

Analytische und Kontinentale Philosophie: Perspektiven und Methoden

Analytical and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives

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ON WITTGENSTEIN'S SO-CALLED METAPHILOSOPHY

Conrad Baetzel

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The topic of this paper is the recent attempt by Paul Horwich to extract "Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy" from the *Investigations*, and the debate between Horwich and Timothy Williamson about the prospects of the resulting "Wittgensteinian" account. I consider first Horwich's project and raise some worries about it; second Williamson's objection against Horwich; before I then argue that, although I take Horwich's project to be both incorrect about the insights of Wittgenstein's later philosophy and philosophically flawed, it is nevertheless an interesting project to adhere to Wittgenstein's insights into the nature and task of philosophy—something that Horwich aims to do but fails to achieve. In this way, the shortcomings of Horwich's account can be a helpful stimulation towards, on the one hand, a better understanding of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, and, on the other, an account of philosophy that is interesting and valuable on its own, independently of exegetical concerns in Wittgensteinian scholarship.

BEYOND FACTS AND TRANSCENDENCE: THE MANIFESTATION OF VALUE IN LANGUAGE. SOME THOUGHTS ON A WITTGENSTEINIAN NOTION OF VALUE

Maria Balaska

Paris, France

This article tries to designate a notion of value which allows us to stay in language and avoid the two following perspectives: that of the merely factual and that of transcendence. The first perspective amounts to the idea that all there is is facts and no value: value in this sense becomes at best a pragmatic concept and gets related to what is merely useful. The perspective of transcendence regards value as emerging from a transcendent source and as involving ineffable truths: value hence becomes a concept which belongs to a realm beyond language. How can one equally avoid these two perspectives and find a place for value in language? It will be argued that the notion of meaning can be a suitable notion for tracing value in language, insofar as meaning is regarded as the recovery of a whole web of relations between propositions that are used significantly. This notion of meaning can fit with the idea of "seeing as a whole" which is pivotal in Wittgenstein's notion of ethics and aesthetics.

ANOTHER READING OF THE TRACTATUS: A COMPARISONS' PATH

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After almost a century since its publication, the *Tractatus* still keeps an aura of obscurity which continues to fascinate whoever has the occasion to read it. Recognizing a too big difficulty in giving a clarification, the purpose of this paper is just giving one of the possible accounts that we can use in order to be able to familiarly move between the terminology of this work: an overall example, on which we will concentrate, is the word "Bild" which is translated as "image", but which presents more affinities with the word "analogy".

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE STANDARDS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW

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In the criminal law and criminal law theory, claims are often made to the effect that 'We can't say *X* without abandoning an objective standard.' 'Objective' is used without much clarity as to what is meant by it. In an effort to shed some light on disputes in philosophy of criminal law and in legal scholarship, and to undermine some common assumptions in criminal law and criminal law theory, I sort through various ways we contrast 'objective' to 'subjective', with particular attention to ways the contrast is drawn in criminal law. I believe that various senses of 'objective' are conflated, with the result that options are sometimes ruled out, or arguments put forward, based on confusion about what objectivity requires.

STOLZ UND VORURTEIL. ÜBER EINIGE SCHWIERIGKEITEN DER ETHISCHEN SELBSTBEWERTUNG

Kathi Beier

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Mit Blick auf das Wissen um die eigene Person, so scheint es, gibt es eine Autorität der Ich-Perspektive, einen privilegierten Zugang der 1. Person Singular. Niemand sonst kann so gut wissen wie man selbst, was man empfindet, denkt oder beabsichtigt. Andererseits scheint dies mit Blick auf ein bestimmtes Wissen von sich gerade nicht zu gelten. Wenn es nämlich darum geht, sich selbst ethisch einzuschätzen, z.B. Auskunft darüber zu geben, ob man eine bestimmte Tugend besitzt, scheint eher das Urteil anderer, nicht das eigene, verlässlich zu sein. Klassische Beispiele sind die Zuschreibung von Bescheidenheit oder Besonnenheit. Was ist der Grund dafür, dass es kein Privileg der Erste-Person-Perspektive bei der ethischen Selbstbewertung gibt? Im Text werden zwei mögliche Antworten auf diese Frage vorgestellt. Für beide spielen Überlegungen von Aristoteles eine zentrale Rolle.

ON SAYING NOTHING: WITTGENSTEIN'S CONCEPTION OF THE RIGHT METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY

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In this paper I discuss Wittgenstein's conception of "saying nothing" or "making no assertions" as the proper way of doing philosophy in the *Tractatus*, the *Investigations* and in *On Certainty*. I also point to a connection between this conception of philosophy and Wittgenstein's conception of logic.

COMPLYING WITH REAL-LIFE MEMORY EXPERIENCES. A NOTION OF MEMORY AS PERFORMED

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In my paper, I present some features of Wittgenstein's view on memory, opposite to the mainstream analytical representationalism of memory and congenial rather to phenomenologies of memory. I try to show that his transcendental account of memory can allow elaborating more

properly the real-life memory experiences like traumatic memories.

GRUNDLOSE GEWISSEIT UND ABSOLUTES WISSEN – WITTGENSTEIN UND HEGEL

Alexander Berg

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Die Arbeit unternimmt den Versuch, die Gewissheitskonzeption des späten Wittgenstein in die Nähe derjenigen Konzeption zu denken, die Hegel in der Phänomenologie des Geistes für die Selbstgewissheit des Geistes als Absolutes Wissen entwickelt hatte. Der gesuchte Zusammenhang wird am Beispiel eines von beiden Autoren in ihrer je eigenen Art erforschten philosophischen Problems untersucht und zwar an dem des sogenannten Cartesischen Dualismus. Dabei zeigt sich, dass die methodischen Problemzugriffe Wittgensteins und Hegels nicht einfach nur verschieden sind, sondern, dass sie sich in ihrer eigentümlichen Gegensätzlichkeit als aufeinander bezogen darstellen lassen. Die Untersuchung der Form dieses Gegensatzes lässt vermuten, dass die Bemühung beider Autoren, den bewusstseinsphilosophischen Dualismus zu überwinden zugleich auch der Grund ist für die besondere Verwandtschaft ihrer Konzeptionen, der *Grundlosen Gewissheit* und des *Absoluten Wissens*.

HUEMER'S PHENOMENAL CONSERVATISM, MARKIE'S OBJECTIONS AND HUSSERL'S INPUT

Philipp Berghofer

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Huemer's Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) states that every seeming is a source of prima facie justification. Arguably, the most common objection against PC consists in referring to counterexamples. This sort of objection has particularly been championed by Markie (2005). In order to meet Markie's objection, a dogmatist could endorse a restricted version of PC. Here, a dogmatist is one who believes that at least one kind of seeming is a source of prima facie justification. This paper aims to show that a dogmatist could benefit from replacing Huemer's seemings with Husserl's phenomenological intuitions as being the ultimate source of prima facie justification.

WAS DER FALL IST, DER TRACTATUS

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"It used to be said that God could create everything, except what was contrary to the laws of logic. The truth is, we could not say of an "unlogical" world how it would look." [TLP3.031]. Computer Engineering is a great example of a logical world, using Logic as the basic knowledge for almost all of their activities. This paper aims to show how much Tractatus is present in Computer Engineering. For this, explores its aphorisms in order to point one more way to deal with hardware and software projects, a help for those engineers that want to know more about the sources of knowledge that feed the Computer Engineering. Tractatus enters in the computer world through the footnote attached to [TLP-1], in the first page, using a tree graph to number all aphorisms.

PANPSYCHISM IN THE FIRST PERSON: PHENOMENOLOGY AND WITTGENSTEIN BEYOND ANALYTIC METAPHYSICS

Michel Bitbol

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The most central presupposition of science, perhaps, is that objectivity is universal. This does not only create a blindspot in knowledge (according to Wittgenstein's metaphor of an eye in the visual field), but also forces one to ignore such blindspot. Several strategies were accordingly adopted in the West to overcome this ignorance. One of them is panpsychist metaphysics, that puts back experience in the very domain that was deprived of it by the act of objectification. Another one is Phenomenology, with its project of stripping the layers of interpretation by way of a complete suspension of judgment (epochè), and evaluating any claim of knowledge on the ensuing basis of "pure consciousness" lived in the first person. In this polemical context, it will be shown that Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology, from its very origin, has more in common with phenomenology than with any other alternative. A hierarchy of radicality will then be established between avoiding the blindspot from the outset and compensating for it retrospectively.

DISPLACING THE SUBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE

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This paper examines Foucault's attempt to displace the constitutive role of the subject of knowledge and to replace it with the concrete practices that constitute subjects. The prevalent tendency to transform discourse analysis into a new form of epistemology, here exemplified through the works of Paul Veyne, is criticized. It is suggested that Veyne's reading of Foucault is subject to an illusion similar to what Kant once called "transcendental illusion," and gives rise to a new form of metaphysics which repeats the problematic that Foucault originally aimed to overcome.

LEERLAUFENDE RÄDER UND TLP 6.53

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Wittgenstein's preferred technical metaphors are not infrequently subject to functional changes. By abandoning the concept of the independence of elementary propositions, for example, Wittgenstein points out that a sentence system rather than a single sentence is the scale to be applied to reality. The thought expressed in his metaphor of idle wheels finds itself reflected throughout his entire oeuvre and therefore serves well to retrace Wittgenstein's philosophical development. While the early Wittgenstein still follows Heinrich Hertz's idea to eliminate idle wheels, the middle Wittgenstein recognizes their inevitability and the later Wittgenstein even acknowledges that they make some kind of 'sense' for our language. I shall show that even though the metaphor of idle wheels does not explicitly appear in the *Tractatus*, it can be used to decipher the enigmatic sentence TLP 6.53 and its meaning for the tractarian project, leading to a clearer understanding of why this project was eventually abandoned.

FOUNDATIONS OF THE SOCIAL MIND: COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY AND THE SECOND-PERSON-PERSPECTIVE

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What does it mean to intend and do something together? While some philosophers argue that collective mental states such as group intentions are nothing over and above the summation of the individual intentions of the group members (e.g. Quinton 1975), others conceive of collective intentionality as a non-summative phenomenon, i.e. something that cannot be reduced to individual intentions (e.g. Searle 1990, Bratman 1999). An important aspect of non-summative accounts is the normative dimension of collective intentionality (Gilbert 1989), which also bears great anthropological significance. Following Tomasello (2014), humans are ultra-cooperative beings, who enjoy being in collective states of mind and the jointness of social conventions. This can be demonstrated with experiments on over-imitation (Kenward et al. 2010), where human infants are of possible evaluation according to principles of “how things are done”. A necessary prerequisite for enjoying this normativity and adjusting one’s own intentions and actions is the ability to change perspectives. Terminologically, the first-person-perspective is characterised by pre-reflective self-awareness and the subjective quality of experience – how things are from here for me. The third-person-perspective, on the other hand, means the observer perspective, from which states of affairs are registered “objectively”. Furthermore, it has recently become common in philosophy and psychology to speak of a second-person-perspective, i.e. an intersubjective, participant, or co-experiencing perspective (Fuchs 2013). This type of perspectivity emerges in dyadic interactions in early childhood and is characterised by an intercorporeality (Merleau-Ponty 2005) and a reciprocal reversibility of roles and actions. Therefore, to elucidate the structure of we-intentionality, one should also look at how perspectivity as structure of experience is transformed in we-intentional contexts. This is where the talk tries to offer some ideas by bridging the debates on collective intentionality and on the second-person-perspective.

MATHEMATICS: PURE AND APPLIED

James Robert Brown

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The distinction between pure and applied mathematics is a commonplace. Yet, the distinction is very different in the minds of philosophers from the way mathematicians conceive it. I will explore this difference and its significance for evidence, focussing on the role of intuitions and visual reasoning.

PHILOSOPHICAL AND RATIONAL INTUITION

Ana Butković

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According to the received view, intuitions are, in epistemological and methodological sense, important as a source of a priori evidence in contemporary analytic philosophy. There is, however, an apparent ambiguity in the usage of the term ‘rational intuition’, which by some rationalists covers a so-called *philosophical* or *classification* intuition as well. This ambiguity makes difficult to understand what is actually asserted about intuitions and what is disputed. Rationalists frequently explain rational intuition by means of *necessity* and *abstractness* concepts, without clearly indicating why they do so. In this paper I will try to show

that rationalists’ accounts are deficient because they fail to justify and explain the use of these concepts, together with the concepts of other properties standardly attributed to intuitions. Consequently, they exclude philosophical intuition from their accounts, contrary to their claim that this type of intuition is of special interest to philosophy as a source of philosophical knowledge.

WHO ARE “WE”? THE PROBLEM ABOUT WITTGENSTEIN’S IDEALISM

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Questioning the bases of the discussion about Wittgenstein’s alleged idealism, this paper intends to show that it is founded upon a misreading of the way in which the Investigations employs the pronoun “we”: an apparent ambiguity shown in two possible meanings of the word “we” that would oppose an empirical and a transcendental view. However, my main objective is not only to expose the falsity of this problem but also to look for a more fundamental question that motivates it. Through the identification of the idealist hypothesis’ roots we end up finding an important problem inside Wittgenstein’ work.

