Realismus – Relativismus – Konstruktivismus

Realism – Relativism – Constructivism

Abstracts

38. Internationales Wittgenstein Symposium
9. – 15. August 2015
Kirchberg am Wechsel

38th International Wittgenstein Symposium
August 9 – 15, 2015
Kirchberg am Wechsel

ARE PHILOSOPHERS CONSTRUCTIVISTS OR REALISTS IN THEIR ACTIONS?

Krzysztof Abriszewski

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It is common to view realism and constructivism as opposing positions. Less common, yet unsurprising, is drawing a continuum between the two poles. One can then locate any theoretical position on the poles or somewhere in the middle, on the line. Actor-Network Theory added another, vertical axis of entity stabilization. What one can ask is: "how can we measure this stabilization?" To answer this question I use a model of four types of knowledge production developed by Andrzej Zybertowicz (reproduction, discovery, redefinition, and design). In order to do so, I would need to redefine knowledge practices in terms of cultural theory, where knowledge production is viewed as a cultural game. This enables to determine if a given knowledge practice is realist or contructivist by identifying one of four types from the model. Using this I would like to discuss examples of philosophers who were realists and constructivists.

ARTIFICE/KNOWLEDGE. MAKING RELATIVISM TRUE

Barry Allen

Hamilton, Canada

I find the concept of artifact indispensable to the theory of knowledge. The artifact is the unit of knowledge, the primary, original instance, where knowledge first begins to exist. The quality that a theory of knowledge should define is a quality of artifacts, and not restricted to mental states or propositions. Knowledge is achieved in artifacts before it is "represented" in the mind. That makes knowledge a vastly greater field than, say, justified true belief. Knowledge embraces the whole sphere of artifacts, human technical culture in the broadest possible sense.

THE ESSENTIAL IN A PROPOSITION: READING THAT WHICH IS COMMON TO *TRACTATUS* 3.341-3.344

Marco Ambra

Siena, Italy

In Tractatus 3.34 Wittgenstein asserted the difference between essential and accidental features possessed by a proposition. He developed this difference on 3.341, 3.342, 3.343 and 3.344, a group of propositions characterized by a range of formal and textual assonances. In this article I show how we cannot understand the coherent and harmonic development of these sentences if we will read proposition 3.34 and succeeding by asserting them as single pieces of evidence. This issue arises only if we look at 3.341-3.344 not in the sequence showed by the published editions of the Tractatus, but as a level of detail in a hypertext, according to Luciano Bazzocchi's hermeneutical tree-like reading.

„DIE FURCHT VOR DEM TODE IST DAS BESTE ZEICHEN EINES FALSCHEN, D.H. SCHLECHTEN LEBENS."– LUDWIG WITTGENSTEINS SUCHE NACH DEM SINN DES LEBENS INMITTEN DES ERSTEN WELTKRIEGS

Ulrich Arnswald

Karlsruhe, Deutschland

Ludwig Wittgenstein gezielt in den Kontext des großen Kriegs von 1914-1918 zu stellen, der sich seit dem letzten Jahr nun zum hundertsten Male jährt, ist äußerst reizvoll: Denn Wittgensteins Erleben dieses Kriegs, den wir heute den Ersten Weltkrieg nennen, ist derart maßgeblich für dessen Philosophie, dass insbesondere der *Tractatus* als Frühwerk kaum ohne das einschlägige Ereignis denkbar ist.

ANOTHER READING OF THE TRACTATUS: A COMPARISONS' PATH

Valentina Balestracci

Pisa, Italy

Here my aim is that of touching on possible connections between Hegel and Wittgenstein's philosophy. Accordingly to that, it must be noticed that this comparison is just possible and that the content of this paper is not intended to be exhaustive: in order to do that, it should be demonstrated that the relationship between Hegel and Wittgenstein's thought is not just possible, but rather necessary. In other words, we need to prove that Wittgenstein, who lived in another century and as far as we know did not read Hegel (we just possess a brief remark made to M. Drury), has been influenced by him. I will be taking into consideration the connection between *The Phenomenology of Spirit* with *the Science of Logic* on one side and the *Tractatus* on the other side, focusing on a few aspects: in particular, starting from the difference between the two, we will see how language and logic emerge in Hegel and Wittgenstein's perspective.

WITTGENSTEIN'S NOTION OF 'FORM OF LIFE' AND THE SOURCE OF INCOMMENSURABILITY IN CULTURAL RELATIVISM

Zhien Bei

Guangzhou, China

Many works of Wittgenstein's later philosophy have influenced the development of contemporary relativism. This paper focuses on the notion of 'form of life', which is one of the essential notions in Wittgenstein's later philosophy and has a close relationship with relativism. This paper aims to find out whether this notion can be regarded as the source of incommensurability which is the key notion in the discussion of cultural relativism. Four steps are taken to achieve this aim. Firstly, clarify Wittgenstein's real intention of putting forward the notion of 'form of life'. Secondly, reveal two implications of this notion. Thirdly, introduce two forms of incommensurability involved in cultural relativism which clarifies the scope of our discussion. Lastly, show that this notion is the source of incommensurability both on semantic and epistemic level.

PROBLEME IN DER HISTORISCHEN WITTGENSTEIN-FORSCHUNG – WUNSCH, WIRKLICHKEIT UND RUSSISCHE PHILOSOPHIE

Alexander Berg
Dresden, Deutschland

Für eine Untersuchung zu der Frage „Was wusste Wittgenstein über Hegels Philosophie?" zeigte sich die Schwierigkeit einer relativ schwachen Datenlage verbunden mit dem Wunsch aus diesem Wenigen möglichst viel historischen Sinn zu erzeugen. Wo verlaufen hier die methodischen Grenzen? Wenn Wittgenstein anmerkt: „Philosophie dürfte man eigentlich nur dichten" (VB, 483), hört er im deutschen Wort *dichten* sicherlich neben dem Aspekt des *Poetischen* auch denjenigen des *Kreativen*. Die Frage nach Wunsch und Wirklichkeit in der Wittgenstein-Forschung wird am konkreten Beispiel von Wittgensteins Russlandreise gezeigt und ermöglicht zugleich einen Einblick in Wittgensteins Interesse für russische Philosophie. Diese betont Polyphonie und Dialogizität bezogen auf die ursprüngliche mystische Einheit für die Glaube und Wissen sich nur nachträglich und formell trennen lassen. Wittgenstein begegnet diesem Anspruch indem er die Philosophie als Projekt einer *Synoptischen Übersicht* kennzeichnet und ihre Tätigkeit als das Dringen auf eine *übersichtliche Darstellung* charakterisiert, die zugleich ihre methodischen Grenzen zeigen muss.

THE ENTANGLEMENT TRACTATUS-QUANTUM MECHANICS

Paulo Cesar Bezerra
São Paulo, Brazil

The term "entanglement" in the title of this paper doesn't refer to the "quantum entanglement" used to enunciate the Schrödinger's cat paradox in "*Die gegenwärtige Situation in der Quantenmechanik*", Naturwissenschaften, Heft 48 , 1935, nor with the "Zen koan" used by Feynman when doing considerations about Heisenberg's uncertainty principle saying: *"if a tree falls in a forest and there is nobody there to hear it, does it make noise?"*. Here, "entanglement" refers to the concepts shared by Tractatus and Quantum Mechanics, resulting of the effort developed by scientific community along the century XIX and through of the first three decades of the century XX. The aim of this paper is to discuss those concepts.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE SUPERNATURAL. WITTGENSTEIN'S LECTURE ON ETHICS

David Bloor
Edinburgh, United Kingdom

In his „Lecture on Ethics" Wittgensein addressed the themes of absolutism and relativism in an explicit fashion. He gave expression to a dramatic form of moral absolutism but, at the same time, developed a revealing sociological analysis of what was involved in the absolutist stance. This analysis ultimately subverted the absolutism that it had been developed to illuminate, but the exercise had fruitful consequences for Wittgenstein's later thinking. My aim is to explore the sociological dimension of the „Lecture on Ethics" and indicate how it was transformed into some of the most characteristic themes of the later philosophy, e.g. the appeal to language games and the analysis of rule following. Wittgenstein's trajectory was from an inconsistent absolutism to a consistent relativism. I shall end by drawing some conclusions about the conditions that should be satisfied by any well-formed definition of the concept of „relativism".

MORAL RELATIVISM

Paul Boghossian
New York, USA

Many philosophers and non-philosophers are attracted to the view that moral truths are relative to moral framework or culture. I distinguish between two versions of such a view. I argue that one version is coherent but not plausible, and I argue that the second one can't be made sense of. The upshot is that we have to make sense of at least some objective moral truths.

FROM WHEELS TURNING IDLY TO MEANING AS USE. PRAGMATIST TENDENCIES IN THE "MIDDLE" WITTGENSTEIN

Anna Boncompagni
Florence, Italy

This paper focuses on the origins of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein's emphasis on meaning as use, which at least partly can be traced back to his reflections on what he called the "*Eingreifen*" (engaging, meshing) of words and beliefs. I argue that one of the roots of this reflection is the pragmatist conception of truth as usefulness, which was most likely debated between Wittgenstein and Frank Ramsey in 1929. After introducing Wittgenstein's (temporary) perspective of a phenomenological language, I will show its shortcomings and the philosopher's need to give account of the working of words in ordinary language. I will then examine Wittgenstein's remarks about the pragmatist conception of truth and more generally about usefulness, and conclude that, although he usually expressed doubts about pragmatism, the "middle" Wittgenstein presented pragmatist tendencies which were pivotal in the development of his thought.

NEITHER REALISM NOR CONSTRUCTIVISM: THE TRACTARIAN CONCEPTION OF LANGUAGE

Silver Bronzo
Auburn, USA

This paper proposes a disjunctivist interpretation of the relation between Tractarian "symbols" and Tractarian "signs" and suggests that, if such an interpretation is correct, the Tractarian conception of language is neither realist nor constructivist.

"AN 'ANTHROPOLOGICAL' WAY OF LOOKING AT PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS." WITTGENSTEIN, FRAZER AND THE ART OF COMPARISON.

Marco Brusotti
Lecce, Italy

Wittgenstein steers clear of relativism, a philosophical thesis he holds to be nonsensical. But conceptual relativity is one major concern of his. A related question is how to assess to what extent conceptual differences subsist. For his 'ethnological approach', which shows the alleged ne-

cessity to be contingent, alternative possibilities are mere objects of comparison in order to better understand familiar cultural phenomena.

ANARCHY IS WHERE STATES MAKE IT – A CRITIQUE OF WENDT'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CONSTRUCTIVISM

Stipe Buzar & Damir Mladić

Zagreb, Croatia

The objective of this paper is to show that the structure of the international system, usually described as anarchy, is a *process independent* cause of states' behavior. The anarchical structure of the international system causes changes in the behavior of states according to its "inner logic," independent of any past or present social interaction. Anarchy is not just an empty vessel filled with social constructs - as Alexander Wendt claims. Due to the very existence of two or more agents in the system, anarchy has its own inherent logic that is independent of friendly or hostile interactions between agents/states.

WITTGENSTEIN'S DISCUSSION ON *RULE FOLLOWING*

Beijia Chen

Beijing, China

The discussion on *rule following* in *PI* (*Philosophical Investigation*) stretches from §134 to §242. Wittgenstein lists a diverse range of examples, from the most familiar ones to those we have seldom thought about. All these examples, however, seem unlikely to be connected with each other in a specific sequence. Nevertheless, this paper believes that Wittgenstein's discussion does have a system. The underlying structure can be clarified by analyzing each case and the logical relationship among them. What's more, Wittgenstein's motivation in writing this part is to offer a method for philosophical research (cf. McGinn, 2007, 15), but not to solve any specific philosophical problem.

MORAL REASONING & MORAL CONTEXT: BETWEEN REALISM AND RELATIVITY

Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen

Odense, Denmark

The aim of this talk is to explore a connection between moral reasoning and moral context – the resources available for talking and thinking about moral matters – and argue that the relation to context explains the interaction between the realistic and relativistic element in moral reasoning. Special attention will be given to the question of whether moral context can distort or even make impossible certain moral insights.

SOCRATES OR WITTGENSTEIN?

James Conant

Chicago, USA

The lecture will explore the following question: to what extent does the conception of the practice of philosophy found in the writings of the later Wittgenstein bear a Socratic aspect? The lecture will consist of three parts: (1) a preliminary examination testing your knowledge of Socrates and Wittgenstein, (2) a reflection on why the claim that a philosopher's conception of philosophy bears a Socratic aspect was once a tautology, and (3) a meditation on how Wittgenstein's philosophy does bear some Socratic aspects and why a claim to that effect is no longer a tautology.

ON THE NON-DUALIZING MODE OF SPEAKING – SOME PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

Marzenna Cyzman

Toruń, Poland

In the reception of Mitterer's writings up to now, there are two predominant types of motifs: the radical constructivistic background of his philosophy and the ontological and epistemological foundations and consequences of non-dualism. The followers indicate that the philosopher develops a new understanding of language. The critics are focused rather on some problematic consequences of non-dualism, ranging from the problem of infinite regress up to the thesis assuming that Mitterer's philosophy presupposes the world reduced to descriptions. However, these two types of readings are founded on dualizing assumptions which are not coherent with non-dualism.
Thus, in the present talk I would try to interpret non-dualism in the frame of non-dualism, based on non-dualizing assumptions. I argue that non-dualism is a rhetorical project resulting in far-reaching consequences in the field of academic and scientific debates, the poetics and practice of negotiations and deliberations, as well as in ordinary discourse. Non-dualism fulfills Richard Rorty's dream about culture as a never-ending conversation in which the argument of power is successfully replaced by the power of argument. Mitterer makes transparent the rhetorical techniques performed in the dualizing discourse (not only in situations of conflict) in order to present an alternative for the dualizing mode of discourse which is aimed at searching for broad agreement and truth. Mitterer's philosophy – reread in the context of Rorty's pragmatism, Foucault's conception of discourses, Perelman's new rhetoric – offers the new *vocabulary* (in Rorty's meaning) which may change the practice of speaking.

WITTGENSTEIN AND CONCEPTUAL NOMINALISM

Soroush Dabbagh & Hossein Dabbagh

Toronto, Canada & Oxford/Reading, UK

There is a notorious debate between philosophers about essentialism and nominalism. Classic essentialism dates back to Aristotle and Plato who believed in universals. Nominalists such as Hume, on the other hand, do not believe in universals and instead focus on particulars. This historical debate, regardless of the different opinions, is all about the natural world. This paper, however, tries to shed more light on this discussion by distinguishing between two forms of nominalism: ontological and conceptual nominalism. Conceptual (semantical) nominalists, contrary to ontological nominalist, such as Wittgenstein alter the discussion from natural world to linguistic world. They focus on the concepts with which we use in our daily life. Conceptual nominalists believe that concepts do not have necessarily one essence.

INSIDE-OUT: THE LIMITS OF LANGUAGE

Stefanie Dach

Pilsen, Czech Republic

My paper is concerned with occurrences of inside-outside metaphors of language in the later Wittgenstein and Richard Rorty. Although there are differences in the ways in which the two authors use this inside-outside image, it is not in line with their overall thought in either case. It implies that at the mysterious "outside" of language we can conceivably find something which makes the contrast between an inside and an outside of language interesting. Regardless of this, there must be some value in the metaphorics for Rorty and Wittgenstein. I try to identify this value and then suggest a less misleading picture that secures these positive aspects.

