

PLATONISMUS

PLATONISM

Kurzfassungen | Abstracts

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MEANING IS MORE THAN ESSENCE

Ankita

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Ludwig Wittgenstein (PI 1953) can be seen as proposing a shift from the explanatory paradigm propagated by the early analytic philosophers like Frege (1918, 1948), Russell (1910, 1912) and even himself (TLP 1922), to the paradigm of understanding. The emphasis of the former paradigm upon a universal underlying logical form, by virtue of which the words in language essentially come to have meaning, can be interpreted as upholding the idea of Platonism. The explanatory model focuses on the question 'how words acquire meaning?' while the understanding model focuses on the question 'how do we understand the meaning of words.' While the former follows the scientific method which is explanatory in nature, the latter emphasizes on how we understand (and not explain) the meaning of words in language when we use them in a context to meet a communicative need such that communication between interlocutors is successful. We can analyze this shift from essentialism in the light of Wittgenstein's discomfort with the way in which the existing traditional theories of language aim for generality and thereby consider language as an object of theorization and explanation. This paper examines how this discomfort seen in later Wittgenstein indicates a shift away from meaning Platonism.

ZU URSPRUNG UND BEDEUTUNG DES SPIELBEGRIFFS IN WITTGENSTEINS SPÄTWERK

Pavel Arazim

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Der Begriff des Sprachspiels und des Spiels im Allgemeinen im Werke Wittgensteins wurden bereits sehr viel diskutiert. Ich möchte es jedoch von einer neuer Seite beleuchten, welche meistens ignoriert wird, manchmal wird sie sogar explizit als irrelevant abgelehnt. Spielen beinhaltet in der alltäglichen Sprache häufig auch Unernst, manchmal auch das Launische oder sogar Tückische. Diese Aspekte lassen sich auch in Wittgensteins Auffassung von Sprache und in seiner philosophischer Methode beobachten und das schon in dem Vorwort zu den *Untersuchungen*. Ich unterstütze meine These, dass diese Aspekte bei einer konsequenten Interpretation nicht ignoriert werden können, durch den Hinweis auf die Erörterung des Spiels von Wittgensteins Gesprächspartner Schlick, welcher das Spiel vor allem wegen seiner Zwecklosigkeit thematisierte. Dieser Aspekt zeigt auch, wie sehr sich Wittgenstein von Pragmatikern wie Rorty unterscheidet, welche sich auf ihn doch gerne berufen. Schließlich zeige ich, wie die besprochenen Aspekte des Spielens durch die Philosophie Eugen Finks klarer gemacht werden können, dessen Philosophie viele überraschenden Gemeinsamkeiten mit Wittgenstein aufweist. Wittgensteins Abneigung gegen Theorienbildung in Philosophie wird durch die neuen Aspekte des Spieles auch neu gedeutet.

HOW TO BE AN ANTI-PLANTONIST (OR: SAVING WITTGENSTEIN'S INSIGHTS ABOUT MATHEMATICS WITHOUT MAKING HIS MISTAKES)

Mark Balaguer

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In this paper, I present what I think is the best argument for mathematical platonism, and I explain how we can sidestep this argument and avoid committing to the existence of abs-

tract objects by endorsing mathematical error theory. Mathematical error theory says that (a) the platonistic interpretation of mathematical discourse is correct (or, more precisely, our mathematical theories do purport to make claims about abstract objects), but (b) there are no such things as abstract objects, and so (c) our mathematical theories are not true. I defend this view against a number of objections by combining it with a version of fictionalism, and I argue that the resulting view – fictionalistic error theory – is not just defensible, but highly plausible. Finally, at the end of the paper, I argue that while this view enables us to preserve a number of insights that Wittgenstein had about mathematics, it also enables us to avoid two great mistakes that he made about mathematics.

WITTGENSTEIN AND DERRIDA – WHAT IS DRIVING DECONSTRUCTION?

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Wittgenstein and Derrida share a deconstructive approach insofar as both try to show that metaphysical statements depend on a rationally arbitrary curtailment of linguistic practices. Similar strategies of argumentation can be found in Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* and Derrida's *The Gift of Death*. Both philosophers furthermore see deconstruction not only as a project which frees us from metaphysical illusions but also a project which is guided by ultimate or absolute ethical values. Their underlying ethical attitudes and values, however, seem to be different. Derrida wants to give room to the various "darker" and "lighter" shades of the complex and paradox play of "Being". Wittgenstein wants to overcome "darkness" and achieve a "bright" and harmonious ethical existence. The different ethical attitudes of Derrida and Wittgenstein are in the background influencing the process of deconstruction and therefore the further question is raised how this affects the validity of Wittgenstein's and Derrida's philosophical results.

STRUCTURE, PLURALITY, AND NEGATION IN THE SOPHIST

Alexander Becker

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In a central section of the *Sophist* (251a–257a), Plato describes what a competent dialectician should be capable of doing. These tasks are embedded in an attempt to present an alternative to monistic (Parmenidean) and atomistic ontologies. I would like to show that Plato outlines here, in order to make the assumption of an irreducible plurality comprehensible, a structuralist ontology in which relations have priority over their relata. I will explore the importance of difference (i.e., what can be expressed as negation) in such a structuralist ontology and compare what emerges from Plato's *Sophist* with recent suggestions towards a non-fundamentalist structuralist ontology e.g. by Ricki Bliss and Graham Priest.

SOUL, NOT MIND. WITTGENSTEIN, WITH PLATO LURKING IN THE SHADOWS

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The paper adds some comments to the later Wittgenstein's conception of the soul. While he touches upon the issue of

the soul in connection with debates on the body and mind (inner-outer) and on behaviourism, I lean towards those who read it independently, as exploring a key concept in understanding what makes life a *human* life, i.e. one in which the dimension of *morality* features centrally. This interpretation would bring Wittgenstein close to Plato; some Wittgensteinian philosophers (such as Rhees or Gaita) offer readings of the two philosophers along analogous “ethical” lines. The distinction between the mind and the soul reveals itself clearest in the context of the difference between what is deteriorating for the mind (mental health disorders) and what is deteriorating for the soul. Disorders of the soul appear to be problems of *life*, often with moral stakes. Possible interpretations of the nature of addiction offer an example of comparison.

WITTGENSTEINS ÜBERSICHTLICHE DARSTELLUNG UND HEGELS SPEKULATIVE PHILOSOPHIE

Alexander Berg

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Warum beginnt Wittgenstein ausgerechnet im Herbsttrimester 1931 sich für die übersichtliche Darstellung zu interessieren? Und was genau versteht er unter diesem Terminus, der augenscheinlich eng verknüpft ist mit einer Wende in der Perspektive auf seine eigene Philosophie? Diese beiden Fragen werden anhand von verschiedenen, zu Teil bisher noch unveröffentlichten Quellen aus dem Studienjahr 1931–1932 untersucht und insbesondere auf den Kontakt Wittgensteins mit der spekulativen Philosophie Hegels und deren Vermittlung über die Vorlesungen C. D. Broads im selben Trimester zurückbezogen.

CHESS AS A LANGUAGE: THE RIDDLE OF TRANSLATING ‘ÜBERSICHTLICHKEIT’ IN PI §122

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Oswaldo Orozco Méndez

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Chess is a language on its own right. Wittgenstein understood and used it extensively as such. Thus, any attempt to fully grasp Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language without assuming this presupposition is incomplete. All available translations of his works from German to other languages should be thoroughly reviewed in light of this approach. For instance, for the discussion and understanding of Wittgensteinian *Übersichtlichkeit* we suggest assuming it as a general overview (“*vision general de conjunto*” in Spanish) rather than as plain overview, synoptic view, perspicuity or surveyability. There are striking differences between the Spanish, English, French, Italian and Portuguese translations of PI §122. Section 2 deals with the translations of *Übersichtlichkeit* and related terms. Section 3 offers a comparison between Wittgenstein’s *Übersichtlichkeit* and Plato’s synopsis following the account of Argentinean philosopher Roberto Rojo in (Rojo 2010). Starting from *The Republic, Laws XII* and *Phaedrus*, he identifies convergence points between Wittgensteinian *Übersicht* and Platonic synopsis. Section 4 contains our attempt to show the convenience of assuming our thesis of chess as a language in Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning in order to enhance the comprehension of the concept of *Übersichtlichkeit*. We argue that conceiving chess as a language enables an ample comprehension of concepts such as synopsis, synoptic view or synoptic representation (as *Übersicht* has been translated) from an epistemic and cognitive perspective.

The extensive, recurrent use of examples drawn from chess by Wittgenstein is a fact that tends to be either overlooked or mistaken by Wittgensteinian scholars that lack the knowledge of the game. The study of the endgame during the training of a novice/intermediate player in the fundamentals of the game – for instance, the theme of the opposition – is an attempt to provide the apprentice with something he lacks firsthand: an *Übersicht*, a general overview of the game – the knowledge of the horizon the game is eventually advancing towards. The result is the understanding of the grammar of chess, which allows for a criterion to decide how and when to apply rules of strategy and to integrate them with tactics.

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEINS VERWENDUNG DER MUSIKNOTATION IN MS 154, MS 156B UND MS 157A. EIN INTERPRETATIONSVORSCHLAG

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Bisher galt die Musikskizze aus dem Manuskript 154 als Wittgensteins einzig erhaltene Musiknotation, wobei es weitere Musiknotationen gibt: In MS 154, MS 156b und MS 157a notierte Wittgenstein insgesamt sechs kurze Musikskizzen, die kompositorisch unbedeutend erscheinen, in Verbindung mit seinen (musik-)ästhetischen Bemerkungen jedoch untersuchenswert sind. Eine Kontextualisierung dieser Musikskizzen mit Wittgensteins Bemerkungen über die Musik legt ein vertieftes Verständnis nahe: Wittgenstein verwendet die Musiknotation in seinen Manuskripten, um Bemerkungen zur Musikästhetik (Dur-Moll Harmonik, Kirchentönen, Anton Bruckner) ebenso wie sprachlogische Konzepte (Variation und Wiederholung, Aspektsehen als Aspekthören) außersprachlich zu illustrieren. Die Analyse zeigt somit auch Wittgensteins Reflexionen über die Grenzen des Sagbaren.

WITTGENSTEIN AND PLATO ON HAPPINESS

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In this paper a comparative analysis is made between Wittgenstein’s and Plato’s conceptions of happiness. We believe that a comparison of the similarities and differences in the ideas of both philosophers regarding good life and happiness can have a great hermeneutical potential in clarifying this aspect of their thought, as well as the ultimate meaning of their philosophies

WITTGENSTEIN AND FREGE’S “DER GEDANKE”: FIGURING THE RESENTMENT

Dušan Dožudić

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In this paper, I propose an explanation of Wittgenstein’s animated resentment towards Frege’s essay “*Der Gedanke*” as reflected in their correspondence. The natural explanation of Wittgenstein’s resentment reflected in Frege’s letter goes by appealing to the content of “*Der Gedanke*” – most notably Frege’s criticism of and Wittgenstein’s sympathy for idealism. I place their correspondence into a broader context and argue that an alternative explanation is possible, and that the resentment reflected in the letter should not be treated as something primarily

caused by something in the content of “Der Gedanke” but rather by Frege’s criticism of the *Tractatus* in his earlier letters.

