Die Philosophie der Wahrnehmung und der Beobachtung

The Philosophy of Perception and Observation

Kurzfassungen / Abstracts

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VERSTEHEN UND GEDANKE IM VORWORT ZUR *LOGISCH-PHILOSOPHISCHEN ABHANDLUNG*

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In einem bekannten Brief an Ludwig von Ficker empfiehlt Wittgenstein, erahnend dass dieser sein Buch nicht verstehen wird, „das Vorwort und den Schluß zu lesen, da diese den Sinn am Unmittelbarsten zum Ausdruck bringen. –" (Wittgenstein 2004; datiert nach 20.10.1919). Man kann sich diesbezüglich als Erstes fragen, was hier mit dem „Sinn" der *Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung* (LPA) gemeint sein kann – da Wittgenstein eigentlich im Vorwort nur vom „Zweck" des Buches redet – und wie das Vorwort ihn ausdrückt. Welche Leseschlüssel sind dann im Vorwort zu finden und wie können die Aussagen darin innerhalb der tractarianischen Philosophie eingeordnet werden? Der vorliegende Beitrag beabsichtigt die ersten Worte des Vorworts zu diskutieren und konzentriert sich auf zwei darin enthaltene Aspekte, nämlich die Idee, dass man die Gedanken des Buches bereits gedacht haben soll, um es zu verstehen, und den Gebrauch des Begriffs „Gedanke" in einer von seiner tractarianischen Definition abweichenden Bedeutung.

ZUR ANALOGIE VON WITTGENSTEINS KONZEPT DES ASPEKTWECHSELS UND DER WISSENSCHAFTLICHEN METAPHER ALS VEHIKEL DER INNOVATION

Ulrich Arnswald

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Zwischen Wittgensteins Konzept des Aspektwechsels und innovativen Metaphern in den Naturwissenschaften gibt es eine erstaunliche Analogie, die das Selbstverständnis der Naturwissenschaften als „exakte Wissenschaften" partiell infrage stellt. Innovative Metaphern dienen nämlich den Naturwissenschaften als Vehikel der Innovation, denn ohne diese könnte kaum erfolgreich eine konzeptuelle Idee von einem wissenschaftlichen Paradigma auf ein anderes übertragen werden. Der Vortrag zeichnet diesen Vorgang nach.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE SHIFT IN WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY? A MOMENTARY REVOLUTION OR A DIALECTICAL RESULT?

Musa Azak

Malatya, Turkey

The philosophy of Wittgenstein is generally discussed in two periods: The early and the later period in Wittgenstein´s philosophy. And in this sense, one of the most important points that distinguishes him from his contemporaries is that he has two mainly opposed philosophical manners during the development of his thought. Although in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, he has a theory of meaning called Picture Theory of Meaning, which is based on his picture conception; however, in his later period, he emphasized mainly the conception of "language games" which is an eventual conception that is figured out from various metaphors related with language and which has a completely different meaning than the philosophy of his early period. Therefore, we see a shift in Wittgenstein's philosophy. At this very point, I think we can ask this question: If we can't speak of a conception such as a momentary revolution or a conversion during this intellectual development, then how can we understand this shift that takes place in Wittgenstein's philosophy? In the literature, this shift is generally taken as a philosophical metamorphosis that results from many momentary inspirations or conversions. But in this paper, the thing that we want to put forward is that this shift is the result of a dialectical process, not a momentary revolution. Thus, our aim is to discuss for which reasons this philosophical shift took place and what are the problematic conditions that did arise under the roof of the theory itself that was put forward in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. And in this regard, we want to deal with the critical contributions made by Piero Sraffa and Frank P. Ramsey to Wittgenstein, and with the problematic conditions that caused him to move away from his thoughts in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. In conclusion, we try to express that the shift in Wittgenstein's philosophy is not a momentary revolution, but the result of a dialectical process, in the meaning of a progress of contrary thoughts confronting each other.

FROM PERCEPTION TO INTENTIONALITY: HUSSERL'S *NOEMA* AS A MEINONGIAN OBJECT BEYOND BEING

Giuliano Bacigalupo

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In this paper, I argue that Husserl's theory of perception and intentionality, as developed in his major work *Ideen I*, may be interpreted as involving Meinongian objects beyond being: to perceive and, more generally, to think is to be directed toward an object which may be existent or non-existent. In section One, I address the account of perception developed by Husserl in *Ideen I* and how it may lead to a Fregean or to a Meinongian interpretation. In section Two, I turn to a development of the Meinongian interpretation: not only the object of perception but the object of every kind of thought, i.e. the noema, may be interpreted as an object beyond being. Finally, in section Three I provide a Meinongian interpretation of Husserl's discussion of *a posteriori* identities and their role in assessing the existence of objects of perception.

VOM WISSEN ZUM DENKEN – WITTGENSTEINS DIALEKTISCHE METHODE AM BEISPIEL DER SEMINARNOTIZEN G. E. MOORES

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In den Arbeiten zu Wittgenstein wird regelmäßig versucht, an den philosophischen Gegenständen und Argumenten, die Wittgenstein diskutiert, festzumachen, worin dessen *Philosophie* besteht. Durch die Untersuchung der konkreten Umstände seines Denkens und deren Genese in den Institutionen der *Cambridge Apostel*, im *Moral Science Club* und in den persönlichen Gesprächen mit Russell, Moore und anderen wird deutlich, wie diese philosophischen Inhalte Wittgensteins Denken erreichten.
Damit eröffnet sich die Möglichkeit, umgekehrt einmal zu versuchen, nicht mehr die philosophischen Gegenstände als Inhalte zu betrachten, sondern die besondere Form, die Wittgenstein diesen Inhalten gibt oder in der er die philosophischen Gegenstände aufeinander bezieht, als das Genuine und Eigentümliche seines Denkens zu verstehen.
Mit Hilfe der Seminarnotizen G. E. Moores aus den frühen 1930er Jahren werden im Folgenden historische und systematische Verbindungen von den auf Aristoteles

zurückgehenden scholastischen Disputationen bis zu Wittgensteins eigenen Diskussionsseminaren aufgezeigt und es wird dafür argumentiert, die *dialektische* Form dieser Disputationen in einer ebenso *dialektischen* Form des Wittgenstein'schen Denkens wiederzuerkennen.

HOW TO AVOID INTELLECTUALISM IN THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF PERCEPTION: A NEO-BRENTANIAN APPROACH

Johannes L. Brandl
Salzburg, Austria

According to intellectualism, we are justified in our perceptual beliefs because we form such beliefs in a highly reflective manner by reasoning about the content of our perceptual experiences. In this talk, I will sketch a plan for avoiding such intellectualism by drawing on the resources in Brentano's psychology. These resources are, first, Brentano's intentional analysis of sensory experiences and, secondly, his non-propositional theory of judgment. Staying clear from exegetical issues, I will offer what I take to be the most charitable interpretation of Brentano's views. More is needed, however, to cope with the problem of the Given. In the second part of my talk, I propose two additions to Brentano's theory: an action-based interpretation of pre-reflective self-awareness and an internalist reliabilist principle of epistemic justification.

THE MULTISENSORY EXPERIENCE OF MEANINGS

Berit Brogaard
Miami, USA

According to the inferential view of language comprehension, we hear a speaker's utterance and infer what was said, drawing on our competence in the syntax and semantics of the language together with background information. On the alternative perceptual view, fluent speakers have a non-inferential capacity to perceive the content of speech. Several arguments have been offered against a pure perceptual view of language comprehension, among others, arguments pointing to its alleged difficulties accounting for homophones and the context-sensitivity of ordinary language. After responding to challenges to the perceptual view of language comprehension, I provide new arguments in favor of a multisensory view of language comprehension by looking closer at the perceptual nature of language learning and language processing.

PERCEPTION: GROUND OF EMPIRICAL OBJECTIVITY

Tyler Burge
Los Angeles, USA

Several types of objectivity are surveyed. The role of perception as a type of empirical objectivity, and as a source for more sophisticated types of objectivity that it itself does not realize, is discussed. Perceptual representation is distinguished from the sort of representation explained in terms of information theory. Perceiving is also distinguished from sensing. Some threads in the history of philosophy that have taken perception not to be a type or source of objectivity are discussed and criticized. Often inevitable limitations on the types of objectivity that perception can embody have been misconstrued as marks of subjectivity. Often perception has been mis-characterized in the interests of one or another philosophical ideology. The irony of this history is that the ultimate basis for the objectivity of the empirical sciences has commonly been miscast in the philosophical tradition.

THE ETHICS AND LIMITS OF UNDERSTANDING LITERATURE

Joy Zhu Tsz Ching
Hong Kong, China

This essay aims to understand how literary texts can be read in relation to Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*. In my essay, I will argue that understanding literary texts requires an approach akin to understanding a fellow human being – not with a cold, scientific rationality, but with our full sensibilities. Like how literary texts amaze us, we are often astonished by our fellow human beings – by their depth and incomprehensibility. To illuminate my point, I will evaluate the work of three scholars: Guetti's approach to literary interpretation based on Wittgenstein's conception of philosophical grammar, William Gass' method in *On Being Blue*, and Stanley Cavell's reading of *King Lear* in his essay *The Avoidance of Love*. With the help of Wittgenstein's concept of "Aspektwechsel" as embodied by his famous duck-rabbit, I will evaluate the named approaches and compare the act of "understanding" with the intuitive act of seeing.

DIRECT REALISM AND SENSE DATA

Claudio Costa
Natal, Brazil

My intention in this paper is to show how we can reconcile direct realism with the idea that we perceive the world through a veil of sensations. The paper suggests that contents given in perceptual experience have a kind of Janus face: they can be interpreted as sensory contents (also called sense data) or as perceptual contents (objectively given entities), although they are phenomenally experienced in the same way.

PERCEPTUAL DEMONSTRATIVE THOUGHT

Sean Crawford
Manchester, UK

There are three rival approaches to understanding the semantic nature of perceptual demonstrative thoughts: the *object-dependent* theory, the *descriptive object-independent* theory, and the *predicative object-independent* theory. All three theories are subject to serious objections. After detailing these, I sketch a more viable alternative, the *property-dependent* theory.

WITTGENSTEIN AND THE PLURALIST THEORY OF TRUTH

Krzysztof Czerniawski
Warsaw, Poland

Many theories of truth have been ascribed to the later Wittgenstein. The reason for this is the unsystematic, antitheoretical nature of his thought and little evidence for his view on the concept of truth. There is no doubt that Wittgenstein's general pluralistic attitude to philosophical problems and concepts inspired the birth of alethic pluralism. However, the same can be said about the epistemic and deflationist patterns of his philosophy. The

possible model for the Wittgensteinian pluralist theory are different concepts of truth in different language games, unified by the family resemblance. Yet it is doubtful whether Wittgenstein has one theory of truth at all, even a pluralist one, which is probably one of the reasons why his contribution to the theory of truth is so rich and diversified.

PICTURES AND PERCEPTION IN THE *TRACTATUS*

Stefanie Dach
Pilsen, Czech Republic

In my paper, I engage with an interpretation of Wittgenstein's picture theory by Arthur Danto. According to Danto, Wittgenstein introduced the picture theory to exploit that for some pictures perceptual and pictorial competence coincide. Linguistic understanding could thus be explained on the basis of basic perceptual abilities. Using the example of the *Tractatus*, Danto's aim is to illustrate that there can be no purely mimetic language. I argue that Danto's critique is not applicable to the *Tractatus* as his interpretation does not square with many of its core claims, and that Danto misunderstands the intent of the *Tractatus* as explaining how we understand. Therefore, we need not ascribe the controversial theses on perception which follow from Danto's diagnosis to the early Wittgenstein.

ARE RACIAL BIASES IN PERCEPTION TRULY AUTOMATIC, AND WHY DOES THIS MATTER?

Ophelia Deroy
Munich, Germany

The fact that people tend to perceive the same face as brighter or darker depending on its morphology is one of the most discussed cases of 'automatic categorical bias' in psychology and philosophy. While the manifestation of this effect has led to various interpretations, either as a canonical case of cognitive penetration or a mere bottom-up effect, everyone accepts that this process is fully involuntary and unconscious. Here, i will challenge that this diagnosis follows from the available evidence, and present new arguments to qualify the assumed automaticity of the effect. This has implications not only for the way we assign responsibility to people who act on biased percepts, but also to better understand the nature of perceptual biases.

THE CONSTANCY MECHANISM PROPOSAL FOR THE LIMITS OF INTENTIONALITY

Sergio De Souza Filho
London, UK

Naturalist theories of intentionality are often criticized of being too liberal about the requirements for a given state to constitute a representation – they treat certain states as representations when they are clearly not representational. But what is the lower border of intentionality that distinguishes the limiting cases of representational states from non-representational states? In order to solve this problem, it is necessary to establish conditions for minimal intentionality – those conditions satisfied by the most primitive representational states. It has been proposed that the employment of a constancy mechanism is such a minimal condition. In particular, Tyler Burge has proposed that the limits of intentionality are the limits of perception and that in order for a system to be perceptual, it required the employment of a perceptual constancy mechanism. My goal is to attack the motivations behind this proposal.