“CECI N’EST PAS UNE ONTOLOGIE” A CONTRIBUTION TO A QUASI-RESOLUTE READING OF THE TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS

Marco Carapezza & Roberta Rocca

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The opening remarks of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus seem to outline the bases of an atomistic ontological theory. For the resolute interpreters, such an ontology should be considered as mere part of the set of nonsensical propositions that make up the parody of a semantic theory. However, resolute readers share with the traditional views an essentialist reading of the ontological section, according to which Wittgenstein’s remarks are intended to build up a real, though parodistic, atomistic ontology. By contrast, textual evidence supports the idea that the basic notion of Wittgenstein’s ontology, i.e. the notion of object, should be considered as an intralinguistic, rather than an ontological one. In this paper, we want to show how some of the main claims of the resolute readings could be fruitfully combined with the analyses of Tractarian objects that illustrate them as the semantic roles of names.

WITTGENSTEIN’S CRITIQUE OF “THE STRONG CAUSAL ACCOUNT”– THE CASE OF SEEING ASPECTS

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In his several later writings, Ludwig Wittgenstein persistently addresses a problem which is called “the confusion in psychology”. This essay aims at arguing that Wittgenstein’s main target of the critique of the confusion in psychology is not merely some particular explanations offered by these psychologists, but the unified methodological assumption which I call “the strong causal account”, which is a common methodological assumption of these psychologies. In the first section, I will first introduce Wittgenstein’s view that this assumption is a general confusion in psychology. In the second section, I will clarify the defining characteristics of the assumption. In the third section, I will

turn to the case of seeing aspects to explain his three arguments rejecting the causal explanation of visual phenomenon provided by psychologist Köhler, which plays a significant role in his general project of critique of the causal explanation of mental phenomenon.

WITTGENSTEIN'S GRAMMAR AND THE CONTEMPORARY SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY

Mauro Condé

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Wittgenstein's philosophy was set in a scientific atmosphere in which the rationality of modern science was in broad questioning, establishing a kind of crisis of reason. Wittgenstein later philosophy formulated in the *Philosophical Investigations* can provide us with rich subsidies for think this crisis of rationality. In particular, in his notion of grammar, we have a key not only to (1) "dissolve" the crisis of modern reason, but simultaneously to establish (2) a new rationality demanded by contemporary science, that is, how to establish new criteria of rationality that, although no more anchored in ultimate foundation, on the one hand, it does not get lost in the extreme relativism on the other. What is intended here is to discuss the possibility of establishing a model of scientific rationality based in the later Wittgenstein, especially in his notion of grammar, thus constituting a kind of "grammar of science".

ON THE VAGUENESS OF "KNOW" AS A GRADABLE TERM

Zvonimir Čuljak

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Epistemic contextualists interpreted the predicate "know" either as *indexical*, comparable to expressions like "I", "here" or "this", or as a *gradable* term, like "tall" or "flat". Mark Heller (1999) categorized "know" as a broadly *vague* term. In this paper, it is argued that "know" does behave or can be considered as a vague term, rather than only as indexical or gradable. In contrast to Heller's contextualist interpretation, the vagueness of "know" can be explained in a non-contextualist manner by referring to its *intra-contextual* gradability, which is not due to inter-contextually shifting standards.

OBJECTS, FACTS AND PICTURES – SELLARS ON WITTGENSTEIN'S PICTURE THEORY

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My paper is concerned with Wilfrid Sellars' reading of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and its picture theory. I defend the view that although Sellars' interpretation has some serious drawbacks, it is unique and stimulating. In the first part, I outline the main features of his naturalist reading of the picture theory. I show that Sellars' reading cannot claim to be an overall consistent interpretation and that it would force us to discard central Tractarian doctrines. Given that consistency is not the only virtue of an interpretation, I proceed to analyze the advantages of Sellars' approach. It allows us to treat objects and facts in a fairly unproblematic way while retaining core elements of the picture theory. Therefore, I advocate Sellars' approach as worth considering despite its inability to render the *Tractatus* consistent.

WITTGENSTEIN AND THE (IM)POSSIBILITY OF MORAL ADVICE

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Moral philosophy has traditionally aimed for correct or appropriate moral judgments. Consequently, when asked for moral advice, the moral philosopher first tries to develop a moral judgment and then informs the advisee. The focus is on *what* the advisee should do, not on *whether* any advice should be given. There may, however, be various kinds of reasons not to morally judge, to be 'morally modest'. I argue that Wittgenstein's philosophy makes a case for the necessity of moral modesty, even to such an extent that the possibility of giving moral advice is threatened. The threat is due to the traditional link between moral advice and moral judgment. I argue that a Wittgensteinian notion of moral advice, in which moral advice does not have to be understood as linked to moral judgment, is compatible with the necessity of moral modesty. It has, therefore, a clear advantage over traditional notions.

SENSIBILITY AND VALUES – TOWARDS A PHENOMENOLOGICAL THEORY OF THE SENSIBLE REASON

Roberta De Monticelli

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Affects – quite especially, but not exclusively, bodily affects - "shape the mind" by general recognition – and emotions are more and more popular as a topic of philosophical research. Since Antonio Damasio's well-received work proposing the "embodied mind" approach to emotions, feelings have been investigated with brilliant results from both a phenomenological and a neurobiological perspective (for recent examples see Gallagher-Bower 2013 and Barile 2013).

On the other hand, since the appearance of Peter Goldie's influential book on emotions, philosophers have (again) become aware of the fundamental importance of the realm of feeling in both the cognitive and practical exercise of reason. Yet, although the relation between emotions and values is much discussed in analytic philosophy, contemporary research seems to be lacking a *general* theory of feeling, which would somehow connect the two levels of affective sensibility apparently concerned: one that is basically embodied, and one that is cognitively of a "higher" level, involved in a large variety of acts and behaviors characteristic of a rational and moral agent – such as a human being.

This paper presents an outline of such a general theory. It draws on classic sources in phenomenological literature, yet aims to provide a somewhat independent response to some of the main questions in contemporary debates, including the crucial one concerning the objectivity/subjectivity of values and value judgments.

METHODS OF DEMYSTIFICATION: WITTGENSTEIN VS. MARX

Janice Deary

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In this paper I claim that there is a significant metaphysical similarity between Wittgenstein and Marx, both of whom were interested in liberating us from our tendency to be 'mystified' by the products of our own confusion. Despite this similarity, Wittgenstein and Marx proffer very different methods to achieve demystification: for the former, demystification is attained through logical or linguistic analysis, whereas for the latter, mystification can only be

overcome if we change the “form of life” that contributes to its production and persistence. Using Wittgenstein and Marx as a basis, I argue that the problem of mystification, and how it is best resolved, is a fundamental question for metaphilosophy.

RIGIDITY AND INCONSISTENT BELIEFS

Dušan Dožudić

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In this paper I will discuss William Lycan's objection to Fregeans who grant name's rigidity, explaining it by the appeal to rigidity of other expressions (descriptions or predicates). Lycan argues that proponents of such a view face the same problem of reconciling the truth of particular propositional attitude reports with agent's rationality, as anti-Fregeans, i.e. Millians do. I will analyse Lycan's objection and argue that it fails to threaten such Fregeans.

WITTGENSTEIN ON KNOWING THE “WHAT IT'S LIKE” OF ONE'S OWN, AND OTHER'S, SENSATIONS

Christoph Durt

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At the 2014 Wittgenstein-Symposium, I will not read this paper, but present electronic slides. For getting the most out of the presentation, it very much makes sense to read this paper first. In it, I connect some of Wittgenstein's arguments around the topic of “private language” to the nowadays popular notion of “qualia.” I argue that Wittgenstein would reject two main features “qualia” are alleged to exhibit. Wittgenstein's arguments show that (1) the quality of sensations is not knowable to the subject that has them just by having them, and (2), that it is not true that they can be known to that subject only.

FREGE UND DAS PARADOX DER ANALYSE

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Das Paradox der Analyse besagt in seiner gängigsten Form: *Keine begriffliche Analyse kann beides sein — korrekt und informativ*. In diesem Beitrag werde ich zeigen, wie es dazu hat kommen können, dass Frege, in einer Rezension von Husserls *Philosophie der Arithmetik*, dieses Paradox explizit formuliert, wie er unmittelbar darauf reagiert und wie sich seine Reaktion mit seinen späteren Ansichten zu Analyse verträgt. Als Schluss wird sich ein Dilemma ergeben: Frege vertritt in seiner Husserl-Rezension *entweder* eine un plausible, schlecht argumentierte, mit seiner reifen Sicht inkonsistente Position *oder* er sagt überhaupt nichts zu dem Problem, das er selbst formuliert.

LOOKING THROUGH A MICROSCOPE. *PHILOSOPHISCHE BEMERKUNGEN 1938*: THE HIDDEN REVISION WHICH FITS THE 1938 VORWORT, THE RHEES TRANSLATION AND WHAT THIS TELLS US ABOUT WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS AND COSMOLOGY

Susan Edwards-McKie

Cambridge, United Kingdom

I set out an argument which uses new evidence for a joining of TSS 220 and 221, but, as it will have its own variations with the new evidence considered, it will both support earlier work by the Wittgenstein scholarly community on the *Frhfassung* and offer new exegetic reflections. This Nachlass discovery is contextualised within ideas of the Vienna Circle and Viennese modernism and, more specifically, the Whewell Court lectures of 1938. Three forms of triangulation of what I here call the Hidden Revision became significant. Firstly, the Hidden Revision provides the projected title *Philosophische Bemerkungen* rather than *Philosophische Untersuchungen*. Secondly, when constructed it is shown to correlate faithfully with the Rhees translation and numbering. Thirdly, as the consecutive numbering has been established across all of TS220 before the cuts for TS239 occur, the Hidden Revision and the TS239 project become indisputably distinct with the latter dated 1944, for which the Smythies translation provides corroboration. Fourthly, a beginning system of extra numberings beside the Hidden Revision numbering of remarks is considered, with suggestions for Wittgensteinian mathematics and cosmology.

DAS MEDIEN-PROBLEM DES PHILOSOPHIERENS UND WITTGENSTEINS NACHLASS

Christian Erbacher

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Das Medien-Problem des Philosophierens entsteht bei Versuchen der Verschriftlichung einer operativen Auffassung des Philosophierens. Da Wittgenstein diese vertrat und zudem philosophische Probleme als Probleme der sprachlichen Darstellung behandelte, spielte für ihn das Medien-Problem des Philosophierens eine besondere Rolle. Neben expliziter Benennung der Operativität des Philosophierens hat Wittgenstein so in den verschiedenen Entwürfen seiner schriftlichen Werkgestaltung verschiedene Darstellungsmittel entworfen, um dem Medien-Problem des Philosophierens zu entsprechen. Die von Wittgenstein bestellten Nachlassverwalter Rush Rhees, Elizabeth Anscombe und Georg Henrik von Wright waren sich Wittgensteins operativer Auffassung des Philosophierens bewusst und wollten ihr bei der Erfüllung ihrer Aufgabe Rechnung tragen. Das Medien-Problem des Philosophierens setzte sich so als Medien-Problem philosophischen Edierens fort. Der Vortrag skizziert die drei unterschiedlichen Umgangsweisen, die Wittgensteins Nachlassverwalter während der Editions-geschichte von Wittgensteins Nachlass als Antworten auf das Medien-Problem philosophischen Edierens entwickelt haben. In einem Ausblick wird auf die Nützlichkeit dieser editionshistorischen Einsichten für zukünftige digitale Editionen verwiesen.

JOSEF SCHÄCHTER'S TURN: FROM THE VIENNA CIRCLE TO NON-DUAL RELIGIOUSNESS VIA WITTGENSTEIN

Rachel Even

Oranit, Israel

The philosophy of Josef Schächter, from his membership in the Vienna Circle to his activity in the religious and educational field, was in effect influenced by Wittgenstein. Two vectors of influence operated on Schächter: one from the direction of ideas related to purifying language of metaphysics with an emphasis on the ethical standing granted to these observations; and the other from Wittgenstein's approach to religiousness, which can be extrapolated from his connection with Paul Engelmann. In that, Schächter demonstrated two aspects of philosophy: analytical and existentialist. The aggregate vector of what he learned from Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle was built into his educational activity and in his approach to the Bible. Schächter's students saw him as a mentor, going so far as to establish a community in Kibbutz Yodfat in the Galilee whose members lived according to the insights regarding human development, as they had learned them from him.

INSTRUMENTALISM: TWO DIFFERENT APPROACHES, ONE EPISTEMIC OPTIMALITY ARGUMENT?

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Instrumentalism plays a central role in two opposing epistemological positions, i.e., Radical Constructivism (RC) and Constructive Realism (CR): RC represents instrumentalism as an *epistemological position* that is consistent with skepticism about the external and incompatible with the concept of *truth*; information theory and cybernetics are adopted for modeling a self-organizing mind (von Foerster 1972; von Glasersfeld 1998). CR-proponents (Popper 1963; Giere 1985; Kuipers 2000), however, accept instrumentalism as *instrumental methodology* but stick to ambitious concepts of *truth* and the traditional certainty/uncertainty-dichotomy. The present paper suggests (i) information-theoretic measures of predictive success and progress, (ii) a principle of inductive inference that is basic enough to apply even to the extreme case of single event prediction on the basis of only one observed event, and (iii) the view of the heuristic *rationale* behind that principle as *optimal* in (almost) all possible worlds.