WITTGENSTEIN’S EARLY WORK AS A PRECURSOR: CELLULAR INFORMATION AS THE CLUE TO OUR HUMAN WAY OF LIFE

Susan Edwards-McKie
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The heady period of the development of mathematics and physics at the turn of the 20th century and during the stretch of human expansion that also produced the difficulties of WWI and WW2, gave the world radically different theories of how mathematics works and how physics works. For example, one striking diversity appeared at the Second Conference of the Epistemology of the Exact Sciences, held at Königsberg in 1930 and jointly sponsored by the Vienna Circle and Berlin Circle, with the important papers of Gödel, Hilbert, Heyting and Waismann’s presentation “The Nature of Mathematics: Wittgenstein’s Standpoint”. This early work allowed Wittgenstein a developing mathematics which distinguished between set theoretic totalities and Wittgensteinian systems. Elsewhere I have argued for a systems approach to Wittgenstein’s philosophy. A similar congress in Copenhagen in 1936 focussed on causality and quantum physics with Bohr, Heisenberg and Dirac. In Cambridge, the intellectual developments of Russell, Turing and Ramsey were challenged by Keynes, Hodgkin and Huxley. I present work which shows that Wittgenstein respected uncertainty and non-linearity as crucial essentials of human ways of life.

VARIATIONS OF INTUITIONISTIC REVISIONISM

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I survey different versions of the argument against applying the law of the excluded middle to infinite domains. Customarily taken as the intuitionistic criticism, there are in fact many distinct versions of the argument given by different proponents of the issue, such as Michael Dummett, Hermann Weyl (by an argument shared with Wittgenstein), and Erett Bishop. As part of comparing their respective merits, I ask how they manage to justify the principle of induction.

FOCUS EFFECTS IN NUMBER SENTENCES REVISITED

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For thousands of years philosophers have discussed whether numbers exist. But, surprisingly, there are easy arguments from commonly accepted truths that seem to decide the question. For instance, it is commonly accepted that “Obama has two hands” is true. If so, then “The number of Obama’s hands is two” is true as well. The latter sentence is an identity sentence that can only be true if numbers exist. Hence, numbers exist! – If such arguments were convincing, disputes about the existence of numbers could be decided simply by pointing to Obama’s hands! However, some authors have argued that easy arguments rely on a mistaken assumption: that the pertinent number sentences are identity sentences. A particular line of such an argument relies on the observation that they exhibit focus effects. This, so the argument goes, shows that they are

specificational sentences rather than identity sentences. In my talk I will defend this line of argument against a recent objection.

SYMBOLIC COMMUNICATION, TRANSLATABILITY, AND EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES

August Fenk
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Plato’s *Cratylus*-dialogue examines whether names are “natural” or just a matter of “convention and habit” (Plato 1961). Saussure’s doctrine of a principally arbitrary sound-meaning relation in the linguistic sign is in line with the second position. That doctrine is, however, confronted with the universal phenomenon of sound-symbolism and cross-modal correspondences (Spence 2011). Further results of our conceptual analysis: (i) The concepts of convention and habit admit, as already indicated in Peirce’s definition of symbol (Peirce 1906: 495), natural origins and “natural dispositions”. Which holds all the more for the development of viable concepts. (ii) Today’s common concept of symbol as arbitrary sign appears as an amalgamation of Peirce (words are symbols) and Saussure (words are arbitrary signs). Note: Neither in Peirce nor in Saussure is arbitrariness a condition of symbol. – This amalgamation causes complications in the theory of language and language evolution (cf. Scott-Phillips 2015) which can be avoided if we view the word, and the symbol in general, as the sign that represents concepts and positions. This concept may, moreover, explain why only symbolic expressions are translatable. They can be – “arbitrarily” – translated into other expressions of the same language (Peirce 1905) or another language, or even into another code and sense modality, as in spoken versus signed language, whose modes nonetheless realize iconicity in system-specific ways. The impact of this kind of flexibility on the evolution of language and further complex symbol systems, such as “picture language” (graphs, diagrams) and formal language, will be discussed.

WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENT

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Natal, Brazil

In what follows, I will present a strong but plausible interpretation of Wittgenstein’s private language argument, followed by a counter-argument exposing its Achilles heel. The advantage of my counter-argument is that it refutes the most radical conclusions of the private language argument, like the denial of subjectivity or the impossibility of induction by analogy regarding other minds.

WITTGENSTEIN ÜBER FARBEN. UNTERSUCHUNG VON GOETHE’S EINFLÜSSEN

Lilli Förster
State Academy of Fine Arts Stuttgart, Germany

Johann Wolfgang von Goethe wird von manchen Autor:innen als Vorbild für Ludwig Wittgensteins Manuskriptedition *Bemerkungen über Farben* gehandelt, da diese in ihrer Entstehungsgeschichte auf Goethe zurückzuführen seien. Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es nun ausgewählte Themenkomplexe durch Witt-

gensteins Farbbemerkungen hindurch zusammenzutragen und diese in Bezug zu Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, sowie anderen Denkern (Runge, Lichtenberg) zu setzen. Es soll demnach untersucht werden, ob Einflüsse Goethes in Wittgenstein methodologisch oder auch inhaltlich zu finden sind.

Genauer betrachtet werden dazu die Farben Weiß, mit der Besonderheit des transparenten Weiß und Grün mit dem Sonderfall des rötlich Grünen. Herausgestellt werden kann, dass Goethes Einfluss auf Wittgenstein nicht überbewertet werden sollte und kaum über die Rolle eines Impulsgebers hinaus reicht. Wittgenstein stellt nicht wie Goethe eine Farblehre oder Theorie der Farben auf, sondern spricht sich klar für eine Grammatik der Farben aus.

A NOTE ON CONSISTENCY AND PLATONISM

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Is consistency the sort of thing that could provide a guide to mathematical ontology? If so, which notion of consistency suits this purpose? Mark Balaguer holds such a view in the context of platonism, the view that mathematical objects are non-causal, non-spatiotemporal, and non-mental. For the purposes of this paper, we will examine several notions of consistency with respect to how they can provide a platonist epistemology of mathematics. Only a Gödelian notion, we suggest, can provide a satisfactory guide to a platonist ontology.

LOGIC – GRAMMAR – LOGIC

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University of Pardubice, Czech Republic

It is quite clear that Wittgenstein's thinking underwent a subtle and complicated change from the writing of his *Tractatus* where logic clearly takes center stage, to the period between *Philosophical Grammar* and the *Philosophical Investigations* where logic appears to have been forced to leave room for the more multifaceted and varying concept of grammar. But as we get to the latest period of Wittgenstein's writing, as seen for example in the remarks selected to be called *On Certainty*, the notion of grammar has more or less vanished, whereas the concept of logic again takes on a central, yet complicated role. In this paper, I will explore why logic resurfaces and in what shape it does so; and ask why logic is now apparently used in a broader and more inclusive way than Wittgenstein "allowed for" earlier.

WELCHE GRÜNDE GIBT ES, UNIVERSALIEN ANZUNEHMEN?

Volker Gadenne

Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria

Die Annahme, dass es Universalien gibt, trägt der Tatsache Rechnung, dass Einzeldinge einander gleichen können. Ein Problem des Universalienrealismus besteht allerdings darin, dass sich Prädikate bilden lassen, die jeweils auf mehrere Dinge zutreffen, es jedoch zweifelhaft erscheint, dass es entsprechende Universalien gibt. Eine mögliche Lösung bieten naturalistische Ansätze. Danach sollen solche Eigenschaften als Universalien aufgefasst werden, die dem Bereich der Physik angehören und von gut bestätigten Theorien postuliert werden. Naturalistische Ansätze können jedoch die Ausgangsfrage allein nicht zufriedenstellend beantworten, da es auch Universalien zu geben scheint, die nicht aus dem Bereich der Physik stammen,

sondern sich z.B. in Verbindung mit intentionalen Zuständen oder mit Qualia finden.

SOCRATES' DREAM, LOGOS, AND ELEMENTS IN *THEAETETUS*

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In *Theaetetus*, Plato discusses the theory of Socrates' dream, in which knowledge is defined as true judgement with an account (*logos*) and elements are claimed to be both unaccountable and unknowable. Fine (1979) in "Knowledge and *Logos* in the *Theaetetus*" introduces two ways in which the meaning of *logos* can be understood, namely, the *logos_s* and the *logos_k* interpretations. According to Fine, something is knowable in the sense of *logos_s* if there is a true statement of it and is knowable in the sense of *logos_k* if it is analyzable completely into its constituting parts. This paper compares these two understandings of *logos* and argues that if we take a Tractarian view of the relationship between complexes and elements, then the ideas of *logos_s* and *logos_k* could be combined and give a more coherent interpretation of the theory in Socrates' dream. It will also be argued that in this model, the alphabetic letters should not be taken as genuine primary elements.

PLATONISM VS. NATURALISM

Lloyd P. Gerson

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Plato's systematic philosophy is constructed in response to those doctrines of his predecessors that he decisively rejected. I call this via negativa Ur-Platonism and it includes Plato's anti-nominalism, anti-materialism, anti-mechanism, anti-scepticism, and anti-relativism. Together the philosophical positions that he rejects were in antiquity and are now the lineaments of naturalism. The "positive" side of Plato's systematic philosophy rests upon his postulation of an unhypothetical first principle of all, variously called the Good or the One. In this paper, I will explore some of the connections between the elements of Plato's anti-naturalism along with some of their resonances in contemporary debates.

TOWARD THE 'OVERTHROW OF PLATONISM': PROCESSIST CRITICAL SOCIAL ONTOLOGY AND AMELIORATIVE DISCOURSE

Paul Giladi

Manchester Metropolitan University, United Kingdom

In this paper, I argue it is not sufficient to carve gender groups at their joints. One must also have in view whether the metaphysical categories we use to make sense of gender identity are prone to ideological distortion and vitiation. The norms underpinning gender identity attributions, I contend, reveal the metaphysics of gender identity as processist. I argue that the processist idea that gender identities are formed, moulded, and developed means our traditional social ontological vocabulary rests on a mistake. The advantages of a processist critical social ontology of gender are that process-discourse recognises how gender is often messy and therefore requires a radically different conceptual scheme, namely one that can transform vocabulary for the emancipatory purpose of ending oppression and marginalisation. I contend that our best social ontologies are going to be critical ones which are particularly

proficient at ameliorative metaphysical discourse enabling more democratic forms of association.

