

Krise und Kritik: Philosophische Analyse und Zeitgeschehen

Crisis and Critique: Philosophical Analysis and Current Events

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UNPOPULAR SOVEREIGNTIES: CITIZENSHIP, PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY

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So-called democratic states rest upon acts of violence and exclusion which cannot themselves be justified democratically. Yet, much contemporary political theory takes these configurations for granted as the context for philosophical reflection. This paper explores some of the spatio-temporal paradoxes of popular sovereignty as conventionally understood – i.e., as the authorization of government through the consent of “the people.” I argue that, instead of treating the borders of popular sovereignty as given, philosophical reflection on political authority would benefit from greater attention to their continual contestation and critique.

WITTGENSTEIN: NEITHER A REALIST NOR AN IDEALIST

N. Sena Arslan

Istanbul, Turkey

This essay looks into later Wittgenstein’s linguistic anti-realism and whether it is a kind of idealism. I consider Dilman’s reading of Wittgenstein as an opponent of philosophical realism in the traditional sense, without committing himself to linguistic idealism. Taking account of Dilman’s “dimensions of reality”, the first part explains the distinction between the “discourse of objects” and the “grammatical discourse” as found in Wittgenstein, highlighting the role of this clarification in the assessment of our classifications and system of reference. Then an examination of Williams’ interpretation of Wittgenstein as an idealist follows. The second part discusses that Williams’ charge carries a traditionally realist expectation which Wittgenstein aims to debunk through a grammatical clarification in the first place.

THE QUESTION OF VALUE IN SCIENCE

Maria Baghramian

Dublin, Ireland

This paper addresses the traditional question of the place of values in science and proposes an alternative to the more standard approaches. It is generally accepted that the practice of science, as well as decisions to accept or reject a scientific theory, involve so called “epistemic” or cognitive values – values such as consistency, simplicity, accuracy and explanatory power (see for instance Kuhn 1977). The more vexing issues regarding the role of values in science relate to non-epistemic, social and moral values and whether they too should be seen as essential to the methodologies and practice of science. The mantra of “value-free science” is often accompanied by the worry that the objectivity of science could be compromised by the infusion of moral and social values. Moreover, it has been argued by Hempel (1965) among others, that even if we accept that non-epistemic values influence the conduct of science, they do not have a role in the explanations that scientists provide or the theories they construct. Two main lines of thought have been used to counter these claims. The first is based on the Quine-Duhem hypothesis of the underdetermination of theory by data and has been advocated, most notably, by feminist epistemologists (e.g. Longino 1990). The second line, advanced by Heather Douglas (2009), points to the inductive risk, or the risk of error, facing any scientific hypothesis and the role that values can play in addressing such risks. These are con-

tested claims, but even if accepted at face value they still would not help us to decide which non-epistemic values should science and scientists bring to bear on theory construction. A more successful response to the question of the role of value in science, I will argue, may be framed not in terms of the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values, nor in terms of the direct and indirect reliance on values as Heather Douglas (2009) has proposed, but by using a virtue epistemic framework. The focus in this approach is on the continuities between the epistemic virtues of good science and their moral counterparts. I will argue for this point by focusing on the virtues of trustworthiness, integrity and humility, virtues that have both epistemic and moral dimensions.

THE TREE OF THE *TRACTATUS*: WITTGENSTEIN’S PICTURE OF EYE AND FIELD OF SIGHT

Luciano Bazzocchi

Siena, Italy

“The *Tractatus* must be read in accordance with the numbering system, and that demands that the reader follow the text after the manner of a logical tree” (Hacker). “Suddenly the internal references between the remarks of the book become quite clear” (Kuusela). Indeed, the tree-reading that follows Wittgenstein’s numbering faithfully, “makes the book perspicuous and clear: without the numbering, the book would be an incomprehensible jumble” (Wittgenstein). In addition, the whole section 5.6 on the limits of language and world, until now a Calvary for the serial reader, becomes readable and meaningful. It can be seen that the section is not in favour of Schopenhauer’s hypotheses, but against them. The only puzzle that remains is the absurd figure of 5.6331, representing an eye inside, laughably, its own field of sight. But never has Wittgenstein depicted such an inconsistent picture: in his manuscripts and typescripts, he always drew (to criticise it) “how people imagine the shape of the visual field to be” (Wittgenstein). The incredible editorial error, and consequently the non-senses of all the commentators, derive from the apparent obscurity of the section and the biases of the sequential reading. We show that even Ramsey, the English translator, and Ogden, the editor, did not understand proposition 5.6331 and Wittgenstein corrected them twice in vain.

AGENCY AND AUTHORSHIP: TOWARDS A SOCIALLY SITUATED, INTERACTIONIST VIEW

Federica Berdini

Munich, Germany

This paper relates cases of socially displaced and distorted agency, i.e., agency exercised in conditions of oppression, to Christine Korsgaard’s constitutivist authorship view of agency. In light of a potential problem that these cases pose to Korsgaard’s view, I suggest amending it by incorporating Anscombe’s characterisation of intentional action (and relying on a Wittgensteinian interpretation thereof).

KNOWLEDGE IN CRISIS: METHODOLOGICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO REALISM AND RELATIVISM

Gernot A. Biermeier

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In recent years a tendency of thought called social constructivism has given rise (once more) to the idea that our scientific endeavours are merely one among many equally right ways to attain knowledge, which leads destructively to a relativism of knowledge and therefore science. This theory, which has a strong foothold among the humanities, states in its most extreme form that there are no mind-independent facts, but only socially constructed facts, which are influenced by contingent social needs and interests. Following this, objectivity does not exist and therefore neither does objective science and knowledge production. Paul Boghossian argues (rather harshly) against such relativistic points of view from a (classical) realistic standpoint. In this paper I offer a third approach for interpreting the role played by facts. I will do this by adopting a methodological constructivist's point of view. The solution lies, as so often, somewhere in the middle, with the idea of an (maybe not) objective – or at least intersubjective – science, which clearly seems to be worth saving.

WHAT IS BIODIVERSITY AND WHY SHOULD WE FEEL OBLIGED TO PROTECT IT?

Dieter Birnbacher

Düsseldorf, Germany

For a philosopher biodiversity is a challenge for at least two reasons: 1. How is biodiversity defined? What constitutes biodiversity? 2. Why is the conservation of biodiversity important? – The talk makes an attempt to clarify the first issue by isolating a number of component factors that influence the measurement and the appraisal of diversity in general: Is diversity a value at all? Is diversity intrinsically valuable or only in dependence of other values? What of this applies to biodiversity? The second question is answered by a want-regarding and future-oriented ethics: Biodiversity is important because of the diversity of the aspects humans seek in nature and the expectation that, with the ongoing process of civilization, natural variety will become more and more a scarce and correspondingly valuable resource.

SATISFYING WITTGENSTEIN'S DEMANDS OF A "CORRECT LOGICAL NOTATION": QUANTIFICATIONAL POLYADIC PREDICATE LOGIC WITH A SINGLE OPERATOR AND NO IDENTITY-SIGN

Edgar C. Boedeker, Jr.

Cedar Falls, Iowa, USA

A notation, $\mathcal{L}_{Na\bar{\xi}}$, is introduced that, for the first time, satisfies everything Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* demands of a "correct logical notation". The semantics of $\mathcal{L}_{Na\bar{\xi}}$ are "weakly exclusive": extensions of constant names and variables are stipulated not with an identity-sign, but via difference of signs and scopes of operations. $\mathcal{L}_{Na\bar{\xi}}$ features a single, novel operator: $Na(\bar{\xi})$, a jointly-negating quantifier. Given the notation's weakly-exclusive semantics, if ξ_0, \dots, ξ_n are propositions, none of which contain free variables, $Na(\xi_0, \dots, \xi_n)$ is true if and only if each result of uniformly substituting constants for free occurrences of a in ξ_0, \dots, ξ_n is false. A translation-procedure is presented from $\mathcal{L}_{Na\bar{\xi}}$ into a

large segment of standard first-order polyadic predicate calculus with identity, where expressions of the form $x \neq y$ are interpreted as indicating notational conventions governing extensional differences among signs. $\mathcal{L}_{Na\bar{\xi}}$ is shown to be consistent with Wittgenstein's claim that some sentences of standard logic are nonsensical, but inconsistent with his claim that all sentences purporting to assert that n objects exist are nonsensical.

ECOLOGICAL CITIZENSHIP AND COSMOPOLITAN CITIZENSHIP

Michel Bourban

Kiel, Germany

Ecological citizenship and cosmopolitan citizenship are two models of political community that have developed over the last three decades. While they are both based on the conviction that justice extends beyond the borders of nation-states, the two theoretical models have developed mostly separately, and even sometimes in opposition. Most notably, Andrew Dobson (2003: 10-32) claims in *Citizenship and the Environment* that ecological citizenship is "post-cosmopolitan". This paper explores the two kinds of citizenship in order to see if they can converge on their theoretical foundations and practical implications. It proposes two strategies: the first, critical, focuses on the theoretical level and looks for weaknesses in the objections Dobson makes to the cosmopolitan citizenship model; the second, more constructive, focuses on the practical level and finds convergences on the concrete implications that both models have for individual agents' ethical behavior.

IDIOTS AND ASSHOLES: WHAT WE (SHOULD) CRITICIZE WHEN WE CRITICIZE SEXIST ACTION

Christine Bratu

Munich, Germany

Many believe that when we criticize an action as sexist, we thereby issue a statement about the agent's state of mind, e.g. that she had false beliefs about or hateful attitudes towards women. In this talk, I take issue with this mentalistic understanding of sexist action. I start with the observation that, intuitively, we consider "sexist" to be a thick ethical concept, so that to state that an action was sexist is to say something about its wrong-making features. Then I argue – against those who have recently championed the idea of a genuinely doxastic morality – that we cannot wrong other people simply in virtue of the mental attitudes we have about them. Just as we are normatively free to do stupid, ugly or even self-destructive things with our bodies as long as we do not harm anybody else, we are normatively free to hold stupid, ugly or even hateful mental attitudes about other people as long as we do not thereby harm them. Finally, I claim that, given a sensible theory of well-being, we cannot harm each other simply in virtue of our mental attitudes. Were we to call an action sexist in virtue of the agent's states of mind, we would therefore fail to track its wrong-making feature. Instead we should go with the consequentialist understanding of sexist action feminists have long argued for: To criticize an action as sexist is to claim that it selectively harms women.

FORMS OF LIFE AND SOCIAL CRITIQUE: PASOLINI AFTER WITTGENSTEIN

Silver Bronzo

Moscow, Russia

Drawing on Pier Paolo Pasolini and his appropriation of Wittgenstein, this paper argues for the possibility of a radical sort of social critique based on the notion of form of life: the members of a society may not only have an *objectionable* form of life, but also *lack* a form of life altogether.

MYTHS OF MERITOCRACY AND PHILOSOPHICAL CULTURE

Eyja M. Brynjarsdóttir

Reykjavík, Iceland

It is a prominent myth in our culture that people usually get what they deserve in accordance with their merit. The temptation of this myth can be very strong for those who do well; we all like to believe that we truly deserve the good things in our lives and we may even feel that we have worked hard to achieve them. However, when various aspects of the world are examined, it should become quite clear that this is rarely the way things really work. The distribution of good things in the world is dependent on so many other things than people's merit. Philosophical practice and culture have been criticized for their exclusion of women and minorities, most likely to be traced to many contributing factors. One such factor is the gaslighting of women in philosophy; women working in philosophy throughout the ages have gotten the message that they are attempting to do something that they are not really worthy or fit to do, and their experiences of unjust treatment have been systemically dismissed as a problem on an individual level. In this talk, I argue that belief in the existence of a meritocracy causes harm, not only to both the "winners" and the "losers" on an individual level but to the culture on a social level. I discuss this both in the context of issues such as economic injustice and in the context of philosophical practice.

AN AUTHORITATIVE ATTITUDE TO THE LIMITS OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

Shih-Hsun Chen & Tzu-Keng Fu

Pilsen, Czech Republic & Taoyuan, Taiwan

In this paper, we defend the value free ideal (VFI) in the philosophy of science by extending Stephen John's argument. We do so by showing that the methodological critique about VFI is unsatisfactory and offering an alternative solution by arguing that endorsing the so-called "non-epistemic value" is not the only solution for the uncertain connection between evidence and conclusions. We use the concept "research purposes" or "the purposes of having an individual scientific theory" as an approach to case analysis. We argue that although scientific hypotheses, especially policy-related ones, may not meet main social priorities (such as morality and social justice), and in some cases, will incur a huge social cost, the value judgments included in these hypotheses may not be an inappropriate non-epistemic value. Some of these value judgments can also be a preference for the epistemic value of knowledge based on the premise of maintaining scientific authority. As for the case studies put forward by many philosophers, it might be better to distinguish each case individually by each specific problem to understand whether it is due to the limits of scientific research at that time or some inappropriate value judgments in scientific reasoning per se.

A CRITIQUE OF A FRUITLESS DEBATE IN MORAL COGNITIVISM

Yanzhou Chen

Norwich, United Kingdom

In this paper, I first discuss the current debate among traditional normative realists who are haunted by the notorious "placement problem", and I argue that the debate reaches a stalemate: reductive naturalism is vulnerable to what I call the normative challenge, while non-naturalism risks of violating a broadly scientific naturalist world-picture. Next, by appealing to Price's Wittgensteinian work, I suggest that the doctrine of representationalism, which triggers the placement problem, is non-compulsory and that the rejection of it will not automatically lead to non-cognitivism: on the contrary, the truth-aptness of normative judgment that is the hallmark of cognitivism, is shown to be a fundamental aspect of our life.

POLITISCHE KRISE UND KRITIK IM HISTORISCHEN KONTEXT

Ridha Chennoufi

Tunis, Tunesien

Das Ziel dieses Vortrages ist, über den Fall des ehemaligen tunesischen politischen Regimes (Januar 2011) nachzudenken, indem wir ihn sowohl als historische Tatsache als auch als Lebenserfahrung betrachten. Die Lebenserfahrung wird hier heraufbeschworen, weil sie uns dazu gebracht hat, zu erkennen, dass die Kette der vielen, manchmal dramatischen Ereignisse, die den Prozess des Aufbaus der angestrebten Demokratie markierten, nicht im Lichte liberaler, normativer – Rawlsscher und Habermasscher – oder marxistisch-leninistischer Theorien verstanden werden können. Deshalb wird unsere Reflexion in eine historische Theorie des Politischen eingebaut, die von M. Foucault initiiert und vom Soziologen J. F. Bayart auf die Untersuchung afrikanischer Staaten angewendet wurde. Die schon erwähnten Ereignisse werden also durch das Prisma ihrer eigenen Historizität untersucht. Um jedoch die sterile Opposition zwischen einer nicht-westlichen Historizität (afrikanischen, islamischen ...) und einer europäischen oder sogar jüdisch-christlichen Historizität zu vermeiden, werden wir diese Ereignisse als Ausdruck dessen betrachten, was A. Ibn Khaldūn (1406) „eine Herrschaftskrise“ und A. Gramsci eine Hegemoniekrise bezeichneten. Dieser doppelte Einstieg in die Problematik der Krise hat zwei Funktionen: Erstens wird er zeigen, wie eine Gesellschaft eine gegenwärtige Krise überwinden kann, indem sie einerseits die Lehren aus vergangenen politischen Krisen nutzt, und andererseits die sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Bedingungen entsprechend ihrer Zukunftsvision transformiert. Zweitens wird er ermöglichen den Foucaultschen Begriff des „kritischen Fokus“ methodisch als analytisches Werkzeug einzusetzen und dadurch die komplexen und sich ständig verändernden Beziehungen zwischen Macht, Wahrheit und Akteur besser zu beleuchten.

WITTGENSTEIN ON THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF SIGN AND SYMBOL

James Conant

Leipzig, Germany

The talk will begin by arguing that Wittgenstein, both early and late, rejects the idea that the logically simpler and more fundamental case is that of "the mere sign" and that what a meaningful symbol is can be explained through the elaboration of an appropriately supplemented conception

of the sign: the sign plus something (say, an interpretation or an assignment of meaning). Rather the sign, in the logically fundamental case of its mode of occurrence, is an internal aspect of the symbol. The *Tractatus* puts this point as follows: "The sign is that in the symbol which is perceptible by the senses." Conversely, this means that it is essential to a symbol – to what a symbol is – that it have an essentially perceptible aspect. It will be argued that for Wittgenstein there is no privileged direction of explanatory priority between symbol and sign here: without signs there are no symbols (hence without language there is no thought) and without some sort of relation to symbols there are no signs (hence the philosopher's concept of the supposedly "merely linguistic" presupposes an internal relation to symbols).

COMPREHENSIVE PHILOSOPHY IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE

Claudio Costa

Natal, Rio Grande do Norte, Brazil

This short paper is motivated by Susan Haack's critique of contemporary approaches in mainstream philosophy. According to her, much of today's academic philosophy is committed to an institutionalized scientific treatment of philosophical problems which fragments the philosophical quest in ways that make it unable to deal adequately with its real problems. I hope to add some further, more balanced explanations to her diagnosis. I also speculate about the chances of comprehensive philosophical work in this scenario, and finally, about the forms this kind of work could take in an increasingly science-dominated world.

