Abstracts

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PICTURING SEMANTIC RELATIONS
Terje Aaberge, Sogndal, Norway

The paper presents a construction of the metalanguage of an object language endowed with an intensional interpretation, the kind of interpretation naturally associated with the picture theory. The construction is canonical and the result possesses some attractive properties. In fact, unlike Tarski’s its truth conditions do not lead to an infinite regress. It is then shown how the intensional interpretation scheme fits into Wittgenstein’s general conception about language and its objects.

SEEING-AS, SEEING-IN, SEEING-WITH: LOOKING THROUGH IMAGES
Emmanuel Alloa

In the constitution of contemporary image theory, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy has become a key reference. This paper would like to critically assess some of the advantages as well as some of the quandaries in using Wittgenstein’s concept of “seeing-as” for addressing the plural realities of images. Three modalities of iconic vision will subsequently be analyzed in the paper: the propositional seeing-as, the projective seeing-in and the medial seeing-with.

THE AESTHETIC COMMITMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS
Marilena Andronico, Ferrara, Italy

What is Wittgenstein saying when he claims that a philosophical investigation resembles an aesthetic investigation? What do aesthetic issues and conceptual issues have in common? I would like to show that, for Wittgenstein, a certain kind of aesthetic experience is presupposed in philosophical analysis as he comes to conceive of it in the Thirties. It is the experience of becoming receptive to grammatical facts, and pursuing the exactness of expression that characterizes the language of poetry.

INTENTION IN AESTHETICS
Alberto Arruda, Lisbon, Portugal

I will try to give an account of the concept of intention as it is used in the field of aesthetics. I will focus mainly on Wittgenstein’s Lectures on Aesthetics, trying to explain some of the insights, I believe, he has provided on the use of this fundamental concept. This implies, that we first take into account the various differences in the use of the concept of justification, since intention is often used in aesthetics as a form of justification. Secondly, we have to try to understand how intention could possibly be of some help in trying to understand the meaning of a certain aesthetical object or action. Thirdly, I will offer a way of looking at intention in aesthetics, as a way of manifesting an attitude, trying to claim that this is fundamental to this particular activity.

AS FAR AS THE EYE CAN REACH: COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN THE INTERMEDIATE WITTGENSTEIN
Rafael Lopes Azize, Piauí, Brazil

From Wittgenstein’s calculus period to the language games period, the gradations internal to the multiple forms of phenomena migrate to the criteria themselves. The applicability of the calculus metaphor weakens, as the vision metaphor gains in importance. In this context, can one still speak of complete analysis? Yes, but with some qualifications. This paper addresses these qualifications.

WITTGENSTEIN ON THE QUESTION OF BEING: WHERE KIERKEGAARDIAN PATHS MEET
Jonathan Beale, Reading, United Kingdom

In a mysterious and controversial remark made in conversation with Friedrich Waismann on 30 December 1929, we see the only occurrence in any of Wittgenstein’s remarks of both Heidegger’s and Kierkegaard’s names. Yet in spite of the controversy this has generated, little attention has been paid to the charge of nonsense that Wittgenstein appears to bring here against Heidegger; thus, the supporting argument that may be latent in this remark has not yet been properly unearthed. In this paper I argue that here we see Wittgenstein put forward an argument against the central question of Heidegger’s philosophy: the question of the meaning (Sinn) of being. Through analysis of this remark and some of Wittgenstein’s early writings, I argue that this clash between Heidegger and Wittgenstein can be understood as the result of their taking different Kierkegaardian paths that meet one another.

SEEING QUALITONS AS QUALIA A DIALOGUE WITH WITTGENSTEIN ON PRIVATE EXPERIENCE, SENSE DATA AND THE ONTOLOGY OF MIND
Hilan Bensusan / Eros Carvalho, Brasilia, Brazil

In this paper we put forward the thesis that qualia are tropes (or qualitons), and not (universal) properties. Further, we maintain that Wittgenstein hints in this direction. We also find in Wittgenstein elements of an account of language acquisition that takes the presence of qualia as an enabling condition. We conclude by pointing out some difficulties of this view.
LITERATURE: PICTURE, LANGUAGE GAME, PICTURE AGAIN
Ondrej Beran, Prague, Czech Republic

The paper discusses possible analyses of literature in the framework of Wittgenstein’s views on language. The analysis of fiction as picture in the Tractarian sense, though interesting and possibly fruitful, is not without problems. The analysis of it as language game presents it as a defective, private-language-like type of game. However, picturing can be understood as certain function of language games, expressed especially strongly particularly in ‘literary’ utterances.

PICTURING MYSELF: A WITTGENSTEINIAN CONCEPTION OF THE ARTIST’S SELF PORTRAIT
Cecilia B. Beristain, Munich, Germany

It is the aim of this paper to look at the visual artistic self portrait from the point of view of the late Wittgenstein. Specifically, with his dissolution of the ‘inner/outter’ dichotomy, the metaphysic language which artists use to talk about their self portraits can be seen as indescrivable in contrast to what is actually shown in their paintings. In order to achieve this task, notions of artists on how they talk about their self portraits will be mentioned. Consequently, it will be argued with Wittgenstein’s reflections on the ‘inner’ and the ‘outer’ that, independently of what the painter claims about her self portrait, it is in the painting that she expresses no more and no less than what is there to show about herself. In correlation to this, the artistic view of the self portrait in connection to the ‘introspection’ will be seen from a Wittgensteinian perspective.

MIMIKRY. BIOLOGIE DES IMAGINÄREN
Peter Berz, Berlin, Deutschland


EINSTELLUNG, ASPECT AND HINGES IN WITTGENSTEIN’S WORK
Pierluigi Biancini, Palermo, Italy

The paper has its point in a section of the remarks dedicated to the theme of aspect seeing in Wittgenstein’s work, especially those devoted to the distinction between aspects and aspects of organization. This kind of aspect plays the role of a grammatical ground, a sort of frame that organizes the discourse constituting a field of possibilities for its meaning. Taking the step from two imagined and apparently different language games, the first theoretical, the second practical, I combine them in a unique category thanks to the analogy between aspects of organization and Einstellungen, practical dispositions showed in any kind of behaviour, that function like the hinges of the game. This grammatical level, strictly embedded in the language game, gives us the opportunity to take the conclusion that in Wittgenstein’s thought action and perception are one and the same process of constituting the grammar of our language.

INNEN UND AUSSEN, DIAGRAMMATISCH
Steffen Bogen, Konstanz, Deutschland


WITTGENSTEIN ÜBER DIE ROLLE DER ASPEKTWÄHRNEHMUNG FÜR DAS VERSTEHEN VON KUNST
Yves Bossard, Aachen, Deutschland

WITTGENSTEIN, GRAMMAR AND RESPONSE-DEPENDENCE

Tracy Bowell, Hamilton, New Zealand

Significant similarities can be found between Wittgenstein’s views on grammar and response-dependence accounts of concept use and acquisition. Such similarities may be unsurprising since Phillip Pettit’s response-dependence account of concept acquisition was first developed as a response to the rule-following conundrum (in its Kripkensteinian form). However, very little further work has been undertaken at the intersections of the literature of response-dependence and Wittgenstein’s work. I want here to bring response-dependence into productive conversation with Wittgenstein’s work: A consideration of key aspects of a response-dependence approach in the light of Wittgenstein’s remarks on grammar and on the nature and role of hinge propositions adds perspicuity and plausibility to the response-dependence approach, while also showing that that approach fits comfortably within a Wittgensteinian framework.

WIE STARK HÄNGEN MIKROSKOPIE-BILDER VON THEORIEN AB?

Tobias Breidenmoser, Rostock, Deutschland


THE LINGUISTIC STATUS OF ISOTYPE

Christopher Burke, Reading, United Kingdom

It is ironic that Otto Neurath, one of those responsible for the ‘linguistic turn’ in philosophy of the twentieth century, should have been concerned during the last twenty years of his life with developing a ‘pictorial language’. By using simplified pictograms as components, the Wiener Methode der Bildstatistik (later called Isotype) bypassed verbal language to a great extent, creating the potential for universal understanding of biological, social and economic correlations. However, despite its consistency and rigour, Isotype was not a complete language, and Neurath knew that it never could be. This paper will examine the linguistic characteristics of Isotype and describe the deliberate resistance on the part of its creators to develop a full theory behind it.

ARE IMAGES IN THE TRACTATUS ISOMORPHIC TO FACTS?

Marco Carapezza, Palermo, Italy

The notion of image (Bild) is a fundamental one in the Tractatus. This notion is immediately introduced in the text after the brief ontological section, because it serves to give an account in logical terms of our relationship with the world. The relationship between fact and image is generally considered a relationship governed by a form of isomorphism. Here I want to maintain that it is not a matter isomorphism, but instead of homomorphism.

LINKING DISPOSITION ASCRIPTIONS AND CONDITIONALS: A WITTGENSTEINIAN APPROACH

Kai-Yuan Cheng, Chia-Yi, Taiwan

The main purpose of this paper is to invoke some of the images about language used in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigation to illuminate the meaning of disposition ascriptions such as ‘This glass is fragile’. Philosophers have commonly agreed that a disposition ascription is linked in some way to a conditional of some sort, for example, “If this glass were struck, it would break”. However, exactly how to explicate the link in question remains unclear and controversial. I propose that we take a Wittgensteinian approach to tackle this issue. By doing so, we may obtain a fresh and broader perspective to look at what a disposition ascription means and how it relates to other terms such as counterfactual conditionals and ceteris paribus.

SEEING STYLES AS

Robert Chodat, Boston, USA

In recent years, literary critics and theorists have turned increasingly toward cognitive science as a model, including in discussions of literary style. As in cognitive science generally, such discussions frequently use the vocabulary of “information” to describe how a writer's style is grasped by an audience. Such an approach to literary style—and by extension, any other aesthetic phenomenon—is deeply misleading. Most obviously it ignores the genuine puzzle-ment that can be initiated by the syntax and diction of actual texts. Wittgenstein’s discussion of aspect-seeing gives us a much better idea of how our encounters with styles are experienced in practice, providing a way to describe both the struggle we feel in the face of an unfamiliar style as well as the effortlessness that we feel at other times, when confronted in other, more familiar sorts of texts.
GESTALT SWITCH, ILLUSION AND EPISTEMIC SWITCH
Tadeusz Czarnecki, Cracow, Poland

I pose the question whether perceptual beliefs remain perceptual after inferential re-interpretations. I consider three types of seeing-as. First, the Gestalt switch which is in accordance with phenomena. Secondly, a corrected illusory belief, the paradigm of the epistemic switch which is against phenomena. Thirdly, Sellers’ examples of the epistemic switch which involve principles of inference of various syntheticity. I conclude that much depends on whether the principles violate the phenomenal or ontological identity of perceived objects.

LITERARISCHE FORM, GEGENSTANDS- UND FORM-VERFAHREN
Franz Josef Czernin, Rettenegg, Österreich

In his Brown Book Wittgenstein differentiates between a transitive and an intransitive use of the word meaning. Drawing from this distiction I will describe form- and subject-depending procedures in literary texts and their propositional as well as their non-propositional functions. I then will analyse a special kind of implicature (in the sense Paul Grice uses this term) that can be communicated through the subjects of a literary text and seems to me characteristic not only for literary texts, but also for works of art in general.

EMERGING MORAL PATTERNS: READING ROSS IN THE LIGHT OF WITTGENSTEIN
Soroush Dabbagh, Tehran, Iran

In this paper, firstly, Russian ethics is presented as an example of the modest-generalistic position. Secondly, an account drawn from Wittgenstein which is dubbed ‘the metaphysical account’ is presented, according to which, we as language-users are answerable to different patterns of word use. Finally, I suggest that we can read Russian ethics in the light of the metaphysical account of Wittgenstein.

