

Personen. Ein Interdisziplinärer Dialog
Persons. An Interdisciplinary Approach

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Papers

25. Internationales Wittgenstein Symposium
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11. – 17. August 2002

25

Personen. Ein Interdisziplinärer Dialog Persons. An Interdisciplinary Approach

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Editors

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Names that Name Nothing

Frederick Adams, Delaware

1. Introduction

Theories of direct reference maintain that names contribute their bearers to propositions expressed by sentences or utterances on occasions of use. On these theories, names contribute only their bearers and have no surplus meaning. The sentence "Wittgenstein taught school in Kirchberg" expresses the proposition identified by the ordered pair \langle Wittgenstein, having taught school in Kirchberg \rangle . Whether theories of direct reference are correct is a matter of dispute. Kripke's (1972) arguments against descriptive theories of the meanings of names were persuasive, but descriptive theorists have persuasively fought back (Stanley, 1997). In this paper, I will not attempt to settle the larger dispute between the two opposing camps, but will focus on the matter of what a direct reference theorist ought to say about names that lack bearers. In order even to be a contender in the larger dispute between referentialists and descriptivists, theories of direct reference must have a plausible story to tell about the use of names that name nothing in utterances and sentences both positive and negative.

Positive uses of empty names include "Santa Claus lives at the North Pole." What proposition is expressed by this sentence? Does the sentence express a truth or a falsehood? Negative uses of empty names include "Santa Claus does not exist." What proposition is expressed by this sentence? Is this sentence true or false? Until direct reference theorists have a plausible account of such sentences and the role of names in them, direct reference theories are not even in the game (so to speak).

In what follows, I will sketch an account of the role of names that lack bearers and of their contribution to what is expressed on both their positive and negative use. I will offer a theory that is consistent with theories of direct reference and a theory that claims that names make the same contribution on an occasion of use regardless of whether they actually name something or not. I then will defend the view from recent criticisms.

2. The View

On the view that I like (Adams & Stecker, 1994), names that name nothing mean nothing and say nothing. Lacking referents, their use in sentences or utterances, convey no bearer into the propositional structure that may be expressed. This is true whether employed in positive or negative sentences. So "a is F" expresses \langle __, being F \rangle , and "a is not F" expresses \langle __, not being F \rangle when "a" names nothing. There are good reasons (Braun, 1993) to think that propositional structures are expressed by such sentences or utterances, and there are equally good reasons to think that neither sentential form expresses a truth (Adams & Stecker, 1994). This becomes particularly troubling for sentences such as "Santa Claus does not exist" or "Vulcan does not exist" because these negative existential sentences surely seem to be true. Yet, if the above account is correct, they express something of the form \langle __, non-existence \rangle (or better, there is not an x such that x = __, where one cannot fill the blank). Thus, on the above account, negative existential sentences employing

empty names do not express truths (or falsehoods). This plainly seems wrong, (at least at first).

To make the view more palatable, it must explain away the intuition that negative existential sentences employing empty names express truths. It does so by finding something true that, although not literally semantically expressed by such sentences, is pragmatically imparted. It does this by appealing to two mechanisms: association and pragmatic implication. When we hear new names we cognitively place them into a mental file or dossier (Recanati, 1993). We associate descriptions with those names, but the descriptions do not give the meanings of the names (as they are contingently associated with the names through a process of mental association—just as the empiricist, associationist philosophers and psychologists have long maintained). If we acquire the name "Ludwig Wittgenstein" we may associate the descriptions "author of the *Tractatus*" or "famous student of Lord Russell." These descriptions help us cognitively track the individual named. When we say "Wittgenstein was a philosopher" we may impart or imply that a famous student of Lord Russell was a philosopher, but this is not literally expressed by our utterance (what is literally expressed is \langle Wittgenstein, being a philosopher \rangle). Still it is information that is there to be conveyed and would be conveyed in a community of speakers who typically share the same cognitive associations of descriptions and names. The mechanism of pragmatic conveyance is Gricean (Grice, 1989) and is well known. Hence, we will help ourselves to the distinction between what a sentence literally semantically expresses and what its utterance can pragmatically convey.

These associations take place whether names are empty or not. When children acquire the name "George Washington" they typically acquire the associated descriptions "first president of the U.S.", "man who had wooden teeth." When they acquire "Santa Claus" they associate with the name "jolly fat man who lives at the North Pole" or "man who brings presents on Christmas day." The negative existential "Santa Claus does not exist" expresses no literal truth. Still it pragmatically imparts truths: truths such as that there is no jolly fat man who lives at the North Pole and wears a red suit or that there is no one who brings presents to the world's children on Christmas Day. These things, though not literally semantically expressed by the negative existential sentence, are true. They include information that may be pragmatically conveyed by the utterance of the negative existential sentence. It is these truths that we mistake for the literal truth of the sentence "Santa Claus does not exist" when we take that sentence to be true. If this account of the role of names is correct, the sentence itself is strictly truth-valueless, despite our intuitions to the contrary. The theory explains away contrary intuitions, in the ways just indicated (Adams, Stecker & Fuller, 1992), and can be extended to fictional names (Adams, Fuller & Stecker, 1997). The account is unified, attributing to names the same kind of semantic contribution in all contexts whether the names are filled or empty. Names contribute their bearers on occasions of use (if they have bearers) and otherwise make no semantic contribution at all.

3. Objections & Replies

In this section I will elaborate the theory by considering some recent objections and replies. The first objection is that different sentences using different empty names seem to say different things, but on this account they would all say the same thing, so the theory must be false (Everett, manuscript a). Consider "Santa Claus doesn't exist," "Father Xmas doesn't exist," and "Superman doesn't exist." The first two may say similar things, but the latter does not. However, all three should say that there is not an x such that $x = ___$ (where one cannot fill the blank). That is, they should all say the same thing on our view.

The reply is that they all do literally say the same incomplete negative existential propositional structure—one lacking a truth-value, but they do not all say it in the same way. They express it using different names. In that, the situation is not all that different from "Fa" and "Fb" where $a = b$. They express the same proposition but do so using different names. The main difference is that, in cases of empty names, no complete propositions are expressed. Similarly, with filled names we may associate different descriptions. With "Tony Curtis" we associate "famous film star and father of Jamie Lee." With "Bernie Schwartz" we may associate "gray-haired gentleman dressed in black." Tony Curtis = Bernie Schwartz. Yet saying "Tony Curtis is here" may appear to say something different than "Bernie Schwartz is here" because of the different associations (in the minds of those not in the know).

Similarly, we may associate the same descriptions with "Santa Claus" and with "Father Xmas," but not with "Superman." The differences in descriptions are due to differences in the lore surrounding the religious and holiday figures *versus* the comic strip hero. But any apparent differences of expression are due to the differences of associated descriptions and not due to difference of literal, semantic content expressed. "Santa doesn't exist" pragmatically imparts, but does not literally semantically express that no jolly fat man in a red suit who brings presents to the world's children exists. Perhaps "Father Xmas doesn't exist" pragmatically imparts the same thing (if it has the same associations). But "Superman doesn't exist" pragmatically imparts that there is no man of steel. It imparts other things because of different associated descriptions with "Superman" (though these do not give the meaning of the name). That accounts for the apparent differences. Therefore, our theory is not falsified by these apparent differences.

Another, more serious objection is that our theory cannot explain the modal profile of sentences that contain empty names (Everett, manuscript a). The sentence "Santa is identical to John Perry" seems not only to express a falsity, but a necessary falsity. Yet on our view, it expresses the truth valueless propositional structure $\langle ___ = \text{John Perry} \rangle$ (and it does so using the name 'Santa'). If we try to account for the merely apparent falsity of the sentence by relying on associated descriptions, we may pragmatically impart something such as that the jolly fat man in the red suit living at the North Pole who brings presents on Christmas day is John Perry. This is not literally what the sentence above expresses, but it may be pragmatically imparted, as per our account. However, this proposition, while false, is at best contingently false. Thus, our view cannot explain the apparent necessity, as well as apparent falsity of the above type of sentence.

In reply, our view can explain both the apparent falsity and necessity, but does so in different ways. The apparent falsity is already explained nicely above. The above sentence pragmatically imparts that

John Perry is identical with the jolly fat man in the red suit living at the North Pole and who brings presents on Christmas day. This is false, even though it is only pragmatically implied (not literally expressed).

It is true that it is only contingently false. However, this proposition is not what explains the apparent necessity. That is explained by our semantical intuitions. When we see an expression of the form " $a = b$," we know that it is either a necessary truth or a necessary falsehood (if it expresses a genuine proposition at all). We know this because we know (Kripke, 1972) that all identities are necessary. "Tony Curtis = Bernie Schwartz" expresses something necessary. We know this even before we learn that it expresses a truth. "Tony Curtis = John Perry" expresses a necessary falsehood, and we know of the necessity by the semantic structure of the identity sentence even prior to knowing that it is false.

We know that "Santa" is not a name for John Perry. So it is not like the first identity sentence above. This will incline us to think it is like the second. Unfortunately, "John Perry = Santa" does not literally express a truth or a falsehood, but if it did, it would express a necessary falsehood, and we know this via our semantical modal intuitions alone. That is how the appearance of necessity is explained (away). This is a different explanation than that of the appearance of falsity, but an explanation nonetheless.

I will close by considering the view that empty names are descriptive names (Kripke, 1972, Evans, 1982). Suppose we associate "the inventor of the zip" with the name "Julius." Then suppose there was no single inventor of the zip. "Julius does not exist" might be taken to express the proposition that there is no inventor of the zip. This would be literally true, not merely pragmatically imparted. So it may appear to do a better job than our account of handling empty names.

I think this view should be rejected. First, if "Julius" names nothing because the description "the inventor of the zip" fails to pick something out, then "Julius does not exist" still expresses the truth valueless propositional structure that there is not an x such that $x = ___$ (where one picked out by "inventor of the zip" is to fill the blank). Still there is no name to fill the blank, and there is no advantage over our view. If one says the proposition expressed is that there is no inventor of the zip, then "inventor of the zip" would be giving the meaning of "Julius." Empty names would have descriptions as their meaning (contrary to filled names). There then would be no uniform contribution that names make, whether filled or empty. Second, suppose there were a single inventor of the zip, viz., Ken. Then "Julius is smart" should express that Julius (aka Ken) is smart, but on this alternative view it would express that the inventor of the zip is smart (and not act like a name at all). Finally, Recanati (1993) maintains that "Julius" is a name and once attached to its bearer (aka Ken), we could truly assert that Julius didn't invent the zip. But on the view where "inventor of the zip" gives the meaning of "Julius," "Julius does not exist" would express that the inventor of the zip didn't invent the zip. Not good!

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Strawson's Concept of Person – A Critical Discussion

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1. Preliminaries

To his main work, *Individuals* (Strawson 1959) P.F. Strawson gave the subtitle: *An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics*. "Descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world" (Strawson 1959, 9). It is to be contrasted with 'revisionary metaphysics', which "is concerned to produce a better structure" (Strawson 1959, 9). The general features of our conceptual structure lie submerged under the surface of language and therefore descriptive metaphysics has to go beyond the examination of the actual use of words and expose this general structure. There are categories and concepts, which in their most fundamental character, do not change at all. They are not technical concepts of special sciences, but commonplaces of the least refined thinking. It is with these concepts and categories, their interconnections and the structure they form, that the descriptive metaphysics is primarily concerned.

In Strawson's metaphysical world, there are two categories of entities, viz., particulars and universals. Among the particulars, the material objects are basic particulars, in the sense that it is ultimately by making an identifying reference to particulars of these kinds, that we are able, in general, to individuate and identify items of other kinds, such as events. To identify any entity means to locate it in space-time; and material objects are the only entities, which constitute space-time-system. A particular is said to be identified, when the speaker makes an identifying reference to it and the hearer identifies it on the strength of the speaker's reference.

Persons are those basic particulars to which we ascribe consciousness. Thus, in Strawson's ontology of particulars, both the material bodies and persons share equal status. Persons constitute a fundamental and irreducible kind of being.

Persons are credited with *physical characteristics*, designating location, attitude, relatively enduring characteristics like height, colouring, shape and weight on the one hand and various *states of consciousness* like thinking, remembering, seeing, deciding, feeling emotions etc- on the other. How these two sorts of attributes are related to each other and why they are attributed to the very same thing, are the two questions Strawson discusses in the third chapter of the *Individuals*.

Two possible attempts to meet these problems, according to Strawson, are "Cartesianism" and what he calls "No-Ownership doctrine" of the self. Strawson examines and rejects both of them and proposes to acknowledge the concept of person as primitive.

2. Cartesianism and the "no-ownership doctrine"

According to Cartesianism, when we speak of a person we are really referring to one or both of two distinct substances of different types, each of which has its own appropriate types of states and properties. States of consciousness belong to one of these substances and not

to the other. Strawson rejects this theory because, for him, "The concept of the pure individual consciousness – the pure ego – is a concept that cannot exist; or at least, cannot exist as a primary concept in terms of which the concept of a person can be explained or analysed. It can exist only, if at all, as a secondary, non-primitive concept, which itself is to be explained, analysed in terms of a person". (Strawson 1959, p.102)

He argues as follows: it is a necessary condition for ascribing any states of consciousness, experiences etc- to oneself, that one should also ascribe them to others. Ascribing to others is not possible if we accept the Cartesian ego as the subject of all experiences or states of consciousness. For, to be the subject of a predication, something must be identified. Identification as we saw presupposes location in space-time. Cartesian Egos can't be located in space-time; only bodies can be located spatio-temporally. So predicating a state of consciousness to an Ego, presupposes that the state must be predicated to a subject, which is a material body.

In our day-to-day speech we use expressions like 'I am in pain', 'I had a severe pain', 'My pain...' etc-. These expressions somehow suggest that I am the owner of this particular experience of having pain. According to the no-ownership theorist, experiences can be said to have an owner only in the sense of their causal dependence upon the state of some particular body. This causal dependence is sufficient to ascribe one's experiences to some particular, individual thing. But this causal dependence is not a contingent or logically transferable matter. We can own something only if its ownership is logically transferable. Thus, experiences are not owned by anything except in the dubious sense of being causally dependent on the state of a particular body.

This theory, according to Strawson, is incoherent. The theorist denies the existence of the sense of possession but he is forced to make use of it when he tries to deny its existence. Strawson argues that any attempt to eliminate the 'my' (or any possessive expression) in f.i. "my experience" or "my headache" etc. would yield something that is not a contingent fact at all. It is simply wrong to state that all experiences are causally dependent on the state of a single body. But the theorist cannot consistently argue that 'all experiences of person P means the same thing as all experiences of a certain body B', for then the proposition would not be contingent, as his theory requires, but analytic. With "my experience" he means a certain class of experiences and this class of experiences are the experiences of a person. It is the sense of this 'my' and 'of' that he requires to deny. He cannot successfully deny that, because being 'my experience' is – for the experience in question - no contingent matter but necessary. That my headache is *my* headache is – for the headache – no contingent matter.

3. The concept of person as primitive

To get out of these difficulties, Strawson's suggests acknowledging the concept of person as primitive i.e. as a concept that cannot be analysed further in a certain way or another. That means: "the concept of a

person is the concept of a type of entity, such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation & co. are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type" (Strawson 101, 102). In other words, the states of consciousness cannot be ascribed at all, unless they are ascribed to persons (in Strawson's sense). It is to this concept of person, not to the pure ego, that the personal pronoun 'I' refers. Thus the concept of a person is logically prior to that of an individual consciousness.

Strawson names the predicates ascribing corporeal physical characteristics, M-predicates and those ascribing states of consciousness, P-predicates. All P-predicates may not be said to be ascribing states of consciousness but they all imply the possession of consciousness on the part of that to which they are ascribed.

P-predicates are essentially both self-ascribable and other-ascribable. One ascribes P-predicates to others on the strength of observation of their behaviour, but to oneself, not on the behaviour criteria. It is because of the special nature of the P-predicates, or of a class of P-predicates. To learn their use is to learn both the aspects of their use. We speak of 'behaving in a depressed way' and of 'feeling depressed'. Feelings can only be felt not observed, and behaviour can only be observed not felt. But to have the concept like 'X's depression', the concept must cover both what is felt by X and what is observed by others. "It is not that these predicates have two kinds of meaning. Rather, it is essential to the single kind of meaning that they do have, that both ways of ascribing them should be perfectly in order". (Strawson 1959, 110)

4. Appreciation and criticism of Strawson's theory

Strawson makes an attempt to show that the concept of person is primitive or simple in the sense that it cannot be further analysed. The whole argument is based on a group of central P-predicates which are other-ascribable and self ascribable. Persons cannot be defined as a union of mind and body because the possession of mental properties as well as physical properties presupposes that the owner is a person. His subtle point is that the criteria of application of any particular psychological state or property are indistinguishable from the criteria of application of physical properties unless the subject has already been identified as a person.

However, we think that one must call to mind that Strawson's theory of persons does not meet at least some important aspects of the mind-body problem, although he explicitly pretends to deal with it. His attempt, we think, has resulted not in solving the problem, but in escaping it or explaining it away. What he does is only to suggest that there is no problem with the concept of person, so to say, 'if you consider it like this', that is to say, if you consider the concept in a non-Cartesian and non-physicalistic way, the problem vanishes. In other words: his suggestion to consider the concept of person as primitive does not solve the traditional problem of the relation between mind and body, ontologically considered. So he offers only a conceptual solution to a real problem. And it is the real problem with which philosophers of mind deal with, especially under the influence of modern neurosciences. For instance Strawson's conceptual analysis cannot cover problems in the context of questions concerning mental causation. How should we explain the causal relevance of mental states in the physical world in a Strawsonian way?

In addition to the above-mentioned general semantic problem, we believe in particular that it is simply not the case that the concept of person, as we have it even in our ordinary language, cannot be further analysed. As long as we can conceptually distinguish between M-predicates and P-predicates of persons, are we not analysing "person"? As long as we speak of persons as, for instance, having intentions or making experiences, and of persons as having physical properties like weight or shape or something like that, are we not analysing them?

Furthermore: The key idea of ascription of M-predicates and P-predicates are, as we think, to be reconsidered. 'To ascribe' is to consider as 'belonging to'. 'Belonging to' can be understood at least in two senses. In the first sense, as we think Strawson does, M-predicates and P-predicates are ascribed to persons, as a kind of underlying *substratum* of these predicates. In the second sense, one might take it in a more 'Russellian' or 'tropist' way, i.e. persons, so to say, as *made of* M-predicates and P-predicates or properties. In the first *Aristotelean* sense persons are real subjects of properties; in the second sense persons are a kind of sum total or bundle of properties. We cannot deal here with the second alternative. But we want to point out that Strawson, as a theorist following the first way, must presuppose, that there is, necessarily, something that already exists, before you ascribe M- or P-predicates to it. But: if the concept of person has to be primitive, as Strawson's theory requires, it should not be able to refer to something which exists, at least conceptually, without M-predicates and P-predicates.

Another aspect of criticism may be that Strawson's criteria can be applied to other living beings like animals (perhaps to plants and trees) too, without any modifications. At least a big class of P-predicates can be applied to any sort of animals. No doubt, animals also have experiences; they too feel pain and so on. Even the behaviour of plants can be interpreted in a vocabulary using P-predicates. If this is the case, how does Strawson distinguish between animals and plants on the one hand and *human* persons on the other, if at all he distinguishes? Or does he intend to raise animals and plants to the level of human beings and to credit them too with personhood? How to argue for this rather radical thesis? These and some similar questions are left open from Strawson's treatment of the concept of persons.

One has to admit that Strawson actually does not discuss this question whether animals can be ascribed the status of persons at all. Of course, he shouldn't be accused of what he doesn't deal with, but doing systematic philosophy we think we are to point it out.

In this context it is also worth mentioning that it is difficult to distinguish between Strawson's concept of a person and the concept of a human being, understood as the concept of a member of a biological species. Obviously the concept of a human being can also be analysed in terms of M- and P-predicates. Is Strawson of the opinion that there should not be such a distinction at all? – Then he is confronted with all the problems concerning the "traditional concept" of persons, which takes "person" as synonymous with "member of the species of human beings". We just want to call to mind arguments from authors in the field of artificial intelligence research, who regard it as a kind of "racism" to exclude all sorts of computers or robots from personhood because of conceptual reasons.

5. Summary

To sum up we can mention, that Strawson's theory may be seen as a conclusive theory of the concept "person". Nevertheless it cannot solve the main problems of a philosophy of personality or personhood as they are discussed nowadays in philosophy. It is an open question whether we can reformulate Strawson's theory or we must refute it altogether. At any rate we can come to the conclusion that it is short-handed to be applied to a modern theory of personality without more detailed considerations.

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Some Reflections about Wittgenstein's *Bezugssystem*

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Only a few months before his death, Wittgenstein invited us to imagine "that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid"; nevertheless he warned "this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid" (OC 96). Those hardened propositions provide a certainty which is "like a mighty force whose point of application does not move, and so no work is accomplished by it" (Z 402). There are many things that seem to be fixed, things which are removed from the traffic: they are "so to speak shunted onto an unused siding" (OC 210). Those things just give "our way of looking at things, and our researches, their form" (OC 211). Maybe they were once disputed; but perhaps, for unthinkable ages, they have belonged to the scaffolding of our thoughts.

Wittgenstein himself admitted there is no sharp boundary between propositions of logic and empirical propositions (OC 319); besides, he noticed that the concept "proposition" (*Satz*) is not a sharp one (OC 320). As Wittgenstein pointed out, we shall consider a proposition as grammatical only if it is used so (RC III, 19), that is, a proposition may be grammatical or empirical depending on the context where it appears (cf. Z 427; OC 98). We can say about an empirical proposition "One could imagine this in another way" or "One could imagine the opposite too" (cf. RFM IV, 4), while the proposition which can be imagined only as true becomes grammatical and loses its temporal nature (cf. OC 57): in fact, these are propositions about which language users agree, although it would be more suitable to regard those propositions as "nonsense" (PI 252), or like a mere whistling or a simple humming (Z 401). One of the examples Wittgenstein chose to show what he meant by "grammatical proposition" was "Every rod has a length" (PI 251). He says when we try to imagine that proposition, the only we can imagine is a rod: there is no room to imagine a picture of the opposite. We can imagine a rod, but not "Every rod has a length". Anyway, we must not forget that whenever attention is paid to an apparent but isolated grammatical proposition, it will always be possible to contemplate such proposition as empirical, although this should demand to put it in a context we shall have chosen *ad hoc*. In this sense, we can resort to a golden rule which consists in imagining that apparent grammatical proposition is employed to teach a child how any term from such proposition can be used: for example, we could choose "Every rod has a length" to show somebody how the nouns "rod" and "length" are used, but also to teach that boy or girl how he or she can use the adjective "every" or the verb "to have".

Empirical propositions that count as certain for us are countless (OC 273), and the truth of these propositions (OC 83) belongs to our frame of reference (*Bezugssystem*). By the way, when I refer to a frame of reference I shall allude to the channel made up by grammatical (or hardened) propositions. For this point I base mainly on what Wittgenstein said once about such frames. In his opinion, every empirical (or fluid) proposition can work as a rule if that proposition is verified and immobilized in such a way that all the representation revolves around it; so that proposition becomes a part of the frame of reference and independent of facts (RFM VII,

74): in the end the hardened proposition becomes a paradigm to judge experience (RFM VI, 22), that is to say, it becomes a norm of description (*Norm der Beschreibung*) (OC 167). At the bottom of this frame there is a grammatical basis shared by every human being since it will make sense to talk in terms of "human beings" only if one can say all of them have sensations; they see; are blind; hear; are deaf; are conscious or unconscious, etc. Wittgenstein pointed out these characteristics can be said "only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being" (PI 281): I think the words in brackets, "behaves like" (*sich ähnlich benimmt*), place the emphasis not on the beings (or even "things" such as automata) which resemble living human beings, but on the common human form of life itself. On the other hand, it is obvious there are very different cultures and societies: a Tibetan Buddhist monk and an Irish fisherman share, as I said above, a common form of life, but besides, each of them is immersed in a rather different form of life which means different habits and a different linguistic community. So the main point is not how to draw the boundary between two different forms of life, but the fact that there are different forms of life.

Since all languages are founded on convention (PI 355), that is, since they require not only agreement in judgments and definitions (PI 242), but a regular connection between what people say and do too (PI 207), the idea of a "form of life" entails collective activities: there is no room for individual forms of life. By the way, the most famous example of this logical impossibility is the private language user's; as this individual should not lean on the common frame of reference, he has no criterion of correctness, and whatever is going to seem right to him is right (PI 258). The private language user is fated to see the ground vanishing under his feet because there is no room to talk about "right"; in other words, communication turns out to be impossible from the beginning. Sometimes, however, communication is possible but it may be hindered because of the appearance of solidified or grammatical propositions which are not shared by all the members of the linguistic community in question; in fact, the only requirement for these propositions is a practice which can be carried out not by one unique individual, but by individuals having mutual responses and interactions. Some circles of the frame of reference are wide enough to hold such propositions: it is true in some circles (for example, the grammar of sensations) there will not be room for these propositions, but they can proliferate in areas like religion, art, politics, or philosophy itself. So a remark like "You can't hear God speak to someone else, you can hear him only if you are being addressed" may be considered by a particular individual, for example Wittgenstein (Z 717), as grammatical, that is, as something which does not admit discussion and besides, supports to a large extent loads of his own customs and ideas, but another person can regard it as an empirical proposition because in his or her opinion it depends on divine will. In other words, someone can be uncertain where I am certain: Wittgenstein thought this is a fact of nature because concepts with fixed limits would involve a uniformity of behaviour (Z 374). From now on I shall talk about "individual grammatical propositions" whenever I refer to a grammatical proposition which can be understood but is not shared by the linguistic community in

question, that is, I shall always talk about "individual grammatical propositions" as opposed to a specific linguistic community.

In this paper I would like to pay attention to a specific kind of individual grammatical propositions, I mean, those individual grammatical propositions that show how some people are not able to see themselves in certain ways which all of us think they should have no problem to see themselves. To put an example, we can imagine the case of Bob. This head of the family studied economics a long time ago, but he has worked as a cook in burger bars since then. Bob meets his ex-mates from time to time. They have good jobs in banks and finance companies, but Bob works in a burger bar, is sixty, and knows he will never work as an economist: he knows it is too late. As time passed Bob felt more and more inferior to his ex-mates until the proposition "I am inferior to my ex-mates" became grammatical for him, that is, it became an individual grammatical proposition. Bob explains this point in numerical terms. As he says, nobody can doubt " $4 < 8$ ". So when " $8 < 4$ " confronts him, he says the sign " $<$ " has been misused; however, if Bob concentrates on the relation " $8 < x$ " when " $8 < 4$ " confronts him, then he will not see "4" as the number four, but only as a scribble. In the same way Bob cannot see himself as equal or superior to his ex-mates: he would exclaim at most "But that's not me! I can't see myself in that picture! Can you imagine yourself taking an oil tanker on your shoulders? And don't think of a cartoon, think of the ship!".

In this case the proposition in question has become a paradigm to judge experience only for a specific person; obviously there are millions and millions of persons who fortunately have not an inferiority complex, but there are many people undergoing this problem: in fact, anybody could have this complex. In spite of everything, if we thought Bob's problem is limited to get flustered whenever he meets one of his ex-mates and nothing more, we would make the mistake G. Ryle (Ryle 1984, 44) highlighted several decades ago. As Ryle pointed out, there are many people "expecting dispositions to have uniform exercises": they think these are single-track dispositions, that is to say, they assume there is one-pattern intellectual processes in which these dispositions are actualised. But appearances can be deceptive: if we wished to unpack all that is conveyed by a dispositional concept, we should have to produce, as Ryle remarked, "an infinite series of different hypothetical propositions". Regarding Bob's case, we can imagine easily that besides getting low marks in self-esteem tests, being pessimistic to face up to some tasks, etc, Bob often could repeat expressions of the kind of "I am a failure", "I have no right to be happy", "My wife will always be disappointed in me", ... Thus far, however, all these points are common to ordinary inferiority complexes, but one of the distinguishing features of individual grammatical propositions is that individuals are prone to assimilate as grammatical another derived propositions too. So Bob can meet bankers and economists of whom he does not know whether they studied in the same university he finished his degree course: be that as it may, Bob will be prone to feel inferior to these bankers and economists as if they were his ex-mates; in the same way, Bob will be prone to feel inferior to another persons who have been successful in their professional careers, such as engineers, lawyers, physicians, etc. Bearing in mind that Bob assimilated these points as grammatical certainties, he would be prone also to consider "I am a failure", "I have no right to be happy", or "My wife will always be disappointed in me" as grammatical propositions. The mere fact that Bob cannot talk about or see himself as he could before this

assimilation shows the great influence these propositions have on Bob.

Since "everything lies open to view" (PI 126), everybody can find out his own individual grammatical propositions attending to his own use of language. From this standpoint the result of philosophy is simple (cf. Z 452), but we are tempted to go further than we should. By the way, Wittgenstein warned us of one of the main difficulties in philosophy: "to begin at the beginning. And not try to go further back" (OC 471). It is true the common frame reflects our own form of life, that is, the ungrounded activities we engage in, but I am afraid whoever tries to face his own philosophical problems often will have to be ready to find out the beginning in what I have called "individual grammatical propositions". So if we played down the variations allowed by grammar in the individual paradigms through which we confront experience, we would go against our own interests, but besides, if we played down those variations, we would not be doing justice to the man who said that working on philosophy is a working on oneself.

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Von Lebensform oder Lebensformen zu Sprachspielen: Neue Gedanken zur Haller/Garver-Debatte

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Eine Lebensform kann als eine bestimmte Art menschlichen Handelns verstanden werden. Die Handlung spiegelt wider, was Menschen für gegeben halten, insoweit die Menschen überhaupt über ihre Handlungen reflektieren. Deshalb basiert Gewißheit nicht auf einer Überzeugung, sondern vielmehr auf einer Art von Handlung. Lebensformen sind ständig Veränderungen ausgesetzt, nichtsdestoweniger sind sie in einen relativ festen Rahmen eingebettet. Wittgenstein führt daher in *Über Gewißheit* die Flußbett-Metapher als ein suggestives Bild für verschiedene Lebensformen oder Lebensweisen ein, die natürlich selbst wiederum einer permanenten Veränderung unterliegen. Die Idee, daß menschliche Lebensweisen sich grundsätzlich wandeln, macht Wittgensteins Konzept außergewöhnlich. Dieser allumfassende Hintergrund unserer Handlungen konstituiert, was Wittgenstein als *Naturgeschichte* bezeichnet.

Für den Moment lege ich die Annahme zugrunde, daß es zwei verschiedene Arten gibt, wie wir über Lebensformen reden könne¹: Ein Konzept ist das der individuellen Lebensform aus der Sicht des Einzelnen, der versucht, sein eigenes Dasein in der Welt zu erklären. Ein solches Konzept bestimmt eine Lebensform als essentiell singular und muß keine Referenz zu irgendetwas anderes als der Lebensform machen, um die es sich dreht. Die andere Alternative ist das kollektive Konzept einer Lebensform. Sie interessiert sich vor allem für den sozialen Kontext, indem die verschiedenen Lebensformen miteinander interagieren. Die Idee einer individuellen Lebensform, die der Einzelne in seinem Kopf hat, bedeutet nur, die eigene Lebensform hervorzuheben, die sich in den Handlungen jedes Einzelnen manifestiert; während eine Person, die sich als Teil einer kollektiv geteilten Lebensform versteht, sich mit dem sozialen Kontext und den Interaktionen innerhalb dieses beschäftigt. Ein solches Individuum versucht, die verschiedenen Lebensformen innerhalb des sozialen Kontexts zu verstehen, aber zielt nicht darauf ab, die besonderen Handlungen eines Einzelnen ganz nachzuvollziehen.

Es mag verlockend sein, anzunehmen, daß es denkbar sei, diese zwei verschiedene Arten einer Lebensform, oder wie man sagen könnte, diese zwei Lebensformen an sich (also die Form, die mit der Lebensform des Einzelnen und die, die mit dem sozialen Kontext, korrespondiert) einfach miteinander zu verbinden. Im sozialen Umfeld erlaubt die Idee einer Lebensform einen Hinweis (obwohl Konflikte immer möglich sind, als ein Resultat von Mißverständnissen, Ignoranz, Arroganz, oder Dummheit), daß Konflikte vermeidbar sind oder zumindestens überkommen werden können, wenn wir uns den größeren Zusammenhang vor Augen führen, indem unsere Handlungen eingebettet sind. Im Gegensatz dazu führt uns die Lebensform im engeren Kontext der „individuellen“ Lebensform zu einer Methode des Erklärens und Katalogisierens von menschlichem Handeln, die durch die „menschliche Natur“ und die größeren

Rahmenbedingungen des menschlichen Lebens als solches bestimmt ist.

Der Wunsch immer eine Erklärung des individuellen Verhaltens liefern zu können, ist essentiell der Ausdruck des Wunsches immer wissenschaftlich, also rational, die Dinge verstehen zu können. Natürlich kann das Konzept einer wissenschaftlichen Erklärung auch als ein gemeinsamer Wunsch der Menschen angesehen werden, jedoch ist es genau diese Verwissenschaftlichung des menschlichen Lebens und Handelns, die Wittgenstein in *Über Gewißheit* hinterfragt. Wittgenstein lehnt die Annahme radikal ab, daß Wissenschaft Gründe für das geben kann, was wir glauben zu wissen. Er widerspricht der Überzeugung, daß wir wissen, wenn wir vorhersagen oder erklären was passiert, immer angenommen, daß wir die Regelmäßigkeiten, die in der Natur auftauchen, überhaupt identifizieren können. Dieses Argument ist potentiell radikal. Für Wittgenstein gibt es also eine Grenze der Wissenschaft, die eintritt, wenn es um menschliches Lebens und Handeln geht. Unsere Handlungen basieren weder auf einigen ultimativen Grundsätzen noch besteht Wissen nur auf einer Kapazität vorherzusagen oder zu erklären. Im Kontrast zu G.E. Moore's Annahme, daß das was wir wissen, auf bestimmten nicht hinterfragbaren und absoluten Grundsätzen basiert – „Ich weiß, daß dies eine Hand ist.“ –, argumentiert Wittgenstein, daß wir keine Gründe haben können, unserem Wissen zu vertrauen, und uns sogar das Gegenteil vorstellen können, nämlich nicht zu wissen, was wir glauben zu wissen. Wir nehmen also ganz selbstverständlich an, zu wissen, ohne Gründe dafür geben zu können.²

Es ist dieses Vertrauen in unser Wissen, daß uns erlaubt, zu handeln. Laut Wittgenstein ist die Grundlage unseres Handelns das Handeln selbst. Und wenn wir handeln, tun wir dies oft nur, weil wir keine andere Wahl diesbezüglich haben. Jedoch ist es das wichtigste Faktum unseres eigenen Handelns, daß jegliche Art von Handlung eine besondere Bedeutung für den Einzelnen hat, so daß wir, wenn wir handeln, nicht aufhören uns zu fragen, warum wir dies tun. Beispielsweise folgen wir Regeln, gehorchen auf Befehle, bestrafen bestimmte Handlungen, geben Befehle, verfassen Berichte, beschreiben Farben, entwickeln ein Interesse an den Gefühlen anderer, üben mathematische Rechenregeln oder halten religiöse Gebote ein etc., ohne eigentlich überhaupt über diese Wissen zu haben, also über sie etwas zu wissen. Die Tatsache, daß solche Regeln, Rechenregeln oder Befehle nicht wissbar sind, ist der entscheidende und wichtige Punkt. Wittgenstein schlußfolgert allerdings aus dieser Tatsache nicht, daß wir, da wir Dinge als selbstverständlich annehmen, die wir nicht rechtfertigen können, deshalb eine Art Essentialismus zugrundelegen müssen.

Jedoch führt die Art von Gewißheit, die wir empfinden, wenn wir handeln, dazu, daß wir uns zumindestens fragen, von wo die Gewißheit für unsere Handlungen entspringt. Für Wittgenstein ist die Gewißheit oder Sicherheit unseres Handelns ein Teil unserer *Naturgeschichte*. Jede unsere Handlung trifft immer auch

¹ Ich will hier nicht die Diskussion über „Lebensform“ und „Lebensformen“ zwischen Newton Garver und Rudolf Haller wiederholen. Der Leser wird leicht erkennen, daß ich Haller in dieser Frage zustimme.

² Diese Sichtweise wird manchmal als die „nicht-epistemische“ Interpretation bezeichnet.

auf die Handlungen anderer. Dieses Zusammentreffen von Handlungen produziert das Gefühl von Sicherheit oder Gewißheit, das uns dann wiederum das Gefühl verschafft, daß unsere Handlung *ex post facto* gerechtfertigt war. Unser gesamtes Handeln basiert auf diesen ultimativen Konditionen und sie erlauben keine weiteren Rechtfertigungen. Handeln ist vielmehr ein „praxeologisch“ begründetes Konzept. Es ist dieses Überlagern unserer eigenen Handlung mit der Handlung anderer, und die Möglichkeit mit anderen auf diese Weise zu interagieren, die für uns konstituiert, eine Lebensform mit anderen zu teilen. Allerdings bedeutet dies auch, daß es nur im Kontext mit anderen ist, mit denen wir interagieren, daß eine Lebensform ein Konzept an sich wird. Wenn es keine anderen gebe, dann könnte auch das Konzept einer Lebensform nicht existieren, da eine einzelne Lebensform als solche nicht unterscheidbar wäre, und wir überhaupt nicht in der Lage wären das Konzept einer Lebensform zu realisieren. Deshalb können wir auch nie nur Kenntnis über eine Lebensform haben, sondern vielmehr haben wir, wenn wir überhaupt von einer Lebensform Kenntnis haben, immer schon Kenntnis über mehr als eine Lebensform. Das bedeutet nicht, daß das Konzept einer einzelnen Lebensform aufgegeben werden muß, aber das wir nicht nur eine besondere Lebensform unabhängig von anderen Lebensformen und den zwischen ihnen existierenden Unterschieden verstehen können. Lebensformen sind daher immer multipel, so daß sogar die Idee einer singulären Lebensform immer schon andere Lebensformen voraussetzt. Verschiedene Personen können verschiedene Lebensformen besitzen, und assoziiert mit diesen gehen verschiedene Weltbilder einher. Allerdings, obwohl jedes Individuum ein anderes Weltbild haben mag, muß dies nicht dazu führen, die Möglichkeit des Diskurses zwischen Menschen unmöglich zu machen.

In der Tat können Unterschiede zwischen Weltbildern nicht so groß sein, daß sie beiderseitig unverständlich oder gar inkommensurabel werden, denn wenn eine solche Unverständlichkeit denkbar wäre, dann wären wir auch nicht in der Lage, diese als andere Weltbilder oder assoziiert mit diesen als andere Lebensformen zu erkennen. Insofern gibt es hier eine Grenze möglicher Unterschiede, nicht nur zwischen den Weltbildern, sondern auch zwischen den Lebensformen, zumindest soweit, daß sie als Lebensformen verständlich bleiben. Sogar die Tatsache, daß wir nicht dieselben Kriterien für unser Handeln teilen mögen, also das unsere Gewißheit im Handeln auf unterschiedlichen Motiven basiert, würde nicht zu einer Unmöglichkeit des Verstehens der anderen Sichtweise führen. Solange eine Form des Diskurses möglich bleibt, insofern eine Chance besteht, den anderen durch Dialog und Argumente zu überzeugen, haben wir immer noch eine gemeinsame Basis. Diese Gemeinsamkeit ist bereits in der Möglichkeit der Handlungsüberschneidung vorausgesetzt, also durch das Faktum, daß wir irgendwie miteinander interagieren können. Die Kommunikationsmöglichkeit über verschiedene Weltbilder oder Lebensformen hinweg, basiert auf einer solchen Interaktion oder Überlagerung von Handlungen. Man könnte vielleicht auch direkter sagen, daß es unser Handeln und unsere Kapazität zu Handeln ist, die uns den authentischen Hintergrund schaffen, um die Unterschiede zwischen Unseresgleichen und anderen zu überbrücken.

Da Sprache unser Hauptinstrument ist, um uns auszudrücken, ist Sprache die entscheidende Komponente unseres Soziallebens. Das Problem, den anderen zu verstehen, und zu einer Wertschätzung der Lebensform des anderen zu kommen, wird deshalb ein zentrales Problem unseres Verständnisses der Art und Weise wie

ein anderer die Sprache benutzt. Obwohl eventuell Unterschiede zwischen verschiedenen Sprachen und Sprachspielen unser Verständnis vom anderen komplizierter machen, bleibt es eine Tatsache, daß ein solcher sprachlicher Unterschied nicht die Grundlagen unseres Verständnisses in einer Art und Weise betrifft, die Verstehen von Anfang an unmöglich machen würde.

Ein Sprachspiel ist für Wittgenstein ein miteinander verknüpfter Komplex verbaler und nicht-verbaler Handlung, von dem weder die verbale noch die nicht-verbale Komponente separiert werden kann. Es ist darüber hinaus eine Struktur, die sich aufgrund ihrer Natur jedem Versuch der Systematisierung oder Abstraktion verweigert. Deshalb muß man, wenn man die Bedeutung eines Wortes innerhalb eines Sprachspiels oder die Signifikanz eines bestimmten Verhaltens innerhalb des Spiels lernen will, partizipieren und lernen wie man das Spiel spielt. „Das Wesentliche des Sprachspiels“, lesen wir in *Ursache und Wirkung*, „ist eine praktische Methode (eine Art des Handelns) – keine Spekulation, kein Geschwätz.“³ In diesem Zusammenhang spiegelt der Charakter von Sprachspielen den Charakter von Lebensformen wider, nämlich daß sie nur als menschliche Arten des Handelns verstanden werden können. In der Tat könnte man sagen, daß Sprachspiele und Lebensformen Parallelkonzepte sind. In den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* faßt Wittgenstein diesen Punkt zusammen, indem er sagt, daß sich eine Sprache vorzustellen nichts anderes bedeutet, als sich eine Lebensform vorzustellen.⁴ Natürlich folgt daraus eine weitere Frage: Was ist dann der Unterschied zwischen einem Sprachspiel und einer Lebensform?

Eine Art und Weise den hier vorliegenden Unterschied zu erfassen, heißt sich auf das zu fokussieren, was im Verstehen sowohl von einer Lebensform als auch eines Sprachspiels involviert ist. Beides umfaßt verbale und nicht-verbale Komponenten. Während eine Lebensform zu verstehen entwickelt und ausgedrückt werden kann (und es muß möglich sein, an einem mit dieser verbundenen Sprachverständnis anzukommen), verlangt das Erreichen eines Verständnis des Spiels, daß wir lernen, wie man es regelgemäß spielt. Es ist, so könnte man sagen, der nicht-verbale Teil, der hier im Vordergrund steht – vielmehr eine Art zu lernen wie man das Spiel spielt, als eine Art die Sprache selbst zu lernen. Die grundsätzliche Frage, die aufgeworfen wird, ist natürlich, ob es einen minimalen Anteil an Gemeinsamkeit zwischen zwei Akteuren geben muß, um zu erlauben, daß Unterschiede zwischen Lebensformen oder Konflikte zwischen ihnen, in den Blickpunkt treten. Eine solche Minimalvoraussetzung schließe ich aus, da keine Seite in so einem Diskurs, eine „unparteiische“ oder „externe“ Sichtweise nehmen muß, um die andere Lebensform verstehen zu müssen. Vielmehr können beide Seiten in den Diskurs aus ihrer respektiven Sichtweise und auf der Basis ihrer respektiven Sprachspiele eintreten.

Dieser spezifische Punkt wird in Wittgensteins späten Schriften deutlicher, wo er explizit die Möglichkeit neue Sprachspiele zu lernen und sich von einem Sprachspiel zu einem anderen Sprachspiel zu bewegen, berücksichtigt. Etwas, was selbstverständlich auch immer als eine notwendige Voraussetzung für jede Art von Transition oder Verständnis zwischen Lebensformen stehen muß. Sprachspiele sind daher nicht vollständig geschlossene Systeme, sondern vielmehr das Gegenteil, sie sind offen für Bewegungen zwischen

³ *Ursache und Wirkung: Intuitives Erfassen*, 116.

⁴ See PU, § 19, 245-246.

verschiedenartigen Artikulationen, die uns erlauben, ein Verständnis des anderen zu erzielen.⁵

Tatsächlich steht im Zentrum eines Sprachspiels die erfolgreiche gemeinsame Handlung, die sich mindestens zwischen zwei Akteuren ereignet, und zu der Möglichkeit der Ausweitung einer gemeinsamen Handlungsbasis und somit zu mehr Verständnis für den anderen führt. Erfolgreiches gemeinsames Handeln ist in einem Sprachspiel verankert, indem unsere Voraussetzungen auf dem „ohne jeden Zweifel“ anderer aufbaut. Es reicht nicht aus, anzunehmen, daß eine solche Offenheit und Abhängigkeit gegenüber dem anderen ein Defizit unserer Sprachkompetenz ist. Es ist im Gegenteil ein Hauptcharakter unserer Sprachfähigkeit, einen Grad von Offenheit zu beinhalten, der uns erlaubt, neue Möglichkeiten des Handelns und damit einhergehend neue Lebensformen zu entdecken.

Eine Besonderheit der Sprachphilosophie Wittgensteins ist die Tatsache, daß er Sprache nicht nur auf Regeln basierend versteht, sondern vielmehr auf einer Sprachkompetenz, die als menschliche Freiheit, Regeln wieder und wieder zu formulieren, verstanden werden kann. Es gibt daher keine Sprachregeln, die einfach uns aufkotroyiert werden, obwohl wir einigen allgemein akzeptierten Regeln folgen und nur manchmal von unserer Fähigkeit, neue Regeln zu formulieren, Gebrauch machen. In Wittgensteins Worten: „...neue Typen der Sprache, neue Sprachspiele, wie wir sagen können, entstehen und andre veralten und werden vergessen.“⁶ Diese Fähigkeit Regeln zu formulieren, ist eine Art von linguistischer Kernkompetenz der Menschen, und es ist diese Kompetenz, die uns erlaubt, Transitionen zwischen zwei Sprachspielen zu vollziehen, ohne erst via ein *tertium comparationis* gehen zu müssen. Veränderungen in der Sprache sind essentiell mit dem Konzept von Sprachspielen verbunden. Sprachspiele sind variabel und vorläufig, und können, wie man bei Haller lesen kann, gleichfalls mutieren; insbesondere können menschliche Gemeinschaften Sprachspiele erfinden, diese pflegen und gegebenenfalls auch wieder vergessen.⁷ Wenn immer der geerbte Hintergrund sich ändert, kommen Fragen über die Beziehung zwischen der Realität der Welt und dem Grund, aus dem die Sprache entspringt, auf, und tauchen in immer neuen Sprachspielen wieder und wieder auf.

Die Beziehung zwischen Sprache und Welt, die den Grund jedes Sprachspiel ausmacht, kann somit als ein Leitmotiv der Wittgensteinschen Sprachphilosophie begriffen werden. Philosophie leitet sich aus den „tiefen Beunruhigungen“⁸ ab, die wie Wittgenstein in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* gleichfalls sagt, „...so tief in uns [wurzeln] wie die Formen unserer Sprache“⁹. Menschen sind vielmehr so sehr in der Sprache eingebettet und diese ihnen antrainiert, daß sie zur „zweiten Natur“ wird, und Sprache somit zu einem komplexen Zusammenhang von Verhaltensmustern Anlaß gibt, das unser Verständnis wie Sprache arbeitet überdeckt. Um dann aber herauszufinden, wie Sprache arbeitet, müssen wir mit einer Tat anfangen, einer Handlung, d.h. also mit einem Sprachspiel, daß uns einen gewissen Grund von Gewißheit in Form eines besonderen Modus von Praxis verschafft. Wie Wittgenstein bemerkt: „Die primitive Form des Sprachspiels ist die Sicherheit, nicht die Unsicherheit. Denn die Unsicherheit könnte nicht zur Tat führen. Ich will sagen: es ist charakteristisch für

unsere Sprache, daß sie auf dem Grund fester Lebensformen, regelmäßigen Tuns, empowächst.“¹⁰

Da das Sprachspiel auf einer Interaktion im sozialen Kontext basiert, hängt es sowohl von unseren eigenen Handlungen als auch von denen anderer ab. Das Sprachspiel ereignet sich nicht in einem Nirgendwo, in einem Vakuum, sondern immer innerhalb einer bestimmten Lebensform.

Jede Lebensform ist vielmehr wiederum zurückgebunden an einen gemeinschaftlichen Aspekt von Sprache, daß uns die Tatsache bewußt macht, daß wir Teil einer Tradition und Mitglied einer Sprachgemeinschaft sind. Die Lebensform, die wir erworben haben, ist tief verwurzelt in dieser Gemeinschaft. Diese Gemeinschaft folgt gewissen Regeln und Bräuchen, ebenso wie gewissen Verhaltensweisen und Traditionen, die wiederum sowohl unsere Sprachspiele als auch unsere Lebensformen bilden. Als Mitglied einer solchen Gemeinschaft realisieren wir, daß die Traditionen und Setzungen dieser Gemeinschaft bereits vom ersten Tag an, als wir in diese Welt geboren wurden, in unserer Sprache und in unserem Handeln eingebettet waren, da tatsächlich, „[die] Regelmäßigkeit unsrer Sprache unser Leben [durchdringt].“¹¹

Unser Wissen und unsere Sprache basieren genau auf dem gleichem Hintergrund, sozusagen auf dem gleichen harten Grund, aus dem unsere Fähigkeit Sprachspiele zu spielen erwächst. Diese „Natur“, die wir oft auch als *Naturgeschichte* bezeichnen, ist nichts anderes als das Besitzen einer Lebensform. Es resultiert aus dem Faktum, daß Menschen Teil des sozialen Kontexts sind, der es möglich macht, zu einem gemeinsamen Urteil und einem gemeinsamen Handeln zu kommen, und daher auch zur Möglichkeit eines Verständnisses des anderen. Konsequenterweise könnten wir mit Wittgenstein sagen, daß zu versuchen, zu einem Verständnis anderer Lebensformen zu kommen, etwas ist, was „...so *machen* wir es eben. Das ist so bei uns der Brauch, oder eine Tatsache unserer Naturgeschichte.“¹² Die moderate Form des linguistischen Relativismus, auf die dies hier hinausläuft, kann auch als Hinweis auf die „praxeologische Begründung“ angesehen werden, die am Grund eines jeden Sprachspiels steht. Diese schließt die Möglichkeit aus, eine neutrale Sichtweise zu adoptieren, die von Philosophen vertreten werden könnte. Offensichtlich ist die Transition von einem Sprachspiel zu einem anderen etwas, mit dem wir vertraut sind. Die Tatsache, daß wir keine „objektiven“ Kriterien oder eine „externe Sichtweise“ haben, verursacht, wie wir gesehen haben, keine Probleme für Bewegungen zwischen Sprachspielen und ist daher auch kein Hindernis für das Verstehen. Wittgenstein stellt deshalb fest: „Du mußt bedenken, daß das Sprachspiel sozusagen etwas Unvorhersehbares ist. Ich meine: Es ist nicht begründet. Nicht vernünftig (oder unvernünftig). Es steht da – wie unser Leben.“¹³

Das Formen und Verfestigen von Lebensformen ist nicht etwas, was in einer direkten Art und Weise, sondern vielmehr durch die Mittel eines bestimmten Sprachspiels geschieht, an dem ein individueller Akteur teilnimmt. Es ist nur innerhalb solcher Sprachspiele, daß Konflikte zwischen Lebensformen entstehen. Wenn man bedenkt, daß die Fähigkeit ein Sprachspiel zu spielen eine Voraussetzung für ein Konflikt der Lebensformen ist, können wir annehmen, daß Konflikte von Lebensformen immer Konflikte zwischen verschiedenen Artikulationen

⁵ Vgl. Schneider, 28-29.

⁶ PU, § 23, 250.

⁷ Vgl. Haller, 117-118.

⁸ Vgl. PU, § 111, 299.

⁹ Vgl. *ibid.*, § 111, 299.

¹⁰ Ursache und Wirkung: Intuitives Erfassen, 115.

¹¹ ÜF, § 303, 102.

¹² BGM, I, § 63, 61.

¹³ ÜG, § 559, 232.

solcher Formen sind. Als solche sind sie nicht unlösbar. Wenn immer wir daher Lebensformen gegenüberstellen, führt dies nicht notwendigerweise dazu, daß wir eine Form einer anderen überlegen fühlen, sondern gegebenenfalls auch zu einer Bereicherung von beiden durch Analogie. Darüber hinaus folgt aus einem Konflikt von verschiedenen Lebensformen nicht, daß eine von beiden im *status quo ante* verharren muß.

Obwohl es keine Rechtfertigung gibt, eine Lebensform einer anderen vorzuziehen, versteht Wittgenstein individuelle Urteile als gerechtfertigt, selbst dann wenn sie ungerechtfertigt geschehen. Daher besitzen individuelle Urteile in Konfliktsituationen ein Recht an sich. Wie er bemerkt: „Ein Wort ohne Rechtfertigung gebrauchen, heißt nicht, es zu Unrecht gebrauchen.“¹⁴ Daher sollten wir auch wirklich Erfahrungen und Fakten mit anderen austauschen. Der Austausch sollte uns zu neuen Konzepten führen und helfen, eine gemeinsame Basis für unser Verständnis zu finden. Wenn man bedenkt, daß die Menschen gemeinsame Handlungsvereinbarungen sowie einen gemeinsam geteilten Kontext für Sprache haben, ist es ihnen auch möglich, neue Konzepte, und somit neue Lebensformen zu entwickeln. In *Zettel* schreibt Wittgenstein: „Es ist Erfahrungstatsache, daß Menschen ihre Begriffe ändern, wechseln, wenn sie neue Tatsachen kennenlernen.“¹⁵

Es ist mein Verständnis von Wittgenstein, daß er die Bedeutung unserer *Naturgeschichte*, die den Hintergrund zu unseren Sitten und Bräuchen, unseren Regeln und sozialen Institutionen, unserer geerbten Lebensform ebenso wie unserer Sicherheit, die wir glauben zu haben, wenn wir handeln, hervorhebt. Von diesem Hintergrund, oder vielleicht besser besagtem Flußbett, entspringt unsere Sprache. Ohne diesen geerbten Hintergrund wäre weder Sprache noch Veränderungen in unseren Urteilen und Lebensformen möglich. Ich reklamiere nicht, daß Wittgenstein unsere Probleme in bezug auf Lebensformen und Sprachspiele gelöst hat; dafür bleibt nach wie vor zuviel unklar. Aber er hat uns sicherlich geholfen, einen Ausgangspunkt zu finden, von dem aus wir ein Verständnis für Konflikte von Lebensformen entwickeln können.¹⁶

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¹⁴ PU, § 289, 372.

¹⁵ Z, § 352, 355.

¹⁶ Vgl. Kroß, 163.

The State as an Artificial Person by Hobbes

Ligia Pavan Baptista, Brasilia

The British Civil War (1642-1651) as well as its former conflicts, were the background not only of Hobbes's political trilogy *The Elements of Law* (1650), *De Cive* (1642) and *Leviathan*, (1651) but also of his work *Behemoth* (1668) specially dedicated to these happenings from a historical rather than a philosophical point of view. Expressing his feeling in a shocking way, from the point of view of a disappointed citizen, the author stresses that if someone could have a sight of England between the years 1640 and 1660, he could not have found another period in history where violence and brutality were worse than that. In his own evaluation, the historical scenario could not have been worse than the one he testifies. As an attempt to restore the former State's order, broke up by the public disorders just before the British Civil War, the author turns his mind to the study of the causes of conflicts and wars between men and the necessary ways to avoid them. Under the pressure of the historical circumstances he leaves behind his surveys in the field of natural philosophy that in his own evaluation brings nothing else than a private pleasure of mind and any kind of improvement towards humankind's welfare.

Still due to the pressure of the historical environment, the author's survey on politics is placed above any other field of his philosophical investigation. Whether superior or not to theoretical philosophy, political philosophy is certainly more necessary than the former. The welfare of the mankind in face of historical troubled moments has certainly changed the ancient hierarchy of the philosophical knowledge.

The British author feels obliged to focus his analysis exclusively on practical philosophy, urging the search for peace and conflict resolution primarily through educational reforms and claiming for it a central place in the university curriculum. Stressing a great hope that his survey on politics should be considered somehow useful, Hobbes presents his conclusion of the second part of *Leviathan* explicitly comparing his work to Plato's *The Republic* as follows:

"I am at the point of believing this my labour, as uselesse, as the Common-wealth of Plato; For he also is of opinion that it is impossible for the disorders of State, and change of Governments by Civill Warre, ever to be taken away, till Sovereigns be Philosophers. But when I consider again, that the Science of Naturall Justice, is the onely Science necessary for Sovereigns, and their principall Ministers; and that they need not be charged with the Sciences Mathematicall, (as by Plato they are,) further, than by good Lawes to encourage men to the study of them; and that neither Plato, nor any other Philosopher hitherto, hath put into order, and sufficiently, or probably proved all the Theoremes of Morall doctrine, that men may learn thereby, both how to govern, and how to obey; I recover some hopem that one time or other, this writing of mine, may fall into the hands of a Sovereign, who will consider it himselfe, (for it is short, and I think clear), without the help of any inteeested, or envious Interpreter; and by he exercise of entire Sovereignty, in protecting the Publique teaching of it, convert this Truth of Speculation, into the Utility of Practice." (Hobbes, *Leviathan*, XXXI)

The transition from medieval to modern political thought through the renaissance period means, above all, that the role of God in political matters should be minimised or rather totally abolished. On the other hand, the role of man reaches a new status. The contractualist philosopher, followed by Locke and Rousseau, stresses that the King as God's representative on Earth is definitely replaced by a new concept of the State, which is supposed to be, not only as artificial as possible, but also as profane as possible. Neither a product of God, such as presented by the Medieval thought, neither of nature as it was formerly defined by political thinkers, such as Robert Filmer (1588-1653) and Jean Bodin (1530-1596) stress respectively in *Patriarcha* (1680) and *Six Livres de la République* (1576), the State, on its modern sense, is a human creation.

As an artificial person the political power is, from this point of view, understood as artificially built by means of a contract with no connections with the power that could rule the private sphere.

As a key starting point of his modern political thought Hobbes stresses, above all, that the political power lies not anymore in God's but rather in men's will, in other words, that the political power is an artefact. Its legitimacy lies therefore on human's will as its origin.

"For by Art is created that great Leviathan called a Common-wealth, or State, (in latine Civitas) which is but an Artificiall man;" (Hobbes, *Leviathan*, "The Introduction")

Furthermore, he distinguishes a political commonwealth from other kinds of sovereign powers such as, for instance, the master towards his slaves and the father towards his family, named sovereignty by acquisition. Either named *polis*, *civitas*, republic, commonwealth, civil Estate, civil power, civil government, political power, and up to the nineteenth century also, the civil society, or, in the metaphorical sense, leviathan, the sovereign, the prince, a monster, a ship, a political body, a civil person, an artificial person, the State is, in opposition to the so called state of nature, intrinsically or essentially related to the public sphere.

The Hobbesian masterpiece *Leviathan* stresses that not only the sovereign but also the citizens should be aware of the very first principles of the political science that he is, according to his own judgement, founding. Hence, the author suggests in his conclusion that the scientific knowledge on politics presented in *Leviathan* should be printed and primarily taught in the universities. Ironically, they all have been forbidden due to their atheist contents. On the other hand, as a clear way of stressing the approach from the perspective of those who are under the power of the sovereign, whether sovereignty is concentrated in a single man (monarchy) or an assembly of men (aristocracy and democracy), Hobbes former treaty is entitled *De Cive*.

Hobbes names "leviathan" or just "sovereign" the one who holds the political power. His masterpiece title indicates that, the sovereign, inspired in the monster presented in the Bible's tradition, should be able to terrify those who are under his power either named subject, citizen or people.

Although history plays an important role Hobbes refuses to mention any kind of historical roots for the science of politics he is founding. Pretending to be recognised as a pioneer, he is extremely reluctant to locate his own ideas in any familiar intellectual or historical context. While Machiavelli describes and analysis the behavior of several rulers facing many different political crises, Hobbes, one the other hand, through a direct criticism of Aristotle *Politics*, seeks to establish a connection between politics and a rigid scientific methodology based on the principles of geometry. In order to emphasise the original feature of his inquires, Hobbes criticises the moral philosophers primarily due to the lack of methodology as well as to the lack of appropriate use of language. Dedicating his work *De Cive* to William of Devonshire, he stresses that geometry is to be understood as the base of any science, including the political science he is founding.

The contractualist tradition stresses a single origin for political power: the contract, also called by Hobbes pact or covenant, and later on by Rousseau, social contract. Any other possible origin for the State such as the divine right, the natural right, or the use of force are, from that point, definitely eliminated and replaced by a consensus or a common agreement expressed by the contract. Even in the case of a monarchy, Hobbes argues that the political power lies not anymore in God's but rather in man's will, and, in this sense, it is also an artifact or, in Hobbes's words, a *persona ficta*.

The Christian idea of the bloody as the key-element of political legitimacy was by the middle of the Seventeenth Century definitely superseded by the recently created notion of "consent" based on the individual free will. The divine right of kings as well as the idea of king's power as derived from the natural authority of parents, defended by Filmer (1588-1653) in his best-known work *Patriarcha* (1680), is replaced by an artificial approach that settles the contract as the only source of political power. Central to the Hobbesian political theory is the artificial nature of the political power.

"One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence." (Hobbes, *Leviathan*, XVIII)

While a natural person represents himself, an artificial person represents the words and actions of another one. The distinction is central for his theory of the sovereign as a representative from those who have established the political power through the contract. (Hobbes, *Leviathan*, XVI)

Hobbes defines its modern meaning, as a direct and exclusive result of a contract where the contracting parties are just a multitude of men in a free willing action.

Settling the State as an artificial person, that means, a creation of human reason, the author presents the process of transferring the natural right to a common representative through a contract, as the key-element that establishes not only the State but also settles the civil rights and duties of the citizens as well as the ones of the sovereign. It is important to bear in mind that sovereignty, according to his view, could be one person or an assembly. The contract is, therefore, the source not only of the State but also of justice itself.

The common agreement expressed through a contract is the element that defines the modern concept of the State, providing also its legitimacy. There is no other

origin for the State than a mutual contract between men, stresses Hobbes followed by Locke, Rousseau and Kant.

The Hobbesian conception of *persona ficta*, also stresses the contract as the only possible origin to any kind of political association. The same idea could be found in Kant's definition of the political power rather considered as moral person than its territory.

Either considered an artefact or a divine product, one must stress that the political power has the same end, that means, to assure peace and security. If the origin of the State has changed, one can say, from God's to human's will through a contract, in other words, from nature to artefact, its goals, one should emphasise, have remained the same. Although presenting very different approaches on their political theories, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant as well as the ancient and medieval thinkers such as Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and Marsilio de Padua do, nevertheless, agree that the nature and causes of conflicts among men and States are the subject of political philosophy, a branch of philosophy that, in opposition to metaphysics and epistemology, has a very accurate purpose: to promote the necessary means for peace.

Person und Zeit. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Paul Ricœur und Marcel Proust

Ulrike Bardt, Koblenz

1. Die menschliche Existenz in ihrer zeitlichen Dimension

Nach dem Versuch der Vorsokratiker, über Bleibendes und Veränderungen nachzudenken und im Anschluss an Platons Charakterisierung der Zeitmodi definiert Aristoteles die Zeit als „Zahl der Bewegung“ nach ihrem Vorher und Nachher. Zeitpunkte sind dabei Grenzen von Zeitintervallen, deren Länge mit Hilfe von Himmelskörpern gemessen wird. Die Aristotelische Kette der Zeitmomente erlaubt lediglich die Differenzierung von Früher und Später, nicht aber von Vergangenem und Zukünftigem.

Bekanntlich war es Augustinus, der als erster das dialektische Moment des Zeitdenkens erfasst hat bei seinem Versuch, die überkommenen Aporien des Nachdenkens über die Zeit zu lösen. Dabei ist der Ausgangspunkt seiner Überlegungen die These von der Irrealität der Zeit, d.h. die Vergangenheit *ist nicht mehr*, die Zukunft *noch nicht*, das Wesen der Gegenwart besteht darin, flüchtig und ausdehnungslos zu sein. Augustinus löst dieses Problem mit dem Entwurf einer dreifachen Form von Gegenwart: Wenn Vergangenheit und Zukunft auch nicht sind, so existieren doch die Qualitäten des Vergangenen und des Zukünftigen, indem wir uns erzählend auf sie beziehen. Mit diesem Aufweis, dass das Zukünftige Erwartung, das vergangene Erinnerung und das Gegenwärtige Aufmerksamkeit voraussetzt, werden die drei Zeitformen in eine erweiterte Gegenwart überführt, als deren Ort die menschliche Seele bestimmt wird.

Wie Augustinus nicht in der Lage ist, die Ausdehnung der physikalischen Zeit aus der ‚distentio‘ der Seele hervorzubringen, so scheitert jeder Versuch, die lebendige Gegenwart aus dem Aristotelischen Moment abzuleiten, d.h. zwischen der phänomenologischen und kosmologischen Konzeption ist kein Übergang denkbar. Die sich bei Augustinus und Aristoteles ergebende Aporie bestimmt auch alle weiteren Versuche in der Philosophiegeschichte, die Zeit zu denken. Auch Heidegger beispielsweise ist es nicht gelungen, die Abkünftigkeit der von ihm so genannten ‚vulgären Zeit‘, d.h. die Zeit der Sukzession von zählbaren Momenten, von der ursprünglichen Zeitlichkeit des Daseins aufzudecken.

Paul Ricoeur erkennt in dem Ansatz Augustinus‘ den „genialen Gedanken des Elften Buches der *Bekennnisse*, an den Husserl, Heidegger und Merleau-Ponty anknüpfen“ (Ricoeur 1988, S. 32), aber auch den Ort des Augustinischen Fehlschlags. Den Versuch, aus der Zerspannung der Seele die Möglichkeit der Zeitmessung verständlich zu machen, betrachtet er insofern als unbefriedigend, da als Grundlage die Eindrücke verstanden werden, die vorüberziehen.

Im Rahmen der sich anschließenden Untersuchung ergeben sich folgende Fragen:

Wie löst Ricoeur die aus dem Augustinischen und Aristotelischen Zeitdenken resultierende Aporie, die kosmologische Zeit einer Abfolge von Jetztpunkten und die phänomenologische Zeit einer Zukunft und Vergangenheit implizierenden Gegenwart auseinander hervorzubringen?

Auf welche Weise vollzieht die Erzählung eine Vermittlung zwischen der chronologischen und der nicht-chronologischen Zeitdimension?

Kann bei verschiedenen Formen des Erzählens eine gemeinsame Struktur festgestellt werden, die in einem Zusammenhang steht mit unserer Zeiterfahrung?

Welche Rolle besteht zwischen der Fabelkomposition und der lebendigen Zeiterfahrung?

Wie funktioniert – am Beispiel von Prousts *A la recherche du temps perdu* bei dem Erzählen der Vergangenheit einer Person das Wechselspiel zwischen der erinnerten Zeit, der Zeit des Erinnerns und der fiktiven Zeiterfahrung?

2. Das Verständnis zeitlicher Dimension menschlicher Existenz durch Erzählkonfiguration

Die Lösung, die Ricoeur in *Zeit und Erzählung* vorsieht, besteht darin, Aristoteles in gewisser Weise auf Augustinus‘ Aporien antworten zu lassen. Dabei greift er aber bemerkenswerterweise nicht Aristoteles‘ Zeitdenken auf, sondern lässt dessen *Poetik* auf die *Bekennnisse* antworten, indem die ‚distentio animi‘ einen Widerpart in der vom Mythos erzeugten Kohärenz findet, die Ricoeur als diskordante Konkordanz herausarbeitet. Die Komposition der Fabel besteht darin, heterogene Faktoren in einer Geschichte zusammenzusetzen. Durch die Integration dieser heterogenen Faktoren in die Geschichte versieht letztere sie mit einer Verständlichkeit, die das genuine Produkt der Konfiguration der Geschichte darstellt. Sofern die Fabel sich auf menschliche Handlungen bezieht, geht es darum, von diesen ein kohärentes Modell zu entwickeln. Über die zeitlichen Implikationen der Handlung hebt die Integration des Heterogenen in eine einheitliche Gestalt zugleich die Spannung zwischen den auseinanderbrechenden Zeitdimensionen in einem Modell der Konkordanz auf. Die dissonante Konkordanz, welche die Zusammensetzung der Fabel erarbeitet, kann deshalb als eine zeitliche Synthesis des Heterogenen gefasst werden. (vgl. Mattern 1996, S. 161)

Dabei geht Ricoeur davon aus, dass der zeitliche Charakter der menschlichen Erfahrung die spezifische Dimension der Referenzansprüche jedes narrativen Werks ist. Der indirekte Weg zur menschlichen Existenz im Rahmen ihrer zeitlichen Dimension kann nur über eine Analyse ihrer Sprachspiele, die als Erzählungen zusammengefasst werden, erfolgen.

Die Dimension der Konfiguration bringt durch ihre Überführung der Sukzession in eine konfigurierte Ordnung eine bedeutungsvolle Ganzheit hervor, die es ermöglicht, ihren Sinn oder ihr Thema zu benennen. Zu erzählen oder einer Geschichte zu folgen bedeutet, das Sukzessive als bedeutungsvolle Ganzheit zu erfassen. Die Zeitlichkeit ist narrativer Natur, insofern als es sich um eine zwischen Ereignis und Konfiguration vermittelnde Zeit handelt.

Das Erzählen einer Handlung, dies soll nun am literarischen Beispiel von Prousts *A la recherche du temps perdu* erörtert werden, bearbeitet die Paradoxa des Augustinischen und des Aristotelischen Zeitdenkens, indem sie Vergangenheit, Zukunft und Gegenwart jenseits des rein sukzessiven Zeitflusses in eine komplexe Beziehung bringt, die durch immer neue Erzählkonfigurationen neue Verständnismöglichkeiten der zeitlichen Dimension der menschlichen Existenz entwirft.

3. Marcel Prousts *A la recherche du temps perdu* als Fabel von der Zeit

An den Anfang seiner Beschäftigung mit Proust stellt Ricœur die Frage, ob es legitim sei, *Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen Zeit* (*A la recherche du temps perdu*) eine Fabel von der Zeit zu nennen. Dabei blendet er die Frage aus, ob das Werk die Vermengung einer angeblich chiffrierten Autobiographie des Verfassers mit der fiktiven Autobiographie der Hauptperson darstellt.

Die Zeiterfahrung wird zum zentralen Thema des Werks und zwar nicht durch die Anlehnung an die realen Erfahrungen des Verfassers, sondern auf Grund des Vermögens literarischer Fiktion, einen Erzähler-Helden zu schaffen, der sich auf der Suche nach seinem Selbst befindet, wobei die Zeitdimension auf dem Spiele steht. Wenn Ricœur auch die Gleichnamigkeit Marceles, des Erzählers und Helden der *Recherche* hervorhebt, so schreibt er doch den Fiktionsstatus nicht autobiographischen Anleihen Prousts zu, sondern einzig der narrativen Komposition des Romans, die in einem Entwurf der Welt besteht, in welcher der Erzähler und Held sich darum bemüht, den Sinn eines früheren, fiktiven Lebens aufzuspüren.

Ricœurs erste These bezieht sich also darauf, die Figur des Helden und des Erzählers ohne Einschränkung als fiktive Entität zu begreifen, die von der Fabel der Zeit getragen wird. Er verweist dabei zunächst auf Gilles Deleuzes Interpretationshypothese, das vorherrschende Thema der *Recherche* sei nicht die Zeit, sondern die Wahrheit. Prousts Werk basiert nach Deleuze auf dem Lernen von Zeichen; als Beispiele nennt er die des Gesellschaftlichen, der Liebe, der Kunst etc. Dies stellt nach Ricœur die Einschätzung der *Recherche* als Fabel von der Zeit jedoch nicht in Frage. Als das herausragende Phänomen der *Recherche* bezeichnet er, dass sowohl das Erlernen von Zeichen als auch das überraschende Eintreten unwirklicher Erinnerungen in Form eines endlosen Umherirrens vorgestellt wird. Den Zyklus der *Recherche* vergleicht er mit einer Ellipse, deren Brennpunkte Suche und Heimsuchung darstellen: „Die Fabel von der Zeit hat dann die Beziehung zwischen den beiden Brennpunkten der Recherche zum Gegenstand.“ (Ricœur 1989, S. 224). Eine andere Interpretationslinie, welche ein Verständnis der *Recherche* als einer Fabel von der Zeit in stärkerem Maße widerspricht, besteht nach Ricœur in Anne Henrys Anfechtung des narrativen Primats der *Recherche* in *Proust romancier, le tombeau égyptien*. In der Romanform erblickt sie die auf die Anekdotenebene verlegte Projizierung eines anderswo gewonnenen philosophischen Wissens, das der Erzählung bloß äußerlich ist. Alle Proust-Interpreten sind sich jedoch in dem Punkt einig, dass die *Recherche* mehr als eine bloß fiktive Autobiographie darstellt; es handelt sich auch um einen fingierten Roman. Nach Ricœur geht es nicht mehr um die Frage, „wie die Suche nach der verlorenen Zeit, die als Ursprungsmatrix des Werks gilt, mit rein narrativen Mitteln die Wiederaufnahme der romantischen Problematik der verlorenen Einheit ins Werk setzt.“ (Ricœur 1989, S. 226) Auf der Grundlage seiner Theorie der Narration

unterscheidet er in Prousts Werk mehrere ‚narrative Stimmen‘: Der Held erzählt seine Gesellschafts-, Liebes-, Sinnes- und Kunstabenteuer, wobei der Aussageakt die Form eines der Zukunft zugewandten Fortschreitens annimmt, obwohl sich der Held erinnert. Dies kann als ‚Zukunft in der Vergangenheit‘ bezeichnet werden, welche die *Recherche* ihrer Auflösung zuführt. Die Stimme des Erzählers ist jedoch dem Fortschreiten des Helden voraus, weil er die von ihm erzählte Erfahrung mit der Bedeutung ‚wiedergefundener‘ und ‚verlorener Zeit‘ versieht.

Im Folgenden will ich hauptsächlich den von Ricœur erörterten Fragen nachgehen, d.h. welches die Zeichen des Wiederfindens von Zeit für denjenigen wären, dem der Schluss der *Recherche* in der *Wiedergefundene[n] Zeit* vorenthalten würde und welche Beziehungen zwischen ‚wiedergefundener‘ und ‚verlorener Zeit‘ hergestellt werden.

4. Die Bedeutung des Phänomens der ‚wiedergefundene[n] Zeit‘

Der Leser von *In Swanns Welt*, der noch nicht über die rückblickende Interpretation verfügt, die das Ende des Romans auf seinen Beginn projiziert, kann noch keine Zusammenhänge herstellen zwischen dem Zimmer in Combray, in dem ein halb erwachtes Bewusstsein den Verlust seiner Identität empfindet und der Bibliothek im Haus der Guermantes, in der ein überwachtes Bewusstsein eine entscheidende Erleuchtung erfährt. Kennzeichen dieser Eröffnung werden allerdings vom Erzähler gegeben, der Bemerkungen einstreut wie „Lange Zeit bin ich früh schlafen gegangen“ (Proust 1979, 1, S. 9), die auf ein grenzenloses Vorher hinweisen, das keinerlei Abstandsbezeichnungen im Verhältnis zur Gegenwart des Aussageaktes aufweist. In dieses ‚Einst der Halbwachheit‘ erscheinen zwei Kindheitserinnerungen eingebettet, welche die Erzählung um zwei Stufen von der absoluten Erzählergegenwart entfernt. Der Erzähler drückt die ‚verlorene, verschwundene Zeit‘ beispielsweise folgendermaßen aus:

„Alles das liegt jetzt Jahre zurück. Die Wand des Treppenhauses, auf dem ich den Schein seiner Kerze immer näher rücken sah, existiert längst nicht mehr. [...] Es ist jetzt sehr lange her, daß mein Vater nicht mehr zu Mama sagen kann: ‚Geh doch mit dem Kleinen‘. Solche Stunden können nie wiederkehren für mich.“ (Proust 1979, 1, S. 53)

Der ‚wiedergefundene[n] Zeit‘ verleiht er Ausdruck durch gelegentlich eingestreute Bemerkungen wie die folgende:

Aber seit kurzem fange ich an, wenn ich genau hinhöre, sehr wohl das Schluchzen zu vernehmen, das ich vor meinem Vater mit aller Macht unterdrückte und das erst wieder ausbrach, als ich mit meiner Mutter allein war. In Wirklichkeit hat es niemals aufgehört; nur weil das Leben um mich jetzt stiller ist, höre ich es von neuem [...]. (Proust 1979, 1, S. 53)

Diese Erinnerungen selbst ranken um eine einzigartige Episode, das Erlebnis mit dem Madeleine-Törtchen, welches das Tor der Erinnerung öffnet und die erste Andeutung der ‚wiedergefundene[n] Zeit‘ ermöglicht. Proust spricht in diesem Kontext von der Schwäche des ‚mémoire involontaire‘, der ‚willkürlichen Erinnerung‘. Es bleibt dem Zufall anheimgestellt, ob wir die ‚verlorene Zeit‘ wiederfinden. So wird auch derjenige, der die Schlusszene in der Bibliothek des herrschaftlichen Hauses der Guermantes nicht kennt, in der die Wiederkehr der ‚verlorenen Zeit‘ mit dem Schaffen eines Kunstwerks

verknüpft wird, durch die Episode mit der Madeleine auf eine falsche Spur geführt. Erst bei einem zweiten, durch die *Wiedergefundene Zeit* aufgeklärten Lesen, entfalten die vorbereitenden Hinweise des Erzählers ihren Sinn.

Wie das Erlebnis mit der Madeleine innerhalb von *In Swanns Welt* das Vorher der Halbwachheit und das Nachher der ‚wiedergefundene Zeit‘ von Combray abgrenzt, so grenzt die große Szene in der Bibliothek des Guermantes ebenfalls ein Diesseits ab, dem der Erzähler einen bedeutenden Umfang zugestanden hat und ein Jenseits, in dem die letzte Bedeutung der ‚wiedergefundene Zeit‘ zutage tritt.

Das unvollendet hinterlassene Manuskript von *Die wiedergefundene Zeit* beginnt mit der Erzählung eines Aufenthalts in Tansonville in der Nähe des Kindheitsortes Combray, dessen Wirkung nicht darauf abzielt, die Erinnerung zu beleben, sondern im Gegensatz dazu den Wunsch danach verlöschen zu lassen. Proust zufolge muss man darauf verzichten, die Vergangenheit noch einmal zu erleben, wenn man es darauf anlegt, die verlorene Zeit auf eine unbekannte Weise wiederzufinden. Alle Ereignisse, über die im Folgenden berichtet wird, stehen im Zeichen der Dekomposition: Gilbertes Erzählung von der zerbrochenen Beziehung zu ihrem Ehemann Saint-Loup, der Besuch der Kirche in Combray, deren dauerhafter Bestand die Hinfälligkeit ihrer Besucher unterstreicht, die Erwähnung der langen Zeit, die der Erzähler in einem Sanatorium weilte, was zu der nötigen Ferne und Distanz der Schlussversion beiträgt, die Frivolität der Pariser Salons, die in Vergessenheit geratene Dreyfus-Affäre, das Zusammentreffen mit Charlus, dessen Körper von Verfall gekennzeichnet ist etc. Ricœur spricht in diesem Zusammenhang von einem narrativen Übergang zwischen der Erzählmasse und der entscheidenden Szene in der Bibliothek, der den „Sinn des Bildungsromans von dem Erlernen der Zeichen in eine Heimsuchung umschlagen lässt.“ (Ricœur 1989, S. 244) Auf einer tieferen Reflexionsebene sei „die Spekulation über die Zeit in der Erzählung verankert als das grundlegende Ereignis der Berufung zum Schriftsteller.“ (Ricœur 1989, S. 245) So bedeutet die ‚wiedergefundene Zeit‘ nicht bloß die ‚verlorene wiedergefundene Zeit‘, sondern die Aufhebung der Zeit überhaupt durch die Fixierung der Betrachtung von Zeit in einem bleibenden Werk: Die Erzählung stellt so ein Verhältnis zwischen den Brennpunkten einer Ellipse dar, „dem Erlernen der Zeichen mit seiner verlorenen Zeit und der Offenbarung der Kunst mit ihrer Verherrlichung des Außerzeitlichen. Dieses Verhältnis kennzeichnet die Zeit als wiedergefundene, genauer als verlorene und wiedergefundene Zeit.“ (Ricœur 1989, S. 250)

5. Fazit

Die zu Beginn meiner Untersuchung gestellten Fragen könnten folgendermaßen beantwortet werden: Wie sich an Prousts Werk exemplarisch aufzeigen lässt, löst das Erzählen einer Handlung die Paradoxa des Augustinischen und des Aristotelischen Zeitdenkens auf, indem es Vergangenheit, Zukunft und Gegenwart jenseits des rein sukzessiven Zeitflusses in eine komplexe Beziehung bringt, die durch immer neue Erzählkonfigurationen neue Verständnismöglichkeiten der zeitlichen Dimension der menschlichen Existenz entwirft. Die fiktionale Erzählung bietet ein Laboratorium fiktiver Zeiterfahrungen, die imaginative Variationen über die Kluft zwischen den Zeitvorstellungen vollziehen können. Die Erzählung vollzieht eine Vermittlung zwischen der chronologischen und der nicht-chronologischen Zeitdimension, indem die Fiktion gewissermaßen einen Bedeutungsraum zwischen Weltzeit und gelebter Zeit

schafft, wenn sie historische Ereignisse, Personen und Orte mit fiktiven variantenreich vereinigt. Sie eröffnet auf diese Weise Möglichkeiten, die Bezüge zwischen der gelebten Zeiterfahrung ihrer Personen und der Zeit der Ereignisse in der Welt in neuen Varianten auszugestalten und durch diese Variationen in neuer Weise verständlich zu machen. Auf dieser Kreation von neuen Verstehensmöglichkeiten beruht die gestaltende Kraft des poetischen Schaffens. Mit dem anderen Verstehen der Zeit wird ebenfalls der Horizont einer anderen Zeitlichkeit eröffnet und damit eine völlig neue Weise, die Zeitlichkeit zu erfahren.

Die gemeinsame Struktur, die bei verschiedenen Formen des Erzählens festgestellt werden kann, besteht darin, dass jede Fabelkomposition heterogene Faktoren in einer Geschichte zusammensetzen und diese dadurch mit Verständlichkeit zu versehen vermag. Die Analyse der fiktiven Zeiterfahrung – so lautet das Fazit Ricœurs – hat etwas „als die *Welt des Textes* zu denken [aufgegeben], was durch die *Lebenswelt des Lesers* zu ergänzen ist, ohne welche die Bedeutung des literarischen Kunstwerks unvollständig bleibt.“ (Proust 1989, S. 270) Auf diesen Zusammenhang, der zwischen den verschiedenen Formen der Fabelkomposition und der lebendigen Zeiterfahrung besteht, verweist Ricœur in *Das Selbst als ein Anderer*, wenn er festhält, dass „literarische Erzählungen und Lebensgeschichten nicht nur einander nicht ausschließen, sondern sich – trotz oder wegen ihres Kontrastes – ergänzen.“ (Ricœur 1989, S. 200)

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On the *Austere* Conception of Nonsense

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The *Tractatus* is a book that presents a dilemma to its reader. The dilemma can be described briefly in the following manner: what is written in the *Tractatus* will appear possible to understand to a careful reader. But at the end of the book, in 6.54, the author declares that “his propositions” are to be recognized as nonsensical. The reader who thinks that he has reached a reasonable understanding of the *Tractatus* is thus left with the realization that he has in fact failed in his attempts to do so. Put in an even more compact manner: although the *Tractatus* might seem possible to understand, we are not supposed to be able to, according to its author. One way of dealing with the dilemma is to try to make nonsense into something more than just plain nonsense. It can be done by amending the ordinary meaning of the term “nonsense” in such a way that understanding and gaining insight from the nonsense of the *Tractatus* does not represent any direct conflict with Wittgenstein’s statement in 6.54.

James Conant is preoccupied with criticizing this kind of solution to the *Tractatus*-dilemma, or at least that is how it seems. He has presented a reading according to which there is “only one kind of nonsense; *mere nonsense*”, and he refers to this conception of nonsense as the “austere conception” (Conant 2000 p.191). The claim that there is exclusively “mere” nonsense makes it natural to assume that Conant’s approach will result in a solution to the dilemma of a radically different character than the one outlined above. The name “austere conception” indicates that Wittgenstein will be taken very seriously and perhaps literally, when using the term “nonsense” in the *Tractatus*. We might also expect willingness on Conant’s side to deal with whatever consequences that may follow from this radical approach. While trying to get a grip on Conant’s interpretation, I started to suspect that such expectations would not be met. In this paper I will discuss two solutions to the dilemma: one briefly outlined in my introductory remarks and the solution presented by Conant. My main focus will be on the latter.

Conant uses the term “substantial conception of nonsense” when speaking of the first kind of solution. According to its proponents there are two types of nonsense; 1) “substantial” or “illuminating” nonsense and 2) “misleading”, “bad” or “mere” nonsense (ibid. pp.176-177, 191). The most important function of the first type is to serve the purpose of conveying insight into matters that cannot be spoken of with meaningful propositions according to the *Tractatus*. The second type of nonsense has no such function (Conant 2000 p.191). According to Conant, some proponents of this approach are confused about the *tractarian* distinction between “saying” and “showing”: They think the distinction should be applied not only to use of language that satisfy the criteria of meaningfulness found in the *Tractatus*, but also to “illuminating” nonsense which, according to them, *show* ineffable aspects of reality (ibid. pp. 178-179). This allows for some nonsense, viz. the propositions of the *Tractatus*, to be elucidatory via their ability to convey insight. The problem of how nonsense is able to form part of a cognitive process, leading to “the throwing away of the ladder”, will thereby be prevented from arising.

Conant presents an alternative solution based on the “austere” conception of nonsense. The main principle, as I understand it, is that there is only one kind of nonsense from a *logical* point of view, “mere nonsense”: utterances or combinations of words where no logical syntax is discernable (ibid. p.191). In view of the central role logic plays in the *Tractatus*, defining nonsense as language use where no logical syntax can be found precludes it from the realm of cognition and rationality. The *Tractatus*-dilemma is therefore especially acute to the austere reading; nonsense has in a radical way been excluded from what is possible to understand or gain knowledge from. Having pointed this out, I suggest that we consider the two following questions: 1. What is meant by the term “nonsense” in the *Tractatus*? 2. What status do the propositions found in the *Tractatus* have?

Proponents of the “substantial” conception of nonsense can be seen as concentrating on the first question: Their solution to the dilemma is given under the assumption that Wittgenstein in 6.54 is referring to the whole of *Tractatus* - all of its propositions are declared nonsensical (give or take the Preface). This demands an adjustment of the meaning of “nonsense” in order to avoid the dilemma; hence they focus on the question of what is meant by this term by Wittgenstein. I will now try to make it clear how Conant’s solution can be seen as focusing on the second question listed above. It will now be of use to be reminded of what Wittgenstein says in 6.54:

“My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has climbed over through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.” (Wittgenstein 1986)¹

Interpreting this remark as Wittgenstein declaring that all the propositions of the *Tractatus* are nonsensical is a mistake according to Conant - Wittgenstein is only referring to some of its propositions, (Conant 2000 p.216). Conant presents guidelines as to how we can decide to which category a remark belongs: The main principle is found in a distinction between the remarks that form “the frame of the work” and those that belong to “the body of the work”. The former type has the role of “preparing the way” for the remarks that form part of “the body of the work” (ibid.). The latter type of remarks function elucidatory in that they are to be recognized as nonsensical, and are what Wittgenstein is referring to as “nonsensical” in 6.54, according to Conant. It is important to note that deciding to which category a remark belongs cannot be based on any intrinsic properties of the remark itself. Conant claims that it will depend on “the kind of sense a reader of the text will [...] make of it” and on the “sort(s) of aspect it presents” to a reader in such a way that it “will depend on *her* – on the use(s) to which she is drawn to put it in the course of her ascent [up the ladder].” (ibid. p. 217).

In the solution offered by Conant, the propositions of the *Tractatus* are thus divided into different categories.

¹ I have amended C.K. Ogden’s translation since it ignores the difference between “unsinnig” and “sinnlos” in this remark.

He explicitly tells us that understanding some of the remarks of the *Tractatus* as *sinnvoll* is a presupposition for achieving the elucidatory purpose of the work as a whole. Only in so far as we can understand the "instructions" offered by the remarks that belong to the frame of the work, are we able to reach the philosophical goal illustrated by the metaphor of the ladder in 6.54 (ibid. p.216). It should now be clear that Conant can be seen as focusing on the second question that was introduced earlier: What status do the propositions found in the *Tractatus* have? If we connect this question to the *Tractatus*-dilemma, we could say that instead of making distinctions within nonsense, Conant introduces distinctions within the remarks of the book. Naturally, the question of what Wittgenstein means by "nonsense" is also central to his discussion. Briefly, his answer goes as follows: By "nonsense" Wittgenstein means language use where "no method of symbolizing has yet been conferred upon a string of signs". It is implied in this formulation that we have not given any meaning to an utterance or to some of its parts (Conant 2002 pp. 403-4).

Now, I suggested that Conant makes distinctions within the propositions of the book *instead* of making them within nonsense. It is however not at all clear that this is an adequate way of putting it: We have learned that the arbiter of what kind of role a proposition has in the *Tractatus*, according to Conant, is the reader. Decisions on the status of propositions in the *Tractatus* appear to be an individual matter – what is nonsense to me might not be nonsense to you. The reason why we should differ, as I understand it, is connected to the difference in degree or character of the philosophical confusions we are suffering from. In a pre-tractarian stage we will be under different illusions that the *Tractatus* is aiming at liberating us from (Conant 2000 p.196-197). As a consequence, answers to the question of which propositions serve an elucidatory role will vary from reader to reader. Let's look at a passage from Conant's text:

"[...] the *Tractatus* is not concerned to argue that there are no ways to distinguish between kinds of nonsense – or even that there is no distinction to be drawn in the neighborhood of the distinction sought by the proponent of the substantial conception (i.e. one which marks off cases of "philosophical" nonsense from (other) cases of mere nonsense – but only that there are no *logically* distinct kinds of nonsense [...]. The coherence of the entire procedure of the work, indeed, rests upon the assumption that there *is* a distinction to be drawn [...] the *Tractatus* takes it to turn on *psychologically* distinct kinds of nonsense."(ibid. p. 209)

It is evident here that according to Conant there are in fact distinctions to be drawn within nonsense. He mentions "philosophical" as opposed "to (other) cases of mere nonsense" and claims that what makes his reading different from the "substantial" conception of nonsense is that there are "psychologically distinct kinds of nonsense", but not "*logically* distinct" kinds. We must also look at another passage:

"Question: which sentences are (to be recognized) as nonsensical? Answer: those that elucidate [...] Not every sentence of the work is (to be recognized) as nonsense. For not every sentence serves as an elucidation."(ibid. p. 216)

When these passages are seen together, we may conclude that what distinguishes "philosophical" nonsense from other kinds of nonsense, within the category of "mere" nonsense, is that it serves an elucidatory purpose. It should be clear from the passages above, that if asked whether all nonsensical use of language qualify as

elucidatory, Conant's answer would be negative: there's potentially "elucidatory" nonsense and there's complete nonsense - without the potential to play any elucidatory role. Let's take a new look at the *Tractatus*-dilemma.

My starting-point consisted of two different solutions to the dilemma of 6.54 in the *Tractatus*. The first solution, based on the "substantial" conception of nonsense, tried to escape the problem of how we appear to understand the sentences of the *Tractatus*, whilst the author tells us that they are nonsensical, by introducing different kinds of nonsense. The solution presented by Conant was on the other hand introduced, as an approach according to which there are no distinctions to be made within nonsense and hence no help to find in adjustments of the meaning of the term itself. Conant seemed instead to turn to a division of the sentences of the *Tractatus*, so that it would be legitimate to understand some of them, but in accordance with 6.54 to recognize others as nonsensical. As it turned out however, Conant makes use not only of distinctions within the remarks of the *Tractatus*; distinctions within nonsense are also part of his solution to the dilemma. A difference between the two solutions is instead found *in the way* some nonsense serve an elucidatory purpose – not in the reliance on distinctions between types of nonsense. According to the "substantial" conception, elucidatory nonsense *shows* ineffable aspects of reality that may help us gain the insight necessary to "see the world rightly". According to the "austere" reading the very recognition that certain cases of language use result in nonsense is the aim of elucidation in the *Tractatus* (ibid. p. 198). We must however add that this applies only to "philosophical" cases of "mere" nonsense. Another difference from the substantial conception is the introduction of distinctions within the remarks of the *Tractatus*; Conant claims that we must take some of the remarks as "sinnvoll". Our impression that we have understood at least some of the remarks becomes unproblematic since we are supposed to be able to understand them. Hence a suitable conclusion to my discussion would be to say that the name "austere conception of nonsense" does not reflect an approach to the dilemma according to which there are no distinctions to be drawn within nonsense. I wish, however, to add two comments to the picture we have reached. They concern aspects of Conant's solution to the dilemma that might conceal a tension in the guidelines he offers to an understanding of the work.

We have been told that whether a remark in the *Tractatus* is found to be nonsensical or not depends on the role it has in the work for a particular reader. If the reader realizes that it is nonsensical it has served an elucidatory purpose, helping the reader in the ascent up the ladder. This in turn is related to facts concerning the character of the philosophical confusion the reader is entangled in. In giving this account Conant is opposing interpreters who think that it is possible to find out by examining a string of words whether it is a specimen of nonsense or not. He claims that it is a misunderstanding to presuppose "that certain strings of signs are intrinsically either cases of *Unsinn* or cases of *Sinn*" and that questions of nonsensicality "depend on us" (ibid. p. 216). He further claims that "[t]here can be no fixed answers to the question of what kind of work a given remark within the text accomplishes" (ibid.). At the same time, however, he provides examples of remarks that belong to "the frame of the work" and must be recognized as *sinnvoll* (ibid. Conant mentions the Preface, §§ 3.32-3.326, 4-4.003, 4.111-4.112 and 6.53-6.54.). One would expect that this is the sort of interpretative move that cannot be made according to his reading; Conant's acting as the *voice-over* of the *Tractatus* stands in contrast to his own account of how questions

about the status of particular remarks must be settled by the individual reader of the work.

My second comment concerns the claim that there are *psychological* distinctions to be made within nonsense according to the *Tractatus*, while no *logical* distinctions are possible to make. I think it is reasonable to connect this claim to Conant's account of how it depends on *us* whether we recognize a remark in the text as nonsensical and that there will, as a consequence, be variation between different readers on these matters. What will stop one reader from realizing that a remark is nonsensical, as opposed to another, will be the specific misunderstandings of "the logic of our language" he is suffering from. A successful reader will eventually realize *which* of the remarks of the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein is referring to in 6.54, and that they are nonsensical. The aim of Wittgenstein's philosophical project will then be achieved. Since the only kind of distinctions within "mere" nonsense Conant allows for are psychological distinctions, we must assume that whether a remark in the *Tractatus* (which is part of "the body of the work") is recognized as nonsense or not, depends on psychological facts about the reader and on the psychological effects a remark has on him.

It is of importance here that Conant emphasizes that the early Wittgenstein adheres to Frege's three principles from *The Foundations of Arithmetic*, the first of which reads: "always to separate sharply the psychological from the logical, the subjective from the objective" (Frege 1989 p.X, Conant 2000 pp.180, 189). Part of the assumption of a strong continuity between the two philosophers in this respect is that the notion of a thought in a *strict logical sense* is seen as operative in the *Tractatus* (ibid. pp. 193-4). These factors lead to a wide gap between what is psychological and what is logical/cognitive. Conant's claim that only nonsensical remarks are potentially elucidatory commits him to an account of "elucidation" as belonging to the psychological realm. It is therefore reasonable to describe how elucidation functions in the *Tractatus* according to Conant in the following way: The starting-point is a person in a certain psychological state which is caused by exposure to philosophical texts and to the nonsensical remarks of the *Tractatus*. These remarks are of a psychologically distinct kind and trigger a process within the reader; he goes through a certain "experience" (ibid. p.197) resulting in the removal of the confused state as he realizes that some of the remarks in the book are nonsensical. Only after having gone through this "experience" is the attainment of a certain intellectual state possible, that of "seeing the world rightly" (6.54). Conant argues that philosophy, as practiced in the *Tractatus*, depends on the reader going through this psychological process of elucidation (ibid. pp.196-197). This might appear to be in order in view of e.g. 4.112: "A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations." But it becomes difficult to account for remarks that bespeak a very different conception of philosophy, such as 4.1121:

"Psychology is no nearer related to philosophy, than is any other natural science."

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Personen als Handelnde - Ein Problem für den Naturalismus

Armin Berger, Innsbruck

Der Begriff der Person steht in engem Zusammenhang mit dem Rechtsbereich, wo zwischen juristischen und natürlichen Personen unterschieden wird. Juristische Personen sind Rechtssubjekte, welche den Status der Rechtsfähigkeit durch spezielle gesellschaftlich normierte Akte erlangen. Als „natürliche Person“ hingegen wird der Mensch unabhängig von seinen gesellschaftlichen Rollen bezeichnet. Sowohl juristische als auch natürliche Personen sind Rechtssubjekte. Dies hat damit zu tun, dass Menschen als Handelnde aufgefasst werden und ihre Handlungen als rechtlich relevant betrachtet werden.

In der Philosophie wird gewöhnlich der Begriff der natürlichen Person untersucht, wobei sich die Untersuchungen gerne auf den engen Rahmen des Naturalismus beschränken, wo vom gesellschaftlichen Bereich des Normativen und des Rechts abgesehen wird. Es rückt die Frage nach der Identität von Personen ins Zentrum. Grob gesprochen lassen sich dabei zwei Strömungen unterscheiden. Die eine Strömung versucht, den Begriff der Person mittels des Bewusstseins von Menschen zu fassen. Die andere Strömung versucht dies mittels der Freiheit, aus Handlungsalternativen wählen zu können. Beiden Strömungen liegt gewöhnlich das naturalistische Anliegen zugrunde, Personen als Entitäten auffassen zu wollen, die ihren Platz innerhalb der kausalen Struktur der Welt einnehmen.

Ich möchte auf den Begriff der Person unter Berücksichtigung der *Handlungen* selbst eingehen, d.h. der Akte und insbesondere der Unterlassungen. Ich werde dabei jene handlungstheoretischen Probleme aufzeigen, die dem naturalistischen Anliegen entgegenstehen. Diese Probleme ergeben sich dadurch, dass der Begriff der Handlung nicht unabhängig vom gesellschaftlichen Bereich gefasst werden kann. Wenn Personen Handelnde sind, hängt nicht nur der Begriff der juristischen Person, sondern auch der Begriff der natürlichen Personen unmittelbar von jenem Bereich ab, von dem im naturalistischen Anliegen gerade abgesehen wird. Ich werde zeigen, dass die Bedingungen, die für Handlungen erfüllt sein müssen, auch dafür wesentlich sind, eine Person zu sein.

Dieser Aufsatz ist in drei Abschnitte gegliedert. Im ersten Abschnitt gehe ich auf den Naturalismus ein, im zweiten auf den Begriff der Handlung und im dritten auf die Konsequenzen für den Begriff der Person.

1. Naturalismus

Der Naturalismus stellt die heute vorherrschende Strömung in vielen Bereichen der Philosophie dar. Unter 'Naturalismus' verstehe ich hier jene Strömung, die alle Vorgänge in der Welt mittels der Naturwissenschaften zu erklären versucht. Insbesondere geht es um Kausalerklärungen, wonach alle Phänomene so zu deuten sind, dass sie in der kausalen Struktur der Welt Platz finden.

Es scheint mir ein Fehler zu sein, wie naturalistische Positionen vorschnell nur die kausale Wirklichkeit als real anzunehmen. Neben der kausalen Wirklichkeit (Außenwirklichkeit und Innenwirklichkeit) gibt es nämlich noch (unter anderem) das Geistige und das

Soziale. Naturalisten gehen davon aus, dass Geistiges und Soziales entweder auf die kausale Wirklichkeit zurückzuführen sind oder aber, dass ihre Realität zu leugnen ist. Auf der einen Seite explizieren sie weder, was „zurückführen“ im Allgemeinen heißt, noch führen sie aus, wie diese Zurückführung im Besonderen aussieht. Auf der anderen Seite begründen sie nicht, warum Geistiges und Soziales, sofern es nicht auf kausal Wirkliches zurückgeführt werden kann, als nicht-real anzusehen ist. Es mag sein, dass sich der Naturalismus als erfolgreiches Forschungsprojekt erweisen wird. Um jedoch zu zeigen, dass Geistiges und Soziales tatsächlich auf kausal Wirkliches zurückgeführt werden kann, darf man sich nicht von vornherein nur mit Phänomenen des kausal Wirklichen befassen. Statt dessen müssen die Phänomene des Geistigen und Sozialen (vorerst) ernst genommen und genau analysiert werden. Wie soll man sonst diese Phänomene auf kausal Wirkliches „zurückführen“, wenn man nicht weiß, worin sie bestehen!

Für das Folgende mache ich zwei Voraussetzungen. 1. Personen sind Handelnde und damit gibt es auch Handlungen. 2. Soziales hängt zwar eng mit kausal Wirklichem zusammen, kann jedoch nicht darauf reduziert werden. Würde die zweite Voraussetzung im Zuge zukünftiger philosophischer Forschung widerlegt, hätte das drastische Auswirkungen auch auf die erste Voraussetzung. Die Ausdrücke „Person“ und „Handlung“ hätten mit dem traditionellem Verständnis kaum mehr etwas gemein.¹ Ich werde zeigen, dass der Handlungsbegriff und der Personenbegriff nicht unabhängig vom Sozialen gefasst werden können.

2. Handlungen

Sätzen mit Handlungsverben sind systematisch mehrdeutig, weil die enthaltenen Verben prinzipiell sowohl als Tätigkeitsverben als auch Erfolgsverben verstanden werden können. Man kann sich damit jeweils auf Verschiedenes beziehen: mit Tätigkeitsverben auf ein Handeln, mit Erfolgsverben auf eine Handlung mit einem bestimmten Ergebnis.² Diese Mehrdeutigkeit der Handlungssätze bleibt häufig systematisch unbeachtet, vermutlich deshalb, weil die meisten natürlichen Sprachen nicht zwischen Tätigkeits- und Erfolgsverben unterscheiden.³ Das Deutsche verwendet Erfolgsverben: Man kann z.B. nicht wahrheitsgemäß von „Eva schließt die Tür“ sprechen, sofern die Tür nicht zumindest kurzfristig tatsächlich geschlossen ist. Im Sinne der Tätigkeitsverben kann jedoch der Satz „Eva schließt die Tür“ auch dann wahr sein, wenn das Ergebnis nicht realisiert wird. Hier hat Eva alles dasjenige getan, von dem sie fälschlicherweise glaubte, dass es zum Erfolg führen würde.

¹ Vgl. dazu: Meixner, U. 1997 "Die Ersetzung der Substanzontologie durch die Ereignisontologie und deren Folgen für das Selbstverständnis des Menschen", in R. Hütelmann (ed.) 1997 *Wirklichkeit und Sinnerfahrung*, Dettelbach: Röhl, 86-103.

² Dazu: Berger, A. 2000 "Handeln versus Handlungen", in R. Born und O. Neumaier (eds.) 2001 *Miteinander denken - voneinander lernen*, Wien: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 370-374.

³ Das Russische weist hingegen „Aspektpaare“ auf. In dieser Sprache kann man sehr wohl sagen, dass z.B. Eva etwas einkauft oder das Fenster öffnet (im Tätigkeitsinn), ohne etwas einzukaufen oder das Fenster zu öffnen (im Erfolgssinn).

Die Identifizierung des Handelns mit der Handlung ist ein schwerer handlungstheoretischer Fehler. Jedes Handeln kann prinzipiell misslingen. Wäre das Handeln und die Handlung identisch, könnte es nur erfolgreiche Handlungen geben. Dies widerspricht jedoch den Tatsachen. Dasjenige, was wir unmittelbar tun können, ist ein Handeln. Man darf nur nicht den Fehler der Basishandlungstheoretiker begehen, das Handeln mit dem Ausüben von Körperbewegungen gleichzusetzen. Wir können z.B. sowohl etwas *unterlassen*, indem wir gerade keine (spezifischen) Bewegungen ausüben, als auch etwas eintreten *lassen*, ohne etwas dazu körperlich beizutragen. Ob z.B. ein Autofahrer, um einen Fußgänger nicht zu überfahren, bremsen muss (Aktivität) oder nicht weiter beschleunigen darf (Inaktivität), richtet sich nach den gegebenen Umständen. Weil es von der jeweiligen Situation abhängt, ob zur Realisierung eines bestimmten Ziels Aktivität nötig ist, stellen daher Körperbewegungen allgemein weder ein definierendes Merkmal von 'Handeln' noch von 'Handlung' dar.⁴ Ob mit dem Ausführen eines Handelns auch eine Handlung vollzogen wird, hängt u.a. von den Normalbedingungen ab. Sind diese Normalbedingungen erfüllt, wird das Handeln einer Person erfolgreich sein. Ist sie erfolgreich, hat sie die entsprechende Handlung vollzogen.

Ob Aktivität oder Inaktivität gefordert ist, hängt von der gegebenen Situation ab. Genauer lässt sich diese Abhängigkeit anhand folgender vier Situationstypen zeigen:⁵ 1. Der Zustand *z* liegt bereits vor, verschwindet aber, falls dies nicht verhindert wird. Hier kann die Person *S* *z* aufrecht erhalten oder verschwinden lassen. 2. *z* liegt vor und bleibt bestehen, falls er nicht zerstört wird. Hier kann *S* *z* zerstören oder bestehen lassen. 3. *z* liegt nicht vor und tritt nur dann ein, wenn er herbeigeführt wird. Hier kann *S* *z* herbeiführen oder weiterhin nicht bestehen lassen. 4. *z* liegt nicht vor, tritt jedoch ein, falls man ihn nicht unterdrückt. Hier kann *S* *z* unterdrücken oder eintreten lassen. Demnach scheinen acht verschiedene Handlungsmöglichkeiten bezüglich eines Zustandstyps *z* zu bestehen.

Ein Beispiel für den 2. Situationstyp: Eva möchte das Zimmer lüften. Das Fenster ist bereits offen und bleibt geöffnet, sofern es nicht geschlossen wird. Eva muss demnach das Fenster bloß weiterhin geöffnet lassen. *Prima facie* sieht es so aus, als wäre daher das Lüften durch Inaktivität zu erreichen. Was jedoch tatsächlich bezüglich *z* zu tun ist, hängt nicht nur von den jeweils zwei Möglichkeiten des aktiven Eingriffs und inaktiven Lassens bezüglich des gegebenen Situationstyps ab. Kommt etwa Paul herein und schickt sich plötzlich an, das Fenster zu schließen, muss Eva Paul am Schließen hindern, um weiterhin zu lüften. Hier kann sie nicht durch Inaktivität das Fenster weiterhin offen lassen, sondern nur dadurch, dass sie Paul durch Aktivität hindert. Was zu tun ist, hängt demnach nicht bloß von der den Zustand *z* betreffenden Situationsbedingung ab, sondern auch von den gegebenen *Rahmenbedingungen*. Je nach Rahmendbedingung müssen also auch bei einem Lassen spezifische Körperbewegungen ausgeübt werden. Es ist nur wichtig, zu sehen, dass diese Aktivität nicht *kausal* dazu beiträgt, das Ziel, dass das Fenster offen ist, zu verwirklichen. In beliebiger Kausalterminologie ausgedrückt: Die kausale Weltlinie Evas tangiert zwar die Weltlinie Pauls, nicht aber die Weltlinie des Fensters.

Es lässt sich folgendes festhalten. Handlungen, also Akte und Unterlassungen können sowohl durch

Aktivität als auch Inaktivität vollzogen werden, je nachdem welche Situations- und Rahmenbedingung vorliegen. In allen gegebenen Situationsbedingungen des Lassens trägt dasjenige, was die Person tut, nichts *kausal* zur Verwirklichung des Ziels bei.⁶

Personen sind Handelnde, die Akte vollziehen, d.h. Ergebnisse ihrer Absicht oder Gewohnheit gemäß hervorbringen können. Vor allem aber können sie auch *Unterlassungen* vollziehen, d.h. dasjenige (je nach Situations- und Rahmenbedingung aktiv oder inaktiv) tun, dass etwas Bestimmtes daraufhin *nicht* der Fall ist. Hier kommt Negiertes ins Spiel. Ein gedachtes Ergebnis liegt real nicht vor. Weil Unterlassungen erfolgssimplifizierend sind, darf auch das entsprechende Ergebnis nicht vorliegen. Empirisch Beobachtbares dient demnach als Kriterium: Liegt das entsprechende Ergebnis vor, ist die entsprechende Unterlassung nicht vollzogen worden. Doch was sind Kriterien dafür, dass eine Unterlassung vollzogen worden ist? Wegen des negativen Charakters muss auf Gedankliches zurückgegriffen werden. *Erwartet* man ein bestimmtes Ergebnis, tritt es aber nicht ein, liegt die Annahme nahe, dass eine Unterlassung vorliegt. Diese Erwartung kann aus Verschiedenem entspringen, nämlich 1. aus bloßer Willkür des Beurteilenden, 2. aus der Möglichkeit des Handelnden,⁷ 3. aus der Absicht des Handelnden, 4. aus einer für den Handelnden bestehenden Verpflichtung. Aus Punkt 1 ist nichts zu gewinnen für die Frage, ob etwas eine Unterlassung ist oder nicht. Ob etwas eine Unterlassung ist, darf nicht von einer willkürlichen Beschreibung abhängen. Punkt 2 ist für eine Antwort zu weit. Nicht alles, was eine Person tun kann, aber nicht tut, ist bereits eine Unterlassung. Unterlassungen müssen vom bloßen Nichttun unterschieden werden. Bei Punkt 3 liefert die Handlungsabsicht eine richtige Antwort. Wollte eine Person etwas Bestimmtes nicht tun und ist sie damit erfolgreich, liegt eine Unterlassung vor. Jedoch geht diese Einschränkung zu weit. Es gibt auch Fälle von Unterlassungen, denen keine Absicht zugrunde liegt. Dies sind insbesondere jene Fälle, bei denen fahrlässigerweise etwas Bestimmtes nicht herbeigeführt wird. Hier ergibt sich die handlungskonstituierende Erwartung nicht aus der Absicht, sondern aus Punkt 4. Hat eine Person die Pflicht, etwas ihr Mögliches (je nach Situations- und Rahmenbedingung aktiv oder inaktiv) zu tun, tut es jedoch nicht, liegt eine Unterlassung vor.

Viele Philosophen teilen dem entgegen die Intuition, dass Akte durch Körperbewegungen und Unterlassungen durch Inaktivität charakterisiert seien. Der Begriff der Unterlassung müsse in seiner Grundform unabhängig von Normen bestimmt werden, während erst in den erweiterten Formen dem Normativen weiter einschränkend Rechnung zu tragen sei.⁸ Dies ist jedoch nicht richtig. Erst *nachdem* man bereits weiß, um welche Unterlassung es sich handelt, lässt sich nämlich sagen, was überhaupt als konstitutive Körperbewegung gilt oder nicht gilt. Bevor daher bezüglich Aktivität/Inaktivität Entscheidungen getroffen werden können, muss die Handlung von Körperbewegungsmerkmalen unabhängig klassifiziert werden. Dazu dienen einerseits die Intentionen und andererseits die Verpflichtungen. Der allgemeine Begriff der Unterlassung ist daher umgekehrt in seiner

⁴ Ich lasse jene bereits ablaufenden Prozesse unbeachtet, die durch einen Kausaleingriff der Person beschleunigt oder verlangsamt werden. Ferner setze ich hier voraus, dass jene Kausalvorstellung nicht richtig sein kann, die von Gesamtsachen ausgeht, wo auch die Abwesenheit eines bestimmten Ereignisses selbst als Teilursache aufgefasst wird, anstatt bloß von der Abwesenheit *entgegenwirkender* Ursachen zu sprechen. Vgl. dazu meine Doktorarbeit op. cit. Kap. 6.

⁷ Zu den verschiedenen weiten Möglichkeitsbegriffen vgl. meine Doktorarbeit op. cit. Kap. 3; Birnbacher, D. 1985 *Tun und Unterlassen*, Stuttgart: Reclam, Kap. 2.3.

⁸ Vgl. Birnbacher ebd.

⁴ Siehe dazu meine noch zu veröffentlichende Doktorarbeit *Unterlassen und Unterlassungen. Eine philosophische Untersuchung zur Handlungstheorie*, Kap. 4 & 5.

⁵ Vgl. Wright, G.H.v. 1979 *Norm und Handlung. Eine logische Untersuchung*, Königstein/Ts: Scriptor, 59.

Grundform neben den Intentionen u.a. mittels Normen zu bestimmen, während erst in den erweiterten Formen dem Unterschied zwischen Aktivität und Inaktivität Rechnung getragen werden kann.

Um also etwas als Unterlassung beurteilen zu können, müssen wir die Handlungsmöglichkeiten und die Absicht der Person erkennen können, sowie, ob ihr etwas zu vollziehen geboten ist. Ohne die Kenntnis, was ihr von dem Möglichen zu vollziehen geboten war oder sie beabsichtigt hat, lässt sich nicht klassifizieren, um welche spezifische Unterlassung es sich handelt.⁹ Handlungen hängen demnach wesentlich vom geistigen Bereich der Intentionen und dem gesellschaftlichen Bereich des Normativen ab.

3. Personalität

Personen stehen als Handelnde in unmittelbarem Zusammenhang mit ihren Handlungsergebnissen. Handelnde naturalistisch aufzufassen hieße, sie als Teil im kausalen Gefüge der Welt anzusehen. Die Beziehung zwischen ihnen und ihren Handlungsergebnissen bestünde in einer Kausalverbindung. Nun hat sich aber gezeigt, dass die Beziehung zwischen Handelnden und ihren Ergebnissen bei bestimmten Situations- und Rahmenbedingungen nicht kausal ist.¹⁰ Folglich muss die Beziehung zwischen handelnden Personen und ihren Ergebnissen anders als kausal verstanden werden, nämlich vor allem bezüglich jener gesellschaftlichen Realität, welche auch für das Handeln und die Handlung erforderlich ist. Alle jene Bedingungen, die erfüllt sein müssen, um von 'Handlung' zu sprechen, stellen auch Bedingungen dafür dar, von 'Person' sprechen zu können. Andernfalls ließe sich nicht die Beziehung zwischen handelnder Personen und ihrem Ergebnis erklären.

Demnach entsteht folgendes Dilemma: Fasst man den Begriff der Person naturalistisch unabhängig vom Bereich des Gesellschaftlichen, dann sind Personen keine Handelnde; sind Personen hingegen Handelnde, dann hängt der Begriff der Person unmittelbar von jenem Bereich ab, von dem im naturalistischen Anliegen gerade abgesehen wird. Weil Personen aber Handelnde sind, darf der Naturalist nicht vom Gesellschaftlichen absehen, sondern hat zu zeigen, wie es auf seinen behandelnden Bereich „reduziert“ werden kann.

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⁹ Siehe dazu meine Doktorarbeit, op. cit. Kap. 15 & 16.

¹⁰ Ferner sind Unterlassungen dadurch charakterisiert, dass etwas Bestimmtes gerade *nicht* vorliegt. Kausalbeziehungen bestehen jedoch nur zwischen real existierenden Entitäten. Folglich sind Unterlassungen etwas, das selbst nicht Platz im Kausalgefüge findet. Dazu: Berger, A. 1999 "Was sind Unterlassungen? Zur Ontologie im Rahmen einer Handlungstheorie", in U. MEIXNER und P. SIMONS (eds.), *Metaphysik im postmetaphysischen Zeitalter*, Kirchberg am Wechsel: ÖLWG, 47-53.

Personal Identity, Numerical and Qualitative

Oliver Black, London

In the analytic tradition, 'the problem of personal identity' is usually taken to mean a question of numerical identity over time: what makes X at one time the same person as Y at another? But the title also fits a set of questions - at least as interesting - which concern what may be called qualitative identity. A person's qualitative identity comprises his defining properties (DPs): these are properties that he must mention in a full answer to the question 'Who am I?', taken in a special sense which can be discerned by contrast with the ordinary sense of the third-person 'Who is X?' If you and I are watching a ceremony and I, pointing to one of the participants, ask 'Who is she?', my purpose is likely to be to find out that person's role in the ceremony: the question and the appropriate answer are relative to my purpose, which is set by the context. In the sense relevant to DPs, 'Who am I?' is not thus relative to context and purpose: rather, in answering the question I identify properties of mine that determine my purposes. There is, however, no simple asymmetry between the first-person and the third-person questions; the third-person question can, although it rarely does, take this sense, and conversely the first-person question can be relative to purpose and context, as for example where roles in a game are being assigned and one of the players is unsure of his role. Nevertheless the special sense is more prominent in the first-person case.

DPs 'determine' purposes in a sense that covers relations of justification, constitution and causation. Suppose it is one of my DPs that I am a devout Catholic: then my being one justifies me in having - in the sense of being a practical reason for me to have - the purpose of going regularly to church; it is a practical reason for me to fulfil that purpose; and, assuming that I am practically rational, it is a theoretical reason to believe that I have and fulfil that purpose. Also, my having the purpose of going regularly to church is likely to be part of what it is - although it is not a necessary condition - for me to be a devout Catholic, and my being one may cause me to form the purpose of visiting Rome. To say that DPs determine purposes does not imply that a person must first have DPs before he can have any purposes: I may acquire a DP, and may even do so deliberately, in the course of pursuing an existing purpose. If I am set on making money, I may decide that the best method is not only to become a stockbroker but also to adopt that job as part of my qualitative identity.

The justification of purposes is one role played by DPs in practical reasoning. More generally, if F is a DP of mine, that I have F is likely often to be an important premiss, explicit or implicit, in my practical deliberation. Importance can be explicated in various ways, depending on the model adopted of practical reasoning. If the structure of a person's practical reasons is conceived by analogy with standard models in epistemology, it might be viewed as a hierarchy of reasons for action that rest on a set of foundational reasons - the person's ultimate ends - or as a web of reasons. On the former view, the importance of a premiss will be the greater, the nearer it is to the foundation; on the latter view, the nearer it is to the centre of the web.

A wide variety of properties can be DPs. People are often defined by their job, or even their former job

(retired civil servant), or by their occupation in a broader sense (housewife, writer). Someone may be defined by nationality, by a connection with an institution (alumnus of Yale), or by relations - notably ones involving commitments or close attachments - to individuals (father of so-and-so). Holding a certain belief - in particular a religious or political belief - can be a DP, as can having a certain trait of character. A DP can be a physical property - being very short, for example, or being beautiful.

The distinction between a person's DPs and those of his properties that do not define him cross-cuts certain other distinctions, in particular those between necessary and contingent properties and between individuating and non-individuating properties. As to the necessary and the contingent, it may be a DP of mine that I am an artist, but I might not have been one; conversely, it may be a necessary property of mine that I have a certain genetic code, but this is unlikely to appear in my answer to the question 'Who am I?' As to individuating and non-individuating properties, I am not the only artist; conversely, even if I have the property of being the only man wearing a black hat in Piccadilly at noon on 1 July 2002, this is unlikely to be one of my DPs. It is a confusion of immaturity to try to base one's qualitative identity on uniqueness and thus on a contrast between oneself and everyone else.

The concepts of qualitative identity and of DPs, and the special sense of the question 'Who am I?', can be defined in terms of each other, but they appear to form a primitive triad: an explanation in terms of the determination of purposes, practical reason and the contrast with necessary and individuating properties, or in terms of other concepts such as commitment, is not readily sharpened into a definition or even into a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. In particular, importance in practical reasoning seems, at any rate on a narrow conception of practical reasoning, not to be necessary for a property to be a DP. If, for example, the DP in question is susceptibility to a mood, its connection with action will not primarily be rational in any narrow sense. My gloominess may affect my actions - and the connection between mood and action may be rational in the broad sense that my behaviour is appropriate to someone who is gloomy - but in deciding what to do I shall not normally reason from the premiss that I am gloomy (although I may do so if, for example, I am trying to find ways of changing my character). Also, in the case of some DPs - such as that of being a contemplative hermit - there is no connection with action in any narrow sense. Nor is importance in practical reasoning sufficient by itself for a property to be a DP. For example, the premiss that I desire to stay alive is likely to be near the foundation or centre of my structure of practical reasons, but the property of desiring to stay alive will not normally be a DP of mine. My answer to the question 'Who am I?' is likely to presuppose, rather than mention, this property.

Even if these concepts cannot be defined in other terms, distinctions can be drawn within them, in particular between a person's actual identity, the identity he strives to have (projected identity) and the identity he believes he ought to have (normative identity). There is a parallel distinction between DPs. These qualitative identities

interact: for example, actual identity constrains both the formation and the achievement of projected identity. Someone with the actual identity of a Chinese peasant farmer is unlikely ever to have heard of the British Parliament, and hence will be unable to strive to have the identity of a member of the House of Commons. Even if he does have the relevant concepts and thus is able to form that projected identity, he is unlikely to be able to achieve it. Conversely, projected identity affects actual identity: if I constantly strive for an identity beyond my reach, I may acquire the actual identity of a loser. Projected identity may also affect actual identity through interpretation. Suppose that hitherto I have spent my time going to fashionable parties. Disgusted with the triviality of my life, I resolve to become a novelist and, like Proust, to incorporate my experiences of high society in my novels. I accordingly reinterpret my life to date not as a waste of time but as a necessary period for the collection of material. The reinterpretation may involve self-deception - I might pretend to myself that I had only ever gone to the parties with the intention of collecting material - but need not do so. It might be suggested that such cases of interpretation connect projected identity not with actual identity but with beliefs about it; but, although it is true that there is a distinction between who I am and who I think I am, this distinction becomes blurred where the ascription of an identity involves interpretation.

The concept of qualitative identity raises many issues: for example, whether it is a matter of degree; whether everybody has such an identity (see below); whether some people have more than one; the senses in which qualitative identities and DPs cohere; whether we can choose our qualitative identities; whether they are socially determined; the distinction, just mentioned, between who I am and who I think I am; the extent to which we should reflect on our qualitative identities; the nature of change of such identity; and - the topic of the rest of this paper - the relation between qualitative and numerical identity of persons.

For X to be the same person as Y it is neither necessary nor sufficient that X and Y have the same qualitative identity. That it is unnecessary is shown, for all but very broad conceptions of qualitative identity, by the case of the young boy and the old man who are the same person but differ in their actual, projected and normative identities. It also follows from the proposition that a person may lack a qualitative identity. This proposition is plausible for projected and normative identity; it seems that I could live from day to day without ever considering who I want or ought to be. But it also seems possible, if more difficult, to live without an actual identity, or at most with only a low degree of actual identity: such a condition might be described as one of radical irony or detachment. Consider a woman who says of her work as a philosopher, 'It's fun, and I have to earn a living, but I'd have been just as happy working in the City'; of her husband, 'I get on with him, but who knows how long we'll stay together?'; of her attendance at synagogue, 'It's just a habit I picked up in childhood'; and so on. It might be said that, by default, she has the identity of an ironist; but that would be inaccurate if, say, her irony came in phases between periods of commitment, or if she had certain commitments and attachments which were nevertheless too weak to ground an identity. In support of some weaker version of the claim of necessity it might be argued that some radical changes of qualitative identity break the thread of numerical identity: Parfit's example of the nineteenth-century Russian, who as a young man regards his socialist ideals as essential to him but abandons them in middle age, might be described in these terms (Parfit 1984, 327-328). But it seems that

such a description would either be hyperbolic or presuppose a revisionist concept of personhood.

That sameness of qualitative identity is not sufficient for numerical identity follows from the fact that not only are DPs distinct from individuating properties, as noted earlier, but two people can share all the DPs that constitute their qualitative identity. You and I may both be English aristocratic hypochondriacs who work in banking (actual identity), strive to become rich enough to retire as country squires (projected identity) and believe that we ought to have had military careers (normative identity).

Qualitative and numerical identity are nevertheless connected in significant ways. Standard accounts of the latter analyse it in terms of continuity, bodily or psychological, but it is sometimes sustained in part by continuity of qualitative identity: part of what makes the old man the same person as the young boy may be a gradual and overlapping change of DPs. 'Sustained in part' might here be glossed in terms of a condition more complex than a necessary or sufficient condition - possibly, in some cases, an 'in-us' condition in Mackie's sense: an insufficient but non-redundant part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition (Mackie 1974, 62). The relations between continuity of qualitative identity and the other forms of continuity differ from case to case; where the DPs include psychological properties, the same factors - say, a gradual change of character - may partly constitute both psychological continuity and continuity of qualitative identity.

Conversely, numerical identity at least sometimes partly sustains qualitative identity. Certain DPs must of their nature be possessed for an extended period: the property of having a given character trait is an example; another is any DP involving a commitment. I cannot be kind-hearted, or committed to a religious life, merely for an instant. It seems in fact that no property possessed for an instant is fit to be a DP. There was an instant at which Armstrong stepped on to the moon, but the relevant DP here is not the fleeting property of stepping on to the moon but the enduring one of being the first person to have stepped on to it. Possession of a DP therefore presupposes numerical identity through the relevant minimum period.

There is a further connection between qualitative and numerical identity. The existence of a person who can be reidentified over time entails a degree of integration of his properties, specifically those of having certain mental states: as integration declines, the person subsides into madness and at a certain point ceases to exist. It is plausible to hold that such integration in its higher degrees may partly consist of coherence among DPs and qualitative identities.

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Construction, Convention, and Subjectivity in the Early Wittgenstein

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Introduction

Some of Wittgenstein's early remarks on the connection between logic and the world leave a highly anti-conventionalist impression. For example, in the *Tractatus*, he says that the world is "in logical space" (*TLP* 1.13) and that logic "pervades the world" (*TLP* 5.61). At a first glance, this seems to imply that the rules of logic are determined by the way the world is. And this, in turn, seems to be something that is not dependent on convention. Consider, for example, a passage from the *Notebooks 1914-16*, where Wittgenstein says:

And it keeps on forcing itself upon us that there is some simple indivisible, an element of being, in brief a thing ... And it appears as if that were identical with the proposition that the world must be what it is, it must be definite. (NB, 62)

Further statements favouring an anti-conventionalist interpretation can be found in the *Tractatus*. According to 5.4731, language "prevents every logical mistake", and what makes logic a priori is the fact that one "cannot think illogically". And according to 6.124, logic "is not a field in which we express what we wish with the help of signs, but rather one in which the nature of the absolutely necessary signs speaks for itself".

These passages have led Ishiguro to the claim that there is no trace of conventionalism about the rules of logic in the *Tractatus* (Ishiguro 2001, 129–31). However, Ishiguro's claim does not take into account important evidence from the pre-*Tractatus* writings. The aim of this paper is to argue that construction and convention play a significant role in the formation of Wittgenstein's thought. Some aspects of these early developments show considerable influence on the philosophy of the *Tractatus*. Moreover, the role of construction and convention leads to an explanation for some aspects of the Tractarian conception of subjectivity.

1. Logic, Ontology, and Construction

Wittgenstein introduces the issue of construction in the context of his theory of tautologies. This theory of tautologies has its roots in Wittgenstein's theory of the bipolarity of propositions. According to the theory of bipolarity, a meaningful proposition must be able to be true or false (*NB*, 94). The "poles" of the proposition, symbolized by "a" and "b" in Wittgenstein's notation, correspond to the case of the truth and the case of the falsehood of the proposition (*NB*, 98). In the *Notes dictated to Moore*, Wittgenstein makes use of the theory of the bipolarity of meaningful propositions in order to characterize tautologies. Tautologies are propositions that do not have two poles (*NB*, 113). In a letter to Russell of 1913, Wittgenstein analyses the nature of propositions of logic with the help of this conception of tautologies:

It is the peculiar (and most important) characteristic of *non*-logical propositions, that their truth cannot be seen in the propositional sign itself. (...) But the propositions of logic – and they alone – have the property of expressing their truth or falsehood in the very sign itself. (...)

The great question is now: How should a notation be constructed, which will make every tautology recognizable as a tautology *in one and the same way*? This is the fundamental problem of logic. (*NB*, 128–9)

Here, this question is answered with recourse to the application of the ab-notation to more complex propositions. Already at this place, complex propositions are conceived of as truth-functionally dependent on elementary sentences. Finally, the *Notebook* entry of 21 November 1916 answers the same question in a more technical way:

We now need a clarification of the concept of the atomic function and the concept "and so on".

The concept "and so on", symbolized by "..." is one of the most important of all and like all the others infinitely fundamental.

For it alone justifies us in constructing logic and mathematics "so on" from the fundamental laws and primitive signs. (*NB*, 89)

On the side of the constitution of the world, the idea of construction plays a very similar role. Already in the *Notebooks*, Wittgenstein puts forward a theory of simple objects. Although he considers different possibilities for what these objects might be like (e.g. *minima sensibilia* or points in visual space; *NB*, 45; 50; 64), he ultimately is confronted with the impossibility of giving convincing examples. Therefore, he says:

If I can imagine a 'kind of object' without knowing whether there are such objects, then I must have constructed their archetype (*Urbild*) for myself. (*NB*, 74)

The notion of object, therefore, is to be seen as the result of construction similar to the way rules of logic are conceived of as the result of construction. More generally, Wittgenstein writes: "we can foresee what we have constructed" (*NB*, 71), which holds for the rules of logical notation as well as for the conception of simple objects. Construction in logic and construction of the archetype of objects, moreover, seem to be tied to each other. For example, the question around which much of the early sections of the *Notebooks* turn is: "can we manage without simple objects in LOGIC?" (*NB*, 46). Thus, logic and ontology in Wittgenstein's earliest writings are both to be seen as results of construction, and the construction of ontology is immediately connected with the construction of logic.

2. Construction, Convention, and Adequacy Conditions

The obvious question arising at this point concerns the role of convention in construction. In the context of his first formulation of the theory of tautologies in the *Notes dictated to Moore*, Wittgenstein says:

What is unarbitrary about our symbols is not them, nor the rules we give; but the fact that, having given certain rules, others are fixed = follow logically. (*NB*, 114)

He takes this thought up explicitly at *TLP* 3.342. Again, the logical notation shows arbitrary features,

whereas the consequences of these arbitrary decisions follow in a non-arbitrary way. As Wittgenstein says, this has to do with the “nature” (“*Wesen*”) of logical notation.

This does not mean that construction in logic, in Wittgenstein’s view, would be completely unrestricted. Already in the *Notes dictated to Moore*, he says:

It is true, in a sense, that logical propositions are “postulated” – something which we “demand”; for we demand a satisfactory notation. (*NB*, 118).

This point is repeated in *TLP* 6.1223. Here, again, logical truths are characterised as something we can “postulate”, in the sense that we can “postulate” a sufficient logical notation. At both places, Wittgenstein clearly takes a conventionalist line of thought. However, the role of convention in logic at the same time is qualified by conditions of adequacy: Convention has to yield a “satisfactory” or “sufficient” logical notation. For a specification of these adequacy conditions, we have to turn to various passages of the *Tractatus* and the pre-*Tractatus* writings. An important requirement is that a satisfactory notation must be constructed in a way that the self-referential paradoxes cannot occur. According to *TLP* 3.333-3.334, logical syntax must preclude the possibility that a function can be its own argument. This adequacy condition is already part of the early *Notes on Logic*, where Wittgenstein says:

No proposition can say anything about itself, because the symbol of the proposition cannot be contained in itself; this must be the basis of the theory of logical types. (*NB*, 107)

In fact, Wittgenstein sets up a much more extravagant catalogue of conditions of adequacy. In his 1913 letter to Russell mentioned above, there is the requirement that an adequate logical notation has to provide means of proving the tautological character of logical truths in a uniform way (*NB*, 129). The theory of the bi-polarity of propositions also leads to the requirement that an adequate logical notation must be based on the idea that elementary sentences are true-or-false pictures of reality and, for this reason, logically independent from each other (*TLP* 2.021-2.0212). A further requirement is that logic has to be constructed in a way that accounts for the determinateness of sense (*TLP* 3.23), a requirement that leads to a form of semantic atomism. It may not be surprising that Wittgenstein, despite of his conventionalist attitude, was convinced that a logic constructed along the lines of his early philosophy is the only one that is able to meet all these criteria of adequacy (see *NB*, 17).

3. Construction, Convention, and Subjectivity

From this perspective, the seemingly anti-conventionalist statements quoted by Ishiguro can be seen in a different light. It is interesting that one of these statements (*TLP* 5.61) is taken from Wittgenstein’s discussion of solipsism. The fact that “logic pervades the world” there is connected to the view that the world is “my world” and that “that language which alone I understand” is “my language” (*TLP* 5.62). Seen from this perspective, the facts that “my” world is in logical space (*TLP* 1.13) and that “my” language prevents illogical thought (*TLP* 5.4731) do not provide a convincing argument against a form of conventionalism restricted by a set of adequacy conditions.

Quite to the contrary, aspects of Wittgenstein’s view of subjectivity can be seen as a consequence of his views about construction and convention. Subjectivity, for Wittgenstein, does not come in by way of a commitment to the phenomenological character of simple objects, or,

correspondingly, to a phenomenological language (see Blank 2001). It is exactly the insight that it might prove impossible to identify any satisfactory examples of simple objects that introduces the theme of construction into Wittgenstein’s conception of ontology (see *NB*, 74). Rather, constructing logical rules and “archetype” of objects is subjective in the sense that it is something that we do. Thus, there are no *de re* necessities, no given structure of the world which, in turn, determines the structure of language. Language is “my” language, and the world “my” world, because both logic (which “pervades” language and the world) and the conception of simple objects (whose configurations constitute the world) are to be seen as results of construction. The only necessity at work here is a kind of necessity resulting from the set of adequacy conditions for a sufficient logical notation.

This does not mean that the role of construction and convention would provide an exhaustive account of all Wittgenstein has to say about subjectivity. Quite to the contrary, some aspects of his remarks about solipsism cannot be explained without a consideration of the influence of authors such as Schopenhauer and Weininger (see, Sluga 1981; McGuinness 2001). This holds especially for some of the aspects of Wittgenstein’s view of subjectivity that are more closely tied to the issue of individuality, e.g. the issues of will, happiness and death (see *TLP* 6.43-6.4312). However, there also is a strongly, and explicitly, impersonal aspect in his conception of subjectivity. Consider, for example, the *Notebook* entry of 23 May 1915, where Wittgenstein says:

The limits of my language constitute the limits of my world. There is only one world soul, which I for preference call *my* soul and as which alone I conceive what I call the souls of others. (*NB*, 49)

A few days later, in the entry of 29 May 1915, he cautiously, in the form of questions, puts forward the idea that, in some sense, there is only one language (*NB*, 52). The at the same time personal and impersonal character of subjectivity implied by this account of language can, at least in part, be explained by the role of construction and convention in Wittgenstein’s early views on logic and language. The personal aspect of subjectivity is, partly at least, due to the fact that each individual makes use of a language that is based on the construction of logical rules and ontological assumptions (and not on an independently given structure of the world). The impersonal character of subjectivity is due to the fact for all individuals the logical and ontological construction underlying language, due to the set of adequacy conditions, is the same. In this sense, in *TLP* 5.62 Wittgenstein characterizes “my” language at the same time as the only language there is (“that language alone”).

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Different Kinds of Naturalistic Explanations of Linguistic Behaviour

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1. Can there be naturalistic explanations of linguistic behaviour?

"Naturalization" nowadays is often recommended to cure all kinds of philosophical worries and solve old problems. There might be an "epistemology naturalized" and a naturalized philosophy of language. But "naturalism" is understood in quite different fashions. It might be meant as a metaphysical thesis more or the less equivalent to materialism, or it concerns the way of doing things philosophically.

I will be concerned with partially explicating methodological naturalism in the philosophy of language. The essential question is

(Q1) What is meant by giving a *naturalistic explanation* of some kind of linguistic behaviour?

And assuming some answer to this question, the essential problem is

(Q2) Do these naturalistic explanations *explain* anything at all?

One could think naturalism is more about describing events than explaining them. Descriptions seem to be just the opposite of explanations. One could think, on the other hand, that naturalism in the philosophy of language employs some kind of reductionist explanations of linguistic behaviour (in terms of neurophysiology or whatever is considered as the basic science). But given the anti-reductionist arguments concerning the rule governed nature of using language (especially the *socially mastered rules* of using words to refer to something), one might suspect that these reductionist explanations are at the wrong level of theory building to explain overt linguistic behaviour (e.g., being criticized for using expression α on occasion s) at all. If we ask why we speak the way we speak, an account in terms of neurophysiology, so the argument runs, gives us no reason to understand the patterns of overt linguistic behaviour.

Naturalism is often traced back to the work of (the late) Wittgenstein. I will start with some remarks about Wittgenstein as well. With respect to his analysis in the *Philosophical Investigations* (PI) I introduce a distinction between "strong" and "weak" descriptivism (2.). Both forms of descriptivism might be seen as answering (Q1). Weak Descriptivism can accept the anti-reductionist arguments. To see whether it really explains linguistic behaviour the "division problem", originally introduced by Eli Hirsch (Hirsch 1993) in metaphysics, is given a naturalistic solution. (Q2) is considered in face of the strategical question why "to go naturalistic" in the first place (3.).

2. Strong Descriptivism and Weak Descriptivism

According to Wittgenstein philosophy is merely descriptive. There a lots of passage in the *Investigations* stressing this point, e.g.:

"It leaves everything as it is." (PI §124)¹

"All explanation has to go, and description has to take its place." (PI §109)

"Philosophy just states things and does neither explain them nor deduce anything from them. – Since everything is laid open, there is nothing to explain." (PI §126)

Now, this claim of "descriptivism", as I call it, can be understood in two ways.²

(a) Strong Descriptivism

Strong Descriptivism claims that philosophy describes *mere* regularities. In its field of investigation (i.e. linguistic communities and their behaviour) there are regularities. Saying that there are rules amounts to, according to (PI §54), watching the events and extracting a law, like a law of nature is extracted from regular behaviour in other fields of scientific investigation. The very term "law of nature" is used here by Wittgenstein. Natural laws are, of course, regularities. The objects for which the law of nature holds behave as the law tells us, but these objects do not *orient* their behaviour on the law. They do not *consult* the law to confirm to it. Natural laws are not rules for the objects under these laws. They do not have to be consulted to keep in force. And the observer of such laws need not himself understand the laws or make them the laws of his behaviour. So philosophy lays open the facts that speakers naturally behave in this or that fashion. The opinion that language is a rule governed normative behaviour overlooks, according to Strong Descriptivism, that meaning and reference are fixed by our natural traits. The normative idiom (of rule following) is therefore dispensable. Philosophy *cannot* do more than clearly describe regularities of linguistic behaviour. Who does not recognise this is caught in mistaken pictures and needs therapy. (The business of reduction or giving a systematic theory of the laws involved need not be part of philosophy.)

(b) Weak Descriptivism

Weak Descriptivism originates as a restriction of the claims of Strong Descriptivism. The main weakness of Strong Descriptivism is the impossibility, which is not argued for here, but which is widely recognised, to forsake all rules of argument and speaking. The attempt to forsake all rules and normative claims (in using the intentional idiom) seems to be both selfrefuting and against some of our most embedded intuitions. Weak Descriptivism tries to combine the strength of the naturalistic, descriptivistic approach with the thesis that linguistic behaviour is rule following behaviour (i.e. that speakers orient themselves on rules or conduct their linguistic acts in a way to comply to these rules). The strong point of descriptivism is that philosophy leaves everything as it is. Nothing has to be constructed to justify some philosophical claim. The basic

¹ Translated from the German original by the author.

² I am not going to discuss which of the two variants is closer to Wittgenstein's "real" opinion. There are a lot remarks congenial to Strong Descriptivism. On the other hand Wittgenstein's insistence on reasons and the more general problems of an eliminativist view on rule following normativity in linguistic behaviour, which are also not discusses here, favour, on the Principle of Charity, that Wittgenstein himself is closer to Weak Descriptivism. See also his remarks on frameworks in *On Certainty* which point towards Weak Descriptivism.

structures of our intelligent behaviour are just read off from an exact description of our linguistic behaviour. And these structures are justified by the fact that the practise which exhibits them is successful. Alternatives (including alternative philosophical claims on intellectual standards) stand on a far less firm ground by not being entrenched in our successful way of life ("life form" as Wittgenstein might say).

And at the same time these descriptions can speak of normativity – for the simple reasons that normativity is present in the observed behaviour: If someone is to describe the linguistic behaviour of a community, she has to describe the rules/norms which govern and constitute this very behaviour. By being described norms do not cease to *be* norms! A statement referring to a norm (a statement about a norm) is true only if the norm *is* in force in just that way the statement is saying it is.³

Wittgenstein, for example, once and again stresses the fact that a linguistic community evaluates some behaviours as "correct" and others as "wrong". These evaluations would make no sense if the person whose behaviour was evaluated as "wrong" could not reorient her behaviour on the communal standard. For the observer of this community this means, as Peter Winch has elaborated (cf. Winch 1958), that she understands *why* somebody is criticising somebody else. The observer at last can participate in the observed behaviour. All this means that speakers orient themselves on linguistic rules which are more than mere regularities. A cat might develop a regularity responding to similar circumstances (e.g. the alarm clock went off) with similar behaviour (e.g. mowing for breakfast), but there is no intersubjective standard to which the cat's behaviour confirms. Each new twist modifies the regularity. The description just records this factual regularity and its development over time. An intersubjective rule, in contrast, can be observed to be kept in force by evaluations of correct and incorrect behaviours.

So descriptivism in the form of Weak Descriptivism does not exclude viewing linguistic behaviour as normative. The criticism one might level against naturalism on this point does not apply here.

So how does Weak Descriptivism answer (Q1)?

If linguistic behaviour is rule governed, a systematic description of it is adequate only if the observer has understood (and included in her description) what the standards are and how the standards are enforced. And having understood the rules governing the linguistic behaviour the individual behaviour is straight forwardly *explained using these rules* as (part of the) premises.

The behaviour is explained on the level of linguistic "laws". An anti-reductionist should have nothing to complain here. Only a reductionist might complain that this is not *enough* explanation. Seen this way, Weak Descriptivism, although being a form of naturalism, is anti-reductionist!

3. A case study in Weak Descriptivism

Why should we take the attitude of Weak Descriptivism? I will consider one example: the "division problem" as thought of by Eli Hirsch. Hirsch is concerned with the idea of (natural) kinds. He introduces the thought experiment of different kinds of "strange languages".

Strange languages divide reality in kinds and individuals in ways completely different from our normal languages. Strange languages seem to be bizarre, seen from the point of view of our language. They might introduce kinds disjunctively (i.e. "introduce" from the point of view of our language, in the strange language these kinds are, of course, not disjunctive, but just given). So a strange language might contain the kinds *cathouse* and *housecar*. Seen from our language they can be defined:

$$\text{Cathouse}(x) := x \text{ is a cat or } x \text{ is a house}$$

$$\text{Housecar}(x) := x \text{ is a house or } x \text{ is a car}$$

This language has the same expressive power as our own, since our ordinary kinds can be defined within this language:

$$\text{Cat}(x) := \text{Cathouse}(x) \wedge \neg \text{Housecar}(x)$$

$$\text{House}(x) := \text{Cathouse}(x) \wedge \text{Housecar}(x)$$

$$\text{Car}(x) := \text{Housecar}(x) \wedge \neg \text{Cathouse}(x)$$

Now, this strange language has *less* kinds or kind terms than our language. So this language seems to be simpler than our language. It carries less ontological commitment! For the sake of ontological simplicity we *should speak* this language, but this sounds absurd.

This is (part of) the division problem. How can it be explained that we do not speak a strange language? A non-naturalistic solution could be a (metaphysical) theory of *natural* kinds which could disqualify *cathouse* and *housecar*. This requires an ontological account of naturalness which might be no easy exercise (cf. Hirsch 1993, 53-78)! And with respect to this ontological theory there still needs to be explained why our language structure would follow naturalness, if there is such a thing in reality.

A solution could be found turning to naturalism (in the form of Weak Descriptivism):

The strange language is to be rejected since we *are* built as we are built (i.e., our language faculty is structured in some definite way). And the structures of our language faculty (especially our habits of categorizing) do not allow strange languages. We have to consider them strange. So Weak Descriptivism would describe the standards of our categorization behaviour: evaluations what speakers consider strange explain why there are *cat*, *house* etc. around, and not *cathouse*, *housecar*.

Weak Descriptivism can explain what we do according to the standards it described. It leaves the rationality of our behaviour intact. Explanation occurs *within* the framework taken for granted. The rationality of it is there – in Wittgenstein's words in *On Certainty* – "It is there – like our life".

But is this really an explanation? Hirsch complains that the naturalist would just give us the vacant thesis that we were just that way and would give no further argument for this to be the case (cf. Hirsch 1993, 116). One might ask "Okay, but *why* are we built this way?"

This sounds a bit like (Q2).

Nevertheless, this accusation of naturalism misses the whole point of "going naturalistic". Naturalism is pursued since *a priori* arguments to solve some problem have failed. Their failure is the basic reason that only a naturalistic account – instead of a sceptic agnosticism – can answer to the problem. To go naturalistic *means* that one is referring to facts or describing facts which cannot be questioned further. Further inquiries stemming from the

³ Much fuss about naturalistic fallacies seems to overlook this simple point.

philosophical easy chair have to be rejected in favour of systematic descriptions or empirical investigations of our linguistic faculties (e.g., in cognitive science). Strong Descriptivism might try to give an explanation of our behaviour by referring to facts outside of the way of life described. But these explanations no longer answer to the questions put within this way of speaking and acting. Seen from this perspective of participants in this way of speaking we might leave behind this kind of naturalistic investigation altogether.

A systematic description in the sense of Weak Descriptivism can amount to a "rational reconstruction" of our intuitions in the field in question. Question (Q2) itself is not as obviously relevant to the case in point (e.g., Hirsch's deivision problem) as it seems. It could rest on seeing the fact that we can ask for explanations of the framework itself from without as an insufficiency of giving reasons from within: the "why" in question (Q2) really is no further "why" of the sort answered by Weak Descriptivism, but a different "why" altogether. Knowing why we are biologically or neuro-physiologically build the way that we are build might be of no great relevance to the questions raised.

This might be the idea of PI §655:

"It isn't a question of explaining a language-game by means of our experiences, but of noting a language-game."

A reductionist naturalism might be more successful with respect to this further investigation in the natural history or the causal antecedents of our (linguistic) behaviour than a mere description. In a wider scientific perspective on linguistic behaviour we probably might be interested in reductionist explanations.

Nevertheless Weak Descriptivism seems to be a first option.

4. What's the distinction between kinds of descriptivism worth?

That there might be different attitudes and aims in naturalism has been noted before. The distinction made here between Strong and Weak Descriptivism is related, for example, to Strawson's distinction between "strong naturalism" and "liberal or catholic naturalism" (cf. Strawson 1985). Nevertheless many arguments – especially those against naturalism (e.g., in the philosophy of mind) – don't seem to see the distinction.

This is unfortunate for the following reasons:

The merits of Weak Descriptivism aren't appreciated by conflating it with Strong Descriptivism. As a result fanciful philosophical doctrines are developed to "avoid naturalism" (e.g., a hyper-realistic doctrine of natural properties to solve the division problem).

The merits of Strong Descriptivism (contributing to a wider scientific picture of human life) aren't appreciated by conflating it with Weak Descriptivism, and therefore sticking with just "noting" forms of life *in all contexts* of investigation.

The worth of the distinction, therefore, could lay in considering what kind of naturalism might be required or asked for when opting for a naturalistic solution seems to be the most promising option at hand.

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Substanzielle und Personale Identität

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Vorbemerkung

Die im Titel vorkommenden Ausdrücke sind sämtlich *termini technici* der Philosophie, von denen jeder seine eigene Geschichte aufweist. Auf die längste kann die Substanz zurückblicken, die von Aristoteles eingeführt wurde. Was die Identität angeht, so hat Aristoteles das Leibnizprinzip bereits in seiner Topik formuliert. Er verwendet es allerdings nicht als architektonisches Prinzip seiner Philosophie, wie es später Leibniz tat. Person wurde erst später zum *terminus technicus* der Philosophie. Das Eigentümliche dabei ist, dass der Begriff der Person zunächst in die Rechtswissenschaft und die Theologie Eingang fand, bevor er schließlich in der Philosophie landete. Dieser Aufsatz versucht einerseits die Beziehung zwischen Substanz und Person zu klären und andererseits die doppelte Identität von Substanzen und Personen darzustellen.

1. Aristoteles

In seiner Kategorienschrift hat Aristoteles das ontologische Quadrat präsentiert, in dem es neben individuellen und universellen Substanzen - auch erste und zweite Substanz genannt - individuelle und universelle Eigenschaften gibt. Erste oder individuelle Substanzen unterscheiden sich von den anderen Entitäten durch eine Reihe von Kriterien: Sie sind jeweils das letzte Glied der Inhärenz und der Prädikation, sie können Konträres aufnehmen, d.h. es können ihnen konträre Akzidenzien wie rot und grün, heiß und kalt inhärieren, sie können kausale Beziehungen eingehen und sie bestehen über die Zeit hinweg, d.h. bei all diesen Veränderungen, die nur akzidentelle Veränderungen sind, bleibt ein Kern bestehen, den Aristoteles *hypokeimenon* nennt, von der Scholastik später mit *substratum* übersetzt.

Aristoteles hat dann in anderen Schriften neue Varianten des Substanzbegriffes entwickelt, so z.B. in der Physik, in der Metaphysik und in *de Anima*. Bei all diesen Varianten ist der Bestand über die Zeit eine Konstante. Substanzen sind Entitäten, die sich zwar verändern aber trotz dieser Veränderung weiter bestehen.

In *de Anima* kommt eine neue Art von Substanz hinzu, die für die Entwicklung des Substanzbegriffes grundlegend sein wird. Aristoteles analysiert in dieser Schrift nicht-körperliche Substanzen oder Seelen und stellt fest, dass es davon verschiedene Arten gibt, denen verschiedene Vollkommenheiten zugeordnet werden können. Zunächst die *anima vegetativa*, die für Ernährung, Fortpflanzung und Wachstum zuständig ist, dann die *anima sensitiva*, zu deren Vollkommenheiten Wahrnehmung und Gedächtnis gehören, und letztlich die *anima rationalis*, die Denken, also das Operieren mit Begriffen und dadurch auch die Einsicht in notwendige Wahrheiten samt ein Gedächtnis für solche Wahrheiten mit sich bringt.

Pflanzen begnügen sich mit einer *anima vegetativa*, Tiere habe zusätzlich eine *anima sensitiva*, und Menschen setzen eine *anima rationalis* darauf. Nach oben besteht also eine kumulative Beziehung. Man kann bei den höchsten Substanzen alle drei Seelen beobachten. In

diesem Falle sind die Seelenteile zwar unterscheidbar, aber nicht voneinander abtrennbar. *De anima* ist voll mereologischer Analysen; Aristoteles unterscheidet an vielen Stellen zwischen rein distinktionellen oder nicht-abtrennbaren und echten, d.h. abtrennbaren Teilen.

Wichtig ist auch, dass schon bei Aristoteles ein Konkurrenz-begriff sowohl für Substanz als auch für Person aus dem Rennen ausscheidet, denn er kennt auch Individuen im Bereich der Akzidenzien, also individuelle Akzidenzien. Individuum-Sein oder Individualität ist damit nicht auf Substanzen beschränkt.

2. Boethius

Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (480-523) hat als erster Philosoph Person definiert. Der Aristoteliker Boethius weiß, dass der Ausdruck „Individuum“ wegen der individuellen Akzidenzien zweideutig ist und verwendet den Ausdruck „Natur“. Er kennt sich in den Verästelungen der *Arbur Porphyriana* gut aus und unterscheidet vier Arten von Naturen, nämlich die von genera, Substanzen, Körper und Akzidenzien. Seine Definition lautet dann: *Persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia*. Person ist die individuelle Substanz einer rationalen Natur.

Akzidenzien scheiden zunächst aus, dann zweite Substanzen, d.h. genera, und letztlich Körper, die nicht weiter differenziert sind. Personen sind also individuelle Substanzen der höchsten Art, nämlich Substanzen, die über Rationalität verfügen, die also urteilen und denken können. Dabei wird allerdings der Status der Rationalität nicht klar, d.h. ob es genügt, dass Personen rational waren und es nicht mehr sind wie Hirnverletzte oder es noch nicht sind aber sein werden wie Kinder, oder ob die Rationalität als Disposition vorliegen muss, die jederzeit aktuell verfügbar ist, also in Aktion treten kann.

Wie bei Aristoteles gibt es bei Boethius offensichtlich den Begriff des Bewusstseins noch nicht, doch beide kennen durchaus reflexive Akte und Funktionen des Verstandes, die man später als konstitutiv für das Bewusstsein angesehen hat.

3. Thomas von Aquin

Thomas kennt bereits vier verschiedene Definitionen von Person, doch er gibt sich mit der ersten von Boethius zufrieden. Er bezieht Person vor allem auf Handlungen.

Das Partikuläre und Individuelle wird in einer speziellen und vollkommenen Weise in rationalen Substanzen gefunden, die Herren über ihre eigenen Handlungen und nicht nur Objekt von Handlungen sind, wie andere, die also selbst handeln können. Handlungen sind charakteristisch für Individuen. Und so haben unter den Substanzen die Individuen mit rationaler Natur einen eigenen Namen: dieser Name ist „Person“.

Personen sind also für Thomas individuelle rationale Substanzen, die selbständig oder autonom handeln können und deshalb verantwortlich für ihre Handlungen sind. Der Handlungsbegriff tritt bei der

Charakterisierung der Person in den Mittelpunkt. Zur Fähigkeit des Urteilens und Denkens kommt noch die des autonomen Handelns. Damit schränkt sich der Kreis der Kandidaten für das Person-Sein noch weiter ein. Die *species Mensch*, die als rationale, lebende Substanz definiert ist, erhält als weitere Differenzen: Tatsächlich über Rationalität verfügen und autonom handeln können und damit auch für seine Handlungen verantwortlich sein. Damit wird allerdings kein neues Individuum geschaffen, sondern die Rationalität wird näher bestimmt und damit die individuelle Substanz weiter differenziert.

4. Duns Scotus und Ockham

Die Franziskaner bringen zwei neue ontologische Aspekte in die Diskussion um die Person ein: Duns Scotus die Dependenz und Ockham die Mereologie. Duns Scotus unterscheidet eine *dependentia actualis, potentialis* und *aptitudinalis*. Ockham versteht die Person als *suppositum intellectuale*.

Suppositum est ens completum, non constituens aliquod ens unum, non natum alteri inhaerere, nec ab aliquo sustentificari. Natura intellectualis completa quae nec sustentificatur ab alio, nec est nata facere per se unum cum alio sicut pars.

Die Person ist nach Ockham ein vollständiges Seiendes das weder ein Konstituent eines anderen Seienden ist, noch einem anderen Seienden inhäriert, noch durch ein anderes Seiendes zu einer Substanz gemacht wird. Es wird weder durch Hinzufügung eines anderen zu einer Substanz gemacht, noch ist es dazu bestimmt als Teil eines anderen aufzutreten. Ockham versteht das *suppositum intellectuale* als mereologisch vollständiges Seiendes, dem weder etwas hinzugefügt werden muss, noch das einem anderen hinzugefügt wird, um in beiden Fällen ontologische Ganzheiten herzustellen. Bemerkenswert bei dieser Analyse ist, dass Ockham offensichtlich auf höherer Ebene ein *suppositum intellectuale* installiert, das für weitere Bestimmungen offen ist, die allerdings nicht mereologischer Art sein dürfen.

5. Descartes

Descartes bringt eine neue Sicht in die Philosophie ein, die mindestens langfristig auch den Begriff der Person beeinflusst. Er setzt auf die innere Erfahrung, d.h. er hält die Beobachtung unserer psychischen Akte für wichtiger als das, was uns die äußere Erfahrung mittels der Sinne liefert. Im Idealfall versorgt uns die innere Erfahrung mit klaren und deutlichen Begriffen.

Descartes ist aber auch verantwortlich für die Auflösung des Substanzbegriffes, denn er spricht von *res extensa* und *res cogitans*, also von ausgedehnten und denkenden Dingen und nicht von Substanzen. Für die Lebewesen, und das sind nur wir Menschen, ist das Denken die wichtigste Aktivität, Tiere haben nicht einmal Perzeptionen. Sie sind wie die Pflanzen Maschinen. Substanz bedeutet für Descartes völlige Unabhängigkeit. In diesem strengen Sinne ist nur Gott eine Substanz. Im weiteren Sinne auch noch die *res cogitans*, weil sie von ihrem Körper unabhängig ist.

Bei Descartes gibt es erstmals ein Bewusstsein. Unsere wichtigste psychische Aktivität ist zudem nicht das Wahrnehmen, Fühlen oder Wollen, sondern das Denken. *Res extensa* und *res cogitans* sind streng getrennt. Körperliche und geistige Identität laufen parallel zueinander. Es gibt keinen gegenseitigen Einfluss.

Descartes spricht zwar vom Ich, also von der ersten Person und ist sich seiner Existenz durch die innere Erfahrung sicher, aber er ist kein Philosoph des Personalen. Der Personbegriff kommt in seine Philosophie nur am Rande vor. Dafür bereitet er aber das Feld für weitere Überlegungen in diese Richtung. Wichtig ist, dass bei ihm das Bewusstsein sowohl die synchrone als auch die diachrone Einheit des Psychischen garantiert. Einheit des Körpers und Einheit der Seele sind für ihn primitive, d.h. teillose, nicht weiter analysierbare Begriffe.

6. Locke

Nicht den Rationalisten, sondern dem Empiristen Locke verdanken wir die Subjektivierung des Substanzbegriffes. Er charakterisiert die Person als denkendes intelligentes Seiendes, das über Vernunft und Reflexion verfügt und fähig ist sich selbst als sich selbst zu betrachten, nämlich als dasselbe denkende Ding zu verschiedener Zeit und an verschiedenem Ort. Dies schafft es nur durch dieses Bewusstsein, das vom Denken untrennbar ist, und wie es scheint, wesentlich für das Denken ist. Denn da Bewusstsein Denken immer begleitet und das ist, was jeden zu dem macht, was er ein Selbst nennt und wodurch er sich von anderen denkenden Objekten unterscheidet, darin allein besteht personelle Identität, d.h. Selbigkeit eines rationalen Seienden.

Das Selbstbewusstsein konstituiert die personale Identität, Locke kennt keine dem Selbstbewusstsein vorausgehende Entität, sei es eine individuelle Substanz noch eine Person an: "Personal identity consists not in the identity of substance, but in the identity of consciousness."

Wie später für Leibniz, spielt für Locke das Gedächtnis für die diachrone Identität der Person die entscheidende Rolle. Durch die Aneignung früherer Zustände meines Ichs werde ich für die Handlungen verantwortlich, die ich früher begangen habe, nicht aufgrund einer in der Zeit sich durchhaltenden Substanz. Triebkraft für dieses Verhalten des Menschen ist die Sorge um das zukünftige Glück. Diese Sorge führt dazu, dass sich der Mensch für seine Vergangenheit interessiert und damit Selbstinteresse zeigt. Die Person ist für Locke das Ergebnis eines subjektiven Prozesses: "For whatever substance is, however framed, without consciousness, there is no person."