WITTGENSTEIN DOES CRITICAL THEORY

Alice Cray

Oxford, United Kingdom

This lecture is about pivotal but oft-neglected challenges of liberating social criticism. Its primary concern is an account of the nature of critical social thought that, while intuitively attractive, goes missing in many philosophical conversations about such thought. This is because the account presupposes a heterodox conception of rationality that often is not even registered as a legitimate possibility, much less seriously examined. Yet the relevant conception of rationality informs influential philosophical treatments of liberating social criticism, including, for instance, some notable recent contributions to Critical Theory. It is possible to mount a defense of this conception, thereby providing support for the appealing image of critique it brings within reach, by reconstructing – with various qualifications and additions – an argument from mid twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy of the social sciences, viz., the argument that forms the backbone of Peter Winch's *The Idea of a Social Science*. Winch draws his guiding insights from the later philosophy of Wittgenstein, and one payoff of considering Winch's work against the backdrop of congenial work in Critical Theory is contesting the artificial professional strictures sometimes taken to speak against reaching across the 'Continental Divide' in philosophy. The larger payoff of this ecumenical method – and the main concern of this lecture – is advancing the enterprise of liberating social criticism.

IDEALE UND KRITIK: ZUR AUFGABE UND METHODE POLITISCHER PHILOSOPHIE

Julian Culp

Paris, Frankreich

Dieser Aufsatz zeichnet die Konfliktlinien der Debatte um ideale und nicht-ideale Gerechtigkeitstheorie kurz nach und skizziert hierfür zunächst die durch John Rawls zur Bekanntheit gelangte ideale Theorie. Daran anschließend stellt er die Argumente vor, die Philosophen wie Amartya Sen für eine nicht-ideal angelegte politische Philosophie ins Feld führen. In einer kritischen Erwiderung auf Sen erläutert dieser Aufsatz dann, weshalb politische Philosophie weder ausschließlich ideal-theoretisch noch ausschließlich nicht-idealtheoretisch betrieben werden sollte. Hierbei wird dieser Aufsatz allerdings nicht nur dafür argumentieren, dass die ideale und die nicht-ideale Theorie als separate, sich aber komplementär ergänzende Theorieteile verstanden werden müssen. Vielmehr wird er auch die bislang noch nicht vertretene Auffassung verteidigen, dass ideale und nicht-ideale Theorie als wechselseitig abhängig bzw. als wechselseitig ermöglichend oder gleichursprünglich aufzufassen sind, und deswegen weder die ideale noch die nicht-ideale Theorie als vorrangig betrachtet werden darf.

WITTGENSTEIN'S REASONABLE MAN AND INTERACTIONIST APPROACHES TO REASON

Stefanie Dach

Pilsen, Czech Republic

My paper focuses on the concept of reason and "the reasonable man" in Wittgenstein's *On Certainty*. I argue that Wittgenstein's remarks on the reasonable man create at least two questions: whether reason is a substantial concept and whether we must accept relativism about reason. I show that an interactionist understanding of reason, developed among others by authors influenced by Wittgenstein, can help circumvent these two problems. I argue that an interactionist approach to reason can be vaguely discerned in some remarks in *On Certainty*, but is intermingled with a more traditional understanding of reason.

THE MYSTICAL AND THE CRITIQUE OF SCIENTISM

Haiqiang Dai

Beijing, China

Wittgenstein's early philosophy has a special attitude towards the natural sciences. His analysis of the logical structures of propositions reaches to a particular result with regard to the laws of nature, causal form and scientific principle. In this essay, I will argue that Wittgenstein's treatment of natural science has two important points: one is that the investigation of the nature of science has an important relation to his interest in ethics, especially the mystical; the other is that his view about the nature of scientific propositions provides a useful perspective to rebut scientism.

THINKING ABOUT NATURALISM AND PRAGMATISM: WITTGENSTEIN AND RORTY

Cora Diamond

Charlottesville, Virginia, USA

I discuss Wittgenstein's thought in relation to that of Richard Rorty. Rorty counts Wittgenstein as one of "us pragmatists", which involves (as Rorty says) a "repackaging" of Wittgenstein. I examine first what is in the Rortyan packaging, and I then consider the contrast between Wittgenstein and Rorty on what naturalism comes to for them. I will bring out how their different conceptions of naturalism hang together with their totally different philosophical aims.

"A METHOD HAS NOW BEEN FOUND": WITTGENSTEIN VS. FRAZER

Alexandra Dias Fortes

Lisbon, Portugal

Frazer's *The Golden Bough: a study in magic and religion* provides Wittgenstein with a valuable source material for applying his philosophical methodologies. For example, Wittgenstein is able to show that descriptions are better suited for understanding magic and religion than explanations. We might say that his criticism of Frazer constitutes a philosophical approach – one that does something comparable to an investigation in aesthetics where describing instead of explaining plays a similar role of elucidation. This comparison facilitates trying to come to grips with what Wittgenstein meant when he announced that a method had been found. The present paper explores this possibility. In addition, aspects of what could be characterized as a "religious point of view" can be detected in his observations on Frazer's work, even if these are not explicit. For this reason, this paper also briefly sketches the possibility that exercising ourselves in seeing the world from that perspective is representative of philosophy as "a work on oneself", and partly helps to outline the kind of research it constitutes for Wittgenstein.

§92 OF WITTGENSTEIN'S ON CERTAINTY, OR THE ETHICAL IMPORTANCE OF AESTHETIC REFLECTION

Ludwig Drosch

Berlin, Germany

In §92 of *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein gives the example of two divergent worldviews whose gap cannot be bridged by the giving of reasons, but only by a conversion to an entirely new perspective. The paragraph condenses an important strain of Wittgenstein's thought on the ultimate groundlessness of our belief system, and the consequent limits of rational justification as the mediator between different worldviews, that I recapitulate in the first part of this essay. Second, by taking a hint from the remark concluding §92, and with recourse to Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics, I aim to show how these reflections on the limits of reason-giving point to the ethical importance of aesthetic reflection and art. Where rational discourse fails – not merely empirically, but in its very possibilities, as in the example of §92 – to bring into communication divergent perspectives, the question becomes how incompatible pictures of the world could be brought into contact.

STRANDED ASSETS AS A NORMATIVELY SIGNIFICANT BURDEN

Eike Düvel & Lukas H. Meyer

Graz, Austria

Avoiding dangerous climate change will require us to leave a majority of carbon fuel reserves in the ground. This creates various risks of harm to states, carbon companies and their employees. Stranding these assets is normatively significant for two reasons: First, the burdens of stranded assets may also fall on already disadvantaged people in developed and developing countries. Second, these burdens may be especially harmful since they frustrate people's life-plans. We argue that the burden in stranding assets consists in the frustration of people's legitimate expectations connected to the extraction of these carbon fuels. States should avoid frustrating them or minimize burdens in terms of these expectations. However, we do not believe that carbon fuel producers' and their shareholders' expectations to benefit economically from these activities generally constitute legitimate expectations that could ground compensatory claims.

MUSIC AND LANGUAGE GAME

Burcu Durukan

Ankara, Turkey

Wittgenstein introduces the concept of language game in his later period in order to show that the boundaries of meaning in language cannot strictly be drawn as in the language of logic, as opposed to his early understanding of language in the *Tractatus*. According to this point of view, there are different functions of words within different language games, and understanding of language is only possible for those who are involved in a common language game. This study will address the relationship between the concept of language game and music. It aims to indicate that there is a strong connection between ordinary language and music in the sense that they both consist of language games; and both in language and music, meaning changes as depending on which game is played in a certain context.

WITTGENSTEIN, DIRAC AND KEYNES: INVERSE QUANTUM DECISION THEORY FOR CRISIS SITUATIONS

Susan Edwards-McKie

Cambridge, United Kingdom

This paper provides a window onto reactions of three thinkers to world events through their Cambridge milieu of a particular time. I suggest that Wittgenstein, Dirac and Keynes were all three reacting against, and distancing themselves intellectually and mathematically from both the new, yet still classically conceived worldview of Einsteinian relativity and the new, non-classically conceived worldview of Bohr and Heisenberg. All three were not as conservative as Einstein and more conservative than the Copenhagenists, both in their mathematics and in terms of questions of free will and public policy.

TRUST IN TESTIMONY

Eva-Maria Engelen

Konstanz, Germany

In my talk I want to contrast the different conditions for trust in personal testimony and trust in expert testimony. In how far do they differ with respect to personal and impersonal evidence, or with respect to the trustworthiness of the speaker? Furthermore, I want to reflect on the apparent clash that Richard Moran has noticed “between the kind of epistemic relations involved [for example in an expert scenario] and the classic empiricist picture of genuine knowledge basing itself either on direct experience of the facts or on working out conclusions for oneself.” I will show that the “apparent clash” originates from the interaction of the first- and the third-person-perspective – concepts that are known from the philosophy of mind.

ABSOLUTE GENERALITY AND THE NOTION OF PROPOSITION IN THE *TRACTATUS*

Jann Paul Engler

Munich, Germany

In his book *The Incomplete Universe*, Patrick Grim claims that the notion of a totality of facts as it is employed in the first lines of the *Tractatus* is incoherent. Corresponding to the totality of facts there is a totality of propositions. With respect to this totality Grim argues that there can always be another proposition constructed that is not included in it. I aim to show that on tractarian grounds there cannot be such a proposition. For his argument, Grim needs to treat propositions as objects to which properties can be ascribed. Contrary to this, the tractarian distinctions between “sign” and “symbol” and between “function” and “operation” show that propositions are on a conceptually different level than objects and are not to be treated as them. It follows that a proposition like the one Grim uses in his argument cannot be constructed. Thus, the totality of facts can be conceptualized via the totality of propositions properly understood.

CULTURE, VALUE AND CONTRADICTION: WITTGENSTEIN AND EMPSON

Andrew J. P. English

Abingdon, United Kingdom

Wittgenstein’s farcical clash with literary critic F. R. Leavis over the analysis of Empson’s poem “Legal Fiction” is well known to devotees of Wittgenstein’s life (*Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections*, 1981, edited by Rush Rhees, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 80). Less well known is the value of studying Empson’s artistic and intellectual achievement as part of the wider cultural background for the appreciation of Wittgenstein’s views and influence, early and late. This talk sketches some diverting byways awaiting further exploration. A recurrent theme is contradiction.

KANTS BEGRIFF DER POLITIK IN DER INTERPRETATION VON VOLKER GERHARDT

Cornelia Eşianu

Wien, Österreich

Der Beitrag untersucht Kants Begriff der Politik anhand der Interpretation des deutschen Philosophen Volker Gerhardt, für den sich Politik als eine ausübende Rechtslehre dar-

stellt. In kritischer Auseinandersetzung mit einer Reihe von Autorinnen und Autoren stellt Gerhardt die Weichen für eine neue Rezeption der Kant’schen politischen Philosophie. Von dem, was der Mensch sich selbst bedeutet, habe auch das politische Handeln auszugehen. Politik hängt dadurch mit der Moral zusammen. Sie müsse, so Gerhardt, aktiv herbeiführen, was ansonsten nur gelehrt und gehofft wird. Vor diesem Hintergrund versteht sich der vorliegende Beitrag als eine kritisch-philosophische Antwort auf aktuelle durch Politik, Ökonomie und Recht ausgelöste Provokationen.

RISKANTE RISIKOBEWERTUNG

August Fenk

Klagenfurt, Österreich

Wissenschaftliche Risikobewertung argumentiert evidenzbasiert im Sinne von empirisch fundiert. Entscheidungsrelevanz bezieht sie aus ihrer prognostischen Leistung und ist daher an dieser zu messen; was wiederum prinzipielle Bestätigungsfähigkeit voraussetzt. Erfüllt ist diese Voraussetzung bei der Behauptung einer bestimmten statistischen Abhängigkeit, nicht aber, wie ich hier begründen möchte, bei deren Verneinung – etwa in Aussagen der Art, dass ein bestimmtes Pestizid „keine krebserregenden Eigenschaften“ habe und „bis zu einem gewissen Grenzwert ... gesundheitlich *unbedenklich*“ sei. Aus der Sicht *induktiven Schließens* basieren solche Aussagen auf „negativer“, letztlich also „bislang fehlender“ Evidenz trotz mehr oder weniger systematischer Suche. Aus der spezifischeren Sicht *statistischen Schließens* entsprechen sie der Nullhypothese. Auch hier, in der Debatte ums „null hypothesis significance testing“ (NHST), besinnt man sich wieder des Umstandes, dass die Nullhypothese zwar widerlegt, nicht aber als bestätigt akzeptiert werden kann (Pernet 2017). Eine Folge dieser Asymmetrie zwischen positiver und negativer Evidenz: Neubewertungen eines Risikostoffes müssten, so sie tatsächlich aus einem Wissenszuwachs resultieren, zu immer vorsichtigeren, strengerem Grenzwerten tendieren. Andere Ungleichgewichte – zwischen Vorhersage versus Erklärung bezogen auf Häufigkeit versus Einzelfall – werden augenscheinlich, wenn sich jemand als Opfer einer Herbizid-Belastung sieht und auf Schadenersatz klagt. Eine überzufällige Zunahme bestimmter Krebs-Neuerkrankungen speziell in der belasteten Region und/oder Berufsgruppe erlaubt, für sich allein, kein Urteil darüber, wer aus der Gesamtheit dieser Erkrankten direktes Opfer der inkriminierten Belastung ist. In diesem Kontext diskutiere ich die Relevanz statistisch verfassten Wissens für das Konzept der *Plausibilität*.

SIX PRIME REASONS FOR AN UNCONDITIONAL BASIC INCOME

Gregor Flock

Vienna, Austria

The global human family is confronted with many and oftentimes quite serious problems of various types: cultural, economic, environmental, legal, political, etc. The general thesis of this paper is that one of the most effective ways to tackle many of these bigger and transnational problems is to introduce an unconditional basic income or UBI for every person around the globe. More specifically, what is discussed in this paper are six prime reasons for a UBI that shed light on its great problem-solving capabilities from various perspectives.

IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE: WITTGENSTEIN'S *TRACTATUS* AND SOME PROBLEMS OF ART THEORY

Lilli Isabel Förster

Hanau, Germany

In this talk I am first going to discuss Ludwig Wittgenstein's picture theory of language and thinking, then I will explore its relation to the art of drama and painting. In particular, I will discuss the problem of identity and difference of thinking, language and artefacts with reality. I will show that the joint analysis of philosophy of language and thinking with art theory can shed more light on them and thus can bring fruitful results for both sides. Ludwig Wittgenstein's picture theory of language and thought is extensively discussed in the philosophical literature. My main claim is that a picture, in Wittgenstein's sense of the term, is not simply a model. This is clear from the fact that Wittgenstein speaks about living pictures or about tableaux vivants (4.0311) that are in a sense identical with the state of affairs and in this way identical with reality. Similarly, according to the theory of dramatic arts of Stanislavski, the actor/actress leaves their personality behind in order to become one with the character he/she presents. In this way, they make the difference between reality and fiction disappear. In like manner when confronted with Magritte's paintings, one is captivated by the disclosed identity of reality and imagination within them.

IS AN INAUTHENTIC LIFE POSSIBLE?

Mélissa Fox-Muratón

Clermont-Ferrand, France

Authenticity is a predominant concept in existential philosophy, often referenced in comparative studies of Ludwig Wittgenstein and philosophers such as Søren Kierkegaard or Martin Heidegger. This paper will question the concept of authenticity by examining whether Wittgenstein's philosophy allows for an understanding of the notion of inauthenticity. We argue that authenticity is a muddled concept, and that Wittgenstein's later philosophy, which insists on the embeddedness of beliefs in language games and practices, does not support the claim that a life could be judged authentic or inauthentic. The notion – which is not found in Kierkegaard's writings, but which was developed by Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre – is thus not fruitful for comparisons between Wittgenstein and existential philosophy. In addition, the Wittgensteinian critique demonstrates that existential philosophy needs to be wary of making use of confused concepts such as authenticity.

LANGUAGE, CHANGE AND POSSIBLE WORLDS: PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION. AN ESSAY ON METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS RESEARCH

Ulrich Frank

Essen, Germany

Even though the omnipresent narrative of the digital transformation suffers from multiple simplifications and dubious contributions, it targets a phenomenon of substantial relevance that will likely change the way we work, live – and think. While promoted predominantly by innovations in information technology, the transformation is, at its es-

sence, related to problems that have been subject to philosophical discourse for a long time. Among others, those problems comprise the ambivalent role of language for recognition as well as for mastering change, the limitations of truth as the pivotal criterion to justify scientific knowledge offerings, or the role of science within processes of social and political change. This essay aims at the identification and discussion of specific methodological problems related to the study and the support of the digital transformation from the perspective of a discipline that is directly responsible, both as an observer and a driver: information systems research. After a short account of the discipline's history and its present constitution, a brief analysis of key aspects of the digital transformation will lead to the pivotal role of language and conceptual models in particular. Conceptual models do not only form a foundation for the implementation of software systems, they are also a prerequisite for using them. To prepare systems for change, models need to incorporate abstractions that cover possible future worlds. From an academic perspective, this requirement is fascinating and challenging at the same time. It implies the problem of how to adequately justify the construction of possible worlds. Furthermore, it leads to the question how we could think possible future worlds that are beyond the limits of the language we speak. Against this background, the paper proposes facets of a methodology of change. Among others, its application is demonstrated through the idea of multi-level language architectures. This idea does not only enable the construction of self-referential software systems that allow for clearly higher flexibility, it can also be applied to action systems and their ability to adapt to a changing environment.

THE LYING GAME

Ralf Funke

Hamburg, Germany

There is no universally accepted definition of lying. Most definitions focus on the falsity of statements, or the false belief in the truth of statements and on the deception motive. While Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblance seems to suggest that a definition is neither desirable nor helpful I offer a new definition that is not based on any belief in truth or falsity but only on data available to the liar and not to the addressee of the lie. This, I hope, should shed some light on the concept of truth. In a second part Wittgenstein's view on the language game of lying is discussed. What is the prerequisite for lies to occur in primitive language-games and why does the language game of lying have to be learned? And how do children in real-life situations first start lying?

