

Ästhetik heute
Zeitgenössische Zugänge
zur Ästhetik der Natur und der Künste

Aesthetics Today
Contemporary Approaches
to the Aesthetics of Nature and of Art

Abstracts

39. Internationales Wittgenstein Symposium
7. – 13. August 2016
Kirchberg am Wechsel

39th International Wittgenstein Symposium
August 7–13, 2016
Kirchberg am Wechsel

Stand des Abstracta-Hefts: 26.07.2016
Aktuelle Änderungen unter: http://www.alws.at/abstract_2016.pdf.



www.alws.at

Book of abstracts publication date: 26/07/2016
For updates see: http://www.alws.at/abstract_2016.pdf.

Distributors

Die Österreichische Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft
The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

Markt 63, A-2880 Kirchberg am Wechsel, Österreich / Austria

Herausgeber: Stefan Majetschak & Anja Weiberg

Visuelle Gestaltung: Sascha Windholz
Druck: Eigner-Druck, 3040 Neulengbach

**WISSENSCHAFT · FORSCHUNG
NIEDERÖSTERREICH**



Gedruckt mit Unterstützung der Abteilung Wissenschaft und Forschung (K3)
des Amtes der NÖ Landesregierung

**SPONTANEOUS EXPERIENTIAL
UTTERANCES IN THE LIGHT OF
PERCEPTION-ACTION-MECHANISMS.
AN EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVE ON WITTGENSTEIN'S
REMARKS ON SEEING**

Johannes Algrmissen

Nijmegen, The Netherlands

In the second part of his *Philosophical Investigations*, section xi, Wittgenstein observes how spontaneously and effortlessly humans share their experiences and make aesthetical utterances. The phenomenon of sharing experiences, including "gossiping", features in evolutionary psychology as one of the distinctive aspects of human cognition that separates it from animal cognition, and is considered as crucial for establishing and maintaining human cultural life. In this paper, I compare the role spontaneous experiential utterances play in the maintenance of culture both from Wittgenstein's, and from an evolutionary psychological perspective, and identify some striking similarities.

**LEBENSFORM(EN) IM WIDERSTREIT. ZUR
RÜCKKEHR EINER ALTEN DEBATTE**

Ulrich Arnswald

Karlsruhe, Deutschland

Die Rückkehr einer alten Debatte zeichnet sich ab. Der Streit um die Bedeutung von Wittgensteins Begriff Lebensform(en) geht in eine neue Runde. Im Kern geht es um zwei Auslegungen von „Lebensform(en)“, wobei die eine Auslegung als die ethnologische, die andere als die verhaltensbiologische bzw. ethologische bezeichnet werden kann. Beide sollen nun von einer Lesart zurückgewiesen werden, die ein vermeintlich diesen Ansätzen zugrunde liegendes hierarchisches Schichtenmodell mit einer Einteilung in eine höherstufig stehende menschliche gegenüber einer niederstufigen animalischen Lebensform ablehnt. Im Kontrast zu dieser meines Erachtens falschen Exegese Wittgensteins erachte ich beide Ansätze als gleichberechtigt und hierarchisch nicht geordnet.

AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND CERTAINTY

Rafael Lopes Azize

Salvador, Brazil

Wittgenstein's mature philosophy offers a therapeutic way out of some conundrums stemming from taxonomic expectations regarding philosophical description of experience in general. The paper asks if this is also true of the facts of *aesthetic* experience. This possibility is hinted at by examining an application of the notion of certainty to aesthetic experience. Some traits of possible uses of central concepts of the mature Wittgenstein to a philosophical aesthetics inspired by the "new method" are also canvassed.

**CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW FIRST PAGE
THAT WAS DISCOVERED AT THE BEGINNING
OF THE MANUSCRIPT OF THE *TRACTATUS***

Luciano Bazzocchi

Siena, Italy

Martin Pilch has recently demonstrated that Wittgenstein begun the manuscript of his *Abhandlung* with a page that was cut away successively but that we are able to rebuild by means of its imprint on the opposite leaf of the notebook. That very first page contained the first six cardinal propositions (without the formula of proposition 6). This proves that, actually, the *Tractatus* was conceived as a recursive cascade of comments on comments on comments on its main propositions. Furthermore, it confirms that the remarks of the book were thought, and therefore are to be read, into distinct and fully significant sub-sequences, level by level; viz. 1-7, 3.1-3.5, 4.1-4.5, 4.21-4.28 etc. That manner of editing and reading the *Tractatus* is always meaningful and dissolves a lot of pseudo-inconsistencies which troubled traditional readers. Besides, it permits to detect other allusions and references, since a different disposition of its sentences makes the book a different one, probably nearer to author's purpose. Some scholars, like Peter Hacker and Martin Pilch himself, have the merit of having adhered to that exegetical perspective even *before* Pilch's philological discovery. As a fact, in this case like frequently in scientific research, an exegetical hypothesis precedes crucial data disclosure and not vice-versa.

LANGUAGES OF LOVE, AND LITERATURE

Ondřej Beran

Praha, Czechia

The paper discusses the Wittgensteinian concept of love and the problem of specifying the "our" in "our language of love" and of tackling strange, unfamiliar languages of love.

**VOM „PUN“ ZUM SPRACHSPIEL –
WITTGENSTEIN, RUSSELL, BRADLEY,
HEGEL UND DER STREIT UM DAS
CONCRETE UNIVERSAL**

Alexander Berg

Dresden/Prag, Deutschland/Tschechische Republik

Als Ludwig Wittgenstein 1911 in Cambridge zu studieren beginnt, verfügt er kaum über philosophische Vorkenntnisse. Alles, was er in der vergleichsweise kurzen Zeit bis zur Abfassung seines ersten eigenen philosophischen Hauptwerkes – des *Tractatus* – lernt, lernt er im Wesentlichen von Bertrand Russell in dessen Vorlesungen und den anschließenden persönlichen abendfüllenden philosophischen Diskussionen. Wie war es möglich, dass Wittgenstein trotzdem – schon im *Tractatus* und noch mehr im Spätwerk – ein derart eigenständiges, von Russells Philosophie emanzipiertes Denken entwickeln konnte?

Die Antwort auf diese Frage wird anhand des Streits um das *concrete universal* – einer in der Zeit um Wittgensteins Ankunft in Cambridge heiß diskutierten Auseinandersetzung – rekonstruiert und bis auf Hegel zurückverfolgt.

WITTGENSTEIN, ESCHER AND MACH

Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera, René J. Campis C.,
Margarita Jiménez Siado

Barranquilla, Colombia

This paper explores the link between the works on physiological optics by Ernst Mach, Wittgenstein's concept of nonsense and the art of Escher. Theoretical contributions such as Mach bands and the physicist's treatment of optical phenomena and visual perception of space in general lead to an improved understanding of the perception of perspective and movement. They also had an influence in arts that goes beyond the already known relation between literature and Machian phenomenism. Our conjecture is that the work of Escher can be better understood as being intuitively related to Machian physiological optics, and not only to mathematics. Escher's work reflects nonsense and perplexity and the expression of "what can be shown but not said". Artistic representations are depictions of non-actual and impossible objects or circumstances as actual, rendering the spectator perplex, what is compatible with Wittgenstein's account of art as nonsense.

WITTGENSTEIN AND ALTIERI ON LITERARY EXPERIENCE

Konstantinos Boultzis

Vienna, Austria

In his recent book, *Reckoning with the Imagination*, Charles Altieri relies on Wittgenstein for "restoring" aesthetic Idealism. Altieri's restoration consists in describing aesthetic experience as sensual, imaginative and attending to the writer's purposiveness. Altieri's literary experience boils down, I believe, to the reader's awareness that he recognizes the author's purposiveness. I will argue that Wittgenstein's aesthetic remarks do not agree with this description of literary experience. In particular, I will claim that for Wittgenstein literary experience is not conscious in the way Altieri's description requires. Defending Altieri's description by downplaying the role of consciousness and focusing on its directness will be claimed to be incompatible with Wittgenstein's belief that literary experience is indirect.

THE FLY, THE BOTTLE AND POSTMODERNISM. DANTO'S CONCEPT OF THE ART WORLD VERSUS WITTGENSTEIN'S NOTION OF USE

Carla Carmona

Extremadura, Spain

This paper articulates the necessity to rescue the concept of representation understood in a Wittgensteinian sense and reflects on whether one can bridge the gap that some scholars and art critics have identified between modern and postmodern art.

For Danto, Warhol's Brillo boxes were produced in the art world, and it was in that theoretical context where they acquired meaning. It was not form that transformed matter into art, but sense. Wittgenstein's notion of use offers an alternative perspective from where to understand Warhol's Brillo boxes. It could be understood that it is the use that Warhol made of the Brillo box what conferred artistic meaning to it, and this has much to do with form, representation. I will apply Wittgenstein's notion of representation to works that are apparently beyond such a concept.

Besides, I will build a comparison between the theoretical and the pragmatic contexts implied respectively by Danto and Wittgenstein.

WILFRID SELLARS AND PRAGMATIST ASPECTS OF WITTGENSTEIN'S TRACTATUS

Stefanie Dach

Pilsen, Czech Republic

In my paper, I trace out affinities between Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and some forms of pragmatism. I start by asking why the *Tractatus* is appreciated by Wilfrid Sellars, who is himself a source of inspiration for contemporary pragmatism. After sketching the aspects of Sellars's pragmatism salient to the paper, I argue that in many respects the *Tractatus* is congenial to them. Sellars most appreciates (besides the picture theory) Wittgenstein's refusal to assimilate every discourse to descriptive or depicting discourse. Furthermore, in the *Tractatus* we can find first glimpses of a theory of different statement functions based on what can be done (rather than said) using these statements.

WITTGENSTEIN ON THE USE OF "I"

Haiqiang Dai

Beijing, China

Wittgenstein maintains that there are mistakes in the use of the first person pronoun "I" in the traditional philosophy. In order to remove those mistakes, Wittgenstein distinguishes two uses of the "I": it used as subject; and it used as object. The "I" as subject is neither used to refer to a mental entity, nor to describe a behavior. The use of the word "I" is significant. The meaning of "I" is related to its grammar, the language game in which it occurs and the form of life.

DO WE BELIEVE IN OTHER MINDS?

Edmund Dain

Providence, USA

The problem of other minds challenges us to justify our belief in other minds. I argue that we do not believe in other minds, and so that challenge is confused. Our understanding of others as human beings, not automata, is a matter of what Wittgenstein calls an "attitude towards a soul", not a belief about them.

SEEING COLOUR, SEEING EMOTION, SEEING MORAL VALUE

Benjamin De Mesel

Liedekerke, Belgium

Defenders of moral perception have famously argued that seeing value is relevantly similar to seeing colour. Some critics think, however, that the analogy between colour-seeing and value-seeing breaks down in several crucial respects. Defenders of moral perception, these critics say, have not succeeded in providing examples of non-moral perception that are relevantly analogous to cases of moral perception. Therefore, it can be doubted whether there is such a thing as moral perception at all. I argue that, although the analogy between colour perception and moral perception does indeed break down in several crucial

respects, that conclusion does not weaken the case of defenders of moral perception, because better analogies are available. Inspired by some of Wittgenstein's remarks on aspect-seeing, I defend the view that, if defenders of moral perception seek to draw support from an analogy, then seeing emotion will protect them better against criticisms than will seeing colour.

OITICICA: KUNST UND PHILOSOPHIE

Tatiane De Oliveira Elias

Belo Horizonte, Brasilien

Oiticica war ein bedeutender brasilianischer Avantgarde-Künstler und innovativer Filmmacher, der Wert auf Erlebnis, Herausforderung und Experimentieren in seiner Kunst legte. Er schuf Kunst im öffentlichen Raum, Performances, Filme, Fotografien, Videotapes und neue Kunsttheorien. Oiticica begann in den sechziger Jahren damit, den Zuschauer als wichtiges Element in seine Kunst einzubeziehen: Der Zuschauer wird zum Teilnehmer des Werks, das er handhaben kann, in das er hinein gehen kann und mit dem er visuelle und taktile Erfahrungen machen kann. Inspiriert von der phänomenologischen Philosophie des Berührens des französischen Philosophen Merleau-Ponty, räumt der Künstler Oiticica Berührung und Körperlichkeit sowie der Teilnahme der Zuschauer eine zentrale Rolle in seinem Werk ein. Eine besondere Inspiration waren für Oiticica auch die Theorien von Herbert Marcuse und Frantz Fanon, was besonders in Oiticicas Solo-Ausstellung *Éden* in der Whitechapel Gallery im Februar 1969 zu sehen war. Die neuen Werke, die er für die Ausstellung schuf, waren durch urbane Räume inspiriert.

SINGING (WITH SEVERAL VOICES) IN THE (SAME) RAIN. CULTURAL SYMBOLS AND COGNITION IN THE AESTHETICS OF WEATHER

Mădălina Diaconu

Vienna, Austria

The paper draws the attention to the persistent "oblivion" of weather phenomena in the modern aesthetics, as well as in contemporary environmental aesthetics and even in the so-called phenomenology of atmosphere. The few authors who pondered the possibility of a "celestial aesthetics" (A. Berleant, H. Rolston III, D. Macauley) help to emphasize both the necessity and the difficulties of extending the environmental aesthetics (understood as aesthetics) to physical atmospheres. The focus will be laid upon the shift of importance from the mythical imagination to the science communication in the perception and appreciation of atmospheric events, on the example of rain. Selected illustrations from contemporary popular culture worldwide reflect the latent tension between the mostly positive signification of the rain in the traditional agrarian cultures, where rain was regarded as a divine gift and a symbol of fertility, and the spreading fear of acid rain due to industrial pollution.

