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Papers

Kulturen: Streit-Analyse-Dialog

Cultures: Conflict-Analysis-Dialogue

Kulturen: Konflikt-Analyse-Dialog Cultures: Conflict-Analysis-Dialogue

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Egoism, Coexistence, and the Possibility of Altruism: A Rortyan Failure

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Utopian literature has made us accustomed to imagining ideal worlds where harmony between individuals was the main characteristic in human relationships, and life was seen at its happiest. This “search for paradise” has been a usual longing in the history of humankind, and it has guided all of the reflections about the best possible model of society. Nevertheless, the harshness of facts has shown the enormous difficulties in carrying out utopian projects, and the tragic experiences of 20th century have seriously questioned the plausibility, and indeed the meaning, of such projects.

The Bible, the book of Genesis, in its chapter on the “fall”, has probably had an influence as no other book has had to formulate our conception of human condition, stressing its weakness and, because of it, its need for redemption. From this departure from paradise there have been many nostalgic attempts to regain such a “Golden Age”. Those attempts have shown the enormous gap between human aspirations and their possibilities of fulfilment. In my opinion, the key question has been the discussion of evil, and of the relationship between evil and human freedom. This paper tries to make a brief analysis of the concepts *altruism* and *egoism*, discussing them from the perspective of Richard Rorty’s antifoundationalism, to see to what extent it cannot answer some questions concerning the human condition.

The Christian (basically the Catholic) conception of the human being presents it as a weakened being, with a sort of tendency to choose evil. Such evil is considered according to the criteria of a religion whose axis is an Absolute Being who is going to judge our deeds and intentions. The idea that we have the possibility to choose evil has been the point of departure of all political and moral reflections concerning how to give shape to models of coexistence where such possibility has been reduced to a minimum. Moral evil is something related to relationships between individuals. We will focus our attention on the idea of egoism.

As a matter of fact, we all seek to maximize our happiness in one way or another, and we consider such maximization as the permanent attainment of our goals. But in this search we collide with the aspirations of other human beings, who – by definition – want their own happiness as well. This shock is what usually urges us to design conditions for our relationships, and makes duties and obligations arise.

This is what puts the existence of egoism – and the question about what place it has in human behaviour – at the centre of our discussion. Notwithstanding, there seems to be reasons to justify a basic deeply rooted altruism, with clear biological connotations: the relationship between a mother and her children, for instance. Nevertheless, this altruism unfortunately has many counter-examples, and it is of no special use to characterize the human condition. Richard Rorty has pointed out on different occasions that such a concept of human condition is vacuous, whereas essentialism is in complete disagreement with his pragmatist point of view. In this paper, I will try to argue that the existence of a basic tendency to egoism is an inherent part of the human condition.

David Gauthier is the author of an already classic study on egoism titled: “The Incomplete Egoist” (Gauthier 1998). Here he shows the scope of practical rationality when we try to maximize utility. As a rule, it seems that we cooperate when we are expecting others to do the same. When the case is just the opposite, when there is no expectation of reciprocity, we reconsider if our strategy has to bear in mind the benefits to other individuals. We bear this in mind when such considerations allow us to guarantee, one way or another, our highest benefit, be it in specific achievements or satisfactions, or to stop the actions of others that can have negative repercussions on us. To bear in mind the interests of others – contrary to what Gauthier says in his article – can be a strategic element for the egoist.

It is true that he/she looks at them taking his/her own values as a basis, but this is something fundamental to defining him/her as an egoist. The egoist is one who assumes that values can only be relative to agents, and that contacts with other individuals’ reasons are merely strategic. He/she is the one who estimates that all of his/her actions must produce his/her own benefit, and – by definition – in an exclusive mood. The inconvenience for an egoist is that many times he/she may not know the results of his/her initiatives, given that he/she can lack the appropriate orientation to make his/her choice. But if this circumstance makes the egoist have such conduct that can be considered altruist, he/she does it indeed because it is the best strategy from which he/she can keep on looking for his/her interests, by other means.

That the egoist cannot fulfill all of his/her demands is something obvious. As egoist we see he/she who only thinks of his/herself or, better, he/she who in the end tries to achieve only his/her own interests and aspirations. It is quite rare to see examples of a radical egoist, but this does not deny the tendency – we all just have to look at ourselves. So better than a strict definition (that we can be defined just as egoists) we can talk of a deeply rooted tendency towards egoism; a tendency that becomes stressed in propitious situations. To see to what extent this is so, we could imagine a man/woman whom from the very beginning of his/her life had been allowed to do his/her own will without restrictions.

The possibility of pure altruism seems, therefore, to be called in question. The justification of altruism could in principle come from the biological need to cooperate. But this would still be indirectly justifying the individual disposition to personal benefit that characterizes the egoist. In this sense, we can distinguish between *strong* egoism and *weak* egoism, which is compatible with some cases of altruism. It is true that to have a disposition for altruism we depart from concrete societies – social contexts which codify the meaning of that word – or from the knowledge of personal circumstances of those individuals who, one way or another, we know. But I agree with Th. Nagel (Nagel 2004) on the idea that we need to go from the concrete to the abstract to have a really altruistic disposition. At this point it may be good to draw a distinction between *weak* altruism and *strong* altruism. The first one would be circumscribed to the generosity with

which we treat those people close to us: our family, friends, etc.; the place where according to Rorty we make up our initial loyalties. In this personalized area of affections it is quite easy for us to cede parts of our innermost interests. So, manifestations of generosity are easier. The case of the mother who nurses her child is similar to that of the father who does not eat in order to breed his children. This altruism may have a primary interest for survival, but it can be justified by the value it has within the singular-personalized relationship, that is – so to speak – “one to one”. But to extrapolate this basic altruism is highly complicated. In a certain sense, it would be useful to employ the mimetic attitude by means of which we go from singular/particular experiences with singular/particular individuals, with their related commitments, to those – not close – individuals who we have to face personally throughout our life. This assimilation can certainly be simple, but it still requires a certain degree of abstraction or, at least, the projection of what is familiar to us to individuals who have many areas of their lives unknown to us.

There remain many other human groups with which we lack any kind of sympathy, intimacy, proximity or whatever circumstances that could justify our solidarity towards them. It is in these cases where I would use the term *strong altruism*. How can we act for the interest of people we do not know and we will probably never know? What sense does generosity towards future generations make? The question is not a rhetorical one if we take into account that the world they will live is but our legacy.

In those cases where there is closeness – relative closeness – we can easily put ourselves in the place of others in order to project our affections, emotions, and passions onto them. But in those of *strong altruism* we need to transform such a projection into an abstract concept. This is what allows us to treat as other “us”, or Kantian “ends-in-themselves” to those individuals to whom we will never know, but will be affected by the consequences of our actions and decisions. This is what justifies values being objective. In the case of *strong altruism* the need for such objectivity is unavoidable, because particular benefits – or benefit for particulars – are quite diffuse. But also because we recognize as objective reasons, that is, as valid reasons for anybody those who support our personal –individual – action, in so far as we project our particular conditions in a concept: if we want to remain alive and enjoy an inhabitable world, the same will happen to those beings we can consider as humans. We would project our ideal of dignity – of our dignity – on merely conceptual human beings (to say this is just the same as talking about the concept “human individual”).

Nevertheless, nothing of this sort would be acceptable for R. Rorty. The contingency of the self can basically be seen in the fact that “self” is a hollow word. We are beings of historic nature, and we can only deal with things historically, that is, in a contingent way. That makes us open to an ongoing reconstruction of our self-perception. Rorty calls this process *redescription*. With this there is nothing decisive or definitive; which makes clear the radicality of human liberty. In my opinion, this proposal would leave aside the problem of *blame*, given that responsibility and the meaning of human actions would remain circumscribed to contextual demands; to the context where redescription takes place. This is so at least in principle, assuming that the redescription is not conditioned beforehand. So, the process of redescription may have no limits, and our descendants could become extremely different from us (Rorty 2005, p.102). We can

imagine that we cannot imagine them, and that their criteria to choose would be extremely distinct, but still there would be certain commitments we could not avoid by the fact that we cannot imagine that which we cannot imagine. Granted that human beings change a lot by means of their redescrptions, we will never imagine them as absolutely different from us. There will be always a basic model with which we can identify them or assimilate them to us. This is the concept we need. If, as Rorty says (Rorty 2005, p.68) our responsibility is confined to our present interlocutors, who easily can take part in the semantic context where our identity as well as its modifications are forged, it is of no use to assume it in front of those who are not – as such – our interlocutors, unless we would be talking of an ideal interlocution. In fact, given that we cannot know them, to try cooperation or to get to an intersubjective agreement with them would be nonsense.

Besides, if – as Rorty says – the concept of moral evil is reviewable (Rorty 2000a, p.38), there are no reasons to demand a commitment from us with them, due to the fact that there exists no obligation beyond the lexicon we are using in a concrete moment – or time. There is no moral knowledge, given that there are no moral concepts as such. All we have is moral action and the circumstantial responsibility attached to it: rightness or wrongness in what we say is thus related to specific times and places (Rorty 2000b, p.84).

To a certain extent this contradicts what Hans Jonas has called “the Principle of Responsibility” (*Das Prinzip Verantwortung*), according to which our responsibility goes beyond the demands of respect for our fellow contemporaries, reaching those individuals from coming generations, whose value as ends-in-themselves is demanding from us the assumption of some moral obligations. But the lack of Rortyan proposals concerning strong altruism does not end here. These have to do with the consideration of the different degrees in closeness with those individuals who are contemporary to us. If taking care of others is but the projection of those conditions by means of which the links between close individuals develop, we will not be able to sufficiently transfer our version of identity. This is what makes useless those universal aspirations of moral idealism. But this is prejudging whom we are ready to help. Many will be excluded as well. If, in the last instance, as Rorty says, to talk about moral obligations we have to take into account the available resources and goods (Rorty 1998, p.106), it is impossible for the discourse on global justice or on a feeling of generosity that allows – encourages – the redistribution of wealth to end with misery in the world.

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A Naturalistic Method for Therapy not for Science

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Wittgenstein's interest in the connection of language games and forms of life as has often been rightly interpreted as "anthropologism". However, this characterization doesn't help us understand the goal of his philosophical analysis. On the contrary, it seems to make such an understanding harder, for we expect his philosophical work to bring forth anthropological statements. But, as is well known, this is not the case. Wittgenstein rejects all confusion of philosophy with empirical or philosophical anthropology. What then is anthropologism for? I would like to show that Wittgenstein's anthropologism can be put in the proper perspective if it is seen as an attempt to deal with the complex phenomenon of language from a naturalistic viewpoint. For Wittgenstein, our ways of classifying things or languages have become "become [second] nature to us" (BPP II 678) so that the method which makes it possible for us to represent or describe them will itself be naturalistic.

1. Beginning in the thirties, Wittgenstein's anthropological turn takes two distinct directions: on the one hand, the analysis of language is given an anthropological twist; on the other hand, Wittgenstein directly engages with anthropology in the narrow (and conventional) sense in his reflections on Frazer's *Golden Bough*. Here I will not be dealing with these latter thoughts, as I believe that they depend on Wittgenstein's adoption of an anthropological standpoint in philosophy. I would like to show that there is a deep connection between such a standpoint and the therapeutic purpose of Wittgenstein's philosophical activity.

According to Dale Jacquette, Wittgenstein's anthropologism consists in (1) the discovery of a plurality of different kinds of words and propositions, as opposed to the *Tractatus*' semantic reductionism; (2) frequent references to the organic, historical and cultural nature of language as a developing body of linguistic practices or language games; (3) the crucial role of the pragmatic concept of a language game as an activity internal to a *form of life* (Jacquette 1999: 168; see 1998). Anthropologism carries out the program outlined in the first few pages of *Blue Book*, bringing the question „What is meaning?“ back to earth. We could also say that it shapes the enterprise that is outlined in *Philosophical Investigations*, 107, going back "to the rough ground", regaining the "friction" that was lost in the attempted inquiry into "the crystalline purity of logic".

2. However, characterizing Wittgenstein's philosophy in anthropological terms does not make it easier to understand it: on the contrary, it seems to complicate such an understanding. The nature of philosophical inquiry is not made any clearer, for alongside the adoption of an anthropological standpoint we find the explicit rejection of all identification of philosophy with anthropology, and a definite and declared lack of interest in everything that professional anthropologists are usually interested in. If we use the ethnological approach does that mean we are saying philosophy is ethnology? No it only means we are taking up our position far outside, in order to see the things *more objectively*. (CV 45e)

Because of the frequent reference to the intertwining of language games and forms of life, the reader is led to the false expectation that sooner or later truths will be

stated, either empirical or philosophical, concerning the relation of language and forms of life. In this respect, however, he is bound to be disappointed: Wittgenstein clearly declares that the kind of philosophy he is up to does not set itself the task of stating truths, be they empirical or philosophical (i.e., metaphysical). Thus, there are interpreters¹ who take issue with Wittgenstein for not fully understanding the value of his own references to the natural and cultural features that go together with the use of language, i.e., the features that are supposed to define the anthropological standpoint.

3. Wittgenstein's interest in the relation of language and forms of life is regarded (1) either as an attempt at a pragmatic or praxeological grounding of language. As Jacquette points out, what is outstanding in the later Wittgenstein's treatment of language and language games is his aiming at an extra-semantic – pragmatic or praxeological – foundation of language use within a form of life; or (2) as an exploration of the transcendental conditions for the possibility of language, thought and rationality (as with such transcendentalist interpreters as Williams 1974 and Lear 1986). Now, I do not wish to rule out that either reading of the anthropological standpoint may be possible or philosophically fruitful. However, neither interpretation can account for Wittgenstein's explicit claims concerning the nature of philosophy, that it does not generate discoveries or produce explanations (PI 126), be they causal, historical, or metaphysical. That philosophical truths should be stated does not agree with philosophy's therapeutic point, i.e., with the suggestion that philosophical problems should disappear thanks to the achievement of a clearer view of language (PI 133).

4. By contrast, the therapeutic point of Wittgenstein's philosophy is accounted for in John McDowell's "quietist" interpretation of anthropologism (McDowell 1992). For McDowell, Wittgenstein does not mean to take programmatic steps toward some style of positive philosophy just because he mentions customs or forms of life. Wittgenstein's remark "What has to be accepted, the given, is – so one could say – *forms of life*" (PI II p.226) is not to be interpreted as a "philosophical response ... to supposedly good questions about the possibility of meaning and understanding, or intentionality generally"; instead, "his point is to remind us that the natural phenomenon that is normal human life is itself already shaped by meaning and understanding" (McDowell 1992: 50-51).

However, if Wittgenstein had wanted to say that there is a natural phenomenon, normal human life, which is imbued with meaning and understanding, one, wonders why he did not say so in so many words. Again, McDowell's "quietist" interpretation has Wittgenstein say either too little or too much. Too much, if the very general notion of "normal human life" (McDowell) is unqualifiedly assumed as the locus where therapeutic efforts converge or as an unproblematic notion on which we all agree. For if the notion's features and range of application are not specified, how could it fail to be just another metaphysical notion (some kind of foundation or transcendental limit)?

¹ As a rule, this criticism is raised by naturalistic interpreters such as Conway 1989, Pears 1995.

On the other hand, Wittgenstein is made to say too little if normal human life is assumed to be an empirical phenomenon that could be described from some standpoint; once more, we are unable to explain why Wittgenstein did not devote himself to such a description.

5. False expectations and illegitimate interpretations can both be avoided if we pay full attention to Wittgenstein's explicitly paradoxical presentation of his anthropologism. I have in mind the text in the *Investigations* where Wittgenstein declares, on the one hand, that he is interested in "the correspondence between concepts and very general facts of nature", while insisting that, on the other hand, his interest "does not fall back upon these possible causes of the formation of concepts", as "we are not doing natural science; nor yet natural history" (PI II xii, p.230).²

If anthropologism is not meant to provide a scientific or philosophical foundation for language uses, nor meant to ground the identification of philosophy with anthropology, why does Wittgenstein adopt it? My view is that anthropologism is an essential ingredient of the kind of methodological naturalism that Wittgenstein conceived and endorsed in the post-*Tractatus* years. Dealing with philosophical problems from an anthropological standpoint amounts to adopting a naturalistic method in the investigation of the logic of language – a method that could be applied independently of any *theory* of language. For Wittgenstein, this is the solution to the problem of the legitimacy of philosophical inquiry, which, even after *Tractatus*, he is still conceiving of as an investigation of what is most fundamental, i.e., the logic of language. 'Fundamental' here is to be understood as not grounded upon anything else, as logic is, at any time, already active in common everyday language.

By 'naturalistic method' I mean the method of language games, from which analysis proceeds with everyday language (where logic is already effective), isolating parts of it – certain characteristic uses – and comparing them with other parts of the same everyday language, with other uses which are liable to generate conceptual misunderstandings. We know that Wittgenstein did not conceive of language games as preparatory studies to improve, refine or reform the language we have but only as terms of comparison, allowing us to highlight similarities and differences among our concepts in order to achieve a clear, perspicuous view (PI 130).

There are at least three reasons why I call this method 'naturalistic'. First of all, to start with everyday language (or with parts of it, the language games) is to remain on the "rough ground" of use; it is to look at language as "part of the human organism and ... no less complicated than it", as Wittgenstein had already suggested we should do in *Tractatus* 4.002. Secondly, I call the method 'naturalistic' on account of the *Preface* to the *Investigations* where Wittgenstein points out that what looked essential to him in composing his book was that "the thoughts should proceed from one subject to another in a natural order and without breaks" (PI, p.vii). Is Wittgenstein suggesting that nature dictated to his thinking the correct path to follow in philosophical inquiry? What could that mean? The answer can be found in *Zettel* 355³,

where a distinction is made between two different uses of 'natural': in one use it alludes to facts of nature (such as facts about the psychophysical constitution of human beings), while in another use it refers to what comes natural to us after having been trained to follow a rule. In the latter use the word is synonymous with 'usual', 'obvious', 'common'. Adopting the method of language games amounts to embracing a natural method for the description of the phenomenon of language, for language games are constituted by the rules we got used to follow, so that they have become "nature" to us:

"We're used to a particular classification of things. With language, or languages, it has become [second] nature to us". (RPP II 678)

"These are the fixed rails along which all our thinking runs, and so our judgement and action goes according to them too" (RPP II 679). [Z 375].

That the method of philosophy is naturalistic is not inconsistent with its employing acquired forms of linguistic behavior as tools for its comparative practice, for they have become "nature" for us. A philosopher who embraces such a method is thus not bound to be interested in re-establishing something that would be natural in the sense of belonging to physical or biological nature as distinct from the realm of the artificial, or culture. In fact, Wittgenstein has no use for this distinction. In adopting the method, the philosopher is just equipping himself with tools (the language games) and a standpoint (the anthropological standpoint) from which description is to be carried out.

Thirdly, I call the method 'naturalistic' for it is derived from a method that was conceived and applied in biology since the 18th century in the study of the forms and transformations of living beings. It is a comparative method, focussing on the forms and functions of the parts of animals and plants; it originated from the discipline called 'morphology', a necessary condition for the development of Darwinian evolutionary theory (Richards 2002: 522). As is well known, Wittgenstein was well acquainted with the works of one of the creators of the naturalistic or morphological method, J. W. Goethe. Here there is no room to go into the many significant connections between Wittgenstein's thought and Goethe's. Wittgenstein's writings testify to his uninterrupted intellectual exchange with and reflection upon Goethe's method (Schulte 1990, Andronico 1999, McGuinness 2002).

6. Going back to anthropologism, we now understand why it did not lead to anthropological statements asserting anthropological truths. On the other hand, we may wonder whether anthropologism was *merely* functional to the adoption of Wittgenstein's methodological naturalism. The answer must be negative. Although Wittgenstein's focus on the anthropological dimension of language is no end in itself (so that it does not lead to the statement of anthropological truths), philosophical inquiry based upon the method of language games determines in its practitioners effects that are close to those of empirical investigations in anthropology, where the practice of intercultural comparison and contrast allow us to single out and describe the rules that others have given themselves as well as those that we have adopted and follow. An example could be Clifford Geertz's work: his style of doing anthropological research leads to the "acknowledgement of limits" (Geertz 2000: 137), i.e., to the "recognition of the fact that we are all [...] «positioned (or situated) observers»", who renounce "the authority that comes from

² A closely similar remark can be read in the *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* I, 46: "We are not pursuing a natural science; our aim is not to predict anything".

³ "If we teach a human being such-and-such a technique by means of examples, - that he then proceeds like *this* and not like *that* in a particular new case, or that in this case he gets stuck, and thus that this and not that is the 'natural' continuation for him: this of itself is an extremely important fact of nature" (Z 355).

«views from nowhere»" (Geertz 2000: 137). The effect of Wittgenstein's naturalistic method is similar; in his own words, it leads us to recognize the workings of our language in spite of an urge to misunderstand them (PI 109), i.e., in spite of an urge to hypostasize them by attributing them an authority emanating from nowhere.

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About Wittgenstein's mathematical epistemology

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How should we understand the notion of proof in Wittgenstein's philosophy? This is an important question because some philosophical ideas of Wittgenstein are found nowhere else in philosophy and mathematics, at least, in such an extreme form, among them the idea that proof is a purely mental construction. Many philosophical problems are related to this idea and we intend to discuss some of them.

First, let us briefly consider philosophical views of Wittgenstein on the questions of language and mind. In order to understand better Wittgenstein's epistemological ideas, it is necessary to take into account his identification of the limits of one's language with the limits of one's self.

Wittgenstein identifies the limits of our thinking with the limits of our language. In particular, it follows from his doctrines that the necessity of grammatical proposition has its source in our language.

The transcendent boundaries of my thinking are those of my language.

Wittgenstein asserts that since we cannot step outside of language, the limits of my language are the limits of my world.

Since the connection between language and the world cannot depend on me, we can speak of the world because there are already certain relations between language and the world.

So Wittgenstein asserts that necessities are present in our thoughts and in our language.

To arrive at a correct interpretation of Wittgenstein's epistemology it is necessary to compare Kant and Wittgenstein.

Kant and Wittgenstein agree in that the necessities of our thoughts about objects are the necessities which constitute the nature of these objects.

It is meant that objects have their source not in themselves, but in the nature of our thinking.

To Kant, space and time have in principle equal status. Space, the intuitive form of external sense, is the basis of pure geometry, time, the intuitive form of internal sense, must in similar way provide the foundation of arithmetic.

For Kant the limits of some metaphysical subject cannot be the same as the limits of one's actual thoughts.

For Wittgenstein the a priori necessary limits are the general limits of possible thoughts, the limits of language.

To be more accurate, Wittgenstein says that we cannot use language to get outside language. For Wittgenstein we cannot step outside of language and consider the world and language independently.

Along these lines Wittgenstein argues that thought in language cannot depend logically on non-verbal thought. So, non-verbal thought is somewhat unnecessary, but the main point is that it never can be logically necessary.

There is profound metaphysical question: if whatever we think can be expressed in a language, so there is no way to get beyond language. The only way of drawing the limits of a metaphysical subject is to identify them with the limits of its language. To say that Wittgenstein identified the metaphysical subject with a certain totality of propositions means that he identified it also with a certain totality of thoughts. The limits of the metaphysical subject cannot be the limits of one's actual thoughts, because there is nothing necessary about this limitation. For Wittgenstein the only necessary limits are the general limits of possible thoughts (the limits of language in general).

For many commentators it is the basis of Wittgenstein's solipsism. Wittgenstein acknowledges the truth in solipsism. Solipsism is correct, if we consider it as the opposite to certain forms of realism. We hold to it if we cannot know how the world appears in the language and in the experience independently from human perspectives.

The reality of the world manifests itself in language and experience.

Wittgenstein identified the metaphysical subject with the totality of one's language and the limits of language with the limits of the world. In "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" he says that the limits of the metaphysical subject are the limits of the world. "I am my world." (Wittgenstein 1922)

This aspect of his view is surely strange and far from tradition.

Some authors, e.g., (Dummet 1959), (Bernays 1959-60) considered Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics as an extreme form of constructivism.

For Wittgenstein valid mathematics is that which uses constructive proof methods. This doctrine in the philosophy of mathematics was defended by Brouwer.

Very important for Brouwer's view is the claim that mathematics is less a language than an activity of mind.

Many of Brouwer's comments suggest a very strong separation of thought from language. On the one hand, as one of the leaders of the significs movement (cf. Significs 1989); he was engaged in a project whose aim was to reform natural languages. The project relied on distinguishing various levels of natural language, each level presupposing another sort of extra-linguistic reality. Words that could be used for demagogical purposes were to be removed from the language and replaced by other words capable of expressing humanist values. On the other hand, he tried to consider the nature of linguistic phenomena in rather naive terms. The separation of thought from language leads to the charge that Brouwer's notion of intuition and the concept of meaning is solipsistic. We agree with this view. As Brouwer's view is solipsistic, we think it clearly deviates from the Kantian view of intuition.

Our thesis is that the dichotomy between the Realist and the Constructivist views which dominates the modern philosophy of mathematics is misleading. With time not only the doctrines but also what is considered as the opposites change.

Wittgenstein's approach is in a way transversal to both. What is essential to Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics is that philosophy is a descriptive activity. So the aim of the philosopher of mathematics is to understand mathematics as it is. It is no part of the philosopher's task to rewrite all or part of mathematics in new and better ways. The philosopher wants to describe mathematics, but needs to be careful to separate mathematics itself from the philosophy of mathematics.

For Wittgenstein philosophy and mathematics have nothing to say to one another. It would seem that no philosophical opinion could affect the procedures of the mathematicians.

Wittgenstein saw the distinction between mathematics itself, on one hand and what is said about mathematics, on the other, as being of fundamental philosophical importance.

Wittgenstein asserts in "Philosophical Investigations" (Wittgenstein 1956) that there are no mathematical propositions or truths.

Mathematics has its foundation in the activity of calculating.

Thus for Wittgenstein an empirical regularity lies behind a mathematical law.

The mathematical law does not assert what the regularity obtains.

Wittgenstein claims that what we are doing in mathematics is calculation. If we do not prove anything in logical sense, so no possibility of producing a logical contradiction does arise. It means that a calculus is consistent if we calculate in it. Indeed, no proof could tell us that "this calculus is inconsistent or consistent", because there is no calculus which itself can prove anything.

Wittgenstein emphasizes that the calculi which make up mathematics are extremely diverse and heterogeneous – what he calls the "motley" mathematics.

Wittgenstein insists that to accept a theorem is to adopt a new rule of language. It follows from the statement that our concepts cannot remain unchanged at the end of the proof. For an intuitionist, every natural number is either prime or composite. So we have a method for deciding whether this number is prime or not. But Wittgenstein argues that we do not have reliable method even to construct the numbers.

Wittgenstein's main reason for denying the objectivity of mathematical truth is his denial of the objectivity of proof in mathematics, his idea is that a proof does not compel acceptance.

This idea is closely connected with Wittgenstein's doctrine that the meaning is the use.

Wittgenstein's constructivism is seen as a much more restricted kind than Brouwer's intuitionism.

It seems that Wittgenstein is a strict finitist, because he held that the only comprehensible and valid kind of proof in mathematics takes the form of intuitively clear manipulations with concrete objects.

Developing further Brouwer's views Heyting asserts (cf. Heyting 1974) that proofs are mental constructions with fulfillments of intensions.

Heyting explained mathematical propositions as expressions of intentions, «intensions» none only refer to the states of affairs thought to exist independently of us but also to the experiences thought to be possible.

Martin-Löf's views in this are similar to Heyting's.

Martin-Löf asserts that a proof is not an object, but an act, (cf. Martin-Löf, 1996).

So a proof is a cognitive act or a process before it is an object, an act or a process in which we come to see or grasp something intuitively.

Also Martin-Löf's system of intuitionistic type theory uses four basic forms of judgment, among which are the two that «S is a proposition» and «a is a proof (construction) of the proposition S». Martin-Löf notes that we can read these, equivalently, as «S is an intention» and «a is a method of fulfilling the intention S». Thus, we can understand his system as a formalization of the informal concepts of intentionality, intuition and evidence.

Let us now turn briefly to Dummett's views, because Dummett has a very original and interesting view on problems of the philosophical basis of proof.

Dummett, who agrees with Wittgenstein on the role of language in mathematics, believes there is no way to approach the question about proof independently of investigation in the philosophy of language.

Dummett contrasts his view with the position that the meaning of proposition is determined by its truth conditions.

For Dummett only the use of language determines the meaning of an individual statement. One of the things that disappears with the idea of mental acts and processes in Dummett's approach is the philosophical objection to the form of intuitionism based on solipsism. But we shall argue that Dummett goes too far here. Dummett's account of intuitionism contains no theory of intentionality, fulfilled intentions and evidence. He suggests no theory of mathematicians as cognitive information "processors", the cognitive structure of mental acts and meaning of mental representations and the like. We think that if the proof is really to be understood as either a cognitive act or as an objectification of an act then these notions must figure in our understanding of the philosophical basis of intuition.

Thus it is clear that the philosophical basis of intuitionistic mathematics is best understood along the lines suggested by Heyting's investigations. So according to the views of intuitionists, the main source of intuitionistic mathematics and criterion of the validity of its constructions is intuition. Conclusions of intuitionistic mathematics are not obtained by precisely established rules which could be united in a logical system. On the contrary evidence of any separate conclusion is considered directly. The essence of the mathematical proof consists not in logical conclusions and in design of mathematical systems. It is obvious that mathematical activity is defined not with language and logic but as constructive activity of pure thinking. Proceeding from the position that the intuitionistic mathematics is a mental process, obviously, any language including the language of formalization cannot be an equivalent model of the given system as the thinking cannot be reduced to a finite number of formal rules. Logic is only a true imitation of mathematical language. Logic

and language arise after mathematics and the mathematical systems do not depend on logic. Thus, on the one hand, the mathematics do not depend on logic, on the other, logic is applied mathematics.

Parts of mathematical practice are a product of the cognitive "make up" and in those parts where our idealizations exist laid the possibilities of antinomies, paradoxes and illusions.

Just as traditional rationalistic metaphysics existed, so the parts of mathematical practice that cannot be constructively justified actually do exist. Sometimes their distinction cannot be described in terms of usual (but transitory) oppositions between the "classical" and the "constructive".

Humans are bound to project their knowledge beyond their actual or even possible experience but there is an intersubjective agreement in doing so, even if the specific views that result from this are sometimes very different.

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Der Vorrang der Logik vor der Metaphysik bei Wittgenstein

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Die Frage nach den Zusammenhängen zwischen dem *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* und dem Erbe der kantischen Philosophie hat die Wittgenstein-Interpretation in vielen Hinsichten bewegt. Ein möglicher Beitrag zu dieser Interpretationslinie kann durch eine Vergleichungsanalyse, die die Einstellung beider Philosophen hinsichtlich derselben Frage näher in den Blick rückt, geleistet werden. Der gemeinsame Ausgangspunkt des *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* und der *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* ist die Problematik der Grenzbestimmung. Die Festlegung der Grenzen des theoretischen Diskurs ist die erste und vielleicht die einzige Aufgabe der (theoretischen) Philosophie.

Die Lösung der Frage nach dem Sagbaren und Erkennbaren soll ein sicheres Kriterium für die Unterscheidungsverfahren zwischen sinnvollen und sinnlosen bzw. möglichen und unmöglichen Probleme auflegen. Die Durchführung dieses Projekt setzt eine Bedingung voraus, die eine eigene und schwierige Problematik in sich beinhaltet. Um die Grenzen des sinnvollen Satzes zu bestimmen, muss man im Vorhinein begreifen, *wie* und *inwiefern* die Bedingungen der Sprache bzw. des Urteilens mit der internen Struktur der Welt bzw. der Gegenständlichkeit übereinstimmen kann. Das heißt, in der Grenzbestimmung wird nicht nur die Erkenntnis und Sprache beschränkt, sondern gleichzeitig die Form der Erfahrung bzw. der Welt mitbestimmt.

Es stellt sich dann die grundsätzliche Frage: Wie werden die Bedingungen eines objektiven Diskurs über die Natur mit den Bedingungen einer Antizipation der Form der Erfahrung bzw. der Welt reflexiv miteinander verbunden? Anscheinend kann allein eine transzendente Logik eine Antwort auf diese Problematik geben. Die Absicht dieses Aufsatzes ist die Idee und Begriff der transzendentalen Logik bei Kant und Wittgenstein zu analysieren.

I. Definition:

Das zentrale Thema einer transzendentalen Logik ist die Erörterung des Verhältnisses zwischen dem theoretischen Diskurs und der Welt. Der Idee einer solchen Logik liegt die Einsicht zum Grunde, dass das Verhältnis eine gewisse Identität (Isomorphie) zwischen den diskursiven und objektiven Strukturen voraussetzt. Welche sind die Bedingungen des reinen Denkbezuges auf Gegenstände bzw. abbildenden Beziehung zur Welt? Die traditionelle Formulierung dieser Frage befindet sich am kantischen Werk.

In der *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* unterscheidet Kant nach verschiedenen Kriterien die formale von der transzendentalen Logik. Die formale Logik ist eine *a priori* normative Wissenschaft der Regeln des Denkens, sie analysiert die „Form des Denkens überhaupt“ (A55 B79). Formal ist die Logik aufgrund des nicht-empirischen Charakters ihrer Regeln, die unter Abstraktion jeder Form von Gegenständen behandelt werden. Mit anderen Worten kann gesagt werden, dass das Formal-Logische lediglich die Gesetzgebung der Urteile betrifft. Die transzendente Logik dagegen zeichnet sich durch einen *nicht-*

empirischen Inhalt, nämlich den „transzendentalen Inhalt“ (B 105) der reinen Begriffe *a priori*. Das Transzendental-logische betrifft die Regeln des reinen Denkens eines Gegenstandes überhaupt. Die transzendente Logik erklärt, „dass und wie gewisse Vorstellungen (Anschauungen oder Begriffe) lediglich *a priori* angewandt werden, oder möglich sein.“ (B 80). Das Projekt einer transzendentalen Logik, nämlich die Bestimmung des apriorischen Gegenstandesbezugs der Vorstellungen, impliziert eine Rechtfertigung des Anspruchs auf *a priori* Erkenntnis und fordert die Beantwortung der Frage: Mit welchem Recht wendet der Verstand *a priori* Begriffe auf Gegenstände der Sinne an?

Im *Tractatus* findet man keine direkte Bemerkung über die Unterscheidung zwischen der formalen und transzendentalen Logik. Das hat zur Folge, dass verschiedene Interpretationen sich herausgebildet haben. Man könnte drei Möglichkeiten vorstellen: (i) Zu negieren, dass die Unterscheidung überhaupt im *Tractatus* vorkommt und den Terminus „transzendental“ im Sinne „Transzendental“ lesen; (ii) Die Unterscheidung im *Tractatus* als eine Differenzierung von Aspekten einer selben Struktur. Diese Lesart kann in die These formuliert werden: „die formale Logik ist als solche Transzendental“ (Transzendentalität der Logik); (iii) man kann aber auch die Unterscheidung streng als Trennung zwischen der logischen Syntax (formale Logik), verstanden als die Gesamtheit aller Regeln der Zeichenverbindung, und der transzendentalen Logik betrachten. In den beiden letzten Fällen bleibt offen was unter „Transzendental“ zu verstehen ist. Keine von den Interpretationsmöglichkeiten wird hier verteidigt werden. Stattdessen wendet sich der Aufsatz dem Begriff des Transzendental.

Hinsichtlich dieses Begriffs hat die Interpretation viele Schwierigkeiten zu überwinden, weil genauso wenig wie die formale die transzendente Logik nicht näher erläutert wird. Der Begriff „Transzendental“ kommt im *Tractatus* nur zweimal (6.13; 6.421) ohne Definition vor, um jeweils die Ethik und Logik näher zu bestimmen.¹ Und es ist nicht rein wörtlich ersichtlich, ob dieser Begriff ein bestimmtes Ermöglichungsverhältnis zwischen einer Bedingung und einem Bedingten nennt oder einfach auf etwas Transzendentes hinweist. Was die Logik betrifft, soll ihre Transzendentalität darin liegen, dass sie „keine Lehre [ist], sondern ein Spiegelbild der Welt.“ (6.13) Entscheidend in diesem Kontext ist zweifellos die Idee des Spiegels. Die Hintikkas weisen auf die Wichtigkeit der terminologischen Unterscheidung zwischen Abbildung und Widerspiegelung im *Tractatus* (1996, S.159) hin. Im ersten Fall stellt ein Satz einen Sachverhalt dar, im zweiten spiegelt die logische Form die Form der Wirklichkeit wider. Beide Beziehungen hängen aber gewissermaßen von einander ab. So wie sie die Hintikkas definieren, besagt der Widerspiegelungsgedanke, dass „jede zulässige Verbindung von Namen einen Sachverhalt abbildet(...), und zwar einen Sachverhalt, der in einer möglichen Welt besteht.“ (1996, S. 160). Einerseits setzt die Abbildung die Widerspiegelung voraus. Nur weil die Struktur des Satzes mit der Struktur der Welt übereinstimmt (widerspiegelt),

¹ Wenn es wirklich so ist, dass „Ethik und Ästhetik Eins [sind].“ (6.421), dann ist die Ästhetik auch Transzendental.

kann der Satz die Tatsache abbilden. Andererseits setzt die Widerspiegelung die Abbildung voraus. Bei jeder zulässigen Verbindung von Namen wird damit gerechnet, dass es eine mögliche Welt geben könnte, in der diese Verbindung eine Tatsache abbilden könnte.

Was in der Widerspiegelungsidee auffällt, ist die Passivität der Logik bezüglich der Welt. In der Widerspiegelung scheint die Auffassung nahe zu liegen, dass das Wesen der Sprache von der immanenten ontologischen Struktur der Welt abhängig ist. Carruthers stellt fest, wie diese Auffassung zunächst in Konflikt mit dem Vorrang der Logik vor Metaphysik zu stehen scheint. (1990, S. 24) In einer Überlegung scheint Wittgenstein tatsächlich eine Abhängigkeit der Logik von der ontologischen Struktur der Welt anzunehmen. Ohne die „feste Form“ der Gegenstände, die die Substanz der Welt bilden, würde „ob ein Satz Sinn hat, davon abhängen, ob ein anderer Satz wahr ist. Es wäre dann unmöglich, ein Bild der Welt (ein wahres oder falsches) zu entwerfen.“ (2.0211, 20212). Diese Abhängigkeit der Logik von der Substanz der Welt wird allerdings gewissermaßen durch einen noch entscheidenden Vorrang der Logik vor der Welt relativiert. Diese Welt, deren Substanz eine Bedingung jeder Abbildung ist, ist in sich logisch strukturiert. Ich möchte der Idee des Vorrangs der Logik im Folgenden nachgehen. Diese Grundeinsicht seines Denkens hatte Wittgenstein in den *Aufzeichnungen über Logik* (1913) bereits formuliert. In einer prägnanten Einteilung der Philosophie wird behauptet: „Die Philosophie besteht aus Logik und Metaphysik; die Logik ist ihre Basis.“ (WA, Bd. S, 206) Wenn man diesen Gedanken in Hinblick auf die einheitlichen Darstellung des *Tractatus* deutet, dann enthält diese Reflexion drei Elemente: (i) die logische Form der Sprache; (ii) die logische Form der Welt und (iii) ihre *a priori* Isomorphie. Der Begriff der Isomorphie betont *per definitionem* die „Formgleichheit“, „Gleichmannigfaltigkeit“ zwischen aufeinander bezogene Strukturen. Aber was diese strukturelle Identität gewissermaßen offen lässt, ist wie den Berührungspunkt zwischen beide Strukturen zu bestimmen ist oder ob eine Ermöglichungsverhältnis besteht. Wenn der Vorrang der Logik diese erste Unbestimmtheit modifiziert, bleibt unangemacht wie der Vorrang als solcher aufzufassen ist. Der Vorrang der Logik drückt sich in zwei Formen aus: (i) die Entdeckung der ontologischen Struktur der Welt in der Struktur des Satzes; (ii) logische Bestimmung der ontologischen Struktur der Welt. Beide Aspekte werden im Folgenden analysiert.

(i) Wittgenstein hat die These, dass die Form der Wirklichkeit in der logischen Form des Satzes abgelesen werden kann, immer wieder betont. Im *Tractatus* drückt Wittgenstein sich so hinsichtlich dieses Zusammenhangs aus: „Die allgemeine Satzform ist das Wesen des Satzes. Das Wesen des Satzes angeben, heißt, das Wesen aller Beschreibung angeben, also das Wesen der Welt.“ (5.471, 5.4711) Gewissermaßen formuliert diese Annahme unproblematisch die Vermitteltheit der Sprache bei jedem Bezug zur Welt. Es scheint nicht kompliziert zu sein, davon auszugehen, dass das Wesen der Welt in der Sprache zu finden ist, wenn die Sprache unvermeidlich unser Verhältnis zur Wirklich ermöglicht. Diese Einsicht wird außerdem durch die Bildtheorie der Sprache verstärkt, weil diese Auffassung genau die deskriptive Funktion der Sprache als die zentrale behauptet. Wittgenstein bestimmt den Satz als eine Projektion, genauer die Projektion einer möglichen Sachlage. Der Satz „konstruiert eine Welt mit Hilfe seines logischen Gerüstes“ (4.023, TB 20.10.14), denkt ein „Modell der Wirklichkeit“ (4.01). Die Annahme erweist sich erst als problematisch, wenn es darum geht

zu bestimmen, wie diese Entdeckung des Wesens der Welt im Satz geschieht. Es geht hier in erster Linie nicht um die methodische Frage der logischen Analyse der Sätze, d.h. wie man den „nackten Gedanken“ unter der äußeren Kleidung entdeckt (4.002) und dabei das Wesen der Welt erfasst. Sondern vielmehr um die Frage, wie kann man tatsächlich voraussetzen, dass diesen Gedanken dem Wesen der Welt korrespondiert?

So wie es in der berühmten Tagebuchnotiz 2.8. 16. heißt: „Ja, meine Arbeit hat sich ausgedehnt von den Grundlagen der Logik zum Wesen der Welt.“² Wie soll man diese Ausdehnung verstehen? Wie lässt sich der Sprung von der Logik zur Welt rechtfertigen? Es ist klar, dass diese Fragen im Rahmen des philosophischen Programms des *Tractatus* gar nicht formuliert werden kann. Hier trennt sich Wittgenstein wie in vielen anderen Momenten vom Kritizismus. Das Problem des Übergangs von der Logik zur Ontologie kann wegen des realistischen Hintergrundes des *Tractatus* nicht mit dem Problem einer transzendentalen Deduktion gleichgesetzt werden. So hat Bachmaier die Projektion (miss)verstanden z.B., indem er behauptet: „Indem Wittgenstein die Bedingungen für äußere Welt abbildendes Sprechen aufzeigt, nähert sich dem, was Kant in Bezug auf die reinen Verstandesbegriffe transzendente Deduktion nennt“ (1978, S.56). Der Übergang von der Logik der Sprache zur Welt betrifft nicht eine zu rechtfertigenden Anwendung von Prinzipien *a priori* auf Gegenstände der Sinne, er verlangt nicht die Begründung eines Recht auf die Anwendung von reinen Begriffen. Dass die abbildende Beziehung *a priori* ermöglicht ist, zeigt sich in der Sprache selbst. Um diesen Übergang einzusehen, rekurriert Wittgenstein erneut auf die Distinktion Sagen-Zeigen. „Der Satz zeigt die logische Form der Wirklichkeit.“ (4.121)

(ii). Wie oben gesagt wurde, hat die Logik vor der Metaphysik Vorrang, nicht nur weil das Wesen der Welt allein im Wesen der Satz erfasst wird, sondern weil das Wesen der Welt logisch strukturiert sein muss. Selbstverständlich hängen beide Thesen zusammen. Bevor ich auf den zweiten Aspekt des Vorrangs eingehe, möchte ich kurz den Begriff des „Transzendentalen“ näher betrachten. Der andere Aspekt des Vorrangs der Logik vor der Metaphysik unterscheidet nicht nur den kantischen Ansatz von dem Wittgensteins, sondern lässt die Eigentümlichkeit des Transzendentalismus des *Tractatus* erkennen. Ganz allgemein aufgefasst kann das Thema einer Transzendentalphilosophie so definiert werden: Sie ist eine Untersuchung über das Ermöglichungsverhältnis zwischen einer *a priori* bedingenden Instanz und eine faktische Sphäre. Die Interpreten, die den *Tractatus* für eine Variation der Transzendentalphilosophie Kants halten, meinen, dass man ein Ermöglichungsverhältnis zwischen der Sprachlogik und allen sprachlichen Ausdruck konstatieren kann. So verstanden beantwortet der *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus* die transzendente Frage: Welche sind die *a priori* Bedingungen, die einen Satz erfüllen muss, damit er das logische Bild einer Tatsache sein kann? Diese Interpretation erfasst sicherlich wichtige Elemente dieses Werkes, allerdings gibt diese Lesart nicht das gesamt Konzeption der Transzendentalität bei Wittgenstein wieder. In der Tat denkt Wittgenstein die Transzendentalität der Logik nicht nur als eine interne Ermöglichung der Abbildung, sondern auch als eine Beziehung zwischen Logik und Welt. Wenn es zutrifft, dass die Logik transzendental ist (6.13.), dann nur deswegen weil die Logik „(...) eine Bedingung der Welt

² Wittgenstein, L., *Tagebücher 1914-1916*, in: Werkausgabe Bd. I, Suhrkamp, 1984, S. 174. Vgl. die Tagebüchernotiz 1.6.15 (S.145) und im *Tractatus*: 5.4711.

sein [muss]“(TB 24.7.16), so wie es in den Tagebüchern heißt. Wie soll man diese Einsicht verstehen?

Wittgenstein geht davon aus, dass die Welt in sich logisch strukturiert sein muss. In Anlehnung an der alten metaphysischen Behauptung, dass selbst Gott in der Schöpfung rational vorgegangen ist, behauptet Wittgenstein: „Wir könnten nämlich von einer ‚unlogischen Welt‘ nicht *sagen*, wie sie aussähe.“(3.031) Die traditionelle Ansicht wird allerdings umgedeutet, indem der Akzent auf die Logik gelegt wird. Es wäre mindestens genauso möglich, dass die Metaphysik Vorrang hätte und die Logik bedingte. Das sperrgedruckte Verb „sagen“ in diesem Zitat soll vermutlich darauf hinweisen, dass die Rationalität der Welt sich in der Sprache ausdrückt, aber darüber hinaus, dass die Logik die Welt antizipiert. Es ist klar, dass der *Tractatus* keine Theorie der Erfahrung im Sinne Hermann Cohen postuliert, sondern er weist jede *a priori* Bestimmung einer immanenten Ordnung der Welt (5.634) zurück. Allerdings setzt die Logik eine andere Art von Erfahrung voraus, nämlich „daß etwas *ist*, aber das ist eben *keine* Erfahrung.“(5.552) Die Logik des *Tractatus* ist gewissermaßen eine Logik der Tatsache, sie ermöglicht nicht nur das Sagen und den sprachlichen Ausdruck, sondern die ontologische Struktur der Welt als solche. Der logische Raum enthält in sich alle möglichen Kombinationen der Gegenstände, alle denkbare Welten: „Die Logik erfüllt die Welt; die Grenzen der Welt sind auch ihre Grenzen.“(5.61)

Wenn wir wieder die oben gegebene allgemeine Definition der Transzendentalphilosophie aufgreifen, lässt sich einsehen, inwiefern die Umformung der kantischen Philosophie im *Tractatus* wenig zur Debatte über die Zukunft dieser Denkungsart beitragen kann. Nach der Definition sind zwei die zentrale Elemente der Transzendentalität: (i) die Ermöglichung und (ii) was in der faktisch ermöglichte Sphäre lokalisiert wird. Bezüglich der Ermöglichung ist nicht nur entscheidend, dass die ermöglichende Instanz eine *a priori* Bedingung ist, sondern, muss man genauer bestimmen, *wie* diese Ermöglichung geschieht. Es ist kein Zufall, dass der *Tractatus* genau über diese Problematik *schweigt*. Nicht nur die semantische Beziehungen der Sprache zur Welt, sondern auch die logische Strukturierung der Welt gehören dem Bereich des Unsagbaren. Die Deutung, dass die Transzendentalität der Logik gewissermaßen in ihrer Transzendenz auch liegt, begreift den zweideutigen Ort im Philosophieren.

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Jenseits des nichtzweifelnden Benehmens: Vertrauen als Einladung zu einem fremden Blick auf den abendländischen Geist

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I

Nur wenige Arbeiten reagieren sensibler auf die Beziehung zwischen Vertrauen und Zweifel als Ludwig Wittgensteins *Über Gewißheit*. Wenn der Leser ein Exemplar von *Über Gewißheit* öffnet, begegnet er einem sehr speziellen Konzept von Vertrauen. Ich möchte zeigen, dass die Art, wie Wittgenstein den Begriff „Vertrauen“ verwendet, nicht mit der Präsenz des Zweifels zusammenhängt, sondern mit dem Fehlen des Zweifels selbst. Mein Ziel ist nicht nur auf diese Form des Vertrauens zu verweisen, sondern auch zwei Fragen anzugehen, die aus meiner Sicht nicht ignoriert werden sollten. Welche Beschränkungen nimmt der Geist einerseits wahr, die, laut Wittgenstein, die gegenwärtige europäische und amerikanische Zivilisation unterrichten, um Wittgensteins Bemerkungen zum Vertrauen zu attackieren? Andererseits, was war die „Hauptsache“ (vgl. ÜG 459) in *Über Gewißheit*? In dieser Arbeit will ich eine Antwort auf diese Fragen anbieten, während ich versuche, dem Geist, in dem Wittgenstein sein Werk schrieb, so treu wie möglich zu bleiben.

II

Wie beurteilt Einer, welches seine rechte und welches seine linke Hand ist? Wie weiß ich, daß mein Urteil mit dem der Andern übereinstimmen wird? Wie weiß ich, daß diese Farbe Blau ist? Wenn ich hier mir nicht traue, warum soll ich dem Urteil des Andern trauen? Gibt es ein Warum? Muß ich nicht irgendwo anfangen zu trauen? D. h. ich muß irgendwo mit dem Nichtzweifeln anfangen; und das ist nicht, sozusagen, vorschnell aber verzeihlich, sondern es gehört zum Urteilen. (ÜG 150)

Man könnte argumentieren, dass Zweifel vorstellbar sind, wenn wir z.B. versuchen zu klären, ob eine bestimmte Farbe blau ist. Schließlich könnten zwei Personen diskutieren, ob die Karosserie eines neuen Autos grün-blau oder lediglich grün ist. Diese Diskussion kann beigelegt werden, wenn man berücksichtigt, was der Hersteller angibt: in diesem Falle gäbe es einen Verweis, der von beiden akzeptiert werden könnte. Aber nehmen wir an, dass einer darauf beharrt, die Farbe des Autos sei blau-grün, obwohl der Hersteller bestätigt hat, es sei grün. Im Falle, dass die fragliche Person nicht immer grün und blau verwechselt – die Möglichkeit einer Sehstörung ausgeschlossen ist – wäre es sinnlos diese Person zu fragen, woher sie wisse, welche Farbe „grün“ bzw. „blau“ ist. Es gibt einen Punkt, an dem der Zweifel unverständlich ist, ein Punkt, an dem Erklärungen und Rechtfertigungen unangebracht sind. Genau hier finden wir das Vertrauen, auf das Wittgenstein anspielt: ein Vertrauen, das durch das Fehlen des Zweifels charakterisiert ist. Wittgenstein selbst bemerkt:

Der Ursprung und die primitive Form des Sprachspiels ist eine Reaktion. (VB, 493)

Ich denke, Wittgenstein wählte den Begriff „Vertrauen“ in *Über Gewißheit*, weil er einerseits einen Verweis auf die negative Seite der Münze in seinen Gedanken darstellt - das Fehlen des Zweifels; andererseits

verweist er jedoch auf die positive Seite – nämlich dass das Individuum handelt. Wie ich es sehe, ist dies ein guter Grund den Begriff „Vertrauen“ anstelle eines anderen psychologischen Begriffes zu wählen. Wittgenstein merkt an:

Wenn der Kaufmann jeden seiner Äpfel ohne Grund untersuchen wollte, um da recht sicherzugehen, warum muß er (dann) nicht die Untersuchung untersuchen? Und kann man nun hier von Glauben reden (ich meine, im Sinne von religiösem Glauben, nicht von Vermutung)? Alle psychologischen Wörter führen hier nur von der Hauptsache ab. (ÜG 459)

Nicht zu erkennen, dass wir viele Dinge als unzweifelhaft hinnehmen müssen, um zu zweifeln, führt zu der Illusion des Denkens, dass wir willentlich alles anzweifeln können. Wenn wir bedenken, was wir zuvor über die Art gesagt haben, in der Wittgenstein den Begriff „Vertrauen“ gebraucht, scheint es, als wäre es ausreichend zu behaupten, es gäbe viele Dinge, in die ein Ladenbesitzer vertraut, um dieses Problem zu lösen. Nichtsdestotrotz zeigt sich, dass alle psychologischen Begriffe, einschließlich der des „Vertrauens“, uns von der Sache abführen, die gemäß Wittgensteins Standpunkt wirklich zählt. Was also ist das Problem? Ist Vertrauen wirklich wichtig in *Über Gewißheit* oder brauchen wir vielleicht etwas anderes, um uns Wittgensteins Bemerkungen zu nähern?

III

Wenn man einige der Hauptcharakteristika der Herangehensweisen an die Frage des Vertrauens, die in den letzten Jahrzehnten entwickelt wurden bedenkt, könnten wir sagen, diese Herangehensweisen widmen sich der Bereitstellung detaillierter Theorien und Klassifikationen, die die verschiedenen Manifestationen des Vertrauens begründen. In anderen Worten, Vertrauen wird als eine schwer fassbare Frage angesehen, die mit Hilfe von Werkzeugen angegangen werden sollte, die es uns erlauben die zahlreichen Formen, Elemente und Aspekte des Vertrauens zu verstehen. Diese kurze Beschreibung zeigt deutliche Ähnlichkeit mit dem abendländischen Geist, der, laut Wittgenstein, die gegenwärtige europäische und amerikanische Zivilisation informiert. Im Vorwort von *Philosophische Bemerkungen* lesen wir, dass dieser Geist:

...äußert sich in einem Fortschritt, in einem Bauen immer größerer und komplizierterer Strukturen ...will die Welt durch ihre Peripherie – in ihrer Mannigfaltigkeit - erfassen ...Daher reiht dieser ein Gebilde an das andere, steigt quasi von Stufe zu Stufe immer weiter. (PB, 7)

Diese Haltung ist typisch, wenn unerklärliche Konzepte beginnen den westlichen Geist anzugreifen, doch Wittgensteins Bemerkungen über das Vertrauen könnte man sich auch auf andere Arten nähern. Tatsächlich schlägt uns Wittgenstein einen anderen Weg vor, oder besser, einen anderen Geist. Er sagt, dass dieser Geist:

...äußert sich (...) in einem Streben nach Klarheit und Durchsichtigkeit welcher Strukturen immer ...will die Welt (...) in ihrem Zentrum –ihrem Wesen (...) erfassen ...dort bleibt, wo er ist, und immer dasselbe erfassen will. (PB, 7)

Um zu verdeutlichen, was es heißt Wittgensteins Geist zu folgen, denke ich, es wäre hilfreich den Begrenzungen, die der abendländische Geist aufweist, Aufmerksamkeit zu schenken, wenn wir ihn benutzen, um Licht auf Wittgensteins Nutzung des Begriffes „Vertrauen“ zu werfen. Um eine solche Aufgabe durchzuführen, sollten wir erkennen, dass jede Analyse, die erdacht wurde, um die besondere Art des Vertrauens, die wir in *Über Gewißheit* finden, zu erklären, hauptsächlich einen Verweis auf die Abwesenheit der Zweifel, die sie mit sich bringen, machen muss. Auf den ersten Blick ist dies kein Problem. Schließlich tut Wittgenstein dies selbst, wenn er Vertrauen für ein Nichtzweifeln hält, das zum Urteilen gehört (ÜG 150). Er erörtert dieses „Nichtzweifeln“, um zu zeigen, dass das Begründen von Zweifeln manchmal zu einem Ende kommen muss: dieses Ende ist eine unbegründete Handlungsweise, bei der die Erwägung des Zweifels völlig fehl am Platze ist (ÜG 110). Wie wir in *Über Gewißheit* lesen können, charakterisiert Wittgenstein ausdrücklich das Verhalten, in dem Zweifel nicht vorhanden sind:

Zweifelndes und nichtzweifelndes Benehmen. Es gibt das erste nur, wenn es das zweite gibt. (ÜG 354)

Dieser Punkt führt zu einem weiteren Problem: Wie können wir Nachdruck auf das „nichtzweifelnde Benehmen“ legen, ohne den Zweifel zu erwähnen? Einerseits müssen wir auf den Zweifel verweisen, um zu sagen, dass dieser zu einem Ende kommt; andererseits bleibt die Erwägung des Zweifels erhalten, wenn wir auf „Nichtzweifeln“ anspielen, welcher unsere unbegründeten Handlungsweisen charakterisieren. Da „Nichtzweifeln“ ein Verweis auf den Zweifel ist – wenn auch ein negativer – wird das „Nichtzweifeln“ erwähnt, wenn es keinerlei Grund gibt, der es dem Zweifel erlaubt sinnvoll zu sein (ÜG 458), doch auf diesem niedrigen Niveau gibt es keinen Platz für Gründe: es gibt nur Reaktionen. Betrachten wir diese Handlungsweisen von einem angemessenen Standpunkt, wird Nachdruck auf die Abwesenheit von Zweifel gelegt, ohne diesen zu erwähnen. Hier trifft der westliche Geist auf seine Hauptbeschränkung, um sich Wittgensteins Anspielung auf „Vertrauen“ anzunähern. Doch auch Wittgenstein selbst scheint Probleme zu haben, diese Beschränkung zu überwinden, wenn er sich auf das „nichtzweifelnde Benehmen“ bezieht. Das ist der Tatsache geschuldet, dass wir bis zu diesem Punkt die Art, wie Wittgenstein, um den Leser zu kontaktieren, seine Gedanken ähnlich dem abendländischen Geist erläutert, betrachtet haben. Der Punkt ist einen Schritt nach vorn zu machen, um zu erwägen, wie wir mit diesem Problem im Sinne Wittgensteins umgehen könnten.

IV

Wittgenstein bietet ein Beispiel an, dass sich dem Geist, in dem er schreibt sehr gut anpasst; dieses Beispiel betrachtet nicht nur die Klarheit als zu Selbstzweck wertvoll, sondern zeigt auch die Grundlagen der möglichen Gebäude als durchsichtig von uns (VB, 459). Wegen seiner Schönheit denke ich, dieses Beispiel ist es wert zitiert zu werden:

Es könnte nichts merkwürdiger sein, als einen Menschen bei irgendeiner ganz einfachen alltäglichen Tätigkeit, wenn er sich unbeobachtet glaubt, zu sehen. Denken wir uns ein

Theater, der Vorhang ginge auf und wir sähen einen Menschen allein in seinem Zimmer auf und ab gehen, sich eine Zigarette anzünden, sich niedersetzen, u. s. f., so, daß wir plötzlich von außen einen Menschen sähen, wie man sich sonst nie sehen kann; wenn wir quasi ein Kapitel einer Biographie mit eigenen Augen sähen, - das müßte unheimlich und wunderbar zugleich sein. Wunderbarer als irgendetwas, was ein Dichter auf der Bühne spielen oder sprechen lassen könnte, wir würden das Leben selbst sehen.- Aber das sehen wir ja alle Tage, und es macht uns nicht den mindesten Eindruck! Ja, aber wir sehen es nicht in der Perspektive. (...) als ein Kunstwerk Gottes. (VB, 455-456)

Was bedeutet es, diesen Menschen „von außen“ zu betrachten? Um diese Frage zu beantworten, sollten wir zuerst klären, was es heißt, jemanden „von innen“ zu beobachten. Meines Erachtens ist dies die gegenwärtige Erwägung, die uns dazu bringt in Begriffen bloßer Fakten zu sprechen: wenn wir das Individuum auf der Bühne von innen beobachteten, könnten wir sagen, „er läuft auf und ab“, „zündet sich eine Zigarette an“, „setzt sich“ etc. Im Gegensatz dazu kann das, was wir von außen betrachten nicht in Worte gefasst werden: in diesem Sinne sollten wir nicht vergessen, dass Wittgenstein selbst die Erwägung des Lebens selbst als eine Art, „die Welt *sub specie aeterni* einzufangen“ betrachtete (VB, 456). Das Vertrauen, das unsere primitiven Reaktionen charakterisiert kann nicht durch Sätze ausgedrückt werden: da solche Sätze – z.B. „der Mann zweifelt nicht, dass die Feuerzeugflamme echt und nicht fiktiv ist“, „der Mann zweifelt nicht, dass der Sessel immer noch existiert, wenn er sich setzt“, etc. - haben keinen Platz in unseren Sprachspielen, sie wären bedeutungslos. Diese Sätze beweisen nichts, überzeugen oder informieren niemanden, es sei denn, es ist ein Ausnahmefall.

V

Komme ich nicht immer mehr und mehr dahin zu sagen, daß die Logik sich am Schluß nicht beschrieben lasse? Du muß die Praxis der Sprache ansehen, dann siehst du sie. (ÜG 501)

Was wir sehen können, wenn man der Praxis der Sprache Aufmerksamkeit schenkt ist, laut Norman Malcolm (1982, 19-22), das bereitwillige Verhalten, das wir zeigen, wenn wir z.B. das Wort „Hand“ in einer Erklärung benutzen. Dieses Verhalten ist, wie Malcolm sagt, „die Logik“ der Sprache, die nicht mit psychologischen Worten beschrieben werden kann, weil sie dafür zu primitiv und instinktiv ist. Malcolm fügt hinzu, dass wir den Hang haben anzunehmen, dass jegliche Sprachbeherrschung als auch das bedeutungsvolle Verhalten, aus unseren mentalen Zuständen und Haltungen basiert und auftaucht, die in psychologischen Begriffen auszudrücken sein sollten. Aber tatsächlich stellen wir fest, dass all diese psychologischen Begriffe Handlungsweisen entweder erneut beschreiben oder voraussetzen. Laut Malcolm sind diese Handlungsweisen „die Hauptsache“, auf die Wittgenstein anspielt. Dennoch denke ich, dass das falsch ist. Wittgenstein sagt, alle psychologischen Begriffe führten von der Hauptsache ab. Bedenkt man, dass die Nutzung der psychologischen Begriffe in diesem Falle ein Verfahren ist, welches darin besteht unsere Gewissheiten zu verbalisieren, könnten wir Malcolms Standpunkt zusammenfassen, indem wir sagen, ein bestimmtes Verhalten führte uns von den Handlungsweisen ab. Doch in welchem Sinne geschieht dies? Ich komme dabei nur zu einer Antwort: das fragliche Verfahren führt uns davon ab

die Handlungsweisen auf angemessene Weise zu verstehen und anzugreifen. Die Hauptsache können also nicht die Handlungsweisen selbst sein, sondern die Art wie wir uns ihnen nähern.

Um mehr Licht auf diese Frage zu werfen, möchte ich betonen, dass Wittgensteins Bemerkung über die Logik, die sich nicht beschreiben lässt, einer fundamentalen Frage in seinem *Tractatus* stark ähnelt: Ich beziehe mich auf den Unterschied zwischen dem was gesagt werden kann und dem, was nur gezeigt werden kann. Meines Erachtens kann die Form, wie Wittgenstein den Begriff „Vertrauen“ benutzt mit der Leiter verglichen werden, auf die er sich im *Tractatus* bezieht. (TLP 6.54). So wie wir die Leiter hinaufsteigen und wegwerfen sollten, um die Welt richtig zu sehen, denke ich, dass der Begriff „Vertrauen“ in *Über Gewißheit* überwunden werden muss, um das Leben selbst zu sehen. Wenn wir dazu anfügen, dass Wittgenstein die Betrachtung des Lebens selbst als eine Art „die Welt *sub specie aeterni* einzufangen“ (VB, 456) nahm, sollten wir erkennen, dass Wittgensteins Bemerkungen über das Vertrauen gewisse Ähnlichkeiten mit den Bemerkungen über Mystizismus im *Tractatus* aufweisen. Während sich das Mystische in Wittgensteins *Tractatus* in der Existenz der Welt zeigte, könnten wir sagen, das Unsagbare zeige sich in der Perspektive des Lesers, der Wittgensteins Bemerkungen über das Vertrauen in der Existenz des Lebens überwindet – weit davon entfernt das Leben als das Gegenteil des Todes zu bezeichnen, wird deutlich, dass ich das Leben, wie Wittgenstein anmerkt, als etwas betrachte, das beobachtet werden kann, indem man einen bestimmten Standpunkt annimmt. Das Fehlen einer Rechtfertigung der Existenz der Welt war es, welches einen enormen Einfluss auf das Thema des *Tractatus* zeigt, und welcher sich jetzt durch das Fehlen der Rechtfertigung der Existenz des Lebens offenbart. So wie die Welt nicht existiert haben könnte aber doch existiert, könnte auch das Leben nicht existiert haben. Doch es existiert. Ferner können wir auf diesem niedrigen Niveau nicht erklären, warum das beobachtete Individuum jene primitiven Reaktionen zeigt, auf denen Sprachspiele basieren und keine anderen. Wir sollten uns immer in einer angemessenen Position befinden, um den Fakt zu werten, dass wir auf eine bestimmte Art fortfahren und nicht auf eine andere. Wie ich es sehe, hat die Hauptsache, auf die Wittgenstein verweist, wenigstens zu einem frühen Zeitpunkt mit einer tiefen Veränderung der Einstellung zu tun: die plumpen Gelüste des abendländischen Geistes, die versuchen seine Studienziele in einem Konzept oder einer Theorie zu komprimieren, werden durch die in der Ferne liegende Betrachtung dessen, was wirklich wichtig ist, ersetzt. Mit anderen Worten zeigt sich, dass die Philosophie, wie es Wittgenstein oft betonte, nicht eine Frage des Verstehens, sondern des Willens ist.

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Intercultural Dialog and Mathematics Education: A Contribution from Ancient Chinese Algebra

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
1. Introduction

The focus of this paper is on the possible educational uses of an ancient Chinese artifact. The *intercultural perspective* (Abdallah-Preteceille 1999) is important from the educational viewpoint: it is based upon the identification and the celebration of the diversity that history of mathematics itself can show us (Grugnetti and Rogers 2000), and upon the interaction which makes possible the educational use of the experiments considered. A recent study (Bagni 2006) considers an educational experiment based on the use of an ancient Chinese artifact.

The traditional Chinese representation of numbers by means of counting rods on a board can be referred to the fingers of a hand:



The counting rods are arranged in columns placed side by side, with the right-most column representing the units, the next column representing the tens, and so on. Before the 7th - 8th cent. AD, there were no known written Chinese symbols interpreted as zero (Martzloff 1997), so in order to avoid misunderstandings Chinese mathematicians used two different dispositions: the aforementioned *Tsung* disposition for units, thousands and so on, and the *Heng* for tens, hundreds and so on.



2. Theoretical Framework

According to Vygotsky, the function of semiotic mediation can be connected to technical and psychological tools (Vygotskij 1978). Wartofsky identifies technical tools as *primary artifacts*; *secondary artifacts* are used to preserve and to transmit the acquired skills or "modes of action" (Wartofsky 1985). So counting rods can be considered as primary artifacts; prescriptions and representative rules (expressed in original books and commentaries) are secondary artifacts. A mathematical theory is a *tertiary artifact* which organizes the secondary artifacts and hence the models constructed in order to represent the modes of action by which primary artifacts are used (Bartolini Bussi 2002).

We must consider the distinction between artifact and tool (Rabardel 1995), i.e., the artifact associated to a personal or social *schema* of action: if we refer to an object as artifact, in order to be able to consider it as a tool, we need a constructive mediated activity on the part of the subject (Radford 2002). Thus the artifact in question must be framed into a wider social and cultural context. When a pupil uses a primary artefact with reference to a secondary artifact, he or she *follows the rules* and thus uses the primary artifact in a *rational way*. There is an important socio-cultural element in this, if one takes into account that rule-following must be framed in an essentially collective practice (for instance, with reference to Wittgenstein's use of the considered expression, see: Kripke 1984 and Wright 1980). Let us note that, according to Habermas, the

rationality has three different roots, strictly related the one to the others: the predicative structure of knowledge at institutional level, the teleological structure of the action and the communicative structure of the discourse (Habermas 1999); of course these roots are influenced by different cultural traditions.

According to Bruner's constructivist approach, we, too, create our own realities through interaction with the social world and with symbols (Bruner 1987): learning itself must be considered within a cultural context, which involves the shared symbols of a community, its tools, its traditions (Bruner 1996; in Bruner 1991, the author asserts that culturally shaped notions, stories, and narratives organize our experience and expectations). The doctrine of *meaning as use* (Wittgenstein 1953, § 43) implies that the key concept is that of *context embeddedness*, where the term refers to the institutional and cultural context (Godino and Batanero 1997). So an aspect to be considered is the context in which we are going to propose an activity with counting rods: as a matter of fact, pupils were not asked to approach an explicit *mathematical* (algebraic) activity. As we shall see, the method they used can be approached as a *new game*, which is not included in the usual cultural system, not as a traditional mathematical task.

3. Methodology

In this paper we make reference to the chapter 8 (*Fangcheng*) of the *Jiuzhang Suanshu* (*Nine Chapters on the Mathematical Art*, 1st cent. BC), an anonymous handbook containing 246 problems (Cullen 2002). In order to solve a system of linear equations, ancient Chinese mathematicians placed coefficients and numbers on the counting board; their arrangement can be changed according to the following rules: the expression *biancheng* ("multiplication throughout", Martzloff 1997, p. 253; Needham 1959) is an instruction to multiply all the terms of a row by a given number; the expression *zhichu* ("direct reduction") carries out a series of term-by-term subtractions of a row from another row.

We are going to summarize an experiment with a group of 11-year-old pupils. The experience took place in a 6th grade classroom (in Treviso, Italy). The experimental excerpts (Bagni 2006) allowed us to highlight some elements that are relevant to our discussion.

Let us consider the system (in our modern notation):

$$5x + 3y = 19$$

$$3x + 2y = 12$$

and let us see the rods arrangements proposed by some pupils in order to obtain the solution (we report the original counting board used; the translation of the labels is: "type A" and "type B bundles", "cereals"):



Let us consider now the second system (in our notation):

$$4x + y = 6$$

$$2x + 3y = 8$$

and the solution proposed by the same group of pupils:



4. Discussion

In the experiment in question, pupils approached an algebraic procedure without using the typical algebraic signs. They effectively solved a couple of simultaneous linear equations by using counting rods, thus with reference to the secondary artifact expressed in chapter 8 of the *Jiuzhang Suanshu*.

According to Bruner, developmental growth considers the enactive, iconic and symbolic modes, and requires ability to translate between them (Bruner 1987): the experiment in question provides us with interesting examples of translation. An effective translation from the enactive to iconic mode (the frequent use of deictic expressions and of gestures is remembered in: Bagni 2006) and, in addition, a first approach to the symbolic mode can be seen in the pupils' behaviour.

Pupils gave preference to the rule that is based more directly upon the concrete presence of counting-rods on the counting board. Indeed, when they apply rule *zhichu* ("direct reduction"), which allows term-by-term subtractions of two rows, they consider two quantities that they can see and touch; whereas when they apply rule *biancheng* ("multiplication throughout"), which allows the multiplication of all the terms of a row by a number k , this number k cannot be referred to the concrete presence of counting-rods. So, according to the empirical data, we can state that using (original) primary artifacts with reference to (original) secondary artifacts can be relevant to the introduction of some methods; more generally, the crucial point is that *the considered method is based upon the "positional" character of ancient Chinese algebra*, according to which a particular place in the board must be always occupied by a particular kind of number (e.g. a particular coefficient). This "positional" character cannot be pointed out in our basic algebraic European tradition.

What is the transparency (Meira 1998) of the artifact in question? Pupils used a representation including signs, spatial relations and embodied rules with reference to a context having some typical features of a *game*, more precisely of a *new game* (concerning multicultural games, a lot of references can be quoted; for instance: Barbarash 1999; Kirchner 2000; Braman 2002; several mathematical games are examined in: Zaslavsky 1998). So an important path to follow can be related to the role of the game: this concrete context may allow the effective construction of meanings that can be referred to abstract algebraic representation.

It is worth noting that the secondary artifact introduced is not strictly necessary in order to allow a physical action with the primary artifact: from this point of view, the introduced rules can be considered conventional,

arbitrary (the original secondary artifact can be simplified: for instance, the use of both *Tsung* and *Heng* dispositions is not strictly necessary: counting rods can be arranged in very many ways; of course the intercultural aspect leads us to refer to the original dispositions). So pupils referred to a particular algebraic "language" that "did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination" (Wittgenstein 1969, § 475): in fact, the origin of a language game is a reaction. Following Wittgenstein, we can remember that language is not just a code, whose power can be referred to its syntax; its creative power lies in how language itself is embedded in the rest of pupils' activities, and, in this particular case, in a *game*. The game has a well-defined meaning in the pupil's mind, being a *new game* to be explored and played; we are dealing with a game making reference to a very different cultural tradition: and this meaning is clearly *useful in order to give sense to the algebraic procedure considered*.

Of course, it is important to investigate the conceptualization of the experience, in order to avoid the meaning of the procedure introduced being considered only in the sense of *know how* and not in the sense of *know that* (Wittgenstein 1956, I § 99 and II § 46): further research will be devoted to the study of the educational possibilities connected to activities similar to the one considered. However, in our opinion, the main point cannot be summarised in the possibility of a complete derivation of an argumentation, or a mathematical proof (Balacheff 1987): as a matter of fact, pupils will develop the connection with the predicative structure of knowledge at an institutional level in the process of teaching and learning.

Finally, we should point out that the experiment described can be regarded as an intercultural opportunity for proposing a mathematical content with reference to the context in which it was actually developed. All over the world, in all historical periods, people have developed mathematical ideas to meet their needs and interests. This perspective can thus enrich the learning of all students: they learn that mathematics was created by real people attempting to solve real problems and they are asked to extend their problem solving skills to issues within their communities. It should be remembered that Rorty underlines the importance of the relativity of descriptive vocabularies to periods and traditions (Rorty 1979). Nevertheless, pupils of different interests and diverse achievement levels will take pride in the contributions of their own people and learn to appreciate the accomplishments of others. Education is an instrument for promoting understanding and dialogue between cultures: really overcoming prejudice and obstructing the emergence of intolerance are primary educational tasks.

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Wittgenstein, Language and Chess

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Wittgenstein's works on the field of philosophy of language are usually seen as being inspired by the years he spent in Cambridge, England. However, Janik and Toulmin (1974) do debate this interpretation and look instead to the Central European tradition, especially the Viennese cultural and historical context of the late 19th and early 20th century. One of the strongest influences is that of Fritz Mauthner: "Language is just a convention just like a rule of a game... Its task isn't to alter the real world, anyway." For both Wittgenstein and Mauthner, language is an activity that puts order in human life in the same way a rule does in a game.

My intention is not to show that the Viennese philosophical tradition influenced Wittgenstein, but rather to show that great chess theoreticians and their points of views had an influence on him. I refer here to authors such as Reti and others that published classic works on chess in Vienna.

The use of the chess analogy by Wittgenstein is not a mere rhetoric figure, but rather an integral part of his logical thought. Wittgenstein's interest for chess is, no doubt, related to the environment in which he grew up as a child and as a young man. It is known that from the mid-19th century to the first three decades of 20th century Vienna was the epicenter of chess activity in Europe. Some international tournaments took place here in 1873, 1882, 1898, 1914, 1922. One of the oldest clubs in Europe, the *Wiener Schachklub*, was also founded there in 1857 and the *Wiener Schachzeitung* began being published as early as 1855. By 1914 Marco, its editor, turned it into the world's best publication dedicated to chess by that time. Austrian chess was considered to be at its peak during the Habsburg monarchy, especially between 1873 and 1914. Top players also settled in Vienna.

At first sight this information could be taken to be excessively centered on the field of chess, if it were not for that it is precisely within this context that the youngest of the Wittgensteins was born in 1889 and grew up at *Alleegasse 16*. His house was one of Vienna's musical centers. Musicians frequently visited the home on the musical evenings organized by the hosts. Ludwig also used the analogy with music to express his conception of language. And it is most probable that, at a young age coinciding with the most prominent epoch of Viennese chess, he learned there the rules of chess game – rules that he would later use as a fundamental and indispensable analogy to show his philosophical conceptions of language.

The language-chess analogy has been used by many philosophers and scientists before and after Wittgenstein. We could mention Thomas Huxley (Salzmann, 1949) amongst them. In the late 19th century he asserted metaphorically: "*the chessboard is the world, the pieces are the phenomena of the universe, the rules of the game are what we call the laws of nature.*" More recently, a video has been released in which Richard Feynmann uses the analogy to explain the laws of physics.

But perhaps the most important direct antecedent with respect to language-chess relationship is Ferdinand de Saussure. He relates the way in which language

operates like a chess game. The chess analogy in the theories of de Saussure is considered to be a frontal attack to the linguists of his time, who thought that language was to be explained on the basis of analyzing etymologies and that language analysis was nothing different from describing the evolution of etymologies. He sustained that the speaker very seldom knows the language he is using very well, what he is interested in is the way he makes use of it. This is also the case of chess: many players do not even need to know neither the particular history of chess ideas, nor the particular history of a game in order to be able to find a move at a given position. It suffices to have enough practice at playing to select the appropriate move. Likewise, a speaker does not need to know the history of the word he is about to speak within a given context. This rendered as absurd the pretensions of the partisans of the history of language and etymologies, who pretended to reconstruct a chess game from the initial starting point of each piece.

Let me illustrate the above mentioned with an example:



In this position, a skilled player will recognize that the immediate winning move is to place the black queen in g3. He doesn't need to know that the game was played by Levitsky and Marshall, nor that the first move was 1.d4, nor that the game was derived by transposition into a French defense. It is irrelevant that German fans threw gold coins to Marshall as a sign of admiration and so on. The skilled player doesn't need to know any of those things to find the quickest winning move in this position. Again, the same is valid for language: a speaker doesn't need to know the etymology of a word to use it appropriately.

Now we turn to Wittgenstein (1974). In the period known as the intermediate one we find an endless number of references to the analogies words-chess pieces and language-chess rules. Here is a sample of the above mentioned:

"Does not comprehension only start with the proposition, with a whole proposition? Can half of a proposition be comprehended? –Half a proposition is not a complete proposition. But we might understand what this question means as follows. Let's assume that the movement of the knight is always made by means of two movements of the piece, one straight and one perpendicular. We could thus say that 'in the chess game the half of the movement of the knight does not exist', meaning that the relationship between the half of the movement of the knight and a whole movement is not the same as that existing between the half of a muffin and a whole muffin. We mean that it is not a difference of degrees."

While half a muffin is still a piece of bread, half a knight's move makes no sense within the system of chess rules, i.e., there is no such thing as half a knight's move. The same is valid for a pawn or any other piece. In one of his conversations with Waismann we can read that "the pawn is the sum of the rules it moves in accordance with, just as in language the rules of syntax what determines what is there of logic in the word" (Waismann, 1973). That is, the pawn, the knight or any other figure are not precisely physical objects made of wood, plastic or any other material. They are the sum of the rules they move in accordance with. Otherwise, blind chess could not be played, which shows that it isn't played with physical objects properly, but with rules and relationships between rules.

Wittgenstein wants to comprehend language and to think about what "comprehending" and "not comprehending a proposition" means. Thus, he appeals time and again to the chess analogy. On behalf of the theoreticians of the game we can cite a tradition that also compares chess with language. One of the greatest of all times is Reti (1922), who tells us that

"The most surprising, even on a superficial study of Capablanca's game is his great security, his almost absence of mistakes and false interpretations of the position. It is undoubtedly the consequence of having learned to play being a four year old kid. In a certain sense, chess is his native tongue... comparing him to Rubinstein, who learned chess at the age of 18 and never mastered completely the middle game difficulties... [Rubinstein] is like a speaker that is speaking in a foreign language, learned as a grown up in a way that, despite his profound ideas, can not always find the most appropriate word. On the contrary, Capablanca, while paying chess, speaks his native tongue and conceives his thought in exact terms. The rules of the technique mean to chess what the rules of grammar to a language. But grammar, which is replaced by our language practices, is unnecessary in our native tongue..."

Reti had shown that for theoretical-grammatical apprenticeship the learning process of a native tongue is unnecessary long before Strawson (1997) referred himself to the fact that the domain of a practice (for instance, chess, or the apprenticeship of a language) does not imply an explicit domain of the theory of that practice, since "grammars were learned implicitly long before they were written explicitly."

Another classical theoretician of chess who compares the rules of chess with grammar is R. Fine (1948):

"Rules in chess can perhaps be better compared to the grammar of a language. When we get to be adepts, we obey the chess rules unthinkingly, and in our native tongue we speak grammatically, even though in both cases most of us, if pressed, could not make a formal statement of the principles we are applying."

Also the English theoretician Abrahams (1952) tells us that "the fact that the chess player is controlled by rules makes him more comparable to the user of a language with a grammar than those who explicitly use deductively rules and formulas."

When Wittgenstein wants to explain the meaning of a word he tells us that it consists of "the «place» that it has on a «grammatical system»." If we are to believe in the reference made by G. E. Moore (1983), "the meaning of a word is determined by the grammatical rules it is used in accordance with." Moore tells us that he had not managed to understand well what Wittgenstein meant when he asserted that a word must pertain to a «system» in order to have a meaning. And this is repeatedly alleged by Moore in his text on the Wittgenstein's Cambridge conferences (1930-1933). He also admits being confused by the problem of the rules of grammar; he does not fully understand Wittgenstein's constant comparison of them with the rules of chess.

This last thing is what made me take a closer look at the chess-language analogy in Wittgenstein, because in his text on the Cambridge conferences where he refers to the notion of logical multiplicity, Moore explicitly states: "nevertheless, I doubt that he [Wittgenstein] was right with respect to what he meant by affirming that 'the characteristic feature of chess is the logical multiplicity of its rules'". Moore previously said about this concept "whatever it is that it means", clearly suggesting that he didn't know what it meant. Then he tried to make the notion clear assuming that Wittgenstein was wrong:

"But I relieve he was wrong if by «the rules of chess» he meant (what I consider very likely) the rules that define the movements that can be made with pieces of different kinds (for instance, with pawns and bishops), and suggested that the «logical multiplicity» of rules that define the possible movements of a pawn and a bishop are enough to distinguish a pawn from a bishop..."

It is precisely here that Moore gets confused because he assumes that Wittgenstein refers to the rules that define the legal movements of the pieces when he's actually referring to chess rules in general. But anyone familiar with the game – as I assume that Wittgenstein was – will understand that within the concept of rules we also include those that serve to be conducive to our strategy during a game.

"The beginner at chess has dozens of rules thrown at him. 'Capture towards the center'; 'Develop Knights before Bishops'; 'In cramped positions free yourself by exchanging'; 'Place rooks behind passed pawns' are among the better known. For one who is just beginning to formulate ideas about the game such rules are an ideal short-cut."

It is exactly in this sense in which a Viennese of the mid-20th century, who learned the languages of music and chess at an early age, understood chess (Wittgenstein, 1992):


"Anyone will deny that the study of nature that the rules of games must be useful for the study of grammatical rules, because undoubtedly there exists some similitude between them. The right thing is to let instinct guide us, being persuaded that there is an affinity, and to consider the rules of games without previous judgments or prejudices about the analogy between grammar and games."

In modern chess we find many examples of players who have applied theories that illustrate the concept of logical multiplicity of rules as, for instance Bent Larsen and David Bronstein. Let's illustrate this with a diagram:



The rule that is broken here is that there shall not be many moves made with pawns during the opening, but in this case it is perfectly justified by a strategy of restriction that is fully appropriate for the position. It reminds us of the notion of *rule-independence* as described by the theoretician John Watson (1998). Let's take a closer look at this definition:

"Many changes have taken place in modern chess, for instance, with respect to new ideas about the weaknesses, the relative strength of the minor pieces, the value of exchange and considerations on time and mobility. But the predecessor, and to some extent the precursor of those changes has been a certain philosophical concept so deeply embodied in us today that we almost do not even notice it. I call it the 'rule-independence concept'... It is simply the dispossessing, made by chess players, of the manifold generalities, rules and abstract principles that directed classic chess and still do prevail on our text books. Furthermore, the rejection of the very concept of 'rule' has been taking place in favor of a pragmatic research of particular game situations. The intense study of a large amount of game positions combined with a dramatic growth of playing frequency by the majority of professional players has led to a new way of looking at chess knowledge. This way of looking at it could be described in terms of 'unconscious principles' or also subtle clues that cannot be verbally expressed, that are continuously modified and measured to refine the judgment of the diverse positions. A 'sense' has been developed for positional chess... [that] abandons (completely or to a great extent) the dogma. This is rule-independence."



The above diagrams are taken from an actual chess game. They show rule-independence in the sense of classic chess: the rule that the knights should be moved towards the center of the chessboard. The diagrams show that both white knights move towards the sides of the board. Technical analysis proves that it is the right strategy independent of what the so-called "classic rules" tell us. We can confidently say that in contemporary chess there are thousands of examples that confirm the rule-independence concept.

But what is it that allows us to relate Watson's concept of rule-independence to Wittgenstein's concept of logical multiplicity of the rules? We shall turn to the propositions of what is known as *Hypermodern School* and thus, to Reti- The goal of the school was "not to consider each position in accordance to a general law, but rather according to the principle inherent to the positions."

Let us revise three quotes (Wittgenstein 1992 and Waismann 1973) to illustrate this idea:

"Wir reden von dem räumlichen und zeitlichen Phänomen der Sprache; nicht von einem unräumlichen und unzeitlichen Unding. Aber wir reden von ihr so, wie von den Figuren des Schachspiels, indem wir Spielregeln für sie angeben, nicht ihre physikalischen Eigenschaften beschreiben. Die Frage »was ist ein Wort« ist analog der »was ist eine Schachfigur (etwa der Schachkönig).«"

"[...] The game of chess does not consist of moving wooden pieces... The essence of chess is not the wooden figures. What is characteristic of chess is the logical multiplicity of the rules..."

"[...] It does not matter what the aspect of a pawn is, because the set of rules of the game is what gives its logical place to the pawn. The pawn is a variable, as the x is in logic."

My suggestion is to integrate Watson's concept of rule-independence in Wittgenstein's concept of logical multiplicity. I included long quotes from current chess theory to suggest that the notion of logical multiplicity (as understood and applied by Wittgenstein as an analogy for arithmetic and grammatical rules) is well oriented. This analysis has proven Moore to be wrong, for no skilled chess player takes rules to be only the legal movements of the pieces, but rather also includes in his understanding of the concept the rules of strategy. Chess constituted an unbeatable analogy for his intuition of what grammar rules really are. Basic knowledge of chess strategy is advisable for those interested in developing a deeper understanding of Wittgenstein's theory of language.

"Now language is the work of thought: and hence all that is expressed in language must be general. What I only mean or suppose is mine: it belongs to me -- this particular individual. But language expresses nothing but generalities; and so I cannot say what I merely mean."

With respect to these words taken from Hegel 1991, I shall say that current chess theory confirms the richness of Wittgenstein's use of the analogy of chess. Many of Wittgenstein's notions of language do say much more than he actually wanted to say when he used the analogy. His intention was rather to show concepts that couldn't be adequately expressed by means of articulated language. And that is why he used analogies for grammatical rules and games rules. Finally, the analogy of chess has perhaps its limitations, but an analysis of them is a task for a different stage of the research on this topic.

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Wittgenstein on the Relationship Between Individual and Community

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How does a child learn to speak its native tongue? What makes for the normativity of rules? Can there be a private language? Do I only know from my own case what pain is? These and similar questions make up a large part of Wittgenstein's later work, and his answers all testify to the same basic conviction: that language is a thoroughly social phenomenon and man is an inherently social being. Although Wittgenstein can perhaps not be said to explicitly endorse a social theory of, e.g., mind or meaning, he clearly emphasizes the public instead of the private and the collective instead of the individual in dealing with such issues.

When trying to extrapolate Wittgenstein's – or a Wittgenstein-inspired – view on mind or meaning, one naturally takes this social emphasis as one's starting point. It is arguably the only place to start, but it also leads to some important difficulties – or so it has led me. Sometimes Wittgenstein practically seems to reduce the private to the public and the individual to the communal; does that not effectively prevent him from accounting for the very phenomena he is investigating? For is the ability to, say, understand and follow a rule in the end not an individual capacity? And how to explain the dynamic nature of language without recourse to individuals who break linguistic conventions? It seems that Wittgenstein must maintain *some* notion of individuality, but how is that compatible with the immense importance he apparently attaches to the community?

It is not just for such systematic reasons that one could want to preserve a notion of individuality. An objection that is frequently raised against the (over)emphasizing of the role of community, is that this undermines our concept of personal responsibility. The argument roughly goes that if the self is completely constituted by context, it is unclear whether a person can ultimately be held responsible for his or her actions. Wittgenstein, too, appears to think that the concept of personal responsibility is indispensable. In *Culture and Value* he for instance states that a religious upbringing should never take the form of indoctrination, but must always involve an appeal to conscience. (CV p. 28, 64) He also rejects the theory of predestination as being profoundly irreligious or unethical. (CV p. 81, 86)

To Wittgenstein, then, life is a calling the ethical or religious person should not ignore. Now does this ideal of individual answerability not shed a new light on the priority he assigns to the community elsewhere? Indeed, Wittgenstein's prioritization of community is only irreconcilable with a notion of individuality if both are considered to be diametrically opposed. But could community on the basis of Wittgenstein not be depicted as something to which every individual makes an unequivocal contribution and for which he or she remains responsible? In what follows I hope to contribute to this question of community and individuality or, more precisely, personal responsibility.

Looking for a Wittgensteinian account of community is, however, no easy task. Perhaps it should come as no surprise that Wittgenstein nowhere spells out how he considers the individual and the community to interrelate. I

came across only one remark from which a clearer concept of community seems to emerge. In this 1931 reflection on the position of the Jews in European history, Wittgenstein employs the traditional idea of the body politic. Though he does not present the simile as his own, he seems to empathically describe how citizens experience the nation as a body of which they are part, while the Jewish minority is felt to be “a kind of disease”. Such a “swelling”, Wittgenstein goes on to explain, “can only be taken to be a proper part of the body when the whole feeling for the body is changed.” (MS 154 p. 22-23; transl. CB) But he seems rather pessimistic about the possibility of such a transformation ever taking place.

Yet despite this one remark, other parts of Wittgenstein's oeuvre suggest that the idea of the body politic is actually an inappropriate metaphor for thinking about community. An important insight from Wittgenstein's reflections on meaning, first of all, is that the “model of ‘object and designation’” (PI § 293) is not the format according to which all of our words function. Wittgenstein is for example highly critical of the temptation to think that ‘time’ is the name for a special kind of entity or even person (BT p. 522); similarly, one would expect him to call it misguided to assume that ‘community’ must refer to a particular item or substance. But the idea of the body politic is not only questionable on language-theoretical grounds. It also raises pertinent questions concerning personal responsibility; that appears to be a problematic concept of this picture as responsibility seems transferred to, or at least mediated by, the nation as a whole. But it is precisely this concept of which I have just claimed that Wittgenstein regards it as indispensable.

At first sight, then, Wittgenstein's writings only indicate how *not* to depict the relationship between societies and their ‘members’, without pointing to a genuine alternative. But instead of concluding that there simply is no legitimate Wittgensteinian concept of community, I propose to develop or extract one by re-reading some of his more ‘social’ remarks, and speculate on what may be implied or assumed there. Knowing how Wittgenstein would not want to depict community will, rather than bringing my explorations to a halt, be the driving force behind them.

A good starting point are the sections from the *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* and *Philosophical Investigations* where Wittgenstein puts forward that being in a particular mental state is – to borrow a phrase from his reflections on rule-following – “not something that it would be possible for only *one* man to do” and to be done “only *once*”. (PI § 199) Wittgenstein thinks that a person can only be said to pretend, mourn or hope if he or she has been initiated into a certain form of life. A person's being in a particular mental state is therefore not something that is, strictly speaking, limited to that person at that point in time. In the way someone manifests hope or grief he namely reflects the manifestations of hope or grief of those who initiated him.

Hence Wittgenstein states: "Not, what *one* man is doing *now*, but the whole hurly-burly [of the actions of a variety of humans], is the background against which we see an action." (RPPii § 629)

Now what does the observation, that a person's psychological states are what they are only given a larger social context, imply about the concept of community? Is the background Wittgenstein talks about some totality superior to individual human beings; a predetermined whole into which the individual immerses itself without leaving the slightest trace? Elsewhere Wittgenstein describes feelings like grief as "pattern[s]" in the "weave of our life," (PI II i p. 174) which may seem to support such an 'impersonal' reading. On closer inspection, however, these remarks turn out to point in a different direction. Wittgenstein continues that if grief can be taken to be a pattern in the weave of life, one should think of this pattern as being "not always complete" and "varied in a multiplicity of ways." (RPPii § 672) So instead of a monolithic whole, Wittgenstein's weave of life is something open-ended and heterogeneous; the background of an individual's psychological states is a hurly-burly or a "bustle" (RPPii § 625) of human activity. Individuals cannot be said to disappear in the weave of life, for it is composed of nothing more, and nothing less, than the doings of many a human being.

Yet regardless of the dynamics invoked by this 'hustle and bustle' terminology, one could ask whether the picture Wittgenstein paints is nonetheless that of a single human being having to adapt to the others and adopt a common way of life. Is there, to put it differently, not still an ideal of a common identity or collective essence – so unmistakably present in the metaphor of the body politic - at work here as well? When the question is phrased in terms of identity or essence along these lines, one well-known Wittgensteinian concept comes to mind: that of 'family resemblance'. Though Wittgenstein did not intend this concept to represent the relationship between individual and community, it aims to rethink precisely what identity or essence amounts to.

In response to an interlocutor complaining that the *Investigations* nowhere explain what the essence of language is, Wittgenstein famously urges him to consider all the different things we call 'games'. These activities do not have some one thing in common; like the members of a family, each game resembles the other games in one or more respects, but resembles every other game in a different way each time. As a result, the word 'game' is "a concept with blurred edges." (PI § 71) It stands for an open-ended collection of proceedings to which new ones can be added on the basis of characteristics that cannot be given beforehand. But this flexibility is exactly what makes the concept fit for use.

With this in mind, Wittgenstein compares the use we make of concepts like 'game' to the spinning of a thread: "[We] extend our concept [...] as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres." (PI § 67) Certainly, Wittgenstein adds, though a concept like 'game' is not "closed by a frontier" prior to all use, "[you] can *draw one*" (PI § 68) at any point. That is, however, always a choice one makes for a specific purpose. It is at any rate not enforced by one essential characteristic that supposedly defines what a game is.

I propose taking the notion of family resemblance as a metaphor, not simply for the flexibility of our concepts,

but for the very way individual and community interrelate. Reading it this way can namely provide an account of community - or at least the outline of one – that could prove to be a worthy alternative to the idea of the body politic. The weave of life that forms the background of a person's mental states is, as I mentioned earlier, composed of a wide range of human activity. It would therefore be more appropriate to speak of the 'weaving' than of the 'weave' of life. But this weaving does not revolve around the production of one ready-made fabric that is supposed to fit all shapes and sizes. It does not, in other words, result in the individual having to conform to a static, prearranged pattern. What the role of the individual human being rather is, can be explained by means of the 'spinning of a thread' analogy.

Just as a thread does not consist of one single fibre but derives its strength from the overlapping of many fibres, community is not a matter of individuals sharing one essential characteristic, but of being both like and unlike each other in many different ways. Partaking of the weaving of life, therefore, is as much a matter of reformation or innovation as it is of conformation. Moreover, just as one can keep on extending a thread by twisting fibre on fibre, it cannot beforehand be stated which individuals with what characteristics belong to a certain community, and which do not. That is to say, one can always draw a boundary line, but that is always a decision one takes for a specific purpose; a decision that cannot be defended by pointing to some unchanging essence and that can thus always be put up for discussion.

My suggestion, then, is that when Wittgenstein appeals to the community, he is not thinking of a mere cluster of isolated beings, nor of the incorporation of persons into some larger whole. Instead, he is thinking of the interweaving of individual human beings' lives by sharing both similarities and differences. The question is whether this suggestion reconciles the apparent tension, identified at the beginning of this paper, between Wittgenstein's ethico-religious ideal of individual accountability, and his prioritization of community. What conclusions, if only provisionally, can be drawn concerning the issue of responsibility from within this framework?

One lesson to be learned concerns the responsibility of the community towards individuals, especially those on the fringes or outside of a community. As there is, on this picture, no ultimate foundation on which a community can be established, the in- and exclusion of individuals, or groups of individuals, is always a choice one must be prepared to defend when objections are raised against it – and objections can always be raised against it. But this form of answerability cannot be seen in isolation from the responsibility that the individual has towards the community, or communities, in which he or she participates. Since an individual's life is interwoven in many ways with many others' lives, anything one does or refrains from doing affects the lives of those others, be they more, less or even remotely akin. One can therefore never withdraw from community, but that does not mean that one thereby loses all responsibility. It should, on the contrary, be understood that one's actions reverberate throughout the weave of life.

Let me conclude by stating that on this reading of Wittgenstein – and let me add that I do not assume it to be beyond improvement or debate - community and personal responsibility are in agreement instead of at odds with each other. To Wittgenstein, indeed, individual and community seem intimately connected instead of diametrically opposed. This suggests that there are limits

as to how social a theory of, e.g., mind or meaning one can develop on the basis of Wittgenstein. But it also suggests that no purely individualistic account can serve as an alternative to an overly social one. To include Wittgenstein in these philosophical discussions means to think beyond this dichotomy.

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About “die letzte Zusammenfassung”

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I

On 22 October 1915 Wittgenstein wrote to Russell, telling him that was doing a satisfactory job of synthesis in treatise form, which would be finally fit for publication. Publication could not take place before Russell looked at the work, and thus this would only be possible after the war. But he could not survive: therefore he invited Russell, in this case, to ask for all his manuscripts, among which he would base the final summary written in pencil on loose sheets.¹ Taking in consideration this letter in his "Historical Introduction" to the first edition of *Prototractatus*, von Wright does not think that speaking about a “last” version implies that there must have been at least another one, and that at the time there existed two “Zusammenfassungen”; it can be only derived from this - he supposes - that the *Prototractatus* note-book, preliminary drawing up of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, in turn had at least one predecessor (Wittgenstein 1971, 6). Von Wright thought that the *Prototractatus* was composed immediately before the final version, in summer 1918; with much caution, and it was only 30 years later that McGuinness (McGuinness 2002) came to the conclusion that both of von Wright theses are wrong. On October 1915 already two prototypal versions of the *Abhandlung* existed, and one of these was the *Prototractatus* (more exactly, the first pages of *Prototractatus* note-book).²

In the dating of literary works, one usually agrees to consider the moment of completion, imagining a sequential process on whose end the entire job is dated. But there are cases that break off the outline and completely puzzle the classic interpreter. The *Prototractatus* note-book is one of these, because it accompanies the entire composition of the *Abhandlung*, from 1915 to 1918, and in every moment, by virtue of its structure and the ingenious expedient of its numbers, it turns out to be up-to-date. In fact the modifications that followed over the course of time consist in adding new propositions and do not consider the already written text. Since material organization is based upon the decimal numeration, the note-book does not require any rewriting and it is indeed in every moment the exact documentation of itself. It happens therefore that it turns out to be prior to as well as later than October 1915. Not in the banal sense of a work in progress, and therefore of indeterminate and insignificant dating, but rather in the sense that in every moment the *Prototractatus* is a last copy. It is enough to read it watching to the numeration, and not to the physical order of the phrases. Apart from this, the composition order is totally different from the sequence in which we are accustomed to reading the *Tractatus*: to say, the cardinal propositions 1 – 6 are all on the first page of the notebook; the “comments” that

Wittgenstein gradually adds can be connected to whichever previously inserted proposition. Such a top-down technique of drawing up gives to the work a second, valuable characteristic: it is also, in every moment, complete. It can have more or less details, a comment in one or in another point, but it appears always virtually finished, totally readable. This particularity is doubly loved by Wittgenstein, who risks life in any moment and who, in any case, always thought he was destined to die a premature and unexpected death. Nevertheless, in October 1915 Wittgenstein claims to have constructed a still better version than the *Prototractatus* notebook, a representation method on melted sheets which he advises Russell to take mainly into consideration as “last summary”.

II

We can reasonably assume that on October 1915 the notebook reached the separation line on page 28 (on 121 in total): the “original” part of the treatise, which was not resumed from previous manuscripts, was nearly completely carried out and comprised all the entire structure and various detail coppers. What did the *letzte Zusammenfassung* suggest to Russell to possess more? Here McGuinness puts forward an important hypothesis (McGuinness 2002), that nevertheless neglects Wittgenstein’s overall sense. He imagines that the version on loose sheets contained the same propositions of the notebook, but in numeration order, exactly as the final typescript. McGuinness thinks that later on Wittgenstein wrote up other versions ordered by decimals, some on typescript, some on intermediate note-book, some on melted sheets. But in so doing he disregarded the fundamental structural difference between the notebook and the typescript, on one side, and melted sheets, on the other. A drawing up in tightened decimal order is sequential by definition, and demands a sequential support. Loose sheets are of opposite nature, have the faculty and the aim to be put in different orders and they certainly do not introduce any advantage; they demand indeed sagacity and attention in order not to be melted and for the sequence not to disappear. Why then does Wittgenstein choose just a melted sheets support, as he specifies to Russell? If we place such question, McGuinness hypothesis isn’t tenable. Can we think that at the moment Wittgenstein did not have a normal notebook and predisposed just for Russell a package of sheets that goodness knows in which order and after how many passages would have reached him?

Imagining the route of the sheets from Wittgenstein to Russell, we can approach the kernel of the objection. In this type of interpretation one is inclined to discuss only one side of the semantic of “the last”: that is, the reference to a temporal order, to a question of “before” and “after”. It is neglected instead the observer point of view: *when* something turns out “last”, and how longer eventually it can remain such. Since that was a letter in which Wittgenstein speaks about his recent work, it was considered obvious that “*die letzte Zusammenfassung*” was “the last” only at that time when Wittgenstein writes the letter. Obviously - thinks who has in mind a normal sequential copy - very soon *die letzte Zusammenfassung*

¹ „Ich habe in der letzten Zeit sehr viel gearbeitet und, ich glaube, mit gutem Erfolg. Ich bin jetzt dabei das Ganze zusammenzufassen und in Form einer Abhandlung niederzuschreiben. Ich werde nun keinesfalls etwas veröffentlichen, ehe Du es gesehen hast. Das kann aber natürlich erst nach dem Kriege geschehen. Aber, wer weiß, ob ich das erleben werde. Falls ich es nicht mehr erlebe, so lass Dir von meinen Leuten meine ganzen Manuskripte schicken, darunter befindet sich auch die letzte Zusammenfassung mit Bleistift auf losen Blättern geschrieben. Es wird Dir vielleicht einige Mühe machen allen zu verstehen, aber lass Dich dadurch nicht abschrecken.“ (Wittgenstein 1980, p.74)

² Until 1996, McGuinness thought that *Prototractatus* notebook started after October 1915, on the basis of the lose sheets version (McGuinness 1989, p.39; Wittgenstein ²1996, p.IX).

is no more the last one, and is forgotten, rejected, integrated in other versions (see McGuinness 2002). But if we examine the step more thorough, we see how Wittgenstein nearly represents the moment in which Russell will read his papers: if I don't survive, get my people to send you my manuscripts, and among them you'll find the last summary made so and so; it will cost you some trouble to understand it etc. All makes think that the main interest of the *letzte Zusammenfassung* is to be still the last version at the moment in which Russell will have it in his hands. *Die letzte Zusammenfassung* is such not only because was composed *in der letzten Zeit*, i.e. little before 22 October 1915, but because it will be the final synthesis, that is the most up-to-date, also when Russell will receive his manuscripts.

If Wittgenstein's letter was that one of a condemned in the imminence of his execution, the two interpretations would be equivalents: the state of manuscripts during the letter writing down would be the same one at the moment of the testamentary bequest reception. But Wittgenstein cannot know if and when he will die: who knows whether I shall survive the war, he writes; and he expects a long war. Therefore he's imagining that in case of his sudden death, perhaps after some month, perhaps after some year of further work, among his manuscripts there will still be the *Zusammenfassung* written in pencil on loose sheets, and it will be indeed classifiable, for Russell, as *die letzte*. How could he prefigure something of this sort, if the drawing up on loose sheets was a simple sequential rewriting, immediately obsolete and quickly to eliminate? Nevertheless Wittgenstein feels himself truly, in an obscure way, condemned to death; his letter is at all effects a testamentary disposition. Make Russell read *die letzte Zusammenfassung* is not a simple fantasy, but a precise will, that formally obligates Russell as Wittgenstein himself. Therefore the letter, while engages Russell as publishing executor, equally engages Wittgenstein to make possible what he promised. His punctilios rigor would not tolerate the idea that Russell would not find any *letzte Zusammenfassung* written in pencil on loose sheets, any future time Wittgenstein would die.

A testamentary disposition remains valid until its revoke, or until it is exceeded by ulterior actions: in this case, until when, on 1919, Wittgenstein writes to Russell again and he succeeds to send him the definitive version. Until that moment, or at least until August 1918 dictate, we must presume that, in force of his engagement, between Wittgenstein's papers remained *die letzte Zusammenfassung* written in pencil on loose sheets. The hypothesis seems fantasious because a loose sheets support is rather unusual, and above all because, in general, it is difficult to understand how an on-paper drawing up can remain so along the last version, in spite of its radical restructures. On the contrary, if Wittgenstein had had a PC and had written to Russell: "you'll find in the 'Dokumente' directory the file: *letzte_Zusammenfassung.doc*", we would not doubted that this would have been the last synthesis for every following month, and not only in the moment in which the letter was sent. Analogous, if we admit that the flying sheets support had a structure finalized to favor a continuous upgrading of the propositional device, it becomes obvious that Wittgenstein's words testify not only the existence of a copy written "on loose sheets", but the persistence of the support and the relative method of representation for the entire period of treatise composition - in symbiotic parallel with *Prototractatus* note-book.

III

This allows a more precise hypothesis on the real structure of the text on loose sheets, that cannot be that one assumed by McGuinness. Sure the melted sheets must respect the propositional numeration, but without falling back in the absolute sequence of final *Tractatus* editing. In order to use the heuristic hypothesis that the *Tractatus* is an hypertext organized by hierarchical levels, one has to imagine that the melted sheets structure was very liked as that one of electronic virtual pages. The method with which a today computer science engineer plans a Web site can help us to understand the sense of Wittgenstein job. If the engineer was forced to work with paper and pencil, he would predispose an increasing set of single sheets, on everyone of which to develop different sights. In case he decided to represent the connections by means of absolute numerical indices, a good solution would be just the Wittgenstein decimal notation, that specifies pages virtual positioning and links sequences inside every sight. Structural modifications are done simply changing the numerical index of the single object and they correspond to different arrangements of paper sheets, or of objects inside the same sheet. On paper, this is the best way in order to visualize the dependencies net, which becomes more and more articulate and impossible to reconstruct in abstract on the basis of only pointers.

The package of loose sheets remains an optimal work support for all the planning phase and does not demand any overall rewriting. On the contrary of whichever sequential drawing up in decimal order, the version on flying sheets is always up-to-date and available for several representations - by hierarchical lines, sequences of equal level, local or general structures. Additions are possible in every part of the configuration, in particular by putting new objects at the bottom of every sheet, or by inserting ulterior detail sheets - witch is exactly the proceeding way that *Prototractatus* note-book documents (see Geschkowsky 2001, pp.64-66). Probably, every new proposition is put by attempt into different places, reconstructed thanks to various sheets dispositions. Once accepted the new object, it is recorded inside the destination sheet and, with the consequent decimal number, on *Prototractatus* note-book.

If Wittgenstein therefore had not clearly insisted on the "last synthesis written on melted sheets", all this would not be that one pale conjecture. But if we put that indication beside the other clues we have, the picture becomes finally clear:

a) The choice of a loose sheets support, with all the risks of conservation, ordering etc., is comprehensible only if it's strongly finalized to a modelling work

b) Such version in 1915 is imagined as "*die letzte Zusammenfassung*" for all the incoming period; that is, it's always upgradeable and always concluded, ready for editing

c) The *Prototractatus* note-book, at least after page 28 separation line, has evidently a parallel alter-ego from which to obtain the number of every new proposition and on which to reorganize the propositional cascade; otherwise, the continuous numeration modifications remain inexplicable

d) The reference to "melted sheets", that some times seems to return and that puzzled critics, is not else than the echo of only one gradually increased package of sheets. Therefore, the manuscript "written in pencil on loose sheets with numbered propositions" that Heinrich

Groag remembers to have had in winter 1917-18 is not properly another new version, like von Wright said (Wittgenstein 1971, p.6 fn.2). Neither it's necessary, for economy of versions, to anticipate the episode to the previous year and to imagine a memory fault only because in a letter datable in spring 1917 Wittgenstein already asked Groag to return his manuscript sheets (McGuinness 1988, p.265). The loose sheets accompanied the entire *Tractatus* composition

e) The 1918 "*Korrektur*", cited on *Prototractatus* page 103, that involves a nearly complete propositions renumbering, necessarily happened on another support, used at least until August 1918 final dictate

f) After the "*Korrektur*", the *Prototractatus* operativity remains unchanged and the job proceeds in the same exact way of the previous pages, also in presence of a new numeration and therefore with necessary reference to a parallel document. This appears so incomprehensible to the *Prototractatus* editors that they decide that the note-book properly finishes at page 103 and they don't publish the successive 18 pages, which they consider simple copy of *Tractatus* parts and not a preparatory work to it. Viceversa, these pages continue to collect new additions, obviously with the definitive numeration that the loose sheets now have. Some proposition continues to be composed and reviewed on the note-book, with all the corrections of a first drawing up

g) The melted sheets instrument is perfected during its use and allows the tuning of the decimal indexes, which is testified – but not explained – by the note-book. The enigma of the numeration, origin of infinite arguments, is all in being the product of a long formal elaboration that is carried out in part on *Prototractatus* (moreover very rarely taken in consideration from critics) and in part elsewhere, quickly growing rich of multiple uses and means. From a point on, the ulterior evolution remains invisible; the "*Korrektur*" pointed out on page 103 exalts an architectonic and aesthetic function that was able to be fine-tuned only through the formal work on melted sheets.

IV

The representation on loose sheets is not the only possible one; Wittgenstein, so as our hypothetical computer science engineer, considers it a work support. It isn't evidently proposable for a sequential edition, because it would lose its main value: the possibility to freely reorganize the pages at different deepening levels. While the engineer can decant the sheets in their electronic analogous, Wittgenstein is forced to decide for one definitive paper sequence. This can only become in tight numbers order, assigning to every proposition its absolute logical place. The iconic-formal composition remains at reader responsibility, who must have the necessary ability to logical abstraction. But if an exhaustive representation turns out nearly impossible for a normal reader, it would remain to ask how could therefore Wittgenstein *create* a so pregnant architecture, in converging of logical, aesthetic and (for their needing power) ethic requests. The elaboration by loose sheets, to which Wittgenstein points out, answers well to the question, because it allows complex structural alternatives and it was able to represent much sophisticated formal aspects. This hypothesis naturally emerges in experimenting the effectiveness of the hypertextual transcription of the *Tractatus*, which exalts similitudes, symmetries and shapes that Wittgenstein fine tessellated and assembled in one only harmonic organism.

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Analytical Philosophy as a Project of Emancipation from Suffering

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Analytical philosophy is sometimes accused of being locked in splendid isolation, treating strictly technical problems of logical analysis of the language that interest no one on the outside, so there is no dialogue about these questions except the internal analytical one. The interpretation of Wittgenstein's work nonetheless offers an opportunity to reflect upon other parts of the European philosophical tradition, as well as to let oneself be inspired by non-European philosophical traditions.

The Schopenhauerian roots of Wittgenstein's thinking are perhaps sometimes uncritically overestimated as something major (see the examples of such writings in Gier 1981), sometimes underestimated, but the influence of Schopenhauer's work on Wittgenstein is already known today as well as Frege's and Russell's influence. I think we can trace the Schopenhauerian contribution to the interpretation of Wittgenstein beyond the reference to the particular solipsism of *Tractatus*, which is definitely influenced by *The World as Will and Representation*. Whereas the solipsistic point of view is something that Wittgenstein himself was trying hard to suppress and root out from his late works, he nonetheless retains a certain general solipsistic leaning in his philosophical activity.

I am not a Schopenhauerian scholar, but what can I say in short about his philosophical leaning? What is the final purpose of the project of *The World as Will and Representation*? Of course he does not want to do more than to tell the truth; that the whole of our experience is "representation" originating in the activity of blind 'will'. Schopenhauer sees life under the dictate of 'will' as full of pain and suffering. (Schopenhauer 1993 Bd. 1 § 57) So this initial standpoint leads to a set of various proposals or techniques how to escape, to get saved from the suffering of life. The noblest way of the emancipation from suffering is the philosophical one. The core of it lies in gaining the full knowledge of the functioning of 'will'. Once we have recognized that all what there is, the entire world with all its concerns, is nothing but representation originating in 'will', our desires, ambitions and fighting about worldly good burn out. 'Will' has no power over us anymore. (Schopenhauer 1993 vol. 1 § 68, 71)

These Schopenhauer's thoughts have deep parallels in old Indian doctrines, the teachings of Vedanta and Buddhism: once we have seen through the illusory essence of the world and the endless cycle of reincarnation, all our worldly desires become extinct and the God of death loses his power over us (cf. [anonymous] 1992, § 46, 170, 348, 353, 383). Schopenhauer himself notices many times these similarities, but it is up to competent Schopenhauerian and indologist scholars, which I am not, to decide whether he was rather directly influenced in this topic or he was more searching a parallel and support for his own conclusions., is to be left to. What interests me at this point is the question: how much from this view (whether genuinely Schopenhauerian or ultimately inspired by India) can we find in Wittgenstein's philosophy, both early and late?

We must concentrate mostly on the purpose of Wittgenstein's efforts. Of course, philosophy must tell the truth about its topic, in this case language and us. But what is the sense of this telling the truth? Certainly not a foundation of a philosophical school. Let's look where the

Tractarian story ends. The aim is to delimit as clearly as possible the realm of thinking (expressed as system of statements) and to show that the effable can be told with utmost clarity and the ineffable should be kept in silence. (Wittgenstein 1964, Preface) All the readers of *Tractatus* know that this teaching is just a "ladder". The ladder that shows the way from the chaos and confusion of misleading philosophical ambitions to grasp what there is. But even "good" philosophy, the "ladder", should be thrown away, once it has fulfilled its purpose. (Wittgenstein 1964, Preface, 6.53 & 6.54) It has been already said, I think more than once, that the "ladder" metaphor, though probably borrowed from Schopenhauer (Schopenhauer 1993 vol. 2, chap. 7, p. 108), evokes the *Diamond Sutra*'s characterization of Buddha's teaching as a "raft" that serves just to cross the river and then should be abandoned.

Wittgenstein's philosophy thus has a dual "escapist" structure. Firstly, it proposes the escape from the realm of what is not said clearly. Secondly, it itself is not something that should be retained as correct information. It is not information, it is a tool (cf. Heidegger's conception of *Leitwort* or *Wink*: Heidegger 1960), that can and should be put away after being used. Is it what should be transcended in some sense analogous to the realm of suffering? And to what end does Wittgenstein want to transcend it?

These questions are maybe put wrongly. Let's return to the "solipsistic" standpoint. The Schopenhauer's subject tries to orientate her-/himself in (to reinterpret) the whole of representation. The representation is put as generally her/him own and the orientation takes place with respect to the emancipation from suffering of the worldly existence, which is also only her/his own. (Schopenhauer 1993 vol. 1 § 2) The Tractarian subject also makes for her-/himself an order in the whole of the world, which is totally her/his own. The purpose of this project is nonetheless not just to make a report about the world as it is, but, as Wittgenstein's biography suggests, to be finally allowed or able to leave the solved problems and to deal with what is really worth to be dealt with. Philosophy shows itself as a difficult struggle. Indeed it provides an opportunity to justify one's existence as meaningful, but this justification is a struggle that should be abandoned once it has been won. At least Wittgenstein seems to have meant that by this all the problems vanish. (Wittgenstein 1964 6.52 & 6.521)

But is philosophy, both the old, confused one, and the new, instrumental one, comparable to the world of ambitions, pain and suffering, described colourfully by Schopenhauer? What is the connection between false philosophical problems (the confusion) and suffering? We should assume that there is no direct connection. But we can trace a very vague intuition: namely that for Wittgenstein, as for Schopenhauer, in some philosophical sense the clarification of the world (macrocosm) falls in one with the clarification of his own self (microcosm). And so the solution (the elimination) of philosophical and scientific questions falls in one with the solution (the evanishment) of the problem of life. (Wittgenstein 1964 5.6 and subordinates, see also Monk 1990, chap. VII)

Surprisingly enough, the late Wittgenstein's philosophy provides probably better ground for a straightforward comparison with this aspect of Schopenhauer's vision. The late Wittgenstein's philosophy serves as a *therapy* (Wittgenstein 1958 § 133). Recall the therapeutic elements in Schopenhauer: the prescribed medicine is the philosophical knowledge, the end of the therapy is not gaining the knowledge itself, but the extinction of passions, the emancipation from suffering, *reached by* gaining the knowledge. The knowledge should remove the cause of the disease, and so the disease is healed by philosophy. The cause of the disease is the veil of illusion, *maya*. (Schopenhauer 1993, e.g. Bd. 1 § 63, p. 481f) This is an image borrowed from old Indian thinking.

How much of this can be found in Wittgenstein? The core of his late philosophy is a description. Philosophy itself does not emend, correct anything. It lets everything as it is (Wittgenstein 1958 § 124). The description should establish the clarity; remove the confusion, rising from the veil in front of our eyes. As for Schopenhauer our experience is dictated by the veil of illusion originating in 'will', so in Wittgenstein's opinion we are tempted to see everything through something: not a veil, but "glasses". It is nonetheless true that these glasses are a metaphor for the ideal of logic (Wittgenstein 1958 § 103), which is indeed forced upon us, but is not probably something quite necessary. But something really holds us captive, in enchantment, with an important degree of resilience. This is our language itself. Language is presented as something, which we cannot escape from. (Wittgenstein 1958 § 115)

Can we see the *maya* of Vedanta and Buddhism (and Schopenhauer) in relation to Wittgenstein's language? Both these phenomena are a part of human "thrownness". We are born into a world generated by *maya*, formed by the use of language. There is a difference on the level of metaphysics, indeed. In the case of language it is the community of others, that founds the power of language over us. *Maya* is a product of 'will' superior to the humankind. But this metaphysical difference is not of such great importance. The task of philosophy and the desired end seem to be surprisingly parallel in both cases.

Both the phenomena compared here are in some sense unshakeable. Philosophy reveals the mystery of their functioning, but cannot totally cancel it. By having been revealed, language (as well as *maya*) loses its power, but does not cease to exist, to occur at all. What then does philosophy do? It places everything in front of our eyes, provides a "survey-able demonstration". (Wittgenstein 1958 § 122) Philosophy by no means excludes us from language, or from the world of *maya*. Wittgenstein does not stop speaking the ordinary language with all its misleading structures, Schopenhauer does not stop behaving in a manner corresponding to the fact that his house is a *real* house and Hegel is a *real* tragedy for German philosophy. But once philosophy has revealed the functioning of experience, something has changed. (cf. the result of Husserlian epoché (or "bracketing"): e.g. Husserl 1954 § 35) What?

Wittgenstein himself says that philosophy is a struggle against the enchantment of our intellect by means of our language. Is this enchantment broken, when we describe the functioning of language? Wittgenstein to a certain extent repeats what he had said in *Tractatus*: that so-called philosophical problems vanish. What deserves attention here is his choice of keywords. He speaks of bruises, slashing, and discomfort and of his philosophical

conation as bringing of quietude, of a *therapy*. (Wittgenstein 1958 § 119, 133) But does Wittgenstein really mean that by reaching the goal of philosophy all pain and suffering vanish? It sounds ridiculous. Wittgenstein probably did not expect to eliminate with his philosophy pains like those caused by a broken leg, or a broken heart. He did not want to dabble in the work of doctors or priests. His therapy was to heal philosophical diseases. In this sense he repeats the pattern known from *Tractatus*: to dissolve so-called philosophical problems resulting from the muddle of language, by which his own philosophy becomes not necessary, overcome (something that can be ceased at will, any time). This sounds very modestly. Compared to the problems of life, emotional problems or spiritual problems, philosophical problems seem to be something secondary, like a matter of luxury. But Wittgenstein's biography teaches us that for him, they were of great importance. So a philosophy conceived this way seems to have been, just for him, personally, very attractive and vitally important.

Let me repeat my argument: Schopenhauer wants his philosophy to break through the veil of illusion, *maya*, to grasp 'will', in order to stop the pain and suffering of blind non-philosophical life, by gaining knowledge about 'will'. I think that Wittgenstein's philosophy is perhaps more inspired by Schopenhauer in this motivation than in topic or method (this is the originally rather Fregean and Russellian contribution, apart from the later inspiration from Spengler or Goethe). So the direct connection between philosophical description of language and the emancipation from suffering is more difficult to trace. In both cases, *Tractatus* as well as the late works, some unease and discomfort actually vanishes, thanks to philosophy, namely the philosophical dis-ease (unease) and discomfort. The structure of the therapeutic project of *Philosophical Investigations* recalls in a sense the structure of Schopenhauer's project: it is necessary to overcome the illusion by means of philosophical description, of knowledge. This knowledge is not a goal in itself, it is a means to remove something negative (confusion and disquiet) and to establish something at once positive and negative, a peace of mind, a peace *from* mistaken intellectual ambitions.

It is a rather popular approach to Wittgenstein to try to demonstrate the essential points of his philosophy by means of comparison with the so-called paradoxical aspects of Zen Buddhism. I think that the trans-cultural parallel (conveyed by Schopenhauer) with ascetic and quietist thoughts of Vedanta and old Indian Buddhism is at least equally interesting. We can only guess whether there was a real influence; as well just as we can only guess whether Wittgenstein's personal project of the emancipation from suffering was successful.

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Wittgenstein and Kripke's Sceptic

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1. Introduction:

Exercise of human freedom results in human action and human action in turn forms cultural facts. Physical actions, such as running, walking, lifting something, arranging books, etc. are all cultural activities. The divide between what is natural and what is cultural is marked by the absence or presence of human freedom.¹ Note Wittgenstein's remark: 'What is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?'² If we subtract 'my arm goes up' from the fact that 'I raise my arm' what we get is the expression of human freedom. My arm going up is an event and my raising the arm is an action. In both the cases of my arm going up and my arm being raised, what is perceived is the same, but the observations made are two different things. One is observed as an event and the other is observed as an action. We invoke the laws of nature in observing events and we invoke the exercise of freedom in observing actions.

Our expectation is based on these two things. If some one holds a gun, we expect a sound if it is fired.³ The link between the triggering of the lever and the gunshot are causal, and triggering of the lever is an action expected of the person if he is a police inspector running after a terrorist. Regularity or repeated experience is the basis of expectation. We expect rain after observing the clouds; we expect a visitor if there is a prior engagement. Expectation in the case of natural events is based on the laws of nature, and expectation of human behaviour is built on the norms we follow.

2. Rules as norms

Systematic use of human freedom in a particular way becomes the norm. Going for a walk at a fixed time regularly becomes a norm. So would be our eating at a regular time becomes a norm. Anything that a human being does with regularity would acquire a normative status. Telling the truth is a norm since we often tell the truth. Thus, language too is normative since its words and sentences are used in accordance with syntactical and semantic rules. There should be an agreement between the subject and the verb in a sentence is a norm. All culture-regulating rules of human beings are normative; since music, dance, architecture, painting, literature, philosophy etc. are all systematic and regular rule governed institutions, they are all normative.

Science that deals with nature and laws of nature too is an inseparable part of the social institution. The laws of nature can be made into a norm by adapting the laws of nature as part of cultural activity. For instance, the lighting of candles can be a norm though lighting of the candle has to meet the conditions of combustion, that is, presence of oxygen and wax apart from igniting the fire. Similarly, a mobile phone is a cultural product even though much of scientific and technological principles have gone into making such a tool available to us.

To speak in general terms, scientific activity including technology is an inseparable part of a culture. A certain type of cultural activity we call science. Science has its own language. To be more specific, each science has its own language. The language of physics is different from the language of biology and this in turn is different from the language of chemistry and mathematics.⁴ Yet there is connection between them and each and every language of science has a connection with natural language. The norm of language of science is that it should describe and explain, hence the descriptive language. The correspondence theory of truth goes well with this norm of describing⁵ and explaining and occasionally we require coherence when it becomes the matter of theory in science.

One cannot speak of a norm without a normative principle. Within the legal system we find the laws of the land and in the context of language, we find the rules for the use of words as norms. When you write in English, be grammatical would be a normative statement about writing. When we edit the sentences or correct ill-formed sentences, we are following the norm. When we provide different criteria for the use of the word 'game' for instance, board game, card game, ball game etc., we are distinctly laying down the norm for the use of the word. Since rules of words are normative, they have the ability to guide us in our linguistic behaviour.⁶ When there are several rules, no one rule would be necessary. Therefore, we cannot speak of a necessary and sufficient condition for the use of a word. Every rule is a sufficient condition, though every rule is not a necessary condition.

The distinction between a statement and a sentence makes it clear that a description is too normative. A statement is said to be the use of a sentence. For instance, when I utter the sentence 'I am hungry' I make a statement that can take the value true or false. Someone else can use the same sentence to make a different statement having just the opposite truth-value. What is important to note here is that the act of asserting makes the sentence a statement capable of taking on the value true or false. A mere sentence is neither true nor false. To realize this is to realize the value of describing.

We may note here certain practices. When someone offers a definition, one takes the sentence to be true by definition and does not ask the question, what makes a definition true? Nothing needs to be done to know that a definition is true. This is because when we offer a definition, we make a linguistic move of proposing the manner in which the word is to be used. Being the member of this institution called language, each one of us has the license to introduce or modify the rules of the use of certain words, by way of a definition. This linguistic liberty cannot be taken away, since in defining the words, we exercise our freedom as a member of the institution of language.⁷ Wittgenstein has rightly emphasized the arbitrary nature of rules in language.⁸ However, he is equally aware of the necessity of following the rules.

¹ Wittgenstein, L. *Philosophical Investigations (PI)*, 3rd Edn. Trans by G.E.M. Anscombe, Prentice Hall, NJ, 1958, § 25.

² PI § 621.

³ PI § 442.

⁴ PI § 7.

⁵ PI § 136.

⁶ PI § 172-178.

⁷ PI § 3, § 29, § 69.

⁸ PI § 372, § 397.

Commitment to the rule makes the rule necessary. 'Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so; we react to an order in a particular way.'⁹ By arbitrariness of rules, one should not understand that the rule is arbitrary in the sense that it could be changed any time one wants it, but one should understand it as conventional, as opposed to something natural and given. 'The rules of language are arbitrary' means that the rules are formulated by human beings at will. Without human effort, the rules would not have come into being. Or another way of putting the same thing would be that the rules are cultural, and not natural. 'Arbitrary' as we normally use it always has reference to some practical end.¹⁰

Every word in language is equally governed by the rules of language. There is no order in language in terms of something being superior or inferior.¹¹ Different words, sentences etc. have their use, some of them may change over time.¹² 'For a large class of cases – though not for all – in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.'¹³ Ordinary language is all right. It is doing its job quite well.¹⁴

It is important to note that we are able to learn the rules of language by learning the use in a few contexts. Rules of language are comparable to rail lines. When we speak of a series it is one like a visible section of rails laid to infinity. Here infinitely long rails correspond to the unlimited application of a rule.¹⁵ When we stipulate a rule, we have no choice. 'When I obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule blindly.'¹⁶

3. Rules and their interpretations

Certain words have several rules for their use. This leads to the unpredictability of the use of words. We require an interpretation of the rule to comprehend. This leads to the problem of *seeing as*. Wittgenstein recognizes several possible interpretations. Speaking of ostensive definition, he holds that any ostensive definition will have various interpretations.¹⁷ It is possible to interpret and reinterpret a facial expression, for instance as timid or courageous.¹⁸ Similarly, Wittgenstein has provided a figure of a square that is seen as a glass cube, or as an inverted open box. His famous duck-rabbit example too emphasizes the interpretative aspect of language.¹⁹ We interpret human behaviour and ascribe the intention to the speaker.²⁰ 'The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language.'²¹

Interpretation is sometimes essential since there are several criteria for the use of the word. For instance, if someone states: 'the teacher carried his table to the class' this might require some interpretation. One might have to interpret that the teacher has carried mathematical table with him when he entered the class or his writing table, as the classroom was not well furnished. However, there

would be only one interpretation if there were only one defining criterion. For instance, the notion of validity of an argument as opposed to the soundness of an argument has only one criterion: the conclusion cannot be false when the premises are true. Similarly, a series might have just one criterion, say, add 2, to get the next number in the series. We might use the formula $n+2$ to obtain the next number and then we know exactly that the next number in the series ought to be 1006 after 1004, and 1868 after 1866, and 100036 after 100034, and so on.²² This is because the criterion provided is precise and only one, i.e., $n+2$.

4. Kripke's Skeptic

Rule-following skeptic Kripke fails to notice this point about the rules of language. Having recognized the arbitrary nature of rules, the skeptic constructs a rule parallel to our rule of addition. Thus, the stipulated *quus* rule behaves exactly the way our plus rule behaves in all observed cases and differs from plus rule only in unobserved cases. Kripke's skeptic then argues that there is no way one can identify the rule followed since the behaviour is identical. However, there is a difference in meaning since the rules determine the meaning and the one who follows plus rule would count $68 + 57$ to be 125 and the other would claim the resultant to be only 5.²³ However, there is some kind of inconsistency in the argument of Kripke's skeptic. Either he should claim that when you know the rule, you learn all the instances of the application of the rule, or when you know the rule, you know only the application that you have learnt so far. In the former case, when the rule is given all its extensions are given and in the latter case, when the rule is given not all the extensions are given. Kripke's skeptic makes use of both these views in constructing his argument.

While providing the observed cases, Kripke's skeptic believes that we are aware of the rule plus and the rule *quus* but do not know in advance that when we add 67 and 58 they do not behave in the same manner. That is to say, when we learn a rule, we do not know all its applications. Of course, such a view leads to certain kind of absurdity: If we do not know when and where to apply the rules, and if we have to take fresh decisions regarding the application of either rule of plus or *quus* each time we confront a situation, the rules would lack their normativity, and thus the power to guide us. While arguing for the difference in meaning of the rules of plus and *quus*, Kripke's skeptic counts the unobserved cases. As we have noted, Kripke's skeptic wants to have the cake and eat it too. The *quus* rule remains arbitrary all the time for the skeptic. It does not follow any logic in all the unobserved cases, and hence lacks generality, which is an essential feature of all rules. Kripke's skeptic believes that his *quus* rule requires interpretation every instance of its application.

⁹ PI § 202-206.

¹⁰ Wittgenstein, L., Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1932-35, From the notes of Alice Ambrose and Margaret MacDonald (Ed.), Alice Ambrose, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1979, p. 60.

¹¹ PI § 97.

¹² PI § 23.

¹³ PI § 43.

¹⁴ PI § 402.

¹⁵ PI § 218.

¹⁶ PI § 219.

¹⁷ PI § 28.

¹⁸ PI § 536, § 537.

¹⁹ PI Part II, pp. 193-194.

²⁰ PI § 201-202, § 634-653.

²¹ PI § 206.

²² PI § 186-187.

²³ Kripke, S. A., Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1982, p. 21.

5. Concluding remarks

For Wittgenstein, when we grasp a rule, we grasp the whole of the rule in a flash.²⁴ We do not have undecided cases waiting for us to confront them and to decide upon anew. If it ever happens that way, that would be the case of modifying the existing rule or invoking a slightly different rule. Of course, this is not to claim that interpretations are not required at all. Those cases where interpretations are at work are the ones where multiple rules are applicable. If different rules were used, there would naturally be a difference in meaning. Kripke's skeptic is not able to show that plus rule and *quus* rules are different epistemically. If these two rules are different, Kripke's skeptic does not know at time *t* that they are different and when he learns that they are different at time *t'* he would not claim that the rule plus and *quus* are identical in their behaviour.

²⁴ PI § 155.

Conflicts, Language, and Rationality

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Moral divergences have been the normal condition of human life. There are divergences related to the facts. For the latter we may use the alert observation of the involved factual characteristics and a common language for references to them. But there are the most important *evaluative divergences* related to what to choose, or what to do even after our factual divergences have been solved. It might be a good rational solution for moral conflicts to find a similar factual method (a descriptive method) for solving evaluative divergences like the factual ones. What I have in mind is one form that combines clarifying our referential language and attentively and mutually observing the facts with an eye to *which* and *when* is the case for applying a word. However, in this paper I will try to show that this is a mistake because this blocks the communication among divergent views and maintains a kind of circular and “closed” agreement among convergences. We need a rationality (a logic) that makes possible both intelligible divergences and “open to criticism” convergences!

The main problem of the descriptive method is that any person of another culture or any divergent person within the same culture may use exactly the same strategy. She could restrict the entire meaning of her evaluative words to her truth conditions. Something essential in the communication, the expression of intelligible evaluative divergences would be impossible because the meaning of the moral words, for example, it would be totally encapsulated in the descriptive references of a given culture. To learn to use those words as the descriptive words would always mean restricting all their meaning to the linguistic and moral *status quo* of that culture, ending any possible divergence within the culture and making every different or new moral proposition, inside or outside, a *necessary* divergence and conflict. In some aspects the relativism is maintained and incentives offered to the insoluble conflict and (probably) the violence among the divergent.

We would not be contradicting ourselves if we would have divergences because we would always be right in *our* truth conditions, simply treated as real truth conditions for all, not *our* particular truth conditions. At the same time there would not be any disagreement when we confine ourselves to our truth conditions because those conditions may be accessed in our linguistic community. They are our truth conditions, but even so, every different culture may do the same, and in all cases each group is always right. And if there were real divergences among them, with the descriptive interpretation of the moral words, every group or person would have a reason to maintain the conflict and, who knows, to solve it by violent means, since the rational resolution is now impossible. This type of descriptive practical rationality is doomed to relativism, but in practical cases, relativism is a kind of conservatism and an authoritarianism of groups or persons aversive to criticism.

If descriptive words (for example, white) may be used for referring to a property when we observe certain things, evaluative words (for example, good) are not used primarily for describing properties that can be described with other merely descriptive words. Consider an example. For some people the word “eugenics” is a bad word, and it

is used in general for reproving certain actions (for example, some medical action described in a certain way). For another people, it can be used for approving the same conduct described in certain way in the same way. For the former, the word “eugenics” is equivalent to wrong acts or bad conducts and it is used for blocking these acts. For the latter, it is equivalent to a good conduct. But we may not say “*eugenics* is wrong because it is *eugenics*, an obviously wrong conduct”, neither “*eugenics* is right because *eugenics* is obviously a good thing for humanity”! For having an intelligible or rational argument we need to operate without circularity and to attack or defend “eugenics” *because* it is a medical conduct described so and so, in a descriptive way of descriptions, that can be factually accepted by everyone (who attacks and defends). It is in this sense that evaluative words may not be used for describing and that descriptive words may not be used for evaluating. “Eugenics”, as a descriptive word, referring to a certain conduct in its physical properties, does not necessarily incorporate any value.

The possible intelligible evaluative divergence – one that is intelligible because it may be rationally right or wrong, thus makes it possible that the evaluation may be different for different groups or persons because one of them may be wrong and because the agreement between them is not a simple matter of internal communitarian commitment aversive to other possibilities. So not only does every consolidated cultural group have the right (an “intellectual” right) to defend its way of life because the group is a cultural and consolidated one, but every possible group or possible person can express divergences that are intelligible inside her culture as a change of rational or justified reform. If all of them are always right, the change of reform is always as arbitrary as the *status quo* and the divergent may be easily excluded by force.

The possibility of rational evaluative divergences is made possible because our evaluative thinking is not an act of describing, but rather of approving or disapproving certain conducts or subjects. We use value words (as *good*, *right*, *acceptable* etc) for expressing this fundamental behaviour and stipulating the criterion or criteria for clarifying the approval or disapproval. These are the *reasons* or the “*why*” we approve or do not approve of some conduct or subject. These reasons are the facts or physical properties present in the conduct or subject and its objective context, but to approve is not only to recognise these facts as present, because approving involves choosing or deciding. Therefore, the meaning of these evaluative words or of these evaluative-*cum*-descriptive discourses does not restrict itself to the truth conditions or conditions of application of these words in a given linguistic community, because the truth conditions are stipulated by the approbatory use of the evaluative words logically preceding the standards or criterion for applying the words. This evaluative meaning makes possible that we agree with the presence of the same physical properties (the same descriptive context) as our opponent, but even so we may to maintain divergences about how to evaluate the same properties.

Here something strange happens, however, since this phenomenon, superficially taken, has suggested to many the impossibility of convergence and the naturalness and plausibility of a type of relativism. If we may or must choose or decide, there is no objectivity, and morality is a matter for particular decisions, since everyone is right. But, logically taken, we must learn a different lesson from this phenomenon: it is precisely this evaluative meaning (that we approve of and choose with our evaluative words) that opens the door for objectivity or rationality in our divergence or convergence, given that this meaning is logically *permanent* even though the criteria for its application (the evaluative standards in a given culture or in a *status quo* linguistic community) vary. In this sense evaluative meaning is neutral between *pro* and *contra* the many substantive propositions in morality and others evaluative discourses. And this permanent meaning may be shared (and in general it is shared in the main natural languages known) among all cultures or persons without defining by language, or by natural facts, who expresses the truth in their statements. This means that the links between approving and facts within our language (and culture) are neither necessary by definition nor necessary because of the physical facts. They may be, in principle, modified, but one aspect of this is that the parts in divergence need not necessarily circumscribe themselves with respect to their own point of view, even if they have the same moral ideas (which would be now seen as a contingent fact), which makes it possible for one individual to present new criteria for applying the evaluative words, being a reformer (as were Buda, Socrates or Jesus Christ, in ancient times, or the socialist, humanitarian and animal-rights activists have been in more recent times – which signals that this kind of rationalistic, individualistic and universalistic interpretation of evaluative discourse is not only “liberal” or “modern” in the narrow sense of word).

Then, sharing the same language, as one necessary condition for communication among people, does not exactly mean sharing the same descriptive standards of application of our evaluative language. It does not mean sharing all the meaning when using evaluative words in a given culture (the evaluative *cum* the descriptive meaning). We may rationally engage in a dialog with those disagree with us if we understand that we need a common language (and culture), *ma non troppo* (but not much!), I believe we need a language with evaluative words whose main meaning is to approve or disapprove of certain *given* properties found in the subjects or conducts on evaluation, making contingent the link we or others have done between facts and values. Making such a link a contingent link is a necessary condition for separating the shared common evaluative language from particular applications of that, applications we used do in our culture, but that may vary independently of the first. Here, the logic (this logic, a prescriptive one) says we evaluate something *good* or *bad* because it has certain factual characteristics, but having these is not sufficient as a condition of the evaluation. We need to approve or to choose this type of characteristics, and this is not a logical implication, but a decision, a decision on principle. A decision on principle means that every situation with the same properties must be evaluated in the same way if we do not change the principled decision, and *vice-versa*, that we can change our decision on principle only if we change coherently our standard for similar cases, including the wishes and preferences of the individuals affected. This includes, when the morality is at issue, a kind of golden rule: when we cannot want for us what we want for others if we were in their shoes with all their properties. We take seriously their want and

preference representing what is that other is in that circumstances. Thus we do not have a justified or rational decision if we continue wanting this.

Being restricted only by this we may present reasons that are not circular reasons and we would thus be able to find the rational convergent proposition for conflicts if we could access all the facts and consistently apply the prescriptive logic. At least communication is neither blocked nor restricted only to those who have agreed with us since the beginning. I conclude that a certain kind of objectivism or universalism well understood in morality is not so closed to violence and authoritarianism as many generally assume, and which a certain kind of subjectivism and relativism is in a plural and conflictive world!

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Davidson on Intercultural Dialog

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1. There are some different ways to look into questions about intercultural dialog; I begin emphasizing two of them for the interesting features its conclusions can hold.

One possible way is to ask about the conditions that structure and take part in the conversational interaction among cultures. It would be possible, for example, to indicate how the gap in power determines the very existence of such a dialog in an intercultural context. In an extreme situation, one could conclude that dialog is impossible even in a trivial sense of the term.

Another direction of enquiry can be taken by asking about the consequences which other philosophical issues have for the final picture of the scenario of culture interacting. One could, for instance, depart from some theory of language and try to find answers to matters such as the significance of different languages and cultures existing at the same time. Here also the other extreme situation could be that different languages mean different cultures and therefore, different worlds not accessible to one another. In other words, we would once again be facing the possibility of inexistence of a dialog between different cultures.

Both extreme conclusions from both ways of reasoning strike me as being not just neutral conclusions. Rather, there are a sign that something is really going wrong in some part of our philosophy. However illuminating it may be to show that power plays a vital role in a dialog, to accept that it is impossible to think about dialog practices without this variable is not the same as to declare that we must cease our efforts to improve dialog conditions. Similarly, although it is very beautiful to understand how each language and each culture has its own treasures, it could even be detrimental to conclude it is worthless trying to understand anyone else who does not share our natural language because those treasures are assumed to be inaccessible.

I take it that any philosophy which is able to banish that kind of conclusion I have pointed as extreme ones has something important to say about dialog between different cultures.

This paper focuses on what I have exposed as the exercise of asking about the consequences that other philosophical issues have on a theme such as Intercultural Dialog. I am concerned with what Davidson could say about interacting cultures, departing from some of his conclusions on language and interpretation.

2. The conclusions from Davidson's philosophy I have in mind are:

1. Once someone is recognized as interpretable, a lot of beliefs must be shared between the interpreter and the speaker.
2. A large part of those beliefs must be true beliefs.

The arguments I am citing as some conclusions of Davidson's philosophy stem from an overall picture of how we cope with the world and from how we can understand our practices of language and interpretation. Davidson's well-known attack on what he calls the third dogma of empiricism plays an important role here. Regarding that

context he argues against the distinction between conceptual scheme and empirical content. This will be an important step in the construction of what I have mentioned as a different picture of the relation between mind and world.

In a nutshell, that distinction is viewed by Davidson as the main source of conceiving our cognitive and linguistic abilities as organizing activities of a raw material offered by the world and captured by our senses. To deny this distinction is, in a sense, to deny that there is pure stuff in the world waiting to be captured by a scheme and then being constitutive of concepts. On the other hand, to maintain this dualism is all one needs to affirm the existence of various conceptual schemes sharing a common content which may not be translated one to another. About this, Davidson says:

"Given the dogma of a dualism of scheme and reality, we get conceptual relativity, and truth relative to a scheme. Without the dogma, this kind of relativity goes by the board. Of course truth of sentences remains relative to language, but that is as objective as can be. In giving up the dualism of scheme and world, we do not give up the world, but re-establish unmediated touch with familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false." (Davidson 1974, p. 198)

Davidson is clear about the implication of his rejection. He is rejecting the distinction between conceptual scheme and empirical content but through this he can deny the dualism existing between scheme and reality. There are not several schemes that deal differently with the same worldly content; by the same token, there is also not just one general human scheme that is at risk of being detached from what the world really is. Once we have something as a world view the world has to be part of it. And it is because of this that differences have to be understood and explained already within this picture of general agreement.

3. The reasons Davidson has to reject this dualism are basically the same ones that lead us to the theses (i) and (ii) presented in the previous sections. Besides the fact that we could just discard the picture of a raw material in the world waiting to be conceptualised, the point for Davidson is that it is just inconceivable that such a thing is an alternative conceptual scheme .

In order to conceive an alternative conceptual scheme (and by doing so to allow for the dualism) we should be ready to accept that we can recognize someone as a linguistic being without being able to understand anything of their linguistic behaviour.

The peculiarity of this picture appears when one realizes that recognizing something as someone is already a big task: once we recognize sounds as meaningful acts we are inexorably assigning a mind and a language to that creature in the sense that she has intentional acts.

In other words, we cannot recognize someone as a linguistic being that has a world view unless we consider her as having an intelligible language, i.e., an accessible world view. In Davidson's words: "The interdependence of belief and meaning springs from the interdependence of two aspects of the interpretation of speech behaviour: the

attribution of beliefs and the interpretation of sentences.” (Davidson 1974, p. 195)

And the very exercise of interpreting someone’s words requires from us a knowledge of a “good deal about what the speaker believes (and intends and wants), and that fine distinctions between beliefs are impossible without understood speech.” (Davidson 1974, p. 195)

To Davidson only a “theory that simultaneously accounts for attitudes and interprets speech, and which assumes neither” (Davidson 1974, p. 195) can be a good theory to explain our practices of interpretation.

Therefore, to assume that practices of interpretation and linguistic interaction can take part in a situation of complete ignorance is an option we must give up if we follow Davidson’s steps. Both knowledge about some of the speaker’s beliefs and knowledge about the world are required¹.

Following this path we can arrive at both argument(i) and (ii). And if we focus on the first of these arguments - the thesis about the requirement of some level of agreement between those who are participating in a dialog – it is possible to understand the importance of Davidson’s words: “Since knowledge of beliefs comes only with the ability to interpret words, the only possibility at the start is to assume general agreement on beliefs.” (Davidson 1974, p. 196)

4. Throughout the previous sections we could see how Davidson could lead us out of the dilemma I alluded to in the first section. If we want to accept that there are some differences between the ways different cultures see the world, these differences must be understandable without the appeal to the inaccessibility between them. Differences can be understood only on a general ground of agreement. It is useful to hear Davidson again:

“If by conceptual relativism we mean the idea that conceptual schemes and moral systems, or the languages associated with them, can differ massively – to the extent of being mutually unintelligible or incommensurable, or forever beyond rational resolve – then I reject conceptual relativism. Of course there are contrasts from epoch to epoch, from culture to culture, and person to person, of kinds we all recognize and struggle with: but these are contrasts which with sympathy and effort we can explain and understand.” (Davidson 1988, p. 39-40)

5. Up to here I have tried to show that Davidson has something to say about intercultural dialog because he offers an approach on differences between cultures that does not need to be explained in terms of an incommensurable distinction between them. But, in order to do so, I have considered relativism as an issue that somehow deserves our attention.

I would like to briefly contrast this kind of reasoning with another one that sees relativism as a kind of philosophical artificial problem. The reasoning I have in mind was developed by R. Rorty. Rorty once said he could see three different senses in which the label “relativism” was normally understood; he says:

“The first is the view that every belief is as good as every other. The second is the view that “true” is an equivocal term, having as many meanings as there are procedures of justification. The third is the view that there is nothing

to be said about either truth or rationality apart from descriptions of the familiar procedures of justification which a given society – *ours* – uses in one or another area of inquiry.” (Rorty 1985, p. 23)

After defending himself against being put down as a relativist in the first two senses – one being a “self-refuting” position and the other an “eccentric” one – Rorty seems to dismiss any importance this question could have by stating the following:

“But the pragmatist does not have a theory of truth, much less a relativistic one. As a partisan of solidarity, his account of the value of cooperative human inquiry has only an ethical base, not an epistemological or metaphysical one. Not having *any* epistemology, *a fortiori* he does have a relativistic one.” (Rorty 1985, p. 24)

6. The importance of Rorty’s consideration in this paper is that besides seeing another way of overcoming relativism, by undermining its sources, he offers metaphilosophical considerations that may have consequences as to how we can see Davidson’s position. If his metaphilosophical criticism is accurate, the results reached by Davidson can be seen as a mere extension of historical quandaries. Accordingly, it would be difficult to accept that quandaries have consequences to practical queries such as the one concerning intercultural dialog.

Rorty has important and interesting reasons for dismissing some of the queries philosophy has been traditionally engaged in. I believe that his effort to do away with obscure philosophical convictions merits philosophical reflection; two of those convictions attacked by Rorty are pointed out by Ramberg as:

“the Kantian idea that knowledge, or thinking generally, must be understood in terms of some relation between what the world offers up to the thinker, on one side, and on the other the active subjective capacities by which the thinker structures for cognitive use what the world thus provides. The second is the Platonic conviction that there must be some particular form of description of things, which, by virtue of its ability to accurately map, reflect, or otherwise latch on to just those kinds through which the world presents itself to would-be knowers, is the form in which any literally true – or cognitively significant, or ontologically ingenuous – statement must be couched.” (Ramberg 2000, p. 351)

One direct consequence of this kind of attack from Rorty is the dismissal of the concept of truth as constituting an important philosophical question. And it is because of this that it is easy to understand that, following Rorty, once we can stop worrying about “truth”, the danger of a relativist position is automatically defused.

Davidson’s approach, however, refuses to take this step by focusing on the importance of talking about truth and so we might be tempted to think that relativism remains a query.

Everything that could be said in favor of Davidson against the risk of being under the sway of useless philosophical convictions has probably already been said by Ramberg (2000). Even Rorty himself, despite some specific criticisms, has paid a great deal of attention to Davidson’s philosophical works. And also it seems that Davidson is in the same side as Rorty if we remember his rejection of the dualism of conceptual scheme and empirical content.

¹ See Davidson (1973) and Davidson (1991) for a very clear exposition of his argumentation.

For this reason I think we are entitled to consider Davidson as not dealing with artificial problems in the Rorty's sense, and thus able to say something with practical consequences.

7. I have argued that we can draw out conclusions from Davidson's philosophy on language and interpretation and apply them to the issue of intercultural dialog by saying that differences among cultures or among "world views" are just possible because there is a great amount of common ground between them.

As final observations, I would like to stress that this apparent platitude is one of the most interesting results of Davidson's works. Because it is by doing so that Davidson is able to stress that all the rest is our responsibility. Or in other words, it is the interpreter's responsibility to be an interpreter. We thus have to recognize that to interpret someone requires from us a kind of self-disposition to listen the others with the direct consequence that not to listen is revealed as an open choice.

I have said that one of Davidson's central conclusions is that a relevant part of interpreter's and speaker's beliefs has to be shared. And a great part of these beliefs has to be in fact accurate, i.e., has to be knowledge about ourselves and about the world. But which of those beliefs are shared and accurate is our task to discover.

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Ist meine eigene Weltanschauung *third-personal enough*?

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Aber nun denk dir eine Schachpartie nach gewissen Regeln in eine Reihe von Handlungen übersetzt, die wir nicht gewöhnt sind, mit einem Spiel zu assoziieren, - etwa ein Ausstoßen von Schreien und Stampfen mit den Füßen. Und jene Beiden sollen nun, statt die uns geläufige Form des Schach zu spielen, schreien und stampfen; und zwar so, daß diese Vorgänge sich nach geeigneten Regeln in eine Schachpartie übersetzen ließen. Wären wir nun noch geneigt, zu sagen, sie spielten ein Spiel; und mit welchem Recht könnte man das sagen? (Wittgenstein, PU 1 200)

Die Frage nach der Interpretierbarkeit von Handlungen, die zu einem anderem Kulturkreis gehören, d.h. in einer anderen Weltanschauung wurzeln, läßt sich mit der Frage nach der Ähnlichkeit von willkürlichen und systematischen Irrtümern, mit der sich Wittgenstein in einigen Passagen seiner *Untersuchungen* befasst (vgl. PU 1, §143), vergleichen. Der systematische, gleichbleibende Irrtum kann dort den Schüler zu einem Schritt führen, der sich nur schwer von einer zufälligen Abweichung unterscheiden läßt: zwischen den beiden Irrtümern besteht letztlich kein klarer Unterschied. In einer Situation radikaler Interpretation – wie etwa in der Konstellation, die sich Davidson (1973) ausgehend von Quine (1960) aneignet – muß der Interpret angesichts eines seltsamen Verhaltens des Einheimischen entscheiden, ob sein Interpretationsmodell (systematisch) irrig ist oder ob vielmehr das Verhalten des Einheimischen einem Irrtum seitens des Einheimischen selbst entspringt. Interpretieren könnte man hier dann als ein Gespräch von zwei normativen Sinn-systemen verstehen: Regeln, die der Interpret als richtig in Bezug auf das Verhalten des Einheimischen aufstellt und Regeln, die die Einheimischen für richtig halten, wenn sie sie miteinander korrigieren. Ganz ähnlich lassen sich dort, wo der Schüler dabei ist, zu lernen, Regeln zu befolgen, zwei Elemente konstatieren: einerseits die Lernschritte des Schülers, andererseits die Regeln, die ihm der Lehrer beizubringen versucht. Sowohl vom Schüler als auch vom Einheimischen wird der systematische Irrtum nicht bemerkt. Wenn sie aber einem Irrtum zufällig verfallen, können sie ihn problemlos erkennen. Es gibt aber einen wichtigen Unterschied: anders als beim Schüler läßt sich beim Einheimischen die Abweichung korrigieren, ohne daß der Einheimische sich selber korrigiert – das Normensystem des Einheimischen, an dem der Interpret eigentlich interessiert ist, wird von der Gemeinschaft des Einheimischen ebenso beachtet und die Abweichungen von den Normen werden von dieser Gemeinschaft korrigiert. Es ist nämlich diese Gemeinschaft, die uns hier erlaubt, von zwei Sinn-systemen zu sprechen. Interpretieren ist dann etwas anders als lehren, Regeln zu befolgen: wenn wir etwas lehren, prägen wir dem Schüler Regeln ein, und der Irrtum bezieht sich auf solche Regeln. Die Lernschritte des Schülers können in sich keine Normativität bergen, da es hier keine unabhängige Korrekturinstanz gibt (PU 1 §257-8).¹

¹ Den Schüler durch seine Schritte in den Wörtern, die er dabei denkt, zu korrigieren, ist unmöglich, wenn man diese Wörter nicht versteht. Gott würde angesichts eines abnormalen Gebrauches eines privaten Wortes nicht entscheiden können, ob der Schüler sich geirrt hat, oder ob Er die Bedeutung des Wortes nicht richtig erfasst hat. Es gibt nichts, was Ihm erlauben würde, hierin eine Entscheidung zu treffen. In analoger Weise gibt es nichts, was Ihm erlaubt, zu bestimmen, ob wir uns geirrt haben oder ob Seine Interpretation irrig ist – nichts, es sei denn, daß Er mit uns einige unserer Annahmen über

Wenn wir einen Interpretationsakt betrachten, stehen wir normalerweise vor dem Phänomen des Irrtums, der entweder auf der Seite des Interpreten oder auf der Seite des Interpretierten liegt. Verschiedene Interpreten finden verschiedene Irrtümer vor. Möglicherweise stehen wir vor einem Problem des Maßstabs: wo ist der Irrtum? Diese Frage verweist uns aber keineswegs auf eine Tatsache, besser gesagt, auf einen bestimmten Platz, auf dem der Irrtum vorzufinden wäre. Es geht vielmehr um eine souveräne Entscheidung von uns, die allein durch die Möglichkeit eingegrenzt wird, daß unsere Interpretationshypothesen das Verhalten der Einheimischen verständlich machen. Das lehrt uns Davidson (vgl. z. B. 1991): es kann verschiedene annehmbare Interpretationen geben, wie es verschiedene Modi (Skalen) der Temperaturmessungen gibt. Nicht der Irrtum ist es, der bei einer Interpretation den festen Platz hat. Die Begegnung mit den Handlungen anderer Menschen wird allerdings im allgemeinen von der Gefahr begleitet, die Quelle des Irrtums so zu verstehen, als befände sie sich bereits auf einem festen Platz. Entweder steht sie auf der Seite des Interpreten, der sich zurückhaltend weigert, die Einheimischen zu korrigieren, und lieber das Risiko eingeht, sich niemals verständlich zu machen; oder sie steht auf der anderen Seite, nämlich der Seite des Einheimischen, dem alle Abnormität zugeschrieben wird, damit die Möglichkeit des systematischen Irrtums endgültig beseitigt wird. Diese letzte Attitüde scheint im Einklang zu stehen mit der kolonialistischen Mentalität, die nicht zögert, über Gruppen von Einheimischen, die auf unkorrigierbare Weisen ‚primitiv‘ oder lässig oder einfach untergeordnet sind, epistemische Gewalt jeglicher Art auszuüben. Hier gibt es keine Unsicherheit. Die verwendete Interpretationshypothese wird nicht in Frage gestellt: der Irrtum ist bereits festgesetzt. Spivak (1988) hat andererseits bemerkt, wie die Anstrengungen der Untergeordneten, um Widerstandskräfte – gegen die Überlegenheit der größten Städte oder gegen die Überlegenheit der Weißen oder der Männer – zu vereinen, das Risiko in sich birgen, daß die Interpreten ihre eigene Interpretationshypothese als irrturnsfrei zu empfinden. In der Absicht, ein Gedankengut zu finden, das ihrer (als heroisch und richtig verstanden) Weltanschauung entspricht, kann sich den Untergeordneten ein Vernünftigkeitssystem aufdrängen, das sie statt zu interpretieren, eher zum Schweigen bringen.

Interpretationshypothesen sind Teil der Weltanschauung des Interpreten. Auf eine Weltanschauung kann man sich aber sowohl als erste als auch als dritte Person berufen. Diese beiden Modi der Berufung² implizieren jedoch nicht, daß die Gegenstände

unsere Wörter teilt. Von daher folgen einige wichtige Bemerkungen von Davidson, die sich auf die Unmöglichkeit, Gedanken von außen her zu identifizieren.

² Bei Karl Jaspers (1919), der sich sehr früh für die Weltanschauungsproblematik interessiert hat, stoßen wir auf zwei Grundbedeutungen von Weltanschauung: die ‚echten‘ und die ‚unechten‘. Im ersten Fall wird Weltanschauung praktisch als Synonym für ‚die faktische Existenz der Seele in ihrer Totalität‘ aufgefaßt. Es handelt sich um eine ‚konkrete‘, ‚faktische‘ Weltanschauung, die zwar ‚in das gesamte Leben des Individuums verwebt‘ ist und die Handlungen und Verhalten bestimmen, die aber dem in ihr Lebenden ‚anonym‘ bleibt. Zugleich hat bei Jaspers auch das übliche Verständnis von Weltanschauung Geltung, worunter nicht nur bestimmte ‚Lehren‘ subsumiert werden, sondern Gebote, auf die man sich beruft, um seine Handlungen zu rechtfertigen. Die ‚unechten‘

verschieden sind. Die Überzeugungen, die jegliche Weltanschauung ausmachen, sind nicht nur Denkweisen, sondern werden uns zugeschrieben, um unser Verhalten zu erklären (vgl. Moran, 2001, v. a. 3.Kapitel). Vom Standpunkt der dritten Person kann man sich auf eine bestimmte Weltanschauung berufen, um Handlungen zu interpretieren. Vom Standpunkt der ersten Person zeigt sich die Weltanschauung in jenen Transparenz-Beziehungen (*relations of transparency*), in denen ich durch eine bloße Untersuchung eines Gegenstands oder eines Geschehens schon weiß, was ich darüber denke. Es genügt aber nicht, daß ich den Gegenstand oder das Geschehen betrachte, um zu wissen, was eine andere Person darüber denkt. Freilich kann ich mich auf meine eigenen Überzeugungen und meine eigene Weltanschauung als dritte Person berufen, indem ich etwa mein eigenes Verhalten untersuche. Richard Moran (2001) versucht zu zeigen, daß, falls ich über meine Gedanken keine letzte Autorität habe, ein Konflikt entstehen kann – ein Konflikt, der von keinem allgemeinen Prinzip gelöst werden kann – zwischen den Überzeugungen, die ich mir zuschreibe, und jenen, die mir durch eine Transparenz-Beziehung in den Sinn kommen (*avow*). Auch hier hat der Irrtum keinen festen Platz: ich kann mich irren sowohl wenn ich mir eines Gedankens bewußt werde, als auch wenn ich mir einen Inhalt zuschreibe. Auch meine eigenen Überzeugungen und meine eigene Weltanschauung entspringen einer Interpretation, die all das umfaßt, worauf ich mich auf eine transparente Weise berufe und was ich mir als einer dritten Person zuschreibe.

Meine Weltanschauung kann gelegentlich nicht genug von erster oder von dritter Person sein. Bernard Williams (1985) weist darauf hin, wie manchmal ein Diskurs über Tugenden, den ich auf die Art und Weise, wie ich mich beim Handeln entscheide, verwende, das Ergebnis einer in die falsche Richtung gehenden ethischen Blickes, da er nicht genug von erster Person bestimmt ist (*not first-personal enough*). Wir können uns zwar mutig verhalten, auch ohne von Mut getrieben zu werden. Solche Gefahr besteht in Bezug auf viele unserer Überzeugungen (Bensusan & Pinedo, 2006). Wir können uns Überzeugungen und sogar eine ganze Weltanschauung aneignen, weil sie von den meisten akzeptiert werden, nützlich, populär, oder sogar weil sie kohärent, erklärungs-fähig und tugendhaft sind. Es besteht immer das Risiko, daß unsere Weltanschauungen nicht wirklich *unsere* sind.

Eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem Irrtum und der Interpretation kann uns aber zu einer anderen Ansicht führen. Es ist immer noch möglich, daß unsere Weltanschauung nicht genug von dritter Person ist. Das heißt: wir sind nicht imstande, unsere Weltanschauung als eine oder als Teil einer Weltanschauung zu verstehen. Es ist hier nun letztendlich nicht mehr möglich, die Frage nach dem Irrtum zu stellen. Aber das ist nicht alles. In Bezug auf die anderen, etwa die Einheimischen, können solche Attitüden uns zu einer Kommunikationslosigkeit, bestenfalls zu einem Monolog führen. Die Irrtümer befinden sich hier immer auf der Seite des Einheimischen. Da wir uns in diesem Fall unserer Interpretationshypothese und unserer Weltanschauung nicht bewußt sind, können sie nicht thematisiert werden und zur Diskussion stehen. Der Einheimische wird zum Schweigen gezwungen.

Ähnliche Fragen scheinen auch Hans-Georg Gadamer (1960, S. 272f) in seiner Hermeneutik zu

beschäftigen. Nach Gadamer werden wir die Meinung des anderen niemals verstehen, wenn wir uns auf unseren „Vormeinungen“ beharren, sie „nicht ausdrücklich auf ihre Legitimation, und das ist, auf Herkunft und Geltung“ prüfen. Aber die „Offenheit“, auf die uns Gadamer hier insistierend verweist und die als Basis des Miteinanderverstehens fungieren soll, scheint mit der „Aneignung der eigenen Vormeinungen und Vorurteilen“ Hand in Hand zu gehen. Wir können hier von einer anderen, vielleicht sogar ursprünglicheren Offenheit sprechen – einer Offenheit für uns selbst, für die erste Person, d.h., einer Art Erfahrung mit dem Faktum, daß wir uns stets in einer Weltanschauung befinden.

Auf Ähnliches hat uns bereits Karl Jaspers in seiner *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen* (1919) hinzuweisen versucht, vor allem dort, wo es um die Frage nach den Weltbildern geht: „Wir leben in einer Welt des Verstandenen und Verstehbaren, ohne es zu wissen, unkritisch, uns nicht kontrollierend, begrenzt [...] Wie selbstverständlich, ohne zu fragen, wird die Gegenwart, das gewohnte und sich immer gleichbleibende soziale Milieu, das eigene Seelenleben, Fühlen und Wünschen für das einzige gehalten.“ (S. 171)³ Die Selbstverständlichkeit, auf die uns in dieser Passage verwiesen werden, macht den Modus aus, in dem wir uns meistens die Dinge und die Ereignisse erfahren. Das heißt freilich nicht, daß wir für alles Verständnis haben oder alles ohne Bedenken akzeptieren. Fraglosigkeit bedeutet also nicht, daß sich man keine anderen Möglichkeiten ausdenkt, wobei dann die Dinge und Lebenserfahrungen relativiert werden könnten. Das alles spielt aber bereits in einem „Spielraum“ (Heidegger, 1927, S. 368), oder wie es Jaspers ausdrückt, in einem „Weltbild“, dessen Grenzen wir uns gar nicht bewußt sind. „Unser Weltbild ist uns immer irgendwo und irgendwie letztlich selbstverständlich. Und mögen wir auch noch soviel Einzelnes als relativ erkennen, wir leben doch mit dieser Selbstverständlichkeit schließlich irgendwie in einem Gehäuse, aus dem wir nicht hinausspringen können“ (S. 141). Wenn aber noch eine Chance besteht, daß wir aus unserem „Gehäuse“ herauskommen – d.h. in einer Weltanschauung leben, die *third-personal enough* ist –, dann liegt diese Chance vielleicht gerade darin, zu wissen, daß alle Anschauungen der Welt einem Gehäuse entspringen.

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³ Eindringlich sind diesbezüglich auch jene Passage am Anfang des Buches, in der Jaspers sich mit der Möglichkeit, eine religiös-mystische Erfahrung eines Mitmenschen zu verstehen, befaßt (S. 22). Ständig stoßen wir nach Jaspers auf Grenzen des Verstehens, die sich nicht überwinden lassen. Ich will den anderen verstehen, aber verstehe ihn eigentlich nicht. Man kann versuchen, das Phänomen etwa psychologisch oder soziologisch zu erklären oder gar existentiell zu explizieren. Aber jegliche Explikation enthält nur bestimmte, nicht die entscheidenden, die wesentlichen Elemente, die uns „nur sofern wir selbst leben, selbst Mystiker sind, selbst ganz außerhalb aller Betrachtung stehen“, zugänglich sind.

Weltanschauungen besitzen eher ein apologetischen Charakter und fungieren als festes und manchmal die faktische Situation ignorierendes Orientierungsmittel im Handeln. (vgl. Brea, 2004).

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An economist's reflections on some recent trends in European culture.

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Capitalism's competition-driven market-system increased mankind's ascendancy over the retentiveness of nature and endowed the citizens of the technologically-advanced countries with previously unmatched material affluence. Inexorably it drove entrepreneurs by the fear of being forced out of business by more efficient competitors to search for, and introduce, superior technological and organizational methods of production. It compelled employers to maintain the necessary profit to finance these innovations, and it imposed work-discipline on workers by the fear of unemployment and destitution. Though not the exclusive driving force, and not always functioning smoothly, this two-pronged mechanism of competition – competition between entrepreneurs for their share of the market, and competition between employers and organised labour for their relative shares in the fruit of production – was the system's dynamic and progressive elements.

The adverse effect of this fear-induced economic-growth promoting mechanism was that it inspired a spirit of acquisition which seized not only upon all phenomena within the economic realm but reached over into the entire cultural sphere including social relations. It established the supremacy of business interests over almost all other values and inflicted on society a utilitarian valuation of people, objects and events. The motives of entrepreneurs could be many – the simple urge to action, the desire for power, the craving for acclaim, even the impulsion to serve the common good – but by virtue of an inner necessity they all became subordinate to profit-making, because without economic success almost none of these desires could be attained.¹ The need to compete invested egoism with almost moral quality. As a result, Capitalism's paradigm of thought and modes of conduct became habitual and seemed to be "human nature", which, of course, they are not.

After World War II, many people expected the *Welfare State* to usher in a new more humane and equitable world. They believed that education, the progress in science and technology, and individuals' increasing economic security, would eclipse much of the miscreant mentality that ages of poverty and fear of starvation had imposed. They underrated the opportunities which the tenacity of old institutions, ideas and norms of conduct, offered those wishing to restore their lost privileges to stage a comeback. Erroneously the hopeful had taken for granted that given time the Capitalist era's unbridled materialism would simply taper off. They listened to the students' vocal denunciations of "false wants" and to their calls for a new agenda for society, but turned a deaf ear to their slogan: "We want it all, and we want it now!". Optimistically they ignored that an egalitarian society which incorporates everyone in a shared moral citizenship and high culture, without poverty, oppression or arbitrariness, and with perpetual economic and cognitive growth, is not inscribed into any historical plan.²

In fact trite materialism, and much of the old system's mind-set, lingered on. An important role in this played Capitalism's ability to socialize opposition by allowing individuals a relative mobility within the system. It

permits individuals to find their place in society on the basis of competitive ability, while the system itself remains immutable – a kind of running in place leading nowhere in particular. Thus, with no clear moral guideline, the system is held together by a universal pursuit of gain which permeates society to the last individual. It provides each individual with an illusion of security of life and property which leads him or her to approve of arrangements that enable him or her to enjoy what earnings or property they have but leaves them unmoved by the fact that it prevents them from obtaining long-run true economic security.³

When a pharmaceutical firm with limited resources faces the choice between investing in a medicine against River Blindness, which afflicts millions of poor Africans, and investing in a new perfume, that will please a few thousand rich Europeans, the decision will be in favour of the perfume. Not that the firm's managers are lacking in humanity – they simply cannot ignore the logic of the market. A cure for River Blindness is less financially rewarding than the sale of a new perfume. Shareholders neither know nor care what is produced with their investments, but they are well aware of the returns. A manager who does not make the customary rate of profit will not remain manager for long. Books which do not conform with conventional thought are not prohibited. But they seldom promise sufficient profit to publishers for investing much money in their publicity. For similar reasons real issues are reduced by television programmers into kitschy sentimentality and transformed into sterile sensationalism by the press.⁴ Symbols of opposition are seldom prohibited, but turned into a fad.⁵

The *Welfare State* was not designed to eliminate the market system. It was to give it direction and to provide it with a human face. It assigned the State a corrective task, namely to reduce fear of destitution and to restrict entrepreneurs' freedom to employ resources where they were not conducive to the public good. In the social sphere it was to provide health-insurance, care for the infirm and aged, support for needy unemployed and unemployable.

However, the *Welfare State's* success was only partial. Generic structural developments in the economic system and substantial changes in the social climate cast a dark shadow over its positive achievements. The generic economic modifications were the accelerated concentration and accumulation of wealth and of economic power which gave rise to monopolistic or near-monopolistic business conglomerates with world-wide connections that enabled such conglomerates to determine not only supply but also the structure of demand. Labour-cost differences, and other considerations,⁶ led to the removal abroad of labour-intensive enterprises and sometimes of entire industries. This, together with technological *process-innovations*, revived the spectre of unemployment. A scramble for funds to finance costly technological innovations, a mounting public debt, relatively high and rising taxes, and governments' inability to restrain inflation which cast doubt upon the adequacy of the Keynesian inspired economic policies, eroded the public's support for the *Welfare State*.

Next to this, lack of political probity, bureaucratic insensitivity, mismanagement and corruption, as well as widespread abuse of social security arrangements, and the tenacity of old ideas, bred resentment and cynicism. Egoism, mistakenly understood as individualism, became almost a virtue and prepared the way for a reactionary onslaught.

A process which accompanied the economic permutation and facilitated the moral decline was the accelerating separation of the ownership from the control and management of large enterprises. In earlier phases of the Capitalist system most funds involved in business transactions belonged to the persons directly involved in them, or were employed by persons who stacked their good name on the funds' proper utilisation. This endowed traditional Capitalism with its necessary business confidence. Not that traditional capitalists never indulged in shady practices, but the opportunities to do so were more circumscribed than they became with the increasing separation of the ownership from the management of enterprises. Classical capitalism made a clear distinction between legitimate and illegitimate means of acquiring wealth. Thieves, swindlers, embezzlers, forgers, and the rest of that ilk, were excluded from free enterprise society. This was still so in the late 1970s, but the threshold of social disapprobation became lower. With the separation of ownership from management corrupt individuals' modus operandi changed in a way that made malpractices less easy to prosecute and less directly visible. The problem with the separation was, and continues to be, that the self-interest of managers increasingly deviated from the shareholders'. The separation introduced a managerial elite – a new social stratum or class – between Capital and Labour with interests and a culture of its own. An acceptable level of profit continued to be required, but more often than not managers' prestige and social positions came to hinge more upon the size of the firm they control than on their real business acumen. This encouraged many of them to build economic empires by making takeover-bids and amalgamate firms with little regard whether this is in the shareholders' best interest. Members of this new *class*, and occasionally even respectable businessmen, increasingly regarded tax fiddles as peccadilloes and employed *armies* of bookkeepers and lawyers to gloss-over failures and to cover up malpractices.⁷ Many borrowed irresponsibly large amounts of money to finance costly technological *process innovations*, and allocated to themselves inordinately high salaries, which exacerbated inflation and then put the blame for it on workers' wage hikes. At the same time more and more working-men were also taking undue advantage of the state. In the 1980s and 1990s a significant number of workers *moonlighted* and collected unemployment pay, or conspired with employers to defraud the state, and abused the welfare provisions in a variety of other ways. Eventually all this overshadowed the positive achievements of the *Welfare State*, and reduced democracy's socially emancipating powers and remedial control over the Free Market system.

Since the late 1970s many young people lost interest in politics. Partly this was the result of the failure of the ideology inspired political systems to live up to expectations and worse, but in a large measure this was also due to the mistaken impression that the *Welfare State* had done little except supplemented industrial capitalism with bureaucratic insensitivity. Paradoxically this decline in political engagement was also precipitated by the *Welfare State's* success in providing a safety net that protected people from the worst economic consequences of

unemployment and other ills it managed to reduce or eliminate. Before the war, the scourge of unemployment placed ideologies at the head of the political agenda. Political parties were committed to programmes which stated how they intended to deal with these problems. This made elections meaningful. Post war prosperity, and the failures of the *grand* ideologically inspired policies, turned political leaders into administrators trying to overcome short-term hurdles in what was considered to be a stable social and economic system. The new mass-media of information replaced political discussion by sound-bites and practically muted everything not *entertaining*. Informed democracy was practically drowned by undifferentiated and misleading information and by *political correctness*.⁸ And as the voice of high social, business and academic position gives access to television, radio and the press, the voice of economic advantage being louder, was regularly mistaken for the voice of the people.⁹

Unfortunately the economics profession also contributed to the denigration of *Welfare State* and to the loss of a social compass. By its efforts to emulate the methodology that proved successful in the exact sciences, and to obtain a similar scientific status, economists restricted their investigations to narrow domains. To obtain rigour by quantification, they excluded long-term dynamic processes of complex social and economic life, by labelling them "exogenous" or by lumping them together in empirically untraceable "proxy variables".¹⁰ They did not deny the influence of technological innovation, changes in social conduct, the emancipation of women, the increasing alertness to environmental hazards, but treated them as if they impinged upon the economic system from outside and were not at least partially the system's own product. They simply ignored that most of the variables which they labelled exogenous do not develop in an economic vacuum. Separating social from economic factors, and disregarding their mutual influence, introduced unrealistic assumptions, such as "ceteris paribus" which may well be expedient for the prediction of short-run microeconomic processes but become a travesty where long-term macroeconomic processes are concerned. The point is that although good scientists' philosophical background seldom influences their answers it does determine their questions, and the final outcome can depend on this.¹¹ As a result of this, even the work of brilliant economists¹² was tainted by "habits of thought" which led them to try to incorporate Keynes's *General Theory* in the old conception, rather than see in it a step on the road to a new scientific paradigm free from the myth of the eternally full employment-seeking equilibrium.

Since the eighteenth century the rising productivity in agriculture was more or less matched by an equivalent long-term fall in the real prices of farm produce. This allowed people to spend more of their income on industrial goods.¹³ In this way the falling demand for labour in agriculture was compensated by a rising demand for labour in industry. Later, when productivity in industry increased, and the demand for labour in this sector began to flag, and competition reduced the price of industrial products, growing demand for services made good the loss of jobs in industry. In other words, for as long as competition remained sufficiently powerful to pass on to consumers the benefits of technological progress, a diminished demand for labour in one sector gave rise to an increased demand in another sector. This sequence lasted well into the 1960s,¹⁴ and led social scientists to believe that the rising demand for services would continue to sustain employment into the future. It looked like a plausible prognosis. Especially it seemed so, because

several important services can hardly be improved by labour-time-reducing innovations considering that they require the simultaneous attendance of consumer and provider, and because their quality depends on duration, for example patients and doctors and pupils and teachers. This, again, appeared to confirm the metaphysical foundation of economic theory. An "invisible hand" was leading the economy toward full employment equilibrium. It was an illusion. In fact, old and new monopolistic practices prevented prices from falling in line with labour input, and many services, which were expected to provide the new employment opportunities, fell prey to *automatization*. Together with this, the cost of the services where labour-time could not be reduced, greatly increased in comparison with the cost of the goods where new technologies could be applied. Obviously, if two cars can be produced with the labour input previously required to produce one car, and the time required by a hairdresser to serve a customer remains as before, then, compared to the cost of a car, a haircut becomes expensive. The problem with this was that the relative rising cost happened mainly in the state funded services.¹⁵

In other words, relative to the decreasing costs of goods produced by the private sector, the services provided by the public sector became dearer. This was one reason for the rising cost of the *Welfare State* but not the only reason for the relatively high taxes and the growing public debt. Equally important were the profound changes in the lifestyle of the increasingly more affluent societies, and the increasing complexity of the economic system. The widespread ideological commitment to greater social and economic equity placed with the state many of the obligations which traditionally rested with the family. The customary responsibility for the aged, and for healthcare and education, shifted from the household to the public sphere. But people accustomed to assigning social status to private ownership of property tend to forget that even if these needs were met by the family rather than the state the share of the national income allocated to their satisfaction would still be high and rising. The aged and infirm would still have to be housed and fed; medical care would still have to be paid for, teachers would still want to be remunerated. In this respect, the difference between a regulated and deregulated economy is inconsequential, but the distribution of the burden is significantly different. Under a system of *progressive taxation*, the rich, while being the least dependent on its services, are obliged to pay more than the poor to maintain the provisions of the *Welfare State*. This then, is the crux of the matter. The rich are allergic to subsidizing the "undeserving poor".

In practice, although everyone was entitled to free healthcare, state pensions; free education including higher education, unemployment benefit, and many other advantages, it was the large middle class which gained most from the State. It had better access than the poorer members of society to advantages provided by the state.¹⁶ Yet, the cultural legacy of old-style capitalism prevented the majority of the members of this class from recognizing this. Their eyes were focussed on taxes and other deductions from their incomes and not on the advantages they got in return.

Next to this, government became more costly because the economic system became more complex and more prone to monopolistic influences. It had to finance the construction and maintenance of new national communication networks (which at least initially were too expensive to be constructed and maintained by private enterprise alone), new sources of energy, new means of

protecting the public from epidemic diseases, from pollution of air and water, and, in the shadow of the Cold War and later threats, new expensive investments in defence related goods and services.

The power of monster conglomerates¹⁷, and their power to influence prices, is well known and needs here no elaboration. But while there was little new in the tendency toward monopoly, the stimulus it received in the 1980s from technological developments ushered in a *new market structure*. Manufacturing production-technology, and *Computer Integrated Manufacturing* (CIM), together with changes in the world economy, caused a revision of large corporations' market strategy.¹⁸ From being companies in many countries, important *multinationals* became *global* concerns.¹⁹

This new market structure rested on the presence of near monopoly in certain semi-finished goods and particular production processes. Each new investment in any of these industries led to a greater output than an equivalent investment did before, while the oligopolistic structures prevented prices from falling. Consequently consumer demand did not increase in line with rising productivity, and profits could no longer be made in the market-place. The result was that producers turned to *process innovation* because in a sluggish or shrinking market the way to preserve or increase profitability is to reduce production costs. With this, competition shifted from markets to innovation. The most efficient process innovator made the highest profit. As *process innovation* (as well as *product innovation*) usually involves high R&D expenditure and costly new equipment, the new structure strengthened the near monopoly of successful producers. It facilitated the determination of prices in line with investment plans with little regard for market competition. Variations in the volume of demand did not influence prices but determined the volume of production. The final outcome was growing unemployment together with rising prices and rising rates of interest. This then, was the phenomenon known as *stagflation*.²⁰ In short, the market-mechanism of prices did no longer function in the way it did before, or in the way the pre-Keynesians expected it to function.

What the situation really required was a judicious allocation of the fruits of the technologically generated economic growth. Such an allocation of added value does not imply *less* for the rich, but *more* for the poor and a little *less more* for the rich. In other words, what was needed was state intervention to sustain effective demand in line with growing productivity, and measures to provide sufficient capital to allow innovative investment to continue. With stringent steps to reduce abuse of social security, to restrain tax evasion and to restrict the ill-use of public funds, this could probably have been achieved with little or no inflation. But, since the mid-1970s, instead of doing this, governments adopted economic policies designed to stop inflation by wage restraint and by stimulating the private sector.²¹ Governments featherbedded the rich in the hope that easy money will encourage investment and revitalize demand for labour. The result was that investment continued to increase, but only in *process innovation* – in the replacement of human labour by machines, and production was scaled down in line with the resulting diminishing consumers' effective demand, thus increasing unemployment.²² Eventually, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, an entirely new economic structure was gradually developing in Western Europe with investment moving to the East and labour from the East into Western Europe.²³

There is, however, a cultural aspect of this economic process why neither the technological achievements of the last decades nor the new markets opened by the disintegration of the communist block and the accelerated economic growth of China and India, can break this vicious spiral by which the western economic progress is slowly grinding to a halt. This is the spreading of a new culture I call *industrial feudalism*. As already mentioned,²⁴ the position in the social hierarchy of the old *Captains of Industry*, the owner-managers, was determined by their wealth. Their wealth reflected what was taken to be evidence for their economic sagacity, and the manner in which they displayed their wealth reflected their social standing in the eyes of their peers. The new "*Captains*" of large enterprises are managers whose personal wealth and attainment are less directly tied to their businesses' profitability, and their social position is no longer subjected to a culture of *noblesse oblige*.²⁵

Controlling large funds which are not their own, the members of this new elite are less careful than their forebears to avoid unnecessary costs when this can strengthen their personal prestige. Provided such expenditures can be correctly booked as business costs, or tax deductible, they will be incurred regardless of whether or not they are really necessary for the business. Wealth continues to bestow numerous advantages on those who own it, and company profits remain an indispensable necessity, but the role of salaries and profits is reversed. Not current business profits but the height of his personal remuneration reflects the manager's status. This means that the new utility-maximizing "Captains of Industry" no longer resemble Adam Smith's profit-seeking entrepreneur who is willy-nilly promoting business efficiency, but an individual who constantly weighs his own against the enterprise's best advantage.²⁶

Worse. Since the late Middle Ages Capitalism developed in the shadow of the bourgeoisie's efforts to obtain equal status with the aristocracy. This was already amusingly illustrated in the seventeenth century by Moliere in his *Le Bourgeois gentilhomme*. It imposed upon the rising bourgeoisie a modicum of civilized behaviour in order to be regarded genteel – in order to appear socially of a high class. Whether or not the Aristocracy ever lived by the romanticised mode of conduct the bourgeoisie ascribed to it, is beside the point. It imposed certain rules on a bourgeoisie which was trying to emulate their *bettors*. It required individuals to be trustworthy, polite in conversation, and even cultured. The new elite, which was already well established before World War II in the United States, was less inhibited by all this, and after the war the inhibiting power of the old rules of the bourgeoisie's conduct were also rapidly waning in Europe. The new symbols of distinction – of *class* – which replaced the traditional were based on conspicuous show of wealth, power, and media attention. The result of this was a decline of the values that have made western civilisation economically powerful and given it the chance to promote a more rational and humane world. It placed expediency instead of truth at the head of the agenda and success ahead of the means by which it was attained.²⁷

The position of the scientific and technological research units in the large enterprises and public institutions is somewhat different. Characteristically real scientists are motivated by curiosity and peer appreciation. They are therefore less keen than administrators to obtain the kind of status which comes from power and control of people. Often their successes and failures can be tested by experiments and are immediately visible. Consequently,

unlike administrators whose status is determined by their level of remuneration, scientists' and technologists' remuneration only *reflects* their status which is in fact determined by their genuine achievements. It is this, the special position of Research and Development, which permits innovation and scientific progress to continue in spite of managerial inefficiency and rising unemployment. But even here the feudal culture takes its toll. When a section head in R&D is offered a new idea which deviates from well-established principles he faces a dilemma. If the idea proves to be successful, the acclaim is reaped by the person who suggested it or by the top managers of the organization, but if it turns out to be a failure it is he who will be blamed. It therefore becomes safer for heads of sections to avoid spending money on new or unconventional ideas.

Unfortunately this debilitating culture is rapidly also spreading to public research institutions, such as universities. Worse than this, the penetration of commercial interests into the world of science has led to a confusion between profitability and social relevance. Scientists still register tremendous achievements, particularly where science has a high degree of technological applicability, but they lost control over the direction of their work. They push back the frontiers of ignorance but leave the decision which frontiers to push back in the hands of industrialists and bureaucrats, and thus relinquish their moral obligation to society.

For several decades, well into the twentieth century, science played a major role in the promotion of welfare and economic growth. This gave scientists a special position in society. The majority of people romanticized their work and regarded scientists as selfless servants of human progress and truth. At the same time the scientists themselves developed a sub-culture of their own in the midst of an otherwise profit-dominated social environment. They found their ideal in the advancement of knowledge and put this before the pursuit of material advantage. Not that there was a lack of people in the scientific community who were keen on money, but these did not determine either the principles of scientific practice or the public image of the scientist. Many students of medicine, engineering and the natural sciences, as well as of economics and sociology, chose their studies out of strong social commitment. Even those studying just to obtain a well-remunerated job with social status, or because their parents just wanted them to go to universities, did not escape the influence of the sub-culture's value system. In recent years this is no longer true - the scientific community is losing its soul; it is becoming part of the commercial enterprise, and apart from some exceptions forfeited its public esteem. Together with the spreading of the feudal structure, this makes scientists less and less able to produce new ideas and find financial backing for their testing and application. But just as the loss of confidence in a businessman's word is not merely a moral decline but a real threat to the proper functioning of capitalism, so this loss of the traditional scientific spirit - the search for truth - is a real hazard for the proper functioning of the new market economy, because new ideas is precisely what western society needs to sustain a humane face, and what industry requires to keep ahead its new Asian industrial competitors.

In conclusions. Since the late 1970s we are drifting toward a society which is neither economically expedient nor offering much hope for a more humane world order. For centuries the West, and particularly the west of the West, had turned its eyes to the morrow and eagerly

embraced change, perceived as progress, and by this it marked itself off from earlier and alternative cultures. From the 1950s onwards much of this intellectual energy spent itself in practical achievements, from town planning to the Welfare State. The subsequent loss of momentum gave people the impression that the wheel is motionless - that it fails to carry them upward, as they previously believed, or downward, as they try not to fear. They immerse themselves in their daily business and immediate circle, and turn their back on the political parties who still claim to command the levers of change.²⁸

In the dark days of World War II, Albert Einstein declared that whatever "(science) will produce depends entirely on the nature of the goals alive in this mankind. Once these goals exist, the scientific method furnishes means to realize them. Yet it cannot furnish the very goals. The scientific method itself would not have led anywhere, it would not even have been born without a passionate striving for clear understanding. But perfection of means and confusion of goals seem to characterize the age. If we sincerely and passionately desire the safety, the welfare, and the free development of the talents of all men, we shall not be in want of the means to approach such a state."²⁹ Einstein's statement is as true today as it had been when he made it, but a society nurtured on individualism interpreted as materialistic self-interest is ill equipped to choose goals and pursue policies designed to promote *social safety*, *social welfare* and the *free development of talent*. And a scientific community which regards *expediency* as its guiding principle is ill equipped to deal with truth. Nobody is against safety, welfare, and the development of talents, but events have given these desires a different meaning from those supposed by Einstein's generation to be self-evident.³⁰

Unfortunately, the virtual monopoly of the establishment over the media of public information makes the explanation of the necessary choice practically impossible.³¹ It excludes the possibility to present *alternatives* to the "received" recipe for solving the unemployment problem, as the New Deal had purported to be. Moreover, the survival of the achievements of the Western World crucially depends on education. And education, as distinct from training, is anathema to obedience and compliance. But the latter are the attributes the new industrial feudalism requires to ensure its hegemony. Hence, the new oligarchy has most to lose from the free development of talents and independent thought in the tradition of the enlightenment. The denial of the traditional role of the study of history and literature in the widening of the concept of "humanity" ignores the wish for progress associated with modernity. If the term human progress can be given any meaning at all; even if my definition of economic progress as *the augmentation of freedom of choice*³² is not accepted, the term human progress means the extension of equal rights to an increasing number of people.³³

Democracy promoted equal rights for all irrespective of colour, religion and sex, though unfortunately they were never fully attained. The hallmark of progress is the search for what is common to mankind, and the hallmark of reaction is the stressing of differences.³⁴ Striving for equality is not antithetical to individuality, but bigotry is.