MINIMAL SELF, MINENESS, AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY

Christoph Durt & Oliver Lukitsch
Vienna, Austria

In our presentation, we investigate the commonalities between Wittgenstein's account of sensation and recent accounts of the "minimal self" and its definition as "mineness" of experience. These recent accounts hold that "mineness" is characterized, (1) by a difference between the way I access my sensations as opposed to how others can access them and (2) by the *experiential* givenness of the self. We argue that Wittgenstein agrees with the first claim and that he holds that sensations are in a sense had by one person. Nevertheless, he implies that, if the determinate quality of a sensation conditions the meaning of a word in a language, that quality is intersubjective. With regard to the claim of *experiential* givenness, we argue that Wittgenstein would be unlikely to find a common kind of experience in all uses of the first-person pronoun, but that he may find resemblances between some uses.

WITTGENSTEINIAN NAÏVETY

Jørgen Dyrstad
London, UK

The following develops an insight in the second part of the Investigations and applies it to issues in current issues in the philosophy of perception. The insight is found in Wittgenstein's discussion of aspect switches, where he emphasises not just the way experience changes through a switch but also the way it nevertheless remains the same. This latter emphasis in particular is shown to be relevant for recent debates concerning relational and representational views of perception. The paper argues that Wittgenstein's reflections on the relation between perception and thought leads to a relational view of perception – one which holds that the objects of experience are ordinary objects (as opposed to sense-datum theories) and where the relation is decidedly non-representational (as opposed to representationalism).

FOLLOWING A RULE WITHOUT THE PLATONIC EQUIVALENT. WITTGENSTEIN'S INTENTIONALITY AND GENERALITY

Susan Edwards-McKie
Cambridge, UK

Seeing that Wittgenstein's non-Platonist position in respect of numbers, as opposed to Russell and Gödel, is also his position on rules allows a fundamental breakthrough in the connections between how we individuate anything (as in counting) yet can think in terms of the 'heap' and how rules allow human practices to develop within a form of life with a deep need for convention yet without a defined precursor as template. Wittgenstein's objection to Russell's Peano-based definition of number in terms of equinumerity, is objecting to the use of classes to construct the definition of number on the logicist programmes. Peano's fifth postulate is, however, not lost on Wittgenstein but is, I suggest, prefigured in Wittgenstein's Tracterian non-class based, non-functionalist iterative operation in which intentionality plays a role. Even though moving on from the picture

theory, I suggest that there are aspects of the *Tractatus* which provide a guide to characterizing the way use works.

HYPOTHESES ON PERCEPTUAL HYPOTHESES

August Fenk

Klagenfurt, Austria

Why are we, against better knowledge, reliably misled by Müller-Lyer figures? And why do we rely on our visual system in measuring-procedures unmasking illusions produced by the very same system? Extended perspective theory (Gregory 1968) offers a reasonable answer to our first question and an enormous coverage, particularly if we complement it by the Changizi *et al.* (2008) perspective of a moving perceiver's anticipatory perspective. It implies, I shall argue, hierarchical organization. Only a higher specialized level of now symbolic/measuring intelligence enables classifying and reconstructing (wrong) perceptual hypotheses. More specifically, I shall suggest an advantage of paying, in case of conflict, the price of erroneously estimated object size in favor of precisely estimated distance from the eyes. The alternative could result in a grasp at nothing, with fatal consequences not only in a monkey's flight through the canopy.

REPRESENTATIONS, PRIVATE EXPERIENCES AND BRAIN ACTIVITY – A BRIEF INVESTIGATION

Nara M. Figueiredo

São Paulo, Brazil

The nature of mental states and events is a very controversial topic in the cognitive sciences and it has led cognitive neuroscientists to several confusions when it comes to understanding the relation between private experiences and brain activity. The idea that there is a gap between a physical scope, namely, the brain processes, and something immaterial such as private experiences is an illusion provoked by the conceptual conflicts of our understanding. To overcome this illusion, we have to clarify the foundations and implications of the uses of key concepts in the cognitive field such as the concept of representation.

In this paper, I will refer to the notion of representation and point to the idea that brain activity is merely correlated to private experience, without supposing neither a causal nor a traditional representative relation between brain activity and private experiences. This is justifiable based on Wittgenstein's beetle in a bottle analogy; for whatever the private events or states might be, they are irrelevant for understanding the processes correlated to them.

STRUCTURE, INTENTIONALITY AND THE GIVEN

Marcello Oreste Fiocco

Irvine, USA

I maintain that one's answer to the ontological question of what the world per se is—and, hence, how it comes to be structured—illuminates what a mind is and how to understand intentionality, the capacity of a mind to engage the world. Such an understanding provides insight into the given, what is presented to a mind in its primary engagement with the world, when merely confronting it. There is a long-standing concern about the given, namely, whether such presentations are able to serve as the basis of one's knowledge of the world. I demonstrate that this concern is pressing only in light of a certain view of the world and its structure. Without this view, which is of dubious coherence, there is no reason to doubt that one's primary engagement with the world yields the foundations for all one's knowledge of it. On a different view of the world and its structure, then, on which the given is itself structured, though not contentful, these non-representational intentional states are nevertheless suitable epistemic foundations for knowledge. Appreciating this last point requires an appropriate notion of judgment, one provided by Brentano. Thus, general concerns that the given is not an apt epistemic basis—or is so only with structural contributions from a mind—are misplaced. Indeed, the appropriate understanding of the given provides a compelling naïve realist, foundationalist account of one's perceptual knowledge of the world.

THE FACT OF THE GIVEN FROM A REALIST-IDEALIST PERSPECTIVE

Gregor Flock

Vienna, Austria

In his well-known Mind and World and in line with Wilfrid Sellars' (1991) or "that great foe of 'immediacy'" (ibid.: 127) Hegel, McDowell claims that "when Evans argues that judgments of experience are based on non-conceptual content, he is falling into a version of the Myth of the Given" (1996: 114). In this paper, on the basis of a) a mainly Kantian 'realist idealist' world view and b) an explication of Kant's concept of the "given manifold" (e.g. CPR: B138), I will argue that Kant and Evans (1982, chs. 5.1–5.2) were indeed mistaken in their versions of the given, but that Sellars and his student McDowell were even more mistaken and that, in the end, there would appear to be a non-conceptual and (thus) non-propositional given in perceptual experience from which we unconsciously and automatically infer to our first perceptual beliefs.

WHO "SEES THE WORLD RIGHTLY"? THE "I" AS TENSION IN WITTGENSTEIN'S WRITINGS

Mélissa Fox-Muraton

Clermont-Ferrand, France

In recent years, many commentators have attempted to read Wittgenstein's works in light of the philosophy of subjectivity. Despite the fact that Wittgenstein himself never uses this term, it is clear that there is certainly a preoccupation in his writings with the question of the place of the self or subject. This paper will argue that rather than a philosophy of subjectivity, Wittgenstein's original contribution to the question arises from his existential presentation of the self or the "I" as tension, and that a tensed "I" is the mode of existence of the self.

INTENTIONALITY AND THE CONTENT OF PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE

Florian Franken Figueiredo

Campinas, Brazil

In the first part of my paper I briefly present Wittgenstein's way of dissolving the problem of intentionality arguing that the relation between the content of mental states and reality is not representational. In the second part of the paper I explore whether this argument also applies with

respect to perceptual experience. It is often assumed that perceptual experience is a form of intentionality, i.e. that it has representational content. I show that Wittgenstein's conception of intentionality is not quite suitable for either approving or rejecting this assumption. However, I shall give a further argument claiming that at least in some cases the content of perceptual experience is indeed not representational. As a conclusion, I present the view that perceptual experience should be understood as the ability to arrange sensations, rather than as mental states that have representational content.

BRENTANO ON PERCEPTION

Guillaume Fréchette

Salzburg, Austria

Brentano's philosophy of perception has often been understood as a special chapter of his theory of intentionality. If all and only mental phenomena are constitutively intentional, and if perceptual experience is trivially (or by definition) mental, then all perceptual experiences are intentional experiences. Following these lines, perceptual experience is a determinate of the determinable "intentional experiences". I will refer to this conception of perception as the "intentionality" reading of Brentano's conception of perception. There is however another important item to add to this theory of perception, namely its foundationalist ground: since only mental phenomena really exists, and physical phenomena only enjoy an intentional existence (as the objects of mental phenomena), we must attribute to inner perception – the perception of one's own mental phenomena – an epistemological priority: only innerly perceived mental phenomena are evident. The truth about physical phenomena cannot enjoy that kind of evidence, it has at best a certain degree of probability. Following this view, only inner perception deserves the name "perception"; there is, properly speaking, no outer perception in an analogical sense; there are probalistic inferences following which a certain physical phenomenon corresponds to something in the outside world, but our relation with the outside world is not perceptual, but strictly inferential.

Put together, these two central insights of Brentano's philosophy of mind lead to the idea that the object of the intentional relation is an intentional or immanent object. Whenever I present something, or judge about the existence of something, or love or hate something, there always is an object of my mental act. This intentional object doesn't need to exist – in fact, it simply cannot exist since it is constituted at bottom by physical phenomena which are constitutively inexistent. Following this account, if Brentano has something to say on perception, then it will have much to do with inner perception and the fact that we only have access to intentional objects. Different options are available to him following this account: a sense-data theory of perception; an adverbialist account of perception; representationalism. Most of the interpretations of Brentano's theory of perception, understood as a special case of his theory of intentionality, go along one of these lines. In all these three varieties, I will call such "intentionality" reading of perception, "strong views" on the nature of perception. There is however another alternative, which has been rarely considered, and which consists in relaxing somewhat the strong foundationalist view of perception. The strong foundationalist view is usually based on statements from the *Psychology from an empirical Standpoint*, affirming that "true perception is inner perception", or that "outer perception is false-taking" (Falsch-nehmung). But there is prima facie no reason to take this as meaning that there is nothing like "outer perception", or even that outer perception is not in an important sense perception as such. One may not have a comparable evidence in outer perception as the one one has in inner perception, but this is not a reason to believe that perception is constitutively evident. I will characterize this view as the "moderate view" and will argue that Brentano had good reasons to defend the view that inner and outer perception both belong to the general kind "perception".

TRANSPARENCY AND KNOWLEDGE OF ONE'S OWN PERCEPTIONS

Martin F. Fricke

Merida, México

So-called "transparency theories" of self-knowledge, inspired by a remark of Gareth Evans, claim that we can obtain knowledge of our own beliefs by directing our attention towards the world, rather than introspecting the contents of our own minds. Most recent transparency theories concentrate on the case of self-knowledge concerning belief and desire. But can a transparency account be generalised to knowledge of one's own perceptions? In a recent paper, Alex Byrne (2012) argues that we can know what we see by inferring from visual facts about our environment because such facts can exclusively be known by us through vision. I discuss his proposal and object that visual facts, as conceived of by Byrnes are odd: they cannot be remembered and we cannot, as yet, write them down. More needs to be said about them to make his account plausible.

THE CHINESE CHESS ROOM

Ralf Funke

Hamburg, Germany

When DeepMind's program AlphaGo beat one of the leading masters of the ancient board game Go Lee Sedol in March 2016 it was regarded as a major breakthrough in the development of Artificial Intelligence. In contrast to DeepBlue that relied on computing power to do extensive tree search and was designed to achieve one specific goal – excelling at chess, a program like AlphaGo by employing modern "Deep Learning" techniques should in principle be able to solve any problem at all without being taught first. That at least is the credo of its creators.

Do modern AI programs represent a step forward to "thinking machines"? And what becomes of old philosophical arguments that declare that such things are impossible? In a variant of Searle's Chinese Room, I am introducing a prisoner who has to do all learning and reasoning by himself to come up with answers to Chinese questions.

PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCES, STEREOTYPES, AND LOSS OF JUSTIFICATION

Martina Fürst

Graz, Austria

The cognitive penetrability of perceptual experiences motivates the debate about the justificatory power of such shaped experiences. Plausibly, perceptual experiences can lose their justificatory power due to detrimental top-down effects of unjustified beliefs on the experience. Moreover, if these experiences are used as evidence for further beliefs, this might result in a circular and illicit belief formation process (Siegel 2017). I analyze a bad case

where the mere exposure to stereotype representations shapes perceptual experiences of members of the target groups, even if one explicitly disavows the corresponding stereotype belief. For example, the exposure to racist stereotype representations can turn a perceptual experience of a black man into one who looks dangerous. First, I explain why beliefs formed on the basis of such shaped perceptions are epistemically problematic, even though there is no top-down effect of a doxastic state and no threat of circularity. Second, I discuss a way in which these beliefs stand in tension to explicit egalitarian beliefs. Finally, I provide an explanation of why the subject is ignorant of that tension.