READING THE *TRACTATUS* AND SEEING THE WORLD RIGHTLY

Alexandra Dias Fortes

Lisbon, Portugal

If the cardinal problem of philosophy is to be found in the distinction between what can be said (= thought), and what

cannot be said but can only be shown in what is said, the task of making the logic of language perspicuous can be understood as a perceptive exercise – and the TLP as an aesthetic endeavour that, in what it says and in the form in which it says what it says, allows its readers to see the world rightly. In the end, this is both an ethical and an aesthetic achievement, for, what is then seen should make one understand that what is more valuable is indescribable in language – and the way to do it justice, is to keep silent about it.

MODELING AXIS BY ROTATION

Josipa Điri, Josip Lukin, Kristijan Krkač

Zagreb, Croatia

In this paper, the authors discuss OC 152 as an example of the idea of modeling as it is used in the contemporary philosophy of science. In the first part, an analysis of OC 152 is supplied and three possible interpretations of the section. In the second part, Schulte's analysis of OC 152 is presented. In the third part, the "axis remarks" are interpreted in terms of blurring the distinction between grammatical and experiential remarks in terms of their dynamism and connectedness to practice and activity. In the fourth part, the "axis remarks" are interpreted in terms of "modeling" in contemporary philosophy of science.

THE PROBLEM OF NON-ECOFRIENDLY AESTHETICS

Damla Dönmez

Istanbul, Turkey

Environmental aesthetics is a new area in the contemporary philosophy, in which some aesthetic judgments are criticized to be non-ecofriendly such as is the case with swamps, prairies, snakes or bats. This creates a problem for the ethics-aesthetics relation since, unlike Wittgenstein assumes, aesthetics and ethics are not "one and the same". My aim in this paper is to find a way to save the so-called *ugly* creatures from aesthetic prejudices and justify how they can still be aesthetically appreciated. I claim there are two main reasons behind their condemnation: (1) *biophilia* thesis of Wilson and (2) the picturesque tradition left from the 18th century. In contrast to these influences, I claim that (1) Carlson's cognitive aesthetic approach along with guarantee of self-existence, and (2) a holistic and multi-sensuous aesthetic appreciation of nature can save these creatures within our aesthetic agenda and prove that aesthetics and ethics are in harmony.

THE BREATH OF LIFE: "ESSENTIALLY COMPLEX TOTALITIES"

Susan Edwards-McKie

Cambridge, United Kingdom

I will suggest that the composition of MS 142 when viewed as a writing *process* helps us to unpack subtle shifts in important concepts. I illustrate this idea by making observations on the interplay between MS 152 and MS 142 and MS 157a&b, principally. I discuss the concept of *Übersichtlichkeit*, and propose a migration of this concept from the early 1930s to the writing of MS 142, with possible co-changes in the concepts of aspect perception and mathematical drawings of divisibility of groups. Thus, rather than finding passages of the early 1930s in which a desire for a surveyability of our grammar can be read as proof of Witt-

Wittgenstein's later views, I argue that this conception is best viewed as left behind as Wittgenstein moves further away from philosophical dogmatism and a morphology of cultures.

ASPECT-BLINDNESS AND EXPERIENCE: CAN THERE BE AESTHETIC-BLINDNESS?

Suzanna Ellington

Hamilton, New Zealand

This paper considers the three types of perception-specific blindness that occur within Wittgenstein's work and argues that it is possible to propose the idea of an aesthetic-blindness. From a reflection on Wittgenstein's usage of colour-, aspect-, and meaning-blindness it is suggested that what is lacking in all three types of blindness is not only the ability to perceive or experience a particular aspect of something but more importantly the facility for participating in all associated language-games. For the aesthetically-blind it is impossible to produce an emotional reaction to a particular work despite understanding notions of form and structure. The paper ends with a consideration on whether any form of aesthetic-blindness might be genuine.

SOME NOTES ON WRITING A HISTORY OF EDITING WITTGENSTEIN

Christian Erbacher

Siegen, Germany

This paper presents conceptual links between a 4-year project to write a history of editing Wittgenstein and a freshly established Collaborative Research Center at the University of Siegen (Germany). In contrast to exclusively tracing editorial-philological operations in transforming manuscripts into published books, the here-presented project utilizes key concepts from the sociological and media-ethnographic Collaborative Research Center „Media of Cooperation“ (MC), with the main objective to make present again social processes and scholarly practices involved in the making of the posthumous editions from Wittgenstein's writings. Three key concepts from MC are discussed to suggest how such a history of editing Wittgenstein may be written: Susan Star's *boundary objects*, Bruno Latour's *actors* and Clifford Geertz' *thick description*. Using these concepts, a history of editing Wittgenstein ought to provide a thick description of how acting editors have translated Wittgenstein's writings into boundary objects for scholarly communities.

THE ATTENDANT ARTWORLD — A CONTEMPORARY WESTERN PERSPECTIVE FOR THE READING OF CHINESE TRADITIONAL ARTS

Yinghao Fan

Jiangsu, China

In response to the contemporary arts that appeared in the 20th century, Arthur Danto proposed a new strategy: identify and explain an artwork by a certain *artworld* instead of more traditional definitions of art. Danto's article, "Shapes of Artistic Pasts, East and West", attempts to uncover the philosophical and historical models of Chinese scholar-paintings by using the example of *Wan Shang-Lin*. Through an analytical study of Danto, this paper finds that

Chinese traditional art history is also a product of the inheritance of a distinct Chinese *artworld* attendant in the paintings and rich in historical and theoretical atmosphere centered around the painters' aesthetic personalities and lives.

WITTGENSTEIN AND THE AVANT-GARDE

James Fielding

Paris, France

This paper explores a comparison between Wittgenstein's *Investigations* and the aesthetic strategies of the avant-garde, here understood to comprise the well-known artistic schools of Futurism, Dada, and Surrealism. This comparison highlights the manner in which Wittgenstein employed strikingly similar techniques to the historical avant-garde in terms of the work's production (the 'album-form' of philosophy), its intended mode of reception (dialogic-therapeutic), as well as its social function (realigning the praxis of philosophy with the praxis of life). Beyond demonstrating how Wittgenstein's aim in philosophy, like that of the various schools of the avant-garde, necessitated the unusual approach he took, this reading helps to further clarify some of the tensions inherent in Wittgenstein's reception, especially that between Wittgenstein's anti-institutional stance and the various institutional forums wherein his work receives its significance today, as well as some of the challenges faced by those who would seek to follow in his footsteps.

CAN PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE BE A KIND OF PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE?

Nara Miranda de Figueiredo

São Paulo, Brazil

In this paper I present a recent research - FoP experiment - performed by a group of neuroscientists and researchers in robotics and I try to raise conceptual questions about the conceptual scheme used by them. The aim is to drive the attention to the possibility of an enlightening philosophical activity that interacts with science - considering uses of words - and clarifies conceptual relations. This proposal has its base on the philosophical method emerged from Wittgenstein's texts, on Peter Hacker's view on the philosophical method as conceptual analysis, and conceptual analysis of the sciences, and also on my own interpretation that highlights the evaluation of the role of our expressions in their context of use.

WITTGENSTEIN AT CULTURAL CRITICISM: CLEMENT GREENBERG AS WITTGENSTEINIAN CRITIC

Craig Fox & Cynthia Persinger

California, Pennsylvania, USA

In this talk we draw a comparison between some ideas of two superficially different thinkers who are nonetheless thinking about the state of things in the late 1930s. We use notions of "correctness" and "deterioration" from Wittgenstein's *Lectures on Aesthetics* to frame Clement Greenberg's discussion of "avant-garde" and "kitsch." We thus begin to suggest the potential for using Wittgenstein's thoughts about aesthetics to underwrite a kind of aesthetic, artistic, and cultural criticism.

WITTGENSTEIN AND KIERKEGAARD ON ETHICS, RELIGIOUS JUSTIFICATION AND MEANING

Mélissa Fox-Muraton

Clermont-Ferrand, France

In a 1942 conversation with Rhees, Wittgenstein allegedly dismissed as nonsensical Kierkegaard's question, "Does a Human Being have the Right to Let Himself Be Put to Death for the Truth?" This paper will examine in detail Kierkegaard's essay, and will argue that Wittgenstein failed to see the importance of Kierkegaard's fundamental insights on moral language and religious justification. Rather than a mere meaningless question, Kierkegaard's aesthetic examination of this particular moral problem offers a means of getting past the relativism of different world-views, and establishing universal moral norms independent of systems of belief.

MENTAL STATES AND ATTITUDES

Florian Franken Figueiredo

Campinas, Brazil

When philosophers talk about the psychology of human beings they usually refer to their mental states, e.g. to what they believe, desire, fear, hope, etc. In this paper I am interested in what it means that someone *believes* something. Human beings believe many things, and what they believe, i.e. their beliefs, develop in different ways. They acquire beliefs, they justify their beliefs, they change their beliefs, and sometimes they give up their beliefs. In considering the question of what it means for someone to have a belief, I take into account the development of someone's beliefs. I also use some of Wittgenstein's remarks from *On Certainty* that consider how and under which circumstances we use our language in order to express that someone believes something.

TRUST IN THE WORLD. GOING TO THE MOVIES (WITH CAVELL, WITTGENSTEIN, AND KANT)

Josef Früchtl

Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Looking at the history of so-called Western thought, we can identify several thresholds where our belief in the world severely got damaged. Scepticism is a term for this. It is the central term, as well, for Stanley Cavell. He agrees with some other philosophers that overcoming scepticism cannot be merely a task of better knowledge but requires "acknowledgement": of others, and the world as a whole. One of the challenging aspects of Cavell is the fact that he connects this overcoming of scepticism with cinema. In doing this, he very much relies on Wittgenstein and Kant but has to make two even larger argumentative steps that connect him to a theory of aesthetic experience first elaborated by Kant. Going to the movies with Cavell, Wittgenstein, and Kant, then, means restoring our trust in the world. The aesthetic experience in cinema offers a modern way of ontological or existential affirmation.

THE DIFFICULTY OF READING PICTURES: EAST VS. WEST

Jianping Gao

Beijing, China

It is widely believed that the script is national while the image is universal. This is misleading. Learning is necessary for one to read the script. In the same vein, learning is necessary for one to appreciate the image. The word "illiteracy" refers to those who are unable to read, yet there is no word for those with good eyesight who are unable to understand an image. When appreciating a traditional Chinese ink wash painting, the difference between a Chinese and a European in the acceptance and imitation of calligraphy is obvious. In both calligraphy and painting, the Chinese have the order and direction of brushstrokes in mind, and the human spirit and gestures are shown. Such a difference, for instance, has its roots deep in the sediments of culture. Hence, the formation and transformation of the aesthetic criteria for evaluating art are profoundly shaped by culture. At the same time, cultural differences are not fully incommunicable. Since learning is indispensable for the appreciation of the image, cross-cultural evaluations and interpretations of art necessarily contain various misunderstandings.

WITTGENSTEIN UND WELTDESIGN

Martin Gessmann

Offenbach, Deutschland

Design hat etwas mit Weltverbesserung zu tun. Das dachte man jedenfalls noch im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Arts and Crafts wollte den Menschen zu sich selbst führen, später und ganz anders das Bauhaus, und selbst die Postmoderne sollte neben den Produkten auch noch Persönlichkeiten gestalten.

Spätestens im 21. Jahrhundert ist man kritischer geworden. Kehrseiten zeigen sich nicht nur ästhetisch – man denke nur an Funktions-Architektur und seelenlose Weltautos –, sondern auch in einem weiteren kulturellen Horizont. Es scheint, als wäre das heraufziehende Welt-design in die Rolle eines Hegemons gerückt, der fragwürdige Vorgaben macht, angefangen bei Verhaltensweisen im Alltag bis hin zu Fragen des Sozialprestiges. Traditionen blieben auf der Strecke.

Wir haben uns daran gewöhnt, Wittgensteins architektonisches Werk als die Verkörperung einer logischen Weltaufklärung anzusehen. Umgekehrt wäre zu fragen, ob seine Philosophie nicht Anlass gibt, die Konzeption eines Welt-designs zu konterkarieren – und überhaupt auf einer neuer Basis zu überdenken.

ÄSTHETISCHER DISKURS UND ETHISCHE URTEILE

Felix Gmür

Basel, Schweiz

Demokratische Gesellschaften sind Diskursgesellschaften. Ihre Fragen sind öffentlicher Natur, und oft geht es um Gegenstände der Ethik. Der offene Diskurs bedarf neben einer entsprechenden Diskussionskultur unter anderem jener Argumente, die einer Vielzahl des „Demos“ bzw. dessen Repräsentanten, die ja regieren sollen und die die Gesetze verabschieden, zugänglich sind. Welche Art von Argumenten hilft bei der Urteilsfindung? Wenn es stimmt, dass Ethik und Ästhetik eins sind, dann muss es möglich sein, dass der ästhetische Diskurs und die sich daraus

ergebenden ästhetischen Urteile ethische Relevanz erhalten und sich in Urteilen über Gegenstände der Ethik bis in die Gesetzgebungsprozesse hinein niederschlagen. Als Beispiele können die Debatten um Karikaturen in Dänemark und Frankreich, die ästhetischen Codes von Wahlkämpfen oder die aktuelle Diskussion über die Beihilfe zur Selbsttötung dienen.