THE SIMILARITY BETWEEN PLATO'S AND WITTGENSTEIN'S NOTION OF THE ABSOLUTE, WHICH IS ATTAINED THROUGH THE COMMONPLACE

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Referring to the pursuit of intelligible values through the commonplace is a possibility in Plato and Wittgenstein. The main difference in viewpoint is that for Wittgenstein what really is cannot be indistinguishable from its meaning. This relationship between meaning and reality is no longer necessary, as it is for Plato. But the same relationship does not presuppose, for Wittgenstein, that what really is depends for its meaning on human mind. The true objects of knowledge will always remain outside our conceptual range. However, it is in the context of our social contacts, Wittgenstein avers, that language does provide a unifying factor beyond the diversity of views concerning what cannot be said about the unknown. Hence, our knowledge of what really exists in the realm of the intelligible has a vital relevance to our dealings with the everyday world, according to Plato.

BEING IN PLATO'S *SOPHIST*

Mary-Louise Gill

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Midway through the *Sophist*, Plato's Eleatic Stranger says that, whereas the sophist hides in the darkness of not-being and is hard to see because of the darkness, the philosopher spends time with the form of being and is hard to see because of the brightness of the place (*Sph.* 254a4–b1). Earlier he said that, because being and not-being have proved equally puzzling, clarity about one may also reveal the other. The dialogue analyzes not-being as difference and resolves puzzles about negation, falsehood, and the sophist, but being gets no comparable treatment. Even so, the Stranger provocatively says that, whereas being operates both itself by itself (*auto kath' hauto*) and in relation to other things (*pros alla*), difference operates in only the second way. Being is thus a richer notion than not-being. How should we answer the vexed questions about being *pros alla* and being *auto kath' hauto* in the *Sophist*?

IDEAS, CONCEPTS, AND NORMS: THEMES FROM PLATO AND WITTGENSTEIN

Hans-Johann Glock

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Wittgenstein is often regarded as an antipode to Plato, both on account of his hostility to the Socratic quest for definitions and on account of his repudiation of mind-body dualisms. At the same time some commentators (Stegmüller, Rorty) have recognized that in terms of intellectual temperament and style Wittgenstein is much closer to Plato than to Aristotle. Going beyond this general observation I detect a specific topic on which there are both intriguing affinities and important differences between the two. Plato's notion of an idea encapsulates both what we would nowadays call the concept of a concept and what we would regard as a standard. Keeping this association in mind sheds light on the ideas of rules and rule-following that play such an important role in Wittgenstein's later work. Starting out from this observation,

the main trajectory of my presentation is substantive rather than exegetical or comparative. My aim is to elucidate the normative dimension of concepts and conceptual thought. The key to my approach is that there is a minimalist yet general notion of a norm as a standard against which something can be assessed. This basic notion can take on various forms, depending on the objects and parameters of assessment – as being of a certain kind (classificatory normativity), good or bad (evaluative normativity), prescribed or prohibited (deontic normativity). The difference between classificatory and deontic normativity is then exploited in order to resolve what I call the 'paradox of conceptual judgement'. The application of concepts is subject to standards of correctness, yet without being subject to the will.

ON THE PRIVACY OF COMPLEX THOUGHT AND ITS PUBLICATION

Sebastian Sunday Grève

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Following Plato and Wittgenstein, I shall develop an argument according to which philosophical writing cannot achieve its purpose. I shall explain the challenge that this argument poses, and I shall outline some practical implications with illustrations from both Plato's and Wittgenstein's philosophical writings. Along the way, I shall argue that there is a conception of private language to be found amongst Wittgenstein's remarks, which was previously noted by Frege, that provides an interesting sense in which private language exists.

A STRUGGLE AGAINST BEWITCHMENT: WITTGENSTEIN ON METAPHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICAL PLATONISM

Jan Gronwald

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In this paper I ask about Wittgenstein's view on importance of character in contriving a philosopher. This question has much to do with Platonism, as Wittgenstein believed that there are certain pre-philosophical attitudes standing behind various positions, and since the one behind Platonism stands out exceptionally, he used Platonism as an example of an insincere position. I focus on a non-theoretical aspect of the stance claiming that there are abstract entities. I juxtapose it with Wittgenstein's criticism of Platonic thinking from *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* and Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics, where Wittgenstein did not give a theoretical argumentation, but strove towards showing the menace of dishonesty behind the view. I conclude that philosophy is construed here as a process of working on oneself, and on arbitrariness of one's philosophical propensities. According to Wittgenstein, a true philosopher has specific virtues of character, not mere intellectual excellenc.

FAMILY RESEMBLANCE AND CONTEXT

Paul Hasselkuß

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When Wittgenstein introduces the notion of family resemblance in the PI, he claims that family expressions like 'games' are applied to things in a very particular way. Speakers do not point to some characteristics found in all games,

but, instead, call a thing 'game' because it shares some characteristics with some other things already called 'game'. Contextualists like Charles Travis argue that this supports a contextual theory of meaning. According to Travis, when speakers point to different characteristics for calling something 'game', the meaning of 'game' varies in relation to the context it is used in (in relation to the different criteria used in different contexts). I argue against this interpretation. To do so, I introduce a distinction between the static meaning of a family expression at a fixed point in time and the dynamic extension of its meaning over time. The context of utterance is only relevant for the latter and not, like Travis needs to claim, for the former.

WITTGENSTEIN ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ASSERTORIC FORCE AND PROPOSITIONAL CONTENT

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It is common to distinguish between two components of an assertion: propositional content and assertoric force. One of the main arguments for such a distinction is related to the Frege Point. In the first section of this paper, I will illustrate this point and the corresponding Fregean model of judgment and assertion. I will show that it raises a serious philosophical challenge, which I call the Frege-Geach Challenge, to explain how the same content can appear in discourse now asserted, now unasserted. The distinction of force and content is a straightforward answer to this challenge and many philosophers take it to follow immediately from the Frege Point. Wittgenstein rejects the force-content distinction. In the second section, I will outline his linguistic argument against such a distinction from §22 of the *Philosophical Investigations*. This raises the question concerning how Wittgenstein is able to answer the Frege-Geach Challenge. In the third section, I will show that an answer to this question can be found in the course of Wittgenstein's reflections on Moore's paradox.

ARTIKULIERT' AND 'GEGLIEDERT' IN THE TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS

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In his Letters to C. K. Ogden concerning the English translation of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein suggests that 'artikuliert' (TLP 3.141, 3.251) and 'gegliedert' (TLP 4.032) should be translated as 'articulate' and 'articulated' respectively. He seems, nevertheless, willing to accept a translation that renders this distinction opaque if his suggestion is not viable in English (CCO 1971: 24, 27). This indicates that Wittgenstein considered this distinction relevant and yet did not believe that failing to grasp it would impair the understanding of the book. In this paper, I will provide an account of the distinction between 'artikuliert' and 'gegliedert' that explains Wittgenstein's (ambivalent) remarks. Appealing to how these terms are used in the *Notebooks 1914–1916*, I will argue that 'gegliedert' applies to any sign insofar as it can be a picture of a situation, whereas 'artikuliert' applies specifically to propositions, insofar as they conform to the Principle of Compositionality. According to this account, in order to characterize propositions as gegliedert, one must first endorse the claim that propositions are pictures of reality, which only happens in TLP 4.01. Thus, although subtle in light of the whole book, this distinction ensures the coherence of Wittgenstein's presentation.

WAS WITTGENSTEIN A FIDEIST? A READING OF THOMAS D. CARROLL'S WORK

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In this paper, I will present Thomas D. Carroll's view on the question of fideism in *Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion*. In his 2014 book *Wittgenstein within the Philosophy of Religion*, Carroll presents us with an analysis of the manifold questions regarding Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion within the literature of the field. One of his main concerns is the concept of fideism, and the association many philosophers make with Wittgenstein. For Carroll, a philosophical housekeeping is needed in order to clarify the confusions related to the meaning of that term. He proposes a contextual and hermeneutical reading of fideism: through a conceptual, context-oriented, historically sensitive, clarification it is possible to understand the true usefulness of the term in a philosophical investigation of Wittgenstein.

THE SPECIAL QUESTION "WHY?"

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I shall discuss the relationship between acting intentionally and acting for a reason, and Elizabeth Anscombe's conception of this relationship in her book *Intention*.

UNITY THROUGH HIERARCHY. ON THE SEARCH FOR AUTHENTIC POLITICAL PLATONISM

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It is well known that for Plato, the model of the best constitution takes the form of a social hierarchy. Hierarchy is introduced as a means of solving what he considers to be the most serious political problems of his day: extreme individualism and the resulting societal pluralism. These problems can be avoided precisely by forming society hierarchically, because – and this is the key Platonic assumption – hierarchy is a true representative of unity. And to form plurality into unity means to make the community good. The underlying connection between unity and hierarchy which on our view is the blueprint of authentic political Platonism, is, however, something that the modern reader does not seem to find much understanding for. In our paper, we are not going to criticize the modern view, but rather hermeneutically focus on how modern preconceptions can retroactively affect the interpretation of Plato. At the end, we hope to be able to demonstrate the systematic relevance of social hierarchies for politics of any time.

ÜBER MICH UND ÜBER DIR – DAS ÜBER-ICH ALS BEISPIEL ZWISCHEN PSYCHO- UND SPRACHANALYSE

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In Wittgensteins Beschäftigung mit der Psychoanalyse finden sich Ablehnung und Anerkennung nebeneinander. Sein Gebrauch einzelner psychoanalytischer Ausdrücke wird zum

Anlass genommen, um Missverständnisse wie Verständigungsmöglichkeiten Wittgensteins mit der Psychoanalyse Freuds darzustellen. Eine getrennte Betrachtung von Methode und Forschungsgegenstand erweist sich dabei psychosprachanalytisch als nicht haltbar.

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN UND FRÉDÉRIC CHOPIN

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This contribution deals with an interdisciplinary Ludwig Wittgenstein research. Musical aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy are discussed in comparison with Frédéric Chopin. In Wittgenstein's Nachlass there are not many references to Chopin. There is one in Wittgenstein's handwriting, in MS 134, and the same is in TS 229, TS 245 and TS 233. It is the composer Josef Labor, who influenced Wittgenstein's relation to Chopin. – "Könnte man sich nicht denken, daß Einer der Musik nie gekannt hat & zu uns kommt & jemand einen nachdenklichen Chopin spielen hört, daß der überzeugt wäre, dies sei eine Sprache & man wolle ihm nur den Sinn geheimhalten." (MS 134, 39v, 29.3.1947)

WITTGENSTEIN AND THE SOCRATIC DIALOGUES. REMARKS ON PLATO'S *PROTAGORAS* AND THE WITTGENSTEINIAN THERAPEUTIC FUNCTION OF A CRITIQUE OF LANGUAGE

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Ludwig Wittgenstein, in *Culture and Value*, considered the Socratic dialogues of Plato a "waste of time". However, a close interpretation of an early dialogue of Plato's as, for example, the *Protagoras*, will exhibit striking parallels between the ancient thinker and Wittgenstein. Socrates and Protagoras are discussing the question of whether there is only a unique virtue or a pluralism of virtues. Protagoras: There are many virtues, each and every of them of an individual nature. Socrates: There is a unitary nature of virtue. For Protagoras, the individual virtues are related to one another as the features of a human face to the face itself or its overall contour (*Protagoras*, 329d ff.). With Wittgenstein, one could say that a picture held him captive.

