Kurzfassungen / Abstracts

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42nd International Wittgenstein Symposium
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UNPOPULAR SOVEREIGNTIES: CITIZENSHIP, PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY

Richard Amesbury
Tempe, Arizona, USA

So-called democratic states rest upon acts of violence and exclusion which cannot themselves be justified democratically. Yet, much contemporary political theory takes these configurations for granted as the context for philosophical reflection. This paper explores some of the spatio-temporal paradoxes of popular sovereignty as conventionally understood – i.e., as the authorization of government through the consent of “the people.” I argue that, instead of treating the borders of popular sovereignty as given, philosophical reflection on political authority would benefit from greater attention to their continual contestation and critique.

WITTGENSTEIN: NEITHER A REALIST NOR AN IDEALIST

N. Sena Arslan
Istanbul, Turkey

This essay looks into later Wittgenstein’s linguistic anti-realism and whether it is a kind of idealism. I consider Dilman’s reading of Wittgenstein as an opponent of philosophical realism in the traditional sense, without committing himself to linguistic idealism. Taking account of Dilman’s “dimensions of reality,” the first part explains the distinction between the “discourse of objects” and the “grammatical discourse” as found in Wittgenstein, highlighting the role of this clarification in the assessment of our classifications and system of reference. Then an examination of Williams’ interpretation of Wittgenstein as an idealist follows. The second part discusses that Williams’ charge carries a traditionally realist expectation which an idealist follows. The second part discusses that Williams’ charge carries a traditionally realist expectation which an idealist follows. Wittgenstein aims to debunk through a grammatical clarification in the first place.

THE QUESTION OF VALUE IN SCIENCE

Maria Baghramian
Dublin, Ireland

This paper addresses the traditional question of the place of values in science and proposes an alternative to the more standard approaches. It is generally accepted that the practice of science, as well as decisions to accept or reject a scientific theory, involve so-called “epistemic” or cognitive values – values such as consistency, simplicity, accuracy and explanatory power (see for instance Kuhn 1977). The more vexing issues regarding the role of value in science, I will argue, may be framed not in terms of the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values, nor in terms of the direct and indirect reliance on values as Heathcr Douglas (2009) has proposed, but by using a virtue epistemic framework. The focus in this approach is on the continuities between the epistemic virtues of good science and their moral counterparts. I will argue for this point by focusing on the virtues of trustworthiness, integrity and humility, virtues that have both epistemic and moral dimensions.

THE TREE OF THE TRACTATUS: WITTGENSTEIN’S PICTURE OF EYE AND FIELD OF SIGHT

Luciano Bazzocchi
Siena, Italy

“The Tractatus must be read in accordance with the numbering system, and that demands that the reader follow the text after the manner of a logical tree” (Hacker). “Suddenly the internal references between the remarks of the book become quite clear” (Kuusela). Indeed, the tree-reading that follows Wittgenstein’s numbering faithfully, “makes the book perspicuous and clear: without the numbering, the book would be an incomprehensible jumble” (Wittgenstein). In addition, the whole section 5.6 on the limits of language and world, until now a Calvary for the serial reader, becomes readable and meaningful. It can be seen that the section is not in favour of Schopenhauer’s hypotheses, but against them. The only puzzle that remains is the absurd figure of 5.6331, representing an eye inside, laughably, its own field of sight. But never has Wittgenstein depicted such an inconsistent picture: in his manuscripts and typescripts, he always drew (to criticise it) “how people imagine the shape of the visual field to be” (Wittgenstein). The incredible editorial error, and consequently the nonsense of all the commentators, derive from the apparent obscurity of the section and the biases of the sequential reading. We show that even Ramsey, the English translator, and Ogden, the editor, did not understand proposition 5.6331 and Wittgenstein corrected them twice in vain.

AGENCY AND AUTHORSHIP: TOWARDS A SOCIALLY SITUATED, INTERACTIONIST VIEW

Federica Berdini
Munich, Germany

This paper relates cases of socially displaced and distorted agency, i.e., agency exercised in conditions of oppression, to Christine Korsgaard’s constitutivist authorship view of agency. In light of a potential problem that these cases pose to Korsgaard’s view, I suggest amending it by incorporating Anscombe’s characterisation of intentional action (and relying on a Wittgensteinian interpretation thereof).
KNOWLEDGE IN CRISIS: METHODOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO REALISM AND RELATIVISM
Gernot A. Biermeier
Innsbruck, Austria

In recent years a tendency of thought called social constructivism has grown rise (once more) to the idea that our scientific endeavours are merely one among many equally right ways to attain knowledge, which leads destructively to a relativism of knowledge and therefore science. This theory, which has a strong foothold among the humanities, states in its most extreme form that there are no mind-independent facts, but only socially constructed facts, which are influenced by contingent social needs and interests. Following this, objectivity does not exist and therefore neither does objective science and knowledge production. Paul Boghossian argues (rather harshly) against such relativistic points of view from a (classical) realistic standpoint. In this paper I offer a third approach for interpreting the role played by facts. I will do this by adopting a methodological constructivist’s point of view. The solution lies, as so often, somewhere in the middle, with the idea of an (maybe not) objective – or at least intersubjective – science, which clearly seems to be worth saving.

WHAT IS BIODIVERSITY AND WHY SHOULD WE FEEL OBLIGED TO PROTECT IT?
Dieter Birnbacher
Düsseldorf, Germany

For a philosopher biodiversity is a challenge for at least two reasons: 1. How is biodiversity defined? What constitutes biodiversity? 2. Why is the conservation of biodiversity important? – The talk makes an attempt to clarify the first issue by isolating a number of component factors that influence the measurement and the appraisal of diversity in general: Is diversity a value at all? Is diversity intrinsically valuable or only in dependence of other values? What of this applies to biodiversity? The second question is answered by a want-Regarding and future-oriented ethics: Biodiversity is important because of the diversity of the aspects humans seek in nature and the expectation that, with the ongoing process of civilization, natural variety will become more and more a scarce and correspondingly valuable resource.

SATISFYING WITTGENSTEIN’S DEMANDS OF A “CORRECT LOGICAL NOTATION”: QUANTIFICATIONAL POLYADIC PREDICATE LOGIC WITH A SINGLE OPERATOR AND NO IDENTITY-SIGN
Edgar C. Boedeker, Jr.
Cedar Falls, Iowa, USA

A notation, \( \mathcal{L}_{\text{nat}} \), is introduced that, for the first time, satisfies everything Wittgenstein in the Tractatus demands of a “correct logical notation”. The semantics of \( \mathcal{L}_{\text{nat}} \) are “weakly exclusive”: extensions of constant names and variables are stipulated not with an identity-sign, but via difference of signs and scopes of operations. \( \mathcal{L}_{\text{nat}} \) features a single, novel operator: \( \text{Not}(\xi) \), a jointly-negating quantifier. Given the notation’s weakly-exclusive semantics, if \( \xi \), …, \( \xi \) are propositions, none of which contain free variables, \( \text{Not}(\xi \land \ldots \land \xi) \) is true if and only if each result of uniformly substituting constants for free occurrences of \( a \) in \( \xi \), …, \( \xi \) is false. A translation-procedure is presented from \( \mathcal{L}_{\text{nat}} \) into a large segment of standard first-order polyadic predicate calculus with identity, where expressions of the form \( x \neq y \) are interpreted as indicating notational conventions governing extensional differences among signs. \( \mathcal{L}_{\text{nat}} \) is shown to be consistent with Wittgenstein’s claim that some sentences of standard logic are nonsensical, but inconsistent with his claim that all sentences purporting to assert that \( n \) objects exist are nonsensical.

ECOLOGICAL CITIZENSHIP AND COSMOPOLITAN CITIZENSHIP
Michel Bourban
Kiel, Germany

Ecological citizenship and cosmopolitan citizenship are two models of political community that have developed over the last three decades. While they are both based on the conviction that justice extends beyond the borders of nation-states, the two theoretical models have developed mostly separately, and even sometimes in opposition. Most notably, Andrew Dobson (2003: 10-32) claims in Citizenship and the Environment that ecological citizenship is “post-cosmopolitan”. This paper explores the two kinds of citizenship in order to see if they can converge on their theoretical foundations and practical implications. It proposes two strategies: the first, critical, focuses on the theoretical level and looks for weaknesses in the objections Dobson makes to the cosmopolitan citizenship model; the second, more constructive, focuses on the practical level and finds convergences on the concrete implications that both models have for individual agents’ ethical behavior.

IDIOTS AND IDIOTS: WHAT WE (SHOULD) CRITICIZE WHEN WE CRITICIZE SEXIST ACTION
Christine Bratu
Munich, Germany

Many believe that when we criticize an action as sexist, we thereby issue a statement about the agent’s state of mind, e.g. that she had false beliefs about or hateful attitudes towards women. In this talk, I take issue with this mentalistic understanding of sexist action. I start with the observation that, intuitively, we consider “sexist” to be a thick ethical concept, so that to state that an action was sexist is to say something about its wrong-making features. Then I argue – against those who have recently championed the idea of a genuinely doxastic morality – that we cannot wrong other people simply in virtue of the mental attitudes we have about them. Just as we are normatively free to do stupid, ugly or even self-destructive things with our bodies as long as we do not harm anybody else, we are normatively free to hold stupid, ugly or even hateful mental attitudes about other people as long as we do not thereby harm them. Finally, I claim that, given a sensible theory of well-being, we cannot harm each other simply in virtue of our mental attitudes. Were we to call an action sexist in virtue of the agent’s states of mind, we would therefore fail to track its wrong-making feature. Instead we should go with the consequentialist understanding of sexist action feminists have long argued for. To criticize an action as sexist is to claim that it selectively harms women.
FORMS OF LIFE AND SOCIAL CRITIQUE: PASOLINI AFTER WITTGENSTEIN
Silver Bronzo
Moscow, Russia

Drawing on Pier Paolo Pasolini and his appropriation of Wittgenstein, this paper argues for the possibility of a radical sort of social critique based on the notion of form of life: the members of a society may not only have an objectionable form of life, but also lack a form of life altogether.

MYTHS OF MERITOCRACY AND PHILOSOPHICAL CULTURE
Eyja M. Brynjarsdóttir
Reykjavík, Iceland

It is a prominent myth in our culture that people usually get what they deserve in accordance with their merit. The temptation of this myth can be very strong for those who do well: we all like to believe that we truly deserve the good things in our lives and we may even feel that we have worked hard to achieve them. However, when various aspects of the world are examined, it should become quite clear that this is rarely the way things really work. The distribution of good things in the world is dependent on so many other things than people’s merit. Philosophical practice and culture have been criticized for their exclusion of women and minorities, most likely to be traced to many contributing factors. One such factor is the gaslighting of women in philosophy: women working in philosophy throughout the ages have gotten the message that they are attempting to do something that they are not really worthy or fit to do, and their experiences of unjust treatment have been systemically dismissed as a problem on an individual level. In this talk, I argue that belief in the existence of a meritocracy causes harm, not only to both the “winners” and the “losers” on an individual level but to the culture on a social level. I discuss this both in the context of issues such as economic injustice and in the context of philosophical practice.

AN AUTHORITATIVE ATTITUDE TO THE LIMITS OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
Shih-Hsun Chen & Tzu-Keng Fu
Pilsen, Czech Republic & Taoyuan, Taiwan

In this paper, we defend the value free ideal (VFI) in the philosophy of science by extending Stephen John’s argument. We do so by showing that the methodological critique about VFI is unsatisfactory and offering an alternative solution by arguing that endorsing the so-called “non-epistemic value” is not the only solution for the uncertain connection between evidence and conclusions. We use the concept “research purposes” or “the purposes of having an individual scientific theory” as an approach to case analysis. We argue that although scientific hypotheses, especially policy-related ones, may not meet main social priorities (such as morality and social justice), and in some cases, will incur a huge social cost, the value judgments included in these hypotheses may not be an inappropriate non-epistemic value. Some of these value judgments can also be a preference for the epistemic value of knowledge based on the premise of maintaining scientific authority. As for the case studies put forward by many philosophers, it might be better to distinguish each case individually by each specific problem to understand whether it is due to the limits of scientific research at that time or some inappropriate value judgments in scientific reasoning per se.

A CRITIQUE OF A FRUITLESS DEBATE IN MORAL COGNITIVISM
Yanzhou Chen
Norwich, United Kingdom

In this paper, I first discuss the current debate among traditional normative realists who are haunted by the notorious “placement problem”, and I argue that the debate reaches a stalemate: reductive naturalism is vulnerable to what I call the normative challenge, while non-naturalism risks of violating a broadly scientific naturalist world-picture. Next, by appealing to Price’s Wittgensteinian work, I suggest that the doctrine of representationalism, which triggers the placement problem, is non-compulsory and that the rejection of it will not automatically lead to non-cognitivism: on the contrary, the truth-aptness of normative judgment that is the hallmark of cognitivism, is shown to be a fundamental aspect of our life.