WITTGENSTEIN REIMAGINES MUSICAL DEPTH

Eran Guter

Yezreel Valley, Israel

I explore and outline Wittgenstein's original response to the Romantic discourse concerning musical depth, from his middle-period on. Schopenhauer and Spengler served as immediate sources for Wittgenstein's reliance on Romantic metaphors of depth concerning music. The onset for his philosophic intervention in the discourse was his critique of Schenker's view of music and his general shift toward the 'anthropological view', which occurred at the same time. In his post-PI period Wittgenstein was able to reimagine musical depth in terms of vertically interrelated language-games which facilitate *Menschenkenntnis*.

NEW (RE)SEARCH POSSIBILITIES FOR WITTGENSTEIN'S NACHLASS II: ADVANCED SEARCH, NAVIGATION AND FEEDBACK WITH THE FINDERAPP WITTFIND

Max Hadersbeck, Alois Pichler, Daniel Bruder, Stefan Schweter

Munich/Bergen, Germany/Norway

We present a new web-based approach to searching and researching Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophical Nachlass as made available by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB), on Wittgenstein Source (<http://www.wittgenstein-source.org/>). The approach uses highly sophisticated web-technology together with methods and tools from the field of computational linguistics that are developed at the Centrum für Informations- und Sprachverarbeitung (CIS) at the LMU Munich. Tools include the full-form lexicon WITTLex, the "FinderApp" WITTFind, the symmetric autosuggestion tool SIS, a Facsimile Reader with hit-highlighting and an Investigation Mode with an integrated FeedbackApp. The search-methods of the FinderApp include a query language which allows the user to specify exact, lemmatized and grammatical search-queries and a semantic search which permits content driven navigation for colour language and other selected areas. In 2014 our FinderApp WITTFind won the Open Humanity Award within the EU-Project Digitized Manuscripts to Europeana (DM2E).

MOORE-SÄTZE – NORMEN AUF TOTEM GLEIS?

Shogo Hashimoto

Göttingen, Deutschland

G.E.Moore hat bestimmte Erfahrungssätze, bspw. „Hier ist eine Hand“, als trivial oder gewiss wahr behandelt. Sätze dieser Art werden in ÜG ausgiebig behandelt. Ihre gängige Bezeichnung ist dementsprechend „Moore-Sätze“. Ein Satz dieser Art, – z. B. p –, ist nur allzu klar, so dass wir im Alltag in Bezug auf ihn *Knowledge-Claims* wie „Ich weiß,

dass p “ normalerweise nicht erheben. Die Trivialität der Moore-Sätze beschreibt Ludwig Wittgenstein so, dass sie „auf ein totes Geleise verschoben“ worden seien (ÜG §210). Welche Rolle spielen dann aber diese „auf ein totes Geleise verschobenen“ Sätze in unserer Sprache? Fungieren Moore-Sätze als Normen, deren Regeln wir ständig folgen, weil sie die Grundlagen unserer Lebensform ausmachen? Oder gehören die Moore-Sätze zwar zu unserer Sprache, werden aber nie gebraucht, weil sie gleichsam kaum einen Nutzen haben? In diesem Paper werde ich zeigen, dass entgegen der Erwartung die zweite Deutung plausibler ist.

RECHNEN UND ZEICHNEN. PAUL KLEE UND LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN ÜBER DAS KOPFRECHNEN

Richard Heinrich

Wien, Österreich

„Kopfrechnen ist vielleicht der einzige Fall, in welchem von der Vorstellung ein regelmäßiger Gebrauch im Alltagsleben gemacht wird. Darum hat es besonderes Interesse.“ (Item 245) Diese Bemerkung Wittgensteins ist Ausgangspunkt für Überlegungen zu einer Radierung Klees aus dem Jahre 1929 mit dem Titel „Rechnender Greis“. Sie konzentriert sich auf das Verhältnis zwischen dem (Vorstellungs-)Inhalt eines Kopfes, den Händen, die den Kopf stützen und (drittens) dem für uns als Betrachter vorliegenden Blatt. Dieser Konstellation wird abschließend Wittgensteins Auffassung von Beweis und Rechnung als Bild gegenüber gestellt.

WITTGENSTEIN IN TAGORE'S DARK CHAMBER: AN EXAMINATION OF THE INFLUENCE ON WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY OF TAGORE'S THE KING OF THE DARK CHAMBER

Charitha Herath

Kandy, Sri Lanka

It is a widely accepted fact that the influences on Wittgenstein by the traditional philosophy are very limited. Among this 'limited' group of philosophers, Rabindranath Tagore was the notable 'one & only' thinker from the outside of the Western world. In a letter to Paul Engelmann, Wittgenstein discusses Tagore's play, *The King of the Dark Chamber*, and indicates that he disagrees with the 'object of inquiry' of the drama. However, few months later, in another letter to Ludwig Hänsel, Wittgenstein claimed that his earlier opinion on the drama should be revised and drama has something grand. I would like to locate this study in the theoretical space between Wittgenstein's two positions on *The Dark Chambers*. In particular, this study explores Wittgenstein's discussion of Tagore's play within the context and the process of his philosophical development and examines whether Tagore's creative works influence Wittgenstein's later philosophy (the *Philosophical Investigations*).

“DO I UNDERSTAND THIS SENTENCE?”

Lars Hertzberg

Åbo, Finland

In *Philosophical Investigations* § 525 Wittgenstein asks whether he understands a particular sentence if no context

is given. He suggests the answer may be both yes and no. According to a widely accepted account of linguistic meaning, compositionality, the meaning of a sentence is given with the words of which it is composed and its syntax; hence if the sentence is grammatically well-formed and the words in it are familiar there should be no question whether we understand it. This disregards the variety of ways in which questions of understanding words spoken may arise. Above all, it is important to note the radical distinction between discourse concerning *types* of things said, and discourse concerning the particular things said on a given occasion. While these may bear on one another, my suggestion is that it would not be fruitful to try to give a systematic account of their mutual relations.

IS HEIDEGGER'S REJECTION OF AESTHETICS JUSTIFIED?

Thomas Hilgers

New York/Berlin, USA/Germany

Heidegger fervently rejected aesthetics. According to him, aesthetic theories offer nothing but false conceptions of art, beauty, experience, and human existence. Of course, this rejection is intimately connected to Heidegger's attack on the modern paradigm of (human) subjectivity, to his take on the history of metaphysics, and to his own positive accounts of art, technology, and truth. It therefore is hard to understand and evaluate Heidegger's rejection of aesthetics independently of an exploration of these other themes. In this paper, I will shed some light on Heidegger's attack on aesthetics precisely by means of discussing it in the context of his overall philosophy. In particular, I will address these three questions: 1) What is aesthetics according to Heidegger? 2) What are the main problems with it? 3) What value can Heidegger's criticism and rejection still have for contemporary debates in and on aesthetics?

ZWEI SCHIFFBRÜCHE UND EIN LIEGEPLATZ

Herbert Hrachovec

Wien, Österreich

Lukrez zeichnet zu Beginn des 2. Buches von *De rerum natura* das Bild eines Schiffes in Seenot – gesehen vom sicheren Ufer aus. Hans Blumenberg hat das Motiv als „Schiffbruch mit Zuschauer“ aufgegriffen. Es exemplifiziert ein Verhältnis zwischen Naturgewalt und reflexiver Reserve; übertragen auf künstlerische Darstellungen zwischen Ästhetik und Natur. Der Beitrag analysiert diese Bezüge schematisch und wendet die Analyse auf Blumenbergs Motiv an. Das Photo der Folgen eines Schiffbruchs hat, zweitens, 2015 international Betroffenheit ausgelöst. Sie folgt ästhetisch-moralischen Beweggründen und muss, so wird argumentiert, durch die Anerkennung des Faktors Natur ergänzt werden. Natur gehört mitbestimmend zu einem Kunstwerk, das diesen Schiffbruch im Gedächtnis hält.

RECOLLECTING RUSH RHEES

Liam Hughes

Swansea, Wales

This brief recollection is primarily an acknowledgement of a personal debt of gratitude to Rush Rhees. It may serve as a reminder that apart from his contribution to making Wittgenstein's works accessible, he developed his own distinctive philosophical voice. By casting a particular light

on the man and his work I hope to encourage a re-reading. In the early part of this paper, I focus on his seminars and the impression they made on those who attended, while in the remainder, I comment briefly on wider issues; editing Wittgenstein, making his works more understandable through teaching and writing, as well as his own unique contribution to philosophy.

THE VIEWPOINT-VIEW SCHEME – AGAINST THE PHILOSOPHICAL DOCTRINE OF THE PRIVACY OF MENTAL PHENOMENA

Tomoaki Ihara

Tokyo, Japan

An essential part of the inner/outer picture of the mind which has dominated modern philosophy is the idea that mental phenomena are private. In this paper, I discuss the privacy of mental phenomena, not from the standpoint of subject-object framework but from that of viewpoint-view scheme, taking up the three different types of mental phenomena – perception, sensation and aspect-seeing – and suggest, inspired by and thinking with Ludwig Wittgenstein, that while the first two – a view and a pain – are not private, the last – an aspect – is private. I will then dispel the inner/outer picture out of the consideration on mental phenomena. Finally, I would say we might come up with communicative discrepancy due to the private characters of our seeing-an-aspect in that language game.

THE HOW IS KEY FOR THE WHAT. THE FAMILY CHRONICLE: LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN FROM A RELATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Nicole L. Immler

Utrecht, The Netherlands

The family chronicle (*Familienerinnerungen*) by Ludwig Wittgenstein's eldest sister Hermine is one of the main biographical sources about the 'private Ludwig' and has crucially shaped the images of Wittgenstein family members. This chronicle, published as a whole for the first time at the end of 2015, is an important step towards an informed reading of this source. However, a reading based upon autobiographical and literary theory can help to deconstruct some of the seductive interpretations of such an (auto)biographical text. In *Das Familiengedächtnis der Wittgensteins* (2011) I analysed this source, arguing that a relational approach – reading autobiographical sources from Hermine alongside autobiographical notes from Ludwig Wittgenstein and examining their attitudes towards the (auto)biographical genre – grants more insights into the way that the formatting of autobiographical texts shapes its content and its perception. This will help to review the images we have from both, built around alleged intended silences.

WITTGENSTEIN AND DOSTOEVSKY ON AESTHETICS AND THE 'INNER' LIFE

Tea Jankovic

Fribourg, Switzerland

The Private Language Argument (*Philosophical Investigations*, §§243-315) is often accused of seeking to abolish 'inner life'. However, reading it together with Wittgenstein's remarks on perception and aesthetics in Part II, iv and xi,

reveals potential for a sophisticated account of discernment of other people's intentions and 'inner' states. And his scattered references to Dostoevsky's novels—which reflect the role of art in the refinement of perception—point towards an aesthetic-ethical account of emphatic perception.

WITTGENSTEIN ON COLOR

Yi Jiang

Beijing, China

Wittgenstein has discussed the problem of color through his life but had varied the focus of his discussions in different periods: in TLP the problem has been discussed as a way of showing the logical structure of our language; in his middle period as an instantiation of expressions; and in his later philosophy he focused on the clarification of usages of the color terms. Though he discussed a lot on the problem of color, Wittgenstein did not provide any theory of color. He just discussed various usages of the color terms, which is one of significant parts in his later philosophy.

SEEING THE SAME DIFFERENTLY – A CASE OF FAMILY DEFORMATIONS

Amadeusz Just

Warsaw, Poland

The aim of my paper is to propose a new term: *family deformation*. In the first part I discuss Wittgenstein's use of the term *family resemblance* to show that: 1) contrary to what Hans Sluga has suggested, it is only a resemblance, not a kinship term; 2) it should be understood as an object of comparison. In the second part I discuss a fragment of Ernesto Sabato's novel *The Tunnel* to interpret occurrences of the term *family deformation*. In the final section I compare *family resemblance* with *family deformation* and present *family deformation* as a special case of seeing an aspect.

CORA DIAMOND AND STANLEY CAVELL ON THE AESTHETIC IN WITTGENSTEIN

Géza Kállay

Budapest/Vienna, Hungary/Austria

This paper compares how Cora Diamond and Stanley Cavell conceive of the Wittgensteinian aesthetic in the *Tractatus* and in *Philosophical Investigations*, respectively. I argue that for Diamond the Wittgensteinian aesthetic (and the ethical) is overcoming the illusion that we have meant something through the imaginative understanding of others, including literary works of art. For Cavell, in turn, the Wittgensteinian aesthetic is conspicuous representations, also mirrored in the *Investigations* itself, fighting lostness, resulting in the acknowledgement of our finitude. For both Diamond and Cavell, the aesthetic is (a change of) attitude.

