Abstracts

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MAKING SENSE OF FAULTLESS DISAGREEMENT

Domink Aeschbacher, Bern, Switzerland

There has been much criticism of the notion of faultless disagreement recently. Isidora Stojanovic (2007) amongst others has argued that what prima facie seems to be a faultless disagreement is either not faultless or a misunderstanding. In this paper I will show that this criticism is based on an equivocation of the notion of disagreement and that it misses its target. Since we have the intuition that faultless disagreement really exists, we should not deny it, but rather try to explain it. Furthermore, I will argue that if we take care of the fact that the notion of disagreement can be understood differently, then we should prefer relativism over all forms of contextualism (epistemic contextualism, contextualism about predicates of taste etc.).

EINE RELIABILISTISCHE RECHTFERTIGUNG DES WERTES VON WISSEN ÜBER THEORIEN

Albert J.J. Angibeher & Christian J. Feldbacher, Salzburg, Austria

In this contribution the so-called Meno-Problem will be discussed. With respect to theories the problem is the following question: Why is it epistemologically more valuable to know a true theory than to simply believe it? A classical answer in realist accounts to this problem refers to the value of the operation which is used for gathering knowledge. But there is a gap in the argumentation as far as one is not allowed to derive from this assumption the conclusion that also the result of the operation is valuable. We are going to show a difference between true theories which are just believed and theories which are also known to be true. This difference seems to allow one to close the mentioned gap.

REFERRING TO CIRCUMSTANCES

Alberto Arruda, Lisbon, Portugal

I will focus on the concept of intention, although this word will hardly be mentioned. I will try to outline some aspects of this concept, mainly what it is to perceive an intention, and to evaluate one. This will lead to the idea of a ‘circumstance’ or ‘situation’ which I argue is secondary in relation to the concept of ‘intention’. I will defend that we normally understand intentions rather than acquiring any kind of technique that enables us to identify them. Nonetheless, I will not fully dispense of the concept of ‘circumstance’ or ‘situation’, but try to dissolve these into a broader description of the idea of ‘intention’.

KNOWLEDGE, CONTEXT, FACTIVITY AND A CONTRADICTION

Peter Baumann, Swarthmore, PA, USA

Suppose Joseph finds himself in an ordinary epistemic context O while Ann finds herself in a demanding (though non-sceptical) epistemic context D. Contextualists hold that Joseph’s utterance of ‘Ann knows that she has hands’ can be true even if Ann’s utterance of the same sentence is false; similarly, Ann’s utterance of ‘Ann doesn’t know that she has hands’ can be true even if Joseph’s utterance of the same sentence is false. Assume that Ann is a contextualist, making judgements about the epistemic state of Joseph and herself. According to her, it is true that

1. ‘Joseph knows that Ann has hands’ is true in O and that
2. ‘Ann knows that she has hands’ is not true in D.
Assume further that Ann knows (1). We thus get:
3. ‘Ann knows that (1)’ is true in D.
According to disquotation and factivity principles
4. ‘A knows that p’ (as uttered in some context) is true \(\Rightarrow p\).
If we apply (DF) to (1) we get:
5. ‘Joseph knows that Ann has hands’ is true in O \(\Rightarrow\) Ann has hands.
It is not unrealistic to assume that
6. ‘Ann knows that (4)’ is true in D.
Here is one more plausible assumption:
(Clos) For all contexts C, speakers A and propositions p, q: ‘A knows that p’ (as uttered in C) is true and ‘A knows that (p \(\Rightarrow\) q)’ (as uttered in C) is true \(\Rightarrow\) ‘A knows that q’ (as uttered in C) is true.
(Clos), (3) and (5) entail
7. ‘Ann knows that she has hands’ is true in D which contradicts
8. ‘Ann knows that she has hands’ is not true in D.
Voilà: a contradiction for contextualism. This is a problem which has been neglected very much so far (but see Bendl 2003 and Wright 2005). As it turns out there is also a version of this problem for contextualism’s cousin subject-sensitive invariantism. If time permits, I will go into both versions of the general problem and also discuss a solution.

UNDERSTANDING AND ITS RELATION TO KNOWLEDGE

Christoph Baumberger, Zurich, Switzerland

Is understanding the same as or at least a species of knowledge? This question has to be answered with respect to each of three types of understanding and of knowledge. I argue that understanding-why and objectual understanding are not reducible to one another and neither identical with nor a species of the corresponding or any other type of knowledge. My discussion reveals important characteristics of these two types of understanding and has consequences for propositional understanding.

WHAT DID “THE SUPPLEMENTS” TO THE TRACTATUS CONTAIN PRECISELY, AND WHEN WERE THEY TYPED BY WITTGENSTEIN?

Luciano Bazzocchi, Siena, Italy

The two fragments of paper on which proposition 4.0141 was typed originally, testify that there was really a typescript with a hundred of possible “supplements” (as Wittgenstein called them) to the Tractatus. Reconsidering the various composition methods which Wittgenstein adopted, it’s possible to indicate the potential sources of that document, and also when its typing took place. Moreover, if we examine the relationships between the diaries and the
manuscript of the *Tractatus* (Ms104), and between the manuscript and the final typescript (Ts202), we can infer from which paragraphs the "supplementary typescript" was taken, and so it’s possible to rebuild part of its content. In this way, we answer to an old question of Tractarian critics and draw a more coherent picture of the last stage of *Tractatus* composition. As final result, anyway, we obtain a precious list of not yet used statements of Wittgenstein’s Notebooks: that is, which statements Wittgenstein himself regarded as notable and possibly exploitable for the latest tuning of his masterpiece (and, by exclusion, which statements were not so).

### WITTGENSTEIN ON ‘THE NOTHING’

**Jonathan Beale, Reading, UK**

Perhaps the most notorious proposition in the history of philosophy is Heidegger’s ‘Das Nichts selbst nichtet’, usually translated as ‘The nothing nothets’. Many critiques have been made of this, most notably Rudolph Carnap’s vehement critique in 1932. To this day if a philosopher needs a ready-made piece of nonsense for their purposes, this is often cited.

One apparent critique that remains unclear lies with Wittgenstein, who discusses this in an elusive remark from December 1932. The orthodox view holds that Wittgenstein’s position on Heidegger is essentially the same as Carnap’s. However, some argue that Wittgenstein does not put forward a critique at all, but rather attempts to engage with what Heidegger might mean.

Through discussion of the contributions to the debate concerning this remark from P.M.S. Hacker, Gordon Baker, James Conant and Duncan Richter, I argue that we should not read Wittgenstein as putting forward a Carnapian attack against Heidegger.

### ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE PRIVATE LANGUAGE METAPHOR?

**Ondřej Beran, Prague, Czech Republic**

The private language account offers an interesting tool for describing some features of the situation of (mutual) misunderstanding. However, as I try to show, in some contexts (male-female miscommunication, in particular) it rather obscures the point, as it makes it possible to interpret a problem of ethical/political nature in epistemological, i.e. ethics-neutral terms.

### SENSITIVITY KEEPS THE PROMISE SAFETY MAKES

**Sven Bernecker, Irvine, CA, USA**

It is widely thought that the sensitivity account of knowledge forces us to reject closure of knowledge under known entailment. This paper argues that sensitivity is compatible with closure. Closure considerations cannot be used to adjudicate between safety and sensitivity accounts of knowledge.

### KANT AND WITTGENSTEIN: THE REGULATIVE ASPECT OF SOME LIMIT CONCEPTS

**Cecilia B. Beristain, Munich, Germany**

In this paper I will compare some limit concepts in Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* with similar limit connotations in Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. I claim that some limits are established by both authors, i.e. the noumena for Kant and the logic for Wittgenstein as conditions of possibility, and these present a regulative character. My aim is to present how both philosophers reflected analogously on the distinction of what can be known and what cannot (Kant); what in language can be meaningful or senseless (Wittgenstein); which judgements or propositions can be part of those of science and which cannot. Moreover the necessity of these limits presents the un-
knowable and unsayable with regulative outcomes in our behaviour.

VIRTUE AND ARGUMENT: TAKING CHARACTER INTO ACCOUNT
Tracy Bowell & Justine Kingsbury, Waikato, New Zealand

In this paper we consider the prospects for an account of good argument that is augmented by taking factors about the character of the arguer into consideration. We begin by situating arguments in an epistemic context and in relation to epistemic norms. We then consider cases in which we seem already to take legitimate account of agents’ character. We go on to consider aspects of agents’ character that might usefully be taken into account when evaluating arguments. We end by suggesting that these characteristics are also ones which we should nurture in epistemic agents.

CONTEXTUALISM, RELATIVISM AND THE SEMANTICS OF KNOWLEDGE ASCRITIONS
Elke Brendel, Bonn, Germany

According to contextualist accounts of knowledge, the truth-values of knowledge claims of the form “S knows that p” are sensitive to the knowledge-ascriber, i.e., sensitive to the context in which the knowledge claim is made. Like contextualism, relativism holds that there is a context-dependent variability of knowledge-ascriptions. However, relativists contend that knowledge claims are assessment-sensitive. For a relativist, a knowledge claim can therefore have different truth-values when assessed from different perspectives. In contrast to contextualism and relativism, subject-sensitive invariantism holds that the truth-value of a given knowledge ascriptions is determined by the practical interests of the epistemic subjects.

In my talk, versions of indexical contextualism, John MacFarlane’s truth relativism, as well as Jason Stanley’s subject-sensitive invariantism are critically examined. It is shown that all of these accounts cannot yield a satisfying semantics for knowledge ascriptions. In particular, indexical contextualism cannot explain the intuition of real disagreement with regard to knowledge ascriptions. Furthermore, contextualists cannot account for the fact that we often retract earlier knowledge claims in light of new counter-evidence. In addition, there are clear counterexamples to the claim that “know” is an indexical. Both, subject-sensitive invariantism and relativism seem to fare better with respect to these problems. Nevertheless, they have their own serious shortcomings. Whereas contextualism leads to counterintuitive results when the knowledge attribute is in low knowledge standards and the epistemic subject is in high standards, subject-sensitive invariantism fares badly in “attributor-high standards/subject-low standards”, and relativism gets problematic in cases in which the assessor is in low standards and the speaker or subject is in high standards.

It is finally argued that the truth-value of a knowledge claim does neither depend in any relevant way from the speaker’s nor the subject’s or the assessor’s context. A (sceptical or moderate) invariantist account provides the most promising semantic theory for knowledge ascriptions.

“THE WHOLE CURLY-BURLY”: WITTGENSTEIN AND EMBODIED COGNITION
Robert G. Brice, New Orleans, LA, USA
While typically ignored by the cognitive sciences, Wittgenstein’s later work provides those defending Embodied Cognition (EC) with a needed philosophical foundation. Cognition, as Wittgenstein demonstrates, is not simply a matter of disembodied intellect, but is actional, time-pressured, body-based, and dependent on the larger environment.

A NEW PROBLEM FOR PERCEPTUAL JUSTIFICATION
Jochen Briesen, Konstanz, Germany
There is a well known argument to the conclusion that our beliefs cannot be justified by perceptions but only by other beliefs. Most philosophers reject this argument by dismissing one of its premises. In this paper I argue that there is a problem with this popular refutation of the argument that has been overlooked thus far. Solving this problem will improve our understanding of the justificatory relationship between perceptions and beliefs.

WITTGENSTEIN ÜBER GEDANKENEXPERIMENTE
Joachim Bromand, Bonn, Germany

THE KNOWLEDGE NORM OF PRACTICAL REASONING AND IMPURISM
Jessica Brown, St Andrews, UK
The idea that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning, or reasoning about what to do, is central to the defence of “impurism”. According to impurism, whether the true belief that p is knowledge not only depends on such factors as one’s evidence, and the reliability of the belief-producing process, but also the stakes or how important it is that p be true. I will argue one main way of formulating
available from the perspective of fully developed logical and justify rival logics, such a pluralist view is no longer the method of reflective equilibrium allows us to develop and Shapiro. While from the pre-systematic perspective logics is possible against arguments advanced by Resnik that reasonable disagreement between proponents of rival process. This distinction can be used to defend the claim with the systematic principles, which result from the process. This distinction can be used to defend the claim that reasonable disagreement between proponents of rival logics is possible against arguments advanced by Resnik and Shapiro. While from the pre-systematic perspective the method of reflective equilibrium allows us to develop and justify rival logics, such a pluralist view is no longer available from the perspective of fully developed logical systems.

REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM AND DISAGREEMENT ABOUT LOGICS
Georg Brun, Zurich, Switzerland

Most accounts of the method of reflective equilibrium fail to distinguish explicitly between judgements held prior to the process of mutual adjustments and judgements in agreement with the systematic principles, which result from the process. This distinction can be used to defend the claim that reasonable disagreement between proponents of rival logics is possible against arguments advanced by Resnik and Shapiro. While from the pre-systematic perspective the method of reflective equilibrium allows us to develop and justify rival logics, such a pluralist view is no longer available from the perspective of fully developed logical systems.