PICTURES OF IMAGES AND IMAGES OF PICTURES
Whitney Davis, Berkeley, CA, USA

The talk deals with the interaction between – the recursion of – depiction as a representation of imaging (natural vision and “mental imagery”) and the imaging (the natural vision and mnemonic [re]visualization) of pictures. This interaction or recursion is historical; it takes time, it requires work, it varies in agent’s experience, and it can fail. It is often overlooked by psychology, philosophy, history, or art theory that concentrate exclusively either on imaging (seeing, visualizing) or on depiction (including modes of representation, such as linear perspective, and media, such as painting), despite the fact that pictures must be imaged in a certain way in order for their pictoriality to be seen (for them even to be seen as pictures) and images must be pictured in a certain way for the information available in them to be realized, replicated, and retrieved. Particular interactions or recursions between imaging and picturing are constituted socially within historical forms of life, and can therefore be regarded as culturally variable despite biopsychological and logical-semiotic constants in image structure and pictorial representation. In historical social life, the interaction between imaging and picturing is phenomenally experienced at a particular standpoint, a physical location of embodied seeing or viewing to which the basic interaction is usually oriented intentionally. Once the context of a standpoint in a form of life has dissipated, changed, or disappeared, however, the interaction or recursion between imaging and picturing ceases to be visible in itself as human visuality. Instead it must become the object of analytic and historical reconstruction—the proper activity of “visual-cultural studies” as conducted by art historians and others. Nonetheless it can be assumed that such reconstruction is also constantly carried out in our daily intercourse with pictures: their recursions in imaging must be discovered and replicated.

ON THE MEANING OF “METHOD” IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS
Enzo De Pellegrin, Vienna, Austria

According to the later Wittgenstein, the principal path to the resolution of a philosophical problem is to subject the terms in which it is stated to rigorous criticism. The general form such criticism takes in the Philosophical Investigations (PI) is determined by Wittgenstein’s genetic conception of a philosophical problem as the result of some kind of misunderstanding as to how our language works. In my talk I consider specific features of this approach, as witnessed in Wittgenstein’s criticism of the idea that vagueness renders concepts unfit for linguistic use. After addressing some well-known exegetical problems, I examine the modes of critical investigation Wittgenstein deploys in this case. In order to identify the limits of his criticism I then turn to relevant general remarks on his methodology in PI. Finally, I propose to view these general remarks as regulative principles rather than as self-standing explanations of the later Wittgenstein’s Sprachkritik.

ADORNOS KONZEPT MIMETISCHEN VERHALTENS – EIN KOMMENTAR MIT WITTGENSTEIN
Nicolas Dierks, Lüneburg, Deutschland

PEIRCE AND WITTGENSTEIN: ON DIAGRAMS AND PICTURES; MAKING SENSE OF LOGICAL AND ONTOLOGICAL FORM
Randall R. Dipert, Buffalo, NY, USA

The connections between C. S. Peirce (1839–1914) and Wittgenstein might at first seem very tenuous, such as that both read and admired works of William James. Yet in 1868 Peirce offered a critique of Cartesian skepticism that is strikingly like one later offered by Wittgenstein in On Certainty (and since articulated independently by David Lewis and Michael Williams) – that real doubts must be understood only through reference to known, restricted errors rather than as universal pseudo-doubt. More striking still is the careful attention Peirce and Wittgenstein paid to the philosophical relevance of pictures, diagrams, and the way these can express logical and ontological form. I investigate their robust accounts of these phenomena at some length. While Wittgenstein eventually dropped this approach, Peirce developed it in myriad ways; I hypothesize about the deep philosophical and metaphysical reasons why they parted ways.

RUHE, VERGNÜGEN UND SELBSTERKENNTNIS IN DER PHILOSOPHIE
Tomáš Došek, Brno, Tschechien


REPRESENTING ATTITUDES: A PLEA FOR A RELATIONAL APPROACH
Dušan Dožudić, Zagreb, Croatia

In this paper I examine Schiffer’s reply to the substitution failure argument against the view of propositional attitude reports according to which attitude verbs are relations and ‘that’-clauses singular terms. Schiffer relies on the comparison of the substitution failure in attitude reports with the substitution failure in appositions because both result in ill-formed constructions. I discuss some objections to Schiffer and argue that they fail to undermine his reply. I conclude that Schiffer’s argumentation based on the apposition case supports relational approach and weakens the Substitution Problem.

FORM UND INHALT IN DER MUSIK – WITTGENSTEINS BEITRAG ZU EINEM ZENTRALEN MUSIKPHILOSOPHISCHEN PROBLEM
Katrin Eggers, Hannover, Deutschland


A NOTE ON THE HISTORY OF F. A. VON HAYEK’S UNPUBLISHED ‘SKETCH OF A BIOGRAPHY OF LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN’
Christian Erbacher, Bergen, Norway

The von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives in Helsinki (WWA) at the University of Helsinki provide a large amount of copies, drafts and an extensive collection of correspondence connected to Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. Among these documents is a sketch of a biography of Wittgenstein written by Friedrich August von Hayek, Nobel laureate and distant relative of Wittgenstein. The sketch covers 45 typewritten pages and is accompanied by at least 40 additional items in the WWA related to its genesis and eventual abandonment. The paper presents the short story of von Hayek’s biographical sketch as it appears from this material.

WORKSHOP 2: WITTGENSTEINS BILDBEGRIFF IM MS 115
Christian Erbacher, Bergen, Norwegen
Herbert Hrachovec, Wien, Österreich
Heinz Wilhelm Krüger, Bergen, Norwegen


SAYING AND SHOWING IN ART.
THE ETHICAL MOMENT IN AESTHETICS.
EGON SCHIELE’S WORKS IN PRISON AS A SAMPLE CASE
Carla Carmona Escalera, Seville, Spain

We propose that Schiele’s oeuvre is on the frontlines of the battle between saying and showing specified by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*. We will show how Schiele’s oeuvre could be understood as a tacit response to the ethical demands to which the philosopher yielded all his work.

HUME’S PROBLEM, OCCAM’S RAZOR, AND WITTGENSTEIN’S STANDPOINT OF COMMON SENSE
August Fenk, Klagenfurt, Austria

Wittgenstein was a critic of scepticism and wanted to teach us (§464) “to turn a piece of unclear nonsense into clear nonsense”. Is Hume’s problem such a piece of unclear nonsense? Hume argues that a hitherto ever so regular course of nature alone, “without some new argument or inference”, does not prove that “it will continue so”. Two counter-arguments: (a) Epistemologically relevant changes in the “course of nature” are an elusive idea, and any respective inference would presuppose the validity of the very same inductive principles questioned by Hume. (b) The following “reversal” of Hume’s argument can be justified by using Occam’s razor: Without some new argument or inference it is vain to speculate that the course of nature would not continue so. Both counter-arguments are related to other pragmatic dissolutions of Hume’s problem, to Wittgenstein’s standpoint of common sense, and to the evolution of knowledge systems in general.

IMAGINING SCIENTIFIC OBJECTS AS A BRIDGE BETWEEN METAPHYSICS AND SCIENCE
Luis Flores, Santiago de Chile, Chile

I define: 1) “imaginary objects” as objects produced by scientific imagination for understanding phenomena: metaphors, analogies, models and reductions are networks in which these objects appear. 2) “metaphysics” as a type of background thinking about categories and principles of reality. 3) “phenomena” as real things insofar as they are perceived, according to certain parameters, by a scientific observer. – My claim is that scientific imagination builds, according to rules of abstraction, combination and idealization, a map of possible worlds with the fictional objects implicit in scientific hypotheses. The problem is how to choose among these objects. The solution concerns not only experimentation or theory, but also the connection of new objects with categories and principles of metaphysical reflection.

DAS PROBLEM DER ANWENDUNG BEI GADAMER UND WITTGENSTEIN
Florian Franken, Berlin, Deutschland

In der Anwendung hermeneutischen Verstehens wird die Frage des Verhältnisses von Allgemeinem zum Besonderen virulent, die schon von Aristoteles in Hinsicht auf die Konkretisierung ethischen Verhaltens in Anschlag gebracht wurde. Die These ist, dass dieses Verhältnis auch im Verständnis des späten Wittgenstein in Hinblick auf die Anwendung von Sprache thematisch wird. Konstuiert sich sprachliches Verstehen durch das Applizieren eines allgemeinen Regelwissens? Haben wir es in diesem Zusammenhang mit einem vorgängigen Wissen zu tun und wie lässt sich die Konkretisierung dieses Wissens verstehen? In diesen Fragen zeigen sich Konvergenzen zum hermeneutischen Verständnisses Gadamer’s, die entlang der Aspekte Form, Zweck und Gemeinschaftlichkeit des Wissens skizziert werden.

ÜBER MEHRDEUTIGE UND NICHT MEHRDEUTIGE BILDER
Georg Friedrich, Graz, Österreich


INDEPENDENCE VS. COMPOSSIBILITY
Ralf Funke, Hamburg, Germany

Wittgenstein and Leibniz had a radically different view on the ultimate constituents of the world and resulting from this on the ontological status of the actual world in contrast to possible worlds. Whereas Leibniz thought that the world (the actual world) was chosen “as a whole” by God out of infinitely many alternative possible worlds, Wittgenstein believed that the world was a random conglomerate of mutually compatible “states of affairs”. For Leibniz no part of the actual world could be identical to a part of a different world. For Wittgenstein every part of the world had exact counterparts in other worlds. They both agreed on the importance of logic though, and they both shared a desire to explain the nature of contingency.
THROWING AWAY THE LADDER BEFORE CLIMBING IT
Dimitris Gakis, Amsterdam, Netherlands

The paper discusses some aspects of the New Wittgenstein debate, using Tractatus 6.54 as its starting point. First a brief genealogical account of the ladder metaphor employed in 6.54 is provided. Then Wittgenstein’s later rejection of the metaphor is considered and its consequences for the issue of continuity in his thought, especially in relation to his metaphilosophical stance, are investigated. Next, a critical account is given of some of the key moves of resolute readers concerning the way they treat metaphysics, ethics and therapy in the Tractatus. Finally, some features of the resolute readings are discussed with regard to the relation of early Wittgenstein’s thought to the tradition of modernity.

WITTGENSTEIN’S CONCEPTION OF LANGUAGE IN TEACHING AND IN THE COMPREHENSION OF CONCEPTS
Cristiane Gottschalk, São Paulo, Brazil

How are our concepts, in general, formed and understood? This is a question that deserved Wittgenstein’s attention, at the moment in which he perceived that the role of language is not reduced to communication, but also has one constitutive function in the process of the meaning of our experience. This new “linguistic turn” in his thinking brought him to a struggle against the dogmatism present in philosophical positions that are based on one exclusively referential conception of language. I think that this struggle extends to the educational field, when we see the uses of concepts that presuppose ultimate foundations in the acquisition of our knowledge, situated in the ideal, mental or empirical domains, establishing an image of meaning that determines, even today, the educational policies: the image that there would be extralinguistic meanings that can be naturally achieved through a teaching method.

DARSTELLUNGSWEISEN.
EINE NOTIZ ZUM § 50 DER PHILOSOPHISCHEN UNTERSUCHUNGEN
Frederik Gierlinger, Wien, Österreich

Im § 50 der Philosophischen Untersuchungen findet sich die kontroverse Aussage “man kann von einem Ding nicht aussagen, es sei 1 m lang, noch, es sei nicht 1 m lang, und das ist das Urmeter in Paris.” Während Saul Kripke annimmt, diese Aussage sei falsch, bringen Gordon Baker und Peter Hacker Gründe vor, anzunehmen, sie sei richtig. Anstatt Seite zu beziehen, schlage ich in diesem Aufsatz vor, dass Wittgensteins Analyse nicht den Inhalt der Aussage, sondern ihre Form im Auge hat.