THE LATER WITTGENSTEIN ON PERSONAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Dimitris Gakis
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The paper discusses some of the later Wittgenstein's views on personal and social change and philosophy's relevance. Specifically, it highlights how Wittgenstein's later anthropological perspective, as opposed to his earlier logical one, contributes to the unification of the 'personal' and the 'social' in his later philosophy. Moreover, the paper calls attention to the potentially transformational aspects of Wittgenstein's later philosophy and his own pessimism about its actual efficacy. It also hints at some of the features regarding the means and the direction of personal and social change that Wittgenstein discusses.

THREE KINDS OF NONCONCEPTUAL SEEING-AS

Christopher Gauker
Salzburg, Austria

It is commonly supposed that perceptual representations embed concepts and that this embedding accounts for the phenomenon of seeing-as. But there are good reasons to doubt that perceptions embed concepts. The alternative is to suppose that perceptions are marks in a perceptual similarity space that map into locations in an objective quality space. From this point of view, cases of ambiguity resolution (such as the duck-rabbit) are cases in which we are free to place the representation at various locations in perceptual similarity space (closer to the marks that represent rabbits or closer to the marks that represent ducks). In cases where expertise affects perception, the accumulation of perceptual landmarks permits a more precise placement of a mark in perceptual similarity space. Finally, extensive experience with an object (e.g., the family dog) allows similarity to that object to serve as an acquired dimension in perceptual similarity space.

HOW TO MAKE SENSE OF THE IDEAS OF INNER PERCEPTION AND OBSERVATION ACCORDING TO WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY OF PSYCHOLOGY?

Charlotte Gauvry
Liège, Belgium

Contrary to the traditional behaviourist (Ryle 1949), logical behaviourist (Fodor and Chihara 1965), more recent psychologist (Hacking 1982) or expressivist (see e.g. Taylor 1980, Rosenthal 1993, Wright 1998, Moran 2001) readings of Wittgenstein, I intend to show that there is room both for the *expression* of *inner perception* and for

the *observation of one's reactions* in Wittgenstein's last writings. In his last grammatical remarks, Wittgenstein (1980, 1982, 1992, 1998) indeed introduces a critical distinction between two kinds of psychological utterances: expression and description. The purpose of this paper is to show that, against behaviourist readings, a certain form of first person authority and of infallibility of linguistic self-analysis manifests itself in the grammar of "*expressions*". I will also show that the grammar of first person *descriptions* reveals, against psychologist or expressivist readings, a Wittgensteinian use of the notion of observation of oneself, based on reports and inference of my own psychic language games.

THE FORM OF EXPERIENCE: TRAVIS AND MCDOWELL ON THE LESSON OF WITTGENSTEIN'S RULE-FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS

Johan Gersel
Vienna, Austria

John McDowell and Charles Travis disagree on how we should understand experience and the form of reason giving relations between experience and judgement. I want to suggest that a large part of this disagreement stems from their contrasting interpretation of Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations. Finally, I want to point in the direction of an argument that may serve to settle which of their views we should endorse.

OBJECT OF PERCEPTION. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF MARTIN'S NAÏVE REALISM

Sarthak Ghosh
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Subjective indistinguishability of veridical perception with non-veridical experiences has been used to argue that object of perception are mind-dependent sense-data. This has been a serious challenge to realism about object of perception. M.G.F. Martin has responded to the challenge by arguing against bracketing perception together with non-veridical experiences and claiming that perception, unlike the non-veridical experiences, is indeed a relation to mind-independent objects. Martin's view is not just a criticism to sense-data view of perception but also to the content view about perceptual experiences which maintains both veridical and non-veridical experiences are mental states sharing representational content. This paper critically analyses Martin account of perception presenting criticisms levelled at the position by Susanna Siegel and John Searle. Also, the paper tries to produce independent arguments to show why a repressentative account to perception is a better response to sense-data theory than Martin's disjunctivist account.

CRISIS OF MEANINGS IN THE FIELD OF ENVIRONMENT: A WITTGENSTEINIAN CRITIQUE

Charitha Herath
Peradeniya, Sri Lanka

According to Wittgenstein in the *Philosophical Investigations*, meaning is not fixed for any given concepts in the language that we use. Contrary, it suggests that the meaning given for a concept was depended on the context where that concept is constructed or used. This idea of meaning which considers 'use value' is considered as a

one of the central points of the philosophical analysis in Wittgenstein methods. This study aims to inquire the 'meaning issue' related to the context of environment using Wittgenstein´s method of investigation.

Meanings of the field of environment have gone into problematic situations. This leads to a dispute over meanings between environmentalist/philosophers and has led to cripple both the national and international programs and plans that have been applied to solve environmental problems and conserve the environment. The broad objective of this paper is to inquire into the meaning crisis in the context of the environment using Later Wittgenstein approach.

PERCEPTUAL METAPHORS

Marek Hetmański

Lublin, Poland

The main aim of this paper is to analyze pictorial metaphors – both in the fine arts and mass culture – as creative means of artistic expression. By comparing them with the verbal and literary figurative *tropes*, one can show how they are suggestive and effective in communicating ideas to a viewer. The answer to the question on how universal themes are depicted and perceived (encoded and decoded) is given. Special emphasis is put on selected surrealist and symbolic paintings as well as caricatures and advertisings.

WHAT IS THE FORM OF THE RELATION BETWEEN THE COLOURS OF THE RAINBOW?

Ines Hipolito

Wollongong, Australia

A speck in a visual field need not be red, but it must have a colour (2.0131), and, however, objects are colourless (2.0232). Are colors internal relations? Is it possible to state the structure of internal relations among qualities such as color? What is the form of the relation between red and blue? In his *Remarks on Color*, Wittgenstein believes color can be resolved by the notion of language-games. I will investigate whether the *Tractatus* already allows explaining the ontology of color. My aim is to evaluate whether it is possible to describe the pictorial internal relation among color qualities. As a method, I will focus on the notions of internal properties and internal relations on the *Tractatus*, particularly addressing the concept of configuration. Since Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*, unlike Frege and Russell, thought the configuration of objects as a material property, this should allow us to frame the problem of color and answer my initial question. I finally argue that color is a form because the visual field requires color for its configuration.

WITTGENSTEINS RUSSISCHES ABENTEUER

Robert Hofstetter

Wien, Österreich

Im Mittelpunkt steht Wittgensteins Absicht, in die Sowjetunion zu emigrieren. Zur Umsetzung seines Plans führte er 1935 eine fact-finding-mission durch. Das politische Umfeld dieser Reise soll ausgeleuchtet, ihr genauer Ablauf rekonstruiert werden. Des weiteren bot die Veröffentlichung der Maiski-Tagebücher Anlass, sich etwas näher mit der Rolle des sowjetischen Botschafters Iwan Michailowitsch Maiski zu befassen. Eine kurze Analyse der stalinistischen Ideologie erlaubt das Fazit:

Wittgenstein hätte in der Sowjetunion sowohl mit seiner frühen als auch mit seiner späten Philosophie Anstoß erregt.

MASSSTAB UND REGEL. EIN BERÜHRUNGSPUNKT ZWISCHEN HEGEL UND WITTGENSTEIN

Herbert Hrachovec

Wien, Österreich

Hegel und Wittgenstein untersuchen Wissensformen, die „Phänomenologie des Geistes" verfolgt die Entfaltung des „natürlichen Bewusstseins", die „Philosophischen Untersuchungen" beziehen sich auf das Alltagsverständnis als Regulativ der Kritik an der herkömmlichen Philosophie. Am Beispiel der Messpraxis, die beide Philosophen als regelgeleitetes Verfahren betrachten, lassen sich Affinitäten zwischen ihnen zeigen. Sie implizieren eine vergleichbare Sicht dynamischer Erfahrungsprozesse, verschwinden aber, wenn es darum geht, ihnen eine Richtung zuzuweisen.

BOUWSMA, SMYTHIES, AND WITTGENSTEIN

Ronald E. Hustwit Sr.

Wooster, USA

O.K. Bouwsma spent two years (1949-51) meeting often with Wittgenstein for philosophical discussions. Through Wittgenstein he met the latter's unusual student Yorick Smythies. That, in turn, led to frequent discussions with Smythies. Bouwsma kept detailed and reflective journals in which he recorded discussions with both Wittgenstein and Smythies. The present paper is an account of culled journal entries on Smythies revealing interesting insights to Smythies' thinking in relation to Wittgenstein. In particular, they show Smythies objecting to Wittgenstein's analysis by means of examining the grammar of a word, an activity that Smythies thought made philosophical analysis seem dead and ignored the deeper insights into our sub-conscious motives for speaking – a kind of inauthenticity or "falsity." The notes show Smythies finding in Dostoievski and Kierkegaard what he could not find in Wittgenstein.

FAMILIAR FACES AND NOTICING ASPECTS

Michael Hymers

Halifax, Canada

Wittgenstein's discussion of noticing aspects flows from his attempt to clarify the grammar of "seeing"–a task that is necessitated by his critique, beginning in 1929, of sense-datum theories and, more generally, of the misleading analogy that they presuppose between physical space and phenomenal space. In his writings of the early 1930s Wittgenstein presents a dilemma for sense-datum theories: they must treat the dawning of an aspect either as the appearance of a new sense-datum (Broad 1923: 260), or as the interpretation of a neutral perceptual substrate (Russell 2001 [1912]: 4). Each option faces fatal difficulties. I have elsewhere defended the first horn of this dilemma (Hymers 2017: 68-70). Here I elaborate and defend the second horn.

WITTGENSTEIN ON SUBJECTIVITY AND THE VIEW OF 'I' AS FIELD

Tomoaki Ihara

Tokyo, Japan

In early 1930s Wittgenstein came to grips with the problem of subjectivity. During the period, he came to think 'something exclusively I have' is so ineffable that the word 'I' can be omitted in representing immediate experience. His idea on the ellipsis of 'I' is similar to contemporary cognitive grammarians and Merleau-Ponty in that the word 'I' is implicit when it has no neighbor, and that embodied 'I' am assimilated with 'field' in which things happen.

PARADIGM CASE ARGUMENT AND ORDINARY CASES

Michal Ivan

Prague, Czech Republic

The paradigm case argument could be considered as an enigmatic example of hastened conclusions that we could see in the heydays of the Ordinary language philosophy. The paper tries to analyze the basic form of the argument and review its critique. Then it offers what could be still followed while remaining inside the paradigm of the ordinary language – the argument failed not because it followed ordinary language, but because it did not follow it enough.

WHY VERBAL UNDERSTANDING IS NOT AN EXTENDED FORM OF PERCEPTION

Pierre Jacob

Paris, France

Several influential philosophers, who disagree about many other topics, have recently endorsed the twofold Reidian view of human testimony according to which by default recipients of human communicative actions should be trustful since agents (or speakers) have basic truthful dispositions (and are therefore fundamentally trustworthy). On this Reidian picture of human testimony, there is no room for drawing the Gricean (or neo-Gricean) distinction between understanding another's testimony and accepting it. Two such philosophers are Tyler Burge and Ruth Millikan. I will focus on Millikan, whose teleosemantic approach to human testimony offers a powerful framework for explaining the continued reproduction and proliferation of intentional conventional linguistic signs, and thereby the stability of human verbal intentional communication. Because I find her framework particularly impressive, in my paper, I will focus on, and sharply criticize, one distinctive feature of her Reidian approach to testimony, namely her claim that verbal understanding of another's utterance is a kind of direct perception of whatever the utterance is about.

SOUND AND IMAGE

Mark Kalderon

London, UK

We hear sounds, and their sources, and their audible qualities. Sounds and their sources are essentially dynamic entities, not wholly present at any given moment, but unfolding through their temporal interval. Sounds and their sources, essentially dynamic entities, are the bearers or susbtrata of audible qualities. Audible qualities are qualities essentially sustained by activity. The only bearers of audible qualities present in auditory experience are essentially dynamic entities. Bodies are not, in this sense, essentially dynamic entities and so are not present in our auditory experience. Though absent in auditory experience, we may, nonetheless, attend to bodies in audition, when an audible sound-generating event in which they participate presents a dynamic aural image of them.

I AM SEEING (FACES IN) CLOUDS. ON THE (HALF-)TRUTH OF/IN PERCEPTION

Peter Paul Kirschenmann

Amstelveen, The Netherlands

My main question is whether there is a sense in which one can say that (some of) our perceptions are true. I survey some quasi-perceptions, mainly illusions. I present the so-called problem of perception: arguments from hallucinations and illusions entailing that even in genuine, veridical perceptions we are not aware of ordinary objects. I comment on the notion of veridicality and the conditions for applying the notion of truth. I discuss five major types of philosophy of perception, as answers to the problem of perception and to my main question. I conclude that three of them have some place for truth. Finally, I suggest that illusions could be said to be 'half-true' and maybe even hallucinations might be accorded some particular variant of truth.