PERSPICUOUS REPRESENTATION AND PERSPICUITY

Tom Fery

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'Perspicuity' is of central importance in the works of the late Wittgenstein. Remarks such as "A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words. [...] Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases." (PI 122) speak a clear language. A lot of work has been done by interpreters on remarks like this one. In his remarks on the foundations of mathematics 'perspicuity' is a central concept as well, e.g. in RFM III, 1: "Mathematical proof must be perspicuous." I will discuss whether the notion of perspicuous representation as a guidance of philosophical method and perspicuity as a condition of a proof are connected to each other. A closer look on Wittgenstein's remarks on Cantor will be helpful in this respect.

THE MIND'S INTENTIONALITIES

Luis Flores

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Husserl's and Wittgenstein's approaches about mind are, to a certain extent, premises of my proposal. For Husserl, mind is consciousness, a network of acts. Every act is intentional, temporal, has horizon and comes from somebody. Lived body is the hinge between mind and physical body. It is inserted in life-world. For Wittgenstein, mind becomes off-center in favour of praxis. Natural languages are social. According to a grammar of experiences, we have to understand the language-game in which we talk about mind. I understand mind as consciousness. This one is immediate and directed to something. My first claim is that it is ontologically original, because: it is only temporal; experiences have not spatial foreshortenings; it is bounded only by motivation; experiences have fuzzy borders; it is *essentially multiple*, excluded the I. Consequently, my second claim is that there are four intentionalities of mind, isomorphical with lived body's intentionalities: *cognitive*, *symptomatic*, *deontic* and *aesthetic*.

SPRACHLICHE ZWECKE UND DER ZWECK DER SPRACHE

Florian Franken

München, Deutschland

Der Gebrauchcharakter der Sprache, der mit Wittgensteins Sichtweise auf das Wesen der Sprache verbunden ist, ruft Fragen hinsichtlich des Zwecks und des Gegenstands des Gebrauchs hervor. Wittgenstein legt sich diesbezüglich in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* und darüber hinaus nicht eindeutig fest. Ich möchte deshalb untersuchen, was darunter zu verstehen ist, dass (I) mit einzelnen sprachlichen Einheiten und (II) mit einer Sprache insgesamt ein Zweck verbunden ist. Daraus wird sich der Schluss ziehen lassen, dass mit dem Bezug auf unterschiedliche Gegenstände des Gebrauchs auch unterschiedliche Zweckbegriffe in Anschlag gebracht werden, die in der Wittgenstein-Rezeption indes häufig miteinander verwechselt werden.

TWO PHENOMENOLOGICAL ACCOUNTS OF INTUITION.

Guillaume Frechette

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It is usually acknowledged that one of the important ways thanks to which Husserl's phenomenology departed from Brentano's philosophy was his understanding of intuition as involving not only sensory perception, but also our grasping of universals (through eidetic insight) and phenomenological reflection as such (e.g. through a grasp of the structures of consciousness and intentionality). Following this view, Brentano's rejection of a perception of forms (a categorial intuition) would have restrained him to develop a proper phenomenological analysis. In other words, defending a larger concept of intuition, as Husserl did, would be a prerequisite for phenomenological investigation. In the following paper, I propose a reconstruction of the debate between Brentano and Husserl on the nature of intuition. I suggest that the central point of the debate is not the scope of the concept of intuition – whether it involves categorial intuition and phenomenological reflection alongside sensory perception – but rather the question concerning the constitutive elements of intuition. While Husserl considers intuition to be the presence, or givenness, of an object in experience, Brentano describes intuition as constituted by the proper presentation (*Ei-*

gentlichkeit) of an object in experience. After discussing the differences behind these two accounts, I will argue that Brentano is not restricted to sensory perception, as commonly believed.

TRANSPARENCY OR OPACITY OF MIND?

Martin F. Fricke

Mérida, Mexico

Self-knowledge presents a challenge for naturalistic theories of mind. Peter Carruthers's (2011) approach to this challenge is Rylean: He argues that we know our own propositional attitudes because we (unconsciously) interpret ourselves, just as we have to interpret others in order to know theirs'. An alternative approach, opposed by Carruthers, is to argue that we do have a special access to our own beliefs, but that this is a natural consequence of our reasoning capacity. This is the approach of transparency theories of self-knowledge, neatly encapsulated in Byrne's epistemic rule (BEL): If p , believe that you believe that p (Byrne 2005). In this paper, I examine an objection to Carruthers's theory in order to see whether it opens up space for a transparency theory of self-knowledge: Is it not the case that in order to interpret someone I have to have some direct access to what I believe (cf. Friedman and Petrashek 2009)?

MODELLE UND METAPHERN

Georg Friedrich

Aachen, Deutschland

In fast allen wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen trifft man im Rahmen von Hypothesen und Theorien auf Modelle. Physiker erklären subatomare Strukturen anhand des bohrschen Atommodells, Psychologen nutzen Verhaltensanalysemodelle zur Vorhersage von pathologischen Verhaltensweisen, Biologen sprechen über die Erbinformationen von Lebewesen mithilfe des Strukturmodells der DNA und Soziologen gehen davon aus, dass sich mit Modellen das soziale Verhalten von Gruppen adäquat beschreiben lässt. Eine Problematik von Modellen ist, dass sie sich auf einer höheren Abstraktionsebene befinden als die empirisch beobachteten Daten. Modelle sind in der wissenschaftlichen Gemeinschaft dennoch akzeptiert, denn sie erklären die beobachteten Phänomene und erlauben es, Vorhersagen zu treffen. Metaphern sind insofern wichtig, als eine große Anzahl von wissenschaftlichen Begriffen selbst eine Metapher oder zumindest metaphorischem Ursprungs ist. Da Metaphern eine nicht-wörtliche Redeweise sind, stellt sich hiermit die zweite Problematik. In diesem Beitrag soll die Frage beantwortet werden, inwiefern Modelle und Metaphern in der Philosophie Anwendung finden und finden können.

EMBODIED KNOWLEDGE – EMBODIED MEMORY

Thomas Fuchs

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The distinction between representational and enactive knowledge (knowing-that versus knowing-how) has gained new significance through the investigation of implicit memory. This kind of memory is formed in the course of the interaction of organism and environment: Recurring patterns of interaction are sedimented in the form of sensorimotor, but also affect-motor schemes. We may speak of an implicit "body memory" that underlies our habits and skills, connecting body and environment through cycles of perception and action. This embodied knowledge is actual-

ized by suitable situations or by overarching volitional acts, without necessarily being made explicit.

The structure of embodied knowledge will be analyzed by taking the example of learning social skills through dyadic interactions in early childhood. It will be argued that the non-representational, enactive knowledge acquired in these interactions is the basis of intercorporeality and empathy. Explicit or propositional forms of knowing others ("theory of mind") are derived from later steps of development; they are not sufficient for explaining the interactive and empathic human capacities.

THE METHOD OF PHENOMENAL CONTRAST AND COGNITIVE PHENOMENOLOGY

Martina Fürst

Graz/ Austria)

According to the phenomenal intentionality thesis, phenomenal character grounds intentional states. The relevant notion of 'phenomenal character' can be spelled out in two ways—either as the familiar kind of sensory phenomenology (such as visual or auditory imagery, emotional or bodily responses, etc.) or as a proprietary cognitive phenomenology. A strong version of the latter account has it that cognitive phenomenology forms an autonomous realm and individuates intentional states. The strong cognitive phenomenology thesis has significant explanatory power. Unfortunately, it is hard to establish. The key-arguments for cognitive phenomenology rely on the method of phenomenal contrast that aims at establishing cognitive phenomenology by offering scenarios of the following structure: First, readers are invited to imagine two phenomenally contrasting mental states. Second, by pointing out that the same sensory phenomenology is involved in these states, it is argued that the phenomenal contrast can only be accounted for in terms of a cognitive phenomenology. I will argue that the method of phenomenal contrast fails to establish a strong cognitive phenomenology thesis. I will demonstrate that on one reading, this method supports a proprietary cognitive phenomenology, but at the cost that it fails to be individuating. On another reading, phenomenal contrast scenarios point towards an individuating cognitive phenomenology, but at the cost that it fails to be proprietary.

SCEPTICISM, ISOLATION, AND MORALITY. CAVELL AND KRIPKE ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

Frederik A. Gierlinger

Vienna, Austria

Stanley Cavell and Saul Kripke have both argued that an adequate understanding of what Ludwig Wittgenstein sought to achieve in the *Philosophical Investigations* requires a proper understanding of the scepticism that is expressed therein. They disagree, however, on what the sceptical challenge is and on whether and how it can be met. This short essay is an attempt to clarify where their accounts agree, where they differ, and to indicate what consequences their views have for interpreting the *Philosophical Investigations*.

WITTGENSTEIN'S METAPHILOSOPHY: THE PROBLEM OF GENERAL MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT MEANING

Stefan Giesewetter

Berlin, Germany

In his recent *Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy*, Paul Horwich has advanced a view of later Wittgenstein centering on the claim that Wittgenstein's discussion of *meaning* should be regarded as far less central than it usually is by Wittgenstein scholarship. He argues that Wittgenstein's therapeutic philosophy does not rest on any particular account of meaning – especially not on a “use-account” of meaning – but has its origin in his “deflationary”, anti-theoretical *metaphilosophical* viewpoint. However, in his exposition of this methodology, Horwich is mentioning general misconceptions about meaning which impede our seeing differences in *use* – misconceptions he counters with statements of the form “meaning is use”. The question is: How does this fit with his view that Wittgenstein's discussion of *meaning* is of no central relevance for his “metaphilosophy”? I will show how this dilemma can be avoided by reconsidering the role of remarks on the grammar of ‘meaning’ for the debunking of such misconceptions.

THE SCHOPENHAUERIAN BACKGROUND OF THE TRACTATUS 5.6-5.641

Petr Glombíček

Prague, Czech Republic

The paper aims to reconstruct the argument of Tractatus 5.6-5.641 in the light of its Schopenhauerian background. It points out the Schopenhauerian sources of the relevant passages and explains how this background helps to understand the motivation and the structure of Wittgenstein's line of thought.

ON INTUITING, IMAGINING AND INTROSPECTING IN PHILOSOPHY

Sebastian Greve

Oxford, United Kingdom

I discuss David Chalmers' proposed way of modelling the notion of conceivability and some of his connected remarks about modal knowledge in general and the viability of conceivability arguments in particular. After an initial evaluation of Chalmers' basic model, I offer a few possible improvements drawing on considerations on a web of interrelated notions such as meaning, imagination and abstraction. Subsequently, putting the new model to the test, I apply it to Chalmers' own well-known conceivability argument concerning the possibility of physically perfect duplicates of human beings which somehow “lack” consciousness (the so-called ‘zombie argument’). I conclude by reflecting on the broader question of the usefulness of constructing models for our understanding of complex philosophical notions such as ‘conceivability’, drawing on some ideas by later Wittgenstein.

CAN DIFFERENT PEOPLE HAVE THE SAME PAIN?

A PHILOSOPHICAL ENTERTAINMENT.

Peter Hacker

Oxford, United Kingdom

The question of whether different people can have the same pain (or, more generally, the same experience) has engaged philosophers for centuries. The following dialogue,

which is an intellectual entertainment, addresses the issue. There are five protagonists Frege, John Searle, Wittgenstein, Peter Strawson and Wolfgang Künne. The meeting takes place in Elysium, where the spirits of the living mingle with the shades of the dead.

THE RESEMBLANCE BETWEEN A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION, AN AESTHETIC ONE AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

Elinor Hallen

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In this paper I will address the affinity of aims and methods between Wittgenstein's philosophy and Freud's psychoanalytic therapy. More specifically, how Freud's practice accords with what Wittgenstein characterizes as an aesthetic investigation and takes to be essential to philosophical practice. Wittgenstein talks of the three activities – the philosophical, the aesthetic and the psychoanalytical – as sharing characteristics and as able to shed light on each other and he often uses analogies to aesthetic activities or investigation as well as images to show the affinity between philosophy and psychoanalysis. Some of these I will present in this paper.

WITTGENSTEIN AND KANTIANISM

Robert Hanna

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In the 1970s, Peter Hacker and Bernard Williams argued that Wittgenstein was a Kantian transcendental idealist. In the 1980s, Hacker officially rescinded this interpretation; and Williams in any case regarded Wittgenstein's transcendental idealism as a philosophical mistake. And ever since, there has been a lively debate about Wittgenstein's Kantianism, anti-Kantianism, or non-Kantianism. In my opinion, however, this particular line of Wittgenstein-interpretation and debate was a dead letter from the start: If I am correct, then Hacker and Williams adopted a false, or at least needlessly uncharitable, conception of Kant's transcendental idealism in particular and also of his Critical philosophy more generally, from the get-go-hence the gambit of interpreting Wittgenstein as a transcendental idealist or Critical philosopher in that sense was bound to lead to ‘obscurity and contradictions’ (Dunkelheit und Widersprüche) (CPR Aviii). But if we revolutionize the way we think about Kant, then we can, correspondingly, revolutionize the way we think about Wittgenstein in the light of Kant's transcendental idealism and Critical philosophy.

SEEING EMOTION: AN APPLICATION OF WITTGENSTEIN'S TRANSITIVE/INTRANSITIVE DISTINCTION

Nicole Hausen

Groningen, The Netherlands

Wittgenstein indicates in a variety of remarks that we see the emotions of other people. Building on that idea, this paper offers a grammatical analysis of the concept of ‘seeing emotion’. Specifically, it is suggested that Wittgenstein's distinction (which he introduces in the *Brown Book*) between ‘transitive’ and ‘intransitive’ uses of words applies to sentences like ‘I see the happiness in his face’ and ‘I see his fear’. This analysis brings out a certain connection with Wittgenstein's notion of ‘imponderable evidence’, and that connection is described.