In this context it is worth remembering that characteristically modern science searches for the unifying principles behind events, but also emphasizes the diversity of particulars. It makes the distinction between facts and values. Equal *rights* provide the basis for the opportunity to realize individual aims and desires. But the attempt to

regard pure self-interest as a unifying principle behind all behaviour, as if it was a scientifically established fact, and in the political sphere equating it to individualism, turns success itself into a kind of vindication of almost all means by which it is obtained. Alas, this attitude is more evident from day to day.³⁵ Increasingly in the public's mind high office is becoming synonymous with corruption, and herein lies the real danger for the future: distrust in *politicians* is leading to distrust in *politics* and hence to disbelief in the possibility of obtaining desired ends by means of the ballot-box. It is for this reason that the diminished interest young people show for political engagement and the change from ideological to religious commitment threaten the achievements of modernity.

The fate of the humane values of western civilization is still in the balance - the battle for a more decent world is not yet lost. What is required is a plausible *alternative* to the mad rush to privatisation. Discontent, and efforts to correct specific wrongs alone, cannot reverse the drift toward despondency. A realistic alternative, the vision of a future worthy to be struggled for, is indispensable. Without it discontentment breeds desperation, reaction and disaster. But given an alternative people find *hope*, and hope is the great antidote to despondency and fear.

Our social and economic system is in the process of reorganization, and the final outcome of any system's reorganization is always unpredictable. But our decisions may influence its future.

How to Make Opposite Ends Meet?

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The twentieth century is an epoch, in which linguistic studies were intensified, and in the history of philosophy this is referred to as the 'linguistic turn'. The philosophy of language, which emerged as a very new sub-discipline of philosophy through the investigation of theories asserted under this heading, focused primarily on the problem of meaning. The problem taking place in the analytic tradition, as a whole, is concerned with the power of linguistic expressions, which exceeds themselves, with their providing possibilities to represent the variety of universe without recognizing any obstacles such as their existence-nonexistence, complexity, abstractness, gravity, substantiality, space, indirectness (Denkel, 1984). Today, if the theories of meaning asserted in the twentieth century are investigated, it is seen that there are two opponent approaches these theories based on: 'Absolute objective approach' –as Denkel calls it (1984)- and 'pragmatic approach'. The former, the roots of which can be found in Plato, includes 'referential theory of meaning', which is argued by Russell, and Frege. This approach, which can also be classified in the logical positivist view, solely investigates the relation between language and the objects of the world. In this sense, it gives us a universalistic picture of reality. As to the latter, it is an approach based on 'ordinary language' which gained importance towards the end of the century mainly after the publication of *Philosophical Investigations*. This approach, which is still in the process of evolving, puts the emphasis on the relation between language and the one who uses it to communicate. Therefore, the meaning of linguistic expressions depends on how they are used; and this is what brings about cultural elements as variable criteria on the determination of meanings.

In this paper, I'll assert that the trace –even the base- of these two opponent approaches of analytic philosophy can be found in Wittgenstein's dual philosophy if it is appraised in terms of the concept of meaning. Hence, contrary to the claim that his philosophy has no dual character and has no such periods as early and late, I will endorse the claim that his philosophy should be investigated in two opposing periods. To this aim, I will correlate the views expressed in *Tractatus* with the absolute objective approach and the views expressed in *Philosophical Investigations* with the pragmatic approach. More specifically, I will argue that his early understanding of meaning put forward in *Tractatus* has to do with 'referential theory of meaning' advocated by Russell and Frege, and hence with logical positivism, which introduces us a universalistic picture of reality. Whereas his late understanding of meaning, 'meaning as use', is based on pragmatic movements, which accentuate the effects of social practical elements on the meaning of terms, thus its dynamic character. As far as his understanding of meaning is concerned, in the analytic tradition, it takes place as the representative of two opposite approaches. However, this does not mean that the theories of meaning put forward by Wittgenstein, though being opposing, are not incompatible. In fact, here, I will further claim that 'meaning as representation' and 'meaning as use' are two opposite, but yet compatible theories argued by Wittgenstein. This is mainly because the pragmatic approach includes the absolute objective approach in that there are uses of language that fits the latter approach among many other language games. That is to say, the absolute objective approach is included in the pragmatic approach. Thus, it will be shown on the basis of the concept of meaning that it is not the case that

Wittgenstein has no two opposing periods. On the contrary, he has such periods, which are compatible with one another.

Although there is no consensus on dividing his philosophy into periods, in my opinion, in *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein can be considered as the prime advocate of the logical positivist approach, which offers an objective picture of reality. This is simply because his early understanding of meaning put forward in *Tractatus* can be seen as a model of the 'referential theory of meaning' advocated by Russell and Frege, and hence of logical positivism, which introduces us to a universalistic picture of reality. He shares with Russell and Frege the idea that mathematical logic is of great importance to understanding the world. According to Wittgenstein's views in *Tractatus*, there is an agreement between thought, language and world indeed they all share common logical form. What is meaningful in language shares the same logical scaffolding with the world and thought. In this sense, meaningful sentences, propositions, are the logical pictures of reality, which have the same structure as reality. They are, in this sense, the representatives of states of affairs, which are relations among elementary objects of which the world consists. As to the meaning of a word, it is the elementary object which is represented in the world. So, since what is meaningful is the representative of linguistic expressions in the world, Wittgenstein can be taken as an advocate of a referential theory of meaning, 'meaning as representation.' By providing this relation through sharing common logical form with our world and thought, language, which is perfect, represents the world as a mirror. Therefore, it gives us a universalistic logical picture of reality. For him, "...we must make use of a sign-language... that is governed by logical grammar –by logical syntax.", as he puts it in *Tractatus*, 3.325. This idea leads us to a universal understanding of meaning, if something is meaningful, its meaning does not change from culture to culture or time to time. Since language shares one and the same logical scaffolding with our thought and reality, what is meaningful in language has one and the same meaning everywhere and every time, regardless of the one using it.

However, Wittgenstein, in his later works, especially in *Philosophical Investigations*, betrays the handicaps of the theory of meaning asserted in *Tractatus* and puts forward a theory of meaning that would be a prototype of the (pragmatic) approach based on 'ordinary language'. In this work, Wittgenstein adopts a main understanding of meaning which gives rise to some theories, which mostly emphasize the importance of the ordinary use of language serving to communicate, hence, the social aspects of language, which points to cultural elements in language.

According to his views asserted in *Philosophical Investigations*, linguistic expressions do mean not objects or states of affairs that refer to reality, but to the use of them in a language game. If it is taken for granted that there are many different uses of a term or an expression, it will exhibit variety in meaning depending on the way it is used. This opens up different interpretations of the meaning of a term because there are many ways to use it. For as he states in § 23, "...there are...countless different kinds of use of what we call "symbols", "words", "sentences"..." This is, for him, something that leads us to "new types of language, new language games"; hence, to new meanings of linguistic expressions. For, since he takes language games as part of an activity of

our lives, various life-forms take us to various language games, which results in meanings. In this sense, meanings can be construed as having changeable character depending on in which language game or in which culture or in which context it is used. Hence, the meaning of an expression varies from one culture to another. Therefore, it is contradicted by Wittgenstein's early understanding of meaning (as representation), which gives objective-universal essence to meaning.

Furthermore, he rejects the perfect language argued in *Tractatus* by saying the followings, in §107:

"...the crystalline purity of logic was ...not a result of investigation: it was a requirement... just because of that we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!"

What he means here by 'rough ground' is, as Soykan states, the language we use in our daily lives, which is shaggy, rough, and knotty (2002, 55). In this sense, as Soykan further construes, Wittgenstein points to ordinary language which gives the results of descriptive investigations as opposed to pure-crystalline perfect language, which offers an unrealistic normative explanation of world.

Now, having seen that he has two opposite periods, at least as far as the notion of meaning is concerned, I think that these two opposing theories advocated by Wittgenstein are not incompatible ones. This is simply because they are conjoined; games theory does not exclude, but comprehend picture theory. For, what is seen as meaningful in *Tractatus* is considered, in *Philosophical Investigations*, as not wrong, but only one of many languages games. In this sense, what picture theory asserts as meaningful is taken as one of countless language games; thereby picture theory is included in game theory, and therefore is combined with it. In this sense, picture theory can be seen as a subset or sub-theory of game theory. So, although being opposing, since these theories are not mutually exclusive, but conjoined, it is impossible for these conjoined yet opposite theories to be incompatible. Therefore, these opponent theories argued by Wittgenstein should be taken as compatible.

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Intercultural Dialogue in Philosophy: Julio Enrique Blanco, Hans Lindemann, Wittgenstein and Austrian Tradition

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Julio Enrique Blanco (1890-1986) is, in our opinion, one of the most important philosophers Colombia has ever had, although he hadn't been recognized completely as such by Colombian historiography of philosophy. He's one of the few Latin American thinkers who could give an account of the Vienna Circle, Wittgenstein and of German speaking philosophy by the 1940's given his readings of German, English and French writings on science and philosophy at the beginning of the 20th century. (See Blanco 1917, 1920). What is the evidence for these assertions?

I. Blanco's background

Blanco's philosophical thought could be classified in four periods: the first period (1910-1925) is related to his early autodidactic studies and his contributions to the *Revista Voces*, (1917-1920, "A magazine of sciences, letters and arts"¹); the second (1925-1945) partially coincides with his travels to Europe, and is characterized by his approach to Husserl's philosophy; a third (1945-1975) that is related to his *Metafísica de la Inteligencia* (*Metaphysics of Intelligence*, an attempt to build his own metaphysical system); and the fourth and last which goes from 1975 to his death in 1986. Being a "lonely intelligence" as he regarded himself, this last period is marked by his contact with a younger generation of scholars (Julio Nuñez Madachi, Eduardo Bermúdez Barrera, Jesús Ferro Bayona) in Barranquilla, his hometown. It is of interest for our purposes to focus on the first two periods, which are critical for understanding his view of German speaking philosophy.

By 1911, in order to improve his mastery of German language, he made two translations to Spanish, one of Ewald Hering's *Über das Gedächtnis als eine allgemeine Funktion der organisierten Materie* (1870) and the other of Kant's *Prolegomena*. During his first period, Blanco was interested in naturalistic explanations of life and consciousness, being under the strong influence of authors such as Darwin, Haeckel, Hering, Herbart, Hertwig, Loeb, and Mach, amongst others. In a letter of 1934, Pablo Wolf, recalls their 1915 meeting on a Magdalena river steam boat. Wolf was a Viennese citizen that had a bookstore in Bogotá, 800 Km away from the Caribbean port of Barranquilla. The latter is the city where Blanco lived for most of his life. Wolf recalled how Blanco translated for him a poem by Heine. Wolf also claimed that

"If one is to take into account the commercial and material environment in which you used to live, it's something worthy of admiration your courage to follow your own path despite of all the adverse circumstances."

Blanco was a member of a group of young intellectuals in Barranquilla. Amongst them we could mention Julio Gómez de Castro, Enrique Restrepo, Ramón Vinyes and Hipólito Pereyra. They founded a magazine called *Voces* in 1917, where they published their own original writings, reviews of scientific books and translated works from the fields of poetry, arts and philosophy. Pablo Wolf, for instance, considered Hipólito Pereyra to be

"Barranquilla's Peter Altenberg": "as the deceased Viennese poet, sometimes he writes good stuff, and at others stupid stuff as well."² As another sample of the contents of the magazine with respect to arts and literature, *Voces* magazine published original articles of authors such as Hugo von Hoffmanstahl and Ewald Hering.

Of the *Voces* group, it was mostly Restrepo and Blanco who were involved with philosophy and science. In his introductory note to Blanco's essay *Sobre la causalidad biológica*³ (*On biological causality*, 1917) Restrepo writes that aside of a clear Kantian influence,

"the current trends of scientific philosophy lead by James Clerk Maxwell in England and followed by Helmholtz, Mach and Hertz... did not take long to exert on him [Blanco] a vivid attraction and to mark his actual orientation that, given his youth, cannot be considered definitive."

His knowledge of these and other authors is confirmed by his autobiographical notebooks⁴, where he made critical notes on many of the previously mentioned authors and some other of his readings, as well as by the volumes that can be found in his library (amongst others, part of the *Ostwald's Klassiker der Exaktenwissenschaften*, Poincaré, Helmholtz and Hertz). JEB was also familiar with scientific-biologically oriented philosophy, the field of psycho-philosophy and the general positions of J. Loeb, E. Haeckel, P. Ehrlich, E. Metchnikoff, W. Ostwald and the *Monistenbund*. Of particular importance are the notes of 1911, which correspond to his studies on Mach and his *Analyse der Entdeckungen* (6th edition of 1906). It is fair to say that in his first period Blanco was following the theoretical direction of empirio-criticism, though he was very much impressed by Kant:

"But I kept on dwelling solitarily on Kant, whose philosophical superiority I could sense without being able to understand nor to embrace completely."⁵

This previous history enabled him to become deeply involved with Lindemann's article and is to be taken into account in order to understand Blanco's position.

II. Hans Lindemann and the "Schlick Circle" experience

Lindemann was an Austrian-Argentinean born in a family of mathematicians and scientists that initially was more interested in arts than in science and philosophy, but subsequently got interested in them as he recalls:

"Material circumstances stronger than myself were what lead me first to the pragmatics in life, then to arts and

¹ Subtitle of the *Revista Voces* (See Bermúdez and Campis, 2005).

² In a note by Pablo Wolf on Hipólito Pereyra in Nieto, José A. and De Parias Francisco, 2002.

³ For more details see Bermúdez 2001.

⁴ We herewith would like to thank Pedro Blanco Lassen, son of Julio E. Blanco, for granting full-access to the JEB files.

⁵ *La Filosofía en América*. See also *Sobre el origen y desarrollo de las ideas teleológicas en Kant*, *Voces*, 1918.

philosophy and finally to science, logic and exact disciplines.”

As for Blanco, he admits being influenced by Kant:

“My philosophical speculations started under the influence of Kant and neo-Kantians, without accepting that doctrine at all, but not knowing how to escape from it because of a lack of orientation in a purely commercial environment like Buenos Aires during the period 1912/27.”

After moving to Berlin in 1927, then he went to Vienna to study philosophy where he attended Schlick’s seminar (1929-1930. See *Lindemann* 1944, p. 146. Also *Staedler* 2001, p. 235). There they discussed Russell’s *Analysis of matter* and modern physics (the theory of relativity and quantum physics) as well as the foundations of mathematics. This coincides in time with the meetings of Schlick, Waismann and Wittgenstein. Having read in Buenos Aires the works of Poincaré –another coincidence with Blanco-, whose ideas he thought to be continued by the philosophy of the Vienna Circle, he soon found that “the only way out of the abyss of school philosophy was to apply the method of science to philosophy as well”.

Despite his sympathy for the general positions of the Circle, he shows his critical distance with respect to Carnap’s early works (in our opinion, he must have referred to *Psychologie in physikalischer Sprache*):

“... I realized that the weakest point of the Vienna Circle, and especially of Carnap’s point of view, was their position with respect to psychology that seemed simply ridiculous to me... Then I started studying psychology... My doctoral thesis was therefore, dedicated to the incorporation of psychology as it was practiced in psychological laboratories, with its diverse methods of research, to the system of radical empiricism, because Carnap’s behaviorism, constructed *ad hoc* for his logical reconstruction of the world, was not enough for me.”

Finally, Lindemann published *Weltgeschehen und Welterkenntnis* in Vienna in 1937. A review by Rudolf M. Rohrer was published in *Kantstudien* the same year. There is a reference to Lindemann and Quine having visited Brazil in 1944 (Dussel, 2003), motivated by the growing interest there in the works of Russell and logic. Lindemann also wrote a review of Quine in the *Journal of Symbolic Logic* (June 1948). Most of the information on Lindemann is supplied by himself in his article; other references are scarce, but this is enough to draw a partial portrait of the man and his works.

III. Lindemann’s El Círculo de Viena y la filosofía científica and Blanco’s La filosofía en América: an intercultural dialogue

In Buenos Aires Lindemann published an article at the *Revista Minerva* –a philosophical magazine (1944-1945) founded by young physicist and philosopher Mario Bunge– where he gives an account of the Vienna Circle and the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus*. Then came Blanco’s reply. It contained many criticisms to the general positions of the circle. Blanco also expands antecedents provided by Lindemann. The latter refers to Vienna as an environment where liberal scientific and philosophical ideas had spread early.

He gives a summary description of the Viennese tradition: assuming the contemporary trends in philosophy to be valid, he considers that

“Instead of starting all over again on the base of new dogmatic metaphysical systems, we’ll obtain constant progress toward the elaboration of an adequate view of the world based upon the results of science.”

It is interesting to see some of the points of convergence and divergence between Blanco y Lindemann, which will serve as guide to illustrate some historical ways in which intercultural dialogue between Europe and Latin America has taken place.

As we have already seen, both authors started their philosophical speculations from a Kantian point of view, although not being completely in agreement with Kant. They also had in common the fact of having read authors such as Poincaré or Hans Vaihinger. These two authors moved in an intercultural context with a strong Spanish-German context.

Both JEB and Lindemann were also related to commercial activities. It would be an interesting exercise to analyze this fact in the light of the ideas of Karl Kautsky on “Trade and Philosophy” in his *Foundations of Christianity*. The fact that both used to live in coastal cities is closely related to these ideas.

On the other hand, both lived for a considerable time in Europe, an issue which explains the intercultural dialogue. While Argentina was built upon migrations, Colombia practically rejected foreign immigration with just few exceptions, Barranquilla being probably the most significant one.

As to the differences between our two authors: they are represented by their intellectual and theoretical development, especially with respect to their positions on logic and metaphysics. Despite having some readings in common, Lindemann identified himself with the trend that moved towards the reduction of the importance of metaphysics, while Blanco got stuck in the tradition of metaphysical systems –those created by a single individual as his own representation of the world- because of his appraisal of Kant and Hegel, as we can see in the following quote:

“It cannot be even dared to compare the logic that pleases the Vienna Circle by the mere fact of being innovative with the *Critique of Pure Reason*, not the work of a premature genius, but of a mature one... Kant had not been just satisfied with the sustentation of mere artificial combinations by means of arithmetical transpositions as the juvenile genius of Leibniz did, but with the deepening in the very essence of pure reason. With it he opened precisely the path of inner experience that was to prove fruitful with Hegel... Neither the *ars combinatoria* of Leibniz nor any of the newest logical artifices can be compared to Kant’s transcendental or Hegelian logic.”

This marks a great contrast with Lindemann, who praised Leibniz, Frege and Russell. Lindemann knew already that

“Any metaphysical use of logic, for instance, Hegel’s ontological logic and its derivatives like the logic of Croce cannot be sustained by any means.”

Because of a lack of actualized information on the logical-mathematical tradition (Bolzano, Frege and their successors), JEB misunderstood Wittgenstein, although he considered the *Tractatus* to be “the work of a genial thinker”. But both JEB and Lindemann coincided in taking the *Tractatus* as being his only important work.

Lindemann considers Wittgenstein to be “a disciple of Russell”, and claimed that

“It is not an exaggeration to say that this treatise represents the philosophical work of this century with the greatest consequences... .. [Although] his name and work is not known in most of the world philosophical circles interested in the renovation of school philosophies and metaphysical and dogmatic professors.”

Lindemann, even expressed that

“Personally –and some others have confessed the same to me- I have not had a favorable impression of the last products [1944] of this thinker.”

He also considers that “*it seems that his main work is always going to remain his Tractatus.*” As we have already seen, both Blanco and Lindemann –though the latter being better informed than Blanco- had a very narrow view of the influence Wittgenstein would have on contemporary philosophy. This issue can be fully explained by the mere fact that the works of what came to be known as the late Wittgenstein were only published after his death in 1951. That is the reason why neither JEB nor Lindemann got to see more than the tip of the iceberg.

IV. Conclusion

The articles of Blanco and Lindemann are highly illustrative of the particularities of Latin American philosophy by the middle of the 20th century, a very agitated age in terms of political and theoretical trends; it also offers a chance of increasing historical understanding of Austrian and German traditions, as seen through foreign eyes. Further research is needed in order to gain a better understanding of both European and Latin American philosophical environments and their mutual influences. Our purpose here is that of raising interest for these matters among scholars from all the involved countries and all other international researchers.

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On Siamese Twins and Philosophical Zombies: A New Reading of Wittgenstein's 'Private Language Argument'

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Wittgenstein's so-called 'private language argument,' that is, those sections of his *Philosophical Investigations* following upon §242 and featuring, prominently, a critical discussion of the notion and possibility of a language involving reference to one's immediate and private sensations, has seemed elusive, if not impenetrable, to many. Attempts to assess the validity of the argument have traditionally been hindered by vast differences of opinion regarding its overall content, differences supervening upon a myriad of smaller exegetical puzzles which have themselves, in turn, evaded satisfactory interpretive consensus.

As opposed to rehearsing these well-worn pathways of controversy, in what follows I shall attempt to give a new and simplified reading of Wittgenstein's argument, one which I hope will undercut many of these concerns, and shed light on many contentious points, by bringing to the fore a key aspect of the considerations developed in § 242 ff that has, historically, been relatively underappreciated. More specifically, I shall present Wittgenstein as giving an argument in two basic stages, the second of which pertains to the possibility of a private sensation language, and which addresses concerns which emerge naturally out of the first stage, which pertains to identity statements. The first stage involves the development of a claim made initially in the *Tractatus* (c.f. 1961 5.5301-5.5302, p xviii), but to which Wittgenstein continued to adhere, though in modified form, in the *Investigations*, and which he introduces in various contexts throughout his later philosophy. (e.g., 1958, § 216, and 2005, p 304e) The claim, reiterated in this context at § 253, is simply that Leibniz's principles of identity are flawed; identity statements, in so far as they are not nonsense, must state, not that a thing is identical to itself *simpliciter*, but rather, and *contra* Leibniz, either of *two* things that they are identical to one another (e.g., sortal identity), or of *one* thing that it is qualitatively discernable from itself in some respect (e.g., the morning star and the evening star are the same celestial body). This claim, I shall argue, is intended to provide support for a characterization of pains etc., as qualitatively discernable identicals, states of a living human body which 'show up' in qualitatively distinct ways depending, for instance, upon whether one is in the state in question, or merely observes it. One important merit of this characterization is that it renders much more plausible Wittgenstein's various claims to the effect that it is possible for others to have direct (i.e., non-inferential) knowledge about, *inter alia*, our sensations and mental states.

The argument against a 'private sensation language' can then be seen, I shall argue, as invoking previously developed considerations regarding the concept of following a rule in an effort to address a potential response available, in light of the attack undertaken on the basis of the consideration of identity statements, to a defender of the 'in principle' epistemological privacy of sensations. The response is to attempt to identify the phenomena referred to by our sensation words with phenomenal items which, existing independently of the "natural expressions" (§ 256) or "outward signs" (§ 257) of sensation, it is impossible for others to know. The argument against a private sensation language is invoked to block this move by demonstrating,

not that we *cannot* meaningfully refer to our own 'in principle' epistemologically private sensations,¹ nor that we *can* refer to such items but only insofar as our sensation words are employed within the context of a 'public framework,'² but rather that, because we, and others, *can* in fact refer to our sensations, the phenomena they refer to cannot, as the interlocutor had hoped, be identified with phenomenal items of this sort.

Consonant with his general approach to identity statements, Wittgenstein insists, in § 253, that the criteria for identity in the case of ascriptions of sensation (or of sensation location), are such that, in so far as it makes sense to say that one pain is identical to another, e.g., "'my' pain is the same as (or in the same location as) 'his' pain," it must involve reporting a *contingent* identity. It might, for example, intelligibly be thought of as asserting identity of sortal (and so be analogous to e.g., "this chair is not the one you saw here yesterday, but is exactly the same as it" (§ 253)), or, on the other hand, the self-identity of some particular object but as determined by two or more sets of qualitatively discernable descriptive or perceptual information (e.g., "The place where Fred has a pain is in the same as the place where Bob has a pain" (where Fred and Bob are Siamese twins) (*ibid.*)). By contrast, in the sense in which it seems *impossible to deny* or doubt that a particular pain was mine, it is also *impossible to affirm* or be certain about it. Propositions in connection with which it makes sense to think that the opposite of what they apparently assert might obtain, such as 'this table has the same length as that one over there,' (§ 251) play a fundamentally different role within language than those, such as 'Every rod has length,' for which this is not the case. (*ibid.*) In particular, while the former are empirical propositions which are capable of being true or false, the later are grammatical propositions which simply state or are derived trivially from linguistic rules. (§ 253) Since attempts to deny the latter sorts of propositions are senseless, further, emphatically stressing the point that a particular pain is mine and so cannot be someone else's, i.e., 'Surely no one else can have THIS pain,' are thus not empirical assertions, (§251) but rather amount, much as does the proposition 'Only you can know whether you had that intention,' (§ 247) to a potentially misleading explication or explanation of a grammatical rule, in this case, that first-personal ascriptions of sensation are first-personal. Much as in the case of 'a thing is identical with itself,' (§ 216) the seemingly legitimate employment of a criterion for identity in the case of 'another person cannot have my (or 'THIS') pain,' is, Wittgenstein argues, chimerical. This is because, though perhaps reflecting certain contingent empirical features of our nature and circumstances, 'another person cannot have my (or 'THIS') pain,' is no more an empirical proposition than is, for example, 'One plays patience (Solitaire) by oneself.' (§ 248) To deny the latter proposition, clearly, would not amount to repudiating a deep metaphysical necessity, but would rather simply demonstrate a lack of understanding

¹ This is a reading given, for example, by George Pitcher (*The Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1964)).

² This line is defended, e.g., in Merrill and Jaakko Hintikka, *Investigating Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).

vis-à-vis the contingent empirical fact as to what the word 'patience' (Solitaire) means. Similarly, in the sense in which it seems impossible to do so, the attempt to deny the proposition 'another person cannot have my (or 'THIS') pain' would not amount to denying an important philosophical truth, but would rather simply show a misunderstanding of the grammar which, as a contingent and empirical matter of fact, governs ascriptions of sensation formulated in the first-person. Taken, by contrast, in one of the two senses in which it can intelligibly be thought of as employed to make an empirical assertion which repudiates the possibility of a certain sort of identity relation, the claim that 'another person cannot have my (or 'THIS') pain,' is simply false, with the case of Siamese Twins, and that of corresponding injuries, bearing decisively against it.

But because, in so far as pains etc., are identical they must be qualitatively (or, derivatively 'quantifiably') discernable (i.e., any legitimate assertion of a relation of identity must be a contingent proposition such as one of those of the two sorts outlined above), it is possible, for example, for someone to *know* that another is in pain without needing to *have* the others pain (§ 246). Pain 'shows up' differently depending upon whether one has the pain or observes it. In particular, while the observer cannot ordinarily *have* the pain of the one whom he observes (unless, e.g., he has a corresponding physical injury), it is nonetheless perfectly possible for that observer to know another's pain non-inferentially, on the basis, specifically, of the fact that the pain in question is often quite readily discernable in certain characteristic and overt 'natural expressions' as well as 'outward signs' (such as grimaces, groans, and exclamations). The sense in which one's sensations (and perceptions) are 'private' is thus not that others *cannot know them*, but rather simply that others ordinarily *do not have them*. That sensations (or sensation locations), are typically 'had' by only one person and so 'show up' in a unique way to the person whose states or sensations they are, is, furthermore, indicative neither of a deep metaphysical division, nor a consequent 'in principle' epistemological privacy, but is rather simply a contingent, empirical fact about our bodies which in certain cases does not obtain (e.g., Siamese Twins (§ 253)). Because the usual, if contingent, circumstances are such that it is true, however, that one and only one person has a particular pain or is in a particular mental state, etc., the grammar of first-personal ascriptions of sensation and mental conduct are such that we will say things like 'only you can know whether you had that sensation (or intention),' where 'knowing' is not here, as elsewhere, something opposed to uncertainty, but merely indicates that the expression of uncertainty is not ordinarily a genuine move in the language-game of first-personal ascriptions of sensation or intention. (§§ 247-248)

Analogously, if one is to *doubt* a proposition in the sense in which doubt is genuinely opposed to knowledge, it must be possible to *know* it. There can thus be no logical 'half-way house' consisting of bodies which may or may not have consciousness or sensations (i.e., may or may not be 'philosophical zombies'), but of which it is impossible to know whether they do (or are), and so no 'problem of other minds' in the sense that because the minds of others are epistemologically private and hidden, we cannot, even in principle, know whether or not those minds exist. If we can meaningfully make an assertion about something, e.g., that our own or some other body does or does not have consciousness, or is in pain, etc., that assertion must rather, Wittgenstein insists, employ words with *epistemologically public* criteria of correct

application. (§ 258, 265) Indeed, the argument against a 'private sensation language,' taken up in § 256ff, makes precisely this point in an effort to subvert an attempt, undertaken by the interlocutor, to identify the various phenomena referred to by our sensation words with 'in principle' epistemologically private phenomenal items which are (purportedly) independent of the 'natural expressions,' or 'outwards signs,' of sensation (i.e., are the sorts of thing which a 'philosophical zombie,' by definition, is supposed to lack).

As in the case of the rule-following considerations introduced prior to § 242, the argument against a 'private sensation language' involves introducing a certain sort of scepticism concerning the movement from present (or past) to future employments of a particular sign, in this case, a putatively 'private' ostensive definition. Here, however, the scepticism is neither constitutive,³ nor epistemic, but rather heuristic. Wittgenstein's point in § 258 is that in remembering, in the future, the connection which I have established in the past between sign and sensation, I will have *no genuine criterion for the correctness* of the memory, since, given the privacy of the definition, whatever seems to me to be correct will be in fact correct. While going on to concede, of course, that "the hypothesis that I make a mistake is mere show," (§ 270) i.e., it is *not* genuinely possible to make a mistake in the case of (putatively) employing a sign the use and definition of which it is impossible for others to understand (this, in fact, is precisely the problem with such a sign), Wittgenstein brings this point out heuristically by noting that, given that memory is ordinarily fallible, it is intuitively problematic to rely *exclusively*, as would seem to be required in the case of a private ostensive definition, upon our personal and introspectively available memories in order to guarantee, or provide a criterion for, the 'sameness' of usage in each case. This simply reflects, however, the more fundamental point that there *being* a correct usage of a particular sign involves its being governed by standards conformity to which can readily be *independently* determined or confirmed. The manner in which a sign with epistemologically *public* criteria for correct application evades the difficulties characteristic of a 'private' ostensive definition is, further, not that it facilitates communal agreement in regards to the use of the sign (understood in this way a 'public' definition will inevitably seem no more or less tenuous than a 'private' one),⁴ nor that it allows for the introduction of public evidence which facilitates or assists in the correct identification of our epistemologically private sensations,⁵ but rather that, because its definition can be understood by others, it is possible for there to be genuine disagreement about whether it has been used correctly; it is thus possible in such a case, and as it is *not* in the case of a language which it is impossible for others to understand, for someone to *misapply* a term referring to e.g. a sensation.

But if a private language of the sort envisioned is impossible, then claims to the effect that 'I am in pain' or 'She is in pain,' *cannot*, Wittgenstein insists, refer to a phenomenon which is knowable only to the person that has it. It is therefore not available to the defender of the 'in principle' epistemological privacy of sensations to identify the various phenomena referred to by our sensation words with phenomenal items which, according to her view,

³ That the rule-following considerations which occur prior to §242 are 'constitutive' rather than epistemic in nature, is a claim discussed by both Boghossian (1989, p 150), and Kripke (1982, pp. 14, 21, 150)

⁴ This is a point made by P.M.S. Hacker and Gordon Baker (1984, p 37), as well as Simon Blackburn (1984, p 37), against Kripke (1982).

⁵ This line is taken by Ayer ("Can There Be A Private Language?" *Aristotelean Society Proceedings*, Supplementary Volume 28 (1954), pp. 63-76).

others cannot know. Simply put, if it is impossible for others to know it, then it cannot be what I or anyone else refers to by a sensation word. This is *not* to say, however, as has sometimes been supposed, that it is impossible to refer meaningfully to our own 'in principle' epistemologically private, and inner, sensations. Indeed, given the validity of the private language argument, so conceived, this statement about its import would be meaningless (i.e., it would amount to the self-defeating assertion that 'I have pains (or sensations) to which I cannot refer.') Nor is it the point to show that we *can* refer to our 'in principle' epistemologically private sensations provided the words employed to do so are situated within a 'public framework.' Understood in this way, the argument against a private sensation language would render mysterious Wittgenstein's claims to the effect that sensations etc., are non-inferentially knowable. The point of the argument is rather to show that our sensations, perceptions, and so on, and in fact *because* we can meaningfully refer to them, are simply *not epistemologically private 'in principle'*.⁶ In so far as they are 'inner,' furthermore, it is not in the sense of their being encapsulated in an epistemologically private, and metaphysically distinctive, 'inner' space, but rather in the sense of their being 'in a living human body,' the mental and other states of which are qualitatively discernable identicals and so non-inferentially knowable from a third person point of view. Sensations, perceptions, consciousness, unconsciousness, and so on, are thus states of a living human body, that is, a person, and though, as a contingent matter of fact, they 'show up' differently to the person who is in those states than to a person who observes them (much as a table, as a contingent matter of fact, looks different from different angles), they are nevertheless perfectly discernable in that person's behavior (and, derivatively, their physiology) within certain circumstances.

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⁶ This reading of the aims and import of the 'private language argument' bears a family resemblance to, and was influenced by, that of Cook (2005, c.f. pp 24-25).

Wittgenstein on Frege on Connectives

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When Wittgenstein says that "logical constants do not stand for anything", it is clear that his immediate target is the way Frege treated connectives and quantifiers. Quantifiers, as it is widely known, are defined by Wittgenstein in terms of simultaneous negation, and so he can consistently forget them when it comes to giving logical reasons to accept his claim about logical constants (5.3-5.4). Only connectives are then considered.

For Frege, connectives are not objects, but functions, and Wittgenstein is well aware of this. Wittgenstein is thinking of Frege when he opposes truth functions to material functions (5.44), saying that logical connectives like "not", "or", etc. should not be viewed as functions which take propositions as arguments. According to Wittgenstein, they belong to another logical category – they are operations. Even so, if they were functions (in the Fregean sense) they would be "objects" (in the Tractarian sense) – they would be entities for which certain symbols stand for. That's why it is legitimate to think that when Wittgenstein denies the existence of logical *objects*, he is also aiming at the Fregean treatment of negation, disjunction, and so on. Frege thinks that connectives "stand for something", and that's the very idea Wittgenstein is trying to avoid.

None of Wittgenstein's arguments against Frege seems more intuitive than the one we find on aphorism 5.44:

If there was an object called '~', then '~~p' would have to say something other than 'p'. For the one proposition would then treat of ~, the other would not. [5.44]

Apparently, Wittgenstein is saying something directly applicable to the context of Frege's semantics of sense and reference. If we take negation as being a concept, we have to deal with the negation sign in the same way as we deal with any functional symbol. It will have a sense and a reference. Its reference will be the concept of negation, and any proposition containing a negation sign will have to be "about" this concept (among other things). As a consequence, "p" and "~p" will deal with different things, since "~p" would be "about" the concept of negation, while "p" would not, and that is plainly absurd. "The proposition '~p' does not deal with denial as an object", according to Wittgenstein (5.44).

As I have just said, in these contexts the word "object" should be taken in the Tractarian, not in the Fregean sense. The reference of a conceptual term is certainly not a Fregean object, but (for the sake of argument) it can be imagined as a Tractarian one. According to this reading, Wittgenstein would be attacking Frege on the flank of reference. The argument would have the following layout: (i) The negation sign has its own reference. (ii) A proposition is about (deals with) the references of its terms. (iii) "p" and "~p" are about (deal with) different entities. As (iii) seems to be absurd and (ii) seems to be evident, we are bound to deny (i). The negation sign is not a "logical constant"; it does not name a "logical object"; it has no reference.

Thus reconstructed, the argument rests on the slippery notion of "aboutness". Wittgenstein's text itself suggests this reading by the use of the verb "handeln" (to deal with). It seems that all depends on what the sentences "p" and "~p" deal with, that is to say, "what they are about". But so interpreted the argument will have a weakness which make it

completely ineffective as far as Fregean semantics is concerned.

The problem is that, if we do not want to rely on intuitive claims, we have to define "aboutness" within Fregean theory. We have basically two options. We could say that a sentence is about any reference of any of its proper names, provided that the proper name is not itself a sentence. ("The cat is on the mat" would be about the cat, the mat, but not about the truth-value named by the sentence which is being denied.) But this move would be of little help to Wittgenstein. If we are using the word "name" in such a way that no functional expression is a name, then "~" is not a name, and "~p" is not about denial.

Finally, we could take functional expressions as special kinds of names. In this case, "~p" would be about a truth-function, but there would be nothing strange in saying that. We would only be saying that the sentence contains a functional expression that has its own reference. From the point of view of the theory, that is not absurd. On the contrary, it is quite trivial.

So it is better to abandon any reading involving the notion of "aboutness". Perhaps Wittgenstein is not talking about reference. He could be talking about sense. The textual evidence, in this case, would be the use of the verb "sagen" (to say). Let us examine Wittgenstein's phrasing once more. He says that "if there was an object called '~', then '~p' would have to say something other than 'p'." We could rephrase it as follows: "if there was an object called '~', then *the sense* of '~p' would have to be different from *the sense* of 'p'." That seems to be a quite natural reading, since what a proposition says is the sense it expresses, and not the truth-value it names. Now as the word "object" is obviously being used with a Tractarian tone, it is better to translate this into the Fregean dialect. In Fregean terms, the sentence would say something like this:

If there was a concept called "~", then the sense of "~p" would have to be different from the sense of "p".

That is not simply nonsense, though I don't think it is a fatal objection to Frege. Let us examine the situation in some detail.

If there was a concept called "~", this concept would have to be the reference of the negation sign (in the usual contexts, at least). If the negation sign has a reference, it must have a sense as well. The principle of compositionality must be at work on both levels. The reference of the sentence – its truth-value – must be a function of the partial references involved, and the sentential sense must be completely determined by the corresponding partial senses.

At the level of references, it would be a mistake to understand compositionality in terms of parts and wholes. Socrates was Plato's teacher, but Plato is not a "part" of Socrates in the same sense as the first chapter of a book is part of the whole book. Compositionality does not mean juxtaposition. At the level of reference, it only means functional determination: given this argument (Plato) and this function (the teacher of x), we get exactly this value (Socrates). In a certain sense both function and argument "disappear" in the value. They are not inscribed in it. Given a value (Socrates) and a function (the teacher of x), the argument is not given as yet. After all, Socrates was also Theaetetus's teacher.

The situation is even clearer when we are dealing with truth-values. If the sentence

The teacher of Plato was put to death.

is a name of the True, then if the partial references are conserved, the total reference will be conserved as well.

Socrates was put to death.

keeps being a name of the True. But it would be absurd to think that the True and Socrates unequivocally determine a certain propositional function. The truth-value is determined by the function and argument involved, but function and argument are not "parts" of the truth-value. They *produce* the value, and (so to speak) disappear leaving no trace behind them.

The same reasoning could not be repeated at the level of senses. If we proceed within the compositional paradigm, we will be inclined to think of sentential senses as having constituent parts. We will also be inclined to think that we could distinguish each of these partial senses "inside" the sentence. The sentential sense wouldn't seem to be an entity quite different of, and only functionally associated with the partial senses. The sentential sense seems to be "formed" by them, to be something that could not be given without them. Partial senses would, so to speak, be the very stuff sentential senses are made of. In a word, the compositional paradigm seems to be much more demanding at the level of senses than it was at the level of references.

Now it is possible to give strictly logical reasons in support of these intuitions. Consider, for instance, the proposition "5>2". We cannot change the reference of the whole sentence (its truth-value) without changing the reference of one of its parts – that's the meaning of the "functional dependence" in this case. But we could easily change the reference of a part without changing the reference of the whole: "7>2", for instance, keeps being a name of the True. But how could we alter the sense of a part without altering the sense of the whole? Just compare the sense of

The number of fingers in my hand is greater than two.

with the sense of an arithmetical proposition like "5>2". A change in the parts is, so to speak, a guarantee of change on the whole. We are clearly dealing in this case with conditions which are not only necessary but also sufficient – no changes in the whole without a change in the parts, and no change in the parts without an immediate echo in the whole. The sense seems to be given *with* the parts, and not merely *by means of* them.

If that is true, Wittgenstein seems to have a point. If the sign "~" is the name of a concept, then it must have a sense, that's to say, it must be linked to a special way of presenting the concept of denial. But if the sense of "~" is a component part effectively present into the sense of "~p", then we must admit that "p" and "~p" have *different* senses.

Now that is not an admission entirely free of undesirable consequences. First of all, if "p" and "~p" do not have the same sense, it is difficult to imagine in what conditions sameness of sense should be admitted. All examples given by Frege (passive voice, for instance) seems to involve, so to speak, a greater distance from one sense to another. What could be closer in sense to "p" than "~p"? Moreover, if "~p" and "~~p" do not have the same sense, then we would have an infinite number of negations introduced in language. We could define "~~p" as "¬p", define "~~~p" as "¬¬p", and it is obvious that "¬p", "¬¬p" and "¬¬¬p" will have the same truth-value, but different senses.

In order to avoid this infinite multiplication of senses, we can postulate a sense for "~" which makes it work approximately as a Tractarian operation. Our aim is to find a sense for the negation sign such that, applied once, it produces the "opposite" sense; applied twice, it cancels out. I think the only way to conceive of the sense of the negation sign in these terms is to take it as *the empty presentation of the True, when applied to a presentation of the False, and an empty presentation of the False when applied to a presentation of the True*. Being an "empty presentation", the sense of "~" does not add any sense-feature to the proposition which it belongs to, so that now "p" and "~p" will have exactly the same sense. The trick is achieved through the use of the word "empty" in the definition we gave. Suppose that "p" is a name of the True. Both its sense and the sense of "~p" will be *the same* non-empty presentation of the True. On the other hand, "p" and "¬p" will have opposite senses: the sense of "p" will be a non-empty presentation of the True, while "¬p" will be a non-empty presentation of the False. They would agree as to the "non-empty presentation" involved, but not as to the logical object presented in each case.

The notion of an "empty presentation" is certainly not an easy one to swallow. If we take the Fregean notion of sense as being equivalent to the notion of "cognitive content", for instance, the idea of an "empty presentation" seems to be too close to the contradictory idea of a "contentless content". We can avoid this consequence by saying that any logical connective is to be taken as a "contentless contextual pointing". It contentlessly points to a truth-value which varies according to the truth-value which the rest of the context is pointing to. Even so we are left with the impression that a "contentless pointing" is a function that the sign itself could carry out alone. Why would it need the help of an absolutely transparent sense?

Be that as it may, the fact is that although the doctrine works reasonably well with negation, it does not work with other truth-functions. Suppose both "p" and "q" are names of the True. How could we deal with the obvious difference of sense between "p&q" and "p⊃q"? According to our approach, both sentences would be non-empty presentations of the True, and would agree on each point of their non-empty parts. We would have to say that they have the same sense, and that is simply absurd. A parallel absurdity would emerge in the analysis of the sense of the connectives in this context. Both would be empty presentations of the True. The doctrine is clearly an untenable one.

In a desperate move, we could try to take the sense of a connective as being a *presentation of a determined way of associating truth-values to truth-values*. Conjunction and material implication are different ways of doing this kind of association. Although they may produce identical results sometimes, the procedures are different. Even though "p&q" and "p⊃q" are names of the same truth-value, "&" and "⊃" have different senses. They introduce different ways of associating truth-values with truth-values. A truth-table is a good picture of the kind of content the sense of a connective amounts to. The price to be paid is obvious: "p" and "~p" will not have the same sense. The sense of the second sentence involves the presentation of a kind of truth-table, while the sense of the first sentence does not have any presentation of this kind of thing. To repeat Wittgenstein, "p" would have to say something different from "~p". I think Frege would be forced to concede this extreme consequence of his doctrines. But this admission would amount to a *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole theory.

Where to seek for the ‘Uniquely Individual’ in Human Experience: In the Twilight Zone of Consciousness or Somewhere More Accessible?

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When we are faced with a profoundly unique experience such that ‘our mouths remain wide open’ – overwhelmed by having had such an experience – as the Turks say, our immediate reaction to that event is to attempt to store it in the private realm of our consciousness, i.e., our mind. Above all else, the mind is the coolest cellar to store such precious gifts as the sense impressions and the ineffable qualia of that very experience which are to be sifted through our memory—that is, a cognitive faculty of our intellect- and soon to be called for, i.e., introspectively ostended in light of our first- person authority. Perhaps it is not for nothing that ‘our mouths remain wide open’¹, for we think we do not have the words, the sentences to utter with that mouth with which we are able to explain what we went through during that particular experience, since language will contaminate it with what is cultural and what is public. According to this view, when our privately owned experience is brought to light with an avowal cloaked in words, those very words will always fall short of explaining what happened in our mind by crudely publicizing the private aspect of the phenomenon.

Before getting involved in an investigation as to why it is thought that language falls short of explaining the private aspect of our experiences, let us have an insight as to what we have in mind when we talk about these ‘profoundly unique, authentic, individual, etc. experiences’.

Ironically, the more technology advances, the more eclectic the practices of daily modern life become. While we observe a mass depersonalization on one side as we are being transformed more and more into numbers on our credit cards, genetic codes on our chromosomes or income recipients in tax statistics, an ever-increasing number of people, take refuge in fortunetellers’, tarot and horoscope readers’ and all sorts of meditation centers, be it Zen Meditation or Vipassana, etc. Whether they are looking for their lost self in these inward looking practices or whether they are looking for it in the wrong place, namely in the ‘inner’, in the disembodied ‘soul’, in the ‘etheric’ and the ‘spiritual’ is hardly our concern here. The problem at hand is that this recent phenomenon of masses being interested in matters ‘beyond explication’ concerning the quality of one’s experience when he is said to be experiencing for example a trance or when he (for example an Indian Sadhu) is lowering the rhythm of his heartbeat or when he(for example a deaf mute) is said to be recalling the memoirs of his thoughts before learning language raises the question as to whether there is an essentially private, an essentially ‘inner’ aspect of one’s experiences which only the first person can be said to ‘know’ or have access to and that which nothing can be said about. Thus, with the advent of such neo-spiritualism and, moreover, in the light of the quest to regain an authentic personhood in the realm of depersonalization, so-called genuine and individual experiences, the nature of which we tried to study are those which are said to have a non-linguistic leftover for and exclusively owned by their bearer. For don’t we hear ever more frequently from people around

that they had an utterly unique experience which they can not express in words?

One wants to ask: ‘Are you sure you have no medium to express what you have experienced? For there might be other ways than words upon which to load your thoughts. Say, for example, can you draw a picture of it or compose a song of what you went through in that profoundly unique, inexplicable experience?’ The answer may be ‘yes’ but the individual experiencing it will not be committed to accepting the picture s/he draws or the song s/he composes as the public expression of her private, inner experience in a somewhat symbolic language, for s/he will not see the practices of drawing and composing as yet other examples of language games. S/he will argue that the picture drawn on the basis of her memory or the song composed on the basis of what it feels to her to live such and such will remain to be private since they do not carry out the task of outwardly expressing her inner experience. Rather, they function to be the private note s/he takes down in her diary which only s/he herself can make sense of. Had there not been a language game of seeing something as something, another of identifying an experience as something, and yet another of identifying oneself as the owner of that experience, would s/he be able to draw that private picture or compose that private song for herself? Plus, wouldn’t s/he fail to make use of what her memory provides were s/he not able to *remember* her experience which involves her judging that event to be the foundation of what s/he is creating now?

The reason why I take the relationship between creative acts and ‘private’ aspect of an experience is that I believe creative acts have an authenticity, a privacy exclusively owned by its possessor. But here I am using the terms ‘authenticity’, ‘privacy’, ‘exclusively owned’ as parts of a different language game such that a composition, a drawing are unique to their creator but no more or no less than a sentence is unique to the individual uttering it. The privacy does not owe its existence to the individual’s founding afresh a language of which constituents originate from their possessor, but rather it owes its existence to the individual’s unique combination of what is given publicly such as the words and sentences of a spoken language, the notes of a musical system, the lines of a drawing be they Van Gogh’s drawing or tribal designs by Mitkila women. To better illustrate my point, we can take the example of ‘Take Five’ where notes never come together in that form with that rhythm until Dave Brubeck combined them in a way unique to him. In that sense it would be absurd to say that one can have a private composition of notes originating from him since recognizing something as a note already requires mastery of a technique called hearing and performing music in the absence of which the individual will fail to perceive anything as a *note*.

What about the case in which the individual who is said to have experienced something profoundly unique fails to provide even a private exhibition of her experience stating that s/he lacks the conceptual tools with which to explain what s/he went through? What use is such an

¹ (‘Şaşkınlıktan’) Ağzım bir karışık açık kaldı.’ in Turkish.

experience or such a claim of privacy to its possessor? What will be the criterion for her to judge that s/he had an experience at all? For isn't a certain grammar presupposed here within which s/he is to locate her experience as one that which s/he can not make sense of but still be sure to *have*? Why not regard it as a dream in which the individual sees something but fails to recognize it, i.e., a dream which the individual simply does not understand? Will a congenitally blind person understand, that is, be able to apply the concept of blue? He does not have a stage set to fit in colors whereas he has the stage set to fit in shapes and solids, etc. What happens then when the aspect of color sensation is by nature inaccessible to him? He simply cannot make use of the concept of color such that he won't be able to pick out blues from non-blues, which the language game of differentiating colors suggest. Were his eyes to open one day, he would not be in a position to pick out blues from non-blues on his first encounter with blue objects since he lacks the requisite practice of 'seeing something as' which the language game of differentiating colors presupposes.

So what are we to conclude when we are faced with reports such as an individual having a trance and having no conceptual tools to express what is it that he went through? Are we to grant him the privacy which in turn will entail that there can be thought without language? The question is 'did thinking take place or was he like the congenitally blind person facing blue but failing to recognize it and thus was what was uniquely individual in that experience conceptually inaccessible to him? Are we to conclude that he does not know more than what we know of his very individual experience? And plus where does this quest to know what nobody can know concerning our personal experiences come from?

Were we to find anything other than what is public, namely other than what we can conceive of within the conceptual framework that our forms of life provide us which also draw the boundaries of our consciousness, then we would be justified in thinking that there is a twilight zone in our consciousness which we are to conquer by inwardly ostending and through a circumspection of locating the self of our mental life in the brain somewhere. But Wittgenstein shows us that rising above our concepts is not an empirical but a grammatical impossibility. Because of our concepts which we sieve through the forms of life of the society we are a part of are the very boundaries of our *inner* life. Our language and thus our concepts are the conditions of the possibility of our understanding the world. Had we been of a different height, had we had no faces, had we been able to fly, the grammar of our world would have been completely different. That is why it does not make sense to think of our consciousness as disembodied.

When we think about the quest for conquering the twilight zone of our consciousness, namely the quest for what we cannot know with the concepts at hand which are the outcome of our public life that we have gained through public practices such as learning, rule following, practicing, calculating, etc., we find ourselves in the realm of what is inaccessible to us within our conceptual framework. The affinity of this quest with a commitment to disembodied brain events winks at us from the distance so that the attempt to make an effort to understand what we can not understand within the limits of our conceptual framework, i.e., with this body and this language, is in a way an attempt to go beyond our limits, to opt for the unlimited self of which conceptual borders are nothing but the infinity.

Wittgenstein's abrogation of the privacy of the mental realm has important bearings on our life. In the Cartesian picture the only type of existence that we could be certain about was existence of the self as a thinking being. So the self was flown away from the chimneys of the mind never to necessitate again its disposable extension, the body. Wittgenstein can be said to have put the mind back in its finite position. His *Philosophical Investigations* can be read as an ode to everything that is finite and human. For it is from that very finitude and that very bodily existence which we derive our concepts and which draw the borders of our consciousness.

When the individual is brought back on its feet again from the realm of the unlimited possibilities, which include existing without a body or doubting afresh all that is, one descends from the floor of the divinities to the ground. That means, to look for the uniquely profound experiences is now the everyday practice of worldliness, human discourse, namely language.

It would not be wrong to say that as long as there is life, there will be infinitely many combinations of words to come together, infinitely many contexts to make sense of and every time one utters a sentence it will be profoundly unique to that individual such that it is his or her own tone of voice, speaking out of the context of his/her own personal history, bounded by the conceptual framework of his/her own society, time and geographical conditions.

Therefore where to look for authenticity, uniqueness and individuality is by no means inside the brain lurking in the grey stuff, nor is it in the mental realm the mysteries of which wait yet to be explored but rather in public life, on the streets, neighbourhoods where the substance to fill in the *mental* is formed and practiced, i.e., in the realm of communication.

It is through communication that we experience our individuality. We are individual and authentic with respect to *others* who are out there in the world, not to entities trapped within our mind. The sphere of communication is the very sphere of creativity in which we constantly improvise with the other performers, namely, the rest of the world using the given tools of the language.

Language, being the vehicle(bearer) of thoughts in Wittgensteinian terms, and thus the vehicle of all there is to human discourse provides the basis for undermining the foundations of skepticism such that outright skepticism is nonsense since we speak a language, since we are able to communicate. We are indebted to Wittgenstein for such an aspect of language which presupposes the existence of people, world and communication based on these:

"that if what would satisfy our quest for 'unique individuality' is by nature inaccessible to us, then it would not be in a position to satisfy us".

Searles Naturalismus: Eine seiner Schwierigkeiten in Bezug auf das Geistige und das Soziale

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1. Searle über den Naturalismus in der Philosophie

„That for me is the basic position: Philosophy starts with what we know about the world.“ (Searle, *The limitations of phenomenology* 09.08.2004)

John Searle ist ein Philosoph, der offensichtlich eine *naturalistische* Auffassung von Philosophie vertritt.¹ Seiner Ansicht nach sollte die philosophische Arbeit davon ausgehen, was *Tatsachen* sind (oder wenigstens davon, was *wir* berechtigt sind, für Tatsachen zu halten)². Die Ergebnisse der Naturwissenschaften hätten einen schwerwiegenden Einfluss auf das philosophische Nachdenken. Die Philosophie beschäftige sich damit, was wir noch nicht systematisch verstehen, und die von den Naturwissenschaften gelieferten empirischen Daten können zu solch einem Verständnis eines bestimmten Themas führen, so dass es nicht mehr eine Frage der Philosophie sei, sondern eine Frage der empirischen Wissenschaften:

„Because philosophy deals with framework questions and with questions that we do not know how to answer systematically, it tends to stand in a peculiar relation to the natural sciences. As soon as we can revise and formulate a philosophical question to the point that we can find a systematic way to answer it, it ceases to be philosophical and becomes scientific.“ (Searle, 1999: 2070)

Und diese naturalistische Vorgehensweise liegt der Lösung zugrunde, die Searle für das Körper-Geist Problem anbietet und die er dementsprechend „biologischer Naturalismus“ nennt. Diese Lösung wird von dem Versuch gekennzeichnet, bei den festgestellten *Tatsachen* zu bleiben:

“Biological Naturalism” is a name I have given to an approach to what is traditionally called the mind-body problem. The way I arrived at it is typical of the way I work: try to forget about the philosophical history of a problem and remind yourself of what you know for a fact. (2004b: 1)

2. Eine naturalistische Lösung des Körper-Geist Problems

Um das das Körper-Geist Problem zu lösen, versucht Searle die Laster der traditionellen philosophischen Debatte zu vermeiden und die zeitgenössische *wissenschaftliche Weltanschauung*³ ernst zu nehmen:

¹ Dazu schreiben Bennett & Hacker (2003:436): „According to Searle, there is no sharp dividing line between science and philosophy. In this respect, Searle works within the received American tradition that has been influenced so much by W.V.O. Quine.“

² „Any philosophical theory has to be consistent with the facts. Of course, something we think is a fact may turn out not to be, but we have to start with our best information.“ (2004b: 1)

³ „Notice that in advancing the views I put forward, I made no use of the traditional philosophical vocabulary. None of the famous theories and issues were mentioned, such a dualism, materialism, epiphenomenalism, Cartesianism, or all the rest of it. If you take seriously the so-called ‘scientific world view’ and forget about the history of philosophy, the views I put forward are, I believe, what you would come up with.“ Searle (2004b: 6)

„But suppose for a moment that we could forget all about this entire tradition and try to imagine that we are simply investigating the place of our own human and animal mental states, intentional and otherwise, in nature, *given what we know about biology, chemistry and physics* and what we know from our own experiences about our own mental states. I believe if we could forget the tradition, then the question as to the place of such states in the nature would have an obvious answer. They are physical states of certain biophysical systems, viz., brains.“ (Searle, 1984: 94, Kursiv von mir)

Searle ist der Ansicht, dass die gesamte Körper-Geist Debatte, sowohl die materialistischen als auch die dualistischen Ansätze, von *falschen* Voraussetzungen ausgeht (vgl. Searle 1992: 2-3). Aber es gibt eine unter ihnen, die er für die *wichtigste* falsche Annahme (vgl. Searle, 1998: 50) hält, nämlich die Annahme, dass geistige und physische Phänomene in einem *Gegensatz* stehen, was er „Begriffsdualismus“ nennt:

„This view consists in taking the dualistic concepts very seriously, that is, it consists in the view that in some important sense ‘physical’ implies ‘nonmental’ and ‘mental’ implies ‘nonphysical.’ Both traditional dualism and materialism presuppose conceptual dualism, so defined.“ (Searle, 1992: 26)

Die Festhaltung an dieser Annahme sei genau der Grund, warum laut ihm die Körper-Geist Debatte zwei tausend Jahre lang ergebnislos geblieben sei. Seine Vorgehensweise, diese Voraussetzung zu widerlegen und das Körper-Geist Problem zu lösen, ist von einer grundsätzlichen *naturalistischen* Einstellung geprägt, insofern er die These einer *führenden Rolle* der Naturwissenschaften in der Philosophie vertritt. In Bezug auf die Strategie, mit der Searle den Aufeinanderprall von Dualismus und Materialismus lösen will, schreibt er: „*It is always a good idea to remind ourselves of what we actually know.*“ (Searle, 1998: 51) Aus unseren alltäglichen Erlebnissen wissen wir einerseits, dass wir ein geistiges Leben besitzen. Von den Neurowissenschaften wissen wir andererseits, dass alle unsere Geisteszustände von unserem Gehirn hervorgerufen werden. Wie Searle dazu schreibt: „We know for a fact that all of our conscious states are caused by brain processes. This proposition is not up for grabs.“ (1998: 51). Searles Argument gegen den Begriffsdualismus ist dann, dass die Geistesphänomene von Hirnvorgängen verursacht werden und *gleichzeitig* in dem Hirnsystem realisiert sind, so dass sich herausstellen soll, dass sie ganz normale *biologische* Phänomene sind.⁴ Und der Umstand, dass die Geistesphänomene von Hirnvorgängen *verursacht* seien, führt laut Searle dazu, dass diese Phänomene *kausal* *reduzibel* auf die Hirnvorgänge seien (vgl. Searle, 1992: 115). Searle formuliert die kausale Reduktion folgendermaßen:

⁴ Er argumentiert gegen den Begriffsdualismus folgendermaßen: „Thus we are supposed to believe that if something is mental, it cannot be physical; that if it is a matter of spirit, it cannot be a matter of matter; ... But these views seem to me obviously false, given everything we know about neurobiology. The brain causes certain ‘mental’ phenomena, such as conscious mental states, and these conscious states are simply higher-level features of the brain.“ (Searle, 1992: 14) Vgl. (Searle, 1998: 52)

„This is a relation between any two types of things that can have causal powers, where the existence and a fortiori the causal powers of the reduced entity are shown to be entirely explainable in terms of the causal powers of the reducing phenomena.“ (Searle, 1992: 114)

Die kausale Reduzibilität bestehe darin, dass ein Phänomen durch ein anderes *erklärbar* sei. Wenn Searle die kausale Reduzibilität des Bewusstseins (das grundlegendste Merkmal des Geistigen – vgl. z.B. Searle, 1992: 84) erläutert, behauptet er ausdrücklich, dass das Bewusstsein *bereits erklärt* worden sei: „all features of consciousness are accounted for causally by neurobiological processes going on in the brain“ (Searle, 2002: 60, Kursiv von mir) „consciousness is entirely causally explained by neuronal behaviour“ (Searle, 2004a:119). Und aus dem Umstand, dass die Geistesphänomene erklärt worden seien, folge die *Auflösung* des Körper-Geist Problems. Es gebe keine Schwierigkeiten, das Körper-Geist Verhältnis zu verstehen, insofern dieses Verhältnis nach dem Modell ganz normaler Systemeigenschaften verstanden werden könne: „Consciousness is a mental, and therefore physical, property of the brain in the sense in which liquidity is a property of systems of molecules.“ (Searle, 1992:14)

3. Sind die Geistesphänomene erklärt worden?

Die kausale Erklärbarkeit des Bewusstseins ist das Herzstück der Searleschen Lösung für das Körper-Geist Problem. Doch steht die Auffassung, das Bewusstsein sei bereits kausal erklärt worden, verschiedenen Schwierigkeiten gegenüber, sogar schon in Rahmen des Searleschen Ansatzes. Das *erste* Problem ist, dass Searle in einen Widerspruch geraten zu sein scheint, denn obwohl er die These der kausalen Erklärbarkeit vertritt, behauptet er *zugleich*, dass wir zur Zeit über keine Erklärung des Bewusstseins verfügen: „we really do not understand how brain processes cause consciousness.“ (Searle, 2002: 57-8) Wenn wir noch nicht verstehen, wie das Hirn den Geist verursacht, bedeutet das einfach, dass das Hirn-Geist Verhältnis *unerklärt* bleibt. Und was einem noch merkwürdiger vorkommen kann, ist, dass Searle selbst eingesteht, dass solch eine Erklärung vielleicht *unmöglich* ist. Über die Denker (wie z.B. Collin McGinn), die die Möglichkeit einer Lösung des Körper-Geist Problems bezweifeln, schreibt Searle: „I think the mysticians are too pessimistic. They may be right, of course, that we will never find a scientific account of consciousness. But it would be defeatism to give up in advance.“ (Searle, 2004a: 146, Kursiv von mir).

Ein *zweites* und noch undurchdringlicheres Problem ist, dass Searle gewisse Merkmale den Geistesphänomenen zuschreibt, die mit einer Erklärung dieser Phänomene durch Hirnvorgänge völlig *unverträglich* zu sein scheinen. Wenn er für das so genannte *Verbindungsprinzip* argumentiert, behauptet Searle, dass der Aspektgehalt (zu dem Begriff von „Aspektgehalt“ vgl. Searle, 1992: 155) intentionaler Zustände durch objektive Prädikate *nicht völlig* charakterisiert werden kann: „The aspectual feature cannot be exhaustively or completely characterized solely in terms of third-person, behavioral, or even neurophysiological predicates. None of these is sufficient to give an exhaustive account of aspectual shape.“ (1992: 157-8, Kursiv von Searle) Wenn er für die *ontologische* Irreduzibilität des Bewusstseins argumentiert, behauptet Searle, dass der qualitative (und deshalb subjektive) Charakter geistiger Phänomene durch

objektive Beschreibungen *nicht* wiedergegeben (convey) werden kann: „No description of the third-person, objective, physiological facts would convey the subjective, first-person character of the pain, simply because the first-person features are different from the third person features.“ (Searle, 1992: 117). Wenn die Intentionalität mit dem Bewusstsein wesentlich verknüpft sei und wenn der subjektive Charakter des Bewusstseins durch objektive Beschreibungen nicht ausgedrückt werden könne, dann folgt daraus, dass eine neurobiologische Theorie die wichtigsten Merkmale des Geistigen (Intentionalität und Bewusstsein) nicht zum Ausdruck bringen könnte. Die neurobiologische Theorie handelt von ganz objektiven Phänomenen (Hirnzustände, -ereignisse und -vorgänge), die doch laut Searle wesentlich verschieden von subjektiven Geistesphänomenen sind. Aber wenn der subjektive Charakter der Geistesphänomene im Rahmen einer neurobiologischen Theorie nicht einmal ausgedrückt werden kann, dann brauchen wir immer noch *geistige* Begriffe, um auf die subjektiven Phänomene Bezug zu nehmen. Aber dann scheinen diese beiden Redeweisen (die geistige und die neurobiologische) so grundsätzlich verschieden zu sein, dass das Verhältnis der beiden Bereiche *unverständlich* bliebe. Unser neurobiologischer Diskurs scheint nicht zu unserem Verständnis des qualitativen Charakters des Geistigen beitragen zu können, so dass eine neurobiologische Erklärung des Geistigen unmöglich zu sein scheint. Aber wenn eine kausale Erklärung des Geistes nicht möglich ist, geht die Grundlage des biologischen Naturalismus verloren.

4. Die Konsequenzen für Searles Theorie der sozialen Wirklichkeit

In seinem Buch *The Construction of Social Reality* versucht Searle zu erklären, wie es gewisse Tatsachen geben kann, die von der menschlichen Übereinkunft (*agreement*) abhängig⁵ und trotzdem *objektiv* sind. Er beschäftigt sich mit den *institutionalen Tatsachen*,⁶ die zu den Tatsachen gehören, die nur *relativ zu Beobachtern und Benutzern* existieren (vgl. Searle, 1995: 9-10). Sie lassen eine große Schwierigkeit entstehen, insofern sie sich nicht in naturwissenschaftlichem Vokabular beschreiben lassen:

„We live in exactly one world, not two or three or seventeen. As far as we currently know, the most fundamental features of that world are as described by physics, chemistry, and the other natural sciences. But the existence of phenomena that are not in any obvious way physical or chemical gives rise to puzzlement“ (Searle, 1995: xi)⁷

Die Art wie Searle seine Auffassung der sozialen Wirklichkeit artikuliert, kann im Rahmen der vorliegenden Arbeit nicht ausführlicher beschrieben werden. Für meine Ziele reicht es doch aus, darauf hinzuweisen, dass seine Auffassung des Geistes, wie er ausdrücklich behauptet, seinem Ansatz zur Naturalisierung der sozialen Wirklichkeit zugrunde liegt:

⁵ „there are portions of the real world, objective facts in the world, that are only facts by human agreement. In a sense there are things that exist only because we believe them to exist.“ (Searle, 1995: 1)

⁶ „Institutional facts are so called because they require human institutions for their existence. In order that this piece of paper should be a five dollar bill, for example, there has to be the human institution of money.“ (Searle, 1995: 2)

⁷ „There is no physical-chemical description adequate to define 'restaurant', 'waiter', 'sentence of French', 'money', or even 'chair' and 'table', even though all restaurants, waiters, sentences of French, money and chairs and tables are physical phenomena.“ (Searle, 1995: 3)

"I tacitly abandoned the traditional dualistic conception of the relation of mind and body in favor of the view that the mind is just a set of higher-level features of the brain, a set of features that are at once 'mental' and 'physical'. We will use the 'mental' so construed, to show how 'culture' is constructed out of 'nature'." (Searle, 1995: 9, Kursiv von mir)

Die Auffassung der Geistesphänomene als biologische Naturphänomene mache die Verknüpfung von Kultur und Biologie:

„The thesis I have been arguing is that there is no radical break. The connecting terms between biology and culture, are, not surprisingly, consciousness and intentionality. What is special about culture is the manifestation of collective intentionality and, in particular, the collective assignment of functions to phenomena where the function cannot be performed solely in virtue of the sheer physical features of the phenomena.“ (Searle, 1995: 227-8)

Aber wenn eine kausale Erklärung des Geistes durch Hirnvorgänge nicht möglich ist, dann darf man nicht behaupten, dass die Geistesphänomene biologisch sind. Und wenn die biologische Natur des Geistes nicht gesichert ist, dann ist die angebliche Verknüpfung von Biologie und Kultur nicht möglich.⁸

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⁸ Ich möchte mich bei Olivia Klimm bedanken, die die vorliegende Arbeit sprachlich korrigiert hat.

Concepts, Prototypes, Person. Does cognitive science solve cultural problems or does it merely dissolve their specificity?

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In Alvin Goldman's opinion cognitive researches on concepts may help to find a universal foundation for moral concepts. This paper deals with some problems of this thesis, discussing Goldman's position according to which prototype theories show that the instance 'foetus' is included in the concept 'person'. Firstly, the paper discusses *why* prototype theories do not supply any *necessary* criterion for determining the inclusion of 'foetus' in 'person' and *why*, on the contrary, there are reasons for hypothesizing that they support the opposite conclusion. Secondly, it shows that the classical theory, which has been abandoned by the cognitive research, still keep a central role into moral theories. Finally, it investigates the contribution of cognitive research to ethics.

1. Introduction

In his *Philosophical Applications of Cognitive Science* Alvin Goldman proposes an ambitious program: to show how the foundation for many philosophical problems lie in the cognitive research. One of the most interesting aspects of this program concerns ethics and the attempt to construct a moral view on the basis of the cognitive theory of concepts, since this theory gives the possibility to examine "the cognitive materials deployed by moral judges or evaluators in thinking about moral matters" (Goldman 1993, 125) and is therefore able to explain how we represent the concepts that constitute our moral theories.

Goldman's aim is to analyse moral concepts through the cognitive theory of concepts in order to get rid of their 'cultural superstructure' and to reduce them to their fundamental dimension: i.e. to the *universal* informational content and principles of formation that the mind uses to develop all concepts including the moral ones. What this fundamental dimension could supply, is an a-priori, non-historical, non-social foundation for the moral thought which could be used as criterion to settle the difficulties arising from the plurality of moral theories developed in different philosophical traditions, cultures or historical periods.

The example that Goldman discusses more exhaustively and that we examine in this paper is that of 'person': "How does concept representation bear on moral philosophy? It turns out that in many areas of moral philosophy there is much controversy over whether a certain item is an instance of a certain concept. For example, on the issue of abortion it is controversial whether a foetus is an instance of a person [...]" (Goldman 1993, 128)

According to Goldman, the cognitive theory helps to understand how (on which basis and in which way) the mind produces judgments of conceptual inclusion (i.e. categorical judgments) and comes to subsume a certain instance (like 'foetus') into a certain concept ('person'). Goldman's considerations aren't limited to a general level, but he outlines a theory of the concept of 'person'. He states that the cognitive research shows the failure of the classical theory of concepts, according to which concepts are *rigorous definitions*, and the necessity to explain concepts through a *prototype theory*.

The classical theory particularly maintains that "concepts encode necessary and sufficient conditions for their own application" (Margolis, Laurence 2000, 9) which allow to decide univocally whether a certain instance does or does not belong to a concept. 'Bachelor' is characterized for instance by the conditions *male*, *adult* and not *married*: these conditions decide that 'bachelors' are all and only them, who are male, adults and not married. Unlike this model prototype theories propose a more flexible conception of concepts that aims to explain two aspects of concepts¹: I. the phenomenon of *typicality*, according to which certain instances are better examples of a concept than others (going back to the bachelor example – a forty-year-old man is a better example of adult than an eighteen-year-old one) and II. the fact that categorical judgments are often uncertain and subjectively variable (leaving aside the jurisprudence, are we able to say for sure whether a sixteen-year-old person is an adult?).

Since from a cognitive point of view prototype theories are considered more plausible than the classical ones, Goldman proposes to give up classical definitions of moral concepts in favour of an approach based on prototype theories. "Often people try to settle this issue by trying to find necessary and sufficient conditions for being a person. This search presupposes, however, that such a definition is in principle forthcoming, that we (tacitly) represent the concept of a person in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. It may be, however, that our representation of this concept [...] has a prototype structure. This may support a conclusion that the foetus is an instance of person but a highly atypical instance. No such conclusion could directly settle the abortion controversy, of course, but it could significantly affect our theoretical reflections on the issue." (Goldman 1993, 128-9)

The paper aims to show:

1. *why* prototype theories do not supply any *necessary* cognitive criterion to determine that 'foetus' is an instance of 'person' and *why*, on the contrary, there are reasons for hypothesizing that they support the opposite conclusion;
2. *why* the classical theory still keep a central role into moral theories; and
3. *which* is the contribution that the cognitive research can make to ethics.

2. A prototypical 'person'?

Prototype theories differ from the classical ones insofar as they give a different explanation of the way in that individuals produce categorical judgments. According to prototype theories concepts I. may be better exemplified by specific, particularly typical instances and II. have

¹ Prototype theories (plural) or prototype view is preferable to prototype theory (singular), since there are many models based on prototype slightly different from each other. About prototype theories vs. classical ones see e.g. Murphy 2004, ch.2.

structures that tend to shade off in their periphery, producing uncertain judgments in case of non-typical instances.

Leaving aside the differences among the various prototype theories, they start in general from the idea that categorical judgments are based on sufficient, but not on necessary conditions. Since they refuse necessary conditions, it is impossible for such theories to decide a priori on which and on how many properties an instance must have in order to belong to a certain concept. According to the prototype view concepts encode a statistical analysis of the features that their instances tend to have. This means that the conditions of a certain concept can be weighted differently, depending on their typicality, this is on how frequently the properties corresponding with these conditions occur in the instances of the concept. (See Margolis, Laurence 2000, 27)

Let us consider the example of 'bird' in relation to the conditions *to fly* and *to speak*: neither fly nor speak are necessary conditions of 'bird', since there are birds that do not fly (like penguins) and birds that do not speak (almost all, apart from parrots and few more). Nevertheless, differently from 'to speak' – which is a property of very few species of birds – 'to fly' is an extremely *frequent* and therefore extremely *typical* property of birds that has a remarkably superior weight for the categorial judgment of 'bird'. What the prototype theories say, in short, is that categorical judgments are based on conditions which vary depending on the considered instances, and that the number of the sufficient conditions for producing the judgment depends on the degree of typicality of the properties found in the instance to be judged.

The peculiarity of prototype theories in comparison to the classical model is exactly that they give up a view according to which concepts produce a rigorous structuring of the 'cognitive material', deciding univocally which instances do or do not belong to them. Because these theories refuse necessary conditions, they are weaker than the classical model, in the sense that they can determine for sure the result of a categorial judgment *only* with respect to the typical cases of a concept. Metaphorically, the image of concepts that emerge from prototype theories do not describe well-defined elements, juxtaposed with each other, but a spectrum of colours that shades off into each other and that are object of certain judgments (surely red, orange or yellow etc.) only in some precise places of the spectrum.

Exactly because of this constitutive inaccuracy of prototype theories it is extremely counter-productive to appeal to them to settle subtle disputes about the inclusion of an instance in a concept. Therefore, if we consider Goldman's problem to determine whether 'foetus' is an instance of 'person' using the prototype theory, we cannot consider the concept of 'person' in isolation, but we have to take into account a continuous conceptual spectrum that goes from 'cell' (or 'agglomerate of cells') to 'person'. The prototype view does not allow to determine that 'foetus' is doubtlessly an atypical example of 'person', instead of an atypical example of 'cells'. Exactly because of the difficulties caused by this categorial judgment, the conceptual apparatus of our languages and in particular of the medical languages has created (by virtue of a *cultural option*) intermediate classes as 'foetus' and 'embryo' that distinguish themselves progressively both from 'person' and from 'cells'.

If we want to indeed hazard an hypothesis about the 'cognitive materials' that constitute the concept of 'person'

in the spirit of the prototype theories as an approach to the conceptual constitution centred on the processing of empirical information, perceptively accessible to subjects, this concept should be plausibly explained on the basis of some empirical characteristics that correspond to the typical aspect of humans (legs, arms, head etc.) together with some 'mental' characteristics, (that e.g. allow to distinguish a person from a dummy) and that are experienced through the observation of the interactions and reactions uniquely peculiar to humans. If we accept the plausibility of this hypothesis, then we should conclude that foetus isn't necessarily part of the concept of person because it misses the features that characterize the cognitive materials used for constituting the concept of 'person' like the physical form and the possibility to mentally react and interact. From this point of view, a categorial judgment according to which 'foetus' is an instance of person can only depend on the beliefs that subjects learn socially and that – through learning – become part of the cognitive materials of concepts. However, the distinction implicit to the previous reflections between a conceptual core, developed through the processing of perceptive information alone, and a cultural superstructure that grows around this core, imply that – differently from what Goldman states – there isn't anything 'natural' (alias *universal* or *fundamental with respect to ethics*) in the categorial judgment according to which 'foetus' is an instance of 'person'.

3. Moral theories and the normativeness of definitions

As a cognitive theory about the way in which humans represent tacitly the concepts, the classical approach results inadequate. For this reason Goldman suggests abandoning the search of necessary and sufficient conditions for the definition of morally relevant concepts as 'person' and to embrace a prototype approach. But, is it really possible to give up the classical approach to moral concepts?

First of all it has to be considered that the moral theory has an extremely relevant application in everyday life, that is constituted (primarily²) by the various legal measures of different communities.

On ground of its function, law cannot be based on a weak moral theory that *isn't able* to determine for sure the results of categorial judgments. A codification of the moral in the law requires to supply the conceptual apparatus of the moral with conditions that allow *in every case* to discriminate whether an instance does or does not belong to a concept. Going back to the example of foetus/person: while it makes sense to explain the *individual* uncertainty in the categorial judgment regarding 'foetus' using a weak theory like the prototype one, every legislative (*social*) codification of the concept 'person' requires a rigorous definition of 'person', equipped with necessary and sufficient conditions for deciding *in any case* whether something is a person (and has the rights of a person), regardless of individual uncertainties. Indeed, on ground of the necessity of rigorous definitions, moral concepts are often specified in such detail that they may sometimes appear arbitrary: think e.g. at the calculation of the intervening days after fertilization as element for determining the difference between 'embryo' and 'foetus'.

² Actually, a moral general reflection on this aspect should also include other forms of civic regulations like the ones established by the religions.

Moral concepts are not only characterized by a rigorous definition, but – in their social definition – they also have a further peculiarity that distinguishes them from the concepts described by the prototype theories: in their conditions they also include factors which are independent from the concept to be specified. Going back to the example of 'person' and 'foetus': differently from the prototype theories that explain (subjective) categorical judgments on the basis of the number and of the kind of features an instance (foetus) shares with a concept, ('person'), the categorical judgment produced by the law is based also on social factors, unrelated to similarity. When the law judges, for instance, whether a foetus is an instance of person, it also takes into account factors like the health and the future of the foetus and of the mother, that does not have anything to do with the similarity between a foetus and a person.

From these brief reflections we can gather, on the one hand, that it is difficult to give up the classical theory, at least when we need to put moral concepts into practice. On the other hand a cognitive approach results insufficient for explaining the complexity of social concepts and the general (systemic) factors that characterize them.

4. Concluding remarks: cognitive approach and moral concepts

'Foetus' is necessarily an instance of 'person'? The discussion of the concept of 'person' has shown the falsity of this conclusion: not only prototype theories exclude necessary judgments in atypical cases, but – as theories about the way in which subjects process perceptive information – they tend to identify a concept of person with a very narrow core, that do not include cultural factors in its cognitive materials as the ones that – at least in our legislation – brings us to consider a foetus as something close to a person and for instance an embryo as something different from a person.

If these observations are correct, then the cognitive materials of the concepts are partially constituted by cultural factors (by a cultural superstructure – as we called them previously) that result from the influence of the cultural context and of the definitions it produces (through law but also through other forms of legislation like religion) on concepts. Since the prototypical core alone isn't able to produce any categorical judgment in the atypical cases, the cultural superstructure shows a decisive role regarding moral theory. In this sense it seems to be particularly complicated to trace a *universal* foundation of moral concepts, based on a purely cognitive approach that only considers the processing of perceptive information.

What we need in everyday life are theoretic means to deal with problems related to disagreement among different categorical judgments due to cultural factors that assume the form of definitions and that influence the content of moral concepts. Therefore, it seems necessary to develop a *rational* analysis that includes the study of both the cognitive and the social factors involved in the moral thought and that helps to understand *why*, if concepts are developed in the way described by prototype theories, also individuals (at least often) use them as they were definitions and *how* these definitional concepts come to be constituted by the individual mind in relation to a cultural context.

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Probleme der interkulturellen Philosophie (unter besonderer Berücksichtigung Indiens)

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Jede Erörterung zur interkulturellen Philosophie sieht sich vor die Frage gestellt: Wo fängt die Geschichte der Philosophie an, und warum fängt sie dort an, wo sie anfängt? Noch genauer könnte man fragen: Unter welchen Bedingungen fängt sie an, sich zu entfalten? Das sind nicht bloß historische Fragen, sondern sie enthalten sowohl das Selbstverständnis der Philosophie als auch das philosophische Selbstverständnis derer, die sie einführen (Niehues-Pröbsting 2004a).

Diogenes Laertios, der im Prolog seiner Schrift *Leben und Lehre berühmter Philosophen* die kontroverse Ansicht vom Ursprung der Philosophie bei den „Barbaren“ referiert, vertritt die Auffassung, dass die Philosophie eine ursprünglich griechische Errungenschaft sei. Die Gegenüberstellung beider Ansichten bedeutet zweierlei: Zum einen, dass auch die Griechen eine Weisheitstradition, die der barbarischen vergleichbar und aus der die Philosophie hervorgegangen ist, besitzen. Zum anderen, dass sich die Philosophie prinzipiell von Weisheit unterscheidet. Für Diogenes beginnt die Geschichte der Philosophie mit der ionischen Linie und den Milesiern, nämlich mit Anaximander, obwohl er an einer Stelle ausdrücklich von zwei Ausgangspunkten spricht. Die Philosophie sei zweifach entstanden: „bei Anaximander, dem Schüler des Thales, und bei Pythagoras, dem Schüler des Thales, und bei Pherekydes anleitete“ (Laertios 1998). Nun muss man fragen, wer die Milesier zu den ersten Philosophen gemacht hat, denn sie selber verstanden sich als solche nicht, zumal es die Bezeichnungen ‚Philosoph‘ und ‚Philosophie‘ noch nicht gab. Erst Aristoteles macht Thales zum ersten Philosophen und setzt damit den geschichtlichen Anfang der Philosophie, weil Thales der erste gewesen sei, der die Frage nach dem Urgrund nicht mit einer mythologisch-theologischen Geschichte, sondern mit einer sachlichen Erklärung beantwortet. Bei Platon dagegen bleibt Thales eine Astronomengestalt, dessen Missgeschick, das die Thales-Anekdote im *Theaitetos* schildert, zum „lebenspraktischen Versagen des Philosophen in einer von Rhetorik dominierten Gesellschaft“ (Niehues-Pröbsting 2004b) wird, oder er ist für Platon einer der sieben Weisen, wie dies aus dem Dialog *Protagoras* hervorgeht. Auf die Frage nach dem ersten Philosophen hätte Platon aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach mit Parmenides oder Sokrates geantwortet. Nach dem Urteil Hegels, dass mit Platon die Philosophie als *Wissenschaft* anfangen (Hegel 1998), und dem Alfred North Whiteheads, dass die philosophische Tradition Europas „aus einer Reihe von Fußnoten zu Platon besteht“ (Martin 1976), kann man zurecht fragen: Gäbe es ohne Platon überhaupt die Philosophie? Husserl interpretiert den Anfang der Philosophie als eine bewusste Entscheidung des europäischen Menschentums, Heidegger stellt diesen Anfang als das schlechthin Unerklärliche dar. Es wäre zu viel erwartet, wenn man meint, den *griechischen* Anfang der Philosophie aus eine einzigen Ursache ableiten zu können. Man kann eher sagen, dass die Philosophie bei den Griechen mehrere Anfänge hat, und es lässt sich schwer bestimmen, wann und wo unter den Griechen sie zuerst begonnen habe.

Die Griechen, so lautet ein älterer und bekannter Topos, verfügten von Natur aus über die Fähigkeit zu

staunen und über die Begabung zur theoretischen Betrachtung. Der materielle Wohlstand ermöglichte ihnen die zur Philosophie erforderliche Muße. Außerdem hatten sie die Sprache, die Schrift und die Religion, die die Entstehung der Philosophie begünstigten. Wenn hier die Voraussetzungen für den Anfang der *griechischen* Philosophie erörtert werden, so schließt das nicht aus, dass in Indien unabhängig davon und eigenständig Philosophie entstanden ist. Es müsste dort nur, so meint man, *ähnliche* Voraussetzungen gegeben haben.

Von diesem Gesichtspunkt ausgehend ist die Frage, ob dem indischen Denken der Status einer Philosophie zugesprochen werden kann, heute noch ungeklärt. Hierzu die herrschenden Meinungen: Hegel spricht dem indischen Denken diesen Status ab. Der Orient habe die Freiheit und die freie Verfassung nicht. Außerdem disqualifiziere das Verhältnis zur Religion das indische Denken als Philosophie. In seinen *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* meint Hegel, dass die griechischen Götter individualisiert seien. Im Orient dagegen, wo die Subjektivität und das Prinzip der Freiheit noch nicht hervorgetreten seien, hätten die religiösen Vorstellungen den Charakter von allgemeinen Vorstellungen, die daher als philosophische Vorstellungen erscheinen. Die Philosophie der Inder, so Hegel, sei identisch mit der Religion, ihre Interessen wären dieselben.

In *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie* unternimmt Husserl eine originäre Auslegung der europäischen Geistes- und Wissenschaftstradition. Das europäische Menschentum, so die These, vollzieht in der Renaissance eine revolutionäre Umwandlung; es wendet sich gegen das Mittelalter und will sich in Freiheit neu gestalten. Vorbild dafür ist das antike Menschentum und seine philosophische Daseinsweise, die sich dadurch auszeichnet, dass der Mensch sich die Regel aus freier Vernunft gibt. In der Neuzeit will die theoretische Philosophie gemäß der antiken nicht traditionalistisch, sondern kritisch sein, und sie lässt sich fassen unter dem Stichwort ‚Vernunft‘. Denn all ihre Fragen enthalten Probleme der Vernunft, ob es um vernünftige Erkenntnis oder um Handeln aus praktischer Vernunft, oder ob es um das philosophische Problem des Menschen als Vernunftwesen geht. Nach Husserl sei die Ursprung der neuzeitlichen Philosophie zugleich eine Ursprung des neuzeitlichen Menschentums, das sich durch seine Philosophie und nur durch sie radikal erneuern will. So stellt Husserl dem europäischen Menschentum, das Träger einer „absoluten Idee in sich“ sei, einen „bloß empirischen anthropologischen Typus wie ‚China‘ oder ‚Indien‘“ (Husserl 1962) entgegen. Ist die Philosophie eine strenge Wissenschaft, und speist sich die Krisis der Wissenschaften aus dem Verlust ihrer Lebensbedeutsamkeit, so sieht Husserl seine transzendente Phänomenologie nichtsdestoweniger als die Rettung aus der Krisis, in welcher alle neuzeitlichen Wissenschaften verstrickt sind.

Wenn Hegel, Husserl und Heidegger vom eigentümlichen griechischen Ursprung und der europäischen Leistung sprechen, was zu einer unbegründeten Ausschließung Indiens aus der

Philosophiegeschichtsschreibung führt, so findet man bei Schopenhauer und Deussen genau so eine unbegründete Einschließung des indischen Denkens in die Philosophiegeschichte. Nietzsche ist diesbezüglich ambivalent. Hat er zu seiner Bonner Studienzeit bei Carl Schaarschmidt die Ausschließung des indischen Denkens aus der Philosophiegeschichte kennen gelernt, so sagt er im *Antichrist* vom *Gesetzbuch des Manu*, es habe eine wirkliche Philosophie in sich. Henrich zufolge, der zwar der Meinung ist, dass das Philosophieren jedem Menschen eigne, muss man dennoch das indische Denken aus der philosophischen Tradition ausschließen, da die Forderung der Aufgabe der Subjektivität die Entwicklung einer Philosophie nicht begünstige; die Philosophie begreift das fragende Subjekt selbst in ihr Denken mit ein (Henrich 1982).

Woher bezieht, vor diesem Hintergrund, die interkulturelle Philosophie ihren Ort und ihre Rechtfertigung? Sucht man nach den im antiken Griechenland befindlichen *ähnlichen* Voraussetzungen, um dann womöglich den Anfang der indischen Philosophie festzustellen, dann fängt man die Suche mit einem bereits vorgeprägten Verständnis von Philosophie an. Man behauptet, die Philosophie gestalte sich so und so, das seien ihre Voraussetzungen, wenn es eine Philosophie woanders geben soll, dann müsse es ähnliche Voraussetzungen geben. Will man aber interkulturelle Philosophie betreiben, und soll diese selbst Philosophie sein, so kann man nicht umhin, auf den Grund der Sache zu kommen und sich zunächst über den Gegenstand der Erörterung zu verständigen. Man steht unumgänglich vor der Frage: Was ist Philosophie? Ist sie eine Weltanschauung, eine Wissenschaft, eine Lebensdeutung, die die Erfahrungen des menschlichen Lebens in einen Sinnzusammenhang bringt? Das tut auch die Religion. Die Philosophie ist, wie sie in Griechenland entsteht, Nachfolgerin der Religion, nicht bloß dadurch, dass sie sie ersetzt, sondern auch dadurch, dass sie ihre Motive aufnimmt und auf andere Weise erfüllt. Außerdem kann eine Religion Fragen aufnehmen, die selbst philosophisch sind. Ein bedeutender Grund dafür, dass die Philosophie sich schwer bestimmen lässt, ergibt sich daraus, dass sie keinen vorgegebenen Gegenstand hat wie z. B. die Literaturwissenschaft oder die Mathematik, dass sie zu ihrem Gegenstand erst vordringen muss. Dadurch unterscheidet sie sich von einer positiven Wissenschaft. So sieht Heidegger den Gegenstand der Philosophie, zu dem sie erst kommt, in der Frage nach dem Sein, das sie unter die radikalste Kritik stellt (Heidegger 2004). Lässt sich das Wesen der Philosophie schwer bestimmen, so auch ihre Aufgabe. Wenngleich sie das Dasein zu offenbaren, die Auflösung von Unklarheit und Beirung herbeizuführen, die Selbstverständigung des bewussten Lebens zu ermöglichen hat, so tut sie dies nur unter der radikalsten Kritik, indem sie Annahmen überprüft und unbegründete durch *Gründe* zurückweist. Aber Philosophie besteht nicht nur in einer Aneinanderreihung von Annahmen, sondern sie führt sie zusammen und durchdringt sie mit dem einheitlichen Interesse von Erkenntnis. Zur radikalen Kritik gehört eben auch die Integration. Der Weg der Philosophie, ihr Suchen allein unter die radikale Kritik zu stellen, ist schließlich ein Um- und manchmal auch ein Irrweg. Deshalb hat die Philosophie eine Geschichte, und sie ist ihr wesentlich. Sie ist Geschichte der Wege des Denkens, das nur sie selber ermöglicht. Insofern sie in sich selbst begründet ist, ist die Geschichte der Philosophie jedoch mehr als nur irgendein historisches Ereignis. Vielmehr kann sich die Philosophie nur aus ihrer eigenen Geschichte heraus verstehen.

Wenn ich im Obigen einige Aspekte hervorgehoben habe, nämlich Gründe, Kritik, Integration und Geschichte, die unabdingbar zur Philosophie gehören, so schließt dies nicht aus, dass die Philosophie auch noch andere hat. Hat man aber auf diese Weise den Maßstab, das Kriterium gewonnen, womit man mit Entschiedenheit behaupten kann, dass die Denktraditionen verschiedener Kulturen *Philosophie* sind? Ist nicht schon der Begriff ‚Philosophie‘ problematisch, nicht nur weil die aus der griechischen Tradition stammende *philosophia* nicht die Weisheit selbst, sondern die Liebe zur Weisheit bedeutet, sondern auch, weil die europäische Tradition keinen einheitlichen Begriff der Philosophie hat? Hier stellt sich die Geltungsfrage der interkulturellen Philosophie, eine Frage, die mit ihrer Aufgabe zusammenhängt. Besteht diese im Vergleich unterschiedlicher Kulturen, die eigentlich nicht verglichen werden können, weil die Hinsicht des Vergleiches fehlt, über die also nichts gesagt werden kann, und wovon man - um das Wittgensteinsche Wort zu nehmen -, schweigen muss? Es besteht ein Unterschied zwischen der rohen Kenntnis zweier Denktraditionen einerseits und dem prinzipiellen Verständnis und der Ausarbeitung einer Thematik andererseits. Es besteht auch ein Unterschied zwischen bloßer Kenntnis der Denktraditionen und dem Verständnis ihres eigensten Sinnes. Interkulturelle Philosophie kann sich nicht damit zufriedengeben, in einer enzyklopädischen Zusammenstellung von Meinungen aufzugehen, wenn sie zugleich den Anspruch hat, *Philosophie* zu sein. Das, was sie zur Philosophie macht, ist ihre kritische Methode, die immer zugleich Selbstkritik ist. Mag sein, dass sie den Begriff der Philosophie, während sie so verfährt, in der Schwebelasse lassen muss. Mag sein, dass sie nicht *die* Methode im Sinne einer philosophischen Technik hat, sondern sich jeweils nach dem zu erschließenden Gegenstand richten muss. Es liegt im Wesen aller Methode, die den Zugang zu den Gegenständen öffnet, dass der vollzogene Fortgang die Methode, die gerade dazu verhilft, notwendig veralten lässt. Ebenso ist die Methode der interkulturellen Philosophie nicht etwas von außen an ihr Gebiet herangebrachtes. Es wäre auch grundverkehrt, an die sich entwickelnde interkulturelle Philosophie äußerliche Maßstäbe einer endgültigen Terminologie zu legen. Man sieht z. B., dass sich die Ausdrücke ‚Philosophie‘ bzw. ‚philosophisch‘ in Bezug auf das indische Denken nicht meiden lassen, insofern sie den Blick auf eine klar zu erfassende Gegebenheit lenken. Aber die interkulturelle Philosophie betrachtet diese Ausdrücke als flüchtig und immer bereit, sich zu differenzieren. Während dies einerseits zu ihrer eigenen Geschichtlichkeit beiträgt, wird sie andererseits, indem sie diese Ausdrücke aus ihrer ursprünglichen Sphäre herauslöst und auf die interkulturelle überträgt, feststellen, dass selbst der Begriff der Philosophie einer Klärung bedarf. Aber freilich kann jede Erörterung über den Begriff der Philosophie nur vorläufig sein, denn dieser ist das Ergebnis ihrer selbst (Heidegger 1975). Ebenso kann die Frage, ob eine interkulturelle Philosophie möglich ist, nur durch ihre Methode, d. h. durch sie selbst, denn sie ist *selbst* Methode, beantwortet werden.

Wie zur Philosophie überhaupt, so gehört es auch zur interkulturellen, dass sie ihrer eigenen Probleme bewusst wird. Nur dadurch kann sie sich den Fragen widmen: Sind die Divergenzen im Denken verschiedener Kulturen *andere* Wege? Oder ist eine gemeinsame Grundlage zu finden, von der aus die Divergenzen zu verstehen sind? Mit diesen Fragen wendet sich die interkulturelle Philosophie zu ihren Voraussetzungen um. Selbstverständlich kann sie nicht alle Probleme lösen, aber sie kann immerhin das Feld vorbereiten, auf dem sie allererst möglich wird.

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The Rational Structure of Non-Violent Worldview

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1. A premise

Was the 1989 event of the non-violent liberation of so many Eastern countries an explosion of irrationality? Most people think so, since rationality in national defence has also been equated with a great capability for destruction, obtained by applying scientific research, that is, the collective reason of mankind applied to human needs. To want to face a conflict without weapons was considered as a merely wishful attitude.

Yet the in 20th century, Indian people, subjugated by the greatest colonialist empire, conquered national independence without weapons. Their leader, Gandhi, was inspired by a notion, non-violence, which rejects all offensive means. Moreover, Gandhi often reiterated that his non-violent method had to be qualified as a very science, so that his life experimented with it in a scientific way (e.g., see the title of 30). On the other hand, Gandhi accused Western science of being one of the structural violences exported by Western civilisation.(29) Apparently, by the term "science" Gandhi was referring to the hard sciences, yet by interpreting them from an alternative viewpoint. Which one?

2. An alternative tradition within Western science

An close look at the history of scientific theories proves that since the 18th century natural science has included a relevant minoritarian tradition. It is not difficult to recognise that classical chemistry was at variance with Newton's mechanics, the dominating theory throughout two centuries of science. The same holds true for: (12) L. Carnot's calculus(6), geometry(5) and mechanics(4), S. Carnot's thermodynamics(7), Lobachevsky's non-Euclidean geometry(37), Einstein's theory of special relativity(26).

The alternative attitude of so many theories is commonly ignored since they are all accused of being "phenomenological", "immature", lacking advanced mathematics theories. Yet, a comparison shows that they enjoy a common method, which was sketched by L. Carnot as an improvement of the "synthetic method".¹

3. The parallelism with conflict theories

Its basic features are shared by some social theories and even Gandhi's non-violent thinking.

i) According to L. Carnot's synthetic method, *each of the above-mentioned theories*, rather than being organised as an apodictic system (whose truth flows from few, abstract axioms by means of a purely deductive development), *first posits an universal problem concerning a given field of phenomena*; e.g., in classical chemistry, to discover which elements constitute matter; in S. Carnot's thermodynamics, the maximum efficiency in producing work from heat; in Lobachevsky's theory, whether more than one parallel line is

possible in geometry; in Einstein's theory, which are the Lorentz invariants in mechanics(13,7, 37,9, 26).

Likely, Gandhi's worldview cannot be derived from self-evident principles; rather it puts the universal problem as to how to solve conflicts in interpersonal relationships by means of a final agreement among opponents.

Let us note that a scientific theory of even the most intimate conflicts, i.e., *Freud's psychoanalysis*, shares this feature: it *places the problem of solving traumas in a patient*.(27) Also *Marx' theory of social conflicts places the problem of how to overcome capitalism* in mankind's history.(31)

Some theories mediate between natural sciences and the theory of conflicts; *strategic theories* apply rationality in a scientific way to a lot of factors involved in the most tremendous conflict – *war*. Rather than merely use brute, destructive force, some strategies *pose the universal problem of managing wars by linking the best destructive power with political aims*. This attitude characterises the three strategists Sun Tzu,(41) L. Carnot,(8) Clausewitz.(10)

ii) *Each of the above theories induces from commonly shared knowledge a new method*, capable of solving the previously stated universal problem. Such a feature is apparent in classical chemistry, where chemists, although lacking direct evidence on elements of matter, induced, from both analysis and synthesis of common substances, an excellent method for listing these elements. Similar notes apply to the remaining above-mentioned natural theories. In particular, Einstein's theory started his celebrated paper by suggesting a new method for measuring space and time, for obtaining a first Lorentz invariant.(26)

Likely, Gandhi's theory of non-violence leads us to induce from the knowledge of the common links with an opponent a conciliatory viewpoint, from which to develop a specific method for solving through a common agreement the conflict.

Notice that both *Freud and Marx* did not appeal to esoteric or highly abstract notions from which to draw their theories; rather, both *wrote books addressed to a wide public for presenting new methods*.

Just because the *above-mentioned alternative strategists* based their theories on common knowledge their *books on strategy were addressed to laymen*.(10, Introduction) Each of such theories does not suggest a list of technical orders imparted to subordinate people, but a *new method*, which each soldier can interiorise.(1,11,21)

iii) The entire synthetic method was qualified in semi-formal terms by L. Carnot as *the method of the 'adjunctions' to a given system, which is so generalised that the search for a solution is made easier*; after the desired solution is obtained, it is introduced, by suppressing auxiliary variables, to the initial system. For instance, in the (ancient) infinitesimal analysis one adds to a mathematical system to be solved some auxiliary variables, commonly called infinitesimals; which, after the solution is obtained, are "suppressed". In his mechanics, L. Carnot added "geometrical motions", which in the simplest case represent changes in the reference frames, and which in general constitute a group of transformations; in fact, Carnot started

¹ "Note" (6, 217-253). An authoritative book on his scientific activity is (32). A more recent and complete book is (8).

group theory for obtaining the basic invariants of the theory.(18) Fifty years later, by reiterating the same crucial word "adjunction" Galois applied the same method to algebra.

Aldo Capitini, the first Western, active non-violent individual in the 20th century, offered a philosophical basis for Gandhian non-violence, by considering the whole development of Western philosophy. Kant recognised that human reason unsuccessfully attempted to know *noumena*; man can, however, grasp reality through an ethical move, characterised as an "adjunction";(33) this notion originated in Hegel's philosophy Absolute Spirit's *aufhebung*. Instead, Capitini considered only personal 'adjunctions' as the typical moves performed by "an individual persuaded for the cause of non-violence", aiming to rise above the level of an even distressing situation of interpersonal relationships, and hence to apperceive a higher viewpoint from which to achieve a "choral" solution.(3,2) Indeed, the process of non-violent solution of a conflict can be modelled by attributing to the notion "adjunction" the same role it plays in scientific theories.(16)

In Freud's psychoanalysis the patient, by describing his dreams to analyst, "adjoins" them to his psychological "system" for its clarification. A therapist analysing patient's diseases, obtains a hint for the solution by adding a second negation to each patient's negated statement, (27). Marx wanted to add, as a trigger eliciting the desired change in the history of mankind, historical consciousness to the proletariat.

Among strategic theories, L. Carnot's defensive one is expressly based upon the term 'adjunctions'. He maintains that the best strategy is a step-by-step strategy. When the besieged of a stronghold is threatened by a besieger applying a step-by-step strategy for approaching with impunity the stronghold, then the besieged has to 'adjoin' to his defensive activity some quick sorties, in order to break the besieger's strategy, and hence to preserve the best strategy within the stronghold.(8)

4. A formal interpretation

iv) The above parallelisms among so disparate theories can be qualified in formal terms. The law of double negation holds true in classical logic (e.g., "It is not true that 2+2 is not 4" is equivalent to "2+2=4"); its failure (e.g., a court judgement of "lack of guilt evidence" is not equivalent to its corresponding positive judgement of "honesty") characterises non-classical logic.(26,40) The founders of the above-mentioned scientific theories wrote books where one recognises a lot of double negated sentences, whose corresponding positive sentences are not true for lack of scientific evidence (= DNSs). For instance: "It is impossible that matter is divisible in a not finite way" (chemists of 19th Century); "Infinitesimals are not chimerical (=not real) beings";(6) "It is impossible a perpetual (= without an end) motion";(4,7); "It is not contradictory the hypothesis of two parallel lines to a given straight line."(37)"... we can attribute no absolute (= not relative) meaning to simultaneity."(26). Hence, *all these theories are governed by non-classical logic.*

Non-violence is essentially merged in non-classical logic, since the word itself, non-violence, is a doubly negated word (being violence a negation of a lot of values), which cannot be appropriately substituted by a concrete, positive word. The best candidate in Gandhi's eyes, the word 'Satyagraha' (= force of Truth), in fact sublimates the original meaning in an abstract word, hanging over human life. Christian people commonly think that positive word 'love' is

equivalent to "non-violence"; yet, 'love' is a multi-purposed word, as it is proved by the social history of Christendom. Furthermore, any typical non-violent slogan is appropriately expressed by two negations: e.g., "It is impossible that this man is my enemy", "Nobody is without a soul", "Eye for eye (=vengeance) makes blind the world".

A celebrated methodological paper by Freud equates a patient's negation to a trauma repression; which has to be solved by the analyst by denying the patient's negation.(27,24)

It is well known that Marx wanted to illustrate his theory by means of dialectics, where a synthesis is obtained by the "negation of the negation" of the starting thesis.

In the alternative strategic theories the main goal is not to win always, but to result in-vincible, a word including two negations.(41) Moreover, the celebrated Clausewitz' statement is "War is nothing else diplomacy through other means" (never he wrote the corresponding positive statement, wrongly quoted by almost all scholars).(10)

v) Leibniz sketched a 'Science of Science'(14) whose two basic principles are the principle of non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason; the latter one being a DNS ("Nothing is without a reason") constitutes the best introduction to non-classical logic within an alternative theory.(17) There is not enough space to identify in each of the above theories the translation of the latter Leibniz' principle in a particular DNS, working as its specific methodological principle.

vi) Some of the above-mentioned theories present one more feature; *the mere sequence of DNSs within an original text faithfully synthesises the core of the respective theory.* This can be found in S. Carnot's booklet on thermodynamics,(22) Lobachevsky's new geometry (20), Freud's psychoanalysis,(24) the above strategic theories.(11,1,25)²

It cannot be overemphasised the fact that all the above scientists, although unaware of non-classical logic, consistently built entire theories by means of DNSs.

vii) Some of the above theories attained their crucial results through *ad absurdum* theorems, e.g., the celebrated S. Carnot's theorem in thermodynamics.³

The eventual result of the non-violent method is obtained by reducing an argument *ad absurdum*, e.g., "It is absurd that my opponent is not my brother, otherwise God does not exist", or "... otherwise universal brotherhood is impossible". Gandhi often argued in such a way.(35, ch.4, no.s 8,43,52,76)

Also both L. Carnot's and Clausewitz' theories end with *ad absurdum* arguments.(1,10)

viii) At last, we have characterised the both logical and alternative organisation(20) of non-violence as a theory.⁴ Thus, conflict theory is linked with scientific theories.

² See (19,23) for more such reconstructions.

³ *Ad absurdum* argument is rejected by non-classical logic when one, complying with classical logic, imposes the conclusion, really a DNS $\neg\neg T$, onto the positive sentence T . But when a theory argues on the basis of DNSs, this step is not necessary, because the last DNS works as a methodological principle for the following argument. Only in the final argument of the theory, when $\neg\neg T$ achieves universal evidence for all problems at issue, then the author feels justified to change both logic and organisation of the theory, by assuming T as a new hypothesis from which to draw all possible derivations. This move is recognised in both S. Carnot's and Lobachevsky's theories.(20)

⁴ Non-violence can be also characterised by its privileged attention to the development of interpersonal relationships, rather than to the development of material objects, institutions or abstract ideals. By adding this option to the above one, one obtains two dichotomic variables, generalising the variables

Indeed, already Leibniz exploited his (alternative) theory of impact of bodies, where his notion of elastic body solves a possibly disastrous impact in an exchange of common quantities (i.e., momentum, momentum of momentum and energy) for constructing a theory of interpersonal conflicts where the corresponding notion of flexible attitude solves them in mutual agreements.(36,16)

Furthermore, some historians of science have recently stressed the essentially conflictual nature of history of science.(34,35) Conversely, from their categories I developed a general theory of conflict resolution,(15) which both includes non-violent theory and generalises Galtung's theory.(28)

5. Conclusion

Western civilisation led human reason on one hand to reconcile in an unitarian, organicistic scheme the various scientific theories on all kinds of reality, and on the other hand to maintain as an inevitable necessity (at least, in extreme circumstances) to destroy enemies as evil. Instead, Gandhi's teachings addressed human reason to consider, on one hand, as an ineluctable ethical task to conciliate conflicting persons, by viewing all of them within an organicistic, global unity, constituting the only true reality, the highest irrationality being to destroy it, and, on the other hand, to see scientific theories as mutually incommensurable. That actually translates into a theoretical term which already both Kant and Capitini suggested, i.e., the conversion of Western philosophical reason into an ethical attitude. That amounts to a very paradigm-shift in traditional rationality of mankind (39).

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described by Galtung(28); they bring forth the notion of four models of development, which, according to Galtung, characterises non-violent thinking.(28,12)

Radical Interpretation and Intercultural Communication

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1. Radical Interpretation.

Davidson's radical interpretation is an adaptation of Quine's (1960) famous thought experiment of *radical translation*, in which a field linguist is faced with a speaker of a language he does not know. The linguist's task is to create a translation manual from the alien's language to his own, i.e., to understand him, and this without the aid of a dictionary, or of an informant that can serve as a translator. Thus all that the linguist has to go on is the speaker's overt linguistic behavior. What the linguist can learn about the alien's language in this situation, given sufficiently rich and long interaction, encapsulates all that can ever be learned about any person's linguistic behavior. Hence, according to Quine's inter-subjectivist (some would say behaviorist) view of language, what the linguist can come to know in radical translation is all that there is to know about what any person means by his words.

Davidson (1984a) retains Quine's inter-subjectivist view of linguistic meaning: He holds that meaning must be accounted for in terms of what is publicly available in linguistic interaction, rather than in terms of, e.g., internal representations that are somehow associated with words and sentences in each speaker's head. However, Davidson introduces several significant changes into Quine's framework. Here are three of the most central such changes. *First*, Davidson holds that the linguist's feat (which captures what we all do in understanding each other) should be conceptualized as relating the other's words not to the linguist's own words, but to the world they both share. Admittedly, the linguist uses his own language to express, e.g., what the other's referring expressions refer to. However, what are established in this process are connections between (some of) the other's words and objects in the world (as conceptualized by the linguist). Thus the result is better thought of as interpretation rather than translation. *Second*, the change from translation to interpretation leads Davidson to use the notion of truth in his account of meaning. That is, Davidson's interpreter establishes systematic connections between the other's language and the world, and the primitive notion applied in this process is truth: The interpreter assigns truth conditions (derived from a so called truth theory, expressed in his own language) to the sentences uttered by the speaker. And *third*, Davidson's notion of radical interpretation takes into account not only linguistic meaning, but also belief and desire. (This is as opposed to Quine, who dismisses such mental states as not amenable to rigorous philosophical analysis.) Thus Davidson views his interpreter as using the (meager) publicly available information that he has in order to break into the interconnected system of speaker's beliefs, desires and meaningful utterances. Meaning is assigned to both mental and linguistic components of this system together in the process of interpretation, and therefore intentional, meaningful thought and desire are viewed as inherently dependent on interpersonal linguistic interaction.

This, in a nutshell, is the foundation of Davidson's philosophical outlook on language, an outlook which he continued to elaborate and develop since its inception until his death in the beginning of this century. We turn to see how this highly influential view of language bears upon an issue which was not central to Davidson's interests as a philosopher, namely intercultural dialogue.

2. Radical Interpretation and Intercultural Dialogue.

It is evident from the above characterization of radical translation and radical interpretation that both describe situations of intercultural communication: In both cases we are presented with scenarios in which people from completely alien linguistic and cultural backgrounds are faced with each other and eventually succeed to communicate. However, it is also clear from the foregoing brief overview that neither Quine nor Davidson, who designed these thought experiments, were intent on addressing issues of intercultural communication. Rather, the objective of each of them is to make a philosophical point with regard to linguistic meaning and interaction in general, and the situation that each envisions is supposed to capture this point and underline its force and consequences.

However, contrary to this acknowledged explanatory role we can now turn this picture around and ask: How does the philosophical outlook on language and thought that is expressed and supported by Davidson through his talk of radical interpretation bear upon the very situation that is described in this scenario, viz. intercultural dialogue? Does this outlook offer us any insights concerning such dialogue and its place vis-à-vis everyday, intra-cultural communication?

The direct, immediate answer to these questions is positive: The Davidsonian outlook does bear upon the relation between intra- and inter-cultural communication. Its major consequence is that there is no philosophically significant difference between these two kinds of interaction, that essentially they are not two kinds of interaction at all, but one. The reason should be clear. The workings of any type of linguistic interaction are brought out by the radical interpretation parable, according to Davidson. This is true for interaction across cultural lines, which is outwardly more similar to the parable itself, as well as for intra-cultural, everyday such interaction, which is outwardly dissimilar to the parable. The outward dissimilarity of typical language use to radical interpretation should not deceive us, tells us Davidson: It does not involve any intuitively appealing notions such as mutual access to a common store of shared meanings, or a friction-free transfer of mental contents. Rather, in these close-to-home kinds of language use too all that we can go on in the ascription of contents to utterances is overt language use. Therefore everyday linguistic interaction is not different from any actual or hypothetical interaction with an alien—be it an extra-terrestrial or a human from a different continent.

Of course, no one should deny the obvious fact that there are great differences between linguistic interaction within and across cultural lines (not even philosophers, who, as David Lewis (1975) says, are notorious for denying obvious facts). Clearly it is one thing to engage in conversation with a person who shares your language, and an altogether different thing to do so with someone who does not. But the question, of course, is in what sense are these two scenarios 'different things'? Practically they obviously are, but the question is whether they are philosophically different as well—that is, for example,

whether language works differently in the two cases. A plausible picture is that indeed in one case language supposedly works as a transparent vehicle for the transmission of thought, and in the other case as an obstacle in the way of such a transmission. But the crux of the radical interpretation set-up can be rightly described as the rejection of this picture: This set-up encapsulates Davidson's rejection of the transmission model of linguistic communication in favor of a constitutive view, in which both linguistic and mental contents are given rise to in the context of communicative linguistic interaction. Once this alternative view is adopted it can be accepted that the acknowledged practical differences between intra- and inter-cultural dialogue do not express a deep chasm between these two types of interaction, but rather hide a surprising affinity.

This consequence of Davidson's position can be challenged in the following way. For the sake of the argument, the objector would say, let us accept that linguistic meaning is constituted inter-subjectively. However, most plausibly this is done within the borders of a linguistic and cultural community, according to the rules and conventions of this community. But when such a community is engaged in a dialogue with another, meaning is already constituted on both sides of the cultural line, and therefore cannot be said to arise through the interaction across this line. Rather, meaning needs to be transmitted across the cultural gap (be it narrow or wide), exactly in tune with the conception of communication that Davidson rejects, according to the account presented above. Thus we get an internalist view of meaning in the intercultural level that supervenes on an inter-subjectivist view of meaning in the intra-cultural level.

And what about the radical interpretation scenario? That is, how does this alternative position vis-à-vis intercultural dialogue bear upon the utility of this scenario to the conceptualization of linguistic meaning in general? The objector's answer to this query would be that indeed the difficulty in Davidson's conclusions as regards intercultural communication highlights the shortcomings of his thought experiment in explicating linguistic meaning: The 'one-on-one' character of radical interpretation hides the essential role of social convention in constituting inter-subjective meaning.

Now Davidson's philosophy is not without means to answer this challenge. A major component of such an answer is the rejection of the view that convention is essential to language use and to linguistic meaning. Davidson is well known for his debate with, e.g., Michael Dummett on this issue. Dummett (1978) and others claim that the very basic 'moves' of language—e.g., that of making an assertion—depend on social convention: Such convention constitutes the conditions for their performance in the same way that the rules of chess constitute the practice of playing the game. Davidson's (1984b) position, on the other hand, is that the role of convention in language is more similar to the role it plays in eating than in playing chess: There are many conventions associated with language use, some of which are clearly very convenient and useful, but they do not constitute the practice of interpretation. In principle, interpretation (like eating) can be achieved without appeal to convention, through local, contextual interpersonal interaction (Davidson, 1986).

It is obviously beyond the scope of this paper to defend Davidson's outlook and delve into the debate concerning language and convention. Rather, it is my aim here only to show how Davidson's position on convention bears upon the issue at hand, viz. intercultural communication. If indeed convention is not constitutive of language, as Davidson maintains, then the transmission model of inter-cultural communication can, and should, be rejected. A linguistic culture is not a tightly-knit conventional system, as this model suggests, but rather a much looser aggregate of innumerable local interpersonal interpretation processes that take advantage of convention but do not depend on it or are completely governed by it. (This is not to deny that some aspects of culture are conventionally constituted, but rather only to suggest that language, which undoubtedly plays a major role in culture, is not so constituted.) Therefore there is no justification for a clear-cut distinction between communication within the bounds of convention and across such bounds, as the objection suggests. Rather, in all cases we have contextual interpretation that may or may not appeal to the resources of shared conventions. Thus the primacy of the radical interpretation scenario is upheld.

The upshot of these considerations may be summarized as an attack against the very expression 'intercultural communication'. When juxtaposed with the term 'interpersonal communication' the former term creates the impression (or expresses the presupposition) that indeed two kinds of communication should be distinguished—one between persons, the other between cultures. But the thrust of Davidson's position is that cultures are not really engaged in communication—only people are. Cultural similarity is just one factor (albeit a very important one) that can affect the success of any given concrete act of communication between two (or more) individuals.

3. Conclusion

I argue to have shown in the foregoing discussion that Davidson's philosophy of language, as epitomized by the radical interpretation thought experiment, bears in a significant way upon the question whether and how intercultural dialogue differs from intra-cultural communication: It is a consequence of the Davidsonian outlook that no great difference between the two cases exists. Furthermore, it was shown how Davidson's views regarding the role of convention in language support the implications of his radical interpretation parable for intercultural communication. Thus I claim that the explicit consideration of intercultural dialogue and the way Davidson's philosophical system applies to it helps bring out the connection between different themes in this system, and is therefore of a broader value than mere 'applied philosophy' (if there is such a thing at all). This outcome is in tune with the natural expectation that the discussion of intercultural dialogue in the context of the philosophy of language should be beneficial both for understanding such dialogue and for understanding language.

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Indeterminismus freier Willensentscheidungen: ontisch, epistemisch oder logisch?

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1. Das Problem der alternativen Möglichkeiten in der Debatte um die Willensfreiheit

Die neuronalen Korrelate mentaler Zustände unterliegen den Gesetzen der Physik. Die alte Debatte darüber, was das für die vorwissenschaftlichen Intuitionen von menschlicher Freiheit bedeutet, wird seit einigen Jahren von Neurowissenschaftlern und Philosophen wieder verstärkt geführt. Dabei hat sich gezeigt, dass das Prinzip der *Urheberschaft* (Zurechenbarkeit zur Person), das Prinzip der *Intelligibilität* (Mitteilbarkeit bzw. Rekonstruierbarkeit von Entscheidungsgründen) und das Prinzip der *alternativen Möglichkeiten* (Legitimation kontrafaktischer Rede) nicht alle drei in starker Form aufrecht erhalten werden können (siehe etwa Goschke und Walter 2005).

So setzt die sichere Zurechenbarkeit einer Willensentscheidung deterministische Kausallinien voraus, um die resultierende Handlung auf die willentlich handelnde Person zurückführen zu können, schließt genau dadurch aber die Möglichkeit alternativer Handlungen aus. Umgekehrt sind ontische Zufallsereignisse zwar der Beginn von Kontrafaktizität, gleichzeitig jedoch das Ende von Urheberschaft. Intelligibilität wiederum ist weder mit der weiteren Rückverfolgung deterministischer Kausallinien (hinter die Willensentscheidung zurück und aus der Person hinaus) vereinbar noch mit der Annahme ontischer Zufallsereignisse im Entscheidungsprozess.

Vor diesem Hintergrund hat sich eine *kompatibilistische* Auffassung von Willensfreiheit als zweckmäßig erwiesen, d.h. ein Verständnis freier Willensentscheidungen, das mit der naturwissenschaftlichen Beschreibung der unterliegenden neuronalen Prozesse verträglich ist. Dabei werden die Fähigkeiten und Präferenzen der sich entscheidenden Person zum zentralen Kriterium für die Freiheit der Entscheidung erhoben (vgl. etwa Bieri 2001, Beckermann 2006). Die Rückverfolgung von Kausallinien endet mit einem methodischen Schnitt, der den Übergang zur makroskopischen Rede von „Person“ anzeigt. So kann personale Urheberschaft rekonstruiert werden, ohne dabei die Existenz vorgängiger Kausallinien zu leugnen. Intelligibilität kann durch den methodischen Ebenenwechsel von der materiellen Beschreibung zur Zuschreibung von Gründen und Motiven rekonstruiert werden, ebenfalls ohne dabei die Durchgängigkeit der materiellen Beschreibbarkeit (etwa der neuronalen Dynamik) zu leugnen.

Es verbleibt die Frage, was aus der Intuition der alternativen Möglichkeiten wird. Diese Intuition erscheint sehr robust: Sie gänzlich zur Illusion erklären zu wollen, würde dem kompatibilistischen Konzept der Willensfreiheit erhebliche Plausibilität rauben und letztlich einer inkompatibilistischen Auffassung das Wort reden, die dann Willensfreiheit schlechthin zur Illusion erklärt. Daher ist von Interesse, welcher Geltungsanspruch für indeterministische Beschreibungselemente und Sprechweisen im Rahmen einer kompatibilistischen

Grundposition noch erhoben werden kann. Das ist die Leitfrage dieses Beitrags.

2. Drei Sorten von Indeterminismus

Zur Schärfung der Argumente betrachten wir ein idealisiertes Universum, in dem alle materiellen (einschließlich neuronaler) Prozesse deterministischen Verlaufsgesetzen folgen, die erforschbar sind und als bekannt vorausgesetzt werden sollen.

Ontischer Indeterminismus kommt in einem solchen Universum nicht vor. Die objektive Unbestimmtheit von Quantenobjekten ist unserer Idealisierung zum Opfer gefallen. Für die materiellen Korrelate bewusster Deliberation oder unbewusster Abwägungs- und Verrechnungsprozesse bedeutet das keine wesentliche Einschränkung, denn Unterbrechungen neuronaler Kausallinien würden die Zurechenbarkeit von Entscheidungen schon konzeptionell bedrohen (siehe Abschnitt 1). Außerdem liegt bis jetzt keine überzeugende neurophysiologische Evidenz für solche Unterbrechungen vor. Falls überhaupt aufweisbar, wären sie wohl eine vernachlässigbare Ausnahmeerscheinung. Für die Umwelt außerhalb der handelnden Person stellt der Ausschluss des ontischen Indeterminismus jedoch eine echte Einschränkung dar, auf die wir am Ende zurückkommen.

Epistemischer Indeterminismus aus der Beschreibungsperspektive der 3. Person gegenüber einer sich (kompatibilistisch) frei entscheidenden Person mag auftreten, etwa durch begrenzte Rechenkapazität der 3. Person oder durch neuronale Prozesse der sich entscheidenden Person, deren Berechnung algorithmisch irreduzibel sind. Aber erstens erscheinen solche Begrenzungen der Beschreibung nicht zwingend (und angesichts der realen Erforschbarkeit von Entscheidungsdeterminanten heuristisch eher unplausibel), und zweitens ist ihre Relevanz für das Verständnis von Willensfreiheit zweifelhaft: Die ontische Ebene bleibt ja deterministisch strukturiert, und auch das Erleben der sich entscheidenden Person bleibt somit festgelegt. Partielle Unkenntnis einer 3. Person ändert daran nichts. Eine Offenheit der Zukunft wird so nicht begründet, sondern lediglich ihre Voraussagbarkeit erschwert oder verhindert.

Natürlich kann man den Gegenstandsbereich der Beschreibung auf die sich entscheidende Person einschränken und ihre Umwelt (einschließlich aller Mitmenschen und ihrer Äußerungen) als Variable betrachten. Dann erscheint die Zukunft der Person offen: Sie wird auf verschiedene Situationen verschieden reagieren und vielleicht sogar durch neue Argumente beeinflussbar sein. Doch ist der unterliegende Determinismus dabei bloß durch die Restriktion der Beschreibung von einem größeren isolierten auf ein kleineres offenes System aus dem Blick geraten. Die vermeintliche Offenheit der Zukunft ist daher ein Artefakt dieser Restriktion.

Überzeugender ist demgegenüber schon der epistemische Indeterminismus aus der 1. Person-Perspektive: Wer sich entscheidet, weiß vorher nicht, wie. Wüsste er/sie es, dann wäre die Entscheidung schon getroffen. Das Denken in gleichermaßen möglichen (wenn auch vielleicht nicht gleich wahrscheinlichen) Alternativen erscheint in der Innensicht als *konstitutiv* für freie Willensentscheidungen. Einer klassischen Abhandlung Karl Poppers (Popper 1950) zufolge kann ein deterministisches System seine eigene Zukunft prinzipiell nicht vorausberechnen und auch nicht das Ergebnis einer solchen Vorausberechnung durch ein anderes System entgegennehmen, ohne damit zugleich deren Gültigkeit zu bedrohen. Hat die sich entscheidende Person also notwendigerweise ein Wissensdefizit gegenüber ihren Beobachtern?

Der *logische Indeterminismus* behauptet eine in der Differenz von Entscheider- und Beobachterrolle begründete Relativität der jeweiligen Beschreibungen, die notwendig verschieden, aber aufeinander abgestimmt seien und beide nicht mit Objektivitätsanspruch vertreten werden könnten. Insofern habe die 1. Person in ihrer Entscheiderrolle *kein* Wissensdefizit, daher das Attribut „logisch“ statt „epistemisch“.

Diese Position ist in den 1960er und 70er Jahren von Donald M. MacKay ausformuliert (MacKay 1960, 1967) und wiederholt gegen verschiedenartige Kritik verteidigt worden (MacKay 1971, 1973). Sie geht insofern über die Poppersche Sichtweise hinaus, als hier selbst bei völlig korrekter Vorausberechnung der Willensentscheidungen einer 1. Person durch eine 3. Person (*ohne* dass jene vor ihrer Entscheidung von dieser über die Berechnung informiert worden wäre) auf jeden Geltungsanspruch der deterministischen (3. Person-)Beschreibung gegenüber der 1. Person verzichtet wird. Die Willensfreiheit der 1. Person zeigt sich nach MacKay somit in einem keineswegs bloß epistemischen, sondern *logischen* Indeterminismus ihrer eigenen Beschreibung in einem deterministischen Universum. Diese alte Position hat jüngst neue Hoffnung auf eine philosophisch tragfähige Begründung des strafrechtlichen Schuldkonzepts auf sich gezogen (Merkel 2006).

3. Kritik des logischen Indeterminismus

Seine Plausibilität bezieht der logische Indeterminismus aus der unvermeidlichen Störung der neuronalen und mentalen Dynamik des Entscheiders durch die Mitteilung der Prognose des Beobachters. Diese Plausibilität trägt jedoch. Neuronale und (damit verbunden) mentale Lebensgeschichten, die die Kenntnis (eines Teils) der Zukunft mitrepräsentieren, sind durchaus denkbar.

Stellt man sich neuronale Konfigurationen im Rahmen der klassischen Mechanik durch Punkte in einem hochdimensionalen Phasenraum beschrieben vor, so kann der Zustand einer Person vor dem Treffen einer Willensentscheidung durch eine Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilung auf dem Gebiet des Phasenraums modelliert werden, dessen Punkte unter deterministischer Zeitentwicklung jeweils zu einer getroffenen Entscheidung (einem Entschluss) führen. Man beachte: Das Gebiet umfasst Punkte, die zu *verschiedenen* möglichen Entschlüssen führen, jeder einzelne Punkt führt jedoch zu *einem* bestimmten.

Der mit einem Phasenraumpunkt verbundene mentale Zustand kann nun durchaus Prognosen über den künftigen Entschluss mitumfassen, und zwar zutreffende

wie falsche Prognosen. Insbesondere ist es *möglich*, dass die Person ihren Entschluss prognostiziert – und ihn dann auch genauso trifft. Zwar ist es ein schwieriges (wohl prinzipiell unlösbares) Problem, solch einen Zustand gezielt herbeizuführen, denn es ist nicht zu sehen, wie die Selbstkonsistenzbedingung „vorher schon wissen, was eigenes späteres Überlegen ergeben wird“ allgemein aufgelöst werden kann.

Aber es ist nicht widersprüchlich (und phänomenal sogar vertraut), etwa vor einer Speisekarte zu sitzen und sich zu sagen: „Ich habe mich noch nicht entschieden, aber ich kenne mich: am Ende werde ich wieder Gericht x bestellen“ - und sich anschließend kompatibilistisch frei für Gericht x zu entscheiden.

Dabei ist zu beachten:

- „Sich kompatibilistisch frei entscheiden“ heißt *Aneignung* eines Entschlusses nach der Überlegung von Gründen. Der Phasenraumpunkt des neuronalen Zustands durchläuft dabei deterministisch seine Trajektorie.
- „Wissen“ heißt nicht ständige Instantiierung im Bewusstsein, sondern Abrufbarkeit bei Bedarf – also nur *phasenweise* Bewusstheit.
- Auch wenn ein Entschluss schon vorher „gewusst“ wird, kann und muss der zugehörige Entscheidungsprozess noch *durchgeführt* (d. h. seine mentalen Gehalte im Bewusstsein instantiiert) werden. Dieser Prozess wird nicht notwendig gestört durch das (nicht instantiierte) Wissen um sein Ergebnis.
- Allerdings wird eine *Abschwächung der konstitutiven Rolle* erzwungen, die der Offenheit der Entscheidung in der Innensicht zukommt: Sie gilt nicht mehr für die ganze Person, sondern nur noch für die Phasen, in denen der Entscheidungsprozess läuft, also nur solange die Vorabkenntnis des Entschlusses nicht instantiiert wird.
- Insbesondere muss die Person ihren „momentanen Kenntnisstand“ im Sinne der noch zu treffenden Entscheidung getrennt halten von ihrem Mehrwissen über das Ergebnis des Entscheidungsprozesses. Eine Abfolge von Bewusstseinsinhalten, die diese Bedingung erfüllt, mag schizoid wirken, aber sie ist nicht undenkbar. Somit gibt es keinen logischen, sondern bestenfalls einen *psychologischen Indeterminismus*.

4. Fazit: Hauptsache phasenweises Überlegen

Es gibt keinen Grund, die 1. Person vor ihrer Entscheidung vom Geltungsanspruch deterministischer Beschreibungen ihrer neuronalen und mentalen Dynamik auszunehmen. Der logische Indeterminismus ist daher nicht haltbar.

Im Rahmen der gewählten Idealisierung erscheint nur der (phasenweise, aber dann konstitutive) epistemische Indeterminismus der 1. Person als zwingend. Er muss daher die Intuition der alternativen Möglichkeiten alleine tragen. Für die Freiheit einer Willensentscheidung bleibt wesentlich, dass es Phasen der Überlegung von Gründen gibt, die zur Aneignung des Entschlusses durch die Person führen.

In der realen Welt, d.h. bei Auflösung unserer Idealisierungen, kommt der epistemischen Offenheit der Zukunft eine grundlegende praktische und psychologische Bedeutung zu. Die Offenheit der Zukunft wird hier zusätzlich durch den ontischen Indeterminismus der Umwelt garantiert: Künftige Entscheidungssituationen, die von der Verstärkung von Quanteneffekten abhängen, sind prinzipiell unvorhersagbar.

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Is naturalism progressive? A naturalistic approach to the philosophy of science

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In current debates in philosophy one important division is between naturalistic and non-naturalistic approaches (vgl. Keil & Schnädelbach 2000). Basic premises as well as methodology of the two sides appear virtually incompatible and exclusive. The following article will explore some consequences of a naturalistic perspective, as in my field of research – philosophy of science – this approach appears to be the more favourable.

I will limit the present enquiry to one particular area – philosophy of science. Here the difference between both schools can be seen quite clearly. It enables me also to define a naturalistic approach and to actually carry out one very small example. Before I do that some shortcomings of non-naturalistic approaches will be discussed. My conclusion will be that some of the problems of modern philosophy of science cannot be understood without a naturalistic approach.

The term naturalism is rather vague, often used in many different notions by proponents and opponents alike. In its most trivial sense it means taking natural sciences seriously – a statement everybody would agree with. A more ambitious and precise definition qualifies naturalism in *ontological* respects as materialistic, in *methodological* respects as making the heaviest possible use of natural sciences and in *epistemological* respects as proposing a hypothetical realism (vgl. Sukopp 2006).

The second aspect is the most controversial and the most interesting. What are its implications? The foremost implication is that there are indeed natural sciences with a profound influence on philosophy of science studies. For example: Look at negotiations of individuals and groups in the laboratory (Knorr Cetina 2002) – is it not necessary to know at least something about sociobiological group dynamics? And if we want to know about the mind, nowadays we turn to fMRI-studies (*functional magnetic resonance imaging*), and not philosophy of mind. These empirical studies – with some important caveats – are seen as *the* way to uncover the riddles of the mind, one of the most elusive problems in philosophy. And for a closer look on scientists and their problem-solving abilities – is it not necessary to study cognitive psychology?

An investigation into the scientific enterprise needs to consider the cognitive abilities of human beings, i. e. scientists (cf. Kitcher 1993). Next to other factors like historical and sociological ones, cognitive abilities are at the center of decision-making and problem-solving of individuals and are of paramount importance. Some disciplines come readily to mind as a possible resource for answering these questions, as they have just these topics as their subjects: Neuropsychology, cognitive science and evolutionary biology. I want to discuss the last two.

Cognitive abilities are like any other human trait the result of an evolutionary history. Cognitive Science and Psychology *describe* these abilities, but they cannot ultimately *explain* them. Possible explanations come from Evolutionary Psychology (Cosmides & Tooby 1992), Evolutionary Epistemology (Vollmer 1975/2002) and Evolutionary Biology. These are all disciplines with a solid

empirical basis, and indeed I am convinced that this is the place where philosophy of science has to look for support.

In fact some announcements have been published (cf. Rubinstein 1984; Callebaut 1993; Ruse 1995; Kitcher 1993) asserting that this is the direction to follow, this is how to do philosophy of science. The label for this is the so called *cognitive philosophy of science*. Closely linked to this is the psychology of science (Shadish et al. 1989). Unfortunately – and this is an important objection – almost no historical scientific case studies are available that are based on empirical results from cognitive science. This situation exists in spite of numerous demands to take cognitive sciences seriously and incorporate or use them in case studies. There are hardly any attempts to link empirical results from, say psychology, to scientific case studies (two noteworthy exceptions are Tweney et al. 1981 and Wimsatt 1986).

In contrast, there is a number of sociological (e. g. Rheinberger 2001) or social-constructivist case studies (e. g. Knorr Cetina 2002). In my opinion this kind of explanation is, however, seriously flawed. I confine my criticism to three points. First:

Despite decades of research on this issue, cognitive sociologists have yet to produce a single general law which they are willing to evoke to explain the cognitive fortunes of any scientific theory, from any past period.” (Laudan 1977, S. 217/218, emphasis in the original)

Second, if there are indeed negotiations in the laboratory – and not even the most ardent naturalist would deny that – what are the negotiations about? Prior in time and logic is the interaction with the entities of the real world (and even social-constructivists are ontological realists, see Knorr Cetina in Callebaut 1993). And third, social-constructivists should be able to show that identical social circumstances produce in fact the same kind of science (Kitcher 1993). This has not been shown yet.

So here we have in a nutshell the fundamental differences between naturalists and non-naturalists: Causal explanations for the behavior of scientists go back either to natural sciences like Cognitive Psychology, or to soft sciences like Sociology.

However, there are points where both schools can meet. I agree with Kuhn, Feyerabend, Latour and Knorr Cetina in their criticism of the „received view” of science as too simplistic. Social and historical factors *are important*. It is however indispensable to add another important influencing factor: the psychology of science.

An account focusing on cognitive aspects would *complement* these theories. This has been an area of neglect to date, but we must not forget that humans are first and foremost biological beings.

To sum up: What should be expected of a naturalistic approach to the philosophy of science?

1. The focus is on the psychological and biological attributes of scientists.

2. These attributes are not a subject to speculation, there being lots of empirical results from cognitive science for this.
3. These results can be explained by evolutionary biology.
4. Historical and social factors are not neglected – they are complemented.
5. The theories of philosophers of science have to be warranted by historical case studies as another source of empirical support.

The last point merits a short explanation. Donovan and Laudan (1988) examine postulates from Kuhn and Lakatos by checking them through case studies. The majority of postulates are disproved. So, even very thorough, credible and expert historicists like Kuhn or Lakatos lose the connection to how „real science“ is done. This has to be avoided at all costs.

Of course there are objections to cognitive naturalistic approaches as well. Four of them shall be discussed below:

The first objection claims that individual cognitive processes cannot be studied; and if they could, it would not be possible to generalise from a genius to other individuals. This objection can be rejected, in so far as naturalists are interested in the cognitive processes *that are common to all individuals*. There are loads of data concerning human problem-solving, decision-theory, confirmation of hypotheses which are all relevant to discoveries (e. g. Tooby & Cosmides 1992; Newell & Simon 1972; Gigerenzer 1999).

The second objection states that there is no well-founded psychological theory to describe those phenomena. This is wrong, as the so-called Cognitive Psychology has been around since 1970 and Evolutionary Psychology since 1992.

The third objection holds that biological explanations are too reductionistic and on the wrong level of description – thus these explanations are not able to explain cultural processes like scientific endeavors. Biological explanations, however, do not claim to explain all levels of analysis and I put emphasis on their complementary nature. Plus, reductionistic approaches have been very successful in theory and practice, e. g. biology (Ruse 1988).

Fourth, accusations like evolutionary accounts imply radical nativism, panadaptationism or no possibility of falsification are outdated (nativism and panadaptationism: see Cosmides & Tooby 1994; Vollmer 1985/2003; not falsifiable: see Williams 1973; Buss 1989).

In the following paragraphs I would like to apply this theoretical framework to a very short example. The example also emphasises the importance of empirical support and the necessity to do case studies.

Human beings have massive problems in handling *complex systems*, a claim that is empirically well supported by quite a number of (computer)-simulations (Dörner 1989, 1983, 1976). Dörner found that nearly all subjects – scientists or not – use the same strategies for problem-solving in artificial complex task environments. The strategies used are often error-prone and certainly a long way from optimal. Examples for errors are *linear* problem-solving, failure to take into account side effects, long term

effects or feedback-loops. Moreover, humans tend to solve problems first that loom large, but not those that are really important – thus the question of priority is neglected. Other errors include the absence of control, the inability to see or correct one's own mistakes and difficulties to control a process. These errors were found to be almost completely independent of task and subject.

To explain these shortcomings in real complex systems managed by scientists there is no need to postulate other factors than those above. But this has frequently been done.

Let's take a look at the management of ecosystems like forests or national parks – real complex systems, most often run by scientists. Consider the Yellowstone national park:

Practically identical with the so called „Freezer“-simulation of Dörner we see the regulation of a *state* (the animal population of deer, beaver, bears of the *moment*), but not of the *process*. As these static tries to regulate animal populations are often confined to only one animal species (linear thinking) there have been big and unwanted fluctuations with disastrous consequences (Chase 1987). These fluctuations have been well-known since 1930 (one catastrophe through the same type of regulation) – but it seems to be very hard to learn from these mistakes.

Another big problem arose when the existing multiple interdependencies and feedback-loops were not heeded. One result was the sharp decline of beaver and grizzly populations, because too many deer (which were regulated!) used up mutual food resources (Chase 1987).

Two other examples that show practically the same problem-solving mechanisms are the management of the Blue Mountains in Oregon during the last 100 years (see Langston 1995 for details) and various very problematic introductions of new species (see Low 1999). I cannot go into these examples for lack of space, but they are – when seen in all their details – very illuminating: Again and again we notice the very same cognitive strategies and methods *independent of context or time*.

These short considerations imply the answer to the question: Is naturalism progressive?

The answer is a resounding yes, as I hope I could demonstrate. Not only is a naturalistic program (at least in the philosophy of science) superior in explanatory power to other attempts, but it is very much alive and fruitful as the very short example of a „case study“ hopefully could show.

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Two Senses of Common Sense

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Analytic philosophy often evokes a conceptual consensus of mankind in order to justify its analyses. It is the "rock bottom" of our understanding: a corpus of pre-theoretical intuitions incorporated in our community. Sometimes this consensus is taken in as a criterion for philosophical inquiry altogether; it is to determine what is sensible to ask for while doing philosophy. This appeal to a common conceptual background could be interpreted as a plea for some kind of "common sense". In this paper, I would like to suggest that analytic philosophy's call for common sense can be of at least two kinds. The first one suggests an appeal to everyday intuitions of plain men. The second invites an ideal common sense of a "second nature".¹ The former is at best represented historically in the writings of G. E. Moore and J. L. Austin, the latter in the later philosophy of L. Wittgenstein. I would like to explore those two notions and examine whether each or any of them can provide a solid, intercultural criterion for philosophical purposes.

In "A Defense of Common Sense", G. E. Moore cites a list of obvious beliefs:

"There exists at present a human body, which is my body... Among the things which have... formed part of its environment... there have ... been large numbers of other living humans bodies, each of which has, like it (a) at some time been born (b) continued to exist from some time after birth (c) been at every moment of its life after birth, either in contact with or not far from the surface of the earth..." (p.107)

Moore goes on with his "list of truism" which, he claims, everyone knows with certainty. His defense of common sense consists of reminding us beliefs we all share. Moore aims at bringing out some *obvious truths that people in common would agree on*. There is no need for further justification of any of those propositions; they represent native good judgment. Here "common sense" evokes what a typical man believes. It is a quasi-statistical notion suggesting what an average person admits – more or less – without any hesitation.

A more elaborated, but similar sense of common sense is implicit in the works of J. L. Austin. He constantly asks what the *ordinary man* would say on this or that occasion and uses his supposedly spontaneous responses in order to draw philosophical conclusions about free will or empirical knowledge, for example, about the legitimacy of philosophical enquiry in general:

"It is clearly implied ...that the ordinary man believes he perceives material things. Now this... is surely wrong straight off; for material thing is not an expression which the ordinary man would use..." (Austin, *Sense and Sensibilia*, [SS] pp.7).

"...But in fact the plain man would regard doubt in such a case, not as far –fetched or over-refined or somehow unpractical, but as plain nonsense..." (SS, pp.10).

The philosopher here relies on the *ordinary man*: if we keep in mind what *he* would say in real life situations, we will see that the problem in question has a rather

obvious solution. Austin, too, appeals to common sense, to what plain men sense that is, in order to remind us what no-one would sensibly agree on or deny.

Austin's version is more *linguistic* than Moore's: the former evokes our spontaneous linguistic responses being interested in what would seem obvious *to say* in the circumstances he describes.

It is partly because of this linguistic element that Austin's appeal is improved: On the one hand, linguistic data is a more reliable guide for what we perceive as common. Language is a rule-governed activity; we give the correct, common answer, simply because we have all mastered those rules. On the other hand, language, as used in Austin's writings, does not provide us with beliefs but rather with an *understanding* that is common. What we share, then, is *concepts* or a conceptual background, not necessarily (truth-begging) beliefs or opinions about how things are. As he puts it:

"...When we examine what we should say when, what words we should use in what situations, we are looking again not merely at words ... but also at the realities we use the words to talk about: we are using a sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of, ..., the phenomena." (PP, pp.182).

The idea is that the analysis of language is going to guide us in order to clarify our understanding of things. Looking closely at the expressions we use, we can clarify our reasoning. Language is the medium of our understanding; it embodies the concepts we employ.

Yet Austin's steady appeal to the "*plain man*" still implies something short of arithmetic mean. The term "plain man" is by itself a quasi-statistical notion. It suggests an abstraction of all actual language users: "Plain man" is the *average* speaker.

I don't think that Austin uses this term without realizing this very connotation. Elsewhere he claims that the common understanding of mankind is to be found within our linguistic history:

"...our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing... in the lifetimes of many generations: these surely are likely to be more...sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the fittest and more subtle, at least in all ordinary ...practical matters, than you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs..." (PP, pp.182).

So it then seems that Austin's appeal to the "plain man" is an abstract way to refer to the descendent of all previous language users. As such, he has inherited all the distinctions mankind found worth drawing, all the concepts that have proven useful for every practical purpose.

Austin's view on the history of our concepts might seem similar to Wittgenstein's "form of life". Yet, I believe that he appeals to linguistic history rather literally. On many occasions,² Austin refers to a historical process of creating distinctions, whenever an actual practical need is presented, and he explicitly compares this (natural)

¹ I use J. McDowell's phrase. He claims human nature to be of a "second nature", intermediated with norms of reasoning. See McDowell, J., 2000, pp 85-86, 94-95.

² Austin, J.L., 1979, *Philosophical Papers*, pp. 68-69, 195, 281-282.

practice with the philosophers' (unnatural) invention of new vocabulary. He often speaks as if he is describing the actual empirical process of language evolution. The same empirical element is also apparent when he appeals to "plain men" to get the answers he seeks for in possible everyday circumstances.

Wittgenstein's method is not of this kind. His analysis of language does not appeal to the typical speaker but rather to the "grammar", the *rules* of our language.

"...our investigation is ...a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away." (Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* [PI], 91).

We are talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about some non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm. ...But we are talking about it as we do about the pieces in chess when we are stating *the rules of the game*, not describing their physical properties. (PI, 108, the italics are mine).

According to Wittgenstein, language sometimes projects false images and we have to be very careful and look behind those images, at the grammar of the relevant expressions. The aim of his philosophy is to uncover the rules that govern our language use in actual language games. And this may in fact be overlooked even by *all* language users.

"... it is rather of the essence of our investigation that ...we want to *understand* something that is already in plain view. For *this* is what we seem in some sense not to understand." (PI, 89)

We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language: an order with a particular end in view... To this end we are constantly giving prominence to distinctions which *our ordinary forms of language easily make us overlook*... (PI, 132, italics: mine)

Wittgenstein aims to describe grammatical features that are easily overlooked. In this way, he can clarify our concepts, avoid false images imbedded in language and reach a better understanding.

What he is looking for is the corpus of our pre-theoretical intuitions or presuppositions which are embedded in our language or in our form of life. *This* is what lies beyond any doubt, *not the propositions that Moore states*. (Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, passim). It is the rock bottom of our understanding and it determines what is legitimate to ask for or to doubt. It is not questionable itself – any such attempt would hardly make any sense. Wittgenstein's opposition to Moore's conception of certainty elaborates the difference of their appeal to common sense. Wittgenstein's plea for this kind of conceptual consensus, one that I have here associated with an appeal to "common sense", refers to some *underlying norms of reasoning that are rooted in our form of life even if no-one notices them*. His analyses invite a common sense of a "second nature", an ideal or a guiding norm for philosophy.

Austin indeed seems to stand halfway between Moore and Wittgenstein. On the one hand, his appeal to language brings out the Wittgensteinian idea of an appeal to the norms of our understanding, while, on the other hand his constant plea to the plain man suggests that a typical speaker's responses can provide us with the criterion we seek for. A typical speaker's responses might be the very propositions Moore quotes.

Who, then, is this "plain man" that Austin puts so much confidence in? From his writings it seems that an ordinary or plain man is a competent English speaker *who is not a philosopher*.

Now, Austin goes to him with questions regarding very small and detailed distinctions of ordinary language: would we say "by mistake" or "by accident", "real" or "proper" carving knife" (etc). So, plain man is supposed to draw distinctions that not even a dictionary would make. Yet, even if a competent speaker has mastered the rules of language and relies on them in order to give the appropriate answer, it seems that those rules cannot always help when he is faced with such detailed distinctions- not in real life situations, anyway.

But, more importantly, these questions are related to philosophical problems and, therefore, the average speaker's answers are to provide us with the correct understanding on empirical knowledge, free will or the legitimacy of philosophical query in general. The ordinary man is faced with questions that do not normally arise in everyday life and which probably he has no interest in, not to mention a complete lack of intuitions to rely on. In fact, when confronted with such questions the ordinary man *turns into a philosopher*: he will have to take a theoretical stand. When we raise normative questions, there are no theory-free answers. Any kind of criterion is a theoretical criterion and our pre-theoretical presuppositions cannot be of any help.

Yet Austin's appeal to the linguistic responses of plain men raises an extra question as to whether these can provide us with an intercultural criterion. If we are to answer very detailed questions about the use of terms, and if these questions are supposed to determine our theses in philosophical matters, can we rely on our ordinary linguistic responses to provide us with common answers for any physical language? Surely not. Different languages employ different distinctions, many of which are very difficult to translate. Besides, physical language is not theory-free, as Wittgenstein implies, and may embody many alternative theses. Austin seems partly aware of this problem and suggests that any difference in usage is to be highlighted and studied (PP, p184). Yet, on the one hand, he implies that we are not to look for answers that can be applied to all problems, and on the other, suggests that his answers (concerning free will, for example) are global. (PP, pp. 175-204).

Wittgenstein's idea is different; the strong relation he draws between *language* and *form of life* and his appeal to the grammar of both, suggest a common ground for all human understanding. It is this that we are to elucidate: the underlying norms of our reasoning. It is an intercultural criterion that refers to the common ways language relates to our understanding. An analysis of language can then provide us with a clarified understanding on things.

But such a criterion requires further explanation. How can we identify grammar? When will we know we have uncovered it, rather than invented it?

Wittgenstein would suggest: whenever we succeed in eliminating philosophical problems:

"For the clarity we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that philosophical problems should *completely* disappear. The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to. - The one that gives philosophy in peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring *itself* to questions..." (PI, 133)

Wittgenstein is very explicit on this. Philosophical problems arise when language is "like an engine idling, not when it is going to work" (*PI*, 132). Our aim is to put language back to work, to uncover "one or another piece of plain nonsense and of the bumps that the understanding has got by running its head up the limits of language" (*PI*, 119). "Once we manage to do this on a topic, there will be no room for disagreement; everyone would agree" (*PI*, 128).

If I am right and Wittgenstein does appeal to some kind of common sense, this notion suggests a criterion that advocates a clear view of things, an enlightened understanding of our concepts. It is a *philosophical ideal* that Wittgenstein evokes and not some typical or average understanding. Of course, he doesn't say much about what this ideal consists of. The idea is rather that we always know when we reach it; when we do get to a clearer understanding of things in question. Wittgenstein suggests that there are, at any given time, certain norms rooted in our reasoning as humans and that a clarification of those rules is the only thing we can rely on in order to answer deep questions that concern us all. Shedding some light on those questions is the philosopher's demand.

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Against Their Own Intention: Problematic Consequences of Ontological Emergence

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1. The aims of Emergentism

Basically emergentism has a *naturalistic understanding* of reality: Everything that exists is constituted by basic material particles and is thus, at least in principle, accessible to natural sciences. In terms of taking the discoveries of natural sciences very seriously for epistemological and ontological claims, emergentism is sympathetic to physicalist positions. However, according to emergentism, a thoroughgoing reduction of reality from the complex to the less complex to the point of basic material particles is not possible. Even if complex systems are composed of basic material particles at a certain point of complexity, complex systems begin to exhibit new emergent properties which are neither reducible to nor explicable out from the basic particles composing that specific system. At this point emergentism departs from physicalistic positions with a strong reductionist smack: It denies that certain phenomena in the world must ultimately be explicable in terms of physical laws and facts. The so called 'hard problem of consciousness' consisting in the lack of any bridging theory for the explanatory gap between the physical and the mental world faces the emergentist with 'natural piety': It is not a hard problem because there is nothing to explain. Rather it is a brute fact of reality that has to be accepted as it is.

We could say that an attitude of natural piety is in the same breath a concession to common sense assumptions of reality: Certain phenomena in our world, though depending from the physical, are not ontologically reducible to it. The outstanding candidate of such a conception of emergent phenomena is our mental life. So far so good. At this point we can turn our attention to O'Connor et al's account of emergentism and the wider ontological framework they provide.

2. O'Connor et al.'s version of OE

We can characterise OE with the following theses:

- (1) Every entity in the world which has causal powers is constituted by simple particulars.
- (2) An emergent system must be able to "cause downward" if it is existent.
- (3) If a system is emergent, then it has some systemic, non-reductive properties, which are not owned by the constituting parts of the system.

OE, as far as presented here, is not a general ontology (cf. O'Connor/Jacobs 2003). (1)-(3) are (merely) ad-hoc-claims which need both (empirical) justification and (ontological) amendments. Thus, OE needs to be embedded into a general ontology which O'Connor et al find in trope ontology.

In Campbell's version of TO tropes are individual properties which are able to co-exist with other tropes at the same location. According to TO, what a person really is, is a *bundle of tropes*. But the basic version of TO is not able to catch the intuition that there are "enduring yet

changing" (O'Connor / Jacobs 2003, 551) objects. This will require a concept like (Aristotelian) substances, that is, the concept of an entity which exists ontologically independently, is the bearer of various properties, remains the same through time and is subject of (accidental) changes. A concept of tropes which takes over the job of Aristotelian substances as well has been developed by Simons (see Simons 1998). In Simons' nuclear theory kind of TO a bundle of co-located tropes, which are interdependent in their existence, serve as base of an enduring system. Other, so called 'accidentals'- tropes, are not part of the interdependent nucleus. What we call an accidental change is a change of existence of an accidental trope that is co-located with a nucleus bundle of tropes. Though O'Connor et al. are sympathetic towards this account, they do not adopt it. In their opinion, Simon's TO, if combined with OE, will result in substance dualism:

"In order to adhere consistently to the proffered analysis of individuality, one should say that the result would be an emergent individual if and only if a plurality of emergent tropes constitutes an enduring nucleus, one that will invariably be accompanied by more short-lived accidental emergent tropes. Suppose this to be so. Here it seems that we finally have the makings of a true substance dualism." (O'Connor / Jacobs 2003, 552)

Thus, the best interpretation of TO will be a "substance-attribute version" (O'Connor / Jacobs 2003, 550). This interpretation is similar to the ontology of immanent universals. In addition to the bundle of particular tropes there is a "holistic" trope of *thisness*. Thus, a human organism consists of a bunch of tropes plus a holistic trope guaranteeing "thisness" and endurance of a particular human organism. In combination with OE the substance-attribute version of TO behaves just like the ontology of immanent universals.¹

Since O'Connor et al. seem to favour TO, we will treat OE with TO as their standard general ontology. This ontology has the following features:

1. Every entity is constituted by material simples.
2. There are basic composite systems, consisted by the simples, which are "capable" to constitute the identity of an emergent individual "by a continuing manifestation of smoothly evolving emergent psychology bound up with an underlying flux of micro-level basic trope-bundles and temporary emergent tropes" (O'Connor / Jacobs 2003, 551-2).
3. The relation between constituent parts and the emergent individual is a causal one: The material simples, in virtue of being co-located with some tropes, *cause* an emergent property to exist.
4. The emergent individual, or substance, as O'Connor et al. call it, is the whole composite system with both the basic, low-level properties and the emergent,

¹ As far as we can see, the only difference between the favoured TO and the favoured ontology of immanent universals lies in their treatment of the individuality of an emergent substance. In TO the emergent substance gets its individuality out of the particularity of the tropes, while in the ontology of immanent universals the substance is an individual by its own.

high-level properties. Some of these properties are of special interest, because they determine the special substance-kind of the composite system.

5. The endurance of an emergent substance is based upon the basic underlying "maintenance" tropes; the individuality of an emergent substance is based upon particular (holistic) tropes; and the ability of the system to be causally effective in ways different than its parts is based on emergent properties, which are caused by other lower-levelled tropes.

3. A critique of this proposal

We welcome the overall project of O'Connor's et al.'s approaches, especially their scepticism towards introducing all too soon many emergent levels in reality (see e.g. Morowitz 2004 who states 28 levels of emergence) on the one hand and their defence of a robust realism of our mental life. Nevertheless, we believe, that these approaches are doomed to fail; at least some of their consequences are more than problematic.

3.1 O'Connor's endurantism:

Although according to Ockham's razor trope ontologies are 'elegant and simple' in the sense of getting along with only one kind of entity, O'Connor's et al.'s construal of human persons appears to be rather complicated: Apart from "maintenance tropes" which are the building blocks of reality in general, temporary emergent tropes guarantee for the existence of our mental life. It seems, however, that this is not enough for accounting for a person's particularity and unity. A third kind of tropes is needed, namely holistic tropes providing endurance for the trope-complex consisting of physical and mental properties. We can concede to emergentists that the mental-physical divide accounts for the scientific and the manifest image of ourselves and the divide must be accepted with natural piety. The introduction of holistic tropes as realisers of endurance, however, is a postulation which implies a stronger claim than O'Connor's et al.'s recent account can provide.

The problem of personal identity can be framed as follows: Why are A today (A_1) and A yesterday (A_2) the *same* person? Basically two answers can be given to this question. According to the simple view A_1 and A_2 is the same person *because* the notion of 'diachronic identity' is primitive and basic. For this reason we cannot *explain* diachronic identity but we need this notion to explain other things. According to the 'complex view' connections of some kind ('space-time-continuity', 'causal relation' etc.) between A_1 and A_2 account for a person's identity through time. In this case the identity of A is constructed out of a continuous series of 'time slices', A_1, A_2 etc. which perdures through time (see Quante 2002, 29-31).

O'Connor et al. are committed to the endurance theory. While TO *prima facie* is neutral to the endurance-perdurance debate, we think that – especially when connected with OE – TO *must* commit to the complex view and therefore to a perdurance theory. Otherwise TO is just a version of substance ontology in a new clothing with implausible premises.

For TO A_1 is a bundle of different tropes, say $(T_p, T_1, T_2 \dots T_n)$, while T_p is the *thisness*-trope (which has a family resemblance to the nuclear trope-bundle in Simon's TO). If one wants to commit to both, TO and the simple view, she must content that a trope is a three-dimensional entity, like

an Aristotelian substance. The concept of TO does allow for this. But difficulties arise when we want to combine all three theses: TO, OE and the simple view.

O'Connor et al. suggest that an emergent trope is caused to exist by lower-levelled tropes. Assuming that the person A_1 is the bundle $B_1 (= (T_p, T_e, T_1, T_2, T_3 \dots T_n))$, while T_e is a bundle of emergent mind-tropes which are caused to exist by T_p, T_1, T_2 and T_3 . Two different kinds of endurance can be imagined: First, T_e is itself capable for endurance, so the diachronic identity of A is *not* based on the diachronic identity of T_p , but on the diachronic identity of T_e . alone O'Connor et al. will scrap this version of OE for its dualistic character.

According to the second version, T_e is *not* enough to guarantee the diachronic identity of A_1 , so the diachronic identity of A is based upon the diachronic identity of T_p . This concept has some interesting consequences. The *thisness*-trope T_p is serving as the base for the "thinginess" and for diachronic identity of the bundles B_1 and B_2 . When we assume, that T_p is a basic and non-emergent trope², T_p is really the Aristotelian kind, to which B_1 and B_2 belong to. This concept comes very close to the Aristotelian Kind-essentialism, which O'Connor et al. reject. So T_p cannot be a basic, non-emergent trope.

Let us assume that T_p is itself an emergent trope, caused to exist by the tropes, say, T_4 and T_5 , both of them truly basic tropes. The same problem, which we encounter while treating the relation between T_e and T_p , arises again. We will get a substance dualism, if T_p can exist independently. So we conclude that T_p in order to be the same trope over time must depend on T_4 and T_5 .

By doing so, we have successfully *reduced* diachronic identity of T_p to the diachronic identity of T_4 and T_5 . If we admit that the diachronic identities of T_4 and T_5 are not simple, but consist in some causal relation, this version of diachronic identity will be a complex, but not a simple one. If we assume that the diachronic identities of T_4 and T_5 are simple, we will still have the problem that the ontological constitution of T_e is not non-structural in the sense of O'Connor et al., but it consists, at least partly, in T_4 and T_5 . This contradicts with the version of OE as proposed by O'Connor et al. Thus, it seems that it remains an unsolved problem how diachronic identity shall be provided by TO.

3.2 O'Connor's understanding of living beings

As already mentioned before, the status of thisness-tropes is rather unclear. It seems that only emergent individuals have one. The only emergent individuals O'Connor et al. are explicitly committed are human persons:

"Biological life, so poorly understood in the early twentieth century, was the favorite target of earlier emergentists. Now, of course, the epistemic situation is dramatically different. With the chemical basis of life being further charted with each passing year, there is no positive reason for us to suppose that emergent factors are essentially involved" (O'Connor & Wong 2005, 674).

Such a view of emergence taken together with the ontological position that complex objects lacking emergent features (which according to O'Connor et al. living beings most likely do) are "no more objectively there than an arbitrary scattered object that one might choose to name"

² We assume that this is not a welcome option for TO, since with this concept many unanswered questions arise, e.g. the question where such a thisness-trope comes from at a certain point.

(O'Connor / Jacobs 2003, 550) leads to the conclusion that the only composite beings in a robust sense are human beings. Systems lacking emergent features, "however much they may appear to be unified to the uneducated eye, are individual objects only by a courtesy born of practical concerns." (O'Connor / Jacobs 2003, 547)

In this concept the only real composite entities in a world of loose mereological sums of particulars would be human persons. Such a view would exceed van Inwagen's argument that the only existing material beings are either living organisms or simples, because according to O'Connor et al. ultimately only human beings and simples exist. Apart from the fact that such a view has an extreme revisionary character it seems to contradict to biological facts as well. There are good reasons to distinguish between living beings and "arbitrary scattered objects". In terms of their inner structure and composition even though actions and reactions of living beings might to a large extent be understood as results of given microscopic processes and external conditions. O'Connor et al. show sympathy for such a disintegrating view of those living beings without emergent features. This could be the result of an overestimation of the explanatory force of reductionism plus a misconception of living being's metabolism and boundaries. O'Connor et al. are not explicit of whether processes are part of their trope ontology but certain formulations suggest they have processes in mind when talking about interactions among tropes. If living beings are just bundles of tropes interacting on a micro-level and thereby "producing" for the uneducated eye the illusion of substantial unities, so O'Connor's et al.'s view comes very close to Zimmermann's equation of living beings with processes like tornados and waves: "(...) upon careful thought, the similarities between the activity of certain self-perpetuating events like tornados and hurricanes, on the one hand, and the 'homeodynamic' processes involved in biological life, on the other, might make us reconsider a facile dismissal of this (...) suggestions." (Zimmermann 1995, 91)

In this case living organisms are understood as mere processes. Even if it might be right to see an analogy in the persistence of a tornado and in the persistence of an organism since in both cases the persistence is based on a constant exchange of particles, the entity which persists is in each case a different one: The form of a tornado is merely the sum of all micro-particles constituting it. Due to the sum of these micro-particles and their interactions the tornado might appear as a persisting object with determinate boundaries. The boundaries of a tornado, however, are nothing else than the boundaries of the sum of the tornado's micro-particles. In the case of living beings, instead, metabolism and metabolic transfer take place through an already existing boundary of the organism's body. A distinction between an organism's body and metabolic processes has to be held up for an adequate understanding of this facet of reality. We do not want to dwell longer at this point but it seems to be indispensable to interpret living beings as ontologically different from mere compounds of micro-particles.

For O'Connor et al. it might be quite difficult to bring "biological unities" back into the picture once the decision was made that the world's main ontological category are simples. Then one has the task to bring biological organisms and human beings back to the fore. If one, as O'Connor et al. are, is reluctant to postulate a variety of emergent levels, then the "dual" solution of simples and emergent human individuals seems to be the only viable way. Dualism within human beings might be avoided by

this approach but another form of dualism lurks: A dualism between human beings and the rest of the world. As true individuals we are desperately alone among an indefinable sea of particles. All the other things we assume there are with our common sense are just pragmatic posits out from these masses of simples because of contingent human interests and purposes.

4. Substance-Based Ontology as an Alternative

It might be asked whether with an alternative substance-based ontology it is not possible to achieve what O'Connor et al want to have but for a lower price. The substance-based ontology we have in mind belongs to the strand of Aristotelian hylemorphism (AH). According to AH only three-dimensional substances endure; they are thought to be ontological *primitive*, and therefore the building blocks of reality. Other entities like events and properties can only exist in virtue of the existence of substances. While each substance belongs to a certain natural kind, the kind itself does not exist separately from substances. In a nutshell, substances are bearers of accidental properties, and changes are interpreted as coming and going of accidental properties. Substances can have parts. But parts of a substance are ontologically subordinated to them. Since a substance is thought to be genuine three-dimensional, its diachronic identity is truly simple and cannot be reduced. (Cf. Lowe (1998), 121-125)

What is the status of OE within such an ontology? Can we combine a substance-based ontology with OE? The answer is "yes and no". Since in hylemorphism basic existent entities are substances, there is no need for emergence theory to explain how special emergent property arise out of parts which do not have these properties. Since there will be *no* emergent properties, but only properties of substances, we do not need OE anymore. Emergentism can still be useful to hylemorphism, though. If an arbitrary system expresses no emergent behaviour, than it is not a substance; if this system has an emergent feature, then it should be called substance, but not its parts. If this combination of substance-based ontology with emergentism is sound, emergence theory will be merely an epistemic help for AH, but not an ontological position anymore.

But how should we solve the mind-body-problem? We cannot discuss the full solution of the mind-body-problem within the substance-based ontology; only some hints should be given here to draft an answer. In AH "having mind" is a special property which can be obtained by human beings, and perhaps higher primates. Since the kind of properties a substance can instantiate depends on the substance-kind, and since every actual property is the realisation of dispositional properties, also the property "having mind" should be regarded as a disposition of human beings. We remain neutral on whether this property is accidental or essential. But in this concept 'having mind' is just another property of a human substance, but not itself a substance. Thus, substance dualism is avoided.

5. Conclusion

It seems that O'Connor et al.'s OE, despite its prima facie potentiality to harmonise everyday intuitions with scientific findings, still presents itself as a revisionary concept with strong revisionary elements. We have presented a draft on how emergentism and AH can be harmonised. The bad news for emergentism is that its strong version-ontological

emergentism- is not needed anymore. The good news is that the concept of emergentism is still useful as an epistemic help to distinguish substances from "scattered objects".

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Recognising Beauty : On The Intercultural Dialogue In Philosophy

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1. "The Bluest Eye"

In her novel, *The Bluest Eye*, Toni Morrison gives us a story of two young black girls growing up in 1960s white America, and who begin to discover that beauty can only have blue eyes and blonde hair. One of the girls is Claudia MacTeer, the narrator, who tells us:

It had begun with Christmas and the gift of dolls. The big, the special, the loving gift was always a big, blue-eyed Baby Doll. From the clucking sounds of adults I knew that the doll represented what they thought was my fondest wish ... I had only one desire: to dismember it. To see of what it was made, to discover the dearness, to find the beauty, the desirability that had escaped me, but apparently only me. Adults, older girls, shops, magazines, newspapers, window signs – all the world had agreed that a blue-eyed, yellow-haired, pink-skinned doll was what every girl child treasured. (Morrison 1970: 13-14)

Claudia responds to this culture in two ways: she insistently refuses to acknowledge the beauty of white girls, of white people, and she becomes enraged that white and black people refuse to acknowledge her beauty.

In contrast to Claudia, there is Pecola Breedlove, a more timid and perennially damaged character. Like Claudia, Pecola is not thought of as a candidate for beauty because of her blackness; unlike Claudia, Pecola concurs with this judgement, and regards herself as ugly and as someone who deserves the rejection and ignominy she encounters. This failure to recognise her own beauty takes its most disturbing form when she makes a visit to the local holy man to ask for a strange and desperate miracle:

"I can't go to school no more. And I thought maybe you could help me."

"Help you how? Tell me. Don't be frightened."

"My eyes."

"What about your eyes?"

"I want them blue."

... He thought it was at once the most fantastic and the most logical petition he had ever received. Here was an ugly little girl asking for beauty ... Of all the wishes people had brought him – money, love, revenge – this seemed to him the most poignant and the one most deserving of fulfilment. A little black girl who wanted to rise up out of the pit of her blackness and see the world with blue eyes. (Morrison 1970: 138)

Claudia and Pecola represent two different strategies of self-definition in response to a marginalisation. Claudia retains her self-belief but thinks this must be accompanied by antagonism and hostility; Pecola surrenders her self-belief and chooses abnegation and self-effacement in order to be accepted and valued. Following Honneth, I argue that this dynamic is an example of the struggle for recognition and for recognition's attendant self-respect, self-esteem, and love (Honneth 1995); this sort of recognition is, as Taylor rightly points out, a vital human need and so withholding it is a form of oppression (Taylor 1991: 43-53). But what I think

Toni Morrison shows us, in addition, is that this dynamic results in a loss of beauty; Morrison takes this dynamic out of the sphere of justice – a sphere where we may have become jaded or fatigued or may simply be defensive or complacent – and rediscovers its power to appal by locating it in the aesthetic imagination.

I want to do the same for intercultural philosophy, and I read *The Bluest Eye* as a parable for the situation of intercultural philosophy and the prospects for an intercultural dialogue. Before there can be an intercultural dialogue in philosophy, there must be different philosophical cultures in a relationship of mutual recognition. I argue that many philosophical cultures are experiencing a profound and persistent lack of recognition, and this is causing a steady loss of beauty, a bleeding of loveliness, from philosophy as a whole.

It is evident that the dominant culture in philosophy – the Shirley Temple so hated by Claudia and so revered by Pecola – is the academic analytic philosophy that has its origin in Athens 500BC and is most widely practised in universities in Europe, North America, and Australasia. Consequently, different or alternative philosophical cultures to this have been set up in a relation of "the Other". One important group of other philosophies that consistently have recognition withheld from them are the philosophies that originate from different ethnic or historical traditions, philosophies that do not have the peculiar honour of being a footnote to Plato. In this group I count non-Western philosophies such as African philosophy, Arabic philosophy, Chinese philosophy, Jewish philosophy, South Asian philosophy, and South American philosophy, as well as the philosophical practices of communities that were marginalised or otherwise abused in the days during and after the West's empire-building and colonial eras. For evidence of this lack of recognition, I offer the comparative meagreness of scholarship in these areas, easily less than 10% of philosophical output; moreover, of this scholarship, a distressing amount takes the form of papers with titles like "Is there such a thing as Chinese philosophy?" or "Does African philosophy exist?".

But philosophy's spectrum of beauty is not merely a collection of ethnically-sourced variations; a culture of philosophy is any school or tradition of philosophy that brings to the activity a distinctive perspective, or set of concepts or concerns, or maybe a different vocabulary or practice to help deal with the objects of philosophy. With this notion of "culture" it is clear that the map of philosophical cultures offering us different sorts of beauty can be drawn in a number of ways, with some cultures overlapping with and supervening on each other; I shall say more about this interrelation of cultures later. For now, I am particularly interested in the status of feminism, and of Continental philosophy.

Both feminism and Continental philosophy are distinct philosophical cultures that share part of their history with the dominant analytic culture of philosophy; yet the intercultural dialogue between them and analytic philosophy has been, at best, erratic. Feminism is recognised within political philosophy, but in epistemology and philosophy of language, for example, its contributions rarely form part of the conversation; that is to say, its contributions in many aspects of philosophy are largely

unrecognised. Continental philosophy has received more attention but has been similarly sectioned off; a typical undergraduate course on metaphysics will include Lewis but not Heidegger, say, implying that Continental philosophy is not *relevant* to the aims of analytic philosophy, and so undeserving of a particular recognition. Thus the exclusion of non-Western philosophy is different only in scale, but not in kind, to the exclusion of other philosophical cultures that possess an alternative beauty to the prevalent aesthetic of analytic philosophy.

2. The loss of beauty

In a climate like this, I argue that we must be deeply sceptical about the possibility of an intercultural dialogue; if cultures are not first in a relation of mutual recognition, then I fail to see how genuine dialogue can take place. It might be argued that intercultural dialogue is intended to *bring about* recognition, but I think this mistakes the proper order of events, and risks conferring the status of "dialogue" on any assortment of monologues and diatribes. The pragmatic theories of language tell us that successful conversation requires participants to assume certain equivalencies between them: what sort of dialogue can occur if the interlocutors are not beginning with the premise of equality? At worst there will simply be a reiteration of prejudices, at best the slow disclosure of pernicious but dearly-held preconceptions. I identify three ways in which the absence of mutual recognition between cultures has resulted in an artificial and unconstructive "dialogue".

In *The Bluest Eye*, we see that Claudia is so preoccupied with defying the standard paradigm of beauty, and so preoccupied with asserting her own beauty, that she consistently fails to recognise the beauty of other marginalised girls; Claudia even fails to acknowledge the beauty of her friend Pecola, another black girl, who is tragically convinced of her own ugliness. In being deprived of recognition, Claudia loses the ability to recognise others. Similarly, we can see a disappointing lack of dialogue *between* philosophy's "marginal" cultures precisely because, I suggest, the cultures are still *individually* struggling to achieve recognition. If there are comparatively few scholars working on African philosophy or feminist epistemology, then there are even fewer who are applying African philosophy to feminist epistemology and vice versa; their beauty is lost to each other. For "intercultural dialogue" to be a real phenomenon, cultures should have equal recognition and the dialogue must be between *all* and *any* cultures within philosophy.

The second way in which a lack of mutual recognition can result in an intercultural dialogue where beauty is lost is if a culture's beauty is exaggerated or misrepresented in order to justify the dialogue. Nussbaum calls the former "romanticism" (Nussbaum 1997: 123-126) and Said calls the latter "Orientalism" (Said 1978). The danger with romanticism is that by exaggerating another's beauty, one is failing to see what is really there and so one is self-deluded; moreover, in over-stating another's beauty, one can very easily be suppressing or refusing to acknowledge one's own. Nussbaum uses as an example those Western scholars who eagerly and extravagantly praise "the East" for its spiritual culture and in doing so usually fail to discern the equivalent spirituality of the West. Here the motive is almost as much a misguided rejection of the West as it is a misguided interest in the East. Consequently, dialogue between the cultures is warped because the participants are surrounded through

obscuring veils of prejudice. Said gives us another view of how misguided scholarship can hinder genuine intercultural dialogue: writing on the perception and portrayal of the Middle East in Western scholarship, Said describes a certain predilection to equate "the Orient" with its history – usually its glamorous antiquity – and to simply ignore or dismiss its contemporary manifestations. So "Chinese Philosophy" becomes Confucius and not modern Chinese neo-Marxism; "South American Philosophy" becomes the astrology of the Incas and not recent Latin American political thought. I argue that this insistence on a historical conception of a culture is another way of refusing to see the culture's beauty for what it is. Consequently, any "intercultural dialogue" in philosophy that treats one interlocutor as living and dynamic and the other as an exhumed and wonderfully-arrayed corpse must involve, I suggest, a loss of beauty, an inability to recognise the other's present beauty.

The third way in which a lack of mutual recognition can result in an intercultural dialogue where beauty is lost is if the aim of the dialogue is to obtain or confer recognition on the basis that the "weaker" culture gives up some of its differences so that its beauty is less alien, so that it can join the dominant language-game. In "The Bluest Eye", this is the strategy Pecola chooses, trying, as best she can, to surrender or abandon her blackness so that she can be deemed more valuable. The problem with this strategy is that it is ultimately an act of self-loathing, a reiteration of an injustice, a violation and not just a dismissal of beauty. Morrison writes:

A little black girl yearns for the blue eyes of a little white girl, and the horror at the heart of her yearning is exceeded only by the evil of fulfilment. (Morrison 1970: 162)

Morrison illustrates this "evil of fulfilment" with the character of Geraldine, a black woman who has already made the decision Pecola makes and who has successfully transformed her beauty, as best she can, to resemble the white paradigm of beauty. Geraldine explains to her son, who is Pecola's age, that there is a difference between "coloured people" and "niggers", and that "he belonged to the former group: he wore white shirts and blue trousers; his hair was cut as close to his scalp as possible to avoid any suggestion of wool, the parting was etched into his hair by the barber ... The line between coloured and nigger was not always clear; subtle and telltale signs threatened to erode it, and the watch had to be constant." (Morrison 1970: 67-68). Geraldine has won a sort of recognition from white people by emulating them and distancing herself from other black people. Consequently, Geraldine treats Pecola with a honed and ardent contempt that is far worse, far more hateful, than the indifference Pecola encounters from white people. Because the recognition that Geraldine has won was not predicated on equality, or on a recognition of her own beauty, she has to reconcile herself with this loss by refusing, passionately, to acknowledge a similar beauty in other black people. In terms of the intercultural dialogue in philosophy, we can see a similar loss of beauty occurring when scholars from a marginalised culture achieve wider recognition by themselves marginalising, partially or totally, their original culture. Most non-Western universities predominantly teach courses in Western philosophy – very often neglecting their own tradition of philosophy as they do so; many women philosophers do not allow feminist scholarship to influence the non-political philosophy that they do. A marvellous richness of beauty is seeping away as talented philosophers choose to make themselves more

conventionally attractive instead of celebrating or propagating the beauty already available to them.

What should be obvious – and what is obvious in Morrison's novel – is that this is as much a story about money and power as it is about preconceptions and paradigms of beauty. For example, the celebrated migration of intellectuals to the West – the "brain drain" to wealthier, more politically stable countries – is not a philosophical problem per se but a problem that also afflicts philosophy. But even if we, as philosophers, cannot prevent the large-scale inequities and pressures, we can choose to avoid complicity with these inequalities in our own sphere of activity, and we can still act to prevent the particular loss of particular philosophical beauties.

3. Intra-cultural philosophy

So far I have discussed what the intercultural dialogue in philosophy cannot or should not be. I would now like to comment, briefly, on what a good intercultural dialogue, where diverse manifestations of beauty are admired and created, might look like.

The first suggestion is that we teach, and allude to, philosophy's different cultures in tandem and not in parallel; for example an undergraduate course or an academic research paper in ethics should be just as likely to draw on work by Kant or MacKinnon or Gyekye or Levinas. Honneth has argued that a condition for recognition is that one contributes to a community's goal: it is important that marginalised philosophical cultures are given an opportunity to contribute to philosophy's goal, and just as important that this contribution is recognised with contributions from other sources.

The second suggestion is that we must accept that cultures may be incommensurable – that in addition to offering different answers to the same question, different contributions to the same goals, they may in fact be answering different questions, a startling family-resemblance series of questions. Rather than just selecting the aspects of another culture that are useful to the particular question our dominant culture has chosen, we must instead be willing to face the wider meta-philosophical context and reconsider our sense of what philosophy's questions and goals might rightly be.

I suspect that these suggestions will have the effect of creating, more than anything else, an *intra-cultural* dialogue. Rather than being a series of isolated and discrete cultures, philosophy will encompass conflicting or even incommensurable intellectual positions, layers of debate and discussion, a free and consistently surprising intermingling of ideas and arguments; in short, there will be a *single* philosophical culture characterised only by its richness and flexibility. Surely this is a goal desirable to all of philosophy's sub-cultures? I believe it is, and I believe that proof of its manifestation will be when we no longer need to use the phrase "intercultural dialogue".

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Trendwende in der Evolution? Nicht gestellte Fragen in unserem relativistischen Zeitalter.

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Wir können unser Zeitalter als „relativistisch“ bezeichnen. Der Relativismus wurde durch die Errungenschaften des frühen 20. Jahrhundert bestärkt, Errungenschaften, die wie die Quantentheorie und die Relativitätstheorie weit über die Grenzen des mesokosmischen Bereiches (Vollmer 1983) hinausgehen. Aber gerade der mesokosmische Bereich ist der Bereich, in dem wir leben und bestehen müssen, für den unsere Sinne ausgelegt sind. Unsere Untersuchungen beziehen sich nur auf diesen Bereich, nicht auf die unserer direkten Erfahrung entzogene mikrokosmische Welt (Quantentheorie) oder auf die makrokosmische Welt (Relativitätstheorie).-

Zunächst eine eigene Erfahrung: Je länger der 2. Weltkrieg dauerte, umso mehr fanden sich kleine Gruppen zusammen, die den Faschismus ablehnten. Wir schimpften gegen den „Führer“, der aus dem Debakel Napoleons nichts gelernt hatte, auf die Heeresleitung, die uns erst im März mit Winterkleidung versorgte oder auf unsere direkten Vorgesetzten.

Erst etwa 50 Jahre später fiel mir auf, dass wir die wichtigste Frage ausgelassen hatten: Was hatten wir überhaupt in Russland zu suchen?

Selbst große Philosophen, die wir verehren, haben solche nahe liegenden Fragen oft nicht gestellt. Wir wollen hier auf solche Denker eingehen, die zum heutigen Relativismus beigetragen haben.

1. David Hume (1711 – 1755)

Hume war ein großer Aufklärer, aber auch das erste wichtige Glied in der Kette, die zum heutigen Relativismus geführt hat. In seiner Zeit standen die Menschen noch unter dem mächtigen Einfluss der Pioniere der modernen Wissenschaft: Kopernikus, Galilei, Francis Bacon, Kepler und Newton. Hume nahm die Aufgabe des Philosophen wahr, nämlich, den Naturwissenschaftlern auf die Finger zu schauen. Er bestritt, dass die Beobachtung regelmäßiger Abläufe Schlüsse auf die zukünftigen Abläufe oder das Aufstellen eines Naturgesetzes erlaube. Als reiner Phänomenalist, lehnte er auch Kausalitätsbehauptungen ab. Wir können nur ein „Post hoc“, niemals aber ein „Propter hoc“ erkennen. Die nicht gestellte Frage lautet aber: Wenn ein Mensch geköpft wird (damals und auch später leider ein häufiger Brauch), stirbt er nur post hoc, rein zufällig, oder doch, weil lebenswichtige Vorgänge von denen man damals schon einige kannte, (Harvey hatte die Gesetze des Blutkreislaufes bereits 1628 aufgestellt), unterbunden werden. Ein weniger blutrünstiges Beispiel: Der klassische Uhrenvergleich. Wenn wir zwei annähernd gleichlaufende Uhren so einstellen, dass die eine Uhr die Zeit fünf Minuten nach der anderen angibt, so liegt bei dem Nachlaufen nur ein Post hoc, kein Propter hoc vor. Es genügt aber zum Nachweis einer Kausalität eine einzelne federbetriebene Uhr, die dann nicht geht, wenn sie niemand aufzieht. Und kocht das Teewasser nicht, weil es auf einen Herd gestellt wurde?

Hume hat diese Fragen nicht gestellt. Vielfach ist seine Skepsis berechtigt, es gibt aber einen sich mit dem

Fortschritt der Wissenschaften ausdehnenden Kausalitätsbegriff, nämlich dann, wenn zu einer dauernd homogenen Beobachtung noch darüber stehende Naturgesetze kommen, Gesetze, die sich im Mikrokosmos ebenso wie im Makrokosmos bewährt haben. Das sind, am Beispiel der Uhr oder des Teewassers, die Erhaltungssätze und am Beispiel des Köpfens, Gesetze, die das Leben aller höherer Lebewesen, einschließlich des Menschen bestimmen und die zum Teil auch Hume bekannt waren und in der Folgezeit ausgebaut wurden.

Wir können Hume als Vater des bis in unsere Zeit reichenden Relativismus ansehen.

2. Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804)

Aus mehreren Gründen ist Kant verehrungswürdig. Seine kosmologischen Untersuchungen waren damals bahnbrechend. Er war der bedeutendste Aufklärer im deutschen Sprachraum, ein Verfechter der Menschenrechte und sein Werk „Zum ewigen Frieden“ (1795) kann als eine Vision gelten, die heute noch aktuell, ja zukunftsweisend ist. Was hier kritisiert werden soll, ist die „Kopernikanische Wendung“. Kopernikus hatte ursprünglich den Menschen an die Peripherie des Sonnensystems gesetzt. Kant gibt dem Menschen seine zentrale Rolle wieder:

„Wir haben also sagen wollen, dass alle unsere Anschauung nichts als die Vorstellung von Erscheinung sei; dass die Dinge, die wir anschauen, nicht das an sich selbst sind, wofür wir sie anschauen, noch ihre Verhältnisse so an sich selbst beschaffen sind, als sie uns erscheinen, und dass, wenn wir unser Subjekt oder auch nur die subjektive Beschaffenheit der Sinne überhaupt aufheben, alle die Beschaffenheit und , alle Verhältnisse der Objekte in Raum und Zeit, ja selbst Raum und Zeit verschwinden würden, und als Erscheinung nicht an sich selbst, sondern nur in uns existieren können. ...“

Hier erheben sich einige Fragen: Nehmen wir an, wir benötigen eine neue Schublade für unseren Schrank. Wir können den freistehenden Raum, nach Höhe, Breite und Tiefe ausmessen und der Tischler würde auf Grund der Maße eine passende Schublade herstellen. Kann etwas, das wir messen können, nur subjektiv sein? Konnte vor der Entstehung des Menschen und der Tiere weder Raum, noch Zeit objektiv vorhanden sein? Wusste Kant nicht auf Grund seiner kosmologischen Untersuchungen, dass das Ganze in riesigen Räumen und in Millionen Jahre dauernden Zeitspannen ablief?

Vielleicht war damals nicht bekannt, dass Menschen mehrere Mittel zur Schätzung von Entfernungen gegeben sind: Die Linsenkrümmung, das binokulare Sehen, die Perspektive etc. Die Entfernungsschätzung ermöglicht aber auch eine Raumwahrnehmung. Außerdem gibt es für den Satz: „Alle materiellen Dinge nehmen einen Raum ein“ keine gesicherten Ausnahmen!

Kant nimmt das Bestehen von Dingen an sich an, auch wenn wir von ihnen nichts wissen können.

Wissen wir vom Ding an sich wirklich nichts? Nehmen wir eine rote Tomate. An ihrer Oberfläche werden die meisten Farben des weißen Lichtes absorbiert, nur was uns rot erscheint, wird reflektiert. Wir wissen aber von der Tomate mehr: Wir kennen ihre Form, ihren Geruch und Geschmack. Wissenschaftler können für die Tomate spezifische Proteine erkennen und ihr Genom analysieren. Auch wenn uns viele andere Eigenschaften unbekannt sind, vielleicht auch unerkannt bleiben, die rote Farbe, die Form etc. sind Eigenschaften der *Tomate an sich*.

3. Die Deutschen Idealisten

gingen aber noch weiter als Kant. Das unerkennbare Ding an sich war für sie ein „hölzernes Eisen“, sie leugneten das Ding an sich vollkommen und sahen die Welt als Produkt unseres Geistes an. Das war eine willkürliche Setzung, die viele weitere willkürliche Setzungen nach sich zog: Nationalismus, vielleicht auch als Folge der Napoleonischen Kriege, Glaubensfanatismus, Rassismus auf der einen Seite, Marxismus und Kommunismus auf der anderen. Die deletären Folgen dieser Einseitigkeiten sind bekannt, wir könnten sie als Geißel der Menschheit ansehen.

Die nicht gestellten Fragen: Warum soll ein Mensch anderer Nationalität, anderer Muttersprache, anderer Hautfarbe oder anderer Religion weniger wert sein, als die Mitglieder der Gruppe, der ich (oft nur zufällig) angehöre? Ist es sinnvoll, für diese Gruppe unser Leben einzusetzen oder gruppenfremdes Leben zu vernichten? Ist ein Staat berechtigt, Gruppen, die geschlossene Gebiete bewohnen und die einen eigenen Staat bilden wollen, mit Gewalt an der Selbständigkeit zu hindern, statt mit ihnen auf höherer, überstaatlicher Ebene zu kooperieren?

Die Irrationalität des Gruppenfanatismus und seiner Folgen hat zu dem heutigen Relativismus beigetragen, der darin besteht, schlechthin die Möglichkeit einer vernünftigen Erkenntnis zu bezweifeln. Wahrheit war bei den Pragmatisten, „was gut für den Menschen ist“ Ein Höhepunkt war aber die Erklärung R. Rotys, dass man die Erkenntnislehre aufgeben solle, ähnlich wie im 16. Jahrhundert die Scholastik aufgegeben wurde. Aber selbst die sonst sehr rationalen Positivisten standen unter dem gewaltigen Einfluss Humes und der heute wieder propagierte Konstruktivismus beruft sich auf das für uns unerkennbare „Ding an sich“. Paradoxe Weise werden diese Zweifel durch die

Fortschritte der Physik im mikrokosmischen und makrokosmischen Bereich noch genährt. Zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts war die Humesche Skepsis unter Philosophen und Naturwissenschaftlern weit verbreitet. Diese Skepsis erhielt einen Auftrieb durch die Befunde von Physikern, wonach im Bereich der atomaren und subatomaren Dimension die Kausalität aufgehoben schien. Besonders trugen die Doppelspalt-Experimente zu dieser Auffassung bei. In der heutigen Physik kommen die „spukhaften“ Fernwirkungen hinzu. Die Humeaner und Relativisten frohlockten: Das Fehlen der Kausalität schien sie zu bestätigen. B. Russell schrieb damals (1914) noch:

„I wish ... to maintain that the word 'cause' is so inextricably bound up with misleading associations as to make its complete extrusion from the philosophical vocabulary desirable.“ Und „The law of causality, I believe, ... is a relic of bygone age, surviving like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm.“

Die nicht gestellte Frage lautete: Wären wir bei allen Schwierigkeiten der Beobachtung überhaupt fähig im Quantenbereich Kausalität zu erkennen, wenn sie wirklich bestünde?

Die Fortschritte in der Quantenphysik bewirkten, dass es um die Akausalität ruhiger wurde. Man erkannte, dass im Quantenbereich neben allgemeinen Sätzen (Erhaltungsregeln) eigene Gesetze herrschen, die streng eingehalten werden. Dazu gehören u.a. das Ausschließungsprinzip, das „Entanglement“, die konstanten Halbwertszeiten der Isotope und die Einstein noch als „spukhaft“ erscheinende Fernwirkung.

Ähnlich verhält es sich im makrokosmischen Bereich. Die Relativitätstheorien beziehen sich auf große Massen und auf Geschwindigkeiten, nahe der Lichtgeschwindigkeit. In unserer mesokosmischen Dimension können wir weiterhin mit der Newtonschen Physik arbeiten. Daraus ergeben sich ernste Verantwortung und gewaltige Aufgaben.

Der heute vorherrschende Relativismus hat dazu geführt, diese Verantwortung nicht voll zu erkennen. „Wenn ich nichts sicher erkennen kann, dann sind auch die Gefahren für das Überleben unsicher“. Hier ist zu bedenken, dass auch unsicher erkennbare Gefahren immer noch Gefahren sind und dass alles getan werden muss, um auch nur möglichen Gefahren vorzubeugen, wenn es um das Überleben der Menschheit geht.

