

Ethik – Gesellschaft – Politik

Ethics – Society – Politics

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THE IDEA OF A CONTRACT

Maija Aalto-Heinilä,

Joensuu, Finland | maija.aalto@uef.fi

In modern moral philosophy, the idea of a contract or agreement has been used to solve what Gauthier calls the “foundational crisis” of philosophy. Modern contract theory is divided into Hobbesian contractarianism and Kantian contractualism. In my paper I will look at what Hobbes and Kant actually say about the concept of contract, and in this way show that the attempt to base morality on a contract is quite problematic.

WITTGENSTEIN UND DIE SPRACHPOLIZEI

Joachim Adler

Aarau, Schweiz | joachim.adler@uzh.ch

Der Methode Wittgensteins werden immer wieder zwei Einwände entgegnet. Der eine stellt die Möglichkeit in Frage, Regeln für den Gebrauch der Begriffe aufzustellen, weil ein solches Regelsystem der Sprache in ihrem Wandel immer nur hinterher hinken könnte. Der andere verurteilt die Begriffsklärung als einen Eingriff in die Sprache, der der Philosophie nicht zusteht. Ich werde erläutern, warum diese Einwände zurückzuweisen sind und weshalb die Methode der Begriffsklärung durchaus ihre Berechtigung hat.

DER AUSDRUCK ‚LOGISCHES GEWICHT‘ IM TRACTATUS

Rubén Aguilar

München, Deutschland | Ruben.Aguilar@campus.lmu.de

Der Ausdruck ‚logisches Gewicht‘ im *Tractatus* ist mit dem Nummerierungssystem des Buches verbunden. Damit versucht Wittgenstein die Anordnung der Textes zu erklären, indem er andeutet, welche Sätze mehr Nachdruck besitzen sollen. Die Relevanz dieses Systems für das Verständnis des *Tractatus* wurde in einem Brief vom 06.12.19 an Ludwig von Ficker betont. Wittgenstein deutet dort auf die Notwendigkeit hin, die Dezimalnummern der Sätze mitzudrucken, „weil sie allein dem Buch Übersichtlichkeit und Klarheit geben und es ohne diese Nummerierung ein unverständlicher Wust wäre.“ (Wittgenstein 2004)

Trotz Wittgensteins Bemühen, die Anordnung des Textes klar zu machen, sind einige Fragen zum logischen Gewicht der Sätze nicht geklärt. In der Tat lässt sich eine ausreichende Interpretation des Gewichts der Sätze nicht allein aus dem *Tractatus* aufbauen, sondern ausschließlich mithilfe des sog. Prototractatus, denn nur dort wird erklärt, welche Sätze mehr oder weniger Gewicht besitzen sollen. Die Wichtigkeit dieser Feststellung liegt darin, dass die richtige Art und Weise, das logische Gewicht der Sätze zu interpretieren, genau umgekehrt verstanden werden sollte, als die vorhandene gewöhnliche Auffassung.

DER BEGRIFF „NEOLIBERALISMUS“ ALS TROJANISCHES PFERD – PARADOXIE UND POINTE EINER BEGRIFFSVERWIRRUNG IN DER ÖKONOMISCHEN THEORIE

Ulrich Arnswald

Karlsruhe, Deutschland | arnswald@philosophie.uni-karlsruhe.de

Die Kritik am *Neoliberalismus* ist allgegenwärtig. Der Begriff erklärt sich scheinbar von selbst, wobei die ursprüngliche Verwendung in der Öffentlichkeit in Vergessenheit geraten ist. Deren Ausformung entstammt der Denkfamilie des Ordoliberalismus der 1930er Jahre, der mit *Neoliberalismus* seine Abgrenzung zum *Laissez-faire*-Kapitalismus bezeichnet. Durch diese begriffliche Verwirrung sind erhebliche Folgeprobleme entstanden, die die heutige Debatte um die Zukunft der Marktwirtschaft überlagern.

Die Tatsache, dass der *Neoliberalismus* der Ordoliberalen heute von seinen Kritikern mit dem Kapitalismus der Libertären gleichgesetzt wird, wirft Fragen auf. Da das Wirtschaftsdogma Milton Friedmans, der für die so genannten *Chicago Boys* in Chile, deren Wirtschaftspolitik erstmals mit dem heutigen, negativ konnotierten Begriff *Neoliberalismus* erfasst wurde, Pate stand, ist dieser Ansatz genauer zu betrachten. Sollten die Ideen der Chicagoer Denkschule sich substantiell von den anderen Strömungen des Wirtschaftsliberalismus abheben, könnte eine Lösung der Begriffsverwirrung möglich sein, die der Debatte um die Marktwirtschaft eine neue Wendung gibt.

MORAL DIFFICULTIES AND REPRESSION

Joel Backström

Helsinki, Finland | jbackstr@abo.fi

I argue for the centrality of a dynamics of *repression* in moral difficulties, and for making this problematic central in ethics. I further propose that our moral language itself tends to function in a systematically repressive way, and that ethics should be concerned with revealing the patterns of this functioning. I close by suggesting that Wittgenstein’s philosophising points in this very direction.

THE UNFORESEEN SLIPS OF EDITORS AND SCHOLARS ABOUT THE REPRESENTATION OF THE VISUAL FIELD IN TRACTATUS 5.6331

Luciano Bazzocchi

Siena, Italy | l.bazzocchi@fls.unipi.it

The tree-like reading of the *Tractatus* allows us to understand, finally, also section 5.6 about solipsism. Proposition 5.64 makes no sense, indeed, if we read it after 5.634, like in the sequential approach, while its predecessor is, obviously, 5.63; and so on. As a result, the meaning of this crucial part of the book results to be very different from current accounts. Wittgenstein intends to supersede Schopenhauer’s transcendental Ego, not to confirm it. In particular, we can see that proposition 5.6331 was usually misinterpreted and even the picture that it presents has been completely altered. As the Nachlass shows clearly, the original figures drawn by Wittgenstein, starting from his Notebooks until the typewritten versions of the work, represent (to criticise it) *the habitual way* of depicting the visual field. In no manner one can believe (as, instead, all critics and editors do) that (Morris 2008) “the diagram portrays the eye as occurring within the visual field”.

THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY AND AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT

Etienne Bebbé-Njoh

Yaounde, Cameroun | bebbenjohetienne@gmail.com

By adopting an action plan on the knowledge economy, African Heads of States have shown their interest for this new economy. To avoid disappointments as those which resulted from the implementation of the development programs at the early 1960s then at the 1980s, it is necessary to examine the significance and the implications of this economy, but also to consider the particular context of African societies. The scrutiny of the actors' play brings out some ethical and ideological stakes.

LIFE AS A SOAP OPERA: CONCERNING THE "MIDDLE" WITTGENSTEIN'S CONCEPT OF TIME

Ondřej Beran

Plzen, Czech Republic | jerdnonareb@seznam.cz

The paper comments on the foundations, advantages and implications of the "middle" Wittgenstein's concept of time. It sketches possible elaborations of Wittgenstein's illuminating movie-metaphor of the present.

THINKING ABOUT THE ROLE OF LABORATORIES TODAY. ANTI-ESSENTIALISM, MACRO-ETHICS AND PARTICIPATORY TURN

Ewa Bińczyk

Toruń, Poland | Ewa.Binczyk@umk.pl

The paper presents the most important elements of the philosophical turn concerning our current way of thinking about technological innovations, scientific discoveries and politics of science in risk society. Within such areas as Science and Technology Studies, Actor-Network Theory, Technology Assessment and Public Understanding of Science the political role of laboratories is intensively discussed. The conceptions formulated within these fields postulate the rejection of essentialism, create a specific form of macro-ethics and insist on a larger democratic participation in the decisions concerning technoscience. At the same time, they reject technological instrumentalism and the previous philosophical technophobic tendencies.

HUMAN WITHOUT SELF: FROM ETHICS OF SOUL TO ETHICS OF EMBODIED MIND

Sebastian Bodzak

Lublin, Poland | sebastianbodzak@yahoo.com

For the last century, in philosophy and other sciences new methods of describing man based on a category of bodiliness have been developed. In the concepts of the embodied mind or bounded rationality, the existence of mental states independent from the body and the environment have been denied. The idea of "self" or "free will" have lost their explanatory power. This change has been reflected in the social environment – in the media and culture. Despite this alteration, a dualistic description of man has not been excluded. We need a debate on the ethics that takes into account a new picture of human mind. The knowledge on

the determinants of human decision-making and ways of thinking should be employed to create selfless ethics. It is difficult to predict how this change will influence social life, but we can observe that it has already been introduced. In my article, I shall defend the thesis on the necessity of adjusting the ethics to the embodied human agency.

A PERFORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF HUMAN DIGNITY

Dieter Birnbacher

Düsseldorf, Germany | dieter.birnbacher@uni-duesseldorf.de

SYSTEME IN DER MEDIZIN UND DEREN VERNETZUNG

Hans Burkhardt

München, Deutschland | hans.burkhardt@lrz.uni-muenchen.de

Systeme finden sich in der Medizin, ausgehend vom ganzen Organismus, in absteigender hierarchischer Ordnung bis zu den Molekülen. Zwischen den einzelnen Systemen besteht jeweils eine mereologische Inklusion. Wichtig sind vor allem die großen Organsysteme, die Organe und die Zellen. Die großen Organsysteme sind teilweise autoregulatorisch organisiert. Verschiedene mereologische Strukturen weisen die großen Organe auf. Herz und Gehirn sind heterogene Ganze: das Ganze hat Eigenschaften, die die Teile nicht haben, so z.B. beim Herzen die Pumpeigenschaft und beim Gehirn das Bewusstsein. Die Leber dagegen ist ein homogenes Ganzes. Das Ganze verhält sich homogen zu seinen Teilen und auch umgekehrt verhalten sich die Teile homogen zum Ganzen.

Eine besondere Form von Systemen sind Wahnsysteme. In diesen Fällen weichen die einfließenden Daten und ihre Vernetzung vom normalen Erfahrungssystem ab, das durch das Prinzip der Rationalität wird, also vom Widerspruchsprinzip, aber zusätzlich auch vom Prinzip der Kompossibilität, d.h. die Daten müssen nicht nur möglich, sondern auch miteinander möglich sein.

Systeme können also homogene und heterogene Ganze sein, aber auch Aggregate. Letztere Form findet man in der Biologie nicht, wohl aber im Bereich des Sozialen, d.h. im Bereich sozialer Artefakte.

INFORMATION UND MORALISCHES HANDELN IM KONTEXT DER DIGITALEN INFORMATIONS- UND KOMMUNIKATIONSTECHNOLOGIEN

Rafael Capurro

Stuttgart, Deutschland | rafael@capurro.de

Der Titel dieses Beitrags erweckt den Eindruck eines scheinbar selbstverständlichen Verhältnisses zwischen Information und moralischem Handeln, wenn man unter moralischem Handeln ein begründetes und deshalb verantwortbares Handeln versteht. Unbegründetes, d.h. auf Desinformationen oder auf falschen Informationen beruhendes Handeln ist verantwortungslos und somit unmoralisch. Bedeutet dies nun, dass in einer Welt in der dank der digitalen Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien (IKT) kein Mangel an Information herrscht, es im Prinzip kein verantwortungsloses Handeln mehr geben kann, es sei denn, der Handelnde weigert sich oder versäumt, sich

zu informieren? Jeder und jede Handelnde, der wie im Falle des Menschen fähig ist, über die Folgen seines oder ihres Handelns nachzudenken, hat die moralische Verantwortung sich zu informieren. Die digitalen IKT ermöglichen somit die Vollendung des Traums der Aufklärung, der moralisches Handeln als begründet in der informierten Autonomie des Subjekts sich erhoffte. Daher der Kampf der Aufklärer gegen politische und religiöse Zensur und ihr Bestreben, das in Bibliotheken und Enzyklopädien externalisierte Wissen für alle Bürger jenseits ökonomischer und sozialer Unterschiede zugänglich zu machen.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE CRITIQUE OF ETHICAL THEORY

Anne-Marie S. Christensen

Odense, Denmark | amsc@ifpr.sdu.dk

The aim of this talk is to discuss what role we should assign to ethical theory in moral philosophy. The focal point of the discussion is a wholehearted defence for ethical theory presented by Martha Nussbaum. After a short introduction of the critique of ethical theory, I will present Nussbaum's defence and examine whether she is successful in warding off the critical points raised. The aim of this approach is to show that Nussbaum does not address the main issues raised by critiques of ethical theory and that she fails to distinguish between ethical theory and moral philosophy. Nussbaum thus seems to assume that a successful attack critique of ethical theory will mean the end of any critical role for moral philosophy. In contrast, I will in the last part of the paper try to indicate a role for moral philosophy – independent of ethical theory – that still involves critical bite.

THE INTERVENTIONIST ACCOUNT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. A CRITICISM AND AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL

Christine Chwaszcza

Cologne, Germany | christine.chwaszcza@uni-koeln.de

In "The Idea of Human Rights" (2009) Charles Beitz argues that human rights are best conceived of as norms that raise international concern and impose a responsibility on the international community of states to promote respect for those rights, if domestic state institutions fail to guarantee them. I will call this approach the "interventionist analysis" of human rights because it specifies human rights as those norms that justify some form of "outside interference", although not necessarily military intervention. I find this view extremely restrictive and unconvincing.

The interventionist analysis is partly motivated by the role that the concept of human rights plays in the practice of inter-state relations and national law. As a more subtle analysis reveals, however, it is also motivated by a couple of theoretical precommitments. First, the analysis implicitly assumes that human rights – insofar as they are "normative" – must be "action-guiding". Second, since "action-guiding" norms require an agent, it seems to follow that an analysis of human rights must identify some party or parties that can act as bearer of corresponding duties or responsibilities to human rights claims. A particular feature of Beitz' analysis is the idea that international agents have to step in only when domestic agents fail to protect human rights of their people. By restricting human rights to violations of those norms where outside interference would be justified, however, seems to assume that the substantive

content of human rights is fixed and identical at the domestic and at the international level.

The target of my critique is the abstract account of norms in the interventionist analysis, which is not only proposed by Beitz but widely shared. I will argue that it is theoretically reasonable to distinguish different types of norms and to specify their different roles in the constitution as well as in transformations of complex social practices. Human rights, I will claim, are best conceived of as standards of legitimacy for institutions and systems of norms. They thus belong to a type of norm that is of special relevance for the transformation and (moral) improvement of institutions and social practices (including systems or branches of law) rather than being action-guiding. This analysis provides a basis for an alternative account of human rights that conceives of international human rights as a new generation of human rights developments that is different from domestic human rights.

FREEDOM IS FOR THE DOGS

Alice Crary

New York, USA | crarya@newschool.edu

This talk is about freedom and dogs. It is also part of a larger project dedicated to demonstrating the availability of a tenable *conceptualism*, where conceptualism is understood as the view that our modes of awareness are conceptual all the way down. Champions and critics of conceptualist views tend to represent them as obliging us to deny that animals possess any significant capacities of mind. Yet I claim that, far from being a hindrance, a thoughtful conceptualism can give us the resources to describe the rich range of capacities of mind possessed by animals of different kinds. A conceptualist outlook can equip us to recognize that many non-human animals are neither mere stimulus and response mechanisms nor mere systems of exploitable instincts but rather creatures that are in an important sense free. This talk's treatment of these topics focuses on the case of dogs. But its argument – which includes references to the writings of authors who work with dogs – has a direct bearing on our resources for thinking not only about other non-human animals but also about the kinds of free and rational animals that we human beings are.

WITTGENSTEIN, AUDI AND "DUCK-RABBIT"

Hossein Dabbagh

Reading, UK | hosein.dabbagh@gmail.com

In this paper I am going to shed light on the idea of "reflectionism" in moral intuitionism tradition which is dubbed by Robert Audi. He, indeed, believes that we can understand "self-evident" moral propositions in two ways: Some of them are "immediately" perceived (hard self-evident), whereas some other are "mediate" ones (soft self-evident) and need reflections. In order to illuminate this, I utilise Wittgenstein's application of "Duck-Rabbit" in his *Philosophical Investigations* and it is shown that there are some similarities between Wittgenstein's "Continuous" seeing and Audi's method of reflectionism. To this end, I draw upon Wittgenstein's account of the concept of "game". I emphasise the role of perceptual knowledge and the way that the idea of 'seeing the similarities' of concept application is embedded in the idea of being engaged in a practice.