DER NACHLASS ZU LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN IN DER ÖSTERREICHISCHEN NATIONALBIBLIOTHEK. EIN BERICHT ZU SEINER WISSENSCHAFTLICHEN ERSCHLIEßUNG

Elisabeth Edith Kamenicek

Wien, Österreich

Im Rahmen des von einem privaten Sponsor finanzierten seit Juni 2013 laufenden Forschungsprojekts werden bislang größtenteils unpublizierte 700 Fotos – darunter auch unbekannte Momentaufnahmen aus der Kindheit Ludwig Wittgensteins – wie auch Korrespondenzstücke und Objekte der wissenschaftlichen Forschung zugänglich gemacht. Anhand deren Analyse soll ein umfassenderes Bild der Familie wie ihrer kulturgeschichtlichen Bedeutung ermöglicht werden.

Die Österreichische Nationalbibliothek verfügt über eine umfangreiche Sammlung von Originalbriefen der Familie Wittgenstein, darunter circa 760 Briefe von beziehungsweise an Ludwig Wittgenstein. Feinerschlüssen wurden auch circa 350 Korrespondenzstücke zwischen anderen Familienmitgliedern, die nicht in der Online-Edition des *Brenner-Archivs* enthalten sind, jedoch für die biographische Wittgenstein-Forschung und die Erschließung des Fotobestandes größte Relevanz haben.

Die Forschungsergebnisse sind über den Katalog der ÖNB frei verfügbar und ermöglichen es ForscherInnen verschiedenster Disziplinen die Inhalte über Suchfunktionen gezielt zu recherchieren wie zu nutzen.

ETHISCHE UND ÄSTHETISCHE ASPEKTE IN DEN SCHRIFTEN DES PHILOSOPHISCHEN NACHLASSES LUDWIG WITTGENSTEINS

Peter Keicher

Wien, Österreich

Der Vortrag beinhaltet eine methodische Differenzierung zwischen der Diskussion über Wittgenstein I und II einerseits (z.B. Stegmüller, K.T. Fann, Apel, Rorty, mit Betonung der Gemeinsamkeiten Diamond, Conant) und den Wenden andererseits, die sich meistens auf spezifische Kenntnisse des Wittgenstein-Nachlasses begründen (z.B. Hintikka, Kienzler, Pichler). Da aber schon zahlreiche unterschiedliche Wenden postuliert wurden, sollte man sich genauer anschauen, was diese verbindet und was sie unterscheidet. Dann erkennt man auch, dass die Antworten auf die Frage „How many Wittgensteins?“ sich historisch unterscheiden lassen (z.B. Kenny, Hintikka, Stern), wobei sich eine zunehmende Ausdifferenzierung hinsichtlich des Nachlasses abzeichnet. Betrachtet man Wittgensteins Nachlass nun aber nicht nur aus einer philosophischen, sondern auch aus einer ästhetischen Perspektive, dann erkennt man bei Wittgenstein sehr unterschiedliche und sich verändernde Formen und Methoden der Werkfindung, die bislang nur teilweise ausreichend gewürdigt wurden. Darauf soll anhand von Beispielen aus dem Nachlass hingewiesen werden. Diese ästhetische und methodische Betrachtung des Nachlasses soll mit einer ethischen Interpretation verbunden werden.

ZUM UMGANG MIT DEM WERK WITTGENSTEINS IN DER KUNST

Benjamin Kiel

Kassel, Deutschland

Der Beitrag ist eine Fortführung einer früheren Untersuchung (Kiel & Toopekoff 2016), inwieweit die Philosophie Ludwig Wittgensteins die Entwicklung der amerikanischen Kunst in den 1960er Jahren beeinflusst hat. Dabei stellte sich heraus, dass in der zur Beantwortung der Fragestellung herangezogenen Literatur Missverständnisse, welche die Philosophie Wittgensteins und auch die Interpretation der Werke der dort vorgestellten Künstler betrafen, perpetuiert wurden und werden. In Bezug auf den Umgang mit dem Werk Wittgensteins scheint es daher notwendig, Publikationen zum Thema ‚Wittgenstein und die Kunst‘ sowie die darin oft allzu leichtfertig geschlagene Verbindung zwischen einer künstlerischen Position und dem Namen Ludwig Wittgenstein einer kritischen Betrachtung zu unterziehen. In diesem Zusammenhang soll im Vortrag ein Künstler vorgestellt werden, von dem es heißt, er sei nicht nur von der Philosophie Wittgensteins beeinflusst, sondern sogar sein Student in Cambridge gewesen: Jani Christou, bedeutender griechischer Komponist avantgardistischer Musik in den 1950er und 1960er Jahren.

ON THE BEAUTY OF EQUATIONS OR FORMULAS

Peter P. Kirschenmann

Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Many pieces of music and many poems are beautiful. Many mathematical formulas and physical equations have also been regarded as beautiful. Do we have to do with the same notion of beauty or, in the case of equations and formulas, with a specific notion? I present examples of such equations, formulas, comments on them, and also the results of a neuroscientific study. I discuss the possible aesthetic properties of such equations and formulas. I conclude that the notion of beauty involved here is rather specific, mainly since it concerns non-material, but object-regarding relations of concepts or ideas. I also argue that, as a desideratum, the possible beauty of equations or formulas will remain secondary with respect to their truth.

WAS ÄNDERTE SICH MIT NIETZSCHE? ÜBER EINE WENDUNG IM ÄSTHETISCHEN DENKEN

Endre Kiss

Budapest, Ungarn

Jedes philosophische, aber auch jedes dichterische Werk ändert die ‚Wirklichkeit‘, es macht die geistige, soziale und mentale Beschaffenheit dessen, was wir Lebenswelt oder Gesellschaft nennen, anders.

Dass Friedrich Nietzsche zu den Philosophen, aber auch Ästheten (und wenn man noch will: Dichtern) gehört, die diese schöpferische Funktion am vollständigsten erfüllt haben, gilt heute als allgemein eingesehenes Faktum.

Aktuell wird ein Versuch gemacht, Friedrich Nietzsches *Bilanz* auf dem Gebiete des ästhetischen Denkens zu ziehen.

ASPECT PERCEPTION AND SEEING ANEW IN WITTGENSTEIN, GEERTZ, AND BRUEGEL

Stephanie Koerner

Manchester, United Kingdom

Culture and Value (1998, 42) documents Wittgenstein arguing that: "People nowadays think scientists are there to instruct them, poets, and musicians etc. to entertain them. *That the latter have something to teach them; that never occurs to them.*" This essay responds by exploring "aspect perception" and "seeing anew" in Wittgenstein and Pieter Bruegel the Elder (1525 - 1569). It addresses Wittgenstein's argument by showing how such explorations relate to challenges of taking the sciences, humanities and arts equally seriously.

MEDIUM. PHILOSOPHIEHISTORISCH- KRITISCHE ANMERKUNGEN ZU EINEM AKTUELLEN BEGRIFF

Petra Kolmer

Bonn, Deutschland

Der Vortrag klärt die heute selbst in akademischen Zusammenhängen gängige und anscheinend ganz beliebige objektsprachliche Verwendung des lateinischen Ausdrucks *medium* („für Licht, Sand und Steine bis zum Internet“) auf. Er erinnert zunächst daran, dass die durch den lateinischen Ausdruck abgedeckten Begriffe – vor allem (und im Deutschen) „Mitte“, „Mittleres“ und „Mittel“ – theoretisch neutrale Ordnungsbegriffe (keine Gegenstandsbegriffe) sind und dass ihre erfahrungs- oder weltbezogene Verwendung (implizit oder explizit) einer teleologischen *Lebensweltinterpretation* zugehört, in deren Rahmen das heute „Medium“ Genannte (explizit seit Aristoteles) als Wahrheitsbedingung (für die Interpretation selbst: als „theoretisches Mittel“, nach Hegel) thematisch ist. Der Vortrag geht auf Aristoteles, Kant, Hegel und die neuere Medienphilosophie ein und zeigt in aller Kürze weltanschauliche Veränderungen auf, die dazu geführt haben, dass man den lateinischen Ausdruck im 18. Jh. gerade für dieses Mittel beibehielt und dass wir heute – im Grunde sehr voraussetzungsreich und deshalb nicht so ganz beliebig, wie es scheint – den Ausdruck „Medium“ für vieles in der Welt verwenden.

“AS IF THE EARTH HAS LONG STOPPED SPEAKING TO US”. ON RESONANCE WITH NATURE AND ITS LOSS

Angelika Krebs

Basel, Switzerland

This lecture explores the aesthetic argument for nature conservation. The main claim is that the experience of beautiful landscapes is an essential part of the good human life. Beautiful landscapes make us feel at home in the world. Their great and irreplaceable value lies therein.

To establish this claim, the concepts of landscape and "Stimmung" are clarified. It is shown how "Stimmung" (in the sense of mood) is infused into landscape (as atmosphere) and how we respond to it aesthetically. We respond by resonating or feeling at home.

Literature can help us to better appreciate natural beauty. Peter Kurzeck's novels are a case in point. The title of this lecture is taken from one of his novels. Philosophy with its concern for clear concepts and stringent arguments should go hand in hand with literature and its power to make things present. If the aesthetic argument for nature con-

ervation is to have any effect in the real world, philosophy and literature must join forces.

HOW NOT TO ARGUE THAT WITTGENSTEIN WAS A MORAL ANTI-REALIST

Philipp Kremers

Leipzig, Germany

Mario Brandhorst provides an interpretation of Rush Rhees' *Some Developments in Wittgenstein's Ethics* and Wittgenstein's *Lectures on Aesthetics* which ascribes a moral anti-realist position to Wittgenstein. In this paper, I show that at least two of his arguments are insufficient in order to support this claim. On the one hand, Brandhorst fails to capture Wittgenstein's distinction between the question what one ought to do and the question which ethical framework one ought to embrace. On the other hand, Brandhorst mistakenly assumes that Wittgenstein's rejection of Moore's particular kind of moral realism is sufficient for ascribing an anti-realist position to Wittgenstein.

LAURENCE AND LUDWIG. LITERARY AND PHILOSOPHICAL IMAGINATION IN STERNE AND WITTGENSTEIN

Matthias Kroß

Potsdam, Germany

Whereas Laurence Sterne's infamous book *The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman* might be read as a playful attempt to illustrate the vanity of philosophical thinking by documenting a life which obviously does only exist in its textual fabric spun by philosophy – and therefore doesn't succeed to come to pass – Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations might be read as an attempt to show the vanity of philosophical thinking by engaging it into an infinite self-debate – with the intention to finally free life to come to pass. But in the end, one might suspect, they both do fail in their endeavor to conceive of a notion of life freed from the captivity of textuality. In fact, it seems to be conceived of as a mere vanishing point of their literary resp. philosophical imagination – presented in a playful relish by the one, with resignation by the other, with subtle irony by both. Is their notion of life something one cannot speak of but in an imaginary or literary way?

WITTGENSTEIN'S COMPARISON BETWEEN AESTHETICS AND PHILOSOPHY

Oskari Kuusela

Norwich, United Kingdom

In his writings Wittgenstein occasionally compares philosophy and philosophical argumentation with aesthetic considerations and explanations. In both philosophy and aesthetics our understanding or appreciation of an object of interest depends, according to him, on the adoption of specific ways of conceiving the object (as in hearing a musical phrase in a certain way), and in both cases we are faced with the task of explaining and bringing another to conceive the object in some such way. (In philosophy the adoption of a particular way of conceiving an object of study serves the purpose of rendering it comprehensible, and releasing us from problems that arise in the context of some other way of conceiving it.) Accordingly, the psychological phenomenon of seeing something as something is

of interest from the point of view of both philosophical and aesthetic considerations. In my talk I explore this comparison between philosophical and aesthetic considerations, and its consequences for philosophy, among which is, according to Wittgenstein, the lack of conclusive arguments in philosophy. I will also push the comparison further by asking, whether and in what ways abstraction in art might help to understand idealization in philosophy, and in particular the difference of idealization from generalization, a question also suggested by Wittgenstein's analogy between the task of articulating exact logico-philosophical clarificatory concepts, and that of describing the shapes of colour patches with vague boundaries by means of geometrical shapes with sharp boundaries.

REMARKS ON FERRUCCIO ROSSI-LANDI'S INTERPRETATION OF THE WITTGENSTEIN-SRAFFA RELATIONSHIP

Emiliano La Licata

Palermo, Italy

In one of the very first articles that deal with the theme of the relationship between Wittgenstein and Sraffa, Ferruccio Rossi-Landi argues that Sraffa influenced Wittgenstein on the level of philosophical method, encouraging him to observe semantic phenomena through the new concepts of immanence, contextualism and relatedness. Rossi-Landi also states that unlike Marxian tradition, there is no historical dimension to semantics in late Wittgenstein. I disagree with the last statement. In this paper, I maintain that a dynamic and therefore historical dimension to semantics, connected to creativity of speakers, is present in the *Philosophical Investigations*.

WHAT IS THE PHILOSOPHY OF POETRY?

Peter Lamarque

York, United Kingdom

It is only relatively recently that analytical philosophers have given special focus to poetry as a topic in its own right in aesthetics or as a semi-autonomous branch of the philosophy of literature. A new field is taking shape: the so-called Philosophy of Poetry. But do analytical philosophers have anything new to say on the topic? What kinds of issues or problems attract their attention? Rather than simply surveying the field, the lecture will look at some emerging concerns—about form & content, expression, interpretation, poetic complexity, experience, poetic truth—and will suggest that poetry poses some quite serious challenges to standard conceptions of meaning and truth. On the current showing it seems likely that studying the practices and norms of poetry will force a reconceiving of the powers or limits of language that could itself promote fresh understanding in core areas of philosophy. So bringing analytical philosophy to poetry can yield benefits in both directions, offering insights as well as challenges.