7. Leibniz

Leibniz spricht in einigen Texten von Person und vom Ich. Seine Ausgangsposition ist neu. Er knüpft an Descartes an, geht jedoch weit über dessen Position hinaus. Leibniz tut sich insofern leichter, als er von geistigen Substanzen ausgeht, die er später Monaden nennt. Auch sein Substanzbegriff stellt eine Reaktion auf die Auflösungstendenzen des Substanzbegriffs durch Descartes dar. Leibniz' metaphysisches Inventar besteht aus Monaden, Perzeptionen und Appetitus. Monaden sind mereologisch primitiv, d.h. sie sind nicht weiter teilbar: Sie haben keine substantiellen Teile. Perzeptionen spiegeln die Gesamtheit der Welt wider, d.h. alle anderen Monaden samt ihrer Perzeptionen. Diese sind selbst komplexe Entitäten, d.h. sie haben Teile. Leibniz nennt diese Teile *petites perceptions*. Auch der Appetitus oder die *appetition*, die den Übergang von einer Perzeption zur anderen organisiert, ist mereologisch komplex. Leibniz spricht hier von *petites inclinations*, also von kleinen Neigungen oder Tendenzen. Der Appetitus macht das dynamische Prinzip der Monade aus und er ist deshalb für Leibniz' Raum-Zeit Theorie grundlegend.

Um den metaphysischen Status und Funktion von Apperzeptionen oder reflexiven geistigen Akten zu verstehen, muss man die schon erwähnte Unterscheidung von Seelen beachten. Man kann bei Leibniz von einfachen Monaden, Seelen und Geistern sprechen. Diese Hierarchie ist wie bei Aristoteles kumulativ, d.h. Geister enthalten sowohl einfache Monaden als auch Seelen. Dabei ist allerdings zu beachten, dass die einfachen Monaden nicht der *anima vegetativa* entsprechen. Die *anima vegetativa* ist mit der *anima sensitiva* verschmolzen. Einfache Monaden habe mit Seele und Leben nichts zu tun.

Im Falle der einfachen Monaden gibt es nur Perzeptionen und Appetitus. Auf jeden Appetitus folgt notwendigerweise eine Perzeption und auf jede Perzeption folgt notwendigerweise ein Appetitus. Jeder Appetitus erreicht zudem die ganze durch ihn angestrebte Perzeption und nicht nur einen Teil der Perzeption. Dazu kommt, dass einfache Substanzen nicht dominieren, d.h. sie werden nur dominiert und bilden so die untere Schranke in der Hierarchie der Monaden.

Seelen oder *animae sensitivae* nehmen eine mittlere Position in der Hierarchie der Monaden ein. Sie verfügen zusätzlich zu den Perzeptionen, mit deren Hilfe sie das Universum widerspiegeln - im Gegensatz zu den einfachen Monaden - auch über ein Gedächtnis, nämlich für ein Gedächtnis über frühere Perzeptionen. Außerdem haben sie sowohl die Fähigkeit zu dominieren als auch dominiert zu werden.

Geistseelen oder *animae racionales* bilden die oberste Gruppe der Monaden. Sie haben zusätzlich zu Perzeptionen und Appetitus auch Apperzeptionen, d.h. reflexive geistige Akte, wie sie Aristoteles schon in *de Anima* beschrieben hat. Damit kommt zum ersten mal Reflexivität in die Monadenhierarchie, denn die Perzeptionen sind irreflexiv, symmetrisch und transitiv. Apperzeptionen schaffen erst das Bewusstsein, denn ohne Reflexivität gibt es kein Bewusstsein und kreieren auch eine neu Art von Gedächtnis, nämlich neben dem Verstehen von notwendigen Begriffen und Aussagen im ontischen und deontischen Sinne, auch die Erinnerung an sie, d.h. an Wahrheiten, die so und nicht anders sein können und an juristische und moralische Normen. Leibniz spricht deshalb im Zusammenhang mit der Gedächtnisfunktion der Apperzeptionen auch immer vom Ich, von Person und Verantwortung. In *Discourse de Métaphysique* von 1686 gibt er ein eindrucksvolles Beispiel für die Wichtigkeit von Apperzeptionen und ihre Reflexions- und Gedächtnisfunktion für die Konstitution des Ich, von personaler Kontinuität und Verantwortung. Dem Ich kommt dabei eine einheitsstiftende Funktion für alle psychischen Akte zu.

In der Monadologie erwähnt Leibniz zusätzliche Eigenschaften von Geistern oder Geistseelen: Der Appetitus oder in diesem Falle der Wille erreicht nicht immer die ganze angestrebte Perzeption, sondern manchmal nur einen Teil von ihr. Außerdem gibt es zwar immer eine Unendlichkeit von Perzeptionen, aber nicht immer Apperzeptionen. Die gibt es nur, wenn das Bewusstsein funktioniert, also nicht im Schlaf oder bei Bewusstlosigkeit. Leibniz beschreibt zudem Zustände, in denen die Apperzeptionen keine Rolle spielen, und wir uns auf der Stufe der *anima sensitiva* befinden, d.h. wir geben uns mit Perzeptionen zufrieden. Geistseelen dominieren zwar, können aber nicht dominiert werden. Dies schließt sie nach oben ab und verhindert gleichzeitig, dass es so etwas wie eine Weltseele gibt, von der die einzelnen Monaden nur Teile sind.

Hat die Apperzeption Teile wie Perzeptionen oder Appetitus? Leibniz kennt keine *petites apperceptions*, aus denen sich die Apperzeptionen in Analogie zu den Perzeptionen zusammensetzen. Qua psychische Akte haben die Apperzeptionen genauso Teile wie die Perzeptionen, auch als Begriffe können sie nicht teillos sein, denn sie sind sicher keine primitiven Begriffe. Apperzeptionen sind offensichtlich psychische Akte, die zusammengesetzte Begriffe enthalten, die wiederum Metaideen entsprechen, mit deren Hilfe wir der Perzeptionen oder auch anderer Apperzeptionen gewahr werden. Garantiert die von Brentano beschriebene Automatik die Einheit des reflexiven Bezuges?

Haben Personen qua Personen Teile? Individuelle Substanzen sind Körper und damit integrale Ganze und habe als solche Teile, wesentliche Teile, deren Abtrennung zur Zerstörung der Substanz führen und unwesentliche, die abgetrennt werden können. Personen qua individuelle Substanzen haben sicher Teile, sowohl körperliche als auch zeitliche, d.h. Phasen. Personen sind durch eine Verfügbarkeit ihrer Rationalität für Denken, Urteilen und Handeln gekennzeichnet. Diese Verfügbarkeit hat keine Teile.

Leibniz Beitrag zur Philosophie der Person ist grundlegend und wichtig. Monaden sind geistige Substanzen, deren *petites perceptions* eine substanzielle Kontinuität und Identität garantieren. Da dominierte Monaden passiv und damit Körper sind, gewährleisten sie auch die Identität von Körpern, die nach Leibniz dem rein phänomenalen Bereich angehören. Perzeptionen bilden noch kein Bewusstsein, weil sie nicht reflexiv sind. Dazu sind reflexive geistige Akte oder Apperzeptionen nötig, denn Bewusstsein ist für Leibniz identisch mit Selbstbewusstsein. Da das Bewusstsein nicht immer über solche Akte verfügt - Leibniz vertritt die Ansicht, dass wir uns in $\frac{3}{4}$ der Fälle mit Perzeptionen begnügen müssen - postuliert er für die Konstituierung der Person eine neue Art von Gedächtnis, nämlich ein Gedächtnis für notwendige Wahrheiten und zwar sowohl für alethische als auch für deontische Modalitäten. Erst der Zugang zur Welt der Ideen samt dieser Art von Gedächtnis macht individuelle Substanzen zu Personen, die fähig sind Verantwortung für ihre Handlungen zu übernehmen.

8. Hume

Hume führt den Ansatz von Locke konsequent weiter und gibt den Substanzbegriff ganz auf:

That what we call mind, is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity.

Es gibt nach Hume keine von der Wahrnehmung unterschiedene Selbstwahrnehmung, die den Personbegriff oder die Idee des Selbst rechtfertigen würde.

But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are supposed to have a reference.

Jeder Mensch ist nur ein "bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each another with an unconceivable rapidity and there is a perpetual flux and movement." Die personale Identität ist eine Fiktion. Die Identität, die wir dem menschlichen Geist zuschreiben, ist nur eine fiktive und von der gleichen Art, wie wir sie Pflanzen und Tieren zuschreiben. Sie kann deshalb keine andere Ursache haben, sondern sie entstammt der gleichen Operation der Einbildung gegenüber ähnlichen

Gegenständen. Die Identität wird gestiftet durch die allgemeinen Assoziationsprinzipien der Ähnlichkeit und der Verursachung. Wenn wir keine Erinnerung hätten, dann hätten wir keinen Begriff von Verursachung, noch irgendeinen Begriff dieser Kette von Ursachen und Wirkungen, die unsere Person und unser Selbst konstituieren.

Hume erweist sich mit diesen Argumentationen als reiner Psychologist. Über die Beschreibung von Assoziationen geht seine Analyse psychischer Vorgänge nicht hinaus. Selbst die Reflexivität fällt weg, von ontologischer Fundierung ganz zu schweigen.

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Criticism, Context and Community: Connections between Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* and Feminist Epistemology

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I explore the conceptual connections between Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* and the work of three contemporary feminist epistemologists: standpoint theorist Sandra Harding and feminist empiricists Helen Longino and Lynn Hankinson Nelson. My inquiry reveals both surprising similarities and important differences between Wittgensteinian and feminist epistemologies. Exploring these similarities and differences clarifies Wittgenstein's epistemology and reveals ways feminist epistemologists have developed themes from *On Certainty*.

On Certainty anticipates three important pillars of feminist epistemology: criticism, context, and community.

1. Criticism

One focus of feminist criticism is the alleged objectivity of science. According to tradition, science involves a method of justification that prevents our personal feelings and biases (such as greed and ambition) from distorting our understanding of the world.

Both Wittgenstein and feminist epistemologists reject the traditional notion of scientific objectivity. Wittgenstein maintains that rather than being coercive and external to us, our linguistic and epistemological rules are based on our human customs, practices and institutions--our "form of life". Feminists see science as situated in and influenced by a social, historical, and cultural context. They maintain that science is not autonomous because scientists have no method for eliminating shared social biases.

Having rejected the problematic traditional notion of objectivity, Longino and Harding offer non-traditional accounts of objectivity intended to fit feminism, avoid relativism, and explain how feminist criticism can enhance scientific objectivity. I shall maintain that while Wittgenstein's account of objectivity is closer to Longino's than to Harding's, he would nevertheless reject both not because he supports the traditional account, but because his own non-traditional account conflicts with theirs at certain crucial points.

Helen Longino argues that scientific knowledge is produced not by isolated individuals, but by an interactive dialogic community (Longino 1990). A scientific community is objective if it satisfies her four criteria for transformative criticism:

1. There are public avenues for criticism: journals, conferences, etc.
2. Critics can invoke shared public standards.
3. The scientific community is open to criticism and reevaluation.
4. Qualified scientists share equal intellectual authority (Longino 1993, 112-113).

The heart of Longino's account is the third criterion, which involves questioning the background beliefs in light of which states of affairs become evidence

(Longino 1990, 73). Like theories, background beliefs should be articulated and critically evaluated by the scientific community. They can then be defended, modified or abandoned in response to such criticism. As long as such criticism is possible, individual and communal biases can be checked (Longino 1990, 73-75).

The formal requirement of demonstrable evidential relevance constitutes a standard of rationality and acceptability independent of and external to any particular research program or scientific theory. The satisfaction of this standard by any program or theory secured, as has been argued, by *intersubjective criticism, is what constitutes its objectivity*" (Longino 1990, 75).

While Longino emphasizes intersubjective criticism, Wittgenstein characterizes the necessary foundation for such criticism. He writes, "All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place within a system. And this system is . . . not so much the point of departure as the element in which arguments have their life" (OC 105). "I have a world picture. . . . it is the substratum of all my enquiring and asserting" (OC 162). "Whenever we test anything, we are already presupposing something that is not tested" (OC 163). [See also OC 110, 136, 141-42, 144, 151-52, 167, 204, 220, 212, 225, 232, 253, 308, 337, 341-344, 370, 401, 411, 414-15 & 475.]

Sandra Harding maintains that traditional objectivity is not strong enough to eliminate gender bias. She advocates a "strong objectivity" that extends "the notion of scientific research to include systematic examination of powerful background beliefs" (Harding 1991, 149). Scientists, their practices, and their background beliefs must become objects of scientific study. Longino supports examining background beliefs, but recognizes that there may be limits to the scope of such examinations. Some background beliefs "may not be subject to empirical confirmation or disconfirmation," and may "be infused with metaphysical or normative considerations" (Longino 1990, 75). Longino maintains that Harding is mistaken in identifying the objectivity of scientific methods with their empirical features *alone*.

Like Longino, Wittgenstein maintains that certain background beliefs cannot be empirically tested, but he explains this limitation differently. For Wittgenstein, the activities of science require that certain things go unquestioned or "stand fast" thus providing the general background context for inquiry and criticism. "One cannot make experiments if there are not some things that one does not doubt... If I make an experiment I do not doubt the existence of the apparatus before my eyes. I have plenty of doubts, but not *that*" (OC 337). "The *questions* that we raise and our *doubts* depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are *in deed* not doubted" (OC 342). What "stands fast" is not subject to testing, criticism or confirmation.

2. Context

Wittgenstein and feminist epistemologists stress that human knowledge is *situated* in *contexts*. Their use of "context", however, varies. For Harding, the context of science is one of hierarchy and power differences. White males at the center of science see the world from a perspective of dominance; women and others on the margin see the world from the perspective of subordination--an epistemically superior position according to Harding (Harding 1991 & 1993).

Wittgenstein did not discuss class or gender based differences in power and epistemic perspective. He did insist that our beliefs be justified by public criteria that function only given certain contexts. He discusses two types of contexts with different epistemic roles. First, criteria function only given certain very general facts of nature (including facts about human behavior) and certain human customs or general practices. Wittgenstein calls this general background context "our inherited background", "our world picture", etc. (OC 167) and insists it is necessary for inquiry. Moore's propositions in "A Defense of Common Sense" belong to this world picture. At this level of generality, certainty is absolute. There is room for fluctuation, but not for doubt.

Second, criteria provide a reliable basis for justification only in the appropriate particular contexts, which include where, when, who, what happened before and after, etc. We assume that general circumstances obtain; we must determine what particular circumstances obtain in a given case. This determination is two-fold. First, we must determine whether the context is one appropriate for applying a particular criterion or standard. If it is, then, we must determine whether the circumstances are normal. Wittgenstein writes, "If however, one wanted to give something like a rule here, then it would contain the expression "in normal circumstances". And we recognize normal circumstances but cannot precisely describe them. At most, we can describe a range of abnormal ones" (OC 27). [See also OC 10, 27, 155, 250, 255, 334-35, 348, 423, 553, 554, & 622.] At this level, context may seem liable to the charge of relativism, for a proposition that is certain in one context may be uncertain in another. But certainty at the more general level neutralizes the apparent relativism at this level.

Longino's epistemology is "a form of contextualism that understands knowledge as the historical product of interactions between contextual factors such as social needs, values and traditions, and practices of inquiry such as observation, experiment, and reasoning" (Longino 1990, 176-177). Longino also has two types of contexts: one universal and one particular. First, she sees the context of scientific inquiry as the international scientific community: "What is called scientific knowledge, then, is produced by a community (ultimately the community of all scientific practitioners)" (Longino 1990, 69). Second, she emphasizes particular contexts, suggesting that we embrace multiple and, in some cases, incompatible theories that satisfy local standards (Longino 1993, 114). This need not plunge us into epistemological relativism because the standards of transformative criticism protect us from this fate.

3. Community

The most innovative aspect of feminist empiricism is its portrayal of knowledge as social or communal. Traditional epistemology is essentially individualistic and largely ignores the role(s) of social interactions and the

community in the production of knowledge. Alvin I. Goldman maintains that social epistemology "focuses on social paths or routes to knowledge... that feature interactions with other agents" (Goldman 1999, 4). Social epistemology thus encompasses both minimally interpersonal views of knowledge, in which the individual is the primary knower, and maximally communal views, like Nelson's, in which the community is the primary knower. Consequently, Nelson, Longino, and Wittgenstein all have social epistemologies.

Nelson uses feminist science criticism, Quine's holistic empiricism, and neurobiology to argue that knowledge is social, constructed by the community, and constrained by our experience (Nelson 1990, 40). What others say and do is vital to the child's cognitive development. Without interpersonal experience, an infant could never develop the neurological structures permitting language, concepts, and perceptions. Other people provide the child with a language and a conceptual scheme. The community also provides public standards of evidence for judging beliefs (Nelson 1990, 256). These standards constrain what we can know as well as our theorizing (Nelson 1990, 277). Hence, for Nelson, the agent of knowledge is "First and foremost the community, and then secondarily the individual" (Nelson 1990, 14). Her brand of "social epistemology" is quite robust and contains obvious parallels with Wittgenstein's remarks on language acquisition and communal practices.

Longino's contextual empiricism is significantly more "social" than traditional epistemologies, but noticeably weaker than Nelson's communal coherentism. Longino maintains, "scientific knowledge is constructed not by individuals applying a method of investigation to objects, but by individuals interacting with one another in ways that modify their observations, theories, hypotheses, and patterns of reasoning" (Longino 1990, 111). Longino focuses on individuals interacting to produce knowledge. Her view is, thus, more modest than Nelson's. Nelson focuses on the community; Longino focuses on the interaction between the members of the community. Although Longino's view is less communal and more interpersonal than Nelson's, they agree that epistemic agency is not solitary. Knowing and coming to know are social and interactive. They are things we do: our human actions and practices. Sentiments that seem compatible with Wittgenstein's rejecting the notions of a logically private language and a private mental life or world completely unavailable to others.

How strongly social is Wittgenstein's account of knowledge? Is it robustly communal like Nelson's or modestly interpersonal like Longino's? Longino believes "the later philosophy of Wittgenstein does challenge the individualist ideal" although "few commentators have developed the anti-individualist implications of his work" (Longino 1993, 119). I am attempting to do so for *On Certainty*. Wittgenstein writes, "We are quite sure of it" does not mean just that every single person is certain of it, but that we belong to a community which is bound together by science and education" (OC 298). How tightly do these cords of science and education bind us to each other? Does Wittgenstein believe with Nelson that the community is the primary knower? Do his remarks allow or perhaps even entail such a robustly communal view?

Stroll argues that Wittgenstein's notion of community involves three different levels:

1. The totality of humans and other animals, their activities, interactions, practices and institutions together with inorganic products such as buildings.

2. The set of human practices, customs, habits, and traditions.

3. Individual practices of asserting, inquiring, etc. (Stroll 1994, 170).

Stroll's third level can be divided into two sub-levels: the domain of the expert, and the domain of the novice (Williams 1999, 8).

Science is a specialized epistemic enterprise engaged in by experts. Experts train novices in the epistemic practices of science. First, however, novices must be trained in the more basic practices of language use, inquiry, etc. Through this more basic training, children unconsciously absorb--Wittgenstein intentionally does not say "learn" (OC 297)--the inherited background beliefs of their community. "When a child learns language it learns at the same time what is to be investigated and what not" (OC 472).

The training of novices by experts of science indicates that knowledge is social. Experts have mastered special scientific practices and gained special knowledge. Whether someone is such a master of science is determined by public criteria. The domain of the novice is not that of the master.

A pupil and a teacher. The pupil will not let anything be explained to him, for he continually interrupts with doubts, for instance as to the existence of things, the meaning of words, etc. The teacher says "Stop interrupting me and do as I tell you. So far, your doubts don't make sense at all. Or imagine that the boy questioned the truth of history (and everything that connects up with it)--and even whether the earth had existed at all a hundred years before. Here it strikes me as if this doubt were hollow (OC 310-312).

Scientific knowledge is the province of well-trained experts. Their knowledge is part of the community's system of knowledge. As libraries hold knowledge gained in the past, so today's experts are a living repository of scientific knowledge. The community possesses this knowledge and passes it on to future generations through them. Individual members of the community can generally gain access to the experts' knowledge through their testimony. Thus, Wittgenstein's epistemology, like Nelson's, is robustly communal.

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Freiheit, Personen und ontologische Verpflichtungen

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Nach der bekannten These von Kant macht ein Diskurs, der einen Soll-Operator involviert, nur dann Sinn, wenn wir bestimmte Voraussetzungen über das Universum des Diskurses machen. In der Welt, in der es moralische Verpflichtungen gibt, muß es nämlich Gegenstände von einer ausgezeichneten ontologischen Struktur geben, die als Subjekte von diesen Verpflichtungen dienen. Diese Gegenstände sind *Personen* und ihre einzigartige ontologische Struktur besteht darin, daß sie imstande sind, nicht nur als ein Bestandteil eines Sachverhalts (bzw. eines Ereignisses) in eine Kausalkette involviert zu sein, sondern sie sind auch fähig, eine solche Kausalkette zu beginnen, d.h. als ein *Agens* zu funktionieren. Wir versuchen, die Kantische Position zu präzisieren und erklären, worin die ontologischen Verpflichtungen, die man durch das Verwenden des moralischen Diskurses in Kauf nimmt, bestehen.

1. Freiheit und Verantwortung

Man darf jemandem wegen seiner Handlung nur dann moralische Vorwürfe machen, wenn er *anders handeln könnte*. Das ist die erste Banalität, die Kants Moralphilosophie zugrundeliegt. Nicht nur wäre es extravagant, einen Blitz oder einen Wind wegen der Zerstörung eines Hauses bestrafen zu wollen, es wäre auch unangebracht, jemandem, der in der tiefen Hypnose seinen Nachbarn umgebracht hat, für diese „Tat“ Schuld zu geben. Wenn also etwas moralisch geboten ist, dann muß es zumindest *möglich* sein. Wenn „*p*“ eine Satzvariable und „*S*“ ein Soll-Operator ist, dann gilt als das erste Prinzip:

$$(1) \quad Sp \supset \diamond p$$

Wovon man durch Kontraposition die Konsequenz erhält, daß nichts, was notwendig ist, verboten sein kann:

$$(2) \quad \Box p \supset \neg S\neg p$$

Daß das nicht alles sein kann, was im Begriff der moralischen Verpflichtung steckt, bemerken wir, sobald wir uns von der deontischen Aussagenlogik zu den komplizierteren Strukturen wenden, die eine Beziehung auf das Subjekt der Verpflichtung involvieren. Normalerweise sagen wir nicht bloß, daß *etwas* sein soll, sondern wir sagen vielmehr, daß *jemand* etwas machen soll.

Um die Personen-gebundene Verpflichtung auszudrücken, müssen wir unsere Grammatik ein wenig ändern. Das Zeichen „*S*“, das bisher als ein Funktor der syntaktischen Kategorie *s/s* (d.h. als ein Funktor, der, wenn wir ihn mit einem Satz verbünden, einen neuen Satz gibt) funktionierte, ersetzen wir durch das Zeichen „*S**“. Dieses betrachten wir jetzt als einen Funktor der Kategorie *s/n,s* (d.h. als einen Funktor, den man, um einen Satz zu erhalten, mit einem singulären Term und einem Satz verbinden muß).

Die unqualifizierte Form, daß *etwas* sein soll, bedeutet übrigens oft, daß es für *jeden* gilt, daß er das (machen) soll, etwa nach dem Prinzip:

$$(3) \quad Sp \equiv \forall xS^*(x,p)$$

Manchmal bedeutet sie allerdings, daß es sicherlich jemanden (oder eine Institution) gibt, der (die) für etwas Bestimmtes sorgen soll(en) (den Hausmeister, die Polizei, die Regierung, das Arbeitsamt usw.):

$$(4) \quad Sp \equiv \exists xS^*(x,p)$$

Die wichtige Bedingung, welche eine sinnvolle Verwendung vom *S**-Operator – in der Form „*S*(a,p)*“ – erfüllen muß, ist es, daß es *in der Macht* des Subjekts *a* ist, daß *p*, zu verwirklichen. Diese Bedingung drücken wir durch die Form: „*F(a,p)*“ aus, die wir als: „*a* ist frei *p* zu verwirklichen“ lesen können. Die Freiheit von einem Subjekt bezüglich *p* impliziert natürlich, daß *p* möglich ist:

$$(5) \quad \exists xF(x,p) \supset \diamond p$$

(Es gibt bekanntermaßen schwierige theologische Probleme, die mit (5) zusammenhängen. Die lassen wir aber beiseite.)

Die Umkehrung von (5) gilt aber nicht:

$$(6) \quad \diamond p \supset \exists xF(x,p)$$

Es ist möglich, daß das Wetter morgen schön ist, obwohl es niemanden gibt, der das verursachen könnte. (Wieder mit dem Vorbehalt, daß wir eventuelle allmächtige Subjekte beiseite lassen.)

Unsere Bedingung sagt also, daß die moralische Verpflichtung zu *p* eine Freiheit bezüglich *p* impliziert:

$$(7) \quad S^*(a,p) \supset F(a,p)$$

2. Zwei Formen der Kausalität

Was aber heißt genau, daß jemand zu etwas frei ist bzw. daß jemand imstande ist, etwas zu verwirklichen?

Nach Kant bedeutet das nichts weniger als, daß die kausale Homogenität der Welt an diesem Punkt abgebrochen sein muß. Wenn wir über kausale Beziehungen sprechen, so sprechen wir typischerweise über die Beziehungen zwischen den Sachverhalten bzw. zwischen den Ereignissen. Daß es im Frühling viel regnete, verursachte, daß das Wasser hoch steht; daß die Musik zu laut war, verursachte, daß die Nachbarn nicht schlafen konnten usw. Sofern wir jedoch im ethischen Sinne von einem Agens oder von einem Täter sprechen, verlassen wir diese Konvention. Wenn wir Peter die Verantwortung für einen Autounfall zuschreiben wollen, dann sagen wir zwar oft, daß es sein unvorsichtiges Fahren (d.h. die Tatsache, daß er unvorsichtig gefahren ist) war, was die Ursache für den Unfall (d.h. für das, daß es einen Unfall gab) war, wir fügen aber gleich dazu, daß es allein *Peter* war, der so unvorsichtig gefahren ist. Die Kette der mittleren Ursachen kann übrigens sehr weit verlängert werden, wenn man jedoch letztlich von der Verantwortung eines Agens sprechen will, muß man an irgendwelchem Punkt dieses Agens als die Ursache betrachten.

Wir haben also mit zwei Formen von Kausalverhältnissen zu tun, die syntaktisch ganz unterschiedlich aussehen. Einerseits haben wir eine rein

propositionale Kausalität, in der ein Sachverhalt (bzw. ein Ereignis) als Ursache für einen anderen Sachverhalt (bzw. ein anderes Ereignis) funktioniert, andererseits haben wir eine nominal-propositionale Kausalität, in der die Wirkung ein Sachverhalt (bzw. ein Ereignis) ist, in der aber in der Rolle der Ursache eine Entität der nominalen Form auftritt. Wenn wir die Kausalbeziehung durch das Zeichen „ \Rightarrow “ ausdrücken, dann unterscheiden sich die zwei Formen der Kausalität dadurch, daß das Zeichen „ \Rightarrow “ im ersteren Fall von zwei Aussagen, im letzteren Fall hingegen von einem singulären Term und einer Aussage flankiert wird:

Eine rein propositionale Kausalität sieht so aus:

$$(8) \quad p \Rightarrow q$$

während eine nominal-propositionale Kausalität die folgende Form hat:

$$(9) \quad a \Rightarrow q$$

Roderick Chisholm hat in diesem Kontext eine terminologische Unterscheidung zwischen Ereignis-Kausalität und einer Substanz-Kausalität eingeführt. (Vgl. Chisholm (1989), S. 8)

Wenn ein Objekt a über die Freiheit bezüglich p verfügt, dann muß es zumindest möglich sein, daß ein Verhältnis der Substanz-Kausalität zwischen a und p besteht.

$$(10) \quad F(a,p) \supset \diamond(a \Rightarrow q)$$

Wir haben hier den Kern des Kantischen *Personenbegriffs*. Kant zufolge ist ein Gegenstand genau dann als eine Person zu bezeichnen, wenn er über eine Freiheit verfügt; und daß bedeutet *inter alia* daß er als ein nominales Glied in einem Verhältnis der Substanz-Kausalität auftreten kann.

Ob die Umkehrung von (10):

$$(11) \quad \diamond(a \Rightarrow q) \supset F(a,p)$$

gilt, ist umstritten. Zunächst könnte es scheinen, daß man eine Substanz-Kausalität nicht ausschließen sollte, die sozusagen nach dem Zufallsprinzip abläuft. Die Freiheit, die den Personen zukommt, ist aber keine Zufälligkeit, sondern eben die Fähigkeit, das zu machen, was man will. In der *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* lesen wir:

„[...] so ist die Freiheit, ob sie zwar nicht eine Eigenschaft des Willens nach Naturgesetzen ist, darum doch nicht gar gesetzlos, sondern muß vielmehr eine Kausalität nach unwandelbaren Gesetzen, aber von besonderer Art, sein; denn sonst wäre ein freier Wille ein Unding.“ (*Grundlegung*, BA 98)

Wobei diese Freiheit des Willens nach Kant nichts anderes ist „als Autonomie, d.i. die Eigenschaft des Willens, sich selbst ein Gesetz zu sein“ (*Grundlegung*, BA 98)

Es scheint aber, daß Kant (11) akzeptieren würde, und zwar deswegen, weil er nur zwei Formen der Kausalität zu akzeptieren scheint. Kausalität ist entweder eine Ereignis-Kausalität, die sich nach den physikalischen Gesetzen abspielen muß, oder andernfalls muß sie eine freie Personen-Kausalität – eine „Kausalität des Willens“ sein.

„Der Wille ist eine Art von Kausalität lebender Wesen, sofern sie vernünftig sind, und Freiheit würde diejenige Eigenschaft dieser Kausalität sein, da sie unabhängig von fremden sie *bestimmenden* Ursachen wirkend sein kann;“ (*Grundlegung*, BA 97).

Alle Fälle, in denen wir sagen, daß ein Gegenstand (eine Person oder ein Tier) rein instinktiv gehandelt hat, sind also unter die Ereignis-Kausalität zu subsumieren.

3. Ethik und Ontologie

Eine freie Substanz-Kausalität verursacht übrigens ernsthaft philosophische Probleme, die mit der kausalen Geschlossenheit der Welt zu tun haben. Nehmen wir an, daß wir eine vollständige Beschreibung der Welt (an einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt t_1) liefern wollen. Wenn wir über eine logisch analysierte Sprache L verfügen, dann würde eine solche Beschreibung eine Menge von Sätzen sein, die für jeden atomaren Satz der Sprache L entweder diesen Satz oder seine Negation enthält. (Vgl. Carnaps „state descriptions“, Carnap 1960, S. 9)

Eine solche Beschreibung spezifiziert also alle Sachverhalte, die zu diesem Zeitpunkt bestehen. Wenn wir annehmen, daß ein späterer Zustand des Universums (am Zeitpunkt t_2) eine kausale Konsequenz des früheren Zustands (t_1) darstellt, dann muß jeder Sachverhalt dieser t_2 -Phase seine kausale Erklärung in der Beschreibung der t_1 -Phase finden. Nun, wenn in den Sachverhalten der t_1 -Phase Subjekte involviert sind, die bezüglich eines gewissen Sachverhaltes p frei sind, dann hat das die Konsequenz, daß es zunächst unbestimmt ist, ob die t_2 -Phase den Sachverhalt p enthält oder nicht enthält (und zwar unabhängig davon, wie die Beschreibung der t_1 -Phase aussieht).

Kant meinte, daß man angesichts dieser Probleme von zwei Arten der Beschreibung sprechen kann, die nach ganz verschiedenen Prinzipien funktionieren. In der *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* schreibt er:

„So hat denn jeder Mensch einen empirischen Charakter seiner Willkür, welcher nichts anderes ist, als eine gewisse Kausalität seiner Vernunft, sofern diese an ihren Wirkungen in der Erscheinung eine Regel zeigt [...]. Weil dieser empirische Charakter selbst aus den Erscheinungen als Wirkung und aus der Regel derselben, welche Erfahrung an die Hand gibt, gezogen werden muß, so sind alle Handlungen des Menschen in der Erscheinung aus seinem empirischen Charakter und den mitwirkenden anderen Ursachen nach der Ordnung der Natur bestimmt, und wenn wir alle Erscheinungen seiner Willkür bis auf den Grund erforschen können, so würde es keine einzige menschliche Handlung geben, die wir nicht mit Gewißheit vorhersagen und aus ihren vorhergehenden Bedingungen als notwendig erkennen könnten. In Ansehung dieses empirischen Charakters gibt es also keine Freiheit, und nach diesem können wir allein den Menschen betrachten, wenn wir lediglich *beobachten* [...].“

Wenn wir aber eben dieselben Handlungen in Beziehung auf die Vernunft erwägen, und zwar nicht die spekulative [...] sondern ganz allein, sofern Vernunft die Ursache ist, sie selbst zu *erzeugen*; mit einem Worte, vergleichen wir sie mit dieser in *praktischer* Absicht, so finden wir eine ganz andere Regel und Ordnung, als die Naturordnung ist.“ (*KrV*, A 549 B 577 ff.)

Er hat das oft in der Terminologie von *zwei Welten* ausgedrückt, und wir wollen zeigen, daß diese Terminologie einen guten Punkt hat.

Seit Quine ist es üblich, die sogenannten ontologischen Verpflichtungen einer Theorie auf Grund von Variablen, die in der Theorie quantifiziert werden, zu identifizieren. (Vgl. dazu Quine 1948 und Quine 1960,

S. 224) Nun, im Rahmen eines moralischen Diskurses quantifizieren wir offensichtlich über Personen. Wir wollen z.B. sagen, daß es jemanden gibt, der über die Freiheit bezüglich p verfügt:

$$(12) \quad \exists xF(x,p)$$

oder, daß es Sachen gibt, die für jede Person eine Pflicht sind:

$$(13) \quad \exists \phi \forall xF(x,\phi)$$

(In der letzten Form quantifizieren wir übrigens auch über eine Aussagenvariable (ϕ), dieses Problem lassen wir aber außer Acht.)

Für uns wichtig ist, daß die Personenvariablen, die im Rahmen des moralischen Diskurses quantifiziert werden, auch in den Formen der Art:

$$(14) \quad \exists x(x \Rightarrow q)$$

aufzutreten. Dies sind aber die Formen, welche Kant zufolge den Rahmen des *theoretischen* Diskurses offensichtlich sprengen.

Es liegt also nahe, die singulären Terme (Konstanten und Variablen), die sich auf Kantische Personen beziehen, von den „normalen“ singulären Termen auch *syntaktisch unterscheiden*. (Wir können sie z.B. als fette Buchstaben schreiben.) Wenn wir diese Konvention treffen, dann sehen wir deutlich, daß der praktische Diskurs eine neue syntaktische (quantifizierbare) Kategorie einführt, die in einem theoretischen Diskurs aus prinzipiellen Gründen fehlt. Es ist übrigens einer der Punkte einer übersichtlichen logischen Notation, daß sie die ontologischen Verpflichtungen der jeweiligen Theorie deutlich erscheinen läßt.

4. Worin bestehen ontologische Verpflichtungen?

Verpflichtet uns also ein bloßes Verwenden des moralischen Diskurses zu Personen, die im Kantischen Sinne frei sind? Die meisten würden auf eine solche Behauptung mit einem Kopfschütteln reagieren. Ist es – würden sie fragen – nicht vielmehr so, daß es wohl möglich ist, daß in der ganzen Welt keine einzige Entität a gibt, die die Bedingung:

$$(15) \quad \exists \phi F(a,\phi)$$

erfüllt, und zwar unabhängig davon, *wie wir über diese Welt sprechen*?

Dieser Einwand resultiert allerdings aus einem Mißverständnis. Zwei Begriffe von ontologischen Verpflichtungen werden hier vermengt. Man spricht oft von den ontologischen Verpflichtungen, als ob es sich einfach um die Frage handelte, welche Entitäten in der Welt existieren. Eine Theorie, aus der die Existenz von Hunden und Fischen folgt, würde nach dieser Interpretation stärker ontologisch verpflichtet als eine Theorie, die nur die Existenz von Hunden anerkennt.

Dieser Begriff der ontologischen Verpflichtung scheint allerdings philosophisch nicht sehr interessant zu sein. Es ist schließlich eine empirische Frage, ob es in der Welt Hunde, Fische oder was immer gibt. Was hingegen interessant ist, ist die Tatsache, daß *beide* Theorien es zulassen, über *individuelle Variablen* zu quantifizieren, wodurch sie sich zu den Individuen verpflichten. Anders ausgedrückt: Der Unterschied zwischen den zwei Theorien wäre erst dann philosophisch interessant, wenn man die

Variablen, die sich auf Hunde und Fische beziehen, als Variablen von verschiedenen syntaktischen Kategorien betrachtet (und dementsprechend Hunde und Fische als verschiedene ontologische Kategorien einstuft.)

Ein interessanter Punkt ist, daß die Tatsache, ob dann aus einer bestimmten Theorie die tatsächliche Existenz von Fischen und Hunden folgt, ziemlich irrelevant ist. Selbst wenn eine Theorie nur das behauptet, daß es keine Hunde und keine Fische gibt, ist sie *in einem gewissen Sinne* zu den ontologischen Kategorien, zu denen Hunde und Fische gehören, verpflichtet.

Der Sinn dieser Verpflichtung besteht also nicht darin, daß man eine gewisse ontologische Kategorie als *sinnvoll* betrachtet. Man erkennt es an, daß es zumindest ontologisch möglich ist, daß es etwas gäbe, was zu dieser Kategorie gehören würde. Die ontologischen Verpflichtungen in diesem Sinne hängen nicht davon ab, ob eine bestimmte ontologische Kategorie in Wirklichkeit *leer* ist, sondern vielmehr davon ab, ob sie „ontologisch vorstellbar ist“, und das heißt: ob sie in eine Art des kohärent funktionierenden Diskurses in eine systematische Weise eingebettet ist, so daß diese Art des Diskurses ohne diese Kategorie nicht funktionieren könnte.

Genau diese Situation haben wir im Fall des moralischen Diskurses, der die singulären Personen-Terme als eine spezielle ontologische Kategorie betrachtet. Ob es in unserer Welt wirklich freie Personen gibt, ist eine Frage, die wahrscheinlich nie entschieden wird. Wenn wir aber über diese Welt in der Weise sprechen, die eine systematische Quantifizierung von Personenvariablen involviert, dann erkennen wir *eo ipso* die Kategorie der Person als eine ontologische Kategorie an. In diesem Sinne sind wir zu dieser Kategorie verpflichtet, selbst wenn wir schließlich behaupten wollen, daß sie leer ist.

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Social Externalism and Psychological Explanations - The Problem of the Semantic Features of Contents

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1. Introduction

It starts to rain and I open the umbrella or, if I don't have one, I ask my colleague, who is walking with me, if he has an umbrella in the bag. Why do I do so? There are many ways to answer this question, but if I adopt the strategy to explain the causes of my acting or speaking by looking for the reasons that I have for doing it (for instance, I notice that it is raining and I don't want to get wet), I commit myself to an explanation of a psychological kind (Davidson 1980).

The following discussion tackles an internal problem of psychological explanations concerning the *taxonomy* (or *categorization*) of intentional contents. Intentional contents define what beliefs, desires, hopes, etc., are about. One believes *that something is so-and-so* (for instance, one believes *that it is raining*); one desires *that something is going to be so-and-so* (that tomorrow it isn't going to rain), etc. The content of intentional states is the object of those so-called *that-clauses*: 'it is raining' is, for instance, the content of the belief *that it is raining*.

Insomuch as the content of beliefs, desires etc. can only be expressed by use of propositions, psychological explanations are commonly framed in terms of propositional attitudes. The notion of a propositional attitude involves two components: on the one hand, the proposition that describes the intentional content; on the other hand, the attitudes one may have towards these contents (the attitude of *believing* something, of *desiring* something, of *hoping* for something, etc.). The idea behind this is that subjects will behave differently depending on both the specific attitude they have towards these contents (depending on whether they believe something or they desire something or they hope for something, etc.) and the peculiar content itself, which characterizes those attitudes. The particular topic that the present paper deals with does not concern the function of different attitudes, but the semantics of the propositions that describe the content of attitudes. In other words, this paper maintains, according to the view proposed by social externalism, that the semantic content of propositional attitudes are socially constituted by the linguistic practices of communities. Nevertheless, the paper also deals with a peculiar matter regarding social determination of content; namely, that not all subjective contents share the same semantic features, even if they seem to be determined by one and the same social constituted content. The goal is to show how a socially constituted content may 'affect' the contents of individual minds differently. The paper concludes with an assessment of the consequences that follow from this view with respect to psychological explanations.

2. Individuation of Content from an Externalist Point of View

The classical shape of the taxonomy problem is defined by the debate about the so-called 'narrow' and 'wide' approach to intentional states, which was introduced *chiefly* by Saul Kripke's, Hilary Putnam's and Tyler Burge's externalist theories of content (Putnam 1975, Kripke 1979,

Burge 1979). Briefly, externalism maintains that certain intentional states, such as beliefs and desires, have contents that depend on factors external to the individual mind.

I am not interested here in tracing the differences between the existing forms of externalism.¹ Instead, I examine the externalist view insofar as it is relevant for delineating the taxonomy-problem in psychological explanation. This view consists basically in the social externalism proposed by Burge as well as by Putnam's thesis of the 'division of linguistic labor'.²

The essential features of social externalism can easily be shaped by using Burge's famous arthritis example. If I give voice to my belief by stating, 'I have arthritis', the proposition 'I have arthritis' expresses the content of my belief, while the word 'arthritis' conveys the concept that determines what my content refers to. Contents are described by propositions that are made up by words. Words express the concepts that determine what contents are about.

Social externalism maintains that the concepts occurring in sentences that describe intentional contents are constituted by the classification of the external world that a society develops through its experts and imposes through linguistic practices. This is to say that arthritis is what medical science and the doctors tell us it is, viz. only a disease of the joints.

What would be the case, however, if I did not have any idea about how medical science describes arthritis, but I still believed that I had arthritis: if, for instance, I had no idea that arthritis is a disease of the joints and thought that the pain in my thigh is caused by arthritis?

Putnam's idea of the division of linguistic labor and Burge's position differ on this matter. For Burge, social practices constitute the concepts that we use, and the socially constituted concepts are the only ones that actually exist. So, if I lack the concept of arthritis, I simply do not know (or, at least, do not know exactly) what I believe to be the case; for my belief is nothing more than a socially defined concept of arthritis.

Unlike Burge, Putnam maintains that subjects do know what they think even if they don't share the concept with the experts; they only identify these concepts on the basis of different criteria or properties. Putnam's point is that for identifying (viz. taxonomizing) the peculiar concepts and related contents of subjects, one has to rely on the corresponding concepts determined by the experts. From this point of view, the analysis of content bifurcates into two differently determined notions,³ namely, the externalist (wide) *and* the subjective (narrow). On the one hand, there is a *wide* notion of content developed by externalism that points out how the individuation of

¹ Among those the most relevant positions are social, physical, causal and causal-informational externalism. For a classification see Bilgrami 1992, 22-26.

² Here externalism is considered exclusively as a theory of content. Other matters connected with it such as, for instance, the problem of supervenience are set aside.

³ The notion of the 'bifurcation' of content is taken from Bilgrami (1992).

concepts and, therefore, the evaluation of contents depends on the external (physical and social) world, which exists beyond and before the individual mind; on the other hand, there is a *narrow* notion of content, which aims to taxonomize the specific contents of individual thought in order to describe behavior as the causal product of intentional contents.

3. Semantic Features of Intentional Contents

Psychological explanations in intentional terms rest, as Fodor points out (Fodor 1987, 33), on the idea that intentional states have causal power. The behavior of subjects (viz. language and action of subjects) is explained on the basis of the causal interaction of attitudes and contents. Inasmuch as psychological explanations concern subjective intentional contents, the relevant question is not what doctors say arthritis is, but how I *intend* arthritis when I believe that I have it. Because I do not know that arthritis is a disease of the joints only, I can believe to have arthritis in the thigh; and this belief is what matters for explaining my behavior on the basis of the causal power of my propositional attitudes. Thus, what is needed for a psychological explanation is an individuation of the properties that a subject associates with a certain concept and the semantics of his correspondent intentional contents. From the point of view of a psychological theory, the idea that subjects do not know what they think is nonsense, because a subjects' behavior cannot be caused by a content, which the subject does not know. For this reason, we can suppose any kind of nebulously or wrongly individuated content, but we must say that subjects know what they think with it; otherwise, we must give up psychological explanations as well as the principle that grounds them, namely, that behavior of subjects is a causal product of their thought.

The matter in question is how to determine the semantics of subjective contents. If I utter bona fide 'I have arthritis,' it is because I believe that 'I have arthritis'. But this report of my beliefs must still be put in quotes because I don't believe to have arthritis in the wide or social sense of arthritis as far as my doctor understands it. For taxonomizing my subjective content, one needs to disquote the proposition, which describes my belief in a way that identifies its semantics 'objectively'. This is nothing but the old problem of intentional and extensional contexts. The natural suggestion for this problem seems to be Putnam's: to evaluate subjective properties relying upon the properties that identify the concepts in a wide sense, which is to say relying upon the properties that the experts tell us to be the essential ones for determining objects in extensional sense.

But in this respect we have to distinguish between two sides of the externalist view. On the one hand, there are the concepts and contents defined by scientific theories, which are based on structural properties of reality. These properties may identify the reference in an essential way: water is only and univocally H₂O. This externalist view is most properly called 'physical externalism'. Although physical externalism relates with social externalism as far as its concepts and contents influence social linguistic practices, linguistic practices and scientific theories are not the same. More precisely, social linguistic practices include the concepts constituted by different scientific theories as well as everyday classification of concepts based upon simple categories like the shape of objects or their features. A concept can be univocally determined only in the field of a theory, which sets up its own vocabulary. Social linguistic practices are

juxtaposed onto the same linguistic frame of concepts constituted on the basis of different 'fields of knowledge', which describe the empirical world on the basis of different properties. For this reason, linguistic practices do not determine their own concepts in an univocal way. What the relevant properties are for determining a concept depend upon the context within which this concept is used.

Social practices define many properties for identifying a concept, but none of them determines which features *necessarily* individuate it in every case. Concepts like 'cat' or 'Oedipus' are not characterized by an essential property, which is in every case the same. Social uses offer many properties for individuating, for instance, the concept of 'table' or of 'Oedipus,' but no one determines univocally the concept of table or of Oedipus in the sense in which H₂O determines the concept of water. As Davidson points out, there is no way to make sure that the individuals will "pick out 'the' relation that constitutes knowing which object some object is" because "any property of an object may, under suitable conditions, be considered the relevant identifier." (Davidson 2001, 56)

4. Concluding Remarks: Taxonomies and Psychological Explanations

If, as the previous part points out, linguistic practices do not determine univocally which properties identify a concept, then different subjects may be affected by concepts in different ways. In this case, every property may be the relevant one for the individuation of subjective content. From this point of view, my concept of arthritis, for instance, may be identified on the basis of properties that have nothing to do with the medical definitions of arthritis, joints and thigh, even if they arise from the linguistic practices of my society. I may actually individuate every one of those three concepts through features that diverge from anatomic criteria.

The taxonomical work, which has to be done in order to develop psychological explanations, consists, in this case, in pointing out the properties of the subjective content that are relevant for explaining a behavior as causal effect of propositional attitudes. Developing such an apparatus does not mean to be able to grasp the whole of the actual semantic features of subjective contents. The explanation elaborates, rather, the hypotheses about possible features of those contents, which may be the relevant ones for the aim of explaining a behavior. An easy way for solving Burge's mystery regarding the belief of having arthritis in the thigh could be to hypothesize that the relevant properties for the determination of this belief is that arthritis causes pain and, therefore, this pain becomes the relevant property identifying this concept.

Yet, psychological theories can only develop hypotheses. To identify subjective contents for the aims of a psychological theory is a tricky interpretative work. The difficulty of this kind of explanations depends on the fact that the taxonomies of subjective contents build on the language defined by the social practices, which does not determine its own concepts in a univocal way. Thus, the identification of the relevant properties that determinate a subjective content requires a definition of the 'contextual variable', viz. the 'level of language' or, as previously stated, the 'field of knowledge' to which a concept has to be attributed.

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An Epistemic Component to Personal Identity: the Case of Religious Conversion¹

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Under what conditions is a person *a* at time *t* the same person as a person *b* at a later time *t'*? This is the problem of personal identity over time. In this paper, I wish to argue that there is a necessary (though not sufficient) epistemic condition for identity. I will explain this condition and offer some support for it. I will then discuss a case - religious conversion - where it is arguable both that the necessary condition fails to obtain and that there is a failure of identity. If the case displays a fruitful co-occurrence between these two failures, that will be some evidence in favor of my necessary condition.

The epistemic condition I have in mind derives from Bas van Fraassen's Principle of Reflection:

(Reflection) $P_{a,t}(Q|P_{b,t'}(Q)=r)=r$.

This principle requires that *a*, at *t*, believes *Q* to degree *r* conditionally on *b*'s believing *Q* to degree *r* at *t'*. Van Fraassen (1984) argues that, when *b=a*, Reflection is a requirement of rationality. My claim is

(R) Conformity to Reflection is a necessary condition for the identity of *a* and *b*.

Let me begin by saying some of what conformity to Reflection does *not* involve. First, it does not require that one's beliefs undergo no change. The question that will concern us is rather, what kinds of belief change, and how much of it, is consistent with Reflection, and hence with identity. Secondly, there are usually many hypotheses about what our future degrees of belief might be. Satisfying Reflection involves instantiating the schema above for all hypotheses about future degrees of belief. But since we will rarely have any reason to accept any particular hypothesis about what those future degrees of belief will be, satisfying Reflection will rarely have any consequences for our current *unconditional* degrees of belief. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, I take conformity to Reflection to be a matter of degree. One can conform to the principle (to a high degree) even if one does not satisfy every instance of it. Since there is vagueness in what counts as a high degree of conformity, there will be, on (R), a corresponding vagueness in the concept of personal identity. Since, I believe, any plausible account of personal identity should recognize its vagueness, this is fine. What is important is whether (R) captures the 'right' vagueness for personal identity. This is what I shall be putting to the test when we come to conversion.

What supports (R)? Reflection has the form of what Gaifman (1985) calls an expert function. *b* is an expert for *a* if learning what *b*'s degrees of belief are is enough for *a* to make them her own. (R) thus implies that a necessary condition of the identity of *a* at *t* and *b* at *t'* is that *b* should be an expert for *a* - we must take our future selves as expert relative to our present selves. The basic idea behind taking one's future selves as expert is what I call *normal epistemic change*. A preliminary characterization of this notion (to be refined below) is change in epistemic state that occurs for one of three

reasons: a) we acquire new information; b) we acquire new skills in interpreting information; c) we apply (more carefully) our skills to our information. Under normal circumstances, changes in epistemic state arising from any of these causes will make us more expert. Hence, if all our epistemic change is normal, our future selves will be expert relative to our present selves, and we should satisfy Reflection with respect to them. (R) follows from this connection between normal epistemic change and Reflection if we make the following connection between identity and normal epistemic change:

(P) A person ceases to exist by undergoing too much abnormal epistemic change.

('Too much' is vague in the same way that 'high degree' above was vague.)

If we assume that where there is normal epistemic change Reflection should hold, we must consider (P), and the link between (ab)normal epistemic change and identity, to see whether, ultimately, we should accept (R). The literature is replete with apparent counter-examples to Reflection of the following kind. Take the hypothesis that, as a result of hypnosis, I will later believe I am a pumpkin. Reflection would have me now believe, given that hypothesis, that I am a pumpkin. But that is absurd. In this example, the epistemic change between my current state, in which I do not believe I am a pumpkin, and my future state, in which I do, is abnormal: it is induced by hypnosis. Most of the counter-examples to Reflection are variants of this case and involve intuitively abnormal epistemic change. But since (P) only requires that a person cannot undergo *too much* abnormal epistemic change, we need not argue that identity is not preserved in these examples, so long as they involve only a small range of beliefs. What I want to focus on for the rest of this paper are cases in which there is much more extensive abnormal epistemic change. If (P) is correct, we should expect to find that there is some sense, in such cases, that personal identity is at stake. (Since, as I have indicated, the notion of 'too much' abnormal change is vague, we need not expect a clear cut failure of identity. It will be enough if identity is problematic.)

I shall concentrate on religious conversion, which, to my knowledge, has not been studied in this context. But first a few remarks about another, perhaps simpler case that will allow to me to make a methodological point. If somebody suffers a serious form of dementia (bringing with it a high degree of abnormal epistemic change), we find it not implausible, though not obligatory either, to conceptualize this in terms of failure of identity. The senile person is no longer the same person as she was before. We have a host of ways of talking about this that reflect ambivalence about the identity of the person with her former self: "so-and-so is no longer there"; "just a shadow of her former self"; and so on. Such locutions express, often in metaphorical ways, discontinuity. But I think there is no hard fact about whether talk of discontinuity itself

¹ Thanks to John Beusterien, Giovanna Pompele and Jennie Uleman for helpful comments.

functions merely as a metaphor for drastic change or as indicating a failure of identity. This can only be settled in the light of a theory of personal identity. But, along with Carol Rovane (1998, 59-64), I think that our normal conceptions of personal identity are sufficiently incoherent that any consistent theory will be revisionary. Such revisionary theories do not represent antecedent facts of the matter, so much as give us ways of conceptualizing the messy data that life provides. They should be judged by how fruitful they are in application to difficult cases.

There are many modalities of religious conversion, gradual, reasonbased, pragmatic, etc. I shall confine myself to one modality: that in which a non-believer, as a result of a sudden particular experience, becomes a believer. I take it that in conversion, particularly of this sudden type, there is some sense that the identity of the pre- and post-conversion person is put into question. The language of being born again is testimony to this. Other language is also suggestive: "becoming Sons of God" (i.e. changing parentage), "the newness of life", "being buried with Christ" (i.e. to mark the end of the previous life). If there were no limitations on the size of this paper, this would be the place to undertake an extensive examination of the religious language surrounding conversion, descriptions made by converts of their experiences, etc. As it is, I shall just take it for granted that identity is at least problematized.

What kinds of changes in epistemic state are involved in conversion? Clearly, one comes to believe that God exists where before one either disbelieved this or was agnostic. But this is just the beginning. New ways of life will come with a whole host of new beliefs. Newly acquired love and fear of God will interact with beliefs in complex ways. There will also be changes in systemic features, such as what is taken as evidence for what. So, the changes in epistemic state will be many and ramified. However, we should also not ignore the obvious fact that there will be vast amounts of epistemic continuity. Very likely (in so far as such quantifications make sense at all) the bulk of our epistemic state will be unaffected, but the affected parts will be especially important.

Will this epistemic change be abnormal? The three types of normal change, remember, were those brought about by a) more information; b) new skills in interpreting information; and c) application of our skills to our information. The changes wrought by sudden conversions obviously do not fall under c). It might seem as if such changes fall happily under a). The sudden conversion experience is one in which a person, say, hears a voice from Heaven; conversion is simply the response to this new information. But this is not quite right. The information itself is consistent with any number of interpretations. Why think that it is a sign of God? From the pre-conversion point of view, the possibility of such information would certainly be put down to some other type of cause. (I assume that the pre-conversion non-believer does not treat God's existence as an ordinary empirical hypothesis for which certain events would be good evidence. Such a perspective is, surely, possible but my case is not an example of it.)

By arguing in this way that the epistemic changes in conversion do not fall under a), it may seem as if they obviously *do* fall under b). What happens in conversion is not new information *per se*, although that might play some role. What seems essential is that one comes to see information in a different way. One is endowed with a new faculty, so to speak, which reveals the presence of God in things that one might have perceived before, but not have been able to detect God in. This seems promising as a way of understanding the epistemic changes in

conversion. But this very fact should make us realize that the characterization of normal epistemic change above was too rough with respect to b). b) is in the definition of normal epistemic change to allow for certain types of new skills we may acquire. As we age, we may gain an emotional maturity that enables us better to understand people's behavior. Furthermore, one may acquire skills deliberately, as when one learns a new language, or takes a class in accounting. It is cases such as these that lead to normal epistemic change. But when someone becomes paranoid, and so acquires a new 'skill' in seeing malicious motives behind apparently innocent actions, or if someone suddenly takes herself to understand the language of birds, this leads to abnormal epistemic change. How should we characterize the, I hope intuitive, differences between these types of cases?

Not surprisingly, part of what makes some skills sources of normal epistemic change, and some of abnormal, has to do with the natural facts of human life. New skills involved in maturation happen naturally, as a part of ordinary development. Others, such as learning new languages, are the kinds of skills humans are well suited to acquire. Paranoia, at least of an extreme variety, is not a natural part of human life. This much almost everyone will agree too. But of course, there are likely to be differences of opinion about other skills as to whether or not they are natural. Many theists think that we naturally have an ability to sense God's existence. Non-theists will disagree. The significance of this fact, for our present topic, is great. It means that there is no conception of the exact content of normal epistemic change that is independent of one's epistemic starting point. Regarding the convert, there will be at least two different verdicts: from the non-believer (including the convert's earlier self), that the epistemic change involved in conversion is abnormal; and from the believer (including the convert), that the change was normal, the effect of the de-occlusion of the formerly sin-impaired ability to sense the presence of God.

If we can give no absolute answer to the question of whether the epistemic change in conversion is normal, is it impossible to assess whether we can match the way in which identity is put into question in conversion with the abnormality of the epistemic change involved? There are two possible answers to this question. First, we could say that the standards in play are those of the person to whom Reflection applies. Thus, from the non-believer's point of view, the change in conversion would be abnormal. Hence, the questionableness of identity is matched by the abnormality of the epistemic change. Secondly, we could say that in cases, such as conversion, where the epistemic change induces a change in the very standards of what counts as normal epistemic change, whether the change is normal is relative to the standards used. In that case, the attempt in (R) to link Reflection with personal identity, through the notion of normal epistemic change (i.e. through (P)), will be vastly complicated, if not frustrated altogether. However, there need be no threat to (P) itself, if we accept that judgments of identity, like judgments of the normality of some epistemic change, may also be relative to epistemic standards. The non-believer, hypothesizing her own future conversion, might see this as bringing her continued identity into question; the believer may see it as a person having 'found herself.' That judgments of personal identity might be relative in this way may appear odd. In fact, it is the consequence of the fact already posited, that such judgments will be relative to a theory of personal identity. The different epistemic standards of what counts as normal epistemic change associated with the believer and the non-believer are likely to be associated, in

turn, with different theories of the person and her identity over time.

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On the Interpretability of Rules

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Saul Kripke's skeptical argument and skeptical solution concerning rule-following are quite well known (cf. Kripke 1982). As an interpretation of Wittgenstein's view, it seems to have a basis in Wittgenstein's writings such as the following remarks: "And how can it [a rule] guide us, when its expression can after all be interpreted by us both thus and otherwise? I.e. when all various regularities correspond to it" (Wittgenstein 1978, 347) It is in the spirit of such a passage that Kripke starts his own unusual reading of Wittgenstein's views on rule-following. In particular he considers the case that in teaching a rule such as 'addition' to a person, the number of examples actually shown is finite. Various rules would be compatible with such a finite number of examples. So there seems to be no reason to insist that the teacher teaches, or the pupil learns, a particular rule rather than any of the other possible rules. Against this, one may want to cite a fact which can be used to single out one particular regularity. But Kripke goes on to show that various possible candidates that may constitute such a fact are all wanting. Thus he concludes that there is no matter of the fact as to what an expression or rule means, a dire consequence that seems to obliterate meaning and even mental contents, his skeptical solution in terms of communal agreement notwithstanding.

In Kripke's argument, it is not only a single rule that is subject to different interpretations, but rather that, as Wittgenstein puts it, "However many rules you give me—I give a rule which justifies my employment of your rules" (Wittgenstein 1978, 79). Let us call the fact that a rule or a set of rules can be variously interpreted as the interpretability of rules. It would then seem that it plays an pernicious role in leading toward the obliteration of meaning. But Wittgenstein does not seem to take it that way, as attested by the following remarks: "But, that everything can (also) be *interpreted* as following, doesn't mean that everything is following" (Wittgenstein 1978, 414). Here he seems to suggest that there is a way of making the interpretability harmless, as long as it is seen in the right light. But how can something be interpreted as following a rule and yet it is not really following that rule? What is the distinction between the two cases?

To get a glimpse of what Wittgenstein has to say to questions like these, we may first look at two of the prominent attempts which want to save Wittgenstein from Kripke. They are those made by Cora Diamond and John McDowell. What Diamond wants to point out, as a way of avoiding Kripke's skeptical argument, is that when a person teaches, say, the rule of "adding 2" to a pupil, he does not mean to teach the pupil to do the impossible job of picking out, from among all the possibilities, the correct sequence. Rather, the success of the teaching depends very much on the pupil's uptakes and responses (Diamond 1991, 68-69). This seems to imply that the distinction between "being interpreted as following" and "is following" is to be made by appealing to the pupil's uptakes and responses. McDowell, on the other hand, criticizes Kripke for his "...mistaken idea that grasping a rule is always an interpretation" (McDowell 1998, 238), or "...the assumption ...that the understanding on which I act when I obey an order must be an interpretation" (McDowell 1998, 236). Instead, "there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation" (Wittgenstein 1968, §201). Such a way of

grasping a rule, according to McDowell, is made possible for a person by his being initiated into a practice (McDowell 1998, 238). Again, this seems to imply that the distinction between "being interpreted as following" and "is following" can be made by appealing to *practice*.

Now let us turn to Wittgenstein. He gives a gloss to the phenomenon that although we ordinarily do know the rule of "adding 2", we nevertheless think that what we are taught are compatible with different regularities. Thus he remarks that:

What happens is not that this symbol cannot be further interpreted, but: I do no interpreting. I do not interpret because I feel natural in the present picture. When I interpret, I step from one level of my thought to another.

If I see the thought symbol "from outside", I become conscious that it *could* be interpreted thus or thus; if it is a step in the course of my thoughts, then it is a stopping-place that is natural to me, and its further interpretability does not occupy (or trouble) me. As I have a railway time-table and use it without being concerned with the fact that a table can be interpreted in various ways. (Wittgenstein 1974, 147)

It is then clear that, according to Wittgenstein, a rule can indeed be interpreted differently, when it is seen "from outside", or when we step from one level of our thought to another. But what is to see a rule "from outside" or to step from one level to another? The following from Wittgenstein seems quite suggestive: "What, in a complicated surrounding, we call 'following a rule' we should certainly not call that if it stood in isolation" (Wittgenstein 1978, 335). Equally suggestive is: "Then according to you everybody could continue the series as he likes; and so infer *anyhow!* In that case we shan't call it 'continuing the series' and also presumably not 'inference'" (Wittgenstein 1978, 80). If read together with the passage quoted before—"But, that everything can (also) be *interpreted* as following, doesn't mean that everything is following"—these two passages seem to be saying that following a rule has its complicated surrounding and that to interpret a rule in a "deviant" way is to rid of the rule of such a complicated surrounding, and without such a surrounding it is no longer counted as following the rule, interpretability notwithstanding. To look at the rule "from outside" would then be to isolate it from the needed surrounding.

But what then is the complicated surrounding of a rule? And what is it to isolate a rule from its complicated surrounding? "But *this* is important, namely that this reaction [to a rule], which is our guarantee of understanding, presupposes as a surrounding particular circumstances, particular forms of life and speech." (Wittgenstein 1978, 414) "As we employ the word 'order' and 'obey', gestures no less than words are intertwined in a net of multifarious relationships. If I am construing a simplified case, it is not clear whether I ought still to call the phenomenon 'ordering' and 'obeying'" (RFM, VI-48). The complicated surrounding thus includes particular circumstances, particular forms of life and speech, and even gestures. And if we keep in mind the complexity of a form of life, we may even just say that the surrounding of a

rule is the form of life in which it is embedded. What Diamond calls the (natural) uptakes and responses of a learner of rules would then be part of the surrounding. To have a feel about how much the complicated surrounding may encompass, let us look at a case discussed by Wittgenstein. After pointing out that we should not take whichever (deviant) way of counting as correct, Wittgenstein continues:

For what we call "counting" is an important part of our life's activities. Counting and calculating are not—e.g.—simply a pastime. Counting (and that means: counting like *this*) is a technique that is employed daily in the most various operations of our lives. And that is why we learn to count as we do: with endless practice, with merciless exactitude; that is why it is inexorably insisted that we shall say "two" after "one", "three" after "two" and so on. (Wittgenstein 1978, 37)

In addition to significantly referring to techniques, this passage serves to indicate how a rule corresponding to a particular regularity is to be singled out or instilled in a child. Similarly, "And thinking and inferring (like *counting*) is of course bounded for us, not by an arbitrary definition, but by natural limits corresponding to the body of what can be called the role of thinking and inferring in our life" (Wittgenstein 1978, 80).

But then what is it to look at a rule "from outside"? From what we have said before, to see a rule "from outside" is to isolate the rule from its surrounding. But what more can we say about such an isolation? If it is the surrounding that enables us to regard one particular regularity as *the* regularity, then it is the same surrounding that enables the pupil to learn the particular regularity without having to choose from among all the possibilities. The latter is made possible, according to Diamond, by the pupil's uptakes and responses. The exclusion of such uptakes and responses would then account for, at least in part, the interpretability of a rule, and hence the reason why choosing from among all the possibilities seems inevitable, if one is to know how to follow a rule. We have mentioned some of the ingredients of the complicated surrounding of a rule. But what needs to be emphasized is that the ingredients are, to use Wittgenstein's words, "intertwined in a net of multifarious relationships" (Wittgenstein 1978, 352), a fact Diamond correctly stresses (Diamond 1989).

Our answer about what surrounding is excluded, when a rule is seen "from Outside", can in fact be generalized. In *On Certainty* Wittgenstein makes the following remarks: "Our rules leave loop-holes, and the practice has to speak for itself" (Wittgenstein 1969, § 139). It is such practice which, on the one hand, helps to give content to a rule and, on the other hand, which is carried out without the guidance of rules. Practice in this sense is what one does or capable of doing, not what one thinks or is conscious of. It is what Kjell Johannessen calls pre-knowledge or foreknowledge (Johannessen 1988, 357). What is especially important about such foreknowledge is that it helps to determine the meaning of a rule, as "[I]nterpretations by themselves do not determine meaning" (Wittgenstein 1968, § 198). Equally important is that foreknowledge cannot be fully captured by sentences or propositions. The significance of this can be brought out by looking at what can be termed sententialism, a position we can attribute to Donald Davidson.

As a way of avoid the inscrutability of reference, Hartry Field proposes that we take into consideration causal relation between a name or its use and what it refers to (cf. Davidson 2001, 235). But Davidson thinks that this maneuver would not work, for such a relation can

be expressed by a sentence. And if any set of sentences can be differently interpreted, the addition of one more sentence would not change that, and hence the inscrutability of reference again. What Davidson does here is to take any connection between the use of a term and what it refers to as expressible in sentences, hence he is taken to be holding the position of sententialism. The sententialism with respect to rule-following would take any connection between (an expression of) a rule and acts the rule dictates as completely expressible in sentences. It then follows from well known facts (such as those one may find in model theory) that those sentences are individually or collectively subject to different interpretations. Sententialism would then correspond to seeing a rule "from outside". And what sententialism excludes is the existence of foreknowledge, or practice when it is carefully delimited. But if practice or foreknowledge is what determines the meaning of a rule, then sententialism can at best be entertained as an abstraction, if it indeed can be so entertained at all.

The sort of sententialism held by Davidson also has similar difficulties. If interpretation by itself does not determine the meaning of a rule, then a set of sentences do not determine their own meaning either. It may be said that it is their use that gives them meaning. And if Wittgenstein is right, their use had better be something like what we call foreknowledge or practice. When sententialism is taken for granted, though the interpretability of the set of sentences, with its existence as an abstraction, is guaranteed, the meaning of the set of sentences may still be out of sight. With this in mind, views such as the thesis of the indeterminacy and the thesis of the inscrutability of reference may need a second critical look.

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Das Selbst und die Seele als Substanz bei Brentano¹

Edoardo Fugali, Triest

Es ist bekannt, dass Brentano den Vorrang der inneren Wahrnehmung behauptet, aufgrund dessen nur die eigenen psychischen Phänomene direkt zugänglich sind: hier spielt eine wesentliche Rolle das sich nach ihnen richtende Bewusstsein. Laut der *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt* machen die psychischen Phänomene den Hauptgegenstand der psychologischen Untersuchung aus, vom Begriff der Seele abgesehen. Während der 80er Jahre bekommt aber die Seele in Brentano wieder eine zentrale Stelle, wie sich es aus verschiedenen Texten von dieser Zeit ergibt, wie die Vorlesungen über die deskriptive Psychologie und eine Reihe von unveröffentlichten Manuskripten. (Über diese Ansatzveränderung in Brentanos Auffassung des Selbst und der Seele vgl. Baumgartner 1991, 23-36, Münch 1993, 56 ff., Antonelli 1996, 400-405). Im Zusammenhang damit verliert der Begriff von intentionaler Inexistenz seine Relevanz als Grundeigenschaft der psychischen Phänomene, was die wesentliche Bestimmung des Gegenstands der Psychologie betrifft.

Fangen wir mit den Texten an, die in der Sammlung *Deskriptive Psychologie* enthalten sind (Brentano 1982, 1-4 u. 10-20). Die Psychologie als deskriptive Wissenschaft untersucht das psychische Leben des Menschen auf dem Niveau der inneren Wahrnehmung, wobei die Elemente des Bewusstseins mit ihren Verknüpfungsweisen zu beschreiben sind. Von Elementen zu sprechen, setzt aber voraus, dass das Bewusstsein kein einfaches und einheitliches Wesen ist, sondern in einer Mannigfaltigkeit von Teilen besteht. Trotzdem charakterisiert sich das Bewusstsein durch seine Einheitlichkeit: was vom gegenwärtigen Bewusstsein umgeschrieben ist, ist eine reale Einheit, obwohl diese nicht einfach, sondern zusammengesetzt ist. Die Seele ist dabei der substantielle Grund, der die Einheit und die personale Besonderheit der Individuen ausmacht, wie diese jenseits dieser Mannigfaltigkeit sich selbst erscheinen. Die Seele zeigt sich immer nach ihren verschiedenen Tätigkeiten spezifiziert, die sich im Lauf der Zeit abwechseln. Als wirkender Grund von diesen Tätigkeiten ist die Seele etwas Substantielles. Aufgrund seiner Ontologie, scheint Brentano die traditionelle Idee der Seele als Substanz wiederaufzunehmen, nicht ohne aber eine Reihe von wesentlichen Änderungen vorzunehmen. Unter der Voraussetzung, dass alle substantiellen Bestimmungen innerhalb der einzigen allgemeinen Gattung des Dings fallen, sind darin eine lebendige Substanz und eine rein materielle zu unterscheiden, ohne dass ihre letzte individuelle Bestimmtheit durch unsere Anschauung zu erfassen ist: nie nehmen wir uns selbst als solche wahr, sondern nur dadurch, dass wir von einem äußeren Gegenstand bewegt werden, d.h. wir nehmen unser Selbst durch die sichtbaren Wirkungen von unbekanntem Ursachen wahr (Diesen Bemerkungen und diejenigen, die in diesem und in den drei folgenden Absätzen dargestellt werden, sind in Brentano M 94 – das Manuskript der sogenannten *Würzburger Vorlesungen* – enthalten). Strenggenommen zeigt uns die innere Wahrnehmung nicht

uns selbst, wie wir sind, sondern nur das Ergebnis zweier unbekanntem Faktoren (der äußere Gegenstand und unsere psychophysiologische Beschaffenheit), die sich als solche unserer Wahrnehmung entziehen. Die innere Wahrnehmung selbst zeigt von uns nichts anderes als Phänomene, hinter denen sich das von uns uneigentlich als Ich bezeichnete unbekanntes Ding verbirgt (Über die Unmöglichkeit, direkt die substantiellen Bestimmungen unseres Selbst wahrzunehmen vgl. Galewicz 1992, 49-57). Die Vorstellung und der Gegenstand sind also auch in der inneren Wahrnehmung inkommensurabel, sodass wir nicht in der Lage sind, ein Urteil über ihre Entsprechung auszusagen. Die innere Wahrnehmung richtet sich immer nach etwas Veränderlichem, das im Lauf der Zeit wird (hier beruft sich Brentano ausdrücklich auf die Kantische Auffassung der Zeit als innerer Sinn).

Dieser Einwand trifft aber nicht die Evidenz der inneren Wahrnehmung, sondern nur die Möglichkeit, dass sie eine immer wahrhafte und erschöpfende Erkenntnis von uns selbst gibt: die wirkliche Konsistenz unseres Selbst besteht strenggenommen nicht darin, was die innere Wahrnehmung uns zeigt. Dieses ist indessen nicht völlig genau: in unseren momentanen psychischen Zuständen wird uns immerhin das Erzeugnis beider obengenannten Faktoren und nichts anderes gezeigt; zumindest im gegenwärtigen Augenblick verfügen wir über eine adäquate Erkenntnis von unserem Selbst. Auch wenn der äußere Gegenstand zuerst uns unbekannt ist, da die äußere Wahrnehmung keine unmittelbare Evidenz besitzt, bezweifeln wir nicht die Tatsache, dass unsere psychische Verfassung vom Gegenstand modifiziert wurde, wie wenn wir die Bewegung eines Körpers wahrnehmen können, ohne dass es notwendig ist, ihre Ursache und Herkunft zu erfassen. Im Fall der inneren Wahrnehmung, stellt sich die Frage nach der Adäquation von Vorstellung und Gegenstand überhaupt nicht, da wir durch sie unmittelbar und evident den Gegenstand fassen.

Brentano führt in diesem Zusammenhang eine sprachliche und grammatikalische Analyse des Ausdrucks ‚Ich‘, indem er die Tatsache hervorhebt, dass das ‚Ich‘ im philosophischen Sprachgebrauch falsch als Hauptwort verstanden wurde, das ein selbständiges Ding bedeutet: es ist im Gegenteil wahr, dass sich es einfach um ein Fürwort d.h. um einen synsemantischen oder mitbedeutenden Ausdruck handelt. Was an sich selbst besteht, ist eigentlich nur die vollgezogene Handlung, also die psychische Tätigkeit und deren substantieller Träger, der durch seine verschiedenen Tätigkeiten spezifiziert ist. Brentano verweigert sich, die psychische Substanz mit dem Subjekt zu identifizieren, in der Moderne als Ich verstanden. Dass Brentano den Begriff von unmittelbarer Evidenz wiederaufnimmt, kann wohl den Eindruck eines entscheidenden Einflusses der Philosophie von Descartes erwecken, der gerade die moderne Auffassung der Subjektivität eingeführt und begründet hat. Die Evidenz bei Brentano beruht sich aber nicht auf ein einheitliches und monadisches Subjekt, zu sich selbst identisch und völlig durchsichtig, sondern ist auf das transpersonale Niveau

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der inneren Wahrnehmung verlegt: diese zeigt nicht die psychische Substanz in ihrer letztbegründenden und konstitutiven Individualität, sondern lässt von ihr nur die allgemeinen Bestimmungen zu Tage kommen, die mehrere Individuen gemein haben können, was den Charakter von Transversalität und Unpersonalität der psychischen Tätigkeiten erweist.

Brentano lehnt die reflexiven Implikationen ab, die der verabsolutierte und unterschiedlose Gebrauch des Ausdrucks ‚Ich‘ mit sich bringen kann. Sie darf nur unter der Bedingung verwendet werden, dass dieses Fürwort ein personales Wesen oder eine rationelle bzw. eine selbstbewusste Substanz (nach Herbart's Sprachgebrauch) bezeichnet, ohne damit sie mit dem Selbstbewusstsein zu identifizieren, das keine Substanz ist, sondern als psychische Tätigkeit nur ein Akzidens. Eine Substanz kann von sich selbst bewusst sein, ohne dass diese spezifische Tätigkeit völlig und absolut ihren Substanzcharakter konstituiert. Wenn ich sehe, sehe ich mich selbst als jemand, der sieht, und bin von mir selbst bewusst, als von jemandem, der von diesem Sehen bewusst ist; durch die konstante und vertiefte Ausübung der Reflexion kann ich von mir selbst bewusst werden, als von jemandem, der von seinen psychischen Tätigkeiten bewusst ist, d.h. mich selbst als Selbstbewusstsein fassen. Das geschieht immer unvollständig, da ich von mir selbst nicht ein für allemal und erschöpfend bewusst werde. Der Gegenstand des menschlichen Selbstbewusstseins ist die Möglichkeit selbst des Ich: es besteht immer wieder ein Unterschied zwischen dem Selbstbewusstsein und dem sich selbst als Gegenstand betrachtenden Bewusstsein, da unser Selbst und dessen Bewusstsein überhaupt nicht identisch sind.

Weitere Bemerkungen über dieses Thema sind im Brentano M 116²/2 enthalten. Das Selbstbewusstsein informiert uns über den substantiellen Charakter der Seele, insofern es eine Erkenntnis bezeichnet, die sich in erster Instanz nach ihrem substantiellen Träger richtet: jeder Erkenntnisakt bezieht sich auf das erkennende Subjekt wie das Akzidens auf die Substanz. Das Selbstbewusstsein bezieht aber sich nicht ausschließlich auf den substantiellen Träger, sondern auch auf dessen Akte und andere verschiedene Inhalte. Das kann in zwei Weisen erfolgen: 1) explizit und deutlich; 2) implizit und undeutlich, was auch für das Selbstbewusstsein gilt. Unsere Individualität ist nicht nach der Substanz von unseren psychischen bzw. kognitiven Tätigkeiten in der selben Weise bedingt, wie ein Körper von seinen räumlichen und qualitativen Eigenschaften bedingt ist: ein Individuum hört nicht auf, zu sein, was es ist, nur weil es aufhört, zu denken oder irgendwelchen anderen psychischen Akt auszuüben. Es ist wohl wahr, dass wir überhaupt kein Selbstbewusstsein sind (das in seinem Wesen ein Gedankenakt ist), wenn wir an nichts denken: Descartes hat einen Fehler begangen, indem er die *res cogitans* mit dem Akt des Denkens und zwar mit dem Selbstbewusstsein identifiziert hat, das nur eine akzidentielle Bestimmung ist. Strenggenommen können wir auch nicht von einem Weiterbestehen unseres Selbst sprechen: diese Bezeichnung verdient nur eine Substanz, die ständig und wesentlich über die Erkenntnis von sich selbst als Substanz verfügt, und die aufhören würde, zu sein, was sie eigentlich ist, sobald das Selbstbewusstsein fehlt.

Die innere Wahrnehmung zeigt uns eine Substanz, die irgendwie spezifiziert ist, obwohl sie überhaupt keine räumliche und qualitative Bestimmung und sogar keine Gestalt und Ausdehnung besitzt, d.h. alle Eigenschaften, die der körperlichen Substanz gehören. Das hindert aber nicht, dass eine substantielle Konsistenz zum Träger der psychischen Tätigkeiten zugeschrieben werden kann. Um die geistige Substanz ausreichend zu charakterisieren,

genügt nach Brentano eine Art und Weise von analogischem Ersatz der körperlichen Bestimmungen vorauszusetzen: wir nehmen diese Substanz als ein nulldimensionales Wesen wahr, das nicht lediglich in einer Grenze wie ein Punkt besteht, sondern als ein Ding für sich existiert. Die Körper sind nicht nur nach der Substanz durch ihre dreidimensionalen Grenzen bestimmt, weil sie Dinge für sich sind, von diesen Grenzen abgesehen: mit anderen Wörtern ist keine erschöpfende substantielle Bestimmung, die Tatsache, dass die Körper dreidimensional begrenzt sind. Brentano bezieht sich auf die Errungenschaften der nicht euklidischen Geometrien, und zwar auf die Hypothese der Existenz von vierdimensionalen Topoiden, die von dreidimensionalen Grenzen umgeschlossen sind, wie die dreidimensionalen Körper von den zweidimensionalen Grenzen der Oberflächen umgeschrieben sind; nun macht eine solche dreidimensionale Grenze für sich selbst keinen Körper aus, d.h. sie genügt nicht, die substantielle Dichte eines Ding für sich zu erschöpfen, das sich durch die Überschneidung mannigfaltiger Reihen von Kontinua (räumlich, zeitlich, qualitativ u.s.w.) ergibt. Dasselbe gilt für die nulldimensionale geistige Substanz, die sich von einem bloßen räumlichen Punkt dadurch unterscheidet, dass sie keine Grenze ist, sondern ein Ding für sich.

Wenn sich die Sache so verhält, können wir vermuten, dass Brentano das psychische Leben in seinem ganzheitlichen und einheitlichen Zusammenhang betrachtet, der sowohl die psychische Substanz als auch ihre akzidentiellen Tätigkeiten (d.h. ihre Teile) einschließt. Dieses Ganze besteht als ein zeitliches Kontinuum, das jeweils nur nach der Grenze des gegenwärtigen Augenblicks eigentlich besteht; diese Grenze kann jedoch für sich selbst betrachtet werden, vom Ganzen abgesehen, das sie begrenzt und ohne das sie nicht bestehen kann. Wie die dreidimensionale Grenze nicht mit dem Körper identisch ist, so auch ist nicht die geistige Substanz mit der Zeitgrenze identisch. Diese Grenze andererseits bestimmt sie in einer wesentlichen Weise, und nicht bloß akzidentuell, obwohl sie nicht ausreicht, die Substanz völlig zu erschöpfen. Diese Substanz ist ein ausdehnungs- und dimensionsloses Etwas, das mit sich selbst identisch ‚hinter‘ dem kontinuierlichen und gleichmäßigen Verlauf der Zeit fortbesteht, d.h. ‚hinter‘ der Abwechslung der Zeitgrenzen, die sich jeweils im jetzigen Augenblick geben. Kurz zusammenfasst können wir in folgender Weise den Unterschied zwischen dem Ding und dem Kontinuum und dessen Grenzen charakterisieren: das Ding gehört dem Kontinuum als sein unabhängiger Teil, und das Kontinuum konstituiert ein Ganzes, das die Substanz (mit dem Ding für sich identifiziert) und die akzidentiellen Bestimmungen einschließt, die bestehen, wechseln und aufhören können, ohne dass die geistige Substanz dadurch verändert wird. Aus dem Vergleich zwischen der geistigen Substanz und der körperlichen Substanz, die auf dem Niveau der äußeren Wahrnehmung erscheint, gelingen wir zum allgemeinen Begriff von Substanz, der sowohl den dreidimensionalen räumlichen und sinnlich-qualitativ bestimmten Seienden als auch den geistigen nulldimensionalen und ausdehnungslosen Seienden gemein ist. Geistiges und Körperliches bezeichnen keine einander untergeordneten Arten, als ob die Körper als dreidimensionale Geiste und umgekehrt die Geiste als nulldimensionale Körper zu verstehen sind, sondern koordinierte und gleichrangige Arten, da sie die nächstliegenden Arten der Gattung Substanz sind.

Sowohl die äußere als auch die innere Wahrnehmung zeigen uns eine Substanz nicht nur in allgemeiner Weise, sondern auch nach ihrem artbildenden Unterschied. Das soll aber nicht die Meinung veranlassen, dass sich die Substanzen uns absolut individualisiert

zeigen, wie es des öfteren im gewöhnlichen Sprachgebrauch geschieht, die sich auf die Wahrnehmung unseres Selbst beziehen: in solchen Fällen, glauben wir, dass dieses in einem absolut einzelnen Individuum besteht. Es ist wahr in der Tat, dass wir nicht imstande sind, irgendwelche substantielle Bestimmung zu fassen, die vorzüglich unseres Selbst qualifiziert und es von demjenigen eines anderen Menschen unterscheidet. Alles, was wir von einer gesetzmäßigen und wissenschaftlichen Psychologie erfahren können, betrifft sowohl meine geistige Substanz, als diejenigen eines anderen Individuums. Außerdem sind wir auch nicht in der Lage, direkt und unmittelbar in die Seele eines Anderen einzudringen; wir können uns nur durch die Analogie mit unserer Seele ihr nähern; jedenfalls haben wir keinen Grund anzunehmen, dass unsere ‚echte‘ Individualität den Anderen zugänglich ist, wenn wir sie in uns selbst wahrnehmen. Aus der Tatsache, dass wir nur über die Wahrnehmung unseres individuellen Selbst verfügen, folgt es notwendig, dass wir nicht in der Lage sind, zu unterscheiden zwischen dem, was ihm eigentümlich ist, und dem, was mehreren Individuen gemein ist: die Anerkennung eines Unterschieds setzt eine Mannigfaltigkeit voraus, und im Fall des Selbst können wir nur unseres wahrnehmen, und überdies nur nach der Art und nicht nach dem es individualisierenden letzten Unterschied (Über die Undurchsichtigkeit des Selbst vgl. auch Brentano LS 2/2). Das ist aber für uns keine Beschränkung, sondern sogar ein Vorteil: wir sind imstande, die Anderen gerade deswegen analogisch zu fassen, weil wir dasselbe mit uns tun, indem wir nicht die letzte individualisierende Bestimmung unseres Selbst wahrnehmen; das hindert aber uns nicht, uns selbst und die Anderen als Individuen zu fassen, was als ein kräftiger Einwand gegen jegliche Form von subjektivem Solipsismus und als mögliche Grundlage einer Theorie der Intersubjektivität dienen kann.

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Mental Simulation: the Old-Fashioned Dispute¹

Gary Fuller, Michigan

We attribute psychological states and intentional actions to others. We also predict such states and actions and explain them. I attribute to Fred the belief that that mountain in the distance is the Schneeberg as well as the thought that it would be pleasant to climb it. I predict that later in the week when there is some free time Fred will form the intention to climb the mountain that very afternoon. And when one morning later in the week Fred says, "Let's drive to Puchberg [at the foot of the Schneeberg] this afternoon," I have no problem explaining what is up: Fred has Schneeberg plans. Further, we often do this spontaneously, effortlessly, and, in the majority of cases, successfully.

How do we do this? How do we attribute, predict, and explain the psychological states and intentional actions of others? This seems to be mainly a question for psychology, or, more broadly, cognitive science. Let us call it the 'cognitive-science' question. In the last fifteen years or so there has been a lively dispute over the answer to the cognitive-science question (Davies, 1995a and Davies, 1995b contain representative articles). The theory-of-mind theory (TT) holds that we handle the above psychological phenomena by deploying a psychological theory, which will contain, among other things, familiar commonsense generalizations. The simulation theory (ST), on the other hand, denies that we employ psychological generalizations; rather, we exploit the similarities between others and ourselves and we simulate them. We put ourselves in the other's shoes, see what we would think or do, and go on to infer that the other will think or do the same. Turning my gaze in the direction of Fred's, I think, "It would be nice to climb that mountain," and go on to infer that Fred thinks so as well.

Interestingly enough, the recent dispute grows out of a much more traditional dispute. Over a half century ago, in his brief foray into the philosophy of history, Carl Hempel held that scientific historical explanation "can be achieved only by means of suitable general hypotheses, or by theories." He attacked "the familiar view that genuine explanation in history is obtained by a method which characteristically distinguishes the social from the natural sciences, namely, *the method of empathetic understanding*" (Hempel, 1959, p.352). To use the method of empathy the historian must imagine himself in the place of the historical figures whose thoughts and actions he wants to explain and see how "he himself would act under the given conditions" (pp. 352-3). In other words, although Hempel does not use the expression, the historian must "simulate" the person he is studying. Such a procedure, according to Hempel, "may sometimes prove heuristically helpful," but it does not establish the "soundness" of a historical explanation. Nor is such a method indispensable for historical explanation (p. 353). Hempel's attack on the method of empathy was directed to thinkers in the *verstehen* tradition, such as Dilthey and Collingwood.

Hempel is not really concerned with the question of what historians, or ordinary people, do. Rather, he is

concerned in the main with the following question: Whether or not historians or ordinary folk do use the method of empathy, or simulation, is such a method a *good* method (a permissible, justifiable, or even indispensable method) for arriving at truths about the psychological states and intentional actions of historical figures or ordinary people. The traditional dispute pitting theory against empathy/simulation, in which we can count Hempel as a representative participant, is thus different from the cognitive-science dispute. Let us call the traditional dispute the 'normative' dispute.

The traditional normative question seems out of fashion today. I want to revive it. My question, then, is this. In the light of the recent cognitive-science dispute what can be said in answer to the normative question of whether the method of empathy/simulation can provide us with a good method of acquiring knowledge about others' thoughts and actions? I shall argue that the cognitive-science discussion, not surprisingly, can shed some light on the old normative dispute, but that that the light that it sheds leads us to some pessimistic conclusions about at least the short-term prospects for empathy/simulation as a good method.

¹ The old normative question is that of whether in addition to the theory method used in the natural sciences --- the method of theory construction, testing, and application --- there is also a method of *verstehen*, empathy, or simulation that can be used to acquire knowledge in the human sciences. But what is a method of empathy or simulation? Here the cognitive-science discussion has been very helpful. A representative and useful cognitive-science characterization of simulation is Goldman's. Simulation involves the investigator's going through a succession of states that is isomorphic to the actual succession of states of her subject. Further, the investigator's succession of states must be "process" rather than "theory" driven, that is, driven by psychological mechanisms similar to those of her subject that are deployed but not represented in her mind (Goldman, 1995, p. 85).

Consider an example (following Harris, 1995, pp. 210-11). I am asked to predict whether my friend Peter, from Michigan, will think that the following sentence is good English: "The piano weighs this pound." I reply spontaneously, or at least with little conscious thought, "Of course not!" Here it does seem plausible that I do use simulation along the lines suggested above. I repeat silently and represent to myself the sentence about the piano. This input is then processed by linguistic mechanisms that I share with Peter but which I do not represent and theorize about --- I am not a theoretical linguist and at least in this case do not have much of a clue as to what relevant rule is operating. Finally, the output of the process, which I use to make my prediction about

¹ This paper expresses in briefer, but hopefully clearer form, my views in Fuller, 2002. Some short passages, as well as some examples, have been drawn from that article.

Peter, is my thought that the sentence is indeed grammatically deviant.

Contemporary ST is a cognitive-science account of how we do handle psychological attributions, irrespective of whether we know we are using simulation or not. Simulation as a normative method, however, must meet higher standards. Scientific methods of inquiry, after all, should consist of a set of explicit requirements that the investigator can ascertain to have been met. Can Goldman's account of simulation be turned into such a normative method? It seems that it can. A scientific method of simulation would have to meet the following requirements, among others. The investigator must have good reason to believe that her psychological mechanisms are relevantly similar to those of her subject. She also must have good reason to believe that her inputs and those of her subject are relevantly similar. And finally, she must have good reason to believe that her output state is produced by her psychological mechanisms and not by some theoretical inference.

The good news is that there is some reason for believing that these requirements for simulation as a normative method can be met in many cases. A few years ago I wanted to get my sister a present for her birthday. I explicitly put the method of simulation into practice. I was thinking of getting her Glen Gould's version of the late Brahms Intermezzi. But would she like the CD? I had, and still have, inductive reasons for believing that our musical psychologies are similar. She and I had the same musical education when we were young, including the same piano teachers and the same exposure to classical recordings. We also have tended over the years to agree in our likes and dislikes of classical pieces of music in a wide range of cases and circumstances. I exposed myself to an input that was obviously relevantly similar to her future input: I bought a copy of the Gould recording and listened to it. I was enthralled. I predicted that she would be as well. She was. The example of my sister's present and many others, however anecdotal, do give us some reason for thinking that simulation can provide a justifiable, and even a sometimes practically indispensable, method for arriving at knowledge of others' psychological states.

2 I said earlier that the cognitive-science discussion leads to some pessimistic conclusions about simulation as a normative method. After the optimism above, how can that be? What is the problem? The problem is that the type of simulation about which there is some cause for optimism is actual (or actual-situation) simulation in which the inputs and outputs of the simulation are 'real.' In the case of my sister's present, for example, I really do listen to the Gould CD and enjoy it. Opportunities for using actual simulation in attributing psychological states in everyday life, and certainly in history, are quite limited. A more comprehensive and significant account of simulation will have to include off-line (or pretense-driven off-line) simulation, in which at least some of the inputs are pretend ones (see Stich and Nichols, 1997). Indeed, ST has been mainly concerned with off-line simulation.

In off-line simulation the inputs, or at least some of them, are pretend ones. (And, of course, so are the outputs.) When I explain what Fred is up to in wanting to drive to Puchberg, I may actually believe that it is Aspang that is at the foot of the Schneeberg; nevertheless, I form the pretend belief that it is Puchberg. Or, suppose that I am told that Mrs. Smith has just sat down at a table in her local restaurant and is being handed the menu by a new waiter, when she notices a distinctive scar on the waiter's hand and thereby recognizes him as a wanted criminal. I

try to predict what she will do by forming, among other states, the pretend beliefs that I am in the restaurant and that the waiter is a wanted person (adopted from Heal, 1996b, p.79). Finally, the historian, in trying to explain Caesar's famous return to Rome, forms the pretend belief that the Rubicon is in front of her. Or at least this is so if the supporters of ST are right.

Off-line simulation, it seems, can also be reformulated into an explicit method with similar requirements to that of actual simulation, although two important points need to be stressed in this case. First, to get himself into the initial pretend state, the off-line simulator must focus on the outside world. To form the pretend belief about the waiter with the scar, I must imagine: There is a waiter with a scar in the restaurant. Second, to insure that the pretend inputs are being handled in a process rather than a theory driven way, the simulator must ask not "What *would I do* if I believed the waiter was a wanted criminal?" but rather "What *is the thing to do* in a situation like this?"

It is here that we start getting into trouble. The cognitive-science discussion has shown that off-line simulation, or better, off-line attempted simulation, does not work in many cases. It may work in some cases of off-line simulation of perceptual inputs (imagine that the mouth of a 'smiley' face is turned downwards), but it clearly does not work in others (imagine that you are looking at two equal lines encased by pairs of wedges arranged in the familiar Muller-Lyer way). It does not work in predicting what people, including oneself, will do in Milgram experiments. Stich and Nichols have provided some evidence that it does not work in predicting the behavior of subjects in the Langer lottery experiment. In that experiment subjects buy a lottery ticket and are later given the opportunity to sell the ticket. Subjects who initially are just handed their ticket are willing to sell it for less than those who initially *chose* their own ticket (Stich and Nichols, 1997, p. 311). In other words, even if the investigator shares psychological mechanisms with the subject and her pretend inputs have similar contents to the actual inputs of the subject, the two outputs may be different.

What turns this initial trouble into bad news is that, at least at present, no one has a systematic account, or even a good sketch, of how to draw the distinction between cases where off-line simulation works and those where it does not. Jane Heal's view that off-line simulation works for *rational* transitions between states with propositional contents is as good as any (Heal, 1996b, p. 56). There are, however, at least three serious problems with it. First, the rational-irrational distinction is far from clear. Are the subjects in the Langer experiment really irrational? Second, even if the rational-irrational distinction can be clarified, there may be no easy way to apply it on the basis of recognizable features. Assuming Heal is right, if I am to make a defensible decision of whether or not to use off-line simulation to predict what Langer subjects will do, I will need to know beforehand whether rational or irrational processes will be involved. Finally, there may well be many 'rational' cases where off-line simulation does not work. I suspect that it will not work in many cases of predicting emotions, even where the emotions are ordinarily thought to be quite rational. Again, it may not work in cases of predicting the results of reasoning which involves a subtle weighing of evidence. This ignorance about how to draw the distinction between good and bad uses of off-line simulation gives rise to doubts about almost any particular use of off-line simulation as a scientific method. Of any particular use of off-line simulation I do not know whether it is of a type that is likely

to work or not, and hence I am unjustified in using it on that occasion.

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Three Applications of an Austin/Wittgenstein Ontological Insight

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On the first page of *How to do Things with Words*, Austin claims that 'making a statement' is primary, and 'statement' derivative – a 'logical construction', as he calls it, out of the makings of statements. Wittgenstein, in similar vein, takes 'explaining the meaning' to be primary with 'meaning' a derivative notion. He says that '[m]eaning is what an explanation of meaning explains' (Wittgenstein 1974, 68). Part of Wittgenstein's point is that giving explanations of meaning is, like the making of statements, a perfectly common, everyday occurrence, but asking what meaning is is a perverse question of the sort that gives philosophy a bad name – Austin makes the same point in his paper 'The Meaning of a Word' (Austin 1961, 23-43). Wittgenstein's diagnosis of why philosophers are misled is very simple: the mistake lies in supposing that, for every noun there is an object named (*unum nomen, unum nominatum*) and so coming to believe that there is something – some thing – named by the noun 'meaning'. He says that he wants to cure us of the temptation to look about us for some object which you might call 'the meaning' (Wittgenstein 1958, 1). This is hardly a new insight. Kant famously argued, in the Transcendental Aesthetic, that the noun 'time' does not name a thing and one consequence of this conclusion is that talk of the Big Bang as marking the beginning of *time* is nonsensical. Are there some comparably important conclusions that can be drawn from the thesis that the nouns 'meaning' and 'statement' do not name objects? The answer, as I hope to demonstrate, is 'Yes'.

Let us first get clear on the thesis. Wittgenstein says that (for a large class of cases in which we employ the word 'meaning') the meaning of a word is its use in the language (Wittgenstein 1953, §43). But the use of the referring expression 'the use' might, again, create the misleading impression that we are talking about some object. A useful comparison is between a screwdriver and the use of a screwdriver – we don't think of the latter as having such object-like qualities as a location, and likewise, meaning is not a locateable entity. So, straight away, we have Important Conclusion No. 1: Meanings ain't in the head – for they are not located anywhere, and in fact they ain't no 'they'. Now Putnam, when he argued from Twin-Earthian considerations that meanings are not in the head, went on to suppose that, in part at least, they were *outside* the head -- hence Externalism. But, if Wittgenstein is right about the ontology of meaning, then meanings can't be outside the head either. In particular, understanding an utterance – grasping the meaning – is not to be construed as oneself or one's mind standing in relation to something, to a Russellian proposition, for example.

Important Conclusion No.2 now comes into view. Let us suppose that Portia has never come across the name 'Tully', but knows that Cicero is a Roman orator. Since 'Tully is a Roman orator' and 'Cicero is a Roman orator' express the same Russellian proposition then if Portia thinks or understands that Cicero is a Roman orator, it seems that she must equally think or understand that Tully is a Roman orator. Yet, intuitively, it seems false to say that Portia thinks that Tully is a Roman orator. Once we free ourselves from bondage to the prejudice that to think or to understand is to stand in a relation to some object such as a Russellian proposition or a Fregean

thought (again an object, but one existing in Plato's heaven) a simple explanation of our (correct) intuitions becomes available. When telling you about Portia, I assumed that you, as an educated scholar, knew that 'Tully' is another name for 'Cicero', or would have inferred it from what I said. But suppose that I were conversing with a person, Hans, who, unlike Portia, did not know the name 'Cicero', but knew a lot about the Roman orator whom he (Hans) knew as 'Tully'. It would be pointless my reporting Portia's belief to Hans by using the words 'Portia believes that Cicero is a Roman orator'. I would, instead, say to Hans 'Portia believes that Tully is a Roman orator' and, under these circumstances, what I say is *true*. Have I just concluded, then, that the proposition 'Portia believes that Tully is a Roman orator' is both false and true? Not at all. The moral to be drawn here is that it is not Russellian propositions that have truth-value; the bearer of truth or falsity is *what is stated by the speaker*, and what is stated by the speaker is a function of context – in particular, of what the speaker takes to be relevant beliefs of the hearer. It is always such considerations of the particularities of context that allow us to escape from substitutivity puzzles.

If, as we argued earlier, it is not a sentence but *what is stated by a speaker* that has truth-value, what are we to make of Tarski's Convention T

S is true iff p

where 'S' is a name or description of the sentence appearing on the right hand side of the biconditional? Tarski, as a result of examining a case where the sentence substituting for 'p' was a Liar-type sentence concluded that ordinary language is incoherent. But if we 'fix up' Convention T, allowing as substituends for 'S' only expressions designating what is said by a speaker (i.e., the statement made) then a different possibility suggests itself; in fact, Important Conclusion No. 3: Liar-type sentences fail to make statements. This conclusion comes about as follows: Our reformulated Convention T is a most basic, incontrovertible truth about truth. If someone say that pigs can fly then what he says is true if and only if pigs can fly. So we wish to insist that Convention T is true: if someone makes a statement – says something that is either true or false – then Convention T applies to it. Now *suppose* that 'L' designates a statement made by the sentence 'L is not true'. Making the appropriate substitutions in our reformulated Convention T gives

L is true iff L is not true

and *that* is certainly *not* true. But, as we mentioned, reformulated Convention T is true in every instance, and we have no need to deny that, so long as we *reject* the assumption just made, that 'L' designates a statement made by the sentence 'L is not true'. In other words, there can be no statement that says of itself that it is not true. But, since the Liar Paradox (in this case, the Strengthened Liar) starts from the assumption that there is such a statement and derives a contradiction from it, a principled rejection of the assumption is a dissolution of the paradox.

This is very good progress: three important conclusions from one ontological insight, and we could stop here, well pleased. But considerations of space do

not allow me not to go into further details, so I shall add some more words on the third conclusion. The first thing to be said is that, although it has been reached by a novel route, that conclusion is not new. In mediaeval *insolubilia* literature up to about 1225, the idea that the Liar sentence fails to make a statement was quite common. Impatient critics in those days complained that the sentence contains good words in good grammatical order, with no category mistakes or any other infelicity, so how could it *not* be a statement? What the Austin/Wittgenstein ontological insight shows is that making a statement is different, in important respects, from producing a pheme or a grapheme.

Second, there is an alternative, utterly simple proof of the same result obtainable entirely within classical logic. Classically, we accept the Principle of Bivalence, which says that every statement is either true (1) or false (0) -- not neither, not both, not anything inbetween, i.e.

For all statements p, $\text{val}(p) = 1$ or (exclusively) $\text{val}(p) = 0$

Accept also classical negation:

For all statements p, $\text{val}(\text{not-}p) = 1 - \text{val}(p)$

Now consider sentence A, which is 'B is not true'

Obviously $\text{val}(A) = 1 - \text{val}(B)$

But now 'let' $A = B$ (giving us the Strengthened Liar)

We have, then, $\text{val}(A) = 1 - \text{val}(A)$

i.e. $\text{val}(A) = \frac{1}{2}$

Therefore (from Bivalence) A is not a statement.

Likewise if, when doing elementary algebra, we discover that the value of x is 1 – the value of y, we cannot then 'let' x be equal to y; no finite number can be 1 less than itself.

If A is not a statement, it doesn't say anything – it doesn't say anything true, false or anything inbetween; it doesn't say that it is either false or neither true nor false. That disposes of the simple and strengthened Liar.

The difference between sentences and statements is evident most obviously in sentences that contain indexicals. The type sentence 'It's hot here' is clearly neither true nor false, but neither is a token of that sentence, if a token is taken to be a physical sign (grapheme). For I may take on an expedition to the North Pole a token of that sentence written on a slip of paper that I found at my starting point in Accra. This token, though it may have a meaning (in Kaplan's terms, a 'character' in that it can be translated into a foreign language) does not have a content or a truth-value. It is the use of a token on a given occasion (i.e. a statement) that has a content. If, on reaching Greenland, I pull the token out of my pocket and show it to a deaf native in order to start up a conversation (as opposed, say, to making him a gift of the piece of paper) then it is my location that gives content to the utterance, and the temperature there that determines its truth-value.

One striking fact about paradoxes in the Liar family is the prevalence of indexical expressions. Thus (in a 16th Century variant) we have a card on one side of which is written 'The statement on the other side is false' while what is written on the other side is 'The statement on the other side is true'. The presence of the word 'statement' should not fool us into thinking that there are any statements here (any more than we should be fooled into thinking that the phrase 'this number which is 1 less than itself' denotes a number). In virtue of the *character* of the

sentence on the first side of the card, we look on the other side of the card in order to determine the content and truth-value of what is written on the first side. And if what is written on the second side were 'Pigs can fly', then the content would be established and we could rest content. But, in the paradoxical case, the sentence on one side needs to inherit content from the sentence on the other, but the latter needs to inherit content from the former. Result: no content and no truth-value for either. It's like trying to make a telephone call to someone when that person is trying to make a telephone call to you: neither person succeeds.

Tarski's classic presentation of the Liar in his paper on the concept of truth in formalized languages employs an indexical – he uses the symbol 'c' as a typographical abbreviation of the expression 'the sentence printed on this page, line 5 from the top', and on line 5 of the page stand the words

c is not a true sentence

and nothing else. It is easy enough to modify the example so as to eliminate the indexical expression – instead of 'this page', we could have 'page 158 of J.H. Woodger (trans.), *Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics*'. In so doing, we replace the expression containing the indexical with one that gives the geographical co-ordinates of a particular sentence. And, so long as we *assume* that where there is a sentence there must be a statement, we shall run into paradox. But, as we have demonstrated in the 'card' version above, that assumption is vulnerable.

Let us, finally, consider a version of the Liar, discussed by R.L. Goodstein (1958) in which truth and falsity are ascribed to what is said by a person A. The following proof closely follows Goodstein/Slater (2001). In this version, A says that everything that he says is false, which we can formalise as

$\text{Sa}\S((x)(\text{Sax} \supset \sim\text{Tx}))$

Write y as an abbreviation of $\S((x)(\text{Sax} \supset \sim\text{Tx}))$

$(x)(\text{Sax} \supset \text{Tx})$ Assumption

$\text{Say} \supset \text{Ty}$ 2, UI

Say (Rewriting of 1.)

Ty 3,4, MP

$(x)(\text{Sax} \supset \sim\text{Tx})$ -- since $\text{T}\S p \rightarrow p$

$(\exists x)\text{Sax}$ -- well, for a start, he said y

$\sim\text{Tb}$ 6,7

Tb 2,7

$\sim(x)(\text{Sax} \supset \text{Tx})$ 8,9,2, RA (discharging Assumption 2)

$(\exists x)(\text{Sax} \ \& \ \sim\text{Tx})$

This is the first part of the proof – A says something untrue.

12. $(x)(\text{Sax} \supset \sim\text{Tx})$ Assumption

13 Ty (since $p \rightarrow \text{T}\S p$)

14. $\text{Say} \supset \sim\text{Ty}$ 12, UI

15. $\sim\text{Ty}$ 4,14, MP

16. $\sim(x)(\text{Sax} \supset \sim\text{Tx})$ 12,13,15, RA (discharging assumption 12)

17. $(\exists x)(\text{Sax} \ \& \ \text{Tx})$ -- A says something true.

Goodstein takes himself to have dissolved the version of the Liar with which he deals. He says that 'instead of a paradox [we find] a proof of the sentence: If A says that everything which he says is false then A says something false and something true'.

Yet this result is in itself paradoxical. For we are given that A made a statement, and we seem to have deduced, by pure logic alone, that A must have said at least one other thing. But why could A not just have said the one sentence we attributed to him and no other? Goodstein seems to have proved that, whatever the truth-value of A's statement that we are scrutinizing, he must have made other statements at least one of which has a truth-value opposite to that one. Can logic deliver us such a strong empirical result?

In the case where A just does utter the one sentence 'Everything I say is not true' – so that he is effectively uttering the Strengthened Liar 'What I am saying is untrue' -- then, if Goodstein is right that A says both something true and something false, his sentence must be both true and false, as Dialetheists claim, or it must be ambiguous, as B.H. Slater claims; that is, it must be one sentence expressing two statements, but those statements are ineffable. Unfortunately, Slater does not provide much support for this claim, save to offer for comparison the sentence 'There is a thought for which there is no linguistic expression in English'. Obviously, if there is such a thought, then there can be no statement in English expressing it.

Recognizing ineffability in this special case goes no way towards making it plausible that at least one of the statements made by the Liar sentence is ineffable. And there seems a much simpler way to confront Goodstein: It will be noted that at steps 6 and 13 of the above proof, Tarski's classical Convention T was invoked. But to say that a non-statement (i.e. something without a truth-value) is true is to say something straightforwardly false. Truth-valueless items are not available for plugging into the Tarski biconditional, for doing so would make one side of the biconditional false, the other truth-valueless, hence the biconditional itself would be false. Once again, the answer seems to be that those 13th Century logicians were right – the Liar is a sentence, but it fails to deliver a statement.

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Die Konstituenten der Person: Eichung an Hand der Realität

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1. Die Konstituenten der Person

Die „Person“ gilt als hochkomplexes Gebilde, das über die folgende *Grundausrüstung* verfügt

Tabelle 1 (ohne Anspruch auf Vollständigkeit):

1. Somatisch: Genom;
2. Triebmäßig: Reflexe, Automatismen, Verhaltensweisen (Instinkte, „Angeborene Lehrmeister“ - kein echtes „Wissen“.
3. Emotionen
4. Kognitiv: Erkennen (Sinnesdatenverarbeitung, Begriffe, Selbstbewusstsein=
5. Gedächtnis, Wissen
6. Diskursiv: Schließen, Rationalität und Logik
7. Soziales Verhalten
8. Reproduktives Verhalten
9. Sprache
10. Bewegungskoordination
11. Ethik, Verantwortung: Die Person ist „wertvernehmend“ (N. Hartmann).

Fehlen oder Fehlentwicklung eines dieser „Module“ führt zur Störung der Persönlichkeit. Wenn wir untersuchen, wie sich die Person zu einem in der Sozietät überlebensfähigen Individuum entwickeln kann und wie sie diesen Status aufrecht erhält, dann erkennen wir mehrere *Eichmöglichkeiten*, die die Grundausrüstung den realen Bedingungen anpassen. Das beginnt bereits in der Evolution, ist in der frühkindlichen Phase hoch aktiv und ist zum Teil sogar lebenslang wirksam.

Unter der Vielfalt der Eichmöglichkeiten sei auf die folgenden verwiesen.

Tabelle 2 (Die Zahlen beziehen sich auf die oben angeführte Grundausrüstung):

- 1 –11: *Evolutionär*: Disposition zu allen Fähigkeiten selektiert.
- 3 - 5, 7, 9, 10: *frühkindlich*, an Hand der Realität
- 2 -5, 7, 9 – 11: „ Vorbildwirkung (Erwachsene, Gleichaltrige)
- 3 -7, . 9 - 11 : *Erziehung*, Indoktrinierung, Schule
- 4 – 11 : *Adoleszenz*: Ausbildung, Beruf
- 2 – 11 : potentiell *lebenslanglich*.

2. Einige Bemerkungen hierzu

Zur Evolution von Instinkten, Trieben und Verhaltensweisen: Es gibt keinen Beweis für vererbtes konkretes Wissen. Vererbt sind grundsätzlich nur die Dispositionen zum Wissenserwerb, weiters Triebe, Verhaltensweisen und reflexartige Reaktionen. Beispiel: Ich habe einen schwarzen, gelb gemusterten Gartenschlauch gekauft. Wiederholt ist mir passiert, dass ich für Bruchteile von Sekunden zurückgeschreckt bin, wenn der Schlauch im Gras schillerte. Das war kein konkretes Wissen, vielmehr ein „angeborener Lehrmeister“ (K. Lorenz), der mich veranlasste, zu stocken, wenn ein schlangenhähnliches Bild auftauchte. Es ist erstaunlich, dass sich im Lauf der Evolution dieser Reflex über Äonen und zahlreiche Species erhalten hat, jeweils von Generation zu Generation, nur durch die DNS von zwei Zellen, Spermia und Eizelle, übertragen. Es war aber kein

konkretes Wissen, nur ein ererbter Reflex, ich wusste ja, dass es nur ein Gartenschlauch war.

Zur Frühkindlichen Eichung: Konkretes Wissen wird erst vom Kleinkindalter an erworben und das hat den Vorteil, dass es der Realität angepasst und nicht Mutationen unterworfen ist. Das Kleinkind greift zunächst nach dem Mond, es lernt dann bald, die angeborenen Mechanismen zur Entfernungsschätzung (binokuläres Sehen, Parallaxe, Linsenkrümmung Konvergenz etc.) anzuwenden. Damit wird aber die Raumwahrnehmung im mesokosmischen Bereich (G. Vollmer, 1995) ermöglicht und aus den rhythmischen Vorgängen (Tag-Nacht, Nahrungsaufnahme etc.) erwächst der Zeitbegriff. Damit wird das Koordinatensystem für alle beobachteten Fakten und Prozesse an Hand der Realität erworben.:

Vorbilder: Der Nachahmungstrieb ermöglicht es, von älteren oder erfahreneren Individuen Wissen und angepasste Verhaltensweisen auf kurzem Wege zu übernehmen. In der *Schule* besteht die Möglichkeit einer direkten Übertragung kulturell bedingter Errungenschaften, die damit zu wichtigen Persönlichkeitskonstituenten werden. In der *Adoleszenz* kann der Sexualtrieb in zivilisierte Bahnen gelenkt werden. Zahlreiche berufliche Fähigkeiten werden durch Schulung und eigene Erfahrung erworben. Damit ist der Erwerb und die Eichung von Konstituenten der Person noch nicht abgeschlossen, es kommt eine

Lebenslange Eichung hinzu. Als Beispiel für eine solche Eichung wurde von G.M. Stratton (1898) und von H.A. Carr (1935, beide zitiert nach Th. S. Kuhn, 1962) das folgende Experiment beschrieben. Auf unseren Netzhäuten wird die Realität verkehrt abgebildet, wir sehen die Dinge aber richtig. Setzt man einer Versuchsperson eine Prismenbrille auf und lässt man sie die Brille ständig tragen, ist sie zunächst hilflos weil sie alles seitenverkehrt wahrnimmt. Der Zustand dauert aber nur mehrere Tage oder Wochen, dann lernt die Versuchsperson, wieder, trotz der Prismenbrille, alles richtig zu sehen. Nimmt man ihr dann die Brille weg, benötigt sie einige Tage, um wieder alles richtig sehen zu lernen. Dieser Versuch spricht dafür, dass wir lebenslanglich unsere Wahrnehmungen an Hand der Realität eichen. Falsche Wahrnehmungen oder auch falsche Bewegungskoordinationen können wir in einem unbewussten Prozess korrigieren und dieser Vorgang trägt dazu bei, dass wir den Erfordernissen unseres täglichen Lebens weitgehend gewachsen sind und Fehlsteuerungen ausgeglichen werden. Diese Eichmöglichkeit unserer Sinnesdatenverarbeitung an Hand der realen Verhältnisse kann als Argument gegen konstruktivistische Auffassungen dienen.

Sprache Zweifellos haben wir sowohl die somatisch- anatomischen Voraussetzung als auch die neurale Disposition zum Spracherwerb ererbt. Ebenso gewiss ist, dass wir für keine *bestimmte* Sprache vorprogrammiert sind.. Strittig ist dagegen, ob wir über eine *angeborene „universelle Grammatik“* (N. Chomsky 1976, S. 33) verfügen. Ich halte es für unmöglich, eine angeborene Grammatik nachzuweisen, wenn das Kind alle sprachlichen Äußerungen durch Jahre mühsam, wenn auch spielend, von Erwachsenen oder von anderen Kindern erlernen muss. Zumindest in unseren Breiten geht der Spracherwerb so vonstatten: Es werden einzelne

Wörter erlernt, es kommt über das Zweiwortstadium und über die ersten Verben schließlich zur Satzbildung. Wie will man ausschließen, dass dabei grammatische Regeln mit einfließen? Auch eine kürzlich erschienene ausführlich Zusammenfassung der Argumente Chomskys (St. Laurence und E. Margolis, 2001) kann diese Frage und einige andere nicht beantworten. Darüber hinaus verlangt jede sinnvolle Aussage über die Realität eine Gliederung in Subjekt und Prädikat, somit eine in der Natur der Dinge enthaltene fundamentale Grammatik. Subjekt und Prädikat ermöglichen einzeln, eines ohne das andere, keine Wiedergabe der Realität, außer, wir können das jeweils Fehlende stillschweigend voraussetzen. Daher können wir vermuten, dass unsere Grammatik weitgehend an naturgegebene Bedingungen, an die Struktur der Realität, angepasst und von dieser vorgegeben ist.–

Logik Ähnlich scheint es sich in der Logik zu verhalten. Kann sich die Natur „unlogisch“ verhalten, kann ein Apfel an der gleichen Stelle rot und zugleich nichtrot sein? Muss ein nicht nichtroter Apfel nicht rot sein? Nach J. Piaget und B. Inhelder (1977) ist die logische Entwicklung des Menschen erst etwa mit dem 12. Lebensjahr erreicht. Bis zu diesem Alter kann der Mensch das logische Verhalten der Natur internalisieren, auch wenn er die Gesetze der Logik nicht formulieren kann. Das schließt eine angeborene Logik nicht sicher aus, aber wie will man sie nachweisen?

Weitere Eichmechanismen wollen wir uns

3. Am Beispiel der kognitiven Fähigkeit für singuläre Fakten noch etwas genauer ansehen

Ich kenne keinen Menschen, der wach und seiner Sinne fähig gewesen wäre und trotzdem in einen Kieselstein statt in einen Apfel gebissen hätte. Selbst eine Apfelatrappe aus Kunststoff können wir leicht von einem echten Apfel unterscheiden. Das basiert auf mehreren Prinzipien. Schon erwähnt haben wir die evolutionäre, frühkindliche und lebenslängliche Eichung. Damit haben wir noch kaum eine wichtige Wahrnehmungsform von erstaunlicher Präzision berührt, die *Gestaltwahrnehmung*. Wir erkennen Dinge des Alltags oder eine Person oft auf den ersten Blick und man geht kaum in der Annahme fehl, dass bei letzterer ein Zusammenwirken zahlreicher Merkmale, der Statur, der Kleidung, der Haarfarbe, des typischen Ganges, der Stimme etc. stattfindet. Oft genügen wenige Worte, um eine Stimme am Telefon zu erkennen und wir wissen gar nicht, welche feinen Nuancen der Stimmlage und der Obertöne uns das Erkennen ermöglichen. Es spricht vieles dafür, dass hier überwiegend unbewusste *probabilistische* Überlegungen eine Rolle spielen. Hier stehen uns im Prinzip drei Methoden zur Verfügung.

a) Die Methode der *relativen Häufigkeit* ist die einfachste und wohl auch am meisten angewandte. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit P , dass ein Ereignis E^+ eintritt, entspricht dem Quotienten aus der Zahl der hierfür günstigen Fälle und der Zahl der möglichen Fälle ($E^+ + E^0$). Somit erhalten wir: $P = E^+ / (E^+ + E^0)$. Sehr oft schließen wir, weitgehend unbewusst, etwa so: Alle Dinge, deren Merkmale zusammen dieses bestimmte, komplexe Bild ergaben, waren bisher Äpfel, dieses Ding zeigt ein in allen Belangen ähnliches Bild, es wird mit höchster Wahrscheinlichkeit auch ein Apfel sein.

b) Die *Bayessche Methode* dient besonders dazu, die berechnete Zunahme unseres rationalen Glaubens an

eine Hypothese abzuschätzen, wenn diese durch neue Evidenz bestätigt wird.. Die Formel lautet:

$$P(H|E) = P(H) \times P(E|H) / [P(H) \times P(E|H) + P(\neg H) \times P(E|\neg H)]$$

Hierbei ist $P(H|E)$ die Wahrscheinlichkeit, die eine Hypothese H durch die Evidenz E erhält. $P(E|H)$ ist die „Likelihood“, die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass E eintritt, wenn H wahr ist. Im Nenner wird das den Zähler bildende Produkt um $P(\neg H) \times P(E|\neg H)$, die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass E zutrifft, wenn H nicht gegeben ist, vermehrt. – Die Bayes- Methode ist somit einigermaßen kompliziert, es werden für den einfachsten Fall drei empirische Angaben benötigt und es ist zu bezweifeln, ob wir eine solche Methode rein intuitiv bewältigen können.

c) Das ist eher möglich mit der *MPE- Methode* (Method of the Multiplication of the Probabilities of Error, Gottlob, 2000): $P \uparrow (H \& E) = 1 - [1 - P(H)] \times [1 - P(E)]$ In dieser Formel hat der aufwärts gerichtete Pfeil (\uparrow) die folgende Funktion: $P(E_1 \& E_2)$, die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass zwei zufällige, unabhängige Ereignisse zugleich auftreten, ist $P(E_1) \times P(E_2)$. Da die Wahrscheinlichkeiten Brüche <1 sind, wird das Produkt kleiner. Anders verhält es sich aber, wenn die Brüche einander bestätigen. Dann müssen wir, um eine Zunahme der Wahrscheinlichkeit zu erhalten, nicht die Brüche multiplizieren, sondern die Fehlerwahrscheinlichkeiten, $[1 - P(H)]$ oder $[1 - P(E)]$, das sind die Komplemente der Wahrscheinlichkeiten und damit erhalten wir durch Multiplikation die Gesamtfehlerwahrscheinlichkeit, die abnimmt, wenn sich die Wahrscheinlichkeiten gegenseitig bestätigen. Davon können wir leicht die Gesamtwahrscheinlichkeit der sich bestätigenden Wahrscheinlichkeiten berechnen. Am Beispiel des Apfel sieht das so aus:

Die Form des Apfels spricht mit $P = 0.8$ für die Erkenntnis „Apfel“. Das Komplement, $1 - 0.8 = 0.2$. Ebenso spricht der Geruch, das Gewicht, die Oberfläche, der Geschmack etc. jeweils etwa mit 0.8 für Apfel, das Produkt der Fehlerwahrscheinlichkeiten beträgt somit $0.2 \times 0.2 \times 0.2 \times 0.2 = 0.00032$ und das entspricht einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von $1 - 0.00032 = 0.99968$. Eine solche Wahrscheinlichkeit reicht für unseren praktischen Bedarf vollständig aus. – Natürlich wird unsere intuitive und in der Regel sogar unbewusste Rechnung keine exakten Daten, sondern nur Größenordnungen ergeben, aber mit diesen können wir schon große Sicherheiten gewinnen, besonders, wenn noch weitere Kriterien hinzukommen, etwa, wenn die Frucht aus einer Apfelplantage stammt, geschält wurde, bei Durchschneiden das typische Kerngehäuse aufweist etc. Unsere Intuition besteht darin, dass wir annehmen: Je mehr unabhängige Merkmale für eine Erkenntnis sprechen, um so geringer muss die Fehlerwahrscheinlichkeit ausfallen. Die Abnahme der Fehlerwahrscheinlichkeit geschieht aber nicht linear, sondern exponentiell. Bei einer *Gestaltwahrnehmung* spielt das Zusammenwirken einer großen Zahl von Einzelbeobachtungen eine besondere Rolle. Hierbei entscheidet die *semantische Diversität* darüber, ob ein multiplikatives (exponentielles) Verfahren, wie die MPE- Methode angewandt werden kann oder ob bei *gleichem semantischen Gehalt* der Teste oder der Wahrnehmungen, die Beobachtungen sich *nur zahlenmäßig addieren*, was für die weniger wirksame Methode der relative Häufigkeit ausreichen würde. *Kombinationsverfahren* : Der Vollständigkeit halber sei hier noch erwähnt, dass man die fallweise der Bayes- Methode vorgeworfene Willkürlichkeit dadurch reduzieren kann, dass man die einzelnen Daten vor Einbringen in die Bayessche oder in die MPE- Operation mit der relativen Häufigkeit (oder mit der Laplaceschen Methode) zunächst genauer absichert, bevor man in die Multiplikation eingeht. In Extremfällen, bei

Aufstellung von Naturgesetzen oder bei Bestimmung von Naturkonstanten, können wir zwar die Humeschen Skrupel gegen allgemeine Sätze und Naturgesetze nicht restlos ausräumen. Vorgängen, die wir zu jeder beliebigen Zeit und ohne gesichertes Gegenbeispiel in großer Zahl beobachten, können wir mit dem Kombinationsverfahren Fehlerwahrscheinlichkeiten in Größenordnungen von unter 10^{-80} - 10^{-100} zuordnen. (Beispiel: Alle materiellen Dinge im mesokosmischen Raum unterliegen der Schwerkraft, sind träge, nehmen einen Raum ein, verhalten sich kausal und uniform etc.) – Bei allen probabilistischen Operationen handelt es sich um rationale Annahmen bei teilweise ungenügendem Wissen. Hierbei muss, offen oder stillschweigend, unser Hintergrundwissen berücksichtigt werden, dem der Vorrang vor Vermutungswissen und unsicheren Schlüssen zukommt.

4. Zusätzliche Sicherheiten und apriorisches Wissen

Die genannten statistischen Methoden gehen von einer mehr passiven Aufnahme von Wissensstoff aus. Zusätzliche Sicherheiten werden durch Arbeiten mit den Dingen und durch Bearbeiten der Dinge gewonnen. Unsere Technik ist heute fähig, sich auf zahlreiche Naturgesetze und Materialkonstanten zu stützen. Das gilt zunächst für die mesokosmische Dimension. Die geglückten Mondlandungen basieren auf einer großen Zahl solcher allgemeiner Sätze und Materialkonstanten. Die Aufklärung des genetischen Codes, der Erfolg der grünen Revolution bei der Steigerung der Ernteerträge und viele andere Erfolge bieten zusätzliche Sicherheiten. Zu diesen trägt auch unser apriorisches Wissen bei. Wieder kann die Frage: Angeboren oder erworben? diskutiert werden. Hier sei nur darauf hingewiesen, dass die Sinnesausstattung unserer Person das Wahrnehmen von Raum und Zeit und das Verfolgen von Kausalketten zumindest in der mesokosmischen Dimension möglich macht.

5. Fehler in der Grundausrüstung, ungenügende oder fehlende Eichung

Das bisher entworfene optimistische Bild wird getrübt, wenn wir abschließend

einen Blick auf ungelöste Probleme der Menschheit werfen. Der an sich faszinierende Fortschritt der Naturwissenschaften, besonders von Medizin und Technologie, hat unsere Welt verändert. Das Durchschnittsalter der Menschen hat sich verdoppelt, die Zahl der Menschen auf der Erde wächst exponentiell an. Bisher waren wir fähig, diese Zahl schlecht und recht zu ernähren. Das geht auf Kosten unserer Umwelt. Regenwälder schmelzen dahin, Treibhausgase durchsetzen die Atmosphäre, die Folgen einer Klimaerwärmung sind nicht abzuschätzen. Nach zwei Weltkriegen ist kein Frieden eingeleitet. Wir können sagen, dass die Entwicklung der Persönlichkeiten von der technologischen Entwicklung überrollt wurde, dass die Eichung unserer Grundausrüstung an der Realität mit deren Wandel nicht Schritt hält. Eine noch gefährlichere Entwicklung ist nicht auszuschließen. Atavismen, Aggressionen, Rachsucht werden dominante Motive, sogar in hoch zivilisierten Staaten. Selbst die primitivste Rationalität verkümmert, etwa, wenn Menschen eines sich unterdrückt fühlenden Volkes gegen den Unterdrückter mit Selbstmordattentaten an Zivilisten vorgeht und das sich überlegen fühlende Volk gegen das technisch unterlegene Racheaktionen durchführt, die wieder Zivilisten zu Opfern

machen. Es ist ein Zeichen von Fehlern in der Grundausrüstung, wenn man den schädlichen Kreislauf nicht erkennt, nicht bemerkt, dass beide Völker unter dieser Haltung leiden, bei jeder tragbaren Kompromisslösung aber profitieren würden.

Es ist überhaupt ein Fehler in der Grundausrüstung der Menschen, dass ihnen nationale, religiöse oder rassistische Wir-Gruppen wichtiger scheinen, als das bedrohte Wohl der gesamten Menschheit auf der Erde.

Hier zeichnet sich eine gewaltige Aufgabe der Philosophie ab, die darin besteht, die zurückgebliebene Eichung in unserer Grundausrüstung zu erkennen und einen neuen Menschen zu entwerfen, der diesen Problemen gewachsen ist. Auf Grund der Eichung seiner Rationalität an der bereits eingetretenen Realität wird der neue Mensch zum Beispiel globale Probleme nicht mehr nur vom wirtschaftlichen Gesichtspunkt aus beurteilen, sondern auch seine Verantwortung dafür sehen, seine eigene Rationalität und die seiner weltweiten Handelspartner den Geboten der Zeit anzupassen. Begrenzte Erfolge, etwa die Bildung der Europäischen Union aus Staaten, die vorher als „Erbeinde“ galten und zwei Weltkriege zu verantworten hatten, zeigen, dass das nicht unmöglich ist. Das Überleben der Menschheit in einer lebenswerten Umwelt muss uns heute als das Problem der Definition einer weltumspannenden Rationalität erscheinen und als das Problem, die Grundausrüstung der Personen weltweit durch Erziehung den dringenden Erfordernissen anzupassen.

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Referential Relation in Wittgenstein's Theory of Language (Tractatus, Philosophical Investigations)

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Let us remember Wittgenstein's main assertions in *Tractatus*. As everyone knows Wittgenstein suggests a theory of language called "picture theory", according to which every word names an object or every word represents something. The proposition in *Tractatus* concerned with this idea is "A name means an object. The object is its meaning" (3.203).

Accepting that every name is to be the name of something to which it refers, then it becomes clear that there is no word or name which does not refer to an object. So this view becomes intelligible when the whole domain of language is thought to be consisting of names or nouns as *Tractatus* itself supposes. Here as one may realise though we are aware of that the object to which a name refers is the meaning of the name, we do not contemplate the relation of a name to an object as the relation or reference of a name to a "meaning" just for not presenting a third constituent for this relation. As one may recognise the notion of referential relation¹ has already slipped into our arguments. Now it seems reasonable to point out that there is a referential relation between a name and what a name stands for or refers to. In other words naming activity necessitates a referential relation between a name and an object. However such a referential relation between a name and an object can be made clear by means of examining each part of this relation.

To consider the first part of this relation, it can be said that to name is to name something, in other words a name is the name of something. That is to say every name supposes a relation in which the representation of something in some way is unavoidable. In order to be able to talk about a name we have an inevitable reference or relation to what is non-name or an object. Without a reference to an object it is impossible to speak of a naming activity. The act of naming is always going to be the act of naming something or an object. Where an act of naming is supposed, the existence of an object to be named is also supposed.

Now if we consider the nature of such a referential relation between a language and an object from the object part, then we can say that in the referential relation of languages, there is always an object to be named or to be referred to. Conceivably, when there is no something to be named, then the act of naming becomes unintelligible. If there is no an object to be named, then the act of naming, if correct, would not exist at all. For if there is an object to be named, then the act of naming, which may be thought to be in a referential relation to the object, will become understandable. To use another method for the clarification of the view, it can be said that if the object is the meaning of the word, suppose that there is not an object to be named it means there is no an act of naming either due to that an act of naming must have a meaning. An act of naming without a meaning would not mean much, for Wittgenstein. For Wittgenstein every name must have a meaning simply by depending upon the existence of an object to which it has a referential relation. So the elimination of the object from this referential relation will

mean that the language that we use will not have any meaning. Given an example, let us have the word "ofsu" in mind, if there is not an object which corresponds to this word, then we cannot talk of an act of naming an object which is called "ofsu", simply because the meaning of the word "ofsu" and that of related act of naming is missing. To have a meaningful language means to have a language domain where each name or word is in a referential relation to an object, which is the meaning of the language used, as to *Tractatus*.

In addition to having names which does not refer to an object such as "ofsu", we can also take some attention on the cases where some names refer to objects² which do not exist. The round square, unicorn and similar names attempts to name things which do not exist. So how is this possible, if possible, on what ground could they be accepted as having a meaning, it still remains questionable on the part of Wittgenstein.

So far we have tried to show that there is a referential relation which is describable in *Tractatus*. But now by following a similar line of reasoning we will attempt to clarify that there is also a referential relation which one may describe in *Philosophical Investigations*. At this point let us recall the main assertions of Later Wittgenstein concerning the theory of language: later theory of meaning has a claim of defining language in a different way. First of all the language is not to be conceived of as the name of a single phenomenon or some phenomenon, as claimed in *Tractatus*. Such a definition supposes the use of words as only names. But Wittgenstein believes, this is a mistaken notion of language. For, besides that a word can be used as a name, it can also be used in numerous other ways too. There are other domains of language where many different words are used in many different ways. From these remarks we possibly come to the recognition of the fact that Wittgenstein needs to present to us a different theory and definition of language by which a limitation to proper names would be unnecessary. From the fact that even the names themselves can mean in many ways Wittgenstein finds himself in a need of defining language in a different way. In *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein writes; "For a large class of cases-though not for all in which we employ the word 'meaning'", it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language" (PI. §43(P.20⁵)). By this definition of language Wittgenstein introduces a new notion to the field of language. This is, namely, the language-game. What is a language-game? According to Wittgenstein, a language-game is a "whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven" (Ibid §7(P.5⁶)). It can be said that it is the language-game by which the use of a certain word in a certain way is made possible. When a word is used in a certain way, there is a related language-game in which the word gains a distinguishing meaning. Before pointing to the way by which a word gains a meaning, let us remember, Wittgenstein's own words: "Here the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of

¹ As becomes clear, throughout this paper I will use the terms "relation", "reference", "referential relation" interchangeably.

² Here the term "object" can be replaced by the term "entity" for a better understanding of the case.

life " Ibid §23(P.11^e). Simply what he says is that the language-games are expressions of people's form of life or mode of activity. So the definition of language turns out to be that when a word is used in a certain way, it is also used in relation to a related human action. This is to say that words used are to reflect some human actions, which are found in a form of life. There is always a social context in which a word is used in a certain manner, and this social context relates us to a human action undeniably. This clarifies that when a word is used in a certain way for gaining a meaning, this use of word or language-game always is in a relation to a human action into which, as Wittgenstein holds, the word is woven.

As becomes clear, different language-games brings us into a connection with different human actions or mode of activities. For such language-games, let us take an example; the word " die " used in a battle by a commander will relate us to the defined human action of attacking and taking all the risks for winning the battle. Another example, suppose one going to a shop and says " Marlboro ": what follows the utterance of the word " Marlboro " is that the shopkeeper walks towards a certain shelf and picks one of the cigarette packets, on which " Marlboro " is written, from the shelf and hands it to me. In this language-game the use of the word " Marlboro " relates us to a defined human action which has been described above.

In such and similar language-games we are always capable of defining a referential relation between a language-game and a human action or mode of activity. Such a referential relation is considerable for every language-game by which the use of a certain word gains a meaning: this referential relation can diagrammatically be indicated as follows;

Language-game I----->Related human action
(use of a word) (mode of activity)

Figure.1

We can also diagrammatically represent the examples given above. Concerning the language-games by which the word " die " and the word " Marlboro " are put to a certain use, the languages or language-games are in relation to two separate human actions;

Language-game I----->Victory(winning the battle)
(use of " die ") (Related human action)

Figure.2

Language-game I----->The walk towards shelf
(use of "Marlboro") (Related human action)

Figure.3

From the above diagrams it becomes clear that a language-game by which a word is put to a certain use is always in a relation to a human action or mode of activity. Though a human action always is in a relation to a form of life, we shall not say more about this relation rather than pointing to it. Returning to our original argument, the relation of a language-game to a related human action, we can say that such a referential relation between them becomes clear from the plainly written words of Wittgenstein; Wittgenstein holds that " the speaking of a language is part of an activity " Ibid §23 (P.11^e). Namely, as soon as we utter a word depending upon the way in which it is used, we refer to a related human action or mode of activity. In the Wittgenstenian sense, there is no a language-game which does not relate us to a human action. For the language or language-game becomes the part of the human activity to which it intentionally refers. So not only definition of language-game but also its actual

occurrence depends on the referential relation between a language-game and a human action. Namely, without a related human action we cannot speak of a language-game. Because a certain word used in a language-game can have a meaning by depending upon that there is a social convention relating our use of the word to a certain human activity. Furthermore the language-game which suggests us a possible meaning for the word used is unified with the human actions. The language-games and human actions constitute a unification by which language-games become definable. The unification of the language-game with the human action clarifies that one cannot be separated from another. This inseparateness is not supposed by definition, but the uses into which words are put makes it clear. To put this in a similar way it can be said that the language-game is included in the related human actions, or language-games have a participation in the human actions. Naturally, the involvement of the language-games in the related human actions clarifies that the language-game and related human action are fused into one another. This is claimed by the idea held by Wittgenstein that the language-games are part of human activities upon which they are inevitably directed. Such a fusion or unification of language-game with the human action describes a dependency of one onto another in terms of its occurrence if to be held that a language-game always refers to a related human action. This view can be explained by an example such that; let us suppose somebody who walks backwards and counting numbers simultaneously. Now the point is that here there is a certain human activity or mode of activity, though it is imaginative, but there is no language-game which relates us to this human activity, in other words there is no use of any word or language into which the above human action is woven. This is because, as one may suppose, there is not a human action of such a kind, simply the described human activity does not exist at all. When a human action of such kind does not exist, it is also impossible to suppose the existence of a related language-game into which the above human action would be woven.

The same kind of analysis of the referential relation between a language-game and a human action can also be conceivable from the side of language-game. Let us consider the supposed word " kima " as a language-game for a special use. If there is no a human action into which this use of the above word as a language-game is woven, then we cannot speak of a language-game. For, if in Wittgensteinian sense a language-game is part of an activity into which it is woven, then the question arises in what way the above example can be thought of as a language-game. For there is no such use of the word " kima " as the language-game suggests. This also clarifies that there is not a related human action to which the use of the word " kima " as a language-game would refer to. Mainly the reason for not accepting this use of the word " kima " as a language-game is the non-existence of a related human action or mode of activity to which it would hold a referential relation.

As far as I can say, beside the referential relation of a language-game to a human action in general, it is also the case that different language-games or uses of one and the same word relates us to different human actions. But a detailed study of such cases, I believe, comprises another independent investigation.

Abbreviation

The following abbreviation is used throughout the whole text in this paper:

PL: Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*; the English Text of the Third Edition, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe.

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- Wittgenstein, L. 1961 *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, translated by D.F. Pears B.F. McGuiness, London: Routledge Kegan Paul.
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Are Persons Members of a Natural Kind?

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1 A quick answer to the question posed by the title is that they may be. Since the prevailing consensus - I think it is fair to say - regards persons not to be members of a natural kind, a longer answer is required. Sketching an outline of how that answer might proceed is the purpose of the present paper.

Members of natural kinds, e.g. quarks, electrons, gold molecules, viruses, human beings etc., form natural divisions in the fabric of the universe. I shall ignore the voices that might be raised at this point against the notion of natural kinds or for, at most, a few basic natural kinds, e.g. quarks and electrons. Rather I shall address the more prevalent view that the concept of a person does not represent a natural division in the fabric of the universe. If that view turns out to be wrong then the austere view will have a ready response.

The consensual position I am interested in finds clear expression in the work of Colin McGinn:

I have been speaking of terms for mental states and types of event, but parallel considerations apply to psychological sortal predicates, i.e., 'person' and restrictions thereof. In fact, what we already have implies that persons do not comprise a natural kind. For (as I take it) a person is precisely an individual sufficiently richly endowed with mental traits, and if these do not qualify as natural kinds, nor can persons. Persons have no real essence; their essence is nominal, and analytically defined. In this respect, the concept of a person does not coincide with that of a human being, though they may be *de facto* co-extensive: for, by contrast with persons, to qualify as a human being an individual must instantiate the appropriate empirical real essence - genetic structure, evolutionary origin, and the like. The relation between personhood and humanity is a contingent one, analogous to realization; and the contrasts so far remarked seem to hold equally of persons. God did not have to make persons out of human beings nor beliefs from patterns of synaptic connexions; but he had no choice in the making of human beings and heat and lightning. (McGinn 1991:135-6.)

The following simple argument can be extracted from this passage (I have framed it in terms of concepts; of course, if the argument is sound, their ontology would come under scrutiny):

P1. Mental concepts do not represent (members of) natural kinds.

P2. The concept of a person is a complex of mental concepts.

Therefore,

C3. The concept of a person does not represent (members of) a natural kind.

To turn this into an argument for the position that persons are members of a natural kind P1 requires rebuttal. I do not seek to accomplish that task here, merely to show what it would require. In fact I think that such a rebuttal can only arise in the light of a future cognitive science. This view is reached in the next section after setting out the stalls belonging to either side in the debate. P2 is then discussed in more detail. Since the view that

persons are not members of a natural kind arguably underpins the more traditional debate stemming from Locke on the individuation of persons in terms of psychological connectedness, the balance of the paper makes the connection between the possible rejection of C3 and our view of the personal identity issue.

2 Why should mental terms ('believing', 'desiring', 'perceiving' etc.) not be construed as expressing concepts of natural kinds? According to McGinn, in order for mental terms to refer to members of a natural kind there must be psychophysical laws relating mental states to physical states; for to be members of a genuine natural kind mental states must have real essences, and those can only be physical states. (McGinn 1991: 127.) More schematically, for it to be true that a mental state ψ (a propositional attitude or a sensation) has a physical real essence ϕ it must be the case that a creature cannot instantiate ψ without thereby instantiating ϕ and *vice versa*. But McGinn, who follows Kripke on this issue, holds it conceivable that instances of ϕ and ψ can come apart, therefore the physical state ϕ cannot, 'as a real essence must, determine the existence and identity conditions for ψ ', and therefore mental terms do not denote 'physically circumscribable natural kinds'. (McGinn 1991: 127-8.)

Now intuitions of conceivability are notoriously unreliable. So McGinn argues that the modal intuition is based on the more reliable claim of the multiple-realizability of the mental by the physical (hereafter MR). It is MR which establishes the lack of psychophysical laws and hence prevents the instantiation of psychological natural kinds. He supports MR further by claiming that it only requires reflection on our common sense psychology to appreciate that mental states have no empirical depth. Hence reference to mental states is not constituted via implicit reference to kinds of intrinsic physical states but by reference to behavioural regularities and introspection. In other words, mental terms refer to members of nominal kinds. (McGinn 1991: 146-52. A comparison with Dennett's instrumentalist view is worth drawing here.)

One might be just as wary of intuitions of MR as one is of intuitions of conceivability. (See Bechtel & Mundale 1997.) But suppose, for the sake of present purposes, we accept both MR and its use as a defence of the view that there are no psychophysical laws. Does this mean that we must draw the conclusion that there are no psychological natural kinds? Fodor draws the opposite conclusion: there are both physical natural kinds and independent psychological natural kinds. Distinct psychological and physical natural kinds are evidence for Fodor of the fact that the world is divided up in different ways: 'not all the kinds (not all the classes of things and events about which there are important, counterfactual supporting generalizations to make) are, or correspond to, physical kinds'. (Fodor 1981: 144.) Fodor's argument is intended to explicate the purpose of science: it is not to 'find some natural kind of physics coextensive with each kind predicate of the special science. It is, rather, to explicate the physical mechanisms whereby events conform to the laws of the special sciences'. (Fodor 1981: 138.)

So the controversy boils down to what the correct story is that we should be telling about mental predicates and psychological kinds. Instrumentalists (nominalists), like McGinn and Dennett, believe that mental predicates pick out nominal kinds. Realists, like Fodor, believe that mental predicates pick out genuine psychological natural kinds. According to a popular view in cognitive science these psychological natural kinds involve functional/representational states. They are constituted by physical states, but only in virtue of those particular causal properties of the physical states that determine the relevant psychological kind. The advocate of psychological natural kinds must navigate a fine line. On the one hand, mental states cannot be related to all the causal properties of the physical states, otherwise the mental states would be reducible to physical states; in other words, if McGinn were right that psychological kinds have to be physically circumscribable we would have little reason for thinking of them as distinctively psychological natural kinds. (See also Kim 1993: since kinds are determined by their causal properties and the causal properties of putative psychological kinds belong to their underlying physical features, psychological kinds will be concomitantly diverse, viz. not proper kinds; MR, rather than implying the autonomy of psychology, undermines it.) On the other hand, mental states cannot be related too loosely to the causal properties of physical states, i.e. not just anything can realize a psychological state, for then they would amount to merely nominal kinds. In short, different realizations of mental states must have just the right causal powers.

There are no grounds to rule out the psychological natural kind account *per impossibile*. Constrained as mental states must be both by related mental states and by inputs from and outputs to the environment, they may have the appropriate causal properties. We just do not know at the moment what the right view about the reference of psychological terms is. The crucial point from the preceding is that realism about psychological kinds, *pace* McGinn, is an empirical hypothesis which only a completed cognitive science will be able to vindicate (or otherwise).

3 Suppose mental states do not belong to natural kinds. Perhaps persons are nevertheless members of a natural kind. Or suppose mental states do belong to natural kinds. Perhaps persons do not.

I can think of no reason why either of these options is appealing. If persons are natural kinds yet their main constitutive features are not, one would have to produce an alternative criterion of personhood, which seems *prima facie* implausible. And, if mental states are natural kinds, there seems no reason why, if persons are just 'individuals sufficiently endowed with mental traits', then what one concludes about mental traits should not be transmitted to persons

As mentioned previously Dennett's view has affinities with that of McGinn. Dennett has detailed how richly an individual has to be endowed with mental traits to count as a person. He counts six necessary conditions for personhood:

- (1) Stance dependence
- (2) Rationality
- (3) Intentionality
- (4) The capacity to reciprocate
- (5) Verbal communication

(6) Self-consciousness

(1) – (3) are mutually dependent. According to the intentional stance view Dennett advocates, individuals are to be regarded as systems, whose behaviour, in order to be predicted and explained, is assumed to be fully rational, and then predicated beliefs and desires (intentional states). Although Dennett believes that beliefs and desires are only posited once the appropriate stance is taken to an individual, beliefs and desires are nevertheless objective (i.e. reliable posits) once the appropriate stance has been taken.

(1) – (3) are not sufficient conditions for personhood. Persons belong to that class of intentional systems that also display (4) – (6). The 'higher features' are dependent on the 'lower features'. Persons necessarily reciprocate the intentional stance taken towards them. That is to say, persons are second-order intentional systems: they believe, desire, etc. that others believe, desire, etc.. Furthermore, persons necessarily communicate with each other. Adopting a Gricean intentional account of language, persons can be said to be third-order intentional systems: they intend that others believe that they intend a piece of behaviour to produce a specific response. Finally, persons are necessarily self-conscious: they have the ability to examine their own beliefs and desires.

I only have a quarrel with (1). I think that a realist interpretation of personhood remains an option. (Some may conclude from the appearance above of the concept of a person as a cluster concept – or at least not a primitive concept – that it cannot be a natural kind concept. I conclude rather that the interlocking nature of the conditions is more suggestive of membership of a natural kind than a merely nominal kind.) Dennett, perhaps counter-intuitively, concludes that (1) – (6), although necessary, are not jointly sufficient. Why does he conclude this? It is because (1) – (3) introduce normative presuppositions. None of us actually fulfil them. Individuals can only ever aspire to the ideal of full rationality. If (1) – (6) were sufficient conditions for personhood then 'they would not ensure that any actual entity was a person, for nothing would ever fulfil them'. (Dennett 1978: 285.) So we cannot set a standard for personhood that is not arbitrary; to emphasize: persons are not natural kinds but nominal kinds. But it is just not clear that we do need to presuppose an ideal standard of rationality. Perhaps certain organisms do fulfil (2) – (6) because they have sufficient rationality, i.e. they actually have beliefs and desires related to each other in such a way as to ground rationality. On such a view (2) – (6) would provide both necessary and sufficient conditions for personhood. I acknowledge that there may be borderline cases for which we would not know whether to ascribe personhood, but the problem of vagueness is associated with many putative natural kinds, not just persons.

4 There are two questions that one might address concerning the concept of a person. Firstly, one might address the question of what criteria are to be used to distinguish persons from other types of things. Secondly, one might address the question of what it is that distinguishes one person from another person. The second question might be considered prior to the first question in so far as it might be argued that the concept of a person is such that only by addressing the issue of what distinguishes one person from another person can one fully understand what distinguishes a person from other kinds of thing. I think this may have matters the wrong way round.

Considering persons as nominal kinds would supply a motivation for standard debates concerning the individuation of persons, e.g. in terms of psychological connectedness: we have to turn to our own intuitions about what should count as the same subject of consciousness. But if persons do turn out to be members of a natural kind, in virtue of sufficient psychological conditions such as those outlined above and realized by physical states having the relevant causal properties, then we might do well to look to cognitive science rather than to our intuitions about the mental for whether some entity qualifies as being a person (or otherwise).

I am grateful to Brian Garvey for suggestions concerning some of the issues raised in this paper.

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Translation of Idiomatic Expressions

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Russians do not have hands or feet, and Russians consider it inappropriate to "grab your mother." Russians do not have a word for hands or feet *per se*, and so they speak of the fingers on their arms or fingers on their legs. The English expression, "lend me a hand" (to solicit help) would be stated as "lend me an arm" in the Russian language. Moreover, a proper Russian would never use either the hands he does not have nor the fingers on his arm to grab his friend's mother. A Russian acquaintance, residing in the United States at a friend's house, told me he was bewildered by a phone call he had received from his American friend. The friend, who wanted to speak with his mother, asked the Russian to "Grab my Mother for me," which did not sound like something a loving, considerate son would want done to his own mother.

Korean students in the United States are extremely puzzled when they hear someone place an order by saying, "I want a pepperoni pizza with extra cheese, and step on it!" In America, "step on the gas" means pushing down firmly with your foot on the gas pedal of your motor vehicle to increase speed. "Step on it" is a euphemistic way to request rapidity. No doubt in Korea it is considered unsanitary to step on your food.

Language is embedded in culture, "forms of life," or more general ways of going about doing things. It is important to note that Wittgenstein looks at language as something that people do, instead of something that they think. It is a kind of activity. Wittgenstein states: "Here the term "language_game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life." (PI, 23) Hence, understanding amounts to acquisition of skill with regards to engaging in this activity. As he puts it, language activity is a "practice."

Rules are consistent patterns of language behavior. Understanding of a word or sentence is not a mental (or cognitive) sort of thing. Rather, it is "mastery of a technique" that is made evident by the ability to use a word or sentence consistently in ways that conform to established patterns. Wittgenstein states:

To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions). To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique. (PI, 199)

A "history of correct usage" is needed to achieve understanding, *viz.*, a person learns to speak and write according to the rules in about the same way a person learns to play chess by moving the pieces according to the rules.

Different cultures have different customs. So, it is not surprising that their practices, language rules, and language games also differ. Wittgenstein states: "What has to be accepted, the given, is – so one could say – *forms of life*." (PI, 226e) He also states: "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?" – It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life. (PI, 241) To really learn a language a person must also learn the

wider range of cultural activities in which it is embedded. Consider some examples.

The concept of "privacy," as it is understood in the United States and elsewhere, does not exist in Russian culture. This is understandable in terms of the communal nature of the Russian society, perhaps rooted in fatalism as a result of centuries of war and tyranny. So, in the attempt to translate the word 'privacy' into the Russian language, the closest one may come to the idea are Russian words for 'solitude', 'secret', or 'personal'. Although these words do illustrate aspects of the concept, they fail to convey the full meaning of the word. Privacy is more than being alone or secret or personal: It is, in US culture, something held very closely, with passion, and as an inalienable right. It maintains personal dignity and has legal implications (It is protected by law.). Where there are cultural differences, there is a necessity for explication in addition to direct rendering of the word. (Sofer 1999)

In some cases, words must simply be left in their original language. I recall a few instances when a Japanese philosophy student (and lover of the works of Wittgenstein) at Utah State University, struggled enormously to define a particular Japanese word for me. He felt it impossible to find adequate descriptors in English, or to fully appreciate the meaning without having experienced the culture. Hence, as a true Wittgensteinian, he proceeded to give me a list of examples. For example, the Japanese word '*wabi*' was made clearer to me by showing its occurrence in the world when viewed from a Japanese perspective. *Wabi* can be found in a teacup or an old book. An object may even be flawed, but nevertheless it holds our attention, creates affection, and touches our aesthetic sensibilities. In fact, it is the flaw, "the beautiful, distinctive, aesthetic flaw that distinguishes the spirit of the moment in which this object was created from all other moments in eternity." (Rheingold 1988). My young daughter created a flower vase in her ceramics class. The hand-built pottery touched me in a deeper sense than the ever-present pride a mother carries in her heart for her children's accomplishments. There was something about this simple, roughly-styled, asymmetrical vase. It had *wabi*. In English, real estate agents appeal to the potential buyer's sense of wabi when they describe a typically old, small house, often in need of repair, as a "cottage". Suffering from decades of sleek, mass-produced, "perfect" goods, Americans could find some respite and delight in the use of wabi and the internalization of its meaning.

In some cases, the introduction and usage of a word in a new culture can promote adoption and understanding. In the US, the Chinese phrase 'feng shui' has become a popular concept recently through the publication of several books concerning the incorporation of this human aesthetic concept into landscaping, interior design and more. It translates as 'wind and water' and names an ancient Chinese art, philosophy, and science involving the proper arrangement of the physical environment (objects, furniture, buildings, etc.) in order to obtain a maximal balance of *chi*, an invisible energy force. This philosophy claims to promote feelings of well-being and tranquility in the human psyche. It has enjoyed a timely introduction to the culture, as many Americans have

begun to cringe over the rapid increase in huge mega-stores and mega-malls, and ever widening highways in scenic areas, some with fragile ecosystems. This is an example of one culture enriching another, even helping to effect a healing of a sort, through the identification and naming of the problem. The answers to the cultural questions, what are we lacking, or what have we lost, can be found sometimes in the language (and culture) of another "form" of life.

Returning to the Russian language, it is interesting to note that while the Russians have equivalent words for the English and German expressions for good morning and good day, they diverge from good night, saying rather, *peaceful* night. Could this be the result of the horrific night raids and purges of the Stalinist era? Yet another example is that the English word 'excited' (as in, "I am excited about going to Hawaii this summer!") has no Russian equivalent. The concept of a happy anticipation of an event does not exist. This could have value in the understanding of the Russian culture, its history and idiosyncracies, such as why Russians typically have a neutral facade in public, which is often interpreted as unfriendly by foreigners.

The pelmeni house has significant connotations for Soviet era Russians that are lost in a literal translation. The term 'pelmeni house' denotes a small restaurant that serves pelmeni (Russian style ravioli), coffee, and sometimes ice cream. However, the Soviet era pelmeni houses were both a microcosm of the Soviet world and a retreat from it. The ambiance was grim, surfaces were sticky, forks were greasy, and a dirty rag would be tied around the door handles to keep the massive door from slamming. The air was steamy from the boiling of the pelmeni, and there was a faint odor of aluminum in the air. Behind the counter stood a couple of cheerless women rationing the more expensive toppings for the pelmeni. In the pelmeni house one experienced the aesthetics, politics, planning, and absurdities of Soviet life. Nevertheless, either consciously or unconsciously, the pelmeni house was a retreat for the passive resistance of the Soviet rule. Here inside the house, people could be themselves without slogans and propaganda. They did not go there simply to eat. They stealthily opened vodka under the table and poured it into their coffee glasses (Sometimes the cooks would overlook the fact that you took an empty glass or two). It was a place to go to converse with dear friends and become well. It was more than a mere restaurant. Pelmeni houses still exist in Russia, but they have changed and no longer hold this particular function and meaning. (Makaryevich 2001)

People in the US are creating something comparable to pelmeni houses themselves, as feelings of alienation in the workplace develop from impersonal corporate behavior. Americans are searching to fill a void. Small cafes and coffee shops are increasingly popular (even opening in the mega-bookstores). Some establishments are marketing themselves as a 'third-place', i.e., that which is not home and not work. Many folks do not even know the people in their own neighborhoods. They are looking for something, but cannot find the word. It has to do with feeling comfortable and free from cares for a while. Perhaps they are searching for the German language concept of *Gemütlichkeit*, which embodies feeling of home, hearth, and simple pleasures. This word has its origins in the impoverished era following the Napoleonic wars. There was a strong need at the time for contemplation and for relishing the small, everyday joys at hand. (Rheingold 1988)

In a recent English to Russian translation project, I came across the German word '*Schadenfreude*'. An

English equivalent of this word does not exist, and although a Russian equivalent does exist, the Russian writer chose to use the German equivalent in his English writing. After all, Americans have adopted a few German words, such as 'kindergarten', 'bratwurst' and 'gesundheit'. *Schadenfreude* is the tendency to feel happiness in someone else's misfortune. Americans may experience *Schadenfreude* when they laugh at slap-stick comedy, speak of sweet revenge or begin and perpetuate a cycle of jokes in the wake of a tragic event. Nevertheless, this raises an interesting question: Why have they not labeled this behavior? I have not noticed any joke cycles directly related to September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the US. Maybe there are limits to its application in American culture, as a coping mechanism up to a certain point, whereas in other cultures it has a more deeply rooted and profound meaning.

The idea that language is imbedded in culture, and vice-versa, can be helpful in understanding and overcoming cross-cultural problems. For example, the conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians over land in the Middle East could perhaps be greatly illuminated and more completely understood by the ways in which these people speak of land and land ownership. For a Palestinian to say he would sell his land in order to achieve some result, such as, to have his child enter some needed medical treatment, has a more profound meaning to him where land is so tied to the past, present, future, and personal identity; whereas, for highly mobile Americans, (with some exceptions, as in selling the family farm), it may for most part represent a mere transaction, the liquidation of assets.

Wittgenstein states:

We also say of some people that they are transparent to us. It is, however, important as regards this observation that one human being can be a complete enigma to another. We learn this when we come into a strange country with entirely strange traditions; and, what is more, even given a mastery of the country's language. We do not understand the people. (And not because of not knowing what they are saying to themselves.) We cannot find our feet with them. (*PI*, 223e)

We cannot look at language for understanding without also considering culture. They are closely interrelated with each other. Language and cultural sensitivity provide us with critical tools for understanding and overcoming conflict, for embracing new world views, and rejoicing in the differences and the insight they provide into the human condition which unites us all.

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What Is Constituted in Self-Constitution?

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1. Two senses of personal identity

A subject who has a self-transformation behind herself—say, a conversion to Catholicism—may say of herself “before transforming myself, I was a different person”. How are we to understand such a claim? Obviously, there is a sense in which the subject takes herself to be the same as before and another sense in which she considers herself to be somebody else now. One possible way of understanding it would be the following: Despite the *change* involved in the self-transformation, there is *enough similarity* between the pre-conversion subject—S1—and the converted subject—S2—to say that they are numerically identical. And there is enough difference for the subject to speak of herself before the self-transformation as another person.

In my view, such an explanation of the preservation of personal identity in self-transformation is entirely misguided. Consider belief-revision as an example of self-transformation. A subject’s revision of her own belief should not be thought of as a change which is a “minus-point” with respect to the persistence of the subject—a “minus-point” that must be outweighed by enough similarity over time if the subject is to persist. On the contrary, by revising her beliefs, a subject *maintains her identity* over time (just as she would maintain her identity by sustaining her beliefs). In other words, the process of belief-revision—and, more generally, self-transformation—is a process in which a subject *maintains* her own identity *irrespective* of whether S1 is similar to S2 or whether S2 identifies with S1 (or S1 identifies with S2) etc.