BILD, SAGEN, ZEIGEN.
WITTGENSTEINS VISUELLES DENKEN
Fabian Goppelsröder


THINKING WITH THE ENVIRONMENT.
LANGUAGE, PICTURES AND OTHER GUIDES FOR THE EXTENDED MINDS
Hajo Greif, Klagenfurt, Austria

According to Clark and Chalmers (1998), the environment plays an active role in cognition, forming a “coupled system” with the organism. Memory devices (e.g., notebooks) and language appear as the paradigmatic extensions of a mind that recruits features of its environment as cognitive resources or “epistemic tools” (Sterelny 2004). On the background of the authors’ choice of examples, two questions concerning the concept of the coupled system are discussed in this paper: Firstly, do these examples really support the idea of a coupled system, as they make their appearance as external instruments of cognition? Secondly, in which ways could other kinds of cognitive resources in the environment function as extensions of the mind – probably even as their paradigm? – To answer these questions, three clarifications of the role of the environment in cognition are suggested: the implications of the public use of cognitive resources, such as language, maps and pictures; the import of direct guidance of action through detecting patterns in the environment; and the modification of the environment in the course of interacting with it.
WITTGENSTEIN’S PICTURE THEORY OF LANGUAGE AS A KEY TO MODERN PHYSICS
Hans Herlof Grelland, Ågder, Norway

In this paper I pose the following question: how can we understand modern physics, which is completely dependent on mathematics for its expression, and where the mathematical symbolism has no obvious correspondence with our images of physical objects? This problem is particularly acute in quantum physics and has stimulated a vast amount of discussion and research on what is called the interpretation problem. I argue that Wittgenstein’s Tractatus provides a key to understanding of such theories by explaining how a mathematical language can be meaningful in a linguistic sense. I further argue that such an approach to the interpretation problem corresponds closely to the position of quantum pioneer P. A. M. Dirac, famous for his silence on the interpretation problem, which I identify as exactly the kind of silence Wittgenstein recommends in Tractatus, 7.

„DAS DENKEN IST GANZ MIT DEM ZEICHNEN VON BILDERN ZU VERGLEICHEN.“
ZUR BEDEUTUNG DES ZEICHNERISCHEN IN LUDWIG WITTGENSTEINS PHILOSOPHIE
Hana Gründler, Firenze, Italien


DEVELOPMENT OF PICTURE STATISTICS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN THE 1930s
Lada Hanzelinová, Pilsen, Czech Republic

The development of pictorial statistics in Czechoslovakia in the early 1930s was associated with the name Augustin Tschinkel. This graphic artist was an associate member of Ge-Wi-Mu and co-developer of the publication Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft. After his return to Czechoslovakia, he was a co-author of publications that use pictorial statistics graphs. Tschinkel had a clear idea of graphical representations of reality, and perhaps therefore his method of image statistics differs from the Vienna method. The single article of Otto Neurath in the Czech language called „Obrazová statistika – metoda zrakové výchovy“ (Visual statistics – a method of visual education) is not accompanied by original illustrations of the Vienna method. In former Czechoslovakia no charts were made using the original Vienna method. So we cannot talk about any expansion of the Vienna method in the Czech country. We can state that in former Czechoslovakia this method was not expanded, only the idea of adding text to graphic painting or another type of pictorial statistics was spread. This, from my point of view, does not contribute to the expanding of the original idea.
THE PHILOSOPHICAL RELEVANCE OF WITTGENSTEIN’S DISCUSSION OF EXPERIENCES OF MEANING

Michel ter Hark, Groningen, Netherlands

It is often assumed that the discussion of the experience of meaning marks a shift of interest in Wittgenstein’s writings after finishing Part 1 of the *Investigations* in 1945. Yet there is abundant evidence of an early interest in this topic in writings from the first half of the 1930s. Thus, Wittgenstein distinguishes between meaning as use and William James’s conception of the experience of meaning as early as 1932. In the same period he devotes a long discussion partly published in *Philosophical Grammar* to the relation between understanding in the sense of experiencing the meaning of a word and what he later calls ‘aspect seeing’. Finally, in the second part of the *Brown Book*, his most sustained treatment of the experience of meaning at the time is to be found.

KNOW-HOW: CERTAINTY, MASTERY OR BOTH?

Britt Harrison, Herefordshire, United Kingdom

The Third Wittgenstein reading of *On Certainty* proposes that our foundational ways of acting, which Wittgenstein takes to be our hinges certainty, are a kind of know-how. In this paper, I motivate and contextualise my claim that Wittgensteinian know-how provides a rich set of resources and insights, which might be fruitfully brought to bear on the current debate about the relation between know-how and know-that.

LOGIK ALS SPIEGELBILD DER WELT. DAS PROBLEM DES ISOMORPHISMUS UND DER AUTONOMIE DER LOGIK IM TRACTATUS

Wlodzimierz Heflik, Krakau, Polen

In diesem Beitrag wird betrachtet, was die Logik im Lichte von Wittgensteins *Tractatus* ist. Der Ausgangspunkt ist die Metapher des Spiegels, die auf zwei Probleme hinweist: den Isomorphismus und die Autonomie der Logik. Die Frage nach dem Isomorphismus führt zur Analyse der Relation ‘Logik – Welt’, die sich als eine supertranszendentale Relation herausstellt. Weiterhin werden drei Hauptinterpretationen besprochen, die auf der Analyse der Relation ‘Logik – Substanz der Welt’ basieren: (1) der metaphysische Realismus im Stile Leibniz’ – die Logik und die Substanz der Welt sind aptorisch, notwendig, jedoch voneinander unabhängig; (2) der Monismus Spinozas – die Logik wird aus den Formen der einfachen Gegenstände abgeleitet; (3) der Transzendentalismus im Geiste Kants – das transzendentale Bewusstsein, bzw. das transzendentale Subjekt, als Logik betrachtet, ist ursprünglich.

AESTHETICS AND A SECONDARY USE OF ‘MEANING’? ON STEPHEN MULHALL’S VISION OF WITTGENSTEIN

Christian Herzog, Klagenfurt, Austria

Stephen Mulhall’s reading of Wittgenstein in *Inheritance & Originality* and earlier in *On being in the world* takes the remarks on aspect-perception and the ‘experience of meaning’ in section xi of PII to contain a major enhancement and revision of the conception of language prevailing in part I of PI. After briefly sketching Mulhall’s position two questions shall be discussed: 1) whether it can be argued to meet the intentions of Wittgenstein’s text regarding its genesis and 2) is it justified to object, as Justin Good does, that Mulhall’s notion of continuous aspect-perception exceeds the limits of grammatical investigation and presents a metaphysical claim?

SHOWING SPACE OR: CAN THERE BE SCIENCES OF THE NON-DISCURSIVE?

Bill Hillier, London, United Kingdom

In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein argues that what is expressed through language cannot be represented in language, but only shown. He was thinking of logic, but complex spatial relations seem a clearer case. They are present in both minds and worlds, in that human beings live in spatial complexes like buildings and cities, and deal with them competently, but their patterns are nondiscursive and cannot be described in natural language. What language does have, of course, are terms for simple spatial relations involving two or three entities (‘inside’, ‘between’, ‘through’, ‘beyond’ etc), and these relations can be represented graphically, and so shown. However, by isolating their elementary concepts, it was possible to develop graphical representations of complex spatial relations which first showed how spatial complexity was structured, and then permitted it to be quantified, so in effect rendering space analysable and the nondiscursive discursive. But when we do this, we encounter Wittgenstein again in two senses. First, we find that Wittgenstein’s arguments against over-arching structures in the Untersuchungen turn out not to be true for spatial relations, since culturally differentiated ‘spatial games’ can be shown again and again to generate universal emergent structures in the forms of cities, showing that for all its variation in cultural expression, these is a single underlying language of space. But second, although these emergent structures can be represented graphically, and tested against functional evidence, they cannot (so far!) be described within the formal language. So we are back to the *Tractatus*!
OTTO NEURATH – THE OTHER MODERN
PROPOSING A SOCIO-POLITICAL
MAP FOR URBANISM OR:
THE CITY AS A SOCIAL FACT
Sophie Hochhäusl, Ithaca, NY, USA

In 1937 Otto Neurath (1882–1945) created a map that revolutionized the illustration of the city. Neurath was of course famous for his engagement with picture statistics and quantitative maps at large, but his 1937 map marked the beginning of a new tradition: socio-political mapping in the field of urbanism.

Originally designed in color, Neurath’s map titled City Planning appeared in black, white and red in “Architectural Record” in July 1937 and accompanied the text, Visual Representations of Architectural Problems.

Compound of ISOTYPE symbols, ISOTYPE hatches and the spatial abstraction of a city, this map was crucial to the discipline of urbanism, because it represented the first comprehensive solution in illustrating spatial implications and socio-political components. In addition the article directly responded to Neurath’s failed collaboration with CIAM (Congrès Internationaux d’Architecture Moderne) in 1933 (Otto Neurath, “Visual Representation of Architectural Problems,” Architectural Record, July 1937: p. 56–61).

But this map is not only crucial because it stood at the beginning of a new tradition and because it was Neurath’s answer to the largest mapping project of its time; the 1937 map is also important, because it marked Neurath’s culmination point of theorizing the city while at the same time putting an end to Neurath’s discussion on architecture and urbanism, which he actively engaged with for more than two decades.

For the workshop “Picturing Social Facts. On Neurath’s Visual Language” I want to elaborate on the evolution of this map in detail and explain how it came about that Neurath eventually pictured spatial parameters of the city as social facts. I want to do this by casting some light on Neurath’s ambivalent relationship with CIAM, but also in terms of Neurath’s specific skill and mind-set, which eventually superseded the architects’ undertaking in illustrating the city. In uncovering these roots, I want to stress that it was Neurath who introduced the field of urbanism to the socio-political analysis of the city.

WE SHOULD BE CERTAIN OR WE ARE CERTAIN?
Minoo Hojjat, Tehran, Iran

I am to critique part of Marie McGinn’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty in her Sense and Certainty. She believes that Wittgenstein provides the philosophical understanding that leads to a satisfactory rebuttal of the sceptic. I think that some objections can be made against her assessments. I raise two objections: The first objection concerns the comparison between mathematical and Moore-type (as she puts it) propositions, which forms the main base of McGinn’s argument. I believe that she neglects a point in this comparison, and thus she does not represent the similarity between them as it was in Wittgenstein’s mind. The second one concerns the conclusion which is to be taken from that comparison. McGinn conceives these two types of propositions as possessing the same functions, while there is a difference between them which does not allow us to ascribe mathematical certainty to Moore-type propositions and conclude rebuttal of scepticism.

IMAGING MEANING
Jean G. Horta

This paper is part of a larger project that attempts to explain meaning as a complex network consisting in the relationship between different modes of presentation. This may be clarified by the understanding of the multiplicity of modes of imagination, and the uniqueness of each imaging which contains the following three elements: the intention – the presence of the agent for which this relationship may be meaningful; the infiniteness of the process – seen in the fact that new texts are still being written despite the fact that they use the same finite vocabulary, along with the continuous evolution of language and thought; and finally, the relationships which are determinant of the particular elements (including the agent of intention) – these define and are defined in terms of the meaning they are made to evoke by those who understand them.

WARUM SIND DIE GEGENSTÄNDE DES TRACTATUS EINFACH?
Susanne Huber, Zürich, Schweiz

Der Beitrag untersucht das Argument, mit dem Wittgenstein im Tractatus begründet, warum Gegenstände einfach sind. In der Wittgensteinliteratur wird die entsprechende Passage oft so gedeutet, dass Einfachheit soviel wie Unzerstörbarkeit heisst. Nur wenn Gegenstände nicht zerstörbar sind, ist gewährleistet, dass es da etwas gibt, worauf die Namen referieren, unabhängig davon, was der Fall ist. Diese Interpretation wird im ersten Teil des Beitrags kritisiert. Es wird gezeigt, dass sie im Widerspruch mit anderen Stellen des Tractatus steht und daher zu verwerfen ist. Im zweiten Teil wird eine eigene Interpretation vorgeschlagen: Nur wenn Gegenstände einfach sind, gibt es überhaupt Namen und damit einen Unterschied zwischen Benennen und Beschreiben. Damit ist die These, Gegenstände seien einfach, grundlegend für die Bildtheorie des Satzes.
ETHICS AS A PRIMARY FORM OF LINGUISTIC INQUIRY
Yaniv Iczkovits

“Traditional” commentators about the Tractatus perceive Wittgenstein’s work on language to display a philosophical theory on the relation between language and world as constituting the possibility of meaning. In this sense, we can find a similar attitude towards the ethics of the Tractatus, that is, we can reach a correct perspective from which to view the world rightly and still preserve the idea that this attitude cannot be formulated in meaningful sentences. Hence, “traditional” commentators will usually take the approach of trying to figure out what it is that Wittgenstein is really trying to say but cannot, because it cannot be meaningfully uttered. – Other commentaries have created what has become known as the “austere” reading.