PRACTICAL COGNITIVISM: KNOWING-HOW TO FOLLOW A MORAL RULE

Darlei Dall'Agnol

Florianopolis, Brazil

In this paper, I argue that Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations reveal an important, yet unexplored, option in contemporary ethics, namely they can help us to identify the main elements of what I call "Practical Cognitivism," a philosophical approach to morality as based on knowing-how. If this approach is cogent, it will show that some present day metaethical debates are misconceived. Thus, I will first examine the kind of knowledge that is necessarily presupposed in following rules, namely knowing-how and, afterwards, I will identify a criterion for distinguishing moral from non-moral rules. Then, I will explore some ethical implications of considering moral knowledge in terms of knowing-how. Finally, I will point out some further developments Practical Cognitivism is subject to, especially the kind of normative ethics that best fits within it.

CARNAP'S NON-COGNITIVISM AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO BOTH VALUE-ABSOLUTISM AND VALUE-RELATIVISM

Christian Damböck

Vienna, Austria

Carnap's value-non-cognitivism claims that values do not obtain truth values. While it might be true or false that a certain person holds a certain value-statement, the value-statement in itself does not obtain a truth value at all, for Carnap. In spite of this, a value-absolutist claims her value statements to be strongly true and any diverging value statement to be strongly false, while a value-relativist claims every value statement whatsoever to be weakly true. Thus, absolutism wins against relativism, because the absolutist's truth-predicate logically overrules the relativist's one. However, absolutism is genuinely racist and therefore is nothing that we should adopt (in my opinion, at least). Carnap's conception provides a forceful alternative here; it allows us to hold value statements (depending on our intuitions, strongly or weakly) without forcing us to choose between the pest of absolutism and the cholera of relativism.

CONSTRUCTIVISM AND REALISM: HOW TO TAKE CONSTRUCTIONS TO BE REAL AND REALITY NOT TO BE CONSTRUCTED YET

Istvan Danka

Budapest, Hungary

In this paper I shall characterize constructivism as compatible both with (ontological) realism and (epistemological) relativism. As a consequence of distinguishing ontological and epistemological levels in the debate, a traditional opposition between realism and relativism/constructivism can be dissolved. Weakening realism and relativism until they become compatible is perhaps not too challenging. But even though the sort of constructivism introduced may seem to be a sort of middle ground between realism and relativism, I shall formulate it as a way of *radicalising* constructivism, claiming constructions to play a causal role and hence be ontologically real.

WHO IS THE AUTHORITY WHEN ALL ARE MASTERS?

Massimiliano Davì

Paris, France

The following text aims at showing the importance of both the notion of open concept – or with blurred edges – and the notion of rule, in order to understand how the three vertices of the triangle, community, language and subjectivity can be linked. The rules of the community shape subjectivity, but at the same time they suffocate it. Nevertheless, it's exactly thanks to the training received and the abilities to find resemblances (abilities developed inside the system) that the individual can bring out its subjectivity and claim itself as a master. The creation of a new metaphor is the clearest example of this process. It shows us how the notion of family resemblance can become an operational tool that is able to describe our cognitive abilities.

WITTGENSTEIN AND CONCEPTUAL RELATIVISM

Piotr Dehnel

Bielany Wrocławskie, Poland

There are reasons to attribute conceptual relativism to Wittgenstein. They are related mainly to his notion of grammar, its posited arbitrariness, theory of language games and forms of life intertwined with them. In his famous article "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," Donald Davidson rejected conceptual relativism, questioning the very idea that various conceptual schemes exist. In my paper, I would like to consider how Davidson's arguments could be responded to, drawing on some of Wittgenstein's findings.

MORAL ARGUMENTS AND THE DENIAL OF MORAL CERTAINTIES

Benjamin De Mesel

Liedekerke, Belgium

Arguments are often called 'moral arguments' because they deal with moral issues, such as the permissibility of killing in certain circumstances. I call this the 'thin' sense of 'moral argument'. Some arguments in moral philosophy are moral in this sense, but fail to be moral in other respects. Inspired by Wittgenstein's *On Certainty,* I argue

that, if an argument about moral issues involves or leads to the denial of a moral certainty, the argument is not moral in a 'thick' sense and does not qualify as a proper response to a moral problem. We have good reason not to do whatever thin arguments involving the denial of moral certainties claim we ought to do, even if we have no reason to question the truth of the premises or the logical validity of the argument.

THE CONSTRUCTIVIST DIMENSION OF THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE CONTEMPORARY SYSTEMS BIOLOGY

Alexandra Derra
Toruń, Poland

Recent methodological literature in biology has announced that the discipline is approaching the post-genome era of its studies aiming at the so-called 'systems biology'. Faced with enormous data biologists need to understand how the examined items work in complicated sets which produce certain behaviours, features and functions. They have to take into account not only elements, correlations and interactions among them, but also the results it reflexively produces in a complex system of its research, more properly labeled as 'a system of systems'.
I want to show that the transition of molecular biology from reductive methodology of pre-double helix time to a more holistic approach of systems biology wonderfully illustrates the conceptual power of a constructivist approach in science. I want also to point out how this discipline tries to build a new conceptual and theoretical framework at the crossroads of physics, computer science, new language and its own tradition.

TRUTH IN ETHICS: WILLIAMS AND WIGGINS

Cora Diamond
Charlottesville, USA

David Wiggins argued that there are ethical questions that admit of answers that are substantially true. He considers the case of slavery, and argues that, in response to the question about its moral legitimacy, *there is nothing else to think but that it is unjust and insupportable.* His view was criticized by Bernard Williams. I examine their disagreement, and consider the views of those who defended slavery, since it is central to Wiggins's argument that discrepancies in belief about a case of this sort need to be accounted for.

ÜBERSICHTLICHE DARSTELLUNG AS SYNOPTIC PRESENTATION IN PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS, I, §122

Alexandra Dias Fortes
Lisbon, Portugal

As was pointed out by Gordon Baker, *Philosophical Investigations,* I, §122 "(...) seems to condense into one short remark much of Wittgenstein's distinctive conception of philosophy" (Baker, 2004, 22.), and it "is well known and often quoted" (*ibid.*). Despite this latter circumstance, Baker proceeded to further elucidate the key notion in §122 of a "perspicuous representation" [*übersichtliche Darstellung*]. Notwithstanding Baker's reading, one further aspect might be important in trying to figure out what kind of view is an *übersichtliche Darstellung*, specifically, its translation. In my paper I want to suggest 'synoptic presentation' as a more befitting translation of *übersichtliche*

Darstellung. In so doing I will draw a distinction between representation and presentation that might help us read PI, I, §122, and I will consider the reasons for translating *Übersicht* as 'synopsis' (and *übersichtliche* as ,synoptic'). I conclude with a brief note on synoptic presentation and style.

A PROBLEM FOR FREGE'S ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDE REPORTS AND ITS METAPHYSICAL CONSEQUENCES

Dušan Dožudić
Zagreb, Croatia

In this paper, I will consider a problem that affects Frege's analysis of propositional attitude reports. Firstly, I will outline Frege's analysis. Then, I will show how it straightforwardly leads into a problem that seems to undermine that very analysis. After that, I will consider an attempt to avoid the problem. Finally, I will point to potential metaphysical consequences of that problem that go well beyond Frege's framework and then connect Frege's problem with some more recent discussion concerning propositional attitude reports.

HOW TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE WORD PROBLEM FOR AN ENCODING SYSTEM: THE *ENTSCHEIDUNGSPROBLEM* REVISITED THROUGH WITTGENSTEINIAN CONSTRUCTIVISM

Susan Edwards-McKie
Cambridge, United Kingdom

What these problems have in common are difficulties between levels of a system, whether that be an opacity which blocks knowledge or information, or the creation of numbers or types which fall outside of the system and therefore cannot be described or accounted for within the system of origin. Wittgenstein wrestled with such problems throughout his work, whether we look at the type theoretic problems of the *Tractatus*, the heterological paradox and 'uebersichlichkeiť' of the later 1930s, the mathematically theoretical issues about recursion in the middle period, with a range of issues of differentiation and indiscernibility in the later years. Similarly, in mathematics and logic Goedel's Incompleteness Theorems and Cantor's Diagonal Proof on the Incommensurability of the Reals and the Natural Numbers are all issues which Wittgenstein returned to repeatedly in his MSS. I have argued elsewhere (2012, 2014, 2015) for a reappraisal of Wittgenstein as a significant philosopher of mathematics. In the inaugural HAPP lectures and in a projected book for Cambridge University Press, I argue for a reappraisal of Wittgenstein's philosophy of physics. In this short piece, I will draw together ideas of mathematics and physics, using a Wittgensteinian constructivist approach.

OBSERVATION, EVIDENCE, AND CAUSE IN THE ANTHROPOCENE

Heike Egner
Klagenfurt, Austria

Since the Nobel Prize winner Paul Crutzen almost incidentally declared our present times to be the new era of the Anthropocene at a UN-conference in Mexico in 2000, an intensive debate has emerged on the plausibility of this statement and on the evidence the era of the

Anthropocene could be based on. The hypothesis of the Anthropocene implies a concept fundamentally different from many precursors: It is assumed that humans and their societies do not have a symbiotic relationship with nature but rather modify and transform natural processes. If we take this seriously, a fundamental revision of almost every concept of the interrelation between humans and nature, but also of our concept of ourselves as humans, as well as our responsibilities as scientists would be necessary.

In my contribution I will take a look into the scientific practices of gathering evidence (observation) and the structure of the arguments behind the evidence (causation).

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WITTGENSTEIN. HOW A HISTORY OF EDITING WITTGENSTEIN'S NACHLASS MAY CONTRIBUTE TO THE *SOCIAL STUDIES OF THE HUMANITIES* (SSH)

Christian Erbacher
Bergen, Norway

Analogous to *Science and Technology Studies* (STS), *Social Studies of the Humanities* (SSH) promise to illuminate everyday working practices in the humanities as well as the humanities' role in society. This paper summarizes results from a research project on the History of Editing Wittgenstein's Nachlass in order to show how this research may contribute to SSH's objectives. By showing that Wittgenstein's literary executors' distinct ways of editing were not merely informed, but formed by the practice of philosophizing they had learned from Wittgenstein in personal acquaintance, it is highlighted that acquisition of skills and demeanor taught by a master is of prime importance in the humanities.

ETHICAL RATIONALITY IN LIGHT OF THE LATER WITTGENSTEIN

Cecilie Eriksen
Aarhus, Denmark

Inspired by the later work of Wittgenstein, this paper will discuss how to understand ethical rationality as potent and legitimate in secular, democratic societies wedded to the belief that the ethical is a dynamic and pluralistic phenomenon. It will do so by references to the philosophical theories moral realism, constructivism and relativism.

RECONCILING THOSE LIVING IN DIFFERENT WORLDS. CAN WITTGENSTEIN HELP AGAINST CLAIMS OF INCOMMENSURABILITY?

Yuliya Fadeeva
Vienna, Austria

Radical cultural relativism poses a weighty threat on understanding between groups that are supposed to *live in different worlds*. There are two main lines of argument for this claim: one *radical* form claiming that incommensurable conceptual schemes are implemented in untranslatable languages. A *weaker* form, typically concerned with magical or religious beliefs, defends the view that religious/magical beliefs and meanings of religious statements are inaccessible to non-believers, being only fully understandable to those sharing the religious/magical belief system.

I want to argue that the claim of incommensurability can be defeated. In its radical form it is strongly attacked by Donald Davidson. The weaker form can be met by a new interpretation of Wittgenstein's "Lectures on Religious Beliefs" offered by Martin Kusch. He argues for a distinction between "ordinary" and "extraordinary" beliefs, thus giving a broader contextualisation of religious beliefs and allowing for understanding and dialogue between believers and non-believers.

EIN BILD HIELT UNS GEFANGEN

Hans Rudi Fischer
Heidelberg, Deutschland

Wittgenstein vergleicht seine Arbeitsweise häufig mit der eines Malers, wobei er Denken (und Sprechen) mit dem Zeichnen von Bildern analogisiert. Der Begriff des Bildes ist ein Schlüssel zu seinem Sprachdenken und wird in der Bildtheorie des Tractatus (T) enfaltet. Die Klärung, *wie* ein Bild (bzw. Satz) Wirklichkeit abzubilden vermag, ist das Paradigma, anhand dessen W. die Abbildbarkeit von Wirklichkeit klären möchte. Abbildung im bildlichen bzw. sprachlichen Sinne ist im T explizit ein Konstruktionsprozess, der Satz ist „Projektionsmethode".

Die Methode sichtbare Dinge in einem Bild so darzustellen, dass sie für einen Betrachter als realistisches, i.e. perspektivisches Abbild erscheinen, wurde im 15. Jh. auf Grundlage geometrischer und optischer Gesetze erfunden (Alberti, Brunelleschi). Albertis Bildtheorie, mit dem Velum als Projektionstechnik, ist analog zur Abbildtheorie im Tractatus.

Im Rekurs auf Alberti und anhand einiger Bilder möchte ich 1. zeigen, dass der Tractatus die Konstruktionslogik der Perspektivtheorie nutzt, 2. *dass* und *wie* der Tractatus konstruktivistisch zu lesen ist und 3. wie darin W´s Ambivalenzen gegenüber der eigenen, auf Ein-Eindeutigkeit zielenden Logik des T. zum Ausdruck kommen. Wittgensteins Ambivalenz gegenüber der zweiwertigen Logik, die er im T. auf so geniale Weise exponiert hat, bleibt die kreative Quelle seiner konstruktivistisch besser zu verstehenden Spätphilosophie. Aber: die Entscheidung zwischen Realismus und Konstruktivismus ist rational unentscheidbar, sie bleibt ambivalent bis in die letzten Passagen von Über Gewißheit.

WAS SIND „SPIELE"

Andrew U. Frank & Jürgen Hahn
Wien, Österreich

Wittgenstein hat sich im Rahmen der Sprachspiele gefragt, was denn das Wesentliche eines Spieles ausmache und dabei Beispiele für den ganz unterschiedlichen Sprachgebrauch des Wortes „Spiel" diskutiert.

Inzwischen haben Linguisten zwei Beschreibungsmodelle entwickelt, um dieses Phänomen besser zu erfassen: die Polysemie, d.h. ein gleichlautendes Wort bezeichnet Unterschiedliches, und die Prototypentheorie, wonach es für Klassen von Dingen, die mit einem Wort bezeichnet werden können, bessere und schlechtere Beispiele gibt; schliesslich ist auch auf die in Kommunikationssituationen wichtige Funktion des Kontextes, welcher die Bedeutung eines Wortes verändert, hingewiesen worden.

Vor diesem Hintergrund präsentieren wir einen neuen, analytischen Zugang zur Funktion des Kontextes, der auf quantenmechanischen Überlegungen aufbaut, der aber mit Datenbank-Methoden beschreibbar und auch durchführbar ist. Damit ergeben sich praktikable Lösungsansätze für die von Wittgenstein aufgeworfenen Fragen.

FOUR ARGUMENTS FOR UNIVERSAL RELATIVISM

Gregor Flock

Vienna, Austria

In the academic literature and elsewhere, specific relativisms are often a hotly debated topic. In this paper, I considerably up the ante by proposing an across the board 'universal relativism' that is supported by four arguments: the inductive argument, the argument from causality, the argument from elimination, and the counterargument against self-refutation.