4. Trendwende in der Evolution?

Naturwissenschaftler setzen Fitness mit der Fähigkeit der Fortpflanzung gleich (Mahner und Bunge, 1999, S. 323 ff), diese hängt wieder mit der Adaptedness, dem Angepasstsein zusammen: *„An Organism's (degree of) adaptedness (co)determines its (degree of) reproductive capacity or Fitness. More precisely, the greater an organism's (degrees) of adaptedness, the greater its (degree of) reproductive capacity or fitness.“*

Stimmt das mit der heutigen Situation der Menschheit überein? Zweifellos ist die Fitness groß, wie sieht das aber mit der Adaptedness aus? Wenn wir unter Adaptedness unsere Fähigkeit der Naturbeherrschung sehen (z.B. Hygiene), ist zweifellos ein Teil der Fitness mit der Adaptedness verbunden. Andererseits: Je höher die Adaptedness in Industrie und Technik, um so geringer die nach der Zahl der Nachkommen gemessene Fitness. Das weist schon darauf hin, dass bei dem heutigen Menschen keine Koppelung mehr besteht. Nun könnte man Fitness auch als Fähigkeit des Überlebens der Art auffassen. Und hier muss man feststellen, dass die Adaptedness als Fähigkeit der Naturbeherrschung gemeint, geradezu deletäre Folgen für das Überleben der Art nach sich zieht. Wir können als Menschheit nur überleben, wenn es uns gelingt, unsere Fitness zu reduzieren. Unsere „Adaptedness“ muss global orientiert sein, und hier liegt der Unterschied zum konventionellen Darwinismus. Unser Verstand hat sich durch Mutation und Selektion entwickelt. Damit haben wir uns die Erde untertan gemacht, gleichzeitig aber unser Überleben in einer lebenswerten Umwelt hochgradig gefährdet. Wenn wir uns hier nur auf die Selektion verlassen, würde das unseren Untergang bedeuten.

5. Wir stellen zu wenige Fragen.

Hier einiger Beispiele:

Die Weltbevölkerung nimmt pro Jahr etwa um 80 Millionen zu.. Schränkt nicht jeder zusätzliche Mensch, der Wohnung, Strassen, Schulen etc. braucht, ein wenig von der für uns lebenswichtige Natur ein?

Werden nicht in den so genannten Entwicklungsländern die Menschen immer ärmer, sind sie wegen unzureichender Bildung nicht Diktaturen ausgesetzt, besteht in den „Entwickelten Ländern“ nicht immer die Gefahr des Populismus? Ergibt sich aus diesen Gefahren nicht die Gefahr von Kriegen?

Verhindern nicht nationale, ethnische, rassistische oder religiöse Ideologien eine weltweite Kooperation?

Wenn eine Volkswirtschaft nur bei ständigem Wachstum florieren kann, geht das nicht auf den Umweltschutz, hält die Erde dieses ständige Wachstum aus? Sägen wir nicht an dem Ast, auf dem wir sitzen?

Müssen wir nicht annehmen, dass Fabriken, Flugzeuge, Autos und private Haushalte mit ihrem Bedarf an fossilen Energien zu Luftverschmutzung, Umweltzerstörung und Klimaveränderung beitragen und dass dieser Prozess bei „Entwicklung“ großer Länder, wie China oder Indien, ein gewaltiges Ausmaß annehmen wird?

Die Liste der nicht gestellten Fragen lässt sich noch wesentlich ausdehnen. Wir wollen hier eine letzte, aber wesentliche Frage stellen: Wenn wir weltweite Katastrophen verhindern wollen, müssen wir da nicht unsere geistige Evolution selbst in die Hand nehmen, um die uns beherrschenden Atavismen wie Tribalismus, religiösen Fanatismus und falsches Heldentum zu überwinden? Wir können und wollen unser Genom nicht ändern, wir können aber mit einfachen Mitteln diese Atavismen bekämpfen.

6. Antiideologische Erziehung

Antiideologische Erziehung ist ethisches Gebot und sollte als Ergänzung der philosophischen Erziehung einen bevorzugten Platz unter den Lernzielen einnehmen.- Im Folgenden hierzu einige Anregungen, die die Erziehung betreffen und ohne große Anstrengungen umgesetzt werden können.

Fünf Fragen (für die Unterstufe). So wie verschiedene Anstandsregeln (Tischmanieren, Sauberkeit, Höflichkeit) durch Erziehung gelernt und internalisiert werden, sollten die Kinder dazu angehalten werden, immer wenn man sie von etwas überzeugen will, fünf Fragen zu stellen:

- (1) *Gibt es vernünftige Menschen, die anderer Meinung sind?* Beispiel: Kommunismus und Nationalsozialismus waren nur in bestimmten Gebieten der Erde anerkannt.
- (2) Reichen die mir zugänglichen Informationen aus, Stellung zu nehmen? Die Schüler lernen zwischen Fragen zu unterscheiden, die sie beantworten können (Diebstahl ist schlecht), für deren Beantwortung sie weitere Informationen einholen müssen (Wieviel Schokolade darf ich essen, ohne meine Gesundheit zu gefährden?) und die außerhalb ihrer Entscheidungsfähigkeit liegen (Gibt es Grenzen des Weltalls?).

- (3) Hat jemand Interesse daran, daß ich diese Meinung annehme? Hier ist auf die mit der Werbung verbundenen Interessen hinzuweisen. - Die Fragen (1) – (3) gelten~als Vorbereitungsfragen für die entscheidenden Fragen (4) und (5):
- (4) Woher weißt du das? Diese Frage soll die Kinder auf die Begründungserfordernis bei der Annahme konkreter Meinungen hinweisen.
- (5) Könnte ich mich zu dieser Meinung bekennen, wenn ich anderer Herkunft wäre?
Weltanschauungen müssen für alle Völker, Klassen und Rassen annehmbar sein.

Hierzu passt der "*Hebammeneffekt*": Ob in Irland ein Mensch als Protestant auf einen Katholiken oder als Katholik auf einen Protestanten schießt, könnte von der Ordnungsliebe der Hebamme abhängen. Werden nämlich beide nach der Geburt irrtümlich vertauscht, dann würden sie unter vertauschten Rollen aufeinander schießen. Ähnliches gilt für die Kämpfe der Singalesen gegen die Tamilen, der Hindus gegen Mohamedaner, zwischen Israelis und Palästinensern. Moral: Wir müssen uns immer fragen, würden wir uns ebenso verhalten, wenn uns die Hebamme vertauscht hätte, wenn wir in eine andere Familie, eine andere Schule geraten wären? *Für höhere Schulklassen* kommt hinzu:

- (1) Der Geschichtsunterricht muß darauf ausgerichtet sein, das Elend herauszuarbeiten, das durch falsches Heldentum, falsche Ideologien, Kriege, bei Genoziden und bei jeder Form von Unterdrückung zustande kommt. Die Sinnlosigkeit von Selbstmordattentaten, die immer wieder neue Gewalt hervorrufen, soll gezeigt werden.
- (2) daß überall, wo Gewalt herrscht, wo Menschen einander töten, Ideologien im Spiel sind.
- (3) Es muß das selbstsüchtige Interesse demonstriert werden, das oft hinter Ideologien steckt.
- (4) Es muß das Wesen der Ideologien als eine falsche Werthierarchie mit Vernachlässigung essentieller menschlicher Werte erklärt werden.
- (5) Es ist zu zeigen, daß wir auch die heute akuten Probleme des Überlebens der Menschheit in einer lebenswerten Umwelt Ideologien (Fortschrittsideologie, rücksichtslose Naturbeherrschung etc.) zu verdanken haben.

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Postmodernismus als Argumentationstechnik

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1. Die Definition des Postmodernisten

Ein Postmodernist ist man dann, wenn man für einen solchen gehalten wird und/oder sich selbst hält. Eine solche „Definition“ des Postmodernismus ist kein antiessentionelles Ausweichmanöver. Im Gegenteil, wir meinen, sie ist eine gute Perspektive für die soziale und kommunikationsorientierte Analyse dieser Erscheinung. Wir fragen also nicht nach dem ohnehin kaum näher präzierten Wesen des Postmodernismus, sondern nach der kulturellen Grundlage für die Unterscheidung zwischen dem Postmodernismus und allem anderen. Dadurch sind wir auch nicht verpflichtet, uns in die Auseinandersetzungen um das Wesen der postmodernistischen Einsichten einzumischen, weil laut unserer Definition der Postmodernismus existiert, und zwar wenn über ihn kommuniziert wird.

2. Der Postmodernismus als Konstrukt

Der Postmodernismus ist ein Kommunikationskonstrukt, das im Kommunikationssystem der Geisteswissenschaften und der Philosophie entstanden ist. Konstrukte dieser Art („-ismen“) dienen meistens zur Unterscheidung der Diskurse und sind Herleitungen aus Selbstbeobachtungsprozessen. Ihre wohl wichtigste Funktion ist es, das Selbstreferenzpotential im Rahmen des Systems zu steigern. Sie identifizieren - an diese Identifizierungen kann man später anknüpfen - Diskurse d.h. bestimmte, gewohnte Redeweisen. Die Redeweisen sind Repertoires von Zeichen, Normen und Regeln, nach denen die Zeichen organisiert werden (Fleischer). Aus diesem Grund kann man zum Beispiel über den Strukturalismus, den Pragmatismus, den Radikalen Konstruktivismus etc. sprechen. Das Konstrukt des Postmodernismus dient einer doppelten Unterscheidung. Einerseits unterscheidet man bestimmte Redeweisen von der Philosophie an sich, andererseits von den sozialwissenschaftlichen (geisteswissenschaftlichen) Diskursen, wie z.B. vom Strukturalismus. Der Doppelcharakter der Unterscheidung kommt klar zum Vorschein, wenn man bedenkt, dass sich der Postmodernismus eben in den Sozialstrukturen der Philosophie und der Sozialwissenschaften abspielt.

3. Der Postmodernismus als Argumentationstechnik

Wovon unterscheidet sich der Postmodernismus? Nehmen wir an, dass Philosophie eine Argumentationstechnik ist, welche es möglich macht, beliebig gewählte Einsichten als wahr, richtig, nützlich oder angemessen einzustufen, die anderen dagegen als falsch oder unrichtig abzulehnen (Mitterer).

Wissenschaft ist somit eine Argumentationstechnik, die es möglich macht, Einsichten zu legitimieren, sofern diese sich mit professionalisierten und intersubjektiven empirischen Tests verbinden lassen, und sie abzulehnen, sofern sie dieser Forderung nicht entsprechen.

Beide Techniken können gleichzeitig angewendet werden. Der postmoderne Legitimationsanspruch bezieht

sich in sozialer Hinsicht auf das Gebiet der Philosophie und der Sozialwissenschaften, aber in der Kommunikation hat er einen universalisierenden Charakter (daraus der Fall Sokal).

Man kann also sagen, dass der Postmodernismus eine Argumentationstechnik ist, die dazu dient, aus dem Kommunikationsraum jene Einsichten auszuschließen, die sich auf „Wahrheit“ und/oder auf „Empirie“ oder auf ihre funktionellen Äquivalente stützen, und auf Autoritäten basierende Einsichten bindend zu machen. Meistens beruht diese Technik auf dem Bekämpfen der „Wahrheit“ und dem Ignorieren der „Empirie“. Mit anderen Worten: „Bindend ist das, was ich sage, nicht bindend das, was die anderen sagen, diejenigen, die sich der ‚Wahrheit‘ bedienen, und diejenigen, die sich auf die Empirie stützen; jene hingegen, die mit Empirie arbeiten und dadurch ihr Reden nichtbindend machen, werden ignoriert“. Man kann also (wertungsfrei) sagen, dass die Postmodernisten die Sophisten der Gegenwart sind.

4. Der Postmodernismus als Diskurs

Der Postmodernismus, so wie wir ihn hier verstehen, sollte nicht als ein traditioneller Diskurs betrachtet werden. Der Grund dafür ist vor allem die Tatsache, dass Kollektivsymbole, Diskursformationen, Normative und andere Mittel des Postmodernismus aus verschiedenen Diskursen stammen: aus der Dekonstruktion, dem Feminismus, der Kulturanthropologie, der Psychoanalyse Lacans, aus philosophischen Diskursen usw. Das kommt dann klar zum Vorschein, wenn man den Strukturalismus mit dem Poststrukturalismus - der nicht selten stellvertretend für Postmodernismus auftritt - vergleicht. Sofern wir es im Fall des Strukturalismus mit einer bestimmten Kommunikationseinheit zu tun haben, ist der Poststrukturalismus in dieser Hinsicht viel komplizierter. Unserer Meinung nach ist der Postmodernismus erstens ein Metadiskurs, weil er die Verhältnisse zwischen Diskursen ordnet, und zweitens ein Interdiskurs, d.h. eine gewisse Resultante der Diskurse, aus denen sich der Postmodernismus zusammensetzt. Er ist nicht nur der gemeinsame Nenner für Diskurse, welche die oben genannten Argumentationstechniken anwenden, sondern er öffnet auch für diese Diskurse einen spezifischen Kommunikationsraum: den Raum des Pluralismus. Pluralismus ist ein Zustand, in dem unterschiedliche und manchmal sogar sich widersprechende Diskurse in demselben Raum aufgrund eines bestimmten „Nichtangriffpakt“ koexistieren. In diesem Kontext wird der Postmodernismus als ein Interdiskurs verstanden, nach dessen Regeln man über verschiedene Dinge auf eine unterschiedliche Art und Weise reden kann - wobei man die Sachformationen aus dem Gebiet der Philosophie und der Sozialwissenschaften respektieren soll - solange man nicht auf wissenschaftliche oder traditionell-philosophische Weise spricht.

5. Der Postmodernismus als neues Feld - Systemcharakteristik

Aus dem oben Gesagten ergibt sich, dass der Postmodernismus für uns ein Element des Konstituierungsprozesses eines neuen Feldes ist, welches sich in seinen Regeln von dem Feld der Philosophie und dem der Sozialwissenschaften unterscheidet. Das Auftauchen dieses Feldes ist eine evolutionäre und systemische Erscheinung, deren Ursprünge wohl im antipositivistischen „Durchbruch“ zu finden sind, weil zur Zeit des Durchbruchs die emanzipatorischen Postulate eine deutliche Kommunikationsform gewonnen haben. Wir haben es mit dem Prozess der Aggregation und der Autonomisierung bestimmter Praktiken zu tun. Obwohl diese Praktiken bis heute noch nicht imstande sind, sich zu institutionalisieren (und eine Institutionalisierung ist unentbehrlich für das Reproduzieren des Feldes), sind sie eine Kraft geworden, die sowohl von den Philosophen, als auch von den Sozialwissenschaftlern und in Polen besonders von den Literaturwissenschaftlern berücksichtigt wird. Das wichtigste Systemproblem, mit dem der Postmodernismus noch nicht zurechtgekommen ist, ist die geringe Legitimationskraft aufgrund bloßer Autorität. Um so mehr, als die Autorität des Postmodernisten doch aus seiner sozialen Teilnahme an dem philosophischen oder sozialwissenschaftlichen Feld herkommt. Daraus resultiert auch seine pädagogische Autorität (Bourdieu). Die Legitimierung der Philosophie ist geschichtlich (durch Aussitzen) gegeben, die Wissenschaft wurde dadurch legitim, dass das Sozialsystem ihr die ganze Urteilskraft über die Wahrheit übertragen hat. Aber wie kann der Postmodernismus, der sich auf die „reine“ Autorität stützt, legitimiert werden? Aus der Sicht der Kommunikation hat er keine andere Wahl, als die Kommunikationsregeln zu nutzen, die in einem System gelten, in dem die Wichtigkeit einer Person „an sich“ geschichtlich erreicht und garantiert worden ist. Er muss also die Regel des Kunstsystems (und Kunstfeldes) benutzen, da dieses System seine Autonomie (und das Feld die Autonomie angesichts des Marktes) erreicht hat, indem es den „Künstler“ geschaffen hat. Evolutionär erreicht seine Autonomie ihren Höhepunkt in dem Konzept des „Künstlers als Kunstwerk“. Dieser Höhepunkt wurde durch die Konsekrationsmechanismen, zuerst des Werkes, dann des Künstlers, erreicht. Den Künstler legitimiert die bloße Tatsache, dass er eben ein Künstler ist, d.h. er nimmt eine Position in dem Feld ein. So funktioniert heute der Postmodernismus. Das Funktionieren im postmodernen Quasi-Feld beruht auf der allmählichen Bewegung in dem Konsekrationsraum (deswegen - je älter der Postmodernist ist, desto „heiliger“ ist er) und auf der Bildung des Feldes als einer quasi-literarischen Form. Nur so kann man „reine“ Autorität sein. Man kann sagen: Ein Postmodernist zu sein, bedeutet, philosophische Literatur zu schreiben oder ein spezifischer, zum Nachdenken neigender Schriftsteller zu sein. In etwa so beschreiben sich die Postmodernisten selbst. Jedoch die Anlehnung an die „reine“, quasi-literarische Autorität hat Schwächen, die am Beispiel des sogenannten „Fall Sokal“ deutlich werden.

6. Der Fall Sokal

Der sogenannte Fall Sokal hat keinen Erkenntnis-, sondern moralischen Charakter. Das bedeutet, dass man eigentlich unabhängig von der Stellung, die man zu dieser Sache einnimmt und unabhängig von der Argumentation, die man benutzt, an einem Kommunikationsereignis teilnimmt, das sich mit dem Kommunikationskode (nach Luhmann) Achtung/Geringschätzung beschreiben läßt. Wenn es um das Recht geht, dann beschränkt sich das Verleihen des

Rechtes in diesem Streit entweder darauf, jemandem Respekt zu erweisen (Sokal, den Postmodernisten), oder ihn zu verweigern (Sokal, den Postmodernisten), infolge der Auflösung des Problems: wer war hier unehrlich? Es ist nicht unsere Absicht, einen moralischen Streit zu entscheiden, obwohl wir sicher auch unsere eigenen Überlegungen dazu haben. Die Erkenntnisgewinne aus der Teilnahme am Sokal- Skandal scheinen eher gering zu sein, aber vielleicht kann aus der Beobachtung des Falls ein Erkenntnisgewinn resultieren (aus einer Beobachtung der dritten Ordnung). Uns interessiert nicht der Fall Sokal an sich, sondern eher der „Fall Sokal“ als diskursives Ereignis im Feld der Wissenschaft (Bourdieu), das mit durch den Mechanismus des Systemcharakters (nach Luhmann) bedingt ist. Mit anderen Worten: wir möchten dieses Ereignis theoretisieren. Vor allem möchten wir die Fragen beantworten: wie ist der „Fall Sokal“ möglich? Wer und warum nimmt daran teil? Welche Argumentationsstrategien und diskursiven Taktiken werden benutzt? Wir möchten dabei betonen, dass wir uns nur mit der Diskussion des Falls in Polen beschäftigen, weil wir nicht viel über seine Sozial- und Kommunikationsverwicklungen im Westen wissen.

Fangen wir mit der Erklärung an, warum (auch in Polen) der „Fall Sokal“ ein Ereignis geworden ist. Dass es ein Ereignis ist, steht außer Frage, denn darüber schrieb man in *Przegląd Filozoficzny*, *Edukacja Filozoficzna*, *Teksty Drugie*, *Opcje*, *Res Publica Nowa*, *Czas kultury*, *Kultura współczesna*, *Kultura*, *świat Nauki*, *Wiedza i życie*, *Tygodnik Powszechny*, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, *Polityka*, *życie Warszawy* und anderen Zeitschriften. Der Fall Sokal erfaßte alle Wissenschaftskreise, bis hin zu den populärwissenschaftlichen. Das Skandalträchtige, das Skandalöse des Ereignisses erklärt nichts, weil ein Skandal, das Skandalöse sich aus der Medialisierung des Ereignisses ableitet und nicht umgekehrt. Noch seltsamer wird alles, wenn wir die genologische Zuordnung des Buches von Sokal und Bricmont betrachten. „Eleganter Unsinn“ ist eher ein Pasquill und eignet sich zu nichts besonderem, jedenfalls ist der Ausdruck nicht für die Standardkommunikation in der Wissenschaft geeignet. Trotz allem Anschein gibt es keinen Grund, sich über das Pasquill aufzuregen, denn es schafft keinen Kommunikationsraum, das heißt, es erschwert (nicht - erleichtert) das Anknüpfen der Kommunikation zur Kommunikation. Zwangsläufig zwingen sich die Teilnehmer (auf beiden Seiten) des Falls zu verschiedenen Arten genologischer Äquilibristik, um das Buch von Sokal und Bricmont zu „entpasquillieren“ und um dieses Buch als anschlussfähig vorzustellen. Die Beharrlichkeit dieser Äquilibristik ist merkwürdig und man kann daraus folgern, dass im Fall Sokal die Systemmechanismen verwickelt sind und dass irgendwelche Systemeigenschaften in die Klemme geraten sind. Kommunizieren der Moralität taucht im System der Wissenschaftskommunikation nicht oft auf, weil es Medien und Kommunikationskodes aktiviert, die der Wissenschaft nicht innewohnen (daher kommt die berühmte Meinung von Popper, dass „der höchste Wert der Wissenschaft jener ist, dass sie wertfrei ist“), es führt Regeln ein, mit denen die Wissenschaft nicht zurechtkommt. Sogar in der Philosophie wird Heidegger wegen seiner Nazi-Vergangenheit disqualifiziert. An dieser Stelle haben wir sehr oft mit einer sehr bedeutsamen Differenz zu tun: „disqualifiziert“ als Mensch oder als Philosoph? Das „Aufspalten“ zwischen Mensch und Philosoph ist ein Beispiel für die Art und Weise, wie Wissenschaft mit der Moralität zurechtzukommen versucht. Die Moral ist ein fremdreferenzorganisierter Abbrecher wissenschaftlicher Kommunikation, der solche selbstreferenten Vorläufe stört, die sich auf die wie auch immer verstandene „Wahrheit“, „Erkenntnis“ oder „Empirie“ stützen, deshalb hat auf Moral gestützte Kommunikation ein

eher kurzes Leben in der Wissenschaft. Solche Kommunikationen haben natürlich ihre Geschichte, ein gewisses symbolisches Potential, aber sie haben das System nicht in besondere Turbulenzen gesetzt. Immer wenn wir mit moralischen Konflikten, Pasquillen und ähnlichen innersystemischen Ereignissen zu tun hatten, gab es daraus keine Folgen. Hat der Spott und Hohn von Carnap, Heidegger und den Heideggerianern und in der De-Man'schen Fortführung dieses Falles Schaden zugefügt? Hat Poppers ätzende Kritik den Vertretern der Frankfurter Schule geschadet? Welche Folgen und Konsequenzen hatte die bekannte Publikation von Stanislaw Andreski über Magie in den Sozialwissenschaften (obwohl er in dieser Publikation Parsons selbst mißhandelt hatte)? Welche Bedeutung hatten die Pasquille von J.M. Bocheński, obwohl er in ihnen fast die ganze zeitgenössische Geisteswissenschaft inkriminierte (andererseits: der Genetik hat der Fall Lysenko nicht geschadet, obwohl hier die ganze Schuld von der Wissenschaft auf die Politik verlegt wurde)? Solche Konflikte werden sehr leicht durch das System absorbiert, weil sie am Ende für die Realisierung von symbolischen Spielen gehalten werden, und auch für eine zulässige Erhöhung eines symbolischen Kapitals durch wissenschaftliche Diskurse, (denn sie sind ein Ergebnis des Kampfes um die Stellung auf dem Gebiet der Wissenschaft). Die ersteren mindern die übrigen, um sich über sie zu erheben, dies übrigen bleiben den ersteren nichts schuldig. Die Verteilung der Kräfte ist klar, die Interessen von irgendwelchen Diskursen können auch wirklich bedroht werden, aber das ist kein Problem, denn es geschieht mit einem Gewinn für die anderen Diskurse, also bleiben die Spielregeln im Feld der gegebenen Disziplin unverändert. Vom Systemstandpunkt her geschieht auch nichts besonderes. Für das System ist es nämlich gleichgültig, ob z.B. auf dem Feld der Literaturwissenschaft die Vorherrschaft dem Strukturalismus oder der Dekonstruktion gehören wird, ob auf dem Feld der Philosophie die analytische Option oder die Neopragmatismus-Befürworter gewinnen werden, solange die Grundregeln der System-Reproduktion unberührt bleiben. „Wir werden auch daran nicht erinnern, dass auch die Symbolgewinne in den beschriebenen Situationen sehr gering sind, man wird doch die Position der Hermeneutik nicht erschüttern, indem man meist raffinierte Pamphlete gegen sie publiziert (z.B. Markiewicz vs. Przybylski „Pamflet na ksi'żkę hermeneuty“). Auch die BefürworterInnen von Derrida werden nicht aus den Seminarien fliehen, nur wegen der wenig schmeichelhaften Meinung Woleńskis über ihn.“

Mit den Angriffen, die von außerhalb des Systems kommen, kommt die Wissenschaft auch dank der operativen Geschlossenheit zurecht. Am besten derart, dass sie solche Angriffe ignoriert. Das System entscheidet nämlich selbst, welche Impulse aus der Umwelt es als relevant und welche es als blosses „Rauschen“ betrachtet. Es droht uns kein Fall Galileo mehr. Das Wissenschaftssystem reagiert nicht auf Religionssysteme. Die Probleme der Folgen z.B. der Genetikforschung oder des amerikanischen Streits zwischen „Evolutionisten“ und „Kreationisten“ sind keine Probleme für die Wissenschaftskommunikation. Sie sind eher eine Methode, mit deren Hilfe die Religionsdiskurse versuchen, sich die nötige Medialisierung zu gewährleisten und für sich soziale Wichtigkeit zu gewinnen. Im Zusammenhang damit unterscheidet sich der Fall „Evolutionismus gegen Kreationismus“ nicht vom Fall Harry Potter oder Leonardo Kode. Auch die Interaktionen mit dem politischen System, außer wenigen Ausnahmen, führen die Wissenschaft nicht in die Klemme (wir möchten hier an die Geschichte des literaturwissenschaftlichen Strukturalismus in der kommunistischen Volksrepublik Polen erinnern). Die Angriffe von Seiten des Mediensystems werden in der Regel

ignoriert. Wir finden z.B. kaum Reaktionen der polnischen postmoderistischen Geisteswissenschaft auf konservative Kritiken (z.B. die Publizistik von Legutko). Es reicht nur, auf die ideologische (rechts- und linksgerichtete) Option des Opponenten hinzuweisen um die Vorwürfe nicht relevant zu machen.

Der Fall Sokall hat einen ganz anderen Charakter. Wir sollen hier nicht entscheiden, ob der Postmodernismus in die Klemme geraten ist oder ob er mit dem Problem zurecht kommen wird, indem er die Kritik internalisiert, obwohl wir davon überzeugt sind, dass die zweite Alternative sich verwirklichen wird. Der Fall Sokal ist ein Konflikt im Feld zwischen zwei Subsystemen des Wissenschaftssystems. Genauer gesagt, es ist ein Konflikt zwischen den empirischen Wissenschaften und der postmodernen Geisteswissenschaft. Wir müssen berücksichtigen, dass die Autorität des Wissenschaftlers und die Autorität der Wissenschaft sich in etwa gleich auf die Vertreter der empirischen Wissenschaften als auch auf die Vertreter der Sozialwissenschaften (und der Philosophie und sicher auch der Postmodernisten) erstreckt. Die Regeln des „Wissenschaftsspiels“ führen dazu, dass es unmöglich ist, einen Teilnehmer des Wissenschaftsfeldes von außen ernsthaft anzugreifen (delegitimieren). Und Innen: die Philosophie (als eine Argumentationstechnik verstanden) ist auch nicht imstande, den Postmodernismus zu delegitimieren; auch die Sozialwissenschaften sind nicht imstande, den Postmodernismus in ihrem Feld zu delegitimieren. Und zwar deshalb, weil die Postmodernisten die Regeln des Feldes, die ihren eigenen Voraussetzungen gemäß sind, selbst bestimmen (diese Voraussetzungen haben wir schon kurz besprochen). Und es gelingt ihnen: es kommt zum Kampf um Autoritäten. Und auf diesem Gebiet kommt der Postmodernismus sehr gut zurecht, denn die Autorität ist eine Hauptfigur, die den postmodernen Interdiskurs erzeugt.

Die Autoritäten im Postmodernismus unterliegen spezifischen Generationswandlungen (dem generationsmäßigen Wechsel der Autoritäten), sie sind das Hauptmedium der Reproduktion, sorgen für ein Übermaß an Reproduktion (es gibt von ihnen mehr als gebraucht werden, deswegen müssen sie miteinander konkurrieren), unterliegen der Traditionalisierung und den Vererbungssequenzen; die Kreation der Autorität wird im Rahmen des Feldes als eine Innovation behandelt. Die Autoritäten unterliegen Substitutionsprozessen, der spontanen Selektion (die alten werden von den neuen verdrängt durch das Anhäufen der individuellen Präferenzen), der Konsekration. Ein Philosoph, genauso wie ein Sozialwissenschaftler, ist auch deswegen nicht imstande, eine postmoderne Autorität in Frage zu stellen, da die oben genannten Mechanismen der Autoritätserzeugung auch in ihren Feldern sehr wichtig sind. Aber die Autorität eines Naturwissenschaftlers kann die des Postmodernisten ins Wanken bringen, weil im Rahmen der Wissenschaft als einer Ganzheit die Autorität des Naturwissenschaftlers ein viel größeres symbolisches Kapital besitzt, als die quasi-literarische Autorität irgendwelcher Postmodernisten. Falls ein Scheinstreit um die Verbindlichkeit zwischen Einstein und Lyotard, Derrida und Niels Bohr, Gerhard Roth und Lacan wirklich erfolgte, wäre sein Ergebnis leicht absehbar. Sokal als Physiker gewinnt sehr einfach im Konflikt mit der Autorität „des Schriftstellers“ Lyotard. Um so mehr, als er gegen den Mechanismus der Aneignung der wissenschaftlichen Terminologie durch die Postmodernisten auftritt. Diese Aneignung ist nichts mehr als ein Versuch des Postmodernisten, seine schwankende Autorität durch die Autorität des Naturwissenschaftlers zu untermauern.

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Freud-Jung controversy: a failed intercultural dialogue

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1. Nietzsche's challenge

The role of the so-called oedipal crisis was always at the core of Freud's virulent struggles with his rebellious disciples. The question whether that crisis was universal or specific to "patriarchal" cultures was at the root of their specific dispute. The question is why the universality of that crisis was so important to Freud, and why Jung insisted that there were "matriarchal" societies with non-oedipal myths. It may be fruitful to examine how the dispute was related to the latter's opinions.

Both Freud and Jung were deeply influenced by Nietzsche. Both did not take for granted the traditions of their respective ethnic groups and their place in their respective multi-ethnic environment. Both rejected the religious beliefs and practices of their close ancestors, and tried to define their own personal identity by a radical re-interpretation of their own cultural heritages as well as those of others. Both were challenged by Nietzsche's battle cries against the dominant culture in Germany, and impressed by his use of myths in his genealogies. But their reactions were totally different.

Freud took Nietzsche's myths for what they were probably meant to be – argumentative (or persuasive) *fictions*; i.e., counter-myths to "canonized" European meta-narratives, in order to challenge dominant European values. Although he did not reject all the old narratives, he accepted some of Nietzsche's counter-claims, and explained the old myths as well as Nietzsche's genealogy of "slave morality" in a radically new way. He contributed his own discoveries (or inventions) – the Oedipal dramas - and created his own genealogies, which gave those of Nietzsche an ironic twist. Those genealogies – the "phylogensis" of civilization, religion and morality and the "ontogenesis" of civilized individuals - had philosophical functions, over and above their roles in his professional thinking. One of them was to answer to the Nietzschean challenge as he - an atheist Viennese with a rather positivistic background and humanistic convictions, born in Moravia to a Jewish *maskil* father - had understood it. He accepted Nietzsche's claims about the genealogy of "slavish" morality, and his opinion about the "Super Ego": The Oedipal theory (together with the theory of the unconscious) was supposed to explain the never fully achieved process of its formation, its developmental function and its socio- and psychopathological side-effects. He disagreed with Nietzsche's attribution of the "slave morality" to a "Jewish" influence, yet he thought that the Jews shared some of those traits. The *theory* about the oedipal process and his oedipal *myths* (about the prehistoric roots of the oedipal fantasies (Freud 1914) and the "historic" pre-Jewish "patricide" roots of Jewish monotheism and moral consciousness (Freud 1939), were his answer to that challenge.

Jung adopted many of Nietzsche's counter-values, took his myths for reflection of historic and recurrent events and as a call for a future action. He was Christian, but rejected the "patriarchal" religion of his Protestant father, and wanted, like Nietzsche, to "re-include" the "Dionysian" element. He was Swiss, but identified himself as a "German", claimed to share with other "Indo-Europeans" an allegedly prehistoric but self-perpetuating

"collective sub-conscious" heritage, different than those left by the ancestors of other "races".) He was close to the Pan-Germanist ideology (Noll, 1994), and was inspired as such by some ideals of *some* anti-positivist German philosophers and poets. The admired Nietzsche sounded to his camp as a louder voice in that chorus. They heard him announcing the German "destiny". Jung had, however, to reconcile his own religious views with Nietzsche's atheistic declarations, and to cope with the fact that the Germans as Nietzsche had described them did not seem to fit for the mission. His assumption that there were "matriarchal" societies that did not experience the oedipal complex was supposed to do the job, and help him to justify his revolt against his father.

2. Incommensurable worldviews

Freud studied philosophy from Brentano, who shared with his teachers in the faculties of science and medicine a very negative attitude to many of the ideals of the philosophers and ideologues that had inspired the Pan Germanists. Among those ideals was the "return" to "*the authentic religion*", or its *Aufhebung* to a new conception: Freud was an evolutionist atheist, and interpreted such ideals as regression to infantile wishes and fantasies. Another ideal was the "restoration" of a mythical cosmic, cultural and personal well-balanced "*wholeness*", *free from the dualities, conflicts and struggles* that were allegedly introduced by alien or self-alienating one-sided agents, which were responsible for taking the part for the whole - and putting an end to that "intervention". Freud thought in terms of biological, social and psychic evolving systems, and believed that conflicts etc., which were inevitable, were due to the interplay between opposing forces within the system. He opposed to that ideal not only as a positivist but also as a Jew, for the "alien" intervention was often attributed to Judaic ideas, Jewish mentality or activities of Jews. The "wholeness" ideal was involved with the recognition of allegedly "alienated", "projected" or "suppressed" parts of the "whole" and their *re-integration* in one's personal, collective and spiritual identity. Freud agreed that people "repressed" and project to others parts of their mental life, but he thought that "repression" had a defensive function, and becoming aware of the "repressed" was necessary only when it interfered with the ability for self-control and disrupted the functioning of the system. The recognition of *non-intellectual* "sources of wisdom" that were beyond the reach of science or intellectual philosophy, and their the interpretation, especially that of dreams and myths, as transmitters of symbolic "messages" from some "absolute" and "whole" reality that is somehow psychic and physis, metaphysical and spiritual at once, was another "Germanic" ideal. Freud was a rationalist and his ideal was an intellectual self- control. He believed the function of dreams and myths was to contribute to the maintenance of social and personal systems despite inner conflicts, and assumed that their interpretation could reveal unconscious conflicts and not secret wisdom. Jung shared with other Pan-Germanists the conviction that nations or "races" have their specific mentality and role, and the belief that the realization of the above-mentioned ideals was the "destiny" or "mission" of the Germans. He was perhaps more eager than many of them in his attempt

to combine the notion of a collective "mission" with the "Germanic" ideal of individualism, according to which *conscious* "self-realization" was not a right but a duty, as if the individual was "called" by the Gods to become by his own free will what he was pre-destined to be. Freud did not believe in "destiny" and pre-destined "missions" and "calls". He thought that the *feeling* of having them, which was connected with narcissistic aspiration and neurotic compensation, should not be confused with a *fact* or *duty*. His ability to make the Augustinian distinctions (which he had learned from Brentano) - between the thought and the asserted, the desired and the rationally willed, the intended and the done - and judge rationally enables one to be realistic despite his awareness to contrary wishes, emotions and ideals. That was the sign of mental maturity, and the ideal towards which psychoanalysis should strive.

The common denominators between the two psychiatrists were very few. They tried to collaborate because both were interested at that time in the interpretation of free associations and in myths, and both believed that their cooperation would advance their respective cause. But the only thing that that was common to their methods of interpretation was their circularity: They helped them to "discover" what they had already presupposed. Jung "discovered" the remote existence of "matriarchal" societies through the interpretation of "the great goddess" myths as an echo of the struggle between invading "patriarchal" tribes and earlier "matriarchal" tribes. He had no other evidence for their prehistoric existence. Freud "discovered" that the story of Abraham's sacrifice, for example, was oedipal thanks to the presuppositions that all the Isaacs and all the narrators wanted to kill the father, but associative defensive mechanisms could exchange the roles of the subject and the object. None of them could persuade the other.

3. Freud's response

Freud, like many other non-religious European Jews that were quite assimilated in the "general" environment, chose to "stay Jewish" nevertheless. He therefore had to define a sense of "being Jewish" that would be meaningful to him, make his own selection of Jewish and non-Jewish norms, values and ideals. He also had to find his own response to the anti-Jewish traditions and fashions in contemporary Europe, and among them the claim that a Jew, however assimilated (or even converted) "would always be a Jew". The same claim, though on the level of duties and not of alleged behavioral facts, was made by Jews who were more loyal to the traditional way of life. Freud's father was among them, and his personal father-son conflict, no less than that of Jung, was involved with disagreements about *culture*. His oedipal theory implied answers to all those issues.

The attribution of the European defects and troubles to a "Jewish" influence was traditionally fostered by the Church, but it was also frequent among modern intellectuals, who had invented a variety of secular versions or counter-versions of the Christian meta-narrative, and found accordingly new "Jewish" defects. Freud admitted that some dark aspects of the modern European culture were indeed common among Jews. He insisted, however, that they were universal rather than specifically Jewish traits. For that purpose he picked two targets that were central both in the traditional Christian theology and the secular modern anti-Judaic attacks. He did not think that the anti-Semitic attribution of *personal* character traits and behavior to *individual* Jews, or

conspiracies to groups of Jews, deserved anything beside the diagnosis of a projective xenophobia, and that was his attitude to Jung since the latter started to analyze the "Jewish psychology". He responded, however, to Jung's non-original identification of the "one-sided", "partial", "over-intellectual", "alien" or "alienated" factor with the Jew or with Jewish influence, by a theoretical dismissal of Jung's ideals. (He did not live to see Jung's forgetting his anti-Jewish attacks and returning to anti-Judaic insinuations.)

The first anti-Judaic target was the *authoritarian* ideal of blind obedience to *heteronymous* commandments. The alleged influence of the rabbinical-Judaic attitude to the allegedly Divine decrees of the Torah was held responsible not only for the refusal of some secular Jews to assimilate completely in the Christian environment. Schopenhauer and Nietzsche "found" it responsible, respectively, for the Pauline or the Augustinian contribution to the "distortion" of the "pre-Jewish" spirituality. Anti-democrats linked it with the "slavish" acceptance of the *vox populi* in European societies, and partisans of individual or racial "self-realization" blamed it for the conventionalist tendencies of the "philistine" German majority. The second target was the alleged Judaic *insensitivity* to "*Christian love*" and "*spirituality*".

Freud agreed with Nietzsche that the "slavish" obedience and humility of the pious, Jew or "Jewish" non-Jew, was motivated by feelings of guilt and fear of punishment rather than pure respect of, and love for, a celestial Father. The Oedipal theory, which explained the dynamic tension between the former and the latter feelings, said, however, that such a conflict-ridden acceptance of rules and values, which is indeed explicit in the Jewish tradition, is common to members of any civilization. Any "super ego" was a social product, i.e., was an uncritically internalized "other-directed" morality. Its psychological genealogy was based on a defensive "identification" of the child with the loved-hated-feared father, who thereby transmitted his own ancestral heritage as well as conventional norms. He conceived it, however, as Nietzsche did, as an essential and necessary step in the development of *any* (male) child towards the next stage. In that (never completely achieved) stage the individual was supposed to be cognitively and emotionally capable of a critical attitude towards the blindly and rigidly adopted morality, and therefore have a certain measure of "inner-directness". The mature person was supposed to obtain his *autonomy*, but a more or less Kantian rational - "ego" - moral autonomy rather than selfless Pauline love, Humian selfish benevolence, or the "self-realization" of a "Self" whose "wholeness" was supposed to be "beyond good and evil".

Freud agreed with Nietzsche that the "slavish" morality was not the first stage. But he reduced the prior stage to the "narcissistic" and "object-love" of the still amoral child, who was indeed a "master", but only in his imagined motherly world... He agreed with Nietzsche that the original attitude to any desired "object" was an "un-Christian" instinctual, corporeal and egotistic lust rather than Platonic inborn longing for the sublime and spiritual curiosity or an *a priori* Kantian "rational respect". The point was, however, that the "erotic energy" which had to be first "detached" from the original motherly "object" and "transferred" to other "objects", "condensed" (with the "ego-drives") into search for knowledge and dedication to work or "sublimated" to "higher" forms of love for "higher" objects, *could not be so transformed unless the child had lived through the oedipal process*, with its "obscene"

wishes, anxiety, guilt and hatred, and its authoritarian and heteronymous results. His answer to the modern interpretation of the traditional Christian claim – the claim that the Jews “got stuck” with their acceptance of a “transcendent” authority and failed to develop towards the conception of religious and moral “immanence” – was that having developmental “fixations” was universal. The Jews (“who still felt unconscious guilt for the murder of the “original” Moses”(Freud,1939) had, however, accomplished the last stage of the Oedipal process, whereas Christian cultural heroes such as Jesus and Saint Augustine were “fixated” in its earlier stages. The believers in “immanence”, the modern version of the idea of incorporation of the Divine, were “fixated” at, or “regressed” to, the stage where one still did understand that eating the clan’s totem was a taboo... It was also a response to the supporters of the counter-narrative, like Jung, according to which the “authentic religion” was “distorted by a “Judaic” influence, who advocated a “return” to the Pre-Jewish “pagan roots” of Christianity (or Judaism) and “restoration” of the primordial “wholeness”: That was a “regression” to even earlier fantasies.

The mature person would, thanks to his post-oedipal ability to transfer the desire-transformed-to-love from the “primordial”, maternal, object to others, be capable of *responsibility*, i.e. readiness to work, care for dependent family members, solidarity with community members, concern for other people and good citizenship – and the required self-control. He would therefore realize – and that was the answer for the a non-traditional Jew, that being civilized meant obedience to universal and innate taboos of the human race, but also the freedom to abandon ancestral religions, select rationally their moral elements, and adapt only to the reasonable among the conventional norms and rules in one’s environment. It would be a stage of *individualism* which would consist in a (partial) self-knowledge and (limited) self-determination by the “Ego”, and not in the “realization” of his pre-destined “Self”. Although the precarious *rationality* of the mature Freudian person would be limited to his conscious level, he should be able to avoid the confusion between a *feeling* of having an innate mission with a *fact* or a *duty*. It would enable him, finally, to come into terms with the fact that civilized persons would always live in tension with the world and carry the traces of past conflicts, while “wholeness”, just like the “oceanic feeling” (Freud 1926) of “oneness” or the restoration of a mythic “pre-Jewish”, “well-balanced” culture, whether Germanic and whether Hebraic, or establish a conflict-free post-capitalist society, was an illusion, a wish to return to the maternal uterus or to the paternal protecting paradise that existed only in the infantile wishes.

4. Jung’s way

Freud’s conception, which reflected in its peculiar way one of the versions of the secular Jewish adaptation of the Kantian conception of *Enlightenment*, was incompatible with Jung’s “Germanic” ideals, and his personal revolt against specific conventional norms. He did not believe, moreover, that persons with no religious longing, but with oedipal guilt feelings and “slave mentality”, could fulfill the “mission” of counter-cultural liberation. He mixed therefore the claim, which had already made by Schopenhauer, that “real” Christianity was Indo-European, and Jesus was just one of many *avatars* - whereas the Pauline narrative, which had connected him to the notion of an Original Sin and the need for salvation through suffering, was a Judaic distortion - with the Nietzschean “anti-Judaic”, i.e., anti

Augustinian, longing for Dionysus. He claimed (Macguire, 1974) to have discovered that the “original” Last Supper was a kind of a Dionysian feast of love and Joy, a merry event that was commemorated by the ancient *Agape* rites of the early Christian sects. At an early stage of his correspondence with Freud, when he was still unaware of Freud’s attitude to Schopenhauer’s speculation, Judaism, religion or marital commitments (and the Pan Germanist movement was still opened to “anti-Judaic” Jews), he suggested to mobilize the psychoanalytic movement to the campaign for “true” Christianity, and the struggle, with joyful feasts, for the cause of “free love”. At that stage, when Freud was eager to “prove” that child-scarifying myths expressed the repressed fantasies of patricidal children, he seemed still to believe that he will welcome the “discovery” of non-Oedipal myths, (Macguire, 1974) and accept the thesis that they reflected developmental stages in “matriarchal” societies. It is not altogether clear whether at that stage he still assumed that Freud shared the Nietzschean opinion about a “race” free from hereditary guilt feelings that would be capable and ready to liberate the world from the allegedly Judaic mentality of the Augustinian legacy in the Protestant world. Freud’s reaction to his presentation of the “discovery” of ancient societies with a “matriarchal” legacy as a scientific event does not tell whether Freud understood the subtext; but he recommended to stop sailing (with anthropological speculations) far away from the “scientific harbor” (of psychiatry). A little bit later, in his published presentation of the psychoanalytic theory, Jung (Jung explained that psychoanalysis was generalized by limiting the oedipal theory to “patriarchal” societies and replacement of the materialist hypothesis of two drives, “sex” and “ego”, by the simpler assumption of underlying “pure energy” (which could be the basis for spiritual activation as well). The generalization and publication were done without Freud’s knowledge or consent. Only the non-initiated could still think that he expected Freud to appreciate his contribution.

5. The failed dialogue

The conflict started when Freud rejected the suggestions, but it took Freud some time to realize that the “student” was not on a short juvenile excursion. Jung needed the formal interdiction to call his approach ‘psychoanalysis’, in order to understand that he could not continue to describe the disagreement as a matter of rigid “patriarchal” *pedagogy*. There were no more direct dialogues between the two, but the controversy went on. Jung began to claim, in the name of cultural relativism, that the Oedipal theory was a “Jewish theory”: Its “Jewishness” would consist not only in the “fact” that the traumas with which it dealt that were specific to Jews, but also and mainly in its acceptability: Such a theory was acceptable to people with a “Jewish mentality”, but not to German minds. Among the “Jewish” mental traits that were insinuated thereby was the preoccupation with sex, with incestual and patricidal tendencies. In response to Freud’s reaction – the(Freud 1914) “description” of an imaginary unique *prehistoric* trauma that was the basis for the allegedly *universal* incest and patricide taboos and oedipal fantasies, he elaborated his counter-theory of a *racial-specific* self-perpetuating “collective sub-conscious” that reenacted *psychologically* the archetypes of frequent experiences in the remote *history* of its common ancestors, for those experiences reflected processes of socialization that were specific to the social structure of their tribes. The claim, based on “evidence” from “Aryans” myths, that Germans had and Jews had not a “matriarchal” remote ancestry some helped him to give the blow: Psychoanalysis was acceptable to

Jews because oedipal deeds were frequent among their remote ancestors. Freud answered by the remark, in some of his public lectures, that the "sex drive" was actually Plato's Eros, and he latter unified the two drives in the "Eros". His reaction to Jung's insinuations was his analysis of anti-Semitism as the self-defensive projections of anxiety-ridden xenophobes. The analysis of the "ego-less" mass- psychology, the addition of the aggressive and self-destructive "death" drive, and the theory of the "return of the repressed" can be also read as ironic responses to Jung's claims. Jung in the meantime recommended to his German Jewish followers that had to immigrate to Palestine to recognize that "sub-consciously" they shared with Jews from other cultural backgrounds was stronger than their ties to the German culture. The myth that Freud developed in his last book, which "based" the alleged Jewish sense of guilt that was responsible for their "slave" morality on the murder of a *foreign revolutionary legislator*, (rather than a conventionalist father) was his last ironic reaction to Jung's insinuations. Jung retorted (Jung 1929) by an enlarged comparison between "Jewish" and "German" psychology. In Jung's 1952 "Answer to Job", however, Freud was described as a contributor to Jung's theory by his studies of the "patriarchal" aspect of the "whole", and the "matriarchal" aspect, which was missing in Protestant theology but present in the Jewish Cabbala, had to do with the mediatory function of the female aspect of the Godhood. There were neither pro-German nor anti-Semitic remarks, but it was suggested that the Jews, together with the stuck "patriarchal" Protestants, join the "development of God himself" towards Jung's new version of revived Christianity. Was

The controversy was about incompatible worldviews, and incommensurable criteria for the legitimacy and validity of arguments and evidence. But the dialogue failed not only because each of the rivals was a prisoner of his own hermeneutic circle, and used analytical "methods" that presupposed the truth that he tried to prove. It failed because each of them needed the negation of the other's culture, and the negation of the other's attitude to that culture, in order to define his own and his group's identity. Both used the *ad hominem* tactic in order to dis-validate the other's theory – Jung by attacking Freud's ethnic group, and Freud by "diagnosing" the mental immaturity of Jung's ideological groups and their cultural heroes. Each pretended to know better than the other what the members of the other's group "really" thought, wished and felt, and had, moreover, a theory of mind that pretended to explain why they had those "distorted" ideas, and why they were not aware of having them. Both based their respective pretension on their ability to decipher unconscious thoughts.

Freud and Jung are famous – or notorious – for their erudite *systems*, but they were not the first to assume that people have non-conscious thoughts, wishes and feelings, nor the first to pretend to know those latent contents, explain why they were unconscious and how they were related to conscious thoughts and overt behavior, and understand the intended as well as unintended acts of other persons better than the agents themselves. Both followed Nietzsche, who competed with other interpreters of socio-cultural phenomena – such as Schelling, Schopenhauer, Comte, Hegel, Feuerbach or Marx – on a job that was formerly reserved to the earthly representatives of gods and demons. Both (and Nietzsche *via* Foucault) are followed today by socio-cultural theorists that take part in controversies between supporters of different cultures or sub-cultures, and campaigns for new attitudes to culture itself. Those who pretend, in the name

of "modernism" or humanism, to represent universal truths and values are accused with refusal to let the present "captured" birds fly away from the "cage" and speak for themselves. They are attacked by "pre-modern" fundamentalists as well as post-colonialists, neo-Marxists, anti-orientalists, feminists and other post-modern liberators of particular groups. Whatever they say, their critics "know" that unconsciously they represent the perspectives, ideas and interests of the "dominant group" to which they belong, or by which they are still influenced. Many of the universalists tend, indeed, to ignore opinions that are expressed in the name of "non-dominant" groups, and pretend to know that what is wrong with the "primitive", "immature" or "distorted" minds that hold them. Both sides pretend to know not only that the opponents are wrong, but also why they are wrong. i.e., what is wrong with their minds. That "knowledge" does not allow any fruitful dialogue.

The Freud-Jung controversy is typical of many conflicts between groups also for other reasons. The disagreements about cultural interpretations and values and the evaluation of culture itself are also typical to such conflicts. Such conflicts are often involved with a self-identity that requires the negation of the identity that is attributed to the other. They are often involved with confusion between the culture that is attributed to the other group and the personal position of the individual that is considered its member. They become malignant when at least one side demands the other's conversion to its "religion", recognition of its "truths", awareness of its "sins" and "repentance". They become lethal when even "converted" individuals are suspected for unconscious loyalty to the ancestral "mentality". The dialogue between a Jew with Freud's convictions and a German with Jung's convictions was perhaps pointless; and so would be any dialogue between a Jew with a "Jewish" version of the Jungian ideology and a German with those of Freud's: Their worldviews are incommensurable, and their similar demands follow from incompatible needs. But that does not mean that Germans and Jews (and *mutatis mutandi* Bosnian and Serbs, Israelis and Palestinians, Sunnis and Shites etc.) cannot have fruitful dialogues, for there are many Jews and many Germans, with a great variety of conceptions of their own and the others' identities and of attitudes, more modest claims to knowledge and less urgent need for the others' self-denying conversion.

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Grounded Action: Wittgenstein against Skepticism

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I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again and again "I know that that's a tree," pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell him: "This fellow isn't insane. We are only doing philosophy."¹

An impassable divide between our everyday experiences and our ideals seems to be an indelible aspect of the human experience. How do I know that this is the good life, how do I even know that I am the being that I think I am? Skepticism has always thrived on this professed riff. Any attempt that recognized the riff and attempted to bridge it was doomed to deconstruction from the outset. Philosophical skeptics, following Descartes' example, have understood their aim as infecting even the most "ordinary" propositions with skeptical doubt. This position has evolved into the more radical claim that not only can we not be certain of any of our claims to knowledge, but no certainty or knowledge exists *even in the language* in which we express our knowledge claims. Such a skeptical claim rests on a peculiar understanding of language -an understanding which has completely ignored the contributions of Ludwig Wittgenstein. When we begin to investigate how language works we discover that there is no need to bridge the riff off of which skeptics have profited, as no riff necessarily exists!

What separates the responses of Wittgenstein, and even Quine to a large degree, from other language-based responses to skepticism is precisely their understanding of language as the performance of games which are couched in a number of contexts. Denying our ability to be certain of the meaning of our speech, and hence, our thought, requires much more than what the skeptic would have us believe.

Thomas Nagel in his *The View from Nowhere* and Peter Unger in his "A Defense of Skepticism"² both respond to a challenge issued by recent (ca. 1950) criticisms made by philosophers of language against a skeptical attitude. Nagel rightly claims that "recently there has been a revival of arguments against the possibility of skepticism reminiscent of the ordinary language arguments of the fifties" (L&M, 82-83) and goes on to formulate a well-defended skeptical posture against said language-based responses. However the argument chosen as the response of philosophers of language by Nagel and (though tacitly) Unger is quite certainly not the best response.

Nagel's skepticism relies on the realist conception of language: "What we refer to by the terms in our statements about the external world [...] is said to be whatever *actually* bears the appropriate relation to the generally accepted use of those terms in our language. (This relation is left undefined, but it is supposed to be exemplified in the ordinary world by the relation between my use of the word "tree" and actual trees, if there are such things.)" (L&M, 83) Nagel goes on to insert his skeptical wedge between what we intend to signify and the signifier which we use: "Such [language-based responses to skepticism] are refuted by the evident possibility and intelligibility of skepticism, which

reveals that by 'tree' I don't mean just anything that is causally responsible for my impressions of trees, or anything that looks and feels like a tree, or even anything of the sort that I and others have traditionally called trees. Since those things could conceivably not be trees, any theory that says they have to be is wrong." (L&M, 84) Nagel concludes that there can be no assured certainty that the words I use are meaningful or accurately describe what it is I wish to describe.

Unger as well bases his response on such an understanding: he believes that what he calls "basic absolute terms" (words like "flat", "certain", etc.) have no place in our speech, and hence our knowledge, because one hardly ever is referencing something which is, e.g., absolutely flat (L&M, 91-92). Unger requires a bit more than Nagel, not only does he demand that words operate on an empirically testable one-to-one correspondence with the world, but the meaning of a word is to be organized into a one-to-one relation with the word itself. This can be seen from the disturbing feeling Unger expresses when he observes that absolute terms can on occasion also admit degrees of relative (i.e. contextual) meaning. It is rather obvious at this point that this referential conception of language to which both Unger and Nagel respond is no match even for any lightweight version of skepticism. To what, then, should we turn to put our skeptical worries to rest if not a referential theory of meaning?

It is precisely a *contextual theory of meaning* that will help us put our skeptical doubts to rest. This contextualism, however, goes well beyond understanding where and by whom a statement is made but how we use different statements will determine meaning (as Wittgenstein has remarked: "it is only in use that the proposition has its sense." *On Certainty*³, #10). In using words meaningfully we exhibit our grasp of them and consequently our knowledge or certainty of their meaning. Certainty moves from being an inner, mental state to being part of an expression, something outside of one's own mind. A fundamental tenet of both Quine's and Wittgenstein's view is that any empirical statement about the world is misleading in its apparent simplicity (i.e. that it can be judged as either agreeing or disagreeing with 'the facts'). For Quine empirical propositions are not only "couched" in networks of other beliefs, but "the total field [of our beliefs] is so underdetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to re-evaluate in the light of any single contrary experience." (L&M, 325) Our network of beliefs only interact with experience on their periphery and so empirical observations not only reflect something exterior to ourselves but also, to a greater degree, reflect greater aspects of our networks of belief. Wittgenstein makes many similar points throughout *On Certainty*, e.g. a statement about the date of a battle Napoleon fought in also implies that the earth existed at that date, that there were people other than Napoleon, etc. "When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole.)" (OC, #141) If empirical statements are misleading in their simplicity, if our experiences affect our beliefs, they are only the inch or so

¹ Wittgenstein, *On Certainty*, #467

² Both articles are presented here as they are found in Landesman and Meeks, 2003, henceforth (L&M).

³ Henceforth (OC).

of water beneath a glacier and any theory of meaning which would claim that our language is entirely subservient to the empirical facts of the world and conforms itself to match the world around us is naïve and certainly not any strong basis for a response to skepticism.

The view that our empirical propositions do not simply boil down into simple atomic propositions is the beginning of an ample response to skepticism. For if one were to attempt to insert degrees of doubt into the very propositions that a global version of skepticism (i.e. a view that, at its strongest, claims, along with Unger e.g., that we in fact know very little if not nothing) were to attack it seems that one must doubt a whole system of thought rather than individual propositions – we are no closer to building the bridge to cross the skeptical impasse, but the ruff suddenly seems smaller. If much more is built into our language use than one-to-one referential correspondence, than positing the “possibility and intelligibility of skepticism” (L&M, 83) becomes a rather difficult role to play convincingly. As Wittgenstein notes, “In order to make a mistake, a man must already judge in conformity with mankind.” It does not make sense to say that we make mistakes in all of our beliefs always, because what are seen as mistakes from outside the error-ridden language-game would be tautologies from within that language-game. An error occurs only within a language-game, in mistaking aspects of the language-game. We must be careful here to admit that for Wittgenstein there is no absolutely true, objective relation of signification, Quine as well suggests that there is no framework which is any more true or objective. We will discover that Wittgenstein’s response is that the language-game does not rest on some foundational, privileged view; the following is an illustration of this point: Nagel and I may stroll past a tree one afternoon and observe a group of children playing Tag. These children call the same object we know as “tree” their “base”. Would Nagel say here that either the children or we have made a mistake? Would he address the children in saying “You cannot in actuality know that this thing is called “base” there’s always the possibility for a mistake.” The children, though not versed at all in Wittgenstein, would either say “Well, what should base be then?” Or, as true Wittgensteinians, remain silent and go on with their game.

One can see here how the skeptic’s question “but how do you know etc.?” has been removed as a serious knowledge-defeater. If one were to ask the children “but how do you know this tree here is base and not that tree over there?” They would, like good Wittgensteinians say, “Our talk gets meaning from the rest of our proceedings” (OC, #229). A statement’s context provides enough ground for certainty. Should they be pressed further “But you haven’t answered my question, how is it that you can be certain about something as immaterial as a ‘base’?” They would perhaps respond “Isn’t the question this: ‘What if you had to change your opinion even on these most fundamental things?’ And to that the answer seems to [us] to be: ‘You don’t have to change it. That is just what their being ‘fundamental’ is.” (OC, #512) This conversation could go on until the skeptic walks away unsatisfied or until the children tire of the line of questioning and go on with their game.

It is clear that the skeptic is asking something from the children which they do not understand, not out of ignorance, but because it does not make sense to introduce skepticism into their game. The skeptic has yet to understand that there is something arbitrary even irrational at the foundation of language-games. The

children could reflect that their understanding of the tree as base was arbitrary at first, but the whole game unfolded around that tree being base. One child may mistakenly claim, in a moment of weakness (or slowness), that a different tree is base, he would be informed by the rest of his peers that he is mistaken or, if his claim is acceptable, the game will change as well as the language-game but there is no judgment that the former understanding of ‘base’ was incorrect – it was merely part of a different language-game. Note that the formulation of a ‘base’ in a game of tag corroborates Wittgenstein’s claim that: “I have arrived at the rock bottom of my convictions. And one might almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole house.” (OC, #248)

When the skeptic presses us for criteria for certainty we may initially supply a few justificatory premises and support these with other premises, however sooner or later our explanations come to an end. Does this mean that we have, like so many before us, fallen victim to the problem of the criteria? No. In our understanding of language-games we understand that explanation must as some point give way to description, “this is how one plays the game”. We see that the end of an explanation is not an “ungrounded position: it is an ungrounded way of acting”. (OC, #110) The question then becomes should we rest content with the idea that our language-games are ungrounded? Wittgenstein suggests that there is no greater assurance, that at the end of our justifications there are not propositions which assure us of truth, for they could be pressed for their justification. In a clarifying use of metaphor we see that there is no need to see the ground or the foundation of our belief as true, for “if the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor is it false.” (OC, #205). It is not a knowing or truth that provides a foundation for our beliefs, rather it is our way of living or the way we play our language-games. This will later be strengthened by Quine’s emphasis that one foundation is on the same epistemic level as any other foundation (e.g. an explanation of the way things are involving the Homeric gods is equally as justifiable as contemporary physics) which explains that there is nothing beyond saying “this is what we do” and letting that statement serve as a foundation.

Wittgenstein reemphasizes the notion that explanations must end a few times throughout *On Certainty*, but these two statements resound with the wisdom of a mystic rather than an everyday philosopher of language, the first directly related to the children’s game of tag:

‘So one must know that the objects whose names one teaches a child by ostensive definition exist.’ – Why must one know they do? Isn’t it enough that experience doesn’t later show the opposite? For why should the language-game rest on some kind of knowledge? (OC, #477)

And, something much more sagely and advisory that we might console the unsatisfied skeptic with: “The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing.” (OC, #166) If language-games could rest on knowledge, what would that knowledge be? Of the certainty of language-games perhaps, but this already is based on how it is we play language-games – that we just take them to be certain. Once we see that there is no reason to feel alarmed at the lack of endless justification, and accept the “groundlessness of our believing” we will no longer see the reason for skeptical behavior if not just to play a senseless language game. For even assuming that one could set-up a skeptical language-game, which I would presume one

could not as skepticism is not based on any way of life, but putting that aside, it seems that the skeptical language-game would involve coming up with claim after claim more removed from experience than the last.

For example we would play by perhaps wondering if it were the case that we have ever been on the Jupiter. Because statements like "How do you know you haven't been on Jupiter" are so removed from my experience and the foundation of my belief these statements gradually lose their meaning and become senseless. I would not presume to have the authority or desire to bar off any game the skeptic would like to play so long as the skeptic recognizes that the game has the same application as a child coming up to me and tagging me as I go on my stroll – I may play with him or her for a little bit, but I will resume my walk after a while. Wittgenstein refers to this sort of game as similar to awkwardly inserting "Good morning" in the middle of a conversation. (OC, #464)

The analogy with the game of tag may serve to illustrate how the skeptic may be quieted in similar situation, but when we introduce the notion of measure, calculation or any sort of verifiable claim, it seems that the skeptic's response may be strengthened with the idea that there is a correct conclusion that we may not approximate in our perhaps defective calculus or enfeebled means of reasoning. Unger, for example, asserts that "hardly anyone knows that 45 and 56 are equal to 101, if anyone at all." (L&M, 91). Skeptical criticisms such as these seem to be of a different feather than doubts regarding our knowledge of the meaning of the words we used (i.e. the children playing a game of tag). There seems to be a rift for skepticism to exploit, that since in ancient times and even fairly recently the scientific world view was admittedly mistaken in its claims that, e.g. an intangible, invisible ether surrounded the Earth. Quine, along with Wittgenstein, provides a more than adequate response while maintaining a contextual theory of meaning.

The skeptic would perhaps suggest, with shades of Hume, that perhaps our world-view today be completely changed tomorrow. This suggestion at first eludes the contextual response as it claims that there is an objective bit of knowledge that resides outside all current contextual views. Quine will begin our response with claiming that: "The notion of observation as the impartial and objective source of evidence for science is bankrupt." (L&M, 341) As suggested in his quote above, our network of beliefs are so effective that we may drape seemingly disruptive empirical data with language that fits entirely with our worldview (just ask any member of any major news corporation, any political party, etc. if this is case). This aside, Quine suggests that all entities, whether "the abstract entities which are the substance of mathematics", "the gods of homer" or "physical objects" are all "myths" on the same epistemological "footing" (L&M, 327). Indeed we only accept one myth over another not because any are more true or more certainly the case than others, homer's gods and physical objects are "neither better nor worse except for differences in the degree to which they expedite our dealings with sense experience." (L&M, 327). Quine's response turns the skeptic's point on its head. The primacy of one scientific view over another is not determined by how it corresponds with the objective reality, rather the view gains its prime status by finding favor within the context of those who would follow it. This view may be corroborated with a remark from Wittgenstein: "But can't it be imagined that there are no physical objects? I don't know. And yet 'there are physical objects' is nonsense. Is it supposed to be an empirical proposition?" (OC, #35) Both

points only serve to show that what is supposedly "given" in terms of empirical data or what we may take as true depends entirely on the framework to which we refer. As any book on mathematical logic worth its salt will tell you, that any tautology certainly does *not* follow from nothing. Rather tautologies require a framework and construction of truth, necessity, etc. in order to be "given".

The skeptic may claim that the Homeric Greeks were ignorant of quite a bit of empirical data, data which we can measure. However this view is couched within a worldview that ignores data which the Homeric Greeks thought to be very real. And so Wittgenstein's claim that "Whether a proposition can turn out false after all depends on what I make count as determinants for that proposition." (OC, #5) resounds all the more strongly here. One should be careful to note that one does not choose one's worldview as one chooses a flavor of ice-cream. The view being expounded here is something akin to a linguistic idealism or even a sort of pragmatism⁴. The knowledge children have of something called a "base" is unshakeable, not because it is "useful" for the game of tag to have a base, but because it is a required part of that game of tag (a game which they all would like to play). And so the idea here is that the contents of our language-games are not there for any sort of pragmatic value, but rather reflect the way the game is played, or a way of life: "[...] what stands fast does so, not because it is intrinsically obvious or convincing [we may insert here "or useful"]; it is rather held fast by what lies around it." (OC, #144) One should also recognize that it is a dubious distinction to make between the content of a language-game and the context of the language-game as is made clear by Quine who suggested that a statement is couched within a context as well as a statement made by Wittgenstein that "there is no sharp boundary between methodological propositions and propositions within a method." (OC, #318) So it may be suggested that one chooses one's language-games as much as one chooses one's physical attributes, one's society, etc., essentially no choice.

In an article entitled "Certainties of a World Picture: The Epistemological Investigations of *On Certainty*"⁵ the author, Michael Kober, proposes that:

It seems to me, indeed, hopeless to try and refute a "strong" skepticism by means of LW's philosophy. I want to show here the main outcome of *On Certainty* is not a dissolution of skepticism, but a philosophically illuminating picture of the epistemic structure of language-games and their epistemically relevant settings. (Sluga and Stern, 412)

It seems obvious that this paper agrees with Kober to an extent – that, though Wittgenstein helps us see the lack of a reason to play the skeptic's game, there is no contradiction in a skeptical way of thought – but I would like to strongly contest a claim made later by Kober. He suggests that "such skepticism [the strong variety] sets up the possibility of a gap between the World or Reality and our talk about it, and this gap cannot be bridged by means of a collective linguistic idealism" (Sluga and Stern, 438). This paper has endeavored to show that a "collective linguistic idealism", if that is what we are to call Wittgenstein's philosophy, precisely does claim that the gap does not exist. It was precisely in our discussion where Quine expanded on bits from Wittgenstein that suggest that there is no difference between the notion of a

⁴ Wittgenstein himself remarks that he is "trying to say something that sounds like pragmatism" (OC, #422), but he is not quite giving the pragmatic response.

⁵ As seen in Sluga and Stern, 1996

given physical world and our representations of it or our talk about it – or at least it is a difficult line to draw. That the ideas of a tree and a base in the game of tag have the same epistemic footing (to use Quine’s terminology) is a proposition that we may see coming out of Wittgenstein. And we can most certainly see that there is no discernable gap between our language-games and the reality with which they correspond if we perceive that the empirical world is precisely *that which is recognized by our language-games by their involvement in the games*; and “here we see that the idea of ‘agreement with reality’ does not have any clear application” (OC, #215) if it is not an agreement with semantics.

This paper has pursued the notion that the heavyweight language-based response to skepticism is to be found in Wittgenstein and corroborated by Quine. It has been shown that should one resort to an understanding of language as language-games then there is no room for “strong” skepticism beyond the room allotted for any other language-game. There may perhaps be even less as we noted above that the practice of such a game would amount to expostulations further and further removed from ways of life and meaning. At the least it has been shown that it would take a total revision in terms of how meaning is constructed in order for skepticism to overpower this language-based response and that, once we recognize this, there is no need to resort to skepticism or at least it is even less necessary to consider skepticism than it was when we suggested before that the best response was to ignore skeptical concerns.

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Al-Ghazālī on the Incoherence of “Substance”

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Arabic top-level ontology

According to a metaphysical framework that Al-Ghazālī largely accepts, there are two kinds of entities: those that are in receptacles, such as accidents and forms, and those that are not in receptacles (3,41, 66).¹ Entities that do not exist in any receptacle or substratum are called substances (5,24,90). There are three kinds of substances. Some substances are receptacles for accidents and forms; others are self-subsistent (3,41,66). The self-subsistent substances divide into two kinds. Some of them are attached to substances that are receptacles; others are not essentially related to any other thing at all. Instances of the first kind of substance, which are receptacles for accidents and forms, are mere extension (*mādda*) and bodies (*jism*). According to a view that Al-Ghazālī attributes to Avicenna, the human soul is a substance of the second kind: it is not itself a receptacle, but it is individuated only by being attached to a body that is a receptacle of forms and accidents (19,9,202–3). The third kind of substance is exemplified by the divine intelligences, who are immaterial, unique in their kind, and not attached to any material bodies.

The extended substance

The “philosophers” (Al-Farābī and Avicenna) argue that before a thing comes into existence, it must have been possible for it to exist. However, before it is actualized, this possibility must be present in a receptacle. Therefore it seems that if something *A* is possibly coming to be, something that is already actual must have the potential for becoming *A*. Hence, the universe in its entirety can have no beginning, since there would have to be a receptacle for its possibility of coming to be. This receptacle, however, will already have to be an extended thing (1,113,41).

Further, since a substance does not inhere in anything, there can be no substratum underlying the process by which a substance comes to be. It is easy to see how a property comes to be: something that may possibly have this property turns into something that actually has this property. No such account, however, can be given for the way in which substances come into being. This appears to entail a spinozistic ontology, according to which there is only one eternal substance, and everything that is subject to change inheres in this substance. Hence, the argument of the philosophers, as Al-Ghazālī states it, leads to undesirable conclusions.

The thinking substance

Al-Ghazālī picks up the same issue again in his discussion of the persistence of the soul (*nafs*). He begins by stating the following philosophical argument to the effect that the soul cannot cease to exist. A thing may cease to be for three reasons: by lack of support by an underlying substratum, by encountering its opposite, or by something

else’s execution of a power. But the soul does not cease to exist in the first way, since it needs no support from an underlying substratum. Rather than being imprinted in the body as its receptacle, the philosophers argue, the soul uses the body as a tool, and the destruction of a tool does not entail the destruction of its user. Second, there are no negative substances, such that a substance could be destroyed its encountering its negative counterpart. Third, the non-existence of a substance is not a positive fact and can therefore not be specified as a condition of success for the execution of a power. Since a power must be defined in terms of its successful execution, this means that there can be no power for destroying a substance (19,2–5,201–2).

These arguments are of doubtful validity. In order to establish the first, the philosophers would have to show that the soul does not in any sense depend on the body for its existence. But even if the soul is not imprinted in matter as in a receptacle, it may still cease to exist in the absence of the body to which it is attached, just as humans will cease to exist in the absence of air without being imprinted in air as in their receptacle. The specific way in which the soul depends on its body may be that it has its identity only insofar as it is attached to this body rather to another (19,8–15,202–4). And as Al-Ghazālī argues elsewhere, we do in fact never refer to ourselves without in some way or other referring to our body (18,53,192–93). Therefore, it might well be that the soul depends on the body even if it uses it only as a tool. At any rate, Al-Ghazālī concludes, it is not logically impossible that God should be able to destroy the soul, and no one guarantees that the list of possible ways of ceasing to be that the philosophers offer is exhaustive (19,16–17,204–5).

In a second round, Al-Ghazālī has the philosophers elaborate on their first argument. Since a substance does not exist in a receptacle, they argue, it cannot cease to exist. For ceasing to exist is a process, and hence, there must be an underlying substratum that undergoes this process. This substratum, however, would have to underlie all stages of the process in question, such that first, the substance would be supported by this underlying substratum as long as it exists. But a substance needs no such support. Second, if the substratum underlies all the stages of the soul’s ceasing to be, it would still have to be there in the absence of the soul—but there is nothing that belongs to a human being that would still be present when the soul has perished. This leads us back to the argument for the eternity of the extended substance. The substratum that remains when the soul has ceased to be would have to be a receptacle for a potential of a soul to be, in the same way in which extension (*mādda*) is the receptacle for a possible body (*jism*). This however would turn the soul into a kind of form or accident, which would need something like extension as its receptacle (19,18–22,205–7). “But the soul”, they argue, “is simple, since it is a form denuded from matter” (19,21,206).

Al-Ghazālī’s way out

The main argument for the eternity of both extended and thinking substance is thus that the possibility that a substance exists would have to inhere in something else as long as this substance does not exist. But then, there

¹ All references are to (Al-Ghazālī 2000). The numbers stand for the discussion, paragraph and page respectively, such that the above “3,41,66” refers to the Third Discussion (which is found in part I), §41, p. 66. I have occasionally modified the translation.

would be a further substratum on which the substance would depend for its existence.

Against this, Al-Ghazālī argues that possibilities do not require a real substratum and that we rather "call that possible which the intellect (*ʿaql*) may suppose to be there without encountering a contradiction" (1,116,42). This, he claims, may be seen by considering the following three arguments.

First, there would have to be a substratum not only for the possibility of things to come into existence, but also for their refusal to exist (1,117,42).² Although it might seem that a refusal to be must still be the refusal of some existing thing to be, this is not the case. There "are" things that may never be actually the case. Such things need no receptacle in order not to be, and hence their refusal to exist does not need any receptacle (1,122,43; 1,129,45).

Second, Al-Ghazālī argues, that which comes into being when an accident comes to be in a receptacle is not an abstract and universal form (18,9,181), but only one of its particular instances. The universal itself does not come to be, but still, there is a sense in which a non-instantiated universal is only possible, not actual. That the universal is possible in the sense of being possibly instantiated does not mean that it may itself come to be; it rather means that something else may come to be: one of its instances. By the same token, the soul may be said to be possible not because there actually is a receptacle in which it may come to be, but rather because something else may come to be: a bodily thing to which the soul may come to be attached (1,118,42).

A universal form may only be actual by being realized in a particular instance, but this does not mean that it needs this instance as a *receptacle* for its existence. The form does not come to be by being instantiated; it only comes to be *instantiated*. Likewise, the soul may be merely possible as opposed to actual as long as it is not attached to a body. But that does not mean that it comes to be in a body that would be its receptacle. It only means that it comes to be attached to a body.

sūra vs. maʿnan

The comparison between universals, souls, and possibilities is the most important step in the line that Al-Ghazālī's takes against the philosophers. Both universals and possibilities may exist without inhering in a receptacle. They may be said to inhere in the intellect, but then the intellect will not be their receptacle—that they inhere in the intellect does not mean that the intellect exemplifies them.

As far as universal forms are concerned, Al-Ghazālī thus remains firmly within the limits of traditional Arabic metaphysics. We have already seen that the "philosophers" distinguish between two kinds of substance: substances that are receptacles for forms and accidents, and others that are self-subsistent. According to an account that a writer like Avicenna would put forward and with which Al-Ghazālī agrees, there are also two kinds of accidents or forms. There are, corresponding to the first kind of substance, forms and accidents that only exist in a receptacle (sūra). These are always forms of some particular thing: particular form-instances that come into existence when a thing actually has a property. Second,

corresponding to the second and third kind of substance, there are forms that do not require a bodily receptacle in order to exist (*maʿnan* = Latin *intentio*). These are the universals that may be present in the mind without necessarily being instantiated by anything (18,3,179). In his 18th Discussion, concerning the immateriality of the soul, Al-Ghazālī makes extensive use of the distinction between *suwar* and *maʿānin*. Although universals are indivisible, he argues, they may still exist *in* a divisible substratum such as the brain, since they need not be *instantiated* by this substratum. The soul can accordingly be *in* a body without being its form; that is, it may depend on the body for its existence without being imprinted in it.

Possibilities require a substratum, potentials require a receptacle

Although Al-Ghazālī himself present his argument against the eternity of extended and thinking substance only in order to "throw dust in the face" of the alleged proofs (1,134,46), we may extract from his criticism two distinctions that are still of crucial importance.

First, it emerges that one should distinguish between the *substratum* (*mau ʿī*) of a universal or possibility and its *receptacle* (*ma ʿīl*). The receptacle of a possibility or universal is that in which it is present when it is actual. The receptacle of a color must be an extended thing. The substratum of a universal or possibility is that in which it may exist without necessarily being actual. According to Al-Ghazālī, the intellect may function as a substratum for universals and possibilities.

The receptacle of a possibility can only be an existing thing that may eventually actualize this possibility. For instance, it is possible that my son catches a cold since I have a son that may eventually catch a cold. In this case, my son is the receptacle of the possibility of his getting a cold. But this is not the only way in which possibilities may be there. For in a different sense, it is possible that my daughter catches a cold, although I do not yet have a daughter and may never have one: it is possible that I may have a daughter who has a cold. These two senses in which a state of affairs is possible have also been distinguished as *de re* and *de dicto* modality: one may say that it is possible *for* my son to catch a cold, but not literally that it is possible *for* my daughter, since there is no daughter for it to be possible for.

The second distinction that we may extract from Al-Ghazālī's discussion of the philosopher's "substance" is closely connected to this distinction between *de re* and *de dicto* modality. We may distinguish between possibilities that require a receptacle in order to become real and possibilities that do not require such a receptacle, but may exist in a substratum such as the intellect. The former may be called *potentials* of the receptacle in question. This distinction mirrors the division of forms into universals and particular form-instances. Potentials are particular possibility-instances, as it were, and they require a receptacle in order to exist. *De dicto* possibilities do not require a receptacle, but only a substratum such as the intellect in order to exist.

² Marmura translates *imtinaʿ* as "impossibility", such that the claim would be that there must be a substrate for the impossible. This does not follow and "refusal" is a more natural translation; at any rate *imtinaʿ* is not literally the opposite of possibility (*imkān*).

Substances

Traditionally, a substance is said to be something that does not inhere in anything else, but in which other things such as forms and accidents inhere. This is, admittedly, a vague formulation, and much more would have to be said about what "inherence" means in this context. The question that Al-Ghazālī raises is whether a substance is supposed not to inhere in another thing as its *receptacle* or as its *substratum*. If a substance may not inhere in any substratum whatsoever, it will be difficult to explain how substances come and cease to be. On the other hand, if the relevant kind of inherence were restricted to inherence in a receptacle, it would seem that space and matter are the paradigm—if not only—cases of substance.

The best thing to do will probably be to account for *both* kinds of inherence. It will then turn out that the mind or intellect is not a substance in the same sense in which a body is a substance, and that thoughts inhere in the mind not in the sense in which properties inhere in bodies. The mind is not a receptacle, but a substratum of thought and action, whereas bodies are only receptacles of their properties. Likewise, bodily substances can only host potentials, and *de dicto* possibilities can only inhere in the mind.

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Wittgenstein and the Language of Religion in Secular Age

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My whole tendency and, I believe, the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it. (LW 1965, 12)

1. A religious point of view?

Wittgenstein's utterances on religion and ethics are largely isolated, non-systematic and difficult to construe. On the one hand Wittgenstein states the importance of religion and ethics for his thinking; on the other hand he never publicly takes any positive position in religious and ethical matters. Religion and ethics are very often amalgamated as they partake in the same difficulty concerning the use of language.

Wittgenstein was not publicly religious yet he acknowledged at some point a certain religious perspective to be central to his thinking: "I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every problem from a religious point of view" (Drury 1981, 94). Apart from the Lecture on Religious Belief, where Wittgenstein discusses certain religious expressions, most of his notes on religion are found in his diaries, especially those from the First World War and in *Vermischte Bemerkungen*. Those were private notes and cannot be seen as his statements on religion. Moreover, the notebooks from 1916 show a telling attitude to expressing things religious. The notes on God, the sense of life and a good way to live were enciphered, whereas only the notes on logic written down on the opposite page, material for the *Tractatus*, were immediately legible. We can argue that religious and ethical notes were problematical in their expression and were destined to remain un-uttered in a way (Macho 1984, 43).

For Wittgenstein, ethics and religion have a similar status as to expression of their contents: "[...] a certain characteristic misuse of our language runs through all ethical and religious expressions." (Wittgenstein 1965, 9) We will assume that they are part of one complex (talk of God, meaning of life, the right way of living) as they purport to express the speaker's attitude to something "higher." This corresponds, as Wittgenstein asserts in Lecture on Ethics, to a use words in an absolute sense that radically differs from a mere (and meaningful) statement of facts. The ascription of an absolute value stands out of usual use of language. Indeed, religious and ethical speech contradicts the letter, bestowing on language an extraordinary power. Yet, there is no reason to assume that certain uses of language are superior to others: "There are no propositions which, in any absolute sense, are sublime, important, or trivial" (LW 1965, 5). In this context Wittgenstein's utters the in many regards startling statement on the paradoxical use of religious language: "My whole tendency and, I believe the tendency of all men

who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless." (LW 1965, 12)

Consequently, Wittgenstein's avowed religious point of view does not in any way lead to expression of religious contents, quite on the contrary. In an attempt to solve this apparent contradiction, I will attempt to circumscribe the place of the "running against the wall of language" in Wittgenstein's writings.

2. Impossible articulation of religion

The thesis of limits of language certainly belongs to the first, Tractarian phase of Wittgenstein's reflection on language. Here, language is essentially a means of representation and its justifiable use is merely descriptive, factual. A more complex idea of language helps to attenuate the most radical edge of Wittgenstein's criticism of religious language. Yet, it does not solve it.

In the Lectures on Religious Belief Wittgenstein talks about "the enormous gulf" (LW 1966, 53) between those who believe and talk about the Last Judgement and himself, who can at most abstain from expressing an opinion on that matter. The reason is twofold: Firstly, the meaning of religious dogmas is unclear, and without appeal to a non-religious person like him. Likewise, calling Jesus "my Lord" is not totally un-understandable, yet "it says nothing" to him, unless may be "he lived totally differently" (Wittgenstein 1977, 101). Secondly, it seems utterly meaningless to have an *opinion* on these matters. "'Opinion' sounds queer." (LW, in Pojman 1998, 436). Taking part in a certain language-game, here in a religious language-game, seems to entail far more than a simple discursive exercise: that is, a shared way of life (common persistent, admonishing pictures, common concerns etc.) To those who do not share them, religious language is not totally accessible, religious metaphors produce only bewilderment and logical difficulties.

The "characteristic misuse of our language" in ethical and religious expressions has been stated from a point of view of a representational use of language. Acknowledging the mentioned gulf between speakers, they can be also construed as similes, a pertaining to a non-representational communication. As it seems to express an attitude to life (Kross 1993, 113) rather than partake in a discursive practice, religious speech can be meaningful when referring to its use inside a specific form of life (Kross 1993, 116). According to Wittgenstein, religion should not be apprehended as a doctrine (*Lehre*). We do not adopt a religious way of life as a finite set of principles, but in a "passionate embracing of a perspective" (LW 1977, 123) and through a life experience, not through vision or understanding (LW 1977, 161). Religion thus appears as the opposite of a representing discourse, rather as an expression of a complex form of life.

3. Puritanism in language

Yet, acknowledging a place of religious language still does not help understanding Wittgenstein's resolutely anti-cognitivist stance in things ethical and religious. Wittgenstein cannot contradict religious sentences; he cannot assent to them either. Trying to understand the phenomenology of religious utterances does not entail their justification. As a matter of fact, they remain unjustifiable. Even though Wittgenstein relinquished his early limiting view on language through the representation paradigm, there is no reason to believe that he changed his perspective on religious utterances. Moreover, the Tractarian reductionist stance on language is perfectly congruent with his later, more complex views on belief. That is, there is a difference, actually the said "enormous gulf," between understanding religious utterances from the point of view of a collective communication and considering them from a subject's perspective. The reluctance to accept and contradict religious beliefs, in which Wittgenstein greatly delved, stems from the peculiar use of language in religious discourse, different from his own, circumspect and a-theoretical use of language. I will call it a language Puritanism and try to show the relevance of its contrast to the impossible articulation of religion.

As stated early in the *Tractatus*, "There is nothing in sentences that can express something higher. Thus there can be no ethical sentences." (TLP 6.42) This does not mean that it is impossible to talk about religion and ethics; it means that there can be no general theory, i.e. representation, of the absolute good and generally committing description of values. Rather, religious and ethical contents are fixed in affective experiences and transported by showing examples, pictures and narratives, as opposed to statements. These are not situated in the Tractarian realm of justification of beliefs, but rather in the space of motivating beliefs. This second space corresponds to what the Tractarian vocabulary designed as *showing*. Showing does not express a referring state of affairs; it exemplifies a use of a term in question. Like that, Piergiorgio Donatelli explains a possible meaning of an ethical attitude [courage, ethical vision of life] not stating what ethics is, but in illustrating a possible meaning of this ethical stance on a literary example from Kenzaburo Oe (Donatelli 2005, 32). Stories, like pictures, exemplify an ethical or religious point without expressing some positive, general content. Similarly, Wittgenstein is said to appreciate Tolstoy's ethics when the latter just tells stories more than when he turns to the reader and preaches (Conant 2005, 81). Preaching about what is good misses the point because it engages with the wrong (ineffective, problematic) discourse reserved to justifying factual beliefs.

4. Religious dimension of the language Puritanism

Thus, the language puritan abstains totally from asserting ethical and religious contents, even without refraining from reading Tolstoy. The reason is not just that pictures and stories allow for more complexity, but above all because any assertion of a religious or ethical content will fail the expectations. Wittgenstein argues for a strong incommensurability between the usual factual significance of ordinary language and the purported expression of something absolute. The latter would effectively claim for language an extraordinary morally committing power. "Now when this is urged against me I at once see clearly, as it were in a flash of light, not only that no description that I

can think of would do to describe what I mean by absolute value, but that I would reject every significant description that anybody could possibly suggest, ab initio, on the ground of its significance." (LW 1966, 12) We can argue about the unusual scope of Wittgenstein's concept of ethics. Unlike in philosophy of ethics concerned with describing and justifying moral action, Wittgenstein understands ethics from the subject's perspective. Only from such a perspective he can say the following "I see now that these nonsensical expressions were not nonsensical because I had not yet found the correct expressions, but that their nonsensicality was their very essence. For all I wanted to do with them was just to go beyond the world and that is to say beyond significant language." (ditto)

Wittgenstein tendency to "run against the boundaries of language", to expect a highest significance from language corresponds, to the way he sees moral commitment, i.e. in absolute terms. He gives examples of such a commitment. They are personal experiences (wonder at the existence of the world, experience of feeling absolutely safe) whose content cannot be conveyed to others. Unsurprisingly, all attempts to transport their effect to others via language are bound to fail. The model for language insufficiency in religious and ethical matters and thus for a puritan abstention is to be sought in this very point: in the ordinary ineffability of affective experiences grounding ethical attitude to life, not in the ineffability of ethical content itself.

He states later that these are fundamentally religious examples. "... the first of [the experiences] is, I believe, exactly what people were referring to when they said that God had created the world; and the experience of absolute safety has been described by saying that we feel safe in the hands of God." (ditto) So, the impossibility of ethical speech based on language insufficiency to express "the higher" actually refers to Wittgenstein's concern with religious transcendence. His circumspect attitude to language has effectively to do with his underlying tendency to see every problem from a religious point of view and consequently from the point of view of limits of expression. Only, Wittgenstein is not a religious person in the usual sense, but a secular one, and he disposes of a critical stance to language. Thomas Rentsch ascribes Wittgenstein "a consequent 'worldly', because 'secularised' form of mystical religiosity" (Rentsch 1997). His secular language Puritanism bears similarity with the tradition of negative theology, as the attempt to make space for transcendence (e.g. quasi-religious experiences of the absolute) in something immanent and worldly, i.e. inside a secularised language and to ground it in a negative way.

5. Conclusion

Wittgenstein's writings on ethics show thus in what sense he could maintain a religious point of view even though religious expression was radically impossible for him. The interest this paper was not to suggest a religious reading of Wittgenstein, on the contrary. If he did not hide his ethical and religious concerns, the place of religious and ethics was often construed as some 'ineffable insight'. However, I have argued that Wittgenstein resolutely refuses any expression of assertive religious and ethical content, yet his motivation to this refusal might result from a secularised quasi-religious stance. The aim and possible achievement could have been, in this negative perspective, to restore certain autonomy to religious language from incursions of positivist theoretical language.

The fact that religious attitude is or can be construed as radically other to secular theories (social sciences, philosophy, psychoanalysis etc.), grounded in largely ineffable experiences and not in criticised dogmas, is no longer a commonplace. Wittgenstein could thus open up space for reconsidering religious meanings as well as save philosophy from overly theorising. The model for such a difference would then not be another theory, but a picture or spatial analogy, that of the "gulfs between us", where a possibility of "respecting deeply" is still granted.

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Uncertainty as a challenge for ethical reasoning

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1. Introduction

The moral problems which appear to be the most urgent at present — ranging from questions touching intergenerational justice to biomedical ethics — often confront us with decisions under ‘uncertainty’. Thereby the content of ‘uncertainty’ in the demotic meaning of the word (denoted by the use of inverted commas) exceeds what decision theory treats when referring to this term. However, for an ethical theory seeking an implementation of its normative theories in moral practice, the whole complex of ‘uncertainty’ has to be considered. In order to make this term accessible to a systematic treatment, we identify three types of ‘uncertainty’, namely ‘incertitude of consequences’, ‘incertitude of demarcation’, and ‘incertitude of reliability’ (Section 2). Considering the man-made greenhouse effect as an example, it is pointed out that all three incertitudes constitute major problems for ethical reasoning. We thus want to ask the question to what extent decision theory can be of benefit for ethical reasoning (Section 3).¹ While it is (within limits) indeed able to cope with the incertitude of consequences, decision theory takes into account only fragmentarily the incertitude of reliability and demarcation. These shortcomings of decision theory can only be adumbrated here. A possible solution using a dianoetic approach is suggested (Section 4).

2. A typology of ‘uncertainty’

The possible man-made climate change details the problems which ‘uncertainty’ entails for ethical reasoning most lucidly: The consequences of an enhanced greenhouse effect due to man-made emissions of greenhouse gases are largely unclear. Possible aftermaths range from a severe global warming through hardly any changes to a cooling down of parts of the globe. Below we give a classification of ‘uncertainty’ with respect to *context* that is illustrated by the man-made greenhouse effect. This typology follows loosely Hansson 1996.

Incirtude of demarcation: Just as any analysis of a specific decision, a political evaluation of the present predictions of the future climate must start with some demarcation of the decision itself. Facing actual decisions, the incertitude of demarcation can be twofold: (a) Assuming the general purpose of the decision is well determined, it can still be unclear whether or not all the available options have been identified. For example it is not at all clear whether or not there are yet unknown means as to how to compensate for or adapt to (severe) climate changes. Furthermore, (b) not in every decision situation is it established how to determine the ‘decision horizon’ (Hansson 1996, 37; Savage 1954, 83): The scope of the decision or even which problem the decision is supposed to solve might be unclear. Hence the actual decision horizon would be infinite. Nevertheless, in order to be able to make any decision, one has to restrict the decision horizon. Concerning our example, it is under debate as to whether a possibly man-made climate change can be discussed independently of problems connected to the use of energy resources whose usage

emits no greenhouse gases, such as nuclear power. Discussing nuclear waste disposal, one might ask whether we do or do not have to take into account that future generations might be incapable of reading records on the waste disposal while, at the same time, there will have been no other information transfer from one generation to the next on the subject of nuclear waste disposal. We can continue with an infinite list of related questions.

Incirtude of consequences: Most of the time, prognoses about the outcomes of a decision are rather dubious. This might be due to the fact that information which may influence the knowledge of consequences of a decision is not available or is on such a scale that it cannot be assessed adequately by the agent within the time the decision has to be taken. This can be due to (i) contingent features of the specific situation. Just think of all the shortfalls of present climate models and their numerical implementations. But there may also be (ii) limitations in principle to obtaining such information: The implications of the man-made emission of greenhouse gases on future people, for example, depend crucially not only on the future course of environment, but also on the course of societies, technologies, etc. In this case the way of farming is of particular importance. Furthermore there are situations where (iii) the decision touches systems that do not allow for certain predictions: Complex systems as the climate system or most sociological systems entail feedback processes and therefore — although the underlying dynamics is purely deterministic — cannot be predicted with certainty as they might exhibit chaotic behaviour.

Incirtude of reliance: In many cases it is not clear, if the available information which is necessary to determine the consequences, the available options, as well as the horizon of a certain decision is at all reliable. It might be difficult or even impossible for the moral subject to decide whether the people providing it are themselves reliable, whether the used methodology is subject to doubt, or even how to determine the relevant scientists for obtaining the information. The problem the moral agent encounters when estimating the reliability of the information needed for the ethical evaluation of the present prognoses on the anthropogenic greenhouse effect, is expressed lucidly by the German Umweltbundesamt which states (Umweltbundesamt 2003, my translation): ‘Concerning the present climate debate the layman seems to be incapable of judging whether a report really emanates from a research with adequate quality standards or if it represents only some “story”.’

The forgoing analysis made clear that all three incertitudes cannot be eliminated in principle. How to deal with the various incertitudes identified here — how to deal with an unfinished list of decision options as well as with a finite decision horizon, how to take into account of the uncertain consequences of a decision, and how to estimate the reliability of the available data — constitute major challenges for ethical reasoning if it seeks an implantation of its norms in moral practice.

¹ Thereby we focus on welfare based ethics only.

3. Potentials and limitations of decision theory

The incertitude of consequences is elaborated extensively within decision theory and risk analysis. So let us restrict for the moment to this kind of 'uncertainty'. Here further differentiations seem necessary and we distinguish three different kinds of incertitude of consequences which differ by their *degree* of incertitude (e.g. Leitner 2004; Knight 1948, 19f.): *Risk* is defined as a setting in which all possible outcomes of the decision are known and can be assigned some frequency which offers some confident estimate of the occurrence probability of the corresponding outcome. *Uncertainty* is defined by a setting in which again the whole set of outcomes is known but not for all outcomes can one assign the corresponding frequencies. Situations where one lacks knowledge not only on the probabilities, but on (part of) the outcomes too, are called decisions under *ignorance*.

Actual situations quite often entail elements of risk, uncertainty, and ignorance: There is a more or less continuous gradation of incertitudes of consequences running from the ideal case (choices under certainty) to complete ignorance. Classifying a certain decision situation as a situation under risk, uncertainty or ignorance, is somewhat arbitrary. Here the second kind of incertitude of demarcation comes into play: The wider the chosen decision horizon, the more likely we face a decision under ignorance; narrowing down the decision horizon, we will encounter a risky situation. Although incertitude of consequences and demarcation are thus interrelated, the two are conceptually different. The same is true for the third type, the incertitude of reliability. This motivates the above classification of the incertitude of consequences by its degree where we rather follow the nomenclature used in ethics of technology than in decision theory. The terminology used in decision theory (e.g. Luce/Raiffa 1957, 13) might blur the differences between probability estimates via frequency approaches and probability estimates via subjective probabilities. But as will be detailed in the following, it is the way one handles the incertitude of reliability that determines which probability estimate should be chosen. The incertitude of consequences is treated in a different way.

For the moment we assume the decision horizon to be fixed and focus on decisions under *risk*. Probabilistic decision models which do not restrict to the mean, but take into account also higher order moments of the probability distribution, indeed provide a suitable way of how to deal with such decisions. We refer to the literature with regard to the debate on which kind of probabilistic model is adequate. Here it shall be only stressed that this question can be settled completely within decision theory — presupposing that the consequences have been evaluated 'properly' in a preliminary step. How to actually do this, is again determined by ethical reasoning and not by decision theory. Though this constitutes a severe problem, it is not specific for ethical considerations under 'uncertainty' (e.g. Hillerbrand 2005). Hence it will not be discussed here.

In order to make any probabilistic decision model fruitful for decisions under *uncertainty*, one has to assign 'subjective' or 'personal' probabilities to those outcomes for which frequencies are not known. More sophisticated approaches reintroduce in a second step uncertainty into a closure ansatz: So-called 'second level subjective probabilities' or 'higher order beliefs' estimate the reliability of the assessed occurrence probability of the various outcomes. Elementary, i.e. non-probabilistic decision

models such as Maximin, do not have to make the additional assumption of a subjective probability. At a first glance they thus might appear to be most suitable for decisions under uncertainty.

Nonetheless probabilities seem to be of importance for a moral assessment. For example, the total harm of a decision might depend on the number of people harmed; this is often codetermined by the occurrence probability of the harm. Furthermore, an overall preference of frequencies to subjective probabilities does not seem adequate in all cases. For example considering the shortcomings of present climate model, it is not at all clear whether or not the (few) existing frequency estimates of the occurrence probability of a raise in sea level due to anthropogenic greenhouse gases are indeed more reliable than subjective probability estimates of some specialist. Here it becomes crucial to estimate the reliability of the probability estimates. Although it is not the primary task of moral philosophy to reason about the reliability of scientific forecasts, it seems up to ethics to provide the decision maker with a kind of 'threshold' that indicates when a reduction approach is appropriate, i.e. that indicates when to accept subjective probability estimates and treat decisions under uncertainty or even ignorance in complete analogy to decisions under risk. Here it seems that — although we argued for a general guideline, a probabilistic decision model, when facing decisions under risk — there is no general, context-independent answer to that question.

The problems encountered in setting this threshold parallel (to some extent) the problems encountered when classifying a given decision situation as a decision under risk, uncertainty, or ignorance. Here the second incertitude of demarcation comes into play. A formal way of how to deal with it was proposed by Savage 1954. But the relevant question for tackling this incertitude of demarcation, namely, to state criteria on how to form, in Savages terms, the 'small worlds' from 'the grand world', is not answered satisfactorily by Savage or in any other decision theoretical approach (Savage 1954, 16; Spohn 1978, 63; Schmidt 1995, 57). Without having to address a specific example, difficulties seem to arise whenever one wants to state context-independent criteria to determine the decision horizon.

4. Outlook: Judgment as a supplementation of rules

The analysis of the forgoing section seems to reveal that with respect to certain aspects of 'uncertainty' a solution detached from contingent features of the decision situation is out of reach. With respect to the colloquial use of the term 'uncertainty' M. Luntley notes something similar (Luntley 2003, 326):

The ethically competent needs general rules, but these are not what primarily lie behind ethical competence in decision making. Wise judgement is not constituted by grasp of general rules, but by the attentional skills for finding salience in the particularities of situations. The important element of decision making [...] is the element that turns on the possession and operation of these attentional skills.

We suggest to identify the conceptual skill Luntley mentions with Aristotle's dianoetic virtue of phronesis (e.g. *Ethica Nicomachea*, VI 8-19) as it is used for example by O. Höffe (1993). Then judgement labels a certain ability and willingness to identify and to implement the ways and

means of how to realize a moral norm in real life situations (Aristotle *Ethica Nicomachea*, VI 8-19). But contrary to Luntley who does not distinguish 'uncertainties' which are different with respect to context (see Section 1), we hold the opinion that for treating the incertitude of consequences adequately, general 'rules' of the form given by probabilistic decision models on the basis of welfare ethics seem to be required. A synthetic approach, combining welfare based ethics and a virtue ethics approach might be able to cope with the 'uncertainty' of decisions in the full meaning of the word.

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Es gibt keinen Dissens, es gibt nur schlechte Interpretation. Interkultureller Dialog und Dissens

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In multikulturellen Gesellschaften ist die Gefahr von Missverständnissen relativ gross. Dies hat zunächst weniger etwas mit rein sprachlichen Verständigungsschwierigkeiten zu tun – damit natürlich auch – als vielmehr mit dem Aufeinandertreffen fremder, wechselseitig unverständener Lebensformen. Wittgensteins Bemerkung in den Philosophischen Untersuchungen über die Möglichkeit, dass man trotz der Beherrschung der Sprache eines fremden Landes, die Menschen dort nicht *versteht* (Wittgenstein 1995, 568), scheint mir auf genau diesen Sachverhalt hinzuweisen. Missverständnisse, wenn es denn echte Missverständnisse sind, lassen sich aufklären. Häufig jedoch gestaltet sich die interkulturelle Kommunikation über die Klärung von Missverständnissen hinaus konfliktuell und dann wird von interkulturellen Konflikten oder auch von unauflösbarem Dissens gesprochen. Bevor ich ein sprachphilosophisches Modell vorstelle, das – pointiert ausgedrückt – behauptet, es gebe gar keinen Dissens, es gebe nur schlechte Interpretation, möchte ich kurz auf den Dissensbegriff im interkulturellen Kontext eingehen und dabei einen starken Dissensbegriff von einem schwachen, üblicherweise mit „Meinungsverschiedenheit“ benannten, abheben.

Der Beispiele, auf die der Dissensbegriff angewandt werden kann, sind genügend: Ehrenmorde, Zwangsheiraten, Dispensierung vom Turn- und/oder Schwimmunterricht usw. Das sind die bekannteren, insbesondere religiöse, im Gegensatz zu säkularen Lebensformen betreffenden Beispiele; es mag weniger bekannte und für andere Lebensformen geltende geben, auf welche der Dissensbegriff gleichermaßen zuträfe. Es geht mir jedenfalls nicht darum, irgendeine kulturelle Gemeinschaft zu privilegieren oder zu stigmatisieren, sondern darum, an diesen allseits bekannten Beispielen die Bedingungen für einen starken Dissensbegriff zu erläutern.

Worum geht es? Zunächst ist klar, dass im vorliegenden Zusammenhang Dissens bezüglich einer bestimmten Praxis besteht, die von einer Seite befürwortet wird, während die andere sie missbilligt. Weniger klar scheint mir schon, dass beide Seiten gute Gründe für bzw. gegen die in Frage stehende Praxis vorbringen können sollten. Doch um zu einem Dissens im starken Sinne zu kommen, reicht es nicht, eine Praxis einfach abzulehnen, weil es z.B. nicht die eigene ist, sondern es setzt ein gewisses Verständnis dieser Praxis, und das heißt, der Gründe, die dafür oder dagegen sprechen, voraus. Ein starker Dissensbegriff ist nicht auf der Ebene eines ersten, möglicherweise idiosynkratischen Urteils über einen bestimmten Sachverhalt oder eine Praxis anzusiedeln. Er beinhaltet eine Verständigung über die Gründe für oder gegen diese Praxis. Dies kann eine Verständigung über die den Gründen zugrunde liegenden Werte einschließen. Der Verständigung über Gründe oder Werte ist das Verstehen der sprachlichen Äußerungen, welche die Gründe oder Werte zum Ausdruck bringen, vorgeschaltet. Dissens steht also Ende eines Verstehens- und Verständigungsprozesses, und nicht an seinem Anfang. Dieser Umstand bezeichnet den Unterschied zur Meinungsverschiedenheit, dem Dissens im schwachen

Sinne. Die Meinungsverschiedenheit kann am Anfang eines Verständigungsprozesses stehen und am Ende aufgelöst sein, wenn man sich über einen Konsens verständigt hat. Die Meinungsverschiedenheit kann auch am Anfang eines Verstehensprozesses stehen, an dessen Ende sich herausstellt, dass man die andere Person „bloß“ nicht richtig verstanden hatte. Dissens hingegen bezeichnet die mittel- oder längerfristige Unmöglichkeit, einen Konsens herzustellen.

Dies ist der Punkt, an dem beispielsweise Jürgen Habermas die Toleranzzumutung einführt: „Toleranz wird denen zugemutet, die aus jeweils guten subjektiven Gründen andere Überzeugungen und Praktiken in dem Bewusstsein ablehnen, dass es sich um einen zwar kognitiven aber auf längere Sicht unlösbaren Dissens handelt.“ (Habermas 2003, 390) Man könnte dies als eine Art *Dissensmanagement* bezeichnen. Ich möchte dieser Art von Dissensmanagement eine Position gegenüberstellen, die von Anfang an die Möglichkeit von Dissens im starken Sinne zu verneinen scheint. Es handelt sich um Donald Davidsons sprach- und handlungstheoretischen Ansatz, den ich oben durch die Formulierung „Es gibt keinen Dissens, es gibt nur schlechte Interpretation“ charakterisiert hatte.

Das für multikulturelle Gesellschaften diagnostizierte Dissensrisiko scheint gegen Null zu streben, legt man einen Ansatz, wie Donald Davidson ihn vertritt, zugrunde. Davidson behauptet, dass, *wenn* wir mit den anderen kommunizieren können, wir bereits eine ganze Reihe an Grundwerten mit ihnen teilen. „If we understand their words, a common ground exists, a shared ‘way of life’.“ (Davidson 1984, 37) Das Finden einer gemeinsamen Grundlage geteilter Werte ist gemäß Davidson eine Bedingung von Verstehen und nicht umgekehrt Verstehen die Bedingung für das Herausfinden, dass man gemeinsame Werte hat – oder eben nicht hat. Mit anderen Worten: Verstehen fungiert gerade nicht als Bedingung dafür, dass man gegebenenfalls einen Dissens im vorher beschriebenen starken Sinne feststellen kann (vgl. Davidson 1995, 51; 1984, 37). Es scheint, als sei Dissens in einem starken Sinne überhaupt nicht möglich.

Dies hat etwas mit Davidsons integrierter Bedeutungs- und Handlungstheorie zu tun (vgl. Davidson 1980), auf die ich im Folgenden näher eingehe. Es wird sich zeigen, dass in Davidsons Ansatz Einigkeit sowohl hinsichtlich Überzeugung und Bedeutung als auch hinsichtlich Werten aus *methodologischen* Gründen maximiert wird. Dennoch bleiben meines Erachtens Spielräume, bei denen die Interpretin die Wahl hat, einen Dissens festzustellen und ihn als Dissens stehen zu lassen oder Dissensmanagement zu betreiben, wobei der Dissens dann verschwindet.

Die Maximierung von Einigkeit, die grundsätzliche Übereinstimmung in bezug auf Überzeugungen oder Werte ist der zentralen Rolle, die das Nachsichtigkeitsprinzip in Davidsons Philosophie spielt, geschuldet. Nachsicht, dies betont Davidson immer wieder, sei nicht etwa „eine zur Auswahl stehende Möglichkeit“, sondern sie sei uns „aufgezwungen“ (Davidson 1974, 280). Denn nur aufgrund von

Nachsichtigkeit hinsichtlich des uns fremd oder unverständlich vorkommenden Verhaltens bzw. Sprechens anderer, gelingt es uns, dieses Verhalten bzw. Sprechen intelligibel zu machen. Nachsicht heißt im Klartext, dass wir den anderen zuerst einmal „in den meisten Dingen recht geben, ob wir das mögen oder nicht“ (Davidson 1974, 280). Im Kontext von Rationalität und Werten spricht Davidson statt von Nachsichtigkeit auch von einer „policy of rational accommodation“ (Davidson 1984, 35), womit die Schwerpunktverschiebung von der im bedeutungstheoretischen Zusammenhang wichtigen Wahrheitsunterstellung zu einer Rationalitätsunterstellung, die zugleich einen gemeinsamen Werthorizont transportiert, deutlich wird.

Das Verfahren, voraussetzungslos das Verhalten anderer intelligibel zu machen, ist das der Radikalen Interpretation. Handelt es sich bei dem Verhalten nur um Sprachverhalten, so gilt es herauszufinden, was diejenigen, die sich sprachlich auf eine bestimmte Weise ausdrücken, mit ihren Äußerungen meinen. Es gilt also die Bedeutung der benutzten Wörter und Sätze herauszufinden. Diese findet man heraus, indem man den Sprechern die propositionale Einstellung des Für-wahr-Haltens zuschreibt und dann ihre Äußerungen in Beobachtungssituationen und im Lichte dessen, was man selbst für wahr hält, interpretiert. Ohne an dieser Stelle im Einzelnen auf die bedeutungstheoretische Variante der Radikalen Interpretation eingehen zu können, möchte ich festhalten, dass hier zwei Variablen im Spiel sind, nämlich die unbekannte Bedeutung der Worte und die unbekanntenen Überzeugungen eines Sprechers. Diese sind interdependent, denn: „Für wahr hält der Sprecher einen Satz aufgrund dessen, was der Satz (in seiner Sprache) bedeutet, und aufgrund dessen, was er glaubt.“ (Davidson 1973, 196)

Was das Nachsichtigkeitsprinzip leistet, ist die Fixierung einer der beiden Variablen, nämlich der Überzeugungsvariable (vgl. Davidson 1973, 199). Die Norm der Einigkeitsmaximierung wird in der „Praxis“ der radikalen Interpretation so ausgelegt, dass der Sprecherin weitgehend die gleichen Überzeugungen, die man selbst hat, zugeschrieben werden. Damit ist Einigkeit sozusagen automatisch garantiert. Diese auf den ersten Blick ungeheuerliche hermeneutische Vereinnahmung ist nur deshalb vertretbar, weil es sich beim Nachsichtigkeitsprinzip um ein methodologisches Prinzip handelt und nicht um eines, das empirisch begründet wäre. In der integrierten bedeutungs- und handlungstheoretischen Variante der Radikalen Interpretation kommt zu den beiden Variablen Bedeutung und Überzeugung eine dritte hinzu, die der unbekanntenen Präferenzen oder Werte einer Person. Davidsons Umgang mit dieser komplexeren Variante ist im Wesentlichen analog zum Verfahren der Radikalen Interpretation in der bedeutungstheoretischen Version.

In dem Aufsatz „Expressing Evaluations“ fragt Davidson nach dem Zusammenhang zwischen evaluativen Einstellungen, wie er sie nennt, und Sprache bzw. wie evaluative Einstellungen in Sprache ausgedrückt werden (Davidson 1984, 20). Nachdem er darauf hingewiesen hat, dass das Ausdrücken einer evaluativen Einstellung oder Werthaltung bzw. Präferenz nicht an einen bestimmten semantischen Gehalt gebunden ist, sondern die Einstellung der Sprecherin zu einem beliebigen Satz darstellen kann, kann er die Menge von Sätzen, mittels derer eine Werthaltung ausgedrückt wird, über die Menge von Sätzen, die explizit ein Wertevokabular benutzen, hinausführen. Der Unterschied zwischen einer

präskriptiven und einer deskriptiven Einstellung bemisst sich nun nicht mehr an sprachlichen Ausdrücken wie „es wäre gut“ oder „ich möchte, dass“, welche in offen präskriptiven Sätzen vorkommen, während sie in deskriptiven Sätzen fehlen, sondern an der Einstellung, welche die Sprecherin zu einer Proposition, also zum semantischen Gehalt eines Satzes einnimmt. So muss beispielsweise nicht ausdrücklich geäußert werden „Es wäre gut, wenn es keinen Krieg (keine Zwangsheiraten, Ehrenmorde usw.) mehr gäbe“, um eine bestimmte Werthaltung zum Ausdruck zu bringen. Die Werthaltung drückt sich in der Einstellung aus, welche die Sprecherin zur Proposition „Es gibt keinen Krieg (keine Zwangsheiraten, Ehrenmorde) mehr“ einnimmt. Eine evaluative Einstellung äußert sich dann darin, dass man *möchte*, dass die Proposition „Es gibt keinen Krieg mehr“ wahr sei – im Gegensatz zur Überzeugung, also der Einstellung des Für-wahr-Haltens, welche *glaubt*, dass die Proposition „Es gibt keinen Krieg mehr“ wahr ist (vgl. Davidson 1984, 24-26).

Nach einem entscheidungstheoretischen Exkurs, in welchem Davidson herleitet, dass man die relative Präferenz zwischen zwei Sätzen einer Sprecherin ermitteln kann, auch wenn man deren Sprache nicht versteht, kommt er zurück auf das Nachsichtigkeitsprinzip. „The key to the solution for simultaneously identifying the meanings, beliefs, and values of an agent is a policy of rational accommodation.“ (Davidson 1984, 35) Wie schon in der bedeutungstheoretischen Version leistet auch hier das Nachsichtigkeitsprinzip die Fixierung einer der drei Variablen. Um Einigkeit zu maximieren, wird die Interpretin der handelnden Person ihre eigenen Präferenzen und Werte zuschreiben. Spätestens hier muss man fragen, ob diese Einigkeitsunterstellung mehr ist als eine egozentrische Vereinnahmung oder ein „kommunikativ ungehemmter ‚Deutungswahn‘“ wie Josef Simon es formuliert hat (Simon 1995, 15), und ob sich die Einigkeitsunterstellung über die Behauptung hinaus begründen lässt, dass es sich dabei um eine methodologische Notwendigkeit der Interpretation handle. Ich meine, sie ist mehr und sie lässt sich begründen, sofern man Davidsons Auffassung davon berücksichtigt, wie der Gehalt von Werten bzw. Überzeugungen zustande kommt und bestimmt werden kann.

Gemäß Davidson hat der Gehalt von Überzeugungen etwas mit den Ursachen dieser Überzeugungen zu tun. Zwischen Ursache und Gehalt einer Überzeugung besteht ein systematischer Zusammenhang. Davidson nennt es eine „Grundeinsicht“, dass „Worte und Gedanken in den einfachsten Fällen auf das Bezug nehmen, wodurch sie bewirkt werden... Der Grund ist, dass wir nicht zuerst Begriffe bilden und dann herausbekommen, worauf sie zutreffen; vielmehr ist es so, dass in den fundamentalen Fällen die Anwendung den Inhalt des Begriffs bestimmt.“ (Davidson 1989, 70f) Was in diesem Zitat aus der bedeutungstheoretischen Perspektive beschrieben wird, gilt nicht nur für Überzeugungen, sondern für alle propositionalen Einstellungen, also auch für Präferenzen und Werte. Evaluative Ausdrücke wie „gut“, „schlecht“ oder „das ist falsch“, sagt Davidson, würden auf dieselbe Weise erworben wie deskriptive Ausdrücke (vgl. Davidson 1995, 47, 48; 1984, 36). Wenn eine Interpretin das Verhalten einer Person verstehen möchte, geht sie davon aus, „...that similar causes beget similar evaluations in interpreter and interpreted“ (Davidson 1986, 72). Es bleibt ihr dann nichts anderes zu tun übrig, als der fraglichen Werthaltung oder Überzeugung eine Ursache im sozialen Raum zuzuordnen. Dabei handelt es sich natürlich um die

Ursache gemäss ihren eigenen Wertmassstäben. „As an interpreter, I can do no better at the start than to suppose that a belief someone else is caused to have is the same belief as a belief of mine that has the same cause.“ (Davidson 1986, 69) Mit anderen Worten: Von dem, was ich will, dass es wahr sei, werde ich annehmen, dass es bei anderen die gleiche evaluative Einstellung des Wollens-dass-es-wahr-sei hervorrufe. Die Berechtigung zu dieser Annahme liegt gemäss Davidson in der Objektivität von Werten begründet, auf die ich hier nicht eingehen kann (vgl. Davidson 1995).

Während bei der Identifikation von Überzeugungen, d.h. bei der Rekonstruktion dessen, was eine Sprecherin für wahr hält, der Druck des Nachsichtigkeitsprinzips auf Einigkeitsmaximierung relativ groß ist und nur wenig oder wenigstens keine substantiellen Abweichungen duldet von dem, was die Interpretin selbst für wahr und konsistent hält, ist dieser Druck hinsichtlich dessen, was sie wertschätzt, weniger groß. Bei der Präferenzzuschreibung, meint Davidson, seien größere Differenzen zwischen dem, was die Interpretin für wertvoll hält, und dem, was sie der anderen Person als deren Präferenzen zuschreibt, möglich (Davidson 1986, 72). Dies ist die Stelle, wo man mit der Frage nach der Möglichkeit von Dissens in Davidsons Ansatz einhaken kann.

Wie erläutert erfolgt die Zuschreibung einer Überzeugung, dass p, über die Einstellung des Für-wahr-Haltens von p. Die Zuschreibung einer Präferenz für p erfolgt über die Einstellung des Wollens-dass-p-wahr-sei. Ich meine, dass in der Differenz zwischen glauben-dass-p-wahr-ist und wollen-dass-p-wahr-sei der Spielraum liegt, der nötig ist, um die Möglichkeit von echtem Dissens plausibel zu machen. Davidson weist selbst darauf hin, dass der Interpretationsvorgang mit der Einführung der dritten Variable, der Präferenzvariable, sehr komplex geworden ist (vgl. Davidson 1986, 71). Die Interdependenz der drei Variablen zusammen mit dem Holismus des Mentalen und der inferenziellen Struktur der Sprache führen dazu, dass es unter Umständen mehr als nur eine mit der Gesamtheit der Belege übereinstimmende Interpretation geben kann (vgl. Davidson 1995, 50). „Given the multiplicity of considerations, it is inevitable that different considerations will often favor different interpretations. Remembering that the underlying policy of interpretation requires us to choose an interpretation that matches the other's beliefs and desires to our own as far as possible, the conflict in considerations means that we have come across a recalcitrant case. Making a fair fit elsewhere perhaps forces us here to interpret a sentence the other holds true and wants true by one we hold true while hating that we must.“ (Davidson 1986, 71f)

Davidson bestreitet also keineswegs, dass es Differenzen in bezug auf Normen oder Werte geben kann, auch wenn man sich versteht (Davidson 1995, 50). Aber er ist der Meinung, dass basale Werte eine Tendenz zum Konvergieren haben (Davidson 1995, 49). Stellt man eine Uneinigkeit hinsichtlich eines basalen Wertes fest, so sollte man sich laut Davidson stets fragen, ob man die Person tatsächlich richtig interpretiert hat. Im Zweifelsfalle kann und sollte man die Bedeutung ihrer Worte uminterpretieren, wenn sich dadurch die Einigkeit in bezug auf Werte maximieren lässt (vgl. Davidson 1974, 279; 1995, 48,50). Dies ist Davidsons Form des Dissensmanagements.

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Wittgenstein im Iran

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I. Erste Phase

Die Rezeption Wittgensteins im Iran erfolgte zum erstenmal gegen Ende 1971, und zwar durch die Übersetzung des zusammengefassten Vorworts David Pears zu seinem damals neuerlich erschienenem Buch *Ludwig Wittgenstein*. Der Übersetzer war Manutschehr Bosorgmehr, der an der Teheraner Universität lehrte. Dieser veröffentlichte kurz danach, im Jahre 1972, seine Übersetzung von Justus Hartnacks ursprünglich auf Dänisch erschienenem *Wittgenstein and Modern Philosophy* (London 1965). Bosorgmehr war scheinbar ein Positivist, wahrscheinlich war besonders der frühe Wittgenstein für ihn von Bedeutung; es ist nicht ausgeschlossen, dass er Wittgenstein gezielt und bewusst im philosophischen Raum Irans vorstellen wollte. Es gab nämlich auch einen von Martin Heidegger begeisterten Kreis.

Im gleichen Jahre veröffentlichte Darjusch Aschuri, ein bekannter Intellektueller, einen Aufsatz mit dem Titel „Ludwig Wittgenstein: der leidenschaftliche Logiker“, in dem er eine für die damalige Zeit Irans gute und allgemeine Beschreibung von Wittgenstein und seinem Werke gab.

1975 veröffentlichte der hochgelehrte Scharafoddin Khorasani seine Übersetzung von I. M. J. Bochenskis *Europäische Philosophie der Gegenwart* (Bern 1947) mit einem von dem Übersetzer selbst verfassten Anhang, in dem er eine auf Wittgensteins eigenen Werken gegründete Beschreibung der beiden Denkphasen Wittgensteins auf etwa 25 Seiten gibt. Diese Beschreibung scheint der erste philosophisch ernstzunehmende ursprünglich auf Persisch geschriebene Text über Wittgenstein zu sein.

1980 erschien von dem späteren Übersetzer des *Tractatus* Wittgensteins ins Persische, Mir Schamssoddin Adib Soltani, ein beachtenswertes Werk mit dem Titel *Die Wiener Abhandlung*, in dem er sich freilich auch mit dem frühen Wittgenstein beschäftigt.

Viele Jahre später, 1987, erschien ein Aufsatz von Schapur Etemad, einem bekannten Akademiker, mit dem Titel: „Wittgenstein: Logik, Mathematik und Naturwissenschaften in der ‚Logisch-philosophischen Abhandlung‘“.

Abgesehen von manchen Hinweisen in Werken zur Philosophiegeschichte scheinen das alle Texte zu sein, die über Wittgenstein bis etwa 1990 in persischer Sprache veröffentlicht wurden.

II. Zweite Phase

1. Hintergrund

Etwa dreizehn Jahre nach der Islamischen Revolution und drei Jahre nach dem langen Krieg mit dem Iraq, hat der Iran langsam begonnen, auch in kultureller Hinsicht viele neue Erfahrungen zu sammeln; trotz aller Schwierigkeiten hat das Land eine spannende ja in mancher Hinsicht glühende Zeit vor sich. Die intellektuellen Diskussionen werden heißer, die philosophisch-theologischen Debatten schärfer. Dabei

werden in verschiedenen Bereichen viele Aufsätze und Bücher übersetzt und veröffentlicht. Die philosophischen Werke haben dabei besonderen Stellenwert, und auch Wittgenstein genießt zunehmende Aufmerksamkeit: Nicht nur Werke von ihm werden veröffentlicht, sondern es kommen auch allerlei Werke über ihn in persischer Sprache heraus, wie etwa „Wittgenstein für Anfänger“ oder „Wittgenstein in 90 Minuten“ bis zu sehr bedeutsamen Werken, manche davon mit nicht immer gelungenen Übersetzungen. Die Zahl persischer Bücher von und über Wittgenstein beträgt gegenwärtig um die 40. (Die wichtigen Forschungen zu Wittgenstein sind jedoch größtenteils nicht übersetzt worden.) Sogar in vielen nicht philosophischen Pressen kann man über Wittgenstein lesen, man könnte sogar von einem Wittgenstein-Fieber reden. Bis zum Jahre 2004 – hauptsächlich in einen Zeitraum von fünf Jahren – sind nach der Statistik über 100 Aufsätze, einschließlich Buchbesprechungen, über Wittgenstein veröffentlicht worden, und zwar in verschiedenen Zeitschriften und Zeitungen (es war ja der „Frühling der Presse“, die Zeit der „Reformisten“). Man braucht nicht darauf hinzuweisen, dass manche von diesen Veröffentlichungen kein so hohes Niveau hatten.

Warum aber solche Aufmerksamkeit gegenüber Wittgenstein? Diese Frage lässt sich nicht leicht beantworten; vielleicht könnte man sagen, dass sie zum größten Teil nur ein bloßer Zufall ist. Eines scheint mir jedoch sicher, und zwar was die ernste Seite dieser Zuwendung zu Wittgenstein betrifft: Bei den erwähnten theologisch-philosophischen Debatten hatte für viele die rationale Rechtfertigung der Religion und des religiösen Glaubens an Gültigkeit verloren. Die „Religiöse Erfahrung“ war wichtig und ist viel diskutiert worden, der religiöse Pluralismus wurde von vielen stark verteidigt (da kennt man nun etwa John Hick sehr gut). Kein Wunder also, dass Wittgenstein gut zu verwenden war. Jedenfalls war die Aufmerksamkeit gegenüber Wittgenstein größten Teils im Bereich der Philosophie der Religion zu finden. Abhängig von den theologischen Debatten bekamen auch erkenntnistheoretischen Themen große Bedeutung; und auch hier hörte man den Namen Wittgenstein.

Obwohl für manche von den sogenannten „religiösen Intellektuellen“ – die die Modernität verteidigen und versuchen den Islam und die Werte der Moderne in Einklang zu bringen – Wittgenstein bei den schon erwähnten Debatten vieles zu sagen hatte, konnte seine zweite Denkphase für manche von ihnen von keiner Bedeutung sein, anders als zum Beispiel Karl Popper. Dagegen konnten manche Gegner der „Religiösen Intellektuellen“, darunter die Vertreter der Postmoderne, sich auch Wittgensteins Denken bedienen. Ich möchte mich aber hier nicht in diese ziemlich komplizierte Angelegenheit vertiefen. Jedenfalls ist in diesen Jahren Wittgenstein auch für die Iraner mit postmodernistischen Neigungen verständlicherweise attraktiv gewesen, und diese – seien es die Religiösen, seien es die Säkularen – haben bei der zunehmenden Aufmerksamkeit auf ihn mitgewirkt; es hat ja in Iran auch ein Postmodern-Fieber gegeben!

Ich möchte jedoch nicht alles auf die kurz beschriebenen Faktoren reduzieren. Für manche ist die Person Wittgenstein interessant und beachtenswert gewesen, für manche die Beschäftigung mit ihm von bloß

akademischem Charakter, natürlich teilweise verbunden mit den erwähnten Debatten. Die akademische Aufmerksamkeit auf Wittgenstein in diesen letzten etwa 15 Jahren Irans hat vor allem Mostafa Malekjan, einem der prominenten Denker des heutigen Irans, vieles zu verdanken. In seinen beliebten und viel besuchten Lehrveranstaltungen stellte er auch Wittgensteins Werke vor, schlug Interessierten Themen für Magister- bzw. Doktorarbeit, half ihnen bei deren Realisierung. Ohne Malekjans Einfluss wären viele von den guten veröffentlichten Werken über Wittgenstein nie entstanden. Eine andere Person, die diesbezüglich erwähnt werden soll, ist Sohrab Alawinia, der als Professor für Philosophie Wittgenstein zum Schwerpunkt hat. Viele Studenten haben bei ihm von Wittgenstein gehört und manche Arbeiten über Wittgenstein sind unter seiner Betreuung übersetzt bzw. geschrieben worden.

Die zunehmende Aufmerksamkeit gegenüber Wittgenstein und ihre oben aufgezeigten Schwerpunkte – die religiösen und epistemologischen Themen – zeigt sich besonders in den Magister- und Doktorarbeiten, die an iranischen Universitäten geschrieben worden sind; laut einer Statistik sind in den wenigen Jahren vor 2004 etwa 20 solche Arbeiten über Wittgenstein geschrieben worden. Angesichts der noch zunehmenden Aufmerksamkeit ist anzunehmen, dass in den letzten 2-3 Jahren diese Zahl auf 30-40 gestiegen sei. (Auffallend sind dabei die Arbeiten zum Thema Religion und religiösen Glauben bei Wittgenstein) Von den persischen Doktorarbeiten über Wittgenstein möchte ich folgende erwähnen, und zwar nur beispielsweise, ohne jegliche Bewertung:

„Religion bei Wittgenstein“, Mohammad Akwan (2000; nicht veröffentlicht);

„Wittgenstein und Erkenntnistheoretische Objektivität“, Minu Hojjat (2003; noch nicht veröffentlicht);

Metaphysik und Philosophie der Sprache: der frühe Wittgenstein und die islamischen „Vernunft-Wissenschaften“, Hossein Waleh (2003; eine vergleichende Studie).

Ich möchte hier noch zwei weitere persische Untersuchungen nennen, die ich für wichtig halte; die erste von einem schon erwähnten Wittgensteinianer, die zweite von einem bekannten Gegner des späten Wittgensteins:

Wittgenstein und Quine über Mathematische Epistemologie, Sohrab Alawinia (2001).

„Eine Analyse mancher Folgen der Lehren des späten Wittgensteins für Sozialwissenschaften“, Ali Paya, (2003).

2. Wittgenstein-Übersetzungen

A. Wittgensteins Werke

Zwischen den zwei oben dargestellten Phasen der Beschäftigung mit Wittgenstein erschienen 1990-1992 nacheinander zwei persische Übersetzungen vom *Tractatus*. Die erste wurde zu Recht nie ernst genommen, die zweite – von dem oben genannten Adib Soltani – war philosophisch und auf ihrer Genauigkeit ein Ereignis; sie war aber nicht in Einklang mit der geläufigen Sprache, stilistisch entsprach sie dem Geschmack der meisten nicht.

Das war aber nur ein Anfang, besser gesagt, ein Ende. Es hatte fast nichts zu tun mit dem, was in den nächsten Jahren geschehen sollte; die Übersetzer entstammten einer anderen Generation. Es brauchte etwas Zeit, bis sich die Aufmerksamkeit gegenüber Wittgenstein ausreichend entfalten und sich ihre Ergebnisse zeigen konnten. Zwischen 1999-2004 erschienen Übersetzungen

folgender Werke Wittgensteins (ich begnüge mich mit den Namen der Werke, vermeide jegliche Bewertung):

„Vortrag über Ethik“

Bemerkungen über die Farben

Über Gewissheit (zwei Übersetzungen)

Philosophische Untersuchungen (auch eine nicht veröffentlichte Übersetzung)

Vorlesungen und Gespräche über Ästhetik, Psychoanalyse und religiösen Glauben

Vermischte Bemerkungen

Briefe an Paul Engelmann und Ludwig von Ficker

Zettel

Von manchen der erwähnten Übersetzungen gibt es inzwischen schon eine zweite Auflage. Darüber hinaus stehen meines Wissens momentan (im Juni 2006) die Übersetzungen folgender Werke vor ihrer Veröffentlichung:

Kapitel „Philosophie“ von *The Big Typescript*

Das Blaue Buch

Vorlesungen über den Religiösen Glauben (eine zweite Übersetzung)

B. Werke über Wittgenstein; eine Auswahl

Von den zahlreichen Übersetzungen der Werke *über* Wittgenstein, die in dem oben genannten Zeitraum erschienen, sind möchte ich folgende hier nennen, damit der Hörer bzw. Leser sich ein ungefähres Bild von der Lage machen kann. Mit einer Ausnahme sind diese Werke wiederum in dem Zeitraum 1999-2004 erschienen.

Ludwig Wittgenstein: a memoir, Norman Malcolm;

Ludwig Wittgenstein, David Pears;

Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*: an introduction, H. O. Mounce;

Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy, K. T. Fan;

Wittgenstein and religious belief, W. Donald Hudson;

Wittgenstein: a religious point of view?, Norman Malcolm (zwei Übersetzungen);

Wittgenstein on Human Nature, P. M. S. Hacker;

Wittgenstein and the Philosophical Investigations, Marie McGinn;

Wittgenstein, Ethics and Aesthetics: the View from Eternity, Benjamin R. Tilghman;

Language, Saussure and Wittgenstein: how to play games with words, Roy Harris;

Wittgenstein's poker: the story of a ten-minute argument between two great philosophers, David Edmonds and John Eidinow;

„Wittgenstein and his time“, G. H. von Wright;

„Gott beim frühen Wittgenstein“, Cyril Barrett (Kapitel 5, „God“ von Wittgenstein on Ethics and Religious Belief);

„Religion in Wittgenstein's Mirror“, D. Z. Philips.

Für sehr nützliche Informationen bin ich Babak Abbasi und Mohammadmansur Haschemi dankbar.

Wittgenstein's Paperwork. An Example from the "Big Typescript"

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1. Understanding requires two Languages

Can we detect patterns governing those arrangements? The table of contents lists 19 chapters and 140 sub-chapters, to be sure, but those are extremely abstract and, conversely, highly specific terms ranging from "philosophy" and "grammar" to "the cardinals" and "proof by induction". This listing clearly serves as a first attempt to collect the available material under a manageable number of headings. It is not intended to express a continuous philosophical argument, even though its opening trias "Understanding" -- "Meaning" -- "Sentence. The Meaning of a Sentence" can be read this way. It is virtually impossible to extract just a few lines of thought from Wittgenstein's free-wheeling, dense and occasionally cryptic remarks.

Subsection I,3 is entitled "Das Verstehen als Korrelat einer *Erklärung*". The crucial intuition is that "meanings" are not there to be discovered, they are constructed in an observer-language, imposed upon a web of supposedly meaningful activities of a linguistic community. Meaning arises at the interface of two languages.

If one looks closer at the typescript one notices a variety of discursive strategies governing the arrangement of the various pieces derived from copies of previous typescripts. I have, in an earlier paper, demonstrated how Wittgenstein constructs his initial argument against "private language" by means of a careful *grouping* of snippets extracted from antecedent work (Hrachovec 2001). Here, I will pick one sub-chapter and delineate the internal shape of what turns out to be a complex and coherent -- albeit small-scale -- exposition.

"Verstehen" damit meine ich eine Korrelation der Erklärung, *nicht* einer - etwa medizinischen - Beeinflussung.

Mit dem Worte "Missverständnis" meine ich also wesentlich etwas, was sich durch Erklärung beseitigen läßt. Eine andere Nichtübereinstimmung nenne ich nicht "Missverständnis".

No mention of interpretation or language diversity here. But look at the context of Ms 109 (Nov. 29th and 30th, 1930; WA 3.140 ff) from which this piece is taken. Wittgenstein is discussing rule-following and in particular how we can grasp a rule exemplified in some semiotic system, e.g. a piece of musical notation:

Wenn wir z.B. ein Musikstück von Noten lesen so beurteilen wir das Ergebnis nach der Intention die Noten in bestimmter Weise zu übersetzen. (WA 3.142.1)

Translation is the key to separating rule-following from mechanisms. Punch cards may well determine the output of a loom, yet it is not the actual result that can serve as a criterion of rule governed activities. What if the machine breaks and its *de facto* output is completely at odds with the intended one? The rules embodied in a punch card have to be taken as *meaning projections*, bridging the gap between, for instance, a carpet and our understanding of its anterior design. Wittgenstein's remark about understanding and explanation from MS 109 directly links to his discussion of a piece of music and a loom. His

main point is that this is not achieved by intuition, but by a special kind of discursive elaboration of the given data: they are treated as instances of rule-governed behavior. Wittgenstein's next paragraph elaborates on this. Unarticulated understanding is not his topic. It would not fulfill the requirement of possible translation.

Verständnis entspricht der Erklärung, soweit es aber der Erklärung nicht entspricht, ist es unartikuliert und geht uns deswegen nichts an; oder es ist artikuliert und entspricht dem Satz selbst, dessen Verständnis wir beschreiben wollen. (WA 11.21.2)

Wittgenstein -- this is the present claim -- does carefully compose the sequence of paragraphs. Consider his entries from February 9th and 10th, 1930 which are the *locus originarius* of the preceding quote (WA 3.192.7). They are mainly concerned with coming to terms with a common sense objection to his linguistic theory of meaning. It seems that no discursive articulation can capture the actual accomplishment of "catching the rule" or knowing the meaning of an expression since this is an *event* (within the mind or within communicative practice). Two pages of the manuscript are spent in discussing the merit of those intuitions an answer to which is given by the preceding quote in February 1930. It's reappearance in the BT does not carry over this context but treats it as an initial thesis.

2. Dialogue Dependence

There is a second set of assertoric statements that opens the sub-section under discussion. The remarks WA 11.21.3 - 11.21.6 deal with an aspect of the linguistic approach to meaning that might be called "dialogue dependence". Like the initial remark (WA 11.21.1) WA 11.21.3 - 11.21.5 are taken from a discussion of rule-following (January 29th, 1931. MS 110; WA 3.168.4-6). In both instances Wittgenstein picks remarks that generalize the issue, referring to understanding *in toto* rather than to particular cases of rule-following. In order to perceive the subtle difference between those two sets of remarks it is, again, helpful to cast a glance at their provenance. The first set was triggered by musical scores and machines, the second one arises in a discussion of an inter-personal event, namely the understanding and obeying of an order. Since scores and machines cannot talk back there is a shift of emphasis from translation to interpretational dialogue.

Wissen, was der Satz besagt, kann nur heißen: die Frage beantworten können "was sagt er?"

Den Sinn eines Satzes verstehen/kennen/, kann nur heißen: die Frage "was ist sein Sinn" beantworten können. (WA 11.21.3)

We are given two independent, if closely connected theses on understanding. Firstly, it is articulated like an explanation and secondly it comes as an answer to a question demanding explanations. This might not seem a remarkable distinction and Wittgenstein in fact continues by treating WA 11.21.1 - 11.21.6 as *one* part of his argument. There is an interesting subtext, though. Erased by the technique of collage the background to the thesis of

dialogue dependence is a discussion of the singularity of philosophical method.

To pick up this thread one has to take the hint of WA 11.21.6. This is a single sentence inserted from a sequence written between February 19th - 21st, 1931 (Ms 110, WA 3.216.7).

Das Triviale, was ich zu sagen habe, ist, daß auf den Satz "ich sage das nicht nur, ich meine etwas damit" und die Frage "was?", ein weiterer Satz, in irgend welchen Zeichen, zur Antwort kommt.

To analyze this quote one has to be aware of the two respective contexts. In 1931 the issue is philosophical vis a vis everyday explanation, whereas the 1933 occurrence of the assertion follows a series of remarks lacking this distinction. Wittgenstein is considering a difference in explanation. Explanations of how to sew or to smoke *add* information to surface appearances, whereas rule-following *does not* enrich the content of the rule. "Translating" a command into an action stays within the scope determined by this command and this fits well into Wittgenstein's notion of non-revisionary philosophy. Explaining thought is not supposed to teach us more than we already know (WA 3.215.9). The dialogue dependence of meaning that manifests itself in the need to produce a sentence in response to the challenge "What do you mean by that?" is (imperceptibly) determined by Wittgenstein's refusal to countenance anything but ordinary language in philosophy.

To sum up: the third sub-section of "Verstehen" in BT starts out with two sets of related claims concerning understanding: (i) it is a translational activity that (ii) does not assume a stance outside a given language. We can somehow understand the working of a loom, but it is more to the point to consider inter-personal conversation. And here, in order to explain one's meaning, as far as philosophy is concerned we are simply invoking statements of a familiar nature.

3. Resolution

My working hypothesis is that Wittgenstein follows a particular dramaturgy in assembling his cut-outs into the BT. After having put forward several theses on understanding, culminating in the claim that they amount, in fact, to a trivial statement, Wittgenstein switches sides and inserts four paragraphs questioning what has just been proposed. "Aber man kann fragen ...", "Man will sagen ..." and "Man möchte sagen ..." are the phrases he uses to raise doubts against the preceding remarks.

Wittgenstein has set the stage. He has built up a thesis and its anti-thesis. His next *Zettel* is a continuous segment that first appears as two handwritten pages on November 15th, 1931 (Ms 112, 91v-92v, WA 4.193.181-183) and is carried over into Ts 211, Ts 212 and Ts 213 in its entirety with very little changes. It seems that Wittgenstein was comparatively satisfied with this exposition and that it is positioned as a resolution to the foregoing conflict. The issues touched upon in the first part of the sub-section are taken up and put into perspective. Wittgenstein reminds himself that he is dealing with the grammar of "meaning" and he comes up with an explicit statement about the use of two languages:

Die Antwort auf die Frage 'wie ist das gemeint' stellt die Verbindung zwischen zwei sprachlichen Ausdrücken/zwischen zwei Sprachen/ her. (WA 11.22.2)

After thus reaffirming his initial maxim he proceeds to explain how we might be misled into thinking that such expressions conveying meaning are somehow incomplete and in need of additional consideration.

His point is that we tend to treat nouns like "sense" and "meaning" as terms referring to some thing called SENSE. A name requires something to refer to and by analogy we are tempted to search for "the meaning" of an expression as if we could find it in some objective realm. But consider how we deal with e.g. an arrow. It is meant to direct us into *this* direction, that is: it is employed this way. We understand it by conforming to this prompt. If someone picks out the symbol and treats it as one of the more common nouns she might ask: "What is the meaning of this sign?" and feel like supplementing its "raw" notational appearance with some interior state "... als wäre der Pfeil gleichsam nur das Musikinstrument, die Meinung aber die Musik, oder besser: der Pfeil, das Zeichen - das heißt in diesem Falle - die Ursache des inneren, seelischen Vorgangs." Even though Wittgenstein does not spell it out (he rarely does) these remarks are not just a rejection of the anti-thesis indicated above, they include an account of how their plausibility can be comprehended -- and dissolved. If I am right Wittgenstein's three-step composition is a micro-cosmos containing the essence of his philosophical message: We are deceived by inappropriate grammatical analogies; we can sort things out by paying close attention to how our language actually works; philosophy is words that remind us of insights at the surface of our linguistic practice.

4. Bonus Track

This leaves a final remark that does not seem to serve a particular purpose. It comes from MS 110 (August 4th, 1931; WA 3.324.6) and might have been appended to this sequence simply because of its reference to an arrow.

Was die Erklärung des Pfeils betrifft, so ist klar, daß man sagen kann: "Dieser Pfeil bedeutet/sagt/ nicht, daß Du dorthin (mit der Hand zeigend) gehen sollst, sondern dahin." - Und ich würde diese Erklärung natürlich verstehen.-

"Das müßte man aber dazuschreiben."

If I have been right in my reconstruction of Wittgenstein's purpose one would hesitate to dismiss the remark as a simple appendix. And it does, indeed, play a more important role within Wittgenstein's textual arrangement.

Looked upon in isolation Wittgenstein's observation seem harmless, even a platitude. If meanings are given by sentences explaining symbols such sentences will contain phrases like "this arrow means ...", accompanied by appropriate verbal and physical prompts. "This arrow means *right*, accompanied by a movement of one's arm is not incomprehensible. Wittgenstein might extend his concession: "Of course I would understand this explanation." There is an approved rendering of the meaning of an arrow: "that you should go *there*" and a deprecated account: "right"- yet, there seems to be no big difference in actual use. Both forms of explanation will ordinarily succeed. If this is correct Wittgenstein is undercutting his own grammatical regime in admitting that "to got there" or "to the right" or "right" can all be conceived of as valid explanations of a given arrow. His aim is not to revise language but to avoid philosophical puzzlement arising from improper analogies.

Not quite. One final sentence, easily overlooked, remains to be accounted for. At a first glance it does not seem to carry much philosophical weight. Yet, this is a very suggestive remark which can be enhanced to contain a splendid summary of the preceding discussion. It shows Wittgenstein at his best: finding an uncontroversial, temporary resolution to an irritating philosophical dispute. Remember that the problem at hand is the relation between (linguistically) articulated accounts of meaning and meaningful pursuits that seem to add something to the mere symbols. Sentences put forward as contentful articulations and sentences as moves in language games are different. One might compare them to a physical coin and a coin within some system of monetary exchange. How should we respond to this incongruence?

Wittgenstein does not deny the problem. He offers an everyday remark that shows how we can easily reconcile the opposite sides. The Austrian colloquial meaning of the present sentence can be illustrated by the following episode. A child is given a slip of paper with a sketch of three red apples and sent to the grocery to buy such apples. The shopkeeper looks at the note and does not recognize the fruits. He asks what this sketch is supposed to show. The child answers "apples", to which the grocer replies "Das müßte man aber dazuschreiben." The main purpose of symbols is to support interaction. If signs are ambivalent, more signs can help. They have, of course, in turn to be understood, i.e. employed in language games. But there is no dogmatic divide between the undisturbed working of language and its ruptures. Meaning requires both elements, understanding signs and understanding the need to supplement signs with further notes.

It is a pity that this humble remark did not survive Wittgenstein's editorial revisions and drops out from later versions of his "Philosophical Grammar". A small detail, to be sure, but it serves to illustrate an important point. Wittgenstein's remarks are highly sensible to their local discursive context. When it dissolves, the remarks lose a considerable amount of their force.

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Substance and Attribute in the Controversy Between the Two Greatest Western Philosophers (Leibniz and Spinoza)*

Leibniz's Critique of Spinoza's Argument for Pantheism (*Ethics*, th. 14) in his *Remarks on Benedict de Spinoza's Ethics* (part I, Of God)

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1. Introduction

Ethics proved in geometrical order by Benedict de Spinoza is undoubtedly one of the most interesting philosophical works of European culture. One can even say that if the ideal of *mathematical* (Russell) or *formal* or *exact philosophy* should be made real some day, it should (setting aside the fact that contemporary formal means were of course unavailable to Spinoza) take the form of Spinoza's main work. As a book of such importance, it comes as no surprise that *Ethics* has had many commentators. Among them, especially great philosophers deserve our attention. One of them is Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.

In the current article I would like to present and comment on fragments of Leibniz's critical remarks on the first part of *Ethics: Remarks on Benedict de Spinoza's Ethics* (part I, Of God). As indicated in the title of this article, I shall focus on the notions of *substance* and *attribute*.

In what follows I shall rely on Leibniz's text up to theorem 14 (i.e., to the proof of pantheism), and I shall also omit certain portions of *Remarks* unnecessary for the topic.

2. G.W. Leibniz, *Remarks on Benedict de Spinoza's Ethics* (part I, Of God)¹

Definition 1. The cause of itself is that whose essence involves existence.

Definition 2. Is unclear, since, as he says, a thing, which can be limited by another thing of the same kind, is finite. What does it mean that a thought is limited by another thought? Is any thought bigger than another thought? As he says that a body is limited, when another body, bigger than it, can be conceived. Add below, theorem 8.

Definition 3. Substance is that which is in itself and is conceived through itself. This definition is also unclear. What does 'to be in itself' mean? Then, one should ask, whether inclusively or exclusively Spinoza joins these phrases: 'to be in itself' and 'to be conceived through itself'; that means, would he like to say: substance is that which is in itself, and which is conceived through itself as well; or would he like substance to be something about which these two are true, namely, that it is in itself and that it is conceived through itself. Or will it be necessary to prove that something which has the first, also has the second, though, contrary to it, it would seem that there are things which are in themselves, even if they are not conceived through themselves. And this is how people

usually conceive substances. He adds: substance is something the concept of which doesn't need the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed. But here also lies the trouble, since in the next definition he says that attribute is perceived of substance by the intellect as constituting its [i.e. substance's] essence. So the concept of attribute is necessary to form the concept of substance. If you said that attribute is not a *thing*, whereas you require at least from substance not to need the concept of another thing, I say: one should explain now what is called 'a thing' in order to understand the definition, and in what sense *attribute* is not a thing.

Definition 4. Is also unclear, since attribute is something that is perceived of substance by the intellect as constituting its [i.e. substance's] essence. A question arises whether by 'attribute' he understands every reversible predicate, or every essential predicate – reversible or not – or every essential first predicate, that means, not requiring the proof from substance. See def. 5.

Definition 5. Mode (*modus*) is that which is in another thing and through which it is conceived. So it seems that it differs from attribute in that attribute is of course in substance, though is conceived through itself. And here, after adding this explanation, the obscurity of def. 4 disappears.

Definition 6. As he says, I define God as the absolutely infinite being, or substance constituted by infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence. One should show that these two definitions are equivalent; otherwise one cannot substitute one for another. They will be equivalent provided that it is demonstrated that in reality there are many attributes or predicates which are conceived through themselves; and, in addition to that, that many attributes can coexist. Besides, every definition is imperfect (even if it can be correct and clear), if having understood it one can doubt whether the thing defined could be possible. And this definition is such; for still, one can doubt whether being having infinite attributes is not incoherent. (...)

A1.² Everything which is, is either in itself or in another

A4. The cognition of an effect depends on the cognition of the cause and involves it [i.e. the cognition of the cause].

A5. Things having nothing mutually in common cannot be mutually understood through one another.

(...)

Theorem 1. Substance is by its nature prior to its affections, i.e., modes, since (according to def. 5) Spinoza holds that by affections of substance he understands modes. Yet he hasn't explained what 'to be by its nature prior' means, hence, this theorem cannot be proved. (...)

¹ G. W. Leibniz, *Ad Ethicam B. d. Sp. Pars prima de DEO*, as translated by TK. The original text is taken from: Leibniz 1978 (this is a reprint of Berliner edition from 1875), Vol. I, pp. 139-150. Words in square brackets come from me. According to Gerhardt, Leibniz received one exemplar of Spinoza's *Opera Posthuma* at the beginning of 1678 (p. 116, footnote; p. 119). These remarks come also from this year.

² From Spinoza's axioms I shall mention only the following three: - TK.

Theorem 2. Two substances having different attributes have nothing in common with one another. If by attributes he understands predicates conceived through themselves, I agree with it provided that there are two substances, A and B, and *c* is an attribute of substance A, *d* is an attribute of substance B; or that *c* and *e* are the only attributes of substance A, whereas *d* and *f* are the only attributes of substance B. It would be otherwise if these substances had some attributes in common, and some not, e.g. if *c* and *d* were A's attributes, and *d* and *f* – B's ones. Now, if Spinoza denies this possibility, one must demonstrate this impossibility. In case of disagreement, he will probably prove this theorem in this way: since *d* and *c* express the same essence (as we have assumed that these are the attributes of the same substance, namely A), and the same goes for *d* and *f* (as they are also the attributes of the same substance, namely B), so *c* and *f* [express the same essence]. From this it follows that A and B are the same substance, contrary to what we have assumed. Hence, that two different substances have something in common is an absurdity. I reply that I haven't assumed that there can be two attributes conceived through themselves, yet expressing the same. For whenever this fact holds, those two attributes expressing the same, albeit in different ways, can then be resolved [= decomposed], and at least one of them. That can be easily proved by me.

Theorem 3. If two things have nothing in common with one another, one cannot be the cause of the other (from axioms 4, 5).

Theorem 4. Two or more different things differ from one another either in attributes of substance, or in affections. He proves it as follows: everything which is, is either in itself or in another (from axiom 1), that means, (from def. 3 and 5), there is nothing outside the intellect but substances and their affections. Here I am surprised that he forgets about attributes, for according to def. 5 by affections of the substance he understands only modes. It follows that either he expresses it equivocally or he doesn't regard attributes as things existing outside the intellect, but only substances and modes. Anyway, he could demonstrate this theorem more easily, if he had only added that things, which could be conceived through their attributes or affections, necessarily could be known through them, and hence differentiated.

Theorem 5. In reality there cannot be two or more substances having the same nature i.e., attribute. Here I notice that it seems to be unclear what 'in reality' would mean. Would he understand by it 'in the domain of existing things' or 'in the domain of ideas or possible essences'? Next, it is unclear whether he wants to say that there are not many essences having the same attribute or whether he wants to hold that there are not many individuals having the same essence. I am also surprised why here he uses words 'nature' and 'attribute' as synonyms, unless he understands by attribute something which includes the whole nature. But having assumed that I cannot see in what way there can be many attributes of the same substance, [attributes] conceived through themselves. Proof: if substances differed from one another, they would differ either in affections or in attributes; if in affections, then, since substance is by its nature prior to their affections (from theorem 1), setting aside affections, these substances must differ from one another, hence, differ in attributes, and if in attributes, then there are no two substances having the same attribute. I reply that there seems to be a paralognism here. For two substances can be distinguished by their attributes, and yet they can have

certain attribute in common, provided that they have (apart from this attribute) some properties. For example, if there were two substances, A and B, the former having attributes *c*, *d*, and the latter – *d*, *e*. I also notice that theorem 1 is not used by Spinoza anywhere but in this proof. True, this proof could be made without this theorem, since it suffices that substance can be conceived without affections, whether it would be by its nature prior to their attributes or not.

Theorem 6. One substance cannot be produced by another substance, for (from theorem 5) there are no two substances having the same attribute, hence, they have nothing in common with one another (from axiom 5). The same in other words and in a much shorter way, since that, which is conceived through itself, cannot be conceived through another, e.g. through a cause (from axiom 4). Anyway, I reply that I agree with this proof provided that substance is assumed here as a thing conceived through itself; things will be different if one assumed substance to be something which is in itself, as people usually assume, unless one demonstrates that being in itself and being conceived through itself are the same.

Theorem 7. Existence pertains to the nature of substance. Substance cannot be produced by another (theorem 6). Therefore, it is the cause of itself, that is (from def. 1), its essence itself involves existence. Here Spinoza is rightly criticized for the fact that at one time he assumes cause as something fixed, whose specific meaning is established by def. 1, and at another time he uses it in its popular meaning. Yet the remedy is simple, if he had transformed def. 1 into an axiom and said: everything which doesn't come from another comes from itself, i.e., from its essence. True, other problems arise here: namely, the reasoning will be valid if we assume that substance can exist. For it is necessary that substance will exist by itself (if it cannot be produced by anything else), hence, exists necessarily. Therefore, one must prove that substance is possible, i.e., it is conceivable. It seems that it can be demonstrated from the fact that if nothing is conceived through itself, then nothing will be conceived through anything else, hence, nothing at all will be conceived. In order to show it clearly: one should consider that if one assumed that *a* is conceived through *b*, the concept of *b* is in the concept of *a* itself. And again, if *b* is conceived through *c*, the concept of *c* is in the concept of *b* itself, and thus, the concept of *c* itself will be in the concept of *a* itself, and so on, up to the last concept. If someone said that there was not the last concept, I would reply that there is not the first one, which can be demonstrated as follows: since in the concept of a thing, which is conceived through another thing, nothing can be found except what is different, thus – decomposing the concepts gradually – either nothing can be found in it or nothing but that which is conceived through itself. And this proof I regard as quite novel and valid. And with its help one can demonstrate that what is conceived through itself, is conceivable. Yet one can still doubt whether this thing is possible in the sense of "possible" used here, namely, not as something which is conceivable, but as something whose cause (which finally amounts to the first cause) is conceivable. For things we can conceive cannot be produced *because* we can conceive them: [if they cannot be produced that is] in virtue of other things, more perfect ones, with which they are incompatible. Thus, that being which is conceived through itself actually exists, must be demonstrated by experience [, namely:] since there are things which are conceived through something else, something *through which* they are conceived, exists. As you can see, in order to prove in a strict way the existence of the thing existing

through itself, one would need an entirely different reasoning. Yet, maybe this highest caution is not necessary.

Theorem 8. Every substance is necessarily infinite; otherwise it would be limited by another substance of the same nature (from def. 2), and hence there would be two substances having the same attribute, contrary to theorem 5. This theorem should be understood as follows: A thing, which is conceived through itself, is infinite in its kind, and that is how this theorem should be accepted. The proof, however, is weakened, firstly due to the expression 'is limited', secondly, due to the uncertainty pertaining to theorem 5. In *scholium* [= additional note] Spinoza presents elegant reasoning aiming to show that the thing which is conceived through itself is unique, namely, is only one in its kind. Since he assumes that there are many individuals, there must be reason in nature, why there are as many of them, and neither more, nor fewer. The same reason, by virtue of which there are as many individuals, is the one by virtue of which there is this and that. Hence, explaining why there is this one. [sense: the reason in virtue of which there are as many individuals is the reason in virtue of which there is any particular individual] This reason is not contained in this thing rather than the other. Hence, it is outside everything. (...)

Theorem 9. The more reality or being (*esse*) a thing has, the more attributes it has. One must explain what is understood by 'reality' or 'being', for these things are susceptible to equivocality. Proof: this is evident from def. 4. So much Spinoza. It doesn't seem that this proof can be evident from def. 4. For a given thing can have more reality than another thing due to the fact that it is greater in respect to its kind, i.e., it has the greater part of some attribute. E.g., a circle has more extension than a square inside it. And similarly, it can be doubtful whether there are many attributes of the same substance, in the sense of "attribute" used by the author. Meanwhile, I agree with that, and that assuming that attributes are compatible, the more perfect substance is, the more attributes it has.

Theorem 10. Each attribute of a given substance must be conceived through itself (from def. 3, 4). Yet it implies – as I have objected several times – that there are no attributes of a substance but one, provided that it expresses the whole essence. (...)

Theorem 14. Besides God, no substance can be nor can be conceived. For God has all the attributes, and there are not many substances having the same attribute, and thus there is no substance besides God. All that assumes the definition of substance (that is a being which is conceived through itself) and many other claims, pointed out above, shouldn't be allowed. (...)

3. Comments

Ad def. 2. It seems that by 'infinite' and 'limitless' Spinoza understands 'perfect'. One can say that God's every attribute is "perfect in its own kind" (Spinoza, *Short Treatise on God, Man and his Well-being* [Spinoza 1930a], part I, chapter 2), that is, infinite in its own kind (Spinoza, *Ethics* [Spinoza 1905], part I, def. 6, explication). "Perfect" in a sense similar to the traditional, Aristotelian notion of perfection (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1021b: perfect *x* is such an *x* which does not lack anything or such an *x* which is not surpassed by anything in its proper quality), that is endorsed by both Leibniz and Spinoza. According to Leibniz, if *p* is a quality that allows for different degrees of intensity, then *x* is perfect in *p*'s respect iff *x* has *p* in the

highest degree. If *p* can have at all the maximal degree of intensity, it is called by Leibniz *perfection* (Leibniz, *Discourse on Metaphysics* [Leibniz 1978c], § 1). If one can take into account *extension*, then, according to Spinoza, a thing "infinite (i.e., perfect) in the kind of extension" would be such a thing that one cannot conceive any greater (spatially) than it, i.e., this thing cannot be limited by another thing. In order to answer Leibniz's question ("what does it mean that a thought is limited by another thought?") one should first answer the extremely difficult question: what is *thought* for Spinoza?

Ad def. 3. Leibniz's objection is not clear (setting aside the right question about the meaning of the phrase 'to be in itself'). Spinoza simply proposes the following definition: substance := something which is in itself & which is conceived through itself. It seems that – according to Leibniz – Spinoza holds either that everything which is in itself, is conceived through itself, or not. If so, Leibniz finds this claim doubtful. If not, then Spinoza has in mind that substances are such things that they are in themselves and conceived through themselves as well. The author of *Ethics* adds the explanation, from which – at first glance – follows that substance is something indefinable (Leibniz is aware of the fact that the term 'substance' is not used here in material supposition, speaking in medieval terms – otherwise Spinoza's definition would be: "substance" – this term is primitive, i.e., not defined"). Since the traditional definition was the one "by the nearest kind and the difference of species" (and that is why it usually had the form: A := B & C, that can be interpreted in many ways, e.g., in a set-theoretical manner), such an explanation suggests that to be in itself and to be conceived through itself means the impossibility of possessing such a definition. As it turns out later, the author of *Monadology* understands def. 3 in the following way: *x* is a substance iff *x*'s concept is simple, i.e. indefinable, i.e. conceived through itself. From the comments on def. 5 it follows that Leibniz reads def. 4 (i.e., the definition of attribute) as follows: attribute is something which constitutes the essence of a substance (which is connected to the assumption that Spinoza's puzzling phrase "...intellect perceives of substance as..." is redundant). So Leibniz accuses Spinoza of a contradiction: the concept of attribute is therefore necessary to form the concept of substance. It looks as if Leibniz transforms def. 4 into the definition of substance: substance is something whose essence is constituted by an attribute. Of course, we cannot accept both definitions, and the author of *Ethics* does not.

Ad def. 4, 5. *P* is a reversible predicate for *Q* iff both of them have the same extension (Leibniz, *On universal Synthesis and Analysis...* [Leibniz 1978b]). *P* and *Q* can also be complex predicates. The standard example is 'rational animal' and 'man'³. A primitive concept is conceived through itself, i.e., is not decomposable into simpler concepts, i.e., is indefinable. In his *Meditations on Cognition, Truth and Ideas* [Leibniz 1978d], Leibniz calls them *absoluta attributa Dei*. As it is clear from his remark on def. 5, Spinozistic attributes are understood by him as certain simple concepts. It should be noted that Spinoza holds that attributes are conceived through themselves, and although he does not say it until theorem 10, in the proof of this theorem he refers only to definitions 3 and 4.

Ad def. 6. The absolute infinity is the infinity in every respect (see def. 2). From Leibniz's comment on theorem 9 it follows that '*x* has an infinite attribute *y*' means that '*x*

³ I hope I don't offend feminists here. Politically incorrect as it is, I prefer 'man' to 'human being' here for reasons that will become clear further in the text.

has an attribute y in the highest degree'. As an ontological pluralist, Leibniz assumes the existence of many attributes; the problem is whether these attributes can coexist in the same subject. So a famous question appears, the question that can be found in many other of Leibniz's works, which is an objection raised by the author of *Monadology* against Descartes's ontological proof: the problem of the possibility of God (see e.g. *Discourse on Metaphysics* [Leibniz 1978c], § 23 and many others). Leibniz himself tried to prove the possibility of God in his text from 1676 (entitled "The Most Perfect Being Exists" [Leibniz 1978f]) – interestingly, the year of his meeting with Spinoza.

Ad theorem 2. If substances have no attribute in common, then they have nothing in common – Leibniz agrees with this. Yet Spinoza holds that difference in one attribute alone suffices for their having nothing in common. Leibniz tries to reconstruct Spinoza's reasoning in a very interesting way: he is not satisfied with an enigmatic proof from *Ethics*, in which Spinoza refers only to def. 3.

Now, Spinoza could reason in the following way: Let two substances, a and b be given. Let D , C and F be attributes (i.e., indefinable concepts, conceived through themselves). Let D and C be the only attributes of a , whereas D and F be the only attributes of b . Let P be an attribute of x iff P is indefinable and is an essential property of x . Hence, that P is x 's attribute means that P expresses x 's essence. Assume also that every object has its essence. Next, we can agree that

if P expresses x 's essence and Q expresses it too, then P and Q express the same essence

From this it follows that

(1) if P is x 's attribute and Q is x 's attribute, then P and Q express the same essence

Next, we can assume that

if P and Q express the same essence and P pertains to x and Q pertains to y , then x and y have the same essence

From this last assumption and from the principle of individuation *via* essences, we have:

(2) if P and Q express the same essence and P pertains to x and Q pertains to y , then $x = y$

After suitable substitutions we obtain from (1) that D expresses the same essence as C , and that F expresses the same essence as D . From the transitivity of the relation of *expressing the same essence* as we obtain that F expresses the same essence as C . Since we have assumed that C pertains to a and that F pertains to b , from (2) it follows that $a = b$.

Leibniz rejects (1); he agrees instead with the following theorem:

(1') if P is x 's attribute and Q is x 's attribute and $P \neq Q$, then P and Q express different essences

What could the proof for (1') look like? Let us rewrite (1') as follows:

(1'') if P is x 's attribute and P and Q express the same essence and $P \neq Q$, then Q is not x 's attribute

Now Leibniz would say that e.g. 'man' expresses the same essence as 'rational animal'. If we agree that 'rational animal' is x 's attribute, then although x is essentially a man, 'man' is not x 's attribute, because we define 'man' by 'rational animal', so it is not a primitive

concept, as a result of which (1'') is satisfied here. Another example: 'trilateral' and 'triangle'. They express the same essence, yet if 'triangle' is x 's attribute, then if 'trilateral' can be defined, it is not x 's attribute, hence, (1'') is satisfied here, too.

It seems that the above considerations regarding (1'') reveal Leibniz's motivations quite well and are more instructive than searching for a general proof for (1''). In addition, it is worth noticing that the weakest step in the presented hypothetical argument of Spinoza is this: we said at the beginning that 'that P is x 's attribute means that P expresses x 's essence'. Now, it does not entail that P expresses *the whole* x 's essence. But without that premise the whole proof for theorem 2 simply fails.

Ad theorem 4. The author of *Ethics* "forgot" about attributes if we agree with the definition of attribute given by Leibniz in his comment on def. 5. The most interesting thing here is Leibniz's suggestion that Spinoza's proof can be explained by the fact that attributes don't exist outside the intellect (a similar, yet less clear suggestion was present above, by def. 3: is attribute "a thing"?).

Ad theorem 5. If this theorem says that no different individuals have the same essence, Leibniz agrees with it. Yet if it says that no possible objects have certain attributes in common, Leibniz rejects it (see comment on theorem 2). In turn, if attribute, i.e., indefinable concept "includes the whole nature" of the object to which it is ascribed (i.e., expresses its whole essence), then there cannot be any other attributes which can be ascribed to that object. Leibniz's remark concerning the redundancy of theorem 1 can be understood thus: that substance can be conceived without their modes means that there cannot be two substances differing from each other only with respect to their modes, hence, modes cannot be the principle of discernibility of substances.

Ad theorem 7. Spinoza proves theorem 7 thus: (i) from the fact that substance doesn't have any cause different from it (theorem 6) it follows that it is the cause of itself; (ii) from the fact that it is the cause of itself and from def. 1 it follows that its essence involves existence. Leibniz holds that term 'cause' in (i) and def. 1 have different meanings. The author of *Theodicy* thinks that if something doesn't come from anything else, it comes from itself (i.e. exists through itself), but provided that it *can* exist. It seems that we can paraphrase Spinoza's and Leibniz's reasoning, following remarks of the former from his second proof for the existence of God (*Ethics* [Spinoza 1905], theorem 11).

Now, both a given thing's existence and nonexistence must have its reason (Leibniz shares with Spinoza this rationalistic claim). These reasons can be external or internal. Accordingly, we can distinguish objects (i) for which there is an internal reason for its existence; (ii) for which there is a non-internal (i.e. external) reason for its existence; (iii) for which there is an internal reason for its nonexistence and (iv) for which there is a non-internal (i.e. external) reason for its nonexistence. Let certain object a be fixed and let 'E' be a sentential constant read as ' a exists'. We can make the following, nonstandard interpretation of modal operators: Let $\Box E$ iff object a satisfies condition (i); $E \wedge \Diamond \neg E$ iff it satisfies condition (ii); $\neg \Diamond E$ iff it satisfies condition (iii) and $\neg E \wedge \Diamond E$ iff it satisfies condition (iv). According to this interpretation, Spinozistic proof for theorem 7 could be as follows: substance doesn't have any external reason for its existence (from theorem 6), hence, it has an internal one. Assuming the aforementioned interpretation of modalities

(and assuming that *a* is certain substance), Spinoza holds that

$$\neg(E \wedge \Diamond E) \rightarrow \Box E$$

i.e.

$$(\alpha) (E \rightarrow \neg\Diamond E) \rightarrow \Box E$$

Leibniz doesn't agree with (α) , but holds that

$$(\beta) (E \rightarrow \neg\Diamond E) \wedge \Diamond E \rightarrow \Box E$$

We can add that Spinoza probably assumes that $\Box E \rightarrow E$, since in his first proof for theorem 11 he infers E from (α) .

This interpretation of modalities can be seen as a little bit *ad hoc*. Yet it is worth noticing that it allows for a very interesting observation concerning the second proof for the existence of the Spinozistic God (*Ethics*, theorem 11: God has neither external nor internal reason for His nonexistence, hence, it exists). In the case of our substance *a*, a counterpart of this proof will be:

$$\neg(\Diamond E \wedge \neg E) \wedge \neg\neg\Diamond E \rightarrow E$$

i.e.

$$(\gamma) (\Diamond E \rightarrow E) \wedge \Diamond E \rightarrow E$$

So (γ) is just a suitably substituted tautology of CPC in the modal language. Therefore, it suffices to prove the antecedent of this implication (that is not an easy thing to do, indeed – recall, for example, Leibniz's remark concerning the possibility of God).

Returning to the main strand of Leibniz's comment: notice that Leibniz explains (somewhat in passing) what 'possible' means: namely, it means 'conceivable' (we can call this kind of possibility 'A-possibility'). Since substance has been defined as something which is conceived through itself, one must show that something which is conceived through itself is A-possible. Next, notice that objects denoted by simple concepts – if, according to Leibniz, 'is A-possible' means 'is consistent in itself' – are always A-possible. For to show that a given object is incoherent amounts to decomposing concepts which determine this objects, showing that there are contradictory concepts among them. Therefore, the question about A-possibility amounts to the question about simple concepts. So, as in some traditional proofs for the existence of God, we try to find some terminal objects in a certain domain (ordered by the relation of *conceiving through* or *being in* – the latter if the domain consists of concepts. Following Leibniz, we can compare these relations thus: *x* is conceived through *y* iff *x* contains (i.e. is in) the concept of *y*). In concord with the tradition (see Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 994b) Leibniz holds that if there is nothing which is conceived through itself, then there is nothing which is conceived through something else. Yet there is something which is conceived through something else. Therefore, there is something which is conceived through itself. Or, in other words: if there are no primitive (or simple) concepts, then there are no complex ones. Yet, there are complex concepts⁴. Leibniz thinks that an analysis of every concept of a thing we conceive (and it seems that such things exist, anyway) should lead us to simple concepts: otherwise how to account for conceiving?

⁴ If someone finds these considerations anachronistic, I offer him one quote from contemporary philosophy: „But if there aren't any primitive concepts, then there aren't any concepts at all.” (J. Fodor, *Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1998, pp. 131-132)

(we could call this postulate *the principle of conceptual foundationalism*).

At the same time, Leibniz adds that A-possibility (i.e., consistency alone) doesn't suffice for demonstrating that a given object *can come to exist*. The possibility of coming to existing involves more than bare conceptual coherence; it requires compatibility with other objects from the universe. We can distinguish among these objects more and less perfect ones (in the sense explained above, see Leibniz's remark on def. 2 and our comment).

Unfortunately, it seems that Leibniz's thought is incomplete; in his *Definitions* [Leibniz 1948a] he writes: “Existing: that, which is compossible with the most perfect being. Compossible: that, which – taken together with something else – doesn't entail contradiction” (we could add that if we prove that there is precisely one most perfect possible object, we can show that it exists, since it is compossible with itself – compare Perzanowski 1994).

In sum, Leibniz's reasoning in his comment on theorem 7 is not clear: one doesn't know why writing about substance (as we know, which doesn't have any cause) at the same time he writes that another sense of possibility “is used here” (which we can call 'B-possibility') – the possibility of conceiving the cause of a given object. It seems as if two kinds of considerations merged here: one concerning the conditions of demonstrating the existence of substance, the other concerning conditions of demonstrating the existence of arbitrary objects.

Ad theorem 8. Substance is infinite in its kind, i.e., by def. 2, one cannot conceive substance which would have a given quality in a higher degree. Leibniz agrees with this theorem, but not with the proof it rests on (due to rejected theorem 5). Yet he accepts the Spinozistic proof (given in *scholio II*) for the uniqueness of a thing conceived through itself (more precisely, uniqueness in its kind). Since Leibniz doesn't present this reasoning, let us recall it:

1. If there are *n* individuals of the kind *K*, then there is a reason in virtue of which there are precisely *n* of them.
2. This reason is either in *K* or outside of *K*.
3. The reason in virtue of which substance exists is in its nature (by theorem 7, see above).
4. Yet, no *K* has any reason in virtue of which there would be *n* individuals of this kind.

Spinoza concludes that there is only one individual of the kind *substance*. Yet this reasoning is not clear, worse, it seems that 3 and 4 are contradictory premises. Fortunately, a small reformulation of this reasoning can save its validity: maybe Spinoza could see nothing problematic if *n* = 1 (leaving aside the case in which *n* = 0)? Namely,

1. (Alleged Spinoza's Principle)

if *x* is of the kind *K* and there are many objects of the kind *K*, then, if *y* is a reason in virtue of which *x* exists, *y* is outside *x*

Yet by theorem 7,

2. if *x* is of the kind *substance*, then, if *y* is a reason in virtue of which *x* exists, *y* is in *x*

Now it is easy to calculate that if x is of the kind *substance*, then, if y is a reason in virtue of which x exists, there is at most one object of the kind *substance*.

Interestingly enough, Leibniz doesn't write here about substance, but about a thing conceived through itself. He treats it as a proof for the uniqueness of God. Moreover, Leibniz's comment resembles his writings in which he argues for the existence of God as a sufficient principle of existence of every thing (for example, in his *The ultimate origin of things* [Leibniz 1978a] and *Monadology* [Leibniz 1840a], § 37).

Ad theorem 9. Leibniz denies the possibility that substance could have different attributes provided that the attribute expresses the whole essence (see above, his comments on theorem 2 and 5, and our comment). The problem of the compatibility of attributes has already been mentioned by Leibniz in his comment on def. 6. Finally, notice that Leibniz uses 'reality' and 'perfection' interchangeably (following Spinoza, see *Ethics* [Spinoza 1905], part I, theorem 11, *scholium*; part II, def. 6).

Ad theorem 10. See Leibniz's remarks on theorem 2, 5, 9 and our comment.

Ad theorem 14. This is, of course, the famous theorem often cited as the formula of Spinozistic "pantheism". As we saw, the crucial premise here is theorem 5 (and finally – theorem 2) – both thoroughly criticized by Leibniz.

Finally, let us ask: what is substance and attribute for Leibniz?

Substance is – following tradition (more precisely – Aristotle) – the last terminal subject. On the other hand, substance is any object that has a complete concept. C is an x 's complete concept iff for any concept characterizing x , C entails this concept (*Discourse on Metaphysics* Leibniz 1978c], § 8).

Substances can be divided into simple and complex ones. The simple ones do not have parts. We call them *monads* (*Principles of Nature and Grace* [Leibniz 1840b], § 1; *Monadology* [Leibniz 1840a], § 1). The complex substances are aggregates of monads (*Principles of Nature and Grace*, § 1). For example, *I* am such an aggregate.

The number of simple substances is fixed (*Discourse on Metaphysics*, § 9; *Principles of Nature and Grace*, § 2; *Monadology*, §§ 5,6). Substances are produced by means of emanation (*Discourse on Metaphysics*, §§ 14, 32; *Monadology*, § 47; this is an extratemporal process, hence, it doesn't contradict the previous claim) by a distinguished simple substance – the divine one, or, shortly, by God. A substance is a divine one iff it is a subject of all perfections and only perfections. Therefore, by the principle of identity of indiscernibles, there is at most one such a substance.

Some simple substances are centers of the complex ones and the principle of their unity. This center is surrounded by infinite number of other monads, stating to it in the relation of *subordination*. The center of such a structure is also called the *dominant monad*, whereas the rest constitutes the *body of this monad* (*Principles of Nature and Grace*, §§ 3, 4). The relation of subordination can reasonably be thought of as asymmetric (hence, irreflexive), thus, it induces some kind of ordering among simple substances.

Certainly Leibniz denies that *extension* can be an attribute in the Spinozistic sense of the term: on the contrary, he defined it as "the order of coexistence of possibilities" (*The second article against Bayle* in Leibniz 1978e) or "indeterminate repetition of things, inasmuch as they are similar to one another or indiscernible" (Leibniz 1854, p. 28), whereas "the infinite extension" is "no more than a kind of imaginative being" (*ibidem*, p. 42).

4. The Upshot

Leibniz holds that Spinoza's *definition of substance* is unclear, reconstructing the proof of the theorem which is a crucial premise in the Spinozistic argument for the *uniqueness of substance* and pointing to a formal error in this proof. He also points to what he considers to be certain gaps in the proof of theorem stating *that substance exists* (though, as we wrote, Leibniz's remarks are not clear). Finally, whether Leibniz accepts Spinoza's definition of the attribute or not, he firmly rejects the proposition that *extension* is an attribute.

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On Freedom to Predict

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This essay is written in a Wittgensteinian spirit, in the light of the relatively little-known *Lectures on Free Will* (LFW). For historical accuracy: the LFW were written by a student and there is no evidence that the text faithfully records Wittgenstein's words. I shall assume that it does, since my work is not exegetical. I want to throw a Wittgensteinian light on the problem of free will.

Prima facie, the LFW exhibit a compatibilist view. Like other thinkers – both religious ones like Augustine and secular ones like Hume – Wittgenstein does not believe that, if all our actions are predictable from sufficient causes, our concepts of voluntariness and responsibility must be abandoned. Determinism threatens freedom if understood as availability of alternate possibilities ("we could have done otherwise") so we must be satisfied with freedom of spontaneity ("we do as we will"). Wittgenstein's position is more nuanced, as he holds that:

"It is in one sense foolish to say 'If my actions can be predicted, I can't choose...Prediction is incompatible with choice in the case where you yourself predict what you will choose, or I predict and then tell you'. (LFW, p. 442)

Suppose that at the end of a day, I write down in a diary everything I did that day. Then I discover a printed text, dated one day before, that differs from the last entry in my diary only in that the sentences "Today I did so-and-so" are replaced by "Tomorrow Laurian will do so-and-so". Do I have good reasons to believe that I was not free, that all my choices were not really my choices and I acted mechanically?

My first reaction to such an event would be to look for author of the text, and find if what s/he wrote is not due to mere chance. If a human author is found, I would probably ask her for the method used in writing the forecast. Suppose that no author can be found – all we know is that a computer printed the text. Let's further imagine that next week, the computer regularly prints, every evening, the texts that I write in the diary every next evening – so the prediction cannot be mere lucky guess. In such a case, we have good reasons to look for a scientific law correlating the computer's texts with the entries in my diary. Would this prove that I am not free? My answer is: yes, provided I continue my usual behaviour: continue to write entries in my diary, do not read the computer's texts until at least one day after they are printed and do not actively look for their human author (if any). But then the entries in my diary will become *meaningless*. I hope to make this clear.

The scientific law that has to be discovered, correlating the computer's output with the entries in my diary will most likely take into account facts about the computer's mechanisms and about my behaviour. It is important to note that it will also be a *psychological* law, that will have to answer to the question: "Why do I write in my diary what the computer printed the day before?". A spy may watch for one day two persons who spend the whole day together and may write in his report that they did the same things; but the two persons watched might write different stories from each other – and from the spy's report - in their respective diaries under the heading "What I did today": they may attach a sense of importance to

different things they did that day. "To write an accurate report of what someone did in a certain day" makes no sense, apart from the standpoint of the report's writer. And if two stories about what a person did are identical, this proves the identity of their points of view, their cobelongingness to a form of life. To return to my example: what would be astonishing about the computer's printing accurate forecasts of the entries I write in my diary is that it predicts not only what I am going to do the next day, but also what I shall deem important, worth remembering and writing down at the end of the day.

If the person whose behaviour is predicted keeps no diary, it is not clear what accurate prediction means. A team of doctors (including neuroscientists) may try to predict all the physical movements that a politician will make until the end of the year. Even if their forecast is 100% confirmed by a video-camera that watches the politician, the forecast will be of little political interest, since it will hardly be possible, on its basis alone, to know whether that person will keep the same political office until the end of the year. The accuracy of the prediction does not prove that the politician will not have freely chosen his gestures – his physical movements are, partly, reactions to political events and reactions to the reactions to these events: it will be reasonable to conjecture that the doctors who predicted his behaviour were also good political analysts, who tell us less than they know. (On the other hand, if it can be predicted that the politician will describe his behaviour in purely physiological terms, this will have a tremendous political interest, since he will have to be considered insane). This proves why it is foolish to say that "If my actions can be predicted, I can't choose". What matters is: *who* makes the prediction, why s/he predicts my behaviour rather than interfere with it; what matters is the *point of view* of the prediction, whether it coincides with the point of view of the person whose actions are predicted. If the two points of view are different, this does not prove that person whose behaviour was predicted was not free. It proves, *inter alia*, that the person who formulates the prediction chooses to adopt a fatalist perspective about the person whose behaviour was predicted – rather than actively influence his decisions and his behaviour. And "fatalism is a peculiar way of looking at things". (LFW, p. 431), a human attitude that may be proven true or false as little as the belief in the uniformity of nature (*Philosophical Investigations* par. 473, 477).

Consistent fatalism is self-defeating, since it implies that the fatalist's uttering his own words is subject to natural necessity like the movement of planets. The consistent fatalist should not try to convince other people of the truth of fatalism, but regard his utterance "Fatalism is true" as a parrot's words. A consistent fatalist should change his way of life and make random movements of his body, rather than purposeful actions (of course, "random" in the eyes of other humans). The fatalist predicts based on the belief that he did not *choose* to predict, that he was not *free* to predict.

If the two points of view are identical – as in my original example – the prediction is empathetical. The prediction-maker is a person who belonged to the same form of life with me, then shifted to an outer view of it. Such a person resembles a good psychologist, who

understands the patient's worldview and simultaneously judges it from the outside. An empathetic prediction-maker can only be someone who once considered me as a free agent, then shifted to a mechanistic view of mine. Such a person started by playing a common language-game with me (and obeyed the same rules as I did) and ended in a meta-game (in which s/he obeys not the rules I obey, but meta-rules, meant to discover which rules I obey). Wittgenstein discusses the example of a game of chance:

Two people play roulette. "Suppose someone says 'this is not a game of chance at all'. What makes us think it is a game of chance is our ignorance'. I could contradict him and say: 'No. It is a game of chance now that we are ignorant; if in the future we were no longer ignorant, it would no longer be a game of chance'" (LFW, p. 443)

The moves in the roulette game cannot be predetermined as long as they are considered "empathetically", from the standpoint of the roulette-players, and it makes no sense to tell them that the development of the game is predetermined – unless we want them to stop playing roulette.

If we generalize from roulette to language-games, lack of predetermination requires playing the same language-game. And playing a language-game requires First Person Authority (FPA). Let's imagine a person devoid of FPA – call him The Psychotic. When the Psychotic avows "I feel pain", we contradict him: "No, you don't". When the Psychotic says he desires to eat a cake, we answer "You don't want to eat a cake; perhaps you want something else or nothing at all". The Psychotic cannot be sure of what he believes – let alone whether his beliefs are true, since he is systematically told "You don't really believe this"- he cannot be sure even of his second-order beliefs: when he says "I believe that p" we may not grant him any propositional attitude involving p at all. Correcting the Psychotic would be pointless, since we don't reasonably think that the Psychotic can understand how to correct his mistakes. If we are reasonable, we must treat the Psychotic *paternalistically* and describe – rather than discuss- his utterances in our language (which becomes a meta-language whose object is his language) and perhaps explain *why* he utters them: The Psychotic's words don't have their usual meaning. We never truly contradict the Psychotic and never truly refuse to fulfill his wishes, since we never have what to disagree about. To have FPA is to have the privilege to utter certain sentences without being asked for *grounds*: the right to use words without justification (PI 289). Justification is public, and doubts can only be removed by public debate; but justification may be required only for what is believed without doubt.

It makes no sense to say that the Psychotic is free as it makes little sense to say that he is a voluntary agent. Whenever he wants something and receives it, he must be *surprised* that he receives precisely what he wanted (or "wanted"). It is a central tenet of Wittgenstein's discussion of will and intention – throughout all his work - that we are not surprised that we reach what we intend; that our words mean their usual meaning..

The Psychotic is unfree because he lacks FPA and does not play our language-game. Our interest is to scientifically *predict* his actions, and if our predictions fail, to devise better theories, until a successful forecast. People's actions are unpredictable not for lack of adequate theories, but because their normal attitude towards their fellows is reacting to them and influencing their actions by providing good grounds and not predicting them. Grounds can be provided and understood only on the basis of what is not grounded. It would be wrong to say that the Psychotic is metaphysically

free but only politically unfree: such a person would have his beliefs contradicted and his desires rejected; but we saw this is not the Psychotic's case.

I suggest that one of the most radical consequences of Wittgenstein's philosophy is that the distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions is itself linguistic. I shall only point here that the *Philosophical Investigations* claim that an intention is embedded in its situation, in human customs and institutions (PI 337); that will is not an experience (PI 621).

It can be replied that "voluntary" is not the same as "intentional". But what is an unintentional voluntary action? Someone arrives into a foreign country and utters blasphemous words, ignorant of their meaning. It will be said: he should not be punished because his action was *voluntary* but not *intentional*. The foreigner is *surprised* to discover that he uttered a blasphemy, and this proves that he did not intend this. As long as his action was voluntary, he was however not surprised that he uttered his words: his action was intentional, although in another language-game or (a la Davidson) under another description. But can there be a voluntary action that is not, would not be, intentional in any language-game, under any description? I have a hard time thinking so: such an action would surprise its agent no matter how it is considered.

Let's imagine a tribe whose members believe that the stars occupy their places on the sky because the shaman wants so. If we ask them: "How do you know this?", they answer "If a star ever falls from the sky, we will punish the shaman". Do we have any ground to contradict them? The typical Westerner will probably point that there is no causal connection between the shaman's desires and the position of the stars on the sky; but such a route is not available to Wittgenstein since he did not believe that the will (as a mental event) causes the action; (PI 613); he did not consider causal relations as ontologically primitive, but rather dependent on the framework of a language-game. (PI 325).

That's why I suggest that the distinction between *voluntary* and *involuntary* makes no sense outside a language-game, as FPA makes no sense outside of a language-game. If freedom is voluntariness *cum* responsibility, the possibility that my actions are predicted, or have sufficient causes does not undermine my freedom as long as prediction comes from outside my language-game and is thus unrecognizable by me as an accurate prediction; causal relations are not recognized as such. Determinism threatens freedom if I abandon my original language-game and start playing a language-game whose participants are interested in predicting my behaviour (they play a meta-game about my games). A person who is absolutely unfree is a person who plays no language-game, like the Psychotic in my example. To be free is to be granted first-person authority: the right to speak and act without doubts. At the same time, to be free is to risk to make mistakes. We are free insofar as we play language-games with other free people, and our actions are not predicted because the attitude of the other participants of the games towards us is not to predict our actions, but rather to motivate us to choose them. But eyes which I know to look at me from my back change my behaviour, even when they claim to be its mere spectators.

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Reflections on Ethics and Cultural Clash

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1. Introduction

In commentaries on the recent uproar about the Danish cartoons, many have called for an intensification of intercultural dialogue. What they mean, of course, is a civilized dialogue, abiding by the norms of mutual respect, fair exchange of ideas, free of insults or threats. Although as a procedural basis for ethics as a whole, such norms have been articulated explicitly by discourse ethicists.

Other commentators submitted that we need to reconsider our ethics. What, rightly, counts as a central ethical issue is the question of free speech and its limitations.

But we know that, even when an intercultural dialogue or a reconsideration of our ethics would take place, offensive words, threats or violent actions could, in the real world, resurge at any time. Manipulation, power play, verbal or physical aggression will then take over. Ethical considerations will then seem to have to be replaced by those of prudence or retaliation. Or do, or should, ethical considerations not still play a role even in war-like situations?

I shall discuss a few ethical issues involved in the cultural clash in question, both its substantial ethical focus and ethical aspects of the way it has been conducted. We shall see that ethical considerations often are but feeble factors in the tangle of predominantly non-moral motives.

2. Free Speech and Its Limitations

In Western democracies, the freedom of expression of ideas is constitutionally guaranteed. It also figures in the United Nations Charter and is part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is one of the civil rights, mainly meant to protect citizens, their autonomy and dignity, against governmental interference and censorship. This right has its limitations. In Germany, for instance, expressions of opinions which tend to disturb the public peace are excluded. In the US, there is the "fighting words doctrine", which prohibits "hate speech". However, there is a large grey zone of what is prohibited and what not. It is telling that in just about all legal cases, the US Supreme Court did not uphold any conviction for fighting words.

Quite generally, many moral norms of societies are codified in their constitutional and legal systems. They can, then, be legally enforced by penalties, which forms one of the prerogatives of the respective state. Yet, there are severe differences between such systems, particularly between Western liberal democracies and Islamic countries whose juridical system is based on the Sharia. A glaring instance is the difference between freedom of religion and the death penalty for one falling from Islamic faith. Such differences form an influential background of the cartoon conflict, the most pertinent one being given by the Islamic traditions of prohibiting pictures of Muhammad (and also people or animals), let alone satirical ones.

Within a given Western state, offended parties in transgressions of the limits of free speech, apart from expressing their moral disapproval publicly, can at least have their complaint dealt with by its own juridical system.

Especially in a globalized world with instant electronic communication, the cartoon affair could not be contained to Denmark. It has mainly been in other, Arab countries that indignant parties acted out their protest.

Because of these circumstances, M. Zeeman (2006) contended that, if "we are willing to take the vulnerability of religious believers seriously ... then we must search for a new ethics for a globalized world, ... for the relationship between modernity and religion". He means, we can no longer haughtily insist that freedom of religion and its undisturbed practice can only be granted on our conditions. "Responsibility may then be preferable to freedom. ... Self-control may here be much more courageous than seeking out the limits of others' tolerance and of the legally permitted freedom of expression of opinion."

Strictly speaking, what Zeeman proposes is not a new ethics, novel moral principles or values. He says, firstly, in morally evaluating our actions, we cannot restrict ourselves to considering only their consequences in our own country, in the light of our own legal system. Secondly, in such evaluations, we have the extended responsibility of weighing the religious sensibilities in other cultures very carefully. Thus, his suggestions seem to go not really beyond standard utilitarian ethics. Yet, once the "consequences" of our actions consist of fairly unpredictable reactions of others, matters get complicated – and there is no standard risk ethics. Note, finally, that Zeeman seems to speak only about *our* ethics and the new ethics we need. Should the "new ethics" not hold for everyone – in line with the universality pretension of all ethics?

The universality claim of documents on free speech and on human rights in general, though, has all along met with criticism. Countries stressing the importance of community and tradition have criticized this claim for being an expression of Western individualism, "Enlightenment fundamentalism", or just capitalist imperialism. Addressing this tension, B. Oomen (2006) recently argued that human rights should not be considered dogmatically as a "block of granite", but also not relativistically as holding only in certain cultures. As a third way, she advocates a "process approach", borrowing the term from a Muslim human rights activist. Human rights should be regarded as "an outcome of a dialogue between parties". They should, in negotiations, find their translation into the vocabulary of the respective cultural and religious convictions. Among the examples given of successes of this approach is the constitutional abolishment of the death penalty in South Africa, based as it was on both human rights and African religion. I do not doubt the possibility and value of such convergences. Yet, certain oppositions will remain unbridgeable, like that between human rights advocacy and countries *not* prepared to abolish the death penalty.

3. Other Types of Freedom

Some Western constitutions expressly guarantee the freedom of the arts and sciences. Also, in the US, free speech has been broadly interpreted as freedom of expression, be it verbal, non-verbal, visual, symbolic, artistic. Now, I have seen no commentary discussing even

the possibility of defending the cartoons as works of art. Surely, their aesthetic quality is minimal. If it were high, it could outweigh minor moral objections, making them morally tolerable.