In this view, Wittgenstein’s philosophy, from beginning to end, is animated by an anti-metaphysical vigor, which prohibits any possibility of an external viewpoint on language. In other words, it is not that what is seen from a transcendent perspective cannot be put into words and is instead shown through language; rather, the mere possibility of such transcendence is a fantasy. Seen in this light, Wittgenstein’s remarks on ethics are part of the overall disorientation that the Tractatus wants us to see as a whole. If there is any ethical guidance, it is not to be found in the text, that is, in its content, but rather, in its unique form and procedure.

POETIC SEEING IN WITTGENSTEIN AND THE CONTEMPORARY AVANT-GARDE THEATRE
Ioana Jucan, Providence, USA

This paper puts forth the hypothesis that Wittgenstein’s remark that “philosophy ought really to be written only as a form of poetic composition” is potentially actualized in the avant-garde theatre at the current moment of its turn to philosophy through poetry. Positioning an inextricable relation between philosophy and theatre, the paper explores the notions of poetic seeing in a number of Wittgensteinian remarks and in Botho Strauss’ play, Die Zeit und das Zimmer. Based on the insights gained in this investigation, the paper seeks to rethink mimesis in conjunction with poetic seeing. Finally, it opens the way for a consideration of poetic seeing in relation to the “new logic of vision” (Friedberg 2006: 242) structured by the digital.

WHY DID WITTGENSTEIN CHOOSE AUGUSTINE?
Pravesh Jung Golay, Mumbai, India

The general consensus among Wittgensteinian Scholars for Wittgenstein’s choice of Augustine can be fairly summarized as follows: Augustine’s depiction of language portrays a very narrow and primitive picture of language in terms of meaning structures and hence leaves out in the process a major chunk of the language outside its constructed boundaries. This picture has kinship with the picture of language that Wittgenstein himself paints in his Tractatus and hence serves as a basis for its critique which is held to be one of the tasks, among others, of his later work, Philosophical Investigations. The paper argues against this interpretation and argues that the purpose of Wittgenstein’s selection of Augustine to begin his later work is more carefully deliberated choice than it appears.

ON THE INVENTION OF REASONS THAT DO NOT MOTIVATE A WITTGENSTEINIAN/SELLARSIAN TAKE ON HUMEANISM
Matthias Kiesselbach, Berlin, Germany

This essay compares Humeanism to two views which have come to be the targets of well-known pragmatist attacks: the view of doubting as an inner-doing (argued against by Wittgenstein), and the view of sense-data as the foundation of all empirical knowledge (argued against by Sellars). The essay shows that the Humean view of passion as a necessary ingredient in all motivated action can be countered in much the same way as its two classical cousins. In all three cases, the classical, pre-pragmatist, view loses its attraction once proper attention is paid to the pragmatic role of the relevant attributions – attributions of beliefs and doubts (in Wittgenstein’s case), of perceptual evidences and seemings (in Sellars’ case) – and of practical reasons that do or don’t motivate (in the Humean question). In all three cases, adherence to that pragmatic role yields a reversal of what is seen as the ordinary background, and what is seen as demanding explanation. With respect to Humeanism, the point is to recognise the attribution of a practical reason that fails to motivate as a complex linguistic manoeuvre which logically relies on, and can be elucidated in terms of, the simpler manoeuvre of attributing an ordinary, motivating, reason.

REACHING THE PEOPLE: ISOTYPE BEYOND THE WEST
Eric Kindel, Reading, United Kingdom

Isotype’s claim to internationality is embedded in its very name and in the title of Otto Neurath’s International picture language (1936), the book that describes Isotype most fully. Isotype’s international character is generally located in its techniques of graphic configuration that incorporate pictograms and other simplified graphic imagery to produce compelling and widely understood visual explanations that rely only minimally on verbal language. But just how international did Isotype prove to be when deployed beyond the modernised West where, by far, the bulk of its work was directed? – This paper will take as its case study the export of Isotype to British colonial West Africa in the mid 1950s, where it encountered the only significant test of its suitability in the developing, non-Western world. The paper will explore how the international effectiveness of Isotype was pursued, paradoxically, through strategies of locally responsive modification and use. It will identify how shifts in Isotype techniques of graphic configuration and changes in graphic imagery (including pictograms) helped in the adaptation of Isotype to West African contexts. It will also consider how the use of vernacular languages together with English amplified Isotype’s ability to ‘speak’ to audiences with force and clarity. Further attention will be directed towards Isotype’s work ‘on the ground’ in schools, hospitals and community centres where it was hoped a better understanding of local sites of learning and reception could be gained, an understanding that in turn would better shape Isotype’s delivery. And possibly most revealing of Isotype’s internationality, the paper will review attempts to train local peoples to make Isotype work themselves.
ON THE TRUTH OF PICTURES IN SCIENCE
Peter P. Kirschenmann, Amsterdam, Netherlands

Philosophers of science are no longer exclusively preoccupied with theoretical statements and observation statements and their interrelations. In many studies, they have turned to the roles of models and visual representations in science, to scientific instrumentation with its reliance on pictures, or to the growing role of computer simulations. One of the issues concerning the role of these various forms of scientific representation is whether such representations can or should be accorded truth and falsity. This is the only question, and particularly two published views on it, that I discuss in my paper. I conclude that, depending on the context of their uses, scientific visual representations can justifiably be accorded truth or falsity, understood in the sense of a correspondence theory of truth.

ÜBER DIE TRANSFORMATION DER MIMESIS IN HERMANN BROCHS ROMANTHEORIE
Endre Kiss, Budapest, Ungarn


ABOUT PICTURES WHICH HELD US CAPTIVE – RICHARD RORTY READS WITTGENSTEIN
Sebastian Kletzli, Vienna, Austria

In this paper I discuss Rorty’s thesis that the later Wittgenstein should be interpreted as arguing against a certain metaphysical picture and as a satirist with respect to metaphysical concepts. In the first part I sketch the picture which Rorty wants us to abandon. I also explore if Wittgenstein could be seen as arguing against this picture. I will argue that Wittgenstein does really give good arguments against large parts of this picture but that Rorty’s reading of Wittgenstein is one-sided and therefore problematic. I shall outline Rorty’s picture of Wittgenstein and its shortcomings in the second part. I argue that Rorty’s reading of Wittgenstein as a “philosophical satirist” is wrong and stems from his improper exclusion of large parts of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Therefore Wittgenstein is better to be seen as an “ironic propagandist” of a new style of thinking.

WITTGENSTEIN, TOULMIN AND IMPLICATIONS OF RETHINKING ART AND SCIENCE’S HISTORIES FOR ‘SHOULD DO’ QUESTIONS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY PROCESSES
Stephanie Koerner, Manchester, United Kingdom

Recent decades have seen remarkable intersections of insights that the “unpredictability of the future” may form “the essence of the human adventure, be it at the level of individual learning or at the collective levels of history making” (Nicolas and Prigogine 1989), with findings of efforts to rethink art and science’s histories. Using examples from a new University of Manchester course in art history, this presentation explores the light areas of overlap and contrast in Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958) and Stephen Toulmin (1990) can throw on how directly these intersections relate to arguments that policy makers need alternatives to “technologies of hubris” (Jasanoff 2003) in order to balance the immense but unpredictable potential of science and technology with acknowledging that not everything that can be done should be done (Felt and Wynne 2008; Nowotny 2008).
CONTEMPLATION OF THE VARIETY OF THE WORLD
Timo Koistinen, Helsinki, Finland

This paper explores D. Z. Phillips’s contemplative conception of philosophy and philosophy of religion. On the one hand, Phillips argues that philosophy is not a guide to life but, on the other hand, he holds that its task is not merely to clarify conceptual confusions. Instead, it is concerned with what it means to say something. It shows the variety and complexity of the world and tries to do justice to different perspectives, including those which are at variance with the philosopher’s own personal perspective. In this respect, an analogy exists between contemplative philosophy and great literature. I will begin with an account of some central ideas of Phillips’s contemplative conception in philosophy. After that I will turn to critical discussion of his approach in philosophy of religion. My main question is whether contemplative philosophy of religion can exhibit the kind of religious neutrality that Phillips sees as essential to it.

PERCEPTION AND DEPICTION IN THE LIGHT OF EMBODIMENT
Zsuzsanna Kondor, Budapest, Hungary

We can approach different depictive systems (i.e., pictorial and linguistic) from the perspective of cognitive capabilities. The difficulty, which arises from the logically encoded incapability of expressing the relation between the depictive system and the depicted world within the given depictive framework, can be eliminated only by stepping beyond the depictive system and taking into account its cognitive background. Within this cognitive background, the notion of embodiment provides the leitmotif. That is, I suggest a relation between pictorial/linguistic capabilities and the world they depict on the basis of bodily experiences and evolving cognitive capabilities. Within this framework, it becomes possible to highlight how a picture can display its pictorial form (TLP 2.172), and how propositions mirror their logical form (TLP 4.121). In this paper I will focus on pictures.

Sybille Krämer, Berlin, Germany

Between ‘reality’ and the ‘imaginary’ there is the intermediary world of graphical artifacts like writing, notations, diagrams, graphs and maps. What are the epistemological functions of these diagrammatical inscriptions, situated between language and the pictorial? The guiding hypothesis here is that the ‘diagrammatical’ provides a link between the perceptible and the rational, insofar as it not only bridges the gap between these two realms but also gives rise to the very possibility of differentiating between the ‘aesthetic’ and the ‘noetic’. Starting from a reflection on exemplary forms of diagrammatical reasoning in philosophy (Platon, Descartes, Wittgenstein) first steps in the direction of an ‘epistemology of the line’ will be sketched: (i) Surface, lines, and points are the building elements of diagrammatic graphism. (ii) The diagrammatic space is not an ‘illustrative’ but an operative space within which eye, hand and mind work together: thus the ‘mind’s eye’ is born. (iii) Diagrammatical spatiality has a dual character: it is both a perceptible concrete surface and a rational abstract space. This duality is the dodge of the diagrammatical. (iv) In this dual character it functions as a means for visualizing the non visual and for ‘spatializing’ the non-spatial. Thus bringing theoretical entities to intuition. Placing the theme within a cultural perspective: Could the invention of inscribed surface perhaps have meant for the mobility and productivity of the mind what the invention of the wheel meant for the mobility and productivity of the human body?

‘RONDOM REMBRANDT’ REVISITED. ON NEURATH’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO VISUAL/MUSEUM EDUCATION AND FOR COMPETENCE BUILDING
Hadwig Kraeutler, Vienna, Austria

For roughly 20 years (1925–1945), Otto Neurath engaged himself with museum and exhibition work. This was part of his preoccupation with the visual. It was these two media (within the orchestration of various social tools) to which Neurath attributed highest effectiveness for the delivery of pertinent information, and empowerment to take part in society’s development, especially concerning that part of the population without access to academic schooling/habits. Neurath’s practical and theoretical work with museums and exhibitions usually subsumed under the acronym Isotype and identified with ‘pictorial statistics’, challenged museum traditions, and is still considered avant-garde in many aspects. I shall briefly report on practical developments – museum, exhibition work – and on Neurath’s use of terms (picture, picture language, visual education) based on his writings on ‘Bildpädagogik’ (Haller and Kinross 1991, Vol. 3, Collected Writings). In a second strand, I treat some of the topical qualities of his museum and exhibition concepts (their relevance for today), using the booklet International Picture Language (1936), Neurath’s manuscript on ‘Visual Education’ (in Nemeth and Stadler 1996), and the example of the exhibition ‘Rondom Rembrandt’ (1937).