KIERKEGAARD ON LANGUAGE AND MEANING: A BRIEF CONTRIBUTION TO KIERKEGAARD-WITTGENSTEIN SCHOLARSHIP

Mélissa Fox-Muraton

Clermont-Ferrand, France

Søren Kierkegaard did not develop any systematic analyses of language and meaning, despite the fact that these themes are omnipresent in his works. These questions have unfortunately often been neglected by scholars interested in Kierkegaard's influence on Ludwig Wittgenstein. In this paper, we will examine a short extract from *Works of Love* in which Kierkegaard gives a rather concise presentation of his understanding of language and meaning. Our examination of this passage will show that many of the points of convergence generally noted between Kierkegaard's and Wittgenstein's writings, especially those articulated by James Conant, do not hold in light of Kierkegaard's actual conception of language. A closer examination of Kierkegaard's writing on language and meaning does however open up the possibility of more serious encounter with Wittgenstein's philosophy.

A PLURALITY OF TRUE MORALITIES? TRACING ˈTRUTHˈ IN MORAL RELATIVISM

Marie-Luisa Frick

Innsbruck, Austria

Commonly understood, moral relativism calls into question the capability of moral judgments to be true in an absolute manner. Yet, what truth signifies in that regard remains contested. If there is no single true morality, as moral relativists typically suggest, does this imply that there are multiple equally true moralities without any nuances of truth and error? By what standards would the assumption that there are no moral truths itself be either true or false? Setting apart moral relativism as a branch of limited or local relativism from types of universal relativism, it can be shown how moral relativism is relying upon a certain notion of truth in order to sweep away another. Far from shying away from it or fearing it, moral relativism embraces truth as a 'weapon' and a criterion of its own adequacy. Without it, moral relativism would not only risk self-defeating inconsistencies; it also would lose its critical potential rendering it a vital enrichment of ethical discourses not only in the eyes of its proponents but also in those of many of its antagonists.

MEHRDEUTIGKEIT, VAGHEIT, WAHRHEIT UND FALSCHHEIT

Georg Friedrich

Aachen, Deutschland

Der Satz „Der Mount Everest ist ein hoher Berg" ist wahr, denn der Mount Everest hat eine Höhe von 8848 Metern; er wäre aber auch wahr, wenn der Mount Everest 100 Meter niedriger und somit nur so hoch wie sein Südgipfel wäre. Sätze, die vage Begriffe enthalten, sind mit mehr Sachverhalten verträglich als Sätze, die exakte Begriffe enthalten. Aber wie verhält es sich mit Sätzen, die mehrdeutige Begriffe enthalten? Welche Voraussetzungen muss man machen, um zum Wahrheitswert von mehrdeutigen Sätzen zu gelangen? Ist es trivial, einem Satz wie „Bruno sieht die Katze mit dem Fernglas" einen Wahrheitswert zuzuordnen? Mehrdeutigkeit und Vagheit sind in der Alltagssprache eher die Regel als die Ausnahme. Damit stellt sich unwillkürlich die Frage, welchen Einfluss Mehrdeutigkeit und Vagheit auf den Wahrheitswert von Sätzen unserer Sprache ausüben. Ziel dieses Beitrages ist es, den Zusammenhang von Mehrdeutigkeit und Vagheit und dem Wahrheitswert von Sätzen zu klären.

ABSOLUTE PLURALISM AND DEGREES OF NONSENSE

Ralf Funke

Hamburg, Germany

Wittgenstein's Tractatus was to an important extent a development of ideas first presented by Russell with his version of logical atomism. Russell himself reacted to the doctrines of the monism of British Idealists. The monists held the view that a singular judgement can only be partially true. Russell and Wittgenstein tried to show that judgements – or propositions – can be and must ultimately be independent and can thus be absolutely true without reference to other judgements.

Whereas a proposition of the postulated ideal language depicts an existing or not existing state of affairs and is thus unequivocally either true or false, the propositions of everyday language are often vague and ambiguous or nonsensical. Everything that is not strictly true or false is to some degree nonsensical. This includes propositions following the law of induction or a lot of hypotheses of natural science that have heuristic value but are not and do not claim to be true.

IST DER KONSTRUKTIVISMUS SELBSTWIDERSPRÜCHLICH?

Volker Gadenne

Linz, Österreich

Gegen den Konstruktivismus ist der Einwand erhoben worden, dass er selbstwidersprüchlich sei: Er würde zu einer Schlussfolgerung gelangen, die seinen Ausgangsannahmen widerspreche. Dieser Einwand ist seit langem bekannt, doch gibt es keine Übereinstimmung darüber, welche Bedeutung ihm zukommt. Für manche ist er ein hinreichender Grund, konstruktivistische Positionen als unhaltbar zu erachten, andere sehen in ihm hingegen kein größeres Problem für den Konstruktivismus. Im Vortrag soll zunächst gezeigt werden, dass das Problem eines Selbstwiderspruchs nur durch solche konstruktivistischen Positionen aufgeworfen wird, die eine antirealistische These beinhalten. Anschließend werden drei von konstruktivistischer Seite vorgeschlagene Wege diskutiert, die geeignet sind, einen Selbstwiderspruch zu

vermeiden. Der erste sieht vor, dass der Konstruktivismus auch für seine eigenen Aussagen darüber, wie Wirklichkeit konstruiert wird, keinen Wissensanspruch im realistischen Sinne erhebt. Der zweite Lösungsweg besteht darin, das behauptete Konstruktionsgeschehen von dem Bereich auszunehmen, auf den sich die antirealistische These bezieht. Nach einem dritten Lösungsvorschlag wird für die konstruktivistischen Thesen ein bescheidener Wissensanspruch erhoben, während zugleich die antirealistische These beibehalten wird. Eine Diskussion der drei Möglichkeiten führt zu dem Ergebnis, dass die ersten beiden wenig zufrieden stellend sind. Die dritte erscheint überzeugender, doch wirft sie die Frage auf, ob durch sie der Konstruktivismus nicht aufgegeben wird, da die resultierende Position von einem fallibilistischen Realismus kaum unterscheidbar ist.

PI 117: A PROBLEM FOR THERAPEUTIC READINGS OF LATER WITTGENSTEIN?

Stefan Giesewetter
Berlin, Germany

In recent years, so-called "therapeutic" readings have centered on the claim that Wittgenstein's treatment of questions involving 'meaning' should not be seen as playing a foundational role for his project of dissolving philosophical problems by clarifying the grammar of expressions. As they argue, the dissolution of problems involving 'meaning' is of no special relevance for this method as such. Now in PI §117, Wittgenstein is bringing in his criticism of the "atmosphere" conception of meaning – which he links directly to this method. Assuming the widespread view that what should be pitted against this "atmosphere" conception are remarks clarifying the grammar of 'meaning', the problem confronting therapeutic readings is that the clarification of the grammar of this particular word appears to assume yet a special relevance for this method. I will show how this dilemma can be avoided by reconsidering the role of this clarification for the debunking of such misconceptions.

A METAPHILOSOPHY WITHOUT TRUTH? A REALIST READING OF WITTGENSTEIN'S NOTION OF GRAMMAR

Vincent Grondin
London, United Kingdom

In different contexts, Wittgenstein holds the view that philosophy can and should 'describe' language by drawing artificial distinctions and imagining alternative language-games. It is then quite tempting to conclude that he conceives philosophy as a merely therapeutic activity, which does not necessarily aim to provide a true picture of the actual grammar of our language. The main goal of this paper is to challenge this strong therapeutic reading by showing that the use of fiction is not incompatible with the idea of a true and accurate description of our ordinary language.

MANIFEST IN BEHAVIOUR

Ian Ground
Newcastle, United Kingdom

"An 'inner process' stand in need of outward criteria" asserts Wittgenstein. Mind is made manifest in behaviour. But manifest to whom? This paper discusses how we should understand the Wittgensteinian concept of criterial access to minded life, not as regards our understanding of animal minds but in the context of interactions amongst and between non-linguistic animals themselves.

EIN ARGUMENT GEGEN DEN MORALISCHEN RELATIVISMUS BEI WITTGENSTEIN?

Tobias Gutmann
Essen, Deutschland

Eine Beobachtung des späten Wittgenstein lautet, dass Begründungen an gewissen Überzeugungen bzw. Verhaltensweisen an ein Ende gelangen, die selbst wiederum nicht weiter begründbar sind. Dieser Gedanke führt schnell zur Behauptung, dass Überzeugungen nur stets relativ zu gewissen Annahmen begründet sind. Allerdings findet sich in Wittgensteins Ausführungen auch eine antiskeptische Überlegung, die diesem Schluss entgegensteht. Sie lautet, dass das Verstehen von Äußerungen voraussetzt, diese in einem Netz von Überzeugungen verorten zu können. Der Beitrag besteht im Versuch, zu zeigen, dass sich auf dieser Grundlage auch ein Argument gegen den moralischen Relativismus gewinnen lässt.

WAHRE GESCHICHTE. BEMERKUNGEN ZU EINEM NICHT-DUALISIERENDEN VERSTÄNDNIS VON GESCHICHTE

Thomas Hainscho
Klagenfurt, Österreich

Für Geschichtswissenschaft ist Vergangenheit zugleich Problem und Voraussetzung. Ohne Vergangenheit kann nichts erforscht werden, zugleich ist es nicht möglich, die Vergangenheit selbst zu erforschen, weil sie nicht direkt gegeben, d.h. vorbei, ist. Ich möchte in meinem Text die Geschichtsauffassung von Hayden V. White vorstellen, der geschichtswissenschaftliche Diskurse als erzählerische Interpretationen historischer Quellen versteht, im Gegensatz zu einer Auffassung von Geschichtsschreibung als objektive Rekonstruktion der Vergangenheit. Anschließend wird auf Ähnlichkeiten zwischen Whites Auffassung von Geschichte und Josef Mitterers nicht-dualisierender Redeweise hingewiesen und ein gemeinsames Problem beider Auffassungen diskutiert: wie sollen Fakten von Fiktion unterschieden werden?

WHAT COULD WITTGENSTEIN'S CONCEPT OF „PERSON" BE?

Rom Harré
Washington, USA

Peter Hacker's recent insight that neuroscientists routinely commit the fallacy of ascribing predicates to parts of persons that get their meaning by the their use of whole persons. In the development of this insight he grounds Wittgenstein's thought in the idea of humanity as the highest species of animal. I have argued that to distinguish between those predicates that can be used for a whole and any of its parts and those for which such predications would be fallacious we need to realise that the person relevant predicates are one and all moral. By that I mean that are simply descriptive of some state of affairs but incorporate judgements of correctness and in general of value. The distinction between the two groups of predicates is more or less identical with Hume's famous `is'/`ought' distinction. Persons, I argue, are beings which are moral agents and are morally protected, that is it is morally wrong to damage or destroy them. This applies easily to animals, higher or lower. What then is the body

for a person – and there is no doubt that the most basic concept of person is an embodied being. We should think of the body as a tool kit for that person to carry out his or her projects, an instrument or collection of instruments. At the same time a human body is the site at which a person may dwell, but there are living bodies of the species homo sapiens not inhabited by people. This observation gives added point to Wittgenstein's distinction between a stone and a wriggling fly.

WITTGENSTEIN'S GRAMMAR OF ASSENT

Suzy Harris
London, United Kingdom

In John Henry Newman's *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent* the notion of assent is central to his critique of a conception of knowledge and understanding informed by a scientific method of enquiry. He argues that there are areas of life and social practices such as religious belief that do not conform to formal empirical method. Newman anticipates Wittgenstein's view that explanation must come to an end; that we do not begin with the process of questioning and the suspension of assent. The importance Newman attaches to the notion of assent connects with Wittgenstein's remarks on doubt and certainty. The paper explores the connection between these lines of thought.

ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL IMPORTANCE OF WITTGENSTEIN'S REMARKS ON ASPECT-BLINDNESS AND EXPERIENCE OF MEANING

Nicole Hausen
Fort Atkinson, USA

In work from the 1940's, Wittgenstein explicitly states that there is a relation between the concepts of aspect seeing (including aspect-blindness) and experiencing the meaning of a word. This paper investigates that relation along various lines: Wittgenstein's notion of aspect-blindness is considered from both a perceptual and a linguistic perspective. An explicit parallel between seeing aspects and experiencing meaning is suggested. Consequences of being aspect-blind are outlined. And finally, conclusions are offered as to the philosophical significance of these results.

INTENTIONAL ACTION: PRIVACY, PUBLICITY, RELATIVITY

Nathan Hauthaler
Stanford, USA

Wittgenstein's 'private language argument', whatever its precise structure and content, has received its fair amount of philosophical attention. It has also motivated various analogous arguments in domains of practical philosophy, such as Korsgaard's argument against the privacy of reasons for action, or Thompson's against the privacy of life forms. Here I advance another related argument, against the privacy of intentional action. I take as my point of departure Anscombe's account of intentional action, for being a foundational account for contemporary philosophy of action which is congenial and variously indebted to Wittgenstein's philosophy. I conclude by sketching how the argument against private intentional action has (limiting, moderating) upshots for relativist accounts of intentional action such as Velleman's.

WHAT'S WRONG WITH MOORE'S RESPONSE TO SKEPTICISM?

Jose-Ramon Hernandez
Madrid, Spain

In this paper, I will try to show why Wittgenstein found Moore's approach to skepticism interesting, but all the same unsatisfactory. To that end, I will take some remarks from Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* as my reference point, but I don't pretend to offer a coherent interpretation of this collection of working notes not prepared by Wittgenstein himself to be published. According to Wittgenstein, Moore realized something essential about the skeptical doubt: that it makes no sense; but failed to see the real nature of this nonsense. Moore believed that the skeptic falls into absurdity because she tries to doubt certainties that are obviously true, but he did not notice that the real nature of the skeptical nonsense is "grammatical". We will see what exactly this grammatical nonsense consists of and how the skeptical doubt is neutralized by the grammatical analysis.

DER INTRINSISCHE WERT VON VERTRAUEN

Martina Herrmann
Dortmund, Deutschland

In zwischenmenschlichen Beziehungen hat gegenseitiges Vertrauen einen hohen Wert. Dafür gibt es viele gute Erklärungen: es gibt Sicherheit, fördert die Kooperation, befriedigt ein Grundbedürfnis sozialer Wesen, usw. Die meisten Erklärungen sind funktional. Sie zeigen, wie eine vertrauensvolle Beziehung sich positiv auf andere Ziele, individuelle oder soziale, auswirkt. Der Wert des Vertrauens liegt, funktional betrachtet, in seinem Beitrag zu diesen anderen Zielen.
Insbesondere in persönlichen Beziehungen hat Vertrauen aber einen Eigenwert. Die meisten Menschen schätzen vertrauensvolle Beziehungen, auch ohne dass sie dabei weitergehende Ziele im Auge haben. In meinem Vortrag möchte ich weiter klären, worin dieser intrinsische Wert des Vertrauens in persönlichen Beziehungen genauer besteht. Dabei knüpfe ich an Überlegungen von Philipp Pettit, Martin Hartmann und Bennett Helm an.

ABSTRACT COGNITION AND THE NATURE OF MATHEMATICAL PROOF

Inês Viegas Hipólito
Lisbon, Portugal

The importance of mathematical proof is hardly underestimated; it is the doorway to finding new and non-ordinary ways to look at the systems and to explain phenomena. We certainly know that mathematics allow us to solve an equation, to find a function or to proof a theorem. However, knowing how to differentiate a function is certainly not the same as trying to understand how a theorem is possible. The question of how and why is it possible for numbers to accurately represent relationships and entities in the physical world is an epistemological question of what mathematics is. In this paper I will considerer Aristotle's conception of mathematics as ions from physical objects and their properties as the major advance in the human understanding of reality. Firstly, I will evaluate why proof is important, and subsequently how we, cognitive beings, are able to understand them and their relationship with the world.