ETHICAL FRAMEWORK

Ethical life pervades human life and should not be disconnected from it. This is an investigation into the ethical framework, i.e. the foundations upon which ethical action take place. It is an attempt to shed light upon the ethical ‘hinges’ which make up this framework. It is an investigation of ethics in action.

SELF-UNDERMINING INFERENCE RULES
Stewart Cohen, Tucson, AZ, USA

Responses to the rational disagreement problem can be broadly divided into two categories – steadfast and concessive. Steadfast views hold that you are rationally permitted to maintain your belief/credence in the face of peer disagreement. Concessive inference rules dictate that you are rationally required to revise your belief/credence in the face of rational disagreement. Adam Elga argues that such rules are self-undermining if they are concessive about themselves. Elga holds that we should be steadfast about first-order propositions. Brian Weatherson also argues that concessive inference rules are self-undermining if applied to themselves. He holds that we should be steadfast about both inference rules and first-order propositions. I argue that concessive inference rules are not self-undermining in any problematic way. Thus we can be concessive both about first-order propositions, and the inference rules themselves.

WITTGENSTEIN OUT OF CONTEXT
Annalisa Coliva, Modena, Italy

In the light of the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s remarks in On Certainty on “I know” provided in my Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense, the paper argues against contemporary contextualist renditions of Wittgenstein’s thought. Both semantic contextualist readings, like Charles Travis’, and epistemological con-

KNOWING HOW TO φ AND INTELLIGENT ABILITIES
Boleslaw Czarnecki, Cracow, Poland

Bengson and Moffett (2007) argue that in order to overcome the puzzle about attribution with respect to knowing how to we must appeal to the notion of understanding qua reasonable conceptual mastery. I briefly demonstrate that this approach is wrong and point to a solution which lies in Gilbert Ryle’s (2009) conception of intelligent abilities. I will also show how such intelligent abilities could be employed as epistemic virtues in the account of knowing how as non-accidentally successful performance.

APT SEEING AND INTELLIGENT SEEING
Tadeusz Czarnecki, Cracow, Poland

Ordinary seeing, dominated by interpretations of objects in terms of means to some ends, satisfies Ryle’s criteria of intelligence. Primarily focused on instrumental identifications, ordinary seeing is multi-dimensional and context-sensitive. The issue of what is represented in visual experience is within the perspective of instrumental seeing marginalized and, consequently, the division between naïveté and criticism remains thoroughly epistemic. Sosa’s model of apt seeing, though conceptually similar to Ryle’s model of intelligent performance, is motivated by the requirement of ontological adequacy and reverses the order of priority characteristic for ordinary seeing. Sosa proposes relatively one-sided perspective of a cognitive success which does not absorb the tension between ontological and instrumental properties of seen objects. It is a weakness because only double identifications of seen objects are unquestionably intelligent.

WITTGENSTEINIAN APPROACH TO PARTIALITY
Mohammad Hossein Dabbagh, Reading, UK

In this paper I will try to respond Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument against intuitionism on the grounds of partiality. According to him, we are partial; we must therefore consider other, different confirmations, inferentially. This means that moral intuitionists are wrong in believing that some of our moral judgments are reached non-inferentially. According to this epistemological claim, in order to arrive at a justified moral judgment in a concrete ethical situation, we have to use other confirmations, inferentially. In this article, I am going to show that Sinnott-Armstrong’s epistemological account against moral intuitionism is not convincing. To this end, I draw upon Wittgenstein’s account of the concept of “game”. I emphasise the role of perceptual knowledge and the way that the idea of ‘seeing the similarities’ of concept application is embedded in the idea of being engaged in a practice.
Moreover, Tabatabaie, unlike Wittgenstein, endorses that sondern die Frage nach seiner Erkennbarkeit sinnlos. Verschwinden. Nicht das radikal Neue ist unerkennbar, selbst durch einen Wandel der Betrachtungsweise zum schluss an Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie stellt die Antwortständnis des Ausdrucks "neu". Die Untersuchung im An-gen gemeinsamer Irrtum aufgezeigt, nämlich ein Missver-lernd als Unbestimmbares. Es  wird ein beiden Erzählun-ten auf die Frage liefern, ob das wirklich radikal Neue Gegenstand gewesen. Es werden zwei dafür paradigmati-sche Erzählungen vorgestellt, die komplementäre Antworten auf die Frage liefern, ob das wirklich radikal Neue überhaupt erkannt werden kann. Im ersten Fall bleibt es notwendig unsichtbar, im zweiten Fall erscheint es schil-lernd als Unbestimmbareres. Es wird ein beiden Erzählun-gen gemeinsamer Irrtum aufgezeigt, nämlich ein Missver-ständnis des Ausdrucks „neu“. Die Untersuchung im An-schluss an Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie stellt die Antwort auf die Frage zurück und bringt stattdessen die Frage selbst durch einen Wandel der Betrachtungsweise zum Verschwinden. Nicht das radikal Neue ist unerkennbar, sondern die Frage nach seiner Erkennbarkeit sinnlos.
CONTENTS OF KNOWLEDGE
Gerhard Ernst, Stuttgart, Germany

The examples in the tradition initiated by Gettier play a pivotal role in the analysis of knowledge. In my opinion these examples are odd because they sit uneasily between two standard applications of the word “knowledge”. In this paper, I am going to describe these two contexts of knowledge, and explain why the examples in the Gettier tradition are, in a sense, mixed cases. From this the contextualist can learn what is involved in describing contexts.

WIRED FOR ANTICIPATION: AN ADAPTIVE TRAIT CHALLENGING PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATION?
August Fenk, Klagenfurt, Austria & Lorenz A. Fenk, Cambridge, UK

Biological studies suggest a view of anticipation as a ubiquitous adaptive trait (Mitchell et al. 2011). We relate such (neuro)biological studies to conceptions of ubiquitous adaptive trait (Mitchell et al. 2011). We relate biological studies to conceptions of ubiquitous adaptive trait, with particular attention to computational models of learning. And: If a logical justification is neither possible nor necessary in adaptive traits such as anticipation in microorganisms and in our immune system, why should it, then, be possible and necessary in our “conscious” inductive inferences?

THROUGH PICTURES TO PROBLEMS: COGNITIVE EPISTEMOLOGY AND THERAPEUTIC PHILOSOPHY
Eugen Fischer, Norwich, UK

By offering a précis of my Philosophical Delusion and its Therapy (PDT, Routledge 2011), the talk presents the project of a cognitive epistemology and shows that its first results vindicate therapeutic approaches to a range of philosophical problems. The cognitive epistemology of philosophical studies how philosophical reflection is shaped by automatic cognition of which we are largely unaware but can study through experiments. The project is to explain intuitive judgements and inferences to be found in philosophical texts, as the result of cognitive processes for which there is independent experimental evidence, and to use these explanations to assess what probative force these intuitions have and what warrant thinkers have for accepting them. PDT identifies one relevant process by developing the idea, mooted in Wittgenstein’s Big Type-script and contemporaneous sources, that philosophical worries are engendered by ‘false analogies within language’ and ‘similes at work in the unconscious’. This idea is developed with the help of concepts and experimental findings from cognitive linguistics and psychology, namely, from work on conceptual metaphor and on non-intentional analogical reasoning: Under conditions frequently met in philosophical reflection, competent thinkers may apply conceptual metaphors overly literally, in non-intentional reasoning which is not under their direct control. This gives new content to the notion of ‘being under the spell of philosophical interest’. Through a series of historical case-studies, PDT shows that the process identified can explain philosophical intuitions that have shaped the early modern mind-world dichotomy and gave rise to classical problems about the mind, secondary qualities, and perception. These are ill-motivated ‘pseudo-problems’ which arise only from the clash of unwarranted intuitions with familiar facts, or among each other.

This account of how thinkers under the spell of philosophical pictures come to raise pseudo-problems allows us to explain where and why something worth calling a ‘therapy’ is called for in philosophy, and to develop one set of therapeutic methods. By clarifying the frequently misunderstood notion of ‘therapy’, PDT shows that the need for therapy arises within philosophy to the extent to which cognitive processes which are not under our direct control drive philosophers to formulate ill-motivated ‘pseudo-problems’ that engender unwarranted intellectual disquiet and pointless efforts. By coming to understand how unsound processes of automatic thought engender unwarranted intuitions and ill-motivated ‘problems’, we can come to see through the latter and put an end to what misplaced toil and worry they occasioned. The findings of cognitive epistemology thus vindicate and facilitate the practice of a kind of cognitive therapy in philosophy.

The talk outlines this main argument with illustrations drawn from a case-study on Locke and the genesis of the conception of the mind as a space of inner perception. In this way it seeks to show that results from recent work in cognitive science can be used to develop and vindicate some key ideas of Wittgenstein’s meta-philosophy.

SOME THOUGHTS ON WITTGENSTEIN AND FILM
Craig Fox, California, PA, USA

It is not uncommon to find, among philosophers interested in film, some interest in or influence from Ludwig Wittgenstein. In this paper, I sketch some suggestions as to why this convergence of interests can be appropriate. I draw parallels between the ways Wittgenstein does philosophy (and what he’s trying to achieve) and the way certain films affect some viewers. I hope merely to have established a possibility for one way in which films may do philosophy, and to have cleared the way for the useful examination of particular films and how they function.

THE CONCEPT OF OBJECTIVE CERTAINTY AND THE CONCEPTION OF DYNAMIC KNOWLEDGE
Florian Franken, Munich, Germany

One leading interpretation of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty proposes the view that some certainties are universal and immutable. This paper argues against this assumption and claims that the concept of objective certainty does not refer to something that is shown, but that it indicates the origin of primitive language-games. The focus therefore is a grammatical one. Primitive language-games in which we are socialized with certainty and which are the condition for more elaborate language-games like knowing or doubting, should be conceived as mutable, since their grammar is arbitrary and unjustified. As a result of the mutability, it can be concluded that in On Certainty Wittgenstein discovers a reciprocal and dynamic relation between the fore- and the background of our convictions. This dynamic relation is appropriately expressed in the riverbed metaphor and excludes the idea of foundationalism as sourced in universal certainties.
EPISTEMIC VARIANTISM AND THE FACTIVITY PROBLEM
Wolfgang Freitag, Konstanz, Germany
In a recent exchange, Anthony Brueckner & Christopher Buford (2009 and 2010) and Peter Baumann (2010) discuss the right reaction to an apparent problem for both epistemic contextualism and SSI deriving from the factivity of knowledge. While Brueckner & Buford suggest to give up the possibility of cross-context knowledge of variantist scenarios, Baumann takes this to be an unsatisfactory response. In this article, I present a unified description of the problem for both contextualism and SSI and argue that, with a clear view on the commitments of epistemic contextualism and SSI, the problem turns out to be apparent only.

“I HAVE MY REASONS...” – EDWARD CRAIG ON TESTIMONY AND EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION
Robert Frühstückl, Vienna, Austria
In this paper I will take a look at a specific conception of knowledge, advocated by Edward Craig in his Knowledge and the State of Nature. According to Craig testimonial knowledge lies at the heart of our epistemic practices and, beyond that, at the genealogical root of the very concept of knowledge itself. For this reason it would be interesting to put his position on epistemic justification of testimony under closer scrutiny and this is the purpose of my article. I will argue that Craig is reductionist on testimony.

THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF ZOMBIE-BELIEFS
Martina Fürst, Graz, Austria
According to one reply to the zombie-argument the conceivability of zombies need not be explained by their possibility, since an alternative explanation is available which recurs to phenomenal concepts. The basic idea is that we conceive of our experiences in terms of phenomenal concepts, whereas in imagining zombies we employ physical concepts. This explains our intuitions that phenomenal experiences and physical states can come apart, even if this is metaphysically impossible.

In this paper I investigate to what further claims one is committed if one holds that the conceivability of zombies can be explained recurring to phenomenal concepts. Comparing us to zombies instantiating epistemic gaps, sheds light on accounts of phenomenal concepts and their epistemic ramifications. Zombie-beliefs turn out to convert into knowledge according to reliabilism. But, I argue, in the actual world there is an alternative explanation available why we have knowledge about our mental states, which, contrary to reliabilism, can also account for dualist intuitions: namely, evidence on the basis of constitutional phenomenal concepts.