Context and some materials:
The museological background to this paper is found in my book Otto Neurath: Museums and Exhibition Work. Spaces (Designed) for Communication (2008, Peter Lang; http://www.peterlang.com/) and further research at the Isotype-Collection in Reading/UK which also led to an earlier article ‘Rondom Rembrandt’ (http://www.isotyperevisited.org/2010/01/rondom-rembrandt.html).
THE CONCEPT OF PICTURE IN WITTGENSTEIN’S ‘LECTURES ON RELIGIOUS BELIEF’

Martin Kusch, Vienna, Austria

This paper suggests that the central theme of the ‘Lectures on Religious Belief’ is the possibility of a certain form of faultless disagreement. The disagreement is between two sides: (1) advocates of different religious views (such as that there will be a Last Judgement); and (2) Wittgenstein himself. I shall explain Wittgenstein’s various attempts to clarify the nature of this disagreement; and why he holds the disagreement to be faultless. I will give special attention to the role of pictures in Wittgenstein’s reflections.

TOWARD WITTGENSTEIN AS A COMMON SENSE PHILOSOPHER

Eric Lemaire, Dijon, France

In that talk, my main purpose will be to point out some resemblances between the second Wittgenstein’s works and the program of common sense philosophy. Here, we shall not have time to argue that contrary to appearances (that is, contrary to the fact that he repeatedly says that philosophical propositions are nonsense and that the philosopher’s task should be to make it explicit), the second Wittgenstein has indeed offered a common sense philosophy. Our talk will be too sketchy for that purpose. However, we hope for showing that it could be an interesting and fruitful way of understanding his later works. Our talk will be divided in two main parts. In the first part, we will portray a common sense philosophy program and, in the second part, we will point out some important resemblances between this program and Wittgenstein’s philosophy. We will finish by raising objections against the idea that the second Wittgenstein’s works are closed to common sense philosophy.

BETWEEN WRITING AND PICTURING: THE SQUARE OF OPPOSITION IN FORMAL LOGIC AND FORMAL AXIOLOGY OF ALETHIC AND DEONTIC MODALITIES

Vladimir Lobovikov, Yekaterinburg, Russia

From some point of view, the famous “Square of Opposition” in the formal logic has nothing to do with squares and other geometrical objects which can be pictured, shown and seen. All the rational formal logic contents of the “Square of Opposition” could be written, read, said and understood without any picturing and showing. The well-known picture is really useful only in mnemonic relation: the scheme supports the mimesis. Assuming this abstract-language-form viewpoint in the present paper, and using the hypothetic-deductive method, below I develop the mentioned assumption (hypothesis) with respect to one particular case, namely, in relation to alethic and deontic modality interpretations of the “Square”. According to the hypothesis under examination, all the formal rules making up the rational contents of the “Square” are to be adequately formulated and expressed in a written language without picturing.
OUT OF THE WILD
Bart Lootsma, Innsbruck, Austria

In the research project OUT OF THE WILD, the chair for Architectural Theory of the University of Innsbruck investigates three Austrian-born Architects and Theoreticians: Otto Neurath (1882–1945), Friedrich Kiesler (1890–1965) and Christopher Alexander (1936). This research has two main goals. The first is to investigate if it is possible to find continuous traditions in the work of these three, which could be traced back to the particular situation in Vienna after WW I. More importantly however is the fact that Neurath, Kiesler and Alexander all three have a particular relationship to anonymous and natural architectural practices and democratic design processes. When it comes to design, all three start from the smallest possible units to develop complex systems, methods and forms of organization. Now that research, design and planning methods that were developed for the first modernity, with its emphasis on classes and large statistic collectives, have reached their limits, it might be helpful to reinvestigate this other modernist tradition. Not in the least because Neurath, Kiesler and Alexander were also important forerunners of the Word Wide Web, software development and parametric design.

PICTURES AND SOULS. ON KNOWING ONESELF BY OUTWARD CRITERIA (PI II IV)
Sandra Markewitz, Bielefeld, Germany

“The human body is the best picture of the human soul.” The famous quotation from the second part of the Philosophical Investigations (if such a “second part” does exist is a different and well-discussed question) presents a philosophical problem not to be confused with emphatic existentialist thinking about the self. The self Wittgenstein is talking about is characterized by contingent ascriptions rather than inner processes constituting our language use. If someone is in possession of a soul, this “soul” is not an abstract entity to be respected under all possible circumstances, it is the outcome of common attitudes governing individual linguistic approaches to other individuals and vice versa. The deepest feelings can be silenced by not reacting to them; “deep” is a word expecting certain reactions of compassion and consolation, where there are no common “attitudes” to expressions affirming their existence as undoubtably, they will gradually peter out. This petering-out is known to be the consequence of a specific, non-mentalistic understanding of how linguistic meaning comes into being.

FAMILIENÄHNLICHKEIT ALS ANALYSEMETHODE VON SPÄTWERKEN BEETHOVENS UND WITTGENSTEINS
Ingolf Max, Leipzig, Deutschland


EYE SEE
Dejan Makovec, Vienna, Austria

Challenged by a colleague to ‘depict the contemplation of self as “I”’, Ernst Mach responds with an image: he draws what he sees of himself when he squints with one eye. Viewing this image through the lens of certain writings and conversations of Wittgenstein from the years 1929–31, I would like to ask: what is this picture saying? And, if anything at all is being said: how is it said? The ensuing discussion of the field of vision and visual space touches – among other things – on a critique of idealism and realism, the difference between complete and incomplete images, depiction in a proposition, and the hand as an element. In this way, the question will lead us to consider possible aspects of the expressive power of Mach’s image.

DAS KUNSTWERK ALS ASPEKT DER KULTUR
Jakub Mácha, Brno, Tschechische Republik

IST DAS WORT PFANNE EINDEUTIG INS RUMÄNISCHE ZU ÜBERSETZEN?
VOM UMGANG MIT EINEM WORT ALS TRANSPORTEUR EINES BILDES
Annelore Mayer, Baden, Österreich


VON DER VERSAGENDEN SPRACHE ZUM VERKLÄGELICHEN BILD – MECHTHILD VON MAGDEBURGS FIGURATA LOCUTIO
Johannes Leopold Mayer, Baden, Österreich


GRAMMAR IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS
Marie McGinn, York, United Kingdom

Wittgenstein describes the kind of investigation he is engaged in in the Philosophical Investigations as ‘a grammatical one’ (PI §90). He speaks of looking for ‘grammatical differences’ (PI II, 185) and of ‘the rules of grammar’ (PI §497); and he makes a distinction between the ‘surface grammar’ of a word and its ‘depth grammar’ (PI §664). He traces the misunderstandings which he holds to lie at the root of philosophical problems and paradoxes to ‘grammatical illusions’ (PI §110), and to the creation of ‘grammatical fictions’ (PI §307). Understanding what he means by the terms ‘grammar’, ‘depth grammar’ and ‘grammatical investigation’ is therefore fundamental to an understanding of the Investigations. In this paper, I consider two contrasting interpretations of Wittgenstein’s conception of grammar. One developed by Peter Hacker, which places the emphasis on the clear arrangement of rules for the use of words and on transgressions of the bounds of sense; the other, defended, for example, by Gordon Baker, which sees Wittgenstein’s conception of grammar as focusing on a dimension of use that is not captured in the notion of rules for the construction of well-formed sentences and which emphasises the resolution of philosophical problems and paradoxes. I try to see what difference, if any, each of these interpretations has for how we understand Wittgenstein’s investigation of the concepts of meaning, understanding and thinking.

BEGINNING WITHOUT THE SAYING/SHOWING DISTINCTION
Luke McNulty

Wittgenstein is uncertain of how to picture the preconditions of all language. He vacillates between a realism that construes these facts as logically prior to language, and an idealism that construes them as internal to it. I argue that he is reluctant to endorse either picture because each seems to presuppose the troubled notion of a shown but ineffable reality. After arguing that the root of this apparent dilemma is a tension between methodological quietism and the view that grammar is arbitrary, I offer two suggestions on how the dilemma might be dissolved.

VISUAL EPISTEMOLOGY. ON THE ‘LOGIC’ OF SHOWING
Dieter Mersch, Potsdam, Germany

Is there something similar to the ‘logic’ of proposition in images, a symbolic structure of its own, or ways to express the negative or ‘modal forms’ such as the impossible or the conjunctive to address more hypotheses and the like? Images were often considered to be non-rational or only ‘pre-linguistic’. Instead, the presentation argues that there is a genuine ‘logic of showing’ which differs from the ‘logical form’ of language, but which function as a structure of its own, based on a series of differences and differential systems such as frame, line (contour), contrast (also contrast of colours), the play of figure and background and so on. Moreover the difference between ‘showing’ (Zeigen) and ‘showing-in-itself’ (Sichzeigen) ruptures all images and allows for the formulation of a ‘critique of pictorial reasoning’ as it was suggested by the plural approach of the late Wittgensteinian investigations on images.
SIMULATION THEORY WITH OR WITHOUT INTROSPECTION: AN EXPRESSIVIST COMPROMISE

John Michael, Copenhagen, Denmark

In this paper, I will defend Robert Gordon’s non-introspectionist version of the simulation theory of social cognition against the criticism put forth by Alvin Goldman, who argues that simulation theory must include an introspectionist account of mental concepts. My strategy will be to isolate the compelling part of Goldman’s challenge and then consider conceptual options for meeting it without turning to full-blown introspectionism, i.e. by taking on a deflationary account of introspection, based upon Wittgenstein’s expressivist conception of self-ascription. But first I will briefly introduce and contextualize simulation theory.

WITTGENSTEIN THROUGH THE BILDER: FROM SATZ TO BEGRIFF

Arley Moreno, Sao Paulo, Brasil

Wittgenstein elaborates different conceptions of Bild, from the Tractatus to the On Certainty periods of his thought. In that paper I focus on just a few specific moments during which some movements of deepening the notion of Bild seem to have happened; I concentrate on three of these moments; the first one is the leaving of Wittgenstein from the Tractatus, the second corresponds to the period between 1929 and 1932, finally the Philosophical Investigations period. I attempt to show the conceptual contexts within which these change happened as well as the philosophical function of that concept in each case.

VON INTERNEN RELATIONEN UND EIGENSCHAFTEN ZUR GRAMMATIK

Christian Millererfi, München, Deutschland


WIE WIRKLICH IST DIE WIRKLICHKEIT? WISSENSCHAFTLICHE FOTOGRAFIEN ALS DATEN

Nicola Mößner, Aachen, Deutschland


THERE IS NO ‘I’ IN ‘IMAGE’: WITTGENSTEIN’S IMAGE FORMING, THE VISUAL ROOM AND THE BOUNDARIES OF LANGUAGE AND SPACE

Jane Mustard / Peter Wood, Wellington, New Zealand

Wittgenstein described images as visual impressions conjured up in the psychological act of image forming. The visual room is his example of forming an image. It is significant that the visual room is a room – a spatial, architectural thing – as the first part of this paper shows that image forming and other philosophical tasks are spatial by nature. The second part shows how Wittgenstein’s architectural experience – designing the Stonborough-Wittgenstein House in Vienna, completed in 1929 – embodies his philosophy of public/private, inner/outer and accessibility by blending the boundaries of architecture with the boundaries of language. Boundaries, divisions of space, accessibility and motion are investigated as analogous to linguistic concepts. The House is physical evidence for Wittgenstein’s experiments in philosophy through the medium of architecture, leading to a philosophy grounded not only in language but in architectural space.