This means that a proper understanding of self-transformation requires a distinction between two senses of personal identity. In one sense—call it “subject-identity”—the subject maintains her own identity across the change irrespective of the dimension of the change. In another sense—call it “self-identity”—the change is the end of one self and the birth of another. It would require more argument to show that self-transformation requires a distinction between two such senses of personal identity. In this paper, I will simply rely on this distinction to argue that subject-identity and self-identity cannot be constituted by the same kind of activity and that this poses a problem for self-constitution views of personal identity. (Self-constitution theorists often use the ambiguous word “person”, but I avoid it precisely in order to keep the two senses of identity distinct.) In the following, I shall focus on Marya Schechtman’s self-constitution view, but the criticism applies more widely.¹

2. Schechtman’s self-constitution view

In the second part of her *The Constitution of Selves*, Schechtman is concerned with what she calls “the characterization question”. “[T]his question asks which actions, experiences, beliefs, values, desires, character traits, and so on (hereafter abbreviated ‘characteristics’) are to be attributed to a given person” (Schechtman 1996,

73; subsequent references given by page number only). Schechtman distinguishes this question from “the reidentification question”, “the question of what makes a person at time t_2 the same person as a person at time t_1 ” (1-2). She says that, in its most common form, the characterization question is “which characteristics are *truly* those of some person” (73) and that the question “concerns the kind of identity that is at issue in an ‘identity crisis’” (74). However, she says that the characterization question does not only ask which characteristics truly belong to a person but also which characteristics are a part of the history of a person at all. In fact, she says that “there is a single question—the question of whether a particular characteristic is attributable to a particular person—the answer to which admits of degrees” (76). In other words, the difference between belonging truly to a person and belonging merely to the history of a person is a *matter of degree*.

Before turning to the self-constitution view itself, I should stress that the distinction between subject-identity and self-identity cuts across Schechtman’s distinction between the reidentification question and the characterization question. One can ask both questions about subject-identity as well as self-identity: One can ask what makes something the same person at two different times (the reidentification question) and what makes something the characteristic of a particular person (the characterization question), irrespective of whether “person” is taken to mean *subject* or *self*.

Schechtman defends an answer to the characterization question which she calls “the narrative self-constitution view”:

According to the narrative self-constitution view, the difference between persons and other individuals (I use the word ‘individual’ to refer to any sentient creature) lies in how they organize their experience, and hence their lives. At the core of this view is the assertion that individuals constitute themselves as persons by coming to think of themselves as persisting subjects who have had experience in the past and will continue to have experience in the future, taking certain experiences as theirs. Some, but not all, individuals weave stories of their lives, and it is their doing so which makes them persons. On this view a person’s *identity* (in the sense at issue in the characterization question) is constituted by the content of her self-narrative, and the traits, actions, and experiences included in it are, by virtue of that inclusion, hers. (94)

Consider first “the assertion that individuals constitute themselves as persons by coming to think of themselves as persisting subjects who have had experience in the past and will continue to have experience in the future, taking certain experiences as theirs”. One part of this claim is that “individuals constitute themselves as persons by coming to think of themselves” in a certain way. But what does it mean to say that individuals come to think of themselves in a certain way? One possible interpretation would be that these individuals are already able to *think of themselves as themselves*—that they already have a first-person point of view—and then by coming to think of themselves *in a certain specific way* constitute themselves as persons (or, in my

¹ For reference to other self-constitution theories, see Schechtman 1996, 93. To her list, one should add Korsgaard 1989, 1996 and 1999 to which my criticism also applies.

terminology, as subjects). Although I cannot argue this here, if Schechtman's assertion is understood in this way, it is unacceptable. If one already has a first-person point of view, then one is already a subject and nothing more is needed to make one a subject.

However, there is another possible interpretation. Schechtman's claim might be that thinking of oneself as oneself—having a first-person point of view—is only possible if one also thinks of oneself in a certain specific way. In other words, being able to think of oneself as oneself *at all* is not possible without being able to think of oneself in a certain way. But in what way? Schechtman's general answer is that persons "think of themselves as persisting subjects who have had experience in the past and will continue to have experience in the future". Her central and more specific answer is that to think of themselves in this way requires that persons "weave stories of their lives, and it is their doing so which makes them persons". In other words, thinking of oneself in the required way is to have "a self-conception that is narrative in form" (96).

I agree with Schechtman that, to be able to think of oneself as oneself at all, one must be *active* in some way. It is a further question whether this activity must be understood as somehow involving *weaving stories*. However, this is not a question I want to settle here. My topic is not what makes an individual a subject in the first place, but rather what makes a subject be the same subject over time and what makes a future or past mental state be the mental state of the present subject. Here Schechtman's answer is that "a person's *identity* (in the sense at issue in the characterization question) is constituted by the content of her self-narrative, and the traits, actions, and experiences included in it are, by virtue of that inclusion, hers". In other words, those future and past mental states which are included in a self-narrative belong to the person who is the "self" of the self-narrative. I shall argue that this answer fails as an account of subject-identity, though it may partially succeed for self-identity.

3. What is being constituted and how?

Schechtman works the basic idea I just described into a nuanced and complex view. Here I will only mention two ways in which she qualifies the bold statement that characteristics belong to a person by inclusion in a self-narrative. First, to avoid assuming that a characteristic belongs to a person simply because it is part of a person's self-conception—to avoid assuming that a person cannot be mistaken about herself—she introduces constraints on what can count as an identity-constituting narrative (94-95). Here I will not discuss what these constraints are. Second, to (among other things) explain how unconscious mental states can belong to a person, she says that there may be *implicit* as well as explicit self-narratives. "The implicit narrative is understood as the psychological organization from which his experience and actions are actually flowing" (115). Schechtman knows that this notion of an implicit narrative seems to diverge from the usual meaning of "self-narrative". She responds by saying that her talk of self-narratives is merely meant to make clear that "the psychological forces constituting identity are dynamic and active—things a person *does*—rather than static and passive features she *has*" (117).

What does it mean to say that a psychological organization is somehow the person's doing? One can give the claim two different senses. Consider first an ordinary case in which a subject revises a belief on the basis of new information or experience. In doing so, the

person is not only changing her belief but also her "psychological organization": Her old belief having been causally and normatively connected to other psychological states of hers, in revising her belief, the subject needs to consider how the new belief fits to her other commitments. In other words, the subject needs to organize herself psychologically anew. Since the mental states with which the relevant beliefs are connected are themselves connected with other states, I simply assume here that all the psychological states of a person form one *elementary unity*.

Second, we can understand the organization Schechtman talks about as something imposed by the subject on the already existing elementary unity. This organization distinguishes between those members of the elementary unity which are connected in a certain way—for example by inclusion in a narrative—and those that lie outside of this organization. We might say that this is a way of distinguishing between *more and less central elements* of the elementary unity.

The two senses are significantly different. When a subject adopts a certain belief on the basis of her other mental states, she is maintaining her psychological organization in the first sense. However, simply by adopting the belief, the subject has done nothing to decide whether this belief is central among the mental states, whether it is important with respect to the unfolding of the subject's life. Thus, the subject has done nothing to decide whether this belief is part of "the psychological organization from which his experience and actions are actually flowing" if this psychological organization is understood in the second sense.

If this is correct, something important follows for the self-constitution view. According to Schechtman, something the person *does* decides whether a characteristic belongs to her or not. Let us say that what the person does is "narratively organizing" her life. If what I have said is correct, Schechtman must decide whether she wants "narratively organizing" to be what the subject does in the first kind of case or whether she wants it to be what the subject does in the second kind of case. If I am right, to "narratively organize" cannot mean the same in both cases. *If it meant the same, then to "narratively organize" in the first sense would suffice for psychological organization in the second sense. But it does not suffice. Thus, the two senses must be distinct.*

By "narratively organizing" in the first sense one is—in my terminology—maintaining subject-identity, whereas by "narratively organizing" in the second sense one is defining one's self-identity. Any defender of a self-constitution view must decide whether whatever it is that the subject *does* to constitute herself is to be understood in the *subject-constitution* sense (the first sense) or the *self-constitution* sense (the second sense). Now Schechtman could choose to use "narratively organizing" in the subject-constitution sense. However, it seems to me that, if the notion of a *narrative* is to play a significant role in her account, she should opt for the self-constitution sense. She says that "[t]o have an autobiographical narrative in the relevant sense is . . . to have an implicit understanding of one's history as unfolding according to the logic of the story of a person's life" (113-114). It seems to me that in simply adopting a certain belief and thus maintaining one's identity, one need not be acting in accordance with such an implicit understanding. However, when one sorts one's mental states according to their importance in one's life, one is precisely acting in accordance with such an understanding.

Of course, defenders of self-constitution views could specify two kinds of activities, one for subject-constitution and the other for self-constitution. However, like Schechtman, most defenders of self-constitution views do not distinguish between subject-identity and self-identity and defend their views for a kind of activity which seems only capable of the constitution of self-identity. These self-constitution views thus face a dilemma: *Either* they must give up the claim to be offering a general theory of personal identity *or* they must explain what kind of activity is responsible for subject-constitution as opposed to self-constitution.

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Haben juristische Personen Persönlichkeitsrechte?

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1. Allgemeines zum Persönlichkeitsrecht

Die Medien nehmen in unserem Leben einen hohen Stellenwert ein. Die Entwicklung von neuen Kommunikationstechniken hat für einen rascheren Zugang zu Informationen gesorgt. Besonders durch die Entwicklung der Massenmedien ist der Informationsfluss gestiegen. Die Zunahme der Medien hat allerdings nicht gleichzeitig auch eine Qualitätssteigerung bewirkt. Die journalistischen Mittel werden eingesetzt, um mit Sensationsmeldungen das Interesse der Öffentlichkeit für sich zu gewinnen. Derartige Meldungen nehmen auf die private Seite des Menschen keinerlei Rücksicht. Für eine gute Schlagzeile werden Affären ausgeschlachtet, um Schwächen und Fehler von Menschen öffentlich anzuprangern. Die journalistischen Recherchen verletzen oft Anstand und Ehre. Wenn nun ein Mensch in seiner Würde verletzt wird, stellt sich die Frage nach einem wirksamen Schutz. Bereits im antiken Rom sah das *Zwölf-Tafel-Gesetz* Strafen für ehrabschneiderische Verleumdungen und böswilligen Rufmord vor. Dem Beleidiger wurde per Klage eine Busse von 25 asses auferlegt (Berka 1989, 203–204).

Die österreichische Rechtsordnung enthält an verschiedenen Stellen Regelungen, um Schutz vor Angriffen auf die Persönlichkeitsrechte zu bieten. Diese Regelungen sind über verschiedene Rechtsgebiete verteilt (zB Privatrecht, Strafrecht, Medienrecht). Die einzelnen Gesetze beziehen sich auf unterschiedliche Rechtsgüter. Die Ehre ist ebenso geschützt wie der wirtschaftliche Ruf oder die persönlichen Daten (Edlbacher 1983, 423 und Zeiler 1998,3).

Anknüpfungspunkt für die Ausgestaltung der *Persönlichkeitsrechte* ist § 16 ABGB. Ein Blick in die Geschichte des ABGB weist auf den naturrechtlichen Charakter des § 16 hin. Zeiler und Martini, die Väter des ABGB, standen unter dem Einfluss der Naturrechtslehre Immanuel Kants. Die grundlegenden Prinzipien der *Menschenwürde, der Billigkeit und der guten Sitten* prägen das Naturrecht (Edlbacher 1983, 424).

Die Naturrechtslehre entwickelte bereits im 18. Jahrhundert die Theorie vom geistigen Eigentum. Demnach steht das Recht an einem Geisteswerk dem Autor zu. Aus dem Eigentum an den eigenen Gedanken und Geisteskräften sowie aus dem Erwerb durch Arbeit und Erfindung wurde der Schutz vor Nachahmung hergeleitet (Hubmann 1987, 145).

Immanuel Kant (1987, 137) hat mit seiner Theorie zum *ius personalissimum* einen Beitrag zur Ausgestaltung der Persönlichkeitsrechte geliefert. Er bezeichnet das Recht des Autors an seinen Handlungen, nämlich *an seiner Rede an das Publikum und an etwas, welches in seiner Person ihr Dasein habe, als unveräußerliches Recht (ius personalissimum)*. Ungeachtet des Nachdrucks verbleibe dem Autor das Recht an seinen Gedanken.

Die Persönlichkeitsrechte haben durch deren Aufnahme in die Zivilrechtsordnung und in die Verfassung einen umfassenden Schutz erfahren. Edlbacher (1983, 423) bezeichnet alle *Persönlichkeitsrechte als Grundrechte*, auch wenn diese nicht in der Verfassung verankert sind.

Der Persönlichkeitsschutz ist in die Rechtsbereiche des Zivil- und Strafrechts eingebettet. Allerdings ist der verfassungsrechtliche Schutz der Persönlichkeitsrechte gerade im Medienbereich von eminenter Bedeutung. Hier gilt es, einen Ausgleich zwischen den grundrechtlich geschützten Interessen der Medien und den Ansprüchen des Einzelnen zu erzielen. Einschränkungen des durch die Verfassung geschützten Rechts auf freie Meinungsäußerung sind klar festgeschrieben. Der Informationsanspruch der Allgemeinheit kann zu einer Begrenzung des Persönlichkeitsschutzes führen. Um den grundsätzlichen Wertungen einer demokratischen Gesellschaft Ausdruck zu verleihen, sollte eine ausgewogene Verbindung zwischen Persönlichkeitsschutz und dem Interesse der Öffentlichkeit an Medienberichterstattung möglich sein (Berka 1989, 206-207).

2. Begriff und Inhalt der Persönlichkeitsrechte

Wellspacher hat in einer Schrift aus dem Jahre 1911 festgehalten, dass § 16 ABGB als Grundlage für die Anerkennung privater Persönlichkeitsrechte benützt werden kann. Persönlichkeitsrechte stehen *jedem Menschen zu* und bedeuten die Anerkennung und Nichtverletzung der Person (Koziol 1984, 5).

In der Lehre sind viele Definitionen zu den Persönlichkeitsrechten versucht worden. Eine klare Beschreibung bereitet allerdings Schwierigkeiten.

Bydlinski F. (1965, 253) bezeichnet das Persönlichkeitsrecht des § 16 ABGB unter Berufung auf Zeiler als *Urrecht, um die Würde eines vernünftigen, freihandelnden Wesens zu behaupten*.

Da die Persönlichkeitsrechte auf mehrere Rechtsgebiete verteilt sind, ergeben sich in Bezug auf die einzelnen Regelungen Abgrenzungsfragen. Das Zivilrecht zieht die Haftung für die Verletzung von Verhaltensregeln mit sich, die für jedermann gelten. Der in seinen Rechten Verletzte erhält eine Entschädigung. Das Strafrecht legt fest, dass der Staat die Verletzung der Bestimmung mit Strafe sanktioniert. Die Grundrechte beziehen den Persönlichkeitsschutz auf das Verhältnis *Staat-Bürger* (Berka 1982, 206-208).

§ 16 ABGB spricht von *angeborenen Rechten, die jedem Menschen zustehen*. Der Gesetzgeber, die Judikatur und Lehre haben diesen naturrechtlichen Grundsatz konkretisiert. Gerade weil wir in einer Informationsgesellschaft leben, ist das Bedürfnis nach Schutz für die individuellen Interessen eines Menschen in den letzten Jahren verstärkt hervorgetreten. Aufbauend auf der Zentralnorm des § 16 ABGB sorgen zahlreiche gesetzliche Regelungen für persönlichen Schutz in den Bereichen Leben, Gesundheit, persönliche Freiheit, Ehre, Namen, eigenes Bild, Briefe und vertrauliche Aufzeichnungen, um einige Beispiele für Persönlichkeitsrechte anzuführen (Bydlinski P. 2002, 50).

Persönlichkeitsrechte sind *absolute und subjektive Rechte*, die vor Eingriffen schützen. Persönlichkeitsrechte werden deswegen als absolute Rechte bezeichnet, weil sie als höchststrangig gelten. Solche Rechte sind jedoch nur wirksam, wenn die Gewährung von Schutz gegen Eingriffe mit der Anerkennung dieser Rechte verbunden ist. Bei der Beurteilung der Frage, ob ein Persönlichkeitsrecht verletzt ist und daher ein unzulässiger Eingriff vorliegt, ist eine Interessenabwägung vorzunehmen, um den Konflikt durch Konkretisierung der Ansprüche zu entscheiden. Zu berücksichtigen ist einerseits das Interesse des in seinen Rechten Verletzten und andererseits das Allgemeininteresse. Nicht jedes Verhalten ist als rechtswidrig zu bezeichnen, da eine zu strenge Handhabung des Persönlichkeitssschutzes zu einer Verkürzung des öffentlichen Interesses führt (Koziol 1984, 6 sowie Canaris 1991, 211 – 214).

In vielen Staaten sind Persönlichkeitsrechte anerkannt. So wird in Deutschland aus den Artikeln 1 und 2 des Bonner Grundgesetzes ein *allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht* abgeleitet, welches zur freien Entfaltung des Persönlichkeitsbereiches anerkannt ist (Gschnitzer et al. 1982, 213 – 223).

In der österreichischen Lehre herrscht bezüglich der Anerkennung eines *allgemeinen Persönlichkeitssschutzes in Bezug auf § 16 ABGB* Uneinigkeit.

Ein Teil der Lehre (Koziol 1984, 6 und Bydlinski F. 1965, 69) lehnt § 16 ABGB als allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht ab. Die Persönlichkeit wäre zu vielgestaltig, um diese durch ein allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht zu erfassen. Die §§ 16 und 17 ABGB bilden nach Bydlinski F. die Grundlage für die einzelnen Persönlichkeitsrechte.

Gschnitzer et al. (1983, 183) betrachten § 16 ABGB als allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht, aus dem die einzelnen konkreten Rechte fließen.

Der Oberste Gerichtshof hat sich in der Entscheidung 1 Ob 36/86 vom 22.10.1986 für ein *allgemeines Persönlichkeitsrecht* ausgesprochen. Aus diesem werde von der Lehre das Recht auf Namensanonymität abgeleitet, meint das Höchstgericht.

Das System der Persönlichkeitsrechte ist ständigen Veränderungen unterworfen. Neue technische Errungenschaften und soziale Gefährdungslagen ziehen die Weiterentwicklung durch den Gesetzgeber und die Rechtswissenschaften mit sich. Deshalb ist die Herausarbeitung einzelner persönlichkeitsbezogener Rechte unverzichtbar. § 16 ABGB sollte als *Rahmenrecht* betrachtet werden, wobei im Wege der Analogie einzelne Persönlichkeitsrechte abgeleitet werden können (dazu Posch in Schwimann 1997, 71 und Edlbacher 1983, 428).

Bydlinski F. (1962/63, 460) erachtet das einfache Gesetz und die richterliche Rechtsfortbildung als wirksamen Schutz für die Persönlichkeit im Privatrecht.

3. Persönlichkeitschutz für juristische Personen

Neben natürlichen Personen (nPen) nehmen auch juristische Personen (jPen) am Rechtsverkehr teil. Die jPen besitzt einen hohen Stellenwert, weil ihr Tätigkeitsfeld weit verbreitet ist. Sowohl im wirtschaftlichen, als auch im sozialen und privaten Bereich finden sich jPen. Deshalb taucht oft die Frage auf, ob jPen überhaupt Persönlichkeitsrechte zustehen. Dieses Problem ergibt sich, weil sich die jPen von der nPen wesentlich

unterscheidet. Durch das Gesetz sind beide Rechtssubjekte gleichberechtigt, auch die jPen ist Träger von Rechten und Pflichten (§ 26 ABGB). Haben nun jPen als Gebilde der Rechtsordnung und Realität ebenso schützenswerte Interessen wie nPen?

Die jPen ist eine *Vereinigung, die vom menschlichen Willen getragen ist* und ihren *Gesamtwert als Gemeinschaft besitzt*, meint Lessmann (1970, 269) die jPen. Im Gegensatz zur nPen fehlt es der jPen an *Würde und Personalität*, denn dies leitet sich vom Menschsein ab. Einer jPen mangelt es am *Willen* im psychologischen und ethischen Sinn.

Bereits in früherer Zeit wurden Theorien zum Persönlichkeitschutz für jPen entwickelt. Nach der Ansicht von Savigny können jPen keine Persönlichkeitsrechte zustehen. Nur dem einzelnen Menschen komme Rechtsfähigkeit zu, weil er diese in seiner *leiblichen Erscheinung* mit sich trage. Die Rechtsfähigkeit für jPen fingiert Savigny und begrenzt diese auf die Vermögensfähigkeit. Otto Gierke hingegen bejahte den Persönlichkeitschutz für jPen. Eine Gleichsetzung von jPen und Individuum kann nicht vorgenommen werden, weil die jPen eine andere rechtliche Struktur als das Individuum aufweist. So sind Familienrechte etwa der nPen vorbehalten (Klippel 1988, 629).

In der österreichischen Lehre und Rechtsprechung ist anerkannt, dass jPen Persönlichkeitschutz zukommt (Koziol 1984, 7).

Für die Begründung des Umfanges von Persönlichkeitsrechten wird das Wesen der jPen herangezogen. Das Gebilde der jPen wird zu Trägern personaler Werte, weil durch die Tätigkeit der Organe die jPen getragen und im Rechtsleben vertreten wird. Obwohl die jPen von der nPen verschieden ist, besitzt sie Werte und hat Bedürfnisse, die ebenso schützenswert sind wie jene des Einzelnen. Die Interessen der einzelnen Mitglieder einer jPen werden in den Dienst der Organisation gestellt und dadurch zu Gütern der jPen. Wird nun ein solches Gut verletzt, so trifft dies die Mitglieder in deren Zugehörigkeit zum Verband. Einer jPen kommt Persönlichkeitschutz zu, weil die Interessen der Mitglieder durch deren Zusammenschluss in der jPen vereinigt werden. Entscheidend für die Zuordnung eines Persönlichkeitsrechts zu einer jPen ist, ob dieses Recht jeder Person zukommen kann oder lediglich einer Einzelperson zurechenbar ist.

Einer jPen stehen jene Persönlichkeitsrechte zu, die ihrer Stellung im Rechtsleben angemessen sind. Massgebend für Inhalt und Grenzen der Rechte ist neben dem Zweck der Tätigkeitskreis, die Beziehungen und die schutzwürdigen Interessen der jPen. Rechte, welche die Menschenwürde schützen, kommen für jPen nicht in Frage (Hubmann 1967, 333-337 und Lessmann 1970, 272).

4. Einzelne Persönlichkeitsrechte

Die nunfolgenden Schilderungen sollen einige Persönlichkeitsrechte darlegen, die jPen betreffen. Die österreichische Rechtsordnung legt an keiner Stelle die Persönlichkeitsrechte für jPen fest. Diese werden aus bestehenden Vorschriften abgeleitet.

Anerkannt ist für alle Rechtssubjekte der Schutz des Namens. Das *Namensrecht* (§ 43 ABGB) dient zur Identifizierung einer Person. Auch jPen haben ein Interesse, ihre Bezeichnung (Firmenname) zu schützen.

Auch Decknamen sind vom Namensschutz nach § 43 ABGB erfasst (*Koziol 1984, 9-10*).

Das Recht auf Freiheit wird aus den §§ 16 und 1329 ABGB hergeleitet. Auch juristischen Personen stehen gewisse Freiheitsrechte zu. Je nach dem Interessenkreis einer jPen wird man entsprechende Rechte bejahen können. Die körperliche Bewegungsfreiheit für jPen wird von der Lehre verneint, weil dies kein Gut ist, welches jPen unmittelbar besitzen können. Jedoch umfasst das Freiheitsrecht auch die freie wirtschaftliche Betätigung. Diese steht jPen durchaus zu, denn dadurch werden die Wettbewerbsfreiheit und die unternehmerische Entfaltungsfreiheit ebenso geschützt (*Lessmann 1970, 275*).

Aus dem Urheberrecht entspringen nach herrschender Meinung Persönlichkeits- und Vermögensrechte (monistische Theorie). Das Urheberrecht ist ein subjektives Recht, dessen Schutzbereich die eigentümliche geistige Schöpfung ist. Aus diesem Grund kommt Stellvertretung nicht in Frage und ein originäres Urheberrecht steht jPen nicht zu. Arbeitgeber müssen sich von ihrem Arbeitnehmer, der ein Werk im Sinne des Urheberrechts geschaffen hat, per Vertrag eine Bewilligung zur Benutzung des Werkes einräumen lassen. Das *Urheberpersönlichkeitsrecht* sichert dem Urheber das Recht an seinem Werk. (*Kucsko 1996, 18 und 30*).

Ein wichtiger Bereich nimmt der in § 1330 ABGB festgelegte Schutz der Ehre ein. Der Oberste Gerichtshof (10. Oktober 1995, 4 Ob 49/95) hat jPen zugestanden, dass sie *andere persönliche Nachteile* haben können und daher passiv beleidigungsfähig sind. Schliesslich stehen jPen nach § 26 ABGB dieselben Rechte wie nPen zu.

Das Recht der Ehre regelt die einem sozialen und sittlichen Wert entsprechende Behandlung. Die Ehre einer jPen kann verletzt werden, wenn die Tätigkeit einer jPen in der Öffentlichkeit in herabwürdigender Weise bezeichnet wird. Vorwürfe, die sich auf Handlungen beziehen, für welches der Wille der jPen steht, richten sich gegen die Mitglieder und daher gegen die jPen. Die jPen ist der Ehrenbeleidigung und Kreditschädigung (§ 1330 ABGB) fähig, denn der wirtschaftliche Ruf einer jPen hängt mit deren sozialer Geltung zusammen. Die Wertschätzung ihrer Tätigkeit erfährt eine jPen im Urteil Dritter (*Lessmann 1970, 289*).

Der strafrechtliche Persönlichkeitsschutz ist jPen verwehrt, weil die Ehrenbeleidigung im strafrechtlichen Sinn das Individualinteresse schützt. Ebenso verhält es sich mit den Bestimmungen des Mediengesetzes (§ 6 folgende Mediengesetz), welche immateriellen Schadenersatz nach erlittener Kränkung gewähren (*Zeiler 1998, 3*).

Berka (1997, 272) gesteht jPen keine Ehre zu, die gekränkt werden könnte. Der Schutzbereich des § 1330 ABGB ist nach Meinung *Berkas* die Gewährung eines Schadenersatzes für eine begangene Ehrenbeleidigung. Ein ideeller Schaden ist von § 1330 ABGB nicht erfasst, vielmehr wird auf den strafrechtlichen Ehrbegriff verwiesen.

Physische Personen haben ebenso wie auch jPen Interessen, die schützenswert erscheinen. Bei der Beurteilung, in welchem Ausmass jPen Persönlichkeitsschutz besitzen, sind natürlich die Unterschiede zur nPen zu berücksichtigen. Der Mangel an Persönlichkeit kann mit der Begründung *analoger Interessen der jPen* ausgeglichen werden. Auch jPen haben eine Individual- und Geheimsphäre. Anerkannt sind von Lehre und Rechtsprechung der Schutz des Namens

sowie die Achtung der Ehre und die freie wirtschaftliche Betätigung. Die Beurteilung des Persönlichkeitsschutzes für jPen nach ihrem Zweck und deren Interessen bedeutet, dass die einzelnen jPen beleuchtet werden müssen, um den Umfang des Persönlichkeitsschutzes feststellen zu können. Festgestellt werden kann, dass auch jPen Angriffsflächen besitzen, die verletzt werden können. Äusserungen, die sich unmittelbar auf das Unternehmen beziehen und daher den wirtschaftlichen Ruf beeinträchtigen können, sind meines Erachtens durchaus unter die Tatbestände des § 1330 ABGB zu beziehen. Eine Äusserung an der Börse etwa, mit der ein Unternehmen als zahlungsunfähig bezeichnet wird, kann diesem Unternehmen Probleme bereiten.

Um klar feststellen zu können, ob auch Verbände ohne Rechtsfähigkeit ebenso wie jPen Schutz geniessen, müssten die materiellen und rechtlichen Strukturen der einzelnen Verbände dargestellt werden. Dies würde jedoch den Umfang dieses Beitrages sprengen und ist daher auch nicht möglich.

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The Mental, the Mind and the Body

Paul Hedengren, Brigham Young University

I would like to give an account of the mental, the mind and the body.

To begin, let us consider some of the differences between objects and activities. An object has spatial extension and can exist at an instant of time. Objects are considered to have properties whose spatio-temporal conjunction is commonly thought to define what the object is. No temporal extension seems to be necessary for the object to be what it is. The object can exist at an instant. Similarly, the object can remain through time what it is, without changing any of the properties commonly thought to be internal to it.

In contrast, an activity does not have spatial extension at an instant, though the object performing the activity does. Yet the activity necessarily has temporal extension. There is no activity at an instant. As a consequent, the continuance of the activity through time requires continuance in the change that is the activity.

To illustrate, consider a clarinet. As an object it has spatial extension, even at an instant of time. It may be considered as a composite of its properties: It may be black, of such and such weight and shape. We can consider the weight apart from the color and may consider the clarinet to be the composite of its properties. It can both exist at an instant of time and can continue to exist through time with no change in its internal properties.

Now consider the same clarinet involved in the activity of sounding middle C. The sounding of middle C is an activity. While we may locate where the sounding originates, the sounding itself is more dispersed. But more importantly, for our purposes, the sounding necessarily requires temporal extension. There is no such thing as an instant of the sounding of middle C. The origin of the necessity of this temporal extension is the fact that the sounding of middle C requires an alteration of one thing, the wave form and such alternation necessarily exists only through temporal extension. Similarly, if the sounding of middle C is to continue, the sounding of middle C must continually be recreated. The continuance of the sounding of middle C is the continuance of a rate of change. If there is no change, there is no rate of change and hence no continuance of a rate of change.

Now let us consider the traditional mind-body problem. First let us consider the body, or, as medical science has brought us to focus on, the brain. The brain is an object. As such it necessarily has spatial extension; and the collection of properties at the specified spatial-location may be deemed to comprise a specific brain. Both these commonly considered properties and the brain these properties are taken to comprise can as well exist at an instant. The brain as an object may remain what it is without change in at least some commonly considered properties such as size and mass.

Now we come to the more puzzling of the two, the mind. What is the mind? A traditional approach considers the mind as a distinct type of substance having properties in much the same way that ordinary physical objects have properties. As such the mind can exist at an instant of time. Yet when we consider the location and spatial extension of the mind, we are puzzled. Traditionally the mind is conceived as a depository for feelings, thoughts,

and sensations, entities whose nature is as problematic as the mind which allegedly contains them.

Now may I suggest that some of the puzzlement that surrounds this conception of the mind as a depository object might be dissolved, in ways advanced by Wittgenstein, if we consider the mind not as an unusual type of object, but instead as an activity. Evidence that we should take the mind in this way comes from the seemingly necessary temporal extension of all that we are directly aware of in regard to the mind and from the fact that to maintain what is mental seems to require its continual reconstruction.

Take, for example, the mental activity of thinking: "Freedom is desired by all who have ever known it." It does not seem possible to think this in an instant. We may think it quickly, but not instantly. Similarly, if we wish to continue to think this, we cannot think it once and hold the thought, but must continually be reconstructing the same thought over and over again.

In short, it seems that in thinking: "Freedom is desired by all who have ever known it," we seem to be doing something similar to what the clarinet does in continuing the sounding of middle C.

What we have illustrated with thinking seems as well the case with feeling and sensing. Feeling happy does not seem possible at an instant and if we should continue feeling happy it seems that the feeling is continuously being renewed. It is similar with sensing cold. There seems to be no instant of sensing cold; and to continue in the sensing of cold, it seems the sensing of cold need be continually renewed.

Now we have so far been considering how emotion, thought and sensation, objects commonly thought to be *in* something are actually activities. But what are they activities of? Our feeling, thinking and sensing is clearly manifest in our experience. It appears each is an activity. But it is not clear what performing or causing the activity.

Consider a similar situation. We have in a room a fine quality stereo system and a friend who has brought his clarinet as well as a recording of the friend playing the clarinet. If we are in another room, we may hear the sounding of a clarinet, but not be able to determine the source of the sounding. Is the sounding coming from the stereo system or from the clarinet? From our experience in the room where we are, we cannot tell.

With manifest mental activity, what are some entities that could host or cause the manifest mental activity? One possibility is that nothing has or causes the manifest mental activity. The activity simply is self-existent in that it exists without being the activity of anything else or being caused by anything else. An analogue for this possibility may be found in the wave activity that is light. At one point it was considered that light waves must be propagated in some medium in much the same way that ocean waves must be propagated in ocean water. Now it seems reasonable to consider light waves being propagated through a vacuum. Perhaps manifest mental activity has no underlying substance of any type. We may call this unsubstantiated manifest mental activity, intelligence. So understood, intelligence is understood

more as an activity like energy rather than as a substance like physical matter.

A second possibility is to consider mental activity either to be the mind itself, or to be caused by a mind. Of course the problem is what is a mind? The only clear and unproblematic aspect of the description of the mind is that it is not composed of physical matter. If it is substance, but not physical matter, what is it? It could be considered as material, but more refined matter than physical matter which renders it unobservable, but still material. A scientific analogue to this account might be a force field which has spatial extension, but is not observable like spatially extended physical objects.

Some tradition claims mind is immaterial substance, perhaps reflecting a similarity to Platonic forms. However, the coherence of the very concept of immaterial substance is not apparent. Apart from that, however, it seems structurally deficient in that it presents a genus, but only a negative differentia. It is akin to defining man not as a rational animal, but as a non-kangaroo animal. Until the differentia becomes affirmative, it is not clear that even if we could perceive every type of thing in the universe, we would know we were perceiving mind, if in fact we were perceiving mind.

In addition to the composition of the mind, it is useful to determine the capacity of the mind. Most accounts will attribute to the mind the capacity to feel, intend, think and sense its sensations. More problematic is whether the mind, by itself, can perceive. Considering the mind to be capable of perception brings it closer to its historical antecedent the spirit, found in the history and philosophy of religion. Philosophers may wish to grant the extension because it may conceptually permit one of few pertinent empirical tests relevant to the mind-body problem.

Feeling, intending, thinking and sensing its own sensations are all internal to the mind. All knowledge that comes from these activities is about the mind, not that which is other than the mind. Perceiving, however, is different. Perception is to give us knowledge about what is other than the mind. Now how does this permit an empirical test relevant to the mind-body question? While there are many collected accounts of near death experiences in which people report perception while outside their body, most of what is reported could be explained in a materialistic model. However, the acquisition of independently confirmable information that would not have been available to the body in its observed location would be strong support for the existence of the mind as a perceiving entity, independent of the body.

Another possible entity that could be the place or cause of mental activity is the brain. Suppose the brain changed shape continuously and the various formations were found to correlate in a one-to-one function with various respective feelings, thoughts or sensations. If the shape alternation could be detected to occur only before the correlated mental activity, then it would seem normal to consider the brain transformation to be the cause of the correlated mental activity. If the mental activity were found to occur only prior to the brain shape transformation, then it would seem normal to consider the mental activity to be the cause of the correlated brain transformation. If they were simultaneous changes, then it would seem they were in some sense identical, or at least that one was an aspect of the other.

If we start a causal chain that results in a brain shape transformation and there followed a mental activity transformation, then this would suggest that the brain transformation caused the mental activity transformation. At times this seems to occur.

Now suppose we are thinking, "Freedom is desired by all who have ever known it." And then we wonder, has anyone ever not known it? We reflect on the matter and then think, from early childhood experiences all have known some degree of freedom and then conclude all desire freedom.

Now the problem is this: In the mental activity, there is a cognitive relationship between the first thought, the second thought and what is eventually concluded. To each of the respective thoughts, suppose there is identified its respective brain shape change. If the respective brain state transformation is considered to cause its correlated mental activity, how are we to understand what appears *prima facie* to be a logical relationship among successive mental activity when each thought is deemed to be caused by a succession of brain shape transformations that *prima facie* appears to be devoid of cognitive content and hence void of logical relationship?

It would seem that any fully adequate account of the brain as the object of activity responsible for manifest mental activity, must not only establish the sequential correlation but also be able to trace the causal sequence between the brain shape transformation activity and the mental activity and account for what seems to be logically guided mental activity in terms of physical processes guided by laws of forces rather than laws of inference.

In the example just considered, the activity of the brain postulated to correlate with mental activity was transformation of shape. But of course, no such transformation exists.

Instead the more reasonable correlate to mental activity is the electrical and chemical activity in the brain. This complicates the model considerably. If there were simple brain shape transformations corresponding to various mental activity, then it would seem there would be no space for non-material postulations, making the mind-body purely dichotomous between the material and the nonmaterial. But realizing that the manifest mental is an activity and finding only chemical and electrical activity in the brain as possible correlates does not sustain the material/non-material dichotomy. Electrical activity as energy transfer is especially problematic. A simple mechanistic material model of the brain seems to leave no space for the immaterial; but the electro-dynamic model does. Not only is energy immaterial, but some of the very principles by which it conforms seem to re-infuse the mental-like conceptions materialists may have hoped the study of the brain would exorcise. These come not only in the various conceptions of the nature of electrical activity but also in the quantum mechanical principles that replace mechanical determinism with probability and, under some interpretations of quantum mechanics, the intentional activity of measurement or perception as the creator of material reality, suggesting the material world is a function of its being perceived.

In conclusion, it seems that what is manifest is mental *activity* rather than an object, state of an object or substance. As an activity, it is difficult to see how mental activity could be correlated either to an entity or a state of an entity, be it mind or brain. As an activity, be it an activity of mind or electrical activity in the brain, it seems increasingly difficult to adequately render the self in terms congruent with deterministic materialism. In fact, realizing that the mental is an activity, not an object, may cause us to find the mind-body problem less interesting because the mental, considered as an activity, does not seem to fit so well the long assumed parallel debates about materialism and determinism.

The Vienna School for Truth Exploration*

Wasfi A. Hijab, Beirut

Preamble

The [fantasy] Vienna School for Truth Exploration was founded by Ludwig Wittgenstein in 1918 [the *Tractatus's* Preface date]. Its aim: Prepare students for exploring the world and its reality. Its textbook: The famous *Tractatus*. Its motto: 'Argue or Agree!'¹ The School has a peculiar aura of back-to-the-future, since its students have already been to a mid-nineteen forties Ludwig Wittgenstein's lectures at Cambridge. It may get confusing, as these 'two' philosophers happen to have exactly the same name. The students' names are Greek letters, Alpha, Beta, Gamma, etc. [In this paper, all the characters, including Wittgenstein, are fictitious. Sometimes they are the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein, sometimes they are the *Investigations* one, and often they are I].

1. Students are all eager to learn

Wittgenstein: "Welcome to our school. Our aim is to prepare you for a career in truth exploration. The school will also conduct field trips in your training. I have prepared for you fill-in-the-blanks forms that list all possible states of affairs. In your field trips, all you have to do is to observe the world and indicate which state of affairs exists and which does not. This will provide you with all the facts. Indeed, the world is nothing but the totality of these facts. Now, does anyone have a question or a comment about our objectives or about our methodology?"

Alpha: "I would like, Sir, to start by indicating our reason for preferring your school over others. When your family asked you why did you want to do philosophy, you told them it was because you wanted to find the truth. Indeed, you have pursued that goal with the utmost of seriousness and with no ax to grind. Most other philosophers, for most of the time, carried out their investigations in order to support a religious belief, a political theory, or simply to maintain a livelihood. On the other, you have been ultra pure in seeking the truth for its own sake."

Beta: "Just look at what you are planning to do, after you had written the book that embodied all the truth as you found it. You are now determined to give away all your immense wealth, and to prepare for a teaching position in an elementary school."

Gamma: "I have a general comment, Sir, about your book. In introducing his article '*On Certainty*'², your Cambridge namesake raised the following question, 'How does one know how to set about satisfying oneself on the existence of unicorns.'³ The mere raising of the question alerts us to the immense difficulty of finding the truth about even such a simple matter as to the existence of a myth. My question, Sir, is how on earth were you able to observe the whole world and decide that it is *the totality of facts, and not of things* [*Tractatus* 1.1]?"

Beta: "Not only what you are saying, Sir, but the utmost confidence in what you are saying. '... the *truth* of the thoughts that are here communicated seems to me unassailable and definitive.' [*Tractatus's* Preface.]"

Alpha: "Also, Sir, the way you have expressed yourself in sentences that are as hard as nails and as knocks of destiny. Is the *Tractatus* a new Book of *Genesis*, or what?"

Beta: "We are wondering, Sir, whether you had utilized any equipment in your search for the truth. A telescope, a microscope, or, may be, a slide rule⁴."

Wittgenstein: "Since I am the professor here, may be I'll be permitted to put in a word *edgewise!*"

Alpha, Beta & Gamma: "Sir, Sir, Sir, all of this is because we are so frustrated while reading our textbook. We do not seem to have a handle on how to understand it. It has the tone of a scientific investigation, but it actually sounds so mystical!"

2. How to read the *Tractatus*: (i) in levels of logical importance & (ii) backwards!

Wittgenstein: "Now, I see your difficulty. I can give you two pieces of advice on how to read our text. My first advice is that you should not read it as a continuous stream. Begin with reading only seven sentences, the ones indicated by the numbers from 1 to 7, without decimals. Then read these sentences together with their first comments, e.g., 1.1, 1.2, ..., 2.1, 2.2, ... and so on. Then read all the above, together with second level comments that have a second decimal digit numbering, e.g., 2.35, and so on. This will keep you aware of the various levels of importance of the various statements."

Alpha: "This is very interesting, Sir. What is your second advice?"

Wittgenstein: "My second advise is that you should read the book *backwards!* May be not completely backwards. Start with Section 5, then go to 4, etc., until you reach Section 1. In my student days, I started as an engineering student, then went on to the field of mathematical logic, while it was being created. I believe I did make a modest contribution to its creation. This led me to thinking about the nature of propositions, and how propositions are used to express the facts of the natural sciences. I asked myself, 'How should the world be like in order to make it possible for propositions of natural science to be true or false, and to express facts when they are true?' So, I began a journey of abstraction through successive suppression of dimensions: Abstracting from language, then abstracting from thought, then abstracting from us making to ourselves pictures of facts, until I reached the ultimate rock of states of affairs. I said to myself, 'This is the rock on which I can build my system.'"

Alpha: "Wow! How fascinating! You make it all sound so simple and straightforward. Then, Sir, did you write the book *backwards?*"

¹ This is the motto of the Cambridge University Moral Sciences [i.e. philosophy] Club

² Wittgenstein, L.: *On Certainty*. Harper Torchbooks, 1969.

³ Wittgenstein (ibid)

* Part 1 of a planned book on Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*

⁴ In his engineering years, Wittgenstein must have sported a slide rule. No calculators or computers were available at that time

Wittgenstein: "Alpha, don't be silly, you make me laugh! Of course not. Then I followed with an opposite journey of reconstruction: Adding dimension after dimension, in the opposite order in which they were suppressed."

Beta: "In effect, Sir, you have touched upon all the branches of traditional philosophy: From ontology, to epistemology, to philosophy of mind, etc. Our text is a full-fledged traditional metaphysics!"

Wittgenstein: "Beta, I think I resent your remark. I believe my book solves all problems of traditional philosophy, rather than being one."

Beta: "I am sorry, Sir. I beg you to postpone this issue until later. Gamma has been screaming for his turn to speak."

3. Totality of facts exhibits Barber's Paradox

Gamma: "Sir, I have a problem with your insistence that we should, in addition to knowing the facts, also know that this is the totality of all the facts. Shall we say, for argument's sake, that there are a hundred facts, f_1, f_2, \dots, f_{100} . Further, let us agree that $F =$ 'There are exactly 100 facts'. Is F a fact? If F is a fact, then it is a fact that is outside the totality of facts, and therefore it is not a fact. If F is not a fact, then it is a fact has to be included in the totality of facts, and therefore it is a fact. This is analogous to the Barber paradox."

Alpha: "In 2001 Wittgenstein Symposium, a paper⁵ was presented that showed how to resolve such paradoxes. I wonder if this paradox can be resolved in the same way."

4. When is the Barber's Paradox unresolvable?

Gamma: "No, the totality of facts paradox cannot be resolved similarly. Actually, if we take the barber's definition to be: $B_1 =$ 'The barber shaves all those who do not shave themselves *throughout the universe*', then the B_1 paradox is no longer resolvable. This is why: The new universe of discourse has no boundary, and the barber cannot be evicted outside it. That is why it is more suggestive to call the paradox 'Barber of Seville's' rather than 'Barber's'. I trust you recall how this paradox was resolved. The barber was evicted out of Seville, and his definition was then restricted to be B_2 : The barber outside the new smaller universe of discourse. 'Other than himself, the barber shaves all those who do not shave themselves.' Now, if we are asked, 'Does the barber shave himself?' we can say, 'We do not know; we have not been told!' Clearly, the totality of facts paradox is similar to B_1 , as no boundary was established for the world, and is therefore unresolvable."

Wittgenstein: "I must admit that you have made your point very clear. I will rebut it later. Now I'll hand you your homework for the weekend. This form lists all the possible states of affairs, all 200 of them." You go forth and explore the truth: Find out which of these states of affairs exists, and which does not exist. The ones that exist are the facts. This way we get to know the totality of facts, which is obviously the world. Good hunting!"

[The students come to class after the weekend, but they are all excited and cannot settle down.]

Wittgenstein: "Now, what is the problem? Let us all sit down and begin collecting your homework."

All the students: "Sir, Sir, Alfa discovered a new fact!"

Wittgenstein: "What you are saying is impossible!"

Alpha: "Sir, I saw the two hundred and one state of affairs, and it existed, So, that is a new fact, Sir!"

5. Gamma recalls his childhood chess

Gamma: "When I was a young boy, Sir, I used to love playing chess. After I grew up, I was shocked to find out that my childhood play was illegal! At the first move of each side, we used to permit ourselves to move two pawns, each one square forward. Later I came to realize that this was not permitted by the international chess rules committee. Now, Sir, I am wondering whether your world facts are rules of the game or moves in that game."

Wittgenstein: "Now, Gamma, what is this sophistry. A fact is a fact!"

Beta: "May I, Sir, present a specific example. Say that Fischer in his game against Spassky moved his king one square to the right at his tenth move. This is a piece of chess news. If I say, 'The king of chess moves one square at a time,' this is a second piece of chess news for those engaged in learning the game. The first news could have been different, and; therefore it is a *contingent* fact. The second news could not have been different, therefore it is a *necessary (tautological)* fact."

Alpha: "Sir, I do not want to be left out of this interesting discussion. Let us assume that I am a big shot in the world of chess, and I call for an open meeting of the chess rules committee to consider adopting Gamma's childhood chess rule variation. In the committee's meeting, chess rules are robbed their necessity status, and have become contingent facts, and subject to modification."

Gamma: "Every game has two language levels: The *object* language level, and the *metalanguage* level. At the object level, those egged in using the language *follow* the rules of the game, as the Cambridge Wittgenstein would say, but never speak of them. If a reporter at a chess match says: 'The white king just now moved one square! (which happens to be a chess rule)' he is liable to be fired on the spot. His remark is ridiculous and, at best, a silly an tasteless joke."

Beta: "I presume this is, Sir, what the *Tractatus 7* is meant to indicate, in your strikes of destiny style: 'Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must remain silent.'⁶

Gamma: "In the *metalanguage* of chess, everyday language in this case, one may comment on the object language and speak about its rules."

⁵ Wittgenstein's Missing Map, by Wasfi A. Hijab, appeared in ALWS Contributions Vol. IX

⁶ My own rendering, I believe.

6. Third mistake: The dichotomy fallacy

Alpha: "May we consider, Sir, the genus/species distinction, which is usually associated with biological classification? I do think, Sir, that it also plays an important though role in abstraction. For example, the proposal 'It is raining', with no affirmation intended, is really a genus, and *true* and *false* are the differentia that generate the two statements: (i) 'It is raining!' and (ii) 'It is not raining!'. The dichotomy fallacy is the unstable oscillation between the genus and between the positive species. I wonder, Sir, whether I presented this idea in a clear fashion."




Figure 1. Dichotomy Fallacy: Oscillation between (1) & (2).

Beta: "Alpha, I think you did alright. It is a fine point, and probably no one can do any better."

Wittgenstein: "Can anyone explain what Alpha is trying to say?"

Gamma: "I'll try, Sir. Your state of affairs is really the possibility for a fact, and it becomes a fact when it exists. In your presentation, Sir, a fact is often confused with its corresponding state of affairs. Alpha is proposing the name of 'dichotomy fallacy' for this conceptual flaw."

Alpha: "I believe, Sir, that flaw often appears in well-established contexts. However, in such contexts we can easily correct the situation, as there will morally be enough criteria to isolate the genus from its positive species."

Alpha: "At the high level of abstraction in the *Tractatus*, we have no possibility of escaping this fallacy. We have no rudder to control our steering. We humbly submit to you, Sir, that this fallacy is a third grave mistake in section 1 of the *Tractatus*."

7. Is the vienna school closing down?

Gamma: "Don't you agree, Sir, that the real problem is not having two choices in each of the three mistakes. It is rather the *instability* of the choosing. On Monday, we choose the first option, on Tuesday we choose the other option, and on Wednesday we go back to the first option!"

Beta: "Isn't this what your Cambridge namesake described as the fly being at the top of an inverted bottle, trying desperately to escape by hitting the top *upwards* rather than retracing its direction *downward* to the exit?"

Alpha: "Sir, how can we escape these maddening situations, or should we just quit our truth exploration?"

Wittgenstein: "Now, you all make me feel sorry for myself: I wish I have never written this *Tractatus*! I am going to close down this school and look for a simple down-to-earth career, something like an elementary school teacher!"

All the students clamoring, "No, Sir! No, Sir! Never say that. Your *Tractatus* was the luckiest thing that ever happened to philosophy! With your beyond belief sincerity and with no ax to grind, you exhibited philosophic pitfalls in

their purity. Thus, you paved the way for your Cambridge namesake to create his Socratic technique, explaining the nature of philosophic problems, how we get entrapped by them, how to scramble out of the entrapment, and how to recognize them and avoid them. Between the two of you, Sir, the world will one day credit you with curing human thought of a conceptual plague that lasted for more than two milleniums!

"Believe us, Sir! We are by no means condemning philosophy. What we are saying is this: There is bad philosophy, and there is good philosophy. Your *Tractatus* is an excellent illustration of the bad variety, and your Cambridge namesake's *Investigations* is an excellent example of the good variety."

Alpha: "I have one last thought, Sir. I would like to hear what everyone thinks of it. It seems to me, Sir, that the philosopher attempts to discover the rules of the language that he is using in order to discover those rules. Alas, this is an impossible quest. If, however, he or she should appear to succeed, then they will be inventing a new branch of *mathematics*, that one day may turn out to be useful for application in science or technology. If he or she should fail, then they are producing a new *metaphysics*. This, closing down your school is probably the only proper thing to do."

Sehen wir geschlechtlich verschiedene Körper oder sehen wir Körper als geschlechtlich verschiedene?

Gabrielle Hiltmann, Basel

1. Zur immanenten Konstituion von Welt im Sprachspiel

Die Frage, ob Ludwig Wittgenstein eine idealistische oder eine realistische Philosophie entwickelt hat, wurde in der Rezeption seiner Schriften immer wieder heftig diskutiert (vgl. beispielsweise Anscombe, Elisabeth 1981 sowie Diamond, Cora 1991). Ludwig Wittgenstein selbst stellte sich die Frage, ob seine Untersuchungen der Sprache eine Form von Nominalismus darstellten (PU 383). Er insistiert darauf, dass es ihm anders als den Nominalisten um den Gebrauch der Sprache in den Zusammenhängen unserer Lebensform geht. Damit unterläuft er die in der philosophischen Tradition wirkmächtige Unterscheidung von Realismus und Idealismus. Bedeutung ergibt sich laut dem Grundsatz von PU 43 nicht durch die Referenz auf eine aussersprachliche Welt, vielmehr anhand des wechselseitigen Zusammenspiels von Sprechenden sowie Gegenstandswelt und Sozietät im Sprachgebrauch selbst. Dass die Materialität von Dingen und Wörtern – insbesondere deren Gestaltung – beim Entstehen von Bedeutung in dieser vielschichtigen Interaktion ihr Wörtchen mitzureden hat, wird durch den Beizug der Stellen PU 531 ff. zu Fragen des Verstehens deutlich. Die genannten Stellen sind ein Beispiel für die in PU 43 erwähnten Ausnahmen vom Grundsatz der Gebrauchsbedeutung. Worum geht es? Ludwig Wittgenstein unterscheidet hier zwei Arten des Verstehens. Bei der einen Art – sie entspricht dem Grundsatz von PU 43 – kann ein Satz ohne Bedeutungsveränderung durch einen anderen ersetzt werden. Hier ist ausschliesslich der Gebrauch und dessen Zusammenhang für die Bedeutung konstitutiv. Bei der anderen Art prägt die Wahl der Wörter und ihrer Stellungen die Bedeutung derart, dass sie nicht verändert werden können, ohne eine Veränderung der Bedeutung zu bewirken. Ein Beispiel für letztere Verwendungsweise ist der literarische Sprachgebrauch, insbesondere die Lyrik. Wir können aber auch an die bildende Kunst oder die Musik denken. Ausführungen dazu finden sich insbesondere in PU II, xi, wo es um das Sehen von Aspekten geht.

Es gibt also eine Verwendungsweise von Sprache, bei der die Materialität des Wort- und Satzkörpers sowie deren Gestaltung für die Bedeutung konstitutiv sind. Dies im Unterschied zum alltäglichen Sprachgebrauch, wo sich der Gehalt einer Aussage normalerweise im Gebrauchszusammenhang ergibt. Dass diese Unterscheidung nicht ausschliessend ist, wird daran deutlich, dass auch beim alltäglichen Sprechen Intonation und Betonung – also materiale Gestaltungselemente – für die Bedeutung und das Verständnis einer Aussage relevant sind (vgl. Hiltmann, Gabrielle 1997).

Wie kann die Mitwirkung der Gegenstandswelt am Entstehen von Bedeutung gefasst werden? Hier gilt es folgende Konstellation zu beachten: Unsere Annäherungen an ‚etwas‘, das nicht Sprache ist, finden immer im Komplex der Verschränkung unserer Lebensform mit unseren Sprachspielen statt. Jeder Versuch eines direkten Zugriffs verfängt sich deshalb

immer wieder in der Gegebenheit unserer Sprachimmanenz. Wir können den Eigensinn der Dingwelt, der in unseren Sprachspielen agiert, lediglich indirekt fassen, zum Beispiel als Widerständigkeit, die sich unseren Gestaltung entgegensetzt, sie scheitern lässt oder uns zu Modifikationen zwingt (vgl. Haraway, Donna 1991). Dies ist der Punkt, an dem L. Wittgensteins Überlegungen ansetzen. Von Interesse ist nicht nur das Phänomen des Sich-Verfangens in und des Modifizierens von Regeln als wissenschaftliche Verfahrensweisen im Prozess des Erkennens, sondern insbesondere das Faktum, dass wir Regeln aufstellen, die nicht einfach funktionieren. Es ist Sache der Philosophie, das Scheitern als ein Moment des Sprachspiels zu verstehen, das über Sprache hinausweist. Konstruktion ist nicht alles. L. Wittgensteins Spätwerk kreist aus einer sprachimmanenten Position um diese zwiespältige Bruchstelle der Konstruktion. Der Spielzug des Verfangens in den Regeln eröffnet im Sprachspiel einen Raum der Reflexion auf eine Problematik, die in der philosophischen Tradition mit dem Stichwort Ontologie angesprochen wird. L. Wittgensteins Ansatz, das Problem der Ontologie weder mit der klassischen ‚Was-ist-Frage‘ noch mit der ebenso klassischen Frage ‚Warum gibt es etwas und nicht vielmehr nichts?‘ anzugehen, sondern pragmatisch an der Feststellung des Sich-Verfangens in Regeln festzumachen, kann es vermeiden, sich in positiven Bestimmungen dessen, was nicht Sprache ist, zu verfangen. Erforderlich für eine Annäherung an etwas, das bei unseren Gestaltungen der Realität dadurch mitwirkt, dass wir uns in unseren eigenen Regeln verfangen, ist eine ‚Art des Hinhorchens, der Rezeptivität‘, die sich nicht im lernbaren Anwenden von Regeln erschöpft (PU 232).

2. Zur Konstitution des wahrgenommenen Gegenstandes anhand der Unterscheidung von ‚etwas sehen‘ und ‚etwas als etwas sehen‘

Das erkenntnistheoretische Problem der Gegenstandskonstitution lässt sich auch über die Frage angehen, ob wir Gegenstände sehen oder ob wir Dinge immer als etwas sehen. Die erste Position ist Ausdruck einer realistischen, die zweite einer konstruktivistischen Weltansicht. Hierzu ist festzuhalten, dass wir wohl nie genau klären können, welchen Anteil das Denken am Wahrnehmen hat, da wir dieser Verquickung immanent sind. Ludwig Wittgensteins Bemerkungen zum Verb ‚sehen‘ anhand des Vergleichs mit den Wendungen ‚eine Ähnlichkeit sehen‘, ‚einen Aspekt sehen‘, ‚etwas als etwas sehen‘ in PU II, xi zielen denn auch nicht auf eine Wahrnehmungstheorie, die uns auf diese Frage eine Antwort geben könnte. Seine Untersuchung ist eine begriffliche (PU S. 518/5 sowie S. 535/4). Beim Vergleich der verschiedenen Spielarten des Sehens von Aspekten wird deutlich, dass sie alle die Fähigkeit, etwas zu sehen, voraussetzen. Wir müssen die beiden verglichenen Gesichter sehen können, um die Ähnlichkeit zwischen ihnen zu entdecken. Wir müssen etwas sehen, um den Aspekt wechseln zu sehen. Um etwas als etwas zu sehen, müssen wir zunächst etwas sehen. Aspektblindheit impliziert keine physiologische Schwäche. Von einer

blinden Person erwarten wir nicht, dass sie einen Aspekt sehen kann, was nicht ausschliesst, dass sie Aspekte hört. ‚Aspekte sehen‘ ist also notwendig auf ‚dies sehen‘ bezogen.

Wir sehen ganz selbstverständlich Gabel, Messer und Löffel auf dem Tisch neben dem Teller und halten sie nicht für Essbesteck (PU S. 521/3). Das schliesst nicht aus, dass wir ein Messer als Brieföffner verwenden können oder dass wir eine Gabel dazu benutzen, ein Loch zu bohren. Die Bedeutung eines Gegenstandes ist also nicht durch seine Alltagsverwendung determiniert. Der Mehrfachverwendung und damit der Mehrdeutigkeit von Gegenständen sind mehr oder weniger enge Grenzen gesetzt. Ludwig Wittgenstein arbeitet in PU II, xi mit Bildgegenständen, anhand derer er diese Grenzziehungen und die ihnen impliziten Logiken auslotet. Das Doppelkreuz beispielsweise kann als weisses Kreuz auf schwarzem Grund oder als schwarzes Kreuz auf weissem Grund gesehen werden (PU S. 541/4). Die dieser Figur implizite Schwarz-Weiss-Logik ist kontradiktorisch. Beim Hasen-Enten-Kopf hingegen haben die beiden Gestalten keinerlei logischen Bezug. Wichtig ist hier festzuhalten, dass die beiden Figuren Hase und Ente in der graphischen Gestaltung des H-E-Kopfes angelegt sind. Wenn jemand sagt, er sehe einen Hund, macht er allenfalls einen Witz, aber er berichtet nicht sein Seherlebnis dieser Gestalt.

Wir bewegen uns im Umgang mit Gegenständen immer im Spielraum, der sich aufgrund der Unterscheidung ‚etwas sehen‘ und ‚etwas als etwas sehen‘ eröffnet. Die Bedeutung eines Gegenstandes ergibt sich in diesem Spannungsfeld zwischen einer einzigen, selbstverständlichen Bedeutung und der Möglichkeit, denselben Gegenstand auf (ganz) andere Weise zu sehen. Methodisch kann dieser Spielraum dazu genutzt werden, um aus der Sicht der Aspektbedeutungen einen neuen Blick auf die Alltagsbedeutung und die mit diesen verbundenen Selbstverständlichkeiten unserer Lebensform zu werfen. Ludwig Wittgenstein tut dies in seinen Untersuchungen des Spätwerks insbesondere hinsichtlich des Entstehens von Bedeutung im Zusammenhang der tatsächlichen Verwendung der Sprache (vgl. dazu Hiltmann, Gabrielle 1998). Er entwirft immer wieder fiktive – zum Teil absurde – Sprachspiele, die einen Aspekt des Sprachgebrauchs ausloten und an seine Grenzen zu führen suchen.

3. Sehen wir Körper als geschlechtlich verschiedene?

Etwas Biologie

Ich gehe davon aus, dass die Beschreibungen der Welt durch die Naturwissenschaften der konkreten Verquickung von Sprachspielen und Lebensform, der wir immanent sind, Ausdruck geben. Sie bilden also keine Realität an sich ab, die unabhängig von unseren Erkenntnisbemühungen und deren technischer Umsetzung wäre.

Damit soll nicht gesagt sein, Welt, Dinge, Materialität gebe es nicht. Wir können sie jedoch nicht direkt erfassen, da unsere Versuche, dies zu tun, den Gegenstand immer schon in unsere Sprechhandlungszusammenhänge integrieren. Auch die biologische Forschung spricht also nicht vom Körper an sich. Sie entwickelt immer neue Sichtweisen der biologischen Realität, die sich mehr oder weniger gut bewähren. Was ist das aktuelle Bild der Biologie hinsichtlich der Entwicklung von weiblichem und männlichem Geschlechtskörper?

Der geschlechtliche Dimorphismus betrifft die *inneren und äusseren Geschlechtsorgane*. Das *genetische Geschlecht wird bei der Empfängnis bestimmt* je nachdem, ob zwei X- oder ein X- und ein Y-Chromosom verschmelzen. Während der ersten 6 bis 7 Wochen ist der Embryo *bipotent*. D. h. die paarigen noch nicht differenzierten Keimdrüsen sind noch nicht weiblich oder männlich. Die Entwicklung von weiblichen Genitalien ist die Regel, denn die Entwicklung der männlichen Genitalien findet nur statt, wenn das SRY-Gen auf dem Y-Chromosom die Entwicklung der undifferenzierten Keimdrüsen zu Hoden auslöst. Fehlt dieses Gen, entwickeln sich die Keimdrüsen zu Eierstöcken. Die weitere Entwicklung wird durch die von den weiblichen oder männlichen Keimdrüsen ausgeschütteten Hormone bestimmt. Auch das Gewebe der äusseren Genitalien ist *ursprünglich für Frauen und Männer identisch*. Es besteht für beide Geschlechter aus der urogenitalen Falte mit urogenitaler Membran, analer Membran und Phallus. Die geschlechtliche Bestimmung der Keimdrüsen löst die Entwicklung des Phänotyps der Geschlechtsorgane aus. Bei Fehlen von Testosteron entwickelt sich der *Phallus* der indifferenten bipotenten Phase zur *Klitoris*. Die urogenitale Falte wächst nicht zusammen und entwickelt sich zu den inneren Schamlippen. Da für die Entwicklung der weiblichen inneren und äusseren Genitalien keine Hormone auslösend wirken, kann die Differenzierung zur weiblichen Geschlechtsgestalt normal vonstatten gehen, auch wenn die Keimdrüsen *dysgenetisch* sind. Bei Absonderung von Testosteron aus den Hoden entwickelt sich der *Phallus* der geschlechtlich indifferenten bipotenten Phase zu einem *Penis* mit einer Urethralöffnung.

Nicht eindeutig zuordenbare Interferenzbildungen (ich vermeide den Ausdruck Fehlbildungen) finden sich bei etwa 1 bis 4 % der Neugeborenen sowohl für die inneren als auch für die äusseren Genitalien aufgrund der bipotenten Ausgangssituation mit alternativen Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten. Sie bilden kein *drittes Geschlecht*. Medizinisch werden verschiedene Formen unterschieden: *Intersexualität, geschlechtliche Unbestimmtheit und Hermaphroditismus*. Ein nicht vollständig entwickelter Mann und eine vermännlichte Frau können gleich aussehen. Der Entscheid, welchem Geschlecht das Kind angehöre, ist hier schwierig und muss medizinische, psychische, soziale und rechtliche Aspekte berücksichtigen.

Wir sehen Körper, die nicht eindeutig einem Geschlecht zugeordnet werden können

Das selbstverständliche Sehen von geschlechtlich verschiedenen Körpern impliziert eine dichotomische Kategorisierung, welche die Vielfalt der individuellen Körper, die aufgrund der bipotenten Ausgangssituation immer mehr oder weniger weiblich oder männlich sind, zwei alternativen Kategorien zuordnet. Diese Zuordnungen nach der Geburt bereiten meist keine Schwierigkeiten. Ausnahmen bilden die genannten Interferenzbildungen. Hier ist nicht immer ersichtlich, welchem Geschlecht ein Kind zugeordnet werden soll. Der Entscheid, ob eine grosse Klitoris als Penis oder ein kleiner Penis als Klitoris gesehen und allenfalls chirurgisch verändert werden soll ist für Eltern, Ärzte und allenfalls beigezogene PsychologInnen schwierig und bildet einen massiven Eingriff für die weitere psychophysische Entwicklung des Kindes, das sich spätestens in der Adoleszenz persönlich mit der von anderen Personen getroffenen Entscheidung, es als Mädchen oder als Knaben zu sehen, auseinandersetzen muss. VertreterInnen von Selbsthilfgruppen sprechen sich in den letzten Jahren vermehrt gegen eine chirurgische Geschlechtsanpassung

durch Reduktion des zu kleinen Penis aus, da dieser Eingriff in den Körper geschlechtliche Fakten schafft, welche die betroffenen Personen als Kastration erleben.

Die chirurgische Angleichung der äusseren Genitalien wird hingegen von transsexuellen Personen trotz der damit verbundenen Sterilität ausdrücklich gewünscht. Trotz Fortschritten in der plastischen Chirurgie ist das Gestalten von Geschlechtsorganen des anderen Geschlechts hinsichtlich des Erhalts der erogenen Wahrnehmung kaum und ästhetisch nur beschränkt befriedigend. Die Bildung einer Klitoris und einer falschen Vagina sowie die hormonelle Stimulierung der Brustbildung oder der Einsatz von künstlichen Brusttransplantaten gelingen besser als das Bilden eines Penis. Hier sind die Ärzte bereits zufrieden, wenn die transsexuellen Männer aufrecht Urinieren können. Letzteres bildet ein kulturell bedeutendes Kriterium für die Wahrnehmung als Mann. Transsexuelle Personen wirken während der langwierigen Anpassungszeit und nach der operativen Geschlechtsanpassung mehr oder weniger authentisch. Auch nach den operativen Eingriffen kann die selbstverständliche Geschlechtswahrnehmung zum Beispiel durch die zu grossen oder zu kleinen Hände und Füsse von transsexuellen Frauen oder Männern irritiert werden. Für transsexuelle Personen ist die eindeutige Zuordnung zum gewählten Geschlecht wichtig. Sie stützen damit indirekt die Dichotomisierung der Geschlechterordnung.

Geschlechtsinszenierungen

Die Zuordnung einer Person zum einen oder anderen Geschlecht erfolgt in der Regel nicht aufgrund der durch die Kleidung verdeckten äusseren Geschlechtsorgane. Leitend sind vielmehr äusserliche Attribute wie Haartracht und Kleidung. Gestützt auf diese kulturellen Geschlechtsmerkmale bereitet die Zuordnung von Menschen zur einen oder anderen Geschlechtskategorie Personen, die mit den kulturellen Symbolisierungsformen vertraut sind, in der Regel keine Schwierigkeiten. Diese Selbstverständlichkeit kann beim Kontakt mit Menschen anderer Kulturen oder mit gleichgeschlechtlich orientierten Personen unserer Kultur fragwürdig werden. Der Dandyismus im 19. Jh. oder Maskerade, Transvestismus, Queer-Praktiken, die Inszenierungen von Geschlecht in Homosexuellen- und Lesbenszenen sowie in der zeitgenössischen Kunst – alle diese Praktiken spielen mit den kulturellen Formen der Darstellung von Geschlecht und der Zuordnung zur einen oder anderen Kategorie.

Dieses artifizielle Spiel mit den Geschlechtskategorien bleibt durch Parodie, Verzerrung, Übertreibung sowie Ironie auf die zwei Grundkategorien weiblich und männlich bezogen. Es betrifft letztlich nicht den geschlechtlich verschiedenen Körper, vielmehr das kulturell sich wandelnde und kontingente Geschlechtsverhalten zwischen Personen verschiedenen oder gleichen Geschlechts. Das Auftreten des menschlichen Körpers in zwei geschlechtlich verschiedenen interferierenden Gestalten wird durch diese Praktiken als Vexierbild genutzt, das zwischen weiblich und männlich oszillieren kann. Dies ist möglich, weil die Kategorien weiblich und männlich aufgrund der bipotenten Ausgangssituation der interferierenden Entwicklung nicht scharf voneinander getrennt sind. Wie wir oben bei der Untersuchung der Verben ‚sehen‘ und ‚sehen als‘ festgestellt haben, können wir aber aus den schillernden Inszenierungen von Geschlecht nicht schliessen, wir sähen Körper immer als geschlechtlich verschieden. Das Spiel mit der Verschiedengeschlechtlichkeit bleibt – indem

es auf die Grenzen der dichotomischen Kategorisierung aufmerksam macht – immer auf die Referenz des Sehens von geschlechtlich verschiedenen Körpern bezogen.

4. Dass wir geschlechtlich verschiedene Körper sehen hat einen Grund

Das selbstverständliche Sehen von zwei geschlechtlich verschiedenen Körpern wird sowohl auf der physiologischen Ebene durch Interferenzbildungen als auch auf der symbolisch-kulturellen Ebene durch Geschlechtsinszenierungen in Frage gestellt. Wird die dichotomische Entgegensetzung zweier Geschlechter damit hinfällig? Nein. Die kategoriale Unterscheidung von Frauen und Männern lässt sich am unterschiedlichen Beitrag zur Prokreation festmachen. Hier ist die Unterscheidung sinnvoll und muss im Sinne eines Anspruchs auf gesellschaftliche Anerkennung der Verschiedenheit als Ausnahme vom Anspruch auf soziale und politische Gleichheit von Frau und Mann positiv gewürdigt und realisiert werden, denn die Durchsetzung des Rechts auf gleichen Lohn für gleiche Arbeit und des Anspruchs auf einen angemessenen Elternurlaub sind immer noch ausstehend.

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Personal Identity and What Matters

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1. Introduction

Identity is not what prudentially matters in survival (this is originally and most famously argued in Parfit 1984, 245-280). Consider the case of division. *a* is one of three identical triplets. In World 1 his equipollent cerebral hemispheres are removed from his head and each is inserted into the (suitably emptied) skull of one of his brothers, resulting in the existence of two persons, *b* and *c*. In World 2, only one of his hemispheres is transplanted (while the other is destroyed), resulting in the existence of *b**. Note that, assuming the necessity and transitivity of identity, *b** is identical to neither *b* nor *c*.

Now, in World 1 *a* stands in the relation that matters to *b** (indeed, it is plausible to claim that they are one and the same person). Furthermore, since in World 2, *a* stands in the exact same intrinsic physical and psychological relation to both *b* and *c*, he also stands in the relation that matters to each of them. But since he cannot be identical to two persons (who are not identical to each other), identity cannot be what matters in survival.

Furthermore, the conclusion that identity is not what matters is supported by our intuitions about what matters in cases of division. Consider World 2 again. Assume that *a* is informed that *b** is going to be tortured terribly immediately after the brain transplant has been completed. Naturally, *a* is devastated. But now suppose that *a* learns that, as it turns out, both of his brain hemispheres are going to receive a new body, that is, that the actual world is World 1. Nevertheless, the person on the left branch is still going to be tortured terribly. Putting myself in *a*'s shoes, I am inclined to care just as much about *b*'s torture in World 1 as I would about *b**'s torture in World 2. (While, to some extent, benefits to *c* may compensate for *b*'s torture in World 1, this would not affect my attitude to the *torture itself*). In other words, the existence of *c* (say, in some other wing of the hospital) does not change my attitude to the torture. And this suggests that the relation that matters is preserved equally well in both worlds, despite the fact that *a* only survives in one of them. And so it suggests that identity is not what matters.

Nevertheless, I now want to consider three recent objections to these arguments. I shall argue that they are not conclusive.

2. Survival, Existence and What Matters

My description of the case of division may seem to lead to absurdities. First, whether *a* continues to exist depends upon whether someone else, *c*, comes into existence. After all, in World 2, where *c* does not come into existence, *a* survives the transplant (*a* is identical to *b**), whereas he does not survive in World 1. Second, whether *b* comes into existence also depends upon whether *c* comes into existence. *b* only comes into existence in World 1 because here, *c* does so as well (note that *b* and *b** are not identical). And these judgements may seem quite absurd. After all, *c*'s existence does not causally affect *b*.

Of course, similar accounts of the identities of other types of objects (that can divide) have similar implications. And, in general, such accounts seem to me

quite plausible, or at least more plausible than alternative accounts. Regarding insentient objects, the fact that their persistence and existence may depend upon whether other causally unrelated objects come into existence does not seem disturbing. To a large extent, this is because their persistence conditions do not have the sort of significance the persistence conditions of persons have. Except maybe for legal reasons, it does not seem terribly important which of two ships is in fact Theseus' original ship. Now, this is controversial, but I shall merely assume that the implications are acceptable regarding insentient objects.

What makes it particularly difficult to believe that the persistence of *persons* may depend on causally unrelated matters is the apparent great significance of our survival. However, the crux of the above argument is that although *a* will cease to exist if *c* comes into existence, this sort of death does not matter from his perspective. Neither of *a*'s continuers will be him, but his relation to them will contain what matters. Therefore, the special sort of badness that is associated with the death of a person (but not with the death of a ship) does not even come into play. And so the absurdity of the first alleged absurdity may be more apparent than real.

The second alleged absurdity has received less attention in the literature. It does not concern the significance of identity over time, but of coming into existence in the first place. Why, exactly, is the second 'absurdity' thought to be absurd? According to Harold Noonan we could say to *b*: "You should consider yourself fortunate that the other fellow's brain transplant [that is, *c*'s brain transplant] went so well - if it hadn't you would never have existed" (Noonan 1989, p. 160). But why claim that *b* is *fortunate*? Just as it does not matter from *a*'s point of view whether his future continuers are identical to him, as long as the relevant relations hold between him and them, it may be claimed that it does not matter from *b*'s point of view whether the person who comes into existence in the *b*-body is *b*. After all, if all the nonexistence of *b* would really amount to would be the nonexistence of *c*, then why should nonexistence matter from *b*'s perspective? This, I think, takes some of the sting out of the second absurdity as well.

Let me briefly elaborate on this point. Noonan holds World 1 to be better than World 2 from what we may call *b*'s prudential point of view. This is because *b* exists in the former world but not in the latter. But the existence of *b* depends in a very intimate way on the existence of *c*. This is clear when we consider that World 2 contains everything that is needed for the existence of *b* *except* the existence of *c*. Furthermore, while *c* enables the existence of *b* in World 1, this is not in virtue of any causal relations between them. Rather, it is the *mere* existence of *c* that brings *b* into existence here.

In the light of these connections between the existence of *b* and the existence of *c*, can we maintain that, since *b* exists in World 1 but not in World 2, World 1 is better from *b*'s prudential point of view? Such a claim would not be incoherent. Nevertheless, it seems to me very hard to believe. The difference between World 1 and World 2 in virtue of which *b* exists in the former but not in the latter is simply that (the causally isolated) *c* exists in

the former but not in the latter. And why should the existence of *c* make a difference from *b*'s prudential point of view?

3. Division and Indeterminacy

According to Mark Johnston and Peter Unger, the case of division does not support the claim that identity is not what matters (Johnston 1997, pp. 169-170, Unger 1990, pp. 255-259). They hold that in World 1, it is not determinately true that *a* ceases to exist. This is because it is neither determinately true that *a* is identical to (for instance) *b*, nor determinately true that they are not identical. Indeed, *almost* all of what ordinary survival consists in is present in World 1 - all that prevents *a*'s survival is that he stands in the relevant relation to both *b* and *c*. Therefore, *a*'s prudential concern for *b* (and *c*) is a reasonable extension of his concern for himself. So while identity is what matters, a person's concern for himself (and so for identity) may in certain rather bizarre situations be extended to people to whom he is not (determinately) identical.

However, I am inclined to hold that it is, in fact, determinately true that *a* is not identical to *b* (or *c* for that matter). This is not because I believe that statements about identity always have determinate answers. In a spectrum of gradual physical and psychological changes where a person is dismantled one cell at the time, I believe that there is a range in which it is neither true that the person ceases to exist, nor true that he does not cease to exist. But it seems to me that the case of division is relevantly different. Here, we have a clear reason to claim that *a* is not identical to *b* or *c*. He cannot be, since neither has the stronger claim to being identical to *a*.

Furthermore, the view that it is not determinately true that *a* is not identical to *b*, and not determinately true that *a* is not identical to *c* has counterintuitive implications. Intuitively, there is one and only one person inhabiting the *a*-body before division takes place. However, if it is not determinately true that *a* is not identical to *b* and not identical to *c*, then there is no determinate answer to the question of how many persons there are in the *a*-body at this stage. Therefore, it is not determinately true that there is only one person inhabiting the *a*-body prior to division (Garrett 1998, p. 64).

Finally, I believe that it is uneconomical to claim that what matters is identity, but that the concern for oneself can be extended to beings one is not determinately identical to. Suppose that we correctly believe that a particular criterion of personal identity is true, say, a psychological criterion, according to which personal identity consists in non-branching psychological continuity. And suppose that we hold that what matters is the sort of psychological continuity referred to in this criterion, regardless of whether it branches or not. The difference between our view of what matters and the view that identity is what matters will then consist merely in the fact that the latter view has a clause to rule out branching. Which view should we accept?

I noted that my attitude to the torture of *b* would be no different than my attitude to the torture of *b**. The existence or nonexistence of a further continuer, besides the one who will be tortured, will not make a difference (or more precisely, it will not make a difference to my attitude to the *torture*). But this means that the fact that in World 2, psychological continuity takes a *non-branching* form is irrelevant for my attitude towards the torture.

In other words, the fact that the relevant relation holds uniquely does not seem to make a difference. So it

appears that we can account for our value judgements merely by invoking the view that what matters is psychological continuity *whether or not branching occurs*.

Why, then, claim that uniqueness matters? We do not need to claim this in order to explain our judgements. And since the only difference between our view of what matters and the view that identity is what matters is that the latter includes a clause to rule out branching, it seems that the former view is superior. In particular, it is uneconomical to claim that what matters is identity and that in cases of indeterminacy the concern for oneself is extended to one's continuer(s). At best, this would be to assign a role to uniqueness in which it makes no difference.

4. Other values

There is one final objection I want to consider. Brian Garrett has argued that even if we do not consider division as bad as ordinary death, this does not support the claim that identity is not what matters (Garrett 1998, pp. 92-93). Rather, this merely means that given the choice between ordinary death and division, we would choose division. And there may be reasons for preferring division other than the judgement that identity is not what matters. Garrett suggests the following: if *a* divides, *b* and *c* can complete his public projects (those of his projects that others can complete). That is, *b* and *c* can, say, finish his book, look after his family etc.

I agree with Garrett that even if we prefer division to ordinary death, this does not prove that identity does not matter. However, I made a stronger claim than that division is preferable to ordinary death. I argued that *a*'s attitude to future torture is not likely to change just because he is informed that it will be *b* rather than *b** who receives it. If this is correct, then *a*'s attitude to the torture will not depend on whether he is identical to the recipient or not. And this suggests that identity does not matter.

This, of course, is compatible with the other claim that Garrett makes, namely that the completion of public projects matters. Both *b* and *b** may complete *a*'s public projects, and this fact may provide part of the reason why they matter to *a*. But note that even if it is important to *a* that someone completes his public projects, this need not be because this someone prudentially matters to *a*. It may be because the completion of these projects matters in the sense that his strivings will then not have been in vain, and so his life will have been *better*. Or it may even be because these projects matter in what we might call an 'impersonal' or 'other-regarding sense'. Perhaps it is important to *a* that someone takes care of his family, not because it either benefits him or someone else to whom he stands in the relation that prudentially matters, but simply because it makes his *family* better off.

In conclusion, I believe that none of the three objections pulls through. Identity is not what matters.

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Language, Intentionality and Appropriation

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In the mid 80s Daniel Dennett has published a series of articles on the problem of the self. His suggested solution to the problem is rather unique and seems to be at odds with some more recent work on the subject. It is my aim to try to square his thoughts with some other approaches that tentatively point to quite different sources of selves. Dennett in all of his papers relies heavily upon a strategy that made it all the way to the title of one of them. He speaks of selves as *centers of narrative gravity* (Dennett 1992). This strategy uses two crucial components – language and fiction. Let me say few words about each of them. First, in accordance with a general tactics of his post-behaviorism and fully in line with his method of heterophenomenology (see Dennett 1991), he treats mental phenomena in linguistic terms. We only know of a presence of the former via our confrontation with the latter. Psychological self receives the same treatment. Claiming to capture a fundamental building block of the self, Dennett gives elaborate examples of linguistic practices that lead one to *become oneself*. It is in the game of asking and answering questions on their history, present conditions and future plans or desires that organisms arrive to a coherent, stable and lasting view of their selves. He doesn't seem to be troubled by questions of subjectivity, i.e. what constitutes subjects and whether in fact some accounts of their selves is needed. At various points where he speaks of subjects, he dismisses philosophical explanations and wants to replace them with biological ones (e.g. Dennett 1989).

Second, this linguistic strategy leads Dennett to adopt an anti-foundationalist view of the self. He employs the metaphor of the center of gravity to illustrate that explanatory models in sciences are often furnished with items of a rather dubious ontological status. While everyone knows how important centers of gravity for explanations are, a short contemplation reveals there is no material object that would necessary correspond to any of them. It's not their material being that constitutes their existence. Such abstracta enter scientific explanations to serve the purpose of enabling successful predictions of conduct of various entities. Centers of gravity help to predict behavior of physical objects. For a successful prediction of human beings, we need to utilize a different, more complicated fiction. "It turns out to be theoretically perspicuous to organize the interpretation around a central abstraction: each person has a *self* (in addition to a center of gravity). In fact we have to posit selves for *ourselves* as well" (Dennett 1992, 105). Although an introduction of selves with all their intricacies into our explanatory web presents a much more sophisticated problem than introduction of centers of gravity, it adds no more reality to the final product. Selves are as fictitious as centers of the gravity. „It is a category mistake to start looking around for the self in the brain,“ (ibid., 108) pronounces Dennett in his Rylean dialect.

True to his naturalism, he also supplies empirical evidence to support his claims. In the collaborative work with N. Humphrey (Humphrey and Dennett 1998), he ventured to investigate clinical case studies of Multiple Personality Disorders (MPD). These cases are particularly intriguing for the proper treatment of the origins of the self, because patients with MPD exhibit a variety of fully developed selves. Dennett and Humphrey convincingly argue that emergence of multiple selves is a direct consequence of a narrative strategy patients employ through their development. In defense of their integrity under long-term attack (most of

them have a history of child abuse), they create a second (or third...) personality that encompasses unwanted memories, moods and feelings. These are continuously supplied with a battery of beliefs, so that a complete psychological trait establishes itself. Competing selves then occupy one body.

So far I didn't say much new and in fact I believe on a certain level of description Dennett's assertions are basically on the right track. However, there seem to be something missing in his picture. The problem of the self is in his picture strongly tied with operations of language. In fact there seem to be for him a direct correspondence between language use and maintenance of the self. But if the claim is to establish an exclusivity of language in self-deliverance, the claim is a way too strong. If language produces selves and nothing else does, we should encounter instances of neither developed selves without language capacities, nor selfless language users. However, we find examples of both. On one hand, we seem to unproblematically assign selves to adult human beings without language (aphatics of various kinds, savants). On the other hand, there are humans with fully developed language who lack selves nevertheless.

Now, for the first group of cases, Dennett can reasonably defend himself by saying that his notion of language is broader than that of verbal behavior. Intentional intelligent behavior of people without spoken language can still accumulate enough of subject-centered information to establish and preserve their selves. Under such a broad definition, selves could still be thought of in categories of language. As I don't want to enter the debate on the nature of language and thinking, I will grant Dennett this strategy and concentrate on the second group of cases, i.e. people with fully developed language who fail to complete their self building and show some striking discrepancies in making distinctions between self and the rest of the world. I have in mind patients showing various symptoms of schizophrenia.

In recent years, a revived interest in schizophrenia has brought into the light patients with particular difficulties pertaining to their selves. Schizophrenia is a complex disorder, uniquely characterized by symptoms such as thought insertions, alien limbs or illusions of control (Franck et al. 2001, 454). Clearly, such symptoms are best understood as problems with self-ascription of activities. And there is no complete self without self-ascription. Schizophrenic patients, while moving around, observing activities of others or even thinking apparently can't locate the agent who does all this. In extreme cases, they either live in the world where they are in command of virtually nothing (depersonalization) or, conversely, in the world where they are in charge of almost everything (delusions of control) (Proust 2000, 308). Several research groups, despite the fact they greatly disagree over the general picture of the mind, have conclusively demonstrated that schizophrenic patients have significant difficulties in self-ascription of their actions in comparison with controls when matched for IQ, verbal abilities, attention or memory capacities (see Firth 1992; Franck et al. 1997 or Stirling et al. 2001). These differences are present even when patient's conditions are not acute. In one such an experiment, patients were asked to draw simple geometrical figures pictures out-of-sight and subsequently select their own works from a set of four where the additional three were drawn by other participants of the experiment. Overall,

schizophrenics had much bigger difficulties appropriating their own works and their "impairments appeared to be unrelated to performance on other cognitive or attentional measures" (Stirling et al. 2001, 201). While fulfilling rather sophisticated tasks they are unaware of the task originator.

There is something deeply puzzling about these results. Schizophrenics in these experiments are undoubtedly involved in intentional actions and it's hard to see how one could interpret their behavior using non-intentional vocabulary. (After all, they listen to the commands of experimenters!) It's natural for us to ascribe intentionality to agents. The talk of intentionality is bound to *who* is intending, as if intentionality and subjectivity were intrinsically tied together. (Just on a side: I take this to be the reason behind the initial appeal of Searle's Chinese room argument – computers can't think as there is "nobody at home".) In ordinary discourse, intentionality is paralleled by subjectivity. And subjectivity could be either external (it's him, or them who have done this...) or internal - the self. Inability to find the agent therefore leads in schizophrenics to problems with selves. How it is possible that intentionality of actions of schizophrenics lacks a purported relation to its source?

In her discussion of similar experiments, Joëlle Proust suggests there is nothing intrinsic about the connection between intentionality and agency (Proust 2000). She points out that various experimental paradigms in cognitive science suggest detachment of goal-directness of executed actions from its executor. According to her, the above-mentioned case of schizophrenia establishes one illustrative example of a more general trend. This dissociation is not confined to pathological cases. Normal subjects often entertain mental states with a dubious status of authorship. For example, visual imagery can be reasonably thought of as being deprived of its agent. This is not supposed to mean subjects of imagery are confused about who is undergoing imagery. It only says there might exemplify occasions in which subjects are sincerely confused about origins of their mental states. In this sense, fantasies or daydreams are often subjectless in a way similar to experiences of schizophrenics and one has to undertake a further effort to make its creator unequivocal. Crucially, even without such an effort mental events without representations of an explicit agency still seem phenomenologically coherent. In spite of a need for an additional step of determining the agent, we have no problem experiencing them. Although first-person accounts are central to discussions of the self, evidence from the third-person domain would make the case Proust's case stronger. Fortunately, a mounting support now emerges from various areas of neuroscience. Indirect support for a separation between intentionality and agency is now offered by research on sensory modalities. Most of the sensory processes, whether visual, auditory or motor, are carried out by the same networks, regardless of agency involved. As Kosslyn's (Kosslyn 1986) notorious findings show, visual imagery and vision are carried out by the same cortical areas. Similarly, mental simulation of action performance activates motor cortex (Bonnett et al. 1997). While in normal vision ownership appears to be locked in the viewed scene (i.e. there is a backward state of awareness that indicates to the subject it's her who is looking), imagery is short of clear agency ascription. Analogically, the difference between performed and simulated actions dwells, among other things, in owner attribution. This evidence seems to imply that in addition to processing of intentional sensory states there has to be a further neuronal processing that associates (or fails to associate) visual processing with its owner. More direct evidence bearing on the issue comes from a hotly debated discovery of mirror neurons in macaque monkeys (for discussion of results and implications see Gallese 2000). In a manner analogical to

the role of visual cortical areas in imagery tasks, mirror neurons track intentional motor activities, usually hand movements. In doing so, they do not take account of authorship of actions and fire both in cases of grasping initiated by the monkey or observed grasping carried out by a different monkey. Thus mirror neurons appear to present the strongest empirical base for the needed dissociations between intentionality and ownership.

Where does this lead us in our discussion of Dennett and his narrative strategy? It seems like Dennett is unaware of this dissociation and operates on the level where the parallelism of intentionality and subjectivity is unquestioned. His narrative strategy presupposes normal functioning of the "ownership" neural network. People indeed *become themselves* with the help of discourses they participate in. However, there is a permit one needs to obtain just to enter the game of becoming. That permit consists of a functioning bridge between intentionality and agency ascription. Once that bridge is lacking, no amount of game participation can cure the initial setback. It is an additional empirical task to discover what exactly breaks down in these cases – some believe a module is impaired (Firth 1992), others speak of lower level explanations (Proust 2000). It is not my intention to come up here with a conclusive answer. My conclusion aims elsewhere. Schizophrenics have no apparent problems using first-person (or other) pronouns, they understand and produce sentences about themselves and easily execute tasks asked of them. Still, their selves are in an important aspect incomplete. Language is not able to help them in overcoming initial conditions that do not favor self-ascription. Behind the intended fictive anti-foundationalism of Dennett rests something that is very real and concrete, namely one's brain.

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Aquinas on Self-Knowledge

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1. Two kinds of self-knowledge

Aquinas distinguishes two kinds of self-knowledge. The intellect, he says, knows itself in two ways:

In the first place, singularly, as when Socrates or Plato perceives that he has an intellectual soul because he perceives that he understands. In the second place, universally, as when we consider the nature of the human mind from knowledge of the intellectual act. (*ST I*, 87, 1)

Although the second kind of knowledge about the nature or essence of man raises interesting issues, in this paper I want to consider just one thesis ascribed to Aquinas as concerns the first kind of self-knowledge in which the intellect knows its own mental states (hereafter self-knowledge *simpliciter*). This is the thesis that what distinguishes human beings from animals is 'a self-reflexive power that allows them to have not only cognitions but also cognition of the truth of their cognitions'. (MacDonald 1993, 186) Call this the M-thesis. One interpretation of the M-thesis might seem trivial: what distinguishes humans from non-rational animals is not merely the fact that they are able to have concepts and produce thoughts on the basis of the concepts that they possess but also that the indispensable precondition of being a person is precisely the fact of human self-knowledge. For what use would our concepts and thinking be if we did not know what concepts we are having or what thoughts we are entertaining?

The M-thesis might now be interpreted as expressing some kind of Cartesian view according to which mind is transparent to the subject and the subject has an infallible access to his own mental states. However, I will show that it is wrong to ascribe such a view to Aquinas.

2. Knowledge of our own mental states

We can divide our mental states into two groups: phenomenal mental states (sensations: bodily feelings and perceptual experiences, for example hearing a sound or feeling hot), and intentional mental states (cognitive, conative and affective attitudes such as my thought that it is hot outside or my desire to go back home).

(a) First-person access to phenomenal mental states

Apparently Aquinas would have no problem with ascribing to the intellect knowledge of the first group of mental states. For him, as for Aristotle, sensations belong to the realm of the sensitive and not of the rational soul. The proof of that is the fact that sensory experiences are always of particular objects. My seeing a dog is a relation between my sense of sight and this particular dog.

The realm of the intellect, in contrast, is the realm of what is universal. The intellect does not understand a particular dog but rather its universal canine nature. Phenomenal mental states are physiological, and thus the intellect by itself cannot have any (self-) knowledge about them. Having concepts is not sufficient for thinking about a particular experience. That is why the intellect can refer to

experiences only with the aid of the senses: we need perception to be able to point to a particular phenomenal mental state that we are having. As Aquinas puts it, 'It is clear that our mind cannot be directly aware of the individual. We are aware of the individual directly through our sense-powers.' (*DV*, 10, 5)

One might want to object to the idea that the mind knows its phenomenal mental states in such a non-problematic way, for this seems to necessitate the existence of a faculty of inner sense. If mental states are in some sense material, then in order to know them the intellect has to proceed as it proceeds with phenomena in the external material world. For this, on the Aristotelian-Thomistic (and -Brentanian) theory of knowledge, it needs the aid of a sense that would have mental states as its proper objects.

(b) Knowledge of our intentional mental states

Further problems with self-knowledge of our intentional mental states turn on the fact that, for Aquinas, only thoughts that are somehow based on sense images would be *about a particular thing* and thus the intellect could not know them by itself. Presumably, however, there are thoughts (e.g. mathematical thoughts) that are in no sense connected to sense images. For what sense image would we need in order to entertain the thought that $2 + 2 = 4$?

How, most importantly, could the intellect know its own universal thoughts? In the case of knowledge of external material objects, the intellect grasps the universal form contained in the particulars. The form that existed as a particular in an object acquires a new, intelligible and universal existence in the mind of the knowing subject. What is needed for the cognition of thoughts is that the intellect forms second-order thoughts about first-order thoughts, where second-order thoughts grasp the form from the first level.

Now, if self-knowledge is really possible and if it means having second-level mental state ascriptions, then this suggests that there has to be a difference between the two levels of thoughts. However, on both levels the intellect is referring to one and the same universal form. Aquinas himself says that there is a difference between thinking about a stone and understanding that one is thinking about a stone (*ST I*, 87, 3). Perhaps this only concerns the 'mixed' kind of thoughts, i.e. those in which the intellect is collaborating with the senses. If so, then would the difference be between the two levels of 'pure' thoughts? Could we make any sense of the idea that in self-knowledge the universal form from the first-level thought acquires some kind of second-level intelligibility and universality? And how could the second-level grasp the individual that is *me* in all of this, since it can grasp only universal forms?

3. Is self-knowledge *knowledge*?

(a) Apparent infallibility of self-knowledge

A person can be said to have *knowledge* in a domain, if she has some true beliefs about this domain (without entering into details about what constitutes necessary conditions for knowledge). Is this the sense in which we have knowledge about our own mental states? The Cartesian trend in philosophy would suggest that not only do we have knowledge about our mental states, but also that this knowledge is total: we know all mental states we ever have and our access to our mental states is infallible.

Aquinas says in different places, for instance in *Summa Theologiae* (ST I, 85, 6) after St. Augustine, that 'the intellect is always true'. This claim as to the infallibility of the intellect does not seem to be limited only to self-knowledge; it should also apply to knowledge in general. But is Aquinas denying the very obvious fact that we make mistakes in our cognitive activities? One solution to this apparent puzzle goes as follows. Consider what happens when we think that our knowledge of our mental states belongs to what Aquinas calls the first operation of the intellect, in which the intellect forms an abstract idea, or a concept, of a given object of cognition. On this first solution it is then indeed acceptable to say that the intellect is never false, but this is so only because on this level of cognition we do not deal with knowledge properly speaking at all. For according to this solution the workings of our intellect are never false because they are never true, either.

(b) Is Aquinas a reliabilist?

Aquinas, however, offers a different explanation of the reliability of the intellect. Its reliability is not much different from that which we usually ascribe to our senses – namely that we usually rely on what they report without having too many doubts. This is how Aquinas explains this fact:

each potency, as such, receives an intrinsic, non-incident ordination to its proper object. But whatever has this sort of ordination is always the same. Thus, as long as the potency remains intact, judgments concerning its proper object are not defective. (ST I, 85, 6)

The veracity of the intellect means that 'it is not deceived about its proper objects'. The proper object of the intellect is the essence of things. The intellect is correct in understanding a thing, if it is 'assimilated to the thing understood'. (DA, III, XI) This means that the veracity of the intellect consists in the essence of the thing being correctly grasped by the concept that the intellect forms. (Haldane 1993, 21) I am not quite sure if this is sufficient as an explanation. What Aquinas is suggesting is that the intellect works like the senses: it is just a fact that, if my organ of sight is working properly (and certain other conditions are satisfied), then whenever the sense 'sends' the information to the intellect that there is a dog before me, then there truly is a dog before me. But as we shall see, there are still many problems connected with this interpretation of Aquinas' explanation of self-knowledge.

Firstly, this account of the veracity of the intellect indicates that its infallibility is something automatic, and that Aquinas' theory of knowledge is a reliabilist theory: we (usually) have knowledge about our own mental states *because our mechanism of cognition is reliable*. Such a reliabilist theory of knowledge, however, would not give any support to the M-thesis from the beginning of this paper according to which it is the fact that humans can consciously appraise the truth or falsity of their own mental

states that distinguishes them from non-rational animals. Aquinas, as it turns out, does not think that reliability of a mechanical sort is a good enough guarantee for the veracity of the intellect, for he 'makes it a requirement of justification that the person possess or have access to the grounds constitutive of his justification.' (MacDonald 1993, 186)

Another problem one might have with the given interpretation is that it seems to leave no room for any kind of privileged access that a subject has to her mental states. Instead, it suggests that we are as reliable or as likely to make mistakes in our statements about our mental states as we are in our statements about external objects. Again, this claim is not necessarily implausible. However, in order to provide a plausible support for the M-thesis we need to defend some kind of special access in the case of self-knowledge.

4. The special character of self-knowledge

Robert Pasnau in his *Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature* claims explicitly that Aquinas 'accounts for the special access we so clearly do have to our minds' through his theory of the reflective method of self-knowledge. (Pasnau 2002)

(a) Inner-sense model of self-knowledge

In the passage already quoted above Aquinas says: 'Plato perceives that he has an intellectual soul because he perceives that he understands.' (ST I, 87, 1) This suggests that the intellect directly grasps its own actions and that it somehow automatically perceives its own actions whenever they happen. Here, again, we might surmise that Aquinas is endorsing a Lockean 'inner sense' view about self-knowledge, a view according to which it is by acts of introspection (or by means of a special inner sense) that we perceive our mental states. On this view, as we said before, the intellect would have to form some higher-level ideas or concepts about its own mental states. However, as Pasnau puts it,

Aquinas denies that self-knowledge involves any further, special idea of ourselves or our own actions. (...) there is no further set of ideas, derived directly from mind, and what ideas we have of mind, we have precisely from things without. (Pasnau 2002, 342)

In Question 87 of the first part of the *Summa* Aquinas explains that the intellect is by its nature directed toward objects outside the mind. Self-knowledge, then, can only be a secondary activity of the intellect. Human intellect has no direct access to its own mental states and it can acquire knowledge of them only indirectly, by 'apprehending external things.' (Pasnau 2002, 341) This is so because 'there is no such thing as pure thinking: whenever we think, we are thinking of something.' (Kenny 1993, 121) Consequently, the natural role of concepts or ideas is to be the means and not the objects of thought. Concepts and ideas can become object of thoughts in reflection (Haldane 1993, 21) but not in the way in which the introspective model of self-knowledge suggests.

(b) Reflexive model of self-knowledge

Aquinas calls the way in which the intellect grasps its own actions 'a kind of return' or 'a kind of reflection' (DV, 10, 9) and he compares it to the way in which we look in a mirror:

Through a likeness within vision obtained from a mirror, one's vision is directly drawn to cognize the reflected object; but by turning back in a way it is drawn

through that same [internal likeness] to the likeness that is in the mirror. (DV, 2, 6)

When I look at myself in a mirror, what I usually see is, precisely, myself. Of course, I can also see the mirror, but only by making a special effort in this direction. In the same way, external things are the primary objects of thought, and thought itself can be known by the intellect only by some special effort on the part of the intellect. Therefore, as Pasnau notes, 'reflection, for Aquinas, is not an introspective turning away from external things, but a certain way of looking at external things: it is an outward look that is reflected back within.' (Pasnau 2002, 343)

Brentano (1969) seems to be advancing a view similar to Aquinas'. He claims that all our mental phenomena are intentional. This means that they are first of all directed to their objects; at the same time, each of them is also accompanied by a secondary consciousness of the mental act itself. Aquinas would thus agree with Brentano that it is not by turning away from the external world and looking within that we discover our own thoughts, but rather 'by attending in a special way' to the content of our original thoughts about the external world.

(c) Are all our mental states conscious?

According to Pasnau (Pasnau 2002, 344-347), there is one more similarity between Aquinas' and Brentano's views: both of them take consciousness for granted. This, Pasnau claims, is what constitutes a weak point in Aquinas' theory of self-knowledge. It is true that for Brentano every mental act is conscious as a matter of definition. I think, however, that Pasnau is going too far when he suggests that also for Aquinas self-knowledge is possible only because all of our mental states are conscious. To prove my point it will be useful to make another distinction within the initial typology of mental states presented above. For Aquinas, what I called *intentional mental states* do not constitute a homogeneous group. Rather, he would consider some of our beliefs and desires as *dispositions* to a certain kind of behavior. (ST, I, 87, 2) Those mental states that are always conscious, on the other hand, belong to another group: the group of propositional mental states; I will call them, simply, *thoughts*. (In fact, the same beliefs and desires could belong to either of the two groups; when they are not conscious, we call them dispositions.)

On this view, the intellect learns about its own dispositions in the same way in which it learns about other people's beliefs and desires, that is to say by observing its own behavior. As for thoughts, it seems that they always must be expressed (or *be expressible*) in language. My beliefs and desires can properly be called conscious only when I formulate them in language (either overtly to other people or silently to myself). If this is so, then it turns out that for Aquinas the special character of the human capacity for self-knowledge is in the end due to the fact that only human beings possess language.

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"Beam me up, Scotty! - Teleportation, and Personal Identity

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Near the end of the Nineteenth Century a Prussian woman arrived at her local telegraph office with a bowl of sauerkraut she wanted sent to her son. She insisted that, if soldiers could be sent to the front by telegraph, certainly her sauerkraut could be sent the same way. (Standage, 1998)

The Prussian woman thought that communication and transportation could coincide. She may have been correct. In 1993 an IBM scientist, Charles H. Bennett, predicted that quantum teleportation is possible, but only if the original object is destroyed. More recently, in October, 1998, Caltech scientist H. Jeff Kimble succeeded in instantaneously transporting information contained in the quantum state of a photon one meter across a lab bench without it traversing any physical medium in between. Kimble and his colleagues used an extremely delicate quantum mechanical phenomenon, "quantum entanglement." Kimble's findings suggest that teleportation of the sort depicted in the Star Trek television series and movies is theoretically possible.

In science fiction and science fact teleportation of a human being would involve a person stepping into a send-booth and having every single atom in his body and its location encoded. His complete physical structure would be stored in a memory buffer. The code of his structure would be sent, presumably by quantum mechanical means, to a remote receive-booth. At the reception end, the person's body would be reconstructed according to the encoded information. A very slow way of doing this would be to also convey the matter from his prototype body to the receive-booth by snail mail. However, since he was completely disassembled back in the send-booth, we need not be fussy about what matter is used for the reconstitution. To optimize speed, local matter could be recruited for the purpose of reconstructing his body at the reception site. Initially this seems to be an extremely rapid means of transportation. However, teleportation amounts to transportation only in the event that personal identity is preserved. Whether the person who emerges from the receive-booth is the numerically same individual who entered the send-booth depends on the concept of "person" we employ.

Cyberneticist Norbert Wiener claimed that matter does not matter. He suggested that a person is not a static entity, but a pattern whose instantiation is constantly changing. Wiener said, "The individuality of the body is that of a flame rather than that of a stone, of a form rather than of a bit of substance." Regarding the prospect of teleportation, he added:

The pattern of the body can be regarded as a message that is in principle capable of being coded, transmitted, and then translated back into its original form, as sight and sound patterns may be transmitted by radio and translated back into sound and picture. Hence there is no absolute distinction between the types of transmission which we can use for sending a telegram from country to country and the types of transmission which at least are theoretically possible for transmitting a living organism such as a human being. (Wiener 1954, 91.)

If a person is simply a pattern, then it looks as though teleportation could be a viable form of transportation. Some practical difficulties exist. For example, information theory dictates that, whenever large amounts of information are transferred from one location to another, some bits of information are inevitably changed or distorted. This makes it unlikely (or impossible) that the individual decoded and reconstituted in the receive-booth is exactly the same in all respects as the one who entered the send-booth. Even if we disregard the change in location and the discontinuity, if the received person differs from the sent person in any respect, no matter how minute, then Leibniz's principle of identity of indiscernibles indicates they are not the same.

A second practical difficulty concerns the information stored in the memory buffer. Physicist Lawrence M. Kraus contends that transporters are the least plausible technological devices depicted on Star Trek, because of the daunting amount of memory that would be required to store all the information regarding the atomic structure of a human body. About 10^{28} kilobytes would be needed to store a human pattern in a memory buffer. It is difficult to imagine how this much information could be stored. Moreover,

The fastest digital information transfer mechanisms at present can move somewhat less than about 100 megabytes per second. At this rate, it would take about 2000 times the present age of the universe (assuming an approximate age of 10 billion years) to write the data describing a human pattern to tape! (Krause, 1996, 76-77)

Even if these practical difficulties could be overcome, personal identity problems remain. Recent philosophical accounts of personal identity have become increasingly sophisticated compared to the treatment by John Locke. For example, Robert Nozick's closest-continuer schema for numerical identity is a means for keeping track of an individual's identity over time. According to Nozick's schema an object can be thought of as chopped up into time-slices; each slice is an object-at-a-time. Time-slices of objects have causal descendants, or continuers, as they undergo changes. Nozick suggests that we are willing to call the closest-continuer the same object as its ancestor based upon its qualitative similarities. If I replace a part in my watch, I consider my repaired watch as the same one I had before, because of similarities and because it is the closest continuer of my old one. Even if I have my watch completely disassembled for cleaning and then reassembled afterward, I regard my cleaned, reassembled watch as being the same as my old, dirty one. Nozick supposes that his schema works as well for people as it does with watches. Since the human body replaces most of its cells, and presumably most of its matter every five to seven years or so, Nozick's closest-continuer schema provides a justification for saying that I am the same person who was born in Chicago fifty-seven years ago even if none of the cells now present in my body, or none of the matter that now comprises my body, was there when I was an infant.

Richard Hanley uses Nozick's schema to defend the claim that personal identity is retained when a person goes through a Star Trek transporter. (Hanley 1997, 123-

162) However, a watch is different from a person. A disassembled watch can be reassembled with no significant differences being imposed on it. A disassembled person dies. Moreover, the generation of duplicates by a transporter presents no great difficulties with respect to a watch. Transporter duplication of objects could be a benefit; it might be an efficient means of mass production. While transporter duplication of persons could be an alternative to cloning, the possibility of duplication of human bodies precludes the possibility of retaining personal identity. A watch cannot socially "meet" its duplicate. A person can meet his *doppelgänger* in a transporter scenario.

Transporters provide the illusion of transportation. A working transporter would not be a means of extremely rapid conveyance; it would be a killing and duplicating machine, comparable to a FAX machine in which in original document is automatically destroyed. Consider a scenario:

Transporter Scenario 1:

Chuck steps into the send-booth of a teletransporter in Kirchberg.

Chuck is encoded and disintegrated in the send-booth.

An exact replica of Chuck, Dopppe-Chuck, steps out of the receive-booth on Altair-4.

Dopppe-Chuck is completely similar to the individual who entered the send-booth regarding both physical and psychological characteristics (for instance, he has the same fingerprints, DNA structure, and stomach contents; he also has the same memories and personality).

It seems to Dopppe-Chuck as though he is the same person who entered the send-booth.

A deputation of colleagues is sent to Altair-4 by conventional means. They find that Dopppe-Chuck is exactly as though he had traveled from Kirchberg to Altair-4 by conventional means.

Notice that you could use a functional transporter to commit suicide by turning off everything except the disintegrate feature. To demonstrate that a working transporter would not retain numerical identity of a person, activate all the features except disintegration so the prototype individual is not destroyed. After the transporter completes its work, you have two, numerically distinct individuals, one in Kirchberg and the other on Altair-4.

Transporter Scenario 2:

Chuck steps into the send-booth of a teletransporter in Kirchberg.

Chuck is encoded, but not disintegrated, in the send-booth.

Chuck steps back out of the send-booth.

An exact replica of Chuck, Dopppe-Chuck, steps out of the receive-booth on Altair-4.

Dopppe-Chuck is completely similar to the individual who entered the send-booth regarding both physical and psychological characteristics (for instance, he has the same fingerprints, DNA structure, and stomach contents; he also has the same memories and personality).

It seems to Dopppe-Chuck as though he is the same person who entered the send-booth.

A deputation of colleagues is sent to Altair-4 by conventional means. They find that Dopppe-Chuck is exactly as though he had traveled from Kirchberg to Altair-4 by conventional means.

We can remove the illusion that any traveling is accomplished with a transporter by drastically reducing the distance between the send and receive-booths. Place them both right here, within the same room, just a meter apart. Now we have a device that is analogous to a copy machine instead of a FAX machine.

Transporter Scenario 3:

Chuck steps into the send-booth of a teletransporter in Kirchberg with a stout rope tied around his waist. The rope is firmly held by a delegation of his colleagues and friends.

The receive-booth is located one meter from the send-booth

Chuck is encoded, but not disintegrated, in the send-booth.

Chuck steps back out of the send-booth, with the rope still tied around his waist and firmly held by his colleagues and friends.

An exact replica of Chuck, Dopppe-Chuck, steps out of the receive-booth one meter away.

Dopppe-Chuck is completely similar to the individual who entered the send-booth regarding both physical and psychological characteristics (for instance, he has the same fingerprints, DNA structure, and stomach contents; he also has the same memories and personality).

It seems to Dopppe-Chuck as though he is the same person who entered the send-booth.

A delegation of Chuck's colleagues, still holding the rope, which remains tied to Chuck's waist, sees Chuck to their left and Dopppe-Chuck to their right. The delegation counts two numerically distinct individuals.

Chuck meets Dopppe-Chuck.

Both objective and subjective criteria show that the prototype person is not the same person as the duplicate. The objective case is easiest. Witnesses keep track of which one is the original by means of the stout rope. Moreover, they can readily observe that the original is to the left of the duplicate. Leibniz knew that locational properties were among the characteristics we use to distinguish between distinct individuals. It is insightful that, in transporter scenarios, the locational differences are more obvious when the two individuals are in the same room than when they are on difference planets.

Subjective criteria are more intriguing. First, the fact that it *seems* to the duplicate that he is the same person who entered the send-booth proves nothing. *Seeming* is not a viable criterion for correctness. "It *seemed* to me at the time that I was correct," usually implies that I was not correct. If my "seeming" impression gains its force from comparing me with myself itself, then it is not trustworthy, no matter how psychologically compelling it is. The standard meter rod cannot be used to measure its own length. (*PI*, 50) Lewis Carroll's Alice cannot figure out whether she is shrinking or growing by placing her hand on top of her own head. An independent standard is needed to determine sameness.

Wittgenstein's remarks concerning the "metaphysical I" from the *Tractatus* are helpful at this point.

Similar observations were made by Leibniz and Gershon Weiler. A person can be identified by his physical characteristics including his memories, personality, and his relationships with other persons. However, a person can also be identified in terms of his point of view. Points of view are unique. Only I can have my perspective on my world of experience (that is what makes it mine). Just as a camera can take photographs of other cameras, but it cannot take a picture of itself, so too, I can meet other persons, but I cannot meet myself. If I meet another person at all, that suffices to show that the other person is not me. "I am my world." (*Tractatus*, 5.63) ". . . the metaphysical subject [is] the limit of the world – not a part of it." (*Tractatus*, 5.641) Dopple-Chuck is a part of my world. My world would come to an end, if I were disintegrated back in the send-booth. (*Tractatus*, 6.431) Since I can meet my duplicate in the third transporter scenario, he is not me. The moment Dopple-Chuck steps out of the receive-booth, his experiences, history, and viewpoint differ from mine. He becomes an external fact in my world, and I become one in his.

No one I have asked would be willing to use a functioning, reliable transporter as a means of transportation. They feared that using a transporter involves death and duplication. If you were the prototype in Transporter Scenario 3, when you stepped back out of the send-booth, would you be willing to have yourself killed and permit your duplicate to carry on with the rest of your life? Would you cheerfully let him share love with your partner, possess your belongings, interact with your friends, and enjoy the loyalty of your dog? Would it matter to you? If so, then the transported duplicate is not you.

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Gendler on Why We Can't Trust Thought Experiments on Personal Identity¹

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In "Exceptional Persons," Tamar Gendler argues that we cannot make reliable judgments about imaginary cases because the conceptually necessary and sufficient conditions for application of the concept of personal identity (sameness of person) don't guide our application in everyday cases, and while acceptable in actual cases, this leads to error in considering hypothetical cases. In this paper, I explain Gendler's argument against the utility of thought experiments on personal identity and argue that the central case she uses to illustrate the problem is mishandled.

Gendler argues that even if our concept of personal identity is structured around a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, they do not "play a role in how it is that we identify candidates as falling under that concept" (Gendler 1998, 594). Ordinarily judgments about personal identity are based psychological and bodily continuity indifferently. However, Gendler holds, our indifference is not due bodily and psychological continuity each being conceptually sufficient, but rather to their being contingently reliably correlated. In thought experiments, often either psychological or bodily continuity is *absent*, and, relying *uncritically* on ordinary practice, she says, we make judgments based on the remaining cue. Gendler argues that our intuitions about imaginary cases can therefore mislead us by being based on insufficient evidence or on whatever *usual* cues are present.

If Gendler is right about judgments in hypothetical cases, there ought to be cases that trigger different cues and produce inconsistent results. Gendler's argument depends on showing that we make inconsistent identity judgments in two nominally different cases that are essentially the same. I argue that in her central example, the two descriptions are not of the same case and that one of them is of something conceptually impossible. In addition, I argue that even if her example were successful, we could easily avoid making the kind of mistake it would illustrate.

To show that thought experiments are unreliable, Gendler appeals to a thought experiment discussed by Bernard Williams in "The Self and the Future" (Williams 1975). She argues that the two cases involved in Williams' thought experiment (described below), though described slightly differently, are fundamentally the same, though our intuitions about personal identity differ in accordance with the description.

I call the two cases the 'mind-continuous' and 'body-continuous' cases. Williams and Gendler argue that our intuitions yield different criteria for personal identity in the two cases. However, since the cases are supposed to be different descriptions of the same situation, our intuitions, if they are tracking the conceptually necessary

and sufficient conditions for personal identity, should give us the *same* answer.

In both Williams' cases, we are to imagine the following situation: Two persons, person *AA*, the person associated with psychological-states-*A*, body/brain-*A* and person *BB*, the person associated with psychological-states-*B*, body/brain-*B*, are told at t_0 about an operation they will undergo at t_1 the result of which is that at t_2 brain-*B* is associated with the psychological states previously associated with *AA*, and brain-*A* is associated with the psychological states previously associated with *BB*. Two persons emerge—*AB* and *BA*.

In the 'mind-continuous' case we are also asked to imagine that at t_0 , before *AA* undergoes the procedure, she is told that either *AB* or *BA* will be given a large sum of money and the other will be tortured. *AA* is then asked to make a self-interested decision as to whether the reward should be given to *AB* or *BA* at t_2 . Plausibly at t_0 *AA* would choose that at t_2 *AB* receive the reward since *AB* will have the psychological states previously associated with *AA*, the individual making the choice. Here it seems that *AA* makes her choice based on psychological continuity and does not concern herself with body-*A*.

In the 'body-continuous' case, we are asked to imagine that *AA* is told by the surgeon at t_0 that *she* will be tortured after the procedure, at t_2 , but that during the torture *she* will have no memory of being told so. Furthermore, *she* will not have any memories of *her* past; rather, *she* will have a new set of impressions of *her* past. Williams argues that the person associated with psychological-states-*A*, body/brain-*A* at t_0 will be disturbed and concerned that both *her* body and mind will be harmed. That *BA* at t_2 has no memory of having been told the outcome of the procedure beforehand and knows at t_1 that body-*A* will be associated with different brain-states at t_2 seems not to affect the way *she* reacts. Williams argues that it is clear that at t_0 *AA* is, and should be, concerned about what is going to happen to *herself* at t_2 , which shows that *she* identifies *herself* with *her* body.

Gendler argues that what's going on is that the same situation is being described in different ways. One description makes psychological continuity salient. One makes bodily continuity salient. We respond to the salient continuity indifferently, as we do in ordinary life. But both reactions can't be right. So one or the other response must be wrong, she argues, and this shows that in at least one case we rely on a feature contingently correlated with a conceptual sufficient condition, but which is not one. And this shows that thought experiments are generally unreliable, or so the argument goes.

Clearly, Gendler's argument requires the two descriptions to be of the same situation. If the cases

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described are genuinely different, then it does not follow that one of the judgments is wrong. If the situations described are distinct circumstances, we can get different answers to the question of who is who because the application conditions for the concept can be sensitive to the differences between the two cases, thus removing the immediate threat to the utility of thought experiments.

Three conditions must hold for Williams' cases to do the work that Gendler wants them to do:

- (i) our intuitions produce discrepant judgments in response to the different descriptions,
- (ii) our discrepant intuitions are *not* easily dislodged, and
- (iii) the descriptions she offers are of the same situation.

Gendler needs all three conditions since her argument against the utility of thought experiments depends on claiming that we get conflicting intuitions about the same situation described differently. This is evidence for the claim that we do not make judgments about personal identity in hypothetical cases always on the basis of application conditions.

Williams' thought experiment is supposed to reveal that our intuitions can be swayed by various descriptions of the same situation, and so we cannot rely on them to reveal the necessary and sufficient application conditions for personal identity. If the two descriptions are of one and the same situation, yet, contrary to Gendler, our intuitions do not conflict with one another in the first place, then Gendler has not given us any reason to think we are misled by the thought experiment in the way she describes. Alternatively, if the two descriptions are of one and the same situation, then if *at first* we have conflicting intuitions, but upon reflection decide that Gendler may be mistaken, then we have grounds to argue that the danger of being misled is not serious enough to undermine the use of thought experiments in personal identity. Or, if the thought experiment does not contain two descriptions of the same situation, but descriptions of two genuinely different cases, then her claim is groundless. In what follows, I argue that we have reason to question whether any of these conditions hold.

First, assuming that the descriptions are of the same case, it is not clear that our intuitions conflict as Gendler suggests. In the body-continuous case, if AA were told at t_0 that tomorrow she would have none of her memories, she may be disturbed, but perhaps not because BA will not have any memories of AA's past or of being told the situation, but because at t_2 AA will no longer exist! That is, where the surgeon implies AA will undergo the torture that BA will be subjected to, even if AA buys into it at first, it seems that upon reflection, she will realize that *she* will not be subject to torture—*she* will be dead. So, although AA will be disturbed by the situation, she will be disturbed for different reasons than Williams (and Gendler) suggest. The description of the 'body-continuous' case expresses something conceptually impossible. We are gulled by an illegitimate appeal to authority.

Second, suppose, as Gendler argues, that from the two descriptions of the case we make different identity claims that are not immediately reconcilable—in the 'mind-continuous' case we make a judgment based on psychological continuity and in the 'body-continuous' case based on bodily continuity. Once it is made clear that we have made this mistake in judgment the question we should ask is, "can we safeguard ourselves from making this kind of mistake?"

If by being cautious and reflective we *can* safeguard ourselves, then Gendler's observation gives us

no general reason *not* to appeal to thought experiments. So, the fact (if it is a fact) that the conceptually necessary and sufficient application conditions for personal identity do not guide our application of it will not suffice as an argument against thought experiments. Furthermore, we should want a strong argument to support such a claim, since it has profound implications in philosophy independently of the consideration of thought experiments.

Finally, consider whether these two descriptions are of one and the same case. It seems that the first case is described so that it is not obvious who is identical with whom. Presumably when one makes a self-interested decision about who is to undergo torture at t_2 , one implicitly makes an identity judgment—when AA decides that BA should receive the reward and BA should receive the torture, we can infer (that AA thinks) that AA=BA since one would not choose torture for oneself. The second case, however, is described so that it is unnecessary for us to appeal to our intuitions. We cannot *infer* an identity judgment from what the surgeon says about the torture since it is clear from the description who is to be identical with whom. We are told that the surgeon tells AA at t_0 that *she* will undergo torture at t_2 , but that *she* will not have any memories of being told so. The surgeon in the case presupposes that *she* (AA) will be *identical* with the person who will undergo torture at t_2 (BA), thus dictating that personal identity in this case is preserved by bodily continuity. By accepting (on authority) the description of the case as one that is conceptually possible, we have committed ourselves to bodily continuity being sufficient for personal identity, but not on the basis of an intuitive reaction. So, where the 'mind-continuous' description is neutral and invokes our intuitions, the 'body-continuous' description smuggles in the "intuition".

Additionally, if Gendler argues that we get inconsistent intuitions about who is identical with whom in the cases described, it must be that one of the intuitions is right and the other wrong. *Prima facie* Gendler does not have to say which one is correct for her argument to succeed. However, her argument only works if bodily continuity is sufficient for personal identity. In what follows, I show that presupposing *that* criterion for personal identity is disastrous for her argument.

Gendler is committed to bodily continuity being sufficient for personal identity by supposing that the 'mind-continuous' and 'body-continuous' cases are the same case, for the judgment is smuggled into the 'body-continuous' case. Gendler accepts the description is coherent. So, Gendler accepts bodily continuity suffices for personal identity. Since she needs one of our judgments to be wrong for there to be a problem, she cannot hold one of the hybrid views about personal identity, i.e., one where both bodily and psychological continuity are sufficient.

To see Gendler's commitment to bodily continuity, suppose psychological continuity is sufficient for personal identity and bodily continuity is not. Then our intuitions are correct in the 'mind-continuous' case. But the 'body-continuous' case could not then be a true description of any possible circumstance, because a personal identity claim is built into that description. That description could only be correct if bodily continuity were sufficient. Thus, if psychological continuity is sufficient and bodily continuity not, the two descriptions cannot be of the same possible circumstance; the example would not serve Gendler's purposes.

On the other hand, suppose bodily continuity is sufficient for personal identity and psychological continuity is not. Then, our intuitions in the 'mind-continuous' case

are wrong. So, if bodily continuity is sufficient and psychological continuity not, then these two descriptions might conceivably be of one and the same case, because our psychology-favoring intuitions could just be wrong.

This is disastrous for Gendler because her argument against the use of thought experiments relies on a commitment to a sufficient condition for personal identity, which is what is in question. Furthermore, anyone who wants to buy this argument must agree that bodily continuity is sufficient for personal identity because that is the only way the descriptions can be of the same case. However, it is not clear why we should agree or even how Gendler *knows* that bodily continuity is sufficient for personal identity. Endorsing bodily continuity as a sufficient condition is not a position Gendler should want to be in. Not only has Gendler presupposed a criterion that she was supposed to be searching for, she presupposed a controversial, perhaps even counterintuitive, answer to the question about the necessary and sufficient conditions for personal identity! The conclusion to be drawn is not that we should not appeal to thought experiments, but that they should be described in a way that doesn't beg the question if we want useful results. But *of course!*

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Why is the Notion of Person also Descriptively Problematic?

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1. A Confusing Notion

Informally and on occasions formally, the notion of person seems to be indispensable in many walks of life. In philosophical debates, though, the notion oftentimes appears to play a subordinate role. Other notions--subject, self, individual, human being, or characteristic marks of persons: mind, consciousness, rationality, (individual or cultural) identity, autonomy, authenticity, responsibility--occupy center stage. There are exceptions: there is the venerable problem of personal identity through time; in certain ethical issues, e.g., in bioethics or political philosophy, conceptions of person figure explicitly; and there are some treatises of the "concept of person" itself. Yet, even here one can hear warnings, e.g., that the concept is fraught with dilemmas and should be avoided in bioethical debates (Birnbacher 1997), or warnings concerning the "vagueness" (Wils 1997, 37) or the "contemporary crisis" of the concept (Kobusch 1997, 263ff.).

The sciences, in turn, seem to have little use for the notion of person itself. Exceptions may be psychology, neurophysiology or evolutionary biology. But in their studies of conscious phenomena, e.g., they again only touch on characteristics of persons. Theological studies, I should add, presumably cannot do without the concept of person; also, we know that the question of divine trinity was influential in the rise of the notion of person in Western thought (cf. Gunton 1996, 639).

What are the systematic, especially conceptual or semantic, reasons for the rather confusing situation sketched above (for which there surely are intricate historical reasons)? This is my general question. Further, is this situation due to certain peculiarities of our notion of person - possibly reflecting the peculiar nature or, theologically, the "mystery" of the human person (cf. Kirschenmann 2001, ch. 13)?

Perhaps, we can only have particular *concepts* of a person, geared to particular issues or contexts? Regarding ethical issues, for example, the concept of person in political philosophy might always differ from the concept of person in medical-ethical issues (abortion, euthanasia) and again from the concept of person that might be relevant in bioethics. Are there possibly irresolvable tensions between such particular issue-dependent concepts? Is a general notion of person then pre-theoretical, eluding any attempt at theoretically conceptualizing it? Should we just take it as a "primitive concept" in our practices of ascribing both mental and physical properties to people (Strawson 1959)?

What one in fact encounters in ethics (and some other philosophical fields) are diverging and competing *conceptions* of persons, depending on diverging philosophical positions. Liberals conceive of a person as an autonomous being, an "unencumbered self", while communitarians regard persons as being constituted by their communal, social, cultural and historical relations (cf., e.g., Mulhall and Swift 1996). In bioethics, one position, opposing more traditional views, tends towards a conception of person as both Intensionally and extensionally distinct from the concept of human (cf. Ricken 1997), making it possible to regard also non-

humans as persons. In abortion debates, there are diverging answers to the question of whether the embryo is a potential person (cf. Reinders 1993).

Implications of explicitly formulated position-dependent conceptions of persons can be traced relatively easily. In this light, my questions suggesting that there should be one notion of person may appear absurd: there just are informal uses of the term, and there are diverse specified uses of it; and these specific concepts or conceptions pick out a few, prominent characteristics attributable to persons - as is especially clear in the case of the technical concept of the "legal person". I shall call such views 'criteriological views' of the notion of person. I would maintain, however, that especially disputes about diverging conceptions cannot be entirely disconnected from the question of a unifying notion of person, possibly capturing the nature of persons. Hence, the problem of accounting for the situation sketched remains.

2. A Suggestion Dismissed

One suggested answer might be that our notion of person is a rather mixed notion, intending to capture both common characteristics and the unique individuality of human beings. (These intentions can be attributed, respectively, to the Greek-Roman and the Judeo-Christian roots of the notion.) Thus, our conceptual, semantic uncertainties about the notion might stem from our wavering between these two intentional aspects.

We rely (tacitly) on general characteristics of human beings, maybe just on their unity and thus on their being units of their kind, when we simply state, for instance, that there is one person in the room. The other intention is perhaps best brought out in adverbial and adjectival usages: we state sometimes what we "personally" think and did or that we know someone "personally".

The suggestion could explain the absence of the notion in the sciences: they are at best concerned with general characteristics. Theology, however, cannot avoid speaking of personal relations. Philosophy, again, primarily deals with certain general characteristics (subjectivity, self-consciousness), thus mostly adopting criteriological views. Different concepts of persons in ethical fields could become plausible: political philosophy is about certain general characteristics (freedom, autonomy), while the issue of euthanasia requires attention to the uniqueness of persons.

Yet, this suggested answer faces objections.

- (A) Material things are unique, too.
- (B) If concrete uniqueness is to be stressed, why not turn to the most unique elements, particular experiences, as done in Lockean conceptions (with personal identity becoming highly problematic).
- (C) Uniqueness (paradoxically?) is itself a general characteristic.

- (D) In ethics, we much rather have different *approaches*: rule ethics concerned with general characteristics of people and actions, contrasted with care ethics stressing people's particular circumstances.
- (E) At least one other reason explains the absence of the notion in the sciences better: it at once is a normative or dignifying notion, methodologically not falling within the purview of the sciences. At least, it expresses respectfulness, while a "scientist" will count just *human beings*. More is at issue when being considered a person or not may decide about one's right to life. Typically, too, we take a person to be a moral agent, capable of entering into binding agreements or being accountable for his deeds.

3. A Normative-Descriptive Notion

So, the notion of person should rather be considered a mixture of descriptive and normative, evaluative or prescriptive components—although such normative ascriptions as the 'dignity of the human person', in contradistinction to the 'dignity of man', may foremost concern the uniqueness persons. Part of the elusiveness of the notion is certainly due to that problematic mixing relationship.

The descriptive components, of course, should provide conditions of application of the notion and grounds for its normativity. Yet, there are conceptual dangers. A naturalistic, e.g. neurophysiological, characterization of human beings might provide no adequate basis for our self-consciousness and accountability (cf. Wils 1997, 30). Conversely, a stress on the normativity of the notion might neglect or bias its descriptivity (cf. Birnbacher 1997, 11; Wils 1997, 30). Descriptive uses may be crypto-normative (cf. Birnbacher 1997, 24).

In what follows, I shall mainly investigate to what extent the descriptive components of the notion can already account for its elusiveness, even though its normativity and their interrelationship are most controversial.

4. Descriptive Elusiveness

Older conceptions of persons, philosophical and theological, used to indicate that descriptive core of the notion in terms of an essence of a person. Think of Boethius' definition "Persona est naturae rationabilis individua substantia".

In modern, anti-essentialist, times, it has become more uncertain how the notion of a person should be "positioned" in semantic and other respects (cf. Wils 1997, 38). The descriptive components have since been put in terms of features of human subjectivity: cognitive capacities--intentionality, self-consciousness, transcendence of the presence, rationality; and moral capacities--responsibility, critical self-evaluation, autonomy (cf. Birnbacher 1997, 13). Clearly, some characteristics state minimal, others ideal conditions. Philosophers have selected--and ontologically elevated—different ones, engendering different criteriological views of the notion of person.

If one does not want to just follow some traditional approach and its particular ontological answer, one can turn to more or less phenomenological characterizations of

persons. In this regard, persons appear to be unified centers of all their acts - physical, social and primarily mental - and bearers of values and disvalues. As N. Hartmann (1933, 108) stated it:

Im Leben pflegen wir diese Einheit des geistigen Einzelwesens als "Person" zu bezeichnen. Wir unterscheiden sie damit schon im Alltag von der Sache, dem Organismus, ja dem Seelenleben und dem Bewusstsein. Unter Personen verstehen wir die menschlichen Individuen, sofern sie als handelnde, redende, wollende und strebende, als Vertreter ihrer Meinungen, Einsichten, Vorurteile, als Wesen mit Ansprüchen, Gesinnungen und Wertungen im Zusammenleben mit anderen ebensolchen menschlichen Individuen dastehen und deren Behandlung, Äusserung, Wollen und Streben erfahren, ihren Meinungen, Einsichten, Vorurteilen begegnen, zu ihren Ansprüchen, Gesinnungen und Wertungen irgendwie Stellung nehmen.

A comparable circumscription of a "concept of person" is given by what D. Wiggins (1987, 68) calls his "neo-Lockean account" of personhood:

x is a person if x is an animal falling in the extension of a kind whose typical members perceive, feel, remember, imagine, desire, make projects, move themselves at will, speak, carry out projects, acquire a character as they age, are happy or miserable, are susceptible to concern for other members of their own or like species....conceive of themselves as perceiving, feeling, remembering, imagining, desiring, making projects, being susceptible of concern for others..., who have and conceive of themselves as having a past accessible in experience - memory - and a future accessible in intention....

Given such characterizations, what kind of notion is the notion of person then descriptively, and do its descriptive peculiarities provide reasons for its elusiveness? There at least are two noteworthy points not captured by criteriological views of the notion. One is that the notion is *open-ended*, as Wiggins emphasized and indicated by those dots. Hartmann (ibid.), too, stated that the weight of the characterization fell on the plenitude of mutual relations. This could explain part of the elusiveness of the notion. One would ask, however, whether such characterizations could not be brought to a close; for, clearly, this open-endedness is not without some definite directedness (an issue to which I shall return). By the way, this open-endedness can shed light on the problem of personal identity (cf. Brüntrup und Gillitzer 1997): the open-ended characterizations are gradualist, whereas identity is not gradual.

Another point is related to the simple question of why, next to the notion of person, we also have those of man and human being and others. Normatively speaking, should we indeed distinguish between the 'dignity of the person' and the 'dignity of man'? The characterizations quoted provide clues for an answer: the notion of person considers human beings in certain respects (indicated by Hartmann by "sofern", and by Wiggins by his strategy of characterizing a "concept of person" and not the nature of persons). Surely, we also use it as a plain discriminating notion, when we distinguish persons from things. Yet, above all, it is a *correlative* notion: it expresses our involvement with matters of all kinds and, foremost, with other persons, though also with ourselves.

One can mention a third point. Clearly, the acts and activities referred to in the characterizations quoted are things that persons *can* do ("typically" do, according to Wiggins), but do not do all the time. As in many traditional accounts and thus already in many criteriological views of

the notion of person, the emphasis is on *capacities*, not on actual performances. This circumstance surely adds a particular openness to the notion. And it requires subtle considerations of potentialities, well-known from the debates about abortion.

Concerning the first two points mentioned, Wiggins (1987) proposes that the relation between 'human being' and 'person' should be conceived of as that between 'Venus at dawn' and 'Venus at dusk'. People have had different conceptions thereof, those of evening star and morning star, or those of Hesperus and Phosphorus. Likewise, we have different conceptions of the concepts of person and human being. The analogy is meant to suggest, not only a way of continuing the task of characterizing what a person is, but also its direction and goal. The goal, for him, is the convergence of the two conceptions, since the two concepts ultimately have the same referents, men (in the sense of 'homines'). The way to approach this goal is by further interpreting what a person is for us, by coming to "understand what forces us to account that creature not only as a subject of consciousness and a subject of interpretation but also, consequentially, as an object of reciprocity, or (in more Kantian terms) as a member of the kingdom of ends" (Wiggins 1987, 70).

5. Conclusion

I would maintain that the open-endedness, the peculiar correlativity and the built-in potentiality of the notion of person can account for much of the situation sketched in the beginning. Whether we should follow Wiggins' proposal about how to continue and possibly complete the characterization of persons - which would mean adopting his particular conception of persons - is another question. If we adopt it, we will have ruled out the possibility of regarding animals as persons, although this need not prevent us from having moral consideration for them. (The question of the status of embryos might still linger on).

While the diverse conceptions of person can thus be very influential or even decisive, for instance in ethical issues (if, e.g., one would also adopt the rule that only persons have a right to life), the conceptual elusiveness of what persons fundamentally are, remains - just as much as the elusiveness of what non-humans are.

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Homo Ideologicus und Homo Chaoticus¹

Endre Kiss, Budapest

Der österreichische polyhistorische Roman, diese so relevante intellektuelle Wiederentdeckung der sechziger und siebziger Jahre, hat im kulturellen, aber auch theoretischen Bewusstsein unserer Periode seinen philosophischen Status längst schon errungen. Diese Renaissance hat aber mit der originalen Thematisierung der Problematik der Person, Persönlichkeit und etwas allgemeiner mit derselben der Identität wesentlich zu tun.

Diese Interessenrichtung ist und bleibt allerdings ein janusköpfiges Phänomen. So unvorstellbar es auf der einen Seite auch wäre, Robert Musil in der disziplinär engeren Diskussion der Sozialpsychologie oder vielleicht mit noch größerem Recht in derjenigen der Wissenssoziologie und Hermann Broch in der wertphilosophischen Diskussion als voll legitimen und einwandfrei authentischen Autor heranzuziehen, wäre es auf der anderen Seite ebenso unvorstellbar, die intellektuelle Würde eines Mann ohne Eigenschaften oder einer Schlafwandler-Trilogie selbst indirekt in Zweifel zu ziehen. Die jetzige Situation repräsentiert (auf der Sprache des Sports gesagt) ein Unentschieden, das nicht gerade vorteilhaft für die synergetischen Prozesse der einander so nahe liegenden Wissensgebiete auswirkt. Auf der positiven Seite erscheint der lange Weg der intellektuellen Emanzipation eines Robert Musil oder Hermann Broch (zu denen wir ohne Zögern auch noch die Namen Franz Kafka oder Elias Canetti) hinzufügen würden. Auf der negativen Seite zeigt sich immer wieder die sich immer wieder wie von allein einstellende Grenzlandsituation zwischen intellektuellen Sphären, auch wenn die relevanten Inhalte längst über die einst unter vollkommen anderen Umständen gelegten Grenzsteine hinübergegangen sind. Der Doppelstatus zwischen "Philosophie" und "Literatur" im Falle eines Robert Musil oder Hermann Broch scheint sich verfestigt zu haben.

Reflektiert man die eigentliche Aufgabe des polyhistorischen Romandichters (auf eine kurze Formel gebracht: Interpretation eines Ganzen bei gleichzeitigem Aufbau dieses Ganzen, so wird einsichtig, warum die unterschiedlichen Menschenbilder der beiden Dichter in den strategischen Entscheidungen eine so grosse Rolle spielen müssen. Einerseits sind es eben die neuen und bis lang präzedenzlosen Auffassungen von Person, Persönlichkeit und Identität, die zur notwendigen Entstehung der neuen Romanstrukturen führen. Die Interpretation eines Ganzen bei gleichzeitigem Ausbau dieses Ganzen würde aber, und das ist die andere Seite dieses Zusammenhanges, ein konventionelles Menschenbild nicht mehr ertragen.

Es geht in diesen Werken um einen "Weg zum Ganzen". Einer der allerersten Schritte ist dabei gleich, den exemplarischen Menschen zu bestimmen. Eine "methodische" Konstruktion, eine Ausarbeitung dieses "exemplarischen" Charakters (der Person, Persönlichkeit und Identität) ist naemlich vollkommen unentbehrlich beim Ausbau eines Ganzen. Dieses von Musil exemplarisch konstruierte Menschenbild wird fähig, die Ganzheit des

Denkbaren und Erlebaren in kritischer Reflexion aufzunehmen und zu vertreten. Das so entstehende Ganze ist selbstverständlich nie das extensiv Unendliche, aber auch nicht ein intensiv Unendliches im Sinne traditioneller Ästhetikkonzeptionen. Es geht vielmehr um eine methodisch durchgearbeitete und voll bewusste Konstruktion der Person, welche nicht (oder nicht mehr) nur den ästhetischen Schein, sondern auch die intellektuelle Realität des Ganzen auf eine inhaltlich-sachlich begründete Art heraufbeschwören kann. Der als weltanschaulich-wertbezogenes, im Mannheimschen Sinne ideologisches Wesen aufgefasste Mensch wird also von Musil methodisch konstruiert gewaählt, um das Ganze der Romanproblematik auf ihn aufbauen zu können.

In den methodischen Überlegungen und strategischen Entscheidungen steht es bei Broch auch ganz ähnlich, wiewohl die Inhalte derselben unterschiedlich sind. Sein homo chaoticus (ebenfalls eine neue und auf das Ganze gehende Konstruktion von Person, Persönlichkeit und Identität) schreibt eine andere dichterische Verfahrensweise, eine andere Werkstruktur, das heißt, einen anderen Weg zu einem anderen Ganzen vor. Brochs Mensch ist kein "leeres Blatt", sondern affektbeladener Träger einer Unzahl von vitalen und intellektuellen Möglichkeiten. Damit hängt zusammen, dass bei ihm nicht die analytische Beschreibung von wirklichen Denkprozessen, dem Denken, wie es in der Wirklichkeit praktiziert wird, sondern das Bewusstseinsstrom als die fundamentale menschliche Artikulation erscheint, in dem Rationales und Irrationales auf eine spezifisch Brochsche Art der Einheit dargestellt wird. Das hierbei Wesentliche ist nicht so sehr die reflexive Akzeptierung dieses gedanklichen Materials als eine "Anthropologie", vielmehr das wirkliche Verstehen dessen, warum Aufgabe und Ziel des polyhistorischen Romans wie automatisch die Formulierung einer eigenen, inhaltlich wie strategisch motivierten Anthropologie vorschreibt. Mangels eines ausserhalb des Werkes tätigen allgemein verbindlichen Wertsystems muss nämlich der polyhistorische Roman selber ein konkretes Menschenbild zur Geltung bringen, um seiner Aufgabe (Interpretation des Ganzen bei gleichzeitigem Ausbau desselben) überhaupt gerecht werden zu können.

Schon bei dieser Rekonstruktion der sich voneinander unterscheidenden beiden Anthropologien, in denen die neuen Auffassungen über Person, Persönlichkeit und Identität problemlos aufgehen, sollen wir jedoch vorwegnehmen, wie sich auch in diesem Fall das Paradigma der Broch-Musil-Relation enthalten ist: (1) die methodisch überlegte Zielsetzung ist dieselbe (Notwendigkeit einer Anthropologie, damit u.a. auch die strategische Entscheidung der Romankonzipierung gefällt wird), (2) die manchmal geradezu spiegelverkehrt konzipierte inhaltliche Realisierung des gemeinsamen Vorhabens (bei Musil: homo ideologicus, bei Broch: homo chaoticus und endlich (3) eine innere Bewegung zum Ausgleich hin: bei Musil geht die Darstellung "psychologisch" von der Ebene der wissenssoziologisch

¹ Person und Identität im österreichischen philosophischen Roman

korrekten "Ideologie" in die analytisch immer weniger erfassbare Tiefe der Persönlichkeit, bei Broch versucht es der homo chaoticus immer wieder, seine vitalen Prozesse wertbezogen-ideologisch zu begreifen und zu fixieren.

Mit diesen konkreten Innovationen kann auch die Frage nach der Legitimität des großen Kunstwerkes (und der Kunst überhaupt) von unseren Autoren hinreichend beantwortet werden kann. Wie bekannt, stellte sich diese Frage auch aus mehreren weiteren Quellen, von der Herausforderung der Wissenschaft angefangen bis zur moralischen Krise während des Krieges und nach demselben, die eine leidenschaftliche Ablehnung des Ästhetizismus der Vorkriegszeit artikulierte. In dieser Reflexion würden höchstwahrscheinlich Kategorien wie Kreativität, existentielle und geschichtsphilosophische Beteiligung, intellektuelle (erkenntnistheoretische) Konstitution der "Welt" des Romans und der Person in den absoluten Mittelpunkt vordringen. Es ergibt wieder eine Ebene unserer Untersuchung, auf welcher die Bestrebungen Musils und Brochs - trotz der durchaus unterschiedlichen, teilweise sogar einander entgegengesetzten Realisationen dieses Programms - einander in der größter Nähe standen. Es geht um die Neuformulierung der Vorstellung von Person, Persönlichkeit und Identität, deren konkrete Bestimmung wir vorhin als "strategische Entscheidung" bezeichnet haben, da sie notwendig war. Man könnte es auch so formulieren, dass die holistische, auf das Ganze gehende Darstellungsaufgabe in ihrer Besonderheit nur mit einem exemplarischen, auf eigene Anthropologie gegründeten, sich von dem traditionellen Menschenbild unterscheidenden Menschenbild zusammengehen konnte und tatsächlich auch kann. Dies führte zu dem so merkwürdigen Zug des deutlich artikulierten Antipsychologismus sowohl Brochs wie auch Musils, eines Zuges, der auf den ersten Augenblick bei Autoren so erstaunend auswirken kann, die - jeder auf seine eigene Weise - so begründete und tiefe originelle psychologische Darstellung lieferte. Der Antipsychologismus richtet sich gegen die "traditionelle" Psychologie des "traditionellen" Romans. Die mehrfach artikulierte Unzufriedenheit mit der traditionellen Psychologie ist eine Konsequenz sowohl der ganzheitlichen Aufgabenstellung des polyhistorischen Romans selber wie auch der im wesentlichen außerliterarischen allgemeinen philosophischen oder quasi-philosophischen Überlegungen der beiden Autoren. Den Rahmen der analytisch durchaus reichen psychologie-kritischen Gedanken bildet bei Musil vor allem ein moralkritischer Ansatz, während es bei Broch eher darum geht, die Psychologie in einem Sinne direkt auszuschalten und zu versuchen, im Roman "erkenntnistheoretische Grundhaltungen" zu gestalten. Auf diese Weise wird es sichtbar, dass der Antipsychologismus aus romantheoretischer (d.h. nicht aus selbständiger theoretisch-reflektiver) Sicht als Konsequenz und gleichzeitig auch als Mittel der Konstruktion jenes Ganzen gilt, welches die holistische Aufgabe des polyhistorischen Romans geradezu vorschreibt.

Bei der Analyse der Ganzheitsproblematik ist es ebenfalls notwendig, zumindest auf die wichtigsten Elemente des dynamischen Charakters dieses holistischen Gebildes hinzuweisen. Man irrt sich nicht viel, wenn man in diesem dynamischen Charakter der polyhistorischen Romandichtung die sowohl ideengeschichtlich, wie auch romantheoretisch komplexesten und analytisch am schwierigsten zu erschließenden Probleme identifiziert. Der holistisch eingestellte polyhistorische Roman verwirklicht in seiner Realität eine ganzheitlich gestaltete Dynamik, wobei die konkrete Bestimmung derselben wiederum Produkt einer "methodischen Konstruktion"

(Broch) ist, wie dafür eben die Schlafwandler-Trilogie das geradezu klassische Beispiel abgibt. Die im polyhistorischen Roman verwirklichte Dynamik weist aber naturgemäß auch über sich hinaus auf jene Dynamik hin, die sich ausserhalb des Romans historisch abläuft. Das Verhältnis der "inneren" und der "äußeren" Dynamik weicht nicht nur in einem gewaltigen Ausmaß von dem des traditionellen Romans ab, sondern - und es ist für unsere Sicht viel wichtiger - dieses Verhältnis in seiner konkreten Ausführung wird für die konkrete inhaltliche Artikulation eines polyhistorischen Romans produktiv, es erscheint also als eine neue ästhetische Qualität. Damit hängt es zusammen, mit was für Problemen Robert Musil aus dem einfachen und trivialen, außerliterarischen Grunde zu kämpfen hatte, dass sein Gegenstand Kakanien historisch nicht mehr existierte. Dieses Faktum verhinderte ihn letztlich darin, die innere Dynamik des grossen Romans konsequent zu entfalten, sein analytischer und darstellerischer Bewegungsraum war durch dieses Faktum also durchaus eingeschränkt und es entstand für ihn der Zwang, die von ihm dargestellten menschlichen Inhalte von der Perspektive des definitiven Ausgangs von Kakanien sehen zu müssen. Auf diese Weise geriet Musil in eine merkwürdige "post-moderne" Situation, die einer weiteren eingehenden Analyse wert wäre. Jedenfalls scheint es uns durchaus notwendig zu sein, die in diesem Geiste verfassten ästhetisch-literaturwissenschaftlichen Analysen Robert Musils mit Vorliebe zum Untersuchungsgegenstand zu wählen. Musils Position wird dabei auch gefärbt, dass seine Denkweise der positivistischen Analyse schon von Anfang an sehr wenig historisch-dynamisch eingestellt worden ist und diese seine intellektuelle Veranlagung im späteren durch das Faktum des Endes Österreich-Ungarns weiter verstärkt. Ganz anders steht es bei Broch, der innerhalb des Eklektizismus seines philosophischen Diskurses im wesentlichen ein historischer Denker ist, die Dynamik seines ganzheitlichen Ansatzes stellt nicht nur einen produktiven Gegenpol zur außerwerklichen Dynamik dar, sondern durch den ins Werk selber eingebauten geschichtsphilosophischen Essay gelingt es ihm auch, die literarisch-künstlerische und die historisch-wirkliche Dynamik in einem einheitlichen Entwurf im Werke selber zu reflektieren.

Aus diesem Grunde ist es für uns eine durchaus wichtige Tatsache, dass Broch seinen großen Roman erst nach einer psychoanalytischen Behandlung anfangen konnte. Unsere diesmal rein psychologische Erklärung dafür ist, dass diese veränderte Einsicht ihn dazu bringen konnte, den homo chaoticus in den Mittelpunkt zu stellen und den Dämmerzustand als condition humaine ernst zu nehmen. Kein Zufall, dass es eben der letzte Teil des Essays "Zerfall der Werte" ist, in dem Huguenau namentlich erwähnt wird, die beiden Annäherungsweisen vereinen sich.

So lässt sich auch sagen, dass Musils homo ideologicus aus zweifachen Gründen (Ende Kakanien sowie die im Vorhinein schon eher antihistorische Einstellung des Autors) wenig Affinität zur Geschichtlichkeit hat (was die Seins- und Wirkungsweise der einzelnen ideologischen Inhalte auch durchaus beeinflusst, wenn nicht eben bestimmt), während Brochs homo chaoticus eine durchaus historische Existenz führt und seine Rationalisierungsversuche der eigenen unbewusst-chaotischen Inhalte stets von der Geschichte untrennbar erfolgen. Auf eine beinahe ironische Art ergeben sich aus diesen beiden Einstellungen auch Kontrastwirkungen. Während die historische Seinsweise von Musil fern steht, ermöglicht dieser Mangel es ihm, sich durch eine positivistische Analytik in die einzelnen Bewusstseinsstrukturen im originellen Sinne des Wortes

zu vertiefen, während auf der anderen Seite der sehr historisch denkende und erlebende Broch sich mit jener Gefahr konfrontieren muss, dass seine Gestalten in der historisch idealtypischen Darstellungsweise manchmal zur bloßen Illustration von historisch-intellektuellen Thesen werden.

In unserem Versuch haben wir nur begrenzte Möglichkeiten, nicht nur die Beschaffenheit, die Struktur, die Bewältigung der ganzheitlichen Aufgabenstellung sowie die jeweils eigene und originelle Transformation der Begriffe "Person", "Persönlichkeit" und "Identität" in ihren wesentlichen Einzelheiten miteinander zu vergleichen, sondern auch die "Aussagen", den "Gehalt" dieser Romane auch als einen "Dialog der Meisterwerke" interpretieren zu können. Uns scheint, dass sich das Paradigma der Broch-Musil-Relation auch in diesem Zusammenhang bewährt. Zunächst ist die ursprüngliche Gemeinsamkeit ihrer Aussage sichtbar. Auf der höheren Ebene artikulieren sich in vielen Variationen die Gegensätze in den Inhalten, während auf einer noch höheren Ebene wieder die Gemeinsamkeit dominiert. Denn beide registrieren am Ende dasselbe. Bei Musil scheitert der homo ideologicus, seine historisch-geistige Realität adäquat und lebensfördernd aufzuarbeiten. Ebenso scheitert aber Brochs homo chaoticus, seine unbewussten Prozesse zu verstehen, sie zu sozialisieren und in historisch gültigen Bewegungen aufzuheben, d.h. historisch emanzipativ fruchtbar zu machen. Nun wissen wir, dass diese Aussagen ihnen von der Geschichte unseres Jahrhunderts unvermeidlich aufgegeben worden ist. Der Triumph sowohl Brochs wie auch Musils besteht nicht nur darin, dass Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften und die Schlafwandler-Trilogie entstand, sondern auch darin, dass ihre Gattung des polyhistorischen Romans, die gleichzeitig der Ort realisierter neuer Identitäten Wirklichkeit geworden ist. Damit gaben sie der Geschichte eine Antwort, an die wir bei der Einsicht in die wirkliche Komplexität der Identitätsproblematik heute auch anknüpfen können.

Persons, Agents, and the End-of-life Decisions

Friderik Klampfer, Maribor

1. Introduction

Extensive discussions about the nature and value of personhood, of metaphysical and normative aspects of becoming a person and ceasing to be one, having been conducted at the very center of the debates on abortion, therapeutic human cloning, embryo experimentation, and so on, for decades have proven notoriously difficult and their insights disappointingly inconclusive. In the paper I would like to turn our attention to the other end of the life span and explore the moral implications of acknowledging to, or withholding from, someone the status of a person, i.e. a rational being, for the choice between prolonging her life and facilitating her death.

The philosophical challenge facing the opponent of euthanasia can then be put as follows: suppose the patient's decision to have her life terminated is both voluntary and prudent; further suppose that neither her decision nor the carrying out of it by a health professional violates anyone's rights or fails to discharge anyone's duties. What else could possibly make the doctor's compliance with the patient's request wrong and what other moral objections could possibly be raised against the proposal to provide a legal protection for such an option for the terminally-ill patients?

2. The "missed encounter" argument

In a series of recent papers David Velleman has tried to provide a solution to the above mentioned riddle. The following quotation introduces his ingenious idea, one which I will be primarily concerned with in this paper.

"I believe that respect for a person's dignity, properly conceived, can require us to facilitate her death when that dignity is being irremediably compromised. I also believe, however, that a person's dignity can be so compromised only by circumstances that are likely to compromise her capacity for fully rational and autonomous decisionmaking. ... One reason for my opposition (to the idea of a legal right to die) is the belief that so long as patients would be fully competent to exercise an option of being euthanized, their doing so would be immoral, in the majority of cases, because their dignity as persons would still be intact" (Velleman 1992a, 667)

We can reconstruct Velleman's argument against the permissibility (and legalization) of active euthanasia as follows:

(1) We ought to respect the dignity of every person (be it in ourselves or in others).

(2) In circumstances where a person's dignity has been irremediably compromised (circumstances of compromised dignity or CCD) and only in those circumstances, the principle of respect for a person's dignity can command us to facilitate her death.

(3) CCDs are identical with, or at least non-contingently coincide with, circumstances in which a person's capacity for fully rational and autonomous decision making is compromised (circumstances of compromised autonomy or CCA).

(3*) One cannot be in CCD, unless one is in CCA.

(4) No violation of the principle of respect for the dignity of persons can ever be morally justified.

(5) Only CCDs are CPEs (circumstances of permissible euthanasia).

Therefore (from 3 and 5)

(6) In CPEs patients will never be fully competent to exercise an option of being euthanized, i.e. as long as they are in CPE, they are not in CFC (circumstances of full competence), and vice versa.

(7) If the circumstances in which the terminally ill patients can fully competently exercise the option of being euthanized, and those in which it is permissible or even obligatory to provide them with such option, can in principle never coincide, then it makes no sense to protect such an option by means of a law.

Thus

(8) It makes no sense to provide terminally ill patients with a legally protected choice between having their life prolonged and being euthanized.

The upshot of Velleman's opposition to active euthanasia is that destroying the life of a person is morally wrong, unless its (her) dignity has been irremediably compromised; in which case, however, the person can no longer make a morally and legally binding decision to die. Let's call this the "missed encounter argument" to celebrate/emphasize the fact that, according to it, circumstances of permissible euthanasia and those of a morally legitimate decision to die can in principle never coincide. Is Velleman's argument sound? My thesis is that it is not. In my rebuttal, I will focus on the crucial premise (3). I will contend that this premise cannot stand closer scrutiny (as will become apparent when we reflect on cases like the one described below), and that we should therefore reject both the intermediate conclusion (6) and the final conclusion (8).

Consider the following situation.

"Diane Pretty, 42, has been left almost completely paralysed from the neck down by motor neurone disease. Due to her condition, she is too disabled to kill herself and the 1961 Suicide Act prevents anyone from helping her. She was diagnosed with this untreatable disease in 1999. Alone in Britain as many as 5000 people may be affected by it. Motor neurone disease is a group of ailments affecting nerve cells along which the brain delivers messages to muscles. This leads to weakness and wasting of muscles, usually first in the arms and legs, but progressively in other areas as well. Intellect, touch, smell and hearing are not usually affected. At present, Mrs. Pretty is still fully mentally competent and uses little power she has in her arm to communicate by using a machine on her wheelchair which prints out text messages. As her disease progresses, however, nerve cells in her brain and spinal cord will further degenerate. The muscles in the diaphragm essential to breathing will become paralysed, leaving her to suffocate. There is no cure for the disease, except a drug called riluzole which can slow the advance of one form. Two in 10 people are alive five years after

diagnosis and one in 10 survives more than 10 years." (from an account of Diane Pretty's legal battle in *The Guardian*)

Diane Pretty's unfortunate situation, or so I would like to claim, is an example of life (and person) that is pretty much devoid of dignity despite the fact that she is still perfectly capable of making rational and moral choices. As such it demonstrates that not all CCDs (circumstances of compromised dignity) are CCAs (circumstances of compromised capacity for autonomy), as Velleman erroneously maintains. There are CPEs (circumstances of permissible euthanasia) - other than those in which the patient's rational capacities are literally switched off due to "the pain so unbearable that one's whole life is focused on that pain" (the only situation of CCD which Velleman explicitly admits of as providing justification for the destruction of a person's life, see Velleman 1999, 618) - in which the patient's decision to die is perfectly legitimate and hence binding on others. Velleman's final conclusion is thus simply wrong.

What Velleman overlooks, in his argument, is that the concept of dignity is intimately linked to the concept of (rational) agency and that some patients lacking the capacity for (not only rational) agency (but agency altogether) may nevertheless be fully competent and autonomous decisionmakers. This insight, if correct, can be used to construct a simple argument against Velleman's conclusions along the following lines. According to Kant, "morality, and humanity, so far as it is capable of morality, is the only thing which has dignity" (Kant 1785/1981, 40-1). On one plausible construal of this thesis, only rational agents are capable of morality, and so only (rational) agents can have dignity. Since not all human beings are agents (Diane Pretty is not one), not all human beings will have dignity and not everyone's existence will command unconditional respect.

Now I can think of the two promising ways in which one can question the credibility of the intuition that by complying with Diane Pretty's request to help her die one would no longer violate the principle of respect for the dignity of every person (or that, at least, in her and similar cases, an affront to her dignity would, and should, be morally justifiable - this latter view would commit us to rejecting the premise (4)). One is to deny that Diane Pretty's decision to die is really autonomous and/or competent and hence morally and legally binding; the other is to insist that Diane Pretty has, despite appearances to the contrary, preserved her capacity for rational and autonomous agency (and, consequently, her dignity as a person). Let me take these challenges in turn.

3. Competent and/or autonomous decision-making

Is Diane Pretty's decision to die really competent and/or autonomous? It certainly seems so to her supportive relatives, to various legal representatives and judges (none of them has ever tried to dismiss her motion by appeal to this alleged defect), but is she *really* competent and autonomous? Consult, as a first approximation to a satisfying answer, the list of conditions deemed necessary for someone's competence as a decision-maker. Such criteria normally include things such as the capacity for understanding and communication, the capacity for reasoning and deliberation, and the capacity for the formation and application of a consistent and stable conception of the good, or set of values. (Buchanan and Brock 1990, 23-5) There is no evidence, either in what we know generally about different stages of the advancing

motor neurone disease, or in what we know about her particular medical condition, to suggest that Diane Pretty has lost, up to the present moment, all, most, or even some, of the above capacities, and is hence incapable of making a competent (and, consequently, legally binding) decision about her life.

The distinction I would like to uphold, between being a rational (moral) decision-maker and being a rational (moral) agent, can be drawn within the very domain of autonomy. Beauchamp and Childress (1994), for example, introduce a useful distinction between the so-called decisional and executional autonomy. A person is autonomous in the former sense if she is capable of making personal, informed choices; and she is executionally autonomous insofar as she can implement those choices. Each of the two capacities is relatively independent - a disease or detrimental effects of ageing may (as it often happens) significantly reduce (or even completely eradicate) the person's ability to implement her personal, informed choices (i.e. impede on her executional autonomy), without at the same time affecting her ability to make such choices (i.e. deteriorating her decisional autonomy). Both aspects of autonomy are, however, or so it seems in the light of the previous discussion, a necessary component of the supervenience base of dignity.