THE SLEEPWALKERS: HOW EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHERS PARTED WAYS IN THE 1920S—AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY, ANALYTICAL AND CONTINENTAL

George Heffernan

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The decade 1920–1930 had a lasting impact on the divergence of European philosophy into “Analytical” and “Continental” in the twentieth century. The bookends of these years are two seminal works, namely, Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* (1921) and Husserl’s *Formale und transzendente Logik* (1929). These texts are guided by two distinct conceptions of the methods, horizons, and results of philosophy. Their styles of philosophizing are also different. Yet they exhibit uncommon common ground, for both investigate the relationship between philosophy and logic. Despite the promise for collaboration that these works show, however, their respective philosophical approaches have yielded only sporadic cooperation. Thus neither “Analytical” philosophers nor “Continental” philosophers have actualized their full potential. There is no necessity in this history.

MULTISENSORY INTEGRATION: A NEUROPHILOSOPHICAL ACCOUNT OF BIOLOGY OF PERCEPTION AND LOSS OF SELF-EVIDENCE IN DISORDERS OF DISINTEGRATION

Inês Hipólito

Lisbon, Portugal

We perceive the environment and ourselves through the sensory system (Gallagher, 2005; Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2011; Damasio, 2012). The multisensory integration with the environment relates to the various aspects of self-experience, body recognition, actions, imagination, memory and consciousness (Gallagher, 2000; Damasio, 2001). We share with humans, and even some animals, the images in which relies our concept of the world and which seems to imply perception, memory and reasoning. The images are directly based on neural representations and they are topographically organized (Damasio, 2011). These are formed, or under the control of sensory receptors or under the control of dispositional representations contained in the brain cortical and subcortical regions and nuclei. These neural representations have to be correlated, on an essential way, from moment to moment, constituting the basis for cognitive self-awareness. The “I” that is the author of thoughts, emotions, body and actions, and is continuously informed by multisensory inputs and the results of this mental impression are presented in the form of a perception as a whole (Gallagher, 2005; Zahavi, 2005; Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2011; Blanke, 2012; Damasio, 2012). The perceptual inconsistency is analogous to the inconsistency of self-experience described by Sass and Parnas (2001, 2003) as disorders of the self. Loss of association between thoughts, feelings and actions described by Bleuler (1911) or loss of self-evidence described by Blankenburg (1971). This paper will try to present the neuro-cognitive basis for the refutation of the “Cartesian Theater” defending the hypothesis that mental images are constructions of the brain from a fragmented activity in an integrated mind, and that an inconsistency at this level results from an inability integration of sensory-perceptual, which seems to be revealed in integration disorders such as schizophrenia.

IS THE GETTIER PROBLEM CAUSED BY THE EPISTEMIC PASSIONS OF ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHERS?

Helmut Hofbauer

Vienna, Austria

The Gettier problem is completely incomprehensible for me as a philosopher with background in continental philosophy. However, in introductions to epistemology the Gettier problem is usually presented as an issue of common sense and everyday life. My analysis leads to the conclusion that analytical philosophers share a common sense that strongly differs from mine. Their attitude seems to be rooted in a passion of claiming knowledge (unnecessarily) in many everyday situations which is accompanied by a lack of need to talk about what they are actually doing when trying to solve the Gettier problem.

PHENOMENAL CONSERVATISM AND THE PRINCIPLE OF ALL PRINCIPLES

Walter Hopp

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According to the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism [PC], if a proposition P seems true to you, you have at least prima facie justification for believing it. In this paper, I will argue that PC, while plausible, is false. More specifically, I will argue that seemings are neither evidential nor non-evidential justifiers of our beliefs. If seemings are distinct from intuitive experiences such as perceptual experiences, then all of the important epistemic work is being done by those experiences, not the seemings that they normally generate. And there is good reason to think they must be distinct from perceptual experiences, since seemings have propositional content while perceptual experiences do not. I will contrast PC with Husserl’s “Principle of All Principles,” according to which “whatever presents itself to us in ‘intuition’ is to be taken simply as what it affords itself as.” I will argue that a close relative of this principle -- *if an intention is intuitively fulfilled, then we are justified in believing that the object of that fulfilled intention is the way the intention represents it to be* -- avoids all of the objections I raise against PC.

ASPECT-SEEING AND MEANING

Reza Hosseini

Grahamstown, South Africa

You see a face as friendly, a gesture as generous or pretentious, a smile as artificial or genuine, and a look in the eyes as frightened or hopeful, etc. But what do we see when we see an aspect? In other words, what does it take to see an aspect? By referring to Wittgenstein’s discussion of ‘aspect-seeing’ and ‘aspect-blindness’ in his later works, I argue that in most cases we arrive at seeing an aspect not by an ostensive method but as a result of an involved relationship with that aspect in the course of ‘our complicated form of life’ (Wittgenstein 1958: 174). In this view, when you point at a face and tell the child that ‘this is a friendly face’, the child might take the friendly face to mean a smiling face, but not that all smiling faces are friendly; we learn that a smile sometimes represents other things besides friendliness, like confidence, condescension, or cruelty. Children smile, politicians, too. The child will not learn the meaning of friendliness merely by an ostensive method of teaching words; life will teach her what a friendly face is.

A LADDER AND A CAVE

Herbert Hrachovec

Vienna, Austria

Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* does, at a first glance, employ a Platonic strategy, dividing the universe of discourse into two realms, with an atemporal, rationally transparent order determining a lower stratum. On closer inspection the *Tractatus*' „prototypes“ (Urbilder) come surprisingly close to Platonic ideas. The Wittgensteinian metaphor of a ladder may therefore profitably be compared to Plato's parable of ascent from a cave, the crucial difference being that Wittgenstein's image does not provide a return option. Feedback between the ideal and the real is, on the other hand, an essential ingredient of the success of Plato-style progress. The later Wittgenstein, consequently, rejects the metaphor of a ladder in favor of what might be called the trouble-free plateau of the ordinary. Yet, this is not his only lesson. He also considers a kind of reverse Platonism with the philosopher, confused about the way things are, in need of redemption.

WITTGENSTEIN'S ARGUMENT ON ASPECT

Tomoaki Ihara

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This paper deals with the issue of aspect and aspect-seeing, following Wittgenstein, to put a new light on the concept. The following are the five points to discuss; 1) There's no aspect-free looking at things. Everything I see is always aspect-related. 2) When aspects change, what changes is not the object but the way of looking at it. 3) The expression "seeing A as B" functions as a statement of grammatical rule. 4) Our communication (language-games) would be different either in a mono- or a multi-aspect situation. Whereas we can exchange our ideas on the basis of the shared meaning in a mono-aspect situation, we have to play a language-game with diverse meanings with no guarantee of the common signification in a multi-aspect situation. 5) As aspect-blind person would have difficulties when s/he engages in language-games in a multi-aspect situation, because s/he recognizes just one meaning (aspect) out of many.

VALUE THEORY: BETWEEN HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY AND MOORE'S INTUITIONISM

Gemmo Iocco

Parma, Italy

Although the ethical intuitionism and the phenomenological theory of value have been considered to be in some way incompatible, both acknowledge the distinction between *facts* and *value*. Starting from this basic assumption in this paper I focus on the ethical accounts proposed respectively by G.E. Moore and E. Husserl referring to the psychological-ethical model proposed by F. Brentano. Accordingly I argue that (a) Moore's ethical intuitionistic approach is not able to clarify, within ethical considerations, the fundamental difference between *axiology* and *deontology* and that the (b) Husserlian distinction between *technical* and *practical* dimension of moral reasoning represent a valid response to the difficulties arising from the fact-value distinction.

EMBEDDED PERSONS

Hanne Jacobs

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In my paper I propose a definition of personhood on the basis of Husserl's phenomenology. On my view and interpretation persons are capable of taking stances and they become the persons they are by and through the specific stances they take. In the paper I first develop what stance taking amounts to. Then I show how the account of personhood in terms of stance taking entails a conception of personhood that can do justice to the socially embedded nature of subjects, while at the same time also accounting for personal autonomy.

FACTS IN ETHICAL SPACE: WITTGENSTEIN ON THE WAXING AND WANING OF THE WORLD

Rene Jagnow

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Many interpreters of Wittgenstein have argued that the *Tractatus* expresses a type transcendental idealism about ethics and moral value. Yet, most of these interpreters ascribe to Wittgenstein only what I will call a "cautious" transcendental idealism, according to which value is constituted by the transcendental subject, but not instantiated in the world. In this paper, I have two goals. I first argue that such a cautious transcendental idealism is inconsistent with Wittgenstein's remarks in *Tractatus* 6.43. I then show that we can avoid this problem if we ascribe to him a "bold" transcendental idealism, according to which value is not only constituted by the transcendental subject, but also, in a way to be clarified, instantiated in the world.

4E COGNITION AND THE PROBLEM OF POSITIVISM

Julia Jansen

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It is true, naturalist "realism", understood in a positivist fashion, has become so 'common sense' again that it makes any alternative position appear foolish. However, this common-sensical bias also requires that we are especially vigilant in our investigations. In this paper, I will reflect critically on the potential implications of the 'naturalist' bias for current extended, embedded, embodied and enacted cognition theory. In particular, I will discuss the significance of questions regarding the imagination for a thorough understanding of the 4e framework. These questions are still mostly put to the side, but, if taken seriously, they tend to complicate matters in interesting ways.

A CASE STUDY: ARE PHILOSOPHICAL CLAIMS JUSTIFIED BY INTUITIONS?

Masashi Kasaki

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The orthodox view in the recent methodology of analytic philosophy is that intuitions play a central role in justifying or falsifying philosophical claims or theories. In this paper, I attempt to argue against the orthodox view through a *case study*. The cases I examine are the Gettier cases and the gypsy lawyer case. I describe how these cases are presented and diagnose what features are relevant to their acceptance or refusal in epistemology. My case study suggests that philosophers have a general tendency to take cases seriously only on well-established, principled

grounds. Hence, my case study provides evidence for the denial of the orthodox view.

TRANSCENDENTALISM AS A SPECIAL TYPE OF PHILOSOPHIZING: KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL SHIFT, DASEIN-ANALYSIS OF HEIDEGGER AND SACHVERHALT-ONTOLOGY OF WITTGENSTEIN

Serguei L. Katrechko

Moscow, Russia

In this paper, we attempted to consider Kant's transcendental philosophy as a special type of philosophizing (resp. new transcendental paradigm), which differs both from the 'object' metaphysics of Antiquity and 'subject' metaphysics of the Modern Age (transcendent — transcendental — immanent metaphysics). For this purpose, we introduce such methodological terms as transcendental shift [B 25] and transcendental perspective. The basis for such representation of transcendentalism is cognitive and semantic reading of the *Critique* and theory of 'two aspects'. While in classical metaphysics, cognition is interpreted as a relation between empirical subject and object, in transcendental metaphysics, 'possible experience' (*Erfahrung*) shall be understood as a relation between transcendental subject and object. However, Kant considers the subject and the object uncritically, in the substance *modus* and their transcendental rethinking in existential (*Dasein*; Heidegger) and event-ness (*Sachverhalt*; Wittgenstein) mode will allow taking the next important step towards development of transcendental paradigm of philosophizing.

DIE VERMISCHTEN BEMERKUNGEN UND DAS MANUSKRIFT MS 168

Peter Keicher

Wien, Österreich

Im ersten Teil dieses Beitrags wird auf ein Manuskript Wittgensteins hingewiesen, das mit der von G.H. von Wright für die *Vermischten Bemerkungen* gewählten editorischen Vorgehensweise methodisch unmittelbar in Verbindung steht. Im Manuskript MS 168 hat Wittgenstein selbst eine Auswahl von Bemerkungen zusammengestellt, wie sie aus den *Vermischten Bemerkungen* bekannt sind. Alle von Wittgenstein für dieses Manuskript ausgewählten Bemerkungen sind in den beiden Manuskriptbänden, denen sie entnommen sind, durch die gleichen Randzeichen gekennzeichnet. Es handelt sich dabei um senkrechte Striche zu Beginn und am Ende der jeweiligen Bemerkungen. Dadurch stellt sich die Frage, ob die Manuskriptquellen der *Vermischten Bemerkungen* ähnliche formale Kennzeichnungen oder Randzeichen aufweisen. Im zweiten Teil folgen zunächst einige allgemeine Angaben zu den noch kaum genauer erforschten Randzeichen in Wittgensteins Nachlass. Im dritten Teil werden die Ergebnisse einer Studie zu den unterschiedlichen formalen Kennzeichnungen und Randzeichen der Manuskriptquellen der *Vermischten Bemerkungen* zusammengefasst. Dabei geht es auch um die Frage, ob und inwieweit solche formalen Kennzeichnungen und Randzeichen zur Konzeption einer möglichen erweiterten Neuedition der *Vermischten Bemerkungen* beitragen können.

WHY MEANING INTENTIONS ARE NORMATIVE

Jon Keyzer

Dunedin, New Zealand

In "Why Meaning Intentions are Degenerate" (2012), Bilgrami argues that meaning intentions fail to be normative in any interesting sense. I situate this argument with respect to the skeptical challenge posed by Kripke's Wittgenstein (1982). I argue that Bilgrami mischaracterizes the relevant meaning intention and thus misses the important normative dimension imparted by a speaker's duty to be interpretable to others in his speech community.