MORAL AND RELIGIOUS GRAMMAR

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Wittgenstein considered both ethical and religious statements nonsensical. While this has been taken to imply the impossibility of their philosophical study, I will argue that his later conception of grammar allows for such studies as grammatical remarks on moral and religious practice. I will first consider an apparent tension between Wittgenstein's thoughts on grammar and ethics, brought out in recent years by a debate between Anne-Marie Christensen and Edmund Dain. I will then argue that, though the topic of ethics was seldom mentioned by Wittgenstein in his later career, his remarks on religion point to the viability of the grammatical study thereof, regardless of any changes to his views on value since the *Tractatus*. I will close by connecting these remarks to later developments in Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion, particu-

larly in the works of D. Z. Phillips, showing how such studies are independent of considerations of propositional sense or the delimitation of their areas.

PLATONISM OF NATURE AND COSMOS: WAS KEPLER A PLATONIST OR RATHER A PYTHAGOREAN?

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I present Platonic views of nature and the cosmos as expressed in the *Timaeus*, concentrating on elements or themes which, it appears, can also be found in views of Johannes Kepler: the use of regular polyhedra, the belief in a well-ordering divine agent, the conviction of an intimate relation between astronomy and harmonics. I discuss Kepler's polyhedra-model and questions of the number and distances of the planets, which were not only touched on by Plato, but also treated by the Pythagoreans. I comment on the topic of the *Music of the Spheres* (1619), where Kepler was closer to the numerical speculations of the Pythagoreans than to Plato. I add a recent view about the mathematical nature of reality. I conclude that Kepler, while indeed following up on general concerns of the ancient philosophers, cannot be considered anything like a full-fledged Platonist or Pythagorean, if only because he definitely abolished the distinction between celestial and terrestrial motion, between celestial and terrestrial physics.

THE FLY-BOTTLE AND THE CAVE

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Wittgenstein's aphorism about the fly-bottle (PI §309), and Plato's parable of the cave (Rep. VII 514a–521a) provide two of the most memorable images in the history of Western philosophy. In addition to their use in making philosophical points, they do so in a literary fashion through this imagery. In this paper I examine and compare how this literary feature functions in their two philosophies. Then I consider both the positive and less-explored negative aspects of these images. It turns out that both Plato and Wittgenstein are engaged in that "ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy" (Rep. 607b).

WONDER IN ANCIENT GREEK EPIC POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY, AND IN WITTGENSTEIN, DANTE AND GIOTTO

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In this essay, Ilsa Somavilla's insights of "Thaumazein in Ancient Greek Philosophy and Wonder in the Writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein" (2005) are starting points for addressing the problem: "People nowadays think, scientists are there to instruct them, poets, musicians etc. to entertain them. That the latter have something to teach them; that never occurs to them." (CV 1998: 42). We engage the problem by exploring features of 'wonder' Wittgenstein shares with 'visible speech' in Dante Alighieri's (1265–1321) *Divine Comedy* and Giotto di Bondone's (1267–1337) Scrovegni Chapel murals.

EINE KRIPKENSTEIN'SCHE AUFFASSUNG UNSERER REDE ÜBER NATÜRLICHE ARTEN

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Im Zentrum desjenigen Bildes von Sprache, welches Ludwig Wittgenstein in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* zeichnet, steht die Einsicht, dass die Gegenstände unserer Rede wesentlich durch unsere Methoden ihrer Identifikation bestimmt sind. Demjenigen Bild zufolge, welches Saul Kripke in *Naming and Necessity* von insbesondere unserer Rede über natürliche Arten zeichnet, bestimmen dagegen umgekehrt die Gegenstände unserer Rede die Methoden ihrer Identifikation. Im Hintergrund von Kripkes Bild steht die Beobachtung, dass wir unsere Methoden der Identifikation von natürlichen Arten stetig verbessern, ohne jedoch, dass dabei unsere entsprechenden Ausdrücke ihre Gegenstände ändern. Vielmehr ist der Prozess der Verfeinerung unserer Methoden der Identifikation natürlicher Arten von der Untersuchung der Natur der dabei konstanten Gegenstände unserer Ausdrücke für sie geleitet. Ich versuche, diese Beobachtung in Wittgensteins Bild von Sprache einzupassen, indem ich in Auseinandersetzung mit Oswald Hanflings Kritik an Kripke eine Auffassung der Art unserer Verwendung von Ausdrücken für natürliche Arten skizziere, der zufolge die Verbesserung der Methoden der Identifikation ihrer Gegenstände erster Stufe durch konstante Methoden ihrer Identifikation zweiter Stufe geleitet ist.

ÜBER ZERLUMPTTE BEGRIFFE (VGL. Z 111) UND EIN „LEBEN [...], WORIN FÜR HOFFNUNG PLATZ IST“ (Z 469). EINE FRAGMENTARISCHE BESTANDSAUFNAHME VON LUDWIG WITTGENSTEINS ZETTEL (TS 233a, b)

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Der Name „Zettel“ steht für ein Typoskript, in dem sich ca. 170 von Wittgenstein in einer Zettelbox gesammelte und hernach von Peter Geach in zwei Kontorbücher eingeklebte Textfragmente aus insgesamt acht Typoskripten (TSS 208, 210, 211, 220, 228, 229, 232, 242) aus einem Zeitraum von ca. 18 Jahren (1929 bis 1947/48) befinden. Während aufgrund dieser Zusammenstellung des Textes in Frage steht, ob es sich hier überhaupt um ein Werk Wittgensteins handelt, besteht über den philosophischen Wert der über 700 Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie, die sich auf den Fragmenten befinden, kaum ein Zweifel. Thematisiert wird hier unter anderem der Gebrauch von „meinen“, „verstehen“, „beabsichtigen“, „hoffen“, „denken“, „Schmerzen haben“ und die Verwendung von Farbbegriffen. Insbesondere erwähnt Wittgenstein dabei deren ‚uneinheitliche‘ Regelung in Verbindung mit der „Innen-Außen-Problematik“. Vervollständigt wird diese bunte grammatische Palette mit Bemerkungen über die Entstehung von Sprachspielen, die Unabhängigkeit ihrer Grammatik und über Bedingungen, die Wittgenstein für notwendig erachtet, diese sinnvoll zu spielen. Unser Begriff des Wissens spielt dabei ebenso eine Rolle wie der von „Naturtatsachen“ (Z 374). – In diesem Beitrag soll die Entstehung und der Inhalt dieses TS, dem v. Wright die Nummer 233 (a, b) gab, thematisiert und gewürdigt werden. In Frage steht damit auch, inwieweit dieses von Wittgenstein nicht autorisierte TS 233a, b als eine vollständige Zusammenfassung seiner (sog.) Spätphilosophie angesehen werden kann, und was das für die Einordnung dieses Typoskripts mit Bezug auf den I. und II. Teil seiner PU und auf die Manuskripte bedeutet, die als ÜG und BÜF veröffentlicht wurden.

COLLINGWOOD, WINCH AND WITTGENSTEIN ON THE STATUS OF LOGIC

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This paper compares R. G. Collingwood and Peter Winch, with Wittgenstein as an important background figure. Their shared philosophical concerns were (1) resistance to ontology, especially metaphysical realism, in favour of a view on philosophy as cultural self-understanding; and (2) critique of the idea of logic as a formal science, labelled “Aristotelian Logic”. Instead, they advanced a conception of logic as the contextually sensitive analysis of actual reasoning. The connection between these two concerns was particularly explicit in Collingwood’s work. We bring out the connection via their reactions to Moore’s “Proof of an External World”. The meaning of what Moore says is indeterminate, because he has not specified the doubt to which his “Proof” is an answer. We see the logical status of a statement when we understand how it constitutes an answer to a question that has arisen. As Collingwood would put it, the logical analysis of a concrete piece of reasoning is an ‘historical’ exercise.

NAMING THE NAMELESS: APOLLODORUS’ SYMPOSIUM AND DIOTIMA’S PSEUDONYM

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In line with Andrea Nye’s argument that the true host of the *Symposium* is not Agathon but Diotima, the following will emphasize the power of the “unnamed” or nameless in the dialogue, e.g. Apollodorus’ companions, the slaves, the flute girl and the “women within.” Moreover, due to Apollodorus’ own sophisticated but clever way of playing with names, it is also the contention of this paper that the disciple of Socrates jeers at the pompous attendants of the drinking party, e.g. Agathon, Aristophanes, Eryximachus, Pausanias and Phaedrus and, in so doing, reveals the mystery of “Who is Diotima?” In other words, this essay (hubristically!) contends that via concentrating on Apollodorus’ narration and his unique way with words – his way of naming the nameless – that the true historical identity of Diotima and her corresponding unnamed cult can be named. It will be argued that far from being a mere parrot who fails to truly lead the philosophical life as modeled by Socrates, Apollodorus has taken the philosopher’s arguments to heart, advancing a playful but serious style that both reveals and conceals the mysteries of what it means to be an erotic lover of the Beautiful and Good, a lesson Socrates learned from a particularly powerful and noble woman.

VISIONS OF THE IDEAL CITY: PLATO, KARL POPPER AND LEO STRAUSS

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Plato imagined two ideal cities in his dialogues: Kallipolis in the *Republic* and Magnesia in the *Laws*, his last work. Although many differences may be detected, these regimes offer examples of practical application of the philosopher’s political theories. For Plato, the most wise and morally best citizens should rule the state (“timocracy”), according to reason and aiming at the unity of all the members of the society, who should cooperate harmoniously to create and maintain a just and stable

welfare for all. Since Antiquity many authors commented in one way or another these positions. In the 20th century, two important philosophers analyzed in a completely opposite way Plato's political vision. Karl Popper saw there one of the earliest expressions of a totalitarian, closed society, to be condemned unconditionally by all democrats. On the contrary, Leo Strauss detected in Plato's works a rational exploration of universal political and moral questions that should be taken seriously under consideration, as a source of inspiration for the modern democracies. In my paper, I shall give a brief critical presentation of Plato's ideal cities, as well as of their modern interpretations, trying to see if and to which extent we may still find these positions of some actuality for the political life of the 21st century.

IMAGINATION IN WITTGENSTEIN'S WRITINGS

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The concept of imagination has become central in twenty-first century cognitive linguistics (Johnson 1993, 2014, 2018). Johnson extends the concept of imagination, yet it is still a challenge to identify concrete characteristics that would allow to understand the difference between imagining and other cognitive functions. Though Lakoff and Johnson (1999) relied on Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance in their attempt to understand how metaphors function within the process of meaning construction, they did not make the connection between the concept of imagination as it appears in Wittgenstein's writings and the way that people construct metaphor. This paper addresses this lacuna by assessing the development of Wittgenstein's writings on the concept of imagination, to clarify two additional important contributions that he made to the debate about imagination in the twenty-first century: the activity of imagination as an intermediate link and as an expression of free will.