More to the point, of course, is freedom of the press, partly subsumable under freedom of expression. Yet, it possesses special features and is associated with special obligations, articulated in the many professional codes of ethics of journalists. I distinguish between the decision to publish the cartoons in the first place and decisions to republish them. *Jyllands-Posten* published the cartoons after illustrators had refused to contribute to a book on the Koran and Muhammad or at least wanted to remain anonymous, for fear of Muslim retaliation, and after this matter had been reported in the Danish press. Angered by this, the editors of *Jyllands-Posten* wanted to show courage (required by those codes) and test the exercise of free speech in Denmark. They could not foresee the reactions abroad. Had they known them, they said, they would not have published the cartoons. This concession, surely, is rather prudential than purely moral.

Decisions to republish the cartoons form a mixed affair. They might be inspired by the same motives as those of *Jyllands-Posten*. But they can also be seen as exercises of the right and duty to inform the public truthfully, adequately and comprehensively about a controversy. Muslim circles, of course, have seen them as insult piled on insult.

4. Morality in a Messy World

Violence, threat or manipulation has no place or role in morality as such. If someone offended someone else, then, from the moral point of view, the offended one may express his anger in a non-violent form, the offender should offer his sincere excuses, possibly mitigated in the case of an unintentional offense, will often promise not to repeat his misconduct and think of some additional ways of making repair. Yet, in reality, offenses frequently lead to verbal fights and more. The straightforward moral point of view gets obstructed by thoughts and acts of aggression, resentment, revenge, strategic manipulation and also of self-defense and self-protection, depending on the circumstances. It is not that ethics has nothing to say about situations where things get out of hand. For fights of a greater dimension, for example, there after all are the well worked-out Principles of Just War. In all such situations, there is the general moral duty to restore peace and security. Legal systems and international treaties – in the example given, the Geneva Conventions – are meant to bring some order into the messy human world. One, then, has the second-order moral duty to heed the law and agreements.

The *circumstances* that go to explain the reactions in the cartoon controversy are too many and too complex to be detailed here (cf. Bednarz et al. 2006). There is the long history of enmity between Islam and Christianity. The Muslim world and culture lost the superiority they once possessed. Many Muslims now feel exploited, excluded, humiliated, misunderstood or despised by the West. And since 9/11 Muslims have felt subject to a generalized suspicion of being potential terrorists. Given such feelings, it was easy for religious and political leaders to organize mass protests and boycotts, and let violent reactions to the Danish cartoons happen – maybe welcome distractions from their own problems at home. Acts of destruction and incitements to kill the cartoonists, of course, are morally unacceptable.

What about the circumstances in Western countries? The invited cartoonists who refused to contribute or wanted to stay anonymous remembered that all Muslims were called upon to kill Salman Rushdie and knew about the actual murder of Theo van Gogh. The “courage” shown by the editors of *Jyllands-Posten* could be considered to be misplaced. The substantial issue, also in most of the commentaries, has been whether, or in how much, we should sacrifice freedom of speech to Muslim threats and violent actions. If we did so at all, in a reconciliatory mood, due to non-ethical motives, we would at least lose some of our moral integrity and maybe much more. If we did not, politicians might fear that we would endanger the flow of oil from Arab countries.

One commentator (Black 2006) says to be furious about any attempts to placate Muslim demonstrators, “understand” their anger. Her main argument is that they should not complain, since they have been doing the same thing with their anti-Semitic cartoons and their anti-Semitic and anti-American propaganda. Such a very common *tu quoque* argument has little to do with morality: it does not ask what is right, but denies the opposing party the relevant moral standing for complaining. It is a confrontational strategic move, though, to me, an ethically permissible one. A. Hirsi Ali (2006), who had to go into hiding because of death threats, has, in her political and cinematographic work, been emphatically pleading for abandoning a policy of reconciliation in favor of a policy of confrontation with respect to radical fundamentalist Muslims, from whom more moderate Muslims, in her mind, too little distance themselves. She reminds us of Chamberlain’s policy and its consequences, replaced then by Churchill’s. In a confrontational approach, morality will often be moved to the back seat, except for the assessment of the envisioned goal.

5. Concluding Remarks

Europe had to go through long periods of atrocious and, in large part, senseless religious wars before the principles of religious freedom and tolerance were formulated and accepted. In many countries, revolutions and violent struggles were needed to establish or enforce civil rights and liberties, among which free speech; at times, non-violent movements have been successful. It is not predictable which course Islamic countries will take in these respects. Some, like S. P. Huntington (1996), think that world politics is entering a phase in which clashes, not so much between nations, but between cultures, most of which religion-based, will be inevitable. Even if one does not share this view, it is certainly not enough just to hope that conflicts will disappear.

No ethical theory tells us to condone oppression or terror. Thus, one should strive, as suggested by Oomen, to realize liveable local arrangements, morally and otherwise acceptable, as much as possible honoring human rights. Historical and current experience, though, warns us that changing a totalitarian religious order too rapidly, may cause more pain than positive results. One should also work towards a global order which incorporates at least minimal moral standards. On both fronts, negotiation and dialogue will be needed. Yet, these cannot get underway in a civilized form, as long as the circumstances, as sketched above, have not suitably changed.

For judging cultures and intercultural transactions, H. Procee (1991) formulated two ethical meta-principles, those of non-exclusion and of promotion of interaction. “The first demands respect and some protection of other

cultures, unless they fail to heed these principles themselves. Globally, it can mean that no [such] culture should be excluded in giving shape to the world community. The second principle says that they should actively, interactively, take part in this process.” (Kirschenmann 1998: 348; also 2001). The second encourages dialogue and negotiation. Unfortunately, the first one, its prerequisite, can hardly be said to be complied with by present circumstances. Think of the fact that everywhere in Christian Europe ever more mosques are being built, whereas in Saudi Arabia catholic services are forbidden to be held in embassies, and he who brings a Bible into the country runs the risk of imprisonment (Bednarz 2006, 100f.). Mere ethical appeals appear to be too feeble to change such a situation.

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Anderssein und/oder die Macht der Differenz

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Die Problematik des *Anderen*, des *Andersseins* und der *Interkulturalität* erscheint in unseren Jahren in einem dezidiert neuen Kontext und in einem auffallend neuen Medium. Dieser Gestaltwandel scheint von Anfang an weder problem-, noch ganz gefahrlos zu sein. Der Gestaltwandel wird nämlich den Eindruck erwecken, wie wenn die neue Einbettung derselben Fragestellung unmittelbar von inhaltlicher Bedeutung gewesen sein dürfte. Ein Funktionswandel lässt für viele sogar auch die Interpretation aufkommen, die Identifizierung dieses Wandels sei ein Vorgang, der *gegen* die frühere Auffassung über den Anderen, das Anderssein und die Interkulturalität gerichtet gewesen wäre, anders ausgedrückt, wie wenn die Feststellung eines Gestaltwandels von vornherein eine Polemik oder eine andere Wertsetzung beinhalten könnte.

In den vergangenen Jahrzehnten des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts galt der sich stets ausbreitende Diskurs über den Anderen, das Anderssein und die Interkulturalität als "Öffnung", als Teil einer inkludierenden Ausdehnung der Emanzipation. Diese Bewegungsrichtung des Diskurses galt auch mit einer übergreifenden Eindeutigkeit und wurde gerade in dieser Eindeutigkeit Teil der internationalen Diskussion. In unseren Jahren erhält derselbe Diskurs *neue Akzente*. Hinter diesem Diskurs stand, in einer etwas verallgemeinerten *Form*, eine *emanzipative Logik der Identität*, die den Anderen und das Anderssein bei vollkommener Anerkennung seines anderen Charakters als etwas mit sich selbst essentiell Identisches ansah. Die angesprochene aktuelle Tendenz markiert eine wesentlich differente Auffassung des Anderen und des Andersseins. Diese Interpretation des Anderen und des Andersseins verlässt schon den Boden der vorhin skizzierten Identitätslogik. Das heißt, dass eine ohne die *Identitätslogik* gedachte Interpretation sowohl den Anderen als auch das Andersseins unvermeidlich im Zeichen der *Differenz* bestimmt.

Diese Verschiebung von einer *Logik der Identität* zu einer *Logik der Differenz* ist in der Modifizierung in den Hintergrunddimensionen verankert. Die Einstellung der sich öffnenden und den Anderen und das Anderssein in sich aufhebenden Identität gründete *ursprünglich* nicht auf einer *partikulären* Identität. Es ist aber aus dem Bewusstsein historischer Akteure im späteren verschwunden, dass diese Identitätslogik auf *Gattungswerte* aufgebaut worden war, die in der Regel als Werte der *Zivilisation* aufgefasst und interpretiert worden sind. Die Einstellung zum Anderen im Zeichen der emanzipativen Identität gründete somit auf einer *Allgemeinheit* des Zivilisatorischen. Dies ist das Medium, in welchem die Verschiebung von der Identitätslogik zur Differenzlogik vor sich ging. *Die Verschiebung ging von einer auf Gattungs-, bzw. Zivilisationswerte aufgebauten Identitätslogik zu einer nicht mehr auf Gattungs-, bzw. Zivilisationswerte aufgebauten Differenzlogik*. Die dem Andersseins entstammende Kommunikation, d.h. der Anfang der interkulturellen Annäherung setzt in diesem Zeichen stets eine *gemeinsame Plattform* voraus, die dem interkulturellen Prozess als Grundlage dient. Ganz exemplarisch erscheint es in Joseph Roths treffender Bemerkung über die Judenemanzipation, in der er diesen Prozess nicht als eine *Emanzipation zu einer Nation*, vielmehr als *eine zu einer Zivilisation* definiert. Wir

möchten interkulturelle Prozesse hiermit noch keinesfalls von der Seite der Zivilisationskomponente vereinnahmen, wir denken es aber in der allerdeutlichsten Form, dass hinter Interkulturalität stets eine zivilisatorische Dimension steht.

Dieser (real sich manifestierende oder virtuelle) zivilisatorische Bezug schafft den wahren Rahmen für interkulturelle Kommunikation. Hierin allein liegt die allerwichtigste Bestimmung der *Identität*. *Das klassische Grundmodell der so aufgefassten Interkulturalität geht also einerseits von der Differenz aus und gelangt zu einer gewöhnlich auf zivilisatorische Werte aufgebauten Identität*, wiewohl eine konkrete, von Gattungswerten motivierte Vorstellung von dieser Identität im Anfang des besagten Prozesses nicht nur schon da sein, sondern mit Notwendigkeit als entscheidende Motivation des ganzen Prozesses gelten muss.

Vor diesem Horizont erhebt sich unser eigentlicher Gegenstand, jener *Gestaltwandel* der Interkulturalität, der in einer Differenzlogik mündete, welche aber nicht mehr auf Wertoptionen gründet. Differenzlogik scheint dem Anderssein scheinbar wie ideal gerecht zu sein. Eine Differenzlogik aber, welche auf keine plattformartige Option gemeinsamer Gattungswerte zurückgeht, erzeugt eine neue, anders geartete Realität. *Der scheinbare Sieg entlarvt sich als plötzliche Herausforderung*. Eine Differenzlogik ohne eine Bewegungsrichtung zur auf Gattungswerte hin ausgebauten Identitätslogik hat eine eigenartige, zum Teil *beispiel- und präzedenzlos geltende Qualität*.

Die Situation ist umso prekärer, weil die Differenz, geschweige denn die Differenzlogik geradezu *identisch* mit der Richtung der Entwicklung und der *Emanzipation* war. Lange Jahrzehnte vergingen im Zeichen der wachsenden Anerkennung von Differenz, während die Identität geradezu vereinnahmende, wenn eben nicht *totalitäre* Züge annahm. Im Jahrhundert der totalitären Diktaturen geriet die Logik der Identität in Misskredit, während man den qualitativen Unterschied zwischen Identitätslogik mit zivilisatorischer Begründung und derselben *ohne* diese Fundierung kaum mehr zu realisieren im Stande war

Fragt man *heute* nach der relevanten Beschaffenheit der Differenzlogik, so erweist sich als geboten, nicht Phänomene dieser Logik einzeln zu beschreiben, sondern die Aufmerksamkeit gleich und gleichzeitig auf die beiden führenden und umfassenden philosophischen Richtungen unserer Zeit zu lenken. Denn wir haben heute zwei umfassende Richtungen, die ausschließlich auf die Differenzlogik aufgebaut sind. Nach dieser Analyse erhebt sich selbstverständlich die Frage, wie die in diesen beiden umfassenden Richtungen sich generierende Differenzlogik in der Problematik des Anderen, des Andersseins und der Interkulturalität ihre Wirkung ausübt.

Die letzten dreißig Jahren erhoben zwei große philosophische Strömungen auf das Niveau der unmittelbaren und vielfachen sozialen Wirksamkeit. Die eine umfassende, in ihrer Struktur institutionelle wenn nicht eben imperiale Züge annehmende grosse Schule ist die Erneuerung des philosophischen *Neoliberalismus*, der weitgehend mit dem philosophischen *Neopositivismus*

identisch ist. Charakteristischerweise erwies sich dieser am spektakulärsten im Wiener Kreis Gestalt annehmende Neopositivismus/Neoliberalismus auch damals als ein Weg der an marxistisch-utopischen Konzepten Enttäuschten und Frustrierten. Diese Konstellation wiederholte sich. Denn sowohl in der Wirtschaft wie in der Politik und der Epistemologie geriet diese Wiederkehr des Neoliberalismus/Neopositivismus erst nach dem schnellen, unerwarteten und entscheidenden Untergang des Neomarxismus in der Mitte der siebziger Jahre. Die andere umfassende komplexartige philosophische Richtung ist die der *Postmoderne*. Sie verdankt (allerdings zweifellos in einem etwas geringeren Masse) ihre aktuelle dezisive Position ebenfalls dem plötzlichen Untergang des *Neomarxismus*, aber auch dem damit in vielem zusammenhängenden Untergang des *Strukturalismus*. Trotz der für uns bestimmenden Tatsache, dass der Neoliberalismus/Neopositivismus und die Postmoderne seit drei Jahrzehnten die philosophische Szene gemeinsam beherrschen, traten sie nur ganz selten in eine offene kommunikative Berührung miteinander.

Nach all dem ist es durchaus erstaunlich, dass die beiden sich voneinander klar unterscheidenden umfassenden Richtungen eine Reihe von Ähnlichkeiten aufweisen, die man mit vollem Recht als *Symmetriebeziehungen* beschreiben kann. *Eine dieser Beziehungen ist diejenige gemeinsame Eigenschaft von ihnen, die Entstehung jeglicher Identitätslogik zu verhindern.* Und in dieser Definition sind alle Worte von der gleichen Wichtigkeit: die Verhinderung der Entstehung, aber auch die noch nicht näher bestimmte konkrete Art der Identitätslogik.

Für unsere Themensetzung bedeutet es, dass die Fragestellung der *Interkulturalität*, des *Andersseins*, des *Fremden* oder des *Fremdseins* wegen dieser in der gleichen Richtung weisenden Transformationen der beiden führenden umfassenden philosophischen Schulen *nunmehr im Diskurs der vollgeführten und vollendeten Differenzlogik realisiert werden kann.*

Wir sahen, beide umfassenden philosophischen „Imperien“ versuchten es, durch eine Neuregelung der philosophischen Begriffsbildung die Ganzheit des legitimen Denkprozesses neu zu gestalten. Diese Neuregelung schreibt die Arten des legitimen Denkens vor, unbedingt hinzuweisen ist aber auch auf jenen notwendigen Zusammenhang, dass die Optionen für die legitime Begriffsbildung zur gleichen Zeit auch die Regeln der möglichen und legitimen *Gegenstandskonstitution* mit gestalten.

Dies heisst im praktischen, dass die Neuregelung der philosophischen Begriffsbildung nicht nur abstrakte logische Formen neu gestaltet, sie prägt es auch vor, *worüber, d.h. über welchen Gegenstand man in einem bestimmten Kontext legitim reden kann.* Konkretisiert man diesen Zusammenhang auf unser Thema, so heisst es, dass die Wendung von der Identitätslogik zur Differenzlogik (die ja in beiden grossen philosophischen Komplexen, die ja in den letzten Jahrzehnten bereits auch imperiale Züge angenommen haben) so viel bedeutet, dass man von gewissen Gegenständen einerseits überhaupt nicht reden kann oder - und für unsere Thematik hat diese zweite Möglichkeit eine ebenso hohe Bedeutung - *von gewissen Gegenständen kann man nur im Reiche und nach den Regeln der Differenzlogik reden.*

Diese Differenzlogik weist jedoch eine Eigenschaft auf, die wir eingangs im Verhältnis zur Identitätslogik bereits erwähnt haben. Nicht zuletzt wegen der Aktivität

und Effektivität dieser beiden grossen Denkschulen gelangte die Differenzlogik zur Vorherrschaft. Ebenso stark von der Hegemonie von diesen beiden Denkschulen iniziert *verschwand* aus dem Umfeld dieser Differenzlogik das Universum von Gattungswerten und die zivilisatorische Komponente. *Während wir eingangs über die Möglichkeit einer Identitätslogik ohne Gattungshintergrund sprechen mussten, so wird es an dieser Stelle unvermeidlich, über eine Differenzlogik ohne den Hintergrund von Gattungswerten zu sprechen.* Und es ist diese Differenzlogik, die sich materiell manifestiert in den zahlreichen Phänomenen der modernen *Individualisierung*, es ist aber diese Differenzlogik, die die Fragestellung des Anderen, des Andersseins und der Interkulturalität weitgehend bestimmt.

Was die moderne Individualisation anlangt, ist sie selbstverständlich ein umfassender Realprozess und als solcher ein primärer Gegenstand der Soziologie. Ihre Entfaltung ist aber ohne den auch in den erwähnten umfassenden philosophischen Richtungen erfolgenden Durchbruch der Differenzlogik nicht denkbar. Im Neopositivismus/Neoliberalismus realisiert sich diese Tendenz in der Ökonomie und der politischen Philosophie ganz unmittelbar, während auf dem epistemologischen Gebiet dieser Trend zur Differenz in der Regelung der legitimen Begrifflichkeit zwar indirekt, nichtsdestoweniger aber um so effektiver zur Geltung kommen kann. Was die Postmoderne anlangt, so würden wir direkt dazu neigen, die Eliminierung der Identitätslogik jeglicher Couleur zugunsten eines umfassenden Differenzdenkens als die *umfassendste Errungenschaft* und die tiefste Identität dieser Richtung ansehen zu dürfen.

Der umfassende Prozess der Individuation, selbst ein Motiv und ein Resultat der Verwandlung der Identitätslogik in die Differenzlogik, als *unsichtbare, nichtsdestoweniger aber umfassende Voraussetzung*, verändert jede grundsätzliche Relation, wie die zwischen Gesellschaft und Gemeinschaft, Gemeinschaft und Individuum, Individuum und Individuum. Es ist unvermeidlich, dass diese umfassenden Transformationen *die ganze Problematik des Anderen, des Andersseins, sowie der Interkulturalität ebenfalls grundsätzlich verändern.*

Die neue Individuation, die wir mit vollem Recht als *globalen Individualismus* bezeichnen könnten, ist eine wie vollkommene Verkörperung einer Differenzlogik, der jede Begründung in Gattungswerten abgeht. Diese neue Individuation ist einerseits die Manifestierung einer Differenzlogik, die von einer gewissen Distanz der Abstraktion aus gesehen als die historische Siegerin über einer im Totalitarismusverdacht stehenden Identitätslogik fungiert. Diese Differenzlogik des globalen Individualismus erzeugt aber auf einen Schlag eine ganze Reihe kritischer neuer Probleme, denn ihr geht jegliche Gattungsdimension ab. Die Siegerin wird dadurch noch nicht unbedingt zu einer Verliererin, die Logik der Differenz ohne Gattungswerte muss jedoch als ein vielfach problematisches Phänomen der allerneuesten Geschichte vorkommen.

Es geht nicht darum, dass wir die Differenzlogik mit dem Verdacht versehen wollten, den globalen Individualismus hervorgebracht zu haben. Anstatt einer so direkten ideologiekritischen Attacke erblicken wir in der spezifisch postmodernen Verabsolutierung der Differenzlogik ein schwerwiegendes Hindernis dessen, dass man unter anderen auch das Problem des Anderen, des Andersseins und der Interkulturalität von jener Identitätslogik aus konzeptualisiert, welche das

gemeinsame Anderssein auf der Grundlage der Gattungswerte einander näherbringen will. Der Sieg der Differenzlogik ist ein *Scheinsieg*, die zwar jeder beteiligten Seite die gleiche Chance und den gleichen Rang gewährt, die aber im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes eine Sackgasse ist, denn sie bestätigt den Anderen und das Anderssein, ohne aus den beiden Polen des Andersseins auf der Basis gemeinsamer Wertsetzungen eine differenzierte Identität erzielen zu wollen.

Die Differenzlogik ohne Gattungswerte wäre eine ideale Lösung, wenn es in diesem Zusammenhang um eine optimale verbale Lösung und nicht um konfliktuose Realprozesse gehen dürfte. Diese Lösung ist in dem grössten Masse der Grundeinstellung der postmodernen Epistemologie identisch. *Eine Kritik des Logozenismus mag richtig sein, mit Hilfe dieser Kritik aber kann man keine erkennende Tätigkeit ausführen!* Eine Verabsolutierung der Differenzlogik ohne gemeinsame Gattungswerte kann formal richtig sein, mit Hilfe dieser Einstellung kann man mit dem Anderen in keine Berührung kommen!

Neben der Differenzlogik und dem globalen Individualismus ist es somit die Globalisation selber, die die Probleme des Anderen und des Andersseins dramatisch neu organisiert. Vor allem setzt sie neue gewaltige Migrationsprozesse in Gang, sie organisiert die Notwendigkeit dieser Migration und transformiert die Problematik des Anderen und des Andersseins in eine neue historische Qualität.

Der globale Individualismus, sowie die Hegemonie der Differenzlogik schafft eine Reihe *neuer anthropologischer* Züge, die mit Notwendigkeit auch die Problematik des Anderen, des Andersseins und der Interkulturalität von Grund auf verändern. Der Andere wird nicht mehr von einer aus individuellen Personen bestehenden Gemeinschaft empfangen und aufgenommen. Der Andere erscheint in einer Gesellschaft, die lauter aus Vertretern der Differenzlogik und des globalen Individualismus besteht. Dies führt zu ganz anderen Auseinandersetzungen zwischen der "Gesellschaft" und dem "Anderen" wie es in früheren Begegnungen der Fall gewesen sein dürfte. Die hier entstehende Konfusion wird aber nur noch grösser, wenn man bedenkt, die neuartige Begegnung wird mit einer Begrifflichkeit beschrieben und aufgearbeitet, die vor dem Horizont der vorangehenden Situation entstanden ist.

Der globale Individualismus und die Hegemonie der Differenzlogik ist aber nicht unbedingt nur für jene charakteristisch, die als "Andere" einer "Gesellschaft" gegenüberstehen. Es ist durchaus erweislich, dass die Tendenzen und die neuartigen Einstellungen des globalen Individualismus auch in der Attitüde derjenigen auszuweisen ist, die als "Andere" in einer anderen "Gesellschaft" aufgenommen werden möchten. In welchem Ausmass ihr Verhalten von den Elementen und Inhalten des globalen Individualismus bestimmt ist, lässt sich im Augenblick nicht exakt beschreiben, die Präsenz dieser Inhalte springt jedoch ins Auge.

Die globale Individualisierung "individualisiert" beide Seiten der Begegnung mit dem Anderen, bzw. mit dem Anderssein. Begriffe wie "Fortschritt", "Entwicklung", "Entwicklungsland", "Reflexive Modernisierung", "Zurückgebliebenheit" bewahren zwar ihren sozialwissenschaftlichen, ökonomischen oder historischen Sinn, ohne jedoch für die Individuen einen entsprechenden Rahmen der sozialen Handelns mehr gewähren zu können. Der Andere oder das Anderssein wird durch die Differenzlogik zementiert, sogar auch noch allseitig anerkannt, er (und es) wird es aber nicht mehr zur Grundlage dynamischer Prozesse einheitlich-gattungsmotivierter Wertsetzungen. Jeder achtet den Anderen oder das Anderssein, er (und es) kann aber keinen Anspruch mehr auf eine Entwicklung erheben, während welcher er (es) den zivilisatorischen Fortschritt der Anderen nachholen. Der entwickelte Teil betont seine zivilisatorischen Fortschritte nicht mehr und sieht den Anderen mit Respekt. Der Andere kann den zivilisatorischen Fortschritt nicht nachholen wollen, während er sich des erwiesenen Respekts sicherlich freuen kann. Das Individuum des zivilisatorisch nachholenden Universums kann auf einen gattungsorientierten Sprung seiner zurückgebliebenen Gesellschaft mit grosser Gewissheit verzichten, während dasselbe Individuum als "globales" Individuum durchaus starke Chance hat, durch Differenzlogik und globale Individualisation in die begehrte Gesellschaft aufgenommen zu werden. *Was er als Gattungswesen mit Gattungswerten und Gattungsnormen nicht mehr kann, verwirklicht er als Individuum mit Leichtigkeit.* Während dieses Gestaltwandels der Problematik des Anderen, des Andersseins und der Interkulturalität wird aber die archaische Dimension, der Tribalismus, die magischen Residuen oder die vorindividuellen Einstellung auch unverändert aktiv.

Nachdenken über Gewissheit – Zur Artikulierbarkeit und Verhandelbarkeit unseres kulturellen Hintergrundkönnens und -wissens

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„By taking scepticism seriously, and by attempting to show that it is based on a profound misunderstanding of language, Wittgenstein helped to remove scepticism from the centre of the philosophical agenda...“ (Searle 2005, 319)

Obwohl der Skeptizismus, laut John R. Searle, seit Wittgenstein nicht mehr im Zentrum des Philosophierens steht, und obwohl Wittgenstein mit seinem Werk sozusagen unfreiwillig einer *systematischen, theoretischen, konstruktiven Philosophie den Weg bereitet hat, die er selbst für unmöglich hielt* (Searle, ebenda), bleibt die Frage nach den Hintergründen menschlichen Verstehens offen zur Beantwortung durch die zeitgenössische Philosophie; vor allem im Kontext scheinbarer oder wirklicher kultureller Inkompatibilitäten und ihrer enormen Konsequenzen gewinnt dieses Thema an Relevanz.

Der skeptische Zweifel ist ein Welt-Zweifel. Wittgenstein zeigt in *Über Gewissheit*, dass ein solcher Zweifel nicht artikuliert werden kann. Zweifeln kann man nur an einem Wissen im weiteren Sinn, d.h. an einem intentionalen Zustand (z.B. auch an einer Wahrnehmung oder einem Glauben), dessen Gelingensbedingungen verifizierbar oder falsifizierbar sind. Nicht-intentionale Zustände sind nicht bezweifelbar, weil sie keine Gelingensbedingungen haben.

Die Sätze, die Wittgenstein in Auseinandersetzung mit Moores Verteidigung des gesunden Menschenverstandes auf ihre Bezweifelbarkeit hin untersucht und für nicht-bezweifelbar befindet, sind Sätze, die in Searles Modell zum nicht-intentionalen Hintergrundwissen gehören.

Der Unmöglichkeit des *Zweifeln*s am Wissenshintergrund begründet durch die logische Unmöglichkeit eines solchen Zweifels innerhalb unseres Sprachspiels steht die reale *Erfahrung* der Hintergrundinkompatibilitäten und die potentielle, individuelle, oder sogar kollektive, Erfahrung des Zusammenbruchs einer solchen vor-intentionalen, vor-linguistischen Grundlage für Intentionalität entgegen. Wenn der Hintergrund unseres Wissens nicht bezweifel- oder artikulierbar ist, ist er einer rationalen Kontrolle zugänglich?

Zunächst zum Vergleich des Wittgensteinschen Begriffes der Gewissheit mit dem Konzept des Hintergrundes bei John R. Searle: Ich untersuche die Probleme der Formulierbarkeit des Hintergrundkönnens und -Kennens (des Sagbaren und Unsagbaren), der Erfahrbarkeit der Gewissheit (des Sagens und Zeigens), und der Zweiteilung des Hintergrundes in biologische und kulturelle Fähigkeiten und Anlagen.

Moore antwortete auf die These des Skeptizismus, dass wir manche Dinge nicht wissen können, mit dem Satz *Aber ich weiß sie!* (Wittgenstein 1970, 135, § 521) Wittgenstein zeigt auf, dass eine Behauptung der Art des Skeptizismus nicht mit einer *Gegenbehauptung* entkräftet werden kann. Wenn Wittgensteins Untersuchung des

Begriffs Gewissheit notwendig war, um Moores Zurückweisung des Sektizismus in ihrer Formulierung zu berichtigen (Malcolm 1986, 152), so kann Searles Konzept des Hintergrundes uns helfen zu verstehen, welche *eigentümliche logische Rolle die ohne Prüfung bejahten Erfahrungssätze, d.i. der vor-intentionale Hintergrund, im (gesellschaftlichen) System unseres Wissens spielen* (Wittgenstein 1970, 43, § 136).

Intentionale Zustände zeichnen sich durch ihre propositionale Bestimmtheit aus; sie handeln immer ‚von‘ etwas und können durch einen dass-Satz näher bestimmt werden. Sie haben spezifische Erfüllungsbedingungen. Diese sind z.B. in Fällen des Glaubens, Wollens, Erinnerns und Wahrnehmens Wahrheitsbedingungen (Searle 1983, 91 und 97). Das Postulieren des nicht-intentionalen Hintergrundes ist ein notwendiger logisch-argumentativer Schritt zur befriedigenden Erklärung intentionalen Handelns. Wir können bei der Handlungserklärung nicht bloß auf ein Netzwerk intentionaler Zustände verweisen, die einander bedingen, denn dies resultiert in einem infiniten Regress. Um Handlungen *vollständig* zu erklären, muss auf ein großes Repertoire nicht-intentionaler und damit nicht-begrifflicher Hintergrundkenntnisse und Fähigkeiten verwiesen werden (Searle 1983, 141-142). Searle schlägt eine Analyse des Hintergrundes anhand von Fehlleistungen vor. Obwohl solche Hintergrund-Fehlleistungen sich negativ auf das Gelingen intentionaler Zustände auswirken und hier sichtbar werden, liegt der Fehler nicht auf der Ebene der Intentionalität, sondern auf der Ebene der vorintentionalen Bedingungen für das Haben von intentionalen Zuständen (Searle, 1983, 155).

Bei der Darstellung des Hintergrundes ex positivo ergeben sich begriffliche Schwierigkeiten, denn das intentionalistische Vokabular, mit dem wir den Hintergrund beschreiben, darf nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, dass wir es mit nicht-begrifflichen, nicht-intentionalen Bedingungen für Intentionalität zu tun haben, für die keine Wahrheitswerte und keine anderen Gelingensbedingungen angegeben werden können (Searle, 1983, 156).

Die Searle-Wittgenstein-Einsicht ist die, dass wir nicht nach dem Zwiebelprinzip ein zweites Sprachspiel um das Sprachspiel der Alltagssprache herum konstruieren können, in dem wir den Hintergrund darstellen, sondern dass der Hintergrund per definitionem außerhalb eines jeden Sprachspiels steht: *„Ich will eigentlich sagen, daß ein Sprachspiel nur möglich ist, wenn man sich auf etwas verlässt. (Ich habe nicht gesagt „auf etwas verlassen kann.“)“* (Wittgenstein 1970, 131, § 509)

Wittgensteins Beschäftigung mit dem Wissenshintergrund konzentriert sich auf das Verstehen von Sätzen; allerdings sind diese Sätze wiederum Voraussetzung und Beispiele für unsere Teilnahme an öffentlichen Praxen. Die Sprachpraxis ist für Wittgenstein das grundlegendste Beispiel für die Unmöglichkeit des Weltzweifels. Regeln und Konzepte sind nicht selbst-anwendend, d.h. wir bedürfen eines praktischen Wissens der Anwendung, um diese Regeln zu benutzen (Wittgenstein 1970, 46, § 145), dies zeigt sich sowohl beim

Disambiguieren von wörtlicher Bedeutung, als auch beim Verstehen von nicht-wörtlichen Äußerungen (Searle 1983, 145-149).

Wittgenstein weist darauf hin, dass wir also die Erfahrung nicht als den Grund für unser So-Urteilen ansehen können, und auch nicht als seinen Erfolg (Wittgenstein 1970, 42, § 130 und §131). Searle formuliert diesen Gedanken zur Verursachung unserer Intentionalität durch den Handlungshintergrund so:

The Background, to repeat, is not a set of representations, but like the structure of the game or of the Constitution it nonetheless provides a set of enabling conditions. The background functions causally, but the causation in question is not determining. (Searle 1983, 158)

Die Theorie vom Sagen und Zeigen kann als *Klammer um die sonst recht disparaten Teile* des Werkes Wittgensteins gelesen werden (Watzka 2000, 23-24), seine Philosophie z.T. als „*Theorie über das, was durch Sätze – d.h. durch Sprache – gesagt (und was auf dasselbe hinausläuft, gedacht) und was nicht durch Sätze ausgedrückt, sondern nur gezeigt werden kann*“ (Wittgenstein in einem Brief an Russell 1919, zitiert nach Watzka 2000, 23). Sagbarkeit ist für Wittgenstein die Vorbedingung für Denkbarkeit. Wenn der Welt-Zweifel des Skeptikers unsagbar ist, so ist er damit auch undenkbar. Der Hintergrund wird nicht bezweifelt, sondern das Gelingen der nicht-intentionalen Zustände wird qua Gelingen der Intentionalität, die sie ermöglichen (indirekt) erfahren; ein Fehlschlagen wird 'erlebt', nicht 'erdacht' oder 'erzweifelt'. Aber: dies gilt natürlich zunächst für die Person des Zweiflers, dem Wittgenstein seine Stimme auch in *Über Gewissheit* oft leiht (vgl. Watzka 2000, 15).

Beim Nachdenken über Verhandelbarkeit und Beeinflussbarkeit des (kulturellen) Hintergrundes müssen wir Folgendes im Sinn behalten: Die Perspektive des Beobachters kann als 3. Person Perspektive verstanden werden, die auch in der theoretischen Beschäftigung des Philosophen mit dem Hintergrund eingenommen wird, und die die nun gestellten Fragen in einem anderen Licht erscheinen lässt:

„Ich sitze mit einem Philosophen im Garten; er sagt zu wiederholten Malen „Ich weiß, dass das ein Baum ist“, wobei er auf einen Baum in unsrer Nähe zeigt. Ein Dritter kommt daher und hört das, und ich sage ihm: „Dieser Mensch ist nicht verrückt: Wir philosophieren nur.““ (Wittgenstein 1970, 121, § 467)

Das Nachdenken über Gewissheit hat im Sprachspiel der Philosophen seinen Platz und der Zweifel (als Kehrseite der Gewissheit) ist in dieser Situation das, was das Gedankenexperiment ermöglicht (vgl. Wittgenstein 1970, 87, § 337). Obwohl in der Situation der erfolgreichen (Sprech-)Handlung der Hintergrund nicht bezweifelt wird, ist es das Charakteristikum anderer erfolgreicher Sprechhandlungen, den Hintergrund zum Thema zu machen.

Searle teilt den Hintergrund topographisch auf in den tiefen und lokalen Hintergrund.

Der tiefe Hintergrund umfasst biologische Fähigkeiten und Anlagen, universelle menschliche Fähigkeiten, aber auch Fähigkeiten, die alle zur Intentionalität begabten Wesen teilen, wie z.B. die Fähigkeit zur Repräsentation und zur Intentionalität. Der kulturelle Hintergrund erfährt seine Ausprägung in

Muttersprache, sozialen Normen, Geschmack, Vorlieben, Erwartungen, erlerntem situativen Rollenverhalten, oder der in die Zukunft projizierten eigenen Lebensgeschichte

Ist der biologische Hintergrund der Hintergrund des kulturellen Hintergrundes? Die Metapher von tiefem und lokalem Hintergrund legt dies nahe. Allerdings sollte der kulturelle Hintergrund eher als die Instantiierung von biologischen Anlagen begriffen werden, seine Ausprägungen auch als Tokens von Typen, als kontingente und individuelle Variationen von Möglichkeiten oder als Phänotypen des Genotyps. Wichtig ist vor allem, dass kultureller und biologischer Hintergrund nicht getrennt voneinander betrachtet werden können.

Wittgenstein scheint zu oszillieren zwischen dem Beharren auf der Konventionalität und Erlerntheit unseres Wissens und der biologischen Bestimmtheit unserer Gewissheiten, d.h. manchmal scheint die Betonung auf der kulturellen und damit auch kontingenten und relativen Ausprägung des Hintergrundes zu liegen, manchmal scheint seine Konzeption des Handlungshintergrundes den biologischen Hintergrund mit einzubeziehen:

„Das heißt doch, ich will sie <die Sicherheit> als etwas auffassen, was jenseits von berechtigt und unberechtigt liegt; also gleichsam als etwas Animalisches.“ (Wittgenstein 1970, 94, § 359)

Der Grund für diese scheinbar inkonsistente Redeweise ist der Folgende: Wittgenstein stellt den vor-intentionalen Handlungshintergrund vor allem in Form von Fragen eines Subjektes an sich selbst dar. Das stilistische Mittel der Selbstbefragung verweist auf eine wichtige Komponente des Hintergrundes – seine Indexikalität: „*Ich handle mit voller Gewissheit. Aber diese Gewissheit ist meine eigene.*“ (Wittgenstein 1970, 53, § 174)

Searle beschreibt den Hintergrund aufgrund seiner Indexikalität auch als *mental* (Searle 1983, 154): Ich bin ich selbst nur aufgrund meines durch biologische Kapazität und soziale Ausprägung geformten Hintergrundes, und vice versa, ist der Hintergrund nur in seiner Beeinflussung meines *mind-brains* (Searle, ebenda) von Interesse und nur hier zu lokalisieren.

Der *kulturelle* Hintergrund wird als Instantiierung unserer biologisch angelegten Kapazitäten weitgehend naturalisiert erlebt. Nicht nur der biologische Hintergrund erscheint unbezweifelbar und in diesem Sinn unausweichlich, sondern ebenso der kulturelle Hintergrund. Dies freilich gilt zunächst für das phänomenale Erleben, für die 1. Person Perspektive. Es ist wiederholt in Kritik an Searles Modell darauf hingewiesen worden, dass eine „logische“ Analyse des Hintergrundes nicht ausreiche (Dreyfus 1999, Stekeler-Weithofer 2000), sondern dass eine phänomenologische Analyse notwendig sei. Eine adäquate Beschreibung des Hintergrund-Phänomens muss der spezifischen Qualität der Indexikalität, die seinem phänomenalen Charakter gleich kommt, Rechnung tragen. Searles Analyse ist dazu in der Lage.

Umgekehrt kritisiert Searle an Wittgensteins Darstellung, dass die Frage nach der Beziehung zwischen dem nicht-intentionalen Hintergrund und der Regelbefolgung unbeantwortet bleibe:

„He <Wittgenstein> says there is an ungrounded way of acting. We reach the point where we just do it. We talk this way and not that way. We accept this and not that. But Wittgenstein's approach is very unsatisfying,

because it does not tell us what the role of the rule structure is.“ (Searle 1995, 140)

Searles sozialontologisches Projekt ist es, die Rolle der Regelstruktur für gesellschaftliche Institutionen, die Systeme konstitutiver Regeln sind, darzustellen (Searle 1995, 140).

Die Interpretation der Begriffe Bedeutung, Regel (Wittgenstein 1970, 25, § 62) und Anerkennung illustriert Wittgensteins Position: Innerhalb der Sprachspiele ist die Bedeutung eines Wortes eine Art seiner Verwendung und macht damit den Inhalt einer Regel aus (Wittgenstein 1970, 24, § 61 und 62). Wenn Gesellschaften Systeme für kollektives Handeln schaffen, dann sind Bedeutungen (Regel-)Zwecke der in diesem System Handelnden (vgl. Meggle 1985, 9-13).

Wissen und Regel-Können gründet sich am Schluss auf Anerkennung (Wittgenstein 1970, 99, § 378). Die Anerkennung der Regeln ist eine Funktion des kulturellen Hintergrundes und ist meiner (persönlichen) Entscheidung entzogen und ist kollektiv bestimmt.

Die Hintergründe einer Kultur sind auf der vor-intentionalen Ebene für ihre Träger nicht verhandelbar, aber sind sie deshalb auch tatsächlich jeder Reflexion entzogen?

Wie ist kulturelles Hintergrundkönnen und –Wissen artikulierbar? Wie ist es verhandelbar?

Zur Verhandlung und Veränderung des kulturellen Hintergrundes ist das Erleben der Unsicherheit des Hintergrundes und seiner Relativität notwendig. Diese Relativität geht zurück auf die Indexikalität und die Kontingenz des individuellen Hintergrundes, der *mental* ist; er beinhaltet die Erfahrung der Privatheit des Individuums im Verhältnis zur Umwelt. Der kulturelle Hintergrund ist die Ausformulierung der Anlagen des tiefen Hintergrundes, aber er wird als naturalisiert erlebt. Die Erfahrung des Zusammenbruchs erscheint nicht nur aus der Perspektive der „vernünftigen Menschen“, sondern auch aus der Perspektive des Zweifelnden unnatürlich und abnormal. „Damit der Mensch sich irre, muß er schon mit der Menschheit konform urteilen.“ (Wittgenstein 1970, 49, § 156) Wenn der „Irrtum“ in einer Nicht-Konformität mit der Praxis des Urteiles allgemein besteht, dann wird der Weltzweifel als Zusammenbruch erlebt.

Manche literarischen Werke befassen sich mit der Darstellung des *Erlebens* des Weltzweifels. Das soziale Scheitern von Ödön von Horvaths Figuren zeigt z.B. die Tragik der Naturalisierung des kulturellen Hintergrundes. Weil der Hintergrund nicht bezweifelt werden kann, wird ein Auseinanderbrechen von Selbst und Gesellschaft als ausweglos erfahren. Horvaths Figuren sind in diesem Sinn Opfer ihrer Gesellschaft.

Der Welt-Zweifel wird dann nicht als Zusammenbruch meiner Welt erfahren, wenn das Auseinanderbrechen von Selbst und Welt (Gesellschaft) kontrollierbar bleibt, d.h. wenn dieser Zweifel uns nicht widerfährt, sondern als Teil eines Sprachspiel erlebt wird. Das Spielen des Weltzweifels findet statt z.B. in der dramatischen Kunst. Das kontrollierte Erleben des Welt-Zweifels ist die *kathartische* Wirkung solcher Spiele.

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Zar'a-Jacob und Walda-Heiwat über die Rationalität religiöser Aussagen – Ein Beitrag zur äthiopischen Religionsphilosophie des 17. Jahrhunderts

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1. Einführung

Im Besitz der Nationalbibliothek in Paris befindet sich eine größere Anzahl äthiopischer Manuskripte, unter anderem das Manuskript 215 der Sammlung von Antoine d'Abbadie (vgl. d'Abbadie 1859). Dieses enthält zwei Abhandlungen, eine von Zar'a-Jacob und eine von seinem Schüler Walda-Heiwat.¹ Beide Philosophen lebten im 17. Jahrhundert in Äthiopien. Zar'a-Jacob wird 1599 in der Gegend von Axum geboren. In den Kirchen- und Klosterschulen lernt er die philosophisch-theologische Tradition seines Landes kennen. Danach ist er als Schreiber und Lehrer tätig. 1667, im Alter von 68 Jahren, vollendet er seine Abhandlung, zu der sich beispielsweise Hermann Cohen und Benno Erdmann anerkennend äußern (vgl. Cohen 1916/17, 201, Erdmann 1916, IX). 1692 stirbt er in Enferaz, einem Ort am Ostufer des Tana-Sees, der Quelle des Blauen Nils. Walda-Heiwat ist sein unmittelbarer Schüler. Er wird in Enferaz, vermutlich um 1626 geboren. Seine Schrift verfaßt er etwa um das Todesjahr des Zar'a-Jacob.

Beide Denker sind Monotheisten, es ist jedoch schwierig anzugeben, welcher Konfession sie angehören (vgl. UZJ 35 [28rv], UWH 207 [37v]²). Von Zar'a-Jacob wissen wir, daß er getauft ist (vgl. UZJ 3 [1v]). Er lehrt und kopiert als Schreiber die Psalmen, zitiert sie auch zustimmend, wenngleich er andere Bemerkungen der Bibel gelegentlich kritisiert. Walda-Heiwat zitiert ebenfalls die Bibel, allerdings viel seltener.

Im folgenden soll es darum gehen, in einer ersten Annäherung den Stellenwert, den Zar'a-Jacob und Walda-Heiwat in ihren Traktaten der menschlichen Vernunft bei der Behandlung von Glaubensfragen einräumen, zu erörtern und an Hand ihrer Begründungen für die Annahme der Existenz Gottes darzustellen.

2. Fides sine inquisitione non exigitur

Den religiösen Glauben seiner Zeitgenossen kritisierend, schreibt Zar'a-Jacob:

Wiederum sann ich nach und sprach: "Warum verstehen denn alle Menschen nicht die Wahrheit, sondern [glauben an]³ das Falsche?" Da schien mir der Grund zu sein, daß die Natur der Menschen schwach und träge ist. ... Und deswegen wollen die Menschen nicht nachforschen, sondern glauben eilends an das, was sie

von ihren Vätern gehört haben, ohne es zu prüfen. ... Sie glauben an all das nicht etwa, weil sie durch Forschen es als wahr erfunden hätten, sondern sie glauben daran, weil sie es von ihren Vorfahren gehört haben (UZJ 10f. [7r-8r]).

Die Menschen sollen sich also nicht ohne weiteres auf die religiösen Aussagen der Tradition verlassen, da diese oft falsch sind. Wenn viele dennoch unkritisch an religiösen Überlieferungen festhalten, so deshalb, weil diese Menschen zu schwach und zu träge sind, um das Gesagte zu prüfen. Zar'a-Jacob zufolge muß man in religiösen Dingen seine Vernunft gebrauchen. Religiöser Glaube soll nicht nur nach Einsicht *suchen* - fides quaerens intellectum -, religiöse Aussagen *können und sollen* auch eingesehen werden. Letzteres ist möglich, weil die menschliche Vernunft in Gott ihren Ursprung hat und Gott den Menschen nicht täuscht (vgl. UZJ 11-13 [8r-9v]).

Ähnlich äußert sich Walda-Heiwat. Er kritisiert diejenigen, die ohne Untersuchung die Religion ihrer Väter übernehmen:

Es gibt keinen anderen Grund für ihren Glauben als den genannten; weil sie Kinder ihrer Väter sind und weil sie in ihrer Kindheit gehört haben, daß die Religion ihrer Väter richtig ist. Und sie haben daran ohne Untersuchung oder Kenntnis geglaubt (UWH 200 [32r]).

Man dürfe an das, was man mündlich oder schriftlich gelehrt bekommen habe, nicht glauben, solange man es nicht geprüft und als wahr befunden habe (vgl. UWH 201 [32v-33r]). Da die Vernunft ein Geschenk Gottes ist, versetzt sie den Menschen in die Lage, die Wahrheit zu erkennen (vgl. UWH 202, 209 [33r, 38v-39r]).

Beide Philosophen vertreten nicht nur die Meinung, daß es so etwas wie eine natürliche Theologie gibt, daß also gewisse Inhalte des religiösen Glaubens der menschlichen Vernunft zugänglich sind, sondern sie sind der stärkeren Auffassung, daß Theologie auf natürliche Theologie reduziert werden muß, daß also *alle* Inhalte des religiösen Glaubens der menschlichen Vernunft zugänglich sein müssen und daß es insbesondere überflüssig ist, einen Bereich von Glaubenswahrheiten anzunehmen, der nicht prinzipiell eingesehen werden kann. Walda-Heiwat schreibt das an mehreren Stellen auch ausdrücklich:

Damit ich nicht in meinem Glauben falsch geleitet werde, glaube ich an nichts, mit Ausnahme dessen, was Gott mir durch das Licht meines Verstandes offenbarte (UWH 207 [37v]).

Ein Glaube ohne Untersuchung ist von Gott nicht gefordert und entspricht nicht der Natur der rationalen Kreatur (UWH 208 [38v]).⁴

Der Glaube, den unser Verstand uns zeigt, ist größer als alle versteckten Geheimnisse ... (UWH 211 [40v]).

¹ Die Authentizität dieser Schriften wurde von Sumner 1976, 61-275, nachgewiesen. Littmann hat beide Texte kritisch ediert (vgl. Littmann 1904a), ins Lateinische (vgl. Littmann 1904b) sowie den ersten ins Deutsche (vgl. Littmann 1916) übertragen. Eine vollständige Übersetzung *beider* Abhandlungen ins Deutsche, angefertigt von Amsalu Akililu und Hopfmann, ist in Hopfmann 1992 enthalten. Littmann folgend, seien beide Abhandlungen *Untersuchung* (Hatäta) genannt. Zitiert werde Zar'a-Jacob nach Littmann 1916 (UZJ) und Walda-Heiwat nach Hopfmann 1992 (UWH), wobei neben der Seitenzahl die Referenzstellen des äthiopischen Manuskriptes in eckigen Klammern angegeben sind. Die Schreibweise der Namen entspricht der in Littmann 1916.

² In der Übersetzung von Amsalu Akililu und Hopfmann fehlt an dieser Stelle offensichtlich ein Satz. In diesem wird der Glaube des Moses erwähnt. Vgl. Littmann 1904a, 65, emendanda zu p. 34, l. 22, Littmann 1904b, p. 34, l. 19.

³ In eckigen Klammern gesetzte Einschübe stammen von Littmann.

⁴ In der lateinischen Übertragung von Littmann: "Fides autem sine inquisitione non exigitur a Deo neque congruit cum natura creaturae rationalis" (p. 35, l. 13-15).

Religiösen Aussagen darf man nur dann zustimmen, wenn sie von der menschlichen Vernunft eingesehen werden können. Demnach darf man, da man jeder Aussage, die eingesehen werden kann, zustimmen darf, einer religiösen Aussage *genau dann* zustimmen, wenn sie eingesehen werden kann. Einen der Vernunft nicht einleuchtenden religiösen Glauben muß und darf man nicht akzeptieren. Niemand darf - auch nicht durch Gott - zu einem solchen Glauben verpflichtet werden (vgl. UWH 208 [37v-38r]). Der Gläubige trägt gegenüber dem Ungläubigen die Beweislast. Er muß die Gründe für seinen Glauben angeben und nicht der Ungläubige dafür, warum er nicht glaubt (vgl. UWH 206 [36v]). Er muß insbesondere die Existenz Gottes beweisen, nicht der Ungläubige die Nichtexistenz Gottes. Nun sind Zar'a-Jacob und Walda-Heiwat allerdings der Ansicht, daß die Existenz Gottes bewiesen werden kann:

Die Grundlage aller Religion ... ist es, zu glauben, daß es einen Gott gibt ... und wenn wir es untersuchen, beweist uns unsere Vernunft, daß es wahr ist ... (UWH 202 [33v]).⁵

Hier zeigt sich ein methodischer Zirkel, denn einerseits soll die menschliche Vernunft ihre Sicherheit dadurch erhalten, daß sie von Gott stammt, andererseits soll sie die Existenz Gottes erweisen. Dieser Zirkel scheint den Autoren nicht bewußt zu sein. Ihre Gottesbeweisversuche seien jetzt dargestellt und kurz diskutiert. Beide geben allerdings keine Begründung für die *Einzigkeit* Gottes an.

3. Zar'a-Jacobs Beweisversuche

Zar'a-Jacob entwickelt zwei Argumente für die Existenz Gottes. Anmerkungen hierzu finden sich in Sumner 1978, 119-127.

Erstes Argument

Und ich sprach: "... Und wer hat mich denn geschaffen? Bin ich etwa selbst von meiner eigenen Hand geschaffen? Aber ich war doch noch nicht da, als ich geschaffen wurde. Wenn ich aber spreche: 'Mein Vater und meine Mutter haben mich geschaffen', so wird wiederum der Erschaffer meiner Eltern und ihrer Eltern gesucht, bis daß man zu den ersten [Menschen] kommt, die nicht so geschaffen sind wie wir, sondern die in diese Welt gekommen sind auf eine andere Art ohne Erzeuger. Wenn nun auch diese geschaffen sind, so weiß ich nicht, wo der Anfang ihres Ursprungs ist, außer daß ich sage: 'Der sie geschaffen hat aus dem Nichts, ist ein Wesen, das nicht geschaffen ist, sondern das ist und sein wird in alle Ewigkeit, der Allherr und Allumfassender, der keinen Anfang und kein Ende hat, der unveränderlich ist und dessen Jahre unzählbar sind.'" Und ich sprach: "Es gibt also einen Schöpfer; denn wenn es keinen Schöpfer gäbe, so gäbe es auch keine Schöpfung. Nun wir aber da sind und nicht Schöpfer sind, sondern Geschaffene, so müssen wir sagen, daß es einen Schöpfer gibt, der uns geschaffen hat. ..." (UZJ 7f. [4v-5r]).

Der in den Eingangsfragen verwendete Begriff des Schaffens bzw. Erschaffens ist von dem im Argument ebenfalls benutzten Begriff des Schaffens (Erschaffens) aus dem Nichts zu unterscheiden. Dies würde Zar'a-Jacob vermutlich dadurch tun, daß er sagt, daß ein beliebiges x von einem beliebigen y genau dann *erschaffen wird*, wenn x von y verursacht wird, und von y genau dann *aus dem*

Nichts erschaffen wird, wenn x allein von y verursacht wird. Hierbei sei bei allen Schwierigkeiten, die mit dem Begriff der Ursache verbunden sind, vorausgesetzt, daß der Unterschied zwischen *alleinigen Ursachen* und *Ursachen, die keine alleinigen Ursachen sind*, intuitiv klar ist: Alleinige Ursachen sollen im Gegensatz zu Ursachen, die nicht alleinige Ursachen sind, für das von ihnen Verursachte "ausreichen".

Nach dem obigen Zitat soll es nichts geben, das sich selbst geschaffen hat. Bei der Begründung hierfür wird unterstellt, daß Ursachen früher zu existieren anfangen als das von ihnen Verursachte. Somit ist es nicht möglich, daß er, Zar'a-Jacob, sich selbst geschaffen hat. Vielmehr wurde er von seinen Eltern, Vater und Mutter, geschaffen und diese wiederum von ihren Eltern usw. bis zu einem (oder eventuell mehreren) ersten Elternpaar(en). Der Kern des Gottesbeweisversuches besteht darin, daß daraus, daß die Stammeltern - im Gegensatz zu den anderen Menschen (und im Gegensatz zu Zar'a-Jacob) - nicht durch Zeugung entstanden sind, darauf geschlossen wird, daß sie aus dem Nichts geschaffen worden sind, und zwar von einem Wesen, das selbst nicht geschaffen worden ist, das ewig, (zeitlich) anfangs- und endlos, unveränderlich, allherrschend und allumfassend ist, wobei dieses Wesen dann gerade Gott ist. Natürlich enthält dieser Schluß unausgedrückte Prämissen. Schon die Behauptung, daß die Stammeltern aus dem Nichts geschaffen worden sind, ist begründungsbedürftig, denn sie könnten beispielsweise aus bereits Geschaffenem - also nicht aus dem Nichts - geschaffen worden sein. Daß die Stammeltern von einem Wesen geschaffen wurden, das selbst nicht geschaffen wurde, ist ebenfalls nicht einsichtig. Warum sollte dieses Wesen nicht von einem anderen Wesen geschaffen worden sein? Ob dieses andere Wesen dann geschaffen worden ist oder nicht, sei dahingestellt.

Zweites Argument

... wenn alle Menschen über eine Sache einig sind, so erscheint die Sache ihnen als Wahrheit. Aber über das Falsche können nicht alle Menschen einig sein, wie sie ja auch über ihren Glauben ganz und gar nicht einig sind. Laßt uns doch bedenken, warum alle Menschen einig sind darin, daß sie sagen, es gebe einen Gott, den Schöpfer aller Dinge! Der Verstand aller Menschen weiß, daß dies alles, was wir sehen, geschaffen ist, und daß ein Geschaffenes nicht ohne einen Schöpfer sein kann. Daß es einen Schöpfer gibt, das ist wahr; deswegen sind sich alle Menschen darüber einig (UZJ 17 [12v-13r]).

Dieses Zitat enthält folgende Überlegung:

- (1) Alle Menschen sind sich darüber einig, daß es einen Gott gibt.
- (2) Dasjenige, über das sich alle Menschen einig sind, ist der Fall.
- (3) Also gibt es einen Gott.

Der Schluß von (1) und (2) auf (3) ist formal korrekt, nur ist (1) falsch und (2) sehr voraussetzungsreich. Gegen (1) spricht die Existenz von Agnostikern oder Atheisten. Dennoch versucht Zar'a-Jacob (1) zu begründen: Jeder Mensch erkennt, daß es Gott, "den Schöpfer aller Dinge", gibt, weil jeder Mensch erkennt, daß alles, was er sehen kann, geschaffen ist und daß es Geschaffenes nicht ohne einen Schöpfer geben kann, wobei dieser Schöpfer dann gerade der Schöpfer aller Dinge ist. Hier muß man Zar'a-Jacob unter anderem entgegenhalten, daß selbst dann,

⁵ Vgl. auch UWH 209 [39r].

wenn jedes von Menschen sichtbare (oder nur von ihnen gesehene) Ding geschaffen worden ist, nicht gelten muß, daß jedes Ding *von ein und demselben Schöpfer* geschaffen worden ist, es könnte mehrere Schöpfer geben, darunter geschaffene. Daß Zar'a-Jacob (2) vertritt, wird nicht so sehr durch die Bemerkung "wenn alle Menschen über eine Sache einig sind, so erscheint die Sache ihnen als Wahrheit" deutlich, sondern durch die Behauptung "über das Falsche können nicht alle Menschen einig sein", denn aus ihr folgt sofort, daß dasjenige, über das sich alle Menschen einig sind, auch der Fall ist. (2) ist nicht nur historisch, sondern auch systematisch interessant. Kann es sein, daß *alle* Menschen, also alle, die gelebt haben, leben und leben werden, der Ansicht sind, ein bestimmter Sachverhalt sei der Fall, obwohl er es nicht ist? Zar'a-Jacob zufolge ist das nicht möglich:

... die Weisheit Gottes hat mit gutem Vorbedacht die Menschen sich nicht über das Falsche einig sein lassen, damit es ihnen nicht als das Wahre erschiene (UZJ 16f. [12v]).

4. Walda-Heiwats Beweisversuch

Wir sind geschaffen worden und genauso ist all das, was wir in dieser Welt sehen, ... geschaffen worden. Wie kann es erschaffen worden sein ohne einen Schöpfer? Jede Kreatur ist begrenzt und schwach und hat keine Macht, aus dem Nichts zu schaffen. Deshalb bedarf es eines Wesens, das vor allen Kreaturen existiert hat, ohne Anfang oder Ende, das all das, was dick und dünn, sichtbar und unsichtbar ist, aus dem Nichts erschuf (UWH 203 [33v-34r]).

Der Kern dieses Argumentes lautet wie folgt:

- (1) Alles Weltliche ist erschaffen worden.
- (2) Nichts Weltliches kann aus dem Nichts erschaffen.
- (3) Also gibt es etwas, das aus dem Nichts erschafft - Gott.

Dieser Beweisversuch kann nicht befriedigen. Mögen auch die Prämissen (1) und (2) einleuchten (vielleicht dann, wenn man statt von *erschaffen* von *verursachen* spricht) - der Schluß von (1) und (2) auf (3) ist ohne zusätzliche Annahmen nicht einzusehen.

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Wittgenstein on consciousness in “Philosophical Investigations”

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There are many important sides of Cartesian dualism and among them is the epistemological perspective, which says that there is a faculty of introspection by which a human being as a conscious being can know the contents of his/her own consciousness.¹ Here, we will discuss only Wittgenstein's criticism of this perspective. He changed his position at least twice (TLP, PI), but we are going to discuss only a few paragraphs from PI (398-427), and some related passages from Z. Wittgenstein in his philosophy, and in this part of it as well, did not formulate a thesis in the strict sense, nor did he formulate strict objections and arguments. Rather, he “displayed philosophical puzzlement about the mind by the identification of misleading images and superficial similarities” (Budd 1995:617). He saw that there is an important problem closely connected with the Cartesian picture of consciousness.

(1) Wittgenstein says: “Though the ether is filled with vibrations the world is in dark. But one day man opens his seeing eye, and there is light.” (PI II 184, Glock 1997, Mladić 2003:207-216)

Consciousness is conceived as the ray of light which illuminates our private mental episodes. (Glock 1997:85) In his later work, Wittgenstein raised numerous objections to this picture, or “world of consciousness”, especially in PI. The point is that if these objections stand, then the Cartesian picture of consciousness is unacceptable. But let us see some of his strongest objections to the picture (1).

(1.1) According to the thesis, the content of consciousness is a special kind of entity to which only I have access. The objection is formulated by the well-known “private language argument” which says that there are no such private entities and private access to them (PI 243-315, McGinn 1997:143-177). But that might be going too far. He certainly holds that we can't talk about an inner private realm, but in PI 304 he infamously says it is “not a something, but not a nothing either...”.

(1.2) The consequence of the first objection is that there is no infallible introspection. If after an accident I say to my doctor “I am conscious” I don't report the result of introspection of my mind but simply signal him that I have regained consciousness and I could have done that equally by saying “Hello!” (PI 416-417).

(1.3) For this reason (1.2) it is completely misguided to look for the essence of consciousness by turning one's attention toward one's own consciousness. Quite the contrary, what is needed is an investigation of the use of the word “conscious” and similar words like “aware” etc. But regarding this and (1.2) if I could signal to my doctor that I am conscious equally by saying “I am conscious now” and by saying “Hello doctor!” why are we then so puzzled by the analysis of the word consciousness and not by the analysis of the word hello?

(1.4) Such an investigation reveals that “consciousness” doesn't refer to a phenomenon inside us, and the alleged ontological gap between the physical

world and the world of consciousness is merely a categorical difference between sentient and non-sentient beings that we commonly apply. “Healthy human beings are conscious” or “Healthy human beings hear, see, smell...” are grammatical propositions. This is established in Wittgenstein's concept of grammar (PI 281-284).

(1.5) If what is previously said (1.1 – 1.4) is correct, then there is no “unbridgeable gulf between consciousness and brain process” and there is not a such thing as a “metaphysical mystery of consciousness” (PI 412). This is Wittgenstein's treatment of the Cartesian picture of consciousness and it is a part of his more general criticism of the inner/outer distinction (Glock 1997:174-179). The core of the inner/outer distinction is the idea of privacy which has two different but nonetheless interconnected connotations (the private ownership thesis, and the epistemic privacy thesis); privacy (regarding 1.1) could mean:

(2) “X is privately owned” which means that no one else can have somebody's X (“my pain” for example), and “X is epistemically private” which means for example that “only I can know that I am in pain”. (PI 398-411, Mladić 2003:207-217).

(3) This is also closely connected to the problem of other minds. The mental states of others are hidden to me as well as my mental states are hidden from others. Wittgenstein's criticism can be summarized as “Nothing is hidden!”

This was Wittgenstein's criticism of the Cartesian “world of consciousness”. The treatment of empiricist view of consciousness was also criticized from the same position, i.e., by the same arguments.

(4) The Cartesian solution is “res cogitans” as immaterial substances which are the bearer of psychological properties. Cartesian and empiricist conceptions imply that the mental is an inner realm of subjective experience contingently connected to the body. For Wittgenstein, “the mental is essentially manifested in the forms of behavior which give expression to the inner” (Hacker 1999:4).

(5) Regarding behavior, “while Cartesians and behaviourists represented behaviour as bare bodily movement, Wittgenstein emphasized that human behaviour is, and is experienced, as being, suffused meaning, thought, passion and will” (Hacker 1999:5).

Wittgenstein's final criticism of Cartesian and the empiricist “world of consciousness” is a simple statement that human beings have consciousness, and trees and stones do not have it (PI 418, similar in PI 281 with difference in “*living* human beings ... have or haven't consciousness”), and this is a grammatical statement. So, investigation of our use of words like “consciousness” or “awareness” is of utmost importance, and the result of such investigation is:

(a) That we conceive consciousness as something that is realized not by some “mental entity” like “res cogitans” (Cartesian solution),

¹ We wish to thank professors Peter Hacker, Jim Klagge, Davor Pečnjak, and Anja Weiberg for helpful critical comments and suggestions regarding this paper.

- (b) And not that it can be deduced from premises that include facts about our behavior as bare bodily movements (empiricism),
- (c) But rather that we conceive the whole human being as being in "the stream of life" that give signs to others like a sign "Hello!" or a sign "I am conscious now".

This unity of human beings implies many ideas that are quite contrary to those of the Cartesian and empiricist traditions. This kind of unity, as is presented in Wittgenstein's treatment of "human being/life", seems to be extraordinarily strong in terms of the third position between dualism and behaviorism.

(6) Wittgenstein's solution is that human being is a psychophysical unity, not an embodied anima, but a living creature in 'a stream of life', because it is human beings, not minds, who perceive and think, have desires and act, feel joy and sorrow. But the question is how he connected these two elements of his solution, namely:

(6.1) That our investigation of consciousness is conceptual or grammatical, and the other one,

(6.2) That only a living human being as a kind of unity or whole in its stream of life expresses consciousness or is conscious?

The crucial aspect of grammatical investigation (6.1) is that "'I have consciousness' – is not a proposition" (Z 401), and the crucial aspect of the "descriptive" investigation (6.2) says that "a man can pretend to be unconscious; but "conscious"?" (Z 395) However, it seems to us that the connection is almost natural concerning his later philosophy.

(7) Since language is given in language-game model and practice, since language game is "a part" of an activity or form of life (PI 23), and "is there – like our life" (OC 559), and finally since expressions in language have their meaning only in "stream of life", it seems that investigating consciousness means "investigating grammar of consciousness".

(8) On the other hand and following the same line of argument, there is no private language since language games are actual practices of speaking of language and since language is public. These elements imply that there is no inner realm of anything including consciousness among many other things in the manner of Cartesian "res cogitans" and its contents, but this is a bad sign for a language, if it cannot "express" the inner realm. Of course from this it does not follow that behaviorism is correct, but this will be discussed later.

Now we must ask how this was done in Wittgenstein's work, especially in PI. (9) Regarding (7) and (8), if we apply these results (some of them coming directly from the criticism of TLP, PI 1-133) regarding the problem of the gap between brain processes and consciousness, Wittgenstein must criticize the Cartesian view of consciousness as a result of "res cogitans". Imagine that a stone has a soul, or that a human body has a soul, (PI 284), and you will see that it is wrong, because "only for a being that behaves like a human we can say that it has pain" (PI 283).

That is how the human being is introduced in the argument.

(10) But, there is another problem. If we criticize dualism, or the Cartesian "world of consciousness" then

implicitly the statement that human action (linguistic as well as non-linguistic) and the form of life is what counts, then we can be accused of behaviorism, because fiction is everything besides human behavior (PI 307).

The first thing is that Wittgenstein explicitly says that if it is a matter of fiction, then it must be grammatical fiction (PI 307). But, quite the contrary, it is a grammatical reality, since when a child is in pain, and it is gesticulating in a certain typical way, and it is screaming "It hurts!" for example (acculturated pain-behavior), that means that it was educated in pain behavior (Schmerzbehemen, PI 244), and this acculturation by virtue of uttering "It hurts!" is the result of this education. And that means that a child acquired not only a language in which it could say "I am in pain", but also a form of life. A description of behavior is not something that serves us as an explanation of a certain behavior, but a description of a certain behavior makes sense precisely because one is behaving in such a way. (PI 357) Psychology is interested in behavior, not in the soul. So, what does a psychologist observe if not the behavior of people, especially their utterances and statements? "But *they* [utterances/statements] don't speak of behavior." (PI II, 179). So, for Wittgenstein behavior is not just "bodily movement" like in behaviorism, but rather the whole life of a living human being, and actions as its parts. In this respect, Wittgenstein rejected behaviorism and empiricism with the same argument with which he refused Cartesian consciousness. Concerning consciousness, Wittgenstein followed the same line of description as he did regarding language, rules, and reality in PI. Since there is no private language, and there are no isolated "res cogitans", then there must be something objective. But he criticized behaviorism on the same grounds. Moreover, he contrasted them as similarly unacceptable positions. Following A. J. Rudd (2000) and P. M. S. Hacker (2001) we can see the place of his position in the context of these two opposite viewpoints. FIRST PERSON: Starting from the introspection of the isolated subject: Cartesian "res cogitans". THIRD PERSON: Starting from the objectivity of scientific observation: behavioral bare "bodily movements". SECOND PERSON: Starting from ordinary human interaction: language-games, forms of life, which is Wittgenstein's position, namely the investigation of how we learn the language in which we talk about inner states. The result of such investigation is the following:

(11) "The inner states find a natural or "primitive" expression in and through physical behavior." /.../ "To be in pain is not just to display pain behavior, or even to have a disposition to do so; but it is a part of the experience of pain that it finds natural expression in certain types of behavior." (Rudd 2000)

Living human beings are entities which express their feelings, thoughts, intentions, which are occupied in different activities in their stream/form of life. But, from the point of view of the form of life (and especially in light of its connection with practice, handling, routines, etc. from PI and OC, see Krkač 2003) there is no relevant difference between expressing pain, sorrow, or joy, and lifting a book, or sitting on a chair. This seems the way in which Wittgenstein connected or saw the connection between "grammatical investigation", and the "investigation of form of life" of consciousness among other things. It seems that explications (7) to (10) show the difference and connection between (6.1) and (6.2), and in the end this explains his general solution stated in (6) which says: Wittgenstein's solution is that the human being is a psychophysical unity, not an embodied "anima", a living creature in "a stream of

life", because it is human beings, not minds, who perceive and think, have desires and act, feel joy and sorrow... But the question is what the human being is. Regarding human nature, Wittgenstein surely rejected Cartesian (dualist) and Humean (empiricist/behaviorist) explanations, and adopted a quite simple reason in the famous, already mentioned paragraph of PI.

(12) "Only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears, is deaf; is conscious or unconscious." (PI 281, related to 282-287).

Regarding the interpretation of paragraph 281 we can quote A. Kenny: "I conclude that there is good reason to heed the warning of Wittgenstein with which this paper began [PI 281]. The moral is not that the human-being predicates cannot have their use extended at all, but that they must be extended cautiously and self-cautiously, and that if they are extended one may not argue from the application of such a predicate to a whole human being to the application of the transferred predicate to anything other than the whole human being." (Kenny 1987:133-134) Following H. – J. Glock (1997:156) we can cite two arguments for this claim (12).

(13) There is a conceptual (grammatical) connection between psychological terms and forms of behavior. We can ascribe thoughts only to those creatures which are capable of 'manifesting them' (PI 284).

(14) Such expressions ("I am in pain") make sense only as a part of a complex of the form of life. "The concept of pain is characterized by a particular function in our life... we only call 'pain' what has 'this' position, 'these' connections." (Z 532-533).

There are at least three possible explanations for these arguments.

- (a) In the first interpretation there is a tension between behavioral criteria and contextualism of the form of life.
- (b) In the second interpretation there is a relation and in it the form of life implies behavioral criteria (for a different community it is possible to respond the same, but that "pain" would have a different meaning).
- (c) In the third, they are compatible because without forms of life, forms of behavior would be unintelligible (Glock 1997:156). The point is simple.

(15) If it is correct that we can ascribe experiential predicates (like "... in pain") only to sentient beings, then there (a) is no sense to ascribe them to non-material substances like in dualism, (b) nor to ascribe them to physical bodies or their parts like in materialism.

The first consequence (a) is nevertheless accepted by the majority of contemporary philosophers of the mind, and the second (b) is suspicious because some philosophy of science informs us that "the mind is the brain" (science of course does not tell this). As far as we can see it, this claim that the mind is the brain is not crucial for the argument, but rather, the answer to the question – what cultural anthropology tells us about sentient beings. But, what really seems problematic in Wittgenstein's overview of human nature is not so much the concept of a "sentient being" or "human being", but more fundamentally, the concept of a "living being".

(16) "I am inclined to speak of a lifeless thing as lacking something. I see life definitely as a plus, as something added to a lifeless thing. (Psychological atmosphere)" (Z 128, see also PI 430 (comparison between a log and living creature) /.../ "Seeing life as a weave, this pattern is not always complete and is varied in a multiplicity of ways." (Z 568)

However, Wittgenstein often speaks of life metaphorically and also literally. So, we can draw the analogy: like "the use of a sign is its life", (metaphorically), so "the action of a living (sentient as well) being is its life" (literally). And being conscious is not a part of a mental realm nor is it a part of mere brain activity/or expressed by bodily movement, but rather implicit in the action of a living human being (Hacker 2001:87).

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Geltung und Naturalismus

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Die transzendente Erkenntnistheorie besteht vor allem aus Untersuchungen der Geltung von den Voraussetzungen „dogmatischer“ und „naiver“ Sätze. Sie nimmt eine Trennung zwischen *questio iuris* und *questio facti* vor. Die ersten Fragen gehören zur Philosophie und die zweiten zum sachlichen Wissen. Diese Unterscheidung soll den Bereich der Philosophie vom Bereich der einzelnen Wissenschaften trennen. Im Unterschied zur naturalistischen Erkenntnistheorie nimmt die Transzendentalphilosophie an, dass nicht die „Frage nach dem Recht“ zur Sachfrage reduziert werden könne, denn die Gültigkeit der Urteile kann nicht aus den Tatsachen hergeleitet werden. In diesem Sinne ist die Erkenntnistheorie unabhängig von der Empirie; sie hat zur Aufgabe die Legitimität unserer Rede über empirische Entitäten.

Kann diese Reduktion nicht durchgeführt werden, müssen Argumente für die Unreduzierbarkeit angeführt werden. Dieses Problem ist vom sprachlichen Gesichtspunkt aus als Frage zu verstehen, worin der Unterschied zwischen den präskriptiven Normen und deskriptiven Aussagen besteht.

Der Gegenstand dieses Referats ist eine Analyse des Normbegriffs von Wilhelm Windelband. Wir wollen jedoch nicht nur seine Lehre rekonstruieren, sondern auch deren Folgen und Wirkungen für die formale Logik und insbesondere für die Semantik der klassischen Aussagenlogik aufzeigen.

Logische und psychologische Gesetze

Windelband ist der Meinung, dass Normen und Naturgesetze (verstanden als eine Art von deskriptiven Aussagen) zwei verschiedene Funktionen haben:

„Die Norm ist nie ein Prinzip der Erklärung, so wenig wie das Naturgesetz je ein Prinzip der Beurteilung.“ (Windelband 1882: 67)

Die Naturgesetze geben Gründe an, um Tatsachen zu verstehen. Wie jedoch können sie verbinden und erklären? Diese Verbindungen und ihre Erklärungen können nur aufgrund der Normen beurteilt, d.h. gebilligt oder missbilligt werden. Die Funktion der Naturgesetze besteht in der Tatsachenerklärung und die der Normen liegt in der Beurteilung.

Es gibt zwei Arten der Gesetzgebung: (1) die „psychologische Gesetzgebung“ und (2) die „normative Gesetzgebung“. Die psychologische Gesetzgebung erklärt das Seelenleben und die normative Gesetzgebung beurteilt dasselbe Seelenleben nach seinen Leistungen. Die erste Art der Gesetze bestimmt Windelband folgenderweise:

„Die psychologischen Gesetze sind also Prinzipien der erklärenden Wissenschaft, aus denen der Ursprung der einzelnen Tatsachen des Seelenlebens abgeleitet werden muß (...).“ (Windelband 1882: 66)

Die psychologischen Gesetze sind also feste Regeln, nach denen Vorgänge in der Natur verlaufen. Wir können mit ihrer Hilfe jede Tatsache erklären und den Ursprung jeder Tatsache ableiten.

Wenn das psychologische Gesetz die Aufgabe der Erklärung (Explikation) hat, können wir es im Anschluss an Jan Łukasiewicz als eine Art der regressiven Reduktion rR betrachten. (Bocheński 1954: 101) Dieses Gesetz besagt, dass eine Schlussfolgerung aus einer konditionalen Aussage (die metasprachliche Implikation) und ihrem Nachsatz B auf den Vordersatz A folgt. Die Variable B entspricht einem Nachsatz über die bekannten psychischen Tatsachen. Die Variable B ist ein Symbol für eine Aussage über ihren unbekanntem Ursprung.

(rR) Wenn A , dann B

nun aber B

also A .

Aus dieser Implikation und ihrem Nachsatz B wird in der Erklärung ihr Vordersatz A gefolgert. Das psychologische Gesetz entspricht in diesem Schema der Implikation, die durch B eine Aussage über die Wirkung und mit A über die Ursache trifft.

Die zweite Art des Gesetzes unterscheidet sich dadurch, dass es keine theoretische Erklärung bringt, sondern die Weise normiert, wie diese Erklärungen formulieren werden sollen:

„Sie [die Normen] sind also keine Gesetze, nach denen das Geschehen objektiv sich vollziehen muß oder subjektiv begriffen werden kann, sondern ideale Normen, nach denen der Wert dessen, was naturnotwendig geschieht, beurteilt wird. Diese Normen sind also Regeln der Beurteilung.“ (Windelband 1882: 67)

Die Normen enthalten die Anforderungen an den tatsächlichen Erkenntnisprozess, um sie als „allgemeingültig“ zu billigen oder nicht.

Um diese Beurteilung aus logischer Hinsicht zu verstehen, müssen wir uns auf den Regelbegriff beziehen. Es wird angenommen, dass die (logischen) Normen IN dann als Schlussregeln SR zu verstehen sind:

(1) $SR = IN$

Das im rR -Schema dargestellte Schlussverfahren ist nicht rechtfertigbar, weil ihm keine Schlussregeln auf metalogischer Stufe entsprechen. Jedes Schlussverfahren S ist wie z. B. die Deduktion logisch korrekt, wenn ihm irgendeine Schlussregel SR wie z. B. *modus ponens* bei der Deduktion entspricht:

(2) $S \rightarrow \{SR, \text{non-}SR\}$

Der regressiven Reduktion rR entspricht keine Schlussregel. Deshalb ist sie ungültig:

(3) $rR \in S \rightarrow \text{non-}SR$

Das reduktionistische Schlussverfahren rR kann also als negativ beurteilt werden, weil es die Normen IN gibt, die uns zeigen, welches Schlussverfahren korrekt ist. Die Beurteilung ist eine Funktion, die jedes Schlussverfahren S den Schlussregeln SR wie im Schema (2) zuordnet. Das reduktiv regressive Schlußverfahren entspricht keiner logischen Regel, und deshalb können wir es nicht billigen.

Normalität vs. Naturalität

Das erste Argument für die Unterscheidung der Normen besteht in der grundlegenden Unnaturalität des logischen Gesetzes:

„Mit derselben Naturnotwendigkeit, mit welcher der eine richtig denkt, denkt der andere falsch.“ (Windelband 1882: 69)

Windelband beruft sich auf die klassische Lehre von der Assoziation, die mit Hilfe des Begriffes der Verknüpfung von Vorstellungen, von denen die eine die andere hervorgerufen hat, das seelische Leben (in heutige Psychologie – nur die Lernprozesse) erklärt. In der Psyche geschieht also der Prozess der Verknüpfung von Vorstellungen, der naturnotwendig bedingt wird.

Dem naturnotwendigen Prozess der Assoziation entspricht in manchen Fällen die logische Norm, in anderen aber nicht.

„Unter der ganzen Menge der Vorstellungsassoziationen sind nur wenige, welche den Wert der Normalität haben. Der Naturprozeß kann der Norm entsprechen, aber er braucht es nicht tun.“ (Windelband 1882: 69)

Die Naturnotwendigkeit bestimmt den Wahrheitswert der Assoziationen nicht. Es ist möglich, dass es einige Assoziationen richtig sind oder gar keine. Wenn wir die Assoziation als die möglichen Urteile betrachten, können wir nicht auf Grund ihres Gesetzes (der Ähnlichkeit, des Kontrasts, der räumlichen und zeitlichen Kontinuität) über ihre Richtigkeit entscheiden.

Windelband war sich jedoch dessen bewusst, dass die strenge Trennung zwischen den Gesetzen der Logik und den Gesetzen der Assoziation die Erklärung schwer machen könnte, wie überhaupt Logik im psychischen Leben möglich sei:

„Die von dem logischen Bewußtsein aufgestellten Regeln des Denkens sind weder identisch mit den Gesetzen der Vorstellungsassoziation überhaupt, nach denen sich jedes Denken vollziehen muß, noch sind sie etwas gänzlich davon Verschiedenes: sondern sie sind bestimmte Arten der Verknüpfung, welche im naturnotwendigen Prozeß neben den anderen möglich sind und sich von diesen eben durch den Wert der Normalität unterscheiden.“ (Windelband 1882: 69)

Für Windelband sind die Normen eine Form der Verwirklichung des Naturgesetzes. Die logischen Gesetze sind weder mit den Naturgesetzen gleich, noch widersprüchlich; sie sind eine „Selektion aus den durch die Naturgesetzgebung bestimmten Möglichkeiten“. (Cf. Windelband 1882: 74) Es gibt viele assoziative Verknüpfungen von Vorstellungen und wir wählen aus ihnen nach den Normen aus.

Windelband beruft sich damit auf den Evidenzbegriff, den – wie man sagen kann – die ideale Geltungssphäre mit der psychische Wirklichkeit verbindet:

„Normen sind diejenigen Formen der Verwirklichung der Naturgesetze des Seelenlebens, welche in unmittelbarer Evidenz mit der Überzeugung verbunden sind, daß sie und sie allein realisiert werden sollen, und daß alle anderen Arten, in denen die naturgesetzliche Notwendigkeit des Seelenlebens zu individuell bestimmten Kombinationen führt, wegen ihrer Abweichung von der Norm zu mißbilligen sind.“ (Windelband 1882: 74)

Das Problem besteht jedoch darin, dass nicht klar ist, welchen Charakter diese Evidenz hat. Wenn es um die Verwirklichung der Normen in der Wirklichkeit (psychische Evidenz) geht, könnte uns dieser „Drang“ täuschen. Wenn es sich um die logisch notwendige Deutlichkeit (logische Evidenz) handelt, könnte sie von uns nicht zu erkennen sein. Windelband bestimmt in späteren Werken die Evidenz als die den naturnotwendigen psychologischen Gesetzen entgegengestellte „logische Denknötwendigkeit“ und noch präziser als die „immanente sachliche Notwendigkeit des Vorstellungsinhalts“. (Cf. Windelband 1914: 202)

Allgemeingültigkeit

Wir kommen nun zum Hauptbegriff der Transzendentalphilosophie. Die Beziehung zwischen Norm und Geltung bestimmt Windelband folgenderweise:

„Normen sind diejenigen Formen der Verwirklichung von Naturgesetzen, welche unter Voraussetzung des Zwecks der Allgemeingültigkeit werden sollen.“ (Windelband 1882: 74)

Logischen Normen sind Verwirklichungen der Naturgesetze, die allgemein gelten. Sie sind eine Bedingung der Intersubjektivität der Erkenntnis: Wenn es um die Beurteilung der Richtigkeit von Vorstellung geht, können wir keine Rücksicht darauf nehmen, woher irjemand diese Vorstellung gewonnen hat und wie er dazu gekommen ist. (Cf. Windelband 1882: 80f.)

Wenn die logischen Normen *IN* allgemein gelten, müssen auch die Schlussregeln *SR* gelten. Die Variable *g* ist ein Symbol für die Allgemeingültigkeit der Formel der klassischen Aussagenlogik und somit kann man die logische Beurteilung neu bestimmen.

$$(4) \quad \forall s \in S \quad (b(s) = g, b(s) = \text{non-g})$$

Die logische Beurteilung besteht in der Funktion *b*, die jedes Schlussverfahren *s* als gültig oder ungültig bestimmt.

Erkenntnis und Wissen haben für Windelband als „empirische Funktionen“ eine „soziale Natur“ und er schreibt, dass „zu den Merkmalen des Wahrheitsbegriffes (...) deshalb auch die Allgemeinheit der Anerkennung oder Geltung [gehört - TK].“ (Windelband 1912: 11) Ohne Rücksicht auf die Wissenschaftsgemeinschaft darf man nicht über Wahrheit reden, dennoch kann nicht „die tatsächliche Allgemeingültigkeit“ gemeint sein, weil diese beschränkt ist und Wahrheit nicht gewährleisten kann.

Die Erkenntnis als ein Faktum hat ohne Zweifel einen sozialen Charakter, aber dieses Merkmal entscheidet noch nicht über Wahrheit. Der Begriff der tatsächlichen Allgemeingültigkeit bezieht sich auf den Pluralismus der erkennenden Subjekte, der zu den sozialen Voraussetzungen gehört. Windelband will aber eine interpersonale Bedingung der Wahrheit bestimmen, die nicht bloß in der sozialen Tatsächlichkeit besteht, weshalb der Anspruch auf Allgemeingültigkeit ganz außerhalb der sozialen Bedingungen liegt.

Die interpersonale Bedingung der Wahrheit besteht im „Normalbewusstsein“. Windelband zeigt auf:

„Die Allgemeingültigkeit, um die es sich bei dem formalen Wahrheitsbegriff handelt, ist also nur die verlangte, es ist die, welche um der Notwendigkeit willen bei allen normal denkenden Subjekten stattfinden sollte.“ (1914: 199)

Das Verb „sollen“ bedeutet hier eine Art der Pflicht und des Erfordernisses zugleich und bezeichnet schon den normativen Charakter der Allgemeingültigkeit: Sie *soll* vorliegen, und deshalb ist sie keine tatsächliche Notwendigkeit des Naturgesetzes. Es folgt daraus, dass der formale Wahrheitsbegriff außerhalb aller psychologischen und sozialen Abhängigkeiten besteht.

Windelband verweist auch auf eine „prinzipielle Doppelstellung aller logischen Gesetze“: Sie alle haben nicht nur „Geltung an sich“, sondern auch „Geltung für uns“. Die logischen Gesetze haben eine „Geltung für uns“, weil sie normative Regeln des auf die Wahrheit gerichteten Denkens für das empirische Bewusstsein sind. Sie haben außerdem „Geltung an sich“, d. h. sie besitzen „innere und selbstständige Bedeutung und Wesenheit ganz unabhängig davon, ob sich tatsächliche Vorstellungsprozesse abspielen, die ihnen gemäß sind oder auch nicht sind.“ (Windelband 1912: 18) Mit Hilfe dieser „Doppelstellung“ beweist Windelband, dass das Urteil eines „Einzelsubjektes“ aufgrund des „Sollens“, das in Geltung an sich besteht, universal wahr sein kann. D. h. wir sind in der Lage, Urteile auszudrücken, die der Wahrheit oder Richtigkeit fähig sind, und zwar nicht nur von unserem Standpunkt aus, sondern für jeden, denn unser Urteil gilt als wahr „an sich“.

Für Windelband besteht das Verhältnis von der Geltung zum Sein in der Beziehung zwischen Form und Inhalt. Die Geltung betrifft „Zusammenhänge und Beziehungen“ zwischen dem Seienden; sie ist aber kein Seiendes, kein Ding, kein Zustand und keine Tätigkeit. Die Geltung ist die „Form und die Ordnung, in der das Seiende steht“. (Cf. Windelband 1912: 53f) Die Geltung besteht in der Form der Wirklichkeit, die sich im logischen Gesetz äußert. Die Trennung zwischen dem Geltenden und dem Seienden bedingt die Möglichkeit der logischen Beurteilung.

Mit dem Begriff der Allgemeingültigkeit verbindet sich der Begriff der formalen Wahrheit, die eine von drei durch Windelband getrennten Begriffen der Wahrheit (immanenten und transzendenten Wahrheitsbegriffen) ist. Dieser Wahrheitsbegriff involviert an sich gar keine Beziehung auf Gegenstände. (cf. Windelband 1912: 9.) Windelband präzisiert diesen Begriff:

„Bei ihnen [allen mathematischen, logischen, ethischen und ästhetischen Wahrheiten – TK] bleibt als das Kriterium der Wahrheit nur die Notwendigkeit und Allgemeingültigkeit übrig, mit der sie sich im Bewusstsein darstellen und welche bei jenen andern Wahrheiten durch die Beziehung auf den Gegenstand begründet zu sein schien.“ (Windelband 1914: 198-199)

Es ist die für jene anderen Wahrheiten grundlegende Wahrheit. „Notwendig und allgemeingültig“ bedeutet in der kritischen Philosophie dasselbe wie „a priori“. (Cf. Kant KRV B 3-4) Das Kriterium der Notwendigkeit bezeichnet für Windelband nicht eine psychologische, sondern die logische Denknötigkeit; diese ist nicht die Notwendigkeit des Naturgesetzes. Die formale Wahrheit gehört zur formalen oder reinen Logik, die „diejenigen Formen des Denkens, von welchen die Erfüllung des Wahrheitszwecks im Erkennen und Wissen abhängt, in der Abstraktion zu isolieren und in ihrer unmittelbaren Evidenz aufzuzeigen“ hat. (Windelband 1912: 16) Für das wissenschaftliche und auch vorwissenschaftliche Denken gilt die Logik mit ihren unmittelbar evidenten formalen Wahrheiten. Die apriorische *resp.* formale Wahrheit wird als logisch der

Erfahrung vorangehend, von ihr unabhängig gewonnen und sich selbst bedingend bezeichnet.

Man kann sagen, dass die formale Wahrheit für Windelband eine spezielle Rolle spielt, nämlich indem sie die Metawahrheit darstellt. Sie ist eine allgemeingültige Wahrheit von anderen gegenständlichen Wahrheiten, die für Individuen („Pluralität erkennender Subjekte“) sowie für alle Wahrheiten, die in Beziehung auf Gegenstände begründet werden, gilt. Man kann sagen, dass die formale Wahrheit nicht nur zur reinen Logik, sondern auch zur Logik im allgemeinen Sinne gehört. Die formale Wahrheit ist ebenso grundlegend, wie die Logik für die Erkenntnistheorie und Methodologie grundlegend ist.

Wenn eine Tautologie eine Formel ist, die allgemeingültig und *a priori* ist, kann die formale Wahrheit in der heutigen Nomenklatur als eine Tautologie verstanden werden. Eine Aussage α kann als eine Tautologie bestimmt werden, wenn sie bei jeder Beurteilung gültig ist:

$$(5) \alpha \text{ ist eine Tautologie} \Leftrightarrow \forall b \in B(S, \{g, \text{non-}g\}) (b(\alpha) \subseteq \{g\})$$

Eine Formel der klassischen Aussagenlogik ist eine Tautologie, wenn sie immer als gültig beurteilt wird. Mit Hilfe der Tautologie kann man den Begriff der Schlussfolgerung bestimmen:

$$(6) X \models Y \Leftrightarrow \forall b \in B(S, \{g, \text{non-}g\}) (b(X) \subseteq \{g\} \Rightarrow b(Y) \subseteq \{g\})$$

Aus eine Menge der Formel X wird logisch die andere Menge der Formel Y ($X \models Y$) in der Semantik der klassischen Aussagenlogik genau dann abgeleitet, wenn bei jeder Beurteilung, bei der alle Elemente der Menge X gelten, auch alle Elemente der Menge Y gelten. Wir können also das Ganze der Semantik der klassischen Aussagenlogik auf Grund des Geltungsbegriffs zusammen mit der Trennung der präskriptiven Normen von der deskriptiven Aussage begründen.

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Did you do something wrong if you couldn't have done otherwise? – Deontic act evaluation and some doubts concerning “ought implies can”

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1. Introduction

It seems to be plausible that if you can't do otherwise than what you actually do, it would be unfair to charge you with wrongdoing. Despite the familiar ringing of the “Frankfurt-type-examples”-bell, wrongdoing should not be confused with blameworthiness. In this paper I will solely be concerned with the question whether the ability to do otherwise, in conjunction with the principle “ought implies can” (OIC), might function as a necessary condition for deontic act evaluation, i.e. judging acts as wrong.

Firstly, I will present some short examples along with contradictory intuitions concerning the deontic evaluation of the acts involved. To solve this contradiction, bringing in next OIC (including “can refrain”) will, however, lead to some general doubts concerning the validity of the principle itself. A concluding example eventually gives rise to an alternative view, resting on normative standards as the basis of deontic act evaluations, while abandoning OIC.

Some further remarks concerning the restrictions of my question might be helpful: I will not be dealing with the intriguing question whether freedom of the will requires alternatives. The “can do” here only refers to freedom of action. A little example might help: Assume you stand at a crossroads and two ways seem to be open to you. After a little deliberating, given you have no choice but to move on in some direction, you choose the second way and go ahead. Unknown to you, however, the first way is blocked. As it seems, you couldn't have acted otherwise. Unfortunately for you, it turns out that the second way is the wrong way for you at all, given your goal to reach a certain spot in the landscape. It seems to be clear, however, that you indeed acted in choosing to take the second way, for you freely made that choice. But can your action be judged as wrong? One might hesitate to admit this, given the harmless situation. So let's make things more grim. Assume acting freely in the only possible way means killing somebody. The question whether you did something wrong now seems to be more urgent. John Kekes (1984, 459f.) formulated a provoking example: A mentally ill sadist entraps people and tortures them to death. He is fully aware of what he's doing and that people think of it as evil. However, it is also not in his power to refrain from doing it. Given the same inability to act otherwise as in the crossroads-example, might the sadist's actions now be judged as wrong? One might be inclined to admit it, provoking a contradiction to one's evaluation of the former action. Furthermore, if you have doubts over the ability of the sadist to act rationally at all, here is third example – less dramatic but maybe as deadly: The act of smoking might seemingly be a wrong act, given your goal of staying healthy, despite the fact that you assumingly cannot give up smoking. So the contradiction remains. What do we make of it?

2. “Ought implies can” and the ability to do otherwise

Another familiar statement now might come to mind in order to solve the contradiction: OIC. You can only be required to do something if you are able to do it. If you are not able to do it, it can't be required of you and, therefore, it can't be wrong not to do it. It should be noted that Kekes formulated his example precisely in order to undermine OIC. Hence it is far from being accepted in general – indeed one of my central aims in this paper is to shed even more doubt on it. However, I will not go into every detail concerning the exact understanding and scope of OIC. For all my purposes here, it might be understood as semantic entailment or substantial moral principle. The “ought” of OIC will be taken primarily as the basis for deontic act evaluations. The question, then, is whether the ability to act otherwise, or at least refrain from doing something, is included in the “can”. The thesis would be: “wrong implies can and can refrain”.

Ishtiyaque Haji (2002, 32f.) and Michael Zimmerman (1996, 88f.) explicitly argue in favour of this position. They take the following steps: First, they accept OIC. Second, some action can only be required if it is wrong not to perform it. This springs from the notion of “required” as “morally or prudentially necessary”. Third, conversely, if an action is wrong than its performance is forbidden which in turn means that agents are required to omit them. Fourth, given OIC, it follows that if agents are required not to perform an action then they can refrain from doing so. Therefore, the “can” in OIC includes “can refrain”. This, at last, also leads to the conclusion that an act cannot be wrong if the agent cannot refrain from doing it because it can't be required of him to omit it. If one accepts OIC then the steps of the argument seem to be straightforward enough to count as valid. In the following I will refer to this position simply by OIC because, obviously, this is the core idea of it. Hence abandoning this position would also mean to abandon OIC.

However, the presented conclusion seems to be clearly at odds with our intuitions concerning the mentioned examples. Surely, at least *something* is wrong with the actions of the sadist and the smoker. How could we reasonably abandon the claim that the sadist is required not to torture and kill and, therefore, acts wrongly in doing so? Analogously, should we see the act of smoking as allowed even in non-smoking areas just because a smoker can't refrain from smoking? Furthermore, if I make myself *unable* *not* to carry out a required action it would follow that I no longer can act rightly. Michael Stocker (1971, 304f.) presents such an example – this time totally harmless again: I am required not to be at home in the evening in order to avoid disturbing party preparations. For this reason, I go into town and, thereby, make myself unable to be at home at the time in question. It follows that I can't refrain from doing what is allegedly required of me. But that, in fact, would mean that it no longer can be required of me and I'm not doing something right in not being at home. However, normally we would say just the opposite. Being *unable* *not* to act as required would rather be regarded as fulfilment of my

requirement. Surely, such questions and considerations should motivate us to look into matters more closely.

To catch up, at least, with the last counterexample one could reply, following David Copp (2003, 297), that an asymmetry exists between, on the one hand, being allegedly required to do otherwise and, on the other hand, don't be able to act otherwise than required. While in the latter case the requirement stays intact – after all, you can fulfil it – in the former case it has to be abandoned. However, this, I think, essentially would mean giving up OIC in cases like Stockers example. It would, therefore, be a half-hearted defence of it at best.

Instead of admitting an asymmetry, defenders of OIC could develop a more sophisticated version which, indeed, they have done. Especially Zimmerman (1996, 96-107) has presented an account of OIC including a double time-indexed version of both "ought" and "can": You ought at t_1 to do an act at t_2 implies that you can at t_1 do that act at t_2 . This enables Zimmerman to establish not only the notion of "immediate" obligation or can but also the notion of "remote" obligation as well as "remote" can or "remote" right- and wrongdoing respectively. With this sophisticated version at hand, no asymmetry needs to be admitted in Stockers example. Indeed, I fulfilled my requirement in making myself unable to be at home. But this fulfilment took place earlier than assumed. It took place all the time from first being required not to be at home up to the exact time at which my ability to be at home ceased to be the case. I did a remote right and, thereby, fulfilled a remote obligation. The crucial point, as easily can be seen, is that in all this time I not only was able to fulfil my requirement but also was able to refrain from doing so by coming home in time. Therefore, defenders of OIC can now say that an act is wrong when there was a time at which the agent "remotely" was able to refrain from doing it. For simplicities sake, I will put aside the fairly obvious problem that an agent might be able to fulfil a requirement at a time at which he doesn't even know of it and, therefore, surely can't be said to be intentionally able to fulfil it or to refrain from fulfilling it. However, it seems to be possible now to claim that the agents in the examples all do something wrong, at least under the condition that there was a time at which they could "remotely" have refrained from doing so. Maybe the wanderer in the crossroads-example was able to make another turn prior to the crossroads and avoid it altogether. The sadist may have been able to develop a different character, and the smoker may have been able not to acquire the habit of smoking.

3. From general doubts about OIC to an alternative view

Of course, all those alleged abilities can be questioned, especially if the development of our character is at issue. For surely, this is also a matter of growing up in a certain culture or tradition. Again Kekes (1998, 219) presents a thought-provoking example, mentioning a dogmatic sixteenth-century witch-hunter. He doesn't seem to be – and assumingly never was – strictly in control of the development of his character and habits. Even in the sophisticated version of OIC, therefore, we would have to admit that the witch-hunter does nothing wrong in torturing and burning women. Again, one could also give a more harmless example: Imagine someone who tries to repair his car by chanting at it (Mason 2003, 323). Given his goal to repair it successfully, he surely does something wrong. However, for all that he knows singing incantations is the best and most promising idea. He, therefore, can't do otherwise than chanting because of his lack of information.

If, furthermore, there was no possibility for him to gain proper information about how to successfully repair cars, there even wasn't a time prior to his chanting at which he "remotely" could have refrained from it. All in all, it still seems to be doubtful that even the sophisticated version of OIC can avoid being at odds with our intuitions.

The following concluding example by Matthew Kramer (2005, 328) will further nourish the doubts concerning OIC and finally give rise to an alternative view. Suppose George is tried in a criminal court for a serious crime, albeit that, in fact, he didn't commit it. However, all evidence and witness testimonies count against him. The court fully abides to procedural fairness, and all details are weighed scrupulously before the sentence is given. Given the situation, however, the court can do nothing but to decide against him, and George spends the next years in prison. No sooner than a few days before the end of his imprisonment the truth comes out and George is released. The reason for his release, obviously, is that the sentence and his imprisonment were wrong from the start, despite the fact that the court couldn't have acted otherwise. This clearly shows that there was an "immediate ought" present during the time of the court trial which no one could immediately fulfil, namely not to convict innocent persons. Given OIC, however, this "ought" would be impossible, and the court, therefore, would have done nothing wrong. One has to bear in mind that I am not at all concerned with questions of blameworthiness. After all, in following due process the court surely isn't blameworthy. But it seems to be equally intuitively sure that they did something wrong in convicting George.

I think the easiest and most compelling way to explain the "ought" in question is by abandoning OIC and invoking the idea of binding normative standards, regardless of the agents abilities. Therefore, one might call them "ability neutral normative standards". They would function as the basis for deontic act evaluation, enabling us to judge the acts in the examples as wrong, following our well-considered intuitions about them. They would be wrong because they violate a relevant normative standard, be it a moral or just a prudential one, regardless if the agent has the ability to act or refrain from acting as required by the standard. I am stressing once more at this point that this doesn't mean that the agents might also be blameworthy for violating the standard. No such conclusion is drawn here, and additional arguments are necessary to establish any conclusion whatsoever about that. Of course, much more should be said to develop the notion of "ability neutral normative standards". Unfortunately, I can't provide them in this short paper. However, even at this stage, it should further support our intuitive doubts concerning the alleged validity of OIC by hinting at some alternative view.

4. Conclusion

Still, I have to admit, of course, that my considerations here have not shown that OIC is false. Indeed, it is able to give a consistent analysis of all mentioned examples. However, its conclusions can't avoid being at odds with some of our well-considered intuitions. Therefore, I think, the adoption of the mentioned alternative view of "ability neutral normative standards" should be favoured. For it is a view which is equally consistent and able to provide comprehensive analysis of the examples. Furthermore, it obviously goes along fine with our intuitions. That, in turn, should be the main incentive for us to rethink the reasons for sticking with OIC. After all, to stick with some position should not have the effect to get stuck with it.

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Wittgenstein und Pyrrhonismus

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In den letzten Jahren wird Wittgenstein immer häufiger mit dem Pyrrhonismus in Verbindung gebracht (Fogelin 1994; Sluga 2004; Stern 2004; Williams 2004). Aber *inwiefern*, könnte man fragen, ist eine solche Charakterisierung berechtigt? Nur eine nähere Betrachtung der Texte des Sextus Empiricus – unsere Hauptquelle für den alten Pyrrhonismus – in Zusammenhang mit einigen philosophischen Motiven bei Wittgenstein kann uns Antwort auf diese Frage geben.

Mit dem folgenden Beitrag beabsichtige ich zweierlei zu zeigen: einerseits, daß (i) die Philosophie des ‚letzten‘ Wittgenstein einige wesentliche Merkmale aufweist, die – wie auch Fogelin (²1987) behauptet – dem alten pyrrhonischen Skeptizismus gemeinsam sind; andererseits jedoch, daß (ii) der ‚Skeptizismus‘ Wittgensteins einen eigentümlichen Charakter besitzt, der im Zusammenhang mit seinem ‚philosophischen Stil‘ steht, einen Charakter, den man nicht adäquat erfassen könnte, würde man den Anspruch erheben, ihn ausschließlich mit einer herkömmlichen Kategorisierung wie derjenigen des ‚alten Pyrrhonismus‘ zu beschreiben.

Selbstverständlich setze ich mich hier *nur* mit *einer* möglichen Lesart der Philosophie Wittgensteins auseinander, und zwar mit derjenigen der ‚Pyrrhonian Wittgensteinians‘ (Stern 2004, S. 35). Ich möchte nicht behaupten, sie sei die einzig richtige. Aber *wenn* sie zutrifft, ist es nützlich und instruktiv, die Gemeinsamkeiten und die Unterschiede zwischen diesem möglichen philosophischen Ansatz Wittgensteins und dem des alten Pyrrhonismus genauer zu betrachten.

1. Was Wittgenstein und der alte Pyrrhonismus gemeinsam haben

(i) Die gemeinsamen Charakterzüge zwischen Wittgenstein und dem Pyrrhonismus betreffen sowohl (a) seine philosophische Position als auch (b) seine philosophische Methode (seine Art und Weise zu philosophieren). In Bezug auf (a) seine philosophische Position scheint mir, daß man zumindest die drei folgenden Punkte hervorzuheben hat:

— (aa) Die Philosophie wird als eine therapeutische Tätigkeit betrachtet. Wittgenstein schreibt: „Philosophie ist ein Instrument, das nur zum Gebrauch gegen Philosophen und den Philosophen in uns dient.“ (MS 219, 11). In der Tat scheint dies der Hauptgrund der ‚Pyrrhonian Wittgensteinians‘ zu sein, um ihre pyrrhonische Lesart zu bestätigen. Fogelin (²1987, S. 233-234) bemerkt: „Classical scepticism was a critique of philosophizing and the anxieties it generates. [...] Wittgenstein and the Pyrrhonians were concerned with the same object: philosophy as traditionally practiced. Their goal was the same: to eliminate it.“ (Daß letzteres – ‚the goal‘ – möglicherweise ein Mißverständnis ist wird sich am Ende meines *Papers* zeigen). Man könnte als paradigmatisch für die beschriebene Haltung *Philosophische Untersuchungen* (= *PU*) 133 heranziehen (vgl. *PU* 38, 118, 255):

Die eigentliche Entdeckung ist die, die mich fähig macht, das Philosophieren abzubrechen, wann ich will. – Die die Philosophie zur Ruhe bringt, so daß sie nicht mehr von Fragen gepeitscht wird, die *sie selbst* in Frage stellen.

– Sondern es wird nun an Beispielen eine Methode gezeigt, und die Reihe dieser Beispiele kann man abbrechen. – Es werden Probleme gelöst (Schwierigkeiten beseitigt), nicht *ein* Problem.

Es gibt nicht *eine* Methode der Philosophie, wohl aber gibt es Methoden, gleichsam verschiedene Therapien. (*PU* 133)

Nun, Sextus erinnert uns in seinem *Grundriß der pyrrhonischen Skepsis* (= *P*) daran, daß „der Skeptiker [...] aus Menschenfreundlichkeit nach Kräften die Einbildung und Voreiligkeit der Dogmatiker durch Argumentation heilen“ will (*P* 3.280). Die philosophische Argumentation ist nichts anderes als ein Instrument, ein Mittel, das *auf verschiedene Weise* verwendet werden kann, um sich von einem kranken Zustand zu befreien:

Wie nun die Ärzte für die körperlichen Leiden verschiedene kräftige Heilmittel besitzen und den Schwerekranken die starken unter ihnen verabreichen, den Leichterkranken dagegen die leichteren, so stellt auch der Skeptiker verschieden starke Argumente auf und benutzt die schwerwiegenden, die das Leiden der Dogmatiker, die Einbildung, nachhaltig beheben können, bei den stark vom Übel der Voreiligkeit Befallenen, die leichteren dagegen bei denen, deren Leiden der Einbildung nur oberflächlich und leicht heilbar ist und von leichteren Überzeugungsmitteln behoben werden kann. (*P* 3.280-281)

— (ab) Der Umstand, daß der Skeptizismus nur einen punktuellen, keinen universellen Charakter haben kann; in diesem Punkt ist Wittgenstein ganz explizit in *Über Gewißheit* (= *ÜG*), und dies wird normalerweise als eine Kritik an dem Skeptizismus aufgefasst (Kenny 1973); wenn man allerdings diese Kritik unter Berücksichtigung von Stellen wie *PU* 133 (gerade zitiert) betrachtet, so sieht man, daß sie sich auf den *philosophischen Skeptizismus* bezieht, sprich auf (in Termini von *PU* 133) *eine* Methode der Philosophie, die den Anspruch auf eine allgemeine vollständige Lösung der Probleme erhebt („Es werden Probleme gelöst [...], nicht *ein* Problem.“). So schreibt Wittgenstein in *ÜG*:

»Jedes einzelne dieser Fakten könnten wir bezweifeln, aber *alle* können wir nicht bezweifeln.«

Wäre es nicht richtiger zu sagen : »*alle* bezweifeln wir nicht.«

Daß wir sie nicht alle bezweifeln, ist eben die Art und Weise, wie wir urteilen, also handeln. (*ÜG* 232)

Ein Zweifel, der an allem zweifelte, wäre kein Zweifel. (*ÜG* 450)

Wie verhält es sich mit dem alten Pyrrhonismus? Hat er nicht eine universelle Enthaltung des Urteils gepredigt, eine, die sich allgemein auf *jeden* Untersuchungsgegenstand, gleichgültig welcher Natur, erstreckt? Die entscheidende Stelle für die Charakterisierung der alten Pyrrhoneer bezüglich dieser Problematik ist *P* 1.12: Sextus berichtet hier darüber, daß Ausgangspunkt der Philosophie eines Pyrrhoneers eine gewisse Beunruhigung ist, die durch die Wahrnehmung einer Ungleichförmigkeit (*an malia*) in den Dingen

zustandekommt. Der Pyrrhoneer ist gegenüber dieser *anomalía* ratlos, und deswegen gelangt er dahin „zu untersuchen, was wahr ist in den Dingen und was falsch, um durch die Entscheidung dieser Frage Ruhe zu finden.“ Er wird die Erfahrung machen, sich außerstande zu sehen, die Frage in einem oder dem anderen Sinne zu entscheiden, was er Urteilsenthaltung nennt. Aber die Pointe ist: Wird man von den Dingen nicht beunruhigt, so ist für einen Pyrrhoneer auch kein Grund vorhanden, um eine Untersuchung anzustellen. Wie universal der Umfang der Urteilsenthaltung eines Pyrrhoneers ist, wird durch seinen psychischen Zustand (seine Wahrnehmung von *anomalíai* in der Welt) bestimmt.

— (ac) Die Berufung auf die Natur als Grundlage des menschlichen Denkens und Handelns. Fogelin (²1987, S. 233) stellt folgendes fest: „In trying to decide whether unicorns exist, I might consult certain books. I do not, however, raise the prior question of whether books exist. All this points to a fundamental tenet of Wittgenstein's later philosophy: our participation in language-games lies beyond justification; *it is a brute fact of human nature.*“ (Meine Hervorhebung); Fogelin stützt sich dabei auf *ÜG*:

Ich will den Menschen hier als Tier betrachten; als ein primitives Wesen, dem man zwar Instinkt, aber nicht Raisonement zutraut. Als ein Wesen in einem primitiven Zustande. Denn welche Logik für ein primitives Verständigungsmittel genügt, deren brauchen wir uns nicht zu schämen. Die Sprache ist nicht aus einem Raisonement hervorgegangen. (*ÜG* 475)

In der Antike war die pyrrhonische Position von Anfang an den Vorwürfen ausgesetzt, daß sie das Leben unmöglich macht und sich außerdem in einen Widerspruch verwickelt. Was erwiderten die Pyrrhoneer auf diese Vorwürfe? In Sextus' *Adversus Mathematicos* (= *M*) finden wir eine Antwort:

Wenn sie *das* sagen, verstehen sie nicht, daß der Skeptiker zwar nicht im Einklang mit philosophischer Argumentation lebt (untätig ist er nämlich nur, insofern es darum geht), daß er aber nach der nichtphilosophischen Beobachtung das eine wählen und das andere meiden kann. (*M* 11.165)

Er kann, so Sextus, ohne in einen Widerspruch verwickelt zu werden, das eine wählen und das andere meiden, weil er „aufgrund des Vorbegriffs im Einklang mit den väterlichen Gesetzen und Bräuchen“ handelt (*M* 11.166). In anderen Worten: der Pyrrhoneer macht die Ebene des alltäglichen Lebens geltend, eine Ebene, auf der die Natur die Hauptrolle und die philosophische Argumentation, wenn überhaupt, eine untergeordnete Rolle spielt (s. *P* 1.23, 2.246; vgl. *ÜG* 347).

Die zweite Gemeinsamkeit zwischen Wittgenstein und dem alten Pyrrhonismus betrifft (b) die philosophische Methode. Es ist möglich, in der *dialogischen* Vorgehensweise der philosophischen Methode Wittgensteins eine gewisse Verwandtschaft mit dem alten Pyrrhonismus festzustellen: Der *sokratische* Zug einer Darstellung widerstreitender Standpunkte, die zu einer Aporie führen, erinnert an die argumentative Strategie der Pyrrhoneer, die in der Darstellung einer *diaphronía* (Widerstreit) über den jeweils untersuchten Gegenstand bestand. Kann man zwar über Sokrates behaupten, daß bei ihm die philosophischen Probleme ungelöst bleiben, aber daß sie sich trotzdem nicht *auffösen*, weil er offen gegenüber einer weiteren Untersuchung derselben bleibt, so trifft dies für den Pyrrhoneer *nicht* zu. Bei ihm lösen sich die Probleme nach der Untersuchung auf, weil sich eine

gewisse Beruhigung, zumindest für eine bestimmte Zeit, in der Seele des Untersuchenden einstellt (*P* 1.26, 29). Hier ist also eine Ähnlichkeit mit Wittgenstein zu beobachten, zumindest wenn man Stellen wie die folgende betrachtet: „(Die besondere Beruhigung, welche eintritt, wenn wir einem Fall, den wir für einzigartig hielten, andere ähnliche Fälle an die Seite stellen können, tritt in unseren Untersuchungen immer wieder ein, wenn wir zeigen, dass ein Wort nicht nur *eine* Bedeutung (oder, nicht nur zwei) hat, sondern in fünf oder sechs verschiedenen (Bedeutungen) gebraucht wird.“ (*Big Typescript*, § 89)

2. Was Wittgenstein vom alten Pyrrhonismus unterscheidet

(ii) Die oben erwähnte Einschränkung ‚zumindest für eine bestimmte Zeit‘ ist wichtig, denn Sextus beschreibt ganz genau (a) warum der Pyrrhoneer zu philosophieren beginnt, und (b) welche Art von Erfahrung er dabei macht, das heißt, warum eine Beruhigung (*ataraxía*) in der Seele des Untersuchenden eintritt.

(a) Er fängt an zu philosophieren, weil ihn bestimmte Probleme beunruhigen, weil er eine *anomalía* in den Dingen wahrnimmt (*P* 1.12). Am Ende der Untersuchung, und dank ihrer, lösen sich die Probleme auf und Beruhigung tritt ein, aber dies gilt nur, *solange* derjenige, der die Untersuchung angestellt hat, nicht mehr von denselben Problemen beunruhigt wird. Mit anderen Worten: Das Ergebnis der Untersuchung hat nicht die Kraft, die Probleme ein für alle Mal aufzulösen, es gibt keine Garantie dafür, daß der Untersuchende in Zukunft nie wieder eine *anomalía* über dieselben Probleme wahrnehmen und von ihr beunruhigt sein wird (man kann ja nicht ausschließen, daß neue Elemente ins Spiel kommen). Dies ist schließlich auch der Grund, weswegen Sextus völlig kohärent in *P* 1.2-3 behaupten kann, daß die Pyrrhoneer, im Gegensatz zu allen anderen Philosophen, die einzigen sind, die *weiterhin* nach der Wahrheit (bestimmter Gegenstände) suchen.

Der erste Zug bei einer pyrrhonischen Untersuchung ist in der Regel die Darstellung unterschiedlicher, gegeneinander streitender Stimmen (was Sextus *diaphronía* – ‚Widerstreit‘ – nennt (*P* 1.164-165), wobei der Streit verschiedene Definitionen von Begriffen oder verschiedene Thesen bzw. Theorien betrifft). (Die *diaphronía* ist allerdings nur *eines* von mehreren Argument-Schemata, die der Pyrrhoneer in seinen Untersuchungen anwenden kann.) Die Tatsache nun, daß eine *diaphronía* über einen bestimmten Untersuchungsgegenstand herrscht, reicht an sich *nicht*, um zu zeigen, daß die Probleme ungelöst sind (damit die Beruhigung eintreten kann). Es könnte der Fall sein, daß eine der Parteien recht hat, obwohl die anderen nicht bereit (oder nicht in der Lage) sind, dies anzuerkennen.

(b) Sextus drückt sich sehr sorgfältig aus, wenn er angibt, *warum* der Pyrrhoneer zu einer Beruhigung gelangt; er sagt uns, *warum* eine Untersuchung besteht, und welche die Folgen für den Untersuchenden sind: „Die Skepsis ist die Fähigkeit, auf jede mögliche Weise erscheinende und gedachte Dinge einander entgegengesetzt, von der aus wir wegen der Gleichgewichtigkeit (*isostheneia*) der entgegengesetzten Sachen und Argumente zuerst zur Urteilsenthaltung (*epoché*), danach zur Seelenruhe (*ataraxía*) gelangen.“ (*P* 1.8) Eine Bedingung also, um zur Enthaltung des Urteils zu gelangen, ist, daß dem Untersuchenden die Argumente *pro* und *contra* eine bestimmte These gleichgewichtig

erscheinen. Nur wenn man mit der *isostheneia* der Argumente konfrontiert wird, kommt man zur *epochē*, und nur wenn man zur *epochē* kommt, erreicht man die *ataraxia* (s. P 1.26-29).

Sextus definiert genauer, was man unter *isostheneia* und unter *epochē* zu verstehen hat: „Gleichgewichtigkeit“ nennen wir die Gleichheit in Glaubwürdigkeit und Unglaubwürdigkeit, so daß keines der unverträglichen Argumente das andere als glaubwürdiger überragt. ‚Urteilsenthaltung‘ ist ein Stillstehen des Verstandes, durch das wir weder etwas aufheben noch setzen.“ (P 1.10.) Angesichts der Tatsache, daß der Begriff der *isostheneia* eine zentrale Rolle in der pyrrhonischen Philosophie einnimmt, scheint mir, daß einige Formulierungen über *PU* in Stern (2004), die den Charakter der philosophischen Methode Wittgensteins beschreiben sollen, dem Geist des Pyrrhonismus nicht entsprechen. Stern behauptet: „(Wittgenstein) aimed to dissolve those problems, by means of a dialogue between opposing voices, a dialogue in which the commentator comes closer to expressing the author's viewpoint than either of his leading protagonists do.“ (S. 23, meine Hervorhebung.) Wenn ein Pyrrhoneer zu der Ansicht neigt, daß *p* (statt *q* oder *r* etc.) der Fall ist, dann erreicht er keine *isostheneia*, enthält sich infolgedessen nicht des Urteils, und gelangt so auch nicht zur *ataraxia*. Damit wird das anfängliche Problem nicht aufgelöst.

Stern macht außerdem auf den folgenden Umstand aufmerksam: „However, if Wittgenstein is correct, the accounts offered by all the participants in his dialogues are nonsense, and so cannot, in the end, be true or false.“ (S. 25, meine Hervorhebung.) Der Pyrrhoneer würde sich in diesem Fall wohl vorsichtiger ausdrücken; er würde offen lassen, ob es sinnvoll ist, auf ein bestimmtes Problem eine bestimmte Antwort zu geben, ob diese Antwort wahr oder falsch ist. Das einzige, das er feststellen könnte, wäre, daß ihm die bis jetzt angeführten Argumente nicht hinreichend erscheinen, um das Problem zu lösen. Vielleicht ist die Antwort sinnvoll, vielleicht ist sie wahr, doch nach seiner philosophischen Untersuchung ist es ihm nicht gelungen, dies zu sehen.

Man sollte die Definition der *epochē* (s. oben) in bezug auf das pyrrhonische Schlagwort ‚nicht eher‘ deuten: „Das ‚Nicht eher dieses als jenes‘ zeigt aber auch ein Erlebnis (*pathos*) von uns an, bei dem wir wegen der Gleichwertigkeit der gegensätzlichen Dinge in ein Gleichgewicht münden. Dabei nennen wir [...] ‚Gleichgewicht‘ das Keinem-von-beiden-Zustimmen. So gebrauchen wir das Schlagwort ‚um nichts eher‘ [...] gleichgültig und mißbräuchlich, entweder anstelle einer Frage oder anstelle des Ausdrucks ‚ich weiß nicht, welchem von diesen Dingen man zustimmen soll und welchem nicht‘.“ (P 1.190-191, meine Hervorhebung.)

Zusammenfassend läßt sich also feststellen, daß gerade der Hinweis auf die Methode auch einen wichtigen Unterschied zwischen Wittgenstein und den Pyrrhoneern zu markieren scheint, denn die letzteren hatten neben der *diaphronia* auch eine Reihe weiterer, bewährter Argument-Schemata – s. (Barnes 1990), (Annas and Barnes 1985), die sie *systematisch* auf jeden möglichen Untersuchungsgegenstand anwendeten. Wittgensteins Art und Weise zu untersuchen, sein Sich-Entfernen von dem und sein immer wieder Zurückkommen auf den selben Untersuchungsgegenstand aus unterschiedlichen Blickwinkeln (Sluga 2004) stellt einen originellen Charakter dar, der es verdient, eingehender und unabhängig von den herkömmlichen Kategorisierungen erörtert zu werden.

Abschließend möchte ich noch etwas über das Ziel bemerken, das Fogelin (²1987) Wittgenstein und dem alten Pyrrhonismus zuschreibt: die Philosophie, wie sie traditionell praktiziert wird, aufzuheben. Wir haben gesehen, daß sich die ungelösten (philosophischen) Probleme für einen Pyrrhoneer nur temporär auflösen können, daß ein Pyrrhoneer möglicherweise von den selben Fragen in einer mehr oder weniger fernen Zukunft „gepeitscht“ werden kann (es steht nicht in seiner Macht, ob dies eintreten wird oder nicht), und daß er sich deswegen als einen sieht, der, im Gegensatz zu den dogmatischen Philosophen, diesen Fragen gegenüber offen bleibt und weiter (unter)sucht. Wittgenstein äußerte sich meiner Meinung nach in eben diesem Sinne, als er Rhees gegenüber in bezug auf *PU* 133 sagte: „In my book I say that I am able to leave off with a problem in philosophy when I want to. But that's a lie; I can't.“ (Stern 2004, S. 53.)

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Wittgenstein's "notorious paragraph" about the Gödel Theorem

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1. Introduction

In §8 of *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* (RFM), Appendix 3 Wittgenstein imagines what conclusions would have to be drawn if the Gödel formula P or $\neg P$ would be derivable in PM. In this case, he says, one has to conclude that the interpretation of P as " P is unprovable" must be given up. This "notorious paragraph" has heated up a debate on whether the point Wittgenstein has to make is one of "great philosophical interest" revealing "remarkable insight" in Gödel's proof, as Floyd and Putnam suggest (Floyd (2000), Floyd (2001)), or whether this remark reveals Wittgenstein's misunderstanding of Gödel's proof as Rodych and Steiner argued for recently (Rodych (1999, 2002, 2003), Steiner (2001)). In the following the arguments of both interpretations will be sketched and some deficiencies will be identified. Afterwards a detailed reconstruction of Wittgenstein's argument will be offered. It will be seen that Wittgenstein's argumentation is meant to be a rejection of Gödel's proof but that it cannot satisfy this pretension.

The notorious paragraph runs as follows (the last three sentences are omitted and will not be discussed in this paper):

I imagine someone asking my advice; he says: "I have constructed a proposition (I will use ' P ' to designate it) in Russell's symbolism, and by means of certain definitions and transformations it can be so interpreted that it says ' P is not provable in Russell's system'. Must I not say that this proposition on the one hand is true, and on the other hand is unprovable? For suppose it were false; then it is true that it is provable. And that surely cannot be! And if it is proved, then it is proved that is not provable. Thus it can only be true, but unprovable."

Just as we ask, "'Provable' in what system?", so we must also ask, "'true' in what system?" 'True in Russell's system' means, as was said: proved in Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's system' means: the opposite has been proved in Russell's system. – Now what does your "suppose it is false" mean? *In the Russell sense* it means 'suppose the opposite is proved in Russell's system'; *if that is your assumption* you will now presumably give up the interpretation that it is unprovable. And by 'this interpretation' I understand the translation into this English sentence. – If you assume that the proposition is provable in Russell's system, that means it is true *in the Russell sense*, and the interpretation " P is not provable" again has to be given up.[...]

2. The Floyd-Putnam interpretation: Wittgenstein's "remarkable insight"

While the first commentators such as Kreisel (1958) and Bernays (1959) were rather shocked by Wittgenstein's remarks on Gödel in the 1956 published RFM and concluded that Wittgenstein failed to appreciate the consistency assumption of Gödel's proof, Floyd argued in her papers 2000 (with Putnam) and 2001 contrary to Kreisel and Bernays that Wittgenstein's argumentation is based on Gödel's assumption of ω -consistency. Relying on

the above quoted §8 Floyd and Putnam attribute to Wittgenstein a "philosophical claim of great interest", namely that "if one assumes [...] that $\neg P$ is provable in Russell's system one should [...] give up the 'translation' of P by the English sentence ' P is not provable'" (Floyd (2000), p. 625). According to Floyd and Putnam this claim is grounded in Wittgenstein's acceptance of Gödel's mathematical proof showing that PM must be ω -inconsistent, if $\neg P$ is provable. From this it follows that the predicates 'NaturalNo(x)' and 'Proof(x,t)' occurring in P cannot be interpreted as ' x is a natural number' and ' x is the number of a proof of the formula with the number t ' because one has to allow for non-standard interpretations of the variable's values being other than numbers. This interpretation is joined by the claim that Wittgenstein's "aim is not to refute the Gödel theorem", "for nothing in that proof turns on any such translation into ordinary language" (Floyd (2000), p. 625f). According to Floyd and Putnam Wittgenstein himself is just stating what Gödel holds if the latter insists that his proof is independent of any interpretation and rests on consistency assumptions.

Depart from the question of the "philosophical interest" of the position Floyd and Putnam attribute to Wittgenstein, the sympathetic point of their interpretation seemed to be the possibility to find a way of interpreting Wittgenstein's remarks on Gödel without the need of accusing him to misunderstand the great mathematician. However, depart from the fact that they cannot quote direct textual evidence for their interpretation, two main reasons speak against it: First of all, it cannot be ignored that Wittgenstein does not agree with Gödel's argument, to mention only some evidence: he calls the "Gödelian reason" a "stupid one", that is "obviously nonsensical" (MS121, 81v), similar to paradoxes he sees in Gödel's argument a "profitless performance" (RFM, App.3, §12) and "bits of legerdemain" (RFM, App.3, §19), he questions to call Gödel's proof a "forcible reason" for giving up the search of a proof (RFM, App.3, §14f.). Secondly, what Wittgenstein says in §8 is not in harmony with Gödel's argument. Wittgenstein presumes that " P is true in Russell's sense" means " P is provable in Russell's system" and " P is false in Russell's sense" means " $\neg P$ is provable in Russell's system" – these assumptions Gödel would not affirm but claim to have disproved by his incompleteness proof. And he (Wittgenstein) maintains that due to the derivation of a contraction from both of the assumptions – that $\neg P$ is provable and that P is provable – one will follow that the interpretation of P as " P is unprovable" has to be given up. Yet, Gödel in his proof shows that assuming the provability of P it would follow that PM is ω -inconsistent and assuming P it would follow that PM is inconsistent and from this he draws the conclusion that these assumptions and not any interpretation have to be given up. Whatever the exact meaning of Wittgenstein's argumentation in §8 is, to try to harmony it with Gödel's view does not justice to both – Wittgenstein and Gödel. Actually, Gödel rejected Wittgenstein's argumentation accusing him to confuse his argumentation with "a kind of logical paradox" (cf. Wang (1987), p. 49).

According to Floyd and Putnam, Wittgenstein's "remarkable insight" culminates in "a philosophical claim of great interest", namely that Gödel does not prove the truth of P , because this would presuppose the acceptance of

the translation of P which is in question because the consistency of Russell's system PM cannot be proven. Even Rodych (1999), p. 188ff. makes a similar claim according to his interpretation of §14f. and RFM, VII 22. Unfortunately, Floyd, Putnam and Rodych do not explain why the triviality that Gödel's proof including the claim that P is true rests on the assumption of consistency of PM is a "philosophical claim of great interest". They leave it an open question what the significant difference consists in whether one says that Gödel proved the undecidability and truth of P, given the consistency of PM, or one insists that Gödel did not prove the truth of P because the consistency of PM is not proven. Thus, if one does not trace Wittgenstein's remark on Gödel back to a misunderstanding all what one can make out of them is a repetition of the fact that Gödel's proof rests on the unproven assumption of consistency as Gödel stressed himself.

3. The Rodych-Steiner interpretation: Wittgenstein's mistake

According to Rodych and Steiner §8 cannot be interpreted without accusing Wittgenstein to misunderstand Gödel's argumentation. To both of them Wittgenstein mistakenly assumes that Gödel's proof rests on a natural language interpretation, whereas the pure mathematical part proving the undecidability of either P or $\neg P$ does not presume any interpretation of P. As will be seen, evidence can be put forward for this claim. Yet, whereas Steiner does not at all argue for it by examining §8, Rodych (1999) does offer a detailed analysis of §8, yet not a wholly convincing one. In Rodych (1999), p.182 Wittgenstein's mistake is explained in the following way:

Thus, when Wittgenstein says in §8 "if that [i.e. "suppose 'P' is false' means 'suppose the opposite is proved in Russell's system'] is your assumption", the obvious and immediate Gödelian reply is: "Well, yes I would 'now presumably give up the interpretation that it is unprovable' if that were my assumption – but it isn't – it's your assumption".

The parenthesis is by Rodych and interprets the reference of "that" wrongly: The demonstrative pronoun does not refer to Wittgenstein's interpretation of "P is false" in the sense of " $\neg P$ is proved in Russell's system", but only to the assumption " $\neg P$ is proved in Russell's system" – this is the assumption directly mentioned before. Wittgenstein maintains in §8 that this assumption will compel one to give up the interpretation of P as "P is unprovable". To this, the obvious and immediate Gödelian reply would not be, as Rodych maintains, that one would give up the interpretation of P as "P is unprovable", whether this assumption is only Wittgenstein's or not. The immediate Gödelian reply would rather be: Given this assumption, it follows by applying purely recursive definitions, an ω -inconsistency, and that is why I actually do give up this assumption! Thus, a Gödelian needs not to accept Wittgenstein's argumentation and draw the consequence that P shall not be interpreted as "P is unprovable". Though not needed in order to derive the undecidability of P in PM, as will be seen in the next section, this interpretation is needed in order to prove the incompleteness of P. Thus from a Gödelian point of view one should not concede Wittgenstein's argumentation and assume the provability of $\neg P$ while giving up the interpretation of P as "P is unprovable".

To sum up, in order to evaluate the validity of Wittgenstein's argument a thoroughly reconstruction of it and a comparison to Gödel's way of argumentation is needed. This will be done in the following section, by examining sentence for sentence of the above quoted §8.

4. Reconstruction of Wittgenstein's argument

§8 opens by presuming that "by means of certain definitions and transformations" P can be interpreted by "P is not provable in Russell's system". Let's abbreviate this assumption by

$$P = \neg \Pi P$$

In the following of the first paragraph an argument is given for the thesis that P is true and unprovable by reducing the negation of both conjuncts of this thesis to absurdity. First of all from $\neg P$ a contradiction is derived (sentence 3 and 4). In order to do so, in addition to the assumption $P = \neg \Pi P$ the assumption $\Pi A \rightarrow A$, i.e. the correctness of PM, has to be introduced. The reductio of $\neg P$ can be reconstructed in the following way:

1*	(1)	$\neg P$	A
2	(2)	$P = \neg \Pi P$	A
1*,2	(3)	$\neg \neg \Pi P$	2,1=E
1*,2	(4)	ΠP	3 DNE
5	(5)	$\Pi A \rightarrow A$	A
5	(6)	$\Pi P \rightarrow P$	5 SUB
1*,2,5	(7)	P	6,4 MPP
1*,2,5	(8)	$P \ \& \ \neg P$	7,1 &I
2,5	(9)	$\neg \neg P$	1,8 RAA
2,5	(10)	P	9 DNE

In the last but one sentence of paragraph 1 Wittgenstein hints at the reductio of the second conjunct of the thesis that P is true and unprovable (i.e. $P \ \& \ \neg \Pi P$). In detail, the argumentation runs as follows:

1*	(1)	ΠP	A
2	(2)	$P = \neg \Pi P$	A
1*,2	(3)	$\Pi \neg \Pi P$	2,1=E
4	(4)	$\Pi A \rightarrow A$	A
4	(5)	$\Pi \neg \Pi P \rightarrow \neg \Pi P$	4 SUB
1*,2,4	(6)	$\neg \Pi P$	5,3 MPP
1*,2,4	(7)	$\Pi P \ \& \ \neg \Pi P$	1,6&I
2,4	(8)	$\neg \Pi P$	1,7 RAA

The last sentence of the first paragraph of §8 entails the conclusio of this argumentation, i.e. the conjunction of both arguments: $P \ \& \ \neg \Pi P$.

A similar, though not identical proof sketch is given by Wittgenstein in MS 117, pp.147-148. Of course, this way of understanding Gödel's proof, is mistaken. First of all, Gödel never starts by assuming the truth or falsity of P, even not in his introductory remarks of Gödel (1931).

Instead, Gödel always gives a reductio of the provability of P and the provability of $\neg P$. Secondly, his reductio, as conveyed in his formal proof following his introduction does not entail the "interpretation assumption" $P = \neg \Pi P$. Instead, he is relying on purely recursive definitions (in short: DEF.). Presupposing Rosser's improvement of Gödel's proof that allows one to dispense with the concept of ω -inconsistency these definitions allow one to *construct* a proof for P given a proof for $\neg P$ and vice versa. The "interpretation assumption" is only needed in order to conclude from the undecidability of P (i.e. from $\neg \Pi P$ & $\neg \Pi \neg P$) the incompleteness of PM (i.e. P & $\neg \Pi P$). Thus, in order to compare Gödel's way of arguing, his proof can be put in the following form: Given ΠP one yields only by applying DEF. a proof of $\neg P$, ergo $\Pi \neg P$, ergo ΠP & $\Pi \neg P$, presuming the consistency of PM, it follows by RAA $\neg \Pi P$; given $\Pi \neg P$, it follows only by applying DEF. a proof of P , ergo ΠP , ergo ΠP & $\Pi \neg P$, presuming the consistency of PM, it follows by RAA $\neg \Pi \neg P$. Ergo $\neg \Pi P$ & $\neg \Pi \neg P$ (the "undecidability thesis"). Yet, given $P = \neg \Pi P$ (the "interpretation assumption"), P follows from the first conjunct of the undecidability thesis. Thus, Gödel's proofs of the undecidability thesis is a mathematical proof in the sense that it is only relying on recursive definitions, yet his proof of the incompleteness of PM is based on the interpretation assumption. Because he wants to end up with the incompleteness of PM, a Gödelian is not willing to give up this assumption and even though he will not accept Wittgenstein's reconstruction of the argument, he also will not be inclined to draw the consequence Wittgenstein wants him to draw in the second paragraph of §8, that now shall be examined further.

Wittgenstein's argument starts with the assumption, he elaborated in the §1-7: "truth" is - as "provability" - system-dependent; "true in Russell's system" means "proved in Russell's system", "false in Russell's system" means "the opposite has been proven in Russell's system". Thus, one yields

$$P = \Pi P$$

$$\neg P = \Pi \neg P$$

Given this, he argues in the following, his opponent will not any more be inclined to draw the same consequences: Instead of reducing $\neg P$ and ΠP to absurdity, his opponent will now come to understand that the "interpretation assumption" $P = \neg \Pi P$ has to be given up, because if he would still derive the thesis P & $\neg \Pi P$ this would be contradictory: According to $\neg P = \Pi \neg P$ this would amount to P & $\neg P$ and according to $P = \Pi P$ this would amount to maintain ΠP & $\neg \Pi P$. Thus, Wittgenstein's argument is, that the reductio argumentation of his opponent are underdetermined and that by considering $P = \Pi P$ and $\neg P = \Pi \neg P$ the Gödelian will come to understand that not the assumption $\neg P$ and $\Pi \neg P$ have to be reduced to absurdity but the interpretation assumption $P = \neg \Pi P$.

This reasoning is mistaken because of the following reasons:

1. Gödel does not agree with the assumptions Wittgenstein starts his argumentation in the second paragraph: Whether $P = \Pi P$ and $\neg P = \Pi \neg P$ are valid is just what is in question and the philosophical upshot of Gödel's proof is to have *proven* that these assumptions are wrong. This, indeed, is in conflict with Wittgenstein's philosophy. Yet, Wittgenstein has to argue against the premises of Gödel's proof (especially DEF. which itself strengthens the interpretation assumption), if he wants to stick to these assumptions. One cannot pertain to argue against the incompleteness proof by presupposing the falsehood of its conclusion.
2. Gödel does not start his argument, by presuming $\neg P$ and reducing it to absurdity: Instead, he only reduces $\Pi \neg P$ and ΠP to absurdity, thus putting forward the undecidability thesis $\neg \Pi \neg P$ & $\neg \Pi P$. And this he does without assuming the interpretation assumption. Only his move from the undecidability thesis towards the incompleteness theorem presupposes the interpretation assumption without hereby using RAA.

Conclusion

According to any given interpretation, Wittgenstein's notorious remark on Gödel cannot be appreciated as revealing a "remarkable insight" of "great philosophical interest", because either it is understood as simply affirming what Gödel said or as a misguided critique of Gödel's proof. Wittgenstein's argumentation is no challenge for the Gödelian, yet Gödel's argumentation is a challenge for the Wittgensteinian.

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The Problem of Simple Objects

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1. Introduction

The *Tractatus's* interpretation is beset by an old problem: What was Wittgenstein's view of simple objects? This problem is a fundamental one because the existence of the simple objects is the condition of the success of the central project of the book: the analysis of the ordinary language to demonstrate that philosophical propositions are nonsensical. Simple objects are actually the ultimate constituents of the proposition. We find them when analysis ends. Then, as a result of Enlightenment, what is nonsense and what is not nonsense can be seen immediately. The aim of Wittgenstein's methodology, the entire meaning of the enterprise is expressed in the introductory remark: "what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence."

Our reflection will proceed in seven stages. First, we will present the problem of the simple objects. Second, some of the solutions proposed, and third, two critical remarks concerning different interpretations. Fourth, we will examine the implications of the problem. This problem is related to the problem of the interpretation of the baffling section 6.54. Fifth, we will show how 6.54 is linked to the general problem of the relation between the conception and the practice of philosophy in Wittgenstein's thought. Sixth, three different approaches of the two last problems will be described. Finally, the comparison of the three approaches to 6.54, will show what can be called the real problem of the *Tractatus*, which relates the problem of the objects and the problem of the interpretation of the section 6.54. This constitutes a new basis for the comprehension of the relation between the conception and the practice of philosophy: *Can we do philosophy when we think philosophy is nonsense and, if yes, how?*

2. Presentation of the Problem of Simple Object

What is the problem of object? We said above that this problem can be formulated in the following way: What exactly did Wittgenstein think about the simple objects in the *Tractatus*? This general problem can be broken down into two questions. First, an ontological one: "Are the objects universal and/or particulars?" and, second, an epistemological one: "How can we know them?"

The method of philosophy is the analysis of ordinary language. It consists in illuminating the apparent structure of a proposition in order to clarify the expression of thought and to reveal the real structure of the reality that is also the real structure of thought. The analysis ends when the proposition becomes a concatenation of proper names: the completely analysed proposition. A proper name denotes a simple object (immediately without any description or intermediate). The analysis is the means for drawing the limit of the expression of thoughts so as to separate what, in ordinary language, is meaningful and what is nonsense. So using the term "nonsense", recognizing non-sense requires the existence and our knowledge of such objects. Moreover, Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy as an activity demands that the analysis works. *Alternatively, the book is like a clock that does not work.*

3. Some Solutions to the Problem

A number of solutions have been suggested for the problem of objects. Without going into detail, we can give an idea of the different points of view. The important point is that there is absolutely no consensus about Wittgenstein's view of simple objects in the scientific community. The difficulty with this problem is that there is no textual evidence to support one of the possible solutions. We can briefly describe some of the existing solutions. We can classify the authors according to the two following fundamental questions regarding objects: 1) The *epistemological question*: How can we know the objects? 2) The *ontological question*: What is their ontological status?

- Those who think that we can answer the two questions.

Jaako and Meril Hintikka (1989) argued that the *Tractarian* objects are Russellian objects in disguise¹ except for the logical one. So objects can be known from experience and ontologically they are particulars and universals.

- Those who answer the ontological question and deny we can answer the epistemological one.

Peter Hacker (1972) affirmed that objects are universals and we cannot say that they are objects of acquaintance.

Elizabeth Anscombe and Irving Copi think that the objects are particulars and that we cannot say that they are objects of acquaintance.

- Those who think we can answer neither the ontological nor the epistemological question.

David Pears (1988), Anthony Kenny (1973) both think that we cannot answer these questions because Wittgenstein does not know a definitive answer. They consider this to be a weakness.

Sebastian Gandon (2003) asserts that Wittgenstein does not know but that is not a shortcoming. He believes that the necessity to answer these questions is an illusion?²

4. Two Critical Remarks

Firstly, we want to point out the weakness of Wittgenstein's statement argument about the problem of objects. The difficulty arises from the fact that the *Tractatus* does not give any textual evidence. That is partly the reason why different interpretations have flourished. Therefore, some external evidence plays a decisive role in the different interpretations, in some of Wittgenstein's remarks directed to L.Von Ficker, N.Malcolm, or D.Lee etc. The different solutions are not based on a solid foundation. Moreover, in

¹ Russell's ideas change a lot during the two first decades of the twentieth century. The expression "Russellian objects" refers to his posthumous book written in 1913 *Theory of knowledge*.

² The supporters of the New Wittgenstein did not give any direct interpretation of the problem. However, we can consider, even if he probably disagrees with this, that Sebastian Gandon's book defends Diamond-Conant's point of view.

our view, this plurality of remarks can be seen as reflecting Wittgenstein's difficulties in solving this problem.

Secondly, we would like to mention the fact that we lack proofs of the impossibility of the analysis³. Although we acknowledge that the problem of simple objects is still undecided, most of the commentators admit that the analysis is impossible. However, it seems that no proof is given to support this argument. Finally, the strongest reason to believe in the impossibility of the analysis is the history of Wittgenstein's thought. Indeed, he himself considered the concept of analysis, as developed in his early book, to be inconsistent and could not give us any analysis practice.

The implications of the problem of objects can be addressed on three related levels. As will be shown, the problem of object can be seen as a fundamental problem for the understanding of Wittgenstein's entire work.

5. The Problem of Object and 6.54

At the end of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein, in his famous and enigmatic remark, said that the propositions of the book "serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands [Wittgenstein] eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them – as steps – to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright." The use of the term "nonsense" in the passage must be understood in connection with Wittgenstein's notion of a simple object that is fundamental in the philosophical method of analysis. Indeed, if we accept the fact that the function of the analysis is to draw a limit of the expression of thought, then the reason why the book's propositions are nonsense rests on the concept of object. Then the idea of eliminating nonsensical propositions makes us wonder: What does the ladder metaphor mean?

Ramsey saw the end of the book as presenting a baffling position. He compared it as the following situation: A asks B to say "breakfast", B answers "I cannot", A replies "What cannot you say?" and B says "breakfast". In his later thought, Wittgenstein seems to agree with this. We usually say that Wittgenstein is cutting the branch on which he sits. He tries to avoid cutting the branch again. The baffling situation stems from his attempt to theorize, to generalize, and to construct a general theory of proposition. Therefore, in order to escape this dilemma, he thought that we couldn't construct any theory at all, even a general theory of proposition. He tried to give some examples without any generalization.

6. 6.54 and the Problem of the Relation Between Conception and Methodology in Wittgenstein's Philosophy

As Anthony Kenny (1973) remarks, Wittgenstein always thought that philosophical propositions are nonsense. This is the heart of his conception of philosophy. Numerous philosophers, like Frank Ramsey, Bertrand Russell or Alfred Ayer have been harsh in their criticism of this position, rejecting it as incoherent or absurd. Others entirely accept it as a revolutionary conception. The conception and practice of philosophy seem to be

incompatible. Where is the truth? To answer this question we must ask ourselves the following questions: Can we do philosophy when we think that philosophical propositions are nonsense and how? Can we see Wittgenstein's conception and practice of philosophy as adequate?

7. The commentators on 6.54 and the problem of the relation between the conception and practice of philosophy

There are at least three different competing answers (that have been debated in the past few years) to the problem of the relation between conception and practice of philosophy in Wittgenstein's works⁴. We can very cursorily sum up them as follows. Firstly, the general approach of the problem of the relation between conception and practice in Wittgenstein's philosophy; and secondly, the solution each one presents with respect to 6.54.

-The *classical* interpretation:

Some of the authors who can be included in these categories are Peter Hacker, Anthony Kenny, David Pears, Saul Kripke, Michael Dummett, and Crispin Wright. 1) They say that in *Tractatus* there is no suitability between conception and practice of philosophy because the method is vapid. The analysis does not work at all. The reason is the quest of essence, the search for purity. However, once Wittgenstein recognizes it as a disease, a source of mental confusion, he rectifies his error and in the *Philosophical Investigations*, the suitability is given. 2) The Tractarian propositions are substantial nonsense (Hacker 2001). Such nonsense is represented by metaphysical utterances of meaningful expressions combined in an illegitimate way because of the incompatibility of the component parts. Substantial nonsense denotes something ineffable, something we can neither say how and what it is. According to Peter Hacker, the *Tractatus's* propositions affirm the existence of ineffable metaphysical truths we cannot assert without cutting the branch on which we sit.

-The *new* interpretation:

The principal supporters of this interpretation are Cora Diamond, James Conant, John Mc Dowell, Hilary Putnam, Alice Crary and Rupert Read. 1) They maintain that both the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* present a proper relation between conception and practice of philosophy. According to the supporters of the new interpretation, Wittgenstein's philosophy is a therapeutic one from the beginning to the end. 2) The therapeutic interpretation of the *Tractatus* says that the propositions of the book are literal nonsense as "Agga is frabble" is nonsensical. For them, the propositions that compose the book do not say ineffably that there are metaphysical truths, which cannot be asserted without cutting the branch. The *Tractatus* says nothing at all.

-The metaphysical point of view:

It is not systematic. It is composed of all those who reject Wittgenstein's anti-metaphysical conception of philosophy. The principal interest of this third position refers to the problem of the understanding of 6.54. It was

⁴ The classification used here is the one described in the introduction of *The new Wittgenstein* published in 2003. According to us, it is partly misleading. The classical interpretation must be divided into two branches: the Realistic (Hacker-Kenny-Pears) and the anti-realistic interpretations (Dummett-Kripke-Wright). In the cited introduction, the implicit argument is that the realistic interpretation is reducible to the anti-realistic one. Anthony Kenny, even though he advocates this type of interpretation, defended a continuity against Hacker Peter.

³ We gave one in our contribution to a colloquium in San Sebastian, November, 2004.

defended by Goddard Leonard and Brenda Judge (1982). For them, it is usually assumed that the project of analysis of ordinary language to identify philosophical propositions is nonsensical and bound to fail?. Therefore, considering that the boundary line between sensical and nonsensical propositions must be traced by analysis, there is no reason to think that the thesis according to which philosophical propositions are nonsensical is true. However, they consider 6.54 to be wrong. We are not forced to believe Wittgenstein when he wrote this.

8. The Real problem of the *Tractatus*: Presentation and Implications

As we have seen above, it is usually assumed⁵ that logical analysis of ordinary language in the *Tractatus* is impossible. An important reason for this state of affairs is the enormous difficulty of solving the problem of simple objects. Nevertheless, we can note that the history of Wittgenstein's thought invites us to adhere to this thesis. Relatively to 6.54 section, the problem, for the *classical* and the *new* interpretations, is "In what sense are the *Tractatus* propositions nonsensical?" However, according to Goddard Leonard and Brenda Judge, we must remember that if we do not solve the problem of simple objects then there is no boundary line between sensical and nonsensical propositions because the method of philosophy is the analysis. According to Wittgenstein, this is the only approach to philosophical questions. Therefore, if analysis does not work, the *Tractatus's* conception of philosophy does not work either, and there is no means for distinguishing between what is sensical and what is nonsensical. Nevertheless, if Wittgenstein has no such means, how can he use the term "nonsense" to qualify his own propositions? This leads us to the following paradoxical acknowledgment: the analysis is impossible and at the same time, there is a use of the term "nonsense". The problem we will address is: Can we find a nonsense criterion to describe the apparent paradoxical acknowledgment?

This new problem constitutes a new basis for understanding the relation between the conception and the practice of philosophy: Can we do philosophy when we think philosophy is nonsense and, if so, how? It is not possible here to anticipate long developments, but as we have seen above, the comprehension of 6.54 is at the heart of the reflection on the possibility of Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy and its relation to the practice.

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⁵ Except in Jaako and Meril Hintikka's interpretation.

Designation and Ontological Commitment in Sellars and Prasangika Madhyamika

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The Prasangika Madhyamika system of Buddhist philosophy has a striking account of the ontological commitments involved in naming and designation. The controlling claim in their account is that *the basis for the designation of an object is never the object designated*, even in cases in which the designation is truly made (cf. Lamrimpa 1999, 39; Klein 1994, 140). I'll call this the "designation thesis" or *DT*. The Prasangika hold the *DT* to provide partial support for the core Buddhist contention that all phenomena are empty of self-nature, that is, that they lack establishment by way of their own entities (Candrakirti, 1980). The *DT* requires the Prasangika to draw a distinction between two domains of truth: conventional truth and ultimate truth. This distinction has proven difficult to expound. I hope to illuminate it, and the *DT*, by way of a comparison with Wilfrid Sellars' distinction between the "manifest image" and the "scientific image". I will use Sellars' distinction as an entry point into the Prasangika's *DT* and their doctrine of two truths.

Sellars distinguished the manifest and scientific images to mark a difference "between that conception which limits itself to what correlational techniques can tell us about perceptible and introspectible events and that which postulates imperceptible objects and events for the purpose of explaining correlations between perceptibles." (Sellars 1991, 19) The scientific image is the scientifically informed conception of unobservable events that explain events that are directly perceptible through correlation with them. The entities of the manifest image are those of ordinary experience: pens, beliefs, pains, persons. It is these "in terms of which man first became aware of himself as man-in-the-world" (1991, 6).

Sellars presented the scientific image as a regulative ideal; a philosophical vision of an ultimately "completed" and unified scientific explanation (1991, 5). Whether such a vision is viable is not important here, for even in its current form, science tells us that many of the entities that comprise the manifest image, such as thoughts, or the pink of a pink cup, do not exist in the mode that the manifest image imagines. The thought, which in the manifest image has a qualitative character of an inner state analogous to speech, is imaged in a way nothing like the neurophysiological process that contemporary scientific image says it is. Similarly, the pink of the pink cup, which appears in the manifest image as a solid property possessed by an external object, does not exist in the same way in the scientific image, which posits instead a "gappy" system of discrete particles (1991, 34-5).

It is noteworthy that Sellars did not regard the displacement of the manifest image to be something that should lead to its rejection. To the contrary, not only is there no guarantee that science could ever reach the completed state posited in the scientific image, such a state, even if reached, would not reduce or eliminate many of the entities of the manifest image (1991, 36-7). One reason Sellars gives for this is the possibility that normative phenomena, among which Sellars counts human beings with their rights and duties, might never be reducible to the descriptive claims of the scientific image (ibid, 39).

The manifest image is thus not fully eliminable in favor of the scientific image, yet it is at odds with the scientific image at important points. Sellars clearly recognized the tension here. He proposed resolving it, in part, by a rational reconstruction of the manifest image in purely nominalist terms, thereby allowing for a greater "fusion" of the two images by removing the troublesome non-nominalistic uses of type-expressions such as color words. Yet even the hypothetical completion of such a project would not fully resolve the tension, as Sellars' own example of normative elements in the manifest image exposes. Sellars thus offered us a second proposal for reconciling the two images: the hope that future science might reveal "a non-particulate foundation of the particulate [current scientific] image" which would make a fusion of the two images possible (1991, 37).

As these hopeful suggestions reveal, Sellars did not fully resolve the relation between the two images. Nonetheless, I think he did point out a real phenomenon. For it is the case that when we analyze a cup, say, we don't find the entity of a cup among the analysans. What does appear among the analysans, in a scientific analysis, for example, is something like a collection of particles, states, and configurations, none of which are the cup itself, as a distinct entity. What we designate a cup seems to disappear upon analysis.

This feature, the unfindability upon analysis of a designated entity among the analysans, is one of the reasons the Prasangika introduce in support of *DT*. Their reasoning is straightforward. We call a certain phenomenon a cup. We do so for reasons: a certain visual or tactile appearance, perhaps, or an observation of something performing a certain function. These reasons are the "bases of designation". In the case of empirical objects, they are typically perceptions. When we examine a basis of designation for a term, such as "cup", we fail to find the designated object itself. But what exactly do we fail to find? The cup, as the expected, fully characterized entity. The cup as fully characterized occupies three dimensions of space and exhibits temporal continuity. It has sides, as well as past and future moments, which are not all apparent to someone making the designation. The fully characterized cup also has functional, causal, and dispositional properties, such as holding small quantities of liquid, or exhibiting resistance to touch, which are also not all apparent at a given time. Among the dispositional properties, some can be characterized only counterfactually (the cup *would have been* a receptacle for juice, had we poured some in it, e.g.) and so are necessarily not apparent. In sum, what is designated, cup, is not findable among the bases for designating a given locus "cup". We certainly find reasons for calling something a cup. But upon analysis we find that these reasons, the bases of designation, fall short of the object designated, the fully characterized cup.

Among empirical objects, then, the Prasangika distinguish between:

1. The basis of designation of a thing, which is our ground(s) or reason(s) for applying an expression, such as "cup", to a given locus.
2. The designator, which is a conventional label or sign with an agreed-upon use, like "cup".
3. The designated object, which is what I have called the "fully characterized entity" that we hypothesize, or impute upon a basis (cf. Lamrimpa 1999, 36; Klein 1994, 131f).

Bases of designation: such as a particular cup-like appearance, the observed function of holding small quantities of liquid, or a particular collocation of particles, are not the designated object cup. For instance, the observed function of holding small quantities of liquid, while part of a sufficient reason for designating something "cup", is not identical to the designated object *cup* (the function doesn't exhibit resistance to touch, e.g.). Were the designated object among the bases of designation, we would find it there upon analysis. But we do not. Call this argument for *DT* the "unfindability argument".

The Prasangika adduce a second argument for *DT*, which I'll call the "fallibility argument". Suppose for a *reductio* that a designated object existed among its bases of designation, so that, say, cup was among the bases of the designated object *cup*. Then the basis, the ground or reasons for applying the expression "cup", would *entail* that "cup" was correctly applied given that basis. But this result is contradicted by the observation that our reasons for calling something a cup are never entailing reasons.¹ Our reasons for calling something a cup are various cup appearances, and as such are fallible. Take any reasons for calling a given entity a cup, such as some observations. There is no logical contradiction involved in supposing that those reasons are defective (the product of a clever deception, say). If the designated object were among the bases of the designation, there would be a contradiction in supposing the reasons could be defective. But there isn't one.

I think that the unfindability and fallibility arguments are sufficient to motivate *DT*. But if *DT* is accepted, when can we say that a given designator is truly applied? Here the Prasangika mark a distinction akin to Sellars'. They distinguish between the *conventional truth* that a given thing is correctly, truly called a cup, and the *ultimate truth* that the entity of a cup is unfindable among its bases of designation.

A *conventional truth*, for the Prasangika, must satisfy three conditions:

1. It must be commonly accepted with respect to ordinary cognition.
2. It must not be undermined by another valid conventional cognition.
3. It must not be undermined by reasoning examining ultimate truth (cf. Lamrimpa 1999, 88f; Klein 1994, 45f.).

A cognition (*jnana*) is an awareness that may include propositional content. A cognition is *ordinary* iff it is established as true according to the conventions of use in

a given community which govern the relevant designator (Lamrimpa 1999, 92). In English-speaking communities, the designator "cup" is governed by certain conventions licensing its application given a certain basis. One such convention may be that the object designated "cup" be intended for use in holding and drinking small quantities of liquid. The first condition is thus a positive one: it postulates grounds that, if met, defeasibly license the claim that a judgment is conventionally true.

The second and third conditions specify two types of defeating conditions. They rest on a distinction between conventional and ultimate cognitions, which stems from the aim of the inquiry generating the cognition (Klein 1994, 46). A *conventional cognition* is the result of an inquiry aimed at establishing that a particular entity exists, or that it has such-and-such functional properties. An *ultimate cognition* is the result of an inquiry into whether phenomena exist in the mode that they appear to when established conventionally. Searching for a cup, or seeing how much water a cup holds, are examples of inquiries generating conventional cognitions. But a cup may appear to be its own basis of designation. If it does, then searching for the cup among its bases of designation is an inquiry generating ultimate cognitions. Its goal is to see if the cup exists in the mode that it appears to.

If, having judged that something is a cup, we find that it is a cup illusion (a hologram, say) then the condition (2) of conventional truth is not met. In such a case we are in the presence of a defeater (like a valid conventional cognition of a hologram generator), which undermines the grounds, deriving from condition (1), for the correct application of "cup".

Condition (3) blocks admitting entities that are their own basis of designation as truly conventionally existent merely because they satisfy the first two conditions. If, upon analysis, entities are not findable among their bases of designation, then the mere fact that people ordinarily believe that they *are* so findable, and don't find further *conventional* cognitions that undermine this belief, ought not be a sufficient reason to allow it as conventionally true that they are findable. Condition (3) thus insures that conventional truths, like ultimate truths, typically require grounds that go beyond what a given community might believe to be the case.²

Prasangikas thus do not deny that a statement like "this is a cup", uttered in the presence of what a qualified speaker would call a cup, is true. It is true, provided that the defeating conditions don't obtain. However, the content of the true statement "this is a cup" is exhausted by the statement "This is *called* a 'cup'" (Lamrimpa 1999, 43). This latter statement acknowledges that the (undefeated) bases of designation for "cup" obtain, and so "cup" is correctly applied, while avoiding the tempting but faulty inference that cup exists as the basis of the designation "cup".

When Sellars asked whether objects of the everyday manifest image exist in the way they appear, he was, from the Prasangika perspective, engaged in an analysis aimed at ultimate truth. Like them, he returns a negative verdict: phenomena do not exist as they appear, at least in the manifest image. Yet as I have suggested, Sellars had difficulty reconciling this result with his conviction that many of the judgments made about the

¹ Note that "This is a cup" is not a *reason* to hold that "This is a cup" is true, on pain of question-begging.

² This requirement is satisfied for most conventional cognitions simply by the fact that a conventional truth requires the presence of a basis of designation, and whether this basis is present is normally not itself merely a matter of convention or belief.

entities of the manifest image are in some way correct. Here, I think the Prasangka offer an improvement. On their account judgments made about ordinary phenomena – conventional cognitions – can be quite straightforwardly true. They are true iff the undefeated conditions for the application of the relevant concepts are met – full stop. There is no need to aim at a further “fusion”, since there is no conflict between conventional and ultimate truth.

There is a deep difference between Sellars and the Prasangka, however. Sellars is an avowed scientific realist. For him, whatever ultimate truth there is will be cashed out in terms of completed science. The Prasangka would disagree, but not because they deny that scientific results may yield truth. To the contrary, every time that a scientific explanation accounts for some object in terms of factors other than the designated object, that explanation helps to establish *DT*. But the Prasangka will deny that scientific posits exist as their own bases of designation. They will deny, for example, that the basis for the designation “muon” is the designated object muon. They would point out that competent members of the community of English speakers designate something a “muon” based upon factors such as observed charge and mass characteristics, a half-life of a certain duration, decay products, and so on. Yet these phenomena, while they may well constitute the basis of designation for “muon”, are clearly not the designated object *muon*. This latter is no more identical to an observed 2 microsecond half-life, say, than the designated object cup is identical to the observed function of holding small quantities of liquid. Emptiness for the Prasangka -- the fact that phenomena are not established by way of their own entities -- knows no limits.

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Language, world, and structure

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Language is a vehicle of thinking and communication. Dots and noises, the external and public elements of language, have this function because of meanings attached to them. Conceptions about how language fulfils this function depend obviously on the accepted notion of meaning. The present paper discusses the issue from the viewpoint, developed by Charles Peirce and Ludwig Wittgenstein (see Määttänen 2005), that the meaning of a linguistic expression is its use in a linguistic community.

Crudely speaking this approach can be developed in two ways. A narrow notion of meaning presumes that meanings are ultimately linguistic. Meanings associated with other things have their origin in language and are made possible by language. A wide notion of meaning applies the principle that meaning is use not only to linguistic expressions but also to tools, instruments and other things that can be used in specific ways. The meaning of a hammer, say, is the way it is used for hammering, and anyone who has the skill of hammering understands the meaning of a hammer.

Acquaintance with the use of an instrument makes it possible to understand that this instrument refers to possible acts of using the instrument, possible objects of the use and so on. In other words, an instrument functions also as meaningful entity, as a sign-vehicle that can be used for communicating meanings. By showing an instrument one can express a meaningful thought even when linguistic means of communication are not available.

This approach can be applied to all physical objects that are in a systematic way related to meaningful practices, linguistic or other. Peirce expressed this by stating that "what a thing means is, simply, what habits it involves" (CP 5.400). Chairs, tables, houses temples and so on are meaningful objects by virtue of related meaningful practices.

The point can be expressed also in the terms of Peirce's semiotic theory. Sign-vehicles must be interpreted to refer to their objects. This takes place through an interpretant. Sign-relation is thus a three-place relation between an object, a sign-vehicle (or a representamen) and an interpretant. The interpretant may be a further sign-vehicle that requires a further interpretant in order to fulfill its function as a sign-vehicle. In this way the process of interpretation may go on to the indefinite future.

The process of interpretation may, however, stop to a specific kind of interpretant, to the final logical interpretant that is a habit of action (CP 5.591). As noted above, habits are also meanings for Peirce. This all amounts to saying that things are ultimately interpreted to be meaningful entities by virtue of habits (meanings) that they involve.

This approach can be applied to the analysis of the interaction between living organisms and their environment (see Määttänen 1993). The outcome of this analysis is that objects of perception are ultimately interpreted to be meaningful entities by virtue of habitual practices that are in a systematic way related to them. This fits well in with the general principle that meaning is use, although not all objects of perception are used in the same sense as linguistic expressions or tools and instruments. The

point is that objects of perception are experienced as meaningful entities by virtue of non-linguistic habitual practices.

The wide notion of meaning thus gives us a multilayered system of meanings where linguistic and other meaningful practices are related to objects and to each other in various ways. The non-linguistic practices are meaningful in their own right in the sense that the meaning is defined as the use of the corresponding object or as habits that are in a systematic way related to these objects. Linguistic discourse has an effect on our interpretation and understanding of non-linguistic practices, it may change those practices, but the non-linguistic practices have their objective conditions that are independent of discourse.

The physical properties of non-linguistic sign-vehicles restrict the use of these objects. There are things you can do with a hammer and things you cannot do. This entails that the meanings attached to these sign-vehicles cannot be conventional in the same sense than linguistic meanings can, in principle, be. The objective limits of using these sign-vehicles are, by definition, also objective limits of their meaning. These limits are manifest to us as objective conditions of action, for example in situation where muscular effort meets resistance, as Peirce would say. Most of us have the habit of using the door and not the window when exiting a room, for obvious reasons. And this use of doors is a central element in the meaning of doors.

The idea that physical nature sets objective limits to meanings is a simple consequence of a soft version of naturalism (outlined by John Dewey, see Määttänen 2006) according to which we as biological organisms as well as social and cultural beings are a product of nature. Human culture is a phenomenon developed by biological organisms, and no amount of conceptual change or changes in our use of language or other symbolic systems can change this fact of our embodied existence.

It may be objected that the science of physics is still looking for the ultimate structure of matter. However, the distinction between solids, liquids and gases, for example, is still a valid distinction in physics, and its validity is independent of any theory about the ultimate structure of matter. Solid objects admittedly consist of smaller particles, but it is unconceivable how our possible *knowledge* about these particles could make the solids disappear. And it is this sort of physical facts that set the limits of the meanings of non-linguistic sign-vehicles like hammers, tables and buildings.

Another possible objection is the claim that the way the world is curved up is determined by concepts and theories, and this is why any particular categorization, like for instance the categorization into middle-sized three-dimensional objects, cannot be a prerequisite and a starting point for conceptualizing and theorizing. This is a point where we simply have to make a choice between concepts and nature as a starting point. I shall try to argue for the latter.

For one thing, those who appeal to the conceptual categorization of the world should tell explicitly what are these concepts, what is their mode of existence and the mechanism through which the categorization actually takes or could take place. Concepts are either outside or inside of nature. If they are outside, it remains an open question what could be the non-causal mechanism through which they can have an effect on the causal processes of nature (which is causally closed). The burden of proof is on the side of this sort of Neo-Kantians. If the conceptual structures are inside of nature, they have to be realized through causal processes and material structures, and it remains an open question what causal processes do realize conceptual structures and how these structures could change the categorizing principles of themselves. It should be clear that we cannot change the laws of nature just by changing the way we use words and other symbols.

The second point is that by choosing to be naturalists we deny the Cartesian dualism between mental and material substance. This entails that the mind is necessarily embodied. Cartesian skepticism is not of much help for proving the opposite, because mere doubt cannot really make the body disappear. More concrete operations are needed for that. For a naturalist there is no evidence for the view that a mind can really exist without a body. The body (or the brain, if you like) is a necessary prerequisite for there being conscious subjects capable of conceptual thought and using natural language.

Naturalism is, of course, committed to the view that there no *a priori* conceptual truths or unchanging presumptions. Here it is important to distinguish between two possible formulations of this idea. This commitment of naturalism may be expressed by stating that anything could have been otherwise or by saying that any part of our present beliefs may, in principle, be subject to change in the face of new evidence.

The first formulation speculates with logical possibilities. Of course it is possible, as far as we know, that this universe had been different, that there exists other kind of universes or that there are forms of life based on different principles that our life. But why should we here and now take it as a serious alternative for our own existence? These stories are mere fiction as long as someone shows a plausible connection between them and the evidence we face now.

The second formulation follows the naturalistic principle that all claims and generalizations should be evaluated on the face of our present (and future) empirical evidence. The denial of an *a priori* method entails that philosophical and scientific theories and methods are not opposed to each other, that there is continuity between them.

The denial of an *a priori* method entails, further, that there is continuity not only between scientific and philosophical methods. The continuity extends also to everyday experience. From this point of view the fact that we are embodied beings, biological organisms, marks down the intersection of the scientific and the manifest image. In everyday experience, in science and in philosophy we look for new evidence and new knowledge as embodied beings using various tools, instruments and symbolic resources. And it is quite safe to say that new evidence or theorizing will not change this fact in the predictable future. This should be enough for a naturalist.

Now we are in the position to say that our body with its organs is the first instrument of investigating the

surrounding world, and the use external instruments and other physical objects requires always an embodied agent. Certain empirical facts set certain limits to how we can use external objects and to what kind of habits may be involved with things external to the body. These limits are also limits of what can be the meanings attached to these objects as non-linguistic sign-vehicles.

The next question concerns the relation of linguistic and other symbolic meanings to these non-symbolic meanings. There are, of course, branches of discourse like fiction where symbolic meanings are not even supposed to be entirely consistent with our non-linguistic practices limited by objective conditions of action. However, if we want our multilayered system of meanings to be a consistent whole, it is not advisable to use symbols in ways that would make us try to act against objective conditions of action.

We can think, we can write novels and we can elaborate philosophical theories based on the possibility that the bodies of biological organisms were sliced differently, but we cannot really act upon this kind of beliefs. It would be acting against the prerequisites of our own existence. Not all symbolic practices are consistent with non-symbolic practices. If we admit that there are non-linguistic meanings as habits of action, we have to admit that there are also non-linguistic beliefs expressible through these meanings (for Peirce habits are also beliefs, see CP 5.398 and CP 5.480). If we hope to be consistent, as I hope, we should consider also the relation between linguistic and non-linguistic practices whenever it is relevant.

Finally there is the question about experiencing the world as meaningful entities. This can be expressed in different ways. It has been said, for example, that the experienced world is already the result of signficatory processes, or that the world is necessarily the world under a description, or that nothing is distinct before the appearance of language. This way of thinking leads to two entirely different views depending on what kind of notion of meaning we have.

A narrow notion of meaning, according to which meanings are linguistic, leads to the conclusion that only the emergence of natural language made it possible to experience the world as distinct and meaningful entities. The problem of this view is that it makes it difficult to understand the very emergence of language. How did our ancestors get the ability to use some noises as distinct and meaningful entities and how did this ability change so radically the character of experience that chaos became rational order under description?

The wide notion of meaning has the advantage of showing the continuity. Meaningful dots and noises form only a specific kind of distinct and meaningful entities. All objects of perception may be meaningful by virtue of habits of action that are in a systematic way related to them. The principle that meaning is use is a way to apply this idea to things that are consciously used for different purposes. This entails, of course, that we have to reject the presumption that conscious thinking is a product of mastering a language. Actually it may well be the other way round, as is suggested in various occasions (see, for example, Donald 2001, 276)

From the viewpoint of the wide notion of meaning the experienced world has a meaningful structure as distinct entities independently of mastering a natural language. The objects of perception simply are sign-

vehicles that stand for the outcomes of the action associated with them. The only prerequisite is the ability to guide one's activities purposefully on the ground of previously adopted habits of action associated with these objects of perception. This habitual way of encountering the world is the connecting element that shows the continuity between the ways we experience our natural and cultural environment. It also shows the objective limits of the non-linguistic meanings that follow from our embodied existence and form the basis of all the cultural divergence of symbolic discourse.

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On the Impossibility of Solitary Persons

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1. The first-person perspective as relational

According to Baker, the first-person perspective is relational: "it would be impossible for a being truly alone in the universe to have a first-person perspective" (Baker 2000, 69-70). On Baker's interpretation, there could be no persons without there being objects external to the entity's first-person perspective. Baker argues for this as follows:

(1) x has a first-person perspective [iff] x can think of herself as herself*. (2) x can think of herself as herself* only if x has concepts that can apply to things different from herself. (3) x has concepts that can apply to things different from x only if x has had interactions with things different from x. Therefore (4) If x has a first-person perspective, then x has had interactions with things different from x. So, x's having a first-person perspective depends on x's relation to other things (Baker 2000, 72).

Basically, this is a refutation of solipsism: if (3) were true, then solipsism cannot be true. Conversely, if (3) were false, then we would have no plausible account of concept-acquisition. But curiously, Baker claims that language is dispensable for the first-person perspective: "Although the first-person perspective does not depend on natural language, it is often manifested [...] in a person's use of I* sentences" (Baker 2000, 76). (The oneself*-locution means: "S can think of herself as herself" [iff] S can think of herself in a way naturally expressible in the grammatical first-person as the bearer of the first-person thoughts. 'I am tall' expresses a simple first-person thought. S can express her thought of herself as the bearer of the thought 'I am tall' by saying 'I am having the thought that I* am tall'" (Baker 2000, 65).) This is a peculiar claim, on which I strongly disagree with Baker, as language seems to be necessary for the development of the first-person perspective. Baker's argument, as it stands, seems to tacitly invoke the (Cartesian) thesis that word-meanings can be known privately. Granted, Baker admits that she lacks a theory of concept-acquisition, and that she would look at Wittgenstein's work for this (Baker 2000, 75). Yet Baker's theory of personhood is dependent on Wittgensteinian ideas more than she acknowledges. Baker understands the notion of an entity's being "alone in the universe" as indicative of there being no objects external to the entity. I claim that this interpretation is too weak; the notion needs to encompass individuals permanently isolated from a community. I claim that in such a condition, there could not be persons in Baker's sense of the term. If language is indispensable to personhood, and language is essentially social, there must more than one entity for there to be persons.

2. The impossibility of solitary speakers

To show that language is indispensable to personhood, I will turn to Wittgenstein's private language argument. In the secondary literature we find two primary interpretations of the claim that there could be no solitary speakers, namely, the individualistic and the communitarian interpretations. These can be found in the works of Peter Hacker (Hacker 1984/2001 and 1990/2001) and Norman Malcolm (Malcolm 1989), respectively. On Hacker's view, there could be Crusoe-like speakers who have been

forever isolated. For Malcolm, individuals permanently isolated from a community could not develop a language. There are analogues of these two claims for persons. Baker's claim is akin to Hacker's: there could be solitary persons provided that there are external objects. My goal is to defend the thesis that there can be no persons in absence of a community. This communitarian conception rests on two premises, namely, on the social nature of language and on the necessity of language for representation. Thus, a forever-solitary individual would be unable to develop the first-person perspective requisite of personhood. Notice that the communitarian view makes it possible that an individual who already is a language-user could be isolated from the community without losing their linguistic ability. *Mutatis mutandis*, a person who gets isolated from her community would still remain a person.

To establish the impossibility of solitary speakers, I will turn to Donald Davidson's argument. Davidson argues that language is necessarily a social enterprise: "Language [...] does not depend on two or more speakers speaking in the same way; it merely requires that the speaker intentionally make himself interpretable to a hearer" (Davidson 1992, 260). Davidson argues that minimally, language requires two parties and, thus, a solitary language-user is a conceptual impossibility. Davidson offers a triangulation argument, grounded on primitive language-learning situation:

Some creature [...] learns to respond in a specific way to stimulus [...] The child babbles, and when it produces a sound like "table" in the evident presence of a table, it is rewarded; the process is repeated and presently the child says "table" in the presence of tables. The phenomenon of generalization, of perceived similarity, plays an essential role in the process (Davidson 1992, 262).

Here there are more than just one perceived similarity involved. To say that the child makes a sound like "table" in the evident presence of tables, the child's sounds in the evident presence of tables have to be observable. This makes for *three* similarity patterns:

The child finds tables similar; we find tables similar; and we find the child's responses in the presence of tables similar. It now makes sense to for us to call the responses of the child responses to a table (Davidson 1992, 263).

Now, Davidson claims, we can triangulate these responses and find the common object:

one line goes from the child in the direction of the table, one line goes from us in the direction of the table, and the third line goes from us to the child. [...] If I am right, the kind of triangulation I have described, while not *sufficient* to establish that a creature has a concept of a particular object or a kind of object, is *necessary* if there is to be any answer at all to the question of what its concepts are concepts of (Davidson 1992, 263).

The solitary speaker fails at triangulation because she has no confirmation of her responses being similar. We can conclude, with Wittgenstein: "In the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that

only means that here we can't talk about 'right' (Wittgenstein 1958/1999, §258).

Nevertheless, there are reasons to question Davidson's conclusion. Claudine Verheggen defends Davidson's claim after pointing out that Davidson's argument, albeit unsuccessful, makes considerable progress in the right direction. As presented, Davidson's claim is vulnerable to an objection from the relativity of perception. Two people, even if they are viewing the same object in one sense, are viewing different objects in another sense, given their different perspectives. Now, if we fail to locate the *common* cause to the responses of interacting people, then we should not be worried that we cannot locate *the* cause for the solitary individual's responses. Verheggen revises Davidson's argument by introducing a requirement for objectivity. Instead of focusing on the *common* object as the cause for responses, Verheggen shifts the focus to *recognizing* the commonality. Thus,

possession of language requires the possession of the concept of objectivity. [...] one could not have a language unless one knew, if only in an unarticulated way, that one's use of words is governed by standards, and that whether or one's use meets those standards is an objective matter (Verheggen 1997, 365).

Granted, even a solitary individual could be in disagreement over whether or not her use of words conforms to the standards (by comparing her word-usage at two different occasions) but this kind of disagreement fails to be objective, as it is resolved by the speaker alone. Genuine (dis)agreement is possible only with interpersonal interaction; anything short of this is insufficient for language: "The person who can interact only with a languageless creature is no better off than the person who can interact only with himself. He has the last and only say on everything, i.e. no say at all" (Verheggen 1997, 367).

3. The impossibility of solitary persons

Verheggen's modification of Davidson's argument establishes the social nature of language, which subsequently entails the impossibility of solitary speakers. Next, I want to comment on the notion of solitary *persons*. Despite the different positions advocated by Hacker and Malcolm, both of them seemingly regard the solitary individuals as persons. Malcolm writes:

Let us *arbitrarily assume* that Wittgenstein was imagining someone who had always lived alone, and who was employing a picture-language (Bildersprache). Would Wittgenstein be implying that there could be a forever solitary person with a language? (Malcolm 1989, 25)

Hacker answers this in the affirmative:

Wittgenstein demands [...] a behavioral context rich enough to provide adequate grounds for ascription of the mastery of the technique. This may (logically) be found in the behaviour of a solitary person, whether or not he had ever been part of a community (Hacker 1990/2001, 321).

Moreover, we see Verheggen conceding to this possibility (in talking of "solitary persons"), her denial of the possibility of solitary speakers notwithstanding. This suggests that both sides accede to the possibility that a forever-solitary individual is a person. This is quite expected on Hacker's individualistic approach, but when

Verheggen accedes to this, her communitarian view seems to falter. More pointedly, both sides can be seen as being under the shadow of Descartes in thinking that there could be solitary persons, explicit disavowals of Cartesianism notwithstanding. My aim here is to demonstrate this to be false.

Let us turn to Baker's claim that "a first-person perspective is a defining characteristic of all persons" (Baker 2000, 91). In delineating the first-person perspective, Baker writes: "One has a first-person perspective [iff] one has the ability to conceive of oneself as oneself", where this ability is signaled by the linguistic ability to attribute (as well as to make) first-person reference to oneself (Baker 2000, 68). Two points are crucial here. First, Baker claims that "Although the first-person perspective does not depend on natural language, it is often manifested [...] in a person's use of I* sentences" (Baker 2000, 76). On her interpretation, language is not necessary for the first-person perspective to emerge. But if this is so, then the first person with the first-person perspective (since, assumedly, there had to be one) was able to achieve this with *private* language in the strongest sense. Alternatively, she had to be able to represent herself as herself* without any linguistic apparatus, but I am not certain what this would be like, or even that this possibility is coherent. So the *first* person, were she to achieve personhood, would also have to be, *per impossibile*, a solitary speaker. This doesn't bode well for Baker's argument. Second, although Baker doesn't mention this, we've seen that *there can be no such thing as a private language in the sense required for Baker's argument*. And thus, either (i) there are no persons, or (ii) language is requisite for personhood. As (i) is clearly false, it follows that (ii) language is requisite for personhood.

Here I foresee someone raising the following objection (due to Hacker against Malcolm) against my claim that there could not be solitary persons:

Crusoe will continue speaking English whether or not there are still English-speakers elsewhere. If the English-speaking peoples are wiped out by a catastrophe, Crusoe's utterances do not thereby become gibberish. [...] But, Malcolm will reply, these *were* social practices, and were learnt from others. That is true, but constitutes an objection only insofar as it presupposes the dubious principle that the genesis of an ability is relevant to the determination or identification of the current ability (Hacker 1990/2001, 321).

That is, one could object that this renders the persistence of persons extremely fickle. But is the principle to which Hacker alludes really dubious? Suppose the entire human population is decimated, save for one individual. It seems that the last individual would not be a person if personhood depended on a community. Or would she? The crucial fact here is that constituted entities are governed by two (not-at-all-dubious) conditions for their existence:

If x constitutes y at t, and y's primary kind is G, then x is in what I called 'G-favourable circumstances' at t. [...] We should distinguish two kinds of G-favourable circumstances for [entities], say: (i) the circumstances in which [an entity] may come into existence, and (ii) the circumstances in which an existing [entities] continues to exist. The circumstances in which [an entity] comes into existence are more stringent than those for [an entity's] remaining in existence (Baker 2004, 103).

For instance, it takes creative more work to create an artifact – say, a statue – but once this act is completed, the artifact persists, even if the culture in which the artifact emerged disappears. Likewise, moving in and out of isolation doesn't endanger the personhood of someone who already is a person.

4. Conclusions

Baker argues that there could be no persons if there were no objects external to the entity. This leaves open the possibility that the person develops the first-person perspective independently of others. So Baker is forced back to the (Cartesian) individualistic theses. In order to avert this, language needs to be a prerequisite for personhood. However, my proposal seems to carry the implication that if the conditions requisite for personhood can materialize only in a community, then personhood seems to be a social artifact of sorts. I defend this conclusion elsewhere; regrettably, this paper does not allow for a detailed exploration. For now, we have (i) that language is requisite for personhood, and (ii) that language is necessarily social. Thus, personhood is dependent on an external element, which makes persons closer to *social* artifact-kinds rather than to natural kinds.

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Wittgensteins Philosophieren für den Menschen – Denken sub specie hominis als Methode

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1. Einleitung

Mit der Abkehr von der solipsistischen Sicht auf das Ich im *Tractatus* entwickelte Wittgenstein sukzessive über die Erweiterung des Begriffs der logischen Form zu dem der Grammatik eine Philosophie, die den sprachverwendenden Menschen neu in sein Recht einsetzt, ein sprachverwendender *Mensch* zu sein. Das Neue dieser Philosophie besteht dabei vor allem in einer methodischen Konsequenz, die mit der Sicht des Menschen als Mitmensch (vgl. v. Savigny 1996), der eine gemeinsame Sprache teilt, verbunden ist. Diese Verbindung läßt sich fruchtbar unter zwei Aspekten betrachten: Erstens im Blick auf eine Frage, die Anthony Kenny aufgeworfen hat, wenn er die Unvereinbarkeit Wittgensteins metaphilosophischer Bemerkungen mit dessen genuin philosophischen Äußerungen konstatiert. Der Rekurs auf Wittgensteins Behandlung des Begriffs „Widerspruch“ in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* läßt dabei eine Auflösung der von Kenny gesehenen Spannung denkbar werden. Zweitens ist die Verbindung von später Methode und der neuen, bescheideneren Sicht auf den Menschen durch den Gedanken zu erläutern, daß die metaphilosophisch verwertbaren Stellen (etwa PU 124-128) einen inneren Zusammenhang haben, der eine Lösung der Frage enthält, wie der berühmte und oft mißverständene Satz über die Philosophie: „Sie läßt alles wie es ist“ (PU 124) mit der Tatsache vereinbar ist, daß im Reden über eine solche scheinbare Limitierung die propositionalen Standards der Sprache schon erweitert werden.

2. Die Unterscheidung von Philosophie und Methode (Kenny)

In PU 599 findet sich einer der folgenreichsten Bemerkungen der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*:

„In der Philosophie werden nicht Schlüsse gezogen. ‚Es muß sich doch so verhalten!‘ ist kein Satz der Philosophie. Sie stellt nur fest, was Jeder ihr zugibt.“

Was Wittgenstein hier betont, scheint dem alltäglichen Verständnis dessen, was Wissenschaft ist, entgegenzustehen. Philosophie ist nicht dazu da, durch logische Verfahren zu neuen Ergebnissen zu gelangen. Nicht eine induktive oder mit C.G. Hempel deduktiv-nomologische Methode wird hier favorisiert, die mit einem gewissen Nachdruck auf der Gültigkeit der von ihr durch wissenschaftliche Gesetze erkannten Erkenntnisse besteht. Vielmehr hat die Philosophie bei Wittgenstein nicht demonstrativ auf die Normativität ihrer Aussagen zu pochen, die durch die Legitimität ihrer Methode verbürgt scheint. Der Satz „Es muß sich doch so verhalten!“ ist deshalb nicht so sehr Wissenschaft als Emphatik, also eine Versicherung, die nur auf den ersten Blick dem untersuchten philosophischen Problem gilt, dahinter aber das Individuum in seinem Tun sichern soll, das ein philosophisches Problem untersucht. Wenn Philosophie nicht mehr dazu da ist, das Wissen einer Sprachgemeinschaft zu erweitern, also entdeckend in bestehende Gepflogenheiten einzugreifen, hat sich der

Status der philosophischen Untersuchung geändert: Philosophie ist nun keine *ars inveniendi* mehr, die Neues erfindet, das hängt mit der engen Verzahnung von Wissen und Können zusammen, die bei Wittgenstein den Wissensbegriff prägt (PU 150). Wer philosophiert, steht nicht über den Dingen, sondern handelnd mitten unter ihnen; es gibt eine Grammatik des Wissens, nicht mehr ein weltfernes, cartesianisch geprägtes Ideal des *clare et distincte*. Wenn Philosophie aber nur feststellt, was jeder ihr zugibt und alles läßt, wie es ist, ergibt sich die Frage, wie dann noch metaphilosophische Sätze möglich sind, die eine bestimmte philosophische Methode als richtig nahelegen. Anthony Kenny schreibt über den oben zitierten Abschnitt PU 599 „that Wittgenstein is talking about philosophy as correctly understood, not philosophy as mismanaged and misunderstood by bad philosophers.“ (Kenny 2004, 173) PU 599 ist so nicht mehr die Diagnose eines bestehenden Zustands der Philosophie, sondern die Formulierung eines Desiderats. Philosophie, die diesen Namen verdient, nicht Philosophie, wie sie ist, stellt nur fest, was jeder anerkennt. Vor diesem Hintergrund läßt sich der Stellenwert der metaphilosophischen, als methodologisch verstehbaren Stellen klären: Muß eine Philosophie, die ihre Probleme radikal neu denkt, nicht auch Hinweise für andere darüber enthalten, wie diese scheinbare Radikalität durch ein Netz von angebbaren Überzeugungen gestützt wird, die dem Neuen einen Halt geben? In dem von Kenny thematisierten Satz von der Selbstverständlichkeit des durch den Philosophen Erkannten (PU 599) scheint in der Tat eine Vorannahme gemacht worden zu sein. Nur wenn Philosophie auf ihren alten, im Überlieferungszusammenhang prozedural verbürgten und historisch stabilisierten Rechten besteht (Abstraktion, Universalisierung, Mentalismus), gerät die metaphilosophische Bemerkung mit der „eigentlichen“ Philosophie in Konflikt. Nur deshalb sind Philosophie und Methode bei Wittgenstein zu trennen, kann man mit Kenny sagen, weil die Metaphilosophie hier denjenigen adressiert, der hinsichtlich der Natur der Philosophie noch im Irrtum ist. Wittgensteins späte Prosa ist so gewissermaßen ambig; einmal philosophierend für jene Leser, die schon imstande sind, die neuen Gedanken mitzudenken und zu verstehen, einmal methodisch klärend für die, die, ohne es zu wissen, an die alten Bilder anknüpfen und das Innovatorische der neuen Philosophie verzerren. Diese Ambiguität, über die man leicht hinwegliest, führt bei Kenny zu einem eindeutigen Schluß: Wittgenstein „could not hide from himself that there were more things in his philosophy than could be confined within his metaphilosophy.“ (Kenny 2004, 182)

Muß man in diesem Sinne annehmen, daß Wittgensteins Bemerkungen zur philosophischen Methode mit seinen philosophischen Äußerungen unvereinbar sind? Ist dies eine Inkonsequenz, die Bedenken hervorruft sollte oder eine in Wittgensteins Werk absichtlich angelegte Spannung, die sich nur unter Mißachtung fundamentaler Überzeugungen des Philosophen lösen ließe? Wittgenstein selbst gibt in PU 125 einen Hinweis: „Die bürgerliche Stellung des Widerspruchs, oder seine Stellung in der bürgerlichen Welt: das ist das philosophische Problem.“ Die „bürgerliche Welt“ neigt dazu, Widersprüche als Ausnahmen aufzufassen, die behoben werden müssen,

nicht als unumgängliche Bestandteile eines komplexen sprachlichen oder staatlichen Organismus. Es scheinen ethische Schwierigkeiten zu sein, die hier überwunden werden müssen, „tiefe Beunruhigungen“ (PU 111) eingeschliffener Lebensformen, die hervorgerufen werden, wenn Dinge sich nicht verbinden lassen. Dies geschieht auch deshalb, weil Sprache sich nicht in ihrer funktionalen Benennungsleistung erschöpft, sondern selbst in postmoderner Zeit nicht umhin kann, Subjekte zu konstituieren. Die Kohärenz der Benennungen sichert den Sprachverwendern die Verlässlichkeit ihrer sprachlich erlangten Identität. Der propositionale Kern einer sprachlichen Äußerung hat sein Äquivalent in dem, was ein Sprachbenutzer über sich denkt. Diese Verbindung kann unbewußt bleiben und wird nur gelegentlich in besonderen Umgebungen nach außen getragen, wie dem setting der psychoanalytischen Therapie. Gelingende Benennungen, also sprachliche Verkehrsformen, die erfolgreich von Dingen in der Welt sprechen, haben ihren Spiegel in gelingenden Zuschreibungen auf das sprachverwendende Subjekt. Der Spiegel aber soll nicht trüben, der Widerspruch wird negativ konnotiert, obwohl die Praxis der Sprachverwendung von dem durchzogen ist, was Austin *infelicities* nannte. Methode und Philosophie bei Wittgenstein im Blick auf unterschiedliche Adressaten zu trennen, mag so der Eindeutigkeit dienen, ist aber mit Wittgensteins eigener unbürgerlicher Offenheit für Widersprüche und Mißverständnisse in der Sprache (und im Leben) nur schwer zu vereinbaren, da die philosophische Beseitigung von Mißverständnissen nur scheinbar dem Ziel der vollkommenen Exaktheit zustrebt (PU 91). Tatsächlich sind die produktive philosophische Desillusionierung und die Akzeptanz sprachlich immer gegebener Vieldeutigkeit und Unschärfe bei Wittgenstein miteinander verbunden, da es Menschen sind, fehlbare Akteure, die sprachlich handeln, nicht mehr die Träger der Vorstellung einer traktarianisch lebensfernen Idealsprache im Kontext des logischen Empirismus. Ist der Widerspruch einmal als notwendige Zutat des Alltagssprachlichen Diskurses rehabilitiert, löst sich die Spannung zwischen Philosophie und Methode. Nicht nur der Mensch hat ein Recht auf seinen Widerspruch, auch der Philosoph; was nicht heißt, daß nun inkonsistente Gedankengebäude erwünscht wären. Es ist vielmehr der Abschied von einer bestimmten dichotomisierenden bürgerlichen Denkweise, der bei Wittgenstein die akribische Unterscheidung zwischen Philosophie und Methode überwindet und begreifbar macht, daß metaphilosophische Bemerkungen in all ihrer Ambiguität auch schon Philosophie sind, nicht nur deren Präliminarien.