DAS SELBSTBILD BEI LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN IM GEGENSATZ ZU RENE DESCARTES

Bettina Müller, Düsseldorf/Irun, Deutschland

VISUALIZING EUROPE:
THE LEGACY OF OTTO NEURATH’S ISOTYPE FOR COMPARATIVE RESEARCH

Karl H. Müller, Vienna, Austria

The talk will be focused on four main parts. First, a short summary will be presented on Otto Neurath’s visualization system, its grammar and its comparative advantages. Second, it will be shown that Otto Neurath’s arguments for the relevance of visualization are still valid and that visualization offers a powerful tool for analysis in the social and in the natural sciences. Third, the presentation will be concentrated on a special research segment, namely on comparative social research across Europe. For this area, numerous restrictions become relevant so that visualization in Otto Neurath’s form cannot be undertaken. Thus, the fourth and final part of the presentation will show a new online program under the name of WISDOMIZE which has been developed over the last two years and which allows the production of visual patterns which can be used for comparative analysis. The talk will show a small number of visual examples and will discuss the relevance of this type of visualization for contemporary comparative research.

THE ROLE OF PRODUCTIVE IMAGINATION IN CREATING ARTWORKS AND DISCOVERING SCIENTIFIC HYPOTHESES

Dan Nesher, Haifa, Israel

In this article I elaborate on Kant’s conception of artistic Productive Imagination in creating artworks and I generalize it to explain the scientist intellectual intuition in discovery of new hypotheses. Kant explicates Intuition as presentation of the imagination and developed the conception of Productive Imagination to explain the genuine creation of fine art. Kant’s conception of Intellectual Intuition is supersensible objects of reason and not human cognition. I turn this transcendental concept into cognitive operations and explain all cognitions experientially. Hence the role of productive imagination lies in the artistic creation of new exemplary artworks, and the role of intellectual intuition, as productive imagination, lies in scientific discovery of new scientific hypotheses. Within Pragmatist epistemology I explain that artists and scientists use their productive imaginations differently in their respective enterprises to construct their different modes of representing reality.

VON DER GRAMMATIK DER SPRACHE ZUR GRAMMATIK DER NATUR

Marc Müller, Berlin, Deutschland


‘OPERATING WITH WORDS’ AND THE SHOPPING SCENE

Ioana Naforinita, Bucharest, Romania

In this paper I challenge Mulhall’s claim that Wittgenstein’s remark in the opening of the PI “It is in this and similar ways that one operates with words,” implies that the shopping scene “is a paradigm of the ordinary”. First, I show that the shopping scene is not meant as a paradigm of the ordinary. Then I show that Wittgenstein’s remark is meant to make the shopping scene a paradigmatic case for ‘operating with words’ and that Mulhall’s claim rests on the assumption that ‘operating with words’ is what we ordinary do with words. But ‘operating with words’ is only part of what we call ‘using words’. Hence, Mulhall’s assumption is false. In the end I suggest that we should not see the shopping scene as a paradigm of the ordinary, but as providing us with a picture of the use of our words (an alternative to the Augustinian one).

DIE ZWEIHEIT DES BILDES – JASPER JOHNS, RICHARD WOLLHEIM UND LUDWIG WITTGENSTEINS PROBLEM DES „SEHEN-ALS“

Stefan Neuner, Zürich, Schweiz

“WORDS DIVIDE, PICTURES UNITE” – OTTO NEURATH’S PICTORIAL STATISTICS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Sybilla Nikolow, Bielefeld, Germany

Otto Neurath’s (1882–1955) well known slogan, has been extensively quoted in the recent image, media and communication studies to claim the superiority of pictorial languages over verbal languages. His pictorial statistics has been used as evidence for the validity of this modern assumption. But if one looks in the historical context of the first half of the 20th century, in which Neurath developed and used his method, this evaluation seems to be less straightforward. What we gain if we historicize Neurath’s pictorial work is a deeper understanding of the socio-cultural transformations and upheavals in media technologies in his time, that could be made responsible for and has driven the birth of innovations like this in the visual culture of modernity. Of course his method was exceptional in its radical nature, but it was also a typical project with the aim to modernize and democratize society. It illustrates how societal blueprints and scientific concepts fertilized each other. – In my paper I am working out how Neurath embedded his method in three historical contexts: First, how he developed his communicative understanding of pictures in line with his methodological premises of the Vienna Circle. Second, how he modelled his pictorial statistics as counterpart to specialized technical and artificial languages. And third how he defined his method as useful approach to problems of everyday life in contrast to forms of expressions practiced in propaganda and art work. I will show in greater detail how the pictorial statistics was born in the interwar period of Red Vienna and how later the original Vienna Method was transformed into the International System of Typographic Picture Education (short: Isotype) in the 1930ies in the Dutch exile and further developed in Neurath’s British exile.

AGAINST THE PSYCHOLOGISTIC READING OF THE TRACTATUS 3.11

Yasushi Nomura, Hokkaido, Japan

The proposition 3.11 is a stronghold of psychologistic readings of the Tractatus. In this paper, I will deal with Norman Malcolm’s book, Nothing Is Hidden, as a typical example of such a reading and point out the problems that it gives rise to and like to present a possible way of understanding the Tractatus’ framework of views concerning language and thought in a non-psychologistic way. One of the most important points in doing so is how to read 3.11.

IMAGE AND TIME IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF WITTGENSTEIN

Kristóf Nyíri, Budapest, Hungary

Between the notions of image and time there obtains an intrinsic connection. Images are incomplete unless they are moving ones – unless, that is, they happen in time. On the other hand, time cannot be conceptualized except by metaphors, and thus ultimately by images, of movement in space. In my talk I will suggest not only that Wittgenstein provides substantial insights that help us to come to terms with the connection between image and time, but also that grasping the philosophical strategy he applies here can make us realize what the later Wittgenstein was actually up to. In two previous Kirchberg papers of mine, I have dealt with Wittgenstein’s philosophy of images (2001) and touched on his philosophy of time (2005). I will now bring together, and radically expand, the arguments of those papers. In so doing, a crucial issue I have to face is the later Wittgenstein’s view on metaphors – his views on what figurative language philosophically amounts to. Those views have undergone a change between the 1920s and the 1940s, and it is essential that we should understand the precise direction of this change. Did the mature Wittgenstein still believe that metaphors, in order to make sense, have to be reducible to their literal meanings? I do not think he did, and will attempt to spell out the momentous consequences of this development.

THE VON WRIGHT AND WITTGENSTEIN ARCHIVES IN HELSINKI (WWA): A UNIQUE RESOURCE

Bernt Österman / Thomas Wallgren, Helsinki, Finland

In 1948 the then 32 year old Finnish philosopher Georg Henrik von Wright (1916–2003) succeeded Ludwig Wittgenstein as professor of philosophy at Cambridge. When Wittgenstein died in 1951 Elisabeth Anscombe, Rush Rhees and Georg Henrik von Wright became the executors of Wittgenstein’s literary estate. – Von Wright played a major role in the editing and publishing of Wittgenstein’s work for over fifty years. In the course of his work as a literary executor von Wright founded the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Helsinki. After von Wright’s death WWA has been enriched with new material, such as unpublished manuscripts by von Wright and a large collection of letters to and from von Wright related to the editing and publication of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass. The work of cataloguing and describing the material is still incomplete. – WWA has recently been reconstituted as a research resource and is again accessible to visiting researchers.

WITTGENSTEIN ON ART AND CREATIVE IMAGINATION: “HOW TO UNDERSTAND ‘GENIUS’ AS COURAGE IN TALENT AND CHARACTER MANIFESTED THROUGH TALENT”

Fulya Özlem, Berlin, Germany

In this paper I intend to provide a Wittgensteinian account of creative imagination and the use and context of creative imagination in line with Wittgenstein’s Private Language Argument as well as his numerous remarks on the concepts of genius, talent and art stated in Culture and Value. Wittgenstein’s philosophical position regarding arts and the artistic creation, has been a topic rather rarely touched upon by philosophers elaborating on his work, since it suggests a peculiar point of view where the incapability of the agent to create and imagine “a world from scratch”, in other words “ex nihilo” privately in his mind poses questions about whether that allows enough room for creative imagination and the utter uniqueness of the artist which bear the mark of genius that eventually point to a break with tradition and bring about a revolution in the perception of art throughout the history of art.

WITTGENSTEIN ON CULTURE
Ratikanta Panda, Mumbai, India
Wittgenstein has reflected and criticised what is known as the materialist culture based on the achievements of modern science and technology. He has argued that the kind of culture which leads mankind in the right direction is the spiritual culture based on eternal values. It is the eternal values which constitute the core of the spiritual culture of mankind.

WIE MAN EIN LUFTGEBÄUDE ZERSTÖRT, ODER: DIE BEDEUTUNG DER UNTERScheidung VON SAGEN UND ZEIGEN FÜR NIETZSCHEs UND WITTGENSTEINs PRAXIS PHILOSOPHISCHER KRITIK
Axel Pichler, Graz, Österreich
Der Vortrag untersucht auf der Grundlage eines Vergleichs der denkterischen Praxis des späten Nietzsche mit Wittgensteins Philosophischen Untersuchungen eine spezifische Form philosophischer Kritik. Es handelt sich dabei um jene Form der Kritik, die versucht die versteckten Vorannahmen einer entgegengesetzten Theorie offen zulegen, ohne dabei das eben dieser Theorie inhärente Schema zu verlassen oder in einen Selbstwiderspruch zu verfallen. Aufgrund des beiden Philosophen gemeinsamen Anti-Essentialismus und der ihnen ebenso gemeinsamen Philosophie der Grammatik entwickelten Nietzsche und Wittgenstein ähnliche Lösungsansätze für dieses Problem. Der Vortrag wird zeigen, dass Wittgensteins im Tractatus eingeführte Unterscheidung von Sagen und Zeigen ein adäquates Mittel zur Beschreibung der von den beiden Denkern entwickelten innovativen Form philosophischer Kritik darstellt, durch die sie ihnen gelingt die „abergläubi schen“ Vorannahmen bestimmter Theorien freizulegen.

MIRRroring, REPRESENTing, PICTuring: WHY CLARITY HAS AESTHETIC SIGNIFICANCE IN THE TRACTATUS
Dawn Phillips, Warwick, United Kingdom
Wittgenstein appeals to clarity when he characterises the aim, task and results of Philosophical activity. I will argue that Wittgenstein’s ‘picture theory’ in the Tractatus means that clarity has aesthetic significance. The ‘picture theory’ of thought and language distinguishes between the key notions of mirroring (spiegeln), representing (darstellen) and picturing (abbilden). Wittgenstein uses these notions to establish that a thought expressed in language is a proposition with a sense and that a proposition is a picture of reality. He tells us that the task of philosophy is to make thoughts clear. My question is: how should we understand the significance of clarity, if ‘making a thought clear’ is making clear a picture of reality? The distinct notions of mirroring, representing and depicting mean that the result of philosophical activity – the clarification of propositions – is inexpressible, valuable as an end in itself and pleasurable. For these reasons clarity has aesthetic significance.

PICTURING AS MAPPING: A MARK OF CONTINUITY IN WITTGENSTEIN’S NOTION OF REPRESENTATION
Sabine Plaud, Paris, France
Throughout his philosophical development, Ludwig Wittgenstein has been using an identical paradigm when accounting for the nature of representation: namely the paradigm of projective translation. In the Tractatus logico-philosophicus, Wittgenstein describes propositional pictures as projective mappings of a given multiplicity into another. After repudiating this early “picture-theory” of proposition, he nonetheless maintains the paradigm of representation as a projection, especially in his exposition of the business of philosophy. He now claims that the goal of philosophy is to provide “synoptic” representations of language and of its grammatical rules. Such synoptic representations aim at translating the logical multiplicity of a given grammatical system into a perspicuous symbolism, in a way that is commonly compared by Wittgenstein to a kind of “map-making”. On that respect, the notion of representation he has in mind in his later philosophy is quite comparable to the one he had in mind in his early philosophy, except that this projective paradigm is now used to characterize philosophical elucidations rather than the nature of propositions.
A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO TWO PUZZLES IN MATHEMATICAL MAPPING
Donald V. Poochigian, Grand Forks, ND, USA

Identifying different things as the same thing, mathematical equality is puzzling, same thing (A=A) not being different things (A=B), and different things (A=B) not being same thing (A=A). Resolution occurs considering a translation function determining a relational field. Hereby inductive generation of an element in a domain terminates when fused into an indistinguishable whole with an element in a converse domain. A lacuna occurring, precedent and subsequent of the lacuna cannot be known to be related. Generation is recursive or iterative. Recursive generation identifies aspect, occurring when within a fixed set of elements, only one sequence is traceable in marginal order from most like archetype to most like autotype and back in reciprocating order. Iterative generation identifies instance, occurring when within a fixed set of elements, more than one sequence is traceable in order from most like archetype to most like autotype and back in varying order. A=A identifies a corecursive hyperset, reciprocally generating the same transmutable sequence in inverse order from alternate limits. Iterative sequence is recursive archetype identifying reverse autotype. A=B identifies a communicative ring with unity, reciprocally generating the same transmutable sequence in variable order from alternate limits. Iterative sequence is discursive archetype not identifying reverse autotype.