4. Autonomy pertains to decision-making, not action?

One might find my suggestion that dignity does not depend just on one's capacity for rational and autonomous *choice*, but must at least partly be grounded in one's capacity for rational *agency*, plainly false, because it contradicts Kant's treatment of autonomy as attribute of (primarily) human *wills*, not actions. Given this, are we not driven to the conclusion that one has uncompromised dignity, as long as one has preserved autonomous will, whether one is in principle capable of implementing or exercising it in action or not? Yet such a conclusion is certainly premature. Kant himself defines will as "the power to *act* (my emphasis) in accordance with one's ideas of laws or principles" (Kant 1785/1981). For him, to have will is to have power to *make things happen* for reasons, or according to policies or principles. And his idea of autonomy, as a property of the will of rational agents, is to be understood in terms of the reasons, or principles, for which we *act*. (see also Hill 1992, 84) It is constitutive of ourselves as rational/moral *agents* that we conceive of ourselves as being free - that we deliberate about what to do and make choices about our actions on the assumption that our choices and actions are up to us, i.e. that they are not causally determined by some prior causal conditions over which we can exert no control (desires, inclinations,...). So autonomy, even if primarily a property of the individual's will, is essentially connected with his agency, and its attributions only make sense in the context of practicing agents.

5. Proving too much?

One might find my claim simply too strong. If Diane Pretty were no longer a rational or moral agent, as I contend, would she then not lose her moral standing altogether (with the further implication that considerations other than what she wants would become relevant or even crucial in deciding her faith)? Let me explain. On one plausible reading of Kant, (all and) only moral agents qualify as moral patients, i.e. beings with moral status

(Hayward (1994) calls this "the patient-agent parity thesis"). But my treatment of Diane Pretty's condition as one permitting the termination of her life, my insistence that she no longer qualifies as a rational agent and that she has, consequently, lost the dignity that attaches to every person in virtue of this capacity, then not imply, that she has stopped being a moral patient as well? And if so, why believe that we owe her any compliance, why feel duty-bound to take seriously into consideration what she wants for herself, at all?

This objection, however, misses the point. The loss of the capacity for (rational and moral) agency does not entail the loss of the capacity to generate, by the power of one's will (as opposed to mere wish or desire or whim), valid moral claims on others. All my rebuttal implies is that due to Diane Pretty's condition we are no longer under moral obligation to respect her dignity (since not just her life, but her own self may be completely devoid of it). We may, however, nevertheless well be (since she is still undisputably a rational *valuer* and *decision-maker*) under an obligation to respect her (rational) *will*. To try to dissassociate the principle of respect for a person's dignity from the principle of respect for her will in such a way is neither arbitrary nor ad hoc. Kantians themselves admit that we can occasionally discharge our duty to respect the dignity of a person only by taking her life. What my account of Diane Pretty's situation suggests in addition to this is just that some of these situations will be characterized by another morally relevant feature - the fact that by doing so we will also comply with the person's own will and the judgment that underlies it. Hence even if we deny her the capacity for agency, Diane Pretty's moral status won't automatically reduce to that of a non-rational non-human animal (thereby exposing her to all kinds of morally unproblematic degrading and harmful treatments).

6. Conclusion

Let me recapitulate. In the paper I have argued, indirectly, in favor of a positive, even if qualified, moral judgment on active euthanasia (as well as proposals to legalize it). I have done so by showing that Velleman's argument for the claim that by euthanizing the terminally-ill patient we would violate either the principle of respect for his dignity or the principle of respect for his autonomy, is flawed. Dignity pertains to persons in virtue of their capacity for a rational and autonomous choice and agency. Clear-minded, competent patients like Diane Pretty have their dignity compromised, because the disease has robbed them of their capacity for agency. Unless we acknowledge, and give proper weight to, the intimate link between the concept of (as well as the value in) a person and the concept of an agent (a link that figures so prominently in Kant's moral philosophy, but is plausible enough as such), we will keep misapplying the principle of respect for dignity in all the numerous ways recorded in ethical discussions, past and present.¹

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¹ I owe thanks to Prof. Barabasova for an insightful discussion on the topic.

Integrating Conflicting Perspectives

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1. Introduction

“*Theory of mind*” describes the ability to impute mental states, such as beliefs, desires and intentions, to oneself and to other people. Usually we want to know why people did what they did and we wonder what they are going to do next. That is, everyday we try to predict and explain human behaviour. In order to do this we refer to a person’s beliefs, desires, emotions, intentions etc. Behaviour is the product of belief and desire: People do things because they *desire* something and *believe* some act will achieve it. For adults it is clear that our assumptions about reality do not necessarily match the real world; but we know, regardless of whether our beliefs are true or not, our beliefs direct our actions. In contrast, it is not until the age of 4 years that children understand that one can be mistaken about the world and that actions can be based on this false belief.

The most widely used measure for tapping these crucial changes in theory of mind understanding around 4 years is the *false-belief task* which was first devised by Wimmer and Perner in 1983. In their standard unexpected transfer task the protagonist puts an object in location A. In his absence the object is unexpectedly transferred to a different location B. Then the protagonist returns for the object, and the child is asked where he will look for the object. In order to answer correctly children must understand that the protagonist will act on the basis of his false belief rather than on the basis of reality. That is, he will look in location A and not in location B where the object actually is. Typically children pass this kind of task around 4 years of age (for a review and meta-analysis, see Wellman et al. 2001).

The umbrella term *executive functions* refers to a long list of higher cortical functions which enable the conscious control of thought and action. Ozonoff et al. (1991) describe executive functions as “the ability to maintain an appropriate problem-solving set for attainment of a future goal; it includes behaviors such as planning, impulse control, inhibition of prepotent but irrelevant responses, set maintenance, organized search, and flexibility of thought and action” (p. 1083). The anatomical correlate for executive functions is believed to be the prefrontal cortex (e.g. Luria 1966).

At about the same age that children master the false-belief task they also improve markedly in self control: Around the age of 4 years children master a host of executive function tests. An example of these tasks is the *Dimensional Change Card Sorting task* (DCCS task; Frye et al. 1995) in which cards bearing pictures that vary in two dimensions have to be sorted first according to one dimension (e.g. colour) and then according to another dimension (e.g. shape). Two target cards, each affixed to one of two sorting boxes, are used. They depict for instance a red apple and a blue pear. The test cards (red pears and blue apples) match one target card on one dimension and the other target card on the other dimension. In the pre-switch phase children are told a pair of rules, e.g. the colour rules: They are asked to sort all the

blue ones into the box portraying something blue and to sort all the red ones into the box displaying something red. Typically 3-year-olds have no problems when sorting the cards according to one dimension. In contrast, they usually have difficulties in the post-switch phase when the sorting rules change: Now the cards should be sorted according to the opposite dimension, e.g. according to shape. It is not until the age of 4 years that children continue to sort correctly after the sorting criterion has switched.

That is, at around 4 years of age children improve markedly on theory of mind tasks (like the false-belief task) and executive function tests (like the DCCS task). Furthermore, several recent studies have demonstrated correlations between theory of mind tasks and executive function tasks in the age range of 3 to 5 years (for a review, see Perner and Lang 1999). Specifically, Frye et al. (1995) and Perner et al. (2002) have reported correlations between the false-belief task and the DCCS even when age and verbal intelligence is partialled out.

Despite a host of correlational research, the specific nature of this relationship between theory of mind and executive functions is far from clear. Correlational studies cannot inform us whether this developmental link is causal. Therefore, in order to gain better insight into this developmental coincidence we put a *training study* into effect.

2. Training theory of mind and executive functions

After a pre-test, 44 children (22 girls and 22 boys) who failed one of two test questions of a false-belief task or sorted more than one card (of five) incorrectly in the post-switch phase of the DCCS were randomly allocated to one of three training groups matched for false-belief and card sorting performance. The false belief (FB) group (8 girls and 7 boys) was trained on false-belief tasks, the card sorting (CS) group (7 girls and 7 boys) was given a training on executive functions using the DCCS, and the control group (7 girls and 8 boys) was trained either on relative clauses or on Piagetian number conservation tasks.

Training started about one week after pre-test. Each child participated in two training sessions within approximately one week of each other. The post-test including three near transfer tasks (a false-belief test, a card sorting task and a control task) and one distant transfer task (a newly developed card sorting task using three different targets and three different test cards) was given about one week after the second training session. The pre- and post-test sessions were conducted by a male experimenter who was blind to the training group membership of the children. Training was carried out by a female experimenter.




Figure 1 presents performance changes between pre- and post-test on the various tasks. The data were analysed in the following way: First, in each training group *false belief* performance at pre-test was compared to post-test performance. Only the card sorting group showed a significant improvement achieving 36% correct at pre-test and 61% correct at post-test. The pre-post-comparison in the false belief group (pre-test: 40% correct; post-test: 57% correct) and in the control group (pre-test: 33% correct; post-test: 50% correct) failed to reach significance.

On the *DCCS task* the card sorting group improved markedly from 29% correct sorts at pre-test to 86% correct sorts at post-test. The pre-post-comparison (36% correct vs. 72% correct) was also significant in the false belief group. In the control group there was no significant difference between pre- and post-test. None of the training groups showed a significant improvement on the *control task*.

On the distant transfer task, the *3-boxes card sorting task*, children in the card sorting group performed better (93% correct) than the other two groups (false belief group: 70% correct; control group: 64% correct). But a significant difference was only found between the card sorting group and the control group.

Concerning the card sorting training one might suspect that children have only acquired a simple response rule like: "If the experimenter suggests playing a new game, I have to reverse my actions." But such a reversal rule cannot be applied to the 3-boxes card sorting post-test used as distant transfer task. Nevertheless, children in the card sorting group were almost perfect (93% correct) in this task, and they performed significantly better than the control group. Therefore, the transfer effects on the 3-boxes card sorting task suggest that

children learned something which goes beyond the immediate task context.

To summarize, this training study showed mutual transfer effects between theory of mind and executive functions, at least concerning the false-belief test as an indicator of theory of mind performance and the DCCS task as a measure of executive functions: The false belief training led to a significant rise in card sorting performance, and the executive training significantly increased children's performance on the false-belief task. Perhaps, neither theory of mind is a prerequisite for executive functions nor self control is a prerequisite for theory of mind. In contrast, the present results support the existence of an underlying cognitive factor which is necessary for solving the false-belief test as well as for mastering the card sorting task. Of course, we don't know what exactly children realized or learned during the training. But they might have become aware of the fact that a single entity (e.g. a certain situation or a certain object) can be represented in two different ways.

3. The perspectival relativity of representations

To master the false-belief task or the DCCS children must understand the perspectival relativity of representations. They must recognize that sometimes "...we hold different perspectives about the real world at the same time and place. The only way to bring this information into a single perspective is to mark the contents as different ways in which the world is conceived (represented), i.e., as different perspectives." (Perner et al. 2001, 5)

To clarify, a false belief is a (mis-) representation of reality and must be distinguished from the correct representation of reality. Similarly, in the DCCS the post-switch dimension provides a new perspective on the test cards which conflicts with the pre-switch dimension. In both tasks children must understand that one thing can be connected with two contradicting representations at the same time and place because the salience of the actual location of the object in the false-belief task as well as the salience of the pre-switch dimension in the DCCS prevent children from simply switching perspectives. Perhaps, this *perspective problem* (Perner et al. 2001) can explain the strong developmental relation between the false-belief test and the card sorting task.

Further evidence for this explanation comes from one of our recent experiments: As noted above, in the standard DCCS task children must sort cards, displaying for example a blue apple, first according to colour and then according to shape. If children have difficulties describing this single entity (the blue apple) first as an apple and then as something blue, visually separating the two dimensions should improve their performance. Therefore, instead of cards with, for example, blue apples, we introduced cards displaying an outline of an apple next to a splotch of blue.

We tested 32 children aged 36 to 55 months. Each child was given one of four different versions of the card sorting task: In addition to the standard version, a version with dimensions separated on test and target cards, a version with dimensions separated only on test cards and a version with dimensions separated only on target cards were used.

If colour was detached from shape on test cards children performed significantly better. Separating the two dimensions on the target cards had no significant effect. Thus, children seem to focus their attention on test cards (which have to be sorted), and disentangling the two dimensions on test cards significantly enhances children's ability to switch to another sorting criterion. This might be due to the fact that children must no longer connect one entity with two contradicting representations, that is, they must no longer distinguish between *sense* and *referent*.

This distinction between sense and reference was emphasized in 1892 by the German philosopher and logician Gottlob Frege. He noted that "the morning star" and "the evening star" both refer to one and the same entity, to the planet Venus. These two expressions denote Venus in virtue of different properties that it has (being visible at dawn or at sunset respectively).

According to Frege, the reference of an expression (e.g. "the morning star") is the actual entity corresponding to it (e.g. the planet Venus). In contrast, the sense of an expression, the "mode of presentation", refers to the cognitive concept associated with this expression. This cognitive concept is in some way objective, it is not just a subjective representation held by a single individual (Frege 1892, 29-30). Perhaps, to master the false-belief task and the card sorting task children must understand that one entity can be represented by different – in this case by contradicting – cognitive concepts. The contradiction arises from the fact that in these tasks different "modes of presentation" ("blue thing" vs. "apple"; "is in location A" vs. "is in location B") implicate different actions.

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Das Theorem der „Locked-in-Person“

Nikolaus Knoepffler, Jena

1. Das Theorem der „locked-in-person“ (TLP)

Im Folgenden soll sehr vereinfacht jedes Lebewesen eine Person genannt werden, wenn und nur dann wenn es über die Fähigkeit verfügt, sich gegenüber Wünschen erster Ordnung auf einer höheren Ebene nochmals zustimmend oder abweisend verhalten zu können. Unter dem Theorem der „locked-in-person“ (TLP) soll im Folgenden das Theorem verstanden werden, dass auch Lebewesen Personen sein können, also über oben genannte Fähigkeit verfügen, die keinerlei empirische Eigenschaften von Personsein zeigen. Sie können nach diesem Theorem deshalb als Personen verstanden werden, weil ihr Personsein sozusagen eingeschlossen ist. Es ist da, kann sich aber nicht ausdrücken, weil das Ausdrucksmedium, der Körper dies nicht zulässt. Ein bekanntes Bild hierfür stellt der taube Klavierspieler dar, der nach eigenem Empfinden wunderbare Sonaten vorspielt. Böse Jungs haben jedoch das Klavier verstimmt, sodass für das Publikum nur ein unsinniges Gelärme aus dem Klavier herauskommt. Das Publikum würde nach dem empirischen Befund schließen, dass auf dem Podium ein Nichtskönner sitzt.

Das TLP hat weitreichende Konsequenzen, sobald man folgende moralische Bewertung vornimmt: Personen, also Lebewesen mit obiger Fähigkeit, erkennen wir die fundamentalen Grundrechte auf Freiheit und Leben zu. Unter der Annahme des TLP sind dann nämlich nicht nur Menschen, die empirisch diese Fähigkeit zu zeigen vermögen, als Personen zu verstehen. Vielmehr ist es auch möglich, Menschen mit schweren geistigen Behinderungen als Personen zu verstehen. Ebenfalls ist es dann möglich, ungeborene Menschen und Kleinkinder als Personen zu bezeichnen. Allerdings stellt sich die Frage, ob das TLP überhaupt ein sinnvolles Theorem darstellt. Darum stelle ich kurz die Voraussetzung für die Annahme des TLP dar, nämlich eine dualistische Lösung des Leib-Seele-Problems (LSP). Ich werde anschließend die wahrscheinlichkeitstheoretische Plausibilität der dualistischen Annahme untersuchen und danach aufzeigen, in welcher Weise das TLP für Fragen angewandter Ethik von Bedeutung sein kann.

2. Der Leib-Seele-Dualismus als notwendige Bedingung für die Annahme des TLP

In der Diskussion des LSP geht es um eine zentrale Fragestellung: Wie sind mentale Prozesse auf physische Prozesse, mentale Zustände auf physische Zustände bezogen? Sie ist eine philosophische und nicht eine theologische Fragestellung, insofern der Begriff „Seele“ in diesem Zusammenhang nicht notwendig als von Gott geschaffen vorzustellen ist, sondern einfach das Gesamt mentaler Prozesse und Zustände bezeichnet. In der philosophischen Tradition hat es mehrere bedeutende Lösungsangebote für das Leib-Seele-Problem gegeben:

den Substanzdualismus (z. B. Platon, Descartes, Swinburne)

den transzendentalen Dualismus (z. B. Kant)

den Sprachdualismus (z. B. Wittgenstein)

den Hylemorphismus (z. B. Aristoteles)

die Zwei-Aspekte-Lehre (z. B. Spinoza)

den Monismus (z. B. Hobbes, die Mehrzahl gegenwärtiger angelsächsischer Autoren in unterschiedlichen Spielarten)

den transzendentalen Monismus (z. B. McGinn).

Wenn man nun das TLP annimmt, dann ist es notwendig, eine dualistische Lösung des LSP zu vertreten, beispielsweise in der Form der Philosophie von Descartes. Die Seele als *res cogitans* ist nach dieser Theorie eine unkörperliche Substanz (der Körper als *res extensa* wäre die körperliche Substanz). Die *res cogitans* könnte verbürgen, dass jeder Mensch notwendig Person in actu und ein konkret benennbares „Du“, ein „jemand“ ist, auch wenn die noch nicht genügend ausgebildete *res extensa* des Embryos bzw. die beschädigte *res extensa* des Menschen mit geistiger Behinderung nicht zulassen, dass der betreffende Mensch sein „Personsein“ zu zeigen vermag.

Freilich ist der Dualismus nur notwendige, nicht hinreichende Bedingung, da das TLP außerdem noch voraussetzt, dass das „könnte“ zu einem faktischen „so ist es“ wird. Man könnte ja auch als Dualist der Überzeugung sein, dass eine *res cogitans* erst in einem gehaltvollen Sinn gegeben sein kann, wenn die entsprechende *res extensa* vorhanden ist. Beispielsweise ging Dante in der göttlichen Komödie davon aus, dass das Gehirn als notwendige Bedingung vorhanden sein müsste, ehe eine Beseelung stattfinden könne.

3. Ein wahrscheinlichkeitstheoretischer Plausibilitätstest des TLP

Eine Diskussion der unterschiedlichen Lösungsangebote für das LSP kann hier nicht geleistet werden. Für unsere Fragestellung ist dies auch gar nicht nötig. Es genügt, die Frage zu beantworten, ob die dualistische Lösung des LSP zusammen mit der Zusatzannahme einer weitreichenden körperlichen Unabhängigkeit eine so signifikante Wahrscheinlichkeit für sich beanspruchen kann, dass wir das TLP als plausibel annehmen dürfen. Dazu kommt freilich noch eine weitere wichtige Überlegung. Da es sich bei der Frage nach dem TLP um ein auch moralisch relevantes Theorem handelt, so muss zudem das tutoristische Argument in Betracht gezogen werden. Da sehr viel auf dem Spiel steht, wenn wir beispielsweise Ungeborenen oder Menschen mit geistiger Behinderung den Personenstatus aberkennen würden, muss mit besonderer Vorsicht vorgegangen werden (Johannes Paul II 1995, Nr. 66). Es genügt also bereits eine relativ geringe Wahrscheinlichkeit für den Dualismus einschließlich der Zusatzannahme, um von einer Plausibilität zu sprechen. Beginnen wir, um zu einer Entscheidung zu kommen, wie wir mit behinderten und ungeborenem menschlichem Leben umgehen sollten, mit Überlegungen zur Wahrscheinlichkeit des Dualismus als solcher.

(a) Wahrscheinlichkeitswerte für den Dualismus

Was die Wahrscheinlichkeit für den Dualismus angeht, haben wir es, modern gesprochen, mit einer Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit im engen Sinn zu tun, da es sich um eine finite Wahrscheinlichkeit p handelt. Die Zustände Z lauten dann:

Z_1 : Dualismus ist wahr, mit $p(Z_1) = x$, wobei $0 < x < 1$

Z_2 : Dualismus ist nicht wahr, mit $p(Z_2) = 1 - x$

Würde man den obigen genannten LSP-Lösungen dieselbe Wahrscheinlichkeit zumessen, so wäre die Wahrscheinlichkeit (Dualismus) $p = 1/7$. Eine derartige Wahrscheinlichkeit würde einen signifikanten Wert darstellen:

Z_1 : Dualismus ist wahr, mit $p(Z_1) = 1/7$

Z_2 : Dualismus ist nicht wahr, mit $p(Z_2) = 1 - 1/7 = 6/7$

Allerdings stellt diese Zumessung von Wahrscheinlichkeitswerten bereits eine wichtige Entscheidung dar. Wer hier der Überzeugung ist, dass $p(Z_1)$ gegen Null geht, der wird das TLP ablehnen.

(b) Wahrscheinlichkeitswerte für den Dualismus unter der Zusatzannahme der Unabhängigkeit von der res extensa

Nun stellt sich das Problem aber schwieriger dar. Es genügt nicht die Annahme eines Dualismus, sondern wir benötigen noch die Zusatzannahme einer Unabhängigkeit von der res extensa des Körpers. Diese Unabhängigkeit kann aber keine totale sein, weil wir ansonsten über eine Geisterwelt sprechen könnten und überhaupt keinen Anhaltspunkt mehr hätten. Vielmehr muss eine res extensa vorausgesetzt werden, die jedoch gerade nicht Ausdrucksmedium für die res cogitans ist (unzureichende oder geschädigte Hirnstrukturen, noch nicht ausgebildete Hirnstrukturen).

Erneut haben wir Wahrscheinlichkeitswerte unter Unsicherheit zuzuordnen. Setzen wir an, dass wir mit $p = 1/2$ annehmen, dass diese Unabhängigkeit besteht, dann ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit für das TLP $= 1/2 \times 1/7 = 1/14$. Erneut muss betont werden, dass mit der Zumessung eines bestimmten finiten Werts bereits eine wichtige Vorentscheidung getroffen wurde. Wer die Wahrscheinlichkeit für die Unabhängigkeit von res extensa und res cogitans in praxi gegen Null gehen lässt erhält eine Gesamtwahrscheinlichkeit, die gegen Null geht, und wird von daher das TLP ablehnen.

(c) Die Bedeutung des Tutorismus

Hier kommt nun eine weitere Erwägung ins Spiel, der bereits genannte Tutorismus. Selbst wenn die Wahrscheinlichkeit für einen Dualismus mit Zusatzbedingung recht gering wäre, so müssten wir doch folgende Überlegung anstellen. Würden wir zu Recht eine „locked-in-person“ schützen, so wäre der Nutzen unermesslich, wenn wir davon ausgehen, dass eine Person unendlich wertvoll ist. Würden wir zu Unrecht ein menschliches Lebewesen wie eine Person schützen, obwohl es keine ist, so wäre der Schaden solange recht gering, solange dadurch nicht grundlegende Rechte von Personen verletzt werden. Würden wir dagegen eine „locked-in-person“ zu Unrecht schädigen, weil wir ihr die grundlegenden Rechte nicht zuerkennen, abgekürzt Personenwürde nicht zuerkennen, dann wäre dies ein sehr großer Schaden. Wir haben dabei zu unterscheiden, ob wir diesen Schaden als unermesslich oder als finit verstehen.

Verstehen wir den Schaden als unermesslich, und den Aufwand für den Schutz zusammen mit dem Nutzen durch diesen Schutz als finites n , dann ergibt sich:

	Z_1 : Dualismus mit Nebenbedingung ist wahr $p(Z_1) = x$, wobei $0 < x < 1$	Z_2 : Dualismus mit Nebenbedingung ist nicht wahr $p(Z_2) = 1 - x$
A_1 : Zuerkenntnis von Personenwürde	$\infty + n$	n
A_2 : Keine Zuerkenntnis von Personenwürde	$-\infty$	0

Wie sich bereits aus dieser Bewertungsmatrix ablesen lässt, ist eine Entscheidung für das TLP mit den entsprechenden moralischen Konsequenzen der Zuerkenntnis von Menschenwürde die strikt dominante Strategie, sobald der Wert von $n > 0$ ist, also diese Zuerkenntnis selbst im Fall, dass der Dualismus mit Nebenbedingung nicht wahr ist, beispielsweise gesellschaftlich mehr Nutzen als Schaden bringt. Man könnte sich zum Beispiel vorstellen, dass durch einen liebevollen Umgang mit Menschen mit geistiger Behinderung die Gesellschaft insgesamt lebenswerter und freundlicher wird. Ist $n = 0$ wie im obigen Grundtypus der Wette, dann ist die Entscheidung für die Zuerkenntnis der Personenwürde schwach dominant. Der entscheidungstheoretisch interessanteste Fall tritt ein, wenn $n < 0$ ist, denn dann gibt es keine dominante Strategie mehr. Dennoch zeigt ein Blick auf die Erwartungswerte, daß auch in diesem Fall das TLP vorzuziehen ist. Die Nutzenerwartungswerte lauten nämlich so, daß man bei einer Entscheidung für das TLP mit den entsprechenden moralischen Konsequenzen einen unendlichen Gewinn erwarten kann, im anderen Fall dagegen unendlichen Verlust macht:

$$E_U(A_1): x(\infty + n) + (1 - x)n = \infty + xn + n - xn = \infty + n = \infty$$

$$E_U(A_2): -\infty + (1 - x)0 = -\infty.$$

4. Probleme einer derartigen Lösung

(a) Einwände im Zusammenhang mit der Möglichkeit von (unendlich) vielen Personen außerhalb der empirisch wahrnehmbaren Grenzen

Ein entscheidender Einwand gegen eine derartige Lösung könnte darin bestehen, dass man das TLP dann nicht nur auf Menschen mit geistiger Behinderung und Ungeborene, sondern auch auf Tiere, ja sogar Pflanzen und ganz radikal auf unbelebte „scheinende“ Dinge anwenden kann. Die Weltreligion des Hinduismus beispielsweise würde auch Tieren eine personale Seele zuerkennen. Der Tutorismus würde einen gewaltigen Aufwand erfordern, denn wir müssten nicht nur allen Menschen, sondern auch allen übrigen Lebewesen, in der radikalsten Form allem, was ist, diese Personenwürde zuerkennen. Dies wäre praktisch unmöglich.

Eine Lösung für dieses Problem könnte darin bestehen, das TLP nur auf die Alternativen zu beschränken, die man für subjektiv wahrscheinlich hält. Ein Kriterium könnte in diesem Zusammenhang sein: Das TLP kann nur bei denjenigen Lebewesen angewendet werden, bei denen es mindestens einige Exemplare der Gattung gibt, die Personsein auch *zeigen* können.

Ein weiteres Kriterium könnte sein, dass nur für das TLP in Frage kommt, wessen Entwicklungsstand wenigstens soweit ist, dass man von einer Beseelung mit vernünftigen Gründen ausgehen kann. Auf ganz frühe, noch nicht im strengen Sinn individuierte Embryonen vor dem 14. Tag könnte das TLP dann nicht angewendet werden (Knoepffler 1999), weil noch eine Zwillingsbildung möglich ist, weil noch Chimären möglich sind, weil das Toti- und später Pluripotenzstadium noch so plastisch ist, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit für das TLP gegen 0 geht. Damit kommen auch übliche menschliche Zellen, die theoretisch wieder zu embryonalen Zellen zurückentwickelt werden können, nicht in Frage. Ebenso ist der Traduzianismus keine Alternative, wonach nur der männliche Samen Träger der Seele ist.

Man scheidet also alle Alternativen aus, die man für subjektiv völlig unwahrscheinlich hält ($p = 0$) und beschränkt sich auf diejenige Alternativen, die man für relativ wahrscheinlich hält. Diese Lösung hat freilich den Haken, dass für den gläubigen Hindu wie für denjenigen, der eine Beseelung mit der Befruchtung annimmt, die vorgeschlagene Elimination nicht annehmbar ist. Der Hindu wird auch andere Lebewesen einschließen wollen, was das Problem der Ressourcenallokation im Gesundheitswesen beispielsweise, wenn man seine Personenzuerkenntnis ernst nimmt, außerordentlich verschärft. Wer die Beseelung mit der Befruchtung annimmt, wird bestimmte medizinische Möglichkeiten wie die Gewinnung von Stammzellen aus menschlichen Embryonen und damit verbundene Heilungschancen für empirisch als Personen wahrnehmbare Menschen nicht akzeptieren können.

Diese Lösung ist darüber hinaus nicht eindeutig, weil die Fälle ungeklärt sind, in denen Menschen anenzephal geboren wurden oder durch Krankheiten und Unfälle wichtige Gehirnregionen ausgefallen sind. Nicht einmal ist geklärt, ob auf diese Weise das Hirntodkriterium überzeugend ist. Auch in diesen Fällen muss also eine Entscheidung getroffen werden, ob man dem TLP in diesen Fällen eine Wahrscheinlichkeit zuordnet, die größer Null ist.

(b) Entscheidungstheoretische Probleme

Darüber hinaus gibt es ein weiteres Problem. Wir haben oben unendliche Nutzenwerte verwendet. Die Verwendung unendlicher Nutzenwerte führt jedoch zur Verletzung grundlegender Axiome, weswegen übliche entscheidungstheoretische Ansätze auf unendliche Werte verzichten (McGlennen 1994, 124f).

Das Problem unendlicher Nutzenwerte lässt sich praktisch gut aus folgendem Beispiel ersehen. Selbst wenn die Wahrscheinlichkeit für das Personsein $p = 0,000001$ gegen den Fall des Personseins eines normalen erwachsenen Menschen ($p = 0,999$) aufzuwiegen wäre, so wären die Nutzenerwartungswerte für die beiden Optionen dennoch identisch, nämlich unendlich.

Eine Lösung könnte darin bestehen, sowohl für die Anzahl der relevanten Alternativen und für die Größe der Wahrscheinlichkeit eine endliche Zahl annehmen. Außerdem könnten wir zur Vereinfachung davon ausgehen, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass ein erwachsener normaler Mensch eine Person ist 1 beträgt

($p(Z_1) = 1$). Die Nutzenerwartungswerte könnten dann beispielsweise für das Problem einer strengen medizinischen Indikation, bei der es darum geht, ob das Leben der Mutter oder des Ungeborenen (seine Wahrscheinlichkeit, eine Person zu sein ist $p(Z_2)$, mit $0 < p(Z_2) < 1$) zu retten ist, folgendermaßen aussehen, wenn wir prinzipiell davon ausgehen, dass die Lebensrettung einer Person immer den gleichen Wert n hat, während die Nichtrettung immer den umgekehrten Wert $-n$ annimmt:

$E_U(A_1)$: Lebensrettung der Mutter: $n(Z_1) - p(Z_2)n = n - p(Z_2)n$; dieser Wert ist immer größer 0

$E_U(A_2)$: Lebensrettung des Ungeborenen: $p(Z_2)n - n$, dieser Wert ist immer kleiner 0

In einem solchen Fall ist klar, dass das Leben der Mutter Vorrang hat. Ihre Lebensrettung ist die strikt dominante Strategie. Allerdings gibt es drei mögliche Alternativen.

1. Die Mutter selbst möchte das Leben des Kindes retten. Man denke an eine Mutter, die lieber stirbt, als dass bei ihrem Kind eine Craniotomie (Zertrümmerung der Schädeldecke) vorgenommen wird.

2. Man nimmt an, dass gilt: $0 < \text{die Wahrscheinlichkeit für das Personsein des Kindes } p(Z_2) \leq 1$. Dann haben wir keine strikt dominante Strategie mehr, weil auch $p(Z_2) = 1$ sein kann.

3. Man nimmt an, dass ein Rechnen mit Nutzenerwartungswerten der Komplexität des Problems nicht gerecht wird. In diesem Fall wird man freilich selbst bessere Lösungsstrategien anbieten müssen.

Akzeptiert man, dass in bestimmten Fällen die mathematischen Überlegungen und das TLP von Bedeutung sind, dann gibt es noch viele weitere Anwendungsfälle. Bei der Entscheidung, welcher Patient als erster zu behandeln ist, derjenige mit schwersten irreversiblen Gehirnverletzungen oder derjenige mit schweren aber möglicherweise reversiblen Gehirnverletzungen ist letztgenannter vorzuziehen. Das Hirntodkriterium ist nach diesen Überlegungen ein sinnvolles Kriterium, weil die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass durch die Organgabe eine Person gerettet wird sehr hoch ist, die Wahrscheinlichkeit jedoch, dass der Hirntote eine „locked-in-person“ ist, als minimal angesehen werden kann.

Die systematische Diskussion des TLP hat damit zu wichtigen Resultaten geführt.

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„Keine Fachprüfung in Menschenkenntnis“: Wittgenstein über Person und Technik¹

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1. Vorbemerkung

Es ist eine weit verbreitete Intuition, dass denjenigen Wesen, die wir als Person bezeichnen oder denen wir Personalität zuschreiben, ein besonderer Wert zukommt und ein besonderer Schutz gebührt. So unterscheiden wir normalerweise die Kriterien, an denen sich ein angemessener Umgang mit Maschinen bemisst, von solchen, die uns beim Umgang mit Lebewesen leiten. Und unter diesen räumen wir den Wesen, in denen wir Persönlichkeit erkennen können, einen herausgehobenen Rang ein. Was aber verstehen wir unter 'Persönlichkeit'?

Mit Wittgenstein über den Begriff der Person nachzudenken, kann nicht darauf zielen, unmittelbar Kriterien zu gewinnen, um die Wesen, die als Personen gelten sollen, anhand bestimmter Eigenschaften zu identifizieren. Wittgensteins Suche nach Kriterien der Begriffsverwendung ist nicht normativ sondern deskriptiv; und zwar in dem Sinne, dass er das Feld der wirklichen und möglichen Verwendungen eines Wortes erprobt, um innere Mannigfaltigkeit und Grenzen der Wortverwendung freizulegen. Die Methode der grammatischen Beschreibung hat nicht zum Ziel, abschließende Kriterien zu identifizieren. Dennoch sind ihre Deskriptionen keine bloßen Wiederholungen des ohnehin Bekannten, im Gegenteil: sie führen vor Augen, dass der Raum einer Begriffsverwendung reichhaltiger ist als wir, getäuscht von einer zu schlichten Auffassung der Sprache, stets annehmen. Insofern sind Wittgensteins Untersuchungen, die sich im Umfeld der Begriffe Person, Bewusstsein, Wille und Schmerz bewegen, wertvolle Ansatzpunkte, um das Feld zu vermessen, in dem sich auch ethische, juristische und politische Diskussionen bewegen.

2. Sprachspiel und Gegenstand

Die Bedeutung von Worten aus dem Gebrauch und den Gebrauch als Handeln in einer Situation kenntlich zu machen, heißt in erster Linie, konkrete Gegebenheiten zu beschreiben, in denen eine bestimmte Verwendung nachvollziehbar ist, gelehrt und gelernt werden kann. Die Schilderung einer solchen Situation kann sich deshalb nicht darauf beschränken, Worte und Sätze zu bezeichnen, sondern bezieht auch die Tätigkeiten und Gegenstände ein, die mit dem Gebrauch der Worte verbunden sind. Zu den einfachsten Sprachspielen gehören Gegenstände, auf die unmittelbar hingewiesen werden kann, wie Steine verschiedener Farbe und Form. Die Regeln des 'Spiels' werden zwar nicht durch die Eigenschaften der involvierten Gegenstände bestimmt; das regelgemäße Handeln ist aber auch nicht unabhängig davon, wie die Dinge beschaffen sind und sich verhalten: "Die Prozedur, ein Stück Käse auf die Waage zu legen und nach dem Ausschlag der Waage den Preis zu bestimmen, verlöre ihren Witz, wenn es häufiger vorkäme,

daß solche Stücke ohne offenbare Ursache plötzlich anwachsen oder einschrumpfen." (PU, §142)

Der Zusammenhang zwischen der Beschaffenheit der Gegenstände und den Regeln des 'Spiels' mag zunächst sehr schwach erscheinen, es läßt sich jedoch zeigen, dass die Bedeutung von Worten, ihr Gebrauch, mit den Tätigkeiten, in die er eingebettet ist und die wiederum in bestimmter Weise mit Gegenständen bestimmter Beschaffenheit verknüpft sind, einen Gesamtkomplex bildet, dessen Teile aufeinander abgestimmt oder eingerichtet sind. So ist beispielsweise der Begriff der Zahl mit dem Erlernen des Zählens verbunden und dieses wiederum mit Gegenständen bestimmter Art. Wittgenstein notiert dazu (am 2. Januar 1948): ""Wir lernen die Bedeutung, den Gebrauch der Wörter unter gewissen Umständen. Es lernt z.B. jeder die Farbwörter in einer Welt, in welcher ..." (...) Das Problem, [das] was] uns hier beunruhigt, ist das gleiche, wie das in der Betrachtung[: "Du kannst Menschen zählen lehren, wenn die Dinge in ihrer Umgebung nicht im fortwährenden schnellen Entstehen und Vergehen begriffen sind." (...) Es ist natürlich möglich, zu sagen: "Lehre einen an Fingern, Stäbchen, Bohnen, rechnen; nicht an den Haaren eines Fells, den Tropfen eines Regengusses, den Funken eines Schmiedefeuers Aber warum? Man kann verschiedenes sagen. Eines ist: Er wird an diesen Dingen den Begriff der Anzahlen nie verstehen lernen. [D.h., nicht erlernen, die Zahlwörter zu verwenden.] D.h., die Technik des Verwendens der Zahlwörter nicht erlernen.] D.h., das Verwenden der Zahlwörter nicht erlernen.]" (WN 136,47b-136,48b)

3. Gegenstand und Person

In Wittgensteins Sichtweise bedeutete es, eine jener dem Theoretisieren eigentümlichen Verkürzungen vorzunehmen, wenn man nun begänne, das Wesen von Dingen, Zahlen und Personen zu bestimmen. Stattdessen fordert Wittgensteins Sprachspieldenken, den Gebrauch der Begriffe im Zusammenhang mit anderen Worten, Tätigkeiten und Gegenständen in seinen mannigfaltigen Formen zu erforschen.

Beginnt man damit, das Feld um den Begriff Person auszuloten, so ist zunächst einmal zu bemerken, dass das Hinweisen und Bezugnehmen auf Personen in vielen Fällen ganz ähnlich geregelt sein kann, wie das auf jeden anderen Gegenstand auch. Doch es gibt andere sprachliche Tätigkeiten, die für die Bezugnahme auf Personen eigentümlicher sind: Im *Blauen Buch* entwirft Wittgenstein ein Sprachspiel, um Kriterien für die Rede von der Identität der Person zu erproben. Er stellt eine Situation vor, in der sich alle menschlichen Körper gleichen, während bestimmte Charakterzüge von einem Körper zum anderen wandern. "Unter solchen Umständen wäre es zwar möglich, den Körpern Namen zu geben,

¹ vgl. WN 138,25a

jedoch unsere Neigung, das zu tun, wäre vielleicht ebenso gering wie die, den Stühlen in unserem Esszimmer Namen zu geben. Andererseits könnte es nützlich sein, den Gruppen von Charakterzügen Namen zu geben, und der Gebrauch dieser Namen würde *ungefähr* den Personennamen in unserer gegenwärtigen Sprache entsprechen." (BIB, S. 99)

Das Kriterium der "Charakterkontinuität" (Schulte 1989, 182) ist nur eines von verschiedenen Kriterien der Personenidentität (vgl. PU, §404). Es zeigt sich jedoch schon in diesem Gedankenspiel, dass für die Verwendung nicht die physische Identität ausschlaggebend ist: wir neigen eher dazu, das 'Unstofflich-Charakterische' als das 'Materiell-Gleichförmige' mit Personennamen zu belegen. Natürlich denkt Wittgenstein bei solchen Charakterzügen nicht an ideale Entitäten, sondern an konkrete Äußerungen des Verhaltens und Benehmens. Solche aber, so wendet er gegen Carnap ein, lassen sich nicht auf physische Gegebenheiten reduzieren. Während es Carnaps erklärtes Ziel ist, Aussagen über Psychisches auf naturwissenschaftliche Sätze zurückzuführen, Unwägbares auf Messbares (wie der Metereologe den Laubfrosch durch das Barometer zu ersetzen trachtet) (vgl. Rust 1996, 148f), zeigt Wittgenstein, dass die Sprachspiele im Bereich des Begriffs Person mit Verhaltensweisen verbunden sind, die eine andere Qualität haben und eigentümliche Schwierigkeiten aufwerfen:

"Man kann eine Veränderung eines Gesichts merken und mit den Worten beschreiben, das Gesicht habe einen härteren Ausdruck angenommen, — und doch nicht imstande sein, die Änderung mit räumlichen Begriffen zu beschreiben. Dies ist ungeheuer wichtig. — Vielleicht sagt nun jemand: wer das tut, beschreibe eben nicht die Veränderung des Gesichts, sondern nur der Wirkung auf ihn selbst; aber warum sollte dann eine Beschreibung durch Form- und Farbbegriffe nicht auch dies sein?"




Man kann auch sagen "Er machte dieses Gesicht", oder "Sein Gesicht veränderte sich so", indem man's nachmacht, — und ist wieder nicht imstande, die Veränderung anders zu beschreiben. ((Es gibt eben viel mehr Sprachspiele, als Carnap und andere sich träumen lassen.))" (BPP, I, 919-920)

Insofern wir also mit dem Begriff Person Wesen bezeichnen, die charakteristische Züge aufweisen, befinden wir uns in einem Typ von Sprachspiel (ich werde darauf zurückkommen, inwiefern es verschiedene Arten von Sprachspielen gibt), der sich auf zweifache Weise von den einfachsten Sprachspielen unterscheidet: zum einen ist das Phänomen, um das es geht, so beschaffen, dass es sich einer Explikation in physikalisch-räumlichen Begriffen entzieht, zum anderen sind die Ausdrucksformen, die wir tatsächlich einsetzen, gerade nicht von der Art empirisch verifizierbare Sätze.

4. Person, Charakter und Gesicht

Was macht Charakterzüge zu Phänomenen, die sich einer räumlich-physikalischen Sprache entziehen? Die charakteristischen Züge, die beispielsweise als Kompositionen von "Sanftheit, zusammen mit einer hohen Stimme und langsamen Bewegungen, - oder ein cholerasches Temperament, eine tiefe Stimme und ruckartige Bewegungen" (BIB, 99) beschrieben werden könnten, zeigen sich natürlich körperlich, im Ausdruck von Haltung, Stimme, Mimik. Ein Ausdruck ist aber kein fixer Zustand, der sich ausmessen ließe. Das lässt sich besonders deutlich an Versuchen zeigen, Robotern mit einem Gesicht und Minenspiel zu versehen, das diskrete Zustände in den Maßverhältnissen erzeugt, die einem

emotionalen 'Raum' korrespondieren. Der Ausdruck der Freude, des Ärgers oder der Sorge können – als statische Bilder – kaum identifiziert werden.



("Kismet" ist der Personenname (?) eines Roboters, der am MIT entwickelt wurde, um die technische Realisierbarkeit von Gesichtsausdrücken zu erforschen.)

Wittgenstein spielt solche Versuche als Gedankenexperiment durch und notiert (am 1. Januar 1948): "Ist es so, als wollte man sich einen Gesichtsausdruck vorstellen, der nicht allmählicher zarter Veränderungen fähig wäre, sondern, sagen wir, nur fünf Stellungen hätte; bei einer Veränderung ginge die eine mit einem Ruck in die andere über. Wäre nur dies starre Lächeln wirklich ein Lächeln? Und warum nicht? — Ich könnte mich vielleicht nicht so dazu verhalten wie zu einem Lächeln, Es würde mich [etwa]vielleicht nicht selber zum Lächeln bringen. Ein vollkommen starrer

Gesichtsausdruck könnte kein freundlicher sein. Zum freundlichen Ausdruck gehört die Veränderlichkeit und die Unregelmäßigkeit. Die Unregelmäßigkeit gehört zur Physiognomie. Die Wichtigkeit für uns der feinen Abschattungen des Benehmens." (WN,232,657)

Dabei ist wichtig zu beachten, dass diese nuancierte Variabilität des Benehmens auch durch keine unendlich differenzierte Auflösung in Zwischenstufen, die einen kontinuierlichen Fluss im Minenspiel erlaubte, zu gewinnen ist. Ein vollkommen animiertes Gesichtsbild, das ohne jede Einbettung in einen situativen Zusammenhang seine Gestalt veränderte, ist noch immer ein Grenzphänomen: es zeigt zwar differenzierte Ausdrucksformen, jedoch bleiben diese Formen maskenhaft, solange in ihnen kein Verhalten zu einem Gegenüber, zu einer Umgebung Gestalt gewinnt. Wittgenstein illustriert die besondere Verfassung der Umgebung, in denen die Sprachspiele von Persönlichkeit und Ausdrucksverhalten stehen, mit einem Bild, das andeutet, warum wir uns hier zwar auskennen können, dieses Auskennen aber nicht in technisch reproduzierbare Zustände umgesetzt werden kann (Notiz vom 1. Januar 1948): "Wir beurteilen eine Handlung nach ihrem Hintergrund im menschlichen Leben, und dieser Hintergrund ist nicht einfärbig, sondern wir könnten ihn uns als ein sehr kompliziertes filigranes Muster vorstellen, das wir zwar nicht nachzeichnen könnten, aber nach seinem allgemeinen Eindruck wiedererkennen." (WN,232,754)

5. Menschenkenntnis, Technik und Person

Wittgensteins Bemerkungen zur Menschenkenntnis sind geeignet, ein Licht darauf zu werfen, dass die Worte, mit denen wir von Personen und ihren Eigenschaften sprechen, in einer Weise verwendet werden, die sich von einfacheren Sprachspielen unterscheidet. Ein solches 'einfaches' Sprachspiel zu erlernen heißt, in konkreten Einführungssituationen eine praktische Kompetenz zu erlangen, die die Fertigkeit verleiht, Worte als Züge in einem 'Spiel' ein- und in Handlungen umzusetzen. Daher resümiert Wittgenstein: "Einen Satz verstehen, heißt, eine Sprache verstehen. Eine Sprache verstehen, heißt, eine Technik beherrschen." (PU,§199) Ob jemand die Bedeutung eines Wortes versteht, ist daran zu ersehen, ob er sich auf dessen 'Anwendung' versteht, ob er zeigt, dass er weiß, wie demnach zu handeln ist. Die Bedeutung von 'Platte', 'Würfel', 'Farbtafel' und 'Käsestück' sind nur dem zugänglich, der mit solchen Gegenständen den Regeln des Sprachspiels gemäß umgehen kann.

Das Phänomen der Menschenkenntnis bildet hier eine Ausnahme: "Kann man Menschenkenntnis lernen? Ja; Mancher kann sie lernen. Aber nicht durch einen Lehrkurs, sondern durch 'Erfahrung'. — Kann ein Anderer dabei sein Lehrer sein? Gewiß. Er gibt ihm von Zeit zu Zeit den richtigen *Wink*. — So schaut hier das 'Lernen' und das 'Lehren' aus. — Was man erlernt ist keine Technik; man lernt richtige Urteile. Es gibt auch Regeln, aber sie bilden kein System, und nur der Erfahrene kann sie richtig anwenden. Unähnlich den Rechenregeln." (PU,S.575)

Das Urteil des Menschenkenners, der z.B. einen echten von einem geheuchelten Ausdruck zu unterscheiden vermag, ist auf eine andere Weise gewonnen als eine Technik – etwa die des Zählens – erlernt wird. Von einer Jury gefragt, worauf sich seine Einschätzung stützt, könnte der Kenner keine Kriterien unmittelbar angeben, an denen er sie gewonnen hat und die sie nachvollziehen könnte (vgl. LS,927). Die Evidenz bleibt hier – wie Wittgenstein sagt – "unwägbar" (PU, S.575f;LS,921ff), sie ist nicht auf allgemeine Regeln zum

'Gebrauch' isolierbarer Elemente rückführbar. Das Urteil bewegt sich nicht in einem 'Systemraum', sondern in dem filigranen Muster des menschlichen Lebens.

Gleichwohl sind solche Einschätzungen nicht aus der Luft gegriffen. Wittgenstein spricht auch von kumulativer Evidenz ("Die kumulative Evidenz, die Rolle der Erfahrung. Der Erfahrene kann nicht seine Erfahrungen aufzählen." (WN,137,51b)) und meint damit die Erfahrung, die jemand gewinnt, der durch vielfach wiederholtes Betrachten und Vergleichen einen 'Blick für etwas' entwickelt (vgl. LS, 924-938). Ein solcher 'Blick' kann sehr differenziert und sicher sein. Was seine Urteile von anderen, beispielsweise denen im Sprachspiel des Messens unterscheidet (vgl. PU,§242), ist weniger die Konstanz der Ergebnisse als die Art wie sie gewonnen und vermittelt werden.

Wittgenstein notiert: "Bin ich weniger sicher, dass dieser Mann Schmerzen hat, als dass $2 \times 2 = 4$ ist? (...) Die Art der Sicherheit ist die Art des Sprachspiels." (PU,S.569) Und er deutet damit an, dass die Sprachspiele, die von Personen handeln, einen besonderen Typ von Sprachspiel bilden.

Persönlichkeit, insofern damit die Ausprägung charakteristischer Züge gemeint ist, entzieht sich der unmittelbar lehr- und lernbaren Praxis. Urteile und Einschätzungen sind hier darauf angewiesen, dass sich der Urteilende im differenzierten Muster der Verhaltensweisen auskennt; ein Auskennen, das eine im "Getriebe des Lebens" (WN,137,54a) gewachsene Orientierung des 'Blicks' zum Hintergrund hat. Die indirekte Weise, in der solche Urteile, die sich auf Personen beziehen, durch Hinweise und 'Winke' vermittelt werden, deutet darauf, dass die Sprachspiele – insofern sie als in Techniken fundierte Handlungszusammenhänge betrachtet werden – das Phänomen der Persönlichkeit nicht vollständig zu durchdringen vermögen. Und dies gehört zu unserem Begriff von Person.

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Loneragan on Person as Psychological Subject

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The turn to the subject, heralded by Kant as the transcendental turn has influenced subsequent modes of philosophizing. For Hegel, this turn has meant a shift from substance to subject. A shift from talk about substance or soul to talk about subject has brought about a new perspective in the approach to thinking about person. So instead of speaking about a soul, its acts and its objects, we speak about a subject and its conscious acts.

It is in the light of this turn that Lonergan's view on Person as psychological subject is to be understood. By psychological subject here is meant the approach to subject as subject and not as object. A person is a psychological subject because of his performance of conscious operations (I). These conscious operations thrust him into a world (II), and relate him to other persons with whom he shares a community (III). Self-knowledge makes a person's living to be authentic (IV). Through authentic living persons develop (V). And personal development involves an ongoing self-transcendence (VI) and conversion (VII). By living in a community persons exercise authority and are subject to authority whose legitimacy is based on authenticity (VIII). The exercise of his conscious acts makes a person to stand within a synthetic view of history in terms of progress, decline and redemption (IX). Lastly, there is an interdisciplinary value to the conception of person as a psychological subject since this conception sheds new light on basic issues in systematic theology such as Trinity and Christology (X).

1 A psychological subject is a subject of consciousness. By consciousness is meant not some sort of "inward look", but an "awareness immanent in cognitional acts" (Loneragan, 1997, 344). To be conscious is to be present to oneself. And by his conscious acts a person operates on different levels: there is consciousness on the level of empirical awareness. On this level we sense and perceive, imagine and feel, speak and move. There is also consciousness on the level of intelligence, where we inquire and understand, express the content of our understanding, and work out their presuppositions and implications. There is consciousness on the level of reasonability, where we reflect, marshal evidence and pass judgment on a statement as its truth or falsity, certainty or probability. And there is consciousness on the level of decision, where we deliberate about the courses of action to take, evaluate, decide on them and carry the decisions (Loneragan, 1999, 9). These levels of consciousness constitute a whole. This whole is a structure that is dynamic, self-constituting and reaches out to an object.

These structured levels of consciousness form imperatives that are all-pervasive. These imperatives are *Be attentive*, *Be intelligent*, *Be reasonable*, *Be responsible*. But to deny being attentive is pretend to be absent minded or a somnambulist, to deny being intelligent is to pretend to live on the level of a brute, to deny to have acted reasonably would mean to subject oneself to be unreasonable; and to deny to have ever been responsible would mean accepting to have always acted irresponsibly.

2 The conscious operations of a person take place not only in the world of immediate experience, but also thrust him further into another world. Apart from the world of immediacy and there is a world mediated by meaning and motivated by values.

A person's world is constituted by a realm of meaning. We may differentiate four realms of meaning: the realm of common sense, the realm of theory, the realm of interiority, and the realm of transcendence. When a person is operating in the realm of common sense, his meanings are expressed in everyday or ordinary language. If he is operating in the realm of theory, then his linguistic expression is technical. If he is operating in the realm of interiority, then his linguistic expression would be in terms of basic cognitional operations such as experience, understanding, judgment and decision, the relation between these operations and their verification in the consciously self-affirming operator. When a person operates in the realm of transcendence, his linguistic expression would be in terms of the ultimate concern that takes over his whole being (Loneragan, 1999, 257).

3 The conscious operations of a person relate him to other persons. In this relation among persons there results an intersubjectivity. Through intersubjective relations persons could live as a community when persons become subjects sharing a common field of experience; when they share a common or at least complementary way of understanding; when they have common judgments and common aims. But where there is lacking common field of experience among persons, people get out of touch. Where they lack a common way of understanding, persons misunderstand one another, suspect each other, become distrustful, and even get hostile and take to violence. Where they lack common judgments, persons are likely to live in different worlds. And where they lack common aims, persons could be working at cross-purposes (Loneragan, 1985, 5).

4 Self-knowledge makes a person's living authentic. By self-knowledge is meant that persons reduplicate the constitutive structure of their conscious intentionality. It means that they experience their operations of attentiveness, intelligence, reasonability, and responsibility. It means that they understand the dynamic structure of their attentiveness, intelligence, reasonability and responsibility. It demands that they make a self-affirmation of the operative structure of their attentiveness, intelligence, reasonability and responsibility. It demands that persons make an existential decision to implement the transcendental precepts, to make decisions based on the cumulative elements of their attention, intelligent inquiry, reasonable judgments and responsible actions. It is the fidelity to this known operative structure of our human intentionality that makes our living authentic. An unauthentic personal living would be constituted by lack of fidelity to the transcendental precepts. It would be a commitment to inattentiveness, unintelligence, unreasonableness, and irresponsibility.

5 Through authentic living persons develop. Persons develop authentically through an advance from below upwards and from above downwards. The upward development is a finality that begins with human experience and advances through inquiry to the level of understanding; and from the level of understanding facts and problems through reflection to the making of sound judgments; and from the sound judgments made to the level of existential decisions for responsible courses of action. This upward process brings about a creative process in history. For fidelity to the norms of human attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility lead to cumulatively new insights that, when committed to action, could reshape our world and bring about a progressive development.

But there is also a development from above downwards. This form of development starts with our acceptance of the invitation to fall in a love that transforms our whole being. The transforming power of love would direct persons in their deliberations and decisions, it would reinforce their making cogent judgments, it would intensify their concern for inquiry, and redirect their attention to the things that matter in life. The development from above downward brings about a healing process, a transformation of evil into good.

6 Personal development involves an ongoing self-transcendence. This ongoing self-transcendence is the constant fidelity to the transcendental precepts, to sustained attentiveness, sustained effort to be intelligent, to a constant effort to be reasonable, and to an effort to persevere in making responsible decisions. It is a sustained effort to advance from the level of attentiveness to the level of intelligence; from the level of intelligence to the level of reasonability; and from the level of reasonability to the level of informed decisions that make a person's courses of action to be responsible. The ongoing self-transcendence also involves a constant effort to withdraw from any slip into inattentiveness, unintelligence, unreasonableness, irresponsibility and the refusal to fall in love. This constant effort to resist violating the dynamic orientations of the transcendental precepts could make us experience what is meant by saying: "the price of liberty is perpetual vigilance".

7 An ongoing self-transcendence demands conversions. The conversions could be intellectual, moral and religious. A conversion on the intellectual order makes persons to distinguish between the real and the imaginary, and to know that the real is not the imaginary. The effect of this form of conversion is evident in St. Augustine when he said that it took him time to realise that the real is not simply identical with the bodily (Lonerger, 1997, 15). It is this form of conversion that makes a person to distinguish between history and legend, astronomy and astrology, chemistry and alchemy. For Lonerger the breakthrough to this conversion lies in the ability to grapple with these basic questions: "What I am doing when I am knowing? Why is doing that knowing? What do I know when I do it?" (Lonerger, 1996, 241).

The moral conversion gives us orientation to the good and valuable. When this conversion is operative, then a person's decisions would be based on the criterion of values and not on personal satisfactions, interests and tastes. A moral conversion makes a person to opt for the truly good, even in the face of conflict of choice between values and satisfaction. This conversion demands a constant scrutiny of one's intentional responses to values (Lonerger, 1999, 240).

The religious conversion is always preceded by a religious experience. It transfers a person into the world of worship. This conversion shows that a person has the capacity for a total surrender, with grounds of the heart that reason does not know.

Lonerger distinguishes Christian religious conversion from religious conversion in general. An identity of the Christian religious conversion is its inter-subjective character. It is God's love to the human person as manifested in the person of Jesus Christ. The Christian religious experience gives a person a conversion that makes him to realize that the New Testament is not just a religious document that calls for religious living, but also a personal invitation that demands an appropriate response of a personal commitment to the person of Jesus Christ as God (Lonerger, 1985, 84).

8 Persons living in community may be subject to authority or exercise authority. Authority means legitimate power. Authority belongs to the community that has a common field of experience, common and complementary ways of understanding, common judgments and common aims. Every member of a community is subject to the rule of law constituted by human attentiveness, intelligence, rationality and deliberation. But in the name of the community some persons exercise authority. Where there is authenticity in the exercise of authority, power is legitimate. But where there is unauthenticity in the exercise of authority, power lacks its legitimacy. An authentic exercise of authority has a hold on the consciences of the governed. But an unauthentic exercise of authority could invite the consciences of the governed to repudiate the claims of the rulers to rule. Persons who are subjects to authority may act authentically or unauthentically. They act authentically when they accept the claims of legitimate authority, and resist the claims of illegitimate authority. But the governed may act unauthentically if they resist legitimate claims to authority and support illegitimate claims to authority (Lonerger, 1985, 7-8).

9 The exercise of his conscious acts makes a person to stand within a synthetic view of history in terms of progress, decline, and redemption. The historical progress is conceived in terms of faithfulness of persons to the dynamics of the transcendental precepts. Persons contribute to the historical process by meeting up the exigencies of Being attentive, Being intelligent, Being reasonable, and Being responsible, in formulating and implementing policies that cumulatively improve human life.

But persons could also be agents of historical decline. The decline in human history is effected by persons when their choice of inattentiveness, obtuseness, irrationality and irresponsibility contribute to the breakdown of law and order, and promote instability.

But beyond the historical progress and decline there stands the need for redemption. The historical progress wells up into the need for redemption when human attentiveness, intelligence, reasonability and responsibility call forth a self-sacrificing love. A self-sacrificing love "can wipe out the grievances and correct the objective absurdities" (Lonerger, 1985, 10) brought about by the cumulative consequences of infidelity to the dynamic orientations of the transcendental precepts. Religion has a redemptive function in an era of crisis when it thinks less "of issuing commands and decrees and more of fostering the self-sacrificing love that alone is capable of providing the solution to the evils of decline and of

reinstating the beneficent progress that is entailed by sustained authenticity" (Loneragan, 1985, 10f.).

10 Lastly, the conception of person as psychological subject has an interdisciplinary value since it sheds light on basic issues in systematic theology such as Trinitarian and Christological understanding.

The relevance to Trinitarian understanding lies in the ability still to speak of God in terms of person, and to transpose the classical Doctrine of three persons in one God into "three subjects of a single, dynamic, existential consciousness" (Loneragan, 1996, 25). When we speak of God as person we mean that he is "somebody, someone, not something..." (Loneragan, 1996a, 125). The Christian doctrine of three persons in one God refers to three cases of somebody, who is attentive to prayers and answers them, who understands human needs, judges human actions with fairness, and intervenes in human history. Christians know that they relate to God as somebody whose presence fills them with awe, whose will they want to know, whose Word they affirm to be true, and whose command of love they want to carry out.

The conception of person as a psychological subject sheds light on the understanding of the consciousness of Christ. This makes it possible to transpose the traditional doctrine that conceives Jesus Christ as one person in two natures, as a Divine person with human and divine natures into one subject, a Divine Subject, with human and Divine Consciousness (Loneragan, 1996, 25). The transposition of the classical Trinitarian and Christological doctrines in the light of Loneragan's conception of person as a psychological subject makes it possible for us to understand, re-express and re-affirm what the Church fathers said, meant and professed in the councils of Nicea and Chalcedon to be coherent with biblical data.

To conclude, Loneragan's view on person as psychological subject is relevant for authentic living and religious understanding in a world mediated by meaning and motivated by values.

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A Dilemma for Personal Identity

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Some theories of personal identity allow persons to lose their identities in processes of qualitative change, i.e., to become a numerically different person by getting new physical and/or psychological properties. I shall call these theories *strong*. *Weak* theories, in contrast, do *not* allow for such a loss of identity. In general, weak theories put less restrictions on personal identity than strong ones. I will argue that each type of theory faces a serious problem.

Let me start with the strong theory which is built upon the notion of *psychological connectedness*. Suppose A is a person existing at a certain time, and B a person existing at a later time, then A and B are identical iff they are related by a sufficient number of direct psychological connections. According to Noonan (1989, 12-13) the following types of relations figure as direct psychological connections:

Memory: B remembers some of the experiences of A.

Intention: connections between an intention and the later act in which this intention is carried out.

Persistence: connections holding when a belief, or a desire, or any other psychological feature, persists.

Causality: any causal links between past factors and present psychological traits, including subconscious ones, such as links between childhood experiences and adult character traits, fears and prejudices.

Psychological connectedness, given by these four types of connections, is a strong criterion of personal identity. If the mind of A has changed so dramatically that B bears no specific similarity to A anymore, then psychological connectedness might have got lost. The person might have lost all memories, including the memories of past intentions. There might be no acts of B in which past intentions are carried out. No relevant belief, desire or other psychological feature might persist. And though there are probably causal links between A and the mind of B, other causal factors might have had much greater impact on B. Imagine that A's brain has been manipulated by a neuroscientist to implement new psychological features. In this case the main causal factor would arguably be the neurological manipulation itself, not the specific psychological properties of A before the manipulation.

A loss of identity can occur quite rapidly, but it can also take place as a gradual change over a relatively long period of time. David Lewis (1976, 65-67) gives the example of Methuselah who lived for 969 years (so the Bible says). Assume that at the age of 900 Methuselah has lost almost all mental properties he had at the age of 50. He has lost his memories and changed his character, turning from a happy and optimistic young guy to a grumpy, pessimistic old man. According to the theory of psychological connectedness, Methuselah at the age of 900 isn't identical to Methuselah at the age of 50 – provided that the psychological change has been large enough.

Perhaps you are still wondering, despite the previous example, whether there really is such a thing as a loss of identity. Actually, since we want to judge different theories as to whether they allow a person to become a

numerically different person, we must convince ourselves that such a transformation is possible independently of any particular theory of personal identity. In short, we must not accept the possibility of a personality transformation because our favourite theory of personal identity says it is possible. The argument goes the other way around: *first* we must accept the possibility of personality transformation, *then* a theory not allowing for that transformation can be claimed to be insufficient.

So can a person become another person? I personally am convinced by the example of Methuselah. If you are not, try to envisage more drastic changes. Imagine that not only the psychological, but also the *physical* properties of the person vary in a significant degree, which arguably happened in the case of Methuselah too. Or think again of neurological manipulation, or of serious forms of mental illness. Psychopathology provides at least *prima facie* reasons that a person can change identity, becoming a person who isn't the same as the one who existed before.

Strong theories, such as the theory of psychological connectedness, seem to be okay as far as loss of identity through qualitative change is concerned. It's possible to lose one's identity, and that's what strong theories imply. But nevertheless they suffer from a serious defect, for they don't correspond to how the notion of personal identity is commonly used. Among other things, it is used to describe the relation between *babies* and *adults*, especially when a person identifies with a baby who existed in the past. Suppose a person is watching a photo, saying "This is a picture of me when I was only one month old." Cases like this happen often enough, and they seem to be essential applications of our ordinary concept of personal identity.

Of course, there are possible worlds in which persons are *not* born as babies and don't grow up to become adults. Instead, adult people might come into existence, say, by some magical process. If you think that the concept of personal identity comprises, or should comprise, worlds like these too, then you are probably inclined to think that the identity of babies and adults isn't *essential* to personal identity. But even then your favourite theory should cope with the *possibility* of human development as we know it, and therefore with the identity of babies and adults. In fact, what we are looking for is a criterion of personal identity that fits the real world, not some possible world in which the concept of personal identity has changed too.

Unfortunately, the criterion of psychological connectedness does *not* fit with human development as we know it. If we are asking whether babies and adults are psychologically connected, the answer is likely to be no. Of the four types of connections mentioned before (taken from Noonan), the first three don't exist. I have no memories of my experiences as an one-month old baby, nor did I have an intention, at that age, which I am now carrying out. And finally, there's no persistence of a belief, or a desire, or any other psychological feature. Although the baby did have feelings of hunger, thirst and tiredness, which regularly affect me too, these feelings have not persisted during all those years.

While there's no memory, no intention, and no persistence, there are probably relations of type 4, causal connections. We expect to find causal links between the baby and the adult. Neurological processes in the baby's brain, e.g., are causally relevant to my present state of mind, if only in a remote way. This, however, suffices not to justify the claim that the baby and the adult are psychologically connected. In the absence of memory, intention and persistence, causality alone isn't enough to establish psychological connectedness.

We may conclude that according to the theory we are discussing at the moment, there's no identity of the baby and the adult. Hence it would be literally wrong if I said, "This is a picture of me when I was one month old". But this result is quite absurd. We must not sacrifice the identity of babies and adults, which is an important part of our common-sense theory of persons, and therefore of how we see ourselves. Better to sacrifice the underlying theory: the theory that personal identity is given by psychological connectedness. Though this theory is applicable to processes in which a person becomes another one by changing physical and psychological properties, it doesn't apply to the process in which a baby becomes an adult while staying the same person.

Turning to *weak* theories, however, we find them suffering from just the opposite problem. They are adequate for babies growing up to become adults, but not for Methuselah who becomes another person. As a paradigm case, let us consider *psychological continuity*, which is defined by psychological connectedness: B is psychologically continuous with A iff there's a chain of persons, beginning with A and ending with B, such that each link in that chain is psychologically connected to its predecessor.

Since I am psychologically continuous with the baby who was me, I am identical to the baby who was me. So here the theory yields the correct conclusion. But it fails to describe the transformation of Methuselah in the proper way. Given that his transformation doesn't occur in a moment but during a certain period of time, there arguably is a chain of psychologically connected persons linking Methuselah before the transformation with Methuselah after the transformation. Hence there's psychological continuity. The theory implies that Methuselah does *not* lose his identity.

It's easy to see that other weak theories give the same result. Think of the bodily criterion saying that A and B are identical iff they have the same body, where the diachronic identity of physical bodies is preferably defined by spatio-temporal trajectories: a body is identical to a body at a later time iff they are linked by a continuous trajectory. (To save the logic of identity, we would have to exclude fission and fusion, perhaps by something like the closest continuer criterion of Nozick 1981, 29-37.) According to the bodily criterion, the adult is identical to the baby, but Methuselah has again not turned into another person, because the identity of his body – defined by the body's trajectory – is conserved during the process, even when it undergoes great physical changes.

So far for naturalism. We may take a look at supernaturalism too. Maybe personal identity is constituted by the continuing existence of an indivisible soul, being the only essential part of a person, while the body is just a temporary and contingent part. This is basically the conception presented by Swinburne (1984) as the theory of classical dualism. If we assume that the soul sticks to the person from birth to death, and that it isn't affected by qualitative changes, i.e., by changes of physical or psychological properties, the dualist approach implies the

preservation of the person's identity no matter how great the physical and psychological changes may be. So the dualist approach too classifies as a weak theory of personal identity, containing the same defect as all the others.

Any theory of personal identity is either a strong or a weak one, for it either admits of the loss of identity through qualitative change, or it doesn't. If it doesn't, it's inadequate. If it does, however, it will fail to describe the relation of babies and adults as a relation of identity. Although there's no conclusive proof that any strong theory fails to do so, there's a good reason for this assumption: if the qualitative change is large enough, strong theories imply that the person has changed into some other person. But the process leading from babies to adults is just another qualitative change. In fact, it's the largest change in a person's life. Nevertheless we don't consider it a change of identity.

This is the reason why both strong and weak theories are doomed to fail. There are two kinds of processes, each involving a great qualitative change. A theory of personal identity, which could be said to be adequate, must describe these changes in different ways, one as a loss of identity, the other as a preservation of identity – although there's no essential difference between the two change processes. The main difference lies in the biological fact that every adult person has once been a baby, whereas only a few adult people go through a real change of personal identity. Since we all are familiar with the first kind of transformation, but usually not with the second one, we judge them differently as far as personal identity is concerned. And it's difficult, perhaps even impossible, to translate this contrast of attitude into a uniform theory.

A theory of personal identity that would suit both kinds of transformations would probably be a mixture of at least two theories, one for babies becoming adults, and one for adults becoming other adults. We could call such a mixture a "theory", but since it contains more than one criterion of personal identity, there are in fact more theories involved than just one. Therefore it is reasonable to adopt the view that personal identity cannot be sufficiently described by one theory alone.

Though this is a theoretical conclusion based on theoretical considerations, it's also backed by pre-philosophical discourse. People use the concept of personal identity in various ways, implicitly appealing to different identity criteria. Talking about the dead body of person X, e.g., people sometimes say, "This is X," implying that the person is just the body. But sometimes they say, "This is the *body* of X," implying that the person is *not* identical to the body. Of course, this pre-philosophical usage doesn't *force* philosophers to accept more than one identity criteria, but words like "person" and "identity" haven't been invented by philosophers. They have first been used by ordinary people. If philosophers are able to create a uniform theory that removes the ambiguity of pre-philosophical discourse, then they should have a right to replace pre-philosophical discourse by that theory. But in the absence of such a theory it may be better to retain the ambiguity.

I conclude with a short terminological remark. It's for those who doubt that babies are *persons*, and therefore hesitate to classify the identity of babies and adults as a relation of *personal* identity. As you will know, there's no agreement on what a person is. To mention just a few possibilities: some define persons simply as *human beings*, or as bearers of certain basic *rights*. Then, of course, babies are persons too. Others prefer to define

personhood through *rationality*, or *freedom*, or having *obligations*. If they are right, babies are probably no persons. But even if you deny that babies are persons, you must cope with the diachronic identity between babies and adults, however you call it. If babies are not persons, this diachronic identity is no *personal* identity, so we should give it a different name. We could provisionally call it "identity of human beings". In this terminology, my argument has not been concerned with personal identity, but with the identity of human beings.

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Strong Evaluations and Personal Identity

Arto Laitinen, Jyväskylä

1. Strong evaluations

Charles Taylor (1985a, 15-45; 1989, 25-52) draws a distinction between weak and strong evaluations. They are two kinds of evaluative attitudes persons can have towards a variety of objects of evaluation. The possible objects can vary from individual desires, emotions and acts to whole ways of life. Strong evaluations are stable preferences based on *qualitative distinctions* concerning the *worth* of the options. Strong evaluations are responses to the non-instrumental value of the options, and they can be mistaken, because the value of the options is not based on the response. By contrast, what Taylor calls "weak evaluations" cannot be mistaken. Weak evaluations make any of their objects weakly valued. This means that strong evaluations are value-based, and weak evaluations desire-based preferences. Taylor also says that strong evaluations, unlike weak evaluations, are central to one's identity. One's identity is constituted through a *strong adherence*, a strong identification with and commitment to the values. Thus strong evaluations are stable preferences that are strongly adhered to, and which are based on strong values.

Both "strong" and "evaluation" are potentially misleading terms. "Strength" does not refer to motivational strength: I can have very strong desires which I disapprove of. Values are "strong" in Taylor's sense if they are important, and the motivational strength derives from their importance to one's identity. Taylor (1994, 249) has also commented that the term "evaluation" is not an entirely happy one, because it might suggest that the value in question is dependent on the evaluations, or that the valuing must be reflective. It is also important that contrary to the suggestion of some commentators, like Owen Flanagan (1996), the value in question need not be *moral* value, but it can be prudential or existential, aesthetic or "spiritual" (Taylor 1985a, 24). There is a broad spectrum of values which can be central to one's identity. Strong evaluations can be implicit or explicit, more or less articulate and more or less reflective.

Taylor's notion of weak evaluations seems to be a mixed bag. As we saw, in his definition, weak evaluations are desire-based preferences. Yet Taylor's examples of weak evaluations are best seen as value-based preferences, but ones which are of *small value* and not central to one's identity. Here the inflationary way that Joseph Raz (1999) uses the notion "value" is helpful in that it includes also what he calls "small values". These are not based on desires, but it would be odd to call them "strong" values either. Using Raz's notion of value, we can see that Taylor's (1985a, 17) examples of weak evaluations, namely "exhilarating holiday in the north" and "relaxing holiday in the south" in fact embody values. The value of exhilaration or relaxation is not dependent on one's taking them to be valuable. It is intelligible to choose either option, they are both eligible, whereas it would not be intelligible to spend the two weeks in the nearby wasteland wiggling one's toes in the mud. It has *no* value in it, and is an unintelligible option, and it would make no sense to desire it (Taylor 1991, 36). Thus, it seems that strong evaluations differ in degree from preferences based on "small" values, and they differ in kind from preferences based on desires.

To sum up, strong evaluations are stable preferences which are strongly identified with and which are based on important values as opposed to small values and as opposed to desire-based preferences.

2. The senses of "personal identity"

How should we assess Taylor's claim that personal identity is a matter of strong evaluations?

"Personal identity" can be discussed in many senses. First of all, the question of personal identity can refer to criteria of personhood i.e. the question of what features make something a person. The classical answers are that a person is a rational animal, a linguistic animal, a moral agent or a self-conscious being. We can say that the question in this sense concerns the universal "*species-identity*" of persons, not an individual's self-identity. When Taylor says that strong evaluations are central to one's identity he does *not* mean species-identity in this sense. Yet, it may be noted that one aspect of Taylor's answer to the question of criteria of personhood is that persons are actual or potential strong evaluators.

Secondly, identity can refer to the logical relation of sameness, or as Paul Ricoeur (1992) has called it, "*idem-identity*". Identity can refer to diachronic persistence in time, i.e. numerical sameness of an object at two different points of time. Or, identity can refer to the synchronous unity of an object at one point of time. Or again, identity can refer to the exact similarity of two numerically distinct objects. In this sense of "*idem-identity*", strong evaluations are not of help, and Taylor does not really discuss the problem at all. Taylor's analysis presupposes that issues concerning *idem-identity* are already settled. Most importantly, he does not suggest that if two people have exactly similar evaluative views, then they are the same person.

Finally, "personal identity" can refer to identity in the sense of *selfhood*, or as Ricoeur calls it, "*ipse-identity*". Human beings are self-interpreting animals, or "identity-forming animals", who have practical orientations and who can suffer from identity crises (Taylor 1985a, 15-76; 1989, 25-52). Everyone has their own subjective perspective and their own life to lead, and they pose and answer questions like "Who am I really? When am I really myself?"

Being a person or a self is an active business. Having a self in a full-fledged sense means having a conception of oneself, and having conceptions is an active business. People do not have beliefs like things have properties. As Sellars (1963) has stressed, the relation of two mental episodes has to be normative if it is to count as knowledge; it cannot be merely causal. And as the "transcendental tradition" from Kant onwards has stressed, being a subject is not merely a matter of having mental contents (which could possibly be caused by the world) but being aware of the reality, taking the mental contents to be *about* the world. In addition to normativity and intentionality, the activity of self-defining is one aspect of the spontaneity of the subject. One's self-identity does not rest simply on "having features", but on one's activity, on identification with some actual or possible features. In this sense, everyone's identity is self-made. Cultural and social

mediations are of course intertwined in this self-definition, and the point in stressing the self-made nature of self-identity is not directed against these social and cultural mediations, but against the view that one's identity is a matter of given, natural features. Self-identity is a tentative result of an ongoing process of self-interpretation.

We can distinguish between a narrower and a broader notion of self-identity. First, Taylor (1989, 25-52; 1997) stresses that what we want to know when we ask "who am I" is our orientation in life. What kind of person do I want to be, what kind of goals do I have in life, what kind of things matter to me, towards what kind of things I want to have a developed sensibility? In an identity crisis, says Taylor, we need to fix the "moral map" by which we navigate our lives - we want to know where to go from here. "Practical identity" is an orientation concept. It is this "practical identity" which is wholly constituted by one's strong evaluations, by the important values that one has strong adherence to.

But there seems to be another, more comprehensive notion of self-identity, which includes more than one's orientation in life. It covers among other things one's success in living up to one's goals, and any of one's features that one identifies with. This broader notion is related to a metaphor of self-image and it includes all aspects of the self-definitions, not merely the practical ones. Often Taylor talks as if everything related to personal identity would be a matter of practical orientation. Yet some of Taylor's discussions of self-identity in fact concern this broader notion, but he has not distinguished it from what I call here practical identity (see Taylor 1991, 31-53; 1985b, 221-5, 1989, 43-52). I call this broader notion one's "self-interpretation" or "self-definition". Self-definition consists of one's *identifications with* one's actual or possible *features*. It is important that not all the features that one actually has are constitutive of one's identity. The central concept here is "identification with" (Frankfurt 1988, Taylor 1985b, 221; Ricoeur 1992). The paradigm example is addiction: I cannot help having these desires, but yet I do not identify with them, they are not really "mine". The same process of identification is possible in relation to any of my features. The function of strong evaluations in this process deserves a closer look.

3. The role of strong evaluations in self-definitions

Strong evaluations have a double role in one's self-interpretations. In addition to the direct role they have in constituting one's practical identity, strong evaluations provide the framework in the light of which other features are evaluated, and possibly identified with or disowned.

Identification does not start from scratch, it always presupposes something given that I identify with. What are these other features? We can distinguish different ways of having a feature: "first nature", value-identifications, habitual "second nature", voluntary effort and social attribution.

First, as embodied beings, we have some biological characteristics that are given in birth. These are not merely linked to our physical features but also our mental capacities. Also events after our birth can affect our natural features, our first nature: one can lose one's sight in a traffic accident, for example. These natural features are optional raw-material for one's identity.

Secondly, at the core of our self-identity is our practical identity, our identifications with culturally mediated values and goals. As we saw, these acquired

identifications play a double role in our self-definitions: indirectly our value-horizons mediate our other identifications-with. It depends on our value-identifications, which aspects of our first nature, experiences or habits we identify with and which not. But my value-identifications affect also directly the kind of person I am: there is an aspect of identity, which directly consists of value-orientations. We can call this aspect also the "ideal self", which consists of the ideal values and goals that I would wish to be able to live by. There is an element of imagination here, the goals and features that I include in my ideal self need not be something that are already I am, they are appropriated from the surrounding world.

Thirdly, persons have a second nature, a character consisting of acquired dispositions. What we do and learn by doing affects the kinds of dispositions and habits we have. Our "second nature" is different from what we were at birth, and what we would like to be, but nevertheless, this is what we have become. Theorizing one's self-identity more narrowly in terms of one's value-orientations only loses this dynamic aspect of identity-formation.

Fourth, one's habitual second nature, once formed, does not require much attention and voluntary striving. But some features belong to me through *voluntary effort*. Paul Ricoeur (1992) illustrates this with keeping one's word: when the time comes to keep one's word, I may have lost all the inclination to do it, but yet I may voluntarily stick to my word.

Finally, some features belong to me merely through attributions from others. "Being famous" or "being out of fashion" may be things that I have not striven to be or even paid any attention to. I may be aware of such socially attributed labels without identifying with them. The influence of these social attributions to one's self-image is at the basis of much discussion concerning recognition.

All these features, one's first and second nature, one's ideal self, one's voluntary strivings and one's social appearance are raw-material for identity, they are something I can identify with. Through these identifications, something that is merely a given part of first nature, second nature, voluntary effort or social attribution is transformed into my identity. There is a process of selection as to which features are *significant* enough to belong to my identity. The significant features are either positively identified with or negatively "disowned". This process of identification implicitly relies on the framework of strong evaluations: if I value, say, courage and see myself as courageous, I may identify with some of my aggressive impulses, but if not, I may see these impulses as a feature that is not genuinely "mine".

Thus, to sum up, strong evaluations are stable preferences which are strongly adhered to and which are based on important values. The role that they have in one's self-identity depends on whether we talk about *practical identity* or *self-definitions* in the more encompassing sense. Practical identity is entirely constituted by one's strong evaluations. In self-definitions strong evaluations play a double role: they are directly a constituent of one's self-definitions, and indirectly they provide the value horizon in the light of which one's other features, (natural, acquired and socially attributed) are evaluated and either identified with or disowned.

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Human Motivation in Thomas Reid¹

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1. Introduction

According to Reid (1969, 283) motives are an ens rationis. Because of that they may influence to action, but they do not act as causes or as agents, that is motives are only advisory (cf. Seebaß 1993, 329; Lehrer 1989, 210). Instead motives presuppose an efficient cause, namely an agent (cf. Rowe 1991, chapter 4), and the agent's freedom (Reid 1969, 284). In opposition to Leibniz (1994, 84-85) who defends subtle reasons Reid (1969) claims that motives have to be conscious (cf. Seebaß 1993, 269). For to "be influenced by a motive of which I am not conscious, is, ..., an arbitrary supposition without any evidence," (Reid 1969, 285)

Reid (1969, 288-290) distinguishes between animal motives, which human beings have in common with animals and which influence the will by impelling us, and rational motives, which are peculiar to rational beings (cf. Seebaß 1993, 269) and which influence the will by convincing us of what we ought to do. Only the latter are proper motives (Reid 1969, 290). Reid (1969, 287) poses contrary motives of the same kind, which differ only in quantity, like bribes of different amounts, and contrary motives of different kind, like money and fame.

According to Reid (1969, 95) motives are related to other concepts as follows: "By *principles* of action, I understand every thing that incites us to act. ... To every action ..., there must be some incitement, some motive, some reason." Reid (1969) distinguishes between (1) "mechanical principles of action", like "instinct" and "habit", where no motives are present, (2) "animal principles of action", like "appetites", "affections", and "passions", and (3) "rational principles of action". In Reid's (1969, 329) discussion of Leibniz' principle of sufficient reason Reid interprets "reason" among other things as "motive", so that in some cases "reason" can be equated with "motive".

Advocating free will Reid (1969, 283-293) criticises several postulates of the necessity doctrine of his time. I will deal with Reid's responses.

2. Reid on every deliberate action must have a motive

Reid (1969, 285) claims the truth or falsity of this thesis depends on the meaning of the word "deliberate". He distinguishes:

(i) The original meaning of the word: If a deliberate action is an action where motives are weighed, then there must be motives and also contrary motives. For otherwise they couldn't be weighed.

(ii) The common meaning of the word: If a deliberate action is an action which is done by a cool and calm determination of the mind, then there are innumerable many actions done without a motive. For if motives are marked by consciousness, then there are many unimportant actions done every day where the agent

isn't conscious of a motive. Because there are many actions performed without a motive, the common meaning of the word "deliberate" seems to be more appropriate.

According to Reid motives are marked by consciousness; for there is no proof of unconscious motives. Yet if one takes unconscious motives like Leibniz (1994, 85) to be habits, then Reid's claim turns out to be false. For one can gather evidence of habits quite easily. But one can doubt that Reid would accept habits as unconscious motives; he rather considers them as mechanical principles of action. Besides one usually knows one's habits, so that they are conscious after all. Even if they are not conscious at the moment, they can be made conscious by asking the person what kind of habits she has. Thus habits are potentially conscious.

Yet one can argue for unconscious motives: If there are words which lie on the tip of the tongue, which one is certain to know, and which need only a trigger to come to the fore, why shouldn't there be also unconscious motives which just need a trigger for becoming conscious? Reid would probably respond by claiming that such motives are no counterexamples to his position, because they are potentially conscious. Another argumentation for unconscious motives can be taken from Reid (1969, 286-287): Reid states that there is wilfulness, caprice, and obstinacy among human beings, because we have names for them. Likewise one can argue that there are unconscious motives. For we have a name for that. Yet having a name for something, for example, extraterrestrials, doesn't prove their existence.

Contrary to Leibniz (1994, 40-41) who claims that nothing is without reason Reid (1969, 285-286) postulates that there are many unimportant actions performed every day without any conscious motive. For there are many important intended goals, like paying one's debt, which can be done by several different means, like paying with this or that shilling, in which the agent has no difficulty in taking one of them despite his indifference to these means. Thus the agent is free to want this or that shilling for payment. Because Buridan's ass doesn't differ from the shilling case (Reid 1969, 285-286), the ass has no difficulty in taking one of the haystacks to cure its hunger, thereby going against Leibniz' and Locke's (1961) point of view.

Locke (1961, 220) postulates that freedom of action consists primarily in the ability to postpone the decision "till they have looked before them and informed themselves whether that particular thing which is then proposed or desired lies in the way to their main end, and make a real part of that which is their greatest good", so that the agent cannot pay his debt and Buridan's ass dies of hunger still waiting for a decisive reason to pay with this particular shilling respectively to eat this particular haystack. Yet Locke could save his action theory by maintaining à la Leibniz that there are no Buridan situations in real life.

Yet if one asked the agent why did you take this particular shilling for paying your debts, the agent would

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probably answer: I took this shilling, because I wanted to pay my debts and because this particular shilling was equally apt for this purpose as any other one. Thus there seem to be motives present in the shilling case. If one objects that the agent didn't address the question by his answer, because he didn't say why he preferred this particular shilling to the other ones, one can respond that agents don't distinguish between two kinds of motives while deliberating: Motives which speak for a particular action and motives which speak for preferring one particular action over the other ones. Agents rather consider every available motive during deliberation.

One can question the analogy. For Buridan's ass is construed in such a way that there is no reason, not even subtle ones, to prefer one particular haystack, while in the shilling case such reasons can be present. Reid (1969, 285-286) only states that each coin can be used for payment leaving the possibility open that the coins don't lie in equal distance from the agent, so that he can cite economical or habitual reasons for taking the nearest one. One can defend Reid by saying that an agent searching in his purse for a shilling doesn't perceive a difference in the distances of the shillings to himself, so that the analogy holds after all. Against this one can object that an agent arguing in this way must also be able to tell me when a difference counts. This seems difficult to me. For I cannot see how an agent can legitimate that a difference doesn't count up to a certain point and that it counts from a certain point onwards. Thus the analogy isn't perfect.

3. Reid against if there is only one motive, then this motive must determine the agent

According to Reid (1969, 286-287) motives are not the sole causes of action, because there is also wilfulness, caprice, and obstinacy among human beings. If one denies that the latter exist, one has to explain why they have names in all languages. If one, however, affirms that they exist, a single motive doesn't have to determine the agent.

Yet having a name for something doesn't prove its existence. In the case of extraterrestrials it couldn't even be evidence for its existence. In the case of wilfulness, caprice, and obstinacy, however, like in the case of human freedom of will and unconscious motives, it could be evidence for our feeling to be wilful, capricious, obstinate, and free, and for our feeling that there are unconscious motives, but not for its sole existence.

4. Reid on if there are contrary motives, then the strongest motive must prevail

Since Reid (1969, 287-291) defends agent causation, he maintains that the agent determines which motive prevails, be it the strongest or not. For contrary motives can be compared to "advocates pleading the opposite sides of a cause at the bar" where the "sentence is in the power of the judge" (Reid 1969, 288) and not in the power of the advocates.

Because the defenders of the necessity doctrine have never explained what is meant by the strongest motive (Reid 1969, 287-288), one cannot judge whether the strongest of contrary motives must prevail. Reid then argues that either we measure the strength of motives by their prevalence or by some other measure distinct from their prevalence. If we do the former, we are confronted with two possibilities: (1) If we define the strongest motive as the one which prevails, then it is true indeed that the strongest motive prevails. Yet this means no more than the

strongest motive is the strongest motive, and one still cannot judge whether the strongest motive prevails. (2) If one takes the strength of a motive to be the cause of its prevalence, and not its prevalence like in (1), one takes for granted that motives are the sole causes of actions which Reid (1969, 286-287) already has argued against. Therefore after having dismissed these two possibilities Reid does the latter and devises two tests by which the strength of motives can be tried, namely an animal and a rational test of the strength of motives. While the former consists of the competition of animal motives for prevalence, where the strength of animal motives is perceived by our feeling, the latter consists of the competition of rational motives for prevalence, where the strength of rational motives is perceived by our judgement. While animal/rational motives are strongest/weakest when tried by the animal test, animal/rational motives are weakest/strongest when tried by the rational test. Hence according to Reid the strongest motive doesn't always prevail.

The necessitarian would probably object that even if we suppose agent causation and that the agent determines which motive prevails, the prevailing motive becomes the strongest, when it is chosen, so that the strongest motive prevails after all. Although the first definition of strongest motive can be criticised, the second definition does better. For as I already pointed out Reid's argumentation against motives as sole causes of actions isn't conclusive. The necessitarian could maintain that Reid's animal and rational test of the strength of motives is no improvement to the prevalence definition. For to say with regard to the animal test that the strongest motive is the one to which the agent "can yield with ease or which it requires an effort of self-command to resist" (Reid 1969, 289) doesn't give an objective standard either by which the strength of animal motives can be measured. Besides yielding with ease is just the opposite side of the coin of prevailing. With regard to the rational test it is also not convincing to say that the strongest motive is the one "which it is most our duty and our real happiness to follow" (Reid 1969, 290), because one has to explain what the latter actually means and whether this amounts to an objective standard. Thus Reid's proposal has several weaknesses.

5. Reid on we draw conclusions from an agent's motives to his actions, as we draw conclusions from other causes to their effects

Reid (1969, 291-292) objects that we reason from an agent's motives to his actions, because agents act as if they are free, that is foolish agents prefer present small gratification, whereas wise agents prefer the greater and more distant good. Thus the analogy to cause and effect doesn't hold.

Yet acting as if they are free, doesn't prove that they are really free. For even if motives are no causes, there might be other causes which might determine the agent and which might even explain the different behaviour of wise and foolish agents. E. g. there might be genes which are responsible for the wise and foolish behaviour, in the sense that they determine the behaviour of the agent completely, so that agents are not free after all. If we take certain genes to cause certain motives which in turn cause wise respectively foolish behaviour, even the analogy to cause and effect can be saved and the necessitarian wins out.

6. Reid on if human beings are free and are not directed by their motives, then their actions can only be capricious, and rewards and punishments have no effect

Although human freedom of will may be abused by foolish and vicious agents to result in capricious actions, Reid (1969, 292) concedes, this doesn't mean that human freedom of will cannot be put to its proper use, namely to act wisely and virtuously.

If we suppose human freedom of will and see transgressions of human and divine law, this can be explained by the following: While rewards and punishments may have no effect on foolish and vicious agents, they have their due effect on wise and virtuous agents (Reid 1969, 292-293). If we, however, suppose the necessity doctrine to hold and see transgressions of law, then rewards and punishments have not been strong enough to produce obedience to the law, that is they have not functioned properly and therefore cannot be properly called rewards and punishments.

With regard to the second scenario where the necessity doctrine holds one can object that it is to be expected that rewards and punishments don't function properly in all cases; and even if there are transgressions of law, there are also many cases of obedience to the law, so that rewards and punishments work properly in these cases and can be properly called in that way.

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Cartesian Minds

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1 According to a basic dualistic conception that originated in Descartes, minds are immaterial, non-spatial and simple thinking particulars that are independent of anything material. Call this view the *Cartesian conception*, and minds thus conceived, *Cartesian minds*. In what follows I propose a new version of an argument against the Cartesian conception that can be traced back to Descartes' days (Garber and Ayers 1998, 232). The inspiration behind my version is an argument suggested by Strawson's seminal discussion of the concept of a person (1959, Chaps. 3-4). However, in both form and substance my argument takes its own course.

2 Simplicity in the sense assumed by the Cartesian conception means absolute indivisibility. As Leibniz insisted simplicity in this sense is compatible with complexity of internal structure (Rutherford 1995, 159): A complex whole may be such that it cannot exist except in its entirety. Indeed, on the Cartesian conception the properties of minds relate to them as constituents relate to wholes, and here is my starting point.

Properties of concrete particulars are respects in which these entities may be alike or differ – e.g., the similar shape but different colour of two objects. Similarly with relations, or properties of ordered n-tuples of concrete particulars – e.g., the parent-child relation in which I stand to each of my children but in which none of them stands to me (Mellor and Oliver 1997, 1). In itself this characterization is not controversial. Nevertheless, it has given rise to an age-old debate concerning the question of how the similarities and differences embodied in properties should be accounted for. One basic answer to this question, which goes back to Plato, is what has traditionally been called *realism* (Loux 1998, Chap. 1). On this view properties are a special type of entities, *universals*, that differ from particulars in that they are *repeatable* – i.e. while no particular can have distinct occurrences at the same time, numerically one and the same property can, realists maintain, be wholly and completely *exhibited* or, as they typically put it, *exemplified* simultaneously by several distinct particulars, or n-tuples of particulars, or even by other properties. According to realism then, particulars are similar or agree in attribute if and only if there is some one thing, a universal, which they literally share or have in common. And similarly with properties, and properties of properties, and so on without end.

Realism's traditional rival account, *nominalism*, denies the existence of universals, and acknowledges only the existence of particulars. Going back to Abelard, Ockham and perhaps even Aristotle, this account has two main variants. According to the first, *extreme nominalism*, concrete particulars exhaust the things that exist (Loux 1978, 6-7; Loux 1998, 58-60). Therefore, the similarities and differences between them must be irreducibly primitive features of the world that cannot be explained in more basic terms. Likewise, talk about properties of properties should be construed in ways that do not presuppose anything above and beyond concrete particulars (Loux 1998, 62-79).

On the second main variant of nominalism, *trope theory*, properties, as well as properties of properties, should be accounted for in terms of a special type of particulars, *tropes*: Where concrete particulars agree in attribute, trope theorists maintain, it is because they have similar tropes (Loux 1998, 79-82). As particulars tropes are supposed to be nonrepeatable. But unlike their concrete kin, they are taken to be *abstract* in some sense (Mellor and Oliver 1997, 121-3 and 126), and the similarities and differences between them are considered irreducibly primitive features of the world (ibid. 169-70).

3 Extreme nominalism conflicts with the Cartesian conception. For it implies that concrete particulars have no constituents of a more basic ontological status. But Cartesian minds are supposed to be ontologically structured in the sense of having such constituents. As will become clear below this difficulty may be relieved by slightly modifying the Cartesian conception. But as we shall also see, extreme nominalism raises another problem for the Cartesian conception, which resists this modification.

Trope theory too clashes with the Cartesian conception. For it considers the particularity of tropes to be acquired through location (Mellor and Oliver 1997, 136), which implies that attribute agreement should be accounted for in terms of spatial things. But Cartesian minds are supposed to be completely non-spatial.

Finally, realism does not sit very well with the notion of simplicity that the Cartesian conception assumes. For even on an Aristotelian version of realism that denies the possibility of there being uninstantiated universals (Loux 1998, 45-8), a property of a given Cartesian mind can exist independently of all other constituents of this mind – viz. as a property of a different mind. It may perhaps be possible to get around this problem by modifying the said notion of simplicity. But as I shall now show, realism raises another, insurmountable problem for the Cartesian conception.

4 According to the principle of the *identity of indiscernibles* it is impossible for numerically different concrete particulars to share all their properties. Although this principle is trivially true under trope theory (Loux 1998, 108), there are very strong reasons to consider it false under realism (Armstrong 1989, 64-70). This is therefore the majority view today as well as what I shall assume.

Call the question of what it takes for concrete particulars of the same sort to be numerically identical or distinct, the *individuation problem*. My assumption concerning the falsity under realism of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles immediately entails that, given realism, numerical diversity cannot consist of the having of at least some different properties, nor can numerical identity consist of the having of exactly the same properties. Thus, this assumption entails that, given realism, an account of the ontological structure or constitution of concrete particulars cannot solve the individuation problem if it involves only properties. Are there then any accounts of this structure that involve more

than properties, and can they solve the individuation problem?

5 Of the three accounts of the ontological constitution of concrete particulars that contemporary metaphysicians hold to be exhaustive, one, *bundle theory*, involves only properties (Loux 1978, 112-115; Loux 1998, 98-100). However, the two other accounts – *bare substratum* and *characterized particulars* – are less spartan. A basic idea of bare substratum theory is that the properties of concrete particulars must be supported by an entity, *substratum*, which is completely independent from them. Another basic idea is that the relation between a substratum and its properties – if there are such – must be the same as the relation between concrete particulars and their properties. This means that if a substratum has properties of its own, there must be another substratum that supports them, which will immediately set us off on an infinite regress. So yet another basic idea of this theory is that a substratum must be devoid of any properties of its own (Loux 1970, 235-44; Loux 1998, 93-8).

The basic idea of a representative and particularly elaborated version of characterized particulars theory, namely *substance theory*, is that concrete particulars are instantiations of a special type of universals, *kinds*, that represent irreducibly unified ways of being (Loux 1970, 193-195; Loux 1978, 158-166; Loux 1998, 117-127). This means, first, that a concrete particular's belonging to a kind cannot be analyzed in terms of its possessing given properties. But secondly, it also means that a concrete particular can be construed as a *genuine* subject of the properties associated with it. Thirdly, it means that a subset of these properties that are determined by the kind to which the concrete particular belongs, expresses its core being or essence thereby enabling it to function as the possessor of all its other properties.

6 Both bare substratum theory and substance theory hold that the bare substrata and kinds which they postulate respectively, make it possible to solve the individuation problem. Thus, according to bare substratum theory bare substrata are what endow concrete particulars with individuality, thereby rendering them distinct (Loux 1970, 192 and 242). Similarly, substance theory takes the irreducible unity represented by kinds to be reflected in concrete particulars, qua instantiations of kinds, thereby rendering these instantiations distinct (Loux 1998, 121-123). However, merely to postulate a sort of individuating entities is not yet to explain what it means for the things individuated by these entities to be identical or distinct. Ontological generosity, as Strawson most aptly put it, is no substitute for elucidation (1997, 38). Apart from this problem substance theory's approach to the individuation problem entails that instantiations of kinds must be considered numerically diverse (Loux 1978, 161), which does not seem to cohere with the fact that qua universals kinds must have numerically identical instantiations. Moreover, other versions of characterized particulars theory (Loux 1998, 129), are not better off than substance theory with respect to the individuation problem. It follows that, given realism, a proper solution to the individuation problem requires some other ontological machinery. But what can this other machinery be?

7 Going back to Avicenna and Duns Scotus, the first of what seems to be the only two possible answers to this question, is *haecceity* or *thisness* – i.e. a primitive feature of a particular, which that particular alone

possesses and which nothing else could have had either instead of or as well as it. Obviously this solution to the individuation problem does not advance us beyond the solutions offered by bare substratum theory and bundle theory. For like the latter two the “thisness” solution does not specify in an informative way *what it takes* for concrete particulars to be the same or different. Indeed, all it says concerning this question is tantamount to the claim that there is some feature of concrete particulars in virtue of which such entities are identical or distinct. But then, short of explaining – as a proper solution to the individuation problem should – what it means for concrete particulars to be identical or distinct, the “thisness” account presupposes an understanding of what this means.

The second possible answer to our question is, of course, a spatio-temporal position. A widely accepted view is that it is impossible for two distinct particulars to occupy precisely the same region of space at a given time. Consider, however, the possibility of, e.g., two objects that consist of distinct parts or particles, which mingle so that the parts/particles constituting the one fill the gaps between those constituting the other. Examples of this type show, I take it, that although the said view is not very wide of the mark, it requires some refinement or perhaps even reformulation in terms of spatio-temporal history (Hamlyn 1984, 72-75). Nevertheless I will keep to the original formulation since it will simplify my discussion without significantly affecting its main points.

If distinct particulars cannot occupy the same spatio-temporal position, then any such position is nonrepeatable – i.e. it cannot characterize more than one thing. Given realism, this means that spatio-temporal positions are not properties. But it also means that the spatio-temporal positions that particulars occupy can be considered as that which individuates them. This suggestion may be objected to on the grounds that given the widely accepted relational conception of space and time it is viciously circular: If spatio-temporal positions are determined by relations between distinct particulars they must apparently presuppose rather than explain numerical difference. However, this objection would be justified only if the relational conception of space and time requires that the individuation of spatio-temporal positions be separate from and posterior to the individuation of particulars. But insofar as the relational conception is concerned the individuation of spatio-temporal positions and that of concrete particulars may be intimately linked in much the same way as, e.g., the justification of specific deductive inferences and that of general logical rules are interrelated (Goodman 1983, 63-64) – i.e. each may require the other and be inseparable from it (Strawson 1959, 36-38). So the circularity objection is unsound. This rejoinder requires of course further elaboration. But even in its present, very sketchy form it is sufficient to block the main objection to the spatio-temporal account of individuation.

8 Since incorporeal things like Cartesian minds are supposed to be non-spatial, it is impossible to apply to them directly the spatio-temporal account of individuation. However, this does not preclude the possibility of applying this account to Cartesian minds indirectly by way of some non-spatial relation in which they stand to corporeal objects like human bodies. As examples of such relations one can bring (1) a relation of uniform regularity between mental and bodily events, (2) a nomic (or lawful) connection between such events, (3) natural supervenience (Chalmers 1995, 34-38) of Cartesian minds on bodies. However, for reasons we already saw, it is – given realism – logically possible for there to be numerically distinct Cartesian minds that are qualitatively

indistinguishable. This being the case, whatever the non-spatial relation between a given Cartesian mind and a given body, it is logically possible that there are other Cartesian minds that stand in exactly the same relation to this very same body. In Strawson's apt formulation "uniqueness of the body does not guarantee uniqueness of the Cartesian soul" (1959, 101). It follows that, given realism, it is impossible to apply the spatio-temporal account of individuation to Cartesian minds even indirectly. This being the case realism entails that no answer can be given to the question wherein the identity or diversity of Cartesian minds consists. But without an answer to this question the idea of Cartesian minds would not really make sense. For such an answer is partially constitutive of the meaning of sortals like this idea (Lowe 1989, 24-5). Thus, realism renders the idea of Cartesian minds unintelligible.

9 Unlike the supposed non-spatiality of Cartesian minds the fact that such minds are supposed to be ontologically structured is not a very central feature of the Cartesian conception. Thus, unlike the conflict between this conception and trope theory, which is due to the former feature, its clash with extreme nominalism, which is due to the latter feature, may be resolved by simply forgoing this very feature. However, such a course will not remedy the Cartesian conception. For extreme nominalism must allow for the possibility of there being distinct yet absolutely alike Cartesian minds. Otherwise it will have extremely implausible consequences – e.g., that distinct yet very similar minds, which it certainly must allow, merge into one mind when becoming, as they certainly can, absolutely alike. But then, problems analogous to those that realism faces with respect to the individuation of Cartesian minds, will also inflict extreme nominalism. And this means that this view as well renders the notion of Cartesian minds unintelligible.

10 To sum up, then, the Cartesian conception must assume either nominalism or realism, since these ontological views are jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive. However, if it assumes either extreme nominalism or trope theory it is incoherent. And if it assumes either extreme nominalism or realism it is unintelligible. Thus, the Cartesian conception is either incoherent or unintelligible or both.¹

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Are There Philosophical Answers to Psychiatric Questions?

Paul B. Lieberman, Leston Havens

Contemporary psychiatry has only one generally accepted model, that of biological – materialist explanation and treatment. But clinicians recognize that this model omits much that is important and they therefore confront a dilemma: either limit their practice to an incomplete model, or use other models which seem unfounded and speculative. Philosophical considerations may help clinicians find a way out 1) by showing the inherent limitations of biological – materialist explanations, and 2) by grounding other (psychotherapeutic) approaches on general considerations of how the mind, and in particular language, works. These general considerations include: the dependence of meaning upon environmental context, the attribution of meaning as involving sets of skills, capacities and reactions, the multiplicity of language games and therefore their individual limitations, the dependence of meaning upon our shared interests, the largely unconscious nature of mind and our necessary limitations to public criteria for mental events and processes.

1. The Hegemony of the Biological – Materialist Model in Contemporary Psychiatry

American psychiatry is now firmly committed to a nearly exclusive focus on biological – materialist models of psychiatric conditions and their treatment. This hegemony of biological approaches, and the ‘descriptive’ approaches which are intended to lay the groundwork for biological explanation and treatment, has been commented upon by many authors – both inside and outside of psychiatry.

Pharmacological and other biological treatments, such as electroconvulsive therapy, are often effective, particularly for more severe disorders where other types of treatments, such as psychotherapies, have not shown consistent benefit. But this exclusive focus has also created unease among psychiatrists and their patients. Psychiatry, after all, purports to be the branch of clinical practice which treats the whole person. The exclusive focus on biological – materialist interests has excluded many areas of patients’ lives from clinical compass.

Despite these reservations, however, for the working clinician, biological approaches seem to possess an important advantage: a clear model which is easy to understand and use. This is the model of the interlocking biological sciences: chemistry grounding physiology, physiological systems organized anatomically, disorders localized at particular points in the causal chain located inside the body. It has been spectacularly successful throughout medicine.

By contrast, there is no generally accepted, readily teachable and empirically grounded model to guide other therapeutic approaches in psychiatry. Thus, the clarity and convincingness of the biological model, and the absence of any accepted and validated alternative among the psychological therapies, have contributed to the hegemony of biological approaches in clinical work. This leaves psychiatrists with a dilemma: either adhere to the biological – materialist model which seems logically invincible but clinically incomplete, or use other clinical methods (the

psychotherapies) which are felt to be more hypothetical, less scientific and even, from a biological perspective, superfluous or frivolous.

In what follows, we shall attempt to use recent philosophical considerations to support two conclusions: 1) the biological – materialist model, rather than being necessarily valid, is in fact incomplete and inadequate, and 2) other psychological approaches to clinical understanding and treatment can be founded on very general features of mental life, and, therefore, should not be considered “hypothetical.”

2. Problems with the Biological – Materialist Model in Psychiatry

If the biological – materialist view of mind is inadequate or wrong, we should expect that there might be many ways in which it fails to fit or represent reality. And, in fact, philosophers have noted several.

First, the biological or materialist conception of mind cannot explain or model human action. Action seems to involve the causal efficacy of psychological events or processes: our thoughts, beliefs and wishes. But if such thoughts, beliefs and wishes are identified with biological states of the brain, then it is those material states which are causal, and the experienced psychological states merely ‘drop out’ in terms of their causal efficacy. Moreover, it is completely obscure how a thought, belief or wish, conceived of as a mental experience could interact with or influence any physical state, such as the movement of a limb or the forming of a word. This set of age old problems has not received any successful or generally received solution. (Kim, 1998)

Second, psychological states such as thoughts, beliefs or wishes have the property of intention: they refer to things, frequently objects outside the person whose thoughts, etc. they are. But how can one material thing – a brain state – refer to another material thing – the object outside? The brain state is merely, we imagine, an inscription; we might as well try to imagine a scratch, or a mark on paper, as referring. (Putnam, 1981) Perhaps the brain state refers because of a complex causal chain which has linked that state to previous encounters with the referred-to object. (Putnam, 1975) But this, too, is difficult to imagine. Suppose that science allowed us to establish that, after a number of exposures to an object, a correlation is set up between the appearance of that object and a pattern of brain activity. And now suppose that that brain pattern were stimulated, for example by an implanted electrode. Is it possible, whatever my ensuing psychological state, that when that brain activity occurred I meant that object? Suppose I said, “A” (the name of A): would I be meaning A? It seems clear that we would not say this: whether I meant A would depend on much else (for example, whether A was present, whether I responded to it in certain ways, whether I handled certain related concepts ‘appropriately’). Only if all these other things were true could we say that, when the appropriate brain activity is stimulated, that I meant A. And therefore, only if all these other requirements were met could we claim that the appropriate causal chain had established the object –

meaning connection. By contrast, for many objects we can readily imagine multiple ways they could be meant or referred to – and no single pattern of brain activation would be necessary.

Third, not only do thoughts, etc. refer to things, they refer to them in particular ways: they apply predicates to them, or embody a stance toward them. As Austin noted in connection with action (Austin, 1956), a crucial aspect of cognitive functioning, one which is too little considered, is the process of appraisal or appreciation. Not only do I recognize that someone is grieving, but I appreciate the depth and even the quality of his sorrow; I share his experience. Could this ‘appreciation’ be a biological – materialist event or process? If there are problems in my meaning A, for example, in the thought ‘A is f,’ there are exactly the same problems, it would seem, in my meaning ‘is f.’ For appreciating or appraising that A is f is at least as complicated and ramified a set of activities as simply recognizing the presence of A.

Fourth, it seems clear that people *experience* things: there is something it is like to be a person, and to be the particular person one is. (Nagel, 1974) Now it may not at all be true that this is a unique experience – my being me and you being you may or may not be similar or comparable – but it is at least clear that some experiencing is involved. It at least seems to be the case that, *pace* James, consciousness does exist. But just how consciousness arises from or supervenes on biological processes remains unknown.

These considerations are familiar to philosophers, and some of them were also discussed by Freud (who held a ‘dual-aspect theory’ of the relationship between mind and brain). But most contemporary psychiatrists rarely ponder them. What would happen if they did?

They would not have to give up an appropriate interest in the biological influences upon or causes of mental states. But they might feel more comfortable in thinking “outside the box” of biological – materialist explanations. If such explanations are inadequate to explicate our ordinary notions of mental life, they may be inadequate for clinical work, as well. When biological factors are recognized as causes or influences upon particular psychological states or processes, rather than as identical to them, psychiatrists may feel more justified in using other explanations and perspectives, including ones involving meaning, action and experience.

But this conclusion lacks either content or conviction. Psychiatrists may be justified, but are they? And what ‘other explanations and perspectives’ are available to compete convincingly with the biological?

3. Wittgensteinian Considerations and the Psychiatric Encounter

A useful model in psychiatry must be prescriptive: it must help the clinician to handle complex clinical situations. The biological-materialist model does guide clinicians, but only so far. Psychological models – psychoanalytic, cognitive, supportive – cover areas which are left out of biological – materialist approaches, but are also incomplete, and do not have the *prima facie* plausibility that the biological-materialist model seems to have.

Much of Wittgenstein’s work, of course, concerns our mental life. Phillips has spoken of Wittgenstein’s subject as being “the possibility of language.” (Phillips, 1999) Diamond has characterized his work as involving

“the mind” but not “empirical psychology.” (Diamond, 1991) Cavell has developed Wittgenstein’s views in many ways which, I think, emphasize his relevance to our self-understanding, and to psychological concerns. (Cavell, 1979) It does not seem too much of a stretch to wonder whether Wittgensteinian considerations might provide psychiatrists with an orientation toward mental life which is more encompassing, and more true to it.

The question I wish to ask is: If we try to collect some of Wittgenstein’s observations and reminders, can we do so in a way, or ways, which can interest or help the psychiatric practitioner?

What might a clinician learn from Wittgenstein, and from other contemporary philosophers who have followed his lead? Here are several key ideas which, I believe, are commonly identified as being ‘Wittgensteinian’. (Wittgenstein, 1958)

1. The meaning of what we say depends upon the context, or environment, in which words are uttered. Any word or group of words takes its meaning from how it is used: in what context, to achieve what purposes. This means the interpersonal context as well as the non-personal.

2. When we ascribe a thought to someone, including oneself, we are attributing to that person not the presence of an inner picture or silent sentence, or even an unconscious model. Rather, we are attributing to him or her a set of skills, capacities and reactions. Thus, someone’s knowing the meaning of a word means that she can use it appropriately and can use related concepts appropriately: that, in other words, so far as that word or set of words is concerned, she responds more or less as we all do.

3. There is not one type of language game, but there are many. While many words are names, many others are not. While the purpose of some propositions is description, the purpose of others is not. A poem is not a theorem of logic or a newspaper account.

From this it follows that words and concepts have *limited* uses. This observation is of singular importance to psychology. Wittgenstein emphasized that psychological concepts are heterogeneous. By this, I think he meant, for example, that while the report of an event, the report of a dream and the report of a pain may all appear similar, the grammars of these various ‘reports’ are different in ways that may have clinical importance. (For example, if there is some detail missing from your report of yesterday’s event, I might look for another witness; but that would not be possible for your dream or pain.)

4. What we mean follows our interests and what we care about: what we care about is shown in what we do. Wittgenstein emphasized that words take on meaning as parts of our practices and ways of living. The words we use thus reflect our natural and learned reactions; in fact, communication requires that we share such reactions. It seems a natural extension that what we care about includes other people’s interests.

5. Mind is largely unconscious. This may seem inappropriate in a list of Wittgensteinian themes, since it is a point made by Freud, not Wittgenstein. But if meaning and communication depend upon our shared reactions, and such reactions are shown only through or in our overt behavior, including speaking, then these all-important reactions and dispositions are unconscious: they are shown only by their effects; they are hypothetical entities, but necessary ones.

6. An 'inner process' stands in need of outer criteria. I think it is not clear how Wittgenstein intended us to take this famous dictum: I imagine that he rather grudgingly accepts that this way of talking has its uses. The importance of this for psychiatry is that at least one kind of uncertainty in attributing psychological predicates to people (the kind that can be formulated in the question: "How can you know whether A is really imagining, remembering, projecting, incorporating, etc., since you would have to see inside him?") is itself made unstable and of uncertain, questionable sense. If you look for evidence of criteria being satisfied *there*, you will not find them. It still leaves wide open, of course, how such words in fact are used, how difficult it can still be to know such things, or why you are "tempted" to feel shut out as you do.

How might these Wittgensteinian considerations be of use to a psychiatrist? When psychiatrist and patient meet, the psychiatrist begins to react: she hears what the patient says and how he presents himself according to her (the psychiatrist's) orientation. If that orientation is biological – materialist, the psychiatrist will be led in certain directions: to elicit symptoms, make a diagnosis, consider medication. But a clinician wanting to use other, perhaps psychotherapeutic, orientations lacks an equally clear and accepted model. It is this gap which, I believe, Wittgensteinian considerations may help to feel. Wittgenstein's investigations into the nature of the mind can orient the psychiatric clinician in several important ways.

First, it can attune him or her to the fact that every communication, every expression, receives its content or meaning, from the context in which it is uttered. Every statement is a 'move' in a language game. This means that every communication, every statement involves the relationship of at least two people – and 'involving the relationship', itself, depends upon certain usually implicit appraisals and motivations. Behind or under every 'chief complaint' and expression of distress, this feature of meaning is present. It is, therefore, always a potential focus of clinical interest.

Second, it is acceptable, in fact necessary, to keep in mind a mixture, not a synthesis or unified structure, of multiple language games. These may involve making a biological-materialist diagnosis, but they may also involve thinking about what the patient is doing, where she is coming from (psychologically, what her history has been) or what she is intending. These multiple approaches do not necessarily form a unity, although we may learn, empirically, that they share certain connections and associations.

Third, what we say and mean depends upon our interests and what Cavell has called our "routes of feeling (Cavell)." Clinically, this means that when the psychiatrist listens, what he can hear, through or in the patient's words, are his or her latent, underlying interests or intentions. This is not a hypothesis, for example, of the existence of relational elements in our current day interpersonal relationships. Rather, it is a feature of communication itself.

Fourth, the clinician is provided with certain methods or ways of focusing, which permit him or her to get to know the patient better. Understanding fully what the patient means requires knowing his or her history. For example, if we want to know *why* someone did some particular action, we must look at his or her reasons, and that means knowing about his or her past (Anscombe, 1957) Historical understanding is thus necessary to a full understanding of human behavior.

Because what we say gains its meaning only within a network of activities (forms of life) which are extended in space and time and not directly present, the clinician is attuned to the fact that what the patient means may not be obvious – to the patient or to the clinician. Even apparently simple reports of direct experiences need to be explored for their uses, their roles in patterns of activity. For example, when the patient says he feels anxious, this may appear to be a simple report of a feeling. But in fact, identifying it as anxiety already presupposes the mastery of this concept. Exploration of how this concept 'works' may provide important insight into the patient's meaning, and, therefore, world. Nussbaum, for example, has suggested, following the Stoics, that emotions are appraisals of our relationships to essential aspects of the world which are outside of our control. (Nussbaum, 2001)

Fifth, the clinician is provided with what we might call a 'meta approach' to understanding how patients change, and, therefore, how we may help them to change. To influence what the patient thinks and means must be to influence what he or she intends: his interests and routes of feeling. As Havens has pointed out, our language is rich in resources for doing this. Simple empathic statements ("How awful!") or what Havens calls "extensions" ("You must have missed him very much") are not intended to convey information, but to elicit, amplify and thus change certain reactions. (Havens, 1986)

The same may also be said for reconstructions of the past. Much debate in and about psychiatry has focused on whether the past can be truly known, for example, whether the events patients report actually occurred. But in many clinical situations there is little real doubt about the truthfulness of patients' reports of the past. The clinical question is, rather: what does it mean to be aware of the influence of the past? What role can an awareness of the past play in one's life? This question echoes one suggested by Anscombe: how do we so much as develop a concept of the past, and what does it mean to have one? (Anscombe, 1950). Her answer was that it means being able to appreciate and participate in certain activities, for example, referring to events in particular ways. More fully appreciating our own past changes our ways of seeing it, and that is another example of our changing our dispositions, reactions and "routes of feeling."

Sixth, this approach allows the clinician to keep what is valuable in empirically validated treatments, for example cognitive – behavioral approaches to various symptoms, while continuing to see them as useful techniques *within* a larger context – the context of human life, with its structures of meaning and forms of activity.

Seventh, the clinician is provided with a map of the normal, and ways of identifying and localizing the abnormal (Havens). What is normal is encoded into our ordinary uses of words: *these* ways of living, with *these* words have been found, for the most part, to 'work.' Others might work better, equally or less well. The clinician listens to the patient's uses of words and compares them with his own – his own as benchmarks for the normal. But the clinician is also always aware that a) he, too may be misusing language, b) disagreements are not usually resolved by proof or disproof, and c) many forms of life are possible.

In summary, philosophical explorations might help clarify what it means to say that the psychiatric encounter is a meeting of two people – one seeking and one offering help. Recognizing the nature of our language games helps define the broader human compass by which any, particular clinical technique is supported and sustained.

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Die juristische Person im Internationalen Privatrecht

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1. Einführung

In einer Zeit, in der aus den mannigfaltigsten Gründen die Bedeutung der einst so gewichtigen Staatsgrenzen immer mehr in den Hintergrund tritt und sich grenzüberschreitender Handel beständig von der Ausnahme zur Regel fortentwickelt, stellt sich die Frage, ob die in Geltung stehenden Rechtsnormen diese Tendenz forcieren, dulden oder gar hemmen. Die Grundvoraussetzung für die Beurteilung dieser Frage besteht darin, dass feststehen muss, welche Normen bei Sachverhalten mit relevantem Auslandsbezug überhaupt beachtlich sind. Doch schon diese Grundvoraussetzung stellt, wie zu zeigen sein wird, ein erhebliches Problem dar, denn welche von mehreren Rechtsordnungen ist in der jeweiligen Fallkonstellation anzuwenden, wird eine verdrängt oder gelten mehrere kumulativ?

Die Regeln, die in den privatrechtlichen Fällen der Kollision verschiedener Rechtsordnungen (*conflict of laws*, *conflits de lois*) bestimmen, nach welchem Sachrecht ein grenzüberschreitendes Lebensverhältnis zu beurteilen ist, werden mit dem – anerkanntermaßen etwas verwirrenden (vgl. nur Schwind 1990, 20)– Begriff „Internationales Privatrecht“ (IPR) umschrieben. Verwirrend deshalb, weil mit Internationalem Privatrecht weder eine konkrete Rechtsfrage gelöst werden (wie dies der herkömmlichen Vorstellung von Privatrecht entspräche), noch von einem nichtstaatlichen Normenkomplex die Rede sein könnte. Vielmehr ist das IPR derjenige Teil jeder nationalen Rechtsordnung, der fremde oder aber auch eigene Sachnormen zur Anwendung beruft (von Hoffmann 2000, 7).

Die Bedeutung der juristischen Person als in nahezu allen Bereichen des Privatrechts der natürlichen Person gleichgestelltes Rechtssubjekt (Gschütz 1992, 290f) ist auch hinsichtlich ihrer Teilnahme am grenzüberschreitenden Geschäftsverkehr immanent. Sie ist es, die etwa dem Verbraucher gegenüber als Vertragspartner auftritt, die ein Gewerbe ausübt, die sich an Unternehmen beteiligt, mit ihnen fusioniert u.dgl. mehr.

Um den bereits aus Platzgründen bedingten Rahmen einen schlichten *tour d'horizon* nicht zu gefährden, finden im Folgenden von den zahlreichen Erscheinungsformen der juristischen Person vornehmlich jene Beachtung, die im Handelsrecht beheimatet sind. Obwohl auch die juristischen Personen öffentlichen Rechts (Gebietskörperschaften, anerkannte Kirchen und Religionsgemeinschaften usw.) unbestritten der Privatrechtsfähigkeit teilhaftig sind, ist ihre Bedeutung hinsichtlich der Teilnahme am internationalen Geschäftsverkehr doch eingeschränkter, als dies beispielsweise bei den Kapitalgesellschaften (insbesondere GmbH, AG) der Fall ist.

Das IPR benötigt *Anknüpfungspunkte*, um einen Sachverhalt einer bestimmten Rechtsordnung zu unterstellen (vgl. Schwimann 2001, 6). Hinsichtlich der Rechts- und Handlungsfähigkeit natürlicher Personen wird die maßgebliche Rechtsordnung (das sog. *Personalstatut*) durch deren Staatsangehörigkeit, mangels einer solchen durch ihren gewöhnlichen Aufenthalt bestimmt (§ 12 iVm § 9 IPRG). Beide Anknüpfungspunkte fehlen der juristischen Person. Weder hat sie einen gewöhnlichen Aufenthalt, noch weist sie eine Staatsangehörigkeit auf (Kegel/Schurig

2000, 501: „*Ein Staatsvolk aus juristischen Personen böte ein sonderbares Bild.*“). Es gilt daher, geeignete Wesensmerkmale der juristischen Person zu finden, um auch sie einer Rechtsordnung zu unterstellen und damit die Voraussetzungen für ihre Teilnahme am grenzüberschreitenden Geschäftsverkehr zu schaffen.

2. Die Suche nach dem Personalstatut

Das Personalstatut einer juristischen Person (auch *Gesellschaftsstatut*, *lex societatis*) soll diejenige Rechtsordnung bezeichnen, nach der ihr *Bestand*, ihre *Rechtsfähigkeit* und *Organisation* und auch ihre *Außenbeziehungen* beurteilt werden (Schwimann 2001, 32). Darüber, welches Kriterium nun als Anknüpfungspunkt herangezogen werden soll, herrscht allerdings Uneinigkeit. Die Vertreter der sog. *Gründungstheorie*, die vor allem im anglo-amerikanischen und skandinavischen Raum zur Anwendung gelangt (detaillierte Nachweise bei Reithmann/Martiny 1996, 1242), sehen ausschließlich den Gründungsort (*domicil of origin*) als ausschlaggebendes Kriterium für die Zuordnung der juristischen Person zu einer Rechtsordnung. Dh., dass zB eine englische *private company*, die in ihrer Satzung (*memorandum of association*) London als *Gründungsort* angegeben hat, aus Sicht der englischen Rechtsordnung dieser auch dann noch unterworfen ist, wenn der *Unternehmenssitz* mittlerweile in Panama ist (gewisse steuerrechtliche Fragen knüpfen jedoch aus nahe liegenden Gründen traditionell an den Unternehmenssitz an; vgl. von Bernstorff 1996, 190). Daraus folgt, dass die Gründungstheorie zwar dem Interesse der Gründungsgesellschafter bestmöglich Rechnung trägt, dabei jedoch Gefahr läuft, die Schutzbedürfnisse potentieller Vertragspartner (*Verkehrsschutz*) und Gläubiger zu vernachlässigen. Diese Überlegungen aufgreifend, steht die österreichische Rechtsordnung (§ 10 IPRG) auf dem Boden der sog. *Sitztheorie*, nach der für die Beurteilung der Rechts- und Handlungsfähigkeit ausschließlich das Recht am *tatsächlichen Sitz der Hauptverwaltung* einer juristischen Person maßgeblich ist. Definiert wird der effektive Hauptverwaltungssitz als jener Ort, an dem *nach außen hin erkennbar üblicherweise die leitenden Geschäftsentscheidungen getroffen und umgesetzt werden* (Zehetner). Bloße Betriebsstätten sind demnach unbeachtlich. Gleiches gilt für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, die zwar nicht über eine geschriebene Kollisionsnorm verfügt, die das Gesellschaftsstatut bestimmen würde (Junker 1999, 505), im Wege von Rechtsprechung und Lehre aber zum gleichen Ergebnis gelangt. Angewandt wird die Sitztheorie weiters in Frankreich, Belgien und Portugal (Zehetner 1999) – Italien weist eine Mischform auf, die Schweiz hängt interessanterweise der Gründungstheorie an.

Für die Gründungstheorie spricht hauptsächlich die durch sie gewährleistete *Rechtssicherheit* – der satzungsmäßige Sitz lässt sich eindeutig und relativ problemlos bestimmen, beim Sitz der tatsächlichen Hauptverwaltung fällt dies wesentlich schwerer (so auch von Hoffmann 2000, 258). Ebenso stellt die Möglichkeit der *rechtspersönlichkeitswahrenden Sitzverlegung* einen wesentlichen Vorteil für die Gesellschaftsgründer dar.

Doch genau diese Mobilität ist es auch, die dem *Rechtsmissbrauch* Tür und Tor öffnet (Stichwort: Briefkastenfirma) und damit bereits für die Sitztheorie spricht: Denn ist die Hürde der Bestimmung des tatsächlichen Hauptverwaltungssitzes einmal genommen, gewähren die Sachlösungen der in der Folge berufenen Rechtsordnung tendenziell eine weitaus höhere Einzelfallgerechtigkeit. Das Hauptproblem der Gründungstheorie liegt demnach darin, dass sie zur Anwendung eines Rechts führt, in dessen Gebiet der zu regelnde Tatbestand nicht hineinreicht (*Kegel/Schurig* 2000, 502).

Neben diesen beiden Haupttheorien werden in der Lehre noch einige andere Lösungsansätze vertreten (insbesondere die *Differenzierungs-* und *Überlagerungstheorie*), die nach Schutzwürdigkeitskriterien teils Gründungsrecht, teils Sitzrecht zur Anwendung kommen lassen. Gemein ist diesen Versuchen trotz ihrer unbestreitbaren Vorzüge die schwierige Handhabung (zB die Unterscheidung zwischen Außen- und Innenverhältnis einer Gesellschaft) und vor allem die Konsequenz, dass ihre Realisierung zur Verfehlung des Zieles führt, die Rechtsstellung der juristischen Person *einer einheitlichen Rechtsordnung* zu unterstellen (in diesem Sinn auch *von Bar* 1991, 452). Aus diesen Erwägungen vermochten sich die genannten Theorien bis dato nicht durchzusetzen.

Abschließend bleibt in diesem Zusammenhang darauf hinzuweisen, dass gemeinschaftsrechtliche und staatsvertragliche Regelungen, sofern sie vorliegen, ebenso wie sog Eingriffsnormen (das sind zwingende staatliche Lenkungs Vorschriften, vgl *Schwimmann* 2001, 4) dem Personalstatut aufgrund ihres *Anwendungsvorranges* vorgehen.

3. Der Anwendungsbereich des Personalstatuts

Grundsätzlich beherrscht das Personalstatut einer juristischen Person diese wie gezeigt *in ihrer gesamten Rechtsstellung*, insbesondere hinsichtlich Bestand und Umfang der Rechtsfähigkeit sowie aller gesellschaftsrechtlichen Belange der inneren und äußeren Organisation (zB Mitglieder- und Organstellung, Haftungs(durchgriffs)- und Vermögensregelungen, Unternehmensverbindung (Konzern), Übertragung von Anteilsrechten, Zulässigkeit des Rückkaufs eigener Aktien usw, vgl *Schwimmann* 2000, 230). Auch die Kaufmannseigenschaft und das Firmenrecht – nicht aber die Firmenbuchanmeldung oder die Buchführung, die als öffentlich-rechtliche Konstrukte nicht dem IPR unterliegen – sind mitumfasst.

Nicht dem Gesellschaftsstatut, sondern aufgrund jeweils eigener Statuten gesondert angeknüpft werden weiters: Handels- und Verbrauchergeschäfte, Prokura und Handlungsvollmacht, Arbeitsverhältnisse, Fragen des Wertpapierrechts (weitere bei *von Bar* 1991, 441). Die Zulassung einer Gesellschaft zum *Gewerbe- und Geschäftsbetrieb* wird durch das *Niederlassungsrecht* jedes Staates, wenn auch innerhalb der Grenzen gemeinschaftsrechtlicher Zulässigkeit, autonom geregelt (*Koppensteiner* 1999).

Hingegen gelangt das Personalstatut unabhängig davon zur Anwendung, ob einer Gesellschaft Rechtspersönlichkeit zukommt (sie juristische Person ist) oder ob eine bloße Personen- oder Vermögensverbindung mit beschränkter Rechtsfähigkeit vorliegt. Dh auch die OHG, die KG und die eingetragenen

Erwerbsgesellschaften unterliegen dem Recht des Staates, in dem sich ihre tatsächliche Hauptverwaltung befindet. Reine Innengesellschaften (zB die stille Gesellschaft) unterliegen aufgrund ihres überwiegenden Vertragscharakters nicht dem Gesellschafts-, sondern dem Vertragsstatut. Gleiches müsste mE auch für die als bloße *Gelegenheitsgesellschaft* ausgestaltete ABGB-Gesellschaft gelten, der es an einer dauerhaften (Gesellschafts-)Struktur fehlt (in diesem Sinne *von Bar* 1991, 465; wohl auch *Heldrich* 2001, 2391).

Unabhängig von den demonstrativ geschilderten Ausnahmen zeigt sich dennoch, dass das Personalstatut der juristischen Person ungeachtet seines an sich durchaus beschränkten Anwendungsbereiches für das *gesamte internationale Gesellschaftsrecht* – wenn auch teils in *analoger* Anwendung – fruchtbar gemacht wird (vgl *Schwimmann* 2001, 56).

4. Personalstatut und Konzern

Aufgrund der besonderen Bedeutung der zunehmenden internationalen Unternehmensverflechtungen erscheint eine kurze Bemerkung zur Behandlung des Konzerns trotz des vorgegebenen, äußerst knappen Umfangs unerlässlich.

Beim Konzern als einem *Zusammenschluss mehrerer rechtlich selbständiger Unternehmen* unterliegt grundsätzlich jedes Unternehmen weiterhin seinem eigenen Gesellschaftsstatut (siehe zuvor, weiters *von Hoffmann* 2000, 262-263). Betrifft eine Rechtsfrage die gesamte grenzüberschreitende Unternehmensverbindung, so unterliegen im Fall des *Unterordnungskonzerns* (ein herrschendes Unternehmen steht einem oder mehreren abhängigen gegenüber) die Beziehungen zum herrschenden Unternehmen dem Recht des/der abhängigen Unternehmen(s), ansonsten jeweils dem Recht der *hauptbetroffenen Gesellschaft*. Die Privilegierung abhängiger Unternehmen erscheint dabei vor allem aus nahe liegenden Schutzgedanken (man denke etwa an die Einräumung von Weisungsbefugnissen) plausibel.

Im Fall des *Gleichordnungskonzerns* gibt es aufgrund der fehlenden Abhängigkeit der Unternehmen untereinander keine hauptbetroffene Gesellschaft, sodass zwangsläufig alle Gesellschaftsstatute *kumulativ* berücksichtigt werden müssen, was in der Praxis freilich zu erheblichen Schwierigkeiten und unbefriedigenden Ergebnissen führen kann (Details bei *von Bar* 1991, 467f).

5. Vereinbarkeit von Sitztheorie und Niederlassungsfreiheit

Wie bereits dargelegt, liegt der markanteste Schönheitsfehler der herrschenden Sitztheorie in ihrer ausgesprochenen *Mobilitätsfeindlichkeit*. Mit der *Sitzverlegung* in einen Staat, in dem die Sitztheorie herrscht, geht zwangsläufig auch eine Änderung des Personalstatuts einher. An einem praktischen Beispiel illustriert, hat dies für eine liechtensteinische Anstalt zur Folge, dass sie in Österreich (obwohl sie durchaus mit der GmbH vergleichbar ist), nur durch Neugründung und entsprechende Firmenbucheintragung Rechtspersönlichkeit erlangen kann (vgl BGH 1986). Dies freilich mit der höchst unangenehmen Folge, aller „Begünstigungen“ des bisherigen Personalstatuts insbesondere hinsichtlich Kapitalausstattung, steuerrechtlicher Vorschriften, Haftung und Arbeitnehmermitbestimmung verlustig zu gehen. Die

Möglichkeit einer identitätswahrenden Sitzverlegung durch *formändernde Umwandlung* (§§ 239f und 245f AktG) wurde zwar etwa in der deutschen Lehre diskutiert (vgl. Nachweise bei *Reithmann/Martiny* 1996, 1259), konnte sich jedoch, soweit ersichtlich, nicht etablieren.

Besonders problematisch erscheint die diesbezügliche „Härte“ der Sitztheorie hinsichtlich der durch den EG-Vertrag gewährleisteten Niederlassungsfreiheit (Artt 43 und 48 EGV).

Während der Europäische Gerichtshof (EuGH 1988, *Daily-Mail-Fall*) hinsichtlich der *Gesellschaftssitzverlegung* bisher durchaus akzeptiert hat, dass die einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten hierfür besondere Voraussetzungen vorsehen (wie eben die Verlegung des effektiven Verwaltungssitzes als Voraussetzung für die Verleihung inländischer Rechtsfähigkeit iSd Sitztheorie), akzeptiert er solche Beschränkungen für die Errichtung von *Zweigniederlassungen* (EuGH 1999, *Centros-Fall*) nicht.

Im zuletzt genannten *Centros-Fall* hatte ein dänisches Ehepaar *rechtswirksam* in England eine *private limited company* gegründet und beabsichtigte in der Folge, eine Zweigniederlassung dieser Gesellschaft in Dänemark zu errichten. Unbestrittenermaßen bestand der einzige Zweck dieser Konstruktion darin, die dänischen Kapitalaufbringungsvorschriften zu *umgehen* (beachte: England sieht für diese Gesellschaftsform kein Mindestkapital vor!) und schließlich ungeachtet dessen in Dänemark mittels „Zweigniederlassung“ die ausschließliche Unternehmenstätigkeit zu entfalten (klassischer Fall einer *pseudo-foreign company*). Obwohl die Eintragung einer Zweigniederlassung im Sinne der *sekundären Niederlassungsfreiheit* gemeinschaftsrechtlich geschützt ist, weigerte sich die dänische Zentralverwaltung, die Firmenbucheintragung vorzunehmen und begründete dies damit, dass die Umgehung der Kapitalaufbringungsvorschriften eine missbräuchliche Ausnutzung des Niederlassungsrechts darstelle. Der EuGH sprach in seiner Entscheidung jedoch klar aus, dass die Mitgliedstaaten zwar berechtigt seien, geeignete Maßnahmen zu treffen, um *Betrügereien* zu verhindern, von solchen könne aber im gegenständlichen Fall nicht gesprochen werden. Vielmehr hätten die klagenden Eheleute *legitimerweise* versucht, von den liberaleren gesellschaftsrechtlichen Vorschriften eines anderen Mitgliedstaates zu profitieren.

Die Reaktionen auf dieses Urteil waren kontrovers (vgl. die Nachweise bei *Schwimmann* 2001, 60) und es wurde sogar die Ansicht vertreten, die Sitztheorie wäre im Lichte der *Centros*-Entscheidung nicht mehr mit der Niederlassungsfreiheit vereinbar. *Schwimmann* (2000, 230f) führte die unterschiedlichen Meinungen vor allem auf den sprachlichen „*Orakelstil*“ des Urteils zurück.

Bei nüchterner Betrachtung stellt sich jedenfalls heraus, dass es der EuGH in auffälliger Weise vermieden hat (vgl. *Roth* 1990, 381f), umfangreiche *kollisionsrechtliche* Ausführungen zu tätigen, von deren Notwendigkeit im Falle einer Grundsatz-Entscheidung gegen die Sitztheorie durchaus ausgegangen werden könnte. In diesem Sinne ist mE die *Centros*-Entscheidung auch ausschließlich auf *Zweigniederlassungen* anwendbar und keinesfalls auf die Sitztheorie zu erweitern. Dies wird besonders deutlich, wenn man bedenkt, dass das Personalstatut (dessen Ermittlung Ziel der Sitztheorie ist) in der gegenständlichen Angelegenheit außer Streit stand, weil sowohl Dänemark als auch England der Gründungstheorie anhängen und Dänemark folglich nicht von einer unwirksamen Gründung ausging, im Gegenteil: Wäre dies der Fall gewesen, hätte eine

Zweigniederlassungseintragung schon allein aufgrund des fehlenden Rechtsträgers nicht erfolgen können. Und auch nur deshalb argumentierte Dänemark ausschließlich mit der angeblichen *Missbrauchs-* und *Umgehungsabsicht*, die sich am Ende prompt als zu stumpfe Waffe gegen Briefkastenfirmen erwies (für eine einschränkende Interpretation ferner *Heldrich* 2001, 2315 sowie *Zehetner*, im Ergebnis ähnlich *Roth*).

In Anbetracht solcher Ernüchterung erscheint die jüngste Judikatur des Obersten Gerichtshofes (OGH 1999) umso bedauerlicher (aA *Nowotny* 1999): Der zugrundeliegende Sachverhalt der angesprochenen Entscheidung war mit dem zuvor geschilderten exakt identisch, jedoch mit dem wichtigen Unterschied, dass ein österreichisches Firmenbuchgericht (das naturgemäß die Sitztheorie zu beachten hat!) die Eintragung der Zweigniederlassung verweigerte. Die Verweigerung ist aber in diesem Fall durchaus korrekt, da bereits die Rechtsfähigkeit der *private limited company* aus Sicht der österreichischen Rechtsordnung zu verneinen ist, wenn sich der effektive Hauptverwaltungssitz (ob er dabei als „Zweigniederlassung“ deklariert wird, ist unbedeutend) im Inland befindet. Aufgrund der *fehlenden Rechtsfähigkeit* des Rechtsträgers – die jedoch im Fall *Centros* wie gezeigt außer Streit stand – konnte auch die ihre Existenz hiervon ableitende Zweigniederlassung nicht rechtswirksam im Firmenbuch eingetragen werden (vgl. § 13 HGB). Ungeachtet dessen hat der OGH (wie auch in zwei weiteren Fällen) eine Vorlage an den EuGH aufgrund „völliger Vergleichbarkeit“ abgelehnt und die Sitztheorie im Verhältnis zu EWR-Gesellschaften für unanwendbar erklärt.

In diesem Zusammenhang sei schließlich aufgrund der teilweise unpräzisen Formulierungen des OGH mit *Schwimmann* darauf verwiesen, dass die *sekundäre Niederlassungsfreiheit* ausschließlich Gesellschaften des bürgerlichen Rechts und des Handelsrechts sowie alle juristischen Personen, die einen *Erwerbszweck verfolgen*, erfasst. So gelangt etwa der *gemeinnützige Verein*, wiewohl er unter das Personalstatut des § 10 IPRG fällt, nicht in diesen Genuss.

6. Resümee und Ausblick

Der deutsche Bundesgerichtshof (BGH 2000) hat das Versäumnis des österreichischen OGH nachgeholt und die konkrete Frage, *ob die Sitztheorie gegen die sekundäre Niederlassungsfreiheit verstößt*, dem EuGH vorgelegt. Die Lösung dieses Problems darf mit Spannung erwartet werden – bis dahin ergeben sich mE aus der EuGH-Rechtsprechung keine hinreichenden Gründe für eine Unvereinbarkeit.

Der Schutzgedanke der Sitztheorie wird wohl erst mit der *völligen Rechtsvereinheitlichung* (vgl. diesbezüglich den jüngsten Richtlinienentwurf „*über die Verlegung des Sitzes einer Gesellschaft in einen anderen Mitgliedstaat*“ vom 22.04.1997) obsolet werden. Bereits vorher die allseitige Geltung der Gründungstheorie einzuläuten, kann nur dazu führen, dass sich die einzelnen Rechtsordnungen im Wettstreit um die Ansiedelung von Unternehmen in ihren Mindestanforderungen gegenseitig unterbieten. Eine solche Entwicklung wird zu verhindern sein.

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Wie man NaturalistInnen (nicht) kontern sollte

Winfried Löffler, Innsbruck

1. Einleitung

Die Vielzahl von Naturalismusbekenntnissen und (teils nur angedeuteten) Naturalismusdefinitionen macht es schwer anzugeben, was den philosophischen Naturalismus eigentlich charakterisiert. Ich schlage vor (ähnlich Grundmann 1996; Moser / Trout 1995, 1), daß philosophischer „Naturalismus“ verstanden werden kann

a) als eine *methodologische* These bezüglich der in der Philosophie zulässigen wissenschaftlichen Methoden; und/oder

b) als eine *semantische* These darüber, welche Merkmale kognitiv sinnvolle Sätze kennzeichnen; und/oder schließlich

c) als eine *ontologische* These darüber, was alles existiert (bzw. darüber, was alles nicht existiert, siehe dazu weiter unten).

Diese drei Thesen können, müssen aber nicht notwendig miteinander gekoppelt werden. Und innerhalb dieser Grobeinteilung legen sich natürlich weitere Differenzierungen nahe, die ich hier allerdings übergehen muß (Löffler 1998).

2. Grundtypen antinaturalistischer Strategien

Auch für die Einschätzung von „nicht-“ oder „antinaturalistischen“ Positionen ist diese Einteilung heuristisch nützlich. Sie kehrt dort sozusagen in negativer Wendung wieder. Als wesentlich an antinaturalistischen Positionen kann angesehen werden:

a) die Verteidigung der kognitiven Sinnhaftigkeit bestimmter umstrittener Aussagenklassen (etwa über Qualia etc.) trotz ihrer offenkundigen Unübersetzbarkeit in physikalische Aussagen (*semantischer* Antinaturalismus); und/oder

b) die Verteidigung der ontologischen Unverzichtbarkeit bestimmter Entitäten wie Willensakte, agent causality, cartesianischer Seelen u.a. (*ontologischer* Antinaturalismus); und/oder

c) die Verteidigung der Berechtigung verschiedener Wissens- und Erkenntnisformen jenseits der Naturwissenschaften (*methodologischer* Antinaturalismus).

Antinaturalistische Strategien lassen sich weiters in eher *direkte* bzw. phänomenologische einerseits und eher *indirekte* bzw. methodologische Strategien andererseits einteilen. *Direkte* antinaturalistische Positionen legen das Augenmerk auf Gegebenheiten im Bereich des Mentalen, die zwar phänomenologisch deutlich faßbar und schwer aus unserem Weltbild wegzudenken sind, die jedoch notorische Problemfälle für die Naturalisierung darstellen. Verwiesen wird in diesem Zusammenhang meist auf Selbstbewußtsein, Intentionalität, das Phänomen der Kommunikation, das auf Bedeutungsverstehen mit einem gewissen Maß an intersubjektiver Flexibilität beruht, Handlungsfreiheit und insbesondere die sogenannten „Qualia“. *Direkte*,

phänomenologisch orientierte antinaturalistische Standpunkte arbeiten die Unverständlichkeit heraus, wie diese eigentümlichen Eigenschaften des Mentalen jemals aus den mikrostrukturellen Eigenschaften des physikalisch o.ä. Faßbaren erklärt werden können, und begründen aus dieser Sicht, daß naturalistische Auffassungen vom Menschen wesentlichen Aspekten nicht gerecht werden, daß sie daher - bestenfalls - unabgeschlossen sind.

Indirekte, eher methodologische antinaturalistische Standpunkte legen ihr Augenmerk dagegen auf die in den jeweiligen Beschreibungs- und Erklärungsweisen verwendeten Begrifflichkeiten und auf die Frage ihrer Herkunft und methodischen Einführung in die Rede. Damit verbunden ist die Frage nach den Erklärungs-, Beschreibungs- und Verständigungszwecken, die einzelne Redeweisen verfolgen. Das Ziel eines solchen Vorgehens ist nicht etwa, den naturwissenschaftlichen Zugang zum Menschen als grundsätzlich methodisch fehlerhaft darzustellen (ebensowenig wie der introspektiv-phänomenologische oder andere grundsätzlich fehlerhaft wären), sondern der Aufweis, daß allein schon die Wahl bestimmter Begrifflichkeiten und Erklärungsweisen eine methodische Vorentscheidung darüber trifft, welche Art von Fragen im Raum stehen und welche Antworten sinnvollerweise erwartet (bzw. nicht mehr erwartet) werden können. Der philosophischen Anthropologie als „metaphysischer“ Reflexion auf den Menschen könnte aus dieser Sicht die Aufgabe zufallen, auf solche unterschiedliche Zugänge zum Menschen aufmerksam zu machen und ihr gegenseitiges Verhältnis zu klären.

Die folgende Skizze einer solchen indirekten antinaturalistischen Argumentation ist im Sinne des obigen Einteilungsvorschlags also eine *methodologische* Strategie, und sie richtet sich demgemäß auch primär gegen methodologische Versionen des Naturalismus. Aus den methodologischen Überlegungen sollte aber ersichtlich werden, warum eine naturalistische *Ontologie* problematisch ist, und ebenso, warum eine naturalistische Einschränkung des Bereichs kognitiv sinnvoller Aussagen (*semantischer* Naturalismus) zu eng ist.

Zunächst sollen jedoch einige antinaturalistische Argumentationsansätze zur Sprache kommen, die ihrerseits kritischen Überlegungen nicht standhalten.

3. Defiziente Wege antinaturalistischer Argumentation

3.1 Verweis auf Nichtselbstanwendbarkeit: Altbekannt und naheliegend ist der Einwand der *Nichtselbstanwendbarkeit* der naturalistischen Kriterien für berechnete Erkenntnis. Strukturell ähnliche Einwände wurden schon gegen das Verifikationsprinzip als Sinnkriterium erhoben. Ähnlich ist die naturalistische Position, nur die Erkenntnisweise der Naturwissenschaften als Weg zu berechtigter Erkenntnis zu betrachten, selbst kein mögliches Resultat naturwissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis. Sie mag zwar einiges an pragmatischen Gründen für sich haben (etwa, daß in den gesicherten Kernbereichen der Naturwissenschaften ein höherer Grad intersubjektiven Konsenses zu beobachten ist als in den

meisten, vielleicht sogar allen anderen kognitiven Betätigungsfeldern des Menschen), sie bleibt aus der innertheoretischen Sicht des Naturalismus aber immer eine unbegründbare metatheoretische Option. Sofern man die Selbstanwendbarkeit einer philosophischen Position, d.h. die Rechtfertigbarkeit (oder zumindest Verteidigbarkeit) ihrer zentralen Aussagen innerhalb ihrer eigenen Rechtfertigungsstandards als ein taugliches metaphilosophisches Kriterium ansieht, ist dies ein antinaturalistisches Argument von gewisser Bedeutung.

Allerdings bleibt dieses Argument bei einem negativen Ergebnis - dem Hinweis auf ungerechtfertigte Grundvoraussetzungen - stehen. Es erbringt aber noch keine Hinweise darauf, wie die Naturalisierungsprogramme methodisch einzuschätzen sind, welche Formen unserer Erkenntnistätigkeit durch die naturalistische Option von vornherein als unberechtigt ausgeschlossen werden, und wie die naturwissenschaftliche Redeweise zu anderen möglichen Redeweisen steht. Dies ist nicht unproblematisch: Solange nämlich derlei Zuordnungsfragen nicht geklärt sind, könnte es durchaus als legitime antinaturalistische Strategie erscheinen, einfach auf andere Evidenzen zu pochen und andere Redeweisen vom Menschen - etwa introspektiv-mentalistiche, emotionale, existentielle, spiritualistische oder sonstwie spekulativ-metaphysische bis hin zu esoterischen Mystizismen etc. - als ebenso plausibel, ja vielleicht sogar als die einzig angemessene zu präsentieren. Die Frage, wie einzelne Redeweisen über den Menschen zueinander stehen, ist aber philosophisch unabweisbar.

3.2 Sprachenpluralismus: Eine mögliche, aber problematische Reaktion darauf ist die Behauptung eines nicht weiter aufhellbaren „*Sprachenpluralismus*“. Solche Thesen werden z.T. als sprachphilosophisch begründete Behauptungen einer prinzipiellen Pluralität vorgebracht, z.T. sind verstehen sie sich auch nur als Diagnosen einer faktischen, aber beklagenswerten Fehlentwicklung unserer wissenschaftlich geprägten Kultur. Teilweise geht damit auch die Relativierung der (natur-)wissenschaftlichen Redeweise als eine von vielen, aber grundsätzlich beliebig austauschbaren „Erzählungen“ über die Wirklichkeit einher, mitunter auch der kulturkritische Appell, den Einfluß der naturwissenschaftlichen „Erzählung“ zugunsten anderer zurückzudrängen.

3.3 Synthesversuche: Sprachenpluralistische Situationen werden vielfach als gefährlicher Mangel an Orientierungswissen empfunden. Dies motiviert fragwürdige Versuche, disparate Theoriebereiche doch innerhalb einer *Totalerklärung* unterzubringen, d.h. einer einzigen großen Theorie über den Menschen, die naturwissenschaftliche, phänomenologische und andere Aspekte vereinigt und damit umfassende Orientierung bietet. Das naturalistische Anliegen einer Einheitswissenschaft kehrt hier also in einer paradoxen Wendung wieder.

Ein Beispiel für solche wissenschaftstheoretisch unreflektierten Vereinigungskonstrukte sind die Versuche, der menschlichen Willensfreiheit durch Anleihen bei der Quantenphysik und neuerdings der Chaostheorie einen Platz in einer naturwissenschaftlichen Theorie zu geben (Darstellung und Kritik bei Kügler 1998). Chaotische Prozesse im Gehirn könnten (indeterministische) Quanteneffekte so verstärken, daß das Gehirn auch makroskopisch betrachtet indeterministisch funktioniere und somit Raum für die Willensfreiheit bleibe.

Der wesentliche Einwand gegen solche Theoriekonstruktionen liegt auf der Hand: Selbst wenn es eine zufriedenstellende naturwissenschaftliche Theorie

gäbe, die impliziert, daß Gehirnprozesse nicht deterministisch sind, wäre damit noch nicht die Existenz von Willensfreiheit erwiesen. Gehirnprozesse (und damit auch menschliche Handlungen) wären nämlich nichts anderes als etwas komplexere Zufallsprodukte. Ein wesentliches Moment am Freiheitsbegriff ist jedoch die phänomenologisch deutlich faßbare Möglichkeit des Etwas-Wollens-aber-auch-anders-Könnens. Zwischen der Annahme eines Indeterminismus auf irgendeiner physikalischen, biologischen o.ä. Mikroebene und der Erfahrung der Freiheit scheint ein unüberbrückbarer Graben zu klaffen. Jeder rein naturalistische Versuch der „Erklärung“ der Freiheit im Sinne einer Rückführung von „Makroeigenschaften“ auf „Mikroeigenschaften“ scheint von vornherein aussichtslos, und eine sachlich wirklich angemessene Theorie der menschlichen Freiheit scheint an irgendeiner Stelle doch wieder auf die subjektive, phänomenologisch gegebene Freiheitserfahrung und damit auf menschliche Handlungssubjekte rekurrieren zu müssen. In den nächsten Abschnitten soll der Frage nachgegangen werden, warum dies so ist.

4. Hinweise auf Zirkularität: handlungstheoretische Aufladungen im naturalistischen Vokabular

Das methodische Problem, das im vorigen Abschnitt am Beispiel des Versuches herausgearbeitet wurde, eine Theorie der menschlichen Willensfreiheit zu entwerfen, die sowohl dem naturalistischen als auch einem größeren weltanschaulichen Anliegen gerecht wird, kehrt in ganz ähnlicher Form auch bei der Naturalisierung anderer mentaler Gegebenheiten wieder: Naturalisierungsprogramme wollen den Bereich des Mentalen aus den naturwissenschaftlich faßbaren Eigenschaften auf der Mikroebene und ohne Rekurs auf Erklärungsmuster aus dem geistigen Bereich rekonstruieren. An irgendeiner Stelle des Naturalisierungsvorhabens muß aber doch wieder (explizit oder implizit) auf ein Vokabular zurückgegriffen werden, das offensichtlich unserem Reden über Personen als freie Handlungssubjekte, ihre Ziel- und Zwecksetzungen und ihre Interpretationspraxis, unserem Reden über „vernünftige“ Überzeugungen, Handlungen und Begründungen etc. entstammt. Ähnlich relativiert Quine in seiner naturalisierten Erkenntnistheorie den Unterschied zwischen Fragen der kausalen Genese und der Rechtfertigung unserer Erkenntnis, und in den naturalistischen Explanantia kommt durchaus begründungstheoretisches Vokabular wie „evidence“, „meaning“, „information“ vor; Quine hält die Zirkularität aber für unproblematisch und unvermeidbar. Bei externalistischen und evolutionären Erkenntnistheorien muß zur Antwort auf die Frage nach der „eigentlichen“ Bedeutung von Repräsentationen und zur Lösung des Problems der Fehlrepräsentation auf in der Natur eingebaute Zwecke hinter den „proper functions“ rekurriert werden. Zwecke im engeren Sinne des Wortes gibt es aber nur dort, wo es auch Handlungssubjekte und ihre Zwecksetzungen gibt. „Proper functions“ werden immer relativ zu „Normalbedingungen“, „typischen Kausalketten“, „passenden Erkenntnisumgebungen“ etc. definiert - alles sind normative Begriffe, die ihre Einführung Situationen verdanken, wo vernünftige Beobachter die (Ab-)Normalität von Situationen einschätzen (Koppelberg 1994).

Die Liste der Beispiele ließe sich leicht verlängern. Altbekannt ist etwa das Problem, daß das Vokabular des psychologischen Behaviorismus ebenfalls nicht ohne handlungstheoretische bzw. mentalistische Begriffe auskommt; nicht einmal die behavioristischen Explananda

sind ohne Begriffe wie „Vermeidungsverhalten“, „Verstärkung“ etc. zu identifizieren (Keil 1993, 39). Um dem allzu offenkundigen Einfließen solchen handlungstheoretischen Vokabulars auszuweichen, verwenden zeitgenössische externalistische Theorien meist „Information“, „Anzeichen (indication)“ oder „Repräsentation“ als scheinbar rein „kausale“ Grundbegriffe, postulieren die Existenz „natürlicher Repräsentationen“ und rekonstruieren mentale Phänomene als komplexe Arten von Informationsverarbeitung etc. (Dretske 1998, Papineau 1993 u.v.a.m.). Auf den zweiten Blick erweisen sich allerdings auch diese Begriffe als implizit handlungstheoretisch aufgeladen (Keil 1993, besonders 150-159): Ein „Anzeichen“ ist ein Anzeichen-für-jemanden, der es berücksichtigen, verstehen und evtl. danach handeln kann, von „Repräsentation“ kann begrifflich nur dort die Rede sein, wo es einen Interpretierenden gibt, der das Repraesentans als Repraesentans eines Repraesentatum versteht und für den die Repräsentation in irgendeiner Hinsicht handlungsrelevant sein kann, und auch eine rein naturalistische Definition von „Anzeichen“ oder „Information“ (d.h. ohne Bezug auf irgendwelche Kommunikationskontexte und Informationsbenützer, auf ein gemeinsames Zeichenrepertoire u.a. Verstehensvoraussetzungen) gibt es nicht (zur Kontextabhängigkeit des Informationsbegriffs in der Biologie Küppers 1995). Die bekannten Suggestivbeispiele für offensichtliche Repräsentations-, Anzeichen- oder Informationsverhältnisse sind daher erst treffend, wenn man den Kontext mitberücksichtigt: Ein Tachometer repräsentiert „an sich“ nichts, sondern erst für den Beobachter oder ein weiterverarbeitendes System, mit dem es eine gemeinsame Sprache, die Maßeinheiten etc. teilt. Ähnlich kann von zielgerichtetem Verhalten oder Informationsverarbeitung im engeren Sinne nur dort die Rede sein, wo der Informationsempfänger aufgrund des Anzeichens oder der Information so-oder-anders handeln, d.h. aus mehreren möglichen Zuständen einen verwirklichen kann. Ein Thermostat, um ein altes Beispiel zu gebrauchen, zeigt an sich noch kein selbstregulierendes oder zielgerichtetes Verhalten, weil er - sofern er seiner „proper function“ gemäß arbeitet - keine Verhaltensmöglichkeiten hat; von „Selbstregulierung“, „Zielen“ etc. kann erst die Rede sein, wenn die Absichten des Konstrukteurs etc. mitberücksichtigt werden.

Überhaupt kann mit guten Gründen bezweifelt werden, ob ein „rein kausales“ Vokabular ohne jede handlungstheoretische Aufladung grundsätzlich möglich ist: Georg Henrik von Wright u.a. haben gezeigt, daß die Bedingung der Möglichkeit sinnvoller Rede von Kausalität, von Ursache und Wirkung, von naturgesetzlich determiniertem Wirken die Erfahrung unserer Fähigkeit zum manipulierenden Eingriff ist, daß also die Rede von naturgesetzlicher Kausalität gegenüber der Rede von Handlungskausalität eine abgeleitete Redeweise darstellt (Von Wright 1991³, Runggaldier 1996; Zum Stand der Kausalitätsdebatte Falkenburg / Pätzold 1998).

5. „Mentalistische“ und „physikalistische“ Begrifflichkeiten als Abstraktionsprodukte

Die Beispiele handlungstheoretischer Aufladungen sollten nicht etwa die Berechtigung solcher Redeweisen in Abrede stellen. Erst recht nicht sollte bestritten werden, daß es Verhältnisse in der Natur gibt, die man zweckmäßigerweise und erfolgreich mit derlei Redeweisen erforschen und beschreiben kann. Zweck der vorstehenden Beispiele war es vielmehr, den folgenden Vorschlag zu motivieren: „Mentalistische“ und

„physikalistische“ Begrifflichkeiten sind bereits Abstraktionsprodukte, und der eigentliche erkenntnistheoretische Ausgangspunkt und die konstitutionstheoretische Wurzel, von der ausgehend diese in der *philosophy of mind* verwendeten Begrifflichkeiten eingeführt werden, ist die Rede über menschliche Personen mit ihren Handlungen und Absichten. Personen haben im Unterschied zu anderen Gegenständen der Lebenswelt zwar die Eigentümlichkeit, daß ihnen mentale und physikalische Prädikate zugesprochen werden können, dies bedeutet aber nicht, daß wir unseren Personbegriff erst unter Zugrundelegung mentaler und physikalischer Begriffe (als grundlegenderer Begriffe) konstruieren müßten. Vielmehr ist der Begriff der Person - als derjenigen Entität, der sowohl mentale als auch physikalische Eigenschaften zukommen - ein Basisbegriff unseres Weltbildes, und es lassen sich überzeugende Argumente dafür entwickeln, daß wesentliche Züge unseres Weltbildes unverstänlich bleiben würden (etwa unsere Fähigkeit des „Einsteigens“ in ein gemeinsames Raum-Zeit-Schema und des Bezugnehmens auf Gegenstände darin, unsere Annahme der Identität dieser Gegenstände durch die Zeit etc.), wenn wir nicht über diesen Begriff der Person als einer Entität mit dem eigentümlichen mental-physikalischen Doppelaspekt verfügten (Strawson 1972).