ISMS LEAD TO MISINTERPRETATIONS OF MODERATE CONCEPTS AND FRAME DEBATES

Helmut Hofbauer

Vienna, Austria

My paper draws attention to the fact that the use of isms predetermines the manner how we perceive the issues expressed by them. Realism seems to be diametrically opposed to relativism and constructivism, but it is of the same kind by virtue of being an ism. Isms accomplish to constrain our thinking by limiting the linguistic registers we are allowed to use when discussing a topic. They exclude registers that express e.g. restraint, uncertainty, attitudes of modesty or moderation, private opinions, and insincerity. This leads to misinterpretations of moderate concepts like "skepticism" and "relativism" which are actually contradictions in terms.

DIE WAHRHEITSSPIELER – ÖFFENTLICHE STRATEGISCHE KOMMUNIKATION ALS SPIEL

Olaf Hoffjann

Salzgitter, Deutschland

Wettbewerbssituationen haben zunächst die Wirtschaftswissenschaft und später auch andere Disziplinen wie die Politikwissenschaft als strategische Spiele beschrieben. In der PR-Forschung ist diese ökonomisch-mathematische Spieltheorie nur vereinzelt aufgegriffen worden. Dies dürfte insbesondere auf ihre Annahme rationaler Entscheidungen und ihre Beschränkung auf einige wenige Regeln zurückzuführen sein. Dennoch ändert diese Kritik nichts an der naheliegenden Vermutung, dass Situationen strategischer Kommunikation einen spielerischen Charakter haben. Dieser Vermutung soll nachgegangen werden: Das Ziel des Beitrages ist es zu prüfen, inwiefern ein unterscheidungstheoretischer und paradoxiehaltiger Spielbegriff in Anlehnung an Wittgenstein, Bateson und Baecker geeignet ist, Aspekte strategischer Kommunikation zu beschreiben und zu erklären. Die These: Strategische Kommunikation kann als Wahrheitsspiel verstanden werden, weil sie den eigenen Wahrheitscharakter implizit oder explizit behauptet und darauf zielt, dass sich die eigene Sichtweise im Sinne Mitterers als konsensuell und damit nicht mehr oder kaum noch ernsthaft hinterfragt durchsetzt.

WORLD-PICTURE PROPOSITIONS IN *ON CERTAINTY*

Eri Ishida

Tokyo, Japan

In this paper, hinge propositions, or "Weltbild propositions" (Moyal-Sharrock 2013, 366) in On Certainty are considered. Wittgenstein characterizes the basis of our knowledge, beliefs and activities by means of these words. By examining Moyal-Sharrock's interpretation and Hacker's interpretation of these issues which Wittgenstein suggests in On Certainty, we can grasp our basis is a kind of conditions which we cannot state explicitly. This research focused on the argument that there is implicit assimilation (Moyal-Sharrock 2007,105) through which such basis is acquired.

THE CONCEPT OF LUCK AS AN *OBJECT OF COMPARISON* TO MAGIC

Mikko Jaakonsaari

Helsinki, Finland

I argue that comparing the concept of magic, which is alien to us, to the concept of luck, which is familiar to us, will help us to better understand magical thinking. This is due to important connections and similarities between these two concepts, concerning where they stem from, their highly independent status as concepts and their role in our moral lives.

WITTGENSTEIN AND DOSTOEVSKY ON THE ETHICAL-AESTHETIC PERSPECTIVE ON "THE WHOLE"

Tea Jankovic

Fribourg, Switzerland

In the Tractatus and the Notebooks, ethics and aesthetics delimit the sayable because they conceptually mark the limit of the world of facts, as opposed to representing isolable subject matter that can be talked about in factual language. They can only be "shown". However, what is shown is an impossible view: the view on the language using subject's relation to the world from outside the subject and from outside the world of all sayable propositions. However, art can provide the impossible view by means of the artifice of a fictional world. I offer a reading of The Brothers Karamazov, one of Wittgenstein's most obsessed-over novels, that narratively performs the ethical relation to the world by reflecting the protagonists' involvement with the limits of the novel's world.

CONSTRUCTED REALITY

Ludger Jansen

Münster/Rostock, Germany

The following is a popular argument: This is a construction, hence it is not real. Adding an appropriate adjective (social, mental, human, .) in front of "construction" or cognate terms like "(legal) fiction" yields a whole family of related arguments, all of which, or so I will argue, are fallacious. Contrary to popular opinion, these arguments fail both on the epistemic and the ontic sense of construction. Epistemic constructions may in fact correspond to reality, and ontic constructions always exist. There are important domains of reality (mental life, social reality, technical artifacts, art and fiction) which existentially depend on mental or social constructions. Important parts of reality are, that is, mind-dependent. The motivation behind these fallacious arguments can often be found in a misconceived conception of ontology and reality.

WOULD EARLY WITTGENSTEIN HAVE UNDERSTOOD A LION?

Amadeusz Just

Warsaw, Poland

One of the reasons why Wittgenstein's Remarks on Frazer's Golden Bough are interesting for a research project focused on the development of his philosophy is the presence of a method, which in Philosophical Investigations he called a perspicuous representation. However, while in the former, understanding people from different cultures is possible, in Philosophical Investigations he certainly de-

nied it. This change of views is followed by an important methodological change. What enabled understanding culturally different ritual actions in the Remarks was an immediate reference to the subject. In Philosophical Investigations the subject is absent, and what took its place as the basis of understanding were forms of life. This methodological shift has a significant impact on the limits of sense as Others, like people from other cultures and animals, reach beyond its outer bounds. Therefore, discussing Wittgenstein's methodological approach in the Remarks seems important both to cultural anthropology and philosophical ethology. Moreover, I am going to suggest, that in his methodological survey, Wittgenstein owes a greater debt to Arthur Schopenhauer than it is usually acknowledged.

"MY GLANCE…*LIKE* THAT OF SOMEONE ADMIRING THE ILLUMINATION OF THE SKY AND DRINKING IN THE LIGHT": PERSPECTIVES AND "THE REAL" IN THE *TRACTATUS*

Géza Kállay

Budapest/Vienna, Hungary/Austria

This paper is ultimately concerned with various aspects of reality in the Tractatus. Following largely James Conant's and Cora Diamond's resolute reading, it tries to interpret, first and foremost 6.54. of the Tractatus in the light of § 415 of Philosophical Investigations and identifies the conflict of three perspectives in 6.54. It argues that this conflict can be upheld as a model of how human consciousness works, and that the Tractatus itself is a slow-motion picture of the operation of consciousness. Thus the Tractatus, from the perspective of the Third Person, makes absolute sense, while it is sheer nonsense from the First Person perspective, and their conflict, characteristic of the whole book, "culminates" in 6.54. This has implications as regards our various senses of reality, as well as the degrees of reality we are able to acknowledge.

SCIENTIFIC REALISM, APPROXIMATE TRUTH AND CONTINGENCY IN SCIENCE

Katherina Kinzel

Vienna, Austria

This paper explores the implications of scientific realism for the debate over whether the results of successful science are contingent or inevitable. It argues that the core theses that constitute scientific realism as a philosophical doctrine do not imply inevitabilism. It also shows that the historical pictures of scientific development presented by scientific realists allow for some degree of contingency in science. Nevertheless, the type of contingency acknowledged by realists is very different from what social constructivists have in mind when speaking of contingency in the history of science. This paper concludes that there is a genuine conflict between realists and constructivists, but that this conflict is not about whether science is contingent, but rather about how contingent it is.

SCIENTIFIC PLURALISM BETWEEN REALISM AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM? SOME CRITICAL COMMENTS

Peter P. Kirschenmann

Amsterdam, Netherlands

Scientific pluralists oppose their views to scientific realism, especially in its monistic form. I sketch the problem context that has given rise to pluralisms. I critically discuss these views in terms of a number of questions: Is the monism they oppose not a straw-man? Are pluralists onlookers or philosophers? Are the claims of strong pluralism tenable? Do pluralists not have an unclear relation to truth? I conclude that scientific realists can accept the main point of pluralists, but need not and will not accept that there are ineliminable incompatibilities between scientific approaches to particular phenomena.

EDIFYING NON-DUALISM: RICHARD RORTY MEETS JOSEF MITTERER

Sebastian Kletzl

Vienna, Austria

In this paper I argue that Josef Mitterer's non-dualizing mode of discourse and Richard Rorty's edifying philosophy should team up. My starting point in the first section is the central role anti-representationalism plays in Rorty's project. In the second part I argue that the non-dualizing mode of discourse is the best available way to express this anti-representationalism. In the third part I indicate how edifying philosophy provides a framework in which the non-dualizing mode of discourse is to be embedded fruitfully.

AFTER CONSTRUCTIVISM: THE RETURN OF TRUTH

Hans-Herbert Kögler

Florida, USA

For a long time, constructivist talk was taken to imply a rejection of realism and truth. The overcoming of ill-conceived and deeply entrenched dualisms was widely understood to lead to 'the world well lost,' in Rorty's famous words. In this contribution, and contrary to much of contemporary postmodern, hermeneutic, and social-theoretical thought, I argue that a rightly understood constructivism preserves rather than destroys realism. To that end I will reconstruct—and not deconstruct—the truth-conducive features of social discourses in the world. After developing some problematic as well as productive dimensions of truth-talk, a pluralized and decentered account of discursive world-disclosures is shown to enable a theory of truth as the expressive articulation of reality. We present a conception of truth based on domain-specific criteria of experience and procedure, which allows us to reconstruct normative standards of truth talk as an essential feature of critical discourses by self-reflexive social agents.

REVISITING WITTGENSTEIN'S 'PICTURES' IN THE NACHLAß – THE ARTS AND SCIENCES IN A NEW KEY

Stephanie Koerner

Manchester, United Kingdom

This presentation explores something of the range of reasons why the time is especially ripe for revisiting Witt-

genstein's work on 'pictures'. Emphasis falls on interfaces of insights of his *Nachlaß* with innovations in approaches to art and science's histories, which challenge hitherto predominant utopic and dystopic 'disenchantment' images of modernity, 'two cultures' traditions and polemic over "realism versus relativism" and "truth versus contingency" (IWS 2015) in philosophy.

DIE ERFINDUNG DER SEIN-SOLLEN-DICHOTOMIE

Hans Kraml

Innsbruck, Österreich

Durch G. E. Moores Hinweis, dass Bewertungen nicht an speziellen Eigenschaften von Dingen oder Umständen liegen, wurde das Sein-Sollen-Problem zu einem im Rahmen von Ethik und Sozialwissenschaften unter Rückgriff auf D. Hume viel diskutierten Thema. Die sprachlichen Unterschiede, die in der Gegenüberstellung von rein deskriptiven zu normativen Sätzen im weitesten Sinn ihren Ausdruck finden, sind jedoch nicht Eigenschaften sprachlicher Einrichtungen als solcher, sondern Ergebnis einer Entwicklung im Rahmen theoretischer Debatten, die sich im Universitätsbetrieb des Mittelalters abspielten. Dabei handelt es sich um eine Neubeschreibung der Aufgabe und Reichweite von Metaphysik und Philosophie überhaupt. Mit dieser Neubeschreibung erfuhr das Verständnis von Wissenschaft eine Veränderung, durch die normative und handlungsorientierende Vorstellungen allmählich in einen eigenen Bereich übergeben wurden. Dieses Erbe zeigt sich in der gegenwärtigen Problematik um normative Regelungen das menschlichen Zusammenlebens.

RELATIVISMS AND THEIR OPPOSITES

Michael Krausz

Bryn Mawr, USA

This paper unpacks variables embedded in the following definition of relativism. "Relativism is the view that such values as truth, goodness or beauty are relative to a reference frame, and no absolute overarching standards to adjudicate between reference frames exist." When unpacked and combined in various ways, the embedded variables give rise to a myriad of relativisms. In turn, varieties of absolutism may be realist, universalist, or foundational. When absolutism is disambiguated, the self-referential argument against relativism is found to be invalid.

LEONARD NELSON AND METAPHYSICAL KNOWLEDGE

Tomasz Kubalica

Katowice, Poland

Leonard Nelson's lecture *Die Unmöglichkeit der Erkenntnistheorie* is regarded primarily as a critique of the theory of knowledge. What has been rarely discussed in this context, however, is the problem of the possibility of metaphysics. By the impossibility of epistemology he means the possibility of metaphysical knowledge. I would like to devote this paper to the analysis of this problem.

ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVISM AS TRANSCENDENTAL NOMINALISM

Peter Kügler

Innsbruck, Austria

Ontological relativism, which denies metaphysical realism and with it the existence of natural kinds, assumes a pre-conceptually given reality or experience that is sometimes envisaged as an unstructured domain (unformed matter, raw experience) ready to be structured by the application of concepts. But ontological relativism is best interpreted as transcendental nominalism, which is to be distinguished from metaphysical nominalism. Transcendental nominalism construes the pre-conceptual realm as an experience of individuals in Nelson Goodman´s sense, that is, of entities that are not classes or natural kinds. Medieval nominalists referred to this experience as "sensory intuitive cognition". Following a suggestion by Dominik Perler, the latter can be understood as encoding information about individuals in analog form (Fred Dretske). Conceptual schemes classify these individuals in different ways. Concepts do not structure an unstructured something, but nor do they "carve nature at the joints". They classify individuals – first of all, objects of experience.

WHEN PAUL MET LUDWIG: WITTGENSTEINIAN QUALMS ABOUT BOGHOSSIAN'S ANTIRELATIVISM

Martin Kusch

Vienna, Austria

This paper develops a broadly-speaking "Wittgensteinian" response to Paul Boghossian's criticism of epistemic and moral relativisms. I shall discuss Boghossian's interpretations of Wittgenstein's views; suggest reformulations of epistemic systems and encounters between them in light of "On Certainty"; and challenge some of Boghossian's views on propositions, as well as on the distinction between philosophical and physical forms of relativism. The positive project of the paper is to suggest how an interesting philosophical relativism might be formulated in light of Wittgenstein's philosophy.

RELATIVISM ABOUT MORALITY AND EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

Anna Laktionova

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Relativism challenges normative elaborations of philosophy about both methodology of science and morality (ethics). That is why there appear different attempts of accommodating and accepting it. The discussion between Boghossian P., C. Wright and JC Beall gives examples of such attempts. After bringing it into attention, the case of 'auto-justification' is analyzed with the aim to trace the possibility of preserving normativity consistent with relativism.

WITTGENSTEIN THEORIST OF THE COMMONWEALTH: HARDT/NEGRI'S WITTGENSTEIN

Emiliano La Licata

Palermo, Italy

In the paper I wish to bring some arguments in order to explain why, in my opinion, Hardt and Negri are interested

in later Wittgenstein and how they read the Viennese philosopher in their last work "Commonwealth". I will be concentrating on the concept of immanence, which Hardt and Negri insist on repeatedly across the book. Immanence means rejection of a principle or any dispositive of power which can determine the life of singularities gathered in common from a transcendental space. The Common accepts immanence as space ruled by the creativity of people, which freely chooses or invents a way of life. In my opinion, a concept of immanence is deeply present in later Wittgenstein. Indeed, in *Philosophical Investigation*, Wittgenstein refuses the idea that a space exists above the relations between people, which gives meaning to language and gives shape to their life as well. According to Wittgenstein, meaning develops only through immanent and common relations within language games.