QUALIFYING CORRECTIVE CLIMATE JUSTICE: THE STRUCTURAL AND NORMATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF HISTORICAL EMISSIONS

Laura García Portela

Graz, Austria

This paper makes the case for a corrective view of climate justice by presenting and defending a *Qualified Polluters Pay Principle* (QPPP). The *Ordinary Polluters Pay Principle* (OPPP) states that polluters should bear the burdens of climate change in proportion to their emissions record, namely, according to how much they have emitted in the past. The *amount* of emissions is what matters to determine *how much* these agents should contribute to a fair

solution to climate change. Against this, I will argue that emissions are more or less causally and normatively significant depending on when they were emitted and by whom they were emitted. The Qualified version of PPP that I offer here states that powerful early emitters have a special kind of responsibility to overcome climate change. That responsibility boils down to leadership duties to boost collective action against climate change.

THE PARADOXICAL VIRTUES OF THE ANTHROPOCENE

Stephen M. Gardiner
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Some believe that the onset of the Anthropocene – a new geological era marked by the dominance of humanity on the history of the planet – forces us to look anew at human virtues. In this paper, I discuss how to think about whether the evolving influence of humanity on the Earth's environment really does call for new virtues, and how such virtues may be seen as contributing to human flourishing. I defend three controversial claims: (a) that it is not the Anthropocene as such that should concern us; (b) that nevertheless genuinely new virtues may be involved; but (c) that these may be virtues to which we should not aspire (now, or perhaps ever).

DO THE MEANINGS OF THE PARTS DETERMINE THE MEANING OF THE WHOLE UTTERANCE? RECAPTURING THE ELEMENT OF COMMON SENSE IN SEMANTIC COMPOSITIONALISM

Stefan Giesewetter
Turku, Finland

Among philosophers of language, it has been debated what role the *context* in which a sentence is uttered plays for fixing the *meaning* of that sentence as uttered in that context. One group of positions – often labeled “compositionalism” – holds that the meaning of an utterance is determined by the meanings of the parts of the sentence uttered and the way they are combined. Against this, another group of positions – often labeled “(radical) contextualism” – has argued that contextual factors play a role in contributing to the meaning of an utterance in an essentially *unforeseen* way, i.e. in a way not determined by the meanings of the parts of the sentence. In my talk, I will address the debate from the vantage point of Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following in the *Investigations*. My aim is to bring out a presupposition that is shared by compositionalism and contextualism alike, a presupposition which prevents them from recapturing the ordinary sense of how the meanings of the words “determine” the meaning of the whole utterance.

THE N-OPERATOR AS A CONSTANT DIFFERENCE OF FORMS: A NEW APPROACH TO THE OLD PROBLEM

Jakub Gomułka & Adam Roman
Kraków, Poland

We propose a non-standard approach to the Tractarian N-operator. Contrary to the received view, we assume that it should be defined as a constant difference of forms within the formal series of propositions. In consequence, we reject Wittgenstein's own definition of the N-operator as a

generalized Scheffer stroke, for it contradicts his own general definition of a series of forms. Instead, we construe a new definition of N-operator by assembling three separate functions: T , σ , Π . The first translates truth-functions to binary sequences, the second takes a sequence as a binary number and increments it, the third translates binary sequences back to truth-functions.

MARX MIT WITTGENSTEIN LESEN

Sepehr Goudarzi Boroujeni
Berlin, Deutschland

Im Sommersemester 2018 habe ich ein Seminar zu Wittgensteins *Über Gewissheit* besucht. Dies war meine erste ernste Begegnung mit Wittgenstein. Außer der im Text strahlenden Genialität, oder eben wegen der besonderen Art dieser Genialität, verwunderte mich die große Ähnlichkeit, die ich zwischen Wittgenstein und Marx fühlte. Den Grund dieser Ähnlichkeit konnte ich allerdings nicht genau ausdrücken. Ich konzentrierte mich daher auf das erste Kapitel des *Kapitals* und probierte, ob ich mithilfe von Wittgenstein besser verstehen kann, was das sehr Besondere aber schwer Fassbare an dem ist, was Marx mit seiner Kritik der politischen Ökonomie macht. Der vorliegende Beitrag ist ein Bericht dieser Probe. Dessen Hauptthese ist, dass den Philosophien von Marx und spätem Wittgenstein die Kritik der Verdinglichung der Welt zugrunde liegt. Dabei wird versucht, zwei Parallelen aufzuzeigen. Die eine zwischen Wittgensteins Kritik der Gewissheit und Marx' Zweifel an der politischen Ökonomie. Und die andere zwischen Wittgensteins Kritik der Skepsis und Marx' Annahme der kommunistischen Perspektive.

ZWISCHEN ‚POLITIK DER FEINDSCHAFT‘ UND ‚PARTEILICHEM KOSMOPOLITISMUS‘. ACHILLE MBEMBE UND KWAME A. APPIAH IM DIALOG

Anke Graneß
Hildesheim, Deutschland

Während Kwame Anthony Appiah Abtrennung und Abschließung als etwas dem Menschen eher Fremdes betrachtet und sich in seinem Buch *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers* (2006) auf die Suche nach der Möglichkeit einer kosmopolitischen Gemeinschaft macht, in der sowohl die lokalen Anbindungen des Individuums geschätzt als auch freundschaftliche Beziehungen mit Fremden gepflegt werden, argumentiert Achille Mbembe in seinem 2018 erschienenen Buch *Politik der Feindschaft* auf der Basis einer historischen Analyse, dass „Trennungsarbeit“ zu den Ursprüngen der Demokratie gehört. „Demokratie, Plantage und Kolonialreich gehören objektiv derselben geschichtlichen Matrix an“, wie Mbembe u. a. an der Geschichte der USA zeigt, die lange Zeit ein „demokratischer Sklavenstaat“ war. Wer die heutige „Politik der Feindschaft“, in der neue Mauern gebaut werden, verstehen will, muss, so Mbembe, an die Anfänge der Kolonie zurückgehen. Denn die Kolonie war undenkbar ohne den Sklavenhandel und damit das Primat der ‚Rasse‘, welches die Teilung der Menschheit erst möglich machte. Beides wiederum war Voraussetzung für den weltumspannenden Kapitalismus. Der Sklavenhandel ist demnach der zentrale Knotenpunkt für ein Verständnis einer tödlichen „Nekropolitik“, die rund um den Globus bis heute für Hass und Terror sorgt. Nach dieser vernichtenden Analyse stellt sich die Frage, ob das Konzept des Kosmopolitismus nicht bereits seit langem abgedankt hat – selbst das eines eher eingeschränkten bzw. ‚partiellen und partiellchen Kosmo-

politismus', wie er von Appiah vertreten wird, der versucht universale Werte in eine Balance mit lokalen Loyalitäten zu bringen und sich von jenem ‚unbescheidenen‘ Kosmopolitismus abgrenzt, der die Bedeutung nationaler Grenzen ebenso in Frage stellt wie den Vorrang der Sorge um Verwandte und Mitbürger. Ist Mbembes „Ethik des Passanten“ eine Lösung?

WITTGENSTEIN AS CRITICAL THEORIST? AFFINITIES WITH MARX, BENJAMIN, AND ADORNO

Edward Guetti

New York City, New York, USA

This paper outlines a program for considering the nature of a Wittgensteinian sense of philosophical critique. It is offered in response to recent work in fields related to both Wittgensteinian philosophy and also to that of Critical Theory. I argue that affinities exist between a Wittgensteinian philosophical activity and the mode of analysis outlined by Marx, Benjamin, and Adorno. This paper thus outlines a notice for further philosophical exposition.

DIE GRUNDLOSIGKEIT DER PRAXIS IN WITTGENSTEINS ÜBER GEWISSHEIT: KRITIK ALS ÜBUNG DES KONTINGENZBEWUSSTSEINS

Lucilla Guidi

Hildesheim, Deutschland

Der Beitrag erörtert die Grundlosigkeit der Praxis, die in Wittgensteins Werk *Über Gewissheit* im Zentrum steht, um ein philosophisches Konzept von Kritik als Übung des Kontingenzbewusstseins zu skizzieren. Der Leitfaden dieses Konzepts von Kritik liegt in der Aufgabe, die Wittgenstein als „die Schwierigkeit, die Grundlosigkeit unseres Glaubens einzusehen“ (*Über Gewissheit*, 2012: 166), beschreibt. Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen, wird zuerst Wittgensteins Verständnis der Philosophie als Arbeit an einem selbst, die darauf abzielt, die Sichtweise oder den Denkstil zu transformieren, erläutert. Zweitens wird die grundlose Gewissheit unseres Weltbildes betrachtet, um den Sinn dieser Grundlosigkeit von der bloßen Abwesenheit jedes Fundaments zu unterscheiden, in Marcharts postfundamentalistischem Paradigma zu verorten und als oxymorische „notwendige Kontingenz“ der menschlichen Praxis aufzuzeigen. Letztlich wird Wittgensteins Vollzug des Vergleichs zwischen Sprachspielen und Lebensformen als eine praktische Übung skizziert, die darauf abzielt, das Bewusstsein der notwendigen Kontingenz unseres alltäglichen Systems von Praktiken bzw. unseres Weltbildes zu wecken und diese Kontingenz uns erfahren zu lassen.

WITTGENSTEIN, AUSTIN, AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ILLOCUTIONARY AND PERLOCUTIONARY ACTS

Martin Gustafsson

Turku, Finland

Among Austin-inspired philosophers and linguists, the complaint is sometimes made that even if Wittgenstein asks us to conceive meaning in terms of use, he does not do enough to distinguish between different notions or dimensions of language use. The distinctions between locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, and the

more fine-grained taxonomy Austin develops within the domain of the illocutionary, are meant to identify such different dimensions that Wittgenstein's less systematic talk of use allegedly papers over. In this talk, I will instead use Wittgenstein to argue that Austin's way of distinguishing between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts is unsatisfactory. I will do this by bringing out the significance of a distinction Austin makes within the domain of the perlocutionary – namely, the distinction between a perlocutionary *object* and a perlocutionary *sequel*. I will defend what might be called a disjunctivist conception of illocutionary uptake, which stands in conflict with Austin's way of drawing the line between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts.

“DER LÄUFER DES KÖNIGS” IN RFM VI, §4

Shogo Hashimoto

Göttingen, Germany

In the original German text of his *Remarks on the Foundation of Mathematics*, Part VI, in §4, Ludwig Wittgenstein writes about the multiplication “ $8 \times 9 = 72$ ” along with the expression “*der Läufer des Königs*.” G. E. M. Anscombe is the principal translator of this work and translates it as “the King's Bishop,” whereas she gives to it the notice “we have not been able to find out what routine Wittgenstein did have in mind.” To shed more light on what he means by this expression, I go not only into the passages in question, but also into the illustration that appears only in his manuscript and seems helpful for a better understanding of the text. For this purpose, this paper first spells out what the issue in the given text is, then displays three different possible interpretations including that of Anscombe and compares them. Consequently, it examines if some of them could be appropriate, or after all none of them matches with the text.

THE PLACE OF SOCIAL ONTOLOGY IN SOCIAL CRITIQUE

Sally Haslanger

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A *critical* social theory is a social theory, but one with a specific aim. It seeks to reveal in its account of society the sites and sources of injustice. How is this accomplished? There is a temptation to think that the key elements are (a) empirical social science, and (b) normative inquiry (whether a priori or not). Either empirical social science is undertaken with an eye to the processes and mechanisms of injustice; or (non-ideal) normative inquiry is embedded in empirical social science. I argue that this picture is incomplete. Instead, there are three contributors to this project: empirical social science, normative theory, and social ontology; the potential of critical theory depends on a shift in both the metaphysics of and explanatory strategies for the social world.

GEDANKE, PROPOSITION UND TATSACHE. RUSSELL-FREGE-KONTROVERSE

Włodzimierz Heflik

Krakau, Polen

Im Beitrag bespreche ich den Streit zwischen Russell und Frege um das Wesen des Gedankens, der Proposition und der Tatsache. Der Ausgangspunkt für diese Auseinandersetzung ist die Unterscheidung Freges zwischen Sinn und Bedeutung und seine Behauptung, die Tatsache sei der

wahre Gedanke. Dann stelle ich zwei Auffassungen zusammen: (1) die Fregesche, dass Gedanken aus Sinnen bestehen, und (2) die Russellsche, dass Propositionen aus Gegenständen in der Außenwelt bestehen. Beide Auffassungen führen zu ernststen Schwierigkeiten. Es lässt sich trotzdem meiner Meinung nach die Interpretation der Konzeption Freges darbieten, die das Behalten der Sinne mit dem direkten Realismus in Einklang bringt.

THE IMPOSSIBLE RELIGIOUS ROBOT – A WITTGENSTEINIAN APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS SENSIBILITY IN NON-HUMANS

Ricardo N. Henriques

Lisbon, Portugal

Is it possible for a robot to develop religious sensibility? Before trying to answer this question, I will first show how Julian Friedland addresses a similar issue in his article *Wittgenstein and the Aesthetic Robot's Handicap*, where he analyses the (non-)possibility of aesthetic sensibility in robots. Although I follow Friedland's conclusion and main argument, I shall try to sketch a different path: instead of following the dispositionalist account of meaning, as Friedland does, I will try to build a line of reasoning based on the insights of Saul Kripke's book *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*. After this small detour, I will try to apply the same conclusions drawn from aesthetic value to the case of religious value, since the cornerstone of my argument is something that crosses both axiological discussions: the human form of life as the background for meaning in language.

IS THE BENEFICIARY PAYS PRINCIPLE REDUNDANT?

Clare Heyward

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Most accounts of climatic burden-sharing generally offer accounts of corrective justice, based on one or more of the following: the ability-to-pay principle (APP), the contribution-to-problem principle (CPP) and the beneficiary pays principle (BPP). The APP holds that liability to bear the burdens of climate change should be distributed among agents according to their relative ability (often conceived as relative wealth). The CPP holds that this liability should be distributed according to agents' own records of GHG emissions, whereas the BPP links liability to an agent's having benefitted from activities or practices that involve emissions of GHGs, whether or not that agent produced those emissions themselves. In this paper, I argue that the BPP, as it is standardly employed in accounts of climatic burden-sharing, is redundant. By that, I mean that its adoption is unmotivated, and/or its distributive implications can be just as easily achieved by a combination of the CPP or APP. I show this by examining three accounts of climatic burden-sharing which use the BPP to a greater or lesser extent: Simon Caney (2010), Christian Baatz (2014) and Edward Page (2011). For each account I show that their appeal to the BPP is not necessary, or inadequately supported. Instead, a combination of the CPP and APP will provide the same distribution of burdens (and in some cases, with better justification). However, this conclusion only applies for accounts which use the BPP in the standard way. I end by outlining another way in which the BPP might be used in burden-sharing accounts which, at least prima facie, is less susceptible to charges of redundancy.

WHY LANGUAGE GAMES CAN BE A FRUITFUL TERM WHEN EXAMINING THE LINGUAL EXCHANGE IN THE COURTROOM

Line Norman Hjorth

Bergen, Norway

In this paper I argue that the term language games is able to shed light on and thereby help us gain a better understanding of the defendant's speaking situation in the courtroom. The lingual exchange must therefore be regarded as a *response* to the initiated language game. Further, the courtroom setting has a very exceptional lingual practice that makes the distinction between game and speaking, introduced by Rush Rhees, relevant. I find that the lingual/legal practice in court is governed by rules, strategies and tactics that make it resemble a game and that this constitutes challenging conditions in terms of the defendant's ability to get heard or acknowledged as an individual, without at the same time trying to expand or challenge the conditions that determine the language games.

CRISES OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: A FOCUS ON FEAR

Elisabeth Holzleithner

Vienna, Austria

That liberal democracy is in a crisis is nothing new. In Hungary, the steering towards illiberal democracy was announced years ago; and while nationalist, right-wing populist movements demand "law and order", they take liberties with the rule of law. Human rights and tolerance are qualified when the rights of "others" are at stake, particularly those seeking asylum; at times, even the European Convention on Human Rights is disputed. A significant driving force of these developments is the fear of "imported" dangers, which is fueled by narrations charged with xenophobic resentment. The lecture draws on this very point, the role of fear. As the fear humans have of each other, it has played a pivotal role for the legitimation and design of the modern state at least since Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan*. It was carried to extremes in the work of Carl Schmitt, who well-nigh celebrates the fear humans pose to one another. Schmitt believes that liberalism is politically naïve owing to its unduly optimistic image of humanity; accordingly, he advocates a strong, even a "total" state. But whoever takes fear seriously as an eminent factor of politics need not end up with autocracy. This is, by all means, Judith Shklar's intuition, which she spells out in her "Liberalism of Fear". She holds that human fear can be redirected and transformed into a force conducive to liberal democracy. The lecture is interested in the commonalities of Schmitt and Shklar that seem to reside in their pessimistic anthropologies, and it explores why the authors' conclusions are so radically distinct. The idea is to generate impulses for a productive role of fear in political philosophy – and for conceiving ways to come out of the crises of liberal democracy.