POLITISCHE KRISSE UND KRITIK IM HISTORISCHEN KONTEXT
Ridha Chenoufi
Tunis, Tunesien


WITTGENSTEIN ON THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF SIGN AND SYMBOL
James Conant
Leipzig, Germany

The talk will begin by arguing that Wittgenstein, both early and late, rejects the idea that the logically simpler and more fundamental case is that of “the mere sign” and that what a meaningful symbol is can be explained through the elaboration of an appropriately supplemented conception.
of the sign: the sign plus something (say, an interpretation or an assignment of meaning). Rather the sign, in the logically fundamental case of its mode of occurrence, is an internal aspect of the symbol. The *Tractatus* puts this point as follows: “The sign is that in the symbol which is perceptible by the senses.” Conversely, this means that it is essential to a symbol – to what a symbol is – that it have an essentially perceptible aspect. It will be argued that for Wittgenstein there is no privileged direction of explanatory priority between symbol and sign here: without signs there are no signs (hence the philosopher’s concept of the essentially “merely linguistic” presupposes an internal relation to symbols).

**COMPREHENSIVE PHILOSOPHY IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE**

Claudio Costa
Natal, Rio Grande do Norte, Brazil

This short paper is motivated by Susan Haack’s critique of contemporary approaches in mainstream philosophy. According to her, much of today’s academic philosophy is committed to an institutionalized scientific treatment of philosophical problems which fragments the philosophical quest in ways that make it unable to deal adequately with its real problems. I hope to add some further, more balanced explanations to her diagnosis. I also speculate about the chances of comprehensive philosophical work in this scenario, and finally, about the forms this kind of work could take in an increasingly science-dominated world.

**WITTGENSTEIN DOES CRITICAL THEORY**

Alice Crary
Oxford, United Kingdom

This lecture is about pivotal but oft-neglected challenges of liberating social criticism. Its primary concern is an account of the nature of critical social thought that, while intuitively attractive, goes missing in many philosophical conversations about such thought. This is because the account presupposes a heterodox conception of rationality that often is not even registered as a legitimate possibility, much less seriously examined. Yet the relevant conception of rationality informs influential philosophical treatments of liberating social criticism, including, for instance, some notable recent contributions to Critical Theory. It is possible to mount a defense of this conception, thereby providing support for the appealing image of critique it brings within reach, by reconstructing – with various qualifications and additions – an argument from mid-twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy of the social sciences, viz., the argument that forms the backbone of Peter Winch’s *The Idea of a Social Science*. Winch draws his guiding insights from the later philosophy of Wittgenstein, and one payoff of considering Winch’s work against the backdrop of con-genial work in Critical Theory is contesting the artificial professional strictures sometimes taken to speak against reaching across the ‘Continental Divide’ in philosophy. The larger payoff of this ecumenical method – and the main concern of this lecture – is advancing the enterprise of liberating social criticism.

**IDEALE UND KRITIK: ZUR AUFGABE UND METHODE POLITISCHER PHILOSOPHIE**

Julian Culp
Paris, Frankreich

Dieser Aufsatz zeichnet die Konflikte der Debatte um ideale und nicht-ideale Gerechtigkeitstheorie kurz nach und skizziert hierfür zunächst die durch John Rawls zur Bekanntheit gelangte ideale Theorie. Daran anschließend stellt er die Argumente vor, die Philosophen wie Amartya Sen für eine nicht-ideal angelegte politische Philosophie im Feld führen. In einer kritischen Erwiderung auf Sen erläutert dieser Aufsatz dann, weshalb politische Philosophie weder ausschließlich ideal-theoretisch noch ausschließlich nicht-idealtheoretisch betrieben werden sollte. Hierbei wird dieser Aufsatz allerdings nicht nur dafür argumentieren, dass die ideale und die nicht-ideale Theorie als separate, sich aber komplementär ergänzende Theorieteile verstanden werden müssen. Vielmehr wird er auch die bislang noch nicht vertretene Auffassung verteidigen, dass ideale und nicht-ideale Theorie als wechselseitig abhängig bzw. als wechselseitig ermöglichen oder gleichursprünglich auffassen sind, und deswegen weder die ideale noch die nicht-ideale Theorie als vorrangig betrachtet werden darf.

**WITTGENSTEIN’S REASONABLE MAN AND INTERACTIONIST APPROACHES TO REASON**

Stefanie Dach
Pilsen, Czech Republic

My paper focuses on the concept of reason and “the reasonable man” in Wittgenstein’s *On Certainty*. I argue that Wittgenstein’s remarks on the reasonable man create at least two questions: whether reason is a substantial concept and whether we must accept relativism about reason. I show that an interactionist understanding of reason, developed among others by authors influenced by Wittgenstein, can help circumvent these two problems. I argue that an interactionist approach to reason can be vaguely discerned in some remarks in *On Certainty*, but is intermingled with a more traditional understanding of reason.

**THE MYSTICAL AND THE CRITIQUE OF SCIENTISM**

Haiqiang Dai
Beijing, China

Wittgenstein’s early philosophy has a special attitude towards the natural sciences. His analysis of the logical structures of propositions reaches to a particular result with regard to the laws of nature, causal form and scientific principle. In this essay, I will argue that Wittgenstein’s treatment of natural science has two important points: one is that the investigation of the nature of science has an important relation to his interest in ethics, especially the mystical; the other is that his view about the nature of scientific propositions provides a useful perspective to rebut scientism.
THINKING ABOUT NATURALISM AND PRAGMATISM: WITTGENSTEIN AND RORTY
Cora Diamond
Charlottesville, Virginia, USA

I discuss Wittgenstein’s thought in relation to that of Richard Rorty. Rorty counts Wittgenstein as one of “us pragmatists”, which involves (as Rorty says) a “repackaging” of Wittgenstein. I examine first what is in the Rortyan packaging, and then I consider the contrast between Wittgenstein and Rorty on what naturalism comes to for them. I will bring out how their different conceptions of naturalism hang together with their totally different philosophical aims.

“A METHOD HAS NOW BEEN FOUND”: WITTGENSTEIN VS. FRAZER
Alexandra Dias Fortes
Lisbon, Portugal

Frazer’s The Golden Bough: a study in magic and religion provides Wittgenstein with a valuable source material for applying his philosophical methodologies. For example, Wittgenstein is able to show that descriptions are better suited for understanding magic and religion than explanations. We might say that his criticism of Frazer constitutes a philosophical approach – one that does something comparable to an investigation in aesthetics where describing instead of explaining plays a similar role of elucidation. This comparison facilitates trying to come to grips with what Wittgenstein meant when he announced a method had been found. The present paper explores this possibility. In addition, aspects of what could be characterized as a “religious point of view” can be detected in his observations on Frazer’s work, even if these are not explicit. For this reason, this paper also briefly sketches the possibility that exercising ourselves in seeing the world from that perspective is representative of philosophy as “a work on oneself”, and partly helps to outline the kind of research it constitutes for Wittgenstein.

§92 OF WITTGENSTEIN’S ON CERTAINTY, OR THE ETHICAL IMPORTANCE OF AESTHETIC REFLECTION
Ludwig Drosch
Berlin, Germany

In §92 of On Certainty, Wittgenstein gives the example of two divergent worldviews whose gap cannot be bridged by the giving of reasons, but only by a conversion to an entirely new perspective. The paragraph condenses an important strain of Wittgenstein’s thought on the ultimate groundlessness of our belief system, and the consequent limits of rational justification as the mediator between different worldviews, that I recapitulate in the first part of this essay. Second, by taking a hint from the remark concluding §92, and with recourse to Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics, I aim to show how these reflections on the limits of reason-giving point to the ethical importance of aesthetic reflection and art. Where rational discourse fails – not merely empirically, but in its very possibilities, as in the example of §92 – to bring into communication divergent perspectives, the question becomes how incompatible pictures of the world could be brought into contact.

STRAINED ASSETS AS A NORMATIVELY SIGNIFICANT BURDEN
Eike Düvel & Lukas H. Meyer
Graz, Austria

Avoiding dangerous climate change will require us to leave a majority of carbon fuel reserves in the ground. This creates various risks of harm to states, carbon companies and their employees. Stranding these assets is normatively significant for two reasons: First, the burdens of stranded assets may also fall on already disadvantaged people in developed and developing countries. Second, these burdens may be especially harmful since they frustrate people’s life-plans. We argue that the burden in stranding assets consists in the frustration of people’s legitimate expectations connected to the extraction of these carbon fuels. States should avoid frustrating them or minimize burdens in terms of these expectations. However, we do not believe that carbon fuel producers’ and their shareholders’ expectations to benefit economically from these activities generally constitute legitimate expectations that could ground compensatory claims.

MUSIC AND LANGUAGE GAME
Burcu Durukan
Ankara, Turkey

Wittgenstein introduces the concept of language game in his later period in order to show that the boundaries of meaning in language cannot strictly be drawn as in the language of logic, as opposed to his early understanding of language in the Tractatus. According to this point of view, there are different functions of words within different language games, and understanding of language is only possible for those who are involved in a common language game. This study will address the relationship between the concept of language game and music. It aims to indicate that there is a strong connection between ordinary language and music in the sense that they both consist of language games; and both in language and music, meaning changes as depending on which game is played in a certain context.

WITTGENSTEIN, DIRAC AND KEYNES: INVERSE QUANTUM DECISION THEORY FOR CRISIS SITUATIONS
Susan Edwards-McKie
Cambridge, United Kingdom

This paper provides a window onto reactions of three thinkers to world events through their Cambridge milieu of a particular time. I suggest that Wittgenstein, Dirac and Keynes were all three reacting against, and distancing themselves intellectually and mathematically from both the new, and yet still classically conceived worldview of Einsteinian relativity and the new, non-classically conceived worldview of Bohr and Heisenberg. All three were not as conservative as Einstein and more conservative than the Copenhagenists, both in their mathematics and in terms of questions of free will and public policy.
TRUST IN TESTIMONY
Eva-Maria Engelen
Konstanz, Germany

In my talk I want to contrast the different conditions for trust in personal testimony and trust in expert testimony. In how far do they differ with respect to personal and impersonal evidence, or with respect to the trustworthiness of the speaker? Furthermore, I want to reflect on the apparent clash that Richard Moran has noticed “between the kind of epistemic relations involved [for example in an expert scenario] and the classic empiricist picture of genuine knowledge basing itself either on direct experience of the facts or on working out conclusions for oneself.” I will show that the “apparent clash” originates from the interaction of the first- and the third-person-perspective – concepts that are known from the philosophy of mind.

ABSOLUTE GENERALITY AND THE NOTION OF PROPOSITION IN THE TRACTATUS
Jann Paul Engler
Munich, Germany

In his book The Incomplete Universe, Patrick Grim claims that the notion of a totality of facts as it is employed in the first lines of the Tractatus is incoherent. Corresponding to the totality of facts there is a totality of propositions. With respect to this totality Grim argues that there can always be another proposition constructed that is not included in it. I aim to show that on tractarian grounds there cannot be such a proposition. For his argument, Grim needs to treat propositions as objects to which properties can be ascribed. Contrary to this, the tractarian distinctions between “sign” and “symbol” and between “function” and “operation” show that propositions are on a conceptually different level than objects and are not to be treated as them. It follows that a proposition like the one Grim uses in his argument cannot be constructed. Thus, the totality of facts can be conceptualized via the totality of propositions property understood.

CULTURE, VALUE AND CONTRADICTION: WITTGENSTEIN AND EMPSON
Andrew J. P. English
Abingdon, United Kingdom

Wittgenstein’s farcical clash with literary critic F. R. Leavis over the analysis of Empson’s poem “Legal Fiction” is well known to devotees of Wittgenstein’s life (Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections, 1981, edited by Rush Rhees, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 80). Less well known is the value of studying Empson’s artistic and intellectual achievement as part of the wider cultural background for the appreciation of Wittgenstein’s views on culture, early and late. This talk sketches some diverting byways awaiting further exploration. A recurrent theme is contradiction.