Freilich können wir aus diesem „doppelaspekthaften“ Reden über Personen Aspekte herausheben und abstrahierend von reinen „mentalenen“ und „physikalischen“ Phänomenen sprechen. Und für bestimmte Zwecke sind derlei Abstraktionen sogar unabdingbar, etwa wenn im Rahmen der Neurobiologie nur biologisch faßbare Aspekte des Menschen berücksichtigt werden, oder wenn bei manchen wahrnehmungspsychologischen Versuchen nur die Innenperspektive berücksichtigt wird, und wenn dabei von anderen Aspekten jeweils methodisch abgesehen wird. Auf diese Weise entstehen unterschiedliche „regionale Ontologien“, also Gegenstandsbereiche einzelner Frage- und Wissensgebiete, sowohl im wissenschaftlichen als auch im außerwissenschaftlichen Bereich.

6. Reziproke Begriffsbildung

Ein methodischer Fehler wäre es jedoch, die so erhältlichen Abstraktionsprodukte als erkenntnistächtig primär zu betrachten und zu versuchen, aus ihnen das ursprüngliche Ausgangsphänomen in seiner ganzen inhaltlichen Fülle - also Personen mit ihren Handlungen, Absichten, Interpretationsweisen etc. - zu rekonstruieren. Man könnte diesen methodischen Fehler „Trugschluß aufgrund reziproker Begriffsbildung“ nennen: Unter methodischer Abstraktion von bestimmten Eigenschaften *E* am Ausgangsphänomen wird ein Gegenstandsbereich *B* konzipiert, der sich als nützlicher ontologischer Rahmen für bestimmte Zwecke erweist. In einem zweiten Schritt wird unter Zugrundelegung von *B* versucht, eine Erklärung für die Eigenschaften *E* zu geben - also gerade jenen Eigenschaften, von denen vorher abgesehen wurde. An dieser methodologischen Grenze scheitern etwa Versuche, Erklärungen für mentale Gegebenheiten im Wege einer Rückführung von Makroeigenschaften auf Mikroeigenschaften zu liefern. Ein damit verwandter methodischer Fehler wäre es, Abstraktionsprodukte der einen Abstraktionsrichtung unter Zugrundelegung der Abstraktionsprodukte einer anderen Abstraktionsrichtung erklären zu wollen.

Naturalisierungsprogramme im Bereich der philosophischen Anthropologie scheinen jedoch gerade diesen Grundstrukturen zu folgen: (a) Ausgehend von den

mit den Methoden der Naturwissenschaften faßbaren Gegenständen (Elementarteilchen, Felder, Neuronen etc.) oder ausgehend von dem, was man als einen zweckmäßigen ontologischen Rahmen für die Physik ansieht (etwa Formen von Ereignis- oder anderen Ontologien) soll versucht werden, eine Erklärung für Aspekte am Menschen zu finden, von denen im Zuge der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung gerade methodisch abgesehen wurde. Den Hintergrund für solche methodische Fehler bilden jeweils stark realistische Deutungen der von physikalischen Theorien vorausgesetzten Gegenstände. Dieser Bereich theoretischer Gegenstände wird - unter Ausklammerung der damit verbundenen erkenntnistheoretischen Problematik - als der ontologisch primäre Bereich vorausgesetzt. (Für eine ähnliche Kritik siehe Ryle 1970; Hartmann 1998).

Oder (b): Es werden zwei Gegenstandsbereiche als Voraussetzung für die Fragestellung angenommen (etwa: „physikalische“ und „mentale“ Gegenstände), wobei der eine als unproblematisch, der andere als ontologisch dubios und erklärungsbedürftig angesehen wird, und es wird gefragt, wie der problematische (mentale) Bereich aus dem unproblematischen (physikalischen) heraus erklärt werden kann. Dabei wird jedoch übersehen, daß es sich in beiden Fällen bereits um Abstraktionsprodukte handelt, allerdings in verschiedenen Richtungen, sodaß ein solcher Erklärungsversuch - quer über Abstraktionsrichtungen hinweg - von vornherein fragwürdig ist. Scheinbar unverdächtige Fragestellungen wie „Welche Art von Ereignissen sind mentale Phänomene?“ sind ein Anzeichen dafür, daß unterschiedliche Abstraktionsprodukte in eine Erklärungsbeziehung gesetzt werden sollen.

7. Schluß

Versucht man dennoch, eine inhaltlich adäquate Theorie vom Menschen auf diesem „rekonstruktiven“ Weg von der Mikro- auf die Makroebene zu erzielen, so ist zu erwarten, daß dieser Versuch mit den erwähnten unbefriedigenden Begleiterscheinungen belastet sein wird: Entweder müssen wesentliche Aspekte dessen, was wir als für Personen charakteristisch annehmen, als unrekonstruierbar und damit letztlich nicht real weginterpretiert werden (z.B. im eliminativen Materialismus); oder die Erklärung des für Personen Typischen muß zu mehr oder minder metaphorischen Formulierungen ohne viel Erklärungswert greifen (wie etwa dem Postulat der „Emergenz“ oder „Supervenienz“ mentaler Eigenschaften in hinreichend komplexen physikalischen Systemen). Oder manche inhaltliche Gehalte, die eigentlich entscheidende Teile des Explanandums ausmachen, werden bereits durch die verwendete Begrifflichkeit („Repräsentation“, „Information“ etc.) stillschweigend ins Explanans eingebaut.

Eine adäquate philosophische Reaktion auf den Naturalismus scheint also weder in der simplen Forcierung alternativer Redeweisen vom Menschen noch in irgendwelchen fragwürdigen Theoriesynthesen zu bestehen. Die hier skizzierte Strategie der methodologischen Klärung verschiedener Redeweisen und Begrifflichkeiten dürfte ein aussichtsreicherer Weg sein, die Berechtigung, die Erklärungsmöglichkeiten und auch die Erklärungsgrenzen verschiedener Zugänge zum Menschen aufzuzeigen. Von der oben abgelehnten Pluralismusbeseitigung unterscheidet sie sich dadurch, daß auf die gemeinsame Wurzel unserer jeweiligen Begriffsbildungen besonderer Wert gelegt wurde - nämlich unsere Rede von handelnden Personen.

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Zur Konstitution von Personen durch Zuschreibung von Handlungen und Unterlassungen - Eine Kritik individualistischer Person- und Zuschreibungstheorien aus quasi-wittgensteinscher Perspektive

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Der Klassiker, der die begrifflichen Weichen für den modernen Personbegriff gestellt hat, ist zweifellos Locke. Im Kapitel 27 des zweiten Buches seines *Essays Concerning Human Understanding*, das erst der dritten Auflage hinzugefügt wurde, konstruiert er die Identität von Personen über eine Selbstbeziehung, für die er einen damals fast noch unbekanntem Begriff verwendet: den Begriff des "Bewußtseins" (*consciousness*). Eine Person ist nämlich nach Locke ein Wesen, das sich selbst *als* sich selbst wahrnimmt. Eine Person "can consider it self as it self."

Mit der damals noch ungebräuchlichen Verwendung des Substantivs Bewußtsein löst Locke die Bedingungen der Identität einer Person von den Bedingungen der Identität einer Substanz ab. Denn mit dem Bewußtsein – das macht Locke hier ganz deutlich –, erkennen wir nicht nur unserer Selbst, wir *werden dadurch für uns selbst* zu Personen: "For it being the same consciousness that makes a Man be himself to himself, *personal Identity* depends on that only." (Locke, 336) Eine Identität der Person über die Zeit hinweg entsteht durch die bewußte Selbstzuschreibung vergangener Handlungen als der eigenen Handlungen: "For as far as any intelligent being can repeat the Idea of any past Action with the same consciousness it has of any present Action; so far it is the same *personal self* [...] and so will be the same self as far as the same consciousness can extend to actions past or to come." (Locke, 336.)

Diese Identitätsauffassung hat die merkwürdige Konsequenz, daß Handlungen, an die ich mich nicht mehr erinnern kann, nicht meine Handlungen sein können, und daß ich entsprechend auch nicht die Person sein kann, die sie ausgeführt hat - eine Konsequenz, die bekanntlich schon bei Lockes Zeitgenossen Rätselraten und Kopfschütteln ausgelöst hat. Schließlich erinnern wir nur einen sehr kleinen Teil der Handlungen, die wir im Laufe unseres Lebens ausführen; und solche Handlungen erkennen wir gewöhnlich durchaus als die unsrigen an, wenn andere uns glaubhaft nachweisen, daß wir dergleichen getan haben. Auch im Strafprozeß ist es üblich, einer Person aufgrund des unbezweifelten Zeugnisses Dritter oder aufgrund von Indizien auch dann Handlungen zuzurechnen, wenn sie selbst jegliche Erinnerung bestreitet. Mangelnde Erinnerung als solche – auch wenn sie glaubhaft ist - gilt nicht als ein hinreichendes Kriterium der Unzurechnungsfähigkeit. Entsprechend würden wir auch die Frage, wer wir in Wahrheit sind, nicht nur auf das beziehen, was wir uns selbst zurechnen – daß man sich hier täuschen oder gar selbst betrügen kann, ist uns durchaus geläufig. Daher stellt sich die Frage, *warum* Locke die Person so definiert, wie er es tut. Und diese Frage führt direkt in den normativen Kontext des Lockeschen Personbegriffs.

Viel spricht nämlich dafür, daß es bei Lockes Deutung von Personalität vor allem um das Problem der Wiederauferstehung und der Rechtfertigung vor dem jüngsten Gericht geht. Entsprechend darf unter dem

Bewußtsein bei Locke nicht ein wertneutrales Gewahrsein verstanden werden: gemeint ist vielmehr ein Gewissen, das von der Sorge um das eigene Seelenheil angetrieben wird. Denn wie Locke ausdrücklich sagt, ist es das eigene Gewissen, das das Urteil des jüngsten Gerichts rechtfertigt: "The Sentence shall be justified by the consciousness all persons shall have, that they themselves in what Bodies soever they appear, of what Substances soever that consciousness adheres to, are the same, that committed those Actions, and deserve that Punishment for them." (Locke, 247) Jeder "shall receive his Doom, his conscience accusing or excusing him." (Locke, 344)

Es ist dieses *sich um sein Leben nach dem Tod sorgende Selbst*, das für Locke die Person im moralischen und rechtlichen Sinne ausmacht. Entsprechend kann nur das für ihn als Bestandteil personaler Identität und Verantwortung gerechnet werden, was auch *Gegenstand dieser Sorge* sein kann. Da Betrug gegenüber einem allwissenden Gott ausgeschlossen ist, wird so das Gewissen einerseits selbst zur Instanz der Wahrheit. Denn die Frage, ob es gerecht ist, jemanden für eine Handlung verantwortlich zu machen, bezieht sich hier allein auf den persönlichen Verdienst bzw. Unverdienst daran, der sich allein daran bemißt, inwieweit ein göttliches Verbot wissentlich oder vorsätzlich *übertreten* wurde. Die Frage, inwieweit jemand für die Folgen seines Verhaltens aufkommen muß, weil andere Parteien oder oder die Rechtsordnung als solche dadurch geschädigt werden, stellt sich in diesem Kontext nicht. Die Interessen anderer Parteien und der Öffentlichkeit können daher keine Berücksichtigung finden – weder bei der Frage der Zurechnung, noch bei dem damit verbundenen Personbegriff, der allein an der Perspektive der 1. Person Singular orientiert ist.

Locke hat mit seiner Bewußtseinstheorie von Personalität und Verantwortung nicht nur eine Epoche der Bewußtseinsphilosophie eingeleitet, sondern zugleich die Weichen für eine nichtsubstantialistische Auffassung von Personalität gestellt. Bei aller Kritik an den "empiristischen" Unzulänglichkeiten Lockes bewegen sich die modernen Bewußtseinstheorien der Person weitgehend im Rahmen seiner beiden grundlegenden Dogmen: *Erstens* daß eine *bewußte* Selbstbeziehung des "Ich" die notwendige und hinreichende Grundlage für Personalität und Verantwortung abgibt, und *zweitens* daß wir selbst einen privilegierten Zugang zu unseren Handlungen und den damit verbundenen psychischen Einstellungen hätten. Wenn man Personalität und Verantwortung theologisch versteht, nämlich aus der exklusiven Beziehung des Individuums zu Gott, erscheinen beide Unterstellungen durchaus sinnvoll. Problematisch wird dieses Modell jedoch durch seine Übertragung in säkulare Kontexte, weil dort Zurechnung nicht primär eine Gewissensfrage sein kann, sondern auch durch andere normative Gesichtspunkte bestimmt wird. Ich möchte dies am Beispiel einer neueren Variante des bewußtseinstheoretischen Ansatzes verdeutlichen, die

sich nicht auf den Begriff der Erinnerung, sondern auf den Intentionalitätsbegriff stützt: Der Ethik John Mackies.

Mackie nennt dies "the straight rule of responsibility: an agent is responsible for all and only his intentional actions." (Mackie, 208) Nach dieser Regel sind wir für alle intendierten und gewußten Aspekte unserer Handlungen verantwortlich, aber auch nur für diese. Da Handlungen beschreibungsabhängig sind, ist ein Individuum also genau dann für eine Handlung verantwortlich, wenn es zur Zeit der Handlung gewußt hat, daß auf sein Vorgehen eine entsprechende Handlungsbeschreibung zutrifft. (Mackie, 204) Diese "geradlinige" Regel der Verantwortung bezieht sich genau wie Lockes Kriterium der bewußten Erinnerung auf die *tatsächlichen psychischen* Vorgänge des Individuums. Es ist nach diesem Ansatz nicht möglich, Intentionen einfach aus dem allgemeinen Handlungstyp als solchen zu erschließen. Vielmehr muß der tatsächliche intentionale Zustand des Individuums ermittelt werden.

Tatsächlich gibt es Entwicklungen im europäischen Recht des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts, die darauf hindeuten könnten, daß es sich in die Richtung der "geradlinigen Regel" entwickelt. Mackie selbst weist darauf hin, daß Tötungen, die im Zusammenhang eines Verbrechens wie eines Banküberfalls geschehen, nicht mehr automatisch als *Mord* gerechnet werden, auch wenn keine wirkliche Absicht vorlag. Für Mackies These scheint auch zu sprechen, daß die Strafen für Vorsatztaten in der Regel ungleich höher sind als die für Fahrlässigkeitstaten, und die Strafe für den Versuch kann mitunter der Strafe für die vorsätzliche Vollendung einer Straftat nahe kommen.

Gleichwohl zeigt unser Umgang mit *fahrlässigen* Handlungen oder Unterlassungen, daß weder unsere rechtliche, noch unsere moralische Zurechnung geradlinig der Mackieschen Regel folgt. Mackies "geradlinige Regel" ist zwar auf vorsätzliche Unterlassungen anwendbar. Aber wir ziehen Personen häufig gerade dann zur Verantwortung, wenn wir davon ausgehen, daß bestimmte sozial erwünschte psychische Aktivitäten *nicht* stattgefunden haben: Dafür, daß sie bewußt oder unbewußt Dinge geschehen lassen. Welche Kriterien legen wir anders als Mackie zugrunde, wenn wir jemandem etwas vorwerfen, was er weder in seinem Handeln absichtlich herbeigeführt noch wissentlich in Kauf genommen hat? Eines davon mag folgender Fall aus dem deutschen Strafrecht verdeutlichen:

In der fraglichen Nacht kam der Ehemann K. zu dem angeklagten Bereitschaftsarzt und bat ihn, zu seiner Frau zu kommen, die an heftigen Magenschmerzen leide. In dem Glauben, es handle sich um einen einfachen Magen- und Darmkatharr, lehnte der Angeklagte einen Hausbesuch ab und riet dem K., Beruhigungsmittel zu geben und Umschläge zu machen. Das half nicht. K. versuchte einen anderen Arzt zu erreichen, der aber, unter Berufung auf die Verpflichtung des Bereitschaftsarztes, ebenfalls nicht kam. Frau K. starb an innerer Verblutung infolge des Platzens einer Eileiterschwangerschaft. Der BGH hat den Arzt wegen fahrlässiger Tötung durch Unterlassen verurteilt, da ein sofortiger Besuch aller Voraussicht nach den Tod verhindert hätte. (Gekürzt wiedergegeben nach Roxin, 135)

Dieses Urteil wird mit dem überragenden Interesse der Bevölkerung an der geordneten Durchführung des Bereitschaftsdienstes begründet. Da Ferndiagnosen nur selten möglich sind, hätte der Arzt die möglichen Folgen seiner Unterlassung erkennen können. Die Grundlage für die Zuschreibung der Tötungshandlung ist hier also nicht der tatsächliche Glaube des angeklagten Individuums, das ja wohl wirklich fest von der Harmlosigkeit der Krankheit

überzeugt war; Maßstab ist hier vielmehr die Unterstellung eines *möglichen Wissens*. Daß der Angeklagte die möglichen Folgen seines Verhaltens vorhersehen konnte, wird nicht mit Blick auf seinen individuellen Gemüts- und Bildungsstand festgestellt, sondern mit Blick auf den *Berufsstand*, den er ausübt und dessen Pflichten. Dazu gehört die *Pflicht zur sorgfältigen Meinungsbildung*. Nicht die wirkliche Absicht und das wirkliche Wissen eines Individuums, sondern das mögliche Wissen und die Pflichten des Angehörigen eines bestimmten Berufsstandes erscheinen hier also als Grundlage der Zurechnung.

Aus der Perspektive Mackies sind solche Entscheidungen grundsätzlich ungerecht zu nennen, obgleich er zugesteht, daß sie gesellschaftlich erforderlich sein können. (Mackie, 215) Seine Unterscheidung zwischen gerechten und ungerechten, aber gesellschaftlich nützlichen Zuschreibungskriterien folgt dem selben Schema wie Lockes: Gerechtigkeit im strengen Sinne richtet sich auf die Beziehung einer Handlung zu den tatsächlichen psychischen Zuständen des Individuums, die allein ihm selbst bzw. Gott letztlich zugänglich sind, Nützlichkeit betrifft die Beziehung der Handlung oder Unterlassung zu gesellschaftlichen Erwartungen an die betreffenden Typen von Handlungen oder Handlungsträgern. Nach Mackies Auffassung wird hier zwar der Gesellschaft Rechnung getragen, aber nicht der individuellen Person.

Hier wären wir wieder bei der Frage, was eine individuelle Person ausmacht. Gibt es wirklich Grund zur Annahme, daß diese sich grundsätzlich nicht dieselben Handlungen und Unterlassungen zurechnen würde, die andere ihr zurechnen? Eine solche These wäre mit dem Beispiel des Bereitschaftsarztes schwerlich zu stützen. Schließlich haben wir keinen Grund zur Annahme, daß der Angeklagte in unserem Beispiel andere Vorstellungen von den Aufgaben eines Bereitschaftsarztes hat als der Rest der Gesellschaft. Es ist aber nicht einzusehen, warum eine Verurteilung ungerecht sein soll, die sich auf eine nichteingehaltene Verpflichtung bezieht, die er als solche anerkennt und bei anderen Personen einklagen würde. Und selbst wenn er die Verpflichtung de facto nicht anerkennen würde, würde daraus nicht folgen, daß seine Verurteilung ungerecht wäre. Sie würde erst dann als ungerecht betrachtet werden können, wenn er für seine Nichtanerkennung der Verpflichtung Gründe angeben könnte, die nicht seine persönliche Gemütslage, sondern die Aufgaben des Bereitschaftsdienstes und die besten Methoden zu ihrer Erfüllung betreffen; wenn er beispielsweise zeigen könnte, daß es de facto nicht möglich ist, die Pflichten eines Bereitschaftsarztes, so wie sie gegenwärtig gedacht werden, zu erfüllen, und daß daher eine Neuformulierung der entsprechenden Normen erforderlich wäre.

Daß wir bei Zurechnungen nicht auf private psychische Zustände, sondern auf normative Erwartungen und Regeln Bezug nehmen, betrifft jedoch nicht nur die Sonderfälle von Unterlassungen im Kontext von Garantenbeziehungen. In einem sehr viel weiteren Sinne trifft es auf alle Bezugspunkte der Zurechnung, auch auf die Ermittlung der "tatsächlichen" Motive einer Person zu. Diese wären nämlich gar nicht ermittelbar, würden sie als etwas rein Privates verstanden, das vorrangig oder ausschließlich dem Täter selbst zugänglich ist. Die Gerichte scheinen sich jedoch in der Regel durchaus zuzutrauen, die Frage zu klären, welcher Person aus welchen Motiven welche Art von Handlung zuzuschreiben ist.

Wittgenstein hat in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* mit seinem sogenannten Privatsprachenargument darauf aufmerksam gemacht, daß wir bei der Identifikation einer Empfindung als einer bestimmten

Empfindung – sagen wir eines Zahnschmerzes -, eine Empfindungssprache benutzen, die wir nicht selbst erfunden haben, und an deren Regeln wir uns halten müssen, wenn wir etwas sinnvolles ausdrücken und nicht nur Laute äußern wollen. Behauptungen über Gefühle sind in einer solchen Sprache jedoch nie nur eine empirische, sondern, wie Wittgenstein sagt, auch eine "grammatische" Angelegenheit. Dabei geht es um korrekte Züge in Sprachspielen : Die Verwendung von Ausdrücken nach bestimmten Regeln, die von Kontext zu Kontext verschieden sein können. Ob jemand ein Gefühl *hat*, mag immer noch eine empirische Angelegenheit sein: aber ob er es haben kann – d. h. ob er sinnvollerweise behaupten kann, ein bestimmtes Gefühl zu haben, oder man dies über ihn behaupten kann, wird zu einer grammatischen Angelegenheit. Dies gilt auch für "mentale" Phänomene wie Absicht, Wollen und Nichtwollen, etc., wie Wittgenstein in seinen "Philosophischen Untersuchungen" an vielen Beispielen demonstriert. Um beispielsweise den Sinn einer Äußerung wie "er hat es absichtlich getan" zu verstehen, muß man wissen, in welchem Kontext er auf welche Weise verwendet wird und wie er nicht verwendet werden kann. Daß wir das "Lächeln des Säuglings" nicht für "Verstellung" halten, (Wittgenstein, § 249) liegt nicht daran, daß wir dem Kind einen besonders ehrlichen Charakter unterstellen, sondern daran, daß nach unserem Sprachgebrauch der Ausdruck Verstellung nur in einem Kontext Sinn hat, in dem auch von Absichten, Strategien, psychologischer Einschätzung etc. gesprochen werden kann; wo wir Personen als verantwortlich und verlässlich betrachten, was die Bedingung dafür ist, daß sie uns täuschen können. Obgleich wir dem Säugling durchaus ein Innenleben zuschreiben, verorten wir seine Gefühle, wenn wir über sie mutmaßen, nicht in seinem individuellen Bewußtsein, sondern in bestimmten sozialen Umgebungen. (Wittgenstein, § 583)

Auch wenn Wittgenstein keine allgemeine Theorie der Psyche und der Persönlichkeit aufstellt, können wir aus seiner Sprachspielanalyse entsprechende Folgerungen ziehen, um den Kontrast dieser an der Sprachpraxis orientierten Auffassung vom Psychischen mit der bewußtseinstheoretischen Auffassung der modernen Philosophie deutlich zu machen. Denn da nach Wittgenstein die Regeln der Verwendung die Bedeutung mentaler Begriffe festlegen und die Regeln, denen eine Person folgt, nicht von ihr selbst festgelegt werden können, sondern nur in Gesellschaft, hat sie, so läßt sich aus Wittgenstein folgern, auch nur insoweit eine "Psyche", als sie in sozialen Beziehungen existiert. (Vgl. Savigny, 67, 84) Sich bewußt zu sein, daß man bestimmte psychische Zustände hat, bedeutet also notwendigerweise, in bestimmten sozialen Beziehungen zu existieren und sich selbst dabei gemäß den Regeln von Sprachspielen zu beschreiben, die öffentlich bekannt sind und deren korrekter Gebrauch daher intersubjektiv überprüfbar ist.

Ein ähnlicher Personbegriff scheint implizit im Strafprozeß vorausgesetzt zu werden, wenn man dem Strafruristen Walter Grasnack glauben schenken kann, von dem das folgende Beispiel stammt: Mitunter beruft sich ein der Körperverletzung oder des Totschlags Angeklagter auf § 33 des deutschen Strafgesetzbuches, wonach ein Täter nicht bestraft wird, wenn er die Grenzen der Notwehr aus Verwirrung, Furcht oder Schrecken überschreitet. Er behauptet also, aus Furcht und nicht etwas aus Zorn oder Mordlust einen Schlag mit tödlichen Folgen ausgeführt zu haben. (Vgl. Grasnack, 287) Wenn "Furcht" in erster Linie als ein empirisches Phänomen besonderer Art, nämlich ein privates Erlebnis im Geist des Einzelnen betrachtet würde, müßte das Gericht nun grundsätzlich an der Möglichkeit zweifeln, die Wahrheit dieser Behauptung zu überprüfen.

Aber das tut es nicht. In der Regel begründet auch der Angeklagte seine Behauptung nicht mit einer detaillierten Darstellung seines Seelenzustands vor der Tat. In seinem Seelenleben kennt er sich meist selbst nicht so genau aus, und gewöhnlich fehlen ihm auch die sprachlichen Mittel zu einer entsprechend individuellen Schilderung. Er begründet seinen Zustand vielmehr als Furcht, indem er die näheren Umstände der Tat schildert. (Vgl. Grasnack, 292) Und ob er mit Recht von Furcht spricht, wird ermittelt, indem man durch genaues Erfragen der Tatumstände die vermeintliche "Umgebung" des Affekts, nämlich den Typ von Situation rekonstruiert, in der er aufgetreten sein soll. Handelt es sich um eine Situation von der Art, in der man sinnvollerweise von Furcht spricht, oder – so könnte man mit Wittgenstein sagen – begeht der Angeklagte mit seiner Behauptung einen grammatischen Fehler? Dies wäre etwa der Fall, wenn er vorgibt, mit Furcht auf eine Sprachhandlung reagiert zu haben, wenn der korrekte Zug im Sprachspiel Zorn gewesen wäre. Wenn er hingegen seine Behauptung den üblichen Regeln der Verwendung des Furchtbegriffs gemäß begründen und im Kreuzverhör stützen kann, besteht auch kein Zweifel mehr an seinem Affektzustand. Zweifel gehört nicht in jedes Sprachspiel, wie Wittgenstein sagt. (Vgl. Grasnack, 295) Aus dieser Analyse des Verstehens von Gefühlen folgt, daß der Bereich der personalen Verantwortung und entsprechend die Identität einer Person sich nur auf den Bereich gemeinsamer sozialer Sprachspiele erstrecken kann. Darüberhinaus erscheint es unter diesen Voraussetzungen nicht selbstverständlich, die Identität einer handelnden Person an die Selbstzuschreibung von Handlungen zu binden. Es ist durchaus möglich, daß sich eine Person in ihren Selbstzuschreibungen täuscht und sich von anderen über ihre wahre Identität belehren läßt – nämlich dann, wenn gezeigt werden kann, daß sie in ihren Selbstzuschreibungen oder ihren Unterlassungen von Selbstzuschreibungen Regeln der Tiefengrammatik und der Zuschreibung verletzt, die sie mit anderen teilt. Das schließt überhaupt nicht aus, daß eine Person sich mit einem gewissen Recht Gefühle und Handlungen zuschreiben könnte, die ihr andere nicht zuschreiben. Falls sie nicht verrückt ist, würde das jedoch erfordern, daß sie kreativ ist; daß sie, mit anderen Worten, neue Regeln der Beschreibung und Zuschreibung von Gefühlen und Handlungen entwickelt hat, mit denen sie ein neues Sprachspiel eröffnet hat, an dem auch andere teilnehmen.

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Wittgensteins Paradox des interkulturellen Verstehens

Wilhelm Lütterfelds, Passau

Die späte Philosophie Wittgensteins hat mit ihrer Konzeption von Sprachspiel und Lebensform eine Reihe von Einsichten formuliert, die nicht nur unentbehrlich sind, will man das Phänomen und die Problematik des interkulturellen Verstehens begreifen, sondern die auch die Unvermeidlichkeit interkultureller Konflikte verständlich machen. Denn interkulturelles Verstehen ist in Wittgensteins Konzeption durch eine paradoxe Struktur gekennzeichnet.

Zunächst gilt es allerdings, die traditionelle cartesianische Begründung für die Probleme des interkulturellen Verstehens zu verabschieden. Die Erfahrung, „daß ein Mensch für einen anderen ein völliges Rätsel sein kann“, etwa in einem „fremde[n] Land mit gänzlich fremden Traditionen“, und selbst dann, wenn man die „Sprache des Landes“ sogar „beherrscht“, daß man also die Menschen dieses Landes überhaupt nicht „versteh“ -, diese Erfahrung hat ihren Grund nicht darin, daß vor allem bei Menschen anderer Kulturen deren „Inneres“ einem völlig verborgen ist (vgl. PU, S. 568)¹. Denn dieses „Innere“, seine Gedanken, Gefühle und Emotionen, seine Intentionen, Erwartungen und Hoffnungen, seine Formen des Lebenssinnes, die es zu verstehen gilt, wenn man mit Menschen fremder Kulturen kommunizieren möchte, sind die privaten Erlebnisse eines Subjekts. Sie sind einer fremden Person prinzipiell unzugänglich. Und zwar deshalb, weil nur das betroffene Subjekt derartige Erlebnisse hat, sie fühlt, sie ausbildet und vollzieht.

Wittgensteins Privat-Sprachen-Kritik hat diese cartesianische Begründung hinreichend widerlegt. Vor allem mit dem Argument, daß die „Seele“ des Menschen nur im öffentlichen „Bild“ des „Körpers“ existiert, also nur im sprachlichen und nichtsprachlichen leiblichen Ausdruck. Descartes' „Meditationen“ widerlegen sich insofern mit ihrer These des radikalen Zweifels an der gesamten Wirklichkeit a priori dadurch selber, daß sie in der Sprache formuliert sind.

Es muß demnach eine andere Art von „Verborgenheit“ sein, die das interkulturelle Verstehen problematisch macht, und zwar selbst dann, wenn man die Sprachen fremder Kulturen beherrscht, und wenn in ihnen wie auch im nichtsprachlichen Verhalten der Menschen deren „Inneres“ anderen Personen öffentlich zugänglich ist.

„Wir können uns nicht in sie finden“ diese These des späten Wittgenstein (PU, S. 568) wie auch seine frühe Bemerkung, daß die Welt „meine Welt“ ist, machen auf einen Sachverhalt aufmerksam, den man als die Eigen-Zentrik des interkulturellen Verstehens beschreiben kann. Es sind immer die „Sprachspiele“ der eigenen Kultur, die die Basis des Verstehens von Menschen fremder Kulturen ausmachen. Sie geben den alternativlosen und unhintergehbaren Verstehenshorizont vor. Dieser Horizont legt aber das Kriterium des interkulturellen Verstehens auf ein Sich-selber-Wiederfinden im fremden Anderen fest, in seiner Sprache, in seiner Lebensform, in seiner kulturellen Tradition. So wenig man in der eigenen Wahrnehmung der Welt über fremde Gesichtsfelder verfügt, weil man sie vom eigenen visuell nicht unterscheiden kann, so daß sie nur

als Inhalt des eigenen Wahrnehmungsraumes auftreten können, so wenig läßt sich im interkulturellen Verstehen die Möglichkeitsbedingung der eigenen hermeneutischen Perspektive ausblenden oder gar abgrenzen. Auch radikale interkulturelle semantische und pragmatische Differenzen des Verstehens verbleiben deshalb innerhalb des Sinn- und Bedeutungsfeldes der eigenen Sprachspiele und ihrer Lebensform.

Für Hegel ist es die Subjektivität, die den Unterschied von Eigenem und Fremden „absolut“ macht, derart, daß er nur noch in der Negation besteht - ohne jede inhaltliche (interkulturelle) Gemeinsamkeit. Und alle Konzeptionen des Verstehens, die mit der Konstitution des Anderen operieren, mit Theorien der Einfühlung, der Übertragung oder auch des Analogieschlusses, verdanken sich dieser Einsicht. Deren Problematik ist freilich auch hinreichend bekannt: Denn der Andere der fremden Kultur wird darin gerade in all dem negiert, was seine kulturelle Individualität ausmacht, und zwar selbst dann, wenn man über ein hinreichendes Wissen über die Eigenart dieser Kultur ebenso verfügt wie über Kenntnis und Fähigkeit ihrer Sprache. In das interkulturelle Verstehen gerät dann jedoch unweigerlich eine bestimmte Machtstruktur, derart, daß man von einer hermeneutischen Dominanz der eigenen Sprachspiele und Lebensformen im interkulturellen Verstehensprozeß sprechen muß. Schließlich sind dann auch hermeneutische Konflikte vorprogrammiert, sofern es im Pluralismus der Kulturen viele hermeneutische Zentren gibt, deren kulturelle Verstehenshorizonte vorgeben, was „Verstehen eines Fremden“ heißt, und die insofern - selbst im Falle der hermeneutischen „Übereinstimmung“ - notwendig miteinander im Verhältnis der Rivalität und Konkurrenz, des Streites und Konfliktes stehen. Und es scheint dann nur eine Form des Dominanz-Verhaltens zur Verfügung zu stehen, um derartige Spannungen aufzulösen.

Natürlich ist diese Konzeption des interkulturellen Verstehens - gleichsam eine Variation des eigenen Sprachspiels -, so unvermeidbar sie auch faktisch wie begrifflich ist, in sich selber widersprüchlich. Und zwar deshalb, weil das Sich-selber-Wiederfinden im Fremden und seiner Kultur zugleich ein symmetrisches Phänomen ist. Denn es setzt ja eine autonome fremde Kultur voraus und vollzieht sich immer auch in der kulturellen Perspektiven der anderen. Dadurch verwandelt sich diese Konzeption aus ihrem eigenen Begriff heraus zu einer ihr entgegengesetzten Theorie des interkulturellen Verstehens. Darin besteht die Basis des Fremd-Verstehens im anthropologisch Gemeinsamen der humanen Universalien, die das gemeinsame Fundament der Sprachspiele aller Kulturen darstellen. Für den späten Wittgenstein besteht dieses Fundament aus der „gemeinsame[n] menschliche[n] Handlungsweise“, und sie ermöglicht als „Bezugssystem“ auch das Verstehen einer „gänzlich fremden Sprache“ (PU § 206). Weil für den Sprach-Pragmatismus Wittgensteins nun die Sprachspiele einer jeden Kultur aus einer unlösbaren Einheit von sprachlicher und nicht-sprachlicher Handlungen in der Welt und im Rahmen von sozialen Gepflogenheiten und Institutionen bestehen, ist es diese überkulturelle Einheit, die das Verstehen einer fremden Kultur ermöglicht. Fundamental für diese Einheit ist nun jene „regelmäßige“ Verknüpfung, die zwischen der Handlungsweise bzw. den

¹ L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophische Untersuchung* (PU), in: Werkausgabe Band 1, Frankfurt/Main 1995²; *Über Gewißheit* (UG), in: Band 8

Handlungen und den sprachlichen Lauten existiert. Zwar kann die Art der Regelmäßigkeit dieser Einheit von Sprache, Handlung und (sozialer) Welt in einzelnen Kulturen sehr unterschiedlich sein, so daß auch dasjenige, was „Regelmäßigkeit“ heißt, in einzelnen Kulturen sehr voneinander abweichen kann. Gleichwohl ist es diese sprachpragmatische Basis, die eine überkulturelle Konstante der gemeinsamen menschlichen Lebensform darstellt.

Allerdings wird von Wittgenstein diese „gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise“ sowie die darin implizierte „regelmäßige Verknüpfung“ mit sprachlichen Lauten dahingehend noch präzisiert, daß es vor allem die gemeinsame Urteilsweise ist, worin die überkulturelle „Übereinstimmung der Menschen“ besteht. Nur weil Menschen unterschiedlicher Kulturen in dem, was sie „sagen“, immer auch übereinstimmen, also auch darin, was für sie „richtig und was falsch ist“, besteht die Möglichkeit, eine kulturell fremde Sprache zu verstehen (PU § 241 f). Wenn die Menschen nicht in bestimmten Situationen gleiche Urteile fällen und sprachlich zum Ausdruck bringen, dann gibt es für sie keine gemeinsame Welt, keine gemeinsame Semantik ihrer unterschiedlichen Sprachen und mit ihr auch keine Möglichkeit interkultureller Verständigung. Umgekehrt, eine derartige sprachliche Verständigung reicht dann immer auch nur so weit, als es die gemeinsame Urteils- und Sprachpraxis gibt und damit eine Übereinstimmung in der gemeinsamen „Lebensform“. Und ohne eine derartige interkulturell gemeinsame Urteils- und Sprachpraxis, die selber nicht erst durch Verständigung hergestellt werden kann, gibt es dann erst recht keine Verständigung darüber, inwieweit Menschen unterschiedlicher Kulturen in ihren Meinungen nicht übereinstimmen. Schließlich ist es dann auch nicht möglich, gemeinsam festzustellen, inwieweit gegenseitige interkulturelle Verständigung gelingt oder aber nicht gelingt.

Mit all dem legt Wittgenstein ein Fundament für das interkulturelle Verstehen, das in einem universalen Verstehens-Pragmatismus besteht, in einer globalen „Handlungsweise“ des Urteilens und Sprechens. Und Wittgenstein ist sich auch darüber im klaren, daß dieses Fundament der gemeinsamen kulturellen „Lebensform“ eine gleichsam irrationale Basis im „Animalische[n]“ der menschlichen Natur hat (vgl. ÜG § 110, 204, 358 f). So wenig sich diese „Lebensform“ der menschlichen Kultur in und durch Sprachspiele selber erst herstellen läßt, so sehr gilt es umgekehrt, sie faktisch hinzunehmen - denn sie steht da „wie unser Leben“ (ÜG § 559), dessen Herkunft und Genese für uns selber auch einen vorrationalsten Prozeß darstellt. Wenn Menschen unterschiedlichster Kulturen sich in ihren Aussagen irren, dann setzt dies für Wittgenstein voraus, daß sie „schon mit der Menschheit konform“ urteilen (ÜG § 156). Insofern gibt es ein überkulturelles Wissen der Menschen, worin sie sich in gewisser Weise „nicht irren“ können (ÜG § 155). Beispiele eines derartigen überkulturellen Wissens sind für Wittgenstein Sätze wie, daß die Erde lange vor meiner Geburt existiert hat, daß auf ihr Menschen leben, daß wir von anderen Menschen abstammen, daß die Dinge der Welt nicht verschwinden, wenn man sie nicht mehr sieht, daß sie nicht diskontinuierlich in Raum und Zeit existieren, daß Tiere nicht auf Bäumen wachsen, daß Menschen sich ernähren, daß sie sich mit der Sprache verständigen usw. Derartiges Wissen bestreiten, bedeutet insofern in jeder Kultur, daß man dabei nicht eine sinnvolle und mögliche Aussage macht, eine Meinung äußert, die möglicherweise wahr sein kann, aber auch falsch. Sondern es bedeutet, daß man „geistesgestört“ ist (ebd.).

Wenn dieser Hintergrund einer globalen interkulturellen Konformität der menschlichen Handlungs-

Urteils- und Sprachpraxis die interkulturelle Verständigung ermöglicht, dann ermöglicht sie auch eine Verständigung über Grenzen des gegenseitigen Verstehens.

Es ist nun interessant, daß in Wittgensteins späten Schriften beide Modelle des interkulturellen Verstehens und Nicht-Verstehens formuliert werden. Neben der Basis der „gemeinsamen menschlichen Handlungsweise“ steht unvermittelt das „Sich-selber-Wiederfinden“ im Anderen; neben einer gemeinsamen, globalen Handlungs-, Sprach- und Urteilspraxis steht unvermittelt das eigenzentrische Modell des interkulturellen Verstehens auf der Basis eigener Sprachspiele und Lebensformen. Schließt jenes Modell eine prinzipielle Verstehensgrenze zwischen Kulturen aus, so ist genau diese prinzipielle Verstehensgrenze im letzteren Modell a priori impliziert, sofern das Verstehen einer fremden kulturellen Lebensformen nur über deren Identifikation mit der eigenen verläuft. Beide Modelle schließen sich aber begrifflich aus. In diesem Modell ist der kulturell Andere ein „Rätsel“, in jenem ist er ein anderer Mensch, dessen kulturelle Eigenart und Besonderheiten nichts Rätselhaftes aufweist.

Für Hegel sind derartige begriffliche Strukturen ein „ungeheurer Widerspruch“, sofern das Verhältnis von Eigenem und kulturell Fremdem sich einerseits über Gemeinsamkeiten menschlicher Lebensformen und Sprachspiele bestimmt, innerhalb derer sich die jeweilige Individualität und Besonderheit einer einzelnen Kultur herausbildet. Andererseits ist das Verhältnis von eigener und fremder Kultur nur negativ, nur durch den bloßen Unterschied gekennzeichnet - denn alle interkulturellen Gemeinsamkeiten werden ausschließlich aus der Perspektive der eigenen Sprachspiele und Lebensformen heraus faßbar und verstehbar, so daß lediglich die negative Feststellung bleibt, fremde Kulturten sind „anders“ - ein interkulturelles Verstehensparadox.

Wittgenstein hat in seinem Spätwerk auch diese Variante einer rein negativen Beziehung zwischen den Kulturen Rechnung getragen. Im Unterschied zu den Modellen des Verstehens- Universalismus und des Verstehens-Zentralismus geht Wittgenstein darin von einer prinzipiellen Inkommensurabilität der Sprachspiele und Lebensformen unterschiedlicher Kulturen aus. Die empirische Basis dieser Variante besteht in der Erfahrung, daß die Sprachspiele unterschiedlicher Kulturen derart verschieden voneinander sein können, daß trotz der „gemeinsamen menschlichen Handlungsweise“ und der in ihr implizierten „gemeinsamen Lebensform“ des Urteilens und Sprechens die kulturellen Weltbilder z. B. über kein gemeinsames Verständnis von wissenschaftlicher Welterklärung, von den Fähigkeiten des Menschen, von der Geschichte der Erde und ihrer Natur oder auch von der Identität physischer Dinge und ihres Wesens verfügen. Beispiele Wittgensteins sind Kulturen, die „statt des Physikers etwa ein Orakel“ befragen (ÜG § 609), die glauben, daß von ihnen gefangene fremde Menschen „von irgendwo zwischen Erde und Mond“ hergekommen sind (ÜG § 264), die die Entstehung der Erde „50 Jahre []“ zurückdatieren (ÜG § 262), die sich „nicht erinnern“ können, ob sie „immer fünf Finger oder zwei Hände gehabt“ haben (ÜG § 157) oder die auch wie die „Katholiken“ glauben, daß ein Stück Brot „unter gewissen Umständen“ sein „Wesen gänzlich ändert“ (ÜG § 239).

Der Grund für diese prinzipiell kulturelle Inkommensurabilität der Weltbilder und ihrer Sprachspiele liegt für Wittgenstein in jenen „grammatischen Sätzen“, die als „Norm“ sprachlicher Beschreibung und Darstellung die Referenz, den Sinn und die Bedeutung eines Sprachspiels erst festlegen, und damit auch das jeweilige kulturelle Weltbild. Weil derartige „grammatische Sätze“ einer

Sprache zugleich das „Substrat“ alles „Forschens und Behauptens“ sind, läßt sich weder ihre Wahrheit, noch ihre Falschheit feststellen - sie sind „der überkommene Hintergrund“, auf dem man „zwischen wahr und falsch“ überhaupt erst unterscheiden kann (ÜG § 94, 162). Ihre Sicherheit entspringt der kulturellen „Gemeinschaft“, worin die Personen einer Kultur durch „Wissenschaft und Erziehung verbunden“ sind (ÜG § 298). Insofern ist das kulturelle Sprachspiel, das von derartigen „grammatischen Sätzen“ festgelegt wird, weder gerechtfertigt, noch nicht gerechtfertigt, da es die „Grundlage“ von allem Handeln und Denken innerhalb einer Kultur und ihrer Sprachspiele darstellt (ÜG § 411), und damit eben auch angibt, was ein wissenschaftliches „Argument“ ist, was „Prüfung“ heißt, was „vernünftig“ und „unvernünftig“ usw.

Wenn aber dasjenige, was in den Sprachspielen einer Kultur „Wirklichkeit“ bzw. „Welt“ heißt und was „Übereinstimmung“ von „Gedanke und Wirklichkeit“ durch „Normen“ sprachlicher Beschreibung und Darstellung allererst festgelegt wird, und wenn diese „Normen“ auch die „Grundprinzipien der menschlichen Forschung“ erst bestimmen (ÜG § 670), dann kann man weder auf vermeintlich objektive und intersubjektiv identische Tatsachen der Welt verweisen noch auf wissenschaftliche Erkenntnisse, um Menschen anderen Kulturen oder Weltbilder davon zu überzeugen, daß diese ebensowenig den Tatsachen der Welt entsprechen wie wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen, daß sie im Gegenteil durch beides gerade widerlegt werden. Und auch das Argument, ein Weltbild „ widerspreche alle [unserer] Erfahrung“ kann nicht geltend gemacht werden (ÜG § 132). Denn gerade dasjenige, was „Erfahrung“ heißt, ist in einer derartigen durch „grammatische Sätze“ konstituierten kulturellen Lebensform sprachspielrelativ. Für Wittgenstein ist es allein die Tradierung eines kulturellen Weltbildes durch „Erziehung“, die die Akzeptanz eines kulturellen Weltbildes und die Übernahme in das eigene Selbstverständnis erzeugt (Vgl. ÜG § 399). Überzeugungen fremder Kulturen, nach denen etwa „ein König [...] Regen machen“ kann oder in denen es durchaus verständlich ist, daß „ein Mensch sich nicht erinnern könnte“, ob er über „immer fünf Finger oder zwei Hände gehabt“ hätte, verwenden sprachliche Ausdrücke in Sprachspielen in einer Art und Weise, die nicht nur unserer Ausdrucksverwendung und den ihr zugrundeliegenden „grammatischen Sätzen“ völlig widerspricht, sondern wir können die Sprachen dieser Menschen überhaupt nicht verstehen. Denn wenn wir die Sätze der kulturell fremden Sprachen in unsere eigene Sprache übersetzen, dann liegen unserem Gebrauch der entsprechenden Ausdrücken andere „Normen“ der sprachlichen Darstellung zugrunde. Deshalb müssen wir völlig offen lassen, ob und inwieweit die Semantiken der unterschiedlichen Kulturen und ihre Weltbilder in einander übersetzbar sind oder nicht – wir können nicht einmal sagen, daß sie nicht in einander übersetzbar sind. Offenbar ist dieser Pluralismus der kulturellen Sprachspiele durch eine Inkommensurabilität gekennzeichnet, in der jeglicher interkultureller Maßstab fehlt, die unterschiedlichen Semantiken der Sprachspiele auf einander zu beziehen und sie auf Gemeinsamkeiten wie auch Unterschiede hin zu vergleichen.

Daraus resultiert für das interkulturellen Verstehen nun eine prinzipielle Verstehensbarriere, die nicht aufhebbar ist und aufgrund derer man sich eines jeden Urteils darüber enthalten muß, ob gegenseitiges interkulturelles Verstehen vorliegt oder aber nicht. Die unterschiedlichsten Grammatiken und Lebensformen, die über inkommensurable „grammatische Sätze“ verfügen, lassen dann aber keinerlei gegenseitige Beurteilung darauf hin zu, ob sie wahr oder falsch, vernünftig oder unvernünftig sind.

Für die interkulturelle Verstehenspraxis resultiert daraus nicht notwendig eine Konflikt-Situation. Bestenfalls reduziert sich interkulturelles Verstehen auf die Anerkennung eines konfliktfreien Nebeneinander, man läßt es eben dabei „bewenden“, daß die kulturellen Sprachspiele höchst unterschiedlich, ja gegensätzlich sind (ÜG § 238), oder auch „höchst seltsam“ (Vgl. PU S. 542, 539).

Nun ist wiederum auch diese Lösung der Problematik des interkulturellen Verstehens nicht hinreichend. Sie übergeht ebenso die „gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise“ wie die darin implizierte gemeinsame Urteilspraxis der Kulturen, aber auch daß wir dann, wenn wir nicht aus der kulturellen Eigenperspektive heraus kulturelle Fremdbilder auf ihre Wahrheit und Falschheit hin beurteilen, uns selber aller „Grundlage“ des Urteils berauben (ÜG § 618). Wenn wir nicht unterstellten, daß „jeder Vernünftige in unserer Lage“ unser kulturelles Weltbild übernimmt (ÜG § 325), hingen unsere kulturellen Sprachspiele in der Luft und entbehrten völlig einer „unwankende[n] Grundlage“ (ÜG § 403).

Daraus folgt aber nicht nur das Recht der eigenen Kultur, fremde Weltbilder und Lebensformen kritisch zu beurteilen. Sondern damit ist auch der interkulturelle Versuch legitimiert, durch „Überzeugung“, ja auch durch „Überredung“ die Sprachspiele und Lebensformen von Menschen fremder Kulturen zu verändern - und zwar im Sinne einer Übernahme des eigenen kulturellen Weltbildes (ÜG § 612). Anstelle eines kulturellen Nebeneinander tritt dann kulturelle Rivalität und Konkurrenz, ja der kulturelle Konflikt. Verweigern fremde Kulturen die Anpassung an und die Übernahme der eigenen kulturellen Lebensform, werden sie bestenfalls zu „Narren“, schlimmstenfalls zu „Ketzer“ - samt allen Folgen eines entsprechenden Verhaltens ihnen gegenüber erklärt (ÜG 611). Interkulturelles Verstehen impliziert dann jedoch auch eine radikale Abwertung, ja Unterwerfung fremder Lebensformen unter das eigene kulturelle Weltbild und impliziert unter Umständen sogar eine militante strategische Praxis der „Überredung“.

Damit wird in gewisser Weise ein „Konflikt der Kulturen“ unvermeidlich. Wittgenstein hat zwar auch immer wieder hervorgehoben, daß die kulturellen Sprachspiele kontingent sind, daß sie sich aufgrund des Erfahrungsdrucks wie auch aufgrund von wissenschaftlichen Konsequenzen ändern - und damit ändern sich auch die „Begriffe“ der kulturellen Sprachspiele und vor allem dasjenige, was als „vernünftig oder unvernünftig erscheint“ (ÜG § 336). Dieser Prozeß impliziert mehr als kulturelle Begegnung und interkultureller Dialog. Denn in ihm kann sich durchaus auch die Inkommensurabilität der kulturellen Weltbilder ändern -, ein Prozeß, den Wittgenstein vor allem mit dem Finden von interkulturellen „Zwischengliedern“ (PU § 122) beschreibt und dem die „gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise“ ebenso zugrunde liegt wie eine interkulturelle Übereinstimmung in Urteilen.

Doch trotz alledem bleibt interkulturelles Verstehen immer auch geprägt von einem nicht aufhebbaren Verstehenskonflikt. Er entspringt der unvermeidbaren eigenen Perspektive der kulturellen Sprachspiele und Lebensformen, und zwar gerade als Verstehenskriterium und Beurteilungsmaßstab fremder Kulturen.

Wenn aber interkulturelles Verstehen ebenso durch semantische Universalien geprägt ist wie durch interkulturelle Verallgemeinerung des eigenen Weltbildes und nicht zuletzt durch eine daraus resultierende Inkommensurabilität kultureller Lebensformen, dann scheint interkulturelles Verstehen eine Art dialektische

hermeneutische Praxis zu sein, d. h. eine Art Mischung von symmetrischem, gegenseitigem Verstehen, von verstehensneutraler Anerkennung der Fremdheit der Sprachspiele anderer Kulturen und Versuchen, die Dominanz der eigenen Lebensform durch argumentative Überzeugung und strategische Überredung zur Geltung zu bringen. Insofern scheint es unumgänglich zu sein, von einer Paradoxie des interkulturellen Verstehens zu sprechen - eine Paradoxie, die in ihrer praktischen Härte vielleicht nur durch die Befolgung des kategorischen Imperativs: „Behandle den Anderen nie nur als Mittel, sondern immer auch als Zweck an sich selbst!“ gemildert werden könnte.

Der Personbegriff der ordinary language

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Einleitung

Die Vereinten Nationen begründeten die Menschenrechte mit der Würde der Person und muten es damit jedermann zu, die Bedeutung dieses Begriffs erfassen zu können. Auf dieses allgemeine Sprachverständnis rekurrieren neuerdings auch Philosophen wie Peter Strawson, Martin Brassler, Robert Spaemann, Dieter Birnbacher oder Dieter Sturma, der konstatiert: "Will man sich nicht von vornherein auf Spekulationen einlassen, die in aller Regel von einer Mischung theoretisch unbefangener Meinungen zur Subjektivität und willkürlichen Adaptionen traditioneller Modelle gesteuert werden, ist ein Rekurs auf das Sprachverhalten von Personen unumgänglich. Das Sprachverhalten ist der Phänomenbereich, der rechtfertigungsfähigen Untersuchungen von Subjektivität offensteht, und in ihm müssen die Spuren der Subjektivität rekonstruiert werden" (S.112). Diese Rekonstruktion des Personbegriffs der Alltagssprache und des Alltagsdenkens möchte ich in meinem Beitrag empirisch fundieren, da die bisher praktizierte rein virtuelle Einbeziehung des vermuteten Alltagsbegriffs zur Person lediglich das eigene Sprachverständnis der Philosophen wiedergibt, das auf einer recht willkürlichen, kontextgebundenen Inanspruchnahme der Normalsprache basiert. Die jeweils angedeuteten oder wie bei Brassler (S. 11 - S. 15) ausformulierten Interpretationen umfassen nämlich nur einen Teil des Bedeutungsumfangs.

In der vorgestellten empirischen Untersuchung werden der Sprachgebrauch des Personbegriffs und die damit verbundenen Kognitionen mit Hilfe der Alltagsliteratur sowie der Subjektiven Theorien überprüft. Die Deutungen des Begriffs *Person* sind nämlich wegen der ethischen Folgen nicht nur für den interdisziplinären Diskurs relevant, sondern auch für die übrige Bevölkerung.

1. Die Analyse des alltagssprachlichen Personbegriffs - operationalisiert über die Print-Medien

Der Personbegriff der Alltagssprache kann nur aus seinem jeweiligen Kontext erschlossen werden, da in der Umgangssprache in der Regel lebensweltliche Zusammenhänge transportiert werden und keine theoretischen Elaborate. Die manifeste Ebene wird sich also auf die Nennung des Begriffs beschränken. Zur Rekonstruktion der latenten Bedeutung wurde deshalb die kontextuale Sinneinheit inhaltsanalytisch untersucht und mit dem Chi-Quadrat-Test als Signifikanz-Test überprüft. Die Verwendung dieses Tests, der auf einem Vier-Felder-Schema beruht, bot sich deshalb an, weil der Begriff *Mensch* zur Kontrastierung diente.

Der Ausgangspunkt war die von Boethius geprägte philosophische Hypothese, daß der Begriff *Person* auf ein Individuum verweist, der Begriff *Mensch* dagegen auf die Gattung. Bei der Interpretation der Ergebnisse ist natürlich zu berücksichtigen, daß die gesprochene bzw. literarische Sprache lebendig ist und sich nicht am trennscharfen Begriffseinsatz orientiert.

Die sprachliche Grundlage für die Inhaltsanalyse lieferten 200 Szenarien, in denen die Begriffe *Person* bzw. *Mensch* paritätisch verteilt sind. Die Szenarien wurden in einer Zufallsstichprobe aus alltagssprachlichen Skripten, wie z.B. Romanen oder Zeitschriften gewählt. Durchgeführt wurde die Inhaltsanalyse von 35 speziell geschulten Ratern, die jeweils 40 Szenarien mit Hilfe eines Kodier-Leitfadens in ein Kategoriensystem einordnen. Dabei ergab sich folgende Verteilung:

Der Chi-Quadrat-Test

	Anzahl der Szenarios Individuum	Anzahl der Szenarios Gattung	insgesamt
Person	614	103	717
Mensch	220	463	683
insgesamt	834	566	1400

Das Ergebnis ist signifikant ($p > 0,001$).

Im allgemeinen Sprachgefühl ist also der Begriff *Individuum* mit dem Begriff *Person* eng verbunden.

Zur Erfassung des Bedeutungsumfangs des Personenbegriffs wurden nun die Szenarien mit Hilfe weiterer Unterkategorien einer Einzelanalyse unterzogen. Zunächst einmal zeigte es sich, daß die Frage, wer eine Person ist, die in der Philosophie alternativ diskutiert beantwortet wird, in der Alltagssprache kein Problem darzustellen scheint. Im Regelfall ist die als *Person* bezeichnete Entität ein Erwachsener.

Die Analyse der Szenarien läßt sich in folgendem Konstrukt zusammenfassen: Eine Person ist ein Individuum mit einer unabschließbaren Liste von P(ersonen)- Prädikaten und einer biologisch begrenzten Liste von M(aterie)-Prädikaten. Unter P-Prädikaten werden dabei die Zuschreibungen von Handlungen, Intentionen, Gedanken, Gefühlen und Erinnerungen verstanden, während die M-Prädikate auf die materiell-physikalische Seite der Person hinweisen, also auf somatische Eigenschaften, die sich in der gegenwärtigen körperlichen Beschaffenheit und in der Veränderung über die Zeit hinweg ausdrücken. Aber nicht nur die M-Prädikate sind dynamisch zu verstehen, sondern auch die P-Prädikate. Das führt zu Fragen nach der diachronen Identität bzw.

Modaltheorie 2 (*Bewußtsein*): *Person* ist der bewußte Mensch

Eine Person ist ein Individuum, das sich seiner Personalität bewußt ist. Die zentralen Elemente sind die P(erson)-Prädikate, die M(aterie)-Prädikate haben lediglich einen funktionalen Wert.

Die Dauer des Personseins wird durch die Bewußtseinsfähigkeit bestimmt. Da diese eine kontinuierlich wachsende bzw. schwindende Dimension ist, wird zwischen der werdenden und der vollentwickelten Person unterschieden. Das Personsein beginnt mit der Partnerschaftsfähigkeit und dem Verantwortungsbewußtsein für das eigene Handeln. Es endet mit dem bewußten Leben.

Die personale Individualität entsteht durch das einzigartige Konglomerat der unterschiedlichsten Variablen, den einmaligen M-, P-, und U(mwelt)-Prädikaten, die sich wechselseitig beeinflussen. Zu den U(mwelt)-Prädikaten gehören die spezifischen Raum-Zeit-Positionen, sowie die kulturellen, bzw. familiären Bedingungen, in die ein Individuum hinein geboren wird. Aufgrund ihrer P-Prädikate, also aufgrund ihrer rationalen, emotionalen und sozialen Kompetenzen, kann eine Person als Bezugsperson oder Funktions- bzw. Rollenträger mit ihrer Umwelt in Interaktion treten.

Die Korrespondenz von Gefühl und Intelligenz gilt als wichtigstes personales Merkmal, das die Humanität konstituiert. Gefühle lassen sich über Indikatoren wie Gestik, Mimik, Sprachmodulation bezüglich der Wortwahl und der Lautstärke oder über die Bewegung (z.B. Rückzug) erfassen. Das Mitteilen von Gefühlen beeinflusst den sozialen Austausch. Die Rationalität betrifft ebenso die theoretische wie die praxisbezogene Ebene und lenkt die Handlungsabläufe. Das Denken kann sich also bei einer Person im Handeln manifestieren und reicht im persönlichen Bereich von der Entwicklung eigener Lebenspläne bis zur Selbststeuerung im Alltag. Auch hochkomplexe Qualitäten wie die Ästhetik werden durch die Rationalität verarbeitet. Als Problemlöseprozeß realisiert sich das Denken auch in Sprechakten, die durch Vernunft und die geistige Fähigkeit der Artikulation gekennzeichnet sind. Hier werden die Regeln des Umgangs miteinander geklärt, also die Organisation des Zusammenlebens, die zur Festlegung von ethischen Normen führt. Diese Wertvorstellungen müssen ständig reflexiv überdacht werden. Sie sind vom Kriterium der Verantwortung geprägt. Die Fähigkeit, Intentionen zu bilden und sie planend umzusetzen, gehört also zu den Merkmalen einer Person.

Die Verbalsprache ist eine Möglichkeit der Vergegenständlichung des Denkens und auch eine Möglichkeit des personalen Austauschs. Sie ist gekennzeichnet durch theoretische Konzepte, logische Strukturen, aber auch durch bildhafte Prozesse und wird ergänzt durch die Körpersprache.

Damit aber diese Merkmale des Personseins realisiert werden können, muß eine Person autonom sein. Sie muß sich also frei entscheiden können, zumindest in der Form der Willensfreiheit. Als Voraussetzung für die freie Entscheidung gilt der Selbstbezug, der aus den Elementen *Selbstbeobachtung*, *Selbstreflexivität*, *Selbstkritik* und *Selbstkorrektur* besteht, also die höchste Form des *Sich-Selbst-Bewußt-Seins* darstellt. Auf der Gefühlsebene sind diese Prozesse mit Reue und der Motivation zur Änderung bzw. im positiven Fall mit Selbstzufriedenheit verbunden. Die Verbindung der Merkmale *Rationalität*, *Emotionalität*, *Sprache* und *Selbstbezug* führt zur sozialen Kompetenz. Die höchste Stufe wird in der reziproken, symmetrischen

Kommunikation realisiert. Das Ziel der sozialen Kompetenz liegt in der Regulierung von Nähe und Distanz, die zu differenzierten Beziehungen führt und das Leben in Gemeinschaften ermöglicht.

Die Handlungskompetenz bezieht darüber hinaus noch alle Objektebenen mit ein und realisiert sich in der Ausführung von Ziel-Mittel-Analysen.

Da eine Person ihre Handlungen selbst verantworten kann, ist sie rechtsfähig. Sie muß also in ihrem Handeln den Rechtskanon berücksichtigen, ist aber durch diesen auch in ihrem Personsein geschützt. Ihr wichtigstes Recht ist das Recht auf Leben und der Befriedigung ihrer Grundbedürfnisse. Dazu kommt das Recht auf menschenwürdige Behandlung, also der Beachtung ihrer Würde, die sich in der Toleranz gegebenenfalls sogar Akzeptanz und dem Respekt vor ihren Wünschen und Zielen sowie der Förderung ihrer Entfaltungsmöglichkeiten äußert. Außerdem hat eine Person auch das Recht auf ihre eigene Meinung. Eine Person soll also ihre individuellen Züge und ihre Fähigkeiten verwirklichen können und eine entsprechende Bildung erhalten.

Neben dem Schutz durch festgeschriebene Rechte resultieren aus dem Personsein auch Verpflichtungen, und zwar moralische Pflichten gegenüber dem Einzelnen und gegenüber der Gesellschaft. Die erste Pflicht, aus der sich die anderen Pflichten ableiten, besteht darin, den anderen als Person zu behandeln

Modaltheorie 3 (*Tier*): *Person* ist jede Entität mit P-Prädikaten

Das hochentwickelte Tier mit intelligenten Strategien ist eine Person, da es über P-Prädikate verfügt. Diese P-Prädikate umfassen die Bereiche *Emotionalität*, *instrumentelle Intelligenz*, *soziale Kompetenz*, *Handlungskompetenz* und *Individualität*.

Vor allem Haustiere, die eine enge Beziehung zu ihren menschlichen Betreuern haben, werden aufgrund ihrer Emotionalität, die sich z.B. in ihrer Freude, Trauer oder Bindungsfähigkeit zeigt, als Personen wahrgenommen. Sie werden reziprok ebenfalls geliebt und entsprechend ihrer Natur mit Achtung behandelt. Sie gelten als Familienmitglieder. Das P-Prädikat *Emotionalität* grenzt an das P-Prädikat *soziale Kompetenz*. Als Bindeglied dient die Sprache, die sich beim Tier in Form von Lautäußerungen und als Körpersprache darstellt. Das Tier hat eine breite Palette der Kommunikationsmöglichkeiten und der Darstellung seiner Gefühle. Sie reicht von der Augensprache über die Körperhaltung bis zur Modulation des Klangs seiner 'Stimme'.

Durch seine soziale Kompetenz paßt sich das Haustier der menschlichen Lebensgemeinschaft an und verhält sich korrespondierend zu den Sitten und Anforderungen seiner Bezugspersonen. Aber auch Nutztiere mit instrumenteller Intelligenz werden unter den Personstatus subsumiert.

Das Tier hat Wünsche und Ziele, also einen Willen. Das Tier lebt aber nicht nur im Zeitraum der nahen Zukunft und der Gegenwart, über sein Erinnerungsvermögen hat es auch zu seiner eigenen Vergangenheit Zugang. Aufgrund seiner Handlungskompetenz, die eine gewisse Denk- und Lernfähigkeit einschließt, kann das Tier seine unmittelbaren Wünsche durch zielvolle Handlungsabläufe befriedigen. Seine einzigartige ausgeprägte Persönlichkeit verleiht dem Tier Individualität.

Auch das Tier hat als Person das Recht auf Achtung und damit das Recht auf Leben und auf einen artgerechten Umgang. Da es allerdings keine intellektuell gesteuerte Verantwortung übernehmen kann, sondern lediglich über instinktgesteuerte quasi-moralische Qualitäten verfügt, entfällt die Dimension der Pflichtübernahme.

Schlußbemerkung

Alle drei Konstrukte der Modaltheorien entsprechen dem Grundverständnis des Personbegriffs der Alltagssprache: Mit *Person* ist ein Individuum gemeint. Die Modaltheorie 2 (Bewußtsein): '*Person* ist der bewußte Mensch' kommt inhaltlich der Alltagssprache am nächsten. Im weiteren Forschungsprozeß sollen die Alltagskonzepte mit den philosophischen in Beziehung gesetzt werden.

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First-Person Knowledge: Wittgenstein, Cavell, and 'Therapy'

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The recent publication of *The New Wittgenstein* signals the arrival of a distinctive 'therapeutic' reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophical enterprise. As announced in its Preface, this collection presents the 'nonsense' of philosophy as the subject of Wittgenstein's therapeutic work. The simple, plain nonsense of many philosophical remarks is revealed under the scrutiny of Wittgenstein's investigations, according to this interpretation, leading us to see that such remarks „fail to make any claim at all“ (Crary 6). This view of Wittgenstein's use of 'nonsense' as a term of criticism begins with the work of Stanley Cavell, on this account, and has extended more recently to work on a wide area of Wittgenstein's concerns, elevating 'nonsense' to a central position in his philosophy. This paper argues that, in at least one case of Wittgenstein's talk of nonsense, this „therapeutic reading“ (Crary 7) oversimplifies the subtlety of Wittgenstein's writing. Indeed, one of the most prominent cases of 'nonsense' in the later Wittgenstein concerns the remark 'I know I am in pain'. Though Wittgenstein repeatedly treats this remark as nonsense, this treatment is not final in his philosophy of psychology. Rather, though his rich discussion in the later manuscripts of the indeterminacy of psychological judgments, the relation of these judgments to knowledge, and the role of first-person psychological descriptions, Wittgenstein is able to find what sense a remark such as 'I know I am in pain' might perhaps have. 'I know I am in pain' may be called nonsense, but this is not the last word on the matter in Wittgenstein's text: as Cavell says, „it makes no sense to say these things' (in the way we think it does)“ (Cavell 70). Wittgenstein is able to find what sense our remarks of first person psychological knowledge might have, contrary to what the therapeutic reading in *The New Wittgenstein* would have us suppose. Therefore, at least in one case, the therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein goes wrong.

Most directly to pursue this reading of first person knowledge in Wittgenstein, a preliminary summary of the indeterminacy he finds in psychological judgments may help open discussion. As Wittgenstein turns to examine many of the judgments that might typically be considered 'psychological', he finds indeterminacy saturating the weave of the mental they help to comprise. This indeterminacy is reflected in the lack of rules to which we take ourselves to be able to appeal in resolving disputes over some of these judgments. Even though we may have "evidence" (LWPP II ff.) to enlist in support of our 'indeterminate' judgments according to Wittgenstein, this evidence may fail to settle the question in a decisive fashion (e.g., LWPP II 89-90). So, in my own description of my feelings of, say, depression, we do not seem to have available evidence that settles whether I am suffering from depression. I "can observe the state of my depression. In that case I am observing what I for instance describe" (LWPP II 6): yet despite being able to describe my feelings and even discuss these descriptions, perhaps having friends recall what I have recently confessed to feeling, pointing out a trace of hesitancy in my current report, decisive evidence still is lacking. As a result, suppose someone disagrees with my description of my feelings in this case:

We are playing with elastic, indeed even flexible concepts. But this does not mean that they can be

deformed at will and without offering resistance, and are therefore unusable. For if trust and distrust [of a description of feeling] had no basis in objective reality, they would only be of pathological interest. But why do we not use more definite (bestimmtere) concepts in place of these vague ones? (LWPP II 24).

Though we may lack decisive evidence in assessing my depression, this indeterminacy does not make our descriptions entirely arbitrary. There is still correctness and incorrectness of our judgments in these contexts of indeterminacy:

Is there such a thing as 'expert judgment' about the genuineness of expressions of feeling?--Even here, there are those whose judgment is 'better' and those whose judgment is 'worse'. Correcter prognoses will generally issue from the judgments of those with better knowledge of mankind...What one acquires here is not a technique; one learns correct judgments. There are also rules, but they do not form a system, and only experienced people can apply them right. Unlike calculating rules. What is most difficult here is to put this indefiniteness (Unbestimmtheit), correctly and unfalsified, into words (PI II 227).

If, as Wittgenstein suggests, we make indeterminate, though nevertheless correct, judgments in such 'psychological' matters, and we do so without always having evidence we take to be decisive, we might wonder how commonly the psychological manifests this indeterminacy on his view.

The lack of rules of evidence that we encounter with respect to many of our 'psychological' judgments does not signal an essentialism about psychology or a mark of the „essentially undecidable character“ (Hacker 138) of psychological judgment. This lack of rules of evidence is rather, according to Wittgenstein, the product of an openness of our disputes to irresolution, a lack we can see in our inability to settle decisively certain disputes based on the evidence available to us. Thus, at least in some circumstances of 'psychological' judgment (of "knowing what goes on in someone else") and its disputation, there is a "lack of exact rules of evidence" (LWPP II 94). The lack of rules of evidence is supposed to be borne out in the many imagined situations Wittgenstein has us consider.

I am for instance convinced that my friend was glad to see me. But now, in philosophizing, I say to myself that it could after all be otherwise; maybe he was just pretending. But then I immediately say to myself that, even if he himself were to admit this, I wouldn't be at all certain that he isn't mistaken in thinking that he knows (kennt) himself. Thus there is an indeterminacy in the entire game.

One could say: in a game in which the rules are indeterminate one cannot know who has won and who has lost (LWPP II 86).

If we consider a situation in which we initially are convinced of someone's warmth, only to have him admit his lack of gladness, we would not necessarily be positioned to settle whether he himself is mistaken in his 'admission'. If we cannot rely on his manner to settle

whether he is glad, and if we cannot even rely on the admissions or confessions he may have made as to his own feelings at the time, then we might wonder what else we have to which to appeal in this case, at least, that we could use to decide the issue. This inability to decide the issue is redescribed by Wittgenstein as an "indeterminacy" in the game of judging his gladness. In this remark from the Last Writings Wittgenstein touches upon a theme that reappears throughout the second volume of collected manuscripts: we encounter again and again contexts in which our judgments lack determinacy through lacking rules of evidence, rules to which we may appeal that settle the correctness of a judgment about someone's feelings or thoughts. If there is indeterminacy in an entire game, this indeterminacy is only as well established as the considerations Wittgenstein adduces while searching for "any and all rules of evidence that refer to experiences" (LW II 89): on the path to essentialism, Wittgenstein stops short.

Wittgenstein sets out his conception of knowledge about (at least a portion of) the 'psychological' in a revealing passage that links strong knowing with the availability of rules. While elevating some families of knowledge above others, Wittgenstein still preserves talk of our less rule-informed judgments as knowing. The differences between these families of knowing appear to shape Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology.

Then one can ask: What is the characteristic of what we can really know? And the answer will be: One can only know where no error is possible, or: where there are clear rules of evidence.

"I know that he enjoyed seeing me." -- What follows from that? What of importance follows? Forget that you have the right idea of his state of mind! Can I really say that the importance of this truth is that it has certain consequences? -- It is pleasant to be with someone who is glad to see us, who behaves in such and such a way (if one knows a thing or two about this behavior from previous occasions).

So if I know that he is happy, then I feel certain, not uncertain, in my pleasure. And that, one could say, isn't knowing (LWPP II 49).

My knowing that someone is glad is legitimately knowing, though not knowing of the particular variety Wittgenstein mentions at the beginning of this passage. No harm is done in claiming I know someone is glad provided that I am not taking myself to have rules which settle the case when there is a "lack of exact rules of evidence" (LWPP II 94). As Wittgenstein repeats, „If someone 'pretends friendship and then finally shows his true feelings, or confesses', we normally don't think of doubting his confessions in turn, and of also saying that we cannot know what's really (wirklich) going on in him" (LWPP II 86). There is a sense to knowledge claims in psychology on Wittgenstein's view, only without the suggestion of proof we might otherwise expect to be able to provide: this is the working of third person psychological knowledge according to the later manuscripts.

Having focused much of his discussion on interpersonal psychological judgment, Wittgenstein extends his discussion from third- to first-person descriptions. As a beginning for interpretation, Wittgenstein reveals quite openly that he is prepared to treat first-person talk about feelings as descriptions properly understood. As Hacker suggests, „Describing one's state of mind is indeed something one can do" (Hacker 95). More properly to familiarize us with the terms of this discussion, Wittgenstein attempts some clarification of his talk of 'observation' which may help with the interpretation of more complex passages. Observing our

own feelings, according to Wittgenstein, involves positioning ourselves to be receptive to our mood.

I can observe the state of my depression. In that case I am observing what I for instance describe.

A thought which one month ago was still unbearable to me is no longer so today. (A touch which was painful yesterday is not so today.) That is the result of an observation. ...

What do we call 'observing'? Roughly this: putting oneself into the most favorable situation to receive certain impressions with the purpose, for instance, of describing them (LWPP II 6-7).

As these comments may help make evident, Wittgenstein is prepared to speak of observing and describing in the first-person case quite openly. Indeed, first-person description is available for a range of psychological qualities, including pain, as Wittgenstein remarks while considering another example of self-observation. „And now I can simplify the case. He doesn't even have to produce the pain on purpose; rather, let it be a constant pain (a headache or a stomach-ache) and let him be thinking about how to describe his feeling correctly (richtige)" (LWPP I 614-18).

Wittgenstein therefore finds in his exploration of psychology that first-person psychological descriptions may correctly characterize our depression or our pain, and not in a manner which clearly admits of definite rules which help to settle their correctness. He has spoken of first-person knowledge of features of our psychology, albeit in a limited and deflated sense of 'knowledge' familiar from cases of third-person psychological judgment. As a result of his investigations, Wittgenstein has found a way to lend sense to first-person knowledge, perhaps even to instances in which we might claim 'I know I am in pain'. 'I know I am in pain' was nonsense, yet through his treatment of the philosophy of psychology Wittgenstein has found what sense such a remark may have.

In closing, the therapeutic reading advocated in The New Wittgenstein regards nonsense as an unwelcome presence in philosophical discourse, one that Wittgenstein exposes for its failure to „make any claim at all" (Crary 6). In what may be the most renowned case of nonsense from Wittgenstein's later work, however, this reading does not account for the subtle treatment of first-person knowledge present in the later manuscripts. Rather than failing to make any claim at all, our remarks of first-person knowledge are able to have sense, if Wittgenstein's texts are to be believed. At least in one case, therefore, nonsense remarks may yield some sense, and there is an irony here. The therapeutic reading, attributed to Cavell, is belied by Cavell's own early treatment of self-knowledge – upon which it is supposed to be based (Crary 7). In Cavell's own words, first-person knowledge of our psychology is not an illusion on Wittgenstein's developed view: „philosophers, I believe, are under the impression that Wittgenstein denies that we can know what we think and feel, and even that we can know ourselves. This extraordinary idea comes, no doubt, from such remarks of Wittgenstein's as: ... 'It cannot be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain' (246). But the 'can' and 'cannot' in these remarks are grammatical; they mean 'it makes no sense to say these things' (in the way we think it does). ... The implication is not that I cannot know myself, but that knowing oneself ... is not a matter of cognizing (classically, 'intuiting') mental acts and particular sensations" (Cavell 69-70). If the argument of this paper lends support to Cavell's early view of knowledge in the first-person, then the therapeutic reading in The New Wittgenstein may be in need of a firmer rooting in both the texts of Wittgenstein and the tradition of their exegesis.

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The Joint Philosophical Program of Russell and Wittgenstein (March–November 1912) and its Downfall

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1. The Intellectual Honey-moon of Russell and Wittgenstein and its End

After finishing *Principia Mathematica* in 1910, Russell concentrated his efforts in questions of epistemology. In "Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description" (1911), and *The Problems of Philosophy* (written in 1911 but published in 1912), Ch. III, he developed the epistemological implications of his logic in detail. At that time, Russell accepted that whereas we are acquainted with sense-data, we know physical objects by description only. More precisely, we logically infer that there are physical objects from the sense-data we are acquainted with. In 1911 Russell believed that this understanding is much more coherent than any competing philosophy of matter, for example, from solipsism, according to which there are no physical objects at all or from naive realism, according to which we directly apprehend material objects.

Exactly at this point of his work, late in October 1911 Russell met Wittgenstein. Soon between them arose an intellectual sympathy of higher form. On March the 22^d 1912 Russell wrote in a letter: "His [Wittgenstein's] attitude justifies all I have hoped about my work. . . . He has even the same similes as I have: a wall, parting him from the truth, which he must pull down somehow." (Clark 1975, 172)

In fact, in the months between March and November 1912 Russell and Wittgenstein had a Joint Program in philosophy, on which they often worked tête-à-tête, and in which they developed the major tenets of their later works. Incidentally, this was the only time in the history of Wittgenstein's thought when he worked co-operatively with another philosopher for months. Of course, Wittgenstein often criticised Russell's conceptions. This criticism, however, was constructive. At that time he tried to advance ideas, supplementary to those of Russell.

Wittgenstein's visit to Frege in December 1912, by which the latter "absolutely wiped the floor with [him]", terminated his intellectual honey-moon with Russell—their Joint Program in philosophy was abandoned. The practical effect was that Wittgenstein decided to leave Cambridge for Norway (which he made in the autumn of 1913)—he didn't need the collaboration of Russell anymore. The negative effect in theory was Wittgenstein's criticism of Russell's *Theory of Knowledge* (May–June 1913). The first positive result were his "Notes on Logic", written down in September 1913.

Despite this criticism, the Joint Program in philosophy from March–November 1912 remained central to the philosophy of both Russell and Wittgenstein. From now on, main occupation of the two philosophers was to develop the already well-charted Program following his idiosyncratic intuition. In what follows, I am going to articulate this Program in view of its later implications for the mature philosophy of both Russell and Wittgenstein.

2. The Impact of the Joint Program on Russell and its Effects in Philosophy of Science

Whereas Wittgenstein was a beginner in philosophy, in March 1912 Russell was already an established author. This explains why we are going first to find out the traces of impacts of the Joint Program in Russell's already available philosophy.

This impact had several dimensions. Above all, it was manifested as a kind of sceptical radicalism in Russell, unknown to him before and after that. Most important document of it was his paper "On Matter" (1912b), written in May–October 1912 but first published in 1992. The declared aim of the paper was: To show "(i) that all the arguments hitherto alleged by philosophers against matter are fallacious; (ii) That all the arguments hitherto alleged in favour of matter are fallacious; (iii) That, although there may perhaps be reason to suppose that there is matter, yet we can have no means of finding out anything whatever as to its intrinsic nature." (Russell 1912b, 80) The style used in these lines was perceptibly close with that used by Wittgenstein in his writings from 1912–21.

This sceptical stance led to changes in Russell's philosophy of science. In "On Matter", he abandoned the belief that matter is an inference out of sense-data and accepted that it is a logical construction out of them. The underlying idea of this new understanding was that the world consists of independent units—sense-data, which can be both particulars and universals,—ordered in different, logically organized nets. In these nets the units are logically interrelated to one another. We can infer from the sense-data that there are (hypothetical) material objects. But if physics is to be applied, as for example in calculating the motions of the moon, it must be possible to derive, from the sense-data which we have when we see the moon, some object, either inferred or constructed, which satisfies the hypotheses of abstract physics." We can advance many such hypotheses in physics which are "indistinguishable from the standpoint of the pure mathematician, since all give the same formulae, and the difference lies only in the meaning assigned to the symbols" (Russell 1912b, 83, 87).

3. The Joint Program in Logic

Parallel to Russell's work on the paper "On Matter", Wittgenstein did some investigation in philosophy of logic. Indeed, the "discussion of the problem of matter and of the nature of logic proceeded *pari passu*" (McGuinness 1988, 160). An evidence for this is the recent discovery, made by B. F. McGuinness, that on the back of "Matter—the problem stated" (the first MS of "Nine Short Manuscripts on Matter" (Russell 1912/13), written shortly after Russell delivered "On Matter" in Cambridge on 25th of October 1912), Wittgenstein produced jottings on logic in which the idea of truth-table and of the idiosyncratic Tractarian conception of one logical constant were developed for the first time.

In the jottings Wittgenstein advanced the idea that the truth-table is a logical symbol of the propositions under consideration (see Wittgenstein 1976, 177). This means that the truth-possibilities can be expressed employing a single sign for logical connective. Specifically, Wittgenstein discovered that logical constants can be reduced to a single operation: "·" (in the *Tractatus* 5.1311 this sign is delivered as "·".)

This point hanged together with the already mentioned (in § 2) assumption of Russell's that the world of science consists of independent units (atoms),—sense-data—ordered in many logical nets, in which the units are interrelated to one another. This is supported by the fact that the sign "·", which is to symbolise the interconnectedness of the logical atoms, was sometime used by Russell in the meaning of interweaving of the elements in a *complex*.¹ they are tied together up—in a certain way.

Later Wittgenstein expressed the connection between the ontological problem of composition of complexes and the assumption that there is only one logical constant thus: "Wherever there is a compositeness . . . we already have all the logical constants", and this means that there is a "sole logical constant." (Wittgenstein 1922, 5.47) He developed this idea further, setting out that the relations in the Tractarian actual states of affairs and propositions have, in a sense, the same character as the relations between the objects in states of affairs. This means nothing but that formations of different order—(i) objects; (ii) states of affairs; (iii) propositions—are connected in one and the same way: through their elements that are hinged together as the joints of a bulky construction.

Truthless Logic. This idea goes hand in hand with a Joint Program of Russell and Wittgenstein for Truthless Logic. Indeed, between April and October 1912 Russell also worked on logic. The product of this work was his paper "On Logic", of two pages only, written immediately after 13 October 1912. Its main thesis was that logic was the study of the logical form of complexes: "It did not deal with judgements (which are a matter for psychology) nor with propositions (which can be false and hence cannot be anything objective but must be mere forms of words). Complexes will be recognised as identical with the true or asserted propositions."² (McGuinness 1988, 162)

At that time, this was the position of Wittgenstein as well. He abandoned this doctrine only after he visited Frege in December 1912.

4. Changes in the Project in Logic after Wittgenstein's Visit to Jena in December 1912

They were made in three directions.

(a) *Truth-making.* Wittgenstein accepted that the meaning of propositions is not the complexes which correspond to them but propositions' truth-values (see *ibid.*, 164). More precisely, Frege criticised the identification of complex and fact, accepted in the Joint Program, arguing that "complex is not like a fact. For I can, e.g., say of a complex that it moves from one place to another, but not of a fact." (Wittgenstein 1974, 199) Wittgenstein accepted this understanding; after some years of deliberation, Russell accepted it too. Indeed, this was a major change in his "The Philosophy of Logical

Atomism" (1917/18), when we compare it with his *Theory of Knowledge* (1913), which was based on the logic of complexes.

It is of importance that Wittgenstein connected this conception with the truth-table method developed in his jottings on logic from November 1912, with some modifications, though. Indeed, already in 1912 the truth-table was conceived as a compendium of the possible meanings of the propositions. What was new was the theory of many imaginary possible *worlds*, only one of which is real. On this understanding, the truth-combinations are nothing but parts of possible worlds; parts of the real world *makes* some parts of the possible worlds, expressed by the sentences we use, true, or real. This was the theory of truth-making, developed in "Notes on Logic" (1913) by Wittgenstein (see Wittgenstein 1979, 95),³ and also embraced by Russell some years later in *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism* (see Russell 1956, 182 ff.).

(b) *The Doctrine of Showing.* Especially spectacular was Wittgenstein's criticism in June 1913 of Russell's multiple-relation theory of judgement. As it was recently convincingly demonstrated, it was based on the doctrine of showing (see Landini 1991). Here it is to be remembered that Russell's multiple-relation theory of judgement was grounded on the logic of complexes: judgements receive their sense through the logical form of the complex consisting of the judging mind, the individuals judged, and the epistemic relation between them. This understanding was made invalid through Wittgenstein's criticism. To be sure, "to Wittgenstein [from after December 1912], logical form is a matter of sense; and "sense" is captured only when it is shown. . . . There cannot be a theory of logical form" (*ibid.*, 66).

As it is well-known today—from the works of P. T. Geach,—the doctrine of showing was first elaborated by Frege. Apparently, the latter communicated it to Wittgenstein in their discussions in December 1912.

(c) *Tractarian Objects.* The very idea of a system of objects, out of which the Tractarian world is build up—through the medium of the states of affairs, which are nothing but concatenations of objects,—has its roots in the Joint Program. On this point too the Program was modified. How much?

As already mentioned, in *The Problems of Philosophy* Russell accepted that sense-data are not to be found in the outer but in the inner world. They are only what we directly perceive. The realm of sense-data comprises colours, sounds, (the private) space, time (see Russell 1912a, 45). They are formed as individuals so that they can be perceived in isolation.

Obviously, in 1912 this was also the view of Wittgenstein. After his reformation through Frege, however, he revised it considerably. In the *Tractatus*, he accepted that we never know the stuff out of which the sense-data are build. We know them only when they are organized in certain shape, form, size, etc.; but we don't know them "in themselves". Further, he called exactly parts of this rough, non-organize stuff—not the sense-data themselves—*objects*. This explains the Tractarian statement that objects are colorless (2.0232); they are the substance of the world (2.021).

The objects receive their configuration when they are molded into forms. Before this moment, they were only possible; now they are real. This assumption was a clear step towards a form of "modal atomism" (Raymond

¹ See, for example, Russell 1905, Russell 1906.

² This was nothing but a variant of "identity theory of truth" (S. Candlish).

³ See Milkov 2001.

Bradley, Brian Skyrms), apparently suggested by the doctrine of possible worlds, embraced by Wittgenstein after December 1912 (and already mentioned in (a)).

Exactly like the idea of showing and saying, Wittgenstein's new understanding of sense-data was not assimilated by Russell. This explains why his form of logical atomism differs considerably from that of Wittgenstein.⁴

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⁴ On the difference between Russell's and Wittgenstein's logical atomism see Livingston 2001.

Is the *Private Language Argument* a Transcendental Argument?

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1 Comparisons between Kant's critique of pure reason and Wittgenstein's critique of language, which became current in analytic philosophy (Cf. e.g. Hacker 1972, 30.) seem not far-fetched in view of the impetus for the destruction of dogmatic metaphysics both philosophers share. Their relevance would gain though by an elaboration of their dissimilarities rather than by just stressing similarities.

An example of the former approach, Weinert (1983, 412) contrasts the tools both critics of metaphysics employ: the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, and the description of the logic of language-use and in particular the 'Argument from Epistemic Operators' (Wittgenstein 1961, sects. 6.5, 6.51; 1958, §§ 246, 247, 251, 303; references in the form of paragraph-numbers are to the latter text) respectively. The analysis of the employment of those tools in anti-metaphysical arguments -and Weinert treats the Private Language Argument (PLA) as such (427-429)- enables to uncover underlying assumptions, e.g. the implicit assumption in Kant of a prior conceptual relation between concepts to which his notion of analysis is to be applied (430-431) and Wittgenstein's explicit doctrine that "ordinary language is alright" (434).

An example of the latter approach, Hacker suggests an outright similarity in scope of the PLA and those arguments:

One can, without undue caricature, conceive of Wittgenstein's purpose in the private language argument as being an endeavour to extend and elaborate the Kantian dictum that intuitions without concepts are blind. (Hacker 1972, 216.)

Due to its disregard of contextual differences, the illuminative value of that assessment is dubious. As Kitcher contends, those differences are so pervasive:

that it is an interpretive and philosophical mistake to try to force an alliance between what are, in fact, deeply opposed camps. (...). (2000, 35.)

And indeed, in what sense one could understand such a treatment of Kant's dictum (see: 1990, B75) is unclear.

Kitcher's criticises the conflation of Kant's transcendental 'I' with Wittgenstein's linguistic 'I' that prevails in the "British tradition of Kant interpretation from Strawson on", and mentions, among others, Hacker as a target (2000, 35). In this paper I extend Kitcher's criticism to a 'Kantian' reception of the PLA as a transcendental argument (TA), taking Hacker's qualification as a starting point (section 2). Adopting Weinert's approach, I will single out some characteristics of the PLA that suggest an 'unkantian' reception. An assessment of its relevance can then be made. (Section 3).

2 As a follow-up of Strawson's (1959) and (1966), the debate on TA's facilitated the reception of the PLA as such an argument (Wilkerson 1975, 108; recently Stern 1999, 3), thereby attributing to its Kantian flavour. For the Transcendental deduction (TD) of the categories and the

Refutation of Idealism (RI) are generally regarded as models for TA's (Brueckner 1983, 552; Stern 1999, 2).

Under a general denomination, TA's claim "that one thing (X) is a necessary condition for the possibility of something else (Y), so that (...) the latter cannot obtain without the former" (Stern 2000, 3; Wilkerson, 1975, 102). This does not mark off anything special about the argument itself, but only says something about the propositions it contains. (Gram, 1971, 15; Grayling 1985, 95.) Ample discussion has produced various distinctions between Kantian and revisionist accounts of TA's (Stern 1999, 9), concerning the nature of the subject matter of (Y) (1999, 3). In 'weaker' TA's (Y) stands for the necessary features of a conceptual scheme which makes possible a given structure of experience (Schaper 1972, 102). 'Weightier' TA's (Grayling, 1985, 83) establish necessary conditions for the possibility of experience (Stern 1999, 3). This distinction coincides with Kant's between regressive and progressive arguments (1993, 26, n). The former can function in refutational arguments to demonstrate the incoherence of a sceptical claim with the necessary assumptions underlying that claim. (Kant 1990, A388-389.) Thus, in the RI, for example, it is argued from the assumption of empirical self-consciousness, the empirical 'I' of Descartes' *Cogito*. (Kant 1990, B275), to the conditions of its possibility, outer objects. The latter argue from a principle to its *principiatum*. Thus, in the TD, it is argued from an *a priori* principle (the transcendental unity of the apperception, or transcendental 'I'), concerning the subject of possible experience, the conditions of which it has to establish, to its *principiatum*, those conditions, i.e. the categories. Aschenberg (1982, 262, 284), regards only weightier TA's as transcendental. They, like Kant's TD, establish basic principles for a conceptual scheme "without which we could not think coherently about experience at all" (Schaper 1972, 102). Accordingly, Kantian would, for Brueckner, be the argument which shows that "the existence of physical objects of a general character is a condition for the possibility of self-conscious experience", as he believes both the TD and RI do (1983, 552). Hintikka requires the conclusion of the Kantian variant to be an assertion concerning the epistemic process involved (1972, 275). This marks it off from any inference from a successful use of concepts *a priori* to its presuppositions and *a fortiori* from arguments which establish the logical presuppositions of something being the case, that Schaper reckons among the general variant (1972, 277, 101).

This survey shows that the premises of a TA generally may contain synthetic and analytic, a priori and a posteriori, grammatical (Grayling 1985, 109) and empirical propositions. Consequently progressive as well as regressive arguments fall into its scope. Moreover, it shows that the genuine transcendental of revisionist TA's is controversial. Finally, that the dialectical distinction between the TD and the RI is often unaccounted for. In view of all this, a reception of the PLA as a TA seems unobvious. Besides, the use of the Argument from Epistemic Operators in the PLA to vitiate a private linguist's claim concerning the epistemic privacy of sensations -e.g. §248 asserts the non-epistemic character of that claim- indicates already at the outset *pace* Hacker (1972, 271) the immoderation of a transcendental reading of the PLA, taking into account the primarily

epistemological connotation of 'transcendental' (Kant 1990, B25). Moreover, it turns out to be equivocal.

This is illustrated by Hacker's suggestion of a similarity between the PLA and the TD when he cites Kant's emphasis on the necessary co-operation of the Understanding and Sensibility for the objective validity of judgments (1972, 216) on the one hand, and his suggestion of a similarity with the RI when he presents the PLA as an argument demonstrating the incoherence of scepticism about the existence of the external world, on the other (215).

If one would want to project the PLA on the Kantian models, the RI seems the most obvious candidate, judged by its dialectical similarity with the PLA, both being refutations of a sceptical claim. Even if the success of the PLA at refuting the private linguist can be contested (see: Stroud 2000, 78) it could be, in a qualification Bennett coined for the Kantian prototype (1966, 203), taken as a gesture towards such a refutation. Precisely due to this similarity however, the PLA as an undogmatic procedure, merely clarifies that the private linguist's claim stems from an inconsistency in his use of words (cf. Glock, 1991, 85). As a refutation it would not entail the possibility of interpersonal communicability, let alone, by contraposition of its result, the claim that language is 'inevitably public'. Hintikka *et al.* notice that this claim is one of Wittgenstein's basic assumptions but that he does not use it as a premise in the argument (1986, 261-262, 265). To his observation that his argument would "not be nearly as radical and as sweeping as it in reality" (264) if he nevertheless had done so has to be added that the refutational character of the PLA prevents such use.

Due to its exclusive orientation on the logic of rules, the Kripkean PLA (Kripke 1982, *passim*) suggests that it were merely dealing with questions of interpersonal communicability of S-words. As §257 shows however, its greater import is that it deals with the logic of language-games, that are constitutive for name-object relations and hence with the 'inevitably public' nature of 'grammar.' (Hintikka *et al.* 1986, 201, 262.) It remains to be seen whether the PLA purports to show the constitutive force of language-games. In view of this, it is questionable whether its projection on a Kantian TD-model, can convince of its radicality. For the PLA to be a deduction in an analogous Kantian sense it would have to be an argument that would establish a principle of significance (cf. Strawson 1966, 16) to warrant the objective validity of the S-words the private linguist writes in her diary. This principle should obviate the appeal to a *Restriktionsthese* (cf. Prauss 1974, 174) for that would presuppose the adoption of transcendental idealism (cf. Aschenberg 1982, 61). Therefore, it should precipitate the conditions that would make possible that the concepts falling under that principle, would exhaust the universe of sensible discourse, thus leaving no room for concepts that would be meaningful, without having objective reality *blosse Gedankenformen* (Kant 1990, B148). To paraphrase Strawson: if the private linguist would use a concept that would not fall within the scope of the principle, she would not merely be saying what she does not know, she would not really know what she were saying (1966, 16), and, one should add, she would "just emit an inarticulate sound" (§ 261). But, for all it does, the PLA is not concerned with a justification of the use of S-words: §§267, 289. Wittgenstein's descriptions of language-games in §§249, 261, 290, 293, 300 are not meant to be exhaustive; that would contradict the notion of language-game as part of a form of life (§23, cited in Hintikka *et al.* (1986, 218); cf. Stroud's (2000, 78) reading of §258): the positive claims of the PLA are of a much more 'familiar', even 'mundane' nature.

3 With all its incontestable exegetical merits, its equivocality corroborates an extension of Kitcher's criticism to a projection of the PLA on a Kantian model. It is bound to oscillate between the contemporary aliases of the empirical 'I' and the transcendental 'I' thus leaving the status of the linguistic 'I' undecided. This approach would, anachronistically, allow of a reconstruction *via* Strawson of the PLA as a TD and *vice versa*, as is offered in Stevenson (1982, 334). Rorty's appreciation of "Strawson's only good transcendental argument for the 'necessary' character of material object concepts", i.e. their TD in his (1959), as a PLA (1971,13), and Bennett's rephrasing of the RI as a 'realism argument' for the claim that selfconsciousness requires outer experience, the PLA being a version of that argument (1966, 203 ff.), may serve as further illustrations of the systematic intricacies of this approach.

Its preoccupation with subjectivity and reciprocally, with its objective counterpart forms an implicit plea for postneokantianism. To use a Kuhnian, obviously un-Wittgensteinian concept, that move would be a regression. For, unlike Kant, the PLA does neither deal with Cartesian metaphysics (Hintikka *et al.* 1986, 250) nor with Cartesian epistemology. It rather shows e.g. in §§269, 278 the redundancy of the 'transcendental' subject, as well as of the metaphysical private object, sensation, most notoriously in §§272, 293 and 299.

By contrast, Weinert's observation in Wittgenstein of a trend towards explicitness (1983, 423, 434-435) indicates a progressive problemshift. As such the emergence of a sharper awareness of the linguistic counterpart of the Paradox of Transcendental Knowledge, the intrinsic link between the unknowability of things considered independently of our epistemic procedures and the conceptual framework they utilize, and their unknowability, is also noteworthy. Wittgenstein's awareness of this latter paradox, the mutual dependence of linguistic relativity and the ineffability of semantics (Hintikka *et al.* 1986, 5, is expressed in his calling the sensation itself "not a something, but not a nothing either!" (§304). Wittgenstein does not merely offer a Kripkean sceptical solution (1982, 95) for this paradox. Instead, he proposes a 'radical break' with the idea that language always functions as a means to convey thoughts. More than welcoming Kant's 'cognitive theoretical analyses' to give direction to cognitive sciences, as Kitcher proposes (2000, 61), contemporary philosophers should study the consequences of this break.

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Person

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1. Introduction

"Person" is a very ambiguous word (as most of our words when isolated). The outstanding vagueness of the terms used in philosophical discourse, like "action" or "mind", is an essential characteristic of language that provides the set upon which philosophy relies. Indeed, inquiries into certainty, objectivity and many other important metaphysical problems would never arise if this indeterminacy were not present in language. The history of philosophy as such can be considered as a quest for meaningful statements on which we can ground our judgment. This search for certainty has an ethical dimension, since it discloses what we have in common and what we cannot share. An important feature of this ethical dimension is that the investigation of "certainty" is, at the same time, a struggle against arbitrariness. However, we must be careful while engaging into this exploration, by refusing to analyze or equate certainty with goodness or correctness. The danger of this attractive analysis is evident in our religious and political history.

I believe that Wittgenstein can help us in elucidating some of these difficult issues. The problem of the identity of persons, or what constitutes a human being, pervades through philosophical texts. The general strategy of this paper is to link the issue of certainty, as explained by Wittgenstein, with the concept of person.

2. Wittgenstein's Distinction between Bedrock and Ground

The following remarks are the basis of my discussion about *bedrock* and *ground*.

"And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited." (Wittgenstein 1972, 15e-99).

"It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid." (Wittgenstein 1972, 15e-96).

"Doesn't one need grounds for doubt?" (Wittgenstein 1972, 18e-122).

"The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing." (Wittgenstein 1972, 24e-166).

"Foundation" or the German "grundlagen", "sense data", "the given", "impressions", are names for something wrongly called "ground". Why does Wittgenstein think this is wrong? For him, *bedrock* (or the limit to our inquiries), is different from *ground* because a ground can be known; it is something that *speaks for* something else: we can *doubt* about it, we can be right or wrong, we can look at it as a hypothesis, etc... "Bedrock" is something we just reach (*unconsciously*) where we find silence and attitudes. The hypothesis of the mathematical continuum and our

awareness about the fact that we cannot talk with animals are examples of this lack of knowledge and justification.

Wittgenstein's *On Certainty* might be considered as a strategy to show how our certainty is never related to knowledge. It makes us face a crude *fact*, a very different one from Russell's knowledge by acquaintance (*familiarity with things as an epistemic relation*). We can even say that it is more an *attitude* than a *fact*.

"The child learns by believing the adult. Doubt comes *after* belief." (Wittgenstein 1972, 23e-60).

"I might suppose that Napoleon never existed and is a fable, but not that the *earth* did not exist 150 years ago." (Wittgenstein 1972, 26e-186).

3. Persons and Rights

I think *bedrock* or our *worldview* is a path for action (which means that it is ethical in all instances). If we are Aristotelian in this respect, action as such is impossible without such a pathway, which is provided by thought. Our freedom depends on the possibility of conceiving different paths for action, thus reshaping our beliefs and attitudes. It seems that justification and judgment (or critique) is what makes us initiate the process of changing our attitudes and commitments. To have a unique worldview is to be enslaved and plunged into absolute determination. The tension is then to know how and why the *hardened* sections of bedrock change, as well as which are shared by humankind and which are cultural.

We need particular worldviews to interpret the *world* as well as to act through choices we make in particular scenarios. My identity as person is determined by my story (or standpoint, determined by my worldviews, which provide options for my actions). To use Robert Nozick's expression, the "closest continuer" of me is my story (Nozick R 1981, *passim*). So what does it mean that I share a unique story (or bedrock) with humankind and at the same time that I am free to act by reflecting on different possibilities and consequences of my actions? Empirical statements seem to be independent of my story. That my body will not suddenly evaporate and that I will not wake up tomorrow in the body of a different person is part of my certainty for action and thought. It is important to draw our attention to the fact that the very scenario itself, the very possibility of entertaining into these thought experiments is based on further assumptions, like the linearity of time and the gap between mind and body. Is this a worldview I share with humankind? Any answer (positive or negative) to this question seems to be problematic. This indeterminacy is important to make clear why justification comes to an end.

Although Wittgenstein suggests that this tension can never be answered, nor can we find any ground to know or doubt about bedrock, I think there is a way in which we can show how bedrock operates with respect to the concept of person through the notion of human rights.

Human rights are the minimum conditions under which human dignity is supposed to be reached or at least guaranteed. Human dignity refers in this case to

circumstances and not to actual humans. Although human rights claim for universality, their specificity (for example in a given judicial decision) reveals some anxieties between worldviews. We can focus in the well known tension between the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. There are some human rights (like the right not to be tortured) which might be considered as absolute, in the sense that if they clash with another human right the decision must be made as privileging them. For example, we cannot entertain the idea (or the thought experiment) of torturing people for the sake of preserving freedom of expression or the right to be informed.

These are concerns within the same worldview, namely, the liberal and individualistic worldview of the ICCPR. However, there are clashes between worldviews within human rights, such as the clash between the right to preserve cultural identity with respect to the right to property, (as in the case of communal tribes) or bodily integrity and the cultural tradition of circumcision or other forms of mutilation or deformation of the body as elements of identity or attachment to a particular society. We can say that, at the end, our notion of conceivability (the realm of the imaginable where we can find paths for our action) depends to a great extent on our ethical convictions and beliefs. This is why we say it is unimaginable to torture babies just because we find it amusing. But how is this related to our incapacity to talk with the Wittgensteinian wood sellers or about the fact that the chair will not evaporate and that objects continue being *the same* through time. As Wittgenstein pointed out, it seems that the most plausible approach to the problem is that belief has a stronger role in our life than what we normally suppose.

Going back to our discussion about human rights, we can consider the clash of worldviews as one which is essentially ethical. The dispute between individualism and communitarianism, Kantian based normative moralities, utilitarianism and moral skepticism are all forms of alternatives to avoid, as much as possible, conflictive pathways for action. Nevertheless, these few alternatives are not as rich as they claim, because we shall finally realize that our notion of freedom is exactly the opposite to the construction of a single worldview.

4. Persons and Aspects of Persons

If we force an analogy between aspect dawning (as used by Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Investigations*) and worldviews, we can find in the discussion of human rights some aspects of what is a human being. It is important at this moment to recall that when we start doubting about bedrock (or trying to justify it) we are in the domain of nonsense (a domain that exists only in jokes). But why does this seem not to be a joke like "I know I am in pain" or "I know I am here"? The appalling image of torture is not nonsense nor is it something we can justify. Although it seems within the things we can know, it nevertheless *stands fast* for us.

The violation of the right not to be tortured or to bodily integrity seems beyond any explanation. We cannot justify circumcision (whether feminine or masculine) whereas we can believe that it makes us part of something bigger than us. However, we can justify that it is impossible to privilege any right above the right not to be tortured. So it is essential to our notion of *person* to privilege some rights over others (in some manner of

justification) but also to have a *bedrock* account of what is to be human as it stands fast for us.

Human dignity seems to start with the notion of inviolability of the body and the preservation of our integrity as individuals. Other rights, like property or freedom of expression are somehow part of our dignity, but because of some inexplicable situation we are prone to say that they are contingent, we can justify their repression for the sake of the basic rights of dignity. The problem is that, this very notion of dignity relies on a series of unjustifiable beliefs, for example, that my body continues through time and that it is a unity. We cannot argue against this and this is why it is so fundamental for us nowadays (although it has not always been the case). This elementary character of these basic rights seems to be linked with our metaphysical convictions. It seems nonsensical to discuss whether this is related or not to the unity of mind and body or rather to the gap between these entities. It is just part of our bedrock. We know that because our discussions on these topics create thought experiments that are either jokes or nightmares. There is nothing more to say about our notion of person.

If we try to consider different aspects of persons to characterize them, like their juridical nature (being a *subject* of rights and obligations and not a *mere object* of them) we will fail in grasping what is at stake, since to *know* what is *exactly* to be a person is something we cannot *really know*. For instance, we share our juridical nature with corporations and governments (since we attribute to them some sort of mind and body). We can push this further and say that we attribute to animals and to God such a mind set; some sort of body or mind with intentions, or at least with feelings.

To conclude, we might say that the current speech on human rights, their justifiability and the issues of philosophy of mind related to the *problem* of mind and body are misleading attempts to determine something that is undeterminable, historical and absolutely contingent; something that simply stands fast for us: a set of possible worldviews that constitute a particular complex of pathways through which my action is determined; which constitute my very essence as an individual human being with particular commitments and convictions.

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The Notion of Person: a Reappraisal from the Side of Human Rights

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My aim here is to defend the plausibility of identifying the subject of human rights through the concept of 'moral person', by reflecting on the inherent connection between the concept of person and that of human rights in their moral dimension, that is in the light of an 'ethics' of human rights, an ethics in which human rights represent the fundamental moral values.

I will speak of the 'moral dimension' of the concept of person to stress the difference between this dimension and the 'legal dimension' of the concept of person, which refers not only to individual human beings, but also to social units and, in being so applied, presupposes the existence of a body of law. This because in the legal dimension the person, from the analogy with the mask used by classical actors during performance and, therefore, with the character they represented, is conceived first and foremost as an 'agent' that responds publicly for its own actions and its own choices.

While, in its moral dimension, the concept of person, presupposing 'only' a moral evaluation of life and the condition for dignity and respect in the context of social interaction and cooperation, is not co-extensive with that of an agent who is accountable for actions and has rights and responsibilities. As we shall see, it is the capability to 'communicate' (actively but even passively), to appreciate the value of otherness and not the capability to act morally or rationally, that represents the pre-eminent value of the person as authentic subject of human rights. The unsuccessful distinction between these two dimensions of the concept of person, from my point of view, is one of the major causes of misunderstanding about the role the concept of person can play as 'the subject of human rights'.

It has been observed that, "if we think of a person as [...] a creature possessed of inherent moral dignity, [we have] a theory that begins with, and always centres on, the person and his or her inherent dignity. Human rights establish and protect the social conditions necessary for the effective enjoyment of moral personality" (J. DONNELLY, 1985, p. 31). And in 1966 the International Covenant on civil and political rights recognized that 'human rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person'.

But we could say also the other way round, that human rights represent the set of conditions in which a moral subject can identify and exercise his or her 'personality' in a conscious way. It is this second way that will be defended here: as J. Locke argued, the term person stands for 'a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection and can consider itself the 'same' thinking thing, in different time and places'. And, in our perspective, the person can consider itself the 'same' thinking thing only by means of human rights, only by means of an ethics in which human rights represent the fundamental moral values.

This is not a new argumentation (after all, it gives a lot to the reflections of classical authors like Cicero – in his elaboration of the Greek concept of 'persona' –, J. Locke, D. Hume and, today, of authors like Dennett, A.I. Melden and B. Ackerman), but its plausibility can be confirmed by referring to the fact that the concept of moral person,

conceived in his/her capability to 'communicate', to appreciate the value of otherness and not the capability to 'act' morally or rationally, seems to be a concept not too thin and not too thick, that is a concept by means of which we try to avoid the current criticisms against the adoption of 'person' as the subject of human rights – or too much entities are persons or too less human beings are persons.

1 It is commonly said that human rights are those universal rights one has simply because one is a human being. Anyway, besides their universality, the essential characteristic of human rights seems to be their moral 'status': the exact import of this status is unclear, but at least it suggests they represent basic moral values in the life of humans, high-priority norms, strong enough as normative considerations to prevail in conflicts with other norms, less strong and less valuable.

Human rights are distinguished also by their moral 'weight', their existing independently of recognition or implementation in the customs or legal systems of particular countries.

Human rights are weaker than positive rights only in terms of implementation; their moral force, usually, is stronger, precisely because, even if they may not be 'effective' rights until legally implemented, they exist as moral standards of argument and criticism independently of legal, cultural or conventional implementation.

It is in this way that we can speak of an ethics of human rights, as a way to guarantee the integrity and the autonomy of persons with respect to power and positive laws. Because of this, it becomes difficult to avoid referring to the concept of person to clearly understand what human rights and their defense really mean; and it seems plausible to suppose that the identification of the subject of human rights should be done on moral grounds.

Anyway, the importance of the notion of person for human rights could emerge better from a comparison with the concepts of individual, human being, and self, commonly used to indicate the same ontological entity, a biological, social and self-conscious being, but with distinct meanings, accordingly to their use. When used to refer to human rights, what concept exhibits the best use?

If we refer to ordinary language, we find that the term person is commonly used by people as the singular noun, which refers to another specific being of the same biological species. This means that in its ordinary use the term is understood though underdefined. But to show why to prefer the concept of person for human rights we must clarify the meaning and value of interrelated concepts like that of individual, human being and self (that represent different modes under which people are understood).

As known, reference to the term 'individual', as a distinctive feature of the liberal tradition, holds a place of priority in the understanding of human rights. As noticed above, the Universal Declaration claims that human rights appeal directly to the 'integrity of the individual', which could be translated in the respect for the separateness of individuals.

But today, it seems that the principle of the separateness is better sustained by means of pluralism. Today, in fact, the appeal to human rights has tempered the individualism of classical theories of natural rights and people are conceived as members of families, of groups and communities, not as isolated individuals who must be given reasons for entering civil society. In the Universal declaration we read, for example, that 'the family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection'.

But we must consider that critics of the ethics of human rights very often refer to individualism to say that it represents a morality that does not recognize any intrinsic value in any collective good. Using the term 'individual' to indicate the subject of human rights, then, could be criticized in so far as this is the age in which the separateness of people is better defended through the appeal to pluralism, to the respect of the integrity of various and different unities and their goods, like groups and communities, which are separate, but inserted in an articulated system of social interaction, reciprocation and global communication.

And we may take the separateness as something similar to a principle of equality, a principle not requiring equal treatment, but requiring that different - plural - matters regarding people being treated with equal regard.

Can we obtain anything better using the concept of 'human being'? Fundamentally, the concept of human being represents a way of understanding individuals as biological entities. For this reason, in ordinary language we find the conviction that one need not do anything special in order to hold human rights, because they are the rights one has simply because one is a human being. But, to identify the subject of human rights with the 'human being' as such is simply to commit us to 'speciesism', the famous prejudice, pointed out by P. Singer, toward the interests of members of one's own species and against those of other species (P. SINGER, 1963), and to 'biologism', as pointed out by B. Williams, that is to identify the human species only through biological criteria (B. WILLIAMS, 1986).

Also, it seems that for a human entity to count as a person it is not enough for it to be identified as a member of a particular species, that is, the meaning of the term person is not co-extensive with the meaning of human being. We must refer to something else than our biological identity.

The same we can say for the word 'self'. It seems that the self represents the 'internal' experiential nature of an individual. But private experience is not enough to be a subject of human rights.

The subject of rights, therefore, does not seem to be either a biological unit, or a 'solipsistic' unit, but rather the individual in so far as he or she is a moral, rational, communicative and social entity, a holder of values such as dignity and freedom, that is in so far as he or she is a person. As I. Melden writes, "the concept of a person is the concept of an individual human being whose features enable him to join some segments of his life with others" (I. MELDEN 1977, p. 227).

2 What does it mean to be a 'person'? As Hume noticed, humans are in a situation in which there is a scarcity of resources and a strong need for cooperation and reciprocation. It is in this sense, I think, that a person can be conceived as 'an individual human being whose features enable him to join some segments of his life with others'. But what does it mean exactly this definition? What is primarily necessary to 'join some segments of our life with others'?

The Greek etymological origins of the term person seem to give us important suggestions here. As known, person derives from the classical Greek term 'persona', the mask dressed by actors in the Greek tragedy to conceal their identity and, at the same time, to exhibit their character.

In its origins, then, and after in the Latin culture, the term person was peculiarly a cultural term, ambivalently situated between concealing and showing, but at the same time very rich in content, indissolubly linked to the dimension of 'recognition' and relation among the various persons.

To understand the meaning and value of human rights today, then, it could be useful to restate the semantic extension the term person had achieved in the reflections of Latin thinkers, above all with Cicero. It was Cicero, in fact, by stressing not only the aspect of concealing, but first and foremost the aspect of recognition and relationship among masks who reciprocally interact and reveal themselves, that conferred to the term person its most valuable extension. With Cicero, the term person plainly assumes the moral connotation we need today: person becomes the symbol of the most dialectical form of communication individuals can exhibit in their social interaction, representing at the same time 'the delicate meeting point of the decisive elements for the moral destination of human life'. Individuals, becoming moral persons, appreciate the value of otherness and, at the same time, reveal themselves; in a reciprocal communication, they can 'feel' the others directly in their interiority and can join some segment of their life with them.

3 Thus, the moral dimension of the concept of person appears in all its clarity. With respect to the concept of self, that of person is characterized by a strongly social, communicative dimension and not a 'solipsistic' one; with respect to the concept of human being, it appeals to the value of dignity, to moral possibilities, to the moral nature of human existence, and not only to the biological nature; with respect to the concept of individual, finally, it is capable of mediating between public and private, between selfish and collective demands.

From this perspective, we can also avoid that the notion of person become a factor of discrimination within the human species. It is precisely in the communicative and relational dimension of the moral dimension of the concept of person, in fact, in the ambiguity that is also extreme potentiality, between concealing and showing, being and appearing, that lies the moral force of the person, and not only in its identification with a moral or rational agent.

This means that the 'moral' concept of person, contrary particularly to the 'legal' concept of person, is not co-extensive with that of an agent, that is, one who is accountable for actions and has rights and responsibilities. It is the capability to communicate (actively or passively), to appreciate the value of otherness and not the capability to act morally or rationally, that represents the pre-eminent value of the person as authentic subject of human rights.

It is in this sense that we say that the concept of a moral person is 'the concept of an individual human being whose features enable him to join some segments of his life with others'.

From this perspective, therefore, the notion of moral person is, potentially at least, anything but a factor of discrimination for the human species, a concept not too thin and not too thick.

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Language Idling and Language in Use Wittgenstein on Following Rules

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This paper has a simple goal: it aims to present the difference between static logic and dynamic grammar. At the same time I will stress another difference which traverses logic and grammar: the difference between language idling and language in use. There is a development from static logic to dynamic grammar in Wittgenstein's philosophy from early to late, whereas the difference between language idling and language in use pervades the whole oeuvre. Therefore I shall distinguish between four different conditions pertaining to the attempt to render the relations that hold language together. We find in early Wittgenstein 'idle static logic' and 'static logic in use,' and in late Wittgenstein 'idle dynamic grammar' and 'dynamic grammar in use.' This four-fold distinction serves to emphasize that the crucial shift to 'use,' which is usually claimed to be a feature of the *Philosophical Investigations*, already takes place in the *Tractatus*. A negligence of this 'double shift' from logic to grammar and from idle language to language in use brought about a vast amount of misapprehensions of Wittgenstein's philosophy, especially of the account of rule following.

I will begin this paper with an introduction to the problem of rule following. Secondly I shall present Kripke's reading, which goes wrong because it opens up a gap between rule and application. The subsequent presentation of Baker and Hacker's criticism of Kripke will focus on their take on internal relations. Even though they rightly hold that there is no gap between rule and application, they neglect the differentiation between idle language and language in use. An elaboration of the account of internal relations in the *Tractatus*—and how they are connected to Wittgenstein's shift to 'use' in the early work already—will show Baker and Hacker's shortcoming.

1. Introduction

At my first arrival in the United States at JFK Airport I bought a sandwich wrapped in paper. I was astonished upon discovering an imprint on the paper warning: "Paper is not edible." I thought it odd and senseless to have such a warning on a piece of paper that was clearly not edible. Only after having lived in the United States for some time did I realize that it indeed made sense, as there are sandwiches, 'wraps,' which come wrapped in what looks very much like paper and is edible. In addition to that the culture of lawsuits in the United States makes it imperative to have such warnings on the paper of sandwiches, in order to prevent being sued by people who mistake their sandwich for a wrap. Anyway, when I first read the warning I was puzzled and not sure how I ought to understand it. It was so obvious to me to not to eat a sandwich with its paper on that I thought there must be another message behind it. I came up with various interpretations in order to make sense of the words. What did not come to me naturally is what every U.S. citizen would have done—to just not eat the paper. At *Investigations* § 199 Wittgenstein writes:

"To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are *customs* (uses, interpretations)." (Wittgenstein 1958)

The same apparently holds for signposts or warnings. In order to understand a warning and act according to it, it is crucial to be immersed in a community that has a certain practice or 'life' with it. Understanding or not understanding the warning does not consist in making the right interpretation but in abiding by the interpretation, custom or use of the community, which issued the warning in the first place. In this sense 'to understand a warning' or again 'to obey a rule' are not interpretations, but actual uses that are made in actual cases. This is what Wittgenstein says at § 201:

"[...] What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is *not* an *interpretation*, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases. "

The section of the *Philosophical Investigations*, which is often called the 'Rule Following Considerations' has been read in this important way for almost two decades. More recently the reading of the 'New Wittgenstein' (called after the same book published in 2000, including authors like James Conant and Cora Diamond) stresses that there is no gap between rules and interpretations in the first place. In this book it is shown again and again how one ought to leave behind the view that there is a paradox in rule following. Let us now see how we got to the paradox in the first place.

2. How Kripke got it wrong

We follow Saul Kripke on his way to the paradox in his groundbreaking contribution to the problem of rule following *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* published in 1982. He presents us with a simple mathematical problem, the addition of 68 and 57. Although the rule of addition determines for indefinitely many cases how to proceed, Kripke holds that someone's grasp of the rule is problematic, as she can only compute finitely. Even though she might be sure that '125' is the right answer there is nothing she can bring up to prove that she was really following a certain rule called addition, and not another rule called 'quaddition,' as Kripke's skeptic claims she did. 'Quaddition' would look like adding up to the number 68 from whence the result is always 5. Now Wittgenstein says in PI 201:

"This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule."

Kripke's paradox takes off the ground when asked by a skeptic, one is incapable of stating any fact of whatever kind as a proof that one really did follow a certain rule. Kripke argues that whatever we do is, "one some interpretation, in accord with the rule." (Kripke 1982, 98) The problem is that anything could potentially serve as a fact about our former behavior or mental life for meaning

'plus rather than quus', as Kripke has it. Our corpus of finite data may always be subsumed under indefinitely many distinct generalizations. This means that 'quus' is as good a generalization for our data as 'plus' and we can do nothing to prove that 'plus' would be the right interpretation. But Kripke fails to acknowledge that §198 claims: "Interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning." Wittgenstein holds that to make interpretations of rules is not to follow rules. In § 201 he says:

"[...] there is an inclination to say: every action according to the rule is an interpretation. But we ought to restrict the term "interpretation" to the substitution of one expression of the rule to another."

To think that the relation between rules and the grasping, understanding or application of rules needs to be secured by the right interpretation of that relation, is a mere tendency or inclination according to the 'Wittgensteinian' interlocutor. Certainly, paragraph 195 has a vexed interlocutor say:

"[But I mean that] in a queer way, the use itself is in some sense present."

which would support Kripke's reading of the paradox, that there is something—a rule, the meaning of the word and its use present in it—that intimates 'how to go on.' But we cannot give any interpretation of 'it' that could prove what we meant (whether plus or quus or any other generalization of our finite data). Wittgenstein's response to this vexed interlocutor is the following: he has another interlocutor immediately answer:

"Of course it is, 'in some sense!' Really the only thing wrong with what you say is the expression "in a queer way"[Wittgenstein 1958, §195]

There is nothing queer or paradoxical about what we do, the second interlocutor says and points out that if we think something is queer we just have not properly understood the 'use of the word' and in what sense it is present when grasping the meaning of a word. It will hence be crucial to elaborate on what is meant by 'the use of the word.'

3. Baker and Hacker's internal relations

Two years after Kripke's contribution to the 'rule-following considerations' Baker and Hacker published *Skepticism, Rules and Language* an approach to the problem of rule-following that takes a definite stance against Kripke's skeptical paradox and solution. They are the first to abandon Kripke's influential reading of a paradox in rule following. Their claim is that "the absurd paradox that rules cannot guide one shows [is] that how one understands a rule need not be an interpretation, but is manifest *in acting*, in what we call "following a rule."" (Baker and Hacker 1984, 13f) In the third part of their book Baker and Hacker give an outline of the important role internal relations play therein. They criticize the rule-skeptic's misapprehension of what 'internal relations' are and claim that rule-skepticism ignores or distorts the internal relations that hold between rules and their application.

"[...] the rule skeptic comes into conflict with a conceptual truth expressing an internal relation between rules and their applications." [Baker and Hacker 1984, 101]

Baker and Hacker's point is—as elaborated in the chapter above—that there is no interpretation needed to

bridge rule and application, because there is no gap in the first place. The relation between rule and interpretation is internal. The rule skeptic distorts this relation. But how are we to understand internal relations?

There is a flaw in Hacker and Baker's account of internal relations. They use the term 'internal relation' interchangeably with the term 'logical or grammatical relation' and thereby they cover the fact that 'internal relation' is a prominent term only in the *Tractatus* and does not reoccur but once in the *Philosophical Investigations*. By pointing to the genesis of Wittgenstein's view of internal relations they try to justify taking them in one. Early on Wittgenstein had held that internal relations are such that it is inconceivable that entities should not stand in this relation. (Wittgenstein 1922, 4.123) They are therefore necessarily true or tautological. Later on he added that nothing external could mediate between them. Baker and Hacker do exemplify internal relations by desire and its fulfillment. There is no third—like the feeling of satisfaction—allowed entering in. It is, as they claim, 'a truth of grammar' or a 'necessary truth' that the fulfillment of the desire to drink a pint of beer is to drink a pint of beer—"it can be read off the expression of the desire." (Baker and Hacker 1984, 108) The internal relation is exhibited in grammar. Desire and fulfillment make, as it were, contact in language.

Just as rule and application are internally related, so too an interpretation as mediation would stand in the same vain and drop out. But the example of rule and application is not so easy—there is no direct contact in language as in the example of drinking beer as desire and fulfillment. Baker and Hacker claim that the contact is made by "the practice of using language, of explaining and justifying its use. [...] To understand the rule is to know what counts, in this technique, as doing the same." (Baker and Hacker 1984, 115) Understanding the rule is then to know how to proceed in applying it. Therefore the explanation of a meaning of a word is a rule or standard for its correct use.

"The uses of a word are viewed as the application of these rules (instances of following it)" (Baker, Hacker 1984, 122).

This makes Baker and Hacker privilege the rules of grammar in Wittgenstein's late philosophy to the rules of logic, or logical syntax of the early *Tractatus*. They think that the shift from logic to grammar is crucial for understanding Wittgenstein's 'new' account of rule following.

Instead I shall claim that it is the shift from idle language to language in use which is necessary to understand rule following in Wittgenstein. Baker and Hacker's account treats internal relations in the *Tractatus* not as that which is exhibited in language, but as holding between a proposition and a fact that makes it true. They claim that Wittgenstein presupposes some metaphysical harmony in his early work, which results in an isomorphism between language and world. Only later on, they claim, did Wittgenstein come to see that this harmony is merely forged in grammar.

"The harmony between language and reality is no more than a reflection, a shadow of a rule for the use of signs, a grammatical convention." [Baker and Hacker 1984, 126]

There is no gap between rules of logical syntax and their application, or between rules of grammar and their application. But it can be shown easily in a quote how Hacker and Baker do indeed treat rules of syntax different

from rules of grammar. In their book *Wittgenstein. Rules, Grammar and Necessity* published only a year after *Skepticism, Rules and Language* they make the following claim

“Wittgenstein’s ‘rules of grammar’ serve only to distinguish sense from nonsense. Unlike the depth rules of logical syntax, they do not reflect ineffable metaphysical truths.” (Baker and Hacker 1985, 40)

On my reading the rules of logical syntax and the rules of grammar stand in the same vain. They are both ‘that which shows,’ that which is exhibited when we use language. ‘What is exhibited when we use language’ is not an ineffable metaphysical truth but the rules of logical syntax in early Wittgenstein and the rules of grammar later on.

It is utterly crucial to gain a better understanding of ‘internal relations’ in order to understand why we do not need the extra step of interpretation when we try to link rule and application. What distinguishes my line of thought from theirs is that they hold the account of the *Tractatus* to be completely different from the later view in the *Philosophical Investigations*. It is the distinction between idle language and language in use that they do not take into consideration.

At this point the analysis of ‘internal relations’ as they appear in the *Tractatus* and as they pave the way from language idling to language in use should follow. Time-restrictions do not allow going into detail now. Therefore I will simply sum up with my example from the beginning.

1. Static Logic	2. Dynamic Grammar
I. Language idling “Paper is not edible”	“Paper is not edible”
II. Language in use “Paper is not edible”	“Paper is not edible”

Let us have a look at the relations between propositions and their constituents in (I.1.) Idle Static Logic. “Paper is not edible” is a tautology here because it is always true that paper is not edible; paper has the property of being not edible. Therefore the proposition “Paper is not edible” is senseless—like the propositions of the *Tractatus*, which Wittgenstein claims at the end of it (6.54). That does not mean that “Paper is not edible” is always senseless. When the proposition is actually used it ‘makes sense’ This is how (II.1.) ‘Static Logic in Use’ differs from idle static logic. “Paper is not edible”, has sense in the actual case—when it is used it is true.

(I.2.) Idle Dynamic Grammar is different from Idle Static Logic as Wittgenstein abandoned the idea of atomic constituents. The relations, which were stable between those smallest parts, became dynamic. Instead of logical rules that reigned between propositions and their constituents, one is left with a grammar of language games. Certain examples of how the word has been used before and which indicate in what ways one can use it are all the ‘rules’ we are left with. At this point it should be clear that the rule and the application of the rule fall together. Therefore I.2 Idle dynamic grammar is a fictional construct. Nevertheless Wittgenstein saw this condition as the most dangerous one, because it makes us think we actually use language, although we deal with mere idle grammar. These grammatical propositions do not do any work; they rather make us fall back into the mistake of thinking that there are rules apart from their application. Therefore II.2 Dynamic grammar in use leaves us with the proposition “Paper is not edible”, which makes sense only in the actual use. E.g. when written on a piece of paper, which is

wrapped around a sandwich, it means that you are most likely in the United States and need not try to sue the company who produced the sandwich.

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Zum Primat der juristischen Person im internationalen Recht – Zugleich ein Beitrag zur „Rehabilitierung“ der natürlichen Person als Völkerrechtssubjekt

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1. Einführende Überlegungen

Es ist für die uns geläufigen Rechtsordnungen durchaus nichts Ungewöhnliches, dass von den Menschen unterschiedenen Gebilden *Rechtssubjektivität* oder – *persönlichkeit* zuerkannt wird, dh die Fähigkeit, als solche Träger von Rechten und Pflichten zu sein; damit tritt neben die erste Gruppe der *natürlichen* eine zweite der *moralischen* oder *juristischen* Personen (vgl beispielsweise § 26 ABGB).

Dies gilt auch für das Völkerrecht, wobei wir neben diesen uns vertrauten Begriff gleich eingangs – worauf schon Immanuel Kant nachdrücklich hingewiesen hat (MS VI,343) – den wohl treffenderen und auch anderen Sprachen geläufigeren (zB *public international law*, *droit international public*) des *internationalen Rechts* stellen wollen. Schon aus dieser Bezeichnung allein leuchtet hervor, dass es hierbei vorrangig um die rechtlichen Beziehungen *inter nationes*, also zwischen den Staaten geht: Da es sich bei diesen um Rechtssubjekte, offensichtlich aber um keine natürlichen Personen handelt, müssen sie als juristische Personen qualifiziert werden. Tertium non datur.

Dabei sticht ein Proprium des internationalen Rechts ins Auge: Die nationalen Rechtsordnungen kennen die Individuen als *originäre (geborene)* Rechtssubjekte; schon allein ihre Benennung als *natürliche* weist darauf hin, dass ihre Personeneigenschaft als eine „schon von ihrer Natur her gegebene“ vom Recht mehr anerkannt als verliehen wird. Dadurch avancieren die Menschen auch zu den primären Subjekten der staatlichen Rechtsordnung, wogegen die *juristischen* Personen einen sekundären Rang einnehmen. Denn ihre Rechtspersönlichkeit ist eine *derivative (gekorene)*, die erst durch die Rechtsordnung konstruiert und damit konstituiert werden muss.

Die eben vorgenommene „natürliche“ Zuordnung dieser Begriffspaare erweist sich aber auf der Ebene des internationalen Rechts als problematisch: Für die Staaten als juristische Personen gilt auch hier, dass ihre Personalität eine abgeleitete ist, sich erst in Hinblick auf bestimmte Kriterien zu erweisen hat. Dennoch nimmt der Staat, konsultiert man ein beliebiges Lehrbuch des in Geltung stehenden Völkerrechts, die Stellung des Primärsubjektes des internationalen Rechts ein: Ipsen 55 spricht von ihm als der „Normalperson“ des Völkerrechts, der sich Internationale Organisationen als aus und von Staaten gebildete juristische Personen hinzugesellen. Den Individuen kommt in diesem Bereich, wenn überhaupt, nur eine sehr nachgeordnete Bedeutung zu.

Diese im *Primat* der juristischen Person bestehende Atypizität des positiven Völkerrechts ist keineswegs selbstverständlich: Im Folgenden gilt es sich in aller gebotener Kürze die historische Entwicklung (und Relativität) dieser Konzeption zu vergegenwärtigen und auf diesem Hintergrund nach der Begründung der angesprochenen Atypizität zu fragen.

2. Ein Blick in die Geschichte

Eingangs war davon die Rede, dass Rechtssubjektivität darin bestünde, selbstständig als Träger von Rechten und Pflichten fungieren zu können; dies bedeutet, von der Rechtsordnung als Normadressat, als eigenständiger „Zurechnungsgrund“ für Rechte und Pflichten in den Blick genommen zu werden. Für die erwähnten „Normalpersonen“ des Völkerrechts, die Staaten, gilt genau in diesem Sinne, dass ihnen internationalrechtliche „Vollrechtsfähigkeit“ zukommt: Dies wird traditionell mit der Rede von der *Souveränität* des entsprechenden Gebildes zum Ausdruck gebracht, ohne auf die Differenziertheit und Komplexität dieses Begriffes hier näher eingehen zu können.

Die gegenständliche Frage nach der völkerrechtlichen Primärperson, die auf diesem Hintergrund auch als eine nach den *Trägern der Souveränität* gestellt werden kann, ist in der Geschichte durchaus nicht einheitlich beantwortet worden: Die Vehemenz, mit der die Völkerrechtslehrer des ausgehenden 19. und beginnenden 20. Jahrhunderts darauf beharren, dass allein den Staaten Souveränität zuzugestehen sei (so etwa von Liszt, 47 unter der Überschrift „Nur die Staaten sind Subjekte des Völkerrechts: Träger von völkerrechtlichen Rechten und Pflichten“), darf nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, dass diese Überzeugung relativ jungen Ursprungs ist.

Während schon das Völkerrecht in dem uns heute geläufigen Sinne – von einigen hier nicht behandelbaren Vorläufern abgesehen – nach weitgehender Überzeugung mit Hugo Grotius' *De iure belli ac pacis* (1625) seinen Ausgang nimmt, findet die Lehre von der ausschließlichen Völkerrechtssubjektivität des Staates erst ein Jahrhundert später mit dem Schweizer Emer de Vattel expliziten Niederschlag, wenn dieser 1758 das Völkerrecht definiert als „die Wissenschaft von dem zwischen den Nationen oder Staaten geltenden Recht und von den Verpflichtungen, die diesem Recht entsprechen“ (Vattel 17). In der weiteren Entwicklung sollte diese Lehre dann zu der schon angesprochenen Prädominanz und Prononziertheit finden.

Grotius hätte sich dieser Definition Vattels von ihrem Gehalt her durchaus anschließen können, sein Verständnis von „Nationen oder Staaten“ ist aber doch davon abzuheben: Nicht zuletzt unter dem Eindruck des Souveränitätsverständnisses von Jean Bodin verortet Grotius diese „absolute und ewige Gewalt“ (Bodin I,8) zwar auch im „Staat“, sieht diesen aber weitgehend in Einheit mit der Person des (absoluten) Monarchen, des *Souveräns*. Indem so die Souveränität im König und damit in einer natürlichen Person lokalisiert wird, ist für diese Zeit die den Gegenstand unserer Überlegungen bildende Atypizität des Völkerrechts noch nicht wirklich zu konstatieren.

Natürlich muss zugestanden werden, dass es sich beim Monarchen um keine „gewöhnliche“ natürliche Person handelt, dass sich überhaupt erst im 18.

Jahrhundert mit den Ideen der Aufklärung und den darin gründenden politischen Bewegungen ein breiteres Bewusstsein der prinzipiellen, „angeborenen“ Gleichheit aller natürlichen Personen entwickeln konnte (vgl. §§ 15f ABGB). Dieses „Schillern“ der Person des Monarchen hat in markanter Weise in der mittelalterlichen Rede von den zwei Leibern des Königs, eines körperlichen und sterblichen sowie eines geistigen und überdauernden, Gestalt angenommen (Kantorowicz 1957); in diesem zweiten „mystischen“ Leib inkarniert sich das Königtum, der Staat, worin sich die Konzeption einer von der natürlichen Person unterscheidbaren (wenn auch noch nicht abgelösten) Persönlichkeit schon andeutet und der „garstige Graben“ zwischen natürlichen und moralischen Personen übersprungen scheint.

Erst ab Mitte des 18. Jahrhunderts wird die eigentliche Souveränität der nun klar vor Augen stehenden (moralischen) Person des Staates zugeschrieben. In diesem Sinne stellt Vattel der bisherigen *Fürstensouveränität* die *Souveränität der Staatsperson* entgegen, wobei erstere nur mehr – als bloße Ausübung oder Innehabung der letzteren – als sogenannte *Organsouveränität* verstanden wird. Nur der Staat genießt echte Völkerrechtssubjektivität.

Dieser Akt terminologischer Klärung vermag sich trotz der fast ungeteilten Zustimmung, der er sich in der Lehre in der Folge erfreuen sollte, aber nicht gänzlich durchzusetzen. Exemplarisch sei nur etwa auf Artikel 57 der Wiener Schlussakte von 1820 verwiesen, der die „gesamte Staatsgewalt“ uneingeschränkt beim „souveränen Fürsten“ ansiedelt (Uhlenbrock 24), und unerwähnt bleiben soll als zeitgenössisches Beispiel auch nicht der Sonderfall des Heiligen Stuhles, dessen unbestrittene Völkerrechtssubjektivität sich nicht in einer „abstrahierten Verbandseinheit“, sondern im römischen Papst personalisiert, als „das letzte Relikt jener Zeit, in der Herrschaftsverbände Rechtssubjektivität allein in der Person des Souveräns erlangten“ (Ipsen 82).

3. Der Staat als Personenverband

Mit Vattel, so haben wir gesehen, werden die Staaten (damit juristische Personen) als einzige Völkerrechtssubjekte herausgestellt. In aller Unmissverständlichkeit formuliert er als Kapitelüberschrift „Eine Nation oder ein Staat ist eine *persona moralis*“, worunter näherhin „politische Körper, Gemeinschaften von Menschen“ verstanden werden, welche letzteren die Souveränitätsgewalt „ursprünglich und wesensmäßig“ zusteht (Vattel 17/46). Damit rücken die natürlichen Personen verstärkt in den Blick: Der Staat (und sohin seine Personalität) gründet in einer spezifischen Form der Verbindung unter diesen und steht nicht dem Monarchen gleichsam als „Eigentumsrecht“ zu.

Dies ist über weite Strecken auch das Verständnis, das sich Immanuel Kant in seiner Rechts- und Staatslehre zu eigen macht: Im Anschluss an den ihm und seiner Zeit wohlvertrauten Gelehrten spricht er vom Staat nicht als „Habe“, sondern als einer „Gesellschaft von Menschen“ und ausdrücklich auch als einer „moralischen Person“ (ZEF VIII,344; MS VI,343). Das Völkerrecht ist ihm ganz in diesem Sinne „das Recht der Staaten im Verhältnis gegen einander“ (ZEF VIII,350; MS VI,343).

Hier wird auch deutlich, dass die so entwickelte Vorstellung des Staates als moralischer Person zuallererst in den Zusammenhang des Völkerrechts gehört, also die sogenannte *äußere*, die in der Rechtspersönlichkeit im internationalen Verkehr bestehende Souveränität betrifft. Was die *innere* Souveränität anlangt – und darauf soll nur

kurz hingewiesen werden, da dies nicht den unmittelbaren Gegenstand unserer Überlegungen bildet –, kommt es erst in der deutschen Staatslehre des 19. Jahrhunderts zu der Verdichtung, die den Staat auch im Inneren gegenüber seinen Bürgern als eigenständige juristische Person auf den Plan treten lässt: Die Schöpfung dieses Konzeptes bleibt mit dem Namen des Staatsrechtlers Wilhelm Eduard Albrecht verbunden, der in einer unscheinbaren Rezension zu einer deutlichen Artikulation dieses Gedankens findet (Albrecht 1837).

Dabei steht im Mittelpunkt seines Interesses, die für das Völkerrecht aufgezeigte Entwicklung im innerstaatlichen Bereich nachzuvollziehen und so auch hier die „Staatlichkeit“ dem Zugriff des Fürsten zu entziehen. Diese Konzeption drängt den Monarchen einmal mehr in eine bloße Organstellung und führt wiederum zu einer Ablösung der *Fürstensouveränität*, diesmal durch die *Volkssouveränität*. Mit dieser Verselbstständigung ist tendenziell Positionen das Wort geredet, die dem die Staatsperson konstituierenden Volk auch die grundsätzliche Entscheidung über diese zusprechen; denn die zunehmend prominenten Gesellschaftsvertragstheorien in ihren verschiedenen Spielarten kommen darin überein, dass die Staatsperson eine „Gesellschaft von Menschen“ ist und ihre Personalität gerade von und in diesen – wiewohl dann von ihnen unterschieden – Grundlegung und Rechtfertigung findet (MS VI,347).

4. Die Rückkehr der natürlichen Person ins internationale Recht

Die weitere Entwicklung von diesem gemeinsamen Ausgangspunkt aus verläuft aber in markant verschiedener Weise: Während im Inneren die Konzeption des Staates als juristische Person letztlich immer stärker eine Beförderung und Stärkung der Stellung der Individuen zeitigt, führt sie im völkerrechtlichen Bereich zu der Monopolstellung der Staatsperson und der Ausblendung der natürlichen Person, die wir eingangs skizziert haben.

Im 19. Jahrhundert stellt sich das Völkerrecht als eine völlig abgehobene Rechtsordnung dar, wo selbstverständlich angenommen wird, dass nur Rechtssubjekte ganz eigener Art zum Zug kommen können: Die Individuen sind durch den unüberwindbaren *écran* der staatlichen Souveränität gänzlich vom internationalrechtlichen Verkehr *abgeschirmt*. Die strikt monopersonalistische Konzeption, für die wir von Liszt exemplarisch angeführt haben, erfährt dann aber mit dem Auftreten Internationaler Organisationen sowie mit dem zunehmenden Bewusstsein für Individualrechte auch im Völkerrecht wachsende Kritik.

Für eine gewisse Aufweichung der Position und einen höheren Grad an Differenziertheit steht schon etwa Dionisio Anzilotti, der als Präsident des Ständigen Internationalen Gerichtshofes im Haag auch die berühmte Entscheidung über die *Zuständigkeit der Tribunale von Danzig* (1929) mitverantwortet, in der ausdrückliche Anerkennung findet, dass Individuen *unmittelbar*, dh nicht von ihres Staates Gnaden, völkerrechtliche Ansprüche zukommen können, ohne jedoch den Primat des Staates grundsätzlich in Frage zu stellen (Anzilotti 96ff).

Dies ist dann in sehr markanter Weise durch Georges Scelle geschehen, für den überhaupt nur die natürlichen Personen als Rechtssubjekte in Frage kommen – auch und gerade im Völkerrecht. Die sogenannten „*personnes juridiques ou morales*“ sind für ihn bloße Fiktionen, bloße Mittler für die eigentlichen

Rechtssubjekte; denn die wahre Personalität leite sich aus der Fähigkeit ab, einen Willen zu bilden, was den erwähnten Konstrukten aber unmöglich sei (Scelle 8ff).

Diesem vornehmlich soziologisch-empirischen Zugang bleibt aber ein entscheidender Durchbruch versagt. In der Folge ist zwar durchaus zu konstatieren, dass die einmal eröffnete Möglichkeit von unmittelbaren völkerrechtlichen Ansprüchen von Individuen immer mehr ins Bewusstsein tritt, zB in den diversen Menschenrechtskodifikationen samt der zu ihrer Umsetzung installierten Verfahren und Einrichtungen. Seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg und vor allem in jüngster Zeit entwickelt sich auch machtvoll die Überzeugung von der Existenz völkerrechtlicher Individualpflichten und der Notwendigkeit der Sanktionierung von deren Verletzung (vgl etwa den in Errichtung begriffenen Internationalen Strafgerichtshof). An der Überzeugung vom grundsätzlichen Primat der juristischen Person im Völkerrecht hat das aber nichts geändert (Ipsen 55).

5. Die Rehabilitierung des Individuums als Völkerrechtssubjekt

Die bisherigen Überlegungen zielen darauf ab, den vielfach *als schlechthin gegeben* akzeptierten Primat der juristischen Person im Völkerrecht in Frage zu stellen und in seiner Atypizität deutlicher sichtbar werden zu lassen. Die für das positive Völkerrecht gestern wie heute nicht von der Hand zu weisende Präponderanz des Staates darf nicht darüber vergessen machen, dass diese Konzeption – rechtsphilosophisch betrachtet – einmal angesichts ihrer historischen Relativität, vor allem aber in der Abweichung vom sonstigen Primat der natürlichen Person auf dem argumentativen Prüfstand steht, ja gleichsam die Beweislast für diesen „Sonderweg“ trägt.

Diese Fragen vor Augen – und dies kann nur als abrisshafter Ausblick einer möglichen Fortführung dieser Überlegungen formuliert werden – hat Kant dem *Staatsbürgerrecht* und *Völkerrecht* noch das von ihm so bezeichnete *Weltbürgerrecht* neben- bzw übergeordnet. Jene werden damit noch einmal in den größeren Rahmen eines Rechtsbereiches gestellt, wo „Menschen und Staaten ... als Bürger eines allgemeinen Menschenstaats anzusehen sind“ (ZEF VIII,350), auch wenn das einzige explizit darin enthaltene Recht nur ein allgemeines Hospitalitätsrecht ist (ZEF VIII,357f; MS VI,352).

Darin zeichnen sich allerdings der Wurzel nach bereits die Konturen einer viel weiter greifenden Welt- (in einem umfassenderen Sinne also Völker-)Rechtsordnung ab, deren Rechtssubjekte vorrangig die natürlichen Personen sind. Von dieser Potentialität und Aufgabe kündigt Kant selbst, wenn er „die Idee eines Weltbürgerrechts [als] keine phantastische und überspannte Vorstellungsart des Rechts, sondern [als] eine notwendige Ergänzung des ungeschriebenen Kodex sowohl des Staats- als Völkerrechts zum öffentlichen Menschenrechte überhaupt“ (ZEF VIII,360) verstanden wissen will. Gleichsam als Programmklärung ist uns auf den Weg gegeben, vom „Bürger“, also von der natürlichen Person ausgehend *eine* Weltrechtsordnung zu denken, die jeden prinzipiellen Dualismus von Staats- und Völkerrecht überwindet, die aber gleichzeitig auch nicht einem blinden und gleichmacherischen Monismus frönen muss.

Vielmehr tritt in den drei angeführten Rechtsebenen, und dieser Gedanke kann hier wiederum nur angedeutet werden, eine *föderalistische* Konzeption zu Tage, die dem Individuum als eigentlich *autonomen Subjekt* allerorts in der Rechtsordnung den ersten Platz

einräumt, ihm aber je nach Ebene, Dimension und Bedürfnis „Hilfspersonen“ – und etwas Anderes kann eine juristische Person nie sein – unterschiedlicher Funktionalität und Ausgestaltung zur Seite stellt.

Der darin überwundene (oder besser: ins rechte Licht gerückte) „Primat“ der juristischen Person im Völkerrecht – nun verstanden als bloß relativer Vorrang in einer bestimmten Rechtsschicht mit ganz besonderen Anforderungen – würde einer echten Rehabilitierung des Individuums in demselben Platz schaffen. Die für das klassische Völkerrecht charakteristische Atypizität im Bereich der Rechtssubjekte ginge auf in einer einheitlichen, aber in verschiedene Ebenen differenzierten Rechtsordnung, deren primäres Rechtssubjekt die natürlichen Personen darstellten.

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»I can't have your pains« First Person Statements and the Ambiguity of Meaning

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In *PI 246* Wittgenstein remarks: »In what sense are my sensations *private*?« This question is embedded in a broader context that deals with the possibility of a private language (cf. *PI 243-315*). Sensations can thereby be considered with respect to an epistemic as well as a possessive kind of privacy. In *PI 246* Wittgenstein refers to statements of the form »Only I can know that I am in pain whereas others can only surmise it«. He then argues that such expressions are in one sense false and in another nonsense. Although this remark refers to the epistemic aspect of privacy I shall argue that this semantic differentiation also holds for sentences stating the ownership of sensations.

It is of course clear that those paragraphs involve a huge amount of questions such as: Are sensations private objects? Is there a logical difference between sentences using the verb »to have« in connection with mental expressions such as »I have a bad feeling«, »I have no idea«, etc. and sentences such as »I have 5 Euro in my pocket«, »I have grey hair« etc.? Can two sensations be identical? What is the connection between sensations and their expressions? Can present mental phenomena justify my using mental vocabulary in referring to them? just to mention a few. For several different reasons none of those questions can explicitly be taken into account here, although I think the problem of ambiguity concerning first person psychological statements can at least be pointed at. The paper shall therefore concentrate on the question in what sense statements of the above kind can in one way be false (or true) in another nonsensical for this also seems to be one of the crucial arguments in Wittgenstein's treatment of metaphysical propositions.

In order to understand the remark in *PI 246* we have to get clear about the problem that is involved here and Wittgenstein's way of dealing with it. This is, generally speaking, part of his whole conception of language and the role metaphysics plays in it.

All of Wittgenstein's writings centre around the relation between language and reality, so to speak. There, the question of what it means for a sentence to have sense, of what it means to say something plays an essential role. And within this context of language, sense and nonsense we also have to look for the placing of metaphysics.

When Wittgenstein started doing philosophy again in 1929 he realized the incompleteness of the Tractarian symbolism that seemed to have forced him to introduce the concept of a rule, in a sense that rules that are *not* part of the logical syntax could rule the use of propositions. The concept of »logical syntax« disappeared in his writings and he introduced the idea of a *grammar* which was closely connected with the *application* of language. In a single lecture on necessary propositions (hitherto unpublished) Wittgenstein remarks: »What I call a rule of grammar is not what would be found in grammar books. (...) Ordinary grammar deals with rules about the order of words, gender etc. No one could learn the use of language from such a grammar only. (...) You could make quite formal rules about the use of the language, the sounds etc. You could

also make rules relating to the sort of situation in which the sounds were used. Finally you could get what I choose to call 'rules of grammar'.« Although Wittgenstein does not tell us explicitly what he means by »rules of grammar« it seems clear that the concept of a rule or grammatical sentence is closely related to the way an expression is used in language. To understand the idea that a proposition can both be true (false) and nonsensical we have to look at this conception of a rule and its relation to empirical and metaphysical propositions:

»The statement 'Only I have real toothache', either has a commonsense meaning, or, if it is a grammatical proposition, it is meant to be a statement of a rule.« (Wittgenstein 1979, 22). This remark already indicates the problem of a particular semantical ambiguity that is involved in statements of such kind. About the relation between grammatical rules, metaphysical statements and empirical propositions Wittgenstein makes the following interesting remark: »And it is particularly difficult to discover that an assertion which the metaphysician makes expresses discontentment with our grammar when the words of this assertion can also be used to state a fact of experience.« (Wittgenstein 1972, 56-57). Thus when in a particular situation someone claims that only his pain is real he might just want to say that all the others are pretending. Or when he argues that a particular object does not exist when no one looks at it, he might just want to point out that it vanishes, when it is not looked at. A solipsist, however, who states that only his pain is real pain, does not want to make any empirical assumptions about the pretense of other people, e.g., that he has good reasons to assume that they are only cheating. What he wants to say is that it is inconceivable to imagine that anyone except him *could* be in pain. This conception of what is possible to imagine and what makes sense to say is already found in the *Tractatus*. A proposition that has sense expresses a possible state of affairs, a state that is imaginable in the sense that the statement that expresses it does not contain a contradiction or concepts excluding each other (cf. *Some Remarks on Logical Form*). And as we shall see the distinction Wittgenstein draws between empirical and logical impossibility is crucial for the whole understanding of a grammatical proposition.

In *PI 251* we find another remark about the idea of inconceivability of the opposite and the confusion of grammatical and empirical propositions. In this passage Wittgenstein points out that this impossibility is not due to the human powers of imagination as if it were only a question of trying hard enough. The form of a sentence like »I can't imagine the opposite« in contexts of the privacy of sensations or the knowledge about having pains etc. equals an empirical proposition but is really a grammatical one.

So, let us look at a few examples to try to clarify the semantic ambiguity of the two kinds of expressions. If our assumption is right, sentences such as, »Another person can't have my pains«, »I can't feel your pain«, »I feel my toothache«, »Two people can't have the same pain«, »Only I have real pain« etc. can both have a truth value or be nonsensical.

The best way to point out the ambiguity is to choose a rather radical example Wittgenstein introduces to point out the difference between logical and empirical impossibility. This grammatical difficulty becomes most obvious when we introduce the idea of having pain in another person's body, say teeth. Here the metaphysical proposition »I can't feel another person's pain« differs from the experiential proposition »I can't have pain in another person's mouth« (cf. Wittgenstein 1972, 49), which is the expression of an empirical impossibility. Since the negation does, however, not contain a contradiction, it is imaginable to have pain in another person's body. So to say »I cannot have your pain« would be false if it is meant in the sense »I cannot have pain in your tooth« whereas »I cannot have your toothache« because my pain is mine and yours is yours would be nonsense, forbidden by syntax, as Wittgenstein puts it. In the *Philosophical Remarks* and elsewhere he argues that the concept of pain differs according to intensity and location but not according to a possessor and in particular to a physical body, an assumption that is fundamental to understand the idea of having pain in another person's body. So the toothache case is a perfect example to illustrate the difference between logical and physical impossibility which I think is basic for Wittgenstein's distinction between sense and nonsense he draws in *PI 246* and elsewhere.

This example also shows the grammatical asymmetry between first person and third person statements in metaphysical contexts as opposed to empirical one's. Here the question of given criteria seems crucial. When Wittgenstein raises the question about the criteria of identity for pains (cf. *PI 253*), it looks as though he wants to imply that there are no such criteria which I think is a false interpretation. What the question does imply is that the criteria show in what way it makes sense to speak of »the same« in connection with pains. In one of his lectures (1979, 18) Wittgenstein's remarks the following: »It makes sense to say "His ache is worse than mine", but not to say "I feel my toothache" and "Two people can't have the same pain". Consider the statement that no two people can ever see the same sense datum. If being in the same position as another person were taken as the criterion for someone's seeing the same sense datum as he does, than one could imagine a person seeing the same datum, say, by seeing through someone's head. But if there is no criterion for seeing the same datum, than "I can't know that he sees what I see" does not make sense. We are likely to muddle statements of fact which are undisputed with grammatical statements. Statements of fact and grammatical statements are not to be confused.« So if there are criteria that allow to speak of »sameness« even in cases of sense perception than it does make sense to apply the concept and the particular propositions would either be true or false.

Furthermore, if the expression »toothache« has the same meaning both in first person and third person statements than why should we not say that two persons have the same pain? Wittgenstein's point seems to be that we can speak of »the same pain« if »I« and »he« are on the same *logical* level. If I use such a proposition in a context where both pronouns are meant to be on the same level than the proposition does have sense. This means in other words that both those pronouns are possible arguments for the same function. If we, e.g., allow an expression such as »unconscious pain«¹ than I can

¹»Again, when in a metaphysical sense I say "I must always know when I have pain", this simply makes the word "know" redundant; and instead of "I know that I have pain", I can simply say "I have pain". The matter is different, of course, if we give the phrase "unconscious pain" sense by fixing experiential criteria for the case in which a man has pain and doesn't know it, and if then we say (rightly or wrongly) that as a matter of fact nobody has ever had pains which he didn't know of.« (Wittgenstein 1972, 55). And in his lecture on

equally say with sense »He has pains I do not feel« and »I have pains I do not feel« or generally speaking substitute first person for third person pronouns. In both cases the verification methods could be the same. If on the contrary we are in a context where someone (say a solipsist) wants to point out the unique role of the first person in the sense that in his grammar »I« or »personal experience« has »no neighbour« (cf. Wittgenstein 1972, 71 or Klagge 1993, 229) than first person statements of the above kind are nonsense. This point obviously hangs together with Wittgenstein's understanding of metaphysical statements being used without an *antithesis* (cf. Wittgenstein 1972, 45).

Another example concerning »sameness of pains« is found in the *Blue and Brown Books*. Wittgenstein introduces the phrase »I won't feel your cold« in a context where we might be angry with someone who wants to go out on a cold day with a cold in his head and this phrase could mean something like »I don't suffer when you catch a cold« which is a proposition taught by experience. »For we could imagine a, so to speak, wireless connection between the two bodies which made one person feel pain in his head when the other had exposed his to the cold air« (Wittgenstein 1972, 54). And against the argument that my pain is my pain because it is in my head Wittgenstein constructs a scenario which is quite similar to the Siamese twins case. Two persons share one part of their bodies, say, a hand. Nerves and tendons of A's arm are connected to B's hand by operation. Now let's imagine that the hand got stung by a wasp, both A and B cry, contort their faces give the same description of the pain etc. Would we now say they have the same pain or a different one? Wittgenstein goes on: »"We feel pain in the same place, in the same body, our descriptions tally, but still my pain can't be his", I suppose as a reason you will be inclined to say: "because my pain is my pain and his pain is his pain". And here you are making a grammatical statement about the use of such a phrase as "the same pain". You say that you don't wish to apply the phrase, "he has got my pain" or "we both have the same pain", and instead, perhaps, you will apply such a phrase as "his pain is exactly like mine".« (Wittgenstein 1972, 54).

The same point is illustrated by the Siamese twins example (cf. *PI 253*) where a sentence like »Each of them has a different pain« is *opposed* to »They both have the same pain«. So if one of them is true the other is false but not nonsense, e.g. when one feels a throbbing pain the other a burning one. Again, one who wants to state that they *cannot* have the same pain, using »cannot« as a logical cannot, does not want to distinguish two experiences.

Those examples show, it seems to me, at least two things:

If there are criteria for calling something, e.g., the »same pain«, such as location or intensity, than it does make sense to say that two persons can feel the same pain and so sentences like »We can't have the same pain«, »I can't have his pain« would be false but not nonsensical and

If one makes a metaphysical statement about »the same pain« where there are no such criteria than the proposition is nonsense. He should therefore consider something like: »I don't wish to apply the phrase "He has

necessary propositions Wittgenstein says: »There is no reason why I should not say "I have unconscious toothache" if a.) I feel no pain, b.) I have a bad tooth. Saying this would produce depression and fear. It suggests that if I don't feel it now I shall feel it in a second.« The notion of »unconscious toothache« is also discussed in the *Blue and Brown Books* (cf. Wittgenstein 1972, 22-23).

got my pain", "We both have the same pain" « etc. as a rule that would forbid expressions of such kind.

These two assumptions already point at one of Wittgenstein's proposals to avoid meaning ambiguities which he discusses in several places: the introduction of an alternative notation with a system of rules that determines the use of expressions in a way that avoids the confusion of empirical and metaphysical statements. (Another rather simple alternative is indicated in *PI* 116: »What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday usage.«)

This solution, however, does not touch Wittgenstein's second diagnosis of metaphysical propositions which is certainly more fundamental for it directly points to the claim of such statements: The metaphysician wants to say something about the *nature* of things but all he really does is confusing such statements with grammatical rules about the use of expressions, for according to Wittgenstein »I can't feel his pain« is not something about the nature of pain but a grammatical remark about the concept of pain. »It seems as though it would be not false but nonsense to say "I feels his pains", but as though this were because of the nature of pain, of the person etc. as though, therefore the statement were ultimately a statement about the nature of things. So we speak for example of an asymmetry in our mode of expression and we look on it as a mirror image of the essence of the things« (Klagge 1993, 208-209).²

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²»Philosophische Untersuchungen: begriffliche Untersuchungen. Das Wesentliche der Metaphysik: daß sie den Unterschied zwischen sachlichen und begrifflichen Untersuchungen verwischt.« (Wittgenstein 1992, 381)

Autism, Dilogic and Persons

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1. Introduction

The syndrome of autism was first systematically identified in the 1940's (Kanner 1943), and has been the focus of a broad range of work since that time (Rutter 1999). Its symptomatology is seemingly diverse, and involves a rough division between 'personal' and 'non-personal' tendencies. In the personal category are difficulties in understanding and interacting with other persons, socialisation, empathy and communication. In the non-personal category are difficulties in adaptability, occasional special abilities, and a wide range of peculiarities in learning, generalisation, pursuit of narrow interests, and so on. Some tendencies, such as peculiarities in the use of language, seem to span both categories.


A central question in the theory of autism, therefore, is whether these two categories of impairment share a common pattern or character. It is true that received sets of diagnostic criteria (World Health Organisation 1993; American Psychiatric Association 1994), drawn from empirical observation, give the impression of a split syndrome in which non-personal and personal tendencies occur together but are different in nature. However, we cannot simply trust the language games which inform the presentation of these observations: as Wittgenstein repeatedly argued, forms of words and 'analogies in language' can have the effect of obscuring both similarities and differences between things (Peterson 1990). The main thesis of the present paper is that there does exist a pattern common to these two areas of impairment, in that both involve *dilogical structures*.