SEEING-AS AND THE NECKER CUBE IN WITTGENSTEIN'S *TRACTATUS*

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Though Wittgenstein devoted himself to aspect perception in the second part of *Philosophical Investigations*, and other post-*Investigations* writings, his attention to seeing-as runs through his whole philosophical development. In the *Tractatus*, a solution to perceiving complex picture (taking the Necker cube as instance) is brought up, by attributing this perception to seeing two or several different facts. The analysis of the Necker cube among scholars are primarily concerned with its reflection on perception, judgement, then suggest what Wittgenstein fails to recognize regarding seeing-as in the *Tractatus*. However, in this paper, I argue that the conception of projection, implicit in his analysis of the Necker cube, offers a nice bridge between the *Tractatus* and Wittgenstein's later writings about aspect perception. In doing this, I will first discuss the case of the Necker cube, and then introduce "projection" followed from the distinction between fact and state-of-things, finally elucidate that "projection" is actually still implicit in aspect perception in his later times.

TOWARD A WITTGENSTEINIAN COGNITIVISM

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With its picture theory of meaning, Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* provides an early articulation of truth-conditional semantics. Partly under the influence of Noam Chomsky, in turn partly under the influence of later Wittgenstein, Paul Pietroski argues that we ought to abandon truth-conditional semantics. On Pietroski's alternative, sentence meanings are not truth-conditions. Instead, sentence meanings are instructions for composing concepts in a (Fodorian) language of thought. At first blush, this cognitivist approach to semantics looks like a significant departure from the Tractarian line of thought. But Pietroski allows that (at least certain stretches of) this language of thought (*Mentalese*) comprising the concepts composed in executing the instructions that meanings are may have a truth-conditional semantics; and implicit in the *Tractatus*, I argue, are the outlines of a cognitivist account of propositionally-articulated thought agreeing in all essential respects with Pietroski's full account—provided that a *Mentalese* sentence composed by executing the meaning of a natural language sentence and that natural language sentence share a logical form. Drawing on Chomsky's competence/performance distinction, and recognizing that what is provided in the *Tractatus* is not a performance model but the outlines of a competence model, we arrive at a form of psychologism, but not one that gets us "entangled in unessential psychological investigations".

ABSTRACTION AND GROUNDING

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Are there "thin objects" whose existence does not make any substantial demand on the world? In my *Thin Objects* (OUP 2018) I defend an affirmative answer based on a Fregean form of abstraction. This talk attempts to connect two central aspects of the resulting view with the notion of metaphysical grounding. First, every truth about some thin objects is grounded in a truth that does not involve these objects. Second, the notorious "bad company problem" for abstractionism can be solved by insisting that every truth about the desired abstracta be grounded in a truth that is solely about a prior and independently available ontology.

THINKING AND BEING ARE NOT THE SAME: JUDGMENT AND THE UNDECIDABLE

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Against the backdrop of Parmenides' assertion of the identity of thinking and being, I consider some recent attempts by John McDowell, Sebastian Rödl, and Irad Kimhi to rehabilitate, within contemporary analytic philosophy, a project of absolute idealism reminiscent of that associated with Hegel in his overcoming of Kant. Characteristically, these attempts operate by grounding that identity in the rational capacities of a subject or agent, as evidenced primarily in her activity of judgment. Developing the remarks in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* (5.54ff) about the form of intentionality and the propositional attitudes, I consider the logical form of consistent unity that this requires of the relevant capacities. I argue that, once the relevant rational capacities are seen as linguistic ones – capacities, that is, which are maintained and exercised within the life of finitely

constituted learners and speakers of language – the identity of thinking and being required by idealism in this sense cannot be upheld. At the same time, a further development of the early Wittgenstein’s position along the lines of the logic of truth points instead to a structurally deep mutual incommensurability between thinking and being grounded in – as I argue – a more basic undecidability of the thinking-being “relationship.” I conclude with some considerations about the implications of this for the “logical grammar” developed, in response to Parmenides, by Plato in the *Sophist*, in which the later (Aristotelian) idea of the mind or soul’s rational capacity of judgement is already suggested, at least in embryonic form.

WITTGENSTEIN AND BUTLER: ENCOUNTERING DIFFERENT FORMS OF LIFE

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The project of this paper consists in finding an analogy between the thought of Judith Butler and that of the later Wittgenstein in the consideration of what is different, as both authors seem to ask themselves fundamental questions to understand the possibility and the modality of the relationship with what is not contemplated in our system of thought. Indeed, thinking about forms of life and cultural modalities different from ours is not something easy, as it is impossible to abstract and alienate ourselves from the very conceptual scheme in which our questions and reflections are formulated. Both authors, however, while recognizing these difficulties, affirm a possibility of change, albeit progressive and limited, in our forms of thought. To demonstrate this last point, the concept of repetition presented by Butler in *The Psychic Life of Power* (1997) will be analyzed, as well as that of analogy in the later Wittgenstein, underlined by Andronico’s research on the imaginative method.

A SCEPTICAL PARADOX FOR COMPUTATION

Chiara Manganini

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In this paper I explore a point of connection between Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* (PI 1958) and the contemporary philosophy of computation. As for the former, I follow the exegesis famously offered by Kripke in *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* (1981), who interprets the text as a repudiation of a mentalistic conception of rule-following presented in the shape of a sceptical paradox for the metaphysics of language. As for the latter, I focus on a theory called “Ontology of Levels of Abstraction” (LoAs) which, quite unusually, endorses the very Wittgensteinian observation that no physical fact-of-the-matter about a machine can univocally determine which function it is implementing. But the advocate of the LoAs Ontology also claims that, given a machine, what really settles the question about its implementation is the content of the intention of the human who designed it. This opens the way to the formulation of a sceptical paradox analogous to the one Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein, this time concerning the metaphysics of computation. This paradox forces us to the unacceptable conclusion that nothing can determine which function a machine is implementing and, therefore, whether its output is correct or incorrect. Finally, a sceptical solution à la Wittgenstein is sketched.

ON WITTGENSTEIN AND SOCRATES’ USE OF MAIEUTIC DEVICES

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In this paper, I explore similarities between what I call “maieutic auxiliary devices” found in the dialogue *Theaetetus*, and various methodological devices Wittgenstein uses throughout *Philosophical Investigations*. I begin by giving a brief description of a maieutic auxiliary device, using an example drawn from the *Theaetetus*. I then examine Wittgenstein’s responses to his Augustinian interlocutor in the opening sections of the *Investigations*, and argue that the way Wittgenstein employs fictional scenarios in response to the interlocutor (in particular, the builder-tribe scenario) has some similarities with the Socratic Midwife’s employment of so-called auxiliary devices. Furthermore, I argue that where Wittgenstein’s employment of such devices differs from the Socratic Midwife’s, he is still fulfilling the criteria for a maieutic practice of philosophy. I hope that this will help highlight a neglected maieutic aspect of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and will spur further work in attempting to locate such devices in the *Investigations*.

THE PHYSICAL AND MORAL INTERPRETATION OF ALLEGORIES IN ANTIQUITY

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The idea that allegorical texts have both a physical and a moral meaning seems to persist through the whole ancient era, as one finds it in authors as far away in time as Theagenes of Rhegium (6th century BC) and Olympiodorus of Alexandria (6th century AD). Moreover, this idea was applied to texts as diverse as epic poems (the *Iliad*), sacred texts (the Bible), and philosophical dialogues (Plato’s works). Such persistence of the physical/moral binary model is interesting, as more complex categorizations of allegorical meanings were developed from it and alternatively to it, and yet the binary scheme returned again and again. With this paper, I would like to provide a brief history of the physical/moral interpretation model, analyzing the texts where it is mentioned, piecing together its evolution, and comparing it with similar models, such as the classifications of the philosophical sciences.

PLATO AND WITTGENSTEIN ON GUESSING, *EIKASIA*, AND THICKNESS OF ATMOSPHERE

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Does the prisoner’s guessing game at the objects carried behind the fire in the Republic count as knowledge? Are Wittgenstein’s remarks about the halo or atmospheres of words or images in the later work something that contributes to knowledge? To find out I first elaborate on *eikasia*, the lowest rung or state of knowledge in the line analogy and highlight the reading of ethical *eikasia* that does provide knowledge. In a close reading of Wittgenstein’s later work I elucidate the passages in which he speaks of “halos” or “atmospheres” of concepts and sentences. Wittgenstein writes that they are a medium that we look at or perceive together with the word or sentence. Finally, I conclude that although Plato’s philosopher must leave the cave, and Wittgenstein was convinced that he needed a “thinner” atmosphere, when others were allowed to

live in a thicker one that the answer lies in mandating the philosopher to return to the cave and for Wittgenstein to get back on rough ground.

GANZHEIT, SUBJEKTIVITÄT, PRAKTIKEN: IRIS MURDOCH ZWISCHEN WITTGENSTEIN UND PLATON

Kai Marchal

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Welche Gründe gibt es, im Schatten des Wittgenstein'schen Denkens platonische Ideen zu rehabilitieren? Diese Frage steht im Zentrum meines Beitrages, der sich mit dem Denken der britisch-irischen Philosophin Iris Murdoch beschäftigt. Nur bei wenigen Philosophen ist es so offensichtlich, dass sie von Platon und Wittgenstein beeinflusst worden sind, wie bei Murdoch. Anhand des Problems der organischen Einheit zeichne ich einige wesentliche Aspekte ihres Denkens nach. Weiter argumentiere ich, dass die platonische Idee der Wiedererinnerung (*anamnesis*) das Scharnier darstellt, das Murdochs Rückwendung von Wittgenstein zu Platon ermöglicht. Und damit zeigt sich, dass Murdoch zwar eine „Platonikerin“ ist, aber nicht hinter Wittgensteins Einsichten über die Verflechtung von Subjektivität und Praktiken zurückfällt.

WITTGENSTEIN ON DARWIN (ISM)

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This paper aims to reconstruct Wittgenstein's opinion on Darwinism. Even though he wrote very few and scattered remarks on the topic, I will argue that there is an epistemological understanding of Darwinism in Wittgenstein that, though merely sketched, is surprisingly modern. I will proceed as follows. In the first section, I will address the Tractarian remark mentioning Darwin (4.1122) and show its function within the *Tractatus*, considering Bertrand Russell's critical opinion on 'evolutionism' as its probable background. Second, I will analyse Wittgenstein's claim that Darwin discovered 'a fruitful new aspect', not a true theory, and argue that this statement still mirrors Wittgenstein's commitment to Heinrich Hertz's philosophy of science. Third, I will address Wittgenstein's quick criticism of Darwinism as 'lacking multiplicity' and show that, far from revealing a form of reactionary distaste for evolutionary theory, such a comment adumbrates (or better, it is compatible) with recent criticisms to what Stephen J. Gould and Richard Lewontin called 'adaptationist program' in evolutionary biology.