KANTS BEGRIFF DER POLITIK IN DER INTERPRETATION VON VOLKER GERHARDT
Cornelia Eșianu
Wien, Österreich

Der Beitrag untersucht Kants Begriff der Politik anhand der Interpretation des deutschen Philosophen Volker Gerhardt, für den sich Politik als eine ausübende Rechtslehre darstellt. In kritischer Auseinandersetzung mit einer Reihe von Autorinnen und Autoren stellt Gerhardt die Weichen für eine neue Rezeption der Kant’schen politischen Philosophie. Von dem, was der Mensch sich selbst bedeutet, habe auch das politische Handeln auszugehen. Politik hängt dadurch mit der Moral zusammen. Sie müsse, so Gerhardt, aktiv herbeiführen, was ansonsten nur gelehrt und gehofft wird. Vor diesem Hintergrund versteht sich der vorliegende Beitrag als eine kritisch-philosophische Antwort auf aktuelle durch Politik, Ökonomie und Recht ausgelöste Provokationen.

RISKANTE RISIKOBEWERTUNG
August Fenk
Klagenfurt, Österreich


SIX PRIME REASONS FOR AN UNCONDITIONAL BASIC INCOME
Gregor Flock
Vienna, Austria

The global human family is confronted with many and oftentimes quite serious problems of various types: cultural, economic, environmental, legal, political, etc. The general thesis of this paper is that one of the most effective ways to tackle many of these bigger and transnational problems is to introduce an unconditional basic income or UBI for every person around the globe. More specifically, what is discussed in this paper are six prime reasons for a UBI that shed light on its great problem-solving capabilities from various perspectives.
IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE: WITTGENSTEIN'S TRACTATUS AND SOME PROBLEMS OF ART THEORY
Lilli Isabel Förster
Hanau, Germany

In this talk I am first going to discuss Ludwig Wittgenstein’s picture theory of language and thinking, then I will explore its relation to the art of drama and painting. In particular, I will discuss the problem of identity and difference of thinking, language and artefacts with reality. I will show that the joint analysis of philosophy of language and thinking with art theory can shed more light on them and thus can bring fruitful results for both sides. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s picture theory of language and thought is extensively discussed in the philosophical literature. My main claim is that a picture, in Wittgenstein’s sense of the term, is not simply a model. This is clear from the fact that Wittgenstein speaks about living pictures or about tableaux vivants (4.0311) that are in a sense identical with the state of affairs and in this way identical with reality. Similarly, according to the theory of dramatic arts of Stanislavski, the actor/actress leaves their personality behind in order to become one with the character he/she presents. In this way, they make the difference between reality and fiction disappear. In like manner when confronted with Magritte’s paintings, one is captivated by the disclosed identity of reality and imagination within them.

IS AN INAUTHENTIC LIFE POSSIBLE?
Mélissa Fox-Muraton
Clermont-Ferrand, France

Authenticity is a predominant concept in existential philosophy, often referenced in comparative studies of Ludwig Wittgenstein and philosophers such as Søren Kierkegaard or Martin Heidegger. This paper will question the concept of authenticity by examining whether Wittgenstein’s philosophy allows for an understanding of the notion of inauthenticity. We argue that authenticity is a muddled concept, and that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, which insists on the embeddedness of beliefs in language games and practices, does not support the claim that a life could be identical with reality. Similarly, according to the theory of dramatic arts of Stanislavski, the actor/actress leaves their personality behind in order to become one with the character he/she presents. In this way, they make the difference between reality and fiction disappear. In like manner when confronted with Magritte’s paintings, one is captivated by the disclosed identity of reality and imagination within them.

LANGUAGE, CHANGE AND POSSIBLE WORLDS: PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION.
AN ESSAY ON METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS RESEARCH
Ulrich Frank
Essen, Germany

Even though the omnipresent narrative of the digital transformation suffers from multiple simplifications and dubious contributions, it targets a phenomenon of substantial relevance that will likely change the way we work, live – and think. While promoted predominantly by innovations in information technology, the transformation is, at its essence, related to problems that have been subject to philosophical discourse for a long time. Among others, those problems comprise the ambivalent role of language for recognition as well as for mastering change, the limitations of truth as the pivotal criterion to justify scientific knowledge offerings, or the role of science within processes of social and political change. This essay aims at the identification and discussion of specific methodological problems related to the study and the support of the digital transformation from the perspective of a discipline that is directly responsible, both as an observer and a driver: information systems research. After a short account of the discipline’s history and its present constitution, a brief analysis of key aspects of the digital transformation will lead to the pivotal role of language and conceptual models in particular. Conceptual models do not only form a foundation for the implementation of software systems, they are also a prerequisite for using them. To prepare systems for change, models need to incorporate abstractions that cover possible future worlds. From an academic perspective, this requirement is fascinating and challenging at the same time. It implies the problem of how to adequately justify the construction of possible worlds. Furthermore, it leads to the question how we could think possible future worlds that are beyond the limits of the language we speak. Against this background, the paper proposes facets of a methodology of change. Among others, its application is demonstrated through the idea of multi-level language architectures. This idea does not only enable the construction of self-referential software systems that allow for clearly higher flexibility, it can also be applied to action systems and their ability to adapt to a changing environment.

QUALIFYING CORRECTIVE CLIMATE JUSTICE: THE STRUCTURAL AND NORMATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF HISTORICAL EMISSIONS
Laura García Portela
Graz, Austria

This paper makes the case for a corrective view of climate justice by presenting and defending a Qualified Polluters Pay Principle (QPPP). The Ordinary Polluters Pay Principle (OPPP) states that polluters should bear the burdens of climate change in proportion to their emissions record, namely, according to how much they have emitted in the past. The amount of emissions is what matters to determine how much these agents should contribute to a fair...
solution to climate change. Against this, I will argue that emissions are more or less causally and normatively significant depending on when they were emitted and by whom they were emitted. The Qualified version of PPP that I offer here states that powerful early emitters have a special kind of responsibility to overcome climate change. That responsibility boils down to leadership duties to boost collective action against climate change.

THE PARADOXICAL VIRTUES OF THE ANTHROPOCENE
Stephen M. Gardiner
Seattle, Washington, USA

Some believe that the onset of the Anthropocene – a new geological era marked by the dominance of humanity on the history of the planet – forces us to look anew at human virtues. In this paper, I discuss how to think about whether the evolving influence of humanity on the Earth’s environment really does call for new virtues, and how such virtues may be seen as contributing to human flourishing. I defend three controversial claims: (a) that it is not the Anthropocene as such that should concern us; (b) that nevertheless genuinely new virtues may be involved; but (c) that these may be virtues to which we should not aspire (now, or perhaps ever).

DO THE MEANINGS OF THE PARTS DETERMINE THE MEANING OF THE WHOLE UTTERANCE? RECAPTURING THE ELEMENT OF COMMON SENSE IN SEMANTIC COMPOSITIONALISM
Stefan Giesewetter
Turku, Finland

Among philosophers of language, it has been debated what role the context in which a sentence is uttered plays for fixing the meaning of that sentence as uttered in that context. One group of positions – often labeled “compositionalism” – holds that the meaning of an utterance is determined by the meanings of the parts of the sentence uttered and the way they are combined. Against this, another group of positions – often labeled “(radical) contextualism” – has argued that contextual factors play a role in contributing to the meaning of an utterance in an essentially unforeseen way, i.e. in a way not determined by the meanings of the parts of the sentence. In my talk, I will address the debate from the vantage point of Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following in the Investigations. My aim is to bring out a presupposition that is shared by compositionalism and contextualism alike, a presupposition which prevents them from recapturing the ordinary sense of how the meanings of the words “determine” the meaning of the whole utterance.

THE N-OPERATOR AS A CONSTANT DIFFERENCE OF FORMS: A NEW APPROACH TO THE OLD PROBLEM
Jakub Gomulka & Adam Roman
Kraków, Poland

We propose a non-standard approach to the Tractarian N-operator. Contrary to the received view, we argue that it should be defined as a constant difference of forms within the formal series of propositions. In consequence, we reject Wittgenstein’s own definition of the N-operator as a generalized Scheffer stroke, for it contradicts his own general definition of a series of forms. Instead, we construct a new definition of N-operator by assembling three separate functions: \( T, \sigma, \Pi \). The first translates truth-functions to binary sequences, the second takes a sequence as a binary number and increments it, and the third translates binary sequences back to truth-functions.

MARX MIT WITTGENSTEIN LESEN
Sepehr Goudarzi Boroujeni
Berlin, Deutschland


ZWISCHEN ‘POLITIK DER FEINDSCHAFT’ UND ‘PARTEILICHEM KOSMOPOLITISMUS’. ACHILLE MBEMBE UND KWAME A. APPIAH IM DIALOG
Anke Graneß
Hildesheim, Deutschland

WITTGENSTEIN AS CRITICAL THEORIST?

Edward Guetti

New York City, New York, USA

This paper outlines a program for considering the nature of a Wittgensteinian sense of philosophical critique. It is offered in response to recent work in fields related to both Wittgensteinian philosophy and also to that of Critical Theory. I argue that affinities exist between a Wittgensteinian philosophical activity and the model of analysis outlined by Marx, Benjamin, and Adorno. This paper thus outlines a notice for further philosophical exposition.

WITTGENSTEIN, AUSTIN, AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ILLOCUTIONARY AND PERLOCUTIONARY ACTS

Martin Gustafsson

Turku, Finland

Among Austin-inspired philosophers and linguists, the complaint is sometimes made that even if Wittgenstein asks us to conceive meaning in terms of use, he does not do enough to distinguish between different notions or dimensions of language use. The distinctions between locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, and the
discussions: the human form of life as the background for value to the case of religious value, since the cornerstone try to apply the same conclusions drawn from aesthetic agents according to their relative ability (often conceived.

Rules and Private Language

Friedland does, I will try to build a line of reasoning based following the dispositionalist account of meaning, as argument, I shall try to sketch a different path: instead of he analyses the (non-)possibility of aesthetic sensibility in robots. Although I follow Friedland’s conclusion and main argument, I shall try to sketch a different path: instead of following the dispositionalist account of meaning, as Friedland does, I will try to build a line of reasoning based on the insights of Saul Kripke’s book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. After this small detour, I will try to apply the same conclusions drawn from aesthetic value to the case of religious value, since the cornerstone of my argument is something that crosses both axiological discussions: the human form of life as the background for meaning in language.

REDUNDANT?

IS THE BENEFICIARY PAYS PRINCIPLE REDUNDANT?

Clare Heyward
Tromsø, Norway

Most accounts of climatic burden-sharing generally offer accounts of corrective justice, based on one or more of the following: the ability-to-pay principle (APP), the contribu-
tion-to-problem principle (CPP) and the beneficiary pays principle (BPP). The APP holds that liability to bear the burdens of climate change should be distributed among agents according to their relative ability (often conceived as relative wealth). The CPP holds that this liability should be distributed according to agents’ own records of GHG emissions, whereas the BPP links liability to an agent’s having benefitted from activities or practices that involve emissions of GHGs, whether or not that agent produced those emissions themselves. In this paper, I argue that the BPP, as it is standardly employed in accounts of climatic burden-sharing, is redundant. By that, I mean that its adoption is unmotivated, and/or its distributive implications can be just as easily achieved by a combination of the CPP or APP. I show this by examining three accounts of climatic burden-sharing which use the BPP to a greater or lesser extent: Simon Caney (2010), Christian Baatz (2014) and Edward Page (2011). For each account I show that their appeal to the BPP is not necessary, or inadequately supported. Instead, a combination of the CPP and APP will provide the same distribution of burdens (and in some cases, with better justification). However, this conclusion only applies for accounts which use the BPP in the standard way. I end by outlining another way in which the BPP might be used in burden-sharing accounts which, at least prima facie, is less susceptible to charges of redundancy.

WHY LANGUAGE GAMES CAN BE A FRUITFUL TERM WHEN EXAMINING THE LINGUAL EXCHANGE IN THE COURTROOM

Line Norman Hjorth
Bergen, Norway

In this paper I argue that the term language games is able to shed light on and thereby help us gain a better understanding of the defendant’s speaking situation in the courtroom. The lingual exchange there is the legal practice, which is regulated by the law of criminal procedure and of a range of written and unwritten rules about how to behave in a court of law. The concept of language games is able to illuminate how the juridical actor’s questions are part of ongoing language games performed to advance certain arguments and achieve certain goals – usually to underpin or undermine the defendant’s credibility at specific areas. The defendant’s answers must therefore be regarded as a response to the initiated language game. Further, the courtroom setting has a very exceptional lingual practice that makes the distinction between game and speaking, introduced by Rush Rhees, relevant. I find that the lingual/legal practice in court is governed by rules, strategies and tactics that make it resemble a game and that this constitutes challenging conditions in terms of the defendant’s ability to get heard or acknowledged as an individual, without at the same time trying to expand or challenge the conditions that determine the language games.