2. Dilogic

For purposes of illustration, we start with a fictitious example from the film *Rain Man*. The main character in the film, who has autism, is crossing a busy road at a pedestrian crossing. Half way across, the sign changes from 'Walk' to 'Don't Walk', and the character stops and stands still (rather than hurrying to the pavement). This situation has an identifiable structure, in that *two factors bear interactively on the same result*. A legal factor ('I am at a pedestrian crossing and the sign says "Don't Walk"') suggests stopping, while a safety factor ('I am in the middle of a road and the traffic is starting to move') suggests hurrying to the pavement. Such structures will be called 'di-logical', in the sense of involving two reasons, and the following terminology will be used to describe them.

source (S)	I am at a pedestrian crossing and the sign says 'Don't Walk'
monological result (M)	stop
context (C)	I am in the middle of a road and the traffic is starting to move
dilogical result (D)	hurry to the pavement.

This structure can be read as 'Given S, M would follow by default, but given C as well, D follows in this instance', and it can be expressed diagrammatically as follows.



What the character in the film does is to produce a monological response to this dilogical structure, ignoring the modulating influence of its context component (Peterson in press). In the present case, this modulating influence overrides the basic default of the monological response, but in other cases it may involve less radical adaptation or re-scheduling (indicating how, when or where to do something, whom to do it with, when to start and stop, how much of it to do, and so on).

3. Non-Personal Cases

In these terms, many tendencies found in autism consist in errors of *adaptation* to context, as in the illustrative example above. One case is the following of routines. The individual may have a procedure for getting up in the morning (S), and may follow this to the letter (M), despite the circumstance on this particular day of the need to leave early (C), which requires the adapted response of taking a quick shower instead of a bath (D). The individual may have a route for walking to school (S), and may insist on following this rigidly (M), despite the circumstance that there are deep puddles on the habitual side of the road (C), which could be avoided by walking on the other side of the road (D). The pattern is borne out by tests of executive function used in neuropsychology such as the Detour Reaching Task, the Wisconsin Card Sort Test and the Towers of Hanoi (Russell 1997). Once a rule (S) is understood, the individual with autism may follow it rigidly (M), despite indications (C) that execution should be delayed, terminated or temporarily suspended (D).

A related problem exists in the *differentiation* of context. Here, something is encountered which is in fact the joint product (D) of a basic factor (S) and a modulating circumstance (C). But despite accumulating evidence, the person with autism may fail to articulate this structure, and may fixate on the original context as if it were essential. Thus in the case of echolalia, a word is first heard with a particular pronunciation. This is the joint product (D) of the basic word (S) and its pronunciation on that particular occasion (C), but the individual may persist as if this original modulation were essential. The word 'impolite', for example, having first been heard with heavy intonation as 'im-pol-ite' may continue to be enunciated as such despite exposure to alternative pronunciations. Equally, a detail such as the colour of a cup may be treated as essential and the individual may refuse all others. And in classification, a species (D) which is a compound of a

genus (S) and a differentia (C) may be treated as more important than the genus itself, so that the child with autism invents a neologism for 'red men's bicycle with racing handlebars' without using the general word 'bicycle'.

In all of these cases, the odd behaviour at issue is situated within a dilogical structure, and the moment when we understand the behaviour is the moment when we locate it in relation to this structure. The child with autism walking through a puddle makes sense when we know that this is his usual route to school (and his actions are insulated from current context), and the child who refuses to use a cup at school makes sense when we learn that the cup used at home is of a different colour (and she has fixated on this contextual detail).

4. Personal cases

Problems of adaptation to context also appear on the personal side of the symptomatology of autism. In the case of tact, an individual may have something to say (S) and may simply say it (M), despite possibilities or signs of causing offence (C) which indicate, on this occasion, the adapted action of saying it in a moderated way or not saying it at all (D). Similarly, in the case of overinforming, the individual knows something (S) and downloads it in immoderate detail (M), despite the fact that only some of this is relevant to the audience (C), which suggests a filtered delivery (D). In general, a script or formula of social interaction (S) may be learned, but it may then be executed in an automatic or self-propelled fashion (M), despite contextual factors such as discouraging reactions from others (C) which indicate on particular occasions that execution of the script be moderated or terminated (D). Thus the person with autism can be insensitive to social contexts just as they can be insensitive to other contexts, and again this behaviour makes sense when we locate source and context within the larger dilogical structure.

The problem, however, is worse than this. If we are to adapt to something, we need at least to know what it is, and people with autism show significant difficulty in working out what other individuals think and feel in the first place. This impairment in 'mindreading' is not simply a domain-specific 'blindness' to persons, since individuals with autism can be taught facts and rules of 'folk psychology' or 'theory of mind'. These may be applied in a non-adapted way, as above, but they are not incomprehensible in the first place. We therefore need to ask whether there exists an additional learning strategy which is available to neurotypicals but is impaired in autism. It is relevant here that some writers have argued that mindreading can be achieved through mental simulation: the process of using our own cognitive system, adapted as required, to simulate that of another person (Goldman 1989; Gordon 1986). The question, then, is what sort of adaptation is involved. A useful focus for analysis is the false belief task (Wimmer and Perner 1983) on which people with autism show significant impairment (Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith 1985). A typical scenario, played out with dolls, goes as follows.

Mummy and Maxi are in the kitchen. They have a bar of chocolate and they put it in location-1. Maxi then goes away to play with his friend. During this time Mummy takes the chocolate from location-1 and puts it in location-2. Maxi then starts to come home, and wants to find the chocolate.

Against this scenario, the participant in the experiment is asked the test question 'Where does Maxi think the chocolate is?'. As argued elsewhere (Peterson and Riggs 1999) what we need to do in order to answer

this question is to ask ourselves the simple question 'Where is the chocolate?' while imposing a mask or filter which says 'ignore the fact that the chocolate was moved'. In this way we operationalise Maxi's perspective, and we achieve a virtual simulation of his database without significantly disturbing our own. The present point is that this task has a dilogical structure: we have knowledge of the entire story (S), and by default we would say 'in location-2' (M) in answer to the simple question, however under the imposed filter (C), we answer differently and say 'in location-1' (D). And in autism there is impairment in working out the dilogical response in this structure, and hence impairment in using this strategy in mindreading.

This simulation strategy belongs to the broader category of *cooperative cognition*, where we also find dilogical structures and impairment in autism. In simulation, we need to think-with the other person, so as to work out what they believe. Equally, the individual with autism may learn to skate, but not to skate-with a partner. They may learn to play an instrument but not to play-with other musicians. They may feel, but not feel-with other people in an empathetic manner, and so on. As elsewhere, the problem is not blindness to a particular domain (people's beliefs, skating, playing music, emotion), but one-handedness in dealing with scenarios of a particular structure. This allows us to understand the originality which is sometimes noted in people with autism. Accommodation of context is not necessarily a good thing, and what is appropriate and cooperative may also be compromised and pointlessly conventional. Communities gain coherence through shared dilogic, by accepting assumptions which act as filters on thought and action, and progress may require detachment from these filters so as to 'think outside the box'. And here there is no absolute right or wrong: the monological style found in autism can be seen as closing the door to cooperation, opening the door to originality, or doing both at once.

5. Conclusion

We have identified the logic of a particular type of task, and we find this to be a common factor in the seemingly diverse symptomatology of autism. It is fair to make several qualifications here. --- The causes of the clinical syndrome of autism are biological, and these may produce effects which do not fit our pattern, including additional brain damage and impediments to speech and learning. People with autism show variable performance in the tasks discussed above, and the detail of exactly why they have difficulties with dilogical structures remains to be discovered (Peterson and Bowler 2000). Also, the pattern identified is not unique to autism, and any particular error or denial of dilogic may be produced by an individual who does not have this biological condition. --- The point remains, however, that a pattern exists which it is unhelpful to obscure. And this pattern suggests, in autism and non-autism alike, that our grip on persons and our grip on things both rely on our grip on dilogical structures. This reliance may not be absolute: for any dilogical structure we could in principle incorporate the context into the source as an exception case, so as to produce a unitary but more complex rule or algorithm. However, in Wittgenstein's terms, such a 'superlative fact' is always open to 'surprises' which fall outside its scope. And given this, the attempt to explain autism in terms of inadequate 'theory of mind', like Socrates' attempt to explain judgement in terms of adequate definitions, is an enterprise which looks for the right thing in the wrong place.

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Measuring the Uncertain – Remarks on Entropy and Information

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1. Entropy as the measure of our uncertainty in knowing the World

According to original Shannon's concept entropy is the measure assigned to the spectrum of possible states of a given system. The formula

$$S = \sum_{i=1}^N p_i \log p_i$$

where p_i is the probability of state i reaches the null value for the case when the cognitive subject knows exactly in which state the system is. The practical use of this formula strongly depends upon the actual ability to determine ALL possible states of the system and ability to estimate ACTUAL PROBABILITIES of those states, which is possible only for highly idealized and reduced systems. Thus direct application of such measure to our general knowledge of the world seems rather impossible unless we suggest some general procedures to reduce the number of 'possible worlds'. The way philosophy maintains such a task is metaphysics of the world.

A cognitive subject can reduce his/her uncertainty through gaining some information. Incoming information can change the subject's knowledge in two ways: it may either eliminate some possible states or it can change the way the subject 'partitions' the world. The former situation corresponds to gaining some knowledge in the way of empirical examining the world – the result of an experiment reduces our uncertainty of the world by selecting of the whole spectrum of expectable answers to the "experimental question" those which may be the most probable. We claim that the expectable answers are not declarations stated by "the World" but result from our ability predict "the World's" behavior. Such predictions are based upon a certain metaphysical model of "the World" as well as upon the theoretical background.

The latter would rather resemble the change in 'paradigm' suggested by T.Kuhn and thus is characteristic to the discovery processes. It is evident that the both are not independent.

2. Relative entropy concept

The way a cognitive subject computes the entropy depends on the way he/she "partitions" the world i.e. what number and kinds of possible states of the world are possible according to the metaphysical representation of the world.

Provided one and only one metaphysical representation of the world is possible and this one is 'uniquely filled out' with the 'scientific theories' one can try to evaluate the entropy. In the more probable case, where there are competitive theories or, which is even worse, competitive metaphysical representations, the problem can be handled with the use of the concept of relative entropy between two probability distributions $P(x)$ and $Q(x)$

$$D(P||Q) = \sum_x P(x) \ln \frac{P(x)}{Q(x)}$$

In general the relative entropy is not symmetric under interchange of the distributions $P(x)$ and $Q(x)$

$$D(P||Q) \neq D(Q||P),$$

Both distributions $P(x)$ and $Q(x)$ are defined over the same alphabet A_X

The measure of information resulting from the relative entropy formula is lower than the one resulting from original Shannon's formula. As the formula can be reversed one can get the measure of world partitioning and consequently a measure of information content embedded in a certain metaphysical hypothesis. This, however requires the existence of clean, separate metaphysical pictures of the world, which does not seem to be the case in any period of history of philosophy. What is more, one can hardly expect such situation in the future.

Therefore one should note that the relative entropy formula does not, and cannot, contain the complete probability. In order to use the latter we would have to be in possession of the complete knowledge of the world. The ability to possess such a knowledge is a myth present in philosophy since Aristotle. Mythical character of this assumption results from at least two premises:

the world seems open

our knowledge does not partition the world uniquely

Here we would like to stress that standard concept of cognition based upon the assumption that a cognitive subject is spiritual and "isolated" from the world and information can be considered as spiritual substance only. As long as such assumption remains the base of epistemology no progress is possible.

3. Information and its usefulness

The relative entropy concept does not cover all aspects of information usefulness. Pragmatic approach to information requires also including the actual use of the information. As this is often considered subjective we would like to concentrate on some objective characteristics of information use. When we think of information as a means of subject's fitness to the real world. The thesis, that cognitive subjects are subject to natural selection bridges the gap between abstractive cognition and "physical" reality. The cognitive subject no longer is a "purely spiritual" entity but is treated as a specific subsystem of the world. A specific system because of his/her homeostatic functions, but a subsystem since he/she is connected to the world with multiple feedback relations.

Understanding information should be based upon its realistic function as evolutionary fitness. As evolution theory suggests, we must thus introduce a certain "fitness factor".

The problem seems to be of nonlinear character where methods of complexity analysis would be more appropriate. Nevertheless, continuing the examples

coming from other sciences we suggest some linearization:

$$I = -S \cdot F(\xi) = \left(-\sum_{i=1}^N p_i \log p_i\right) \cdot F(\xi)$$

The factor $F(\xi)$ should show the following features:

tend to zero when fitness of information tends to zero

tend to Shannon formula when fitness of information tends to infinity

be negative when fitness becomes negative

The above requirements can be fulfilled for instance by a formula:

$$F(\xi) = (1 - e^{-\xi})$$

The suggested formula has some advantages:

it reveals the real value of information not subjective one

it covers all interactions of the cognitive subject with his/her environment; no matter what partitioning are

it lets for accounting of negative fitness

it shows that control processes can be treated as the information edge.

it gives qualitative factor ready for simulation of cognitive processes

Apparently the ability to include both concepts: relative entropy and evolutionary "fitness factor" should give a means to estimate "objective" assessment of metaphysics. It would also allow to treat such assessment dynamically. This would be especially beneficial for describing the culture flow.

4. Conclusion – why "objective"?

For centuries philosophy have taught us how to search the most objective and the most certain knowledge. On the other side information theory gives us a means to measure not what we know about the world but what we can expect i.e. what we do not know in such strong meaning of this word as we are used to assign to logic.

Our considerations in this topic lead to the following conclusions:

it is impossible to construct a homomorphism between the knowledge and the world: first - information comes to a subject dynamically, second – the environment (the world) changes, last but not least – any attempt to estimate the complete probability must fail because the classes established by different metaphysics are not separate – thus correspondence concept of truth must be abandoned

the latter does not mean that any subject can construct the world's image freely (which is often called relativization of knowledge)

our knowledge – or as we would rather say: information about the real world – is not certain but rather probable but still useful because of its influence on our fitness to the world

the objective does not necessarily mean anti-relative – as a subsystem of the Universe trying to learn its structure we are both cognitive subjects and objects within this Universe – this has several consequences: a need for "new language of science", which would reflect the complexity of systems examined, based on *Principia Cybernetica* rather than *Principia Mathematica*, a need for revision of classical philosophical divisions such as *the spiritual* and *the material*, *the mental* and *the mechanical*,

there is a need for changing the objectives of science: the aim of science is not finding the truth about the universe but rather deciding which of the theoretical pictures of the world is better fitted to reality.

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Metaphysical Disputes

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1. Ontological disputes

Ontological disputes tend to involve your intuitions concerning relations between the statue and the clay, between persons and their bodies, those concerning personal identity and identity through time.

Let us suppose for a while that there exists a multiplicity of entities and that the ontologist is dealing with them. There is a chunk of the matter that I observe. It is a body. But the description of the chunk of the matter as a body may perhaps be substituted by another description: there is a person here. Once a person is mentioned, we will tend to be attentive at other things as we were in the former case. We will be observing patterns of bodily behavior, concerning not just its spatio-temporal position, but also patterns involving this body's acting as a person, with its various deeds and with the dynamics in several dimensions such as physical, inter-personal and aesthetic dimensions that it involves. Now you ask yourself whether the person is identical to her body.

Another couple of examples concerns personal identity and identity through time. We ask ourselves whether a person is identical to her temporary stages. A child and a grown up person do not share much of the physical matter, given that the cells and the material from which they consist are repeatedly changed as we observe them through the passage of time. Almost complete and repeated substitution of the matter in a person's body is not diminished in any way because of the gradual nature of this substitution.

What are the conditions for identity

Body = Person?

May person be reduced to her body? There are powerful intuitions that this cannot be the case: You cannot reduce person to her body. But one may also try to argue in the opposed direction. The important thing for our discussion is that the dispute does not seem to deal with the ultimate entities, but with the relation between two *descriptions* involving the chunk of matter in question. So this does not prove to be a debate concerning real entities of ultimate ontology. It is rather a dispute about the status of connections existing between descriptions of one supposedly existing entity.

The question about personal identity and about the identity through time puts under our scrutiny the equation

Person = Person's temporary stages.

If we again take the chunk of matter under question as our starting point, we may recognize the dispute to be about two descriptions of this same chunk, once taken as the description involving a person, and once as the description of the person's several temporary stages. We can conclude that the dispute does not concern the chunk of matter in question in any direct manner.

The work of ontologist thus does not directly concern the language and mind independently existing reality. It deals with and handles intuitions about the concepts involved into metaphysical discussion, such as concepts relating to the person, to a human body, identity, existence and non-existence. It is actually a research into the penumbral connections between these concepts.

There are intuitions relating to what is appropriate to think about a case under scrutiny. Counterexamples involving conceptual possibilities are produced, trading on relations between penumbral connections of the concepts involved. If all this is true, then one can conclude that the now mentioned disputes happen in the area of descriptive metaphysics and not in the area of the real metaphysics. Real metaphysics is supposed to deal with the ultimate reality that exists irrespective of the linguistic and conceptual schemas that are applied to it. Descriptive metaphysics is understood here as dealing with description of the world.

Let us take the equation

Clay = Statue.

Your intuitions concerning the equation may be pulled in opposite directions, be it in the direction of reducibility of the statue to the clay, or in an opposed manner, in direction of irreducibility. If you zoom in right now at the alternative of reducibility, you will stress the prototypical concepts related to the clay, and your intuition will follow in this direction. If, on the other hand, you zoom in at the properties of the concept "statue", your overall intuitions will turn in another direction, and you will be more inclined towards nonreductionist interpretation.

2. Normativity

The usual belief is that debates in metaphysics concern ultimate reality. There cannot be any normativity involved into the ultimate reality. But it goes otherwise for discussions in which you take part. The reality of these is discursive and it certainly involves normativity. Now we found out that ontology as practiced does not proceed at the level of ultimate reality. Ontologists are not engaged in the real metaphysics, but in the descriptive metaphysics. If this is the case, then the discourse involving matters ontological is in the foreground, and not the area of the world as it may exist outside of this discourse. But then it will be quite natural to see this ontological discourse governed by normative constraints.

There are two generic possibilities about the dynamics involving normative standards. These may be either high standards in the sense that they would put demanding requirements on the discourse in question. Or they may be rather the case of standards that are lower and closer to the earth. The proclaimed standards of the ontological discourse tend to be high. But this form of normativity is contrary both to the practice of ontological discourse as it is actually proceeding, and to the nature of cognitive systems underlying the ontological discourse in question.

Ontological disputes belong to the area of descriptive metaphysics. Accordingly, they involve the discourse of metaphysics, and they do not involve the mind and language independently existing world in any direct manner. Ontological positions are in the offing, and the choice seems quite democratic as far as the space of logical possibilities is concerned. Your heart may choose between nominalism and realism, between anti-realism and between several other positions for different areas. But once the choice is made, pressure is put on the

ontological positions to embrace principles of the following sort:

“For all the relevant cases, accept substance-accidence distinction as an explanatory principle”.

“For all the relevant cases, accept tropes as an explanatory principle”.

Relevant cases may include particulars that can be understood as spatio-temporal chunks of matter or as middle-sized dry goods. You can notice that the first mentioned principle offers different and opposed interpretative proposals as compared to the second principle. According to the first principle, a body will be interpreted by application of the substance-accidence distinction. Whereas according to the second principle, the same body will be interpreted as consisting of tropes, that is of spatio-temporally instantiated properties. In this case, the nature of the proposed principles will pull interpretation in opposed directions, involving intuitions proper to the prototypes of concepts “substance-accidence” pair and intuitions proper to the prototypes of “trope”, as applied to the body under question. Principles thus introduce interpretative constraints that may pull intuitions linked to the concepts involved into the opposite directions.

The important thing though is that the principles underlying metaphysical discourse are spelled out as general principles. Given the relevant domain, such as the domain of middle-sized dry goods, they are supposed to hold for this domain in a general manner.

The general form of the principle stated will also be in value for the area under question in an *exceptionless* manner. This means that for all the cases of middle sized dry goods, in the example above, you will have to apply the substance-accidence distinction, even if these would be counterintuitive cases as far as your position is concerned. Even and especially, you will be obliged to spend your time with the limit cases of the sort just mentioned, as these will be important for the defense of your position and for making it plausible. The exceptionless nature of the principles involved is actually a consequence of generality of these principles.

General exceptionless principles also allow for *projectibility*, which is built into them by the fact that they are general and exceptionless. If you buy the general principle concerning tropes, you will have to reason somehow in the following way: “If this chunk of matter is an assemblage of tropes, then another similar chunk of matter will be assemblage of tropes as well.” More generally: tropes will provide *patterns* that allow projectibility to the whole range of further cases, that is to all the cases belonging to the domain. This general form of principles is there in order to secure *tractability*. If there is a general principle of the mentioned sort, the hope is that it may be unambiguously decided for each particular case in the domain whether it is a member or whether it isn't.

There are two sorts of reasons though that make us realize inappropriateness of exceptionless projectible general principles as the basis for ontological discourse. The first reason relates to the world and the second reason relates to the nature of the cognitive system that underlies the ontological discourse. In each case, the reasoning will be that the domain under question is too rich to be codified by the use of exceptionless general principles.

Neither the rich nature of the mind independently existing world, nor the rich nature of cognition that backs up the discourse of ontology are appropriate to fit exceptionless general ontological principles that are explicitly put as guidelines for ontological inquiry by the descriptive metaphysicians.

Ontological descriptive discourse explicitly requires tractable principles. But actually this discourse engages into conceptual penumbral connections related to the disputes it is interested in. Now as the mentioned conceptual penumbral connections engage the cognitive system, the question arises what kind of normativity would be appropriate for the subject matter of the ontological normative discourse. We may propose particularist normativity to do the job. Dynamical cognition does not buy any tractable general principles; rather it accentuates richness. The matter under consideration concerns concepts, and concepts get realized in the cognitive system. According to the hypothesis of dynamical cognition there is a rich cognitive intractable background where cognitive forces lead to realization of total cognitive states, at the mathematical middle level of cognitive system's description.

3. Phenomenology

It may seem a very peculiar claim to affirm the vicinity of qualitative experiences to the metaphysical undertaking. The main wrong presupposition of the arguing to the contrary figures the belief that ontology or metaphysics concerns directly things happening in the mind and language independent world. We have dismantled this false belief by claiming that the work of metaphysician happens in the area of the descriptive, that it concerns discourse and intuitions about conceptual penumbral connections. If this is right, however, the ontology as practiced turns out to be a part and parcel of the working of our cognitive systems. But if this is the case now, then the intentional thoughts implied into ontological work are not just psychological – they are also qualitative. So, phenomenology, after all, really turns out to be constitutively involved into metaphysics.

You may ask yourself if there would be anybody to hold such a strange view: that metaphysics and phenomenology go hand in hand. Intertwining of metaphysics and phenomenology was the domain of Brentano and of his school. Contrary to Aristotle, Brentano required Cartesian kind of evidence to be integrated into research of ontological categories. But evidence should be understood as qualitative experience that is a precondition for each intentional act to happen. It is intrinsic to it and not just an accompanying feature. So it turns out that the area of metaphysics has phenomenology intrinsically built into it.

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Das Ideal, ein guter Mensch zu sein Zur Leistungsfähigkeit des motivationalen Bonismus

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1. Die rationalistische Erklärung emphatisch-moralischen Handelns

Unter emphatisch-moralischem Handeln verstehe ich das Ausführen des moralisch Richtigen in denjenigen Fällen, in denen die fragliche Handlung sowohl sämtlichen egoistischen Motiven des Handelnden entgegensteht, als auch ihr individuelles Maß an Altruismus deutlich übersteigt. Von der Anerkennung des Phänomens emphatisch-moralischen Handelns wird im folgenden ausgegangen.

Eine unserem Alltagsdenken recht nahe kommende motivationale Erklärung besagten Phänomens ist die folgende, hier als "rationalistisch" bezeichnete Theorie: Manche Handlungsweisen sind moralisch schlecht, andere sind gut. Die schlechten sollen wir allesamt unterlassen; von einer Teilmenge der guten gilt, dass sie moralische Pflichten darstellen, d.h. dass wir sie ausführen *sollen*, wobei das hier ins Spiel kommende moralische Sollen ein kategorisches ist, welches weder von unserem Wollen abhängt noch von dem Wollen anderer Personen. Wenn wir nun durch die Vernunft erkennen, dass wir eine Handlung tun sollen, so geht von dieser Erkenntnis eine motivierende Kraft aus, welche uns befähigt, unseren Egoismus zu überwinden und über die Grenzen unseres Altruismus hinauszugelangen.

In der skizzierten Erklärung wird von der Annahme objektiver moralischer Werte Gebrauch gemacht, welche gewissermaßen so zum Sein drängen, dass jede Erkenntnis derselben mit einer entsprechenden Motivationskraft einhergeht. Diese im folgenden als Objektivismus bezeichnete Annahme hat heute kaum noch Anhänger (zur Kritik an ihr siehe etwa Mackie 1977, Chapter 1).

2. Die antiobjektivistisch-bonistische Erklärung emphatisch-moralischen Handelns

Lehnt man derartige objektive Werte ab, so muss man eine alternative Erklärung für die Motivation zu emphatisch-moralischem Handeln anbieten. Hierfür kann man sich des Begriffs des Ideals, ein guter Mensch zu sein, bedienen und zwar in der folgenden Weise: Um ein im umfassenden Sinn gutes Leben zu führen — dies ein Ziel, nach dem wir alle von Natur aus streben —, genügt es nicht, wenn unsere elementaren natürlichen Bedürfnisse und Triebe (einschließlich der erwähnten egoistischen und altruistischen Motive) befriedigt werden. Erforderlich ist darüber hinaus, dass wir unser eigenes Leben als sinnvoll empfinden, und hierfür müssen wir uns geeignete Lebensziele wählen und zu erreichen suchen. Ein solches sinnverleihendes Lebensziel kann nun in dem Ideal, ein guter Mensch zu sein, liegen. Menschen, die sich dieses Ideal freiwillig zu eigen machen, beziehen hieraus die Motivation zu jenem den Rahmen egoistischer und altruistischer Bedürfnisse sprengenden moralischen Handelns. Nicht Vernunftfeindsicht in moralische Wahrheiten motiviert sie, sondern die selbstgewählte Bindung an das

Ideal, ein guter Mensch zu sein. — Die damit skizzierte Position bezeichne ich als antiobjektivistischen Bonismus (als eine beispielhafte Vertreterin sei Wolf 1984 genannt, welche an die angelsächsische Diskussion anknüpft; siehe Kapitel VII).

Um genaueres darüber herauszufinden, wie das fragliche Ideal zu interpretieren ist und welche Leistungskraft es infolgedessen beanspruchen kann, betrachten wir es zunächst im Kontext derjenigen beiden Theorien, die sozusagen als konstruktives Pendant zu jener Verwerfung objektiver Werte auftreten: des Nonkognitivismus und des Naturalismus.

3. Nonkognitivistischer und naturalistischer Bonismus

Gibt es keine objektiven Werte, so spricht einiges dafür, Werturteile nonkognitivistisch (etwa wie folgt) aufzufassen: Statt axiologische Tatsachen zu beschreiben, drücken Werturteile Einstellungen aus; mit der Äußerung "Die Handlung H ist gut" bringt der Äußernde eine positive, motivierende Kraft bereits einschließende, nicht-kognitive Haltung gegenüber H zum Ausdruck, eine positive Haltung, die von der *Meinung*, H sei gut, klar unterschieden werden muss. — Ein gewichtiger Vorteil des skizzierten Nonkognitivismus besteht darin, dass er unserer Intuition Rechnung zu tragen vermag, wonach ungeheuchelte Akzeptanz eines moralischen Urteils eine gewisse Motivation zu der entsprechenden Handlung bereits einschließt.

Unter einem guten Menschen wird man in jedem Fall einen Menschen verstehen, der dazu disponiert ist, Gutes zu tun, und der infolgedessen in der Regel auch viele gute/gebote Handlungen vollzieht. Konzentrieren wir uns nur auf den letztgenannten Aspekt, so lautet die nonkognitivistische Deutung von "ein guter Mensch sein wollen": ein Mensch sein wollen, der diejenigen Handlungen ausführt, zu denen er bereits eine positive, motivierende Einstellung hat. Wer sich also das Ideal wählt, ein guter Mensch zu sein, der bekräftigt und verstärkt damit lediglich seine Tendenz, diejenigen Handlungsweisen auszuführen, deren Ausführung er ohnehin (arationalerweise) zuneigt.

Festzuhalten ist: Nicht, weil die fraglichen Handlungsweisen gut wären bzw. man der Überzeugung wäre, dass sie gut sind, will man sie nach nonkognitivistischer Deutung ausführen — wenn man das Ideal hat, ein guter Mensch zu sein —, sondern weil man ihnen zuneigt. Um alle kognitivistischen und wertobjektivistischen Fehldeutungen fernzuhalten, mag es vielleicht hilfreich sein, sich die Wahl des Ideals, ein guter Mensch zu sein, etwa so zu denken: Eine Person beschäftigt sich mit dem Leben Gandhis, ist davon fasziniert und gewinnt den Eindruck, dass dies auch für sie eine Möglichkeit wäre, ihrem Leben einen Sinn zu verleihen und so über die bloße Befriedigung gewöhnlicher Bedürfnisse hinauszukommen. Der Beschluss, ein guter Mensch zu sein, nähme hier schlicht die Form des Beschlusses an, zu leben wie Gandhi; und der Gedanke,

dass Gandhis Handlungen *gute* Handlungen sind, hätte in keiner Weise in die Beschlussfassung hineingespielt.

Obwohl der (kognitivistische) Naturalismus unter ganz anderen Vorzeichen steht als der Nonkognitivismus, nimmt sich die motivationale Erklärung emphatisch-moralischen Handelns ähnlich aus. Moralische Urteile der Art "Die Handlung H ist gut" werden als wahrheitsfähig gedeutet, doch drücken sie nur aus, dass H eine bestimmte natürliche Eigenschaft E zukommt, z.B. die Eigenschaft, dem Wohl der Mitmenschen zu dienen. Die Einsicht, dass H E besitzt, vermag nun ebensowenig zu motivieren wie jede andere Einsicht in irgendwelche natürlichen Sachlagen. Um Motivation zu moralischem Handeln erklären zu können, bedarf es daher der Entstehung des arationalen Wunsches, Handlungen mit der Eigenschaft E auszuführen. Entwickelt jemand, beispielsweise aufgrund einer Faszination durch die Lebensführung Gandhis, das Lebensziel, ein Mensch zu werden, der sehr oft Handlungen mit der Eigenschaft E ausführt, so hat er damit nach naturalistischer Auffassung nichts anderes getan, als sich das Ideal zu wählen, ein guter Mensch zu sein. — Auch hier wieder ist, um den Naturalismus nicht wertobjektivistisch zu verfälschen, der Gedanke tunlichst fernzuhalten, bei der Entstehung des Wunsches, möglichst oft Handlungen mit E auszuführen, spiele der Gedanke eine Rolle, dass solchen Handlungen außer E auch noch eine weitere Eigenschaft zukomme, nämlich die Eigenschaft, gut zu sein.

Emphatisch-moralische Handlungen entstehen somit sowohl nach nonkognitivistischer als auch nach naturalistischer Auffassung nicht aus Vernunftfeinsicht, sondern aus einer in sich motivierenden bzw. wunschartigen positiven affektiven Einstellung zu bestimmten Handlungsweisen; wobei sich der Unterschied zwischen beiden Erklärungen der Handlungsmotivation darauf reduziert, dass im naturalistischen Ansatz zusätzlich eine *natürliche* Eigenschaft zur Identifikation der Klasse von Handlungen namhaft gemacht wird, zu denen solche Motivation besteht.

Nun kann der in Anspruch genommene Motivationsmechanismus freilich ebenso gut zu einem höchst unmoralischen wie zu einem moralischen Leben führen. Denn auch von dem Leben eines erbarmungslosen Tyrannen kann eine Faszination ausgehen, die zum Nacheifern anregt. Daher spricht manches für den Verdacht, dass die skizzierten motivationalen Erklärungen moralischen Handelns weniger Anhänger fänden, wenn sich die Interpreten stets gegenwärtig hielten, dass diese Erklärungen kein motivationales Plus zugunsten moralischer gegenüber unmoralischer Lebensführung hergeben, sondern beide Fälle gleichermaßen abdecken. Doch soll dieser Punkt hier nicht weiter verfolgt werden, da der Anspruch der vorgelegten Theorien ja nur der ist, zu erklären, wie es zu emphatisch-moralischem Handeln kommen *kann*. (Niemand behauptet ja, dass solches Handeln die Regel ist oder dass es auch nur häufiger vorkomme als unmoralisches.)

4. Die Leistungsfähigkeit des antiobjektivistischen Bonismus

Wenden wir uns nun der Frage der Leistungsfähigkeit der skizzierten nonkognitivistischen und naturalistischen Erklärungen des Zustandekommens moralischen Handelns zu. Es scheint mir unbestreitbar, dass Menschen sich mitunter derartige Ideale und Lebensziele wählen und dass hiervon eine Kraft ausgeht, die egoistische Motive wirksam zurückdrängt und altruistische ausbaut.

Daher sind Vertreter des vorgestellten Modells folgendem, oben bereits erwähntem Hauptargument ihrer Gegenspieler (welche glauben emphatisch-moralisches Handeln nur unter Rekurs auf weitere, mit Moralerkenntnis verbundene Motivationsquellen erklären zu können) durchaus nicht schutzlos ausgeliefert: Moral verlangt uns mitunter Handlungen ab, die zu wollen das uns zuteil gewordene Maß an Menschenliebe bei weitem übersteigen würde, da sie sehr hohe Opfer fordern und starke egoistische Triebfedern derartigen Opfern entgegenstehen, Handlungen also, die wir eigentlich gar nicht wollen können, ja, die zu wollen als Zeichen einer pathologischen Entwicklung interpretiert werden muss. Da Menschen nicht anders können, als ihrem stärksten Motiv zu folgen, hätte Moral in solchen Fällen keinerlei Aussicht auf Befolgung. Tatsächlich werden solche emphatisch-moralischen Handlungen aber doch gelegentlich realisiert. Dies kann man nur durch die Annahme erklären, dass moralische Einsicht entweder selbst ein gehöriges Maß an Motivation liefert (dies die rationalistische These) oder indirekt eine weitere Motivationsquelle ins Spiel bringt, wie z.B. die durch interne Sanktionsmechanismen bedingte Angst vor der Selbstabwertung, die im Falle eines Handelns gegen die eigene moralische Einsicht erfolgen würde (dies die sanktionistische These).

Unter Rekurs auf das Ideal, ein guter Mensch zu sein, läßt sich das vorgestellte Argument zurückweisen: Ein Leben zu führen, das man selbst als sinnvoll empfindet, dies kann die höchsten Opfer rechtfertigen. Wer daher das thematische Ideal besitzt, der vermag dadurch sehr wohl auch die stärksten egoistischen Motive zu überwinden, ohne dass man deswegen sagen könnte, es liege ein pathologischer Fall vor. Denn ein sinnvolles Leben zu führen, dies gehört zu den natürlichen Bedürfnissen eines jeden Menschen, und daher läßt sich der Preis, den jemand für die Befriedigung dieses Bedürfnisses zahlen kann, ohne irrational oder krank zu sein, nicht objektiv festlegen und gegen seine sonstigen Motive verrechnen. Wo daher freiwillig gesetzte Ideale verfolgt werden, bedarf es zur Erklärung emphatisch-moralischen Handelns jener rationalistischen oder sanktionistischen Motivationsquellen nicht.

Indem er emphatisch-moralisches Handeln aus dem Haben des Ideals, ein guter Mensch zu sein, erklärt, erweist sich der Bonismus somit als ideale motivationstheoretische Ergänzung von Nonkognitivismus und Naturalismus. Als nicht hinreichend könnte sich diese Erklärung freilich dann erweisen, wenn der Objektivismus im Recht wäre.

5. Die objektivistisch-bonistische Erklärung emphatisch-moralischen Handelns

Die nicht zu heilende Schwäche des antiobjektivistischen Bonismus, welche mit der nicht zu heilenden Schwäche des Antiobjektivismus — nonkognitivistischer wie naturalistischer Prägung — zusammenfällt, zeigt sich, wenn wir noch einmal zurückblicken auf jenes schon angeklungene Charakteristikum der Position, wonach sie keinen *moralischen* Unterschied festzustellen und auszudrücken erlaubt zwischen einem Menschen, der wie Gandhi sein möchte, und einem, der wie Hitler sein möchte. Da nähere Begründungen den Rahmen des vorliegenden, auf motivationstheoretische Fragen konzentrierten Beitrags sprengen würden, hier nur die aus besagtem Charakteristikum abzuleitende These: Konsequenz durchgeföhrt müssten sowohl Nonkognitivismus als auch Naturalismus auf Aussagen der Art verzichten, das Ideal, wie Gandhi zu sein, sei moralisch besser als das Ideal, wie

Hitler zu sein. Ein solcher Verzicht wäre indes grob kontraintuitiv. Gerade diejenigen, die auf den motivationalen Bonismus setzen, werden der Jugend die rechten, des Nachahmens werten Vorbilder geben, ihr positive, motivierende Erfahrungen mit den richtigen Idealen verschaffen wollen, usw. Moralisch wertvolle von moralisch verwerflichen Handlungen/Idealen zu unterscheiden, dies setzt jedoch als theoretischen Unterbau einen nicht-naturalistischen Kognitivismus voraus.

Wer aufgrund derartiger Überlegungen beschließt, den Ausdruck "gut" in dem Begriff des Ideals, ein guter Mensch zu sein, denn doch objektivistisch zu deuten und damit sowohl dem Nonkognitivismus als auch dem Naturalismus den Rücken zu kehren, der könnte nun den Bonismus entsprechend reformulieren und emphatisch-moralisches Handeln weiterhin daraus zu erklären, dass Menschen sich freiwillig als Ideal gewählt haben, ein guter Mensch zu sein (nunmehr im objektivistischen Sinn von "gut") und charakteristischerweise Handlungen auszuführen, die gut (gleichfalls im objektivistischen Sinn) sind.

Vertreter einer solchen objektivistischen Bonismus könnten offenbar noch immer beanspruchen, zur Erklärung moralischen Handelns nicht auf die problematische rationalistische Annahme einer Motivation aus bloßer Vernunft Einsicht angewiesen zu sein. (Auf besagte Annahme wird im folgenden nicht mehr weiter eingegangen, da auch ich die Einschätzung teile, dass Vernunft Einsicht keine Motive aus dem Boden zu stampfen vermag.) Und sie könnten allem Anschein nach darüber hinaus auch beanspruchen, auf die metaphysisch kränkende Annahme verzichten zu können, manche Fälle moralischen Handelns seien nur durch Sanktionsmechanismen zu erklären und daher als Fälle heteronomen Handelns einzustufen.

6. Der versteckte Sanktionismus des objektivistischen Bonismus

Prüfen wir daher nunmehr, ob Menschen sich tatsächlich freiwillig und ohne Einfluß von Sanktionsmechanismen das Ideal wählen können, im Sinne einer kognitivistischen und nicht-naturalistischen Deutung von "gut" *ein guter Mensch zu sein*. Möglich wäre eine solche freiwillige Entscheidung nur dann, wenn man ebenso gut wählen könnte, kein guter Mensch zu sein. Doch ist es Menschen tatsächlich psychisch möglich, sich dafür zu entscheiden, ein Mensch zu sein, der objektiv weniger wertvoll ist als andere? Eine solche Entscheidung bewusst zu treffen, dies hieße, sehenden Auges das eigene Selbstwertgefühl herabzusetzen; und dies dürfte (außer in pathologischen Fällen) eine psychische Unmöglichkeit darstellen. Es hat also den Anschein, als *müsse* man ein guter Mensch sein wollen — und zwar, um sich vor der Sanktion der Selbstabwertung zu schützen. Erkennt man nur Entscheidungen als autonom an, die ohne Sanktionsmechanismen zustandekommen, so wäre die Wahl jenes Ideals kaum als autonom zu bezeichnen.

Dem vorgetragenen Bedenken ließe sich jedoch entgegenhalten, die als psychische Unmöglichkeit hingestellte Entscheidung laufe ja lediglich auf die Entscheidung hinaus, ein Mensch zu sein, der häufiger Handlungen ausführt, die objektiv moralisch nicht gut sind; und angesichts des lockenden Gewinns an Befriedigung egoistischer Bedürfnisse sei eine solche Entscheidung durchaus denkbar.

Nehmen wir also an, es gehe bei der Entscheidung für oder gegen das thematische Ideal nur um die Entscheidung dafür oder dagegen ein Mensch zu

sein, der größtenteils gute (gebotene) oder größtenteils nicht gute Handlungen ausführt, und der moralische Wert der Handlung schlage nicht auf den des Handelnden durch. Und wenden wir uns nun mit dieser Voraussetzung erneut den eigentlich brisanten Fällen moralischer Forderungen zu, in denen gefordert wird zu tun, was den übrigen Motiven entgegensteht.

Das thematische Ideal zu wählen, d.h. den Wunsch auszubilden, ein guter Mensch zu sein, dies liefe dann im Kern darauf hinaus, Handlungen ausführen zu wollen, die ausführen zu wollen ohne ihre moralische Gebotenheit — aufgrund mangelnder Motive — unmöglich wäre. Gemäß den vom Bonismus geteilten Voraussetzungen, dass bloße Vernunft Einsicht in die Gebotenheit einer Handlung nicht zu motivieren vermag und dass Handlungswünsche stets auf arationale Motive zurückgehen, ist die Ausbildung eines solchen Wunsches als ein Ding der Unmöglichkeit zu betrachten. Kommt es dennoch zu einem solchen Wunsch — und hierfür sprechen die Phänomene —, dann kann dies nun nur noch durch die Annahme erklärt werden, dass die Einsicht in die moralische Gebotenheit zwar nicht selbst motiviert, aber zusätzliche Motive mobilisiert: die verinnerlichten Sanktionsmechanismen — dies mein Vorschlag.

Die Diskussion des objektivistischen Bonismus hat damit für beide seiner möglichen Lesarten ergeben, dass emphatisch-moralisches Handeln ohne Rückgriff auf Sanktionsmechanismen nicht erklärbar ist, da auch die bonistischen Theorien nicht ohne Sanktionsmechanismen auskommen. Die motivationale Erklärung moralischen Handelns aus der Wahl des Ideals, ein guter Mensch zu sein, erweist sich damit als bloßer Umweg.

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How Anti-Introspectionist is Theory Theory?

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Introspection is often seen as criterion to distinguish between theory theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST). Many empirical arguments against ST rely upon the thesis that ST is introspectionist and that it presupposes the Cartesian dictum that the mind is transparent to itself. According to Perner 1999 the capacity to introspect is so important for ST that it can be seen as *the* criterion that distinguishes ST from TT: "These two positions and their sub-varieties differ as to whether they presuppose or explain the ability to introspect. Theory theory is extremely anti-introspectionist. Traditional simulation is based on the ability to introspect one's own mental states." (Perner 1999)

The introspectionism-thesis and the transparency-of-the-mind-thesis together form the basis for different *experimenta crucis* in which the following empirical hypothesis is deduced from ST: If ST is right the child would first develop the capacity to understand its own mental states and only later develop the capacity to understand (or to successfully ascribe) other person's mental states. (Gopnik & Astington 1988, Gopnik & Wellman 1995) The fact that both capacities emerge at the same time is taken as a refutation of ST and a confirmation of TT. (Perner 1999, Gordon 1995)

The thesis that introspectionism is a criterion for the distinction between ST and TT has been criticized by some adherents of ST – like R. M. Gordon. Gordon maintains that introspection is not a prerequisite for simulation. For Gordon, introspection always presupposes a theory because in order to introspectively identify a mental state one has to know the type of this state; the knowledge of the type of a mental state is something that presupposes a theoretical framework of mental concepts. According to Gordon, simulation is not based upon theoretical knowledge about one's own or other people's mental states, or knowledge about the correlations of certain mental states to other mental states, or certain kinds of behavior. Simulation does not require introspection, it demands an "ascent routine" of identifying mental states and using them for simulation. (Gordon 1995b) Gordon denies the thesis that ST is introspectionist. But it remains undisputed that TT is extremely anti-introspectionist. In my paper I would like to question this anti-introspectionist view of TT. Is there any reason for a theory theorist to be anti-introspectionist? If there is, is it a good reason?

I think the only reason for a theory theorist to be anti-introspectionist is the special character of TT itself. Folk psychology (FP) is defined in TT as "a conceptual framework ... used by ordinary people to understand, explain and predict their own and other people's behavior and mental states." (Eckardt 1994, 300) In TT FP is seen as an explanatory system that can be compared with other theoretical systems (e.g. of natural science).

There is, however, a difficulty with FP when it is compared with other theories: A folk-psychological explanation can be compared with a scientific one only if there is empirical evidence for testing the different explanatory hypotheses. A law-like generalization or hypothesis can only be tested if it is possible to verify the presence of all relevant *antecedentia* which together form the *explanans*. The intersubjective access to all (relevant

explanantia of a theoretical hypothesis is a necessary condition for the objective valuation of its explanatory power. (Stegmüller 1969, 86ff.) But the intersubjective access to the antecedent conditions of folk-psychological explanations would be impossible if some of them could be verified only in an act of introspection.

Introspection cannot be accepted as a precondition for a successful mental explanation if FP is basically seen as a theoretical hypothesis for the explanation of human behavior. As a theory it has to be independent of the psychological characteristics of its users, which are available only in an act of introspection. This independence is what A. Goldman calls the attributor-neutral heuristics of FP in TT. (Goldman 2000) Therefore, the reason for the anti-introspectionism of theory theorists is their belief that FP is essentially a theory and as such independent from the properties of the person who is applying the theory. If folk-psychological explanations would presuppose the ability to introspect one's own mental states it would lose its theoretical, intersubjective status.

Is this belief justified? Do folk psychological explanations necessarily lose their attributor-neutrality when they presuppose the ability to introspect one's own mental states? Must everybody who emphasizes the role of introspection in folk psychological explanations share the Cartesian dictum of the transparency of the mind?

As a counterexample I would like to mention Eliminative Materialism (EM) for the following reasons: a) Eliminative materialists are theory theorists. TT is a necessary condition for a successful elimination of FP: Only if FP is basically an explanatory theory, it can be compared with other theories with regard to its explanatory power. The superiority of the explanations of, for example, neuroscience over folk-psychological explanations could then be proved on the basis of the empirical success of neuroscience.

b) Eliminative Materialists do not believe at all in the transparency of the mind. In EM introspection is seen as a totally inadequate instrument to gain knowledge about internal cognitive processes.

c) Eliminative Materialists even argue explicitly for the attributor-neutrality of FP:

Knowledge of other minds thus has no essential dependence on knowledge of one's own mind. Applying the principles of our folk psychology to our behavior, a Martian could justly ascribe to us the familiar run of mental states, even though his own psychology were very different from ours. He would not, therefore, be "generalizing from his own case." (Churchland 1990, 208)

An analysis of Churchland's statement makes clear that attributor-neutrality does not imply a non-introspective attitude toward FP. Churchland's Martian acquires a new access to his internal states with the principles of FP. Together with FP he acquires a "special habit of conceptual response to ... [his] internal states", called introspection. This habit of conceptual response "is always contingent on (the integrity of) the acquired

conceptual framework (theory) in which the response is framed." (Churchland 1990, 208)

According to this position every perception basically depends on the respective underlying theoretical framework. This position can be called "theory-holism" because it does not distinguish sharply between the theoretical and the empirical domain. In the view of theory-holism sentences like, "there is a subject who is aware of certain mental states", "my mental states cannot be observed from outside" etc., are expressions of implicit assumptions of an underlying folk-psychological framework. These implicit assumptions can be compared with the paradigmatic principles of scientific theories and do not only determine the modes of reasoning but also the modes of perception.

One consequence of the influence of the implicitly given theoretical assumptions in folk psychology, according to this position, is the special theoretical character of the perceived evidence: The tacit theory of folk psychology divides perception in two different types - outer perception and inner perception. Awareness or consciousness of one's own inner mental states is only possible within the theoretical framework of folk psychology. According to this theory-holistic position the antecedent conditions of many folk-psychological hypotheses are given primarily through this special sort of theory-laden perception called "introspection". "Insofar as introspective judgments are just a species of observation judgment then, there is no problem at all about the theoretical nature of the concepts they characteristically involve." (Churchland 1979, 96) This form of perception presupposes that certain objects (the mental ones) are internal and other objects (the physical ones) are external. It would seem clear that the impression of a "privileged access" to these inner mental objects can arise only in this theoretical context. Because of the intrinsic connection between introspection and the tacit theoretical assumptions of folk psychology, instead of a gradual correction of introspection-based knowledge, the entire folk-psychological theoretical system is supposed to be eliminated together with its theory-laden introspective evidence. Within the framework of eliminative materialism the introspected mental states are shown to be theoretically dependent on folk-psychological assumptions, and if we change the underlying folk-psychological framework (in favor of a more sophisticated neurophysiological one, for example) the inner states that we perceive will be different (perhaps there are no more 'inner' states in the former sense).

"If our conceptual framework for P-states is an empirical theory, then it is possible, at the limit, that said theory be wholly false, that there are no such things as P-states, that *all* of our introspective judgments have been systematically false by reason of presupposing a false background theory." (Churchland 1979, 96)

It is clear that the radical position of EM regarding the future of FP is very problematic. In this paper I do not want to comment or criticize Churchland's belief in the elimination of FP through neuroscience. What is important for our question "how introspectionist is TT?", are the following points: In EM we have a conception of TT that presupposes the ability to introspect one's own mental states for folk psychological explanations. But the introspectionism which EM presupposes for FP is neither connected with a transparency-of-the-mind-thesis, nor does it imply attributor-dependent heuristics. Anybody – including Martians – who adopts the conceptual system of FP and uses it for the explanation of cognitive processes

and human behavior will have an introspective access to its mental states.

This (introspectionist) conception of TT could help to interpret the empirical findings of Gopnik & Astington 1988 and Gopnik & Wellman 1995 in a more moderate – that means less anti-introspectionist – way: From the fact that children develop the capacity to understand (or successfully ascribe) other person's mental states together with the capacity to understand their own mental states it need not be concluded that folk psychology does not rely upon the ability to introspect one's own mental states. It could also be interpreted in the following way: Both capacities emerge at the same time because children together with the folk psychological theory also acquire a new access to their own mental states – they learn to introspect. In introspection they obtain an access to some antecedent conditions of folk psychological explanations that they would not have without introspection. Thus, the folk psychological explanations children perform after acquiring this new conceptual framework essentially presuppose the ability to introspect one's own mental states.

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Has Nelkin Discovered Anything about Consciousness?

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The most important fact about persons is that they are conscious, but contemporary philosophers, who ignore Wittgenstein's work in this area, present incredibly distorted views of consciousness. The central principle of Wittgenstein's later philosophy is that meaning is use. The word "consciousness", like "awareness", is used ordinarily more-or-less synonymously with "experiencing" and with "knowing", but in a much narrower range of situations (e.g. when someone is coming out of a faint). "Consciousness" does not denote anything ontologically real; instead, it has uses. Philosophers extend the sense of the word to include all experience or our entire mental life. Even then, there is no mystery about consciousness. There are neural preconditions for consciousness, but these are to be investigated by the scientist, not the philosopher. It is absurd to identify consciousness with the neural preconditions; the concept is not used like that. When one sees a flower, one can be said in the extended philosophical sense of conscious, to be conscious of it. But while one can be conscious of a flower, there is no such thing as being conscious of the seeing, in the sense of experiencing the seeing. If one tries to be conscious of *seeing* the flower, one does not find anything while the attention one gives to the flower diminishes markedly. Seeing, like being conscious and being aware and experiencing, is always of something; the word does not denote anything in its own right; it is relational, like "consciousness". Moreover, the flower one sees is the real flower, not a representation of it in the mind. How does one see a *representation in the mind* of a flower? Consciousness can also mean knowing and when one sees a flower, one can be said to know one is seeing it, but here again, the use is relational; one cannot say anything about knowing, about being conscious in this sense, in their own right. Moreover, this use of "know" or "conscious" is innovative; these words are normally used when it makes sense to doubt, to talk of not knowing etc., but here it makes no sense to do this.

It already shows confusion to ask what consciousness is; if one knows how to use the word, there is nothing more to discover. When philosophers try to discover what consciousness is, they get nowhere. As an example, let us take the work of Norton Nelkin (Nelkin 1996).

Nelkin believes that there are three disparate states, each of which he calls consciousness- CS states, or sensation consciousness, C1 states, or proposition-like consciousness and C2 states, or apperceptive consciousness, which is consciousness of some CS or C1 states. Nelkin calls CS and C1 states states of consciousness because one is aware in these states although not apperceptively aware. In CS states, one can feel tingles, experiences colours and hears sounds without knowing that one is doing so. To know that one is feeling tingles, an act of apperceptive consciousness is necessary; one would have to be C2 aware of the CS state; one would have to be aware of the feeling. In C1 states, one can work on a philosophical problem or drive a car safely through traffic obstacles without knowing that one is doing so; for that, there has to be C2 awareness of the C1 states; one has to be aware of the thinking or the driving. Apperceptive consciousness is not necessary for thinking or driving. If we are usually aware of our

experiences, it is because we are usually C2 conscious. To give another example: if a man runs approaches us with a knife, a baby and an adult would experience the same sensation (a CS state) but the adult would also have an experience of meaning; he would see a man approaching with a knife (a C1 state). But to know that he is seeing a man approaching with a knife, a C2 state would be needed.

These extravagant claims about human nature are actually incoherent. There can be no such thing as feeling a tingle and not knowing that one is doing so. In fact, it does not even make sense in such situations to doubt, whereas we use "know" in situations where it makes sense to doubt. "I feel a tingle but I do not know it" does not make sense. If someone is not aware of feeling tingles, we cannot say that he is feeling tingles and similarly for experiencing colours, hearing sounds, seeing a man approaching with a knife and so on. Nelkin separates experiencing colours, for example, from being aware of experiencing colours, and maintains that the first can exist without the second, but there is no second state, only a tautological possibility of talking about being aware of or knowing that one is experiencing colours when one is experiencing colours, and the "being aware" or "knowing" is being used innovatively, because here doubt makes no sense. Apperceptive consciousness is an illusion, born of an idle and innovative tautology. Actually, this is the old view of consciousness as an extra something bestowing luminosity upon mental states. But consciousness is not an extra something; to be conscious of a flower is just to see the flower, with the word being used in special circumstances.

Nelkin tries to support his case with empirical arguments. Regarding CS states, he suggests the following experiment. If one concentrates on the soles of one's feet, one experiences certain phenomena. When one shifts one's attention to the pit of one's stomach, one experiences certain other phenomena. When one returns one's attention to the soles of one's feet, the original phenomena are once again experienced. This is an instance of one's discovering phenomena that were experienced all along, of one's discovering that the feelings continued, although they were not apperceived. It seems as if one discovered phenomena that were being experienced all along, although they were not apperceived; the phenomena seem to be *still* there. Or if one is asked if one still has a headache, one may move one's head about and seem to discover the feeling there and say that one *still* has it. Or, at a cocktail party, when one does not apperceptively hear anything until a key word or topic of interest occurs, it seems as if one is tapping into a phenomenal flow that was already there. Or one might, when concentrating upon something else, find oneself scratching one's arm. This is surely done to rid oneself of a phenomenal feeling, an itch. Nelkin argues that the feeling of discovery is natural and justified if phenomenal states can exist dissociated from apperception.

Feelings, experiences and phenomena (as Nelkin uses this word) are processes that are manifested to us, or explicit processes. If feelings were there all along, one cannot discover them because one can only discover what one is not aware of, what is not already explicit. If one

discovers that a process existed, then it must have been something that one was not aware of till then, and therefore not a feeling or an experience or a phenomenon. It could be the pressure of the ground on one's feet, the headache, the conversational flow, or the itch. Regarding the headache, although one would say that one still has the headache, one would not say that one felt it all along. One cannot "tap into" the phenomenal flow, although one can tap into a conversational flow to which one was not attending till then. One can only "tap into" what is hidden from oneself, not into what is already manifested to oneself. The itch Nelkin mentions is a very common occurrence but it is a case of the body reacting without one's being conscious of it; again there is no feeling. All these are states that one is not conscious of but could become conscious of if one wanted. Perhaps Nelkin is unconsciously making a linguistic recommendation; he wants to call these unconscious states feelings, experiences and phenomena. Nelkin thinks that future empirical research will decide the issue one way or the other but the demand made upon empirical research would be self-contradictory; how can empirical research prove that what is manifested to oneself is not manifested to oneself? If something is already manifested to oneself, it will always make sense to say that one knows it. Is someone feels a tingle, it will always make sense to say he is aware of it.

Nelkin makes similar claims about C1 states. He thinks, for example, that it is possible to think without being "apperceptively conscious", that is, unconsciously. He gives the example of working on a problem, getting stuck and leaving it for a while, to find a well-formed solution coming to oneself. This suggests that a reasoning process took place without one's knowing it. Another example is that of driving while thinking deeply about a problem. One reaches one's destination safely but is unable to remember the traffic obstacles one must have negotiated successfully. This suggests that one saw them, although one did not know it. But there is no such thing as an argument appearing unsatisfactory to us, rejecting it and putting a better one in its place and not knowing that we are doing so. There is no such as seeing a red traffic light and stopping without knowing that there is a red traffic light and that one is stopping or swerving to avoid a car and not knowing that one is swerving to avoid a car. Since these are explicit processes, it does not make sense to say that one does not know that they are there. The well-formed solution can be explained in terms of the previous grappling with the problem and the inability to remember the traffic obstacles is just an inability to remember.

Nelkin makes use of experiments involving pathological cases (blindsight, commissurotomy cases etc.) to support his suggestion that C1 states can exist without C2 states. He cites, for example, the case of blindsight patients who, when presented with shapes like an X or an O in their blind areas, consistently denied seeing anything. But when asked to guess what the shape of the object is, they nearly always succeeded in guessing correctly. This shows, according to Nelkin, that they were in a C1 state (had an experience of meaning or intentionality, saw objects under an aspect) without being aware (or apperceptively aware, in his phraseology) of it. Since the conception of a C1 state is incoherent, there can be no confirming evidence for it, any more than for a round square. The patients' denials show that there was no experience, and their behaviour that there was experience; there is no such thing as proving that unconscious experience exists. These are cases of reports and behaviour not matching. The patients, who suffered from abnormalities, may have misused language, or the experiments may have lacked proper controls. Nelkin

suggests that although the patients experienced no visual phenomena, a purely physical process, starting at the retina and continuing into the brain, and involving processing there, caused the patients to give the correct answers. This means that the process was unconscious. There was no visual experience, no seeing. And if the patients were caused to give the correct answers, they were not conscious then; they were automata. If they were conscious, they would act for reasons, not mechanically.

The above argument is a part of Nelkin's thoroughgoing physicalist internalism where consciousness is concerned. Take the case of one's seeing the clock on Parliament Tower. Nelkin would say that there is first a sensory "scanning" of the clock. This results in an unaspectualized (i.e. lacking in intentionality or meaning) internal representation, a CS state, a neural pattern, which is further "scanned" and "weighed", resulting in an aspectualized representation, a C1 state, another neural pattern, which we call a perception. By now, there is intentionality or meaning but one does not know it; if asked if one is seeing the clock, one would deny it, like Nelkin's patients. This aspectualized representational state causes an apperceptive representation having the content "I am seeing the clock" to emerge. This information is "broadcast" to other modules, causing the person, for example, to utter an appropriate English sentence. Since Nelkin does not give us the actual mechanisms (e.g. how exactly the apperceptive state is produced) his suggestions are empty. Since he does not say what a disconfirming instance would be, his theory is metaphysical and not scientific. "Scanning", "weighing" and "broadcasting" involve rational processing which is possible, as a matter of grammar, only for conscious creatures (the homuncular fallacy) or, in a different sense of rational processing, for machines designed by conscious creatures. Elsewhere Nelkin uses expressions like "computing data", "inferring", "encoding" and "recoding" in connection with processes in the brain and the same objection holds. Nelkin even maintains that apperception has a language. The inference is unavoidable because there can be no rational processing without language, but again this implies the presence of a language-user. If sections of the brain were capable of rational processing, could act for reasons, could use language, we would have to say that they were conscious creatures or machines designed by conscious creatures. Nelkin thinks that advances in computer technology will help us to understand how parts of the brain could function in this way, but very sophisticated human beings will design those computers. Nature is driven by causes, not reasons; Nelkin has overlooked the Wittgensteinian distinction between the two. Actually, Nelkin's theory implies that persons are *not* conscious, for consciousness in the everyday sense is of external things, not of brain states. Again, if persons are caused to do things by modules, they are automatons, and not conscious. On the other hand, homunculi inside their heads *are* conscious!

Clearly, Nelkin has misunderstood consciousness. Philosophers like Paul Churchland, David Rosenthal and Fred Dretske are equally vulnerable to a critique from a Wittgensteinian perspective when they discuss consciousness, as also Robert M. Gordon, when he takes up the related subject of emotions. Philosophers should return to the principles of Wittgenstein's philosophical psychology.

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Beyond Relativism? Re-engaging Wittgenstein

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1. The Problem

Relativism is the view that there are as many worlds as there are ways of thinking and expressing the worlds that are expressed. That is to say, things are related to the ways in which we express them. Thus philosophers assert that the way we express our thoughts in language even affects the way we perceive the world. Relativism is a reaction against the view that there is one and only one way of describing the world. Therefore, relativists argue that the different conceptual abilities and habits are liable to result in different ways of seeing the world.

Linguistic relativists advocate a theory that culture is closely related to language. Culture varies if language varies. They say that whatever men do may be conceived in their language, so there must be a correlation between their language and their activities. There is a deeper connection between their thought and language. It is true not only with reference to a particular sentence or a particular thought, but also with reference to the whole area of human intellectual activity. According to this view, it is absurd to say that there is only one reality or one world.

Cultural relativists, on the other hand, say that people may live differently according to their own life-styles. There is no one ultimate culture that everybody should follow. There are multiple cultural societies in the history of mankind, and each culture has its own rational law, order, etc.

Ontological relativists believe that reality is related to language. Our concept of the real is parasitic on our language. Different societies and cultures have different assumptions of reality. There is no one reality or one universal form that everybody should share. There are different realities depending upon various cultures, languages, etc.

In this essay, I shall discuss Wittgenstein's arguments against relativism. According to him, relativism cannot be sustained at a transcendental level, for there is commonness among cultures and languages through which communication and interaction is possible. He considers language in the broad sense as embodying universal concepts and rules. In his opinion, language is the only medium through which we can express our thoughts, feelings, etc. His notions of 'language-games' and 'forms of life' imply that, in spite of the apparent diversity, there are universal features of language and forms of life. We have different kinds of language-games, but there is a common structure among them. Language-games belong to a family where there must be some similarity or resemblance among them. Language, in the narrow sense, does not interest Wittgenstein. Therefore there is a universal and absolutist dimension to Wittgenstein's idea of language and forms of life.

2. Logic, Language and Conceptual Scheme

According to Wittgenstein, there is a definite structure underlying the world - the structure of language and the world that is the manifest concern of analytic philosophy. He writes:

Logic pervades the world; the limits of the world are also its limits. So we cannot say in logic 'the world has this in it, and this, but not that'. For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well. We cannot think what we cannot think; so we cannot think what we cannot say either.¹

We grow up with language as we grow up with the ability to walk or run. Language is the only source of our thinking. We can explain, describe or do something only through language. Language and world are intimately related. In *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein established that the "limits of my language means the limits of my world". There is, therefore, a necessary relation between language (picture) and reality so that we can understand the structure of the world through language. Thus, there is a determinate structure of truth and meaning which language embodies. The world has a structure of objects and states of affairs. Logic shows the underlying structure of language and the world.

The metaphysics of *Tractatus* contains the absolutist idea that there is a logical structure of language and reality. All languages must share the same structure, which is the structure of the world as well. Thus logic is the central focus of Wittgenstein's idea of conceptual scheme. His later philosophy, as Bernard Williams² points out, does not disown this idea. The logical structure of language continues to be the focus of our understanding of language-games and forms of life. That is why Wittgenstein does not allow the multiplicity of language-games and forms of life to dissolve the unity of logic. Williams has pointed out that there is a transcendental³ dimension to the Wittgensteinian idea of logic, since logic always determines the limits of language and the world. The conceptual scheme embedded in logic tells us what are the possible language-games and the possible world-structures.

3. Wittgenstein on Relativism

Relativism has been widely accepted by many modern and postmodern philosophers. It has taken different dimensions in the philosophy of science, culture and language. The fact that Wittgenstein has related language to the forms of life of the people in his later philosophy may make him appear as a relativist. Williams

¹ Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 5.61.

² Williams, *Moral Luck*, p.146.

³ Ibid.

rules out relativism in Wittgenstein's philosophy in the following passage:

It seems to me that both the nature of view, and the nature of the later Wittgenstein material, makes it hard to substantiate any unqualified claim of that kind.⁴

Wittgenstein has not propounded relativism at all. We can argue that the truth of a proposition is always relative to some language. But this will be a trivial thesis since truth must belong to some language or other. So, cognitive universalism can be established with regard to truth. The argument that truth is relative to specific culture and language is not a serious one. Such cultural and linguistic relativism makes a very poor understanding of language.⁵

Cultural relativism suggests that both language and knowledge are relative to cultures. It further claims that truth is relative to culture. That is, categories and concepts are not dictated either by nature or by reason, but they result from social negotiation and conventions. Therefore concepts vary from culture to culture. Such conceptual differences are a matter of empirical research.⁶

Cultural relativism has found support in the study of human language. Whorf and his followers have propounded that grammars contain metaphysical theories, predetermining the contents of thought as well as forms of expression. The grammar of different languages leads people to have fundamentally different world-views. In the words of Whorf:

The background linguistic system (in other words, the grammar) of each language is not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas but rather is itself the shaper of ideas.... Formulation of ideas is not an independent process, strictly rational in the old sense, but is part of a particular grammar, and differs, from slightly too greatly, due to different grammars.⁷

The argument arising from conceptual and grammatical differences as outlined by Whorf suggests that the perception of the external world is relative to grammar. It also leads to the conclusion that language determines our experience of the world. From this follows a kind of linguistic relativism, which tells us that as there are many languages, so there are many world-views.

Relativism, however, is not philosophically satisfactory. It is absurd to accept the Whorfian Hypothesis. If relativism is true, there will be no universal truth or universal logic. Relativism makes us accept different worlds, but, in fact, there are no other worlds than the world we know.⁸ We can only imagine different kinds of worlds very different from the one we know. But these would be imaginary worlds, not alternative to the actual world.

The narrow empirical sense of language is always defective. In a philosophical sense we can talk of language as such. It is the latter idea of language that is relevant in this context. That is what is universal from the logical point of view.

The narrow sense of language 'seems' to explain the variations in world-views among the different linguistic groups. In this sense each linguistic group has a form of

life of its own. Thus the difference in world-views can be accounted for in terms of the interests of the linguistic groups.⁹ Wittgenstein writes:

For here life would run on differently.... What interests us would not interest *them*. Here different concepts would no longer be unimaginable. In fact, this is the only way in which *essentially* different concepts are imaginable.¹⁰

4. Commensurability of World-pictures

Wittgenstein, in *On Certainty*, develops the conception of a world-picture¹¹, which is integrated into the concept of language-games and forms of life. Wittgenstein's idea is that a world-picture contains the concepts through which we understand the world. It is a kind of mythology,¹² which contains the basic category of understanding the world. It is a way of seeing the world, i.e., a *weltanschauung*. Wittgenstein says that our language embodies this world-picture uniquely and absolutely. There are no alternatives to it, though other ways of seeing the world are quite imaginable. Wittgenstein encourages such imagination. The different world-pictures are accessible to each other, since they are only extensions of our world-view and are not alternatives in the real sense. The different imaginable world-pictures are commensurable with one another. We can understand them well from within our world-pictures.

Our world-picture is not chosen or constructed by ourselves. It is not based on reasoning. It is something given to us in a fundamental sense. Wittgenstein says:

I do not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.¹³

Our language-games and forms of life are absolutely acquired. As Williams points out, the grammar of our language-games cannot be justified, and that the language-games are not reasonable or unreasonable, but are there like our life.¹⁴ Wittgenstein, therefore, suggests that there is nothing right or wrong about language-games or forms of life. He writes:

Suppose we met people who did not regard that (sc. the propositions of physics) as a telling reason. Now, how do we imagine this? Instead of the physicist, they consult an oracle. (And for that we consider them primitive.) Is it wrong for them to consult an oracle and be guided by it? If we call this 'wrong' aren't we using our language-game as a base from which to *combat* theirs?¹⁵

But from this it does not follow that there are different world-pictures, which are inaccessible to one another. The various linguistic groups exist only in an empirical sense. But logically there is one world-picture and one linguistic community. This entails that the limits of our language determine the limits of our world. Our language is not a group-language, but that of the entire human community. It is not an empirical truth, but grammatical or, as Williams claims, a transcendental truth.¹⁶

⁴ Ibid., p. 153.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Barre, *The Human Animal*, pp. 176-177; Barnes and Bloor, 'Relativism, Rationalism, and the Sociology of Knowledge' in Hollis and Lukes (ed.) *Rationality and Relativism*, pp. 38ff.

⁷ Whorf, *Language Thought and Reality*, (ed.) J. B. Carroll, pp. 221-223.

⁸ Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense, An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, p. 15.

⁹ Williams, *Moral Luck*, pp. 144-163.

¹⁰ Wittgenstein, *Zettel*, (tr.), sect. 388.

¹¹ Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, (tr.), sect. 95.

¹² Ibid., Sect. 195.

¹³ Ibid., Sect. 94.

¹⁴ Williams, 'Wittgenstein and Idealism' in *Moral Luck*.

¹⁵ *On Certainty*, sect. 609.

¹⁶ Williams, 'Wittgenstein and Idealism', pp. 156-157. *On Certainty*, Sect. 609.

There are two senses in which we can talk about language and world-picture, the narrow (empirical) sense and the wider (non-empirical or transcendental) sense. In the narrow sense, we belong to small groups. In a wider perspective, we belong to the larger humanity. It is in the latter sense that we can discuss our language and world. Therefore, whatever appears as other forms of life is really part of our form of life. The other forms of life are understood only within our form of life. Thus there is no other form of life in the absolute sense.¹⁷

The so-called different world-views are the functions of our world-view. Socially it can be called "aggregate solipsism".¹⁸ This overcomes the threat of relativism. The only option left is that we have a unique conceptual scheme. The other schemes are part of this scheme.¹⁹

5. Absolutism

The question arises as to whether we are really thinking at all in terms of actual groups of human beings and their incommensurable forms of life and world-views. The answer is 'no'; we are not concerned so much with the epistemology of different world-views, and still less with the methodology of the social sciences, as with the basic structures thereof.

Imagined world-views are certainly not real. They are the ways the world could be conceived. Alternatives are, therefore, not the sort of empirically actual alternatives. As William says, "the imagined alternatives are not alternatives to us, they are alternatives for us..."²⁰ Our imagination must have a limit, which it cannot transcend. Imagined worlds are really a part of our world.

We all must agree that behind the imagined world-views and forms of life, there are the forms of life given to us. They are absolutely real and true. We need no justifications or explanation for them. They are logically true. However we cannot exclude the possibility of other language-using creatures whose picture of the world might be different from ours. But that does not imply that there are really inaccessible world-views and forms of life other than our own.

If we accept the relativity of language and forms of life, then communication or interaction becomes impossible. If we understand others' activity and communicate with them, then other forms of life surely belong to us. Thus our forms of life are absolutely real, and we have a universal world-view to share with. As Williams says:

Leaving behind the confused and confusing language of relativism, one finds oneself with a *we* which is not one group rather than another in the world at all, but rather the plural descendant of that idealist *I* who also was not one item rather than another in the world.²¹

So again we come back to the *Tractatus* dictum: "The limits of my language mean limits of my world". Here we can easily move from 'my' to 'our', so those limits of our language mean limits of our world. This transcendental idea of the first person plural cannot be ruled out. This 'we' includes all 'we' (groups). Thus absolutism of a sort emerges out of Wittgenstein's conception of language, life and the world.

In this essay, I have pleaded for absolutism from Wittgenstein's points of view. 'Absolutism' is here that I have taken in a very moderate sense. For Wittgenstein, there is a universal conceptual scheme underlying our thought, language and reality.

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¹⁷ cf. *Ibid.*, p. 158.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.158.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

The Gap between 5.641 and 6 Logik und Person bei Wittgenstein

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1. Der Sprung

Tractatus: „5.641 Es gibt also wirklich einen Sinn, in welchem in der Philosophie nichtpsychologisch vom Ich die Rede sein kann.

Das Ich tritt in die Philosophie dadurch ein, dass „die Welt meine Welt ist“.

Das philosophische Ich ist nicht der Mensch, nicht der menschliche Körper, oder die menschliche Seele, von der die Psychologie handelt, sondern das metaphysische Subjekt, die Grenze – nicht ein Teil – der Welt.

6 Die allgemeine Form der Wahrheitsfunktion ist:
[$p, \xi, N(\xi)$].“

Mit einem gewissen Recht kann man, denke ich, behaupten, dass hier ein Sprung, ein abrupter Themenwechsel vorliegt. 5, „Der Satz ist eine Wahrheitsfunktion der Elementarsätze“, ist inhaltlich sehr nahe an 6. Wittgenstein muss von dem 6 so nahen 5 zu dem von 6 so weit entfernten 5.641 auf einem nachvollziehbaren Weg gelangt sein. Ich meine, dass die Frage, was der Logik ihre Gestalt gibt, die Verbindung zwischen 5.641 und 6 herstellt. Dann sollte sich diese Verbindung aber auch in dem Abschnitt zwischen 5 und 5.641 erkennen lassen.

2. Der Weg von 5 nach 5.641

Von einigen Abschweifungen abgesehen bleibt Wittgenstein bis 5.5 beim Thema ‚Wahrheitsfunktion von Sätzen‘.

„5.5 Wir müssen nun die Frage nach allen möglichen Formen der Elementarsätze a priori beantworten. [...]

Die *Anwendung* der Logik entscheidet darüber, welche

Elementarsätze es gibt. [...]

5.6 *Die Grenzen meiner Sprache* bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Welt.“

Das Ich schleicht sich langsam ein. Es gilt, eine Frage a priori zu beantworten (5.5). Die Antwort aber zeigt sich in einer Anwendung (5.557). Anwenden muss *jemand*. Der Jemand ist aber gar kein Jemand („5.631 Das denkende, vorstellende, Subjekt gibt es nicht. [...]“), sondern ich. *Die Welt ist meine Welt* (5.61 bis 5.63).

Das Ich konzipiert durch Anwendung der Logik die Welt, indem es die Elementarsätze festlegt. Es wird zu untersuchen sein, welche Leistung das Ich bei dieser Anwendung erbringt, welche Merkmale dem, was Wittgenstein hier ‚ich‘ nennt, zukommen müssen.

3. Apriori-Rechtfertigungen der Logik

„1.6.15. Das große Problem, um welches sich alles dreht, was ich schreibe, ist: Ist a priori eine Ordnung in der Welt, und wenn ja, worin besteht sie? [...]“

Tagebücher 1914-16

Unter Apriori-Rechtfertigung verstehe ich hier eine Explikation von Möglichkeitsbedingungen, eine Erklärung, dass etwas – in unserem Fall die Logik – so sein muss, damit es überhaupt sein kann. Wittgenstein wirft bekanntermaßen in den Tagebüchern in bezug auf die Elemente der Logik die Frage nach Apriori-Begründungen auf. Im *Tractatus* finden sich dann meist lediglich die fertigen Antworten in sehr komprimierter Form.

In demonstrierte an zwei Beispielen. Das erste Beispiel handelt von der Möglichkeit der Zerlegung in einfache Bestandteile.

„17. 6. 15. [...] *Ist es, A PRIORI, klar, daß wir bei der Zerlegung auf einfache Bestandteile kommen müßten – liegt dies etwa schon im Begriff der Zerlegung –*, oder ist eine Zerlegbarkeit ad infinitum möglich? – Oder am Ende gar ein Drittes? [...]

Ob nicht die Darstellung durch unzerlegbare Namen *nur ein System* ist?

Alles, was ich will, ist ja nur die vollständige Zerlegtheit *meines Sinnes!*!

Mit anderen Worten: Der Satz muß vollkommen artikuliert sein. [...]“

Den Ausführungen in den Tagebüchern allein, würde man nicht deren Niederschlag im *Tractatus* kennen, wäre nur schwer zu entnehmen, ob Wittgenstein meint, zu Lösungen der Probleme gefunden zu haben. In der mit „[...]“ gekennzeichneten, ausgelassenen Passage räsoniert Wittgenstein noch ausführlicher über diese Probleme. Im *Tractatus* dagegen ist alle Fragwürdigkeit vollständig verschwunden. Die Entschlossenheit, mit der Wittgenstein seine Antworten im *Tractatus* präsentiert, kann schon erstaunen:

„3.25 Es gibt eine und nur eine vollständige Analyse des Satzes.

3.251 [...] Der Satz ist artikuliert.“

Das zweite Beispiel handelt von der Notwendigkeit der Verwendung von Namen.

„31.5.15.

Könnte man [...] ohne Namen auskommen?? Doch wohl nicht.

Die Namen sind notwendig zu einer Aussage, daß dieses Ding jene Eigenschaft besitzt usf.

Sie verknüpfen die Satzform mit ganz bestimmten Gegenständen.

Und wenn die allgemeine Weltbeschreibung wie eine Schablone der Welt ist, so nageln sie die Namen so an die Welt, daß sie sich überall mit ihr deckt.“

Die vor diesem Hintergrund wieder verblüffend kurze ‚Antwort‘, der Niederschlag, den diese Stelle im *Tractatus* findet, lautet:

„3.202 Die im Satz angewandten Zeichen heißen Namen.

3.22 Der Name vertritt im Satz den Gegenstand.“

(Siehe auch 3.203, 3.26, 4.0311.)

Ob der *Tractatus* ein Buch der Antworten oder der dogmatischen Würfe ist, werde ich hier nicht diskutieren, jedenfalls stehen erst die späteren Texte Wittgensteins wieder zu den sie erzeugenden Fragen.

Wittgenstein hat sich gefragt, wie und woraus die Welt gebaut sein muss. Ich stelle nun eine dem zweiten Beispiel analoge Frage:

Könnte man ohne den N-Operator auskommen?

4. Der N-Operator und die Logik

Die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Logik und N-Operator kann von zwei Standpunkten aus gestellt werden. Man kann den *Tractatus* lesend sich Wittgensteins Überlegungen entlang hanteln und nach einiger Zeit der Konzentration auf das fixe Gefüge bestehend aus Gegenständen, Sachverhalten, Bildern und Sätzen sehr zielsicher beim N-Operator anlangen. Oder aber man kann Wittgenstein beim Schreiben zusehen und sich fragen, was ihn dazu gezwungen oder bewegt hat, zu schreiben, was er geschrieben hat. Nun geht es mir keineswegs um ein Studium der Psyche Wittgensteins, sondern gerade darum, was *nicht* Spezifikum des Schreibers Wittgenstein ist. Widmet man sich nur jenem Teil des *Tractatus*, der für die Fundierung jeglicher Logik unumgänglich scheint, dann verliert man natürlich große Teile des komplexen Konstruktes, das Wittgenstein errichtet hat, aus den Augen. Einerseits ist ein solches Herangehen also fragwürdig, steht doch zu befürchten, dass das Verbleibende ein sehr nebuloser Rest ist. Andererseits lässt sich dieses Herangehen rechtfertigen, wenn man sich ansieht, woraus Wittgenstein selbst die Gewissheit schöpft, die ihn im *Tractatus* zu so dezidierten Abschlüssen führt. „Alles, was ich will, ist ja nur die vollständige Zerlegtheit *meines Sinnes!*“ (s.o.) Die einzige Form der Gewissheit, die man überhaupt erlangen kann, ist, dass man eben *nicht anders kann*, als genau zu der fraglichen Gewissheit zu gelangen.

Der N-Operator erzeugt die Aussagenlogik¹. Setzt man andererseits voraus, dass man die Aussagenlogik

¹ Die Frage nach der Reichweite des N-Operators im Rahmen der klassischen Logik ist meiner Ansicht nach in Varga von Kibed 1993 zufriedenstellend behandelt. Jedenfalls erzeugt der N-Operator völlig unumstrittenweise die Sätze der Aussagenlogik.

erzeugen will, so kann man den N-Operator wählen, und man hat auch keine essentiell differierenden Alternativen. Warum aber will man gerade die Aussagenlogik erzeugen? Anders: Warum taugt genau die Aussagenlogik zur Festlegung der Welt? Diese Frage lässt sich nicht beantworten, weil sie gewissermaßen das Pferd von hinten aufzäumt.

Will man die Aussagenlogik, so braucht man den N-Operator (oder etwas Verwandtes); will man den N-Operator, so erzeugt der die Aussagenlogik (und Prädikatenlogik erster Stufe). Warum aber will man das eine oder das andere?

Die richtige, i.e. beantwortbare Frage lautet: Warum verfahren wir mit Elementarsätzen so und nicht anders? Was können wir tun, in der logischen Analyse oder Synthese der Welt?

Ich behaupte nun, was der N-Operator tut, ist, was man bei jeglichem logischen Umgang tun muss. An dieser Stelle ist es wichtig daran zu denken, dass der N-Operator eigentlich kein Operator ist, da er den Bereich, auf dem er operiert, wechselt. Er wählt zuerst einen Bereich und ändert dann die Wahrheitswerte auf diesem Bereich. Die Leistung des N-Operators besteht also in folgendem: 1.) zusammenfassen, Einheiten des Mannigfaltigen bilden 2.) ja oder nein sagen, Wahrheit zuschreiben. Das aber ist die Grundstruktur *jeglichen* formalen Umgangs mit der Welt. Wir müssen gewisse Ausschnitte der Welt wählen und über diese Aussagen machen. Einfache Zusammenfassungen bilden, Gesamtheiten ohne weitere Struktur zu schaffen, und eine 2-wertige Bewertungsfunktion ist die simpelste Form, die sich denken lässt.

Findet sich diese Antwort bei Wittgenstein?

„1.2 Die Welt zerfällt in Tatsachen.

4.23 Die Wirklichkeit muß durch den Satz auf ja oder nein fixiert sein.

Dazu muß sie durch ihn vollständig beschrieben werden.[...]“

Bedenkt man, dass die Welt *meine* Welt ist, dann sieht man, dass Wittgenstein genau die obige Antwort also tatsächlich selbst gibt. (In 6.111 stellt er „wahr“ und „falsch“ außerhalb des Bereichs ‚Eigenschaften‘, außerhalb des Bereichs des Willkürlichen.)

Ich meine nicht, dass das Anwenden des N-Operators eine protologische Operation ist (Mayer 1990), sondern dass es eine protologische Deutung zulässt. ‚Proto‘ und ‚Deutung‘ scheinen zwei unterschiedliche ‚Zeitpunkte der Betrachtung zu markieren, aber jede Reflexion auf Vorbedingungen zeigt diese Dualität. Der N-Operator ist ein Objekt der Logik, aber die Bedeutung seiner Anwendung zeigt sich; er ist ein wohlbestimmtes Objekt in einem speziellen logischen Gefüge, aber in seiner Ursprünglichkeit kann er auch auf das Grundmuster jeglichen formalen Umgangs mit der Welt hindeuten.

Angesichts der Entwicklungen der modernen Logik liegt es nahe zu konstatieren, Wittgenstein wäre in den Kinderschuhen steckengeblieben, aber eine solche Auffassung verkennt meines Erachtens, dass eine Fundierung einer Theorie immer nur die strukturelle Kindheit der Theorie betrifft. Natürlich ist die Beschränkung auf die anwendungsfunktionalen Aspekte des N-Operators ein sehr grober Raster, durch den Feststellungen betreffend Bildtheorie, Definitionsbereich des N-Operators (Satzvariablen als (welche Art von) Satzlisten?) oder Erzeugbarkeit der Prädikatenlogik völlig ungeachtet ihrer Richtigkeit oder Falschheit einfach durchfallen, aber dafür

bilden diese Aspekte einen Anknüpfungspunkt an die Gemachtheit von Logik.

5. Der N-Operator und das Sprachspiel

Aus der Sicht des post-tractatischen Wittgenstein ist der N-Operator definierender Bestandteil des Sprachspiels, das wir spielen, wenn wir formale Logik betreiben. Ist damit ein Apriori-Begründungsanspruch obsolet, da es nur noch Ansprüche relativ zu Sprachspielen gibt?

Tatsächlich spielen wir die Sprachspiele, die wir spielen *wollen*, und es gibt keine Gründe, die uns dazu zwingen. Aber wenn wir ein Sprachspiel mit diesen und jenen Voraussetzungen zu spielen erst einmal beschlossen haben, dann können wir diese und jene anderen Voraussetzungen nicht auch noch zusätzlich machen, das Sprachspiel nicht beliebig spielen. Und eine Aussage, die eine solche Unverträglichkeit oder Unmöglichkeit beschreibt, ist eine Apriori-Aussage.

Setzt man voraus, dass man ein Sprachspiel ‚formale Logik‘ spielen will, dann muss man mindestens formal-logische Einheiten und Bewertungen festlegen, das heißt, man hantiert (zumindest implizit) mit dem N-Operator.

Lenkt man seine Aufmerksamkeit in diesem Zusammenhang auf das Sprachspiel, so lässt sich ein erstes Mal erahnen, wie die ‚Person‘ ins Spiel kommt: Sie *will* ein bestimmtes Sprachspiel spielen.

Sätze bedeuten *a priori* nichts. Folgt man den Verästelungen der Wittgensteinschen Logik zu ihren Anfängen, so findet man dort die Schnittstellen zwischen Apriori-Gültigkeiten und ‚Empirie‘: die Namen und die Elementarsätze. Am anderen Ende der Verästelungen dagegen findet man den N-Operator, der angewendet werden muss, und somit als reines Apriori-Ding dennoch auf die Anwenderin verweist.

6. Der N-Operator und das Ich

„[...] wie kann ich Logiker sein, wenn ich noch nicht Mensch bin! *Vor allem* muß ich mit mir selbst in's Reine kommen!“

Brief an Russell, Weihnachten 1913

Diesen Satz kann man lesen wie ‚Man sollte keine Kathedralen bauen, solange Menschen verhungern‘. Man kann ihn aber auch wörtlicher nehmen, als ihn Wittgenstein vermutlich selbst gemeint hat: Es gibt Charakteristika des Menschen, die eine Logik überhaupt erst möglich machen. Ich werde versuchen, etwas am Menschen auszuweisen, das zur Entwicklung von Logik Grundvoraussetzung ist.

Sehen wir uns dazu zuerst unabhängig von allen bisherigen Überlegungen an, was wir meinen, wenn wir von einer ‚Person‘ sprechen. Eine mögliche Definition lautet: „Eine Person ist ein solches Existierendes, das trotz der Vielheit der Teile eine reale, eigenartige und eigenwertige Einheit bildet und als solche trotz der Vielheit der Teilfunktionen eine einheitliche zielstrebige Selbsttätigkeit vollbringt.“ (W. Stern, *Person und Sache*, I, 1923) Eine Person bezieht sich also auf die Welt, hat und kennt Einheit und Wertung, funktioniert und will.

Nun aber wieder zurück zum N-Operator. In der formalwissenschaftlichen Betrachtungsweise des 20. Jahrhunderts sind die Grundlagen der Wirkungsweise des N-Operators problematisch geworden. Sowohl das Bilden

von Einheiten (das Auswahlaxiom in der Mathematik ist umstritten) als auch der Wahrheitsbegriff (Gödel) verweisen aus dem jeweiligen formalen System hinaus.

Erkenntnis als Erkenntnis gebunden an ein formales System funktioniert nicht. Schon Gödel selbst hatte den naheliegenden Ausweg vor Augen: Die Fähigkeiten des menschlichen Geistes könnten die Fähigkeiten eines nur Mathematik betreibenden Geistes übersteigen (Gödel 1986, III, Manuskriptseite 30). Eine mögliche solche Funktion des menschlichen Geistes könnte das auswählende Einheit-Stiften sein. Das kann er aber, wenn, nur qua Identität, Subjektsein. Eine Einheit muss *meine* Einheit sein, Grenzen sind immer *meine* Grenzen.

Diese Einheit stiftende Instanz ist aber nun nicht nur Subjekt, sondern muss Person sein. Sie muss etwa wollen können. Das ‚philosophische Ich, das die Grenze der Welt ist‘ (5.641) muss Person sein, damit der N-Operator die Grundlage eines Sprachspiels sein kann. Sie muss Konstanz in ihrem Wollen aufweisen, sie muss mit sich identifizierbar bleiben, sie muss ordnend in die Welt eingreifen und urteilen. Damit aber sind die wichtigen Bestandteile dessen erfasst, was wir Person nennen. Ich wiederhole meine obige Beschreibung von ‚Person‘ und ersetze lediglich ‚Person‘ durch ‚Anwenden des N-Operators‘: Beim Anwenden des N-Operators bezieht man sich auf die Welt, hat und kennt Einheit und Wertung, funktioniert und will.

Die Parallelisierung des anwendungsfunktionalen Aspekts des N-Operators mit Eigenschaften des Personenbegriffs mag vielleicht auf den ersten Blick artifiziell erscheinen. Demgegenüber steht aber die aufdringliche Banalität, dass unsere Logik wohl kaum anders kann als unsere Züge zu tragen.

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Wittgenstein on Sameness, Necessity and Privacy*

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The aim of this paper is to examine Wittgenstein's arguments against the meaningfulness of statements which state the possessive privacy of sensations; and to demonstrate their incorrectness.

The English word 'same' is ambiguous and according to that the following proposition is ambiguous too:

(1) *The car of Peter is the same car as the car of Paul.*

The ambiguity of the word 'same' is caused by the fact that the word 'same' can be used in English in two different ways and meanings. Let us therefore distinguish 'same₁' and 'same₂'. What do 'same₁' and 'same₂' mean? To make the differences between 'same₁' and 'same₂' precise and obvious we can give the following definitions of 'φ is the same₁ F as α' and 'φ is the same₂ F as α':

[S1] *For all objects x and y: x is the same₁ F as y ↔ x ∈ {F} and y ∈ {F} and x = y.*

[S2] *For all objects x and y: x is the same₂ F as y ↔ x ∈ {G} and y ∈ {G} and {G} ⊂ {F}.*

Commonly the sameness of kind [S1] is called *token-identity* or *numerical identity* and the sameness of kind [S2] is called *type-identity* or *qualitative identity*.

In the paragraphs PU §244 – 254 of the *Philosophical Investigations*^[1] Ludwig Wittgenstein focuses - in connection with the discussion of privacy (of a language and the consciousness) (PU §243 – 315) - on the following proposition:

(2) *(All) Sensations are (necessarily) private.*

This proposition is in more than two ways ambiguous, because of the ambiguity of the word 'private' (PI §246). Therefore Wittgenstein distinguishes two kinds of privacy: (a) *the epistemic privacy of sensations* and (b) *the possessive privacy of sensations*.

If we interpret 'private' for example in (2) as 'possessively private' then we can again distinguish to kinds of possessive privacy. And these two readings are especially connected with the ambiguity of (1) and 'same'. We can interpret:

(2*) *(All) Sensations are (necessarily) possessively private.*

as (2*.1) *A person x and a person y can't have the same₁ sensations.*

and (2*.2) *A person x and a person y can't have the same₂ sensations.*

It is obvious - as Wittgenstein states in PI §253 - that (2*.2) is a false proposition; but what about (2*.1)? If we interpret the expression 'can' in (2*.1) as *logical necessity* then (2*.1) seems to be a metaphysical truth: the consequence of a certain ontological interpretation of the world, which is normally called *substance-ontology*. We can reformulate (2*.1) as follows to clarify the claim that

the expression 'can' in (2*.1) is understood as logical necessity:

(2*.1.1) *It is necessary that for all x and y: if x ≠ y and x has a sensation and y has a sensation then the sensation of x ≠ the sensation of y.*

According to a specific reading of *substance-ontology* - which is for example supported by Frege² [II] - sensations have the following characteristics:

(O1) *Sensations are owned: they are part of the consciousness of a certain person.*

(O2) *Sensations need a bearer; this bearer (= a mental substance) is a certain person.*

(O3) *Every sensation has one and only one bearer (= a certain person that owns the sensations or is the bearer of them).*

(2*.1.1) can be derived from the axioms (O1) – (O3) of this specific reading of *substance - ontology* as a necessary truth. This fact that (2*.1.1) is a consequence of (O1) – (O3) can easily be shown. A proper formulation of (O3) is:

(3) *It is necessary that for all x and y: x has a sensation iff x has the sensation of x and no y has the sensation of x iff x ≠ y.*

The logical form of (3) is: $\forall x \forall y \Box ((Sx \leftrightarrow (Hxs(x) \wedge \neg Hys(x)) \leftrightarrow \neg(x=y))$

Now we can derive (2*.1.1), which has the logical form ' $\forall x \forall y \Box (\neg(x=y \wedge Sx \wedge Sy) \rightarrow \neg(s(x)=s(y)))$ ', from (3) and the following reformulation of (O1):

(4) *It is necessary that for all x, y, u and v: if x ≠ y and x is a bearer of u and y is a bearer of v then u ≠ v.*

And now if we apply (4) to (3) we get:

(5) *It is necessary that for all x and y: if x has a sensation iff x has the sensation of x and no y that has the sensation of x iff x ≠ y then the sensation of x ≠ the sensation of y.*

The logical form of (5) is ' $\forall x \forall y \Box ((Sx \leftrightarrow (Hxs(x) \wedge \neg Hys(x)) \leftrightarrow \neg(x=y)) \rightarrow \neg(s(x)=s(y)))$ ' and therefore we can derive from (3) and (5) the conclusion (2*.1.1). And that means that (2*.1.1) is a logical consequence of the above-sketched version of *substance-ontology* and therefore a necessary truth.

According to Wittgenstein the view that (2*.1.1) is a metaphysical truth is incorrect. He holds the thesis that

[CW] (2) - interpreted as (2*.1.1) - is nonsensical.

In my opinion Wittgenstein gives in his works two different arguments to justify this claim. I will focus in this paper on the first one of Wittgenstein's arguments to justify [CW]. And it is my aim to show that this argument has two major weaknesses.

In the *Philosophical Remarks*³ [III] and the *Blue Book*⁴ [IV] Wittgenstein puts forward the following

¹ WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*

^{*} I wish to thank Volker Munz for lots of interesting and helpful discussions.

² FREGE, Gottlob. *The Thought*

argument [A1] to justify [CW]: According to Wittgenstein (all) propositions that are necessary truths do not express a metaphysical or ontological necessity: for example that something is true in every possible world. Necessary truths are no metaphysical truths! In Wittgenstein's opinion a necessary truth expresses a convention (of our language) or an (implicit) rule of grammar⁵. Therefore we can define logical necessity according to Wittgenstein as follows:

[LN] 'p' is a necessarily true iff 'p' is or expresses a rule of grammar or a convention of a language⁶ [3]

On this background we can reformulate (2*.1.1) as follows:

(6) 'For all x, y: if $x \neq y$ and x has a sensation and y has a sensation then the sensation of $x \neq$ the sensation of y' is or expresses a rule of grammar.

On the first sight according to this analysis (2*.1.1) seems to be true as (6) is. How can it then be nonsensical? We have to revise our assumptions to understand Wittgenstein's claim. We have to reformulate (2*.1.1) as follows:

(7) For all x, y: if $x \neq y$ and x has a sensation and y has a sensation then the sensation of $x \neq$ the sensation of y.

What are nonsensical proposition according to Wittgenstein? Let us examine three possible answers to this question. We can (A) for example define 'φ is nonsensical' as 'φ is neither true nor false'.

[N1] 'p' is nonsensical iff 'p' is neither true nor false.

According to [LN] and (6) the proposition (7) is a rule of grammar and rules of grammar are neither true nor false. Therefore (7) is in the sense of [N1] nonsensical. The problem with (A) is that we do not use the predicate 'φ is nonsensical' interchangeable with 'φ is neither true nor false' in English and [N1] is not combinable with [LN]: *How can a proposition that is neither true nor false be necessarily true?* A more serious problem of [N1] is that Wittgenstein never explicitly holds [N1].

A further alternative (B) is: We can interpret 'φ is nonsensical' as a predicate of assertions of propositions (statements) and not of propositions itself:

[N2] the assertion of 'p' is nonsensical iff 'p' is a rule of grammar.

And this fact can be justified. Rules of grammar are no empirical proposition, but normative propositions which are in fact neither true nor false. If someone asserts a proposition, he asserts thereby the truth of the proposition. But it is nonsensical or incorrect to assert the truth of proposition that is a rule of grammar and therefore neither true nor false; that means if a proposition is a rule of grammar then the assertion of this proposition is nonsense. The problem with this definition is that it is too narrow, because we also call assertions of some propositions, which aren't rules of grammar, nonsensical or incorrect. And [N2] is as [N1] not compatible with [LN]: *How can a proposition that is neither true nor false be*

necessarily true? Is the assertion of a necessary true proposition nonsensical?

A third and last alternative (C) to justify [CW] is: We follow our intuitions that nonsensical propositions offend against something; for example against rules of syntax, grammar etc. So we define 'φ is nonsensical' as follows:

[N3] 'p' is nonsensical iff 'p' offends against a rule of grammar.

We said that (7) is or expresses a rule of grammar. Wittgenstein calls such propositions *grammatical propositions*. The negation of (7) is:

(8) *There is at least one x and y: ($x \neq y$ and x has a sensation and y has a sensation) and (the sensation of $x =$ the sensation of y).*

And (8) seems to offend against the rule of grammar expressed by (7) as every propositions that can be derived from (8) like:

(9) *a ≠ b and a has sensation and b has sensation and the sensation of a = the sensation of b.*

An ordinary language reading of (9) can be formulated as:

(11*) *A person a (that is different from a person b) has the same₁ sensation as a person b.*

Therefore (8) and (9) / (9*) are nonsensical propositions according to [N3]⁷. And if we combine [N3] with the famous Wittgensteinian principle:

[WP] *If 'p' is nonsensical then the negation of 'p' is nonsensical too,*

then according to [N3] and [WP] (7) is as well as (8) nonsensical.

But we are again confronted with two major problems with our Wittgensteinian analysis on the background of [N3]: *Is it possible to formulate a rule of grammar for a term t or a proposition p just by using t or p and without mentioning t or p?* Propositions like (2) or (7) seem to be propositions about pains and persons and not about language use. They seem to express no rule of grammar. We have already quoted a passage of *the Blue Book* where Wittgenstein says that by means of 'My pain is my pain and his pain is his pain' someone makes a *grammatical statement* about the use of such a phrase as 'the same₁ pain'; we say that we don't wish to apply the phrase, 'he has got my pain' or 'we both have the same pain'. Is this claim of Wittgenstein correct? The following proposition for example expresses a rule of grammar: (10) *It is not correct to apply the relation 'φ is the same₁ F as α' to sensations in English.* In (10) the term 'φ is the same₁ F as α', which should be ruled, is mentioned. A grammatical proposition that expresses a rule of grammar should be about words or propositions, about the possible uses of a specific term or proposition and it is only possible to say something about the use of a specific term or proposition by means of mentioning the term or proposition: The

⁷ comp. with: "If in such a case you say: "We feel pain in the same place, in the same body, our descriptions tally, but still my pain can't be his", I suppose as a reason you will be inclined to say: "because my pain is my pain and his pain is his pain". And here you are making a grammatical statement about the use of such a phrase as "the same pain". You say that you don't wish to apply the phrase, "he has got my pain" or "we both have the same pain", and instead, perhaps, you will apply such a phrase as "his pain is exactly like mine". (It would be no argument to say that the two couldn't have the same pain because one might anaesthetize or kill one of them while the other still felt pain.) Of course, if we exclude the phrase "I have his toothache" from our language, we thereby also exclude "I have (or feel) my toothache"." (BB p.54 – 55)

³ WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig. Philosophische Bemerkungen, Chapter VI.

⁴ WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig. The Blue and Brown Books, p. 52 – 56.

⁵ "...when one says 'You can't count through the whole series of cardinal numbers', one doesn't state a fact about human frailty but about a convention which we have made." (BB p.54)

⁶ "3 x 18 inches won't go into 3 feet". This is a grammatical rule and states a logical impossibility" (BB p.56)

proposition (11) 'My pain is my pain and his pain is his pain' is not about terms and their use and therefore it is not possible to express a rule of grammar by means of such propositions as (11). Therefore the claim of Wittgenstein is not correct that (2) is a grammatical proposition or that it expresses a rule of grammar in the specific reading of (2*.1.1), because in (2) and (2*.1.1) all terms are used and no term is mentioned and they are in fact propositions about pains and persons.

A second problem of Wittgenstein's analysis is the following: *Is it really true that it is no matter of fact that the relation 'ϕ is the same₁ F α' can't be applied to sensations and just a matter of the rules of grammar?* I don't think so. What would happen if it would be correct to apply the relation 'ϕ is the same₁α' to sensations in our language? It would probably cause us to think more intensive about the strange thing called 'identity'. And maybe then we would come to the same conclusion as Wittgenstein in the Tractatus (5.5303): *"To say that two things are identical is nonsense..."* But this is in fact no serious strategy. The fact that two persons cannot feel the same₁ pain is not a matter of convention, because we cannot imagine the case that they do. If it would be a convention it must be possible to change the convention, but this case seems to be impossible and beyond our rational capacity.

It seems to me that Wittgenstein has no plausible arguments against the claim that two persons cannot share the same₁ feelings, which is not only a dogma of substance-ontology, but also a common-sense truth.

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Die Rolle der Körperlichkeit im gegenwärtigen Personbegriff

Anne Reichold, Kaiserslautern

1. Einleitung

Der Begriff der Person dient in der Neuzeit im wesentlichen der Explikation des menschlichen Selbstverständnisses (Sturma 1997). In der gegenwärtigen Philosophie wird der Begriff der Person vor allem in zwei Problemzusammenhängen thematisiert: in praktischen Kontexten wie Ethik, Handlungstheorie und Rechtsphilosophie und in metaphysisch-ontologischen Theorien zur Frage des Zusammenhangs von Körper und Geist (Herrmann 2001, Quante 1999).

In ethischen Kontexten bezeichnet der Personbegriff das handelnde, verantwortliche Subjekt. Er klassifiziert diejenigen Lebewesen, denen ein unantastbares Recht auf Leben zugesprochen wird. Die paradigmatischen ethischen Verwendungskontexte des Personbegriffs sind die der Verantwortungszuschreibung und der Zuschreibung von intrinsischer Würde.

In ontologisch-metaphysischen Kontexten bezeichnet der Personbegriff eine Entität, der sowohl geistige als auch körperliche Bestimmungen zukommen und die daher eine Vereinigung der häufig dualistisch entgegengesetzten Bestimmungen des Körpers und des Geistes leistet. Der Personbegriff bildet in diesem Kontext einen zentralen Begriff im Rahmen des Körper-Geist-Problems.

In der analytischen Philosophie besteht zwischen ethischen Personbestimmungen und ontologisch-metaphysischen Analysen des Personbegriffs im Hinblick auf die Körperlichkeit der Person eine Inkongruenz. Im Rahmen ethischer Begründungen der Person wird die körperliche Verfasstheit der Person nicht thematisiert. In der ontologisch-metaphysischen Persondiskussion der analytischen Philosophie dagegen wird die Körperlichkeit der Person neben mentalen Bestimmungen als konstitutiv für den Personbegriff angesehen. Unter Betonung körperlich-materieller Elemente dient der Personbegriff hier als Gegenbegriff zu einem rein durch Vernunftprädikate bestimmten Subjektbegriff in kartesischer Tradition.

2. Ausgrenzung der Körperlichkeit in ethischen Persontheorien

Für die Begründung eines ethischen Personbegriffs aus Bewusstseinsbestimmungen liefert Parfit eine in der analytischen Philosophie einflussreiche Theorie (Parfit 1971; 1984). Parfit bindet die ethischen Fragen nach den Grenzen einer Person ausschließlich an psychologische Relationen wie z.B. die Erinnerung und löst diese anhand von Gedankenexperimenten zum Zusammenhang von Körper und Bewusstsein völlig von der Identität eines Organismus oder lebendigen Körpers. Die Kontinuität des personalen Lebens beruht ausschließlich auf psychologischen Verknüpfungen. Im Unterschied zu Vertretern des in der Lockeschen Tradition stehenden Erinnerungskriteriums greift er darüber hinaus aber auch die Vorstellung einer durch psychologische Relationen etablierten Identität der Person an. Die für die ethische Persondiskussion relevante Frage nach dem Überleben einer Person muss nach Parfit von der Frage

nach personaler Identität getrennt werden. Während die Identität eine eindeutige Relation ist, die keine Spaltungen oder Verdopplungen zulässt, ist das Überleben eine graduelle Relation, die auch mit Spaltungen einhergehen kann.

In *Reasons and Persons* konstruiert Parfit folgendes Teilungsszenario (Parfit 1984, 199): mit Hilfe eines Teletransporters wird eine Person auf den Mars befördert, indem die genaue Position ihrer Zellen aufgezeichnet wird. Diese Informationen werden zum Mars gesendet und dort werden der Körper und das Gehirn der Person aus anderer Materie nachgebildet. Die Person auf der Erde hat nun die Möglichkeit, mit ihrer Replikation auf dem Mars Kontakt aufzunehmen. Nach Parfit überlebt in diesem Fall die gescannte Person in beiden Personen, von einer Identitätsrelation kann hingegen nicht mehr gesprochen werden. Entscheidend für die existenzielle personale Frage des Überlebens ist nach Parfit nicht die Identitätsrelation, sondern die schwächere Relation der psychologischen Verknüpfung. In dem Gedankenexperiment wird deutlich, dass körperliche Kontinuität oder Zerstörung kein Kriterium für den Tod oder das Überleben einer Person sind. Psychologische Verknüpfung kann zwar nicht ohne materielle Basis realisiert werden, die moralische Kontinuität einer Person in der Zeit aber ist von der Kontinuität des organischen Fortbestehens unabhängig.

Eine exemplarische Gegenposition zur Persontheorie Parfits stellt der Personbegriff Korsgaards dar (Korsgaard 1989). Während Parfit die Einheit der Person in der psychologischen Verknüpfung sieht, stellt Korsgaard die Person als autonomes Handlungssubjekt in den Vordergrund. In Anknüpfung an Kant unterscheidet sie zwischen einer theoretischen und einer praktischen Perspektive auf das Subjekt. Die theoretische Vernunft erklärt Phänomene der Natur als kausal verursachte Ereignisse. Auch Handlungen von Personen sind aus dieser Perspektive kausal verursachte Ereignisse. Die praktische Vernunft dagegen betrachtet Handlungen als von einer Person frei gewählt und in Gang gesetzt. Die entscheidenden Bestimmungen der ethischen Person sind die Spontaneität und die Freiheit.

„Your conception of yourself as a unified agent is not based on a metaphysical theory, nor on a unity of which you are conscious. Its grounds are practical [...]“ (Korsgaard 1989, 110)

Die Rede von Personen ist abhängig von der praktischen Perspektive, aus der sich die Person selbst als Verursacherin einer Handlung und somit auch als Subjekt von Verantwortung betrachten kann. Jede Theorie, die für den moralischen Personbegriff als entscheidendes Kriterium die psychologische Relationen der Erinnerung angibt, unterschlägt nach Korsgaard das eigentlich wichtige Faktum des moralischen Personbegriffs: dessen Autonomie und ursprüngliche Spontaneität und die darin begründete praktische Struktur der Person.

Trotz der Unterschiede in der Identitätskonstitution der Person – bei Parfit psychologische Verknüpftheit, bei Korsgaard Identitätskonstitution durch Aktivität und Spontaneität des Subjekts – gilt die Körperlichkeit der Person in beiden Theorien als irrelevant bei der

Begründung des ethischen Charakters der Person. Gerade die Theorie Korsgaards führt durch die methodische Unterscheidung von praktischer und theoretischer Perspektive einen methodischen Dualismus zwischen praktischen und deskriptiven Begriffen ein, der zu einer Ausgrenzung körperlicher Bestimmungen aus ethischen Begründungszusammenhängen führt. Die körperliche Verfasstheit der Person wird zwar auf ontologischer Ebene nicht bestritten, aber sie stellt ausschließlich eine theoretisch-deskriptive Bestimmung dar. Als solche wird sie von den Naturwissenschaften beschrieben. Da das deskriptive Vokabular der Naturwissenschaften den Standpunkt des autonomen Subjekts aber nicht zum Ausdruck bringen kann, fallen Körperbestimmungen aus den Begründungszusammenhängen der Ethik heraus.

3. Betonung der Körperlichkeit der Person in der analytischen Ontologie

Während körperliche Bestimmungen der Person in der Ethik nicht expliziert werden, ist der Verweis auf die Körperlichkeit in metaphysischen und ontologischen Persontheorien der analytischen Philosophie zu einem Gemeinplatz geworden. Der Personbegriff fungiert hier als Vermittlungsinstanz zwischen den in der Tradition getrennten Bereichen des Mentalen und des Physischen. Als Einheit von Körper und Geist stellt die Person einen expliziten Gegenpol zu einem rein geistig gedachten Subjekt dar. Die Argumentation für die Körperlichkeit der Person und den konstitutiven Zusammenhang von geistigen und körperlichen Bestimmungen beruht auf bedeutungstheoretischen Argumenten gegen die Möglichkeit einer privaten Sprache (Wittgenstein 1953, §243f.). Im Ausgang von Wittgenstein wird in der analytischen Philosophie argumentiert, dass sich Sprache und Bedeutung erst im intersubjektiven Kontext etablieren. Die Bedingung für sprachliche Bezugnahme auf Gegenstände ist, dass Begriffe intersubjektive Identifikationskriterien haben. Intersubjektive Identifikation ist aber nur im Bereich raumzeitlicher Gegenstände gegeben. Auch für mentale Begriffe müssen aus bedeutungstheoretischer Perspektive raumzeitliche Individuationskriterien angegeben werden, die neben der Selbstzuschreibung auch eine Fremdzuschreibung möglich machen. In der cartesienkritischen Tradition der analytischen Philosophie kommt dem Personbegriff die theoretisch-metaphysische Funktion zu, den Subjektbegriff der neuzeitlichen Philosophie zu kritisieren.

Eine prominente Begründung eines körperlichen Personbegriffs ist von Strawson formuliert worden (Strawson 1977). In *Individuals* wird der Personbegriff in direkter Kritik am kartesischen Dualismus als ontologisch primäre Einheit von Körper und Geist eingeführt. Personen erhalten bei Strawson eine grundlegende Position in der Ontologie, weil sie die einheitlichen Referenten von geistigen und physikalischen Zuschreibungen sind.

„What I mean by the concept of a person is the concept of a type of entity such that *both* predicates ascribing states of consciousness *and* predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation &c. are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type.“ (Strawson 1977, 101f.)

Als ontologische Grundbausteine unseres Begriffssystems stellen Person eine ursprüngliche Einheit des Geistigen und des Körperlichen dar, der Begriff der Person ist ein „primitive concept“ (Strawson 1977, 102). Die Einführung des Personbegriffs in die Ontologie stellt

somit ein Argument gegen einen grundlegenden Dualismus von mentalen und physikalischen Begriffen und gegen die Annahme eines rein geistigen Subjekts dar. Die dualistische Unterscheidung zwischen Geist und Körper ist eine Abstraktion, die auf einer ontologisch grundlegenden Ebene gar nicht formuliert werden kann. Ein rein geistiges Subjekt kommt als Referent für Selbstzuschreibungen nicht in Frage, da ein geistiges Subjekt nicht der bedeutungstheoretischen Anforderung der intersubjektiven Individuation gerecht wird. Der einheitliche Bezugsrahmen der Identifikation in unserem Begriffsschema ist nach Strawson das raumzeitliche Beziehungssystem. Innerhalb dieses Systems können wir jedes Einzelding zu jedem anderen in eine eindeutige Beziehung bringen. Der Begriff der Wirklichkeit ist an die Möglichkeit der raumzeitlichen Verortung gebunden und an die Möglichkeit, eine Entität mit anderen Entitäten in raumzeitliche Beziehungen zu bringen. Der Begriff der Person ist gerade deshalb ein grundlegender Begriff unseres Begriffssystems, weil er raumzeitliche Identifikationskriterien besitzt. Geistige Bestimmungen wie Empfindungen, Gedanken, Gefühle, Wünsche stellen für Strawson klare Beispiele für ontologisch abhängige Bestimmungen dar. Sie sind abhängig, weil sie sich nicht unabhängig von den Subjekten, denen sie zugeschrieben werden, identifizieren lassen. Und diese Subjekte sind nach Strawson Personen.

4. Ausblick: Integration der Körperlichkeit in den ethischen Personbegriff

Während die analytische Philosophie aus bedeutungstheoretischen Gründen für einen Personbegriff als Einheit von körperlichen und geistigen Bestimmungen argumentiert, findet sich keine entsprechende Integration der Körperlichkeit in den ethischen Personbegriff. In ethischen Persontheorien wird im Gegenteil für die Bedeutungslosigkeit körperlicher Bestimmungen im Hinblick auf die ethische Personalität argumentiert. Ein Grund für die Trennung der ethischen Personstruktur von der körperlichen Verfasstheit der Person liegt in dem in der analytischen Philosophie vorherrschenden physikalistischen Körperverständnis. In Verbindung mit dem methodischen Trennung von deskriptiv-naturwissenschaftlicher Argumentation und ethisch-normativen Begründungen fallen körperliche Bestimmungen der Person aus dem Bereich ethisch-normativer Begründungen heraus.

Die Ausgrenzung körperlicher Bestimmungen der Person aus den expliziten ethischen Bestimmungen der Person in der gegenwärtigen Philosophie birgt aber die Gefahr in sich, die Grundstruktur ethischer Personalität insgesamt zu negieren. Die Körperlichkeit der Person ist in praktischen Begriffen wie dem der Handlung, des Schutzes von Leib und Leben und des Lebensrechts mitgedacht. Ethische Themen wie Verteilungsgerechtigkeit, Tötungsverbot, Abtreibung oder Klonierung setzen alle an der körperlichen Verfasstheit von Personen an. Gerade weil die Person sterblich und verletzbar ist, kann sie Objekt ethischer Überlegungen sein. Der Körperlichkeit der Person kommt damit auch in der Ethik eine fundamentale Begründungsfunktion zu. Die Orientierung der Ethik an der körperlichen Verfasstheit von Personen zeigt sich u.a. klar in den Menschenrechten. Artikel 25 der *Allgemeinen Erklärung der Menschenrechte* von 1948 garantiert jedem Menschen

„[...] das Recht auf einen für die Gesundheit und das Wohlergehen von sich und seiner Familie angemessenen Lebensstandard, einschließlich ausreichender Ernährung, Bekleidung, Wohnung,

ärztlicher Versorgung und notwendiger sozialer Leistungen.“ (Watzal 1999, 57)

Voraussetzung für diese ethischen Themen ist die Körperlichkeit der Person mit den aus ihr resultierenden Bestimmungen der Verletzbarkeit, Sterblichkeit und Schutzbedürftigkeit. Ethische Fragen stellen sich im Hinblick auf Personen nur, weil Personen keine autarken Geistwesen sind, sondern weil sie aufgrund ihrer Körperlichkeit anderen Personen und deren Handlungen ausgesetzt sind. Der ethische Gebrauch des Personbegriffs weist damit implizit immer schon auf die Körperlichkeit der Person hin. Eine Integration körperlicher Bestimmungen in den ethischen Personbegriff erfordert allerdings eine Thematisierung von Körperlichkeit, die auch die normativen Bedeutungsanteile des Personbegriffs begründen kann. Die physikalistische Beschreibung des Körpers aus der objektivierenden Perspektive der dritten Person muss verbunden werden mit der normbegründenden Perspektive des Selbstbewusstseins. Der Dualismus zwischen Subjekt und Körper lässt sich nur auflösen, wenn der Körper der Person nicht ausschließlich als neutrales Objekt der Naturwissenschaften angesehen wird, sondern zugleich als Ort von Subjektivität und Moralität.

Für eine ethische Interpretation der Körperlichkeit der Person bietet sich der Begriff der Leiblichkeit, wie er in der Phänomenologie im Ausgang von Husserl formuliert worden ist, an (Husserl 1973). Der Begriff der Leiblichkeit unterscheidet sich wesentlich vom mechanistisch-naturwissenschaftlichen Körperbegriff, da er im Unterschied zum Begriff des physikalischen Körpers eine Einheit von Körper und Geist bezeichnet. Auch die Beschreibungsperspektiven der ersten- und der dritten Person verbinden sich im Begriff der Leiblichkeit. Einerseits kann der Leib von anderen sinnlich wahrgenommen werden, andererseits entsteht das volle Konzept der Leiblichkeit als beseeltem Körper erst aus der Erfahrung des eigenen Leibes und der Annahme, der andere besitze ebenfalls eine subjektive Innenperspektive.

Der von Husserl in erkenntnistheoretischen Zusammenhängen thematisierte Begriff der Leiblichkeit kann aufgrund seiner integrierenden Funktion zwischen geistigen und körperlichen Prädikaten sowie zwischen Innen- und Außenperspektive in die ethische Diskussion um die Bestimmung des Personbegriffs integriert werden. Das Konzept der Leiblichkeit knüpft zum einen an die von Strawson mit dem Personbegriff intendierte Einheit von physikalischen und geistigen Begriffen an. Zum anderen greift es die in der Ethik betonte Subjektivität und Geistigkeit der Person auf. Mit dem Begriff der Leiblichkeit wird auf die Rückgebundenheit geistiger Personbestimmungen an die Materialität hingewiesen und zugleich eine intentionale Interpretation der körperlichen Verfasstheit der Person vorgenommen. Das subjektkritische Moment der bedeutungstheoretischen Persondiskussion im Ausgang von Wittgenstein wird im Begriff der Leiblichkeit ebenso aufgegriffen wie die für den ethischen Personbegriff wesentliche Unterscheidung zwischen bloßer Materie und Normen begründender Personalität. Die systematischen Anknüpfungspunkte, die in der Persontheorie der Gegenwart für das Konzept der Leiblichkeit bestehen, rechtfertigen die Verknüpfung zweier philosophischer Traditionen, die meist völlig disparat voneinander bestehen – der analytischen Philosophie und der Phänomenologie. Die Analyse der Leiblichkeit von Personen führt nicht nur zu einer Kritik am kartesischen Geistbegriff – wie dies vor allem die Intention des analytischen Personbegriffs Strawsons ist – sondern auch zu einer Erweiterung und Veränderung des Konzepts von Materialität oder Körperlichkeit. Diese ist nicht nur das Objekt naturwissenschaftlicher Forschungen, sondern

auch der Ansatzpunkt für Intersubjektivität und Ethik. Durch die Betonung des in der ethischen Persondiskussion vernachlässigten Aspekts der Leiblichkeit von Personen wird eine entscheidende Begründung für den ethischen Charakter der Person genannt, der implizit in allen ethischen Normen enthalten ist: die Verletzbarkeit und Sterblichkeit der Person, die ethische Überlegungen überhaupt erst erforderlich und möglich machen.

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Understanding Everyday Mental Concepts: Theory or Simulation?

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In the course of explaining and anticipating thought and action, we characterize both ourselves and others in mental terms, e.g. as '*believing* the bus departs at ten' or '*wanting* to go swimming'. The ability to characterize oneself and others in such terms is central to understanding persons. It underwrites the self-attribution of beliefs, desires, emotions and other conscious, occurrent 'mental states' (MS) and subserves MS-attribution to others. How do ordinary people understand the contents of mental state concepts like belief or desire? Philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists have put forward answers based on theory-theory (TT), modularity theory (MT) and simulation theory (ST). Before examining how these approaches explain the contents of MS-concepts, two widespread assumptions concerning everyday psychological attributions should be discussed.

The first concerns the notion that the same MS-concept is attributed in self-attributions and in other-attributions, i.e. the same mental concept is applied to oneself and to others. On this assumption the concepts expressed by mental predicates are unitary and the mental predicates employed in attributions are not ambiguous between first-person and other person uses. The contention that mental state predicates are univocal and mental state concepts unitary is supported by the observation that first-person and third-person mental attributions are symmetric with respect to truth or falsity.

The second assumption concerns whether there is a principled asymmetry between self- and other-attributions of mental states, a point familiar from the discussions of L. Wittgenstein, P.F. Strawson, E. Tugendhat, G. Evans and D. Davidson. That there is an epistemological asymmetry between self-attribution and other-attribution concerning criteria for attribution, e.g. the observation of behavior and speech and the role of inference, has been argued by many. On the asymmetry assumption the grounds for self- and other-attributions of mental states vary, even though the meanings of the MS-predicates employed appear to be univocal. One need not subscribe to a privileged access thesis in order to maintain that there is a principled asymmetry between self- and other-attributions. The notion that MS-concepts are indexical, i.e. tied to a particular point of view, suffices to induce an asymmetry between MS-attributions to oneself and to others.

In attributing a mental state, an attributor characterizes the modality in the case of sensations and perceptions. In the case of beliefs and other "propositional attitudes" both the MS-type ψ and the content p must be characterized. Plausibly, the phrases '*hoping* it is raining' and '*believing* it is raining' characterize different mental states and express different MS-concepts, because the MS-types are different. Whereas, '*believing* it is raining' and '*believing* the sun is shining' are different states, because their contents differ, even though the MS-type is the same. Let's set the question of content to one side and concentrate on MS-concepts. If the attribution of a mental state, whether to oneself or another, consists in characterizing a person's mental condition as being of one type or another, then MS-attribution involves a judgement. Hence, the notion of a MS-type like believing, wanting, etc. is the notion of a mental concept. How do ordinary

attributors understand mental concepts like belief or desire?

According to TT, the concepts employed in MS-attribution are theoretical concepts, postulated in explaining and predicting thought and action. In attributing mental states to ourselves and others, we inferentially apply a folk-psychological theory of mind. Depending on the particular version, the theory involved is conceived as a set of generalizations or laws for the deployment of mental concepts (Lewis 1972), or as a theory like any other scientific theory (Churchland 1988; Gopnik 1993). One attributes mental states by inferring their occurrence from observation of behavior and environmental events, i.e. by recognizing their causal-explanatory role in accordance with the theoretical generalizations comprising the theory. Versions of TT differ as to whether the theory in question is acquired through a process of theory formation analogous to scientific theorizing or through learning. However, both versions require that ordinary attributors grasp a mental concept as it is defined by the generalizations of the theory in order to make corresponding MS-attributions.

On TT understanding a mental concept involves mastering theoretical generalizations about causal-inferential relations and MS-representations. On one influential version, mental states like beliefs and desires are defined functionally in terms of their (causal) relations to events in the environment, other mental states and overt behavior. The concept of a mental state is the concept of a particular functional role. Specifying the content of a MS-type on this account thus involves generalizations that make reference to dispositions, causal interactions or subjunctive considerations, as Alvin Goldman has pointed out. These generalizations -- specifically, the causal-functional role the terms play in the generalizations of the folk-psychological theory -- determine the contents of mental concepts (Lewis 1972; Churchland 1988). Consequently, one must master the "theoretical" concepts of the theory in order to employ MS-predicates. Even though the grasp of mental concepts may be "tacit" or "implicit", it is incumbent on the TT to explain how attributors can acquire facility with such concepts. In particular, TT must explain how ordinary attributors acquire and deploy such concepts, for the TT claims that knowledge of the folk-psychological theory of mind grounds MS-attributions.

An important consequence of TT is that mental concepts are defined from what is essentially a third-person or observer point of view. The contents of mental concepts are specified in terms of logical and epistemological relations between external stimuli, mental states and behavior, i.e. on the basis of inference and observation of external stimuli and behavior. They are not essentially linked to a first-person point of view. In this respect mental concepts as defined by TT do not differ in kind from non-mental concepts in theories about the natural world. Clearly, the third-person approach of TT to mental attribution accounts for the assumed uniformity in applying mental concepts. The same theory is used both in self- and other-attributions. By the same token, the TT entails that there is no principled asymmetry between MS-attributions to oneself and to others; for we attribute mental

states both to ourselves and others by means of the folk-psychological theory and theory-mediated inference. However, the question of how one learns to apply folk platitudes to oneself or how theory formation gets started, e.g. where MS-concepts come from, remains open.

Although modularity theories are often construed as versions of TT, even by their proponents, there are good reasons for treating them separately. For they construe cognitive structures like the apparatus of MS-attribution as the result of innate modules, not as the consequence of an acquired theory. On MT mentalizing abilities are not developed from evidence in the course of development, but created from pre-determined representations of input. Leading proponents of modularity, Noam Chomsky, Jerry Fodor and Alan Leslie, differ significantly in their specific positions and respective claims about innate modules. However, the central idea is that the contents of everyday mental concepts in the Theory of Mind (ToM) are part of a special purpose body of knowledge in a mental module, which is innate and matures through a process of ontogenetic development (Fodor 1992; Leslie 1987). Although MT, like TT, construes MS-concepts as abstract theoretical postulates embedded in causal laws, it claims that such concepts are part of our innate endowment as humans. Consequently, their development is genetically determined and not based on theory construction. On MT mental concepts are present from the beginning and merely triggered by experience and maturation. Leslie (1994) postulates several different modules that come on line sequentially in children's developing Theory of Mind. He hypothesizes that a domain-specific mechanism or information processing device, the ToM Module, computes data structures, metarepresentations, which specify attitude, agent, an anchor (an aspect of the real situation) and a pretend state. Modularity theories like Leslie's ToMM hypothesis account for the assumption of uniformity by citing our innate endowment as members of the human species, but offer no further elaboration of mental state concepts. Thus, beyond MT's claim that mental concepts are innate, the little light is shed on ordinary understanding of mental concepts.

Simulation approaches deny that MS-attributions rely on theoretical knowledge and inference. They take the first-person point of view to be essential to mental states and concepts despite different views on the nature of simulation, e.g. on whether it involves analogical inference (Goldman), "ascent routines" (Gordon) or "co-cognition" and rationality assumptions (Heal). Simulationists also differ over whether prior possession of MS-concepts is required (Goldman; Heal) or not (Gordon). The central idea is that one uses one's own cognitive resources to attribute mental states by pretending or imagining oneself to be in the other's position and then generating the thoughts or actions attributed to the other within a simulation.

On Alvin Goldman's introspection-based ST, one attributes mental states to others by using one's own cognitive and inferential mechanisms to match those of another person (1993, 2000). Simulation terminates in an analogical inference from oneself to the other. The end product is a judgement, which classifies an (occurrent) mental state as a token of a particular MS-type and thus requires mental concepts. Goldman proposes an account of mental concepts in terms of introspection or self-monitoring, not simulation. He suggests we have a first-person, introspective understanding of MS-concepts which rests on direct, non-inferential access to our conscious mental states, i.e. inner sense or higher-order perception. Goldman hypothesizes that some sort of intrinsic (non-relational) and categorical (non-dispositional) properties of mental states are available to the cognitive system. These

internally detectable properties of MS-tokens are definitive of a particular MS-type and form the basis for our understanding of mental state concepts.

The asymmetry of self- and other-attributions is a central tenet of Goldman's account, for the contents of mental concepts are anchored in "phenomenologically disinctive" MS-properties which are introspectively detectable. On this view the question of the uniformity of MS-attributions stands and falls with the viability of the analogical inference from oneself to the other. Specifically, what reason is there on Goldman's view to assume that others have mental states like one's own? This is the conceptual problem of other minds. In response Goldman has proposed a dual-representation hypothesis for MS-concepts like desires, suggesting that one develops two sorts of MS-representations: representations of inner features and representations of behavioral characteristics, perhaps based on resonance phenomena like "mirror neurons" (2000). However, this response still does not meet the "other minds"-objection which undermines any uniformity assumption.

Robert Gordon takes the simulation approach itself to have direct implications for our understanding of mental concepts. He denies that simulation relies on introspective access to one's own mental states or that it involves an implicit analogical inference (1995). He introduces the notion of an 'ascent routine' to account for self- and other-attributions of mental states without introspection or analogical inference. An ascent routine is a procedure which allows one to get the answer to a question about one's mental condition by answering a question that is not about oneself or mental states, e.g. "Do you *believe* that Mickey Mouse has a tail?", by asking oneself an "outward-looking" question about the world, "Does Mickey Mouse have a tail?".

According to Gordon, an attributor "recenters her cognitive map" on the other so that the first-person pronoun 'I' refers to the individual on whom the attributor's egocentric map has been recentered. After this imaginative transformation into the other, a simulator *directly* attributes the belief or decision generated within the scope of simulation to the other *via* an ascent routine, thus obviating the need for an analogical inference. Other-attribution is, in essence, a case of mental "self"-attribution to oneself-as-the-other within the context of simulation. This is because embedding an ascent routine within a simulation allows one to attribute mental states to the other „directly“. On Gordon's account an egocentric shift on the part of the attributor lies at the core of simulation and the ascent routine is the key to other-attribution *and* self-attribution. Note that Gordon's ascent routine ST accommodates the uniformity assumption by default, since self- attributions *and* other-attributions are cases of „self“-attribution *via* ascent routines.

Gordon suggests that ascent routines provide the basis for an account of MS-concepts in terms of simulation and indicate how we go about mastering mental state concepts, because they provide a way of reconceptualizing pains and beliefs as having a mental location (1996). However, this is not the case. The meanings of mental predicates and a grasp of mental concepts must be presupposed in order to get an ascent routine started. One must understand that the initial question in the example is about belief, not hope or desire. Thus, the ascent routine procedure does not supply the foundation for an account of mental state concepts. It does accommodate the indexicality intuition through the notion of a mental location, but it falls short of capturing the asymmetry of mental attribution. For mental attribution is essentially self-attribution either directly *via* ascent routine or to oneself-

as-the-other within a simulation. It remains unclear how genuine other-attribution is to be understood. The crucial assumption that one can mentally “transform oneself into the other”, “recenter one’s cognitive map” or “become the other” remains a metaphor, leaving any asymmetry between self- and other-attribution of mental states a mystery. In the end, imaginative transformation *cum* ascent routine appears to presuppose an account of the contents of mental concepts, rather than providing one.

Neither TT, MT or ST accommodates both the uniformity and the asymmetry assumption. However, it is argued that they are well-motivated and cannot be dismissed out of hand, if we are to explicate how people understand everyday mental states. As things stand, the answer to the question whether our understanding of everyday mental concepts is a matter of theory or simulation is ‘neither of the above’.

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Good, Self, and Unselfing - Reflections on Iris Murdoch's Moral Philosophy

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1. Introduction

When discussing Iris Murdoch's moral philosophy it is often easiest to start by saying what she is opposing. Such is the case also in this paper, which concerns Murdoch's views of our identity as persons or "selves". The good enemy against which Murdoch writes is what she calls the "current", the "modern", or the "liberal" view of morals. This is a view whose essential features are shared by such apparently quite different philosophers as, for example, R. M. Hare or J. P. Sartre, and whose ancestors are Hume, Kant and Mill (VC, 34). One of the several critical characterizations Murdoch applies to the picture of the individual contained in this view is "existentialist". In Murdoch's account, such philosophers as Sartre, who claims the title, as well as others who do not, are existentialist when they emphasize the solitary omnipotent will at the cost of the substantial self, that is, if they identify "the true person with the empty choosing will" (S, 9, 35). Murdoch's objection to this picture might be put as follows: by making morality a matter of a solitary choosing will, the view neglects ordinary human moral experience and instead builds an empty abstraction which it then elevates into a "man-God", the moral super hero of modern times.

Having said this as an introduction, I shall leave aside the details of Murdoch's objections, as well as the question of their accuracy. Instead, I shall draw a sketch of her positive viewpoints of the matter, the view of human identity which she sets against the "current view". In her view, man is set "against a background of values, of realities, which transcend him" (AD, 290). I shall explore the transcendental argument by which Murdoch aims to establish this. This is an argument concerning the concept of "Good" as a unifier of our experience and hence, as a condition of our being persons. The argument is, in fact, "not of the most rigorous kind", as Murdoch puts it herself. However, when it is supported by imaginative appeals to experience (metaphors, new concepts) and by moral reasons for its acceptance, it seems - not only to Murdoch, but also to many philosophers inspired by her - that it can support an attractive alternative to the picture of the man presented by the current view. The aforementioned moral reasons are taken up at the end of this paper. They are reasons for replacing the man-God with other kinds of sacred objects, with goodness as exhibited in contingent particular beings such as real people.

2. Good and the Self

According to Murdoch, moral philosophy in the contemporary secularised world should retain a concept which has the characteristics formerly attributed to God. Her suggestion for such a concept is "Good", characterized as "a single perfect transcendent non-representable and necessarily real object of attention" (S, 55). However, when speaking of the reality, or necessary existence of Good she wants to avoid "any heavy material connotation of the misleading word 'exist'" (S, 64). So in which sense does Good exist? In my interpretation, it exists as a condition of experience. In other words, one can in Murdoch's philosophy find a transcendental argument that proceeds from our human experience to the necessary

conditions of this experience. The experience central to the argument is one concerning moral progress, or what Murdoch also calls our "pilgrimage". It involves a strong sense of direction on one hand and the knowledge that it is someone's - a particular person's - experience on the other (S, 22-23).

Let us first examine the idea of direction. Murdoch asks: "Are we not certain that there is a 'true direction' towards better conduct, that goodness 'really matters'?" (S, 60). She claims that in all our evaluations we use a standard of excellence, which cannot be found in the evaluated things themselves. This standard is the idea of perfection, which brings scales and distances to the area under assessment. Such scales and distances are necessary for all thinking. In order to understand any domain of life, we have to be able to relate things to each other, classify them as better or worse, important or not - in short, evaluate. As so often in her philosophy, Murdoch here takes art as an example. Learning to understand some art form means learning to evaluate its objects according to degrees of excellence. This activity also reveals that there is "little that is very good and nothing that is perfect". (S, 61-61.) The same goes for all human activity. We know that even the best are not perfect. This knowledge is, nevertheless, made possible by the idea of perfection that brings with it the sense of a right or a wrong direction in which one can move.

Murdoch compares her argument concerning the idea of perfection to the ontological proof which, rather than a proof, is an "assertion of faith", appropriate for those already convinced (S, 63). In other words, it can only be made on the basis of some experience of Good as perfection (or God in Anselm's case). If one wants to speak of proof, it is a proof an individual can ultimately give only to herself, not a universal moral formula seen valid by virtue of rationality only (MGM, 392). Not so much the formal qualities of the argument but the experience out of which it arises makes in convincing. However, the moral philosopher can help even the sceptic to find the proof within herself by "appeal to certain areas of experience, pointing out certain features, and using suitable metaphors and inventing suitable concepts where necessary to make these features visible" (S, 75). Then, if a person can find hierarchies of value in her experience, she will, according to Murdoch, also find the idea of perfection as the end point of them. Hence, if successful, the moral philosopher can make the sceptic discover the evaluative nature of all her thinking: to discover that in this sense she really is a believer of Good. From this one can proceed to understanding how Good also functions as a condition for the unity of our experience and ultimately for our being persons with particular identities.

Murdoch claims that "if there is any kind of sense or unity in human life [...] it must be sought within a human experience" (S, 79). Unity is experienced by someone. The notion of a person or individual is, according to Murdoch, inseparable from morality. In her view, the movement towards Good can be described as activity that aims at an increasing precision of moral concepts, and such activity is highly personal. Our moral vocabulary is of course subject to some public rules, and our concepts are derived from a

public context. However, we take these concepts "into our privacy", where we can reassess them. For Murdoch, this in fact is the main characteristic of "live personality". Within certain limits, an individual's use of moral concepts is a function of her history. (S, 25-26.) Moreover, as (and if) our understanding of moral concepts grows, we also become increasingly aware of their relationships and hierarchies. "Increasing moral sophistication reveals increasing unity", Murdoch notes (S, 57). Hence, whatever unity there is in our experience it is there due to our ability to evaluate, and to Good that provides the standard for these evaluations. Good is compared by Murdoch to a magnetic centre of reflection, or (her favourite image) the sun outside the Platonic cave, in the light of which we can see the world properly, but which itself is very difficult to look at (if at all possible). Without Good we would have no sense of direction in our lives and therefore no unity of experience. In other words, we have to evaluate in order to be integrated persons. How we evaluate is in turn a function of our individual histories, our struggles for increased precision of our moral concepts. In this way Good and our movement towards it is also a condition of all the experience we call *our own* experience, and, hence, a condition of our having "a self".

This is my (admittedly sketchy) reproduction of the "transcendental argument" by which Murdoch supports her view of the human being as set against a background of value.¹ Of this picture she then asks, whether we cannot find just this in our deepest experience (see MGE, 507).

3. Good and Unselfing

However, the question of why we should accept her picture is not just a question of experience. Since all our thinking is evaluative, the question is also evaluative: whether this is not the picture of us that we should accept for moral reasons. Every moral system is, according to Murdoch, reflecting an evaluative vision, commanding an ideal. And since this cannot be avoided, it is important that the system is commanding a worthy ideal (S, 78). I come now to what I think are Murdoch's moral reasons for preferring the ideal she is presenting to the one implied by the "existentialist" current view.

The idea of Good as the unifier of our experience avoids at least two moral dangers tightly connected to the existentialist view of the person. Both of these dangers have to do with the notion of freedom that goes with the existentialist view. In it, freedom is identified with an empty choosing will, as Murdoch puts it (S, 36). The creator of value is the will, whereas the world outside the moral agent consists of facts. So we are talking about the famous fact-value distinction, which Murdoch was among the first to criticise (see, Diamond 1996, 79). In the existentialist view, the human being moves against a background of facts, and it is at her will to choose how she evaluates these facts. The moral agent is "free to withdraw, survey the facts, and choose again". (VC, 83)

One problem is that this picture of human freedom tends to marginalise the ethical. It sees facts as that which human beings share with each other. We can discuss our moral differences by reference to, and clarification of, the facts relevant to the question. If there is no agreement on what the facts are, that is, if the disagreement concerns "purely values", the argumentation becomes more difficult and perhaps impossible. (VC, 81). But this is the area where the solitary will moves - it is "marooned upon a tiny island in the middle of a sea of scientific facts", or to use

another of Murdoch's metaphors, we have "a big world of facts, little peripheral area of value" (S, 27 MGE, 25).

Another problem is that in the existentialist view the solitary will, supposedly stripped from a metaphysical background, is turned into a hero figure. It is affirmed that an agent, identified with her will, can attain an authentic existence by sheer force of that will alone. Such a strong emphasis on the freedom of the individual will is, however, more likely to enhance than constrain selfish impulses, which according to Murdoch are so fundamental to human beings. She describes the human psyche in Freudian terms as a "historically determined individual relentlessly looking after itself" or also as a "fat relentless ego". This ego is the enemy of moral life and thus moral philosophy is properly the discussion of techniques for its defeat. The question for moral philosophers is "how can we make ourselves better?" (S, 50-52, 78.) In modern moral philosophy Kant's original quest for finding something clean and pure outside the selfish empirical psyche has only lead back again to the self and degenerated into a "Luciferian philosophy of adventures of the will" (S, 48, 83), which looks more like another project of self-aggrandizement of the selfish ego than an answer to the question how to make ourselves better.

Murdoch's metaphysical picture is drawn as a guard against these moral dangers.² It points at the evaluative aspect of all thinking. Valuing is not one (peripheral) kind of cognitive activity among others, but rather the condition of any cognitive activity, the condition for there being persons who think. As such, valuing is not something we can choose whether or not to do. This is what Murdoch means by saying that the idea of the Good lies beyond our experience and exercises its authority from there (S, 62-63). Taking seriously this picture of Good as the condition for our being selves in the first place should also humble the fat ego. Rather than me being the creator of value, value creates me.

Murdoch's answer to the question how we can make ourselves better is: by paying attention to the Good. However, as stated in the beginning, Good is a "non-representable object of attention". There is no immediate way of encountering it - it exists as the ideal endpoint of those hierarchies of value that we *can* perceive. This means that moral improvement is improvement of vision: it requires close attention to what lies outside of the selfish mechanism of the human psyche. Murdoch characterizes the proper kind of attention (following Simone Weil) as "a just and loving gaze directed upon an individual reality" (S, 34). The most important and most difficult individual realities for our attention are other people. Cultivating one's vision in order to see beyond the self to other individual selves is true moral activity. This calls for what Murdoch refers to as "techniques of unselfing". Attending to Iris Murdoch's philosophy can be recommended as one such technique.³

¹ For a detailed but somewhat different account of Murdoch's transcendental argument see Antonaccio, 2000, chapt. 5.

² Murdoch does note that her picture involves moral dangers of its own, although she claims in a rather self-assured manner that "we know roughly how to deal with these dangers and part of moral life is to deal with them" (VC, 91-91).

³ I would like to thank Nicholas Barlow and Petter Korkman for their insightful comments that helped me to improve this paper.

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Human Beings and Automatons

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1 J.S. Mill has formulated a classical statement of the “argument from analogy” concerning knowledge of other minds: “I must either believe them [other human beings] to be alive, or to be automatons” (Mill 1872, 244). It is possible that Wittgenstein had this in mind when writing the following:

“I believe he is suffering.”—Do I also *believe* that he isn’t an automaton?

It would go against the grain to use the word in both connexions. (Or is it like this: I believe he is suffering, but am certain the he is not an automaton? Nonsense!)

Suppose I say of a friend: “He isn’t an automaton”.—What information is conveyed by this, and to whom would it be information? To a *human being* who meets him in ordinary circumstances? What information *could* it give him? (At the very most that this man always behaves like a human being, and not occasionally like a machine.)

“I believe he is not an automaton”, just like that, so far makes no sense.

My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul [*eine Einstellung zur Seele*]. I am not of the *opinion* that he has a soul. (*PI* p. 178)

Here Wittgenstein contrasts opinion (*Meinung*) and attitude (*Einstellung*). How should this contrast be understood? On a view such as Mill’s, to regard someone as a conscious being is to hold certain beliefs about him, beliefs that can perhaps ultimately be grounded in a theory of some sort. To have an “attitude towards a soul” is, on the contrary, to see a person’s gestures and facial expressions as “filled with meaning”. We have an *attitude* towards a soul when confronted with a person, which means that we react to his presence and behaviour in a certain way.

There is a similar remark in the *Nachlass* which develops the contrast between *Einstellung* and *Meinung*, but also involves religious belief:

Instead of “attitude toward the soul” one could also say “attitude toward a human”.

I could always say of a human that he is an automaton (I could learn it this way in school in physiology) and yet it would not influence my attitude toward someone else. After all, I can also say it about myself.

But what is the difference between an attitude and an opinion? I would like to say: the attitude comes before the opinion. (*Isn’t* belief in God an attitude?)

How would this be: only one who can utter it as information *believes* it.

An opinion can be wrong. But what would an error [*Irrtum*] look like here? (*LW II* 38)

By introducing this contrast between opinion and attitude Wittgenstein wants to make at least the following points:

(i) Opinions are often expressed merely by words, while attitudes are not necessarily verbalized or even verbalizable; rather they *show themselves* in the actions and reactions of people, in how I treat the object of my attitude, in “fine shades of behaviour” (*PI* p. 204). It means that we *directly* see actions and expressions of emotions; it is not a question of first

observing “bodily movements” and then interpreting them as meaningful (which will always leave room for the possibility that we are dealing with automatons, not human beings). To put it in a more technical vocabulary we could say that an attitude towards a soul is not a psychological state but rather “a condition of the sense of the ascription of mental predicates” (Gaita 1991, 189), meaning that such an attitude is a condition of behaviour to be seen as the behaviour of a conscious being.

(ii) The difference between opinions and attitudes is perhaps best shown by the fact that changing an attitude involves changing the person with that attitude (his way of reacting, his way of understanding a certain thing, etc.), whereas changing an opinion need involve nothing more than changing just that, the opinion.

(iii) This also means that we can speak about an *internal relation* between the attitude of a person and the object of his attitude (Winch 1987, 148), and between an *Einstellung* and the reactions indicative of it. In other words, the attitude is constitutive of the object. Opinions only have an external relation to their objects; i.e., our understanding of what the object *is* is independent of our opinions about it (the object is what it is regardless of our opinions about it). In contrast to this, we can say that an attitude is something that is manifested in our life, which means that our reactions indicate and presuppose a certain attitude towards the object of the reaction.

Thus, to regard someone as a human being is not to believe that he is *not* an automaton; instead, we have to do with “an attitude towards the soul”. It is important to keep in mind when discussing Wittgenstein’s notion of an attitude that it is not a feature of an experience discoverable by an empirical investigation. That is, it is not a psychological stance or special mode of perception, but rather something that characterizes the grammar of the concept of a person.

2 On the basis of what we have said so far, Wittgenstein seems to deny the very possibility of regarding other human beings as automatons. He did, however, sometimes speak or write in a way that contradicts this. What are we to make of such passages? There are at least three different cases to be considered:

(i) In the *Nachlass* passage quoted earlier he introduces the puzzling possibility of actually saying of a human being that he is an automaton. He writes (seemingly in contrast with the example in the *Investigations*) that “I could always say of a human that he is an automaton (I could learn it this way in school in physiology) and yet it would not influence my attitude toward someone else”. That is, if the teaching in physiology changes (e.g., as the result of new scientific discoveries) this might influence my *opinions* about human beings (including myself), but would not change my attitude toward a human being. To be more precise, what we seem to have to do with here are facts and beliefs about the workings of the human body. It might become my opinion that the human beings can be thought of as automatons in this sense without this fact influencing my *attitude* towards people.

(ii) Wittgenstein also introduces a possibility of seeing a human being (and not just the body) as an automaton. This is a case of aspect perception: to see a human being as an automaton is possible, but Wittgenstein describes this as a kind of "limiting case". Such a possibility is derivative upon the fact that we do *not* normally regard human beings as automatons, that our *basic* attitude towards them is an attitude towards a soul, which is *not* a case of aspect perception. This allows us to (imaginatively) see human beings as automatons. However, it is impossible to hold on to this kind of aspect perception in our day-to-day dealings with others:

But can't I imagine that the people around me are automatons, lack consciousness, even though they behave in the same way as usual?—If I imagine it now—alone in my room—I see people with fixed looks (as in a trance) going about their business—the idea is perhaps a bit uncanny. But just try to keep hold of this idea in the midst of your ordinary intercourse with others, in the street, say! Say to yourself, for example: "The children over there are mere automatons; all their liveliness is mere automatism." And you will either find these words becoming quite meaningless, or you will produce in yourself some kind of uncanny feeling, or something of the sort.

Seeing a living human being as an automaton is analogous to seeing one figure as a limiting case of another; the cross-pieces of a window as a swastika, for example.

(*PI* §420)

The point here is that we have to do with a limiting case, a possibility of aspect perception that is derivative upon something more basic, in this case, our attitude toward human beings.

(iii) Norman Malcolm does, however, report that Wittgenstein (in lectures) attempted to give sense to the idea of *consistently* regarding other people as automatons. He introduced the example of "a tribe of people who had the idea that their slaves had no feelings, no souls—that they were automatons—despite the fact that the slaves had human bodies, behaved like their masters, and even spoke the same language". The masters would observe the slaves as if they were machines, and "if a slave received a mortal injury and twisted and screamed in agony, no master would avert his gaze in horror [...] any more than he would if the ceiling fell on a printing press". Malcolm concludes that "here is a difference in 'attitude' that is not matter of believing or expecting different facts" (Malcolm 1954, 548–549). If this really is a difference in attitude, then it would be impossible for us to say that the slave-owners have got something *wrong*, since it is out of order to talk about errors when attitudes are concerned, *pace* Wittgenstein's example involving belief in God. How could a belief in God be shown to be wrong, if it really is an *Einstellung*? Of course it is possible that such an attitude changes; one might fall out of faith, say. But this does not make one's former belief an *Irrtum*; there are no independent facts to be mistaken about (thus proofs of the existence or non-existence of God are quite irrelevant here). So what about the case of the slave-owners? We would like to say that they are terribly wrong about their slaves, but here, too, it seems that it is out of order to speak of an error. What is lacking in the case of the slave-owners is not more *information*. It is not as if they would have got the *facts* wrong. But there *is* something lacking. When discussing sensations, Wittgenstein writes: "Our attitude to what is alive and to what is dead, is not the same. All our reactions are different" (*PI* §284). Indeed, in the case of the slave-owners, we can say that their reactions are so utterly different from ours that it is questionable whether we would

like to describe *them* as human beings whom we could criticize from a moral point of view. It is only within a web of human relationships that an attitude towards the soul can be revealed (Winch 1987, 143), and what is lacking in the example of the slave-owners is precisely such a web, or form of life. Thus we can say that it is questionable whether Wittgenstein seriously entertained the possibility of there being such a difference in attitudes towards human beings. As Cockburn notes, if we think that this case is clear then we just fail to appreciate how extraordinary it is. Indeed, such a tribe would be so completely alien to us that it is unclear that we could even describe the situation in terms of judgements these slave-owners do make about their slaves (Cockburn 1990, 48-50). I would like to claim that Wittgenstein here, too, describes a kind of "limiting case". The very difficulty or even impossibility to fill in the details of this case and still keep it intelligible shows us something important about the limits of the concept of a person.

3 But does not all this boil down to a kind of idealist position? Isn't Wittgenstein saying that the attitude decides what things are? It is important to realize that we are not talking about aspects here, or "emergent properties". It is not the case that if I take a certain attitude towards a body, the mental properties somehow emerge or dawn as an aspect. Indeed, it is question-begging to speak about "taking an attitude" in these contexts; an attitude is rather something I *find* myself in, and something that I am unable to abandon at will. It has something to do with how we see and treat things; the light in which we understand them; the perspective in which things make themselves perceived by us. To have an attitude towards a soul means that I react to a person's words and behaviour in a way that indicates that he has a soul; I am not of this *opinion*, i.e., I do not interpret his movements and behaviour and then infer that he is indeed a self-conscious being. But this does *not* make the position an "idealist" one. The attitude does not turn a body into a human being; nor is it up to us to simply choose whether to have such an attitude or not. "Our attitude to what is alive and to what is dead, is not the same. All our reactions are different" means that I am not, e.g., of the opinion that a fly is alive and a stone is not: this is something that shows itself in the way I react to the object in question, how I treat it and what I am prepared to say and do about it. But it is not my *attitude* in itself that makes the fly a living creature! Similarly, it is not my "attitude towards a soul" that makes something a person or a human being. But to say that *eine Einstellung zur Seele* is basic to our concept of a person is a way of showing how this concept is dependent upon the web of human relationships within which such attitudes are meaningful and possible.

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Has the Mind-Body Problem Advanced over the Years?

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1. Introduction

The mind-body problem is one of the deepest puzzles of philosophy. It is the problem of giving an account of how the mind or mental processes are related to bodily states or processes. Ever since its beginning in antiquity the problem has intrigued philosophers and theologians. Even today philosophers of mind, neuroscientists and psychologists are all concerned with this problem. Since René Descartes (1596- 1650) introduced the famous Cartesian Dualism, separation of mind and matter into two different but interacting substances, much discussion has followed. Current debate in philosophy of mind has become too technical for a layman to follow although the mind/body problem continues to enjoy a great popular appeal. We ask like Susan Greenfield (Greenfield 2002) *How does a wrinkled lump of grey matter weighing little more than a kilogram manage to think, love, dream and feel such widely different sensations as raw pleasures and numbing depressions?* This of course assumes that the human brain is the seat of all mental activity.

2. The problem

It has been customary to divide loosely the problems about the human mind into easy and hard ones. The former refer to empirical brain research and experimental psychology, implying that there are no mysteries and we are making rapid progress in these fields. On the other hand there are philosophical problems about the relation between mind and body which can be termed the hard problems. Whether there has been any progress in the philosophy of mind over the years is debatable. The answer would depend on what we mean by philosophy and by progress.

A principal problem in the philosophy of mind, as already mentioned, was kicked off by René Descartes by postulating two different kinds of substances in our bodies: *res cogitans* (mind) and *res extensa* (matter). This crude form of substance dualism opened up so many difficulties (how to fit it in with all our beliefs of science?) that it is no longer pursued by either scientists or philosophers perhaps with the exception of Karl Popper or John Eccles.

According to Franz Brentano (1838-1917) the mentality of mental phenomena consists in their *intentionality*—their aboutness or their being directed upon an object. Many of my beliefs, desires, intentions are directed to external objects. But how could processes in my brain be *about* anything? Of course, there are many mental activities and emotions which are not *about* anything in particular.

The problems of the mind can be enumerated in terms of further ideas, e.g. Mental Causation or Intentional Causation: How could a conscious mental state have any impact on a physical object such as a human body?

The major problem, however, remains the problem of Consciousness (or self-consciousness), the feeling of subjectivity, the feeling of 'I'. Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) stated that consciousness was the greatest wonder of all wonders. David Chalmers opens his new book *The*

Conscious Mind (Chalmers 1996) as follows: *What is Consciousness? Conscious experience is at once the most familiar thing in the world and the most mysterious. There is nothing we know about more directly than consciousness, but it is far from clear how to reconcile it with everything else we know.* Another recent book *Conscious Experience* edited by Thomas Metzinger (Metzinger 1995) begins with these words: *How can consciousness arise in a physical universe? ...Today, the problem of consciousness – perhaps together with the question of the origin of the universe – marks the very limit of human striving for understanding.* To quote another expert: *Consciousness is almost certainly a property of the physical brain. The major mystery, however, is how neurons achieve effects such as being aware of a toothache or the smell of cinnamon. Neuroscience has not reached the stage where we can satisfactorily answer these questions...no one would say we pretty much understand the neurobiological mechanism of awareness (although Dennett's book title *Consciousness Explained* (Dennett 1991), rather misleadingly suggests otherwise. (Patricia Smith Churchland in (Metzinger 1995, p.185))*

3. Some Current Views on the Mind-Body Problem

Starting from Ryle's classic *The Concept of Mind* (1949), through writings of philosophers like Wittgenstein, Davidson, Searle, Dennett, Chomsky, Nagel, McGinn, Smart, Armstrong, Fodor and many others up to today's work in Cognitive Science, the current status of the philosophy of mind is too vast to be meaningfully summarised by me. I can only attempt a subjective thumbnail picture.

We can see basically two schools of thought:

1. The mind-body problem, or the problem of consciousness can never be understood fully however much we may learn about the functions of the brain. We may call this a mysterian or pessimistic view. A related view is that we are asking needlessly meaningless questions which cannot be answered.

2. We are getting closer to an understanding of consciousness by the advances in neuroscience and cognitive science, notwithstanding the fact that science does not claim to be able to explain everything.

Philosophers can be divided into Dualists and Monists. Dualists like Descartes may be rare nowadays but many philosophers do not accept that matter alone can explain mental phenomena and seem to suggest a milder form of dualism.. They argue that any objective physical science would leave an 'explanatory gap' failing to describe what it is like to have a particular experience and failing to explain why there are phenomenal experiences at all.

Other philosophers, called Naturalists or Physicalists or adherents of Identity Theories (mental events are identical with physical events) assert that matter is all that there is for us to study. Consciousness appears as an emergent property from matter, they say. Or, better still, it is suggested that once we develop the

right concepts and ask the right questions we will be able to solve the mind-body problem once and for all.

Wittgenstein has recorded vast amount of his reflections on mental states and subjectivity. Without going into his thoughts on private language argument or access to the inner, we can just recall his repeated declaration that the problems of philosophy would vanish if we attended properly to language. As an example he reminds us that in thinking about the mind we are often in the grip of a picture whose application we do not fully understand (Metzinger 1995 p.133)

A group called Eliminativists (or Eliminative Materialists) counsel the abandonment of the whole set of terms consciousness, self, qualia that usher in the problems of mind and body.

In the heyday of Artificial Intelligence a computational model of the mind (neuro-anatomy and chemistry don't matter) was proposed, but Searle with his Chinese Room example and others have convincingly shown that a computer or a Turing machine cannot have what we call consciousness.

The theory of mind currently in vogue with cognitive scientists is known as functionalism. Functionalism is the modern successor to behaviourism, and arguably is the most influential position on the mind-body relation today (Honderich 1995 p.579). Functionalism says that mental states are constituted by their causal relations to one another and to sensory inputs and behavioural outputs. (Guttenplan 1994 p.323)

4. Nature of Philosophy and Progress in Philosophy

Philosophy can be taken either as a guide to life or as a clarification of our concepts (Sanatani 2001). Despite rumours about the death of analytical philosophy, we prefer the modern Anglo-American style of philosophising and appreciate the views of Wittgenstein on the nature of philosophy. W.V. Quine and Bertrand Russell thought philosophy as an extension of science, Wittgenstein differed. The following quotations will give an idea of Wittgenstein's views. (Sanatani 2001)

Philosophy is wholly distinct from science, and its methods and products are not those of the sciences. (NL)

The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thought.

Philosophy is not a theory but an activity.

A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. (T 4.112)

Philosophy is not a cognitive pursuit; there are no new facts to be discovered by philosophy; only new insights. ((PR; PG 256)

Philosophy seeks to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language (PI #132)

The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness. (PI 255)

Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. (PI 109)

A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not survey (übersehen) the use of our words. Our grammar is lacking in perspicuity (Übersichtlichkeit) . A perspicuous representation produces this understanding, which consists in seeing connections.. ..(PI 122)

Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything... (PI 126)

With such views Wittgenstein would have hardly believed in the progress in the philosophy of mind, or for that matter in any type of philosophy over the ages. But then how to evaluate the production of page after page of philosophical writings, including perhaps 30,000 pages by Wittgenstein himself? One might ask, like John Haldane, Has Philosophy Made a Difference and Could it be Expected To? (O'Hear 2001).

According to Haldane a common complaint seems to be that philosophy is characterised by a general and marked failure to make progress. What was being discussed in antiquity about substance, identity, time, knowledge, value and virtue.. is still being debated today with no incontestable sign of advance let alone of resolution. Haldane further says that this complaint comes not only from outside philosophy but is also heard from within philosophy, especially from those attracted to a scientific conception of philosophy. (O'Hear 2001, p.155).

Like Wittgenstein we do not accept a scientific view of philosophy. We believe philosophy should clarify our questions and thereby somehow show if our questions are at all answerable or not. If a question is clearly answerable and objectively verifiable, it ceases to be a philosophical question and ends up being a scientific one as has often happened in the past. There are no new philosophical questions to discover only new insights are provided by worthy philosophers. A philosophical analysis throws fresh light on age-old problems and provides valuable insight but rarely gives a clear-cut yes/no answer or prescribes what we should or should not do. Again with Wittgenstein we believe philosophy has a therapeutic value, it can remove our intellectual worries and bring us a peace of mind. In other words, philosophy as a discipline is one that soothes rather than solves but is no less constructive or important for that.

These remarks can be illustrated by the current status of the mind/body problem. The scientific study of the brain has made remarkable progress. But the age old philosophical questions remain unanswered. With the proposal of new theories and models the modern philosophy of mind has become a very rich, and at the same time a technical field where only a specialist can find his way. But we have still not found within our brains the seat of consciousness, nor any extra-material substance proposed by Descartes. We are still groping for an understanding.