„WELCOME HOME, MR COBBI!“ ZUR ANALYSE UND INTERPRETATION DER SCHLUSSEQUENZ VON *INCEPTION*

Sebastian Lederle

Wien, Österreich

Der Beitrag verfolgt zwei Ziele: *Erstens* soll anhand einer kurzen Analyse der Komposition der Schlusssequenz des Films *Inception* von Christopher Nolan gezeigt werden,

dass es sich dabei um einen exemplarischen Mindgame-Movie handelt. Im Anschluss an Überlegungen Blumenbergs zur ästhetischen Transformation der Fraglosigkeit des Mythos und Cavells zum prekären Verhältnis zwischen Anerkennung und Skeptizismus wird *zweitens* die These vertreten, dass *Inception* beispielhaft den Zusammenhang von Ethik und Ästhetik performativ aushandelt: Wer überlegt, wie es um die Wirklichkeit des Glücks des Odysseus nachempfundenen Protagonisten steht, tut dies nur, weil der Film mit seinen ästhetisch-präsentativen Verfahren dessen Verlangen danach in seiner Zerbrechlichkeit und Illusionsanfälligkeit vorführt. Die völlige aufgehobenheit aller Erfüllungsbehinderungen, wie sie im Bild der endlich gelingenden Rückkehr am Schluss des Films gezeigt wird, gehört selbst ins Reich der Fiktion. Der Film reflektiert darauf durch eine Infragestellung desjenigen Versprechens, das er um der Inszenierung der Heimkehr willen erfüllen zu können vorgegeben hat.

ARTIST AND AESTHETE: A DUAL PORTRAIT

Jerrold Levinson

College Park, USA

Two of the principal roles or positions or identities in the aesthetic/artistic situation are those of artist and aesthete. The former is obviously primarily a creative role, while the latter is obviously primarily an appreciative role. And these roles, as we know, are also interdependent: aesthetes would have little, or at any rate less, to appreciate without artists; while artists would have little, or at any rate less, creative motivation without appreciators, with aesthetes as the most important vanguard therein.

But what, more significantly, differentiates artist and aesthete? Do the basic impulses of the two tribes coincide, or are they rather in conflict? Is being an artist fully compatible with being an aesthete, or might there be a fundamental tension between those identities? Are the same talents, inclinations, and attitudes essential to being a successful artist those which make for a successful aesthete, or are they at some level at war with one another?

My talk will be devoted to exploring those questions, in the course of which clear profiles of the artist and the aesthete will be offered, and to exploring some concrete cases in the hope of illuminating those questions, of figures such as Beethoven and Van Gogh on the one hand, and figures such as John Ruskin and Walter Benjamin on the other hand, though without neglecting cases in which the roles of artist and aesthete have, to all appearances, been successfully combined in a single individual, such as those of Baudelaire, Schumann, and Oscar Wilde.

RELATIONS OPERATIONALIZED

Montgomery Link & David Rollow

Boston, Massachusetts, USA

It has recently been established that Tractarian logic is first-order quantification theory with identity. Due to restraints on definability, Tractarian logic admits only countably many objects. Taken together, these facts undercut a central argument for the longstanding interpretation that relations are named in the *Tractatus*.

JUST WHAT IS IT THAT MAKES TODAY'S ART-PHILOSOPHY SO BORING AND ART-CRITICISM SO DIFFERENT, SO MUCH MORE APPEALING?

Karlheinz Lüdeking

Berlin, Germany

Those who suspect that the title of this lecture might betray a slightly combative stance are absolutely right. I will actually deliver a plea for the fundamental importance of art-criticism. Art-criticism safeguards the borders of the realm of art, it has to decide what is admitted to enter and what has to stay outside. Art-criticism, thus, determines the composition of the set of phenomena that can afterwards, when the die is cast, be scrutinized by philosophers of art.

PARADIGMATIC SAMPLES, SELF-REFERENCE AND THE WHITE KNIGHT'S PARADOX

Jakub Mácha

Brno, Czech Republic

The name of the name is not the name. This is the White Knight's paradox coined by Giorgio Agamben taking up a line from Lewis Carroll's *Through the Looking Glass*. I am going to show that there are rigorous formulations of this paradox in Frege and the early Wittgenstein. However, we can find almost an exact restatement of the White Knight's paradox in terms of paradigmatic samples in the later Wittgenstein: "one proposition can never describe the paradigm in another, unless it ceases to be a paradigm." (PG, p. 346) I shall argue that such self-referential propositions, which lie on the limit of language, can mark something radically new, something that marks a radical change of our language and the world, something that was inexpressible previously.

WITTGENSTEIN'S THERAPEUTIC METHOD AND HIS PATIENT'S PROBLEMS

Saori Makino

Chiba, Japan

There has been much discussion about Wittgenstein's philosophical therapy, dealing with such questions as what objects of therapy are, why philosophy is therapeutic, what the goal of therapy is, and how Wittgenstein develops his therapeutic method. On the subject of therapeutic method, it has often been asserted that Wittgenstein barely tells his interlocutor the correct use of language, and rather, makes him reflect on his own expressions. This proposition seems to explain rightly how Wittgenstein exercises his method. However, the availability of a therapeutic method does not seem to have received sufficient deliberation. It may still be questioned whether Wittgenstein's therapeutic method is most suitable or merely adequate as a means of treatment. The present study not only analyses treatment in *Philosophical Investigations* but also examines the nature of philosophical problems, proving that therapeutic method is not just one effective procedure but is necessary in its own right. Someone who understands a philosophical problem may see the matter differently from another person who has difficulty in finding the way to deal with it. We should not take a shortcut in therapy by merely disclosing grammatical misinterpretation.

BESCHREIBEN UND ERINNERN. ÜBER IRIS MURDOCHS ANVERWANDLUNG EINIGER WITTGENSTEINISCHER MOTIVE

Kai Marchal

Taipeh, Republik China (Taiwan)

In meinem Vortrag möchte ich neues Licht werfen auf Iris Murdochs ethisch-ästhetischen Holismus, den sie in kritischer Anverwandlung einiger Wittgensteinischer Motive entwickelt hat. Ausgehend von einer Neulektüre des berühmten Beispiels von M und D diskutiere ich Murdochs Verständnis der Tätigkeiten von Beschreiben und Erinnern sowie der Privatheit seelischer Zustände und des Aspektwechsels. Schließlich zeige ich, dass ihre „Idee der Vollkommenheit“ nicht vorschnell in einem realistischen Sinn interpretiert werden darf, sondern vielmehr auf die Ganzheit des *erinnerten* Lebens verweist.

ETHIK UND IRONIE IN DEN OPENING SECTIONS DER PHILOSOPHISCHEN UNTERSUCHUNGEN

Sandra Markewitz

Vechta, Deutschland

Der Gebrauch ironischer Sprechweisen in den einleitenden Bemerkungen der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* hat, wie gezeigt werden soll, neben der stilistischen eine anthropologisch-ethische Seite. Erst die Ironie, die sich aus einer nicht eindeutigen Redeweise oder Anordnung der Wissensinhalte ergeben kann, entspricht dem provisorischen, weltbildrelativen Charakter des menschlichen Lebens. Damit ist nicht ein Unernst gemeint, der die Schwierigkeit des Lebens verkennen würde, sondern ein Bewusstsein der vorläufigen Form der Erkenntnismittel, das in der Darstellungsform der *undecidability* bei Wittgenstein einen Ausdruck findet, der die Einsicht der *Lecture on Ethics* bedenkt, dass Faktenaussagen keine absoluten Werturteile implizieren können und die Entscheidung für eine bestimmte Darstellungsform philosophischer Überlegungen Rückschlüsse auf das Menschenbild zulässt, das diesen zugrunde liegt.

“PART OF THE PLEASURE IN HEARING BEETHOVEN’S NINTH SYMPHONY IS HEARING THE NINTH SYMPHONY”. WITTGENSTEIN’S LECTURES ON AESTHETICS (LA)

Michael J.S. Martens

Haarlem, The Netherlands

In this paper I have tried to analyse how Wittgenstein deals in these lectures with the notion of aesthetics. In Wittgenstein’s oeuvre aesthetics occupies a radically different place than his philosophical, logical and mathematical outlook and methods. Out of these lectures I have formulated two types of languages games: A) Language games with intrinsic values of autonomous works of art, and B) language games with cultural values that are always contextual. This is set against the notion of explaining aesthetics by scientific models such as discomfort as explained by cause and effect.

WITTGENSTEIN – ALJOSCHA. ÖSTERREICHISCHE LITERARISCH- PHILOSOPHISCHE REFLEXIONEN AUF DOSTOJEWSKIJ UND TOLSTOJ

Annelore Mayer

Baden, Österreich

Die russische Literatur, beginnend bei Turgenjew, erfuhr in Österreich in den 70er-Jahren des 19. Jahrhunderts eine starke Rezeption, welche im Weiteren dann Dostojewskij und Tolstoj mit einbezog. Bedeutende Erscheinungen der österreichischen Literatur wie Marie von Ebner-Eschenbach waren vor allem von Ethos und Moralität dieser Schriftsteller beeindruckt. Ebner-Eschenbach – für Wittgenstein eine Vorbildfigur – wurde eine Leitfigur einer ethisch ausgerichteten Kunst. Zumal sie, aber auch Karl Kraus schufen ein Klima, in welches Wittgenstein gleichsam hineingeboren wurde, so dass seine Beschäftigung mit Tolstoj und Dostojewskij durchaus auch hier eine Grundlage hat.

ÄSTHETIK ALS WERKZEUG DES INHALTES – EINE KULTURGESCHICHTLICHE BETRACHTUNG

Johannes Leopold Mayer

Baden, Österreich

War zuerst ein Inhalt, der geformt werden wollte, oder ist Ästhetik ein unabhängiges Bedürfnis? Anhand von weit auseinanderliegenden Epochen – die Urnenfelderkultur und das 19. Jahrhundert – sollen Denk- und Handlungsmöglichkeiten beschrieben und überdacht werden.

HUMAN “FORM OF LIFE” AS PREMISE FOR UNDERSTANDING OTHER CULTURES: WITTGENSTEIN’S PERSPECTIVE

Nikolay Medvedev

Tambov, Russia

The paper analyses the methodological significance of Wittgenstein’s concept of a “form of life” for the problem of understanding other cultures. The category of a “form of life”, containing biological and cultural elements, suggests universal patterns of human behaviour, on the basis of which one can achieve an understanding of the utterances in an unfamiliar language. The author argues that this interpretation of the notion of a “form of life” allows to escape the position of cultural relativism and to recognize the existence of the common ground for the cross-cultural interpretation.

THE CONCEPT OF ABSTRACT PAINTING: PROPOSING A MODEL FOR THE APPLICATION OF WITTGENSTEIN’S PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD

Claude Meurehg

Toronto, Canada

This paper uses the concept of abstract painting as a case study to propose a model for the application of Wittgenstein’s philosophical method. The model seeks to produce *surveyable* representations of various uses of this concept as well as the *family resemblances* between them. The

model introduces the use of spreadsheets and network interaction analysis software.

AESTHETIC GESTURES: AN ESSAY IN THE FREGE-WITTGENSTEIN THEORY OF ART

Nikolay Milkov

Paderborn, Germany

Frege's conception of works of art was scarcely discussed in the literature. This is a pity since, as we are going to see below, his innovative philosophy of language also outlined fruitful perspectives in the realm of aesthetics. In short, Frege holds that only complete sentences express thought. Sentences of literature express "mock thoughts". The early Wittgenstein closely followed Frege on this point. The *Tractatus* holds that only propositions model ("picture") states of affairs. Works of art are merely objects seen *sub specie aeternitatis*, beyond time (Wittgenstein 1961, 83). In the 1930s and 1940s, however, Wittgenstein started to claim that works of art *can* convey thoughts. To be more exact, successful (*gelungene*), or cogent works of art can play the role of gestures that show life directions. In this sense, artists "*have something to teach*" (Wittgenstein 1980, 36).

"SEEING AS" AND EXPERIENCING THE MEANING OF POETRY

Philip Mills

London, United Kingdom

In his *Lectures on Aesthetics*, Wittgenstein tackles the question "How should poetry be read?" giving an example of his understanding of Klopstock. A striking feature of Klopstock's poetry is that he indicates the rhythm with which his poems should be read. This discussion can be linked to Wittgenstein's reflection on "seeing as" in the second part of the *Philosophical Investigations*. More than "seeing as", Wittgenstein's remark on poetry is a matter of "reading as". In this paper, I explore the relation between "seeing as" or "reading as" and the interpretation of poetry following two of Wittgenstein's insights concerning the importance of context, imagination, and perspective in the act of "reading as".

ON THE VERY IDEA OF UNDERSTANDING MUSIC

Georg Mohr

Bremen, Germany

Can music be 'understood'? Does the notion of understanding make sense if applied to music? In everyday communication, understanding seems linked to words and (images of) objects. 'Understanding' works of literary or pictorial arts, therefore, seems to be quite 'natural'. In instrumental music, however, where words, pictures or narrative programs are missing, we only can refer to sounds and the form of their succession. Two issues arise here: First, what concept of understanding fits to hearing and interpreting music in general? Second, if there is no general answer to the question of what understanding music in general means, understanding music might be something different depending on what kind of music we are dealing with. My paper will include discussion of some recent research by Dahlhaus, Davies, Eggebrecht, Kivy, Levinson, Lissa, Ridley and Scruton.