PARADOX AND RELATIVISM

Hajj Muhammad Legenhausen

Qom, Iran

Since the time of Plato, relativism has been attacked as a self-refuting theory. Today, there are two basic kinds of argument that are used to show that global relativism is logically incoherent: first, a direct descendent of the argument Plato uses against Protagoras, called the peritrope; and, second, a more recent argument that relativism leads to an infinite regress. Although some relativist theories may be formulated in such a way as to be susceptible to these arguments, there are other versions of relativism that are impervious to these charges of incoherence. First the arguments against relativism will be stated. Next, a radical form of global relativism with assessment sensitivity is introduced, RR. Finally, it is shown how RR can be defended against the challenges of the peritrope and the regress. No attempt is made to defend RR as a plausible theory; however, the usual attempts to show the logical incoherence of radical forms of global relativism fail.

LET'S PLAY "MAKE THE REALIST FOOLISH"!

Eric Lemaire

Chätenois, France

Why are there no established theories in the philosophical world? Is it because philosophical theories and problems are meaningless, like gibberish? The correct answer here is: we don't care. Philosophy does not have to establish widely accepted theories describing the unique reality. In that paper, I propose a game "Make the Realist foolish" in order to show why.

EVERYONE'S AT FAULT OR NOBODY DISAGREES? CHALLENGING BOGHOSSIAN'S ARGUMENT AGAINST ALETHIC RELATIVISM

Christoph Lernpaß & Paul Tucek

Vienna, Austria

In his latest paper on relativism (2011), Boghossian challenges alethic relativism. He constructs a dilemma for the relativist, and allegedly shows that no disagreement is faultless.
In this paper we challenge Boghossian's dilemma. We seek to show, that faultless disagreement, put his way, misuses the idea of attributing mistakes and therefore cannot amount to the rejection of alethic relativism. We develop a distinction between perceived and genuine mistakes and show, that on the relativistic picture, only genuine mistakes are of interest. Moreover, the disagreement does not dissolve because alethic relativism offers options for maintaining it. Therefore, Boghossian's attack against alethic relativism is ineffective.

TRUTH AS COMMUNICATION

Dominik Lewiński

Wroclaw, Poland

Usually truth is problematized within an epistemological or onto-epistemological perspective. In this essay, I argue that truth is not an epistemological phenomenon. Following Niklas Luhmann's approach, I claim that truth is an exclusively social (communicational) phenomenon. My goal is to demonstrate that truth is produced by the operations of a communication system. Truth is not generated by subjects to maintain cognitive process nor is it stimulated by subjects, but is created by society in order to sustain communicational processes; to coordinate communication within a communication. From the proposed perspective, the key function of truth is not to verify effects of human cognition but to ignite and reduce communicational conflicts.

REASON, MOTIVE AND CAUSE FROM A WITTGENSTEINIAN PERSPECTIVE

Jakub Mácha

Brno, Czech Republic

We can say of an intentional action that it has a reason or a motive; and in the same vein, such an action must have a cause. It is thus only a matter of terminology whether all species of intentionality can be restated in this way—as a relation between an action and its motive. I argue that the distinction between a reason and a cause is a special case of the distinction between internal and external relations. This distinction allows us to analyze a metaphysical haze which is produced by confusing empirical (i.e. external) and grammatical (i.e. internal) propositions. When an agent aims to justify their action, they have several options at their disposal: (1) to give the actual cause which is always hypothetical (2) to report their actual reason, and (3) to give a possible reason which might have led to the action.

MOORE AND THE KING. WITTGENSTEIN ON THE GROUNDLESSNESS OF WORLD-PICTURES

Stefan Majetschak

Kassel, Germany

In *On Certainty* §92, Wittgenstein discusses the question whether it is possible for somebody to be convinced of something with *good reason* that is quite contrary to the fundamental convictions that most of us hold. By means of a thought experiment he introduces the figure of a fictional king who has never been told anything but that the world began to exist with his birth and who is correspondingly convinced of something that we believe to be apparently absurd. But are we able to demonstrate the correctness or suitability of our different conviction?
This lecture will examine Wittgenstein's epistemologically radical and at the same time astonishing discussion of this question. Is there, as Wittgenstein seems to suggest in OC 92, really no possibility to demonstrate the correctness of the fundamental beliefs of one's own world-picture? Is there positively no way to prove one's own fundamental

convictions as correct, true or appropriate to the facts? After suggesting answers to these questions, this lecture will offer an interpretation that might be described as cultural "relativism". Some scholars explicitly reject such a reading of *On Certainty*. The lecture will therefore conclude with two comments on the problem of »cultural« or »world-picture relativism«.

LANGUAGE-GAMES OR MISLEADING EXPEDIENTS FOR PHILOSOPHICAL THERAPY

Saori Makino
Chiba, Japan

In *Philosophical Investigations* (PI), Wittgenstein (2009) intends his well-known idea of "language-games" to be applicable for practising philosophical therapy. Some language-games serve as "objects of comparison" (PI §130), replacing unsound ideas with sound ones, as the game of §48 shows the unsoundness of a view presented in the *Theaetetus* (PI §46). Language games function as objects of therapy or detailed examination.
Is Wittgenstein"s method sufficient for treating philosophical diseases? The answer is both "yes" and "no". The affirmative emphasizes the desirable effects of language-games, and the negative the undesirable ones. In this paper, I scrutinize both desirable and undesirable effects and attempt to reveal unreasonable grounds for the latter.

A CURE FOR WHAT ILLNESS? THE *TRACTATUS*' TARGET IN THE THERAPEUTIC READING

Eduardo Marchesan
Porto, Portugal

How can a book that says nothing be responsible for an awareness experienced by its readers? If the *Tractatus* propositions are nonsensical, how are we supposed to understand the idea that they are capable of bringing about the realization of their nonsensicality? These questions display that which Marie McGinn considers to be a paradox derived from a reading of the *Tractatus* committed both to the idea of the nonsensicality of its propositions and to the notion that Wittgenstein wants to cure his readers from the tendency to talk nonsense – the so-called therapeutic reading. In this paper, I wish to show what lies at the basis of McGinn's paradox – something I believe to be a misconception of the therapeutic reading's account of what the *Tractatus*' target is. Exposing this misconception, I want to suggest that what McGinn sees as a paradox is actually an important theme present in Wittgenstein's early work.

THE HARMONY OF COLOUR CONCEPTS – BRIDGING THE EARLY AND THE LATE WITTGENSTEIN

Ingolf Max
Leipzig, Germany

The street over the bridge linking the early and the late Wittgenstein has among its cornerstones not only such concepts like "logic", "elementary proposition", "manifold", "meaning", "sense", "nonsense", "multiplicity", "language game", "(family) resemblance", "rule following", "grammar" etc. but also such concepts like " the logical structure of colour" (T 6.3751), "the logic of colour concepts" (Remarks on Colour I, 22), "eine Harmonielehre der Farben" (very badly translated as "a theory [?] of colour harmony", Remarks on Colour I, 74): "If there were a theory of colour harmony, perhaps it would begin by dividing the colours into groups and forbidding certain mixtures or combinations and allowing others. And, as in harmony, its rules would be given no justification." We can use the concept "harmony" in our language of analysis to describe Wittgenstein's early and late positions in close contact with the intermediate period as well as the transition from the early to the later Wittgenstein.

KANN EINFÜHLUNG RELATIVISTISCH SEIN? – WERTE UND WERTEDISKURS IM FREMDSPRACHENUNTERRICHT

Annelore Mayer
Baden, Österreich

Der Fremdsprachenunterricht beruht auf der Akzeptanz von Werten: einerseits jener der Ziel- und der Herkunfts-sprache, aber ebenso auf jenen Werten, welche in den Traditionen der Sprachen zur Evidenz kommen. Werte innerhalb dieser kulturellen Äußerungen sind nicht relati-vierbar, sondern müssen im Lern- und Lehrprozess als das grundsätzlich Gegebene zumindest für's Erste angenom-men werden. Erst dann ist es möglich, nach dem Inhalt des Wertes – seinem ethischen, moralischen, etc., zu fragen. Insofern ist Fremdsprachenunterricht in Lehre und Forschung ein Gebiet, in welchem relativistische Ansätze nicht zielführend sind, weil solche auch den Eigenwert der Lernenden und Lehrenden und ihres persönlichen Hinter-grundes relativieren würden.

BLOß EIN EREIGNIS SEINER SELBST ODER DOCH EINES DES LEBENS? LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN UND FERDINAND EBNER ÜBER DEN TOD. EINE ÉTUDE

Johannes Leopold Mayer
Baden, Österreich

Steht der Tod als Nichtereignis eines Lebens einsam für sich, oder ist er aufgehoben in einer grundlegenden Ich-Du-Beziehung, welche das Leben des Menschen erst zum Menschenleben macht? Die Stellung zu diesem Fragen-komplex zeigt die Möglichkeiten von Ebners dialogphiloso-phischen Bemühungen und eines „solus ipse" als Aus-gangspunkt wittgenstein'schen Denkens. Es fragt sich, in wieweit die beiden Positionen zueinander geführt werden können und sollen.

RELIABILISM AND RELATIVISM

Robin McKenna
Vienna, Austria

The generality problem is one of the most pressing prob-lems for process reliabilism. This paper proposes a broadly relativist solution to the generality problem. While the basic idea behind the solution is from Mark Heller (1995), the solution defended here departs from Heller on a crucial point. Because of this departure, my solution avoids a serious problem with Heller's solution.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL RELATIVISM, TRANSCENDED PERSPECTIVES AND 'THICK' EXPERIENCES

Patricia Meindl

Graz, Austria

Epistemological relativism seems to feature prominently in the so-called 'Strong Programme' in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, which is particularly associated with Barry Barnes and David Bloor. In their influential paper *Relativism, Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge* (1982), Barnes and Bloor make an important and fundamental argument for relativism, which was more recently criticised by Harvey Siegel (2011). This paper deals with the more constructive components of Siegel's attempt to reject the Strong Programme's relativism, revolving around the core idea of a 'roomier' perspective, which is supposed to yield non-relative judgements. Taking these considerations as a starting point, this paper aims to outline an account on the possibility of non-relative judgements, which draws substantially on the human being's capacity to reflect and to have 'thick' experiences.

FIGHTING RELATIVISM: WITTGENSTEIN & KUHN

Danielle Moyal-Sherrock

Hatfield, United Kingdom

As Ilham Dilman puts it: 'language is the source of the system we find in nature'. There is no *conception* of reality independent of language. There are at least three problems with this – Kuhn's and Wittgenstein's – way of thinking: (1) the problem of incommensurability; (2) the problem of idealism – in the case of Kuhn and Wittgenstein, a *linguistic* idealism; (3) the problem of conceptual relativism. In this paper, I argue that 'incommensurability' is a non-problem. I then defend Kuhn and Wittgenstein against the charge of linguistic idealism by showing that and how, on their view, our concepts attach to the world. Finally, I deflate the charge of conceptual relativism by arguing that although they reject the existence of an objective basis lying outside all human conceptual frameworks and world-pictures, neither Wittgenstein nor Kuhn endorses an indiscriminate acceptance of all conceptual schemes. In conclusion, however, we shall see that only Wittgenstein finds the stopping-place of relativism – in his *naturalism*.

JEAN PIAGET UND DIE ENTSTEHUNG VON RADIKALEM KONSTRUKTIVISMUS UND KYBERNETIK ZWEITER ORDNUNG

Albert Müller

Wien, Österreich

Es ist keine ungewöhnliche Position, die Entstehung von Radikalem Konstruktivismus und Kybernetik Zweiter Ordnung in einem engen Zusammenhang zu sehen. Ranulph Glanville (2012) etwa ging so weit, die beiden Begriffe gleichzusetzen: „Radical constructivism = Second order cybernetics".

Piagets Arbeiten wurden von dreien der (Mit-)Begründer des Radikalen Konstruktivismus, Ernst von Glasersfeld, Heinz von Foerster und Ranulph Glanville rezipiert wurden und gewannen seit den frühen 1970er Jahren massiven Einfluss. Während Glasersfeld den Begriff Radikaler Konstruktivismus prägen sollte, waren Foerster und Glanville maßgeblich an seiner Ausgestaltung beteiligt. Foerster zitierte Piaget seit 1973/1974 in seinen Diskussionen von Kognition und Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit. Für Glasersfeld (1974) nahm Piaget eine Schlüsselposition ein. Piagets Werk steht bei ihm am Anfang des Begriffes Radikaler Konstruktivismus. Die Dissertation Glanvilles (1975), die sich mit dem Begriff des Objekts beschäftigte, profitierte von Piagets Arbeiten zur Objektkonstanz.

EXO-MODE AND ENDO-MODE: TWO EPISTEMOLOGICAL APPROACHES OF EXPLORING THE WORLD

Karl Müller

Vienna, Austria

The lecture will focus on two epistemological approaches in exploring nature and society.

The first approach under the name of exo-mode can be considered as the traditional mode and tries to minimize the role and effects of scientific observers and to maximize the degree of objectivity of the scientific analysis. Eric Kendel provides a very clear summary for the endo-mode: „Scientists make models of elementary features of the world that can be tested and reformulated. These tests rely on removing the subjective biases of the observer and relying on objective measurements and evaluations." (Kendel, 2012:449)

The second approach with the name of endo-mode was developed recently and includes the scientific observers within the research process. The domain of investigation and the observer operate within an endo-sphere in a reflexive manner. Moreover, an endo-sphere must be more complex than the corresponding exo-sphere. The endo-mode can be summarized by inverting the original quotation from Eric Kendel. „Scientists make models of elementary features of the world that can be tested and reformulated. These tests rely on removing the objective biases of observer-free tests and relying on observer-dependent measurements and evaluations."

It will be shown that hypothetical realism becomes the favorite methodology for the exo-mode whereas radical constructivism, so far, has developed several variations for the endo-mode.

WITTGENSTEIN AGAINST FREGE ON CARDINAL NUMBERS

Anderson Luis Nakano

São Carlos, Brazil

This paper examines Wittgenstein's critique of Frege's claim that a numerical ascription is essentially an assertion about a concept, and tries to establish a relation between this criticism and the critical remarks about Frege's categories of "concept" and "object" found in *Philosophical Remarks*. I claim that a careful reading of some key passages in this work and in Wittgenstein's manuscripts can shed light on this relation. In fact, when Wittgenstein emphasizes that Frege's concept/object is not *one* logical form, but *many*, he is also indicating that Frege's theory— according to which an ascription of number is essentially a sentence about a concept—captures only the use of number in the "surface" of language, and does not constitutes a logical analysis of the concept of number *per se*.

EXTENDED EPISTEMIC AGENTS AND AN ACCEPTABLE FORM OF RELATIVISM

Yasuo Nakayama

Osaka, Japan

In this paper, we analyze scientific observations made by a research team equipped with some technical devices. Many parts of the universe are not observable by naked eyes. In other words, with naked eyes, we can observe only a limited part of the universe. By using technical devices, we can enhance our observation capacity in various directions. Nowadays, scientists are doing researches in different disciplines, such as physics, chemistry, and biology. In some disciplines, they have their own methodologies and technical devices. This certain amount of independency of scientific activities in different disciplines can be seen as a sign of relativism. In this paper, we examine what conditions are needed for relativism to be acceptable in science.

REALISM ABOUT IDENTITY AND INDIVIDUALITY OF CONSCIOUS BEINGS

Martine Nida-Rümelin

Freiburg, Switzerland

According to the realist view, conscious beings are perfect individuals: their Identity across time (what it takes for them to continue existing) and their individuality (what it takes for them to exist under counterfactual circumstances) has no informative explication. Nonetheless we can understand, engaging in a specific mode of thought (conceptually taking the perspective of others) what the identity and individuality of a given conscious individual consists in. This particular version of realism about the identity and individuality of conscious beings can be used to motivate a non-materialist view about conscious individuals. The argument is based on the premise (to be justified) that thinking about others in the specific mode at issue is to manifest genuine understanding of what being a conscious individual amounts to.