WITTGENSTEIN – BENJAMIN – FLUSser: CORRESPONDENCES
Marc Geerards, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Between Wittgenstein, Benjamin and Flusser there are strong correspondences: culturally, historically, thematically, biographically. This affinity ultimately can best be grasped by the equally complex and vague concept of ‘style’. In the following I will indicate this relationship through a brief summary of various aspects. I will also briefly indicate pairwise comparisons between these three thinkers. These are merely exploratory prolegomena for a more thorough investigation (a small household step ladder that can be thrown away).

ANMERKUNGEN ZUR REZEPTION VON „ÜBER GEWISSHEIT“ ALS ERKENNTNISTHEORETISCHER SCHRIFT
Frederik Gierlinger, Vienna, Austria

“MEANING IS USE” AND WITTGENSTEIN’S METHOD OF DISSOLVING PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS BY DESCRIBING THE USES OF WORDS
Stefan Giesewetter, Berlin, Germany
In Investigations §43, Wittgenstein famously wrote: “The meaning of a word is its use in the language”. In that book, Wittgenstein also proclaimed: “What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use”. Now what is the relation between Wittgenstein’s method of dissolving philosophical problems by reminding us of the actual uses of words, and “meaning is use” in §43? “Resolute” readings of later Wittgenstein have insisted that “meaning is use” should not be taken as an insight into the nature of meaning – which insight this method is then taken to rely on. These readings highlight that §43 is a mere grammatical remark on how we use “meaning”. I will show that, when we think this through, not only does this method not rely on “meaning is use” – but “meaning is use” in §43 must indeed be regarded as wholly disconnected to this method.

DE RE TRUST AND THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF TESTIMONY
Sanford Goldberg, Evanston, IL, USA
The thesis of this paper is to argue, first, that trust itself, as opposed to the reasons one has for trusting on a given occasion, has no distinctly epistemological payoff, and second, that despite this, epistemologists ought to be interested in the phenomenon anyway. In particular, (interpersonal) trust is of interest because it manifests the distinctly interpersonal nature of testimonial transactions. At the same time, this interpersonal nature is not best understood on the model of the “assurance view” of testimony.
The first part of the paper looks at some analogies between virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. It also discusses two kinds of intellectual virtue, and various proposals regarding their place in epistemology. The second part of the paper defends a neo-Aristotelian account of understanding as knowledge of "causes", and an analogous account of wisdom as understanding regarding the most important things. If this is right, then understanding and wisdom turn out to be varieties of knowledge. Finally, the paper focuses on species of epistemic approaches to democracy that truly engage important issues in epistemology – at least social epistemology.

THE STRUCTURE OF OUR BELIEF SYSTEM: ON NESTS, DOORS, RIVERS, AND OTHER METAPHORS

Oscar L. González-Castán, Madrid, Spain
In this paper I shall try to argue that Wittgenstein has proposed some metaphors to describe our belief system as a whole. On the one hand, he says that our belief system looks like a nest (O.C. § 225). On the other hand, he also claims that our belief system is structured in such a way that some propositions function like an axis and others like a door that rotates around it (O.C. § 152). If we take this latter metaphor as an attempt to describe our belief system as a whole, it seems that it is at odds with the nest picture. For what this simile emphatically conveys is the idea that there is not just one axis in our belief system taken as a whole. Nothing rotates around an axis in a nest.

INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES AND THEIR PLACE IN PHILOSOPHY

John Greco, St. Louis, MO, USA
The conventional view is that "absolute certainty is tantamount to a firm resolve never to change your mind no matter what, and that is objectionable" (Lewis 1981). I shall argue that Wittgenstein rejects this view and I shall show that, indeed, this 'traditional objection' is not based on logic. That it is absolutely logically consistent to say: "I am certain that p (where p is a proposition), no evidence will ever make me doubt p, but, at the same time, I do realize that I may be wrong and that [NOT p] may be the case."

One implication of this paper is that the sceptic's argument reflects his uneasy feeling with the fact that one need not doubt propositions that are dubitable, but there is nothing logically wrong with doing so. It is not logically necessary to accept the sceptic's argument.

PEER DISAGREEMENT – WHAT IS THE CHALLENGE?

Thomas Grundmann, Cologne, Germany
In philosophy, as in many other disciplines and domains, stable disagreement among peers is a widespread and well-known phenomenon. Our intuitions about paradigm cases, e.g. Christensen's Restaurant Case, suggest that in such controversies suspension of judgment is rationally required. But we are still lacking a deeper theoretical explanation of why and under what conditions suspension is rationally mandatory. In my talk I will focus on this question. After a critical survey of some recent alternative approaches, I will argue that recognizing disagreement with an opponent provides me with a rebutting defeater, but only if I am justified in acknowledging her as my epistemic peer. If this explanation is correct, it might put us in a position to rationally retain our beliefs in the face of many controversies. But this would be the topic of another talk.

UNENTSCHIEDENE ALTERNATIVITÄT IN WITTGENSTEINS ÜBER GEWISSHEIT

Florian Gstöhl, Vienna, Austria

LOGISCHE SYMBOLIK UND BEDEUTUNG: ZUR ABLEHNUNG DER 'PRAGMATISCHEN' TRACTATUS-INTERPRETATION VON PAUL LIVINGSTON

Gunnar Hagemann, Munich, Germany


PHILOSOPHY, ETHICS AND THERAPY

Edward Harcourt, Oxford, UK

This paper tries to bring together some thoughts about (i) the ethical significance which Wittgenstein (and not only Wittgenstein) took his work to have; (ii) the nature of psychotherapy; and (iii) the idea, which has been very prominent in recent Wittgenstein commentary, that philosophy - according to Wittgenstein - is ‚therapeutic‘.

Skp: AN AUGUSTINIAN CONCEPTION OF EPISTEMOLOGY?

Britt Harrison, Hatfield, UK

Though the standard knowledge ascription schema, ‚Skp‘, looks to be neutral with regard to any philosophical assumptions, I argue this is not the case. Instead, its apparent transparency harbours a variety of commitments and potential confusions. These unwittingly constrain the direction, scope and understanding that is the task of epistemological investigation. I therefore draw parallels with the Augustinian conception of language, and suggest that it makes sense to identify ‚Skp‘ as enshrining an Augustinian conception of epistemology.

CORRESPONDENCE VS. IDENTITY THEORIES OF TRUTH AND THE TRACTATUS

Nathan Hauthaler, London, UK & Graz, Austria

Wittgenstein’s Tractatus has standardly been taken to advocate a peculiar kind of correspondence theory of truth in conjunction with his picture theory of meaning. Recent criticisms of such construals challenge them on the grounds that Wittgenstein’s employment of correspondence relates to meaning rather than truth, whereas obtaining accounts for truth. Upon that, the Tractatus has recently been related to the identity theory of truth, whereby correspondence and identity theories are understood to be in stark contrast with each other. The present contribution seeks to fathom the kinship of the Tractatus with identity conceptions of truth (as advanced e.g. by McDowell and Hornsby) in contrast to according correspondence construals. It is submitted that the question whether the Tractatus itself may be viewed as advancing an identity conception of truth is hinged upon its notion of ‚fact‘, that regardless of construals thereof which facilitate an identity-theoretic reading, its basic outlook towards a correspondence theory can hardly be denied.

RATIONALITY AND UNCERTAINTY

Marek Hetmański, Lublin, Poland

Traditional models of rationality presuppose that humans must have complete and adequate information to make rational choices and that such perfect knowledge is achievable. But why should one believe still this idea? People are, in fact, satisfied with incomplete information to make proper decisions. Not only rational but also intuitive or instinctive rules and strategies are sufficient to behave properly and effectively. Human rationality is eventually bounded. In unpredictable social situations and in complex artificial environments, the rules of practice are based on incomplete information. Nevertheless, they constitute sufficient and working knowledge. Thus, while the role of uncertainty in the rationality issue increases, its epistemic value has to be reconsidered. Social epistemology is suitable for such an undertaking, since it deals with all social, cultural and technological circumstances, telling us why incomplete information, intuitive knowledge and uncertain beliefs are sufficient to make rational decisions, choices and evaluations.

ON THE ONTOLOGY OF EPISTEMIC DISCOURSE

Jaakko Hintikka, Boston, MA, USA

The ontology of a language is its universe of discourse, i.e. the total range of all its different quantifiers. In epistemic discourse, we have the quantifier over the class of known objects. An object is known if it is identifiable in each epistemically possible world. It need not exist in all of them or in the actual world. Hence the universe of discourse, i.e. the ontology of epistemic discourse must include merely possible but knowable objects. In a limiting case, it includes all and only such possible objects while the actual objects are obtained by relativization. This was the ontology that Aristotle assumed. Modern analytic philosophy initially involved a rejection of the ontology of knowable objects in favor of a universe of actually existing objects. Ironically, Russell fell back to an ontology of knowable objects of acquaintance, i.e. of immediately known objects. Epistemic logic is not a superstructure of our ordinary first-order logic, but involves a different ontology.

SCIENTIFIC VIRTUES AS UNDERSTOOD BY MEDICAL RESEARCHERS AT THE MEDICAL UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA

Helmut Hofbauer, Vienna, Austria

Many philosophers of science claim to be interested only in truth. But is it possible to be interested in truth alone? This paper is about scientific virtues. Could the expression ‘scientific virtues’ not be a contradiction in itself? It could indeed be, since it means science + virtues (i.e. science + something other than science). If scientific virtues are expected to be the means for individuals to prove them-
In science, the interviews which I have conducted with researchers in the Medical University of Vienna suggest that in a scientific career they are more hindrance than help. But if we reject this evidence, dismissing it as sociological, and maintaining that within science the philosophical interest is in truth alone, then scientific truth can assume only simple forms, since systematic scientific work cannot be accomplished by the individual researcher alone.

WITTGENSTEIN ON USING “I KNOW”: OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES
Minoo Hojjat, Tehran, Iran

According to Wittgenstein, there are some conditions for using “I know” in our language. Objections have been raised against these conditions. As this question plays a basic role in Wittgenstein’s general view about knowledge and certainty, it will be important for these objections to be answered. I think that most of these objections do not take into consideration Wittgenstein’s assessments in their totality. In this paper, I reply to the objections raised by Hanfling and Ayer. Hanfling brings up two examples for rejecting those conditions. I show that none of them are genuine counter-examples. Ayer rejects them by comparing “I know” with “I believe”, but I argue that these two are not comparable. I also refer to remarks that may seem contradictory, and try to show why they are not really so.

CONTEXTUALISM, SCEPTICISM, AND THE KNOWLEDGE NORM OF ASSERTION
Christoph Jäger, Innsbruck, Austria

Contextualists maintain that one of the chief merits of their theory is its response to scepticism. Ordinary knowledge ascriptions, the idea goes, typically occur in low standards contexts in which they are true. However, leading contextualists also endorse a version of the knowledge norm of assertion. For example, DeRose (2009) maintains that one must assert that p only if one knows that p according to the standards for knowledge operant in the context of one’s assertion. I argue that the combination of these views creates a ‘statability problem’ for (DeRose’s) contextualism. When he formulates his theory the contextualist – qua epistemologist and philosopher of language – is in a high standards context in which he knows that scepticism is false. But then he cannot coherently state in that context that there are low standards contexts in which he knows that some ordinary empirical proposition (for example, that he has hands) is true. The contextualist must therefore either reject the knowledge norm of assertion or give up the claim that contextualism provides a solution to sceptical problems.

ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN HYPOTHESES OPEN TO EXAMINATION AND ELEMENTS OF THE “WORLD-PICURE” IN SOME OF WITTGENSTEIN’S REMARKS IN ON CERTAINTY
Livia Andreia Jureschi, Bucharest, Romania

In this paper I challenge the claim that Wittgenstein’s remarks in On Certainty regarding Moore’s propositions are to be read as providing an epistemological anti-skeptical thesis. First, I will show that the distinction between hypotheses open to examination and elements of the “world-picture” is central to understanding the conceptual clarification that Wittgenstein brings forth in accounting for the relationship between certainty, knowledge and doubt: certainty is not an intrinsic property of knowledge, but rather something connected with the framework that makes knowledge possible. This distinction accounts for a difference in nature between Moore’s propositions and empirical propositions. I suggest that based on the specificities of this distinction, reading Wittgenstein’s remarks as an anti-skeptical thesis is misleading and that the distinction supports an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s remarks as a grammatical investigation that shows that both skeptical and anti-skeptical assertions are incoherent.

RATIONALITY, BELIEF AND ENGAGED EPISTEMOLOGY
Andrzej Kapusta, Lublin, Poland

In the article I will present various forms of rationality, conceived as a property of beliefs: procedural, epistemic and agential rationality. I want to demonstrate restrictive character of the criteria adopted by contemporary epistemology for assigning to somebody’s beliefs and put emphasis on the empirical contexts (psychological, cognitive, psychopathological), which undermine the possibility of fixing a sharp boundary between rational beliefs and irrational forms of behaviour. By reference to “agental rationality” proposed by Lisa Bortolotti (2008) I try to emphasize the subjective nature of beliefs and outline the current vision of rationality in engaged epistemology and, more broadly, to outline the vision of practical and hermeneutic reason.

