Carnap and Quine as representatives of analytic philosophy. Finally I want to defend a realist solution under the presupposition of epistemic externalism, an epistemological position having come to prominence in analytic philosophy rather recently.

**VISUELLE ERFAHRUNG UND KOMPETENZ
IM KÜNSTLERISCHEN FELD**

Tasos Zembylas, Wien, Österreich

Genauso wie Lesekompetenz, die mehr als bloße Lesefähigkeit bedeutet, die Grundvoraussetzung für textuelle Kompetenz darstellt, erfordert der Umgang mit visuellem Material ein spezifisches, praktisches Können. Dieses ist für die aktive Partizipation im künstlerischen Feld und im Weiteren in der visuellen Kultur unserer Gegenwart von zentraler Bedeutung. Der Vortrag wird sich auf die epistemologische Analyse des Könnens und Kennens, die eine visuelle Kompetenz – speziell in der Kunst – konstituieren, konzentrieren.

MORAL PHENOMENOLOGY

Gloria L. Zúñiga, Grand Rapids – Allendale, Michigan

The argument I defend is that not only ethics *can* be put into words, but that it *must* be put into words because there are moral facts in the world that serve as truth-settling conditions for moral propositions. These moral facts are intrinsically apprehensible, but our apprehension of them is not infallible. Consequently, our correct recognition of moral value in conduct, states of affairs, or in things may be passed over and obscured if not called forth by the evaluative mechanism involved in making moral judgments of value. I shall demonstrate that Natural Law moral theory provides the best framework of reference for such an evaluative mechanism.



Meine Bank in Kirchberg

Andreas Bächli / Klaus Petrus (Eds.)

Monism

Series: *Philosophical Analysis*, Vol. 9

ISBN 3-937202-19-6, Hardcover 340 pp., € 70,00

Herbert Hochberg / Kevin Mulligan (Eds.)

Relations and Predicates

Series: *Philosophical Analysis*, Vol. 11

ISBN 3-937202-51-X, Hardcover, ca. 250 pp., € 74,00

Mark Siebel / Mark Textor (Hrsg.)

Semantik und Ontologie

Beiträge zur philosophischen Forschung

Series: *Philosophical Research*, Vol. 2

ISBN 3-937202-43-9, Hardcover, 445 pp., € 93,00

Christoph Halbig / Christian Suhm (Hrsg.)

Was ist wirklich?

Neuere Beiträge zu Realismusdebatten
in der Philosophie

Series: *Epistemische Studien*, Vol. 3

ISBN 3-937202-28-5, Paperback, 446 pp., € 32,00

André Fuhrmann / Erik J. Olsson (Hrsg.)

Pragmatisch denken

Series: *Epistemische Studien*, Vol. 4

ISBN 3-937202-46-3 Hardcover, 380 pp., € 84,00

Pedro Schmechtig

Sprache, Einstellung und Rationalität

Eine Untersuchung zu den Rationalitäts-
bedingungen von Einstellungs- Zuschreibungen

Series: *Epistemische Studien*, Vol. 5

ISBN 3-937202-56-0, Hardcover, 380 pp., € 89,00

Peter Schaber (Ed.)

Normativity and Naturalism

Series: *Practical Philosophy*, Vol. 5

ISBN 3-937202-41-2, Hardcover, 250 pp., € 42,00

Hans Kelsen

A New Kind of Sciences?

A Contribution to the Critique of Ideology

Edited by Eckhart Arnold

Series: *Practical Philosophy*, Vol. 6

ISBN 3-937202-50-1, Hardcover, ca. 200 pp., € 69,00

ontos verlag

P.O. Box 1541 • D-63133 Heusenstamm nr. Frankfurt

www.ontosverlag.com • info@ontosverlag.com

United Kingdom by: Gazelle Books, White Cross Mills,
Hightown, LA1 4XS Lancaster

North and South America by: Transaction Books

www.transactionpub.com

Arkadiusz Chrudzimski / Wolfgang Huemer (Eds.)

Phenomenology and Analysis

Essays in Central European Philosophy

Series: *Phenomenology & Mind*, Vol. 1

ISBN 3-937202-36-6, Paperback, 350 pp., € 32,00

Ingvar Johansson

Ontological Investigations

An Inquiry into the Categories of Nature,
Man and Society

Series: *Reprint Philosophy*, Vol. 4

ISBN 3-937202-42-0, Hardcover, 380 pp., € 89,00

Michel Weber (Ed.)

After Whitehead

Rescher on Process Metaphysics

Series: *Process Thought*, Vol. 1

ISBN 3-937202-49-8, Hardcover, 339 pp., € 89,00

Manuel Bremer / Daniel Cohnitz

Information and Information Flow

An Introduction

Series: *Linguistics & Philosophy*, Vol. 3

ISBN 3-937202-47-1, Paperback, 186 pp., € 25,00

Michel Weber

La dialectique de l'intuition chez Alfred North Whitehead

Introduction à la lecture de

Process and Reality (1929)

Préface de Jean Ladrière

Series: *Chromatique Whiteheadienne*, Vol. 1

ISBN 3-937202-55-2, Hardcover, 350 pp., € 75,00

Michael Esfeld / Jean-Marc Tétaz (Hrsg.)

Genealogie des neuzeitlichen Denkens

Festschrift für Ingeborg Schüssler

ISBN 3-937202-30-7, Hardcover, 483 pp., € 30,00