THE CONCEPT 'SILENCE' IN THE *TRACTATUS*

Soroush Dabbagh and Hossein Dabbagh

Reading, UK and Toronto, Canada | soroush.dabbagh@gmail.com

In this paper, we are going to shed light on the concept of "silence" which is discussed in the last sentence of *Tractatus*, notoriously. Wittgenstein thought that one sentence suffices and did not talk about it very clearly. So, it is natural that commentators have different interpretations on what exactly is the "silence" Wittgenstein refers to. We deductively dig out four readings which can be called cloudy, negative, mystical and therapeutic readings of "silence". To this end, we discover our judgment that, exegetically speaking, cloudy reading of silence is more plausible and compatible with the spirit of the *Tractatus*. However, other readings have their own power.

VON DER FUNKTIONALEN DIFFERENZIERUNG ZUR RE-HYBRIDISIERUNG. TRANSFORMATIONEN IM (SELBST-) VERSTÄNDNIS DER LEBENSWISSENSCHAFTEN UND IHRE SOZIALEN IMPLIKATIONEN

Peter Dabrock

Erlangen, Deutschland | Peter.Dabrock@theologie.uni-erlangen.de

Der Vortrag entfaltet die These, dass sich auf dem Feld der Synthetischen Biologie exemplarisch umfassende Transformationen im Selbst- und Fremdverständnis der Lebenswissenschaften aufzeigen lassen, die sich z.T. durch wissenschaftsinterne, z.T. durch wissenschafts-externe Gründe (sofern man dieser Unterscheidung traut) erklären lassen. Vor allem die (vermeintlich) extern veranlassten Transformationsbewegungen sollen analysiert und gedeutet werden. Diese sind von besonderem Interesse weil sie eine etablierte Sicht auf die Wissenschaften als ein autopoietisches System unterlaufen und auf ihre Re-Hybridisierungen mit ökonomischem Kalkül und medialer Skandalisierung aufmerksam machen, die theoretisch nicht mehr allein mit der luhmannschen Figur der strukturellen Kopplung domestiziert werden können. Treffen diese Beobachtungen und Deutungen auf der Schnittstelle von Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft zu, dann sind aus ihnen nicht nur wissenschaftstheoretische und -ethische, sondern auch gesellschaftstheoretische und sozialethische Konsequenzen zu ziehen.

ETHICAL ELIMINATIVISM AND THE SENSE OF WITTGENSTEIN'S *TRACTATUS*

Edmund Dain

Providence, RI, USA | edmunddain@gmail.com

This paper argues that Wittgenstein holds that ethical propositions are nonsense, in that they lack any meaning whatsoever, that they are redundant, in that the work they are intended to do is already being done by other features of our language, and that they are harmful, insofar as they prevent us from appreciating what is of genuine ethical significance in our lives. Its aim is to outline a sense in which Wittgenstein can be seen to be trying, through the elimination of "ethical propositions", to reconnect us with the ethical commitments embodied in our ordinary "non-ethical" language, and so the ways in which ordinary language might be taken to be ethically revealing.

WITTGENSTEIN'S PRISON. YOU CAN CHECKOUT ANY TIME YOU LIKE, BUT YOU CAN NEVER LEAVE

Majid Davoody Beni

Tehran, Iran | davoody1980@gmail.com

In their "From Wittgenstein's Prison to the Boundless Ocean: Carnap's Dream of Logical Syntax" (2009), Awodey and Carus developed an interpretation of Carnap's philosophy, which describes Carnap's *Logical Syntax of Language* (hereafter *LSL*) as an effort for by-passing Wittgensteinian barrier of speaking meaningfully about the language. The Wittgensteinian barrier emerged from Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning.

In this paper, I will show that Carnap's effort at leaving Wittgenstein's prison not only was not successful in his syntactical period (i.e., *LSL*), but this mission could not be accomplished even in Carnap's later work in his semantical period, when such a liberating move would have been much more expectable. Hence, I would draw the conclusion that Wittgenstein's prison remained unbroken, in spite of Carnap's efforts.

Moreover, I will draw the more general conclusion that Wittgenstein's insights about the nature of language are deeper than what can be endangered by the fall of the formalism or logicism in philosophy of mathematics and logic, and his insights root in his *fact-value dichotomy* and are attached to his *theory of value*. It seems to me, that the Wittgensteinian barrier is an impenetrable impediment, which is founded in the essence of language and could neither be bridged nor ignored by a change of our interpretation of the operation of language. The failure of Carnap's two consecutive efforts, in spite of their ingenuity, seems like a good evidence for this claim.

THE SAYING-SHOWING DISTINCTION IN THE *TRACTATUS*: A BRIEF ATTEMPT AT A FORMAL ELUCIDATION

Guillaume Decauwert

Grenoble, France | guillaume.decauwert@aliceadsl.fr

In this article, I try to provide an exegetical hypothesis in order to elucidate the unity and the form of the famous tractarian distinction between 'saying' and 'showing'. My main idea is that the various occurrences of the notion of showing are all related to problems which pertain to a common form: the limit of linguistic expression is justified (or can at least be elucidated) by the impossibility of strict self-reference (i.e. positive reflexiveness) for fundamental logico-philosophical 'data'.

WHY HAS THE QUEEN OF BEES BEEN THE KING FOR SO LONG? GENDER PROBLEM IN SCIENCE

Aleksandra Derra

Toruń, Poland | aldewicz@umk.pl

Looking at certain points of the history and tradition of the feminist philosophy of science I would like to point out several interesting issues which I find philosophically valid today. I will consider the complexity of the female subjectivity in the context of science asking what kind of assumptions we have to take for granted in order to use such notions like 'male science' or 'female science'. By presenting some examples I am going to argue that from feminist

philosophical approach to science we can learn how to treat gender problem in science as an ethical matter, how to enrich theory-oriented philosophy of science and correct gender blind tradition of scientific studies.

WITTGENSTEINS ANTHROPOLOGIE. EINE POLEMIK MIT WITTGENSTEINS-LEKTÜRE BEI JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD

Tomáš Došek

Olomouc, Tschechien | dosek.tomas@gmail.com

In dieser Studie habe ich vor, eine anthropologische Perspektive in Wittgensteins Spätdenken offenzulegen und ihre Gründe zu überprüfen. Mein Text ist in drei Abschnitte geteilt. Im ersten Kapitel zeige ich, dass die Kritik an Frazer primär nicht Anthropologie, sondern eine Erklärungsart betrifft. Die Bemerkungen über Frazer sind zwar nicht genuin anthropologisch, dies steht jedoch nicht im Widerspruch zu gewissen anthropologischen Voraussetzungen in Wittgensteins Denken. Damit beschäftige ich mich im zweiten Abschnitt, wo ich ein Argument vorlege, mit dem ich die Anthropologie als einen transzendentalen Standpunkt von Wittgensteins Denken begründe. Im letzten Abschnitt meines Textes werde ich mich mit einer bekannten Kritik von Jean-François Lyotard auseinandersetzen. Lyotard behauptet, Wittgenstein sei ein „Opfer des anthropologischen Empirismus“, was sich in Form eines Arguments gegen meine Interpretation deuten lässt. Diese Kritik werde ich argumentativ erklären, ihre Gültigkeit prüfen und schließlich versuche ich, sie in Zweifel zu ziehen.

SOME REMARKS ARISING FROM HACKING'S 'LEIBNIZ AND DESCARTES: A PROOF AND ETERNAL TRUTHS': A RECONSTRUCTION OF WITTGENSTEINIAN AGENCY

Susan Edwards-McKie

Cambridge, UK | susan.edwards-mckie@bushfield.co.uk

The following remarks draw together ideas which are directly addressed in Hacking's article with ideas from the philosophy of intuitionist mathematics concerning notions of infinity, and an exploration of the types of *cogito* that we can discern in moving from Leibniz to Descartes to Wittgenstein.

It is argued that Hacking is incorrect in concluding that the problems traditionally posed within a Leibnizian-Cartesian framework are left untransformed by Wittgenstein. Rather, taking the fact that Descartes was an epistemologist – and that Leibniz was not – seriously, Descartes' eternal truths align with the Kantian transcendental project of knowledge through intuition, both projects which Wittgenstein rejects. Proof and proof-theoretic reasoning is explored, with a highlighting of modal considerations and a resultant modern conception of agency. A critical translation of passages in the 1s and 2s of *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus* constructs the logical space for a post-Enlightenment agency.

NONDUALISMUS IN SPRACHE UND EMPIRIE

Patricia Ene

Vienna, Österreich | patricia.ene@lumique.com

Um das Referenzproblem der Erkenntnis und die damit verbundenen Dichotomien von Sprache und Welt zu vermeiden, schlägt der Nondualismus eine Aufhebung der kategorialen Unterscheidung zwischen Sprache und Welt bzw. zwischen Theorie und Empirie vor. Es werden zwei nondualistische Ansätze vorgestellt, die in Theorie und Empirie Anwendung finden; der semantische Nondualismus von Josef Mitterer und die nondualistische Erfahrungstheorie von Franz Ofner. Das Resultat dieser Gegenüberstellung legt den Schluss nahe, dass semantischer und empirischer Nondualismus im Verhältnis zueinander neue Dichotomien bilden.

„THE HISTORY OF EDITING WITTGENSTEIN'S NACHLASS“ – DIE ERSTE RUNDE DER NACHLASSIEDIERUNG ALS INTERDISZIPLINÄRES FORSCHUNGSPROJEKT UND GESCHICHTE EINES PHILOSOPHISCHEN ERBES

Christian Erbacher

Siegen, Deutschland und Bergen, Norwegen | christian.erbacher@uni.no

GEN-1 bezeichnet ein Forschungsvorhaben zur Geschichte der Ederung von Wittgensteins Nachlass. Der Beitrag bespricht Bezüge dieses interdisziplinären Projekts zu Philosophie, Editionswissenschaften und Geschichte der Philosophie.

AUTOPHILOSOPHY – THE WITTGENSTEIN CASE

Rachel Even

Oranit, Israel | evenr@zahav.net.il

Autophilosophers are a unique group of philosophers for whom philosophy is a supreme value. Their philosophical insight dictates all their activity and is their way of life. These philosophers not only deal with the development of a philosophical theory or method; rather, philosophy is a doctrine to be lived by. The guiding principle of the autophilosopher is consistency-thought-action, and it is devoutly applied. In this paper, autophilosophical reading is presented as a methodological and interpretive tool to identify philosophers of this kind. The philosopher selected as the case study is Wittgenstein. In light of the conclusions that arise from reviewing the existing study of biography/autobiography and the literature written about Wittgenstein's life, this essay presents a model that defines "autophilosophy" and is applied to Wittgenstein.

INTERGENERATIONELLE GERECHTIGKEIT UND DAS NICHT-IDENTITÄTS-PROBLEM

Christian J. Feldbacher

Innsbruck, Austria | christian.feldbacher@gmail.com

One problem of intergenerational justice concerns the question whether the present generation bears moral

responsibility for future generations and how to justify such a responsibility. A way of justification is to take a person-affecting view of ethics, according to which no action is morally bad *per se*, but only with respect to someone (e.g. with respect to future generations). Against a person-affecting view sometimes the so-called non-identity-problem is posed. This problem states that there are actions which – from a person-affecting point of view – have to be considered as bad for a person, although without execution of the action the person would not exist. In this paper I will try to show how this conflict can be solved by an exact analysis of its structure.

WELT DER ABGRÜNDE. LEBENSFORMEN ALS MORALISCHE RECHTFERTIGUNG

Ferdinand Fellmann

Chemnitz, Deutschland | ferdinand.fellmann@phil.tu-chemnitz.de

„Was die Menschen als Rechtfertigung gelten lassen, – zeigt, wie sie denken und leben“ (PU 325). Die Rechtfertigung, von der Wittgenstein hier redet, ist nicht identisch mit „epistemischer Rechtfertigung“, in der es um Gründe des Fürwahrhaltens von Meinungen geht. Denn die Kette der Gründe hat ein Ende, so dass an die Stelle von abstrakten Meinungen konkrete Lebensformen treten. Sie fungieren gleichsam als Seil, das die Menschen über die Abgründe führt, von denen die Welt voll ist. Was daraus für die Ethik folgt, möchte ich anhand einer Klärung der Begriffe: Grund, Abgrund und Rechtfertigung zeigen.

FREE WILL, THE MIND-BRAIN PROBLEM, AND TESTABILITY

August Fenk

Klagenfurt, Austria | august.fenk@uni-klu.ac.at

Starting from reports on cortical readiness potentials preceding the conscious intention to act (Libet et al. 1983), this paper investigates the possibility of free will as a mental agent in different mind-body theories: Parallelism and monism seem to be incompatible with a mental domain affecting the physical. Epiphenomenalism, the “winner” with respect to the epistemic criteria testability and parsimony, excludes the idea of free will from the onset. And Libet’s results would, if methodologically valid, exclude free will even in interactionism (physical↔mental).

HERAUSFORDERUNGEN UND KRISEN DES VERSTEHENS. DAS PROBLEM DES FREMDEN BEI WITTGENSTEIN UND HUSSERL

Matthias Flatscher

Wien, Österreich | matthias.flatscher@univie.ac.at

Wittgenstein weist in mehreren Texten seit den 1930er Jahre, besonders aber in seiner späten Sammlung *Über Gewissheit* die Vormachtstellung eines rationalistisch-scientistischen Weltbildes zurück, indem er andere Zugänge – z.B. religiöse oder mythologische – als gleichberechtigt ausmacht und jede Privilegierung eines einzigen Weltbildes ablehnt. Sehr zurückhaltend äußert er sich bezüglich der Verstehbarkeit anderer kultureller Kontexte dadurch, dass er jede plane Übersetzbarkeit von einem Weltbild in ein anderes radikal in Frage stellt. Mit dieser Kritik am Eurozentrismus werden dem Denken nicht nur

die eigenen Voraussetzungen und Bedingtheiten virulent, sondern es stellt sich auch die Frage, was Verstehen respektive Verstehen von Fremden überhaupt heißen kann.

Etwa zeitgleich geht Husserl in diversen Forschungsmanuskripten der 1930er Jahre der komplexen Relation von Heim- und Fremd-Welt rund um eine ‚generative‘ Phänomenologie nach. Insbesondere bei der Inblicknahme fremder Kulturkreise insistiert er auf die Gegebenheit eines nicht mehr (unmittelbar) Verständlichen. Diese Überlegungen stehen in einem Spannungsverhältnis zu seinen Erörterungen in der *Krisis*, wo er mit Nachdruck die Welt als Horizont fasst, „für die der Plural sinnlos ist“ und zugleich an der Idee einer Universalisierbarkeit festhält.

Im geplanten Vortrag sollen Wittgensteins und Husserls Überlegungen zur Möglichkeit bzw. Unmöglichkeit des Verstehens von Fremden herausgearbeitet und in Hinblick auf eine notwendige Verschränkung von Verstehen und Nicht-Verstehen zur Diskussion gestellt werden.

DOING JUSTICE TO WHAT THERE IS: A WITTGENSTEINIAN MOTTO?

Alexandra Dias Fortes

Cascais, Portugal | alexandramdias@gmail.com

This essay tries to grasp a motto, or at least, a guiding line through Wittgenstein’s method, which has in the remark “God grant the philosopher insight into what lies in front of everyone’s eyes” (Wittgenstein, 2006, p. 73e), one of its several touchstones. In doing so, I shall consider the form of Wittgenstein’s thoughts, namely, the philosophical remarks that constitute his work, in accordance with thought’s natural inclination, and the conviction that philosophy should only describe and let everything be as it is.

MULTIKULTURALITÄT UND RECHT: DISKURSE UM RECHTSPLURALISMUS UND CULTURAL DEFENSE ALS ANFRAGEN AN DIE RECHTFERTIGBARKEIT UNIVERSAL VERBINDLICHER NORMEN

Marie-Luisa Frick

Innsbruck, Österreich | marie-luisa.frick@uibk.ac.at

Wie lässt sich die Verbindlichkeit von Rechtsnormen auch für diejenigen verlangen, die Grundprinzipien einer Rechtsordnung nicht teilen? Diese Frage betrifft in multikulturellen Gesellschaften nicht mehr nur einzelne Individuen, die äußerste Ränder des politischen Spektrums besetzen, sondern mitunter Bevölkerungsgruppen, die ihren eigenen Rechtstraditionen höhere Bedeutung zuschreiben als jenen der Mehrheitsgesellschaft und ist gerade deshalb keine rein akademische Frage mehr. Diskussionen um Rechtspluralismus und strafrechtliche Rücksichten auf fremdkulturelle Hintergründe werden heute in Europa vermehrt geführt und erschüttern dabei Selbstverständnisse ebenso wie vertraute Gewissheiten. Vor dem Hintergrund sich abzeichnender demographischer Verschiebungen werden sie weiter an Bedeutung gewinnen und bedürfen daher einer ernsthaften philosophischen Auseinandersetzung.