WITTGENSTEIN ON THE EXISTENCE OF MIND IN THE PHYSICAL WORLD

Rajakishore Nath

Bombay, India

In this paper I shall explore Wittgenstein's view on the existence of mind. The main concern is in this paper to give a positive theory of mind which can provide a method for understanding mind as a metaphysical reality. In this context the self is presupposed by which what we call the mental phenomena including consciousness, because without the self the mind will be meaningless in this physical world. That is, this phenomenon of world itself needs a self in which mind is the part of this phenomenal world. Wittgenstein takes mind to be in a continuation with language and world because, for him, mind is not an independent entity in this world, rather it is part of this world. Thus the existence of the mind itself in this physical world proves that mind is metaphysical.

THE VOICE OF WITTGENSTEIN? AN EXPLORATION OF A CORPUS OF KIRCHBERG CONTRIBUTIONS 2001-2010

Yrsa Neuman & Rune J. Falch

Turku, Finland / Bergen, Norway

At the time of Wittgenstein's death in 1951 only the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* had been published. Since then, a vast amount of material has been made available and put to use by scholars in a growing mass of commentary and secondary literature. In this article, we introduce and take some first steps in exploring a digital corpus which may be used to investigate the use of Wittgenstein's work and other aspects of the writing of Wittgenstein scholars.

Which sources do scholars cite, and how? On what themes are Wittgenstein's own words mostly used? What do citation practices of Wittgenstein scholars reveal about the implicit conventions of our research community?

The corpus of Kirchberg Wittgenstein-related conference pre-proceedings papers, published by the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society 2001-2010, were digitized, marked up in XML format, and re-published Open Access by the Wittgenstein Archives in Bergen in 2013. Digital methods of structuring and searching the corpus bring new perspectives on Wittgenstein scholarship within reach.

UNIVERSALS WITHOUT INSTANTIATIONS: A METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATION OF THE TRACTATUS

Yasushi Nomura

Sapporo, Japan

My main concern of this paper is to make the two assertions: (A) We can see universals as the "objects" of the *Tractatus*. This will be established mainly through examining 3.315 of the *Tractatus*. On the other hand, (B) the idea of instantiations of universals is almost wholly lacking in the *Tractatus* (the idea is superseded by that of the existence of states of affairs). It follows from these two assertions that universals are seen in the *Tractatus* as "objects" without being accompanied by the idea of instantiations. This somewhat strange notion of universals without instantiations, however, will turn out to serve to evade Bradley's infinite regress.

AVOIDING THE MYTH OF THE GIVEN: WITTGENSTEIN'S WAY

Erlend W. F. Owesen

Munich, Germany

In this paper I consider the relationship between Wittgenstein and Sellars. I first present the thinking of Sellars that I regard as most relevant for Wittgenstein's own, namely Sellars' identification of and attack on the Myth of the Given, and his account of psychological concepts. Furthermore, I briefly show how Wittgenstein argues against the Myth of the Given in the Private Language Argument, and how he recommends we should think about psychological concepts. I conclude by comparing the two thinkers and suggest how Sellars can be criticized from a Wittgensteinian perspective.

WITTGENSTEIN'S „GEBETSSTRICHE“ IN DEN KRIEGSTAGEBÜCHERN (MSS 101–103)

Martin Pilch

Wien, Österreich

In den MSS 101–103 finden sich in den codierten persönlichen Eintragungen zahlreiche waagrechte Striche von z.T. erheblicher Länge. Ihr auffälligstes Charakteristikum ist, daß diese Striche oftmals zwischen Interpunktionszeichen stehen. Eine genauere Untersuchung der Strichpraxis und ihres jeweiligen Kontexts zeigt, daß sie als Kürzel für wiederkehrende Gebetsformeln interpretiert werden können, die im engen Zusammenhang mit den bekannten, stark an Tolstoj angelehnten, ausgeschriebenen Kurzgebeten stehen. Der Beitrag ist zugleich ein Beispiel für die Verwendung der neuen Facsimilebilder im Rahmen der *Bergen Nachlass Edition* (BNE) auf www.wittgensteinsource.org.

ART IN THE FACE OF THE ABSURD

Thomas Pözlner

Graz, Österreich

Many works of art are valuable. Do they have their value in themselves or is it rather derived from some external source? And why do they have this value? In this paper I interpret and critically assess Albert Camus' answers to these questions. Camus' theory of the value of art is based on his "logic of the absurd", i.e., the idea that the human condition is absurd and that we therefore ought to adopt an attitude of revolt. This idea entails that art lacks any intrinsic value. Rather, Camus argues, art is valuable only insofar as it promotes creators' or recipients' awareness of the absurd and their attitude of revolt. The main problem with this theory is that it exaggerates the significance of the logic of the absurd for art. Even if the human condition is absurd and we ought to revolt, artistic value cannot be reduced to these facts.

WITTGENSTEIN'S *TRACTATUS*, THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHILOSOPHY, AND THE THEORY OF MEANING

Henrique Jales Ribeiro

Coimbra, Portugal

In the past decades, due to the impact of the *Philosophical Investigations*, the related historiography sought to revisit the *Tractatus* as if this work anticipated to some extent the

theory of meaning in the former. The author, placing the *Tractatus* in the history of philosophy, discusses this presupposition. He holds that Wittgenstein in the latter, following Frege and (especially) Russell's investigations on logic, addresses the ultimate foundations of philosophy and human knowledge in general, and that this desideratum resumes in new terms Descartes' and Kant's modern conceptions of such foundations. It is in the light of this framework that one must understand the theory of meaning presented in that work. While the *Philosophical Investigations*, in some sense, are a post-modern work that breaks with the foundationalist ideal, the *Tractatus*, on the other hand, clearly falls within the scope of philosophical modernity.

PENTAGON UND PENTAGRAMM – WITTGENSTEIN'S GRAFISCHE TRANSFORMATION DER KAPPSCHEN TECHNIKPHILOSOPHIE

Ulrich Richtmeyer

Potsdam, Deutschland

In Wittgensteins posthum veröffentlichten *Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik* (BGM) findet sich eine Serie von Zeichnungen, deren Figuren „Hand“ und „Drudenfuß“ genannt werden und die untereinander mit „Projektionslinien“ verbunden sind. Die Gleichzahligkeit der beiden Figuren wird offenbar demonstriert, um hiermit die Geltungsbedingungen geometrischer Beweise zu hinterfragen. Ein ähnlich unvermittelter und irritierender Einsatz des gezeichneten Pentagramms fand sich bereits in den Vorlesungen von 1935. Als Quelle für die Herkunft des Pentagramm-Motivs lassen sich drei Manuskripte Wittgensteins angeben (MS 148, 117 und 118), in denen es über viele Manuskriptseiten hinweg sowohl grafisch als auch thematisch variiert wird. Wo es jedoch herkommt und warum Wittgenstein ihm überhaupt diese intensive und über Jahre anhaltende Aufmerksamkeit widmet, bleibt dabei unausgesprochen. Der Vortrag resümiert den philosophischen Ertrag dieser Faszinationsgeschichte, die auch den Aspektwechsel vorwegnimmt und versucht dabei nachzuweisen, dass Wittgenstein Thema und Zeichnung aus der Lektüre von Ernst Kapps „Grundlinien einer Philosophie der Technik“ bezogen hat.

CROSSING THE AESTHETIC REGIME

Ruth Ronen

Tel Aviv, Israel

The 'aesthetic regime' is an intriguing concept in contemporary aesthetics. Coined by Jacques Rancière, the aesthetic regime re-structures the logic of aesthetic thought since Kant: it turns art into the paradigm of philosophical thought, it asserts the absolute singularity of art but also "destroys any pragmatic criterion for isolating this singularity". For reasons that will be presented in this paper, one of the striking things about the aesthetic regime is that once it was established, breaking away from it becomes practically impossible. The aesthetic regime incorporates everything, modernity and postmodernism, romantic poetry and photography, beauty and politics, art and life. The impossibility of crossing the boundaries of the aesthetic regime will be examined in this paper in relation to other occurrences of this theme: the impossibility of the outside, raised with regard to the relation between a practice and the principle, regime, or law constituting it. The implications of this 'absence' of an outside will be

explored in relation to Agamben's study of 'exception' and Wittgenstein's notion of 'game'.

RECHERCHEN ZUM SOGENANTEN „TEIL II“ BZW. „FRAGMENT“ IN DER POSTUMEN VERÖFFENTLICHUNG VON WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHISCHEN UNTERSUCHUNGEN

Josef Rothhaupt

München, Deutschland

Zwei Jahre nach Ludwig Wittgensteins Tod wurden die *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* im Jahre 1953 in einer postum von den Herausgebern Elizabeth Anscombe und Rush Rhees zusammengestellten zweisprachigen (deutsches Original und englische Übersetzung) Publikation zweiteilig der Öffentlichkeit präsentiert, nämlich bestehend aus dem ersten Teil „PU I“ und dem zweiten Teil „PU II“. Dass es sich dabei um zwei sehr unterschiedliche bzw. um zwei streng zu unterscheidende Teile aus Wittgensteins Gesamtnachlass handelt, ist auch jetzt – nach mehr als einem halben Jahrhundert – deutlich geblieben bzw. noch deutlicher geworden. Inzwischen wurde in der von Peter Hacker und Joachim Schulte überarbeiteten zweisprachigen (deutsch-englisch) Neuausgabe der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* der Teil „PU II“ einerseits – eher zutreffend – zwar umbenannt in „Philosophie der Psychologie – Ein Fragment“ und andererseits – eher unzutreffend – aber dennoch in der Veröffentlichung der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* beibehalten.

Anliegen und Ziel dieses Vortrags ist es – am Exempel des sogenannten „Teil II“ bzw. „Fragment“ der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* – genauer zu klären und zu erklären wie unzureichend die Gesamtgenese von Ludwig Wittgensteins *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* bis jetzt recherchiert und dokumentiert ist.

INNOVATIVE DIGITAL/VIRTUAL RESEARCH IN AND ON WITTGENSTEIN'S "NACHLASS" (BEE, BNE, WITTGENSTEIN SOURCE, HYPERWITTGENSTEIN, WITTFIND): TYPESCRIPT TS212 – THE PROTO-BIG TYPESCRIPT – AS A PRIME EXAMPLE

Josef G. F. Rothhaupt

München, Germany

Wittgenstein's Typescript TS212, the so called *Proto-Big Typescript*, is a very important document in Wittgenstein's Nachlass. Till now it is nearly completely unknown in the research of the genesis of Wittgenstein's philosophical oeuvre. This typescript consists of almost 2000 pieces of paper, namely cuttings from the underlying typescripts TS208, TS210 and TS211. TS212 is much more complicated than TS213, the so called *Big Typescript*, which is – by the way – by no means a finished book composed by Wittgenstein. TS212 contains detailed information and shows detailed patterns about its twofold construction – an alphabetical order as well as a thematic order.

The tools of "Digital Humanities" nowadays give us the very helpful instruments for new and innovative research on and in the Nachlass of the philosopher Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein.

In the workshop in Kirchberg 2016 the typescript TS212 will be treated as an example for the possibilities to competent philological research and adequate philosophical interpretation in and on Wittgenstein's oeuvre in a digital and virtual manner, as practiced and developed at "The Wittgenstein Archiv in Bergen" (Norway) and "The Center

for Information and Language Processing" in Munich (Germany).

ÄSTHETISCHE EIGENSCHAFTEN, DISPOSITIONEN UND INTERPRETATIONEN ZWISCHEN ONTOLOGIE UND ÄSTHETIK

Marcello Ruta

Bern, Schweiz

In diesem Beitrag wird zuerst die dispositionelle Theorie von ästhetischen Eigenschaften als eine solche vorgestellt, die den interpretativen Pluralismus annehmen kann, ohne auf den ästhetischen Realismus verzichten zu müssen; zweitens werden drei mögliche Versionen bzw. ontologische Auffassungen des Begriffs *Disposition* präsentiert; drittens wird eine Entsprechung zwischen diesen drei Versionen der dispositionellen Theorie und drei in der Tradition der Hermeneutik verwurzelten Theorien der *Interpretation* vorgeschlagen, die uns ein Kriterium bieten kann, um eine Auswahl zwischen den drei *Theoriepaaren* zu treffen.

Durch diese drei *Hauptziele* möchte ich auch zwei *Nebenziele* erreichen: zuerst eine Verbindung zwischen zwei Hauptbegriffen der philosophischen Ästhetik (ästhetische Eigenschaft und Interpretation) nicht nur generisch, sondern auch spezifisch zu bestimmen; zweitens, eine Verbindung zwischen Begriffen von zwei verschiedenen philosophischen Traditionen (der analytischen Philosophie und Hermeneutik) zu bestimmen, die zu oft als selbstreferentielle Paradigmen behandelt werden.

ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE VALUE IN AESTHETICS

Simo Säätelä

Bergen, Norway

Wittgenstein's *Lecture on Ethics* (LE) concludes with a paradox: all judgments of ethical or aesthetic value are either relative, and thus completely trivial (since reducible to statements of fact), or absolute and important but nonsensical (since going beyond meaningful language). While this distinction is embedded in a Tractarian conception of language and value, Wittgenstein's treatment of it in LE points forward to his later work, especially through its use of examples of what we would say when. But it is not until he frees himself from the Tractarian constraints on language and value that he can take in the full force of this kind of considerations about use and describe Aesthetics in a satisfactory way. Examples from Wittgenstein's later treatment of aesthetics show how the earlier unconditional distinction between relative and absolute value is understood instead as grammatical distinction within a family of different language-games involving aesthetic evaluation and appreciation.