PERCEIVING VALUE IN A WORLD OF FACTS

Julian Kiverstein

Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Tony Chemero has argued that a science of embodied cognition "requires a new ontology, one that is at odds with the physicalist reductionist consensus that says the world just is the physical world, full stop." (Chemero 2009: 135-6) My aim in this talk will be to unpack what such a "new ontology" might look like by reflecting on a claim about perception that is common to 4e cognitive science and Gestalt psychology. Both claim that meaning and value in some sense belongs to the objects of perception. Although the environment of an animal can be described in terms of molecular and chemical properties and fields of electromagnetic energy, such descriptions miss the value the environment has for perceiving animals. Value is thus not something imposed on the environment but is something to which animals are immediately sensitive to in perception. The environment the animal actively engages with in perception is laden with value.

SEEING ASPECTS ANEW – WITTGENSTEIN, BRUEGEL, TITIAN AND TAKING PUZZLING INNOVATIONS IN ART HISTORY PHILOSOPHICALLY SERIOUSLY

Stephanie Koerner

Liverpool, UK

This essay explores the usefulness of insights of the ubiquity and multi-valence of Wittgenstein's work on "aspect perception" for a framework, which brings recent approaches to the histories of science (Chandler *et al* 1991, Doniger *et al* 2016) and philosophy (Neiman 2002) together with alternatives to 'secularisation' or 'disenchantment' models of art history. Emphasis falls upon the usefulness of insights suggested by Victor Krebs (2010) into the roles played by puzzlement (making strange, de-familiarising) in Wittgenstein's discussions of "aspects," which relate to the question that links

aesthetics, *ethics* and *metaphysic*s: What drives reason to efforts that do not pursue ends or results, that are reducible to a 'rational' - 'irrational' dichotomy. Key points are illustrated with puzzling innovations in Peter Brueghel (1525 - 1599) and Titian (Tiziano Vecelli, 1485/90- 1576).

PERCEPTION AND DELUSIONARY CONCEPTS IN SCIENCE

Zsuzsanna Kondor

Budapest, Hungary

In the present paper I will investigate how language and the concepts we use can delude us when scientific theories suggest that abstraction, as a necessary condition of concepts, is rooted in anatomical structures of the brain, and that language as it expresses meaning is based on embodied cognition, i.e., language is deeply integrated into our physical structure.

First, I will outline the characteristics of language and concepts that might provide ground for delusion. In so doing, I will rely on some ideas from Bergson, Wittgenstein, and Maturana. Then, I will delineate theories suggesting that the capability of abstraction is hardwired as Ramachandran explicates, and the meaning of linguistic expression is rooted in embodied cognition as Merleau-Ponty, and later, cognitive metaphor theory suggest. In conclusion, I will attempt to reconcile the seemingly conflicting views – language is deluding and hardwired at the same time – with the help of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological account.

AESTHETIC CORRECTNESS AND RULE-FOLLOWING

Piotr Kozak

Warsaw, Poland

In the paper, I put under consideration the concept of aesthetic correctness and reformulate the problem into terms of the rule following problem. I argue that an answer to the question about what makes aesthetic judgments and works of art correct lies not in extrinsic standards that we can have a propositional knowledge of, but in the perceptual capacity to perceive the world aright.

THE PERCEPTION/COGNITION DIVIDE: ONE MORE TIME, WITH FEELING

Uriah Kriegel

Paris, France

What is the difference between seeing my dog and thinking of my dog? According to the functionalist orthodoxy in philosophy of mind, the main difference is that the seeing and the thinking have different functional roles. While this may be true, it does not account for the fact that, whatever other differences there may be between the seeing and the thinking, there is also a felt difference – some difference we can introspectively detect from the first-person perspective. In this talk, I consider three possible accounts of the felt difference between seeing my dog and thinking of him. The first is a qualia theory according to which seeing my dog exemplifies certain intrinsic qualitative features that thinking of my dog does not. The second is an intentionalist account according to which my dog has certain properties which can be only seen and/or features which can be only thought of. The third account is an attitudinal account according to which there is a distinctive way in which perception

presents my dog that differs from the way a thought presents him. I argue for the superiority of the third approach and try to specify the precise difference in the modes or ways of presenting characteristic of perception and thought.

BRENTANIAN FOUNDATIONALISM AND THE MYTH OF THE GIVEN

Uriah Kriegel

Paris, France

Foundationalism can be defined in terms of the conjunction of two theses. First: there are beliefs whose justification depends on no other beliefs; call these "foundational beliefs." Second: the justification of all other beliefs depends on the justification of

foundational beliefs. Different versions of foundationalism differ mostly in designating different kinds of beliefs as the foundational ones. Brentano held a traditional, broadly Cartesian version of foundationalism according to which all foundational beliefs are

introspective: the only beliefs whose justification is independent of any other beliefs are introspective beliefs. Now, of all the objections facing foundationalism, the "Myth of the Given" objection has probably been the most influential. The objection takes the form of a dilemma, which may be adapted to Brentano's foundationalism as follows. Suppose foundational beliefs are based on no other beliefs, but are still based on introspective impressions. Either these introspective impressions have a propositional content, or they do not. If they do, then something must account for their justification

(so their justification cannot be foundational after all). If they do not, then it is unclear how they can justify propositional mental states such as beliefs. In this talk, I argue that Brentano is uniquely well positioned among foundationalists to respond to this

objection. The key to the Brentanian response is Brentano's theory of judgment, which actually denies that beliefs have propositional content. I try to show why Brentano held this astonishing-sounding thesis, that it is more plausible than may initially appear, and that it holds the potential to dissolve the "Myth of the Given" objection.

THE MARXISM OF WITTGENSTEIN. AN OVERVIEW

Emiliano La Licata

Palermo, Italy

The paper analyses an interpretative tradition that considers the Sraffa-Wittgenstein relationship and identifies some core themes that frequently emerge from the reading of this literature. It is held to be possible that Wittgenstein developed such themes through his dialogue with Sraffa in the thirties.

STRONG REDUCTION AGAINST MECHANISTIC PLURALIST CAUSATION IN HUMAN VISUAL PERCEPTION

Diego Azevedo Leite

Rovereto, Italy

One of the central aims of the twenty-first century multilevel mechanistic theory of human cognition is to propose 'pluralistic/multilevel causation' within neuro-cognitive phenomena through the notion of 'mechanistically mediated effects' which are hybrids of

'inter-level constitutive/compositional relations' and 'intra-level causal interactions'. However, criticism from different authors has presented a challenge to this pluralistic ambition. Focusing on the concrete example of human visual perception, it is my aim to investigate whether the mechanistic framework can meet the challenge. I argue that the mechanists' replies are not enough to overcome the problems, and the theory leads to a strong neuro-cognitive reductionist position.

'READING' GESTURES: MIRROR NEURONS AND WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY

Tea Lobo

Fribourg, Switzerland

Research on the mirror neuron system reveals that perception is sensimotoric: that cognizing other people's actions resonates in the beholder's own motor system. Even though Wittgenstein's philosophy is conceptual rather than encompassing empirical research, some of his remarks from the private language argument anticipate and elucidate these findings. For, in his later philosophy he dispels the myth that intentions for actions are 'inside' the body and shows in numerous examples all the cases in which these supposedly 'interior' states of intentions are directly 'legible' from the body.

PERCEIVING IS NOT A FORM OF KNOWING: WITTGENSTEIN AND SENSORIMOTOR THEORY

Victor Loughlin

Antwerp, Belgium

Sensorimotor theory claims that perceiving is a form of knowing (O'Regan and Noë 2001). Using Hamilton's (2014) reading of Wittgenstein's *On Certainty*, I will challenge this claim. Specifically, I will argue, not that the SMT claim is false, but rather that it is senseless or nonsensical, that is, it is senseless or nonsensical to claim that perceiving is a form of knowing.

PARADIGMS AND SELF-REFERENCE

Jakub Mácha

Brno, Czech Republic

Paradox according to Wittgenstein is something surprising that is taken out of its context. Thus one way of coping with paradoxical sentences is to imagine the missing context of use. Wittgenstein formulates what I call the paradigm paradox: "one sentence can never describe the paradigm in another, unless it ceases to be a paradigm." (PG: 346) There are several instances of this paradox spread throughout Wittgenstein's writings. I argue that this paradox is structurally equivalent to Russell's paradox. The above quotation is Wittgenstein's version of the vicious circle principle which counteracts the paradox. This ban is, however, restricted to a certain language-game. Finally, I argue that there is a structural analogy between the employing of a noun as a self-membered set and a paradigmatic sample being included in or excluded from the set it generates. Paradoxical sentences are not banned forever, they can indicate the change of the method of dealing with paradigms.

MEANING, REPRESENTATION AND KNOWLEDGE: NOTES ON WITTGENSTEIN'S PRESENCE IN CURRENT CONTEXTUALISM

Eduardo Marchesan

São Paulo, Brasil

In this paper, I take a close look at a relatively recent critique made by Avner Baz on the work of contemporary contextualists in philosophy of language, especially the work of Charles Travis, and at the way in which Travis's work relates to Wittgenstein's latter philosophy. Baz's critique centers on the idea that, while Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP) attacks a representationalist view of meaning, current contextualism is still attached to the notion that the main function of the meaning of assertive sentences is to represent reality, i.e. to express truth-conditions. In this way, contextualism would be an illegitimate heir to the work of the second Wittgenstein. By addressing Travis' read of Wittgenstein's remarks on knowledge in *On Certainty*, I provide some elements to counter Baz's critique.

ON THE POSSIBILITY OF ACQUAINTANCE

Michael Markunas

London, UK

There has been a recent resurgence in the notion of conscious acquaintance in the philosophy of mind and perception. A crucial feature of acquaintance is the supposed knowledge it affords us of objects that is a type of knowledge which is distinct from propositional knowledge. This feature has been put to work in debates in philosophy of mind, perception, and epistemology. In this paper, I look at Bertrand Russell's original thesis that knowledge of objects is logically independent of knowledge of facts. I argue that Russell's view on what he calls intuitive knowledge undermines his thesis that knowledge of things is logically independent of knowledge of truths. One consequence of this argument is that if conscious acquaintance is to play to the role that philosophers have been using for it in recent debates, then it must be revised in order to avoid the pitfalls of Russell's original thesis.

ELUSIVE OBJECTIVITY

Michael Martin

London, UK

In the first two decades of the twentieth century, G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell defended a 'dual-relation' conception of sensory experience. Just over forty years later, P. F. Strawson launched an attack on this picture of experience across a number of influential works. Strawson's picture is one of the origins of a revolt against a relational conception of sense experience and in favour of a representational one. The bridge between the earlier debates and this later discussion is Ludwig Wittgenstein, who reacted against the picture of sensation of the first two figures, and whose writings influenced Strawson's alternative. In this talk I'll compare and contrast these different approaches to objectivity and subjectivity in sense experience.

KICKING THE STONE

Olivier Massin

Geneva, Switzerland

Samuel Johnson claimed to have refuted Berkeley by kicking a stone. It is generally thought that Johnson misses

the point of Berkeley's immaterialism for a rather obvious reason: Berkeley never denied that the stone feels solid, but only that the stone could exist independently of any mind. I believe that Johnson was on the right track. As I understand him, his idea is that because the stone feels to resist our effort, the stone seems to exist and to have causal powers independently of us. But if appearances are to be taken at face value, as Berkeley and other phenomenalists are keen to argue, then the stone exists and has causal powers independently from us. While the independent existence of the stone may not be as troublesome for the phenomenalist as it might first seem, I shall suggest that its having causal powers puts the phenomenalist under important pressure.

ZUR VIELFALT DER SCHACHANALOGIEN IN WITTGENSTEINS PHILOSOPHIEREN

Ingolf Max
Leipzig, Germany

Einführend betrachten wir Schachanalogien als Gegenstand der Wittgenstein-Forschung im Kontext des Gesamtwerks. Der Ausdruck „Schachanalogie" kann dabei selbst als ein Beispiel von Familienähnlichkeit betrachtet werden. Als Indikatoren kommen eine ganze Reihe sprachlicher Ausdrücke in Frage, wobei wir uns hier auf Vorkommen von möglicherweise zusammengesetzten Ausdrücken der Form „Schach–" beschränken. Bereits mit Bezug auf wenige Beobachtungen lassen sich eine *Aufgabe* und eine *Vermutung* formulieren. Die durchaus anspruchsvolle *Aufgabe* besteht darin, Wittgensteins gesamten Nachlass auf die Verwendung von Themen mit Bezug auf Schach in ihren jeweiligen sprachphilosophischen Kontexten zu durchforsten. Die *Vermutung* betrifft den Eindruck, dass sich bestimmte Aspekte der Bezugnahme auf Schach in der Übergangsphase von der sogenannten mittleren zur späten Philosophie nachweisbar verändern, wohingegen andere nur variiert werden. Im zweiten Teil betrachten wir ausgewählte Schachanalogien aus den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* etwas näher. Bereits hier zeigt sich die Vielfalt als Methode bestimmte Aspekte zu beleuchten und neue Aspekte klar zu sehen.