THE ORIGIN OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE BREAKDOWN OF PRIVATE LANGUAGE

Ralf Funke

Hamburg, Germany | ralf.funke@snap.de

In 1984 Julian Jaynes gave a lecture in Kirchberg entitled "Four Hypotheses on the Origin of Mind". The first of these hypotheses and most interesting from a philosophical point of view states that subjective consciousness is a social construction dependent on language, built upon metaphors of behaviour in the physical world.

Wittgenstein would perhaps have been in sympathy with Jaynes. He too thought that consciousness is not some "private theatre". Inner processes at the bottom of conscious thought, accessible only to the individual, he called a "dangerous metaphor".

Like Jaynes Wittgenstein held that language is logically prior to consciousness and when he claimed that dogs cannot be hypocrites but also not sincere Jaynes would certainly have agreed. And like Jaynes Wittgenstein was not afraid to be accused of behaviouristic tendencies.

WITTGENSTEIN AND THE NONSENSE OF EXISTENTIAL QUERIES

Isabel G. Gamero

Madrid, Spain | isgamero@gmail.com

In this paper, the queries concerning the sense or the meaning of human life would be revisited from a Wittgensteinian point-of-view. Its main purpose is to understand the legitimacy or relevance of these questions and whether the Wittgensteinian work might contribute to solve (or dissolve) them. Furthermore, on raising these queries, we might obtain a better comprehension about the Wittgensteinian philosophy itself.

ABSOLUTE EVIL AND JUSTICE

Cristina García Pascual

Valencia, Spain | garciac@uv.es

How do we live with evil? How do we deal with it? I am not thinking in terms of just any old evil, but in what has been called, after the bloody history of the 20th century, absolute evil: offenses against human dignity so widespread, persistent, and organized that normal moral assessment seems inappropriate. How then to confront evil, how to respond to massive human rights violations? How to do so when they are committed by the state or by those who have the consent and tolerance of governments? In this paper such questions are raised again, being however aware from the outset that we will not find answers easily.

RECHTE UND AUTONOMIE IM UTILITARISMUS

Bernward Gesang

Mannheim, Deutschland | bgesang@mail.uni-mannheim.de

Dem Utilitarismus wird von je her vorgeworfen, er sei nicht in der Lage Individual- und Menschenrechten sowie personaler Autonomie einen adäquaten Raum innerhalb seiner Architektur der Moralphilosophie zuzuweisen. In diesem Vortrag versuche ich, diesen Einwand bezogen auf die von

mir vertretene Variante des Utilitarismus – die ich „humanen Utilitarismus“ nenne – zurückzuweisen. Individualrechte zu gewähren, die gegen Verrechnungen durch den Staat geschützt sind, ist eine soziale Institution, die enorm viele Ängste nimmt, Erwartungssicherheit schafft und so persönliche Projekte der Bürger ermöglicht. Daher vergrößert sie das Glück aller Mitglieder einer Gesellschaft. Auch Menschenrechte kann der Utilitarist begründen, ohne dem Speziesismuseinwand anheim zu fallen.

“MEANING IS USE” AND WITTGENSTEIN’S METHOD OF DESCRIBING THE ACTUAL USE OF WORDS

Stefan Giesewetter

Berlin, Germany | sgiesew@gmx.de

In *Investigations* §43, Wittgenstein famously wrote: "The meaning of a word is its use in the language". In that book, Wittgenstein also proclaimed: "What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use" (§116). Now what is the relation between Wittgenstein's method of dissolving philosophical problems by reminding us of the actual use of words, and "meaning is use" in §43? One answer would be this: "Meaning is use" is an insight which Wittgenstein had *before* adopting this method – it is an insight which this method assumes as its *background*. What I intend to show is that this seemingly straightforward answer fails to accommodate one thing: namely, that §43 is a reminder of how we *actually use* the expression 'meaning of a word' in everyday speech. I will show how acknowledging this forces us to rethink the relation between "meaning is use" and Wittgenstein's method.

RULE-FOLLOWING IS NOT A PRACTICE: WITTGENSTEIN’S METHOD OF GRAMMATICAL ENQUIRY AND THE *BLUE BOOK’S* ‘LAST INTERPRETATION’

Sebastian Greve

London, UK | sebastian.greve@yahoo.com

Wittgenstein's discussion in PI198-202 *entirely* proceeds on a grammatical level. This I want to make both clear and plausible, by drawing on a widely neglected passage from the *Blue Book* and through close reading of the relevant remarks in the *Investigations*.

The common misunderstanding I want to address is most clearly exemplified by the so-called *community view readings*, like, for example, Kripke's or Malcolm's. However, my proposed reading equally shows some of their opponents to have missed a crucial aspect of what goes on in PI198-202, most prominently Peter Hacker and the early Gordon Baker.

Following the *late* Baker in his emphasis on Wittgenstein's non-dogmatic method, my proposed reading, rather provocatively put, is this: 'rule-following' is—*really*—*not* a practice! One might wonder whether this isn't inconsistent with what Wittgenstein actually says in PI202, *viz.*, "following a rule" is a practice.' But, as it will turn out, it is not.

RADIKALE INTERPRETATION: EIN ARGUMENT GEGEN DEN MORALISCHEN RELATIVISMUS

Tobias Gutmann

Essen, Deutschland | tovijas@yahoo.de

Die Übertragung der Gedanken Donald Davidsons zur radikalen Interpretation auf den Bereich der Moral stellt ein apriorisches Argument gegen einige Behauptungen des moralischen Relativismus dar. Nach einer Skizze dieser Überlegung verteidige ich diese Behauptung gegen einen Einwand. Abschliessend diskutiere ich knapp die Erfolgsaussichten zweier relativistischer Positionen, welche die Wirksamkeit des Argumentes von Davidson explizit anerkennen.

NEW (RE)SEARCH POSSIBILITIES FOR WITTGENSTEIN'S NACHLASS

**Max Hadersbeck, Alois Pichler, Florian Fink,
Patrick Seebauer, and Olga Strutyńska**

Munich, Germany | Maximilian.Hadersbeck@lmu.de

„Nur der Satz hat Sinn; nur im Zusammenhang des Satzes hat ein Name Bedeutung“ Wittgenstein writes in the *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* (3.3). But how does Wittgenstein use words himself, what context does he choose in his own sentences?

In this paper we present to the Wittgenstein research community a new Web-based computational linguistic access to the Big Typescript Ts-213 (BT). We developed a special electronic full-form lexicon WITTLex and the tool WITTFind to search within the BT for special words, sequences of words, parts of sentences and special sentence structures using methods of computational linguistics. Like usual search machines the user communicates via an internet browser with WITTFind. However the query possibilities of our tool exceed the possibilities of search engines by far. Our user queries are not limited to word based queries, they can be lemmatized and grammatically structured.

PHILOSOPHIE ALS SPRACHKRITIK IM SINNE MAUTHNERS. EINE BEMERKUNG ZU TLP 4.0031

Thomas Hainscho

Klagenfurt, Österreich | thomas.hainscho@aau.at

Fritz Mauthner wird von Wittgenstein im Satz TLP 4.0031 erwähnt: „Alle Philosophie ist ‚Sprachkritik‘. (Allerdings nicht im Sinne Mauthners.) [...]“. Angesichts der wenigen im *Tractatus* genannten Namen ist es eine Überlegung wert, warum Mauthner von Wittgenstein erwähnt wird.

Wittgenstein formuliert seine Bildtheorie auf der Basis von Freges und Russells Logik. Mauthner entwickelte ebenfalls eine Bildtheorie, deren Grundlage ein Sensualismus nach Ernst Mach ist. Von ihren jeweiligen Voraussetzungen ausgehend, üben Wittgenstein und Mauthner Sprachkritik mit Argumenten, die für den anderen jeweils inakzeptabel wären. Dennoch haben beide Sprachkritiken ähnliche Zielsetzungen.

Der Text soll zeigen, wie die Distanzierung von Wittgensteins eigener Auffassung von Philosophie als Sprachkritik zu Mauthners Auffassung von Philosophie als Sprachkritik in TLP 4.0031 gemeint sein kann.

AGING AS A DISEASE

Tobias Hainz

Düsseldorf, Germany | t.hainz@t-online.de

According to the ‘cascade model of disease’, a disease is a condition of an organism that can be detected on the molecular level and affects individuals on the organismic level. This model is closely connected to the idea of ‘molecular medicine’ which is regarded as a complex of medical practice, scientific and technological discoveries, and social conventions. The combination of the cascade model and molecular medicine allows for a flexible account of disease. Whereas the status of aging in medical theory is currently undecided, it is reasonable to categorise it as a disease given the acceptance of the flexible account. Such a categorisation could have profound implications for medical and scientific practice and the public attitude towards aging.

ARE THERE MORAL HINGES?

Rom Harré

Washington, DC, USA | harre@georgetown.edu

This discussion is not an attempt at exegesis but an exercise in drawing on Wittgenstein's writings for insights into long running philosophical issues. The hinges presented in *On Certainty* mostly concern life in the material world of space and time. Are there similar unexamined beliefs influential in our social lives? I propose taking the idea of ‘hinge’ as something expressed in hinge practices related to hinge propositions, the former normative and the latter empirical. This is the ‘doppelgänger’ relation as suggested by Moral-Sharrock. When pressed we tend to support a social practice by reference to its empirical doppelgänger. Does this by-pass Hume's ukase on drawing an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’? Developing the idea of moral hinges involves discussions of ‘hinge changes’, ‘hinge hierarchies’ and various normative principles – moral, prudential and pragmatic.

NAÏVE ACTION THEORY AND ITS ONTOLOGY

Nathan Hauthaler

London, UK | elnathano@gmx.at

In his *Life and Action*, Michael Thompson advances an account of ‘naïve’ rationalization (reason-explanation of action) as to which actions are rationalized in light – as parts – of *other actions*. The account stresses the dimension of *aspect* (perfection vs. imperfection) proprietary to action and its representation, and breaks radically with received views of action and the role of mental states in its explanation. Where ‘standard stories’ of action understand *wanting, intending, etc.* as causally efficacious mental states, Thompson construes them as ‘sophisticated’ markers of imperfection, thereby throwing down the gauntlet to much of contemporary philosophy of mind & action.

In this paper I discuss Thompson's defence of naïve rationalization in conjunction with his underlying ontology of action, criticizing it as infelicitously event-centred to further Thompson's case. I propose a way towards resolving Thompson's ontological problem (or developing his ontology, respectively) based on differences of kinds of perfection and imperfection.

TRUTH IN POLITICS

Agnes Heller

Budapest, Hungary and New York, USA | helleragnes@gmail.com

WONDERING AT THE EXISTENCE OF THE WORLD: ETHICAL VISION IN WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY

Meghan Helsel

Mannheim, Germany | mhelsel1@jhu.edu

This paper argues that at all the stages of Wittgenstein's philosophy, Wittgensteinian ethics can best be understood as a kind of seeing that the later Wittgenstein will call aspect dawning. Aspect dawning, like wondering at the existence of the world, is a manner of being at once completely at home in the world, or in language, while at once feeling oneself to be outside of it. The importance of this contradiction for Wittgenstein's ethics points toward a creative element in Wittgenstein's otherwise deeply embedded ethics, that would respond to a common charge against ethics inspired by Wittgensteinian thought, namely, that their conservative relativism does not allow for action.

THE RULE-FOLLOWING PROBLEM AND WITTGENSTEIN'S DEVELOPMENT

Jaakko Hintikka

Boston, USA | hintikka@bu.edu

According to Wittgenstein's later philosophy, meaning relations are constituted by certain rule-governed human activities. But does rule-following mean anything more than to act in accordance with it? Wittgenstein initially answered "no" because on such behavioral construal only a causal account of language acquisition seems possible. He is right: a rule as a physical object has to be interpreted in the same way as a curve has to be interpreted in mathematics, as representing some particular function. The rule itself must play a role in guiding one's actions. Wittgenstein could not find this role, however, and on May 21-30, 1941 reverted back to following a rule as acting according to it. But now he could give an account of such "blind" rule-following in terms of the entire language-game that a language-learner is trained to play. This confronted him with a new problem situation characteristic of a "Third Wittgenstein."

APPLICATION OF HARRY FRANKFURT'S CONCEPT OF FREE WILL TO THE PROBLEM OF SMOKING

Helmut Hofbauer

Vienna, Austria | helmut.hofbauer@meduniwien.ac.at

In my investigation, Harry Frankfurt's concept of free will is applied to the interpretation of 23 narrative interviews conducted with smokers between November 2010 and January 2011 in the context of a major COPD study. The intent is to apply philosophical concepts in empirical philosophical (phenomenological) research, and to use an internalist approach to the question of the rationality of other persons' actions (that is: not to look at people exclusively from an external point of view). My research shows that rational behavior can be ascribed to other persons when their behavior is analyzed with the help of Frankfurt's

concept rather than by looking at them exclusively from an externalist perspective, which is what physicians often are tempted to do. Frankfurt's concept of free will rules out certain motivations coming from the outside. It is not about doing the right thing in absolute terms, but about the person's determining what she will do herself.

IN DEFENSE OF THE ORDINARY: A WITTGENSTEINIAN APPROACH TOWARD THE THEORIES OF GREAT MEANING

Seyed Reza Hosseini

Johannesburg, South Africa | rezahosseini2000@yahoo.com

In this paper I raise some objections to the current tendency in the literature on the meaning of life to theorize what they call the 'great meaning'. In the literature a distinction has been made between 'the ordinary meaning' and 'the great meaning'. Focusing on Neil Levy's account of great meaning, I argue that, from a Wittgensteinian perspective, the distinction is unjustified and based on a 'one-sided diet', i.e. one-sided examples, and that they fail to see the loose boundaries between the ordinary and the great meaning.

LOGISCHE ANALYSE UND SPRACHGEBRAUCH IM *TRACTATUS*

Susanne Huber

Zürich, Schweiz | susanne.huber@uzh.ch

Im Folgenden beschäftige ich mich mit dem Konzept von logischer Analyse im *Tractatus*. Bei der Erklärung der logischen Analyse geht man oft davon aus, dass mit ihr „einfache Zeichen“ oder „Namen“ bestimmt werden sollen, aus denen „Elementarsätze“ zusammengesetzt sind. Zugleich soll damit die Bedeutung der Sätze unserer Alltagssprache geklärt werden. Dazu sollen diese Sätze als Wahrheitsfunktionen der in der Analyse aufgefundenen Elementarsätze ausgewiesen werden.

Was ein „Name“ oder ein „Elementarsatz“ sein soll und welche Rolle diese Konzepte im *Tractatus* spielen, sind zentrale Fragen, wenn man sich mit diesem Werk beschäftigt. Trotzdem werde ich sie Folgenden ausklammern. Statt dessen will ich das Konzept der Analyse von einer anderen Seite her verständlich machen: von der Idee her, dass umgangssprachliche Ausdrücke erst zusammen mit einem bestimmten Gebrauch eine bestimmte Bedeutung haben. Diese Idee impliziert, dass bei der Analyse eines Ausdrucks, bei der ja dessen Bedeutung geklärt werden soll, der Sprachgebrauch eine bestimmte Rolle spielt.

MODALE MACHTKONZEPTE: VOM WIRKUNGSMODELL ZUM RELATIONENMODELL – KONSEQUENZEN FÜR DIE ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES UND EINE ETHIK DER ERMÖGLICHUNG

Christoph Hubig

Darmstadt, Deutschland | sekretariat_hubig@phil.tu-darmstadt.de

1. Im Rahmen des „klassischen“ Machtkonzepts wird Macht (Sicherung der Fortsetzbarkeit des Handelns gegen Widerständigkeit) in ihrer Wirksamkeit als Modalgefälle gefasst: Unspezifizierte Fähigkeit der Willensdurchsetzung

– Herrschaft/Chance (Macht unter bestimmten Bedingungen) – Gewalt. Probleme eines solchen intentionalistischen Konzepts liegen in der Frage der Genese und Legitimation (kontrafaktisch/faktisch), der Konstitutionsbedingungen von Herrschaft sowie der Selbstaufhebung von Macht durch Gewalt.