NONSENSE PASSING THROUGH TYPE DISTINCTIONS: WITTGENSTEIN'S CRITICISM TO RUSSELL IN 1913 REVISITED

Yasushi Nomura

Sapporo, Japan

There was a dispute concerning the nature of propositions and judgments between Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein in 1913. As is well known, Russell was deeply shocked by Wittgenstein's criticism and was at last "paralyzed". But still the theoretical substance of the criticism has not been clear. Although many commentators tried to make it clear, I will examine in this paper the interpretations by S. Somerville and N. Griffin and try to show that one of their basic presuppositions is erroneous. By this task, we shall see that a problem lurks in non-standard features of Russell's theory of types that is brought to it by the young Russell's motif of anti-monism and that Wittgenstein's criticism shoots the problem unerringly.

A REINTERPRETATION OF LIMITS IN THE *PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS.* AN ESSAY ON WITTGENSTEIN'S LINGUISTIC TURN

Gonzalo Nunez

Sheffield, United Kingdom

Wittgenstein's philosophy has two main periods represented by two works: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations. While the former defends that language and world share a common logical structure, the latter criticises that view by arguing that language is a game whose rules mirror practices and habits. I contend that Wittgenstein's turn is a change in the notion of the limit of language. While in early Wittgenstein language has a sharp metaphysical limit given by logic; in later works, language has fuzzy limits which are drawn by the rules with which we use words in ordinary life.

IS WITTGENSTEIN A MORAL RELATIVIST? WITTGENSTEIN, RELATIVISM AND ETHICAL OBJECTIVITY

Marco Nuzzaco

Bari, Italy

It is a moot question whether Wittgenstein can be considered a moral relativist. In this paper I argue that he is not. According to moral relativism we can only describe moral differences, withholding judgement on the question whether a moral stance is righter or more wrong than another, because no standpoint can be proved objectively truer than any other. A relativist, therefore, assumes moral disagreement as a conclusion of this argument, whereas I argue that for Wittgenstein this is a starting point, insofar as I claim that he holds moral disagreement as a condition of ethics. On the basis of textual evidences, I argue that Wittgenstein is not a relativist and he can be viewed as suggesting a conception of ethical objectivity. Far from being neutral, this conception requires calling ourselves and our own prejudices into question as a condition for any claim of morality to objectivity.

WITTGENSTEIN, THE APHORIST. THE PLACE OF LITERARY QUALITY IN G.H. VON WRIGHT'S UNDERSTANDING OF WITTGENSTEIN AS A GREAT PHILOSOPHER

Bernt Österman

Helsinki, Finland

My talk examines a very specific feature of Georg Henrik von Wright's understanding of Wittgenstein, namely his tendency to associate Wittgenstein with great writers and artists. As such, it may also be seen as rather peculiar. Wouldn't a philosopher firmly rooted in the logical-analytical tradition like von Wright be expected to endorse analytical virtues such as clarity and stringency, rather than literary quality, in philosophy? Based on some of the culturally oriented essays von Wright published in Swedish I will, on the contrary, argue that von Wright, in fact, saw an intimate connection between literary quality and what he called philosophy in a deeper sense. Furthermore, I will claim that this connection, in particular, also applies to his view of Wittgenstein.

WISSENSCHAFTSTHEORETISCHE ÜBER-LEGUNGEN JENSEITS VON REALISMUS, RELATIVISMUS UND KONSTRUKTIVISMUS

Franz Ofner
Klagenfurt, Österreich

Mit meinen Überlegungen knüpfe ich an die non-dualisierende Redeweise von Josef Mitterer an, wonach wir uns bei Auffassungsunterschieden über Forschungs-ergebnisse nicht auf beschreibungsunabhängige Objekte berufen können. Damit wird die Möglichkeit der Unterscheidung zwischen wahr und falsch von Beschreibungen, die im Realismus, Konstruktivismus und Relativismus vertreten wird, negiert. Für die Natur- und Sozialwissenschaften stellt sich damit die Frage, welchen Status Forschungsobjekte in der empirischen Forschung haben und in welcher Beziehung die Forschungstätigkeit zu den sprachlich formulierten Forschungsergebnissen steht. In meinem Vortrag mache ich einen Vorschlag, wie diese Frage auf nicht-dualistische Weise beantwortet werden kann. Ich knüpfe dabei an das pragmatistische Wissenschaftsverständnis sowie die Handlungs- und Kommunikationstheorie von George Herbert Mead an und zeige, dass sich ein Konzept entwickeln lässt, in dem der nicht-sprachliche Aspekt von Forschung und ihr sprachlicher Aspekt auf nicht-dualisierende Weise verbunden sind. Dieses Konzept beinhaltet auch bestimmte realistische, konstruktivistische und relativistische Elemente, jedoch ohne Bezug auf wahr/falsch.

THE UNITY OF WITTGENSTEIN'S "LOGICS OF OUR LANGUAGE" IN IGBO-AFRICAN TONAL LANGUAGES

Chrysanthus Ogbozo
Nsukka, Nigeria

Wittgenstein begins the Tractatus by claiming that philoso-phical problems can largely be resolved by understanding the "Logic of our language,". The implication is that those problems are essentially linguistic, and depend more on the manner of presentation (Fragestellung der Probleme) than on anything else; and as soon as one is capable of explaining the logic of the functioning of our language, philosophical problems will vanish. Identifying two logics in Wittgenstein's entire language discourse, the author be-lieves that a good grasp and exposition of those logics can be a worthwhile venture, particularly as he argues that the said logics are operative or has a place in an Igbo-African tonal language. His argumentation is the novelty in the paper, constituting, as it were, the contribution of the paper to the symposium.

RELATIVE BUT REAL AND BINDING: HOW *FAMILY RESEMBLANCE* AND *NORMATIVE USE* HAVE FOUND THEIR WAY INTO TRANSLATION STUDIES (TS)

Paulo Oliveira
Campinas, Brazil

Wittgenstein's later philosophy is sometimes quoted but seldom really understood in current Translation Studies (TS). Nevertheless, the ideas of family resemblance and normative use have found a place in this specialized aca-demic area, mainly due to the influential work of Gideon Toury. In philosophy, there is a trend to handle translation

in a way alien to TS. This paper suggests that both fields could learn from each other.

FAITH IN BELIEF: WHY LIFE IS NOT BASED ON KNOWLEDGE

Tony Pacyna
Heidelberg, Germany

It is a well-known philosophical investigation that religious sentences should be based on knowledge in a certain way. Alvin Plantinga tries to defend religious knowledge as justified true belief for decades. Mostly scientists and religion-critiques suppose that religion is irrational and hence dangerous.
The critiques as well as the defenders imply a non-linguistic world. The critiques concern a difference be-tween empirical evidences and corresponding formulas, which can explain the world. Hence human cognition would be the result of evolution just to recognise the laws of the world that lie within nature.
The defenders instead react to the critiques by defending the religious language against an empirical approach. While doing this, they accept the critiques approach as true. This would mean that the meaning lies within the objects – a position, which Kant rejected.
It is the thesis of my paper that Wittgenstein uses the example of the religious language-game for describing that every language-game grounds on an inexplainable founda-tion like faith in God. The impossibility of explaining God is quite similar to the inexplainability of the Big Bang. Instead, God can be described as well as the Big Bang. Playing a language-game means to trust in a certain foundation with certainty, but not necessarily with God. Playing a lan-guage-game then is based on faith, but without revelation.

"IT'S NOT SILENT AND DARK WITHIN". MURDOCH, WITTGENSTEIN, AND THE INNER LIFE

Annalisa Paese
Pittsburgh, USA

The aim of this paper is to explain how Murdoch's can, on the one hand, accept Wittgenstein's criticism of inner objects and, on the other hand, embrace a picture of moral life that gives a central place to the notions of privacy and interiority.

PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENT: A WITTGENSTEINIAN APPROACH

Ratikanta Panda
Mumbai, India

Wittgenstein develops an argument to refute the argument of the private linguists in support of a private language in his Philosophical Investigations. He, in course of his argument, shows that a private language is not possible because if possible, it would be a meaningless one. We cannot account for its meaning as a rule-governed phenomenon. For Wittgenstein, a private language means: "The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language." (Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1953, §243)
This language has words, which stand for the immediate private sensations of the speaker and besides, nobody

else can use these words. Thus the aim of this paper is to discuss the mistake of the nature of private sense experience and critically evaluate experience is also not private in a strict sense.

THE OBJECTIVITY OF MEANING IN CONTEXTUALISM

Claudia Picazo Jaque

Barcelona, Spain

Meaning can be considered objective when it extends, independently of our judgements, to unconsidered cases. Both Wittgenstein's family resemblance concepts and the defence of an Underdeterminacy Thesis in Contextualism might threaten this kind of objectivity, which is necessary for the objectivity of truth. I this essay I will present the threat and analyse how Contextualism can account for the extension of meaning to unconsidered cases.

KRIPKE'S PARADOX AND THE NORMATIVITY OF ACTIONS

Michał Piekarski

Warsaw, Poland

Saul Kripke contends that Wittgenstein discovered a new form of philosophical scepticism. He believes that Wittgenstein first created the so-called philosophical paradox and then resolved it. The sceptical paradox is resolved by scepticism towards rules. Things like following a rule, acting in accordance with it, or indeed the meaning itself do not exist for the individual. They do exist and have meaning only in the social context. Kripke's paradox only occurs when we think about rules as something „apart from" or „beyond" actions. Rules seem to be a quasi-transcendental basis for action. The situation is radically different when we start thinking about rules as actions or, to be more precise, self-justifying actions. Rejecting scepticism towards rules is strictly related to abandoning the rule/action dualism. Kripke's scepticism towards the relevance of using the notion of a rule do not hold if we refer to the normative character of actions.

A REASSESSMENT OF WITTGENSTEIN'S POSITION ON THE MEANING AND TRUTH OF NEGATIVE PROPOSITIONS

Jimmy Plourde

Trois-Rivières, Canada

In this paper I present and critically examine the standard interpretation (SI) of Wittgenstein's position on the questions of the meaning and the truth of negative propositions. I then present Guido Bonino's interpretation of these issues as an alternative to SI. I however challenge one important aspect of Bonino's interpretation, namely the idea of negation as some kind of assertive force; I argue that negation is part of the meaning of the negative proposition. Thus, I arrive at an interpretation that leaves room for negation within the proposition's meaning and within facts, without rejecting SI's most fundamental premises.

MORAL DISAGREEMENT, ANTI-REALISM, AND THE WORRY ABOUT OVERGENERALIZATION

Thomas Pölzler

Graz, Austria

According to the classical argument from moral disagreement, the existence of widespread or persistent moral disagreement is best explained by, and thus inductively supports the view that there are no objective moral facts. One of the most common charges against this argument is that it "overgeneralizes": it implausibly forces its proponents to deny the existence of objective facts about certain matters of physics, history, philosophy, etc. as well (companions in guilt), or even about its own conclusion or its own soundness (self-defeat). Is this overgeneralization charge justified? In this paper I argue that both of the overgeneralization objections are rather weak. The companions in guilt version very likely fails, and the self-defeat version more likely fails than not. This result gives us reason to consider the argument from moral disagreement more seriously than has recently been done.

PHILOSOPHY AS CONSTITUTION OF WORLDS

Donald Poochigian

Grand Forks, USA

Understood by the linguistic turn is reality is nominal, creating a crisis in philosophy as the study of reality. There being no one world which exists, however, philosophers map out possible worlds which can exist.

WHAT IS THE THING WHOSE MEASURE IS MONEY?

Nikos Psarros

Leipzig, Germany

The received view defines money by four basic functions: unit of account, store of value, a medium of exchange, and standard of deferred payment. The two main grand views on the nature of money regard either its function as a unit of account (*Cartalism*), or its function as a general medium of exchange (*Metallism*) as the fundamental characteristic of money and try to derive the other functions of money from the proposed fundamental characteristic. Both Cartalism and Metallism fail to see, however, that all four accepted functions of money are rather necessary expressions of the nature of money and not elements of its definition. My thesis is that all four basic functions of money can be explained by regarding money as an instrument for measuring an extensive magnitude of things and poietic actions that is called commonly "value". However, value is not a fundamental magnitude, but is in a certain way the representation of human freedom in the material world. Thus money is in fact an indirect instrument for determining and measuring at least an aspect of human freedom. From this definition of the nature of money also the obligation for the institution of a conditionally guaranteed minimal income can be defended.

HOLMES ROLSTON III'S THEORY OF NATURAL VALUES

Leszek Pyra
Cracow, Poland

As regards the problem of values, Rolston claims that values may exist without the beholder; expressing such opinion he opposes the prevailing contemporary views in this respect. It is also shown how Rolston tries to work out a provisional intuitive scale of values characteristic of particular organisms.
Next the concept of systemic values is presented and discussed. It appears that such values are ultimately life-generating processes, and as such definitely deserve man's respect. Such phenomena constitute the essence of holistic environmental philosophy of Holmes Rolston III.

ANSWERING O'NEILL: WHAT WITTGENSTEIN'S INVOCATIONS OF A 'FORM OF LIFE' ACTUALLY AMOUNT TO

Hannah Read
Boston, USA

In Toward Justice and Virtue, Onora O'Neill takes Wittgenstein's rule-following remarks to leave us with two serious repercussions for ethics and practical reasoning. Insofar as Wittgenstein has shown that rules alone do not guide action, and instead that our ability to follow rules correctly depends on our sharing a form of life, (1) where a form of life isn't shared there seems to be no way left open to us to resolve disagreements about what to do in response to a particular situation; and (2) even where a form of life is shared, if rules don't guide action, there seems to be no way to ensure agreement on what to do in response to a particular situation, even if we agree on all of its relevant features. In this paper, I argue that O'Neill has misunderstood what the invocation of 'forms of life' amounts to for Wittgenstein. Far from being a rigid, culturally specific practice that must be assumed by those who share it in their dealings with one another, a form of life is that in virtue of which we are able to follow one another's words. Our ability to understand one another, learn and speak a language, disagree, or even challenge practices, is all a matter of sharing a form of life. Insofar as O'Neill has misunderstood what the notion of a form of life amounts to for Wittgenstein, I argue that her worries might be alleviated if not wholly dispelled.

WITTGENSTEIN, KIERKEGAARD AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SILENCE

Jonathan Rée
London, United Kingdom

When Bertrand Russell and Dora Black passed through Innsbruck in August 1922, they invited Wittgenstein to join them to celebrate the imminent publication of the *Tractatus*. The meeting was a disaster, one of the reasons being that Wittgenstein spoke admiringly of Kierkegaard, while Russell dismissed him as a mystic. Russell obviously spoke from ignorance; but what about Wittgenstein? What did he know of Kierkegaard? In this talk I will suggest that he read some passages that appeared in German translation in the Innsbruck-based review *Der Brenner* from 1914 onwards, including some striking eulogies to silence. ('Only someone who knows how to remain essentially silent can speak essentially.') Wittgenstein had once hoped that *Der Brenner* would publish the *Tractatus*, and I intend to explore the possibility that his references to silence at the end of that work were meant to echo Kierkegaard's.