FROM INSTRUMENTAL FACTS TO FINAL VALUES – SOME DIAGNOSTIC OBSERVATIONS

Peter P. Kirschenmann

Amsterdam, Netherlands

I critically discuss three "non-standard" views in formal axiology: (1) final values can be extrinsic; (2) instrumental values can be extrinsic final values; (3) instrumental values can be intrinsic. I suggest that many legitimate distinctions can be made, and I name a few relevant notions. I wonder about the broader implications of such notions and distinctions.

(MORAL) PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT INTUITIONS? YOU WISH!

Friderik Klampfer

Maribor, Slovenia

Herman Cappelen has recently argued (Cappelen 2012), against the predominant self-understanding of contemporary analytic philosophy, that its heavy reliance on intuitions as (sources of) evidence is a myth and a misconception. According to a diagnostic tool that he himself developed, most of the putative appeals to intuitions serve a variety of linguistic and dialectical, but very few argumentative purposes. In short, there is a prevalence of 'intuition' talk and discourse, but not really a prevalence of the corresponding method of justification. In the paper, I take up Cappelen's challenge. I find both his proposed diagnostic tool and his analyses of concrete cases wanting. Appeals to intuition are much more frequent and reliance on them far too regular to allow for methodological triumphalism. I support this claim by examples from the debate on moral responsibility, where appeals to intuition abound. What Cappelen calls Centrality, the view that intuitions are an important, if not indispensable, source of evidence for and against philosophical theories, is very much alive among analytic philosophers. This, I argue in conclusion, reinstates experimental philosophy as an important corrective to the reigning, often unreflective use of intuitions in moral inquiry.

MODELLING THE SENSES, MODELLING THE WORLD: WITTGENSTEIN, PICTURES, ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF MULTIPLICITY OF SENSORIAL EXPERIENCE

Stephanie Koerner

Manchester, United Kingdom

This paper uses the idea of 'modelling the senses, modelling the world' (Crombie 1994) to compare Wittgenstein's 'picture theory of meaning' with novel recent approaches to images and 'visual culture' as foci for rethinking art and

science's histories. The concluding section concerns contributions such comparisons can make to addressing problems that "Western privileging of sight as *the* aesthetic sense" (Classen 1998: 139) poses for addressing such jointly epistemic and ethical questions as: What should be represented? Why? By and for Whom? How? (e.g., IWS 2006)

PHILOSOPHY AND THE THEORIES OF MIND

Zsuzsanna Kondor

Budapest, Hungary

Resolving or overcoming the difficulties raised by the mind-body split appears to be a nearly insoluble challenge for philosophers. In this paper I will attempt to illuminate the difficulties which are rooted in either a secondary transcendence as a solution to mind-body dualism, or in monism, which establishes its theory on the physical body. In my argumentation I will rely on phenomenology on the one hand, and recent radicalism with regard to enactive and/or embodied cognition on the other hand. I will argue that "the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language" (Wittgenstein 1963:109) is clearly visible from the perspective of phenomenology as Merleau-Ponty construed it, and that ideas apparently in opposition to the legacy of phenomenology sometimes converge surprisingly.

DESCRIBING THE IMMANENT HIDDEN AND THE WORLDLINESS OF THE WORLD: A CONVERGENCE IN LATER WITTGENSTEIN'S AND EARLY HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPTIONS OF THE AIM AND METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY?

Jo-Jo Koo

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It has been rarely noted that the later Wittgenstein actually works with *two* understandings of the *hidden* (*Verborgenheit*) in *Philosophical Investigations* (*PI*). Although he continually and sharply criticizes our craving in *PI* for the "transcendent" hidden, he shows in *PI* §129 a deep respect for the "immanent" hidden. I first explore in this paper the connection between the reasons for this respect for the "immanent" hidden and the nature of "surveyable presentations" (*übersichtliche Darstellungen*) in *PI* §122. I then briefly sketch how later Wittgenstein's conception of the immanent hidden converges with early Heidegger's conception of the "worldliness of the world" (*Weltlichkeit der Welt*) in *Sein und Zeit*. I end the paper with some suggestive remarks about how this apparent convergence opens up a new aim and method for a correspondingly transformed way of doing philosophy to pursue as a fruitful possibility.

ON CERTAINTY AND RELATIVISM

Martin Kusch

Vienna, Austria

In this paper I seek to distinguish and identify a number of relativistic motifs in Wittgenstein's last notebooks, later published under the title "On Certainty". I shall try to explain how these motifs hang together, and suggest that the question "Was Wittgenstein a relativist?" has no simple answer. I shall also focus on parallels and differences between Wittgenstein's relativistic motifs and contemporary discussions of relativism.

WITTGENSTENIAN FORM OF LIFE AS POSSIBILITY OF EXISTENCE

Emiliano La Licata

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Reading late Wittgenstein, I'm convinced that he believes forms of life are cultural constructions, certainly bridgeable and not incommensurable. Therefore, forms of life such as cultural and social constructions are differentiated and have dynamic and creative features. In the article, I work on the idea that form of life in Wittgenstein is a possibility of existence. Following the work of Agamben, I have presented arguments suggesting the idea that form of life as a cultural condition is certainly with a fixed and regulated shape, but this form could be creatively altered by human agency. It is an ongoing form, in evolution, temporary and manipulable by the creativity of humans. Following also the insights of von Wright, form of life is interpreted as an ongoing process and not something that is crystallized in a biological or cultural form. In other words, life is not structured in one or more static forms; it takes on a possible form, never final and always open to change in its becoming, making itself concrete and historical. Life takes a form that is not *a priori*, but is built on its development through non-deterministic processes. On the one hand, life takes on a certain form in its development, but at the same time an escape opens up from this temporary form. While it follows a path of historicization, the life form always has a forked path which can potentially lead it elsewhere and in an unpredictable direction.

ON BOYD'S REBUTTAL OF KRIPKE'S ARGUMENT FOR DUALISM

Klaus Ladstaetter

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The essay presents Saul Kripke's argument for mind/body-dualism and makes the suppositions explicit on which it rests. My claim, inspired by Richard Boyd, is that even if one of Kripke's central suppositions - the principle of necessity of identities using rigid designators - is shared by the non-traditional identity theorist, it is still possible for her to rebut Kripke's dualism.

FITTING, FEELING AND WHAT HEGEL MEANT

Jakub Mácha

Brno, Czech Republic

Two objects fit together if they have a compatible shape. I want to focus on a different kind of fitting which is predominant in Wittgenstein's latest texts. This is a fitting underlined by a feeling of aesthetic comfort. One may even feel that all things fit together. Wittgenstein ascribed this expression of the unity of experience to Hegel. I argue for two claims: (1) Wittgenstein might have been inspired by the Neo-hegelian philosophy of Francis Bradley and his account of a feeling base. (2) Wittgenstein ascribed to Hegel the idea that objects are what they are only in their familiar surroundings. Hegel indeed claimed something like this—most notably in the "Sense-Certainty" chapter of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. I provide a Wittgensteinian reading of this chapter concluding that every demonstrative act occurs against a background of demonstrative practices and that the doctrine of external relations is an inadequate account of knowledge.

IST „FAMILIENÄHNLICHKEIT“ EIN PHILOSOPHISCHER, EIN THEORETISCHER BEGRIFF ODER BEIDES?

Ingolf Max

Leipzig, Deutschland

Unter Verweis auf die Analogie zwischen Wittgensteins Begriff „Familienähnlichkeit“ und Wagners „Tristan-Akkord“ wird auf die kompositorische Leistung beider verwiesen, Muster mit einer spezifischen *inneren* Struktur in ihren Werken in *internen*, harmonischen Zusammenhängen zu verarbeiten. Im *theoretischen* Sinne könnten wir die Ähnlichkeitsbeziehungen zwischen den Gliedern *innerhalb einer* Familie von denen zwischen den Gliedern *verschiedener* Familien unterscheiden. Mit „Familienähnlichkeit“ wird der Verweis auf *externe* Ähnlichkeiten ausgeschlossen. Wittgenstein verwendet seinen Begriff konsequent *philosophisch*, da er nur dort zur Anwendung kommt, wo wir uns aus der Sprache heraus auf die GESAMTE Sprache beziehen. Hier haben wir keine Wahl zwischen *interner* und *externer* Betrachtungsweise. Es können *Theorien* (z.B. eine Logik der Akkorde) gebildet werden, die *ausschließlich interne* (harmonische) Verwandtschaften betrachten. Diese haben jedoch immer eine *begrenzte Reichweite* und liefern keinen Zugriff auf das GESAMTE Phänomen. An Hand der Kreation einer Folge von Akkordmustern wird gezeigt, wie sich Momente eines *theoretischen* Begriffs „Familienähnlichkeit“ darstellen lassen.

„VANITAS VANITATUM“ – LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN UND BLAISE PASCAL ALS KRITIKER DER EITELKEIT

Johannes Leopold Mayer

Baden, Österreich

Die Eitelkeit ist ein großes kontinuierliches Menschheitsdrama. Und jeder Mensch ist Mitwirkender. Es sollte zu denken geben, dass Blaise Pascal und Ludwig Wittgenstein sich diesem nachdrücklich angenommen haben und auch auf diese Weise diese Kontinuität bestätigen. Sie spüren ihre eigene aktuelle Eitelkeit auf und geben uns damit ein Mittel in die Hand, bei uns das Selbe zu tun.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF HABIT: IDENTITY, KNOWING AND CREATIVITY

James McGuirk

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While habits have been evaluated variously by thinkers in the Western tradition, there seems to be a general sense that they involve stable types or patterns of behaviour which are born out of repetition and which become definitive of a person or group. We form habits (good or bad) through repeated enactments of certain actions until they become a part of who we are, while simultaneously receding from our explicit awareness.

So crucial to most discussions of habit is a focus on (1) habit as a naturalization of mind, as the sinking of reason into nature to become 'second nature' and (2) the role established patterns of habitual behavior play in the constitution of identity inasmuch as stable patterns of acting, thinking or engaging over time, make us who we are as individuals and as groups. As to how these stable patterns are understood, these can range from a thoughtless and blind repetition of actions (Ryle) to more nuanced idea of habits as *structured* and *structuring structures* which operate with some flexibility within a social field of action (Bourdieu).

In this paper, I want to draw attention to an oft-neglected aspect of habit; namely to the possibility for novelty in habitual acting. While I do not wish to deny that habits involve stable patterns of action that are identity-constituting, I want to argue that these patterns of behaviour admit of far greater flexibility than is often done justice too in discussions of habit (both within and without Philosophy). As such, the stability of habituality is often overplayed to the point that the capacity for habituality to engender novelty is overlooked.

The argument is that while it is generally agreed that the concept of habit is a broad one, the examples chosen in discussions of the topic tend to be those that invite the association of habits with reflexes such that we easily overlook the capacity for novelty.

The phenomenologists are interesting here precisely because they draw our attention to both the range of habits in human life (Husserl, Schütz) and to the connection between the habitual and the inventive (Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur). This is done, especially by Ricoeur, in extending the insights drawn from simpler perceptual examples to more complex domains of human action. The consequences of this approach include, (1) that we see in habituality an interplay between the predictable and spontaneous; (2) that the importance of habit has to do with discovering the world and not just with the formation of identity.

THE “NO TRANSCENDENCE, THEREFORE RELATIVISM”- ARGUMENT AND THE POSSIBILITY OF NON-RELATIVE JUDGEMENTS

Patricia Meindl

Graz, Austria

In this paper I am concerned with Harvey Siegel's attempt to reject the Strong Programme's epistemological relativism by refuting the „No transcendence, therefore relativism“-argument. In the first part of the paper I will argue that a great part of Siegel's attempt to refute the argument from the impossibility of transcendence fails, because it hinges on an implausible interpretation of the Strong Programme's epistemological relativism. Nevertheless, in the second part of the paper I want to elaborate on and sharpen up one aspect of Siegel's attempted refutation – the ‚roomier‘ perspective – by arguing that this idea could in fact offer a fruitful account on how to challenge the relativist's assumptions concerning the requirements of non-relative judgements.

REASON AGAINST TRUTH, AND TRUTH AGAINST REASON?

Uwe Meixner

Augsburg, Germany

The paper explores the general relationship between reason (or: epistemic rationality) and truth. It centers on the question of whether there can be conflicts between reason and truth, and on the forms such conflicts may take. Are there philosophically interesting examples of such conflicts?

WHAT IS IT LIKE TO BE AN ANGEL?

Karl Mertens

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In his famous article “What is it like to be a bat?” Thomas Nagel invites us to follow a thought experiment. In my

paper I would like to modify Nagel's question by asking: What is it like to be an angel, i.e. a creature which is not bodily situated in the world? Therefore I would like to pick up some rough features of the idea of an angel's existence with the help of Peter Frederick Strawson and, above all, Thomas Aquinas. My considerations will be focused on two aspects. First, following Nagel for a start it becomes immediately clear that we cannot imagine what it is like to be an angel from an angel's perspective. However, there remains another version of Nagel's question: what is it like to be an angel from a human being's perspective? In contrast to Nagel's remarks about bats, I want to show, that we also have no possibility to delineate a conceivable concept of what could be called a human angel's world. We cannot imagine a possible human experience of an incorporeal intellect and will. Moreover, taking into account an incorporeal existence we have no idea to understand concepts like 'action', 'social communication' and 'individuality'. Second, against this background I will shortly sketch some reflections demonstrating the importance of our bodily situated existence for an adequate theory of action.