2. Im „Relationenmodell“ der Macht (Foucault, Serres, Barad und Rouse) wird hingegen Macht nonintentionalistisch als Struktur notwendiger Beziehungen zwischen Möglichkeitsräumen gefasst, die durch Dinge und Ereignisse (insb. act-tokens) instantiiert werden. Im Zuge dieser Instantiierungen, die mehr Eigenschaften aufweisen, als in den Relationengefügen erfasst, bilden sich neue Zuordnungsmuster heraus („Subversion“ etc.), die die Strukturen modifizieren, fortschreiben oder zerstören.

3. In der Entwicklung der „converging technologies“ (Nano-, Bio-, Info-, Cogno-) lassen sich solche Prozesse identifizieren, und der Charakter dieser Techniken als „enabling technologies“ lässt sich im Rahmen eines „Relationenmodells“ adäquater freilegen und differenzierter analysieren, als es die unspezifische Rede von einer „Macht der Technik“ im Anschluss an klassische Macht-konzepte versucht.

4. Begreift man Technikethik (wie auch die weiteren anwendungsbezogenen Ethiken) nicht als Projekt der Prüfung der Subsumierbarkeit konkreter Handlungsoptionen unter allgemeine Normen mit Hilfe der Urteilskraft, sondern in ihrer Spezifik auf die Rechtfertigbarkeit der Gestaltung derjenigen Systeme ausgerichtet, innerhalb derer Handlungsoptionen realisierbar werden, stellt sich für die Technikethik angesichts der enabling technologies die Aufgabe, die neuen Möglichkeitsräume und ihre im Zuge der Instantiierungen sich entwickelnde Dynamik unter normativen Gesichtspunkten zu analysieren und zu bewerten.

WANN IST EIN NORMENSYSTEM ETHISCH ADÄQUAT?

Laurenz Hudetz

Salzburg, Österreich | laurenz.hudetz@stud.sbg.ac.at

In diesem Aufsatz wird eine Rechtfertigungstheorie für Normensysteme vorgeschlagen, die ohne die Annahmen auskommt, dass Normsätze objektive Sachverhalte beschreiben oder wahr bzw. falsch sein können. Es wird davon ausgegangen, dass Normensysteme mehr oder weniger angemessen für die Erreichung bestimmter Ziele sein können. Ferner wird angenommen, dass ethischen Normensystemen eine bestimmte Zielsetzung zugeordnet werden kann. Anhand dessen wird ein Begriff der ethischen Adäquatheit von Moralsystemen und ein Begriff der Rechtfertigung von Handlungsanweisungen expliziert.

ETHICS AS SHOWN: AGAINST KELLY'S READING OF THE *TRACTATUS*

Maja Jaakson

Amsterdam, Netherlands | jaakson@science.uva.nl

This paper evaluates John C. Kelly's account of Wittgenstein's early views on ethics. I argue against Kelly's claim that, for the early Wittgenstein, ethics does not show itself because showing "requires a common structure." To this end, I examine Kelly's reading of the *Tractatus* in order to reconstruct his argument as to why showing requires such a structure. I then show how passages from the *Tractatus* and "A Lecture on Ethics" can be used to establish that

TLP 6.522 implies that ethics *does* show itself and, consequently, that Kelly's conclusion is unacceptable.

WHAT ABOUT ARGUMENTATION IN WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY? ON STEPHEN TOULMIN'S CONNECTIONS

Henrique Jales Ribeiro

Coimbra, Portugal | jalesribeiro@gmail.com

Discussing the influence that Wittgenstein's philosophy had in S. Toulmin's views on rhetoric, the author examines the role played by the concept of argumentation in that philosophy, and, from that perspective, studies the contrast between theory of meaning (Wittgenstein) and theory of argumentation (Toulmin).

A POLITICS FOR PARADISE: UTOPIAN QUESTIONS FOR EVERYDAY MATTERS

Joaquín Jareño-Alarcón

Murcia, Spain | humanities2011@gmail.com

One of the least controversial claims made in Political Philosophy is that "we do not live in a just world" (Thomas Nagel). The quest for justice is an unended task for human beings. What this seems to show is that there is still a longing for "paradise". One of the basic features of such idea/place is that of the abundance of goods and of an eternal banquet, what in our affluent and secular society can be understood in terms of a continuous consumption of goods. But if we believe this is a fundamental element to shape our happiness, many problems related to justice arise, what should lead us to rethink the role consumption plays in our lives.

ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZENSHIP: NEW CHALLENGES FOR POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL ETHICS

Angela Kallhoff

Vienna, Austria | angela.kallhoff@univie.ac.at

Political ethics may undergo transformations which are similar to the transformation that ethics has recently undergone. Due to research in applied ethics, systematic concepts and methods were overhauled in order to respond to challenges such as the ecological crises, recent developments in medicine etc. Applied ethics has developed as a set of disciplines each of which does not only work on a specified area of research, but also develops new theoretical principles and new solutions to more general problems in ethics. In this contribution I shall discuss comparable challenges to political philosophy. The example which serves as a point of reference is the concept of "environmental citizenship".

PODIUMSDISKUSSION „MENSCHENWÜRDE – MENSCHENRECHTE“ ROUNDTABLE “HUMAN DIGNITY – HUMAN RIGHTS“

Organizer and Chair: **Peter Kampits**
Wien, Österreich | peter.kampits@univie.ac.at

Teilnehmer u.a. / Participants: **Peter Koller, Anton Leist, Sophie Loidolt, Barbara Prainsack**

BEMERKUNGEN ZU WITTGENSTEINS „PROTOTRACTATUS“

Peter Keicher

Wien, Österreich | p_keicher@hotmail.com

Die vorliegenden Bemerkungen verstehen sich als ein Beitrag zur Erforschung der Entstehungsgeschichte des „Prototractatus“. Das erste Kapitel enthält Hinweise auf verschollene Manuskripte aus den Jahren 1912-1918; im zweiten Kapitel werden die wichtigsten Textabschnitte des „Prototractatus“ aufgeführt; das dritte Kapitel enthält Hinweise zur Numerierung des „Prototractatus“. Vor dem Hintergrund der kompositorischen Komplexität des „Prototractatus“ ist mit diesen Bemerkungen keinerlei Anspruch auf Vollständigkeit verbunden. Durch die aufgrund mehrerer verschollener Manuskripte schwierige Quellenlage überwiegen außerdem die Vermutungen gegenüber nachweisbaren Thesen. Dennoch erhält der Leser einen zumindest skizzenhaften Überblick über einige besondere Eigenschaften des „Prototractatus“ und unterschiedliche Thesen von Brian McGuinness, Andreas Geschkowski und Luciano Bazzocchi. Ein wichtiges Ziel des Beitrags wäre erfüllt, wenn dadurch weiterführende Untersuchungen angeregt werden könnten.

WISSEN, WAS MAN TUT

Jens Kertscher

Darmstadt, Germany | kertscher@phil.tu-darmstadt.de

In Anlehnung an Überlegungen von Elizabeth Anscombe und John McDowell soll die These verteidigt werden, dass die sprachliche Artikulationsform für praktisches Wissen in Beschreibungen von absichtlichen Handlungen des Typs „ich Φ e gerade“ besteht, und nicht etwa als Konklusion einer normativ-praktischen Überlegung rekonstruiert werden kann. Die Differenz zwischen theoretischem und praktischem Wissen kann dann entlang der Unterscheidung zwischen zwei Richtungen der Adäquation eines Behaupteten mit dem, was der Fall ist bzw. geschieht, erläutert werden. Diese These soll schließlich gegen den Einwand verteidigt werden, dass sie das von Anscombe kritisierte Vorurteil moderner Philosophen für theoretisches Wissen reproduziere und damit einen Skeptizismus von unterschiedlichen Beschreibungen eines beschreibungsunabhängig bestehenden Ereignisses begünstige.

ON WHAT WE HAVE MEANT BY “GOLD” ALL ALONG. A PRAGMATIST RECONSTRUCTION OF SEMANTIC EXTERNALISM

Matthias Kiesselbach

Berlin, Germany | kiesselm@hu-berlin.de

This paper defends an intuitive way of combining semantic externalism with the principle that speakers ought generally to be considered the final arbiters regarding the proper interpretation of their expressions. The intuitive way of doing so is to allow that speakers' linguistic dispositions (on which any attribution of meaning must rest) are typically complex. Speakers are not only disposed to make certain judgments, but also to revise their judgments in the light of certain kinds of incoming information. Recently, it has been argued that speakers' latter dispositions are not determinate and stable enough to support (at least orthodox forms of) semantic externalism. In this paper, it is argued that once we understand the point of meaning talk correctly, we can rescue an interesting form of semantic externalism even if the charge of indeterminacy of ordinary speakers' dispositions to revise their first-order judgments is correct.

HARMS OR RISKS? ON THE ETHICS OF PRECAUTION

Peter P. Kirschenmann

Amsterdam, Netherlands | jorakir@hotmail.com

The so-called *precautionary principle* (PP) has influenced national and international policy decisions and agreements, e.g. about climate change.

PP concerns situations with (great) risks; an ethical defense of PP requires a risk ethics. Traditional ethical theory cannot provide this. I briefly discuss earlier proposals of an added ethics (Jonas) or new ethics (Beck), putting forward notions of *responsibility*.

In a risk ethics, actual harms and risks have to be related. Decision theory compares utilities and expected utilities. According to C. Munthe, such calculations disregard the moral importance of the *imposition of risks*.

Munthe's own theory for the interpretation and justification of PP introduces a *new moral quality: decisions to impose risks can be (more or less) responsible*. I critically discuss this and other ideas of his theory. I argue, PP needs ethical backing only in case of weighty moral matters; in many respects, its character is prudential, pragmatic, economic.

RICHARD RORTY AND THE „SPECTER OF RELATIVISM“

Sebastian Kletzl

Vienna, Austria | sebastian.kletzl@gmail.com

In this paper I defend Richard Rorty from the charge of cultural relativism. This charge was repeated many times by Hilary Putnam, who was alarmed by the ethical implications of Rorty's position and tried to identify him as a cultural relativist.

On the other hand, Putnam defended Wittgenstein from accusation of cultural relativism. Here he argued that the central idea of cultural relativism is to step out of all language games at one to arrive at a gods eye view. From this standpoint one can judge language games as relative

to each other. Putnam argued that this has never been Wittgenstein's thesis. I want to show that Rorty can be defended with this argument of Putnam. In other words I will argue with Putnam against Putnam.

WITTGENSTEIN, GEERTZ AND CHALLENGES FACING THE 2005 FARO CONVENTION ON "THE VALUE OF CULTURAL HERITAGE FOR SOCIETY"

Stephanie Koerner

Manchester, UK | stephanie.koerner@manchester.ac.uk

This paper explores the relevance for some of the most remarkable aspirations of the 2005 FARO Convention on "The Value of Cultural Heritage for Society" of comparing Wittgenstein and Geertz's conceptions of 'culture'. Key themes are illustrated with examples from a project designed to widen public participation in cultural heritage based solutions to the pressing social and ecological problems confronting the culturally diverse indigenous communities of the region in northwest India where the newly designated World Heritage site of Champaner Pavagadh is located.

HAND UND FUSS. BEGRÜNDUNGSPROBLEME EINER ETHIK DES LEIBES AM BEISPIEL DES ERSATZES MENSCHLICHER GLIEDMASSEN

Ulrich H.J. Körtner

Wien, Österreich | ulrich.koertner@univie.ac.at

In jüngster Zeit gibt es eine Reihe philosophischer und theologischer Versuche, den Begriff der Leiblichkeit als Grundlage für eine kritische Bioethik zu profilieren. Leiblichkeit ist jedoch kein hinreichendes Prinzip zur Begründung einer materialen Ethik. Der Hinweis auf die Leiblichkeit der menschlichen Person und die Leibgebundenheit der menschlichen Vernunft bietet auch keine hinreichenden Kriterien für medizinethische Einzelentscheidungen. Das soll am Beispiel alternativer Ersatzmöglichkeiten für menschliche Gliedmaßen gezeigt werden. Daß sich aus einer Phänomenologie des Leibes nicht unmittelbare Normen für ethische Urteile auf dem Gebiet der plastischen Chirurgie oder der Transplantationsmedizin ergeben, bedeutet nicht, daß leibphänomenologische Argumente ethisch bedeutungslos wären. Sie haben aber lediglich eine fundamentalethische Orientierungsfunktion. Der Vortrag plädiert für ein Konzept von Verantwortungsethik, das die Aspekte einer Güterlehre, einer Pflichtenlehre und einer Tugendlehre integriert. In alle drei Dimensionen von Verantwortung lassen sich leibphänomenologische Argumente einzeichnen. Aber erst in einem solchen Deutungsrahmen gewinnen sie ihre ethische Relevanz.

SOZIALE MACHT UND MORALISCHER DISKURS

Peter Koller

Graz, Österreich | peter.koller@uni-graz.at

Zwischen Macht und Moral bestehen vielfältige Zusammenhänge: Als Richtschnur menschlichen Verhaltens hat Moral unvermeidlich mit Macht zu tun, und umgekehrt spielt Macht in der Praxis moralischer Urteils- und Meinungsbildung eine wesentliche Rolle.

Die Moral, verstanden als die Menge der Richtlinien des sozialen Handelns, die allein kraft subjektiver Anerkennung gelten, aber zugleich intersubjektive Verbindlichkeit beanspruchen, zielt auf die Bereitstellung sozialer Normen, die bei unparteiischer Betrachtung allgemeine Zustimmung finden können. Daraus ergibt sich im Hinblick auf soziale Machtverhältnisse eine doppelte Funktion der Moral: einerseits bestehende Machtungleichheiten, die bei allgemeiner Erwägung als unannehmbar erscheinen, zu unterbinden oder zu verringern; und andererseits zur Institutionalisierung politischer Machtstrukturen anzuleiten, die eine aus unparteiischer Sicht allgemein akzeptable soziale Ordnung braucht. Die Ausbildung einer weithin akzeptierten Moral, die diese Doppelfunktion zu erfüllen vermag, stößt jedoch auf erhebliche Schwierigkeiten, die nicht zuletzt aus den bestehenden, oft beträchtlichen Machtungleichheiten resultieren, weil diese Ungleichheiten eine Einigung über die relevanten moralischen Standards meist erschweren oder verhindern.

Die faktischen Machtverhältnisse spielen schon bei der Frage eine Rolle, ob und, falls ja, wie moralische Standards überhaupt begründet werden können: ob allein durch bloße Klugheitserwägungen oder erst durch die fiktive Annahme eines moralischen Standpunkts, der alle betroffenen Personen in die gleiche Ausgangslage versetzt. Doch davon abgesehen, sind auch die üblichen Meinungsverschiedenheiten darüber, welche Moralnormen Geltung besitzen und wie weithin akzeptierte Moralnormen im Detail zu verstehen sind, zu einem wesentlichen Teil auf Machtungleichheiten zurückzuführen. Denn solche Ungleichheiten bewirken in dem Maße, in dem sie existieren, nicht nur ein Auseinanderdriften der partikularen Interessen der beteiligten Personen, die deren Moralvorstellungen einfärben, sondern auch eine Schiefelage sozialer und politischer Teilhabe, die den öffentlichen Moraldiskurs verzerrt.

Dieser Befund lässt es zwar ratsam erscheinen, die Rolle der Moral im sozialen Leben nicht zu überschätzen, gibt aber auch keinen Anlass zu moralischer Skepsis. Denn auch wenn sich viele der Forderungen oder Wertungen, die mit dem Anspruch auf moralische Allgemeinheit vorgebracht werden, bloß als mehr oder minder geschickte Verkleidungen unvertretbarer Eigeninteressen entpuppen, ist und bleibt die Moral doch eine unverzichtbare Reflexionsform sozialer Ordnungen. Gegen ihre Unzulänglichkeiten gibt es zwar kein Patentrezept, es gibt aber doch diverse institutionelle Vorkehrungen und soziale Prozesse, die allzu starken Verzerrungen des moralischen Diskurses durch ungleiche Machtverhältnisse entgegenwirken und der schwachen Stimme der Moral zumindest einiges Gewicht verschaffen können.

HISTORIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: DEALING WITH EUROCENTRISM

Martti Koskenniemi

Helsinki, Finland | martti.koskenniemi@helsinki.fi

PROOF BEYOND A CONTEXT-RELEVANT DOUBT. OLD WINE IN A NEW BOTTLE? EXAMINING WHAT SHIFTS WHEN CHANGING THE STANDARD OF PROOF

Kyriakos N. Kotsoglou

Freiburg, Germany | kyriakos.kotsoglou@jura.uni-freiburg.de

In order to allocate the risk between parties in legal adjudication we use evidentiary techniques with the main device

among them being the standard of proof. The traditional view holds that the parameter which shifts when moving to different Standards is the grade of probability. In this paper I challenge the accepted view and propose a framework that allows rational distinctions to be drawn between different standards of proof. I defend a contextualist view according to which the shifting parameter is not the grade of (aleatory) probability but the Set of Epistemic Defeaters in play.