KNOWLEDGE AND REPRESENTATIONS: EXPLAINING THE SKEPTICAL PUZZLE

Guido Melchior
Graz, Austria

This paper provides an explanation of the skeptical puzzle. I argue that we can take two distinct points of view towards representations, mental representations like perceptual experiences and artificial representations like symbols. When focusing on what the representation represents we take an *attached* point of view. When focusing on the representational character of the representation we take a *detached* point view. From an attached point of view, we have the intuition that we can know that *p* simply by *using* the representation and without having prior knowledge about the reliability of the source that delivers the representation. When taking a detached point of view, we tend to think that we must have this kind of prior knowledge. These two conflicting intuitions about knowledge and representations provide the basis for our intuition of immediate perceptual knowledge on the one hand and for the skeptical intuition of underdetermination on the other hand.

THE ETHICAL IN WITTGENSTEIN'S WRITING: A REFLECTION ON PLEASANTS CONCEPTION OF WITTGENSTEIN ETHICS

Lumberto Mendoza
Bergen, Norway

The paper takes issue with Nigel Pleasants (2008), specifically on his views about the tendency to overmoralize the study of Wittgenstein as expressed in the work of Alice Crary (2005). I point out that there is an inconsistency in Pleasants´ claim that the study of Wittgenstein is a non-moral intellectual undertaking and his claim that the Wittgensteinian idea of basic moral certainty is a limit or hinge that reveals our fundamental way of being in the world. By drawing from Cavell and from Wittgenstein´s own remarks about this, I explain that Wittgenstein evokes a kind of "Socratic mirroring" that has the potential to bring about an existential crisis and transcendental turn. This transcendental turn involves a kind of self-knowledge that has implications to ethics.

THE PROBLEM WITH J. SEARLE'S IDEA THAT 'ALL SEEING IS SEEING-AS'

(OR WHAT WITTGENSTEIN DID NOT MEAN WITH THE DUCK-RABBIT)

Sofia Miguens
Porto, Portugal

In *Seeing Things As They Are – A theory of perception* (Searle 2015) John Searle claims that all seeing is seeing-as. The thesis in fact encapsulates his intentionalism about perceptual experience. In what follows I suggest that Searle's intentionalism embodies what Wittgenstein thought should not be said about seeing-as. Based on recent interpretations of Wittgenstein on seeing-as (Schulte 2016, Baz 2016, Glock 2016, Travis 2016) I try to spell out the nature and the implications of the head-on clash between Searle's and Wittgenstein's positions regarding perception. I finish by discussing whether an alternative to intentionalism does indeed emerge from Wittgenstein's remarks on seeing-as.

WHAT IS THE ATTITUDE/CONTENT DISTINCTION?

Michelle Montague
Austin, USA

In describing the structure of conscious intentional states, philosophers typically appeal to an attitude/content distinction. On what I will call 'the standard view', attitudes and contents are taken to be distinct metaphysical elements that when put together appropriately form conscious intentional states. I will argue that the attitude/content distinction is not a 'real' metaphysical distinction. Rather, the words and concepts we use to distinguish between the attitudes (e.g. belief, thought, desire) are heuristic devices for grouping together certain classes of phenomenological properties, which themselves determine certain kinds of intentional content. In the end, all we have, metaphysically speaking, are phenomenological properties, intentional content, and a determination relation between them. I will focus on belief, thought, and perception.

AWARENESS OF AWARENESS AND INTROSPECTION

Michelle Montague

Austin, USA

In this paper I discuss and defend a theory of consciousness inspired by Franz Brentano, according to which every conscious experience involves a certain kind of immediate awareness of itself. All conscious experience is in a certain fundamental sense 'self-intimating'—it constitutively involves awareness of that very awareness. I call this 'the awareness of awareness thesis', and I'll call the phenomenon that it concerns 'awareness of awareness' (AOA for short). I attempt to give a substantive description of what AOA consists in in two ways, first, by listing some of its positive features, and second, by comparing it and contrasting it with introspection. The idea is that there are many different ways we can be aware of our experiences, introspection being one way, AOA being another, distinct way. By clarifying the distinction between AOA and introspection, we can get a better grasp of both phenomena.

IS *DEFACTOISM* A KIND OF NATURALISM?

Alice Morelli

Venice, Italy

This paper focuses on Fogelin's *defactoist* interpretation of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, as it is found in *Taking Wittgenstein at his word* (Fogelin 2009). Fogelin explicitly states that *defactoism* must be distinguished from other labels. However, his defactoist reading seems reasonably akin to a naturalistic reading. This paper argues that *defactoism* might be considered a form of liberal naturalism and that the notion of liberal naturalism fits best with Wittgenstein's overall later philosophy. It will be shown that, although *defactoism* clearly accounts for Wittgenstein's peculiar treatment of traditional philosophical problems, it does not include important aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy, such as the morphological method and the relevance of imaginary cases as a non-metaphysical form of estrangement.

"PRIMARY COLOURS" – WITTGENSTEIN ON THE DIVISION(S) IN COLOUR IN THE 1938 LECTURE NOTES

Gabriele M. Mras

Vienna, Austria

The "Whewell Court Lectures" give us new insights into Wittgenstein's interest in the concept of colour. This essay looks at what Wittgenstein says about W.E. Johnson's remark that the colours of things are "absolutely determinate" by examining the idea of a "continuous band of colour" in which colours are identified by extensions. As we will see provide these lectures the beginning of an understanding of the relation between predicating colour concepts and talking about them that will eventually lead to Wittgenstein giving up the aim to represent our "system of colours" in an geometrical way.

THE TRACTARIAN INFLUENCE IN VON WRIGHT'S DEONTIC LOGIC

Maxime Myrand

Canada, Québec

In this article, I explore whether there is still a Wittgensteinian influence within the 1951 von Wright article entitled "Deontic Logic". I shall first present the different elements that Wittgenstein adds to the concept of truth function in 1921, and then attempt to show how these elements are to be found within the method of decidability of the deontic utterances presented by von Wright in his 1951 article.

PERCEIVING WITHOUT, AND WITH, CONTENT

Erik Myin

Antwerp, Belgium

In two recent books Daniel Hutto and myself have defended that basic forms of perception are intentional but do not involve content, neither of the conceptual nor of the non conceptual variety. In this talk I will present the position and show how it is able to withstand some of the most commonly made objections to it. I will argue that aspectual perception is possible without invoking content, as is making sense of the connection between basic perception and judgment. I will also address some empirically inspired objections. That is, I will show that the account can deal with both inter- and intra-modal interactions in perception, as well as with cases of so called cognitive penetration, or the absence of it where it would be expected (as in some illusions). To answer these empirical challenges one should move from a synchronic to a diachronic perspective, so I will argue.

WITTGENSTEIN ON THE PROBLEM OF CONSISTENCY OF ARITHMETIC

Anderson Nakano

São Paulo, Brazil

Wittgenstein's views on consistency of arithmetic and formal systems are often neglected or considered as mistaken. In this paper, I reconstitute and structure these views around a single *Grundgedanke*. Remarks on the notions of consistency, triviality and negation in mathematics are considered in this light. It is also analyzed to what extent these remarks correspond to a critical development of his thinking.

SEEING THINGS YOU DON'T SEE

Bence Nanay

Cambridge, UK and Antwerp, Belgium

This talk is about the importance of mental imagery in general and of multimodal mental imagery in particular in our everyday perception. I bring together empirical findings about multimodal perception and empirical findings about (visual, auditory, tactile) mental imagery in order to argue that multimodal mental imagery, understood as perceptual processing in one sense modality that is triggered by sensory stimulation in another sense modality is a crucial element of almost all instances of everyday perception, which has wider implications to philosophy of perception and beyond, to epistemological questions about whether we can trust our senses. Focusing on multimodal mental imagery can help us to understand a number of puzzling perceptual phenomena, like sensory substitution

and synaesthesia. Further, manipulating mental imagery has recently become an important clinical procedure in various branches of psychiatry as well as in counteracting implicit bias – using multimodal mental imagery rather than voluntarily and consciously conjured up mental imagery can lead to real progress in these experimental paradigms.

WITTGENSTEIN AND PRAGMATISM: ON THE TRUE MEANING AND KNOWLEDGE OF OUR CONVENTIONS

Dan Nesher
Haifa, Israel

Wittgenstein's difficulty with the *forms of life* and their *conventions* is that he offers no objective criteria for their common knowledge, to explain our behaviors in language-games. Without proving that our basic *conventions* are true knowledge they remain only a *mythology*, although we perceive them as a given. Wittgenstein's conception of *linguistic meaning* in regard to their *use* is similar to James' conceptions of *meaning* and *truth* through their *practical consequences*. The distinction I wish to draw is between Peirce's *Pragmaticism*, which claims that our ensuing conduct is based on the proved true interpretation of meanings of our cognitions and their true representation of reality, and James' *Pragmatism*, which claims, conversely, that the truth of conduct determines meaning and truth. Wittgenstein's criterion for the meanings of human behaviors is their *mythology* of the common *background*, yet this method remains subjective and, hence, we cannot be released from the mental prisons.

NAÏVE REALIST CONCEPTION OF PERCEPTUAL PHENOMENOLOGY

Takuya Niikawa
Chiba, Japan

This article argues that naïve realists should adopt the radical sort of disjunctivism, which states that the phenomenology of veridical visual experience differs not only in metaphysical nature but also in type from the phenomenology of hallucinatory experience. To do this, I first make an objection to the modest sort of disjunctivism, which states that the phenomenology of veridical visual experience can be the same in type as the phenomenology of hallucinatory experience. I then defend the radical sort of disjunctivism against an objection.

THE NON-OBSERVABLES IN PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE: A BASIS FOR COMPLEMENTARY EPISTEMOLOGY

Chrysanthus Nnameka Ogbozo
Nsukka, Nigeria

For many ordinary people, nothing can be as real as that which one sees, touches, smells, etc. For instance, at the time I was writing this paper, there couldn't have been any better way of demonstrating that I was writing the paper except by coming to see that I was actually writing the paper. Some philosophers like G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell did recognize a commonsense perception of reality at one time or another, especially because of the appealing force of that which seems to be obvious. However, this paper argues that there are non-observables and beliefs in a supposedly obvious perception; events that challenge us to abandon a univocal approach to

knowledge and to embrace an interdisciplinary investigation into any datum of knowledge that is presented before us. The process and outcome of such investigation is termed here "complementary epistemology".

PERCEPTION, INTUITIONS, AND MATHEMATICS. A KANTIAN PERSPECTIVE

Luca Oliva
Houston, USA

Traditionally, intuitions stand for images that our mind's eye represents without any help of perceptions. In mathematics, the appeal to intuitions aims to furnish a stronger foundation, for instance, of geometric constructions, whose figures can be visualized completely in imagination. In his *Aesthetic*, Kant seems to agree with this classic view. However, in his *Doctrine of Method* and *Lecture on Metaphysics*, he reduces mathematical concepts to intuition-based constructions. "There is nothing – warns Hintikka – 'intuitive' about intuitions so defined" (1992: 23). Breaking with visual images, sensible intuitions require a non-philosophical explanation. My aim is to defend this thesis. I will discuss *1)* what is an intuition for Kant, especially in relation to perceptions and mathematical concepts, and *2)* why it must be understood logically. Then, I will show *3)* how Kant builds abstract entities such as quanta and numbers on such sensible intuitions. Finally, I will compare *4)* Kant's perceptionism to Wittgenstein's conception of 'visual field' (especially in the *Tractatus*), developed in rejection of Russell's multiple-relation theory of judgments (1913).

AGAINST HEARING PHONEMES – A NOTE ON O'CALLAGHAN

Naomi Osorio-Kupferblum
Vienna, Austria

Casey O'Callaghan has argued that rather than hearing meanings, we hear phonemes. In this note I argue that valuable though they are in an account of speech perception – depending on how we define 'hearing' – phonemes either don't explain enough or they go too far. So, they are not the right tool for his criticism of the semantic perceptual account.

"I CAN'T STOP COMPARING HIM WITH CÉZANNE". HOW G.H. VON WRIGHT SOLVED HIS PROBLEM WITH LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN.