BETWEEN PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND COMMON SENSE. REFLECTIONS ON DIFFERENTIAL ANTHROPOLOGY.

Stefano Micali

Heidelberg, Germany

In contemporary thought, the attempt to clearly distinguish normality from anomaly appears to be increasingly problematic. In light of psychoanalytic approaches (Sigmund Freud, Donald Winnicott, Jean Laplanche), psychiatric studies (Kurt Goldstein, Wolfgang Blankenburg) and epistemological-genealogical investigations (Georges Canguilhem, Michel Foucault), contemporary research has become aware of the unreliability of normative methodologies, which presume a universal concept of man as a stable point of reference in determining a disturbance merely as a deviation from the normal.

Michael Theunissen's inquiry into a 'negative anthropology' can be helpful in developing an alternative paradigm. In this lecture, we will critically discuss Theunissen's approach and attempt to transform the negative anthropology into a 'differential anthropology'. We will focus on the fundamental worth of psychopathological research for philosophical and phenomenological anthropology because it enables an explication of the self's basic structure. By contrasting the everyday sense of *Selbstverständlichkeit* with its transformation in pathological disturbances, implicit dimensions can be retraced, which otherwise would remain hidden from anthropological analysis.

A DIFFICULTY IN THE FOUNDATION OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

Karel Mom

Amsterdam, The Netherlands

This paper discusses some assumptions about language and philosophy underlying the programme of linguistic analysis. It questions the tenability of those assumptions and argues that they provide insufficient support for making the usual division between Analytic and Continental Philosophy.

WHAT CAN PHENOMENOLOGY STILL CONTRIBUTE TO CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY?

Dermot Moran

University College Dublin & Murdoch University

Phenomenology, an approach rather than a strict method, is built on first-personal experience (singular and plural) and relies on what is given in a purified intuition to gain a priori knowledge of the conditions of possibility of various kinds of conscious states and their objects. Phenomenology is important for challenging third-person objectivist and naturalist accounts of knowledge. In this paper, I will argue that phenomenology continues to provide a rich conceptual framework for addressing key issues in the philosophy of mind and action. I will concentrate here on some central phenomenological themes and show their relevance for present day discussions. These themes are intentionality, embodiment, empathy, intersubjectivity and the constitution of sociality and the life-world.

LOGICAL FORM IN THE ANALYTIC AND CONTINENTAL TRADITION SEBASTIAN RÖDL'S TEMPORAL LOGIC AND AUSTIN

Aloisia Moser

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According to Sebastian Rödl's *Categories of the Temporal* a temporal logic must underlie the a-temporal logic that philosophy is usually occupied with, especially as it is discussed through representatives of the philosophical-linguistic or analytic tradition. Rödl argues that Analytic Philosophy does not appreciate that the human intellect is finite and depends on intuition. In this paper I present the structure of Rödl's argument for a temporal logic, which he gains from Kant. Subsequently I discuss the implications of Rödl's account of the form of thought as an act of them mind for a reading of Austin's speech acts.

CONCEPT PLURALISM, DIRECT PERCEPTION, AND THE FRAGILITY OF PRESENCE

Alva Noë

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In this paper I explore and defend the idea that concepts are techniques for achieving access. One upshot of the discussion is that perception and thought differ as modes of access. A broader aim is to discuss the place of thought in the actionist or enactive account of perception that I have developed elsewhere.

WORLD-PICTURES IN ON CERTAINTY

Hiroshi Ohtani

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In *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein argues that world-pictures are things that stand fast. However, what do the sentences about them express? Some think that they are propositions, while others regard them as grammatical rules. In this paper, I investigate these two interpretations and one other alternative, and assert that all of them have serious flaws (section 2). I then argue for my interpretation, which affirms that they are pictures, as the name "world-picture" suggests (section 3). By citing the notion of a picture in *Philosophical Investigations*, I argue that a picture is a rough conception that is calling for a clarification, and that

it is different from propositions or rules. In my conclusion, I respond to an objection (section 4).

UNOBSERVABILITY AND MINDREADING

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The 'Unobservability Thesis' (UT) is the thesis that the mental states of other people are 'unobservable'. Both defenders and critics of UT seem to assume that it has important implications for the possible shape of a correct account of mindreading whether we affirm or deny UT. Roughly, the former argue that because UT is true, mindreaders need to infer the mental states of others, while the latter maintain that the falsity of UT makes mindreading inferences redundant. As I argue in this paper, however, it is not clear what 'unobservability' means in this context. I outline various interpretations of what it could mean, and argue that on the most natural interpretation of UT, it has no obvious implications for the mindreading debate whether we endorse or reject the thesis. On other interpretations, UT does matter to the mindreading debate, though not quite in the ways defenders and critics of the thesis have tended to suppose.

STRUKTURELLE EIGENSCHAFTEN DER TEXTFORM „BEMERKUNG“, EXEMPLARISCH GEZEIGT AM „PHILOSOPHIE-KAPITEL“ (§89-§133) DER PHILOSOPHISCHEN UNTERSUCHUNGEN

Sool Park

Seoul, Republik Korea

Dieser Beitrag ist ein Versuch, die Textform der „Bemerkung“ strukturell abzugrenzen gegen andere Formen der philosophischen Miniaturprosa wie Aphorismus oder (romantisches) Fragment. Eine „Bemerkung“ ist sowohl abgeschlossen als auch offen, und steht in einer linearen Konstellation mit anderen Bemerkungen. Somit konstituiert sich die strukturelle Besonderheit einer „Bemerkung“ hauptsächlich in zwei Aspekten: Nämlich in 1) bemerkungsinternen Strukturen mit einem meist lokalen Wirkungsspektrum (Mehrstimmigkeit, Ton, Lesebetonung, Literarizität, Performativität usw.) und 2) ihrem facettenreichen Verweisungspotential zu ihrem Kontext, d.h. zu anderen Bemerkungen. Diese Verknüpfungsmöglichkeit auf argumentativen, rhetorischen und stilistischen Ebenen baut sich zwar auf der Grundlage der bemerkungsinternen Strukturen auf; scheint jedoch der Textform der Bemerkung dennoch inhärent zu sein. Das Ziel des Beitrags besteht darin, anhand der formal-textinternen sowie textgenetischen „Mikroanalyse“ des „Philosophie-Kapitels“ eine Reflexion über Wittgensteins metaphilosophisches Konzept zu entwickeln.

NEW WITTGENSTEIN NACHLASS FACSIMILE, OPEN ACCESS

Alois Pichler

Bergen, Norway

The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB) and the Wren Library at Trinity College Cambridge are cooperating on producing a new digital facsimile of the Wittgenstein manuscripts and typescripts kept at the Wren Library. The facsimiles will be published Open Access on Wittgenstein Source (<http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/>). WAB is also in the process of talking to other libraries and archives that hold Wittgenstein Nachlass originals, such as

the Austrian National Library in Vienna, about inclusion of their materials in the new facsimile edition. The project has been planned for some considerable time, and is made possible through a partnership between Trinity College Cambridge, the University of Bergen and the Stanhill Foundation. The presentation will communicate and discuss these and other relevant developments in more detail and invite feedback on perspectives and proposed scenarios.

FROM ANALYSIS TO MORPHOLOGY. CONTRIBUTION TO INVESTIGATIONS INTO LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD

Michał Piekarski

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The article discusses the problem of the unity of Wittgenstein's philosophy. The author suggests that Wittgenstein uses different methods of inquiring. The modifications of his philosophy are correlated with modifications of his method of thinking and investigations. In *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* the only correct philosophical method is that of logical analysis of propositions. In early 30s his philosophy becomes a phenomenological description of experience. The task is to construct phenomenological language. After 1933 Wittgenstein recognizes the grammatical dimension of language, and creates tools of grammatical analysis. He introduces concepts of language-games and forms of life. His philosophy becomes the morphology and description of human linguistic practice.

DER „UR-TRACTATUS“ – ZUR EIGENSTÄNDIGEN BEDEUTUNG DER ERSTEN 13 SEITEN VON WITTGENSTEINS MS 104

Martin Pilch

Wien, Österreich

In der Unterscheidung selbständiger Zwischenstufen im sog. *Prototractatus* (MS 104) war die Aufmerksamkeit der Forschung bisher zumeist auf die ersten 28 Seiten (*Core-Prototractatus*) oder auf die ersten 70 bzw. 71 Seiten (*proto-Prototractatus*) gerichtet. Die ersten 28 Seiten gliedern sich aber noch einmal deutlich in zwei Textstufen, deren erste (die ersten 13 Seiten von MS 104) so etwas wie die Urfassung der Struktur des *Tractatus* bis Satz 6 enthält. Diese erste abgeschlossene Textstufe bildet ein ideales Referenzmodell für die Erforschung sowohl der vortractarischen Schriften als auch der weiteren Entwicklung des *Prototractatus* selbst.

THE CONTRACTARIAN THEORY OF ANIMAL RIGHTS AS A NEW PERSPECTIVE IN MORAL PHILOSOPHY

Dorota Probucka

Cracow, Poland

The aim of this article is to present a new understanding of the theory of moral contract and linking it with the idea of animal rights. The author focuses his attention on the views of the philosopher Mark Rowlands. In his opinion, contractualism should be reconsidered and reformulated. This theory, contrary to popular opinion, can provide a philosophical basis for the idea of animal rights and the rights of people who do not meet the condition of being rational.

DIE PHILOSOPHISCHE PRAXIS – ANALYTISCH ODER KONTINENTAL? ANREGUNGEN VON WITTGENSTEIN

Esther Ramharter & Donata Romizi

Wien, Österreich

Unter Philosophischer Praxis versteht man professionell betriebene philosophische Lebensberatung. In diesem Artikel werden eine kontinentale Konzeption von Philosophischer Praxis und eine analytische – anhand von Aufsätzen von Gerd Achenbach und Ben Mijuskovic – gegenübergestellt und mit einigen Bemerkungen Wittgensteins in Beziehung gesetzt. Es zeigt sich, dass diese Bemerkungen als Korrektiv sowohl der kontinentalen als auch der analytischen Auffassung gelesen werden können.

ANALYTICAL VS. CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY: THE WRONG PLACE OF WITTGENSTEIN IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

Henrique Jales Ribeiro

Coimbra, Portugal

In this paper it is argued provocatively that (1) the alleged dichotomy/opposition between “analytical philosophy” and “continental philosophy” must be set aside considering the recent inputs from the historiography of the analytical movement in general, which show that the former originates from the latter and/or overall from Western history of philosophy; that (2) this is exactly the case of Wittgenstein’s thought and work; and, therefore, that (3) the concept itself of “analytical philosophy”, or of “analytical tradition in philosophy”, must be abandoned once and for all, specially when applied to studies of Wittgenstein’s philosophy.

THE “QUEER RESEMBLANCE” BETWEEN AESTHETICS AND PHILOSOPHY – A PERSPECTIVE ON WITTGENSTEIN’S PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD

Nuno Ribeiro

São Carlos, Brazil

This paper intends to clarify the importance of aesthetics to the development of Wittgenstein’s philosophical method after his return to Cambridge and philosophy in 1929. Indeed, throughout the several classical sources for the study of the Wittgensteinian aesthetics, such as the *Lectures on Aesthetics*, G. E. Moore’s “Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930-33”, *Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge, 1932-1935*, edited by Alice Ambrose, and the remarks about aesthetics collected in *Culture and Value*, one finds several clues to understand the connection between aesthetics and philosophy, which are the consequence of Wittgenstein’s anti-essentialism and anti-Platonism. Thus, bearing in mind Wittgenstein’s critique of essentialism and his anti-platonic attitude, it will be clarified the consequences of the Wittgensteinian aesthetic thought to the creation of a new philosophical style and, therefore, the development of a new philosophical method.

ETHISCHES URTEILEN – EINE ANNÄHERUNG IM AUSGANG VON ARISTOTELES

Florian Richter

Mühlacker, Deutschland

Im Ausgang von Ludwig Wittgensteins non-kognitivistischen Einwänden gegenüber einer Ethik im *Tractatus logico-philosophicus (TLP)* werde ich zeigen, dass Wittgensteins Überlegungen zum Regelfolgen in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen (PU)* eine Aufgabe des non-kognitivistischen Standpunktes beinhalten. Im Ausgang von John McDowell und Aristoteles können Wittgensteins Erörterungen aber auch genutzt werden, um zu zeigen, dass die Instanz ethischen Urteilens dann in einer spezifischen Fähigkeit liegt: der *φρόνησις*.

THE METHOD OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (WITH SOME REFERENCE TO FRANZ BRENTANO)

Tina Röck

Innsbruck, Austria

To many philosophers the rift between phenomenology and analytical philosophy may seem too deep to traverse. But both traditions can trace some of their heritage back to a common source - the work of Franz Brentano. In Brentano the methods of description (phenomenology) and analysis were integrated in order to render philosophy a strict science. First I will distinguish phenomenology from analytic explanation and show some of the strengths and weaknesses of these methods. Then I will briefly indicate how Brentano combined these methods in such a fashion as to curb their weaknesses and enhance their strengths. The goal of this paper is to hint at an option of a fruitful integration of these methods that might inspire philosophers to bridge the mentioned rift within contemporary philosophy.