RELIGIOUS MAN LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN

Iurii Kozik

Kiev, Ukraine | yur.kozik@gmail.com

This article focuses on the question of Ludwig Wittgenstein's religiosity. The author turns to the contradictory Wittgensteinian words "I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every problem from religious point of view" (Malcolm 2002: vii), which were examined by Norman Malcolm. Exploring Malcolm's research, the author comes to the conclusion that the issue of the answer on this question lies in the way of its formulation. To ask whether Wittgenstein was religious means to look for his religiosity as for something essential and hidden from us. The author proposes to reformulate the question in non-essentialist way and to ask whether we can consider him a religious man. This change makes the issue much easier for giving definite answer. This answer, from the author's point of view, is that Wittgenstein can be considered as the religious man.

"RENDEZVOUS WITH FEAR"

Kristijan Krkač, Josip Lukin, and Damir Mladić

Zagreb, Croatia | kristijan.krkaac@gmail.com

In this paper, the authors study the possibility that in some situations of human interaction with the unknown, there is a fundamental emotion that can have two more or less mixed aspects, namely hope and fear. The following idea is hinted at by Wittgenstein and it is further elaborated in Ridley Scott's film "Alien". Based on that illustration one can claim that there must be a certain aspect change between hope and fear in many daily situations in which humans interact with something relatively unknown. Elaboration of this idea is supported by some Wittgenstein's passages and comments, mainly from RPP and PPO, and by some more detailed analyses and commentaries on the emotional structure of "Alien".

DEEP THOUGHTS. SPENGLER'S INFLUENCE ON WITTGENSTEIN RECONSIDERED

Matthias Kroß

Berlin, Germany | matthias.kross@einsteinforum.de

In 1931 Wittgenstein wrote in a notebook, "I don't believe I have ever *invented* a line of thinking. I have always taken one over from someone else. I have straightaway seized on it with enthusiasm for my work of clarification." Among the philosophers and thinkers Wittgenstein confessed to draw from was Oswald Spengler, the infamous author of *The Decline of the West*. Wittgenstein mentions Spengler directly on occasion, and many of his ideas, including *Lebensform* – or "form of life"; Spengler spoke of the specificity of "culture" – share a kindred spirit. In my paper I argue

that Spengler's thesis of the inevitable demise of modern culture pivotally shaped Wittgenstein's view of philosophy in his later work.

THE DIGNITY OF CONSTITUTION: CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

Massimo La Torre

Hull, UK | m.la-torre@hull.ac.uk

The idea of a judicial check on the constitutionality of ordinary legislation has been an object of intense, contentious debate from its inception. It bears recalling that judicial review is something of a latecomer in the democratic states of continental Europe, and that this form of jurisdiction is not unassailable in the British constitutional architecture, either.

The French revolutionary experience was hostile to the idea, and legal positivism, which held sway throughout the nineteenth century, finds it difficult to even fathom how the idea might be conceptualized. And so, in the outcome, the question and the practice of judicial review remain a thorny matter for every jurist and every approach in legal philosophy. I will not make so bold, then, as to attempt anything like an adequate account of the many philosophical and legal problems and the many disputes arising in connection with this question and practice.

Instead, I will confine myself to presenting and discussing two moments and corresponding debates that strike me as especially significant and replete with suggestions for serious reflection. I am referring to the debate on the "keeper of the constitution" that saw Carl Schmitt and Hans Kelsen go head to head during the crisis of the Weimar Republic, and to the more recent and subtle attack directed at judicial review by a contemporary legal philosopher of the highest rank, Jeremy Waldron. My discussion of the debate between Schmitt and Kelsen will serve as the historical background to a question whose interest, by contrast, I would judge to be distinctly theoretical and institutional. My emphasis, then, will fall on the more recent debate, and in particular on the theses advanced by Waldron.

I should stress that the question of judicial review is of crucial importance to the philosophy of law. For on this question depends, and around it revolves, the theoretical account we want and can give of the law's relation to power, on the one hand, and to morality, on the other. And so at stake here, we might say, is the very concept of law.

THE ROLE AND STATUS OF INSTITUTIONS

Anna Laktionova

Kiev, Ukraine | laktionovaanna@yahoo.com

Common social space, world is constituted by institutions, habituated practices, samples of appropriate actions, agency. Social world could be represented as a 'mosaic' of institutions. Institutions play the role of framework we rely on in our activities. Institutions get their status by being acknowledged, mostly in silence, but sometimes reflections upon them could be needed. Language necessarily accompany institutions. In elaborating stated ideas we refer in the first turn to views of L. Wittgenstein, J. R. Searle, D. Bloor, T. R. Schatzki.

JUSTICE OUT OF COOPERATION

Anton Leist

Zürich, Switzerland | leist@access.uzh.ch

Despite the thorough influence of Rawls, serious suspicion remains whether contractualism is able to ground justice. Mutual advantage contractualism seems as open to criticism as a morality based contractualism. Rawls' own proposal suggests a mixture of both by construing justice as "fair reciprocity". Fair reciprocity is best understood as a hybrid conception, arising out of both self-interest and a sense of fairness. This presentation tries to show that fair reciprocity is able to answer standard objections like those of arbitrary restriction, arbitrary and uneven endowments and exclusion of the handicapped. In addition it suggests a naturalist grounding of fair reciprocity, building on recent findings of experimental economists. Overall it tries to make good of the idea that successful cooperation not only motivationally but conceptually is the source of justice.

MATHEMATICAL PROOF AND INTUITION

Montgomery Link

Boston, USA |mlink@suffolk.edu

To resolve a "looming tension," as Floyd calls it, in Wang's interpretation of Wittgenstein, I wish to distinguish mathematical knowledge proper from mathematical knowledge qua intuition. That's nothing new, for the attitude toward mathematical knowledge is that it is incontrovertible, but not so the attitude toward intuitive knowledge. This is because our theoretical mathematical knowledge entails all and only what has been established by proof, while some intuitive knowledge involves imagination. But theoretical knowledge does not in and of itself close off all access provided by our intuitions. Still, any such access is marked by degrees of certainty. Intuitive access to mathematical reality is not characterized by the certainty of proof.

AUTHENTIZITÄT: EIN VERGLEICH ZWISCHEN DER STOA UND LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN

Ulrich Lobis

Innsbruck, Österreich | ulrich.lobis@uibk.ac.at

Im Vortrag wird der Begriff der „Authentizität“ genauer beleuchtet und historisch untersucht.

Es werden die Konzepte der Stoa und das von Ludwig Wittgenstein als Beispiele vorgestellt.

Bei der Stoa liegt der Fokus auf der Panaitios, bei Wittgenstein vor allem auf dem Komplex *Authentizität und Wahrhaftigkeit*. Die Stoa und Wittgenstein sind deshalb interessant und auch vergleichbar, weil ihre Gedanken zu diesem Thema stark im Leben verankert sind und praktisch gelesen werden können.

FORMAL ETHICS AND NON-MONOTONIC POLITICS. OF PUBLIC POWER AND PRIVATE PROPERTY

Vladimir Lobovikov

Ekaterinburg, Russia | vlobovikov@mail.ru

The paper presents quite a new critique of K. Marx' moral view of society and politics. The main object of criticizing is his positive moral evaluation of terminating private ownership of means of production of means of life. Marx' ethics is *content* one on principle. In contrast to his *content* ethics I submit *formal* one. In contrast to his *monotonic* ethics I submit *non-monotonic* one. The paper defines and investigates "power", "ownership", "private", "public" and other notions of ethics and politics not as *constant* moral values, but as moral-evaluation *functions* determined by moral-evaluation *variables*. (The words "function" and "variable" are used in their mathematical meanings.) This using discrete mathematics at the intersection of ethics and politics produces a very important effect of *non-monotonic* moral evaluations resulting in such a theory of non-monotonic politics of private ownership, in light of which the anti-human essence of Marxism-Leninism becomes perfectly evident.

ALTERITÄT UND/ODER PLURALITÄT? ZWEI PRÄNORMATIVE PARADIGMEN FÜR ETHIK UND POLITIK BEI LEVINAS UND ARENDT

Sophie Loidolt

Wien, Österreich | sophie.loidolt@univie.ac.at

Der Vortrag möchte Levinas und Arendt als PhänomenologInnen der „zweiten Generation“ (nach Husserl, Scheler und Heidegger) begreifen, die die Phänomenologie wesentlich transformiert haben. Die Paradigmen der Alterität und analog der Pluralität sollen dafür als die Leit motive der jeweiligen Transformation herausgearbeitet werden. Dabei gibt es erstaunliche Parallelen, aber auch bemerkenswerte Differenzen. Statt diese sogleich über die Themenfelder des „Ethischen“ und des „Politischen“ abzuhandeln, möchte ich sie vielmehr zuerst am jeweiligen Grundphänomen sichtbar werden lassen: Denn sowohl Arendt als auch Levinas gehen von einer Erfahrung aus, die die klassischen Konzeptionen von Intentionalität und Subjektivität sprengt bzw. transzendiert: Die Alteritäts- und die Pluralitätserfahrung erweisen sich beide als Vollzugsgeschehen, welche eine Rückkehr zu einem substanzial verstandenen Selbst (im Modus des „Wissens“ oder der „Wahrheit“) ausschließen. Gleichzeitig meldet sich in diesen Erfahrungen ein Anspruch, der jenseits der Dichotomie von „deskriptiv“ und „normativ“ liegt. Während nun aber das Pluralitätsgeschehen auf das Miteinander im Handeln und Sprechen verweist, geht es in der Alteritätserfahrung um die Struktur des Einen-für-den-Anderen. Diese unterschiedliche Ausrichtung hat wesentliche Konsequenzen für das Verständnis von Welt und die Errichtung von Institutionen. Aus diesen Konsequenzen erst müssen sich also die jeweiligen Bedeutungen des Ethischen bzw. der Gerechtigkeit sowie des Politischen bzw. der „Sorge um die Welt“ erschließen.

OUTLINE OF A GRAMMAR OF PRIVACY

Nicklas Lundblad

Mountain View, USA | nlundblad@google.com

One of the most pressing social and legal questions that new technologies give rise to is the question of privacy. In both the US and Europe political, philosophical and legal debates about privacy are definitely on the rise. But the core concept of the debate, "privacy" is ill-defined at best.

It has been suggested that this is because there is no one thing such as privacy. Daniel Solove (2008) used Wittgenstein in making the point that privacy – much like the concept "game" – is a word that can be used in many different ways, referring to things that are perhaps only united by a family likeness more than any unitary definition. While true this does not really help the discussion forward. In order to do that we need to collect a series of reminders about how we use this word, and examine its grammar, the language games in which it figures and how we use it in different contexts.

The purpose of this short essay is to do that, and to examine the grammar of privacy in order to give an overview of its use, and suggest some consequences for the debate that such a grammar seems to have. This is a first attempt to collect some of those reminders, and more work is definitely needed.

ON THE IDEA OF ANALYSIS IN THE LATE WITTGENSTEIN

Jakub Mácha

Brno, Czech Republic | macha@mail.muni.cz

Wittgenstein is committed to the idea of analysis in the *Tractatus*. His logical analysis aims to reveal a hidden form of the proposition in terms of ultimate elements and their mutual logical relations. Wittgenstein abandoned this metaphysical commitment in his late philosophy. The aim of this paper is to show that Wittgenstein put forward a restricted idea of analysis throughout his philosophical writings. This idea relies on two theoretical distinctions. The first is that between cause and reason and the second between external and internal relations. I shall argue that the former distinction is a special case of the latter and so, for our purposes, we can take it as one fundamental difference. This difference might be confused in the surface grammar. The aim of Wittgenstein's analysis is to reveal the difference. Finally, I will indicate some philosophical problems that can be surmounted using this difference.

WAISMANN; NOT VAGUENESS! RECONSIDERING THE PHILOSOPHY OF FRIEDRICH WAISMANN

Dejan Makovec

Vienna, Austria | dejanmakovec@gmail.com

Friedrich Waismann, who has been collaborating closely with Wittgenstein for a period of time while being in Vienna, lived and lectured in Oxford from 1939 until his death in 1959. Little is known from these two decades of his life. Yet they are associated with the concept of *open texture* and this, in turn, is associated with the problem of *vagueness*. I claim that this is a misconstruction of Waismann's philosophy. My argument is as follows: a) The concept of open texture is an element in Waismann's broader conception of *language strata*. b) The notion of language strata is crucially inspired by Carl Friedrich

Gauss' *theorema egregium* and by Gilbert Ryle's views on language and philosophical method. c) Therefore, the current notion of open texture lacks awareness of its original purpose.

ALL TRUTHS ARE NOT TO BE TOLD. AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL REFLECTION ON THE CONCEPT OF LEGAL TRUTH.

Michał Makowski

Lublin, Poland | michal.makowsski@gmail.com

Traditionally in legislation it is assumed that the truth exists and is cognizable while the way of discovering is possible thanks to comprehensive study of gathered evidence. However, we may wonder if such view is still valid. Has the truth become only a rhetorical expression which is used to sustain the esteem of law? With regard to Susan Haack's deliberations, I shall present epistemological consequences of gradual divergence from the concept of one unambiguous and non-relative truth. Even though Haack claims that the truth is independent of our beliefs, expressions used in the common and legal language may suggest quite the opposite. Not only because of that discovering the truth during the trial may be troublesome, unnecessary or even impossible. We might wonder: what might be the consequences of depreciating the concept of truth and replacing it with legal conventions? In line with the views of Jack M. Balkin, I shall argue that the law colonizes our minds and as a result it does so with the knowledge of other fields.

„FAKTEN, FAKTEN UND NOCHMALS FAKTEN, ABER KEINE ETHIK“. ÜBERLEGUNGEN ZU ETHIK UND NORMATIVITÄT MIT WITTGENSTEIN UND CHRISTINE KORSGAARD

Sandra Markewitz

Bielefeld, Deutschland | sandramarkewitz@yahoo.de

Im Vergleich mit dem, was Christine Korsgaard in *The Sources of Normativity* schreibt, werden wichtige Aspekte von Wittgensteins eigener Position zu Ethik und Normativität deutlich. Gezeigt werden soll, wie Konzepte, die nach einer Ätiologie moralischen Verhaltens fragen und Ursprungsorte von Semantiken annehmen, kontrastiv die stark normative Aufladung von Wittgensteins Ethikbegriff konturieren: Ethik wird nicht zuletzt aus diesem Grund als Teilbereich der Disziplin Philosophie abgelehnt, da sie in einem existentiellen Sinne verstanden wird, der den Autoren moralischer Leitsätze oft nicht klar ist. Die Nachzeichnung der ethischen Erschütterung angesichts wissenschaftlicher Erklärungen kulminiert in Korsgaards Satz „This would not be me anymore“, vor dem sich moralische Erklärungen beweisen müssen. Nachmetaphysisch wird die Orientierung an grammatischen Standards virulent, die angesichts der Doppelstruktur der Notwendigkeit, über höchste Fragen zu schweigen und sich zugleich mit der Pragmatik sprachspiel- und lebensformbasierter Sätze zu begnügen, in den Blick kommen und die sprachverwendenden Subjekte prägen.

THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF NORMALCY AND EXCLUSION – SOME POLITICAL THOUGHTS INSPIRED BY *ON CERTAINTY*

Tobias Matzner

Tübingen, Germany | tobias.matzner@uni-tuebingen.de

Starting from the idea of a “world-picture” in *On Certainty*, I sketch the strong interdependence of basic beliefs and social life. This result is linked to Hannah Arendt’s idea of power inherent in the common world, which I elaborate for the case of someone contradicting the world-picture where, I argue, the stability of beliefs goes hand in hand with social exclusion.

PHILOSOPHIE ALS HARMONIELEHRE

Ingolf Max

Leipzig, Deutschland | max@uni-leipzig.de

Ein Hauptmotiv des Wittgensteinschen Philosophierens besteht darin, die Philosophie als eine sprachkritische Tätigkeit zu betreiben, die einerseits zwar mit der theoretischen Tätigkeit durchaus auf vielfältige Weise verwandt ist, andererseits aber in mehrfacher Hinsicht ein klar unterschiedenes Projekt darstellt. Gerade die unkritische Übernahme theoretischer Muster und Methoden führt beim Philosophieren häufig in völliges Dunkel. Wittgenstein zeigt gerade mit Blick auf die *Harmonielehre* und die Verwendung von Analogien zu musikalischen Mustern diese Verwandtschaften und Unterschiede auf.