CRISES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: A FOCUS ON FEAR

Elisabeth Holzleithner
Vienna, Austria

That liberal democracy is in a crisis is nothing new. In Hungary, the steering towards illiberal democracy was announced years ago; and while nationalist, right-wing populist movements demand “law and order”, they take liberties with the rule of law. Human rights and tolerance are qualified when the rights of “others” are at stake, particularly those seeking asylum; at times, even the European Convention on Human Rights is disputed. A significant driving force of these developments is the fear of “imported” dangers, which is fueled by narrations charged with xenophobic resentment. The lecture draws on this very point, the role of fear. As the fear humans have of each other, it has played a pivotal role for the legitimation and design of the modern state at least since Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan. It was carried to extremes in the work of Carl Schmitt, who well-nigh celebrates the fear humans pose to one another. Schmitt believes that liberalism is politically naïve owing to its unduly optimistic image of humanity; accordingly, he advocates a strong, even a “total” state. But whoever takes fear seriously as an eminent factor of politics need not end up with autocracy. This is, by all means, Judith Shklar’s intuition, which she spells out in her “Liberalism of Fear”. She holds that human fear can be redirected and transformed into a force conducive to liberal democracy. The lecture is interested in the commonalities of Schmitt and Shklar that seem to reside in their pessimistic anthropologies, and it explores why the authors’ conclusions are so radically distinct. The idea is to generate impulses for a productive role of fear in political philosophy – and for conceiving ways to come out of the crises of liberal democracy.
KRITIK, DAS INTERNET UND WITTGENSTEIN
Herbert Hrachovec
Wien, Österreich

Eine Krise zu diagnostizieren und durch Kritik der Um-
stände zu beheben, ist ein philosophisch beliebtes Muster. Jüngere Protestbewegungen, wie die französischen „gilets jaunes“, werden von solchen Ratschlägen geleitet. Sie artikulieren ihre Anliegen diesseits von Hierarchien und demokratisch verfasster Repräsentation. Ein Leitthe-
ma in Wittgensteins Philosophie passt genau zu dieser Vorgabe. Er unterbindet Hierarchiebildung zwischen Sält-
zen (Tractatus) und erkennt der Philosophie das Recht ab, die Lebensformen des Alltags aus sicherer Distanz zu kritisieren oder gar zu reformieren (Philosophische Unter-
suchungen). Damit ergibt sich ein Problem. Einerseits ist die Gleichberechtigung aller Stimmen im jeweiligen Dis-
kurs eine Grundbedingung herrschaftsfreier Kommunikati-
on. Andererseits trifft diese Voraussetzung auf hochkom-
plexe politisch-ökonomische Systeme, die nur mit Arbeits-
teilung und Delegation von Verantwortung funktionieren. Das Dilemma zwischen der Sprache, die alle sprechen, und dem Expertenjargon, der nicht zuletzt zum Schutz eines lebaren Alltags nötig ist, wird an drei im Rahmen des Internets entstandenen Bezeichnungen exemplifiziert: E-Mail, Open Access, Apps. Eine allgemeine Gleichbe-
rechtigung mit Kompetenzdefizit steht gegen abgestufte Problemlösungen, die sich der generalisierten Öffentlich-
keit schwer vermitteln lassen. Die Thematisierung von Fehlfunktionen (Krisen) im gesellschaftlichen Leben und der Versuch, ihre Ursachen anzusprechen (Kritik) ist eine probate Möglichkeit, die beiden Seiten miteinander zu kombinieren. Sie ist nicht Wittgensteins Weg; er ist kein Systemkritiker. Auf ungewöhnliche Art versteht er es, Schwachstellen des Alltags aufzufinden und dabei die Kritik zu umgehen.

CAN INDECISION EXPLAIN UNCERTAINTY IN INTROSPECTION?
Pablo Hubacher Haerle
Zurich, Switzerland

In this paper I want to examine an approach to uncertainty in introspection frequently found in the secondary literature on Wittgenstein: indecision. Commentators such as P. M. S. Hacker claim that indecision can explain uncertainty in introspection in a way which is completely distinct from explanations of uncertainty in perception or uncertainty about the ‘outer world’ in general. Crucially, following Hacker’s reading of Wittgenstein, the concept of a fallible observation – an “observation in the proper sense” – does not and cannot come into play in the context of introspec-
tion. In applying indecision to an important and common case of uncertainty in introspection, namely being uncer-
tain where to study, I put this view to test. I argue that Hacker’s claim is too strong and that insofar as indecision can explain important cases of uncertainty in introspection, it makes use of the concept of a fallible observation in the proper sense. Thus, I can show that in certain instances uncertainty in introspection is not altogether unlike uncertain-
ty concerning the ‘outer world’.

THE I-ELIMINATED LANGUAGE
Tomoaki Ihara
Tokyo, Japan

This paper presents a new interpretation on the topic of I-eliminated language Wittgenstein contrived around 1929 and explores a broader implication of the idea. The re-

NON-DISCURSIVE SOCIAL PRACTICES: A NEW CRITIQUE OF THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE
Amadeusz Just
Warsaw, Poland

It may seem that in our contemporaneous political situa-
tion, social critique, in order to adequately examine social practices and political processes, should employ a notion of irrationality or unreason. However, to recognize some social phenomena as irrational would be misleading. The notion of irrationality or unreason is what contemporary social critique needs least of all. Instead, what should be reclaimed by social critique is both a positive approach to those social phenomena, which in the prevalent social and political theories have been jettisoned from the socio-
political sphere as irrational, and a new outlook on the socio-political reality. Is it possible to point out a moment in our political thinking when the expulsion of those phenom-
ena takes place and the specific shape of the socio-
political reality is constituted? In my talk, I shall argue that there is a close relationship between the political thinking and what is being called the anthropological difference. I intend to reveal that the anthropological difference is such a moment in our thinking about the socio-political when a specific rationality and normativity of our socio-political life is established and ingrained.

THE CONCEPT OF CRITIQUE, SLOW-ROASTED ON A SAUCE FROM METHODOLOGICAL FORMALISM, SERVED ALONG WITH VALUE INDETERMINACY
Mirosław Kantek
Brno, Czech Republic

This paper consists of three ingredients which are the concept of critique and its two indivisible companions: methodological formalism and value indeterminacy. To claim that there is an unavoidable link between these three ingredients may seem at first sight implausible, especially for scholars who consider themselves as practitioners of critical theory. But I will try to demonstrate that if the con-
cept of critique is applied properly, it inevitably results in methodological formalism and value indeterminacy. Value indeterminacy and methodological formalism gained through though the development of science negative connotations. The second part of the paper will try to show that there is no need to judge methodological formalism and value indeterminacy as downsides of a critical theory. This will be depicted on the example of the critical legal theory. The critical legal theory is facing the same chal-
lenages as critical theory, but with its practical application it can serve as a ground to justify methodological formalism and value indeterminacy.
WELL-KNOWN AND LESS KNOWN OBSTACLES TO FORECASTING THE FUTURE

Peter P. Kirschemann
Amsterdam, The Netherlands

I survey and discuss obstacles to forecasting the future, especially to making accurate predictions, in various areas: in economics with its inadequate models and financial crashes, big business ventures with their cost overruns, the role of novelties, affective forecasting, and ecology. Given the great diversity of these areas, the kinds of obstacles are equally diverse. Altogether, I conclude, they should certainly not prevent us from planning for the future as best we can, if not by means of accurate predictions, then e.g. by means of qualitative estimates and projections, or by working out alternative scenarios.

PICTURING THE MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE – SEEING FRANK STELLA’S POLISH VILLAGES (1972-1974) ANEW

Stephanie Koerner
Liverpool, United Kingdom

“We can never understand a picture unless we grasp the ways in which it shows what cannot be seen… This notion of ‘picturing the invisible’ may seem a bit less paradoxical if we remind ourselves that painters have always claimed to present us with ‘more than meets the eye’…” (Mitchell Iconology, Image, Text, Ideology 1986: 39)

This essay concerns the usefulness of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s insights of ‘seeing anew’ for exploring contributions, which studying innovation in picturing the more than meets the eye can continue to answer questions Svetlana Alpers poses in Vexations of Art: “What do artists do during wars? How have artists dealt with war? Should artists be blamed if they don’t?” Is direct confrontation with conflict the only way for art to take…?” (Alpers 2005: 83).

The essay explores contributions that studying Frank Stella’s Polish Villages (1970-1974) in lights of Wittgenstein can make to appreciating that the arts are not mere solutions to historical crises with disengagement (‘art for art’s sake alone’) or direct confrontation. The Polish Villages show that, contrary to these vexed options, innovations in picturing the dynamics of aspect blindness
and aspect perception can render crises, which may exceed what can be put into words intelligible, and make space for bringing people together anew. The essay concludes with suggestions bearing upon the problem: “People nowadays think, scientists are there to instruct them, poets, musicians etc. to entertain them. That the latter have something to teach them: that never occurs to them.” (Wittgenstein Culture and Value 1998.)

THE CONCEPT OF CRITIQUE IN WITTGENSTEIN’S FIRST PHILOSOPHY

Wojciech Krysztofiak
Szczecin, Poland

In the paper, the Tractarian concept of critique is reconstructed formally as the function of eliminating babbling sentences from infected or “babbling” mental worlds. These worlds are understood as composed of babbling sentences encoded in human minds which do not picture anything. The reconstruction is based on the two-dimensional semantic framework, determined by two classes of world’s points of views formalized as semantic functions taking two values: meaningfulness and meaninglessness. The babbling sentences are defined as ones to which the semantic function of the inside world’s point of view attributes the value of meaninglessness. The language tools of performing the function of critique are constituted by sentences belonging to the existential meta-discourse, which shows the meaning of life and the world.

REVISITING THE CONCEPTS OF CRISIS AND CRITIQUE

María Pía Lara
Mexico City, Mexico

The words “crisis” and “critique” go back to the Greek verb krino and are related to the act of making a judgment – something that the Greeks considered a political action. In the first part of this paper, I will discuss the genealogical meaning of the two terms as theorists have used them in different contexts beginning with the Greeks. In the second part, I will deal with how crisis and critique are concepts that involve a sense of time and therefore are central for history, but also for politics. The semantics of these concepts relate to the past, the present, and the future by bringing up images of salvation or impending destruction, illness or the need to begin anew. As for the present, their semantics have evolved and have been used differently: crisis invoking a sense of repetition, critique involving the assumption that change should come now. Just how these two concepts are of great importance in our present political situation is the goal that my paper aims to disclose. Finally, I will show how both terms reflect the dynamics of repetitions and innovations of political realities in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

IST DIE PHILOSOPHISCHE THERAPIE EINE KRITISCHE PHILOSOPHIE?

Giulia La Rocca
Prato, Italien

Ziel dieses Beitrags ist, die Spannung zwischen Therapie und Kritik in Wittgensteins Auffassung der Philosophie hervorzuheben. Das Projekt einer therapeutischen Philosophie hat zwar ein kritisches Potential, indem sie das, was in unserem alltäglichen Sprachgebrauch verborgen bleibt, zum Bewusstsein bringt. Die Überzeugung, die Philosophie sei eine Tätigkeit, womit man fertig ist, nachdem man mittelest das philosophische Problem überhaupt gelöst hat, setzt sie aber der Gefahr aus, das Resultat der Therapie selbst und ihre kritische Leistung auszulösen.

AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF VOICE

Sandra Laugier
Paris, France

I will try to explore the social and political ideas one can draw from Wittgenstein’s work, and from ordinary language philosophy more widely. I use the concept of forms of life – understood, following Stanley Cavell and Veena Das, not only in the social (horizontal) sense but also in the natural (or biological) sense, as life forms – in order to rearticulate the natural and conventional (following Cavell 1979) and to propose an ordinary conception of politics and culture anchored in the very concept of ordinary language philosophy understood as attention to what human beings say: “What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of human beings…observations which no one has doubted, but which have escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes.” (P: §415). It then becomes a matter of shifting the question of the common use of language towards the question of an anthropology of the voice. The voice is both a subjective and general expression: it is what makes it possible for my individual voice to become shared, to speak in the name of others. The singular claims a common validity. The political question that arises is the question of representation and the subject’s expression by the culture – and, inversely, the culture’s expression by the subject. Ordinary language philosophy encounters a democracy and a politics of voice: what is finding one’s voice? What is the right tone, the pitch?