KRITIK, DAS INTERNET UND WITTGENSTEIN

Herbert Hrachovec

Wien, Österreich

Eine Krise zu diagnostizieren und durch Kritik der Umstände zu beheben, ist ein philosophisch beliebtes Muster. Jüngere Protestbewegungen, wie die französischen „gilets jaunes“, werden nicht von solchen Ratschlägen geleitet. Sie artikulieren ihre Anliegen diesseits von Hierarchien und demokratisch verfasster Repräsentation. Ein Leitthema in Wittgensteins Philosophie passt genau zu dieser Vorgabe. Er unterbindet Hierarchiebildung zwischen Sätzen (*Tractatus*) und erkennt der Philosophie das Recht ab, die Lebensformen des Alltags aus sicherer Distanz zu kritisieren oder gar zu reformieren (*Philosophische Untersuchungen*). Damit ergibt sich ein Problem. Einerseits ist die Gleichberechtigung aller Stimmen im jeweiligen Diskurs eine Grundbedingung herrschaftsfreier Kommunikation. Andererseits trifft diese Voraussetzung auf hochkomplexe politisch-ökonomische Systeme, die nur mit Arbeitsteilung und Delegation von Verantwortung funktionieren. Das Dilemma zwischen der Sprache, die alle sprechen, und dem Expertenjargon, der nicht zuletzt zum Schutz eines lebbareren Alltags nötig ist, wird an drei im Rahmen des Internets entstandenen Bezeichnungen exemplifiziert: E-Mail, Open Access, Apps. Eine allgemeine Gleichberechtigung mit Kompetenzdefizit steht gegen abgestufte Problemlösungen, die sich der generalisierten Öffentlichkeit schwer vermitteln lassen. Die Thematisierung von Fehlfunktionen (Krisen) im gesellschaftlichen Leben und der Versuch, ihre Ursachen anzusprechen (Kritik) ist eine probate Möglichkeit, die beiden Seiten miteinander zu kombinieren. Sie ist nicht Wittgensteins Weg; er ist kein Systemkritiker. Auf ungewöhnliche Art versteht er es, Schwachstellen des Alltags aufzuzeigen und dabei die Kritik zu umgehen.

CAN INDECISION EXPLAIN UNCERTAINTY IN INTROSPECTION?

Pablo Hubacher Haerle

Zurich, Switzerland

In this paper I want to examine an approach to uncertainty in introspection frequently found in the secondary literature on Wittgenstein: indecision. Commentators such as P. M. S. Hacker claim that indecision can explain uncertainty in introspection in a way which is completely distinct from explanations of uncertainty in perception or uncertainty about the 'outer world' in general. Crucially, following Hacker's reading of Wittgenstein, the concept of a fallible observation – an "observation in the proper sense" – does not and cannot come into play in the context of introspection. In applying indecision to an important and common case of uncertainty in introspection, namely being uncertain where to study, I put this view to test. I argue that Hacker's claim is too strong and that insofar as indecision can explain important cases of uncertainty in introspection, it makes use of the concept of a fallible observation in the proper sense. Thus, I can show that in certain instances uncertainty in introspection is not altogether unlike uncertainty concerning the 'outer world'.

THE I-ELIMINATED LANGUAGE

Tomoaki Ihara

Tokyo, Japan

This paper presents a new interpretation on the topic of I-eliminated language Wittgenstein contrived around 1929 and explores a broader implication of the idea. The re-

search questions to be discussed are: Why is the word 'I' redundant in the representation?; Is the reason different from the I-deletion in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*?; Is the I-eliminated language inadequate?; What is logically essential in the representation? After introducing the previous studies, the author gives the following answers: The redundancy is partly because the subject has no neighbor and partly because it is so involved in the situation; The reasons have not been changed since TLP; The I-eliminated language is completely adequate; The essence of the world and its representation is that the solipsistic self cannot be said but only shown in language due to its absoluteness and assimilation into the situation.

NON-DISCURSIVE SOCIAL PRACTICES: A NEW CRITIQUE OF THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE

Amadeusz Just

Warsaw, Poland

It may seem that in our contemporaneous political situation, social critique, in order to adequately examine social practices and political processes, should employ a notion of irrationality or unreason. However, to recognize some social phenomena as irrational would be misleading. The notion of irrationality or unreason is what contemporary social critique needs least of all. Instead, what should be reclaimed by social critique is both a positive approach to those social phenomena, which in the prevalent social and political theories have been jettisoned from the socio-political sphere as irrational, and a new outlook on the socio-political reality. Is it possible to point out a moment in our political thinking when the expulsion of those phenomena takes place and the specific shape of the socio-political reality is constituted? In my talk, I shall argue that there is a close relationship between the political thinking and what is being called the anthropological difference. I intend to reveal that the anthropological difference is such a moment in our thinking about the socio-political when a specific rationality and normativity of our socio-political life is established and ingrained.

THE CONCEPT OF CRITIQUE, SLOW-ROASTED ON A SAUCE FROM METHODOLOGICAL FORMALISM, SERVED ALONG WITH VALUE INDETERMINACY

Miroslav Kantek

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This paper consists of three ingredients which are the concept of critique and its two indivisible companions: methodological formalism and value indeterminacy. To claim that there is an unavoidable link between these three ingredients may seem at first sight implausible, especially for scholars who consider themselves as practitioners of critical theory. But I will try to demonstrate that if the concept of critique is applied properly, it inevitably results in methodological formalism and value indeterminacy. Value indeterminacy and methodological formalism gained through though the development of science negative connotations. The second part of the paper will try to show that there is no need to judge methodological formalism and value indeterminacy as downsides of a critical theory. This will be depicted on the example of the critical legal theory. The critical legal theory is facing the same challenges as critical theory, but with its practical application it can serve as a ground to justify methodological formalism and value indeterminacy.

DAS PARADIGMA SOZIOKULTURELLER PATHOLOGIE. KLINISCHER FUNKTIONALISMUS IM RAHMEN DER KRITISCHEN THEORIE

Matthias Kettner

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Meine Annahme ist, dass klinischer Funktionalismus der „Kritischen Theorie“ viel zu bieten hat. Dies mag überraschend erscheinen, da der krankheits-, störungs- und symptombezogene Stil von komplexem, kontextualisiertem funktionalen Denken – „klinischer Funktionalismus“ – ausschließlich eine Bereicherung für die Medizin oder die Ärzteschaft zu sein scheint. Jedoch behandelt in den Sozial- und Kulturwissenschaften zunehmend mehr Forschungsliteratur dysfunktionale Organisationen, Institutionen und Gesellschaften unter Themen wie „soziale“ oder „institutionelle Pathologien“. Das Ziel der Diagnose von nicht richtig funktionierenden Sozialgebilden angesichts nicht wertneutraler Standards war seit ihren Anfängen Teil der Kritischen Theorie, ist aber heute leider in die theoretische Peripherie zurückgetreten. Um die kritische Kraft des klinischen Funktionalismus auf aktive, organisierte, soziokulturell konstituierte Entitäten anzuwenden, arbeite ich vier zunehmend komplexe Begriffsmodelle soziokultureller Pathologie aus. Ich behaupte, dass diese Modelle innerhalb der aktuellen Kritischen Theorie verwendet werden können und sollen.

WELL-KNOWN AND LESS KNOWN OBSTACLES TO FORECASTING THE FUTURE

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I survey and discuss obstacles to forecasting the future, especially to making accurate predictions, in various areas: in economics with its inadequate models and financial crashes, big business ventures with their cost overruns, the role of novelties, affective forecasting, and ecology. Given the great diversity of these areas, the kinds of obstacles are equally diverse. Altogether, I conclude, they should certainly not prevent us from planning for the future as best as we can, if not by means of accurate predictions, then e.g. by means of qualitative estimates and prognoses, or by working out alternative scenarios.

KRITIK ALS PRÄVENTION DER KRISE. ZU KANTS KRITIKEN

Endre Kiss

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Wir bleiben bei der Metaphorik der *Kriegskunst* und bei der Analogie mit *Clausewitz*. Kant bewegt sich so in dieser Schlacht auf einer extrem langen Frontlinie. Praktisch heißt es, dass er die ganze Vermittlungskette der Herstellung der legitimen positiven Aussagen aufzeigt. Diese Linie („Frontlinie“ oder „Vermittlungskette“ der erkennenden Arbeit) vermeidet aber mit der größten Sorgfalt die Konfrontation mit der formalen Definition der Kausalität, denn Kant weiß, dass Humes formales Argument durch direkte Konfrontation nicht zu besiegen ist. Kant verfolgt in seiner ganzen Argumentation diese Ausweichtaktik. Er ist aber auch so sorgfältig, dass er auch daran denkt, dass jemand einmal eine direkte Frage stellt und ordnet die Kausalität in die *Apriori*-Begriffe ein. Der *Apriori*-Block gilt auch als ein Moment der Positivität in diesem Kritizismus und besagt nicht mehr und nicht weniger, als dass dieses

Moment im Bewusstsein des arbeitenden Wissenschaftlers enthalten existiert, dass es in seinem Funktionieren, in seinem *work in progress* enthalten ist.

EUTHANASIA SLIPPERY SLOPES AND (UN)REASONABLE MEASURES OF PRECAUTION

Friderik Klampfer

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Almost two decades after the ground-breaking introduction of the legal right to (be helped to) die first in the Netherlands and soon after in Belgium and the US federal state of Oregon, proposals to legalize active voluntary euthanasia are still met with staunch opposition and vigorous criticism. In the paper, I set to examine the most popular and influential objection against legalization, the so-called slippery slope argument (SSA). According to SSA, by legalizing active voluntary euthanasia for terminally ill patients, the least morally controversial type of euthanasia, we will nevertheless take the first step onto a slippery slope and inevitably end up in the moral abyss of widespread abuse and rights-violations of the weakest and most vulnerable patients. Have many years of closely monitored practice of legal euthanasia validated such fears or not? For the sake of my argument, I am going to assume that this fierce empirical dispute is not over yet. And yet, given the high stakes, would it not be wiser, and safer, to stick to status quo and maintain the existing legal ban even if the risk of abuse is indeterminable at present and may well turn out to be greatly exaggerated in the future? I disagree. The appeal to precautionary reasoning fails to justify an outright legal ban on euthanasia for at least two reasons: because (a) it grossly underestimates the hidden moral costs of current legal arrangements (competent terminal patients suffer both disrespect for their autonomous will and deprivation of the good of a timely death), and (b) the ban is both too inefficient and disproportionate to qualify as a *reasonable* measure of precaution.

PICTURING THE MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE – SEEING FRANK STELLA'S POLISH VILLAGES (1972-1974) ANEW

Stephanie Koerner

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“We can never understand a picture unless we grasp the ways in which it shows what cannot be seen... This notion of ‘picturing the invisible’ may seem a bit less paradoxical if we remind ourselves that painters have always claimed to present us with ‘more than meets the eye’...” (Mitchell *Iconology. Image, Text, Ideology* 1986: 39)

This essay concerns the usefulness of Ludwig Wittgenstein's insights of ‘seeing anew’ for exploring contributions, which studying innovation in picturing the more than meets the eye can contribute to new ways to answer questions Svetlana Alpers poses in *Vexations of Art*: “What do artists do during wars? How have artists dealt with war? Should artists be blamed if they don't? Is direct confrontation with conflict the only way for art to take...?” (Alpers 2005: 83). The essay explores contributions that studying Frank Stella's *Polish Villages* (1970-1974) in lights of Wittgenstein can make to appreciating that the arts are not restricted to responding to historical crises with disengagement (‘art for art's sake alone’) or direct confrontation. The *Polish Villages* show that, contrary to these vexed options, innovations in picturing the dynamics of aspect blindness

and aspect perception can render crises, which may exceed what can be put into words intelligible, and make space for bringing people together anew. The essay concludes with suggestions bearing upon the problem: "People nowadays think, scientists are there to instruct them, poets, musicians etc. to entertain them. *That the latter have something to teach them; that never occurs to them.*" (Wittgenstein *Culture and Value* 1998.)

THE CONCEPT OF CRITIQUE IN WITTGENSTEIN'S FIRST PHILOSOPHY

Wojciech Krysztofiak

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In the paper, the Tractarian concept of critique is reconstructed formally as the function of eliminating babbling sentences from infected or "babbling" mental worlds. These worlds are understood as composed of babbling sentences encoded in human minds which do not picture anything. The reconstruction is based on the two-dimensional semantic framework, determined by two classes of world's points of views formalized as semantic functions taking two values: meaningfulness and meaninglessness. The babbling sentences are defined as ones to which the semantic function of the inside world's point of view attributes the value of meaninglessness. The language tools of performing the function of critique are constituted by sentences belonging to the existential meta-discourse, which shows the meaning of life and the world.

REVISITING THE CONCEPTS OF CRISIS AND CRITIQUE

María Pía Lara

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The words "crisis" and "critique" go back to the Greek verb *krino* and are related to the act of making a judgment – something that the Greeks considered a political action. In the first part of this paper, I will discuss the genealogical meaning of the two terms as theorists have used them in different contexts beginning with the Greeks. In the second part, I will deal with how crisis and critique are concepts that involve a sense of time and therefore are central for history, but also for politics. The semantics of these concepts relate to the past, the present, and the future by bringing up images of salvation or impeding destruction, illness or the need to begin anew. As for the present, their semantics have evolved and have been used differently: crisis invoking a sense of repetition, critique involving the assumption that change should come now. Just how these two concepts are of great importance in our present political situation is the goal that my paper aims to disclose. Finally, I will show how both terms reflect the dynamics of repetitions and innovations of political realities in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

IST DIE PHILOSOPHISCHE THERAPIE EINE KRITISCHE PHILOSOPHIE?

Giulia La Rocca

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Ziel dieses Beitrags ist, die Spannung zwischen Therapie und Kritik in Wittgensteins Auffassung der Philosophie hervorzuheben. Das Projekt einer therapeutischen Philosophie hat zwar ein kritisches Potential, indem sie das, was in unserem alltäglichen Sprachgebrauch verborgen

bleibt, zum Bewusstsein bringt. Die Überzeugung, die Philosophie sei eine Tätigkeit, womit man fertig ist, nachdem man mittelst derselben das philosophische Problem überhaupt gelöst hat, setzt sie aber der Gefahr aus, das Resultat der Therapie selbst und ihre kritische Leistung auszulöschen.

AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF VOICE

Sandra Laugier

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I will try to explore the social and political ideas one can draw from Wittgenstein's work, and from ordinary language philosophy more widely. I use the concept of forms of life – understood, following Stanley Cavell and Veena Das, not only in the social (horizontal) sense but also in the natural (or biological) sense, as *life forms* – in order to rearticulate the natural and conventional (following Cavell 1979) and to propose an ordinary conception of politics and culture anchored in the very concept of ordinary language philosophy understood as *attention* to what human beings say: "What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of human beings...observations which no one has doubted, but which have escaped remark only because they are always before our eyes." (PI: §415). It then becomes a matter of shifting the question of the common use of language towards the question of an anthropology of the *voice*. The voice is both a subjective and general expression: it is what makes it possible for my individual voice to become shared, to speak in the name of others. The singular claims a common validity. The political question that arises is the question of representation and the subject's expression by the culture – and, inversely, the culture's expression by the subject. Ordinary language philosophy encounters a democracy and a politics of voice: what is finding one's voice? What is the right tone, the *pitch*?

CRITICAL COMMONS, OR: HOW TO REGAIN STEAM

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In the past decade, there have been several philosophical, societal and artistic critiques of critique. Alain Badiou, for instance, rejects the critical Kantian tradition in favour of being 'true to the Event', while Bruno Latour concluded in a seminal article that critique had ran 'out of steam'. Certain artistic practices, finally, prefer participation and proximity over the traditional critical and contemplative attitude of the observer. There seems to be an inherent tension between action and critique. We tend to associate action with immersion and participation, while critique is usually connected to the distance of an outsider-perspective. In my lecture I want to analyse this tension, but I also want to explore the possibilities of going beyond it. To do so, I will connect conceptions of critique to the concept of the 'commons' that is highly debated in contemporary political and social philosophy. What would be the conceptual, socio-political and aesthetic implications for such juxtaposition for both of these categories? While critique is usually considered as a solitary and indeed a distanced activity, the commons are defined as a shared set of resources and/or characteristics. I will argue that these categories can strengthen one another: while commons provide fertile soil ('common ground') for critical theory, critique can prevent the romanticization and appropriation of commons into traditional notions of 'community' or 'common sense'.

WITTGENSTEIN'S CONCEPTION OF UNRELIABILITY OF ALL LAWS OF CLASSICAL LOGIC IN CASE OF UNRELIABILITY OF THE LAW-OF-THE-EXCLUDED-MIDDLE: EXPLICATING THIS CONCEPTION BY MEANS OF A FORMAL-AXIOMATIC-EPISTEMOLOGY-THEORY CALLED "THETA"

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Subject-matter of the article is clarifying and precise defining the meaning of Wittgenstein's original statement that all logic laws are not reliable if the law-of-the-excluded-middle is not reliable. The method of clarifying and defining is axiomatic one; namely, a formal axiomatic epistemology theory named "Theta" (Θ) that is defined precisely and used systematically. A proof of logic consistency of "Theta" (Θ) is given. The article submits a proof of improvability of all classical logic tautologies in Θ . Thus, a model is created for the enigmatic statement of Wittgenstein. The model clarifies and explicates the proper meaning of the puzzling statement in question. Such axiomatic modeling illuminates the general idea of intuitionism philosophy opposed to formalism and logic-ism one. Within the theory Θ , the contradiction between extreme logic-ism and extreme intuitionism is dissolved: each of the two is located in its own limited domain. Borderlines of these domains are defined precisely by Θ .

PARLER-WITTGENSTEINIEN: IRIGARAY AND WITTGENSTEIN CHALLENGING THE SYMBOLIC ORDER

Silvia Locatelli

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The aim of this paper is to understand how the mature Wittgenstein's production could be fruitful to pursue the goal of Irigaray's early work, which consists in the subversion of the western symbolic order and its *monosexuate* culture, connoted by a phallogocentric dialectic that negates the "other" of the sexual difference in the name of a constant mirroring of the male sex. As a result, the female sex is devalued and represented only in relation to the former. To battle an order that does not make room for women, Irigaray proposes the *mimesis* technique that consists in reaffirming in a positive way the characters that in the phallogocentric culture have been attributed to the female sex – especially the corporeal dimension – to unveil the "disruptive excess" of the female. I take the argument of private language of the mature Wittgenstein's production as productive for the *mimesis* strategy that Irigaray proposes, due to the fact that it enables a positive rehabilitation of the corporeal, which is no longer downgraded and subordinated to the mental. Starting from this argument, I try to show that with his particular conception of the human soul – that is connected with the analysis of how we come into contact with other people – he is trying to overcome the mind-body divide and hierarchy and to understand the person as a whole of different and correlated capacities that exceed just the intellectual ones.