Bernt Österman
Helsinki, Finland

The spring of 1947 was a difficult time in the life of Georg Henrik von Wright, one of Ludwig Wittgenstein's three future literary executors. Having re-encountered Wittgenstein after 8 years of absence from Cambridge, von Wright felt uncertain about the philosophical path he had entered in the 1940's and even found it difficult to think thoughts of his own under the influence of Wittgenstein's dominating mind. In my paper, I will show how von Wright eventually was helped by an analogy between Ludwig Wittgenstein and the painter Paul Cézanne, which he elaborated in two letters to friends in Finland in June 1947.

PERCEPTION AND INTENTIONALITY

Erlend Winderen Finke Owesen

Cambridge, UK

Can scientific approaches to perception account for intentional content? In this paper I will provide some reasons for denying this, based on a distinction between a subpersonal level of description in which scientific talk of the visual system belongs, and a level of the animal as whole in which talk of intentional content belongs. I proceed to argue that philosophical naturalists tend to conflate these levels of description, but that science remains on a sound track as long as it is understood as providing causal explanation, and not constitutive explanation, as sometimes supposed. I then illustrate how a naturalistic view of perception, namely Quine's, which holds that intentional content can be preserved in terms of talk of the machinery of the visual system, generates conceptual confusions by conflating the two levels of description.

THE ROLE OF EDUCATION IN CULTURE: AN UNDERSTANDING IN WITTGENSTEIN´S PHILOSOPHY

Ratikanta Panda

Mumbai, India

Man's existence on the earth is marked by the evolutionary history in terms of his anthropological development as well as his ever-growing interpersonal relations through representations of the general facets and occasional conflicts. In this sense, we can say the arts, literature, folk songs, are nothing but the representation of such relationships only. But these are only a smaller part of that broad framework. Here the modes of representations contain, at a more comprehensive level, man's way of looking at the world at large, and at further cosmic level, his way of looking at the entire universe. These modes of representations are collectively called Culture. In this context, a thorough investigation can be proposed for a healthy and solidifying influence of culture on man, as man's existence is rooted in the culture with respect to time and space. Thus, the aim of this paper is to explore Wittgenstein's notion of education in culture.

WITTGENSTEIN'S INFLUENCE IN DENNETT'S THEORY OF FREE WILL

Sabrina Parent

Québec, Canada

In this paper, I shall present two points of resemblance between Wittgenstein's *Lectures on Freedom of the Will* and Daniel Dennett's theory on free will. I shall begin with their critique of determinism and specifically with what determinism doesn't entails. Then, I shall try to demonstrate how they both insist on the importance of the perspective to adopt to avoid any mistakes regarding our free will.

SEEING THE SAME THING DIFFERENTLY

Christoph C. Pfisterer

Zürich, Switzerland

Perception is often quite correctly said to be the primary source of knowledge. "Seeing is believing" is an idiom which stresses the authority of perception over belief and knowledge. However, in this paper I shall not discuss the traditional epistemological problem of how perception gives rise to knowledge and belief, rather, I will draw in the opposite direction and ask, how perception depends on knowledge and belief. In what sense, if any, do our beliefs affect or shape what we see? A positive answer to this question necessitates a distinction between different senses of the verb "seeing", one which is logically independent of beliefs, expectations, etc., and one which isn't. Questioning the view that the latter can be analyzed in terms of the former plus belief, I will argue for the controversial claim that this distinction applies to different forms of seeing.

NORMATIVITY OF PERCEPTION AND PREDICTIVE PROCESSING

Michał Piekarski

Warsaw, Poland

These reflections will focus on the problem of normativity in the theory of predictive coding. First (§1), we will briefly discuss the predictive conception and two types of reasoning. In §2 we will analyse the importance of prediction in perception processes and differentiate between two kinds of perceptive normativity which is closely related to predictions made by the generative model. Next (§3), we will highlight the need to discuss the role the ability to recognise patterns plays in predictive processing. In §4 we will put forward a research hypothesis according to which human normative intuitions about the world and other subjects derive from a sensory, perceptive-predictive experience of the world.

HOW TO USE WITTGENSTEIN TO OPPOSE MARXISM

Miguel Ángel Quintana Paz

Valladolid, Spain

Our interest here will be limited to decide how *we* could use the philosophy of Wittgenstein to oppose Marxist theorizations. We will not imply, thus, that Wittgenstein himself made that use or wanted anybody else to make it. Our focus here is not Wittgenstein's possible intentions against Marxism, but his implications against it. We have found five possible implications of this kind. The first one links his private language argument and Ludwig von Mises' argument about why Marxists fail in determining prices. The second one goes from that very private language argument to a liberal argument against the dictatorship of proletariat. The third is a skeptical argument for participatory democracy that undermines some of Marx's ideas about power. Finally, the fourth and fifth implications use Wittgenstein's philosophy against the Marxist ideas of an essential divide in society and a common human progress, respectively.

IMPURE PERCEPTION

Jesse Prinz

New York, USA

A sizable and growing body of evidence suggests that perceptual processing can be influenced by factors other than the stimuli presented to our sensory receptors: there are later effects from one sense to another, emotional effects, motor effects, linguistic effects and cognitive effects. The approach to perception has a long history of supporters, including Wittgenstein, but it has been under attack for several decades by defenders of modularity. Those attacks have been relaunched with new vigor, with

empirical studies and philosophical machinations designed to debunk the avalanche of evidence. This presentation aims to rebut the recent effort to defend modularity. It is concluded that lateral- and top-down effects are not only pervasive, but essential to some of the most basic functions of perception.

PRE-CUEING, EARLY VISION, AND COGNITIVE PENETRABILITY

Athanassios Raftopoulos

Nicosia, Cyprus

I have argued that early vision is not directly affected by cognition since its processes do not draw on cognition as an informational resource, which is the essence of the claim that perception is cognitively penetrated (CP); early vision is cognitively impenetrable (CI). Recently it has been argued that various pre-cueing effects guided by cognitively driven attention suggest that early vision is CP. To defend the CI of early vision, first, I discuss the problems the CP of perception causes for the epistemic role of perception. Then, I argue that whether CP occurs hinges on whether there are cognitive effects that undermine the justificatory role of perception, and examine the epistemic role of early vision. I argue, finally, that pre-cueing does not undermine the epistemic role of early vision, and does not entail that early vision uses cognitive information. Hence, early vision is still CI.

ODOURS AND SENSE-DATA

Louise Richardson

York, UK

Because awareness of odours mediates olfactory perception of other things, Sense Data Theory looks, superficially, to be a better fit for smell than it does for sight. My first aim is to propose a view of odours on which this appearance of fit is not superficial. On this view, odours have sense data-like features and play a sense data-like role. If this view were accepted, we would have reason to believe that different philosophical theories of perception apply to different varieties of perception. My second aim is to briefly consider the consequences of allowing that perception is in this way not a unitary phenomenon, and some ways those consequences might be avoided.

PERCEPTION AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON

Štefan Riegelnik

Zürich, Switzerland

The aim of this contribution is to establish perception as a social phenomenon. I argue that perception requires the ability to discriminate between true and false beliefs and I elaborate on the conditions for such a discrimination. I show that the acknowledgment of another person can provide a criterion relative to which a belief is true or false. Such an understanding of perception allows for an investigation into the role of sensations.

SEMANTIC DIRECT REALISM – THE DIRECT REALISTS CONFESSION OF DEFEAT?

Howard Robinson

Budapest, Hungary

Amongst the variety of reasons for which the sense-datum theory fell into disrepute, the fact that it was supposed to constitute a 'veil of perception' was one of the most commonly given. As the alternatives to that, the theories that were favoured to replace it are, on the one hand, the intentional or representational theory of perception, or, on the other, what is called 'relationalism', which is propounded as a form of naïve realism.
It is my purpose in this talk to investigate in just what sense these current theories really put us in 'direct' contact with the world, and to suggest at the end, as a form of provocation, that the form of directness they achieve is not significantly different from that available to the sense-datum theory.

IS PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE BASED ON EXPERIENCE?

Johannes Roessler

Coventry, UK

In what sense, if any, is perceptually grounded knowledge of physical objects 'based' on conscious perceptual experience of such objects? In this paper I argue that rather than approaching this question by asking about the grounds of perceptual beliefs, we should consider the role the perceptual presence of objects plays in our thinking about how we know what we know through perception. Doing so opens up the possibility of rejecting the terms of the choice between two currently influential views: the 'internalist' view that our experience of objects grounds knowledge by providing reasons for belief, and the 'knowledge first' view that it's epistemic perception, not object perception, that it to the fore when we ask 'How do you know?'

"LA SCULPTURE EST L'ART DE L'INTELLIGENCE" (PABLO PICASSO) – LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ANTON HANAK, MICHAEL DROBIL

Josef G. F. Rothhaupt

München, Deutschland

Ludwig Wittgenstein hatte sich eingehend mit modernen und in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts zeitgenössischen Skulpturen, etwa von Auguste Rodin und Ivan Meštrović, die sich ja in der Kunstsammlung seines Vaters Karl Wittgenstein befanden, beschäftigt. Für eben diese Beschäftigung können hier nun weitere Beispiele genauer dokumentiert werden, nämlich: Plastiken von Anton Hanak und Plastiken von Michael Drobil. August Schmarsow konstatierte 1899: „Keine Kunst ist dem modernen Menschen so entfremdet wie die Plastik." – Ludwig Wittgenstein kann uns einen neuen Zugang zu und eine adäquate Umgangsweise mit Skulpturen nahe bringen.

PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE. AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH

Marcin Rządeczka

Lublin, Poland

The nascent field of evolutionary psychology can shed some new light on the concept of perceptual biases. Rather than interpreting a bias as a cognitive flaw, evolutionary psychology seeks to reveal its adaptive function. Systematic distortion of reality can act as a first-line safety mechanism limiting the exposure to potentially lethal abiotic and biotic environmental factors. Several such biases affect vision by influencing the perception of size or geographical slant. The sense of hearing is systematically biased due to the effect of auditory looming, while gustatory and olfactory perception tend to act as a safety measures against environmental toxins and pathogens by oversensitization to bitterness. The variety of adaptive perceptual biases suggests that the prime role of human perception is not truth-seeking, but action-guiding, such as navigation in a dangerous environment or deciding whether to confront a foe or flee.

PERCEPTUAL CONTACT, ACQUAINTANCE AND PHENOMENAL PRESENCE

Elisabetta Sacchi

Parma-Milan, Italy

What kind of perceptual contact with an object can ground a perceptual demonstrative thought about it? I shall address this issue by focusing firstly on Evans's acquaintance-based picture and secondly on a criticism recently raised by Montague (2016) against it. What her criticism shows in my view is that Evans's picture is incomplete, not that it is wrong. What is lacking is an account of what it is to be phenomenally presented with something in one's experience of it. I shall provide some hints as to how Evans's picture could be revised in conformity with his claim that perceptual demonstrative thoughts are about ordinary external objects in a direct, non-inferential way.

SIMILARITY, SINCERITY, AND STYLE: RICHARD ELDRIDGE ON RULE-FOLLOWING AND CONCEPTUAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Carlota Salvador Megias

Bergen, Norway

Similarity and associated notions like difference, distance, agreement, and regularity -- all of which Baker and Hacker dismiss as "the background preconditions that *as a matter of fact* make [grammatical/conceptual structures] possible" -- made rule accordance one of Wittgenstein's most pressing frustrations in the *Philosophical Investigations*. Following Richard Eldridge, I will take this frustration to be about what it means "to possess a concept;" and I will understand the possession and application of concepts to be a function of how it is we "see connections." Many of Wittgenstein's interpreters take "practice" to be the end of philosophical inquiry into rules and concepts. By contrast, it is my basic position that in the context of the *Philosophical Investigations*, "practice" is primarily a tool by which to engage with and articulate the difficulties surrounding similarity and etc. -- not the site of their explanation or even a means for their dissolution.

PERCEPTUAL CONSCIOUSNESS AS A MENTAL ACTIVITY

Susanna Schellenberg

New Brunswick, USA

I argue that perceptual consciousness is constituted by a mental activity. The mental activity in question is the activity of employing perceptual capacities, such as discriminatory, selective capacities. This is a radical view, but I hope to make it plausible. In arguing for this mental activist view, I reject orthodox views on which perceptual consciousness is analyzed in terms of (sensory awareness relations to) peculiar entities, such as, phenomenal properties, external mind-independent properties, propositions, sense-data, qualia, or intentional objects.