CRITICAL COMMONS, OR: HOW TO REGAIN STEAM

Thijs Lijster
Groningen, The Netherlands

In the past decade, there have been several philosophical, societal and artistic critiques of critique. Alain Badiou, for instance, rejects the critical Kantian tradition in favour of being ‘true to the Event’, while Bruno Latour concluded in a seminal article that critique had run out of steam. Certain artistic practices, finally, prefer participation and proximity over the traditional critical and contemplative attitude of the observer. There seems to be an inherent tension between action and critique. We tend to associate action with immersion and participation, while critique is usually connected to the distance of an outsider-perspective. In my lecture I want to analyse this tension, but I also want to explore the possibilities of going beyond it. To do so, I will connect conceptions of critique to the concept of the ‘commons’ that is highly debated in contemporary political and social philosophy. What would be the conceptual, socio-political and aesthetic implications for such juxtaposition for both of these categories? While critique is usually considered as a solitary and indeed a distanced activity, the commons are defined as a shared set of resources and/or characteristics. I will argue that these categories can strengthen one another: while commons provide fertile soil (‘common ground’) for critical theory, critique can prevent the romanticization and appropriation of commons into traditional notions of ‘community’ or ‘common sense’.

– 15 –

V. O. Lobovikov
Yekaterinburg, Russia

Subject-matter of the article is clarifying and precise defining the meaning of Wittgenstein’s original statement that all logic laws are not reliable if the law-of-the-excluded-middle is not reliable. The method of clarifying and defining is axiomatic one; namely, a formal axiomatic epistemology theory named “Theta” (Θ) that is defined precisely and used systematically. A proof of logic consistency of “Theta” (Θ) is given. The article submits a proof of improvability of all classical logic tautologies in Θ. Thus, a model is created for the enigmatic statement of Wittgenstein. The model clarifies and explicates the proper meaning of the puzzling statement in question. Such axiomatic modeling illuminates the general idea of intuitionism philosophy opposed to formalism and logic-ism one. Within the theory Θ, the contradiction between extreme logic-ism and extreme intuitionism is dissolved: each of the two is located in its own limited domain. Borderlines of these domains are defined precisely by Θ.

PARLER-WITTGENSTEINIEN: IRIGARAY AND WITTGENSTEIN CHALLENGING THE SYMBOLIC ORDER

Silvia Locatelli
Padua, Italy

The aim of this paper is to understand how the mature Wittgenstein’s production could be fruitful to pursue the goal of Irigaray’s early work, which consists in the subversion of the western symbolic order and its monosexuate culture, connoted by a phallocentric dialectic that negates the “other” of the sexual difference in the name of a constant mirroring of the male sex. As a result, the female sex is devalued and represented only in relation to the former. To battle an order that does not make room for women, Irigaray proposes the mimesis technique that consists in reaffirming in a positive way the characters that in the phallocentric culture have been attributed to the female sex – especially the corporeal dimension – to unveil the “disruptive excess” of the female. I take the argument of private language of the mature Wittgenstein’s production as productive for the mimesis strategy that Irigaray proposes, due to the fact that it enables a positive rehabilitation of the corporeal, which is no longer downgraded and subordinated to the mental. Starting from this argument, I try to show that with his particular conception of the human soul – that is connected with the analysis of how we come into contact with other people – he is trying to overcome the mind-body divide and hierarchy and to understand the person as a whole of different and correlated capacities that exceed just the intellectual ones.

THE AUSTERE VIEW OF NONSENSE IN WITTGENSTEIN’S TRACTATUS

Arianna Longhi
Pavia, Italy

In this paper, I try to analyze a particular reading of nonsense presented by a group of interpreters of the Tractatus and exposed in the essay entitled The New Wittgenstein (Crary, Read 2000): the so-called austere interpretation. My intention is to analyze this reading by contrasting it with the more traditional interpretation of the Tractatus: the substantial reading. I will focus in particular on the concept of elucidation, being essential to understand the nonsense present in the text, as well as the difference between the two readings mentioned above. In this context Geach’s position will be fundamental because, according to him, the elucidation is not a novelty of the Tractatus but it was already present in the works of another philosopher: Frege. The elucidation takes on a positive value here: it shows something that could not be explained by a definition. According to the substantial interpretation, the propositions of the Tractatus have precisely this aim: to show (and not to say) something that would otherwise be un-speakable. According to the austere interpreters, Wittgenstein responded to this proposal with an austere reading of nonsense and elucidation: the propositions of the Tractatus do not express (cannot express) any thought. This proposal, however interesting, has, from my point of view, some contradictory elements that lead me to favor a substantial reading of nonsense over the austere one.

THE PITFALLS OF TERRITORIAL BELONGING: VIOLENCE AND AMNESIA IN THE HOMELAND METAPHOR

Laurin Mackowitz
Innsbruck, Austria

In order to be a member of a political community, a state or nation, every citizen has to acquire documents that define to what territory someone belongs. It seems, however, that we are living in times and places that are more and more defined by the cohabitation of uprooted and displaced people that concurrently belong nowhere and everywhere, moreover, by a global economy, politics, and media that produce a transnational and polyglot social reality. Yet, the metaphorical collusion of land and home has not disappeared. On the contrary, today’s politics of exception repeatedly propagates the governmental phantasms that “home is the land” to justify dehumanizing measures taken to divide the people of the world into hierarchical spatial blocks. Examining the historical and fictional meanings of homeland, the paper scrutinizes how metaphors of territorial belonging legitimate the deprivation of civil rights and facilitate the collective amnesia of violent appropriation and displacement.

ALGORITHMEN & RECHTSprechung

Amadeus M. Mader
Innsbruck, Österreich


— 16 —
Entscheiden über das So-und-nicht-anders. 

(Straf-)Urteil stets etwas Unentscheidbares innewohnt, mithilfe Friedrich Nietzsches Sprachkritik und Jacques Derridas Gesezelskraft argumentiert werden, dass jedem (Straf-)Urteil stets etwas Unentscheidbares innewohnst, wodurch es sich jeder Berechenbarkeit entzieht. Das Handeln eines Jemand erscheint dadurch unerläßlich, ein Entscheiden über das So-und-nicht-anders.

ZUR AKTUELLEN KRISSE VON DEMOKRATIE UND RECHTSTAATLICHKEIT. URSACHEN UND SYMPTOME

Eva Maria Maier

Wien, Österreich


WITTGENSTEIN UNCANNY

Marco Marchesin

Norwich, United Kingdom

This paper aims to explore how Wittgenstein’s grammatical investigations need to be understood in relation to ordinary language. I propose to rearticulate the role of ordinary language in Wittgenstein’s later thought through the concept of the uncanny (Das Unheimliche). My claim is that Wittgenstein’s philosophy constricts the ordinary as uncanny, that is, strangely familiar, as the only way to make it really visible and open to view. I will first define the concept of the uncanny and show how it can be used to describe one main feature of Wittgenstein’s method. Second, I will examine Wittgenstein’s (rather scarce) employment of the term in his work and show that it is compatible with the interpretation I am advancing here. Third, I will illustrate how the concept of the uncanny may help us understand the nature of Wittgenstein’s description of the ordinary and challenge Peter Hacker’s notorious interpretation of Wittgenstein’s philosophy.

DIE INSTRUMENTALISIERUNG DER EHRE

Marie Victoria Luise Marten

Innsbruck, Österreich


ENVISIONING A WORTHWHILE CRITIQUE OF IDEALISM: REFLECTIONS ON THE FREGE-WITTGENSTEIN CORRESPONDENCE

Sam Whitman McGrath

Providence, Rhode Island, USA

A familiar dynamic emerges in the ongoing exegetical debates surrounding Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: so-called “resolute readers” develop and defend interpretations of the work based primarily upon the text itself, and so-called “irresolute readers” challenge these interpretations by appealing to extra-textual evidence, such as the testimony of contemporaries or retrospective remarks in which Wittgenstein seemingly implies prior commitment to one or another metaphysical thesis that resolute readers claim he opposed. The present paper inverts this familiar dynamic by invoking extra-textual evidence to challenge irresolute readings. In closely ana-
lyzing the final letter of the Frege-Wittgenstein correspondence, apparently acknowledges a "deep, true nucleus" in idealism (Schmitt 2003: 30); (ii) nevertheless, he aims to fight against or attack idealism, indicating that, initial appearances notwithstanding, he was not committed to an ineffable metaphysical doctrine; and (iii) his primary point of contention with Frege on this issue stems from their divergent conceptions of critique, with Wittgenstein alleging that Frege’s criticism of idealism does not go far enough. Taken together, these points engender a significant challenge for irresolute readings and suggest Wittgenstein’s conception of “worthwhile” philosophical critique as a potential source of continuity across his significant philosophical evolution (Frege 1977: vii).

STENIUS ON WITTGENSTEIN’S “KANTIAN SOLUTION”
Lumberto Guce Mendoza
Quezon City, Philippines

The paper interprets Stenius’ work “Wittgenstein as a Kantian Philosopher” (1960) in light of Wittgenstein’s remark in Culture and Value on the “Kantian solution of the problem of philosophy”. First, I discuss this so-called “problem of philosophy” in connection with what the Tractatus preface describes as the difficulty of “drawing a limit to thinking”. Second, I discuss how Stenius takes Wittgenstein to respond to this problem indirectly, i.e., by clarifying the limits of thought through the limits of language. This approach, I explain, translates to Wittgenstein’s aim of showing the nonsensicality of philosophical propositions as found, for example, in his remarks on the law of causality. Finally, I explain how the nonsense described by Stenius can be understood as a “Kantian solution” that leads to a triumph of clarity in language.

HUMANS, CYBORGS, HUMANOID ROBOTS: CHALLENGES FOR AUTONOMY AND RESPONSIBILITY?
Reinhard Merkel
Hamburg, Germany

In the not too distant future, humans will establish functional as well as mentally close conjunctions with intelligent machines. Their brains will be equipped with technology sufficiently powerful to consign their further cognitive development in larger part to the specifications of a technological rather than their biological evolution. They will assimilate to machines. At the same time, progress in robotics, artificial intelligence, neuroscience and engineering will permit the production of intelligent machines that will increasingly adopt functions of independent decision-making within our lifeworld. They will assimilate to the future humanoid robots? Will we have to share these fundamental determinations of the Human Condition with them? And eventually the power that comes with it?

EPISTEMIC DISAGREEMENT, DOUBTS, AND COHERENCE
Ulrich Metschi
Innsbruck, Austria

The question which will be addressed in this contribution is whether coherence, in one form or another, provides a criterion to distinguish a ‘healthy’, reasonable type of scepticism from an obstructive form of scepticism that results in the fabrication of spurious doubts, often for partisan ends unrelated to scientific concerns. The question is of some relevance because we often do not know, given the imperfection of our epistemic condition and the ubiquity of epistemic disagreement, when to greet dissenting views at least with ‘sceptical respect’ and to accept them as offering serious possibilities, instead of flatly rejecting them as incredible. It will be argued that whereas some types of coherence, e.g., reflective equilibrium, may well be too weak to yield the desired criterion, diachronic coherence, most familiar as Bayesian updating, is a serious candidate. Everything then depends, of course, on how diachronic coherence is specified in its details.

INTERSEKTIONALITÄT UND DIE BEDINGUNGEN SITUIERTER KRITIK
Katrin Meyer
Zürich, Schweiz


CLIMATE JUSTICE. WHY THE PAST MATTERS IN CONFLICTING WAYS
Lukas H. Meyer & Pranay Sanklecha
Graz, Austria

In order to seriously attempt to meet the 1.5 degree Celsius target, it will be necessary to implement a substantial reduction in global emissions. There are several factors that must be assessed when coming to a view about how emissions should be allocated between states. One of the important issues here, and a source of much political contention, is the question of whether past emissions are relevant to determining how the remaining global carbon budget should be allocated between states and, if so,
THE PHILosophical VOCabulary IN CRISIS?

Josef Mitterer
Klagenfurt, Austria

The current Fake News debate and a serious loss of trust in the media stimulate philosophers of different strands to weigh into a discussion which is about stating, making or blurring distinctions: distinctions such as those between fact and opinion, truth and falsehood, reality and illusion, between what is and what is not. The culprits are relativism, neopragmatism, constructivism and postmodernism in general, the attacks are mainly led by realists, old and "new". Truth as a regulative principle seems to fail and the traditional philosophical vocabulary is at stake. What are the options?

IS PREDATION NECESSARILY AMORAL?

Susana Monsó
Vienna, Austria

The thesis that predation is amoral (PA) is widely regarded as an unquestionable assumption. In this paper, I examine five different reasons that could be offered in support of PA: (1) predators are not moral agents; (2) if predation were moral it would imply an absurd duty to police nature; (3) predatory behavior is too widely distributed in nature to plausibly construe it as moral; (4) predatory behavior is not under the predator’s control; (5) eating other animals is necessary for predators to survive. I argue that none of these reasons can successfully ground PA. While predation is likely amoral in most cases, it may be moral in some cases.