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Affectivity and Identity in the Treatment of mood Disorders

Heike Schmidt-Felzmann, Marburg

1. Mood disorders and the “real self”

It is not uncommon to hear patients who suffer from depression complain that they are not themselves. Given that their lives during a depressive episode may be profoundly changed, it is often easy to agree. But what does it mean to agree here? “Not being themselves” in this context refers to qualitative changes that have occurred in their way of being, including changes in personality and self-understanding. I will use the term “self” to refer to periods of a distinguishable personality pattern in a person’s life, without further discussion of their metaphysical status or the criteria for a distinction between different selves.¹

Given the person with a mood disorder who considers herself not really “herself” any more, what happens when she takes medication and the symptoms disappear? I will now assume for the sake of simplicity (but incorrectly)² that patients generally consider their illness self S2 as alien to their usual self S1. Three different possible reactions to medication can thus be distinguished: (i) First, there are those who just seem to go back from S2 to their usual self S1 that represents what they “really” are. They may have some side effects from the medication, but do not consider these to be relevant. (ii) Then there are those who perceive the effects of medication as changing their personality. In this case, S1 is what they remember being before S2. However, instead of regaining their “real self” through medication, they are now left with S3, which despite many similarities to S1 still seems alien to them. This can happen in the treatment of bipolar disorder with lithium, as well as in the treatment of depression with some antidepressants (e.g. Jamison 1995, Elfenbein 1995). (iii) Finally, there are those cases in which patients again perceive the resulting S3 as different from S1, but now see S1 as comparatively lacking. From the standpoint of S3, they judge S1 as alien, while S3 is now considered to be their “real self”. This phenomenon has sometimes been observed in the treatment of depression, usually with SSRIs, and famously depicted in Peter Kramer’s bestseller *Listening to Prozac* (also Elfenbein 1995 and Thompson 1995).

How should the difference between these cases be understood? The first case seems straightforward – a “mental illness” has interrupted the person’s usual way of being and behaving; once this disruption is under control, she can go on living her life as usual. The second case, again, does not seem mysterious. Psychotropic medication has a pervasive influence on the patient’s nervous system. Its use may be necessary for keeping the “mental illness” at bay, however, it is not surprising that a person under its influence may not feel entirely the same way about herself as before. However, the third case seems puzzling. How is it possible that a person can regard as her “real self” what she has only experienced under the influence of medication, and moreover only for a very brief time? The worry behind this question seems to be above all a worry about authenticity – can a person under these

circumstances authentically identify with S3? In order to bring into focus what is at issue here, I will now explore one specific important aspect that is often reported to differ between S1 and S3.

2. Medication and moral sensibilities

It has long been known that changes in mood can go together with changes in moral sensibilities. Moral scrupulosity is a frequent characteristic of depression, and there is typically some moral carelessness in persons who experience mania. There is also evidence that some kinds of anti-depressant medication (e.g. Prozac) may affect not only mood, but also moral sensibilities, and promote shifts towards greater moral indifference (cp. Kramer 1997, Sobo 1999, 2001, Elfenbein 1995). That is, during the use of medication, the person seems to be more morally indifferent than before.

Such malleability of moral sensibilities is an interesting phenomenon, especially in the context of discussions of personal identity. Given that moral commitments are generally acknowledged to be an important part of a person’s identity, how will such changes affect those who experience them? Empirically, reactions among patients who experience such changes seem to fall into two categories:

(i) Some patients are rather disturbed when they notice these changes, and struggle to keep up their previous moral standards. Their current moral sensibilities as S3 appear to them inadequate when compared with S1. Despite experiencing a certain degree of moral indifference now, the patients still think that they were morally right when they perceived the moral demands of situations differently. Interestingly, just being cognitively aware of this experiential difference seems not to be enough. While using the medication, patients seem not to be able to fully make up cognitively for the experiential difference and act as they would think right. As a consequence, they may choose to rather go back to a state of depression than compromise their moral standards (Sobo 2001).

(ii) Alternatively, other patients may also be aware of similar changes, but not be worried by them. Instead, they consider their current moral sensibilities as more adequate than their previous ones. That is, the more rigid moral standards of S1 are now regarded as obsolete for S3. Not only do these patients not experience the urgency of certain moral demands any more, but they also explicitly discount their validity now, despite being well aware that previously they had thought otherwise about them (Kramer 1997, Elfenbein 1995).

3. Medication and the inauthentic self

When confronted with such changes in personality that have been brought about through medication, the first impulse seems to be to consider them as alien. That is, the patient herself would be considered as suffering from some kind of self-deception if she insists on identifying with S3. Different reasons can be given for this attitude: Some critics would assume that any interference which is not due

¹ I do not want to discuss here whether such “selves” are e.g. Parfitian selves (Parfit 1989). What I want to draw attention to resembles what Taylor refers to as “identity” (Taylor 1992), or what Quante calls “personality” (Quante 1999 and 2001).

² For positive accounts of the experience of depression, cp. Martin 1999 or Graham 1990.

to internal or “natural” causes has to be alien to the “real self”; others would only accept changes as authentic when they come about as a result of a process of rational reasoning; others would claim that authenticity depends on the exercise of autonomous choice in a very strong sense (to name but the most popular options).

How is it possible that persons nevertheless come to identify with S3 as their “real self”? First of all, the influence of medication could be understood as *intoxication*. That is, while patients are under the influence of the medication, they are presumably not in a state in which they can judge these matters correctly. While it may seem to them that they have the ability to judge their former moral convictions as invalid, they are in fact mistaken, and just unable to acknowledge their impairment.

Another possibility is the *hedonist explanation*, based on the assumption that people prefer feeling better to feeling worse. Accordingly, patients may endorse S3 because it suddenly turns out to be much nicer to live that way. However, while understandable, just feeling good will not be enough to warrant the endorsement of S3. In other words, endorsing S3 is ultimately a sign of moral weakness and not of authentic choice; it means to give in to the temptation of hedonism.

Alternatively, there is the *explanation from social values*: S3 may be endorsed because it is correlated with enhanced fulfillment of certain social norms. Given the current cultural stereotypes, it is no wonder that it is Prozac, a medication that seems to bring about carefree, outgoing, assertive and socially adaptive behavior, that is particularly often involved in cases of endorsement of S3. Once the medication has enabled patients to receive social rewards, so the critic, the formerly accepted restrictive moral norms may now seem insignificant. Identification with S3 and rejection of S1 would again turn out to rely on the wrong kind of motives and not support the claim that this is an authentic endorsement of S3.³

4. The possibility of authenticity

Is there any reason to assume that the critics may be mistaken in their diagnosis of S3 as inauthentic? As I want to argue, there is. The main worry in the criticisms in the previous section is concerned with the nature of the patients’ rejection of formerly held moral values. This is indeed a puzzling phenomenon, but I do not think the de-authorization of the patients’ self-understanding is warranted by the given arguments.

First of all, there is little indication that the intoxication model correctly represents the effects of anti-depressant medication. The medication brightens patients’ mood and has some circumscribed side-effects, but does not usually lead to any significant impairment. (Also, neurophysiologically, these anti-depressants do not target those transmitters usually involved in substances of abuse.) The observable changes at least will not be sufficient to establish the presence of an “intoxication” that could justify discounting their judgments.

What about the hedonist and social values explanations? Both assume that the nature of the value change is of a kind that justifies regarding it as inauthentic. However, taking their criticism seriously would entail that authentic selves are extraordinarily hard to come by in ordinary life, as apparently many people are similarly

motivated.⁴ I would want to argue that the kind of authenticity that is at issue when the role of medication is concerned does not usually seem to imply a highly demanding understanding of authenticity. At least for many of the critics, their worry is rather linked more specifically to the sudden appearance switch in value orientation, and the apparent causal role of medication in it. But is this really sufficient for a de-authorization of the personal identification with S3? Sudden onset of value changes can be found at other times, e.g. in religious conversions. Should we discount these as well, despite their considerable significance for those who experience them? The main issue here is probably that these changes are due to the use of some specifiable chemical agent. However, given that the intoxication model is inadequate, what does the problem consist in? After all, chemicals influence everybody’s way of perceiving the world; human psychological life is dependent on the action of exactly such chemicals. Establishing a significant difference between medication and the usual brain chemicals that is relevant for the question of authenticity would require more argument than has been provided.

What is perhaps most irritating in these cases, especially for philosophers, is the apparently non-rational way in which values are changed. However, it is important to note that these changes are not to be understood in terms of chemical brain washing: None of the patients wakes up and finds that overnight a completely different set of beliefs has been installed. Instead, it is their affective experience that has changed, and with it the comparative salience of morally relevant features in their experience. Apparently, changes in affective experience can shape a person’s general moral outlook to a significant degree. Interestingly, such experience seems to present itself to the person as having a certain intrinsic authority, so that following its demands may be perceived as justified in virtue of its affective characteristics (and it will not e.g. be seen as giving in to a temptation).⁵ Nevertheless, accepting the evaluative authority of affective experience does not seem to be an automatism. Persons under the influence of anti-depressant medication are still able to reflect rationally and may even come to the conclusion that their current experience does not do justice to their moral convictions.

In the absence of serious impairments, it does not seem justified to discount the patients’ endorsement of S3 as inauthentic. The identification with S3 is apparently viable in the patients’ lives (Kramer 1997, Elfenbein 1995). If the same value changes had occurred independently of the use of medication, de-authorization of the perspective of these fully competent persons would not have seemed warranted. One may perhaps doubt the value of their specific form of life, but one should be aware that this makes them no different from many other cases. If what we mean by authenticity is not something that succeeds only rarely and requires extraordinary efforts, then the specific causal role of medication does not seem to provide sufficient reason against the possibility of authenticity in this case. In being so visibly dependent on the presence of affective factors, this case is perhaps just a particularly clear example of what is more generally involved in the endorsement of value.

⁴ Arguably, some of the critics who take depressives to have special insight would agree.

⁵ This is also supported by observations in more extreme cases of depression and mania. While the episode lasts, patients with depression will frequently explain why they are indeed as morally blameworthy as they feel, and patients with mania are usually convinced that acting on their impulses is fully justified. After the episode is over, both will usually revert to their former understanding of values. – For some neuroscientific evidence of the specific role of affective factors in moral reasoning see also the results of the recent fMRI study by Greene et al. 2001.

³ For other accounts of similar worries, see also Kramer 1997 and the *Hastings Center Report* 2000.

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Framing-Ansätze und die Standardtheorie der Person¹

Ralph Schrader, Jena

Seit den siebziger Jahren hat sich eine Standardtheorie der Person entwickelt, die hauptsächlich auf Arbeiten von Harry Frankfurt, Amartya Sen und Daniel Dennett zurückgeht. Diese Standardtheorie prägt die Debatte bis heute und liegt insbesondere der Verwendung des Personbegriffs in der praktischen Philosophie zugrunde. Eine ihrer Grundannahmen besteht darin, dass der Personstatus sich ausgehend von der Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie klären lässt: Ein rational entscheidender Akteur zu sein, ist eine notwendige Bedingung für die Zuschreibung des Personstatus. Deshalb stellt eine Revision der handlungstheoretischen Prämissen zugleich eine Herausforderung für die Persontheorie dar.

Im Folgenden soll gezeigt werden, dass neuere Ansätze aus der Psychologie, den Sozialwissenschaften und der empirischen Entscheidungsforschung, die unter dem Schlagwort des „framing“ firmieren, mit den handlungs- und entscheidungstheoretischen Annahmen des Standardmodells unvereinbar sind und daher zu einer Überprüfung des Personkonzeptes auffordern. Im ersten Abschnitt wird zunächst die Standardtheorie der Person kurz rekapituliert. Im zweiten Abschnitt werden gemeinsame Merkmale der Framing-Theorien rekonstruiert, um im letzten Abschnitt das Verhältnis der Ansätze zu diskutieren.

1. Die Standardtheorie der Person

Die Standardtheorie für die Zuschreibung des Personstatus beinhaltet vier zentrale Elemente:

Der Personbegriff wird ausgehend vom Standardmodell der Handlungserklärung erläutert. Für den Personstatus ist es notwendig, dass sich Verhalten unter Bezug auf intentionale Zustände als Handeln erklären lässt.

Das handlungstheoretische Grundmodell wird durch die Einführung von Wünschen zweiter Stufe oder, entscheidungstheoretisch ausgedrückt, von Metapräferenzen angereichert. Handlungsleitende Wünsche höherer Stufe bzw. Metapräferenzen sind eine hinreichende Bedingung für die Zuschreibung des Personstatus.

Wünsche höherer Stufe bzw. Metapräferenzen *begründen* Wünsche bzw. Präferenzen niederer Stufe.

Treten Widersprüche zwischen Wünschen oder Präferenzen unterschiedlicher Stufen auf, so ist es eine mit dem Personstatus verbundene Rationalitätsbedingung, ein *kohärentes* System von Wünschen herzustellen.

Die Standardtheorie wurde maßgeblich von Harry Frankfurt (1971) geprägt. Er unterscheidet zwischen Wünschen erster Stufe, die auf angestrebte Weltzustände gerichtet sind und Wünschen zweiter Stufe, die sich auf Wünsche erster Stufe beziehen. Das berühmte Beispiel ist der Raucher, der in einer gegebenen Situation zu rauchen wünscht, doch gleichzeitig auch wünscht, dies nicht zu wünschen. Gelingt es, eine solche Inkonsistenz aufzulösen

und werden die Wünsche zweiter Stufe handlungsleitend, so bezeichnet Frankfurt sie als Volitionen zweiter Stufe. Die Fähigkeit, Volitionen zweiter Stufe auszubilden, bietet nicht nur ein Kriterium für den Personstatus, sondern zugleich auch für die Willensfreiheit und die moralische Verantwortlichkeit von Akteuren.

Eine wichtige Ergänzung des Ansatzes stammt von Amartya Sen. Während Frankfurt in der philosophischen Terminologie von Wünschen (*desires*) und Überzeugungen (*beliefs*) verbleibt, verwendet Sen das technische Instrumentarium der Entscheidungstheorie und entwickelt ein Konzept der „*rankings of preference rankings*“ (Sen 1077, 100). Das Konzept erlaubt es, auch komplexe Rangordnungen konsistent darzustellen. Den Akteuren sind nicht nur ihre tatsächlichen Metapräferenzen bekannt, prinzipiell sind ihnen auch mögliche andere Rangordnungen kognitiv zugänglich. Die durch eine Metapräferenz geleitete Wahl einer Präferenzordnung kann daher als Fall der Selbstbindung verstanden werden. Die Standardtheorie gewinnt ihre Überzeugungskraft nicht zuletzt aus Sens Verknüpfung philosophischer Intuitionen mit entscheidungstheoretischen und sozialwissenschaftlichen Konzepten.

Die Beiträge von Frankfurt und Sen beziehen sich auf die intrapersonale Ebene. Dagegen vertritt Daniel Dennett (1976) eine Position, die der Persontheorie eine interpersonale und interpretationistische Perspektive hinzufügt. Auch für ihn sind Personen Wesen, deren Verhalten sich als Handeln erklären lässt – denen gegenüber man den *intentional stance* einnehmen kann. Als weitere Bedingung führt er ein, dass diese Wesen in der Lage sein müssen, die intentionale Haltung zu erwidern. Somit gelangt man zu intentionalen Systemen zweiter oder höherer Stufe, die Meinungen oder Wünsche in bezug auf die Meinungen oder Wünsche anderer intentionaler Systeme besitzen. Die Übertragung dieser Interpretationsleistung auf sich selbst, ermöglicht Selbstbewusstsein und Personalität.

Der Bezug auf intentionale Zustände höherer Ordnung als Handlungsgründe (Bedingung (b) und (c)) wird von allen Vertretern der Standardtheorie geteilt. Eine offene Frage ist jedoch das Verhältnis von nieder- zu höherstufigen Wünschen bzw. Präferenzen. Ist ein rationaler Akteur im Falle einer Inkonsistenz von Präferenzen und Metapräferenzen gezwungen, die Präferenzen entsprechend den Metapräferenzen abzuändern? Eine „hierarchische“ Lösung dieses Problems kann darin bestehen, von einigen höchstrangigen Bindungen auszugehen, die (höherstufige) Wünsche bzw. Präferenzen determinieren und selbst nicht in Frage gestellt werden können. Hinweise auf diese Strategie finden sich in neueren Arbeiten Frankfurts (1994) und bei Vertretern des Kommunitarismus. Die höchstrangigen Wünsche sind dann allerdings nicht mehr begründbar. Attraktiver scheint mir daher eine kohärentistische Position, wie sie bei Sen angelegt ist und z. B. auch von Julian Nida-Rümelin (2001) vertreten wird. Hier wird nicht unbedingt gefordert, dass im Falle einer Inkonsistenz Präferenzen nach Maßgabe der

¹ Für Kritik und Hinweise danke ich Susanne Bellin, Thomas Bonschab und Oliver Stengel.

Metapräferenzen verändert werden müssen. Vielmehr haben sich auch Metapräferenzen in einzelnen Entscheidungssituationen zu bewähren. Ein Beispiel bietet ein Akteur, der Eis essen will, dessen Metapräferenzen es ihm jedoch verbieten, da er schlank bleiben möchte. Wenn Metapräferenzen regelmäßig zu Enttäuschung von Präferenzen erster Ordnung führen, kann es auch rational sein, die Metapräferenz abzuändern. Die Rationalitätsanforderung an Personen besteht also nur darin, Präferenzen und Metapräferenzen in Übereinstimmung zu bringen. Der Begründungszusammenhang wird nicht hierarchisch abgeschlossen, sondern Begründungen werden in einem holistischen Netz von Wünschen und Überzeugungen, die einander wechselseitig stützen, situiert.

2. Grundannahmen der Framing-Ansätze

Bei Kahneman und Tversky (1986) findet sich ein Experiment, das einer der wichtigsten Ausgangspunkte für die Entstehung der Framing-Theorien war – das *asian disease problem*. Eine Gruppe von Personen wurde gebeten sich vorzustellen, dass eine neuartige asiatische Seuche ihr Land bedroht: Es werden 600 Todesopfer erwartet, und die Befragten sollen zwischen zwei Programmen, die zur Seuchenbekämpfung vorgeschlagen werden, wählen. Nachstehend die Formulierung der alternativen Programme und in Klammern der Anteil der Befragten, die die entsprechende Alternative gewählt haben.

Wenn Programm A angenommen wird, werden 200 Menschen gerettet. [72 Prozent]

Wenn Programm B angenommen wird, besteht eine Wahrscheinlichkeit von 1/3, dass 600 Menschen gerettet werden und eine Wahrscheinlichkeit von 2/3, dass kein Mensch gerettet wird. [28 Prozent]

Die durchschnittliche Zahl der Geretteten wäre bei der Anwendung beider Programme gleich. Dennoch entscheiden sich die Befragten für Programm A, sind also risikoavers. Interessanter wird das Experiment, wenn man sich die Ergebnisse einer zweiten Gruppe betrachtet, der das gleiche Problem in einer veränderten Formulierung vorgelegt wurde. Statt der Zahl der Geretteten wurde nun die Zahl der Verstorbenen genannt.

Wenn Programm C angenommen wird, werden 400 Menschen sterben. [22 Prozent]

Wenn Programm D angenommen wird, besteht eine Wahrscheinlichkeit von 1/3, dass niemand sterben wird und eine Wahrscheinlichkeit von 2/3, dass 600 Menschen sterben werden. [78 Prozent]

Die veränderte Beschreibung des gleichen Problems führt zu einer Verschiebung von Risikoaversion zu Risikoneigung. Die damit zusammenhängende Rahmung als „Rettung“ in dem einen Fall und als „Todesfall“ in dem anderen ist aus Sicht der Entscheidungstheorie irrational und unerklärlich. An dieser Anomalie setzen die Framing-Ansätze an. Sie untersuchen jedoch nicht nur die Wirkung verschiedener Beschreibungsweisen auf das Entscheidungsverhalten von Akteuren. Ebenso soll die „Routinisierung“ von Entscheidungsprozessen sowie die Wirkung kultureller Faktoren und sozialer Normen auf Orientierungen von Akteuren erklärt werden.

Die Framing-Ansätze sind ausgesprochen heterogen. Dennoch lässt sich ein Frame allgemein als ein mentales Modell einer Situation definieren, welches, wenn es aktiv ist, zu einer stereotypen Situationswahrnehmung und einem stereotypen Verhalten führt. Zudem lassen sich weitere gemeinsame Merkmale der Ansätze ausmachen,

die im Folgenden an zwei Theorien erläutert werden sollen.

Die Framing-Theorien gehen von Anomalien des entscheidungstheoretischen Standardmodells aus.

Frames bilden ein Analogon zu den Metapräferenzen in der Standardtheorie.

Es findet eine rein *kausale Interpretation mentaler Zustände* statt, d. h. es wird eine Verursachungsrelation in bezug auf Wünsche und Überzeugungen postuliert, keine Begründungsrelation.

Der kausalen Ausrichtung entspricht eine *Top-down-Perspektive*.

Um die im Experiment beobachtete Abweichung von der Rationalitätsannahme der Beschreibungsinvarianz zu erklären, nehmen Kahneman und Tversky eine Reihe von Korrekturen an der Theorie der *subjective expected utility* vor. So wird insbesondere angenommen, dass Akteure die Ergebnisse von Handlungen immer als Gewinn oder Verlust beurteilen und eine überproportionale Neigung besitzen, Verluste zu vermeiden. Je nachdem ob eine Situation als Gewinn- oder Verlustsituation gerahmt wird, werden daher unterschiedliche subjektive Bewertungen von Entscheidungssituationen trotz objektiv gleicher Auszahlungen erwartet. Das Framing bestimmt also, welche Präferenzordnungen Akteure bekunden. Die erste Formulierung des *asian disease problem* führte, nach diesem Modell, zur Aktivierung des Gewinnframes, die zweite zu der des Verlustframes. Um den befürchteten Verlust zu vermeiden, waren die Akteure sogar bereit, ein höheres Risiko einzugehen.

Kahneman und Tversky variieren die SEU-Theorie, indem sie veränderte Nutzenfunktionen für unterschiedlich gerahmte Situationen postulieren. Hier besteht eine Analogie zu Metapräferenzen bei Sen, da Präferenzordnungen (erster Stufe) durch den Frame gesteuert werden. Allerdings ist zu beachten, dass den Akteuren alternative Frames unbewußt sind. Da dem Akteur daher auch alternative Präferenzordnungen kognitiv nicht zugänglich sind, kann man seine Entscheidungsverhalten auch nicht als eine Wahl zwischen verschiedenen Präferenzordnungen beschreiben und der Gesichtspunkt des Abwägens entfällt. Darüber hinaus bleibt in der Theorie weitgehend offen, worin die Verlustaversion und die Gewinnneigung begründet sind. Jedoch charakterisieren die Autoren ihren Ansatz durch das Schlagwort der „Psychophysik“ (Kahneman und Tversky 2000, passim), so dass zu erkennen ist, dass sie sich einer rationalitätstheoretischen Einbettung verweigern und eine rein kausale Interpretation mentaler Zustände nahelegen.

Als weiteres Beispiel für die Framing-Ansätze seien die soziologischen Theorien von Sigwart Lindenberg (1993) und Hartmut Esser (2001) genannt. Ihre Ansätze beruhen auf dem Formalismus der SEU-Theorie. Das Framing wird als ein Prozess der Wahl modelliert: Aus der Zahl der möglichen mentalen Modelle wird eines selektiert, das mit den wahrgenommenen Situationsmerkmalen übereinstimmt und attraktive Handlungsoptionen eröffnet. Auf den ersten Blick scheint diese Variante der Framing-Theorie daher mit der Idee der Metapräferenzen und der Standardtheorie des Personstatus vereinbar. Doch müssen die Autoren die paradoxe Behauptung vermeiden, dass Akteure sich entscheiden, automatisch einer Routine zu folgen. Daher erhält das formale Kalkül hier eine andere Interpretation als in der Entscheidungstheorie üblich. Als Faktoren für die „Wahl“ des Frames werden soziale Normen und anthropologisch konstante Bedürfnisse angegeben, zur Erklärung ihrer Wirkungsweise wird auf die Neurophysiologie verwiesen. Die Rekonstruktion

reflexiver Entscheidungsprozesse wird also zugunsten einer Verbindung aus soziologischen und psychologischen Kausalmodellen aufgegeben.

Es ist zu beachten, dass die Framing-Theorien nicht lediglich auf eine Ökonomisierung von Entscheidungsprozessen in dem Sinne hinweisen, dass die Beschaffung neuer Informationen und die Bewertung alternativer Handlungsoptionen Zeit kostet, so dass ein rationaler Akteur die Entscheidungsfindung abbricht. Vielmehr wird ein anderer Entscheidungsmodus als im Standardmodell der Rational-Choice-Theorie postuliert.

3. Das Verhältnis der Ansätze

Vergleicht man die handlungs- und entscheidungstheoretischen Annahmen der Standardtheorie mit den Annahmen der Framing-Ansätze, so treten trotz formaler Ähnlichkeiten erhebliche inhaltliche Differenzen zutage. Metapräferenzen wie auch Frames sind Bestimmungsfaktoren für Präferenzordnungen. Allerdings schaffen Metapräferenzen eine *Rangordnung* von Präferenzordnungen, die den Akteuren bewußt sein kann und im Sinne personaler Verantwortung auch sein soll, während Frames eine *Restriktion* möglicher Rangordnungen darstellen. Man kann vielleicht sagen, dass durch das Framing ausgeschlossene alternative Frames und Präferenzordnungen „unsichtbar“ werden. Daher ist es auch nicht möglich, zu eigenen Frames in der gleichen Weise wertend Stellung zu nehmen, wie zu Metapräferenzen. Anders als Metapräferenzen, die *Gründe* für die Wahl zwischen Präferenzordnungen angeben, sind Frames lediglich *Ursachen* für Präferenzordnungen. Hiermit hängt auch zusammen, dass eine kohärentistische Beschreibung des Verhältnisses Frames und Präferenzen nicht möglich ist und stattdessen eine Top-down-Perspektive eingenommen wird.

Welche Folgerungen sind für die Standardtheorie der Personalität zu ziehen? Die empirischen Befunde, die zur Entwicklung der Framing-Ansätze geführt haben, sind gut bestätigt. Daher ist, auch wenn sich über den Wert der einzelnen Framing-Theorien streiten lässt, eine umstandslose Rückkehr zum Standardmodell der Handlungs- und Entscheidungstheorie nicht möglich. Ebenso wenig kann der Gegensatz der beiden Ansätze als eine Variante des Konflikts zwischen naturwissenschaftlich-nomologischen und intentionalistischen Theorien des Geistes verstanden werden. Der Gebrauch intentionalen Vokabulars durch die Framing-Theorien schließt den Rückzug auf die Positionen des Beschreibungsdualismus oder des anomalen Monismus aus.

Eine erste Lösungsmöglichkeit besteht darin, die Standardtheorie aufzugeben und zuzugestehen, dass Entscheidungssituationen, wie sie für die Zuschreibung des Personstatus notwendig sind, nur in seltenen Fällen gegeben sind. Diese Position hat jedoch erhebliche Konsequenzen für die Verwendung des Personbegriffes in der praktischen Philosophie. Es ist dann fraglich, ob der Personstatus noch Auskunft über die moralische Zurechnungsfähigkeit von Akteuren zu geben vermag.

Eine andere Lösungsvariante könnte im Versuch der Re-Interpretation der Framing-Ansätze bestehen. Eine Voraussetzung hierzu besteht in der Rücknahme der kausalen Interpretation von Framing-Prozessen, d. h. auch eine gerahmte Entscheidung muss sich als Entscheidung zwischen bewerteten Alternativen modellieren lassen. Dass dies nicht unmöglich ist, legen auch experimentelle Ergebnisse nahe. Akteure vollziehen Entscheidungen auch in gerahmten Situationen nicht vollständig automatisch, sondern sind in der Lage, Gründe für ihre Entscheidungen

zu nennen. In ambivalenten Situationen suchen sie zudem nach Merkmalen, die helfen, eine Alternative einer anderen vorzuziehen. (Vgl. Shafir et al. 2000)

Die kausale Deutung des Framing gewinnt ihre Überzeugungskraft aus der Verletzung zentraler Rationalitätsannahmen der Entscheidungstheorie. Doch lassen sich die Rationalitätsdefizite entdramatisieren, wenn man davon ausgeht, dass auch eine gerahmte Entscheidung nicht lediglich einen einmaligen Akt darstellt. Man kann sie vielleicht als einen Schritt in der Konstruktion von Präferenzsystemen und der Bildung eines „Überlegungsgleichgewichts“ betrachten. In diesem Prozess werden in einem ersten Schritt einige Aspekte der Entscheidungssituation überbetont: zunächst die befürchteten Verluste, sodann die erwarteten Gewinne und im weiteren Verlauf des Prozesses eventuell zusätzliche Aspekte der Situation. Dies geschieht, um erste Indikatoren für eine begründete Entscheidung zu gewinnen. Im zweiten Schritt ist von rationalen Akteuren zu erwarten, dass sie ihre Präferenzen und Überzeugungen auf Konsistenz und Kohärenz überprüfen, im Falle einer Inkonsistenz Widerspruchsfreiheit herstellen und die Kohärenz zu steigern versuchen.

Der Gedanke besteht also darin, die scheinbare Irrationalität bestimmter Entscheidungen dadurch aufzulösen, dass man sie als tastende Schritte in einem Prozess von Versuch und Irrtum begreift. Im Rahmen eines evolutionären Ansatzes gesteht man zu, dass Akteure in einzelnen Situationen einem Frame unterliegen, der sich nur kausal erklären lässt. Doch bleibt es möglich, dass Akteure auf die grundlegenden Bedingungen des gesamten Prozesses reflektieren. Ähnlich wie sich in der biologischen Evolution Mutationen nicht steuern lassen, wohl aber günstige Bedingungen für die Entstehung von Mutationen geschaffen werden können, können Akteure die Randbedingungen, unter denen ihre Frames wirksam werden, beeinflussen. Auf diese Weise kann man eventuell auch wieder zu einem tragfähigen Personkonzept gelangen. Ob es einer Person in ihrem Leben möglich ist, evolutionär ein statisches Überlegungsgleichgewicht zu erreichen, ist fraglich. Als Kriterium für die Güte eines Überlegungsgleichgewichts kann jedoch wieder die – auch mit Hilfe von Metapräferenzen beschreibbare – Kohärenz eines Systems intentionaler Zustände dienen.

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Wittgenstein und die Flugtechnik

Monika Seekircher, Innsbruck

Wittgensteins technische Laufbahn und – so meine These – die Übertragung seiner technischen Herangehensweisen und Fertigkeiten auf die Philosophie wurden bisher wenig beachtet. (Vgl. Seekircher 2002) Im folgenden soll nur ein Aspekt von Wittgensteins technischer Laufbahn, nämlich seine Auseinandersetzung mit der Flugtechnik herausgearbeitet werden, wobei jedoch neue interessante biographische Details aus Wittgensteins Leben aufgezeigt werden können.

Wittgenstein kam bereits sehr früh mit der Flugtechnik in Berührung und zwar durch die Bibliothek seines Vaters, in der sich mehrere aus dem 18. Jahrhundert stammende Studien über Luft- und Ballonfahrt befanden, zu denen es durch die Entdeckung des Heißluftballons im Jahr 1783 durch die Brüder Joseph und Etienne Montgolfier gekommen war. Karl Wittgenstein mußte großes Interesse an dieser Entdeckung gehabt haben, denn er besorgte sich folgende Bücher: Faujas des Saint-Fond: *Description des expériences de la machine aérostatique de M.M. De Montgolfier* (Paris: Cuchet 1783); Abate D. Gasparo Turbini: *La nuova scoperta del globo aerostatico die Montgolfier* (Brescia: Sig. Guiseppo Filippini qu. Antonio 1784); David Bourgeois: *Recherches sur l'art de voler* (Paris: Cuchet 1784); A. G. Ro***: *Dissertation sur les aérostates des anciens et des modernes* (Geneva: Librairies des nouveautés 1784); Faujas des St. Fond: *Beschreibung der Besuche mit den aerostatischen Maschinen der Herren von Montgolfier* (Leipzig: Weidmanns Erben und Reich 1784); Vincent Lunardi: *An Account of Five Aerial Voyages in Scotland* (London: Printed for the author, and sold by J. Bell 1786). (Vgl. Spadoni 1985, 43f.). In der Bibliothek seines Vaters fand Wittgenstein aber auch eine Ausgabe mit Faksimiles der technischen Erfindungen von Leonardo da Vinci, der mit seinem Entwurf einer Hubschraube im Jahr 1493 die erste logische Begründung für das Hubschrauberprinzip darlegte, und weiters die antiken Konstruktionen Herons von Alexandria zur Luft- und Wasserkunst, die besonders erwähnenswert in Hinblick auf Wittgensteins spätere Konstruktion eines Flugzeugpropellers sind. (Vgl. Nedo 1983, 57 u. Wijdeveld 1994, 24) Damit wurden bereits sehr früh die Weichen für Wittgensteins späteres Interesse an der Flugtechnik gestellt.

Mit der Erfindung des Ballons durch die Brüder Montgolfiere im Jahr 1783 kam es zum Beginn der Luftfahrt, der Wittgenstein durch Bücher vermittelt wurde. Eine neue Wende in der Luftfahrt waren die ersten Motorflüge durch die Brüder Orville und Wilbur Wright im Jahr 1903, die Wittgenstein bereits als Zeitgenosse miterlebte. Mit diesem Ereignis setzte eine rasante Entwicklung in der Flugtechnik ein, an der auch Wittgenstein – wenn auch nur am Rande – aktiv teilnahm. Nachdem Wittgenstein sein 1906 begonnenes Maschinenbaustudium an der Technischen Hochschule in Berlin abgebrochen hatte, - sein Abgangszeugnis stammt vom 5. Mai 1908 -, kam er schon kurz darauf an die Forschungsstation von Glossop, einer Außenstelle der Universität von Manchester, an der er sich zunächst mit Drachenflugexperimenten beschäftigte. (Vgl. McGuinness 1992, 101 u. 115ff.) Im Jahresbericht des Physical Department der Universität Manchester aus dem Jahr 1908 findet sich folgender Eintrag: "Mr. Wittgenstein came from Austria with a view to making an experimental study

of aerodynamics, and proposes to complete a year's residence." (Report 1908, 168) Von seinen Experimenten mit Drachen ließ Wittgenstein jedoch bald ab und er beschäftigte sich mit der Entwicklung eines Düsentriebwerks, wobei er Rückstoßdüsen an den Propellerspitzen anbrachte, sodaß der Propeller und das Triebwerk eine Einheit bildeten. Diese minimalistische Lösung beruht auf einem Prinzip, das bereits von Heron von Alexandria beschrieben wurde, auf dessen Werk Wittgenstein – wie bereits erwähnt – in der Bibliothek seines Vaters gestoßen war. (Vgl. Wijdeveld 1994, 26) Die Turbinendüsen ließ Wittgenstein von Charles Cook herstellen, wie aus einem Brief von William Eccles an Wittgenstein vom 28.7.1926 hervorgeht. Cook arbeitete unter Lord Rutherford als Techniker für das Department of Physics and Astronomy in Manchester und hatte bereits das Triebwerk für die Drachenstation bei Glossop konstruiert, das so gut war, daß es in Ägypten eingesetzt wurde. (Vgl. Report 1906, 172f. u. 1907, 181f.) Wittgenstein verstand es also auch, gute Leute für seine Interessen einzusetzen. Der von Wittgenstein konstruierte Propeller funktionierte, und er ließ ihn sogar patentieren. Am 17. August 1911 erhielt er das Patent für seine Planskizze "Verbesserungsvorschläge für Flugzeugpropeller".

Dieselbe Idee wandte im Jahr 1943 der Ingenieur Friedrich Baron von Doblhoff für seine Konstruktion eines Hubschraubers mit düsengetriebenem Rotor an, der sogenannten Doblhoff WNF-342. Die Doblhoffs waren adelige Freunde der Familie Wittgenstein. Da die Wittgensteins mit den Doblhoffs bekannt waren, würde die Vermutung naheliegen, daß sich Wittgenstein und Friedrich von Doblhoff über diese Konstruktion unterhalten haben bzw. daß Wittgenstein sogar den entscheidenden Anstoß zu dieser Konstruktion gegeben hat. Michael Nedo korrespondierte diesbezüglich bereits vor Jahren mit Friedrich von Doblhoff, der jegliche Zusammenhänge seiner Hubschrauberkonstruktion mit Wittgenstein negierte.¹ Dennoch scheint es sich dabei um einen merkwürdigen Zufall zu handeln, vor allem wenn man bedenkt, daß es noch einen weiteren Bezug Wittgensteins zur Familie Doblhoff gab: Herbert von Doblhoff war während des Ersten Weltkriegs ebenso wie Wittgenstein dem Feldartillerieregiment Nr. 105 zugeteilt.

Daß Wittgenstein gerne über seine Flugexperimente sprach, zeigt die Frage von Oskar Hantschel, einem ehemaligen Lehrer von Wittgenstein an der Staatsoberrealschule in Linz, in einer Feldpostkarte vom 11.4.1915: "Was ists mit der Flugmaschine geworden??" Aber auch Walter Wahle, einem Kriegskameraden von Wittgenstein, hat Wittgenstein offensichtlich von seinen aerodynamischen Studien erzählt, denn am 22.8.1917 schrieb Wahle folgenden Brief an Wittgenstein:

Fischamend, 22/VIII 1917.

Lieber Wittgenstein!

Du wirst Dich sicherlich wundern nach nahezu 1 ½ Jahren von mir zu hören. Ich komme Dir aber heute einen Vorschlag zu machen, den ich Dich ernstlich zu erwägen bitte. Vorher will ich Dir nur in aller Kürze

¹ Persönliche Mitteilung von Michael Nedo.

erzählen, wie ich hierher kam. Also höre: Vom lieblichen A.W.Z ging ich, wie Dir bekannt, zu meinem Regiment zurück, wo ich sehr gut aufgenommen wurde und angenehme Zeiten verbrachte. Im Juli 1916 erwirkte ich meine Kommandierung zu den Luftfahrtruppen, kam zuerst in die Fliegeroffiziersschule, nach deren Absolvierung in die Pilotenausbildung und bin nun bei der Versuchsabteilung der Flugzeugmeisterei des k. u. k. Fliegerarsenals eingeteilt. Diese junge Anstalt ist bestimmt sämtliche Neuerscheinungen auf flugtechnischem Gebiete, wie neue Flugzeug- und Motorentypen, flugtechnische Instrumente, Luftschauben, kurz alle Neuerungen vor deren allgemeinen Einführung zu begutachten und zu erproben. Die Arbeit ist hauptsächlich wissenschaftlich in Verbindung mit praktischen Versuchen. Kommandant der Abteilung ist der bekannte Aerodynamiker Obltn i. d. Res. Prof. D^f von Karman der technischen Hochschule in Aachen. Ich bin technischer und administrativer Leiter. Ich frage Dich nun lieber Wittgenstein, ob Du Lust hättest auf dem Dir geschilderten Gebiete zu arbeiten. Die Fliegertruppe ist als die jüngste der technischen Waffen frei von jedweder Verknöcherung, man lässt uns wirklich ruhige wissenschaftliche Arbeit leisten, wir können auch schon auf sehr hübsche Ergebnisse zurückblicken. Die Abteilung befindet sich am Flugfeld in Fischamend bei Wien; es unterläge keinem Anstand, dass Du in Wien bei Deiner Mama wohnst, übrigens ist auch hier ein schönes Offizierswohnhaus vorgesehen. Flugzwang, falls Du das Fliegen nicht vertragen solltest, ist *keiner*, es ist uns hauptsächlich um Deine wissenschaftliche Mitarbeit zu tun und versichere ich Dich diesbezüglich der weitgehendsten Freiheit. Es bedarf nur Deiner brieflichen Zustimmung, ohne die ich nichts veranlassen wollte und Deine Kommandierung zur Versuchsabteilung wird vom Fliegerarsenal beim Kriegsministerium erwirkt. Dass Dein Avancement hiedurch in keiner Weise beeinträchtigt wird ist selbstverständlich. Ich für meine Person kann mir für Dich keinen passenderen Wirkungskreis denken. Falls Du also auf meinen Vorschlag eingehst, so lasse mich bitte umgehend Deine Daten: Charge, Stammtruppenkörper, gegenwärtige Einteilung und bisherige Dienstverwendung (chronologisch) wissen. Ich werde mich freuen bald und ausführlich - auch über Deine Schicksale beim AWZ und nachher - zu hören. Bis dahin grüsse ich Dich aufs herzlichste und verbleibe Dein aufrichtiger
Walter Wahle Obltn²

Wittgenstein lernte Wahle während seines Einsatzes beim Artillerie-Werkstättenzug Nr. 1 – in obigen Brief kurz "A.W.Z." genannt – kennen, der in Sokal, einem nördlich von Lemberg gelegenen Ausladebahnhof stationiert war. Walter Wahle (geb. 1890 in Prag), der vor seiner militärischen Laufbahn eine technische Fachschule absolviert hatte, arbeitete beim Fliegerarsenal in Fischamend mit großem Einsatz, wie aus dem Belohnungsantrag vom 22.5.1917 für die Silberne Militärverdienstmedaille am Bande des Militärkreuzes hervorgeht:

Oberleutnant Wahle ist seit Juli 1916 bei der Versuchsabteilung des k.u.k. Fliegerarsenals eingeteilt und hat während dieser Zeit bei der Lösung der verschiedensten Probleme der Flugzeugbewaffnung und Ausrüstung sowie des Instrumentenwesens tätig

und initiativ mitgewirkt, führt überdies mit ausserordentlicher Sachkenntnis, Gewissenhaftigkeit und Ausdauer die Agenden des technischen Adjutanten und hat sich um die einwandfreie Abwicklung der technischen Arbeiten der Versuchsabteilung auch unter schwierigen Verhältnissen hervorragende Dienste erworben. (Wien, Kriegsarchiv)

Fischamend, eine kleine Ortschaft nahe Schwechat bei Wien, wurde durch die Errichtung der militäraeronautischen Anstalt im Jahr 1910 zu einem Zentrum der österreichischen Luftfahrttechnik, an der zahlreiche Entwicklungen bei Ballonen, Luftschiffen und Hubschraubern – den ersten in Österreich – betrieben wurden. Der im Brief erwähnte bekannte Aerodynamiker Theodor von Kármán (1881-1963), der nach seiner Professur in Aachen das Guggenheim Aeronautical Laboratory am California Institute of Technology in Pasadena leitete, war während des Ersten Weltkriegs an der Hubschrauberentwicklung des k.u.k. Fliegerarsenal Fischamend wesentlich beteiligt. Kurz zur Vorgeschichte: Major Stephan Petróczy von Petrócz, Kommandant des Lehrbataillons in Wiener Neustadt hatte die Idee, die wasserstoffgefüllten Ballone durch Helikopter mit Motorantrieb zu ersetzen. Am 28.4.1916 legte Petróczy dem Kommando der Luftfahrtruppen einen Vorschlag für die Entwicklung eines gefesselten Helikopters als Beobachtungsplattform vor. Mitte 1917 wurde Petróczy zum Kommandanten des Fliegerarsenals ernannt, wodurch er sein Projekt vorantreiben konnte und es dann zur Entwicklung eines Fluggerätes kam, das später als PKZ 1 (Petróczy – Kármán – Zurovec) bezeichnet wurde. Kármán und Wilhelm Zurovec patentierten diese Erfindung am 28.7.1917. Beim ersten Flug in Fischamend hob das Gerät bei einer Rotordrehzahl von 700 U/min ab und stieg bis zu der Fesselungshöhe von 50 cm. Daraufhin kletterten 3 Mann an Bord und der Helikopter schwebte weiterhin gehalten durch die Fesselungsseile. Nach 15 Minuten des 4. Fluges brannte der überforderte Motor durch und konnte wegen der Materialknappheit nicht mehr instandgesetzt werden. Dennoch konnte mit dem PKZ 1 in Fischamend die Flugfähigkeit eines elektrisch angetriebenen Helikopters demonstriert werden. Es kam noch zur Entwicklung einer weiteren Hubschrauberkonstruktion, dem sogenannten PKZ 2, der jedoch entgegen seiner Bezeichnung von Zurovec alleine erfunden wurde und wofür er am 12.2.1918 das Patent erhielt. (Vgl. Hubschrauberentwicklung in der K. u. K. Monarchie)

Im Kriegsakt von Kármán befindet sich folgender Vermerk vom 8.8.1917: "Auf 14 Tage nach Aachen kommandiert." Für die Dauer der Beurlaubung von Kármán übernahm Wahle die Führung des Kommandos, wie aus einem Vermerk vom 20.8.1917 im Kriegsakt von Wahle hervorgeht. In dieser Zeit, in der auch – wie soeben gezeigt – die Hubschrauberentwicklung im Fliegerarsenal an einem Höhepunkt angelangt war, kam offenbar Wahle der Gedanke, Wittgenstein zur Mitarbeit beim Fliegerarsenal anzuregen, offenbar mit Erfolg, denn im Februar 1918 findet sich dann tatsächlich auf einer Feldpostkarte von Leopoldine Wittgenstein und einer von Gottlob Frege die Anschrift "Ludwig Wittgenstein / Fliegerkompanie Nr. 30". Leopoldine Wittgenstein schreibt auf ihrer Karte vom 13.2.[1918]: "Mein geliebter Herzenssohn, mit dem innigsten Dank für Deine liebe Karte v. 8./2 muß ich Dir auch unser Aller größtes Erstaunen aussprechen. Daß ich mir wünschen würde der Kurs möge nicht sehr kurze Zeit dauern kann ich nicht läugnen." Daß damit nur ein Fliegerkurs gemeint sein kann, geht aus Hermine Wittgensteins Brief vom 18.2.1918 hervor: "Heute erzählte mir Mama dass Du einen Fliegerkurs machst [...]." Auch Frege spielt in seiner Karte

² Obltn Walter Wahle, Fischamend bei Wien, Gregerstrasse Nr 27.

vom 26.2.1918 auf Wittgensteins neue Tätigkeit an: "Sie haben also, wie es scheint, schon wieder eine Verwandlung durchgemacht. Nun diese Tätigkeit mag sich ja mit Ihren früheren Studien gut in Einklang bringen lassen; denn, wenn ich mich recht erinnere, haben Sie Sich mit Flugzeugen schon früher theoretisch beschäftigt."

Allerdings muß Wittgenstein die Fliegerkompanie Nr. 30 schon bald wieder verlassen haben, denn im März 1918 ist die an ihn gerichtete Post bereits an die Gebirgsartillerie Nr. 11 adressiert. Leider scheint Wittgenstein in den Aufzeichnungen der Fliegerkompanie 30 (Wien, Kriegsarchiv) im Februar 1918 nicht auf, sodaß über diese kurze Episode in seinem Leben nichts Genaueres gesagt werden kann. Jedenfalls hat Wittgenstein nicht nur aerodynamische Studien betrieben, sondern auch praktische Flugerfahrungen – zumindest in einem ersten Stadium – gemacht.

Bemerkenswert ist aber nicht nur Wittgensteins Interesse an der Flugtechnik, sondern auch die Tatsache, daß sich gleich mehrere Personen in Wittgensteins näherem Umfeld für die Fliegerei interessierten. So fühlte sich auch sein Bruder Kurt von Flugzeugen angezogen, wie aus einer Karte an seine Mutter vom 24.11.1917, auf der er in einem Flugzeug zu sehen ist, hervorgeht: "Wie Du siehst, fehlt es mir nicht an Unternehmungslust, auch nicht an Gelegenheit, sie zu befriedigen. Du brauchst Dir aber deswegen keine Sorgen zu machen; es war bloss ein Versuch, der mich aber wirklich begeisterte."

Auch Wittgensteins Freund David Pinsent, mit dem Wittgenstein in den Jahren 1912-1914 eng befreundet war und dem er seinen *Tractatus* widmete, teilte mit diesem nicht nur die Liebe zur Musik, sondern auch die Flugzeugleidenschaft. Im März 1916 kam Pinsent in die Royal Air Forces Factory in Farnborough. Die dortige Arbeit schildert er in einem Brief an seine Eltern folgendermaßen: "Wir stellen die Gabelkardangelenke her, die mit einem Profildraht an den Spezialflugzeugen der Royal Air Force befestigt sind [...]." (Zit. nach Pinsent 1994, 20) Später schloß er sich den aerodynamischen Forschungen der Gruppe um George Thomson an, wobei er seine mathematischen Kenntnisse verwerten konnte. Er führte aber auch mit Begeisterung gefährliche Flugexperimente durch, die am 8.5.1918 zu seinem tödlichen Absturz führten. (Vgl. Pinsent 1994, 21f.)

Wittgensteins Freund Arvid Sjögren, den Wittgenstein aufgrund freundschaftlicher Beziehungen zwischen der Familie Wittgenstein und der Familie Sjögren kannte und mit dem er im Sommer 1921 gemeinsam in Norwegen war, hatte ebenfalls Interesse an der Flugtechnik und am Fliegen. In seinem Brief vom 5.11.[1929] erzählte Sjögren Wittgenstein von seinem Plan, ein Flugzeug zu bauen. Diese Idee gab er jedoch bald auf. Aber er nahm im Herbst des folgenden Jahres an einem Fliegerkurs teil und berichtete Wittgenstein in einem Brief, geschrieben im Oktober 1930: "Mit der Fliegerei geht es langsam vorwärts, da in letzter Zeit das Wetter schlecht war. Doch fliege ich schon allein und hoffe die Prüfung noch heuer ablegen zu können. Dann fliegen wir einmal zusammen aus."

Wittgenstein selbst dürfte sein Interesse an der Flugtechnik nie verloren haben, auch wenn er in seinen späteren Jahren keine weiteren aerodynamischen Forschungen und auch keine praktischen Flugversuche durchgeführt hat; zumindest ist diesbezüglich nichts bekannt. Wenn sich Wittgenstein auch von der konkreten Flugtechnik entfernte, so erinnerte er sich doch auch in seinen späteren Jahren gerne an seine aerodynamischen Studien. Noch im Jahr 1948, als er in der Hütte von Drury in Connemara an der Westküste von Irland wohnte,

erzählte er den Mortimers, seinen dortigen Nachbarn, von seinen Flugversuchen in Manchester. (Vgl. Wall 1999, 12)

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An Aconceptual View of Mind and World

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In *Mind and World* (1994/1996), John McDowell follows Donald Davidson in claiming that the world is a conceptually laden structure. A (conceptual) language and tradition constitutes the world, and our (conceptual) “openness to the world” (ibid, p.155). This means that the condition for access to the world is a clear subject – object split, and a clear split between content and the way the content is presented. With this view as the basis he criticizes the idea of a non-conceptual¹ experience and non-conceptual content, starting from the demand that (conceptual) thinking must be constrained by, and rationally answerable to the empirical world (ibid p.xii).

If conceptual structures are understood as separable from a non-conceptual experience, we stand in front of a dilemma according to McDowell: Either we have to deny experience the role of providing rational reasons (as long as rational reasons requires conceptual reasons that a subject can give for holding for example a belief [ibid p. 165]). Or, we embrace the Myth of the Given, i.e. a separation between scheme and content and in McDowell’s understanding an acceptance of conceptual structures that reaches outside of the conceptual realm in an inconsistent model of experience and conceptual structures. Common to both of those horns is not only the dualistic separation between experience and conceptual structures (ibid p. xi-xxiv and pp 3), but also the metaphysical idea of a clear separation between the non-conceptual (be it experience, surface irritations, stimulus, natural processes or whatever) and the conceptual. McDowell’s way out of the dilemma is to question the first dualism. Experience is understood as conceptually structured, and inseparable from the conceptual realm. This provides for giving experience a rational role. McDowell emphasises that conceptual capacities are drawn on *in* experience, they are not exercised *on* an independent experience. (ibid, p. 10). A subject that is moving from experience to judgement in, for example Gareth Evans’ model where experience and the conceptual system are kept apart is moving between separable spheres – from a non-conceptual, animal sphere to a conceptual, human sphere. In McDowell’s system the movement into the conceptual, from animal to human, takes place differently and on a developmental line². It is a movement over time where a “mere animal” with a (non-conceptual) “sensitivity” to her environment achieves a conceptually structured experience when entering *Bildung*. This also involves a transformation of the animal environment to a human world and of a “proto-subjectivity” (ibid p.117) into a “full-fledged subjectivity” (ibid), and it “brings intentional bodily action on to the scene” (ibid p.117).

Another way to avoid those horns is to reverse McDowell’s model of experience and conceptual system. Such an alternative would take aconceptual experience that is not yet conceptually structured as its starting point³, as opposed to McDowell’s model where conceptual

structures such as subject and object are conditions for experience. Here conceptual structures are instead understood to grow continuously in experience and the autonomy of the conceptual realm is questioned. This means that the conceptual realm does not belong into another realm than experience but conceptual structures arise *within* experience. Thinking, believing and judging are also to be seen as types of experiences. In aconceptual experience world and mind are not separated but must be seen as a whole. The world is not an external object, but an experiential and meaningful environment in which world and mind cannot be ideally separated. In this picture we can talk about experience serving a rationally justifying role in an approximate sense at best. If a fully conceptually structured experience (that satisfy demands on conceptuality such as Evan’s Generality Constraint [Evans, 1982], objectuality, objectivity and systematicity) can only be seen as an ideal, that can be approximated in real human agency and practice growing from “proto-subjectivity”, this consequence need not be radically different from the consequences of McDowell’s way of picturing experience⁴.

A problem in McDowell’s philosophy is a dualism within nature that renders the entrance into the conceptual realm mystical. Nature as natural sciences describe it is in McDowell’s philosophy understood as “the realm of law” whose inhabitants are characterized by “a lack of freedom” (ibid p. 117), while intentionality, freedom and agency are understood as belonging to “the logical space of reasons”, that is, to the conceptual system and capacities that a human being gets access to as she grows from a ‘mere animal’ to subject and agent. Since “world” in McDowell’s understanding is equated with a conceptually structured world, consisting of ‘inner’ and ‘outer objects’ (ibid p. 30-33), intentionality is a purely conceptual affair: a non-conceptual content is no content at all since it is not objective and does not present objects in an independent and detached reality whose existence presupposes a clear subject – object split. In experience and thought we are ‘open to the world’ only as long as the content of experience and thinking is conceptual (ibid p. 31, 37, 47, 54). A non-conceptual experience or ‘intuitions without concepts’ can provide no ‘glimpses of the world’, at least not as long as the world is understood to have a conceptual structure; it is ‘blind’ (ibid p. 32, 89). For avoiding that the transformation from “the realm of law” to “the space of reasons” takes place outside of nature, but still be able to keep the separation between the “realm of law” and “the space of reasons” clear to provide for freedom in “the space of reasons”, McDowell introduces the idea of a “second nature”. Children are ‘born mere animals’ and as they enter their first language and *Bildung*, they move from a ‘first nature’ (‘the realm of law’) into a second nature, (“the space of reasons”) (ibid p. 125). The movement is a movement from a “mere” animal’s being in an environment where conceptual structures such as subjects and objects have not arisen (ibid p. 117), into a “full-fledged” subject and agent in a conceptually structured world. Even if we respect McDowell’s

¹ The term aconceptuality, previously used here, refers to phenomena where the distinction between non-conceptuality and conceptuality can not be applied.

² Evan’s philosophy contains a developmental movement too, in the sense that non-conceptual perception should only count as experience if it is available as “input to thinking, concept-applying, and reasoning system” (Evans 1982, p. 158).

³ See Pauli Pylkkö, 1998 and Tere Vadén, 2001.

⁴ Another consequence of McDowell’s demands on experience is that old people, children, animals, artificial networks and people from cultures that do not have a conceptually structured language cannot be seen as experiencing since their “sensitivity” is not conceptually structured.

understanding of “world” this discontinuity in nature is problematic, and non-conceptual content and a more primitive intentionality seems to be needed to make the development into the human ‘glimpse of the world’ possible.⁵

McDowell’s rethinking of naturalism is a refusal to equate nature with a “disenchanted” nature (i.e. a picture of nature that excludes meaning), or to put it differently: a refusal to equate it with the abstraction that was used to characterise nature in the Newtonian paradigm. But this rethinking must start on a more fundamental level and demands a rethinking not only of nature but also of meaning, a rethinking which needs to provide for a continuous and non-dualistic conception of nature. Meaning, agency and intentionality go deeper down in nature than human beings and “full-fledged subjects”.

A radical way of defending non-conceptual content is to question McDowell’s understanding of “world” as well as “mind”, and therefore also of nature. Thinkers like Heidegger (1992, p. 63-110), Merleau-Ponty (1968, p.248-249; 1962/1986, p. 71) and Pauli Pykkö (1998) are emphasising that the world is to be understood as a holistic cultural and natural experiential environment, where mind and world are not separated. In McDowell’s understanding the possibility of a subject (mind)/ object (world) split is a *condition* for worlds and meaning. Here, conceptual structures are instead understood to arise gradually within nature and they presuppose a lower level of content. Conceptual structures are not in McDowell’s sense transcendental with respect to their aconceptual origin. Pykkö emphasizes that conceptual structures, and conceptually structured experience, action and language grow from, and are to be explained in terms of what McDowell calls “proto-subjectivity” and an “animal environment”. Fully conceptual structures can at best be approximated. (Pykkö, 1998). Also according to Adrian Cussins experience is to be understood in this way as fundamentally embodied and non-conceptual. Conceptual structures presupposes a human practice and action whose content is too holistic or inseparable⁶ to satisfy for example Evan’s Generality Constraint for concepts. Cussins describes experience as structured in a non-pure continuum:

My claim is that we are – as adult humans – still awash in a partially differentiated, partially objective, mind/world continuum, at which pain-experiences lie at the one end, various sorts of emotional experience a little further in, then colour-experience, then, perhaps, shape-experience, and the experience of democratic justice. (Cussins, 1990, s. 411.)

Discussions within recent physics seem to support the idea of the world as a holistic and non-separable wholeness that cannot be fully conceptually analysable. Thinkers like Niels Bohr and David Bohm who are usually thought to be radically different both emphasise the limits of conceptual analysability of quantum phenomena. While Bohr points to epistemological problems in the description of empirical phenomena, the later Bohm’s ontological interpretation puts limits to the idea of both world and mind understood as conceptually structured. Bohm understands the basic reality as an undivided wholeness where distinctions such as subject – subject (and therefore subject – object) cannot, strictly speaking, be upheld (See

Bohm, p. 55, 172-179, 210). Subject and object can be understood as relatively autonomous subwholes, which can be correctly distinguished only in an approximate sense.

The world understood as environment does not mean that it is ineffable and beyond articulation – it is not fully conceptually articulable, but there are a- and non-conceptual aspects also in language. For Bohm, the world has an explicate aspect and so does mind/experience, and thus conceptual description can be possible and approximately correct. But an important aspect of the understanding of the world as fundamentally holistic and inseparable is that it seems as if we risk *losing* information about the world if it is being described as a conceptual structure – i.e., conceptual structures, and conceptually structured agents are in a sense partially *blind* to the world. Conceptual content presents the world as an independent world consisting of conceptually organized separable objects and properties, but on the quantum level it is open to interpretation whether the world can be understood in this sense.

If conceptual structures can reach no ideal transcendent polarisation, the idea of persons, understood as ‘full-fledged subjects’ that remains identical over time, or full-fledged bodily objects that likewise satisfy philosophical criteria of identity, are to be understood as an instrumental description. At the fundamental level persons are not separated from the immediate environment (that can indeed be another person) in a sense that makes identity possible. This picture of nature is not incompatible with intuitive, pre-theoretical ideas about human personality; it is rather the other way around. Within the Newtonian paradigm it is indeed hard to see how naturalism can possibly be compatible with for example meaning and freedom. In the natural science of today, however, there seems to be room for freedom and meaning without the introduction of a “second nature”, and it is not clear that the nature described is “disenchanted”. Here freedom, and uniqueness in persons, can be related to non-determinism, unrepeatability and unpredictability, for example in quantum processes and dynamical systems, rather than to rational prediction and control. The past cannot fully determine the future, but is open-ended in a sense that provides for freedom.⁷ Free activity understood in this way, as well as aconceptual intentionality and agency go deeper down in nature than the human subject.

⁵ See for example Ron Chrisley, 1996, p. 66; Adrian Cussins, 1990 and 1992; Daniel D. Hutto (1998 and 1999, p.122); Jose Luis Bermúdez, 1994 and 1998, p. 19 and p. 182; who argue that a more primitive notion of content is needed to make sense of the movement from what McDowell calls a “proto-subject” into a mature subject.

⁶ In the sense of inseparability used by Howard, 1989, which says that the behaviour of an inseparable phenomena can not be explained comprehensively in terms of any subsystems.

⁷ See Pykkö, 1998, p. 104-107 and Vadén, 2001, for the idea of freedom developed in terms of unpredictability.

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Assertion as a Language-Game: the Role of Linguistic Agency in Social-Epistemic Agency

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Wittgenstein, in contrast with a number of recent epistemologists (e.g., Audi 1998, 130-48; Fricker 1994), held that hearing another person assert that *p* may itself constitute sufficient reason for one to believe that *p* — without one's needing to have positive grounds for one's belief that the other person is sincere or reliable. (Cf. Wittgenstein 1992, §§ 143, 160-1) In this paper I will argue that Wittgenstein's position follows immediately from an understanding of assertion as a language-game governed by norms binding the rational action of participant speakers and hearers.

A theory delineating the norms of assertion would seem to have to meet two general desiderata. Such a theory ought (1) to illuminate the norms to which an agent would have to be sensitive in order to make an assertion. I will call these the *norms of asserting*. Furthermore - and this is an aspect of such a theory almost universally neglected - it should (2) make explicit the norms to which *recipients* (hearers, readers, etc.) of putative assertions would have to be sensitive. I will refer to these as the *norms of attending*. Recognizing the norms governing assertion as a language-game will, I argue, allow us to recognize the centrality of testimony as a basic source of justified belief, and thus to recognize the role of linguistic agency in social-epistemic agency.

I suggest that the norms governing an agent's performance of assertions all stem from one overarching norm:

[TRUTH] Assert that *p* only if it is true that *p*.

Conveying content *truthfully* is a uniquely *linguistic* enterprise. One cannot do so other than by using language. The detective who provides pictorial proof of a crime by providing accurate photographic evidence does not thereby convey *truths* until she tells her client what she has discovered. On the other hand, those various non-truth-related tasks for which we employ language — entertaining, annoying, etc. — are ones that can equally be accomplished by other means. Thus, although one can entertain Herman by telling him a joke, one could equally do so by taking a pratfall or pulling a rubber chicken out of one's trousers. In contrast both to the conveyance of accurate (as opposed to true) information, and to the achievement of goals such as annoyance, entertainment, seduction, etc., the conveyance of truth is a goal properly belonging only to the use of language. (cf. Jackson 1987, 98)

To make this claim, however, is to claim that the conveyance of truth-evaluable information is thus peculiarly linguistic goal, one that is, in fact, constitutive. (cf. Wittgenstein, §§ 80-84, 455) It is one of the goals that distinguishes language *qua* language. Furthermore, to the extent that [TRUTH] is a norm of *assertion*, the fact that the conveyance of truth-evaluable information is a constitutive function of language singles out assertion as a core linguistic practice.

What does it mean, however, to say that [TRUTH] is a norm governing the performance of assertions? It means that in order to be competent in the performance of assertions, one must be sensitive to [TRUTH]. That is, if one is to be competent in making assertions, and one wishes to make an assertion, one must be sensitive to the fact that there is a *pro tanto* reason to see to it that the content of one's assertion be true. Thus, to recognize [TRUTH] as a norm of asserting is not to require that all assertions be assertions of the true. There can be false and/or lying assertions. Rather, it is to require that, in those cases in which one asserts that *p* and it is false that *p*, one has overridden the *pro tanto* reason characterized by [TRUTH] for reasons external to the practice of assertion.

Thus, consider a case in which you lie in order to save the life of someone taking refuge with you from a murderer. In such a case, your reason not to lie, given that you wish to make an assertion, has been overridden by stronger considerations of the danger to those to whom you have granted refuge. Even in the more commonplace, less altruistic cases in which one lies for the sake of some advantage, one will at least believe oneself to have a reason whose force overrides the force of the reason, internal to the practice of assertion, that one has to tell the truth. Whether one ought to be held blameworthy in such a case will depend upon whether it is in fact the case that the reason in question was strong enough to outweigh one's reason for telling the truth.

What [TRUTH] does, however, exclude as irrational would be a case in which one would be competent in making assertions, intend to make an assertion, and fail to tell the truth for no reason at all. Such a case would violate the norms of asserting. Given this, however, one might contend that [TRUTH] is too strong a requirement. Certainly there are many cases in which one is highly justified in believing that what one says is true, although in fact it is not. We would not, however, wish to claim that one is irrational if one makes such an assertion.

It is true that we would not wish to call such a case of asserting an *irrational* one. However, if we accept [TRUTH] as a norm of asserting, we are not forced to do so. For, if we accept [TRUTH] as a norm of asserting, we must accept only that the falsity of *p* is a reason not to assert *p*; it does not suggest that we are always *aware* of our reasons not to make an assertion. In a case in which one asserts something on the basis of very strong, but misleading, evidence that what one asserts was true, then we must only hold that, in such a case, one is unaware of the reason for not asserting what one does in fact assert.

This explanation, however, may fail to satisfy. For, if we accept [TRUTH], we must at least say that there was *something* wrong with false, but highly justified, assertions. And it may be that we are tempted to say that, in such a case, there is nothing wrong with my assertion at all. Such a reaction would, I contend, be mistaken. There *is* something wrong with my barn assertion *qua* assertion, although we might feel uncomfortable terming what it is that is wrong a case of *irrationality*. I will postpone a discussion of what it is that is wrong in such a case,

however, until our discussion of the relation between the norms of assertion and knowledge, below.

There is, however, a more immediate issue raised by the above discussion with which we are in a position to deal at this point. If [TRUTH] is the central norm of asserting, it is not the sole norm. If one is to be sensitive to [TRUTH] as a norm of asserting, one must also be sensitive to one's having reasons for holding the content of one's assertion true. This, however, leaves it open as to *what* sorts of reasons are sufficient to license one in making assertions. Further consideration lends at least some credence to the idea that the level of evidence that one should require for those cases in which one has a reason to (only if p is true) is a level sufficient to underwrite *knowledge*. That is, there is some reason to accept, as a general principle governing rational action [where parentheses indicate the scope of "should" in (2)]:

(2) If you should (only if p is true), then you should (only if you know p).

To see this, consider what must clearly be a norm of good electricianship: one should not rewire electric circuits when the power is not shut off. (Cf. Williamson 2000, 245) In the case of this norm, it is clear that the level of evidence one ought to have is a level sufficient to underwrite *knowledge*. If one should not rewire electric circuits when the power is not shut off, then one should not rewire electric circuits if one does not *know* that the power is shut off.

Even if one judges that (2) ought not be accepted as a *general* rule characterizing rational action, however, there are independent reasons for taking assertion to be governed by (2), and thus by:

[KNOWLEDGE] Assert p only if you know that p .

First, there is support for [KNOWLEDGE] provided by evidence from our everyday practices in response to assertions. If one asserts that p and I wish to challenge that assertion, or simply wish to receive additional information, I can ask: "How do you know?" In response to such a question, any provision of information short of evidence that the assertor *does* know is not a defense of the original assertion, but a *retreat* from that assertion.

The second consideration in support of the acceptance of [KNOWLEDGE] as a norm characterizing assertion provides a reason in support of one of the arguments left open previously — viz., that one would be accountable for asserting a falsehood, even in those cases in which one does not know that the content of one's assertion is false. Consider someone who, because of some lack of background information, was subject to a host of skeptical situations (Cartesian evil demon, brain-in-a-vat, etc.) to which his interlocutors are not subject. If such a speaker were to make assertions concerning that range of subjects for which he is subject to those sorts of unwitting failures of knowledge, he would eventually acquire a reputation for unknowing assertion among his interlocutors. Having done so, however, he will cease to be able to accomplish one of the primary goals of assertion, namely fostering belief in others — even if, *ex hypothesi*, the speaker in question has an unimpeachable reputation for sincerity. That is, even if, in such a situation, we would not hold the hapless speaker to be *blameworthy*

for his failings, we would hold him *accountable*, in the following way. We would no longer believe what he asserts, at least with respect to that range of topics for which he is not reliable. This is a form of censure *internal* to the practice of assertion, (cf. Brandom 1994) in a way in which we will now be able to explicate.

We have just classified certain forms of censure for failure to comply with the norms of asserting — viz., those involving the withholding of belief in the content asserted — as *internal* censures. This suggests that there are norms governing the *reception* of assertions, by hearers, readers, etc., in addition to those norms, already discussed, governing the performance of assertions. Consider for a moment the parallel case of issuing commands. It seems reasonable to suppose that the speech act of commanding would not exist, were it not the case that the issuer of commands could expect, as a result of the understanding of those commands, the performance of appropriate acts on the part of those commanded. Similarly, one might argue that there would be no point to the act of assertion, were it not the case that the maker of assertions could expect, as a result of the understanding of assertions, that her audience would come to believe the contents of those assertions. (Cf. Wittgenstein 1992, §354)

Indeed, when we introduced our discussion of [TRUTH] as a norm of asserting, we did so in the context of a discussion of the central linguistic role of assertion in *conveying* information. The conveyance of information involves more than the making public of information on the part of its possessor, however; it also involves the *acquisition* of information on the part of some audience. This would suggest the following as the central norm of attending:

[BELIEF] If you understand a speech act as involving the assertion that p , believe that p .

Unlike the norms of asserting, however, [BELIEF], involving as it does a norm pertaining to belief, provides a *prima facie*, defeasible reason to believe the content asserted.

That there is such a norm governing attending to assertions should be clear upon reflection. Just as assertors need to have a good reason in order to override the norm of [TRUTH] without incurring blame, recipients of assertions need to have a reason in order to override the norm of [BELIEF]. We would not, e.g., consider it a good reason for not believing an assertion that the assertor is black. Nor would we consider it rational behavior for one to dismiss an assertion for no reason at all. If you are aware of an assertion to the effect that p , and you have no reason to the contrary, you cannot but take that assertion as positive evidence to the effect that p .

Having discussed the norms of asserting above, we can recognize that there are, in fact, two sources of the reason expressed by the norm of [BELIEF]. Given that there could be no practice of assertion, were it not for the existence of the norm of [BELIEF], there is a practice-internal reason for comporting with the norm. And, as assertion fulfills the fundamental linguistic goal of making possible the conveyance of true content, this practice-internal reason is one tied to the pursuit of that aim of theoretical reason, the acquisition of true beliefs. Furthermore, assuming that there is an established practice of assertion, the fact that the norms of asserting include [TRUTH] and [KNOWLEDGE] provide excellent, more immediately truth-directed reasons for comporting

with the norm. As long as interlocutors follow both the norms of asserting and the norm of attention, the practice of assertion will increase the distribution of true beliefs within a population.

Thus, for competent linguistic agents, it is a norm of assertion that one ought to believe what one is told unless and until one has positive reason to doubt it. That is, a correct conception of assertion as a language-game governed by, *inter alia*, the norms of [TRUTH], [KNOWLEDGE], and [BELIEF] supports Wittgenstein's claims to the effect that one need not have positive grounds to support one's belief in the information one acquires from one's communications with others. Our status as linguistic agents thus has implications for our obligations to one another as social-epistemic agents.

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Geheime Beobachtung und der Respekt vor Personen als rational Wählende¹

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1. Einleitung

Der australische Philosoph Stanley I. Benn schreibt in *A Theory of Freedom*:

„Respect for persons will sustain an objection to secret watching that may do no actual harm to anyone. Covert observation – spying – is objectionable because it deliberately deceives a person about his world: It thwarts, [...], the agent's attempts to make rational choices. [...] One cannot respect someone [...] if one knowingly and deliberately alters his conditions of action while concealing the fact from him“ (Benn 1988, 276).

Geheime Beobachtung ist eine nicht nur bei Detektivbüros und Sicherheitsbehörden beliebte Methode des Informationserwerbs. Gegen geheime Beobachtung, wird trotz aller Vorkehrungen doch bekannt, mit „Das ist respektlos!“ zu protestieren, scheint oft naheliegend und angebracht. Ebenso plausibel klingt aufs erste die eingangs zitierte Analyse der Thematik von Stanley I. Benn, die auch andere Autor(inn)en aufgegriffen haben (z.B. Schoeman 1992). Bei näherer Betrachtung tauchen jedoch eine Menge von Schwierigkeiten und entsprechende Zweifel an diesen Ausführungen auf. Ich werde deshalb diese Behauptungen näher untersuchen, aber – da hier gar nicht möglich – ohne exegetische Ansprüche der zitierten Textpassage und deren Autor gegenüber.

Im Speziellen werde ich mich kritisch folgenden Aussagen zuwenden:

- (1) Wer eine Person vorsätzlich geheim beobachtet, täuscht sie vorsätzlich über ihre Welt.
- (2) Wer eine Person vorsätzlich geheim beobachtet, vereitelt vorsätzlich ihren Versuch, rational zu wählen.
- (3) Wer eine Person vorsätzlich geheim beobachtet, ist respektlos, und zwar in Hinsicht darauf, dass die Person eine rational Wählende ist.

Bei geheimer Beobachtung denke ich vornehmlich an visuelle Überwachung, aber auch an Telefonüberwachung, die Überwachung von E-Mail usw. Als paradigmatischer Fall diene hier jedoch die versteckte visuelle Überwachung, wie sie heute beispielsweise durch versteckte Kameras immer häufiger wird. Diese Beispiele sollen zugleich darauf verweisen, dass die Wahrheit dieser Thesen, v.a. von These (3), einige Relevanz für Probleme der Angewandten Ethik hätte, wo es um den Schutz einer privaten Sphäre geht. Um jedoch von vornherein eine falsche Vorstellung von dem zu vermeiden, welche Tragweite dies hätte, möchte ich Folgendes klarstellen: Selbst wenn sich geheime Beobachtung als respektlos herausstellen sollte, bleibt offen, ob sie gerechtfertigt werden kann, z.B. in Fällen geheimer Observierung von Verdächtigen durch die Polizei. Zur Debatte steht also

nur, ob der Respekt vor der Rationalität der beobachteten Personen ein Grund ist, sie nicht geheim zu beobachten, auch wenn der Grund nicht durchschlagend sein sollte. Ebenso wenig geht es um die in der neuzeitlichen Ethik häufig behandelte Frage, ob die Rationalität von Personen von diesen moralisches Handeln verlangt. Die Frage ist vielmehr, ob die Rationalität anderer Personen die moralische Zulässigkeit ihres Handelns mitbestimmt.

2. Geheime Beobachtung und Täuschung

Wenden wir uns zunächst einer zentralen Behauptung der zitierten Passage zu:

(1) Wer eine Person vorsätzlich geheim beobachtet, täuscht sie vorsätzlich über ihre Welt.

Wenn wir eine Person täuschen wollen, wollen wir, dass sie etwas für richtig bzw. wahr hält, was wir selber für falsch halten. (Vgl. Meggle 1998, 2.) Wenn eine geheim beobachtende Person, nennen wir sie ab jetzt G (von ‚geheim‘), will, dass die beobachtete Person, nennen wir sie nun B, es für wahr hält, dass sie von G nicht beobachtet wird, obwohl G weiß, dass dies nicht stimmt, will G B über ihre Welt täuschen. G kann einen Täuschungsversuch unternehmen, mit dem sie diesen Täuschungsvorsatz verwirklichen zu können glaubt. (Vgl. Meggle 1998, 2.) Genau dann, wenn G ihr Ziel tatsächlich mittels ihres Tuns erreicht, ist dieser Täuschungsversuch erfolgreich. (Vgl. Meggle 1998, 3.) Glaubt B tatsächlich aufgrund dessen, dass G sich versteckt hält, dass G sie nicht beobachtet, so ist G in ihrem Täuschungsversuch erfolgreich gewesen. (Vgl. Meggle 1998, 3.) Wer eine Person vorsätzlich geheim beobachtet, versucht, diese über ihre Welt zu täuschen. Erst im Erfolgsfall wird B tatsächlich getäuscht. These (1) sollte daher besser lauten:

(1') Wer eine Person vorsätzlich geheim beobachtet, versucht, sie über ihre Welt zu täuschen.

Der Zusatz ‚vorsätzlich‘ kann hier entfallen, da Versuche immer vorsätzlich sind. In dieser Formulierung scheint These (1) nun unproblematisch.

3. Geheime Beobachtung und rationale Entscheidung

Wenden wir uns nun These (2) zu:

(2) Wer eine Person vorsätzlich geheim beobachtet, vereitelt vorsätzlich ihren Versuch, rational zu wählen.

Diese These ist im Unterschied zur ersten äußerst problematisch. Inwiefern könnte mit einer geheimen Beobachtung der Versuch vereitelt werden, rational zu

¹ Dieser Beitrag entstand im Rahmen des FWF-Projektes Nr. P13396-SOZ („Privatsphäre und Internet“) des österreichischen *Fonds zur Förderung der wissenschaftlichen Forschung*.

wählen? Eine rationale Wahl (als Ergebnis) liegt nach geläufigem Verständnis dann vor, wenn die Wählende gute Gründe für die gewählte Alternative hat. Im Falle der Zweckrationalität wählt eine Person zweckrational, wenn sie eine Handlung wählt, die im Hinblick auf ihre Ziele – relativ zu einem bestimmten Informationsstand – sinnvoll erscheint. Handlungen sind im Hinblick auf die Ziele einer Person sinnvoll, wenn sie als gutes Mittel gelten können, diese Ziele zu erreichen. (Vgl. Nida-Rümelin 1994b, 3 und Arni 1994, 32)

Die Ansichten hinsichtlich der Entscheidungsrationale scheidet sich jedoch in der Frage, unter welchen Bedingungen gute Gründe vorliegen bzw. etwas als gutes Mittel gelten kann. Eine Hauptunterscheidung ergibt sich aus der Frage, ob sich die Wahl relativ zum subjektiven Informationsstand der Wählenden als rational auszeichnet oder relativ zu einem objektiven Informationsstand. In einem Fall haben wir es mit einer *subjektiv rationalen* Wahl zu tun, im anderen mit einer *objektiv rationalen*. Eine objektiv rationale Wahl liegt somit genau dann vor, wenn die Wählende dieselbe Wahl getroffen hätte, die sie subjektiv rational getroffen hat, wäre sie objektiv informiert gewesen. (Vgl. Partridge/Benn/Mortimore 1976, 360.)

Da mit einer geheimen Beobachtung lediglich der subjektive Informationsstand betroffen wird, wird mit einer geheimen Beobachtung kein Versuch, subjektiv rational zu wählen, vereitelt.

Nur ein Versuch, objektiv rational zu wählen, kann durch geheime Beobachtung vereitelt werden. Eine Person, die geheim beobachtet wird, kann unter Umständen eine Wahl treffen, die sie, hätte sie gewusst, dass eine bestimmte Person sie beobachtet, nicht getroffen hätte. Dies trifft jedoch nur auf jene Fälle zu, in denen das Beobachtet-Werden für die Wahl relevant ist.

These (2) muss also, sollte sie haltbar sein, ebenfalls revidiert werden:

(2') Wenn das Beobachtet-Werden für eine Wahl relevant ist, dann vereitelt, wer eine (wählende) Person vorsätzlich geheim beobachtet, vorsätzlich den Versuch der wählenden Person, objektiv rational zu wählen.

Obwohl geheime Beobachtung nur eine objektiv rationale Wahl vereiteln kann, kann sie dennoch in Hinblick auf andere Rationalitätsaspekte respektlos sein.

4. Geheime Beobachtung und Respektlosigkeit

(a) Praktische und epistemische Rationalität

These (3), der ich mich nun zuwende, lautet:

(3) Wer eine Person vorsätzlich geheim beobachtet, ist respektlos, und zwar in Hinsicht darauf, dass die Person eine rationale Wählende ist.

Das Vermögen, eine rationale Wählende zu sein, kommt dem Verständnis nach, das ich hier zugrundelege und das die These wohlwollend ernstnimmt, einer Person zu, die zum einen über praktische Rationalität – in ihrer subjektiven Variante – verfügt, bei der beispielsweise Änderungen in ihren Überzeugungen dazu führen können, dass sie entsprechende Änderungen in ihren Vorgehensweisen macht. So kann die Überzeugung, nicht beobachtet zu werden, zu einer anderen Handlung führen als die, beobachtet zu werden. Zum anderen ist dieser praktischen Rationalität eine epistemische beigelegt. Bei

epistemischer Rationalität geht es um die Rationalität von Überzeugungen, und sie ist bislang, das sei zugegeben, wesentlich weniger aufgeklärt als praktische Rationalität (vgl. Spohn 1994, 224). Im Zusammenhang mit der Respektlosigkeit von geheimer Beobachtung scheint sie trotzdem ein wesentlicher Punkt zu sein. Eines der wichtigsten Vermögen epistemischer Rationalität ist es nämlich, Überzeugungen aufgrund von Evidenz und aufgrund von Regeln für die Bildung von Evidenzurteilen und Schlussfolgerungen zu bilden. Eben dieses Vermögen ist es, so will ich im weiteren zeigen, das mit geheimer Beobachtung häufig nicht respektiert wird.

(b) Respektlosigkeit

Warum sollte, eine Person vorsätzlich geheim zu beobachten, hinsichtlich ihrer Rationalität respektlos sein?

Eine Person zu respektieren, ist eine anspruchsvolle Weise der Rücksichtnahme auf Eigenschaften von Personen. Hier geht es um den Respekt vor Personen als rational Wählende, und ich lasse damit bewusst offen, ob noch andere Eigenschaften von Personen respektiert werden sollen. (Siehe dazu u.a. Spelman 1978.)

Anstatt den Begriff des Respekts hier erschöpfend zu erläutern, werde ich vier Möglichkeiten besprechen, den hohen Standard des Respektierens mit geheimer Beobachtung zu verfehlen, d.h. respektlos zu sein:

Bei vorsätzlicher geheimer Beobachtung wird das Vermögen, rational zu wählen, ausgeschaltet.

Bei vorsätzlicher geheimer Beobachtung wird das Vermögen, rational zu wählen, vorsätzlich gar nicht bedacht.

Bei vorsätzlicher geheimer Beobachtung wird das Vermögen, rational zu wählen, zwar bedacht, aber vorsätzlich nicht zum Wohle der Beobachteten („ausnützen“, „missbrauchen“).

Bei vorsätzlicher geheimer Beobachtung wird das Vermögen rational zu wählen, zwar bedacht, aber es werden vorsätzlich Informationen vorenthalten, auf die die Beobachtete Anspruch hat.

(c) Ausschaltung der Rationalität

Ein Wesen kann als rationale Wählende disqualifiziert sein, weil es dieses Vermögen von sich selbst heraus nicht hat (weil z.B. ihre Überzeugungen lediglich von inneren Ängsten hervorgerufen werden) oder weil es von außen durch andere disqualifiziert wird (z. B. durch Hypnose). (Vgl. Benn 1976, 113-116.) Bei geheimer Beobachtung wird jedoch das grundsätzliche Vermögen, rational zu wählen, nicht ausgeschaltet – weder in ihrem praktischen, noch in ihrem epistemischen Teil. Geheim Beobachtete bleiben weiterhin subjektiv rational Wählende. Als Ausschaltung der Rationalität kämen ganz im Gegensatz sogar am ehesten Formen offener Beobachtung in Frage, die zu massiven Ängsten führen könnten.

(d) Ignorieren der Rationalität

Es kann sicherlich Fälle vorsätzlicher geheimer Beobachtung geben, bei denen das Vermögen, rational zu wählen, vorsätzlich gar nicht bedacht wird. Dies ist dann der Fall, wenn B gar nicht als Wesen gesehen wird, für das es einen Unterschied machen könnte, ob es beobachtet wird oder nicht, entweder aus Gedankenlosigkeit oder falscher Einschätzung.

(e) Ausnützen der Rationalität

Wer eine Person geheim beobachtet, kann in vielen Fällen zum eigenen oder zum Vorteil anderer auf ihr Vermögen, rational zu wählen, zählen. Wenn ich z.B. weiß, dass jemand eine Normübertretung nicht begehen würde, wenn sie offen beobachtet würde, so lasse ich sie sozusagen in die Falle laufen, wenn ich meine Beobachtung nicht offen lege. Ich zähle darauf, dass sie ihre Überzeugung, beobachtet oder nicht beobachtet zu werden, aufgrund von Evidenz bildet. Ist mein Ziel, sie eines Vergehens zu überführen, so kann gesagt werden, dass ich ihr Vermögen, rational zu wählen (in seinem epistemischen Teil), zwar grundsätzlich, aber vorsätzlich nicht zu ihrem Wohle bedacht habe. Dies ist jedoch – wie zu These (2) bereits erläutert – lediglich in Fällen möglich, in denen das Beobachtet-Werden für die Wahl relevant ist. In Fällen, in denen die geheime Beobachtung zum Vorteil anderer oder einer Gemeinschaft (z.B. bei verdeckten Ermittlungen der Polizei) vorgenommen wird, kann das respektlose Verhalten durchaus gerechtfertigt sein.

Um von einem *Missbrauchen* einer Person aufgrund ihrer Fähigkeit, rational zu wählen, zu sprechen, braucht es jedoch neben dem Ausnützen noch zusätzliche Bedingungen, wie z.B., dass G nur seine eigenen Zwecke im Auge hat.

Nancy Davis ist sogar der Meinung, dass nicht einmal dies hinreichend ist, um von Respektlosigkeit im Sinne von *Missbrauchen* (*using*) zu sprechen. Nur dort, wo normalerweise Privatheit zugestanden wird, sei, nur zum eigenen Vorteil geheim zu beobachten, ein *Missbrauchen*. Ansonsten werde nur eine günstige Gelegenheit klug genutzt (Davis 1984, 397). Dies sei hier offen gelassen und explizit zur Diskussion gestellt.

(f) Verweigerung von Offenheitsansprüchen bzw. Privatheitsansprüchen

Auch in Fällen, in denen das Vermögen, rational zu wählen, zwar bedacht wird, aber durch die Geheimhaltung Informationen vorenthalten werden, auf die B Anspruch hat, bzw. wo ein Anspruch auf Privatheit missachtet wird, ist vorsätzlich geheimes Beobachten respektlos.

Ansprüche auf Informationen bereits daraus abzuleiten, dass jemand eine Person ist, wäre nur verständlich, wenn es einen Anspruch darauf gäbe, nach Möglichkeit objektiv rational zu wählen bzw. das subjektive Vermögen, rational zu wählen, möglichst erfolversprechend einzusetzen. Beides ist für eine lebbare Moral zu fordernd.

In vielen sozialen Beziehungen besteht jedoch ein Anspruch auf Offenheit, auch bezüglich Beobachtung bzw. ein Anspruch auf Nicht-Beobachtet-Werden. So haben Staatsbürger(innen) demokratischer Staaten einen Anspruch darauf, darüber informiert zu werden, wenn auf öffentlichen Plätzen Überwachungskameras installiert werden. Diese Information über Beobachtung

zurückzuhalten und damit dem Informationsanspruch nicht nachzukommen, ist respektlos.

Wo zudem ein berechtigtes Vertrauen in offene Beobachtung gesetzt wird – wenn denn schon beobachtet werden muss – liegt mit geheimer Beobachtung Betrug vor. Wenn eine Polizistin beispielsweise vorgibt, an einer Verdächtigen freundschaftliches Interesse zu haben, um durch geheime Beobachtung an persönliche Informationen heranzukommen, so liegt hier nicht nur Respektlosigkeit, sondern auch Betrug vor.

4. Schlussbemerkungen

Der Zusammenhang zwischen geheimer Beobachtung und dem Respekt vor Personen als rational Wählende stellt sich viel komplexer dar, als auf den ersten Blick zu vermuten wäre. Die Plausibilität der These, dass es – zumindest in einigen Fällen – respektlos sei, eine Person vorsätzlich geheim zu beobachten, und zwar hinsichtlich ihrer Rationalität, setzt vor allem ein Rationalitätsverständnis voraus, das bislang nicht zufriedenstellend ausgearbeitet wurde. Möge die hier vorgestellte Problematik mit ihrer praktischen Relevanz Anstoß sein, dies in Angriff zu nehmen.

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Spuren Tolstois in Wittgensteins Tagebüchern von 1914-1916

Ilse Somavilla, Innsbruck

Bei Einsicht von Wittgensteins Nachlaß wird in seinen philosophischen Gedankengängen ein Streben nach "Licht" – nach Durchsichtigkeit bzw. "Transparenz" - deutlich – dies in inhaltlicher wie auch formaler Hinsicht. Die Wurzeln dafür können bereits in den während des Ersten Weltkrieges geführten Tagebüchern, und der damaligen Beschäftigung mit Tolstois *Kurzer Darlegung des Evangelium* gefunden werden. In den codierten Tagebucheinträgen persönlichen Inhalts wird eine Suche nach Gott deutlich, die sich in einem Streben nach Spiritualität, und als Folge, in einem Kampf gegen sinnliche Regungen ausdrückt.

Wer Tolstois Interpretation der Evangelien liest, wird wiederholt auf ähnliche Stellen, insbesondere hinsichtlich der Suche nach dem Geist, der Wahrheit und dem "Licht" stoßen. So heißt es zu Beginn des Ersten Kapitels: "Der Mensch ist ein Sohn Gottes, ohnmächtig im Fleische und frei durch den Geist. (Vater unser!)"(KDE, 31) Im zweiten Kapitel: "Und darum muß der Mensch nicht dem Fleische, sondern dem Geiste dienen. (Der du bist im Himmel)"(KDE, 38)

Zu Beginn des sechsten Kapitels über "Das falsche Leben" lesen wir:

Und dazu, daß er das wahre Leben empfangen, muß der Mensch auf Erden sich lossagen von dem falschen Leben des Fleisches und muß durch den Geist leben. (Wie im Himmel, also auch auf Erden.)¹

Nicht nur im Streben nach einem Leben im Geist lassen sich bei Wittgenstein Bezüge zu Tolstois Schrift herstellen, sondern in einer Reihe weiterer Gedanken der Tagebuchaufzeichnungen dieser Zeit, sowohl im philosophischen als auch im persönlichen Teil:

1) Der Gedanke der Heiligkeit des Lebens und der Rechtfertigung eines guten und glücklichen Lebens: Gott wird von Wittgenstein mit dem Sinn des Lebens bzw. der Welt identifiziert, der außerhalb der Welt der Tatsachen liegt und folglich rational nicht faßbar ist. Doch der Glaube an Gott läßt die Frage nach dem Sinn des Lebens verstehen; er führt zur Einsicht, daß es außerhalb des Tatsachenraumes noch etwas anderes gibt. Die Problematik des Lebenssinns läßt sich jedoch nur lösen, wenn wir versuchen, ein glückliches Leben zu führen – der "Not der Welt zum Trotz" (TB, 176). Dieses ist jedoch ein Leben in der Erkenntnis, mit Verzicht auf die sogenannten "Annehmlichkeiten der Welt" (TB, 176) und mit Verzicht auf einen "Einfluss auf die Geschehnisse"(TB, 167) – eine gelassene Haltung gegenüber dem Weltgeschehen, die an Spinozas Forderung, durch Erkenntnis der Allnotwendigkeit diese zu akzeptieren, erinnert.

2) Daß dieses gute und wahre Leben nur dann gewährleistet ist, wenn wir dem "Willen des Vaters des Lebens" dienen. (KDE; Kap. IV, V, VII). –Wittgenstein schreibt von der Übereinstimmung mit der Welt und

"jenem fremden Willen, von dem ich abhängig erscheine. Das heißt: 'ich tue den Willen Gottes.'" (TB, 169)

Wittgenstein nimmt aber auch Gedanken von Schopenhauers Metaphysik des Willens bzw. der Natur mit auf - wie auch hinsichtlich des Lebens außerhalb von Raum und Zeit und hinsichtlich des Bewußtseins, daß wir alle im innersten Wesen miteinander verwandt sind. Diese Gedanken, wie auch die im folgenden unter Punkt 3 und 5 angeführten, scheint Tolstoi von Schopenhauer übernommen zu haben, dessen Werk "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung" auf ihn laut eigenen Aussagen von faszinierender Wirkung gewesen sei.²

Im Gegensatz zu den "philosophischen" *Tagebüchern 1914-1916* tritt in den verschlüsselten Aufzeichnungen der "fremde Wille" zurück, Wittgenstein spricht stattdessen vom Geist oder von einem persönlichen Gott: der ersehnte "innere Friede", im Verständnis den Mitmenschen gegenüber, scheint ihm nun durch ein "gottgefälliges" Leben gewährleistet. (6.5.16)

3) Auch der Gedanke des harmonischen Zusammenlebens mit den Mitmenschen, die im Innersten alle eines Wesens sind, findet sich in Tolstois *Darlegung des Evangelium*: "Das wahre Leben liegt nicht allein außerhalb der Zeit, als ein Leben im Gegenwärtigen, sondern ist auch ein Leben außerhalb der Persönlichkeit, als ein allen Menschen gemeinsames Leben."³

4) Daß dieses Leben gemäß dem Willen des Vaters "vernünftig" ist. Wittgenstein schreibt wiederholt vom "vernünftigen" und rechten Leben.

5) Daß dieses wahre und gute Leben außerhalb der Zeit, "im Gegenwärtigen" liegt. Im VIII. Kapitel schreibt Tolstoi: "Das Leben ist keines in der Zeit. Und darum lebt der Mensch wahrhaft, wann er sich nährt von der Erfüllung des Willens des Vaters im Gegenwärtigen und abläßt von allen Gedanken an das Vergangene und Zukünftige." (KDE, 126)

Dazu Wittgenstein: "Nur wer nicht in der Zeit, sondern in der Gegenwart lebt, ist glücklich." (TB, 169) Weiters betonte er, daß es für das Leben in der Gegenwart keinen Tod gebe und die Angst vor dem Tode Zeichen eines falschen bzw. schlechten Lebens sei. Unter dem Leben in der Gegenwart verstand er nicht Ewigkeit, sondern Unzeitlichkeit – durch die Führung einer Lebensweise, die ganz der Gegenwart gewidmet ist, im Sinne des Einklangs mit der Welt und mit Gott, in Übereinstimmung mit dem Gewissen, ein Leben in der Vernunft, im Geiste.

² Vgl. einen Brief Tolstois an Fet in *Tolstois Biographie*, 92.

³ KDE, 7. Tolstoi hatte den damals beliebten Gedanken der "All-Einheit" auf das Christentum übertragen und auf spezifische Art interpretiert, was zu ungelösten Konflikten führte. Auch bei Wittgenstein ist eine klare Trennung zwischen pantheistischem und christlichem Gedankengut nicht feststellbar: es läßt sich zwar im philosophischen Teil eine Tendenz zum Pantheismus, im codierten Teil zum Christentum beobachten, doch dieses Problem wurde für ihn nicht wirklich gelöst.

¹ KDE, 90. Die jeweiligen Kapitel sind den einzelnen Zeilen des „Vater unser“ zugeordnet und enthalten entsprechende Erläuterungen dazu.

Tolstoi schreibt, daß der Trug des zeitlichen Lebens den Menschen das "wahre Leben im Gegenwärtigen und in der Vereinigung mit dem Vater" verberge. (KDE, 139)

Am 1.9.1914 begann Wittgenstein in Tolstois Schrift *Kurze Darlegung* des Evangelium zu lesen: "Ein herrliches werk", notierte er am 2.9. in sein Tagebuch. Diese Schrift wurde für ihn während des Krieges zum unentbehrlichen Begleiter, der ihn "geradezu am Leben" erhielt, wie er sich später in einem Brief an Ludwig von Ficker ausdrückte. (BLF, 28)

"Immer wieder sage ich mir im geiste die worte Tolstois vor: 'Der mensch ist *ohnmächtig* im fleische aber *frei* durch den geist.' Möge der Geist in mir sein!" (12.9.14)

Die Anrufung des Geistes zum Kampf gegen körperliche Bedürfnisse bestimmt die folgenden Tagebuchaufzeichnungen dieser Zeit, in der er eine Chance sah, "ein anständiger Mensch zu sein", da er "Aug in Auge" mit dem Tode stand. (15.9.14) Am 5.10.1914 schreibt er in sein Tagebuch:

"[...] In den zeiten des äußeren Wohlergehens denken wir nicht an die Ohnmacht des fleisches; denkt man aber an die zeit der not dann kommt sie einem zum bewusstsein. Und man wendet sich zum geist.---"

In seiner Angst, sich angesichts der ihn umgebenden Roheit der Kriegskameraden und der Gewalttätigkeiten des Krieges zu verlieren, beschwört er gleichermaßen Gott und den Geist, ihn nicht zu verlassen. In dieser Zeit finden sich fortlaufend Eintragungen wie: "Möge der geist mich erleuchten!" (15.9.14), "Möge der geist mich nicht verlassen und in mir beständiger werden. -" (7.11.14)

"Der geist beschütze mich was immer geschehe! ---" (1.12.14), "Lebe nur der Geist! Er ist der sichere hafen geschützt abseits vom trostlosen unendlichen grauen meer des geschehens. ---" (13.12.14)

Im Geist erblickt Wittgenstein nicht nur ein Mittel gegen die Ohnmacht des Fleisches und die ihn umgebende Roheit, sondern auch ein Mittel gegen seine Depressionen. Vor allem aber benötigt er den Geist für seine philosophische Arbeit - der Logisch-philosophischen Abhandlung, von der er ein - noch unvollständiges - Manuskript mit sich führt. Geistige Arbeit bedeutet ihm eine "Gnade" in seiner seelischen Not. Mehrmals trägt er den einen Satz ein: "Die Gnade der Arbeit!!!" (2.11.14, 1.5.14, 14.7.16)

In der Arbeit sieht er die Möglichkeit zu einer frommen Lebensführung, die vonnöten ist, um in Anbetracht der Grauen des Krieges auszuharren:

"[...] Und arbeite nicht zum zeitvertreib sondern fromm um zu leben!" (12.11.14)

Seine philosophische Arbeit erfüllt sein Denken und Tun; die ihn gleichfalls stark beeindruckende Umwelt spiegelt sich in seinen Aufzeichnungen wider - Innenwelt und Außenwelt fließen ineinander über: Das philosophische Problem, für das er eine Lösung sucht, erscheint ihm wie eine "Belagerung":

[...] Ziemlich viel gearbeitet *aber ohne rechte klarheit des sehens!* Ob ich noch weiter werde arbeiten können? (!) Ob der vorgang schon fällt?? Es wäre merkwürdig da ich in mitten eines problems stecke, in mitten einer belagerung. ---.---! (12.11.14)

Am 31.10.1914:

[...] Habe das Problem *verzweifelt* gestürmt! Aber ich will eher mein Blut vor dieser festung lassen ehe ich unverrichteter Dinge abziehe. Eine grösste schwierigkeit ist die einmal eroberten forts zu halten bis man ruhig in ihnen sitzen kann. Und bis nicht die *stadt* gefallen ist kann man *nicht* für immer ruhig in einem der forts sitzen. ---

Wittgensteins Suche nach einer Lösung in philosophischen Problemen, für deren Erfassung durch präzise Formulierung und Erklärung, verläuft parallel zu seiner Suche nach Antwort auf religiöse Fragen, zu seiner Sehnsucht nach Erlösung von innerer Not: Der Terminus "erlösendes Wort", der später häufig in seinen philosophischen Schriften vorkommen sollte, taucht hier erstmals, und mehrere Male auf: "Ob mir der erlösende Gedanke kommen wird? ob er kommen wird??!! ---" (17.10.1914). Je näher er vor der Lösung der Probleme steht, um so qualvoller empfindet er die Erfahrung des Scheiterns. Am 21.11.14 heißt es:

[...] Ziemlich gearbeitet. Aber noch immer kann ich *das eine erlösende wort* nicht aussprechen. Ich gehe rund um es herum & ganz nahe aber noch konnte ich es nicht selber erfassen!!

Am 22.11.1914: "[...]. Das erlösende wort nicht ausgesprochen. Gestern lag es mir einmal ganz auf der zunge. Dann aber gleitet es wieder zurück. --- "

Die enge Verknüpfung von Geist, Moral, Pflicht und Arbeit zeigt sich in den Tagebuch-Aufzeichnungen des weiteren insofern, als Wittgenstein gleichzeitig über seine geistige und seelische Verfassung und seine Fortschritte in der philosophischen Arbeit genauestens Protokoll führt: "Wieder gearbeitet" (17.1.15); "Fast nicht gearbeitet" (29.1.15), "Ein klein wenig gearbeitet" (2.2.15) usw.

Die Angst, nie wieder arbeiten zu können, überfällt ihn häufig. Am 20.7.1916 ermahnt er sich: "Arbeite nur fort, damit du gut wirst!"

Parallel verlaufend zu seinen Aufzeichnungen über seine Arbeit macht er sich Gedanken und Vorwürfe über seine Sinnlichkeit, so daß Geistigkeit und Sinnlichkeit einander gegenübergestellt und geradezu gegenseitig abgewogen werden: "Wieder etwas sinnlich." (30.11.14); "Sinnlich." (21.2.15); "Sehr sinnlich" (23.3.15) usw.. Am 2.1.1915 notiert er, daß sein "moralischer Stand jetzt tiefer" als etwa zu Ostern sei, am 4.3.1915, er sei "moralisch matt". Vor allem fürchtet er, sich selbst zu verlieren und seiner Pflicht nicht nachzukommen. Diese Befürchtung ist stärker als die Angst, erschossen zu werden. (12.9.14) Seine Sinnlichkeit, wie auch sein Wunsch, zu überleben, erschrecken ihn derart, daß er sich ähnlich einem Tier fühlt und Gott um Hilfe im Kampf gegen seine "schlechte Natur" anfleht.

In Sinnlichkeit und Sünde zu leben, bedeutet für ihn, unglücklich zu sein, "unvernünftig" - vom guten und rechten Leben entfernt, welches ein "vernünftiges" Leben, ein Leben im Geist wäre. Wittgenstein bittet demnach Gott und den Geist einmal abwechselnd, einmal in einem Atemzug, ihn zu erleuchten – der enge Zusammenhang zwischen philosophischer und religiöser Bedeutung wird augenscheinlich. "Gott mit mir! [...] Möge der Geist mich erleuchten." (15.9.14)

Der Geist steht primär für Vernunft – in philosophischer Hinsicht für die zur Erkenntnis benötigte "ratio", in religiöser Hinsicht für die Vernunft, die zu einer tugendhaften Lebensweise führt, eng verwoben mit der Erkenntnis Gottes, der für Wittgenstein Symbol des Guten und Ethischen war.⁴

Bei einem Vergleich mit Tolstoj findet sich in dessen Schrift "Gedanken über Gott" eine ähnliche Betonung der Vernunft. Gott wird als Urprinzip der Vernunft bezeichnet. Demnach wird Gott als Gott-Geist angesprochen, weniger als Gott-Vater. Der Begriff eines Gott-Schöpfers wird sogar abgelehnt. "Der Gott-Geist erlöst vom Leiden und vom Bösen und ist immer das vollständige Heil." (GüG, 24)

Auch der Aspekt der Abhängigkeit von Gott kommt bei Tolstoj zum Ausdruck: "Du erkennst Gott nicht vermittelt der Vernunft, auch nicht des Herzens, sondern durch die empfundene vollständige Abhängigkeit von Ihm [...]" (GüG, 17). Wittgenstein, für den die Abhängigkeit von Gott eine entscheidende Rolle in seinem Verständnis von Religion spielte, und der sich in anderen Schriften dabei auf Kierkegaard bezieht, gibt sich in Augenblicken der Erschöpfung und Ratlosigkeit wiederholt in Gottes Hand: "Dein wille geschehe.--"(28.10.14).

"Aber nicht mein sondern dein wille geschehe!"(30.3.16)

In Anbetracht der wachsenden Gefahr des Todes wird Wittgensteins Verhältnis zu Gott inniger, sein Ton leidenschaftlicher. Im Gegensatz zu den beiden ersten Heften, in denen er häufig den "Geist" um Hilfe anfleht, spricht er im dritten Heft, 1916, vor allem von Gott, der ihm zum unentbehrlichen Du wird. Ähnlich der Heiligen Theresa von Avila erkennt er, daß Gott allein genügt: "Nur Gott braucht der Mensch." - vermerkt er am 30.4.16.

Dem Tode täglich gegenüber, ahnt Wittgenstein neue Dimensionen hinsichtlich der Bedeutung des Lebens.

[...] Dann wird für mich erst der krieg anfangen. Und kann sein - auch das leben! Vielleicht bringt mir die Nähe des todes das licht des lebens! Möchte Gott mich erleuchten. Ich bin ein Wurm, aber durch Gott werde ich zum menschen. Gott stehe mir bei. Amen. (4.5.16)

Selbst die philosophische Arbeit wird angesichts der Todesnähe unwesentlich: "Hätte jetzt reichlich zeit und ruhe zum Arbeiten. Aber es rührt sich nichts. Mein Stoff ist weit von mir entfernt. Der Tod gibt dem Leben erst seine bedeutung." (9.5.16)

Als er sich wieder mit philosophischen Problemen befaßt, kommt er zu ersten Einsichten seiner später bestimmenden Auffassung über die Grenze zwischen Sagbarem und Unsagbaren: "Was sich nicht sagen lässt, lässt sich nicht sagen!" (7.7.16)

Dies gilt insbesondere für den metaphysischen Bereich: für Gott, der sich weder begreifen noch bezeichnen läßt, wie auch Tolstoj betonte: "Würde ich Ihn begreifen, so würde ich Ihn erreichen und würde nichts mehr erstreben können und das Leben würde nicht mehr

sein. Was aber als ein Widerspruch erscheint, ist, daß ich Ihn zwar weder begreifen noch bezeichnen kann, Ihn aber doch ohne, den Weg zu Ihm weiß und dies meine sicherste Erkenntnis ist. [...] Ich kann und will mich Ihm nähern, und darin besteht mein Leben, doch vergrößert dies nicht meine Erkenntnis von Ihm [...]. Jeder Versuch meiner Einbildung, Ihn zu erkennen [...] entfernt mich von Ihm und setzt meiner Annäherung an Ihn eine Grenze." (GüG, 15f.)⁵

Die Suche nach Gott ist auch bei Wittgenstein als lebensbestimmende Komponente spürbar und verlief parallel, und in ähnlicher Intensität, zu seinem Streben nach Lösung philosophischer Probleme. Diese Klarheits- und Wahrheitssuche war ihm "Lebenselixier", gab ihm den Impuls zu nimmermüden Gedankengängen, da die Spannung zwischen Wissen und Glauben, zwischen rationaler Erkenntnis und bloßer Ahnung nicht zu lösen war.

Wilhelm Baum, der bereits 1977 auf Wittgensteins "tolstojanisches Christentum" hingewiesen hat, sieht ihn als einen negativen Theologen, mit Ockham, Kierkegaard, Nikolaus von Kues und Kant in eine Reihe gestellt. Was Wittgensteins Weigerung eines philosophischen Disputes über Gott, und sein eher mystischer Zugang betrifft, hat Baum recht; der Terminus "negativer Theologe" scheint mir hingegen zu eng. Wittgenstein irgendeiner religiösen Haltung zuzuordnen ist problematisch – nicht nur, da Widersprüche und Wandlungen festzustellen sind, sondern auch, weil wir mit dem an schriftlich Überlieferten noch lange nicht von einer umfassenden Kenntnis von Wittgensteins Religiosität sprechen können.

Die in den codierten Tagebucheinträgen feststellbare Suche nach Gott äußert sich als eine, aus einem Zustand existentieller Not und Einsamkeit entsprungene Suche. Als eine Art "Notschrei", der sich allerdings auch 30 Jahre später findet, zumindest die gedankliche Auseinandersetzung damit:

Ein Notschrei kann nicht größer sein, als der eines Menschen.

Oder auch *keine* Not kann größer sein, als die, in der ein einzelner Mensch sein kann.

Ein Mensch kann daher in unendlicher Not sein & also unendliche Hilfe brauchen.

Die christliche Religion ist nur für den, der unendliche Hilfe braucht, also nur für den der unendliche Not fühlt.[...] (VB, 93f.)

Das Christentum, so Tolstoj, ist eine Lehre, die dem Leben Sinn gibt – ob es auf göttlicher Offenbarung oder historischer Erscheinung beruhe, sei dabei gleichgültig (KDE, 13) – eine Einstellung, die Wittgenstein mit ihm uneingeschränkt teilte.

Die Suche nach Sinn äußert sich in den frühen Tagebüchern in einem Streben nach geistiger Erleuchtung - auf einer Ebene mit einem Streben nach Klarheit über sich selbst und seine philosophischen Gedankengänge, nach "Transparenz" – die seine Philosophie durchdringen sollte.

⁴ Vgl.: "Wenn etwas Gut ist so ist es auch Göttlich. Damit ist seltsamerweise meine Ethik zusammengefaßt". (VB, 24). Vgl. auch Wittgensteins Bemerkung gegenüber Schlick über das Wesen des Guten, das Wittgenstein folgenderweise – im Sinne der laut Schlick flacheren Deutung der theologischen Ethik – zusammenfaßt: "Gut ist, was Gott befiehlt", denn das schneide den Weg einer jeder Erklärung ab. (WWK, 115). Vgl. dazu Tolstoj: "Die Liebe zu Gott heißt, das wollen, was Gott will." (GüG, 44).

⁵ Vgl. dazu Wittgensteins spätere Ausführungen über das "Anrennen gegen die Grenzen der Sprache", als Ausdruck der menschlichen Suche nach Antwort auf letzte Fragen – die aber zum Scheitern verurteilt ist. Jedes Reden über Religion und Ethik münde in Unsinn, entferne vom eigentlichen Sinn dieser Bereiche. (VüE, TLP)

Die Betonung des Geistigen im Zusammenhang mit Religiosität wird hier besonders deutlich, doch noch Jahre später bleibt Wittgensteins Ringen mit persönlichen und philosophischen Problemen eng mit seinem Ringen um religiöse Fragen verbunden:

"Die Leiden des Geistes los werden, das heißt die Religion los werden", notierte er am 21.2. [1937] in sein Tagebuch. (DB, 191)

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Erinnerte Zeit und Zeit der Erinnerung. Zur Konstitution der personalen Identität aus Lebensgeschichten

Ruth Spiertz, Koblenz

Wenn man von personaler Identität spricht, dann ist meistens die diachrone Identität einer Person gemeint, d.h. eines Menschen, der über eine gewisse Zeitdauer hinweg mit sich identisch bleibt. Doch welche Kriterien gibt es für diese in der Zeit dauernde Identität? Verschiedene Konzeptionen personaler Identität haben auf diese Frage unterschiedlich geantwortet. Gemeinsam ist ihnen, das Problem nicht befriedigend gelöst zu haben.

Ich werde im folgenden die Konzeption der narrativen Identität einer Person vorstellen. Die Untersuchung soll die Vorteile dieser Konzeption gegenüber den früheren Versuchen, das Problem der personalen Identität zu lösen, zeigen. Besonders die zentrale Rolle der Zeit und der Erinnerung beim Erzählen von Lebensgeschichten wird hervorgehoben.

Der Vortrag gliedert sich in vier Teile: Zunächst werden zwei unterschiedliche Positionen bezüglich des Begriffs der personalen Identität gegenübergestellt, deren Ergebnisse für die folgende Darstellung zum Teil wichtig sind, auch wenn sie einige Schwächen aufweisen. Nach allgemeinen Ausführungen zur Erzähltheorie werden die daraus gewonnenen Einsichten auf den besonderen Fall der Lebensgeschichte angewandt, um sodann den Stellenwert der Zeit und der Erinnerung für die Konstitution der personalen Identität aus den Lebensgeschichten herauszuarbeiten.

1. Das Ich als Fiktion und die Bedeutung von Zeit und Erinnerung für die personale Identität

In der Überschrift des Kapitels wird bereits deutlich, daß zwei verschiedene Positionen behandelt werden: erstens die Positionen Humes und Nietzsches, die man als *Suche nach dem verlorenen Selbst* titulieren könnte, und zweitens die Positionen Lockes und Husserls unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Rolle der Erinnerung für die Konstitution der personalen Identität.

Hume sucht im „Treatise of Human Nature“ gemäß seinen erkenntnistheoretischen Prinzipien nach dem Eindruck eines in der Zeit identisch fortdauernden Selbst und findet keine entsprechende Vorstellung eines solchen Eindrucks. Das Selbst soll ja gerade dasjenige sein, zu dem unsere Perzeptionen in Beziehung stehen, d.h. es kann nicht selbst eine Perzeption sein. Außerdem müßte es ein Eindruck sein, der durch das ganze Leben immer unverändert fortbesteht. Es gibt jedoch keinen konstanten und invariablen Eindruck im Fluß unseres Bewußtseinslebens. Daher kommt Hume zu seiner berühmten Bündeltheorie: Das Ich ist eine Sammlung verschiedener Perzeptionen, die mit unvorstellbarer Geschwindigkeit aufeinanderfolgen und in ständigem Fluß sind, ohne daß ein reales Band zwischen ihnen existiert. Es sind nur diese sukzessiven Perzeptionen, die den Geist konstituieren (vgl. Hume 1978, S. 233).

Die Einbildungskraft fingiert die fortgesetzte Existenz der Perzeptionen und schreibt ihnen durch Assoziation der Vorstellungen Identität zu. Das Ich wird zur

Fiktion. Humes Problem bleibt, daß die Identität der Einbildungskraft als Grundlage der assoziativen Mechanismen, die die Perzeptionen zu einer Identität zusammenfassen, nicht fiktiv sein dürfte.

Nietzsches Untersuchung ist hier weitaus radikaler. Ausgehend vom lügenerischen Charakter der Sprache, der eine Unterscheidung zwischen Wahrheit und Falschheit verhindert, revidiert Nietzsche den Wahrheitsbegriff und spricht nur noch von *Zurechtmachung*. Die Innenwelt ist dabei genauso zurechtmacht wie die Außenwelt. Da es für Nietzsche keine Fakten, sondern nur Auslegungen gibt, ist auch das Ich eine Fiktion. „Und gar das Ich! Das ist zur Fabel geworden, zur Fiktion, zum Wortspiel [...]“ (Nietzsche 1985, S. 42) Das Ich ist eine Projektion, um Beständigkeit in die Welt des Flusses zu bringen.

Diese Aussagen Nietzsches dürfen nicht dogmatisch verstanden werden. Da es für ihn keine feststehende Wahrheit gibt, muß der Ausdruck *Zurechtmachung* spielerisch verstanden werden. Die ideale Form eines solchen spielerischen Umgangs mit der Wahrheit ist für Nietzsche die Kunst. Durch sein künstlerisches Tun schafft der Künstler Welten, aber auch sein eigenes Ich.

Einen ganz anderen Zugang zur Ich-Problematik vertritt Locke. Da er den Begriff einer Substanz im Sinne Descartes' ablehnt, hält er es nicht für wesentlich, daß das Denken notwendig einer geistigen Substanz inhäriert, sondern daß es untrennbar mit einem Bewußtsein verbunden sei. Dieses Bewußtsein sei notwendig für die Konstitution eines Selbst. Nimmt man die Dimension der Zeit hinzu, muß das Bewußtsein nicht nur als momentan reflektierendes angenommen werden, sondern als eines, das als Erinnerung in die Vergangenheit zurückreicht und darin die personale Identität begründet. Die personale Identität hängt von der Gleichheit des Bewußtseins und davon ab, wie weit das Bewußtsein als Erinnerung reicht (vgl. Locke 1959, S. 449).

Da Lockes Konzeption der personalen Identität für ihn ausschließlich am psychologischen Kriterium der Erinnerung hängt, stellt für ihn der Fall der Gedächtnisverlustes ein großes Problem dar. Inwieweit ist die Identität der Person gesichert, wenn Lücken im Gedächtnis vorhanden sind oder das Gedächtnis für einige Zeit verändert wurde – etwa durch Drogeneinfluß?

Auch für Husserl spielt die Erinnerung im Zusammenhang mit der personalen Identität eine wichtige Rolle. Doch versucht er im Gegensatz zu Locke, das Phänomen der Erinnerung in einem nichtpsychologischen Sinn zu beschreiben. Das Ich konstituiert sich für sich selbst als identischen Pol „in der Einheit einer >Geschichte<“, indem es Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft konstituiert (Husserl 1977, S. 78) Dabei kann es sich nach Husserl nur dann als konstituierendes Subjekt erfassen, wenn seine Präsenz in einer erweiterten Gegenwart ist, die Vergangenheit und Zukunft umfaßt.

Am Beispiel eines Tones verdeutlicht Husserl die Retention und ihr Gegenstück, die Protention. „Husserls Entdeckung besteht an dieser Stelle darin, daß sich ihm

das >Jetzt< [...] nicht zu einem punktuellen Jetzt zusammenzieht, sondern [...] eine *Längsintentionalität* aufweist, kraft deren es zugleich es selbst ist und die Retention der Tonphase, die >soeben< abgelaufen ist, wie auch die Protention der gerade bevorstehenden Phase.“ (Ricœur 1991, S. 44)

Doch bei schon länger zurückliegenden Ereignissen ist die Verbindung mit der Gegenwart nicht so leicht einsichtig. Hier reicht die primäre Erinnerung nicht aus, sondern es muß auf die sekundäre Erinnerung oder Wiedererinnerung zurückgegriffen werden. Für Husserl ist mit der Wiedererinnerung im Gegensatz zur Phantasie die *Setzung* gegeben, d.h. die Vergangenheit wird als gewesene (und nicht als phantasierte) gesetzt. Ricœur sieht die Wahrheit der Erinnerung dagegen nicht in dieser verdoppelten Selbstpräsenz des intentionalen Bewußtseins, sondern in der Narrativität, die letztere erst konstituiert (a.a.O., S. 58, Anm. 27).

Wie bereits Wittgenstein zeigte, kann unsere sogenannte Innenwelt nicht nur anderen bloß sprachlich vermittelt werden, sondern auch uns selbst. Das gilt ebenso für den Fall der Erinnerung. Die Unmöglichkeit eines rein privaten Zugangs zum Bewußtsein erfordert Identitätskriterien, die nur sprachlich gewonnen und überprüft werden können. Wenn man nun von der These ausgeht, daß bloß innerhalb einer Erzählung sinnvoll von der Identität einer Person gesprochen werden kann und dazu das Erzählen der erinnerten Lebensgeschichte notwendig ist, dann stellt sich die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Person, Lebensgeschichte, Zeit und Erzählung.

2. Allgemeines zur Theorie der Erzählung

„Erzählen bedeutet zu sagen, wer was getan hat, wie und warum – indem man die Verknüpfung zwischen diesen Gesichtspunkten in der Zeit ausbreitet.“ (Ricœur 1996, S. 181) Zu einer Erzählung gehören also Handelnde, ihre Handlungen und Motive sowie die Darstellung der Ereignisse in der Zeit. Die Konfiguration der Erzählung vermittelt zwischen der Konkordanz, der Zusammensetzung der Handlungen, und den Diskordanzen, den Wendungen des Schicksals. Auf diese Weise kommt es zur Synthese des Heterogenen.

Der entscheidende Schritt einer narrativen Auffassung personaler Identität ist der Übergang von der Handlung zur Figur. Die Figur ist diejenige, die die Handlung der Erzählung vollzieht. Sie ist also eine narrative Kategorie wie die Fabelkomposition selber. Nur in einer Korrelation von Figur und Handlung, also erzählter Geschichte, kann Identität geschaffen werden. „Die als Figur der Erzählung begriffene Person ist keine von *ihren* ‚Erfahrungen‘ verschiedene Entität. [...] Die Erzählung konstruiert die Identität der Figur [...], indem sie die Identität der erzählten Geschichte konstruiert. Es ist die Identität der Geschichte, die die Identität der Figur bewirkt.“ (Ricœur 1996, S. 182) Der Konfigurationsakt der Erzählung konstituiert eine Ganzheit, in der sich die Figur und ihre Handlungen erst herausbilden.

3. Die Person und ihre Lebensgeschichte

Ausgangspunkt für die Übertragung fiktionaler Erzählstrukturen auf die Lebensgeschichte einer Person ist erstens Ricœurs These von der Strukturgleichheit realer und fiktionaler Geschichten und zweitens Schapps These vom Menschen als eines in Geschichten verstrickten Wesens (Schapp 1976, S. VI) Auch für MacIntyre ist der

Mensch „[...] in seinen Handlungen und in seiner Praxis im wesentlichen ein Geschichten erzählendes Tier [...]“ und daher geschehe die Identitätsfindung durch die entscheidende Frage: „Als Teil welcher Geschichte oder welcher Geschichten sehe ich mich?“ (MacIntyre 1987, S. 288) Somit ist die Einheit des Selbst in der Einheit der Erzählung begründet. Als Figuren in dargestellten Erzählungen müßten wir potentiell zu jeder Zeit Rechenschaft über unser Selbst ablegen können. Dafür reiche der Begriff der psychologischen Kontinuität nicht aus. Das Selbst sei innerhalb einer narrativen Konzeption das Subjekt der Erzählung, d.h. der eigenen Lebensgeschichte, und damit verantwortlich für die Handlungen und Erfahrungen, aus denen ein erzählbares Leben bestehe.

Für MacIntyre hat das menschliche Leben die Form einer bestimmten Art von Geschichte. Es verkörpere eine bestimmte narrative Struktur und habe eine narrative Ordnung (a.a.O., S. 168, 233 u. 250). Das Leben kann also nur erzählt werden, weil es bereits eine narrative Struktur besitzt. Die Lebensgeschichte wird von einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt an rückblickend erzählt. Dadurch werden vergangene Handlungen und Ereignisse im Lichte der Gegenwart und vorhandener Erwartungen bezüglich der Zukunft gedeutet. Die Geschichten werden erzählt, um das Leben zu erklären. Die menschlichen Handlungen und die Ereignisse werden also vom Erzähler seiner eigenen Lebensgeschichte rückblickend in ein System eingeordnet, das vorher nicht da war, sondern vom Erzähler konstruiert wurde.

Nun zeigt gerade die Methode der Psychoanalyse, daß es darauf ankommt, vergangene Erlebnisse und Handlungen, die wir zum Teil verdrängt haben, in einer kohärenten Geschichte zu erzählen. Nur so können sie Bedeutung für uns gewinnen und wir die Verantwortung für die übernehmen. Nach Ricœur gibt es im Leben einer Person einen Hintergrund erlebter, aber noch nicht erzählter Geschichten, aus dem die erzählten Geschichten auftauchen und in den Vordergrund treten können. „Mit diesem Auftauchen kommt auch erst das Subjekt zutage.“ (Ricœur 1988, S. 119) Die persönliche Identität ist das Ergebnis dieses Komplexes aus verdrängten, nicht erzählten und übernommenen, erzählten Geschichten.

Bis jetzt wurden fiktive und reale Geschichten unterschiedslos dargestellt. Doch bei allen Gemeinsamkeiten ist es wichtig, sich über die Unterschiede klar zu werden. Zunächst muß man festhalten, daß beim Erzählen der eigenen Lebensgeschichte im Gegensatz zur Fiktion Autor, Erzähler und Figur dieser Geschichte identisch sind, wobei der Begriff des Autors hier mehrdeutig ist. Denn man verfügt nicht über die eigene Lebensgeschichte in der gleichen freien Weise wie der Autor einer fiktiven Geschichte. Damit hängt auch das Problem der literarischen Abgeschlossenheit zusammen. Es steht nicht in der Macht des Erzählers der eigenen Geschichte, den narrativen Beginn, die Geburt, und das narrative Ende, den eigenen Tod, zu erzählen. Weiterhin ist die Geschichte eines jeden in die Geschichten vieler anderer verstrickt. In der Fiktion wird diese Verstrickung begrenzt.

Aufgrund der unterschiedlichen Bewertung des vergangenen Lebens zu verschiedenen Zeitpunkten können im Rahmen differenter Erinnerungen und Erwartungen mehrere Geschichten erzählt werden. Für Ricœur ist die narrative Einheit des Lebens „ein unbeständiges Gemisch von Phantasiegebilde und lebendiger Erfahrung“ (Ricœur 1996, S. 199). Die Geschichte eines Lebens werde „[...] unaufhörlich refiguriert durch all die wahren oder fiktiven Geschichten, die ein Subjekt über sich selbst erzählt.“ (Ricœur 1991, S.

396) Und so verbindet die narrative Identität Geschichte im Sinne von Historie und Erzählung im Sinne von Fiktion. Dennoch bleibt der Unterschied zwischen fiktiver und realer Geschichte insofern bestehen, als die Lebensgeschichte auf tatsächlich stattgefundenen Ereignissen referiert.

Welchen Zugang haben wir nun aber zur Vergangenheit? Das Problem der zeitlichen Distanz zwischen Gegenwart und Vergangenheit ist auch ein Problem der Zuverlässigkeit der Erinnerung. Wie kann das Problem der Erinnerung in einem narrativen Rahmen gelöst werden? Diesen Fragen soll im folgenden Kapitel nachgegangen werden.

4. Zeit und Erinnerung

Ich werde im folgenden aus praktischen Erwägungen zwischen der erinnerten Zeit und der Zeit der Erinnerung unterscheiden und beginne mit der Untersuchung des ersten Aspekts. Vergangene Ereignisse sind uns als solche nicht zugänglich. Und selbst wenn sie es wären, sind sie nach Ricœur als Gegenwart so konfus, vielgestaltig und unverständlich gewesen, daß man nicht von einem wirklichen Erfassen der Vergangenheit sprechen kann. Er erwähnt hier das „Vorurteil einer *an sich existierenden Vergangenheit*“ (Ricœur 1988, S. 147). Die Realität der tatsächlichen Vergangenheit entziehe sich dem Menschen (Ricœur 1991, S. 334). Außerdem sei „[...] die aus der Dialektik von Zukunft, Vergangenheit und Gegenwart herausgerissene Vergangenheit unweigerlich eine Abstraktion.“ (a.a.O., S. 251)

Die Vergangenheit kann nur sprachlich wiedergegeben werden. Was bedeutet es, die Vergangenheit *wirklichkeitsgetreu* darzustellen? Dazu muß nach Ricœur der Wahrheitsbegriff radikal umformuliert werden, indem der Wahrheitsanspruch der Fiktionserzählung nicht von dem der Geschichtserzählung getrennt werde (Ricœur 1989, S. 269). Zu diesem Zweck spricht Ricœur statt von Referenz, d.h. dem Bezug einer Erzählung auf Ereignisse, die in der Vergangenheit wirklich stattgefunden haben, lieber von Refiguration. Dadurch soll der Wirklichkeitsbegriff neu gefaßt werden.

Wenn es problematisch bleibt, einen erzählfreien oder mindestens deutungsfreien Zugang zur Vergangenheit oder erinnerten Zeit zu bekommen und deshalb keine eindeutige Geschichte erzählt werden kann, wenn weiterhin die Zeit der Erinnerung die Gegenwart ist, so stellt sich die Frage, wie das Rätsel der Erinnerung mit narrativen Mitteln gelöst werden kann. Jauß zeigt dies am Beispiel von Prousts Roman „Auf der Suche nach der verlorenen Zeit“. „Was muß geschehen, damit aus der kontingenten Ereignisfolge eines gelebten Tages eine Erzählung werden kann?“ (Jauß 1986, S. 23) Das Ereignis muß dabei aus dem Vergangensein der Daten und Fakten in „die Gegenwart der Erzählung“ verwandelt werden (a.a.O., S. 26).

Die reale Welt gewinnt für Proust „[...] erst in dem Maße an Realität, als sie zum materiellen Symbol des Ichs werden kann, d.h. als sie durch die Erinnerung, verstanden als unbewußte Ablagerung der Person in der Zeit [...], dem Ich anverwandelt wird – auf das Vermögen der Erinnerung bezogen besteht der Satz Schopenhauers zu Recht: als erinnerte ist die Welt meine Vorstellung!“ (a.a.O., S. 77)

Wie kann subjektiv Erinnertes, das sich aller Objektivierung entzieht, mitgeteilt werden? Zu diesem Zweck entwickelt Proust eine Poetik der Erinnerung. Zunächst kann nur die Erinnerung mit ihrem wirksamen Abstand der Zeit das vergangene Leben zur Erscheinung

bringen. Um den zeitlichen Abstand aufzuarbeiten, ist ein Weg durch die Zeit notwendig, den das erinnerte Ich antritt und sich dem erinnernden Ich nähert. Die Beziehung zwischen beiden ist eine innere. „Wie setzen demgemäß anstelle des psychologischen Verhältnisses zwischen >reflektierendem und erlebendem Ich< das werkimmanente Verhältnis zwischen erinnerndem und erinnertem Ich [...]“ (a.a.O., S. 100) Beide Perspektiven sind nur zwei Aspekte desselben Ichs. Prousts Methode nun ist es, die Zeit des Erinnerns in die erinnerte Zeit zu integrieren.

Ausgelöst wird der Erinnerungsprozeß, in dem sich für den Leser die Zeit des Erinnerns in die erinnerte Zeit verwandelt, durch einen Eindruck der willkürlichen oder unfreiwilligen Erinnerung. In der Wieder-Erinnerung findet das Ich seine verlorene Essenz wieder. Jauß spricht von einer *authentischen* Wiedergabe des verlorenen Vergangenen (a.a.O., S. 107)

Die Ordnung der Erinnerung hat ihr Prinzip weder in der Chronologie noch in der bloßen Willkür der Assoziationen, sondern in einer ästhetischen Komposition, die die diskontinuierliche Folge von Erinnerungsbildern des erinnernden Ichs und die heterogene Folge von Zeitparzellen des erinnerten Ichs im Gesamtwerk zusammenfügt (a.a.O., S. 132). Die Permanenz des Ichs, die wie die Kontinuität der inneren Zeit die Voraussetzung für die Identität zwischen vergangenem und gegenwärtigem Ich ist, kann erst am Ende durch einen retrospektiven Akt erkannt werden. Darin zeigt sich für Jauß die „identitätsstiftende Kraft der Erinnerung“ (a.a.O., S. 362).

5. Resümee

Es hat sich gezeigt, daß die Konzeption der narrativen Identität gegenüber den anderen hier vorgestellten Konzeptionen den Vorteil hat, durch die Berücksichtigung des sprachlichen Aspekts den solipsistischen Standpunkt zu überwinden. Außerdem braucht man kein selbstidentisches Subjekt zu postulieren, da die Konstitution des Selbst aus Lebensgeschichten ein solches nicht voraussetzt, sondern einen nicht abstrakten Identitätsbegriff zugrunde legt. Dieser neue Begriff zeigt seine Stärke besonders gegenüber den skeptischen Positionen bezüglich der personalen Identität, die das Ich als *reine* Fiktion betrachten.

Problematisch bleibt jedoch die Tatsache, daß keine eindeutige Lebensgeschichte erzählt werden kann. Ist es dennoch möglich, ein authentisches Leben von einer Lebenslüge zu unterscheiden? Dafür müßten wohl neben dem Kriterium der Kohärenz zwei Aspekte hinzukommen: 1. der Wille zur Wahrhaftigkeit, der auf die ethische Dimension des Problems verweist und 2. objektive Kriterien der Überprüfbarkeit, die ähnlich wie die der historischen Forschung beschaffen sein müssen.

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Wittgenstein on Personal Time

Maurice F. Stanley, Wilmington

The most grandiose of the many philosophical problems of time is whether it is real or not. An example of a metaphysical argument to the effect that time is unreal is that of the idealist F.H. Bradley. In setting forth his case he made a distinction between 1) time as space-like and 2) time "as presented," the "now."

Both conceptions, he argues, involve contradiction. Time as space-like must somehow contain, as parts of it, past and future. "Time in fact is 'before' and 'after' in one; and without this diversity it is not time." (Bradley, 1893, 34) But if time – the whole thing – has duration, then all its units must have duration, too. But then these "units" are not really units. So time as space-like is contradictory.

On the other hand, Bradley argues, we also conceive of time as the "now," "as presented," which Bradley pictures beautifully:

"Let us fancy ourselves in total darkness hung over a stream and looking down on it. The stream has no banks, and its current is covered and filled continuously with floating things. Right under our eyes is a bright illuminated spot on the water, which ceaselessly widens and narrows its area, and shows us what passes away on the current. And this spot that is light is our now, our present." (Bradley, 1894, 44)

Bradley finds that this image of time as the moving "now" also harbors a

contradiction:

"But presented time must be time present, and we must agree, at least provisionally, not to go beyond the 'now'... is the 'now' simple and indivisible? We can at once reply in the negative. For time implies before and after, and by consequence diversity; and hence the simple is not time." (Bradley, 1893, 34-35)

So the "now" is also contradictory.

My intent here is not to wrestle with Bradley's metaphysical arguments but to introduce Wittgenstein's arguments and statements on time by way of a serious example of a metaphysical pseudo-problem, in its natural habitat, so to speak. I also want to point out the distinction Bradley makes between "space-like" time and time "as presented" (the "now") which Wittgenstein and certain other philosophers also make.

Wittgenstein in his various discussions of time made points relevant to Bradley's treatment of time (as well as to those of St. Augustine, Schopenhauer, McTaggart, and many others):

"The puzzles about time are due to the analogy between time and motion. There is an analogy, but we press it too far; we are tempted by it to talk nonsense. We say time 'flows', and then ask where to and where from, and so on." (Wittgenstein, 2001, 60-61)

"Why does one feel tempted to say 'The only reality is the present'? ... The person who says only the present is real because past and future are not here has before his mind the image of something moving [past him].

past present future

←-----

"This image is misleading ... That the statement 'Only the present experience is real' [as Schopenhauer believed] seems to mean something is due to familiar images we associate with it, images of things passing us in space." (Wittgenstein, 2001, p. 25)

Wittgenstein is definite in his rejection of such arguments, but at this point he modestly attributes their failure to the standard fallacy of false analogy, rather than to a mistake in "philosophical grammar":

"When words in our ordinary language have prima facie analogous grammars we are inclined to try to interpret them analogously; i.e. we try to make the analogy hold throughout. ____" (Wittgenstein, 1958, 7)

This is a big generalization, but not yet a theory of "philosophical grammar." But then he speaks more directly about the "apparent contradictions" in the grammar of time:

"Consider as an example the question 'What is time?' as Saint Augustine and others have asked it. ... Now the puzzlement about the grammar of the word 'time' arises from what one might call apparent contradictions in that grammar.

"It was such a 'contradiction' which puzzled Saint Augustine when he argued: How is it possible that one should measure time? For the past can't be measured, as it is gone by; and the future can't be measured because it has not yet come. And the present can't be measured for it has no extension." (Wittgenstein, 1958, 26)

But then he quits talking about false analogies and introduces the concept of "philosophical grammar," which he uses to dissolve the cluster of pseudo-problems involving "mental processes," "minds," "pain," and so on: It is difficult to find a brief quote in PI that sums up this long argument, but the following passages will perhaps serve to call it to mind:

"I have a pain in my hand" has the same surface grammar as "I have a quarter in my hand," so we wrongly infer that pains are things, physical objects. But I can throw the quarter away, or up in the air, but not the pain. So pains are not objects. But this argument seems to suggest that pains don't exist, but Wittgenstein is not saying that, of course. Pain is real but it is not a thing, like a coin, as Wittgenstein says:

"But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behavior accompanied by pain and pain-behavior without any pain?"-- Admit it? What greater difference could there be? -- "And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a *nothing*." -- Not at all. It is not a *something*, but not a *nothing* either ... We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force itself on us here." (Wittgenstein, 1953, 102)

This is perhaps Wittgenstein's most famous passage. Therefore we expect him to say something quite similar about time. The appropriate argument would be (now, after Wittgenstein) easy to supply:

"I went back to 1940" has the same surface grammar as "I went back to Dallas," so 1940 must be "space-like." We have clearly been misled by grammar, as Wittgenstein says.

Or, "He slept from Tuesday until Friday" has the same grammar as "He slept from Paris to Vienna," so Tuesday and Friday must be "space-like," like places or like stops on a railroad line, moving, flowing, etc.

What Wittgenstein has said about pain we expect him to say about time. Instead he brings up certain very odd considerations:

"How does the temporal character of facts manifest itself? How does it express itself, if not by certain expressions having to occur in our sentences?"...

"We are inclined to say that negation and disjunction are connected with the nature of the proposition, but that time is connected with its content rather than with its nature." (Wittgenstein, 1974, 215)

"Might one also put the question thus: "How does it happen that every fact of experience can be brought into a relationship with what is shown by a clock?" (Wittgenstein, 1974, 216)

Since time and the truth functions taste so different, and since they manifest their nature only and wholly in grammar, it is grammar that must explain the different taste."

"One tastes like content, the other like form of representation." (Wittgenstein, 1974, 216)

The "taste" of time, the "taste" of negation and disjunction? What can he mean? I think he means that the time of a thing or event is part of *it*, the fact or event, rather than a part of the statement. In "My poker is hot at time *t*" the time, or temporal aspect, is

part of the proposition, while the negation of it must be stuck on.

Then he makes a distinction between "personal time" and "measurable time":

"It is noteworthy that the time of which I am here speaking is not time in a physical sense. We are not concerned with measuring time. It is fishy that something which is unconnected with measurement is supposed to have a role in propositions like that of physical time in the hypotheses of physics." (Wittgenstein, 1974, 217)

Then in the margin of PG at this point he begins (but at a later date) to approach time and time-language in the same way he approached the language of pain:

"A sentence can contain time in very different senses," he says, and gives a list of sentences about time:

You are hurting me.

Water freezes at 0 degrees.

etc., etc. (Wittgenstein, 1974, 217)

Wittgenstein goes no further in this direction. But we do know that time is not a thing or a place, not a something, not a nothing either. We know that pain language is not referential but is a replacement for a cry. So perhaps time language is also a replacement for something. It's also true about time that it is in all

assertions, but has the taste of the content of assertions, not their form. So time is deep in assertions, deeper than pain. And the kind of time we are talking about is personal time, not measurable time – subjective time, not objective time.

Heidegger made very much the same distinction between "real," (subjective) time and

"measurable" (objective) time:

"Time familiar to us as the succession in the sequence of nows is what we mean when measuring and calculating time. It seems that we have calculated time immediately and palpably before us when we pick up a watch ... look at the hands and say "Now it is eight-fifty (o'clock). "We say "now" and mean time. But time cannot be found anywhere in the watch that indicates time ... nor can it be found in modern technological chronometers. The assertion forces itself upon us: the more technological – the more exact and informative – the chronometer, the less occasion to give thought first of all to time's peculiar character."(Heidegger, 1972, 11)

"Measurable time" for Heidegger is scientific, technological time, which draws us off the path of serious thinking. "Real" time is subjective time, of course, for Heidegger:

"Time is not a thing, thus nothing which is." (Heidegger, 1972, 3)

"There is no time without man." (Heidegger, 1972, 16)

These passages represent Heidegger's way of holding the personal and human as real in the case of time, as against the inhumanity, impersonality and abstractness of scientific, measured time. How can a more technologically advanced watch get us closer to the truth of real, personal time? It is the lived experience of time that is of philosophic interest. (This insight derives from Husserl.) Obviously Wittgenstein was interested in personal time, too, rather than scientific, objective, "measurable" time.

Interestingly, Heidegger, concerned with "true time" which, he says, appears as the "It" of "It gives being" ("*es gibt Sein*," or in the English idiom, "What time is it?") asks parenthetically:

"Or are we puzzled now only because we have allowed ourselves to be led astray by language or, more precisely, by the grammatical interpretation of language?" (This passage might be brought into harmony with Wittgenstein's view of language.)

On the other hand, the logician W.V. Quine holds an absolutely opposite, even antagonistic view. He accepts the space-time view for reasons of simplifying grammar, avoiding theoretical awkwardness, etc. in the task of the "artificial regimentation" of ordinary language. He does not seem to even recognize any such distinction as Bradley, Wittgenstein and Heidegger made. Quine is interested only in "theoretical simplicity," which can be achieved through the "artifice of canonical notation," the "regimentation of ordinary language":

"Where the artifice comes is in taking the present tense as timeless always, and dropping other tenses. This artifice frees us to omit temporal information or when we please, handle it like spatial information." (Quine, 1960, 170)

Quine is committed to space-time: "This four-dimensional view of things is an aid to relativity physics; also it is a simplification of grammar, by resolution of tense ... (Quine, 1970, 30-31)

“There is what we say there is,” means in his case that even “objective” time, or “measurable” time, has no ontological status, because we can paraphrase it away. Subjective time gets no chance at all with Quine. Except in logic theory, of course, simplification is not always justified. Pretending there is no such thing as death, for example, simplifies one’s view of life, but at the cost of any authentic understanding of human reality. Denying the existence of poverty might simplify economic theory, but simplification that blinds itself to poverty is hardly adequate to an understanding of our actual world. At least that could be argued. In any case my main point is that the “scientific” view acknowledges no phenomenological, subjective time, at all.

To return to the questions of time and of the language of time, it would seem that we need only ask, “What is deeper in language than even pain or deeper than negation or disjunction? What is the essence of personal time? When we talk about time what is the real depth of it?”

Arthur Schopenhauer believed that the most basic thing there is, is will – not necessarily reasoned, human will, or personal will, but blind will:

“The plant raises its manifestation from the seed through the stem and the leaf to the blossom and the fruit, which again is the beginning of a new seed, a new individual, that runs through the old course, and so on through endless time. ... Eternal, endless flux, characterizes the revelation of the inner nature of will.” (Schopenhauer, 1939, 73)

Language is an expression of will. Indeed we call a statement an “assertion”. Pain language replaces crying. Language is more than that. Time-language, so ubiquitous, must replace some primitive expression of will, something more primitive than pain, something universal, something as deep as the content of a statement. It is what is there in every assertion, a part of that which is as fundamental as the will to speak. That is what Wittgenstein might have said about personal (real) time.

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Normativity, Autonomy and Pluralism. Wittgenstein and the Pragmatic Turn in German Philosophy

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1 Habermas and Apel share with the wittgensteinian linguistic turn the main issue which is at stake in the latter. That is: they rely on the linguistic-pragmatic substitution of the traditional Cartesian (and Kantian) subject of representation, thought as the non-empirical and non-objective pre-condition of the possibility of the objective world, with the function of linguistic and communicative interaction as a means of subjective and intersubjective world-disclosure (H. Sluga 1996; Wittgenstein, Tlp, § 5.54- 5.55). The issue basically concerns the way we think about language as a system and a means of representation. What is here at stake is actually the source of its normativity, and the way in which this normativity can be rationally founded.

For the two German philosophers, the link between linguistic reflection and the question of a normative rational foundation of philosophical research on practical reason, and of practical reason itself, is actually provided by the theoretical tradition they refer to. Especially Habermas has tried to structure his reflections on the later Wittgenstein and on the pragmatization of linguistic turn (mostly by Austin and Searle) as a means to reconstruct the philosophical tradition of Critical Theory. This is the theoretical framework inside which Habermas and Apel attempt a criticism of late wittgensteinian theses. The question of the "authority of language" (Edwards 1990) thus becomes the pragmatic substitute of the question concerning the rational sources of the authority of practical and theoretical reason. Consequently, the question concerning the normative foundation of critical theory concerns the way inter-subjective obligation to such an authority can be thought as a function of the problem of subjective rational autonomy and self-reflexivity. The solution to this problem represents for Habermas and Apel a way of escaping from late Critical theory's contradictions and of thinking of a non-instrumental and nonobjectivating reason.

Inside this framework, the two philosophers' reading of Wittgenstein is shaped by the need of rescuing the consensual feature of the latter quasi-conventionalist approach while escaping from what they think of as a form of anti-normative relativism and contextualism. Their criticism of the *Philosophical investigations'* theses is based on two main points. The first concerns the question of incommunicability between linguistic games, and the real meaning of Wittgenstein's "pluralism" (Apel 1972). The second, strictly related, concerns the foundation question, that is: the question of the representability of the source of normative representation.

Both Habermas and Apel take the latter issue as fundamental for the needs of a critical social theory. They see in the later Wittgenstein a radically anti-normative approach to the question of the self-reflexivity of inter-subjective obligation to linguistic and pragmatic rules. Their criticism of this point rests on a conception of rational practical autonomy as based on the capacity and possibility to transcend every factual - empirical obligation to authority by appeal to a higher ideal authority (i.e. Habermas 1967, pp. 90 ff.; 1971 pp. 67 ff.; 1981, pp. 412 ff). What is here important is in fact how this transcending is thought, and the kind of philosophical justification the

higher authority can claim to rest on. Such a justification is identified, both by Habermas and Apel, with the idealist feature of linguistic world-disclosure. The idealism here concerns the interpretation and criticism of the late wittgensteinian notion of an intersubjective consensus as central to the determination of meaning inside the systematical framework of language as a social praxis (Habermas 1982; Apel 1972). We shall start our analysis from this second point.

What is here at stake is the pragmatic meaning of this consensus, that is: the pragmatic level of judgments and justifications rather than the semantic question of meaning. The link between the two is obviously given by the identification of language with a social praxis (PU, § 51, 202, 560; BIB, pp. 5, 61; BF, III 317), and the definition of linguistic rules as constitutive of this praxis. Habermas and Apel assume this link to be constitutive of the normativity of language in a way antithetical to Wittgenstein's.

The latter's notion of "linguistic game" highlights, against the main assumptions of the *Tractatus*, the contingency and the conventional character of the normative rule system by which the meaning depends. As it is well known, Wittgenstein now gives up the idea of a system of possible meanings as a closed and definitively fixed horizon, and the attribution of the normative feature of language to the fact of mirroring empirical reality. The central notions of rule following and rule-sharing are in turn based on the conventional and arbitrary character of the inter-subjective consensus on which they rely (PG, § 133; WWK, p. 93; Z, § 357). The social consensus sustaining the systematic character of language (that is: language as a system of rules by which in turn significant differences can be defined), is therefore the source of a factual normativity that seems not to be able to transcend itself (Kripke 1982, pp. 15 ff. and 27-49). The later Wittgenstein's "full blooded conventionalism" (Dummett 1978) confers a purely empirical value to the linguistic role, played by its consensual structure, of world-disclosure. This means that the pre-empirical, and quasi-transcendental, condition of experience of empirical world is in fact factual and practical, though not representable but only shown by the practice of speaking and understanding. Wittgenstein argues here against any kind of foundationalism.

This in turn explains the notion of pluralism, which especially attains to the source of normativity. There is no "source", or "essence" of language, but a plurality of levels of linguistic organization of reality; there is no meta-language thinkable as a way of selfthematization of its normative structure (i.e. PU § 108). The whole structure of philosophical representation is in fact revisited: the normativity of statements, practical and theoretical, is a function of a pre-determining factual condition of factuality. This is what Habermas calls a social reflexivity of language, which is in no way a social self-reflexivity of the inter-subjective obligation to rules.

Habermas and Apel argue against Wittgenstein's conventionalism and its consequent contextualist development, for which no communication between

different linguistic games seems to be possible, by a two-step move. Against the conventionalist and purely factual character of social consensus they argue for a normative foundation showing a necessary character. The status of this necessity is in fact, as we shall see, controversial, for Habermas and Apel seem to appeal both to a logical necessity and to an artificial moral necessity (identified with the "emancipating character of modern reason") (Apel 1972, pp. 203 ff.; Habermas 1985). In any case, both refer to the notion of a performative contradiction in order to define the necessity of thinking of the inter-subjective consensus framing the social praxis of speaking and understanding as an idealist world disclosure in which and through which the function of world-disclosure can be defined as the locus of autonomy and equality of speaking-subjects. They both think to the communicative function of language as prominent, and attribute to an ideal communicative situation the role that Wittgenstein attributed to social consensus, with a surplus of (ethical, neither logical nor empirical) normativity given by the inescapable character of its emancipating features. Emancipation is here identified with the form of context-transcendence made possible by the meta-language of equal and free inter-subjectivity. In this framework, autonomy is precisely freedom from established conventions, and the way in which this freedom actually becomes operative is the structuring of communication as argumentation. Against Wittgenstein's idea that the limit of reasons is given by the boundaries of my linguistic game, they postulate the necessity of a universal, normative "game of games" through which an idealist version of linguistic interaction is rescued. They take his meta-game to be the practice of discussion in ideal factual conditions, and think of it as playing a rule of self-justification (thus, of justification of the very criteria of justification). Consensus resulting from the practice of arguing and justifying in ideal conditions is then identified with the normative structure of communicative world disclosure. This normative structure is said to be necessary in virtue of the fact that any attempt to enter the communicative-argumentative game cannot bypass the rules of equality, freedom and inclusion recognized for every member of the communication community. Wittgenstein's attempt to reduce the *Sollen* to a *Sein* is here rehearsed.

The second step is given by the statement of the universal character of such a game of games. From this viewpoint, the necessity of postulating a game of games (which Apel identifies with the linguistic game of philosophical argumentation; Apel 1976, 1997.) is stated as a function of the factual possibility of universal, (non-contextual) criticism. The link between the pragmatic and the semantic dimension is here fully explicit: Habermas and Apel argue for the existence of a point of view, at once internal and external to every linguistic game, by which translation and argumentation is in any case possible. This is in fact the very possibility of thinking of the dialectics between performativity and objectivity as structuring the practice of communication. Wittgenstein's pluralism of language-games, thus the recognition of a plurality of *levels of representation*, is indirectly denied. The denial is actually a result of postulating the pre-determination of linguistic-communicative practices by a normative quasi-transcendental framework which structures the interactive praxis without being structured by it.

2 What is here carried out is a deep revision of Wittgenstein's conception of language and language *use* as conventionally determining the level of linguistic-rational representation. That is: the whole idea of the dependence of the normative structure from interactive practices which

do exhaust themselves in the normative framework of their communicative recognition. I think that this revision can be defined in terms of an attempt to install a Kantian notion of rationality and autonomy inside the framework of the linguistic turn. Both Habermas and Apel recognize this; Apel explicitly speaks of a "semiotization of Kantianism". The idealist turn through which Wittgenstein is interpreted directly refers to a process of linguistic-pragmatic reading of the classical continental conception of representation. The aporias and misunderstandings of this reading seem to depend on such an operation.

Habermas and Apel inherit from the Kantian notion of practical autonomy a fundamental feature. That is: practical individual autonomy comes to be identified with the capacity of transcending the context by appealing to a normative universal rational form. This is basically an appeal to a universal thought as normative and necessary in virtue of its being at once the *prius* and the *posterius* of rational representation. The Kantian conception of practical reason, especially as it is exposed in the *Foundation of the metaphysics of customs*, relies on the teleological and tautological function of the notion of "universality" of reason. The abstraction from contextual ends and means is the necessary precondition of practical autonomy, as it is clear from the very concept of "practical (good) will". This abstraction is in turn the result of a formalistic and teleological conception of practical reason. Thus the very structure of obligation to practical norms (and especially of obligation to the categorical imperative) depends on the universality of the form as at once means and end of context-transcending (FMS, § 398, 421, 429, 444, etc.).

The idealist framework of Habermas' and Apel's conception of communicative autonomy actually replies the Kantian assumption that central for the individual being autonomous and self-reflexive is its capacity to assume the transcendental point of view of rational universality as the form and content of his will. The idealistic pre-determination is thus made possible by the objective subsistence of a quasi-metaphysical framework which in turn is *neutral* to every empirical determination of the will. Its neutrality, which Habermas assumes as the main feature of the communicative-universal point of view, thus of the game of games represented by the ideal speech situation, is in fact ethically shaped. Apel takes this ethical direction to be that of a "universal history" of communication and translation.

The Kantian conception of transcendental and formalistic normativity of practical reason is clearly not compatible with the wittgensteinian refusal of any a-priori determination of the structure-essence of (linguistic) representation. The "final" point of view of justification, given in Kantian metaphysics by the "kingdom of ends" as the possibility condition of autonomy, is actually antithetical to the main assumptions of the *Philosophical investigations*. The illusion of an a-priori universal and normative point of view must here clearly be denied. Does this mean that one has deny any possibility of a non-relativistic reading and development of late wittgensteinian ideas?

3 We must here come back for a moment to Wittgenstein's notion of incommunicability (incommensurability) between linguistic games, which is directly related to the question of autonomy as a capacity to transcend the given conventional context. The notion is interpreted by Habermas and Apel in terms of a profession of full-blooded relativism, and said to be meaningless in virtue of the factual operativity of translation.

In fact, what Wittgenstein is here saying concerns another level, at which this criticism seems not to be reasonable. It concerns precisely the level of normative judgment, at which no neutral point of view is possible. The point of view (that is to say: the criteria of judgment), is thought of as necessarily internal to a linguistic game. The plurality of linguistic games being the plurality of levels of representation, thus of organization of reality, the issue is here given by the incommensurability of paradigmatic pre-conceptions of reality and of the same inter-subjective reading of it. This does not mean that a judgment is not possible; it only means that a neutral, super-partes position is an illusion. However, in the PU, we are faced with the game of imagining linguistic games different from ours (PU, § 299; see also Z, § 350). I think that what actually makes this imagination game possible is precisely the consciousness that the criteria of the game are in some way "biased". Wittgenstein is certainly *not* interested in transforming the practice of linguistic criticism into an emancipating practice. However, he speaks about the "imagination game" as a way of acquiring consciousness and a better degree of understanding of our concepts and paradigmatic assumptions (VB, p.141).

This acquisition of consciousness seems to highlight the basis of a possible redefinition of the classical concept of autonomy, in terms of a capacity of understanding the *genealogy* of our paradigmatical framework of reference's features. Starting from the participative character of such an understanding, and from the assumption that the very recognition of family resemblances between linguistic games is in turn based on what "all men have in common", that is: on features and criteria recognizable from a point of view much "lower" than that postulated by Habermas and Apel, that the notion of autonomy can be thought as deeply linked with that of pluralism.

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Conceptual Analysis, Theory Construction, and Conceptual Elucidation

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Almost a half century after the publication of the *Philosophical Investigations*, it seems important to ask why Wittgenstein's ideas have had so little impact on contemporary discussions in the philosophy of mind.

A clue can be discerned by what Georges Rey says in the introduction to his book on contemporary philosophy of mind. Rey announces at the outset to his readers that his treatment of the mind aspires to be continuous with science, not with literature. He explains that there is a recent resurgence of interest in the philosophy of mind with "explanatory questions" about what sort of thing a pain, a thought, a mental image, a desire, or an emotion is. Neither materialism nor dualism provides a "serious" theory about the mind, which will give us a "serious" explanation of mental phenomena. According to Rey, although old-style grammatical investigations may have given us a "heightened sensitivity to complexities and nuances of our ordinary mental talk," they "tended to occur at the expense of further theorizing about the mental phenomena themselves" (Rey, 4).

But, as Rey acknowledges later in the book, it is not simply that the acquisition of a heightened sensitivity to the complexes and nuances of ordinary talk *tended* to occur at the expense of further theorizing about the nature of mental phenomena: it was *designed* to do so. Such a "heightened sensitivity" was to reveal the futility of such further theorizing. Wittgenstein explicitly repudiates the temptation to *penetrate* or *see into* phenomena. He is also complains about attempts at explanation that invoke "yet uncomprehended processes in yet unexplored mediums." As philosophers, we should be interested in the kind of statements we make in using mental concepts.

Comments like this have led many contemporary philosophers to reject Wittgenstein's attitude as simply prejudiced against scientific enquiry. Rey parodies this attitude – crystallized in Wittgenstein's dictum that explanations have to come to an end somewhere – by suggesting that

one could... [rationally]... never ask for explanations of anything at all: we *could* just say that it is a natural capacity of lightning to burn what it strikes. The question is whether we *can also* rationally ask for slightly deeper explanations, and, if we can, what those explanations might be... (p.5).

But Wittgenstein does not simply reject scientific theories that are advanced about the phenomena in question: he disputes whether there are such phenomena to be so investigated. He rejects, that is, the philosophical presupposition that funds the scientific programme: namely, that expressions containing mental verbs always function in the same way to pick out an independent state of affairs (objects, events, states, properties, or relations) in the first place. This is not anti-science; it is anti-Russell and anti-Tractatus. Expressions containing mental verbs function in various ways at various times. To suppose that they always refer, let alone to phenomena that are ripe for metaphysical or scientific investigation, would be unacceptably to distort the meaning of these expressions. This is not because concept revision is in principle

unacceptable, but because these particular kinds of mental expressions, and the kinds of explanations that they deliver, are perfectly in order as they are. This becomes clear when close attention is paid to the way these expressions are used. It is a great pity that today this fundamental tack is rarely discussed or even acknowledged.

But an interesting trend is worth noting. Cognitive science's close relationship with analytical philosophy is being questioned, and as this occurs, some of Wittgenstein's thoughts are getting a look-in through the back door. This can be seen with respect to a project that has occupied most philosophers of mind in the 1980s and 90s: to articulate a theory of mental content.

Stephen Stich characterises one motivation for articulating such a theory as follows:

A prominent feature of our everyday discourse about ourselves and about other people is our practice of identifying mental states by adverting to their content... In these, and in a vast range of other cases, the attribution of content is effortless, unproblematic, and unquestionably useful. Moreover, in the typical case, there is widespread intersubjective agreement about these attributions. Plainly, there must be a mental mechanism of some complexity underlying this ubiquitous practice, and it seems plausible to suppose that the mechanism in question includes a store of largely tacit knowledge about the conditions under which it is (and is not) appropriate to characterize a mental state as the belief or the desire *that p* (p. 350).

Stich suggests that a perfectly plausible goal for a theory of mental content would be to describe the body of tacit knowledge that is stored in the mechanism underlying our quotidian practice.

If a theory of content is to explain how an ordinary person comes to an understanding of her subject by attributions of mental states then the theory is answerable to the kind of understanding that is involved, and thus the kind of explanation that is delivered, in common sense interpretive contexts. Even if a theorist studying these practices is the best person to articulate what constitute their rules or suppositions, it is still the ordinary practices, explanations, and understanding they deliver that is the subject of investigation.

But philosophers working on theories of mental content have a highly ambivalent attitude toward ordinary understanding. Often, one is given the impression that the authority on the nature of the explanatory role of the mental is within the province of the cognitive sciences, whose theorists should not feel constrained by the remarks of philosophers interested in conceptual elucidation. Anybody tempted to appeal to ordinary language "intuitions" is interfering unnecessarily with a perfectly legitimate scientific enquiry.

The relationship was bound to become uneasy between the tradition of "analytical" philosophy – which takes as its brief an investigation of language as a way of investigating thought, and philosophy-as-science – which

wants to eschew language (especially with its tight ties to what the ordinary folk would say) and study the phenomena of thought on its own. One manifestation of this uneasiness is the realization that theory construction is not far removed from the project of conceptual analysis as practiced, for example, by G.E. Moore.

Moore's explicit characterisation of analysis – as the clarification of concepts – says that the verbal expression of analysis must follow a standard pattern of paraphrase in which what is analysed is logically equivalent to a larger, more explicit, and synonymous expression. Of course the accounts of the mental we are concerned with were never supposed to be definitional, hence the demand for synonymy of expressions is no longer in place. Instead, the strategy might be to suppose that our mental concepts fix the reference of what can be discovered *a posteriori* to be some property or set of properties. On this conception, any proposed identity claim linking the concept with the alleged referent will not purport to be definitional, but rather “reforming”. Nonetheless, any theoretical or reforming definition might still be subject to the challenge that it has either left something essential out of the proposed reforming definition that is central to the concept being reformed, or that it has added something that it was essentially missing.

A number of philosophers have noticed the close tie between theory construction that proceeds in this way and old-fashioned conceptual analysis and have thus expressed misgivings about the whole enterprise. Stephen Stich and Michael Tye have doubts partly on inductive grounds: since conceptual analysis or conceptual definition as Moore conceived it has, by and large, been a failure, then so too will reforming definitions with (in certain ways) even tighter constraints about what is allowed in the paraphrase.

But the past failures of conceptual analysis are not the only grounds for pessimism. Both Stich and Tye have also claimed that empirical findings support rival theories about the nature of the mental structures that underlie people's judgments when they classify items into categories. The empirical evidence shows that these structures do not exploit tacitly known necessary and sufficient conditions. Both philosophers cite Eleanor Rosch's work on prototypes as an example of such a rival theory and both of them mention in a footnote her indebtedness to Wittgenstein's work in the *Philosophical Investigations*. This is what I mean by a recent attention to Wittgenstein slipping through the back door.