THE KNOWLEDGE-ACTION PRINCIPLE AND ISOLATED SECONDHAND KNOWLEDGE
Masashi Kasaki, Calgary, Canada

Jennifer Lackey, by way of counterexample, challenges the sufficiency version of the knowledge-action principle that S knows that p only if it is rational for S to act on p. In this paper, I offer two ways of explaining the intuition Lackey relies on, that it is inappropriate for S to act on p, without undermining the knowledge-action principle. The intuitive inappropriateness involved in her examples amounts to either epistemic irresponsibility or lack of understanding, rather than non-rationality. Hence, Lackey’s examples fail to be genuine counterexamples to the knowledge-action principle.

SCEPTICISM AS INTELLECTUAL SELF-DECEPTION
David Kästle, Trier, Germany

Although the sceptic’s position cannot be logically excluded, i.e. shown to be nonsense, it is still unintelligible. It’s unintelligibility is not a logical one, but resembles the unintelligibility of Moorean Paradoxes in that it results from conflicting behavioural criteria for mental attributes: the sceptic sincerely says he is never absolutely certain but often acts as if he is (and if he is he cannot refuse a claim to knowledge). This paper examines two kinds of sceptical inclinations, the logical and the empirical. It concludes that for both of these kinds, when one gives in to one’s scepti-
FIRST PERSON AUTHORITY WITHOUT GLAMOROUS SELF-KNOWLEDGE
Andreas Kemmerling, Heidelberg, Germany
It is often assumed that we have epistemologically glamorous ('a priori', 'direct', 'infallible', 'self-evident', etc.) self-knowledge. I shall focus on the case of alleged knowledge of our own current conscious thoughts. The best reason for assuming that we have such knowledge of them seems to be this: it is needed to explain our ability to say with absolute authoritativeness what we are currently thinking (at least whenever the thoughts we have are 'sayables'). But this sort of First-Person-Authority can be explained without assuming that we have knowledge of what we are consciously thinking.

RELATIVISM AND KNOWLEDGE ASCRITIONS
Dirk Kindermann, St Andrews, UK
The main argument for relativism about knowledge ascriptions and denials is that the view correctly predicts all the data from ordinary speakers’ use of ‘know’ and thus avoids the attribution of semantic blindness. This is supposed to give relativism an edge over its competitors, each of which is committed to positing some sort of speaker error. In this paper, I argue that relativism requires a semantic blindness thesis, too. Relativist solutions of sceptical paradoxes and epistemic closure puzzles involve the attribution of what I call index blindness to speakers. This undermines the main motivation for relativism about knowledge ascriptions.

STRUCTURAL VALUES OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
Peter P. Kirschenmann, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Debates about scientific (rarely about other forms of) knowledge, research policies or academic training often involve a controversy about whether scientific knowledge possesses just “instrumental” value or also “intrinsic” value. Questioning this common simple opposition, I scrutinize the issues involved in terms of a greater variety of structural types of values. The simple opposition is shown to confute two distinctions. Briefly, I consider components of the value(s) of knowledge and knowing. I go on to argue that functional and constitutive values, attributable to everyday knowledge, can or should also be attributed to scientific knowledge, thus departing from both purist and sociological views of science. In sum, I offer a certain defense of the intrinsic value of scientific knowing (and the inherent value of scientific knowledge) and some important differentiations of its “instrumental values”.

SOMEONE HAS TO KNOW – JENNIFER LACKEY ON THE TRANSMISSION OF EPISTEMIC PROPERTIES
Sebastian Kletzl, Vienna, Austria
Is it necessary for a speaker to know p in order for a hearer to come to know p through a testimonial exchange? No, Jennifer Lackey says. She argues that there are cases in which a speaker fails to have the knowledge in question but a hearer nonetheless has the knowledge after the speaker's testimony.

CERTAINTY AS THE FOUNDATION OF ACTION (OC §141)
Michael Kober, Freiburg, Germany
In “On Certainty” Wittgenstein developed several accounts of what certainty might be, for instance subjective and objective certainty, or propositional and non-propositional certainty respectively. The presentation will focus on non-propositional certainty, which can be described as an attitude that is required if a person engages in making assertions, arguing or doubting. Assertions, arguments, or doubts, however, are brought forward in discursive practices. Therefore, a practice is the conceptual framework in which non-propositional certainty needs to be thematised. In extending this approach, I will show that the feature of non-propositional certainty, being a kind of epistemic attitude, is also required in any account of action.

FOUND IN TRANSLATION: DISCREPANT EXPERIENCE AND ALTERNATIVES TO RELATIVISM AND VARIANTISM IN PHILOSOPHY AND ART HISTORY
Stephanie Koerner, Manchester, UK
This essay compares Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1955) notion of ‘language games’ with approaches to the question of ‘what is meant by the notion of a culturally specific situation” in Reframing the Renaissance: Visual Culture in Europe and Latin America 1450-1650 (Farago 1995). This will provide a framework for exploring aspects of the art history of ‘contextualism and invariantism’, and for reframing approaches to roles of the arts in expressing such norms of intersubjective relationships as ‘telling the truth’ or ‘fair play’ (Lewis 1969; Rescher 1982; Bohman 2003).

ON ‘LEAVING RELIGION AS IT IS’
Timo Koistinen, Helsinki, Finland
In this paper I shall discuss some methodological problems of D. Z. Phillips’ philosophy of religion. I shall concentrate on the question: In what sense does his philosophy of
Disagreement is ubiquitous in our life. Whenever we meet colleagues, friends or strangers and we talk to each other, it usually won’t be long until we disagree on a certain topic. Some of these disagreements can be dissolved rather quickly by easily detectable errors or mistakes, but others seem to be rather stable. Among the most stable disagreements are disagreements in philosophy, especially in epistemology. The epistemology of disagreement deals with the problem of disagreement. To that end, I will, in the first part of the paper, sketch two particular versions of epistemic contextualism: indexical contextualism and hidden-syntactic-structure contextualism, and then address the problem of disagreement. In the second part of the paper, the brand of contextualism that I favor, viz. nonindexical contextualism, will be developed in (slightly) more detail and contrasted with Radical Relativism. The third part of the paper will be devoted to the question of how nonindexical contextualism can account for disagreement.

IS PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE POSSIBLE?
Hilary Kornblith, Amherst, MA, USA
An argument for a fairly broad skepticism about the possibility of philosophical knowledge will be presented on the basis of considerations about the extent of disagreement over philosophical issues, not just at the current moment, but rather over a considerable stretch of time. It will be argued that the dynamics of disagreement within our field give us good reason to doubt that anyone has beliefs about philosophical matters which are reliably formed. A number of objections to this argument will be considered.

PUZZLES ABOUT PEER DISAGREEMENT – A DEONTOLOGICAL SOLUTION
Andrea Kruse, Bochum, Germany
The equal weight view (EWV) is one of the most popular views in the debate concerning the epistemic significance of peer disagreement. It requires from opponents, who are involved in a situation of peer disagreement after full disclosure about p, to suspend judgment about p. We discuss three pertinent objections against the EWV and propose to reject the assumption that an unexcused violation of the EWV requirement has (necessarily) a negative impact on the status of epistemic justification of the beliefs involved. In favor of maintaining the intuitive appeal of the EWV, we suggest to consider it as an epistemic duty which has an effect on the deontological status of justification.

WITTGENSTEIN ÜBER LEBEN, WERTE UND VERNUNFT
Andreas Kortensky, Paderborn, Germany

A DEFENCE OF NON-REDUCTIONISM
Martin Kusch, Vienna, Austria
In her recent book Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge (2008), Jennifer Lackey advances several arguments against non-reductionism in the epis-
termology of testimony. Lackey’s first argument centres on our intuitions about a thought experiment (“ALIENS”) in which “an average human being” sees an “alien from another planet” drop what appears to the human to be a diary written in English. Her second argument focuses on our intuitions about a case in which the diary of a human being is found by a woman who has lost all her common-sense beliefs about human psychology. In both cases Lackey insists that the testimonial beliefs formed by the recipients of the diaries would be justified or warranted only if the recipients had “positive reasons” to believe that the testimony is true and that the testifier is reliable. Since non-reductionism denies the need for such positive reasons, non-reductionism seems to be refuted. Lackey’s third argument seeks to show that non-reductionism has to deny infants and young children the ability to gain testimonial beliefs: if infants and young children lack the cognitive capacities to be sensitive to defeaters, then they cannot adequately (“substantively”) satisfy the central non-reductionist’s condition on testimonial knowledge; to wit, that the recipient of the testimony has no undefeated defeaters.

My main criticism of the first two arguments challenges Lackey’s assumption that we have clear-cut intuitions about cases such as “ALIEN”. They certainly are not prototypical cases of testimony. And it is unclear how we should extend our verdicts about prototypical cases of testimony to such unusual situations. My criticism of the “Infant/Child Objection” is based on the idea that knowledge is a family-resemblance concept. The sense in which we attribute testimonial knowledge to infants and toddlers is unlike the sense in which we attribute testimonial knowledge to older children and adults.

Both of my responses to Lackey raise wider issues about methodology in the epistemology of testimony. I shall briefly comment on the issues towards the end of my talk.

RATIONAL ASSERTIBILITY, THE PERFORMATIVE ROLE OF ‘KNOW’, AND PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT
Igal Kvart, Jerusalem, Israel

In this paper, I lay out an account of the pragmatics of ‘know’, and use it to argue against pragmatic encroachment into the semantics of ‘know’. In the past couple of decades, there were a couple of major attempts to establish the thesis of pragmatic encroachment. Contextualism and Subject-Sensitive Invarianceism offered accounts of knowledge in which standard and/or stakes play a major role in the semantics. These accounts were propelled first and foremost by examples that seemed to require a pragmatic component in the truth-conditions of knowledge ascriptions in order to be accounted for. The pragmatic account I propose explains the admittedly pragmatic character of the examples in question within the pragmatic field, obviating the need for pragmatic encroachment into the semantics. The main pragmatic components I employ are the rational assertibility as well as the pragmatic role of the use of ‘know’ in deliberation that resorts to practical inference. This pragmatic account is fundamentally different than the Gricean approach. It account for the intuitions associated with the paradigmatic examples, and offers new insight about the methodology of using intuitions as semantic evidence.

A DEFlationary ACCOUNT OF GROUP TESTIMONY
Jennifer Lackey, Evanston, IL, USA

Is group testimony an irreducible source of knowledge? Both negative and positive answers have been given to this question. According to a reductionist account, a group’s testimony that $p$ is epistemologically reducible to the testimony of some individual(s). The standard reductionist theory is the summative view, according to which a group’s testifying that $p$ can be understood in the minimal sense that all or some members of the group would testify that $p$ were the relevant opportunity to arise. In contrast, a non-reductionist account of these phenomena maintains that a group’s state is irreducible to that of some individual(s). Such a view holds that in some very important sense, the group itself is the bearer of the state, where this is understood as over and above, or otherwise distinct from, the state of any individual(s). The classic version of non-reductionism is the non-summative view, according to which a group’s state cannot be understood in the sense that all or some members of the group are, or would be, in that state. In this paper, I raise problems for existing accounts of group testimony and then develop my own deflationary account, according to which the epistemic status of a group’s testimony is reducible to that of one or more individuals, though not necessarily ones who are members of the group in question. Thus my view is unlike any existing account of group testimony in the literature since it is both reductionist and non-summative in nature.

WITTGENSTEIN’S LEGACY: THE LINGUISTIC TURN IN 20TH CENTURY PHILOSOPHY
Anna Laktionova, Kiev, Ukraine

The topic of linguistic meaning is central to the whole of Wittgenstein’s work and legacy. His philosophical endeavours play an initiating role in the ‘linguistic turn’ which characterizes the methodological and thematic transformations of 20th century philosophy and the general attention to the linguistic aspects of philosophical argumentation. The linguistic turn can be divided into 3 stages: 1. interest in the theoretical language of natural science and attempts to reduce it to everyday language; 2. interest in everyday language, understanding its irreducibility to the theoretical one; 3. interest in speech per se, rather than some ‘other’ language that is to be deduced from our linguistic practices.

Wittgenstein engages in the Tractatus with the theoretical language of science; in line with the general direction of philosophical investigations of the time. In his own Philosophical Investigations he explores the common language of everyday use; which parallels the then contemporary sub-turn (of the linguistic turn) to the analysis of ordinary language, and the further sub-turn to the analysis of speech; language in use, rather than in the abstract.