Naturwissenschaft und künstliche Intelligenz

Wolf Dietrich Nagl
Kirchheim bei München, Deutschland

"Alle Naturwissenschaft beschreibt bloß das Geschehene, statt es zu erklären."


A MIXED BLESSING: KNOWLEDGE AS VIRTUE VS. KNOWLEDGE AS POWER

Isaac Nevo
Beer-Sheva, Israel

In this paper, I discuss the moral implications, if any, of the possession, as distinguished from the acquisition or use, of knowledge. Taking cues from both the tradition which views knowledge as an intrinsic good and the contrary tradition which views knowledge as essentially implicated with power, I consider Nicholas Rescher’s view, in his “Forbidden knowledge,” according to which knowledge can and should be regulated in terms of its external effects, but not in point of its “mere” possession. I raise and discuss counter-examples, pertaining to the “very” possession of unethical knowledge, and related proposals for scientific “abstinence,” e.g., the possession and use of results from Nazi hypothermia “experiments,” and the obligations on anthropological researchers regarding the “objects” of their studies. Keeping both traditions in focus, I argue that an ethics of knowledge is called for, to balance its intrinsic value and its often unavoidable connection with power.
THE TRACTATUS AND THE RIDDLES OF PHILOSOPHY
Gilad Nir
Leipzig, Germany
The aim of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus is to alter the way philosophers understand the nature of their own propositions. Whereas philosophers tend to think of themselves as seeking answers to determinate questions, Wittgenstein asks us to see philosophical propositions as riddles. Solving an ordinary riddle does not depend on learning a new fact about the world. Rather, it requires that we learn something about how our words can be used. The riddles of philosophy resemble ordinary riddles insofar as they do not allow any immediate, straight answer, and insofar as they involve renegotiating the meanings of our words. But philosophical riddles differ from ordinary ones insofar as no attempt to reduce them to answerable questions will satisfy us. Rather than solving the riddles of philosophy, Wittgenstein proposes to dissolve them.

TRACTATUS ON FUNCTIONS AND HIERARCHY
Yasushi Nomura
Sapporo, Japan
In the Tractatus Wittgenstein suggests the idea of a “hierarchy” that “we ourselves construct” and “independent of (empirical) reality” (TLP 5.556-5.5561). But the official system of Tractatus composed only of “elementary propositions” and their “truth functions” seems to have no room for any “hierarchy”. So, in this paper I shall show: (1) The notion of “functions” in Tractatus is entirely redundant to its official system (this I will show by using as a clue two conceptions of “elementary propositions”). (2) That is why we can insert a hierarchy of ramified types as that of “functions” “independent of reality” into the official system of Tractatus.

“HE IS A PERFECT NATURE-BEING – AND A PERFECT VIENNESE!”: VON WRIGHT AND WITTGENSTEIN IN CAMBRIDGE 1939
Bernt Österman
Helsinki, Finland
As one of Wittgenstein’s three heirs and literary executors, the Finnish philosopher Georg Henrik von Wright has had an enormous influence on the posthumous publishing of the Wittgenstein literary estate. His relationship to Wittgenstein’s philosophy was, however, somewhat paradoxical. Never doubting that Wittgenstein was a philosophical genius, von Wright was still the person close to Wittgenstein who kept the greatest intellectual distance. The paper gives an account of von Wright’s first encounter with Wittgenstein at Cambridge during 1939. It is based on von Wright’s autobiographical writings and the letters he wrote to his professor Eino Kaila in Finland, including also some references to Cora Diamond’s edition of Wittgenstein’s lectures on the foundations of mathematics, which von Wright attended during the Easter term. It is argued that von Wright initially was not completely convinced by Wittgenstein, but finally became totally overwhelmed. In his change of attitude, seeming externalities like Wittgenstein’s whistling skills played a surprising part.

ZUM WESEN UND WERT DER KRISSE IN DER DEMOKRATIE
Elif Özmen
Giessen, Deutschland

EIN FRÜHER UND EIN SPÄTER TRAUM WITTGENSTEINS IM VERGLEICH
Martin Ohmacht
Klagenfurt, Österreich

MANY VOICES, ONE NIGERIA: A CRITIQUE OF NATIONALISM AND NATIONISM
Basil Amarachi Okonkwo
Owerri, Nigeria
It is an undisputable fact that language is an indispensable tool for national development, stability and unity. Language is viewed as the pivot around which all human activities revolve. Such activities as cultural and traditional expres-
interaction amongst people, dissemination of information, advancing education, commerce and industries are the major roles language plays in human and national development. Language is the tool for the integration of diversified cultures. However, with the current ugly trend of events in the political space in Nigeria where inter-group relationship is characterized by rivalry instead of healthy competition and inclusiveness, dominance instead of cooperation, exploitation instead of collaboration, centralization and dictatorship instead of decentralization and democracy, the problem remains whether one can comfortably say “many voices, one Nigeria.” With this in mind, this paper attempts a critique of the notions of “Nationalism” and “Nationism” in Nigeria and concludes that the bane of national development in Nigeria is the dominance of nationism.

PHILOSOPHY AS CRITIQUE OF LANGUAGE IN WITTGENSTEIN AND THE SPOKEN WORD IN IGBO WORLDVIEW: A PHILOSOPHICAL RAPPROCHEMENT
Donald Uchenna Omenukor
Owerri, Nigeria
The philosophical sense of critique is the ability to distinguish, evaluate and react. Wittgenstein conceived of philosophy as an activity concerned with the clarification of thought. For him, the primary task of the philosopher is to react to traditional philosophical arguments using the tool of linguistic analysis to show where they go wrong. In linguistic analysis, the meaning of the word is not found in the form and meaning. Thus, in language, the nature and relations of the world and philosophy are encapsulated. In the Igbo world too, it is language, that is the spoken word, that gives existence to traditional philosophical arguments using the tool of linguistic analysis to show where they go wrong. In linguistic analysis, the meaning of the word is not found in the form and meaning. Considering the functions of language as instrument of thought, communication and identity, this paper demonstrates that for both Wittgenstein and for the Igbo world, man earns his being in and through language.

DER STATUS DER MATHEMATIK IN DER PHILOSOPHIE WITTGENSTEINS
Mélika Ouelbani
Tunis, Tunisia
Die Philosophie Wittgensteins steckt genau wie seine Persönlichkeit voller Paradoxe, die zu verstehen und aufzulösen interessant sind. Diese Besonderheit findet sich in der Rolle wieder, die er der Mathematik ganz allgemein beimißt und insbesondere in seiner Philosophie der Mathematik. Das Ziel meines Vortrags ist es, genau diese komplexe, spiralförmig gewundene Art und Weise, in der Wittgenstein sich mit der Mathematik beschäftigt, aufzuzeigen. Ich werde zunächst zeigen, dass die Mathematik im Tractatus eine besondere und wichtige, keineswegs jedoch eine privilegierte Rolle spielt. Sie stellt eine Art Prototyp der Sprache dar, ist dabei gleichzeitig jedoch „sinnlos“. Nach dem Tractatus werden die mathematische Sprache und das Kalkül ganz klar als Prototyp für die Funktionsweise unserer Sprache betrachtet. Als Wittgenstein sich jedoch mit der Mathematik an sich beschäftigt, sagt er, er habe sie vom Sockel gestoßen. Die gesamte Wittgensteinsche Philosophie der Mathematik ist tatsächlich bestrebt, zu zeigen, dass die mathematische Sprache sich in keiner Weise von den anderen Sprachen unterschiedet oder ihnen gar überlegen ist (der Status des Satzes, die Sprachsphäre, …). Die Mathematik diente als Modell für die Entwicklung des Konzepts des Sprachspiels und wurde dann selbst zum Sprachspiel, das wie ein ganz beliebiges, alltägliches Spiel unserer Sprache funktioniert.

CRITIQUE OF WESTERN CULTURE: WITTGENSTEIN’S PERSPECTIVE
Ratikanta Panda
Mumbai, India
The aim of this paper is to study the fundamental relation between culture and value in general with special reference to Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein has studied human culture in depth and has critiqued what is known as the materialist culture based on the achievements of modern science and technology. He has shown that the culture, which leads man in the right direction, is the spiritual culture based on the eternal values. These values consist in spiritual perfection, love for higher life, peace, harmony, universal brotherhood, love for mankind, etc. Wittgenstein has defended spiritual culture, as he believes that spiritual values alone hold promise for the future of the mankind.

BREAKAGES AND CONTINUITY IN THE EVOLUTION OF WITTGENSTEIN’S THOUGHT
Stefano Perpetuini
Bologna, Italy
The theme of continuity or discontinuity of Wittgenstein’s philosophy is central for philosophy of language. Critics agree about the existence of constant ideas in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, but they do not always agree with their different interpretations. So, critics’ positions regarding the continuity or discontinuity of Wittgenstein’s philosophy are different. Kenny (2016) tries to show us why the idea of a total opposition between the two works is wrong. From his words, it seems that he is in favor of the idea of continuity. The two Hintikka (1990), instead, seem to say the opposite, but, in reality, they simply put the accent on what makes the two works very different from each other, inserting them, however, in a path that sees them respectively as a point of starting and of arrival. Finally, Marconi (2014) proposes what seems to be the most convincing position: a moderate position that neither denies the differences between the two works, nor presents constant themes in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. This, in my opinion, would seem to be the most correct position. A position that allows us to look at Wittgenstein’s thought as a development that starts from one point and reaches another, very different from the original one, but obviously linked to it.

TAKING PICTURES IN THE RIGHT LIGHT
Griffin Pion
Poughkeepsie, New York, USA
What is the experience of being stuck in a picture? And what is its philosophical importance? This paper attempts an answer through a reading of Philosophical Investigations §§ 96-7, where Wittgenstein uses the Tractatus as an example of a picture. Consequently, the paper’s contribution to the literature is twofold: It explains the nature of being stuck in a picture and shows why Wittgenstein’s use of the Tractatus as an example of a picture suggests the correctness of the resolute reading of the book. My paper has five sections. First, I discuss what it means to read the Tractatus resolutely. Second, I explain Wittgenstein’s idea of being stuck in a picture and what makes this a unique phenomenon. Third, I closely read some
sections of the Investigations in which Wittgenstein presents this idea. Fourth, I argue that his presentation cannot be squared with a non-resolute reading of the Tractatus. And finally, I give a sketch of how his presentation squares with a resolute reading.

WHAT WE OWE OURSELVES: ON CLIMATE CHANGE, DUTY, AND RESPONSIBILITY
Adriana Placani
Graz, Austria

Individual agents should do many things, but averting the harms of climate change is not one of them. This is partly because no single individual could possibly avert (or cause) such harms by him or herself. Both causing and averting the harms of climate change requires joint or collective action. This is one of the basic, albeit rough, intuitive thoughts behind some collectivists’ accounts (e.g., Cripps, Sinnott-Armstrong), which argue that duties to avert climate harms are primarily collective. This work acknowledges the collective nature of climate change harms, but argues that this does nothing to vanquish individuals’ personal duties to distance themselves from such harms. Interdependent individual actions of GHG emissions are causally efficacious in the production of climate change harms. This means, among other things, that each GHG emission is a constitutive (though neither necessary nor sufficient) part of the means by which climate-related harms are realized. Following Cripps, it is plausible to hold the putative group of GHG emitters (GHGE) weakly collectively responsible for harm resulting from the predictable aggregation of their individual acts. For Cripps, what follows from this is a corresponding collective duty to do something about the harm together, i.e., to act, qua group, to bring about an end to the harm and a derivative duty for each emitter to promote the required organization of a group capable of such a collective action. This view, however, downplays individual contributions to the collectively realized harms. Such individual contributions, to the extent that they are avoidable, make one into a member of a group that is morally responsible for climate-related harm. Individual emitters who can do otherwise (i.e., not emit at reasonable cost to themselves) should recognize themselves as members of a group that collectively harms. Subsequently, they should take all possible steps (depending on individual circumstances) in order to cease such membership. Thus, this work argues that what follows from assigning collective responsibility to the GHGE is a personal duty that falls on each individual member to renounce membership in this group. To be clear, not all members of GHGE are ipso facto blameworthy for climate change harms, but those who can, but do not, cease membership (e.g., by renouncing their luxury emissions) are. This way of framing the issue acknowledges the collective nature of climate change harms, but rests responsibility and duty squarely on individual shoulders.