SELLARS' KRITIK AN WITTGENSTEIN ÜBER DAS PROBLEM VON INNEREN EPISODEN

Fernando Scherer

Freiburg, Deutschland

Sellars ist der Meinung, dass „innere Episoden" eine Erweiterung der öffentlichen Sprache seien, und daher seien absolute „innere Episoden" nicht möglich. Nach seiner Konzeption erlernt man die Ausdrücke, ihren Kontext und ihre Verwendung durch öffentliche sprachliche Vorgänge, und daher gebe es nichts Gegebenes wie z. B. Sinnesdaten oder innere Episoden, die nicht durch öffentliche Prozesse gebildet seien, und daher seien sie nicht absolut privat. In dieser Hinsicht kritisiert er die Konzeption, dass man Wissen auf nicht-inferentielles Wissen aufbaut, z. B. Wissen aufgrund von unmittelbaren Erfahrungen erzeugt, weil für ihn ein solches Wissen nicht möglich ist.
Sellars behauptet, dass selbst Wittgenstein, der gegen die Idee der inneren Episoden war, noch in die Falle des gegebenen logischen Raums fällt, als er am Anfang der *„Philosophische Untersuchungen"* Beispiele von einer primitiven Sprache gibt.

KRITIK DES AUDITIVEN RELATIONALISMUS

Arvid Schiller

Halle, Deutschland

Dem auditive Relationalismus gemäß sind Laute wie Töne, Geräusche, usw. als etwas zu verstehen, dem seine Existenz nur aufgrund des Bestehens einer Relation zu einem wirklichen oder möglichen Hörer zukommt. In meinem Beitrag möchte ich zeigen, dass diese Auffassung in ihren verschiedenen Varianten nicht plausibel machen kann, von dem zu handeln, was man gewöhnlich unter Lauten usw. versteht.

SIND DIE *PHILOSOPHISCHEN UNTERSUCHUNGEN* ESOTERISCH? ZU EINER BEMERKUNG STANLEY CAVELLS

Alfred Schmidt

Wien, Österreich

Wo wir in der Philosophie auf Formen sinnen, die einem zunächst nicht hinlänglich ausbuchstabierten Problem erst Bedeutung verleihen, dort haben wir uns gegen Forderungen des vorwegnehmenden Planens philosophischer Projekte sperrig zu verhalten. Diesem Gedanken möchte ich dadurch Sinn geben, dass ich den Begriffen des Planens und Kartographierens ein Stück weit nachgehe.

THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE NAÏVE

Michael Schmitz

Vienna, Austria

A naïve realism that is naïve in a good way must also be naively realistic about the mind. It must recognize that perceptual experiential relations to the world can only obtain in virtue of contentful experiential states of the perceiver, and that such states are also involved in the bad cases of misperception. Some naïve realists seem reluctant to acknowledge such states, presumably because they worry that these might insert themselves between subject and world and become epistemologically foundational. I outline a version of naïve realism designed to put such worries to rest. Experiential states do not block direct access to the world, but enable it. The good case is primary because the bad case can only be conceptualized as a deviation from it, and our very understanding of experience and its content is also tied to this. So naïve realism about mind and world and the good and the bad cases are closely tied to one another.

SCHEINBEWEGUNGEN. WAHRNEHMUNG ZWISCHEN WISSENSGESCHICHTE UND GEGENWARTSKUNST

Romana K. Schuler

Vienna, Austria

"When I write in the air, am I writing in my mind or in the air?" (Wittgenstein)
Im Fokus des Vortrages steht die historische experimentelle Forschung zur Wahrnehmung von Scheinbewegungen und ihre Verbindungen zur Gegenwartskunst.
Das Phänomen der Scheinbewegungen rückte im 19. Jahrhundert ins Zentrum des wissenschaftlichen Interesses. Die Problematik, was Wirklichkeit und was letztlich Sinnestäuschung sei, wurde nicht mehr primär von der Philosophie verhandelt, sondern erweiterte sich auf andere, teils neue Wissenszweige wie Experimentalphysiologie, Experimentalphysik sowie Mechanik und Mathematik. Die damaligen neu gewonnenen Erkenntnisse werden heute immer wieder von Künstlern aufgegriffen und in ihren Arbeiten mit ähnlich experimentellen Herangehensweisen reflektiert, die einen weiteren Zweig im Kunstschaffen eröffnet haben – die experimentelle Kunst des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts.

CAN PLANTS PERCEIVE?

Peter Schulte

Bielefeld, Germany

Can plants perceive? It is obvious that they are sensitive to various external stimuli, and that they respond to these stimuli in highly complex ways. But can they perceive in the more demanding sense of forming sensory *representations* of their environment? In this paper, I argue that the answer to this question is 'probably not'. Under the plausible assumption that perception in the demanding sense requires perceptual constancies, we can show that well-understood paradigm examples of sensory systems in plants do not qualify as genuine perceptual systems. In order to do so, however, we have to move beyond the textbook definition of perceptual constancy towards a more thorough theoretical conception of this phenomenon. Hence, despite the fact that plants cannot perceive, they may help us to gain a better understanding of what perception is.

ASPECT PERCEPTION AND IMMERSION IN VIRTUAL REALITY

Radek Schuster

Pilsen, Czech Republic

The goal of this paper is to bring philosophical theorizing about perception into the context of the virtual reality (VR) computer/language game. Wittgenstein's analysis of aspect perception will be applied to the concept of virtual reality immersion. Wittgenstein's puzzle of seeing-as – when we can see that a picture-object has not changed, and yet we can see it differently, will then be dissolved in the VR computer/language game. As a conclusion, technology will be treated as a kind of language that allows us to redefine our epistemological concepts. Accordingly, the concept of "immersion" will be understood as a grammatical rule that enables us to distinguish between the terms "reality", "augmented reality" and "virtual reality" without making serious ontological commitments.

WHAT'S TRIVIAL ABOUT RELATIVE VALUE? WITTGENSTEIN'S *LECTURE ON ETHICS* RECONSIDERED

Daniel Sharp

New York, USA

This paper explores Wittgenstein's conception of relative value in *Lecture on Ethics.* It argues that the category admits of three different interpretations, each of which suggests a distinct criticism of absolute value, but none of which renders relative value judgments trivial.

GOETHE AND WITTGENSTEIN ON THE PERCEPTION OF COLOR

Richard Sherlock

Utah, USA

The influence of Goethe on Wittgenstein is by now well established. This influence is especially to be noted in Wittgenstein's later work *Philosophical Investigations* and *Remarks on Color.* In this paper I wish to focus on a neglected area of commonality, the overlap in their ways of doing philosophy. I will focus on their work on the perception of color in Wittgenstein's *Remarks on Color* and Goethe's *Farbenlehre.*

WITTGENSTEINS WELT

Hans Sluga

Berkeley, USA

Die Welt ist ein zentrales Anliegen der Frühphilosophie Wittgensteins. In seinen Notizbüchern von 1914-18, im *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, und in seiner „Vorlesung zur Ethik" kommt Wittgenstein immer wieder auf den Begriff der Welt zurück. Dann wird es vergleichsmäßig still zu diesem Thema. Aber auch in Wittgensteins späteren Denken spielt der Begriff der Welt eine Rolle, insbesondere in *Über Gewissheit*, wo von anderen Welten und Weltbildern die Rede ist.
„Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist." Was bedeutet der erste Satz des *Tractatus*? Was heißt es, dass die Welt meine Welt ist? Warum kommt das Subjekt nicht in der Welt vor? Warum kann es in der Welt keine Werte geben? Was sind die ethischen Implikationen dieser Weltauffassung?
Was heißt es, wie Wittgenstein zum Abschluss des *Tractatus* schreibt, die Welt richtig zu sehen? Und wieso

muss man dazu erst einmal die philosophischen Sätze aufgeben?

WITTGENSTEIN'S PASSIONATE PERCEPTION OF THE WORLD

Ilse Somavilla

Innsbruck, Austria

Starting from von Wright's remark that Wittgenstein's seriousness of character sprang from a passionate heart, I will focus on the aspects of passion and suffering as obvious in Wittgenstein's personal remarks. Besides, I will show how his passionate nature influenced his way of perceiving the world and of writing philosophy – as reflected in a never-ending process of looking at the objects of his philosophizing, along with an obsessive search for finding the adequate way of grasping and putting them into language.

WEISEN DER VERGEGENWÄRTIGUNG. IN DER SPRACHE DER *PHILOSOPHISCHEN UNTERSUCHUNGEN*

Line Soryano

Köln, Deutschland, Paris, Frankreich

Wittgenstein begnügt sich nicht damit, *über* Beobachtung und Wahrnehmung zu schreiben, sondern gestaltet auch durch eine Reihe von Stil- und Schreibverfahren seinen Text so, dass dieser die Bedeutung von Beobachtung und Wahrnehmung veranschaulicht und konkretisiert. Insbesondere anhand der im Text zahlreichen deiktischen und performativen Wendungen führen die *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* dem Leser das Hier und Jetzt seines Lesens vor Auge. So machen sie ihn ständig der Gegenwärtigkeit bewusst, die sicherlich eine wesentliche Komponente jeder Wahrnehmung und jeder Beobachtung ist. Diese ‚Weisen der Vergegenwärtigung' sind es, denen ich in folgendem Vortrag nachgehen will.

EINE PHILOSOPHISCHE UNTERSUCHUNG DES PERSPEKTIVENBEGRIFFS

Mandy Stake

Bonn, Deutschland

Dem Begriff der Perspektive wurde bisher, trotz seiner umfangreichen und bis in die Antike zurückreichenden sprachlichen Verwendung, erstaunlich wenig explizit philosophische Beachtung zuteil. Diesen Umstand möchte ich zum Anlass nehmen, um eine kurze Übersicht über die Verwendung und Bedeutung des Begriffs der Perspektive zu erarbeiten. Eine sehr etablierte Meinung scheint zu sein, dass man Perspektiven *einnehmen* kann. Ich werde begründen, warum ich diese Annahme für widersinnig halte.

MAPPING THE TRACTATUS

David Stern

Iowa City, USA

An introduction to the University of Iowa Tractatus Map, including a brief history, a rationale, and a discussion of plans for future development. That project builds on a pair of subway-style maps of the numbering system used in the *Tractatus* and the *Prototractatus* that display those books' structures. The talk will use a pair of wall-size maps and a handout and will not presuppose knowledge of our online map tool, which is available at: http://tractatus.lib.uiowa.edu/
I will argue that that our Tractatus map's visually compelling presentation of the numbering system of that book delivers on Wittgenstein's cryptic claim in a letter to his publisher that it is the numbers that "make the book surveyable and clear". It also has far-reaching implications for the interpretation of that text, and its relationship to earlier drafts.

COMMUNICATING PERCEPTUAL CONTENT: MARTY'S DOUBTS

Hamid Taieb

Geneva, Switzerland, Salzburg, Austria

This paper presents the relation between meaning and perceptual content in Anton Marty. For Marty, meaning is (partly) understood in terms of the content of mental acts. Yet perceptual content never constitutes the meaning of linguistic expressions. Communication requires the utterer and the speaker to grasp *the same* content. To this extent, meaning is always conceptual. However, Marty admits that we can talk of what we perceive, but must do so via *concepts of intuitions*. Such concepts comprise indexicals and intentional verbs: e.g. "this, that I see". The meaning of indexicals is understood in terms of definite descriptions, which are conceptual. Thus, what is *given in perception* is never *given in language*.

BOUNDLESS

Charles Travis

London, UK

How can perceptual experience reveal the truth to us? How can it bear for us on what (or how) to think? Consider a way for something to relate to something such that, depending on how A is, for A so to relate to B may be, *eo ipso*, for B to be true. There is such a relation, for example, between the thought that Sid drinks and Pia writes and the thought that Pia writes. Here the way that first item must be is specifiable. The way it is: being true. The relation is thus truth-transmitting. In such a relation B, a potential truth, must be something conceptually structured. Now an idea: So, too, A; there are such relations only between conceptually structured things. An idea with some currency. On it, the conceptual is, so to speak, unbounded. In Wittgenstein's mocking words, "one cannot step outside it, one must always turn back again. There is no outside, outside there is no air to breathe" (*Investigations* §103). But this idea misconceives radically the business of representing-as, and it is disastrous. For, first, it erases the conceptual altogether. Second, it encourages a sort of desperate reverse-psychologism, with which empirical psychological theses masquerade as conceptual necessities. So the conceptual is bounded. Some relations are, not truth-transmitting, but truth yielding. All this the present brief.

THE EXTENDED COGNITION THESIS IN THE SERVICE OF DIRECT PERCEPTION – A CRITICAL SURVEY

Barbara Trybulec

Lublin, Poland

In the paper, the role of the extended cognition thesis in the debate on direct perception will be analyzed. In particular, the focus will be on the dynamic system theory

which is recognized as providing the criterion of the extended cognitive system. The identification of an extended cognitive system with the dynamic system is used by Anthony Chemero to argue in favor of direct perception. The object and agent of perception jointly constitute a dynamic system, hence the former is directly present within the agent's cognitive system. This argument is undermined by Orestis Palermos' remark that the object of perception cannot constitute a dynamic system with the agent, for it does not stand in appropriate mutual relationship with the agent's perceptual system. The present paper attempts to provide a possible solution to this concern. Palermos' argument misses its target if the object of perception is recognized not as an external entity independent of the agent's cognitive system, but as an affordance.