LOGIC AND ITS APPLICATION IN LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN'S EARLY PHILOSOPHY
Mateusz Marek Radzki, Poland

The paper presents Ludwig Wittgenstein’s distinction between logic and its application. It proves that Wittgenstein in his early works (especially in ‘Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus’) considers two perspectives in the philosophy of language: the first one from the viewpoint of necessary logic and the second one from the viewpoint of the contingent application of logic in natural language. The first section, Logical Notation and Natural Language, shows that Wittgenstein’s early philosophy first of all belongs to the philosophy of logic. The second section, Logical Necessity in Logical Notation, points on necessary conditions of expressing logical necessity in the classical propositional calculus. The third section, Contingent Application of Logic, describes the contingent application of logic in natural language as the matter of arbitrary decisions, which cannot be anticipated by logic and cannot be expressed by logical notation.

THE FACE OF THE WORK OF ART: WITTGENSTEIN ON EXPRESSION
Bernard J. Rhie, Williamstown, MA, USA

In this essay I argue that Wittgenstein’s numerous remarks about faces and face perception hold the key to understanding aesthetic expression. Moreover, I suggest that by seeing the connections between aesthetic perception and the way we perceive faces, we can better appreciate the stakes of ongoing disputes about aesthetic expression: especially debates about whether the expressive qualities of artworks are real or merely the projections of beholders. What is ultimately at stake in such disputes, I suggest, is the proper acknowledgement (or denial) of the expressive-ness of the human body: debates about art, that is, serve as proxies for debates about human beings.

RUSSELL VS. WITTGENSTEIN: IN DEFENSE OF RUSSELL
(A REPLY TO SOME OLD THESIS OF PETER HACKER’S INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN’S TRACTATUS)
Henrique Jales Ribeiro, Coimbra, Portugal

The author analyses and challenges the theory according to which Wittgenstein, in Tractatus, would have categorically pointed out the errors and confusions of Russell’s philosophy, and thereby provoked his bankruptcy. He takes Peter Hacker’s interpretation on the subject as a case study.

METHODOLOGISCHE ASPETKE DES BILDGEBRAUCHS BEI WITTGENSTEIN
Marianne Richter, Stuttgart, Deutschland

Unter der Voraussetzung, dass das Bild bei Wittgenstein funktional definiert ist, wird sie der Beitrag der Frage, inwiefern der von Wittgenstein thematisierte und stellenweise auch vorgezeigte Gebrauch von Bildern operationalisiert, d.h. als Ablöse von Handlungserscheinungen beschrieben werden kann. Es soll gezeigt werden, warum sich der Bildgebrauch einer Etablierung als Methode weitestgehend entzieht und welche Konsequenzen dies für ein Verständnis vom Bild als Erkenntniswerkzeug hat.

EINPRÄGSAME BILDER: PARADIGMEN OHNE BEWEISKRAFT
Ulrich Richtmeyer, Weimar, Deutschland

Wittgenstein hat den Olymp der Bilder gestürmt, er hat die ganze Besatzung aus mentalen, psychologischen, sprachlichen und ideellen Ab-, Ur-, Welt-, Vorstellungs- und Erinnerungsbildern über die Klinge springen lassen und die Zeichnung schwimmt unbewiesen in ihrer Tiefe dahin. [frei nach Heinrich Heine]

Wittgensteins Überlegungen zur Beweiszeichnung betonen, dass die Zeichnung eine Verschränkung der individuellen Schöpfung und der menschlichen Empfindungen ist.

Wittgenstein: Planet der Bilder gestürmt, er hat die ganze Besatzung von mentalen, psychologischen, sprachlichen und ideellen Ab-, Ur-, Welt-, Vorstellungs- und Erinnerungsbildern über die Klinge springen lassen und die Zeichnung schwimmt unbewiesen in ihrer Tiefe dahin. [frei nach Heinrich Heine]
A USE-THERAPEUTIC APPROACH TO MEANING
Bernhard Ritter, Zurich, Switzerland

This paper makes two related points: first, that the content of Wittgenstein’s grammatical explanations, including his explanation of word-meaning, is not dissociable from the fact that it is genuinely addressed to the person that is the reader; secondly, that Wittgenstein’s notion of secondary meaning poses a problem for an attribution of a univocal use conception of meaning to him. It is argued that these points support the main contention that Wittgenstein’s approach to meaning is not use-theoretic but use-therapeutic.

ZUR GRAMMATIK DER WORT-BILD-VERBINDUNGEN
Andreas Roser, Linz, Österreich


ZU WITTGENSTEINS BEMERKUNGEN ÜBER „GRUNDLAGEN DER MATHEMATIK“: ZETTELYPOSKRİPT TS222 – „TOPOGRAPHISCH“ UND „NUMMERISCH“
Josef G. F. Rothhaupt, München, Deutschland


SOME THOUGHTS ON WITTGENSTEINIAN NONSENSE AND THE USE OF METAPHOR
Athanassios Sakellariadis, Ioannina, Greece

There are already several general accounts of nonsense in the wittgensteinian literature, especially in the articles and books of James Conant and Cora Diamond concerning Wittgenstein’s “resolute” reading. My aim is not to offer some new general account of the notion of nonsense but to present a kind of relation between it and the notion of metaphor.

MORAL JUDGMENTS AS PART OF WHAT ETHICS MUST SHOW
Janyne Sattler, Montréal, Canada

In both the Lecture on Ethics and the Tractatus, Ethics is not at all concerned with facts and is said to be supernatu-ral. We all know that we cannot speak about what is be-yond the limits of language as stated in these works, lan-guage being confined to empirical and scientific proposi-tions. So, this places Ethics entirely out of the domain of what can legitimately be said. However, at the same time, Wittgenstein seems to allow, or maybe even to recom-mend, that even if an absolute judgment of value is not to be taken as a proposition, it should be expressed when the situation requires. Otherwise we would be involved in a moral mistake. I will investigate this possibility using here as a guide the following expression of the Lecture on Ethics “Well, you ought to want to behave better.”

SEEING THE INVESTIGATIONS THROUGH CUBIST EYES
Beth Savickey, Winnipeg, Canada

In 1932 Wittgenstein wrote, ‘my main movement of thought is a completely different one today from 15 to 20 years ago. And this is similar to when a painter makes a transi-tion from one school to another’. Wittgenstein’s movement from the Tractatus to the Investigations is similar to a transition from representational art to Cubism. He shifts from a fixed logical viewpoint outside the text to a text of dynamic, multi-perspectival and interactive grammatical remarks. The text of the Investigations is like an early Cubist painting in form, content, and meaning.

BILDSPIELE
Oliver R. Scholz, Münster, Deutschland

WITTGENSTEINIAN REFLECTIONS ON McDOWELLIAN NEO-MOOREANISM
Genia Schönbaumsfeld, Southampton, UK

Duncan Pritchard has recently promoted what he calls ‘McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism’, according to which the denials of sceptical hypotheses are true but inappropriate. I will advance some Wittgensteinian considerations casting doubt both on Pritchard’s reading of McDowell’s anti-sceptical strategy as well as on the latter claim. Given that on McDowell’s disjunctive conception of perceptual experience global falsehood is not so much as a coherent possibility, the denials of sceptical hypotheses are either nonsensical or, at best, entirely trivial.

WITTGENSTEIN’S PICTURE THEORY OF LANGUAGE AND SELF-REFERENCE
Radek Schuster, Plzen, Czech Republic

The main thesis of the paper is that self-reference is the fundamental principle of language, which enables the expression of very general issues concerning the essence of the world, in particular it enables naming, paradoxically, an infinity by finitely many expressions. Any endeavor to dispose of self-reference makes language lifeless. From this perspective any description of the essence of language which tends to be sufficiently general must also encompass itself. Wittgenstein’s Picture Theory motivated by the saying-showing distinction is here treated as an example of such general description. But in a negative sense: Wittgenstein’s attempt to determine and express the boundary between meaningful expressions and senselessness is so general, i.e. self-referential, that it becomes itself senseless.

DO WE REALLY NEED NEGATIVE ATOMIC FACTS TO MAKE SENSE OUT OF THE TRACTARIAN SENSE THEORY?
Marcos Silva, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

This paper defends the notion that negative atomic facts are irrelevant to the Tractarian theory of sense, even if it deals with the sense of false and truly negated propositions. In other words, we do not need negative facts compounding the tractarian ontology, if we focus on two well-known Tractarian features. First, the intuition of assuming propositions as maps of reality, as a sort of rehashing significant articulations of denoted objects. Consequently, to understand a map does not imply that the represented complex is actualized in the world, neither now, nor in the past nor in the future. A second tractarian feature is the assumption that the tractarian sense theory conveys two assymmetric levels, namely: projection of sense and determination of truth value. In this way, to understand a proposition, irrespective of being true or false, is to understand the very same fact (always possible!) (TLP 4.021.2). As a result, we can assume that the tractarian passage 2.06 does not introduce another ontological category, that is, it does not maintain that negative facts compound the world, but it conveys an only-terminological distinction between the existence of state of affairs (positive facts) and its inexistence (negative facts).

HESIODS THAUMAS UND PLATONS MYTHOS VON DEN ZIKADEN: BILDER FÜR WITTGENSTEINS STAUNEN
Ilse Somavilla, Innsbruck, Österreich


REASONS AND ASPECTS IN PHILOSOPHY AS AN ART OF INTERPRETATION
Antonia Soulez, Paris, France

Understanding can be seen under two aspects: in the sense of being able to replace a phrase with another that says the same thing, but also in the sense of being unable to do so. These two aspects are stressed in the §§ 527 and 531 of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. I will develop the second aspect which, as Wittgenstein writes in brackets, specially applies to music and poetry. I will then show that the “non-paraphraseability” (A. Ridley) aspect is in fact extremely important. Without calling for a principle of ineffability, it could start with the “sublimity” which makes music resist against its own explanation (H. Schenker for instance concerning Beethoven’s famous incomprehensible bars of the Sonata for piano, the 2nd movement of opus 111), a “sublimity” which extends to the role of surprise when unexpected changes occur transgressing the usual framework of recognizable music (for instance breaking the tonal harmony). – Most interesting to me is the case when, addressing the unaccustomed ear, sounds impose themselves in spite of our expectations towards a familiar schema of identifiable harmony, thus allowing room for unfamiliar chords the sense of which cannot be grasped with the help of any available key of interpretation. This case is (indirectly) illustrated by Kafka’s story “Josefine, die Sängerin” in which understanding her song remains unsolvable (See H. Danuser’s description). At that point the parallel between music and language seems not applicable any longer. I will show how these different cases of non-understanding bring out features of understanding in a new sense, and thereby contribute to musical significance in a philosophically crucial manner, not only for the musicologist-to-day (see the many events today dealing with “Wittgenstein and aesthetics” which flourish here and there) but also for an “art of interpretation” of language which justifies that Wittgenstein could also have said that philosophy is a kind of aesthetics.
ZUR ÄHNLICHKEIT DER BILDER ODER WIE REDEN WIR EIGENTLICH ÜBER BILDER
Jakob Steinbrenner, München, Deutschland

PEIRCE’S NOTION OF DIAGRAM EXPERIMENT
Frederik Stjernfelt, Copenhagen, Denmark
An important idea in Peirce’s doctrine of diagrammatical reasoning is the notion of using the diagram as a tool for making deduction by performing rule-bound experiments on the diagram. This paper surveys the idea and its connections to central concepts in Peirce’s philosophy of logic, epistemology, and metaphysics, such as the notions of dicisign (proposition), of corollarial and theoretical reasoning, of abduction, of continuity, of real possibilities.