FORE- AND BACKGROUND IN NANCY FRASER’S EXPANDED CONCEPTION OF CAPITALISM
Bernd Prien
Graz, Austria

In their recent book Capitalism: A Conversation in Critical Theory, Nancy Fraser and Rahel Jaeggi introduce an expanded conception of capitalism. According to this conception, capitalism is not just an economic system, as orthodox views would have it, but a form of society as a whole, encompassing, in addition to an economic sphere, a sphere of social reproduction, a sphere of public power, and a sphere of exploiting natural resources. In this expanded conception, Fraser assigns the economic sphere to the foreground, while the other, non-economic spheres are said to constitute the background of capitalist society. This is reminiscent of Marx’ distinction between an economic base and political and juridical superstructure. Since Fraser explicitly rejects this thesis, the question remains how her distinction between an economic foreground and a non-economic background can be understood. I argue that there are different, though related strands of thought involved in Fraser’s thesis that the economic sphere occupies the foreground of society: First, the economy depends on inputs from the other social spheres which, accordingly, play a subsidiary role. Second, the economic sphere disavows this dependence on the other spheres, which again reallocates them to a secondary rank. Third, there are passages indicating that Fraser’s foreground/background distinction is also concerned with ideological questions about how capitalist society is viewed. In this regard, she claims that in ideologically established views, the economic sphere occupies the foreground in the sense of being represented as self-sufficient.

WITTGENSTEIN BEYOND THE POLEMICS OF DETERMINISM/INDETERMINISM
Enakshi Ray Mitra
Delhi, India

This paper reads Wittgenstein’s view of action as a move beyond the traditional polemics about determinism versus indeterminism. Both these camps assume space as consisting in discrete terminal bits – forcing thereby a causal split between action and its putative antecedents. Wittgenstein on the other hand looks upon wish, will, physiological events and action as a continuous stretch where the question of causation and the issue of determinism versus indeterminism does not arise.

VARIETIES OF RESENTMENT
Anne Reichold
Flensburg, Germany

Attitudes and expressions of resentment and indignation have been influential forms of critique in social and political contexts. Resentment and indignation express the felt violation of normative claims by actions of some individual or collective agents. As reactions to felt injustices resentment and indignation make strong claims for normative justification. However, these claims need not be correct, and resentment can be subject to criticism and modification. Based on a rule-related interpretation of Peter Strawson’s conception of reactive attitudes resentment is a reactive attitude towards the perceived violation of certain rules or norms by the action of an agent. Whereas Strawson focuses on resentment and indignation in individual persons with regards to individual actions I want to focus on cases of social and political resentment. Referring to literature on collective attitudes and blame in historical contexts I am going to specify the normative structure of reasons for social resentment and the rules regulating the expressions of these attitudes and draw a conceptual distinction between indignation, resentment and resentment.
In this paper, I argue that neuroaesthetics, it loses the characteristics that offer adapting the language-game of aesthetics to that of making aesthetic judgments. I argue that if we, in the spirit of scientism, instead of the mastery of rules as qualifying for aesthetic understanding. I show that there is current literature on neuroaesthetics that treats certain neuronal activities as a language-game of judging objects according to culturally-embedded rules. It is the ability of applying those rules that enables one to make aesthetic judgments. Thereby, aesthetics presupposes and enables aesthetic understanding. I show that there is current literature on neuroaesthetics that treats certain neuronal activities instead of the mastery of rules as qualifying for aesthetic judgments. I argue that if we, in the spirit of scientism, adapt the language-game of aesthetics to that of neuroaesthetics, it loses the characteristics that offer aesthetic understanding.

In this paper I ask what human life plans are and if and how they do and should change due to what is called the Anthropocene, i.e. the time we have lived in characterized by some as the first era in the history of Earth showing severe signs of being influenced by systemic human use and overuse of resources. I analyse John Rawls’ conception of the life plan and criticize it as too narrow. I argue that it needs openness to contingency. I interpret the Anthropocene as a basic contingency of our lives that we need to respond to. If interpreted in such a way a contingency becomes a matter of chance. I present Val Flammwood’s inclusion of the ecological crisis as an early example of such an interpretation.

In the Brown Book Wittgenstein operates with a distinction between “intransitive” and “transitive” meaning, and warns against a philosophical “delusion” that is produced if the former is understood as a special case of the latter. Commentators usually think that Wittgenstein here introduces two different notions of meaning and wants to emphasize the intransitive one by showing its importance e.g. in aesthetics. However, I want to claim that Wittgenstein’s main concern is instead with the question of the limit of language and that the illusion Wittgenstein warns against is produced by the “looping problem”: both the intransitive and the transitive case seem to produce a “loop”, where the explanation of the meaning of a sentence in the end leads us to repeat the sentence. The inevitability of the “looping problem” then suggests that we have reached the limit of language and that we must somehow transcend it and compare language to something outside it in order to explain its meaning. However, this is precisely the illusion Wittgenstein is out to expose. The transitive/intransitive distinction is thus a part of Wittgenstein’s criticism of foundationalist views of meaning. However, I also want to show that Wittgenstein in BB actually undermines this distinction, and that this might be a reason why we do not find the terminology in his later work.

LIFE PLANS IN THE ANTHROPOCENE
Barbara Reiter
Graz, Austria

In this paper I argue that scientism impoverishes the way we perform certain language-games. Wittgenstein presents aesthetics as a language-game of judging objects according to culturally-embedded rules. It is the ability of applying those rules that enables one to make aesthetic judgments. Thereby, aesthetics presupposes and enables aesthetic understanding. I show that there is current literature on neuroaesthetics that treats certain neuronal activities instead of the mastery of rules as qualifying for aesthetic judgments. I argue that if we, in the spirit of scientism, adapt the language-game of aesthetics to that of neuroaesthetics, it loses the characteristics that offer aesthetic understanding.

KAPITALISMUS UND IDENTITÄT. ZUR DEKOLONISIERUNG DEMOKRATISCHER POPULARITÄT
Marc Rülli
Leipzig, Deutschland


THE “LOOPING PROBLEM” AND THE LIMIT OF LANGUAGE: WITTGENSTEIN ON “TRANSITIVE” VS. “INTRANSITIVE” MEANING AND UNDERSTANDING
Simo Säätelä
Bergen, Norway

In the Brown Book Wittgenstein operates with a distinction between “intransitive” and “transitive” meaning, and warns against a philosophical “delusion” that is produced if the former is understood as a special case of the latter. Commentators usually think that Wittgenstein here introduces two different notions of meaning and wants to emphasize the intransitive one by showing its importance e.g. in aesthetics. However, I want to claim that Wittgenstein’s main concern is instead with the question of the limit of language and that the illusion Wittgenstein warns against is produced by the “looping problem”: both the intransitive and the transitive case seem to produce a “loop”, where the explanation of the meaning of a sentence in the end leads us to repeat the sentence. The inevitability of the “looping problem” then suggests that we have reached the limit of language and that we must somehow transcend it and compare language to something outside it in order to explain its meaning. However, this is precisely the illusion Wittgenstein is out to expose. The transitive/intransitive distinction is thus a part of Wittgenstein’s criticism of foundationalist views of meaning. However, I also want to show that Wittgenstein in BB actually undermines this distinction, and that this might be a reason why we do not find the terminology in his later work.

FRANZÖSISCHE MEISTER, FRANK DOBSON, STANLEY CASSON – „DASS DIESE SIE ETWAS ZU LEHREN HABEN; KOMMT IHNEN NICHT IN DEN SINN“ (WITTGENSTEIN)
Josef G. F. Rothhaupt
München, Deutschland


LIFE PLANS IN THE ANTHROPOCENE
Barbara Reiter
Graz, Austria

In this paper I argue that if we, in the spirit of scientism, instead of the mastery of rules as qualifying for aesthetic understanding. I show that there is current literature on neuroaesthetics that treats certain neuronal activities according to culturally-embedded rules. It is the ability of applying those rules that enables one to make aesthetic judgments. Thereby, aesthetics presupposes and enables aesthetic understanding. I show that there is current literature on neuroaesthetics that treats certain neuronal activities instead of the mastery of rules as qualifying for aesthetic judgements. I argue that if we, in the spirit of scientism, adapt the language-game of aesthetics to that of neuroaesthetics, it loses the characteristics that offer aesthetic understanding.

In this paper, I argue in a Wittgensteinian framework what effects scientism could have on the language-game of aesthetics. By scientism I understand a trend in culture and science that prioritizes scientific approaches over non-scientific approaches to any topic. Using the example of aesthetics, I argue that scientism impoverishes the way we perform certain language-games. Wittgenstein presents aesthetics as a language-game of judging objects according to culturally-embedded rules. It is the ability of applying those rules that enables one to make aesthetic judgments. Thereby, aesthetics presupposes and enables aesthetic understanding. I show that there is current literature on neuroaesthetics that treats certain neuronal activities instead of the mastery of rules as qualifying for aesthetic judgements. I argue that if we, in the spirit of scientism, adapt the language-game of aesthetics to that of neuroaesthetics, it loses the characteristics that offer aesthetic understanding.
THE GOOD OF/IN ARTICULATION: PERSONHOOD IN DIAMOND AND CAVELL

Carlo Salvador Megias

Bergen, Norway

I will explore a conception of personhood that sanctifies the sense of absurdity and tragedy we feel towards, ex., school shootings and the discussions surrounding them – that is, one justifying this particular conception of the good against another where these events and ensuing conversations would not strike us as absurd. If this conception of personhood stands, it would show that we cannot be neutral when faced with what we presently take to be competing conceptions of the good, or when faced with the prospect of certain kinds of conceptual change, once modern moral philosophy has been reminded of the fact that this is the conception of personhood it is meant to serve.

CULTURE AND VALUE: A CRITIQUE OF THE CULTURAL ARGUMENT FOR CLOSED BORDERS

Daniel Sharp

New York City, New York, USA

A prominent argument in favor of the state’s right to exclude immigrants appeals to the value of culture. I argue that these cultural arguments for exclusion fail in part because they depend on equivocating between different notions of culture and conflating different ways in which culture might be valuable.

REVISITING WITTGENSTEIN’S RULE-FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS

Antonio Segatto

São Paulo, Brazil

My purpose is to present and defend the possibility of a new interpretation of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations. This interpretation is based on two basic theses that differentiate it from standard interpretations as well as from philosophical debates on the normativity of meaning: 1) Following John McDowell and Juliet Floyd, I intend to show that the dilemma envisaged by Wittgenstein is not a skeptical paradox similar to the Humean argument about causal inferences. The problem involved in Wittgenstein’s remarks is analogous to the Kantian problem of the relation between rules and applications, more specifically, the supposed regress involved in the application of rules; 2) I intend to show that the solution to this problem depends on the consideration of the temporal dimension of language, for the regularity responsible for the institution of the identity of a rule is a regularity in the application of the rule-formulation over time.

LEX ORANDI, LEX CREDENDI: WITTGENSTEIN ON THE NATURE OF RELIGION

Richard Sherlock

Logan, Utah, USA

Much of the work on Wittgenstein and Religion has missed a crucial part of his discussion. Many writers, such as D. Z. Phillips have focused in the idea of religion as a language game. Others have focused on his discussion of religious “seeing” with reference to color blindness. Both of these topics and the associated literature are helpful in understanding Wittgenstein’s thought. In this paper I explore the way that Wittgenstein views religion not as primarily either a special experience or a set of beliefs. Rather it is a way of life.