Wir werden mit Blick auf ein bestimmtes Basismuster der Musik – das Akkordmuster – die Harmonie als eine äußerst komplexe Form von Ähnlichkeit zwischen Akkorden plausibel machen, die in einer sehr ausgeprägten Version zur Familienähnlichkeit wird. Als Grundlage für diese Analyse dienen die ersten Takte der *Mondscheinsonate* von Ludwig van Beethoven.

IST GLÜCK EIN ETHISCHER BEGRIFF?

Annelore Mayer

Baden, Österreich | a-jl.mayer@aon.at

Im Roman „Братья Карамзовы“ stellt Fëdor Michajlovič Dostoevskij anhand eines Gedankenganges des Großinquisitor angesichts des von ihm in Gewahrsam genommenen Christus die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Glück und Freiheit und dessen Bedeutung für die Menschen. Der Kirchenfürst sieht Menschen vor allem als nach Glück strebende Masse, welcher es gar nicht um Auserwähltheit oder Erlösung, sondern einzig um die an ihnen vorgenommene Verwirklichung von Glück geht. Er steht damit im Gegensatz zum Erlösungswerk Jesu, das zu seiner Wirksamkeit des freien, sich seiner Sündhaftigkeit bewussten Menschen bedarf.

Die glücklichen Menschen des Großinquisitors sind aber bloß Sündenlose, sich ihrer selbst unbewusste Kinder.

Angesichts dieser divergenten Positionen wird die Frage nach dem ethischen Wert des Glückes virulent. Eine Antwort im eigentlichen Sinne hat auch der Dichter nicht parat – wohl aber eine weiterführende Überlegung.

„WENN ETHIK UND ÄSTHETIK EINS SIND.“ EINE STUDIE ZU TRADITION UND AUFGABENSTELLUNG EINES KEINESWEGS NUR WITTGENSTEIN’SCHEN GEDANKENS

Johannes Leopold Mayer

Baden, Österreich | a-jl.mayer@aon.at

Die Frage nach dem Zusammenhang zwischen Ethik und Ästhetik, welche durch Wittgensteins Dictum im 20. Jahrhundert folgenreich wiedergestellt wurde, ist in ihrem Kern eine solche nach der Beschaffenheit einer Wechselwirkung, durch welche auch das Erscheinungsbild all dessen, was ist, in seiner Qualität bestimmt wird. Qu. Horatius Flaccus verknüpft damit die Beziehung zwischen Künstler und Kunstwerk, Bernhard von Clairvaux lotet ihre religiöse Dimension im Hinblick auf den dreieinigen Gott und den Menschen aus, für den Komponisten Olivier Messiaen bestimmt sie den Gesamtwert eines Kunstwerkes. Um von dieser Zusammengehörigkeit eine Vorstellung zu bekommen ist es nötig, zu fragen, in welcher Weise Unterscheidbares eins zu sein vermag.

FOUNDATIONS OF NORMATIVE ETHICS: DEDUCTIVE CONSTRUING (SYSTEMIC- INFORMATIONAL APPROACH)

Lidia Mazhul and Vladimir Petrov

Moscow, Russia | vladmpetrov@yandex.ru

In order to ‘construe’ by purely deductive logical method, the system of normative ethics, the ‘principle of the information maximum’ was used as a basis. Two of its sequences: the maximization of the entropy (diversity) of the system’s states, and the aspiration to decrease the entropy of the system’s behavioral errors, combined with the tendency to economize the resource – would build the cornerstones for spatial and temporal ethical models, respectively. Both kinds of models should take into account two main features of contemporary phase of social and cultural development: growing role of the information (in relation to the resource), and the process of globalization. Proceeding from these considerations, it occurred possible to deduce some large-scale ethical regularities, described in the paper by Petrov (2012) presented at the same conference.

SPEAKING OF PAIN AND THE PRECONDITIONS OF LANGUAGE

Luke McNulty

Edmonton, Canada | l.blanchet.mcnulty@gmail.com

The later Wittgenstein is diffident in his remarks about the logical foundations of language. In this paper I aim to illuminate one dimension of this diffidence by comparing these remarks with reflections on this topic from the middle period, circa 1930. I argue that Wittgenstein is troubled by his later day view because it seems to him that, like the earlier view, it makes a confused attempt to point at a *shown* but ineffable reality.

WITTGENSTEIN AND SOCIAL COURAGE

Lumberto Mendoza

Manila, Philippines | totoy0708@yahoo.com

Wittgenstein offers a method of engagement and participation that enables us to establish overlaps between the public and the private. One such overlap is social courage. The duty to help is not a matter of entitlement, but it is an obligation that comes from our sense of connection with others. Wittgenstein's method of language-games enables us to extend this sense of connection even to strangers because it a 'socially reflective mode of learning' through which we are better able to take the perspective of others. Obligations do not just come from a system of codified rules, but from the sense of agency we acquire as a result of reflective engagement in different practices. Wittgenstein does not advance any substantive thesis, but the critical nature of his method offers a framework for understanding social courage without resorting to the extremes of altruism and egoism in ethics.

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO CLIMATE JUSTICE

Lukas Meyer

Graz, Austria | lukas.meyer@uni-graz.at

As a by-product of their activities many people emit greenhouse gases and far above the just per capita level. I discuss whether such acting can be considered morally permissible and politically legitimate under current circumstances. Then I consider how our assessment would differ if climate justice were authoritatively imposed and in a fair way.

GLOBAL ECONOMIC INJUSTICE, INDIVIDUAL DUTIES AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

Corinna Mieth

Bochum, Germany | Corinna.Mieth@rub.de

TRACTATUS 5.1362

Giovanni Mion

Torino, Italy | gmion22@gmail.com

The paper analyzes the conception of *free will* defended by the *Tractatus*, and in contrast to Pasquale Frascolla's recent verificationist reading of 5.1362, it argues that Wittgenstein's conception of *free will* squarely places future contingencies within the boundaries of truth-conditional semantics.

ABGESAGT / CANCELLED

WITTGENSTEIN AND THE DOCTRINE OF NIŠKĀMA KARMA

Enakshi Mitra

Delhi, India | Enakshimitra21@gmail.com

I would like to work out a significant link between later Wittgenstein's approach to absolute morality and the doctrine of niškāma karma (desireless action) as set forth in *The Bhagavad-Gītā*. This project will be carried out in

two phases: The first would be to re-construct the ethical propositions in the model of mathematical paradigms where the result and process are merged into each other. Secondly I shall take the liberty to expunge the notion of niškāma karma off its ontological loads and postulates in order to strike a chord of harmony between these two antithetical genres of philosophy.

NYE'S CONCEPT OF SMART POWER AND NORMATIVITY

Damir Mladić and Tomislav Ogrinšak

Zagreb, Croatia | damir.mladic@diu.hr

Nye claims that smart power is a normative concept. Authors of this article claim that the concept of smart power suffers from what we call the paradox of normativity. This paradox can be described as a normativity that does not offer any kind of normative standards or does not answer the question "what should we do". The authors prove that the concept of smart power per se is not a normative concept because it does not provide us with any kind of norms except the norm of instrumental rationality; instead it can be defined entirely in descriptive terms as the most effective ways to use our power in order to achieve what we want. The concept of smart power answers the question what we can do, but not the question what we should do or how we should use power.

THE REVIVAL OF METAPHYSICS, AND ITS REMEDY

Karel Mom

Amsterdam, Netherlands | karel_mom@versatel.nl

This paper comments upon a controversy about the current revival of metaphysics and suggests a remedy to cope with this revival.

EARLY WITTGENSTEIN, PRAGMATIST

Aloisia A. Moser

San Francisco, USA | aloisiamoser@me.com

In this paper I show the continuity of Wittgenstein's thought by couching it in terms of pragmatism. I discuss Charles Sander Peirce's notion of *habit* as a rule of action in connection with William James' pragmatic method. Richard Bernstein's discussion of three different languages in the *Tractatus* throws a new light on Wittgenstein's projection method as elaborated it in the *Tractatus*. I show that there is a pragmatist thread already in Wittgenstein's early philosophy and with the help of Bernstein I uncover Wittgenstein's method not as a picturing method that introduces a representational picture of language, but as a performative method, which shares the core ideas of pragmatism.

THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF DEMOCRACY: AN AGONISTIC APPROACH

Chantal Mouffe

London, UK | chantalmouffe@compuserve.com

WARUM „LEBENS-FORM“?

Jan Müller

Darmstadt, Deutschland | jmueller@phil.tu-darmstadt.de

Im Ausgang von Wittgenstein soll die These verteidigt werden, dass die Rede von „Lebensform“ die Funktion erfüllt, auf die kategoriale Differenz zwischen dem wirklichen, praktischen Vollzug eines Handelns und seiner sprachlichen Artikulation aufmerksam zu machen, um so die Frage nach einer „Begründung“ menschlicher Praxis als sinnlos zurückzuweisen. Empiristische Begriffserläuterungen werden dem Form-Aspekt nicht gerecht; Erläuterungen, die den Akzent auf die (kategoriale) Form allein legen, bleibt unverständlich, inwiefern diese Form wesentlich Form unserer Praxis und zugleich „willkürlich“ ist. Die Rede von „Leben“ verweist demgegenüber kritisch auf die Unmittelbarkeit des Vollzugs unserer Praxis: Die logischen Grammatik der Artikulation des Vollzugs gibt zwar sein Wesen an; dies gilt aber nur unter der Klausel, dass – um den Preis sprachidealistischer Konsequenzen – zugleich begriffen ist, dass der „lebendige“, praktische Vollzug in seiner Artikulation kategorial nicht aufgeht.

THE USE OF SPARE EMBRYOS FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH: A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH

Juvenal Ndayambaje

Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium | munziza2000@yahoo.com

The use of spare embryo for medical research remains a controversial issue, for it concerns the age-old debate over the moral status of the human embryo. It is a topic that raises the question of whether the embryo merits the same treatment as a more developed human being or whether in virtue of differences between it and more developed members of the species (children or adults), it deserves different moral treatment. After showing reductionist components involved in ontological, biological and relational approaches to the issue, I will argue that to deal with the complexity of the question of using spare embryos for medical research we need a phenomenological attitude.

ZUR ETHISCHEN PROBLEMATIK DES INDIKATIONSLOSEN SCHWANGERSCHAFTSABBRUCHS

Katharina Neges

Klagenfurt, Österreich | katharina.neges@aau.at

Die Positionen zum indikationslosen Schwangerschaftsabbruch reichen von einer rigorosen Verurteilung durch VertreterInnen christlich-konservativer Auffassungen bis hin zu einer völligen Entproblematisierung durch utilitaristisch Argumentierende. Die Phase, in der dieses Thema im Fokus einer aktuell debattierten Gesetzgebung stand, ist zumindest in Deutschland und Österreich vorbei und die ausführlich formulierten ethischen Modelle haben ihre Anhänger bereits gefunden. Diese Umstände führten zur Verfestigung der jeweiligen Auffassungen und zur Stagnation eines offenen Diskurses. Das Größenmaß des Phänomens – laut WHO über 40 Millionen Schwangerschaftsabbrüche pro Jahr weltweit – und der alarmierende Umstand, dass nahezu die Hälfte davon unter unsicheren Bedingungen stattfindet, verleihen dem Thema jedoch Aktualität und Bedeutung. Ein viabler ethischer Ansatz wird vorgeschlagen, dessen Zielsetzung eine Reduktion der Anzahl von Schwangerschaftsabbrüchen durch eine Reduktion der Anzahl von ungewollten Schwangerschaften ist.

RULE-FOLLOWING AND FORMS OF LIFE: WITTGENSTEIN'S CRITIQUE OF AI THEORY

Teodor Negru

Iasi, Romania | theonegru@yahoo.com

According to classical theory of artificial intelligence (AI) the human mind is a formal system made of symbols, which operate according to a set of instructions whose role is to guide the combination of symbols. However, according to Wittgenstein's philosophy the way language operates, which implies a set of rules and its understanding within a form of life, cannot be compatible with the description of the mind in the AI theory terms. Language does not follow a finite set of universal rules but language rules are seen rather as practices or skills that show how a word or a sentence should be used within a given context. Achieving the connection with forms of life and approaching them holistically are characteristics of language that exceed a computer's limited capacity of data processing and its possibilities to simulate cognitive processes.

MORAL DILEMMA AND PRACTICAL REASON

Julian Nida-Rümelin

Munich, Germany | sekretariat.nida-ruemelin@lrz.uni-muenchen.de

Moral dilemmas constitute a peculiar case of practical conflict insofar as – even after the decision – the conflict persists in terms of feelings of guilt, at least of regret. At first sight they seem to violate principles of (deontic) logic. Given the fragmentation of values, the consequentialist resolution of moral dilemmas fails. The underlying reason for the existence of moral dilemmas is the irreducibility of our life-world practice of (moral) justification. The sources of normativity are situated within this practice and cannot be derived from outside. Theories have to prove their justification according to this very praxis. At the level of action-guiding normative convictions moral dilemmas solve themselves, even if, as Immanuel Kant suggested, they might de facto persist as conflicts of reasons for compulsory duties. Thus, the incompatibility of the existence of moral dilemmas with the principles of deontic logic only *seems* to persist. And so the compatibility of moral dilemmas with principles of deontic logic is an aspect of practical coherence. A coherent praxis is based on two types of propositional attitudes, which are related to one another, and fulfill specific formal criteria: epistemic and proairetic.

REALISM WITHOUT LOGICAL OBJECTS: TRACTARIAN PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC(AL FORM)

Yasushi Nomura

Hokkaido, Japan | yasnom@let.hokudai.ac.jp

What is a core idea of Tractarian philosophy of logic? I'd like to identify it as thesis of the “shared logical form” by combining the “logical form” of the remark 2.18 with that of the remark 4.12. In doing so, I will re-grasp the thesis as meaning the same as the “mirror-image” thesis of the logic (TLP6.13, 5.511), with a help of the semantics of “probability” (TLP5.15).

A WORLD OF FACTS, A WORLD OF THINGS

Alfred Nordmann

Darmstadt, Germany | nordmann@phil.tu-darmstadt.de

From the point of view of the later Wittgenstein, the TLP can be read as providing an (albeit incomplete) reconstruction of a particular language game and its attendant form of life, namely the game of (scientifically) describing the world, or of producing a catalogue of true statements about the world. This catalogue enumerates facts, and not things – and this is because facts but not things can be expressed in speech (ausgesprochen). Wittgenstein's point becomes salient when expression-in-speech is contrasted to other forms of expression, e.g. musical expression or the expression of values through the life one leads. When these are taken into consideration, a the technical and technoscientific world of things also comes back into view – and a novel aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy of technology opens up.

PHILOSOPHY AND THE UNCOVERING OF CONSCIENCE

Hannes Nykänen

Helsinki, Finland | hannes.nykanen@abo.fi

My intention with this paper is to indicate how seeing the difference between what I call collective pressure and conscience is connected to philosophical clarification. The difficulty with seeing this difference is not about distinguishing between two concepts nor about being morally upright or honest in one's thinking, but about being prepared to "regroup one's whole language" to paraphrase Wittgenstein.

HOW TO MAKE CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS RELEVANT TO ONE'S LIFE. GEORG HENRIK VON WRIGHT ON MORAL GOODNESS

Bernt Österman

Helsinki, Finland | Bernt.Osterman@helsinki.fi

The Varieties of Goodness was the book the Finnish philosopher Georg Henrik von Wright, one of Ludwig Wittgenstein's three literary executors, ranked highest among his own philosophical works. I argue that a principal ground for the ranking was the personal dimension von Wright saw in the work, as a contribution to the healing of what he called "the rift in his philosophical personality". The rift, which bothered him deeply, stems from an inherent conflict between the fundamental objective of doing philosophy with a relevance to one's life, and commitments to prevalent methodological ideals. The crucial feature of the Varieties of Goodness is its analysis of moral goodness, which amounts to a moulding of the concept based on philosophical reflection, with an obvious personal dimension. The article ends with some parallels with Wittgenstein's famous remark about philosophy as work on oneself.