I argue for continuity to Wittgenstein’s work which makes the practice of dividing his work into periods, redundant.
THE ROLE OF THE UNIQUENESS THESIS IN THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF DISAGREEMENT
Matthew Lee, Notre Dame, IN, USA

The Uniqueness Thesis is the thesis that there is always a unique doxastic attitude which it is rational to have toward a given proposition when in possession of a given body of evidence. This thesis has been thought to play a large role in the epistemology of disagreement, in part because of its supposed connections with Conciliationism—the view that a person should suspend judgment (or at least decrease her confidence) when she finds herself in disagreement with an acknowledged epistemic peer. I present some problems for the alleged connections between the Uniqueness Thesis and Conciliationism and argue that the Uniqueness Thesis should be expected to play only a lesser (though still important) role in the epistemology of disagreement.

THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE
Hui-Min Lin, Minhsiumg, Taiwan

Linda Zagzebski argues that any purely externalism of knowledge has an implication that what is valuable in an instance of knowledge is the value of the truth that is acquired. She thinks, however, these doctrines do not offer sufficient conditions for knowledge which is in fact a more valuable state than true belief. Something more should add to the list of criterion, and she suggests intellectual virtue to be that one. John Greco distinguishes Zagzebski’s account of intellectual virtue from Ernest Sosa’s perspective and calls the former the moral model of intellectual virtue. He argues that all moral model of intellectual virtue are too strong to be a suitable account of knowledge. I think intellectual virtue fully instantiates the value of knowledge; it draws a meaningful distinction between our daily usage of knowledge and true information.

INTERDISZIPLINÄRE ZUSAMMENARBEIT: EIN FALL FÜR DIE THEORIE DES IMPLIZITEN WISSENS?
Ulrich Lobis & Joseph Wang, Innsbruck, Austria


In diesem Beitrag wollen wir unter der Verwendung der Theorie des Impliziten Wissens zu ergründen versuchen, weshalb es zu diesem Unterschied kommt. Es zeigt sich, die Editor/innen haben bei der Erstellung einer digitalen Edition mehr die Leser/innen im Blickfeld, während die Informatiker/innen das Funktionieren der Programme zum Ziel haben.

THE STATUS OF KNOWLEDGE-HOW
David Löwenstein, Berlin, Germany

The intuitive distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-how, prominently defended by Gilbert Ryle (1945, 1949), has recently come under renewed scrutiny (e.g. by Stanley & Williamson 2001). This paper spells out an account of knowledge-how which is inspired by a Rylean insight largely neglected in the current debate, the idea that knowledge-how is a normative matter. I propose to model an account of knowledge-how in analogy to Robert Brandom’s view of knowledge-that as a normative status (Brandom 1994, 201 ff.). This will allow me to make important distinctions between different forms of knowledge-how and to vindicate Ryle’s claim that knowledge-how is “logically prior” to knowledge-that (Ryle 1945, 4).

DISCRETE MATHEMATICAL REPRESENTATING THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE
Vladimir Lobovikov, Ekaterinburg, Russia

The paper submits quite a new interpretation of the epistemic notions: it is not the formal-logical one, but a formal-axiology interpretation. The author exploits two-valued algebra of formal ethics. In this algebra the notions “epistem” and “faith”, “empirical knowledge” and “revisable belief” are precisely defined and investigated as moral-legal evaluation-functions determined by two moral-legal evaluation variables. The mentioned epistemological functions are defined by moral-legal evaluation tables. In the algebra under investigation the formal-ethical equivalence relation is strictly defined, the list of equations relevant to epistemology is generated.

BOLZANO ON TESTIMONY
Winfried Löfler, Innsbruck, Austria

It is scarcely known that Bernard Bolzano’s (1781–1848) extensive oeuvre comprises a remarkable systematic treatise on testimony. In his Lehrbuch der Religionswissenschaft (1834), which is based on university lectures he gave between 1805 and 1819, Bolzano appears to be one of the first scholars who applied the calculus of probability to the issue. Indeed, especially with respect to reported miracles, Bolzano develops something like the bare bones of a Bayesian account of testimony. The treatise seems to intend to make a case against the famous chapter X (‘Of Miracles’) of Hume’s Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. However, Bolzano’s initial formal reasoning rather leads him to Humean consequences. Reacting to that, Bolzano steers back and argues – plausibly, but at a rather intuitive level – that even unreliable witnesses can make reports in sum credible, since it may be improbable that they invented just this story. In my talk, I will first give an overview of Bolzano’s 1834 treatise and compare it to previous versions. I will then show that Bolzano’s Bayesian account is defective. The issue revolves around his formula for the “absolute probability” of an event, where $x$ is the “internal probability” of an event and $y$ its “external probability” established by testimony. Bolzano, it seems, confuses this latter concept with the concept of a witness’ being reliable (formally: $P(E/T_x)$) with $P(T/E)$). This confusion seems to be fostered by his blending formal with informal language at crucial points.
MEASUREMENT AND THE CONTINGENT A PRIORI
Alexandre N. Machado, Curitiba, Brazil

In section 1, I argue that Kripke’s theory of how an object is taken to be an standard of measurement is at odds with our measuring practices. In section 2, I hold that when Wittgenstein says that it makes no sense to say neither that the standard meter is one meter long nor that it is not one meter long, he means that (1) in order for an object x to be one meter long it must be possible for x to be compared to the standard meter and that (2) this condition cannot be satisfied by the standard meter itself. In section 3, I criticise Kripke’s idea that the standard meter is an abstract entity. Section 4 deals with an apparent counterexample of my interpretation of Wittgenstein. In section 5, I deal with the objection that Wittgenstein’s position is based on the confusion between metaphysical and epistemological questions.

KUNST ALS INSTITUTION UND AUSDRUCK
Jakub Mácha, Brno, Czech Republic

Diese Abhandlung setzt sich zum Ziel, eine gewisse Spannung in Wittgensteins Ästhetik darzustellen und daraufhin aufzuheben. Seine Ästhetik, wie sie in Gesprächen geschildert ist, ist stark normativ und institutionell, indem sie auf dem Sprachspiel „Kultur“ basiert, so meine Interpretation. Dagegen brechen Wittgensteins Bemerkungen, die sie verbindenden Lebenswirklichkeit – die Bedeutung der einzelnen Sprachelemente in ebendieser Bedeutung klar machen.

BEMERKUNGEN ZUR FORMANALYSE VON WITTGENSTEINS „TRACTATUS“
Ingolf Max, Leipzig, Germany

Die vertiefende Formanalyse des „Tractatus“, die sich zugleich als Inhaltsanalyse versteht, ist ein nach wie vor bestehendes Desiderat der Wittgensteinforschung. Die vorliegenden Analysen beschränken sich häufig auf eine Fernsicht auf das Werk und berücksichtigen so nicht die filigranen Vernetzungen. Ausgehend von der Annahme, dass Wittgenstein immer bestrebt war originelle sprachliche Kompositionen zu präsentieren, die seiner jeweiligen Vorstellung von philosophischer Sprachkritik entsprechen, wird an einigen Beispielen demonstriert, was eine konkreternden Formanalyse leisten kann. Betrachtet werden der erste Satz des „Tractaus“, die Verbindung der sieben Hauptabschnitte und die scheinbare Sonderstellung des Finalabsatzes. Kritisiert wird insbesondere die dichotomische Trennung von Rahmen und Textkorpus, die sich relativ zur Nähischt auf die vielfältigen Vernetzungsstrukturen nicht aufrecht erhalten lässt.

WARUM DER AAL NICHT VORKOMMT – EINE ÜBERLEGUNG ZU WITTGENSTEINS „WÖRTERBUCH FÜR VOLKSSCHULEN“
Annelore Mayer, Baden, Austria


„DAS GUTE ÖSTERREICHISCHE“ – ANMERKUNGEN ZU LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN AUS DEM BLICKWINKEL DER GESCHICHTSWISSENSCHAFT
Johannes Leopold Mayer, Baden, Austria


INSENSITIVE AND UNSAFE KNOWLEDGE
Guido Melchior, Graz, Austria

Sensitivity and safety are modal concepts of knowledge. A person’s belief that p is sensitive if and only if in the closest possible world where p is false S does not believe that p. A person’s belief that p is safe if and only if in most near-by possible worlds in which S continues to form her belief that p in the same way as in the actual world the belief contin-
ues to be true. Robert Nozick claims that sensitivity is a necessary condition for knowledge. Ernest Sosa, Timothy Williamson and Duncan Pritchard argue among others that safety is necessary for knowledge. I shall contest both views by offering counterexamples of persons, to whom it is highly plausible to ascribe knowledge although their beliefs are neither sensitive nor safe. I conclude that neither sensitivity nor safety is a necessary condition for knowledge and that insensitive and unsafe knowledge exists.

PLAYING NOT-BRIDGE: RAMSEY AND WITTGENSTEIN ON INFERENCE
Steven J. Methven, Cambridge, UK

In 1929, Ramsey wrote that the role of philosophy was essentially normative. He then accused the Wittgenstein of excessive scholasticism, such that Wittgenstein’s account of inference was ‘like saying it is impossible to break the rules of bridge because if you break them you are not playing bridge but as Mr. C. says not-bridge’.

Ramsey’s idea of philosophy’s normativity is noted by Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations*, 81. I draw out the moral of Ramsey’s remark, and expand on it by drawing a comparison between playing a game and inferring. My account is one which accords with Ramsey’s desideratum, insofar as it allows that it is not the case that one is inferring only if one is inferring logically. I conclude that Ramsey’s criticism is well-founded, but that the picture from which it arises cannot be sustained in the light of the rule-following considerations.

FROM THE MULTIPLE-RELATION THEORY OF JUDGEMENT TO THE WORLD AS THE TOTALITY OF FACTS. WITTGENSTEIN AND THE CONTEXT PRINCIPLE
Daniele Mezzadri, Bologna, Italy

As is well known, in 1913 Russell abandoned his multiple-relation theory of judgement in consequence of Wittgenstein’s criticism. In recent years a number of interpretations of Wittgenstein’s objection to Russell have been advanced; although many of them point in the right direction, they all somehow overlook, or underestimate, the importance that Wittgenstein’s account of inference was ‘like saying it is impossible to break the rules of bridge because if you break them you are not playing bridge but as Mr. C. says not-bridge’.

Ramsey’s idea of philosophy’s normativity is noted by Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations*, 81. I draw out the moral of Ramsey’s remark, and expand on it by drawing a comparison between playing a game and inferring. My account is one which accords with Ramsey’s desideratum, insofar as it allows that it is not the case that one is inferring only if one is inferring logically. I conclude that Ramsey’s criticism is well-founded, but that the picture from which it arises cannot be sustained in the light of the rule-following considerations.

APRIORITY AND REFLECTIVE VIRTUE – HOW SUCCESSFUL A RELATIONSHIP?
Nenad Miščević, Budapest, Hungary

Epistemic virtue needs to include reflective justification, and a good combination is a two-level structure, of the kind proposed by Sosa, with more externalist virtue-based justification at the basis and a more internalist-coherentist on the second, reflective level. Can this account support a purely a priori justification of some of our beliefs, promi-
genstein sees as conditioning our concepts (PI p. 230), there would be harmony. But Searle's brute facts are not of that general type; they are of the order of molecules and neurons. And to make language and institutions bottom out in those is where we differ.

COUNTERFACTUAL-PEER DISAGREEMENT
Katherine Munn, Oxford, UK

The peer-disagreement scenario assumes that agents share evidence: a peer is someone whom you think just as likely as you to evaluate the same evidence correctly. But often evidence isn’t shared. In this case, the problem of counterfactual-peer disagreement looms: how to respond to the disagreement of someone whom you think is as likely as you to evaluate the evidence correctly had you shared it, and whom you think as likely to evaluate his evidence correctly as you are to evaluate yours correctly. This problem is more intractable and widespread than peer disagreement. I’ll suggest a way to mitigate it, the limitations of which underline the urgency of greater research into the problem of counterfactual-peer disagreement.

WITTGENSTEIN’S ANTI-THEORETICAL STANCE AND WINCH’S UNDERSTANDING OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
Juvenal Ndayambaje, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

In his later Philosophy, Wittgenstein renounces theory and advocates doing away with explanation. Many philosophers and theorists ignore or de-emphasize his anti-theoretical recommendation, because they claim to see in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy a theoretical perspective (that has an ontological insight into nature of things such as language and rule-following) that is superior to the former philosophical tradition. The aim of this paper is to suggest a way of taking Wittgenstein’s admonition seriously and to reconsider Winch’s interpretation of Wittgenstein in The Idea of a Social Science which has been mediation between Wittgenstein and many social theories. After elucidating the meaning of Wittgenstein’s statement on anti-theoretical stance and showing that it is not, as many would think, an alternative theoretical perspective, it will be argued that Winch’s conception of philosophy and the way he applies it to issues of social sciences is ultimately quite alien to Wittgenstein’s approach.