SURPLUS POPULATIONS AND EMPOWERMENT THROUGH RADICAL NEEDS

Yildiz Silier

Istanbul, Turkey

Why are most workers not socialist and most women not feminist? According to Marx’s immanent critique of capitalism, the radical needs for self-realization, individuality and solidarity are created by capitalism but cannot be satisfied by majority of people within capitalism. Needs are not indicators of our weaknesses and dependencies, but rather reflect our social bonds and the quality of our relationships with the world. He criticizes capitalism as reducing all needs to the need to have money and explains his ideal as the creation of a “man-rich-in-needs” through the “emanicipation of the senses”. Fraser gives concrete examples of empowerment through politicization of needs. Capitalism transforms economic crisis into new opportunities for penetrating more into our everyday lives through enclosure of the commons. The capitalist tendency to increase surplus-populations introduces further divisions within the working class as mediated by race, gender and ethnicity which prevents them from fighting against their common enemies. I will relate two theories that focus on structure and agency respectively. The Marxist-feminist social reproduction theory will be used to analyze the internal contradictions within the capitalist structure. The theory of transindividuality which combines insights from Marx and Spinoza will be used to explain the production of new subjectivities in capitalism and to illuminate the possibilities for the emergence of new revolutionary agencies. My aim is to reveal the contemporary mechanisms underlying the widespread phenomena of voluntary servitude and to propose an alternative theoretical framework for discussing the preconditions of empowerment.
HASE ODER ENTE? WITTGENSTEINS ASPEKTEWESSEL UND IDENTITÄTSPOLITIK
Georg Siller
Innsbruck, Österreich


SCIENCE, CULTURE IN FRONT OF MEDIA: HOW TO AVOID THE DECLINE OF THE EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN THINKING?
Antonia Soulez
Paris, France

The integration of science into culture is Spengler’s leitmotiv. In his Essay of 1921 entitled “Remarks for the readers rescued from the decline of the west” Musil who also deplored this dependency of reason vis-à-vis culture “at the expense of knowledge”, dismisses the attempt to “understand” the “Decline of the West” as Adorno will later do though in different terms. The rescued are those who have escaped reading the “Decline of the west”, and have succeeded in grasping in time the “planeche de salut” or rescue appliance of rationality. The “decline” is that of “the strength to think”. Far from denouncing after Husserl the excessive confidence in natural sciences at the expense of the Geisteswissenschaften that would put reason in crisis, Musil argues against Husserl’s interpretation according to which the lack of a living reason is the symptom of the crisis when reason has lost its “center”. This view assigning a telos to reason is a myth. One should on the contrary save rationality without idealizing it. For Musil, the disappearing of a center is our primary condition, due to the amorphism of human nature. Only a principle of orientation is able to drive us out of this moral indifference at the beginning. There is no such “centre” able to structure humanity by giving it its orientation. Is the claim for universality really the remedy to irrationalism? No, Musil replies. Idealization is the symptom to combat, not the remedy. Therefore, the non-availability of philosophy in the times of the Kritis (Husserl’s Kritis, 1936) is the symptom to be interpreted rather than the self-occultation of its telos. The absence of philosophy speaks for itself. My contention in this paper is to question the problematic relation between science and culture, yet from a point of view that could not be taken into account by Musil and Husserl. How to protect society from the ravages of the market has become the crucial question today given the market-economy and the damages that its deregulation has caused. I suggest bringing to the fore the “market of culture” anticipated by the anti-journalist Karl Kraus almost one century ago, although only at the level of a critique of language intended to protect language from semantic distortions, in absence of considerations on the market of culture. “A social calamity is not only cultural, it is also economic” (K. Polanyi).

TECHNICAL AND SOCIAL RISKS OF CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES
Harald Stelzer
Graz, Austria

In a recent paper Langer and Niederberger (2018) have suggested to understand risks involved in global warming as social risks, demanding social solutions beyond consideration of a technical and scientific nature. Even though this could be an important contribution to the discussions of climate policies, I will show in this paper that technical and social risks are interlinked with each other on different levels.
ONTROLOGIE DES POLITISCHEN:
PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK UND POLITISCHE IMAGINATION
Gerhard Thonhauser
Darmstadt, Deutschland


WITTGENSTEIN’S CRITIQUE OF THE PNEUMATIC CONCEPTION OF THE SOUL
Jasmin Trächtler
Bergen, Norway

The idea of the mind as something hidden inside the body is a picture, with which Wittgenstein was concerned since the 1930s – however, it was especially in his later writings on the philosophy of psychology that this picture became an object of critique itself. An elementary aspect of his critique is the idea of the mind, or soul as an entity, a thing. In a hitherto not edited remark, he spells out his target with unusual clarity: “I turn against the pneumatic conception. Namely, insofar as it is the conception of the gaseousness of the soul” (Ms 130: 3). In this paper, I aim at an elucidation of Wittgenstein’s critique of the “pneumatic conception of the soul” in that very remark. It will be shown firstly, that the postulate of a “pneumatic soul” is problematized by Wittgenstein as a consequence of a “grammatical fallacy” and that this fallacy also dominates a certain idea of the meaning of a word. I will finally point out that Wittgenstein’s critique of the “pneumatic conception” reaches beyond a critique of the mere postulate of a “nebulous soul-entity” towards a critique of the evaluative interpretation of this entity, the “pneuma”, as the essential, life-giving principle behind outer expressions.

WAS IST DIE POSTKRITISCHE VERNUNFT?
Zenon Tsikrikas
Athens, Griechenland


RULE-FOLLOWING AS PRAXIS: A COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE
Kevezai Tureng
Mumbai, India

The concept of rules or standards has raised many interesting philosophical controversies. There are philosophers who have tried to understand the relationship between rules and following them and whether the notion of rule-following presupposes a community or not. Various commentators have given contrasting views to this question. Wittgenstein himself is accused of not explicitly stating his position on the question and hence his arguments become open to various interpretations. This paper is an attempt to clarify whether the concept of rule-following presupposes a community and will take Wittgenstein as doing so. All meaningful expressions are, following Wittgenstein, taken as contextual and to pretend that this is not the case is to be blind. In this regard, a community called ‘Nagas’ in India is taken as a case study to show how the concept of praxis or context which Wittgenstein takes as the background where meaning arise is indeed seen in this community. In many ways the reflections here are provisional, incomplete and are not shaped into any single understanding of meaning but rather used to understand more clearly the relation of meaning to its context. What is presented here tries to lay the groundwork for future development to the approach.

WITTGENSTEIN AND STOIC FATALISM
Miroslav Vacura
Prague, Czech Republic

This paper focuses on the relation between young Wittgenstein’s philosophy and the Stoic concept of fate. In the first part, we discuss the current knowledge on Wittgenstein’s direct or indirect acquaintance with Stoic doctrines. We show that there is no evidence confirming that he was directly knowledgeable of Stoicism; rather, his knowledge of it was probably limited and mediated by secondary
THINKING ONE IS FOLLOWING A RULE IS FOLLOWING A RULE IN CRIMINAL LAW
Eduardo Victor J. Valdez
Manila, Philippines

How should we understand the phrase “otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same as obeying it”? Is this a tautology? I shall endeavor to use this phrase in the context of law, criminal law in particular. I will show that criminal intent or mens rea is a viable concept that can illustrate that thinking one was obeying a rule is the same as obeying it. In classical criminal law, a crime is actus reus + mens rea. Penal statutes that stipulate a mens rea element require one to think in order to obey the rule. In the end, we shall see that thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same as obeying it in penal states that stipulate a mens rea element.

HOW TO BELONG TO A COMMUNITY: MOORE’S A DEFENCE OF COMMON SENSE AND WITTGENSTEIN’S ON CERTAINTY
Wim Vanrie
Ghent, Belgium

I argue that a standard reading of Moore’s defence of common sense – according to which Moore’s first-person singular knowledge claims are the pillars of his argument – is ill-conceived. Moore’s claim against the idealist is not so much that he possesses certain knowledge, but that the idealist herself, in virtue of belonging to the same community, possesses that knowledge. Moore’s invocation of his common sense propositions constitutes his attempt to articulate what it is to belong to a community. It is shared propositional knowledge that, according to Moore, binds the community. Next, I argue that Wittgenstein’s reflections in On Certainty show an awareness of these points and in fact center around the same question: what is it to belong to a community? For Wittgenstein, we could say, it is shared grammar that binds a community. But this is merely the form of an answer, and we will miss the philosophical import of On Certainty if we take it to consist of nothing more than a grammatical investigation aimed at unmasking Moore’s claims as nonsensical. First and foremost, On Certainty constitutes an investigation of what grammar itself is, an investigation that Wittgenstein never took himself to have completed, and to which his grammatical investigations of concepts such as ‘knowledge’ and ‘doubt’ are themselves subordinated.

THE MEANING OF ISLAM: TRACING TALAL ASAD’S WITTGENSTEINIANISM
Harald Viersen
Nijmegen, The Netherlands

Of the many influences that shaped the work of acclaimed anthropologist Talal Asad, the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein ranks among the most important. In this article I unpack the Wittgensteinian strand in Asad’s thinking by showing how the structure of Asad’s seminal essay “The Idea of An Anthropology of Islam” (1986) mirrors the dialectic in Wittgenstein’s changing ideas about meaning. The aim of this article is twofold. First, the parallel between Asad and Wittgenstein explains and strengthens Asad’s argument for a tradition-based definition of Islam. Second, it demonstrates the value of interdisciplinary research, showing how anthropology benefits from a fundamental philosophical discussion in dealing with an important contemporary issue. Simultaneously, this should serve as an encouragement to philosophers to engage with debates in other fields, not only for the benefit of non-philosophers, but equally because the inventive ways in which Asad combines various disciplines may fertilize discussions within philosophy proper.

AFTER SUSTAINABILITY: FREEDOM AND REASON IN THE AGE OF CLIMATE ALARMISM
Thomas Wallgren
Helsinki, Finland

In the first part I present very short remarks on four new features in the present discursive constellation, which present important challenges to “us”, the “us/we” of academic professional philosophers from the Global North. I do this in order to contextualise my presentation, and also in order to highlight my concern that all philosophy is always accountable to, to put it briefly, its self-understanding of when, where and wherefrom it speaks. The catchwords of this part are: (i) the erosion of liberal self-confidence, (ii) plurality of grand narratives, (iii) fragmentation of philosophy, and (iv) new instrumentalising pressures on research. In the second part I provide a summary of the key argumentative steps for two controversial theses. The first of these is the untimely proposal that modernity – and not, for instance, the Anthropocene, transhumanism, neoliberalism, or postcoloniality – conceived (without essentialist reductivism) as an epoch, remains the best available framework for any ambitious diagnosis of our times. The second is that we find in the sceptical idea of philosophy on which Socrates, Sextus Empiricus and the later Wittgenstein are in basic agreement, the highest form of commitment to reason available in the Western tradition and also the best available critical tools for a study of the conceptual aspects of a self-understanding of the times. Such sceptical philosophy could be called studies in moral semantics or political semantics. They could also be called experiments in transformative philosophy. The third part presents select elements of a case study in political semantics. The case is the environmental crisis, or, “the sixth state shift”, or “climate change” which, I suggest, cannot be understood and addressed unless we understand it as a civilisational affront. The elements which I choose to discuss are (i) the interplay between the discourses of climate alarmism, limits to growth and sustainable development and (ii) one aspect of the relation between the ideas of progress and freedom. The aspect I focus on in subsection (ii) is the tense relation between commitment to ecomodernism and technological progress on the one hand and the modern idea of political freedom as rational self-determination of equal citizens on the other. Some prescriptive proposals will be discussed, revolving around the suggestion that today, as pressures on “the modern project” grow, and as liberal and left hypocrisy reaches new heights every year, a commitment to a politics by citizens that does not give up ethical universalism implies a commitment to a
transmodern politics that either celebrates radical uncertainty or seeks to realize radical localization of governance, technology and economy. There are some final, sceptical remarks on philosophy as “real politics”, and on citizenship and hope.

WITTGENSTEIN ON JUDGMENT: POLITICAL AND TEMPORAL CONCERNS
Désirée Weber
Wooster, Ohio, USA
Wittgenstein’s investigations into the role of judgment in forming meaning reveal how the process of judgment functions even in the absence of universal referents that otherwise might be thought to guarantee shared understanding. I argue that Wittgenstein’s novel position on the epistemological conditions in which meaning is established lend his insights primary political relevance: just as meaningful linguistic use is possible despite a lack of foundational referents, political judgments are made without recourse to ultimately stable grounding. Yet agreement in use and in judgments is nevertheless vital, especially to understand political judgements which are forged in a pluralistic space of contested – and thus shifting – conceptual parameters. From this starting point, I then elaborate how we can – despite conditions of uncertainty – critique political concepts and exercise political judgment in times of crisis. This new conception of judgment also makes the temporal complexity of judgments apparent.

ZIVILGESELLSCHAFT ALS MITTEL GEGEN FAKE NEWS UND HATE SPEECH: EINE UNEBGRENZTDE HOFFNUNG
Karsten Weber
Regensburg, Deutschland

KRITIK AN MORALISCHER KRITIK. MORALISMUS IM INTERNET
Eva Weber-Guskar
Göttingen, Deutschland

WITTGENSTEIN ÜBER GEDANKEN UND GEHIRNPROZESSE
Christian Helmut Wenzel
Taipei, Taiwan

A NOTE ON MS 174 – THE MEANING OF A REMARK IS GIVEN BY THE STREAM OF THE TEXT
Peter K. Westergaard
Copenhagen, Denmark
This paper raises the question of whether the reservations Rhees felt about the publication of On Certainty would also have applied with regard to Remarks on Colour and Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology II. This question arises when we consider the unintended consequences of dividing up the notebook MS 174 between the publications On Certainty, Culture and Value and Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology II. This issue is discussed in relation to the example of MS 174, 1v-2r.
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