What conclusion is to be drawn from this? Stich speculatively concludes that the ability to categorize intentional concepts will not have underlying them mental mechanisms that utilize “classical” concepts of the sort that can be defined by sets of necessary and sufficient conditions. If our intuitions about whether a state has the content *that p* are constructed, and not determined by rules for the application of the concept but are rather guided in part in response to the circumstances in which the judgment is called for, then there are no such rules in the form of necessary and sufficient conditions for a theory of mental content to deliver. To a student of Wittgenstein (and ignoring, for the moment, the reference to mental mechanisms), this will sound familiar.

One would expect a concomitant rejection of the idea that it is the job of cognitive science to describe the structure of knowledge underlying people's ordinary judgments about the content of intentional states. But instead Stich suggests that if this is what a theory of mental content is for, the theorist will probably have to give

up doing philosophy as it is traditionally conceived and start doing cognitive science instead (p.354).

But how would doing cognitive science instead avoid what has always been the difficult questions that a theory of content would have to face: namely, what is to count as someone's having a particular mental attitude with a specific content? Or, as Wittgenstein might prefer to say, what counts as a successful or permissible or acceptable use of these mental expressions? Experimenters testing “underlying mechanisms” for their subjects' ability to identify these states or attribute mental concepts have to take a stand on whether any particular attribution is successful before the mechanisms for delivering these and only these successful judgments can be investigated. To reach the conclusion that concepts are not classical in the sense that Moore envisaged does not obviate the need to find out or decide what will count as a successful application of these concepts. Insofar as it is a person's interpretive *abilities* to be explained (and not mere habits or tendencies) we need some idea of what constitutes success.

The pursuit of these answers was traditionally the remit of philosophy. But in a context where the focus is on the mental mechanisms in which the relevant bodies of knowledge are held to be stored, the role of the philosopher has become tenuous. For is it not the business of an empirical psychologist to study mental mechanisms? Thus both Stich and Tye agree that whatever the mental is, it is the job of the latter to investigate it.

Stich and Tye may be right to doubt that a body of knowledge provides necessary and sufficient conditions (for something, say, to be a state with content) but they should – for similar reasons – also be suspicious of the idea that our ability to apply mental concepts has a body of largely tacit knowledge that “underlies” it. How is this knowledge supposed to be explanatory?

The usual supposition is that an interpreter is caused to deliver correct interpretations most the time because the rules for interpreting are embodied in “mental mechanisms.” This presumably means that having the body of knowledge is causally sufficient to produce the correct answers, provided that the mechanism is not defective. But if the mechanism that embodies the knowledge is causally sufficient to produce the right answers, then the content of knowledge itself, as it were, would have to suffice to deliver the right answers. And this leads us back to the idea that the knowledge consists in at least sufficient conditions for the application of our content concepts. Surely the rejection of a classical conception of concepts brings with it the rejection of the model of explanation that supposes that the content of knowledge is sufficient to determine correct interpretations. To put the point another way, surely the rejection of the idea that there are rules that determine the correct application of mental concepts brings with it the rejection of the idea that our ability to interpret is a matter of knowing these rules. What room is left, then, for the idea that the ability to be explained amounts to a kind of information processing? How is the information to be delivered and how is its delivery supposed to explain the ability?

It seems that in viewing a theory of content as an underlying body of knowledge that is supposed to explain an individual's ability to interpret, we have not moved far enough away from conceptual analysis. Moving far enough away would involve rejecting the mechanism hypothesis as otiose. This will in turn allow the focus to be on the intersubjective agreement: why do we tend to converge on the ascription of mental content concepts to one and

another, and in what do correct or permissible judgments consist? These questions will be answered – to the extent that they can be – by paying attention to how we justify, defend, correct, and explain those attributions. And this is just what a good Wittgensteinian should set out to do: to describe the “allowable moves” that can be made using expressions containing mental verbs. Insofar as the focus of investigation is on what counts as “allowable” – as opposed to what is known by someone who makes the moves – the project would be normative in the old-fashioned sense, but it is as far removed from the presuppositions of *a priori* conceptual analysis as the critics should want.

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Zwei Begriffe personaler Identität

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Die Divergenz zweier Identitätskonzeptionen wird deutlich, wenn man bedenkt, dass in Praktischer Philosophie, Psychologie, Sozialwissenschaften und im Alltag davon gesprochen wird, eine Person bilde ihre Identität aus, verändere ihre Identität, verlöre ihre Identität oder sie habe gar mehrere Identitäten. Der theoretische Identitätsbegriff scheint mit solchen Redeweise nicht vereinbar zu sein, denn ein verbreiteter Konsens besagt ‚No entity without identity‘ und das impliziert die Überzeugung, dass eine Entität jeweils *eine* Identität hat, nicht mehr und nicht weniger. Die Selbigkeit einer Entität beinhaltet die Veränderungen, die ihr widerfahren; Veränderungen führen nicht zu einer Vielzahl von Identitäten. Ebenso wird ausgeschlossen, dass etwas noch keine Identität besitzt, sondern diese erst im Lauf einer Entwicklung erwirbt.

Der Begriff der Identität oder Selbigkeit gehört zu den philosophischen Grundbegriffen, die oft als ‚primitiv‘ d.h. als grundlegend und nicht ableitbar bestimmt werden.¹ Unser Denken und Sprechen legt diesen Begriff ständig zugrunde, so dass es unmöglich ist, ihn gewissermaßen erst einmal aus dem Spiel zu lassen, um ihn dann schrittweise einzuführen. Ohne in die Details der seit Frege geführten Kontroversen einzutauchen, kann man festhalten, dass Identität meist als Relation bestimmt wird. Dabei gilt Identität als eine *reflexive, symmetrische, transitive* Relation. Da Identität durch das Merkmal der Transitivität von Ähnlichkeit unterschieden ist, verbietet es sich, Identität als maximale *Ähnlichkeit* zu erläutern.

Als paradigmatisch gelten Identitätsaussagen über Einzelgegenstände, die mittels singulärer Termini bezeichnet werden. Bedeutungsgleiche singuläre Termini dürfen in referentiellen (nicht-opaken) Kontexten *salva veritate* ausgetauscht werden. In empirischen Aussagen über Partikulare wird Ununterscheidbarkeit als Kriterium der Identität akzeptiert. Logisch und metaphysisch ist das nicht selbstverständlich, wie die Diskussion über Leibniz Prinzip der *Identität des Ununterscheidbaren* zeigen (Leibniz 1961, 264, 368, 384, 403; Teichert 2000, 152-176).

Mit Blick auf die Frage nach dem Konzept personaler Identität bietet es sich an zwischen *numerischer, qualitativer* und *diachroner (transtemporaler)* Identität zu unterscheiden. Diachrone (transtemporale) Identität wird oft als der zentrale Punkt des Problems personaler Identität aufgefasst. Dementsprechend lauten die einschlägigen Fragen:

I. „Was bedeutet es zu sagen, jemand sei (zu unterschiedlichen Zeitpunkten) ein und dieselbe Person?“

I.1. *Ontologisch*: „Unter welchen Bedingungen ist jemand gegenwärtig dieselbe Person wie in der Vergangenheit?“

I.2. *Epistemisch*: „Woher weiß man und wie erkennt man, dass jemand gegenwärtig dieselbe Person wie in der Vergangenheit ist?“

I.1. und I.2. werden manchmal als Frage nach den *Kriterien* der personalen Identität behandelt. Es ist aber sinnvoll, die Kriterienfrage ausschließlich als Frage nach der *Feststellbarkeit* der Identität einer Person aufzufassen und von der *Konstitution* strikt zu unterscheiden. Denn in manchen Fällen können wir die epistemische Frage nicht beantworten, obwohl wir grundsätzlich die ontologische Frage als entschieden betrachten wollen.

Die diachrone Identität von Entitäten kann auf ontologischer Ebene entweder als eindeutig *determiniert* oder als nicht eindeutig determiniert, als *vage* betrachtet werden. Die ontologische Vagheitstheorie fasst die diachrone Identität von Personen partiell oder generell als unbestimmt und nicht nur als unbestimmbar auf. Vagheit kann sich auf die Anfangs- und Endpunkte der Existenz einer Person beziehen. Der Determinist behauptet, die Frage „Existiert P jetzt?“ sei grundsätzlich immer eindeutig durch die Fakten bestimmt. Folgt man dem Verteidiger der Vagheit, dann hätten Personen eine ähnliche diachrone Identität wie ein Regenschauer: zu einem Zeitpunkt hat er noch nicht angefangen und zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt hat er eindeutig angefangen, aber welches ist der Zeitpunkt, zu dem er exakt begann? Vagheit besagt: die Person hat zu überhaupt keinem *einzelnen* Zeitpunkt exakt zu existieren begonnen. Das Sorites-Problem und die seit der Antike behandelte Frage nach der diachronen Identität von Artefakten liefern Argumentationsmaterial für den Verteidiger vager Identität (Teichert 2000, 77-81).

Besonders brisant sind die (durch Gedankenexperimente konstruierten) Fälle, in denen zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt zwei gleichermaßen gut qualifizierte Kandidaten als „Nachfolger“ einer bestimmten Person gegeben sind. Hier scheint die Logik des Identitätsbegriffs zum Kollaps des harten Modells Personalen Identität zu führen. Der Konflikt numerischer und diachroner Identität wird beispielsweise bei Parfit durch die Aufgabe des Identitätsbegriffs zugunsten des weiteren Konzepts psychischer Kontinuität zu lösen versucht: „personal identity is not what matters“ (Parfit (1984), 215; vgl. Teichert (2000), 225-264).

Gegenüber der ontologischen Vagheitstheorie nimmt sich die *epistemologische* Vagheitstheorie vergleichsweise harmlos aus: wir können die Frage nach der diachronen Identität einer Person nicht (schwache Variante: nicht immer) eindeutig entscheiden. Das ist nur für diejenigen eine Katastrophe, der Allwissenheit anstrebt. Prinzipiell ist in Sachen personaler Identität ontologische Determiniertheit mit epistemischer Vagheit durchaus vereinbar. Dies gilt zumal in solchen Kontexten, in denen Reduplikationen und Klone von Personen noch nicht realiter auftreten.

Das Gesagte setzt voraus, dass über die Konturen des Personbegriffs und über die *Personalität* des Individuums keine Zweifel bestehen. Man kann vorläufig davon ausgehen, dass Personalität im Kern durch *Erkenntnis- und Handlungsfähigkeit* bestimmt werden kann, wobei *Selbstbewusstsein* impliziert ist.

Der Beginn der neuzeitlichen Diskussion personaler Identität ist dadurch charakterisiert, dass vor

¹ Ich beziehe mich im folgenden auf die Überlegungen in Teichert (2000).

dem Hintergrund des Cartesischen Dualismus ein Gegensatz zwischen der Konzeption des identischen Körpers und des identischen Selbstbewusstseins in den Mittelpunkt rückt. Locke artikuliert die Unzulänglichkeit eines einfachen *Körperkriteriums* personaler Identität: Wer den Weg eines bestimmten Organismus durch das Raum-Zeit-Kontinuum kennt, hat damit nicht notwendigerweise Wissen über die entsprechende Person (Locke (1975), 328-348, vgl. Teichert (2000), 130-152). Die Kongruenz von Person und Körper (Organismus) wird in Lockes Gedankenexperiment aufgelöst. Der heutigen Philosophie liegen - insbesondere insofern sie vom Funktionalismus beeindruckt ist - solche Überlegungen („puzzle cases“) ausgesprochen nah. Lockes Lösung allerdings ist Gegenstand zahlreicher Einwände. Bei Locke ist die Identität der Person allein durch das *reflexive* Bewusstsein konstituiert. Damit überlappen sich die ontologische und die epistemische Problematik: eine über die Zeit hinweg identische Person zu sein heißt bei Locke: sich bewusst darüber sein, das man eine über die Zeit hinweg identische Person ist.

Eine starke Intuition, die gegen Locke spricht, sagt: sicherlich ist es möglich, dass ich mich über meine Vergangenheit täusche. In diesem Fall habe ich tatsächlich nicht die personale Identität, die ich zu haben glaube. Aber wenn meine Identität durch mein Bewusstsein bestimmt ist, welche Identität habe ich denn dann eigentlich? – Locke könnte sagen: „Natürlich ist mir klar, dass wir Irrtümern über die Vergangenheit unterworfen sein können. Das ist aber nicht zentral: nicht Allwissenheit ist verlangt, sondern ein kontinuierliches Bewusstsein über die Zeit hinweg“. *Kontinuität des Bewusstseins* kann unabhängig vom Inhalt des Bewusstseins sein: auch ein lang anhaltender Irrtum ist ein Zustand, der über die Zeit hinweg dauert. Ein Neo-Lockeaner fordert nicht *irrtumsfreies diachrones Selbstbewusstsein* der Person, sondern *psychische Kontinuität*.

Entscheidend ist, dass so gut wie alle diskutierten Modelle Personalere Identität insofern in der Tradition Lockes stehen, als sie das Bewusstsein der Person, ihr in der Zeit fortdauerndes Wissen und ihre Handlungen als fundamental ansetzen. Aufgrund der Probleme des Lockeschen Ansatzes wird das diachrone Selbstbewusstsein oft nicht als notwendige oder hinreichende Bedingung aufgestellt, aber es spielt eine zentrale Rolle. Selbst überzeugte Materialisten können in Sachen personaler Identität nicht problemlos das von Locke in den Mittelpunkt gerückte Selbstbewusstsein los werden, indem sie das Gehirn zur identitätsentscheidenden Instanz erklären. Denn das Gehirn gewinnt in der Personalitätsdiskussion aufgrund seiner kausalen Rolle als Träger des Bewusstseins und als Bedingung der Handlungen und sprachlichen Interaktionen der Person entscheidende Bedeutung.

Obwohl im Bereich der Theoretischen Philosophie vielfältige Optionen formuliert werden, werden die beiden folgenden Überzeugungen von der Mehrzahl der Debattanten als wesentlich akzeptiert:

Personalität ist *nicht gradierbar*: eine Entität ist entweder eine Person oder sie ist nicht Person. Der Personbegriff wird nicht so verwendet, dass jemand mehr oder weniger Person ist.

Ebenso wird *personale Identität* als *nicht gradierbar* anerkannt. Ansonsten würde die Identität der Person zu einer Ähnlichkeitsbeziehung. Damit ist nicht ausgeschlossen, dass in bestimmten Kontexten epistemische Hindernisse eine eindeutige Feststellung der Identität verhindern mögen.

Der Kontrast des harten Begriffs personaler Identität und des offenen Begriffs tritt offen zutage, wenn etwa in den Sozialwissenschaften davon gesprochen wird, dass ein Individuum P mehrere Identitäten hat: P's Identität als Staatsbürger steht in eine Spannungsverhältnis zu seiner Identität als Mitglied einer diskriminierten Minderheit. Der israelische Staatsbürger mit arabischer Herkunft gerät in Konflikte, wenn er die Loyalität mit den beiden verfeindeten sozialen Gemeinschaften in seiner Person aufrecht erhalten will. Politische und ethnische Identitäten, soziale und familiäre Identitäten können konfliktieren.

Der Gebrauch des Ausdrucks ‚Identität‘ ist in vielen Fällen durch Verwendung des soziologischen Begriffs der *Rolle* ersetzbar. Wäre es nicht sinnvoll, den Identitätsbegriff hier zu eliminieren, um die Verwirrungen über seine Gebrauchsweisen zu beseitigen? - Nein: die durch logisches Unbehagen motivierte Reparatur wäre durch den Verlust auf einen sinnvollen Kern des offenen Konzepts personaler Identität erkaufte. Worin besteht dieser sinnvolle Kern? - Er liegt primär in der Betonung des Umstands, dass der Personbegriff in maßgeblichen Versionen die Vorstellung beinhaltet, dass Personen Wesen sind, die gleichermaßen durch *Welt-, Fremd- und Selbstbezug* bestimmt sind:

(a) Personen bilden Repräsentationen und Wissen über die Welt, über andere Personen und über sich selbst.

Jeder Vertreter des harten Begriffs personaler Identität kann (a) akzeptieren. Entscheidend ist aber, dass im Bereich der Praktischen Philosophie, der Sozialwissenschaften und außerwissenschaftlicher Diskurse – meist ohne explizite Klärung der Sachlage – der wesentlich stärkere Satz (b) impliziert ist:

(b) Personen sind konstituiert durch Repräsentationen und Wissen über die Welt, über andere Personen und über sich selbst.

Der entscheidende Unterschied zwischen (a) und (b) liegt offensichtlich in der Tatsache, dass in (b) das Repräsentieren und Wissen über Welt, die anderen und sich selbst *Konstitutionsmomente* der Person sind, während in (a) lediglich gesagt ist, dass Personen diese Repräsentationen und das entsprechende Wissen bilden. (b) ist also grundlegend von (a) unterschieden und stärker, denn nach (b) konstituiert sich eine Person P durch Repräsentationen und Wissen von P. Die Frage, welche Selbst-Repräsentationen entscheidend für die Personale Identität sind, ist eine komplexe Angelegenheit, die mit Blick auf konkrete Fälle zu behandeln wäre.

Die Rede von Selbst-Repräsentation darf dabei nicht in einem idealistischen oder psychologistischen Sinn missverstanden werden. Selbst-Repräsentationen sind nicht als beliebige, willkürliche, phantasievolle Konstrukte aufzufassen, sondern als mit den Handlungsmustern und Interaktionsformen der Individuen eng verzahnte Elemente des Welt-, Fremd- und Selbstbezugs. Der Begriff der Rolle, den ich als möglichen Ersatz für den Identitätsbegriff erwähnt hatte, vernachlässigt im Vergleich mit dem Begriff personaler Identität den *reflexiven* Aspekt der Personen.

Natürlich wird von der Seite des harten Identitätsbegriffs darauf hingewiesen werden, dass (b) im schlechten Sinn zirkulär zu sein scheint. Darauf kann der Vertreter des offenen Konzepts reagieren, indem er antwortet: „Während der harte Begriff mit der Annahme arbeitet, Personale Identität sei durch die einschlägigen *Fakten* bestimmt, operiert der offene Begriff mit der Vorstellung, die Identität der Person sei eine *Aufgabe*: die den einzelnen Personen gestellte Aufgabe, ihre Lebensvollzüge so zu gestalten, dass Welt-, Fremd- und

Selbstbezüge miteinander kompatibel sind und im Licht grundlegender Überzeugungen als akzeptabel erscheinen.'

Entsprechend wäre die Divergenz beider Sichtweisen nicht als Disjunktion zu begreifen. Der offene Begriff personaler Identität wird exemplarisch gebraucht mit Blick auf Biographien, in deren Verlauf ein Individuum eine Identitätskrise durchmacht und eine neue Identität gewinnt. In diesen Kontexten wird erkennbar, dass eine wesentliche Dimension des Personbegriffs darin liegt, dass die - eine reflexive Komponente enthaltende - Erkenntnis- und Handlungsfähigkeit der Person sich nicht nur auf jeweils einzelne Situationen erstreckt, sondern auf die Aufgabe bezieht, das eigenen Leben nicht nur zu leben, sondern ein Leben zu *führen*, im Rahmen der Gegebenheiten zu *gestalten* und zu *verantworten* (Habermas (1976), 63-91 und 92-126; Harris (1995); Lévi-Strauss (1983); Nietzsche (1988) I, 338, II, 524, III, 519, IX, 361; Ricoeur (1988), (1990); Taylor (1989); Teichert (2000a). Solange diese Konzeption der Person und der mit ihr eng verbundene Begriffe der *Autonomie* und des *Charakters* das ethische und alltägliche Verständnis von Personalität mitbestimmen, erfüllt der offene Begriff Personalität seine genuine Aufgabe und erscheint mit seinem harten, theoretischen Gegenstück kompatibel zu sein.

Es wäre eine Überraschung, wenn die Vertreter des harten Begriffs ohne weiteres mit dieser Sichtweise einverstanden wären. Ein solcher hermeneutischer Umgang mit begrifflichen Problemen erscheint ihnen oft inakzeptabel. Angesichts dieser Sachlage sind zwei Hinweise angebracht:

1. solange der harte Begriff personaler Identität die durch Reduplikations-, Fusions- und Spaltungsszenarien offen gelegten Defizite nur formal beseitigt und nicht auch in ein gehaltvolles Modell der Identität von Personen integriert hat, kann der offene Begriff seine Position zweifellos mit guten Gründen behaupten;

2. die logischen Bedenken gegen eine im offenen Begriff personaler Identität vorliegende Zirkularität können entschärft werden, wenn man den Begriff überhaupt nicht im Rahmen der *Relationstheorie* der Identität ansiedelt, sondern personale Identität als ein *einstelliges Prädikat* auffasst, das Personen zugeschrieben wird, die in ihren Lebensvollzügen eine bestimmte Struktur ihres Welt-, Fremd- und Selbstbezug aufweisen. Diese Struktur ist unter anderem dadurch bestimmt, dass eine Person in ihren Handlungen eine rationale Kohärenz und Konsistenz über die Zeit hinweg zeigt. Die prädikative Konzeption personaler Identität besitzt die Form ‚Px‘: ‚x hat personale Identität‘, worunter zu verstehen ist, dass x die skizzierte Form von Welt-, Fremd- und Selbstbezug zeigt.

Diese Konzeption ist mit der Rede davon vereinbar, dass eine Person eine Identität ausbildet oder auch ihre Identität verändert: denn es ist verständlich, dass sich die identitätskonstitutive Kohärenz und Konsistenz des Denkens und Handelns in einem Prozess der Sozialisation ausbildet wie es auch möglich ist, dass sich die ausgebildete Struktur des Welt-, Fremd- und Selbstbezugs im Lauf einer Biographie radikal verändert, etwa im Rahmen von ‚Konversionen‘, von Erfahrungen, die zu einem grundlegenden Wandel der Orientierungen eines Subjekts führen.

Auf sprachlicher Ebene kann man die Divergenz beider Konzeptionen durch den Umstand spezifizieren, dass das harte Konzept primär auf die Formulierung wahrer *Identitätsurteile* ausgerichtet ist, während das offene Konzept nicht nur auf die Artikulation wahrheitsfähiger Sätze abzielt, sondern gerade in der nicht

als Informationssuche aufzufassenden *Frage* „Wer bin ich?“ oder den *Imperativen* „Werde, der du bist!“ und „Sei du selbst!“ entsprechende Lebensweise zu verstehen ist. Wer die Frage „Wer bin ich?“ ausschließlich als Frage nach dem Personennamen begreift, der eliminiert die im offenen Begriff personaler Identität wesentliche Dimension des reflexiven Selbstbezugs und der Verantwortung für das eigene Leben.

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Is Determinism with regard to the Spheres of Law or Nature Consistent?*

Michael Thaler, Salzburg

Probably the most important problem for lawyers is the relationship between cases that confront them and the rules of the legal order that they have to apply. Lawyers want to know whether a certain case falls under a certain rule or, more generally, to which set of cases a certain rule has to be applied. If they are able to answer this question, then those lawyers can tell you fairly precisely what the content of a certain rule is.

If the Criminal Code provides that armed robbery should be punished by a prison sentence of 15 years whereas plain robbery only demands a prison sentence of 10 years, then by way of interpretation the lawyers have to give an answer as to the difference between armed and plain robbery.

At this point, the philosophy of law poses a crucial question: suppose a judge applies these rules in a certain case; is his ruling determined by these rules or do the rules leave him a certain freedom; is he strictly bound by the content of these rules or does he have discretion? If he is strictly bound, then there is one and only one correct ruling. If he has a certain discretion, he is free to choose among several equally correct solutions within the scope of his discretion.

Philosophy of law offers a plethora of answers to the problem at issue¹. The present essay shall be concerned with mainly one set of answers, which this author will call "legal determinism". The main contention of legal determinism is that the legal order properly interpreted offers in each and every case one and only one correct answer. The legal order thus strictly determines its own application and leaves the judges no freedom of decision.

This may seem to you a rather peripheral problem, restricted to a sphere of law that might as well be left to philosophers of law to worry about. The contention of this essay is that this is not the case and that there are structural parallels between the problem expounded here and the question of determinism with regard to human action within the sphere of nature. To prove the point, I shall start with a thought experiment designed to test the assumption of determinism within the sphere of law. In a second step, which I have to reserve for my talk at the symposium, a thought experiment is introduced with parallel structures with a view to testing determinism within the sphere of nature. If this argument proves to be successful, it should show that there are certain parallels between the fundamental problems within the different branches of philosophy.

Consider a legal realm consisting of a lawmaker enacting legal rules, judges and authorities applying these rules to specific cases and persons with legal personality whose behavior is regulated by the rules of the legal order of this realm.

The rules are usually structured in such a way that a legally relevant behavior pattern is connected with a

legal consequence. For instance, armed robbery is linked with a prison sentence of 15 years whereas plain robbery only demands a prison sentence of 10 years.

The judges and officials as well as a certain number of persons belonging to the legal realm are to be considered as lawyers. Lawyers have the ability to envisage behavior patterns of persons belonging to the legal realm. Owing to this ability, they can rehearse possible cases in their minds. In turn, this enables them to give you a certain indication as to what has to be considered as the content of a certain rule. For instance, when asked "What is armed robbery?", they can offer you a few examples which according to them have to be considered as cases of armed robbery and also a few cases which in their opinion are lying outside the scope of this legally relevant behavior pattern. Their list of cases is highly selective and consequently the lawyers are far from certain where the exact boundaries of this legally relevant behavior pattern are situated.

Suppose also that there is a super-lawyer who has a better understanding of the legal order than the other lawyers do. Let us call this super lawyer "Hercules"².

In a gigantic effort, Hercules constructs a theory on the legal order by reconstructing the principles underlying the rules pertaining to that order. By means of this theory, he is able to find for every possible case the right answer or the correct legal consequence. He can only do that by making the rules of the legal order explicit.

Hercules' way to make these rules explicit is to distinguish for instance the legal behavior patterns "armed robbery" and "plain robbery" with the help of some underlying principles of the legal order.

How can Hercules make these rules explicit? Or in other words, how is he going to distinguish between the legal behavior patterns "armed robbery" and "plain robbery"? His way to do this is to find so called hard cases³ that seem to defy the boundaries of the legal behavior patterns. He makes the boundaries tight also with respect to hard cases by resorting to the underlying principles of the legal order. According to his theory, if you interpret the rules in the light of their underlying principles, they become explicit even with regard to hard cases. The added principles make the boundaries of the legal behavior patterns tight, which could for instance enable you to define the term "plain robbery" as "unarmed robbery".

But how do you know that you really succeeded in making the rules of the legal order explicit? In order to test your result, you would have to envisage all possible cases and to put them into distinct sets namely those cases that fall under a certain legal behavior pattern and those that do not.

¹ See for instance *Cohen* (Ed.), *Ronald Dworkin and Contemporary Jurisprudence*, Totowa (1984)

² Compare *Dworkin*, *Hard Cases*, in: *Taking Rights Seriously*, Cambridge Mass. (1977), 105 et seq.

³ See again *Dworkin*, *Hard Cases*, 105 et seq.

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Suppose that Hercules by means of his superior gifts is able to predict how persons belonging to the legal realm may act under every conceivable circumstance. This allows him to rehearse in his theory all possible cases in relation to the rules of the legal order.

He achieves this by constructing a list of all possible behavior patterns that might serve as elements of a possible case. In addition, he puts these behavior patterns into different classes, namely those that have to be subsumed under a legal behavior pattern and those that do not. With the help of this manual, he can always tell whether a given case may be subsumed under a certain rule. Consequently, he is always in a position to give the right answer in a legal case, i.e., point out the correct ruling of the judge.

The superior knowledge of Hercules is founded on his theory regarding the underlying principles⁴ of the legal order and on his manual of possible behavior patterns as elements of possible cases. The theory is reliant on the manual. Without the manual, you cannot be certain whether you have envisaged all hard cases and thus made all rules of the legal order explicit.

This knowledge is in fact what every lawyer is striving for. Therefore, Hercules serves as an ideal that every lawyer strives to achieve. Every lawyer wants to be Hercules, that is to say, to reconstruct his theory together with his manual.

There is, however, a cut⁵ between Hercules and his knowledge on the one hand and the persons and lawyers within the legal realm on the other hand. They lack his knowledge concerning their possible behavior. Because of this, lawyers are unable to envisage all possible behavior patterns. This prevents them from envisaging all hard cases, which in turn makes it impossible for them to make the rules of the legal order explicit. However, they are fellow lawyers with the capacity to reconstruct the superior knowledge of Hercules.

If they are successful and thereby eliminate the cut, both theory and manual are not complete any longer. They now form part of the knowledge of lawyers and certain laymen within the legal realm, which leads to these persons no longer being the same. Their previous behavior patterns were linked to their imperfect knowledge of themselves. Now, in adapting themselves to their enhanced knowledge, they will develop new behavior patterns not foreseen by the manual. The new behavior patterns will lead to new hard cases, which the theory will be unable to deal with.

To put it in a paradoxical way, by acquiring the knowledge on how to make the rules of the legal order explicit, the persons within the legal realm lose the capacity to do so. How is this possible? The knowledge of Hercules only applies to the behavior patterns of persons within the legal realm. It does not involve his own behavior patterns or behavior patterns of persons who share his knowledge. It is true that Hercules can solve all hard

cases, but these are hard cases based on the behavior patterns of persons within the legal realm. It does not include the ability to solve hard cases based on a more extended and refined list of behavior patterns shared by Hercules and persons with the same knowledge.

Let me give you an example:

The original legal realm, i.e., the legal realm beyond the cut contained the two rules that armed robbery is to be punished by a prison sentence of 15 years whereas plain robbery only demands a prison sentence of 10 years. With the help of his theory, Hercules was able to define "plain robbery" as "unarmed robbery". The manual furthermore enabled him to solve any hard case at hand, which made it possible to put any case of robbery in the classes of either armed or unarmed robbery. This result was, however, based on the list of possible behavior patterns of persons within the legal realm.

Now that the theory and manual of Hercules have become common knowledge amongst lawyers and interested laymen, any lawyer can look up the list of behavior patterns with the intention of finding one of his own (newly acquired) behavior patterns or inventing a behavior pattern not contained in this list that defies the boundaries of the legal behavior patterns. For instance, he could ask himself "How could I rob a bank neither unarmed nor armed?" According to the list of behavior patterns pertaining to the original legal realm, this was not possible. You had to be either armed or unarmed. Since the list was complete, it excluded the behavior pattern the lawyer is looking for. The lawyer is interested in this behavior pattern because if found it would be an element of a hard case that could not be solved by Hercules. He could prove both Hercules' theory and manual to be incomplete.

The lawyer finally comes up with the solution that one has to rob the bank with an unloaded gun⁶. An unloaded gun may be considered as a weapon because it is a gun. It may however also be argued that in the present case the gun cannot serve as a weapon because it has not been loaded. This is a hard case because it defies the boundaries of the two legal behavior patterns at hand and more importantly, it is a hard case not foreseen by Hercules, which proves his theory and manual incomplete.

One may argue that this does not prove legal determinism wrong. The lawyer in question may be considered as a sort of Super-Hercules trying to come up with an enhanced and refined theory and manual for the new and more complex legal realm. However, this does not evade the problem because now the cut reemerges between Super-Hercules and his knowledge on the one hand and the persons of the more complex legal realm on the other hand. They do not share the knowledge of Super-Hercules. Only because of that is the enhanced and refined knowledge of Super-Hercules able to determine the right answer or the correct ruling of a judge in a given case. Once this cut is eliminated again, the knowledge of Super-Hercules becomes incomplete.

The problem is caused by the cut or rather by the fact that the cut is dynamic. If the cut is overcome, it is not overcome for good but appears at another point again. Given that, no theory or manual is truly comprehensive. One could counter this tendency either by eliminating the cut or by freezing it in a certain position.

⁴ See *Dworkin*, The Model of Rules I and II, in: *Taking Rights Seriously*, 14 et seq.

⁵ The idea derived from an essay of Putnam, the theory of non-trivial systems as well as Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem. Cp. *Putnam*, Realism with a Human Face, in: *Realism with a Human Face*, Cambridge Mass. (1990), 3; *Foerster*, Prinzipien der Selbstorganisation im sozialen und betriebswirtschaftlichen Bereich, in: *Schmidt* (Ed.), *Heinz von Foerster, Wissen und Gewissen. Versuch einer Brücke* (1993), 252 et seq.; *Foerster*, Lethologie, in: *Kybernetik* (1993), 126; *Gill*, Introduction to the Theory of Finite State Machines (1992); *Gödel*, Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme, I, *Monatshefte für Mathematik und Physik*, 38 (1931), 173. With regard to Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem see also *Nagel-Newman*, Gödel's Proof (1958) and *Hofstadter*, Gödel, Escher, Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid (1979).

⁶ For a different example in a different context see *Putnam's* case of a king ordering his mistress to come to the ball neither naked nor dressed. Her solution is to appear wrapped in a fishnet. Cp. *Putnam*, Rethinking Mathematical Necessity, in: *Words and Life*, Cambridge Mass. (1994), 254.

The elimination of the cut would create a complete and comprehensive legal realm. Assuming the cut between Hercules and his knowledge, on the one hand, and the persons within the legal realm, on the other hand, is to be eliminated then this creates another legal realm, which should be complete and comprehensive by prerequisite. This is only possible, however, if the regress to the enhanced and refined theory and manual of Super-Hercules is disconnected. The knowledge of Hercules needs to be represented as complete, that is to say also covering its own application, i.e., the behavior patterns based on its superior knowledge. This, however, is the enhanced and refined knowledge of Super-Hercules, which does not cover its own application. The application of this knowledge is only covered by the knowledge of a Super-Super-Hercules. The assumption, therefore, leads to a contradiction: The legal realm presupposed to be comprehensive turns out not to be comprehensive after all.

Another possibility would be to freeze the cut in a certain position. Suppose Hercules is to be considered as an ideal that lawyers should seek to achieve, however, without the hope of ever reaching this goal. This would mean that only Hercules could make the rules of the legal order explicit because only Hercules is able to envisage all behavior patterns of persons belonging to the legal realm. Therefore, only Hercules would be in a position to solve all hard cases in order to make the boundaries of the legally relevant behavior patterns seamless. Lawyers could never dream of achieving this simply because they cannot foresee all possible behavior patterns of persons within the legal realm.

This argument does not save legal determinism either. It is not necessary to foresee all possible behavior patterns. Suppose a lawyer reconstructs only part of the manual. Imagine, for instance, that it is the established behavior pattern to rob a bank either armed or unarmed. All he has to do is to invent a behavior pattern that would fall under the category of a bank robbery that is neither an armed nor unarmed bank robbery. If he can come up with such a behavior pattern, he has found the element of a hard case. With respect to this case, the rules of the legal order are not explicit, i.e., do not determine the right answer or the correct ruling of the judge.

If you accept the assumption of the thought experiment that the rules of the legal realm are explicit, i.e., determining the right answer or the correct ruling of a judge in every conceivable case, you have acknowledged the fact that there are lawyers in such a realm. However, if there are lawyers in such a realm it is not possible that all the rules of the legal order are explicit. Your assumption leads to a contradiction.

Tractatus logico-graphicus. Eine Philosophie der Malerei.*

Armin Thommes, St. Goar - Biebernheim

Wittgenstein sagt:

- (1) Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist.
- (2) Was der Fall ist, die Tatsache, ist das Bestehen von Sachverhalten.
- (3) Das logische Bild der Tatsache ist der Gedanke.
- (4) Der Gedanke ist der sinnvolle Satz.
- (5) Der Satz ist eine Wahrheitsfunktion der Elementarsätze.
- (6) Die allgemeine Form der Wahrheitsfunktion ist [$p, \xi, N(\xi)$].
- (7) Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen.

Ich ergänze:

- (1) Die Welt ist alles, was für die Malerei der Fall ist.
- (2) Was der Fall ist, die Tatsache, ist die Welt des Subjektes.
- (3) Das Abbild der Welt ist der Gedanke.
- (4) Der Gedanke ist das sinnvolle Bild (Gemälde).
- (5) Das Bild (Gemälde) ist eine Funktion der Elemente Farbe und Form.
- (6) Die allgemeine Form des Bildes (Gemäldes) ist : $I(W)$.
- (7) Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man malen.

1.¹

Die Welt ist alles, was für die Malerei der Fall ist.

1.1

Die Welt zerfällt in eine äußere und in eine innere Welt.

1.11

Die äußere Welt ist die Gesamtheit der vom Menschen erkannten Tatsachen.

1.12

Die innere Welt ist die Gesamtheit der vom Menschen produzierten Vorstellungen.

1.13

Die Wirklichkeit entsteht aus der äußeren und der inneren Welt.

1.14

Die Wirklichkeit zeigt sich als Produkt des Denkens.

1.2

Die Wirklichkeit ist das, was für die Malerei der Fall ist.

1.21

Die Formen und Inhalte der Malerei sind die Produkte der inneren und der äußeren Weltkonstruktionen.

1.22

Realismus, Impressionismus, Expressionismus, Abstraktion und Surrealismus sind die malerischen Ausdrucksformen der je zugrundeliegenden Weltkonstruktionen.

2.

Was der Fall ist, die Tatsache, ist die Welt des Subjektes.

2.1

Die äußere Welt ist die erste Begegnungsstätte des Menschen.

2.12

Die äußere Welt erscheint in Raum und Zeit.

2.14

Die Welt wird zur Sprache gebracht.

2.15

Mit der Sprache wird die Welt denkbar.

2.16

Die Welt ist das Produkt der denkerischen Konstruktion.

2.17

Die vom Menschen erkannten Tatsachen bestimmen die Welt.

2.171

Eine Tatsache ist ein in einer Lebensform anerkanntes Sprachkonstrukt.

Wenn ich behaupte "Auf dem Tisch liegt ein Buch", und eine Überprüfung hat die Richtigkeit der Aussage bestätigt, so ist es eine Tatsache, dass auf dem Tisch ein Buch liegt.

Die geozentrische Welterklärung galt im Mittelalter als Tatsache. Das war die Welt des Mittelalters.

2.173

Die Tatsachen bestimmen die Welt.

Die Tatsachen legen die Wirklichkeit fest, in der wir leben.

2.1731

Die empirischen Tatsachen bestimmen unseren alltäglichen Umgang mit der Welt (Ernährung, Familie, Beruf usw.).

2.1732

Die Mitglieder unserer Lebensgemeinschaft nehmen die Welt in spezifischer Weise wahr.

Das ist unser Weltzugang.

2.2

Nach dem Spracherwerb wird die innere Welt produziert.

Die Konstruktion der inneren und der äußeren Welt verläuft parallel.

2.21

¹ Wenn ich mich an einigen Stellen auf bestimmte Paragraphen des *Tractatus* beziehe, so kürze ich mit TLP ab und gebe den entsprechenden Paragraphen an.

* Eine Buchbesprechung.

Die innere Welt ist das Produkt des Subjektes.

Die innere Welt ist rein subjektiv.

2.215

Das Instrument der inneren Weltkonstruktion ist das assoziativ-bildhafte bzw. das assoziativ-sprachgebundene Denken.

Analogien und gleichnishafte Vorstellungen sind hier vorherrschend; und das nicht nur bei Kindern (der kindliche "Animismus" z.B., vgl. Piaget).

2.22

Die Philosophie ist voll von Konstruktionen innerer Welten.

Man denke nur an Platons "Ideenwelt", an Leibniz' "Monaden", an Hegels "Weltgeist" oder an Schopenhauers "Willen".

2.3

Letztlich existiert unsere Welt nur als ein Konstrukt des Denkens.

3.

Das Abbild der Welt ist der Gedanke.

3.1

Über das Denken wird die Welt projiziert (vgl. TLP, 3.11).

Der Gedanke stellt die Welt dar.

3.2

Das Denken vollzieht sich bildhaft und sprachgebunden.

Wir denken in Bildern und in sprachlichen Zeichensystemen.

3.21

Das bildhafte Denken ist ein Verknüpfungsprozess, bei dem verschiedenartige Bildelemente zusammengefügt werden.

3.213

Es sind unzählige Bildverknüpfungen denkbar (man vgl. allein die Gemälde von Bosch, Magritte oder Dalí).

3.214

Die Bilder finden über Gleichnisse, Metaphern usw. Eingang in die Sprache.

3.22

Das Denken ist ein inneres Sprechen (Platon).

3.221

Das Denken ist eine Konfiguration von Zeichen.

Beim Denken verknüpfen wir sprachliche Zeichen.

Diese Zeichen müssen nicht schriftlich fixiert werden. Meist spielt sich das Denken im Stillen ab; und nur die Denkergebnisse werden festgehalten.

3.224

Die Regeln, nach denen das Denken funktioniert, sind durch die Grammatik der Sprache, die Logik der Verbindungsmöglichkeiten und die Empirie bestimmt.

3.226

Die Bildhaftigkeit des sprachbezogenen Denkens ergibt sich aus dem Weltbezug der Sprachelemente.

Auf diese Weise sind wir mit der Welt verbunden, die wir gleichzeitig auch sprachlich erstellen.

3.3

Das Denken drückt sich in Sätzen und in Bildern sinnlich wahrnehmbar aus (vgl. TLP, 3.1 und TLP, 3.11).

Sätze und Bilder sind nicht nur die Werkzeuge, sondern auch die Produkte des Denkens.

3.31

Sprachkonstrukte sind die exaktesten Denkergebnisse.

3.311

Die Wortverbindungen erstellen "Netze", die über der Welt ausgebreitet werden (vgl. TLP, 6.341).

3.312

Je größer der Empirieanteil, um so "engmaschiger" werden die "Netze"; die Weltnähe nimmt zu.

3.32

Bilder sind Denkergebnisse mit stark illustrativem Charakter.

3.4

Die im Denken zur Anwendung kommenden Zeichensysteme (Bilder und Sprache) erstellen die Welt.

3.41

Diese Systeme sind die Bedingung der Möglichkeit von Welt überhaupt; sie sind die transzendente Bedingung der Welt.

3.412

Die Sprache führt uns zur Welt.

Unser Bewusstsein wird erst durch die Sprache möglich.

Das Bewusstsein ist an die neurophysiologische Basis unseres Gehirns gekoppelt.

Ohne Gehirn kein Bewusstsein!

3.4121

Mit dem Tod endet die Welt (vgl. dazu auch: TLP, 6.431).

4.

Der Gedanke ist das sinnvolle Bild (Gemälde).

4.1

Im Gemälde drückt sich das Denken sinnlich wahrnehmbar aus.

4.2

Die Welt des Subjektes kommt im Gemälde zur Erscheinung.

4.3

Die unterschiedlichsten Welten sind bildhaft darstellbar.

4.4

Die dargestellten Subjektwelten bilden jeweils den Sinn des Gemäldes.

4.41

Der Sinn konstituiert sich aus den zur Darstellung kommenden Bildelementen.

Die Verbindung der Elemente führt zur Versinnlichung einer bestimmten Situation. Ein Sachverhalt wird auf diese Weise dargestellt (vgl. TLP, 4.031).

4.411

Die Möglichkeit der bildnerischen Sinngebung beruht auf dem Prinzip der Ver-tretung von Gegenständen durch Zeichen (Bilder). (Vgl. TLP, 4.0312)

4.4113

Die Ähnlichkeit verleiht den Bildzeichen die Bedeutung. Denn hierdurch wird der Bezug zur Wirklichkeit klar.

D. h.: Die Bedeutung des Bildes ist der zur Darstellung gebrachte Wirklichkeitsausschnitt.

Das Zeichen ♣ bedeutet Baum.

Das Zeichen ☀ bedeutet Sonne.

Das Zeichen T bedeutet Auto.

Usw., usw.

Die formale Ähnlichkeit mit dem wirklichen Vorbild zeigt die Bedeutung an.

4.4114

Abstrakte Zeichen (Bild- ebenso wie Sprachzeichen) erhalten ihre Bedeutung durch den Gebrauch in einer Gemeinschaft (z. B. Verkehrsschilder).

Die Bedeutungen werden durch den Gebrauch erlernt und dann erst verstanden.

4.412

Sinngehalte kommen zur Anschauung, wenn die Elemente (Worte, Bilder) Bedeutung haben. 4.41224

Abstraktionen benötigen das erklärende Wort, um Bedeutungen aufzuzeigen und ein Verständnis zu ermöglichen (Bildtitel, Manifest usw.).

4.413

Der Sinn des Gemäldes muss verstanden werden, um wirken zu können.

4.4131

Verstehen heißt, dem Gemälde einen Sinn beizulegen.

4.4135

Das Verstehen ist ein interpretativer Vorgang.

4.4136

Durch die Interpretation werden die Bedeutungselemente zu einem Sinngefüge zusammengefasst.

4.4138

Das Denken setzt an dem jeweils gegebenen Objekt an.

Picasso betrachtet sein vollendetes Gemälde und überdenkt es in Bezug auf eine Sinngebung. Obwohl das Werk ohne Sinnhintergrund angefertigt wurde, so kann es dennoch mit einem Sinn belegt werden.

Im Grunde kann das Denken jedes Objekt mit einem Sinn versehen. Pollocks Farbleckse sind ebenso sinn-voll denkbar wie die leeren oder völlig schwarzen Leinwände bei Ad Reinhardt.

4.4139

Jedes Objekt lässt sich "als etwas anderes" denken als es ist.

Durch dieses Denken wird das Objekt zu einer Metapher.

Bereits im Kindesalter ist diese Betrachtungsweise der Dinge vorhanden. Das Kind spielt mit einem Stück Holz und "denkt es als Auto". Es benutzt das Holz als ein Fahrzeug, mit dem es über einen Weg "fährt".

Die metaphorische Denkweise ist typisch für das kindliche Spielverhalten.

4.413 (10)

Durch die Betrachtungsweise eines Dinges als Metapher wird nach heutigem Kunstverständnis auch die Bestimmung eines Objektes als Kunst möglich (vgl. dazu unter 6.).

4.42

Die Welten sind subjektabhängige Denkkonstruktionen.

4.421

Die Anschauungen des Subjektes kommen im Gemälde zum Ausdruck.

4.4212

Die Werke der Kunst bringen spezifische Sinngehalte zur Anschauung.

Im Unterschied zu den Ausführungen der Kinder und der Geisteskranken werden die Bildelemente jedoch in handwerklicher Vollendung gefertigt und darüber hinaus so konzipiert, dass sich ein komplexer Sinn ergibt.

Mit neuen Metaphern werden "eingefahrene" Sehweisen erweitert (vgl. 6.).

5.

Das Bild (Gemälde) ist eine Funktion der Elemente Farbe und Form.

D. h.: Jedes Gemälde stellt seinen Sinn durch eine Verknüpfung von Farben und Formen dar (vgl. Alberti).

5.1

Die seit der Renaissance andauernde Kontroverse über den Vorrang der Farbe einerseits (Michelangelo, Rubens, Delacroix, Impressionismus, Expressionismus usw.) und der Form andererseits (Raffael, David / Ingres, Realismus, Surrealismus usw.) ist müßig. Denn je nach darzustellendem Sinngehalt kann einmal die Farbe und ein andermal die Form das adäquatere Mittel der Versinnlichung sein. Im Grunde gehen beide Elemente stets eine Synthese ein.

5.2

Von der historischen Entwicklung aus betrachtet, ist die Form das grundlegendere Element der Malerei.

Dabei bezieht sich der Formbegriff auf die Gestalt eines sinnlich gegebenen Zeichens. ♣ z. B. ist die einfache Form eines Baumes.

5.23

Die Wirklichkeit wird durch die Form nachgebildet.

Die Umrisse sind nach den Prinzipien der Ähnlichkeit angelegt (und dies bereits in prähistorischer Zeit).

Hiermit sind die Bedeutungen festgelegt. Die Form ♣ bedeutet eben Baum und nicht Haus. Die Bedeutung ist unmittelbar zu erkennen.

5.24

Bei abstrakten Formen ist die Bedeutung nicht sofort zu ersehen.

Die Bedeutung ergibt sich aus dem Gebrauch (der Festlegung) der spezifischen Formen.

5.243

Die meisten abstrakten Formen erhalten ihre Bedeutung aus dem Gebrauch in der jeweiligen Lebensgemeinschaft.

5.3

Die Farbe führt die Form zur Wirklichkeit hin.

Die Form liefert die Hülle, und die Farbe erfüllt das Wirklichkeitsbild mit Leben.

5.33

Die Farbe ist eine Energie mit spezifischer Wirkkraft.

5.332

Grundlegend sind zwei sich gegenüberstehende Empfindungsweisen der Farbe zu unterscheiden (vgl. hierzu Goethe):

Farbe
|
Wärmeempfindung ----- Kälteempfindung

Auf der Seite der Wärmeempfindung befinden sich Gelb, Orange und Rot.

Genauer gesagt handelt es sich um die Gelbtöne "Zitronengelb" (von in-tensivster Wirkung), "Neapelgelb" (ins Orange und Ocker gehend) und "Rapsgelb" (ins Grünliche hinüberweisend), um nur einige zu nennen.

Zinnoberrot (hell) ist ein gesteigertes Orange, das sich dann bis zum reinen Zinnoberrot erhebt.

Von extremer Wirkkraft und Expressivität ist das "Krapprot" und das "Kadmiumrot".

Zu den Farben, die Empfindungen der Kälte hervorrufen, gehören z. B. Azurblau, Ultramarinblau (hell und dunkel) und Indigo.

Violett ist durch den Rot-Anteil auch dem wärmeren Bereich verhaftet. Es ist daher ideal geeignet, um teilweise noch beleuchtete Schattenpartien auszugestalten.

Im Grün gleichen sich die Wärme- und die Kälteempfindung aus. Hier herrscht "Ruhe", wenn es sich um ein Grün ohne Gelb- bzw. Blau-Anteil handelt.

Diese Farbempfindungen ergeben sich aus den Erfahrungen des Wahrnehmenden (vielleicht auch aus den archetypischen Ur-Erfahrungen; vgl. C.G. Jung).

5.333

Die Formen zeigen die assoziativen Möglichkeiten auf.

Empfindungen werden auf diese Weise nochmals steuerbar. (Weiter in 5.336)

5.334

Wenn Wittgenstein polemisiert, Goethes Farbenlehre sei für den Maler bedeutungslos und kaum für den Dekorateur von Nutzen, so ist diese schroffe Ablehnung übertrieben.

Goethes Farbangaben müssen lediglich spezifiziert und der Blaubereich in zwei Blautöne aufgeteilt werden, um in der Malpraxis optimal nutzbar zu sein.

5.335

In einem Gemälde erscheinen die Farben meist nicht einzeln (außer in der monochromen Abstraktion), sondern in Kombinationen. Die Bildwirkung ent-steht aus der Verknüpfung verschiedener Farbwerte.

Welche Farbverbindungen als besonders "günstig", "wohlgefällig", "ästhetisch wirksam", "schön", "harmonisch", "kraftvoll" usw. angesehen werden (hier ließen sich noch viele ästhetische Wertbegriffe anführen), ist vom ästhetischen Urteilsvermögen des Betrachters bzw. Schöpfers abhängig.

Was Goethe beispielsweise als "Harmonie" gilt, ist nach Gauguin "Kontrast". Goethes "charakteristische" Farbbezüge (z. B. Gelb - Rot, Rot - Blau, Blau - Gelb) nennt Runge "Disharmonie". Und Goethes "charakterlose" Farben sind nach Runge "monotone" Farbwerte. Diese "Monotonie" (z. B. Gelb - Orange, Orange - Rot usw.) gilt Gauguin wiederum als höchste "Harmonie".

5.336

Die Wirkung einzelner und in Zusammenstellung gegebener Farben ist von den Erfahrungen des Subjektes abhängig.

Assoziationen entstehen durch den *Erfahrungskontext*, durch die jeweilige *formale Einbindung* der Farbe und durch den *Gebrauch* der Farbe innerhalb einer bestimmten Kultursituation.

5.3361

Einzelne Erfahrungen binden eine Farbe an bestimmte Objekte, die wiederum bestimmte Empfindungen hervorrufen.

Gelb ist die Farbe der Zitrone. Allein die Darbietung des Zitronengelb bewirkt eine "bitter-saure" Empfindung.

5.3363

Farben können von den direkten Wirkungsweisen unabhängige Bedeutungen erhalten.

Die Bedeutung einer Farbe wird dabei durch den Gebrauch innerhalb einer bestimmten Gemeinschaft festgelegt.

Die Farbe wird auf diese Weise zu einem Symbol.

5.4

Je nach Farb-Formsynthese entstehen die Gestaltungen des Realismus, des Impressionismus, des Expressionismus, der Abstraktion oder des Surrealismus.

5.41

Der Realismus (nicht zu verwechseln mit der von Courbet begründeten kunstgeschichtlichen Kategorie) geht in Farbe und Form von der Realität aus (vgl. 6.11).

Die Erscheinung des Wirklichen ist das zentrale Thema des Realismus.

Dabei werden die Wirklichkeitselemente in ihrem unmittelbaren Gegebensein oder in idealisierter Form geschildert.

Diese Art der Bildgestaltung beherrscht die Malerei von der Antike bis ins 19. Jahrhundert hinein.

5.42

Mit dem Impressionismus eröffnen sich völlig neue Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten (vgl. 6.12).

Die Form des Wirklichen wird aufgelöst. Die Objekte werden nur noch in Schraffuren, Punkt- und Strichfolgen usw. angedeutet. Monet bringt die Konturen fast ganz zum Verschwinden.

5.43

Auch nach Matisse sollte sich die Malerei nicht mehr auf realistischen Wege mit der Wirklichkeit auseinandersetzen. Hierfür sei nun die Fotografie vorhanden, die es viel besser könne (*Bekennnis*, 1909). Vielmehr müsse der Maler seine inneren Gefühle und Bestrebungen zum Ausdruck bringen (*expressio*). Mit dieser Forderung, in den *Notizen eines Malers* (1908) formuliert, wird Matisse zum theoretischen Begründer des Expressionismus (vgl. 6.13).

5.44

Mit der Abstraktion löst sich die Malerei vollends vom Erscheinungsbild des Wirklichen (vgl. 6.14).

Der Bezug zum Wirklichen ist nun völlig aufgehoben.

Bei Kandinsky, Mondrian, Debus, Malewitsch u. a. sind noch geometrische Formen in die Gestaltung eingebunden.

Eine extreme Auflösung erfährt die Abstraktion dann z. B. bei Pollock und Ad Reinhardt. Hier gelangen nicht nur die Formen, sondern auch die Farben an ihr Ende. Die Gestaltungen gehen im wahrsten Sinne in ein "Nichts" über.

5.45

Durch die surrealistische Ausdrucksform erhält die Malerei wieder in Farbe und Form einen Bezug zum Wirklichen (vgl. 6.15).

Die Bildelemente sind der Realität teilweise fotografisch genau nachempfunden (z. B. bei Magritte oder Dalí). Die Einzelelemente entsprechen dem Realismus. Die besondere Wirkung ergibt sich aus der Zusammenstellung der Bildteile.

Die Gesetze und Regeln der Wirklichkeit sind aufgehoben.

Der Eindruck des Überraschenden und Abnormalen ergibt sich aus der ungewöhnlichen Bildkomposition.

5.46

Wenn Anfänger der Malerei (Kinder ebenso wie Erwachsene) Pinsel und Farbe zur Hand nehmen, so entstehen stets Darstellungen, die einer der fünf genannten malerischen Ausdrucksvarianten entsprechen.

Es gibt keine grundlegend anderen Möglichkeiten, sich malerisch auszudrücken. Entweder man setzt sich mit der Wirklichkeit auseinander (Realismus, Impressionismus, Expressionismus), man übersteigt sie (Surrealismus) oder man löst sich von ihr (Abstraktion).

6.

Die allgemeine Form des Bildes (Gemäldes) ist: $I(W)^2$

D. h.: Jedes Bild (Gemälde) ergibt sich aus einer Interpretation der Welt.

6.1

So sind Realismus, Impressionismus, Expressionismus, Abstraktion und Surrealismus nicht nur "formale" Ausdrucksmöglichkeiten der Malerei. Die Malvarianten dokumentieren zudem die unterschiedlichen Weltinterpretationen des schaffenden Subjektes.

6.11

Der Realismus entsteht aus einer besonderen Hochschätzung des Wirklichen.

Diese Wertschätzung ergibt sich aus "lebensweltlichen", religiösen und materialistischen Gründen.

6.12

Der Impressionismus ist ein Empiriekritizismus.

Die Wirklichkeit verflüchtigt sich in eine Vielzahl einzelner Wahrnehmungspunkte (in extremer Weise im Neopressionismus bei Seurat und Signac).

Die materielle Welt löst sich auf; sie "verschwimmt" und wird zu einem bloßen Sinneseindruck.

Die impressionistische Malerei verweist auf die Bedeutung des sinnlichen Elementes. Denn im Grunde ist uns die Welt lediglich als Sinneseindruck gegeben. Die Vorstellung von einer materiellen Welt, die den sinnlichen Eindrücken zugrundeliegt, ist nichts als eine These (vgl. dazu Mach und Avenarius).

Daher sind die flüchtigen Elemente des Sinnlichen Ausgangspunkt und Ziel der impressionistischen Malerei.

6.13

Mit dem Expressionismus wird die Innenwelt des Subjektes zur Anschauung gebracht. Gefühle und Stimmungen fließen in die Wahrnehmung und die malerische Gestaltung des Wirklichen mit ein (Matisse). Es geht nicht mehr um die exakte Wirklichkeitsschilderung. Die Gefühlswelt wird nach außen gekehrt.

Die expressionistische Malerei dokumentiert die Bedeutungslosigkeit der materiellen Welt. Die Welt umgibt uns zwar, und wir existieren in ihr. Doch gilt das Ich mit seinen Bestrebungen, Vorstellungen und Gefühlen als viel wesentlicher.

Das Ich formt die Welt (Solipsismus). Diese Einsicht bildet den Kern der expressionistischen Malweise.

6.14

Die Abstraktionen sind Produkte metaphysischen Denkens.

Die sinnliche Welt wird malerisch verlassen, um jeglichen an der materiellen Welt haftenden Vorstellungen zu entsagen.

6.15

Der Surrealist betrachtet die Realität durch die "Brille des Unbewussten".

Die Weltelemente bleiben in ihrer realistischen Schilderung erhalten, werden jedoch in überraschende Zusammenhänge gestellt.

² I = Interpretation, W = Welt.

Die Strebungen und Aktivitäten des Unterbewusstseins sind das Richtmaß des Surrealismus (so Bréton im 1. *Manifest des Surrealismus* von 1924).

6.2

Die verschiedenen Weltinterpretationen kommen in den genannten Malvarianten zur sinnlichen Erscheinung.


Grundlegend können wir zunächst nur die Dingwelt annehmen (Realismus mit den verschiedenen Interpretationsmöglichkeiten) oder sie gänzlich ablehnen (die metaphysischen Gründe der Abstraktion). Dazwischen befinden sich Impressionismus, Expressionismus und Surrealismus, die sich wiederum entweder mehr der Objektseite (der sinnlichen Erscheinung der Objektwelt, Impressionismus) oder mehr der Subjektseite (Expressionismus, Surrealismus) zuwenden.

Die Bandbreite der Interpretationsmöglichkeiten ist hiermit schon vorgezeichnet.

Darüber hinaus ist jede einzelne Weltinterpretation noch durch eine Vielzahl speziellerer Auslegungen untergliedert. Die malerische Umsetzung wird sich jedoch in einer der Varianten zeigen.

6.3

In der jeweils benutzten Malvariante drückt sich zunächst die allgemeine Welt-sicht des Schaffenden aus.



Außerdem sind in jeder Variation malerische Weltinterpretationen im Spektrum zwischen materialistisch-atheistischen und religiös-idealistischen Systemen möglich.

Hierzu werden Symbole eingesetzt.

Während die Sprache über denotative Symbole funktioniert, werden in der Malerei metaphorische Symbole benutzt (vgl. dazu Goodman und Danto).

Durch den Einsatz von Metaphern lassen sich in den fünf Malvarianten alle nur denkbaren Weltinterpretationen ausdrücken.

6.31

Wenn die Sinngehalte durch die dargestellten Bildelemente angezeigt sind, so können die Bildtitel auch fehlen.

Gerade in der Moderne bzw. Postmoderne geht es aber vermehrt um das Erzeugen neuer Sehweisen. Das Wahrnehmen und Denken soll durch die Malerei eine Wandlung erfahren (von Kandinsky bereits beabsichtigt).

Die Dinge sollen neu bedacht werden.

Diese Neuorientierung im Denken ist vornehmlich in der Abstraktion, aber auch im Surrealismus zu finden.

Erst der Titel kann eine Denk-Übertragung ermöglichen. Die Darstellung wird zur Metapher.

In der Befähigung zur Metaphernbildung sehen die Kunstphilosophen Nelson Goodman und Arthur C. Danto denn auch ein wesentliches Kennzeichen des Gegenwartskünstlers. Die farblich-formalen Ausführungen wirken bei vielen Malern der Gegenwart eher primitiv und "stümperhaft" (vgl. z. B. Baselitz, Kiefer oder Penck). Sie bieten jedoch ganz neuartige Metaphern an. Und hierin

liegt ihr besonderer Beitrag zur gegenwärtigen Kunstsituation.

6.4

Die Malerei funktioniert über das Sinnliche. Sie benötigt aber auch die Philo-sophie.

Malerei und Philosophie müssen eine Synthese eingehen.

7.

Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man malen.

Genauer: Worüber man nicht mit Wahrheitsanspruch sprechen kann, darüber muss man malen.

7.1

Für Wittgenstein ist das mit Wahrheitsanspruch aussagbare Gebiet auf die Naturwissenschaften beschränkt. Der empirische Bezug verbürgt hier den Wahrheitsgehalt des Ausgesagten. Alle anderen Bereiche sind zu beschweigen.

Aber selbst für Wittgenstein ist diese Vorgehensweise äußerst unbefriedigend. Denn: "Wir fühlen, dass, selbst wenn alle möglichen wissenschaftlichen Fragen beantwortet sind, unsere Lebensprobleme noch gar nicht berührt sind." (TLP, 6.52)

7.2

Im Grunde kann über alle möglichen Dinge gesprochen werden.

Im Bereich der Philosophie wird alles diskutiert. Es gibt kein Thema, das nicht in irgendeiner Form angesprochen wird.

Aber, und darin liegt eben auch Wittgensteins Bedenken, nicht *eine* der philosophischen Ausführungen kann letztlich als gültig erwiesen werden.

Wittgenstein hält es da für besser, diesen "mystischen Bereich" (das Unausprechliche) zu beschweigen.

Das ist uns zu wenig. Wir nehmen die Philosophie in der Malerei auf.

7.3

Malerei ist philosophische Betätigung auf sinnlicher Ebene.

7.31

Die Welt ist ästhetisch zu rechtfertigen (Nietzsche).

Fassen wir kurz einige Tatsachen zusammen, die eine ästhetische Rechtfertigung der Welt belegen:

1. Die Welt ist das Produkt eines Urknalls.
2. Der Mensch ist, wie alle anderen Lebensformen auch, in einer unvorstellbar langen Zeitspanne aus einfachsten Zellverbindungen entstanden.
3. Die Basis des menschlichen Gehirns ist die Materie.

Mit dem Tod endet das Bewusstsein und somit die Welt.

"Der Tod ist kein Ereignis des Lebens. Den Tod erlebt man nicht." (TLP, 6.4311)

4. "Etwas" im Gehirn kann die materielle Basis verlassen.

Das Bewusstsein vergeht mit dem Tod des Gehirns. Das steht fest. D. h. dasjenige, was den Menschen zum Mensch erhebt, eben das Bewusstsein, geht unter.

Was bleibt, ist eine nicht genauer bestimmbare Energie.

Wir können uns aber trösten, denn: Bewusstlosigkeit bedeutet Zeitlosigkeit!

Wenn es also in irgendeiner Form "weitergeht", dann sofort!

5. Die Grenzen des Lebens (Geburt, Tod) liegen im Bereich des Mystischen.

6. Unser bewusstes Erleben ist auf den Daseinsbereich zwischen Geburt und Tod beschränkt.

Dem Leben in der Gegenwart kommt daher eine besondere Bedeutung zu.

Wie auch Wittgenstein erklärt:

"Wenn man unter Ewigkeit nicht unendliche Zeitdauer, sondern Unzeitlichkeit versteht, dann lebt der ewig, der in der Gegenwart lebt." (TLP, 6.4311)

7. Der Sinn des menschlichen Lebens ergibt sich aus der Zeitspanne zwischen Geburt und Tod.

Selbst wenn die angesprochene "psychische Energieform" über das Ende des Menschenkörpers hinaus fortbesteht, so liegt dieser Bereich doch im Unaussprechlichen. Das Mystische kann nicht als Sinninstanz fungieren; der Versuch einer Sinngebung wäre reine Spekulation.

Daher ist auch Wittgenstein zu korrigieren; es muss heißen: Der Sinn der Welt muss innerhalb ihrer liegen! (vgl. im Gegensatz dazu: TLP, 6.41)

Zurück zur ästhetischen Rechtfertigung der Welt.

Es gibt keine metaphysische Sinngebung für die Welt und den Menschen.

Wir müssen die Welt und unser Leben als "schöne Gegebenheit" betrachten.

Dieses Leben ist für uns die einzige Gelegenheit, in bewusster Weise körperlich, geistig und intuitiv zu agieren.

Unsere Existenz ist ein Zufallsprodukt der Natur, das wir als "Geschenk" ergreifen müssen.

Indem wir unser Leben und die Welt "als schön" betrachten und annehmen, rechtfertigen wir diese auf ästhetische Weise. Die ästhetische Rechtfertigung ist eine annehmende Welt- und Lebensauslegung.

7.32

Die Malerei nimmt all diese Themenbereiche auf.

Das Mystische kann sich so in der Anschauung zeigen.

Das Unaussprechliche erhält eine "malerische Aussprache".

Dazu dienen vor allem der Überrealismus und auch die Abstraktion.

7.321

Der "Überrealismus" ist eine bislang noch ungebräuchliche kunstgeschichtliche Kategorie. Er steht in der Tradition von Surrealismus und Phantastischem Realismus.

Ich benutze diesen Begriff seit 1994 zur Kennzeichnung meiner spezifischen Variante des Realismus.

Im Überrealismus geht es um existenzielle Fragestellungen (Sinn des Lebens, Leben - Tod, Fragen nach der Welt und der Kunst usw.).

Die überrealistische Malerei benutzt die Elemente des Wirklichen, um mit ihnen über diese hinaus zu gelangen

und auf diese Weise philosophische Themen zur Anschauung zu bringen.

Während Surrealismus und Phantastischer Realismus auf den Assoziationsmustern des Unbewussten fußen, ist der Überrealismus ein philosophisch orientierter Realismus.

Der Überrealismus ist anschauliche Philosophie.

7.322

Die Abstraktion verlässt die Wirklichkeit und befriedigt metaphysische Bedürfnisse.

Die abstrakten Gemälde nutzen die reine Farbe, um ein "Fenster zur Seele" zu öffnen (vgl. hierzu z. B. auch Steiner).

Das hierbei in Erscheinung tretende Licht wird zur Metapher der im Menschen angelegten "mystischen Energie".

7.4

"Ich male, also bin ich." (Descartes für Maler)

Wittgenstein's Contributions to Philosophy

James M. Thompson, Wuppertal

Das Lernen der Philosophie ist wirklich ein Rückerinnern. Wir erinnern uns, daß wir die Worte wirklich auf diese Weise gebraucht haben
(Wittgenstein, *Big Typescript* §89).

Any discussion of Wittgenstein's philosophical thought would be incomplete without taking notice of the method he employs. Often criticized for his style and organization, many feel that they are indicative of his state of mind; that such a lack of rigid argumentation betrays an inadequacy within the arguments themselves. However, criticism of Wittgenstein along these lines only serves to demonstrate a superficial reading of his texts. Not simply content (or even able) to just present us with the results of his investigations, Wittgenstein coaxes the reader into taking up an investigation of his own by means of an open dialogue. As a dialogue, we are not confronted with a traditional argumentative structure, i.e. the stating of theses and their subsequent defense. Rather, Wittgenstein attempts to draw the reader away from the obvious by means of an indirect method of discourse.

At first, the term method might be considered suspect. However, as I am using the term, "method" does not describe a singular approach to all problems, but serves as a general heading, under which a variety of different approaches are utilized for a variety of different kinds of problems. What remains constant throughout is Wittgenstein's lack of traditional philosophical argumentation, which is replaced by a constantly shifting perspective in relation to the philosophical problem at hand; the goal of which is to dislodge or disorient the reader from his previously held notions. Here, one recognizes Wittgenstein's appreciation for Kierkegaard extended beyond his profound religious and philosophic insights to his style and method.

No, an illusion can never be destroyed directly, and only by indirect means can it be radically removed. If it is an illusion that all are Christians - and if there is anything to be done about it, it must be done indirectly, not by one who vociferously proclaims himself an extraordinary Christian, but by one who, better instructed, is ready to declare that he is not a Christian at all (Kierkegaard, pg. 24).

Wittgenstein, in much the same way as Kierkegaard, thought that any attempt to confront philosophy directly, i.e. through traditional means of argumentation, is already doomed to failure. Both held that arguing in this fashion was, in a sense, to succumb or expose oneself to the very illness they were attempting to remedy. Here, "the first step is the one that altogether escapes notice...the decisive movement of the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent" (Wittgenstein, *PI* §308). "We predicate of the thing what lies in the method of representing it" (Wittgenstein, *PI* §104). As these passages point out, to utilize direct forms of argumentation would be a form of self-refutation.

Being denied access to the more traditional forms of argument, Wittgenstein proceeds to survey problems

from many different vantagepoints (although never in a direct manner), in an attempt to undermine rather than refute a given position. Since he cannot 'prove' philosophical positions wrong, he must demonstrate how this single-track mindset is inherently problematic. We must come to recognize for ourselves the "glasses" we unintentionally wear are responsible for our skewed relationship to the world, which tends to result in philosophical problems. We cannot simply give up the glasses, nor can we 'trade' them in for a better pair; for this kind of thinking presupposes that there is a 'better' pair somewhere out there. Instead, we must come to terms with the pair we already have; and this means the philosopher needs to give up his remote or disconnected view of the world.

Wittgenstein regards this perspectival misrelation between philosopher and world to be highly individualized, in that the misrelation does not apply to everyone in exactly the same way. For philosophy is not something in which individuals could partake in as one would a game of chess; rather Wittgenstein understands philosophy as what the philosopher 'does' [*macht*] when he loses his way within language. Here, the term philosophy designates something quite specific, and by giving the term a much narrower usage than perhaps warranted, Wittgenstein reserves this term for philosophy "traditionally" conceived. By traditional philosophy, Wittgenstein means those "philosophies" that do not understand the different functions of language, and thus never gain perspective of what they are actually doing. These approaches tend to be highly speculative, rigidly *a priori* logical in nature, and Wittgenstein thought, were very often typified by his earlier Tractarian view.

Lacking an understanding of how language works, the philosopher is prone to 'seeing' problems that require solving, because he does not know the proper use of words in question. The philosopher does not see the sheer variety and richness present in our languages; that language is not one homogeneous whole. Rather, it is comprised of an indeterminate number of language-games that reach every aspect of our lives. These language-games are based upon our different human activities, which constitute not only our experiences, but our existence as well. They come into and go out of existence corresponding to the changes in shared human activities. One consequence of this complex web is that the philosopher's error could be the result of any number and combination of language-games, thus complicating any attempt to untangle them. It also means, as Wittgenstein contends, that no one approach (to use one of his most beloved metaphors) could be used to successfully treat most, let alone all, cases. Every treatment/approach would have to be individualized to address the specific ailment under which the philosopher suffers. To this end, Wittgenstein utilizes an indirect method of discourse to guide the philosopher on his journey toward "getting a handle" on the problem. "The same or almost the same points," Wittgenstein writes, "were always being approached afresh from different directions, and new sketches made" (Wittgenstein, *PI*, *Preface*). This criss-crossing all through language and thought affords one the opportunity to encounter a problem from multiple

perspectives, and the possibility of getting clear about them.

But was I trying to draw someone's attention to the fact that he is capable of imaging that? - I wanted to put that picture before him, and his *acceptance* of the picture consists in his now being inclined to regard a given case differently: that is, to compare it with *this* rather than *that* set of pictures. I have only changed his *way of looking at things* (Wittgenstein, *PI* §144).

Wittgenstein's later work is not an attempt to free others from the task of thinking. I contend that his intention is to put the philosopher on his own path of inquiry; making available a method capable of providing the 'clear view' (following Stern's interpretation) necessary for such a shift. This change of perspective is not an easily accomplished feat; for our "craving for generality" exerts a powerful grasp on us. This constant movement helps jostle us loose from what can be that hardest to see, i.e. that which is directly in front of our faces. Wittgenstein contends that we take for granted what we are given, our primary assumptions upon which we build our worldview, effectively blinding us to the ramifications of our misrelationship. This is why the investigation must proceed in this way, because we have a tendency towards settling down into a perspective. While this last characterization would apply to many figures in the canon, Plato, Aristotle, and Husserl to name a few, what distinguishes Wittgenstein is his emphasis upon language.

A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not *command a clear view* of the use of our words. - Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just understanding which consists in 'seeing connexions'...[this is significant for us, because] it earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things. (Is this a 'Weltanschauung'?) (Wittgenstein, *PI* §122).

To what end does Wittgenstein invoke this investigation of language as a critique of philosophy? This is a difficult question to answer, because he intended his critique to be open-ended, i.e. to be commenting on many different problems and issues. And while there is no one specific problem, most of the problems do share something in common i.e. an inadequate understanding of language. As mentioned in the quotation above, our lack of perspicuity [*Übersichtlichkeit*] has the tendency to leave us locked into a way of looking at things. In order to counter this effect, Wittgenstein needs to break us free or "turn our whole examination round" (Wittgenstein, *PI* §108).

The problems encountered in philosophy are really only grammatical fictions of our own creation. As mentioned earlier, these grammatical fictions or illusions, do not stem from mere inattention, but instead result, in part, from "our craving for generality...our preoccupation with the method of science" (Wittgenstein, *Blue & Brown*, pg.18). Philosophers get caught up in a certain way of looking at things, with a particular grammatical picture. In so doing, they inadvertently lay down the groundwork to misinterpret these pictures as representing reality; the nonsense that such a mistake generates is germane to philosophy. But why only philosophers?

While it seems entirely possible for someone in another profession to confuse different language-game applications, philosophy does not dispute the objectivity and eternity of its subject matter. The philosophical truths, regardless of difficulty in stating, possess an objective status. Philosophers who operate under this directive proceed to do philosophy with a definite

conceptual model in mind -- the "scientific" model of philosophy. J.C. Edwards recounts the distinctive features associated with this model. First, philosophy's goal is the development of theories capable of collecting information (philosophical truths) in an objective manner consistent with those of the "hard" sciences, e.g. physics and chemistry. Second, since the information uncovered is objective in nature, we should be able to build upon them as in the sciences. Lastly, philosophy should be capable of giving explanations, as well as, descriptions regarding our conceptual understanding of the world. On this view, traditional philosophy should be a discipline able to solve problems -- uncovering the truths hidden from us. Although clearly having analytic philosophy in mind, Wittgenstein's critique has much further reaching consequences, e.g. Plato's doctrine of the Forms or Kant's notion of the 'thing-in-itself.' While the problems of science are solved through empirical analysis, philosophical problems are deemed logical ones. Through logical analysis, utilizing objective truths, we would be able to overcome the difficulties.

Wittgenstein, however, rejects the underlying assumptions of traditional philosophy. This idea of "philosophy as science" seems right only if we accept that our problems, as well as language, function in only one way. We see how the sciences collect data, form hypotheses, and in turn, solve their problems. Philosophers are under the mistaken conception that *all* problems are of the same kind; thus they believe that a similar method is required -- understanding them to be solved in the same manner.

Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is 'purely descriptive' (Wittgenstein, *Blue & Brown*, pg. 18).

Unlike science, Wittgenstein believes the task of philosophy should be to assemble reminders regarding the way different language-games operate. For there are no true "problems" in philosophy, only confusion about how our language works. "A philosophical problem has the form: 'I don't know my way about'" (Wittgenstein, *Big Typescript*, §89). When a philosopher is confronted with, for example, unfamiliar language-games, he has little or no understanding of their actual applications. However, he does have knowledge of how other disciplines (language-games) deal with difficulties, i.e. how science deals with problems, and analyzes the problem along these lines; and this is precisely where the trouble begins. Wittgenstein characterizes the philosopher's mentality with a rather unflattering image. "When we do philosophy we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the expressions of civilized men, put a false interpretation on them, and then draw the queerest conclusions from it" (Wittgenstein, *PI* §194).

The only way to resolve the philosopher's predicament, to regain his perspective, is to show him how the word is used in the proper language-game(s), and hence in the language as a whole. Once the philosopher is oriented as to how a language-game operates, in the same way as giving someone a map, they are no longer troubled, and the problem disappears. We are not merely presenting "remarks on the natural history of human beings" (Wittgenstein, *PI* §415), we are gaining insights into our language, which should serve as cathartic ends, and not symptomatic beginnings.

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Trope Theory on the Mental/Physical Divide

Käthe Trettin, Frankfurt am Main

1. From naturalism to realism

In our everyday discourse, we distinguish without fail between minds and bodies or between the mental and the physical. Yet, in philosophy there is a tendency to get rid of this divide. Roughly, the naturalist wants to reduce or to identify the mental with the physical in order to provide a unified basis for scientific research. The idealist, in contrast, sticks to the mental as a precondition of grasping the physical. The physical then tends to turn into mere mental representations. These attempts to overcome the divide, however, are not very promising. While the first tries to assimilate the mental to the physical, the second takes the opposite approach with the result that either the mental or the physical goes by the board. Fortunately, there is a third option: the realist maintains that the mental exists along with the physical.

If one feels that a metaphysics of mind and body should be carried out in a realistic spirit, there are, of course, different possibilities, dualism of some kind being the most prevalent until now. I should like to explore, however, how far one can get to overcoming or at least smoothing the divide without falling back on naturalism or idealism. Before I start, a word or two might be said on preferring monism. Why avoid the divide in the first place? The only respectable reason I can think of is the desire to lay the groundwork for a unified and coherent theory of the phenomena concerned. Reduction is therefore a very respectable method, provided one does not thereby lose the most interesting part of the *explananda*. This is the danger with naturalism, because two essential features of the mental, namely, intentionality and qualitative sensations, apparently cannot be reduced to purely physical phenomena; thus, there are good reasons to try out realism.

2. Bergmann's Test

In his book *Realism*, Gustav Bergmann offered a test for realistic ontologies. Briefly, it goes as follows: Every ontology has a ground plan which is determined by an analysis of the "truncated world", i.e. the physical world. The decisive step for the test is to take a close look at what happens when "minds and knowing situations" come in. "If these further assays", Bergmann says, "require no additional categories, we say that they fit the ground plan. If they do, the ontology has passed the test. If it fails, it is either overtly idealist or at least structurally on the way toward idealism" (Bergmann 1967, 223). Hence, there are only two conditions to be satisfied in order to pass the test. *First*, start your ontology with an analysis of the most general entities of the physical world (and not with an analysis of knowing the physical world). *Second*, do not introduce brand-new categories when analysing the mental. *Prima facie* the test appears to be ridiculously easy to pass. Even Descartes would not fail, as in his metaphysics both the physical and the mental are subkinds of the basic category of substance or *res*. On closer inspection, however, Bergmann's test is not as simple as it looks. The implicit requirement of not introducing further categories is that "representations" are not allowed. A realist has to reconstruct cognitive, emotional and sensing activity as well as their "objects" or "contents" without

positing a third realm of representations which is supposed to mediate between the physical and the mental.

One could, of course, discuss at length the pros and cons of representationalism and the question of whether Bergmann's test is a good one in the first place. I cannot do this here, because it would go far beyond the scope of this paper, so I shall restrict myself to some brief remarks. First, Bergmann's test seems to be closely tied to his own ontology which needs universals such as properties and relations as well as a special binding relation called "nexus" in order to yield the basic category of "fact". Therefore, one might well ask whether only a fact-based ontology is sufficiently equipped to avoid representations. Or, to put it more pointedly, is Bergmann's anti-representationalism essentially dependent on his realism concerning universals and his special relations? Second, as Bergmann's construal of representationalism seems to be totally different from recent representationalist theories in the philosophy of mind, one might object that it is not an appropriate test model. While for Bergmann an ontology reveals itself as idealistic if it operates with representations, Fred Dretske, for instance, argues that mental facts are nothing other than functional representational facts, a theory which he calls himself "representational naturalism" (Dretske 1995). Hence representationalism seems to come in different brands. Nevertheless, it serves as a contrasting foil for the purposes of this paper, never mind whether it be marked as idealistic or as naturalistic. In order to deal ontologically with the divide or, to put it differently, the distinction between the mental and the physical, I shall not invoke representations.

3. On Doing without Representations

To start with my thesis is threefold:

- (i) Mental activities like perceiving, thinking and feeling are qualities of agents, such as animals, human beings and persons. They are neither qualities of minds or bodies nor parts of bodies such as brains or of states or events.
- (ii) Mental activities are not representational. What a thought or belief or hope "is about" or has as "its content" is a particular part of the world itself and not a particular representation of the world.
- (iii) Mental activities are qualities of some entities within the world and therefore as real as the entities which lack mental qualities. Moreover mental activities belong to the basic qualities, because they establish the access of agents to their own and many other qualities of the world.

Let me briefly comment on these claims. With (i) I reject theories which – implicitly or explicitly – are basically committed either to Cartesian substances or to an ontology of states or events. In contradistinction to Aristotelian substances, Cartesian substance is either *res extensa* or *res cogitans*, but neither can on its own be a thinking, perceiving and feeling entity. Nor can states or events. So,

one has to look for something more appropriate, a task which I shall undertake in due course. Statement (ii) is the core of the non-representationalist thesis. It asserts that mental activity connects the agent "directly" to the world and not via representations. Therefore it is also a statement in favour of epistemological realism. Of course, there is a standard problem involved, namely, that thoughts and beliefs obviously can be about non-existing as well as existing things or states of affairs. If one hesitates to endorse Meinong's solution and at the same time wants to reconstruct thoughts about non-existents in a realistic way, a dilemma lurks. How to get out of it remains to be seen. Finally, statement (iii) simply asserts that mental activities are real and basic qualities. They are right in the middle of what there is and not somehow "extra-mundane".

4. On Doing with Tropes

What does a metaphysics of mind and body look like, if one has only tropes, i.e. property instances or individual qualities, in one's ontology? A rough picture can be sketched as follows: All there is and possibly can be are individual qualities, hence the world is bursting with tropes to start with. Tropes are such that they assemble in two different ways. On the one hand, they constitute *trope complexes* in virtue of internal dependence relations; on the other they constitute *trope classes* in virtue of their similarity. This is, in a nutshell, the ground plan of trope ontology.

The interesting part is now to find good answers to (at least) the following questions: How are perceiving, thinking and feeling entities to be reconstructed against the background of trope theory? What are mental activities? What are the "objects" of mental activities? Is a special relation required in order to connect a mental activity to the object it is "about"? How can thoughts about imaginary or fictitious "objects" or other non-existents be explicated in a realistic way? There might be further interesting questions and surely the ones stated could be tuned in such a way that more and more subtleties come to the fore. I shall leave it at that and try to outline how the most pressing problems might be solved against the background of trope theory.

5. Mental Activity I

A mental activity such as a perceiving, believing, thinking, or knowing is an individual quality, i.e. a trope. Consider the statement

(1) Andrew is thinking about the Golden Gate Bridge.

If the activity of thinking is reconstructed as a trope, it seems to have two features. The thinking belongs to Andrew, and it is about the Golden Gate Bridge. Now, "belonging to" and "being about" can be ontologically grounded in the nature of tropes themselves. A trope *per se* is a dependent entity. It is dependent on other tropes or trope complexes. In the case of the above example, the respective think-trope is dependent on a trope complex called Andrew (A) and a trope complex called Golden Gate Bridge (B). Notice that on this reconstruction, the think-trope is neither "in" A nor necessarily "caused" by B. Inherence and causality, however prominently they might figure in some ontological theories, are not the primary resources of explication within trope theory. Ontological dependence is the primary resource. Although this feature

has been marginalized since Aristotle, it has a great advantage, namely, that of providing a smooth account of connectedness (cf. Trettin 2001). So, if there is the individual thinking as stated in (1), the think-trope connects A to B in virtue of being ontologically dependent on both. Consider now the statement

(2) Andrew is thinking of a golden mountain.

If one applies the reconstruction of (1) to this case, everything seems all right as long as it concerns the dependence of the think-trope on the complex called Andrew. The problem lies on the other side of that dependence. How can golden mountains, square circles, Pegasus, the mermaids and the whole lot of fictitious objects figure in that scheme of intra-world-dependency? My proposal for a realistic answer is twofold: Either the "object" of that thinking is impossible like a square circle. In that case the thinking will be "about" impossible things and therefore void. Whoever thinks about square circles, thinks about different possible tropes which taken together result, however, in impossible things. The trope of squareness and the trope of circularity are, to borrow a Leibnizian expression, not compossible. In other words, such a thought is grounded in something which cannot exist. Or the "object" of that thinking is fictitious like golden mountains, mermaids and the like. In this case the thinking would be "about" imaginary things. On a broad construal of fictions and their objects belong to the world, on a narrow reading they don't. Before deciding what the appropriate answer will be, I should like to have a brief look at mental activities which apparently have no specific "objects".

6. Mental Activity II

Consider the statement

(3) Andrew is sad.

When Andrew is sad, deplorable as it is, then against the background of trope ontology, he cannot hope to participate in one grand idea of sadness, as it would be the case with Plato. All he can do is to cope with his individual little trope of being sad. This might, however, be a relief, because one does not have the burden of shouldering somehow the whole sadness of the world. The interesting point about Andrew's sadness or about anyone's feelings is that these mental activities apparently exist without having a determinate object. Although Andrew himself or some experts might find out the relevant cause of his temporary depression or melancholy, this feeling seems to exist even before anybody knows its presumable causes. In order to account for this sort of mental activity, often described as *qualia*, which are ubiquitous manifestations not only on their own but also as accompanying qualities of almost all mental activities, one should simply acknowledge them. If Andrew is sad, there is a trope of sadness which – for a time – constitutes the trope complex called Andrew. Notice that on trope ontology the so called hard problem of qualia is very easily resolved. This is due to the fact that tropes are individual qualities. Andrew's sadness is grounded without any fiddling with instantiation or exemplification in a straight forward way. It simply is the individual quality of sadness that it is.

Qualia can teach one a lesson or two about non-existents. The first is that there are beliefs or thoughts even if they apparently have no existing objects. In that case I should say that they "miss" real objects and that

assertions thereof are void or “false”, as is the case with impossible intentional objects like square circles or golden mountains. Although they fail to dock onto something which exists, they are nevertheless respectable mental activities. Their reality is grounded in being dependent on the trope complex which is the agent of that thought. Notice that one of Jerry Fodor’s prominent concerns has been to explicate misrepresentations within his representational theory of the mind. On trope theory, “misrepresentation” is not a problem at all. The second lesson to be learned is that thoughts about fictitious or imaginary objects are such that there are objects all right, but – as some philosophers would say – in the very deplorable ontological state of being merely abstract. Abstract objects, however, are not at all deplorable. On my version of trope theory, they are tropes or trope complexes which are a-temporal and/or non-spatial. Although they lack the existential mode of time and space, they belong to world, as long as there are trope complexes capable of abstractions. The same goes for numbers and logical concepts.

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Evolving Persons and Free Will

Rüdiger Vaas, Stuttgart

1. Self-models and persons

„Man kann den eigenen Sinnen mißtrauen, aber nicht dem eigenen Glauben“, Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953, p. 514) once remarked. „Gäbe es ein Verbum mit der Bedeutung ‚fälschlich glauben‘, so hätte das keine sinnvolle erste Person im Indikativ des Präsens.“ But what if such a first-person entity is indeed a fiction in certain respects – or if it has at least false beliefs without being able to distrust them?

Human beings are masters of deception if they want to appear superior to others and to suggest that they have everything under control (see, e.g., Fingarette 2000, Mele 2000). Such self-delusions might be advantageous, because those are the most successful liars who believe their own lies. Although it seems paradoxical at first (for he who does not tell the untruth intentionally is, strictly speaking, not a liar at all), it rests upon a much more radical self-deception which is quite useful – a systematic and continuous illusion regarding ourselves. Higher-order forms of self-consciousness, namely *I-consciousness*, are based on a feature which is called a *self-model*. This is an episodically active representational entity (e.g. a complex activation pattern in a human brain), the contents of which are properties of the system itself. It is embedded and constantly updated in a global model of the world, based on perceptions, memories, innate information etc. (Metzinger 1993). But because self-models *cannot* represent their own representations as their own representations and so on *ad infinitum*, they are semantically transparent, i.e. on the level of their content they do not contain the information *that* they are models. Thus, such systems are not able to recognize their self-model as a self-model (Van Gulick 1988). The result is an *ego-illusion*, which is stable, coherent, and cannot be transcended on the level of conscious experience itself.

Such a self-model is not an epistemic luxury. It plays a role for the system, it is a weapon developed in the course of biological evolution. As Marcel Kinsbourne (1988, p. 249) said: „If the concept of self evolved, it did so on account of adaptive advantage, not because it reflects some objective truth. The concept of self reifies the organizing activity of a cybernetic device that incorporates its history („experience“) into the basis for its actions. It is the construct around which are organized impressions and intentions that reach awareness.“

Neuroscience suggests that mind coincides with certain brain processes (Vaas 1999) and has evolved as a goal-oriented device that implements predictive interactions between the organism and its environment. The capacity to predict the outcome of future events – necessary to orchestrate and express their movements successful active movements – seems to be the ultimate and most common of all global brain functions; consciousness and thinking can be viewed as an evolutionary internalization of movement, and a self-model is the centralization of prediction (Llinás 2001, Vaas 2001a).

Such an approach for self-models – if it is basically correct, and it cannot be argued here that it actually is – has essential implications for our

understanding of what is it to be a person. Rationality, higher-order intentionality, I-consciousness, intentional stance, autonomous agency, transcendence of the presence (i.e. a concept of time), language, altruism and morality are the main criteria for characterizing persons, but they are not totally independent, and it is controversial whether they are all necessary or sufficient. Central at least is I-consciousness and some sort of autonomy – terms which are also ambiguous. However, they do not necessarily subscribe to *ego theories* of persons which hold that there are irreducible ontological, immaterial substances endowed with certain properties like free will; but they are compatible with *bundle theories* assuming that persons are based on simpler, e.g. psychological, computational or physiological processes (cf. Vaas 1996, 2001b).

2. Free will as a useful illusion

The *mind body problem* can be taken as a trilemma where any of the following three premises is excluded by the two others: (1) *dualism* – the mental is not the physical, (2) *mental causation* – the mental does causally influence the physical (and is affected by it), (3) *physical closure* – there is no nonphysical influence on the physical. The so-called *mystery of consciousness* consists in the explanatory gap between (1) and (2), i.e. how could matter (if at all) create mind? The *problem of free will* is the incompatibility of (2) and (3) if (2) requires (1). Here, the main opponents are: first, *libertarianism* – (3) is wrong, there are contracausal or nonphysical originations; second, *incompatibilism (determinism)* – (1) is wrong; and, third, *compatibilism* – (1) is wrong, but contradictions between (2) and (3) can be explained away.

Strong arguments (which cannot be defended here) show that the philosophical problem of free will cannot be *solved*, for this would require the reconciliation of apparently inconsistent premises; but it might be *dissolved* by eliminating one of the premises, namely the claim that there are irreducible entities like free-floating selves or Cartesian egos with the ability to act due to their own non-physical power, for this cannot avoid the dilemma of either plunging into an *infinite regress* or leading to a *mysterious causa sui*. Ultimately our reasons, beliefs and volitions are non-consciously determined – by earlier experiences, heredity, physiology or external influences – and therefore not *ultimately* up to us (Honderich 1988, Kane 2002, O'Connor 1995, Vaas 2001c, Strawson 1986, Walter 1998, Wegner 2002).

Nevertheless our misleading *conception* of being such selves with impressions of having free will has to be explained! We do conceive ourselves, at least sometimes, as being free, i.e. that we can decide between alternatives. This feeling depends on complex abilities of voluntary movement (Vaas 2001d), second-order emotions (without which we cannot act and choose in complex situations despite of rationality), a non-deprived development, non-predictability or epistemic indeterminism (we cannot know the future for certain, especially not our own future; Wittgenstein 1921, 5.1362), rationality (the ability to reflect and reason), planning (and hence higher-order thoughts, a concept of the future), higher-order volitions, and sanity.

These features are compatible with naturalism and determinism. Therefore it is not to deny a weaker form of free will. But this does not imply the existence of the kind of freedom for which Libertarianism is arguing.

Libertarians still insist that our subjective impression of freedom is a powerful argument for free will. Thus, a sceptic should be able to explain such an impression within the framework of naturalism. And this is what an evolutionary perspective might achieve.

Many zoo and field experiments as well as behavioral studies in the wild have shown that apes can respond differently according to the desires and beliefs of other individuals – rather than according only to the other's overt behavior. Hence, they probably have what Daniel Dennett (1973) called the *intentional stance*: They ascribe intentions to others and take them into consideration for their own actions (Taylor Parker et al. 1994, Whiten and Byrne 1997) – at least we do this. Evolution shaped our minds respectively our brains to cope with our complex social lives. The social environment might have been a significant selective pressure for primate intelligence (Humphrey 1976) and the rapid expansion of our ancestors' neocortex. This cortical enlargement – about a factor of four during the last five million years – is otherwise hard to explain; and there is evidence for a correlation between neocortical size and group-size or social complexity (Barton and Dunbar 1997). Since better access to food, a safer place to sleep or a higher rank in complex hierarchies normally increase the probability of producing more offspring than other group members, social intelligence pays off pretty well. The elaborated mental abilities of higher primates are conceived as the product of an evolutionary cognitive arms race leading to more and more sophisticated representational capabilities (representation of complex social relationships, higher-order intentional stance, mind-reading, primitive theory of mind).

We are forced by our very nature to interact with other people in a fundamentally different way than to interact with, say, stones and sticks (Strawson 1962). In cognitive psychology, there is plenty of evidence now that in attempting to make sense of other people, perceivers regularly construct and use categorical representations to simplify and streamline the person perception process (Macrae and Bodenhausen 2000). This is advantageous only in so far as it influences one's own actions.

Thus, the evolution of an intentional stance is at the center of our impression of having free will: *Ascribing intentional states to others necessarily includes ascribing volitions to them and assuming that they have the power to transfer their volitions into actions somehow*, because this is the only way to get advantages from the intentional stance at all. For, if other beings are thought to have intentions but they would be causally inert, i.e. their behavior has nothing to do with their volitions, this ascription of intentions and hence volitions simply wouldn't matter. However the intentional stance is not an irrelevant luxury. It is a powerful tool to get along with the complexity of the social world and even an anthropomorphically-conceived nonsocial world (up to highly restricted activities – e.g. in playing computer chess nowadays it is common and useful to think and act as if the computer „wants“ and „plans“ something). Individuals endowed with this tool are better prepared for the struggle of social life. And it is advantageous to assume the volitions of others as somehow being independent of the environment or the past – not absolutely independent of course, but in an approximate sense, because this makes it a lot easier to deal with them due to the fact that complex organisms can

act (or react) quite differently in similar circumstances and quite similar in very different circumstances.

There is another reason to take a concept of volition as evolutionarily advantageous, and this is just the other side of the coin: To deal with other individuals in a complex way means also *to plan one's own actions carefully in an explicit way and evaluate their effects*. This presupposes some kind of awareness of one's own volition, hence a concept of will and self. Higher-order representations also take one's own mental states into account – not only for decisions and follow-up analyses but also as a parameter in the plans of others regarding oneself. Thus, it is reasonable or even necessary to ascribe volitions to oneself, too – because otherwise one cannot reason about the mental states of others who are presumably dealing with oneself. This makes one's own volitions explicit – and much more flexible. At least since the point from which there has been language with an inbuilt grammatical structure, distinguishing between subjects and objects, active and passive, present and future, such concepts of volition, actions and self-notions have been flourishing (Vaas 2000).

This was not only the case in contexts of cheating, however! In the course of time *co-operation* became more and more important among our early ancestors. And the existence of some form of language already implies a high degree of co-operation – spoken language would never have emerged unless most people, most of the time, followed conventional usage. But co-operation in complex, not inherited forms also presupposes an intentional stance and the capacity to ascribe volitions to others.

From this it is no big step to a notion of free will which is a powerful tool to act in consonance with or opposition to others and to establish some kind of moral responsibility – a very effective way to influence the behavior of others and justify punishments. Thus, free will even succeeded to become an entity of religious, philosophical or political theories and a postulate for jurisdiction. Of course we need not dismiss an intentional and personal stance. It is, obviously, crucial for our survival. We cannot leave our subjective standpoints, turning exclusively to an objective, perspectiveless view (cf. Nagel, 1986). We may accept that we have, ultimately, no free choice. Nevertheless, in our everyday life we think and act as if we did. Even sceptical philosophers do – or they might find themselves out of the race quickly.

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Agent Causation: Before and After the Ontological Turn

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1. Section: Persons as Agents

Imagine Ludwig has a cup of tea for breakfast. He pours it; he eats his egg until it seems to him that the tea should have the right temperature; he moves his hand to the cup, puts his fingers at the handle, and then, careful not to spill anything, he does something with his arm; namely, he raises it, and if all goes well he then drinks the tea without burning his lips.

The rising of Ludwig's arm surely has a cause. But what is the cause? Defenders of agent causation, such as Thomas Reid (1788), Richard Taylor (1966), Roderick Chisholm (1976a), and many more recent authors (see Swinburne 1997, ch. 5; Thorp 1980; Meixner 1999; Clarke 1996; O'Connor 2000) have argued that the rising of Ludwig's arm is caused by Ludwig himself. Some events are caused, not by other events, but by concrete things, by substances, more specifically by intentional agents.

Agent causation is usually advocated by believers in libertarian free will. One might think that it is postulated in order to allow for agents originating causal processes. The opponents of agents causation believe that it is metaphysically extravagant to postulate agent causation as another kind of causation besides event causation, and that it is impossible that agents originate causal processes (Honderich 1993, ch. 3). However, I shall argue that the usual theory of agent causation, as Chisholm has campaigned for it, does justice neither to free action nor to non-free action. I shall then sketch an alternative account of causation in free actions, which many will find even more extravagant than Chisholm's.

2. The Chisholmian theory of agent causation

Chisholm holds that actions involve what he calls 'undertakings'. An undertaking is a mental event as it occurs, for example, in Ludwig's mind when he raises his arm, or as it occurs in somebody's mind who *tries* to raise his arm even if the arm does not move because it is paralysed. (Others have used 'trying', 'purposing', or 'volition' instead.) An undertaking is an intentional event whose intentional object is the desired effect, for example the movement of one's arm. When Ludwig successfully undertakes to raise his arm, then Ludwig is the cause of the arm's rising.

A free action, for Chisholm (1976a, 202; 1976b, 62), is an action which involves an undertaking for which there is no preceding 'sufficient causal condition'. That is, Ludwig raised his arm at *t* freely if, and only if, there was in a period which includes, but begins before, *t* 'no sufficient causal condition' either for Ludwig raising his arm or for Ludwig not raising his arm.

A quick, and I believe valid, objection against this view is that it fails to require that the agent has *control* over what he does. The mere fact that there was no 'sufficient causal condition' for a certain undertaking does not entail that *it was up to the agent* that he undertook this rather than something else. It could have been just a matter of

indeterministic processes, that is, just a matter of chance, that one undertaking rather than another one occurred.

Chisholm (like Swinburne 1997, ch. 13) clearly allows for the possibility of an undertaking being caused by preceding events. For him, a *non-free* action is exactly that, an action which involves an undertaking for which there was before a 'sufficient causal condition'. So in non-free actions too the agent is cause of his action and its results.

Now, at this point we should wonder what agent causation really is supposed to be. Surely, if Ludwig, when he raises his arm, is fully determined to do so, then there is no other causation involved than ordinary event causation. Some events, such as brain events or desires, cause Ludwig's undertaking, the undertaking causes events in the nervous system, which cause events in the muscles, which cause the rising of the arm. There is no reason to postulate a kind of causation other than event causation.

3. The linguistic turn

So why do Chisholm & Co. claim that there is agent causation even in non-free action and that it is irreducible to event causation (Chisholm 1976a, 199)? The reason is that they do not mean by this claim what one should think they mean. They do not mean that when Ludwig raises his arm the arm's rising being caused is dissimilar to a billiard ball's rolling being caused. Instead, they mean that statements of the form 'Ludwig did so-and-so' cannot be transformed 'without loss of meaning' into statements of another form (Chisholm 1976a, 199; 1978, 622f). The Chisholmian claim that there is irreducible agent causation really is not a claim about action but about certain *statements* describing actions. It is a child of the linguistic turn.

I suggest we should not make a linguistic turn, or if we have made one already, we should make an ontological turn and look, not at statements describing actions but, at the things they describe and which make them true. The adherent of the linguistic turn might want to hold that investigating statements describing actions is one way, or the best way, or the only way, to investigate causation in actions. I reply that we can see that the linguistic approach here not only does not reveal anything about action, it even leads to false results. The linguistic turn leads us to say that there is agent causation also in non-free actions because statements like 'Ludwig raised his arm' can in no case be transformed into statements of another form. But in fact in a non-free action the undertaking as well as all events involved in the action are solely and deterministically caused by preceding events; there is only one kind of causation involved, namely event causation. So what the linguistic turn leads us to say is false if it is taken to imply anything about action or causation, rather than just about statements.

4. Turning away from the linguistic turn

So let me try to describe the causation involved in free actions. If the rising of Ludwig's arm, including Ludwig's reasoning and undertaking, was the result of ongoing causal processes; if it was—like the movements of the planets on Easter 2000—solely and deterministically caused by preceding events, then, I suggest, we should not say that he raised his arm freely, whatever else was the case. That is, I am using 'free' in the libertarian sense.

I use 'event' and 'state of affairs' here interchangeably in order to refer to a thing's (or things') having a certain property (or properties) at a certain time. One refers to an event by specifying which property is instantiated where, or by what, when, i.e. during which period of time. If an instant of time is specified, instead of a period of time, it is implied that there is a period which includes the instant and during which the property is instantiated. For example, in order to refer to a physical event taking place between t_1 and t_2 one has to specify, at least vaguely, which quality is instantiated where at each time between t_1 and t_2 . One event may be constituted by different properties being instantiated at different places at different times. Further, I am assuming that there are causal processes. A causal process is a continuous series of states of affairs each of which can truly be said to have caused any later state of affairs in the process.

What, then, happened when Ludwig raised his arm freely? The rising of the arm was the result of a causal process, which I call the 'action process'. It comprised events in Ludwig's muscles, in his nervous system, in his brain, etc. That is, for each phase of the rising of the arm there were preceding events in the muscles, in the nervous system, in the brain, etc., which caused this phase of the arm's rising.

Now, if the action was free, then some phase of this process is not just the result of preceding events. The process must somehow have a beginning, and its occurrence—that is, the origination of the action process—must somehow be due to the agent. I call this first phase of the action process the *initial event*, or 'initial state of affairs'.

But not the whole initial event has to be due to the agent. Consider a match being lighted at t_1 so that an explosion at t_2 is caused. The lighting of the match is only a part of the cause at t_1 of the explosion at t_2 . The complete cause includes much more, e.g. the presence of certain gas, etc. Similarly, in a free action only a part of the initial event has to be due to the agent. This event which is a part of the initial event has no preceding cause, that is, it is not caused by an event. So why does it occur? The answer must be: because of Ludwig. Ludwig just brought about this event; he made it pop up. If you investigate the action process going backwards from the action result you come to a stage which has a part for which you cannot find a preceding cause, but you find that its occurrence is due to Ludwig. The event is Ludwig's choice. I call it therefore 'choice event'. I say interchangeably about a choice event that 'it is Ludwig's choice', that 'it is the result of Ludwig's choice', that 'Ludwig brought it about by choice', or that 'Ludwig chose it'. So, on the account I am proposing, free agents are able to bring about certain events just by choosing, and such an event has no event cause.

What are choice events in the case of free human agents? I shall only indicate here what answers to this question are available. The answer depends on one's solution of the mind-body problem. A materialist will say that human choice events are physical, presumably brain events. A non-materialist may, but need not, say that they

involve non-material stuff. If choice events are not mental then we are not aware of them when we act, as we are not aware of the brain events involved in our actions. One candidate for being choice events are undertakings, i.e. certain mental events. On a non-materialist view they may, but don't have to, be taken to be distinct from any physical events; on a materialist view they are identical to certain brain events. In any case, a man's freely moving his body in a certain way involves a choice event which in conjunction with other events, presumably physical events, causes subsequent physical events in the body. I implied this above by saying that the choice event is part of the initial event of the action process.

Further, one may hold that the occurrence of a choice event, sometimes or always, is an intervention into an ongoing causal process. That is, there may or may not have been a causal process (deterministic or indeterministic) that, had nothing intervened, would have led to an event instead of which the choice event occurred. Moreover, one may or may not hold that, preceding a choice event, there are causal processes leading to events involving the same things or stuff as the choice event, but different properties. That is, if a 's being C at t is a choice event, there may be causal processes (deterministic or indeterministic) leading to a 's being D , E , F , etc., at t .

5. Freedom and chance

Many authors have tried to do justice to the intuition that if an action was free the agent 'could have done otherwise', by postulating that certain causal processes which are involved in the action are 'indeterministic'. By an 'indeterministic' process a process is meant which leads with a certain probability to one event or to certain other events instead. It is 'chancy', like (presumably) processes on the quantum level. Some authors hold that in a free action the process of deliberation, before the decision, is indeterministic (Dennett 1978; Fischer & Ravizza 1992; Mele 1999); others hold that the decision itself is the result of an indeterministic process (Clarke 2000). Similarly, Chisholm (1976a, 202; 1976b, 62) and Swinburne (1994, 25; 1997, ch. 13) hold that an action is free if the undertaking involved is not 'fully', i.e. deterministically, caused by earlier events.

The trouble with all these accounts is that they fail to take into account the *control* a free agent has over what he does. They postulate a possibility that the action could have failed to occur, but they do not entail what people usually imply when they say 'he could have done otherwise', namely that it was up to the agent what he did. If somebody's action was preceded by an indeterministic process of deliberation, or if the decision or the undertaking was the result of an indeterministic process, that makes the occurrence of the action a matter of chance and not a free action. This becomes clear also through the fact that it would not make the agent any more responsible for the action than he would be if the action was determined. An agent is responsible for an action not through the mere possibility that the action could have failed to occur but through it having been up to him what he did. An action which occurs as a matter of randomness is no more free than an action which is determined.

Perhaps these accounts are based on the mistaken assumption that if event A at t_2 was the result of a deterministic process between t_1 and t_2 then after t_1 nothing could prevent the occurrence of A . But there are no processes like this. Even a maximally deterministic process, such as the movement of billiard balls as

described by Newtonian mechanics, can be interrupted. It only requires a sufficiently strong intervention. A cat, for example, can interrupt the deterministic process of a rolling billiard ball.

If there is at t_1 an indeterministic process running towards Ludwig raising his arm at t_2 , then Ludwig, if he is to raise his arm freely, has to interrupt this process (as he would have to if it were a deterministic process) and raise his arm via a choice event. This choice event is then the result of Ludwig's choice and not a result of the process. It is hence false what some authors (Clarke 1996, 27) say that the presence of *chance* in the process leading to an action 'leaves room', and is required, for control and for the possibility of alternative actions.

I have not yet answered the question whether agents are causes of what they bring about freely. Non-free actions involve only event causation. It may still be convenient to say that Ludwig is the cause of the rising of his arm even if he raised his arm non-freely; but no special kind of causation is involved. For free actions the question arises whether the agent is cause of the choice event, which has no event cause. The relation between the agent and the choice event is certainly different from the relation between, say, the lighting of a match and the subsequent explosion. But as an agent, like an event cause, is that to which it is due that one thing rather than another occurs—namely one choice event rather than none or another one—I suggest that it is adequate to call the agent 'cause', or more specifically 'agent cause', of the choice event, as well as of the events later in the action process.

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Multiple Realizability and Property-Identities: An Incompatible Couple?

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1. The Argument

During the last 35 years, identity-theorists have been vexed by the apparent multiple realizability of mental properties. It is common wisdom that this multiple realizability rules out the psychophysical property-identities demanded by the identity-theory. In fact, however, multiple realizability is not at all incompatible with psychophysical property-identities.

Some reheated cabbage first: throughout the late 1960s, Putnam argued against Australian 'central-state materialism' that given the *multiple realizability* of mental properties—the fact that mental properties can be realized by distinct neurophysiological properties in creatures of different species, in conspecifics, or even in one and the same individual across time—a mental property cannot be *identified* with any of its neurophysiological realizers. Therefore, psychoneural property-identities are—contrary to central-state materialism—impossible (see e.g. Putnam 1967).

Consider the notorious example: pain might be realized in all humans by the firing of c-fibers, but it could conceivably be realized by the excitation of silicon chips in conscious Martians or by the opening of ω -valves in conscious robots. Since c-fiber firing, silicon chip excitation and ω -valve opening are distinct properties, pain cannot—by danger of violating the transitivity of identity—be identical with any one of them. Some story like this usually underlies the appeal to multiple realizability in arguments against the identity-theory. Call arguments of this type *Multiple Realizability Arguments (MRA)*.

Any major philosophical argument has been subject of careful scrutiny by its opponents, attempting to carve out the premises on which it rests in the hope of showing one of them to be false or showing the argument to be guilty of an equivocation (or otherwise invalid). Surprisingly enough, this did not happen to *MRA*: inspecting the not insignificant amount of literature on *MRA*, one does not come across any attempt of formulating the usual story about multiple realizability in a *rigorous manner*. Trying to do this reveals a striking fact: on the one hand, the usual story behind *MRA* is highly plausible, but does not refute the identity-theory. On the other hand, any version strong enough to refute the identity-theory fails to be backed by the plausibility of the usual story.

2. The Problem with the Argument

It seems common ground that *MRA* directly refutes the fundamental claim of the identity-theory, viz. the existence of *psychophysical property-identities*. In other words: it is assumed that the identity-theory *cannot* be true *if* the usual story behind *MRA* is correct. Here is what I take to be the fundamental claim of the identity-theory.¹

¹ Note that I take the identity-theory only to assert that mental properties are *physical* properties, not that they are *neurophysiological* properties. I will justify this important departure from the tradition in section 3.

(IT) For every mental property M there exists a physical property P such that $M = P$.

Some identity-theorists might prefer a weaker thesis, viz. that *some* mental properties are identical with physical properties (one could e.g. claim that whereas phenomenal properties are physical properties, intentional properties are functional properties). However, using *IT* instead of its weaker cousin means making the claim of the identity-theorist *stronger*. It should thus be *easier* for the friend of *MRA* to refute it and so I expect no complaints.

If *MRA* is to directly contradict the identity-theory, its conclusion must deny *IT*, i.e. be the *negation* of *IT*:

(NIT) There exists a mental property M such that for every physical property P , $M \neq P$.²

So much thus for the conclusion of *MRA*. What about its premises? Following the usual story about multiple realizability sketched above, the reasoning seems to be as follows: (1.) At least some mental properties are multiply realizable by distinct neurophysiological properties. (2.) If a mental property is multiply realizable, then it cannot be identical with any of its realizers. Hence, at least some mental properties cannot be identical with any one of their realizers. More formally:

(1) There exists a mental property M and there exists a (possibly infinite) set Π_M of physical (presumably neurophysiological) properties P_1, \dots, P_n ($n > 1$) such that each P_i *realizes* M .³

(2) M cannot be identical with any physical property $P_i \in \Pi_M$.

(1) is typically supported by alleged empirical evidence or by plausibility- or conceivability-considerations. Among the opponents of *MRA* there is some tendency to question the truth of (1). For example, Kim denies the existential claims in (1), arguing that there

² *NIT* would not only be *sufficient* for rejecting *IT* but also *necessary* in the sense that nothing *weaker* than *NIT* suffices to refute *IT*. Since the argumentation of *MRA* usually makes no essential assumptions about the particular mental property in question, showing *NIT* would presumably be tantamount to showing the stronger result that *no* mental property can be identical to a physical property (see note 2).

³ It is impossible to pinpoint a uniform notion of 'realization', but the following should at least come close to being widely accepted: if a property F is realized by a property G then the instantiation of G is *sufficient* for the instantiation of F , i.e. the instantiation of G *necessitates* the instantiation of F . A property F is *multiply realizable* iff it is realizable by distinct properties G_1, \dots, G_m ($m > 1$). Since the instantiation of each G_k is sufficient for the instantiation of F , none of them is *necessary*. Moreover, assume that in the above case Π_M *exhausts* M 's realizers.

isn't any *single* multiply realizable property M ; rather, there are as many *different* mental properties (and hence psychophysical property-identities) as there are physical 'realizers' (Kim 1998; see Shapiro 2000 for related arguments). (2) is rarely explicitly defended in the literature, but it seems hardly deniable.⁴ I think the identity-theorist should grant the truth of (1) and (2). This admission does not cause her harm, since (1) and (2) do not entail *NIT*, which is necessary to refute *IT*; they only imply the considerably weaker *NIT**:

(*NIT**) There exists a mental property M such that for every physical property $P_i \in \Pi_M$, $M \neq P_i$.

*NIT** is a *restricted* version of *NIT* and hence *weaker*. But, as seen above, *NIT* is the weakest possible claim that refutes *IT*. The usual story about multiple realizability only shows that M cannot be identical *with one of its realizers*, but *not* that it cannot be identical with any physical property *at all*. But this is necessary to refute *IT*. However, it is not difficult to supplement a premise that allows the derivation of the intended conclusion *NIT*. This third premise must contain information about those physical properties which are *not* in Π_M , i.e. it must explicitly rule out that M is identical with any physical property not among its realizers:

(3) M cannot be identical with any physical property $P \notin \Pi_M$.

The argument from (1), (2) and (3) to *NIT* is indeed valid: by (3), if M is identical with any physical property at all, it can only be identical with a $P_i \in \Pi_M$, but this is ruled out by (2). Therefore, M cannot be identical with any physical property at all, which directly contradicts *IT*.⁵

The problem with this new, valid, argument is that it is far from obvious that it is *sound*. Why we should believe (3)? By adding (3), *MRA* loses a great deal of its initial overwhelming plausibility that even hard-nosed identity-theorists could hardly deny. (2) is reasonable by logical reasons alone, and (1) seems supported by empirically fairly consolidated information about the workings of the neural mechanisms underlying our mental faculties and the possibility of different physical/neurophysiological implementations of those mechanisms. (3), on the contrary, makes a claim about *any* physical property *whatsoever*. Not only is it usually left unsupported by the defenders of *MRA*, it is not even clear how (3) *could* be established. There are *many* physical properties—many of them very unlike what we are used to think of as a 'physical property' (e.g. Wilson 1985)—and it is difficult to see what kind of story *MRA* might offer that could make plausible the bold hypothesis that *none* of those countless properties can be identified with M .

I do not want to rule out categorically the possibility that (3) can be buttressed.⁶ I only maintain that the familiar stories about alternative ways to bring about our mental

faculties that usually accompany *MRA* do not support (3). The multiple realizability of a mental property alone only entails that it cannot be identical *with one of its realizers*, not that the identity-theory as such is refuted. Strange as it may seem, the literature on *MRA* has shown little awareness of this: some authors even argue directly from *psychoneural* multiple realizability to the falsity of the identity-theory *per se*! For example, after having characterized the 'type-identity theory' quite generally as the thesis that mental properties are identical with some "feature of the *material* causal chain", Corbí and Prades point out that

there is an important problem that has put *type-identity theories* out of fashion for many years, namely: the multiple realizability of mental properties. For, there is no reason to think that a mental type [...] must have the same type of *neurophysiological* instantiation in any possible mind. (Corbí and Prades 2000, 8; emphasis S.W.)

How could *psychoneural* multiple realizability rule out the possibility that mental properties are identical with *some* "material feature"? Most authors, however, explicitly realize that *psychoneural* multiple realizability alone does not refute the possibility of psychophysical property-identities in general, but they nevertheless usually fail to come up with an argument that rules out those other kinds of psychophysical property-identities. They argue meticulously for (1), while they completely ignore (3). But without support for (3), *MRA* fails as an argument against the existence of psychophysical property-identities and hence against the identity-theory.

Conclusion: If the *MRA* suggested by the usual story about multiple realizability is supposed to derive *NIT* then it is invalid (since it only allows inferring the weaker *NIT**, which does not contradict *IT*). If *MRA* is supplemented by (3) then *NIT* can be validly derived, but the argument loses much of the plausibility that made its initial version so utterly attractive and convincing.

3. Objections and Replies

At this point, the friend of *MRA* will most likely turn to one of two 'burden-of-proof'-arguments.

Objection 1: It is *ad hoc* to interpret the identity-theory as the thesis that mental properties are just *physical* properties of whatever kind, given that the early identity-theorists explicitly insisted that mental properties are *neurophysiological* properties of the human brain.

Objection 2: There is ample empirical evidence that mental properties are related (at least in this world) with brain-processes. Hence it is the burden of those who deny that mental properties are neurophysiological properties and instead endorse other psychophysical property-identities to show what those other physical properties might be.

Reply 1: Maybe the identity-theorist should agree that if (1) and (2) are true, there *cannot* be *psychoneural* property-identities. (But even this is too strong: any neurophysiological property *not* in the set Π_M of realizers of any M remains a viable candidate for a *psychoneural* property-identity because the multiple realizability of M only rules out property-identities with *realizers* of M .) Be that as it may, *psychoneural* property-identities are not mandatory for the identity-theory. The identity-theory evolved in the wake of *physicalism* as leading

⁴ Here is a sketch of a 'proof': Suppose, *for reductio*, that $M = P_i$. Suppose o has P_j ($i \neq j$). Since o 's instantiating P_j is sufficient for o 's instantiating M , o has M . But, by assumption, $M = P_i$. Hence, o has P_i , too, contrary to the alleged incompatibility of P_i and P_j . Therefore, $M \neq P_i$.

⁵ Here it becomes obvious that the main work of *MRA* is done by (2) and (3); (1) only serves as a *non-triviality condition* which prevents (2) and (3) from being vacuously true by having unsatisfied antecedents.

⁶ Although I feel inclined to think that, as a matter of fact, (3) is indeed false and that mental properties are identical with complex physical properties; but I won't defend this claim here.

Weltanschauung, driven by the desire to apply the—in other areas so successful—physicalist worldview to the human mind. But physicalism is, very roughly, the claim that everything is *physical*; it is *not* the claim that mental properties are neurophysiological properties. Formulating the identity-theory in terms of *IT* is thus in the spirit of the traditional project of physicalism. Far from being *ad hoc*, it constitutes one legitimate attempt among others to capture the intent of physicalism as our prevailing *Weltanschauung*.

Reply 2: A comprehensive answer would exceed the scope of this paper, but the general idea is that philosophers usually adopt a rather naïve view of physical properties. They tend to assume that to any 'legitimate' physical property there must correspond an ordinary, projectible predicate, pre-formed already in our mundane or scientific language. But physical reality is more complex than philosophers tend to think of it, and the class of physical properties is larger than we assume.⁷ If we take our commitment to *physicalism* seriously, we must give up our philosophically naïve conception of physical properties and ask the physicists what physical properties *really are*. Without an adequate and substantial conception of physical properties, (3) is difficult—if not impossible—to evaluate. This is not to say that it is false, but the burden of proof is with the defender of *MRA*: she must offer a good argument for why we should accept (3), given our ignorance about the nature of physical properties. Barring any such arguments, I dare conclude that multiple realizability and psychophysical property-identities are not incompatible.⁸

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⁷ For example, Mark Wilson has argued that in order to do its job physics must accept "that extremely generous mathematical methods for constructing new traits [i.e. properties; S.W.] from old [ones] are legitimate" (Wilson 1985, 232). In fact, Wilson claims, physics must be so liberal that just any real-valued function of the state-variables of a system counts as a *genuine property* of that system.

⁸ Thanks to Diana Raffman for comments and criticisms.

Aesthetic Aspects on Persons in Kant, Schiller, and Wittgenstein

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There are two aspects of persons, which are predominant in contemporary philosophy, one being epistemological and the other moral. The first aspect focuses on problems of continuity and personal identity, the second on questions of moral responsibility. Both aspects are related to the double meaning of the Latin word "*persona*", which stood, roughly, first for the role someone plays in a system - be it on stage or in society - and later, under the influence of Christian traditions, was used to express someone's uniqueness and individuality. But there are further aspects of what is essential for a person, aspects, which, although having been paid attention to in the past, are now rather neglected. These are a person's *development*, *free will*, and *personality*. I want to show here how Kant's theory of aesthetic contemplation and Wittgenstein's notion of language games are useful for a better understanding of these aspects of a person.

Parfit in 1987 distinguished between two questions: (1) "What is the nature of a person?" and (2) "What makes a person at two different times one and the same person? What is necessarily involved in the continued existence of each person over time?" Parfit concentrates on the second question, because "in answering (2) we shall also partly answer (1). The necessary features of our continued existence depend upon our nature. And the simplest answer to (1) is that, to be a person, a being must be self-conscious, aware of its identity and its continued existence over time." (Parfit, p. 202) But this "simplest answer" is not only simple, it is also one-sided. Already in 1971 Harry G. Frankfurt pointed out that "what philosophers have lately come to accept as analysis of the concept of a person is not actually analysis of *that* concept at all" (Frankfurt, 5). Frankfurt criticizes philosophers for having been too much concerned with mind-body issues and having forgotten what is "of our most humane concern with ourselves and the source of what we regard as most important and most problematical in our lives" (6), which, according to Frankfurt, is a person's free will. He therefore develops an account of our capacity of "reflective self-evaluation" (7) and our ability to form "second order desires" (6). These abilities are intimately related to the aspects I am going to point out here.

Kant's theory of aesthetic contemplation and Wittgenstein's notion of language games share three features that are essential to the development of a person. These are the features of openness, indeterminacy, and exemplarity.

1 According to Kant's aesthetics, when we make a judgment of taste, we engage in what Kant called a "free play of the faculties of cognition imagination and understanding". In a state of aesthetic contemplation we play with possibilities of different ways of perceiving and combining what is given to our senses. We are open to varieties of possibilities of what the object could be, we are free from conceptual constraints, and instead of concepts and rules we rely on mere "purposiveness". Furthermore, according to Kant, we regard our judgment of taste as "exemplary" for others. That is, if we make a judgment of taste, this judgment will have to be based on the right kind

of free play and we will think of this play and our judgment as being exemplary for others. What I can do, others can do as well. Whoever hears that music should be able to appreciate it in the way I do. At least I make that claim. In fact, others often do not follow our example, but still, I make the claim that they should. Geniuses, for instance, are often not understood by their contemporaries.

In such a state of aesthetic contemplation we exercise those very abilities by means of which we reflect and evaluate in general, not only in the case of aesthetic appreciation, but also in cases of moral decision-making and decision-making in general. Our ability to be self-conscious and to be aware of our own identity is practiced and refined through aesthetic contemplation when we enjoy and "feel" ourselves (Kant, par. 1, 204).

Furthermore, the two meanings of the word *persona*, the individual and the role we play in society, can be found in Kant's account of judgments of taste. When we make a judgment of taste, we reach out to others and want them to agree with us: "[I]f someone likes something and is conscious that he himself does so without any interest, then he cannot help judging that it must contain a basis for being liked [that holds] for everyone" (Kant, par. 6, 212). Although we feel the pleasure as an individual - it is always only my pleasure (or displeasure) and not yours - we at the same time think of other human beings as well. This exercises the ability to "think from the standpoint of everyone else" (Kant, par. 40, 294), which is necessary in reflecting upon our intentions and actions and their consequences and moral values. Kant therefore called beauty a "symbol for morality" (Kant, par. 51, 351).

2 What Kant wrote in his third *Critique* had an effect on people's ideas about education. Schiller, Goethe, and Humboldt, for instance not only read Kant's aesthetics, they were also moved by it and helped shaping the educational institutions in Europe. Schiller wrote in his influential "Letters about the Aesthetic Education of Man" [*Ueber die aesthetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen*] that a being is human only when and in so far as it plays [*er ist nur da ganz Mensch, wo er spielt*, letter 15]. When Schiller wrote this, he was inspired by Kant's rather abstract idea of the free *play* of the cognitive faculties. Furthermore, Kant thought of this play as being "harmonious", and this idea, too, left its traces in Schiller's writings: "Taste alone brings harmony into society, because it creates harmony in individuals" [*Der Geschmack allein bringt Harmonie in die Gesellschaft, weil er Harmonie in den Individuen stiftet*, letter 29]. Similarly, the two aspects of a person (*persona*), its individuality and its role in society, which we could find in Kant's aesthetics, are again the object of reflection in Schiller's writings: "It is the beautiful alone that we enjoy at the same time as individual and as species, i.e., as representative of the species" [*Das Schoene allein geniessen wir als Individuum und als Gattung zugleich, d.h. als Repraesentant der Gattung*, letter 27].

The idea of education in the sense of "*Bildung*" was strong and influential during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe. We find it not only in writings by Schiller, but also in Rousseau's "Emile",

Goethe's "Wilhelm Meister's Lehrjahre", and other popular writings in the tradition of the *Bildungsroman* (or "novel of development"). The idea of the *Bildungsroman* was that a young man must grow up to become an individual and autonomous self, a unique organic unity that is open to the world and that unfolds itself in ways that are unique among human beings and that form his personal history. All this was considered to be part of what makes a person, and very little of this can be found in contemporary discussions about persons.

3 When Kant wrote his third *Critique*, he somewhat softened his rather rigid and systematic style of doing philosophy. He moved somewhat away from the rigidity of concepts and rules, and he opened himself to the relevance of indeterminacy, exemplarity, and mere purposiveness. But he restricted the relevance of such aspects to aesthetics and teleology. The later Wittgenstein was more radical than Kant. He questioned the nature of rules in general, not only in matters of aesthetics and teleology, but also in epistemology. All language games are parts of "forms of life" (Wittgenstein, 1958, par. 23, 11). It is not only in making judgments of taste that we refer to our "feeling of life" (Kant, par. 1, 204). Furthermore, whereas Kant was confined by his transcendental framework and looked for *a priori* grounds and therefore considered only the individual and the universal, Wittgenstein drew attention to particular empirical cases and communities, societies, cultures, and histories. Wittgenstein stressed the differences: "Suppose Lewy has what is called a cultured taste in painting. This is something entirely different to what was called a cultured taste in the fifteenth century. An entirely different game was played. He does something entirely different with it to what a man did then." (Wittgenstein, 9)

Despite many fundamental differences between Kant and Wittgenstein, the aspects of openness, indeterminacy, and exemplarity can be found in Kant's aesthetics as well as in Wittgenstein's notion of language games. In matters of art as well as in learning a language game, we follow examples, there are no determinate rules, and there is always room for misunderstanding and re-interpretation. There are always new geniuses and there are always new language games. Both philosophers have stressed this point. To develop into a person, we have to make many decisions in the courses of our lives. Often we have to decide in one way or another, although it seems to us that we do not have enough information to ensure that we are making the right decision. The ability to reflect and to choose in such situations of under-determinacy has to be developed -- and Wittgenstein never tired of pointing out how many such situations there are in our everyday lives. This ability to reflect can be found in aesthetic contemplation and in the interpretation of language games, and practicing this ability makes self-consciousness and our awareness of our personal identity and continuity potentially more effective.

Although it is true that being in a state of aesthetic contemplation or being involved in a language game, we do not need to be aware of our existence as identical over time, it is also true that through such activities we learn how to live with indeterminacy and openness and thus develop into a more fully grown and competent person. When we follow examples or when we give an example ourselves, for others or ourselves to follow, we continually have to make interpretations and re-interpretations. Following an example is not the same as being determined by rules. In fact, as Wittgenstein pointed out, following a rule is much more like following examples than we thought. He thus extended parts of what Kant did for the judgment

of taste to all kinds of judgments. By making us more aware of certain problems of the nature of rules in general, Wittgenstein made it possible for us to see the relevance of Kant's aesthetics for epistemology.

The features of openness, indeterminacy, and exemplarity are part of Kant's notion of "*freies Spiel*" as well as Wittgenstein's notion of "*Sprach-Spiel*". It is not only a word they share. More importantly here, these features of openness, indeterminacy, and exemplarity are necessary elements in the development of a person, and although they have been much in the center of discussion in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe, most philosophers talking about persons nowadays tend to pay almost no attention to them. There is still much truth in Frankfurt's criticism from 1971, namely that "what philosophers have lately come to accept as analysis of the concept of a person is not actually analysis of *that* concept at all" (Frankfurt, 5). I have tried to show here that we need to go even further than Frankfurt. Not only the notion of free will, but also elements of aesthetic education are relevant to what makes a person.

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The 4th Dimension – Wittgenstein on Colour and Imagination

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1. Introduction


What does it mean when we say we can see colours? How do we use them and how do we learn their names? It is not at all clear whether we all experience the same colour when looking at the same red rose. Nevertheless we use the same word and we do understand it when someone else does. We know that red and yellow make orange and that blue and yellow make green, but can we imagine a reddishgreen or a yellowishblue? And why haven't we got a concept of a white transparent glass?

The problem of colour-incompatibility runs throughout Wittgenstein's work from *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (TLP) until *On Certainty* (OC) and describes a development from 'logic' to 'grammar' and 'form of life'. This problem of colour-incompatibility and Wittgenstein's other remarks on colour have been discussed through the years in several ways (see Literature). In my opinion all these approaches miss a crucial point.

My point is that Wittgenstein is not so much concerned with colours as such, as with our ability to see (that implies both seeing and thinking) and our capacity to imagine something. For he links the grammar of colour to the grammar of language through the notion of 'seeing aspects': a topic he elaborates extensively in *Philosophical Investigations* (PI) part II,xi. He relates this notion on the one hand to the colour-octahedron in *Philosophical Remarks* (PR) and on the other hand to the remarks on colour in *Remarks on Colour* (RC). Wittgenstein asks questions like: Why haven't we got a word for a white colour that is fully transparent? We could speak of something white and transparent as being 'colourless', but does this term still fall under our notion of colour-concept? It seems that we cannot think of the conceptcombination 'white water', because we are not able to describe how something 'white and transparent' should look like (cf. RC I-23). What are the limits of our power of imagination?

2. Colour

In my opinion Wittgenstein has deliberately chosen for the colour-octahedron as a 3dimensional model in order to clarify some of the problems concerning the 'colour grammar', as he also deliberately has left aside the colour-wheel or Runge's colour-sphere in his investigations (cf. Gerritsen 1984 and www.colorsystem.com for an extensive overview of colour systems). Wittgenstein adapts the model of the colour-octahedron from Höfler (Rotthaupt 1996), who follows Hering taking as point of departure the so-called 'opponent classification' (in its modern form proposed by Hurvich and Jameson 1957). This classification can be seen as a kind of reversal process according to the formula: red – green, blue – yellow, white – black. Here the basic colour pairs are situated in the model at opposite points. Therefore green is not a mixed colour in this model, but a basic colour. All basic colours are situated on an *unambiguous point* at the corners of the base; the white-black axis is at right angles to this base.



Höfler – 1883 (Gerritsen 1984:38) Wittgenstein – 1930 (PR-XXI §221)

When we compare Höfler's octahedron with the one Wittgenstein has drawn, it can be noticed that Wittgenstein is concerned to open up the 'logical structure' constructed by the relationships of the colours. This logical structure represents the colour-space in which the rules are laid down: the 'grammar of colour'. It is important to read Wittgenstein's colour-octahedron as *literally* as possible, because only then we can discover why he extended the white-black axis a little upward and downward. In my view he wants to draw with this extension our attention to the fact that this coordinate is situated in a different dimension. This has consequences.

In the first place this so called grey-scale can be seen as an overview of the mixed colours of white and black, but also as a scale of colours between white and black. Secondly in this way can be shown that all saturated colours can be mixed with white, grey tones and black. In that sense the saturated colours (not only the four basic colours) are situated *between* the opponent pair of white and black. In this respect the oppositions white – yellow – black and red – yellow – green for example have the same structure. The third and most important point Wittgenstein keeps returning on in RC is the fact that we cannot speak of transparent colours in case of this white-black coordinate. According to this model we cannot speak of a transparent white, nor of a transparent grey or black; and that we can observe immediately and 'in one clear view'

due to the fact that this coordinate is situated in a different dimension. A transparent white would have to lay on a point of one of the lines of the base (cf. RC III-85 and 178).

Another point we can make by comparing the two models is that Wittgenstein has left out the cross inside the base. In doing this he shows us that we can not make a combination with red and green as 'reddishgreen' and no combination with yellow and blue as 'yellowishblue'. On the other hand he divides this square base towards the outside into a regular octagon where he situates the mixed colours 'somewhere' between the basic colours. Between these different colours lots of mixed colours can be seen each of them more or less tending towards one of the basic colours; that is greener or more red or even more red, reddish yellow or bluish green etc. There are no sharp boundaries between the different categories; they are fluid terms we use in daily life in an in principle unlimited variety of cases.

The colour-octahedron is a 3dimensional model capable of showing two dimensions of the colours: the dimension of the four basic colours and their mixed colours on the square base, that can be opaque or transparent in reality, and the dimension at right angles: the white-black axis the one we can only think opaque. In every day life we deal not only with these two dimensions of the colour-octahedron as being an idealized system but also with a depth dimension. This depth dimension shows itself as a 4th dimension in the reflection, the glittering and shining, and the transparency of the colours (cf. Z 269).

Also in the discovery of the depth dimension Wittgenstein is concerned with the 'logic' (that is the grammar) of colour-concepts; he connects this discovery with the ambiguity of colour. Therefore he wonders in RC for example in what ways we differentiate between a transparent representation 'in a painting' and the opaque colours 'on the palette'. And why is it that there can be a transparent green, but no transparent white? Why don't we have a word for a white colour that is transparent? And when we call it 'colourless', does this word still belong to our notion of colour-concept? What is more: when a colour-concept – for example 'white' (as a colour-patch) – or 'transparent' (as a colour-space) – occurs in just one of the colour geometries: the octahedron or the 4th dimension – how do we connect these two colour geometries? We could try to neutralize this sort of differences by creating an equal standard, for instance by reducing them to colour-samples as we know from the Munsell system. In that way we are able to compare the two different colour concepts, but only at the expense of the depth dimension. For then we can not differentiate anymore between colour-patch and colour-space (RC I-25).

3. Seeing colours and aspects

We can 'see something *now* as luminous, *now* as grey' (RC I-38). It is characteristic of Wittgenstein that he links the phenomenon of seeing aspects, investigated in PI II,xi with his inquiries on colour concerning the colour-octahedron in PR and the colour-puzzles in RC. He discovers that seeing aspects is involved in vagueness and in an ambiguity of the notion of 'seeing'. By taking into account this notion of seeing Wittgenstein is able to extend his grammatical investigations into the broader context of a form of life.

In order to differentiate between the surface dimension and the depth dimension of colours it is not sufficient that we make comparisons the way we do when we call a colour 'pure red' the moment we compare that colour with other reds in a same situation. There is no use

in comparing between '<colour of gold' or 'colour of silver'>' and '<yellow' or 'grey'>' (cf. RC III-241). They each belong to a different logical (grammatical) category. We can only get access to the depth dimension of the colours when we are able to make an aspect-change. We see black *now* as a surface colour *now* as 'deep' or 'reflecting'. Depending on the context we see the spot *now* as 'white' *now* as 'grey'. The change of aspect itself is sharply defined, but the colour-concepts that are involved in that aspect change are ambiguous and context dependent.

Not only in the differentiation of surface and depth dimension do we make use of aspect-change. Also in case of the colour-octahedron Wittgenstein asks us to utilize this ability. According to him the colour-octahedron is a perspicuous representation – *übersichtliche Darstellung* – of the colour grammar (cf. PR I-II). This concept of '*übersichtliche Darstellung*' characterizes our form of representation, the way we look at things (PI 122). The model of the colour-octahedron shows us the rules, the connections, we refer to in making decisions concerning the grammar of the colours. Different combinations of the same grammatical rules are possible and some of them can relate to different objects of comparison. Think for example of the fact that red is a colour situated *between* violet and orange and also between blue and yellow, but is not a mixed colour of violet and orange or blue and yellow. Nevertheless red is the common part of violet and orange. These manners of expression have the advantage that they show us in what ways the colours are defined. However: nothing fixes the rules for ever. The printer or the photographer make use of quite another system than the designer or the decorator.

The purpose of this kind of graphic, 3dimensional and visual model such as the colour-octahedron is to create a change of aspect by illuminating a new application of our words. In his later work Wittgenstein holds that the octahedron, the colour-samples (PI 1) or the standard metre in Paris (PI 50) fulfil a special role in our every day use and get their meaning only in a practice. It is in interaction with the context and with the possibility of making analogies with situations in concrete practices that these models (also) make meaning possible. The colour-octahedron for instance is an *übersichtliche Darstellung* for a certain part of the colour grammar, but falls short in representing the depth dimension of the colours. It is not so much suited for *the* arrangement but for *an* arrangement (cf. PI 132). We only can describe the glittering, reflection or transparency of a colour within the broader context in which they appear. This context brings them to life so to speak.

Wittgenstein repeatedly takes the glittering and the reflection as a subject of inquiry in his colour-puzzles in order to illuminate on the one hand the similarities and differences between those two concepts and on the other hand to show the connection with transparency. The differences between 'black' and 'dark' and between 'cloudiness' (opaque) and 'deep' (transparent). The concept 'white' related to transparency, glittering, the relation white – grey and 'white' related to 'substance colour'. The investigation into 'white' and 'grey' is connected with surroundings, like the different ways of illumination that make a colour-spot on one time appear as white, the other time as grey. The incidence of light seems to make a colour look differently; but does not make it different.

Our conceptual domain is fluid and flexible; Wittgenstein suggests that we could even invent a natural history. A totally different world would imply totally different concepts. He draws our attention to experiments that have the form of 'trying to imagine something' by means of the

colour-puzzles (PR and RC) and the perception-puzzles (PI II,xi). Seeing aspects asks for the power and the ability of imagination. The answer to the question why we cannot think of a 'fully transparent white' is as simple as it is compelling: the expression 'transparent white' does not fit into our form of life, our picture of the world. We just have no use for it. When we have to name it, we call it 'colourless', but then it is not at all clear whether this expression still falls under our concept of colour (cf. PI 115 and RC III-210, 217). It is our picture of the world that is constitutive for our convictions and our language. It is the inherited background to which we decide between true and false (OC 94).

4. Conclusion

Apparently we have words for things that do not exist in reality: words like 'grey-glowing' or 'illuminating-grey' have no representation in reality. In addition we cannot find any words for things that do exist in reality: every painter knows that *making* a transparent white is no problem at all. A handful of flour thrown in a bucket full of water and there we have a beautiful transparent white. Yet we cannot *think* a transparent white! From this angle we can say that the investigations concerning the colours is an investigation that has the limits of our thinking, of our imagination in its centre. The scope of our ability to discover new links by means of seeing aspects implies the scope of our imagination. This scope is related to our form of life. In this respect the investigations of Wittgenstein direct us to an anthropological interpretation.

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Menschen im Wachkoma: Personen oder nicht?

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1 Ein Hauptvorwurf an die Bioethik lautet, dass Personalität und Werthaftigkeit nicht länger als angeborene Eigenschaften unserer Species gelten, sondern im Lauf des Lebens erworben werden und unter Umständen vorübergehend oder dauerhaft abhanden kommen (vgl. Arbeitskreis zur Erforschung der „Euthanasie“-Geschichte 1996).

Im Rahmen des FWF-Forschungsprojektes „Personen und das Problem des Paternalismus im Kontext von Intensiv- und Transplantationsmedizin“ hielt ich mich von 1998 bis 2001 regelmäßig an medizinischen Pflegeeinheiten auf. Ich besuchte psychiatrische Stationen, neurochirurgische Intensivstationen, Transplantstationen und zuletzt die Langzeitpflegestation eines geriatrischen Krankenhauses. Das Ziel dieser „teilnehmenden Beobachtung“ war, den Umgang mit Menschen kennenzulernen, welche die von vielen Bioethikern als personkonstitutiv geltenden Eigenschaften und Fähigkeiten (Selbstbewusstsein, Zeit-, Zukunftsbewußtsein, die Fähigkeit, Interessen zu haben u. a. m.) vorübergehend oder irreversibel verloren haben.

Der Diskussion von Personalität im bioethischen Kontext seien drei Fallbeispiele vorangestellt. Die Patientinnen werden in den Anamnesen als „Apallikerinnen“ und „nicht ansprechbar“ beurteilt. Im Unterschied zu nach der Hirntodkonvention als tot geltenden „stammhirntoten Organspendern“, wie in Fall 3, vermögen diese „großhirntoten Apallikerinnen“ noch selbständig zu atmen.

2 Fall 1: Maria B., 86 Jahre, verwitwet, österreichische Staatsbürgerin, nächste Angehörige: Söhne

Diagnosen: Zustand nach Badeunfall vor zwei Jahren, Wasser- und Magensaftaspiration, Status post Reanimation, hypoxische (durch Sauerstoffunterversorgung hervorgerufene) Hirnschädigung, apallisches Syndrom, Aspirationspneumonie (Lungenentzündung durch Einatmen von Wasser)

Vor zwei Jahren wird Maria B. nach einem Badeunfall in Italien reanimiert und primär behandelt. Bereits nach der Reanimation zeigt Maria B. weite lichtstarre Pupillen. Sie wird mit dem Notarzt nach Österreich transferiert und an einer chirurgischen Intensivstation zur Weiterbehandlung übernommen. Es entwickelt sich ein persistierendes apallisches Syndrom. Maria B. kommt zur Langzeittherapie ins Geriatrische Krankenhaus unter dem Hinweis, dass eine anderweitige Versorgung aus sozialmedizinischen Gründen derzeit nicht möglich sei. Sie gilt als nicht ansprechbar.

Fall 2: Anna C., 39 Jahre, verheiratet, bosnische Staatsbürgerin, nächste Verwandte: Schwester

Diagnosen: Hypoxämischer Hirnschaden bei Status post Strangulatio, symptomatische Epilepsie, Keratitis marginalis (Hornhautrandentzündung), Harnwegsinfekt, Depression

Anna C. wird vor zwei Jahren in erhängtem Zustand aufgefunden. Beim Eintreffen des Notarztwagens besteht eine Asystolie (Fehlen der Herzkontraktion). Anna C. wird reanimiert und erlangt Eigenatmung über den Tubus und Sinusrhythmus. Sie wird an die Intensivstation überstellt. Seither befindet sie sich in einem komatösen Zustand. Aufgrund von Bettenmangel erfolgt die Übernahme in die Überwachungseinheit, dann wird sie auf die Bettenstation verlegt. Anna C. litt unter einer Depression. Sie unternahm zwei Suizidversuche.

Fall 3: Herr D., 22 Jahre, österreichischer Staatsbürger

Herr D. erleidet einen Autounfall ungeklärter Ursache und kommt tief komatös in die Klinik. Eine Computertomographie ergibt eine Blutung im Hirnstamm mit einer massiven Blutung im Ventrikelsystem. Aufgrund des Blutungsmusters wird angenommen, dass der Unfall durch eine Blutung aus einer Gefäßmalformation verursacht wurde. Die Gefäßdarstellung ist jedoch unauffällig. Zur intracraniellen Druckentlastung wird eine Ventrikeldrainage angelegt. Am zweiten Tag tritt eine massive Verschlechterung des neurologischen Zustands ein. Ein Coma dépassé entwickelt sich. Das EEG ist isoelektrisch (Nulllinie). Herr D. wird mittels so genannter „Organpflege“ bzw. „Spenderkonditionierung“ noch weiter in seinen Vitalfunktionen erhalten. Er wird respiratorisch beatmet und im Kreislauf durch Flüssigkeitszufuhr stabilisiert. Auf dem OP-Tisch verabreicht ein Anästhesist Herrn D. eine, wie er sagt, sanfte Narkose. Zur Vermeidung von motorischen Explantationsreaktionen wird Herr D. sediert und festgurgelt. Die motorischen Äußerungen bei Hirntoten werden im Fachjargon als *spinalmotorische Schablonen* bezeichnet und gehen nach aktuellem Wissensstand auf verbliebene Rückenmarksfunktionen zurück. Sie imponieren wie Schmerzäußerungen, werden aber vom Transplantationssteam nicht als solche bewertet.

3 Das Pflegepersonal ist überein gekommen, mit Apallikern auf eine Weise umzugehen, als ob sie ansprechbar wären und hören, sehen und verstehen könnten. Es kommt zu einem imaginären Diskurs zwischen Pflegenden und Apallikern. Diese Als-ob-Beziehung ist durch einfühlsame Monologe der Pflegenden und quantitativ wechselnde Schleimproduktion sowie motorische Äußerungen der Apalliker geprägt. Der Pflegenden imaginieren die Person, die ein Apalliker ursprünglich war, kraft seiner Vorstellungsgabe.

Während Maria B.'s Waschung fasst die Schwester deren motorische Signale als Zeichen einer Interaktion auf. Vermehrte Schleimproduktion, Lidzucken, Wenden des Kopfes und ähnliche Phänomene werden von der Schwester als willentliche Äußerungen, und nicht als unwillkürliche Automatismen, interpretiert. Maria B. wird als jemand verstanden, der vieles hört und wahrnimmt, sich jedoch nicht auf gewohnte Weise äußern kann. Die Schwester stellt sich den „Normalzustand der Kommunikation“ vor. Sie führt einen Dialog mit Maria B., so, als ob deren physiologische Veränderungen Antworten

wären. Das krachende Geräusch des Tracheostomas wechselt in Geschwindigkeit und Lautstärke, was als Ausdruck von Emotionen verstanden wird.

In der Pflegeinformation findet sich die Eintragung, dass bei Anna C. gelegentlich eine Träne zu beobachten sei. Die Schwester läßt in der Notiz offen, ob es etwas zu bedeuten habe. Sie merkt an, nicht beurteilen zu können, ob die Träne „Ausdruck von Gefühlen“ oder „rein physiologisch“ zu begründen sei.

4 Nach dem Hirntodkriterium, das seit dem Adhoc-Beschluss des Harvard-Komitees 1968 den Todeszeitpunkt mit dem unumkehrbaren Stammhirnausfall bestimmt, sind Menschen nach irreversiblen Stammhirnausfall auch bei künstlicher Beatmung als Tote zu betrachten. De facto läßt sich Herr D in seinen Fähigkeiten jedoch kaum von großhirngeschädigten Apallikern wie Maria B. und Anna C. unterscheiden.

5 Wie die Feldstudien deutlich machen, werden komatöse Apalliker, die nach einem in Amerika bereits geforderten „Großhirntodkriterium“ als tot gelten würden, dank ihrer aufrechtgebliebenen Stammhirntätigkeit weiter als personale Wesen betrachtet und vom Pflegepersonal namentlich angesprochen. „Klassischen Hirntoten“ wie Herrn D kommt das Recht, als Personen angesehen und als solche um ihrer selbst willen medizinisch betreut zu werden, als Konsequenz der Hirntodkonvention abhanden, wengleich es beiden Komatösen gleichermaßen an personalen Fähigkeiten, wie sie von Bioethikern angeführt werden, mangelt. Hier setzt das „Unumkehrbarkeitsargument“ zur Verteidigung des Hirntodkriteriums gegenüber dem Großhirntodkriterium an und besagt, der Hirntote könne nie wieder zu Bewusstsein kommen.

6 Der in den Feldstudien beobachtete unterschiedliche Umgang des Pflegepersonals mit komatösen Apallikern („Herr X, ich werde Sie jetzt absaugen“) und komatösen Hirntoten (-), bei ähnlichen Pflegemaßnahmen, ist nach Aussage eines Intensivstationsleiters pragmatisch motiviert, um sich die Würde der Komapatienten vor Augen zu halten, und ferner, um einem slippery-slope-Effekt vorzubeugen, wie er seit eugenischen Maßnahmen rasch als Umsichgreifen zusehends aufgeweichter Todesdefinitionen befürchtet wird. Würden Hirntote wie Herr D in den Status von „Quasi-Personen“ versetzt und namentlich angesprochen, wären die Legalisierung des Hirntodkriteriums und damit verbundene Maßnahmen als grobe Verletzung der Menschenwürde zu betrachten. So haben Hirntote den rechtlichen Status von Sektionsleichen.

7 Manche hängen einer „Äquivalenzdoktrin“ an, wonach die Begriffe Mensch und Person äquivalent gesetzt werden. Wären alle Menschen Personen, und existierte kein semantischer Unterschied zwischen den Begriffen „Mensch“ und „Person“, wären Hirntote als Angehörige unserer Species so lange als „Quasi-Personen“ zu betrachten und durch Zuschreibung mit Rechten zu versehen, bis ihr maschinell erhaltenes menschliches Leben beendet wäre. Es gäbe keine Unterscheidung zwischen „personal“ und „menschlich“, der Dualismus wäre aufgehoben. Zumindest in der westlichen Kultur stellt der Personbegriff jedoch ein „nomen dignitatis“ dar und wird mit dem Begriff der Würde in Zusammenhang gesetzt. Schon der common sense verwendet „Mensch“

und „Person“ unterschiedlich. Aus dem Gesagten ergibt sich die Schwierigkeit, den Personbegriff gegenüber dem Menschenbegriff semantisch abzugrenzen.

8 An die bisherigen Überlegungen anknüpfend, stellen wir folgende Fragen:

Erstens, auf welche Teilmenge innerhalb unserer Species trifft aus bioethischer Sicht der Personbegriff zu - wenn Menschsein nicht per se Personsein heißt - und auf welche Menge von Menschen nicht? Letzteres würde weiterer Argumente bedürfen, die eine Aberkennung bzw. ein Verblässen des Personstatus menschlicher Lebewesen begründen.

Peter Singer nennt das Fehlen von Interessen/Präferenzen bei nur bewussten Lebewesen, wie Säuglingen, aber auch Komatösen wie Maria B., Anna C. und Herrn D. Gemäß Singers präferenzutilitaristischem Denken kommt Personalität allein selbstbewussten Wesen zu, die für die Zukunft Pläne haben und ein Interesse an der Fortsetzung ihres Lebens. Er vertritt einen Antispeciesmus, wonach auch höhere Säugetiere Personen sein können.

Die zweite Frage betrifft praktische Konsequenzen eines so entstehenden graduellen Personbegriffs, wobei im Falle eines Verblässens von Personalität ebenso die traditionellen Werte wie die Würde der Person und ihr unbedingtes Lebensrecht an Schärfe verlieren und bei mangelnder Kontrolle die Gefahr der Instrumentalisierung von Menschen zunimmt.

9 In Bezug auf die Situation von Maria B., Anna C., aber auch von künstlich am Leben erhaltenen hirntoten Organ Spendern wie Herrn D fragen wir, welche Eigenschaften gemäß der adaptierten Bioethik-Konvention als Indikatoren für Personalität und das Innehaben von Rechten und menschlicher Würde gelten. Anders gefragt: Was entscheidet über Aufstieg und Fall der Person? Warum kommt großhirngeschädigten Apallikern wie in den ersten beiden Fallbeispielen noch Menschenwürde zu, während Herr D trotz allem Anschein nach entsprechender Verfassung in narkotisiertem Zustand im Interesse anderer seiner Organe entledigt wird?

Viele Autoren führen eine ganze Liste von Indikatoren für Personalität an. Prinzipiell unterschieden werden kognitive und moralische Fähigkeiten. Daraus ergibt sich die Frage, worum es sich bei menschlichen Wesen handelt, die diese Merkmale *noch nicht, überhaupt nicht* oder *nicht mehr* haben. In allen Fallbeispielen handelt es sich um unautonome Menschen bzw. um Menschen, die aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach (Maria B., Anna C.) bzw. mit Gewissheit (Herr D) bleibend als nicht selbstbestimmungs- und einwilligungsfähig gelten. Maria B., Anna C. und Herr D weisen aktuell keine kognitiven und moralischen Fähigkeiten auf. Sie können gemäß einem in Fähigkeiten gründenden Personkonzept nicht als Personen betrachtet werden, wobei die Apallikerinnen dennoch weiterhin durch Zuschreibung von außen „Quasi-Personen“ sind, um deren Wert und Würde zu achten. Herr D hingegen, dessen für die vegetativen Funktionen zuständiges Stammhirn irreversibel ausfiel, entbehrt jeder Personalität, obwohl er sich äußerlich von Maria B. und Anna C. nicht unterscheidet.

10 Wir stellen fest: Der in der Bioethik etablierte Personbegriff entfernt sich vom christlichen Dogma der Unantastbarkeit menschlichen Lebens und dessen

intrinsicem Wert (vgl. Verlautbarungen des Apostolischen Stuhls 1995, S. 66).

An die Stelle des Menschen, dem nach christlichem Denken bereits im Stadium der Zygote personale Rechte, wie ein Recht auf Respekt vor dem Leben und ein Recht auf Respekt vor der Autonomie zukommen, tritt ein Homo sapiens, dessen Persönlichkeit im Laufe seines Lebens unterschiedliche Grade durchläuft. Das christliche Personkonzept postuliert eine Leib-Seele-Dichotomie, wobei die Seele nicht als Funktion des Organismus gedacht wird, sondern als vom Körper distinkte Entität. (vgl. ebda, S. 7)

Auch das cartesianische Personkonzept unterscheidet die *Res extensa*, den zusammengesetzten Leib, von der *Res cogitans*, einer einfachen Substanz, die unabhängig vom Körper existiert (vgl. Descartes 1986, S. 189)

Wie bereits erwähnt wurde, konstituiert sich Singers Person aus der Fähigkeit, Interessen zu haben, Pläne zu schmieden, sich als distinkte Entität in der Zeit, mit einem Vorher und Nachher, zu begreifen. Aus Präferenzen leitet Singer Rechte ab, die nach christlicher Auffassung jedem Menschen, egal ob Person oder Nichtperson, zukommen.

Der aus dem christlichen Humanismus herrührende intrinsische Wert, die Würde, Heiligkeit und Unantastbarkeit jedweden menschlichen Lebens (vgl. Verlautbarungen des Apostolischen Stuhls 1995, 66 ff), als Grundausstattungen der Species Mensch, verlieren unter dem Eindruck biotechnologischer Möglichkeiten zusehends an Tragkraft. Wie kann auch angesichts von Zugriffen auf biologisch am Leben erhaltene Menschen wie Herrn D, die bekanntlich seit der Hirntodkonvention als Tote gelten und sich in ihren Fähigkeiten fast nicht von Apallikern wie Maria B. und Anna C. unterscheiden lassen, noch von Heiligkeit und Unantastbarkeit gesprochen werden?

11 Wir stellen fest: Gemäß einem bioethischen Personkonzept, für das Personalität im Besitz von bestimmten kognitiven und moralischen Fähigkeiten gründet, fallen die oben genannten Angehörigen unserer Species von vornherein aus den Erwägungen um Personen. Ihnen kommen auch nicht die Personen vorbehaltenen Rechte und Schutzmaßnahmen zu. Zu diesem Punkt gibt es verschiedene Vorschläge, wie man angesichts der gegebenen Unterschiede zwischen Menschen die für alle Beteiligten bestmögliche Lösung erzielen kann, auf die ich in diesem Rahmen nicht näher eingehen.

12 Warum sollte ein Apalliker als Person mit Rechten betrachtet und als „Quasi-Person“ imaginiert werden, während ein Hirntoter - trotz ähnlichen Zustandsbildes - als in den Vitalfunktionen erhaltener Toter gilt?

Gegner eines Großhirntodkriteriums argumentieren, dem schweren Apalliker sei gegenüber einem Stammhirntoten aus dem einfachen Grund der Vorzug zu geben, weil er dank seines funktionierenden Stammhirns noch selbständig zu atmen vermöge und sein Bewusstsein immerhin *potentiell* wiederlangen könne.

Die Gewissheit der Unumkehrbarkeit des Verlustes aller lebensnotwendigen Fähigkeiten nach dem Stammhirntod ist, was die Harvard-Kommission dazu verleitet haben mag, einen durch künstliche Unterstützung

am Leben erhaltenen Organismus von der Person, der dieser Organismus gehört hat und die nun als verstorben gilt, mit Beschluss der Hirntodkonvention abzuspalten. Derjenige von zwei Komatösen, bei dem gesichert ist, daß seine Fähigkeit zur Integration und zentralen Steuerung seiner Körperfunktionen unumkehrbar verloren ist, gilt als tot. Der Komatöse mit „Großhirntod“ (Maria B., Anna C.), der in der Literatur auch unter dem Schlagwort „Teilhirtod“ dokumentiert ist, wird mit Wert und Würde versehen. Ihm werden personale Qualitäten in *potentia* zugeschrieben, solange sein Stammhirn nicht zu arbeiten aufgehört hat.

13 Wie erwähnt, werden komatöse Apalliker vom Pflegepersonal namentlich angesprochen, um sich ihren Wert und ihre Würde vor Augen zu halten. Das heißt, daß die Fähigkeit des Apallikers zu selbständiger Atmung ihn gegenüber dem Hirntoten in einen moralischen Status hebt. Selbst wenn es sich um einen schweren Apalliker wie in den genannten Fallbeispielen handelt, dem es faktisch an denselben Fähigkeiten mangelt wie einem Hirntoten. Also können es nicht die verlorenen Fähigkeiten sein, die dem Hirntoten Wert und Würde rauben. Es ist vielmehr die Gewissheit, daß er sie niemals wiedererlangt, die dazu verführt, ihn für tot zu erklären. Bei mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit „hoffnungslosen Apallikern“ werden, so zeigen die Feldstudien, Infektionen häufig als schicksalhaft betrachtet und in Form von passiver Euthanasie unbehandelt hingenommen.

14 Die bisher gewonnenen Einsichten sind: In der Personfrage ist für das naturalistische Gros der Bioethiker die neurophysiologische Funktionstüchtigkeit der Hauptindikator für Personalität. Auf diese Weise verschwindet der Leib-Seele-Dualismus aus dem Denken, und wird der Mensch als Person auf seine physikalischen Eigenschaften reduziert. Als Folge dieses physikalischen Reduktionismus verlieren auch schon die Apallikerinnen Mara B. und Anna C. als Angehörige unserer Species den vormals christlich gesicherten Personstatus. Vor dem Hintergrund eines physikalischen/zerbebrozentristischen Personkonzeptes endet Personalität mit dem Abbruch der höheren Hirntätigkeit, unabhängig davon, ob der menschliche Organismus noch lebt oder nicht.

Im Zuge der Feldstudien ließ ein Neurochirurg die Bemerkung fallen, dass einem Laien zwar alles, was im Zuge operativer Eingriffe am Gehirn geschehe, rein physikalisch zu erklären sei. Doch spielten noch andere Faktoren mit, gemeint waren „nicht physikalische“, die dem Laien unvorstellbar seien. Mit anderen Worten sind wir nicht nur die Summe aus physikalischen Konstituenten, sondern mehr. Was dieses „Mehr“ an uns ist, kann in einer physikalisch orientierten Welt nur angedeutet werden. Dieses „Mehr“ ist wie das „Ichbewusstsein“ transzendent und für den radikalen Naturalisten ein metaphysisches Hirngespinnst. Im Gegensatz zu einem christlich-dualistischen Personkonzept, das menschlichem Leben einen unbedingten Wert und Schutzwürdigkeit, und jedem Menschen Würde und unveräußerliche Rechte, wie ein Recht auf Leben und ein Recht auf Autonomie, einräumt, ebnet ein in Fähigkeiten fundiertes Personkonzept Verrohungseffekten und der Instrumentalisierung von Menschen den Weg.

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
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