THE TWO DISTINCT MEANINGS OF THE TERM "PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPOSSIBILITY" AS USED BY WITTGENSTEIN

Martin Ohmacht

Klagenfurt, Austria | martin.ohmacht@aon.at

One of Wittgenstein's central foci in his philosophy of mathematics is the question of mathematical impossibilities. This is a reaction to Gödel's 1931 result, to which Wittgenstein reacts fairly soon in his *Big Typescript*. I present an important facet of Gödel's results, which he, Gödel, already gives in 1931 and which is rather dialectical.

Wittgenstein also uses the concept of impossibility outside mathematics by investigating physiological, physical and psychological impossibilities. One of the two meanings of psychological impossibility is a consensus among experts that a certain problem is impossible. A flight to the moon, for example, was considered to be impossible at the time of Wittgenstein's death in 1951. The second meaning of the term "psychological impossibility" is a psychological impossibility in a narrower sense – for example, thought transference without oral communication. I have found three texts by Sigmund Freud, where he works on this issue. There is no "remote perceptible ability"!

ART, AESTHETICS AND CULTURE: A CRITICAL STUDY IN WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY

Ratikanta Panda

Mumbai, India | ratikanta@iitb.ac.in

Art is the emotive side of the cultural values expressed through various ways like paintings, sculpture, literature, music. Modern media also includes technological dimensions of art like movies, graphics, internet etc. Art is the most significant component of a culture and has a definite function to perform. It both work as a practical skill like art of sewing good clothes, doing embroidery, culinary skills, making furniture and so one, and also as institution like the fine arts of paintings, sculpture, architecture etc. Arts exist within a culture, and culture is carried forward to coming generation through various art media. The art expressions like stories, myths, folk tales, and folk songs are the bearer as well as the carriers of cultural values. Both art and culture need each other and depend on each other for their existence.

F.P. RAMSEY ON TAXATION: AN ALGORITHMIC POINT OF VIEW ON FORMAL ARGUMENTS

Stefano Papa

Vienna, Austria | stefano.papa@univie.ac.at

F.P. Ramsey is one of two authors on economic theory who have been in close touch with and (in the case of Piero Sraffa) are said to have exercised a deep influence on L. Wittgenstein. The contributions of Ramsey's to Economic Theory transcend by far the frame of Keynesian Economic and came to be appreciated not before the 1970' (as a matter of fact, the main results and the deepest implications were rediscovered by neoclassical authors). I focus on the systematic interpretation of mathematical theories, in particular on such issues as taxation and wealth distribution. Here I concentrate on Ramsey's Theory of growth as linked with taxation and distribution

(1928/1929). If the formal treatment of optimal taxation rate requests the introduction of some metric and algebraic constraints on the preferences and policies of actors, then the Ramsey's solutions consist precisely in constructing (algorithmic) devices to get over such constraints (since these would seriously narrow the amount of information to be used in decision and policy making). Thus, the mathematical Theory of Saving envisaged and constructed by F. P. Ramsey in the late 1920' is not deemed to be interpreted as a kind of metric of goodness (a "naturalized justice theory", so to speak) or geometry or power, while it can help to construct tools for using formal arguments in evaluating social policies).

GRUNDLOS ODER HALTLOS? WITTGENSTEIN ÜBER ABERGLÄUBISCHE PRAKTIKEN

Christoph M. Paret

St. Gallen, Switzerland | christophparet@gmx.de

Through numerous examples, this article explores a dilemma discovered by G.K. Chesterton which considerably influenced Wittgenstein. The dilemma emerges when trying to explain superstitious or magical practices: the supposed reasons for superstitious actions turn out to be so absurd, that the superstitious can hardly be said to believe them; however, by stating that such actions need not be justified, they also elude explanation. It is also argued that the common understanding of Wittgenstein as having analysed superstitious actions as *expressive* or *instinctive* actions, is mistaken. Instead, Wittgenstein's claim is defended that where superstitious behaviour is concerned, even "the attempt to explain is [...] wrong". It is shown that already for the superstitious, superstition is both untenable and irresistible.

CONTEMPORARY NORMATIVE ETHICS: CORNERSTONES FOR LARGE-SCALE SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL MODELS (SYSTEMIC-INFORMATIONAL APPROACH)

Vladimir Petrov

Moscow, Russia | vladmpetrov@yandex.ru

Being a logical continuation of the paper by Mazhul & Petrov (2012), the given text deals mainly with foundations of 'due models' for relations between "large units" – social groups or countries, as well as members of different generations (e.g., 'fathers and sons'). These foundations are connected with the distributions of the information and the resource which are at the disposal of each society, as well as the dynamics of both constituents in contemporary era. The main large-scale 'spatial' model resorts to the help of the 'phenomenon of centralization' and deals with various kinds of sharp inequality, whereas the 'temporal' model is based on the changes – during the person's life – in the 'weights' of information and resource, and hence, appropriate socio-psychological attitudes relating to inter-generation processes. The last ones are also influenced by 50-year cyclic alteration of left- and right-hemispheric prevalence. Both models permit to derive scientific recommendations for contemporary social and cultural politics.

ELEMENTS OF AN E-PLATFORM FOR WITTGENSTEIN RESEARCH

**Alois Pichler, Deirdre Smith, Rune J. Falch, and
Wilhelm Krüger**

Bergen, Norway | alois.pichler@fof.uib.no

With the AGORA project, the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB) continues its work of building an Open Access (OA) platform for digital Wittgenstein research and learning. This paper presents some of the elements WAB considers key in such a platform. They are partly in the making, partly already in place: 1) Primary sources (5000 pages of the Wittgenstein *Nachlass*, contributed within in the DISCOVERY project); 2) Metadata (a new and extended catalogue of the Wittgenstein papers, in the making through an ongoing international cooperative project); 3) Secondary sources (a selection from WAB's *Working Papers / Publications* series and audio-visual materials as well as several hundred papers from ALWS' Wittgenstein symposia, contributed within the ongoing AGORA project); 4) A Wittgenstein journal (the new *Nordic Wittgenstein Review*, established within the ongoing AGORA project in cooperation with the Nordic Wittgenstein Society); 5) Wittgenstein ontologies (for both textual sources and conceptual domains); 6) Software. These elements and resources are provided OA. In our presentation, we will show and discuss samples from each. We look forward to receiving feedback on their value as well as how we have conceived them.

SEEING RAPE AS RAPE

Rossella Pisconti

Exeter, UK | rp300@exeter.ac.uk

This work proposed to approach the interpretive questions in law from a perspective which is different from those usually encountered in the legal tradition, by challenging the ability of legal reforms to accept or integrate the way in which oppressed persons see rape. In particular, a Wittgensteinian approach would pay attention to the shape of gendered lives as they are experienced, and could not accept just one legal interpretations to address marital law because such a view would neglect the requirements of particular lives, as well as the details of several contexts.

SOLIDARITY AS A PRACTICE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE FIELD OF BIOETHICS

Barbara Prainsack

Uxbridge, UK | barbara.prainsack@brunel.ac.uk

In 2011, the British Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) and The Nuffield Foundation funded a six months Fellowship with the aim of mapping and analysing how the notion of solidarity had been used in bioethical writings in the last two decades. First results from this project were published in the form of a Report on *Solidarity: Reflections on an Emerging Concept in Bioethics* (Prainsack/Buys, London, 2011). This Report also proposed a new understanding of solidarity which regards solidarity first and foremost as a practice. In its simplest form, solidarity is seen to comprises manifestations of people's willingness to carry costs (financial, social, emotional, or otherwise) to assist others. These manifestations can be apparent at any or every one of three levels, at the inter-personal, communal, and contractual/legal level. We argue that by understanding solidarity not as a value to be normatively

justified, but as a practice whose empirical, social, and political dimensions need to be understood, we can employ the notion of solidarity to unlock some controversial debates and provide innovative solutions for policy. We will exemplify this with the case of governing biobank-based medical research.

HOW SHOULD WE UNDERSTAND THE CONCEPT OF FORGIVENESS IN POLITICS?

Dorota Probuca

Kraków, Poland | dorotaprobucka@op.pl

The aim of the paper is to analyze the validity of the postulate of forgiveness in international relations. The main argument is the idea to connect this postulate with the moral duty of being in the truth. This means going beyond the often predicated ideology of oblivion and the also frequently practiced ideology of dwelling on the past. The postulate of forgiveness is the memory of historical facts understood as an act of moral justice without the need for revenge and retaliation.

DOES THOMAS NAGEL DEVELOP A 'HYBRID' ETHICAL THEORY?

Marek Pyka

Kraków, Poland | mpyka@pk.edu.pl

In the paper I offer an interpretation of moral philosophy in the works of Thomas Nagel. Alan Thomas claims that Nagel attempts to build a kind of a 'hybrid' ethical theory. I argue that Thomas underestimates the importance of deontological reasons and norms and that Nagel outlines a wide form of ethical pluralism. Having an important deontological part, it also tries to accommodate a reduced version of the consequentialist insight. The divided nature of morality reflects the divided nature of human beings.

DAS STERBEN ALS TEIL DES LEBENS UND ALS HANDLUNGSRAUM. ETHISCHE ÜBERLEGUNGEN

Christoph Rehmann-Sutter

Lübeck, Deutschland | rehmann@imgwf.uni-luebeck.de

Die Philosophie hat sich mit der Tatsache des Todes und mit der menschlichen Sterblichkeit als Teil der *Conditio Humana* ausführlich auseinandergesetzt. Die Ethik am Lebensende befasste sich mit den moralischen Fragen verschiedener Sterbehilfsmaßnahmen. Weniger gekümmert hat sich aber mit dem Sterben als aktiv gelebter letzter Lebensphase aus der moralischen Perspektive der Menschen, die selbst sterben werden. Sie haben im Hinblick auf das Sterben wichtige, ethisch relevante Entscheidungen zu treffen, Dilemmas zu lösen und mit Ambivalenz umzugehen, wenn sie sich auf den Tod einstellen. Dem Vortrag liegt eine Studie mit hermeneutisch-phänomenologischer Methodik zugrunde, in der die Handlungsperspektive von palliativ versorgten KrebspatientInnen im terminalen Stadium qualitativ untersucht wurde. Menschen, die sterben werden, werden darin als ethische Subjekte sichtbar. Ich werde die Ergebnisse dieser Studie in philosophischer Hinsicht interpretieren und die Fragen nach dem Aktivität-Passivität-Verhältnis, nach der Autonomie des Willens und nach der moralischen Kraft des Wünschens stellen.

ZIELE DES ZEIGENS – VON DER FLIEGENGLASMETAPHER ZUM LÖSUNGSBILD

Ulrich Richtmeyer

Weimar, Deutschland | ulrich.richtmeyer@uni-weimar.de

Der Satz von der Fliege im Fliegenglas variiert in Wittgensteins Manuskripten und Typoskripten hinsichtlich seiner Schreibweise und seines thematischen Bezugs. Dabei treten im Wesentlichen zwei disparate Verwendungen auf. Einerseits die aus den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* bekannte Redewendung, die als Selbstbefragung mit Wittgensteins ethischen-therapeutischem Programm einer Philosophie als „Arbeit an einem selbst“ korreliert. Andererseits findet sich die Fliegenglasmetapher auch als metaphorische Umschreibung für die Evidenz- und Überzeugungseffekte von Lösungsbildern und schematischen Darstellungen.

Beide Lesarten treten in ihrer thematischen Verschiedenheit bereits im Manuskript 118 auf. Die folgenden Überarbeitungen des Satzes im MS 117 zeigen, wie die Zielangabe der Philosophie und das Thema der visuellen, bildlichen Evidenz deutlicher miteinander verknüpft werden. Spätestens im Typoskript 222 wird der bildliche Bezug des Satzes dann explizit gemacht, während die späteren *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* auf diesen Kontext gänzlich verzichten. Eine gründliche Durchsicht der verschiedenen Varianten lässt erkennen, dass Wittgenstein wiederholt die Orientierungsleistungen eines bildlichen Zeigens und besonders die eines Sich-Zeigens thematisiert.

PLAYING HAVOC WITH OUR MORAL INTUITIONS: THOMSON'S VIOLINIST, THE ABORTION-CASE, AND THE GAP BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE IN APPLIED ETHICS

Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl

Graz, Austria | sonja.rinofner@uni-graz.at

Abortion is a stubbornly controversial issue. Due to far-reaching religious, political or ideological commitments lurking in the background it, indeed, seems to elude a purely theoretical solution. Having got stuck between the conservative and liberal front-lines, it is suitable to ponder the aims and methods of an ethical theory that claims to be able to clarify practical conflicts of this sort. Among the most important demands that we may scrutinize in this situation is the idea that ethical theory must meet or, at least, partially do justice to our pre-theoretical moral intuitions.

Accordingly, we shall examine Judith Jarvis Thomson's famous thought-experiment, called "*The Violinist*" (VTE), with a view to the following questions: (A) Does VTE help to expose and challenge specific (and previously unquestioned?) ways to formulate and discuss the issue of abortion, for instance relating to i) active (*killing*) vs. passive (*letting die*) modes of behavior, ii) intending something vs. merely foreseeing and approvingly putting up with something (*double-effect reasoning*)? (B) How should we assess VTE from the point of view of the peculiar (moral) experience the persons concerned actually undergo? On occasion of analyzing VTE, what do we learn about i) our prevailing moral intuitions and our theoretical efforts to benefit from, reflecting upon, refining or modifying these intuitions; ii) the import of diverging descriptions of moral conflicts and moral issues in general; iii) the prospects of

closing the gap between theory and practice in applied ethics?

WITTGENSTEINS PHILOSOPHISCHES ŒUVRE IM SPIEGEL EXPERIMENTELLER LITERATUR

Josef G. F. Rothhaupt

München, Deutschland | josef.rothhaupt@lrz.uni-muenchen.de

Der Vortrag verfolgt zwei Ziele. Es wird gezeigt, dass Wittgenstein nicht nur das experimentelle literarische Werk *Tristram Shandy* von Laurence Sterne sehr gut kannte und hoch schätzte, sondern bei der Gestaltung seines Buches *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* davon inspiriert wurde. Es wird dargetan, dass das experimentelle literarische Werk *Rayuela* von Julio Cortázar durch die *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* beeinflusst ist. Es wird erwiesen, dass diese drei Werke in Wahlverwandtschaft zueinander stehen. Ein tiefes Verständnis eines der Werke hat Auswirkungen für ein adäquateres Verstehen der anderen Werke.

CAN SCIENCE UNDERMINE MORALITY?

Jaroslav Ruzicka

Brno, Czech Republic | ruzicka@phil.muni.cz

The essay addresses the question of whether it is possible to make a moral system based on scientific research. As a starting point, we use an argument of Sam Harris, the author of a bestseller *The Moral Landscape*, who says that moral values are facts about the welfare of conscious creatures. Using the concept of so-called category mistake, we show that science cannot select which values should be essential for some kind of moral system. Such selection could be made only by a myth or by a social contract. However, a myth does not seem to be technically competent for making effective application systems of these values to daily life. It is mostly this aspect which is criticised by scientists. We see an opportunity for ethics to analyze these application systems and design new ones. It could prove more fruitful than recurrent attempts to discover indisputable moral values as such.

WITTGENSTEIN AND EPICTETUS ON HEALING THE SOUL: WHAT PHILOSOPHY CAN (NOT) DO FOR YOU

Janyne Sattler

Florianopolis, Brazil | janynesattler@yahoo.com.br

A healed soul would be Wittgenstein's and Epictetus' conception of the purpose of life. This aim seems to suggest us a certain number of things: first of all, that there was a moment when the soul was unhealed and still in search for the significance of life, something which is essentially connected here with its meaning being taken as "problematic"; second, that there can be a path open to the healing through the achievement of the steps of the path themselves, something both these philosophers seem to have thought out carefully, each in its own way; finally, that philosophy would have itself a role to play in bringing sick souls to a state of peaceful living, only in a way not as ambitious as some would imagine.

SUBJEKT UND PERSON BEI WITTGENSTEIN IM *BLUE BOOK*

Fernando Scherer

Freiburg, Germany | ferscherer2002@hotmail.com

In this paper I will discuss the person and subject conception from Wittgenstein's *Blue Book*, based on the study of Wittgenstein's distinction between the "use as object" and the "use as subject" of the word "I". The "use as object" of the word "I" can be verified with the aid of public criteria, while the "use as subject" of the word "I" can not. I believe the "use as subject" in the *Blue Book* shows a solipsist use of the word "I", a use that demands self-reference and self-identification through the subject. This path leads to the thesis that this is an unnecessary use and that one could eliminate it from the language and that this use of the word "I" has no meaning because there is a lack of identification criteria. It is similar to a moan, as in the case of moaning from pain, for example. In this respect, only the "use as object" of the word "I" remains, to which Wittgenstein's conception of person is based. In this context I will also discuss Klaus Puhl's interpretation of this issue.