THE AUSTERE VIEW OF NONSENSE IN WITTGENSTEIN'S *TRACTATUS*

Arianna Longhi

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In this paper, I try to analyze a particular reading of nonsense presented by a group of interpreters of the *Tractatus* and exposed in the essay entitled *The New Wittgenstein* (Crary, Read 2000): the so-called austere interpretation. My intention is to analyze this reading by contrasting it with the more traditional interpretation of the *Tractatus*: the substantial reading. I will focus in particular on the concept of elucidation, being essential to understand the nonsense present in the text, as well as the difference between the two readings mentioned above. In this context Geach's position will be fundamental because, according to him, the elucidation is not a novelty of the *Tractatus* but it was already present in the works of another philosopher: Frege. The elucidation takes on a positive value here: it shows something that could not be explained by a definition. According to the substantial interpretation, the propositions of the *Tractatus* have precisely this aim: to show (and not to say) something that would otherwise be unspeakable. According to the austere interpreters, Wittgenstein responded to this proposal with an austere reading of nonsense and elucidation: the propositions of the *Tractatus* do not express (cannot express) any thought. This proposal, however interesting, has, from my point of view, some contradictory elements that lead me to favor a substantial reading of nonsense over the austere one.

THE PITFALLS OF TERRITORIAL BELONGING: VIOLENCE AND AMNESIA IN THE HOMELAND METAPHOR

Laurin Mackowitz

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In order to be a member of a political community, a state or nation, every citizen has to acquire documents that define to what territory someone belongs. It seems, however, that we are living in times and places that are more and more defined by the cohabitation of uprooted and displaced people that concurrently belong nowhere and everywhere, moreover, by a global economy, politics, and media that produce a transnational and polyglot social reality. Yet, the metaphorical collation of land and home has not disappeared. On the contrary, today's politics of exception repeatedly propagates the governmental phantasm that "home is the land" to justify dehumanizing measures taken to divide the people of the world into hierarchical spatial blocks. Examining the historical and fictional meanings of homeland, the paper scrutinizes how metaphors of territorial belonging legitimate the deprivation of civil rights and facilitate the collective amnesia of violent appropriation and displacement.

ALGORITHMEN & RECHTSPRECHUNG

Amadeus M. Mader

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Die immer weiter um sich greifende Digitalisierung soll mehr und mehr unseren Alltag erleichtern. Doch wie ist es dabei um unsere Verantwortung bestellt, wenn schon bereits bei Strafprozessen Algorithmen zur Urteilsfindung beitragen? Dies geschieht in einigen Bundesstaaten der U.S.A., wo mittels sogenannter Gefährlichkeitsprognosen die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer weiteren Straftat berechnet wird. Das Ergebnis einer solchen Prognose nimmt dann

Einfluss auf die Höhe der Strafe, oder ob eine vorzeitige Entlassung überhaupt in Frage kommt. Vielfach wird argumentiert, dass dies zu einem wertfreien Urteil beitragen würde, doch die Praxis zeigt genau das Gegenteil. So scheinen einige Algorithmen durchaus rassistische Vorannahmen zu treffen. Auch stellt sich die Frage, ob eine Prognose über Zukünftiges mit dem Zweck der Strafe oder dem Konzept des freien Willens überhaupt vereinbar scheint. Selbst wenn man hierbei keinerlei Konflikt erkennen will, muss man sich dennoch die Frage stellen, wie weit eine technokratisierte Justiz überhaupt möglich scheint. Anders gefragt: Ist dem Menschen hierbei etwas eigen, das eine Maschine nicht zu leisten vermag? Als fruchtbar zeigt sich ein Diskurs, welcher bereits im 19. Jahrhundert geführt wurde. Man verhandelte die Frage, ob die Entscheidung eines Richters das Dafürhalten einer besonders qualifizierten Person oder vielmehr das Ergebnis eines logisch-mechanisch operierenden Subsumptionsautomaten zu sein habe. Daran anknüpfend soll mithilfe Friedrich Nietzsches Sprachkritik und Jacques Derridas *Gesetzeskraft* argumentiert werden, dass jedem (Straf-)Urteil stets etwas Unentscheidbares innewohnt, wodurch es sich jeder Berechenbarkeit entzieht. Das Handeln eines Jemand erscheint dadurch unerlässlich, ein Entscheiden über das So-und-nicht-anders.

ZUR AKTUELLEN KRISE VON DEMOKRATIE UND RECHTSSTAATLICHKEIT. URSACHEN UND SYMPTOME

Eva Maria Maier

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Der Beitrag reflektiert Gründe und Erscheinungsformen aktueller Krisenphänomene von Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit, wie sie längst auch etablierte Demokratien erreicht haben. Diese stellen sich nicht zuletzt als Reaktion auf Tendenzen einer fortschreitenden Erosion und Überforderung des herkömmlichen Souveränitätsbegriffs dar – der freilich bereits von seiner Entstehung her auch Spannungen zur Entwicklung demokratischer Prinzipien aufweist, ja vielfach im Gegensatz zu den republikanischen Grundlagen europäisch-amerikanischen Demokratieentwicklung begriffen werden kann. Nunmehr unterliegt dieser Begriff einem fortschreitenden Funktions- bzw. Legitimitätsverlust, dies nicht nur durch die Verdrängung nationalstaatlicher demokratischer Legitimation im Zuge ökonomischer Globalisierung, sondern auch durch weltweite Migrationsbewegungen und die Zunahme globaler Regulierungsanforderungen. Damit verbunden werden die Ursachen aktueller Krisen in einer Formalisierung des Demokratieverständnisses verortet, etwa in Entwicklungen zur Zurückdrängung des parlamentarischen Diskurses, v. a. aber in der Tendenz zur Entkoppelung gegenüber fundamentalen rechtsstaatlichen Anforderungen, allen voran gegenüber Menschenrechten und der Menschenwürde als fundamentalem Verfassungsprinzip. Dies reicht bis zur Einschränkung zentraler Grundrechte, nicht zuletzt durch Ausgrenzungsmaßnahmen, die auf die Einschränkung der Rechtssubjektivität bestimmter Personengruppen abzielen. Als weitere Symptome der Krise demokratischer Rechtskultur können aber auch Entwicklungen zur Überfrachtung – zunehmend präventiv ausgerichtet – staatlicher Sicherheitsaufgaben gelten, bei der etwa die weit vorverlagerte „Risikobekämpfung“ zur Normalität der Wahrnehmung staatlicher Schutzpflichten aufrückt, sowie Tendenzen zum Umbau des Sozialstaats, die armutsfördernd wirken und damit ebenfalls geeignet sind, politisch-demokratische Handlungschancen einzuschränken.

WITTGENSTEIN UNCANNY

Marco Marchesin

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This paper aims to explore how Wittgenstein's grammatical investigations need to be understood in relation to ordinary language. I propose to rearticulate the role of ordinary language in Wittgenstein's later thought through the concept of the uncanny (*Das Unheimliche*). My claim is that Wittgenstein's philosophy construes the ordinary as uncanny, that is, strangely familiar, as the only way to make it really visible and open to view. I will first define the concept of the uncanny and show how it can be used to describe one main feature of Wittgenstein's method. Second, I will examine Wittgenstein's (rather scarce) employment of the term in his work and show that it is compatible with the interpretation I am advancing here. Third, I will illustrate how the concept of the uncanny may help us understand the nature of Wittgenstein's description of the ordinary and challenge Peter Hacker's notorious interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy.

DIE INSTRUMENTALISIERUNG DER EHRE

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Nicht nur in der Philosophie nimmt der Begriff der Ehre wieder einen größeren Stellenwert ein. Auch basieren politische Handlungen oder vor allem religiöse Motive auf dem, was unter Ehre verstanden werden kann. Dabei ist noch nicht eindeutig geklärt, wie sich der Terminus Ehre definieren lässt. Auffällig sind dabei die zunehmend positiv konnotierten Definitionen in der philosophischen Forschungsliteratur. Beispiele hierfür bieten die Ansätze von Appiah und Cunningham, welche die Ehre von ihrem schlechten Ruf und der Verbindung zur Gewalt befreien und auf die ich mich im Folgenden beziehen werde. Im Gegensatz zu diesen Theorien stehen beispielsweise populistische Bewegungen, welche die Ehre, vor allem die der Nation, hochstilisieren, um sie als Abgrenzungs- und Unterscheidungskriterium zu nutzen. Diese Art des Gebrauchs von Ehre zeigt negative Folgen. Die inhärente Würde des Menschen und die daraus resultierenden egalitären Rechte, die für alle Menschen gelten sollten, werden durch solche Abgrenzungsprozesse angezweifelt. Dieser Gegensatz erlaubt es mir, die These aufzustellen, dass die Ehre instrumentalisiert werden kann. Über drei Zugänge werde ich darstellen, wie eine mögliche Instrumentalisierung aussehen kann.

ENVISIONING A WORTHWHILE CRITIQUE OF IDEALISM: REFLECTIONS ON THE FREGE-WITTGENSTEIN CORRESPONDENCE

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A familiar dynamic emerges in the ongoing exegetical debates surrounding Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*: so-called "resolute readers" develop and defend interpretations of the work based primarily upon the text itself, and so-called "irresolute readers" challenge these interpretations by appealing to extra-textual evidence, such as the testimony of contemporaries or retrospective remarks in which Wittgenstein seemingly implies prior commitment to one or another metaphysical thesis that resolute readers claim he opposed. The present paper inverts this familiar dynamic by invoking extra-textual evidence to challenge *irresolute* readings. In closely ana-

lyzing the final letter of the Frege-Wittgenstein correspondence, three key elements come to the fore: (i) Wittgenstein apparently acknowledges a “deep, true nucleus” in idealism (Schmitt 2003: 30); (ii) nevertheless, he aims to *fight against* or *attack* idealism, indicating that, initial appearances notwithstanding, he was not committed to an ineffable metaphysical doctrine; and (iii) his primary point of contention with Frege on this issue stems from their divergent conceptions of critique, with Wittgenstein alleging that Frege’s criticism of idealism does not go far enough. Taken together, these points engender a significant challenge for irresolute readings and suggest Wittgenstein’s conception of “worthwhile” philosophical critique as a potential source of continuity across his significant philosophical evolution (Frege 1977: vii).

STENIUS ON WITTGENSTEIN’S “KANTIAN SOLUTION”

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The paper interprets Stenius’ work “Wittgenstein as a Kantian Philosopher” (1960) in light of Wittgenstein’s remark in *Culture and Value* on the “Kantian solution of the problem of philosophy”. First, I discuss this so-called “problem of philosophy” in connection with what the *Tractatus* preface describes as the difficulty of “drawing a limit to thinking”. Second, I discuss how Stenius takes Wittgenstein to respond to this problem indirectly, i.e., by clarifying the limits of thought through the limits of language. This approach, I explain, translates to Wittgenstein’s aim of showing the nonsensicality of philosophical propositions as found, for example, in his remarks on the law of causality. Finally, I explain how the nonsense described by Stenius can be understood as a “Kantian solution” that leads to a triumph of clarity in language.

HUMANS, CYBORGS, HUMANOID ROBOTS: CHALLENGES FOR AUTONOMY AND RESPONSIBILITY?

Reinhard Merkel

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In the not too distant future, humans will establish functionally as well as mentally close conjunctions with intelligent machines. Their brains will be equipped with technology sufficiently powerful to consign their further cognitive development in larger part to the specifications of a technological rather than their biological evolution. They will assimilate to machines. At the same time, progress in robotics, artificial intelligence, neuroscience and engineering will permit the production of intelligent machines that will increasingly adopt functions of independent decision-making within our lifeworld. They will assimilate to humans. What does this dual convergence mean for our conceptions of autonomy and responsibility? And, possibly, for “autonomy” and “responsibility” of future humanoid robots? Will we have to share these fundamental determinations of the Human Condition with them? And eventually the power that comes with it?

EPISTEMIC DISAGREEMENT, DOUBTS, AND COHERENCE

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The question which will be addressed in this contribution is whether coherence, in one form or another, provides a criterion to distinguish a ‘healthy’, reasonable type of scepticism from an obstructive form of scepticism that results in the fabrication of spurious doubts, often for partisan ends unrelated to scientific concerns. The question is of some relevance because we often do not know, given the imperfection of our epistemic condition and the ubiquity of epistemic disagreement, when to greet dissenting views at least with ‘sceptical respect’ and to accept them as offering serious possibilities, instead of flatly rejecting them as incredible. It will be argued that whereas some types of coherence, e.g. reflective equilibrium, may well be too weak to yield the desired criterion, diachronic coherence, most familiar as Bayesian updating, is a serious candidate. Everything then depends, of course, on how diachronic coherence is specified in its details.

INTERSEKTIONALITÄT UND DIE BEDINGUNGEN SITUierter KRITIK

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Das in den 1980er Jahren im US-amerikanischen Schwarzen Feminismus entwickelte Konzept der Intersektionalität ist heute eine wichtige Analyseperspektive, um die Verschränkungen von Machtstrukturen nach sozialen Differenzierungskategorien wie Geschlecht, ‚Rasse‘, Klasse oder Sexualität freizulegen und auf die Vielschichtigkeit, aber auch die Widersprüche in der Konzeptualisierung sozialer Ungleichheit und Identität hinzuweisen (Lorde, Collins, Crenshaw). Aus philosophischer Sicht problematisch erscheint am Intersektionalitätsansatz insbesondere dessen affirmativer Bezug auf gruppenbasierte Identitätspolitik. Letztere ist für viele der Ausdruck einer Sozialtechnik, die Individuen nicht als ‚Wer‘, sondern als ‚Was‘ (Arendt) bestimmt, das Politische auf die Logik sozialwissenschaftlicher Identifizierung reduziert (Lefort) und gewalttätigen Konflikten zwischen Identitäten Vorschub leistet (Nancy). Gegen diese Einwände werde ich argumentieren, dass die Intersektionalitätsperspektive eine exemplarische Form von situierter Kritik darstellt, die das Politische nicht zerstört, sondern aktualisiert, insofern sie die sozialen Bedingungen und epistemischen Privilegien für Herrschaftskritik zur Diskussion stellt. Der Intersektionalitätsansatz kritisiert demnach nicht nur ungleiche soziale Positionierungen, sondern macht die soziale Positionierung als Bedingung von Kritik manifest und erkennbar.

CLIMATE JUSTICE. WHY THE PAST MATTERS IN CONFLICTING WAYS

Lukas H. Meyer & Pranay Sanklecha

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In order to seriously attempt to meet the 1.5 degree Celsius target, it will be necessary to implement a substantial reduction in global emissions. There are several factors that must be assessed when coming to a view about how emissions should be allocated between states. One of the important issues here, and a source of much political contention, is the question of whether past emissions are relevant to determining how the remaining global carbon budget should be allocated between states and, if so,

precisely how. We begin from a principled position that high-emitting countries would plausibly want to endorse, namely that inhabitants of these countries have legitimate expectations regarding the continued pursuit of ways of life and long-term projects typical for these countries. We argue that this position reflects at least in part the historical genesis of these expectations. We then argue that consistency requires that the past can be relevant in other ways too; in particular, that the highly unequal levels of past emissions should matter to determining their forward-looking allocation owing to how they benefit and harm currently living and future people. We further argue that this also holds in reverse: when one claims that the highly unequal levels of past emissions are relevant to determining the allocation, one should also accept the normative relevance of legitimate expectations of individuals in historically high-emitting countries.

WHAT COULD JUSTIFY INDIVIDUAL CLIMATE DIFFERENCES?

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Individual denialists deny that the emissions of individuals ever cause climate harms. They accept that large groups do cause climate harms. This requires assuming a meta-physical threshold where large numbers of actions have effects but subsets of those actions have no effect. Most objections to individual denialists do not grant this assumption. Granting this assumption, I go on to systematically determine what kind of justification could be made for the claim that there is a relevant difference between individuals and large groups. I find all the justifications on offer wanting partially as, from a scientific point of view, there is nothing privileged about the emissions at the level of the individual as opposed to larger or smaller levels. I discuss how a claim about the potential value of working with others could have been misconstrued as supporting the radical claim that individuals do not make a climate difference.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL VOCABULARY IN CRISIS?

Josef Mitterer

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The current Fake News debate and a serious loss of trust in the media stimulate philosophers of different strands to weigh into a discussion which is about stating, making or blurring distinctions: distinctions such as those between fact and opinion, truth and falsehood, reality and illusion, between what is and what is not. The culprits are relativism, neopragmatism, constructivism and postmodernism in general, the attacks are mainly led by realists, old and "new". Truth as a regulative principle seems to fail and the traditional philosophical vocabulary is at stake. What are the options?

IS PREDATION NECESSARILY AMORAL?

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The thesis that predation is amoral (PA) is widely regarded as an unquestionable assumption. In this paper, I examine five different reasons that could be offered in support of PA: (1) predators are not moral agents; (2) if predation were moral it would imply an absurd duty to police nature;

(3) predatory behavior is too widely distributed in nature to plausibly construe it as moral; (4) predatory behavior is not under the predator's control; (5) eating other animals is necessary for predators to survive. I argue that none of these reasons can successfully ground PA. While predation is likely amoral in most cases, it may be moral in some cases.