ANTI-PSYCHOLOGISTIC LANDMARKS OF WITTGENSTEIN’S PHILOSOPHY IN THE TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS
Teodor Negru, Iași, Romania

In this paper I intend to show how psychologism was rejected by means of many arguments in the Tractatus. Bearing in mind the existence of many forms of psychologism, I aim at offering a reading of the Tractatus where I highlight the arguments by means of which Wittgenstein avoids the psychologistic assumptions. From this point forward, I will conclude that we can speak, in the case of the Tractatus, of a methodological anti-psychologistic attitude.

JOHN GRECO, THOMAS AQUINAS, AND THE SURPLUS VALUE OF EPISTEMIC VIRTUE: WHAT DOES EPISTEMIC VIRTUE ADD TO RELIABLY FORMED BELIEF?
Bruno Niederbacher, Innsbruck, Austria

The virtue epistemologist John Greco in his book Achieving Knowledge. A Virtue-Theoretic-Account of Epistemic Normativity claims to solve problems that process reliabilism is not able to solve. Among these problems are the so-called value problem, the Gettier problem, and the problem of strange and fleeting processes. I will argue (I) that concerning these problems (with exception to the problem of the fleeting processes) the virtue epistemologist is not much better off than the process reliabilist, and (II) that the extra value of epistemic virtues lies somewhere else, namely in the fact that a person with epistemic virtues is able to use reliable processes constantly and promptly.

HOW MANY FORMS ARE THERE IN THE TRACTATUS?
Yasushi Nomura, Hokkaido, Japan

It is not an easy task to understand properly and clearly the concept of “forms” that plays a very important role in the Tractatus. It does not seem to be the case that interpretations so far have succeeded in this task. In this paper I’d like to go back to a limited question of how we should understand the “forms” in the so-called “picture theory” of the Tractatus and to offer an articulation of the “forms”. We hope the articulation to contribute to proper and clear understandings of the basic structure of the Tractatus.

THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY RESPONSES
Erik J. Olsson, Lund, Sweden

A problem occupying much contemporary epistemology is that of explaining why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. This talk provides an overview of this debate, starting with historical figures and early work. The contemporary debate in mainstream epistemology is then surveyed and some recent developments that deserve special attention are highlighted, including mounting doubts about the prospects for virtue epistemology to solve the value problem as well as renewed interest in classical and reliabilist-externalist responses.

GENRE KNOWLEDGE IN MUSICAL PERFORMANCE AS INTRANSITIVE UNDERSTANDING AND THE PRACTISING OF RULES
Tom Eide Osa, Bergen, Norway

In this paper, I focus on knowledge and genres in musical performance using Wittgenstein’s perspectives on intransitive understanding and the practising of rules and Norwegian philosopher Kjell S. Johannessen’s interpretation and development of them. My interest is initially delimited to the aesthetical aspects of musical genres, realising that aesthetics may be a good way of implicitly addressing political and social concerns.
WITTGENSTEIN AND THE THIRD PERSON
ANALYSIS OF EMOTION
Mamata Manjari Panda, Mumbai, India

The present work aims at showing the importance of the ‘grammar’ of language in Wittgenstein’s philosophy while analyzing emotions from the third person point of view. He uses the grammar of the language game of emotions as an instrument to dissolve the confusion that emotions or emotional experiences are private to the person who has the experience of that emotion and they are unavailable for public investigation. For Wittgenstein, emotions or emotional experiences are reflected in emotional expressions. Hence, one can ‘know’ other’s emotional experiences, and the emotional expressions play a vital role in knowing other’s emotions. Therefore, emotional expressions are used in our language as the public manifestations of the emotional experiences. We use emotional words as the public criteria to read off other’s emotional experiences.

SCIENCE VS. RELIGION: A WITTGENSTENIAN PERSPECTIVE
Ratikanta Panda, Mumbai, India

Wittgenstein never talks explicitly about religion anywhere. It is only from the passages here and there on God religious beliefs, rituals, contrast with scientific discourses that we have to extract out his views on religion. The notion of inexpressibility of religious beliefs too is as dominant as values and ethics. On the apparent incompatibility of religion and science, Wittgenstein refrains from giving any arguments in favor of either simply because both the discourses instead of opposing each other, seems to play their game only with different language games. What religion says is in different words and phrases what sciences say. They use different forms of life altogether. It is because of the similar symbolisms used by both that their discourses appear contradictory to each other.

OPEN ACCESS WEB RESOURCES FOR WITTGENSTEIN RESEARCH
Alois Pichler, Deirdre C.P. Smith & Rune J. Falch, Bergen, Norway

The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB) have in recent years made a number of Wittgenstein Nachlass materials available open access on the Web (see http://wab.aksis.uib.no/wab_nachlass.page/). This includes the Wittgenstein Source site (http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/) which hosts a Web edition of 5000 pages of the Nachlass in both text and facsimile versions and makes such famous texts as the Notes on Logic, the Lecture on Ethics, the Big Typescript and the Brown Book freely available. The talk will present Wittgenstein Source, other sites provided by WAB and the Wittgenstein Nachlass materials available open access on the Web.

THE VALUE OF ACHIEVEMENT AND THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE
Christian Piller, York, UK

In this paper I distinguish three ways in which an analogy between achievements and knowledge can cast light on the value knowledge might have. I argue that Greco’s contributory goodness account is implausible and I distinguish it from Sosa’s attributive goodness account and from the conditional good account, which is the one I favour.

EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY AND CONSOLIDATED INEQUALITIES IN LEGAL PROPOSITIONS
Rossella Pisconti, Exeter, UK

This paper focuses on the concept of rationality in order to illustrate some legal implications of Wittgenstein’s late work. It is suggested that Wittgenstein’s epistemological views support Peg O’Connor’s legal position. Particular attention is paid to the emerging concept of lacuna in law. Moreover, it is shown that the concerns expressed in some feminist views regarding rationality in the area of legal philosophy overlap with some Wittgensteinian reflections.

ZU EINIGEN BEMERKUNGEN WITTGENSTEINS ÜBER DIE SEELE
Richard Raatzsch, Wiesbaden, Germany

Im IV. Kapitel des sogenannten Teils II seiner Philosophischen Untersuchungen macht Wittgenstein einige bekannte Bemerkungen über die Seele. Im Vortrag wird versucht, anzudeuten, inwiefern diese Bemerkungen komplexer sind, als sie zu sein scheinen. Dazu wird auf einige Verbindungen zu frühen Bemerkungen eingegangen. Zu den Themen, die behandelt werden, gehören vor allem die Fragen nach der Singularität der Seele und der Natur des Begriffs der Seele.

THE PRINCIPLES OF APPLICATION OF PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC IN THE LIGHT OF LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN’S EARLY PHILOSOPHY
Mateusz Marek Radzki, Warsaw, Poland

The paper presents the principles of application of propositional logic in the light of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s early philosophy: the principle of logical independence of elementary proposition and the principle of bipolarity of elementary propositions. The first section, Application of Propositional Logic and Function of Representation, describes function of representation that specifies the frame of application of propositional logic. The second section, The Principle of Logical Independence of Elementary Propositions, shows that the principle of logical independence of elementary propositions follows from the philosophical claim that logical analysis is always complete and ultimate. The third section, The Principle of Bipolarity of Elementary Propositions, explains that the principle of bipolarity of elementary proposition is equal to the principle of their logical independence; moreover, the principle of bipolarity is not a supposition – it is a conclusion of Wittgenstein’s early thought.
FALLIBILISM, EPISTEMIC POSSIBILITY, AND EPISTEMIC AGENCY
Baron Reed, Evanston, IL, USA
Fallibilism is roughly the view that one can have knowledge even though one's belief could have been mistaken (while one had the very same justification for it that in fact allows it to count as knowledge). Such a view seems to be incompatible with the standard way of thinking about epistemic possibility: it is possible (for me) that $p$ just in case I don't know that not-$p$. It is also difficult to reconcile fallibilism with the thought that knowledge ought to be action-guiding, given that the margin of error built into fallibilistic knowledge can sometimes become practically relevant. In this paper, I offer a solution to both of these puzzles for fallibilism that relies on neither contextualism nor subject-sensitive invariantism. I conclude by offering an invariantist account of the way we speak about knowledge and epistemic possibility.

SYNOPTISCHE HYBRIDE – GEOMETRIE ALS EPISTEMOLOGISCHE LEITWISSENSCHAFT BEI BACHELARD UND WITTGENSTEIN
Ulrich Richtmeyer, Weimar, Germany

DER KOMPLEX „MS140(I)+MS114(II)+MS115(I)“ ALS WITTGENSTEINS BUCH „LSRPMHMLSRHXSV YVOIQFNTVN“
Josef G. F. Rothhaupt, Munich, Germany
Es kann nachgewiesen werden, dass es sich bei MS140(I)+MS114(II)+MS115(I) um ein eigenes Buch Wittgensteins mit dem Titel „Philosophische Bemerkungen“ handelt. Dieses Buch wurde in der ersten Hälfte der 30er Jahre von Wittgenstein verfasst und danach von ihm nie verworfen; vielmehr diente es sowohl in der zweiten Hälfte der 30er Jahre als auch in den 40er Jahren als Basis für weitere und neue Buchprojekte. In der so genannten „PU-Schlussfassung“ sind schließlich viele wichtige Bemerkungen aus MS140(I)+MS114(II)+MS115(I) an prominenten Stellen vorhanden.

DISAGREEMENTS – FROM EPISTEMOLOGY TO PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
Hans Rott, Regensburg, Germany
Disagreements have become a major topic in recent epistemology. But comparatively little attention has been paid to the fact that disagreements only surface through their linguistic expression in disputes. This raises the principal question whether we can tell apart genuine disagreements (roughly, “disagreements of substance” or “disagreements about the facts” – Dummett) from merely verbal disagreements (roughly, differences in the use of language, “differences in conceptual scheme” – Davidson). Intuitively, the two cases are markedly different, and we expect that the consequences resulting in the course of a dispute should be different as well. But since Quine taught us that “it is nonsense, and the root of much nonsense, to speak of a linguistic component and a factual component in the truth of any individual statement”, the distinction between genuine and verbal disagreements seems equally problematic. I offer an argument that we are able to verify that a disagreement is merely verbal in some lucky cases, but that it is doubtful whether we can ever verify that a disagreement is genuine. In any case, I submit that disagreements are not only an important topic for epistemologists, but are equally important for philosophers of language.

KONTEXT UND WAHRHEITSKONDITIONALE SEMANTIK
Štefan Riegelnik, Vienna, Austria

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THE TRANSCENDENTAL “FOUNDATION” OF MEANING IN EXPERIENCE: A READING OF WITTGENSTEIN’S ON CERTAINTY

Jacob Rump, Atlanta, GA, USA

The paper presents a reading of Wittgenstein's On Certainty as a transcendental account which understands knowledge and meaning as rooted in the direct and pre-linguistic phenomena of first-person, “lived” experience. The various examples of “certainties” in the book are interpreted as evidence of a aspect of the Lebenswelt which is logically prior to propositional meaning, as its condition of possibility, even if that aspect is only analyzable upon reflection and mediation through such meaning. Wittgenstein's notion of certainty is thus ultimately phenomenological in character, insofar as its claims are rooted in the first-person praxis of our Lebensform, and thus based upon immediate aspects of experience and not upon mediated empirical evidence.

DAS SWAMPING-ARGUMENT: GRUNDGEBNANDE UND REICHHWEITE

Karl Heinz Sager, Innsbruck, Austria


WITTGENSTEINIAN CONTEXTUALISM AND CARTESIAN SKEPTICISM

Claudio Salvatore, Edinburgh, UK

Michael Williams has proposed an influential contextualist anti-skeptical strategy inspired by Wittgenstein’s remarks on ‘hinge propositions’. I aim to show how Williams’s proposal, both as a viable interpretation of Wittgenstein’s thought and especially as an anti-skeptical strategy, is ultimately unconvincing. Furthermore, I compare and contrast Williams’s strategy with another Wittgenstein-inspired position, according to which we should consider “hinge propositions” as non-propositional ‘rules of grammar’. I argue that this account represents a more viable solution—or, perhaps better, dissolution—of Cartesian-style skepticism.