TRACTARIAN NAMES AND THE CARDINALITY OF LOGICAL SPACE

Benjamin Marschall

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The role of names in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* has been controversial. Realist interpreters hold that the association of simple names with simple objects plays a fundamental explanatory role in the Tractarian philosophy of language. Anti-metaphysical readers challenge this assumption. One prominent example of the latter tradition is Hidé Ishiguro, according to whom Tractarian names are mere dummy names akin to temporary

constants in a natural deduction calculus. Anderson Nakano has recently put forward a new objection to Ishiguro's view: It is said to conflict with Wittgenstein's own commitments by getting the cardinality of logical space wrong. I will defend Ishiguro by showing that Nakano's argument relies on an assumption about the nature of objects anti-metaphysical readers reject anyway.

THE REDUCTIO ARGUMENT IN WITTGENSTEIN'S TRACTATUS

Gilad Nir

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The *Tractatus* appears to advance a *reductio ad absurdum* of the assumption that logical form can be represented. Yet the declared aim of the *Tractatus* is not to prove the truth or falsity of any such assumptions, but rather to reveal philosophical theses to be nonsensical. We must therefore rethink the nature and aims of Wittgenstein's *reductio*. As I propose to read it, the argument aims to expose indeterminacies in the use of language within which the assumption is couched, and to lead the reader to transform their use of language. Moreover, since the *reductio* itself draws on the same indeterminacies that it is meant to expose, it too is ultimately to be thrown away. I further argue that this interpretation speaks in favor of a resolute reading of the *Tractatus*.

QUESTION ONE: IS THE GOLDBACH CONJECTURE FORMALLY DECIDABLE? – QUESTION TWO: IS QUESTION ONE FORMALLY DECIDABLE IN SOME META-CALCULUS?

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An advocatus diaboli in the philosophy of mathematics could perhaps develop a radical pessimism as opposed to Hilbert's optimism. I should like to investigate the relationship between mathematical impossibilities (such as the squaring of the circle; there are about 30 of them in Wittgenstein) and Ignorabimus phenomena in Emil Du Bois-Reymond's letter to E. Dreher of 1889 and David Hilbert 1900 in the English version given by William B. Edward (1995) in *From Kant to Hilbert* vol. 2, Oxford. This comparison reveals that Du Bois-Reymond equates the two concepts in a letter of 3rd October, 1889, whereas Hilbert separates the two concepts – as can be seen from the fact that he calls a negative clarification ("It is definitely not possible to ...") the solution of a problem. Can one give a clear definition for Hilbert's concept of Ignorabimus phenomena in mathematics? He himself, in fact, refused to give such a definition in 1900. Mathematical impossibilities occur both in geometry and algebra: regular heptagon (MS 162b:18v) and trisection of the angle (WVC 18th Dec. 1929) in the former and general solution for fifth degree equations in the latter (Part II: p. 374). Mathematical impossibilities are ruled out by Hilbert as a definiens for Ignorabimus phenomena, so what is left for them? I pose the question as to whether there are propositions in which the question of their formal decidability leads once again to an unsolvable problem. In that case, not even a "proof of unprovability", i.e. a proof of impossibility (RFM, Appendix III of Part I, Sections 14, 16 and 17), would be achievable! The belief in the existence of a proposition in which the question of its formal decidability leads to an

other undecidability gives rise to substantial pessimism. We could call this a Wittgensteinian impossibility! Do they actually exist?

THE ROOTS OF WITTGENSTEIN'S ANALYTICITY

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Although original, Wittgenstein's notion of analyticity presents characteristics that can be traced back to Leibniz's and Kant's accounts of analytic claims, or so I argue. Specifically, they pertain to (a) Leibnizian identities consisting in the connection of the P-term with the S-term (its inclusion in the S-term); and (b) the Kantian containment (cf. Anderson 2015) that dismisses Leibniz's metaphysical ground and shifts analyticity and a priori truth toward semantics. Accordingly, Wittgenstein's account of analyticity (1967) seems a development rather than a rejection of (a) and (b). It turns Leibnizian identities into tautologies and (later) the Kantian a priori into a grammatical rule (cf. Baker-Hacker 2009) showing how an intelligible description of reality ought to be (cf. Glock 1996). Therefore, I conclude that Wittgenstein's account of analytic claims as tautologies and semantic rules furthers the notions of identity and apriority developed by Leibniz and Kant, respectively.

VINDICATING WATER

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Philosophers generally agree that water is H_2O . I argue that this is a mistake. I show that, instead, being H_2O it is neither necessary nor sufficient for something to be water. Ice, snow, vapour, fog, mist, are not water; conversely, water – the stuff we are familiar with from everyday experience – consists of more than H_2O . The fact that chemists have borrowed the word 'water' for H_2O should not deceive us about what water really is. Linguistic and metaphysical considerations support this conclusion. This paper's argument thus turns against Platonism, defending a common-sense understanding of the paradigmatic stuff of water. The aim is to link the semantics of 'water' to our everyday experience, a precondition for explaining language acquisition and practice.

BEING AT HOME IN THE WORLD

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In one of his most wonderful passages, Roy Holland says that the spiritual point of Platonic education is "being at home in the world". His conception, which was heavily inspired by Simone Weil, combines two requirements: being rooted in a particular place and being able to appreciate its beauty and goodness. In my paper, I will first analyse both the concept of home and the various ways in which one can feel not at home, such as alienation, uprootedness, unfamiliarity, loss. I will then extend this conception to Holland's "existential" concept of being at home in the world. Contrasting it with Ratcliffe's conception of existential feeling, I will argue that it is love that plays the key role in explaining how the particular world, imperfect as it is, can be seen as good and beautiful, and therefore homely.

ÜBERSETZUNG DES UNSINNS: ÜBERSETZUNGSKRITIK ZUM ERSTEN SATZ DES *TRACTATUS*

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The problem of translating philosophical works meets a certain vacuum in the translation of the first sentence of *Tractatus* ("Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist"). Measured on its own "theory" of meaning, TLP 1 is nonsensical ("unsinnig"): objectless in reference, tautological in grammatical structure. Despite its initial impression, it is not a theorem; instead, this sentence has a specific philosophical function of constructing and destructing ideals/illusions simultaneously, as it corresponds to the non-sensical experience of the existence of the world "as a limited whole" (6.45). In a way, it can be seen as absolutely nonsensical. But how can a nonsensical text be translated? Is translation not an operation of communication, after all? In this work, I attempt a critical examination on translations of TLP 1 in English, Chinese and Japanese. It shows that terminological accuracy and presumed transparency of meaning in the process of translation – often interwoven with an analytical interpretation, in the case of *Tractatus* – lead to the opposite effect of concealing the productive obscurity of the original. The examples in Chinese and Japanese show furthermore, that the asymmetrical constellation between "West and the Rest" is a great obstacle for the intercultural validation of the philosophical dynamic of intentionally nonsensical texts.

CONNECTING WORDS AND THINGS. WITTGENSTEIN AND THE *CRATYLUS*

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In the *Big Typescript*, Wittgenstein writes that his philosophical stance on language can be illuminated by comparing it with what Socrates says in Plato's *Cratylus* (434a). This paper presents a critical reexamination of the *Cratylus* remark in its *Nachlass* context and offers a historically informed perspective on how Wittgenstein's engagement with the dialogue influenced his philosophical development. The main function of the reference to *Cratylus* in MS 111, TSS 211-213, and MS 114 is to illustrate a specific group of causal theories, according to which a word's meaning consists in evoking a mental image, association, memory, or idea of a respective thing. Drawing on G.E. Moore's lecture notes, the paper highlights thematic links between Wittgenstein's 1931 May Term lectures and MS 111 and reconstructs an argument against direct reference theories of meaning. It then retraces how Wittgenstein applies the same general refutation strategy to Socrates' mimetic theory of names. Even though Wittgenstein does not explicitly mention the *Cratylus* in subsequent writings, the central problem he identifies in the dialogue, the question of how words and things are connected, provides an important background for his later investigations.

CORRESPONDENCE, IDENTITY OR NOTHING: THE ROLE OF THE TRUTH IN THE *TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS*

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The aim of the paper is to examine Wittgenstein's remarks about truth in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and see if the view which suggests that the TLP should not be read as expounding a correspondence theory of truth can be coherently held. The main focal points of the paper will be

Hacker's and Beckermann's deflationary/semantic reading of the TLP, Sullivan's and Johnston's identity reading and Glock's reading which proposes that the official theory of truth of the TLP is the obtainment theory joined with a correspondence theory of depiction. As Glock proposes that the TLP could hold a non-conventional correspondence theory of truth, the views on truth from the TLP will be compared with such a correspondence theory as proposed by Rasmussen in his book *Defending the Correspondence Theory of Truth*.

WAS WITTGENSTEIN ANTI-PLATONIST?

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In this paper I will investigate the following three questions. The first one concerns the various meanings or uses of the term "platonism" and of its relative counterpart "anti-platonism" that can be found today (in philosophy, in philosophy of language and in philosophy of mathematics). In this regard I shall identify at least three meanings or uses. Thereafter, I will ask whether one or more than one of these meaning or uses have something to do with Plato or at least with some aspects of the historical Plato. Hence, I will again ask the question if, and in case in what sense, Plato was (or can reasonably be considered) a platonist. The third question regards Wittgenstein and is structured in three sub-queries. Indeed, I will ask (a) if, as usual, Wittgenstein can be considered an "anti-platonist", at least in one of the above mentioned meanings; though I will also ask (b) if nevertheless there is something platonist in Wittgenstein, at least in the sense of one the above mentioned meanings of "platonism"; eventually, I will ask (c) if, in his critique of Plato, Wittgenstein considered the distinction between Plato and Platonism.

LIMITS OR LIMITATIONS? – ON A BIFURCATION IN READING WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§185-201

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In *Philosophical Investigations* §§185–201, Wittgenstein addresses an oscillation in our thinking about the nature of rules. He seems to introduce a problem – how do we follow rules? –, and a "paradox" in which it is rooted, in order to find a solution to them; only to then call the whole puzzle a "misunderstanding" after all. My contention is that this apparent friction can best be understood and resolved when we view it in light of Wittgenstein's engagement with limits and limitations, and how easy it is to confuse one with the other when thinking about human thought and language. He is concerned, then, not simply with matters of semantics, convention, or community, but rather with the question of a proper philosophical method for thinking about our life with language in general. When traced out, these few remarks elucidate a bifurcation in interpreting one of the central methodological themes in Wittgenstein.