UNHINTERGEHBARKEIT ALS BRÜCKE ZWISCHEN DEN UFERN DER ANALYTISCHEN UND KONTINENTALEN PHILOSOPHIE: HEGEL, WITTGENSTEIN

Alexander Romahn

Leipzig, Deutschland

Vermittels der Metapher zweier Ufer und einer zwischen ihnen durch eine Brücke zu schlagenden Verbindung wird der Begriff der Unhintergebarkeit bei Wittgenstein und bei Hegel betrachtet. Dabei werden die jeweiligen Ufer durch einen Blick auf die unterschiedlichen Ansichten zur Philosophie bei den beiden Philosophen gezeichnet und es wird auf den Begriff des *Sprachspiels* bei Wittgenstein sowie des *Absoluten* bei Hegel verwiesen, da sie durch den Kerngedanken, man könne aus den jeweiligen Konstrukten nicht heraustreten, einen idealen Ansatzpunkt für eine Brücke darstellen. Nachdem die Brücke gebaut worden ist, wird ein erster Vorschlag unterbreitet, wie beide "Ufer" einander näher gebracht werden können.

GIBT ES EINEN KANTIANISCHEN INTUITIONISMUS IN DER ETHIK?

Inga Römer

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Within the contemporary renaissance of ethical intuitionism, some have proposed a Kantian version of intuitionism that is supposed to solve some of the problems with traditional intuitionism. At the same time, there are Kantians

who believe that Kant's ethics, correctly understood, has indeed an intuitionist and realist foundation. In this sense, there are even two lines of Kantian intuitionism in ethics today. The paper argues however that Kantian intuitionism is neither Kant's own position nor is it a systematically convincing approach. Kant's foundation of morality is not based on an intuition of absolute values but on the performative execution of pure practical reason determining a subject's faculty of choice. But this Kantian position needs to be deepened from a phenomenological point of view, inspired by Levinas, in which the determining function of an anarchic pure practical reason is instituted by means of the call of the other.

LINGUISTIC ORIGIN OF POLICY AND POLICY FAILURE

Yungho Sakong

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Combined with constructive human intentionality, language creates a gap between the state of affairs in itself and the described situations by language. At linguistic level based on 'natural attitude', something problematic seems to be surely happening to justify government interventions. At ontological level (actual life and social action level), however, it is not easy to isolate the state of affairs as an independent phenomenon. Furthermore, this gap is disguised by misplaced concreteness and self-referential meaning formation of words. This gap opens an opportunity for politics and government intervention. Policy and its failure take places because actual state of affairs is completely different from the verbally constructed situations.

COLLECTIVE IDENTIFICATION AND THE WE IN MAX SCHELER

Alessandro Salice

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Especially thanks to the works of Philip Pettit and Carol Rovane, the notion of a collective or group person has attracted increasing attention within recent social ontology debates. Despite its direct relevance for the topic at issue, the contemporary discussion seems, alas, to have rather neglected Max Scheler's theory about the collective person or *Gesamtperson*. The present talk intends to reconstruct, discuss and assess Scheler's position against the background of the ongoing debate. Main claim of the talk is that the collective person has to be considered as an 'identification-free community'. While the term 'community' refers to a primitive and irreducible *we*, 'identification' (Einsfuehlung) means a psychological process which leads those who undergo such process to misidentify the subject of the mental states they are having. Accordingly, a community can be said to be a collective person if its members can adequately discriminate their mental states and distinguish those in the I- form from those in the we-form. At the end of the talk, some interesting conclusions for the theory of collective intentionality will be drawn from Scheler's position.

DAS INNERE-EPISODEN-PROBLEM (PSYCHOLOGISCHE AUSDRÜCKE)

Fernando Scherer

Juazeiro, Brasilien

Die Konzeption von inneren Episoden, wie zum Beispiel dem Schmerz, stellt ein Problem für Wittgenstein in seinem Werk *Philosophische Untersuchungen* dar, weil die

Episoden eine Möglichkeit für die Konzeption einer Privatsprache eröffnen und den Solipsismus ermöglichen. Beziehungsweise sie hängen mit der Konzeption eines Subjekts, das einen privilegierten Zugang zu sich selbst hat und deswegen die bessere und sogar die alleinige Kenntnis dieser Episoden für sich beansprucht, zusammen. Daher wird auch von "Innen" und von "Aussen" gesprochen. "Innen" wäre das, was sich innerhalb des privilegierten epistemischen Bereichs des Subjekts abspielt und "Aussen" wäre das, was auch für andere Subjekte epistemisch gleichermaßen zugänglich sein könnte. In meinem Paper werde ich auf das Problem der inneren Episoden näher eingehen anhand der detaillierten Untersuchung des § 293 der Philosophischen Untersuchungen und der Interpretation von Hacker im Buch *Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience*.

FINAL VALUES AND GROUNDING

Pedro Schmechtig

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In reference to G. E. Moore (1922), it is often asserted that the distinction between final and instrumental value-attitudes coincides with that of intrinsic or extrinsic values. In contrast to this assertion, I argue for a strong non-reductionistic separation of both pairs of conceptions. Under this proposal, Moore's cointensional explanation of metaphysical grounding of intrinsic values must be abandoned. Instead I will make the case for a hyperintensional characterization of those properties on which the values are based. Thusly, such properties can be given both in intrinsic and extrinsic ways. Consequently, typical cases of final-extrinsic esteems must be analyzed as "mixed cases" of the mode of the givenness of a value-grounding property.

UP THE LADDER OR DOWN INTO THE MIRE – SOME REMARKS ON HUSSERL'S AND WITTGENSTEIN'S VIEW OF THE "ORDINARY" – WITH RESPECT TO PI 129

Alfred Schmidt

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The general topic of my paper is the relation of philosophy and the "ordinary", - the specific aim is to offer an interpretation of PI 129. Wittgenstein's first model of this relation can be described as the ladder-model (Tractatus 6.54). Later he rejected this view as arrogant and dogmatic, trusting in the "health of the ordinary" (St. Cavell). When we leave the solid ground of ordinary language, confusions and misunderstandings occur (PI 116, 132). But Wittgenstein insists that in philosophy we cannot avoid being dragged into the "mire" (Of skepticism). In contrast, Edmund Husserl's concept of the "phenomenological epochè" leaves the solid ground of the ordinary intentionally to unveil a sublime realm of (anonymous) acts of sense-constitution, which are hidden in the ordinary view of the world ("natural attitude"). For the phenomenological model as well as for Wittgenstein's hidden aspects in front of our eyes (PI 129) the concept of aspect-seeing from PI II,xI provides a key of interpretation.

WITTGENSTEIN'S LAST WRITINGS

Joachim Schulte

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This is an attempt at drawing a sketch of Wittgenstein's philosophical outlook between the completion of *Philoso-*

phical Investigations (1945-46) and his death in 1951. One question that will be discussed is whether the published writings on certainty, colour and the philosophy of psychology can be seen as reliable accounts of what Wittgenstein had to say. Another question is this: does Wittgenstein, after the completion of *Philosophical Investigations*, embark on a new project? Does he develop a new method or explore untried paths? These questions will be discussed by way of looking at a number of instructive remarks from Wittgenstein's writings.

WAISMANN AS AN UNHAPPY PROPHET OF WITTGENSTEIN

Radek Schuster

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The paper deals with the cooperation between Wittgenstein and Waismann under Schlick's patronage in the period of 1928-1936. Firstly, the purport and historical development of the project *Logik, Sprache, Philosophie* which was meant to systematically present the ideas of the *Tractatus* and later also Wittgenstein's new philosophy is reconstructed. Secondly, the transition from the "principle of verification" to the conceptions of "hypothesis" and "criteria" is expounded. Thirdly, the controversy that arose due to Waismann's "insufficient" acknowledgement of Wittgenstein in a paper on identity is recalled. These three expositions are intended as arguments for the reconsideration of, first, Waismann's alleged plagiarism or misinterpretation of Wittgenstein, and, second, Wittgenstein's purported reluctance to set up a scholarly-like theory of semantics.

MCDOWELL ON RULE-FOLLOWING AND MORAL PRINCIPLES

Daniel Sharp

Vienna, Austria

John McDowell argues that Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations tell against a picture of moral philosophy on which moral principles play a central role. Examining McDowell's argument in conjunction with Wittgenstein's text, I suggest only a considerably more modest conclusion follows. Wittgenstein's considerations only tell against a specific (set of) philosophical misconception(s) about the role of principles in moral practice. They should prompt a reexamination, rather than a rejection, of the role principles play in moral theory and practice.

FOR ANALYTIC PHENOMENOLOGY

Charles Siewert

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This paper describes, defends and illustrates an approach to inquiry about mind that combines influences from contemporary analytic philosophy and classical phenomenology: "analytic phenomenology." Its is motivated by the need to clarify in detail a first-person understanding of concepts central to philosophical and psychological investigation of experience or consciousness, and to show how to interpret such concepts in a way that helps us to address questions about how we know (our surroundings, our own minds), how we understand language, how we can act for reasons, what is valuable to us, and what study of the brain might aim to explain.

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Jan Slaby

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This explorative paper outlines a program for a politicized philosophy of mind. Broadly, it will be suggested to shift the focus of philosophy of mind from concerns with mental causation, qualia and the naturalization of intentionality toward issues of agency, power, affect, self-governance, sociality and (mental) institutions. The pinnacle of the proposed approach is an agentive understanding of individual mentality as constitutively placed within a relational understanding of power. Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Foucault figure as inspirations of the proposal, as does the niche construction approach to conceptual articulation developed by philosopher of science Joseph Rouse. In the second part of the paper, recent philosophical and interdisciplinary work on empathy will be discussed by way of a critical case study. Instead of construing empathy narrowly as cognitive perspective shifting with mental simulation of another's 'interior life', I will outline an interactive approach which is centered around forms of joint agency and co-engagement in the world. Besides the externalist, action-centered and interactive credentials of this proposal to interpersonal understanding, the view will help to place due emphasis upon a variety of social enabling and disabling factors of interpersonal conduct. Overall, my aim is to thoroughly 'politicize' embodied, embedded, enactive and extended approaches to the mind and thereby amend what I think is a glaring weakness of these philosophical positions.

(NON)COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF THE NOTEBOOK: EXTENDED COGNITION AND PRACTICE OF USE

Michal Sládeček

Belgrade, Serbia

In the first part of the article the basic characteristics of the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) are briefly sketched, as well as some problems and objections to this hypothesis. The second part points to affiliations between the hypothesis and Wittgenstein's approach to problems of mind. According to the argumentation presented here, Wittgenstein's position leads to the claim that there are cases in which an external object, along with activity of the organism, are necessary elements for the fulfilment of a cognitive task. Also, Wittgenstein's approach can be helpful as a response to objections to HEC concerning the scope of the cases which can be marked as extended cognition. This approach proceeds from activity, practice of use or acquired technique as the main basis for the determination of the characteristics and the criteria of external cognition.

MEANING: HERMENEUTICAL, THEORETICAL, AND PRACTICAL

Maja Soboleva

Klagenfurt, Austria

The question this article is what kind of hermeneutics can emerge on the basis of a philosophy of life. To answer it, the theories of the German philosophers Georg Misch (1878-1965) and Josef König (1893-1974) have been analysed. The first developed a "hermeneutical logic", which is based on the identification of the notions "life" and "articulation" (Ausdruck). Three aspects – life as a logical category, life as a hermeneutical category, and the discursive forms of self-representation of life – extracted from Misch's theory seem to be relevant for the further

development of hermeneutics. König carries forward this research program, but focuses on the linguistic structures of human perceptual experience and drafts a kind of analytical hermeneutics. The remarkable part of both conceptions is that they posit logical heterogeneity of theoretical and practical discourses. These differences are relevant for the rethinking of such epistemological phenomena as “meaning”, “concept”, “truth” and “knowledge”. According to these positions, hermeneutics can’t be a homogeneous theory of interpretation or understanding, but, on the contrary, the different logical areas of hermeneutic analysis must be analysed. A vital contribution of these theories to the hermeneutic theory is that a discourse analysis doesn’t challenge the hermeneutic method as centred on meaning-making but completes it. They introduce the hermeneutic concept of knowledge as signifying practises of meaning-production that make the analysis of meaning a key method for a general theory of knowledge. Thus, hermeneutics can be interpreted as an alternative to the traditional, i.e. epistemological approach to the theory of knowledge.

„DENK NICHT, SONDERN SCHAU“ – INTERNE RELATIONEN UND DIE KONTINUITÄT IN WITTGENSTEINS PHILOSOPHIE

Katharina Anna Sodoma

Wien, Österreich

„Denk nicht, sondern schau“ – in dieser Maxime bringt Wittgenstein ein wichtiges Moment der methodischen Ausrichtung seiner Spätphilosophie auf den Punkt. Anhand von Tagebucheinträgen aus den Jahren 1914-1916 und dem Begriff der „internen Relationen“ im *Tractatus* soll in diesem Beitrag gezeigt werden, dass auch Wittgensteins Frühwerk – wenn auch innerhalb von Grenzen – von diesem Diktum gezeichnet ist. „Interne Relationen“ sind strukturelle Beziehungen zwischen Sätzen. Um Einsicht in das Funktionieren der Sprache zu gewinnen, müssen diese *gesehen* werden. Die spezielle logische Notation, die Wittgenstein im *Tractatus* entwickelt, bietet verschiedene Möglichkeiten, interne Relationen sichtbar zu machen. Auch wenn Wittgenstein den für die Spätphilosophie bedeutenden Begriff der „übersichtlichen Darstellung“ erstmals explizit einführt, spricht er davon, interne Beziehungen zu ‚illustrieren‘. Dies gibt Aufschluss über Parallelen, die zwischen der Methode des *Tractatus* und der Methode der Spätphilosophie bestehen. Anhand des Begriffs der „internen Relation“ soll eine Linie der Kontinuität zwischen Wittgensteins Früh- und Spätwerk nachgezeichnet werden.