NATURWISSENSCHAFT UND KÜNSTLICHE INTELLIGENZ

Wolf Dietrich Nagl

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„Alle Naturwissenschaft beschreibt bloß das Geschehene, statt es zu erklären.“

Diese Aussage macht Robert Musil in seiner Inaugural-Dissertation *Beurteilung der Lehren Machs* auf Seite 15. Er hat sie im Januar 1908 vorgelegt und wurde dann am 14. März 1908 promoviert. Sie komprimiert den Inhalt des Vortrages, den ich 2018 in Kirchberg gehalten habe: „Łukasiewicz, Ockhams Razor: Operativer Non-Dualismus“. Hier gehe ich auf die Voraussetzungen und Aktionen ein, die in der Naturwissenschaft zu überprüfbarem und realisierbarem Wissen führen. Erklärungen sind das Beiwerk, mit dem zum Planen und Handeln für künftige Sinneseindrücke motiviert wird. Software mit künstlicher Intelligenz übernimmt alle Routinearbeiten beim Erarbeiten und Anwenden dieses Wissens und führt dabei viele Matrizenrechnungen durch. In die müssen sich Geisteswissenschaftler einarbeiten, wenn sie weiter das in der Naturwissenschaft gewonnene Wissen erklären wollen. Messwertematrizen von Tycho Brahe und Johannes Kepler beschriften um 1600 der Astronomie einen naturwissenschaftlichen Zweig. Damals wurden Naturgesetze aus einem Zahlenfriedhof mit gemessenen Planetenpositionen gewonnen. Heute steht die akademische Soziologie in dieser Situation, denn Big Data dokumentiert Aktionen und Interaktionen vieler Menschen.

A MIXED BLESSING: KNOWLEDGE AS VIRTUE VS. KNOWLEDGE AS POWER

Isaac Nevo

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In this paper, I discuss the moral implications, if any, of the possession, as distinguished from the acquisition or use, of knowledge. Taking cues from both the tradition which views knowledge as an intrinsic good and the contrary tradition which views knowledge as essentially implicated with power, I consider Nicholas Rescher's view, in his "Forbidden knowledge," according to which knowledge can and should be regulated in terms of its external effects, but not in point of its "mere" possession. I raise and discuss counter-examples, pertaining to the "very" possession of unethical knowledge, and related proposals for scientific "abstinence," e.g., the possession and use of results from Nazi hypothermia "experiments," and the obligations on anthropological researchers regarding the "objects" of their studies. Keeping both traditions in focus, I argue that an ethics of knowledge is called for, to balance its intrinsic value and its often unavoidable connection with power.

THE *TRACTATUS* AND THE RIDDLES OF PHILOSOPHY

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The aim of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* is to alter the way philosophers understand the nature of their own propositions. Whereas philosophers tend to think of themselves as seeking answers to determinate questions, Wittgenstein asks us to see philosophical propositions as riddles. Solving an ordinary riddle does not depend on learning a new fact about the world. Rather, it requires that we learn something about how our words can be used. The riddles of philosophy resemble ordinary riddles insofar as they do not allow any immediate, straight answer, and insofar as they involve renegotiating the meanings of our words. But philosophical riddles differ from ordinary ones insofar as no attempt to reduce them to answerable questions will satisfy us. Rather than solving the riddles of philosophy, Wittgenstein proposes to dissolve them.

TRACTATUS ON FUNCTIONS AND HIERARCHY

Yasushi Nomura

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In the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein suggests the idea of a "hierarchy" that "we ourselves construct" and "independent of (empirical) reality" (TLP 5.556-5.5561). But the official system of *Tractatus* composed only of "elementary propositions" and their "truth functions" seems to have no room for any "hierarchy". So, in this paper I shall show: (1) The notion of "functions" in *Tractatus* is entirely *redundant* to its official system (this I will show by using as a clue two conceptions of "elementary propositions"). (2) *That is why* we can insert a hierarchy of ramified types as that of "functions" "independent of reality" into the official system of *Tractatus*.

"HE IS A PERFECT NATURE-BEING – AND A PERFECT VIENNESE!". VON WRIGHT AND WITTGENSTEIN IN CAMBRIDGE 1939

Bernt Österman

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As one of Wittgenstein's three heirs and literary executors, the Finnish philosopher Georg Henrik von Wright has had an enormous influence on the posthumous publishing of the Wittgenstein literary estate. His relationship to Wittgenstein's philosophy was, however, somewhat paradoxical. Never doubting that Wittgenstein was a philosophical genius, von Wright was still the person close to Wittgenstein who kept the greatest intellectual distance. The paper gives an account of von Wright's first encounter with Wittgenstein at Cambridge during 1939. It is based on von Wright's autobiographical writings and the letters he wrote to his professor Eino Kaila in Finland, including also some references to Cora Diamond's edition of Wittgenstein's lectures on the foundations of mathematics, which von Wright attended during the Easter term. It is argued that von Wright initially was not completely convinced by Wittgenstein, but finally became totally overwhelmed. In his change of attitude, seeming externalities like Wittgenstein's whistling skills played a surprising part.

ZUM WESEN UND WERT DER KRISE IN DER DEMOKRATIE

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Die über 2500-jährige Geschichte der Demokratie als eine normative Idee und als Regierungs- und Lebensform wird in ihren verschiedenen Entwicklungsstufen flankiert von einer Geschichte der Kritik und Krise der Demokratie. Auch gegenwärtig werden nicht nur im öffentlichen Diskurs, sondern auch aus politikphilosophischer Perspektive immer wieder die allgemeine Krise der Demokratie beschworen oder die Krisen zentraler demokratischer Institutionen herausgestellt. Für die zeitgenössischen Krisen-Diagnostiken gilt aber, so die leitende These des Vortrags, dass sie, anders als viele ihrer historischen Vorläufer, nicht als prinzipielle Zurückweisungen der demokratischen Ordnung und ihrer Grundprinzipien zu verstehen sind, sondern als kritische und konstruktive Beiträge zum Wesen und Wert der Demokratie. Kritisch sind sie, insofern die Realität der Demokratie an einem Ideal gemessen wird, konstruktiv hingegen, insofern ihre normative Richtigkeit gegenüber den faktischen Verhältnissen, Herausforderungen und Problemen verteidigt wird. Somit hängen Krise und Kritik als auf Dauer angelegte Überprüfungen und Infragestellungen der politischen Ordnung systematisch mit der Demokratie als Regierungs- und Lebensform zusammen. Mithin ist Kritik als das *Vermögen*, sich selbst Meinungen bilden und Überzeugungen vertreten zu können, als *Methode*, um Argumente in einer für alle verständlichen (auch in diesem Sinne: demokratischen) Form öffentlich prüfen zu lassen, und als *Fähigkeit*, seine Überzeugungen durch gute Gründe bestätigen, aber auch revidieren zu können, eine demokratische Tugend.

EIN FRÜHER UND EIN SPÄTER TRAUM WITTGENSTEINS IM VERGLEICH

Martin Ohmacht

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Es wird die Freud'sche Grundregel der Psychoanalyse gebracht, die Wittgenstein schon relativ früh rezipiert (Ms 107: 100). Es wird auch die zentrale Stellung der Träume als *via regia* zum Unbewussten ausgewertet, weil Wittgenstein im Lauf der Jahre 18 Träume protokollierte und zum Teil auch selber deutete. Freud stellt in einer Anmerkung den Träumer selbst als Experten für den Traum hin. Die beiden hier gebrachten Träume werden mit Hinblick auf Wittgensteins Stationen auf seinem Lebensweg gedeutet. Der Traum aus dem Jahr 1922 ist ein Berufungstraum (Publikation des *Tractatus!*) und der Traum aus dem Jahr 1942 bezieht sich auf eine berufliche Entscheidungssituation bzgl. seiner Tätigkeit in Guy's Hospital. Der Traum aus dem Jahr 1942 wurde erst kürzlich vollständig publiziert. Siehe Pichler, Alois (2018): Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Report of Two Dreams from October 1942 (Ms-126, 21-26), in: Nordic Wittgenstein Review vol. 7, issue 1, pp 101–107.

MANY VOICES, ONE NIGERIA: A CRITIQUE OF NATIONALISM AND NATIONISM

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It is an undisputable fact that language is an indispensable tool for national development, stability and unity. Language is viewed as the pivot around which all human activities revolve. Such activities as cultural and traditional expressions leading to inculcation of ideologies, establishing

interaction amongst people, dissemination of information, advancing education, commerce and industries are the major roles language plays in human and national development. Language is the tool for the integration of diversified cultures. However, with the current ugly trend of events in the political space in Nigeria where inter-group relationship is characterized by rivalry instead of healthy competition and inclusiveness, dominance instead of cooperation, exploitation instead of collaboration, centralization and dictatorship instead of decentralization and democracy, the problem remains whether one can comfortably say "many voices, one Nigeria." With this in mind, this paper attempts a critique of the notions of "Nationalism" and "Nationism" in Nigeria and concludes that the bane of national development in Nigeria is the dominance of nationalism.

PHILOSOPHY AS CRITIQUE OF LANGUAGE IN WITTGENSTEIN AND THE SPOKEN WORD IN IGBO WORLDVIEW: A PHILOSOPHICAL RAPPROCHEMENT

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The philosophical sense of critique is the ability to distinguish, evaluate and react. Wittgenstein conceived of philosophy as an activity concerned with the clarification of thought. For him, the primary task of the philosopher is to react to traditional philosophical arguments using the tool of linguistic analysis to show where they go wrong. In linguistic analysis, the meaning of the word is not found in the form but in the variety of uses to which it can be put. Thus, in language, the nature and relations of the world and philosophy are encapsulated. In the Igbo world too, it is language, that is the spoken word, that gives existence its form and meaning. Considering the functions of language as instrument of thought, communication and identity, this paper demonstrates that for both Wittgenstein and for the Igbo world, man earns his being in and through language.

DER STATUS DER MATHEMATIK IN DER PHILOSOPHIE WITTGENSTEINS

Mélika Ouelbani

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Die Philosophie Wittgensteins steckt genau wie seine Persönlichkeit voller Paradoxe, die zu verstehen und aufzulösen interessant sind. Diese Besonderheit findet sich in der Rolle wieder, die er der Mathematik ganz allgemein beimisst und insbesondere in seiner Philosophie der Mathematik. Das Ziel meines Vortrags ist es, genau diese komplexe, spiralförmig gewundene Art und Weise, in der Wittgenstein sich mit der Mathematik beschäftigt, aufzuzeigen. Ich werde zunächst zeigen, dass die Mathematik im *Tractatus* eine besondere und wichtige, keineswegs jedoch eine privilegierte Rolle spielt. Sie stellt eine Art Prototyp der Sprache dar, ist dabei gleichzeitig jedoch „sinnlos“. Nach dem *Tractatus* werden die mathematische Sprache und das Kalkül ganz klar als Prototyp für die Funktionsweise unserer Sprache betrachtet. Als Wittgenstein sich jedoch mit der Mathematik an sich beschäftigt, sagt er, er habe sie vom Sockel gestoßen. Die gesamte Wittgensteinsche Philosophie der Mathematik ist tatsächlich bestrebt, zu zeigen, dass die mathematische Sprache sich in keinsten Weise von den anderen Sprachen unterscheidet oder ihnen gar überlegen ist (der Status des Satzes, die Sprachspiele, ...). Die Mathematik diene als

Modell für die Entwicklung des Konzepts des Sprachspiels und wurde dann selbst zum Sprachspiel, das wie ein ganz beliebiges, alltägliches Spiel unserer Sprache funktioniert.

CRITIQUE OF WESTERN CULTURE: WITTGENSTEIN'S PERSPECTIVE

Ratikanta Panda

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The aim of this paper is to study the fundamental relation between culture and value in general with special reference to Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein has studied human culture in depth and has critiqued what is known as the materialist culture based on the achievements of modern science and technology. He has shown that the culture, which leads man in the right direction, is the spiritual culture based on the eternal values. These values consist in spiritual perfection, love for higher life, peace, harmony, universal brotherhood, love for mankind, etc. Wittgenstein has defended spiritual culture, as he believes that spiritual values alone hold promise for the future of the mankind.

BREAKAGES AND CONTINUITY IN THE EVOLUTION OF WITTGENSTEIN'S THOUGHT

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The theme of continuity or discontinuity of Wittgenstein's philosophy is central for philosophy of language. Critics agree about the existence of constant ideas in Wittgenstein's philosophy, but they do not always agree with their different interpretations. So, critics' positions regarding the continuity or discontinuity of Wittgenstein's philosophy are different. Kenny (2016) tries to show us why the idea of a total opposition between the two works is wrong. From his words, it seems that he is in favor of the idea of continuity. The two Hintikka (1990), instead, seem to say the opposite, but, in reality, they simply put the accent on what makes the two works very different from each other, inserting them, however, in a path that sees them respectively as a point of starting and of arrival. Finally, Marconi (2014) proposes what seems to be the most convincing position: a moderate position that neither denies the differences between the two works, nor presents constant themes in Wittgenstein's philosophy. This, in my opinion, would seem to be the most correct position. A position that allows us to look at Wittgenstein's thought as a development that starts from one point and reaches another, very different from the original one, but obviously linked to it.

TAKING PICTURES IN THE RIGHT LIGHT

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What is the experience of being stuck in a picture? And what is its philosophical importance? This paper attempts an answer through a reading of Philosophical Investigations §§ 96-7, where Wittgenstein uses the *Tractatus* as an example of a picture. Consequently, the paper's contribution to the literature is twofold: it explains the nature of being stuck in a picture and shows why Wittgenstein's use of the *Tractatus* as an example of a picture suggests the correctness of the resolute reading of the book. My paper has five sections. First, I discuss what it means to read the *Tractatus* resolutely. Second, I explain Wittgenstein's idea of being stuck in a picture and what makes this a unique phenomenon. Third, I closely read some

sections of the Investigations in which Wittgenstein presents this idea. Fourth, I argue that his presentation cannot be squared with a non-resolute reading of the Tractatus. And finally, I give a sketch of how his presentation squares with a resolute reading.

WHAT WE OWE OURSELVES: ON CLIMATE CHANGE, DUTY, AND RESPONSIBILITY

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Individual agents should do many things, but averting the harms of climate change is not one of them. This is partly because no single individual could possibly avert (or cause) such harms by him or herself. Both causing and averting the harms of climate change requires joint or collective action. This is one of the basic, albeit rough, intuitive thoughts behind some collectivists' accounts (e.g., Cripps, Sinnott-Armstrong), which argue that duties to avert climate harms are primarily collective. This work acknowledges the collective nature of climate change harms, but argues that this does nothing to vanquish individuals' personal duties to distance themselves from such harms. Interdependent individual actions of GHG emissions are causally efficacious in the production of climate change harms. This means, among other things, that each GHG emission is a constitutive (though neither necessary nor sufficient) part of the means by which climate-related harms are realized. Following Cripps, it is plausible to hold the putative group of GHG emitters (GHGE) weakly collectively responsible for harm resulting from the predictable aggregation of their individual acts. For Cripps, what follows from this is a corresponding collective duty to do something about the harm together, i.e., to act, *qua* group, to bring about an end to the harm and a derivative duty for each emitter to promote the required organization of a group capable of such a collective action. This view, however, downplays individual contributions to the collectively realized harms. Such individual contributions, to the extent that they are avoidable, make one into a member of a group that is morally responsible for climate-related harm. Individual emitters who can do otherwise (i.e., not emit at reasonable cost to themselves) should recognize themselves as members of a group that collectively harms. Subsequently, they should take all possible steps (depending on individual circumstances) in order to cease such membership. Thus, this work argues that what follows from assigning collective responsibility to the GHGE is a personal duty that falls on each individual member to renounce membership in this group. To be clear, not all members of GHGE are *ipso facto* blameworthy for climate change harms, but those who can, but do not, cease membership (e.g., by renouncing their luxury emissions) are. This way of framing the issue acknowledges the collective nature of climate change harms, but rests responsibility and duty squarely on individual shoulders.

FORE- AND BACKGROUND IN NANCY FRASER'S EXPANDED CONCEPTION OF CAPITALISM

Bernd Prien

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In their recent book *Capitalism: A Conversation in Critical Theory*, Nancy Fraser and Rahel Jaeggi introduce an expanded conception of capitalism. According to this conception, capitalism is not just an economic system, as

orthodox views would have it, but a form of society as a whole, encompassing, in addition to an economic sphere, a sphere of social reproduction, a sphere of public power, and a sphere of exploiting natural resources. In this expanded conception, Fraser assigns the economic sphere to the foreground, while the other, non-economic spheres are said to constitute the background of capitalist society. This is reminiscent of Marx' distinction between an economic base and political and juridical superstructure. Since Fraser explicitly rejects this thesis, the question remains how her distinction between an economic foreground and a non-economic background can be understood. I argue that there are different, though related strands of thought involved in Fraser's thesis that the economic sphere occupies the foreground of society: First, the economy depends on inputs from the other social spheres which, accordingly, play a subsidiary role. Second, the economic sphere disavows this dependence on the other spheres, which again relegates them to a secondary rank. Third, there are passages indicating that Fraser's foreground/background distinction is also concerned with ideological questions about how capitalist society is viewed. In this regard, she claims that in ideologically established views, the economic sphere occupies the foreground in the sense of being represented as self-sufficient.

WITTGENSTEIN BEYOND THE POLEMICS OF DETERMINISM/INDETERMINISM

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This paper reads Wittgenstein's view of action as a move beyond the traditional polemics about determinism versus indeterminism. Both these camps assume space as consisting in discrete terminal bits – forging thereby a causal split between action and its putative antecedents. Wittgenstein on the other hand looks upon wish, will, physiological events and action as a continuous stretch where the question of causation and the issue of determinism versus indeterminism does not arise.

VARIETIES OF RESENTMENT

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Attitudes and expressions of resentment and indignation have been influential forms of critique in social and political contexts. Resentment and indignation express the felt violation of normative claims by actions of some individual or collective agents. As reactions to felt injustices resentment and indignation make strong claims for normative justification. However, these claims need not be correct, and resentment can be subject to criticism and modification. Based on a rule-related interpretation of Peter Strawson's conception of reactive attitudes resentment is a reactive attitude towards the perceived violation of certain rules or norms by the action of an agent. Whereas Strawson focuses on resentment and indignation in individual persons with regards to individual actions I want to focus on cases of social and political resentment. Referring to literature on collective attitudes and blame in historical contexts I am going to specify the normative structure of reasons for social resentment and the rules regulating the expressions of these attitudes and draw a conceptual distinction between indignation, resentment and *ressentiment*.