RUSSELL'S AND WITTGENSTEIN'S 1913 DISCUSSION ON TRUTH-TABLES AND THE SHEFFER STROKE

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The paper offers a reconstruction of a possible conversation between Russell and Wittgenstein about truth tables and the Sheffer Stroke on the basis of jottings in Russell's and Wittgenstein's handwriting on folio 1v of Russell's paper "Matter: The problem stated". Preserved letters in the Bertrand Russell Archive suggest April 1913 as the most likely date for such a conversation. In conclusion, it can be assumed that Wittgenstein developed and used truth-tables at that time, but considered them to be of secondary importance for logic compared to the *ab*-functions and *ab*-diagrams developed at the same time. The paper also includes a diplomatic transcription of folio 1v.

IS THE OFFICIAL THEORY OF TRUTH OF THE TRACTATUS AN OBTAINMENT THEORY?

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According to Hans-Johann Glock, truth does not consist in the *Tractatus* in a correspondence relation understood as a form of structural isomorphism, but, rather, in an obtainment theory: "a sentence is true iff the state of affairs it depicts obtains" (Glock 2006: 347). Though sympathetic to Glock's critique of the standard interpretation of truth in terms of structural isomorphism, I present three problems his account in terms of obtainment is facing (the omission of the depicting vs representing distinction, evidential support that truth is taken to consist in depicting reality, and, finally, the inadequacy of the obtainment theory as an account of truth), and argue, on that basis, that Wittgenstein does not subscribe to an obtainment theory. Finally, I briefly sketch the outlines of a new correspondentist interpretation according to which truth in the *Tractatus* consists of an indirect relation of correspondence which Wittgenstein understands in terms of 'correctly depicting reality'.

FREGE UND DIE NEUKANTIANISCHE TRADITION. GESTALTEN DES PLATONISMUS UM DIE JAHRHUNDERTWENDE

Joachim Rautenberg

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Eine wichtige Quelle platonistischen Denkens für den frühen Wittgenstein bilden die Werke Gottlob Freges. Wer die Kritik des *Tractatus* am „Platonismus“ verstehen will, muss deswegen prüfen, in welcher Gestalt er sich bei Frege zeigt. Es wird dafür argumentiert, dass Frege nur in einem qualifizierten Sinn als „Platonist“ bezeichnet werden kann. Zu diesem Zweck wird die Verwurzelung von Freges Denken im Neukantianismus untersucht. Die neukantianische Tradition prägte die Unterscheidung von der Entstehung und der Begründung eines Urteils – eine Unterscheidung, die für Freges Werk von zentraler Bedeutung ist. Diese Unterscheidung erlaubt es, zwischen einem ontologischen Platonismus und einem normativen Platonismus zu differenzieren. Freges Überlegung zu der Natur von Gedanken und logischen Gesetzen machen ihn zu einem Vertreter des letzteren. Der normative Platonismus behauptet

tet nicht die Existenz nicht-sinnlicher, abstrakter Entitäten, sondern die Unabhängigkeit dessen, was gilt, von dem, was ist. Als zentrale Schwierigkeit des normativen Platonismus wird die Beziehung von normativen Denkgesetzen und faktischem Denken hervorgehoben. Es werden verschiedene Antwortversuche auf die Frage untersucht, wie die im logischen Gesetz ausgedrückte Norm Eingang findet in das sich faktisch vollziehende Denken. Abschliessend wird der Vorschlag gemacht, das Frühwerk Wittgensteins im Horizont der erläuterten Problemstellung zu betrachten.

NEOPLATONISTS ON THE STRENGTHS OF EMBODIMENT

Pauliina Remes

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I argue that embodiment for Plotinus is moderate – not weak, nor strong. The common view has it that embodiment in Neoplatonism must be weak because the body cannot have causal power over an entity which is on a higher level, ontologically, than it – the soul – and thus soul only uses the body, rather than really resides in it. While accepting the metaphysical challenges, I point to some evidence that suggests that as long as the soul is embodied, and we are looking at the soul phase that comes to be immersed in matter, the relationship is moderate, not weak. This reading yields a picture of embodiment in Plotinus that is more realistic as regards embodied functions, while preserving the ontological independence and priority of the soul proper.

REMARKS ON PARMENIDES, PLATO, AND CONSTRUCTIVISM

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Philosophical theories take shape in the reaction of later thinkers to their contemporaries or predecessors. This paper consists in a series of remarks about the constructivist approach to cognition, with special attention: to Parmenides, who arguably invents the philosophical problem of knowledge as we know it; to Plato, who rejects a Parmenidean solution to this problem; and to epistemic constructivism, also known as constructivism, which points away from Plato and towards a post-Platonic solution to the cognitive problem. I conclude that, as Kant denies, but Einstein suggests, we cannot know that we in fact grasp the mind-independent real as it really is.

HOW CAN MATHEMATICAL OBJECTS BE REAL BUT MIND-DEPENDENT?

Hazhir Roshangar

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Taking mathematics as a language based on empirical experience, I argue for an account of mathematics in which its objects are abstracta that describe and communicate the structure of reality based on some of our ancestral interactions with their environment. I argue that mathematics as a language is mostly invented. Nonetheless, in being a general description of reality it cannot be said that it is fictional; and as an intersubjective reality, mathematical objects can exist independent of any one person's mind.

“IT SEEMS TO ME THAT OUR SOUL IS A BIT LIKE A BOOK”: INNER LANGUAGE AND ERRONEOUS THOUGHTS IN PLATO'S *PHILEBUS*, *SOPHIST*, AND *THEAETETUS*

Catherine Rowett

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In Plato's *Philebus* Socrates proposes that one makes a silent utterance when deciding what something is, and that the utterance is inscribed in the soul as if written, and can be accompanied by an illustration. This illustrated book can contain falsehoods and truths, and accounts for the fact that one's doxa can be true or false, and this can be in virtue of the words or the pictures being false. I compare this passage with similar ideas about the soul's silent enquiries and inner debates, and the soul's doxastic decisions following such enquiries, in the *Theaetetus* and *Sophist*. I argue that the *Theaetetus* contains a (deliberately) unworkable attempt at explaining the same kind of falsity that is clearly and successfully explained in the *Philebus*, but that the *Sophist* is talking about a different kind of judgement, which involves not one but two terms (a label plus a predicate), and in these cases falsity in judgement may arise due to just one of the two items being false.

„DAS WESEN IST IN DER GRAMMATIK AUSGESPROCHEN“ – WITTGENSTEINS ANTIPLATONISMUS UND CAVELLS ZWEIFEL

Alfred Schmidt

Austrian National Library, Austria

Zwei Denkbewegungen Wittgensteins im Zusammenhang mit dem Wesensbegriff stehen in einem interessanten Spannungsverhältnis. Auf der einen Seite Wittgensteins scharfe Kritik an jeder Form eines (platonischen) Essentialismus, die sich aus seinem Konzept der Familienähnlichkeit ergibt. Dem gegenüber steht seine methodische Maxime, das Wesen eines Gegenstandes wäre in der Grammatik festgelegt, bzw. „ausgesprochen“ (PU 371), die den Wesensbegriff für die Philosophie eigentlich zurückgewinnt (Stanley Cavell). Der Beitrag versucht eine Synthese aus diesen beiden Aspekten zu finden.

ON THE LIMITS OF ACADEMIC LANGUAGE

Franz Schörkhuber

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Reading and writing play a predominant role in modern philosophy. In the course of academic training, however, we are conditioned (encouraged or forced) to apply working techniques which tend to suppress individually shaped reading experiences. Reflecting on those, we come to understand that it is linguistic borderline experiences that awaken our philosophical mind. Yet, the borders of language become visible in the way and style of our writings and cannot be made an *object* of our speech. Hence, in order to keep alive our original philosophical motives, we must have the courage to cross the boundaries of academic representation. The first step in doing so is to no longer treat ideas of philosophy in a scientific manner as identifiable and transmittable objects or themes but rather as something that is laid down in our language and can only be demonstrated through linguistic (rhetorical, literary) work. This does not mean that doing philosophy is a formalistic enterprise without any value for our real lives. But it means that philosophy's ethical impact can only be brought to life if we drop the idea of philosophy as a science.

THE TOOL ANALOGY IN THE *CRATYLUS*. PRACTICE, BEING, LANGUAGE

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In my presentation I discuss the ‘tool analogy’ in the *Cratylus* with the explicit aim to compare it to Wittgenstein’s thinking about language. I am focusing on Socrates’s claims that speaking is an action (387b) and that a ‘name’ is an ‘instrument of teaching and of separating reality, as a shuttle is an instrument of separating the web’ (388b–c). I argue that in the *Cratylus* there is an understanding of language not as prior and external to reality, but as intrinsic to shaping it. I then claim that this is a point of view quite close to some central ideas of Wittgenstein’s in the *Philosophical Investigations*, such as that essence is expressed by grammar in paragraph 371. Important to my analysis is the idea that for both Socrates in the *Cratylus* and the later Wittgenstein language is intertwined with the world of human activity and the practices, needs and challenges inherent in it.

RUSH RHEES ON SET THEORY, THE SOPHISTS, AND WITTGENSTEIN

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Rush Rhees, one of Wittgenstein’s three trustees, lectured on Plato and the Presocratics for two decades. In his lecture notes on the Sophists, Rhees briefly mentions Wittgenstein’s views on set theory and claims that mathematicians have responded to them like Sophists. This essay discusses and contextualises Rhees’s claim, including a brief discussion of how Rhees’s understanding of Plato might have influenced him as an editor of Wittgenstein’s *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*.

ÜBER DENKEN, REDEN UND SCHREIBEN: SOKRATES/PLATON UND WITTGENSTEIN

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Ausgehend von Platons Dialog *Phaidros*, in dem Sokrates zwischen Denken, Reden und Schreiben unterscheidet und über die Kunst der Rhetorik spricht, sollen Wittgensteins Gedanken und Bemerkungen zu dieser Thematik erörtert werden, die sich teilweise von Platon unterscheiden, aber auch Ähnlichkeiten aufweisen.

DE MALORUM SCIENTIA: ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF KAKOLOGIA IN PROCLUS AND PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS

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This paper illustrates a point of overlap between the Wittgensteinian and Platonic traditions, particularly their shared penchant for dissolving rather than solving philosophical questions. In particular, I develop a Platonic argument against the possibility of *kakologia* (a science of evil). I argue that inquiries into the *per se* causes of evil constitute what Wittgenstein, in *Philosophical Investigations*, calls “unobvious nonsense.” First, I examine Aristotle’s argument in *Metaphysics* Eta against a science of accidental being. Second, I turn to Proclus’s and

Pseudo-Dionysius’s disjunctive arguments for classifying evils as beings *per accidens*. Given this classification, I draw the conclusion that a science of evil is, in principle, incoherent. Third, I put forward a few therapeutic implications of this argument. If a science of evil is impossible, then the troubled philosopher need not be worried by vexing questions such as “unde malum” (whence evil?), but can content himself with investigating what is actually intelligible.