„DENK NICHT, SONDERN SCHAU!“ INTUITIVE VERSUS RATIONALE BETRACHTUNG BEI WITTGENSTEIN

Ilse Somavilla

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Ausgehend von dem Satz “Denk nicht, sondern schau!” (PU, §§ 66) soll in diesem Beitrag Wittgensteins intuitiver Zugang zu den Objekten seines Philosophierens untersucht werden – dies in Gegenüberstellung zu seinen rational bestimmten, analytischen Untersuchungen.

INTUITION UND ARGUMENTATION. ZUM VERHÄLTNISS VON INTUITIVER UND DISKURSIVER VERNUNFT

Thorsten Streubel

Berlin, Deutschland

Unter ‚Vernunft‘ wird heute in der Regel ein Ensemble diskursiver Fähigkeiten (wie Urteilen, Schließen, Argumentieren, Begründen, Abwägen von Zwecken und Mitteln etc.) verstanden. Tatsächlich gibt es jedoch von Platon bis Husserl und Scheler eine lange Tradition, die neben der diskursiven Vernunft auch eine intuitive Vernunft kannte und zum Gegenstand der Reflexion machte. Anhand zweier paradigmatischer Positionen, derjenigen Kants und Descartes, möchte ich zeigen, inwiefern das Konzept einer intuitiven Vernunft auch für eine moderne Erkenntnistheorie unverzichtbar ist: Ohne intuitive Vernunft, so meine systematische These, gäbe es keine diskursive Vernunft, kein Verständnis mathematischer und logischer Beziehungen und möglicherweise auch kein Sprachverstehen.

IS A WORLD WITHOUT PRETENCE IMAGINABLE? REFLECTIONS ON ASYMMETRY AND INTRANSPARENCY

Michela Summa

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In his later writings, Wittgenstein discusses the phenomenon of pretence particularly with respect to the relationship between “inner” and “outer” and to the skeptical challenge regarding the so-called knowledge of “other minds”. In one of these remarks, he formulates the following question: “Could one imagine a world in which there could be no pretence?” (LWPP II, 37). In this paper, I shall take this question as a guiding thread to reassess the implications of pretence with regard to intersubjectivity. In the first part, a critical discussion of the skeptical argument, based on both Wittgensteinian and phenomenological remarks, will allow me to somehow overturn the skeptical conclusions. Rather than being something that calls intersubjectivity into question, pretence is a constitutively intersubjective phenomenon and cannot therefore be understood independently from an inquiry into intersubjective dynamics, like interaction and mutual understanding. These, I shall argue, are not undermined by the constitutive asymmetry between self and other, being rather based upon such an asymmetry. In the second part, I shall address the question Wittgenstein phrases by more closely investigating the intersubjective nature of pretence. I shall argue that intersubjectivity in pretence shall not be merely considered as related to the possibility of hiding mental states from the other. Rather, due to the intransparency characteristic of both self-experience and the experience of the other, the very meaningfulness of both pretend and genuine actions and expressions shall be considered as an intersubjective accomplishment. Accordingly, pretence, like sincerity, belongs to the development of the different forms of interactions among human beings and as such to the intersubjective constitution of meaningful experience.

SHARED EMOTIONS AND EMPATHY

Thomas Szanto

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According to a dominant view in social cognition research, empathy, in contrast to cognitive perspective taking, or mindreading, “is an affective state, caused by sharing of the emotions or sensory states of another person” (Hein & Singer 2008; cf. De Vignemont & Jacob 2012). Though I strongly disagree with this view, and rather hold in line with

phenomenological accounts (Zahavi 2011, 2014) that sharing emotions and empathizing are two quite distinct social processes, I still contend that they are variously interlinked. The present paper aims at dissecting these interrelations. I will develop my argument in two steps:

(1) First, I will explore the nature and structure of sharing emotions. I will suggest an alternative to both individualist and collectivist, as well as to cognitive (Gilbert 2002) and phenomenal or token-identity accounts of shared emotions (Schmid 2009; cf. Salmela 2009). In particular, I shall argue that sharing emotions is a matter of types and grades of affective and emotional integration, and essentially a matter of sharing appraisal patterns.

(2) I will, then, focus on the issue of how sharing emotions regulates and modulates empathy. Ultimately, I will claim that shared emotional patterns, via habitual and normative 'sedimentation' (Husserl), robustly and deeply penetrate empathy and empathic responses. I will corroborate this claim by drawing on work from the social neurosciences on social identity induced biases in empathizing.

WITTGENSTEIN AND EARLY CHINESE PHILOSOPHY

Kirill Ole Thompson

Taipeh, Taiwan

The present essay is not the attempt to directly compare Wittgenstein's philosophic ideas, reflections, or practices with examples of philosophic thought and practice in early China. Rather, the concern is to discuss the application of later Wittgensteinian approaches in the attempt to rethink some problematic passages in early Chinese philosophy texts. The demonstrated applicability of Wittgenstein's later approaches to these problematic passages reveals the presence of some "deep disquietudes" in early China thought regarding the significance and implications of language and thought. These disquietudes tend not to be addressed using standard textual analysis. The present paper shows problems that arise with the human tendency simultaneously to codify language rigorously as an instrument to express semantically reducible statements about facts in the world while forgetting that the capacity and impulse to use language is "written into" the homo sapiens, which uses language for manifold purposes and for whom language is "a form of life." In both Wittgenstein and early Chinese thought, a sort of questioning if not confrontation is evident between two ways of understanding thought and language, one that stresses reference and inference and another that stresses language use in the stream of life. Going deeper, we note that the two ways also depend on each other for deeper understanding and a fuller picture. As Wittgenstein writes in "Preface" to the PI (1958, 2e), the old *Tractarian* thoughts should be published together with the new ones, for "the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking." The new way of thinking still needs to be ballasted in the old, as a sort of reality check.

WITTGENSTEIN'S ON CERTAINTY AND NECESSARY TRUTHS IN JURISPRUDENCE

Yi Tong

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One of the central characteristics of general theories of law in contemporary analytical jurisprudence is that they make claims of necessity. Famously, Joseph Raz developed his version of legal positivism based on the claim that law *necessarily* claims legitimate authority. However, the nature and grounds of such claims seldom receive clarifi-

cation. In light of recent criticisms of unreflective recourse to claims of necessity in discussions of philosophical methodology, necessity claims in legal theory are in need of explicit defense. In this paper, I argue that necessity claims in legal theory can be understood in a Wittgensteinian spirit. In particular, Wittgenstein's thoughts on "hinge propositions" in *On Certainty* provide us with insights into understanding i) necessity as grounded in our actions and practices and ii) contingent necessity, i.e. necessary truths relative to a discourse or inquiry that change over time.

A FORMAL THEORY OF VALUE

Grzegorz & Renata Trela

Cracow, Poland

In the paper we show how to following line with the intentions of polish logician – a member of Lvov-Warsaw School – Tadeusz Czeżowski, and staying at the position Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and his ontology, we can create rational and formal theory of values. In this theory we understanding values as objective property relation between object and knowing subject. This concept of formal theory of values give us instrument or tool to compare irrelevant tradition of understanding relation between fact and values as algebraic aspect and consequence theory of relation. We have hope that this conception can give assumption to the new way of understanding and interpreting traditional (not only) axiological dilemma, but also new interpretation Wittgenstein logical atomism.

FACTS AND VALUES IN SCIENTIFIC THEORIES

Renata Trela

Cracow, Poland

The modern culture is greatly determined by science and its axiology. At the same time the myth is widespread that science is free of any valuations. I am going to present review of most important 20th century scientific theories formulated on the ground of philosophy in light of values appearing in them. This compilation bears the features of idealization which above all is the result of the circumstance that it is necessary, in the case of numerous concepts, to carry out a number of interpretation-related operations which are as always controversial in such cases, in order to extract values which constitute their basis. I am going to discuss relationship of facts and values in apprehension of Vienna Circle and its successors from the widely apprehended logical empiricism, K. Popper's falsificationism and its successors, historical and cultural concepts of T. Kuhn, P. Feyerabend and Edinburgh School. This compilation will allow to formulate more general regularities of changes occurring in science and culture founded thereon.

PHENOMENOLOGICAL ACTUALISM. A HUSSERLIAN METAPHYSICS OF MODALITY?

Michael Wallner

Graz, Austria

Considering the importance of possible-world semantics for modal logic and for current debates in the philosophy of modality, a phenomenologist may want to ask whether it makes sense to speak of "possible worlds" in phenomenology. The answer will depend on how "possible worlds" are to be interpreted. As that latter question is the subject of the debate about possibilism and actualism in contem-

porary modal metaphysics, my aim in this paper is to get a better grip on the former question by exploring a Husserlian stance towards this debate. I will argue that the phenomenologist's way to deal with the problem of intentional reference to *mere possibilities* is analogous to the actualist's idea of how "possible worlds" are to be interpreted. Nevertheless, I will be pointing to a decisive difference in the metaphilosophical preconditions of what I call "phenomenological actualism" and analytical versions of actualism.

FOUR TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE IN WITTGENSTEIN

Paul Weingartner

Salzburg, Austria

The purpose of this paper is to show that there are at least four important types of knowledge in Wittgenstein's Works on Certainty and Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics. These four types of knowledge are discussed also in the tradition not necessarily on one place and not systematically. They also occur on several places in these two works of Wittgenstein and also not systematically. These four types can be characterised as follows:

- (1) Knowledge 1 as true understanding
- (2) Knowledge 2 as ability to prove it
- (3) Knowledge 3 as justified true belief
- (4) Knowledge 4 as possessing justified information

WITTGENSTEIN AND FREE WILL

Christian Helmut Wenzel

Taipei, Taiwan

In this essay I wish to do three things. First, I wish to discuss a statement from the *Tractatus* which says that our free will consists in our ignorance of future actions: "The freedom of the will consists in the impossibility of knowing actions that still lie in the future. We could know them only if causality were an inner necessity like that of logical inference." (5.1362) I think this statement might well be inspired by a claim Moore made in connection with free will in his 1912 book *Ethics*: "We can hardly ever know for certain beforehand, which choice we actually shall make". But I think Moore's claim in favor of free will is not convincing. Second, I wish to discuss a question raised in *Philosophical Investigations*. Wittgenstein asks what remains if we "subtract" the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm, and he adds in brackets: "Are the kinaesthetic sensations my willing?" (621) This added reflection is a reaction to ideas put forward by William James. Wittgenstein opposes these ideas. He argues that we should not think of the will as a cause at all, kinaesthetic or not, but rather as something imbedded in, and constituted by, certain contexts of learning, expectation, practice, and lack of surprise. This is a strong claim. He also returns to the question about the predictability of the future: "When people talk about the possibility of foreknowledge of the future they always forget the fact of the prediction of one's own voluntary movements" (629). The question is whether Wittgenstein has solved, or dissolved, the problem of free will. Some think that this is the case. I doubt it is. This is the third point I wish to discuss.

WITTGENSTEIN, THE AIM OF PHILOSOPHY AND NEGATIVISM

Sebastian Wyss

Zurich, Switzerland

What, according to Wittgenstein, is the aim of philosophy? Many of the formulations that Wittgenstein employs to describe it have a negative ring, e.g.: The results of philosophy are nonsense, the philosopher a fly in the fly-bottle. This seems to support the ascription of negativism to Wittgenstein, the view that the aims of philosophy are purely negative.

I distinguish two versions of negativism: For the first, Schroeder's, the aim of philosophy is to dismantle philosophical doctrines. The second goes less far, but maintains that the aim is nothing else than to remove misunderstandings. In contrast, I argue that the second formulation of negativism is not negative at all: Resolving Misunderstandings cannot be understood as a pure removal, but the troubled person's understanding has to be deepened in the process of eliminating misunderstandings.

ANALYTIC AND CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY: FROM DUALITY THROUGH PLURALITY TO UNITY

Dan Zahavi

Copenhagen, Denmark

In my talk, I will first assess some of the categorical claims that over the years have been made regarding the relation between analytic and continental philosophy. I will argue that many of these statements involve stupendous oversimplifications and that they overlook too many significant differences. I will then consider the issue of naturalism and discuss how it might allow us to say something informative about the relation between phenomenology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language. I will conclude with a plea for a pluralist approach and with some suggestions about how to continue the dialogue.

"VAULTING AMBITION". MACHIAVELLI SEEKING THE SIGN

Robert Hugo Ziegler

Würzburg, Germany

In the face of political instability and continuous foreign intervention in Italy, Machiavelli sought new ways to answer some of the central questions of political theory: How can a state acquire stability? How can the political be scientifically grasped? What practical advice can be deduced from this scientific knowledge?

In his inquiry, Machiavelli fully accepts the radical historicity of values as well as political systems. This "relativist" approach distinguishes Machiavelli from previous theories, ensures its lasting relevance, and constitutes the biggest obstacle to answering the aforementioned questions.

I will try to show in which way Machiavelli succeeds to overcome this obstacle, how he conceives of the genesis of laws and ethical ideas, and how "impure concepts" contribute to the possibility of social life. My interest in Machiavelli is not primarily historical but systematic and I hope to demonstrate to which extent Machiavelli's theory of the political can still be of use when we try to understand the relations of fact and value, laws and ethical ideas, and the possibility of liberty.

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