3. Grammatische Anamnesis und der sprachhandelnde Mensch

Hat die Trennung von Philosophie und Methode durch das unbürgerliche Verständnis des Begriffs „Widerspruch“ ihren Schrecken verloren, bleibt die Frage, wie auf der Textebene der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* die Entschärfung vor sich geht. Der Widerspruch soll dabei nicht aufgelöst werden, sondern ist als konstruktives Moment in den Gedankenaufbau integriert. Beispielhaft für so eine reflektierte Entschärfung ist die Abschnittfolge PU 126-128. PU 126: „Die Philosophie stellt eben alles bloß hin, und erklärt und folgert nichts. – Da alles offen daliegt, ist auch nichts zu erklären. Denn, was etwa verborgen ist, interessiert uns nicht. ‚Philosophie‘ könnte man auch das nennen, was vor allen neuen Entdeckungen und Erfindungen möglich ist.“ PU 127: „Die Arbeit des Philosophen ist ein Zusammentragen von Erinnerungen zu

einem bestimmten Zweck.“ PU 128: „Wollte man Thesen in der Philosophie aufstellen, es könnte nie über sie zur Diskussion kommen, weil Alle mit ihnen einverstanden wären.“ PU 128 ist nur auf den ersten Blick irritierend; es ist ja ein Hinweis für den, der auf der falschen philosophischen Fährte ist und daher einer etwas groben Korrektur durchaus bedarf. Nicht die These an sich wird verworfen, nur ihre Vergötzung. Thetisch behauptendes Reden ist nicht a priori schlecht, wohl aber die Orientierung an einem einseitig szientifischen Bild der Wissenschaft als Naturwissenschaft, gegen das der locus classicus PU 109 recht eigentlich angeht. In der vorliegenden Abschnittfolge nun verliert Wittgensteins scheinbare Abkehr vom thetischen Reden in PU 128 durch die vorhergehende Bemerkung in PU 127 deutlich an Brisanz. Wenn nämlich die philosophische Arbeit im Zusammentragen von Erinnerungen zu einem bestimmten Zweck besteht, situiert dies die Frage nach der Nützlichkeit philosophischer Thesen neu. Nicht nur die Zukunft ist für unser gegenwärtiges Verständnis philosophischer Probleme relevant, also die Vorstellung, daß Ergebnisse sich erst einmal in ungewohnten Kontexten experimentell beweisen müssen, damit ihnen geglaubt werden kann. Hier trennt sich Philosophie von Naturwissenschaft. Gerade der Blick in die Vergangenheit schon gewesener Sprachverwendungsweisen schafft die Perspektive, in der ein gegenwärtiges Problem gelöst werden kann. Indem die Erinnerung gleichsam tiefengrammatisch wirksam wird, schließt sie zu dem auf, was nach ihr kam und gewinnt eine explanatorisch fruchtbare Aktualität. Der Philosoph, der das Gegebene nicht antastet, sondern alles läßt, wie es ist, kann es doch in Bezug zu Früherem setzen und durch diese Anbindung Widersprüche nicht auf eine bürgerliche, sondern philosophisch freie Weise verstehen. In der weiteren Perspektive der antiplatonischen *grammatischen Anamnesis* kann vieles, was uns heute beunruhigt, sinnvoll werden, da die grammatische, Sprachverwendungsweisen klärende Erinnerung nicht gegenwärtige Fakten ausklammert, sondern eine produktive Ausweitung des Referenzrahmens philosophischer Äußerungen bedeutet. Nicht ewige Ideen sind es, an denen der Philosoph denkend partizipieren will, sondern praktisch und zeitabhängig gegebene weltbildrelative Äußerungen. So erweist sich gerade im methodologischen Kontext der oft unter Destruktionsverdacht gestellte Wittgenstein letztlich als jemand, der im Blick auf einen „bestimmten Zweck“ die Sprechweisen verschiedener Zeitabschnitte versöhnt. Die zusammengetragenen Erinnerungen sind nicht eine Ansammlung toter Gebrauchsweisen, die sich überlebt haben, sondern wichtig, weil die sprachphilosophische Zukunft Herkunft braucht und gegenwärtige Kommunikationen eine Geschichte haben. Wittgenstein romantisiert gleichwohl nicht vergangene sprachliche Interaktionsweisen, sondern erweist sich in der Öffnung der philosophischen Gegenwart für die Vergangenheit als anarchischer Traditionalist, der sowohl dem Vergangenen seinen Raum läßt als auch den Widerspruch nicht fürchtet. So kann Philosophie gegen die in ihr formulierte Methode „verstoßen“, ohne das philosophische Gesamtprojekt zu gefährden. Die grammatisch verstandene Erinnerung nimmt die sprachverwendenden Menschen ernst, die früher lebten und verbindet sie mit den gegenwärtigen philosophischen Problemen. Die Dimension individueller Erfahrung wird zum Bestandteil eines Denkens, das nicht mehr sub specie aeternitatis, sondern sub specie hominis geschieht (Vgl. Majetschak 2000, 273ff).

Im Wissen um die Notwendigkeit, Übersicht zu schaffen, wird das von Menschen tatsächlich Erlebte als Grundlage philosophischer Arbeit genommen und geordnet, denn: „Unserer Grammatik fehlt es an Übersichtlichkeit.“ (PU 122) Erinnerungen sind Teile dieser Grammatik, die berücksichtigt werden müssen, um ein gründliches und verlässliches Bild der menschlichen Sprache zum Untersuchungszeitpunkt zu bekommen. Dabei scheint gerade die von Wittgenstein betonte Offensichtlichkeit dessen, was beschreibend geordnet werden soll, eine Schwierigkeit zu beinhalten, auf die in PU 436 hingewiesen wird: Nicht „schwer erhaschbare Erscheinungen“ oder „die schnell entschlüpfende gegenwärtige Erfahrung“ sollen von der Philosophie dingfest gemacht werden, sondern das, was ohnehin offen zutage liegt. Der PU 436 abschließende Augustinische Leitsatz des *manifestissima et usitatissima sunt* aus den *Confessiones* qualifiziert die zu untersuchenden Phänomene eindeutig als gewöhnlich; ihre Gewöhnlichkeit geht trotzdem mit Frische und Unverbrauchtheit einher, *et nova est inventio eorum*. Wer die Tatsache ernst nimmt, daß Philosophie Menschenwerk ist und meint, daß diese Tatsache sich in der konkreten philosophischen Untersuchung wiederfinden sollte, dem macht das scheinbar paradoxe Bestehen auf der philosophisch ertragreichen Neuheit alter Gebrauchsweisen von Sprache kein Kopfzerbrechen. Ebenso wenig vermag dann noch der scheinbare Widerspruch zwischen Methode (Philosophie läßt alles, wie es ist) und Philosophie (Sie arbeitet an einem Problem und greift ordnend in das Inventar einer Sprachgemeinschaft ein) zu beunruhigen. Der Widerspruch und seine Stellung in der Philosophie, das ist vielleicht der Prüfstein eines Denkens, das den Menschen ernstnimmt. Wittgenstein tat dies. Er gestattete dem Menschen sein Bedürfnis nach Überhöhung und Exklusivität des Ich, ließ aber nicht zu, daß durch diese Seelenlage das philosophische Ergebnis verzerrt wurde. Jedes Zeichen lebt im Gebrauch (PU 432) und so ist auch der, der Zeichen verwendet, ein Kind dieses Gebrauchs. Sub specie hominis nehmen philosophische Eitelkeiten ab; die zwischen Sprache und Wirklichkeit vermittelnde Grammatik inkorporiert bei Wittgenstein das Wissen davon, daß propositionale Standards zuletzt menschliche Standards sind, nach denen auch der Philosoph sich zu richten hat.

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Derivativeness, production and reacting to the cause

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1. Introduction

In the autumn of 1937, Wittgenstein wrote several remarks about the concept of causation, presumably in response to a paper by Russell published the year before. This manuscript was published by Rhees in 1976 and has been studied by a few of Wittgenstein's interpreters but, unlike several of Wittgenstein's other writings, it has not found its way into the contemporary debates on the matter. Wittgenstein's general outlook does appear to have influenced the debates on causation, but only indirectly so; mainly via the works of Anscombe and von Wright.

Interestingly, the accounts of causation presented by these two authors have been generally considered to be almost diametrically opposed and, moreover, they are both interpreted as making claims that would be at odds with Wittgenstein's own views. Anscombe's view is commonly classified as 'primitivist': causation is an unanalysable yet central idea in our conception of the world. Von Wright, on the other hand, is considered to be one of the founders of the manipulability or agency theory, according to which the causal relation can be (reductively) analysed in terms of the means-end relation. Furthermore, on Anscombe's view causation is a relation between singular events, whereas on von Wright's view it is a nomic connection implying the validity of strict rules. Third, Anscombe is said to endorse the view that causal connections can be observed under favorable conditions. Von Wright construes the epistemological problem of knowing causal connections in a Humean way.

(Psillos 2006) defends Anscombe's view, calling it "Wittgensteinian pluralism" without explaining this attribution any further. Von Wright is commonly grouped with (Collingwood 1940), but not Wittgenstein. In this paper I want to make a brief comparison between Anscombe's, von Wright's and Wittgenstein's views on causation, arguing that, on closer inspection, they are in fact largely compatible.

2. Derivativeness and production

In her inaugural lecture, *Causality and Determination*, Anscombe criticised the traditional view that equates the concept of causation with that of law-governed necessitation. Her argument is based on the thought that we can know causes even if we do not know the law. Anscombe's account of causation is, accordingly, *singularist*.

[...] causality consists in the derivativeness of an effect from its causes. This is the core, the common feature of causality in its various kinds. Effects derive from, arise out of, come of, their causes. (Anscombe 1971, p. 67)

The dependency of an effect on its cause cannot be traced back to some universal law or causal nexus, and so it remains unanalysed. Our "primary knowledge" of causation is a knowledge of how to use the word 'cause' to report various scenes and this meaning of the word is tied in with the meaning of many other words, such as action verbs and natural kind terms, that it would be impossible to say what it would mean to add our word 'cause' to a 'pure sensation language' in which none of those other words

can occur. According to (Sosa and Tooley 1993), in their introduction to Anscombe's text, Anscombe would be claiming that "the relation of causation can be immediately perceived" (p. 12). This interpretation is widely shared; cf. (Schaffer 2003) and (Psillos 2006). However, this claim cannot be found in her lecture. All that Anscombe commits to is that we learn to use the word 'cause' in reporting what we observe.

Von Wright's writings on causation are more extensive and more complex. His analysis starts with a more Humean point of view: if causation is a matter of necessary connexion, then how can we ever have knowledge of causes, granted that we cannot "peep under the surface of reality"? According to von Wright, the *only* way in which we may come to believe that we *can* have knowledge of the counterfactual is via the idea of *action*. The statement 'I opened the window' implies, not only that the window opened (the intrinsic result), but also that it would not have opened if I had not performed the action. Otherwise, we should rather say "I held on to the window as it opened". Because of this 'counterfactual element in action', the idea of *producing* a (hypothetical) cause in an experiment to observe whether the effect follows it, *imposes* on a perceived regularity the idea of counterfactuality.

If a man throughout stood quite passive against nature, *i.e.* if he did not possess the notion that *he* can do things, make a difference in the world, then there would be no way of distinguishing the accidental regularity from the causal one ... Man would simply not be familiar with the notion of counterfactuality, with the idea of *how it would have been, if ---*. This is the ground for saying that the concept of causal connection rests on the concept of action. (von Wright 1974, pp. 52-53)

If indeed the relation between the concept of causation and the performance of testing experiments is a conceptual one, we can analyse the concept of causation in terms of the concept of production.

... that *p* is the cause of *q*, I have endeavored to say here, *means* that I could bring about *q*, if I could do (so that) *p*. (von Wright 1971, p. 74)

This view has been defended more recently by (Menzies and Price 1993), but it has also been criticised by a number of authors. (Hausman 1997) thinks that the idea is circular, because 'bringing about' would be a causal concept itself. This is clearly not the case in von Wright's account: the result of an action is intrinsic, whereas causal relations between events are extrinsic.

It is common practice in the literature on the analysis of causation to distinguish between the theories that say that causation is a conditional concept, the theories that say that causation is a (meta)physical concept and the theories that say it is neither, or nothing at all. In such a classification, von Wright would be grouped with the first class and Anscombe with the third. This classification does not reveal the similarities between their respective views. Both authors wish to distinguish between lawlikeness and a concept of dependency that is more primitive than this: derivativeness for Anscombe and production for von Wright.

Both notions have been criticised as being speculative, but in neither case this criticism is justified.

Yet, there is also a striking difference between Anscombe and von Wright concerning the nature of this more basic dependency concept: for Anscombe the difference between observing and intervening plays no role, but for von Wright it is crucial. I believe that when we turn to Wittgenstein, this difference may be cleared up.

3. Reacting to the cause

In his manuscript, Wittgenstein takes issue with a paper by Russell (Russell 1936), who argues that before we come to know a cause by experiencing regularities we must first know it by intuition. Wittgenstein objects to this idea of knowledge by intuition. Instead, he points our attention to the practice of *reacting to the cause*. In some cases we react instinctively or non-consciously to some external stimulus, e.g., blushing or moving nervously when someone is staring at us. This is a form of reacting to the cause, although there is no mediating 'intuitive awareness'. In this context, Wittgenstein quotes Goethe, 'im Anfang war die Tat'.

The origin and the primitive form of the language game is a reaction; only from this can more complicated forms develop. (Wittgenstein 1976, p. 420)

There are many forms of reacting, not all of which are immediate. In such cases we speak of 'looking for the cause'. Here, again, there are different types. In one type of case, we simply *trace* the cause, e.g., tracing a moving rope to find the person pulling at it. Upon finding this person pulling the rope, reacting to the cause (i.e., to him) is simply a response, e.g., to stop the rope from moving. This reaction need not be construed as the overcoming of doubt or the inference 'that this is the cause of the movement of the rope'. The second type of case is where we do not simply trace the cause, but perform experiments to find the cause.

In one case "*He is the cause*" simply means: *he* pulled the string. In the other case it means roughly: those are the conditions that I would have to change in order to get rid of this phenomenon. (*idem*, p. 417)

In R. Rhees' lecture notes (p. 433) we find that Wittgenstein claims that it is their common function of *predicting* what will happen which explains why we use this one word 'cause' in both cases. That is not to say that they always give us the same results. We may find by experiment that the cause is something other than the thing to which we instinctively react. But the practice of looking for a cause is one *root* of the "cause-effect language-game" and this explains the use of this word for both types of behavior.

Wittgenstein's analysis of causation is more diverse than what is presented by Anscombe and von Wright. Anscombe focusses on the reaction of looking from one thing to another thing: when one billiard ball launches another, our reaction to the cause (the hitting) is that we look at the effect (the movement of the second ball). Though her views are not couched in terms of reactions, they no doubt closely resemble what Wittgenstein writes about tracing the cause.

Von Wright accepts the traditional view in which causation is lawlike and nomic, but the reason for this may simply be that he is concerned with the issue of scientific methodology. In natural science we try to discover and

explain regularities by means of experiment. As Wittgenstein's analysis shows, there is no conflict between the existence of this practice and the existence of the practice of tracing causes (this does not exclude the possibility of a conflict between the *findings* of either practice). Von Wright is only concerned with the latter practice---he explicitly refers to the concept he is interested in as 'experimentalist causation'---and so for him the conceptual connection between causation and regularity is not unreasonable. In this respect, the differences between Anscombe and von Wright in this respect could almost be terminological: for which practice do we reserve the term 'cause'?

Von Wright directs our attention to the agency involved in performing experiments. He argues that this practice is *constitutive* of our understanding of causal connections as being nomic. Although this element in von Wright's work is commonly interpreted as an influence of Collingwood, it also clearly follows on Wittgenstein's analysis. Looking for the cause is of course more than a mere shift of attention. We aim to *impute* the witnessed event to something or someone, or we aim to *guard* ourselves against something, or, indeed, we aim to *intervene* in the mechanism to change the course of events. We look for a cause *in order to* intervene. Consequently, without the idea of being able to intervene we cannot make sense of the practice of looking for the cause.

Von Wright then takes the analysis one step further. He notes that tracing an event, *qua* action, to a *person* is different from tracing it to, say, a cogwheel or a virus. Looking for the cause is a process that can, in principle, be continued indefinitely. But when we impute responsibility to a person, the tracing comes to an end. This is so, not because the agent is an 'unmoved mover', a view to which von Wright objects, but because holding a person responsible is not the same as tracing the behavior to some cortical activity. The reactions following imputation are different from the reactions upon finding a cause. In the latter case we may either restart the activity of tracing the cause anew, or physically intervene in the mechanism. In the former case, on the other hand, we can ask for the person's motives and reason with him. In doing so, we are not tracing the behavior to some preceding event, but we consider the person capable of intentional action and we are generally satisfied when the motivation strikes us as reasonable or natural. However, giving a motivation *presupposes* the capability to do otherwise. We do not trace the behavior from the person to his motives, but the motives are attributed *to* him. In view of this, the attribution of responsibility can give us the idea of *alternative* futures which the notion of tracing a cause in principle does not.

This further step is, I take it, still understandable as Wittgensteinian. In fact, von Wright quotes Wittgenstein in a footnote on this point:

An intention is embedded in its situation, in human customs and institutions. (Wittgenstein 1953, sect. 337)

This is for von Wright the source for his view that explanation in the social sciences is different from explanation in the natural sciences, and that the latter practice depends on the very same customs and institutions as the former does.

4. Conclusion

To conclude, Anscombe and von Wright both express views on the concept of causation that are entirely compatible with Wittgenstein's views. Moreover, from a comparison with Wittgenstein's remarks on this issue it becomes clear the views of his students are at least in essence compatible as well. This observation clearly shows that their views have been misconstrued in the recent literature on the analysis of causation. A new interpretation of those texts that takes its cue from an analysis of Wittgenstein's manuscript is called for. I believe that such an analysis will show that many of the objections that have been ventured against Anscombe and von Wright are based on a misunderstanding of their views.

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(Non-) Compositionality and Wittgenstein's *non-ne*-game

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1. (Non-)Compositionality

There are many, many formulations of the so-called "principle of compositionality" to be found. Here is a relatively weak, but characteristic, definition:

(C) "The meaning of a complex expression is determined by its structure and the meaning of its constituents." [Szabó (2001), section 1.1.]

The definition immediately confronts us with the syntax-semantics-interface: The syntax alone seems to be responsible for concepts like "structure", "complex expression" and "constituents". Whereas the semantics has to tell how we should understand the "meaning" of syntactical constructions. As a concept which connects syntax and semantics, compositionality is thought to play a crucial role in languages. However, the nature of this role is not uniquely specified: it may be as an inherent part of a theory, as a property of a theory, as a hypothesis about natural and/or formal languages, as a guiding principle in formulating new theories, as a criterion to evaluate existing theories etc. This multiplicity of uses is further confused by the way that many authors have used a notion of compositionality without making their meaning precise. In an attempt to order some of this confusion, nowadays we can observe a discussion on a meta-level. Without considering specific theories researchers try to find proofs for very abstract properties of compositionality.

The approach adopted in this paper is the very opposite. We will focus on some very specific examples and definitions of compositionality to see what we can learn from them. For example, from a classical point of view non-extensionality is a violation of compositionality. If we look at modal words like *can* – interpreted as modal operators (ϕ) – they do not fulfill the requirement of extensionality:

Not: $(A = B) \vdash (\phi A = \phi B)$.

Intuitively, however, modal sentences are compositional. We therefore need a new formal paradigm to capture the appropriate definition of compositionality in this case. Carnap's idea was to use as input not materially equivalent expressions but logically equivalent ones:

$\vdash A = B$
 $\vdash \phi A = \phi B$

With respect to this criterion of *intensionality* operators which are not extensional but intensional in the indicated sense form intensional contexts. We are able to compute the meaning of expressions like ϕA if we know the meaning of "A" and add a new basic notion to our semantics, such as "possible worlds" or "situations".

The generalization of this situation for n-placed operators is:

$\vdash A_1 = B_1$
 :
 $\vdash A_n = B_n$
 $\vdash \phi^n A_1 \dots A_n = \phi^n B_1 \dots B_n$

In this new paradigm, the intensional operator ϕ^n can be understood as a compositional one even if it is not compositional in an extensional sense.

Given the conceptual similarities between compositionality and extensionality, many researchers would expect that any extensional logic is compositional. This would mean that any n-valued logic with $n > 2$ is compositional. We will explore whether this is necessarily the case. To do this, let us take *non-compositionality* to be defined in the following ways:

$\frac{A = B}{C \bullet A \neq C \bullet B}$ or $\frac{\vdash A \leftrightarrow B}{\text{Not: } \vdash \phi A \leftrightarrow \phi B}$

With these definitions we can explore the properties of compositionality within a formal setting. The general aim of my argument will be that non-compositionality is not as horrifying and shocking as it is generally thought to be. If we have a fruitful definition of non-compositionality ((non-)compositionality in the air means nothing) we can precisely formulate cases of non-compositionality within a well-defined logic and the conditions under which we get compositionality back. The existence of non-compositionality within a logic does not undermine the fundamental basis of all modern thought.

2. Non-compositionality and extensionality: A puzzling case in a 4-valued logic

To explore cases of non-compositionality, let us define a 4-valued logic L4 with $K = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$ as its set of values. Let $D = \{1, 2\}$ be the set of designated values of L4; let f be an assignment of values to the atomic formulas of L4 and let V be a – recursively defined – valuation. A formula A is true iff its value is an element of the set of designated values:

$V(A, f)$ is true if and only if $V(A, f) \in D$.

A formula A is valid if and only if for all assignments f A gets a designated value:

$\vdash_{L4} A$ iff for all f $V(A, f) \in D$.

Now we consider the unary functors " \square ", " \blacksquare ", " \circ " and the binary functor " \leftrightarrow ". Their value tables are:

A	$\square A$	$\blacksquare A$	$\circ A$
1	1	1	3
2	4	3	4
3	3	4	1
4	4	4	4

$A \leftrightarrow B$	1	2	3	4
1	1	2	3	4
2	2	1	4	3
3	3	4	1	2
4	4	3	2	1

Our concept of non-compositionality can be formulated as follows:

$$\vdash_{L4} A \leftrightarrow B$$

$$\text{Not: } \vdash_{L4} \phi A \leftrightarrow \phi B$$

Let "A" be " $\square p$ " where "p" is a propositional variable of L4. Let "B" be " $\blacksquare p$ " and let the context-creating operator " ϕ " be L4-operator " \circ ". Then we are confronted with the following situation:

$$\vdash_{L4} \square A \leftrightarrow \blacksquare B$$

$$\text{Not: } \vdash_{L4} \circ \square A \leftrightarrow \circ \blacksquare B$$

\square	p	\leftrightarrow	\blacksquare	p
1	1	1	1	1
4	2	2	3	2
3	3	2	4	3
4	4	1	4	4

\circ	\square	p	\leftrightarrow	\circ	\blacksquare	p
3	1	1	1	3	1	1
4	4	2	4	1	3	2
1	3	3	4	4	4	3
4	4	4	1	4	4	4

How can this instance of non-compositionality occur? " $\square p$ " and " $\blacksquare p$ " can be logically equivalent because there are situations with $V(\square p, f) = V(\blacksquare p, f)$ but $V(\square p \leftrightarrow \blacksquare p, f) \in D$. That means that L4 is extensional with respect to "V" but not completely compositional.

As we have made no special stipulations in our formulation of L4, it follows that in any functionally complete 4-valued logic we can define " \square ", " \blacksquare ", " \circ ", " \leftrightarrow " and formulate the indicated situation. To get a complete compositional logic back we have to consider a functionally incomplete 4-valued logic or put some other restrictions on it or on the formulation of compositionality, e.g.:

- It is not allowed to use an equivalence relation like " \leftrightarrow " to formulate (non-)compositionality.
- We are allowed to use " \leftrightarrow " only with the restriction that $D=\{1\}$.
- We accept only an equivalence relation with $V(A \leftrightarrow B, f) \in D$ iff $V(A, f) = V(B, f)$ in order to express the identity between "A" and "B".

Each of these steps is a step back towards classical logic!

Many researchers seem to be convinced that losing compositionality means losing the chance of a theoretical formulation of the relevant data. We have, however, just formulated a case of non-compositionality in a clearly well-defined logical theory.

3. Wittgenstein's non-ne-game

The type of construction outline above can help shed light on a puzzling philosophical position held by Wittgenstein. To quote his "Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics"; Appendix I (1933-1934):

„Könnte ich nicht sagen: zwei Wörter – schreiben wir sie »non« und »ne« - hätten dieselbe Bedeutung, sie seien beide Verneinungszeichen – aber

non non p = p

und

ne ne p = ne p?“

The puzzling philosophical inclination is:

„Denn wir möchten doch sagen: Auch daß die doppelte Verneinung eine Bejahung ist, muß für beide stimmen, wenn wir nur die Verdoppelung entsprechend auffassen. Aber wie?“

The answer depends on the understanding of logic, the role of structural rules and finally on our understanding of compositionality. Let us first state that we are confronted with three conditions for which – from a logical point of view – a formal explication is needed:

(A) $non\ p = ne\ p$ [„dieselbe Bedeutung“]

(B) $non\ non\ p = p$

(C) $ne\ ne\ p = ne\ p$.

How could that be?

We find an analogous example in Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations" § 556:

„Denk dir eine Sprache mit zwei verschiedenen Worten für die Verneinung, das eine ist »X«, das andere »Y«. Ein doppeltes »X« gibt eine Bejahung, eine doppeltes »Y« aber eine verstärkte Verneinung. Im übrigen werden die beiden Wörter gleich verwendet. – Haben nun »X« und »Y« die gleiche Bedeutung, wenn sie ohne Wiederholung in Sätzen vorkommen. Darauf könnte man verschiedenes antworten.“

„a) ... Es hat den Anschein, als würde aus der Natur der Negation folgen, daß eine doppelte Verneinung eine Bejahung ist. (Und etwas Richtiges ist daran. Was? Unsere Natur hängt mit beiden zusammen.)" [PU, p. 447]

We can demonstrate the quoted "nature of negation" if we suppose a classical framework:

(1) $non\ p = ne\ p$ hyp

(2) $non\ non\ p = p$ hyp

(3) $non\ non\ p = ne\ non\ p$ from (1) using the uniform substitution $[p/non\ p]$

(4) $p = ne\ non\ p$ from (3) using the replacement indicated by (2)

(5) $p = ne\ ne\ p$ from (4) using the replacement indicated by (1)

There seems to be no way to get Wittgenstein's version of " $ne\ ne\ p = ne\ p$ " without generating an inconsistency " $ne\ p = p$ ". It is clear that we are forced to this consequence if we remain within the framework of classical propositional logic. But what is interesting here is that we have to use (1) twice to get this result. And we have to use it in twofold:

(a) In (3) we use (1) together with a substitution rule:

$$\vdash A$$

$$\vdash A[p/B], B \text{ is substituted for every occurrence of } p \text{ in } A$$

(b) In (5) we need (1) as a logical equivalence for applying the replacement rule:

$$\vdash B = C$$

$$\vdash A = A\{B/C\}, \text{ zero or more occurrences of } B \text{ are replaced by } C$$

Wittgenstein's game is apparently concerned with the question of the invariant meaning of logical connectives if we iterate them. It is possible though that we

can get a formalization of the game which is systematic on the one hand and non-compositional in a precise sense on the other hand. With respect to Wittgenstein's criticism of logical atomism we have to check the possibility that the basic expressions are molecular ones.

4. A (non-)compositional reconstruction of the non-ne-game

We use our system L4 and interpret the negations *non* and *ne* as four-valued functions (and some other connectives we will need later):

A	non A	ne A	◄A
1	3	3	1
2	4	2	1
3	1	3	4
4	2	2	4

A&B	1	2	3	4	AvB	1	2	3	4
1	1	2	3	4	1	1	1	1	1
2	2	2	3	4	2	1	2	2	2
3	3	3	4	4	3	1	2	3	3
4	4	4	4	4	4	1	2	3	4

We get the following:

$$(B^*) \text{non non } A = A \quad [\vdash_{L4} \text{non non } A \leftrightarrow A]$$

$$(C^*) \text{ne ne } A = \text{ne } A \quad [\vdash_{L4} \text{ne ne } A \leftrightarrow \text{ne } A] \quad \text{But:}$$

$$(\text{not-}A^*) \text{non } A \neq \text{ne } A \quad [\text{not: } \vdash_{L4} \text{non } A \leftrightarrow \text{ne } A].$$

The situation changes if we take as arguments "◄A" instead of "A":

$$(A^{**}) \text{non } \text{◄}A = \text{ne } \text{◄}A \quad [\vdash_{L4} \text{non } \text{◄}A \leftrightarrow \text{ne } \text{◄}A] \text{ and}$$

$$(B^{**}) \text{non non } \text{◄}A = \text{◄}A \quad [\vdash_{L4} \text{non non } \text{◄}A \leftrightarrow \text{◄}A]$$

$$(C^{**}) \text{ne ne } \text{◄}A = \text{ne } \text{◄}A \quad [\vdash_{L4} \text{ne ne } \text{◄}A \leftrightarrow \text{ne } \text{◄}A].$$

Our result is that we are able to formalize the basic conditions of Wittgenstein's *non-ne*-game within a four-valued logic if we restrict the arguments to expressions of the form "◄A", i.e. $\forall(\text{◄}A, f) \in \{1, 4\}$. With respect to such pseudo-2-valued expressions the two negations behave alike! But this is another step back to classical logic.

With respect to our construction in section 2 it is easy to show that "*non*" is a throughout compositional connective but "*ne*" is not:

$$\frac{\vdash_{L4} A \leftrightarrow B}{\vdash_{L4} \text{non } A \leftrightarrow \text{non } B} \text{ but } \frac{\vdash_{L4} A \leftrightarrow B}{\text{not: } \vdash_{L4} \text{ne } A \leftrightarrow \text{ne } B} \text{ e.g. } \frac{\vdash_{L4} p \leftrightarrow \text{◄}p}{\text{not: } \vdash_{L4} \text{ne } p \leftrightarrow \text{ne } \text{◄}p}$$

Now we observe that we get another "nature" of negation. The above mentioned demonstration in (1) to (5) to show that $\text{non} = \text{ne}$ – i.e. that both negations have the same meaning independent of any context – does not work. The step in (3) – $[p/\text{non } p]$ – is not possible. Our reformulation uses "◄p" instead of "p". There is no rule allowing us to substitute for complex expressions like "◄p". It is possible to formulate such a rule with restrictions and so it would be context-dependent!

5. Some Consequences

Discussing tensed and tenseless expressions A. N. Prior (1967) uses two types of propositional variables: Propositions of the form p, q, r, \dots stand for arbitrary sentences. Propositions of the form a, b, c, \dots represent only tenseless sentences. We could introduce this distinction in an analogous way: $\forall(a) \in \{1, 4\}$. In L4 this means that the basic expression of this kind gets only two values but the meaning of the connectives is defined with respect to all

four possibilities. It seems that the connectives behave "dynamically" or "creatively" because they introduce values which the basic expressions do not possess: If the value of "a" is 1 then the value of "ne a" is 3!

The usual way of explicating expressions like "a" is to construct them as expressions of the form "◄p". In accordance with Wittgenstein's criticism of logical atomism we can think of the original basic expressions like "p" as molecular constructions. "p" can be a structured proposition containing two basic expressions "a" and "b" as follows:

$$p^* \approx ((a \& b) \vee \text{non } b) \& (a \vee b) \text{ or alternatively}$$

$$p^* \approx ((a \& b) \vee \text{ne } b) \& (a \vee b).$$

Such non-atomic / molecular expressions can be used for substitutions in well-defined environments:

$$\vdash A$$

$$\vdash A[p^*/B], B \text{ is substituted for every occurrence of } p^* \text{ in } A$$

Usually the discussion about (non-)compositionality goes bottom-up. But our picture shows that the discussion makes also sense top-down. In this case the crucial point is not the rule of replacement of equivalences but the rule of substitution. There are many interesting relations between the two cases and Wittgenstein's *non-ne*-game is an inspiring paradigmatic case.

There is a trend in the literature to use compositionality as a criterion to separate semantics (compositional) and pragmatics (non-compositional) from each other. It seems to be the borderline between being INSIDE logic and OUTSIDE logic. This is surely a philosophical thesis. If we accept that we are able to explicate cases of non-compositionality WITHIN well-defined logical systems (here L4) then the distinction between semantics and pragmatics is itself located INSIDE logic. This is in accordance with Wittgenstein's conviction that philosophical misunderstandings are language-dependent and run through the sciences.

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„Patamou“ oder „El poder de la palabra“?

Annelore Mayer, Baden, Austria

„Nirgendwo und nirgendwann fanden oder finden wir den natürlichen Menschen, sondern stets den kulturellen. Von der jeweiligen Kultürllichkeit eines Menschen ist jeweils sein Eigenwert bestimmt.“ (Wimmer 1988, S 148)

Die angesprochene Kultürllichkeit stellt einen wesentlichen Aspekt dar in der unterrichtlichen Vermittlung einer Sprache: Lernende und Lehrende begegnen einander dabei nämlich vor allem in jener, deren Individualität sich in der jeweiligen Muttersprache, aber auch in der besonderen Art von deren Anwendung offenbart. Vermittlung einer fremden Sprache muss daher als eine Form von „Interkultürllichkeit“ zwischen den beteiligten Subjekten angesehen werden. Aus dieser Sicht der Dinge erhebt sich die Frage, ob in der Inbeziehungsetzung der Beteiligten Individualitäten Adäquatheit hergestellt werden kann. Vorweg ist diesbezüglich aus Erfahrung festzustellen, dass diese Adäquatheit dann erreicht wird, wenn die in ihren Muttersprachen unterschiedenen Individuen sich bewusst werden, dass auch und gerade bei der intensivsten Vermittlung und Erlernung jene aller Kommunikation innewohnende „Unschärfe“ (Mayer 2006, S 86-92) relevant wird, sodass die Unterschiedlichkeiten der jeweiligen „Flüsse des Lebens“, in welchen – und nur dort - „die Worte ihre Bedeutung haben“ (Wittgenstein 1984)) mehr denn je zur Evidenz gebracht werden.

Vertreter dreier unterscheidbarer „Kultürllichkeiten“ sind in einem Beispielfall beteiligte Subjekte am unterrichtlichen Prozess „Deutsch als Fremdsprache“: ein Venezolaner, ein Yoruba aus Nigeria und die Vermittlerin, eine Deutsche. Der Herr aus Südamerika bringt – um in der Zielsprache ein Gespräch über Aspekte der Kultur seines Heimatlandes zu initiieren - in den Unterricht einen Text des venezolanischen Schriftstellers Marie-Claude Mattèi-Muller mit, in welchem sich dieser mit einem sprachlich-spirituellen Phänomen, welches beim Volk der Yanomamī von besonderer Bedeutung ist, auseinandersetzt. Die Angehörigen dieser Nation nennen dieses für sie Tatsachencharakter besitzende Phänomen „Patamou“. Entwickelt aus der Vorstellungswelt des Schamanismus verleiht „Patamou“ einem Menschen, der es besitzt, besondere sprachliche Überzeugungskraft, sodass er für Führungs- bzw. Verhandlungsaufgaben besonders geeignet ist. Die Sprache dieses Volkes, deren Eigenbezeichnung „Menschen“ bedeutet, ist eine isolierte und mit keiner anderen verwandt. Der venezolanische Schriftsteller übersetzt das Yanomamī-Wort ins Spanische mit „el poder de la palabra“. Das Unterrichtsgespräch geht von der schamanistischen Tradition des Wortes aus. Diese ist auch dem Yoruba vertraut, dessen Volk trotz Islamisierung bzw. Christianisierung vieles aus der in der ursprünglichen Naturreligion vorhandenen schamanistischen Vorstellungswelt bewahrt hat. Der Vermittlerin ist dieselbe wiederum durch ihre vielen Reisen nach Sibirien und die Begegnung mit dortigen Formen bekannt. Es gibt also eine gewisse „communis opinio“ unter den Beteiligten, dass gewusst wird, worüber hier gesprochen wird. Die Kultürllichkeit der Yanomamī tritt hier aber an alle drei Beteiligten in einer Form heran, die sich auf eine andere als eben diese Yanomamī-Kultürllichkeit bezieht, nämlich die spanische Sprache. Der Schriftsteller geht davon aus, das Wort aus der indianischen Sprache „übersetzt“ zu haben. Dies hieße, dass er gewissermaßen

einen „Fluß des Lebens“ in seiner Weise in einen anderen abgeleitet hätte, wobei beide als solche in ihrer Besonderheit erkennbar bleiben. In der Diskussion zum Thema bekommt aber der Gedanke mehr und mehr Kontur, dass „el poder de la palabra“ keineswegs eine solche „Übersetzung“, sondern vielmehr eine „Umschreibung“ dessen sei, was die Yanomamī darunter verstehen könnten – somit also eigentlich eine „Beschreibung“. Das, was mit dem Ursprungswort „Patamou“ sprachlich zum Ausdruck kommt, bezieht sich nämlich auf das Grundlegende, auf das dem Schamanen von den Geistern offenbarte bzw. an die von ihnen Auserwählten Weitergegebene. Es ist somit in erster Linie Ausdruck einer Offenbarung, welche auf nichts anderem als auf sich selbst beruht. Die Wirkung dieser Offenbarung wird für die Yanomamī erfahrbar in einem Vermögen, welches einem auserwählten Menschen zuteil wird und welches geradezu kausal in Überzeugungskraft, Führungsqualität und Verhandlungserfolg evident wird. Die überlegende Annäherung an dieses Phänomen aus den jeweiligen unterschiedlichen Positionen der an der unterrichtlichen Diskussion Beteiligten musste sich demnach etwas zunutze machen, worauf Thomas von Aquin wie folgt aufmerksam macht: „Die Erkenntnis der Dinge hängt nicht von den Namen, sondern von der Bedeutung der Namen ab.“ (Thomas 2005, S 137) Das bedeutet aber letztlich auch, dass schon das Wort „Patamou“ nichts anderes als ein Rekurs der Yanomamī auf das bis dahin ungenannte Geoffenbarte ist. Es ist ein Rekurs, der sich eines Wortes bedient. Auf die Notwendigkeit einer Wortwerdung weist Arthur Schopenhauer hin, wenn er meint, dass „die Gegenwart durch ein Wort bezeichnet werden muß. Noch mehr so bei Begriffen nicht anschaulicher Eigenschaften die aus vielen Fällen abstrahiert sind deren Wesentliches nie zugleich der Anschauung übergeben werden kann: Gerechtigkeit, Bedingung, Macht u.s.f.. Alle diese Gedanken giengen ohne die Worte ganz verloren.“ (Schopenhauer 1990, S 261) Schopenhauer verweist auch auf die Problematik, der man sich zu stellen hat, wenn man unterschiedliche „Flüsse des Lebens“ ineinanderleiten will. „Wenn wir ein Wort suchen, das unsere Sprache nicht hat: dann haben wir bloß den Begriff und suchen das Zeichen dazu, wobei uns ganz deutlich wird, wie der Begriff völlig verschieden ist sowohl vom Wort, seinem Zeichen, als auch von der anschaulichen Vorstellung: denn bei solchem Suchen nach einem Wort schwebt uns kein Bild oder Phantasma vor, sondern wir haben eben einen abstrakten Begriff, eine Vorstellung ganz eigener Art, die nicht anschaulich ist.“ (Schopenhauer 1990, S 261)

Der angestrebte interkulturelle Dialog, der das Ziel hatte, in einer zu erlernenden Sprache Phänomene aus einer anderen beschreiben zu können, war also eine „Zeichensuche“ und die unterschiedlichen individuellen Ausgangspunkte der beteiligten Subjekte - jene der Herkunft, der religiösen Orientierung und die der jeweiligen Muttersprache mussten auf dieses „Zeichen“ bezogen werden.

Im konkreten Fall wurde die Muttersprache des Venezolaners, das Spanische, eine Grundlage für Weiteres, da er das Thema in den Unterricht eingebracht hatte. Es wurde diskutiert, wie das spanische Hauptwort „poder“ am besten ins Deutsche zu übersetzen sei. Das

Wörterbuch gibt immerhin sieben Möglichkeiten an, nämlich: „Macht“, „Gewalt“, „Kraft“, „Können“, „Fähigkeit“, „Vollmacht“ und „Bedürfnis“. Zur genauen Begriffsbestimmung wurde auch ein französisches und ein lateinisches Wörterbuch herangezogen, um der originalen altrömischen Wurzel und deren Ableitungen nachzuspüren. Als Wurzel wurde „potentia“ mit der Bedeutung „Vermögen“, „Kraft“ und „Wirksamkeit“ angenommen. Am Ende entschied man sich für „Macht“ und „Fähigkeit“ als in diesem Zusammenhang passende deutsche Entsprechung für das spanische Wort „poder“ und stellte dabei fest, wer imstande sei, „patamou“ anzuwenden, der habe vorher dazu innerhalb seiner Gemeinschaft auf Grund von deren Glaubensvorstellungen die Befugnis erhalten und besitze nun Vollmacht. Es ging dabei nicht um authentische Etymologie, sondern um den anhand des Vergleiches von Sprachen mit gleicher Wurzel vorgenommenen Umgang mit scheinbaren Synonymen. (Mayer 2005, S 54)

„Was von einer anderen Kultur angeeignet wird, antwortet auf einen Mangel.“ (Wimmer 1988, S 152) Auseinandersetzung ist als eine besondere Art der Aneignung anzusehen, in deren Verlauf die Grenzen der Positionen des Eigenen und des Fremden evident werden. Auch wenn also jedes der am unterrichtlichen Geschehen beteiligten Subjekte seinen Zugang zu Phänomenen des Schamanismus hatte, so wurde doch allen Dreien bewußt, dass die eigenen Zugänge diesen Mangel zwar aufdecken, aber nicht befriedigen konnten. Diese Bewußtwerdung der Unbefriedigung beruht auf der aller Kommunikation innewohnenden „Unschärfe“.

Das, was zum Ausdruck kommt – im konkreten Falle der Yanomamī also all das, was „Patamou“ ausmacht – ist gemäß Martin Heidegger „Vernehmen im Sein. Sein geschieht nur, sofern es aus dem Verborgenen aufgeht und jemanden an-geht, das heißt: vernommen sein will – sich aber, im Aufgehen, auch zu verbergen sucht und sich entzieht.“ (Heidegger 1989, S 176) Die Betroffenheit durch ein Sein, die nach dem Vernehmen, also dem Wahrnehmen der Realisierung von „Patamou“ verlangt, bewirkt, dass es zu „Geschehen“ kommt und daher auch zu den gegensätzlichen Prozessen des „Vernommen-sein-wollens“ und des „Sich-verbergen-wollens“. Das, was denkerisch und sprachlich erfasst werden will, entzieht sich den Sprechend-denkenden genau in dem Augenblick, in welchem sie, weil sie etwas „an-geht“, dieses bedachte „Etwas“ vernehmbar machen wollen. Das heißt, dass durch die Verbindung von „Sein und Vernehmen“ nun zwar „Geschehen“ – sprachlich nämlich – vorliegt, dass aber die Mechanismen der Gegensätze zwischen dem sich verbergen wollenden Sein und dem Vernehmen auf relevante Art in Gang kommen. Schon auf diese Weise entsteht eine „Unschärfe“ zwischen „Vernehmen“ und „Sein“. Das „Sich-zu-verbergen-suchende“ soll aber sprachlich benannt werden – und zwar nach den Möglichkeiten und Notwendigkeiten einer bestimmten Sprache. „Diese Möglichkeiten erwachsen einer bestimmten, mit dieser Sprache verbundenen Kultur. So kommt es, dass ein bestimmter Begriff in verschiedenen Sprachen verschiedene Bedeutungen hat, auch wenn dasselbe ‚Sein‘ gemeint ist.“ (Mayer 2006, S 86).

So vernehmen wir also in der Sprache wieder eine ganz bestimmte „Kultürlichkeit“, die nur sie und keine andere ist. Die Überführung eines Begriffes aus einer Sprache in eine andere ist demnach eine solche von einem in einen anderen „Fluß des Lebens“, der wiederum selbst „eigenkultürlich“ ist. Ein erkannter Mangel muss mit der daraus entstehenden „Unschärfe“ in Korrespondenz gebracht werden. Das bedeutet am konkreten Beispiel:

schon die spanische Übersetzung des Yanomamī-Begriffes „Patamou“, von welchem die Diskussion ausgegangen ist, macht einerseits einen Mangel im Hinblick auf diesen Begriff und dessen besondere „Kultürlichkeit“ evident. Andererseits offenbart sich dadurch aber auch die „Unschärfe“. Die daraus zu ziehende kommunikative Konsequenz sollte sein, all das, was im hier als Beispiel dienenden Unterrichtsprozess relevant wird, in seiner Subjekthaftigkeit zu begreifen und zu respektieren. Es sind dies alle vorhandenen Kultürlichkeiten, aber ebenso all das, was dieselben in deren Individualität ausmacht: die Sprache, die religiöse bzw. weltanschauliche Orientierung, die Eigenkultur. Lehren und Lernen ist ein Handeln, und ein solches „Handeln erfolgt durch Subjekte, denen es möglich gemacht werden soll, ineinandergreifend zu wirken.“ (Mayer/Mayer 2006, S 108)

Die Bedeutung dieser Sichtweise liegt in dem dadurch möglichen, von der Pädagogik geforderten „Respekt vor dem Subjekt“ (Breinbauer 1982). Dieser ist nur im Kontext mit der Wahrnehmung der Subjekthaftigkeit gerade im interkulturellen Bezug möglich. Im gegebenen Beispiel haben alle drei Beteiligten Subjekte einen Zugang zu Phänomenen des Schamanismus gehabt, aber *nicht der* sollte hier Relevanz gewinnen, es sollte vielmehr im interkulturellen – und das ist also im lernerischen Dialog das zur Anschauung und zur Sprache gebracht werden, was sich für die Yanomamī dahinter verbirgt und im Verbergen Sein geworden ist.

Das Postulat aktueller interkultureller Philosophie, „dass wir Philosophie nur in den Philosophien zu finden vermögen“ (Wimmer 2004, S 32) – und daher mutatis mutandis „das Kultürliche nur in den Kultürlichkeiten“ ist demgegenüber durchaus ein Widerspruch. Der *bestimmte* kultürliche Mensch als er selbst und als kein anderer kann nur in ihm selbst und in keinem anderen gefunden werden. Seine Subjekthaftigkeit ist nicht verallgemeinerbar und nicht relativierbar. Daher ist diese seine unverwechselbare Subjekthaftigkeit als zu respektierende Größe in eben dieser Größe und Unverwechselbarkeit gerade im interkulturellen Gespräch, als welcher Fremdsprachenunterricht unbedingt zu verstehen ist, ins Kalkül zu ziehen. Dies verlangt aber dann auch die Kalkulation mit der „Unschärfe“, welche den Subjekten die eigenen und fremden Grenzen deutlich und daher respektierbar macht.

Die Problematik auf den Punkt bringt ein Witz. Er ist Produkt des Erfahrungsschatzes der in der Diaspora lebenden Juden und bezieht daraus seine aussagekräftige Autorität. Die für Juden im alltäglichen Umgang mit Nichtjuden evident werdende „Unschärfe“ lässt sie mit besonderer Skepsis den Verbindungen der unterschiedlichen „Flüsse des Lebens“ gegenüberstehen.

Aus einer Synagoge wird das für die jüdische Neujahrsliturgie wichtige Schofar, das Widderhorn, gestohlen. Die Sache kommt vor einen nichtjüdischen Richter, der wissen will was denn ein Schofar sei. Der jüdische Zeuge wundert sich über die Frage und meint: „Ein Schofar ist ein Schofar.“ Dieses Wort ist für ihn unübersetzbar. Damit kann aber der Richter nicht zurecht kommen. Nach langem Nachdenken übersetzt der Jude „Schofar“ mit „Trompete“. Der zufriedene Jurist dankt dem Juden, dass er das Wort doch hat übersetzen können. „Aber, Herr Richter“, schränkt jener gleich wieder ein: „Ist denn ein Schofar eine Trompete?“ (Landmann 1963, S 82f).

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On the Limits of Intercultural Argumentation

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1. Arguments and Argumentation Situations

The following definition of an argument might be oversimplifying, but it is sufficient to elaborate my point: An argument consists of one or more theories, which are the premises of the argument and of one theory, which is the conclusion of the argument. The function of the premises is to support the truth of the conclusion. The premises as well as the conclusion are theories, which a person presents as statements, either written or spoken within an act of communication.

Arguments are usually embedded in a communication situation, which involves two persons. According to that, I define an argumentation situation as a communicative situation, which consists of a person who argues and a person, to whom the argument is presented.

2. The Objective Aspects of Argumentation

The Function of Argumentation

According to the common view an argumentation fulfils its function iff one person presents a rational argument to another person, who believes the conclusion of the argument *because of* the argument. In these cases the argumentation situation is ideal. In order to define ideal argumentation situations more precisely, I will firstly define rational arguments and secondly focus my attention on persons who act rationally in argumentation situations.

Rational Arguments

I will use a very simple classification of arguments concerning rationality, which is sufficient to elaborate my thesis:

Definition 1: An argument is rational iff the truth of the premises supports the truth of the conclusion insofar as the conclusion is justified if the premises are justified.

Since epistemology regards justification as the pathway to truth this definition of rational arguments focuses directly on the justification of premises and conclusions and indirectly on their truth.

Objectively Ideal Argumentation Situations

If the actions of persons who are involved in an argumentation situation are rational, depends on the question whether they correspond to the rationality of the argument. The arguing person acts rationally if she argues rationally and the person to whom the argument is presented acts rationally if she believes the conclusion of the presented argument iff the argument is rational. In the following, I will define persons who act rationally in argumentation situations more precisely.

For the arguing person holds:

Definition 2: A person who presents an argument A_i is objectively rational iff firstly every premise of A_i is justified and secondly A_i is a rational argument.

From Definition 1 follows:

If a person presenting an argument A_i is objectively rational, the conclusion of A_i is rational.

For the person to whom the argument is presented holds:

If in an argumentation situation AS a person P_1 presents an argument A_i to a person P_2 it holds:

Definition 3: P_2 is objectively unprejudiced in AS iff it holds: P_2 believes the conclusion of A_i and A_i is the reason for this belief iff firstly every premise of A_i is justified and secondly A_i is a rational argument.

According to this definition a person P_2 is also not objectively unprejudiced if there are different reasons for believing the conclusion of A_i than A_i itself, for example the charming smile of the arguing person.

In the following I will refer to the person who presents an argument in an argumentation situation with " P_1 " and to the person to whom the argument is presented with " P_2 ". Objectively rational persons and objectively unprejudiced persons can be regarded as persons who act appropriately according to the function of argumentation.

An argumentation situation can be regarded as ideal if a person presents a rational argument with justified premises and the person to whom the argument is presented reacts appropriately to it. Hence, it can be defined:

Definition 4: An argumentation situation AS is objectively ideal iff P_1 is objectively rational and P_2 is objectively unprejudiced.

Argumentation situations, which fulfil this definition, are insofar objectively ideal as they guarantee that an argument fulfils its function. An argument has *in fact* to be rational and its premises have *in fact* to be justified to make an argumentation situation objectively ideal. Because of this accordance with the facts the objective aspects of argumentation are concerned.

3. The Subjective Aspects of Argumentation

Persons can have beliefs about the justification of premises and about the rationality of arguments. The belief of a person about argumentations does not entail its truth and the fact that something is the case concerning argumentations does not imply that a person has a corresponding belief. Therefore the objective aspects of argumentation have to be distinguished from the beliefs of a person about argumentation, i.e. from its subjective aspects.

Goals, Beliefs and Coherent Actions

The crucial relation between the goals and actions of a person is that a person has a certain goal and performs a certain action with the purpose of attaining the goal. If the action *in fact* leads to the attained goal, the person is *objectively coherent*.

Persons can also have beliefs about goals and actions. These beliefs can fulfil a specific function for the actions of a person. If a person has a certain goal and believes that she can attain the goal by performing a specific action, the person would act incoherently according to her belief and her goal if she would not perform this action or would perform a different action instead. Hence I define:

Definition 5: If a person P_1 has a goal G_1 and believes that she can attain G_1 by performing the action A_1 , P_1 is subjectively coherent iff P_1 performs A_1 with the purpose of attaining G_1 .

The person is insofar *subjectively* coherent as the person *believes* that the action will lead to the attained goal. A *subjectively* coherent person acts *objectively* coherently iff her belief that the action will lead to the goal is true. Subjectively coherent persons can be regarded as acting to the best of their knowledge.

My thesis is that under normal circumstances persons who have goals act according to their beliefs about how to reach the goals. Hence persons normally are subjectively coherent. Therefore people are not automatically objectively coherent. They are only objectively coherent if their beliefs about how to reach their goals are true.

Objective Coherence in Argumentation Situations

The general theories about goals, beliefs and coherent actions also hold for people who are involved in argumentation situations. The function of argumentations is that one person presents a rational argument whose premises are justified and another person believes the justified conclusion of the argument because of the argument. In an argumentation situation the actions which P_1 performs is to present the argument and the actions which P_2 can perform is to believe the conclusion of the argument. Hence it follows: If P_1 has the goal that the argumentation fulfils its function, P_1 is objectively coherent iff P_1 is objectively rational. If P_2 has the same goal, P_2 is objectively coherent iff P_2 is objectively unprejudiced.

Subjective Coherence in Argumentation Situations

I will next focus on persons in argumentation situations who are subjectively coherent. According to the given definitions this is the case if both persons act according to their beliefs about the rationality of the argument.

Subjective coherence of an arguing person:

Definition 6: P_1 is subjectively rational iff P_1 believes that every premise of A_i is justified and P_1 believes that A_i is a rational argument.

From this definition follows:

If P_1 has the goal that the argumentation situation fulfils its function, P_1 is subjectively coherent iff P_1 is subjectively rational.

Subjective coherence of a Person to whom an argument is presented:

Definition 7: A person P_2 is subjectively unprejudiced iff it holds: P_2 believes the conclusion of A_i because of A_i iff P_2 firstly believes that every premise of A_i is justified and secondly believes that A_i is a rational argument.

From these two definitions follows:

If P_2 has the goal that the argumentation situation fulfils its function, P_2 is subjectively coherent iff P_2 is subjectively unprejudiced.

Subjectively rational persons and subjectively unprejudiced persons can be regarded as persons, who act best to their knowledge in argumentation situations.

From the given definition follows: If the beliefs of a subjectively rational person about the justification of the premises and the rationality of the argument are true, the person is objectively rational. The analogous thesis holds for subjectively unprejudiced persons.

A subjectively rational person and a subjectively unprejudiced person share the same goal of a functioning argumentation situation and act subjectively coherent in respect of this goal. Since these persons have the right goal and act according to their beliefs about how to reach the goal but not necessarily according to the objective facts, such argumentation situations can be regarded as *subjectively* ideal. Hence the following definition can be given:

Definition 8: An argumentation situation AS is subjectively ideal iff P_1 is subjectively rational and P_2 is subjectively unprejudiced.

Persons normally act subjectively coherent. Since persons normally have the goal that an argumentation situation fulfils its function persons in argumentation situations are normally subjectively rational respectively subjectively unprejudiced. Hence, argumentation situations tend to be subjectively ideal.

Theses about the Subjective Aspects of Argumentation

Form the definition of a subjectively ideal argumentation situation it follows: If an argumentation situation is subjectively ideal it holds:

1. P_1 believes that every premise of A_i is justified and that A_i is a rational argument.
2. P_2 believes the conclusion of A_i because of A_i iff P_2 believes that every premise of A_i is justified and that A_i is a rational argument.

From these theories follows the central thesis of my argumentation:

For every subjectively ideal argumentation situation holds: P_2 believes the conclusion of A_i because of A_i iff P_1 and P_2 believe that every premise of A_i is justified and that A_i is a rational argument, i.e. P_1 and P_2 have the same beliefs about the justification of the premises and the rationality of the argument.

If two persons have the goal to act correctly in an argumentation situation, they act to the best of their knowledge if they act according to their beliefs about how to attain this goal. Even under these ideal circumstances the argumentation will only succeed if the persons have the same views about the justification of premises and the rationality of arguments. They will fail if they have different beliefs about justification and rationality. An obvious reason why argumentations can fail is that one of the involved persons is not willing to accept the argument. This thesis shows that the possibility of successful argumentation is also limited if the persons act to the best of their knowledge.

4. Intercultural Argumentation

I will now apply the gained insights to intercultural argumentation. Cultures are groups of persons. An argumentation situation AS is intercultural iff the two persons belong to different cultures.

My view is that the following three theses hold:

1. Within one culture there dominates one view about justification and rationality i.e. typical representatives of one culture have similar beliefs about justification and rationality concerning argumentation.
2. Cultural processes like education by parents, in school or at universities are responsible for the dominating views about justification and rationality within a culture.
3. It is possible that in different cultures different views about justification dominate i.e. it is possible that typical representatives of different cultures have different beliefs about justification and rationality.

I will firstly investigate argumentations within one culture and secondly focus my attention on intercultural argumentations. The central thesis about the subjective aspects of argumentation states that an argumentation in a subjectively ideal argumentation situation is successful iff both persons have the same beliefs about justification and rationality. Furthermore argumentation situations tend to be subjectively rational. The first thesis above states that typical representatives of one culture have similar beliefs about justification and rationality. Hence it follows:

If an argumentation situation is not intercultural, P_1 normally argues successfully in the sense that P_2 believes the conclusion of the argument because of the argument.

The reason why P_1 argues successfully is firstly that P_1 and P_2 act to the best of their knowledge and secondly that P_1 and P_2 have the same beliefs about justification and rationality. The argumentation is successful, no matter whether the argument is *in fact* rational and whether its premises are *in fact* justified. Objective facts are not relevant for the success of argumentations within one culture. If the second thesis is true, cultural respectively educational processes are responsible for it.

For intercultural argumentation holds: If different views about justification and rationality dominate in two cultures, typical members of the two cultures have different beliefs about rationality and justification. If an argumentation situation is subjectively ideal and the two persons act to the best of their knowledge, P_2 believes the conclusion of A_1 because of A_1 iff P_1 and P_2 have the same beliefs about the justification of the premises and about the rationality of the argument. Since argumentation situations tend to be subjectively ideal, it holds:

If an argumentation situation is intercultural, P_1 normally argues successfully in the sense that P_2 believes the conclusion of the argument because of the argument iff in both cultures the same views about justification and rationality dominate.

There are different possibilities, why an intercultural argumentation can fail. One reason is that a person is simply that narrow minded that she does not accept the arguments of a representative of a different culture no matter if she regards the arguments as rational or not. This thesis states that even if both persons act to the best of their knowledge and are willing to accept arguments which are presented in an intercultural argumentation, the argumentation will only succeed if the two cultures share the same concepts about justification and rationality. In this sense the possibilities of intercultural argumentation are limited. Good will and open mindedness is not sufficient.

These consequences are general. Therefore they also hold for representatives of scientifically orientated cultures in which the scientific picture of justification and rationality dominates, i.e. they also hold for *us*. If *we* argue to a person of a different culture or if she argues to us and if we both act to the best of our knowledge we both will only argue successfully if also the other person is a member of a scientifically orientated culture. The fact that we as well as others are open minded and act to the best of our knowledge does not guarantee successful intercultural argumentation.

Wittgenstein, Cavell, and the Fall of Philosophy

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Over the past fifteen years of his interpretive writing, Stanley Cavell has returned on numerous occasions to an articulation of the Emersonian themes of our fall and recovery, themes he finds animating the later years of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophical work. On Cavell's account, the notion of a fall from out of the dynamic and engaged condition of our participation in our cultural discourses and practices, a notion Ralph Waldo Emerson explores in the essays at the heart of his contribution to romanticism, captures a series of dynamics that accompany the manner of descent into philosophy which Wittgenstein carefully describes in his later writings. For Cavell, this striking and, as of his earlier *The Claim of Reason*, rather unanticipated interpretive turn, carries a number of consequences for the proper reading of Wittgenstein's engagement with the philosophical tradition. Wittgenstein's diagnosis of a cycle of collapse into philosophical nonsense offers, for Cavell, a prospect of a return, however fleeting, to the everyday, a return from our avoidance and abandonment, and a turn towards the attunements and criteria of our meaning and understanding. In portraying Emerson and Wittgenstein's analogous projects in philosophy, Cavell strikingly locates in Wittgenstein's work a conception of culture, and of its distinctive philosophical modes of variation, that links Wittgenstein to a broad range of figures writing as it were in the philosophy of culture. Wittgenstein, along with Emerson, diagnoses a pattern of cultural decline and sundering from our meaningful engagement, to which his own work provides a distinctive form of response. Throughout Cavell's discussion, however, neither Emerson's conception of the dynamism of the laws of our intellect, nor Wittgenstein's treatment of the *Weltbild* manifest in our practice, modify the return as Cavell has rendered it. Indeed, both Emerson and Wittgenstein may be able to contribute to a more detailed presentation of the cultural participation to which we return, through their writing, one that reestablishes a layer of engagement between the individual and the universal, that of the *immanence* of engaged participation, which Cavell seeks to describe. As we recover from the fall into philosophy, for Wittgenstein, we return properly not only to criteria but also to a picture of the world from which we have been sundered, one animating our practices, inhabiting our ways of acting, and engaging us with the commitments and beliefs that sustain us.

Cavell's argument for an analogy between Wittgenstein and Emerson conceives of their shared philosophical task as one of restoring their readers to a participation in a common cultural enterprise from which they have fallen, a common to which they are unable otherwise to return. On Cavell's account, the details of this fall and reconstitution concern the loss of engagement in meaningful discourses or practices, primarily evidenced for Emerson in a stagnant culture of conformity, and for Wittgenstein in the emptiness of disengaged assertion that accompanies the degradation of philosophical discourse into nonsense. Cavell sees the alternate sides of this phenomenon registering their presence in a parallel development:

In Emerson's terms, the sides may be called those of self-reliance and conformity; in Wittgenstein's terms, those of the privacy and emptiness of assertion he calls

metaphysical, and the dispersal of this empty assertiveness by what he calls leading words home, his image of thinking (Cavell [1995] 28).

To Cavell, the contrast of static conformity in Emerson's account with the dynamism of self-reliance provides a framework within which to place the moments and movement of Wittgenstein's later work. Wittgenstein, as Cavell renders his writing, draws philosophers away from the disengaged machinations of skepticism or metaphysics, and back towards meaning in a setting of mutual attunement. Both thinkers find their readers adrift from practical or discursive engagement, and fallen into exile.

Wittgenstein's promise of "peace" or "rest" after restlessness is, in his practice, something lost almost as soon as it is found, not a promise that projects a realm of refuge, so his philosophical stance of contradiction and dissatisfaction in effect assumes an independence from whatever world this imperfect one turns out to be (Cavell [2005] 202).

Wittgenstein's treatments of philosophy trace the wrong turnings he finds in the tradition, and directs us onward toward a reengagement, however momentary, in an ordinary that still may be fraught with further philosophical movements. Cavell sees the perspicuity of Wittgenstein's contributions as emanating from a form of engagement that can be representative for the experience of others, enacting himself a process of return from philosophical entanglement in which Wittgenstein stands for humanity itself. Cavell includes himself, along with Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin, and even Emerson, among the practitioners of philosophical autobiography.

Philosophers who proceed as Austin suggests will not be much interested to poll others for their opinion about such crossroads. Then why do such philosophers say "we" instead of "I"? ... Their basis is autobiographical, but they evidently take what they do and say to be representative or exemplary of the human condition as such. ... Can it be seen that each of us is everyone and no one? Emerson famously stakes the oscillation: "I am God in nature; I am a weed by the wall" ("Circles") (Cavell [1994] 8-9).

On Cavell's model, we are drawn back to engagement in the discourses and practices of our culture through the work of a philosophical autobiography that stakes itself in its own engagement rather than an edifying metaphysics. What may seem a hopelessly individual process of confession takes on a universal validity, and draws us to be exemplars of engagement and meaning likewise ourselves. Cavell therefore offers us a return in which we regain individual meaningfulness and the possibility of representative universality.

As his reading of Emerson stands, Cavell at times appears to conflate two understandings of the departure from conformity Emerson often is careful to distinguish. Merely passing over into episodes of enlightenment strikes Emerson as an incomplete, and sometimes perfunctory gesture of recovery from our fall, when what Emerson calls us towards rather is a dynamic alignment with the flow of nature through which our engagement with the discourses and practices of our culture is maintained. Oscillating

between a stagnant conformity and the inspirations of our genius is not yet healing from our fall. From the passage to which Cavell adverts:

Our moods do not believe in each other. To-day I am full of thoughts, and can write what I please. I see no reason why I should not have the same thought, the same power of expression, to-morrow. What I write, whilst I write it, seems the most natural thing in the world; but yesterday I saw a dreary vacuity in this direction in which I now see so much; and a month hence, I doubt not, I shall wonder who he was that wrote so many continuous pages. Alas for this infirm faith, this will not strenuous, this vast ebb of a vast flow! I am God in nature; I am a weed by the wall (Emerson [1983] 406).

This is not healing, and not yet a return, when we are not yet reinserted into a dynamic process of movement toward the call of our genius, or toward the next selves Cavell himself recognizes as lining the Emersonian perfectionist movement of becoming what one is. Instead we oscillate, between stagnation and bursts of illumination, in the manner symptomatic of the 'double consciousness' so endemic among Emerson's transcendentalist contemporaries. Emerson's judgment in "The Transcendentalist" is severe: our healing lies somewhere more sustained than in the momentary flight from dreary conformity that we may seek in bursts of transcendence.

Well, in the space of an hour, probably, I was let down from this height; I was at my old tricks, the selfish member of a selfish society. My life is superficial, takes no root in the deep world; I ask, When shall I die, and be relieved of the responsibility for seeing an Universe which I do not use? I wish to exchange this flash-of-lightning faith for continuous daylight, this fever-glow for a benign climate. These two states of thought diverge every moment, and stand in wild contrast (Emerson [1983] 205).

Emerson suggests, unlike Cavell, that the wavering between weed and God falls somewhere short of a genuine return. Our reconstitution into dynamic engagement with our culture involves the recovery of our alignment with the laws of our intellect, laws that allow us to be the exemplars of new cultural forms such as Emerson praises in "Circles" and elsewhere. In this condition as representatives, we spark a process of cultural creativity through a concrete engagement with and movement among the discourses and practices of our culture. We return, but to a dynamic engagement that is exemplary, a concrete universal.

At the same time as Cavell's account leaves room for a more detailed treatment in Emerson of the laws of our intellect, and their role in our recovery from stagnant conformity, his analogy of return leaves the role of our pictures of the world in the work of Wittgenstein's later period similarly unexplored. For Wittgenstein, by the point of *On Certainty*, a consideration of our *Weltbild* allows us to appreciate the framework of belief and faith whose commitments we reveal in our ways of acting and our engaged participation in inquiry and thought. When pictures of the world accompany our discourse, we can identify these commitments, and even engage in persuading others of elements of this "mythology" (Wittgenstein [1969] 95). When, however, we surrender to our philosophical instincts, the workings of a *Weltbild* begin to withdraw. Wittgenstein detects this loss of an underriding picture of the world in the agitations of philosophical skepticism to which G.E. Moore first attempts his own notorious response.

The propositions presenting what Moore 'knows' are all of such a kind that it is difficult to imagine *why* anyone should believe the contrary. E.g. the proposition that Moore spent his whole life in close proximity to the earth. –Once more I can speak of myself here instead of speaking of Moore. What could induce me to believe the opposite? Either a memory, or having been told [as with Moore and the king]. –Everything that I have seen or heard gives me the conviction that no man has ever been far from the earth. Nothing in my picture of the world speaks in favor of the opposite (Wittgenstein [1969] 93).

As the encounter with this form of philosophical skepticism unfolds, Wittgenstein faults Moore's rendering of his *Weltbild* while at the same time recognizing an identification of its presence at a level distinct from empirical propositions and logical ones. One of the challenges skepticism receives in *On Certainty* is at precisely this level of its operation. For, skepticism in its doubting of our certainties does not manifest faith and certainty, a "*why*" of its own, so much as it withdraws itself from this stage of enactment. As part of what picture of the world does skeptical doubt operate, then, Wittgenstein asks; there is not a skeptic's *Weltbild* as such in *On Certainty* for which we might seek to elicit "conversion" (Wittgenstein [1969] 92). Rather skepticism is an instance of abrogation of this responsibility; skeptics have not undertaken a competing engagement in commitments and certainties alien to our own, and as Wittgenstein remarks the very notion of the "groundlessness of our believing" (Wittgenstein [1969] 166) may itself become what is philosophically alien. For his own part, Wittgenstein struggles to recover Moore's view from a nonsensicality of its own, from fighting nonsense with further nonsense, and to reconstitute "Moore's sense" (Wittgenstein [1969] 371), and "rightly? [*ob mit Recht?*]" (Wittgenstein [1969] 407), in the manner of his response to skepticism. What may be lost in Moore, and what has been lost in the fall into philosophical skepticism, though, leaves us without a picture of the world against which to displace our own: when skepticism becomes just another *Weltbild*, our conversion shall no longer implicate us in a fall into the empty assertiveness that Cavell describes. Until then, a response to philosophical skepticism involves recovery not only of the meaningfulness of our discourse as Cavell indicates, but also of our commitment to "an ungrounded way of acting" (Wittgenstein [1969] 110) that manifests itself in our practice. Has, at last, Wittgenstein been representative in his work in connection with skepticism: where Cavell locates a new picture of our abandonment from criteria emerging in Wittgenstein's project more generally, perhaps in connection with Moore a picture of the role of groundless engagement comes into view in ways that inform the treatment of both the skeptic and of Moore himself. Wittgenstein offers a broader picture of philosophical assessment than Cavell appears to register, and perhaps traces a new circle, beyond even that of the laws of Emersonian genius, with which to contribute to philosophy a new conception of its task.

In closing, Cavell introduces a suggestive analogy between Wittgenstein and Emerson to emphasize an attentiveness to processes of cultural decline their various philosophical writings appear to share. The fall in Emerson, to conformity and a perfunctory transcendence, and in Wittgenstein, to a disengagement from discursive practices and endemic philosophical nonsensicality, may reveal further richness than Cavell details. The accounts of return to the common they provide, though, bring to focus the role of engaged forms of participation in a common

culture in which laws of the intellect and pictures of the world liminally emerge. A return to the common is also a return to engagement with a dynamic unfolding of cultural practices and discourses. While Emerson figures this unfolding as the activity of genius latent in our nature, for Wittgenstein our engagements manifest ways of acting that, if not romantic in their composition and character, nonetheless circulate in the currents of cultural participation that we are able immanently to sustain.

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Rorty, Wittgenstein, and the 'dialogue among civilizations'

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1. Introduction

Pursuing its proclamation (GA 1998) of the year 2001 as the United Nations Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations, the UN General Assembly, in its session of November 8-9, 2001, fixed the agenda for this dialogue (GA 2001). Article 5 of this agenda states that this dialogue shall be open to all, including among others, scholars, thinkers, intellectuals, and writers, who "play an instrumental role in (its) initiation and sustainment".

A part from the preliminary objection that the assumption of an instrumental role would compromise their independence, philosophers might more in particular object to such a role because the call for dialogue owes its urgency to the alarming prospect of, and—as it appears in the meeting records of the GA—the desire to avert a 'clash of civilizations'. Huntington (1993 22, 39) has announced such a clash as the 'battle lines of the future' and as the cause of the "next world war, if there is one (...)". For, if the dismissal of Huntington's analysis by many UN-delegations reflects a resolute optimism, a more austere way of challenging it would be to ask why other civilizations, that "have been around for centuries" are "posing a challenge only now" (Mahbubani 1993 14).

Mahbubani's (1993 14) assertion that a sincere attempt to answer this question would reveal an "inability to conceive that the West (has) developed structural weaknesses in its core value systems and institutions" supplies it with a somewhat polemic flavour. As it stands, though, this question could provoke a philosophical reluctance to participate in the dialogue, given the moral universalism, which is implicit in its objective to "develop a better understanding of common ethical standards and universal human values" (GA 2001 art. 2). The more so if such participation would involve one to subscribe to the strategy Huntington (1993 49) proposes, namely to "exploit differences and conflicts among Confucian and Islamic states" and "strengthen international institutions that reflect and legitimate Western interests and values".

The explicit inclusion of thinkers, attributing an instrumental role to them, touches on the self-understanding philosophers, in contrast with other reflective people, might have of their involvement in this dialogue. In this paper, which is intended as an exercise in empirical philosophy, I will give an account of such a self-understanding by comparing constructs of two different philosophical positions concerning the 'dialogue among civilizations' along Wittgensteinian and Rortian lines respectively (section 0). By 'philosophical' position I will understand: a position, which is coherent with relevant philosophical ideas of the philosopher to whom that position is ascribed. That Rorty (1989 15, 21-22; 44-45) develops his position in approval of Wittgenstein's ideas about the contingency of language and of community helps to articulate the differences between these constructs. The paper ends with some concluding remarks (section 0).

2. Philosophical positions in the 'dialogue among civilizations'

Rorty (1996) argues for it to be self-deceptive or hypocritical to speak of a universal moral community encompassing the human species, in the name of which the UN generally could act. By implication, a Rortian position would be critical at the UN's role to help to "unfold shared meaning and core values", as the dialogue among civilizations is intended to accomplish (GA 2001).

By calling his argument 'philosophical', Rorty suggests that he would envisage his role in the dialogue as not merely instrumental. However, a part from claiming that he is—unlike Huntington—neither "trying to make predictions", nor "offering recommendations for action", he does not clarify why this should be so, nor what he understands by a philosophical argument, other than by stipulating that his argument operates with premises that are connected with the philosophical tradition. This connection consists therein that the first premise "that the primordial philosophical question is not 'What are we?' but 'Who are we?'" is meant as a pragmatist revision of the Kantian "What is Man?".

Rorty calls the latter question scientific and metaphysical, the former, by contrast, political. This is because UN's ability to act in name of this community, which Rorty defines, in his second premise, as a community of reciprocal trust of the peoples that belong to it—as the phrase "We, the peoples of the united nations" in the UN Charter's preamble suggests—depends, according to its third premise, on its ability to help underprivileged peoples and thus "on an ability to believe—in a pragmatic, Peircian sense—that we can avoid economic triage". Rorty denies the UN this ability.

However, despite its connection with the philosophical tradition, Rorty's argument rather is an attempt to answer the political question "Who are we?" in a morally significant way, than that it can serve as a starting point to construct a philosophical position concerning the 'dialogue among cultures'. As such, his dealing with the UN-vocabulary fits his strategy of persuasion that consist in not to provide arguments, in order to avoid using this vocabulary himself (Rorty 1989 8), but to suggest redescriptions that make the vocabulary in which objections to his position are phrased "look bad" (44). This strategy goes along with his "abjuration of philosophical neutrality in the interest of political liberalism" (55). Thus, "We, the people..." is *quasi* redescribed as: "We liberals" (64), referring to the members of an utopian culture of liberalism in which "no trace of divinity remain(s)" (45). The chief virtue of these members is the recognition of the contingency of their own consciences and yet remain faithful to those consciences (46). Their "thoroughly Wittgensteinian (...) approach to language, would be to de-divinize the world" (21).

What would Wittgenstein hold of such de-divinization? Using Wittgensteinian idiom, one could say that the 'common objective elements' such as language, history, religion, customs and institutions, and the subjective self-identification of people, by which Huntington (1993 24) defines 'civilization' are internally

related in a world-picture. This I do not have because I am satisfied of its correctness; it rather contains no indication of its incorrectness (Wittgenstein 1969 93). Nor do I get it by satisfying myself of its correctness; it rather is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false (94); the substrate and the tacit groundwork of all research and assertions (162, 167). As a corollary to Wittgenstein's stipulating the facticity of a language game (559) he observes that "the propositions, describing a world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology". They have a practical function like rules of a game, which "can be learned purely practically" (95). If a 'we' asserts its certainty, this does not mean that every individual is certain of it, but that "we belong to a community which is bound together by science and education" (298).

Wittgenstein attributes Frazer's inability to understand religious practices to his lack of sensibility for the distance between unbelief and belief (Phillips 1996 202). Unlike Freud, who, seeking acceptable (cf. Wittgenstein 1967a 18) psychological explanations, calls approaches like Frazer's too rational, neglecting the emotional character [Gefühlscharakter] of the things that are to be explained (Freud 2000 395), Wittgenstein (1967 235) argues philosophically that religious customs of a people are not delusions. This is because, whereas the recognition of a delusion on which a non-religious custom is based is a sufficient reason for abandoning it, this is not the case for religious customs. Wittgenstein (1967 238) calls Frazer's explanations misleading as they neglect our ability to invent such customs. This indicates, in his view, that they answer to a more general principle, which is present in our soul, than Frazer realizes. Moreover, Frazer's explanations could not be acceptable if those customs would, eventually, not appeal to an inclination in ourselves.

In view of Wittgenstein's descriptive and imaginative approach of religious practices that are embedded in world-pictures, his criticism of Frazer's anthropological rendering of mythical and religious representations and customs as delusions (Wittgenstein 1967 234) is well understandable. As is his strong language in this context, reproaching Frazer to be, in his narrow mindedness, incapable to understand another life as the English life of his time (238). In the same spirit Phillips (1996 201ff.) argues that the tendency in Anglo-American philosophical culture to assess the distance between belief and unbelief in terms of a contradiction that can be settled by argument is an impediment to grasping the import of Wittgenstein's phrase, that "religion as madness is a madness springing from irreligiousness" (Wittgenstein 1980 13), which, in his view, refers to a lack of sensibility concerning the character of religious belief, and is not an admonition to become religious (Phillips 1996 215).

Rorty's project of a de-divinization of culture appears to be vulnerable to a similar criticism, when Arriaga (2005 468) calls Rorty's "distinctive stance as postmodernist" (...) "unashamedly ethnocentric, in a manner that most postmodernists would rather avoid". Such criticism prompts the question how we can interpret Rorty's discussion with the philosophical tradition and his approval of Wittgenstein's ideas about the contingency of community otherwise than as a way of saying how he wants us to see them (cf. Wittgenstein 1967a 27).

I would propose to answer this question by playing off Rorty's appreciation of this contingency against Wittgenstein's remark about a possible demonstrably historical falsity of the Gospels. In, what looks like a referral to Kant, Wittgenstein (1980 32) says that such

falsity would in no way impair belief, not because it has something to do with 'universal truths of reason', but because the certainty of the holding for true of the Gospels is "seized on by men believingly (i.e. lovingly)". The same would hold for other Holy Scriptures, which people believe. Kant (1795 367), conversely, denies a variety of religions, assuming the existence of one universal religion, while acknowledging the historical contingency of Holy Scriptures.

In keeping track with the philosophical antecedents of Rorty's position, we can say that Rorty (1989 192, 193) adopts his strategy to advance his project of "disengag(ing) 'human solidarity' (...) from what has often been thought of as its 'philosophical presuppositions'", of which Kant's universalistic 'rational respect' is a major one. Another such presupposition is Kant's (1795 367) assumption that the combination of universal religion and a variety of languages and Scriptures forms the cause for both war and, in a flourishing of culture, peace. This foreshadows the universalistic optimism about the progressive force of a dialogue among cultures, which is expressed in the relevant UN-documents.

Unlike Wittgenstein's detached analysis of religious practice, Rorty's assumption about a necessary connection of 'absolute validity' with Kantian dualisms amounts, despite his strategy of redescribing traditional dichotomies, to a 'residual Kantianism' (cf. Rorty 1989 35) in his assessment of the contingency of (religious) community. For, if recognizing this contingency entails, in Rorty's view, a rejection of the notion of 'absolute validity', this is because Rorty thinks that such notion presupposes a, let us say, Kantian division of a divine and an animal part of self (47), and an, again Kantian, distinction between reasons for belief and causes for belief which are not reasons (48). Rorty's elucidation of what he understands by contingency, is thus entrenched in a Kantian idiom.

Contrarily, Wittgenstein's (1980 86 in: Phillips 1996 206) recognition of the 'absolute validity' of religious belief in the sense of its immunity for contra-evidence coincides with his insight that "life can force this concept (of God) on us". It does so without involving a fissure between the public and the private aspects of religious belief, which is characteristic of Rorty's (1989 xv) liberal ironist. For the mythological and practical aspects of a world-picture correspond with the elements of absoluteness (cf. Wittgenstein's (1965 12) mentioning the desire to say something about the absolute good) and unreflectiveness that Thomas (2001 4ff.) distinguishes in religious belief. Unreflectiveness is connected with the perspective element, i.e. that it provides a perspective on the whole of life.

For this reason, a Wittgensteinian position can be construed that is more radically distant from Kant's, than Rorty's and, consequently, from religious and moral universalism, than a construction of a Rortian position would allow us to do.

3. Concluding remarks

In Armstrong's (2000 370-371) analysis, religious fundamentalism, which often has evolved in a "dialectical relationship with an aggressive secularism which showed scant respect for religion and its adherents", is a form of self-identification with a pre-modern conservative world; an attempt to re-sacralize society in order to "fill the void at the heart of a society based on scientific rationalism". Following this analysis, the 'dialogue among civilizations' is

likely to benefit more from an imaginative Wittgensteinian, than from a de-divinizing Rortian position.

However, if religious communities set out to give reasons for their beliefs, for instance in a tendency to bring the meaning of the Qur'ān into harmony with the modern discoveries of the natural sciences (Abū Zayd 2004 54) or conversely, to bring Darwinism into harmony with the Bible (cf. Kitzmiller vs. Dover), they enter in the seemingly ludicrous (Wittgenstein 1967a 58) game of seeking evidence. Since "this would in fact destroy the whole business" (56), they could then no longer be met by the imaginative sensibility of a Wittgensteinian position.

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Reservations to Human Rights Treaties – Tribute to Religious and Cultural Diversity or Undermining of Universality?

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The question of reservations to human rights treaties is a delicate issue in international law – in view of its complexity as well as its implications. Far from intending to elaborate on such highly juridical subject in a philosophical context, this very issue affords, however, remarkable lessons on the topic of intercultural dialog, its potential and limits. It will be argued that the stance one takes on reservations to human rights instruments, aiming at preserving religious and cultural diversity, is symptomatic of one's approach to basic questions like the legitimate claims of religious/cultural traditions as normative fundament of human societies, the existence of supra-cultural, universal values superposing them, as well as the ways in which to identify or agree on them. Furthermore, the setting in which this specific kind of intercultural dialog takes place is representative in a double sense: On the *extensional* level, the community of states virtually covers all of humanity and, on the *intensional* one, the state is, if not the only, still the most prominent collective entity in bundling, articulating and representing the normative attitudes of larger populations on a global level.

The rapid rise in the number of states in the 20th century posed a considerable problem to the exclusive club of so-called "civilized nations" which had dominated modern international law from its outset. In the wake of World War II, the intensifying production of human rights instruments found broad support within the international community. However, the "old guard" was soon confronted with increasingly self-confident "greenhorns" referring to, and insisting on, their specific historical/cultural/religious background, which often considerably differed from the "western" normative heritage.

In order not to leave it with isolated protest and insular proposals, certain groups of nations agreed on articulating their genuine approach to human rights in an explicit and consistent manner. Among the major results, one must point at the *Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights* of 1981, stressing the "historical tradition [of the African States] and the values of African civilization" (preamble) which materialize in a particular emphasis on human duties and peoples' rights as a major complement, and corrective, to classical individualistic human rights. Furthermore, the privately sponsored *Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights* of 1981, but especially the 1990 *Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam* as adopted by the Member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference deserve mention. The latter's preamble underlines "the civilizing and historical role of the Islamic Ummah which God made the best nation that has given mankind a universal and well-balanced civilization" and that "fundamental rights and universal freedoms in Islam are an integral part of the Islamic religion", while insisting that all those rights and freedoms "are subject to the Islamic Shari'ah" which is "the only source of reference for the explanation or clarification to any of the articles in this Declaration" (art. 24f.).

The relationship between different concepts of human rights as a primarily theoretical problem on the level of general declarations was soon to become a real conflict of interests in the concrete case: One of the well-

known examples here is the 1979 *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women* which was ratified by some 180 states. When joining the convention, many Muslim nations made material reservations to it, most of them construed in very general terms and globally referring to the "provisions of the Islamic Shari'a law" and their constitutions (see e.g. the pertinent reservations of Malaysia and Saudi Arabia). In case of a collision between those norms and the requirements of the convention, the former should prevail. This approach was openly criticized by numerous Western states, explicitly objecting to these types of reservations and declaring them inadmissible, thus raising the question what the applicable provisions of international law should be, taking into account the concerned states' incompatible views on the matter.

The current legal regime of reservations to international treaties

According to art. 2 (1) d of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VC), reservation "means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State [...] whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State". Reservations are a well proven instrument for broadening the consensual basis of an international treaty. The possibility for a state to articulate a "tailor-made" consent, in virtue of which it can dispose itself of certain unwanted obligations, raises the chance that wavering members of the international community eventually support a draft, while they would boycott the project as a whole if confronted with an "all-or-nothing" alternative.

At the same time, however, the system of reservations tends to create a high degree of complexity with regard to the legal regime applicable to the parties to a convention as each of them potentially takes part in its peculiar way. This is further complicated by the fact that the other parties may either (explicitly or tacitly) accept or object to a reservation (art. 20-23 VC), as the *consensus principle* (which is at the very heart of the institution of reservations and which allows to subject a sovereign state only to the norms it has agreed to beforehand) must consistently also be applied to the states confronted with another's reservation. Depending on whether they approve of it or not, the provisions affected by the reservation can or cannot become effective between the states concerned. Hence, the regime of reservations leads to a *bilateralization* of the rights and duties among the parties to an international treaty, thus transforming it into a bundle of concurring bilateral relations within the framework of one single legal instrument.

The challenge of reservations to human rights treaties

Apart from the complexity just described, the regime of reservations as established by the VC holds another, far more serious risk. Its very logic is based on the principle of

reciprocity. Hence, a state which excludes or weakens a duty arising from a treaty by formulating a reservation must be well aware that the other states might react analogically and thus deprive it of the advantage it would have obtained from their compliance with the duty. Therefore, the sanction mechanism inherent to the principle of reciprocity can motivate states to opt for a general adherence to treaty obligations, for egotistic reasons mainly.

However, this logic is primarily valid for *contractual treaties* which are based on the competing interests of the parties involved, while in case of so-called *law-making treaties* which pursue a common goal, it can trigger detrimental dynamics. There, reciprocity does not lead to stabilization of mutual obligations, but rather to “normative dumping” as the stepping back of one state and the corresponding reaction of the other do not so much harm themselves, but the common goal. With respect to human rights conventions which belong to the second group, this means, paradoxically enough, that a state’s objection to the reservation of another (lowering the human rights standard as set out in the respective treaty) results in the non-applicability of the whole provision between the states concerned and thus in a reduction of the international protection standard in both states to the detriment of the individuals for whose sake the treaty was established.

It was this problem that led the International Court of Justice in its 1951 Advisory Opinion on *Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* to the conclusion that reservations might potentially endanger a treaty as such and thus, that reservations incompatible with its “object and purpose” could not be considered admissible. However, it held that it is up to every state “individually and from its own standpoint” to qualify a reservation in the light of this criterion. The rule of inadmissibility of reservations incompatible with a treaty’s object and purpose, enjoying universal recognition nowadays, was codified in art. 19 VC. The question of how to apply the criterion concretely is still subject of a passionate debate, though. Some insist on the privileged role of each state as *iudex in sua causa*, while others call for a uniform decision binding on all state parties, which either recognizes a reservation as valid or, in the opposite case, declares it null and void.

The CRC as an example

The 1989 *Convention on the Rights of the Child* (CRC) seems to be a particularly promising example for the purposes of this paper, for two reasons: On the one hand, as many as 190 states have ratified or acceded to it, thus making it the globally most widely accepted human rights convention (with the striking exception of the US though). On the other hand, and a major reason for this broad consensus, the issue of children’s rights is – from a cultural/religious background – not so controversial as the rights of women or homosexuals, for instance, and thus permits a “de-emotionalized” approach to the question of reservations. Due to the limited space available, we will content ourselves with an examination of the Shari’a-inspired reservations as they are the most prominent and relevant ones in this context.

When joining the CRC, several Muslim states opted for non-specific reservations globally subjecting the convention’s provisions to the exigencies, and limitations, of Islamic Shari’a (see e.g. the reservations of Afghanistan, Brunei Darussalam, Iran, Qatar and Saudi Arabia). Other states made an effort to specify the CRC articles they

intended to deviate from – duly taking into account abovementioned art. 2 CV which speaks of reservations to “certain provisions”. In this context, Algeria, Indonesia, Iraq, Morocco, Syria and the UAE made, *inter alia*, explicit reservations to art. 14 (1) CRC stating that “State Parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion”, particularly insofar this right was not compatible with Islamic law’s rules on change of religion.

A whole series of European countries, namely Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia and Sweden, deposited similarly phrased objections to some reservations (mainly those of Brunei Darussalam, Iran, Malaysia, Qatar and Saudi Arabia) primarily criticizing their “unlimited scope and undefined character”. Above all, they expressed the fear that “reservations of such comprehensive nature may contribute to undermining the basis of international human rights treaties”. Hence, they considered those reservations to be incompatible with the object and purpose of the convention (according to art. 19 VC and art. 51 CRC) and thus inadmissible and without effect under international law.

Strikingly, hardly any objection was placed in view of the numerous reservations to art. 14 (1) CRC. Furthermore, the reservations to art. 21 CRC which establishes human rights guarantees with regard to adoption were not objected to at all, even though almost ten states (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Maldives, Oman, Syria, United Arab Emirates) explicitly denied the applicability of this provision. This is mainly due to the fact that the CRC itself provides for the possibility of a so-called *opting out* (“State Parties that recognize and/or permit the system of adoption shall ensure ...”) which permits a state not accepting the legal institution of adoption (see e.g. Qur’an, al-Ahzab [33:4f.]) to exempt itself of the respective provisions of the treaty.

Handling reservations to human rights treaties as forum of intercultural dialog

The example given is symptomatic of the broadly felt tension between the universal claim of human rights and the concurring pretensions of religious and cultural traditions (exemplified here by the tradition of Islamic law). Depending on which side of the alternative one might favor, the need to “pay tribute” to religious/cultural diversity is experienced ambiguously. While some (in the phrase’s literal meaning) primarily identify the factual necessity to arrange themselves with *particularist* normative traditions, i.e. to buy themselves off in order to obtain (part of) the liberties they strive for, others call for *particular* cultural/religious traditions to be genuinely honored and taken into account in their richness and wisdom.

At the same time, it may indicate ways out of this *normative dichotomy* by offering a more differentiated approach towards particular traditions’ “right to exist” in the cosmos of human rights and, vice versa, the legitimate claim of universal rights beyond and, if necessary, against particularist normative reasoning. The doctrine of international law, and in particular the handling of reservations to human rights treaties, can teach important lessons on how to appropriately bring together the concurring interests at stake. If a state relies on its religious/cultural traditions to justify the limited or diluted accession to a human rights instrument, its individual concerns have to be counterbalanced with the *bonum commune* materialized in the convention. This is what the

legal jargon calls its “objective and purpose” and a state submits to it by the very act of acceding to a treaty. The decisive question is who is entitled to identify the common interest and what procedure is to be applied in doing that.

One of the most prominent places to find out about a treaty’s goals and purposes is the preamble which regularly gives an insight into the basic values constituting the normative fundament of the legal text. Often, it presents itself as a sort of anticipated balancing of interests indicating the legitimate principles to be taken into consideration in applying the convention and judging the reservations made to it. In the context of the CRC, for instance, the preamble explicitly refers to the “importance of the traditions and cultural values of each people”. However, it takes a *conditional* approach by aligning the elements of tradition with the higher purpose of “protection and harmonious development of the child”.

From this background, one can derive a responsibility of the participating states to explain and justify religion-/culture-specific reservations in the light of the objectives of the convention. This particularly includes an attitude of austerity towards reservations of general and undefined character. In order to allow to effectively examine a reservation’s compatibility with the basic goals of a treaty, it must be clear and comprehensible which provisions (and to what extent) are not considered acceptable from the point of view of a specific normative tradition. Furthermore, the “burden of justification” will be the heavier, the more basic is the human right affected by the envisaged reservation.

On the procedural level, one should not limit one’s imagination to the dichotomy of purely *horizontal* (i.e. leaving it to every state to decide individually on the legitimacy of a reservation) and *vertical* qualification mechanisms (through a centralized convention organ entitled to authoritatively decide on reservations and objections like the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg for the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights). There exist different models of joint decision making, combining *quantitative* (simple/qualified majority requirements for overriding a reservation) and *qualitative* elements (e.g. formation of state groups representing certain cultural/religious traditions involved as such in the decision process), which have in common, however, that they always bear on a collective element, dismissing the solipsism of unilateral definitions of the *bonum commune*. This is and must be a common task and duty.

Bearing that in mind, the handling of religion-/culture-based reservations to human rights treaties might present a remarkable, albeit limited, instance of “dialog of civilizations” so widely discussed, but so rarely experienced at present. It has to be openly admitted, however, that it starts from a particular, not self-evident “pre-understanding” of dialog insofar as it accepts human rights as shared normative fundament for the encounter and exchange of cultural/religious traditions and thus dismisses concepts of absolute cultural pluralism. Without entering the vivid theoretical debate on the question, this approach can bear on the respectable common denominator of the major cultural/religious traditions with regard to basic entitlements of the human person and the principal consensus on the notion of human rights as meta-cultural values among virtually all international actors.

Accepting human rights as basis of dialog between particular normative systems does not necessarily mean to fall into the trap of euro-, occidendo- or ethnocentrism. Taking seriously the distinction between *genesis* and *justification* of human rights, their origin in one tradition’s bosom does not principally disqualify it in the eyes of the others. The decisive question is how to afford the real and substantial possibility to effectively participate and contribute in the continuous definition process of *concept* and *content* of the shared basic values, by virtue of transparent and fair decision mechanisms. This specifically includes the definition on what every single actor has to accept as a universal rule and where it is feasible, if not necessary to embed the human rights heritage in a specific religious/cultural framework.

With regard to contextualization of human rights, reservations can play a central role as they permit the adaptation of a state’s commitment to human rights to its specific situation. They must, however, pay due respect to the jointly defined “demarcation line”, branding the transition from adaptation to undermining of human rights. Intelligent and differentiated reservation regimes can at the same time be flexible to the needs and concerns of religious/cultural traditions while safeguarding the quintessence of human rights (see e.g. the opting-out-clause of art. 21 CRC already anticipating and embracing the cultural/religious *particularité* of Muslim states in that respect). And, not to be forgotten, they can motivate states otherwise hostile to a treaty project to eventually submit to it and thus gain more for the human rights idea than a “head-against-the-wall”-approach.

Beyond the dystopia of “clash of civilizations” and the utopia of *per se* compatibility of all cultures and religions, human rights as common denominator and regulative for intercultural dialog remains one of the most realistic and promising concepts for fruitful, but first of all peaceful, encounter of different normative systems. In the effort to urge the states, as the main international actors, to continuously work on articulating and agreeing upon their shared normative fundament in human rights instruments, reservations perform an important task in permitting flexible, but not perverting translation of human rights into different religious and cultural contexts. The success of this technique must be evaluated with regard to what extent it is able to achieve, and maintain, a principally *universal* level of participation while simultaneously safeguarding the *integrity* of the human rights heritage.

Über „Aspektsehen“ und dessen enge Verwandtschaft mit dem „Erleben der Bedeutung eines Wortes“

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1. Aspektsehen

Bei den Fällen von Aspektsehen, die Wittgenstein in den PU II xi bespricht, handelt es sich um eine Menge zwar alltäglicher aber doch widersprüchlicher Seherfahrungen. Das erste Beispiel von vielen ist das Bemerkten der Ähnlichkeit zweier Gesichter: „Ich betrachte ein Gesicht, auf einmal bemerke ich seine Ähnlichkeit mit einem anderen. Ich sehe, daß es sich nicht geändert hat; und sehe es doch anders.“ (518 c).¹ Diese Erfahrung, das Betrachtete auf eine neue Art und Weise zu sehen, sich zugleich aber dessen physischer Unverändertheit sicher zu sein, nennt Wittgenstein >das Bemerkten eines Aspekts<.

Die Art und Weise, wie der Betrachtende über seine Wahrnehmung Auskunft gibt, ändert sich mit dem Aspektbemerken. Wo er erst sagte „Ich sehe *dies*“ sagt er nun „Ich sehe *dies als jenes*“ (520 e – 521 c). Wittgenstein spricht daher auch vom >Sehen als<. So kann z.B. das so genannte Würfelschema u.a. als Glaswürfel oder als Drahtgestell gesehen werden (518 f). Ähnlich verhält es sich mit dem berühmten Hasen-Enten-Kopf – einer Strichzeichnung, die sowohl als Darstellung eines Hasen als auch einer Ente gesehen werden kann (519 b). Aber auch hier wird es sich erst dann um ein >Sehen als< handeln, wenn der Betrachtende in der Zeichnung zuerst z.B. *eine* Ente sah und später in derselben *einen* Hasen. Dann erst würde er sagen, er sähe es jetzt *als* Hasen und sah es früher *als* Ente. Diese >Aspektwechsel< können durchaus immer wieder geschehen, und stets ist ihr Ausdruck der einer neuen Wahrnehmung *zugleich* mit einer unveränderten (522 e).

Außerdem, so stellt Wittgenstein weiter fest, wird der Betrachtende des *neuen* Aspekts für gewöhnlich ganz unvorbereitet und plötzlich gewahr: Mit einem Schlag sieht alles anders aus. Wittgenstein spricht deshalb auch vom >Aufleuchten eines Aspekts< (520 a).

Zusammengefasst bedeutet dies, dass uns beim Aspektbemerken stets zweierlei zugleich auffällt: einerseits der neue zuvor nicht gesehene Aspekt und andererseits die Möglichkeit, hier überhaupt mehrere Aspekte zu sehen. Wittgenstein unterscheidet beides, indem er manchmal von *einem* Aspekt< und dann wieder von *dem* Aspekt< spricht. Wir wollen stattdessen zur leichteren Unterscheidung sagen, uns falle einerseits *ein* (neuer) *Aspekt* auf und andererseits aber auch die *Aspektartigkeit* des Betrachteten selbst.

2. Aspekt und Aspektartigkeit

Es drängen sich nun anhand dieser Unterscheidung von Aspekt und Aspektartigkeit drei begriffliche Fragen auf, von denen Wittgenstein zwei explizit behandelt. Erstens: Welches sind die Bedingungen dafür, gerade einen *bestimmten* Aspekt zu sehen? Zweitens: Wie hängen Aspekt und Aspektartigkeit zusammen? Drittens: Was hat es mit der Aspektartigkeit selbst auf sich?

Die erste Frage, welche Bedingungen zum Sehen eines *bestimmten* Aspekts zu erfüllen sind, bzw. welches die Kriterien Dritter dafür sind, dass Einer ein solches Seherlebnis hat, beantwortet Wittgenstein in der so genannten Substrat-Bemerkung (554 a; siehe Scholz 1995, 219). Dort heißt es, man würde nur dann von Einem sagen, er sähe etwas gerade so, wenn er „*imstande ist*, mit Geläufigkeit gewisse Anwendungen [...] zu machen“. „Das Substrat dieses Erlebnisses“, so heißt es weiter, „ist das Beherrschen einer Technik“. D.h. von den gelernten Techniken ist es abhängig, als was Einer etwas sehen kann. Und die richtigen Anwendungen der jeweiligen Technik überzeugen Dritte davon, dass Einer tatsächlich gerade auf eine bestimmte Weise sieht.

Mit der zweiten Frage, wie Aspekt und Aspektartigkeit miteinander verknüpft sind, beschäftigt sich Wittgenstein dort, wo er danach fragt, ob wir uns jemanden vorstellen können, der zwar einen neuen Aspekt sieht, dem jedoch die Aspektartigkeit des Betrachteten entginge. Wittgenstein nennt so jemanden >aspektblind< (551 f). Ein Aspektblinder „soll die Aspekte [...] nicht wechseln sehen“ (551 f). Er würde zwar die verschiedenen Aspekte sehen können, aber sie würden „für ihn nicht von einem [...] in den anderen überspringen“ (552 a). Der Aspektblinde beherrschte also zwar die Techniken, von denen in der Substrat-Bemerkung gesprochen wird, und er könnte daher – dem Urteil Dritter gemäß – sehr wohl etwas als *etwas* sehen, aber er sähe es eben nicht *als* etwas. Er selbst würde dies auch nie sagen und verstünde es auch nicht. Aufgrund der ihm entgehenden Aspektartigkeit würde er, wie Wittgenstein hinzufügt, „zu Bildern überhaupt ein anderes Verhältnis haben als wir“ (552 a).

Ob Aspektblindheit nun tatsächlich vorstellbar sei oder nicht, stellt Wittgenstein nicht fest. Gleichfalls geht er nirgends explizit auf die dritte hier gestellte Frage ein, was es denn mit der Aspektartigkeit selbst auf sich habe. Stattdessen jedoch deutet Wittgenstein überraschend eine Verbindung des >Aspektsehens< mit einem ganz anderen Begriff an: mit dem >Erleben der Bedeutung eines Wortes<.

Ich werde nun zeigen, wie die von Wittgenstein angedeutete Nähe der beiden Begriffe zur Erhellung nicht nur der offenen Frage beiträgt.

3. >Erleben der Bedeutung eines Wortes< bzw. Bedeutung und Bedeutungsartigkeit

Die Wichtigkeit der Nähe von >Aspektsehen< und >Bedeutungserleben< für die gesamte Untersuchung von PU II xi hebt Wittgenstein an zwei Stellen besonders deutlich hervor. An der ersten behandelt er ein Schriftzeichen, von dem er schließlich sagt, man könne es auf ganz unterschiedliche Weise sehen, je nachdem mit welcher „Erdichtung“ man es umgebe. Und hierbei, fügt er hinzu, bestünde „enge Verwandtschaft mit dem >Erleben der Bedeutung eines Wortes<“ (546 d). An der zweiten Stelle heißt es von der >Aspektblindheit<, dass die „Wichtigkeit dieses Begriffes [...] in dem Zusammenhang der Begriffe >Sehen des Aspekts< und >Erleben der Bedeutung eines Wortes<“ läge (553 a).

¹ Zitierweise: („Seitenzahl in PU II“, alphabetische Nummer der Stelle auf der Seite).

Worin besteht nun dieser Zusammenhang zwischen >Aspektsehen< und >Wortbedeutungserleben<? Tatsächlich spricht Wittgenstein *darüber* gar nicht, zumindest nicht explizit. Ihm geht es vielmehr um ein Unvermögen, das er in den Vorarbeiten zur PU II xi >Bedeutungsblindheit< nennt und dort in die Nähe zur >Aspektblindheit< rückt (siehe vor allem *BPP I* und *II*; konkreter z.B.: BPP I §344, BPP II §571, Z§183 sowie LS §784). Gefragt wird, was demjenigen abginge, „der die Bedeutung eines Wortes nicht *erlebt*“ (553 a).

Ein solcher Bedeutungsblinder, der die Bedeutung eines Wortes nicht erlebt, könnte vor allem zweierlei nicht: Zum einen würde er die Aufforderung nicht verstehen, ein Wort mit einer ganz bestimmten von mehreren Bedeutungen zu *meinen*. Und das, obwohl er dieses Wort in mehreren Bedeutungen *verwenden* kann. Zum andern wäre er unfähig, das *Verschwinden einer Wortbedeutung* zu „fühlen“. Z.B. dann, wenn ein Wort, das „zehnmal nach der Reihe ausgesprochen wird, seine Bedeutung verliert und ein bloßer Klang wird“ (553 a).

Die Parallelen zur >Aspektblindheit< sind offensichtlich: Obwohl der Bedeutungsblinde – dem Urteil Dritter gemäß – zur *Wortverwendung* in *verschiedenen* Bedeutungen fähig ist, ist er selbst für den dabei auftretenden *Wechsel* der Bedeutung völlig blind. D.h. also, wie dem Aspektblinden die *Aspektartigkeit* des Betrachteten abginge, ginge dem Bedeutungsblinden die *Bedeutungsartigkeit* von Worten ab. Und damit entgeht ihm auch der Umstand, dass sie überhaupt *Bedeutung* haben.

4. Die Verwandtschaft von Aspektsehen und Wortbedeutungserleben

Was Wittgenstein mit dem >Erleben der Bedeutung eines Wortes< meint, ist also sehr ähnlich dem, was er vorher >Bemerken eines Aspekts< nannte. In beiden Fällen gibt es etwas, das gewissermaßen verschieden aufgefasst bzw. verwendet werden kann und zwar ohne dass es sich jeweils verändert hätte. Im einen Fall ist es das Betrachtete, das als Verschiedenes gesehen werden kann. Im andern Fall ist es ein Wort, das verschiedene Bedeutungen haben kann. Sowohl Aspekt- als auch Bedeutungswechsel sind also möglich. Und in beiden Fällen wird der, dem diese Möglichkeit auffällt, ihr auch sprachlich Rechnung tragen. Er spricht dann davon, dass er *etwas als etwas* sieht, oder aber, dass er es *so und so meint* bzw. *versteht*. Die Diskussion der Aspekt- und Bedeutungsblindheit bringt gerade diese Gemeinsamkeiten zum Vorschein.

An anderen Stellen der PU können vor diesem Hintergrund auch noch weitere Übereinstimmungen gefunden werden. So beschäftigt sich Wittgenstein in den PU I spätestens ab §138 bis etwa §197 mit einem Problem, das sich aufdrängt, wenn man sagt, die Bedeutung eines Wortes sei sein Gebrauch. Denn wir „*verstehen* [...] die Bedeutung eines Wortes, wenn wir es hören, oder aussprechen; wir erfassen sie mit einem Schlag; und was wir so erfassen, ist doch etwas Anderes als der in der Zeit ausgedehnte >Gebrauch<!“ (§138). Das Verstörende an dieser Feststellung, die Wittgenstein immerhin ca. 60 Paragraphen beschäftigt, ist u.a. die *Plötzlichkeit* dieses Verstehens. So wie er später vom >Aufleuchten eines Aspekts< spricht, könnte man hier vom *Aufleuchten einer Bedeutung* sprechen.

Eine weitere Gemeinsamkeit findet sich einige Paragraphen weiter. Es zeigt sich dort, dass, wer das

Erlebnis des schlagartigen Bedeutungserfassens hat, nicht etwa, wie zuerst vermutet, einen zeitlich ausgedehnten Gebrauch erfasst. Vielmehr erlangt er eine Sicherheit; die Sicherheit, die Prüfungen seines Verständnisses durch Dritte zu bestehen (§§ 193-197). D.h. wie auch schon beim Sehen eines bestimmten Aspekts bilden *richtige Anwendungen* die Kriterien Dritter dafür, dass einer eine Bedeutung verstanden hat. Zugleich heißt dies für den Verstehenden, dass er eine Verwendung gelernt haben muss. In §150 fügt Wittgenstein gar dem Wort >verstehen< in Klammern hinzu: „Eine Technik beherrschen“.

Die „Verwandtschaft“ bzw. der „Zusammenhang der Begriffe >Sehen des Aspekts< und >Erleben der Bedeutung eines Wortes<“ besteht also in einer deutlichen Ähnlichkeit der *Grammatiken*, in die sie eingebunden sind. Einen wesentlichen Unterschied gibt es dort allerdings doch. Er betrifft die Frage, ob unter den vielen möglichen Aspekten und Bedeutungen sich einer bzw. eine auszeichnen lässt – ob es da ein Richtig und Falsch gibt.

5. Gedankenerraten und Menschenkenntnis

„Es gibt ein Spiel: >Gedankenerraten<“ heißt es zu Beginn des letzten Drittels von PU II xi (567 b, siehe z.B. auch LS §181). Dieser dritte Teil des Textes, wo sich keine expliziten Bezüge auf die vorigen Themen finden lassen, wurde wohl erst aufgrund einer handschriftlichen Korrektur Wittgensteins auf einer Kopie des Typoskripts überhaupt an diese Stelle gesetzt (vgl. von Wright 1992). Dies jedoch nicht grundlos: Geht es doch *implizit* auch noch um Aspekt und Bedeutung.

Die Grundsituation im Spiel des Gedankenerraten ist folgende: Wir sollen über die mentale Welt eines Anderen Auskunft geben. Wir, die wir dessen nicht sicher sein können, sollen etwas darüber sagen, worüber es für den Anderen keinen Zweifel gibt. Wir werden dazu aufgefordert, über dessen Gedanken, Absichten und Empfindungen zu *urteilen*.

Interessant ist nun, dass wir durchaus zum Fällen *verschiedener* Urteile berechtigt sind. Und zwar *ohne* „einen Denk- oder Beobachtungsfehler“ zu machen (574 d). Und darin ähnelt dieses Spiel eben dem >Aspektsehen<.

Und trotzdem gibt es unter den vielen möglichen Urteilen eines, das *richtig* ist. Eines, mit dem der tatsächliche Gedanke bzw. die Absicht oder Empfindung erraten wird. Und darin ähnelt dieses Spiel eben dem Erfassen einer Wortbedeutung. Denn das gesprochene Wort, wenn es auch mehrere Bedeutungen haben kann, wird mit einer ganz bestimmten Bedeutung *gemeint*. Und diese ist dann die jeweils *richtige* Bedeutung. Mit dem Verstehen geht die Überzeugung einher, gerade *diese* erfasst zu haben und nicht irgendeine.

Wie, so überlegt Wittgenstein weiter, erlangt man nun die Sicherheit, in diesem Spiel richtige Urteile zu fällen? Eine Sicherheit wie die eines Menschenkenners, aus dessen Urteilen im allgemeinen richtige Prognosen hervorgehen (574 e). „Kann man [also] Menschenkenntnis lernen? Ja; Mancher kann sie lernen. Aber nicht durch einen Lehrkurs, sondern durch >Erfahrung<. [...] Was man lernt, ist keine Technik; man lernt richtige Urteile.“ (574 f)

Dass im Falle des überraschenden Aspektbemerken *ein* neuer Aspekt auffällt und dass beim Wortbedeutungserfassen aber *die* Bedeutung verstanden wird, nämlich diejenige, die gemeint war, wozu es neben

Technikbeherrschen auch Erfahrung bedarf, darin unterscheiden sich eben beide. Während ein späteres anderes Wortverständnis das vorige typischerweise revidiert oder zumindest nach einer Entscheidung zwischen beiden verlangt, gesellt sich der später bemerkte Aspekt zu dem vorigen hinzu. Zur Auszeichnung eines Aspekts vor den anderen ist zusätzlich die Referenz auf z.B. die Intention des Zeichners nötig. Worte aber werden sowieso immer *gemeint*.

6. Schluss

Bleibt die Frage, was es denn mit der Aspektartigkeit oder auch der Bedeutungsartigkeit auf sich habe.

Wenn man sich vorstellt, dass die Bedeutung eines Wortes in seinem Gebrauch besteht oder dass die Bedeutung eines Gegenstandes durch seine Rolle im jeweiligen Spiel bestimmt wird, durch die jeweilige Technik, in die er eingebunden ist, dann impliziert dies, dass ein Wort oder Gegenstand auch in verschiedenen Praktiken auf verschiedene Weise verwendet werden kann. Ein und dasselbe kann also in mehrerlei Spielen auftauchen und somit mehrerlei Bedeutungen haben. Und genau dies war mit Aspekt- und Bedeutungsartigkeit gemeint: Die Möglichkeit ein und dasselbe verschieden zu gebrauchen – und zwar ohne einen der Gebräuche als den eigentlichen, als den wahren oder gar substantziellen auffassen zu können. Dass wir in manchen und zum Teil auch ungewöhnlichen Situationen, wie Wittgenstein sie beschreibt, einer Aspekt- und Bedeutungsartigkeit bewusst werden, kann dann also nicht mehr verwundern.

Wunderlich scheint es dagegen, wie wir zwischen den verschiedenen Gebräuchen unterscheiden. So reicht es für uns doch nicht aus, eine Vielzahl verschiedener Techniken erlernt zu haben. Wir müssen uns auch darüber klar sein, welche wir gegenseitig gerade meinen, in welchem der Spiele der Zug gerade gemacht wird. Das mag trivial klingen, weil wir dies meist mit traumwandlerischer Sicherheit meistern, und doch ist es eine Leistung, die erlernt werden muss. Und wie erlernt? Eben durch Erfahrung. Nicht durch das Erlernen von Techniken sondern durch das Erlernen richtigen Urteilens.

Und das wiederum heißt, dass es sich bei diesen richtigen Urteilen um eine für die erfolgreiche Kommunikation notwendige Übereinstimmung der Sprecher handelt, von der vorher in den PU I noch gar keine Rede war. Dort wird von einer Übereinstimmung in Definitionen und Urteilen – der Lebensform – gesprochen, die Voraussetzung für das *Erlernen* von *Techniken* sei (§241 f., sowie rekapitulierend u.a. 572 e, 573 a). Hier aber handelt es sich um Urteile, derer auch die Technik beherrschenden Spieler noch bedürfen.

Somit handelt es sich bei der Untersuchung des >Aspektsehens< nicht nur um eines von vielen Beispielen, an denen Wittgenstein seine Methode zeigt. Vielmehr geht er dort einer Eigenart der Gebrauchstheorie der Bedeutung nach, die zu einer Besonderheit der Rolle mentaler Begriffe führt. Nicht ohne Grund erscheint der Abschnitt als ein Destillat all dessen, was Wittgenstein vorher in den „verschiedenen“ *Philosophien der Psychologie* immer neu geordnet und verändert hat.

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Do We Really Need Relativism About Truth?

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1. MacFarlane on Relative Truth

Philosophy is confronted with relativism at least since Protagoras' most famous dictum: man is measure of everything. Contemporary relativists typically do not deny that, within certain areas of discourse, truth can be objective. Rather, they wonder whether in *all* discourses truth should be objective. Their answer is: “No”. The paper focuses on John MacFarlane's and Max Kölbel's recent relativistic frameworks and argues that they run into serious objections.

According to MacFarlane, truth is to be conceived as relative at least within the three following discourses: future contingents, epistemic modalities and knowledge attributions. Consider future contingents (MacFarlane 2003). My friend Joe utters at time t_0 :

(1) There will be a sea battle tomorrow.

Unless we are determinist, as uttered at time t_0 , (1) is arguably neither true nor false. Call this the *indeterminacy intuition*. Now assume that (1)'s truth-conditions are satisfied at a time $t_1 > t_0$: in fact, a sea battle occurs at the time predicted by Joe. Hence, it seems, Joe's utterance was *already* true at t_0 . Call this the *determinacy intuition*. Of course, according to standard semantics, the two intuitions should be mutually exclusive. For the very same (proposition expressed by the very same) utterance cannot have *different* truth-values. However, MacFarlane suggests, both intuitions are correct, and should therefore be respected. Standard semantics, it follows, is to be given up: truth is to be thought as relative both to a context of utterance *and* a context of assessment.

Consider now epistemic modalities (MacFarlane 2005c). Joe asks Luca if their common friend Carlotta is in town. Luca knows that Carlotta is usually in town on Fridays, but hasn't seen Carlotta since Wednesday. So, he answers quite confidently:

(2) Yes, she might be in town.

Then comes Holly, who informs Joe and Luca that Carlotta just took a flight for Toronto: her mother is not doing very well. So, the example goes, Luca says:

(3) Oh, *I was wrong*: she can't be in town.

At time t_0 , Luca's utterance is clearly *true*: Carlotta *could* be in town, as far as Luca knows. Moreover, since Carlotta usually *is* in town on Fridays, Luca is perfectly justified in asserting (2). Nevertheless, it seems, (2) turns out to be *false* as assessed from t_1 – once Holly has informed Joe and Luca about Carlotta's departure. Again, MacFarlane suggests, truth is to be conceived as relative not only to a context of utterance, but also to a context of assessment.

Finally, consider the following classical contextualist example (MacFarlane 2005b). Joe is working in his office. He parked his car in the driveway, and therefore *knows* that his car is parked in the driveway. So the following holds:

(4) Joe knows that the car is in the driveway.

Call this context 1. Now consider whether – while he's working in his office – Joe knows that his car has not been stolen. Of course not: someone might have stolen the car. Call this context 2. Does Joe still know – in context 2 – that his car is in the driveway? If knowledge is closed under logical implication, the answer is negative. For, since knowledge that the car is in the garage implies knowledge that the car has not been stolen, and since Joe does not know that the car has not been stolen, it follows by *modus tollens* that Joe does not know that the car was in the driveway. So apparently we have further evidence for relative truth: (4) is true as assessed from context 1, but false as assessed from context 2.

We are now in position to frame MacFarlane's conception of relative truth:

(RTF) $\forall p$ (p 's truth is relative \leftrightarrow (it is possible that there be two context of assessment C_{A1} and C_{A2} , such that an utterance of p is true as assessed from C_{A1} and not true as assessed from C_{A2})¹,

where p ranges over propositional entities of some sort. If correct at all, MacFarlane's analysis of future contingents, epistemic modalities and knowledge attributions offers some evidence for the right hand-side of (RTF). Since truth is relative, according to MacFarlane, if and only if (RTF) is satisfied by at least one proposition, relativism seems to follow: truth is to be thought as relative rather than absolute, and so much the worse for classical semantics. So far, so good?

2. Relative truth, Belief and Assertion

MacFarlane's relativistic framework face at least two different kinds of objections. Let us start with the first. According to Gareth Evans (1985), relativistic conceptions of truth are at odds with the highly intuitive (and widely shared) thesis that

(TAA) Truth is the aim of assertion.

For how could we aim at truth if truth-values depend on a parameter – the context of assessment – that is clearly *independent* from the speaker's context? MacFarlane's reply is straightforward: (TAA) is not the *real* norm of assertion. Rather, MacFarlane suggests, truth is what we are *committed to* when we make our assertions. More precisely, speakers are committed to: (a) withdraw the assertion when it is shown to be false; (b) justify it when challenged; (c) accept responsibility for what is said. Since this latter norm is not incompatible with (RTF), Evans' objection, according to MacFarlane, does not even apply to it.

Here is a potential concern. MacFarlane subscribes to the standard account of belief, according to which beliefs aim at truth in the very strong sense that no propositional attitude that does not aim at truth can count as a belief (cf. MacFarlane 2005a). The troubles begin as soon as we realize that, according to (RTF), beliefs cannot aim at truth as relative anymore than assertion can. But

¹ Cf. Kölbel (2002), p. 102.

according to MacFarlane, this is not a *real* problem. For while utterances are just events, beliefs are mental states persisting over time. Thus, whenever we assess a belief, we automatically *use* it. As a result, as far as beliefs are concerned, contexts of use and contexts of assessment necessarily coincide. Hence, our beliefs' truth-values are *de facto* absolute: beliefs *do* aim at truth, and our problem is solved.

This would be too high a price to pay, however, for at least two reasons. First, MacFarlane takes *propositions* as the primary truth bearers. Now, according to the standard picture of belief (to which he subscribes), beliefs are relational states whose *relata* are the mental state of believing and a proposition. But how could an utterance of *p* be truth-relative *and* the truth of the corresponding belief that *p* be absolute? Second, according to most accounts of assertion, speakers should *assert* what they *believe*. However, if MacFarlane was right, any normative link between assertion and belief should be given-up, because of the radically different nature of their truth-values.

3. Revisiting MacFarlane's Cases For Relative Truth

MacFarlane's account of truth seems to face an even worst objection: his argument for (RTF) appears to be unsound. Let's start with future contingents and ask ourselves: do we really think, at t_1 , that Joe's utterance of (1) was *already* true at t_0 ? Such a claim, it seems, involves a strong metaphysical commitment to *determinism*, which is not, of course, a matter of common sense: some may have determinist intuitions; some may not. Rather, we would say that, in uttering (1), Joe made a correct prediction. But *this* is not in contrast with (1) being neither true nor false at t_0 . We can define the correctness of a prediction as follows:

(FC) $\forall p \forall a (a$'s utterance of p at t_0 is a correct prediction $\leftrightarrow (\exists t (t > t_0) \wedge p$'s truth conditions are satisfied at $t))$,

where p is a future contingent and a is a speaker. According to (FC), (1) is a correct prediction as assessed from t_1 (once the battle occurred). However, unless we are determinists – in which case we wouldn't assume, as MacFarlane does, that Joe's utterance of (1) was neither true nor false in t_0 – this does not imply considering (1) as *already true* in t_0 as assessed from t_1 . Therefore, it seems, MacFarlane's argument rests on an overstatement of the determinacy intuition.

A similar objection arises in the case of epistemic modalities. Let us assume a broadly standard definition of epistemic modality:

(EM) It is epistemically possible at t that p if and only if p is consistent with what is known at t .

According to (EM), Luca's utterance of (2) was *not* false. For, (2) was perfectly consistent with Luca's body of knowledge at t . Now, MacFarlane's argument requires that Luca withdraw his assertion, once informed about Carlotta's departure. However, such an assumption is highly disputable, since one might plausibly argue that Luca's utterance was perfectly correct at *that* time. After all, Luca simply asserted at t_0 that, for all he knew (at t_0), Carlotta could have been in town – which is of course *true*. Once again, MacFarlane's argument rests on a dubious intuition.

Now to knowledge attributions. MacFarlane's argument here depends on a *theoretical* assumption:

contextualism. According to such a theory, we may have or fail to have knowledge of the very same proposition, depending on the epistemic standards in play. If those are relaxed, Joe knows that his car is in the garage; if we make them a little sharper, Joe fails to know that the car is in the garage. However, we are not necessarily committed to contextualism. Moreover, contextualism itself face serious objections (cf. Wright 2005). MacFarlane's arguments, it follows, are at least objectionable.

4. Kölbel's Relativism

Max Kölbel (2002) has recently developed a different relativist account. Truth, according to Kölbel, is to be relativized to *perspectives*, where perspectives are simply defined as functions from contexts to truth-values (2002, pp. 100-103). So truth, according to Kölbel, is not necessarily objective. For it is possible that there be two thinkers A and B, such that p is true in A's perspective and not true in B's perspective. Kölbel's definition of relative truth may be represented as follows:

(RTK) $\forall p (p$'s truth is relative \leftrightarrow (it is possible that there be two thinkers A and B, such that p is true in A's perspective and not true in B's perspective)).

Different speakers are so allowed to believe something which is true *according to their own perspectives*. They may disagree, but their disagreement will be *faultless*.

Both MacFarlane and Kölbel propose to generalize their relativist account of truth, so to say, across the board. *Every* proposition is true or false with respect to a context of utterance and a context of assessment, according to MacFarlane, or to a certain perspective, according to Kölbel. Absolute truth within a discourse D is therefore reduced either to *coincidence* between context of use and context of assessment, or to general *agreement*. This might be a problem, however.

5. Three Objections to Global Relativism

As is well known, global relativism has been challenged since Plato's *Theaetetus*. According to Plato, the very claim that truth is relative contradicts itself. The argument can be represented as follows. The relativist committed to

(5) Truth is globally relative

is also committed to:

(6) There exists at least one non-relative truth.

For, *qua* metaphysical thesis, (5) itself should be considered *objective* rather than relative. In short, we are presented with a case of *consequentia mirabilis*: if truth is globally relative, then truth is *not* globally relative. Moreover, it seems, even if global relativism was true, it would be true *only* for the relativist. As Jason Stanley puts it:

if all truth is relative to a judge, or circumstance of assessment, then the doctrine of radical relativism is itself relative to a judge. Radical relativism may be true for radical relativist judges, but not for the rest of us (2005, p. 138).

Both Kölbel and MacFarlane can easily resist such pressures. For, on the one hand, if true at all (5) is *a priori* true. Hence, it is true according to every perspective and every context of assessment. But, in this case, both on

MacFarlane's and Kölbel's views, (5) would just be *superficially* non-relative. Thus, the relativist could accept (5) while denying (6). On the other hand, as a matter of fact, philosophers do not agree about (5): they have different *perspectives* on this topic, and they assess it in different ways. As a result, the inference from (5) to (6) turns out to be incorrect. For, if true at all, (5) is not – given philosophers' disagreement and *according to itself* – an objective truth. Now consider Stanley's argument against global relativism: global relativism can be true for the global relativist, not for the rest of us. The argument clearly fails. For, the relativist is happy to concede that, according to Stanley's perspective (or from his context of assessment) relativism is false. But this will only *confirm* global relativism itself.

Global relativism faces more serious objections. Here are three. First, the standard arguments for relative truth only show that truth can be relative only within *some* discourses, not *every*. Thus, *global* relativism is not justified after all. Second, according to a well-established majority view, truth and meaning are intimately related. However, neither MacFarlane nor Kölbel offer a *semantic* reason in order to relativize the truth predicate. Hence, one might still wonder *why* truth should be relative within some discourses. Third, expanding relativism across the board amounts to a broadly *response-dependent* conception of truth. For truth would always be dependent either on our perspectives, in Kölbel's view, or on the verdicts we emit in assessing truths, according to MacFarlane's framework. However, one might question the plausibility of such a claim – at least with respect to, say, empirical discourse. Arguably, we are still in need of plausible account of relative truth².

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² Most of the ideas presented in this paper have been discussed at length with Luca Incurvati: I am very much indebted to him.

On Language and Identity

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1. Taylor's Approach to Identity

1.1 Identity as Orientation is a Moral Space

According to Taylor, to be a self is to take a stand in a moral space. A moral space is "a space in which questions arise about what is good or bad, what is worth doing and what not, what has meaning and importance, and what is trivial and secondary" (Taylor 1989 28). In analogy to physical space, we do not invent moral space; but we do shape, and search for ways that we see as morally better than others. Taylor's notion of identity complements this picture: we are agents who operate in moral space and our identity provides us with an orientation within that space. As he writes, "To know who you are is to be oriented in a moral space."

"My identity is defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose" (Taylor 1989, 27 and see 30).

Since identity provides orientation in a moral space, a crisis of identity typically has the form of disorientation, of feeling lost, of not knowing to distinguish between what is important and meaningful and what is trivial (Taylor 1989, 27 and 30).

At the same time, our identity is not fully imposed on us; rather, it is something that we can also partly form. Taylor writes: "The issue of our condition can never be exhausted for us by what we *are*, because we are always changing and *becoming*. ... So the issue for us has to be not only where we *are* but also where we are *going*" (Taylor 1989 47; see Taylor 1994 32).

Taylor's notion of identity thus brings out the intrinsic connection between "where we come from", and "who we wish to become". The way we learn to think and to signify events informs our deliberations and future decisions. Who I came to be informs my judgments concerning who I want to become. Although my identity is partly determined by historical conditions, it is not fixed by these conditions once and for all; rather, since my orientations and commitments are formed as I go along, they may also be reformed.

Our identity is a project we work out in the course of our life. Taylor is not an essentialist about identity and he is not a determinist about history. Our personal identity is a product of history but it also plays an active role in its making. In fact, I believe that Taylor, somewhat like Foucault, is engaged in historical research of retrieving the sources of modern identity as a project of *shaping* our present and future identity. Here, too, learning where one comes from is essential for who one is and who one wants to become.

1.2 A Dialogical Notion of Identity

According to Taylor,

"My discovering my own identity does not mean that I work it out in isolation, but that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt, partly internalized, with others".

That is why the development of an ideal of inwardly generated identity gives a new importance to recognition. My identity crucially depends on dialogical relations with others" (Taylor 1994 34; Taylor 1991 47)

My very identity is being formed in dialogue, a dialogue through which I am recognized by others. Likewise, my dialogue with others contributes to the constitution of their identity. There is a mutual exchange of identity-recognition among selves, which is constitutive of their proper identities. Taylor holds that "One is a self only among other selves. A self can never be described without reference to those who surround it" (Taylor 1989 35). "The full definition of someone's identity... usually involves not only his stand on moral and spiritual matters but also some reference to a defining community" (Taylor 1989 36). Thus the notion of dialogical recognition applies to both collective and individual identities (Taylor 1994, 37, 38, 42).

2. Wittgenstein's Approach to Language

According to Wittgenstein, a language must be seen within the context of costumes, habits and forms of life, so that it is impossible to separate between the semantics of the language and its use. Linguistic terms and expressions acquire meaning against an extra linguistic context. This is seen clearly through the way we learn and teach the rules of the language. To learn a language is to learn a system of rules. According to Wittgenstein, to learn a rule is to learn a skill or a certain technique within the context of its usage. For example, in order to learn how to count, one has to first recall the sequence of natural numbers and be able to repeat it in right order. But one also has to ascribe a number to each object being counted. And here one has to learn that, in this technique, each object is to be counted only once. The only criterion of knowing whether someone has mastered the procedure of counting is by looking what he does. A child may count on object more than once or may associate with it more than one number in the sequence, and would normally be corrected. Just as walking and riding a bicycle require practice, so does counting, asking questions, pointing to something, etc.

For Wittgenstein, the meaning of linguistic terms is bounded with the rules of their application just as "the meaning of a piece in chess is its role in the game" (PI 563). The role of a horse in chess is given by the rules of the game, which fix its place on the board, the moves permitted to it, and so on. Similarly, one cannot separate the meaning of terms from their function in a language game – that is, the way they figure in human activities and practices.

For example, the meaning (or use) of the sign may radically differ in different contexts. An arrow \rightarrow calls for different actions when it appears as a logical connective in a logic text book or when it appears on a post sign. The meaning of a term is the role it plays within a language game and this role is well defined only within a specific and concrete practice. This is the point of the analogy between concepts and instruments (in PI 569) and working tools (PI 11), which might have different functions.

It follows from this approach that the grammar of a certain language, that is, its system of rules, is not separate from the traditions, forms of life, costumes and habits of the language speakers. Rather, the grammatical structures and rules are strongly related to the way language speakers act and think. In turn, the language expresses and, to an extent, constitutes an essential aspect the speakers' identity.

3. Some Analogies Between Language and Identity

3.1 The Relation between the Individual and the Community

We have seen that Taylor stresses a dialogical notion of the self that requires other selves for its constitution. Wittgenstein, as is well known, has pointed out that a language cannot be private in the sense that its rules are grounded in public practices of a community of speakers. He argued that without a broad extra-linguistic context (such as forms of life, practices, and regularities), the terms of the language would not have any sense. Taylor's approach to the formation of personal identity through dialogical relations is strongly supported by Wittgenstein argument against the possibility of a private language. In paraphrasing Wittgenstein, one might call this the "impossibility of a private identity" – that is, an identity which cannot be partly exchanged and discussed with others but is accessible only to its owner.

3.2 The Foundational Character of Language and Identity

As we have seen, for Taylor, identity is a kind of background for answering questions such as who I am and who I want to be. We examine and evaluate alternatives in light of ideas that guide what we see as worth doing and becoming. In this sense, identity has a distinctive normative aspect. In this sense, identity has a foundational aspect: it constitutes a background that lends significance to our deliberations and choices. Identity is a necessary requirement for a moral agent to operate and orient oneself in moral space.

As we have seen, Wittgenstein's notion of language has a foundational aspect as well. Like in Taylor's notion of identity, the notion of a foundation here is not seen as a metaphysically necessary essence. Like human identity, language is a historical and cultural product, which is formed and reformed in the context of human deliberation and action. Language is foundational in the sense that each linguistic act and exchange presupposes certain rules of syntax and semantics. In most of our activities, practical or theoretical, we employ our language and its rules of representation and communication. Acting, thinking and communicating requires that we represent to ourselves what we call 'reality' through the use of language. Likewise, our legal and economic systems, our science, our government and our social institutions are predicated on the basic rules of the language. In this sense, language constitutes a foundational aspect of individual and collective identities, as well as a necessary condition for managing one's life. Language is indispensable for the way we appear to ourselves, talk to ourselves, deliberate, and so on. It is by means of languages that we conceive of ourselves and conduct our deliberations regarding who we want to become.

3.3 On Learning One's Mother Tongue and Acquiring Primary Identity

In this respect, there is a close analogy between the way we acquire our primary identity and the way we acquire our mother tongue. In both cases, it is not a process of conscious learning but rather a process of growing into a social environment. For the most part, this training has the character of acquiring certain habits and techniques that precedes rational explanations. We are trained to dress up, to play games, to eat etc. This training does not seem to be a mere biological development; rather, we grow into a system of habits that play a normative role in functioning as set of models and examples according to which we learn what we ought to do and how we should behave. The main point of the analogy is that we acquire a fundamental part of our identity before (in both temporal and conceptual senses) we can be conscious of it and be critical of it. Both our primary identity and our mother tongue include a constitutive aspect of our identity that we never choose but must simply grow into. This aspect of our identity is so essential that without it we cannot even think of ourselves, converse with others, ask questions and even begin the project of shaping our own identity in light of who we want to become. In any attempt to reflect upon the way we were brought up we must employ the basic grammatical rules we have acquired and the system of habits and regularities that makes them meaningful.

Does this foundational aspect of both language and identity implies that we cannot change ourselves? Does it follow that we are enslaved in our primary identity? I suggest approaching this question by means of the analogy with primary and secondary language. Just as it is difficult to acquire and fully master a second language, so may be the case with identity. And, to the extent that one can learn and master a second language, perhaps to a similar extent one can also extend one's identity. Even if one's identity has a primary and constitutive status, it does not follow that one is not imprisoned in it in the sense that he or she cannot extend and transcend it. I can, learn, extend my horizons and change my standards and reform my ways of thinking by learning new way of life and new standards. Yet, just as learning a second language requires a considerable effort, motivation and curiosity, so may be the extension of the horizons of my identity. It also seems that the type of effort required for acquiring a second language is similar to that of acquiring and learning a new identity. Both cases require an extension and sometimes a change of our entrenched habits and norms of acting and thinking.

While we have to accept a certain foundation, a certain starting point, we don't have to accept a fixed notion of identity. We only have to accept that any change will have to be made on the basis of this foundation – one cannot start from somewhere else or from nowhere at all. In learning other languages as well as in attempting to reshape our identity we have to presuppose who we are presently. As it is by means of our mother tongue that we learn new languages, so it is in reference to our present identity that we might be able to reform it. Identity need not be seen as a state but as a project. It is a project without a neutral starting point. One is already placed within a tradition, a language, a culture when one can take up this project.

3.4 Learning a Foreign Language and Understanding a Foreign Identity

On the basis of the analogy between identity change and language change one could develop another point of analogy. According to a popular version of cultural relativism, understanding a different identity or culture is impossible since the cultures are incommensurable. I suggest the comparison with the possibility of learning a second language as a model through which we can consider this question. Learning a second language is inherently difficult but it is not impossible. My suggestion is that the motivation and effort required for extending our cultural horizons is similar to the one required for extending the familiar grammatical structures of our primary language. Since such structures have a normative aspect, learning a second language may provide a concrete model of what Gadamar calls a "fusion of horizons".

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Die Relativität von Gewiheiten

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Von Wittgensteins Schriften haben der Traktat und die Philosophischen Untersuchungen die meiste Aufmerksamkeit erfahren. Seine letzte Arbeit, „Über Gewiheit“ (ÜG), mit der sich Wittgenstein noch zwei Tage vor seinem Tod beschäftigt hat, ist dagegen weniger beachtet und interpretiert worden, obwohl nach Meinung mancher Autoren die darin vertretenen Gedanken zu Wittgensteins besten gehören (von Wright).

Wittgensteins philosophische Entwicklung wurde immer an seinen Arbeiten abgelesen. Das hat zu dem Bild des frühen Wittgenstein, dem des Traktats, und zum Bild des späten, dem der Philosophischen Untersuchungen, geführt. Nun vertreten viele Autoren die Meinung, schon der zweite Teil der Philosophischen Untersuchungen (PU) zusammen mit den „Bemerkungen über die Farben“, mit „Zettel“ und ÜG seien Ausdruck neuer Wege, die über den ersten Teil der PU (bis PU 693) hinausgehen, und sprechen daher von einem Dritten Wittgenstein.

Von den oben genannten späten Schriften, die in der Tat in neue Gedankengänge führen, möchte ich mich hier auf ÜG beschränken und beim Versuch einer Interpretation bestimmte Aspekte behandeln, die etwas im Hintergrund geblieben sind. Für Wittgenstein war ein Ansto zu ÜG sicherlich die kontroverielle Debatte mit Moore über commonsense und Skeptizismus und so ist es auch verständlich, wenn Kommentatoren sich vor allem mit dem Skeptizismus und seiner Zurückweisung durch Wittgenstein befassen (Moyal-Sharrok 2002 und 2004). Das führt zur Analyse der „absoluten“, der „fundamentalen Gewiheiten“ und deren epistemischem Status. Ohne auf die diesbezüglichen Interpretationen einzugehen, sei nur eine wichtige Schlussfolgerung erwähnt, die nach meiner Meinung überzeugend ist: Aussagen von fundamentaler Gewiheit (z.B. „hier ist meine Hand“, „es gibt physische Gegenstände“, „in diesem Moment träume ich nicht“) sind nicht als empirische Sätze aufzufassen, sind nicht falsifizierbar und entziehen sich daher skeptischen Fragen. Ob man sie zu den grammatischen, logischen Propositionen zählen kann, ist eine andere Frage; jedenfalls haben sie nach Meinung aller Autoren einen besonderen Status, der sie jedem Zweifel entzieht. Sie sind die festen Punkte, um die sich unsere Sprachspiele bewegen, diese überhaupt erst möglich machen. So sagt Wittgenstein (ÜG 341-343): „D.h. die *Fragen*, die wir stellen, und unsere *Zweifel* beruhen darauf, daß gewisse Sätze vom Zweifel ausgenommen sind, gleichsam die Angeln, in welchen sich jene bewegen. -- D.h. es gehört zur Logik unserer wissenschaftlichen Untersuchungen, daß Gewisses *in der Tat* nicht angezweifelt wird. -- Es ist aber damit nicht so, daß wir eben nicht alles untersuchen können und uns daher notgedrungen mit der Annahme zufrieden stellen müssen. Wenn ich will, daß die Türe sich drehe, müssen die Angeln feststehen“.

Bei allem Bemühen um eine Analyse „absoluter“ Gewiheiten weist Wittgenstein immer wieder auf die Möglichkeit von Gewiheiten, die diesen Status nicht haben. Heißt es doch in ÜG 194: „Mit dem Wort <gewi> drücken wir die völlige Überzeugung, die Abwesenheit jedes Zweifels aus, und wir versuchen damit den Andern zu überzeugen. Das ist *subjektive* Gewiheit. Wann aber ist etwas objektiv gewi? - Wenn ein Irrtum nicht möglich ist. Aber was für eine Möglichkeit ist das? Mu der Irrtum

nicht *logisch* ausgeschlossen sein?“ Dieses Beispiel unterstreicht die Trennung von subjektiver und objektiver Gewiheit; der andere ist anderer Meinung, ich mu ihn erst von der meinen überzeugen. In ÜG liegt der Schwerpunkt auf der Untersuchung jener absoluten Gewiheiten, wie das auch bei den oben zitierten Literaturstellen der Fall ist. Und obwohl Wittgenstein immer wieder die subjektive Gewiheit als Gegenpol zur absoluten, erwähnt, werden die Konsequenzen aus dem Phänomen subjektiver, falsifizierbarer Gewiheit nicht weiter verfolgt. Das soll in dieser Arbeit versucht werden. Welches sind nun die Merkmale dieser subjektiven Gewiheit, wie wird sie begründet und wie äußert sie sich im Alltag?

In vielen erläuternden Anmerkungen, in denen Wittgenstein auf Gewiheiten verweist, die aus subjektiven Erfahrungssätzen gewonnen und damit auch wieder skeptischem Zweifel ausgesetzt sind, schließt er ausdrücklich nicht aus, daß eine subjektive Aussage zu einer von allgemeiner Gültigkeit werden kann und damit auch den kategorial verschiedenen Charakter einer absoluten Gültigkeit annimmt. In ÜG untersucht er, was <wissen> bedeutet, insbesondere, welche Sicherheit, welche Gewiheit der Ausdruck <ich weiß> enthält. Und er zeigt anhand vieler Beispiele, daß eine subjektive Behauptung ein breites Spektrum von der bloen flüchtigen persönlichen Meinung bis hin zu absoluter Gewiheit besetzen kann, wie sie beispielsweise durch Aussagen wie: „das ist meine Hand“ oder „2 mal 2 = 4“ repräsentiert wird. „Aber es gibt keine scharfe Grenze zwischen ihnen“ (ÜG 53). Zwischen den Extremen, der blo subjektiven Meinung und Überzeugung, die sich sogar als Aberglaube zeigen kann, und den absoluten Gewiheiten liege ein Gebiet von Erfahrungen und Überzeugungen, die man sich so vorstellen könne, „da gewisse Sätze von der Form der Erfahrungssätze erstarrt wären und als Leitung für die nicht erstarrten, flüssigen Erfahrungssätze funktionieren; und daß sich dieses Verhältnis änderte, indem flüssige Sätze erstarrten und feste flüssig würden“ (ÜG 96). Das ergibt ein subjektives Weltbild, das durch Erfahrungen stets ergänzt und korrigiert wird, wobei es aber nicht darauf ankommt, einzelne Erfahrungen exakt auf ihre „Richtigkeit“ zu überprüfen, wie etwa eine naturwissenschaftliche Beobachtung. „Sondern es ist der überkommene Hintergrund, auf dem ich zwischen wahr und falsch unterscheide“ (ÜG 94). Ziel dieser pragmatischen Weltsicht ist es, einem jeden ausreichende Sicherheit im Alltag zu geben und die subjektive Gewiheit, jeweils richtig zu handeln. Absolute Gewiheiten bleiben dabei allen Zweifeln entzogen und unbewußt.

Ganz allgemein lät sich sagen, daß unsere Handlungen, auch verbale (Sprechakte), durch Signale und Informationen ausgelöst, beeinflusst, begründet sind, die das Subjekt empfängt. Auch wenn subjektive Wünsche und Bedürfnisse diese Handlungen auslösen, bleiben Verhalten und Handlungen doch in hohem Ma vom umgebenden Weltbild beeinflusst. Für unsere Überlegungen ist wichtig festzustellen, daß die Informationen in *subjektiv unterschiedlicher* Weise aufgenommen, verstanden und interpretiert werden, entsprechend dem Charakter, Gefühlszustand, den Vorkenntnissen, Interessen, dem ganzen „überkommenen

Hintergrund“ des Subjekts, wie Wittgenstein sagt. Eine *gleiche* Sachlage wird durch verschiedene Subjekte *unterschiedlich* verstanden und interpretiert, die Interpretation entspricht dem jeweils urteilenden Subjekt. So erreicht letztlich jedes Subjekt eine persnliche Basis fr seine Handlungen. Das gilt auch, wenn ein subjektiver Standpunkt einmal „ich wei es nicht“, „ich verstehe es nicht“ lauten und gar keine aktive Handlung stattfinden sollte.

Die Vielfalt so entstandener individueller Urteile und Gewiheiten ist natrlich nicht das letzte Wort. In der Praxis werden bei sozialen Kontakten ursprngliche Meinungen verndert und einander angenhert. Auch hier zeigt sich worauf Wittgenstein hingewiesen hat, da sich „feste Meinungen verflssigen und flssige verfestigen“ knnen (G 96). Auch besteht unabhngig von sozialen Kontakten eine natrliche Tendenz, sich Bilder und Sachverhalte zu vereinfachen, um sie besser verstehen zu knnen. Details werden ausgeblendet, Informationen umgedeutet bis zu ihrer Verflschung, um sie dem jeweiligen persnlichen „berkommenen Hintergrund“, beziehungsweise einem aus persnlicher Sicht „richtigen“ Verstehen anzupassen. Dazu kommt, da Informationen, aus denen wir unsere tglichen Gewiheiten ableiten, zumeist so aufbereitet sind, da sie dem Verstehen des Empfngers entgegenkommen und auch so verteilt werden, dass groe Menschenmengen gleiche Informationen erhalten (siehe moderne Medien). Wie auch immer ein Subjekt letztlich einen persnlichen Standpunkt erreicht, eine Gewiheit fr sein Verhalten und Handeln, es bleibt letztlich die Entscheidung des Einzelnen, was er fr richtig hlt. Das gilt auch, wenn Befehle, Ratschlge oder Warnungen befolgt werden, welche die subjektive Gewiheit beeinflussen knnen.

Der Begriff einer „subjektiven Gewiheit“ impliziert also, da ich selbst es bin, der ber die Richtigkeit meines Verstehens und meiner Entscheidung urteilt und da ich mir selbst, reflexiv, die Gewiheit richtigen Verstehens und Handelns vermittele. Anders also als beim Verstehen zwischen zwei oder mehreren Personen wird hier ein Urteil, ob ich richtig oder falsch verstanden habe, durch mich selbst gefllt. Wittgenstein behandelt zwar oft und ausfhrlich Fragen des Verstehens (in den PU, beispielsweise beim Problem des Regelfolgens) immer aber ist von Verstehen in dialogischen Situationen die Rede. Wittgenstein betont, da, gleichsam von auen her, nicht bewiesen oder widerlegt werden knne, ob einer einen Sachverhalt versteht (BPPII 694. hnlich liegt der Fall, wo nicht bewiesen werden kann, wie einer eine Figur sieht. Siehe PU II, XI). Das wrde bedeuten, ein Urteil ber richtiges oder falsches Verstehen sei ohnehin nicht von auen her, durch Rekurs auf die Meinung anderer, sondern nur durch das Subjekt selbst und in der Folge durch Erfolg oder Mierfolg einer Handlung zu fllen. Immer mu das Subjekt selbst sich um das eigene Verstehen bemhen und beurteilen, ob es richtig verstanden hat. Dieser Umstand und die Unmglichkeit, angesichts der prinzipiellen Subjektivitt des Verstehens dem Begriff „richtig“ eine allgemein gltige Bedeutung zu geben, fhrt dazu, statt „richtiges Verstehen“ besser „hinreichend richtiges Verstehen“ zu sagen. So soll in der Folge „hinreichend richtig“ gemeint sein, wenn „richtig“ gesagt wird.

Der Proze des Verstehens, an dessen Ende ein richtiges Verstehen stehen soll, wird also immer undeutlicher, je besser wir ihn zu fassen versuchen. Er bleibt ein Phnomen, das wir nur sehr vage als ein Aha-Erlebnis umschreiben knnen oder mit Wittgensteins

Worten: „Es mu etwas einschnappen“ (BBP I 546). In PU 151 erlutert Wittgenstein, Verstehen sei kein seelischer Zustand wie etwa traurig sein, man knne beispielsweise seit gestern und auch ununterbrochen traurig sein, man knne sagen „ich verstehe etwas seit gestern“ aber nicht „ich verstehe etwas ununterbrochen“. Es gelingt nicht, „den seelischen Vorgang des Verstehens, der sich, scheint es, hinter jenen grbern und uns daher in die Augen fallenden Begleiterscheinungen versteckt, zu erfassen. ... Ja, wie konnte denn der Vorgang versteckt sein, wenn ich doch sagte <jetzt verstehe ich>, weil ich verstand?“ (PU 153). Wir meinen den Zustand des Verstehens erreicht zu haben, wenn wir selbst mit unserem Verstndnis zufrieden sind. Offenbar ist unser subjektiver „Beweis“ fr richtiges Verstehen dann und nur dann gegeben, wenn es zu einem „befriedigenden Verstehen“ wird. Dazu Wittgensteins Hinweis: „Die fr uns wichtigsten Aspekte der Dinge sind durch ihre Einfachheit und Alltglichkeit verborgen.“ (PU 129). Das entspricht der philosophischen Position des spten Wittgenstein, nicht hinter der Sprache, den Sprachspielen, etwas zu vermuten, das die Sprache erklrt, und ganz allgemein, nicht hinter den Dingen etwas Verborgenes, „Eigentliches“, zu postulieren, das sie erklren soll. So sollte auch das Verstehen als solches hingenommen werden als ohne etwas dahinter Stehendes, das es begrndet und steuert. In der Tat ist dieses zumeist ungenaue, unscharfe und auf das verstehende Subjekt zugeschnittene Verstehen unser *eigentliches* Verstehen und die Gewiheit unserer Standpunkte, die wir daraus ableiten, unsere *eigentliche subjektive* Gewiheit, die mit unserem Verstehen, Knnen und Handeln eng verwoben ist. „Die Grammatik des Wortes <wissen> ist offenbar eng verwandt der Grammatik der Worte <knnen>, <imstande sein>. Aber auch eng verwandt der des Wortes <verstehen>“ (PU 150).

Nicht immer besteht Anla zum Handeln, wenn z.B. eine Information blo aus Neugierde und Wissensdurst aufgenommen wird, um Kenntnis von einer Sachlage zu erreichen. Hier besteht offenbar ein angeborener menschlicher Drang, Eindrcke und Informationen aus der Umwelt zu *ordnen*, in *geordneter* Form aufzunehmen und sich anzueignen. Man versucht zu „verstehen“, was um einen herum geschieht; man ordnet neue Informationen ein, indem man sie mit Erinnerungen und Vorwissen in Verbindung setzt, Analogien sowie Gegenstze zu frheren Gedanken drngen sich auf usw. Am Ende dieses Prozesses steht dann die berzeugung, ein richtiges Bild, einen richtigen Eindruck von den Ereignissen gewonnen zu haben. Auch hier gilt natrlich wieder, da die Eindrcke *subjektiv* geordnet sind entsprechend dem eigenen Vorwissen. Der Drang, sich Klarheit bezglich der uns bedrngenden Eindrcke zu verschaffen, kann so stark sein, da er sich sogar unsinniger Argumente bedient, nur um ein geordnetes, subjektiv „verstndliches“ Bild zu erhalten. Das lsst sich interpretieren als die stndige Ergnzung von Vorwissen und Erfahrung, mit Wittgenstein gesprochen, des berkommenen Hintergrunds, der ja, wie an frherer Stelle ausgefhrt, mitbestimmend ist fr Verstehen, Verhalten und Handeln in aktuellen Fllen. Das gilt fr berlegte Handlungen ebenso wie fr emotionale, unberlegte. Auch die Korrektur eines ursprnglichen Bildes ist subjektiv, selbst wenn Ratschlgen, Verboten oder Befehlen gefolgt wird.

Der Drang nach geordneten und verstndlichen Bildern wird leicht Opfer von Mibrauch, von bewut tendenzisen Darstellungen und Erklrungen (z.B. durch die Medien, parteipolitische Nachrichten usw.), die mangels anderer Kenntnisse und Erklrungsmglichkeiten

begierig aufgegriffen werden, insbesondere dann, wenn sie subjektivem Vorwissen und subjektiver Meinung, kurz dem überkommenen Hintergrund, entgegenkommen. Wo sich eine manipulierte Information mit einer – richtigen oder falschen – vorgefaßten Meinung trifft, ist man besonders leicht geneigt, der Information zu glauben. Abgesehen von der Gefahr des Mißbrauchs wird jeder von uns täglich mit Informationen aus Politik, aus Ökonomie etc. überhäuft und bezieht zu ihnen Stellung. Diese wird umso ungenauer und gefühlsmäßiger sein, je weiter die Information von eigener Sachkenntnis und Erfahrung entfernt ist. Der Drang, irgendeine Einstellung zu haben, ist aber offenbar so stark, daß kaum jemand bekennen würde, er habe überhaupt keine Meinung zu einem Thema. Wo einer z.B. durch seinen beruflichen Hintergrund eine detaillierte Sachkenntnis hat und aktiv im Geschehen mitwirken kann, mag die Entscheidung, ob seine Meinung richtig ist, durch späteren Erfolg oder Mißerfolg getroffen werden. Für die große Menge der Außenstehenden aber bleibt die Frage, wer Recht hat, offen. Man denke an die politischen Positionen der Staatsbürger: Jeder ist von der Richtigkeit seiner subjektiven Meinung überzeugt. Daß es dabei – bei uns jedenfalls -- nur selten Exzesse gibt, liegt an der praktischen Unwirksamkeit der meisten Einzelmeinungen, an Verfahren zur geordneten Zusammenfassung subjektiver Meinungen (Demokratie) und der Akzeptanz übergeordneter ethischer Prinzipien (z.B. Menschenrechte).

Entfernt verwandt den Manipulationen ist es, wenn vereinfachte, ungenaue oder sogar falsche Informationen von einer Person *bewußt* als befriedigende Erklärungen akzeptiert werden. Der Wunsch nach einem ausreichend vollständigen und verständlichen Weltbild verbietet es, Informationen über Fachgebiete der Ökonomie, der Medizin, der Naturwissenschaften usw., mit der gleichen Genauigkeit und dem letzten Wissensstand entsprechend, an eine breite Öffentlichkeit weiterzugeben, wie das an die Fachleute geschieht. Man kann hier nicht von bewußter Täuschung sprechen. Der so informierte Einzelne ist mit einer vereinfachten Darstellung durchaus einverstanden, auch wenn sie in den Augen der Fachleute falsch ist. Der Wunsch nach einer hinreichenden Vollständigkeit des Weltbildes und seiner befriedigenden Verständlichkeit ist oft stärker als der nach einer exakten Darstellung, die doch nicht jeder verstehen würde. Dazu ein Beispiel: Wollte man den Aufbau eines Atoms auf einfache Weise erklären, würde man immer noch auf das alte Bohr'sche Modell zurückgreifen: Elektronen kreisen um einen Atomkern wie Planeten um die Sonne. Dieses Modell hat sich in der Forschung bewährt solange, bis man an seine Grenzen gestoßen ist. Auch, wenn die Physik es nicht mehr anwendet, bleibt es allgemein verständlich durch den Rückgriff auf die Analogie zum Sonnensystem, das jeder kennt. (Nebenbei bemerkt ist es in den Naturwissenschaften völlig normal, beim Beschreiten neuer Wege von Modellen auszugehen von denen man weiß, daß sie nicht „richtig“ sind, die aber zu Resultaten führen können, die das Experiment bestätigt.)

Ich hoffe gezeigt zu haben, daß die „subjektive Gewißeheit“, auf die Wittgenstein hinweist, in ihrer Subjektivität eine relative ist, eine – wie es der Begriff „relativ“ meint – auf das jeweilige Subjekt bezogene. Und daß weiter auch das Verstehen und die Beurteilung einer Sachlage, die dieser Gewißeheit vorangehen, relativ und an das Subjekt gebunden sind. (Das gilt natürlich auch für philosophische Positionen). Diese, wie ich zugebe, radikale Auffassung scheint in ein völliges Chaos subjektiver Standpunkte zu führen. Dem wirken aber offenbar starke soziale Kräfte entgegen und der Umstand, daß die meisten subjektiven Meinungen nach außen unwirksam bleiben. Darum erweist sich die relative Gewißeheit im praktischen Leben als völlig ausreichend und auch der Begriff „Gewißeheit“ als vertretbar.

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Natural Language and its Speakers: Davidson's Compositionality Requirement

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1. Compositionality

In 'Truth and Meaning' (Davidson 1984[1967]) Davidson spells out various conditions of adequacy for (empirical) theories of meaning.¹ One such condition – the basis of much else that goes on in Davidson's philosophy of language – is the requirement of compositionality. Since (natural) languages are infinitely productive, so the argument goes, and a potential infinity of meaningful sentences could be generated by each of them, an adequate theory of meaning for any particular language must 'give an account of how the meanings of sentences depend upon the meanings of words' (1984: p. 18). Unless such an account could be given, Davidson goes on to argue, there could be no explanation of the fact that languages can be learnt (as first languages) by speakers possessed merely of finite means. As Davidson puts it: there would be 'no explaining the fact that, on mastering a finite vocabulary and a finitely stated set of rules, we are prepared to produce and to understand any of a potential infinitude of sentences' (1984: p. 18). Since the feature of compositionality actually characterizes the generation of truth conditions (under a suitable formalization of the sentences in question), Davidson suggests that the theory of meaning should be identified with what was previously called the theory of reference, namely, a Tarski-style theory of truth. The Fregean conception of meanings as truth conditions is thus vindicated by the possibility of supplying such a theory for the whole of language, and by the fact that the theory accounts for the compositionality of meaning so construed.

The purpose of this paper is to point out that Davidson's compositionality requirement, as stated above, is ambiguous. There are two possible readings of the principle that are not equivalent, depending on how the order of the quantifiers is to be interpreted within it, and these different readings suggest very different 'pictures' of the relation between speakers and their languages, and very different accounts of what a theory of meaning is and what it has to contribute to the theory of inter-personal understanding. The ambiguity, so I wish to argue, affects much of Davidson's work in the philosophy of language, and renders many of Davidson's subsequent arguments equivocal or otherwise invalid. In particular, Davidson's conclusions with respect to the finite resources of language, the sufficiency of radical interpretability of (all) meaningful speech, the obscurity of 'alternative conceptual schemes,' the redundancy of reference, the place of conventions in language, and the possibility of shared languages, should all be questioned in these terms. All these theses depend, in one way or another, on assumptions regarding the compositionality of language.²

The principle of compositionality states that the meaning of every sentence - each of a potential infinity - is to be composed of, or derived from, the meanings of a finite stock of primitive semantic items (words) according to finitely stated rules. A language that does not satisfy this principle, e.g., a language with infinitely many semantic 'primitives,' is not a finitely learnable language. However, the principle could be read in either of the following two ways:

The Weak Compositionality Principle (WCP): For every sentence of a language (each of a potential infinity) there is a finite basis (primitive vocabulary + rules) from which the meaning of that sentence is to be composed (or can be derived).

The Strong Compositionality Principle (SCP): There is a finite basis (primitive vocabulary + rules) from which the meaning of every sentence of a language (each of a potential infinity) is to be composed (or can be derived).

The ambiguity, in short, is one of scope. In multiply general statements (such as Davidson's statement (quoted above) concerning the semantic dependence of sentences on words) it makes a difference how the quantifiers are ordered. In the weak version of the compositionality principle (WCP) the universal quantification regarding sentences governs the existential quantification regarding the finite basis; in the strong version (SCP) the order of these quantifiers is reversed. Clearly the two versions are not equivalent. The weak version (WCP) says that the meaning of every sentence of the language can be derived from some finite basis or other. It does not require that the entirety of language should be conceived of as a formal semantic unity. By contrast the strong version (SCP) states that there is a finite basis – a single one – from which the meanings of all sentences are derivable.³ Language in its entirety is thus taken to be governed by a single formal semantic theory.

It might be thought that this distinction is pointless. The strong version of the principle is the one needed for any account of a finitely learnable language, while the weak version renders language-as-a-whole non-compositional, as this requirement is usually conceived, and, consequently, not finitely learnable. However, the point of the distinction is that being thus non-compositional and not finitely learnable (as a whole) are not such desperate conditions for natural languages to be in, since languages that are not strongly compositional as wholes

Derangement of Epitaphs' (2005[1986]), and "The Second Person" (2001[1992]).

³ The ambiguity appears not only in Davidson's work. Consider, for example, the following from Fodor and Lepore (2002): 'It appears not to be seriously in doubt that the compositionality of mental and linguistic representation underlies both their productivity and their systematicity. Mental and linguistic representations are constituted by a finite number of recurring primitive parts [WCP, so far], the arrangements of which determines the structure and content of all the complex representations [SCP, by now].' (Bracketed comments added). Notice that the earlier part of the second of these sentences commits us to the finite constitution of each complex representation, which is, indeed, highly plausible. The second part of that sentence already commits us to a finite basis from which all complex expressions are to be derived, which is a much stronger statement. See Jerry A. Fodor and Ernest Lepore, *The compositionality Papers* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 2002): p. 2.

¹ Presently, Davidson's papers are collected in five volumes of collected papers. In these volumes, each paper is presented with its original date of publication. In what follows, using the "author-date" system of reference, I shall make reference to these papers by means of two dates. In square brackets I shall indicate the date of the paper's original publication (as specified in the collected volume). In regular parentheses I shall indicate the collected volume's date of publication. Uncollected papers will be indicated by a single date. Page references, however, will be given to the collected volumes.

² For these various arguments see: 'Theories of meaning and Learnable Languages' (1984[1965]), 'Radical Interpretation' (1984[1973]), 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme' (1984[1974]), 'Reality Without Reference' (1984[1977]), 'communication and convention' (1984[1982]), 'A Nice

may still have parts that are, and through these parts may well be weakly compositional and learnable to a large degree, though not learnable as wholes. The requirement that languages be learnt as wholes, if they are to be learned at all, is a tacit assumption of Davidson's argument that is left without adequate justification. The alternative to a language that can be finitely learned as a whole is not a language in which every part is not finitely learnable (because not strongly compositional), but rather a language in which finitely learnable (and strongly compositional) parts merge together to form a communal and historical medium that can be shared by many.

Many philosophers (including Davidson, in his later developments) have found the notion of "a" language, on which standard arguments from learnability trade, to be bogus. The totality of sentences (and semantic interpretations) generated within what is known conventionally as "a" natural language need not be governed by any single theory, and there is an empirical sense in which such languages are learned, even if not ever in their totality. The point of the distinction is that this fact need not force a sharp decision between abandoning languages as "bogus" (in favor of some ersatz: idiolects, passing theories, etc.) and abandoning compositionality altogether. Rather, if we allow that languages need not be learned as wholes and still be learned sufficiently for speakers to generate potential infinitudes of sentences and semantic interpretations within them, we may think of the compositionality of natural languages as weak compositionality (WCP), thereby leaving room for conventional languages as well as semantic theories.

It is, indeed, easy to think of cases where the one principle applies but not the other. Consider a historically evolving language (such as English or French) in which a historically later phase of the language might contain primitive lexical items that were lacking in an earlier phase (due to conceptual growth), while the earlier phase might contain primitive lexical items that are no longer contained in the later phase (due to conceptual obsolescence). A language such as this requires more than a single theoretical basis to account for truth and satisfaction of its various sentences, and it may also require an additional account regarding how its primitive vocabulary is formed. Consider also a language shared within a community of speakers, where each speaker encompasses a potential infinitude of sentences by means of a slightly idiosyncratic primitive vocabulary. (Suppose each speaker introduces one semantic innovation that is not definable in previous terms.) In cases like these, and surely our empirical languages are all examples of such phenomena, only WCP - the weaker version of the principle of compositionality - applies. SCP - the stronger version - is ill-suited for languages that are shared among many individuals and that admit of (natural) processes of change in their primitive vocabularies (and rules). Of course, the theory grasped by each individual speaker at a particular moment is a strongly compositional fragment of her natural language as a whole, but given that speakers may differ in their primitive vocabulary and semantic interpretations, this does not imply that SCP is also suitable for the language as a whole. As a shared phenomenon, natural language has more resources than may be captured by any particular (strongly compositional) theory.

In one place (Davidson 1984[1977]) Davidson suggests that a language to which a new predicate is added is one for which the account of truth and satisfaction already given would not be adequate. It would not determine how to go on to the new case. He also suggests

that this should better be seen as a case of two languages, one 'just like the old except for containing a single further predicate,' (1984: p. 217). But the languages we share with one another are surely not so easily multiplied. They retain their identity through many conceptual changes. Multiplying languages to preserve an SCP interpretation of the principle of compositionality does not preserve the identity conditions of natural languages (as normally understood) to which the principle is supposed to apply. It is the first step in the creation of a formalistic ontology of languages, an ontology where languages are individuated in terms of the formal theories that describe them, and in which language is supposed to contain no more, semantically speaking, than what such formal theories specify. Thus, Davidson needs SCP for his various theses in the philosophy of language, but the theoretical price he has to pay for this assumption in terms of the individuation of languages raises doubts as to the adequacy of his approach.

In much of his later work Davidson simply denies that languages are concrete (and shared) entities that could be subject to processes of change and growth. Rather, he tends to construe languages as abstract entities that are "unobservable" and "changeless" (2001: p.107), thereby relegating all processes of (linguistic) change and inter-action to the level of intentional speech.⁴ However, this element of linguistic legislation on Davidson's part (regarding the meaning of "language") is, surely, revisionist in character. Ordinarily speaking, languages are concrete empirical entities, subject to social and historical processes of development and change, while Davidson's account of languages as changeless and unobservable abstract entities is a departure from ordinary usage. As we shall see, Davidson's linguistic revisionism in this regard (as in stating 'there is no such thing as a language . . .') (Davidson, 2005: p. 107)) is itself an unfortunate consequence of his failure to notice the ambiguity recorded here. This much is true, so I shall argue, of other claims of Davidson's as well. Indeed, given the centrality of the principle of compositionality to much that Davidson stands for in the philosophy of language, it can hardly be expected that such an ambiguity would not have a fundamental impact on his philosophical moves and arguments.

It might be objected that although SCP fails for languages in so far as they are shared and temporal, i.e., in so far as they are not to be individuated in terms of any single theory or set of primitives, SCP is still a necessary condition for a language in so far as it is finitely learned, i.e., on the actual language that anyone does learn, and that language is the only entity relevant for empirical study. Otherwise, there would be no account of the speaker's linguistic capacities. But this objection is framed in ambiguous terms. The language anyone does learn is the natural language of her community, English, French, or whatever. That language is not SCP-compositional, since it contains more than any single speaker ever learns. It is, however, WCP-compositional. The fragment of it actually learned by any speaker may well be SCP-compositional, at least at a time-slice, but the identification of such fragments with languages, let alone natural languages, is questionable. The individual fragment, or idiolect, may be important for an account of linguistic capacities, but it doesn't account for the language itself, and it doesn't account for all relevant capacities. In particular, it doesn't account for the speaker's capacity to switch from one such

⁴ See in particular, 'communication and Convention' (1984[1982]), 'A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs' (2005[1986]), 'The Second Person' (2001[1992]), and 'The social Aspect of Language' (2005[1994]).

theory to another as new primitives (or rules) are encountered. Notice, too, that even individual fragments, or idiolects, are SCP-compositional only in a time-relative sense. The fragments of language we acquire across different moments in time need only be WCP-compositional. SCP is not a necessary condition for developing idiolects any more than it is for natural languages.

Something like our distinction between WCP and SCP does make an appearance in another article by Davidson – 'Semantics for Natural Languages' (1984[1970]) – as a distinction between learnability and scrutability as two separate requirements that must be captured by any satisfactory theory. The latter distinction makes its appearance in Davidson's following text:

An acceptable theory should, as I have said, account for the meaning (or conditions of truth) of every sentence by analyzing it as composed, in truth-relevant ways, of elements drawn from a finite stock. [WCP – so far] A second natural demand is that the theory provide a method for deciding, given an arbitrary sentence, what its meaning is [SCP – a single method is required for any arbitrary sentence]. (By satisfying these two conditions a theory may be said to show that the language it describes is learnable and scrutable.) (1984: p. 56; bracketed comments added).

How should this distinction be understood? The difference between 'analyzing each sentence as composed of elements drawn from a finite stock,' on the one hand, and 'providing a method of deciding, given an arbitrary sentence, what its meaning is,' on the other, is not far from the difference between WCP and SCP respectively. It is the difference between conceiving every sentence to be derived from some finite stock and conceiving there to be a finite stock of elements (a method) from which all meaningful sentences (any arbitrary one) could be derived. The two, again, are not equivalent. At least one way that an analysis of each sentence as composed of finite elements might fall short of providing a method for deciding what the meaning of an arbitrary sentence is, is by allowing such analyses to proceed from various finite bases. With such a variety, learnability could clearly be satisfied. There would be no sentence that is not learnable by finite means. But clearly, a variety of finite bases would preclude any single 'method for deciding.'

Thus, it seems that in drawing a distinction between being learnable and being scrutable Davidson notices the ambiguity that vitiates his principle of compositionality. However, Davidson does not allow that the two conditions might differ in their own truth conditions. He seems to believe (though this is no-where stated) that the two conditions are at least materially equivalent, namely that no language is learnable unless it is scrutable, and vice versa. In this way the ambiguity is obscured and the passage between assuming learnability (WCP) and requiring scrutability (SCP) is lubricated. (Not until much later in the development of his work has Davidson encountered (and acknowledged) a counter-example to his tacit assumption of material equivalence. The counter-example is the language of Mrs. Malaprop, which is learnable but no longer scrutable, since it requires a 'passing' theory that cannot be learned in advance over and above the 'prior' theory that can. Hence, there is no method of decision. However, Davidson's analysis of that case does not challenge his tacit assumption (of material equivalence). Rather, his analysis moves in the direction of multiplying languages even further, challenging the very

notion of a public language as a 'clearly defined shared structure' (2005: p. 107), and identifying the individual idiolect as the immediate object of semantic analysis. To this issue I shall return below.)

The problem in all this is that whereas the requirement of learnability, or WCP, is very highly plausible both as a descriptive condition regarding natural languages, and as a requirement for the adequacy of any semantic theory of such a language, the requirement of scrutability, or SCP, is not at all plausible. However, Davidson's employment of the principle of compositionality is often made in terms of the latter requirement, namely SCP. A language that does not satisfy WCP is, indeed, a language that cannot be learned by finite means. A language that contains sentences for which no finite basis exists from which their meanings are composed (or could be derived) is not, indeed, finitely learnable (at least with respect to those sentences). No finite means would do to master the language (or parts thereof), not even finite means that are split between indefinitely many speakers. But learnable languages could be imagined that do not satisfy SCP (indeed, some that are very similar to the languages we all speak). It is possible to imagine a language for which every sentence is composed out of a finite basis of elements, but for which there is no single basis that captures all of it. Such a language would contain no sentence that is not finitely learnable, and it would be learnable (in an empirical sense of the term), though learning it would have to be conceived as an open-ended process that involves more than a one-time mastery of a primitive vocabulary (and a finitely-stated set of rules). Learning a language to the extent of being capable of using it productively (encompassing the potentially infinite by finite means) does not require learning the whole of it. We learn such languages by forming fragmentary idiolects in them and modifying these idiolects as we go along. The idiolects formed at a particular point in time are SCP-compositional; the languages of which they are fragments, as well as what the idiolects become in the fullness of time, need not be. They are, however, WCP-compositional. There is, thus, very little reason to suppose that languages in general must satisfy SCP, or some of the consequences of SCP – finite axiomatizability, radical interpretability, linguistic unshared-ness, and so on – just on the strength of satisfying WCP. Clearly, the whole of Davidson's program in the philosophy of language has to be re-examined in light of this argument.

In what follows, I shall offer the beginning of such a re-examination. In particular, I shall examine various Davidsonian theses that depend on his argument from compositionality. In many of these cases it will be shown that the argument establishing the Davidsonian thesis is equivocal, and that consequently the thesis in question stands in need of further support. In particular, I shall examine the three theses mentioned above (finite axiomatizability, radical interpretability and linguistic unshared-ness) along with corollaries of them such as the sufficiency of truth theoretic semantics, the redundancy of reference, the impossibility of 'alternative conceptual schemes,' the inexistence of languages, and more.

Before going on, however, let me point out one Davidsonian thesis that remains relatively unharmed by the distinction drawn above between WCP and SCP. It is Davidson's formalization thesis, namely the thesis according to which sentences of a natural language could be given semantic interpretations only to the extent that they could be fitted with regimented equivalents in quantificational notation which constitute (in so far as they

allow the truth conditions of the sentences to be revealed) the logical forms of the sentences in question. In other words, Davidson's point is that truth theoretical semantics can account for the meaning of every (natural language) sentence, or utterance, by accounting, along Tarskian lines, for the truth conditions of its logical formalization (within first order quantification theory). Given, however, that the various theories envisaged by WCP for this purpose may differ only in their primitive semantic bases, and not in the logical (or semantic) apparatus they use, the point remains unchallenged. Thus, even if every sentence could be fitted with a regimented equivalent only by some theory or another, all these theories could still be conceived as Tarskian theories that do not differ in the kind of quantificational structure they require (but only in their primitive lexicon).

Furthermore, even if WCP is all we can expect by way of compositionality, it is still necessary to account for an individual's power of encompassing an infinite aptitude by finite means (however varied these means might be), and it is still under-written by a Tarski-type theory of truth and its compositional notion of satisfaction. Thus, it still counts as a reason for viewing the quantificational form of a sentence as its logical form. What does change with our shift to WCP is truth theory's claim to semantic sufficiency. With WCP, the items of the primitive vocabulary have to be accounted for independently. Not merely their satisfaction conditions are relevant but also the processes through which they are entered into, or withdrawn from, the language. Truth theoretic semantics is only a partial account of natural linguistic meaning. Concept formation remains an issue to contend with independently.

2. Finite Axiomatizability

As noted, Davidson links the feature of compositionality to that of finite learnability, i.e., the encompassing of an infinite aptitude by means of finite accomplishments. A corollary of this argument is the thesis of finite axiomatizability (of semantic theory). To be learnable, a compositional language must contain mostly a finite stock of semantic 'primitives,' while a theory of meaning for such a language, being a recursion on a finite basis, must have a finite number of axioms regarding the meaning (or satisfaction conditions) of these primitive predicates. The distinction between WCP and SCP (as two distinct versions of the principle of compositionality) points to a gap in Davidson's argument regarding this feature of semantic theory. His argument rests on a version of SCP, which is tacitly (and invalidly) inferred from WCP. Unless compositionality is understood in terms of SCP, there is no reason to suppose that the language itself, not merely the resources of a speaker who learns it, is captured by means of any finite list of axioms. It is, however, WCP – the weaker version of the principle – that is plausibly established by learnability considerations. (The point is not that languages are actually infinite; only that they are not exhausted by any finite list of axioms, or any formal theory that incorporates such a list.) The inference is as follows:

When we can regard the meaning of each sentence as a function of a finite number of features of the sentence [so far, WCP], we have an insight not only into what there is to be learned [SCP, already]; we also understand how an infinite aptitude can be encompassed by finite accomplishments [SCP, again, in so far as the infinite aptitude is tacitly assumed to be exhaustive of all there is to be learned]. (1984: p. 8. Bracketed comments added).

The inference, in short, is from the very plausible claim that the meaning of a sentence is to be understood as a function of a finite number of its features to the much less plausible claim that language itself – what there is to be learned – is a function of a finite number of features, and that, consequently, the infinite aptitude mastered in learning a language is, as mentioned above, exhaustive of all there is to be mastered. Davidson slips from WCP to SCP by assuming (tacitly) that language and individual aptitude are one and the same thing (and that SCP is an appropriate model for aptitude, or idiolect formation).

The rest of the argument is rather simple. A language that does not satisfy this SCP version of compositionality is (allegedly) not finitely learnable because such a language cannot be captured by the finite means available to a (single) speaker. As Davidson puts it, 'no matter how many sentences a would-be speaker learns to produce and understand, there will remain others whose meanings are not given by the rules already mastered' (1984: p. 8). Davidson acknowledges 'empirical' assumptions upon which the argument depends, e.g., 'that we do not at some point suddenly acquire an ability to intuit the meanings of sentences on no rule at all; that each new item of vocabulary, or new grammatical rule, takes some finite time to be learned; that man is mortal' (1984: pp. 8-9). However, Davidson smuggles into the argument more empirical assumptions than just these, easing the passage from WCP to SCP. Among these, as noted, the assumption that individual aptitudes (being potentially infinite) are exhaustive of the languages learned and that (consequently) languages are learned in their totality by each of their speakers. Only on these assumptions Davidson could move from WCP to SCP without noticing the difference in their truth conditions. But these assumptions do not seem to be true. The language mastered by any one speaker at any particular point in time may well be an infinite aptitude that is encompassed by finite means, but for all that it need not be the whole of her natural language in terms of the conceptual resources that might be available to other speakers who are equally 'infinite' in their aptitudes. The primitive vocabulary may simply be different in important respects, and the question of acquiring it may involve more than just adding a lexical item, or even an axiom pertaining to satisfaction conditions, to a finite list. In particular, it may involve learning a new 'trick' (or rule) without which the axiom will not be understood.

In short, Davidson's inference from compositionality to finite axiomatizability rests on an inference from WCP to SCP, which is invalid. To close the inferential gap, Davidson has to add premises that are dubious in point of their empirical support (as well as their truth value). By these premises, the possibility of different idiolects, each capable of grasping a potential infinitude of sentences of the language, but not necessarily the same infinitude, is hidden from sight. Yet, surely, the possibility that is glossed over is closer to our empirical condition than Davidson's model of exhaustive individual idiolects is.

Against this argument, it might be argued that a language that satisfied WCP can be made to satisfy SCP by the simple expedient of adding the various stocks of primitives that are quantified over by WCP into a larger stock. In other words, SCP can be made (trivially) to be satisfied by a language satisfying WCP by constructing a set of semantic primitives that includes all the primitives that would be required for deriving the meanings of any sentence in the language under consideration. But this objection does not get to the heart of the matter. First, a

set of semantic primitives that is constructed along these lines, i.e., by aggregating the primitive vocabularies of all actual speakers, need not be attributable to any single speaker. It may be too large, or too counterfactual, for that purpose. Just uniting the various sets of primitives that different speakers use need not work up to a workable theory, even if we settle for a finite set of such sets according to the finite number of speakers there actually are.

Secondly, the set of finite vocabularies of finitely many speakers may not exhaust the language either, for given any such enlarged vocabulary, the language may still grow and change. The latter set is, of course, finite, and no language will ever have more than a finite number of speakers. But this de-facto finitude of language is not a consequence of its truth-theoretic form, and it is compatible with the language being potentially infinite, i.e., with its not being exhausted by any finite theory. As to the set of primitives that would exhaust the language in terms of its potentiality of expression, there is no guaranteed that it is a finite set. The set of all finite sets of primitives that would be needed to derive any sentence that might be formulated in the language need not be a finite set. This is not to say, of course, that any natural language is in fact infinite, only that it is potentially so (and the infinite potentiality of a natural language is what gives it its prospects of development and growth).

But why is potentiality of expression relevant for the empirical study of language? Admittedly, no empirical theory should be held accountable to such a notion of potentiality. An empirical theory need not be made to account for all the different ways in which a language may develop and change. The point is only that it should not preclude such changes and developments, by imposing – non-empirically – a theoretical individuation of languages. Finite and empirical theories are all very well as long as they are not taken as exhaustive of the phenomenon under discussion, i.e., as long as they do not replace their own principles of individuation for the more customary ones.

3. The Context Principle

In a famous passage, Davidson extends Frege's context principle from sentences to whole languages. His argument is as follows:

We decided a while back not to assume that parts of sentences have meaning except in the ontologically neutral sense of making a systematic contribution to the meanings of the sentences in which they occur . . . One direction in which it points is a certain holistic view of meaning. If sentences depend for their meaning on their structure [WCP, I add], and we understand the meaning of each item in the structure only as an abstraction from the totality of sentences in which it features [WCP, again], then we can give the meaning of any sentence (or word) only by giving the meaning of every sentence (and word) in the language [SCP. Notice how "language" slips in to replace the lesser totality of sentences in which a word appears]. Frege said that only in the context of a sentence does a word have meaning; in the same vein he might have added that only in the context of the language does a sentence (and therefore a word) have meaning (1984: p. 22. Bracketed comments added).

However, the passage from sentence to language as the minimal unit of meaning is more slippery than

Davidson would have it. The totality of sentences in which a word occurs, or even the totality of sentences in which a particular finite vocabulary occurs, need not be the same as the whole of language, at least not if "language" is meant to apply inclusively to natural, as well as formally constructed languages. And while it is plausible to assume that the meanings of the words are abstractions from the roles that they play in the sentences they occur, it is much less plausible to assume that these various totalities must all merge into a single formal unity. Vocabularies and the sentences that can be expressed by them hang together, but different vocabularies (and different totalities of sentences) need not be unified under a single theoretical structure. In this respect natural languages are very different from formal systems. They evolve continuously without losing their identity, and they constitute "wholes" that are greater than those captured by any particular set of rules and words. Hence, to the extent that Davidson's holism consists in imposing a single theoretical structure on the whole of language, it freezes a dynamic human activity into an abstract and a formal entity.

In 'Reality without Reference' (1984[1977]) Davidson poses a dilemma for the theory of meaning. It is the following. No theory of meaning could be adequate unless it supplied an account of truth (since 'truth conditions' are such a central feature of what a theory of meaning is a theory of). Hence, also, no theory of meaning could be adequate unless it supplied an account of reference (since the determination of reference must enter into the determination of truth). However, any reductive theory of reference, i.e., a theory of reference in non-semantic terms, is bound to lead to results that are unsatisfactory in various respects. First, such 'building block' theories tend to be metaphysical in nature, reducing semantics to non-semantic facts. Secondly, no such reduction can do as well as reference in point of underlying the compositionality of language. Only the semantic feature of satisfaction has in fact been given a compositionality-supporting account (Tarski's). Thus, an account of meaning requires an account of truth, and the latter account requires an account of reference, but no account of reference that could be independently given satisfies other requirements of the theory of meaning, particularly the requirement of compositionality.

Davidson goes on to formulate what he calls the 'paradox of reference.' It is the following. Although the 'building block' method of semantics, which starts by accounting for the meanings (references) of constituent terms and builds upwards to the meanings (truth conditions) of the sentences in which they occur fails as a theoretical account, the alternative, namely, the holistic approach, which views the semantic features of sub-sentential components (predicates) as mere abstractions from the meanings of sentences in which they occur, is incapable of giving 'a complete account' of the meanings of these sub-sentential components, and, consequently, no account of truth either. Davidson's resolution is 'to defend a version of the holistic approach, and urge that we must give up the concept of reference . . .' (1984: p. 221). The point is that relative to a finitely-based theory which makes possible a derivation of truth conditions to all sentences of the language, reference and satisfaction could be seen as mere theoretical constructs, for which there should be no non-theoretical role (and no reductive account). Given that semantic theory could find its empirical basis in the connection between sentences and extra-linguistic facts, no further evidence is needed regarding the semantic features of sub-sentential components. Words and their various connections with

objects could be seen as mere constructs that are needed in implementing the theory.

However, the version of holism that is needed for this purpose is SCP. More specifically, Davidson's holism presupposes that there is a finitely-based theory such that the meanings of all sentences could be derived from it, and since that theory can be supported at the level of sentences, no empirical role need be given to meaning and reference at the sub-sentential level. But this works only if the 'whole' of language can be captured by one theoretical basis, of which all alternatives are merely extensional equivalents. If language turns out to be a greater (irreducible) totality, and more than one such theoretical basis is needed to capture it 'whole', then the components, namely, the meanings of the sub-sentential parts, must be recognized as having an additional role to play as parts of the empirical phenomenon to be explained. They enter different idiolects differentially and affect the nature of linguistic communication in ways that require an independent account. Thus, in order to eliminate reference as merely a theoretical construct, Davidson has to reduce language to a lesser totality than it really is, namely, the totality of sentences that could be captured by a single, unified, theory (essentially, a recursively enumerable totality). He thus has to bring in a reductive picture of language as an abstract theoretical construction that is unobservable and changeless, rather than the product of time and chance that language, like all evolving entities, really is. The assimilation of language to a formal theory is right there to be seen. It is not a consequence of Davidson's semantic theory; it is presupposed by it all along.

4. Radical Interpretation

These matters come to a head as we progress to Davidson's interpretation theory, and the various consequences drawn from it (regarding conceptual schemes, malapropism, and more). In radical interpretation, semantic theory takes the form of 'interpretation of one idiom of talk in another' (1984: p. 126), and the question Davidson addresses is what knowledge is required for the successful fulfillment of such a task in relation to a foreign language. Compositionality figures in Davidson's specification of the task, since the 'idiom' to be interpreted is (as always) a potential infinity of sentences, while the interpreter, like the speaker, can avail herself only of finite means. As in language acquisition, the task in question (interpretation) could not be accomplished had there not been a compositional structure in the idiom under interpretation.

Again, Davidson offers truth-theory as the framework within which to accomplish the task of radical interpretation, since truth-theory, if applicable, should supply necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of each foreign sentence (or utterance). But the case of radical interpretation makes it even clearer than before that the truth of each T- sentence cannot be judged with reference to fixed translation relations between quoted sentences of the object language (the idiom under interpretation) and used sentences of the meta-language (the interpreter's language). Rather, what has to be offered is an empirical basis for judging sameness of truth conditions between used meta-linguistic sentences, on the one hand, and quoted (or structurally described) sentences of the object-language, on the other. Sameness of truth conditions can be empirically conjectured with reference to the relatively transparent attitude of 'holding a

sentence true' in particular circumstances, which gives the radical interpreter an entry into the language. However, the condition (sameness of truth-conditions) is so weak as to raise questions about the adequacy of the resulting translation. (Thus, for example, all arithmetical truths could be taken as interpretations of one another, without any finer discrimination). Here, again, compositionality comes to the rescue. Not any interpretation by truth conditions would do. Only such interpretations would be considered that would serve to support systematic projections into the speaker's potential infinity of sentences. And given that the speaker in such circumstances is arbitrarily selected, only such interpretations would do that would serve to support systematic projections into every speaker's potential infinity of sentences. Here, again, we must be careful as to how much compositionality is to be expected of the language at hand.

Davidson's formulation of the requirement is as follows:

The interpreter must be able to understand any of the infinity of sentences the speaker might utter. [A WCP/ SCP ambiguity, depending on how "might" is to be interpreted in this context.] If we are to state explicitly what the interpreter might know that would enable him to do this, we must put it in finite form. If this requirement is to be met, any hope of a universal method of interpretation must be abandoned. The most that can be expected is to explain how an interpreter could interpret the utterances of speakers of a single language (or a finite number of languages): it makes no sense to ask for a theory that would yield an explicit interpretation for any utterance in any (possible) language. (1984: pp. 127-8; bracketed comment added).

Before taking stock of the ambiguity in this formulation of Davidson's compositionality requirement, let us pause over the argument regarding the possibility of a universal method of interpretation. A universal method is one that exceeds the most that can be expected, namely, an explanation of how an interpreter captures the utterances of speakers of a single language or a finite number of languages. In other words, a universal method is one that would promise an interpretation (on a single basis) of infinitely many languages, or of an utterance taken arbitrarily from any possible language (an infinite totality). A method such as this, Davidson rightly claims, is not one that it is reasonable to expect given the finite means of the interpreter. Presumably, the reason for this is that infinitely many languages, where each is an infinite totality of sentences governed by a finite vocabulary (and finitely stated rules), would require infinitely many semantic primitives, making the task of interpreting all of them on a single basis impossible to achieve. But unless we assume languages to be formal entities governed by SCP, the strong version of compositionality, this may also be the condition of a less ambitious interpreter who wishes merely to interpret one language in its totality, for that totality may involve a potential infinity of speakers, each with a variant basic vocabulary and a consequent infinite potentiality of utterances. The contrast between a universal method of interpretation, which is impossible, and a modest method, which is not, presupposes SCP.

Consider, now, the ambiguity affecting 'the infinity of sentences the speaker might utter.' The question is, 'might utter' given what? If the speaker is given as a particular sentence-generating mechanism, i.e., in terms of a particular semantic theory, then the infinity in question is the infinity that can be generated by the theory in question. The task of the interpreter is to decipher each member of

that infinite set of sentences and supply it with an interpretation. Is that the whole of the speaker's language? This is hardly the case. For the speaker may be a member of a linguistic community, whose various members operate with different (though, no doubt, overlapping) sentence-generating mechanisms (or theories), each with its own potential infinity of sentences. Faced with that theoretical whole, the interpreter may find her own finitely based apparatus (what Davidson later calls the 'prior' theory) insufficient (and the 'passing' theory that will be needed may outstrip the limits of radical interpretation). If, on the other hand, the speaker is given not in terms of a particular sentence generating mechanism (or theory), but in terms of her membership in a linguistic community, then the infinite totality of sentences that she 'might' produce (as an arbitrary member of that community) outstrips the totality producible by any specific mechanism (or theory). Granted even that every speaker might be understood in terms of a particular theory, it is yet to be established that there is a particular theory in terms of which all of them (collectively) might be understood.

Assuming SCP, Davidson generalizes the results of radical interpretation from the individual to the community. If radical interpretation begins by supplying open T-sentences with variables ranging over speakers and times, and the evidence for such T-sentences specifies conditions affecting each individual at a time, the generalization is a universal quantification over speakers and times with the proviso that the speakers in question belong to a certain speech community. Thus, if an open sentence T is:

- (T) 'Es Regnet' is true-in-German when spoken by x at time t if and only if it is raining near x at t (1984: p. 135).

And the evidence for it is:

- (E) Kurt belongs to the German speech community and Kurt holds true 'Es regnet' on Saturday at noon and it is raining near Kurt on Saturday at noon (1984: p. 135).

The generalization (which of course requires more evidence) is:

- (GE) (x) (t) (if x belongs to the German speech community then (x holds true 'Es regnet' at t if and only if it is raining near x at t)) (1984: p. 135).