WITTGENSTEIN'S NACHLASS CATALOGUE – SOME SUGGESTIONS

Alfred Schmidt

Vienna, Austria | alfred.schmidt77@gmail.com

Starting with a short look at Wittgenstein non-philosophical Nachlass the von Wright catalogue of the philosophical papers of Wittgenstein is discussed. The difference between (physical) documents and (intended) texts is crucial for a catalogue; different cases of relations have to be decided for an electronic edition.

A text-genetic map as complementary approach together with a set of Metadata of each Nachlass-item is suggested as a threefold online access to the Wittgenstein Nachlass and a backbone of a new Bergen Electronic Edition.

DER MUTMASSLICHE WILLE IM DEUTSCHEN TRANSPLANTATIONS- GESETZ

Christoph Schmidt-Petri

Regensburg, Deutschland | schmidtpetri@gmail.com

In diesem Artikel plädiere ich dafür, den sogenannten ‚mutmaßlichen Willen‘ eines Verstorbenen nicht als Legitimationsgrund für eine postmortale Organspende zuzulassen. Diese Forderung wird damit begründet, daß der ‚mutmaßliche Wille‘ eines Verstorbenen (1) gravierende konzeptionelle Schwierigkeiten aufweist, (2) er, insofern konzeptionell zulässig, selbst im Idealfall nicht zuverlässig ermittelbar ist und (3) ein dennoch zugelassener Rückgriff auf ihn die moralische Verantwortung für die Entnahme und Weitergabe von Organen und Gewebe verschleiern kann.

DIE MENSCHLICHE LEBENSFORM – ANWENDUNGEN EINES KONZEPTS FÜR FRAGEN DER ETHIK UND POLITISCHEN PHILOSOPHIE

Barbara Schmitz

Basel, Schweiz | Barbara.Schmitz@unibas.ch

Das auf Wittgenstein zurückgehende Konzept einer menschlichen Lebensform beinhaltet, dass es Tätigkeiten, Praktiken, Institutionen gibt, die für ein menschliches Leben charakteristisch sind. Diese Idee kann nicht nur – wie bei Wittgenstein – für Fragen der Sprachphilosophie, sondern darüber hinaus auch für Probleme der Ethik und Politischen Philosophie fruchtbar gemacht werden. In meinem Vortrag möchte ich, nachdem ich zunächst den Begriff mit Ausgangspunkt auf Wittgenstein kläre, die Anwendung desselben auf zwei Gebiete zeigen: zum einen in Bezug auf Gerechtigkeit, indem der Begriff des „Bedürfnisses“ näher erhellt werden wird; zum anderen in Bezug auf den Begriff der Behinderung.

THE NORMATIVITY OF THE TRUTH PREDICATE

Gunnar Schumann

Hagen, Germany | gunnar.schumann@FernUni-Hagen.de

Most truth theorists either take “true” to be a descriptive predicate or as more or less semantically redundant. I argue that both views are incorrect, for “true” is a normative predicate. Extending Richard Hares semantic investigations into the meaning of “good” to “true”, I try to show that truth predications have a primarily prescriptive function. Truth predications are mainly used for epistemic commending, not describing. The resulting account is a moderate non-descriptive theory of truth, for “true” also has a descriptive meaning, although only secondarily so. Arguments are delivered to show the primacy of the prescriptive meaning of the truth predicate.

WHAT CAN BE MEANINGFULLY SAID ABOUT THE “NELBÖCK CASE”? WITTGENSTEIN’S AND WAISMANN’S ANALYSES OF ETHICS IN PRACTICE

Radek Schuster

Plzeň, Czech Republic | schust@kfi.zcu.cz

The aim of the paper is to put the “Nelböck case” in the context of Wittgenstein’s and Waismann’s expositions of ethics and the possibilities of its expression in language. The first chapter introduces Wittgenstein’s analyses of ethics as they are rendered in *Tractatus* and in “A Lecture on Ethics”, and their elaborations made by Waismann during the 1930s. The second chapter consists of four descriptions related to the murder of Prof. Schlick, which are then interpreted in accordance with the account in the first chapter.

ON SEMANTIC SKEPTICISM: WITTGENSTEIN’S PARADOX OF RULE FOLLOWING AND KRIPKE’S SEMANTIC PARADOX

Ken Shigeta

Osaka, Japan | sgk-67@ck2.so-net.ne.jp

Despite persistent attempts to defend Kripke’s argument, analyses of this argument seem to be reaching a consensus that it is characterized by fatal flaws in both its interpretation of Wittgenstein and its argument of meaning independent of interpretation. Most scholars who do not agree with this view have directly contrasted Kripke’s understanding of Wittgenstein (KW) with Wittgenstein’s own perspective (LW) in or after *Philosophical Investigations* (PI). However, I believe that those who have closely read both PI and *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* without any preconceptions have a different impression from the one that is generally accepted: that KW does not directly oppose LW. Indeed, KW seems to present one aspect of LW with precision, although the impression that KW deviates from LW in some respects remains unavoidable.

In this paper, I will attempt to elucidate the underpinnings of this impression by analyzing the paradoxes presented by Wittgenstein and Kripke. I will then not only propose a new interpretation of the argument about meaning contained in PI but also suggest a schema or condition for semantics.

RADICAL DEMOCRACY AND AGREEMENT IN PRACTICES

Michal Sládeček

Belgrade, Serbia | sladecek@instifdt.bg.ac.rs

When pointing at the fact that democracy lies on agonism and disensus instead on substantial political values, some theoreticians of radical democracy explicitly rely on late period of Wittgenstein and his understanding of linguistic practices not being united. The first part of the text provides an overview of interpretation of Chantal Mouffe whose treatment of Wittgenstein is exemplary for this position. In the second part of this text the author examines the sustainability of this interpretation. This is how Wittgenstein’s idea that justification still ends somewhere can be in collision with the practice of permanent agonism. Wittgenstein’s insisting on background practices all of which cannot be questioned at the same time, brings the problem of a strict dichotomy of consensus and disensus and the author points at the consensus which does not have to imply conservatism. Finally, what is disputable is the strict distinction between radical democracy and liberalism because the position of radical democracy has difficulties in avoiding either *modus vivendi* of procedural liberalism on one hand or perfectionism on the other.

DOCUMENTING MACROPROCESS: A NOTE ON CATALOGUING WITTGENSTEIN’S NACHLASS.

Jonathan Smith

Cambridge, UK | js10027@cam.ac.uk

The von Wright catalogue of Wittgenstein’s *nachlass* has served the Wittgenstein community for over forty years. New material is periodically added, but I wish to argue for

a radical rearrangement of the catalogue based on the use to which Wittgenstein put the documents he created and the way in which he arranged them while in use. The intention in doing this is to record elements of 'macroprocess' in his work which help us to understand his process as a whole.

WITTGENSTEIN'S ETHISCHER ANSPRUCH

Ilse Somavilla

Innsbruck, Österreich | ilse.somavilla@uibk.ac.at

„[...] wie kann ich Logiker sein, wenn ich noch nicht Mensch bin!“ – diese, vermutlich um Weihnachten 1913 an Bertrand Russell gerichteten, des öfteren zitierten Worte Wittgensteins sollen zu Beginn meiner Überlegungen zu Wittgensteins ethischem Anspruch – stehen, einem Anspruch, der sein Leben wie sein Philosophieren bestimmte.

„Mensch sein“ bedeutete bei Wittgenstein, ein Leben zu führen, das Ethik sichtbar macht, sie *zeigt*. Erst dann könne man sich mit Philosophie, insbesondere mit Logik befassen, da die Auseinandersetzung mit diesen Problemen die kompromisslose Suche nach Wahrheit erfordert, die wiederum Wahrhaftigkeit, Authentizität und Glaubwürdigkeit des Philosophen voraussetzt. Inwieweit die Orientierung an einem derart hohen Ethos in Wittgensteins Leben und Philosophieren deutlich wird, soll im vorliegenden Beitrag an Beispielen aus seinen persönlichen und philosophischen Aufzeichnungen untersucht werden.

CLIMATE ENGINEERING AND THE IMPOSITION OF RISKS OF RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

Harald Stelzer

Graz, Austria | harald.stelzer@uni-graz.at

WITTGENSTEIN ON ETHICAL CONCEPTS: A READING OF *PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS* §77 AND MOORE'S LECTURE NOTES, MAY 1933

David Stern

Iowa City, USA | david-stern@uiowa.edu

After reviewing Wittgenstein's very brief discussion of ethical concepts in *Philosophical Investigations* §77, and its relationship to the discussion of games and family resemblance concepts in §§66 ff, the paper turns to Moore's notes of Wittgenstein's lectures in May 1933 for a more detailed treatment of the topic.

NOTES ON WITTGENSTEIN'S NOTION OF GRAMMAR AND MOYAL-SHARROCK'S *THIRD WITTGENSTEIN*

Sarah Anna Szeltner

Bergen, Norway and Kassel, Germany | sarah.anna.szeltner@gmail.com

Danièle Moyal-Sharrock has argued that the so-called *Third Wittgenstein* has an extended notion of grammar. Although I will try to show both that textual evidence speaks against this claim and that Wittgenstein has al-

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ready in 1933 considered counting an empirical proposition to grammar, I will suggest that some of Moyal-Sharrock's evaluations of Wittgenstein's latest writings may still be seminal for a new understanding of Wittgenstein's notion of grammar in general.

EIN KONZEPT MEHRDIMENSIONALER GRADUELLER HANDLUNGSFÄHIGKEIT MENSCHLICHER UND NICHTMENSCHLICHER AKTEURE ALS BEITRAG ZUR TECHNIKETHIK

Sabine Thürmel

München, Deutschland | sabine@thuermel.de

Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, einen begrifflich-systematischen Ansatz vorzustellen, der den heutigen Phänomenen komplexer Verhaltensregulation und Ausführungskontrolle in computervermittelten Umgebungen gerecht wird und offen für zukünftige Erweiterungen ist. Das Konzept mehrdimensionaler gradueller Handlungsfähigkeit erlaubt, den Bogen von dem passiven Verhaltenspotential zu dem individuellen und kollektiven Handlungspotential zu ziehen. Es ermöglicht die Analyse von Szenarien, in denen menschliche und nichtmenschliche Agenten interagieren – seien letztere nun technische, materiellen Agenten oder reine Softwareagenten. Differenzierte Aussagen zu Urheberschaft und Delegation der Verantwortung in Szenarien kollektiven und verteilten Handelns in soziotechnischen Räumen können auf Basis dieses Ansatzes erfolgen. Dadurch wird das Bewusstsein für den (schon heute gegebenen) aktiven Anteil der technischen Akteure geschärft. Ausgehend von der Annahme, dass Kognition sich situativ entfaltet, und Intentionalität nicht nur individuell, sondern als Fähigkeit eines Kollektivs gedacht werden kann, wird verständlich, warum von einer partizipatorischen Wende gesprochen werden kann.

PHILOSOPHY AND EVERYDAY LANGUAGE

Niklas Toivakainen

Helsinki, Finland | niklas.toivakainen@helsinki.fi

Wittgenstein famously insisted that philosophy, in order to reach clarity, must stick to everyday uses of language. In this paper I suggest that this does not lead to the proposal that clarity is dependent on affirming such uses of language. Rather, the notion of everyday is introduced as a way of locating the root-causes to our problems in philosophy, and further, as a way of urging us to understand that the search for clarity is bound to a search for moral self-understanding. It is also suggested that this leads us to acknowledge the possibility that everyday uses of language might be in need of transformation, that the way words are used in everyday contexts do not by themselves guarantee clarity. As in traditional metaphysics, we might need to be in rebellion against the everyday.

HUME AND RELIGIOUSLY SIGNIFICANT MIRACLES

Alberto Urquidez

Lafayette, USA | beto.urquidez@gmail.com

What determines the religious significance of miraculous events? This paper argues that religious significance is largely determined by a subject's calling the event a mira-

cle; that is, by the ascription of religious significance to an event when one calls it a miracle. In this paper, I unpack and defend this thesis. I then draw out an important implication for philosophical attempts to ground religious claims. I argue that if a Humean miracle (that is, a violation of a law of nature, which has a supernatural cause) should be proved by religious testimony, this would not commit us to believing in a religious event, since belief in a religious miracle requires that a subject ascribe religious significance to the event, and this is an essentially personal matter. The notion of an essentially personal religious ascription may be of general interest to philosophers, outside the philosophy of religion.

WITTGENSTEIN AND HISTORICITY

Gianni Vattimo

Torino, Italy | gianni.vattimo@europarl.europa.eu

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF HIGH MODERNITY: BEYOND BRUNDTLAND AND LIMITS TO GROWTH

Thomas Wallgren

Helsinki, Finland | twallgre@mappi.helsinki.fi

The new green movement that appeared in the 1960s and 1970s claimed that because of objective limits economic growth had become a bad development goal. The claim is interpreted as a claim about an intrinsic tension between two cultural aspirations fundamental to the project of high modernity, ethical universalism and increasing material prosperity for all. Since the mid 1980s, the idea of sustainable development has had a domesticating effect on the green agenda. Today, economic growth is again by and large seen as compatible with environmental and social responsibility. The new consensus is critically examined. A tension between affluence and self-determination as cultural aspirations of our times is identified and discussed. The conclusion of the argument is that the crisis of environment and development remains at its core a civilisational crisis that affects core aspects of the ambitions that define the cultural project of high modernity.

KEYWORD CENTRALITY ANALYSIS WITH WITTGENSTEIN'S CONVERSATION ON FREUD

Joseph Wang and Ulrich Lobis

Innsbruck, Austria | joseph.wang@uibk.ac.at

During the Project "Lectures on Aesthetics Contextualized" (FWF P21038) we have marked each keyword in every paragraph in *Conversations on Freud*, a chapter in Wittgenstein's *Lectures and Conversation on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*. According to the relationship between keywords and sense units we have created a graph in which the nodes are keywords and lines are the co-location of two keywords in one sense unit. We then applied three different kinds of centrality-analysis on this graph. Results of centrality analysis are then compared to the usual interpretation of the text.

ON THE CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION OF HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, ACTION SPACE AND QUALITY OF LIFE

Paul Weingartner and Silvia Haring

Salzburg, Austria | silviahelen.haring@stud.sbg.ac.at

The purpose of this paper is to offer a conceptual clarification of some basic concepts which frequently appear in disciplines like sociology, psychology, geography, medicine and philosophy. These concepts are basically concerned with human life, particularly with its environment, its activity w.r.t. its environment and with its quality.

ETHICS AND RELATIVISM IN WITTGENSTEIN

Christian Wenzel

Taipei, Taiwan | wenzelchristian@yahoo.com

This essay is about Wittgenstein, first about his views on ethics, second about his conception of language games. Third, it combines the two and shows how problems arise from this. Wittgenstein rejects theories of ethics and emphasizes the variety of language games. Such language games are marked by what I call "inner relativity". Wittgenstein himself was not a relativist, but it seems to me his views easily lead to what I call "outer relativism". In matters of ethics this is particularly problematic.

WITTGENSTEIN AS POET

Philip Wilson

Norwich, UK | wilson.philip026@gmail.com

This paper examines Wittgenstein's 'Ein Gedicht' ('A poem') as included in *Culture and Value* and translated by Peter Winch, setting it in the context of recent demands by Wittgenstein scholars for greater intention to be paid to the style of Wittgenstein's later work. By examining literariness, defined in terms of weak implicatures, we can become more aware of what we do when we read this poem. This mode of reading can then be applied to our reading of Wittgenstein's philosophy in order to see it not as a set of propositions but as a literary artefact that demands a literary response in turn from us, which will involve us in the creation of meaning, in line with Wittgenstein's views on the purpose of his work.

BETWEEN THE PRIVATE MORALITY AND THE COMMON DAY ETHICS

Roland Zarzycki

Wroclaw, Poland | zarzycki.roland@gmail.com

A narrative that enables one to overcome various apparent dichotomies often attributed to Wittgenstein's philosophy is going to be presented. Next an attempt to show how Wittgenstein's investigations lead to a philosophy that is pragmatically engaged, devoted to the problems of common day life and thus rooted in an ethical insight is going to be made.

Within the framework of this research an interpretation of a well-known *beetle in the box* metaphor as well as working version of a *private morality argument* will be given. Finally two specific issues from the scope of socially involved philosophy of morality are going to be exhibited in order to provide a practical illustration.

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