SIND ROTEMPFUNDUNGEN RÖTLICH? DER FARBENRELATIONALISMUS UND WITTGENSTEINS PRIVATSPRACHENÜBERLEGUNG

Arvid Schiller, Halle, Germany


EXPRESSIVISMUS UND DER (RELATIVE) WERT DES WISSENS

Pedro Schmectigh, Dresden, Germany


AFTER ALL, WE ARE SATISFIED THAT THE EARTH IS ROUND (OC 299).
A WITTGENSTEINIAN DEFENCE OF SEARLE’S NOTION OF THE BACKGROUND

Ulla Schmid, Basel, Switzerland

Searle’s Hypothesis of the Background has been criticised for the tension between the lack of details Searle provides regarding its status, structure and function, and the heavy argumentative burden it bears in his account of intentionality. Opponents complain about its opacity, unintelligibility and inconsistency, charging it with either functioning as an explanatory dumpsite for unsolvable problems, or declaring it philosophically bankrupt. On a less popular, but more charitable reading, however, the Background starts with the Davidsonian problem that the meanings of a given set of propositional attitudes must have their grounds beyond this set, and ends with Wittgenstein’s puzzles regarding the function and epistemic status of rules and hinge propositions.

Contextualised like this, I suggest that the Background gains illumination and can fulfill the explanatory desideratum Searle supposes it fulfills.
HUME’S ANTI-SCEPTICAL DISSOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION
Friederike Schmitz, Heidelberg, Germany
Kripke famously compared Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following with Hume’s considerations on inductive causal reasoning. His account of Wittgenstein’s aims and methods has come under serious attack by the proponents of elucidatory and therapeutic readings of Wittgenstein. His account of Hume’s work, however, has not been equally challenged in the relevant literature. In this paper, I suggest that to see in need of a re-assessment. I claim that it is possible to read the ideas Hume’s considerations as an anti-sceptical dissolution of the apparent problem.

THE CONTEXTUALIST PROMISE
Sebastian Schmoranzer, Cologne, Germany
One basic reason for subscribing to contextualism is that it seems to promise well in solving the skeptical puzzle. One contextualist theory arguing this way is a certain version of relevant alternatives approach whose proponents maintain that skeptical hypotheses are irrelevant in ordinary contexts but relevant in sceptical contexts. I argue that this approach cannot keep its promise because skeptical alternatives can be shown to be always relevant.

CONJECTURE, PROOF, AND SENSE IN WITTGENSTEIN’S PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS
Severin Schroeder, Reading, UK
One of the key tenets in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics is that a mathematical proposition gets its meaning from its proof. This seems to have the paradoxical consequence that a mathematical conjecture has no meaning, or at least not the same meaning that it will have once a proof has been found. Hence, it would appear that a conjecture can never be proven true: for what is proven true must ipso facto be a different proposition from what was only conjectured. Moreover, it would appear impossible that the same mathematical proposition be proven in different ways. — I will consider some of Wittgenstein’s remarks on these issues, and attempt to reconstruct his position in a way that makes it appear less paradoxical.

META-INDUCTION AS A SOLUTION TO FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENT
Gerhard Schurz, Düsseldorf, Germany
Proponents of competing word-views, such as science versus religion or naturalism versus constructivism are in fundamental disagreement. They disagree in terminal principles of justification-chains and, thus, cannot be justified-as-true without ending up in circularity or infinite regress. Prima facie, fundamental disagreement is neither rational nor irrational but a-rational. The method of agreement among experts is relative to shared world-views. Is there a way out of the resulting world-view-relativity? In this talk I will argue that the method of meta-induction provides a way out.

ON THE EVOLUTION OF NOTIONS OF REASONABLE DISAGREEMENT IN SCHOLASTIC THOUGHT
Rudolf Schüssler, Bayreuth, Germany
The scholastics used probabilis as predicate of epistemic justification. In the Middle Ages, an opinion was called probable mainly if it was, according to Aristotle’s topological definition, held by “the wise and the many”. On this basis, two logically incompatible opinions could be considered probable at the same time, without however entailing the rational assertability of one side in a dispute or deep reasonable disagreement between both sides. This changed in 17th century scholasticism. After a period, in which watered down but no longer Aristotelian characterizations of scholastic probability thrived, the predicate probabilis was explicitly defined as entailing rational assertability. The simultaneous rational assertability of incompatible opinions by epistemic peers (and hence the possibility of reasonable disagreement) was salvaged by some scholastics with the distinction between commensurable and incommensurable evidence.

MAPPING OF THE EPISTEMIC GAP: FROM THE RANGE OF PROPOSITION TO THE OPEN TEXTURE OF CONCEPTS
Radek Schuster, Plzeň, Czech Republic
Verificationism espoused by logical empiricists which is rooted in Wittgenstein’s conception of a proposition as a truth-function of elementary propositions has failed to span a gap between results of our epistemic ability and its capture in language. The paper tries to map this epistemic gap and shows that 1) it is already implicit in Wittgenstein’s concept of proposition in a form of so called “Spielraum” and 2) it becomes declared in Waismann’s later idea of “the open texture of concept”. The argumentation is based on Waismann’s writings that are treated not just a second hand source of Wittgenstein but as a testimony of a creative movement that Waismann undertook from the verificationist position to its original critique.

INFERENTIAL CONTEXTUALISM AND EXTERNALISM – YOU BETTER BE AN INFERENTIAL CONTEXTUALIST IF YOU WANT TO BE AN EXTERNALIST
Ansgar Seide, Münster, Germany
Michael Williams’ inferential contextualism is one of the most interesting recent attempts to give an answer to the challenge of Cartesian scepticism. As Duncan Pritchard has pointed out, Williams’ account includes an externalist element which seems to play the main role in his answer to the sceptic. The question arises if not externalism alone suffices to avert scepticism, which would render inferential contextualism a dispensable part of the anti-sceptical argument.

The aim of this paper is to give an answer to this question along the following line: Externalist answers to scepticism are vulnerable to second-order scepticism. An interesting feature of the main thesis of inferential contextualism is that it blocks the sceptical argument for second-order scepticism. So if you want to incorporate an externalist element into your answer to scepticism, you better be an inferential contextualist.
STAKES AND FULL BELIEF
Nicholas Shackel, Cardiff, UK

Many cases used to motivate contextualism are ones in which an achieved epistemic standard, of the kind that can make the difference between true belief and knowledge, is held constant, whilst stakes are varied. It seems to us that when stakes are low we know and when stakes are high we don't know, and on this basis contextualists argue for contextualism about knowledge, or at least, about the semantic value of ‘know’. Invariantists of a moderate, that is to say, non-skeptical bent, who grant the truth of our intuition need to explain them away. In this paper I defend an explanation in terms of the nature of full belief and consider whether it amounts to a pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.

DEVELOPING PLATO'S SOLUTION TO THE EPISTEMIC VALUE PROBLEM
Mark Siebel, Oldenburg, Germany

Why is knowledge more valuable than mere true belief? Plato's answer was that knowledge includes having good reasons and that having good reasons makes a belief more stable. Miranda Fricker has added that the latter holds because having good reasons makes it less probable to abandon the belief in the face of counter-evidence. However, this approach leads to a strong form of epistemic internalism. For to fulfill the given function, the knower must have access not only to the good reasons but also to the fact that they are good. Briefly, he must have 'expert knowledge'. Prima facie, a prototype account of knowledge offers a way out of this problem. If expert knowledge is the paradigm of knowledge, then knowledge is generically more stable. But isn't there a further typical case of knowledge not offering access to good reasons, viz., 'knowledge by gut instinct'? A feasible solution to this difficulty could be found in the notion that certainty, which promotes stability, is a common feature of expert knowledge and knowledge by gut instinct.

PROTECTING TRACTATUS FROM ISOMORPHISM: ZUR PROJEKTIVEN BEZIEHUNG ZWISCHEN ELEMENTARSATZEN UND SACHVERHALTEN
Marcos Silva, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil & Leipzig, Germany

Wir können (wie es in der Sekundärliteratur zum Tractatus oft gemacht wurde und wird) die projektive Beziehung zwischen Elementarsätzen und Sachverhalten erklären, indem wir zwei Lesemöglichkeiten benützen, die scheinbar harmlos für seine Bildtheorie sind: nämlich die wesentliche Harmonie zwischen Sprache und Welt und die Technik des Isomorphismus. Hier sehe ich zwei Probleme: Die beiden Interpretationen sind miteinander unvereinbar, wenn wir die Metaphysik des Tractatus in Betracht ziehen. Außerdem überschreiten beide seinen Holismus.

A LANGUAGE OF ONE'S OWN?
Deirdre P. Smith, Bergen, Norway

Can women have a language of their own grounded in freedom and not determinism? In their article "Wittgenstein and Irigaray: Gender and Philosophy in a Language (Game) of Difference", Joyce Davidson and Mick Smith argue for Luce Irigaray's position that women can. To this end they employ Ludwig Wittgenstein's expression "language-games" to show that Irigaray's "female" language does not rest on biological determinism. Luce Irigaray and Virginia Woolf also each have their own way of attending to how women and men are different and explore how this affects what the two genders require from language in order to achieve expression and understanding. The wider question at issue, however, is what it means for women to have a language of their own in the first place. And in answer to this question, Wittgenstein, Irigaray and Woolf land differently than Davidson and Smith.

“A TROUBLED AREA”: UNDERSTANDING THE CONTROVERSY OVER SCREENING MAMMOGRAPHY FOR WOMEN AGED 40-49
Miriam Solomon, Philadelphia, PA, USA

Recommendations for screening mammography have been controversial ever since the technology was developed. They continue to be controversial, especially for routine use in women aged 40 to 49, despite the fact that mammography has been more extensively evaluated by randomized controlled trials (RCTs) than any other screening method (Wellis, 1998). Currently, in the USA, the American Cancer Society and the National Cancer Institute recommend annual mammograms beginning at age 40, while the United States Preventative Services Task Force (USPSTF) and the American College of Physicians recommend against routine mammography for women aged 40 to 49. These group recommendations are made by experts—physicians, researchers, statisticians. Why do the experts disagree, both individually and in groups?

A recent "Sounding Board" article in the NEJM (Quanstrum & Hayward, 2010) argues that the disagreement is produced in part by professional self interest, pointing out that the Society for Breast Imaging and the American College of Radiologists also recommend annual mammography screening starting at age 40. They attribute the rest of the disagreement to different value judgments about the benefits and harms of mammography. They argue that we benefit from having a neutral panel—such as the USPSTF and the NIH Consensus Development Conference Program—to make judgments without professional self interest and to demarcate the range in which individual value judgments may legitimately contribute to decisions.

This paper argues that Quanstrum and Hayward's analysis of the controversy is incomplete, and bespeaks a traditional philosophy of science perspective in which scientific disagreement is understood in terms of interests and values. In particular, their analysis omits the ways in which methodological pluralism contributes to the controversy. This paper goes into the debate over screening mammography more deeply, finding that much of the controversy is generated or sustained by application of different methods, or by application of the same methods in different ways. The evaluation of RCTs, in this case, is sensitive to vari-
able judgments of trial quality, and different meta-analyses have come to different conclusions. Steven Goodman (Goodman, 2002) goes so far as to argue that the lack of a clear result from meta-analysis should be regarded as a crisis for evidence-based medicine. The American Cancer Society relies on the pathophysiological reasoning that early detection and treatment saves lives by preventing breast cancer from metastasizing. Michael Baum, a British surgeon, also relies on pathophysiological reasoning to argue that mammography causes harm, because the biopsies that result from positive imaging sometimes make cancers more invasive. “Clinical experience” is often used to argue for the life-saving benefits of mammography on the basis of some salient experiences. Consensus conferences, apparently designed to remove uncertainty, do not agree with one another.

Comparison of the case of screening mammography with the more typical case of consensus on medical recommendations shows, perhaps surprisingly, that methodological pluralism is the rule rather than the exception. Usually, however, there are accepted ways of managing different methods—such as prescribing them to different domains, or privileging one over another—so that controversy is avoided. Controversy is in general good for science because it expands the search space, but bad for the authority of science and for the standardization of technological innovations. Indeed, even in the case of mammography, some controversy is avoided by defining a “grey area” in which clinical decision making and patient preference have autonomy and funding of medical care is not in question. The case of screening mammography is helpful for understanding lack of controversy as well as controversy in medicine.

TRUTH- AND CONTENT-RELATIVISM ABOUT ‘MIGHT’
Jönne Speck, London, UK

The paper argues that content-relativism about epistemic modals is more adequate than truth-relativism. It has three parts. First, I discuss contextualism. Its limitations (section 3) motivate truth-relativism. It likewise proves inadequate (sections 6 and 7). I develop a content-relativist semantics of ‘might’ (sections 8 and 9) and argue that its explanatory power outstrips truth-relativism (10).