WASTE ARTICULATED: DERRIDA VIA BECKETTEAN WATT
Xymena Synak-Pekiň, Gdansk, Poland
The event is coexistive with becoming, and becoming is itself coexistive with language … Everything happens at the boundary between thing and propositions. (Deleuze, The Logic of Sense)
In reference to Valéry’s definition of poetry (The poem: a prolonged hesitation between sound and sense) Agamben writes: “poetry lives only in the tension and difference (and hence also in the virtual interference) between sound and sense, between the semiotic sphere and the semantic sphere.” (G. Agamben, “The End of Poem”, in: The End of Poem, Stanford UP 1999, 109) – This breach within language suggests a certain void which dissimulates everything said from within, thus becoming a discourse that, as Foucault put it, means not a structure but an existential figure. The question one can pose here is: What would be the hesitation “between sound and sense” and how to articulate the very difference between something and nothing – the difference which “is” the space making the difference between sound and sense possible? – The Beckettian Watt (examined in a fragment) approaches the problem indicating a possible path to trace.

DAS FIGURENBILD ALS DIAGRAMM – „LOT UND SEINE TÖCHTER“ (LOUVRE, RF 1185)
Felix Thürlemann, Konstanz, Deutschland
Aus kunsthistorischem Blickwinkel erscheint es nicht sinnvoll, die Grenze zwischen Bild und Diagramm kategorial streng zu ziehen. Auch figurative Gemälde weisen mitunter diagrammatische Strukturen auf, die dazu dienen, die dargestellte Geschichte thematisch zu deuten. Welt mit Sinn zu unterlegen. Am Beispiel eines flämischen Gemäldes der Zeit um 1500 wird zu zeigen sein, auf welchen historischen Voraussetzungen eine solche latente Diagrammatizität beruht und wie sie sich zu traditionellen bildsemantischen Vorgaben verhält.

ON IMAGINING MATHEMATICAL OBJECTS
Hsing-chien Tsai, Chia-Yi, Taiwan
It is believed by quite a few philosophers that mathematical objects are some kind of abstract existence, which is not spatial temporal. However, this poses a question of how we can possibly access them. A usual answer is that we have mathematical intuitions. Charles Parsons has done an impressive job of explaining what kind of intuition involved concerning natural numbers may be by resorting to our capacity for imagination. In this paper, I shall explore the limitation of such a capacity. I will look into the case of natural numbers as well as some cases of larger cardinalities. I will argue that the criterion for judging whether an imagination works is to see whether important structural properties of the mathematical objects in question can be seen there and whether each imagined object can be identified in a clear enough way.

WITTGENSTEIN AND FOUCAULT: APPLICATION OF ANALYTICAL METHODOLOGIES TO THE HISTORICAL EPISTEMOLOGY OF FOUCALUT
Matteo Vagelli
The target of this presentation is to attempt a comparison between the philosophical approaches and methodologies of two of the most influential philosopher of the XXth century, normally ascribed to very different (when not considered irreconcilable) cultural horizons: Ludwig Wittgenstein and Michel Foucault. Among many possible points of coincidence one has the prominence: their very specific and unique anti-metaphysical attitudes entailed by their refusal of a traditional correspondence theory of scientific, linguistic and political truths. In both philosophers the appeal to the concept of game as a strategic activity is intended to give an account of reality (reality of the power, reality of the language) without any reference to any sort of metaphysical substance or essence. This opens up a space for a political way of analysing knowledge in general and the scientific one in particular. I may call this space political epistemology, intending it as a specification of the Foucaultian historical epistemology.
ON TEXT-SETTING AS ASPECT-SEEING BY MEANS OF MUSIC
Panos Vlagopoulos
The Romantic ‘Lied’ is here approached as text-aspect exemplification by means of music. Two Schumann songs are revisited in order to show the aspects a listener can notice in the Eichendorff and Lenau poems. In this case, aspect-noticing involves a critical listener responding to the different aspects seen by the composer in the exploitation of music-to-text interaction. All in all, a listener-based analysis is sketched, building on the two notions of Wittgensteinian ‘aspects’ and Goodman’s ‘exemplification’.

WAS ES HEISST, DEN MENSCHEN ALS MENSCHEN ZU SEHEN: WITTGENSTEIN UND DER EXISTENZIALISMUS
Thomas Wachtendorf

GLIMPSES OF UNSURVEYABLE MAPS
David Wagner, Vienna, Austria
That Ludwig Wittgenstein was interested in maps and map-making comes as no surprise. After all, he compares the form of a philosophical question to our common experience of disorientation – "I don’t know my way about." (Pl § 123) – and likens his Philosophical Investigations (Pl) to an album containing sketches of a landscape which has been explored in a criss-cross manner. In this paper I present metaphors of perfect maps provided by Jorge Luis Borges, Lewis Carroll and Josiah Royce, and set these against remarks by Wittgenstein and Charles Sanders Peirce.

VISUAL GAMES OF MAKE-BELIEVE, AND THE ROLE OF NON-DEPICTIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEPICTIVE CONTENT
Kendall Walton, Michigan, USA
What a picture depicts depends partly on the configuration of marks on the picture surface. But other circumstances contribute to its depictive content as well, including, sometimes, a title or associated text, and in the case of photographs, the real world objects whose reflected light caused the marks. These non-depictive contributors also influence the nature of the visual games of make-believe viewers engage in, and they underscore the importance of such make-believe activities and the associated imaginative experiences in our appreciation and understanding of depictive representations. The fact that photographs are subject to non-depictive contributors of a kind that don’t apply to hand-made pictures brings out an important respect in which photographs are special among depictive representations, one that is distinct from and independent of their transparency.

BILDSPRACHE UND WISSENSCHAFTLICHE VISUALISIERUNG
Peter Weibel, Karlsruhe, Deutschland
Mit seiner Bildsprache von 1936 hat Neurath die Schriftsprache weiterentwickelt, nämlich die logischen Argumente um visuelle Argumente erweitert. Die visuelle Diskursivität wurde durch die digitalen Technologien um die bildgebenden Verfahren angereichert. Der Vortrag zeigt die Entwicklung der Visualisierung als erkenntnistheoretisches Medium, von Neurath bis zur zeitgenössischen Chemie und Physik, nämlich wie Daten zu Bildern und Bilder zu Argumenten werden.

BILDER DES BÖSEN: SCHÄDEL, HIRNE, GENE – WISSENSCHAFTLICHE MODELLE PRÄVENTIVER FORENSIK
Martin G. Weiß, Klagenfurt, Österreich
Starting with the pseudo-Aristotelian “Physiognomica” science tried to visualize human psychological predispositions in order to predict individual behavior. If the soul is the form of the body, as Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas stated, it should be possible to deduce the nature of the soul from the features of the body. This simple model of the relationship between the invisible (mind) and the visible (body) in human beings is the common basis of all “Physiognomy”, from Lavater, Galton, and Lombroso up to modern brain scans and DNA-Analysis. The present paper focuses on the linkage between science (understood as visualization of the invisible) and forensics. Physiognomy, from early-modern phrenology to the recent discovery of the “Warrior gene” was always eager to predict criminal behavior in order to undertake preemptive measures. The “Human Genome Project” at first seemed finally to fulfill this deterministic desire, but soon it became evident that the basic assumption of classical genetics – the one gene/one enzyme hypothesis – was false. In the era of postgenomics, biological determinism has evolved into an discourse of risk- and self-governance, establishing new forms of “subjectivation” and perhaps a new image of the human being.
HOW PICTORIAL IS CHINESE?
AND DOES IT MATTER?
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It has often been said that the Chinese script is pictorial or ideographic, and that this is one of the reasons why Chinese tend to think more analogically than logically, and why in the past the natural sciences developed to a lesser degree in China than in the West. These are strong claims. They have often been oversimplified and exaggerated, but I think there is something to be said for them. Here I will focus on the first question. I will argue that Chinese characters still have semantic features that create image-like qualities in a wider sense: not mere resemblances between sign and object, but family resemblances in semantic fields. The fact that Chinese is an isolating and monosyllabic language is essential in this.

MODELS AND IMAGES IN SYSTEMS BIOLOGY
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New revolutionary technologies based on whole genome analysis have emerged in biology and medicine over the past decade. The unprecedented amount and complexity of data produced by such technologies require a synthesis of formal mathematical methods with the more intuition and diagram based reasoning in traditional biology. Such, mostly informal, reasoning always relied heavily on visual representation, from realistic anatomical drawings or drawings of specimens to abstract flow charts of signaling pathways and other complex regulatory processes in biological systems.

Meanwhile the representation of mathematical and statistical models in a graphical fashion has become increasingly popular among engineers and mathematicians, not least through inspiration from biological models and the availability of high performance interactive computer systems. The development of methods and algorithms for formalising the reasoning based on graphical models has high priority in many areas of statistics and machine learning.

Graphical representations seem to exploit evolutionary deeply rooted reasoning mechanisms based on visual images and dynamic or motoric processes. They are almost indispensable for a proper understanding of a complex system. On the other hand, pictures might suggest more than can be justified by formal inference, for example, in establishing causal relationships. Another issue is how far abstraction and simplification can go before touch to reality is lost. Or for that matter, what, after all, is the purpose of a formal model for a biological system, how is it used?

COLOUR VISION AND KNOWLEDGE
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In his book on colour vision, Arthur Schopenhauer wrote that “A more precise knowledge and firmer conviction of the wholly subjective nature of colour contributes to a more profound comprehension of the Kantian doctrine of the likewise subjective, intellectual forms of all knowledge and so it affords a very suitable introductory course to philosophy”.

In the past thirty years, the neural mechanisms that allow us to acquire that subjective knowledge have been explored in fair detail. The main conclusions are: (a) the brain uses separate pathways for colour; (b) there is a specialized area in the visual brain – the V4 complex – which is critical for colour perception; (c) the operations through which colour is generated are critically dependent upon the V4 complex, as well as the inputs to, and outputs from, it; (d) damage to the V4 complex leads to colour imperception or achromatopsia. The nature of the operations performed in V4 – possibly in concert with areas with which it is reciprocally connected – can be inferred from physiological and imaging experiments. These show that the colour of a surface depends on taking the ratio of light of different wavebands reflected from a surface and from its surrounds. This ratio never changes for any given waveband, even when the amount of light of that waveband reflected from the surface changes markedly. By taking these ratios, the brain constructs colours, which do not exist in the outside world but are instead constructed by the application of the inherited concept of ratio-taking. Strictly speaking, the knowledge about the reflectance of surfaces for lights of different wavebands in comparison to the reflectance of the surrounds for light of the same wavebands. Colour is a language that is somehow added on, and it is interesting to note that there is a special area of the brain that is critical for naming colours, damage to which leads to colour anoma.

The ratio-taking operations performed within V4 lead to the construction of constant colours. This refers to the fact that a green leaf, for example, looks green at noon on a cloudy or sunny day and also at dawn and dusk, when there is a lot more red light reflected from the green surface. But while the colour remains constant, the shade changes. It is this change in shades of a colour – depending upon the wavelength composition of the light in which a surface is viewed as well as the efficiency of the surrounds of that patch for reflecting different wavelengths of light – that artists exploit in creating their colour effects.

Much has been made by physiologists and philosophers – including Wittgenstein – of the importance of opponent mechanisms [red-green; blue-yellow; black-white] in the retina determining colours. In fact, psychophysical and physiological experiments show that opponent colours are generated after colours are generated. This can be shown by both physiological and psychophysical experiments. – The separation between the colour centre and the brain region critical for naming colours raises interesting speculative questions about colour and the language used to describe it, which I will try to address.
Wenn's um Kulturförderung geht,
ist nur eine Bank meine Bank.