SCIENTISM AND AESTHETICS IN WITTGENSTEIN

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In this paper, I investigate in a Wittgensteinian framework what effects scientism could have on the language-game of aesthetics. By scientism I understand a trend in culture and science that prioritizes scientific approaches over non-scientific approaches to any topic. Using the example of aesthetics, I argue that scientism impoverishes the way we perform certain language-games. Wittgenstein presents aesthetics as a language-game of judging objects according to culturally-embedded rules. It is the ability of applying those rules that enables one to make aesthetic judgments. Thereby, aesthetics presupposes and enables aesthetic understanding. I show that there is current literature on neuroaesthetics that treats certain neuronal activities instead of the mastery of rules as qualifying for aesthetic judgements. I argue that if we, in the spirit of scientism, adapt the language-game of aesthetics to that of neuroaesthetics, it loses the characteristics that offer aesthetic understanding.

LIFE PLANS IN THE ANTHROPOCENE

Barbara Reiter

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In this paper I ask what human life plans are and if and how they do and should change due to what is called the Anthropocene, i.e. the time we have lived in characterized by some as the first era in the history of planet Earth showing severe signs of being influenced by systemic human use and overuse of resources. I analyse John Rawls' conception of the life plan and criticize it as too narrow. I argue that it needs openness to contingency. I interpret the Anthropocene as a basic contingency of our lives that we need to respond to. If interpreted in such a way a contingency becomes a matter of chance. I present Val Plumwood's inclusion of the ecological crisis as an early example of such an interpretation.

KAPITALISMUS UND IDENTITÄT. ZUR DEKOLONISIERUNG DEMOKRATISCHER POPULARITÄT

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Die Geschichte der demokratischen Revolutionen macht deutlich, dass spätestens mit dem Unglaubwürdigwerden eines Klassenbewusstseins der Arbeiterschaft die Konstruktion der homogenen Repräsentanz sozialer Ungleichheit ihre Überzeugungskraft eingebüßt hat. Anschließend an zahlreiche Kritiken politischer Subjektivität verbindet sich mit der Verabschiedung einer privilegierten/kolonialen Subjektposition die Affirmation eines radikalen Pluralismus auch in der politischen Theorie. Das bedeutet, dass es keinen unumstrittenen Akteur geben kann, der im Namen der Menschheit Fortschritte im Sinne einer Gattungsgeschichte erzielen könnte – und dass sich die demokratische Rückkopplung an die Souveränität des Volks in der Rückbindung an eine Menge (*multitudo*) fragmentiert und vervielfacht. – Im Unterschied zur üblicherweise vorgetragenen liberalen Populismuskritik (einer demagogisch inszenierten homogenen Repräsentanz des Volks) geht es mir in erster Linie darum, die ‚neoliberalen‘ Machtverhältnisse als demokratiefeindliche Verhältnisse in den Blick zu nehmen. Hier zeigen sich postdemokratische Zustände,

sei es von Eliten, die unsere Demokratien leiten, sei es von wirtschaftspolitischen Machtzentren, die keine demokratische Legitimität vorweisen können. Diese Diagnose macht eine diskursive Deutungsmacht wahrnehmbar, welche die Modernisierungskultur selbst als eine Leitkultur – und gerade nicht: als eine Diskussions- und Streitkultur – begreift.

FRANZÖSISCHE MEISTER, FRANK DOBSON, STANLEY CASSON – „DASS DIESE SIE ETWAS ZU LEHREN HABEN; KOMMT IHNEN NICHT IN DEN SINN“ (WITTGENSTEIN)

Josef G. F. Rothhaupt

München, Deutschland

Ludwig Wittgenstein hatte sich eingehend mit moderner, zeitgenössischer Kunst – Malerei, Zeichnung, Skulptur – etwa Auguste Rodin und Ivan Meštrović (siehe Rothhaupt 2015) oder Anton Hanak und Michael Drobil (siehe Rothhaupt 2017) – beschäftigt. Für eben diese Beschäftigung sollen hier nun weitere Beispiele expliziert und dokumentiert werden, nämlich einerseits moderne Malerei in Frankreich – von Pierre Bonnard, Gustave Courbet und Honoré Daumier über Paul Gauguin, Eduard Manet und Claude Monet zu Pablo Picasso, Camille Pissarro und Maurice Utrillo – und andererseits moderne Skulptur in England – Frank Dobson und Stanley Casson.

THE “LOOPING PROBLEM” AND THE LIMIT OF LANGUAGE: WITTGENSTEIN ON “TRANSITIVE” VS. “INTRANSITIVE” MEANING AND UNDERSTANDING

Simo Säätelä

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In the *Brown Book* Wittgenstein operates with a distinction between “intransitive” and “transitive” meaning, and warns against a philosophical “delusion” that is produced if the former is understood as a special case of the latter. Commentators usually think that Wittgenstein here introduces two different notions of meaning and wants to emphasize the intransitive one by showing its importance e.g. in aesthetics. However, I want to claim that Wittgenstein's main concern is instead with the question of the limit of language and that the illusion Wittgenstein warns against is produced by the “looping problem”: both the intransitive and the transitive case seem to produce a “loop”, where the explanation of the meaning of a sentence in the end leads us to repeat the sentence. The inevitability of the “looping problem” then suggests that we have reached the limit of language and that we must somehow transcend it and compare language to something outside it in order to explain its meaning. However, this is precisely the illusion Wittgenstein is out to expose. The transitive/intransitive distinction is thus a part of Wittgenstein's criticism of foundationalist views of meaning. However, I also want to show that Wittgenstein in *BB* actually undermines this distinction, and that this might be a reason why we do not find the terminology in his later work.

THE GOOD OF/IN ARTICULATION: PERSONHOOD IN DIAMOND AND CAVELL

Carlota Salvador Megias

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I will explore a conception of personhood that sanctifies the sense of absurdity and tragedy we feel towards, ex., school shootings and the discussions surrounding them – that is, one justifying *this* particular conception of the good against another where these events and ensuing conversations would not strike us as absurd. If this conception of personhood stands, it would show that we cannot be neutral when faced with what we presently take to be competing conceptions of the good, or when faced with the prospect of certain kinds of conceptual change, once modern moral philosophy has been reminded of the fact that *this* is the conception of personhood it is meant to serve.

„DIE WEISHEIT IST WIE KALTE GRAUE ASCHE“ – WITTGENSTEIN ÜBER PHILOSOPHIE UND DIE PROBLEME DES LEBENS

Alfred Schmidt

Wien, Österreich

Unter Berücksichtigung von S. A. Kripkes Einsicht „dass man Wittgensteins Argument bis zu einem gewissen Grad verfälscht, wenn man versucht, es exakt darzustellen“, geht es in meinem Beitrag um die Frage, ob neben Wittgensteins therapeutischer Sprachphilosophie Platz ist für eine Philosophie als „Weisheitslehre“, die sich mit unseren Lebensproblemen beschäftigt. Während Fragen nach dem „richtigen Leben“ oder dem Sinn im TLP unter das strenge Verdikt des „Unsagbaren“ fallen, ist dieses Thema für Wittgensteins spätere Philosophie zumindest nicht von Vorneherein ausgeschlossen. Es wird gezeigt, dass Wittgensteins Haltung dazu durchaus ambivalent ist, dass aber methodisch zu unterscheiden ist zwischen Wittgensteins eigentlich philosophischen Schriften und persönlichen Bemerkungen, die seine Lebenseinstellung zum Ausdruck bringen.

REVISITING WITTGENSTEIN'S RULE- FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS

Antonio Segatto

São Paulo, Brazil

My purpose is to present and defend the possibility of a new interpretation of Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations. This interpretation is based on two basic theses that differentiate it from standard interpretations as well as from philosophical debates on the normativity of meaning: 1) Following John McDowell and Juliet Floyd, I intend to show that the dilemma envisaged by Wittgenstein is not a skeptical paradox similar to the Humean argument about causal inferences. The problem involved in Wittgenstein's remarks is analogous to the Kantian problem of the relation between rules and applications, more specifically, the supposed regress involved in the application of rules; 2) I intend to show that the solution to this problem depends on the consideration of the temporal dimension of language, for the regularity responsible for the institution of the identity of a rule is a regularity in the application of the rule-formulation over time.

CULTURE AND VALUE: A CRITIQUE OF THE CULTURAL ARGUMENT FOR CLOSED BORDERS

Daniel Sharp

New York City, New York, USA

A prominent argument in favor of the state's right to exclude immigrants appeals to the value of culture. I argue that these cultural arguments for exclusion fail in part because they depend on equivocating between different notions of culture and conflating different ways in which culture might be valuable.

LEX ORANDI, LEX CREDENDI: WITTGENSTEIN ON THE NATURE OF RELIGION

Richard Sherlock

Logan, Utah, USA

Much of the work on Wittgenstein and Religion has missed a crucial part of his discussion. Many writers, such as D. Z. Phillips have focused in the idea of religion as a language game. Others have focused on his discussion of religious "seeing" with reference to color blindness. Both of these topics and the associated literature are helpful in understanding Wittgenstein's thought. In this paper I explore the way that Wittgenstein views religion not as primarily either a special experience or a set of beliefs. Rather it is a way of life.

SURPLUS POPULATIONS AND EMPOWERMENT THROUGH RADICAL NEEDS

Yıldız Silier

Istanbul, Turkey

Why are most workers not socialist and most women not feminist? According to Marx's immanent critique of capitalism, the radical needs for self-realization, individuality and solidarity are created by capitalism but cannot be satisfied by majority of people within capitalism. Needs are not indicators of our weaknesses and dependencies, but rather reflect our social bonds and the quality of our relationships with the world. He criticizes capitalism as reducing all needs to the need to have money and explains his ideal as the creation of a "man-rich-in-needs" through the "emancipation of the senses". Fraser gives concrete examples of empowerment through politicization of needs. Capitalism transforms economic crisis into new opportunities for penetrating more into our everyday lives through enclosure of the commons. The capitalist tendency to increase surplus-populations introduces further divisions within the working class as mediated by race, gender and ethnicity which prevents them from fighting against their common enemies. I will relate two theories that focus on structure and agency respectively. The Marxist-feminist social reproduction theory will be used to analyze the internal contradictions within the capitalist structure. The theory of transindividuality which combines insights from Marx and Spinoza will be used to explain the production of new subjectivities in capitalism and to illuminate the possibilities for the emergence of new revolutionary agencies. My aim is to reveal the contemporary mechanisms underlying the widespread phenomena of voluntary servitude and to propose an alternative theoretical framework for discussing the preconditions of empowerment.

HASE ODER ENTE? WITTGENSTEINS ASPEKTWECHSEL UND IDENTITÄTSPOLITIK

Georg Siller

Innsbruck, Österreich

Der späte Wittgenstein unterscheidet zwischen einem primären und einem sekundären Bedeutungsbegriff: Einerseits lässt sich Bedeutung als „blinder“ Gebrauch von Wörtern verstehen, andererseits sprechen wir von Bedeutung auch im Rahmen von Bedeutungserlebnissen. Bedeutungserlebnisse beziehen sich aber – wie das Bemerkten des Aspektwechsels beim Hasen-Enten-Kopf – auf das Kippen zweier alternativer Deutungen eines Zeichens, und nicht auf eine bestimmte Bedeutung innerhalb eines konkreten Gebrauchs. Analog zu Wittgensteins Analyse der Bedeutung von „Bedeutung“ kann auch beim Begriff „Identität“ eine primäre von einer sekundären Bedeutung unterschieden werden. Wird mit dem Identitätsbegriff nicht eine funktionale und unreflektiert bestehende Identität (primäre Bedeutung) gemeint, sondern ein Identitätserlebnis (sekundäre Bedeutung), so muss sich dieses Erlebnis gerade auf das mögliche Kippen verschiedener Identitäten richten, d. h. auf die prinzipielle Gleichzeitigkeit konkurrierender Identitätsbeschreibungen beim selben Individuum. Das wiederum hat Konsequenzen für Diskussionen rund um die zersetzende Wirkung von Identitätspolitik: Das Muster echter Identitätserfahrung ist nicht „Ich bin anders“, sondern „Ich bin *gleich und doch anders*“. Emotional gefärbte Identitätsbekenntnisse ohne einen solchen Hintergrund von Ambiguität können nur als rhetorisches Schwelgen verstanden werden, sie gehen von der essentialistischen Voraussetzung aus, wir verfügten über eine Identität, die wir uns als Gefühl direkt ins Bewusstsein holen können.

DER VERLUST AN WAHRHAFTIGKEIT: WITTGENSTEINS KRITIK AN KULTUR UND WISSENSCHAFT DER MODERNEN ZIVILISATION

Ilse Somavilla

Innsbruck, Österreich

Dass Wittgenstein dem „großen Strome der europäischen und amerikanischen Zivilisation“ kritisch gegenüberstand, ist aus seinem Vorwort zu den *Philosophischen Bemerkungen* und weiteren, vor allem aus den in den *Vermischten Bemerkungen* veröffentlichten Aufzeichnungen hinlänglich bekannt. Wie viel mehr diese Äußerungen implizieren, soll im Folgenden in diesem Beitrag untersucht werden – dies insbesondere hinsichtlich seiner ambivalenten Haltung gegenüber den Wissenschaften und der Kultur seiner Zeit. Den Verlust an Wahrhaftigkeit witterte er im ständig wachsenden Fortschritt der Zivilisation, dessen Geist ihm „fremd & unsympathisch“ war, da dessen Ziele sich an persönlichen Zwecken und Erfolgen orientierten, während für Wittgenstein das Streben nach Klarheit und Wahrheit als Selbstzweck oberste Priorität hatte. Seine „Denkbewegung“ sei eine andere als die des „typischen westlichen Wissenschaftlers“, von dem er sich entschieden distanzierte. Ebenso kritisch betrachtete er das aufgrund des fortschreitenden Zerfalls eines gemeinsamen Geistes fehlende Kulturverständnis seiner Zeit. Dieses hänge mit dem Ausdruck des Künstlers zusammen – einem Ausdruck, dessen Voraussetzung Authentizität und Wahrhaftigkeit seien und sich an einer Haltung *sub specie aeternitatis* zu orientieren hätten – in anderen Worten, mit einer ethischen Lebensweise verbunden sein sollten.

SCIENCE, CULTURE IN FRONT OF MEDIA: HOW TO AVOID THE DECLINE OF THE EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN THINKING?

Antonia Soulez

Paris, France

The integration of science into culture is Spengler's leitmotif. In his Essay of 1921 entitled "Remarks for the readers rescued from the decline of the west" Musil who also deplored this dependency of reason vis-à-vis culture "at the expense of knowledge", dismisses the attempt to "understand" the "Decline of the West" as Adorno will later do though in different terms. The rescued are those who have escaped reading the "Decline of the west", and have succeeded in grasping in time the "planche de salut" or rescue appliance of rationality. The "decline" is that of "the strength to think". Far from denouncing after Husserl the excessive confidence in natural sciences at the expense of the *Geisteswissenschaften* that would put reason in crisis, Musil argues against Husserl's interpretation according to which the lack of a living reason is the symptom of the crisis when reason has lost its "center". This view assigning a telos to reason is a myth. One should on the contrary save rationality without idealizing it. For Musil, the disappearing of a center is our primary condition, due to the amorphism of human nature. Only a principle of orientation is able to drive us out of this moral indifference at the beginning. There is no such "centre" able to structure humanity by giving it its orientation. Is the claim for universality really the remedy to irrationalism? No, Musil replies. Idealization is the symptom to combat, not the remedy. Therefore, the non-availability of philosophy in the times of the Crisis (Husserl's *Krisis*, 1936) is the symptom to be interpreted rather than the self-occultation of its telos. The absence of philosophy speaks for itself. My contention in this paper is to question the problematic relation between science and culture, yet from a point of view that could not be taken into account by Musil and Husserl. How to protect society from the ravages of the market has become the crucial question today given the market-economy and the damages that its deregulation has caused. I suggest bringing to the fore "the market of culture" anticipated by the anti-journalist Karl Kraus almost one century ago, although only at the level of a critique of language intended to protect language from semantic distortions, in absence of considerations on the market of culture. "A social calamity is not only cultural, it is also economic" (K. Polanyi).

TECHNICAL AND SOCIAL RISKS OF CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES

Harald Stelzer

Graz, Austria

In a recent paper Langer and Niederberger (2018) have suggested to understand risks involved in global warming as social risks, demanding social solutions beyond consideration of a technical and scientific nature. Even though this could be an important contribution to the discussions of climate policies, I will show in this paper that technical and social risks are interlinked with each other on different levels.

ONTOLOGIE DES POLITISCHEN: PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK UND POLITISCHE IMAGINATION

Gerhard Thonhauser

Darmstadt, Deutschland

Versuche einer Fundierung des Sozialen sehen sich zunehmend mit der Herausforderung konfrontiert, nicht mehr auf substantielle Gewissheiten jenseits politischer Auseinandersetzungen zu können. Die politische Theorie reagiert darauf aktuell mit einer verstärkten Hinwendung zu einer grundlagenphilosophischen Perspektive, die es erlaubt, die ontologischen Grundlagen politischer Auseinandersetzungen zu befragen. Eine solche ontologische Perspektive auf Politik wird anhand der Traditionslinie eines Denkens der politischen Differenz nachgezeichnet. Die Rede von der politischen Differenz verweist auf eine ontologische Tiefendimension unter der Oberfläche des alltäglichen Politikbetriebs, in der die prinzipielle Umgestaltbarkeit jeder politischen Ordnung thematisiert und verhandelbar wird. Während das Denken der politischen Differenz in der kritischen Befragung von Fundierungsansprüchen seine Stärken entfaltet, vermochte es bislang weit weniger zu einem Verständnis von Politik als Sphäre strategischer Institutionalisierung beizutragen. Im Text wird für eine Arbeitsteilung zwischen einem Denken des Politischen (dem die Rolle einer Kritik an Institutionalisierungen, die ihre eigene Kontingenz verdecken, zukommt) und transformatorischer politischer Praxis (der es obliegt, auf eine Neuinstitutionalisierung des Sozialen hinzuarbeiten) argumentiert. Abschließend wird auf die Rolle politischer Imaginationen für soziale Transformationen hingewiesen und die These vertreten, dass für den Erfolg einer politischen Imagination weniger die argumentative Überzeugungskraft als die gefühlte Plausibilität entscheidend ist.