Regarding the proviso that is incorporated into the generalized conditional, Davidson says: 'The appeal to a speech community cuts a corner but begs no question: speakers belong to the same speech community if the same theories of interpretation work for them.' (1984: p. 135). But there is a question that is begged by this reference to the community, and the question is one regarding the scope of compositionality. Notice that the membership criterion just quoted makes being answerable to the same theory of interpretation as others sufficient, not necessary, for membership in that community (i.e., in the community defined by the theory). However, a person may belong to an empirical community, e.g., the German speech community, while being answerable to an entirely different theory and not to the one in question. Again, all we need to imagine for that purpose is a loss or a gain in primitive vocabulary due to conceptual variation. (GE) however makes membership in the community sufficient for holding certain utterances true (i.e., for being answerable to a certain theory). In other words, it makes being answerable to the same theories necessary, not merely sufficient, for membership in a speech community.

Hence (GE) exceeds the limits of the membership criterion and is not supported by the evidence. It is plausible that speakers who are answerable to the same theories (namely, the same theories work for them) are members of the same speech community. It is far less plausible that only such speakers (i.e., speakers answerable to the same theory) are members of any empirical speech community. The former statement is compatible with WCP. The latter requires SCP.

Thus, by moving from the individual to the communal case, Davidson does make an important assumption that is not fully accounted for (indeed, one that he later retracts). The assumption is that interpretation theory governs the whole of language (taken communally), not merely the potential infinity of sentences that a particular speaker would be inclined to produce at a particular time. That assumption requires SCP, namely, the claim that there is a finitely based theory such that every sentence of the language could be derived by it (in terms of its interpretation). That, however, is not the degree of compositionality that it is plausible to require of a speaker, since the speaker could be interpreted compatibly with WCP, namely, the condition that specifies that every sentence of the language could be derived by some finitely based theory or other (the one that suffices for the individual speaker being one of them). Again, Davidson is taking a plausible claim about compositionality and inflating it into a much stronger one without much justification.

The upshot of this analysis is the following. If radical interpretation culminates in generalizations (such as GE), then it contains the presupposition that answerability to a single truth theory (as captured in the idiom of the interpreter) is necessary for membership in the linguistic community in question. This presupposition is a form of SCP. It is, however, an assumption that is not warranted by the evidence gleaned from language as a concrete and historically evolving entity. The evidence is compatible with WCP, which does not require that linguistic communities would be delimited by conformity to formal semantic structures.

5. Schemes and Languages

In subsequent work, Davidson moves in two opposing directions. Earlier on, the dominant direction had been to deny that there are conceptual variations of any kind that might present roadblocks on the way of radical interpretation (or that might question Davidson's reliance on SCP as it is incorporated into his theories of meaning and interpretation). Languages are taken to be primary while 'conceptual schemes' are denied altogether, and in this theoretical setting languages are taken to be both empirically given (as 'spoken' languages) and formally specifiable (as subject to a strongly compositional theory of meaning/interpretation). On this construal, conceptual schemes are made to appear as radically untranslatable natural languages, rather than multiple but irreducible bases upon which interpretation could take place (as made possible by WCP). (Of course, the latter option does still present roadblocks on the way of radical interpretation; it makes it insufficient for determining the truth conditions of an alien speaker's utterances, and it leaves open the possibility that some conceptual learning might have to take place on top of radical interpretation and by other means. But it is not committed to shadowy languages that are absolutely untranslatable.)

Davidson argues against the possibility of 'alternative conceptual schemes,' and against the 'very idea' of a conceptual scheme, by pointing out that a language that is (wholly or partly) untranslatable to a known language is inconceivable, and that whatever the evidence that would persuade us that a language is untranslatable would be strong enough to persuade us that what we have in front of us is not a language to begin with. But there are philosophically interesting cases of incommensurability, e.g., the case of mental and physical predicates (anomaly), or that of alien ethical systems that are not accounted for in these terms. Such differences arise within translatable languages but translatability between languages does not mitigate incommensurability between intra-linguistic schemes. Davidson's argument identifies schemes, i.e., sets of predicates for which truth-theoretic axioms could be given, with languages, thereby presupposing an SCP understanding of what language is. If on the other hand, language is understood in terms of WCP, room is left within (natural) language for a whole variety of schemes, of which some would be of the philosophically interesting kind.

Davidson's argument against the 'very idea' of a conceptual scheme presupposes SCP. The argument, in broad outline, is as follows:

1. If there are conceptual schemes at all, there must also be alternative conceptual schemes.
2. Alternative conceptual schemes would be (mutually) incommensurable, for lack of a common conceptual ground (or measure).
3. However, there can be no incommensurable schemes, since such incommensurability would be tantamount to the existence of languages that are (wholly or partially) untranslatable to a known linguistic idiom.
4. There are no languages that are (wholly or partially) untranslatable to a known idiom. All languages are radically interpretable to a given language.

Therefore:

5. There are no conceptual schemes (over and above translatable languages). The very idea of such schemes does not make good sense.

The weakness of the argument lies in the passage from step 3 to step 4. Step 3 is plausible, if "language" is taken in its most general signification, applying to formally-constructed as well as natural languages. Otherwise, there is no plausible identification of schemes and languages, as required by the argument. Step 4, however, is true only with respect to natural languages. It does not pertain to formally-constructed languages, which may well be untranslatable to other idioms (depending on the kinds of predicates that are incorporated into them). Hence, there is a lacuna in Davidson's argument. Davidson refutes incommensurability only with respect to natural languages. Assuming further that natural languages are strongly compositional (SCP), Davidson extends the case to all languages. In this, however, he is guilty of equivocation.

Presupposing SCP, Davidson ignores an important possibility that lies between his poles of radical uninterpretability to any idiom, on the one hand, and mere "intelligible" (small) differences, on the other. It is that even within a single spoken language there will be different and mutually untranslatable schemes of predicates, or concepts. Davidson's own case of anomalous monism, with mental and physical predicates that are untranslatable

to one another's scheme, is a case in point. Conceptual schemes could be imagined in terms of such diversity of predicates, and their existence within a language, though it does not suffice to establish full blown conceptual relativism, shows that natural language cannot be identified with a seamless conceptual order. A pluralism of such schemes is possible, indeed mandatory, if we are to account for the actual complexities of language use, which is compatible with WCP but not with SCP.

In later work (Davidson 1986; 2001[1992]), some roadblocks on the way of radical interpretation are detected and acknowledged by Davidson after all (malapropisms), and a breath-taking reversal is initiated (though not one that touches on the cardinal issue of strong compositionality). 'In linguistic communication,' Davidson concludes, 'nothing corresponds to a linguistic competence as often described ...' Hence 'there is no such thing as a language ...' and 'We must give up the idea of a clearly defined shared structure which language users acquire and then apply to cases' (Davidson 2005[1986]: p. 107). But notice what Davidson is not denying in these radical-sounding claims. He is not denying that there are languages *per se*, only that languages can be structures that are both 'clearly defined' and 'shared.' Hence, languages remain in the picture as abstract entities that are unshared (and multiplied to suit each individual idiolect). He is not denying that speakers have a linguistic competence which is learned in advance of occasions of use. What he is denying is that this competence is sufficient for linguistic communication. In Davidson's new terminology, a 'passing' theory is required on top of the 'prior' theory that reflects the linguistic competence, where the passing theory contains, in addition to all that is learned in advance, items of information, gleaned from particular contexts, regarding the speaker's idiosyncrasies of use, namely, which word occupies what conceptual role for the particular speaker at hand. Thus, if successful interpretation of malapropism constitutes a counter example to Davidson's prior faith in the sufficiency of radical interpretation, Davidson moves to rectify the situation by relegating to 'linguistic communication,' or 'speech' all that 'linguistic competence,' or the 'clearly defined' structure of language, could not accomplish. But competence and language do not disappear. Minus the sharing, they are still to be described as before, namely, in terms of strong compositionality (SCP). Being insufficient for linguistic communication they are elevated to a higher pedestal as 'abstract object(s)' that are 'changeless' and 'unobservable' (Davidson 2001: p. 107), but they are not rejected altogether. We remain with the oddity of unshared languages (and formal competences) that are spoken (and formed) in the essentially social settings of speech and linguistic communication. This oddity is a later consequence of Davidson's insistence on SCP, and his tendency to multiply languages (as formal unities) whenever the possibility of conceptual variety is encountered.

The possibility of malapropism requires that sometimes a phrase in one person's mouth would occupy the conceptual role of another, and that interpreters should be adept in locating the switch and adapting their interpretations accordingly. On hearing something like 'familiarity breeds contempt,' the interpreter would come up with a 'passing' theory that would state that what the speaker had said is something that is true if and only if familiarity breeds contempt, though she said it by means of a sentence that is true if and only if familiarity breeds attempt. The passing theory differs from the prior theory in not being learned in advance of a particular encounter,

and in incorporating much idiosyncratic information about particular speakers. On pain of failing to account for such phenomena as malapropism, Davidson asks us to choose between three principles upon which the standard view of 'first' (literal) meaning is constituted, namely, that first meaning is systematic, that it is shared, and that it is prepared. Not all three could be met, since the (ubiquitous) possibility of malapropism shows that the interpretation that is based on rules that are learned in advance (prepared) and that are tied to conventional uses of language does not suffice for interpretation, and the interpretation that works is neither prepared nor conventional. Davidson's own choice is for preserving (versions of) the first two conditions, regarding the systematic nature and the shared-ness of interpretations, and revising the third condition, regarding the necessity of conventional, or shared languages. From this argument follows his conclusion against the existence of languages as quoted above.

Notice, however, that Davidson leaves intact the condition of systematicity (of first meaning), and that this condition is another version of our SCP. In fact, the move from the weak to the strong versions of the principle can be observed even in the text of the paper currently under discussion ('A nice Derangement of Epitaphs'). Consider the following:

How should we understand or modify (1)-(3) to accommodate malapropism? Principle (1) requires a competent interpreter to be prepared to interpret utterances of sentences he or she has never heard uttered before. [WCP, so far]. . . The interpreter thus has a system for interpreting what he hears or says. You might think of this system as a machine which, when fed an arbitrary utterance (and certain parameters provided by the circumstances of the utterance), produces an interpretation. One model for such a machine is a theory of truth, more or less along the lines of a Tarski truth definition. It provides a recursive characterization of the truth conditions of all possible utterances of the speaker [SCP, by this point], and it does this through an analysis of utterances in terms of sentences made up from a finite vocabulary and the finite stock of modes of composition. (Davidson, 1986: p. 437; bracketed comments added).

Only the strong version of the principle (SCP) compels us to choose between the second and third requirements (for first meaning), namely, the requirement of shared meanings and the requirement of shared linguistic expressions, respectively. This is so because only SCP requires, on pain of violating "systematicity" that the interpreter should be prepared to interpret every utterance produced by a speaker, on the basis of a particular finite basis. If systematicity is to be understood in terms of WCP, no such requirement follows, and the possibility of malapropism could be taken in stride. The systematicity of language would not be thought of as precluding failures of derivation, where different bases are at hand (as in "one word occupying the conceptual role of another"), and no choice between the shared-ness of interpretation and the conventionality of language need be enforced.

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Der Beitrag einer „Logik der Philosophie“ zum Verständnis des Dialogs der Kulturen

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Die Absicht der folgenden Ausführungen ist es, die von Eric Weil stammende Idee einer „Logik der Philosophie“ (Weil ²1996) systematisch aufzugreifen und für die Klärung von Möglichkeiten und Grenzen eines weltanschaulichen Dialogs zwischen den Kulturen fruchtbar zu machen. Im ersten Teil soll gezeigt werden, was unter einer „Logik der Philosophie“ zu verstehen ist und inwiefern sie rechtmäßig den Anspruch erheben kann, „Erste Philosophie“ zu sein. Im zweiten Teil wird ein kurzer Ausblick gegeben, wie eine Logik der Philosophie auf die kulturell verankerte Dialogsituation zwischen Weltanschauungen ein neues Licht zu werfen vermag.

1. Eine „Logik der Philosophie“ als Erste Philosophie

Der von einer Logik der Philosophie erhobene Anspruch, Erste Philosophie zu sein, soll uns als Ausgangspunkt dafür dienen, die Grundzüge einer Logik der Philosophie in einer Auseinandersetzung mit der Metaphysik/Ontologie (als der traditionellen Form von Erster Philosophie) auf systematische Weise zu entwickeln. Der genannte Anspruch geht aus einer zusammenfassenden Bemerkung Weils hervor: „Die *Erste Philosophie* ist also keine Theorie des Seins, sondern die Entwicklung des *logos*, des Diskurses, für sich selbst und durch sich selbst, in der Wirklichkeit der menschlichen Existenz, die sich in ihren Verwirklichungen versteht, insofern sie sich verstehen *will*. Sie ist nicht Ontologie, sie ist Logik, nicht des Seins, sondern des konkreten menschlichen Diskurses, der Diskurse, die den Diskurs in seiner Einheit bilden.“ (Weil ²1996, 69; übers. v. PO) Mit der hier angesprochenen Ersten Philosophie als einer Logik des konkreten menschlichen Diskurses ist die „Logik der Philosophie“ selbst gemeint. Inwiefern ist es aber überhaupt nur denkbar, dass eine Logik des konkreten menschlichen Diskurses das Erbe der Metaphysik als Erster Philosophie antreten kann? Ist mit der metaphysischen Frage nach dem Seienden als Seienden, d.h. nach dem Sein des Seienden, nicht das Fundamentalniveau des philosophischen Fragens schon erreicht? Kann denn Erste Philosophie etwas anderes sein als die metaphysische „Grund- und Gesamtwissenschaft“ (Coreth 1994, 20)?

Die Fundamentalität und Universalität der metaphysischen Frage liegt in der begrifflichen Eigenart von „Sein“ begründet. Ein gewöhnlicher, empirischer Begriff wird so gebildet, dass von den konkreten Differenzen, die zwischen den Dingen herrschen, die unter einen gemeinsamen Begriff gebracht werden sollen, abstrahiert wird, um derart eine Allgemeinheit aussagen zu können. Im Falle der empirischen Begriffsbildung gilt deshalb: Je allgemeiner ein Begriff, desto abstrakter, d.h. desto inhaltsleerer. Im Gegensatz dazu hat der Begriff des Seins diese außergewöhnliche Eigenschaft an sich, dass seine allumfassende Allgemeinheit keiner Abstraktion geschuldet sein kann: Mit dem Begriff „Sein“ wird nicht eine Einheit ausgesagt, die von allen Differenzen zwischen den Seienden abstrahierend absieht, denn auch die Differenzen zwischen den Seienden bzw. die individuelle Seinsweise sind etwas Seiendes und nicht nichts. Als allumfassende Einheit kann der Seinsbegriff nichts

abstrahierend ausschließen. Deshalb drückt der Seinsbegriff nicht eine abstrakte, sondern eine *konkrete Allgemeinheit* aus: Er meint nicht etwas Spezifisches am Seienden (etwa sein bloßes der-Fall-sein bzw. sein Dass-sein im Unterschied zum Was-sein), sondern das jeweilige Seiende in seiner Gänze als solches. Die Einheit, die der Seinsbegriff bezeichnet, ist also eine Einheit, die nicht abstrahierend von den Differenzen absieht, sondern sie notwendig mit einschließt. Diese begriffliche Eigenart von „Sein“ wird traditionell als Analogie bezeichnet (vgl. Weissmahr ²1991, 89ff.).

Die der metaphysischen Tradition entnommene, hier nur kurz skizzierte Logik des Seinsbegriffs kann noch weiter entfaltet werden. Der Seinsbegriff ist *transzendental*, da er der empirischen Begriffsbildung als Ermöglichungsbedingung voraus liegt. Denn um aus der empirisch begegnenden Mannigfaltigkeit begriffliche Einheiten abstrahieren zu können, muss ich zuvor wissen, dass empirische Mannigfaltigkeit und begriffliche Einheit aufeinander bezogen werden können. Der Seinsbegriff bezeichnet nun genau dieses apriorische Wissen um die in sich differenzierte Totalität, innerhalb derer allererst begriffliche Bestimmungen des empirisch Gegebenen statthaben können. Mit „Sein“ verfüge ich über einen Begriff, der mich die in sich differenzierte, allumfassende Einheit benennen lässt, sodass ich innerhalb dieses ursprünglich analogen Feldes reine Einheiten (von den Differenzen abstrahierende Begriffe) bilden kann und, komplementär dazu, reine Differenzen, die sich der begrifflichen Einheitsbildung nicht fügen, behaupten kann. Jedoch können diese Einheiten und Differenzen niemals so rein sein, dass sie den analogen Grund, auf dem sie ruhen, jemals abschütteln können: Jede begriffliche Einheit ist bezogen auf eine Vielheit, innerhalb derer sie allererst die Einheit abstrahierend erblickt; und jede Differenzierung muss doch noch voraussetzen, dass das Differente wenigstens darin noch übereinkommt, ein Seiendes zu sein.

Der angesprochene transzendente Charakter des Seinsbegriffs ist jedoch nicht zu verstehen als Unabhängigkeit von aller empirischen Erfahrung. Die Rede von „Sein“ erhält ihre Legitimität ja dadurch, dass vom Seienden als Seienden gesprochen werden kann. Die Rede von Transzendentalität meint also nicht etwa, dass der Begriff des Seins das Seiende seinem Dasein nach hervorbringt, sondern präzise dies: Um ein empirisch Gegebenes *als (so und so) Seiendes* zu verstehen, bin ich auf ein nicht empirisch induziertes, d.h. ein transzendentales Verständnis von „Sein“ angewiesen. Dieses Verständnis ist so in Hinblick auf jedes empirische Verständnis ein *Vorverständnis*. In Hinblick darauf, dass „Sein“ immer das Sein eines empirisch begegnenden Seienden meint, wird nun die bloß formale Analogie-Struktur des Seinsbegriffs überschritten: Um zu einem Verständnis des Sein des Seienden zu werden, muss der Seinsbegriff im Sinne eines inhaltlichen Vorverständnisses *entworfen* werden. Der nicht nur formale Seinsbegriff trägt also einen Entwurfscharakter an sich, der sich nicht vom empirisch Gegebenen in seiner bloßen Gegebenheit ableiten lässt.

Ein sehr schematisches Beispiel soll diesen transzendentalen Entwurfscharakter des Seinsverständnisses veranschaulichen. Die naturwissenschaftliche Entscheidung, die Natur als experimentell zugänglichen, funktionalen Gesetzeszusammenhang zu entwerfen, gründet nicht in der Natur selbst. Dies lässt sich daran sehen, dass die Natur auch andere Weisen des Umgangs mit ihr zulässt, von denen nicht gesagt werden kann, dass sie im Gegensatz zum naturwissenschaftlichen Zugang falsch wären: Natur kann zum Beispiel in einer ästhetischen Betrachtung als Sinneinheit entworfen werden. In diesem Sinne hängt das Sein der Natur von einem apriorischen Vorverständnis ab, das entworfen werden muss. Dieser Entwurf findet deshalb keinen Maßstab im empirisch Gegebenen, weil er dessen Seinscharakter allererst eröffnet. Demgemäß ist es ein Entwurf des Seins des Seienden aus dem „Nichts“. Die ontologische Frage zeigt so trotz ihres allgemeinen und fundamentalen Charakters eine eigentümliche Begrenzung: Denn das Seinsverständnis in seinem Entwurfscharakter kann nicht mehr mit ontologischen Mitteln besprechen. Der Entwurf des Seins ist nicht mehr Thema einer Philosophie des Seins des Seienden.

Wie hätte nun eine Erste Philosophie auszusehen, die fähig wäre, den Entwurf des Seinsverständnisses zu thematisieren? Meine These lautet, dass die „Logik der Philosophie“ die gesuchte Erste Philosophie sein könnte. In Bezug auf das Beispiel der Naturbetrachtung nenne ich drei Merkmale, die eine Logik der Philosophie als rechtmäßige Erste Philosophie ausweisen.

Das Beispiel der Naturbetrachtung macht *erstens* deutlich: Es gibt offenbar eine Vielfalt von möglichen Seinsentwürfen, die zwar jeweils auf empirische Erfüllung angelegt sind, zwischen denen aber nicht empirisch in Hinblick auf Wahrheit entschieden werden kann. In diesem Sinne handelt es sich um eine *irreduzible Pluralität* von Seinsentwürfen: Das empirisch Gegebene kann in einem vielfältigen Sinn als Seiendes entworfen werden. Diesem Befund entspricht die Logik der Philosophie, indem sie ein System von philosophischen Kategorien entfaltet, die dem Anspruch nach nicht auseinander abgeleitet werden können und also irreduzibel sind (vgl. Weil ²1996, 70f.). Diese irreduziblen Kategorien lassen sich als Seinsentwürfe im oben genannten Sinn deuten (zur Berechtigung dieser Deutung vgl. Weil 1999, 82).

Zweitens deutet sich am Beispiel der Naturbetrachtung die geschichtlich-kulturelle Verankerung der irreduziblen Seinsentwürfe an: Der naturwissenschaftliche Seinsentwurf ist nicht in allen geschichtlich-kulturellen Situationen auf gleiche Weise möglich; zumindest entspringt er faktisch einer ganz bestimmten geschichtlich-kulturellen Situation. Dieser eigentümlichen Geschichtlichkeit der irreduziblen Seinsentwürfe entspricht eine Logik der Philosophie darin, dass die irreduziblen Kategorien, die sie systematisch entfaltet, einen ebenso irreduziblen Bezug auf ihnen entsprechende lebensweltliche „Einstellungen“ (*attitudes*) aufweisen (vgl. Weil ²1996, 71). Hier erst wird der Grund für die Irreduzibilität der Kategorien deutlich: Sie sind irreduzibel, weil sie eine logisch reine, aber nur in einer bestimmten geschichtlichen Situation zu entdeckende Einstellung (in einer je eigenen Form von Kohärenz) zur Sprache bringen (vgl. Weil ²1996, 428). Philosophische Kategorien sind Sprache gewordene Einstellungen, d.h. Grundstellungen zur Welt im Ganzen. Die so verstandene Einstellung kann als „vorontologisches Seinsverständnis“ gedeutet werden, das durch die philosophische Kategorie

ontologisch expliziert wird (vgl. Heidegger ¹⁷1993, 15). Erst aus diesem Zusammenhang mit der Einstellung wird deutlich, dass eine philosophische Kategorie nicht widerlegt, sondern nur in einem Akt des freien Übergehens in eine andere Einstellung überschritten werden kann.

Drittens kann am Beispiel der Naturbetrachtung der nicht-subjektive Charakter eines Seinsentwurfes deutlich werden: Der naturwissenschaftliche Entwurf ist zwar auf empirische Erfüllung angelegt, gründet aber in „nichts“ (in nichts Empirischem). Trotzdem erfährt sich das Subjekt in einem Seinsentwurf als passiv und responsiv: Das empirisch Gegebene *zeigt sich* mir als so und so Seiendes, und ich *antworte* mit meinem theoretischen Entwurf auf dieses spezifische Sich-zeigen des Gegebenen. Der Entwurf trägt also einen spezifischen Antwortcharakter in sich; doch wem antwortet der Entwurf? Die Antwort kann sich weder auf das empirisch Gegebene beziehen (denn dies ist nur die Erfüllungsinstanz des Entwurfs), noch kann sie sich auf das entwerfende Subjekt selbst beziehen (das als Entwurfsinstanz keine an sich selbst gerichtete Antwort zulässt). Da also der Seinsentwurf weder im „Subjekt“ noch im „Objekt“ gründet, muss es ein Drittes geben (sozusagen die Gründungsinstanz des Entwurfs), das den Seinsentwurf in seiner Eigentümlichkeit verständlich macht. Die Logik der Philosophie benennt dieses Dritte durch den Begriff „Sinn“. Die Kategorie des Sinns ist die „Kategorie der Kategorien“ (Weil ²1996, 423), sie bildet die mediale Einheit aller irreduziblen Seinsentwürfe. Die Einheit des Sinns hat ebenso analogen Charakter wie die des Seins: Alle Seinsentwürfe kommen darin überein und unterscheiden sich zugleich darin, dass sie eine bestimmte Form von Sinn entfalten. Der durch die Seinsentwürfe entfaltete Sinn liegt dabei jeder möglichen Wahrheit (im Sinne der Adäquationstheorie) voraus: Die Kategorien sind nicht vielfältige Theorien über das Seiende im Ganzen, von denen nur eine wahr sein kann, sondern vielfältige transzendente Grundentwürfe von „Sein“, die solche wahrheitsfähigen Theorien über das Seiende allererst ermöglichen. Der so eingeführte Begriff des Sinns meint weder eine bloß subjektive Projektion noch einen an den empirisch begegnenden Dingen zu konstatierenden objektiven Gehalt. Der erwähnte Antwortcharakter, der die Subjektivität des Seinsentwurfs übersteigt, kann so formuliert werden: In der Entfaltung eines Seinsentwurfes antwortet das entwerfende Subjekt auf einen sich ereignenden Sinn, dessen Ort vorläufig nur in einem Bezug eröffnenden „Zwischen“ angesiedelt werden kann: zwischen Subjekt und Objekt, zwischen Mensch und Welt. „Sinn“ meint hier deshalb die irreduziblen Seinsentwürfe selbst, und zwar hinsichtlich dessen, dass sie sich geschichtlich-faktisch ereignen, hinsichtlich ihres Ereignischarakters (vgl. Heidegger ³1988, 20ff.).

2. Schlussfolgerung: Logos zwischen den Kulturen

Aus einer derart konzipierten Ersten Philosophie als eigentümlicher Logik des Sinns (der geschichtlich-konkreten menschlichen Diskurse in ihrer Einheit) lassen sich Schlussfolgerungen für das Verständnis eines Dialogs der Kulturen ziehen. Diese Anwendung auf das kulturelle Feld unterliegt jedoch zwei Beschränkungen.

Erstens müssen all jene Probleme des interkulturellen Dialogs ausgeklammert werden, die sich im Sinne einer entscheidbaren Wahrheit lösen lassen. Aus Sicht der Logik der Philosophie handelt es sich hier bloß um Probleme, die innerhalb ein- und derselben Einstellung

auftauchen können. Die fundamentale Eigentümlichkeit des interkulturellen Dialogs scheint dagegen darin zu bestehen, dass Fragen diskutiert werden, die allen prinzipiell entscheidbaren Wahrheitsfragen voraus liegen. Die prinzipielle Unentscheidbarkeit stellt jedoch die Rationalität von kulturell verankerten Weltanschauungen überhaupt in Frage (vgl. Muck 1999). Die skizzierte Logik des Sinns kann in dieser Konstellation als Versuch verstanden werden, die spezifische Rationalität von kulturell verankerten Weltanschauungen herauszuarbeiten.

Eine zweite Beschränkung ergibt sich dadurch, dass im konkreten Feld der kulturell verankerten Weltanschauungen in der Regel nicht eine logisch reine Einstellung (die sich in einer reinen Kategorie der Logik der Philosophie zur Sprache bringen lässt) angetroffen wird, sondern etwas, was in der Perspektive der Logik der Philosophie als „Reprise“ bezeichnet werden muss (vgl. Weil ²1996, 82): eine Einstellung, die die kohärente Sprache der ihr zugehörigen Kategorie noch nicht gefunden hat und sich deshalb durch die Wiederaufnahme einer älteren Sprache und Kategorie zu verständigen sucht. Diese von sprachlicher Inkohärenz bedrohte, logisch unreine Form des Diskurses kann deshalb hier ausgeklammert werden, weil sie sich mit den Mitteln der Logik der Philosophie prinzipiell vollkommen erklären lässt. Schematisch gehen wir deshalb davon aus, dass sich *im Kern* des interkulturellen Dialogs zwei oder mehrere irreduzible Grundeinstellungen zur Welt (Seinsentwürfe) begegnen. Aber lässt diese Irreduzibilität eine Form von Rationalität zu?

Die philosophisch zentrale Frage hinsichtlich des interkulturellen Dialogs lautet deshalb: Was meint hier überhaupt das Wort „Dialog“? Was ist das für ein *Logos zwischen* den geschichtlich-kulturell verankerten Weltanschauungen? Oder ist gar die radikale Auffassung richtig, dass es überhaupt keinen Logos zwischen Weltanschauungen (und daher keinen Dialog) geben kann?

In der Perspektive einer Logik der Philosophie kann nun folgende These aufgestellt werden: Der Logos, der zwischen Weltanschauungen herrschen *kann*, ist ein Logos des Sinns, nicht ein Logos der Wahrheit (im Sinne der Adäquationstheorie). Wenn es sich im Kern der divergierenden Weltanschauungen um zwei irreduzible Seinsentwürfe, d.h. zwei grundlegende Formen von kohärentem Sinn handelt, die jeweils ein spezifisches Feld von möglicher Wahrheit allererst eröffnen, dann kann der zwischen den Weltanschauungen vermittelnde Dialog nicht darin bestehen, einen übergreifenden Seinsentwurf zu konstruieren, auf dessen Wahrheit sich alle Parteien konsensuell einigen können. Dagegen sagt eine Logik der Philosophie: Das Medium des interkulturellen Dialogs ist „Sinn“ (in den im ersten Teil herausgestellten Strukturmomenten).

Es kann nun so scheinen, dass, da jeder grundlegende Seinsentwurf in sich kohärent und sinnvoll ist, jedem vernünftigen Dialog der Boden entzogen ist. Doch die Irreduzibilität der Kategorien bedeutet nicht, dass die Wahl zwischen ihnen gleichgültig ist, sondern nur, dass sich eine einmal getroffene Wahl einer dieser Grundstellungen mit rationalen Mitteln nicht widerlegen lässt, weil die kategorieimmanente Kohärenzbemühung von äußerlichen Rationalitätsforderungen (die ja auch in einer bestimmten Einstellung gründen) nicht berührt wird. Hier muss eine Logik der Philosophie eine grundlegende Unterscheidung einführen: Im weltanschaulichen Dialog geht es im Kern nicht um eine Sache, die sich als falsch widerlegen lässt, sondern um eine Sache, deren *Sinn* sich vernünftig diskutieren lässt. In einer phänomenologischen Sprache ausgedrückt: Im Dialog behält derjenige Recht, der die begegnenden Weltphänomene in ihrer Sinn-Fülle zum Verständnis bringt, statt sie auf ein bestimmtes Erklärungsschema zu reduzieren.

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Das Gehirn, das Ich und die Straßenverkehrsordnung

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Der Reiz von Symposien und Vorträgen besteht darin, daß man sich gegenseitig provozieren und anregen kann. Im Folgenden möchte ich in diesem Sinne in der gebotenen Kürze die Architektur einer nicht-fundamentalistischen philosophischen Argumentationsstruktur gegen den derzeit modischen Neurodeterminismus skizzieren.

Zur Relevanz der Debatte sei an den Ausspruch eines berühmten englischen Trainers erinnert, der einmal sagte: "Manche betrachten Fußball als einen Kampf auf Leben und Tod. Ich versichere Ihnen, es ist viel ernster." Was hätte er nur zu unserem Sprachspiel der Auseinandersetzung um die Funktion des Gehirns und die Bedeutung des Ich gesagt? Ich versichere Ihnen, das ist noch viel ernster.

Physik und Straßenverkehrsordnung

Fragen wir einen Physiker: Warum steht das Auto dort vor meiner Haustür eigentlich genau dort, wo es steht?

Das ist grundsätzlich kein Problem, wird der Physiker antworten. Versetzen wir uns gedanklich zurück an den Zeitpunkt, zu dem das Auto das Montageband verließ. Zu diesem Zeitpunkt wurde der Motor zum ersten Mal gezündet. Dann wurde ein Gang eingelegt, so dass die Räder in Bewegung gesetzt wurden. Über den Lenker wurde die Richtung dirigiert. Die Betätigung der Bremsen führte dazu, ... und so weiter und so fort und so fort, bis er endlich genau an der Stelle stehen blieb, wo er jetzt steht. Wenn man alle Daten beisammen hätte, könnte man genau ausrechnen, welche Kräfte den Motor in Gang setzten, welche Kräfte die Lenkung drehten, wie sich das auf die Räder auswirkte, welcher Widerstand durch den Straßenkontakt zu überwinden war, etc, etc. Kurz: es ließe sich vollständig in der Sprache der Physik erklären, warum der Wagen dort steht, wo er steht. Vielleicht würde er noch hinzufügen: Bei Autos weiß man das alles natürlich nicht so genau, bei Raketen schon eher. Da hat man mehr oder weniger alles beisammen, was man braucht. Eben deshalb kann man die auch in eine Umlaufbahn um die Erde oder auf den Mond bringen und ziemlich genau dorthin zurück beordern, wo sie hergekommen sind. - Wer wollte bezweifeln, dass physikalische Erklärungen ungefähr so funktionieren und dass das alles höchst eindrucksvoll ist.

Bleibt nur eine Frage: Warum parken die Autos bei uns auf der rechten, in England jedoch auf der linken Straßenseite?

Ich möchte behaupten, dass das weniger mit Massen und Kräften, sondern eher mit unterschiedlichen Straßenverkehrsordnungen zu tun hat, die in der physikalischen Erklärung keinerlei Berücksichtigung finden. Obwohl in diesem Sinne offensichtlich unvollständig, ist der Physiker mit seiner Erklärung dennoch vollkommen zufrieden. Und innerhalb seiner Fragestellung und seines sprachlichen Rahmens kann er seine Erklärung auch mit Fug und Recht als "vollständig" bezeichnen. Die Straßenverkehrsordnung fügt nämlich keine Massen und keine Kräfte zu seinem Erklärungsmodell hinzu. Was es mit ihr auf sich hat, bleibt für ihn außer Betracht, wie es für die Straßenverkehrsordnung außer Betracht bleibt, was die

Physik sagt. Hauptsache, die Autos fahren auf der richtigen Seite, halten bei Rot und parken nur dort, wo es erlaubt es, etc.

Wenn nun die Beachtung der Straßenverkehrsordnung als ein wesentlicher Faktor dafür anzusehen ist, daß der Wagen vor meiner Tür dort steht, wo er steht, dann hätten wir damit natürlich noch lange keine Erklärung, wohl aber ein zu erklärendes Phänomen, ein Explanandum, welches die Physik offenbar anderen überläßt.

Wittgensteins Regelfolgen in Poppers Welten Eins, Zwei und Drei

Das "Beachten der Straßenverkehrsordnung" ist natürlich nur ein Beispiel für das, was man mit Wittgenstein das Befolgen von Regeln nennen kann und was in der Popperschen Terminologie in die Welt3 gehört.

Das Befolgen einer Regel ist nach einem berühmten Diktum Wittgensteins nicht etwas, "was nur *ein* Mensch, nur *einmal* im Leben, tun könnte" (*Philosophische Untersuchungen* §199). Wittgensteins Überlegungen zum Regelfolgen bedeuten die Verabschiedung der Wahrheitstheorie des *Tractatus* (vgl. dazu Oetjens 1980) und werden üblicherweise als Überwindung des erkenntnistheoretischen Solipsismus gedeutet. Das bedeutet, dass Regeln und Regelfolgen nicht als intrinsische Eigenschaften eines Ich angesehen werden können, welches sich selbstgenügsam in der Schau eines angeborenen platonischen Ideenhimmels ergeht, an den die sprachlichen Bedeutungen gleich Fixsternen als identifizierbare Einzelobjekte angeheftet wären. Zum Verständnis dessen, was Regelfolgen heißt, muß man nach Wittgenstein vielmehr aus der Innerlichkeit des Ich heraustreten und "die gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise" (PU §206) bedenken, die konstituiert, was wir sprachliche Bedeutung nennen.

In Popperscher Terminologie müßte man dazu also Welt3 in Anspruch nehmen. Dabei lasse ich hier einmal außer Betracht, daß Popper (vgl. etwa Popper 1972, 1977 und Popper, Lorenzen 1985) seine Konzeption von Bolzano und Frege entlehnt hat und glaubt, unverfänglich und hermeneutisch unangekränkt mit dem bestimmten Artikel von den "Theorien an sich" und dem "Inhalt der Bücher" (vgl. z.B. Popper / Lorenzen 1985, S. 98) und mit den Stoikern von dem Lektoren als "dem" Aussageinhalt (ebda, S. 99) sprechen zu können. Jedenfalls ist für Popper die Sprache gleichsam der "Kern der Welt Drei" (ebda S. 79 u. ö.), so dass man die von ihm ins Auge gefaßte Interdependenz zwischen den drei Welten zumindest teilweise als sprachlich vermittelte Interaktion auffassen muß, wogegen auch Wittgenstein gewiß nichts einzuwenden hätte.

Popper verbindet mit dem Konzept seiner drei Welten eine vehemente Verteidigung des Common Sense, ohne damit jedoch eine Common-Sense-Theorie der Erkenntnis begründen zu wollen (Popper 1972, p. 32ff.). Insbesondere für seine Welt3, die "Welt der geistigen Produkte" (Popper/Lorenzen 1985, S. 81), der Sprache, insbesondere der wissenschaftlichen Theorien, natürlich auch der Straßenverkehrsordnung, bedient er sich dabei

einer ausgesprochen lockeren Sprache. Seine Unterscheidung der drei Welten nennt er "eine Klassifikation: nichts Besonderes" (ebda S. 99). An anderer Stelle platziert er sie in den Bereich der Metaphysik, ohne das jedoch ontologisch zu meinen (ebda S. 74).

Aber er nimmt natürlich eine gewisse Plausibilität für kausale Wirkungen von Welt3 in Anspruch, und ich plädiere dafür, sich dem anzuschließen. Denn, um es mit Max Planck zu sagen: Der Freiheit des menschlichen Geistes würde es wenig helfen, sich auf den Indeterminismus der Quantenmechanik zu berufen. Für das Geistige im Menschen fordert man ja gerade, daß es die Welt zu gestalten fähig sei. Jede Zurechenbarkeit von Handlungen würde sich verflüchtigen, wollte man sich gegen das Kausalitätsprinzip auf den "blinden Zufall" berufen (Planck 1990, S. 152; dazu: Hassenstein 1978).

Pluralismus der Sprachspiele und Inkommensurabilität

Diese Überschrift spielt an auf einen interessanten Abschnitt in Poppers *Objektiver Erkenntnis* (Popper 1972, p. 153). Poppers Abneigung gegen sprachanalytisches Vorgehen um der "objektiven Probleme" willen führt immer wieder dazu, daß er auch in Fragen, die man viel besser sprachanalytisch und methodologisch formulieren könnte, lieber Anleihen bei der traditionellen Metaphysik und dem Common Sense macht. So ist es auch mit dem Pluralismus, den er lieber als einen Pluralismus der Welten einführt (in dieser Hinsicht zählt er nicht wie die Dualisten nur bis zwei, sondern unter Berufung auf Platon, die Stoiker und Moderne wie Leibniz, Frege und Bolzano bis drei) denn als einen Pluralismus von Sprachen oder Sprachspielen, die sich gewiß nicht so einfach abzählen lassen. Fairer Weise wäre allerdings hinzuzufügen, daß Popper diese Dreizahl nicht abschließend nimmt (vgl. Popper 1972, p. 106f.).

Wenn ich jetzt zur Ergänzung Poppers und zur Erläuterung eines un abgeschlossenen Pluralismus der Vielheit auf ein Kriterium von Paul Feyerabend, nämlich auf dessen Prinzip der *Inkommensurabilität* (Feyerabend 1977, S. 310ff.), zurückgreife, so geschieht das nicht ohne eine gewisse Pikanterie. War doch Feyerabend (1981, S. 326 – 364) einer der ersten und schärfsten Kritiker der Welt3 Poppers, welche er einer vernichtenden Kritik unterzog. Andererseits fand er später Gefallen daran, selbst die Regentänze der Hopis für kosmologisch möglich zu erklären (1977, S. 78ff.). Da halte ich mich doch lieber zunächst an die Befolgung der Straßenverkehrsordnung und deren Auswirkung auf das Parken von Autos.

Inspiziert von Wittgensteins Sprachspielkonzept hat Paul Feyabend (1977, 1980, 1981; dazu: Duerr (ed.) 1980, 1981) für einen offenen Pluralismus der Sprachspiele eine etwas schärfere Begrifflichkeit entwickelt, als man sie hierzu bei Popper findet. Feyerabend fordert zu einer methodologischen Selbstreflexion in dem Sinne auf, dass man "die Gehaltsklassen gewisser Theorien" (also Poppers Inhalte der Bücher) daraufhin untersucht, welche der "üblichen logischen Beziehungen (Einschließung, Ausschließung, Überschneidung) zwischen ihnen gilt" (1977, S. 310). Sein Ergebnis: In den allermeisten Fällen, in denen moderne Wissenschaft und Metaphysik aufeinander treffen, werde man finden, dass die Reichweite der modernen Theorien, an deren eigener Logik gemessen, gar nicht zureiche, um die von ihnen aus oft angegriffene Metaphysik in einem logisch strikten Sinne "verbieten" zu können. Diesen Sachverhalt nennt er

Inkommensurabilität. Als Beispiel nennt er die Inkommensurabilität von moderner Physik und Kosmologie der Hopis, zwischen denen aus rein logischen Gründen kein echter Widerspruch zu konstruieren sei. Seine Folgerung: "Wenn man Regentänzen eine Wirkung auf die Natur abspricht, so gibt es dafür also weder unmittelbare noch mittelbar empirische Gründe" (aaO S. 79).

Das Feyerabendsche Prinzip der Inkommensurabilität orientiert sich an den Möglichkeiten deduktiver Logik, die sich bekanntlich auch der *Kritische Rationalismus* Poppers zum Leitfaden erkoren hat. Indem Feyerabend den Kritischen Rationalismus in diesem Sinne gewissermaßen beim Wort nimmt, zeigt er, dass, je konsequenter sich die an der Logik der deduktiven Überprüfung orientierte Rationalität sich auf eben dieses Argumentationswerkzeug besinnt, sie sich eigentlich desto weitherziger und toleranter gegenüber alternativen Weltauffassungen gebärden müßte, die sich gemäß der Inkommensurabilität außerhalb ihrer logischen Reichweite bewegen.

Statt "alles geht": Ignoramus

Zu dem bekannten "*anything goes*" Feyerabends wäre anmerken, daß man dieses "*alles geht*" natürlich nicht positiv in dem Sinne verstehen darf, daß etwa dadurch die Regentänze der Hopis und der mit ihnen verbundene Wirkungsanspruch als legitimiert angesehen werden könnte. Was man aufgrund der Inkommensurabilität aus der Warte der modernen Physik nur sagen könnte, wäre ein achselzuckendes "*weiß nicht!*" oder "*mag sein oder auch nicht!*", vielleicht auch ein vielsagendes: "möglich" (dazu: Oetjens 1983).

In diesem Sinne würde das Prinzip der Inkommensurabilität zu einer Reduzierung des berühmten "*ignoramus et ignorabimus*" ("wir wissen es nicht und wir werden es nicht wissen") des Physiologen Du Bois-Reymond auf ein bloßes "*ignoramus*" nötigen, da nicht klar ist, aus welcher Theorie der Zukunftsanspruch des "*ignorabimus*" logisch-deduktiv ableitbar wäre. Dem würden vermutlich Popper und Eccles in Bezug auf den genauen Interdependenzzusammenhang zwischen den drei Welten zustimmen können.

Der Neurodeterminismus unserer Tage ist damit offenkundig nicht zufrieden. Er räumt zwar ein derzeitiges "*ignoramus*" ein, fügt jedoch ein verheißungsvolles "noch" hinzu: wir wissen es "*noch nicht!*". So proklamiert zum Beispiel ein bekanntes *Manifest von elf führenden Neurobiologen* (2004), dass man in nicht allzu ferner Zukunft "widerspruchsfrei Geist, Bewusstsein, Gefühle, Willensakte und Handlungsfreiheit als natürliche Vorgänge ansehen wird, denn sie beruhen auf biologischen Prozessen".

Programmatischer Determinismus vs. hypothetische Interdependenz zwischen den drei Popper-Welten

Die ganze Diskussion um Determinismus und Willensfreiheit wäre wesentlich entspannter, wenn die Kombattanten sich etwas strikter das Prinzip der Inkommensurabilität vor Augen hielten und sich von dort aus den erkenntnistheoretischen Status ihrer jeweils vertretenen Positionen klar machten. Niemand hätte etwas gegen einen Neurodeterminismus einzuwenden, der sich selbst als Forschungsprogramm deklarierte, welches unter dem leitenden Erkenntnisinteresse steht, die

Funktionsweisen des Gehirns immer detaillierter kausal-analytisch zu erforschen – so weit es eben gehen wird. Man würde auch Verständnis dafür haben, dass er sich Denkverbote verbittet, die etwa von aprioristisch argumentierenden Philosophen kommen könnten, die beanspruchen, sagen zu können, was geht und was nicht geht. Das Problem liegt in der gegenseitigen Grenzüberschreitung.

Gleichwohl darf man an den Neurodeterminismus die skeptisch motivierte Frage richten, ob man denn weiß, was man da alles verspricht. Für den klassischen wie auch den Neo-Empirismus lagen zum Beispiel Logik und Mathematik außerhalb der Betrachtung, weil man sie für analytisch hielt und sie somit keine empirisch zu erklärenden Gegenstände der Erfahrung waren. Auch sind die Sprachen von Logik, Mathematik und Physik im Feyerabendischen Sinne inkommensurabel. Aus der Logik allein läßt sich nicht die vollständige Mathematik, aus beiden zusammen läßt sich keine Physik, aus letzterer lassen sich weder Logik noch Mathematik ableiten.

Für den Neurodeterminismus ist die Beweislast dagegen erheblich schwieriger. Da alles Geistige als "natürliche" Gehirnfunktion aufgefaßt wird, müßte sich also auch das Gödelsche Unvollständigkeitstheorem aus einer zukünftigen Theorie des Hirns ableiten lassen. Diesbezüglich dürften die Zweifel angebracht sein, die z.B. Penrose (1991) artikuliert hat.

Andererseits scheinen mir doch der Common Sense der alltäglich Erfahrung, die technischen Erfindungen, die Wirksamkeit politischer und moralischer Ideen, die die Welt ganz offensichtlich zu verändern vermögen, dafür zu sprechen, daß die Hypothese von der Interdependenz der drei Welten Poppers nicht ganz aus der Luft gegriffen ist.

Moralischer Appell

In diesem Sinne möchte ich mit einem moralischen Appell schließen: Lassen Sie uns unverdrossen die Welt, soweit sie nach menschlichen Ideen gestaltet zu sein scheint, daraufhin untersuchen, ob sie nicht durch alternative Ideen verbessert werden könnte. Es wäre schön, wenn sich auch Neurodeterministen daran beteiligten. Das wäre doch endlich mal "noch viel ernster" als Fußball.

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Wittgenstein, Waismann and Non-Euclidean Geometries

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“6.375 As there is only a *logical* necessity,
so there is only a *logical* impossibility”
(Wittgenstein, TLP)

1. Waismann’s importance for Wittgenstein research

It is well known that Friedrich Waismann often met with Ludwig Wittgenstein, and he regularly gave reports on his discussions with the intellectual to other members of the Vienna Circle. The idea of deepening this cooperation by planning a book was not excessively far-fetched and, indeed, this book exists today as part of Wittgenstein’s heritage (McGuinness 1979). In this text, Wittgenstein refers to the issue of non-Euclidean geometries several times, and what I should like to do is to offer a summary and an idea as to why this important chapter in the history of mathematics was so significant for Wittgenstein’s philosophy. It is the question of impossibility which intrigues the philosopher. Waismann took the first notes for this volume on December 18th 1929 and the last on July 1st 1932.

Ray Monk writes: “Schlick’s death finally put an end to any idea ... to co-operate together on a book” (1990, page 358). The problem with this statement is the fact that Waismann published a book on his own in 1936: therefore, *either* he worked together with Wittgenstein and on his own book at the same time, *or* the cooperation ended before 1936 and not in this year. The first of the two alternatives produces a problem of authenticity and priority, because to work on two books simultaneously necessarily results in an intermingling of thoughts.

The gap between this manuscript and Schlick’s death was filled by a book manuscript which was found among Waismann’s papers in 1959, and published as late as 2003 by Gordon Baker.

Non-Euclidean geometries are mentioned on several occasions in the text produced by Wittgenstein and Waismann and published by McGuinness in 1979. Both philosophers were well-informed on the subject, as this issue represents an important chapter in the history of mathematics. Before I analyse for what purpose Wittgenstein uses it as an example (of the impossibilities), I want to give a short sketch on both the historiography of non-Euclidean geometry and its epistemological importance within mathematics.

2. Direct and indirect proofs

Euclid wanted the axioms to be statements which were clear and self-evident but, in the eyes of the readers of the *Elements*, the axiom of parallels did not meet this requirement. Indeed, Euclid’s version of this famous axiom is not as clear as the version which was discussed later on and as, for example, Hilbert’s formalization of geometry, published in 1899. It was a British teacher, John Playfair, who as late as the end of the 18th century found out that Euclid’s axiom of parallels could be considerably simplified through using the following wording: ‘Given a straight line and a point which does not lie on it, then there is exactly

one parallel to the straight line which passes through the point’.

For almost 2000 years, mathematicians tried to prove the axiom of parallels. There were 2 different methods of doing so:

- 1) Again and again, researchers took as their starting point statements which seemed trivial enough to be true. But they turned out to be equivalent to the axiom of parallels and so their proof was spoiled through running into a “*petitio principii*”. One of these statements asserts that the sum of the angles in a triangle is equal to 2 right angles, a fact which Wittgenstein mentions in his LFM in unit XXXI, page 289.
- 2) Researchers were able to avoid this trap by using the technique of indirect proof. In this case they started to explore a world of inferences which was expected to collapse through inferring a contradiction, and although the inferences achieved were rather absurd and counter-intuitive to the Euclidean world, they could not find a contradiction. Marcel Guillaume writes in a book published by Dieudonné (a member of the Bourbaki group) that, for example, Saccheri developed a large part of what was later on known as non-Euclidean geometry without even being *aware* of the fact before 1733 (page 753).

Gauss, Lobatshevskij and Bolyai jun. had the courage to argue that the proof of the axiom of parallels probably could not be found: in later centuries, this situation would be called the independence of a statement. It is still readily understandable today that this insight must have been a terrible shock to mathematicians, because over the centuries a lot of energy had been invested in a problem which now turned out to be unsolvable.

3. The proof of unprovability

The impossibility of establishing a proof for the axiom of parallels was first suspected by Gauss in 1792 and the period during which mathematicians dealt with this problem lasted until a publication by Poincaré in 1902 (see Schreiber/Scriba 2005, page 428). It can thus be said that, for mathematics, the 19th century is the century of the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries, while Lobatshevskij is known as the Copernicus of Geometry. It is important to realize that when Wittgenstein entered the arena of philosophy, the question of this new realm of mathematics was something which had on the one hand already been settled, while being something completely new on the other.

Now let us consider two different attitudes that were held by mathematicians towards this issue at different times.

- 1) The negative aspect: mathematicians had for a long time invested a great deal of energy and work into proving the axiom of parallels through the rest of Euclid’s axioms, and had indeed completely failed. There is a doctoral dissertation published in 1793 by Klügel, who investigated 17 alleged proofs of the

axiom of parallels and showed that they were all invalid. What a disgrace for the mathematical community! The problem turned out to be unsolvable - so geometers had for many centuries sought something which, in the end, turned out to be impossible! Gauss treated this question as a secret research project, because he was afraid of the "Geschrei der Böötier!" ("The uproar of the Boeothians", cf. Oskar Becker 1975, page 178).

- 2) The positive aspect: when a problem has been definitively established as being unsolvable, researchers are free not to deal with it any more, and are therefore able to calm down and start to work on other questions. The idea of the independence of a statement had not yet been invented, and the new geometry was called Meta-Geometry.

I should like to move now from mathematics to psychology, because I want to use modern psychology as a framework of reference for examining the history of mathematics.

Gregory Bateson and his followers created the concept of "punctuation" and "re-interpretation", which is exactly what happens here in the course of the history of mathematics (cf. Simon/Clement/Stierlin 1999, page 151). On the one hand, a catastrophe occurred because an impossibility had been found. On the other hand, however, it was possible to achieve the clarification of a long-investigated question through a proof. True, it was a negative proof - but a proof nonetheless.

It is not at all astonishing that it took mathematicians just over a century to adopt the new, positive view: their attitude changed from a sense of having utterly failed and of having suffered a catastrophe towards the relief of having negatively but definitively clarified an important issue.

Wittgenstein must have been fascinated by this shift in the attitude of mathematicians towards this new subject, which incorporated an impossibility at the philosophical level.

4. Wittgenstein on the axiom of parallels and the trisection of the angle

Now let us look at Wittgenstein's remarks on non-Euclidean geometry in his talks with Waismann as presented by McGuinness in 1979! What happened in the dialogue between these two intellectuals when they met at Schlick's house on 1st January in 1931? They discussed consistency, and this was not by far the first occasion on which they talked about this topic: indeed, the question of consistency was a central focus of their talks. In current discussions, the connection between geometry and consistency is drawn based on the fact that a *relative* proof of consistency of the two variants of non-Euclidean geometries is established through reducing the question of the consistency of non-Euclidean geometries to the question of the consistency of Euclidean geometry. Waismann introduces this topic:

"If in the one case [the non-Euclidean geometries], the theorems included a contradiction, then the contradiction would have to reveal itself in the other geometry too" (Brian McGuinness 1979, page 144). Wittgenstein's reaction to Waismann is a sharp rebuke: "Consistency 'relative to Euclidean geometry' is complete

nonsense" (op. cit. page 145). This is one of the occasions where Wittgenstein definitely humiliates Waismann and Waismann is humble enough not to react aggressively to Wittgenstein. The choice of these two elements in the dialogue would at first lead one to infer that Wittgenstein is not inclined to accept an element of leadership in the dialogue from Waismann's side - but this impression is not totally correct, because when discussing Fermat's Last Theorem (op. cit. page 144) in this text on consistency, Wittgenstein accepts a suggestion from Waismann concerning an issue of discussion, which had been put forward by Waismann beforehand (op. cit. page 143). Waismann seems to have interrupted Wittgenstein's flow of thought by suggesting Fermat's Last Theorem as a topic because, before turning to this issue, Wittgenstein mentions the trisection of the angle. What is the reason for mentioning this rather simple piece of mathematics? In my interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics, the reason for choosing this topic is that the trisection of the angle is another impossible thing to do, as Pierre Wantzel proved in 1837 following precursory work by Gauss (see Stillwell 2005, page 55). Although the axiom of parallels is a proof that is impossible to establish, while the trisection of the angle is a geometric construction which cannot be carried out, Wittgenstein tells us here that geometry is not only incomplete because the axiom of parallels is independent (next heading line op. cit. page 145), but also because the long-sought trisection of the angle cannot be found (although we can discuss it).

5. Euclidean geometry and consistency

When we examine these parts of the records of the discussions between Wittgenstein and Waismann, then it becomes clear that geometry is being discussed not for its own sake, but in order to clarify the question of consistency. Around 1850, a new term emerges in mathematical discussions: the term "Euclidean geometry". This term only makes sense in relation to the term "non-Euclidean geometry", because without this comparison the term "Euclidean geometry" is a pleonasm. Until the middle of the 19th century, before non-Euclidean geometry was discovered, all geometry represented Euclidean geometry.

Wittgenstein says "The rules of Euclidean geometry do not contradict one another" (op. cit. page 195).

Of course, Wittgenstein's statement that the rules (= axioms) of Euclidean geometry do not contradict each other is not at all a provable statement, but it is part of a hermeneutic approach to what mathematicians believe to be true. Wittgenstein's overall goal when discussing consistency is the establishment of a method in preparation for the appearance of a contradiction in mathematics. This advance preparation for the worst case makes it necessary to discuss what is most feared, whereby a prerequisite for this "talking cure" is a sort of inner freedom not to be so much afraid of contradiction that one shrinks from talking about it. "What are we to do?" (op. cit. page 196) is Wittgenstein's motto. Let us prepare a *method* before a contradiction pops up.

6. Conclusion: the close connection between the issue of geometries and the issue of consistency

When we examine the records of the discussions between Wittgenstein and Waismann in overview, it becomes quite clear that the issue of consistency is of the utmost

importance, since it appears no less than 8 times as a heading line. In 1900, Hilbert had placed the problem of the consistency of arithmetic second on his list of problems, and judging by this common topic of discussion between these two intellectuals, it can be said that Wittgenstein was well informed about the fundamental debate. It was in 1931 that Gödel proved the impossibility of proving the consistency of arithmetic, and the records published in 1979 end with the entry dated 1st July 1932. In 1928, Fraenkel wrote that the problem of consistency was an "urgent problem" ("eine brennende Frage", page 362) for mathematicians and Wittgenstein seems to have felt the same way. Had he apprehended Gödel's 2nd incompleteness result? While I am not seeking to assert this, I should like to pose, as a research problem, the question of when and how Wittgenstein was informed of Gödel's results. This must have been in approximately 1938 because, as Hacker writes (footnote 15, page 575), Wittgenstein was familiar with the article by A. G. D. Gasking.

After all, Gödel's results concern "Principia Mathematica and Related Systems". In order to be affected by incompleteness, such systems must only be complex enough to allow multiplication and this is the case with Euclidean geometry (consider the ray theorem).

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Cultural Alterity and Unilateralism: The Dialogue of Philosophy of Language

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1.

The re-discovery of the centrality of human language in the main course of philosophy has given philosophy the correct bearing and nature this science deserves. In the face of this development, the popular concept of 'linguistic turn' can be described as a philosophical method denoting a passage from the philosophy of nature to the philosophy of language (cf. Okonkwo 2001:289-300).

It is no longer the material being that is the clue to correct interpretation of cosmic order but more of the human worldhood of language and symbolic forms. In this human worldhood the faculty of speech occupies the most central placement. Ernst Cassirer(1944:111) confirms that we must understand what speech means in order to understand the meaning of our universe. If we fail to find this approach, he says, we miss the gateway to philosophy.

In our review, it is very clear that there are three major reasons for this linguistic turn that perfected this centrality. These may among others include:

- a) The emergence of independent nations and national languages;
- b) The global village syndromes;
- c) Cultural alterity and identity crisis.

On the grounds of the above three issues, we are bound by reason to gain a natural consciousness of the facts that the realities of 'national languages' mean by implication the realities of 'national cultures'. The truth of the above hard fact is that the multiplicity of languages, of which each is the incarnation of long traditions, is the sincere expression of cultural richness and diversity. Accordingly, the disappearance or endangerment of sorts of any, stand to mean a great loss to humanhood, and the preservation of each must be recognized as a consequence of a natural struggle for a basic human right (cf. MacBride 1980:49).

We must recognize the states of affairs and positive clues to nationalism and nationism (cf. Okonkwo 1994:115-130) and recognize also that all languages are equal in spite of dominance. It is no longer acceptable to assert 'mental impotence' and/or 'barbarism' to a people or culture that do not speak Greek. It is no longer valid to think that it is only the Greek language that has the competence to perform a '*Weltdeutung*', that is to say a normative clue towards knowledge, understanding and interpretation of the cosmos. The era of Latin with regard to the social consequences and attributes of the '*gentes*' and the '*plebs*', does not hold genuine argumentative scholarship any more. This is to say that it can no longer count as a mental strength if one had no Latin culture which was before now indicative that one belonged to the '*plebs rustica*', that means the rustic man-culture. The consequences of such attributes gave rise to mental enslavements that left none-Latin human beings with the values that equated them to mere '*res*' or *material objects*.

In the above context, we have to agree with the UNESCO Yaounde Conference (1980:16) that every human language serves as the vehicle of their culture and is the most authentic form and instrument of life-long values. Language is a social conditioner. The major little worry of this short review is that there is no inferior or superior language just because of the conditions of 'use'. On this note we can represent our position that:

The multiplicity of languages means the multiplicity of 'philosophies' and the problem of philosophy as such. It is quite true that human life is characterized by the great diversity and/or variety of languages and cultures. The diversity of world languages and allied cultures present fascinating adornment of human history and crucial conditions for human survival, worldview, interpretation (hermeneutics) and philosophies. In the line of the above, we may recall the statement of Edward Sapir (1929:207) who said that:

"Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the *real world* is to a large extent unconsciously built upon the language of the group"

The above position disposes us to assert that my language and my world are merged into the same reality. One can not split the two and try to discuss any separately in a clear isolation without a danger of misrepresentation. An investigation of the structure of language is at the same time an investigation of the formal aspects of the world. To give the essence of propositions means to give the essence of my world. We can therefore not blame Wittgenstein when he stated that the limit of my language is the limit of my world. On this note, we can confirm that the human world which is all the case of philosophical exercise, is this same world made manifest to me through the facts of my language (cf. *Tractatus*: 5.6; 5.62; 5.621; 5.632). The case in point is that all languages of the world have to be recognized by the game of philosophy with equal rights for philosophical existence and praxis despite the positions of some dominant world languages and their configurations of language and linguistic expansionisms. Each world language is a book of the peoples' history and metaphysics.

On another note, we have to recognize the impact of what has been registered as 'the global village syndrome'. On account of this worry, languages have exploded through mechanisms like colonialism, imperialism, dominance, complexities of the modern media that break bounds and boundaries of political, cultural, socio-economic, socio-psychological etc. identities. This approach of our time has little or no regard for subjectivism and/or relativism. The phenomenon of the global village creates acceleration factors that reach out with possibilities of global transcontinental, global transnational contents

that embrace, collect and connect nationalities, cultures, peoples etc. with also little or no respect for collective individuality and/or cultural autonomies. This concrete situation of our time (signs of our time) is made manifest through the jingles and techniques of manipulation, propaganda and advertisements to prove and convince the confronted with unilateral ideas and uniforms of modernity called westernization. Situations of this nature disregard the historical back-grounds of the people's meta-physics. The point made here is that the global village syndrome or globalization generally has little or no regard for the 'other culture' or what we have registered in this paper as 'cultural alterity'. The result of it all is imbued, therefore, in the crisis of unilateralism. We also have to note that cultural inversions, imperialism, colonialism and such agencies call for a new understanding for linguistic turn. A serious fact is that unless a people is forced by any type of conquest as explained above to give up their language, that people can always have their philosophy and history traced through their language. This is therefore to say that a major aspect of the concept of linguistic turn is that of 'cultural revival' in philosophical terms. This made Afigbo (1977:11) once to say:

"...But there came European colonialism which sought to obliterate their culture and separate identity or at least made a determined effort to dam the course of African cultural development and turn it into new channels. This went on until the emergence of a generation of educated Africans who began feeling that they had been severed from those roots by colonialism. It was to re-attach themselves to those roots that they began calling for the revival of things African – African modes of dress, African names, African dances and African traditions in government and politics. Here we recall easily the rise of the philosophical movement for Negritude in French-speaking Africa and for African Personality in Anglophonic Africa, and more recently for Authenticity in Zaire. Again each of these was an attempt to erect a (dialogue) bridge across what was considered an unfortunate cultural chasm in order to get back to the best in the culture of the pre-colonial Africa."

2.

On account of the above issue, we would like to get into the main little worry of this short review. The truth is that there is no more doubt about the realities of alterity since this phenomenon is always reflected through the facts of human narratives, history, self-identity and experience. Tengelyi (2004: xxiii) speaks about the split of the self as a serious conflict that signifies the arrogance of not accepting alterity, and that is the otherness of others. In this aspect it is confirmed that:

"...Our life-histories are intertwined with those of others, and that our identity is forever bound up with alterity, is nowhere more self-evident and nowhere prove to be clearly an unmistakable fact than in this very moment, when we have nothing else but our relationships with others to rely on in order to restore our broken self-understanding".

In view of the above, it is clear that there is need for a good understanding of the 'other' so that the self may endure. The notion of the 'same' requires the tradition of the 'other'. This is in line with Plato's conception of 'the great kinds'. Paul Ricoeur, Husserl and Levinas have all considered this issue of alterity although from different perspectives. One of the issues that has united all these ideas is that alterity has to do with the phenomenology of

language and is also the phenomenological hermeneutic of the self and the attestation of the other. According to Tengelyi (2004:97):

"Husserl and Levinas have one thing in common: both of them insist on the radical alterity of the other. This radical alterity, however, seems to be lost sight of by Ricoeur, who tacitly presupposes a common order encompassing the self and the other. This tacit presupposition lies in the very formula 'oneself as an other among all the others' because this formula applies to the stranger, just as well as to the self"

The result of this approach is that we have to understand the realities of intersubjectivity which should give a new direction to the common denominator in humankind which is the community of language in the given human social order. This also supports the idea of the experience of human history within the temporal order. This may also justify Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the 'visible and the invisible' in the wild region which occurs through communication from one constituted culture to another where they all have originated (cf. Tengelyi 2004:101).

On the above note, cultural alterity in the philosophical sense and the logical connection through the phenomenology of language abhors unilateralism and accepts relativism and universalism as the only possible conception of pure philosophy in the global age.

3.

In an attempt to conclude this paper, we have to revisit the dangers and prospects of unilateral philosophy so that we can proffer suggestions and conclusions. It is very true from all we have said above that all human persons have the ability to adopt to nature but quite *mutatis mutandis*. One other obvious fact is that there is diversity of languages, cultures and the imbued philosophies. It is also true that without diversity, ignorance and myopia would dominate human facticity. Human diversity is part of our common nature. To this effect human facticity permits alterity, relativism, subjectivism right from the level of societies and individual persons. Therefore philosophy as such can not be bracketed out of this complex reality in being and existence. Beyaraza (2005:201) concludes and supports the above view when he says that:

"...The experience of people in their existential circumstances tends to yield different results. The meaning of things tends not to emanate from the things. It appears to be given by the people who interpret, value and use these things...Consequently,...they cannot have the same meaning to different people and societies".

4.

Unilateral philosophy came as a result of cultural imperialism that was nurtured and disseminated through Eurocentricism. As we noted at the beginning of this review, the forces of colonial dependencies gave rise to the endangerment of local cultures, philosophies, alterity in scientific and technological approaches. Because of such fact Eurocentricism which is the origin of unilateralism lost sight, for example, that when the rest of the world celebrated the 3rd millennium, Egypt was enjoying her 7th millennium. As a conclusion we have to express our gratitude to Ludwig Wittgenstein who understood the games of alterity. His reaction to Sir James Frazer's 'The Golden Bough' is concrete evidence that philosophy

should not be a unilateral (straightjacket) mental exercise. For Wittgenstein, unilateralism is a false philosophical method. Wittgenstein as we know is more interested in interpretations, values and usages and as a result, language games, life-forms etc. are the true methods to philosophy.

In conclusion, the meaning of things cannot be found in the unilateral explanation of them. Meaning lies in the society where it is used.

This leads to the conclusion that the European civilization in spite of the yardstick of globalization today cannot be used as the absolute and sole measure for philosophy and culture. There is need for dialogue and cross-pollination philosophy.

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Die Opazität der Oberfläche: Wittgenstein und Celan

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I

In seinen von Wittgensteins *Tractatus* ausgehenden Überlegungen über *implizite Ethik* bemüht sich Heinz von Foerster um den Gedanken einer immanenten Zirkularität und stößt dabei auf das, was er „das autologische Problem der Sprache“ nennt. Den Ausgangspunkt bildet die Fragestellung „Was ist Sprache?“:

Was immer hier gefragt wird, es bedarf der Sprache, diese Frage zu beantworten, und natürlich brauchen wir die Sprache, um diese Fragen über Sprache zu stellen. Wenn wir also die Antwort nicht wüssten, wie könnten wir diese Frage überhaupt stellen? Und wenn wir nicht wüssten, wie man fragt, wie würde eine Antwort aussehen können, die sich selbst beantwortet?¹

In dem Versuch, zu zeigen, inwieweit das autologische Problem kein Problem der Sprache², sondern einer bestimmten Rede über Sprache ist, dürfen wir nicht *übersehen*, dass die Fragestellung „Was ist...?“ ihrer eigenen Geschichte und Herkunft verpflichtet bleibt. Unter diesem Blickwinkel wird sich vielleicht zeigen, in welchem Maße das autologische Problem von einem gewissen philosophischen Gestus nicht zu trennen ist. Im sprachphilosophischen Kontext könnten wir sogar einen *agoraphobischen Gestus* gegenüber der Mannigfaltigkeit der Sprachereignisse hervorheben.

Die Denkschwierigkeiten, die das autologische Problem mit sich bringt, sind vergleichbar mit der Schwierigkeit, eine Regel zu beschreiben bzw. zu erklären während ihrer Anwendung, d.h. mit der Schwierigkeit, einzusehen, dass unser *Erklären* der Sprache eine sprachliche Tätigkeit bleibt³. Wenn wir einen Gebrauch erklären wollen, dann neigen wir dazu, Bezug auf Regeln zu nehmen: diese Regeln aber gehören nicht zum Phänomen ihrer Anwendung, sondern vielmehr zur Erklärung der Anwendung. Insofern regeln sie das Sprachspiel, das wir gerade erklären wollen, nicht, sondern bilden die Züge jenes Sprachspiels, das mit der *Ordnung der Erklärung* zu tun hat. Aus diesem Umstand lassen sich Regeln im Vollzug einer Praxis nur *zeigen*, nicht aber ausdrücken. Das wirft vielleicht ein Licht über eine gewisse *Blindheit*, die alle unsere kognitiven Anstrengungen immer begleitet.

An dieser Stelle wird eine Unterscheidung zwischen Sprache und Wissen über Sprache, zwischen Sprechen und Erklären der Sprache als eine Unterscheidung zwischen zwei Ordnungen unserer Betrachtungsweise nötig. Wo wir den Gebrauch eines Wortes dadurch erklären, dass wir uns auf Regeln beziehen, denen wir im Zuge unseres Sprachspiels *blind folgen*⁴, verhalten wir uns wie ein Beobachter *erster Ordnung*, dessen Beobachtung Einsicht in eine unseren Sprachspielen *immanente Blindheit* zu gewinnen trachtet. Im Glauben dann von einem privilegierten Beobachtungspunkt her alle übrigen Sprachspiele überblicken zu können – zu sehen also, was wir früher nicht sahen bzw. nicht sehen konnten – *übersehen* wir, dass unsere Erklärungen wiederum eine

Praxis sind, die aus anderen Regeln schöpft, denen wir wieder *blind* gefolgt haben. Was wir in der Praxis der Erklärung nicht sehen, ist aber *diesmal* nicht primär, was wir eben nicht sehen, sondern *dass* wir nicht sehen, was wir eben nicht sehen⁵. Unserer Beobachtung erster Ordnung wäre demzufolge eine Art *Blindheit zweiter Ordnung* gegenüberzustellen.

Das autologische Problem taucht also dort auf, wo wir ein Sprachspiel dadurch erläutern, dass wir uns auf Regeln beziehen, deren Auffinden wir dann mit so etwas wie dem Wesen der Sache verwechseln. Darauf hat Wittgenstein aufmerksam gemacht, wenn er in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* anmerkt: „Man prädiert von der Sache, was in der Darstellungsweise liegt“⁶, und darin besteht der entscheidende Zug im Sprachspiel des Erklärens.

Die Zirkularität des autologischen Problems als Denkfigur einer Agonie der Sprache widersetzt sich nun der hierarchischen Unterscheidung zwischen einem privilegierten, Regeln explizierenden Sprachspiel einerseits und einem Regeln *blind* folgenden Sprachspiel andererseits. Eben diese Unterscheidung, die sich auf eine Trennung zwischen Regeln und Handeln zurückführen lässt, bildet die Grundlage der Verwirrung, mit der wir konfrontiert sind, indem wir die Frage „Was ist Sprache?“ *ernst nehmen*. Dieser Gedanke lässt sich vielleicht dadurch weiter artikulieren, indem wir auf Wittgensteins Ablehnung jeglicher Form kausaler Annahme zurückgreifen. Wie Krämer deutlich formuliert hat, liegen „das regelbeschreibende und das regelfolgende Sprachspiel [...]“ bei Wittgenstein „– wie auf einer Fläche – nebeneinander und nicht – wie im tiefendimensionalen Raum – hintereinander“⁷. Hierin wurzelt Wittgensteins Skepsis gegenüber dem „Verführerische[n] der kausalen Betrachtung“⁸.

II

Wittgenstein spricht in seinen *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* von einem Zusammenbruch der formalen Logik, wo die Vorstellung eines kohärenten analytischen Zustandes auf den „durch grammatische Täuschungen“ hervorgerufenen „Aberglauben“, dass „die Sprache (oder das Denken) [...] etwas Einzigartiges [sei]“⁹, zurückgeführt wird. In diesem Zusammenhang erkennt er, dass „die Kristallreinheit der Logik“, die sich ihm im *Tractatus* „ergeben“ hätte, eigentlich „eine Forderung“¹⁰ war, für die ein *Missverständnis der Rolle des Ideals* verantwortlich ist¹¹. Diesem Missverständnis zufolge haben philosophische Theorien das Denken mit einem Heiligenschein umgeben¹².

Zu einem Gestus des Verzichts auf Idealisierungen fordert die Anwendung des zentralen Wittgensteinschen

¹ Foerster (1993: 348-349).

² Vgl. Wittgenstein (1984: 295).

³ Vgl. Wittgenstein (1984: 449, § 560).

⁴ Vgl. Wittgenstein (1984: 351, § 219).

⁵ Vgl. Baecker (1993: 18-19).

⁶ Wittgenstein (1984: 296, § 104).

⁷ Krämer (2001: 130). In diesem Zusammenhang verwendet Krämer auch den suggestiven Ausdruck „flache Ontologie“, der sich für unsere weitere Ausführungen von großer Bedeutung herausstellen wird.

⁸ Vgl. Wittgenstein (1984a: 501).

⁹ Wittgenstein (1984: 299, § 110).

¹⁰ Vgl. Wittgenstein (1984: 297, § 107).

¹¹ Wittgenstein (1984: 295-296, § 100).

¹² Vgl. Wittgenstein (1984: 294-295, § 97).

Begriffes von „Familienähnlichkeit“ auf. Dem oben erwähnten *agoraphobischen Gestus* entspricht bei Wittgenstein eine Art *theoriefester Klaustrophobie*, in der seine Haltung kompromissloser Strenge wurzelt, die sich dezidiert gegen das *Streben nach Allgemeinheit* der Philosophie als Blendung richtet. Daher versucht er durch den Begriff „Familienähnlichkeit“ der Vielfalt der Sprachvorkommnisse Rechnung zu tragen. Sprachspiele sind laut Wittgenstein miteinander – eng oder entfernt – verwandt, und zwar wegen einer *ungenauen Aura*, einer *vagen Ausstrahlung*, etwas Schattenhaftem, „Indirektem“, „Unschärfem“, „Unbegrenztem“, „Unexaktem“ „mit verschwommenen Rändern“¹³. Diese Ähnlichkeiten lassen sich also mit einem einzigartigen Wesen als *Tiefenstruktur* der Sprache schwer in Zusammenhang bringen: „so übergreifen und kreuzen sich die verschiedenen Ähnlichkeiten, die zwischen den Gliedern einer Familie bestehen: Wuchs, Gesichtszüge, Augenfarbe, Gang, Temperament, etc. etc.“¹⁴. Die Sprache, *deus absconditus* der Philosophie, nimmt somit Konturen und Gestalt an und zeigt an ihrer Oberfläche, in ihren Erscheinungsformen ihre Physiognomie.

Aus diesem Grund richtet sich Wittgensteins Verfahren¹⁵ - unter dem suggestiven Motto „Zurück auf den rauhen Boden!“¹⁶ – auf eben diese flache Dimension des Phänomenalen. Somit verweist seine Einstellung ansatzweise auf eine *Physiognomik der Sprachphänomene*, indem sie nicht hinter die Erscheinungen geht, sondern sich an ihrer Oberfläche aufhält, oder besser, *von ihrer harten Oberfläche aufgehalten wird*. Die Anschauung und Wahrnehmung ihres urphänomenalen Charakters hat aber an *Opazität* und *Dunkelheit* gewonnen. In einem klagenden Tonfall muss er in einer Notiz aus dem Jahre 1940 feststellen: „Wie schwer fällt mir zu sehen, was vor meinen Augen liegt!“¹⁷.

III

Ein ähnlicher Denkgestus findet sich bei Paul Celan in seiner Haltung gegenüber Gedichten, so wie sie in seiner Büchnerpreisrede *Der Meridian* (1960) zum Ausdruck kommt, und zwar in Bezug auf die Frage nach einer spezifischen „Aufmerksamkeit“ oder „Konzentration“, „die das Gedicht allem ihm Begegnenden zu widmen versucht, sein schärferer Sinn für das Detail, für Umriss, für Struktur, für Farbe“¹⁸. Dieses Motiv entwickelt sich aus einer genauen Beobachtung von Lucile, einer Gestalt aus Büchners Drama *Dantons Tod*. Für Lucile hat die Sprache „etwas Personhaftes und Wahrnehmbares“¹⁹: sie hört nur die Person sprechen, sie kann von dem *Zusammenhang zwischen Sprechen und Sprechendem* nicht absehen. Dass sie „Sprache als Gestalt und Richtung und Atem“²⁰ wahrnimmt, bedeutet, dass sie die Person wahrnimmt, dass sie das wahrnimmt, *wohin* die Person lebt, wie sie *hinlebt*: ihre Zuwendung zeichnet sich durch einen Vorrang des *performativen Wert* der Rede aus.

Dieselbe Aufmerksamkeit richtet für Celan das Gedicht auf die Sprache. In diesem Sinne *versammelt* sich Celans Dichten um *die ganz bestimmten Umstände*, unter

denen ein Sprachereignis vorkommt. Diese Umstände verweisen bei ihm auf eine konstitutive *Materialität* oder *Härte* der poetischen Aussage. Wie Celan in der Büchnerpreisrede betont, geht es dem Gedicht keineswegs um die „Sprache schlechthin“²¹, die als solche rein *immateriell* und *stimmlos* bleiben würde, sondern um *das Stimmhafte, das Irdische, Terrestrische*²² an ihr. Es geht ihm also um „aktualisierte“, „gestaltgewordene Sprache“²³, die in ihrem sinnlich erfassbaren Element wahrnehmbar wird. Kurzum, es geht um eine Sprache, die noch nicht aufgehört hat, Stimme eines Menschen zu sein, um *eine menschliche Stimme*.

Wenn sich *einerseits* der späte Wittgenstein der Sprache nicht als „einem unräumlichen und unzeitlichen Unding“ anzunähern versucht, indem er seine Aufmerksamkeit auf die „räumlichen und zeitlichen Phänomene der Sprache“²⁴ richtet, *situert* sich *andererseits* Celans Poetik an einem Ort, in dem den Zusammenhang zwischen Sprechen und Sprechendem durch die menschliche Stimme garantiert wird.

IV

In engem Zusammenhang mit dem *Problem der Dunkelheit des Dichterischen* richtet Celan dieselbe Aufmerksamkeit, die Wittgenstein den Sprachspielen als Urphänomenen zu widmen versucht, auf das Gedicht, das er *lapidar* als „Erscheinungsform der Sprache“²⁵ bezeichnet. In ihrer Wittgenstein-Lektüre hat Krämer interessanterweise auf eine „inhärente Bildlichkeit“ des Sprachspielkonzeptes, auf seine „latente Ikonizität“²⁶ hingewiesen, die auch bei Celans Poetik eine große Rolle spielt. Die Oberfläche des poetischen Zeichens zeichnet sich durch eine diffuse Tendenz zur *Ikonisierung* der Sprache aus, ihre Bildlichkeit bedarf aber nicht einer Entschlüsselung. Wie Paul Celan formuliert: „das Gedicht ist schon das Dahinter“²⁷. Celan führt diesen Gedankengang so weiter: „Das Bild ist hier nicht Metapher; diese Dichtung ist keine Emblematik [...] das Bild hat phänomenalen Charakter – es *erscheint*“²⁸.

Auch bei Celan entspricht seine derart gerichtete Aufmerksamkeit einer Skepsis gegenüber der kausalen Betrachtung: „Wer es [das Gedicht] schon durchschaut hat, ehe er es wahrnimmt und anschaut, dem steht das Gedicht [...] entgegen“²⁹. Die erstaunliche Nähe von Wittgenstein und Celan – jenseits der Distanz ihrer Tätigkeitsbereiche – lässt sich also in einer gemeinsamen Haltung zusammenfassen, die sich gewollt gegen die *verdächtige Abgründigkeit* der Philosophen richtet. Beide halten die *philosophische Tiefe*³⁰, die der Ordnung der Erklärung als einem *Ein- und Durchsehen* der *Tiefenstruktur* der Sprache verpflichtet ist, als eine Form regelrechter Sublimierung.

Ähnlich wie Wittgenstein, der in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* hervorhebt, dass es ihm nicht um ein *Durchschauen* der Erscheinungen geht³¹, schreibt Celan: „Vom Durchschautwerden werden die Gedichte undurchsichtig“³², also genau so wie die Vielfalt

¹³ Wittgenstein (1984: 278-280, §§ 68-71; 283, § 76 und 290-291, § 88).

¹⁴ Wittgenstein (1984: 278, § 67).

¹⁵ Krämer nennt dieses Verfahren „das morphologischen Verfahren“: Krämer (2001: 113).

¹⁶ Wittgenstein (1984: 297, § 107).

¹⁷ Wittgenstein (1984a: 554).

¹⁸ Celan (1999: 9).

¹⁹ Celan (1999: 3).

²⁰ Celan (1999: 6).

²¹ Celan (1999: 9).

²² Vgl. Celan (1999: 12; 55; 215).

²³ Celan (1999: 9).

²⁴ Wittgenstein (1984: 298, § 108).

²⁵ Celan (1999: 96-97).

²⁶ Krämer (2001: 115).

²⁷ Celan (1999: 97).

²⁸ Celan (1999: 87).

²⁹ Celan (1999: 96).

³⁰ Vgl. Wittgenstein (1984: 299, § 111).

³¹ Vgl. Wittgenstein (1984: 292, § 90).

³² Celan (1999: 98).

unserer Sprachspiele durch unsere Rede über Sprache³³. Die kausale Betrachtung ist für Celan speziell im Umgang mit Gedichten fehl am Platz: „Von der Erfahrung verspreche ich mir, ohne allzu zahlreiche Begriffsentlehnungen auszukommen. Ferner versuche ich, [...] auf jede Ätiologie zu verzichten. Ich habe das Gedicht vor mir“³⁴. In Anlehnung an ein berühmtes Wittgenstein-Zitat könnten wir dann für Celans Poetik Folgendes gelten lassen: alles *Durchschauen* muss fort, und nur *Anschauung* an ihre Stelle treten.

Auf der rauen Oberfläche der Sprachphänomene angelangt, wo wir auf jegliche Form kausaler Annahme verzichten müssen, befinden wir uns aber keineswegs an einem privilegierten Beobachtungspunkt, von dem her die Alltagsphänomene der Sprache sich in ihrer zweidimensionalen, bildlichen Transparenz offenbaren. Auf der Ebene der *Anschauung* tritt anstelle einer Durchsichtigkeit eine Dunkelheit, eine „Opazität des Phänomenalen“³⁵, die sich nicht durch weitere Analyse *zerlegen* lässt: Der Forschungshorizont einer *höheren Unklarheit* wird eröffnet.

Nun versucht Celan, indem er seinen Vers an dieser Oberfläche verbleiben lässt, eben dieser Dunkelheit Rechnung zu tragen, die er als „konstitutiv“ und „kongenital“ bezeichnet: „Das Gedicht kommt dunkel [...] als ein Stück Sprache zur Welt“³⁶. Celan *dehnt* diese Einsicht so weiter aus:

„Dunkel“ ist das Gedicht zuerst durch sein Vorhanden sein, durch seine Gegenständigkeit (Gegenständlichkeit); dunkel also im Sinne einer jedem Gegenstand eigenem, mithin phänomenalen Opazität [...]“³⁷

Auch beim späten Wittgenstein finden sich Stellen, wo er sich mit einer gewissen Undurchsichtigkeit des Faktischen zu befassen scheint: „Habe ich die Begründungen erschöpft, so bin ich nun auf dem harten Felsen angelangt, und mein Spaten biegt sich zurück. Ich bin dann geneigt zu sagen: ‚So handle ich eben.‘“³⁸, oder, wie er in *Über Gewissheit* schreibt: „Die Begründung aber, die Rechtfertigung kommt zu einem Ende“³⁹. In diesem Zusammenhang könnte man von einer unzerlegbaren Materialität oder Härte unserer Lebensformen sprechen, die für die Dunkelheit und Opazität unserer Spracherscheinungen verantwortlich ist und dennoch für Wittgenstein ihr *Lebenselement* bildet.

Das angeblich von der Logik kommende transparente Verständnis muss laut Wittgenstein dadurch in Frage gestellt werden, dass wir uns bewusst werden, dass unser *Verständnis* nur eine *Form der Blindheit* gegen unser *Unverständnis* ist⁴⁰. Das ist eine schwierige Aufgabe, so wie die Aufgabe, „die Grundlosigkeit unseres Glaubens einzusehen“⁴¹. Genau dort, wo wir die Verankerung unserer Sprachspiele in der Praxis einer Lebensform einzusehen anfangen, stoßen wir auf die Grenze alles Begründens, das sich aus dieser Perspektive wiederum als ein Sprachspiel erweist: da am Grunde des Sprachspieles eine Handlungsweise liegt, lässt sich unser

praktisches Tun nicht weiter rechtfertigen: „es steht da – wie unser Leben“⁴².

Bei Celan finden wir eine ähnliche Argumentationsfigur, wo er das Primat des Begründens im Umgang mit Gedichten dadurch in Frage stellt, dass er sich auf eine gewisse „Autarkie des Gedichts“ bezieht: „Das Gedicht hat, wie der Mensch, keinen zureichenden Grund. (Daher seine spezifische Dunkelheit [...]). Das Gedicht hat seinen Grund in sich selbst; mit diesem Grund ruht es [...] im Grundlosen“⁴³. Die Oberfläche des Sprachspieles wie die des Gedichtes verbirgt seine Gründe – seine Regel – nicht⁴⁴, vielmehr trägt sie diese in ihr selbst in genau dem Sinn, *dass sie aus ihnen besteht*. Daher *steht* das Sprachspiel bei Wittgenstein – so wie das Gedicht bei Celan – *vor Augen*.

In dem Maße, in welchem wir, indem wir auf die Frage „Was ist Sprache?“ stoßen, von einer gewissen *Selbstevidenz* der Fragestellung – vom *Autologischen* an ihr – in eine Art *philosophischer Verlegenheit* gebracht werden, hat das autologische Problem mit einer bestimmten Form von Blindheit zu tun. „Das zum ‚Problem‘ gewordene Selbstverständliche“⁴⁵, das offen zutage, *vor unseren Augen* liegt, zeigt sich dadurch in seiner Dunkelheit und Opazität: „Das Nahe ist gleichzeitig das unendlich Ferne; hat es die Opazität des Gegenüberstehenden, so hat es auch den Glanz der Ferne“⁴⁶.

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³³ Vgl. dazu Wittgenstein (1984: 296, § 103).

³⁴ Celan (1999: 84).

³⁵ Celan (1999: 96).

³⁶ Celan (1999: 84).

³⁷ Celan (1999: 96).

³⁸ Wittgenstein (1984: 350, § 217).

³⁹ Wittgenstein (1984a: 160, § 204).

⁴⁰ Vgl. Wittgenstein (1984a: 202, § 418).

⁴¹ Wittgenstein (1984a: 154, § 166).

⁴² Wittgenstein (1984a: 232, § 559).

⁴³ Celan (1999: 88).

⁴⁴ Vgl. Celan (1999: 88).

⁴⁵ Celan (1999: 95).

⁴⁶ Celan (1999: 96).

A Perspective of Dialogical Engagement Between Self and Culture

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I

In one of his seminal works, Ernst Cassirer writes that, "man is to be studied not his individual life but his political and social life. Human nature, according to Plato, is like a difficult text, the meaning of which is to be deciphered by philosophy" (Cassirer 1944: 63). The difficulty of studying one's individual life lies in its varied, complicated and contradictory experiences that entangle his life experiences. Philosophy helps in deciphering the meaning that follows from the experiences *per se*. Hence, it needs to reflect on the political and social experiences of human life in order to understand the nature of man. The political and the social not only refer to the regulatory guidelines of the state and society, but also broadly include the civilizing process. The civilizing process bears many significant elements that 'organize feelings, desires and thoughts. They are not only contained in thoughts and language, but also systematically organized and represented in myths, in religion and in art' (Cassirer 1944). The art, myth, religion, etc. are very much part of culture as culture represents man's varied experiences. We make a humble attempt to construe the meaning of our existences by philosophizing the modalities and expressions articulated in culture. Human existence commences with intentional-dialogical modes of relationship involving culture as man's being, so to say, the other.

Self has many referential points, such as, man, individual, agent, subject, person, etc. which are characterized by intentionality and freedom. Intentionality constitutes not only man's experiences but also defines the actions performed by the self. Being the constituting feature of experience, self flows along with these experiences that develop the self. The flow of intentionality manifested through experiences has the peculiarity of transcending outer modes of relation as well as reflecting on its own *loneliness*. The outer relations show as to how one develops himself/herself in real time and history with relations to his/her beliefs, desires, hopes, etc. Over and above it defines one's belongingness to the socio-cultural space in which s/he lives. Understanding its own loneliness brings a reflection to the very mode of intentionality that defines the socio-cultural engagement from the 'subjective perspective of the world.' Thus, the subjective becomes the antonym of the objective. In this mode of relationship the self transcends the socio-cultural, socio-political and socio-historical engagements reflecting on the formal conditions of such engagements. Thus, intentionality totalizes the various kinds of relationships that the self shares with the world or the other and with itself (Mohanty 2000: 73).

II

The totalization signifies not only a process of relationship that the self shares with the other, but also shows an inseparable relationship in which the self and the other are engaged. Such an understanding of this inseparable engagement brings out self-knowledge as well as the knowledge about the other (Mohanty 2000). The self-understanding is not generated by the other, rather it is out of the self's own cultivation – the cultivation of freedom (Verne 1979: 83). It is the freedom of the self that

constitutes culture; - 'it defines a way of life, a manner of thinking and acting shared by a group of people over time' (Dallmayr 1994). Here culture is not a stilled phenomenon, rather a dynamic field of knowledge, which has equal potentiality to interact with the self. This potentiality of dynamism is captured in reflective consciousness, so to say, reflective mode of intentionality. As Fred Dallmayr puts it, "captured in reflective judgment, culture provides an over all framework through which we understand the world; it offers a frame of reference which gives sense of meaning to individual terms and concepts (like the concept of development)" (Dallmayr 1994: 101). The freedom in which the self constitutes culture or frames for the discourse of meaning of life implies that there could be diversified flow of experiences in which multiple frameworks can take birth. The multiplicity of cultural life is unified showing the normative traits of integration and aspiration for values. This aspiration works as internal force or operative idea in looking forward to revise and reconstitute the alternative frameworks of values show the result of free engagement in an operative idea of life as whole that enters into the making and working of institutions. Hence, it may be said that the freedom of the self creates values.

Freedom and experience are the breeding ground of creativity. While living in the cultural mode of life and practicing the cultural activities signifies culture as experience. The experiential mode of relationship unfolds the field of interaction and communication in which the involvement of other is shown. The involvement develops the sense of belongingness in knowing, representing and contemplating on experience and they all form an intentional mode of engagement. As Mohanty points out, "But a person, while being all these things, she acts, judges, demands, has rights, entertains values, is in connection with other individuals and their acts, judgments, evaluations, rights and values. This living space of a person is not field of objects, but an actual and valuational field of situations which constants undertake her, and in which she is called upon to make new decisions, and form within which she projects new possibilities" (Mohanty 2000: 83). The culture as experience looks at the living space as the field of intentional engagement and involvement that give opportunity of putting forward new ideas and possibilities as well as opens up the scope for realizing them. This engagement becomes instrumental in developing the self-knowledge.

III

The development of self-knowledge is the result of self-cultivation. The notion of cultivation is one of intrinsic potential quality of man. It initiates the *movement* of rising up 'humanity through culture.' The movement is an 'inner action' (Buber 1965). This action not only commences with the self but also forming the field of dialogue that turns to the other. In this regard, the movement has two important functions with regard to the notion of cultivation as defined by Dallmayr; they are *preservation* and *transformation* (Dallmayr 1994). The idea of cultivation is meant to preserve the self and transform the process of educating it. The notion of educating the self for developing self-

knowledge partly derived from one's involvement with various forms of cultural activities or with the community. Experiences encountered in the process of involvement are significant for 'self-formation'. The experiences are not 'isolated moments' of life. Rather, one's involvement builds up linkages – experience works as in 'integrative processes' toward the development of the 'self- image' (Gadamer 2004: xiii).

The unfolding of self-knowledge opens up the space for one's existence., which we call as man's cultural existence. As Werkmeister would put it, "...human existence is essentially a cultural existence. But since, culture itself is man's own creation, we are up against the fact that, in creating himself, man also creates his own culture; and in creating his culture; he creates himself. The two aspects of his existence and his becoming are inseparable" (Werkmeister 1967: 33). The inseparable relationship represents the two aspects of his selfhood. One of the aspects of the self represents its identity through the socio-cultural system, e.g., as one would like to relate himself to his profession, to social status, etc., in which his association with the other becomes a public phenomenon. The self presents itself in this mode as intersubjectivity. Whereas, another facet of the self represents 'the subjective dimension of the self'; as mentioned earlier, it is the aspect of the self-performing its intentional activities. In this mode, the self looks for new possibilities while interacting with the other. The latter, in fact, integrates the former. Assimilation and integration proceeds in the form of intentional experience, which is otherwise the subjectivity of the self. But it manifests another facet, i.e., its physical participation in the forum of community that is regulated by a normative order. The assimilation itself represents an intersubjective forum. Nevertheless, bringing two facets of the self into one level of thought is indeed an intentional activity manifested in the act of *bundling*. Illustrating the desire of bundling, Buber writes, "Collectivity is not a binding but bundling together: individuals packed together, armed and equipped in common, with only as much life from man to man as will inflame the marching step. But community, growing community (which is all we have known so far) is the being no longer side by side but with one another of a multitude, though it also moves towards one goal, yet experiences everywhere a turning to, a dynamic facing of, the other, a flowing from *I* to *Thou*" (Buber 1965: 31). Buber's emphasis bundling relation not only lays down an intentional space for the integration of the self and the other, but also shows the similar rhythm in prevailing the form of community life in which values of life can be shared and cherished. Thus, the spirit of the intentional movement of the self aspiring for relationship with the other opens up a kind of journey that the self undertakes in search of itself. In other words, it is a search for meaning (Pradhan 1996).

However, the idea of search of meaning is embedded in the dialogical engagement between self and culture. There are two phases to this engagement, as mentioned earlier; one is viewing *culture as experience*, which shows one's existential engagement or participation with cultural activities, whereas another phase refers to the process of distancing from the cultural conflicts and problems in which the self looks forward with a vision and hope for values for future humanity. The process of distanciation requires a *creative dialogue* for sustainable engagement. The sustainable engagement looks after the continuity of making choice for alternative framework so far as one's existential engagement with culture is concerned. It shows a creative mode of succession, which eventually overturns an existing perspective that can be perceived as

narrow or erroneous. Thus, the form of creative dialogue not only develops the unity between the psychological, physical and the cultural but also helps in preserving and protecting the values of life.

IV

The shift from one pattern of cultural life to another form of cultural practice shows the *dialectic of value seeking*. The dialectic of value seeking motivates *self-criticism* and that helps the individual to foresee the value beyond the finitude of a given pattern of life. The self-criticism with regard to the dialectic of value seeking brings about '*self-transfiguration* through the interaction of vision and praxis' (Pande 1994: 54). Unless we conceive the underlying communication between the theoretical and the practical aspects of culture, we will not be able to bridge the gap between the self and the other. The self may create a false distinction in every levels of its experience of culture.

In view of the intertwined relationship between cultural life and cultural practice, some may prefer to overemphasize the tension that persists in comprehending the link between the realm of theoretical meaning and practical meaning. Defining the tension Nandy writes: "It is a creative tension with which some persons and cultures prefer to live. The gap between reality and hope which such a vision creates becomes a source of cultural criticism and a standing condemnation of the oppression of everyday life, to which we otherwise tend to reconciled" (Nandy 1999: 3). The creative tension results in cultural criticism. The self reflects on the asymmetry between the practice and the value aspired. Cultural criticism attempts to make reconciliation between theory and praxis by inviting interpretation from the other. Interpretation as Mohanty suggests, is not a one-way process. It sustains rather in 'multiple processes – simultaneously received from many ends and lays down 'multi-layered paths' to develop coherent understanding. Mohanty observes: "Such multi-layered process and the consequent synthesis of 'overlapping' can lead us much of a better self-understanding as to a better understanding of the other" (Mohanty 2000: 122). Establishing the multi-layered paths, they share their viewpoints communicated in the process of dialogue. The communication reveals its profoundness, when, as Buber points out, "Speech can renounce all the media of sense, and it is still speech" (Buber 1965: 3). Such speech facilitates a healthy conversation in silence.

To conclude, facilitating the *creative dialogue* in the realm of *self-criticism* as well as *cultural criticism* unfolds the complementary process of unification in which the development of the self and culture is realized. Cultural creativity as cultural critique opens up the possibility of appropriating the dimension of the human self and its realization. The dialogical engagement continuously enriches the creative process of understanding the universal end of humanity. Humanity manifested in diversified form of cultural, religious, scientific, artistic, mystical, etc. activities of life needs a dialogical engagement for agreement and harmony. The notion of agreement signifies intersubjective solidarity, whereas, harmony signifies the dimension of valuation. Thus, the dialogical engagement of value seeking would alarm to the notion of *spiritual awakening* in which peace would flourish showing the path towards infinity.

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Double Meant is not Double Good: A Problem for Kane's Response to the Chance Objection

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One frequently voiced objection to libertarian theories of freedom, which I will call the "Chance Objection," is that undetermined choices are nothing more than chance events for which it does not make sense to hold an agent morally responsible. This paper considers a particularly clever response to this objection advanced recently by Robert Kane (Kane, 1999). Drawing upon work by J.L. Austin (Austin 1961) and Philippa Foot (Foot 1966) concerning cases in which indeterminism between an agent and her intended outcome does not block the assignment of moral responsibility, Kane employs a doubling up of their strategy in arguing for the possibility of a special class of free actions that are immune to the chance objection. These special actions, which Kane calls "self-forming actions" (or SFAs), result from a situation of choice which has the following features: 1) it is undetermined which of two competing choices an individual will make and 2) it is appropriate to hold the agent morally responsible whichever choice is made in the end. Though impressive in its ingenuity, I argue that Kane's response succumbs to the following dilemma: If his SFAs are a straightforward doubling up of the Austin/Foot strategy, it leads to an incoherent account of the situation of choice; however, if his argument is understood in a way that avoids this incoherence, it deviates from the Austin/Foot strategy in a respect crucial to the intuitive case they make for the compatibility of moral responsibility and indeterminacy of outcome.

1. Kane's Solution to the Chance Objection

Kane begins his response to the chance objection by conceding to the compatibilist that most free and responsible choices are determined in the sense that they flow from a character and will already formed. Having made this concession, however, he goes on to maintain that such causally determined choices can't be the whole story behind moral responsibility. If it were, "there would have been nothing we could have ever voluntarily done to make ourselves different than we are," and this, according to Kane, is a condition "inconsistent with our having the kind of responsibility for being what we are which genuine free will requires." (Kane 1999, 224) So, free and responsible choices that flow from a character already formed presuppose that we have a kind of control over our characters. Kane locates this control in "self forming actions" (SFAs) a subset of the class of free actions that have the following characteristics: a) they are the product of choices that are causally undetermined and b) they are the origin – at least in part – of the more entrenched character and will that a person comes to develop. SFAs occur when an individual is torn about what to do because she is caught between competing motivations or desires that are recommending mutually exclusive courses of action. Kane gives content to the suggestion that the choices behind SFAs are causally undetermined by supposing that what the agent experiences introspectively as indecision is correlated with indeterminacy at the neurophysiological level in that the competing desires map onto "competing" neural pathways that interfere with one another in such a way that it is undetermined which neural pathway will achieve dominance and thus issue in action.

In order to show that the undetermined choices behind his SFA's are immune to the Chance Objection, Kane first draws upon work by J.L. Austin and Philippa Foot in which they argue that assigning moral responsibility to an agent for the outcome of an action is consistent – in at least some cases – with the outcome being less than fully determined. In such cases, an agent acts on the basis of a settled intention to bring about some result; however, in the execution of the overt action there is some indeterminacy in the agent's efferent neural pathways which makes it undetermined whether the agent will actually succeed in doing what he set out to do. Here we are asked to imagine an assassin who has a political figure in his crosshairs; however, the assassin suffers from an indeterministic tremor that might lead to the shot being missed. Nonetheless, if the tremor happens to conspire with the assassin's intention and the shot finds its mark, we are willing to blame the assassin for the murder. We are willing to do so for the simple reason that he did what he was consciously and intentionally trying to do, and his having done so was the result of his effort.

Now it is one thing to show that responsibility is consistent with the *outcome* of an intended action being undetermined, but it is quite another to show that responsibility is consistent with the *choice* behind an action being itself undetermined. And it is the latter, of course, that a solution to the Chance Objection requires. Whereas Austin and Foot discuss scenarios in which the indeterminacy is at work subsequent to the agent's choice to perform an action, Kane is interested in cases in which the indeterminacy leads up to the agent's choice to perform the action. To respond to the Chance Objection, then, Kane must show that a choice's being causally undetermined can be reconciled with assigning responsibility for the choice.

To do this, Kane notes that his SFA's involve a kind of "doubling-up" of the Austin/Foot strategy. Since the choice behind an SFA constitutes the resolution of the conflict of motives that is the source of the indeterminacy, it is appropriate to say – whichever action is chosen – that the agent did what she was "trying and wanting to do all along." (Kane 1999, 223) In this sense, Kane's SFA's allow for a greater assignment of responsibility than is warranted in the case of the shaky assassin. The shaky assassin receives blame when the intended outcome is achieved; however, he does not receive credit when it fails as a result of indeterminacy in the efferent neural pathways for the simple reason that the failure was not intended. In the case of Kane's SFA's, however, there is precisely that symmetry to the assignment of moral responsibility that we believe accompanies a free choice between alternative courses of action. Irrespective of which choice emerges from the struggle at the level of motivation and desire, it is appropriate to conclude that the agent did what she was striving to do throughout. (Kane 1999, 223) Kane highlights this feature of SFAs by noting, "failing is never just failing; it is always also succeeding in doing something else we wanted and were trying to do." (Kane 1999, 234)

Thus it is, says Kane, the choice behind an SFA is not something that "just happens" or "happens by chance";

rather, it can be described meaningfully as something the agent was "wanting and trying to do all along."

2. The Incoherence of Doubling Up the Austin/Foot Strategy

But is it so clear that Kane can legitimately make use of a simple doubling-up of the situation involved in an Austin/Foot scenario? To see why it is doubtful that he can, it needs to be recalled that in an Austin/Foot scenario the agent does have a clear intention to secure the outcome for which he/she is ultimately held responsible, despite the indeterminism between the intention and its successful execution. But this means that if Kane's SFAs are a straightforward doubling up of such scenarios, he is committed to the supposition that an agent can simultaneously and consciously intend each of two incompatible choices. And this is problematic for at least three reasons. In addition to making incoherence essential to an agent poised before an SFA¹ -- a strange condition for an action alleged to capture the essence of libertarian freedom and one that seems to validate all the usual suspicions compatibilist's have for the notion -- it also seems to introduce an incoherence into the account itself. That the businesswoman was not intending to make specifically one or the other of the choices during the period of indecision is true *ex-hypothesi*. Part of what it means to be in a state of indecision with respect to which of two choices to make is that one hasn't yet formed an intention to make one of the two choices in question.

Given these difficulties, one might well wonder whether Kane really had in mind such a strict doubling up of the Austin/Foot strategy. While he never explicitly says that an agent in an SFA *intends* each of the choices, it is natural to hear this claim as an implied echo of his tendency to characterize the agent as "trying" to make each of the incompatible choices in an SFA. As trying is a concept that typically involves intent to do what one is trying to do, Kane's account does suggest, at least *prima facie*, that SFAs have the aforementioned incoherence of the agent as an essential feature. A particularly striking instance of Kane's use of "trying" in this context occurs in his account of a businesswoman torn between making it to a meeting on time and stopping to help a stranger in need.

The businesswoman who *wants* to go back and help the assault victim is the same ambitious woman who *wants* to go on to her meeting and close the sale. She is a complex creature, like most of us who are often torn inside; but hers is the kind of complexity needed for free will. And when she succeeds in doing one of the things she is *trying* to do, she endorses that as her resolution of the conflict in her will, voluntarily and intentionally (emphases mine) (Kane 1999, 232)

Though it is natural to read intent into the effort mentioned in passages such as the one just quoted, Kane has since indicated² that to do so would be to misunderstand his argument and this for the reason that he was using the locution of "trying to x" in a way that does not suggest the locution of "intending to x". This means, of course, that Kane need not worry about the precise charge of incoherence developed earlier in this section. In the next section, however, I argue that the cost of avoiding this charge is too high.

3. Trying Without Intending

Though he grants that trying to do something often implies that the agent is intending the same something, Kane maintains that the two do not always go together. In some cases, while the act of trying is itself intentional, that which the agent is trying to accomplish is not specifically intended. Returning to Kane's businesswoman with this understanding of "trying" in hand, we can characterize her pre-choice psychology as follows: during the crucial period of indecision she is a) motivated to make each of two incompatible choices (to help a person in distress or proceed to her business meeting in a timely manner) and is b) intentionally trying to make each of the choices in the sense that she wants to give each an equal chance of being made, but c) is not intending either specific choice.

That this way of viewing the pre-choice psychology does resolve the alleged incoherence of intention is clear; however, it does so only by diminishing significantly the intuitive force that Kane's argument derives from its similarity to the Austin/Foot strategy. It is important to remember that the intuitive appropriateness of assigning culpability in an Austin/Foot scenario stems from the stipulation that the outcome is intended by the agent. Kane, of course, believes that whichever choice is made in the case of an SFA, it is right to see it as a choice that was made "intentionally" and that because the choice -- again, either way -- is something that the person was intentionally trying "to do all along." But if it is the case that the competing "tryings" in an SFA do not each involve an intent to bring about that choice with which it would normally be correlated, then it would seem more appropriate to say that the choice made was the "product of a process involving intention" than it would be to say that the choice was intended or even made intentionally. But to be the product of a process involving intention is a linkage between intention and outcome that is too soft to shoulder the burden of solving the chance objection, for all sorts of outcomes, including ones that aren't intended in any way (such as a slight rise in blood pressure), might be the product of a process involving intention. The damage this does to Kane's argument emerges when the softness between intention and outcome in an SFA is contrasted with that found, for instance, in Austin's case of the shaky assassin. Here we have no hesitancy in saying flatly that the assassination was intended. This is, moreover, the principal reason that we are intuitively comfortable assigning moral responsibility for the outcome when the assassin succeeds. And this means that Kane can deploy a doubling up of the Austin/Foot strategy only by forfeiting that element that makes the Austin/Foot line so intuitively plausible.³

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¹ Randolph Clark discusses briefly this implication of Kane's position in Clark 2002, 372.

² In personal correspondence regarding Kane 1999.

³ I am indebted to Robert Kane, Mike Wreen, Mark Lebar, Tad Zawidzki, Alyssa Bernstein and Al Lent for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

The Analytic Theory of the A Priori: Ayer's Argument

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In *Language, Truth and Logic* Ayer offers systematic presentation to the Viennese view that all a priori knowledge is knowledge of analytic statements. Such conception represents one of the most original contributions proposed by the *Wiener Kreis* to defend the empiricist epistemological principle that *all knowledge of reality* stems and is justified by experience. The existence of the statements of mathematic and logic has ever represented a problem for the empiricist principle: on the one hand, such statements seem to be known; on the other hand such statements seem to express necessary truths. Since experience can never justify knowledge of a necessary statement, the admission of logical and mathematical knowledge seems to entail the bankrupt of the empiricist principle.

In response to this difficulty, Viennese logical empiricists have maintained that logical and mathematical statements, though necessary and known a priori, do not violate the empiricist principle, because they are analytic statements, that is to say, they are not statements *about reality*.

Two main issues emerge from within this empiricist solution: the first one concerns the very notion of analyticity, the second one concerns the epistemological role such notion has been taken to perform. In this paper I shall not take issue with respect of the second issue. I shall rather query one major presupposition in Ayer's conception of analyticity. I shall try to show that Ayer's notion of analyticity either entails counterintuitive consequences, or that it is not *sufficient* to ground the claim that all a priori knowledge is not knowledge about reality.

The chapter *The A Priori of Ayer's Language, Truth, and Logic* presents an argument to defend the claim that all statements known a priori are analytic statements, together with a definition of analyticity (Ayer 1957, pp. 78-79). Ayer's argument can be systematized as follows:

A statement is analytic iff its truth is determined by the meaning of its constituting expressions alone;

The truth of a statement is determined by the meaning of its constituting expressions alone iff its truth can be ascertained just by inspecting the meaning of its constituting expressions;

The truth of the statement "either some ants are parasitic or none are" can be ascertained by inspecting the meaning of the constituting expressions;

The truth of "either some ants are parasitic or none are" is determined by the meaning of its constituting expressions;

"either some ants are parasitic or none are" is analytic.

With the further principle

(CT) Statement "p" is analytic in the sense of (1) iff "p" is not about reality, the argument allows the derivation of the claim that

(AT) every statement that is known a priori is not about reality.

The argument, as it stands, is not sound. This can be shown either by arguing against (1), or by questioning one of its other premises. I begin by reviewing the second strategy. The transition from (3) to (4) is valid, because it appeals to (2). (2)'s left to right direction is unquestionable. However, (2)'s right to left direction is much more controversial. The rationalist Ayer opposes, for instance, might deny it on the grounds that, on her *intuitionistic* account of a priori knowledge, understanding certain statements suffices to ascertain their truth without its being the case that these statements' truth is determined by the meaning of their constituting expressions alone. More than this, (2) could be questioned on broadly kripkean grounds. For instance, it could be argued that the statement "stick S is one meter long at t" is a statement whose truth can be ascertained by considerations of meaning facts alone, while it could be maintained at the same time that it is the very length of S at t that makes the statement true (Kripke 1987, p. 153). However, these complaints raise delicate issue in epistemology and semantics. So, for the sake of argument, we can grant (2) to the empiricist, and proceed to consider (1).

Few preliminary observations are in order. Ayer's original formulation is rather unfortunate: «a proposition is analytic when its validity depends solely on the definitions of the symbols it contains» (Ayer 1957, p. 78). Propositions do not contain symbols, statements do. Accordingly, I have interpreted Ayer as defining a sentential property, rather than a property of propositions. It is an argument that can be valid; statements, or propositions, can be true. Accordingly, I have read "valid" as a misleading variant for "true". Recent interpreters of Ayer's argument have proposed slightly different readings. Casullo has retained talk of propositions, while reframing the definition in bi-conditional terms, and in terms of truth. Swinburne has offered the following reinterpretation:

A proposition is analytic if and only if any sentence which expresses it expresses a true proposition and does so solely because the words in the sentence mean what they do (Swinburne 1987, p. 173).

I quote it at length because there is one feature of it I shall retain in what follows, that is to say reference to the property a sentence possesses when it expresses a truth *solely because* the words in the sentence mean what they do. This pretty vague interpretation of Ayer's no less ambiguous «depends solely» will prove of central importance, in what follows, for assessing whether Ayer's argument actually succeeds in showing that all a priori knowledge *is not knowledge of reality*.

The following argument is aimed at showing that (1) is highly problematic, and so that despite (CT), no statement can be analytic according to (1) and then via (CT), *not about reality*. The argument proceeds by pointing out that its acceptance entails the claim that the property of being true on the sole basis of the meaning of its constituting expressions is possibly instantiated, and by showing that the latter claim entails counterintuitive consequences.

Which counterintuitive consequences derive from admitting the possible instantiation of the sentential

property of being true on the sole basis of the meaning of a sentence's constituting expressions? Consider the sentence "either some ants are parasitic or none are". Ayer claims that its truth depends on the meaning of its constituting expressions alone. So, along with Swinburne's terminology, he is committed to maintain that:

"Either some ants are parasitic or none are" is true solely because "either some ants are parasitic or none are" means what it does.

Now consider the following instance of the disquotational schema:

"Either some ants are parasitic or none are" is true iff either some ants are parasitic or none are.

By substituting (II)'s right-hand side for (II)'s left-hand side within (I) yield

Either some ants are parasitic or none are only because "either some ants are parasitic or none are" means what it does.

(III) entails the following counterfactual:

Had it not been the case that "either some ants are parasitic or none are" means what it does, it would not have been the case that either some ants are parasitic or none are.

(IV) is plainly absurd. So either one denies the argument's validity, or one denies one of its premises. Since the argument depends on (I) and the disquotational schema alone, and the denial of (I) entails the empiricist's defeat, the empiricist must engage in the first strategy.

For instance, the empiricist could question the transition from (I) to (III). The general motivation behind this move could be the following. Suppose the empiricist provided principled reasons for rejecting the transition from (I) to (III). The proponent of the argument against Ayer's definition of analyticity could just use (I) to get at her problematic counterfactual conclusion. However, (I) is insufficient to get at this conclusion. (I) just claims that "either some ants are parasitic or none are" is true solely because "either some ants are parasitic or none are" means what it does. The sentence's meaning what it does, however, plainly provides just a sufficient condition for the sentence's truth. Alternative meaning assignments could equally suffice for the sentence's truth. The problem is that the following principle,

if p solely because q , then had it not been the case that q , it would not have been the case that p ,

is not generally true. It true only if q constitutes both a necessary and a sufficient condition for p . Accordingly, left with (I), which just states a sufficient condition, the proponent of the argument (I) – (IV) is impeded to get at the problematic counterfactual.

However, how could the empiricist motivate her rejection of the transition? The empiricist could question the use of (II) within the context of the argument from (I) to (IV). The reason is that "solely because" contexts are plagued by ambiguity: as the following instances arguably show, they do not identify a unique relation between the "antecedent" and the "consequent" within the context:

Kennedy is died only because more than one man fired at him;

J.O. was justified to believe that Kennedy was dead only because she witnessed the attack;

"Kennedy is died" is true only because "Kennedy is died" means what it does and Kennedy died;

q only because p and if p then q .

identifies what might be called the *causal* because-relation; (b), *pace* the externalist, identifies what might be called the *epistemic* (or *normative*) because-relation; (c) identifies what might be called the *truth-making* because relation; (d) identifies what might be called the *logic* because-relation.

Given the multifarious ambiguity of a "solely because" context, it shouldn't be surprising that the practice of substituting within such contexts may effect strange consequences; for the substitution of logically equivalent expressions may not respect the constraint that the logically equivalent expressions thereby substituted one for another be of the appropriate category for the same because-relation to yield non-problematically. Precisely stated, this constraint could be put as follows:

If P is a "solely because context" which identifies the R because-relation, and A is the antecedent within P, for every B such that A iff B the substitution of B for A within P is legitimate iff B is as good an antecedent for a R because-relation as A is.

Once (C) is in place, the empiricist could query the transition from (I) to (III). (III) is yielded by the substitution of a sentence for a truth-attributing (meta)sentence. Just the latter can plausibly feature within a truth-making because context. Therefore the transition from (I) to (III) should be rejected as based on an illegitimate substitution infringing the abovementioned constraint regulating substitutions within "only because" contexts. Since (III) is necessary to get at (IV), and (IV) is necessary to reject the empiricist view that analytic truth is not about reality, the result would be a vindication of the empiricist maxim.

Is it really so? Consider again the general motivation of the empiricist maneuver. The presupposition is that (I) is *per se* insufficient to get at the problematic counterfactual. That is to say, that it should be logically read in the following *conditional terms*:

(I_L) if "either some ants are parasitic or none are" means what it does, then "either some ants are parasitic or none are" is true.

(I_L) is consistent with some other condition's determining that "either some ants are parasitic or none are" is true. Therefore it does not entail the otiose counterfactual (IV).

Is however (I_L) sufficient to ground the empiricist claim that analytic statements are not about reality? The empiricist is presenting a principle to the effect that if "p" means what it does entails that "p" is true, then "p" is true but not about reality. Consider the statement that "snow is white". Given the way the world is, if "snow is white" means that snow is white, "snow is white" is true. Is however "snow is white" not about reality? Clearly it is about the real snow. So (I_L) is insufficient to ground the claim that analytic statements are not about reality.

A better strategy is given by the following modal reading of (1):

(I_{LM}) necessarily, if "either some ants are parasitic or none are" means what it does, then "either some ants are parasitic or none are" is true.

The statement "snow is white" clearly constitutes no counterexample to (I_{LM}). In other possible worlds snow is

not white, so the fact that "snow is white" means that snow is white does not necessarily guarantee that "snow is white" express a truth. So far, so good for the empiricist.

However, the empiricist's endorsement of (I_{LM}) is not immune to possible criticism, as long as its tendency to vindicate (CT) is concerned. Given its *conditional nature* (I_{LM}) is consistent with

(#) "either some ants are parasitic or none are" does not mean what it does *and* "either some ants are parasitic or none are" is true.

(#) is unproblematic if (I_{LM}) is *just* taken to concern the linguistic unit "either some ants are parasitic or none are" (with linguistic unit I mean the linguistic sign abstracted from its meaning, graphically or phonologically identified). Different possible meaning assignments in different possible worlds may effect that the linguistic unit takes up a different meaning in the light of which the linguistic unit nonetheless expresses a truth. In the possible world where "either some ants are parasitic or none are" means that snow is white, and snow is white, "either some ants are parasitic or none are" doesn't mean what it does and is nonetheless true. However, construed as just dealing with the linguistic unit, (I_{LM}) seems to be insufficient to get at (CT). If what (I_{LM}) says is just that certain meaning assignments entail that a certain linguistic unit expresses a truth, no clear case has been made to show that the truth the linguistic unit comes thereby to express is not about reality. There existed necessary facts – ones obtaining in every possible world – (I_{LM}) could be true on the grounds that, for "p" analytic, the present meaning assignments of "p" makes it the case that "p" says that F, and necessarily F. The empiricist cannot deny the existence of necessary facts from the outset without begging an important question, for it is the very nature of necessary statements which is at issue, whether they are or not about reality. Since (I_{LM}) is thus underdetermined with respect to necessary facts, (I_{LM}) , read just as concerning the linguistic unit, is insufficient to get at (CT).

However, (#) is problematic if (I_{LM}) is taken to concern not just the linguistic unit, but rather the interpreted sentence "either some ants are parasitic or none are". For in this case how can the empiricist explain the possibility that in some possible worlds what is presently asserted by an utterance of "either some ants are parasitic or none are" is true, while "either some ants are parasitic or none are" does not preserve its meaning, in a way which is still compatible with (CT)? Consider some possible world w_1 where there is no language and in which what is presently asserted by an utterance of "either some ants are parasitic or none are" is true. Consider the following principle:

What is now asserted in @ by an utterance of "either some ants are parasitic or none are" is true on w_1 iff in w_1 some ants are parasitic or none are.

Apparently, in w_1 no possible meaning stipulation can account for the fact that in w_1 either some ants are parasitic or none are. This result seems to stand in clear conflict with (CT) which is a claim to the effect that statements like "either some ants are parasitic or none are" are made true by conventional stipulations.

Accordingly, (I_{LM}) interpreted as dealing with interpreted sentences, forces the rejection of (CT). As a consequence (I_{LM}) must be upgraded to

(I_B) necessarily, "either some ants are parasitic or none are" means what it does iff "either some ants are parasitic or none are" is true.

(I_B) blocks (#). Under no circumstance consistent with (I_B) it is possibly the case that "either some ants are parasitic or none are" means what it does and "either some ants are parasitic or none are", as presently interpreted, is true.

With (I_B) in the place of (I_{LM}) , however, the foregoing argument can be run through the problematic counterfactual. (I_B) , together with (DS), entails

(III_B) necessarily, "either some ants are parasitic or none are" means what it does iff either some ants are parasitic or none are

from which it follows the problematic

(IV_B) were it not the case that "either some ants are parasitic or none are", it would not be the case that either some ants are parasitic or none are.

Which is false and entails the rejection of (I_B) .

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Experience and social norms in folk psychology – Wittgenstein meets neuroscience

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1. Introduction

Folk psychology has been the topic of much philosophical debate during the previous decades. These debates generally revolve around a rather limited set of questions. Is it a theory, a simulation-module or a practical skill? Is the community or the individual the primary unit when it comes to explaining folk psychology? Do folk psychologies vary culturally or is there one universal folk psychology? Little attention has been paid to the practical enactment of folk psychology, except in discussions on pathologies such as autism, where this enactment is defective. One goal of this paper, inspired by Wittgenstein's "Lecture on Aesthetics", is to fill in this gap to some extent, by discussing the role of experience in people's everyday going about with other people. A further goal is to relate the ensuing account to recent work in neuroscience, specifically, neurophenomenological work on valence. Finally, the consequences of this view on folk-psychological action for the debate on individualism versus "communitarianism" will be considered. It will be argued that the focus on features of individuals (experience *cum* brain dynamics) does not threaten the (Wittgensteinian) view that the social is a constitutive rather than a collateral feature of folk psychology.

2. Experience and skill

Wittgenstein often emphasized the importance of "blind" action at the cost of that of intellectual capacities (e.g. 1953 §§150, 219). He did so discussing rule following in linguistic understanding, but it seems also to apply to folk psychology – if only because this is highly dependent on language. We could say that being able to use folk psychology is more like knowing-how to drive – a highly "automated" skill – than like understanding Hegel's critique of Kant – a cognitive, propositional achievement. For example, knowing a folk-psychological truism such as "If *x* wishes that *w* and believes that *p* will, *ceteris paribus*, bring about that *w*, and *x* has no overriding considerations, *x* will *p*" simply means that in general one uses concepts like *belief* and *wish* in accordance with the rules for their use, that one reacts properly to their use by others, and that, possibly, one can explain their meaning (most likely by explicating their use in real practical contexts).

Several authors have argued that, like linguistic competence, folk psychology should be conceptualized as a skill – and one that to a large extent overlaps with the former (e.g. Schatzki 1996). However, an empirically substantiated account of such skills is lacking so far. In my view, there are (at least) two paths to arrive at this. One is the path through sociology, where one may study how in specific communities people are trained to attain such skills, how they are sustained within these communities, and how they differ between communities. The second route – the one I will pursue here – is derived from some interesting hunches Wittgenstein (1966) provides, where he suggests that an appreciation of people's *experience* is a key to understanding normatively constrained action.

Wittgenstein intimates that what people experience as right and wrong, guides them in their competent going

about. We are concerned here with situations in which fully enculturated, skilful individuals act – Wittgenstein's examples are expert craftsmen. The base line of Wittgenstein's phenomenological analyses is that we adjust our actions in response to very basic feelings of discomfort, which may be called *directed discontent* (Wittgenstein 1966, 13-14).¹ However, this idea on the experiential conditions for correct action hardly receives further elaboration by Wittgenstein.

Let us concretize the idea by considering a folk-psychological human exchange that in relevant dimensions is on a par with the examples Wittgenstein gives. Take the situation that Mary is having an intimate yet cheerful conversation with her friend Lucas, and that they are expecting to meet a third friend, Andra. Mary is in a good mood, and has reasons to believe that Andra will be too. Then, when Andra enters the room where Mary is chatting with Lucas, Mary unexpectedly notices in Andra's facial expression that she feels miserable. The suddenly emerging aspect of Andra's condition affects Mary's subsequent activity, and her mood, expression and attitude change suddenly. From one readiness-to-act (continuing the nice conversation with Lucas) Mary shifts to another (comforting Andra, inquiring what is wrong, etc). It is important to observe that although Mary's (linguistic) actions can be judged by the rules of social interaction – since they are normatively constrained – in such situations people generally don't deliberate about the relevant norms, but *immediately* do what the situation requires.

How, precisely, individuals are introduced in a society of rule followers remains unclear in Wittgenstein's writings, but seems to become a tangible issue now, as we can at this point ask the question what exactly happens when one acts in accordance with a norm.

3. Neurophenomenology

Neurophenomenology, a novel approach within cognitive neuroscience, may help to answer the question just posed. Constraints on space do not allow for a proper introduction to the neurophenomenological framework, so what will follow is only an illustration of its possible value with regard to our present topic.²

Varela & Depraz (2004) can serve as our guide in the attempt to understand such social exchanges as described above. In this text, Varela and Depraz try to give a description of the first-person experience on the phenomenologically basic level of a certain aspect of a situation first affecting us. Unlike Wittgenstein, Varela and Depraz do not employ a narrative (macro-)timescale – on which processes take at least several seconds – but a micro-timescale. On this timescale processes take at most 1500 milliseconds. In Wittgenstein's analyses – as in the account of Mary's action above – the experience of

¹ See e.g. Rietveld 2004 for a more elaborate discussion of Wittgenstein's notion of directed discontent.

² In a nutshell, neurophenomenology constitutes an attempt to wed first-person accounts of experience to third-person accounts of brain dynamics, in order to get a more comprehensive account of human cognition. For an introductory text, see Varela 1996.

directed discontent appeared to be an immediate event. The first major contribution of Varela and Depraz, however, is that affects such as these develop in (micro-)time, i.e., that we are concerned with *processes* rather than events. The second is related, since this small timescale allows us to connect experience with brain activity.³

Let us focus on the phenomenological side of the story. Here we find that the modification of the timescale Varela and Depraz introduce, brings along yet another interesting thing: we find a minimal form of immediate normative action, viz., the very first moment of an appreciative reaction. This is a reaction that involves *movement* from the very first moment onwards. After Varela and Depraz I will call this “valence.”

If we want to attain a better understanding of Mary's experience of the alteration of her readiness to act that arises the moment that she notices her unhappy friend Andra, we need an analysis of the moment at which an object emerges and leads to a change in one's action-readiness. At the moment Mary first sees Andra's unhappy face, she will normally not consciously know what exactly it is that she sees, what condition her friend is in. Phenomenological analysis suggests that part of the process in which affects emerge takes place pre-reflectively. That is to say, such situations as just described generally affect us to some extent even before we have become reflectively conscious of what happens (cf. Rudrauf *et al.* 2003, 59)

Using concrete examples, Varela and Depraz attempt to show that event-related affect and movement (action) are integral aspects of the first constitutive moments of any experience, and that these already have an evaluative dimension to them. Because of this combination of affect and movement Varela and Depraz call valence a motion-affect. (2004, 164) This appreciation can be understood as a dynamic polarity, as a tension that takes several forms: like-dislike, attraction-rejection, pleasure-displeasure. (*Ibid*, 163) Furthermore, it comprises anticipation on the possible actions that the situation allows. (*Ibid*, 164) Varela and Depraz insist that these polarities should not be understood too strictly, but that we should rather see them in terms of distinct global repertoires of actions. Valence, then, is the first (relatively) big restriction of someone's room to manoeuvre in a particular situation. This analysis suggests that from the start, every experience of meaningful objects is value-laden.

When an object occurs there are always several aspects that play a role in the progression towards a more matured affect, such as directed discontent. Examples that Varela and Depraz mention include:

- A precipitating event, or trigger that can be perceptual (a social event, affective expression or behaviour of another in social context) or imaginary (a thought, memory, fantasy or other affect) or both;
- A “feeling of evidence” of the precipitating event's meaning, the emergence of a salience. [...]
- A motor embodiment, especially facial and motor changes, and differential “readiness” activations. [...]

³ On this timescale we find a relative stability of relevant aspects. On a larger timescale, such as the narrative one, complex stochastic processes in the brain come to play a role and there emerges a ‘disorganized complexity [...] because a system has a large number of significant components that exhibit a high degree of random behavior’. (Le Van Quyen 2003, p.72)

- Complex autonomic physiological changes, with the most commonly studied being various cardio-pulmonary parameters, skin conductance, and various muscle tone manifestations. (*Ibid*, 160-1)

All these aspects develop in parallel; they influence each other continuously and in that way add to the emergence of an event-related affective reaction. An example is provided by Mary's change in expression and action when she perceives the unhappy expression on the face of her friend Andra. Taken together, these aspects help to make clear that the first moment that something affects someone, already involves movement, which in this case becomes manifest in the changed expression on Mary's face.

Of course, much more needs to be said about this to fully answer the question what happens when we act instantaneously in accord with a folk-psychological norm. But what we have here is the beginning of an account of the physiology of normativity, and hence a way to tackle the question how individuals become members of a community. And it appears that the neurophenomenological account is valuable here. Moreover, the phenomenological account can (in principle) be wedded to a neurophysiological one, which provides additional explanatory resources. Neurophenomenology, then, enables the assessment of the causal role of experience in folk psychological action.

4. Individualism *cum* mechanicism versus normativity *cum* sociality

Individualism with regard to folk psychology entails that all of it can be explained exhaustively in terms of the features of individuals alone. This position can be ascribed to several prominent contemporary thinkers (e.g. Fodor 1987 and Churchland 1991). Which of these features are relevant is a disputed issue amongst individualists, but, since one popular view has it that it is neurophysiology, neurophenomenology may well be taken as promoting individualism. More generally, the rise of neuroscience seems to many to entail the promise that one day our everyday going about can be reductively explained in terms of neurophysiology.

Such explanation is, by necessity, “mechanical”, since it can only take recourse to causal chains in its accounts of human action. This is not altered when first-person experience guides neuroscience in its quest for answers, as is the case with neurophenomenology. If we assume – as I think we must – that meaning cannot be accounted for in mechanical terms, this puts a constraint on what we can expect from such an enterprise, since then the *meaning* of everything involved in folk psychology cannot play any *explanatory* role.

Since our various folk-psychological practices are intrinsically meaningful, the normative dimension that pertains to language applies to them as well. This is obvious from the fact that meaningful expressions can be used either correctly or incorrectly. It is in virtue of their meaning that, for example, intentions, hopes, wishes and their cognates normatively determine what accords with them. That is to say, what fulfils a particular intention, hope or wish – all crucial knots in our folk psychology – is decided by what the intention, hope or wish is about.

Stressing the meaningfulness and normativity of folk psychology provides the starting point for an argument against individualism, since the normative rules of our

language – and (hence) of our folk psychology – are essentially *social*. They are laid down in the social practices we engage in, and cannot be reduced to mechanical processes of individuals alone. Folk-psychological norms are, like other norms, best thought of as social institutions: they exist only in and through their practical enaction and endorsement in and by a community. Whether my belief that you are in pain is a true belief, for example, depends not just on your experience, but also on what we communally take “to be in pain” to consist in. Equally, your expression of pain depends crucially on the social and normative rules for such expressions.

This understanding of folk psychology in terms of meaningful actions (performed by skilful individuals), has the advantage over the causal construal of such actions that it does not run into the problem of having to explain how causal relations among the various parts of our physiology relate to the meaningful features of our beliefs, which surely must have a place in the explanation of folk psychology.

5. Conclusion

The view on folk psychology outlined in the last section emphasized its normative and social nature, whereas the preceding concentrated on the experiential *cum* neural events involved in folk-psychological action. These perspectives, I claim, do not exclude one another. But in light of the former we can say that the latter's ambitions can never be to give exhaustive answers to questions about folk psychology, since its method only allows for mechanistic answers, i.e., answers in terms of brain dynamics, which do not bear on folk psychology's meaning, since this is a social and normative phenomenon essentially. Nevertheless, a further investigation of the individualist type might help to understand not only the enaction of folk psychology by individuals, it may also add to our understanding of the way in which individuals become members of communities, as it gives an account of the physiology of normativity.

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Can there be such thing as a “hopeless” language user?

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1. Complicated forms of feeling.¹

Let us first turn our attention to Wittgenstein’s suggestions about the constitution of our inner world – our repertoire of feelings, emotions and inner experiences. Those subjects able to learn and master a language are also able to develop that repertoire in many ways.

A baby, for example, is a subject who *feels* pains as well as throbbing pains, although the specific form of pain we describe as ‘throbbing’ is something whose expression requires the use of a language. Matters are different, say, with the concept of ‘fear’. While we should be often right in stating that this baby here fears the stranger in front of her, it would not seem quite acceptable to say that she fears an ancient mausoleum just at the end of the street. In learning a language we not only discover how to express and describe our pre-existent kinds of fear; rather, the *things* we fear and the *ways* we fear are largely expanded – up to the point of our acknowledging a speaker as someone in position to claim the discovery of an unsuspected fear within herself. But things go still another way when it comes to feelings such as ‘hope’ or ‘grief’, for here we must say that the very *feeling* of these experiences requires the learning of a language. It seems that *nothing like* hope or grief could correctly be ascribed to a sentient subject unless the subject were at the same time described as a language user. That is the position Wittgenstein assumes when he describes “the phenomena of hope” as “modifications of this complicated form of life” (Wittgenstein 2001, p. 148).

Wittgenstein’s remarks, as I read them, leave us enough room to doubt whether modifications of the talkative life-form of subjects come about in the same way by the users of very different languages. The point is reinforced by analogy with the idea that “if a concept refers to a character of human handwriting, it has no application to beings that do not write” (Wittgenstein 2001, p. 148). For it is also the case that *different* concepts of characters of writing apply to *different* human systems of writing.

If I am right in keeping your imagination open to the possibilities of modification of the complicated language user’s form of life, I should be also right in asking whether at least some part of our inner experiences may take the form of concepts that vary according to one’s cultural background – and therefore whether the mental repertoire of two different subjects could be other than identical.

2. Setting the stage to the radical interpreter.

Imagine a field linguist or anthropologist trying to explain the behavior of subjects whose language and habits remain unknown to her. The first problem in such situations is that thought, speech and action always suppose each other when it comes to human agency. So, before ascribing any meaning to the utterances of a subject, the scientist needs some grasp of the subject’s

beliefs and intentions; on the other hand, beliefs and attitudes are only finely discriminated under the assumption that she understands the subject’s utterances. Thus, according to Davidson, “we must have a theory that simultaneously accounts for attitudes and interprets speech, and which assumes neither” (Davidson 2001, 195).

The radical interpreter relies on two indispensable instruments to enter into the circle of interpretation. One is the basic evidence available in the form of general attitudes towards sentences, while the other is the interpreter herself; this second point concerns us more directly and deserves some clarification.

One of the basic tenets of radical interpretation is the so called principle of charity: the idea that the interpreter, in interpreting thought and talk of others, must methodologically ascribe to her subjects as much true beliefs as she can (according to her own views). Given the starting point of the radical interpreter, there seems to be no other theoretical procedure available: “Since knowledge of beliefs comes only with the ability to interpret words, the only possibility at the start is to assume general agreement on beliefs” (Davidson 2001, 196). In this sense, the interpreter herself is her main instrument of work.

Besides, Davidson’s suggestion seems to be that the interpreter secures a base of understanding from out of which disagreement becomes first identifiable and accountable for. To make for the point of *methodological* charity, therefore, we must keep in mind that “widespread agreement is the only possible background against which disputes and mistakes can be interpreted” (Davidson 2001, p. 153). Such a heuristic approach gives way to the idea that in ascribing attitudes to subjects and meanings to utterances, the interpreter should assume neither: for insofar as agreement is seen as a mere platform that allows tracing those threads of disagreement between interpreter and interpreted subject, any ascription of attitude to a given person or of meaning to one of that person’s utterances may be revised and corrected while interpretation is on its way.

3. Further Complications.

Suppose we present to the radical interpreter the results of our reflections on the constitution of *our own* mental states and its relations to acquisition of language. We concede to her that attributions of feelings like pain, and of mental attitudes such as belief, desire or fear, must be held not just as basic ingredients of interpretation, but of anything we may intelligibly call a mental life. We concede that the interpreter who refuses to describe a subject’s behavior by means of these basic concepts is never likely to get a foot in the door. Besides, we add the interesting argument, based on observation of our own forms of life, to the effect that feelings and attitudes correctly ascribable to pre-linguistic infants might be extended, expanded or improved, but never *annihilated*, by language acquisition. So making sense of forms of life according to which people do not feel pain, do not desire things nor hold some of them true is an utterly dim possibility.

¹ For the point presented in this section, without which this paper would simply not exist, I am indebted to my friend Murilo Seabra and particularly to the communication he submitted for this symposium under the title “A complicated form of life”.

But what are we going to say about those occasions when a subject's behavior suggests she's in grief, or when we are inclined to interpret one of her utterances as manifesting a feeling of hope? The Davidsonian radical interpreter will naturally hold on to the idea that, no matter what the practices, language and cultural background are, the methodology of interpretation keeps its regular course: so what we should do is to remember that first-person present-tense statements are usually true (unless we have reasons to believe the subject is lying) and that what is being self-ascribed is much like the same things we regularly ascribe to ourselves; besides, we should keep in mind that our interpretation could be corrected at some later stage, and that we might come to realize the subject was not feeling what we at first figured she was.

But if we rely on Wittgenstein's reflections on the mental, then it seems we should proceed with caution when it comes to interpreting some thoughts and behavior of subjects remote from our common cultural background. Perhaps we should avoid making use of concepts such as 'hope' or 'grief'. Perhaps applying these concepts we lay ourselves open to the threat of projecting our provincial perspectives and experiences onto subjects who not necessarily share them. For it may be the case that mental concepts entirely language-dependant, such as hope or grief, be modifications of human experience linked with specific languages in which they are used.

Can we make good sense of the above suggestion? I think we get a clear answer by aligning the problem with the standpoint of the radical interpreter.

4. Back to the radical interpreter.

Now suppose we have reason, as interpreters, to say that some mental concept *c* as used by a speaker of language *L* in a large range of sentences had no clear counterpart in our own language; or else that in giving the truth conditions of *L*-sentences we never made use of something like our own concept of 'hope'. Here, some people will urge, there's little point in accounting for the relevant differences in terms of explicable disagreement; rather, the facts must be accounted for by saying that each concept, *c* and 'hope', is relative and necessarily referred to its respective (kind of) language. So what we get here is a case of full-fledged *conceptual difference* between two languages. And this is the best reason we could ever find for the belief that "the phenomena of hope" are local.

It seems to me that the above account depends on a mislead construal of the expression 'conceptual difference'. I will maintain, in any case, that the inference is wrong from 'lack of conceptual equivalence' to 'linguistic relativity', 'difference in mental repertoire', or any other exciting suggestions. The point will be made first in connection with Davidson's and then with Wittgenstein's ideas.

- (1) Allow concept *c* to be a peculiarity of *L* in the above sense. In this case, the idea that concept *c* of language *L* lacks a good counterpart in our language is tantamount to saying that we could not find appropriate truth conditions for some sentence, or some range of sentences, uttered by speakers of *L*. But that amounts to no more than recognizing we *did not arrive* at a correct interpretation of some or all of the sentences in which *c* occurs. According to radical interpretation two conclusions are therefore available: either we do not have enough evidence to support that the alien sentences were, to begin with,

a sample of speech behavior; or else we must improve our platform of agreement with the speakers of *L* until we get at a plausible interpretation of the aforementioned sentences.

The story goes like this: i) in order to be in a position to judge that others had thoughts different from our own, expressed by mental concepts peculiar to their language, we must be in a position to *interpret* their utterances; ii) in order to interpret people's utterances we must find the appropriate truth-conditions of the uttered sentences; iii) the truth conditions of an alien sentence must be formulated in the interpreter's language; iv) therefore, nothing could count as a case of mental or conceptual difference between ourselves and others that did not require an alien piece of speech behavior to be translatable into our own language. We may also repeat points i)-iv), so as to fully attend the initial demands, conceiving a speaker of *L* as the interpreter and ourselves as the interpreted subjects. Translatability expresses a symmetrical relation.

Of course point iii), in the above sketch, is the most crucial to the argument: it shows that the concepts of truth and translatability go always together in interpretation. What seems important here is to acknowledge that the interpreter would never be able to tell an alien speaker's utterance was true unless she were convinced that she herself might have held one sentence of her own language as true under the same conditions of the speaker's utterance. In other words: the interpreter could never be in a position to say she *understood* the meaning of some alien sentence if she had failed in making her understanding *linguistically* explicit; and of course her only means to make it explicit is using some language she already masters.

Now we have a clearer grasp of our problem. Suppose one is right in assuming translatability as a criterion for the linguistic. Then how are we to make sense of claims about conceptual difference? I think the only way out is to show we *can* make good sense, but no big deal, of these claims. The sentence "Concept *c* cannot be rendered in our language" only states the very natural fact that *c* has no straightforward vernacular counterpart in our language. But when someone says that a given word has no counterpart in another language we should not think she is saying more than she really is. She could not be saying, for instance, that only the speakers of *L* had some mysterious grasp of *c*, or that *c* constituted some mysterious object or state accessed only by those speakers. Radical interpretation precludes radical excitement.

- (2) Wittgenstein asks: "Can only hope those who can talk?"; and his answer is: "Only those who have mastered the use of a language" (Wittgenstein 2001, 148). The question we have been trying to answer was: "Can only hope those who master *given* languages?". And I think the answer is no, at least if we rely on the ideas connected with Davidson's account of radical interpretation.

If we accept the standpoint of the radical interpreter, perhaps we can come to understand why Wittgenstein describes the phenomena of hope as modifications of *this* complicated form of life. That is, why he describes the ability to talk and master whichever languages as *one single* form of life – instead of forms of life in the plural. I think we should understand the criteria of learnability and translatability as a natural consequence of language's publicity. We could not make sense of some thought or

feeling that was *both* thought or felt only by certain speakers *and* that was linguistic all the same. Yet this is precisely what is required of us in order to make sense of the sentence "Only those who master given languages can hope". What we must realize once and for all is that privacy and publicity fare badly together.

Of course the interpreter is bound to find all difficulties ordinary translators usually experience, and these difficulties are often correctly attributed to some tricky words of a language. Still, here is the place to train our capacity of resisting philosophical temptations. No interpretation could be so difficult as to prove our mental or linguistic lack of resources – instead of proving, like Wittgenstein's attacks to Sir James Frazer, that imagination just needs some workout.

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Regaining the Sense of the Tractatus: Wittgenstein's Logical Mysticism

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In recent decades, scholarship regarding Wittgenstein's religious outlook has begun to rescue the *Tractatus* from its dominating Positivist interpretation, an orthodox reading that views the document as a logical and linguistic classic with some minor mystical aphorisms, appendices that can be safely excised without damaging the text. Writers, presenting their work in this Symposium and elsewhere, have forced the academic community to realize the affect of religion on Wittgenstein's early life and the importance of his mysticism in the *Tractatus*. Unfortunately, this research bifurcates the book into logical and religious portions, leaving the reader with a schizophrenic author whose mystical revelations are totally detached from his linguistic enterprises.

This paper is an attempt to understand how Wittgenstein's mysticism completes his logical work and why it is essential for the *Tractatus* as a whole. Tractarian mysticism blooms in proposition 6.41; however, assuming Wittgenstein's dictum, where succeeding decimal figures are comments on the preceding proposition (Wittgenstein, 2000, p.31), the starting point for my analysis will be proposition 6, and progress through 6.4, pointing out how various seemingly non-religious sentences establish the unique logical nature of Tractarian mysticism. From propositions 6.41 until 7, Wittgenstein slowly evolves his conception of the mystical, which emerges from his linguistic study by way of time. Through time, Wittgenstein explores his mysticism, and quickly falls into paradoxical language—echoes of Tolstoy's *Gospel In Brief*, the final link between the mystical and logical in the *Tractatus*.

Foundations of Tractarian Mysticism: Propositions 6-6.4

The genesis of Tractarian mysticism begins at 6, "The general form of a truth function is: $[\bar{p}, \xi, N(\xi)]$. This lays out the structure of propositions, which occur in logic as tautologies (6.1), that which characterizes and forms logic (6.12). Thus, logic is *sinnlos*, senseless; it cannot mean anything, and, if it did, it would necessarily be false (6.111). Presenting the scaffolding of the world (6.124), all logical propositions are of equal rank (6.127). Mathematics is actually a logical method (6.234), where equal signs are hidden tautologies (6.22, 6.2341, 6.24). The first source of Wittgenstein's mysticism appears here: when 6.127 is combined with 6.13, "Logic is not a theory but a reflection of the world," Wittgenstein reveals that logic and the world are of the same rank, with no higher value than true or false. Language and its logical foundation cannot understand value or ever appreciate it, blocking humanity from what is higher. Neither science, the correct philosophical method (6.53), the unification of mathematics and observation, nor logic could provide proof that traditional thinkers, like Anselm, Aquinas, or the Pythagoreans, found for value in the factual world.

Proposition 6.3 provides the second source of Wittgenstein's mysticism, the arbitrary nature of life in the world. Scientific laws and other seemingly necessary propositions are, despite the confidence of their creators,

not logical laws (6.37, 6.371), but rather forms of a law (6.34). Logic, in its ability to provide a descriptive structure for facts, allows for the possibility of scientific laws (6.33, 6.3431). The law of causality provides "uniform connections" (6.361), descriptions of the natural world that, through scientific laws, makes thought and language concerning the world possible (6.362). Yet this is a farce: the law of causality, while a general form of a law, is still not a logical law; its assertions, such as the rising of the sun tomorrow (6.3611), do not provide anything other than a helpful psychological respite (6.3631), for these beliefs rest only on repeated observation and descriptive scientific observations. Wittgenstein regards this accidental characteristic as affecting not only the modern scientific worldview but also personal causation—"The world is independent of my will" (6.373). Intentions are not necessarily connected with our physical form or actions (6.374), further revealing that neither science nor mind provides the ultimate answer as to why the world appears so consistent and regular.

Thus, at the end of 6.3, the two foundations of Wittgenstein's mysticism, the lack of value in the world and its arbitrary nature outside of logic, combines into a palpable angst that explodes in 6.41. All propositions have the same value, that is, none, since the world's accidental nature does not allow for value to be expressed in language or in events. Wittgenstein believes that there exists something higher outside the expressible that shows itself through ethics and art (6.42, 6.421), despite the world's indifference to these higher values (6.432). Wittgenstein, in his description of the world's "valuing," which "...places a stone on the same moral level with beasts and men," (Wittgenstein, 1979, p. 84) sounds more like an existentialist than a proto-Positivist, providing a glimpse into the *pathos* of, and the reasons for, Wittgenstein's logical mysticism. The world's sense cannot be answered by a perfect, omniscient science (6.52), or by eternal life (6.4312). This meaning (6.41), and the problem of the world's inability to account for it, cannot be put into language (6.5); its solution comes through its vanishing (6.521), which Wittgenstein believes will occur after using his words to see the world rightly (6.54).

Time: The Unappreciated Mystical Link

Discussions of time, beyond recasting many of the issues concerning the mystical's foundation, become a weathervane for Wittgenstein's journey from logic and language to mysticism and the ineffable. Initially, Wittgenstein argues that time is related to objects (2.0251), the fundamental Tractarian substance (2.021). Unlike the object, time has no substance (6.3611), and is primarily ordered through logic (Wittgenstein, 1979, 24). When these comments are combined with other propositions, such as those concerning color, another form of objects (4.123), it appears that Wittgenstein considered time a part of the world's structure. If so, time must be a hallmark of the world: any world made up of chains of objects, facts, if combined according to logic's structure, must be in time; such a world, because of its factual construction, will be void of any value or necessity, thus making time a sign of a

vapid factual reality. However, humanity experiences a world in which it appears misplaced: man somehow stumbles upon value in aesthetics and ethics, and understands that some things, like logic, are unable to be explained in reference to the facts. The mystical reaches out through religion and art—and also science (Wittgenstein, 1979, p. 84); it, and not any material reality, is the reason for the existence of the world (6.44). The link between fact and value has again been made: Wittgenstein's mystical considerations of time emerge from his logical exercises, in an attempt to resolve the problem of life.

Obviously, the life that is problematic is the one that is lived in time (Wittgenstein, 1979, p. 74). Bound by time, which follows from the factual world, there is no hope to cure the preceding problems of existence. Wittgenstein believes that happiness is possible if a man "...is *living* in eternity and not in time." (Wittgenstein, 1979, p. 84; 6.4312) For Wittgenstein, eternal life is equivalent to non-temporal existence—to live eternally is to live in the present (6.4311; Wittgenstein, 1979, p. 74). To experience this life, man must progress beyond the totality of facts that make up the world; he must view it together with space and time instead of in space and time (Wittgenstein, 1979, p. 83). Now, outside the bounds of time, man can finally see how the world truly is, and live happily, through agreement with the world (Wittgenstein, 1979, p. 75).

Such non-temporal living would be achieved through the view *sub specie aeternitatis*, the mystical feeling of the world (6.45). *Sub specie aeternitatis* was first used by Spinoza to describe the awareness of the link between God and Nature, the necessary connection between the divine and all (Copleston, 1994, p. 244-5). This view allowed humanity to appreciate higher revelations of reality, to escape from doubt, and to love the divine it was a mode of. The pains of the present could now be reconciled through the eternal substance: since the universe's sole source was divine, even trials and pains were holy (Copleston, 1994, p. 244). Monk believes Schopenhauer acquainted Wittgenstein with the term (1990, p.143), but it was Weininger, a writer Wittgenstein devoured in his youth, who brought the phrase its special content. Weininger believed a great artist, like the brilliant philosopher, bore the problems of life with him, unlike the scientist, whose obsession with matter left him unconscious of higher values (Schule, 2004, p. 127). Life's meaning was united with time and willing: ethics necessarily accepted the boundaries of the present within it was formed, and tried to accord itself with the unidirectionality of time (Schule, 2004, p. 130). However, the genius understood the universe's essence, and, transcending time itself, enshrined each moment in view of this eternal universal value (Schule, 2004, p. 131).

Wittgenstein appropriated, with a few significant modifications, his fellow Austrian's uniting of ethics and non-temporality through the view *sub specie aeternitatis*. Religion and art are similar in that they see the world *sub specie aeternitatis*, from outside of the world, having the whole of logical space as a background (Wittgenstein, 1979, p. 83). Wittgenstein once remarked that in 1910 or 11 he had begun to see the possibility of religion (Monk, 1990, p.51), and it was this ability of religion to view the world telescopically, appreciating the world as a bounded, limited whole (6.45), that led him to become religious. Normally, man's view was microscopic: in space and time, man could see only the facts, and not what was outside of them. Viewing the world *sub specie aeternitatis* modified the whole logical world (Wittgenstein, 1979, p. 83),

expanding to see beyond space and time to appreciate value. One could now, with the world in its proper scope, live in accordance with the facts and the ineffable, Wittgenstein's definition of "happiness" (Wittgenstein, 1979, p. 74-5). Life in the present was an existence without fear and hope: once one lived in accord with the world, there was nothing that could harm one's self, even death. Hope is unnecessary, for hope is not needed when one's goal is already present (Wittgenstein, 1979, p. 76).

Tolstoy, Temporality, and the Tractarian Ladder

From logic, and by way of time, Tractarian mysticism dissolves the riddle of life, a soteriology whose source arose from Leo Tolstoy's *The Gospel in Brief*, the book that, while reinforcing Wittgenstein's views towards religion and the world, revolutionized the philosopher's worldview. Tolstoy's Christ, as Wittgenstein reiterates in 6.521, reminds his followers that one cannot prove the validity of his wisdom, for his teachings are the light through which everything is known (Tolstoy, 1997, p.132, 138). Christ's enlightenment was not removed from living, but was identical with life and existence itself (Tolstoy, 1997, p.132)—one could not, in Tractarian terms, understand Wittgenstein's propositions without first acting, surmounting the sentences. Only after climbing through and perceiving what was above Wittgenstein's words was it possible for the ladder to be seen as unnecessary and, hence, disposable (6.54). Such a living enlightenment realized what the rich young ruler could not: that the goods of this life—both intellectual and physical—were temporary and inferior to the Father's eternal glory (Tolstoy, 1997, p.121-2). Selfishness was to be abandoned for the will of the Father, as were riches, which Tolstoy claimed made doing the Father's commands impossible (Tolstoy, 1997, p.121).

The Gospel also impacted Wittgenstein's temporal mysticism. Chapter Eight, a meditation on "This Day," a line from the Lord's Prayer, contains the subtitle "Life is not Temporal," an appropriate description for this section that consistently emphasizes Wittgenstein's *sub specie aeternitatis*. The link between life in the present and non-temporality are connected through service to the Son, for the Son exists outside of time; thus, to serve him, one must be outside of time as well, as the servant in Matthew 24:44,45 demonstrates (Tolstoy, 1997, p.156). For those who follow this narrow road, disregarding future gain for devotion to the Father's call and fighting against, "The illusions of the temporal life (that) conceal from men the true life in the present," Christ promises life beyond the power of time (Tolstoy, 1997, p.145, 152). Outside of time, those who are alive in God, the eternal, non-temporal fountain of being, never die (Tolstoy, 1997, p.171). Faith, the life of the Spirit, was not a belief in orthodoxy or esoteric doctrine; it existed in understanding one's position and living out this revelation—only through faith, the beholding of the source of life that could transcend time and death, could one boast, "Death is not an event in life. Death is not lived through." (6.4311; Tolstoy, 1997, p. 153, 170-171)

Facing death in World War I was the final catalyst in Wittgenstein's resolution, first expressed in the propositions leading to 6.41, that his logical method pointed to something beyond the world. Tractarian mysticism, with its foundation in language and logic, evolved as an answer to the unique problems of its author's worldview.

The answer was expressed through Wittgenstein's discussion of time: beginning with strictly linguistic analysis, time becomes the face of life's riddle, emerging out of logical concerns of form, object, and fact. Through Tolstoy's mystical temporal linguistics, time is also the face of the solution as well, leading to increasingly paradoxical language as Wittgenstein extends beyond the effable.

Upon writing and surmounting his propositions, Wittgenstein did not imitate Carnap, and begin a revolutionary linguistic research experiment, but rather followed Tolstoy's Christ, becoming poor and teaching disadvantaged children. Without an adequate understanding of the Tractarian ladder's composition, we will fail to see what this action points towards: the sense of the *Tractatus* and why the ladder was necessary in the first place—to get beyond the facts to reach the higher.

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Brandom on Holism, Communication, and Reference

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1. Introduction

My paper aims at exploring the double role that Brandom's account of communication plays for his theory of assertional content. One of the central features of Brandom's approach is his rejection of an analytic/synthetic distinction which in turn commits him to a strong semantic holism, according to which the meanings of all of a speaker's beliefs change at least slightly every time she acquires a new belief. Since this also implies that utterances always have different meanings in different mouths, Brandom has to say something about how communication is possible. The other theoretical role of Brandom's account of communication is that the way communication works in the face of these 'doxastic gaps' between interlocutors enables him to account for a referential dimension of our discursive practices. Accordingly, this paper has three parts: First, I will talk about Brandom's commitment to strong semantic holism, second, I will describe how Brandom thinks that communication can still work, and third, I will explain how this social process can account for a referential dimension of discourse.

2. Semantic Holism

Brandom defends a conceptual-role-semantics, according to which assertions can have propositional content only if they are inferentially related to other assertions. This account has the holistic consequence that speakers can have one concept only if they have many (cf. MIE 2.III.3). However, content is determined holistically in a stronger sense as well: It is not just that the content of an assertion is determined by its inferential connection with some other assertions; the content of an assertion is determined by *all* of the inferential relations it is involved in. Brandom claims that one cannot privilege certain inferences an assertion is involved in as content-constituting to the exclusion of others which reflect empirical claims and are irrelevant for content. So, Brandom takes a Quinean view here: there is no distinction between inferences that are valid solely in virtue of content and inferences that are valid for empirical reasons (cf. MIE 634f).

I do not have time to discuss the Brandom's arguments for this view. Instead, I want to note that a semantic holism of this kind has the consequence that no two speakers ever mean the same thing by their words. The inferences an assertion is involved in correspond to empirical claims. For example, most people endorse the inference from 'There is lightning' to 'There will be thunder soon'. But this endorsement corresponds to the claim that a natural law holds, which is an empirical claim. Now, since two speakers never share all of their empirical beliefs, they will also disagree about what inferential relations a given assertion is caught up in. This in turn means that any assertion has a different meaning for different speakers (cf. MIE 478).

A terminological point: The set of inferences a speaker accepts for a given assertion, i.e., what the speaker takes to follow from the assertion and what he takes the assertion to follow from, is called the inferential significance the assertion has for the speaker. As I have

just argued, the inferential significance of an assertion is speaker-relative. Apart from the inferential significance, assertions also have an inferential content, which is constituted by the objectively correct inferential relations (cf. MIE 478). However, in this paper, I will mainly be concerned with inferential significances.

3. Semantic Holism and Communication

I have argued that it is a consequence of Brandom's theory of assertional content that every utterance means something different in the mouth of the speaker than it does in the mouth of the hearer. In this situation the possibility of communication becomes questionable. Even though he is not very explicit about it, I think that Brandom would react to this problem in the following way: The inferential significances different speakers attach to an utterance will normally be very similar, so that what the hearer understands is pretty much what the speaker meant. Let me spell out this idea in a little more detail: If the hearer is to understand what the speaker says, he has to know many, though not all of the inferential relations the speaker endorses. This condition of communication will normally be fulfilled if the speaker and the hearer have been brought up in the same linguistic community. Then they will attach largely the same inferential significances to the same words and they will share a large part of their background information.

So, when the speaker makes a claim, the hearer has a pretty good idea as to what inferential significance this claim has for the speaker. The hearer can therefore identify in her own web of beliefs an assertion that matches the speaker's inferential significance. Normally, there will be one and only one assertion in the web of beliefs of the hearer that matches the inferential significance the speaker attaches to his utterances far better than any other assertion. With regard to some inferential relations the hearer does not know whether the speaker endorses them, but since these are a small minority, this poses no threat to the possibility of solving the 'matching problem' just described. If, on the other hand, the hearer cannot find a solution to this problem, this means that the hearer does not understand the speaker. Brandom says that interlocutors have to find a way of "mapping their different repertoires of [inferential] commitments onto one another" (MIE 475).

So, even if the constitution of assertional content is strongly holistic, one can say that the transmission of meaning works more or less. What the hearer gets will in most cases be pretty similar to what the speaker has sent. There will be misunderstandings, but they will be rare, most of all because people are in some sense aware of the problem of different significances of words. Competent interlocutors know which inferential relations are commonly accepted and which ones depend on information that is not generally shared, and they will tell their audience those things that need to be told.

From what has been said so far, it is not clear what Brandom's motivation is for rejecting the picture of communication as transmission. The fact that transmission never works perfectly does not constitute a strong reason for rejecting this picture altogether. I think that Brandom's

rejection of the transmission-picture has to do with the fact that his account of the process of communication also serves the theoretical purpose of accounting for a referential dimension of our discursive practices. (See MIE 485: “[C]oncern with what is talked about [i.e. reference] arises in the process of mapping the repertoire of commitments of an interpreted interlocutor onto the repertoire of commitments of an interpreting interlocutor”.) And while it is not wrong to conceive of communication as the more or less faulty transmission of content, this picture leaves it mysterious why communication should be essential for the constitution of content.

Let us therefore consider Brandom’s account of reference. The first step is to shift our attention away from whole sentences to subsentential parts and, in particular, to singular terms, because singular terms are what in the first instance refers to objects. We now have to consider how communication works with regard to singular terms. In order to do that, the notion of an inferential relation has to be broadened in such a way that also singular terms can stand in inferential relations to one another. Primarily, this notion applies only to whole sentences because only they can be used as premises and conclusions. However, this notion can be broadened because language is compositional. Subsentential parts, i.e., singular terms and predicates, make a systematic contribution to the inferential significance of the whole sentence. For this reason, they can be assigned an inferential significance as well (cf. MIE 399f).

The inferential significance of a singular term consists in the fact that it is intersubstitutable with a number of other singular terms. For example, the singular term *a* might be governed by the inferential relation that *a* can in any sentence be substituted by *b* and vice versa. Thus, a whole set of materially good inferential relations of the form ‘from Fa infer Fb ’ (for any predicate *F*) is captured by a single inferential significance concerning *a*. The inferential significances characterizing singular terms are symmetric, i.e., when replacing *a* by *b* always yields a materially good inference, then the converse substitution does as well (cf. MIE 400). This intersubstitutability reflects the fact that one and the same object can be referred to by different proper names and definite descriptions.

Just as Brandom holds that the contents of whole sentences are determined by the inferential relations they stand in, it can be said that the contents of singular terms which, combined with the contents of predicates, yield sentential contents, are determined by the class of singular terms they are intersubstitutable with.

We are now in a position to reformulate the above problem for singular terms. For a given singular term *a*, each interlocutor acknowledges a number of symmetric substitution commitments, i.e., each interlocutor takes *a* to be intersubstitutable with a number of other singular terms, and this set singular terms differs from speaker to speaker. Again, this fact raises problems concerning the possibility of communication because this means that the singular terms have different meanings in the mouths of different interlocutors. Again, corresponding to the case of whole sentences, the inferential significances that different interlocutors accept for a singular term are very similar. Interlocutors who speak the same language will normally be able to solve the ‘matching problem’ for singular terms. There is a uniquely determined singular term in the hearer’s idiolect that is much more similar to the singular term in the speaker’s idiolect than anything else in the hearer’s idiolect. (The passage quoted above actually reads: “mapping their different repertoires of *substitutional*

commitments onto one another” (MIE 475, my emphasis), which refers to the intersubstitutabilities different interlocutors accept for singular terms.)

4. Communication and Reference

So far, I have discussed the question of how communication is possible even though interlocutors attach different inferential significances and thus different meanings to their utterances. Now, I want to consider the question of how the process of communication, as I have just described it, can account for the referential dimension of our discursive practices. (This is the second role the notion of communication plays in Brandom’s theory of content.) To see how communication can account for reference, we have to note that communication is implicitly governed by the following social norm: If the inferential significance a singular term *a* has for the speaker matches the inferential significance of a singular in my mouth (i.e., is very similar, but not identical to it), then I can take it that the singular term in the mouth of the speaker and the singular term in my mouth refer to one and the same object. This in turn means that if the hearer maps a singular term in the speaker’s mouth onto a singular term in her own mouth, the differences between the inferential significances have to be sorted out. Suppose we agree on most of the substitution-inferences concerning the singular term ‘Ludwig Wittgenstein’ and hence map our uses of this term onto each other in communication, but we disagree about whether he can also be referred to as ‘the greatest philosopher of his time’. In this case we are committed to find an agreement about whether this substitution-inference is good or not. If we fail to acknowledge this commitment, this means that we are using different singular terms after all (despite the fact that we use the same word).

The fact that there is such a norm implicit in our discursive practices shows that the singular terms we use refer to something in an objective world, a world that we intersubjectively share in the sense that it is one and the same world for all of us. The presence of such a norm can only be made sense of by assuming that our singular terms refer to objects in this shared world.

5. Concluding Remarks

I have now described the double role that the notion of communication plays in Brandom’s theory of assertional content. Let me now discuss Brandom’s claim that communication should not be understood in terms of transmission of content, but rather in terms of cooperation. We have seen that in a strongly holistic framework the transmission of content never works perfectly. However, that would not yet be a reason to reject the understanding of communication as transmission. The reason why Brandom thinks that we should rather conceive of communication in terms of cooperation is that it plays this other theoretical role in his theory. Communication is, according to Brandom, an essential ingredient in the constitution of content. And if we wanted to understand communication as transmission of content, we would have to presuppose content as already given.

As a final remark, I would like to raise the question whether communication and thus a social dimension in our discursive practices are really necessary in order to account for the reference of singular terms in the way Brandom does. Even if Brandom’s way of explaining reference is accepted, the question arises whether

interpersonal communication is really necessary because it seems that we could just as well consider one person at different times. When I consider the different significances I attach to a singular term at different times, the same questions as in the interpersonal case seem to arise. Of course, my relation to earlier stages of myself is not the same as my relation to other people, but for the purposes of interpreting linguistic practices as referring to objects, these differences seem to be irrelevant:

Because my beliefs change over time, the inferential significance I attach to a singular term changes over time. But in spite of these differences, I have to map the different significance I attach to a singular term at different times onto each other. Otherwise, I would be unable to continue thinking about the same thing and to change my mind about it. Moreover, as in the interpersonal case of communication, there is a commitment for me to sort out the differences between the inferential significances I accept for a singular term at different times. I have to say that the ones I endorse now are the correct ones and if I accepted different ones at an earlier time, then I was wrong.

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Action and Morality: A Reflection on Thomas Nagel's and Christine Korsgaard's Moral Thinking

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In recent decades, there is an interesting group of authors in American metaethics attempting to ground morality in practical reason construed in a broadly Kantian way. Its main representatives are Thomas Nagel, Stephen Darwall and Christine Korsgaard (Darwall et al. 1992). In what follows I shall focus on the positions of Nagel and Korsgaard. Each of them is Kantian in two respects. First, in their approaches to the rationality of action, both of them refer to the internal structure of the act itself and not to its external results. Second, contrary to Hume's position, they assume that practical reason can be normative and that practical reason is not determined by an agent's desire.

In his classic derivation of the categorical imperative from the nature of action of a rational subject, Kant assumed that a subject always acts according to 'a maxim' and that the universality of 'a maxim' is both necessary and sufficient to confer morality on the act. In the perspective of the contemporary philosophy of mind an action is done *for a reason*. Nagel and Korsgaard are interested in the normative kind of reasons i.e., in reasons that can justify and regulate human actions. But each of them assumes that the condition of universality is not enough to establish morality and that it must be complemented by some other conditions.

1. Toward an Objectivity of Moral Theory

In Nagel's approach any reason for action must be universal by virtue of his definition requiring that a reason must be valid for any rational agent. More precisely, Nagel assumes that a reason is 'a predicate' R that 'applies to some act, event, or circumstance' A. "(...) We can say that every reason is a predicate R such that for all persons p and events A, if R is true of A, then p has prima facie reason to promote A" (Nagel 1970, 47). While 'some act, event or circumstance' are apparently natural objects, it is not wholly clear whether the 'predicate' R should be regarded as referring to a natural quality or not. Neither is Nagel absolutely clear on the nature of reasons: are they constructed by agents or are they discovered by them in the external world. Instead, he introduces and elaborates in detail a distinction among reasons for action based on the formulation on the 'predicate'. It is the distinction between 'subjective' and 'objective' reasons for actions that constitutes the complementary condition for grounding morality in practical reason in *The Possibility of Altruism*. A reason is 'subjective' if its formulation contains an irreducible 'free agent-variable' (referring to the person who acts); otherwise the reason is 'objective'. 'Objective' reasons require all of us to promote the same things. Using both his earlier analysis of the prudential reasons and the philosophy of later Wittgenstein, Nagel argues that we cannot accept purely subjective reasons for actions unless we are 'practical solipsists'. As a consequence, as soon as we accept 'a conception of oneself as simply a person among others', we will recognize and act exclusively on 'objective' grounds or the grounds that can be reformulated into their objective forms. The moral implications of the formal system of reasons ('the possibility of altruism') is established by the fact that, as rational agents, we have the same reasons to act for the interest of our own as for any other person's. What is

more, given the internalist construal of the reason for action, we should have the same motivation to do. In the 1980's Nagel dropped the demand that all valid reasons for actions must be 'objective' (Nagel 1986). The true element of it, according to his reinterpretation, consisted in the fact that it reflected the tendency to objectivity, which is characteristic of the moral point of view. The capacity of adopting an objective, increasingly external point of view is specific and central to the human mind. This tendency justifies the demands of the impersonal and formal part of morality and the reasons for action stemming from it. In Nagel's new terminology, there are two kinds of such reasons: 'agent neutral' and 'agent relative'. The latter contains not only the reasons coming from deontological moral theories but also some purely 'subjective' reasons coming from an individual's projects and engagements. 'Subjective' reasons for action are valid as long as they do not conflict with the reasons coming from the demands of morality; in such a case they are overridden by moral reasons. Despite this new distinction and an apparently better and more complete description of human action, some substantial doubts as to the nature of reasons still remain. Are there any reasons in the external world, which are independent of human activity or are they constructed by humans? If the former were true, then Nagel's position would be a moral realism of a non-naturalistic character, a kind of metaethical neo-intuitionism. Nagel himself, on the one hand, explicitly argues for 'moral realism' and against moral antirealism. On the other hand, he says that what he means by 'moral realism' is the fact that the truth about reasons for action is independent of our interests and attitudes and there is no independent reality for a moral theory as is the case for a physical theory. What are then the bearers of the truth about the reasons? Should we understand Nagel's position as a kind of idealism? Clearly, further investigation into the nature of reasons for actions is both necessary and promising.

2. In Search of 'the Sources of Normativity'

Christine Korsgaard has no doubts that Nagel's position represents moral realism and she is sure that moral realism in general is not true. Her description of human action is both unsophisticated and bold. First of all, she has formulated a powerful response to the Humean challenge to the idea of practical rationality: practical reason must be normative even if it is purely instrumental (Korsgaard 1997). This is perhaps the best argument against the Humean position in the 20th century. Korsgaard's aim is not to derive morality as a formal consequence of practical rationality. Rather, her ultimate aim is to discover the 'source of normativity'. What she means by this is an answer to the question: "what justifies the claims that morality makes on us" from the first person perspective (Korsgaard 1996, 10). It is within this, internal perspective of an agent that his or her reasons for action manifest themselves along with the freedom of will. Due to the reflective structure of our consciousness we can either follow our desires and natural impulses or not. Korsgaard's approach is, paradoxically, both strongly Kantian and non-Kantian. It is Kantian because she assumes that all valid reasons for action must fall under some general laws of action. There are no particular, unique reasons that could play a role only once in

an extreme or exceptional situation. Again, it is Kantian because she assumes that an agent has the authority to give these laws of action to himself or herself and this is what she means by normativity. It is an inescapable feature of our action: as humans we have to give imperatives to ourselves. 'The sources of normativity' must be placed inside us as long as we are rational and integral subjects. Yet, Korsgaard's position is at the same time non-Kantian because she claims that the law does not have to be the moral law and they do not have to extend over all rational agents. The thesis she defends instead reads that all the laws of the action of a person must be grounded in what she calls his or her 'practical identity'. It is central to our nature that we have to determine and construct our 'practical identity'. Korsgaard is absolutely clear on the fact that there are no reasons for action in external reality. All the reasons for action are constructed by agents and they are grounded in the laws of their actions and ultimately in their 'practical identities'. Determining what we cannot do without losing our identity, these laws constitute our obligations as well.

Should we conceive our personal identity and the relation between our self and our actions as Korsgaard does? Or can we discover a simple and constant self in the logical analysis of our action, the self that in fact constitutes our identity at a deeper level (Searle 2001, 87)? Do agents have enough authority and power to fulfill all the tasks that Korsgaard attributes to them? She is apparently sure that they have and that there is no better explanation of the nature of normativity.

Korsgaard's entire argument can be divided into two parts: the first goes from normative reasons to practical identity and the second from practical identity to morality. The difficulties and gaps of the first part have been extensively discussed by R. Cohon (Cohon 2000). Even if we assume that all reasons must fall under some general laws it is not clear why these laws should be grounded in our 'practical identity'. There apparently are reasons to teach our children some things even if a mother does not recognize them as a part of her 'practical identity'. The second part is not wholly convincing either. In this part, an agent reflects on his/her 'practical identities' and finds that many of them can be dropped and changed. We can change our jobs, enter some new organizations or make new friends. But if we reflect thoroughly enough, we will arrive at our deepest 'practical identity' that cannot be dropped or changed. It is identity that ascribes the same 'unconditional' value of 'humanity' both to ourselves and all other human beings. This fundamental kind of identity extends over all human beings and the law it constitutes is moral law.

Leaving aside the lacunae of each part of Korsgaard's argument, there is one more general problem that extends over both parts. It is true that if one confers conditional values on the things he or she chooses, one has to ascribe an unconditional value to oneself at the same time. But ascribing the same fundamental value of 'humanity' to any person in the world is apparently a normative claim. Korsgaard offers some new content to the idea of humanity that we must value: we are beings who have to make laws of action for ourselves determining in this way our relative and contingent identities (Korsgaard 1996, 119-122). Both the idea and the value of humanity construed in this way are neither relative nor contingent. In the first part of Korsgaard's argument normativity as such is explained in terms of 'practical identity'. In the second part, however, the most important kind of 'practical identity' is explained in a way that explicitly refers to normativity. In the first part normativity in a broad sense is construed as the central future of our agency and moral normativity is regarded as its particular kind. In the second part, moral normativity, defined by reference to the value of

'humanity', is shown to be the most important and regarded as the source of other more contingent normativities implied by our contingent and relative forms of 'practical identity'. On Korsgaard's theory, in the case of a conflict, moral reasons, always override the reasons coming from other, 'contingent' kinds of 'practical identity'. Leaving the differences in terminology aside, the position at which Korsgaard's argument ends up is clearly very close to the genuine position of Kant, from which it explicitly departs at its beginning.

Drawing from the philosophy of later Wittgenstein, Korsgaard argues that there cannot be private reasons and all reasons for actions are public because the 'linguistic consciousness' is public in the sense that the language in which they are formulated must be public. First, she argues that ascribing the unconditional value of 'humanity' to oneself does mean ascribing the same value to any other person. Second, she argues that we can share all the particular reasons for action that other people have. The reasons of other people have the status that our own natural impulses have: we can construct from them our own reasons for actions. Korsgaard undermines Nagel's distinction between 'subjective' and 'objective' reasons: there is no need to resort to the 'objective' reasons in order to establish morality since morality is grounded in the objective value of 'humanity'. Even if we accept her position, there is still a problem that needs an answer. We can share all the reasons and values of a person on the basis of the value of his/her 'humanity' but we clearly cannot get involved and act on all of them. Where is the line between the reasons and values in which we must get involved and those in which we do not have to, though, of course, we can? Nagel has an answer to this question: we must always recognize and act on objective reasons in the first place.

Are there any reasons for action in external reality, which are independent of our activity? Of course this question must be left open here. But there is one point at which Korsgaard's thinking apparently goes too far. She claims that even if moral realism were true, that would be not enough to explain the 'sources of normativity' since an agent can always question and reject the demands of any external normative entity. True, an agent can do this but would this decision be rational? If there are independent reasons in the world, and morality gives overriding reasons for action to us, and internalism is true, then this clearly would suffice to explain the 'sources of normativity'. If moral realism would be the case, then Korsgaard's thinking would be an important insight into the normative aspects of our action showing suggestively how an agent is able to follow his normative principles despite all the difficulties facing him in the real world. The autonomy of an agent can also manifest itself in this way in the long run.

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Peter Singer's Utilitarianism versus Tom Regan's Rights View. A Comparative Study

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1. Peter Singer's Utilitarianism

In his numerous books and articles Peter Singer, a philosopher from Australia, takes the position of a radical thinker, defending animals against the brutal exploitation of man. He aims at a reformulation of the notion of *equality* so that it refers not only to humans but also to animals. The author notes that when one analyses the notion of equality referring to all human beings, one must inevitably come to the conclusion that there is no real equality at all. Humans evidently differ among themselves as far as their race, size, weight, height and any other imaginable criteria are considered. Therefore equality is not a simple ascertainment of facts, but rather a moral obligation of how humans should treat each other, an ideal norm which should be pursued by all individuals. Henry Sidgwick expresses this idea as follows: "The good of any individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other." (Sidgwick, 382) As a result Singer accepts a somewhat controversial assumption: all animals, both *human animals* and *non-human animals* are equal, especially in a moral sense.

From the principle of equality it follows that we should condemn so-called "speciesism", claims Singer. It seems that the notion was coined by Richard D. Ryder in his book *Speciesism: the Ethics of Vivisection*. (Ryder 1974) Speciesism smacks of racism or sexism, as Singer observes, and as such it should be discarded. In this context the Australian thinker introduces the *principle of equal consideration of interests* which, according to him, should refer not only to humans, but also to higher animals. (Singer 1995, 9) One of the first philosophers who was fully aware that the category of *sentience* is important in man's relations with animals was Jeremy Bentham. He wrote: "The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. (...) The question is not, Can they reason? nor Can they talk? But *Can they suffer?*" (Bentham, 311-12). Only when living beings are sentient may they possess any interests, otherwise it is not possible. When a boy walking along a path kicks a stone such act does not matter morally, because a stone is not sentient. The situation is totally different in case of a mouse, which is sentient and when kicked may be killed or seriously injured, as Singer notes. Therefore the category of *sentience*, which means the ability to feel pleasure or pain, is the only non-arbitrary category of respecting the interests of other sentient beings. Peter Singer, in the book edited together with Tom Regan (!), writes: "If a being is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to be taken into account. This is why the limit of *sentience* (...) is the only defensible boundary of concern for the interests of others." (Singer 1976, 154) All other criteria seem to be arbitrary, as the Australian author claims.

For most people living in the so-called affluent societies the most common, fundamental contact with animals is when they eat meat. The Eskimos living in very harsh climatic conditions are justified when they do this, because otherwise they would not survive. But humans

living in rich, western societies cannot defend their menu in such a way. They should stop eating meat for moral reasons, as Singer claims. Medical sciences prove that eating meat is not necessary as far as good health and long life are concerned. When one takes into consideration the fact that animals are fed with corn and other foodstuff one must eventually realise that there remains less food for men than more, because the food offered to animals could be prepared so that humans could eat it. In this context Singer strongly underlines that people eat meat first of all because they like its taste.

But not all use of animals means killing them. Taking care of milk cows and milking them does not endanger any fundamental animal interests. Similarly when man breeds hen for eggs, and of course keeps them in the open air during the day, no vital interests of animals seem to be disregarded.

Finally Singer claims that *the principle of equal consideration of interests* requires that we abandon the existing ways of exploiting of animals. It is of course obvious that intensive farming (animal factories) should be abolished. In this context Singer strongly underlines that humans should generally develop a *vegetarian style of life* which he and his family have adopted. The author is fully aware that his insistence on general vegetarianism is a sheer utopia, but morality as such extends over centuries (Singer, 1981) and he hopes that in future the *principle of equal consideration of interests* will be accepted and observed by all men.

2. Tom Regan's Rights View

Constructing his own, original theory defending animals the American philosopher, Tom Regan, begins by evaluation some non-deontological theories. He also takes into consideration the utilitarian theory and discusses the version according to which acts are good when they bring an inner good for each party involved; otherwise they are wrong. The author ultimately does not accept utilitarianism, because it may tend to accept evident wrong-doing, for example, when the suffering of an innocent person brings happiness to many humans. Regan, constructing his theory, pays much attention to the so called deontological theories based upon the category of duty. Immanuel Kant is perhaps the best known author propagating such a theory. According to Kant human beings are all of equal value and as such they should be treated as an end, and not only means to an end. On the basis of such theories different theories of rights are constructed, especially human rights, at first moral rights and then legal ones, which are the expression of a given legislation. But as far as Kant's deontology is concerned, the theory seems fruitless when applied to animals, because it considers only secondary human duties to animals, and does not allow attributing primary duties to them. And thus the Kantian theory adheres to the Lockean tradition, also propagating secondary duties of men to animals. (Axfell, 225-6).

Rights may be divided into two categories: those connected with freedom and those connected with claims. The first ones mean that one possesses freedom of

choice, whereas the second ones mean that one may demand to be treated in a certain way. Both categories of rights correspond to certain duties, but there seems to be no obligatory symmetry between rights and duties.

According to Regan the following beings possess rights: those that are 1) free and rational; 2) able to feel pain or pleasure; 3) able to communicate; 4) possess identity felt over a certain period of time. Humans certainly belong to the first category, says the author. Some higher animals, especially mammals, belong to the second category of those holding rights. Mammals possess consciousness, they are perhaps even self-conscious, which is why they should be granted certain rights. Regan evaluates Descartes's and Darwin's theories within the context of man's relation to animals, and notes that Darwin points, and rightly so, to consciousness appearing on different levels in different species, thus proving that there is no gulf dividing humans and animals.

As a result the author suggests the extension of the sphere of morality in such a way as to include animals, especially mammals, that are at least one year old. Regan writes: "Perception, memory, desire, self-consciousness, intention, a sense of future – these are among the leading attributes of the mental life of normal mammalian animals aged one or more." (Regan 1988, 81).

Constructing his theory Regan differentiates between *inherent value* and *intrinsic value*. The latter may mean certain psychical states, e.g., feeling pleasure. The author assumes, and this seems to be a controversial assumption, that both *moral subjects* (men) and *moral patients* (animals) possess inherent value to a similar degree. The criterion of possessing such a value is to be a subject of life. According to the definition: "Individuals are subjects of a life if they are able to perceive and remember; if they have beliefs, desires and preferences; if they are able to act intentionally (...); if they are sentient (...)." (Regan 1988, 264). Regan claims that such a criterion is a condition sufficient for ascribing some inherent value to higher animals.

As a result all moral subjects and all moral patients have the right to be treated with respect and not to be harmed. From the rights theory there result some definite rules of man's behaviour with regard to animals. Rearing animals on so-called factory farms should be stopped as soon as possible. In such factories animals cannot be treated with respect. They are treated instrumentally, and primarily as a renewable source of meat. Hunting and trapping evaluated from the point of view of the rights theory should also cease, which means that the trade of wild animals should be abolished, the fur industry delegalised, and the same be applied to whaling. No special privileges should be given to the endangered species from the point of view of this theory. Animals should not be used for educational exhibitions, in medical/scientific experiments, in toxicity tests. It should be strongly stressed that the above opinion refers to higher animals, *primo loco* mammals. Regan, similarly as Singer, repeats again and again that the boundaryline between species is very unclear, therefore every doubt should be eliminated so as to favour the interests of animals in case of conflicting interests.

Summing up Regan notices that although his theory questions the so far existing, well established socio-cultural practices, it is not directed against humans. He writes: "The rights view is not antibusiness, not antifreedom of the individual, not antiscience, not antihuman. It is simply projustice, insisting only that the

scope of justice be seen to include respect for the rights of animals." (Regan 1988, 399). Therefore it seems that the theory under discussion simply extends the sphere of justice. In light of the above considerations radical changes in the so far existing legislation should be introduced as soon as possible.

In this context it should be noted that Regan's theory is definitely atomistic, as the majority of moral and legislative theories of the past are, and therefore it does not consider the case of endangered species, as some other theories do, for example the holistic ones, as represented by Holmes Rolston III. (Pyra, 2003).

3. A Comparison

The consideration of the clash of interests between humans and animals appears in some other theories, for example in Joel Feinberg's theory. (Feinberg, 1974). Both within Feinberg's and Singer's theory the obligation to take care of the good of animals is not conditioned by animals' inherent value but by taking into account their interests, which can be evaluated and either accepted or discarded as more or less important than human interests.

Both Singer and Regan are conscious that their radical theories are, for the time being at least, utopian. But they both think that the sphere of beings to whom rights have been granted in history has become, and is constantly becoming, wider and wider. Some new groups of humans (but all the time humans only!) were gradually granted rights, for example: slaves, convicted men, women, blacks. In this context Regan stresses the fact that law as such recognizes some artificial subjects of law, such as foundations. Therefore it would seem strange to deny animals, especially mammals, some rights. Rights usually correspond to duties, and animals cannot have any duties, but the situation is similar to that one when small children or retarded people cannot bear any duties at all, but nevertheless have different rights. Singer shares a similar opinion in this respect. It seems that there is no symmetry needed between rights and duties as far as legislation is concerned.

It should be underlined that both theoreticians, who aspire to constructing a new ecological ethics, are not interested in the problem of endangered species and in the world of plants.

Singer constructs his ethics beginning with utilitarian theories, whereas Regan refers to deontological theories. Singer, unlike Regan, does not grant animals moral rights as such. The Australian philosopher tries to convince people to become vegetarians, whereas the American writer thinks that Singer's utilitarian calculus does not make much sense. Regan is less radical than Singer; he assumes that there are millions of people in the world who live from raising cattle, and should such business stop abruptly they would lose their means of economic survival. In addition to this many other businesses are connected with animal farming; they would most obviously also collapse. Singer assumes that each suffering is bad and each pleasure is good, whereas this is not always true, claims Regan. The ability to feel (*sentience*) serves as a survival tool and is secondary as far as the existence of individuals is concerned. For example, pain is an indicator showing in what physical condition a given organism is.

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Normativity, Experience and Concrete Case

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In the pragmatic conception of Wittgenstein's language, rules are neither exact nor definitively established (PI 68). Philosophical studies should not be understood as preliminary stages for a determined end of an exact and total regulation (Ibid., 88, 133) of the use of language, without taking into consideration the specific case of what the rule applies to. Philosophy should consider specific cases in the application of rules. It is not a mere description of the use of language rules, but includes reflection on the adequate or inadequate criteria for the application of rules to concrete cases.

This relationship between rules and concrete cases links philosophy to experience. The criticism of the ideal of the definitive answer of logical rules to philosophical questions, independently of experience (Ibid., 92), and the association of clarity to experience (Ibid., 180), show how the deliberation of normative philosophy is empirical.

Wittgenstein, however, maintains the problematic distinction between grammatical and empirical propositions (Ibid., 251) on the basis of the criteria of indubitableness. The indubitable rules are grammatical, philosophical and normal and the dubious rules are empirical and abnormal (Ibid., 142). But what should the philosopher do when he is confronted with empirical propositions? He may invoke a rule that eliminates the uncertainties. This solution, which offers a criterion for the application of rules — between two competing rules of action, we should follow the one that produces the more evident consequences (Ibid., 238), and is correct in its application (Ibid., 324) — implies undesirable consequences. It excludes from the domain of philosophy the ambiguity of language and is not an attainable end, even in the perspective of the requirement of indubitableness, associated to ambiguity. Let's suppose that the same rule is followed indubitably by two people, as it so happens, for example, in the image of the forefinger. Although the opposing directions correspond, in the perspective of who sees them, to indubitable rules, its dual aspect implies contrary orders to which people give different answers. Rules do not determine definitively concrete cases, nor do they imply a determinist and internal relation to the concrete case as defended by Baker and Hacker. For them, the +2 rule determines once and for all an unlimited series of possible cases and there is no 'third thing' between the rule and the act (Baker and Hacker, 1985, 243). This is seen as an extension, because when the rule is given so too is its extension (Ibid.). For that reason, I refute their interpretation that grammatical rules are normative, autonomous and arbitrary, but not empirical. According to them, rules are normative because they only delimit the limits of sense and arbitrary by not being justified by reality (Ibid., 54). Grammatical rules are also not empirical because they do not report to descriptions, explanations or predictions (Ibid., 267).

Nevertheless, grammatical arbitrariness is delimited by Wittgenstein when he clarifies that grammatical rules are only arbitrary 'if that is to mean that the aim of the grammar is nothing but that of the language' (PI 497). The propositions have an end, that of determining the validity of linguistic norms. This assertion is problematic because it questions the notion of arbitrariness: grammatical propositions are related to an end, that of determining the normative validity of empirical propositions. The difference

between grammatical and empirical propositions also points to an illegitimate distinction between propositions referring to things, empirical propositions, those susceptible to being true and false, and the propositions that are purely logical, the grammatical ones. In *Philosophical Investigations* the meaning of propositions does not depend on the thing the word or proposition refers to, but on its usage; and the grammatical propositions refer to linguistic facts, associated with non-linguistic practices — the forms of life — such as commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, but also walking, eating and playing (PI 25). Although there are only five allusions to this concept in *Philosophical Investigations* (Ibid., 19, 23, 24, II, i 174, xi 226), those forms are the ultimate fact for which language, as an activity, should refer to and are also the grounds for the rules' normativity. Before the contrary order, but indubitable in the perspective of who follows it, such as it was presented in the example of the forefinger, the criteria that decides which of the two should offer a guide for the action is an *agreement* regarding the *forms of life* (Ibid., 224). These forms are an unequivocal sign of the existence of an external relationship between rules and acts.

Although Baker and Hacker establish a relationship between forms of life and the process of following a norm (Ibid., 242), both interpret the agreement on rules based on the identity of the process of following them (Ibid., 249). There is an agreement between rules because people refer to the same actions 'acting in accord with the rule' (Ibid.). Since forms of life are plural and cultural (Ibid., 241), they contradict the identity of the grammatical rule, and cannot be the basis for the normativity of rules.

The valorisation of the identity of the norm with itself and the Wittgensteinian distinction between philosophical and empirical propositions, grounded in their indubitableness, seems to justify their interpretation. Wittgenstein reiterates the importance of the equality of the rule with itself (PI 222, 223). However, the importance of the valorisation of the relationship of rules with concrete cases diminishes the preoccupation with its identity and the distinction between grammatical and empirical propositions.

In the description of the nature of understanding, Wittgenstein criticizes himself for having shared the idea that who pronounces a proposition and understands it puts a calculation functioning with determined rules (Ibid., 81). This conception of thought is refuted when, concerning the understanding of a rule, it refuses the identification of the expression "Now I know how to go on" as 'short for a description of all the circumstances which constitute the scene for our language game' (Ibid., 179). This abbreviation supposes that in its enunciation the totality of conditions that determine it are given (Ibid., 183). But, understanding, thinking, consists in the application of rules to concrete cases.

Applying, besides being a criterion for understanding (Ibid., 146), consists in projecting an image (Ibid., 139), whose expectation of application is based on the fact that people generally make that application (Ibid., 141). This projection depends on the circumstances, whose importance for understanding is evidenced when

Wittgenstein affirms that what 'gives us the right' to say that someone understands are "*the circumstances* under which he had such an experience" (Ibid., 155).