THE DUAL NATURE OF PICTURE PERCEPTION.
PALEOLITHIC PICTURES BEYOND CONSTRUCTIVIST AND ECOLOGICAL ACCOUNTS

Marcin Trybulec

Lublin, Poland

The paper presents an argument that in order to reconstruct picture perception in the Paleolithic era one cannot apply ecological psychology or constructivist theory. Both sides of the debate on picture perception do not clearly distinguish between mere picture perception and recognition of pictures as representations. Material Engagement Theory developed by L. Malafouris is applied in order to highlight that this is a symptom of the representational fallacy implied by both constructivists and ecological positions. The representational fallacy hinders proper understanding of the dual nature of picture perception.

HOW TO THINK ABOUT THE REPRESENTATIONAL CONTENT OF VISUAL EXPERIENCE

Michael Tye

Austin Texas, USA

A number of different theses concerning the representational content of visual experience are canvassed and a new proposal is made. It is shown that the new proposal accounts satisfactorily both for hallucinatory experiences and for the justificatory role visual experiences play.

A SERIOUS MAN AND ATTITUDE: THE COEN BROTHERS AS WITTGENSTEINIAN FILMMAKERS

Martin Urschel

Oxford, UK

The Coen Brothers have directed a number of films with Wittgensteinian themes, but particularly 'A Serious Man' tackles philosophical worries associated with philosophy of religion and philosophy of mathematics. These philosophical worries can be traced back into Ethan Coen's Bachelor's thesis on the Late Wittgenstein's philosophy, which makes some interesting points on its own. By comparing these academic arguments to the film's version of dealing with the same problems it can be shown

how the film's more mature treatment of the same themes takes a Wittgensteinian form.

YOUNG WITTGENSTEIN'S ACCOUNT OF THE WILL, ACTION AND EXPECTATION

Miroslav Vacura

Prague, Czech Republic

This paper focuses on young and "middle" Ludwig Wittgenstein's reflections on nature of will, action and expectation. It is argued that if empiricist lines of thought in Wittgenstein's work are followed he appears to consider imperative sentences as near-identical or even reducible to sentences expressing expectations. Firstly, Wittgenstein's account of imperative sentences (commands) will be established; thereupon an investigation into the preliminary structure of obeying command will be undertaken as the basis of further discussion. In following paragraphs, we will analyze Wittgenstein's view on the relation of act to will, briefly discussing the concept of will itself. To conclude the paper is a discussion of the nature of expectation and its fulfillment. Wittgenstein's philosophical development is briefly alluded to only where relevant to the discussion.

ON DOUBTING AND IMAGINING

Kristina Veinbender

Prague, Czech Republic

The goal of this paper is to investigate the role of imagining as a foundation for doubting in Wittgenstein's *On Certainty*. In this paper I argue that imagining alternatives to existing situation within a language game is what underlies doubting. In my paper I distinguish between imagining within a game and imagining a new game. The former one is referring to doubting in Wittgensteinian sense since it provides alternatives within the existing game struggling to be the true one. In contrast imagining a new game cannot be identified with doubting since it requires reimagining the hinge foundation of the game or the life form.

PAIN AND TOUCH

Frédérique de Vignemont

Paris, France

When one contrasts pain with the classic five senses, discussions generally focus on vision, which is taken as the paradigmatic example of perception, but it may be more interesting to compare it with a more closely related sense, namely touch. Here I will argue that the spatial phenomenology of pain shares some key features with touch by contrast to sight, but these similarities should not make us neglect major differences between them. I shall then draw the consequences of their respective spatial phenomenology for the sense of bodily ownership.

THE PRESENTATIVITY OF PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCES

Alberto Voltolini

Torino, Italy

As is well known, direct realism on perception claims that we straightforwardly perceive objects and properties of the world. In this paper, I will try to show how the phenomenological datum according to which perceptual experiences have a presentational character can be explained in direct realist's terms both for perceptions

(both veridical and nonveridical) and for hallucinations. This prompts me to drop the naive realist account of the datum. It also lets me see the presentational character and the (singular) representational content of perceptual experiences as independent.

DESIGNED FOR PICKPOCKETS. THE ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO PERCEPTION IN (A)SOCIAL WORLD

Witold Wachowski & Krystian Bogucki

Warsaw, Poland

Our purpose is to sketch a theoretical framework for the research on sociocultural dimension of perception, including so-called abnormal cases. Integration of some findings in ecological psychology and in design literature can be useful in cognitive studies on human–artifact interactions in society. We claim that the question what it is like to be a pickpocket is also a question about cognitive structure of his material and social environment, including the role of affordances. We have decided to use movies by Robert Bresson to show some aspects of cognitive engineering of acting people.

CONCEPTS OLD AND NEW: HOW CONCEPTUAL CHANGE EXPLAINS MEANING-MAKING AND IDENTITY-FORMATION

Désirée Weber

Wooster, USA

Wittgenstein's later work provides valuable insights into how concepts gain meaning and the conditions under which they change. Without foundational principles to rely upon, it is our continuous interaction in language-games which helps to explain how the concepts and norms that shape our forms of life are established, perpetuated or challenged through our use of language. Practices and our lived experiences, then, take center stage in understanding the formation of norms and normativity – as well as our individual and collective identities within shared language-games.

OBSERVABILITY AND UNOBSERVABILITY

Paul Weingartner

Salzburg, Austria

The paper discusses different stages beginning with observable facts via different degrees of observer-invariance to indirect and partial observability. Finally, important cases of unobservability are described in science and in religion.

TYPEN VON TOP-DOWN-EFFEKTEN. WELCHE TOP-DOWN-EFFEKTE AUF DIE VISUELLE WAHRNEHMUNG KÖNNEN FÄLLE KOGNITIVER PENETRATION SEIN?

Hannes Wendler

Heidelberg, Deutschland

Die Debatte über kognitive Penetration der visuellen Wahrnehmung hängt von der Interpretation unterschiedlicher Top-Down-Effekte in den Kognitionswissenschaften ab. Hier werden konzeptuell Typen von Top-Down-Effekten unterschieden, von denen

nur einer Fälle der kognitiven Penetration enthalten kann. Diese allgemeinen Typen können nützlich sein, um Forschungsprojekte zu planen und Forschungsbefunde zu interpretieren, wenn es um die Feststellung kognitiver Penetration geht.

PERCEPTION IN KANT, MCDOWELL, AND BURGE

Christian Helmut Wenzel

Taipei, Taiwan

Kant sometimes compares human beings with animals and angels and grants human beings a middle position. But contrary to what one might expect, his transcendental philosophy does not apply well to animals or angels. The question of whether we share perception with animals has no good answer in his system that has to be taken as a single piece and does not allow for introducing steps of empirical, real developments. Differently from Kant, McDowell does compare human beings with animals, but he is not a transcendental philosopher and his attempts to find support in Kant are problematic. Although McDowell says that concepts go "all the way out" and Kant says the categories go "all the way down," which sounds similar, Kant talks of a priori categories, not empirical concepts. Burge is definitely not a transcendental philosopher like Kant. Up front he strongly relies on empirical studies, especially animal perception. Nevertheless, his quest into mental content introduces first-person perspectives that have a metaphysical flavor, and this makes - at least to me - comparisons with Kant tempting again.

A NOTE ON RHEES, THE BEMERKUNGEN ÜBER FRAZERS "THE GOLDEN BOUGH" AND ÜBER GEWIßHEIT

Peter K. Westergaard

Copenhagen, Denmark

This paper calls attention to and outlines Rhees' suggestion to publish Wittgenstein's *Bemerkungen über Frazers "The Golden Bough"* together with *Über Gewißheit* in connection with the first German edition of the latter with Suhrkamp in 1970. The presentation of Rhees' proposal and its outcome is based on the correspondence between Rhees, Anscombe and von Wright, and on material found in Rhees' literary estate. The paper illuminates Rhees' work as one of the executors of Wittgenstein's *Nachlass*.

PERCEIVING ELECTRIC FIELDS. WEYL ON INTENTIONALITY, PERCEPTION, AND MODELS

Harald A. Wiltsche

Graz, Austria

Given their ubiquity in many areas of scientific practice, it is no surprise that the literature on scientific models has vastly expanded over the last several years. However, despite this increased interest, there is still a number of fundamental questions that need to be resolved. Besides the general epistemological question of how models aid us in acquiring knowledge about reality, issues concerning representation play a particularly important role in the contemporary discussion. It is easy to see why: A model can only teach us something about reality if we assume that the model is successful in representing the aspects of the world we are interested in. Hence, what is needed is an answer to the question of how the representational

capacities of models are brought about: In virtue of what is a model a representation of an independent target system? A second, closely related question concerns the ontology of models. While material models such as scale models may not pose much of a problem, the ontological status of physically unrealizable models such as a Newtonian two-body system is not so easy to determine. Are models of this kind set-theoretical structures, equations, fictional entities, descriptions or yet something else?

The purpose of my talk is to contribute to the ongoing discussion about scientific models. Yet, in doing so, I will draw on the works of one of the most important mathematicians and theoretical physicists of the 20th century, Hermann Weyl. As I will show, Weyl proposed a highly original account on modeling techniques in the natural sciences. However, as I shall also argue, Weyl's contribution was widely ignored because of his leanings towards Husserlian phenomenology, a philosophical framework that many physicists, mathematicians and philosophers of science find hard to understand. Hence, one of the aims of my talk is to give a brief description of Edmund Husserl's theory of horizonal intentionality. It is this theory that Weyl uses in order to explain how models aid us in achieving knowledge about the world. It is one of the consequences of Weyl's account that cases of model-based knowledge acquisition and cases of ordinary perception have much more in common than is usually assumed.

THE NON-PERCEPTUAL VIEW AND AN ALTERNATIVE THEORY OF HALLUCINATIONS

Sachin Yadav
Jaipur, India

The non-perceptual view has had a strong impact on the philosophy of perception and when coupled with the possibility of hallucinations, it opens an easy route to rejecting relationalism. Relationalism as a theory of perceptual states is typically dismissed on the grounds that its commitment to a common factor is incompatible with the non-perceptual view of hallucinations. But if an illusionist theory of hallucinations is tenable, then the non-perceptual view of hallucinations is not a view that relationalists about perception must accept. An alternative illusionist theory of hallucinations allows us to maintain that hallucinations do involve perceptual contact with the surroundings. We have little reason to think that any of our basic observations about hallucinations establish that hallucinations are independent from their surroundings. Nor is this established by the fact that hallucinations do not systematically vary with the surroundings.

INTENTIONALITY, GENERALITY AND GRAMMATICAL SPACE

Pascal Zambito
Cambridge, UK

The later Wittgenstein's treatment of intentionality is characterised by a rejection of mental representation and by a focus on grammatical rules like 'the thought that p is the thought made true by the fact that p'. This has been criticised for being an incomplete and therefore insufficient conception of intentionality, because it does not account for cases in which a general expectation is fulfilled by a specific event that was not foreseen: the thought that p can be fulfilled by the fact that q. Although this argument has

been shown to be problematic, I want to take it as a starting point to think in a different direction: Wittgenstein considered generality a serious problem, which is related to the concepts of infinite possibility and indefiniteness that are central to his later philosophy. Mainly discussed in mathematical contexts, they can help us to better understand intentionality too.

PICTURE VERSUS LANGUAGE: AN INVESTIGATION ON WITTGENSTEIN'S MATHEMATICAL GENERALITY

Wei Zeng
Nagoya, Japan

Although Wittgenstein writes more on mathematics than on any other subject, it has been thought for a long time that his philosophy of mathematics 'does not contain much gold'. The vagueness in significant notions of his philosophy of mathematics, such as 'mathematical proof', 'surveyability', 'mathematical generality' etc, might be the most important reason for this criticism. However, in my viewpoint, these terms could be understood in a better way, if one does not examine them independently, but considers them as different expressions to deliver one single idea, i.e. distinguishing what are the real problems of mathematics and what are the problems of our language. In this paper, I shall examine Wittgenstein's arguments on the 'prose/calculus' distinction, generality and 'proof as a picture of experiment', to find the internal relation between them, which might help us to get closer to Wittgenstein's idea on philosophy of mathematics.

UNCONSCIOUS PERCEPTION AND PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE

Paweł Jakub Zięba
Cracow, Poland

It has been objected recently that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported hypothesis that unconscious perception is possible. Because epistemological disjunctivism is plausible only in conjunction with naïve realism (for a reason I provide), the objection reaches it too. In response, I show that the unconscious perception hypothesis can be changed from a problem into an advantage of epistemological disjunctivism. I do this by suggesting that: (i) naïve realism is consistent with the hypothesis; (ii) the contrast between epistemological disjunctivism and epistemic externalism explains the difference in epistemic import between conscious and unconscious perception.

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