INVARIANTISM AND PRESUPPOSITIONS
Erik Stei, Bonn, Germany

It is often taken to be a weakness of strict invariantism that it has difficulties explaining the apparent variability of knowledge attributions exhibited by contextualist case studies. Contextualism, on the other hand, seems to have problems explaining other ordinary language intuitions about “knows”. I briefly outline the relevant intuitions and recapitulate some of the criticisms against invariantism and contextualism, respectively. I then outline a novel invariantist explanation which borrows certain aspects from contextualist readings of pragmatic presuppositions, in order to provide a general explanation of the relevant kind of variability of knowledge attributions.

KONTEXTUALISMUS, INDEXIKALITÄT UND VERSTECKTE PARAMETER
Werner Stelzner, Bremen, Germany

Der kontextuellen Theorie der Wissenszuschreibungen zufolge beschränkt sich die Kontextsensitivität von Wissenssätzen nicht darauf, dass indexikalische Wissenssätze in unterschiedlichen Äußerungskontexten unterschiedliche Bedeutungen, also Wahrheitswerte, haben können, sondern Wissenssätze sollen auch in dem Sinne kontextsensitiv sein, dass sich ihre Wahrheitsbedingungen von Kontext zu Kontext ändern können, dass mit dem gleichen Wissenssatz in unterschiedlichen Kontexten unterschiedliche Wissensbegriffe verbunden sind, so dass auch nicht indexikalische Wissenssätze in unterschiedlichen Kontexten unterschiedliche Wissensaussagen ausdrücken können.


THOUGHT-STYLE AND WORLD-PICTURE – ON SIMILARITIES BETWEEN FLECK AND WITTGENSTEIN
Sarah Anna Szeltner, Kassel, Germany

Although major differences between Ludwik Fleck, the much neglected philosopher of science, and Ludwig Wittgenstein are undeniable, we can still detect surprising similarities between their epistemological views. In my paper I will point out that Wittgenstein’s concept of the world-picture shares many of its characteristics with the system of knowledge that corresponds to Fleck’s concept of the thought-style.
**IS SCEPTICISM PART OF AN ACCEPTABLE EXTRAORDINARY LANGUAGE GAME?**

Philip H. Thonemann, London, UK

Sceptical sentences, if read ordinarily – as in *On Certainty* – are very strange. The sceptic can respond that this is irrelevant; her sentences are part of Empiricism, which is a special way of living and an extraordinary linguistic system rather like Physics, and shares with it an unfortunate tendency to use ordinary words in extraordinary ways. This needs defending; her linguistic system, unlike that of Physics, might either be gibberish, or meaningful but pointless. She therefore needs to defend two theses concerning the claims she is making within her extraordinary linguistic system: Firstly that no mutually accepted negative criteria rule them out, and secondly that some positive criteria rule them in, as interesting, promising, or worthwhile. We propose that there are no negative criteria, and that Empiricism satisfies familiar positive criteria as a progressive research programme, despite its odd sceptical consequences.

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**WITTGENSTEIN, QUINE, AND FUTURE EPISTEMOLOGY**

Grzegorz Trela, Cracow, Poland

L. Wittgenstein and W.v.O. Quine (not only in my opinion, I think) were the most important epistemologists in contemporary philosophy. In my short presentation I would like to compare Wittgenstein’s scepticism to Quine’s naturalism.

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**WITTGENSTEIN’S LIGHT ON ANTHROPOLOGY**

Fenia Tsobanopoulou, Thessaloniki, Greece

The concept of Otherness in late Wittgenstein’s work, mainly in *Philosophical Investigations*, is briefly explored in this paper. The philosopher’s attitude towards the foreign and unknown is described through his critique on Frazer, the notions of the conception and communication of pain, his views on language-games, context, private language, use and life forms.

The way anthropology has received the philosopher’s outlook and the impact the latter had on ethnographic practices and perspective are developed, in reference mainly to the work of Veena Das. The relation between philosophical and empirical anthropology is thus reflected upon, in an attempt to depict the circumstances and the advantages of this pairing.

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**SPECIAL PROPOSITIONS IN ON CERTAINTY: AN EPISTEMIC ANALYSIS THROUGH SENSELESS AND NONSENSE**

Stella Villarrea, Madrid, Spain

I establish a comparison between the different uses of language that Wittgenstein mentions in *On Certainty*, and his distinction between what is meaningful, what is senseless, and what is nonsense in *Tractatus*. This comparison has three advantages: first, it allows the role of the so-called hinge or special propositions in *On Certainty* to be clarified; second, it illuminates the relationship between some features that belong to special propositions in *On Certainty* and the characteristics that define what is senseless in *Tractatus*; and, last, it shows the status of what some interpreters, like Peter Hacker, have denominated ‘insightful nonsense’. On the nature of nonsense, I believe in an intermediate position between the Traditional and the New interpretations of it.

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**ON WITTGENSTEIN ON CERTAINTY**

Christian Helmut Wenzel, Taipei, Taiwan

In the preface to *On Certainty* Anscombe and von Wright say that in 1949 Malcolm suggested to Wittgenstein to think again about Moore’s “Defense of Common Sense” (1925) and “Proof of an External World” (1939). Malcolm himself had written on the issue in “Defending Common Sense” (1949). In the preface to the *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein quotes Nestroy saying that there is usually very little progress in philosophy. But I think some progress has been made from Moore and Malcolm to Wittgenstein regarding skepticism. There is more awareness of practice and perspective this opens the discussion in novel ways. But it also gives rise to new problems, in particular of morality and relativity.

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**IS THERE A RELIABILIST EXPLANATION OF THE EXTRA VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE? VALUE INHERITANCE FROM FUTURE AND TYPE**

Markus Werning, Bochum, Germany

What makes knowledge more valuable than merely true belief? This question is the heart of Meno’s Problem and the related Swamping Problem. Under the assumption of veritism – all that matters in inquiry is the acquisition of true belief – Goldman and Olsson (2009) have recently tried to show how the extra value of knowledge might be explained if knowledge is identified with reliably produced true belief (plus X). Their account distinguishes two possible and, as they claim, independent solutions: (1) the conditional probability solution and (2) the type-instrumentalism/value autonomization solution. Both solutions will be critically analyzed in the present paper.

G&L’s common idea is that the extra value of reliably produced true belief is due to the inheritance of epistemic value. However, whereas the first solution (advocated by Olsson) proposes a kind of future-inheritance – the extra value of a present reliably produced belief is inherited from the truth of future beliefs – the second solution (favored by Goldman) appeals to a kind of type-inheritance – the extra value of a present reliably produced belief token is inherited from the generally truth-conducive type to which it belongs. In a recent debate between Olsson (2009), Goldman (2000), and Werning (2000) the strengths and weaknesses of the two solutions have been at issue. To
evaluate the conditional probability solution, it is crucial to spell out what it means that a present reliably produced belief has “the property of making it likely that one’s future beliefs of a similar kind will also be true.” Three readings have to be distinguished:

a) The merely probabilistic reading: The probability of S’s having more true beliefs of a similar kind in the future is greater conditional on S’s having the reliably produced true belief that p than conditional on S’s merely truthfully believing that p.

b) The causal reading: S’s reliably produced true belief that p causally makes it likely that S’s future beliefs of a similar kind will be true.

c) The evidential reading: S’s reliably produced true belief that p is indicative of S’s future beliefs being true, provided the beliefs are of a similar kind.

While (a) is true, it is consistent with a common cause scenario and therefore too weak to establish a means-end relation between the present belief being reliably produced and the future belief being true. It hence does not establish value inheritance from future truth. Option (b) would be strong enough to achieve value inheritance from future truth, but is false generally. Option (c) remains, but has to undergo further scrutiny: Is an evidential relation between two states A and B sufficient to transfer value from B to A, even though the relation is not grounded in a direct causal connection from A to B? A positive weather forecast is indicative of good weather (which is valuable), but is the forecast itself thereby more valuable than a negative one?

The second solution assumes a kind of type-instrumentalism: If sufficiently many, but not necessarily all tokens of a type are instrumental for a certain valuable goal — in our case truth — then each token of the type is valuable: Even tokens that are not themselves instrumental are valuable because they belong to that type. For Goldman this “is a species of instrumental value that reliable processes may enjoy, and it may be the kind of value it contributes to a composite consisting of a token reliable process and a true belief that it causes.” For us the question should be, though, whether it suffices to explain the extra value of knowledge if one assumes that the composite of the reliable process and the belief are valuable. Notice that the reliable process can be rather non-local and need not even be bound to one person as, e.g., is the case for testimonial knowledge. The prospects for a reliabilist solution to the extra value problem remain dubtable.

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A NOTE ON A REMARK: ‘THE ATMOSPHERE OF A WORD IS ITS USE’

Peter K. Westergaard, Copenhagen, Denmark

In this paper it is suggested that Wittgenstein’s remark in MS 169, ‘The atmosphere of a word is its use’, could be viewed as a tentative supplement to the central dictum of his theory of meaning in Philosophical Investigations, ‘The meaning of a word is its use’. The former is an ‘important addition’ that draws attention to the element of ‘experiencing a word’ in the (rule-governed) use of language.

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NON-RELATIVIST CONTEXTUALISM ABOUT KNOWLEDGE

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Most forms of epistemic contextualism currently discussed imply a form of relativism about knowledge. According to these accounts, “S knows that p at t” can be true relative to one context, but false relative to a different context (even if substitutions for S, p and t are held constant). Many non-contextualists seem to find this consequence unacceptable and therefore reject contextualism. In this paper, I will argue that this consequence follows only given a particularly narrow (“contextual”) conception of what the relevant context is with respect to which knowledge claims are evaluated. If we think of contexts in terms of epistemic practices, by contrast, the relativist consequence can be avoided.

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THE BUILDERS

Meredith Williams, Baltimore, MD, USA

Beginning with the Builders language-game, Wittgenstein pursues a philosophical journey from this “complete primitive language” to a view of naming “as a queer connexion of a word with an object…. a name ought really to signify a simple” (PI §§38–39). I trace Wittgenstein’s discussion of the evolution of names in relation to features of linguistic systematicity. There are four intervening stages that take us from animal-like calls to philosophical theory. These are (i) the expanded and articulated Builders game of PI §8 “A gives an order like ‘d—slab—there’. (ii) The labeling game of PI §15 concludes that “naming something is like attaching a label to a thing”. (iii) The jump to full systematicity of PI §§19-22 opens with the question “is the call ‘Slab!’ in example (2) a sentence or a word?”. (iv) And lastly Wittgenstein introduces the place for ostensive definition and the role for the proper name: “Now one can ostensively define a proper name, the name of a colour… and so on” (PI §28). This journey to PI §39 alternates between discussing names and discussing matters of systematicity: from calls to articulated phrases to names as labels to sentences to names properly so-called. Names and systematic features are seen to evolve together. One aim of this paper is to bring this out.

The journey culminates with the statement of the semantic norm “a name ought really to signify a simple”. This norm “sublimes” (true) names. This paper examines two examples of this “subliming”: B. Russell’s hypothesis in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism that “this” is the only true name; and T. Burge’s contemporary account of the representational content of perceptual states. Though embedded in the empirical science of perception, Burge’s account nonetheless exemplifies the semantic norm of PI §39.

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INDIVIDUALISTIC STRATEGIES TO DEAL WITH PI §202

Christian Wirrwitz, Regensburg, Germany

Semantic individualism is the thesis that the authority over the correct use of one’s language lies in the hand of the individual speaker. To evaluate a single application of an expression as correct or incorrect we only have to consider facts about the speaker himself. This idea is – at least superficially – at odds with Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. The aim of this paper is to focus on a small selection of the many problems of semantic individualism and on a small part of the PI. I intend to sketch two strategies for defending semantic individualism against a plausible reading of PI §202: The internalist strategy claims that either the individual does not need to know whether an use was correct, or that the individual is justified in its knowledge claims. The externalist strategy claims that it is pos-
sible to evaluate correctness from a perspective external to the individual speaker.

JUSTIFICATION AND TRUTH: A VIRTUE ACCOUNT
Sarah Wright, Athens, GA, USA

What is the relationship between epistemic justification and truth? I argue that this relationship is nuanced and cannot be exhausted either through the claim that justified beliefs are reliably true or through the claim that justification aims at truth. Instead we should take a distinction from the virtue ethics of the ancient Stoics—that between our telos, or final end, and our skopos, or proximate target—and extend it into epistemology. Truth is not our telos, but only our skopos. This distinction allows us to explain both why knowledge is more valuable than true belief and why justified false belief is more valuable than unjustified false belief. Developed within a virtue epistemology framework, my view highlights the similarities between moral and intellectual virtues, while still maintaining the distinction between them; it also retains an important place for truth in the life of those exhibiting intellectual virtue.