If the rule and the application are necessarily associated, and if the application supposes knowledge, there is not only one application of the rule, but the application of various possible images of rules (Ibid., 206). Notwithstanding these innumerable possible images, these are not equivalents. They are normal and abnormal rules. The abnormal are referred to by way of misunderstanding the rule of the natural numbers written in decimal notation. When the professor teaches it, instead of writing the series 0,1,2,3,4,5,... the student will write 1, 0, 3, 2, 5, 4. The series written by the student continues to be subsumed under a rule, that of writing the decimal notation intercalating uneven with even numbers. In this case, the error does not result from the absence of a rule — for example 0,5,4,1,3,2 — but from the application of a different rule, which is anomalous in relation to the normal notation.

How does one go from an abnormal rule to a normal rule? Through experience. The professor helps the student to pass from the application of an anomalous rule to a normal rule, through the modification of circumstances under which the application of the rule is carried out, namely through the alteration of the modes of its perception. The decimal notation appears with a dual aspect: the anomalous, that of the student, and the normal, that of the professor. When the professor tries to teach the student the normal rule, he attempts to modify the way he looks at things, helping him consider the given case in accordance with another series of images (Ibid., 144). Wittgenstein thus associates the problem of "following a rule", with that of changing an aspect.

An important aspect in my criticism to Baker and Hacker's interpretation is that the internalist and determinist conception of the relationship of the rule with the case, by ignoring that the same rule may appear with a double aspect is a sort of "aspect blindness". Baker and Hacker highlighted the continuous image of an aspect, in detriment to its mutation (Ibid., II, xi, p. 213). The change of aspect, associated to the psychological experience of alteration of the form of perception, invalidates the internalist relation between rules and cases.

Normativity and experience are associated in the perspectives of the ambiguous rule that demands an empirical deliberation over the more adequate course of action and in the clear, unequivocal and indubitable rule. This is always associated with circumstance. For example, if between turning right or left, the rule indicates, without a *doubt*, which road to follow, the fact that we don't doubt does not imply the absence of considering circumstance and the application of rules to concrete cases. Therefore, Wittgenstein affirms with clarity that between the order of the rule and its execution there is a gulf that must be closed by the act of understanding (Ibid., 431), just as previously defined.

But, if we admit the non-internalist character of the relationship between rules and cases, we do not understand it in Kripke's perspective, which was structured by the paradox formulated in section 201: "(...) no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here". Kripke advocates that the paradox is the expression of a

new type of scepticism (1982, 7), whose Wittgensteinian solution is also sceptic.

I disagree with the two grounds of his development. First, with the distinction between past and present in the analysis of the problem of validity of the application that passed from a rule to new future cases (1982, 12). Secondly, with the assumption that understanding a rule means that, from some past uses, the rule determines a single answer for new and undetermined uses never considered before (Ibid., 7-8). In accordance with these grounds, the paradox consists in the impossibility of validating its action in the future from a past usage unjustified from the rule. Let's look at the function of addition, denoted by the word *plus* and by the symbol '+'. The application of the addition rule of '68 + 57' results in 125.

A sceptic could claim that someone under the influence of LSD, instead of using the word *plus*, for denoting the addition, had used *quus*, in such a way that when he used *plus* he would have always wanted to mean *quus*. In this case, the result of the sum of '68+75' would not be 125, but 5. The recourse to LSD implies, for the sceptic, that there is no fact that means *plus* or *quus*, nor are there reasons for being confident in the result of 125 (Ibid., 11). Since we cannot say how *plus* in the past came to mean addition, any present application is compromised by the impossibility to validate the past application. The conformity of the present application with the previous intentions is therefore impracticable (Ibid., 12).

In the course of the development of the paradox, Kripke concludes that this is not solved in the context of the natural presupposition that the declarative propositions with a meaning should correspond to facts. In this framework, the propositions do not have any meaning (Ibid., 79). Therefore the solution to that paradox has as a consequence the abandonment of a conception of language based on the conditions of truth, and its substitution by another based on conditions of justification (Ibid., 74). That solution is a sceptical answer to a sceptic challenge because Wittgenstein concedes that there are no conditions of truth that make propositions true, but conditions of justification that correspond to social utility (Ibid., 86, 90).

But accentuating the distinction between past and present is for me an impertinent difference in relation to Wittgensteinian thought because he also temporarily considers the problem of 'following a rule'. Only that it doesn't refer to the relation of the past to the present, but to the present with the future (PI 197): Wittgenstein attempts to refute the assumption of the future use being already included in the present and reinforces the necessity to consider the moment of decision for each point — how can a rule teach me what I have to do *at this* point and what does *this* following the signal really consist of (Ibid., 198). Although he affirms that the future application is already in a certain sense present, he also admits the opposite possibility if one imagines different language games (Ibid., 195). These appear because of the different application of rules to concrete cases based ultimately on the forms of life. In this case if justifying rules from the past was not a problem, there would always be that of deliberation in the present over the plurality of actions. It is in the perspective of the occurrence of the particular case that any form of action can be advisable as a rule or contradict it. Besides, since there is not only one application of a rule, but a plurality, this is not necessarily a question of scepticism that any form of action can conciliate or contradict the rule. Since Kripke does not

valorise that aspect, arguing erroneously that the understanding of a rule implies only one answer for new future cases, he interprets with scepticism the fact that the rule may be invalidated.

The problem of the paradox does not then consist in determining the validity of a past application, but in establishing a criterion that will allow us to decide on which of the contending applications of the rule is normal. And this criterion is the forms of life, the solution to the problem of application of a rule in *this* case, or in this *point*.

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Spiel der Sprache und Sprachspiel – Gadamer und Wittgenstein im Vergleich

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1. Gadamer's Konzept des Spieles

Der Begriff des Spieles erweist sich für Gadamer's philosophische Hermeneutik als außerordentlich wichtig: Das Spiel oder präziser, das Spielgeschehen, ist das Modell für Gadamer's Konzeption von Verstehen schlechthin. Gadamer kommt es in seinem Verstehenskonzept wesentlich darauf an, daß wir Menschen als agierende Subjekte unser Tun viel weniger selbst bestimmen als wir allgemein hin glauben wollen. Vielmehr sind wir einem sprachlichen und einem historischen Geschehen ausgeliefert, durch das wir in unserem Denken und Handeln bestimmt werden. Mit diesem zentralen Gedanken seiner philosophischen Hermeneutik richtet sich Gadamer gegen die Subjekt-Gläubigkeit der Moderne. Die Sprachlichkeit des Menschen eröffnet diesem Weltsichten, und sie ermöglicht das grundsätzlich mögliche Verstehen des anderen, da alle an Sprache teilhaben. Daß sich dieses durch Sprache ermöglichte Verstehen in Anlehnung an den Spielbegriff begreifen läßt, soll im folgenden gezeigt werden.

Im Spiel sieht Gadamer den Geschehenscharakter besonders deutlich hervortreten, was er durch Metaphern wie das Spiel des Lichtes auf den Wellen oder das Spiel der Mücken und nicht zuletzt durch die Spielerfahrung, die wir Menschen als Spielende machen, deutlich macht. Dieser Geschehenscharakter des Spieles zeichnet sich in den Spielmetaphern dadurch aus, daß das Spiel weder zeitlich endlich, noch räumlich zielgerichtet ist und vor allem in einer sich ständig wiederholenden Hin- und Herbewegung besteht. Diese Bewegung konstituiert ein in einem Geschehen bestehendes Ordnungsgefüge, das sich auch auf die menschlichen Spiele übertragen läßt und sich in der Spielerfahrung äußert, die wir Menschen machen können. Als Spielende gehen wir in dem Spielgeschehen auf; Zeit und Raum nehmen im Spiel eine eigene Dimension an, der Spielende ordnet sich dem Spielverlauf, den Spielaufgaben und Regeln unter, wenn er nicht als Spielverderber gelten will. (Gadamer ⁵1986: 109, 112) Insofern haben wir als Spielende unser Spiel viel weniger unter Kontrolle oder bestimmen es, als es auf den ersten Blick scheinen mag, wenn wir beispielsweise sagen, daß wir Fußball spielen. Gadamer bringt diese Spielerfahrung auf den Punkt:

„Es läßt sich von da aus ein allgemeiner Zug angeben, wie sich das Wesen des Spieles im spielenden Verhalten reflektiert. *Alles Spielen ist ein Gespieltwerden*. Der Reiz des Spieles, die Faszination, die es ausübt, besteht eben darin, daß das Spiel über den Spielenden Herr wird.“ (Gadamer ⁵1986: 112)

Dieses Strukturmoment der Übersubjektivität des Spielgeschehens ist es, das für Gadamer auch für die Sprache beziehungsweise das Gespräch, konstitutiv wird. In Anlehnung an den Spielbegriff geht er von einer Strukturverwandtschaft zwischen Spiel und Sprache und damit einher von einer Strukturverwandtschaft zwischen der Spielerfahrung und der Gesprächserfahrung aus.

Die Strukturverwandtschaft zwischen Spiel und Sprache macht Gadamer am Geschehenscharakter und der Übersubjektivität von beiden fest. Genau wie das Spiel

die Spieler in sein Geschehen einbezieht, so verhält es sich auch mit der Sprache: „Entsprechend ist auch hier nicht von einem Spielen mit der Sprache oder mit den uns ansprechenden Inhalten der Welterfahrung oder Überlieferung die Rede, sondern von dem Spiel der Sprache selbst, die uns anspricht, vorschlägt und zurückzieht, fragt und in der Antwort sich selbst erfüllt.“ (Gadamer ⁵1986: 494) Gadamer verdeutlicht diese Übersubjektivität von Sprache weiter, indem er festhält, daß es nicht in der Macht einzelner Sprecher ist, die Bedeutung eines Wortes festzulegen. Zwar können Sprecher Fachausdrücke prägen, aber ob diese in den kommunikativen Gebrauch eingehen, haben die einzelnen Sprecher nicht in der Hand. „Die Sprache selber ist es, die vorschreibt, was sprachlicher Brauch ist. Darin liegt keine Mythologisierung der Sprache, sondern das meint einen nicht auf individuelles subjektives Meinen je reduzierbaren Anspruch der Sprache. Daß wir es sind, die da sprechen, keiner von uns, und doch wir alle, das ist die Seinsweise von ‚Sprache‘.“ (Gadamer 1986a: 196) In diesem Spiel der Sprache tauchen neue Wörter auf, alte verschwinden, Bedeutungen verändern sich, aber grundsätzlich ist es ein beständiges Miteinander der Menschen, die sich durch diese Sprachspiele verständigen. Unsere Welt erschließt t sich uns durch Sprache und den Traditionen, in denen wir stehen. So ist es unsere Muttersprache, von der wir aus den Blick in die Welt erlernt haben. (Gadamer 1986a: 6) Und alles Verstehen obliegt einem tradierten Überlieferungsgeschehen, das uns ein bestimmtes Sinnverständnis der Welt vorgibt.

Das spielerische Moment von Sprache zeigt sich für Gadamer vor allem im Sprechen, wenn die grundsätzliche Offenheit der Wortbedeutungen sich gleichsam ausspielt. Obwohl Worte eine bestimmte Bedeutung haben, sind sie niemals nur auf diese eine Bedeutung eingeschränkt, sondern unterliegen in einem Gespräch, wo es gleichsam um das Suchen nach den richtigen Worten geht, einer gewissen Bedeutungsschwankung. (Gadamer 1986a: 197) In Gadamer's Worten:

„Alle Festlegung der Bedeutungen von Worten wächst gleichsam spielend aus dem Situationswert der Worte hervor. [...] das [ist] ein Hin und Her, worin das lebendige Sprechen und das Leben der Sprache sein Spiel hat. Niemand legt die Bedeutung eines Wortes fest, und Sprechenkönnen heißt ganz gewiß nicht allein, die festen Bedeutungen der Worte richtig erlernt haben und gebrauchen. [...] Es ist dieses fortspielende Spiel, in dem sich das Miteinandersein der Menschen abspielt.“ (Gadamer 1986a: 131)

Die Strukturverwandtschaft zwischen Spiel und Sprache spiegelt sich, wie sich bereits angedeutet hat, vor allem in der Gesprächserfahrung. Genauso wie der Spieler, der ernsthaft spielt, das heißt, der sich ernsthaft auf das Spiel einläßt und in dem Spielgeschehen aufgeht, genauso ergeht es Gesprächspartnern im philosophischen (platonischen) Dialog. Der Gesprächsgegenstand nimmt die Gesprächspartner ein, trägt sie weiter und lockt in Gadamer's Worten „Rede und Gegenrede“ hervor. (Gadamer 1986a: 152) Ein solches Gespräch ist dann gelungen, wenn die Gesprächspartner davon gänzlich

erfüllt sind; genauso wie bei einem gelungenen Spiel. (Gadamer 1986a: 152) An anderer Stelle spricht Gadamer von der "verwandelnden Kraft" des Gesprächs. Wer intensiv über eine Sache gesprochen hat, kommt zu neuen Einsichten, dem werden Probleme bewußt, die er vorher gar nicht gesehen hat und die ihn zu neuem Nachdenken anregen, kurz: "Wo ein Gespräch gelungen ist, ist uns etwas geblieben und ist in uns etwas geblieben, das uns verändert hat." (Gadamer 1986a: 211) In dieser Gesprächserfahrung spiegelt sich auch der Prozeß des Verstehens wider. Nur durch das Miteinandersprechen können wir uns verständigen und das heißt über eine Sache verständnis. "Im Miteinandersprechen treten wir vielmehr ständig in die Vorstellungswelt des anderen über, lassen uns gleichsam auf ihn ein und er sich auf uns [...] bis das Spiel des Gebens und Nehmens, das eigentliche Gespräch, beginnt." (Gadamer 1986a: 131) Das Miteinandersprechen, das Einander Verstehenwollen durch das Austauschen von Weltbildern kommt durch uns Menschen niemals zu einem Ende. Frage und Antwort eines Gesprächs bilden einen unendlichen und letztlich offenen Dialog. (Gadamer 1986a: 210, 153)

2. Wittgensteins Sprachspielkonzept

Anders als Gadamer gibt Wittgenstein keine Definition von dem Begriff des "Spieles". Nach Wittgenstein ist dies sogar unmöglich, weil es sich beim Spiel um einen Ausdruck handelt, der sich nicht durch Angabe eines spezifischen Merkmales erfassen läßt. Vielmehr hängt die Bedeutung von den vielen verschiedenen Kontexten ab, in denen er Verwendung findet. Wittgenstein hat diese Art Begriffe bekanntlich Familienähnlichkeitsbegriffe genannt. (Wittgenstein: PU §§66ff) Wie die Mitglieder einer Familie miteinander verwandt sind, so verhält es sich auch mit den Familienähnlichkeitsbegriffen. Es ist gewiß kein Zufall, daß Wittgenstein zur Illustration dieser Familienähnlichkeitsbegriffe den Ausdruck "Spiel" gewählt hat. Es dürfte kaum ein anderes Wort geben, das sich durch eine derartige Verwendungsvielfalt auszeichnet, allein, was es alles für Spiele gibt und was alles als Spiel verstanden werden kann, ist unüberschaubar. Durch diese dem Spielbegriff innewohnende Vielschichtigkeit zeichnet sich das Spiel entsprechend als Modell aus, das Wittgenstein dem, was Sprache ist, zugrundelegt und das als "Sprachspiel" in die Philosophiegeschichte eingegangen ist.

Wittgensteins Intention in den PU ist es, der Sprache ein angemessenes Bild zu geben. (Wittgenstein: PU §130) Demnach läßt sich Sprache am besten von dem Modell des Spieles erfassen: Sprache zeichnet sich vor allem als Tätigkeit aus, einem Handeln, das bestimmten Regeln folgt, genau wie sich Spiele auch durch Handlungen und Regeln auszeichnen. Das Regelfolgen, das Wittgenstein für die Sprache-Spiel-Analogie für wesentlich hält, findet sich im Gadamer'schen Konzept in dem Aspekt eines allgemeinen Ordnungsgefüges wieder, das Spiele grundsätzlich auszeichnet und für Menschen durch Regeln und selbstgesetzte Spielaufgaben entsteht. (Gadamer 1986: 112, 113) Wittgensteins zentraler Gedanke fußt darauf, daß sich der Sprachgebrauch von nichtsprachlichen Handlungen nicht trennen läßt. Für die Sprache ist das Eingebundenheit in Handlungskontexte konstitutiv. Das Worte bedeuten, ergibt sich vor allem aus ihrer Verwendungsweise, daraus, welchen Worten welche Taten folgen: "Unsere Rede erhält durch unsere übrigen Handlungen ihren Sinn." (Wittgenstein: ÜG §229) und "... Eine Bedeutung eines Wortes ist eine Art seiner Verwendung. Denn sie ist das, was wir erlernen, wenn das

Wort zuerst unserer Sprache einverleibt wird." (Wittgenstein: ÜG §61) Diese Verwendung von Worten ist keineswegs von den einzelnen Menschen willkürlich einsetzbar, sondern unterliegt einem gewissen Regelkanon, den wir durch Abrichtung erlernen und der durch Gebräuche, Institutionen beziehungsweise Gepflogenheiten gewährleistet wird. (Wittgenstein: PU §199) Gleichwohl dieser Regelkanon kein festgefügtes unerschütterliches Gebäude ist, das ein für alle Mal gilt. Regeln können sich ändern, und sie werden manchmal im Gebrauch neu aufgestellt. Wittgenstein denkt wieder an sein Modell des Spieles:

"Steckt uns da nicht die Analogie der Sprache mit dem Spiel ein Licht auf? Wir können uns doch sehr wohl denken, daß sich Menschen auf einer Wiese damit unterhalten, mit einem Ball zu spielen, so zwar, daß sie verschiedene bestehende Spiele anfangen, manche zu Ende spielen, dazwischen den Ball planlos in die Höhe werfen [...] Und nun Einer: Die ganze Zeit hindurch spielen die Leute ein Ballspiel, und richten sich daher bei jedem Wurf nach bestimmten Regeln. Und gibt es nicht auch den Fall, wo wir spielen und – ‚make up the rules as we go along?‘ Ja, auch den, in welchem wir sie abändern – as we go along." (Wittgenstein: PU §83)

Der Aspekt der Tradition erweist sich für Wittgenstein als genauso wichtig wie für Gadamer und spiegelt sich in Wittgensteins Ausdruck der "Naturgeschichte" wider. Damit sind laut Arnswald die gemeinsamen Gewohnheiten, Traditionen, Regeln und sozialen Institutionen von Menschen gemeint, die dafür sorgen, daß wir in unserem Handeln übereinstimmen und uns die Sicherheit liefern, daß wir so und nicht anders handeln. (Arnswald 2002: 34) "[...] Befehlen, fragen, erzählen, plauschen gehören zu unserer Naturgeschichte so, wie gehen, essen, trinken, spielen." (Wittgenstein: PU §25) und "Du mußt bedenken, daß das Sprachspiel sozusagen etwas Unvorhersehbares ist. Ich meine: Es ist nicht begründet. Nicht vernünftig (oder unvernünftig). Es steht da – wie unser Leben." (Wittgenstein: ÜG §559)

3. Gadamer und Wittgenstein

Aufgrund seines hohen Lebensalters hat Gadamer gegenüber Wittgenstein den elementaren Vorteil, daß er Wittgensteins Lebenswerk eingehend zur Kenntnis nehmen können, was umgekehrt sicherlich nicht der Fall ist. Für einen Vergleich der Sprache-Spiel-Konzeption der beiden Denker mag es zunächst interessant sein, zu sehen, was für ein Verhältnis Gadamer zum Wittgensteinschen Denken einnimmt. Abgesehen von einigen verstreuten Bemerkungen in seinem Gesamtwerk hat sich Gadamer in *Die phänomenologische Bewegung* eingehender mit Wittgenstein befaßt. Neben Gadamer's Kritik am *Traktat* und dessen logischem Reduktionismus der Sprache interessiert Gadamer vor allem Wittgensteins spätere Selbstkritik an seiner frühen Auffassung der Sprache. Gadamer betont Wittgensteins Hinwendung zum lebendigen Gebrauch der Sprache, der Warnungen vor falschen Übertragungen von einem Sprachspiel in ein anderes und einem metaphysischen Sprachgebrauch. (Gadamer 1987: 144) Daß Philosophie nur als sprachliche Selbstkritik im Sinne einer Selbstheilung fungieren soll, stößt auf Widerstand im Gadamer'schen Denken: das ist dem am produktiven Dialog orientierten Gadamer zu negativ. Auch stellt er in Frage, ob nicht Wittgensteins eigene Beschreibungen der Sprache anhand von "Gebrauch, Verwendung der Wörter" oder "Lebensform" nicht selbst der Sprachkritik unterzogen, also

„heilungsbedürftig“, seien. Trotz dieser negativen Einstellung erkennt Gadamer die Sprachspielkonzeption Wittgensteins an und sieht sich darin in seinem eigenen Denken bestätigt. (Gadamer 1986a: 5, 507)

In der Tat geht Gadamer gegenüber Wittgenstein einen Schritt weiter, weil er es nicht bei der abstrakten Analogie von Sprache und Spiel beläßt, sondern einen konkreten Vorschlag macht, wie Philosophieren allein möglich ist: nämlich im Dialog. Für Wittgenstein wäre dies vermutlich nicht mehr als ein Sprachspiel. Auch Arnswald sieht Gadamer darin gegenüber Wittgenstein einen Schritt voraus, vor allem in Beziehung auf den interkulturellen Dialog, der Überwindung von Konflikten zwischen Kulturen. (Arnswald 2002: 35) Natürlich fußt ein solcher Dialog auf einer elementaren Grundvoraussetzung, was Gadamer später durch die Auseinandersetzung mit Derrida einsehen mußte: dem „guten“ Willen, der Toleranz sich auf den anderen überhaupt erst einzulassen. (Gadamer 1986a: 215) Bringt nur eine Seite diesen guten Willen nicht mit, dann ist alles Verständigen zum Scheitern verurteilt. Allerdings haben wir keine Wahl; wir werden es immer wie! der versuchen müssen, mit den anderen ins Gespräch zu kommen, auch wenn es wie das tagespolitische Geschäft zeigt, fast unmöglich scheint.

Die Konvergenz aber, die Gadamer zwischen seinem und Wittgensteins Denken bemerkt, fußt auf dem Phänomen des Spieles, das sie beide als Modell für die Sprache benutzen. Da wäre zunächst die Betonung des Prozeßhaften, das sich bei Gadamer direkt durch das Spielgeschehen ausdrückt, bei Wittgenstein durch den Gebrauch von Sprache, der potentiell Veränderungen unterworfen ist. Beide gehen im Sprachgeschehen von einer Übersubjektivität aus, daß Sprache nur intersubjektiv möglich ist, was beide durch die Aspekte der Geschichtlichkeit, Tradition und Gepflogenheiten kenntlich machen. Daß sich Wortbedeutungen durch den Gebrauch, sei es im Gespräch, sei es durch Handlungskontexte, ergeben, verbindet die Denker ebenfalls. Und als wichtiger abschließender Punkt: Für beide bildet die Sprache die Basis für unsere Welterfahrung.

Entsprechend dieser gemeinsamen Grundlinien, die sich vom Modell des Spieles aus ergeben, fragt es sich, ob es sich beim Spiel um ein sehr grundlegendes Konzept handelt, mit dem das Verhältnis Mensch-Sprache-Welt erfaßt werden kann. In der Tat stellt das Spielkonzept elementare Parallelen zur Sprache bereit. Unsere Sprache vermittelt uns eine ganz bestimmte Sicht auf die Welt. Daß Sprache nichts Statisches ist, sondern sich durch den Gebrauch der Sprecher verändert und gleichzeitig durch eine bestimmte Ordnung (Regeln) bestimmt ist und daß sie nur in einer Gemeinschaft funktioniert, das sind die Aspekte, die durch die Analogie mit dem Spielbegriff erfaßt werden. Zwar sind wir es, die die Sprachspiele spielen, aber im Grunde liegt es nicht an uns einzelnen Sprechern, wie sich dieses Spiel der Sprache entwickelt.

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'The *riddle* does not exist': Wittgenstein's Philosophy Revisited in the Context of the *Ignorabimus*-Dispute *

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It is generally accepted that Ludwig Wittgenstein figures amongst the most prominent philosophers of the bygone century who executed the *linguistic turn*. The phrase 'linguistic turn' was coined by Gustav Bergmann and became a slogan when Richard Rorty (1967) used it as a title for his famous anthology. According to the traditional view, the *linguistic turn* based on the conviction that philosophical problems are 'problems of language' that can be solved, or dissolved, either by reforming language (ideal language philosophy) or by understanding more about the language we speak in our everyday discourses (ordinary language philosophy). It is often said that Wittgenstein put forward these two philosophies: the ideal language philosophy in his early work and the ordinary language philosophy in his later work. As opposed to the widespread view of 'two-Wittgensteins', other studies, in past and present, try to give evidence for the continuity of Wittgenstein's philosophy. My aim is to throw new light on the problem of continuity and discontinuity in Wittgenstein's thought by focusing on Wittgenstein's philosophy in the context of the so-called *Ignorabimus*-Dispute.

In 1872, Emil Du Bois-Reymond, a famous experimental physiologist, closed his address *On the Limits of the Knowledge of Nature* with the following dramatic pronouncement: 'In the face of the puzzle over the nature of matter and force and how they should be conceived, the scientist must, once and for all, resign himself to the far more difficult, renunciatory doctrine, "Ignorabimus".' (ibid., 464) Du Bois-Reymond maintained that natural science, based on Newtonian mechanics, cannot explain everything and will never be able to do so.¹

Du Bois-Reymond's lecture triggered a storm of papers, among them many critical voices giving the wrong impression that the *Ignorabimus* meant nothing more than rigorous scientific scepticism. Nevertheless, this picture is wrong. Although Du Bois-Reymond maintained that scientific knowledge has its limits, he added self-confidently: 'Inside these limits, the scientist is lord of the menor' (1872, 460). According to Du Bois-Reymond, everything outside these limits was a private matter of individual belief of which science has not to take care. The concept of the soul, for instance, would be outside the scope of natural sciences because of its subjectivity. The belief in the existence of the soul might be of religious or moral importance, at least for some people, but the question whether the soul exists was irrelevant and without sense within the scientific context.

At a first glance, Du Bois-Reymond's liberal agnosticism implied a gesture of modesty and a plea for tolerance toward different worldviews, e. g. toward religion and science. In fact, Du Bois-Reymond's argumentation involved a diplomatic strategy which was neither a matter of armchair philosophy nor a purely academic matter, but the object and weapon of politics. He emphasized the integrity of all natural sciences and rejected both the anti-scientific cultural tendencies prevailing among many intellectuals and anti-modernist trends within science, like spiritualism, occultism and a cult of miracles dulling the mind of the masses.

One of the most disputed issues of the *Ignorabimus*-Dispute was the *demarcation problem*, i. e. the problem of how and where to draw a boundary line between science and non-science, e. g. between science and religion or between science and pseudoscience. In the second half of the 19th century a fallibilist, agnostic and relativized view of science emerged which might be interpreted as a 'loss of certainty' or '*Wahrheitsgewissheitsverlust*', to use Schiemann's German term. It raised a number of difficult questions regarding to the demarcation problem, among them the question as to what criteria could distinguish science from non- or pseudo-science, and who should have the responsibility for establishing such criteria.

The debate about the epistemic privilege of scientific knowledge was in full swing, when at the end of the 19th century the scientific optimism of the old generation (Hermann von Helmholtz, Emil Du Bois-Reymond, Heinrich Hertz, Ernst Mach et al.) started to fade. The conviction of the high problem-solving effectiveness of science came under attack, 'bankruptcy of science' became a slogan and a Nietzschean nihilism and pessimism was very popular. In his article 'Ignorabimus', published in the German newspaper *Die Zukunft* (1898), the physicist Walther Rathenau made a comment on Du Bois-Reymond's lecture in which he turned the tables. Du Bois-Reymond had conceded that science cannot explain everything; on the other hand, he had emphasized that everything which is 'unknowable' is not a matter of science; 'unsolvable riddles' were irrelevant within the scientific context. Rathenau held against (ibid., 527):

[science] does not tell us anything about the big questions that are impressing on the world now and in the future; not a word of the human, moral, economic, social and national matters, not a word of the nature of matter and mind and their connection.

Rathenau argued that there might be questions outside the scope of science, e. g. religious, ethical or moral questions. Nevertheless, they were important and relevant questions of our life. Therefore, we had to ask who was competent to answer them, if not science. Similar to Rathenau the early Wittgenstein stressed how little was achieved even though all scientific questions would be solved one day, because our problems of life would remain entirely untouched by science: 'We feel that even if all possible scientific questions be answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at all. Of course there is then no question left, and just this is the answer.' (TLP 6.52)

* Most of the quotations are based on German originals. They are translated into English. The translations are usually mine (if not stated otherwise), including the mistakes. Where translations already exist, I follow them.

¹ Du Bois-Reymond gave three concrete examples for 'unsolvable riddles': the nature of matter and force, the genesis of motion and the origin of consciousness. Criticising the *Ignorabimus*, Heinrich Hertz 'proposes that, instead of giving a direct answer to the question: "What is force?", the problem should be dealt with by restating Newtonian physics without using "force" as a basic concept' (Monk 1990, 26). The remarkable result of Hertz' criticism was its 'picture theory' which teaches us that theories are models. Wittgenstein extended 'Hertz's analysis of *Bilder* and *Darstellung* in the language of physical science, using Frege und Russell's propositional calculus as the framework for this extension' (Janik/Toulmin 1973, 191).

The *Ignorabimus*-call was well-known in fin-de-siècle Vienna. Its impact is obvious in almost all intellectual Viennese circles of the late 19th and early 20th century. Ernst Mach, for example, called Du Bois-Reymond's 'riddles' meaningless 'pseudo-problems' (*Scheinprobleme*), a notion which was adopted from the members of the Vienna Circle. In their 1929 manifesto they declared that the scientific conception of the world did not admit unsolvable riddles (Verein Ernst Mach 1929, 15) – echoing a famous proposition of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*: 'The riddle does not exist. If a question can be put at all, then it can also be answered.'² (TLP 6.5)

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein intended to fix the limits of world, thought and language by distinguishing between sense and nonsense (see TLP, Preface). The term 'nonsense' is somewhat confusing, because Wittgenstein distinguishes between 'not having sense' on the one hand and 'being nonsensical' on the other. According to the 'picture theory', propositions have sense insofar as they picture (represent) states of affairs or matters of empirical facts. Thus, only propositions of natural (or empirical) science have sense. The propositions of logic – tautologies and contradictions – do not have sense because they do not picture (represent) states of affairs. They are, in Wittgenstein's terms, senseless (*sinnlos*), but not nonsensical (*unsinnig*). Propositions are nonsensical if they transgress the boundaries of sense. Wittgenstein banished traditional metaphysics to that area, as well as religion, ethics and aesthetics.

As opposed to the members of the Vienna Circle, however, Wittgenstein did not classify everything beyond the boundaries of sense and propositional knowledge as irrelevant. He even considered the 'higher' concerns the really important problems of our life. In a well-known letter to Ludwig von Ficker, whom he had hoped to publish the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein wrote: 'My work consists of two parts, the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important point. For the ethical gets its limit drawn from the inside, as it were, by my book; [...] I've managed in my book to put everything firmly into place by being silent about it.' (PT, 16)

Wittgenstein preaches silence as regarding anything that is of importance; that is the central concern and the 'last principle' of the *Tractatus*: 'Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.'³ (TLP 7) This is a bold claim indeed. However, this was not Wittgenstein's last word. Wittgenstein's later work is directed against central theses he favoured in the *Tractatus*. To be more precise, Wittgenstein doubted his earlier thesis that the purpose of language was only to make claims about empirical facts. Furthermore, he criticised the picture-theory which presupposes an isomorphic structure between world and language.

One can regard the following remark as the *locus classicus* of Wittgenstein's practical turn: 'For a large class of cases – though not for all – in which we employ the

word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.' (PI §43) In order to address the countless multiplicity, diversity and varieties of language uses, their un-fixedness, and their being 'part of an activity', Wittgenstein introduced the key concept of 'language-game'. He never explicitly defined it since this new concept is made to do work for a more fluid perspective on language. Another way of saying this is to state that 'form of life' in some way underlies and precedes 'language-games'.

It is notoriously difficult to find consensus among interpreters of Wittgenstein's work, and this is particularly true concerning the works after the *Tractatus*. But I think Alan Janik and Stephen Toulmin have drawn our attention to a crucial point of Wittgenstein's lifelong wrestling with the great philosophical questions and their existential status in our life, e. g. in their following comment (Janik/Toulmin 1973, 233):

At the outset, we argued, Wittgenstein's two main preoccupations – with 'representation' and the problem of 'the ethical' – were related, yet distinguishable. The conclusions of the *Tractatus* had the apparent merit of satisfying both preoccupations at the same time; for his formal mapping of *die Grenze der Sprache* effectively thrust the whole of ethics, values, and 'the higher' too, outside the boundaries of the 'sayable' [...]. From 1930 on, we find him still adhering to the same ethical standpoint, yet in a new philosophical context; and it is not clear that his new account of *language* continued to provide any longer the kind of support for his *ethical* point of view that the *Tractatus* position had given.

In the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein said: 'It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed. Ethics is transcendental.' (TLP 6.421) In his *Lecture on Ethics* (1929), Wittgenstein held on the opinion that facts had to be distinguished from values, and science from ethics: 'Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it.' (ibid., 12)

Wittgenstein always drew a boundary between religious belief and ethics on the one hand and science on the other. Nevertheless, 'the later Wittgenstein' was to generalize the behavioural account of 'meaning' presenting all linguistic expressions as being meaningful because of their role as part of our actions and behaviour. This account, however, has its downsides. Firstly, the accentuation of the common and social character of our language games is hard to reconcile with the position of an unexpressible ethical and religious individualism. Secondly, if it is true that religious and ethical language games are, in their own ways, as verbalizable and meaningful as any others and have their own proper sphere of application, the answer to the demarcation problem Wittgenstein had given in the *Tractatus* does no longer hold.

To sum up, the starting-point of my considerations was the question in which sense the view of 'two-Wittgensteins' is tenable. By focusing on Wittgenstein's philosophy in the light of the *Ignorabimus*-Dispute and its main disputed issue, the so-called demarcation problem, my answer to the question is as follows: Du Bois-Reymond had asked whether science can explain everything and his answer was 'No'. He declared that there are limits of

² Brian McGuinness (1988, 38) points out that Rudolf Wittgenstein's copy of Emil Du Bois-Reymond's *Die sieben Welträtsel* remained on Gretel's shelves (Margarete Stonborough Wittgenstein). Therefore, one can assume that Ludwig Wittgenstein was familiar with the debate about the *Ignorabimus*. Furthermore, Fritz Mauthner, whose influence on Wittgenstein is well-known, criticised Du Bois-Reymond (see Mauthner 1923/24, 270, 279).

³ This is the Ogden-translation. Another translation often used is the Pears/McGuinness-translation: 'What we cannot speak about, we must pass over silence.' See also Paul Engelmann's comments on the *Tractatus* which are very helpful for a better understanding of the mystical side of Wittgenstein's philosophy (Engelmann 1970, 74-97).

scientific knowledge. Wittgenstein's response to the *Ignorabimus*-thesis was not its negation, i. e. 'Non-Ignorabimus', but its rejection by distinguishing between 'question' and 'problem'.

According to Wittgenstein, every question is a linguistic formulation and every meaningful question is part of our propositional knowledge. But not every problem has to be a (well-formulated) question. On the contrary, the problems of our life, however important they were, cannot even be expressed, let alone be answered. This is the position one can find in the *Tractatus*. In his later years Wittgenstein became more and more aware of the naivety of his earlier view of science only telling us something about facts, whereas the 'rest' was a matter of the 'unsayable'. His later philosophy teaches us that science cannot be reduced to a corpus of descriptive sentences about facts. By using several examples, Wittgenstein illustrates the important role of the so-called 'tacit' knowledge or 'knowing-how' as being constitutive for playing language games.

All I have tried to do was to look at Wittgenstein's argumentation from a historical point of view by relating it with the *Ignorabimus*-Dispute. Within this context, we have to take account of both, of the continuity and discontinuity of Wittgenstein's thought. There was one question which troubled Wittgenstein all his life long, namely the demarcation problem. What Wittgenstein modified was his answer to it. Admittedly, it is another matter to discuss Wittgenstein's 'responses' to the *Ignorabimus* from a systematic point of view. It's simply true, if not trivial, that *know-how* cannot be written on the blackboard. Nevertheless, the distinction between different kinds of knowledge gives us no answer to the problem as to what criteria we can and should distinguish knowledge from belief, science from non-science. Maybe the answer to the demarcation problem simply is this: 'Who cares?' With Wittgenstein in mind, one might say: 'This language game is played.' In my opinion this answer is not satisfying. We also have to ask whether we *ought* to play this or that language game. In a passage of the source manuscripts published in the German edition *Vermischte Bemerkungen*⁴ Wittgenstein made a similar remark: 'is this game to be played at all now and what would be the right game to play?' (1994, 63)

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⁴ The English translation of the edition used above was published 1998 under the title *Culture and Value*. Both, the German and the English version, are revised editions of earlier publications edited by Georg Henrik von Wright in collaboration with Heikki Nyman. The manuscript-number of the source quoted and translated above is as follows: MS 118 20r: 27.08.1937.

Zur dringend notwendigen Revision des „standard view“ der Genese der Philosophischen Untersuchungen

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1. Zur Geschichte des „standard view“ der PU-Genese

„Fünf Jahre früher – vier Jahre später – weit komplizierter!“, so könnte man einen Slogan für die dringend notwendige Revision des „standard view of the genesis of the *Investigations*“ formulieren, denn „study of the Nachlass shows that on many counts this standard view is not only incomplete and in need of supplementation but also wrong and in need of correction“ (Hark, 3).

Zu Beginn sei ausdrücklich festgehalten, dass der von Georg Henrik von Wright ausgearbeitete „standard view“ als wissenschaftliche Leistung ersten Ranges zu werten ist. Damit wurde die philologisch-philosophische Erforschung des Wittgensteinschen Œuvres in den 70er Jahren des vergangenen Jahrhunderts begründet (siehe Bibliographie). Die hier vorgelegten Untersuchungen stehen auf den Schultern dieser Forschungsleistung, bilden eine kritische Auseinandersetzung damit. Auch die von G. H. von Wright und Heikki Nyman erarbeitete „Helsinki-Edition“ der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* ist als Meilenstein in der Nachlassforschung anzuerkennen. Aber – und hier setzt meine Kritik an – seit den 80er Jahren wurde diese grundlegende Forschung nicht konsequent und innovativ weitergeführt. Vielmehr wurde der „standard view“ konserviert und weitertradiert. Auftauchende relevante Einwände wurden weitgehend ignoriert. Auch die von von Wright selbst und anderen ausdrücklich markierten Fragen und Ungereimtheiten wurden links liegen gelassen.¹ So bleibt insbesondere auch die von Joachim Schulte im Jahre 2001 herausgegebene Neuausgabe von Ludwig Wittgensteins *Philosophischen Untersuchungen. Kritisch-genetische Edition*, die „Bielefelder-Edition“, ganz dem „standard view“ verhaftet und fixiert so die Nachlassforschung auf dem Stand, den sie schon vor einem Vierteljahrhundert erreicht hatte. Ja, sie fällt sogar ein halbes Jahrhundert zurück, denn „in mehr als 1100 Seiten [wird] im wesentlichen die bereits seit 1953 bekannte Ausgabe *inklusive* aller ihrer Fragwürdigkeiten quellentechnisch nur untermauert statt kritisch hinterfragt“ (Kross, 51). Selbst die Tatsache, dass die Bielefelder-Edition das glücklicherweise wieder aufgefundene MS142 integriert, ist ambivalent zu bewerten: einerseits wird damit ein zweifellos wichtiges Nachlassdokument veröffentlicht, andererseits wird so, da MS142 als sog. PU-„Urfassung“ angesetzt wird, der „standard view“ nur noch rigider. Durch diese enge, unreflektierte Bindung an den „standard view“ wird die Bielefelder-Edition nur zu einem geringen Teil dem selbst erhobenen Anspruch einer *Kritisch-genetischen Edition* gerecht. Sie kann aber – als Edition für den Übergang – hilfreiche Dienste leisten.

¹ Zur Kritik des „standard view“: Hilmy, Hark, Sedmak, Kroß, Rothhaupt. Wichtige Beiträge auch von Pichler und Keicher. Vermerkt sei hier, dass von inhaltlicher Seite her Studien in der Tradition des sog. „New Wittgenstein“ in Richtung einer Auflösung des „standard view“ weisen, worauf ich hier leider nicht eingehen kann.

2. Zur Notwendigkeit einer Revision des „standard view“

Die Notwendigkeit einer Revision des „standard view“ der PU-Genese wird hier nun exemplarisch dokumentiert. Die PU-Genese ist weit spannender, vielschichtiger und diffiziler als es der „standard view“ glauben macht. Die PU-Genese alleine auf wenige „ Fassungen“ zu beziehen ist eine Verengung und Verkürzung im Wittgenstein-Nachlass – nicht (nur) „Werke“, sondern (auch) „Wege“. Kein Gehopste von PU-Fassung zu PU-Fassung (Urfassung, Frühfassung, bearbeitete Frühfassung, Zwischenfassung, Spätfassung), vielmehr ein kontinuierlich rekonstruierendes Nachschreiten der Verläufe unter Berücksichtigung von „Verdichtungen“ innerhalb des Nachlasses. Eine adäquate Erschließung der PU-Genese ist nur eingebettet in das gesamte Wittgensteinsche Œuvre zu erreichen. Die Differenzierung „Bemerkungskreation“ und „Bemerkungskomposition“ bedarf dabei größerer Aufmerksamkeit. Es ist mehr als wünschenswert, dass die philologisch-philosophische Erschließung des Wittgensteinschen Gesamtnachlasses, konsequent, kreativ, kritisch weitergeführt und der Forschungsaustausch intensiviert wird. Ausarbeitung und Diskussion von Alternativvorschlägen zum „standard view“ sind jedenfalls dringend erforderlich.

3. Zu MS142 – „Urfassung“ oder „Neue Umarbeitung“

MS142 mit insgesamt 189 durchnummerierten Bemerkungen enthält mindestens 63 Bemerkungen aus TS213 (1933) bzw. MS114_i/MS115_i (1933/34), die in TS227 weitertransferiert wurden. MS116_i mit insgesamt 278 Bemerkungen enthält mindestens 204 Bemerkungen die in TS213 stehen und noch davor entstanden. Etwa 50 davon gelangten später bis in TS227. (Vgl. auch Hilmy, Hark, Sedmak, Pichler, Kross.) Es besteht eine weitere Transferschiene, die bisher in ihrer Bedeutung nicht erkannt wurde, nämlich: weitere 99 Bemerkungen aus MS114_i/MS115_i gelangten über TS228/TS230 in TS227. So basieren mindestens 219 von insgesamt 693 Bemerkungen in TS227 (nahezu ein Drittel!) also auf Nachlassmaterial, das im Zeitraum 1929-1933/34 kreiert wurde. Wieso sollte dieser Anfangsprozess nicht in die PU-Genese einbezogen werden? Damit sei nicht gesagt, dass – etwa nach MS142: „Vom Buch zum Album“ (Pichler) – keine markanten Übergänge in der Entwicklung des Nachlasses vorliegen; es wird aber nachhaltig betont, dass dies kein legitimer und nachvollziehbarer Grund ist, die voraus liegenden Entwicklungen (zu TS209, TS213, MS114_i/115_i, MS115_{ii}) davon kurzerhand rigoros abzutrennen. Weder Wittgensteins Arbeit der Bemerkungskreation, noch jener der Bemerkungskomposition setzten erst mit MS142 ein. Wittgenstein vermerkt in seinem Taschenkalender am 5.11.1936: „Neue Umarbeitung begonnen“. MS142 ist also keineswegs „Urfassung“, wie es die Bielefelder-Edition darstellt, sondern – in Wittgensteins eigener Bekundung – „Neue Umarbeitung“.

4. Zu MS178e – Knüpfung und Scheidepunkt

Die chronologische Verortung von MS142 selbst ist keinesfalls gelungen. Lediglich der Beginn von MS142 ist fest fixiert, denn korrespondierend mit dem Taschenkalendereintrag vom 5.11.1936 enthält MS142 selbst den Vermerk „Angefangen anfangs November 1936“. Nach von Wright soll MS142 November/Dezember 1936 entstanden sein; nach Schulte trifft dies jedoch nur auf MS142_i zu, da MS142_{ii} erst Mai 1937 fertig gewesen sein soll. Meine Nachlassrecherchen erbringen jedoch eine andere chronologische Einordnung. Am 11.9.1937 trägt Wittgenstein in MS118,89v das Notat: „Habe heute angefangen an dem großen Manuskript weiterzuschreiben. [...]“ ein. Es spricht vieles dafür, dass mit dem „großen Manuskript“ MS142 und mit „weiterzuschreiben“ konkret MS142_{ii} gemeint ist.² Am Ende von MS142_{ii} und am Anfang von MS117_i finden sich Bemerkungen, die in MS178e grundgelegt sind. MS178e steht auf zwei Wochenkalenderblättern, welche die Tage 5.-18. August 1937 umfassen. Da Bemerkungen aus MS178e den Abschluss von MS142_{ii} bilden, wird MS142 nicht vor dem Zeitraum 5.-18. August 1937 vollständig gewesen sein. Entsprechend den zitierten Angaben in MS118 war MS142_{ii} vor dem 11.9.1937 noch nicht einmal begonnen. Dieses unscheinbare vierseitige Nachlassfragment MS178e ist also von elementarer Aussagekraft, die beim Genesestudium gänzlich übersehen wurde. Zusätzlicher Beleg ist, dass insbesondere eine Bemerkung in MS178e nicht nur den Abschluss von MS142 und damit von TS220 bildet, sondern vorformuliert mit der Datierung 11.9.1937 in MS118,88v vorkommt und ebenso mit diesem Datum den Beginn von MS117_i bildet, der dann wiederum als Anfang in TS221 und TS222 vorhanden ist. MS178e ist philologisch und thematisch als Knüpf- und Scheidepunkt zwischen dem Abschluss von MS142_{ii} und dem Beginn von MS117_i zu sehen und lässt sich auf September 1937 fixieren. (Zieht man Wittgensteins Eintrag „Auf Zettel geschrieben, was ich nachtragen muß.“ vom 4.12.1937 in MS120,33v hinzu und betrachtet MS178e als Überbleibsel dieser „Zettel“, so könnte sich der Sachverhalt in der PU-Genese ggf. noch verkomplizieren.) In Konsequenz kann alsdann vor September 1937 auch TS220 nicht vollendet und TS221 nicht begonnen worden sein. McGuinness plädiert übrigens – mit Recht – gegen Schulte dafür, dass TS220 (bis S. 65) im Mai 1937 und TS220 (ab S. 65) im Dezember 1937 diktiert wurde (McGuinness; Schulte in Wittgenstein 2001, S. 1098).

5. Zu MS116 – „Fragment“ und „Masse von Bemerkungen“

Auch MS116 ist in der PU-Genese von gravierender Bedeutung, die aber im „standard view“ nicht wahrgenommen wird. Hier möchte ich speziell einen Sachverhalt explizieren, der die Unzulänglichkeit des „standard view“ und folglich der Bielefelder-Edition sogar innerhalb der dort selbst veranschlagten ausschließlichen Orientierung an „ Fassungen“ dokumentiert. Dazu die Kardinalfrage: Wieso wurde MS142 als „Fassung“ (sogar als „Urfassung“) integriert, MS116 (hier speziell MS116_i und MS116_{ii}) aber gänzlich negiert? Bekanntermaßen spricht Wittgenstein in der Frühfassung des PU-Vorwortes³

² Gründe, warum MS140, MS116, MS117 nicht gemeint sind, können vorgebracht werden.

³ In MS159,37r, in MS117,112+117+123 (ab 27.6.1938 bis „August 1938“) und in TS225,2.

von zwei Komplexen seines damals konzipierten Buches: Dem „Fragment meines letzten Versuchs, meine philosophischen Gedanken in eine Reihe zu ordnen“ einerseits und einer „Masse von Bemerkungen in mehr oder weniger loser Anordnung“ andererseits. Für die „Masse von Bemerkungen“ bekundet Wittgenstein zudem: „Jede Bemerkung soll eine laufende Nummer + außerdem die Nummer solcher Bemerkungen tragen, die zu ihr in wichtigen Beziehungen stehen.“ (MS117,123; ab 27.6.1938) Basierend auf guten Gründen ist MS142 als der erste Komplex, als das „Fragment“ anzusehen (Pichler, S. 14). Und MS116 (exakter: MS116_i und MS116_{ii}) – so die hier vertretene und begründete Position – ist als zweiter Komplex, als die „Masse von Bemerkungen“ aufzufassen.⁴ Warum? MS116_i besteht weitestgehend aus Bemerkungen, die einer Weiterbearbeitung des ersten Viertels von TS213 entstammen. Ein geringer Teil der Bemerkungen in MS116_i wurde neu kreiert. Einige Bemerkungen sind MS119 entnommen. In MS119,79ff sind nun Informationen enthalten, die zur Rekonstruktion auch der PU-Genese überaus wichtig sind. So vermerkt Wittgenstein am 23.10.1937: „Fing an meine alte Maschinenschrift anzusehen“. Am 26.10.1937 notiert er: „Schreibe jetzt nicht mehr, sondern lese nur den ganzen Tag meine Maschinenschrift und mache Zeichen zu jedem Absatz. [...] Ich habe jetzt beinahe ein Viertel des Ganzen durchgesehen. Wenn es also glatt geht, könnte ich in ca. 6 Tagen damit fertig sein.“ Am 27.10.1937 ist vermerkt: „Heute nicht weiter gelesen, sondern wieder geschrieben, da ich mich wieder dazu fähig fühle. Es ging nicht schlecht.“ Und noch einen Tag später liest man: „Bin wieder mit Arbeitsfähigkeit begnadet.“ Mit „alte Maschinenschrift“ meint Wittgenstein TS213. Exakt aus diesem ersten Viertel von TS213 arbeitet Wittgenstein – doch ja wohl nach dieser TS213-Lektüre – Bemerkungen in MS116_i um. Demnach ist MS116_i nicht vor dem 27.10.37 begonnen worden. Und da der Abschluss von MS116_i aus MS119 genommen ist und dort das Datum 12.11.1937 trägt, wurde MS116_i nicht davor beendet. MS116_{ii} wurde weitestgehend aus Bemerkungen erstellt, die MS119-121 und MS158 entnommen sind. Die Datierungsspanne des aus MS119-121 stammenden Textmaterials reicht vom 13.11.1937 bis zum 15.7.1938. MS158 wurde am 24.2.1938 begonnen. Demnach wurde MS116_{ii} nicht vor Mitte Juli 1938 abgeschlossen. Höchstwahrscheinlich fällt der Abschluss in die Zeit der Datierung der PU-Frühfassung in MS117 bzw. TS225, also Juli/August 1938. Nach einem Tagebucheintrag bei G. E. Moore hat Wittgenstein dieses Vorwort am 27.8.1938 fertig gestellt.

6. Zu TS228 – „Jede Bemerkung soll [Nummern] tragen“

Bezeichnenderweise tauchen nur in MS116_i und MS116_{ii} außergewöhnliche Besonderheiten auf, die zum Teil sogar einzigartig im Gesamtnachlass sind: Neubeginn eines voluminösen Manuskriptbandes; erstes Drittel der Anfangsseite ist unbeschrieben; durchlaufende Manuskriptseitennummerierung und seitenweise Bemerkungsnummerierung; besonders tiefer Zeileneinzug

⁴ Eine Vermutung über die Bedeutung von TS116 findet sich bei Keicher, S. 225-227. Die Bedeutung von MS116 allgemein betont Groß, S. 52-54. Pichler, S. 14 identifiziert die „Masse der Bemerkungen“, meines Erachtens irreführend durch den unmittelbaren Übergang von MS142 auf TS220, mit TS221 und versperrt sich so den Blick auf die – zu seiner brillanten These „Vom Buch zum Album“ hervorragend passende – Entwicklung von TS116 über TS228/TS230 in TS227, einem Paradeverlauf für den Gestaltungsprozess des PU-Albums.

bei jedem Bemerkungsanfang; jeweils zwei Freizeilen zwischen den einzelnen Bemerkungen; erste Ansätze zu Querreferenzen unter den Bemerkungen; Reinschriftcharakter dieses handschriftlichen Manuskripts. Das von Wittgenstein angekündigte – man beachte seine Formulierung „Jede Bemerkung soll [...] tragen“ – zweiteilige System der Nummerierung für die „Masse von Bemerkungen“ wurde in MS116 topographisch exakt vorbereitet, dort aber nur zur Hälfte ausgeführt, denn jede Bemerkung hat zwar „eine laufende Nummer“ (kombiniert aus Manuskriptseitenzahl und Bemerkungsnummer je Seite) erhalten, die eigentlich verknüpfende Nummerierung der Bemerkungen untereinander wurde aber nicht ausgeführt. Diese Ausführung hat Wittgenstein jedoch – und darauf möchte ich den Fokus richten – Jahre später, nämlich 1945/46, in TS228 überführt und dort in modifizierter Form und größerem Umfang auch realisiert (Rothhaupt, 196f). Übrigens wurde bei der Durchführung des Prozesses der Bemerkungsauswahl für TS228 auch MS116 vollständig mitberücksichtigt. Der Komplex MS116, und MS116_{ii} ist demnach in spezieller Weise, nämlich im Verhältnis „Fragment“ und „Masse von Bemerkungen“, sowohl als „Pendant“ zu MS142 als auch als „Weiterführung“ nach MS142 und „Hinführung“ zu TS228 aufzufassen. Wenn schon, dann gehört gerade auch dieser Komplex von MS116 als „Fassung“ – besser: als „Pendant“ zu MS142 – unabdingbar zur PU-Genese, also auch in eine PU-Neuausgabe, welche die Bezeichnung *Kritisch-genetische Edition* auch wirklich verdient.

7. Zu TS227 – „No further evidence“

Zuletzt sei auch die Frage angesprochen, was die Herausgeber der postumen Veröffentlichung *Philosophische Untersuchungen*, Elizabeth Anscombe und Rush Rhees⁵, dazu veranlasste die Fertigstellung der PU (Teil I, also TS227) auf 1945 zu datieren. Das dort enthaltene Vorwort von Wittgenstein selbst ist „Cambridge, im Januar 1945“ datiert. Und in den „Bemerkungen der Herausgeber“ in dieser zweisprachigen Erstausgabe von 1953 heißt es: „Was in diesem Band als Teil I vorliegt, war seit 1945 abgeschlossen.“ Im Anschluss wurde diese Datierung kritiklos übernommen und unkritisch bis heute beibehalten. Lediglich einige Ungereimtheiten veranlassten ein halbes Jahrhundert nach der Erstausgabe auch den Herausgeber der Bielefelder-Edition die Datierung der sog. „Spätfassung“ auf „wahrscheinlich Ende 1945 / Anfang 1946“ (Schulte in Wittgenstein 2001, S. 33) zu datieren. Die postume PU-Erstveröffentlichung 1953 unmittelbar mitverfolgt habend, ja selbst bei der Übersetzung ins Englische damit befasst gewesen⁶, gibt aber Denis Paul retrospektiv folgende Auskunft: „I am quite certain that the 1945 date came from its being on the typescript + that Elizabeth & Co had no further evidence.“⁷ Der „standard view“ der PU-Genese ist also auch für die Zeit nach 1938 dringend einer kritischen Würdigung zu unterziehen (vgl. Hark). Zwei meiner Forschungsergebnisse dazu, die Einfluss auf die Revision des „standard view“ haben dürften, kann ich hier nur noch ansprechen: TS230 muss zentral in die PU-Genese einbezogen werden (Rothhaupt, S. 199ff). TS227 ist erst im Jahre 1949 entstanden (Publikation dazu in Vorbereitung).

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⁵ Herausgeber der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen / Philosophical Investigations*, Oxford 1953 waren Anscombe und Rhees, nicht aber von Wright. Siehe dort „Editor's Note“.

⁶ Siehe die Erwähnung von Denis Paul in der „Translator's Note“ der PU-Erstausgabe.

⁷ Brief vom 19.05.1999 von Denis Paul an Josef G. F. Rothhaupt.

Weltsichtkohärenz – um welchen Preis?

Eckart Ruschmann, Innsbruck, Austria

Nelson Goodman beschrieb in seinem 1978 erschienenen Buch „Weisen der Welterzeugung“ (*Ways of Worldmaking*) die Prozesse, mit denen Individuen ihre persönliche Weltsicht entwickeln. Er weist selbst darauf hin, dass sich aus einer solchen Beschreibungsform ganz spezifische „Schwierigkeiten mit der Wahrheit“ (Kap. I, 5) ergeben – eine bestimmte Weltsicht, d.h. eine „Version der Welterzeugung“ wird „dann für wahr gehalten, wenn sie keinen hartnäckigen Überzeugungen widerspricht und keine ihrer eigenen Vorschriften verletzt“ (Goodman 1984, 31).

Gerade in der heutigen Zeit stellt sich die Frage neu und besonders dringend, ob es Möglichkeiten gibt, einen Beurteilungsmaßstab an individuelle Weltsichten zu legen, z.B. um eine Grundlage zum Umgehen mit Konflikten zwischen unterschiedlichen Sichtweisen individuellen, nationalen bzw. religiösen Charakters zu erarbeiten.

Ich möchte diese Frage vor einem erkenntnistheoretischen Hintergrund behandeln und dabei die Frage des Bezugs von Erkennen und Verstehen als zentralen Ansatzpunkt wählen. Diese zwei Begriffe werden sehr unterschiedlich definiert und verwendet, es gibt sogar Überlappungen, die sich aus der Gemeinsamkeit ergeben, dass beide ein „erfolgreiches Einordnen“ in bestehende Wissensbestände beschreiben.

Die Unterscheidung lässt sich am besten durch den unterschiedlichen Bezugspunkt treffen: Prototyp des Erkennens ist die Gegenstands-Erkenntnis (Wahrnehmung, konkrete Erfahrung, wissenschaftlich ‚Empirie‘), für das Verstehen ist es das Sprach- bzw. Textverstehen (im verbalen Dialog oder beim Lesen von schriftlich fixierten Texten).

Einen Baum wahrzunehmen und genau zu untersuchen ist ein Erkenntnisvorgang, der Bericht darüber, als Text publiziert oder mündlich mitgeteilt, wird von einem anderen Menschen verstanden – im hermeneutischen Kontext stellt Verstehen eine Rekonstruktion des Erkenntnisvorganges eines anderen Menschen dar (Schleiermacher), ein ‚Erfassen von Welterfassen‘ oder ‚Erkennen des Erkannten‘ (Boeckh). In diesem Sinne hat Schleiermacher (1838/1977) in seinem hermeneutischen Ansatz Erkennen und Verstehen als komplementäre Hälften des Wissensprozesses (genauer: der Generierung von Wissen) beschrieben – Erkennen als Bezug von Subjekt zu Objekt, Verstehen als Bezug von (einem) Subjekt zu (einem anderen) Subjekt.

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S (1) ⇔ S (2)

Eine individuelle Weltsicht ist vor dem Hintergrund einer persönlichen ‚Lerngeschichte‘ entstanden, wobei ‚Lernen‘ mit den Vorgängen des Erkennens und Verstehens eng verbunden ist – es gibt ‚Lernen durch Erkennen‘ oder ‚Erfahrungslernen‘ und ‚Lernen durch Verstehen‘, sowohl im Umgang mit konkreten Menschen, wie auch durch Teilhabe am ‚kulturellen Gedächtnis‘ und den Inhalten, die in schriftlichen Dokumenten festgelegt und damit zugänglich sind.

Auf einer solchen Grundlage – einer ‚epistemologisch fundierten Hermeneutik‘ – kann auch eine ‚Philosophische Beratung‘ entwickelt werden (vgl. Ruschmann 1999, 2004). Diese lässt sich als eine spezifische Form des Verstehens beschreiben, nicht als ‚Verstehen für mich‘, also die Form verstehenden *Lernens*, sondern in der ‚Richtung‘ des Verstehens-Vorganges hin zum anderen Menschen, also ‚Verstehen für den anderen‘, oder: verstehendes *Beraten*, das zugleich die Kriterien eines prüfenden und einschätzenden Umganges mit einer persönlichen Weltanschauung („world view“) bereitstellen kann.

Philosophen haben sich allerdings bisher nur selten mit individuellen Weltsichten beschäftigt. Die große Herausforderung an die Philosophie besteht in der Spannung zwischen dem Wissen um die Unterschiedlichkeit individueller Sichtweisen und dem doch beständig neu erhobenen Anspruch auf allgemeingültige Aussagen.

Das Thema dieser Sektion „Rationale Strukturen von Weltsichten“ legt die Annahme nahe, eine Prüfung von Weltsichten auf ihre Rationalität könne in diese Richtung orientierende Funktion haben. Philosophische Rationalitätskriterien, die in der Regel ihren Ausgangspunkt von ‚Geltungsansprüchen‘ nehmen und die Frage der ‚Wohlfundiertheit‘ stellen, sollten m.E. jedoch um andere Gesichtspunkte ergänzt werden, die auch die ‚interne‘ Sicht mit einbeziehen und sich von daher eignen, Weltsichten aus ganz verschiedenen kulturellen und auch religiösen Zusammenhängen zu untersuchen.

Dazu möchte ich an Schleiermachers Unterscheidung zweier Schritte im hermeneutischen Prozess anknüpfen, die er mit ‚Verstehen‘ und ‚Kritik‘ bezeichnete. Verstehen bedeutet dabei Rekonstruktion der kognitiven (epistemischen) Prozesse des anderen Menschen, ausgehend davon, dass dieser Mensch spezifische Formen der Erkenntnisprozesse aufweist, die sich von den meinigen unterscheiden können, dass sein Wissen und vor allem seine Hintergrundüberzeugungen aus dem jeweiligen kulturellen Kontext heraus entstanden sind.

Welche leitende Orientierung lässt sich für diesen Vorgang der Rekonstruktion, des Verstehens als ‚Erfassen von Welterfassen‘ oder ‚Erkennen des Erkannten‘ (Boeckh), formulieren? Mir scheint hier ein Begriff besonders gut geeignet, der in den letzten Jahrzehnten vor allem im Bereich der Gesundheitspsychologie große Bedeutung erlangt hat: Kohärenz. Es scheint ein grundlegendes Bedürfnis jedes Menschen zu sein, eine gewisse Kohärenz der persönlichen Weltsicht zu haben bzw. herzustellen. Andauernde Inkohärenzen wirken sich als Spannung aus und haben unmittelbar ungünstige Auswirkungen. Antonovsky prägte den Begriff des „*sense of coherence*“, als ‚Kohärenzgefühl‘ oder ‚Kohärenzsinn‘ übersetzt. Er definierte dies als eine grundlegende Lebenseinstellung, die ausdrückt, in welchem Ausmaß jemand ein durchdringendes, überdauerndes und zugleich dynamisches Gefühl des Vertrauens hat,

- dass seine innere und äußere Erfahrungswelt strukturiert, vorhersehbar und erklärbar ist,

- dass einem die Ressourcen zur Verfügung stehen, um den gestellten Anforderungen zu begegnen und
- dass diese Anforderungen Herausforderungen sind, die Anstrengung und Engagement lohnen (Gefühl von Sinnhaftigkeit bzw. Bedeutsamkeit). [Nach Antonovsky 1997, 16/36]

Damit wird deutlich, dass es sich nicht um ein Außenkriterium handelt, wie es etwa im philosophischen Begriff der Kohärenz als Wahrheitskriterium der Fall ist, sondern ein internes, das vom Individuum unmittelbar selbst eingeschätzt und emotional gefühlt und bis in den Körper hinein gespürt wird (als Spannung bzw. Lösung). Die subjektive Einschätzung der Kohärenz des eigenen Weltbildes, der persönlichen Weltsicht, hat sich als ein primärer ‚salutogenetischer (gesundheitsfördernder) Faktor‘ erwiesen; ein kohärentes Weltbild ermöglicht offenbar dem Menschen ein konstruktives und ‚heilsames‘ Umgehen mit Widrigkeiten im psychischen, sozialen oder somatischen Bereich.

So möchte ich als Antwort auf die gestellte Frage, wie sich Weltsichten untersuchen und auch prüfen lassen, als erstes die Rekonstruktion der Weltsicht und Prüfung auf Kohärenz im Sinne von ‚Kohärenzsinn‘ oder ‚Kohärenzgefühl‘ vorschlagen.

Allerdings besteht m.E. wenig Aussicht, in einem dialogischen Kontext auf differenzierte Weise Weltsicht-Inkohärenzen des Dialogpartners herauszuarbeiten, wenn man sich ausschließlich an kognitiv-rationalen Kriterien orientiert. Es ist wichtig, die Rolle der Gefühle zu beachten – darauf wurde bereits in der älteren Hermeneutik (bes. Rambach) hingewiesen, auch Schleiermacher erkannte diese Notwendigkeit sehr deutlich.

Der Grund dafür liegt darin, dass Inkohärenzen in der persönlichen Weltsicht, den eigenen Konzepten, dem Betreffenden oft nur teilweise in aller Klarheit und Schärfe bewusst sind. Dennoch wirken sich vorliegende Inkohärenzen als Spannung aus, etwa als ein diffuses Unwohlfühlen, nicht wirklich in der Welt zuhause sein etc. So können durch Bezug auf das Erleben des Betreffenden (sein Fühlen und Spüren) bestehende Inkohärenzen besser erkannt und benannt werden.

Manche Philosophen behaupten allerdings, Philosophie sei nicht fähig, das Leben ‚leichter‘ zu machen, sondern im Gegenteil, das reflektierte Leben sei schwieriger. Ist also Harmonie (Kohärenz) eine Illusion, Disharmonie oder Inkohärenz die Wahrheit?

Sicher ist es – insbesondere bei persönlichen Schwierigkeiten, Katastrophen, Verlust geliebter Menschen etc. – im Einzelfall sehr schwierig, dennoch die Kohärenz im Sinne einer ‚Stimmigkeit‘ der Weltsicht zu erhalten bzw. neu herzustellen. Es war genau diese Fähigkeit, auch in Extremsituationen eine konstruktive und kohärente Weltsicht zu bewahren, die Antonovsky bei der Befragung von Holocaust-Überlebenden auf die Bedeutung dieses Faktors für das psychische und physische Wohlbefinden aufmerksam gemacht hatte.

Meine persönliche Überzeugung ist, dass es angesichts der Ungewissheiten und Unsicherheiten des Lebens schwierig ist, zu einer kohärenten Weltsicht zu kommen, ohne in irgendeiner Weise einen Transzendenzbezug im Sinne eines „Umgreifenden“ (Jaspers) mit einzubeziehen. Andererseits können dogmatische religiöse Vorstellungen, die in Diskrepanz zu grundlegenden lebensweltlichen Erfahrungen stehen und insofern als ‚nicht lebensförderlich‘ gelten müssen,

maßgeblich zu Inkohärenzen und Inkongruenzen beitragen.

Es bleibt jedenfalls die Gegebenheit, dass Inkohärenzen im persönlichen Weltbild eine ungünstige, ‚ungesunde‘ Wirkung haben. Wenn es stimmt, dass Kohärenz ‚gesund‘ und lebensförderlich ist, warum sollte es dann unmöglich sein, zu einer guten Form von Kohärenz zu kommen? Nur eine sehr pessimistische Weltsicht wird zu dem Schluss kommen, dass Kohärenz und daraus resultierende Zufriedenheit oder Glück von uns Menschen nicht erreicht werden können.

Dennoch bleibt der Einwand bestehen, dass Kohärenz auf eine oberflächliche Weise entstanden sein kann, durch Ausblenden von Widersprüchen, ungenaue Wahrnehmung, schnelle Verallgemeinerungen etc. Deshalb ist es wichtig, neben der ersten Frage nach Kohärenz auch zu prüfen, mit welchen Mitteln und Strategien Kohärenz erzeugt worden ist – „um welchen Preis“ die subjektiv empfundene Weltsichtkohärenz gewonnen wurde, wie es der Titel dieses Vortrags formuliert.

Das soll hier im hermeneutischen Kontext in einem zweiten Schritt geschehen (nach dem ersten der Rekonstruktion einer Weltsicht und Prüfung auf Kohärenz als Kohärenzgefühl/ Kohärenzsinn), bei dem die ‚Qualität‘ der Kohärenz mit berücksichtigt wird - Antonovsky sprach von der Möglichkeit eines „falschen Kohärenzgefühls“, später fand er die Bezeichnung „rigides oder nicht authentisches Kohärenzgefühl“ angemessener (Antonovsky 1997, 40). Im psychotherapeutischen Kontext wird hier der Begriff der ‚Inkongruenz‘ verwendet.

Während Kohärenz eine Art der ‚internen Konsistenz‘ bezeichnet, ist beim Begriff der ‚Kongruenz‘ das Zusammenstimmen unterschiedlicher Komponenten gemeint, wie etwa in der Mathematik als Übereinstimmung der Fläche von geometrischen Figuren.

Die Betrachtung einer Weltsicht unter dem Aspekt der Kongruenz bezieht zwar die Außenperspektive mit ein, verschränkt aber zugleich Innen- und Außensicht so, dass negative Effekte einer Außenbewertung vermieden werden (die stets in der Gefahr ist, den Charakter einer Ich-Es-Beziehung im Buberschen Sinne anzunehmen).

Bezogen auf Lebenszusammenhänge und Weltanschauungsformen geht es bei der Dimension der Kongruenz um das integrative ‚Zusammengehen‘ der verschiedenen Aspekte und ‚Instanzen‘ eines Menschen, etwa den Zusammenhang von Denken und Fühlen, und vor allem von Konzepten und Lebenspraxis, dem konkreten Handeln, also von Theorie und Praxis, von Denken und Leben.

Kongruenz ist somit ebenfalls ein Kriterium des Individuums, das aus dem Kontext eines konkreten Lebenszusammenhanges von einem Menschen selbst erkannt werden kann, es ist aber zugleich ein Merkmal, das sich aus der Außenperspektive sehr klar einschätzen lässt, vielfach besser als vom Betreffenden selbst („Selbsttäuschung“).

Oft ist für den Außenstehenden sehr schnell wahrnehmbar, dass beim Gegenüber erhebliche Inkongruenzen vorliegen, dass die Konzepte nicht mit der Lebenswirklichkeit übereinstimmen; selbst in einzelnen Äußerungen vermag eine erfahrene Person Echtes und Authentisches in der Mitteilung von unechten, inkongruenten Aussagen deutlich zu unterscheiden.

So lässt sich im konkreten Rekonstruieren einer individuellen Weltsicht erschließen, in welchem Ausmaß

Inkohärenzen sowie Inkongruenzen vorliegen, es wird z.B. verständlich, warum eine Person eine besonders hohe ‚Grund-Angespanntheit‘ hat. Ich gehe davon aus, dass etwa muslimische Selbstmord-Attentäter in ihrem persönlichen Weltbild entweder manifeste Inkohärenzen aufweisen oder eine ‚falsche‘, nicht authentische Kohärenz (Antonovsky) herstellen, die mit hoher Rigidität einhergeht und daher von Inkongruenz begleitet ist, weil manche Konzepte nicht zur Lebenswirklichkeit ‚passen‘. Eine Weltanschauung, die dann Hoffnung auf ein ‚besseres Leben‘ nach dem Tod erweckt, kann einen Suizidwunsch verstärken bzw. erzeugen.

Kongruenz hat dabei auch mit ‚Transparenz‘ zu tun, im Sinne von Offenheit, Durchlässigkeit, erkennbarer Tiefe. In der Selbstwahrnehmung bedeutet sie Zugang zu den eigenen Gefühlen, den persönlichen Motiven („Was will ich tatsächlich?“) und der Tiefendimension eigener Werte („Was ist für mich richtig und gut?“).

Diese Thematik ist ein alter philosophischer Topos, es geht unter anderem um das, was in der antiken Philosophie als Zusammenhang von Tugend und Wissen beschrieben wurde bzw. um die Qualität der Aufrichtigkeit.

Gemeint ist sehr viel mehr als nur ‚intellektuelle Redlichkeit‘, es geht um eine ‚Echtheit‘ der Existenz, die alle Ebenen und Dimensionen des Menschseins umfasst, von daher eine hohe Forderung, die man immer nur annähernd erfüllen kann. Man könnte also, um ein Ideal oder Ziel des Menschseins zu charakterisieren, den Menschen ebenso gut als Kongruenz-Liebenden bezeichnen wie als Weisheits-Liebenden, denn beides ist nur in Annäherung möglich.

Man könnte Weisheit in diesem Kontext sogar als verbindende Größe betrachten: Ein weiser Mensch hat ein hohes Maß an Kohärenz der Weltsicht und Kongruenz zwischen seinen Theorien/Konzepten und der gelebten Praxis, und doch weiß er/sie, dass alle Bemühungen um Kohärenz, Kongruenz und Wissen stets nur Annäherungen sind, Aspekte eines lebenslangen Entwicklungs- und Reifungsprozesses, der nie an einen ‚Endpunkt‘ kommt. Von daher ist auch die Haltung der ‚weisen Person‘ verständlich, die – wie oft berichtet wird – eine klare und überzeugte eigene Position hat und zugleich Wissen um die Perspektivität des Erkennens sowie die Begrenztheit des Wissens (als ‚Wissen um Wissensgrenzen‘), so dass ein konstruktives und doch kritisches Umgehen mit ‚anderen‘ Weltsichten möglich ist.

Die Titelfrage „Weltsichtkohärenz um welchen Preis?“ ließe sich nun so beantworten: Der ‚Preis‘ für Kohärenz auf niedrigem Niveau ist Rigidität und Inkongruenz (Theorien und Lebenspraxis passen nicht zusammen), mit daraus folgender hoher Grund-Gespanntheit.

Kohärenz auf hohem Niveau bedarf eines Einsatzes, einer ‚Investition‘: Reflexion, Achtsamkeit, Arbeit an sich, mit einem modernen Schlagwort: ‚lebenslanges bzw. lebensbegleitendes Lernen‘.

Die Folge (der ‚Ertrag‘ oder ‚Gewinn‘) ist Zufriedenheit, Sinnkonstitution, die Annäherung an ein gutes, gelingendes Leben.

Ich möchte zum Abschluss die wichtigsten Aspekte in vier Thesen zusammenfassen:

1) Es ist für uns Menschen wichtig, eine gewisse Kohärenz in unsere Weltsicht zu bringen, sonst ist das Leben auf unnötige Weise schwer. Kohärenz ist notwendig, weil sie ‚gesund‘ ist, sie trägt bei zur psychischen, sozialen und physischen Gesundheit, ist ein primärer salutogenetischer Faktor.

2) Kohärenz der Weltsicht eines Individuums ist möglich. Wenn sie nicht vorliegt, kann sie erzielt werden.

Kohärenz der Weltsicht sollte von Kongruenz begleitet sein.

- *Kohärenz*: Die Welt, wie ich sie sehe und erkenne (meine Theorien über den Menschen, die Welt und Gott) ‚passen‘ für mich, die persönliche Weltsicht ergibt ein kohärentes, sinnvolles Ganzes.

- *Kongruenz*: Meine Kognitionen (Konzepte) und die damit einhergehenden Gefühle passen zu der Weise, wie ich mich in der Welt verhalte, ich werde als authentisch, kongruent wahrgenommen. In der Selbstwahrnehmung ist diese Qualität eng verbunden mit der Fähigkeit des Gewahrseins der eigenen Gefühle, der Motive und einer ‚inneren Werte-Instanz‘.

3) Kohärenz kann von unterschiedlicher ‚Qualität‘ sein:

- Kohärenz auf einem niedrigen Niveau zeigt Rigidität, eine Haltung der Defensivität, die Unfähigkeit, andere Sichtweisen, andere Meinungen zu akzeptieren. Sie ist meist mit hoher Inkongruenz verbunden.

- Kohärenz auf einem hohen Niveau ist reflexiv, dynamisch, in einem kontinuierlichen Prozess der Veränderung, der Entwicklung und Reifung, evtl. entstehende Inkongruenzen werden rasch aufgelöst.

Menschen mit einem hohen Niveau von Kohärenz sind fähig, mit Diskrepanzen umzugehen, Widersprüchen zu begegnen. Sie haben ihre eigenen Überzeugungen, ihren Standpunkt, und sind doch in der Lage, andere Menschen zu verstehen, auch wenn diese extrem abweichende Weltsichten haben. (Solche Menschen sind begehrte Berater, auch wenn das nicht ihr Beruf ist, und sie werden oft ‚weise‘ genannt.)

4) Die Frage der ‚Kohärenz von Weltsichten‘ ist ein philosophisches Thema.

Deshalb sollten Philosophen in der Lage sein, Menschen bei dem Prozess zu unterstützen, mehr Kohärenz zu erlangen und/oder ihr Komplexitätsniveau zu verbessern. Durch philosophische Beratung (vgl. Ruschmann 2004) können Menschen mehr Kohärenz gewinnen und so ihre lebensförderliche Haltung verbessern, ihre salutogenetischen ‚Fähigkeiten‘ erhöhen.

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Deuten – Missverstehen – ‚Blasphemie‘: Grenze und Potential eines offenen Übersetzungsbegriffs

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1. Übersetzen im interkulturellen Kontext

Als ein zentrales Problem der interkulturellen Philosophie erweist sich die Frage nach der Möglichkeit bzw. der Art und Weise des interkulturellen Dialogs/Polylogs; einen wichtigen Aspekt stellt dabei das Übersetzen dar. Gerade im interkulturellen Kontext scheint es, angesichts der gegenwärtigen, durch Migration und Postkolonialität geprägten globalen Situation und angesichts der Herausbildung neuer und vielschichtiger „translokaler Identitäten“ (vgl. Bachmann-Medick 1994, 594), zunehmend angebracht, hinsichtlich interkulturellen Verstehens und interkultureller Verständigung die herkömmliche Auffassung von Übersetzung neu zu überdenken. In diesem Vortrag soll nun dem Potential eines offenen Übersetzungsbegriffs nachgegangen werden, wie er in Wittgensteins *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* und in postkolonialen Ansätzen anzutreffen ist. Meine Leitfragen dabei sind: Kann Übersetzen als Sprache aufgefasst werden – vielleicht als „Sprache der Interkulturalität“, wie der kubanische Philosoph Raúl Fornet-Betancourt vorschlägt?¹ Und wenn ja, welche Lebensform wäre die des Übersetzens?

Das Verständnis von Übersetzung in relativistisch orientierten Übersetzungstheorien gründet auf einer Vorstellung vom Text als einem „Original“, als einer „unverwechselbaren individuellen Identität und kulturellen Standortgebundenheit“ (Bachmann-Medick 1994, 595). In diesen Theorien wird die Sprache als ein in sich geschlossenes System betrachtet, das in erster Linie zur Beschreibung des eigenen Weltbildes dient; grundlegend dafür ist Humboldts Auffassung von der direkten Abhängigkeit des Denkens von der Muttersprache. Da auf diese Weise in den verschiedenen Sprachen verschiedene Konzeptionen der Wirklichkeit entstehen, wird von einer grundsätzlichen und unüberwindlichen Strukturverschiedenheit zwischen den verschiedenen Sprachsystemen ausgegangen (siehe z. B. Whorfs linguistisches Relativitätsprinzip). Generell gelten nach dieser Auffassung Texte als prinzipiell unübersetzbar, wohingegen die universalistische Auffassung von der prinzipiellen Übersetzbarkeit von Texten ausgeht. Die Sprache gilt als ein der Kommunikation dienendes logisch beschreibbares Zeichensystem, in dem die Sprachzeichen analysierbar bzw. nach bestimmten Regeln transformierbar sind (siehe z. B. Chomskys generative Transformationsgrammatik). Auch wird von einem ‚übergeordneten Dritten‘ ausgegangen, das von jeder Sprache aus gleichermaßen erfassbar ist (siehe z. B. Koschmieders *tertium comparationis*). Aus den beiden Arten von Übersetzungstheorien ergibt sich zum einen die Problematik des Kulturrelativismus: Es gibt nichts Verbindendes und zum anderen die Problematik des Universalismus: der eurozentrische Blick.

Diese europäische Rede wird durch die postkoloniale Debatte unterbrochen, indem man die Idee von fest umrissenen Bedeutungen, die Idee von umgrenzten und definierten Kultureinheiten sowie die Idee

von abgeschlossenen Identitäten zunehmend dekonstruiert und dagegen Prozessualität und Differenz betont. Entscheidend ist dabei die Einsicht, dass eine Kultur stets sowohl durch Konstruktionen von Alterität als auch durch Verknüpfungen mit anderen Kulturen, sozusagen durch Transkulturalität, geprägt ist – Texte wie Kulturen können demnach nicht mehr als „Originale“ im o. g. Sinn aufgefasst werden (vgl. Bachmann-Medick 1994, 592). Die Thematik des Übersetzens sollte daher nicht beschränkt werden auf Literatur- bzw. Textübersetzung. Übersetzung sollte vielmehr verstanden werden als „gesamtsemantisches Phänomen der Übertragung, das sich von der Nachahmung von Gesten und Ritualen über die Übernahme von Institutionen bis zur schriftlichen Übersetzung philosophischer Werke erstrecken kann“ (Shimada 2001, 114/15), und in diesem Sinn als „kulturelle Übersetzung“ (vgl. Bhabha 2000a).

Auch wenn mit Wittgenstein in den letzten Jahren immer wieder von soziologischer und kulturanthropologischer Seite aus hinsichtlich der Frage nach dem Verstehen fremder Lebensformen bzw. nach der Möglichkeit, den Bedingungen und den Grenzen von Verstehen, eine Auseinandersetzung stattfand,² taucht die Thematisierung des Übersetzens dabei eher indirekt auf. Die vorrangige Thematisierung des Verstehens und weniger des Übersetzens liegt wohl daran, dass Wittgenstein selbst das Übersetzen nicht eigens thematisiert hat. Im Folgenden soll nun anhand von Textstellen aus den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* und deren unmittelbaren Kontexten „geschaut“ werden, wie Wittgenstein den Ausdruck ‚Übersetzen‘ verwendet bzw. wie er Übersetzen versteht und dessen Möglichkeit und Grenze begründet.

2. Übersetzen in Wittgensteins Philosophischen Untersuchungen

2.1 Übersetzen als Motiv zur Kritik an einer bestimmten Denkweise

Wie im Folgenden ersichtlich werden wird, dient Wittgenstein der Verweis auf den Übersetzungsvorgang zur Kritik an einer realistischen bzw. universalistischen sprachphilosophischen Denkweise – in diesem Sinne verwendet Wittgenstein den Ausdruck ‚Übersetzen‘ *motivisch* wiederkehrend. Den Fehler dieser Denkweise sieht Wittgenstein darin, dass man 1) Sprache als ein vom Handeln isoliertes Phänomen und 2) auch die Gedanken und ‚das Gemeinte‘ als unabhängig und unterschieden von den sprachlichen Ausdrücken auffasst. Das Problem dabei ist, dass man einerseits sprachlich fassen will, was man andererseits vom sprachlichen Ausdruck löst. Die Beziehung oder Vermittlung zwischen diesen beiden ‚Ebenen‘, so unterstellt nun Wittgenstein, wird schematisch gedacht wie eine Übersetzung. Wittgenstein selbst hält dem entgegen, dass es im Sprachspiel eine solche Trennung nicht gibt und sich daher das Problem einer wie auch immer gearteten Übersetzung nicht mehr stellt. Der

¹ Diese These formulierte Fornet-Betancourt auf dem XXI. Weltkongress für Philosophie 2003 in Istanbul im Rahmen der Round-Table-Diskussion „Intercultural Philosophical Dialogue South-South“.

² Siehe z. B. Deloch 1997, Lütterfelds/Roser (eds.) 1999, Lütterfelds/Mohr (eds.) 2000, Lütterfelds/Salehi (eds.) 2001.

Vergleich mit der Übersetzung funktioniert damit negativ affirmierend („so ist es nicht!“).

Besonders deutlich wird dies in § 342, in dem es um die Kritik an William James' These, Denken sei ohne Sprechen möglich, geht. Mit den beiden gestellten Fragen 1) „Bist du sicher, daß dies die richtige Übersetzung deiner wortlosen Gedanken in Worte ist?“ und 2) „Und warum reckt diese Frage [...] hier ihren Kopf hervor?“) drückt Wittgenstein ein interessantes Paradox aus: Wenn man sich die Beziehung zwischen „wortlosen Gedanken“ und Worten wie den Vorgang einer Übersetzung vorstellt – und man stellt sich einen solchen auch vor, wenn man als kritisch Fragender die ‚richtige‘ Übersetzung anzweifelt –, setzt man immer zwei ‚Ebenen‘ voraus. Wie kann man aber eine Denkweise, die zwei von einander unabhängige Ebenen annimmt, kritisieren, indem man sich selbst auf diese zwei Ebenen bezieht? Durch die zweifache, verunsichernde Fragestellung führt Wittgenstein James' These gänzlich ad absurdum und entkräftet damit eines der klassischen Hauptargumente für sprachunabhängiges Denken. Mit der ersten Frage möchte Wittgenstein also den „nicht offenkundigen Unsinn“ der James'schen Theorie andeuten und mit der zweiten Frage deren „offenkundigen Unsinn“ offenkundig machen (vgl. § 464). Denn die Irreführung der James'schen Denkweise liegt darin, sprachlich beweisen zu wollen, dass Denken sprachunabhängig funktioniert. In die gleiche Richtung führt § 335, in dem Wittgenstein die Vorstellung von Gedanken als außersprachlich „da“-seiende Realitäten kritisiert. Hier weist er auf das Paradox hin, dass eine solche Denkweise einerseits den Gedanken klar vom sprachlichen Ausdruck abtrennt und ihn andererseits in ihrer Redeweise verwendet, als ob es dabei um einen sprachlichen Ausdruck ginge. In § 597 schließlich dient der Vergleich mit dem Übersetzen zur Kritik an der Vorstellung eines unserem Denken zu Grunde liegenden „Denkschemas“, die uns letztlich auch dazu verleitet, schematisch zu denken: Die Denkweise, man spreche eine Sprache *als ob* man übersetze,³ funktioniert eben genau wie nach einem Schema.

2.2 Übersetzen als Deuten und Ersetzen mittels eines Bezugssystems

Ganz direkt zum Übersetzen äußert sich Wittgenstein nur wenig. Allerdings zählt er es in der Liste der „mannigfaltigen Sprachspiele“ auf (§ 23). Dieses Sprachspiel des Übersetzens findet wiederum statt zwischen Sprachspielen, und ist dann möglich, wenn wir die sprachlichen Ausdrücke auf regelhafte Weise mit sie begleitenden Handlungen verknüpft wahrnehmen können. In § 243 bringt Wittgenstein zwei von ihm erdachte Sprachen in die Diskussion: die ‚Monologsprache‘ und die ‚Privatsprache‘. Beide Sprachen unterscheiden sich dahingehend, dass die Monologsprache potentiell übersetzbar ist und die Privatsprache nicht. Dies liegt daran, dass die Monologsprache von (sichtbaren) *Tätigkeiten* begleitet und von *mehreren* Menschen bzw. von der Gruppe der beobachteten Menschen gesprochen wird, während sich die Privatsprache auf (unsichtbare) *innere Erlebnisse* bezieht und nur von *Einem* gesprochen oder aufgeschrieben wird; für „uns“ ist damit lediglich in der Monologsprache ein regelmäßiger Zusammenhang zwischen den Handlungen und den sprachlichen Äußerungen erkennbar (vgl. Sayigny 1996, 86-88). Es ist also die „gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise [...] das Bezugssystem, mittels dessen wir uns eine fremde

Sprache deuten“ (§ 206). Existiert kein regelmäßiger Zusammenhang wie im nachfolgenden § 207, können wir nicht mehr in „unserem“ Sinn von Sprache sprechen und diese Sprache weder erlernen noch deuten noch übersetzen.

Die Entsprechung von Übersetzen und Deuten, wie sie bei Wittgenstein herauszulesen ist, bedeutet aber, dass eine Offenheit bzw. eine Vagheit oder Unsicherheit in der Wahl der Übersetzung besteht. Um diesen Aspekt stärker hervorzuheben, schildert Wittgenstein immer wieder Fälle, in denen in Konfrontation mit einer fremden Sprache in der eigenen Sprache *kein* Äquivalent vorliegt. Aber auch in solchen Fällen, in denen manche Begriffe in der einen Sprache nicht vorkommen, können die Begriffe gelernt werden: „[...] Wer aber diese *Begriffe* noch nicht besitzt, den werde ich die Worte durch *Beispiele* und durch *Übungen* gebrauchen lehren. [...] Ich mach's ihm vor, er macht es mir nach [...]“ (§ 208). Das ‚erfolgreiche‘ Verstehen zeigt sich schließlich darin, dass das Gelernte selbständig ‚richtig‘ gebraucht wird. Entscheidend ist hier, dass Wittgenstein ausdrücklich nicht ausschließt, dass das Erlernen, Deuten und Übersetzen einer gänzlich fremden Sprache möglich ist, und dass er dabei gleichzeitig nicht behauptet, dass in jedem Fall ein (erfolgreiches) Verstehen gewährleistet ist. Da ein Wort oder ein Ausdruck durch Übersetzung aus dem einen Kontext in einen anderen verschoben wird, kann es bei zunehmender Verschiedenheit der Lebensformen zu mehr oder weniger großen ‚Bedeutungs‘-verschiebungen bzw. zu Missverständnissen kommen.

Des Weiteren ist beim Übersetzen im Sinne von Deuten zu beachten: „»Deuten« aber sollte man nur nennen: einen Ausdruck der Regel durch einen anderen ersetzen“ (§ 201). Es ist daher möglich, durch ein regelhaftes Übersetzen im Sinne von Ersetzen eine Sprache zu *bilden*, wie es in § 200 der Fall ist: Hier entsteht ein für „uns“ „ungewöhntes“ ‚Spiel‘ (Schreien und Stampfen) *durch* das Übersetzen von Zügen einer Schachpartie. In diesem Fall braucht es für das Übersetzen ganz klar *keinen* ‚übergeordneten Sinn‘, keine ‚außersprachliche Realität‘ und kein *tertium comparationis*. Übersetzen „nach gewissen Regeln“ ist also ein Deuten im Sinne von Ersetzen. Ein so verstandenes Übersetzen scheint jedoch, da man in der nicht ganz unerheblichen Menge an Paragraphen zum Deuten erfährt, dass es *mehrere* Deutungsmöglichkeiten geben kann (vgl. § 28), einer gewissen Willkürlichkeit Vorschub zu leisten. Es ist hier allerdings entscheidend, dass Wittgenstein Sprache immer eingebettet in eine Lebensform begreift und betont, dass es einer Regelhaftigkeit zwischen Sprechen und Handeln bedarf, die jedoch nicht absolut bzw. eindeutig festgelegt ist. Es gibt somit „Randbereiche des Handelns“, über die „nichts vereinbart“ ist (vgl. § 41 bzw. Schneider 1999, 146), und wir haben daher nicht immer x-beliebige Deutungen zur Verfügung (vgl. § 213). Vielmehr ist auch das Deuten an Gewohnheit oder an das „Abgerichtet-Sein“, also an einen Zusammenhang gebunden, und indem man auf diese Weise deutet, erkennt bzw. beherrscht man gewisse Regeln: „[...] Einen Satz verstehen, heißt, eine Sprache verstehen. Eine Sprache verstehen, heißt, eine Technik beherrschen“ (§ 199). Das Übersetzen im Sinne von Deuten im Sinne von Ersetzen bedeutet daher keine Abschwächung gegenüber dem universalistisch verstandenen Übersetzen, sondern muss im Gegenteil als „Hauptbestandteil der Sprachkompetenz“ angesehen werden (vgl. Schneider 1999, 146); wir sind auf diese Weise sogar weit mehr gefordert, uns auf das fremde Sprachspiel einzulassen.

³ Wittgenstein bezieht sich hier auf den Fall eines Deutschen, der gut Englisch spricht, und dem dabei Germanismen unterlaufen.

‚Postkoloniales‘ Übersetzen

Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, dass es nach Wittgenstein Fälle gibt, in denen es möglich ist, eine fremde Sprache zu deuten bzw. zu übersetzen. Es gibt aber auch den Fall, dass wir für eine Deutung bzw. Übersetzung so gut wie keine Anhaltspunkte haben – „Wir können uns nicht in sie finden“ (PhU II, S. 568). Dennoch besteht immer die Möglichkeit des Mittuns, so dass wir uns vielleicht doch bis zu einem gewissen Grad „in sie finden“ können. Aber stets gilt: Weder für die ‚richtige‘ Deutung noch für die ‚richtige‘ Übersetzung gibt es eine Garantie. Genau in dieser Verbindung von zwei sich üblicherweise ausschließenden Aspekten sehe ich die notwendige Offenheit und damit die entscheidende Grundlage für die aktuelle Diskussion um interkulturelle Verständigung unter postkolonialem Vorzeichen. Sie bietet die Möglichkeit, das Universalismus-Relativismus-Problem zu überschreiten. Entgegen den Kritikern, die Wittgenstein einen „Sprachrelativismus“ vorhalten (vgl. Deloch 1997), ist zu sagen, dass Wittgenstein, wenn überhaupt etwas, dann einen *Relationalismus* vertritt. Wie gezeigt wurde, ist nach Wittgenstein einerseits kein allgemeinverbindliches universalistisches Prinzip – ein „Ober-Sprachspiel“ – aufgrund der „offenen Grenzen“ eines Sprachspiels nötig (vgl. Schneider 1999, 150 bzw. 151), und andererseits argumentiert er mittels des Bezugssystems, mittels eines durch Offenheit bedingten *Relationalismus* zwischen Sprachspielen, gegen einen unverbindlichen und ausschließlichen Relativismus.

Eine Fortführung dieser Auffassung von Übersetzung findet sich in Bachmann-Medicks Versuch, unter Bezugnahme auf postkoloniale Literatur und die Position Bhabhas das kulturelle „Missverstehen“ fruchtbar zu machen. Sein Potential sieht sie vor allem darin, die Kritizierbarkeit und Kritikfähigkeit kultureller Traditionen und Selbstdefinitionen ans Licht zu bringen, da es diese einem „Zwang zur Überprüfung“ aussetzt (Bachmann-Medick 1994, 597 bzw. 603). Wirkliches kreatives Potential entfaltet das Missverstehen in der „Zwischenzone“ (vgl. Bhabha 2000a, 335), einem neuen „Verständigungsraum“, in dem die wichtigste Voraussetzung die der Anerkennung kultureller Differenzen und vor allem deren *Verhandelbarkeit* ist (Bachmann-Medick 1994, 601-602). In dieser Zwischenzone besteht außerdem die Möglichkeit der Hybridität, die durch den ‚Verrat‘ an der Idee einer ‚reinen‘ Kultur ein kritisches Potential in sich birgt. In diesem Sinn ist Hybridität „Häresie“ (Bhabha 2000a, 336). Den überschreitenden Akt kultureller Übersetzung, und damit ihr kritisches Potential, beschreibt Bhabha schließlich als „Blasphemie“, als den Moment, „in dem der Hauptgegenstand oder Inhalt einer kulturellen Tradition im Akt der Übersetzung überwältigt oder verfremdet wird“ (ebd., 337). In diesem Sinn ist Übersetzung Gestaltung und „*Neuschreibung* der transkulturellen Migrantenerfahrung“ (ebd., 338; Hervorh. B.S.). Ein wichtiges Element ist dabei das der ‚Fremdheit‘, was aber nicht die Negierung des Originals, sondern vielmehr die „*Verhandlung* der Disjunktion“ bedeutet (ebd., 340; Hervorh. B.S.). Auf genau diese Weise kommt das Neue in die Welt.

Mit Wittgenstein und Bhabha lässt sich die eingangs genannte These von der Übersetzung als Sprache der *Interkulturalität* stützen, insofern damit ein neues Verständnis von Übersetzung angesprochen ist: Übersetzung ist nicht „Sprache *in situ*“, sondern „Sprache *in actu*“ (Bhabha 2000a, 341) – und ihre Lebensform ist das im weitesten Sinne postkoloniale ‚Zwischen‘.

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Rule following and intercultural perspective

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This paper appears in the context of last year's Christoph Durt's paper discussing Wittgenstein's intercultural approach to philosophy (Durt, 2005). Ending the discussion of it, he expressed a belief, that there is a possibility of creating a "bridging" perspective between two cultures (two forms of life). This suggestion encouraged me to investigate, how such a belief is grounded in Wittgenstein's framework.

The direction my investigation is bound is towards a well known problem of translation. Wittgenstein's account of language brings into focus the fact, that a language is a part of social practice. As he puts it, a sentence of our language is a *move* in our language game. (PI, par. 22). Apart from our utterances, our language involves behaviour, our *form of life*. Thus, understanding a language, understanding its sentences involves participating in a form of life this language is a part of.

A brief sketch like that, suggests that if we do not participate in a given form of life, we are unable to achieve understanding of a language with is involved in it. Thus, speakers of English cannot understand the meanings of, say, Swahili speakers unless they are able to participate in their form of life.

The point of Durt's paper was to say, that we can, according to Wittgenstein, bridge the distance between cultures, between different forms of life, and moreover, we should treat it as our methodology in philosophy. What he calls ethnological approach allows us to find *connecting links* (*Zwischenglieder*), and establish an understanding of other culture from an outsider point of view. Of course, we are not an outsider any more – we now share other culture's form of life while not losing a hold on our own. Our perspective is not that of our original culture, though, and not that of an researched one. Nevertheless, if we are to comprehend other cultures, this is the only perspective we can achieve – stepping outside of our own tight shoes towards something we can have in common with our subject of inquiry.

Language, rules and forms of life

The point of this paper, however, is not to pursue the direction showed by Durt's reading of *Remarks on Fraser's "Golden Bough"*. My intention is to shed some light on how these *connecting links* are possible at all.

Numerous remarks in *Philosophical Investigations* and *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* explore sceptical intuitions about "following a rule". Following a rule is essential to any type of social practice that Wittgenstein wrote about (and probably to any kind of practice), be it mathematics, language games or plain games (like chess). The only way we could make sense of our participation in social practice is if we cast our doubts about following a rule away, at least on practical grounds. Following a rule is knowing a rule, and achieving a result this rule is meant to achieve.

Suppose we want to teach someone a game we know. There are different types of games, and different types of rules they are guided by. There may be formal rules (like types of valid moves in chess) or informal rules

(like tactics). Teaching a game involves either explaining its rules (using a language) or showing the practice of our game. Neither the former nor the latter guarantees our student will 'grasp' what we intend, though. Even if he behaves properly in all the situations we have shown (or described) him, we cannot be sure, that he fails to do so in any new situation that is a part of our game (and *implicite* governed by our rules).

The ability to grasp and act accordingly to rules must be assumed if we want any type of social practice to be possible. Specifically, we need that kind of ability to be able to teach someone (even belonging to our own culture, sharing our form of life) to use a language. In a vast number of cases, we cannot do anything better than to count on their 'grasping' our intention. But given that it is possible that they can (at least in practice) do that, allows us to teach them games, including language games. As Wittgenstein's remarks on mathematics show, the result of student's practice is a proof of him understanding the rule, although not impossible revise.

If we are able to teach people sharing our form of life a language we know, then we do have the ability to 'grasp' rules.

Given that, we should consider learning a different form of life.

Forms of life

What are forms of life? As Durt suggests, we should think about them as cultures, as our language (probably, but that generates problems with considerations from the previous section), our beliefs and social practices we, as a culture, share. So, assuming that we can teach someone a language, the question about teaching a form of life is a question whether we can teach someone our beliefs and practices.

If we assume that we can teach someone a language, then teaching them our beliefs should be trivial. Teaching them our practice involves the same type of 'grasping' our intentions as teaching a language does. Our problem, though, seems trivial only when we've forgotten about assumption, that we already share a form of life, that we've taken in the previous paragraph.

Consider forms of life, then. We can think about animals or aliens having other forms of life than us. Let us assume that we consider only human forms of life. If we have a language, it has to be possible to think of. If we have certain beliefs, they have to make sense in our language. If we share some social practices, they must be possible to be grasped by another member of our society – and another human. If we wish to say, that essentially all humans share the same kind of ability to grasp rules, then it follows, that in theory, any given human should be able to grasp any kind of a rule. Since our learning rules of the games bases on 'grasping' them, then nothing holds us from saying, that we can learn any social practice whatever it be, since it bases on the same notion of rules as games do.

If we can learn a social practice, that is foreign to our culture (which, as I pointed) is possible, then we can create a *crossing link* between our culture and a foreign one. Since in principle, we can add other links, we can create a kind of 'interculture' a common perspective for our cultures, as Durt pointed out. But also, from such intercultural perspective, it is possible to create a game of translation – offering us a means of direct translation between languages – or extending vocabulary of our language so, as to cover practices of another culture, and enabling us description of them in our (now extended) language.

Conclusion

Wittgenstein's framework allows us to chart other forms of life with use of *crossing links*. Creating those is possible when we assume that we are able to 'grasp' rules of social behaviour, but this assumption is necessary for us to believe that language and culture are possible at all.

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Kulturelle Gegenstände und intentionale Erlebnisse

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1. Einleitung

Selbst im vorphilosophischen Kontext begegnen wir täglich der Rede von „kulturellen Unterschieden“, von „kulturellen Merkmalen“ usw. Das Adjektiv „kulturell“ scheint ein *indexical* zu sein. Damit beziehe ich mich auf den Anschein, dass Sätze, welche diesen Ausdruck enthalten, Gültigkeit nur innerhalb eines bestimmten – eben kulturellen – Kontextes beanspruchen können. Wenn man behauptet,

- (1) Die Symmetrie ist ein altgriechisches kulturelles Schönheitskriterium

äußert man die Meinung, dass Symmetrie innerhalb des altgriechischen Kulturkreises bloß bzw. ein Schönheitskriterium spezifisch für diese Kultur ist. Was bezeichnet nun das Substantiv „Kultur“? Hat man es hier mit besonderen Gegenständlichkeiten zu tun? Was für eine Eigenschaft ist „Kulturbedingtheit“?

Beginnen wir mit einer mir nötig erscheinenden Voranmerkung: „Kulturbedingtheit“ kann mindestens zwei verschiedene Bedingtheitsformen involvieren. Die erste Form sieht Kulturbedingtheit in Seinsgegenständlichkeiten, die zweite in Sollensgegenständlichkeiten gegeben. Demgemäß sind ein bestimmtes Sein oder ein besonderes Sollen bloß innerhalb einer bestimmten Kultur vorzufinden. Als Aufgabe stelle ich mich den „Seinsaspekt“ der kulturellen Welt zu erforschen. Es geht mir hier darum, wesentliche Merkmale von Kulturen, die *Seinsmerkmale* darstellen, zu beschreiben. Sprachphilosophisch bedeutet dies, dass ich nur derartige Aussagesätze über Kulturen zu erklären versuche, welche ausschließlich Seinsprädikate enthalten (ein Gegenstand X ist oder ist nicht durch eine Kultur Y bedingt). Um den Gegenstand der Untersuchung weiter zu präzisieren, klammere ich innerhalb der Seinsprädikationen alle werthoretischen Aussagen wie z.B.

- (2) Die Monogamie ist ein kultureller Wert
von der Erörterung aus.

2. Die Erlebnisstruktur

Die Frage nach der Kulturbedingtheit von Gegenständen setzt eine Erörterung der Intentionalität voraus. Obgleich auf einen ersten Blick diese Thematik keine Verbindung zu dem hier zu untersuchenden Problemhorizont aufzuweisen scheint, bin ich davon überzeugt, dass die oben gestellte Frage nur beantwortet werden kann, wenn vorgängig die intentionale Struktur von Akten geklärt ist.

Wesensmerkmal intentionaler Akte ist die Gerichtetheit auf etwas: Ein Akt ist intentional, weil er stets auf etwas zielt. Ein introspektiver Blick auf sich selbst fördert eine Fülle verschiedener intentionaler Erlebnisse zu Tage: Ich stelle mir etwas vor, ich verspreche jemandem etwas... Die intentionalen Korrelate dieser Akte können in ihrer Verschiedenheit unter zwei Hauptkategorien rubriziert werden: Korrelate sind entweder Sachverhalte oder Gegenstände. (So sieht jedenfalls meine Bezugsontologie aus.) Wie nun strukturiert sich der intentionale Bezug? Eine der großen Leistungen der realistischen Phänomenologie besteht darin, eine präzise Beschreibung

von Intentionalität geliefert zu haben, welche um den Begriff des psychischen Inhaltes bzw. der intentionalen Materie kreist. Diesen Begriff verwende ich in engem Anschluss an die Überlegungen Adolf Reinachs, benutze ihn jedoch rein systematisch und erhebe vor allem keinen Anspruch auf eine philosophie-historisch getreue Darstellung.

Die Funktion des Inhaltes ist zwiespältig: Einerseits konstant bei jedem Akktyp vorhanden unterscheidet sie sich andererseits je nach dem, zu welchem Akktyp der Inhalt gehört. Die konstante Rolle des Inhaltes ist eine strukturelle und formale, denn sie wird von der Erlebnisstruktur verlangt. Sie sieht von einer näheren Charakterisierung des Aktes oder des gegenständlichen Aktkorrelates ab. Jeder intentionale Akt bezieht sich genau auf ein gegenständliches Korrelat. Für die Korrelate selbst eröffnet sich eine unendliche Vielfalt und Variation: Ein Korrelat kann bestehen oder nicht, es kann existieren (ideell oder real) oder nicht. Es ist immer dem Akt transzendent und ist kein konkreter Teil des Aktes. Die Rose, die man sich vorstellt, oder die Zahl, die man denkt, haben ganz eigentlich keinen Platz in einem Bewusstsein. Es muss aber etwas im Bewusstsein geben, das diesen Gegenständen entspricht, denn der Akt, der eine Gegenständlichkeit erfasst, unterscheidet sich von einem Akt desselben Typs, der eine andere Gegenständlichkeit erfasst. Da beide Akte dem Bewusstsein immanent sind, ist die Frage berechtigt, was beide Akte unterscheidet. Die zwei Gegenständlichkeiten selbst können die Akte nicht unterscheiden, denn beide sind sie als Gegenständlichkeiten dem Akt transzendent. Es muss also etwas geben, das im Akt liegt, Zugang zu den Gegenständlichkeiten verschafft und das den ersten von einem zweiten Akt absondert. Dieses Element nennen wir den „Inhalt“ eines Aktes. Mit „Inhalt“ ist *nur* ein struktureller, konkreter Erlebnisanteil gemeint, der es dem Akt ermöglicht, *genau diese* Gegenständlichkeit intentional zu treffen.

Formale und strukturelle Inhaltsfunktion vorausgesetzt skizziere ich nun die variable Rolle des Inhaltes an Hand dreier Akktypen: Vorstellen, Denken und Handeln. Dem Inhalt einer Vorstellung entspricht eine repräsentierende Rolle. Damit meine ich Folgendes: Ein Vorstellungsakt ist passiv und dient der Rezeption eines Gegenstandes. Obwohl sich der Gegenstand nie in ganzer Vollständigkeit präsentiert, weil er immer unter diesem oder jenem Aspekt abgeschattet ist, stellt man sich den gesamten Gegenstand vor. Das wird dadurch ermöglicht, dass der Vorstellungsinhalt eine gewisse Anschauungsfülle besitzt, welche den ganzen Gegenstand repräsentiert. Der Gegenstand ist intuitiv zwar nicht vollständig präsent, aber die Anschauungsfülle, welche der Vorstellungsinhalt mit einem bestimmten Grade notwendigerweise in sich trägt, repräsentiert auch die abgeschatteten Seiten des Gegenstandes. Vorsicht ist allerdings geboten, denn es ist darauf hinzuweisen, dass das, was ich hier als „Vorstellung“ beschrieben habe, keine *begriffliche* Vorstellung ist. „Begriffliche Vorstellungen“ (welche genau genommen gar keine Vorstellungen, sondern ein Sachverhaltserkennen sind) besitzt man immer dann, wenn man etwas *als* etwas erfasst. Ein derartiges Erfassen involviert immer einen Begriff und ist von komplexerer Natur.

Keine Anschauungsgrade besitzt hingegen ein aktives Denkerlebnis: Etwas wird entweder gedacht oder nicht gedacht. Man denkt etwas nicht mit mehr oder weniger Klarheit, weil es im Denken weder Abschattungen noch Intuitionen gibt. Zwar kann ein Denken von einer Vorstellung begleitet werden und somit indirekt durch sie eine Intuition bekommen, das ist aber weder verlangt noch vorauszusetzen. Ein Denkinhalt erfüllt demnach keinerlei repräsentierende Funktion, sondern eine semantisch-logische. Das, was man denkt, ist der Denkinhalt, das, worauf sich das Denken durch den Denkinhalt bezieht, ist das gegenständliche Denkkorrelat. Der Inhalt bleibt derselbe in allen Erlebnissen und in jedem Bewusstsein, in dem er gedacht ist. Diese ideelle Identität wird dadurch ermöglicht, dass Inhalte Instanzierungen einer einzigen, ideellen Bedeutung sind.¹ Weil Denken ein sprachlich eingekleidetes Erlebnis ist, welches sich folglich immer in Worten vollziehen muss, kann man wohl von einer Bedeutung und einer Referenz eines sprachlichen Ausdruckes sprechen. Terme haben Gedanken als Bedeutungen und Gegenstände als Referenzen, Sätze haben Propositionen als Bedeutungen und Sachverhalte als Bezug.

Wie das Denken sind auch Handlungen aktive Erlebnisse. Macht man einen Spaziergang, ist man in einem ganz bestimmten Sinne aktiv. Bei einem solchen Spaziergang ist allerdings kein Denken, sondern eine Absicht involviert. Handeln bedeutet, den Inhalt einer Absicht zu „realisieren“, womit die Rolle des Inhaltes weitere Varianten hervorbringt. Dieser Inhalt ist wirkungsreicher oder wirkungsärmer, je nach dem, ob die Handlung eine dem Absichtsinhalt (d.i. dem, was man beabsichtigt) entsprechende Wirkung erbringt. Wie der Inhalt einer Absicht genauer zu definieren sei, ist allerdings eine komplexe Angelegenheit. Wie immer ein solcher Inhalt jedoch beschaffen ist, muss er das enthalten, was man zu vollziehen beabsichtigt, und notwendiger Erfüllungsfaktor dieses Inhaltes ist das, was gemacht wird (ein zustande gekommenes Ereignis, ein hergestelltes Artefakt usw.). Man kann demnach verallgemeinern: Eine Handlung ist die Verwirklichung eines Absichtsinhaltes, Produkte der Handlung sind die durch die Handlung zustande gebrachten Ereignisse oder Artefakte usw... Hat man eine Absicht, dann hat man auch einen Inhalt, der sich auf eine durch das Handeln zustande zu bringende Gegenständlichkeit bezieht.

3. Kulturen und Kulturgegenstände

Ich kehre nun zur Betrachtung meiner Ausgangsfrage zurück. Sie soll sozusagen „von unten her“ erörtert werden. Zunächst stelle ich fest, was einzelne Kulturgegenstände sind; dann gehe ich der Frage nach, was Kulturen sind. Kulturgegenstände werden entlang zweier verschiedener Betrachtungsperspektiven beschrieben. Die erste thematisiert die Produktion, die zweite die Erfassung derartiger Gegenstände.

Die (in meinen Augen) selbstverständliche Behauptung, dass Kulturen notwendigerweise Menschengruppen voraussetzen, stelle ich an die Spitze der Erörterung. Es gibt keine Kultur ohne Menschen und Kulturen existieren nur in Verbindung mit menschlichem Tun. Welche genauere Bedeutung hat diese Behauptung? Die Antwort liegt m.E. darin, dass der Mensch in seinem Tun nicht einfach etwas in unbestimmter Weise macht,

sondern er tut es, er handelt, immer gemäß spezifischer Modalitäten. Ein Beispiel soll diese Sichtweise illustrieren: Ich habe die Absicht mir ein Haus zu bauen. Diese Absicht bezieht sich mittels eines komplexen propositionalen Inhalts u.a. auch auf das zu erbauende Haus. Der Inhalt trägt immer Merkmale, welche bestimmen, wie dieses Haus zu errichten ist. Einige davon sind wesentliche Merkmale: Ein Haus muss gewisse Eigenschaften besitzen, um überhaupt ein Haus zu sein. Andere Merkmale sind kontingent: Man will nicht bloß ein Haus, sondern ein so und so geartetes Haus (bequem, warm, funktional usw.) aufbauen. *Wie* das aufgebaute Haus diese Merkmale erfüllt, ist in den zu erfüllenden Inhaltsmerkmalen nicht vorherbestimmt. Ein und dasselbe Merkmal kann in verschiedenster Weise erfüllt werden. Bei der Analyse dieser Erfüllungsweisen stößt man auf eine ganze Menge heterogener Konstituenten. Sicherlich stellen *a parte subjecti* persönlicher Geschmack oder technisches Können eine Erfüllungsmodalität dar. *A parte objecti* sind weitere Faktoren, wie z.B. die Umweltbedingungen bzw. die zur Verfügung stehenden Materialien wichtig für die Erfüllung der Inhaltsmerkmale, denn auch sie werden die Eigenschaften des Artefaktes letztlich bestimmen. Gleiche Merkmale können also verschieden erfüllt werden. Je nach dem, in welchem Maße die Eigenschaften des aufgebauten Hauses die Merkmale des Inhaltes erfüllen, ist der Absichtsinhalt als wirkungsärmer bzw. –reicher zu beurteilen. „Wie“ ein Artefakt schließlich aussieht, hängt vom Erfüllungsverhältnis zwischen Absichtsinhalt und Artefakt ab: Hat man einen Inhalt und wird dieser Inhalt so-und-so erfüllt, dann erhält man ein ganz bestimmtes Artefakt.

Der Absichtsinhalt ist eine Proposition, die aus Bedeutungen (Gedanken und Prädikaten) besteht. Fasst man nun die Bedeutung des Terms „Haus“ in einer besonderen Weise auf, d.h. wird die Bedeutung dieses Terms mit spezielleren Merkmalen bereichert, dann muss das ausgebaute Haus spezielle Eigenschaften aufweisen, um den Inhalt zu erfüllen. Die Bedeutung kann nämlich so aufgefasst werden, dass sie bestimmte Erfüllungsaufgaben vorschreibt. Bestimmt man die Bedeutung von „Haus“ als ein Haus aus Holz und Papier, kalt im Winter aber frisch im Sommer, mit Reisstrohmatten auf dem Boden und Schiebewänden aus Papier, dann muss das Haus diese Eigenschaften besitzen, um dem so und so beschriebenen Inhalt zu entsprechen. Anders wäre es gewesen, wenn man diese Bedeutung als ein Zelt, das schnell auf- und abgebaut werden kann, gefasst hätte. Ich komme nun zu dem *ersten* entscheidenden Punkt: Hat das individuelle *Wie* – wie sich uns die Bedeutung präsentiert – nur „private“ Relevanz, dann hat man es mit einer rein subjektiven Angelegenheit zu tun. Entspricht aber das *Wie* in unserer Erlebnisstruktur einer zusätzlichen Bedeutung, welche erlaubt, dass der in einer speziellen Weise aufgefasste Inhalt in allen Erlebnissen einer bestimmten Menschengruppe konstant identisch bleibt, dann ist *diese* Bedeutung eine Konstituente der jeweiligen Kultur. Wenn eine Bedeutung nicht nur so und so von einem einzigen Individuum intendiert wird, sondern eine ganze Menschengruppe dieselbe Bedeutung immer unter Einschluss partikulärer Merkmale versteht, dann ist diese Bedeutung konstituierendes Element der Kultur dieser Menschengruppe. Kulturkonstituierende durch partikuläre Merkmale angereicherte Bedeutungen (z.B. „japanisches Haus“) werden auch als „höherstufig“ bezeichnet, denn sie fußen notwendigerweise auf Bedeutungen niedrigerer Stufe. Niedrigstufige Bedeutungen (z.B. „Haus“) besitzen kein bestimmtes Merkmal und schreiben daher nicht vor, wie der Inhalt erfüllt werden soll. Demgemäß sind Kulturen diesem ersten Sinne gemäß Bedeutungseinheiten, näher

¹ Dahingestellt bleibt hier, ob die Instanzierung des Inhaltes auf eine Exemplifikation im Sinne der Methexis oder im Sinne einer Type/Token-Beziehung hinweist.

sind sie Inbegriffe, Summen von Bedeutungen höherer Stufe. Höherstufige Bedeutungen finden üblicherweise angenehmen Platz in natürlichen Sprachen, die immer über korrekte und treffende sprachliche Wendungen verfügen, um sie auszudrücken. Diese Bedeutungen sind nur mit Mühe in eine andere Sprache (oft nur durch Paraphrasen) zu übersetzen und die entsprechenden Ausdrücke, einmal übertragen, verdecken das Gefühl von Selbstverständlichkeit, das sie in ihren ursprünglichen Sprachen charakterisiert.

Technisch gesehen kann man schließen, dass nicht nur der Referenzgegenstand auf eine Gegebenheitsweise (und daher auf einen Inhalt) hinweist, sondern auch die Bedeutung in dieser oder jener Weise intendiert werden kann. Intendiert man die Bedeutung schlechthin (ohne zusätzliche Merkmale), dann hat man eine Bedeutung niedrigstufiger Art. Intendiert man die Bedeutung unter Einschluss bestimmter Merkmale und wird sie von einer ganzen Menschengruppe gemeinsam mit diesen zusätzlichen Merkmalen stets intendiert, dann hat man eine höherstufige Bedeutung. Höherstufige Bedeutungen sind die Weisen, wie niedrigstufige Bedeutungen von einer Menschengruppe stets intendiert sind. Kultur ist eine Bedeutung, welche den Inbegriff von allen möglichen Weisen ausmacht, wie Bedeutungen niedriger Ordnung innerhalb definierter Menschengruppen intendiert werden können. In einem bestimmten Kulturkreis aktiv zu sein heißt, dass sich die intentionale Erlebnisstruktur, während sich sie auf ihr Korrelat richtet, nicht nur eine Bedeutung niedriger Ordnung, sondern auch eine höherer Ordnung impliziert. Auf Grund der Allgemeinheit der Struktur Akt-Inhalt-Gegenstand hat dies ferner zur Folge, dass verschiedenste Erlebnisse sich in den spezifischen Kulturmodalitäten realisieren können. „Macht“ man ein Haus bzw. ein beliebiges Artefakt, dann kann man es mit bestimmten kulturellen Merkmalen machen. „Sagt“ man etwas (als einen Sprechakt), dann kann dies stets in einer bestimmten, kulturbedingten Weise geschehen (dasselbe gilt indes nicht für alle sog. Anpassungserlebnisse, wie z.B. die Vorstellung).

Um dem Kulturabhängigkeitsaspekt einer Gegenständlichkeit gerecht zu werden, habe ich bis jetzt analysiert, wie sie zustande kommt und insbesondere wie sich eine Bedeutung herausbildet. Nun ist noch die Anerkennung von Kulturgegenständlichkeiten zu untersuchen. Da Kulturen von Menschengruppen abhängig sind, muss man Kulturgegenständlichkeit auf menschliche Artefakte beschränken. Mit „Artefakt“ ist ein großes Spektrum von Gegenständlichkeitstypen an Produkten gemeint, so ist z.B. eine Rede auch ein menschliches Produkt. Kulturen sind immer mit spezifischen Gegenständlichkeiten verknüpft, sodass man eine Kultur stets nur an „typischen Gegenständen“ bzw. Produkten erkennt. Wie erkennt man nun, dass ein Gegenstand ein Kulturgegenstand ist? Dieses Wissen entsteht nicht durch einen reinen Wahrnehmungsakt. Derlei Erkenntnis kann sich nur vollziehen, wenn der Erfassungsakt begrifflicher Natur ist, wenn also ein Gegenstand unter seinem besonderen kulturellen Aspekt *als* Kulturgegenstand angesehen wird. Man erfasst den Gegenstand unter dem Begriff der jeweiligen Kultur (was nichts anderes als die Erfassung eines Sachverhaltes meint), so dass – um auf das obige Beispiel zurückzukommen – ein Haus *als* ein italienischer, japanischer, beduinischer kulturbedingter Gegenstand erfasst wird. Das bedeutet freilich nicht, dass man alle Merkmale eines Begriffes kennen muss, um einen Gegenstand bzw. ein kulturbedingtes Produkt unter diesem Begriff subsumieren zu können. Wir verwenden

nämlich regelmäßig Begriffe ohne ihre vollständigen Definitionen zu kennen. Begriffe sind allgemeine Gegenstände, Allgemeinheiten, welche semantisch keine Bedeutungen, sondern Referenzgegenstände sind. Ich kann nun zum entscheidenden *zweiten* Punkt kommen: Wir haben bereits einen ersten Sinn des Wortes „Kultur“ festgestellt, welcher Kulturen als Inbegriffe von Bedeutungen höherer Ordnung festschreibt. Jede Kultur ist näher eine kategorematische Bedeutung, die einem Referenzgegenstand entspricht: Der Ausdruck „japanische Kultur“ hat eine selbständige Bedeutung, die aus der Summe von höherstufigen Bedeutungen besteht und die sich auf etwas bezieht. Referenzgegenstände von Kulturbedeutungen sind allgemeine Kulturbegriffe, welche sich in kulturbedingten Gegenständen und Produkten exemplifizieren. Wenn man also etwas als ein Kulturphänomen erfasst, dann erfasst man das betrachtete Phänomen als Instanz des allgemeinen Kulturbegriffes. Kulturbegriffe sind Inbegriffe der Artefakte, welche in einer bestimmten kulturellen Weise hergestellt werden.

Zusammenfassend gilt: Kulturen sind einerseits Bedeutungen, andererseits sind sie Allgemeinheiten bzw. Begriffe. Kulturbedingtheit heißt entweder die Weise, wie wir zu einigen Bedeutungen in Kontakt treten, oder sie meint, dass bestimmte Phänomene Instanzen eines Allgemeingegenstandes sind. Da kulturbedingte Phänomene nur menschliche Produkte sein können, sind die Allgemeingegenstände von den Kulturbedeutungen abhängig. Kulturbedeutungen haben Gültigkeit nur für eine so und so gearbete Menschengruppe. Kulturen sind also soziale (d.h. zeitliche und zugleich abstrakte) Gegenstände. Ihre Existenz hängt nicht bloß von einzelnen Menschen ab, sondern von bestimmt gearbete Menschengruppen. Indem Kulturen (in den beiden festgestellten Sinnen) notwendigerweise nach Menschengruppen verlangen, sind sie unselbständige Gegenstände: Sie erlöschen zusammen mit dem Erlöschen ihrer Fundamente.

Life's Infinite Variations: Wittgenstein and Cultural Generalization

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1. Finding the Theme in the Variations

Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is a transcendental deduction laying out in highly abstract terms the conditions making representation possible. By its very nature, this project has little concern with the particularities of culture; one has to look hard to find any allusion at all to cultural matters in the *Tractatus*. There is, however, an acknowledgement that these particularities do matter, for "The tacit conventions on which the understanding of everyday language depends are enormously complicated." (Wittgenstein 1961, 19) But complicated though language in its cultural setting may be, to the extent that it succeeds in representing the world it is susceptible to logical analysis, and what that analysis reveals is an underlying logical structure that is the same whatever the particular language or culture. This is an approach to language, then, that looks for the theme in the variations; once that theme is identified, the foundations for intercultural communication are firmly laid.

What then of our cultural generalizations with all their potential to enlighten and oppress? According to the scheme developed in the *Tractatus*, cultural generalizations, if legitimate at all, differ not one whit from other sorts of generalizations. To generalize is to make a claim about how things stand in the world, where one takes into consideration not simply an isolated state of affairs but a pattern present in a whole set of states of affairs. One's claim is true if the pattern represented as obtaining does in fact obtain, and false otherwise. Consider, for example, Wittgenstein's comment in his notebooks from 1929 to the effect that Austrian literary and musical work "is particularly hard to understand" because it is in some sense "subtler than anything else and its truth never leans towards plausibility." (Wittgenstein 1998, 5e) If we take this to be a descriptive rather than evaluative claim, then its truth or falsity depends on whether those who encounter Austrian works and are in position to compare them with works produced in other cultural settings do in fact find them "particularly hard to understand" and in some way "implausible"—a complex state of affairs we would attempt to verify, presumably, using techniques available to us in the social sciences.

If we are concerned with the potential of cultural generalizations to both enlighten and oppress, however, we are not concerned with them as descriptive claims, but with their moral impact. Here, the *Tractatus* famously insists, we are attempting to consider something of which we cannot speak, but about which, Wittgenstein later admits in the "Lecture on Ethics," we have a strong tendency to want to say something nonetheless. Wittgenstein himself, even if he does not give in to the temptation to think he can say anything true or false about such matters, does seem, in the concluding sections of the *Tractatus*, to want to use words to produce an effect that will help us see that which cannot be said. What we need to see is that facts, as such, have no value—it simply makes no sense to describe one state of affairs as better than another, or to view some facts as the effect of acts of will and others not. Rather, "If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts...in short, the effect must be that it

becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole." (Wittgenstein 1961, 72)

A cultural generalization, then, to the extent that it is true or false, has no particular moral valence. However, to the extent that the attitude expressed in the use of it can alter the limits of the world by causing it to wax or wane, the result can be either enlightenment or oppression. The enlightenment that comes with the world's waxing is the reflection of an expansive consciousness that wills actively to represent all there is to be represented. Rabindranath Tagore, whose writings Wittgenstein much admired, captures the idea well: "...the only true human progress is coincident with this widening range of feeling...Man does not acquire rights through occupation of larger space, nor through external conduct, but his rights extend only so far as he is real, and his reality is measured by the scope of his consciousness." (Tagore 2004, 14). Generalizations, furthermore, can be devices for altering consciousness in such a way as to enable it to expand, or wax, so as to grasp the infinite as a single unity. An attitude that causes the world to wane, by contrast, rather than opening us up to a view of the world seen *sub specie aeterni* as a limited whole, confines our consciousness and hence our world to that which, to once again quote Tagore, reflects "our egoistic impulses, our selfish desires," obscuring our vision within the limits of "our narrow self." (ibid., 21)

2. Finding the Variations in the Theme

Comparing Wittgenstein's earlier with his later works is a study in both continuity and contrast. By way of contrast, we find the later Wittgenstein moving away from his earlier fixation on representation to consider a much wider range of uses to which language can be put. The aim is no longer to find the single underlying theme in the variations, but to teach us to how to see the many variations lurking within every theme; rather than dealing in abstract generalities, the focus is on the particularities of practices both real and imagined. The meaning of our language lies not in its capacity simply to picture facts about the world, but in the endless uses to which it is put within the context of our social interactions. But, while the whole tenor of Wittgenstein's later philosophy warns us against making generalizations based on apriori requirements, there is no prohibition on looking to see what resemblances one notices as one travels from one instance to the next. The movement, significantly, is horizontal rather than vertical: we are not rising above to take in the whole in a single vision, but, as Wittgenstein says of his work in the *Philosophical Investigations*, traveling over a wide field "criss-cross in every direction" so as to assemble an album from which a picture of the landscape will gradually emerge. (Wittgenstein 1958, v)

When the picture is of a culture, something like the unity of vision pursued in the earlier work is possible, for a genuine culture, Wittgenstein writes, "is like a great organization which assigns to each of its members his place, at which he can work in the spirit of the whole." (Wittgenstein 1998, 8e-9e) And yet, insofar as we come to understand that culture through an album, our understanding is always open to shifts in insight which differ from the mere accretion of factual information in

being far more alive—a unity endlessly reconfiguring itself in our understanding rather than a static structure into which additional information can always be slotted. Wittgenstein's comments on the unity of culture are complicated, however, by his conviction that culture had effectively disappeared from the European civilization of his own day: "the spectacle afforded by this age is not the coming into being of a great work of culture in which the best contribute to the same great end, so much as the unimposing spectacle of a crowd whose best members pursue private ends." (ibid.) If Wittgenstein is right about this, then it would seem that the only accurate cultural generalizations he can form about his own times are those, such as the one he has just made, that undermine attempts at such.

The situation when it comes to generalizations about civilizations from which culture has disappeared is in some ways analogous to the situation at the end of the *Tractatus*: we use what we have said to climb beyond it. However, unlike the early Wittgenstein, the later does not consign us to utter silence. Wittgenstein continues his remarks on culture and civilization by noting that, "the disappearance of a culture does not signify the disappearance of human value but simply of a certain means of expressing this value." (ibid.) There is no hesitation here in allowing that value can be expressed, if not in one way, then in another. But even if the later Wittgenstein differs from the earlier in this regard, this much stays the same: philosophy has nothing to say about what to value. The idea that there can be philosophical theories that determine what is valuable has no place here—the most philosophy can do is describe the ways in which we express value, clarifying for us the respects in which they do and do not cohere, and revealing to us the ways in which we can become confused about what we are expressing and how we are expressing it.

In this contrast between clarity and confusion we have a further analogue to the earlier thought with its notion that ethics is fundamentally about the waxing and waning of the world. Philosophical confusion has the effect of shutting down the world either by making one's actions unintelligible to oneself and others, or by making it impossible to act at all because we no longer know where we are or where we are going. Philosophical clarity, on the other hand, may not always show us something that we want to see, but the seeing of it, nonetheless, opens up the world. We know where we are and can begin to think constructively about where we want to go.

Cultural generalizations can be used similarly to clarify or confuse. Consider some controversial examples of such from Wittgenstein's own notebooks in the early 1930's. The context for some of Wittgenstein's remarks on Jewishness—those about the "reproductive" nature of the Jewish mind, for example—make it fairly clear that his primary concern is understanding the proclivities of his own intellectual life and his connection to others he takes to be of similar intellectual temperament. The aim, presumably, is to clarify for himself the nature of his own work of clarification so he might get on with it. Significantly, the remarks on Jewishness end abruptly within a year, with the comment that "In Western Civilization the Jew is always being measured according to calibrations which do not fit him...insofar as the words of our language seem to us the only possible standards of measurement, we are always doing him injustice. And he is first overestimated then underestimated." (Wittgenstein 1998, 23e) Here we have another example of a cultural generalization the purpose of which is to undermine other cultural generalizations.

3. Living with Life's Infinite Variations

Although there are analogies between the earlier and the latter thought, the contrasts are also striking. Consider the difference between Wittgenstein's claim in the *Philosophical Investigations* that "If a lion could talk we could not understand him," (Wittgenstein 1958, 223e) and the following quote from the *Notebooks 1914-1916*: "Only remember that the spirit of the snake, of the lion, is *your* spirit. For it is only from yourself that you are acquainted with spirit at all." (Wittgenstein 1979, 85e) Whereas the early philosophy pushes us in the direction of an ever more inclusive consciousness, the later philosophy seems bent on setting up barriers to our understanding. It is possible not simply for lions, but for other people to be an enigma to us: "We learn this when we come into a strange country with entirely strange traditions...even given a mastery of the country's language, we do not understand the people...We cannot find our feet with them." (Wittgenstein 1958, 223e)

The two different directions in which these two different philosophies move have an echo in the rhetoric of recent American politics as it whipsaws between propounding a unifying democratic vision that claims to be the expression of a universal human desire for freedom, and the insistence that we have enemies who do not share this universal desire and hence, apparently, are no longer considered worthy of being ascribed basic human rights. Given a choice between the two incompatible claims, the first seems the lesser evil—problematic not because of its unifying impulse *per se* but because of the confused manner in which that impulse is being expressed. Our political leaders run roughshod over the facts, grounding their generalizations not in investigation into the tacit conventions at play in the enormously complicated global community in which we now find ourselves, but in moral pieties designed to reaffirm our own righteousness even as they provide us with a rationale for doing that which, however much suffering it may impose on others, will ultimately serve our economic and military interests. In this setting, it is easy to sympathize with Wittgenstein's disgust with the rhetoric of the waning Austro-Hungarian Empire, and hence with the critique of it implicit in the *Tractatus*.

The later philosophy, however, suggests the need for a critique that cuts even more deeply. Wittgenstein, writing in 1947, considered it possible that "someday a culture will arise out of this civilization." At the moment, however, the notion that there is a single unifying spirit shared by all Americans, much less all the world, which gives every person a secure sense of their place in the scheme of things, is at best wishful thinking. When spun into generalization that links itself with the ideal of American dominance, it can be downright dangerous thinking, willfully bringing about states of affairs that have had a devastating impact on countless lives. Does this mean that we must back off altogether from cultural generalization, and resign ourselves the impossibility of ever truly understanding those from different cultures?

I don't think so. As Kwasi Wiredu argues in *Cultural Universals and Particulars*, our shared biological history—or, what Wittgenstein might have called our shared natural history—guarantees that intercultural communication is always possible, even when translation between languages is not: "In truth, the ability to perceive the untranslatability of an expression from one language to another is a mark of linguistic understanding more profound than the ability to do routine translation." (Wiredu 1996, 25) We can extend this claim to argue that the ability to be clear about what is and is not enigmatic to one about

another culture is also the sign of a more profound understanding than an attitude that presumes that the spirit that moves one is the same spirit that moves another. Furthermore, cultural generalizations can be useful tools in developing this ability—especially if we listen carefully to those formulated about us by those from other cultures.

Wittgenstein's later philosophy offers a salutary reminder that surrounding any cultural generalization is a world of concrete lived particulars, that is, that "Life's infinite variations are an essential part of our *life*." (Wittgenstein 1998, 83e). But Wittgenstein's earlier philosophy also has something important to say about the value of cultivating the expansiveness of spirit that opens up rather than shutting down a world. Even if it is a mistake to think that there is a unity of logical form underlying all our thought and communication, it is not a mistake to note that when we travel the landscape, we can only grasp that which it is in us to be able to grasp, and that part of the art of creating new possibilities for working together with others is understanding just how far our understanding really does go, and not pretending it goes any farther.

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Against cultural identity: a family resemblance perspective on intercultural relations

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1. Troubles with intercultural relations

In this paper, I would like to draw attention to how Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance can contribute to the discussion on the relations among cultures in the contemporary, globalized world. As everyone knows, relations among cultures are far from being smooth, rather, they are causing various troubles both at the level of individual life stories and at the social or political level. These troubles include:

- (1) *Failures in intercultural communication.* Intercultural communication is getting more and more necessary both among individuals in multi-cultural environments and among states and other institutions in the globalized world. But it is difficult: risks of misunderstanding and failures to acknowledge the other's point of view are always at hand. A naive approach leads to despising alien cultures or their members. A less naive one wonders whether understanding the way of life, values and preferences, habits and beliefs of an alien culture is ever possible.
- (2) *Worries for the preservation of one's cultural identity and of cultural differences.* It is a fact that globalization of economic exchanges as well as of mass communications tends to blur cultural differences and threatens to make them disappear. This is worrying for all those who feel emotionally attached to their own cultural identity and received values. Minorities and non-western cultures often appear to be more aggressive in defending their specificity against globalization, which is felt as in favour of majorities and of western cultures. On the other hand, worries extend to the possible weakening and disappearance of received western values, due to relativism. These various worries raise the level of people's anxiety for whatever are their own cultural identities and, on a less naive approach, for the preservation of differences among cultural identities.
- (3) *Increase in conflictuality.* Because of the defensive attitudes provoked by the above-described worries, conflictuality among cultures tends to increase. Hybrid identities and changes in cultural identity are stigmatized; allegedly "pure" cultural identities are discursively constructed and advertised. When the cultural identity of an alien group (as for example a group of immigrants) is acknowledged, this often happens at the price of a certain amount of segregation.

It may seem that the source of all these problems is incommensurability among cultures. If cultures are incommensurable with one another, difficulties in intercultural communication are easily explained. But acknowledgement of incommensurability is of no help in finding positive solutions either to communication problems or to the other above-mentioned troubles. This awareness, together with the fact that there is no final evidence for incommensurability, has suggested to drop the belief in the incommensurability among cultures. But this too is of no

help. Claims to understanding an alien culture from outside and confrontation conducted as if communication problems did not exist may make intercultural conflict more symmetrical, but do not solve nor soften it and, rather, are a further source of increase in conflictuality.

I would like to suggest that troubles with relations among cultures do not come from incommensurability or from belief in it, but have a different source: the belief that there are such things as cultural identities. Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance can help us see that - in the relevant, trouble-making sense at least - there are no cultural identities. This does not amount to denying that human individuals have personal identities to which cultural features contribute. Personal identities exist and have cultural components and full right to interpersonal or social acknowledgement. So, the view I propose is not a way to conceal from sight cultural differences, thus fostering discrimination. Furthermore, it avoids those threats to personal identities that may come from conceiving of cultural identities in the received way, as normative models (if not Procrustean beds).

2. What is family resemblance?

In a bunch of famous passages in his *Philosophical Investigations* (§§ 65-76), Wittgenstein has proposed to view concepts (such as the concept of a game) not as perfectly delimited by necessary and sufficient conditions, but as grounded in chains of resemblances. To a concept such as that of a game (but perhaps to any concept), there does not correspond any perfectly delimited set of entities. Nevertheless, predicate words may make sense and are correctly applied to certain objects in case these objects can reasonably be seen as entertaining family resemblance relations with one another.

The introduction of the notion of family resemblance in the *Investigations* is slightly misleading, because at first sight it appears to contribute not so much to the discussion on the nature of meaning, but on whether language has an essence (§65; cp. §§99-108). Language has no essence, Wittgenstein suggests (e.g. §65, §92, §108), because it is a network of language *games*, and these, like what we usually call "games", do not form a well-delimited set characterized by at least one property shared by all its members, but merely resemble each other, in different ways under different respects, as members of a family do. The philosophical potential of the idea of family resemblance is not exhausted by this polemical use. There is no essence of language, nor of a game, ultimately because it is search for essence which is senseless; this is so, because of how language works and what meanings or concepts do *not* consist in. In the thematic progression of the *Investigations*, I am inclined to see the family resemblance sequence of paragraphs as continuing the initial attack on meaning as denotation, by transferring it to predicates: just as the meaning of a name is not the object it denotes, the meaning of a predicate is not the set of objects which the concept expressed by the predicate applies to. This is so because the job of the predicate is not that of expressing a concept in the received sense of

this word. Besides being discussed from both the theoretical and the interpretive point of view in philosophy (e.g. Bambrough 1961; Baker and Hacker 1980: 185-208; Travis 1989: 240-292) and inspiring linguistic and psycholinguistic research on prototypes (since Rosch and Mervis 1975), family resemblance has been applied to the discussion of several notions of a social or cultural interest (see e.g. Nicholson 1994 on gender). I am interested in exploring how family resemblance applies to cultural identity and, beyond it, intercultural relations. In this exploration, I will rely on the reading of §§65-76 of the *Investigations* I have sketchily outlined above (I am aware it would require further discussion, but I cannot argue for it in detail in this paper).

3. Cultural identities in a family resemblance perspective

There are various ways of using family resemblance to criticize socially accepted beliefs and expectations about cultural identities.

A first kind of use comes in when we realize that individuals that are said to fall under a certain collective identity denomination of a cultural kind never match exactly its alleged defining features. Just as there are kinds of bird closer to the prototype associated with the word "bird" and kinds of bird more and more peripheral with respect to it (ostriches, penguins, even *Archaeopteryx*), there are individual, personal identities that best reflect the prototype associated with a certain cultural denomination and personal identities more and more marginal with respect to it. So we start seeing how wrong it is to force people to strive for a "pure" cultural identity (under pain of being excluded from that cultural identity altogether). This approach, however, does not deny the reality of cultural identities: their nature becomes that of psycho-social models. People might still feel inadequate if they fail to perfectly match one such model.

A second kind of use comes in when we realize that collective identity denominations of the cultural kind do not correspond to perfectly defined models, but are themselves grounded in

family resemblance relations. The use of family resemblance proposed above focused on the cultural identity of individuals, and therefore on instances or tokens of cultural identity as opposed to types. But types of cultural identity are themselves difficult to define and delimit. To start with, how finely should they be cut? is there one Western cultural identity, or many? are there a North-American cultural identity and an European one? but why not cut North-American cultural identity more finely, to cope with ethnic differences, South and North, and what not? Why not cut European cultural identity into national identities or identities connected with ethnos or environment? and what about, say, Jewish identity? If I think of the region in which I live, I am tempted to assign to my town, Trieste, a peculiar cultural identity (in virtue of its history, literature, etc.), but at a closer look there are at least two such cultural identities (connected, respectively, with the Italian-speaking majority and the Slovene-speaking minority) (see Sbisà and Vascotto 2001). There seems to be no fixed end to the search for pure, perfectly defined types of cultural identity: no one is such. So why not analyze types of cultural identity into their manifold dimensions and admit that any value assigned to any of these dimensions contributes to connecting that type of cultural identity with other types of cultural identity along a specific chain of resemblances, so that no single clear-cut

border is given? In this way, we start seeing that no cultural identity is completely isolated. But this approach can still allow for the idea that there are clear-cut distinctions, if not among peripheral cases, at least between prototypical cores. There is clearly no overlap between, say, the bird prototype and the reptile prototype, even if being a bird and being a reptile split each into many interconnected subtypes some of which may appear as borderline cases.

But a third step can still be taken, especially if we see family resemblance as deconstructing the very notion of a concept, thus depriving concepts of any kind of existence *qua* things. In this perspective, cultural identities (at the type level) are no more existent things than concepts. There is nothing more about "being a C..." apart from collocating oneself, along each of a certain number of the relevant dimensions of cultural identity, in a position similar to that of other individuals accepted as Cs by the relevant audience. Descriptions of types of cultural identity ("A C is...") are not descriptions, more or less accurate, of something existing, but either context-driven generalizations from individuals accepted as Cs or contributions to the construction of stereotypes or models, which in turn do not aim at reflecting reality, but have a more or less apparent normative function.

4. How to cope with troubles

The most widespread attitude as regards intercultural relations is still inspired (to echo Wittgenstein's way of speaking in such passages as §71, §88, §§99ff.) by an ideal of perfect delimitation. A change of attitude, adopting the family resemblance perspective, would enable us to cope with the troubles we have initially described and perhaps prevent some of them from arising.

- (1) *Failures in intercultural communication.* The family resemblance perspective has no problem in acknowledging difficulties in intercultural communication and appreciating the importance of the acknowledgement of each other's difference and autonomy. This does not mean that it presupposes generalized incommensurability; on the contrary, it allows for understanding and comparison, albeit not thanks to a unique recipe, but to the several partial paths, tracing specific chains of resemblances, that can be opened on occasion in the landscape of cultural differences.
- (2) *Worries for the preservation of one's cultural identity and of cultural differences.* These worries have no longer any point, at least as regards the cultural identities of individuals. Whatever cultural identity each individual happens to possess, whether "pure" or hybrid, whether close to those of the most prototypical members of the relevant cultural group or quite peripheral, he or she has a right to possess it. Hybrid identities, which raise lots of problems both at the individual and at the social level when we search for the perfect delimitation of cultural identities, are recognized as being, not the exception, but the rule. The family resemblance perspective enables us to defend cultural identities and differences from globalization processes, without falling prey to normative stereotypes. Possible worries for the right of cultural communities (as opposed to individuals) to their own cultural identity can be addressed indirectly (for recognition of rights to communities would reintroduce claims to the perfect delimitation of cultural identities) on the

basis of the rights of their individual members (as I claim in Sbisà 1999): in fact, the aspects of a person's cultural identity that presuppose participation in certain forms of associated life can be preserved and developed only if these forms of associated life are preserved.

- (3) *Increase in conflictuality.* Defensive attitudes, causing increase in conflictuality, can be appropriately prevented by the adoption of the attitudes described above as regards individual cultural identities and the rights of individuals to develop them (of course, in ways compatible with the wider social framework in which they live: see Kymlicka 1995 on "polyethnic" rights). In particular, the family resemblance perspective debunks the search, both misleading and dangerous, for "pure" cultural identities, while saving or even sharpening sensitivity to differences.

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Kann eine Person als Urheber ihrer Handlungen verstanden werden, wenn sie keine alternativen Möglichkeiten hat?

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1. Das Prinzip der alternativen Möglichkeiten (PAP)

In unserer alltäglichen, lebensweltlichen Erfahrung erscheint uns die Zukunft als offen. Sie erstreckt sich vor uns wie ein mehr oder weniger unbestimmter Raum von Möglichkeiten, den wir als Handelnde gestalten können. Als Handelnde nehmen wir Einfluss auf die zukünftigen Zustände der Welt. Mit dieser Vorstellung ist in unserer lebensweltlichen Erfahrung die Idee der Freiheit verknüpft, und damit wiederum ist die Idee der Verantwortlichkeit verbunden. Als ein wesentliches Element der Idee von Verantwortlichkeit gilt das von Harry G. Frankfurt so genannte Prinzip der alternativen Möglichkeiten, kurz PAP („principle of alternate possibilities“, Frankfurt 1969). Es besagt, dass eine Person nur dann moralisch verantwortlich ist für das, was sie getan hat, wenn sie auch etwas anderes getan haben könnte.

PAP scheint eine in unseren alltäglichen Auffassungen fest verwurzelte Grundintuition über Verantwortlichkeit auszudrücken. So machen wir beispielsweise Jones nur dann dafür verantwortlich, dass er das Auto seines Onkels gestohlen hat, wenn er es auch hätte lassen können. Auf der anderen Seite sind wir geneigt, jemanden von der Verantwortung los zu sprechen, falls es als sicher gelten kann, dass er oder sie gar nicht anders handeln konnte. Bietet sich in einer bestimmten Situation nur eine einzige, alternativlose Option, so scheint Freiheit und damit Verantwortlichkeit unmöglich zu werden. Der Ausruf „Ich konnte gar nicht anders handeln!“ wird, soweit er glaubwürdig ist, als Entschuldigung akzeptiert.

Die intuitive Plausibilität von PAP findet ihren Niederschlag auch in der fachphilosophischen Debatte über den angemessenen Begriff von Willensfreiheit. Alternative Möglichkeiten zu haben, scheint zumindest ein wichtiges Element jeder brauchbaren Explikation von Freiheit zu sein. Stellvertretend sei auf Henrik Walters Drei-Komponenten-Modell verwiesen (Walter ²1999). Walter unterscheidet drei verschiedene Komponenten, die jedes Konzept von Freiheit, das den Namen Freiheit zu Recht beanspruchen kann, in irgendeiner Weise integrieren muss. Die drei Komponenten sind erstens Alternativismus, zweitens Intelligibilität und drittens Urheberschaft. Diese drei Komponenten repräsentieren jeweils einen Aspekt, den wir mit der Idee der Freiheit verbinden, auch wenn es vorläufig noch nicht so klar und präzise ist, worin genau dieser Aspekt besteht. In einem noch vagen Sinn strukturieren die drei Komponenten die Idee der Freiheit: Frei sind wir erstens, wenn wir mehrere Möglichkeiten haben, und nicht auf eine festgelegt sind (Alternativismus). Frei sind wir zweitens, wenn wir unser Verhalten durch verstehbare und rationale Gründe kontrollieren können (Intelligibilität), nicht dagegen wenn es dem blanken Zufall unterworfen ist. Frei sind wir drittens, insofern wir selbst uns als die Urheber unserer Handlungen verstehen können (Urheberschaft), und nicht als Marionetten externer Prozesse.

Die Debatte über die Geltung von PAP betrifft die erste Freiheitskomponente in Walters Modell. Es geht um

die Frage, inwieweit Alternativismus eine notwendige Bedingung ist für eine Form von Freiheit, die hinreicht, um Personen für ihre Handlungen verantwortlich zu machen.

2. Frankfurt-Fälle

In seinem berühmten Artikel „Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility“ entwickelt Frankfurt ein Gedankenexperiment (einen so genannten Frankfurt-Fall), das zeigen soll, dass PAP falsch ist, bzw. dass man auf den Alternativismus grundsätzlich verzichten kann ohne das Konzept der Verantwortlichkeit preisgeben zu müssen. Ein Frankfurt-Fall ist dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass eine Person, z.B. Jones in einer bestimmten Situation S von sich aus eine bestimmte Handlung A vollzieht, ohne dabei zu wissen, dass die Situation S gar keine andere Handlung außer der vollzogenen Handlung A zugelassen hätte. Eine solche Situation soll kurz skizziert werden:

Nehmen wir an, dass eine Person namens Black aus irgendeinem Grund will, dass Jones das Auto seines Onkels stiehlt. Black ist ein hervorragender Neuro-Chirurg, er kann mit Hilfe eines Apparats Jones' Gehirn manipulieren, sodass Jones unfehlbar die Entscheidung trifft, das Auto zu stehlen und diesen Entschluss dann auch ausführt. Weiter nehmen wir an, dass Black nur dann manipulierend eingreift, wenn Jones nicht von sich aus die Entscheidung trifft, das Auto zu stehlen. Black beobachtet daher Jones' Hirnzustände, um zu kontrollieren, ob Jones tatsächlich von sich aus die gewünschte Entscheidung treffen wird. Drittens nehmen wir an, dass Jones in einem konkreten Fall tatsächlich von sich aus entscheidet, das Auto zu stehlen und es dann auch tut. In diesem Fall greift Black also überhaupt nicht in das Geschehen ein. Wie wäre ein solcher Fall zu beurteilen? Zum einen haben wir die starke Intuition, dass Jones verantwortlich für den Diebstahl ist, schließlich hat er selbst die Entscheidung getroffen ohne dabei, im faktisch stattfindenden Szenario, irgendwie manipuliert worden zu sein, zum andern scheint es so zu sein, dass er keine andere Möglichkeit hatte, als den Wagen zu stehlen, denn schließlich hat Black im Hintergrund sichergestellt, dass nur diese eine Entscheidung möglich war. Black fungiert in diesem Beispiel als kontrafaktischer Eingreifer. Sind diese beiden Beurteilungen zutreffend, dann muss PAP falsch sein.

Für das Funktionieren eines Frankfurt-Falles sind zwei Aspekte grundlegend. Zum einen müssen alternative Handlungsverläufe tatsächlich ausgeschlossen sein, dies wird im genannten Beispiel durch die Existenz eines kontrafaktischen Eingreifers sichergestellt. Allgemeiner kann man sagen, ein Frankfurt-Fall muss so konstruiert sein, dass er Umstände beinhaltet, die Alternativen unmöglich machen. Zum zweiten muss es plausibel bleiben, dass die betreffende Person, Jones, auch wirklich als Urheber der entsprechenden Handlung gelten kann, dies wird im Beispiel dadurch erreicht, dass Black gar nicht eingreift. Im faktisch stattfindenden Szenario nehmen also diejenigen Umstände, die alternative Möglichkeiten ausschließen, überhaupt keinen Einfluss auf den tatsächlichen Handlungsverlauf. Da diese Umstände genauso vollkommen wirkungslos bleiben, wie wenn sie

gar nicht da wären, ist man in der Tat berechtigt, Jones im vollen Umfang für den Urheber der Handlung zu halten, und das scheint auszureichen, um ihm auch die Verantwortung für die Handlung zuzusprechen. Jones' Urheberschaft bleibt trotz des Fehlens von alternativen Möglichkeiten völlig unbeeinträchtigt, und zwar deswegen, weil die Umstände in denen Jones handelt zwar jeden anderen Handlungsverlauf außer den aktuellen *verhindern*, dabei aber auf keine Weise *bewirken*, dass Jones so handelt, wie er handelt. Eine Situation die durch solche Umstände gekennzeichnet ist, bezeichnete David Widerker als IRR-Situation (Widerker 1995). Die Zurückweisung von PAP durch einen Frankfurt-Fall scheint genau dann als erfolgreich beurteilt werden zu können, wenn es gelingt, eine IRR-Situation zu entwickeln.

3. Schwierigkeiten

Widerker selbst gehört zu denjenigen, die bestritten haben, dass es möglich ist, eine genuine IRR-Situation zu konstruieren. Viele der zahlreichen Kritikversuche stützen sich darauf, dass eine frühe Generation von Frankfurt-Fällen nicht ohne ein so genanntes „vorausgehendes Zeichen“ („prior sign“) ausgekommen ist. Im Folgenden soll kurz ein Argumentationstyp skizziert werden, der von Michael McKenna und David Widerker mit dem Ausdruck „Dilemma-Verteidigung“ von PAP versehen wurde (Widerker, McKenna, eds. 2003, 8). Ein Dilemma-Verteidiger weist zunächst einmal darauf hin, dass Black auf ein Zeichen angewiesen ist, dass der Entscheidung von Jones vorausgeht und anzeigt, wie diese ausfallen wird. Ein solches vorausgehendes Zeichen könnte zum Beispiel ein bestimmtes neuronales Aktivitätsmuster von Jones' Gehirn sein. Ein solches Zeichen ist unabdingbar für einen Frankfurt-Fall, wie den oben dargestellten, weil Black ja irgendwie erkennen muss, ob sein Eingreifen notwendig ist oder nicht. Entscheidend ist dabei, dass das Zeichen tatsächlich zu einem Zeitpunkt registriert werden kann, der vor dem Zeitpunkt von Jones Entscheidung liegt. Wäre es anders, dann könnte Black nur noch auf eine schon getroffene Entscheidung von Jones reagieren, und niemand würde in einem solchen Fall leugnen, dass Jones nicht die Möglichkeit gehabt hätte, anders zu entscheiden.

Das Zeichen muss also der Entscheidung von Jones vorausgehen. Nehmen wir an, ein bestimmtes neuronales Muster M, das zu einem Zeitpunkt vor der Entscheidung für Black ersichtlich auftritt, fungiert als Zeichen dafür, dass Jones im Begriff ist, die Entscheidung zu treffen, das Auto seines Onkels zu stehlen. Black registriert M und greift daraufhin nicht ein, er hätte die Entscheidung aber in seinem Sinne manipuliert, wenn M nicht aufgetreten wäre. Der Frankfurt-Fall scheint geglückt zu sein: Jones Entscheidung musste in jedem Fall so ausfallen, wie sie ausfiel, sie wurde im konkreten Fall aber allein durch ihn getroffen. Die beiden Charakteristika einer IRR-Situation scheinen damit gegeben zu sein: Die Umstände lassen keine relevante Alternative zu und das ohne Einfluss zu nehmen auf den Entscheidungsprozess.

Der Verteidiger von PAP bestreitet genau das, indem er auf ein Dilemma hinweist, das das Verhältnis von M zu Jones Entscheidung betrifft. Entweder man nimmt an, dass M selbst Teil eines Prozesses ist, der die Entscheidung, das Auto zu stehlen, determiniert bzw., dass M verknüpft ist mit einem solchen determinierenden Prozess oder man nimmt das nicht an. Wenn man es nicht annimmt, dann kann M nur ein mehr oder weniger zuverlässiger Indikator sein. Das Auftreten von M sagt dann nur mit einer bestimmten Wahrscheinlichkeit voraus,

dass Jones die Entscheidung treffen wird, das Auto zu stehlen. In diesem Fall kann man deswegen nicht von einer echten IRR-Situation sprechen, weil alternative Möglichkeiten offensichtlich gar nicht wirklich ausgeschlossen sind. Wenn M nur mit einer bestimmten Wahrscheinlichkeit die Entscheidung zum Diebstahl anzeigt, dann wäre es ja ohne weiteres denkbar, dass Jones obwohl zuvor M aufgetreten ist, Black also auch nicht eingegriffen hat, dennoch sich gegen den Diebstahl entscheidet und das Auto nicht stiehlt.

Dieser Pol des Dilemmas führt also nicht weiter. Um alternative Möglichkeiten wirklich auszuschließen, bedarf es eines absolut zuverlässigen Zeichens. Nehmen wir also andererseits an, dass das Zeichen, in unserem Fall das neuronale Muster M, mit einem Prozess in Verbindung steht, der Jones' Entscheidung, das Auto zu stehlen, determiniert. In diesem Fall sind alternative Entscheidungsmöglichkeiten zwar ausgeschlossen, allerdings fällt nun das zweite Merkmal einer IRR-Situation weg. Denn inwiefern kann man noch sagen, dass Jones die Entscheidung selbst getroffen hat, wenn ein Prozess diese Entscheidung von vornherein determiniert hat? Bzw. man muss sagen, dass jemand der das für möglich hält, der also die These akzeptiert, dass eine Person eine Entscheidung selbst treffen kann obwohl diese Entscheidung determiniert ist, so jemand ist zugleich mit dieser These logischer Weise auch von der Nichtigkeit von PAP überzeugt, denn diese These impliziert die Nichtigkeit von PAP. Damit führt aber auch dieser zweite Pol des Dilemmas zu nichts, denn wenn man zeigen kann, dass ein Frankfurt-Fall nur unter der Voraussetzung funktioniert, dass PAP falsch ist, dann ist der argumentative Wert gleich Null. Ein Argument, dessen Gültigkeit das voraussetzt, was man mit Hilfe dieses Argumentes zeigen möchte, zeigt gar nichts. Aus diesem Grund dürfen Frankfurt-Fälle keinen Determinismus voraussetzen. Sie scheitern, wenn es gelingt, aufzuzeigen, dass sie konstitutiv einen deterministischen Prozess beinhalten.

4. Blockade-Beispiele

Aufgrund der Schwierigkeiten, die sich im Zusammenhang mit einem vorausgehenden Zeichen ergeben, wurde versucht, Frankfurt-Fälle zu entwickeln, die ohne die Existenz eines solchen Zeichens auskommen. Als viel versprechender Versuch können so genannte „Blockade-Beispiele“ gelten (Widerker, McKenna, eds. 2003, 10). Blockade-Fälle sind so konstruiert, dass alternative Handlungsverläufe von vornherein unterbunden werden, sodass ein späterer Eingriff nicht mehr nötig ist. Das könnte zum Beispiel dadurch geschehen, dass Black schon vor der Entscheidung Jones' Gehirn so manipuliert, dass alle neuronalen Ereignisverläufe, die nicht zu der Entscheidung führen, das Auto zu stehlen, blockiert werden. Jones könnte dann immer noch von sich aus die Entscheidung treffen, das Auto zu stehlen, für eine andere Entscheidung dagegen fehlen ihm sozusagen die neuronalen Voraussetzungen. Man kann sich den Entscheidungs-Prozess, bei dem Jones von sich aus die Entscheidung trifft, das Auto zu stehlen, durchaus als einen in sich indeterminierten Prozess vorstellen, der aber dennoch nur zu einem einzigen Ergebnis führen kann, weil alle „Abzweigungen“ blockiert sind.

Um der größeren Anschaulichkeit willen, kann man auf ein Beispiel von John Martin Fischer zurückgreifen (Fischer 1994, 132): Man kann sich vorstellen, dass die Steuerungselemente eines Autos, d. h. Lenkrad und

Gaspedal, technisch so manipuliert wurden, das man sie nur in einer bestimmten Weise bewegen kann, etwa so, dass das Auto bei gleich bleibender Geschwindigkeit eine Linkskurve macht. Mit einem derart veränderten Fahrzeug kann kein Fahrer etwas anderes fahren als eben diese Linkskurve. Zudem kann man sich einen bestimmten Fahrer denken, der genau diese Kurve fahren will, und er fährt sie dann auch tatsächlich *selbst*. Er führt das Lenkrad, er drückt das Gaspedal, der Blockiermechanismus bleibt dagegen völlig unbeteiligt. Fischer unterscheidet anhand dieses Beispiels zwischen Führungs- und regulativer Kontrolle (ebd.). Der Fahrer im beschriebenen Auto hat zwar Führungs- aber keine regulative Kontrolle, er kontrolliert zwar das Auto, hat aber keine Kontrolle *über* das Auto, so Fischer.

5. Urheberschaft ohne Alternativismus?

Ein Blockade-Beispiel stellt einen Fall dar, der einer IRR-Situation zumindest sehr nahe kommt. Die dargestellten Umstände scheinen so zu sein, dass sie eine bestimmte Handlung unvermeidlich machen, ohne sie hervorzubringen. Hervorgebracht wird die Handlung vom jeweiligen Akteur. In einer neueren Stellungnahme weist Harry Frankfurt darauf hin, dass der springende Punkt von Frankfurt-Fällen darin zu sehen ist, dass sie einen begrifflichen Unterschied plausibel machen: Es unvermeidlich zu machen, dass eine bestimmte Handlung vollzogen wird, ist etwas anderes als zu bewirken, dass sie vollzogen wird (Frankfurt 2003, 340). Die Sinnhaftigkeit dieser Unterscheidung wird, so Frankfurt, auch dann deutlich, wenn es nicht möglich sein sollte, eine wirklich unangreifbare IRR-Situation zu konstruieren. Vor dem Hintergrund des Unterschieds von „Es unvermeidbar machen, dass X ausgeführt wird“ und „Bewirken, dass X ausgeführt wird“, kann versucht werden, PAP auf folgende Weise zurückzuweisen: Daraus, dass bestimmte Umstände eine Handlung unvermeidbar machen, d.h. Alternativismus nicht gegeben ist, folgt nicht, dass diese Umstände die Handlung auch bewirken. Daher ist es in einem weiteren Schritt möglich, dem Akteur die Urheberschaft für eben diese (unvermeidbare) Handlung und damit die Verantwortung zuzusprechen. Dieser Gedankengang soll zeigen, dass Urheberschaft ohne Alternativismus denkbar ist: Jemand kann angeblich der Urheber einer Handlung sein ohne alternative Möglichkeiten zu haben. Wenn Urheberschaft ohne Alternativismus denkbar ist, dann kann PAP als widerlegt gelten.

6. Kritik

Kann es tatsächlich gelingen die These, dass Urheberschaft keinen Alternativismus benötigt, an Hand von Frankfurt-Fällen zu begründen? Klassische Frankfurt-Fälle können diese These aufgrund des Dilemma-Problems nicht wirklich erhärten, verfeinerte Spielarten von Frankfurt-Fällen, wie etwa Blockade-Beispiele, hingegen, können die These durchaus insoweit stützen, als sie die begriffliche Unterscheidung zwischen „Es unvermeidbar machen, dass X ausgeführt wird“ und „Bewirken, dass X ausgeführt wird“ einsichtig machen. Blockade-Beispiele zeigen daher, dass man eine Person unter Umständen auch dann als Urheber einer Handlung verstehen kann, wenn die Ausführung dieser Handlung unvermeidbar ist. Zeigt das aber schon, dass Urheberschaft ohne irgendeine Form von Alternativismus denkbar ist? Nein, eine entscheidende Alternative bleibt der handelnden Person in

jedem Fall: Sie kann es vermeiden, *als Urheber* zu handeln. Gerade Blockade-Beispiele zeigen das deutlich.

Greifen wir noch einmal das Beispiel vom manipulierten Auto auf. Der am Steuersystem angebrachte Mechanismus macht eine bestimmte Fahrlinie unvermeidlich, erlaubt dem Fahrer aber, genau diese Linie zu fahren. Im konkreten Fall fährt der Fahrer also tatsächlich selbst exakt diese bestimmte Kurve. Was geschieht aber, wenn der Fahrer eine andere Richtung einschlagen will? Diese Möglichkeit kann nicht von vornherein ausgeschlossen werden, da sein Fahrverhalten nicht determiniert sein darf (siehe 3.). Jetzt greift der Blockiermechanismus und hält den Wagen auf der vorgezeichneten Linie, offensichtlich bewirkt der Fahrer jetzt gar nichts mehr. Er zieht am Lenkrad, das aber nicht gehorcht, er geht vom Gaspedal, das aber gedrückt bleibt. Klarer Weise kann man sich den Blockiermechanismus jetzt nicht mehr unwirksam vorstellen. War es zuvor noch möglich, zu sagen, der Mechanismus macht eine bestimmte Fahrkurve nur unvermeidbar, er bewirkt sie aber nicht, so muss man jetzt, da der Fahrer nichts mehr bewirkt, sagen, der Mechanismus sorgt selbst dafür, dass das Auto sich in entsprechender Weise weiter bewegt. Auf ein Mal wirkt also der Mechanismus, während er vorher nichts bewirkt hat, er wurde durch den Fahrer sozusagen gezwungen, zu wirken. Selbst wenn der Mechanismus gar nichts anderes tut, wie zuvor, so ist doch deutlich, dass sich seine kausale Bedeutsamkeit entscheidend verändert hat. Das Auto ändert seinen vorherbestimmten Kurs natürlich um keinen Deut, was sich aber grundlegend geändert hat, ist, dass der Fahrer nicht mehr als Urheber der Fahrt verstanden werden kann. Die Weitergabe der Rolle des Wirkenden vom Fahrer an den Mechanismus, ging allein von Fahrer aus. Es drängt sich daher die Deutung auf, dass der Fahrer schon vorher eine alternative Möglichkeit hatte, nämlich die, nicht mehr zu wirken.

Der andere Fall, in dem Jones' Gehirn mit einer Blockade versehen wurde, lässt sich zwar sehr viel schwerer vorstellen, man kommt aber zu keiner anderen Deutung: Der indeterminierte neuronale Prozess, der dazu führt, dass Jones das Auto stiehlt, kann prinzipiell eben weil er indeterminiert ist, die neuronale Blockade dazu zwingen, zu wirken, und in diesem Fall wäre Jones nicht mehr der moralische Urheber des Diebstahls.

Blockade-Beispiele zeigen damit ganz deutlich den Zusammenhang von Urheberschaft und Alternativismus. Man kann jemanden nur dann als verantwortlichen Urheber einer Handlung verstehen, wenn man annimmt, dass er zumindest diese eine Alternative hat, auch nicht als Urheber zu handeln.¹ In diesem Sinn ist die Idee der Urheberschaft untrennbar mit dem Begriff des Alternativismus verknüpft. Urheberschaft und Alternativismus bezeichnen zwar zwei verschiedene Aspekte von Freiheit, man kann den einen davon aber nicht völlig eliminieren ohne den anderen nicht auch zu verlieren. Ein Verteidiger von PAP kann, gerade wenn er auf eine technische Diskussion, darüber ob Blockade-Fälle funktionieren oder nicht, verzichtet, und zugesteht, dass Blockadefälle denkbar sind, darauf verweisen, dass Blockade-Beispiele selbst, diesen Zusammenhang aufzeigen.

¹ An dieser Stelle kann man die Diskussion über das „Prinzip der vermeidbaren Schuld“ (PAB „principle of avoidable blame“) anschließen. Vergleiche z.B. Harrison 2004.

Zuzugeben ist, dass wenn man PAP wort-wörtlich versteht, in dem Sinn, dass eine Person nur dann verantwortlich für eine Handlung A ist, wenn sie die Ausführung dieser Handlung A auch vermeiden könnte, dann ist PAP wohl nicht zu halten. Versteht man PAP aber eher als Ausdruck der Intuition, dass man Personen nur dann als verantwortliche Urheber für eine Handlung verstehen kann, wenn sie *zumindest* diese eine alternative Möglichkeit haben, dass sie es vermeiden können, genau diese Handlung *als Urheber* auszuführen, dann gibt es keinen Anlass, PAP aufgrund von Frankfurt-Fällen fallen zu lassen.

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Substanz, Kausalität und Freiheit

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I. Einführung

Libertarianistische Konzeptionen der Handlungs- und Entscheidungsfreiheit werden gegenwärtig anhand von drei unterschiedlichen Ansätzen diskutiert: (a) *Nicht-kausale* Theorien (Ginet 1990, McCann 1998) gehen davon aus, dass eine Handlung H nur dann frei ist, wenn es keine Entität gibt, durch die H verursacht wurde; (b) *Indeterministisch-kausale* Ansätze (Mele 1995, Ekstrom 2000) betrachten eine Handlung H hingegen als frei, wenn H durch die mentalen Prozesse des Akteurs auf nicht-deterministische Weise verursacht wurde; (c) Und im Rahmen von klassischen *Akteurskausalitäts*-Theorien (Chisholm 1985, Taylor 1966) wird eine Handlung H solange für frei gehalten, wie sie durch ein substantielles Einzelding – nämlich den Akteur selbst – verursacht ist.

Unter ontologischen Gesichtspunkten stellen Ansätze, die unter (c) fallen eine besondere Herausforderung dar, da sie auf starken metaphysischen Annahmen beruhen, wie das Verhältnis von Kausalität und Freiheit im Handlungszusammenhang zu denken ist. Einerseits teilen sie mit den unter (a) angeführten nicht-kausalen Theorien die Auffassung, dass freie Handlungen nicht auf eine der verschiedenen reduktionistischen Varianten der Ereigniskausalität zurückzuführen sind (z. B. Regularitätsthese, kontrafaktische Analyse oder probabilistischer Ansatz). Andererseits halten sie zwar daran fest, dass Handlungen das kausale Produkt der motivationalen Zustände einer Person sind, bezweifeln jedoch, dass sich allein auf dieser Grundlage erklären ließe, worin der libertarianistische Gedanke einer *freien* Entscheidung besteht.

Als Gegenentwurf wird eine Art *Substanzkausalität* propagiert, die das Ziel hat, den *interventionistischen* Charakter menschlicher Handlungen in den Vordergrund zu rücken. Dieser Vorschlag beinhaltet jedoch zwei weitreichende Konsequenzen: Erstens wird davon ausgegangen, dass zwischen dem traditionellen Verständnis von Kausalität – beruhend auf einem deterministischen Begriff der Ereignisverursachung – und dem vorgeschlagenen Akteurskonzept eine nicht zu überwindende Kluft besteht, die daher rührt, dass Akteure, obgleich sie in der Lage sind bestimmte Ereignisse selbst zu initiieren, nicht der Verursachung eines vorausgehenden Ereignisses unterliegen. Damit hofft man dem allgemeinen Dilemma zu entgehen, dass freie Handlungen weder im Sinne einer vollständigen Verursachung extern determiniert sind, noch rein zufällig, auf der Basis glücklicher Umstände zustande kommen – denn in beiden Fällen wäre die Handlung der kausalen Kontrolle des Akteurs entzogen. Zweitens folgt, dass dasjenige Glied einer kausalen Relation, welches die Handlung oder einen mentalen Zustand verursacht, selbst kein Ereignis ist, sondern ein unabhängiges substantielles Einzelding; und da solche Einzeldinge über die Zeit hinweg immer vollständig gegenwärtig sind, ist man zugleich auf die Behauptung verpflichtet, dass Akteure *endurantistische* Objekte im herkömmlichen Sinne sind (O'Connor 2002).

Beide Konsequenzen und die Tatsache, dass letztlich nicht klar ist, was sich genau genommen hinter dem Begriff der Substanzkausalität verbirgt, haben Anlass

zu zahlreichen Einwänden gegeben (Aune 1977, Broad 1952, Ginet 1990, van Inwagen 2002), die Vertreter des Akteurskonzepts in jüngster Zeit dazu bewegen haben, den ursprünglichen Ansatz einer nicht unbedeutenden Revision zu unterziehen (Chisholm 1995, Clarke 1996, Markosian 1999, van Wachter 2003). Ausgangspunkt ist die These, dass es offenkundig ein Fehler war, darauf zu bestehen, dass sich Akteurs- und Ereigniskausalität unversöhnlich gegenüberstehen. Vielmehr muss es darum gehen, die traditionelle Sichtweise zu überwinden, wonach bei der Verursachung einer freien Handlung immer nur *eine* kausale Determinante im Spiel ist. Betrachtet man das Hervorbringen einer Handlung als ein komplexes kodeterminiertes Geschehen, das sich aus der simultanen Verschmelzung *zweier* nicht miteinander identischer Verursachungsketten zusammensetzt ('double causation') – wobei es einige Phasen des initiierten Handlungsereignisses gibt, die durch vorangegangene Ereignisse nicht-deterministisch verursacht wurden, und mindestens eine weitere Phase existiert, die der Akteur direkt, ohne eine vorhergehende Verursachung aufgrund seiner spontanen Entscheidung bewirkt hat – dann scheint der im Vorfeld behauptete Gegensatz hinfällig zu sein. Gemäß einer *moderaten* Lesart der Akteurskausalität sind beide Formen der Kausalität genau dann miteinander vereinbar, wenn man die Art der Ereignisverursachung – ähnlich der unter (b) angeführten Theorien – als indeterministisch betrachtet.

Vertreter der moderaten Variante sind der Ansicht, dass die Annahme einer indeterministischen Ereignisverursachung nicht nur große Vorteile für die entsprechende Handlungserklärung bringt, sondern auch für eine höhere Plausibilität der Akteurskausalität sorgt. Aufgrund der Vereinbarkeit beider Konzepte soll es unter anderem möglich sein, den Standardeinwand zu entkräften, der besagt, dass Akteure, die als substantielle Einzeldinge aufgefasst werden, nicht damit verträglich sind, dass Ursachen zeitlich datierbare Entitäten sind. Demgegenüber werde ich deutlich machen, dass auch ein moderater Ansatz der Akteurskausalität nicht in der Lage ist, für dieses Problem eine befriedigende Antwort zu liefern. Generell wird es sich als fraglich erweisen, ob der Rückgriff auf ein indeterministisches Verständnis der Ereigniskausalität wirklich geeignet ist, die inkompatibilistischen Intuitionen zu stützen, die mit einer libertarianistischen Auffassung der Handlungs- und Entscheidungsfreiheit für gewöhnlich verbunden sind.

II. Das Problem der zeitlichen Verursachung

Die Möglichkeit einer auf substantiellen Einzeldingen basierenden Akteurskausalität wurde bereits sehr früh durch einen Einwand von C. D. Broad (1952) attackiert:

„I see no prima facie objection to there being events that are not completely determined. But, in so far as an event is determined, an essential factor in its total causes must be other events. How can an event possibly be determined to happen at a certain date if its total cause contained no factor to which the notion of date has any application? And how can the notion of date have any application to anything that is not an event?“ (Broad 1952, 215).

Broads Argument lässt sich wie folgt verstehen: Wenn ein Ereignis zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt auftritt, dann existiert nur dann eine Ursache, wenn es irgendeinen Teil der gesamten Ursache dieses Ereignisses gibt, der zeitlich so datiert ist, dass die hervorgerufene Wirkung tatsächlich nur zum betreffenden Zeitpunkt eintritt. Eine solche zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt datierte Ursache kann aber nur ein Ereignis und kein substantielles Einzelding sein.

Der Grund für diese Behauptung liegt unter anderem darin, dass kausale Wirkungen durch Entitäten hervorgebracht werden, die, obgleich sie raum-zeitliche Einzeldinge sind, auf ganz spezifische Weise ‚in‘ der Zeit erscheinen. So können Ereignisse im zeitlichen Intervall, in dem sie existieren, zu einem gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt stattfinden, gleichwohl sie echte Teile besitzen, die zu diesem Zeitpunkt bereits vergangen sind, und daher nicht zum derzeitigen Stattfinden des Ereignisses gehören. Dieser Umstand verdeutlicht, warum Ereignisse offenkundig besser geeignet sind, das zeitliche Auftreten einer Ursache zu erklären. Von einem Ereignis kann widerspruchsfrei behauptet werden, dass dessen Auftreten zu einem früheren Zeitpunkt die Ursache für eine bestimmte Wirkung war, obgleich dasselbe Ereignis gegenwärtig stattfindet und nicht diese Wirkung hervorruft. Bei substantiellen Einzeldingen, die als endurantistische Objekte zu jedem Zeitpunkt mit all ihren Teilen vollständig gegenwärtig sind, ist das hingegen nicht so einfach der Fall.

Im Gegensatz zur traditionellen Variante scheint der moderate Ansatz für diese Schwierigkeit eine angemessene Antwort parat zu haben. Wenn das Hervorbringen einer freien Handlung ein komplexes ko-determiniertes Ereignis ist, das durch den Akteur selbst *plus* einige weitere in den Prozess des Hervorbringens involvierte Ereignisse erzeugt wird – wie etwa das ‚Haben‘ von bestimmten Wünschen und Überzeugungen einschließlich der Ereignisse, die diesen mentalen Zuständen vorausgegangen sind – dann kann natürlich eingeräumt werden, dass die Ursache der vom Akteur erzeugten Handlung eine zeitlich datierbare Entität ist (Clarke 2003, 198). Nicht der Akteur, wohl aber das mit ihm verbundene Ereignis des ‚Habens‘ einer propositionalen Einstellung ist so geartet, dass es – wie jedes andere Ereignis – ‚in‘ der Zeit existiert, d. h. es gibt einen datierbaren Teil der gesamten Ursache dieses Ereignisses, der früher stattfand und die betreffende Einstellung bewirkt hat.

Dagegen lässt sich jedoch folgender Einwand erheben: Wenn der Akteur (betrachtet als ein substantielles Einzelding) ein Handlungsereignis hervorbringt, geschieht das *nicht* – jedenfalls dann nicht, wenn die moderate Sichtweise korrekt ist – *weil* dieser Akteur eine bestimmte Handlung erzeugt (z. B. durch den direkten Vollzug der Handlung), sondern aufgrund der Tatsache, dass seine Handlung zum Zeitpunkt der Ausführung die Eigenschaft besitzt, ein ko-determiniertes Ereignis zu sein. Mit anderen Worten, das Handlungsereignis findet statt, *weil* parallel dazu irgendein relevanter propositionaler Zustand existiert, von dem behauptet wird, dass er der kausale Grund für das Stattfinden der Handlung ist. Substantielle Einzeldinge bringen zeitlich festgelegte Handlungsereignisse also nur indirekt hervor, nämlich über das ‚Haben‘ einer Eigenschaft zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt. Aber damit ist die zeitlich datierbare Wirkung – für die der Akteur verantwortlich ist – nicht von der Art, dass sie durch das substantielle Einzelding *simpliciter* erzeugt wird. Nicht die

Substanz selbst, sondern das Ereignis des ‚Habens‘ einer Eigenschaft durch das substantielle Einzelding ist als Ursache zeitlich bestimmt. Und sofern dieser Gedanke plausibel ist, kann auch die moderate Variante der Akteurskausalität nicht die These entkräften, dass das unterstellte Substanzkonzept der zeitlichen Datierung kausaler Relationen zuwider läuft.

3. Inkompatibilistische Kontrolle und kausale Transitivität

Bislang stand völlig außer Frage, dass gerade Ansätze der Akteurskausalität zu den inkompatibilistischen Theorien der Handlungs- und Entscheidungsfreiheit gehören. Ein Akteur vollzieht nur dann eine freie Handlung – was als Voraussetzung dafür gilt, dass er für sein Tun verantwortlich ist – wenn die kausalen Faktoren, die zur Handlung geführt haben, unter seiner Kontrolle stehen und nicht vorab durch andere Ereignisse determiniert sind. Diese Kontrolle wird offenbar am einfachsten gewährleistet, solange der Akteur selbst der Urheber der Handlung ist.

Dennoch mag man sich fragen, was eigentlich gegen eine kompatibilistische Version der Akteurskausalität spricht? Nehmen wir z. B. den folgenden Vorschlag (Markosian 1999, S. 268):

Kompatibilistische Akteurskausalität. Die Handlung H eines Akteurs A ist frei (im Sinne von moralisch verantwortlich), gdw. (i) H ist verursacht; und (ii) die Ursache von H ist A.

Auf den ersten Blick scheint diese Definition völlig inadäquat zu sein. Sie besagt nur, dass A die Ursache von H ist, schließt aber nicht aus, dass es womöglich äußere Faktoren sind, die A genötigt haben, H hervorzubringen. Eine kausale Kontrolle der Handlung durch den Akteur wäre somit nicht gegeben.

Aber hat dieser Einwand im Hinblick auf eine moderate Lesart dieselbe Berechtigung? Sicherlich nicht. Denn gemäß der moderaten Sichtweise ist die traditionelle Behauptung einer bloß linearen Verursachung abzulehnen. Doch sobald man vom Prinzip der Ko-determination ausgeht (als simultane Mehrfachverursachung), ist es durchaus zulässig, dass es Ursachen gibt, die außerhalb der Kontrolle von A liegen. Daraus folgt nun aber nicht, dass A die Handlung H nicht frei hervorgebracht hat. Denn zusätzlich zu den äußeren Faktoren, gibt es mindestens eine weitere Ursache – jenes Sub-Ereignis, das allein der Akteur initiiert hat – die *innerhalb* der Kontrolle von A liegt. Und so gesehen, wäre die moderate Version der Akteurskausalität auch mit einer strengen Auffassung des Determinismus vereinbar; denn unter dem zuletzt genannten Aspekt, kann H durch A hervorgebracht sein, obwohl es andere Ursachen gibt, die außerhalb von A liegen und auf deterministische Weise vorherbestimmt sind.

Ganz egal, wie dieser kompatibilistische Vorstoß letztlich zu bewerten ist, er macht zumindest einen Punkt hinreichend klar: Aufgrund der revisionistischen Tendenz, die der moderaten Lesart angesichts der Aufhebung des traditionellen Kausalverständnisses anheftet, scheint es mit Hilfe dieses Ansatzes unmöglich zu sein, die libertarianistischen Intuitionen zu wahren, die ein auf substanz-ontologischen Überlegungen basierendes Akteurskonzept normalerweise auszeichnet.

Im abschließenden Teil des Vortrags werde ich diese Behauptung durch einen weiteren, mehr grundsätzlicheren Zweifel – der die Natur kausaler Relationen betrifft – zu stützen versuchen. Obwohl zum Teil gravierende Unterschiede bestehen, gehen moderate Ansätze der Akteurskausalität davon aus, dass kausale Beziehungen, die zwischen substanzialen Einzeldingen bestehen, nicht im direkten Zugriff erklärbar sind. Vielmehr wird zu explanatorischen Zwecken angenommen, dass es *höher-stufige Relationen* zwischen Eigenschaften gibt, die für eine direkte Verursachung verantwortlich sind. Die kausale Wirksamkeit von Einzeldinge lässt sich daher *nur* über die Eigenschaften verständlich machen, die von ihnen exemplifiziert werden (O'Connor 1995, Clarke 1996). Wann immer also ein substanzielles Einzelding c die direkte Ursache für ein anderes Objekt e ist, muss Folgendes erfüllt sein: Es gibt eine Eigenschaft F und eine Eigenschaft G, so dass c's Exemplifikation von F und e's Exemplifikation von G erklärt, warum c die Ursache von e ist.

Im Anschluss an Douglas Ehring (1997) kann jedoch gezeigt werden, dass derartige Erklärungen von der allgemeinen Schwierigkeit betroffen sind, gegen das grundlegende Prinzip der *Transitivität* von Kausalrelationen zu verstoßen. Geht man davon aus, dass Einzeldinge verschiedene Eigenschaften exemplifizieren, so lässt sich beispielsweise eine kausale Kette denken – bestehend aus einer Sequenz von drei aufeinanderfolgenden Objekten, die aufgrund ihrer Eigenschaften in einer kausalen Verbindung stehen – die folgende Struktur besitzt: Während das erste und zweite Objekt aufgrund der Exemplifikation von F und G kausal verbunden sind, basiert die kausale Relation zwischen dem zweiten und dritten Objekt auf einer Exemplifikation der Eigenschaften G* und I. Für Kausalketten dieser Art gilt, dass die exemplifizierte Eigenschaft – aufgrund der das zweite Objekt verursacht wird und die gleichzeitig als Ursache für das dritte Objekt dienen soll – nicht dieselbe ist ($G \neq G^*$), weshalb unklar bleibt, wodurch die Transitivität der kausalen Relata gewährleistet ist. Zumindest in einigen Fällen scheint eine Erklärung kausaler Relationen qua Verursachung durch höherstufige Eigenschaften inadäquat zu sein.

Als Alternative werde ich einen Ansatz vorschlagen, der dieses Problem umgeht, indem er das Auftreten kausaler Relationen mit dem Bestehen von zeitlich festgelegten Tatsachen identifiziert. Entsprechend werde ich dafür plädieren, dass das Konzept der Akteurskausalität in seiner bisherigen rein substanz-ontologischen Reformulierung aufzugeben ist.

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Fremdverstehen als dialogische Hermeneutik

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Eine zentrale, als „hermeneutischer Zirkel“ bekannte Einsicht der Hermeneutik besagt, dass jedes Verständnis geprägt und ermöglicht ist von einem Vorverständnis. Die Hauptgefahr des Verstehens besteht darin, die Bestimmungen seines Vorverständnisses über eine postulierte Metaposition absolut zu setzen und das zu Verstehende darauf zu reduzieren. Eine solche Vorgehensweise orientiert sich an erkenntnisfundamentalistischen Ansätzen, die versuchen, aus Inhalt und Form eines durch privilegierten Wirklichkeitsbezug ausgezeichneten Rationalitätskonzeptes heraus einen universellen Maßstab gesicherten Wissens zu gewinnen, mit dessen Hilfe man etwas „versteht“, indem man es in den Bestand der eigenen begrifflichen Vorgaben eingliedert. Im Rahmen einer interkulturellen Hermeneutik äußert sich dies als eine Reduktion des Fremden auf das Eigene, wodurch sich in den Darstellungen der thematisierten Denk- und Lebensweisen überwiegend das Selbstverständnis des Interpreten spiegelt, wogegen das Selbstverständnis des zu verstehenden Gegenübers nur verzerrt zum Ausdruck kommt.

Zu einer Neubewertung der hermeneutischen Situation nötigt jedoch ein verändertes Vernunft- und Rationalitätsverständnis, wie es sich im Kontext der radikalisierten Moderne ausgebildet hat. Im Hinblick auf eine Methodik des Fremdverstehens zentral ist dabei die zunehmende Unglaubwürdigkeit absoluter Erkenntnisansprüche, weil alle Erkenntnisse sich als Derivate eines praktischen und symbolisch strukturierten Lebenszusammenhangs erweisen, dessen wechselhafte und kontingente Bedingungen in ihre Konstitution mit eingehen. Aus der Diversität variierender Bedingungskonstellationen ergibt sich synchron und diachron eine Vielheit von Rationalitätsformen, in die niemand über eine Metaposition privilegierten Einblick beanspruchen kann.

Im Unterschied zu einem selbstbezüglich-zentrisch konzipierten Verhältnis zum Forschungsgegenstand, das letztlich *monologisch* strukturiert ist und das Fremde auf das Eigene reduziert, führen diese Einsichten zur Forderung nach einem *dialogischen* Verhältnis, d.h. Eigenes und Fremdes stehen sich auf gleicher Höhe gegenüber und man ist darauf angewiesen, im Verstehen des Fremden von dort her etwas in sich aufzunehmen, das über den Horizont des Eigenen hinausgeht und sich somit nicht aus dem Bestand des eigenen Erkenntnischemas ableiten lässt. Für einen wissenschaftlichen Verstehensbegriff folgt daraus, dass das zu Verstehende nicht einfach ein Gegenstand ist, dem man gerecht wird, indem man ihn nach Maßgabe der eigenen Verständnisweise deutet, vielmehr handelt es sich um einen Gegenstand, der sich selbst bereits in bestimmter Weise versteht und dessen Selbstverständnis deshalb den eigentlichen Gegenstand bildet. Es kommt dann zunächst darauf an, der Differenz, die das andere Selbstverständnis im Unterschied zum eigenen kennzeichnet, genügend Raum zu geben.

Gleichzeitig muss jedoch bedacht werden, dass Identifizierungen, Verallgemeinerungen und das Postulieren einer Metaposition (die jedoch immer einer partikularen Position immanent bleibt) letztendlich

unvermeidlich sind. Der Vorsicht bezüglich identifizierender Übertragungen des Vorverständnisses in Form ungerechtfertigter Verallgemeinerungen steht also die Notwendigkeit eines minimalen Vorverständnisses gegenüber. Mit anderen Worten, das hermeneutische Verhältnis zu etwas beinhaltet zwei Aspekte: Differenz, aber auch Identität, denn wäre das zu Verstehende in jeder Hinsicht radikal anders wäre ein verstehender Zugang von vorn herein aussichtslos.

Um also weder der Scylla reduktionistischer Vereinheitlichung noch der Charybdis völliger Inkommensurabilität zu verfallen, bedarf es einer begrifflichen Konzeption, welche die beiden hier relevanten Aspekte: a) die unreduzierbare Differenz des zu Verstehenden und b) die notwendigen Verallgemeinerungen und Identifizierungen in angemessener Weise integriert.

Einen besonders geeigneten Anknüpfungspunkt hierfür bietet die Konzeption der „Sprachspiele“ im Spätwerk von Ludwig Wittgenstein (vgl. Wittgenstein 1984), sowie deren Anwendung auf die Probleme des Fremdverstehens bei Peter Winch (vgl. Winch 1987). Für unsere Zwecke zentral ist dabei der Gedanke, dass „Sprachspiele“ jeweils eigenen Regeln folgen, aus denen sich die Bedeutung sprachlicher Ausdrucksgestalten ergibt. Für Wittgenstein besteht daher eine „Entsprechung zwischen den Begriffen >Bedeutung< und >Regel<.“ (Wittgenstein 184a, 132.) Wenn man das eigene und das fremde Denken als unterschiedliche „Sprachspiele“ auffasst, so ist die Unverständlichkeit von Aussagen darauf zurückzuführen, dass wir die entsprechenden bedeutungskonstituierenden Regeln nicht kennen bzw. es kommt zu Missverständnissen, weil wir versuchen, unsere eigenen Regeln zu applizieren. Der Aspekt der Differenz zum Fremden lässt sich also beschreiben als die Unterschiedlichkeit von Regelsystemen.