WITTGENSTEIN'S PERFORMANCE PHILOSOPHY

Beth Savickey

Winnipeg, Canada

David Kornhaber boldly states that philosophy is fundamentally performative (on no less an authority than Socrates). He also suggests that during the intervening millennia, it may not be that performance was seen as incapable of sustaining philosophy, so much as that

philosophy was seen as being unable to survive performance. This paper examines Kornhaber's suggestion in light of Wittgenstein's later work. Wittgenstein often presents acts that go unnoticed, unrecognized, or unacknowledged while doing philosophy. He brings these acts to our attention through detailed description and performance, and demonstrates that they are often empty gestures. Contrary to expectation, however, he does not dismiss them. Rather, he suggests that they express or exhibit conceptual movement. He encourages us to investigate such movement by enacting or performing it. In so doing, Wittgenstein affirms the performative nature of philosophy, lending support to Kornhaber's bold claims.

DAS PROBLEM DES SELBSTBEZUGES IN DEN PHILOSOPHISCHEN UNTERSUCHUNGEN UND DIE VERWENDUNG DES WORTES „ICH“

Fernando Scherer

Juazeiro (Bahia), Brasilien

Das Wort „ich“ bezeichnet nach Wittgenstein keinen privaten Gegenstand, und sein Verwender sei nicht imstande, sich selbst mit dem Wort „ich“ zu identifizieren. Mit anderen Worten, der Sprecher des Wortes „ich“ ermögliche nur Dritten die Identifizierung des Sprechers als Person, und er selbst könne sich selbst nicht identifizieren, weder durch das Wort „ich“ noch durch andere, weil eine Identifikation nicht aus der Perspektive der ersten Person möglich sei, sondern nur aus der Perspektive der dritten Person. Es sei aus der Perspektive der dritten Person möglich, nicht nur weil man einen Gegenstand der Beobachtung hätte, welchen man als eine bestimmte Person identifizieren könne, sondern weil es möglich sei, Kriterien zu erstellen, welche durch eine sprachliche Gemeinschaft geprüft werden könnten, weil es einen öffentlichen Zugang gäbe. Nun ist die Frage: Mit welchen Kriterien könnte man eine Person identifizieren?

KUNST- UND MUSIKTHERAPIE BEI DEMENZ. ETHISCHE ÜBERLEGUNGEN

Martina Schmidhuber

Erlangen-Nürnberg, Deutschland

Menschen mit Demenz bedürfen der besonderen Unterstützung in unserer Gesellschaft. Da es noch keine heilsamen Medikamente gegen Demenz gibt und auch präventive Maßnahmen noch nicht ausreichend auf ihre Wirksamkeit erforscht sind, muss ein Weg gefunden werden, die Lebensqualität von Menschen mit Demenz positiv zu beeinflussen. Kunst- und Musiktherapien sind nicht-medikamentöse Interventionen, die nachweislich die Lebensqualität von Menschen mit Demenz verbessern. Es soll überlegt werden, was Lebensqualität bei Demenz sein kann, wie diese durch Musik- und Kunsttherapien gestärkt werden kann und warum es ethisch geboten ist, diese in unserer Gesellschaft zu forcieren.

NOTICING DEEP ASPECTS AS OTHER AIM OF PHILOSOPHY – BESIDES A THERAPEUTIC READING OF THE LATER WITTGENSTEIN

Alfred Schmidt

Vienna, Austria

In this article I argue that besides the widely discussed therapeutic method of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, there is another important movement of thought or methodological intention in his later work, which has to do with noticing "deep aspects". My suggestion is to read the well known remarks about aspect seeing in PI II, XI (=PPF 111 ff.) together with PI 129, showing a distinction of "Gestalt-aspects" and "deep aspects".

ON JUDGING ART

Reinold Schmücker

Münster, Germany

What is it to judge art? I will argue that this does not equate to judging artworks aesthetically or evaluating them on the basis of aesthetic values or art-specific criteria. To judge an artwork rather means to identify functions it does, or could, fulfill and to relate them to one's own hierarchy of functions that artefacts can fulfill. I will therefore defend a functionalist theory of judging art and also stress its consequences for a theory of art criticism and the value of art.

PLANEN UND KARTOGRAPHIEREN

Franz Schörkhuber

Wien, Österreich

Wo wir in der Philosophie auf Formen sinnen, die einem zunächst nicht hinlänglich ausbuchstabierten Problem erst Bedeutung verleihen, dort haben wir uns gegen Forderungen des vorwegnehmenden Planens philosophischer Projekte sperrig zu verhalten. Diesem Gedanken möchte ich dadurch Sinn geben, dass ich den Begriffen des Planens und Kartographierens ein Stück weit nachgehe.

FRAME AND FRAMING. ON THE PARERGONAL CONSTITUTION OF ARTISTIC REPRESENTATION

Eva Schürmann

Magdeburg, Germany

In this paper, the term Parergonality is used for the complete set of conditions that are necessary for the appearance and performance of artworks: be this the room of a museum, the frame of a painting, the stage, the framing of a film scene, the lighting, or the preface. It refers to more than incidental and accompanying aspects of presentation. What parergonality also points to is a constitutively relevant 'how' of artistic representation. *How* something is shown and seen can, under certain circumstances, be more significant than *what* is being represented because it guides the attention or opens up a particular perspective.

It is therefore necessary to differentiate between various forms of parergonality in the sense of framework factors. The interpretative power of artistic criticism, for instance, or the institutional power of museums constitutes artworks in a different way than staging or performance does.

Moreover, artworks often consist of particular forms of framing perspectives in that they create or problematise certain points of view. Artworks thereby illustrate general interpretative frameworks or styles of thinking, as one might say with Wittgenstein. Thus, in a way that is analogous to 'seeing-as', artworks can be regarded as various forms of 'showing-as': They disclose aspects through de-framing and re-shaping.

I shall exemplify my thoughts with an artwork by Cristo and Jeanne-Claude. Their wrappings not only implemented resolute de-contextualisations; they are also particularly suitable to illuminate the performative forms of discursive framing.

WHAT MAKES BRAHMS KELLERIAN?

Joachim Schulte

Zurich, Switzerland

In the context of a published *Lecture on Aesthetics* recorded by Rush Rhees the editor quotes a lengthy passage from Smythies' Notes of Wittgenstein's Lectures on Description (1940). Here, Wittgenstein is reported as observing: "Take Brahms and Keller — I often found that certain themes of Brahms were extremely Kellerian." In my paper, I try to spell out what Wittgenstein may have had in mind in making this observation. As Wittgenstein himself remarks, his words have an historical dimension that needs to be taken into account if one wants to arrive at a fruitful reading of his observation. At the same time, the suggestion that Brahms is a "Kellerian" composer can be seen as relying on insights developed by Wittgenstein in the course of his later reflections on aspect-seeing and other topics in the philosophy of psychology as well as his ideas on the immediacy of certain connections between linguistic meaning and the expression of feelings.

WITTGENSTEIN ON PROBABILITY: WALKING THE LINE BETWEEN LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY

Radek Schuster

Pilsen, Czech Republic

It is supposed that after Wittgenstein had abandoned the doctrine of elementary proposition his thinking about probability moved from the logical to the epistemological aspect. However, as I show in the first part of this paper, the logical definition of probability also has its constitutive epistemological basis, namely in our knowledge of hypothetically assumed laws of nature. The second part is focused on Wittgenstein's later analyses of observed relative frequencies which still appeal to a *a priori* logical calculus. In conclusion, I argue that the seemingly indecisive results of Wittgenstein's analyses prove that we use judgments of probability because we are reluctant to switch over from logic to epistemology and *vice versa* by means of induction.

NON-NATURAL NONSENSE: WITTGENSTEIN'S LECTURE ON ETHICS AS A RESPONSE TO MOORE'S PRINCIPIA ETHICA

Daniel Sharp

New York City, NY, USA

This paper offers a reading of Wittgenstein's *Lecture on Ethics* as a response to Moore. It argues Wittgenstein and Moore begin from a shared conviction – the falsity of

ethical naturalism – but respond to this conclusion in different ways. While Moore develops a "non-natural" account of value, Wittgenstein offers a critique of just such an account in his lecture. It concludes by suggesting that this reading helps to best position Wittgenstein's lecture in its historical context.

THE LANDSCAPE FALLACY IN ENVIRONMENTAL AESTHETICS

Richard Sherlock

Logan, Utah, USA

The field of environmental aesthetics has been deeply affected by its connection to landscape painting. I argue that this is a mistake. Landscape painting even by masters such as Alfred Bierstadt or Andreas Achenbach is static. The painting will remain as it is for centuries. But nature itself changes constantly. The two essential features of nature, stability and change, are best captured in an aesthetics of music.

SCHWEIGEN ALS PROTEST. INGEBORG BACHMANN ÜBER WITTGENSTEINS TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS

Katharina Anna Sodoma

Wien, Österreich

Am Ende ihres Radio-Essays „Sagbares und Unsagbares“ deutet Ingeborg Bachmann das Schweigen, das sich Wittgenstein im Schlusssatz des *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* selbst auferlegt, als „Protest“ gegen zwei bedeutende Denkströmungen seiner Zeit. Diese Aussage soll anhand einer Rekonstruktion von Bachmanns Auseinandersetzung mit Wittgenstein in den Jahren 1949-1954 erläutert werden.

„IM GUTEN & SCHÖNEN ZU LEBEN BIS DAS LEBEN VON SELBST AUFHÖRT....“

Ilse Somavilla

Innsbruck, Österreich

Ausgehend von Wittgensteins Eintragung im MS 101 – "Im guten & schönen zu leben bis das leben von selbst aufhört" – geht es in meinem Beitrag um den Zusammenhang zwischen Ethik und Ästhetik, den Wittgenstein im MS 103 unter dem Begriff *sub specie aeternitatis* thematisiert. Darüber hinaus soll der Bezug zu Schopenhauer erörtert werden, dessen Ästhetik in ähnlicher Weise ethisch bestimmt ist, und wie bei Wittgenstein als eine Möglichkeit betrachtet wird, in Zeiten der Not und des Leidens zu bestehen.

WAS IST EIN MUSIKALISCHES WERK?

Mandy Stake

Bonn, Deutschland

Ein musikalisches Werk hat einen besonderen ontologischen Status. Ich werde zeigen, dass es weder Partitur, noch Aufführung oder ein psychisches Erlebnis ist. Danach begründe ich die Auffassung, dass es ein abstraktes, intentionales Objekt ist.

SOME REMARKS ON GRAMMAR IN THE *BIG TYPESCRIPT*

Sarah Szeltner
Bergen, Norway

Using the Nachlass facsimiles available on Wittgenstein Source as a primary source, I will show that in the *Big Typescript* Wittgenstein conceives of grammar as a complete system of rules, while on the other hand he also criticises the very idea of grammar being complete. He eventually resolves this struggle by realising that language is not completely governed by rules, and hence that grammar is not complete. This shift in his thinking is induced in the BT. It is an important step in the development of the notion of grammar in Wittgenstein's philosophy.

ON THE INTELLIGIBILITY OF ARTWORKS: WITTGENSTEINIAN VARIATIONS ON A HEGELIAN THEME

Gabriele Tomasi
Padua, Italy

As Ropert Pippin points out, Hegel saw a deep connection between the conditions for understanding some bodily movements as deeds rather than mere events and the conditions for apprehending artworks as such. In Hegel's view, the essential point of contact is the way in which "inner" and "outer" relate in the two cases. As deeds, bodily movements can be said to have an "inner" meaning in a way that parallels how sensible objects like paintings can be said to convey meaning as artworks, even though they do not literally have anything "inside" of them. There is a striking similarity between Hegel's claim about artworks, according to which "the inner shines in the outer and makes itself known through the outer, since the outer points away from itself to the inner", and Wittgenstein's claim that "the human body is the best picture of the human soul". In my talk, I will consider this parallel.

WITTGENSTEIN UND DIE METHODIK DER KUNSTWISSENSCHAFT

Jelena Toopeekoff
Berlin, Deutschland

Auf den Zusammenhang von Wittgensteins Denken und den Künsten ist oft und hinreichend hingewiesen worden. Dies geschieht zum einen durch eine Deutung von Wittgensteins zahlreichen Bemerkungen über die Ästhetik und die Musik. Zum anderen wird auf Wittgensteins Einfluss auf die angewandte Kunst und einzelne KünstlerInnen hingewiesen, welche sein Werk in ihre Arbeiten aufnehmen.

Im Vortrag wird der Versuch unternommen, Wittgensteins Bemerkungen zur Ästhetik auf die werkanalytische Methodik der Kunstwissenschaft zu beziehen. Wie stellen sich theoretisch fundierte Verfahren der Werkinterpretation dar? Einer der bis heute einflussreichsten Kunstwissenschaftler, der das Verfahren der Werkinterpretation entscheidend um Konditionen für zeitgenössische Kunst erweiterte, ist Max Imdahl. Der von ihm entwickelte „empathische Bildbegriff“ ebenso wie das Paradigma der „Ikonik“ sind zweifelsohne methodologische Meilensteine der Kunstwissenschaft.