WHY PLATO IS NO “PLATONIST” AND HOW THAT MIGHT MATTER FOR WITTGENSTEIN

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Wittgenstein seems to have found little of value in Plato, but interpreted him along the lines of what is referred to as “platonism.” I argue that we, perhaps along with Wittgenstein, misinterpret Plato when we attribute “platonism” to Plato, and suggest that Wittgenstein may have more in common with what is in the Platonic dialogues than he thought.

TRANSLATION AS OPEN QUOTATION

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In the present paper, I will propose the view that translation is as a form of open quotation by putting forward the following generalization. When a translator renders a linguistic expression from language A into language B she quotes the author of the source text. In particular, I will argue that the source and target expressions from two natural languages are linked in translation by means of the logical operator *translate as*. Under this view, despite of being put within quotation marks expressions retain their usual semantic values. The operator *translate as* establishes two sorts of relations between the source and target expressions. First, the target expression is a quotation of the source expression because it mentions it. Second, the target expressions is a quotation of the source expression because it acquires its meaning through the use of the source expression. These relations can be represented in situation semantic terms as a series of embedded situations. If Situation 1 denotes a state of affair that occurs in the world and Situation 2 denotes an utterance situation in which the source expression is produced then Situation 1 serves as a truth-maker of Situation 2. Finally, if there is a Situation 3 in which the source expression matches with a target expressions by means of *translate as* then this situation will be true in virtue of Situation 2 being true in virtue of Situation 1.

NEUROPHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON WITTGENSTEIN’S PUZZLES OF THE WILL

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Wittgenstein’s reflections on the nature of the will were motivated by the effort to combine two philosophical approaches: one in the empiricist tradition and the second based on Schopenhauer’s philosophy. The philosophical paradoxes that he encountered are described in *Philosophical Investigations* and in several his other works. Although Wittgenstein’s claims are not meant as empirical statements we believe that several of his questions can be enlightened by comparison to a neurophilosophical approach. We focus

primarily to analysis of the relation of the will to wishing, experience and action. The text also provides a short commentary on the complexity of the problem of the voluntary control of body movements from the point of view of philosophical phenomenological analysis as well as from a neurophysiological point of view.

THE (IN)EXISTENT PARADIGM. ON THE NOTION OF FORM IN WITTGENSTEIN'S AESTHETICS

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At the beginning of his *Lectures on Aesthetics* (1966: 2), Wittgenstein counterposes two ways of understanding language: (1) looking at the form of words (the wrong way) and (2) looking at the use made of that form (the right way). With respect to this opposition: form vs use, in my paper I wonder if (and how) it also applies to art and aesthetics, and if we should conclude that, at least according to Wittgenstein, there is no place for the notion of form in aesthetics or rather recognise that in aesthetics 'form' takes on a new and different meaning. Particularly, I shall try to answer these questions (a) by taking into consideration the possible meanings of 'form' to be found in Wittgenstein's thought (from the logical form of the *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* to the later notions of perspicuous representation and paradigm), and (b) by focusing on the relation between form, works of art and aesthetic experience. What will turn out is that Wittgenstein doesn't admit neither linguistic nor aesthetic (or artistic) formalism. Actually, the form considered as the paradigm which guides our aesthetic evaluation is not strictly a form, not a paradigm: we aesthetically evaluate art (and things) as if there is a paradigm, yet the paradigm doesn't properly exist beyond our practice. So, for Wittgenstein, form is nothing but a rule of use: a rule of language, of thinking and feeling (see *Culture and Value*, 1998: 59). It is, shall we say, a 'form through the use'.

PHILOSOPHY AS A LANGUAGE-GAME? AN APPROACH TO WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHICAL METHODOLOGY

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Wittgenstein introduces the notion of language-game as a methodological device, which aims to describe and clarify language use. This term allows us to regard language as internally related to action (PI 2009: 7). As Wittgenstein suggests, we can consider different human practices through the lens of this notion for clarificatory purposes (PI 2009: 5). This paper explores to what extent philosophy can represent a language-game. The first section presents the problem by showing that if philosophy has not articulated its own terminology, there would be no specific vocabulary related to a particular set of actions that constitutes the language-game of this practice. Section two expands on the notion of language-game and explains why science accords with this model in contrast to more mainstream philosophical approaches.

The final section asks whether a Wittgensteinian approach to philosophy represents a language-game. By rejecting a binary answer to this question, this analysis will shed light on a crucial aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy, namely, that this approach can be understood as the practice that enables the understanding and facilitates the development of grammatically complex language-games (PI 2009: 125-126).

MODESTY IN WITTGENSTEIN'S TRACTATUS

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Modesty with respect to a conception of meaning is the idea that it is impossible to explain what it is for something to be meaningful without invoking the notion of meaning or semantically related notions. Wittgenstein's remarks on meaning in the *Tractatus* suggest that it should be read modestly. A modest account of meaning has implications for an account of truth. Wittgenstein's remarks on truth in the *Tractatus* are further evidence in favour of a modest reading.

GELINGT KRIPKES TRENNUNG VON EPISTEMOLOGIE UND METAPHYSIK? DAS URMETER

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In *Naming and Necessity* argumentiert Kripke für eine Trennung von Epistemologie und Metaphysik, wobei auch Apriorität und Notwendigkeit voneinander getrennt werden. Er greift Wittgensteins Beispiel vom Urmeter auf und argumentiert gegen Kant, dass man einerseits a priori wisse, dass es einen Meter lang ist, dass es aber andererseits nur zufälligerweise einen Meter lang sei. Dass Kripke Wittgensteins Beispiel missversteht, ist schon bekannt. Weniger klar ist jedoch, wie er die Begrifflichkeiten gegenüber Kant verschiebt und ob sein Neuansatz überzeugend ist. Dem will ich hier nachgehen.

EINE ANTIPLATONISTISCHE LESART DER BILDTHEORIE DES TRACTATUS

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Es soll gezeigt werden, dass man die Bildtheorie des *Tractatus* nur dann angemessen verstehen kann, wenn man sie vor dem Hintergrund von Wittgensteins Kritik an Russells Versuch liest, Freges Projekt des Logizismus dadurch zu retten, dass man bestimmte Annahmen über die Beschaffenheit der Dinge in der Welt macht, die wiederum die Gesetze der Logik begründen sollen. Da Wittgenstein eine solche Fundierung der Logik in ontologischen Vorgaben bereits in seiner Frühphilosophie ablehnt, wie dies aus seinen *Aufzeichnungen über Logik* hervorgeht, kann die Bildtheorie des *Tractatus* nicht in einem platonistischen Sinne als eine Abildtheorie ontologischer Entitäten im menschlichen Denken und Sprechen gelesen werden. Statt dessen muss sie als eine Theorie verstanden werden, der zufolge sprachliche Bilder von einem innerweltlichen Standpunkt aus gemacht werden und sich je nach Zwecksetzung des bildermachenden Subjekts voneinander unterscheiden, wobei diese Perspektivendifferenz auch für die einzelnen Disziplinen der Philosophie selbst gilt. Die verschiedenen Aspekte dieser antiplatonistischen Lesart der Bildtheorie des *Tractatus* sollen im Folgenden dargestellt werden.

PRIVATE LANGUAGE, QUALIA, AND GRADIENT!

Abhishek Yadav

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The classical Plato's theory of forms can provide us an important tool to strengthen the inverted spectrum argument in defence of qualia. One can find two kinds of inverted spectrum cases in Witt-

genstein (1968) out of which, he considers one to be coherent and rejects the other one outrightly. The coherent one doesn't pose a problem for his treatment of inner sensations, whereas the second one, he rejects on the basis on behavioural indistinguishability. Block (2007) responds to this indistinguishability condition and argues that there can be a case of shifted spectrum, that can defend qualia irrespective of the fact whether the subjects are behaviourally indistinguishable or not. In this paper, we argue that Block's argument is a case of application of concept of gradient and introducing the gradient does make the case for qualia stronger against the Wittgensteinian treatment.

WITTGENSTEIN ÜBER DIE STRUKTUR DER RECHTFERTIGUNG

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Wittgensteins Bemerkungen in seinem Buch *Über Gewissheit* zeichnen eine gewisse Konzeption einer Struktur des Systems der Überzeugungen. Deshalb schreiben manche der diese Bemerkungen kommentierenden Philosophen dem Autor eine bestimmte Position in der heute viel diskutierten Frage der Struktur der Rechtfertigung zu. Avrum Stroll schreibt über Wittgensteins Fundamentalismus, Paul Moser über dessen relativistischen Kontextualismus und Carol Caraway über einen neuartigen Standpunkt Wittgensteins, der sich weder auf Fundamentalismus noch Kohärenzismus oder Kontextualismus zurückführen lässt. Das Referat enthält eine Kritik der genannten Interpretationen, auf deren Grundlage die These formuliert wird, dass unter den heutigen Positionen in der Frage der Struktur der Rechtfertigung den Ansichten des „dritten“ Wittgenstein ein im weiten Sinne verstandener inferentieller Kontextualismus am nächsten ist.

PLATONISM AND POSTMODERNISM: MODES OF DISCOURSE IN PLATO AND LYOTARD

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Lyotard's opposition to universals, *métarécits*, and general terms, his rejection of grand narratives such as that of the steady progress of humankind toward civilization, the knowability of everything by science, and the possibility of human emancipation pits him against Plato and the tradition of Platonism. However, there are striking similarities of approach between the Platonic dialogues and Lyotard's language games. Lyotard places Plato squarely at the beginning of the "new language game of science" and the problem of its self-legitimation. What Lyotard calls the "pragmatics of science" is "set in motion" in the dialogues and the "game of dialogue [...] encapsulates that pragmatics," with rules like: "argumentation with a view only to consensus (*homologia*)," "unicity of the referent" as a basis for agreement, "parity between partners." Against the notion of the inhuman Lyotard proposes a new kind of thinking that is meant to move us beyond humanism and beyond what we thought the human to be. But if justice and injustice are to remain meaningful terms in postmodernist language games, is it possible to "judge without criteria"? And does Lyotard's critique of humanism offer a viable solution to the dehumanizing commodification of knowledge in contemporary capitalism? Lyotard calls for us to break free of hegemonic discourses and grand narratives. I argue that Lyotard's call for the postmodern to look for what is irreducible to commodification, unrepresentable within our presentation of objective reality, unspeakable in any phrase regimen is at the heart

of what Plato's Socrates undertakes in "seeking while he talks", and that the aporetic and unattainable at the core of Socratic elenctic and Platonic dialectic are precisely what is needed to discover the postmodern in the modern. Disrupting pre-determined significations is the aim of Socratic elenchus as a "logic of selection based on *homologia*" and the core of Plato's hypothetical dialectic, which relies on a permanent conjunction of narrative and discursive reasoning. Lyotard's valorization of the figural, and the mutual implication of discourse and the figural are anticipated in the complementary roles of belief and impressions, intuitive and discursive thought in Plato's Proportion of the Line.

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Platon (428 – 348 v. u. Z.)

Zusammenhänge verstehen.

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889 – 1951)

Das Internationale Wittgenstein Symposium in Kooperation mit

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