DIE IRREALITÄT DER ZEIT – ARGUMENTE UND IMPLIKATIONEN

Alexander Romahn
Leipzig, Deutschland

Im vorliegenden Artikel möchte ich mich der Irrealität der Zeit in drei Schritten annähern und dabei die Bedeutung von Zeit für das Konzept der Freiheit herausstellen. Anfangen werde ich bei den Stoikern, ihrer Haltung zum Konzept der Zeit und einem daraus folgenden Fatalismus. Daran anschließend werde ich anhand McTaggarts "Proof of Unreality of Time" darstellen, dass wenn eine sogenannte A-Reihe oder gegenwartsbezogene Position der Zeit verneint wird, auch keine statische Zeit aufrecht erhalten werden kann. Schlussendlich werde ich mit Verweis auf die Relativitätstheorie die Frage nach der Irrealität der Zeit in einen aktuellen Bezug einbetten und im Ausblick eine mögliche Kritik an den Argumenten andeuten.

„L'HOMME QUI MARCHE" – KARL UND LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, AUGUSTE RODIN, RAINER MARIA RILKE, IVAN MEŠTROVIĆ

Josef G. F. Rothhaupt
München, Deutschland

Der Philosoph Ludwig Wittgenstein war auf dem Gebiet moderne, zeitgenössische Skulptur, Plastik, Bildhauerei sehr gut bewandert. Er war vertraut mit Werken von Künstlern allerersten Ranges – etwa von Auguste Rodin und Ivan Meštrović. Exemplarisch werden herausragende Arbeiten, die sich zum Teil sogar in der Kunstsammlung von Karl Wittgenstein befanden, konkret vorgestellt, so etwa die Skulpturen *L'homme qui marche*, *La Pensée*, *Le Christ et la Madeleine* von Rodin und die Skulpturen *Quelle des Lebens*, *Portrait Mme Wittgenstein* von Meštrović. Diese Skulpturenvertrautheit hatte bei Wittgenstein auch Einfluss auf sein Philosophieren.

WERDEN MORALISCHE NORMEN GESCHAFFEN?

Peter Schaber
Zürich, Schweiz

Es ist eine Ansicht, die von vielen Theoretikern der Moral geteilt wird, dass moralische Normen sich nicht einfach vorfinden, sondern geschaffen werden. Verbreitet ist diese Ansicht, weil es naheliegend ist, moralische Normen in Analogie zu rechtlichen und institutionellen Normen zu verstehen. Letztere sind das Resultat intentionalen Handelns. Der Schluss liegt nahe, dass dies auch für moralische Normen gilt. Doch wie im Vortrag gezeigt werden soll, sind alle Versuche, moralische Normen als Resultat intentionalen Handelns zu begreifen, zum Scheitern verurteilt. Moralische Normen werden, so die These, im Unterschied zu rechtlichen und institutionellen Normen nicht geschaffen, weder durch Menschen noch durch andere Wesen.

WITTGENSTEINS SCHACH-PARADIGMA – ODER: BERUHT UNSERE SPRACHE AUF REGELN?

Alfred Schmidt
Wien, Östereich

Wittgenstein entwickelt besonders in der mittleren Phase seines Denkens – etwa von Beginn bis Mitte der 30er Jahre – eine Auffassung der Sprache, die sich sehr eng am Paradigma des Schachspiels orientiert. Der Regelbegriff, bzw. der einer „*philosophischen Grammatik*", wird zum zentralen Schlüssel seiner Philosophie. Gleichzeitig aber findet sich in Wittgensteins Werk eine deutliche Gegenstimme zu dieser einseitig am Kalkül orientierten Auffassung der Sprache, auf die Stanley Cavell als einer der ersten hingewiesen hat. Danach haben Regeln eine nur marginale Bedeutung für Wittgensteins Sprachphilosophie, im Gegenteil führt uns die Suche nach solchen Regeln häufig in die Irre. Entgegen der oft vertretenen These einer zeitlichen Entwicklung von einer Regel-zentrierten zu einer Regel-kritischen Konzeption der Sprache soll gezeigt werden, dass sich beide Stimmen von Anfang an parallel in Wittgensteins Werk finden, dass sich allerdings die SchwerPU §nkte bezüglich sprachlicher Regeln in subtiler Weise verschieben.

WITTGENSTEINS ANTIRELATIVISMUS IN ÜBER GEWISSHEIT

Sebastian Schmidt
Erlangen, Deutschland

Die Frage danach, ob Wittgenstein in Über Gewissheit einen Relativismus vertritt, ist so allgemein formuliert nicht zu beantworten. Daher werde ich Licht in die Debatte werfen, indem ich zwei Varianten des Relativismus behandle. Nachdem ich den Zusammenhang zwischen Mooreschen Gewissheiten, unserer Erziehung und der Bedeutung unserer Worte skizziert habe, zeige ich auf Grundlage dieser Einsichten, dass sich Wittgenstein deutlich von den folgenden beiden Positionen distanziert: (1) In verschiedenen Systemen gilt Unterschiedliches als Wissen, Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung; sowie (2) verschiedene Weltbilder sind gleichermaßen korrekt.

OBJEKTIVITÄT UND RELATIVITÄT VON WERTEN

Gerhard Schönrich
Dresden, Deutschland

Was die Rede von Werten betrifft, lassen wir uns von drei Intuitionen leiten. Wir glauben erstens, dass es Werte nur in Abhängigkeit von Pro-Einstellungen (des Billigens oder Missbilligens) wertschätzender Subjekte geben kann (Abhängigkeits-Intuition). Zweitens halten wir daran fest, dass es Wertirrtümer gibt, dass sich Werte also nicht auf Einstellungen reduzieren lassen (Objektivitäts-Intuition). Drittens glauben die meisten auch, dass es keine absolut wahren Werturteile geben kann, weil Werte relativ auf eine Perspektive sind (Relativismus-Intuition). Diese drei Intuitionen können anscheinend nicht alle zugleich wahr sein; keine kann aber einfach ignoriert werden. In der Analyse kommt der Objektivitäts-Intuition eine Schlüsselstellung zu. Der Vortrag will klären, wie sich die Objektivitäts-Intuition und ihre normativen Implikationen mit der Abhängigkeits-Intuition in Übereinstimmung bringen lässt, und welche Konsequenzen sich daraus für die Relativismus-Intuition ergeben. Dabei zeigen sich signifikante Unterschiede in der Normativität epistemischer, moralischer und ästhetischer Werte. Nur epistemische Werte scheinen sich Relativierungen entziehen zu können.

MORAL RELATIVISM AND THE IDEA OF MORALITY

Daniel Sharp
Vienna, Austria

This paper explores two strategies for developing a "benign" moral relativism, which allows that there is no single true morality but nevertheless acknowledges substantial constraints on what can count as an adequate moral system. It defends one strategy deployed by Foot, draws parallels between her argument and Wittgenstein on grammar, and concludes with a critical discussion.

THE HUMAN PERSON AND THE LANGUAGE OF VALUE

Richard Sherlock
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This paper explores in a modest way the usefulness and limits of the language of "value" and the "valuable".
The language of "the valuable" is useful when employed with reference to inanimate objects such as gold coins, antique cars, or trees. Trees can be replaced without loss of value as can, say diamonds. This language is also useful for thinking about animals used for food production, for example, cattle. But this language fails with respect to human persons. If a neighbor wants one tree of a certain species cut down on my property and will in return replace it with three others of the same size and type I would be foolish not to accept. But suppose he or she said I like your 5 year old son and I will trade my 3 for your 1. No one would accept this offer.

'SOLIPSISTIC' REALISM VIA THE LOGIC OF *TRACTATUS*

Ken Shigeta
Niigata, Japan

Solipsism was consistently a serious and genuine philosophical problem for Wittgenstein (LW) from the period of pre-Tractatus (TLP) to Philosophical Investigations (PI). According to my interpretation, LW conceived of solipsism as 'correct' at some time in his middle term. Then, he abandoned it as philosophical nonsense.
In this paper, I will examine a solipsism that I believe LW struggled against. This said, I will not be concerned with the validity of the interpretation of it, although I believe that the solipsism in this paper may be equated with LW's own. Independently of the exegetical problem, I will examine a kind of solipsism--to be called 'λ-solipsism' to avoid confusion with LW's own. First, I will formulate the structure of λ-solipsism to reveal that it has an intrinsic self-refuting feature. According to my view, there are at least two logics that can isolate λ-solipsism from its self-refuting circuit. One is the logic that Diamond finds 'in' TLP (Diamond 2000). The other is the logic that I consider to be inherent in TLP. In this paper, I attempt to demonstrate how the latter logic can vindicate what λ-solipsism 'means' to say.

ANDERSON AND BELNAP'S CONFUSION

Hartley Slater

Perth, Australia

Wittgenstein's discussion of the colour exclusion problem in 'Some Remarks on Logical Form' led to a series of papers by Lewy, von Wright and others on Entailment. Later, Anderson and Belnap took up the issue of Entailment in a different way. Indeed, it was not until Anderson and Belnap's work that a thorough study of the distinctive grammar of remarks like 'That something is red all over entails that it is not green' was undertaken. The problem for both of these traditions, however, was that they had no way of formalising 'that'- clauses as referential phrases, allowing the relation to be formalised in predicate logic terms. Indeed that would have brought up for them difficult philosophical questions to do with Realism. But now that we are moving out of the Empiricism of those times it is easier for us to see just what it was that Wittgenstein had in mind.

„WAS IST DENN DANN DIE AUFGABE DER PHILOSOPHIE?!!?" – ZWEI BEGRIFFE DER ANALYSE UND IHRE BEDEUTUNG FÜR WITTGENSTEINS *TRACTATUS*

Katharina Anna Sodoma

Wien, Österreich

Im Tractatus behauptet Wittgenstein, dass sich jeder Satz als Wahrheitsfunktion von Elementarsätzen analysieren lasse, die aus Namen in unmittelbarer Verbindung bestehen. Ausgehend von Michael Beaneys Unterscheidung zwischen verschiedenen Analysebegriffen soll in diesem Beitrag der Charakter dieser Analyse von Sätzen und ihre Rolle im Tractatus geklärt werden. Abschließend wird gezeigt, wie sich die unterschiedlichen Auffassungen der Analyse auf die Einschätzung der philosophischen Entwicklung Wittgensteins zwischen Tractatus und Philosophischen Untersuchungen auswirken.

RULE FOLLOWING: WHERE ARE "THE MISSING MASSES"?

Zinaida Sokuler

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There are many interpretations of the rule following. We agree with the main point of Kripke's and Bloor's interpretation. For both rule following is a social institution. For both community is the only authority to judge whether any instance of rule following is correct, even for arithmetic rules. Both note the significance of the fact that consensus between rule followers in the case of arithmetic rules is easily attainable. Why is it so? In the search for the reasons we propose to turn to Bruno Latour ideas about material objects as an active part of the sociality and social institutions.

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN: REDEN UND SCHWEIGEN, SAGEN UND ZEIGEN

Ilse Somavilla

Innsbruck, Österreich

Obwohl sich Wittgenstein zeitlebens mit Sprache und Sprachproblemen auseinander setzte, spielt der Aspekt des Schweigens in seiner Philosophie eine tragende Rolle, die nicht unterschätzt oder gar ignoriert werden darf.

Zumeist wird damit der bekannte Schlusssatz des *Tractatus* 7 verbunden, doch meines Erachtens lässt sich dieser Aspekt durch das gesamte Oeuvre verfolgen – in seinen philosophischen Untersuchungen sowie insgesamt in seiner Haltung gegenüber der Welt – der der Tatsachen und der außerhalb der Tatsachen.

Folgende Punkte sollen zur Diskussion gestellt werden:

1. Schweigen als Konsequenz der Grenzen von Sprache, d.h. als philosophische Konsequenz oder Resümee im analytischen Sinne, um das Sagbare vom Unsagbaren, schließlich auch das Denkbare vom Undenkbaren abzugrenzen.
2. Schweigen als eine Art mystische Haltung des Staunens.
3. Schweigen bzw. Zeigen als Möglichkeit des Ausdrucks in der Kunst.
4. Formale Aspekte in Wittgensteins Stil und Schreiben.

HOW RUSSELL DID NOT ABANDON RUSSELLIAN PROPOSITIONS

Milan Soutor

Prague, Czech Republic

Recommending that one treat propositions as as incomplete symbols, Russell departed from his earlier theory about propositions in 1910. According to one frequently endorsed interpretation, he maintained that ontological commitments to false propositions as objective entities cannot be reconciled with the associated theory of propositional unity. I explain that the versions of this interpretation in Sainsbury (1979) and Linsky (1993, 1999) are incorrect from exegetical reasons. The objection they ascribe to later Russell relies on the so-called 'unity argument'. I also argue against Weiss (1995) and Lebens (2009) who endorse the unity argument independently on exegesis of Russell's texts. In the course of my argument, I outline Russell's primitivist views about unity and truth. I elaborate on his theory of unity and develop a sort of redundancy account of unity which I consider to be a correct answer to the problem of unity inherited from Bradley-Russell dispute.

NOTHING BUT SOUNDS, INK-MARKS: IS NOTHING HIDDEN?

Paul Standish

London, United Kingdom

Is there something that lies beneath the surface of our ordinary ways of speaking? Philosophy in some of its phases encourages the all-too-human thought that reality lies, as it were, just outside our ordinary grasp, hidden beneath the surface of our experience and language. The present discussion will concentrate on a few connected paragraphs of Wittgenstein's text – in particular Philosophical Investigations §431 ("There is a gulf between an order and its execution. It has to be filled by the act of understanding") and §432 (Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life? – In use it is alive. Is life breathed into it there? – Or is the use its life?). This leads to a consideration of bodily gesture, including "'In my heart I understood when you said that', pointing to one's heart?" Yet this is not a metaphorical elaboration that codes our literal meaning: a literal expression would not be more real. Such figures are woven into our natural forms of expression and constitute part of the fabric of our lives. The meaning is there in the surface of the expression. With some reference to Emerson and to Stanley Cavell, the

discussion explores implications of Wittgenstein's assertion that nothing is hidden. This, it will be claimed, militates against phoney obsessions with transparency and endorses a confidence in the reality of our ordinary words. And yet how adequate is Wittgenstein's treatment of the sounds and ink-marks, the materiality of the sign? Might a more adequate account the sign coincide with the claim that nothing is hidden?

IN DEFENCE OF EPISTEMIC RELATIVISM: THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH IN GEORG SIMMEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY

Johannes Steizinger

Vienna, Austria

As one of the first modern philosophers, Georg Simmel systematically developed a "relativistic world view" (Simmel [3]2004, VI). In this paper I attempt to examine Simmel's relativistic answer to the question of truth. I trace his main arguments regarding the concept of truth and present his justification of epistemic relativism. In doing so, I also want to show that some of Simmel's claims are surprisingly timely.

Simmel's relativistic concept of truth is supported by an evolutionary argument. The first part of this paper outlines that pragmatic foundation of his epistemology. The second part of the paper shows that Simmel develops what today would be called a coherence theory of truth. He presents his coherentist view that every belief is true only in relation to another one primarily as a theory of epistemic justification. The third part turns to Simmel's original way of dealing with the (in)famous self-refutation charge against relativism.