WITTGENSTEIN'S CRITIQUE OF THE PNEUMATIC CONCEPTION OF THE SOUL

Jasmin Trächtler

Bergen, Norway

The idea of the mind as something hidden inside the body is a picture, with which Wittgenstein was concerned since the 1930s – however, it was especially in his later writings on the philosophy of psychology that this picture became an object of critique itself. An elementary aspect of his critique is the idea of the mind, or soul as an *entity*, a thing. In a hitherto not edited remark, he spells out his target with unusual clarity: “I turn against the pneumatic conception. Namely, insofar as it is the conception of the gaseousness of the soul” (Ms 130: 3). In this paper, I aim at an elucidation of Wittgenstein's critique of the “pneumatic conception of the soul” in that very remark. It will be shown firstly, that the postulate of a “pneumatic soul” is problematized by Wittgenstein as a consequence of a “grammatical fallacy” and that this fallacy also dominates a certain idea of the meaning of a word. I will finally point out that Wittgenstein's critique of the “pneumatic conception” reaches beyond a critique of the mere postulate of a “nebulous soul-entity” towards a critique of the evaluative interpretation of this entity, the “pneuma”, as the essential, life-giving principle behind outer expressions.

WAS IST DIE POSTKRITISCHE VERNUNFT?

Zenon Tsirikas

Athen, Griechenland

Gegenwärtiges Denken speist sich vorwiegend aus der Auffassung der Verschiedenheit zwischen Begriff und Sache, Denken und Sein. Allerdings ist diese Konzeption selbstkritischer Vollzug der Wahrheitsidee als Anspruch auf konsequente und treffende Begründung. Am Beginn des kritischen Denkens ist indes bei Platon letztes „Kriterium“ des Erweisens und der Wahrung der Wahrheit das Paar von Gewalt (*βία*) und Gewöhnung (*συνήθεια*). Offenkundig ist dieser Sinn des Beweisens und der Verteidigung der Wahrheit regressiv und ungenügend. Die Regressivität des kritischen Denkens liegt an seinem Charakter, da es Wahrheit und Kritik nur als Verifikation von bereits wahren Gründen gewähren kann, die daher zur Falsifikation der falschen Idole führen. Totale selbstkritische Falsifikation oder sogar der Falsifikationismus sind ebenso Verifikation eines diese Falsifikation durchführenden kritischen Wahrheitsanspruches. Wesen der Wahrheit ist nun die Falsifikation der Wahrheit als eine lebenswichtige Lüge. Eigentlich handelt es sich dabei nicht um eine Alternative, sondern um einen ausgeschöpften Vollzug. Diese Regressivität und Ausschöpfung kann eine Urteilskraft vermeiden, welche nicht die Verifikation bzw. die Falsifikation, sondern die Metamorphose der Unwahrheit zur Wahrheit fordert und so als „postkritisch“ bezeichnet werden könnte.

RULE-FOLLOWING AS PRACTICE: A COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE

Kevezai Tureng

Mumbai, India

The concept of rules or standards has raised many interesting philosophical controversies. There are philosophers who had tried to understand the relationship between rules and following them and whether the notion of rule-following presupposes a community or not. Various commentators have given contrasting views to this question. Wittgenstein himself is accused of not explicitly stating his position on the question and hence his arguments become open to various interpretations. This paper is an attempt to clarify whether the concept of rule-following presupposes a community and will take Wittgenstein as doing so. All meaningful expressions are, following Wittgenstein, taken as contextual and to pretend that this is not the case is to be blind. In this regard, a community called ‘Nagas’ in India is taken as a case study to show how the concept of praxis or context that which Wittgenstein takes as the background where meaning arise is indeed seen in this community. In many ways the reflections here are provisional, incomplete and are not shaped into any single understanding of meaning but rather used to understand more clearly the relation of meaning to its context. What is presented here tries to lay the groundwork for future development to the approach.

WITTGENSTEIN AND STOIC FATALISM

Miroslav Vacura

Prague, Czech Republic

This paper focuses on the relation between young Wittgenstein's philosophy and the Stoic concept of fate. In the first part, we discuss the current knowledge on Wittgenstein's direct or indirect acquaintance with Stoic doctrines. We show that there is no evidence confirming that he was directly knowledgeable of Stoicism; rather, his knowledge of it was probably limited and mediated by secondary

sources, partly by Schopenhauer, and partly by Russell, Moore and his other British associates. In the second part, we discuss some aspects of the Stoic and Schopenhauer's doctrines of will and fate and their (dis)similarities to Wittgenstein's dealings with similar issues in his early texts. We conclude that, while Wittgenstein cannot be considered to have been a fatalist, and his early philosophy is not to be described as stoical in essence, there are still some motives that resemble Stoic philosophy.

THINKING ONE IS FOLLOWING A RULE IS FOLLOWING A RULE IN CRIMINAL LAW

Eduardo Victor J. Valdez

Manila, Philippines

How should we understand the phrase "otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same as obeying it"? Is this a tautology? I shall endeavor to use this phrase in the context of law, criminal law in particular. I will show that criminal intent or *mens rea* is a viable concept that can illustrate that thinking one was obeying a rule is the same as obeying it. In classical criminal law, a crime is *actus reus* + *mens rea*. Penal statutes that stipulate a *mens rea* element require one to think in order to obey the rule. In the end, we shall see that thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same as obeying it in penal states that stipulate a *mens rea* element.

HOW TO BELONG TO A COMMUNITY: MOORE'S A DEFENCE OF COMMON SENSE AND WITTGENSTEIN'S ON CERTAINTY

Wim Vanrie

Ghent, Belgium

I argue that a standard reading of Moore's defence of common sense – according to which Moore's first-person singular knowledge claims are the pillars of his argument – is ill-conceived. Moore's claim against the idealist is not so much that he possesses certain knowledge, but that the idealist *herself*, in virtue of belonging to the same community, possesses that knowledge. Moore's invocation of his common sense propositions constitutes his attempt to articulate what it is to belong to a community. It is shared propositional knowledge that, according to Moore, binds the community. Next, I argue that Wittgenstein's reflections in *On Certainty* show an awareness of these points and in fact center around the same question: what is it to belong to a community? For Wittgenstein, we could say, it is shared grammar that binds a community. But this is merely the *form* of an answer, and we will miss the philosophical import of *On Certainty* if we take it to consist of nothing more than a grammatical investigation aimed at unmasking Moore's claims as nonsensical. First and foremost, *On Certainty* constitutes an investigation of what grammar itself *is*, an investigation that Wittgenstein never took himself to have completed, and to which his grammatical investigations of concepts such as 'knowledge' and 'doubt' are themselves subordinated.

THE MEANING OF ISLAM: TRACING TALAL ASAD'S WITTGENSTEINIANISM

Harald Viersen

Nijmegen, The Netherlands

Of the many influences that shaped the work of acclaimed anthropologist Talal Asad, the philosophy of Ludwig Witt-

genstein ranks among the most important. In this article I unpack the Wittgensteinian strand in Asad's thinking by showing how the structure of Asad's seminal essay "The Idea of An Anthropology of Islam" (1986) mirrors the dialectic in Wittgenstein's changing ideas about meaning. The aim of this article is twofold. First, the parallel between Asad and Wittgenstein explains and strengthens Asad's argument for a tradition-based definition of Islam. Second, it demonstrates the value of interdisciplinary research, showing how anthropology benefits from a fundamental philosophical discussion in dealing with an important contemporary issue. Simultaneously, this should serve as an encouragement to philosophers to engage with debates in other fields, not only for the benefit of non-philosophers, but equally because the inventive ways in which Asad combines various disciplines may fertilize discussions within philosophy proper.

AFTER SUSTAINABILITY: FREEDOM AND REASON IN THE AGE OF CLIMATE ALARMISM

Thomas Wallgren

Helsinki, Finland

In the first part I present very short remarks on four new features in the present discursive constellation, which present important challenges to "us", the "us/we" of academic professional philosophers from the Global North. I do this in order to contextualise my presentation, and also in order to highlight my concern that all philosophy is always accountable to, to put it briefly, its self-understanding of when, where and wherefrom it speaks. The catchwords of this part are: (i) the erosion of liberal self-confidence, (ii) plurality of grand narratives, (iii) fragmentation of philosophy, and (iv) new instrumentalising pressures on research. In the second part I provide a summary of the key argumentative steps for two controversial theses. The first of these is the untimely proposal that *modernity* – and not, for instance, the Anthropocene, transhumanism, neoliberalism, or postcoloniality – conceived (without essentialist reductivism) as an *epoch*, remains the best available framework for any ambitious diagnosis of our times. The second is that we find in the sceptical idea of philosophy on which Socrates, Sextus Empiricus and the later Wittgenstein are in basic agreement, the highest form of commitment to reason available in the Western tradition and also the best available critical tools for a study of the conceptual aspects of a self-understanding of the times. Such sceptical philosophy could be called studies in moral semantics or political semantics. They could also be called experiments in transformative philosophy. The third part presents select elements of a case study in political semantics. The case is the environmental crisis, or, "the sixth state shift", or "climate change" which, I suggest, cannot be understood and addressed unless we understand it as a civilisational affront. The elements which I choose to discuss are (i) the interplay between the discourses of *climate alarmism*, *limits to growth* and *sustainable development* and (ii) one aspect of *the relation between* the ideas of *progress and freedom*. The aspect I focus on in subsection (ii) is the tense relation between commitment to ecomodernism and technological progress on the one hand and the modern idea of political freedom as rational self-determination of equal citizens on the other. Some prescriptive proposals will be discussed, revolving around the suggestion that today, as pressures on "the modern project" grow, and as liberal and left hypocrisy reaches new heights every year, a commitment to a politics by citizens that does not give up ethical universalism implies a commitment to a

transmodern politics that either celebrates radical uncertainty or seeks to realize radical localisation of governance, technology and economy. There are some final, sceptical remarks on philosophy as “real politics”, and on citizenship and hope.

WITTGENSTEIN ON JUDGMENT: POLITICAL AND TEMPORAL CONCERNS

Désirée Weber

Wooster, Ohio, USA

Wittgenstein’s investigations into the role of judgment in forming meaning reveal how the process of judgment functions even in the absence of universal referents that otherwise might be thought to guarantee shared understanding. I argue that Wittgenstein’s novel position on the epistemological conditions in which meaning is established lend his insights primary political relevance: just as meaningful linguistic use is possible despite a lack of foundational referents, political judgments are made without recourse to ultimately stable grounding. Yet agreement in use and in judgments is nevertheless vital, especially to understand political judgements which are forged in a pluralistic space of contested – and thus shifting – conceptual parameters. From this starting point, I then elaborate how we can – despite conditions of uncertainty – critique political concepts and exercise political judgment in times of crisis. This new conception of judgment also makes the temporal complexity of judgments apparent.

ZIVILGESELLSCHAFT ALS MITTEL GEGEN FAKE NEWS UND HATE SPEECH: EINE UNBEGRÜNDETE HOFFNUNG

Karsten Weber

Regensburg, Deutschland

Bei genauerer Betrachtung wird der Begriff der Zivilgesellschaft unscharf, so bei der entscheidenden Frage, wer zur Zivilgesellschaft gehört. Anhand der unterschiedlichen Antworten auf diese Frage wird aufgezeigt, wie problematisch das Konzept der Zivilgesellschaft ist, da nicht davon ausgegangen werden kann, dass Mitglieder der Zivilgesellschaft moralisch besonders vorzugswürdige Akteure wären. Wenn aber schon die begrifflichen Grundlagen und die Frage nach der Zugehörigkeit zur Zivilgesellschaft Zweifel an diesem Konzept aufwerfen, wird der in öffentlichen Debatten häufig zu hörende Rekurs auf die Zivilgesellschaft als Mittel gegen Fake News und Hate Speech selbst zweifelhaft. Ein Grund für diesen Rekurs mag sein, dass das Konzept der Zivilgesellschaft Komplexitätsreduktion verspricht: Die Regelwerke der kollektiven Akteure der Zivilgesellschaft organisieren sowohl die Interaktionen in den Innenraum des kollektiven Akteurs als auch dessen Außenbeziehungen zu anderen kollektiven Akteuren. Dabei wird wohl vermutet, dass jene Regelwerke akzeptable Normen des Umgangs mit Medien und bezüglich der Inhalte und Umgangsformen vor allem in sozialen Medien beinhalten, die nicht zu Fake News, Hate Speech, Herabwürdigung und Diskriminierung führen. An Beispielen soll aufgezeigt werden, dass diese Hoffnung jedoch illusionär ist – das Konzept der Zivilgesellschaft hilft weder bei der theoretischen Fundierung noch bei der konkreten Umsetzung von Normen und/oder Maßnahmen zur Verhinderung devianten Verhaltens in Massen- und sozialen Medien.

KRITIK AN MORALISCHER KRITIK. MORALISMUS IM INTERNET

Eva Weber-Guskar

Göttingen, Deutschland

Eine moralische Gemeinschaft ist darauf angewiesen, dass ihre Mitglieder einander mit angemessenem moralischem Lob und Tadel begegnen: der Ausdruck von Wertschätzung und Kritik ist nötig, um die konstitutiven Normen der Gemeinschaft aufrechtzuerhalten. Doch diese moralische Kritik selbst kann einer Kritik unterzogen werden. In jüngerer Zeit sind in Deutschland verstärkt Vorwürfe laut geworden, es würde zu viel oder auf falsche Weise moralisch kritisiert: man würde „moralisieren“ oder „moralistisch“ argumentieren. In diesem Vortrag will ich diesen Befund mit einer anderen Thematik zusammenbringen, nämlich der relativ neuen Praxis des Online-Kommentierens. Ich gehe von empirischen Annahmen darüber aus, dass es einen gewissen Zusammenhang zwischen der Zunahme von Moralismus in der gesellschaftlichen Diskussion und der Zunahme des Gebrauchs der Online-Kommentare auf Zeitungsseiten oder sozialen Medien-Plattformen gibt. Vor diesem Hintergrund werde ich besprechen, was genau das moralische Problematische an der verfehlten Art von moralischer Kritik ist, wie sie sich in Moralismus ausdrückt, vor allem in Internet, und andeuten, ob und wenn ja, was dagegen zu unternehmen wäre.

WITTGENSTEIN ÜBER GEDANKEN UND GEHIRNPROZESSE

Christian Helmut Wenzel

Taipei, Taiwan

In den *Bemerkungen zur Philosophie der Psychologie I* 903 schreibt Wittgenstein: „Keine Annahme scheint mir natürlicher, als dass dem Assoziieren, oder Denken, kein Prozess im Gehirn zugeordnet ist.“ Aus Sicht heutiger neurowissenschaftlicher Untersuchungen scheint diese Überlegung seltsam. Im Kontext der Passage wird sie verständlicher, und Nachfolger Wittgensteins haben auch versucht sie zu untermauern. Aber ob das reicht, scheint mir fraglich.

A NOTE ON MS 174 – THE MEANING OF A REMARK IS GIVEN BY THE STREAM OF THE TEXT

Peter K. Westergaard

Copenhagen, Denmark

This paper raises the question of whether the reservations Rhees felt about the publication of *On Certainty* would also have applied with regard to *Remarks on Colour* and *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology II*. This question arises when we consider the unintended consequences of dividing up the notebook MS 174 between the publications *On Certainty*, *Culture and Value* and *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology II*. This issue is discussed in relation to the example of MS 174, 1v-2r.

KONJUNKTIV UND KRITIK. MÖGLICHKEIT UND UNMÖGLICHKEIT BEI WITTGENSTEIN UND MUSIL

Pascal Zambito

Cambridge, United Kingdom

Ein Gemeinplatz beim Nachdenken über Krise und Kritik ist der Verweis auf die Wortherkunft der miteinander verwandten Begriffe: beide gehen zurück auf das griechische Wortfeld für Entscheidung und Unterscheidung. Unterscheiden setzt verschiedene Möglichkeiten voraus. Mein Beitrag untersucht den Umgang Wittgensteins mit Möglichkeiten und Alternativen sowohl in der *Logisch-philosophischen Abhandlung* als auch in seinen späteren Schriften. Es wird argumentiert, dass die spätere Position eine gewisse Verwandtschaft mit dem Denkansatz in

Robert Musils Roman *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften* zeigt. Beide Denker teilen eine Auffassung von Erkenntnis und Handeln, die sich der Verengung auf ein einziges Paradigma widersetzt. Den Prioritäten beider Denker gemäß soll auf die *sprachliche* Gestaltung ihrer Überlegungen zur Möglichkeit eingegangen werden, wobei die „Möglichkeitsform“ des Deutschen, der Konjunktiv, im Zentrum steht. Mit der Verschiebung vom *Konjunktivus Irrealis* der *Abhandlung* zum *Konjunktivus Potentialis* im Spätwerk wird das absolutistische Verständnis von Erkenntnis ersetzt durch ein pluralistisches, das die Bereitschaft zum Perspektivwechsel als philosophisch-dichterische Tugend sowie als ethische Aufgabe versteht.

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