Im Vortrag soll diese für die Methodologie der Disziplin beispielhafte Praxis mit Wittgensteins Bemerkungen kontrastiert und gegebenenfalls ein Vorschlag zur Revision gemacht werden.

IDENTITY OF ART OBJECTS— A MERELOGICAL ANALYSIS

Hsing-chien Tsai
Chiayi, Taiwan

This short essay will look into how changes of parts of a piece of art affect its identity. It will argue that if a piece of art is physical, its identity may not be solely determined by its proper parts, but at the same time there could be some of its proper parts which are essential to its identity. The same remarks will also hold for an art object which contains no physical parts. It will also propose that in order to account for changes of its parts, an art object which contains no physical parts should be viewed as a class of types instead of a type. Some further issues will also be suggested at the end of the essay.

FILM LANGUAGE GAMES: SEEING-AS AND SIMPLE OBJECTS OF COMPARISON IN *MULHOLLAND DRIVE*

Martin Urschel
Oxford, United Kingdom

This paper argues for the relevance of the later Wittgenstein for film analysis. It explores parallels between the discussion of language games and of seeing aspects in the *Philosophical Investigations*. These combined conceptual tools help us see narrative films anew, as I show with a reading of the self-reflexive aspects of David Lynch's *Mulholland Drive* (USA 2001).

SYMBOLIC PRACTICES AND CREATIVITY: ON THE INVENTIVE USE OF SIGNS IN ART

Astrid Wagner
Berlin, Germany

The understanding of artworks, just as the understanding of all kinds of signs, is bound to practices of interpretation. These practices can be conceived as the basis on which the potentiality space for creative uses of signs is grounded. When do we call uses of signs inventive and creative? How can creative symbol functions in art be characterized? I would like to specify some typical features of inventive uses of signs in art and in aesthetic symbolization taking into account the interwovenness of their syntactic, pragmatic, and semantic aspects. The presented view will go beyond a mere combinatorial explanation of creativity, focusing instead on some conditions of illuminating rule-violation, of rule-transformation, and on artistic ways to make parts of the grammar of a form of life visible.

WALTON'S "VIVACITY" AND CINEMATIC REALISM

David Wagner
Vienna, Austria

Considered as a game of make-believe (Walton 1990) it is irrelevant whether anything we see in a fictional motion picture has verisimilitude. As Walton claims, what we need in order to use depictions as props for our visual games is not co-identity with natural appearance but a sufficient amount of richness and vivacity. – Film-maker Peter Jackson's use of HFR technologies together with CGI and 3D in his *Hobbit-Trilogy* led movie audiences to reject the

new "life-like" images in favor of ordinary cinematic experience. Jackson's foray into new screening technologies seems to produce experiences one needs to get used to. The notion I intend to discuss is that realism is seen as relative to the observer and understood as an acquired habit. This has been claimed by Jakobson (1987 [1921]), Steinberg (1972 [1953]), or Goodman (1976), but it raises the question of how we come to employ Walton's criteria of richness and vivacity. Is the persuasive power of images conventional, too?!

SCHÖNE, TECHNISCHE, DEKORATIVE KUNST? ANMERKUNGEN IM AUSGANG VON KANT ZU OLAFUR ELIASSONS ARBEITEN MIT SPIEGELN UND LICHT

Violetta Waibel

Wien, Österreich

Der Bildhauer Olafur Eliasson, in Kopenhagen geboren als Kind isländischer Eltern, arbeitet mit seinen inzwischen rund 80 Mitarbeitern in einer Kreativwerkstatt in Berlin. Berühmt ist er unter anderem für sein Projekt Little Sun, einer Solarlampe als Projekt gesellschaftlichen Engagements, das Licht in die entferntesten Winkel der Welt bringt. Eliassons Werke verdanken sich der Faszination an Technik und Physik. Er untersucht elementare Phänomene und Eigenschaften der Natur, wie die von Farben, Spiegelungen, Wasserwirbeln, Wetterverhältnissen, Flüssen, der Erdoberfläche, die in die Sprache der Kunst übersetzt werden.

In diesem Beitrag werden einige Werke Eliassons in den Blick genommen, die sich mit Spiegeln und Licht befassen. Ohne Zweifel üben nicht wenige dieser Werke eine große Faszination aus. Das wirft die Frage auf, ob sie schön in einem emphatischen Sinne (mit Kant) genannt werden dürfen, oder eher als technisch zweckmäßig und dekorativ eingestuft werden sollten. Kants ästhetische Urteilstheorie, in der die Gefühle des Angenehmen, Schönen und Guten als maßgebliche Typenunterscheidungen Geltung haben, soll helfen, Fragen der Gegenwartskunst zu beurteilen.

'ATMOSPHERE' AS A CORE CONCEPT OF ECOAESTHETICS

Zhuofei Wang

Kassel, Germany

As a contemporary form of aesthetics of nature, *Ecoaesthetics* originates from the Chinese environment-ethical debate and is dedicated to an aesthetic revision of the split between humans and nature in the process of modernization. Starting from the criticism that the current ecoaesthetic research is mostly limited to a taste evaluation of natural beauty and hence falls back to the classical aesthetics based on value judgements, the lecture focuses on the following issue: In what way should the prevalent approach be altered to meet the needs of convincingly realizing an ecologically-oriented aesthetics of nature? Here the newly developed aesthetic category *atmosphere* which emphasizes the interaction between bodily perception and qualities of surrounding environment is of particular significance for the study. It is demonstrated that manifold possibilities of analyzing nature-related aesthetic experiences arise from the perspective of atmosphere, which not only transcends the framework being oriented towards an ideal beauty of nature, but also effectively complements the *ecological turn* covering a broad spectrum of present scientific research fields.

THE EMOTION OF AWE IN THE EXPERIENCE OF ART

Eva Weber-Guskar

Berlin/Göttingen, Germany

What is the role of awe in the aesthetic experience of fine arts? To answer this question, I will firstly give an explication of the emotion of awe in general as the emotion in which we feel humbled yet elevated. Secondly, I will sketch two accounts in which ways the role of awe in aesthetic experience has been presented recently (by Kendall Walton and Jesse Prinz) and offer some criticisms of these reductionist accounts. Against this background, I will thirdly sketch a pluralistic account of aesthetic experience in which awe is not the central emotion but one important emotion among others in a process of aesthetic experience involving different stages.

ON THE DEMARCATION BETWEEN ART AND NON-ART

Paul Weingartner

Salzburg, Austria

The paper proposes a demarcation between art and non-art and a criterion for being closer to art (focused on drawing and painting) based on the concepts of entropy and information. Moreover some different levels of order in art are defined.

"BE FREE AS I AM". SCHILLER'S AESTHETICS AS A CHALLENGE TO THE MODERN WAY OF THINKING

Wolfgang Welsch

Jena, Germany

This talk re-evaluates Schiller's idea of beauty as "freedom in appearance," as brought forward in his *Kallias or On Beauty* (1793), against the backdrop of modern thinking that based itself on a fundamental split between nature and freedom, world and man. Schiller's claim that natural beauty results from freedom in nature bridges this gap. His suggestion is confirmed by modern science. Schiller's view will be recommended and defended as a way of escaping modern bigotry. In addition, it will be discussed how contemporary art approaches this general task of our times to bridge the gap between man and world, to articulate the commonality between humans and other entities.

AESTHETICS AND RULE-FOLLOWING

Christian Helmut Wenzel

Taipei, Taiwan

In this essay I will point out parallels between Kant's theory of aesthetics and Wittgenstein's discussion of rule following. Although Wittgenstein did not write an aesthetics and Kant did not discuss Wittgensteinian rule-following problems, and although both Kant and Wittgenstein begin at very different starting points and use different methods, they end up dealing with similar issues, namely issues about rules, particularity, exemplarity, objectivity, practice, and as-if statements.

JEU IMMENSE. GEORGES BATAILLE, DIE KUNST UND DAS LEHRAMT

Tanja Wetzel

Kassel, Deutschland

Im vergangenen Wintersemester veranstalteten wir ein Lektüreseminar zu Bataille, das für Studierende der Philosophie, der Kunstwissenschaft sowie der Kunstpädagogik angeboten wurde. Der Zuspruch der Lehramtsstudierenden war eher zurückhaltend. Grund dafür war möglicherweise, dass ihnen dieser Denker des Überschusses, der Vergeudung und des sinnlosen Opfers wenig kompatibel schien hinsichtlich der Problemstellungen kunstpädagogischer Lehr- und Lernprozesse. Damit hatten sie natürlich recht: Das Denken Batailles bietet weder ein nützliches Instrumentarium für Vermittlungsprozesse, noch liefert es Rezepte. Es gibt jedoch zu denken, dass genau diese damit verbundene zweckrationale Logik nicht aufgeht, weil sie ganz grundsätzlich nicht aufgehen kann. Es gibt nämlich einen energetischen Überschuss, ein Zuviel, das z.B. auch in Bezug auf das Spiel anklingt als ein Einsatz, der hier rückhaltlos „aufs Spiel gesetzt“ werden muss. Wie steht es aber nun um das „Zuviel“ jenes Spiels, das seinerzeit von Schiller zur zentralen Kategorie ästhetischer Erziehung erklärt wurde und aktuell – so die These – ein durchaus beunruhigendes Moment im Dazwischen von Kunst und Pädagogik stiftet?

WITTGENSTEINS ETHIK

Andrea Wilke

Bonn, Deutschland

Meine These lautet, dass Wittgenstein nicht nur, wie er es in seinem *Vortrag über Ethik* vorsichtig formuliert, zeit seines Lebens „versucht“ war, Ausdrücke wie „das absolut Gute“ oder „absoluter Wert“ zu verwenden, sondern dass sich aus seinem Werk vielmehr ein klar umrissener Begriff des Guten entnehmen lässt, vermittels dessen wir (auch) unseren moralischen Diskurs begründen können und sollen. Da die Ethik für den frühen Wittgenstein allerdings unter dem Verdikt der Unaussprechlichkeit stand und der späte Wittgenstein bewusst asystematisch philosophiert hat, möchte ich einige Elemente der Kantischen Moralphilosophie heranziehen, um im Vergleich zu ihnen den roten Faden auch von Wittgensteins Überlegungen zu verdeutlichen. Dabei soll auch der innere Zusammenhang von Ethik und Ästhetik thematisiert werden, und zwar noch in dem allgemeinen Sinne, dass wir, wie nach Kant, so auch nach Wittgenstein, immer schon in ein soziales Umfeld eingebettet sind, vor dem wir uns in all unseren Wirklichkeitsbezugnahmen zu verantworten haben.

UNDERSTANDING A GREEK TRAGEDY

Alan Zaciek

Detroit, Michigan, USA

This paper examines three uses of 'understanding' in the *Philosophical Investigations* in order to consider Wittgenstein's question whether we can 'understand a Greek tragedy'. The examination shows that we can say we understand no matter which use we employ. Also, using the imagined performance of a Greek tragedy, the paper tries to make sense of Wittgenstein's thought that even if we can speak the language we may not understand someone from a strange country with strange customs.

THE INTERPLAY OF VARIOUS FORMS OF ARTISTIC KNOWING

Tasos Zembylas

Vienna, Austria

My analysis of the creative process uses empirical material (interviews, diaries, sketches, and video) that stems from five case studies to document composition processes in actu from the beginning of the work up until the last rehearsal. The general theoretical aim is to move from the description of artistic practices to a deeper understanding of artistic agency.

In the creative process composers in art music use various cognitive and material tools to create, try out, form and elaborate ideas that finally have to be written down in an appropriate way. These various tools are used on the basis of composers' distinct practical experiences, sensual perceptions, embodied emotions and intuitive valuations, which are usually expressed in words like "I feel it fits". Theoretical musical knowledge too (e.g. aesthetic ideas, notational systems) becomes actionable knowledge, because, in the case of composing, theoretical knowledge is embedded in specific artistic paradigms and established practices.

ANYTHING GOES = ANYTHING SAYS... ANYTHING?

PREDICABILITY IN CONTEMPORARY CROSS-CULTURAL AESTHETICS

Anna Zschauer

Hildesheim, Germany

Inheriting and interpreting Wittgenstein's ideas, the postmodern 'aesthetic turn' in philosophy has created a dilemma for the academic discipline of aesthetics because it loses its ability to make assertions as it risks being either inflated to a meta-science or deflated to calculable production standards. This raises the questions, how can aesthetics satisfy the obligation imposed on it by our aestheticized society and how can it restore its predicability? This presentation traces the trajectory from Wittgenstein to current propositions in aesthetics and tries to discover possible ways out of the deadlock.

Für aktuelle Programmänderungen beachten Sie bitte
die Aushänge am Check-Board beim Empfang,
oder siehe: http://www.alws.at/program_2016.pdf.



For program updates,
please check board in reception area, or visit:
http://www.alws.at/program_2016.pdf.

**Raiffeisenbank
NÖ-Süd Alpin**



Meine Bank im Feistritztal

Wir sind seit über 100 Jahren in der Region verwurzelt
und fördern als Genossenschaft
Lebensqualität und wirtschaftliche Entwicklung,
um Menschen zu begeistern, hier zu leben.

Aus dem Leitbild der Raiffeisenbank NÖ-Süd Alpin