REALISM WITHOUT FOUNDATION

Peter Strasser

Graz, Austria

The question whether or not there is an external world consisting of a subject-independent realm of objects, facts and laws is neither trivial nor a pseudo-problem. Today, this question is facing the challenge of neurological reductionism. If we are in essence our brain, then we are entangled in a paradox: on the one hand, our brain is part of the external world and so creates our subject-dependent pictures of the external world. This leads on the other hand to the result that our brain itself is a brain-internal 'construction' completely composed of neurologically coded data. It seems we are trapped in an onto-epistemological circle, which is the main reason that realism does not have a solid foundation. Plato and his followers claimed that there is, nevertheless, a way out of the cave of subjectivism. Their credo is objective idealism. According to this ontology, brain imprisonment and its viciously circular consequences can be avoided by idealistic realism, which postulates not the priority of matter but of mind – in the sense of 'Geist' in German. Idealistic realism itself, however, does not provide an alternative to scientific knowledge of the world's basic laws, nor does it fit into the ontological framework of naturalism.

GRAMMAR AND LOGIC: A CLOSE READING OF PI §89 AND §90

Sarah Anna Szeltner

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"Grammar" and "logic" are two central notions in Wittgenstein's philosophy. When we look at his *Nachlass*, we will find not only that he uses them both throughout his writings, but also that there are shifts in how and how often he uses them. In Wittgenstein scholarship, grammar and logic are often considered as being synonymous. This view, however, is questionable. In this paper I will focus on a text passage in the PI suggesting a conceptual difference between logic and grammar. I will then briefly contemplate what the distinction between grammar and logic may consist in by taking Wittgenstein's latest manuscripts into account. Logic may be understood as including everything that stands fast for us in our way of acting. From this perspective, grammar may be seen as a part of logic dealing with our linguistic practices.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL REALISM, REPRESENTATION, AND INTENTIONALITY

Erwin Tegtmeier

Mannheim, Germany

Epistemological realism is anti-idealism. Idealism was dominant the 18th century and is still very influential, particularly in its Kantian version. The rise of idealism is the consequence of a change of paradigm made by Descartes. In the classical tradition cognition was understood as transfer. Descartes conceived it as representation of objects by ideas in the mind. Already the Cartesians were aware the difficulty to connect idea and object. The idealists then solved it in their way by collapsing both. An epistemologically realist view was developed by the Later Brentano who rejected the representational analysis of cognition and assumed a direct and specific intentional relation between mental states and objects. Brentano's new view has been misconstrued by those who introduced the subject of intentionality into mainstream analytical philosophy. It was even portrayed as a kind of representationalism although Brentano's explicit aim was to overcome it.

ANTI-ANTIREALISM

Renata Trela & Grzegorz Trela

Cracow, Poland & Bystra, Poland

We have discussed a theoretical concept, which we call anti-antirealism. It is the argumentation in favour of realism and developed against any forms of antirealism. This argumentation has been inspired by Wittgenstein's philosophy of language expressed in his *Philosophical Investigations* and by modern natural sciences. We are showing that it is impossible to practice any science without the postulate of realism being accepted.

STANLEY CAVELL, CRITERIA AND FICTIONAL DISCOURSE

Aydan Turanli

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Stanley Cavell criticizes Norman Malcolm and Rogers Albritton for misinterpreting Ludwig Wittgenstein's concept of "criteria." Malcolm and Albritton think that criteria of a

thing allow us to determine the existence of something with certainty. Cavell underlines that the Wittgensteinian criteria help identification and recognition rather than determination of the existence of something with certainty. Therefore, the criteria for a real goldfinch for example are the same for stuffed, painted or phony goldfinch.

In this paper, I criticize John Searle's assertion that fictional discourse is pretended representation of state of affairs by appealing to Cavell's idea that criteria serve identification rather than determining the existence of something with certainty. First, I briefly summarize the Malcolm-Albritton view on criteria and secondly, I express how Cavell's critique of the Malcolm-Albritton view helps us criticize Searle's view of the logic of fictional discourse.

ON THE MATTER OF 'FACT'

Philipp Überbacher

Klagenfurt, Austria

The word 'fact' is essential to many philosophical theories, especially realistic theories and theories in the philosophy of science. Through etymological analysis and by example I want to show that the meaning of this term, once clear and simple, has become overloaded and diffuse. While this has fostered the adoption of the word, it also has lead to the loss of any substance it might have had.

WITTGENSTEIN'S SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND THE UNDECIDABILITY OF THE LIMITS OF SENSE

Thomas Wallgren

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1. I remind the reader of some disagreements between Daniel Dennett, John Searle and Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker about Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind.
2. I refer to Bouwsma's conversation with Wittgenstein in 1949 to argue that the problem in the debate is a false idea about what there is to learn from Wittgenstein's philosophy. "Therapeutic" readers of Wittgenstein also insist too much that Wittgenstein searched for liberation from illusions of sense.
3. Our task in the philosophy of mind is neither to find truth nor to delimit sense from nonsense. It is to understand better what community we can form with ourselves and others.

THE MEANING OF 'SEARCH': HOW SOFTWARE PROGRAMMERS IMPLICITLY DEFINE WORDS

Joseph Wang

Innsbruck, Austria

According to the theory of Operational Analysis by P. W. Bridgman, terms are defined – or rather explicated – by giving accounts on operations which lead to the usage of the words. An explication of a term is therefore a set of operations. Software engineers develop algorithms that are also sets of operations. By calling an algorithm "an algorithm that does x", mostly without acknowledging it, software engineers implicitly define x in their programs. Taking "searching y in a text z" as an example, I want to justify this thesis and discuss some corollaries for scholars in both information science and humanities.

A PEDAGOGIC READING OF THE *PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS*: CRITERIA, JUDGMENT AND NORMATIVITY

Désirée Weber

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A striking number of Wittgenstein's examples throughout the *Philosophical Investigations* revolve around teaching and learning. In this paper, I show how the content, prevalence, and placement of those references compel us to consider a pedagogic reading of Wittgenstein's work. Such a reading not only provides a new lens through which to view his later thought, but also reconciles us to the centrality of judgment and the 'contingent stability' of norms.

MINAR'S QUIETISM IN THE INDIVIDUALIST VS. COMMUNITARIAN DEBATE ON RULE-FOLLOWING

Daniel Wee

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The debate between the individualist and communitarian conceptions of rule-following is a debate on whether the concept of a rule-follower is a concept of something that presupposes more than a single individual. In brief, individualists claim that the concept of a rule-follower does not presuppose more than one individual while communitarians assert that it does so presuppose. With regards to this debate, Edward Minar advocates a third position that I shall call quietism. It is the view that there is no determinate answer to the question of whether the concept of a rule-follower presupposes more than one individual. In this paper, I shall outline and examine Minar's case for quietism and argue that he has given us insufficient reasons for remaining silent in the debate.

ZWEIFELN *KÖNNEN* UND ZWEIFELN *WOLLEN*: ÜG 217-232

Anja Weiberg

Wien, Österreich

In den Paragraphen 217-232 werden zahlreiche, für die Überlegungen in *Über Gewißheit* relevante Themen angeschnitten, so z.B. die Unterscheidung zwischen Irrtum und Geistesstörung, die Rolle des Gedächtnisses, die Verwobenheit von Gewißheiten und die Verwobenheit von Sprechen und Handeln. Miteinander verbunden wird diese Vielfalt an Themen in den genannten Paragraphen durch die Frage nach der Möglichkeit oder Unmöglichkeit bestimmter Zweifel: „Kann ich zweifeln, woran ich zweifeln *will*?" (ÜG 221) Während einige Bemerkungen nahelegen, man *könne* manches nicht bezweifeln, lassen andere Stellen darauf schließen, daß wir nach Wittgenstein gewisse Zweifel (in der Regel) schlicht nicht *haben*. Das Ziel dieses Vortrags besteht darin, diese widersprüchlich erscheinenden Bemerkungen zu klären.

THE NEED FOR PLURALISM AND RELATIVISM OF CAUSALITY

Paul Weingartner

Salzburg, Austria

The paper shows that there is no single concept of causality which is applicable to different domains. On the contrary there is a need for different concepts with different properties relative to different domains.

ANGELINAS WAHRHEIT. GENETISCHER RELATIVISMUS, PRÄVENTIVE MEDIZIN UND DIE WIRKLICHKEIT DES MÖGLICHEN

Martin G. Weiss

Klagenfurt, Österreich

2013 machte Angelina Jolie in der *New York Times* publik, dass sie sich einer präventiven beidseitigen Mastektomie unterzogen habe, nachdem ein Gentest ihr ein stark erhöhtes Brustkrebsrisiko attestiert hatte. 2015 folgte eine präventive Ovarektomie. Weltweit folgten zahlreiche Frauen Jolies Beispiel, sodass in den Medien von einem „Jolie-Effekt" (*Der Spiegel*) die Rede war.

Die Diskussion um den zugrundeliegenden BRCA-Gentest ist dabei nicht nur ein Beispiel für den verunsichernden Übergang vom genetischen Determinismus zum genetischen Probabilismus, sondern zwingt uns auch dazu, die Frage nach dem ontologischen Status der Möglichkeit neu zu stellen.

Denn wenn Wirklichkeit mit Aristoteles (und der Tradition) als Wirkendes, d.h. Tätigkeit (*energeia*, actus) begriffen wird, dann sind die unerwünschten Möglichkeiten, sprich Risiken, um die es in der Gendiagnostik geht, eminent wirklich. Die Unterscheidbarkeit zwischen Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit scheint immer schwieriger zu werden in einem Kontext, in dem Möglichkeiten die selben Wirkungen zeitigen wie Wirkliches und „Prä-Patienten" (Nicolas Rose) genauso behandelt werden wie „aktuell" Kranke.

CHINESE GESTURES, FORMS OF LIFE, AND RELATIVISM

Christian Helmut Wenzel

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In this essay I focus on Wittgenstein's discussion of how we understand and feel about people that come from cultures very different from our own. Wittgenstein writes about "guessing thoughts", "regularities", and "common human behavior" (*gemeinsame menschliche Hand-lungsweise*) in this context. I will argue that his idea of given forms of life that we should "accept" will be problematic if we want to find a meaningful way of relating to such people with whom we cannot "find our feet" (*in die man sich nicht finden kann*).

AGAINST GRAND ILLUSION. SOME REMARKS ON CONSTRUCTIVISM COINCIDING WITH REALISM.

Konrad Werner

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I am first going to refer to Wittgenstein's position, proposed in the Tractatus, which he calls solipsism. This solipsism coincides with realism. This, along with the idea of the philosophical I, will be my point of departure for investigating the constructivist thesis that the apparent world is – as A. Noë calls it – a grand illusion. I will argue that the idea of grand illusion is burdened with a category mistake. On this ground I will go back to Wittgenstein in order to show how constructivism can coincide with realism.

A NOTE ON THE ORIGIN OF RHEES' *SYNTHESE* EDITION OF "BEMERKUNGEN ÜBER FRAZERS *THE GOLDEN BOUGH*"

Peter K. Westergaard

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This paper outlines the origins of Rhees' Synthese edition of Wittgenstein's remarks on Frazer's The Golden Bough, as inferred from correspondence between Rhees and von Wright. The reconstruction draws attention both to Rhees' own transcriptions of Wittgenstein's remarks on Frazer in MSS 110 and 143 and to the importance thereof for Rhees' editing of the Synthese edition. The paper illuminates and illustrates Rhees' work as one of the executors of Wittgenstein's Nachlass.

KANT AND HÖLDERLIN: RADICALIZING THE CRITIQUE OF METAPHYSICS

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In *Judgment and Being*, Hölderlin defines Being as a complete unity which functions as a precondition of judgment, yet is not available to judgment. The contradiction that arises when one subsequently attempts to reach Being in the realm of judgment – i.e., in thought – seems to preclude the execution of a sensible metaphysics of Being. In this paper, I analyze how the contradiction between judgment and Being relates to the contradictions which Kant exposed in traditional metaphysics. Through this comparison, I show that the analyzed contradictions follow similar patterns, and arise for similar reasons. Moreover, I argue that Hölderlin could not follow Kant in his solutions of the antinomies – which implies a radicalized critique of metaphysics on Hölderlin's part.

ON A NEW DEFENSE OF THE DESCRIPTION THEORY

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Accordingly to the traditional description theory (descriptivism) of proper names, the meaning or sense of a name can be given by means of a description. The theory has fallen into disrepute due to intense criticisms, most famously, by Saul Kripke. Recently, in his book *Truth by Analysis*, Colin McGinn mounts a new defense of the description theory. According to McGinn, philosophy is the a priori search for the essence of things by means of conceptual analysis. Naming, therefore, can only be analyzed in terms of essences. The error made by the traditional description theory is focusing on contingent empirical descriptions. To rectify the error, McGinn puts forward a theory that analyzes a proper name by means of a description of the essence of the referent, arguing that it can withstand Kripke's criticisms. This article aims to show that there are some serious difficulties with McGinn's theory.

CARING STANDPOINT THEORY: A TENTATIVE PROJECT OF EPISTEMIZING CARE

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This paper aims to unite the ethics of care and feminist standpoint theory into what I call caring standpoint theory (CST) so as to comprehend why and how care values are internally constitutive to the knowledge production and scientific objectivity. To that purpose, I propose an account of what CST is under the rubrics of its distinctive way of knowing, methodology and conception of strong objectivity. First, CST as care-knowing is similar to connected Knowledge much inspired by maternal thinking. Second, CST attempts to study up from the dailiness of women's lives in different class, race and nationality, where caring works mostly done by women incubate caring habits and caring virtues (patience, humbleness, sensitivity, particularity, receptivity, and empathy) which, in turn, are conducive to the development of intellectual virtues. Third, CST is a project of epistemizing care to narrow the great divide between ethics and epistemology.

BESCHREIBUNG SUBJEKTIVEN ERLEBENS IM LICHTE DES PRIVATSPRACHEN-ARGUMENTS

Sebastian Wyss

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In den Philosophischen Bemerkungen spricht Wittgenstein vom Gesichtsfeld und den darin gegebenen phänomenalen Gegenständen wie dem „Gesichtskreis". Diese Gegenstände fallen unter das sogenannte Privatsprachenargument des späten Wittgensteins: Der Sprecher einer privaten Sprache kann sich selber nicht erklären, was seine Worte bedeuten. Inwiefern aber ist eine Beschreibung subjektiven Erlebens, wie sie in den Bemerkungen angestrebt wird, auch unter den Bedingungen des Privatsprachenarguments möglich? An einem Beispiel wird gezeigt, dass der Beschreibung subjektiven Erlebens nichts abgehandelt werden muss.

THE MYTH OF THE PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENT

Nick Zangwill

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I argue that The *Philosophical Investigations* contains no clear traces of a 'private language argument', or of hostility to the idea of private mental states, or of hostility to the possibility of private languages. Indeed the opposite is the case: the text if anything reveals sympathy to the idea of private mental states and the possibility of private languages. The so-called 'Private Language Argument' is a myth.

ON THE INFLUENCE OF WITTGENSTEIN'S *TRACTATUS* ON TOULMIN'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

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The paper discusses Toulmin's ideas in the philosophy of science – mainly as set out in *The Philosophy of Science* (1953) – in juxtaposition with Toulmin's reading of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. It claims that three themes present in the *Tractatus* had an influence on the core of Toulmin's ideas about scientific explanation: first, Wittgenstein's use of the term "*Bild*" – interpreted, after Hertz and Boltzmann, as "a model", also a mathematical one; second, the active, not passive, element in our forming a model (expressed in Proposition 2.1); and, third, the account of the system of mechanics as a kind of formal net (*resp.* "models") with possibly different shapes of "meshes" (the passages from 6.34 on). Thus, Toulmin's thinking of scientific theories as based on the "modes of representation", or "ways of representing", corresponds well to his understanding of the concept of *Bild*/model in the *Tractatus*.

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