Etwas schwieriger gestaltet sich in Wittgensteins Konzeption das Auffinden eines verbindenden Aspektes der „Sprachspiele“ als Basis für einen Übergang, denn Wittgenstein selbst sprach sich ausdrücklich gegen solche Bestimmungen auf einer Metaebene aus. Statt dessen charakterisiert er das Verhältnis von „Sprachspielen“ als „Familienähnlichkeit“. Demnach kann man die Vielheit der „Sprachspiele“ nicht auf einen verbindlichen Bestand gemeinsamer Merkmale beziehen, sondern nur nach von Fall zu Fall variierenden partiellen Ähnlichkeiten suchen (vgl. Wittgenstein 1984, Teil I, § 65-67). Es ist jedoch fraglich, ob diese Position konsistent durchzuhalten ist, denn auch Wittgenstein kann es nicht vermeiden, allgemeinverbindliche Aussagen über die „Sprachspiele“ zu machen, nämlich u.a., dass sie Regeln folgen.

Das Vorhandensein von Regeln ist also ein allen „Sprachspielen“ gemeinsames Merkmal. Zur Charakterisierung dieser Gemeinsamkeit spricht Winch auch von „Rationalität“, im Sinne eines auf Konvention beruhenden Regelzusammenhangs, der Unterscheidungen in richtig und falsch ermöglicht (Winch 1987, 95ff.). Davon ausgehend, können wir das allen „Sprachspielen“ gemeinsame Merkmal der Rationalität bzw. der Regelmäßigkeit als ein notwendiges Vorverständnis bestimmen für eine Beschäftigung mit einem fremden Denken (sonst gäbe es dort nichts zu

verstehen). D.h.: das Verstehen eines fremden Denkens ist prinzipiell möglich, weil es, so wie das eigene, Regeln folgt - nur eben anderen.

Im Hinblick auf den hermeneutischen Zugang zu einem anderen Selbstverständnis wird es nötig sein, dieses minimale Vorverständnis noch genauer zu spezifizieren und die für uns relevanten Aspekte weiter einzugrenzen. Dabei möchte ich mich konzentrieren auf konstative Aussagen, die im weitesten Sinne einen Anspruch auf Wahrheit erheben. Bei der Explikation des Vorverständnisses bezüglich solcher Aussagen lassen sich drei Kategorien von Regeln unterscheiden, wobei die späteren im Umfang jeweils kleiner werden und die vorherigen voraussetzen:

- 1) Der umfassende Komplex aller Regeln, die es ermöglichen, Wörter, Wortgruppen und Sätze grammatisch korrekt zu bilden, als Voraussetzung dafür, Aussagen zu formulieren.

Eine weitere Art von Regeln bezieht sich auf die Aussagen, welche sich aus der Anwendung der ersten Regeln ergeben. Zwei Aspekte sind dabei zu beachten:

- 2a) Die grammatische Korrektheit an sich sagt noch nichts darüber aus, ob eine Aussage in ihrem verwendeten Kontext als sinnvoll und verständlich erscheint. Neben den Regeln der Grammatik gibt es also sprachpragmatische Regeln, welche über die situationsspezifisch angemessene Verwendungsweise von Aussagen entscheiden. Orientiert an diesen Regeln konstituiert sich ein Horizont des in entsprechenden Kontexten prinzipiell Verständlichen.
- 2b) Innerhalb der durch 2a) gegebenen Grenzen des prinzipiell Verständlichen wiederum kommt es zur Ausbildung von unterschiedlichen Ansichten. Das lässt schließen auf das Vorhandensein noch eines engeren Kreises von Regeln, mit deren Hilfe diese Ansichten bzw. weitergehend Komplexe von Ansichten in Form systematisierter Lehren etc. zum Ausdruck gebracht und von anderen abgesetzt werden. Sie konstituieren ein spezifisches Selbstverständnis und legen fest, ob eine Aussage mit ihm übereinstimmt oder nicht - ob sie aus dortiger Sicht als wahr gelten kann, oder nicht.

In dieser Differenzierung von Regelrationalität in drei Klassen von Regeln bezieht sich also 1) auf grammatische Korrektheit, 2a) auf inhaltliche Verständlichkeit und 2b) auf Zustimmungsfähigkeit von einem spezifischen Selbstverständnis aus. Für die hier formulierte Aufgabenstellung sind nicht alle diese Arten von Regeln gleichermaßen interessant, so setzt die eigentliche hermeneutische Arbeit erst dann ein, wenn der in 1) genannte Regelkomplex hinreichend bekannt ist und man einen Zugang hat zu dem propositionalen Gehalt der zu verstehenden Aussagen. Die Aufmerksamkeit muss sich dann auf die Regeln der Kategorie 2a) oder 2b) richten, denn sie bestimmen, wie eine Aussage innerhalb einer Gemeinschaft verstanden und bewertet wird. Sofern man sich um das Verständnis eines bestimmten expliziten Selbstverständnisses, einer spezifischen Weltsicht oder Lehre etc. bemüht, bilden die Regeln der Kategorie 2b) den zentralen Gegenstand des hermeneutischen Interesses.

Auch damit ist der hier relevante Aspekt der Regelhaftigkeit noch nicht präzise genug benannt. Eine weitere, bezüglich der Annäherung an ein anderes Selbstverständnis hilfreiche Typisierung können wir Gilbert

Ryle entnehmen, der unterscheidet zwischen einem „knowing how“, wobei es um die praktische Fähigkeit geht, etwas tun zu können, und einem „knowing that“, dem ausdrücklichen Wissen um das, was man tut (vgl. Ryle 1969, 26ff.) Angewandt auf die obigen Kategorien von Regeln ergibt sich folgendes Bild:

Die unter 1) zusammengefassten Regeln bleiben im Gebrauch von Sprache für gewöhnlich implizit; das Formulieren und bewusste Vergegenwärtigen grammatischer Regeln ist keine notwendige Bedingung für ihre kompetente Anwendung. Auch die mit 2a) bezeichneten Regeln, die sich auf die Aussageinhalte beziehen und die Grenzen des Verständlichen kennzeichnen, bleiben meist unausdrücklich. Für beide Kategorien gilt, dass die mit den Regeln gegebenen Unterscheidungen zwischen richtig und falsch normalerweise solange unsichtbar bleiben, bis man eine Regel verletzt. Sie bilden einen selbstverständlichen Hintergrund, der erst dann als solcher wahrgenommen wird, wenn Irritationen auftreten.

Anders verhält es sich jedoch bei den Regeln der Kategorie 2b). Bei ihnen ist die Unterscheidung richtig/falsch ausdrücklich der Inhalt einer Aussage. Das gilt immer dann, wenn man mit einer Aussage einen expliziten Standpunkt vertritt - eine Ansicht oder Meinung. Eine solche Aussage entspricht dem Setzen einer Regel, indem man bezüglich einer bestimmten Thematik die korrekte Sichtweise festlegt, d.h. angibt, was hier richtig und was falsch ist. Im Gegensatz zu den unter 1) und 2a) gefassten Regeln sind die Regeln der Kategorie 2b), so wie sie hier bestimmt wurden, immer explizit.

Aus dem Gesagten folgt, dass die Referenzpunkte des Regelsystems eines expliziten Selbstverständnisses, welche über die interne Bedeutung des Inhalts von Aussagen entscheiden, eben die zentralen Aussagen sind, in denen man dort seine Wahrheiten über die Beschaffenheit der Wirklichkeit, über die rechte Lebensführung etc. artikuliert. Der Zugang zu einem anderen Selbstverständnis ist demnach an dem *ausdrücklichen Wissen* interessiert, das die betreffenden Menschen uns in ihren Aussagen mitteilen. Erst in der Rezeption dieses Wissens ist der Interpret in der Lage, den Bestand seiner Begrifflichkeiten und damit den Horizont seines Denkens auf ein anderes Denken hin zu erweitern und etwas Neues zu lernen.

Für eine Hermeneutik des expliziten internen Verständnisses der Aussagen einer fremden Tradition kommt es also darauf an, die ebenfalls in Form von Aussagen zugänglichen Regeln zu identifizieren, an denen sich bemisst, ob eine Aussage als mit dem dortigen Selbstverständnis übereinstimmend betrachtet wird oder nicht. Dabei ergibt sich ein Problem, denn diese Regeln sind ihrerseits nur aus Aussagen ableitbar, deren Verständnis wiederum einen hinreichenden Eindruck der Regeln voraussetzt. Dieses Problem entspricht der für alle Verstehensprozesse charakteristischen gegenseitigen Verwiesenheit des Ganzen und seiner Teile, denn der Forscher muss, einer vorläufigen Ahnung folgend, aus einzelnen Aussagen das umfassende Regelsystem zum Verständnis dieser Aussagen erst entnehmen. Indem man dann im Verlauf der Forschung sein Verständnis der Regeln modifiziert, ändert sich auch das Verständnis der Aussagen und umgekehrt; auf diese Weise zwischen beiden oszillierend, ist eine sukzessive Vertiefung des Verständnisses möglich.

Auf der Grundlage von Wittgensteins Sprachspielkonzeption und deren Weiterführung durch die Unterscheidung verschiedener Arten von Regeln kann der Prozess des Verstehens fremden Denkens im Sinne einer dialogischen Hermeneutik nun genauer bestimmt werden. Das Verhältnis des eigenen zum fremden Denken wurde beschrieben als die Konfrontation unterschiedlicher Systeme bedeutungs-konstituierender Regeln. Die hermeneutische Annäherung an das fremde Denken besteht darin, die Regeln des anderen „Sprachspiels“ zu lernen. Dabei muss man von den Regeln der eigenen Denkweise ausgehen, die das jeweilige Vorverständnis bilden.

Wie wir sahen, bringt jedes Vorverständnis, das über die Minimalbestimmung eines hermeneutischen Gegenstandes hinausgeht, die Gefahr mit sich, das andere Selbstverständnis durch eigene Anschauungen zu entstellen. Daher ist es hermeneutisch kontraproduktiv, die Metaebene von Eigenem und Fremdem über dieses Minimum (Regelrationalität) hinaus zu bestimmen. In der konkreten Begegnung ist man allerdings immer schon von einem weitergehenden Vorverständnis geprägt, denn letztendlich bildet die eigene Denkweise insgesamt dieses Vorverständnis und ist daher im Verstehensprozess unverzichtbar. Man muss also die explizierbaren Aspekte seiner Denkweise, soweit sie in der Begegnung mit dem fremden Denken relevant werden, offensiv in den Verstehensprozess einbringen, ohne sie jedoch dem zu Verstehenden gegenüber erkenntnisfundamentalistisch auszuzeichnen und dabei das Fremde auf das Eigene zu reduzieren. Vielmehr besteht der Prozess des Verstehens darin, das Eigene auf das Fremde hin zu erweitern. In dieser Erweiterung liegt das dialogische Moment, denn man nimmt von dem Fremden etwas in sich auf, das man nicht (monologisch) aus dem Eigenen abgeleitet hat.

Die erweiterten Regeln, mit denen man sich dem zu Verstehenden expliziten Selbstverständnis (also Regeln 2b)) annähert, entsprechen auf der eigenen Seite denen der Kategorie 2a). D.h. man erweitert seinen Horizont des prinzipiell Verständlichen, bewahrt sich aber innerhalb dessen einen eigenen Standpunkt, dem das zu verstehende Denken als ein anderer gegenübersteht, konstituiert jeweils durch Regeln der Kategorie 2b). Auf diese Weise bleibt einerseits eine Kritik des anderen möglich (auf der Grundlage der Regeln des eigenen Standpunktes), andererseits ist durch ein Verstehen der fremden Denkweise auch eine intensivierte bzw. vermittelt durch den externen Standpunkt eines anderen Selbstverständnisses überhaupt erst eine veritable Selbstkritik möglich (weil in der reinen Selbstbezüglichkeit Gegenstand und Vollzugsmedium der Kritik identisch sind und somit Teile des eigenen Denkens, die man in der Selbstkritik verwendet, einer Kritik entzogen bleiben).

Eine dialogische Hermeneutikkonzeption auf der Basis eines durch die genannten Differenzierungen erweiterten Konzeptes von Regelrationalität kann somit den beiden größten Gefahren der interkulturellen Begegnung entgehen: entweder die eigene Sicht der Dinge normativ absolut zu setzen oder einem Beliebigkeitspluralismus zu verfallen. Andererseits eröffnet sie die Möglichkeit, sich auf der Grundlage einer nichtreduktionistischen Wahrnehmung in der kulturellen Vielfalt angemessen zu orientieren und dabei kritisch gegenüber anderem und sich selbst zu sein.

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Towards an Intercultural Phenomenology? – Objectivity, Subjectivity and the Constitution of Otherness

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I

Husserlian phenomenology mainly deals with the relation between world and subject. Thus, transcendental phenomenology is concerned with the conditions of the possibility of any reference to the world. The methodical operation of the phenomenological reduction brings to the fore the transcendental structures which are already effective, but nevertheless non-thematic in the natural attitude.

Even if we accept the methodological considerations so far,¹ one could ask whether there are not serious problems with regard to the topic of intersubjectivity in general and the topic of interculturality in particular. It has repeatedly been objected that Husserlian phenomenology has to be regarded as a quasi-solipsism which cannot do justice to the experiential fact of intersubjectivity at all (Apel 1973, 83). Against this, I want to argue the following: Certainly, the performance of the reduction entails a restriction to the sphere of immanence. This, however, has to be seen as a purely methodical operation which implies no ontological consequences whatsoever. To put the world into brackets simply means to put the validity of the world out of action. This implies that after the reduction the negation or even the questioning of the world becomes an impossibility for the phenomenologist. Thus, in her analysis, she is neither – as objected – restricted to an inner sphere of privacy (introspection), nor to a mere description of “absolute” givenness. Rather – as Husserl has extensively discussed in three volumes of the “Husserliana” and in the fifth Cartesian meditation – the performance of the reduction reveals the close relationship between subjective and intersubjective constitution. In order to support this, Husserl suggests the thought experiment of the primordial reduction (Husserl 1950, 124 ff): To perform this thought experiment means to remove from one’s experience all that which refers to other egos. This means to critically reflect upon all experiential phenomena which transcend the purely subjective constitution with regard to their intentional content. To put it differently: Obviously we are able to mark certain phenomena as objectively given in opposition to others. But every time we mark something as “objectively given”, the intentional content of “objectivity” entails the necessity of intersubjective reference and constitution. Therefore Husserl eventually came to the result that transcendental subjectivity in its full complexity is *transcendental intersubjectivity* (Husserl 1959, 129).

Another line of critique was articulated from within the phenomenological movement itself: Even if it is possible to account for the importance of intersubjectivity on a theoretical level, one could wonder whether it is possible to do justice to this topic on the level of facticity, i.e., on the level of the concrete encounter with the Other. Does – as objected for example by Maurice Merleau-Ponty in his lecture about Husserl’s “Origins of Geometry” (Merleau-Ponty 2002) – phenomenology run the risk of falling prey to unjustified idealizations in performing the

reduction? Is this seemingly abstract account of intersubjectivity even a violation of the phenomenological maxim “to the things themselves”? Does this – if it is the case – endanger the possibility of an “intercultural phenomenology”?²

II

If one asks for an “application” of transcendental phenomenology to “concrete” problems of interculturality, one has to define the concept of concreteness to which one is referring. The problem of the Other as it is posed by phenomenology is a genuine philosophical issue. Under normal circumstances we trust in our ability to recognise the Other as an Other, without ever reflecting upon this. However, there are deviant situations which motivate a certain “breach” of this tacit confidence: Consider the extreme example of a comatose patient but also the encounter with a culturally different Other whose reactions possibly do not meet our expectations. Situations like these can motivate a certain change of attitude which can be regarded as a “mundane prototype” of the phenomenological reduction (Husserl 1954, 141 ff). We could start wondering *how* an Other is given to us under normal circumstances. Furthermore, we could start asking what the difference between “normal” and “deviant” situations exactly is and how our tacit confidence in the possibility of “normal” understanding could be justified at all. Thus, within the phenomenological attitude we suspend this tacit confidence (together with all other presuppositions of the natural attitude) and restrict ourselves to the modes in which the Other is given in direct intuition.

To ask for the givenness of an Other means to ask for the constitution of an Other. Obviously, there is a remarkable difference between the constitution of an Other and for instance the constitution of physical objects. A coffee cup is always given in adumbrations, i.e., in an interplay of presence and absence. Similar to this, an Other is also given in time and space, i.e., certainly via her body she is given as a physical object. The coffee cup as well as the human body transcend every possible mode of subjective reference. Naturally, this is not the whole story: Whereas “givenness in adumbrations” in the case of the coffee cup means that we are always able to transfer every absent aspect into a present one (e.g. in changing our perspective or in manipulating the coffee cup), this is not the case with respect to all relevant dimensions of a concrete Other. So, how can we account for this dimension of the Other which is generally absent to us?

One classical strategy do deal with the problem at hand is the “simulation theory of other minds” that provides us with an argument from analogy: One could argue that all which is directly given is the relation between my mental states and my corresponding bodily behaviour (e.g.

¹ For further clarifications of the methodological prerequisites of this essay cf. the essay of Harald A. Wiltsche in this volume.

² Within this essay „intercultural phenomenology“ is understood as a transcendental meta-science that provides a reflective basis for certain empirical investigations. “Intercultural phenomenology” in this sense does not aim at mediating between different cultures but rather accounts for the conditions of possibility of reflection on intercultural dialogue as such (cf. Mohanty 2000; Orth 1984; Waldenfels 1998).

whenever I am in pain, I am crying; whenever I am happy to see my friend, I am smiling) on the one side and the bodily presence of the Other on the other side (Gordon 1986; Heal 1986). As we can see, the relation between me and the Other is asymmetric: “Mental states” and “behaviour” on the one side, but only “behaviour” on the other. Therefore, why not infer that *if* there is behaviour *then* there have to be mental states too? Correspondingly, one could state, that whenever the Other is crying, it is possible to infer that the Other has to be in pain as well.

However, this “argument from analogy” is highly problematic: First of all, we should critically ask whether this argument is a valid argument at all. If it were true that I had knowledge about the relation between my own mental states and my behaviour, what would that mean for the relation between me and the Other? Strictly speaking, if I could make a direct inference between my own mental states and my own bodily behaviour – which would seem to require already a third-person-perspective on my body – all I could infer is a relation between my mental states, my behaviour and the behaviour of the Other. I cannot see why this argument should provide us with an account of someone else’s mental states or – to say it differently – why the Other should not be a marionette of *my own* mental states (Zahavi 2005, 148 ff).

Apart from these absurd formal consequences, from a phenomenological viewpoint one has to ask whether the fact of recognising an Other is a matter of inference at all: Is it really the case that there is a sharp distinction between my mental states and my bodily behaviour? After the phenomenological reduction was performed, certainly not. What is given in direct intuition are not “mental states” and “bodily behaviour”, but meaningful situations, actions and smiling friends. The distinction between “mental states” and “behaviour” is a theoretical one which has to be bracketed in order to gain the phenomenological attitude. Even more than that: Within the phenomenological attitude, the Other is not given to us as a “bodily mantle” which makes us wonder whether there are mental states “in it”. First and foremost, the Other is given to us as the intentional content “Other”, i.e. as my neighbour, my friend, the stranger from a foreign culture. In order to recognise an Other, the differentiation between “mental states” and “behaviour” is misleading. It makes it impossible to recognize an Other as an “other Self”, by paving the way to the Other as an object. In encountering an Other we do not apply any knowledge about analogies and inferences. Otherwise, we could not explain for instance, why babies recognise their mother even at an age where one would not expect them to be in possession of theoretical concepts of that kind (Fuchs 2000, 275 ff).

However, what is the scope of these phenomenological insights? One could critically ask whether phenomenology gives us better explanations than for instance the “argument from analogy”. Against such objections, one has to bear in mind that phenomenology does not aim at explanations of this kind at all. Rather, phenomenological analysis critically reflects upon the convictions, other theories already presuppose in formulating their questions and answers. To put it differently: Phenomenology helps us to limit the scope of meaningful scientific inquiry without transgressing the boundaries to positive science.

III

Consequently, a phenomenologist is concerned with an investigation of the intentional content “otherness”, in reflectively detaching herself from the involvement in concrete situations in which “otherness” appears (Husserl 1959, 106-108). Thus, as a phenomenologist one is interested in the essential structures of intersubjective encounters: concrete encounters with Others may differ with respect to various aspects (e.g. the degree of cultural foreignness, the aspect of language etc.) but there have to be certain meaning-structures which allow us to recognise an Other as an Other. Maybe the most important insight of a phenomenological analysis is that the intentional content “Other” cannot be reduced to the constitutional abilities of the Ego, i.e. to my constitutional acts. First and foremost, the Other is constituted as *constituting*, i.e. as an acting, perceiving etc. alter Ego. Referring to the “argument from analogy”, the relation between Ego and alter Ego is indeed asymmetric, but in a very special sense. On the most basic level, it is no relation of knowledge versus inaccessibility, but rather of mutual constitution. In recognising the Other as an Other, I have to recognise myself as an Other for the Other.

However, at first sight this may seem trivial. One could argue that the acceptance of this reciprocity does not help us in solving the urgent question of how to gain access to an Other. But from a phenomenological point of view this question is not only inadequate, it disguises the very phenomenon of otherness. To recognise the Other as an Other, i.e., to constitute the Other as constituting means to accept that I cannot have the experiences of the Other. Having the experiences of the Other would mean to *be* the Other. Seen from this viewpoint, the search for an access to something which is supposed to be behind the façade of otherness is to miss the genuine phenomenon of otherness.

It is needless to say that this entails some important consequences for the question of interculturality: First of all, on this most basic level every Other is a “radical Other”, i.e., there are no “shades of otherness”. On the level of phenomenological investigation my neighbour is by no means less foreign than a tribesman I have never seen before. Certainly, this does not hold true for our every-day encounters: By birth we are embedded in an all-embracing horizon of language, of social, historical, personal and cultural structures. This horizon regulates the encounter with our neighbour much more effectively than the encounter with a tribesman. However, the scientific description of this horizon, the question of translatability etc. are empirical questions which do not lie within the scope of transcendental-phenomenological inquiry. Phenomenological investigation is concerned with the conditions of the possibility of such horizons; it is concerned with the relation between self, Other and world, i.e., with those structures which are always presupposed when we recognise someone as an Other within certain horizons and contexts.

In following these methodological decisions, phenomenology takes up a position which can account for the fact of cultural relativity but escapes relativism. To account for the otherness of the Other means to accept the fact the no Other will ever be fully transparent to us. On the empirical level of description, translation and understanding there is always the possibility of error and refutation. But this does not lead us to a relativist position. In dealing with errors, refutations and misunderstandings we already presuppose a tacit level of transcendental structures which make it possible to even recognise

cultural differences. These transcendental structures (e.g. intentionality, embodiment, inner time- consciousness, activity and passivity etc.) provide us with a framework which makes the picture of the “many worlds” meaningful without sacrificing the enterprise of objective science.

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A Complicated Form of Life

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One of Wittgenstein's strongest arguments – and nonetheless one of his less explored arguments in the secondary literature – against the idea that I can never let others really know what is going on within me because the most I can do, for instance, is to say I'm happy and *smile* (that is, show an outward sign of my happiness), never show my happiness itself, is that there are feelings we can only have *after* we have mastered a language, *after* we have already learned how express them. This is what Wittgenstein remarks about hope. “Can only hope those who can talk?,” he asks at the beginning of the second part of the *Investigations* (Wittgenstein 2001, 148). And his answer is quite simple: “Only those who have mastered the use of a language. That is to say, the phenomena of hope are modifications of this complicated form of life” (Wittgenstein 2001, 148).

But what does he mean by “complicated form of life”? To answer this question, we have to remember that Wittgenstein acknowledges two kinds of criteria for ascribing thoughts, desires, feelings and experiences in general to others. The first one is behavioural. The second one is verbal. It is also important to note that both of them are always measured against wider surroundings. Thus the cry is a criterion for pain. But if a baby starts crying without any evidence that it is hurt (or that it has some illness that causes pain), then we will probably say it is not a cry of pain, that it is more likely to be a cry of hunger or thirst. For both are behaviorally displayed by the baby in the same way. Or better, they all are behaviorally displayed in the same way when we consider a rather short section of time. For if the baby is crying with hunger, it will not quiet down when we give it water. Nor will it be pleased with food if it is crying because of thirst. And if nothing satisfies it at all, we shall probably think it was not hungry, nor thirsty, but actually in pain. Besides the general context, we also take into consideration what it is that cries (if it is a *what* or a *who*). If it is a living being, then we shall say it is in pain. But if it happens to be a machine programmed to make the sound of a cry when we press a button, then we won't say it is in pain. We will not accept its behaviour – no matter how lively it is – as a criterion for pain. For it does not satisfy the basic condition of being something that can feel pain. So we have two criteria, a general context and a basic condition that have to be met in order for us to ascribe pain to others.

Why do we take someone's verbal expression “I'm in pain” as a criterion for saying “He is in pain”? Can't he who says “I'm in pain” be lying? But the fact that the verbal expression of pain can be insincere doesn't show that we can't rely on them to ascribe pain to others (in fact, we should note that the person who wishes to deceive us in making us think that he is in pain exhibits precisely what we call a 'pain behaviour'), for it is anchored in non-verbal behaviour that we have no choice other than to take it as being authentic. Although an adult can always lie when he says “I'm in pain” (that is, when he exhibits a *verbal* pain behaviour), we can't easily say a baby may always be faking when it exhibits non-verbal pain behaviour. In fact, that would be as misguided a move as pointing to a sample of blue and saying “That colour is not blue”.

Precisely because the baby's non-verbal pain behaviour is a paradigm for the application of the word 'pain'.

If we can trust non-verbal pain behaviour (if it doesn't make sense to mistrust non-verbal pain behaviour), then we can trust verbal pain behaviour (then it doesn't make sense to mistrust verbal pain behaviour). They are tied together by an internal relation. Linguistic expressions of pain – and that holds both for those in first person as for those in third person – are taught by reference to non-verbal pain behaviour. Therefore we don't require that a person who says “I'm in pain” also behaves as if he was in pain so that we believe him – especially if he is already an adult. It's not because he doesn't behave as if he was in pain that we cannot say he is in pain. The verbal expression of pain is enough. It *replaces* non-verbal pain behaviour. It is so perfectly fair to pass from a calm verbal pain behaviour to “He is in pain”, as it is to pass from a wild non-verbal pain behaviour to “He is in pain”.

So let's come back to the expression “complicated form of life”. When we teach a child to say “I'm in pain” instead of crying, what we do is *modify* its behaviour. Furthermore, after teaching it to say “I'm in pain”, it can eventually say “I have a throbbing pain”. That is, when we teach it to talk, we give it the necessary basis for it not only to *express*, not only to *manifest* its pain, but also to *describe* it. We therefore expand its possibilities of expression. We expand the complexity of its behavioural repertoire. But that of course doesn't mean that we necessarily expand the universe of its sensations. Just as we don't expand it when we teach the child to say “I'm in pain”, we also don't expand it when we teach it to say “I have a throbbing pain”. To deny that it could feel throbbing pains before learning to say “I have a throbbing pain” would be like denying that it could feel pain before saying “I'm in pain”. In fact, it would be like denying that it could have five fingers in its hand before learning to say “I have five fingers on my hand”.

But with the feelings of grief and hope, for instance, matters are quite different. They are not in the least like the sensation of pain. Although we can say we are feeling grief or hope at a given moment (just as we can say we are feeling pain at a given moment), that is, although we can *feel* grief or hope, there isn't much sense in saying we experience these feelings before we can express them. After opening the second part of the *Investigations* discussing hope, Wittgenstein makes exactly this remark in relation to grief:

“But don't you feel grief *now*? (...) The answer may be affirmative, but that doesn't make the concept of grief any more like the concept of a sensation. – The question was really, of course, a temporal and personal one, not the logical question which we wanted to raise.” (Wittgenstein 2001, 148)

Both hope and grief are feelings that a newborn child cannot feel. The same holds for all feelings that presuppose relatively complicated forms of life. If a father gives one of his teenager sons a new bicycle and the other one an old bicycle, it is possible that the second one will feel envy (or jealousy) towards the first one. He may even

feel envy towards his brother without giving any sign of it. If in some other occasion he had expressed envy that could be remembered in order to ascribe envy to him despite his calm and indifferent behaviour. But if this father now gives one of his newborn nephews a big teddy bear and the other one a matchbox toy, we will not in this case say that the second one would probably feel envy towards the first one. Even if he strikes him in the face or bites him.

Therefore, we can say that grief, hope and envy are *not* feelings that babies have within them from the moment they are born. They presuppose a form of life too complex to be experienced by a newborn. Here we meet a fundamental argument against the idea that we can never let others really know what we are feeling since we can only give them external signs of our private experiences, never put them on the table for free public examination. For if we can only feel grief or hope after “mastering the use of a language” and after making our entry into a relatively “complicated form of life”, then it doesn’t make much sense to say that they are ineffable.

So grief and hope are private in the sense that we can hide them, but not in the non-sense that we can’t show them. Furthermore, even if a newborn child can feel a throbbing pain without being able to express that it is a throbbing pain it is feeling (for we can’t tell by its cry whether it is a throbbing pain or not), we can’t say that an adult can feel grief, hope or envy with phenomenal properties he can’t express. The truth of the matter is that he can say how deep his grief is. He can tell us the intensity, the strength and the duration of his grief. In fact, he can indeed manifest the intensity of his grief (and that holds also for his envy and his hope) in his actions.

To say that a pain can have phenomenal properties that a person may not know in a given moment how to express is *not* to say that a pain can have phenomenal properties that deflect any possible expression. The way we learn to express pain is different from the way we learn to express hope. But that doesn’t entail either that we can’t express pain, or that we can’t express hope. When we learned the concept of pain, what happened, for instance, was that we accidentally hurt ourselves, started crying and then an adult asked us to stop crying and simply say “I’m in pain”. We don’t learn to feel pain, only how to express it, only how to name it (better, only to replace our behavioural expression of it by an appropriate verbal expression). It isn’t a sensation that exists only in our specific form of life and that we could simply cancel if we adopted a different form of life (unless it happened to be a form of life in which we never got hurt and never got painful diseases). The fact that pains and throbbing pains could already be felt before we could express them doesn’t mean that we can never get to talk about them, it doesn’t mean that they are essentially ineffable. Stones already existed before we started to talk about them. And they aren’t for that reason indescribable.

But when we learn words like ‘grief’ or ‘hope’, what we go through is rather different. Neither the feeling of grief, nor the feeling of hope are ineffable. For totally different reasons from those given for the pain sensation, of course. The fundamental point is that we don’t simply learn to *express* our grief or our hope. We also learn to *feel* them. Here language doesn’t only function as a means of communication. It is one of the ingredients of that which we communicate. It is true that, as Hacker puts it:

“The possession of a language extends the will and affections no less than the intellect. (...) A dog can want to go for a walk now, but it cannot now want to go for a walk tomorrow or next Sunday; it can want a bone now, but not a bone for Christmas.” (Hacker 2004, p.62-3)

But what happens in the case of the feelings of hope and grief goes a lot deeper. They are not just extensions of feelings which the baby brings within itself from birth. They are not built up on other more basic feelings or sensations through some sort of psychic composition. They are added to our inner world. Just as there may be a concept that “refers to a character of human handwriting” that cannot have any “application to beings that do not write”, so too there may be concepts that refer to a very “complicated form of life” and that therefore can’t be applied to beings that don’t engage in it (PI II i). This is the case of the concept grief. This is the case of the concept of hope. They are internally related to our form of life.

We can therefore say that contrary to what we are inclined to think, we are not born equipped with all the feelings and states of mind we experience in our adult life. The idea that there are innate feelings is so awry as the idea that there are innate truths. We are not born with an already made inner world, and what happens when we learn to talk and to act in accord with the form of life of our environment is not just to name what before remained locked up in us and to associate our innate feelings (like hope) to their appropriate contexts (like being in deep trouble). What we learn is not just to call grief ‘grief’ (instead of ‘happiness’) and to feel grief precisely when we are deceived, forgotten or betrayed by others (and not when someone gives us a present, threatens us or gives us a rather difficult task). What we learn when we learn our language is to name what didn’t exist before. What we learn when we engage in our complicated forms of life is to have their likewise complicated feelings.

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Towards Cosmopolitan Philosophy

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1. Introduction

We call ourselves a rational, or even a wise (*sapiens*) species. Our ancestors learned that we live on a planet; and, having continued the research traditions of astronomy, physics and chemistry, we suppose with good reason that our current cosmological theories nearly adequately describe the universe's nature and structure. Over generations, the fruit of humanity's creativity has formed its own world: a cultural cosmos within the physical one. This *kosmos noetos* consists of works of art, institutions, problems, theories, numbers, etc. To claim that it has cosmic significance is not far-fetched. A program supported by UNESCO, which involves natural objects and artifacts chosen to represent world cultural heritage, entails that we are aware of our achievements' lasting worth. Local appearances thus receive an intercultural status.

We are social and political animals (cf. Aristotle's definition: *zoon politikon*), who depend upon each other for survival. We are born to families and communities, and we pursue our individual and group interests through both cooperation and conflict. Nations, states and cultures are mere continuations of this tendency of individuals to join together. Today, civilizations are becoming increasingly unified. We live amid shared global systems characteristic to economics, technology, legislation, education, art and research. Whether to consider this unification a sign of humanity's progress is debatable. "Progress" may itself prove to be a chimerical ideal. Nevertheless, we always try to improve our institutions, and we evaluate our achievements by comparing them to those of past generations.

Philosophy has arisen from the need to give a rational account of the world and of humanity's place within it. It was the urge to comprehend that gave birth to systematic research. Philosophy, like science, had its background in religious myths and cults. Its texts were written in the language (Chinese, Ancient Greek, Sanskrit) in which poets had conceived their legends, and philosophy shared the human predicament with religion. Philosophical speculation emerged in three main cultural traditions, within which further diversifications occurred. However, the direction that philosophy took was from local to national, international, intercultural and cosmopolitan.

First in this paper, this process will be traced. Next let us address the challenges posed by modern cosmopolitanism to philosophy, which, rather than being threatening, provide new opportunities. From its beginning, philosophy has had to justify its genuine nature, due to its special position between the claims of specializing research and of myth. Philosophical discourse has differed both from that of science and that of religion. The former difference is due to history's importance in systematic philosophical research. The latter difference consists in the confessional nature of religious belief. Since discussion of discourse requires discussion of language and languages, this paper will give a suggestion, in the spirit of Leibniz, about how to account for the idea of a single, all-embracing language and the plurality of natural languages. Final remarks will address the question of intercultural constants in philosophy.

2. From Polis to Cosmopolis

Speculation on the nature of reality and on humanity's grasp of the world began to flourish more than 2500 years ago in Greece, India and China. Thales, Buddha and Lao Tzu, who appear to have mutually independently formulated these problems, initiated three main traditions of thought. Customarily, these traditions are divided into Eastern and Western philosophy, which connects the Indian and Chinese currents and leaves the Greek inheritance on its own. However, Indian and Western philosophies are connected linguistically, which puts the Chinese one into its own class. Ernst von Aster (1980, p. 24 f) comments that the ideograms of Chinese script are abstract concepts as well as concrete optical pictures. Indian philosophy, in turn, may be distinguished from the other two traditions by virtue of its strong commitment to religion. Its goal is salvation rather than rational understanding of the world. (Cf. likewise von Aster 1980, p. 9 and 22).

East and West have never been completely separated. Merchant routes, which promoted commerce of ideas as well as material goods, connected these cultural spheres. One need not assume that the early Greek, Indian and Chinese thinkers had influenced each other, in order to maintain that philosophical thought had transcended its geographical boundaries. This process may be examined in two ways: externally or internally. An external inquiry would concern the three traditions' backgrounds and presumable mutual influences from 500 BC to, say, 200 BC. Background questions concern historical, social, political, religious, literary, economical and technological developments. An internal inquiry would concern how and why search for wisdom for its own sake became possible and flourished in ancient China, India and Greece.

Let us review some common characteristics of these three philosophical traditions' beginnings. These civilizations had developed to a point at which mythology and worship were complemented by rather independent speculation on the character of cosmos and humanity's position within it. Taming the cosmic powers requires an account of their character, which in turn requires conceptualization; therefore, questions began to abound. Customary answers ceased to satisfy curiosity, and questions arose concerning their reliability and adequacy. This tension between doctrine and questions may have led to a new form of religion or a renewed religion (cf. Siddhartha Gautama and Buddhism). It may also have led to questioning of the use of idols (cf. Xenophanes' attack on the Olympian gods and on the anthropomorphic imagery in various cults). Likewise, inherited social and political institutions were questioned, and suggestions were made about organizing them in ways that would be more compatible with human nature (cf. *tao* and *te*, as well as the educational reform by Confucius).

Therefore, thought became liberated, and from the very beginning was cosmopolitan – not only in the sense that it concerned the starry cosmos and sought to stretch the cosmic order to human affairs, but also in the sense that it encouraged shared inquiry. Such inquiry ignores national, cultural, political or linguistic boundaries. It also

bridges chronological distances; for instance, one may take part in a Socratic dialogue by reading its dramatization in Plato.

In Greece, philosophy marched from polis to cosmopolis. It came from Miletos through other poleis to Athens and received its later synthesis in Alexandria, the new center of Greek culture. Philosophy left its seeds to Byzantium and Rome, growing cosmopolitan cities. In China, the province of Chou was the meeting place for Lao Tzu and Confucius, whose philosophies later dominated the whole empire. In India, Banaras was the place in which Buddha gave the first presentation of his ideas, which later spread to the whole India, and to Tibet, China, Korea, Japan, Ceylon and Burma.

The original three languages of philosophy were supplemented in the late Antiquity, with the addition of Latin, and of Hebrew when the tradition of Jewish philosophy was initiated in Alexandria. Arabic philosophers gave their contribution during the Middle Ages. After Renaissance and Reformation, many national languages joined the philosophical discussion: Italian, Spanish, French, German, English, Danish, etc.

Centers of learning contributed to the development of philosophy. The era of universities began in the Middle Ages. Their predecessors had been the Greek philosopher schools, especially Plato's Academy in Athens, which had lasted about 900 years when it was closed in the year 529. The word *universitas* was fittingly chosen to refer to these institutes, the idea being that the curriculum is valid regardless of locality. Universal forms are instantiated in concrete buildings. It is no wonder that one of the main topics in medieval philosophy, the problem of universals and particulars, was inherited from the Academy. Today, the experts in this problem happen to be Australian philosophers.

After the Second World War, English gradually became the leading medium of expression of scientific and philosophical thought. It is about to achieve a status comparable to that of Latin in medieval, learned Europe. Intercultural exchanges in other languages, however, are neither excluded nor prohibited. Having one natural language as the main means of communication certainly has advantages as well as disadvantages. The advantage is the possibility of a common ground for intellectuals (and business people, athletes, etc.) around the world. Likewise, translations from English to some other language and from that language to English animate the language in question. However, the possible decrease in the use of other languages in international encounters may indeed be a disadvantage.

A recent addition to the cosmopolis of philosophy is the Internet. The letters *www*, as well as the linguistic content of the majority of messages, confirm the Internet's English-language dominance, which makes it relevant to the topics just discussed. The Internet has certainly sped up the exchange of ideas. How profoundly it has transformed philosophy, however, remains to be seen.

3. Philosophical Discourse

Philosophy emancipated itself from religion, and science from religion and philosophy. Philosophy shares many of its problems and concepts with religion as well as with science, but it lends itself to a special kind of discourse, within the confines of which problems, concepts, methods and theories receive their peculiar philosophical flavour.

This feature is analogous to swing in jazz: it is either present or absent; and if absent, the music in question is not jazz. Discourse is an interchange of thoughts that manifests itself in speech and in writing and proceeds by successive, interdependent steps. Discourse can be classified according to its purpose.

Religious discourse is not, by nature, argumentative; argumentativeness is a characteristic shared by both philosophy and science. Theology, unlike religion, is argumentative – cf. the word *logos* in its root. But theology is not religion; rather, it is a conceptually organized theory of religion. Theological controversies are not, in themselves, religious controversies, though the participants' religious commitments could make them such. One branch of theology – philosophical theology – encourages a non-committed approach. (Compare, for instance, to Islamic and Catholic theologies.) Philosophical theology belongs to metaphysics and was traditionally known as *theologia rationalis*.

Religious discourse, by contrast, is based on worship and is expressed in ceremonies. Its purpose is not to justify the creed. Rather, revelation justifies the creed; it is repeated in scriptures, sacraments, songs, mysteries, pictures, and sermons. For believers, argument could neither support nor contest revelation, since revelation is sacred, and what is sacred is indefeasible. Therefore, in religion, discourse means confession, whereby believers acknowledge the sacred truths, and admit their sins. Religious discourse connects a world view to a moral order.

Philosophical discourse proceeds in a free space of thought possibilities. It does not claim to possess any self-evident truths; even the goal of certainty can be contested. The propositions considered to be revelations in religion are treated as assumptions in philosophy. Any seemingly settled disputes can be reopened; skepticism is allowed. The very concept of belief is approached in a different way than in religious contexts. Belief is not conceived as faith, but rather as a necessary though not sufficient condition of knowledge. Belief systems are fluid: we change our opinions according to available evidence or due to internal inconsistencies. Doxastic logic does not tell us which beliefs are true; all have their own controversies. Philosophical discourse proceeds wherever argumentation leads it. Science likewise proceeds through argumentation. Research problems arise from the given state of public knowledge. Methods consist of logic and of intersubjectively verifiable observation. Scientific reasoning is therefore a continuation of philosophical argumentation techniques, applied to the resolution of certain conceptual or empirical problems. Philosophy, in turn, has been influenced by scientific procedures and uses as examples certain cases of scientific problem-solving.

Scientific research, which proceeds from problems to solutions and from solutions to new problems, leaves solved problems behind it as settled issues. Philosophy, on the other hand, may return to its past questions. For example, the problem of universals was re-introduced in the form of foundational questions of philosophy of mathematics. This problem has also motivated the recent ontological theory of abstract particulars. In science, by contrast, solutions are final. For instance, once the concept of phlogiston in chemistry was rejected, it was never re-examined. Philosophical discourse carries the history of the whole discipline within it, whereas the scientific discourse relegates its background to history of science or to philosophy of science.

4. Reflection on Language

In philosophy, attention has long been given to language and signs as the basis of all types of discourse. The British empiricists and Kant had focused mainly on the (mental) faculties of sensation, perception and thought as conditions of knowledge; their approach required complementation with reflection about language. Furthermore, Sinologic and Indologic scholarship made the classical Eastern philosophers' texts accessible and raised problems of translation and commentary, as well as of analysis and even possible adoption of certain concepts. (For example, the words *tao* and *nirvana* have been borrowed into Western philosophical vocabulary.)

E. R. Hughes, a reader in Chinese philosophy and religion in Oxford University, presents some principles of translation that, according to him, are "mere precautionary common sense" (1971, p. xxxvii). A translator must assume that the author had something clear enough to say; expose and correct the ideas of the author; suppose that the author did speak sense and not nonsense; be sensitive to nuances of meaning in the author's ideas; avoid anachronisms; and give full justice to the meanings given by different schools to special terms, paying attention to the difference between a term's common and technical uses (*ibid.*). Strictly speaking "the key concepts of a long-established society's language do not quite fit any term in the other language" (p. xxxviii). A full understanding would require the "study of the whole culture" (*ibid.*). These principles can be seen as those of intelligibility in general.

Sentences of natural (or conversational, ordinary) language can be translated not only to another natural language (for instance from Chinese to English) but also to logical formalism. The purpose of this decomposition into simpler constituents is to grasp common, perhaps even universal logical or grammatical features in the immense variety of actual expressions. Two conceptions of language result: a formal and a material. The former relates to uninterpreted formulae, the latter concerns interpretations (cf. Reichenbach 1947, p. 164 ff). Logical analysis of language aims to (adequately) present all ordinary language sentences symbolically. According to F. v. Kutschera (1975, p. 261) there is much to do, before such an analysis would be possible.

Leibniz expressed even greater ambitions in his essay *De arte combinatoria*, which he published at the age of twenty in 1666. His desideratum is a calculus whose aim was to enable any given language community to translate from any other language. It would contain both heuristics and justification: "ars inveniedi et iuridicandi" (1992, p. 42). It was intended to resolve both moral and metaphysical problems, to prove all rules of logic, and to settle disputes. Moreover, the conclusiveness of any arguments would be shown: "cognosci possit an argumentationes quaedam sint in forma bonae" (*ibid.*, p. 56). Leibniz's model for this calculus is the language of arithmetic.

Today, 340 years after the publication of Leibniz' article, we are facing the same disputes on various issues, as was the case in his time. Although English dominates the scene, we do not have a universal, transparent or rational language by which we could overcome natural languages' logical deficiencies. It may well be the case that the idea of *calculus ratiocinator* will remain for ever unrealized. However, symbolic logic has developed greatly, and courses on critical thinking and argumentation flourish. We can expose weaknesses in discourse and make piecemeal analyses of recalcitrant problems. The

successor of Leibniz's mechanical calculator – which he indeed managed to build and which worked – is the computer; its calculating capacity is enormous. Besides logic and mathematics, we have at our disposal various programming languages, all of which can be used to enhance reasoning and to evaluate arguments.

The expressive possibilities of natural languages benefit us. Each one of them is a source of thoughts that would have remained unthought and unwritten, had not there existed that very language. They are reflective in their inbuilt capacity to mix object language and meta-language. Only by means of natural language can we proceed in the logical clarification of language.

5. Invariable Factors

One may wonder what actually makes the Western and Eastern philosophical heritages *the* philosophy – i.e., the shared world philosophy. Congresses and other mutual contacts, translations, books and the Internet help to maintain and strengthen that very discourse that is to be characterized as philosophy. Certain intercultural constants carry philosophy forward. These are the peculiarly structured problems, arguments and theories that tradition has established and education and research nurture. Likewise, logic, epistemology, metaphysics and ethics are the invariant branches that characterize philosophy everywhere. Certain issues are of lasting significance. To these belong correct thinking, conditions of knowledge and understanding, the structure of the universe and human rights.

The last-mentioned issue is especially important in respect to the establishment of a new social, political and legal order in the world. For instance, the Haag International War Crimes Tribunal is a sign of that. We have been able to chart the cosmos, clarify the chemical constitution of the stars and the atomic composition of matter. We have traced our origin and decoded the genetic information of life. Why should we accept violation of our dignity, and yield to dictators when they deny their citizens the basic rights, including access to information concerning what is said of human rights in the Internet? Why should we accept fundamentalists' intolerance and blind hatred of humanity?

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Sprache im interkulturellen Dialog

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Den interkulturellen Dialog kann man als einen abstrakten Begriff verstehen, der Beziehungen zwischen Kulturen, Völkern und Religionen bezeichnet. Der interkulturelle Dialog kann aber auch als Austausch von Äußerungen – also etwas durchaus Konkretes – zwischen zwei Personen verschiedener Kulturen gesehen werden. So werden wir den Ausdruck ‚interkultureller Dialog‘ in diesem Beitrag auch verstehen.

In den letzterwähnten Dialogen gibt es zwei Gesprächstypen: 1. Einen Dialog in einer Fremdsprache für beide beteiligten Personen; 2. Einen Dialog in der Muttersprache von genau einem der beiden. In diesem Beitrag habe ich als Ausgangssituation diejenige des zweiten Typs, in welcher ein Sprecher a mit einem Sprecher b in einer Sprache S spricht, die nur die Muttersprache von a und keine der sog. Weltsprachen ist. Ich versuche folgende Fragen zu beantworten:

- (i) Wann spricht b eigentlich echtes S?
- (ii) Was soll a beachten, wenn er mit b versucht zu sprechen?

Die Sprecher a und b von zwei verschiedenen Muttersprachen führen also den Dialog in der Muttersprache S von a, also nicht etwa in Englisch oder in einer anderen sog. Weltsprache, die keine den Beiden eigene Sprache wäre. Weil die in der Situation gesprochene Sprache nicht eine der weit verbreiteten, von vielen gesprochenen Sprachen ist, sind beide Sprecher wahrscheinlich in einer für sie ungewohnten Situation. Die Beispiele in diesem Aufsatz sind hauptsächlich solche, in denen Deutschsprachige an einem finnischsprachigen Dialog teilnehmen. (Ausnahmsweise, damit die Leser des Beitrages die Beispiele besser nachempfinden können, sind auch einige Beispiele solche, in denen Finnischsprachige an einen deutschsprachigen Dialog teilnehmen, obwohl ich Deutsch für eine sog. große Sprache halte.)

1. Status einer Sprache im interkulturellen Dialog

In der Europäischen Union und wohl auch in der ganzen Welt gibt es heutzutage tatsächlich viel mehr Angelegenheiten und auch Gelegenheiten für den alltäglichen interkulturellen Dialog als noch vor ein paar Jahrzehnten. Der Dialog wird in großen internationalen Versammlungen und Konferenzen geführt, oft mit Hilfe des Dolmetschens. Früher, als internationale Beziehungen unüblicher waren, waren die Menschen für Begegnungen sorgfältig vorbereitet und waren auch bereit mögliche Missverständnisse aufzuklären; normalerweise waren sie auch sogenannte gebildete Personen. Es gab wohl schon immer solche Arbeiter aus anderen Ländern, die die Sprache ihrer neuen Heimat kaum beherrschten. Man hatte jedoch oft die Einstellung, dass es mit ihnen nicht nötig ist, Dialoge zu führen. Heute ist aber der interkulturelle Dialog Alltag von vielen Menschen geworden; diese Art Austausch ist nichts mehr Neues. Die Teilnehmer kommen oft von demselben Kulturkreis und können alle zusammen dasselbe Englisch sprechen – freilich oft nur oberflächlich und mit wenigen Nuancen. Es gibt aber auch Bestrebungen, die fordern, dass wir

miteinander andere Sprachen als euroenglisch – zwecks gegenseitiger Verständigung – benutzen sollten. In so entstandenen ungewohnten Situationen gibt es vielleicht wenig Bereitschaft, die anderen versuchen zu verstehen, diese werden vielleicht öfter und mehr kritisiert; auf einem engeren Sprachgebiet ist man einfach nicht gewohnt, einen unvollständigen oder einen dialektfremden Sprachgebrauch zu akzeptieren. Je mehr wir die persönlichen und privaten Gebiete der Menschen berücksichtigen, desto herausfordernder wird die Situation. Damit steht es nicht im Widerspruch, dass diejenigen Fremden, die mit ihrer Sprachkenntnis auf der ersten Elementarstufe stehen, wegen ihrer wachsenden Fähigkeiten gelobt werden. Andererseits gibt es Leute, die misstrauisch gegenüber den nichtmuttersprachlichen Diskussionspartnern sind. Denen schwebt folgende Frage vor: Wer darf eigentlich meine Kultur kennen und meine Sprache sprechen, ohne dass dadurch meine Identität zerstört wird?

Die Sprecher befinden sich in einer ungleichen Position. Diese Interaktion kann wohl viele von der Kultur und von den Sitten herkommende Aspekte mit sich bringen, aber sie ist auch besonders den rein sprachinternen Angelegenheiten ausgesetzt. Der andere muss die betroffene Sprache als eine Fremdsprache gelernt haben. Wann ist der Muttersprachler überhaupt der Meinung, dass der andere seine Sprache spricht?

2. Wann ist eine Einzelsprache die gewollte Sprache?

Wenn jemand eine Sprache lernt, wann wird eigentlich seine/ihre Sprache die Sprache, die sie sein sollte? Die Frage betrifft auch den Spracherwerb der kleinen Kinder: wann fangen sie eigentlich an, ihre Muttersprache zu sprechen? Es geht hierbei um die Definition und Klassifizierung einer Einzelsprache, eines Idiolekt im Unterschied von einem Soziolekt oder von einer normierten Hochsprache.

In Finnland hatte man vor dem Anfang des 21. Jahrhunderts kaum Erfahrungen von finnischsprechenden Leuten, die nicht so aussehen, wie Finnen allgemein. Für viele war es in einer kommunikativen Situation schwer zu glauben, dass der Diskussionspartner überhaupt Finnisch sprechen würde. Es gab sogar vor einiger Zeit Forscher die sich nicht trautes, das sog. Lernerfennisch, wenn es nicht sehr fortgeschritten war, überhaupt ‚Finnisch‘ zu nennen und unter dieser Bezeichnung zu untersuchen. Das gesprochene Finnisch des Diskussionspartners ist wohl schwierig einzuordnen. Die Abschätzungen des möglichen Status der produzierten Sprache sind oft auch nicht geradezu realistisch. Die folgende Paradoxie kann hervorgehoben werden: Je höher die beiden Sprecher in einem interkulturellen Dialog die Sprachbeherrschung des Partners einschätzen, desto schädlicher sind die Missverständnisse.

Die Adoptivkinder von Ländern außerhalb Europas hatten und haben es immer noch schwer, auch als Erwachsene, die anderen Finnen dazu zu bringen, zu verstehen, dass ihre stärkste Sprache, im Grunde genommen ihre Muttersprache, tatsächlich Finnisch ist.

Hier erweitert sich eine philosophische und linguistische Frage zu einer psychologischen, sozialpsychologischen und auch soziologischen Frage.

In Sprachen gibt es auch viel Variation, von Dialekten und Idiolekten bis zur Hochsprache, so dass man innerhalb einer Sprache Probleme hat, die Sprache eindeutig zu definieren. Die Berücksichtigung der Redeweisen von zweisprachigen Personen oder Lernern verkompliziert die Problemlage beträchtlich. Eine Sprache hat dazu noch (mündlich und schriftlich) so viele verschiedene historische Schichten, dass man fragen muss, wann und aus welchen Gründen die jeweils gegebene Instanzierung der Sprache als die jetzige offiziell akzeptierte Sprache zu identifizieren ist.

Wessen Finnisch ist finnisch, wessen Deutsch ist deutsch? Kann man diese Fragen nur in Bezug auf die Gesellschaft und von einem interaktiven Gesichtspunkt antworten? Zum Beispiel werden bei kleinen Kindern, die in einer einsprachigen Umgebung aufwachsen, schon die ersten sprachähnlichen Wörter für richtige Wörter der eigenen Sprache gehalten, während bei einem Lerner die Zuhörer gewöhnlich viel ungeduldiger sind, seine sogar mit denen vom Kind ausgesprochenen Ausdrücken völlig identischen Äußerungen als echte Sprache zu akzeptieren. Gibt es überhaupt richtige, objektive sprachinterne Antworten auf die obigen Fragen? (S. Latomaa 1996.) Oder sollen wir anders fragen: welches Finnisch ist echt finnisch und welches Deutsch ist echt deutsch? Welche Sprachzüge gehören unvermeidlich zu einer Einzelsprache, wie viele Prozent der sog. korrekten Formulierungen bei den Ausdrücken machen diese zu den Ausdrücken einer bestimmten Sprache?

Damit man eine Konstruktion theoretisch als eine Sprache identifizieren kann, soll man bestimmte Kriterien anwenden, die diese Konstruktion zu einer Sprache macht. Zu einer Sprache gehören Syntax, Semantik und Pragmatik, aber auch Phonologie, Morphologie und Lexikon. (Vgl. Reichenbach 1947, 15–16, siehe Bußmann 2002.) Die Ausdrücke eines Lerners können eine solche Ganzheit bilden, die schon als eine bestimmte, echte Sprache zu erkennen ist. Es gibt auch weitentwickelte Testsysteme, durch die die Sprachkenntnisse eines Lerners zu prüfen und einzustufen sind (s. Europarat 2001). Aber die minimalen Kriterien zu finden, die eine Lernersprache zu erfüllen hat, um die gewollte Sprache zu sein, ist gar nicht einfach. Erstens muss die Lernersprache eine Konstruktion sein, die man theoretisch schon für eine Sprache halten kann. Zweitens muss die Lernersprache genug Ähnlichkeit mit der gewollten Sprache haben und Korrektheit auf allen Stufen aufweisen, um ausreichend für die Kommunikation zu sein.

Vielleicht gibt es keine ganz klaren objektiven Kriterien, vielleicht geht es in der Frage um die Definition letztlich wirklich um das gegenseitige Verstehen. Die Sprache ist, wie gesagt, auch Semantik und Pragmatik, nicht bloß Syntax. Ich kann zehn griechische Wörter nacheinander sagen, aber wenn diese Liste keinen weiteren Sinn hat, ist es dennoch Griechisch? Es kann auch passieren, dass alle verwendeten Wörter somit die ganze Syntax und Semantik vollständig in Ordnung sind und der andere aber doch nicht versteht: Ein Kind hört zu, wie eine ausländische Studentin ein Märchen in seiner Sprache vorliest. Danach fragt das Kind: „In welcher Sprache hat sie gelesen?“ Es war die Aussprache, die das Gelesene unverständlich machte. Manchmal wiederum gelingt das gegenseitige Verstehen beinahe ohne Sprache, mit Gesten und Mienen.

3. Wie erleichtert die Kenntnis gewisser logischer Prinzipien das Lernen

Das zu definieren, wann eine Sprache die gemeinte Sprache ist, ist schwierig. Die Frage ruft Gedankenexperimente hervor. Ein Thema ist, wie die zu lernende Sprache der Zielsprache näher zu bringen sei. Es gibt einige allgemeine pädagogische sowie sprachinterne Prinzipien, die die Lehrer/Lerner ausnützen können, um den Lernprozess zu erleichtern. Die letztgenannten Prinzipien haben die jeweiligen philologischen Untersuchungen entblößt. Freilich werden in den Unterrichtssituationen solche allgemeinen Prinzipien leicht vergessen. Da geht es oft nur um die Übung einiger konkrete Sätze.

Im dem Buch *Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis* sind einige Gespräche von Wittgenstein und Schlick aufgezeichnet worden. Es wird (S. 45–47) bestätigt, dass die Teilnehmer nicht voraussetzen, dass es zwei Sprachen – die Umgangssprache und die sog. primäre Sprache – gäbe. Nur setzen sie voraus, dass die Umgangssprache von den in ihr steckenden Unklarheiten befreit werden soll. (Das ist wohl eine große Herausforderung.) Sie entwickeln weiter ihre Gedanken: zur Darstellung der Verhältnisse von zwei natürlichen Sprachen kann eine künstliche Symbolik doch nützlich sein. Sie kritisieren aber Frege, Peano und Russell darüber, dass diese bei dem Aufbau der symbolischen Logik immer nur die Mathematik und nicht die wirklichen Sachverhalte im Auge gehabt haben. Die Symbole können sehr schön einfache logische Verhältnisse erläutern, aber die gewöhnliche Sprache zeigt sofort, dass es für ein Symbol in Wirklichkeit zahlreiche substituierende und dadurch auch unmögliche Wörter gibt. Ein schönes Beispiel im Gespräch ist das Problem mit *rechts* und *süß*: es scheint auf den ersten Blick so zu sein, dass das Paar *rechts* – *links* dem Paar *süß* – *bitter* entspricht. Man kann wohl sagen *mehr rechts* wie auch *süßer*, aber *...liegt süß von...* geht nicht, obwohl *...liegt rechts von...* völlig korrekt ist. Dieses ist als Gedankenspiel der Muttersprachler schon ergiebig, aber wenn man an die Vielfalt des Vokabulars und an dessen Systematisierung in die bestimmten Wortklassen und in die bestimmten semantischen Gruppen bei dem Spracherwerb denkt, versteht man sofort, wie oft eigentlich falsche Substituierungen vorkommen können. Dieses macht es auch verständlich, wie schwierig es ist die problematischen Fälle den Non-native-speakers zu erklären, geschweige denn die Unklarheiten von der Umgangssprache zu beseitigen (s. oben).

Es ist möglich im Prinzip aller natürlichen Sprachen durch formale Systeme zu beschreiben und zu vergleichen; mit logischen Mitteln, sowie auch z.B. durch die Verwendung der Ideen der konzeptuellen Semantik (Jackendoff 1990). Man kommt ziemlich weit, wenn man die größeren Konstruktionen formal untersucht und gewisse Einzelheiten nicht berücksichtigt. Z.B. lassen sich die kausativen, antikausativen und intentionalen Beziehungen und Strukturen in verschiedenen Sprachen mit den Mitteln der konzeptuellen Semantik miteinander vergleichen.

Die Lerner einer Sprache sprechen die sog. Lernersprache oder Intersprache (engl. *interlanguage*). Wie bekannt, ist die Lernersprache theoretisch gesehen oft ein systematisches Geschöpf, in dem die Regeln des Lerners eine Struktur bilden. Im interkulturellen Dialog kennen die Laien diese Sachlage nicht, sondern können mehr oder weniger gereizt sein, wenn der Lerner z.B. zu einer bestimmten Abweichung noch eine andere ähnliche

Abweichung in seinem Sprachgebrauch produziert. Sie wollen nicht einsehen, dass es da eine Logik gibt, die zu dieser Häufung der Abweichungen zwingt. Die Kumulationseffekte der logischen Missverständnisse der Sprachstruktur sind eine Tatsache; natürlich wirken sie auch störend. Aber weil sie systematisch sind, wird deren Abbau dem Lerner ziemlich leicht vorkommen, wenn er einmal die Einsicht in seine nicht-korrekten Vermutungen bekommt. Noch besser ist es, wenn er einen Lehrer hat, der Erfahrungen über die Wurzeln und Routen der Missverständnisse hätte. Im Finnischen kommt es oft vor, dass der Lerner das Wort nicht identifiziert hat, weil der Stamm in einer Form anders aussieht als in einer anderen (z.B. sind wohl *mäellä* sowohl als auch *mäkeä* Formen des Wortes *mäki* ‚Hügel‘). Ein deutschsprachiger Lerner kann das Objekt in einem Satz durch die deutsche Grammatik interpretieren und dabei doch die finnischen Regeln wohl systematisch folgen. Dieses wäre dadurch zu erklären, dass er die deutsche Begriffsbildung auf die von ihm produzierten Sätze bezieht.

Aufgrund der angeführten Beispiele können wir nun folgende These festhalten: In einem interkulturellen Dialog soll man fähig sein, die eigene Sprache von einem allgemeinen Gesichtspunkt zu sehen. Und was interessant zu sehen ist: Dies lernen die Teilnehmenden allmählich. Durch das Kennen einiger allgemeiner Prinzipien könnte man das gegenseitige Verstehen beschleunigen. Dem Lerner sind unter anderem die folgenden Neigungen typisch: Bestrebung zur Systematik (wenn eine falsche Vorstellung zugrunde liegt, häufen sich die Missverständnisse; siehe oben), Vermeidung von Asymmetrie, Ignorieren der kognitiven Neuigkeiten und Bedürfnis, Agensstrukturen zu verstehen (s. Ellis 1994, 56, 68, 326, 374–375.)

Das Vokabular einer Sprache ist weit und vielschichtig; um das zu lernen, muss sich jeder viel Mühe geben. Es gibt aber jeweils bestimmte spracheigene logische oder unlogische [!] Strukturen, die die Non-native-speakers ab und zu sogar genauer bemerken als die Muttersprachler.

Der Lerner sucht die Symmetrie. Wenn es in der zu lernenden Sprache Asymmetrie gibt, wie es unvermeidlich doch manchmal der Fall ist, wird Lernen schwierig, sogar in denjenigen Fällen in denen es in der eigenen Sprache eine ähnliche Asymmetrie gibt. Z.B. hat man im Deutschen die Endung *-er* für jemanden, der etwas macht (*fahren* > *der Fahrer*). Wenn ein Verb vorkommt, in dem dieses sich nicht verwirklicht, wird es für einen Lerner schwierig. Man kann z.B. von dem häufig vorkommenden Verb *sitzen* ein Substantiv *Sitzer* bilden; es passt wohl in dem folgenden Zusammenhang *SOFA 2-Sitzer DOMINA* (www-Seiten eco-trade.de 17.4.2006), aber dieses bezieht sich nicht auf einen Menschen, der sitzt. Einige Wörter im Finnischen enthalten einen positiven Zug in sich, einige andere wiederum einen negativen. Man kann aber die meisten von den beiden Typen auch in einer umgekehrten Situation benutzen – freilich soll dabei ein Merkmal für diesen umgekehrten Gebrauch hinzugefügt werden. Wegen der Symmetrie wollen die Lerner ein Merkmal auch in gegensätzlichen Fällen gebrauchen. Das ist aber nicht nötig. Solche Sätze zu verstehen, kann problematisch werden, weil sie dem Lerner als irgendwie unvollendet vorkommen. Zum Beispiel sind *Hän pärjää, Häneltä se sujuu* ‚Er/sie wird es schon schaffen‘ positiv, während; *Hän pärjää huonosti, Häneltä se sujuu heikosti* ‚Er/sie schafft es kaum‘ negativ.

Kognitiv schwierig sich anzueignen sind solche Elemente oder Züge, die jemand sich wegen der fremden Denkweise nicht vorstellen kann. Wie ist es z.B. zu verstehen, wenn man mit einigen Verben Unabsichtlichkeit ausdrückt oder mit der Passivform immer ein menschliches Lebewesen verbindet, so wie im Finnischen. Ein Finne wiederum verbindet mit dem in der Passivform stehenden Verb im deutschen Satz *im Autounfall wurden fünf Menschen getötet* einen Täter. Die absurde Konsequenz ist, dass dieser es war, der nach dem Unfall angekommen ist und die betroffenen Personen z.B. mit einem Revolver umgebracht hat (vgl. *wurden von jemandem getötet*).

In der Sprachphilosophie hat man im Laufe der Jahre häufig über die Beziehungen zwischen Sprache und Denken spekuliert und viele verschiedene Zusammenhänge finden wollen. Ich will in dieser Hinsicht vorsichtig sein. Die zahlreichen finnischen Satztypen, bei denen der Agens nicht explizit ausgedrückt wird und/oder das Subjekt fehlt, sind oft als Zeichen oder als Beweis der finnischen Zurückgezogenheit aufgefasst worden. In letzter Zeit wurde in der Linguistik aber behauptet, dass eben die subjektlosen Sätze den Sprechenden mehr nach vorne rücken als die anderen (Laitinen 1995). Wir werden hier diese Angelegenheit nicht entscheiden. Nur ist es für einen Finnischlerner wichtig zu wissen, dass die Struktur des Finnischen die Sätze ohne Subjekt zulässt und in einigen Fällen sogar fordert. Logischerweise werden dann die Finnen, die Deutsch sprechen, oft inkorrekt das Ausdrücken des Subjekts vermeiden. Sie verwenden z.B. statt des Satzes *Ich fühle mich traurig* den Satz *Man fühlt sich traurig* oder statt des Ausdrucks *Ich meine...* den Ausdruck *Es wäre möglich zu denken, dass...* Da würde ich vermuten, dass es in deutschen Ohren so klingt, als ob der Sprecher sehr scheu wäre, wenig Empathie fühle oder sich eben zurückziehe.

Der interkulturelle Dialog wird schon auf einer Sprache geführt. Die bekannten, sog. großen Sprachen haben ein bestimmtes Register für die offiziellen interkulturellen Begegnungen entwickelt. Die kleineren werden öfters inoffiziell benutzt und sind – so wie ich versuchte an einigen Fallbeispielen zu verdeutlichen – viel mehr den Fehleinschätzungen ausgesetzt.

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Wittgenstein and the Problem of Cultural Relativism

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Wittgenstein is frequently mentioned in discussions concerning the problem of relativism and interpreted either as a relativist or as an important source of inspiration for relativists. Unfortunately, relativism is an ill-defined concept, and this fact poses serious difficulties for an evaluation of Wittgenstein's stance on relativism. Not only the general concept of relativism can be understood in different ways, but there are also different, although in some cases partially overlapping, varieties of relativism (moral, epistemic, ontological, conceptual or cultural relativism, for instance). As a matter of fact, one can be a relativist in a certain sense of the word and not in another; one can be a relativist, say, in the moral sphere and nonetheless reject epistemic relativism.

Before answering the question "Is Wittgenstein a cultural relativist?" we need, therefore, to clarify the notion of relativism. Taken in its most radical sense, relativism is the thesis that all perspectives on a certain subject are equally valid or, alternatively, the thesis that all beliefs are equally good. We may wonder whether there are relativists in this strong sense. Since Plato's *Theaetetus* the aforementioned thesis is considered self-refuting; in fact, we can infer from it that those who reject relativism are right... According to another, less radical definition, relativism is the view that values, truth or knowledge are relative to or dependent on a certain framework: a culture, a paradigm, a conceptual scheme or even a personal belief system. This is perhaps a more palatable version of relativism, but it is somehow vague and misleading, because, by emphasizing the idea of context-dependence, it seems to conflate relativism and contextualism. Such a conflation is undesirable; the fact that some key philosophical notions are context-dependent does not entail, *per se*, relativism. According to a contextualist theory of justification, for example, we justify our knowledge-claims by taking for granted a specific set of basic beliefs that can vary with the context. As a result, in different cultural or epistemic contexts our justification practices can lead to different conclusions, but a contextualist is free to criticize and reject rival perspectives. The mere idea of *context-dependence* is not enough to define relativism, because relativism, as the current use of this word clearly suggests, involves also a *permissive* stance regarding conflicting and even mutually exclusive perspectives or belief systems. Accordingly, it is reasonable to characterize relativism as the combination of the context-dependence thesis with the above mentioned permissive attitude. Because Wittgenstein's epistemological contextualism is not committed to the permissiveness that is usually associated with relativism, it is possible, as I will try to show, to absolve him of the charge of relativism. Since I would like to focus on the significance of Wittgenstein's reflections at the level of intercultural communication, I will privilege a particular branch of relativism: cultural relativism, i.e., the view that it is not possible for outsiders to evaluate and criticize values, practices and basic beliefs of significantly different cultures.

There are some strands in Wittgenstein's thought that apparently lead us to relativism. At the level of philosophy of language, Wittgenstein's later thought is based on two fundamental assumptions. On the one hand, there is the idea that meanings, far from being entities existing independently of linguistic use, are determined or

even generated by use. On the other hand, Wittgenstein stresses that sentences or utterances are intelligible only against the background of the non-linguistic activities into which they are woven. He coins the pivotal notion of language game to stress this essential connection between linguistic and non-linguistic activities: "Here the term 'language game' is meant to bring to prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life" (Wittgenstein 1958, §23). In its turn, a form of life can be described as the totality of the practices, institutions and customs that constitute the medium of our everyday life. Considering that the practical and cultural contexts in which language is inevitably embedded can vary in quite significant ways, and since there is not a standpoint outside the plurality of language-games and forms of life from which we could evaluate them, the notion of language game seems to favour relativistic interpretations. It presupposes apparently, as Habermas (1988, 143) put it, a "monadology of language games", each of them governed by its own standards or rules. Another aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language that may be invoked on behalf of relativistic interpretations of his work is the thesis of the arbitrariness of grammar. A grammar is, in its Wittgensteinian sense, the set of rules that govern the use of linguistic expressions and determine the bounds of sense, affecting, therefore, our description and representation of reality. Wittgenstein argues that grammar is arbitrary because, on the one hand, different grammars are characterized by different conceptual resources and alternative forms of representation and, on the other hand, it is not possible to confront grammatical frameworks with a non-linguistic reality; any attempt to promote such a confrontation would have to presuppose a language. As a result, instead of merely being the mirror of an intrinsic structure of the world, language contributes decisively to the constitution of the objects of our experience: "Essence is expressed by grammar"; "Grammar tells what kind of object anything is" (Wittgenstein 1958: §371 and §373). Equally relevant to the problem of relativism are Wittgenstein's reflections on rule-following, because they stress the social and pragmatic dimension of rule-guided processes. One of the main results of these reflections consists in the claim that rules are not transcendent to the practices that embody them and that to obey a rule is to master a practice through a process of social training. Since speaking a language is a rule-guided activity, if we want to understand members of other cultural or linguistic communities, we must be acquainted with the practices underlying their linguistic behaviour; understanding others involves an agreement in form of life (cf. Wittgenstein 1958, §241). From this perspective, the absence of shared practices between different communities endangers seriously the prospects for intercultural communication and, consequently, for a critical evaluation of other worldviews. Such breakdowns of communication may well induce a relativistic attitude.

We can also find in Wittgenstein's epistemological reflections some themes that point, at first sight, to relativism. In *On Certainty*, in the context of a careful analysis of the basic certainties that sustain our practices and everyday life, he points out that these certainties constitute a particular world-picture (*Weltbild*) or even a

kind of mythology (cf. Wittgenstein 1975, §95). The use of the term 'mythology' reflects the fact that our world-picture cannot be justified or supported by argument, because it is what makes justifications and arguments possible: "But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false" (Wittgenstein 1975: §94). It must be stressed that what ultimately explains the fundamental role of certain propositions or beliefs is not, according to Wittgenstein, an epistemic process or mechanism, but their intimate connection with our practices. It is the form of life that determines what must be taken for granted. As Wittgenstein puts it: "Giving grounds [...] comes to an end; - but the end [...] is our acting, which lies at bottom of the language-game" (Wittgenstein 1975: §204). By stressing the epistemological significance of world-pictures and forms of life as the necessary background of our epistemic processes and by calling the attention to the irreducible diversity of world-pictures and forms of life, Wittgenstein seems again to open the door to relativism.

Until now I have gathered signs of relativism in Wittgenstein's thought. In the remaining of the text I will argue that his putative relativistic ideas are simply an expression of epistemological contextualism and that his contextualism should not be confused with relativism. In the first place, it is important to stress that, from a Wittgensteinian standpoint, it is possible to accommodate the possibility of cross-cultural communication even in cases where the participants in the dialogue belong to quite different cultures. Languages owe their intelligibility to the practices with which they are interwoven and these practices may vary significantly from culture to culture, but mankind shares a common biological nature that constitutes the basis of our social or cultural practices. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe in the existence of commonalities in human behaviour that make it possible to understand other people; "The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language" (Wittgenstein 1958, §206). In fact, at the level of intercultural communication we can rely on shared or similar practices as a basis for cultural dialogue. When the practices that we try to understand seem too remote from our culture, we can try to assimilate them through social training. Intercultural communication may face serious difficulties in the absence of a common background of practices, but it seems reasonable to think, in the light of the precedent considerations, that initial difficulties can be gradually overcome.

Not only can we understand other cultures; we can also criticize them. To illustrate this point, we can quote the following passage of *On Certainty*, where Wittgenstein says that he would *combat* people who prefer an oracle to a physicist:

609. [...] Is it wrong for them to consult an oracle and be guided by it? – If we call this 'wrong' aren't we using our language-game as a base from which to *combat* theirs? [...]

612. I said I would 'combat' the other man, – but wouldn't I give him reasons? Certainly; but how far do they go? At the end of reasons comes persuasion. (Wittgenstein 1975, 80-81)

Since Wittgenstein claims that members of significantly different cultures cannot overcome their divergences and reach a consensus on the basis of reasons, it may seem, at first sight, that this passage

constitutes evidence for a relativistic interpretation of Wittgenstein. However, the metaphor of combat is incompatible with the permissiveness that is usually associated with relativism. Moreover, Wittgenstein's conception of cultural combat does not exclude rational arguments. He does not say that the presentation of reasons is useless in the context of drastic cultural differences; he only says that in these cases the power of rational arguments is limited and we have to resort ultimately to persuasion. We must note that, in opposition to what we would normally expect from a relativist, Wittgenstein does not resign himself to the diversity of opinions and cultures. In *On Certainty*, there is another related passage, where Wittgenstein mentions people who thought, in opposition to the science of his time, that it was possible (at that time) to get to the moon, and offers the following conclusion: "If we compare our system of knowledge with theirs then theirs is evidently the poorer one by far" (Wittgenstein 1975, §286). Again, this is far from being a relativistic claim.

The key for understanding Wittgenstein's stance on cultural relativism is provided by the contextualist account of knowledge and justification that is developed in his later work, particularly in *On Certainty*. Like foundationalist theories of epistemic justification, contextualism accepts the existence of basic beliefs. However, unlike foundationalist epistemologies, Wittgenstein does not conceive of basic beliefs as *immediately justified* or *self-justifying* beliefs: "At the foundation of well-founded beliefs lies belief that is not founded" (Wittgenstein 1975, §253). What gives basic beliefs their privileged status is the fact that they are vital presuppositions of our language-games and inquiries. The chains of reasons and justifications must come to an end, but the foundation of knowledge is, as we have seen, non-epistemic: it is our form of life, our social training, our practices. As a result, and again in opposition to traditional foundationalism, Wittgenstein claims that what counts as a fundamental belief may vary from context to context.

In spite of acknowledging that standards for justified belief are context-dependent, a contextualist is not condemned to relativism, because nothing prevents him or her from criticizing rival belief systems and even aspects of his or her world-picture. Standards of justification can be challenged and criticized both from the inside and the outside of a world-picture. In each particular context our critical reflection necessarily takes for granted some propositions, but these presuppositions of our inquiries are not, in principle, immune to challenge and rejection. The claim that justification is context-dependent does not entail relativism, but only that justification is an ongoing and open-ended process, always dependent on certain assumptions. If we consider, with Williams (2001, 225), that a relativist is a "disappointed foundationalist", we can even say that contextualism is incompatible with relativism.

To conclude, I would like to draw a parallel between Gadamer and Wittgenstein, because the latter's conception of understanding as a fusion of horizons can be considered a contextualist antidote against cultural relativism. In fact, and in accordance with epistemological contextualism, Gadamer claims that it is not possible to get outside our cultural horizon or inherited background of intelligibility, but instead of surrendering to relativism, he describes cross-cultural communication as a dialogic quest for truth that may well culminate in a correction of prejudices and in a transformation of horizons. Wittgenstein does not mention explicitly the notion of fusion of horizons, but he could integrate it easily in his

thought; he acknowledges our dependence on a certain background of intelligibility or world-picture, he is aware that language-games and world-pictures evolve with time and he claims that we can have access, in principle, to different cultures. Complemented by the notion of fusion of horizons, Wittgenstein's account of cross-cultural communication would be even more persuasive.

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Social Criticism through Internal and Intercultural Dialogues

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Social criticism, as a social activity, can be situated in a wider inquiry into life. It involves both critique and construction. The task of social criticism is one of interrogating and reinterpreting the foundations of society. It involves questioning the traditional perspectives, the entire social order with its major assumptions and values. In pointing out the gap between values and actual practices and in questioning established orthodoxies it serves as a vehicle for social change and cultural creativity. Social criticism in this way can be seen as one of the most important by-products of a larger activity – cultural creativity and affirmation. Culture contains a critical possibility to question the foundations of society and its structure of power. It contains within it a dimension of ideal seeking in relation to self-realization, modes of intersubjectivity, and the constitution of a good society.

The starting point would be an enquiry into the foundations of our life which leads to an awareness about its multidimensional origin – the socio-cultural and the individual. To be precise, criticism begins with a description of the dynamics of relation between the three domains of life – individual, social, and cultural. Society consists of the dialectic of value and power and social criticism is an inquiry into the mode of this dialectic without presupposing that it is a process of determination where power determines the terms of discourse and holds the key to human emancipation (Beteille 1980). This explicates how social criticism is closely related to self-criticism and cultural criticism.

The questions to be examined here, keeping the nature of society in general and Indian cultural milieu in particular, are: What is the primary objective of a social critic? How do they go about doing it in a society like Indian? What approach should a critic adapt to explain comprehensively the genesis, process, and implications of diverse components of a society and its culture? And finally, how does a critique establish his distance from the people and institutions he criticizes so as to give it a moral authenticity?

Since criticism requires critical distancing, it offers a great challenge for any society to be critical of themselves. In Walzer's words, "the condition of collective life – immediacy, closeness, emotional attachment, parochial vision – militates against a critical self-understanding" (Walzer 1988: 31). Any critic – an individual, a group of critics, or a movement – are also, most of the time, members of the same community, sharing the collective reflection upon the conditions of collective life. Hence the significant question is who can be the most appropriate critic and where do they stand to be social critics? i.e., how much distance can be called critical distance?

The conventional view is for the social critics to stand outside the common circumstances of collective life. They have to radically detach themselves from their own society. This detachment is twofold – emotional detachment from the intimacy of the membership and intellectual detachment from the parochial understandings of their own society. It is believed this would make them dispassionate, open-minded and objective. The critics are perceived here as an outsider, a spectator, a total stranger. He/she applies objective and universal principles only to point out the faults and contradictions of the society concerned but does not take responsibility for their critical positions.

On the contrary, there is an alternative approach to social criticism. Here the critics are related to the society they criticize both politically and morally. They are neither intellectually nor emotionally detached. They seek the success of a common enterprise. Social criticism for such people is an internal argument. It becomes an ordinary activity – less influenced by scientific knowledge than, as Walzer puts it, an 'educated cousin of common complaint'. It does not depend for its force or accuracy upon any sort of high theory. Walzer emphasizes "It is opposition, far more than detachment that determines the shape of social criticism. The critic takes sides in actual or latent conflicts; he sets himself against the prevailing political forces" (Walzer 1988: 48). This way, the true social critic stands only a little to the side of his society.

Using this "connected" critic model, we can examine the important challenges faced by the world in the form of exclusionary practices such as racism and violence, discrimination and oppression of tribal groups, minorities – communal or gender, etc. These again originate from the very notion of culture and tradition. These challenges arise out of the confronting cultural differences and the incommensurability of different cultural identities. Here, I would limit myself to the analysis of the problem of representation of the most marginalized communities in India, the outcasts or *dalits*. This issue is very often touched by deep-rooted imbalances in social relationships. We need to examine these representations in writings or in different forums for their academic status and also for the impact they leave on the actual social conditions and social reality within which they exist. It can be viewed against the broader context of related issues as changing facets of cultural and gender domination, meaning of knowledge and authenticity, and significantly the moral or ethical authority to define and represent the marginalized.

As an illustration, I would elaborate on the problem of representation of the anti-caste movement in India. We can re-frame the problem by asking who would be the appropriate critic and representative of caste issues in India. Most of the time the discourse on caste remains academic and fails to relate to the masses who have important and serious political points to make. Generally, scholars who champion the issue do not bother to relate with those who are sufferers. These interventions remain constricted at the polemical level and mostly fail to elevate our understanding through the expansion of the debate socio-culturally. This is the outcome of exclusion of the insiders, i.e., the ones into the local practices and arrangements – in this case the *dalits*, from the intellectual domain.

This issue can also be looked at by analysing how justified is the representation of *dalits* by non-*dalits*? Any critic of the situation of marginalized subject classes, or oppressed minorities or outcasts, I believe, will be authentic only when this individual is also a participant in the enterprise of the concerned community or class and equally share their concern about success of their common enterprise. So, in this case, a transformative *dalit* movement is possible only when the insiders acquire the leadership as critic and subsequently as representative leading to emancipation of the community. In this context, Professor Gopal Guru writes "In order to claim a moral status to their representation claim, *dalits* have to acquire the moral capacity to question themselves vis-à-vis both their intellectual and political moves....they are supposed

to substantiate their claim not only on the basis of external reasoning, but an internal ethic informed by public accountability, a historicization of dalit reality, and tolerance towards internal intellectual dissent" (Guru 2001: 38).

While a critic or a movement takes a political side, he/she has to connect with as well as keep an appropriate distance from the beliefs and values of the people whose life is the object of his/her criticism. This gives rise to another related problem of relation between social criticism and internal traditions of a society. The question would be: is it necessary to take the traditions of a society seriously so as to make social criticism a worthwhile engagement? In other words, whether to take people's cultural and traditional practices as the starting point of our inquiry or reject them merely as opinion of those whose life itself is in urgent need of deliverance.

If the critics seek fervour through arguments using the traditional beliefs as standards then it must be ensured that the evaluation of tradition involves a movement towards deeper and more objective level. Then only criticism will lead the critics through a thorough imaginative exploration of alternative views and subsequently towards the modification of their unconsidered positions. However "this modification, if it takes place, will take place not as an imposition from without, but as a discovery about which, among that person's own values, are the deepest and the most central. This is self-discovery and discovery of one's own traditions" (Nussbaum and Sen 1987: 24).

Accepting the idea of social criticism as a collective reflection on collective life takes into consideration the reality of collective life, of common values and a shared tradition. Though difficult, it is a significant task of a social critic to respond, within the tradition, to a new social experience and order. It is to be noted here that the sources of this criticism are not always totally internal to the traditions. They usually emerge out of a global interpenetration of traditions and civilizational dialogues. This process of mutual interpenetration becomes imperative for societies to evaluate critically and emerge out of the unjust social arrangements and move towards good life.

In this perspective it becomes easy to situate the critical agenda of some prominent Indian social critics and reformers such as Swami Vivekanand, Mahatma Gandhi, Sri Aurobindo and others. They were looking for an approach to social criticism which has double-edged nature. It would simultaneously be a critique of imperialism and of Indian civilization – culture and tradition – in a radical way. The sources of their criticism were not merely internal to Indian tradition but were also influenced by the emancipatory traditions of the west. In other words, it was a dialectic between the Indian spiritual tradition and the western agenda of modernity.

Another important aspect is that the dialogue between tradition and critique may not always be a smooth one. If tradition fails in upholding the basic humanitarian values of justice, equality and human dignity for its members then it needs to be thrown away. Situations like these demand an audacious social criticism which can break away from the traditional and create new ones for the sake of these values. The emergence of heterodox systems like Buddhism and Jainism, challenging the very foundation of the *Vedic* tradition becomes very relevant against the backdrop of Indian intellectual history. In this context, breaking away from the tradition of *Vedic* texts remained the only possibility to re-establish the values. The need of the time was to break away from the dead letters to the living world. The *dalit* movements have also mostly called for giving up the words of the *Vedas*

and the *Shastras*, which were worshipped as sacred words in the Hindu tradition, and to abandon them in favour of contemporary interpretation of life. Even Gandhi's interpolations for reinterpretation of certain portion of these texts which support caste practices, were rejected.

This leads to another problem of social criticism, i.e., the critic turning a blind eye towards the 'form of life' to which he or she belongs. As social criticism involves taking a hypothetical attitude to one's culture, society and conception of self, it is quite challenging for critics to overcome this blindness. Jürgen Habermas recognises it when he says "individuals who have been socialized cannot take a hypothetical attitude to the form of life and the personal life-history that have shaped their own identity" (Habermas 1990: 104). But it doesn't mean that this blindness cannot be surmounted. In compliance with the Western critical tradition, it is possible through rational deliberation on that 'form of life'. Habermas would call it *discourse ethics*. According to him, the participant in such a discourse will not find the relevance of 'experiential context of his life' for very long. So he will be open to question the normativeness of the existing social institutions. In his words: "Under the unrelenting moralizing gaze of participants in discourse... familiar institutions can be transformed into so many instances of problematic justice" (Habermas 1990: 108). This reaffirms our faith in the ability of rationality to arrive at an integration of life. But it is to be noted here that valorising the collective identities alone can lead to suppression of creative variations within a collective. Hence, there is a need to widen this discourse to accommodate and respond to this paradox.

Self criticism in this respect is the foundation of social criticism. As a mode of critical engagement, it is also meant to enable others to be critical of themselves. It seeks to interrogate the life that one is leading with respect to others making it imperative for any social critique to reflect whether the desired transformation in institutions and society in his / her critical agenda is also at work in his / her own life.

A good social criticism demands a critic to take a hypothetical attitude to one's society and overcome one's blindness towards its culture and tradition. But this process of withdrawal from the society has to be accompanied by a process of returning back to it in order to join the common enterprise. In new light, critics make use of the educatability and the creativity of the people to lead them to a new life which is based on self-realized, transformed values, thereby transforming and reconstructing the society. It is precisely the task of social reconstruction to improve the ethical conventions that govern social life. One cannot overlook the transformational significance of social criticism. However, it is always possible that the critic can get the things wrong. Walzer, I believe, is fully justified when he says "a good social criticism is as rare as good poetry or good philosophy" (Walzer 1988: 58).

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Interkulturelle Philosophie in Russland: Tradition und Neuorientierungen

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Das Phänomen „Interkulturelle Philosophie“ hat in Russland eine lange Geschichte, die zwei Perioden umfasst. Vom 19. bis Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts existierte interkulturelle Philosophie in Form einer Methode vergleichender Kulturforschung. In diesem Rahmen wurden zahlreiche Kulturtheorien und geschichtsphilosophische Konzeptionen entwickelt, die auf die Beschreibung verschiedener Kulturen und das Problem des Verhältnisses zwischen ihnen gezielt waren. Den Ausgangspunkt bildete dabei die sogenannte „russische Idee“ – ein besonderes Geschichtsverständnis, das Russland ins Zentrum aller kultur- und geschichtsphilosophischen Überlegungen stellte. Die Spezifik der russischen Volkskultur, die Rolle und Stellung Russlands in der Weltgeschichte, die Eigentümlichkeiten seiner Entwicklung waren herausragende Themen philosophischer Reflexion. Sie bereiteten das Fundament für die Beurteilung von historischen Ereignissen und den Aufbau des gesamten Weltbildes. Der Suche nach der kulturellen Selbstidentifikation Russlands verdanken ihre Entstehung beispielsweise die Geschichtskonzeptionen von Aleksej Chomjakov (1804 – 1860) und Fedor Dostoevskij (1821 – 1881), sowie die Theorie der kulturhistorischen Typen von Nikolaj Danilevskij (1822 – 1885) und die soziale Ästhetik von Konstantin Leontjev (1831 – 1891).

Der vergleichenden Kulturforschung, die die genannten Theorien präsentieren, liegen folgende Prinzipien zugrunde: Verständnis einer Kultur als Organismus, der in seiner Ontogenese unterschiedliche Entwicklungsstadien erlebt, Verständnis einer Kultur als ein erhaltendes psychisch-mentales Ganzes und Verständnis interkultureller Beziehungen nach Grundsätzen der Evolutionstheorie. Die russische kulturwissenschaftliche Tradition bietet somit eine naturalisierende Deutung der Kulturphänomene. Ein Beispiel dafür stellt die von Danilevskij ausgearbeitete Klassifizierung der «kulturhistorischen Typen» oder «eigenständigen Zivilisationen» aufgrund ihnen innewohnenden «morphologischen Prinzipien» dar. Die Kulturen unterscheiden sich durch psychische, sittliche Merkmale, ihre Begabungen und durch den «Gang und die Bedingungen ihrer historischen Erziehung» (Danilevskij 1995).

Die Reflexion auf die Besonderheiten der kulturellen Entwicklung Russlands im Vergleich mit anderen Ländern und vor allem mit Westeuropa geschah aufgrund einer dichotomischen Bewertungsskala. Man kann dabei Denkmuster finden, die für die Aufteilung der Kulturräume den Gegensatz „Wir“ und „Andere“ voraussetzen. Je nach dem persönlichen Standpunkt des Autors können folgende Denkschemata festgestellt werden: a) Bei dem eurozentrisch orientierten Čadaev (1794 – 1856) kommt der Gedanke vor, dass Russland infolge seiner wirtschaftlichen, sozialen und kulturellen Rückständigkeit „Noch-nicht-Kultur“ ist. b) Chomjakov thematisiert Verhältnisse zwischen Russland und Westeuropa ausgehend von dem Paradigma „Kultur und Antikultur“, wobei Russland mit seinem „guten“ inneren Prinzip „Kultur“ symbolisiert und Westen als „böse“ „Antikultur“ erscheint; c) Für die soziale Monadologie von Danilevskij ist die

Vorstellung von „Anderer Kultur“ grundlegend: In ihrer Eigenart wichen alle Kulturen prinzipiell voneinander ab, sind voneinander unabhängig und für einander unbegreifbar; d) Dostoevskij betrachtet russische Kultur als eine „Mit-Kultur“ der westeuropäischen: vom seinem zivilisatorischen Gesichtspunkt aus erscheint der Unterschied zwischen den beiden kulturellen Topoi als kein qualitativer, sondern als ein quantitativer.

Die Grundideen der interkulturellen Forschungen innerhalb von zwei Jahrhunderten bestehen in der Behauptung der Unmöglichkeit einer allgemeinen Kultur, in der Unzulässigkeit der Identifikation der Weltgeschichte mit der europäischen Geschichte, bei der das „Allgemeinmenschliche“ mit dem „Gesamteuropäischen“ gleichgesetzt wird, und in der Verneinung eines absoluten Fortschritts und des Vorhandenseins allgemein gültiger Maßstäbe bei dem Kulturvergleich. Die meisten Konzeptionen gehen von der Voraussetzung aus, dass das historische Ziel eines jeden Volkes in der Selbsterkenntnis besteht. Da die Kultur das Erkenntnismittel eines Volkes sei, sei jedes einzelne Volk dazu verpflichtet, seine eigene authentische Kultur zu entwickeln. Die Formel „Einheit in der Vielfalt“, die die Koexistenz verschiedener Kulturtypen behauptet, trifft man als regulative Idee bei vielen Forschern.

Die kulturtheoretischen Annahmen, die im Rahmen einer naturalisierenden Geschichtsschreibung gemacht wurden, hatten handlungstheoretische Folgen. Die Beziehungen zwischen kulturellen Gebilden, von denen jedes ein abgeschlossenes Universum mit ihm innewohnenden Prinzipien darstellt, wurden als kontradiktorisch definiert: von ihrer Unvereinbarkeit wurde auf eine Konkurrenz zwischen ihnen geschlossen. Das Weltgeschehen erwies sich damit als ein unaufhörlicher Kampf verschiedener Kulturen gegeneinander. Begriffe wie „Entwicklung eigener Spezifik“, „Wettbewerb“ und „Konflikt“ markieren den Gedankengang russischer Kulturforschung. Integration in einen allgemein menschlichen Kulturraum war entweder ausgeschlossen, oder nur unter Bedingung der Aufrechterhaltung kultureller Eigenständigkeit jeder nationalen Kultur denkbar. Da gegenseitiges Mißtrauen als Norm zwischenkultureller Beziehungen betrachtet wurde, konnte ein interkultureller Dialog allein auf der Basis der „geschickten Anziehungskraft auf ehrerbietiger Distanz“ erfolgen (Leontjev 1966). Im Ganzen kann man behaupten, dass den meisten kulturtheoretischen Konzeptionen ein Abwehrnationalismus innewohnt. Als sein Resultat können die Theorien betrachtet werden, die dem kulturellen Imperialismus Westeuropas den großrussischen Messianismus entgegengesetzt haben, der die Vereinigung aller Menschen aufgrund der vom russischen Volk aufbewahrten orthodox-christlichen Werte ermöglichen soll.

Die Entwicklung von Phänomenologie, Hermeneutik, Semiotik, Sprachphilosophie und dialogischer Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert führten zum Paradigmenwechsel im Selbstverständnis der interkulturellen Philosophie. Dank der Phänomenologie wurden die Fragen nach der intersubjektiven

Sinnkonstitution aktualisiert, die Hermeneutik betrachtete das Problem der Kultur als ein Kommunikationsproblem, die Semiotik hob den symbolischen Charakter jedes Kulturphänomens hervor, die Sprachphilosophie stellte das Postulat von der gegenseitigen Verständigung als Bedingung aller Weltkonstitution auf, die dialogische Philosophie revidierte die Ansicht auf Dialog als Sprachhandlung und bloßer Informationsaustausch und begriff den Dialog als eine neue Form der Rationalität. Dies alles trug dazu bei, dass der ontologisierende und deshalb differenzierende Zugang zur Kulturproblematik durch einen nominalisierenden, relativierenden und deshalb die Möglichkeit einer Integration anbietenden ersetzt wurde. Das Verständnis der Kultur nicht als einer dem Menschen naturgemäß vorgegebenen Umwelt, sondern als einer Objektivierung des freien menschlichen Geistes, bildete die Grundlagen für eine kritische Analyse der Vorstellungen, die im Rahmen einer Kultur als universal gültig erscheinen und die jede Kultur zu verallgemeinern tendiert. Außerdem begann man aktiv den interkulturellen Charakter jeder Kultur zu thematisieren, was zu besserer transkultureller Verständigung führen sollte.

Der erste Schritt in diese Richtung wurde von der Vertretern des russischen „Eurasieriums“ gemacht. Die kulturphilosophische Bedeutung des „Eurasieriums“ ist damit verbunden, dass es ein neues Modell der russischen kulturellen Identität entwickelt hat. Das Wesen dieses Modells besteht darin, dass Russland, das geographisch und historisch zwischen Europa und Asien vermittelt, eine besondere synthetische Einheit bildet, die der Begriff „Eurasien“ zum Ausdruck bringt. Kulturphilosophisch erweist sich „Eurasien“ als ein Konzept, welche die Existenz einer besonderen Welt behauptet, die geographisch, ethnographisch, wirtschaftlich, historisch und kulturell eine europäisch-asiatische Hybride darstellt. Damit wird die Interkulturalität der russischen Kultur in einem Begriff gefasst.

Den Hintergrund dieser These macht die Vorstellung von einem prinzipiell interkulturellen Charakter der menschlichen Kultur überhaupt aus. So ist Pavel Bicilli der Ansicht, dass „genauso wie die politische Geschichte des Okzidents kann seine kulturelle Geschichte von der kulturellen Geschichte des Orients nicht isoliert werden“ (Bicilli 1993). An zahlreichen Beispielen demonstriert er die Wechselwirkung einzelner regionaler Kulturen der Alten Welt im Bereich der politischen Geschichte, Kunst, Philosophie und Religion. Geschichte und Kultur erscheinen ihm als allgemein menschliche Phänomene, die durch gegenseitige Einflüsse strukturiert sind. Die wichtigste kulturelle Aufgabe des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts sieht er in der „Wiederherstellung der gebrochenen kulturellen Einheit der Alten Welt“ und in dem „Auffinden der Wege zu einer kulturellen Synthese, die als Einheit in Vielfalt überall in eigenartigen Formen erscheinen würde“ (Bicilli 1993).

Auch Petr Savickij betrachtet die Kultur und Geschichte der Alten Welt als eine „ganzheitliche Einheit“. Ihm zufolge waren hellenische und byzantinische Kulturen ihrem Charakter nach eurasisch: die Erstere bestand aus den Elementen des „hellenischen Westens“ und des „alten Orients“, die Letztere aus den „östlichen“ Elementen der späteren Antike und den „westlichen“ Elementen des europäischen Mittelalters. Die dritte eurasische Kultur sei Russland, das durch die Orthodoxie mit Byzanz, durch die mongolisch-tatarische Herrschaft mit dem „asiatischen Orient“ und durch kulturelle Kontakte mit Europa verbunden sei. Russland erscheint ihm somit als eine

„verkleinerte Nachbildung“ der interkulturell geprägten Alten Welt.

Als einen entscheidenden kulturbildenden Faktor betrachten die Eurasier den „Entwicklungsraum“, der durch eine Gesamtheit geographischer und ethnographischer Komponenten definiert wird. In Bezug auf Russland erscheint es als wichtig, dass sein Territorium zum großen Teil ein Flachland ist, das in Richtung Westen und Osten keine natürlichen Grenze hat, und deshalb für kulturelle Kontakte mit den dort lebenden Völkern offen ist. Ein „Entwicklungsraum“ schafft den Eurasiern zufolge eine besondere „Kulturpersönlichkeit“, einen besonderen Kulturtypus. In Russland entsteht der sogenannte „eurasische Kulturtypus“. Für ihn ist charakteristisch, dass sein Alltagsleben, seine Ethnopsychologie sowie die technische, geistige und politische Kultur durch das Ineinanderfließen von „arischen“ und „turanischen“ Komponenten bestimmt ist. Als Hauptträger des eurasischen Kulturtypus betrachten die Eurasier die türkischen Völker aufgrund ihrer Anzahl und ihrer außerordentlichen Rolle in der Geschichte Russlands. Längere kulturelle Kontakte mit diesen Völkern beeinflussten die Slaven und führten dazu, dass sie weniger „europäisch“ und mehr „asiatisch“ geworden seien. Beispielsweise stellt Nikolaj Trubeckoj aufgrund der Analyse der türkischen Sprachen, der Musik und Poesie fest, dass die Hauptzüge des türkischen Volksgeistes eine Neigung zu Klarheit und zu Ausgeglichenheit sowohl in geistiger wie materieller Hinsicht seien, die nicht zu tief sinnigen Überlegungen anregt; bildliche statt logische Denkkultur; Lässigkeit der Gedanken; Gewöhnung an bestimmte unbewusste Stereotypen, die zum Gehorsam veranlasse (Trubeckoj 1993). Diese Eigenschaften sind laut Trubeckoj nicht nur für die türkischen Völker charakteristisch, sondern auch für die Russen.

Savickij sieht den Einfluss der nomadischen Steppenvölker auf die russische Mentalität darin, dass den Russen genauso wie diesen das „Empfinden des Kontinents“ innewohnt, das bestimmte Vorstellungen und Handlungsmuster bedingt. Diese spezifisch eurasische Wahrnehmung der Welt konfrontiert er mit dem für die Westeuropäer typischen „Empfinden des Meers“, das einen ganz anderen Kulturtypus schafft.

Wenn man dem kulturellen Topos „russisches Eurasien“ eine allgemeine Bewertung verleiht, bemerkt man, dass sein Zentrum auf den asiatischen Osten Russlands verschoben ist. Dies entspricht dem Anliegen der Eurasier, die gegen die kulturelle Dominanz Westeuropas auftraten, ein alternatives System der Werte im Vergleich mit dem klassischen europäischen Kulturmodell zu erarbeiten. Dieses Vorhaben stützt sich auf die Idee von der Gleichwertigkeit aller Kulturen. Um diese Idee zu begründen, schlägt Savickij vor, Kultur „differenzierend“ zu betrachten, d. h. sie in einzelne Zweige zu gliedern und diese dabei relativ zu der „kulturellen Umwelt“ und der „Epoche“ zu betrachten (Savickij 1993). Eine solche Betrachtungsweise soll eine reduktionistische Bewertung der Völker als „kulturelle“ oder „nicht kulturelle“ ausschließen. Der „ökologische“ Gedanke über Autonomie und Wert jeder Kultur korreliert bei den Eurasiern mit dem Gedanken über den nicht linearen Charakter der Kulturentwicklung. So schreibt Bicilli: „Unstreitig ist sowohl die Tatsache, dass Kultur auf gleicher Stelle nicht stehen bleibt, dass sich ihre Zentren bewegen, als auch die Tatsache, dass sich Kultur ständig ändert und dabei nicht nur quantitativ, sondern auch qualitativ oder, genauer, nur qualitativ, weil Kultur nicht „gemessen“, sondern nur bewertet werden kann“ (Bicilli

1993). Für die Kulturentwicklung der Menschheit ist folglich eine permanente Verschiebung und Abwechslung von Zentrum und Peripherie charakteristisch.

Die russische interkulturelle Philosophie des 21. Jahrhunderts, die sich als „komparatistische Philosophie“ kennzeichnet, entwickelt die Idee der Interkulturalität jeder Kultur. Dabei transformiert sie diese und verwandelt sie in eine Form des philosophischen Selbstbewusstseins: eine selbstbewusste Philosophie solle ihre eigene Interkulturalität anerkennen. Letzteres erneuert die methodischen Grundlagen philosophischer Reflexion einschließlich der vergleichenden Kulturforschung und transkulturellen Ethik. Die moderne komparatistische Philosophie akzeptiert Multiplizität der Welten, die friedlich koexistieren und einen Dialog miteinander herstellen müssen. Die Grundprinzipien der modernen russischen Komparatistik wurden unter dem Einfluss der Postmoderne entwickelt, die das Ende der Meta-Erzählungen, Dezentrierung des Sinns und Dispersion des Subjekts, Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen, Relativierung der Werte etc. behauptet. Sie geht deshalb davon aus, dass Perspektivität als eine allgemeine und notwendige Bedingung von Erfahrung und Erkenntnis und die Vielfalt an Standards der Richtigkeit, denen menschliche Konstruktionen unterworfen sind, ein nicht hintergebares Apriori des Theoretisierens im Bereich der Kulturforschung ausmachen müssen. Dies ruft eine Änderung der Vorstellung von Universalismus hervor: nicht die Idee einer Verallgemeinerung eines regionalen Etalons zu dem Allgemeinmenschlichen, sondern die Idee einer weltweiten Synthese leitet nun die Gedanken.

In Bezug auf die Grundlagen einer philosophischen Komparatistik, deren Gegenstand nationale philosophische Kulturen sind, spezifiziert sich diese Idee einer weltweiten Synthese folgendermaßen: „Die Bildung eines gemeinsamen philosophischen Raums wird zu einer der leitenden Forschungsrichtungen in der Entwicklung der Komparatistik“ (Kolesnikov 2004). Die moderne russische philosophische Komparatistik sieht ihre Aufgabe in der „Schaffung einer universalen Metasprache einer Weltphilosophie“ (Kolesnikov 2004). Den Hintergrund für diese Formulierung bildet die Ansicht auf die Zusammengehörigkeit und Unauflöslichkeit einzelner Kulturen und Regionalgeschichten, die die Weltkultur und Weltgeschichte der Menschheit ausmachen.

Diese universale philosophische Metasprache soll man nicht als ein Lexikon verstehen, das eine Gesamtheit geordneter, gegenseitig übersetzbarer Begriffe darstellt. Außer einer semantisch-syntaktischer Dimension muss diese Sprache auch eine hermeneutische Dimension haben: sie soll im Sinne Michail Bachtins als Polyphonie verschiedener gleichberechtigter Sprachen begriffen werden, von denen jede ihre eigene unikat Stimme hat. Eine solche Metasprache existiert in Form eines Dialogs, wobei der Dialog als eine Interaktion, als ein komplizierter und vielschichtiger Prozess der Selbstdarstellung und Objektivierung im miteinander Sprechen interpretiert werden muss. Die Möglichkeit eines solchen weltweiten philosophischen Dialogs basiert auf einer besonderen Einstellung der Menschen zur Welt, die solche Aspekte wie Verantwortung, gegenseitiges Verständnis, Gleichberechtigung und Kreativität umfaßt. Die moderne Komparatistik stellt weiter die Aufgabe der Erarbeitung eines idealen Modells des Selbstbewusstseins, das die Grenze einer konkreten kultur-historischen Tradition überschreitet und eine „universale“, „deideologisierte“ Position einnimmt.

Einer der Vertreter der philosophischen Komparatistik in Russland, Anatolij Kolesnikov, erblickt die gesellschaftliche Rolle seiner Disziplin darin, dass sie als eine „verstehende Wissenschaft“ durch die Schaffung eines „transkulturellen Fundaments“ für Vergleich und Verständnis philosophischer Kulturen und Traditionen auch die Kriterien einer „überkulturellen Rationalität“ ausarbeite, die einen interkulturellen Dialog ermöglichen müsse. Die komparatistische Methodologie solle auf diesem Weg die Extreme des Universalismus und des Relativismus überwinden und ein innerlich freies, „nomadisches Bewusstsein“ entwickeln, das über den lokal normierten Diskursrahmen hinausgehen und sich an dem überkulturellen Verständnis orientieren könne. In dieser Hinsicht erscheint ihm Komparatistik als eine „interkulturelle Zukunftsphilosophie, die jede philosophische Reflexion, die einen Anspruch auf die Rolle eines universalen Paradigmas, eines dominierenden Zentrums erhebt, dezentriert“. Kolesnikov geht es darum, einen „neuen Typus der Einheit“ zu erarbeiten, der „Unterschiede, Mannigfaltigkeit, nationale und regionale Spezifik modernen Philosophierens“ berücksichtige und jegliche Form von Monologismus, Isolationismus, Zentrismus ablehne. Nicht die Orientierung auf das Erreichen einer endgültigen Wahrheit, sondern die Orientierung auf das gegenseitige Verständnis solle zu einer ethischen Maxime des komparatistischen Denkens werden. Diese Fragestellung kann als Versuch eine „Einheit in der und durch die Vielfalt“ zu schaffen charakterisiert werden. Sie verzichtet somit auf die Semantik des Totalitarismus in einer All-Form und richtet sich auf das Herstellen einer, der Idee einer pluralistischen Gesellschaft entsprechenden, Inter-Form.

Im Ensemble philosophischer Wissenschaften versteht sich die moderne russische philosophische Komparatistik als eine „Metaphilosophie“ oder eine „Philosophie der Philosophie“. Die Frage, ob dieses neue philosophische Verständnis eine stärkere gesellschaftliche und wissenschaftliche Wirkung in Russland haben wird, bleibt jedoch offen.

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Wittgenstein – ein platonischer Idealist und Kulturpessimist?

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Wittgenstein verweist in seinen Schriften häufig auf Platon bzw. Sokrates – dies auf verschiedenen Ebenen und aus unterschiedlicher Wertschätzung. Laut Nyíri waren seine Hinweise Versuche, zu dem Punkt in der Geschichte der Philosophie zurückzukommen, an dem Platon die falsche Richtung eingeschlagen hätte (Nyíri 2005, 311). Dies geht auch aus einem Diktat für Moritz Schlick hervor, in dem Wittgenstein festhält, dass sein Standpunkt der entgegengesetzte dessen sei, den Sokrates in den platonischen Dialogen vertrete. (TS 302, 14. Sog. Diktat für Schlick). Auf die Frage, was Erkenntnis sei, würde Wittgenstein wie der Schüler, den Platon zurechtweist (vgl. MS 114, 108), „Erkenntnisse“ aufzählen und dabei feststellen, dass kein gemeinsamer Bestandteil in ihnen allen zu finden wäre, da es keinen gebe.

Im Gegensatz zu Platon sucht Wittgenstein hinsichtlich des Erkenntnisbegriffs nach praktischen Beispielen, nach Verwendung des Wortes „Erkenntnis“ im alltäglichen Sprachgebrauch und distanziert sich von einer begrifflichen Analyse, vor allem von der Annahme eines allgemeinen „Wesens“ der Dinge, vertritt also eher eine pragmatische als essentialistische Position. Seine kritische Haltung gegenüber Termini wie „Wesen“ und dergleichen lässt sich in seinen philosophischen Aufzeichnungen häufig beobachten, doch es gibt auch Stellen, wo er solche Ausdrücke verwendet. Auf diese Ambivalenz zwischen analytischer, auch pragmatischer, und idealistischer Annäherung werde ich später zu sprechen kommen.

Vorher möchte ich auf die Bedeutung von Bildern hinweisen, denen bei Plato wie auch bei Wittgenstein eine wesentliche Rolle zukam. Wie Nyíri anführt, versuchte Wittgenstein, sich vom Einfluß geschriebener Sprache zu befreien, der seit Plato die Geschichte der abendländischen Philosophie geprägt habe. Geschriebene Sprache als Quelle philosophischer Konfusionen sei Wittgensteins eigentlicher „Feind“ gewesen, wie Nyíri betont (Nyíri 2005, 311). Um die Fallstricke der geschriebenen Sprache zu überwinden, befasste sich Wittgenstein in seiner Philosophie mit der gesprochenen Sprache; um der Barrieren der gesprochenen Sprache Herr zu werden, arbeitete er in seiner Philosophie mit Bildern (Nyíri 2005, 312). Dies gilt meines Erachtens insbesondere für den Bereich des Nicht-Sagbaren, über den es keine sinnvollen Sätze geben könne, für den sich Sprache als Unsinn erweise.

Doch auch in zahlreichen Beispielen aus dem konkreten Sprachgebrauch verwendet Wittgenstein Bilder zur Verdeutlichung philosophischer Probleme. Bezugnehmend auf Augustinus' Benennung von Gegenständen mit Worten zum Erlernen von Sprache, bemerkt Wittgenstein, dass wir ein bestimmtes Bild vom Wesen der menschlichen Sprache erhalten. In diesem Bild fänden wir die Wurzeln der Idee, dass jedes Wort eine Bedeutung habe (vgl. MS 142, 1). In seinem Hinweis auf die Ähnlichkeiten zwischen Wörtern bzw. Familienähnlichkeiten beruft sich Wittgenstein auf Platon, genau genommen auf den Dialog mit Kratylus, wo es darum geht, die Bedeutung eines bestimmten Wortes durch Darstellung eines ähnlichen Wortes zu beleuchten (vgl. MS 111, 13).

In diesem Beitrag möchte ich den Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen Wittgenstein und Platon insbesondere hinsichtlich eines idealistischen Weltbilds nachspüren. Dabei werde ich mich zuerst auf einen Text Wittgensteins beziehen, in dem es auffallende Parallelen zu Platons Höhlengleichnis gibt. Anschließend soll Wittgensteins Abkehr von einem platonischen Idealismus erörtert werden.

In einem Brieffragment, vermutlich 1925 verfaßt und an seine Schwester Hermine gerichtet, vergleicht Wittgenstein das Dasein menschlicher Existenz mit dem Befinden in einer roten Glasglocke. Auch hier geht es um ein Bild, obgleich aus metaphysischer, nicht sprachanalytischer Sicht betrachtet. Weiters geht es um die Metaphern von reinem und getrübtem Licht, als Bilder für wahre und falsche (Welt)Sicht bzw. Erkenntnis.

Im Gegensatz zu Wittgensteins philosophischen Aufzeichnungen geht aus diesem Text seine persönliche Einstellung zu geistigen und kulturellen Werten hervor, die einem Bekenntnis gleichkommt. Unter dem Kulturbegriff versteht er Kunst und Wissenschaft; Religion sieht er nicht eigentlich als Teil, sondern außerhalb der Kultur, eine Sonderstellung einnehmend. Obgleich er die Kulturen dem Bereich des Geistigen zuordnet, bedeuten sie für ihn nur eine Art Ersatz für Religion. Diese mache das wirklich Spirituelle aus.

In einer Metapher wird das religiöse Ideal – als das „reine geistige“ Ideal – dementsprechend mit weißem Licht verglichen, die Ideale der verschiedenen Kulturen hingegen mit den gefärbten Lichtern, die entstehen, wenn das reine Licht durch rot gefärbtes Glas scheint. Allein mit diesem Vergleich werden Kunst und Wissenschaft mit Verschwommenheit und Unklarheit assoziiert, Religion mit reiner Geistigkeit und Wahrheit. Solange eine Kulturepoche bestehe und dem Menschen etwas zu geben fähig sei, halte der Mensch diese für das Wahre, Absolute – für *das* Licht -, nicht wissend, daß Kultur im Grunde nur ein Abglanz eines darüber stehendes Lichtes, des wirklich Geistigen, sei. Bei den Menschen, die in dem getrübten Licht verharren – sich mit Kultur und Wissenschaft begnügen – bestehe kaum Verlangen nach dem reinen, absoluten Licht.

Die Parallelen zu Platons Höhlengleichnis sind unverkennbar, wo die in dunkler Höhle Lebenden, die noch nie das Tageslicht geschaut haben, dieses nicht vermessen, sondern die aus ihrem dunklen Dasein erwachsende Sicht der Dinge für die wahre halten. Der Unterschied zwischen wahrer und falscher Erkenntnis bzw. zwischen Sein und Schein wird von Wittgenstein auf den Unterschied zwischen religiöser und kulturbezogener Betrachtung der Dinge übertragen: während der kulturelle Mensch die Welt durch rosa getrübtes Licht betrachte, erkenne der religiöse diese in reinem, ungetrübtem Licht.

Auch Platon spricht von der unterschiedlichen Betrachtungsweise der Menschen, die diesen, je nach Naturanlage, zu eigen sei. Die Betrachtung der in dunkler Höhle Lebenden gleicht den von Wittgenstein beschriebenen Menschen, die sich mit Kunst und

Wissenschaft begnügen und daher nur in einem begrenzten Teil des eigentlichen Raumes leben. Erst die Schau des Lichts ließe die Dinge in ihrer Wahrheit erkennen, die das durch eine niedrigere Sichtweise Zugängliche nur als Schattenbilder bzw. Abbilder der Urbilder aufzeigt.

Das Licht kann nach Platon die Seele nur denkend erkennen, nachdem sie sich zu einer höheren Betrachtungsweise aufgeschwungen hat und die Welt an sich erkennt. Der Anblick des Lichts kann aber so stark sein, dass der Betrachter es wieder fliehen möchte, da er das Leuchten nicht aushält. Auch Wittgenstein schreibt, wie mancher, der die Glasglocke zu durchbrechen versucht, den Kopf wieder zurücksteckt. Und in einer Tagebucheintragung der späten Dreißigerjahre heißt es, dass der normale Mensch den Anblick des Vollkommenen, der Platons Darstellung des Lichts als Symbol für die Idee der Ideen bzw. der Idee des Guten – des Göttlichen – entspricht, nicht auszuhalten vermag. (DB, 213f.)

So wird bei beiden Denkern das eigentliche Licht – nach Platon die „Idee des Guten“ – nur mit Mühe und Überwindung von Hürden erreicht. Hat man die Idee des Guten einmal geschaut, so erkenne man, dass sie „für alle die Ursache alles Richtigen und Schönen ist, im Sichtbaren das Licht und die Sonne, von der dieses abhängt, erzeugend, im Erkennbaren aber sie allein als Herrscherin Wahrheit und Vernunft hervorbringend, und dass also diese sehen muß, wer vernünftig handeln will, sei es nun in eigenen oder in öffentlichen Angelegenheiten“ (Politeia, 517c).

In ähnlicher Weise wie bei Platon die Idee des Guten als höchstes Ziel genannt wird, nach dem der Mensch zu streben habe, stellt Wittgenstein zeitweise das Gute und das Göttliche auf eine Ebene und betrachtet diese Gleichstellung als Fundament seiner Ethik.¹

In der Metapher der Glasglocke bedeutet das reine weiße Licht nicht nur das Religiöse, sondern Geistigkeit an sich und ist insofern dem von Platon beschriebenen Licht zu vergleichen, das nur denkend zu erfassen ist. Dieses Denken ist jedoch kein diskursives, analytisches, sondern ein „anschauendes“, der „theoria“ zuzuordnendes.

Das Gute ist nicht das Sein, sondern ragt darüber noch hinaus (Politeia, 509b). – Ähnlich wie in Wittgensteins Metapher von der Glasglocke das reine Licht als Symbol für das Göttliche und damit Gute alle kulturellen Werte und damit alle auf Wissenschaften beruhenden Erkenntnisse überstrahlt.

Viele Menschen könnten, so Platon, nur mit Mühe das Seiende erblicken, andere nähren sich vom Scheine, ohne das Seiende geschaut zu haben. In seiner Metapher von der Glasglocke beklagt Wittgenstein, dass sich die Meisten mit Kunst und Wissenschaft zufrieden geben, ohne sich dem „reinen Licht“ genähert zu haben. Melancholie und Humor, die nichts mit Traurigkeit und Lustigsein zu tun hätten, seien die Folge, die jene Menschen befallen.

Das von Platon genannte Seiende entspricht demnach dem „reinen geistigen Licht“ bei Wittgenstein, und auch Platon beschreibt das Seiende mittels der Metapher des Lichts. Durch die Kraft des Geistes schwebte die „gefiederte Seele“ in den höheren Gegenden und erlange in gewisser Weise Anteil am Licht bzw. Göttlichen,

¹ Vgl. MS 107, 192, zit. nach VB, 24: „Wenn etwas Gut ist so ist es auch Göttlich. Damit ist seltsamerweise meine Ethik zusammengefaßt.“ Vgl. auch Wittgensteins Bemerkung zu Moritz Schlick hinsichtlich des Wesens vom Guten in der theologischen Ethik: „Gut ist, was Gott befiehlt“, WWK, 115.

das Platon mit dem Schönen, Guten und Weisen identifiziert. Diesen „überhimmlischen Raum“ habe noch nie ein Dichter besungen, wie es sich gebühren würde. – Auch Wittgenstein weist auf die Unmöglichkeit hin, diesen Bereich in adäquater Weise zu erfassen, verbal wiederzugeben. Allerdings spricht er im Gegensatz zu Platons negativer Einstellung gegenüber der Kunst von den Möglichkeiten, in der Kunst das an sich nicht Darstellbare anzudeuten, das nicht Aussprechbare – unausgesprochen – auszusprechen (Engelmann, 23f.). Auch im Gleichnis von der Glasglocke, wo er zwar eine pessimistische Haltung gegenüber Kultur an sich einnimmt, betont er letztlich, dass es möglich sei, sich mit der Grenze der Kultur auf eine Weise auseinanderzusetzen, die geniale Werke zur Folge hätte. Dies bedeute jedoch eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem Religiösen, ohne die Werke der Kunst nur mittelmäßig wären. Sie würden, im Sinne Platons, das Seiende nicht auf gebührende Weise besingen.

Mit der von Wittgenstein angesprochenen Grenze zwischen (kultur)wissenschaftlichem und religiösem Weltbild sind nicht nur die Grenzen kultureller Werte und wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnisse, sondern auch die der Sprache und damit der Philosophie gemeint.

Das philosophische Ich – im *Tractatus* 5.641 als „das metaphysische Subjekt“, als die „Grenze der Welt“ – definiert, scheint somit denselben Rätseln – denselben philosophischen Fragen – gegenüberzustehen wie der religiöse oder künstlerische Mensch. Die Art und Weise seines Zugangs entscheidet dann über wahre oder falsche Auseinandersetzung mit den Problemen.

Auch mit seiner Bemerkung, daß bei einer nur oberflächlichen Auseinandersetzung mit der Grenze zwischen Kultur und Religion das Wesentliche der Schönheit verloren ginge, die daraus entstandenen Werke uns allenfalls an das erinnern, was einmal schön war, ist bei Wittgenstein der Anklang an Platon gegeben: an dessen Darstellung der „anamnesis“, der „Wiedererinnerung“ an das, was wir Menschen vor unserer Geburt geschaut haben, wenn wir die unvollkommenen Abbilder der Urbilder betrachten.

II

Abgesehen von diesem, in sehr persönlich gehaltenem Stil verfassten Brieffragment lassen sich auch in den philosophischen Manuskripten Wittgensteins Anspielungen auf Platons Urbilder bzw. Ideen finden, allerdings aus sehr unterschiedlicher Bewertung bzw. aus ambivalenter Haltung. In der früheren Periode spricht er noch vom Urbild der Abbilder – hinsichtlich der Analyse eines Satzes, des Urbilds der Allgemeinheitsbezeichnung – oder von einem logischen Urbild, dem Urbild der Farbe und dergleichen (vgl. MS 102, 103, 104, 108 etc.), wobei der Ausdruck „Urbild“ in vielen Fällen als Synonym für „Paradigma“, „Vorbild“ steht.

Um 1934/35 verwendet Wittgenstein den Begriff des „Doppel“ für das „Urbild“ eines Ausdrucks: Bei der Frage, worin der Unterschied zwischen den Strichen einer Zeichnung eines Gesichts und dem Ausdruck des Gesichts bestünde, schreibt er:

Wenn ich das Gesicht einen Eindruck auf mich machen lasse, dann ist das, als ob es ein Doppel seines Ausdruckes gäbe, als ob das Doppel das Urbild des Ausdruckes wäre, und als ob man das Urbild, dem der Ausdruck des Gesichtes entspricht, fände, indem man

den Ausdruck sieht, - als ob in unserem Geist ein Futteral gewesen wäre und das Bild, das wir sehen, in dieses Futteral gefallen wäre und hineinpaßte. Aber es ist eher der Fall, daß wir das Bild in unseren Geist sinken und da ein Futteral machen lassen. (BRB, 252)

Die Bezeichnung „Futteral“ wird häufig für die Form der Vorstellung bzw. das „Vorbild“ verwendet, das in unserem Geist vorhanden sei – insofern dem Urbild bzw. der Idee im Platonischen Sinne entspricht.

Dann aber gibt Wittgenstein den Gedanken, daß das Wort in eine Form passe, auf und bemerkt, daß diese Metapher nicht auf ein Erlebnis des Vergleichens anspielen könne - nämlich des Vergleichs zwischen der Hohlform und der Vollform, bevor sie zusammengefügt werden. Vielmehr passe die Metapher auf ein Erlebnis, die Vollform durch einen bestimmten Hintergrund hervorgehoben zu sehen. (BRB, 261)

1937, im MS 183, spricht er wiederum von einem Ideal, das er vor Augen habe - ähnlich den Ideen oder Urbildern im Platonischen Sinne. Diese Idee könnte er in gewissem Sinne "erhaben" nennen - dadurch, "daß wir die ganze Welt durch sie betrachten". Doch er weist darauf hin, daß wir uns klar werden, welche "Erscheinungen, welche einfachen, hausbackenen Fälle das Urbild zu dieser Idee" seien - er kehrt also den Begriff des Platonischen Urbilds um, indem er das Urbild in den konkreten Fällen sucht. (DB, 163)

Nach diesem Ideal wolle er die Wirklichkeit aber nicht umfälschen, sondern Vergleiche anstellen. Die "sublime Auffassung" zwingt ihn, vom konkreten Fall wegzugehen, da, was er sage, ja auf ihn nicht passe. Er begeben sich nun in eine "ätherische Region", rede vom "eigentlichen" Zeichen, von Regeln, die es geben müsse und gerate dann „aufs Glatteis“ (DB, 164).

"Zurück auf den rauhen Boden!"² heißt es im MS 157, doch es fällt ihm schwer, die „Brille“ abzunehmen (PU, § 103), durch die wir die Dinge – mit einer uns vorschwebenden Idee – betrachten. Trotzdem setzt Wittgenstein alles daran, um die Dinge von der "metaphysischen Verwendung" der Philosophen wieder auf ihre "alltägliche" zurückzuführen:

Zu "Idealer Name" & Ursprung des Ideals gehört die Bemerkung daß wir die Wörter die der Philosoph in Metaphysischer Weise verwendet ihrer gewöhnlichen Verwendung wieder zuführen (MS 157b, 14v. Vgl. auch PU, § 116)

Im MS 157a, 58v, schreibt Wittgenstein, dass der ideale Name folgendermaßen funktionieren solle: „Diesem Namen entspricht das.“ Und das das soll einfach sein, ganz einfach.“

Wenn man etwas Alltägliches sieht, so soll man nicht etwas hinter dem Satz sehen. In der Bemerkung, „der Satz sei etwas sehr merkwürdiges“, liege bereits der Fehler.

Denn die „Analyse, das Denken als seelische Tätigkeit“ berge Gefahren, die uns verleiten, nach einem Ideal zu suchen, da wir von der Idee besessen sind, dass ein Satz so und so gebaut sein müsse. Es sei wie bei Plato, bei dem auch immer geschlossen werde. Die Annahme, es müsse sich „auch dort so und so verhalten“,

² Vgl. auch PU, § 107: "[...] Wir sind aufs Glatteis geraten, wo die Reibung fehlt, also die Bedingungen in gewissem Sinne ideal sind, aber wir eben deshalb nicht gehen können. Wir wollen gehen; dann brauchen wir die Reibung. Zurück auf den rauhen Boden!"

verführe uns dazu, diese Vorstellung bzw. Idee in unserem Kopf zu einem Ideal zu erheben (MS 157a, 59r).

Anstatt denkend zu zerlegen, geht es jedoch darum, zu "schauen":

"denk' nicht, sondern schau!"(PU, § 66)

Trotz dieser Distanzierung von einem platonischen Idealismus gibt es auch in der Spätphilosophie Wittgensteins Parallelen zu Platon: Dies betrifft nicht nur die Sprachphilosophie, wo bei beiden Denkern das „Benennen“ und „Beschreiben“ anstelle des Erklärens im Vordergrund steht, sondern vor allem die kritische Betrachtung von Philosophie als einer zu befriedigenden Ergebnissen gelangenden Wissenschaft. Die von Platon bekannte Äußerung über das Wissen vom Nichtwissen kommt in Wittgensteins Bemerkungen über die Rolle der Philosophie wiederholt zum Ausdruck, die bereits im *Tractatus* angedeutete Infragestellung der Ergebnisse der Philosophie, wie überhaupt die der Wissenschaften, verstärkt sich mit den Jahren.

Der in der Metapher von der Glasglocke angesprochene Gedanke von der Begrenztheit wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis spielt insofern auch in späteren Jahren eine tragende Rolle:

Das Bild des in Kultur und Wissenschaft befangenen Menschen, der sich nur in einem begrenzten Teil des eigentlichen Raumes bewegt und mit seinem Kopf immer wieder an die Grenzen seines Raumes stößt, findet später im Gleichnis von der Fliege im Fliegenglas eine Entsprechung (PU, § 309).

Diese Grenze, an die man durch bloße Befassung mit Kunst und Wissenschaft unweigerlich stößt, könne durch Religiosität überschritten werden. D.h., laut Wittgenstein durch ernsthafte Auseinandersetzung mit dem Religiösen, dem Bewusstsein der Unzeitlichkeit des Lebens – bereits im Frühwerk angesprochen –, laut Platon dem Bewusstsein der Unsterblichkeit der Seele. Die durch den Eros – den Trieb zur „Erzeugung im Schönen“ – erfolgte Auseinandersetzung mit dem Ewigkeitsgedanken kann auf unterschiedliche Art und Weise geschehen: auf niedrigerer Ebene durch den Trieb zur Erzeugung von weiterem Leben in körperlicher Hinsicht, auf höherer – dichterischer und philosophischer – Ebene, durch den Trieb zur Erzeugung von Dauerhaftem im Geistigen. In Wittgensteins Metapher der Glasglocke ist dieser Gedanke Platons in der Auseinandersetzung mit der Grenze zwischen Wissenschaft und Religion nachvollziehbar: auch hier geht es um eine Auseinandersetzung mit dem Religiösen und damit Unsterblichkeitsgedanken – eine Auseinandersetzung, die „genialen Menschen“ zugesprochen wird, deren Werke von Dauer seien. Wie bei Platon geht es um den Geist – von Wittgensteins als „reines weißes Licht“ beschrieben, als „das Licht“ – ähnlich der „Idee der Ideen“ bzw. der „Idee des Guten“, die bei Platon an höchster Stelle steht.

III

Es scheint wie ein Widerspruch, dass Wittgenstein in seinem Gleichnis von rot gefärbter Weltsicht der in Kultur und Wissenschaft verankerten Menschen spricht, das reine geistige (platonische) Ideal wahrer Erkenntnis als die religiöse Sicht beschreibt, später aber im Zusammenhang mit seinen kritischen Äußerungen gegenüber Platon gerade dessen idealistische, auf das Ewige gerichtete Betrachtung als eine durch eine metaphysische Brille gesehene bezeichnet.

Das, was er in seinem Brief an Hermine als „Ideal“ – als reines weißes Licht – beschreibt, durch das eigentliche Erkenntnis gewährleistet wäre, scheint später eine Art „Umkehrung“ ins Gegenteil zu erfahren: der platonische Anspruch eines Ideals wird als etwas Negatives, Abzulehnendes bewertet – als eine mit einer Brille gesehene Sicht definiert, die 1925 ja gerade der anderen, gegenteiligen, „begrenzten“, da nur auf Wissenschaft und Kultur sich stützenden, Weltsicht zugesprochen wurde.

Doch dies betrifft, wie vorhin erörtert, nur die „Ideale“, nach denen wir die konkreten Erscheinungen der phänomenalen Welt „umfälschen“ wollen. Wir sollten jedoch, so Wittgenstein, umgekehrt vorgehen: d.h., die konkreten Fälle als Ausgangspunkt nehmen und sie dann mit dem Ideal vergleichen.

Was den religiösen Bereich anbelangt, so gilt dieser auch später – vor allem in den persönlichen Tagebuchaufzeichnungen – als „Ideal“ und Wittgenstein verwendet in dieser Hinsicht nach wie vor häufig Metaphern, insbesondere die Metapher des Lichts: als Symbol für Klarheit, Transparenz in seiner Philosophie, sowie als Symbol für ethische und religiöse Angelegenheiten, womit die Nähe zu Platon immer noch gegeben ist.

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A Report on Graduate Work in Qom on the Problems of Essence/Attribute and Substance/Accident

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Essence/Attribute

One of the areas that has attracted the attention of Muslim thinkers through the ages has been religious epistemology. The divine attributes have been studied from an epistemological point of view because it is through the attributes that God makes Himself known. This topic of the conditions under which attributions may correctly be made about God as reflections of human knowledge of Him has featured prominently in theological discussions of all the major sects of Islam.

In the Qur'an itself, there are numerous references to the divine names and attributes, and these have prompted some of the earliest theological discussions among Muslims. God shows man how He is to be known by introducing Himself through self-attribution. In many verses of the Qur'an, God describes Himself through particular attributes, and instructs believers to refer to Him by these attributes.

It is generally held that the essence of God is unknowable, and that because of this God can only be known through His attributes. The term for essence in the Qur'an and subsequently in Islamic theology is *dhat*. Literally, the word means *mistress*, in the sense of *possessor (feminine)*. This should not be confused with *essence* in the sense of the Latin *essentia/esse* distinction, for which the Arabic word *mahiyyah* is used. The *dhat* is the possessor of attributes, the self, identity, and in philosophical interpretations, *being*.

After the Qur'an, the most important source for Islamic theology is *hadiths*, and in the sayings reported from the Prophet (s) and Imams ('a) there is ample discussion of the divine essence and attributes. Ash'arite, Mu'tazilite and Shi'ite theologians all took positions on the nature of the divine attributes and their relation to the divine essence.

In Shi'ite theology, this issue has featured in the works of all the prominent theologians, from Shaykh Saduq and Shaykh Mufid in the 4th/10th century, through Majlisi and Lahiji of the Safavid period (11th/17th century), and it continues to be discussed as a central part of contemporary Shi'ite theology, which over the course of time became interwoven with influences drawn from Islamic philosophy and mysticism.

In Shi'ite thought, there has been a great emphasis on divine unity, and as a result, it is held that the divine attributes should not be considered as entities added to the divine essence. On the other hand, the attributes are held to be distinct from one another. God's knowledge is not His power, although each is one with the essence. Much of Shi'ite theology is devoted to discussions of how this paradox is to be resolved, generally by holding that the semantic diversity of the attributes is compatible with an ontological unity with essence.

The relation between the essence and attributes was viewed by the early Muslim philosophers in terms of Neo-Platonic emanation theory. The mystics also made use of such ideas, but emphasized the semantic relation between essence and attribute: differences in attribute are

found in the different meanings through which divinity manifests Itself. The various strands of theological, philosophical and mystical speculation about the divine essence and attributes culminate with the work of Mulla Sadra, in the shadow of which all subsequent Islamic philosophy takes form.

Most of the dissertations about essence/attribute focus on how this topic is developed in one or more prominent Muslim thinkers or schools of thought. In some cases, there is a comparison with non-Muslim thinkers, such as Aristotle or Maimonides. Some attempt to understand the issue by going back to the sources in the Qur'an and *hadiths*, while others seek to defend the Shi'ite position against other schools of thought. In virtually all the dissertations, an attempt is made to present the Shi'ite theological position on this topic, particularly as elaborated in the school of Mulla Sadra, and to defend it against rivals or use it as a basis for the criticism of other positions.

Below is a list of twenty-one dissertations, arranged according to the type of approach taken to the issue of essence/attribute.

Essence/Attribute in Islamic Sources

1. The Divine Attributes from the Perspectives of the Qur'an and Mysticism
2. Philosophical and Mystical Analysis of the Names and Attributes of God in the *Psalms of Islam*
3. Imam Sadiq and the Divine Philosophy of the Essence and Attributes of God
4. Research in Prayers with regard to the Divine Essence and Attributes

Essence/Attribute in Islamic Theology

5. Unity of Attributes, and Deviations of the Ash'arites, Wahhabis and Other Groups
6. Divine Essence and Attributes in the View of Fakhr al-Din Razi
7. Review and Analysis of the Views of Ghazali about the Divine Essence and Attributes
8. Theological Views of Qadi Sa'id Qummi
9. Semantics of the Divine Attributes
10. Semantics of Passive Attributes of God
11. A Comparison of the Views Allamah Hilli and Ardibilli about the Attributes of God and the Return

Essence/Attribute in Islamic Mysticism

12. Mutual Influences of the Ismailis and Sufis about Divine Unity
13. Immanence and Transcendence of God in the View of Ibn Arabi

Essence/Attribute in Islamic Philosophy and Comparative Philosophy

14. God in Aristotle and Ibn Sina
15. Theology and the Quiddity of the Divine Attributes in the View of Maimonides and Allamah Tabataba'i
16. Negative Theology in the Views of Maimonides and Qadi Sa'id Qummi
17. Divine Essence and Attributes in the View of the Peripatetics and Illuminationists
18. God in the View of Sohrawardi
19. Dialogue about the Divine Essence in Islamic Philosophy
20. A Review of the Attributes of God in the Views of Ibn Sina, Mulla Sadra, and Abd al-Jabbar Mu'tazili
21. A Review of the Criteria for Distinguishing the Attributes of Essence and Action in the Views of the Exegetes and Philosophers

Needless to say, the dissertations do not all keep neatly to these categories. There are comparisons between philosophers and theologians, philosophers and interpreters of the Qur'an, and general discussions, as well.

Discussions of Qadi Sa'id Qummi are often featured, since he represents a kind of negative theology that is generally perceived as extremist for its denial of the reality of the positive attributes. Students are encouraged to study how the position taken by Mulla Sadra is able to overcome the difficulties faced by Qadi Sa'id's negative theology.

There are structural similarities between the discussions of essence/attribute and substance/accident, although the discussions are completely separate. There are no discussions of substance/attribute or essence/accident in Islamic philosophy and theology. However, in Mulla Sadra, the identity of attributes with essence is mirrored in his claim that accidents have no existence other than the existence of the substance in which they inhere. Indeed, Mulla Sadra's views about substantial motion may be seen as a solution to the problem that arises when the Shi'ite theological claim of the identity of attributes with the essence is used as a model for the relation between substance and accidents in changing entities.

Substance/Accident

All of the dissertations about substance/accident focus on the doctrine of substantial motion, which is one of the most outstanding features of Mulla Sadra's thought. Some of the dissertations are purely descriptive, and attempt to present a clear exposition of Mulla Sadra's views on the issue. Others seek to defend Mulla Sadra's views from objections, or compare his views with others.

General Explanations of Substantial Motion

1. Substantial Motion (1992)

The M.A. thesis of Husayn Ali Qasimzadeh is divided into five chapters. The first gives the background to the substance notion in ancient Greek philosophy. The second chapter deals with

the problems of defining motion and substance, as well as the place of substance among the categories and their types of substance. The third chapter reviews the philosophical and theological reasons for substantial motion. The fourth chapter considers the most famous objections to this doctrine and the answers given to them. Finally, the fifth chapter summarizes Mulla Sadra's position and elaborates the implications of substantial motion for the relation between rest and motion, the temporal origination of the world, time as a fourth material dimension, the corporeal resurrection, the relation between mind and body, and the rejection of reincarnation.

2. Substance and Accident in the Views of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra (2000)

Muhammad Mahdi Mishkati compares the views of the Islamic peripatetic school led by Ibn Sina with the views of the school of Transcendent Wisdom led by Mulla Sadra on the topic of substance/accident. While Ibn Sina is committed to the existence of both material and immaterial substances, Mulla Sadra, following Sohrawardi, accepts the existence of a third, intermediate kind of substance: *imaginal* substances. Imaginal substances are like immaterial substances in that they do not have a place or spatial direction in the external world; but they are like corporeal substances in that they have a shape and size. Ibn Sina held that accidents themselves possess higher order accidents. Mulla Sadra rejected the arguments for this position without offering any arguments for the contrary position. Most famously, Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra differ on whether there can be motion or change in accidents only, or in substance as well as accidents. Mulla Sadra argues that if Ibn Sina accepts that there is a persisting subject, primary matter, through generation and corruption, this can also serve as the subject of substantial motion, with the difference that in generation and corruption the change is discontinuous and sudden while in substantial motion the change is gradual. In addition to this argument, Mulla Sadra also maintains that the subject of motion is not a thing at rest that possesses motion, but that it is the moving existence of the subject itself, whose unity is preserved through continuity rather than through relation to a stationary subject or matter. The view of the relationship between substance and accident differs in Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra in that Ibn Sina uses a causal model to explain the relationship. Substance is the agent cause of its accidents. In Mulla Sadra, however, the relation of substance to accident is much more intimate. Accidents are explained as relations of dependence to their substance that lack any existence of their own other than the existence of the substance.

3. A Review and Criticism of the Objection to Substantial Motion from the Persistence of the Subject (1992)

Muhammad Baqiri Sabzavar devotes his M.A. thesis to Mulla Sadra's replies to the objection that if there were a change in substance, there would be no subject to undergo the change. These replies are based on the principle that existence has a fundamental priority with regard to quiddity, and the idea that in substantial motion the object that moves is identified with its motion. In short, the subject of

substantial change is the changing substance extended through time.

Comparative

4. Substantial Motion in Mulla Sadra Compared with Creative Evolution in Bergson (1996)

The author of this M.A. dissertation, Mehdi Ra'isi, finds a number of common themes in the works of Bergson and Mulla Sadra: the evolutionary progress of the material world, life (in Bergson) and existence (in Mulla Sadra) are in a constant state of flux, and are continuously being renewed, this progress is in the direction of perfection, both authors emphasize the continuous nature of time, and both hold that objects are extended through time. Both reacted against forms of atomism that were current in their respective intellectual environments, and both introduced the idea of continual change in opposition to those who took a more static view of truth. These philosophers differ in that Bergson emphasizes intuition, while Mulla Sadra takes a more rationalist approach.

5. Substance in the View of the Empiricists and Islamic Philosophy (1995)

In this M.A. dissertation, Ibrahim Abarsaji reviews the definitions of substance offered by Hobbes, Berkeley and Locke, and compares them with those offered by Fakhr Razi, Sohrevardi and Mulla Sadra. He also compares the views of these philosophers on the existence of material and immaterial substances and on the status of the soul.

6. Substantial Motion in the View of Mulla Sadra and Process Philosophy (1994)

A number of Iranian and Western thinkers have seen a similarity between Whitehead's process philosophy and Mulla Sadra's views of substantial motion. Husayn Valeh attempts to sort through the similarities and differences between these traditions of thought on such topics as object/activity duality, the material and the immaterial, the unity of God and His relation to existence and the world, the universality of motion in the material world, continuity and unity, and the nature of time.

Historical

7. The Roots of Substantial Motion in Mysticism, Philosophy, and Theology Prior to Mulla Sadra (1992)

Ahmad Abedi (now a member of the philosophy faculty at the University of Qom) wrote his M.A. thesis on the precursors to Mulla Sadra's doctrine of substantial motion. Prof. Abedi traces the idea of substantial motion to the idea of constant creation, repeatedly mentioned in the Qur'an, as developed in the writings of the Sufis. Among Muslim philosophers and theologians, the idea of substantial motion was not accepted by most writers, although there were a few who alluded to the idea, including the Ikhwan al-Safa, Hamid al-Din Kermani and Sohrevardi.

Summary

From this brief overview, one can get a rough picture of the sort of research that has been done over the last fifteen years in Qom about the divine essence and substantial motion. It is plain that Mulla Sadra's thought continues to dominate Islamic theology and philosophy as it is studied at the graduate level in Qom. On the other hand, the philosophical work done in this tradition is not merely apologetic in nature. Often details of Mulla Sadra's views are subject to criticism and emendations or improvements are suggested by those who teach Islamic philosophy. There is also a strong current of thought in Iran, the *Maktab-e Tafkik* (School of Separation), which is fundamentally opposed to basing a Shi'ite theology on a philosophical system such as Mulla Sadra's, although this sort of opposition is not reflected in any of the dissertations mentioned here. Likewise unrepresented here is the tendency found among some Iranian intellectuals today to reject the tradition of Islamic philosophy altogether. For example, some Iranian Marxists have suggested that the concept of substance should be completely abandoned, and the great Muslim philosopher, exegete and theologian, Allamah Tabataba'i roundly rejected such suggestions as absurd because of the independence criterion of substance: all existents exist dependently or independently; if there were no substances, everything would be an accident, and in that case the accidents would attain independent existence and so become substances.

We also find that while the discussions of these topics are mostly confined to the Islamic cultural orbit (which includes the work of Maimonides), an increasing amount of comparative work is being done, as reflected in our list in references to Bergson, process philosophy and empiricism. This trend is increasing, and I am sure that if another review of these topics is done after another fifteen years, the number of dissertations dedicated to comparative philosophy and theology will be found to have increased tremendously.

* I would like to thank my husband, Hajj Dr. Muhammad Legenhausen, for his help with the preparation of this report.

Konvergenzen in grundlegenden Prinzipien zwischen dem kritischen Rationalismus und der interkulturellen Philosophie

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Die Philosophie von Karl R. Popper und der von ihm begründeten Denkrichtung des kritischen Rationalismus scheinen auf den ersten Blick durch eine einseitige Ausrichtung auf die abendländische Tradition und die analytische Grundorientierung nur wenig mit dem Ansatz einer interkulturellen Philosophie zu tun zu haben. Viele sehen im kritischen Rationalismus vielmehr ein typisches Beispiel für eine eurozentristische Philosophieauffassung. Eine nähere Analyse zeigt jedoch erhebliche Konvergenzen in zentralen Prinzipien und dem grundlegenden Philosophieverständnis von kritischem Rationalismus und interkultureller Philosophie.

Eine erste Konvergenz findet sich in der Ablehnung beider Positionen von Versuchen der Letztbegründung von Erkenntnissen. Für den kritischen Rationalismus enden alle solche Versuche im Dogmatismus (vgl. Albert 1968: 13 f.). Die autoritär-dogmatische Struktur des begründungsmethodischen Ansatzes hat zur Konsequenz, dass durch die Dogmatisierung gewisser fundamentaler Gegebenheiten wesentliche Bestandteile des betreffenden Rechtfertigungszusammenhangs gegen mögliche Kritik immunisiert werden, um sie auf diese Weise einer möglichen Revision zu entziehen (vgl. Albert 1967: 220). Die Philosophie des kritischen Rationalismus versteht sich mit einem wie auch immer gearteten Dogmatismus als unvereinbar. Vielmehr tritt in ihr der Verzicht auf das Streben nach letzter Gewissheit und die Inkaufnahme einer permanenten Ungewissheit in den Vordergrund. Erkenntnisse, Problemlösungsvorschläge, Ansichten sind nicht positiv zu rechtfertigen und auf eine möglichst sichere Grundlage zu stellen, sondern einer möglichst konsequenten Kritik auszusetzen, um frühzeitig Irrtümer und Fehler erkennen und eliminieren zu können. Die Idee einer Letztbegründung wird durch das Prinzip der *kritischen Prüfung* ersetzt und zugleich der Verifikationismus durch einen konsequenten *Fallibilismus* abgelöst (vgl. Albert 1968: 36).

Auch in der interkulturellen Philosophie wird die Existenz eines allseitig akzeptablen archimedischen Punkts unserer Erkenntnis abgelehnt. Grundlage hierfür ist die These, dass sich keine philosophische Tradition im Besitz der absoluten Wahrheit befindet (vgl. Yousefi und Mall 2005: 76 und 131). Beide Positionen führt dies jedoch nicht zu einer Verwerfung der Idee der Wahrheit. Der Methodologie der kritischen Prüfung des kritischen Rationalismus liegt vielmehr das ständige Bemühen zugrunde, Irrtümer über die Wirklichkeit zu eliminieren und so der Wahrheit näher zu kommen (vgl. Wendel 1992: 165). D.h. die Konsequenz des Verzichts auf Gewissheit ist nicht ein Skeptizismus und damit die Aufgabe der Suche nach Wahrheit, sondern das Streben nach Wahrheit bleibt weiterhin der zentrale Antrieb sowohl der Wissenschaft als auch der Philosophie. Ausgegangen wird hierbei von der Möglichkeit der Annäherung an die Wahrheit als regulativer Idee. Auch im interkulturellen Philosophieverständnis ist von einer regulativen Wahrheit sowie von unterschiedlichen Annäherungsverfahren an die Wahrheit die Rede (vgl. Mall 1993: 24; 2003: 124).

In beiden Positionen bezieht sich die Ablehnung von Absolutheitsansprüchen konsequenterweise auch auf die

eigene Position. In der interkulturellen Philosophie ist hierbei, etwa bei Mall, von der Einnahme einer *höherstufigen Einstellung* die Rede, die davon ausgeht, dass Standpunkte, einschließlich des eigenen, auch als solche begriffen und so die nötige Offenheit, Toleranz und Anerkennung bezeugt wird (vgl. ebd.: 104 und 121). Wimmer verwendet hierfür das Bild eines *tentativen Zentrismus*, der zwar prinzipiell an der Suche nach universeller Gültigkeit festhält, jedoch im Bewusstseins einer durch die jeweils Anderen kritisierbaren Überzeugung sowie im Bemühen im gemeinsamen Gespräch eine solche Gültigkeit zu erreichen (vgl. Wimmer 2004: 17).

Die Selbstreflexivität ist auch im kritischen Rationalismus enthalten. So wird trotz der Bezugnahme auf die Rationalität eine Verabsolutierung der Vernunft abgelehnt (vgl. Salamun 1991: 98 f.). Dies richtet sich sowohl gegen die Idee, dass der Mensch über seine Vernunft absolute Gewissheit in Bezug auf die Wahrheit von Erkenntnisansprüchen oder Tatsachenbehauptungen erzielen könnte, als auch gegen die Vorstellungen, aus Menschen reine Vernunftwesen zu machen. Vielmehr ist die bescheidene Rolle, die der Vernunft im Leben des Menschen zukommt, die der kritischen Überlegung und Diskussion (vgl. Popper ¹⁰1999: 232). In diesem Sinn interpretiert Popper Vernunft und Vernünftigkeit als die Bereitschaft, sich kritisieren zu lassen, und den Wunsch, sich selbst zu kritisieren, und als die Überzeugung, dass wir durch Kritik lernen können, durch kritische Diskussion mit anderen und durch Selbstkritik (vgl. Popper ³1995: 164). Popper charakterisiert die seiner Philosophie zugrunde liegende Haltung: „Ich glaube zwar, daß ich recht habe; aber ich kann mich irren, und du magst recht haben. Auf jeden Fall wollen wir darüber diskutieren; denn so ist es wahrscheinlich, daß wir einem wahren Verständnis näher kommen, als wenn jeder auf seinem Standpunkt beharrt.“ (Popper 2000: 517) In Übereinstimmung hiermit definiert auch Mall Vernunft im interkulturellen Verständnis als die Lernfähigkeit und Lernbereitschaft aus der Erfahrung und dem Dialog (vgl. Mall 2003: 98).

Die Ablehnung von Absolutheitsansprüchen verweist auch auf Übereinstimmungen im zugrunde liegende Philosophieverständnis. Beide Positionen sehen den Ausgangspunkt der Philosophie nicht so sehr in den gefundenen Antworten, als vielmehr in den Problemen und Fragen, mit denen sich Menschen philosophisch auseinandersetzen. Damit öffnet sich die Philosophie gegenüber allen Menschen und Kulturen. So betont etwa Popper, dass alle Menschen Philosophen sind und sieht in der Existenz echter philosophischer Probleme nicht nur den Ausgangspunkt, sondern auch den Legitimationsgrund für die Philosophie (vgl. Popper ³1995: 176). Auch in der interkulturellen Philosophie wird das größere gemeinsame des Philosophierens eher in den Fragestellungen als in den Antworten gesehen. Die Gemeinsamkeiten der philosophischen Fragestellungen über die Grenzen der Kulturen hinweg verweisen auf eine allgemeine anthropologische Grundkonstante des Menschen (vgl. Yousefi und Mall 2005: 108). Philosophie kann demnach als das allgemein menschliche Streben

definiert werden, methodische, metaphysische, logische, erkenntnistheoretische, ethische und anthropologische Grundfragen mit Hilfe der Reflexion über die menschlichen Erfahrungen zu verstehen, zu deuten, zu erklären und auch zu begründen (vgl. Mall 2003: 31).

Im Umstand, dass in vielen Traditionen ähnliche philosophische Fragen nach Grund, Sinn, Geltung, Begründung und Rechtfertigung gestellt werden, zeigt sich für die interkulturelle Philosophie eine den Menschen gemeinsame Vernunft. Mall sieht darin eine allgemein menschliche Disposition jenseits der ethischen und kulturellen Grenzen nach Gründen und Argumenten zu suchen (vgl. ebd.: 66). Die Vernunft stellt in dieser Hinsicht eine nicht weiter reduzierbare anthropologische Größe dar, die in ihren Graden der Formalität, des Ordnungsgedankens oder des Normativen in verschiedenen Kulturen unterschiedliche Ausformungen gefunden hat (vgl. ebd.: 94). Auch Ian Jarvie, ein Schüler Poppers, spricht vom Konzept einer *Gemeinschaft der Rationalität* (community of rationality). Die Vernunft ist demnach bei allen Menschen und Kulturen vorhanden, auch wenn sie in verschiedenen Gesellschaften in unterschiedlicher Art und Stärke erkannt und gepflegt wird (vgl. Jarvie 1972: 47). Popper verweist ebenfalls auf eine *rationale Einheit der Menschheit* beruhend auf dem Umstand, dass das menschliche Wissen kein individuelles Produkt ist, sondern auf dem Austausch zwischen den Menschen, auf dem sozialen Prozess der Überlieferung, Diskussion und Argumentation beruht. Dass sich diese Einheit auch interkulturelle verstehen lässt, kann man aus Poppers Darstellung seiner eigenen Erfahrung an der London School of Economics erkennen. Im Kontakt mit Studenten aus anderen Kulturkreisen zeigte sich in der Regel, so Popper, dass die größten Schwierigkeiten für eine rationale Diskussion nicht in kulturellen oder sprachlichen Unterschieden lagen, sondern vielmehr in der Indoktrination der Studenten mit dogmatischen westlichen Ideen und Ideologien. (Vgl. Popper 1994: 51).

Die Pluralität der Kulturen und Philosophien fordert gemäß den Prinzipien einer interkulturellen Philosophie, dass die verschiedenen kulturellen Rahmen erst genommen werden und keine Form einer lokal verorteten Vernunft absolut gesetzt und gegen Kritik immunisiert wird (vgl. Mall 2003: 90). Mall entwickelt hierfür auch das Konzept eines orthoft ortlosen Rationalismus. Orthoft ist die Vernunft, weil sie sich immer nur in den partikulären lokalen Vernunftauffassungen zeigen kann. Ortlos ist sie, weil sie in diesen nicht ganz aufgeht und das Bestehen bestimmter erlebbarer Überlappungen zwischen den Kulturen auf eine Einheit bzw. Universalität der Vernunft jenseits aller Relativismen, Essentialismen und Fromalismen hinweist (vgl. ebd.: 2003: 22; Yousefi und Mall 2005: 32). Auch Wimmer betont, dass die Betrachtung von unterschiedlichen kulturellen philosophischen Traditionen nicht dazu führen darf, dass diese aufgrund der Behauptung einer wie auch immer gearteten Besonderheit, sei es aufgrund der Entstehung, des ethnischen bzw. rassistischen Hintergrundes oder einer anderen natur- oder kulturgegebenen Bedingung, einer rational-diskursiven Begründung entzogen werden. Eine solche Sichtweise hat negative Folgen für die interkulturelle Philosophie, da sie ebenso in relativistische Beliebigkeit wie in Fatalismus münden kann. So kritisiert etwa Wimmer in Bezug auf die Ethnophilosophie, dass hier manchmal nicht nur davon ausgegangen wird, dass Philosophieren außerhalb eines konkreten Kontextes nicht möglich ist, sondern auch die Behauptung aufgestellt wird, dass auch dessen Ergebnisse nur unter Hinsicht auf den

jeweiligen Kontext verstanden, eingeschätzt und beurteilt werden können. (Vgl. Wimmer 2004: 58 f.).

Ganz ähnlich lautet die Kritik Poppers an der Wissenssoziologie Mannheims oder dem Marxismus, die die Menschen als in ihren toalen Ideologien eingesperrt darstellen. Werden die Äußerungen, Ansichten und Argumente von Personen ausschließlich als durch ihren Hindergrund, sei dieser nun ideologisch, geschichtlich oder kulturell bestimmt, determiniert angesehen, dann scheint eine Verständigung zwischen Menschen mit unterschiedlicher Herkunft unmöglich. Die Position, die davon ausgeht, dass eine rationale und fruchtbare Diskussion unmöglich ist, solange die Teilnehmer nicht einen gemeinsamen Rahmen von grundsätzlichen Annahmen teilen oder zumindest über einen solchen Rahmen für ihre Diskussion übereingekommen sind, hat Popper unter dem Titel des *Mythos des Rahmens* kritisiert. Für ihn gehen dessen Vertreter von einem unrealistisch hohen Grad der Verständigung aus. Wenn dieser nicht erreichbar ist, dann wird für sie Verständigung und Verstehen überhaupt unmöglich. Popper sieht hierin jedoch einen gefährlichen Fehlschluss. Auch wenn es niemals möglich ist, den eigenen kulturellen und sozialen Rahmen vollkommen zu verlassen, kann man doch den eigenen Horizont erweitern und im gegenseitigen Austausch einander näher kommen. (Vgl. Popper 1994: 33 ff und 53).

In analoger Weise wendet sich auch die interkulturelle Philosophie sowohl gegen die Fiktion einer totalen Kommensurabilität, die von einer Identität der Kulturen ausgeht und daher versucht, das Fremde unter das Eigene und Bekannte zu subsumieren, als auch gegen die Vorstellung einer völligen Inkommensurabilität, die einen Vergleich zwischen den Kulturen und einen interkulturellen Diskurs unmöglich machen würde (vgl. Yousefi und Mall 2005: 41). Beide Positionen sehen den Weg zwischen der „Scylla“ des dogmatischen Absolutismus und Begründungsdenkens und der „Charybdis“ des Relativismus im Dialog. Die interkulturelle Philosophie verfährt stets dialogisch bzw. polylogisch. Erst durch den Polylog der Kulturen wird es möglich, Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede zu erkennen. Auch der kritische Rationalismus weist eine solche dialogische Ausrichtung auf. Der Weg für den Erkenntnisfortschritt besteht gemäß dieser Position in der freien und kritischen Diskussion. Dadurch soll es möglich sein, gemeinsam der Wahrheit einen Schritt näher zu kommen, ohne diese jedoch je endgültig und mit Gewissheit erreichen zu können. Beide Positionen sehen die Voraussetzung für ein solches diskursives Vorgehen nicht in einer idealen herrschaftsfreien Diskursituation und einem darauf beruhenden Konsensualismus, sondern in der Bereitschaft, aufeinander zu hören, voneinander zu lernen, sich gegenseitig in Frage stellen zu lassen und die eigenen Überzeugungen erneut zu überdenken. (Vgl. ebd. 35 f. und 91 f.).

Dies verweist auf eine weitere Konvergenz zwischen beiden Positionen, die Betonung der Pluralität und Vielfalt. Die Pluralität stellt für den kritischen Rationalismus eine wichtige Voraussetzung für den Fortschritt sowohl im wissenschaftlichen als auch im politisch sozialen Bereich dar. So sind der Theorienpluralismus und die damit verbundene Konkurrenz zwischen unterschiedlichen Hypothesen in der Wissenschaft ein unverzichtbares Element der kritisch rationalen Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie. Ebenso ist die Pluralität ein Strukturmerkmal einer offenen Gesellschaft und eine Voraussetzung und Konsequenz der

individuellen Freiheit (Stelzer 2004: 79 f.). Auch in der interkulturellen Philosophie wird die Vielfalt nicht nur bejaht, sondern als ein Wert an sich begriffen. Die interkulturelle Philosophie geht nicht nur von einem Pluralismus an Prinzipien, Werten, Sozialisierungen, Interessen und Präferenzen aus, sondern ihr Anliegen ist gerade die intrakulturelle Sicht, in der es immer schon unterschiedliche erkenntnistheoretische, ethische und politische Modelle gibt, durch Einbeziehung anderer philosophischer Traditionen zu erweitern (vgl. Mall 2003: 39 und 126; Yousefi und Mall 2005: 116).

Dass eine solche Erweiterung auch für den kritischen Rationalismus einen hohen Stellenwert besitzt, zeigen etwa die Ausführungen von Hans Albert, der die Notwendigkeit des Aufbrechens der natürlichen Kritikimmunität der eigenen Weltanschauung durch die Begegnung mit anderen Kulturen betont (vgl. Albert 2000: 37). Für Popper besitzt der interkulturelle Kontakt zentrale Bedeutung für seine These vom Ursprung der Philosophie. Dieser Ursprung – wohlgerichtet der abendländischen Philosophie – im Griechenland des 6. vorchristlichen Jahrhunderts geht seiner Auffassung zufolge auf den *kulturellen Zusammenprall (culture clash)* mit den östlichen Kulturen in den griechischen Kolonien an der kleinasiatischen Küste zurück (vgl. Popper ¹⁰1999: 118 und 128).¹ Die Wichtigkeit des kulturellen Kontakts besteht aber auch für die Philosophie der Gegenwart. In diesem Zusammenhang betont Popper, dass der kulturelle Zusammenprall Teile seines großen Wertes verlieren kann, wenn sich eine Kultur als universelle überlegen sieht bzw. von der anderen als solche wahrgenommen wird. Der größte Wert des kulturellen Zusammenpralls liegt nämlich gerade im Umstand, dass er die eigene kritische Einstellung erwecken kann. (Vgl. Popper 1994: 51).

Die interkulturelle Philosophie kann also aus einer kritisch rationalen Perspektive einen wichtigen Beitrag leisten, indem sie uns dazu führt, unsere eigene Lebensform, unsere eigenen Ansichten, unsere eigene abendländische philosophische Tradition kritisch zu befragen. Sie bildet genauso wie der kritische Rationalismus mit seiner Forderung nach Kritik und Selbstkritik, seinem Respekt und seiner Offenheit gegenüber anderen Meinungen eine wertvolle Ausgangsbasis für das Programm einer neuen Aufklärung. Zugleich kann der kritische Rationalismus in Hinblick auf seine theoretische und praktische Philosophie zur Grundlegung einer interkulturellen Philosophie beitragen, deren Aufgabe ja auch in der Herausarbeitung der Grundlagenprobleme der Interkulturalität mit den Mitteln der rationalen Analyse und damit zugleich im Aufzeigen der Bedingungen, Möglichkeiten und Grenzen gelingender interkultureller Kommunikation liegt (vgl. Cesana 2000: 73).

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¹ Dass Popper in seiner Darstellung der Philosophiegeschichte sich kaum mit anderen Kulturen auseinandergesetzt hat und deshalb in Bezug hierauf der Vorwurf des Eurozentrismus nicht ganz unberechtigt erhoben wurde, sei hier nur am Rande erwähnt. Die Gründe hierfür bräuchten eine ausführlichere Analyse und Erörterung, die in diesem Zusammenhang nicht zu leisten ist.

Two Viewpoints On Perception: Possibility of Dialog

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1. Introduction

The concept of perception plays a significant role in the solution of a whole series of philosophical problems: the demarcation between science and metaphysics; grasping sense of names; establishing the truth value of proposition; determining the epistemological or ontological status of physical objects; verification of hypotheses and testing of theories. Precisely the last mentioned problem is being widely discussed in modern philosophy in connection with theory-laden observations, because the usage of theoretically interpreted observable data in theory testing entails the danger of a vicious circle.

In my opinion, theory ladenness points to an important feature of the perceptual process, namely, if human perception depends on past experience, context, expectations, available knowledge and other factors, which are called, in a broad sense, "theory ladenness", then the perception is not a simple presentation of the reality providing its exact copy, but it presupposes the activity of a perceptual subject.

For a long time in psychology as well as in philosophy, there dominated the idea that perception is just a simple fixation of sensuous data: visual images, distinct sounds, sensations. Since about from the 1980s perception has begun to be considered as a process in time, and not as an instantaneous one. The view on the nature of perception has correspondingly also changed. If perception proceeds in time, it presupposes the active searching and gathering of the relevant information, as well as its processing and evaluation, which enables one to plan future perceptual actions.

Although this understanding of perception as a process involving the subject's activity is now firmly established in psychology, philosophers have only started to comprehend the role of the subject's activity. The aim of this article is to indicate some philosophically significant corollaries from the view of perception as an active process. From the beginning, two main philosophical views on the mind's influence on perception are considered. Furthermore, the role of passive mind-perception in philosophy is considered, and two main views on theory-ladenness are briefly mentioned. In the next parts the results of experimental research in physiology and psychology of perception are expounded and some philosophically significant conclusions are drawn.

2. Philosophical views of observation: two positions

To begin our reflections we would like to briefly describe some views on perception in the history of philosophy. Concerning the influence of past experience or mental structures on perception one can distinguish two trends – one of them going back to Francis Bacon, and the other originating in Descartes' philosophy. The first considers experience as effected by intellect, the second finds perception as a simple representation of objects. Let me describe these positions shortly.

In the sixteenth century Francis Bacon elaborated a new method of the natural philosophy, which had to be

founded on a systematic programme of experiment. Bacon pointed out four kinds of idols occupying the mind. Artificial idols have entered men's minds either through the philosophical doctrines or through perverse rule of proofs, the innate idols are inherent in the nature of the intellect itself. Bacon suggested clearing away idols to allow for "grave and wise observation", and even if we cannot banish the idols, we have to point to their existence:

The first two kinds of idols can be eliminated, with some difficulty, but the last in no way. The only strategy remaining is, on the one hand, to indict them, and to expose and condemn the mind's insidious force, in case after the destruction of old, new shoots of error should grow and multiply from the poor structure of the mind itself. (Bacon, 2000, 19)

By elaborating the rules for the direction of intelligence Descartes contributed to the rationalistic tradition. Following his dualism he maintained the absolute independence of mind and body. According to his position, any experience provides us with pure sensuous data, which we can consider as solid and undoubted:

...intellect can never be deceived by any experience, provided that when the object is presented to it, it intuits it in a fashion exactly corresponding to the way in which it possesses the object, either within itself or in the imagination. (Descartes, 1988, 15)

Both views regarding the dependence of perception on mental construction later found their followers. The most influential philosopher, who considered experience as formed by a priori form of sensuality, which makes perception possible, was Immanuel Kant. Recently this position has been advocated by philosophers considering observation as theory laden.

3. The role of passiveness of perception in philosophy

Many basic philosophical concepts were developed departing from the assumption that our perception provides us with perceptual data, which does not depend on mental states of a perceptive subject, and our sensuous data are free from any theoretical interpretation. The non-interpreting pure observations were the unproblematic source of information about the world. The passivity of perception guaranteed the independence of the world being perceived from a perceiving subject. Such a view on perception provided firm foundations for objectivism – a position assuming independent existence of the external world. We will briefly indicate the role of such an understanding of perception in philosophy.

The classical understanding of perception as a representation of the world was widely used by logical positivists. Besides this quite ordinary belief that the world is free of influence of observer's mind, positivists found much more useful applications of the unproblematic reliable perception and "pure" experience independent of the mental states. Some of the usages are:

A single observation has epistemological value. First of all, the hypothesis of the possibility of the "pure"

experience gives an epistemologically significant status to a single observation. If perception does not depend on an observer's mental states, then any persons can make an observation, and "on the basis of a single experience, a number of verbal statements are justified" (Russell, 1997, 21). A single observation can be used for the confirmation and verification of a whole series of statements. These sentences are the foundation of all scientific knowledge, and their truth values are established by means of sensuous perception.

Perception provided the meaning of names and allowed establishing the truth values of propositions. In the philosophy of language observation was used in two ways: first, as the initial period of the language learning, which necessarily included ostension (Kripke, 1980); second, to ascribe meaning to some names of the physical objects. In language some names and predicates applicable to the physical objects receive their meaning through a material process involving ostension. Hence, language learning and linguistic competence are a matter of grasping the sense of words.

The sensuous perceptions were assumed to correspond exactly to reality, so sense organs provided adequate cognition of the objective world. Perception understood as passive provided a possibility of reliable and adequate cognition of the world. On the whole, perception accounted for as a representation of reality provided both an ontological and epistemological foundation of objectivism: people did not doubt the existence of the external world and its cognizability. The most serious difficulty of this philosophical approach is David Hume's problem of induction: how can we justify our belief in existing of the external world if we only have sensations.

As we can see, perception that is free from the distorting mind's influence played a significant role in philosophy, namely, in providing a definition for the basic philosophical conceptions, such as object, sense, meaning, truth of a sentence.

4. If perception is active

Since the 1980s the view in psychology that perception is involved in the active gathering of information prevails. This activity reveals itself not only on an external muscular level, but also in the processing of the information received by the brain from neurons, in building an integral image based on it and in the management of the perceiver's further activity. That the experience-ordering structures carry out such actions as classification and categorization of the outer stimuli – actions traditionally referred to as "theoretical" or mental – provides a basis for the claim that any experience is theory laden. Moreover, theory ladenness appears to be a necessary condition of perception, because any perception is possible only due to processing and categorization. Besides, theory-ladenness plays an important role – giving meaning to the perceived.

Previous experience forms different expectation activating different structures even in the same situation. It leads to the difference in understanding of situation and hence different observers can interpret the same situation in various senses. These fluctuations of sense deprive a single observation of its epistemological status. "Protocol sentences" cannot have cognitive value and could not be used for justification of the theoretical statement. Instead of singular observation we should admit the reproducibility of observation. (For a detailed analysis see Radder, 1996.)

That observations and experiments cannot be reproduced by any person or in any condition should not be a pretext for rejecting this requirement. Iterated experiments play a role in elaboration, allowing us to gather more detailed information about a situation. Only a set of several repetitions of the experiment can have the status of a scientific fact, which has epistemological value – because it has integrated in itself a whole series of observations. Thus the scientific fact is a subject of historical development. (Fleck, 1979 (1935))

Since the meaning of a statement is connected to its truth value, Tarski believed that the concept of truth could not be correctly defined in a natural language due to its fuzziness and developed the definition of truth for the formal languages.

The same expression can, in one language, be a true statement, in another a false one or a meaningless expression. There will be no question at all here of giving a single general definition of the term. The problem which interests us will be split into a series of separate problems each relating to a single language. (Tarski, 1956 (1936) (1935), 153)

To avoid relativity concerning the sense and truth value of a statement Duhem and Quine formulated the thesis that "our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body". (Quine, 1951, 38)

Since perception is the active collecting of such information that may correspond to expectations, the same situation may be perceived by various observers differently, and perception itself depends on the past experience of the observers. To give an example I refer to Hanson's consideration of two microbiologists who see *Amoeba* through a microscope and have distinct visions because "one sees a one-celled animal, the other a non-celled animal" (Hanson, 1958, 4).

As appears from the above the ostensive definitions are undetermined, since the finding of relevant information is determined by the former experience of a subject. For the first time the result was formulated by Quine: "pointing does not tell us which summation of momentary objects is intended, beyond the fact that the momentary object of hand is to be in the desired summations". (Quine, 1950, 622)

The environment is, as a rule, sufficiently sophisticated to support more than one perception hypothesis. Different observers, even if they are both experienced, may confirm exactly opposite hypotheses while perceiving the same situation. One and the same situation can be perceived divergently because of the difference in expectations formulated by dissimilar theoretical dispositions. A scientific theory and the background knowledge influence perception through the special features in the structure of the perceptual scheme and the selected activation of some of them.

As an observer actively collects information confirming his hypothesis, he unconsciously ignores any counterexamples. If facts exist contrary to accepted beliefs – so much the worse for the facts: they will be ignored. The point was formulated by Peter Galison [1987], where he cites many examples which illustrated how theoretical presuppositions of the experimenters may enter into the decision to end an experiment and report the result. Galison's view is that experiments end when the experimenters believe that they have a result that will stand up in court.

5. Conclusion

We briefly glanced at two points of view on the influence of the mind on perception. One of them goes back to Descartes and presupposes that mind and body are absolute independent, because perception fulfilled by the body is free from the mind's influences. The second view was founded in the philosophy of science by Francis Bacon, who showed that we do not become free from the influences of the mind when we perceive. The first position considers the perception as reflection, or copy of reality, the second one acknowledges that perception always depends on former experience, available knowledge and so on.

Both positions have some followers and, to sum up, let me once again name some corollaries of acceptance for one or the other position.

<i>Perception as mirror-reflection</i>	<i>Perception as action</i>
The scientific fact is reliable evidence	The scientific fact is a subject of the historical development.
The truth value of a proposition can be established by the confrontation with experience	The truth value of a proposition depends on the observation conditions.
A single statement can be justified	holism
The meanings of some names are established by ostension	Indetermination of ostension
Senses are objective and different speakers can grasp the same senses and transmit a given thought to other speakers	Indetermination of perception by data Indetermination of theory by the facts

The results of recent scientific investigations give arguments in support of Bacon's view on the influence of the mind on perception. This position is not appreciated by some philosophers because to explain the mechanism of the influence it is necessary to take a whole series of arbitrary assumptions. The physiology and psychology data allow us to throw light on the mechanism although many gaps still remain.

The basic part of philosophical concepts is defined with the assumption that perception is a representation of reality. Although the viewpoint that perception is active has been finding more and more followers lately, and many philosophers have been making important remarks about theory-ladenness, a systematic analysis of the observation concept has yet to be carried out.

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The Fraissè Theorem and Goodman's Paradox

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1) Introduction.

Usually¹ the formulas of a predicative f.o. language are characterised on the basis of the number of different interconnected quantifiers that appear in them; we will indicate with $qr(F)$ the number of interconnected quantifiers that appear in the formula F , where:

- 1.0) Given a predicative first-order signature S :
- i) for each $F \in S$, $qr(F)=0$
- ii) $qr(\neg F)=qr(F)$
- iii) $qr(F \vee G)=\max(qr(F), qr(G))$
- iv) $qr(\exists x_i (F x_i))=qr(F)+1$

For a well known theorem⁽⁸⁾ there exists, for any n , a particular class of formula, known as the *Hintikka formulas* of $qr=n$, hereafter H^n , such that, for any consistent formula F of $qr=n$, there is a subset H_F^n of H^n such that: $F \leftrightarrow \bigvee H_F^n$.

By monadic language² we mean here a predicative f.o. language in the signature of which there only appear n one place predicates, whether $P_1 \dots P_n$.

By using the definition of qr mentioned above we have in this case only two types of formula: open formulas with $qr=0$, and sentences with $qr=1$.

The Hintikka formulas of $qr=0$ are the 2^n formulas generated by the scheme:

$$1.1) H^0_i := \pm P_1 x \wedge \dots \wedge \pm P_n x$$

with $P_i \in S$ and where the symbol \pm stands for the possible complement. We will indicate by H^0 the set of them.

The Hintikka formulas $qr=1$ are defined by the scheme:

$$1.2) H^1_i := \pm \exists x (H^0_1 x) \wedge \dots \wedge \pm \exists x (H^0_m x)$$

with $H^0_i \in H^0$, and where the symbol \pm stands for the possible complement. The scheme 1.2) combinatorially generates 2^m formulas with $m=2^n$, but only 2^m-1 of these are consistent.

Among f.o. logics one important peculiarity of monadic logic is that we can demonstrate for it a theorem analogous to that about disjunctive normal forms in propositional logic³:

- 1.3) Every consistent formula G of a monadic f.o. language, is equivalent to the disjunction of a non void subset of the class At defined as the set of consistent formulas generated by the scheme:

$$At_i := \pm P_1 x \wedge \dots \wedge \pm P_n x \wedge \pm \exists x (H^0_1 x) \wedge \dots \wedge \pm \exists x (H^0_m x)$$

where: $P_i \in S$, $H^0_1 \in H^0$, \pm stands for the possible complementation, $m=2^n$.

In this way we combinatorially generate $2^{(n+m)}$ formulas, but only a half of these is consistent, so $|AT|=2^{(n+m-1)}$. Hereafter we will write At_G for the subclass of At such that:

$$G \leftrightarrow \bigvee At_G.$$

We will instead indicate with $|G|_{AT}$ the cardinality of At_G .

Two structures are elementarily equivalent, written $\mathfrak{A} \equiv \mathfrak{B}$, if they satisfy the same sentences. We know that isomorphic structures are elementarily equivalent while, in general, elementary equivalence does not imply isomorphism. Fraissè's theorem offers us a purely algebraic interpretation of the notion of elementary equivalence by utilising a weaker notion than that of isomorphism: two structures are elementarily equivalent if and only if they are finitely isomorphic. And, in turn, two structures are finitely isomorphic if and only if they satisfy, for each m , the same Hintikka formula of $qr=m$.

1.4) Fraissè's Theorem⁴:

Given a f.o. signature S containing a finite number of predicative symbols, the S -structures $\mathfrak{A}, \mathfrak{B}$ are elementarily equivalent if and only if for each $n \geq 1$ they satisfy the same Hintikka formula of $qr=n$. Writing $H^n_{\mathfrak{A}}$ for the Hintikka formula of $qr=n$ satisfied by the structure \mathfrak{A} :

$$\mathfrak{A} \equiv \mathfrak{B} \text{ if and only if } \mathfrak{A} \models H^n_{\mathfrak{A}} \text{ for } n \geq 1.$$

In the following paragraph we will see how, in the monadic case, we can systematically define counterexamples to Fraissè's Theorem, using the atomic properties of monadic languages to construct structures that are elementarily equivalent but not finitely isomorphic.

2) A Counterexample to Fraissè's Theorem:

Given a monadic signature S containing n one place predicates, $P_1 \dots P_n$, we will consider a couple of S -structures $\mathfrak{A}, \mathfrak{B}$, that satisfy, respectively, the Hintikka formulas $H^1_{\mathfrak{A}}, H^1_{\mathfrak{B}}$.

Let there further be:

$$2.0) \dots \dots \dots$$

$$2.1) | \mathfrak{A} |_{AT} = | \mathfrak{B} |_{AT}$$

2.0) guarantees that the two structures are not isomorphic; 2.1), because of the construction of class At , means that the Hintikka formulas satisfied by the two structures imply the same number of non-negated existential quantifiers. There therefore exists a bijection φ from \mathfrak{A} to \mathfrak{B} such that for each relation $P^{\mathfrak{A}}, R^{\mathfrak{A}}$ the following conditions are satisfied:

$$2.2) 1) \varphi(P^{\mathfrak{A}}) = \varphi(P^{\mathfrak{B}})$$

¹ The quantifier rank definition proposed here, and which corresponds to that normally used, does not take into account the presence of formulas such as those defined in 1.3) et seq.

² See [4] for a description of monadic algebras and their atomic properties

³ See [4] pag. 85 ss.

⁴ See [9] pag. 243 ss.

$$2) \varphi(P^{\exists} \cup P^{\forall}) = \varphi(P^{\exists}) \cup \varphi(P^{\forall})$$

φ is therefore a Boolean isomorphism, i.e. a bijection between sets that preserve complement, union, and product.

We further require that for each relation P^{\exists} there be:

$$2.3) \varphi(P^{\exists}) \neq \emptyset \text{ if and only if } P^{\exists} \neq \emptyset$$

If two S-structures are Boolean isomorphic and satisfy 2.3) there exists a subset $e(F)$ of the set of S-formulas such that, given two formulas F and G , there are satisfied the conditions:

$$2.4) \text{ i) } e(\neg F) \Leftrightarrow \neg e(F)$$

$$\text{ii) } e(F \vee G) \Leftrightarrow e(F) \vee e(G)$$

$$\text{iii) } e(\exists x (Fx)) \Leftrightarrow \exists x e(Fx)$$

$$\text{iv) } F \Rightarrow G \text{ if and only if } e(F) \Rightarrow e(G).$$

In particular let $At_1^{\exists}, \dots, At_n^{\exists}$ the formulas that appear as disjoint in the normal form of H^{\exists} and $At_1^{\forall}, \dots, At_n^{\forall}$, and those that appear in the normal form of H^{\exists} , and let us give the definition:

2.5) Given a monadic S-signature for each S-formula F :

$$e(F) \Leftrightarrow \bigvee \{ e(At_i) \mid At_i \in At_F \}$$

where:

$$e(At_i) \Leftrightarrow At_i \text{ if and only if } At_i \notin \{ At_1^{\exists}, \dots, At_n^{\exists}, At_1^{\forall}, \dots, At_n^{\forall} \};$$

$$e(At_i^{\forall}) \Leftrightarrow At_i^{\exists};$$

$$e(At_i^{\exists}) \Leftrightarrow At_i^{\forall}.$$

The $e(L)$ set of formulas so defined satisfies the conditions 2.4) i) -iv).

Let us now consider the new signature $S^e = \langle e(P), P, \in S \rangle$ generated by the images of primitive predicates in S and apply to it the usual definition of formula, generating the set L^e of formulas having the following properties:

2.6) i) the set of L^e formulas coincides with that generated by S .

ii) the set of atomic formulas generated by S^e is different to that generated by S .

iii) the set of sentences generated by S^e is the same, modulo logical equivalence, as that generated by S .

An immediate consequence of definition 2.5) is:

$$2.7) \text{ i) } e(H^{\exists}) \Leftrightarrow H^{\forall}$$

$$\text{ii) } e(H^{\forall}) \Leftrightarrow H^{\exists}.$$

So for every sentence G :

$$2.8) H^{\forall} \Rightarrow G \text{ if and only if } e(H^{\exists}) \Rightarrow G;$$

$$H^{\exists} \Rightarrow G \text{ if and only if } e(H^{\forall}) \Rightarrow G.$$

Let us now consider any primitive predicate P . We have, for 2.4) iv):

$$2.9) \text{ i) } H^{\forall} \Rightarrow P_x \text{ if and only if } e(H^{\exists}) \Rightarrow e(P_x);$$

$$\text{ii) } H^{\exists} \Rightarrow P_x \text{ if and only if } e(H^{\forall}) \Rightarrow e(P_x).$$

Hence $e(H^{\exists})$ and H^{\forall} are satisfied by the same structure, as is $e(H^{\forall})$ and

H^{\exists} . In particular:

$$2.9) \text{ i) } \forall \Rightarrow e(H^{\forall});$$

$$\text{ii) } \exists \Rightarrow e(H^{\exists}).$$

We thus arrive at the conclusion that the two structures \forall, \exists are elementarily equivalent:

2.10) For each sentence F : $\forall \Rightarrow F$ if and only if $\exists \Rightarrow F$. Therefore $\exists \equiv \forall$.

Proof:

$\forall \Rightarrow F$ if and only if $H^{\forall} \Rightarrow F$, for the theorem on disjunctive normal forms;

$H^{\forall} \Rightarrow F$ if and only if $e(H^{\exists}) \Rightarrow F$, since $H^{\forall} \Leftrightarrow e(H^{\exists})$;

$e(H^{\exists}) \Rightarrow F$ if and only if $\exists \Rightarrow F$, for 2.9) and the theorem on normal disjunctive forms.

By assumption 2.0) however, the two structures are neither finitely isomorphic nor isomorphic, contradicting the Fraissè theorem.

More generally it can be demonstrated that:

2.11) Two monadic f.o. structures are elementarily equivalent if and only if they are Boolean isomorphic.

Finally we can introduce the following corollary:

2.12) Given a monadic f.o. structure \forall such that $H^{\forall} \Rightarrow \neg \exists x (H^{\forall}_x)$ for at least one H^{\forall}_x , always there is at least one structure elementarily equivalent but not isomorphic to it.

3) An Application: the Goodman Paradox.

For the sake of simplicity in this section we will only consider finite structures: in this case in fact isomorphism and finite isomorphism coincide and the Fraissè theorem is resolved by the assertion that two S-structures are elementarily equivalent if and only if they are isomorphic.

Given the signature $S = \langle R, T \rangle$, let us consider the two structures not isomorphic between each other:

$$3.0) \Phi = \langle A = \{a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n\}, B^{\Phi} = \{a_1, a_2, \dots, a_n\}, T^{\Phi} = \{a_1, a_2, \dots, a_{n-m}\} \rangle$$

$$3.1) \Theta = \langle B = \{b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n\}, B^{\Theta} = \{b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n\}, T^{\Theta} = \{b_1, b_2, \dots, b_{n-m}\} \rangle$$

The two Hintikka S-formulas satisfied by Φ and Θ are:

$$3.2) H^{\Phi} \Leftrightarrow \exists x (Rx \wedge Tx) \wedge \exists x (Rx \wedge \neg Tx) \wedge \exists x (\neg Rx \wedge Tx) \wedge \exists x (\neg Rx \wedge \neg Tx)$$

$$3.3) H^{\Theta} \Leftrightarrow \exists x (Rx \wedge Tx) \wedge \exists x (Rx \wedge \neg Tx) \wedge \exists x (\neg Rx \wedge Tx) \wedge \exists x (\neg Rx \wedge \neg Tx)$$

Let us now consider an arbitrary⁵ measure function $\mu(T, Ev)$ of inductive support offered by the evidence Ev to the generalisation T , such as to satisfy the following conditions:

⁵ But in the Hintikka tradition: see [5]

3.5) i) Sentences satisfied by elementarily equivalent structures receive, on the same evidence, the same inductive support.

ii) Sentences satisfied by isomorphic structures receive, on the same evidence, the same inductive support.

Let us further assume that the evidence is expressed by the sentence:

$$3.6) Ev^S \Leftrightarrow \exists x(Rx \wedge Tx) \wedge \neg \exists x(\neg Rx \wedge Tx);$$

Given $|H^1_{\phi}|_{AT} = |H^1_{\theta}|_{AT}$, there exists between their models a Boolean isomorphism. By repeating⁶ the procedure introduced in the preceding paragraph, let us define:

$$3.7) f(Rx) \Leftrightarrow (Rx \Leftrightarrow Tx)$$

$$f(Tx) \Leftrightarrow (Tx)$$

The observation that:

$$f(Rx \wedge Tx) \Leftrightarrow (R \wedge Tx)$$

$$f(Rx \wedge \neg Tx) \Leftrightarrow (\neg R \wedge \neg Tx)$$

$$f(\neg R \wedge Tx) \Leftrightarrow (\neg R \wedge Tx)$$

$$f(\neg R \wedge \neg Tx) \Leftrightarrow (R \wedge \neg Tx)$$

is sufficient to demonstrate that f satisfies the conditions 2.4)i-iii).

Let us pass to the new defined signature $Z := \{B, T\}$, renaming $f(Rx)$ with Bx and maintaining Tx .

Let us now consider the Z-structures:

$$\Psi = \langle C = \{c_1, c_2, \dots, c_n\}, B^{\Psi} = \{c_1, c_2, \dots, c_n\}, T^{\Psi} = \{c_1, c_2, \dots, c_{n-m}\} \rangle$$

$$\Delta = \langle D = \{d_1, d_2, \dots, d_n\}, B^{\Delta} = \{d_1, d_2, \dots, a_{n-m}\}, T^{\Delta} = \{d_1, d_2, \dots, d_{n-m}\} \rangle$$

which satisfy, respectively, the Hintikka Z-formulas H^1_{Ψ} and H^1_{Δ} defined:

$$3.10) H^1_{\Psi} \Leftrightarrow \exists x(Bx \wedge Tx) \wedge \exists x(Bx \wedge \neg Tx) \wedge \neg \exists x(\neg Bx \wedge Tx) \wedge \neg \exists x(\neg Bx \wedge \neg Tx)$$

$$3.11) H^1_{\Delta} \Leftrightarrow \exists x(Bx \wedge Tx) \wedge \neg \exists x(Bx \wedge \neg Tx) \wedge \neg \exists x(\neg Bx \wedge Tx) \wedge \exists x(\neg Bx \wedge \neg Tx)$$

For construction $\Phi \simeq \Psi$ and $\Theta \simeq \Delta$. So, because for the hypotheses, not $\Phi \simeq \Theta$, we have:

$$\text{not } \Psi \simeq \Delta.$$

On the other hand by definition of the Z-signature:

$$3.12) H^1_{\Psi} \Leftrightarrow f(H^1_{\phi}) \Leftrightarrow H^1_{\theta}.$$

$$3.13) H^1_{\Delta} \Leftrightarrow f(H^1_{\theta}) \Leftrightarrow H^1_{\phi}.$$

And therefore

$$3.14) \Phi \equiv \Delta \quad \varepsilon \quad \Theta \equiv \Psi.$$

The evidence Ev is translated into L^Z by the statement:

$$3.15) \exists x(Bx \wedge Tx) \wedge \neg \exists x(\neg Bx \wedge Tx)$$

which is logically equivalent to $\exists x(Rx \wedge Tx) \wedge \neg \exists x(Rx \wedge \neg Tx)$.

Therefore, by applying rule 3.5) i), we obtain:

$$3.16) \mu(H^1_{\phi}, Ev) = \mu(H^1_{\Delta}, Ev);$$

$$3.17) \mu(H^1_{\theta}, Ev) = \mu(H^1_{\Psi}, Ev).$$

But $\Phi \simeq \Psi$ and $\Theta \simeq \Delta$, and therefore for 3.5) ii):

$$3.18) \mu(H^1_{\phi}, Ev) = \mu(H^1_{\Psi}, Ev);$$

$$3.19) \mu(H^1_{\theta}, Ev) = \mu(H^1_{\Delta}, Ev).$$

From which, obviously, we obtain:

$$3.20) \mu(H^1_{\phi}, Ev) = \mu(H^1_{\Delta}, Ev) = \mu(H^1_{\theta}, Ev) = \mu(H^1_{\Psi}, Ev)$$

This result too is paradoxical. Let us give an interpretation inspired by Goodman Paradox of the languages introduced here: let our domain consist of a set of balls in an urn and let:

R be the set of red balls,

T that of the balls extracted at n moment,

B the set of rednotred balls

where a ball is rednotred if and only if it is red and it has been extracted at n moment or it is not red and has not been extracted at n moment. Let us consider the generalisations:

3.21) All the balls are red and there exist extracted balls and non-extracted balls at n moment;

3.22) All the balls are red if and only if they are extracted at n moment, and there exist balls extracted and balls not extracted at n moment.

3.23) All the balls are rednotred and there exist extracted balls and non-extracted balls at n moment;

3.24) All the balls are rednotred if and only if they are extracted at n moment, and there exist balls extracted and balls not extracted at n moment.

Now, for definition 3.21) and 3.24) are logically equivalent, and too 3.22) and 3.23).

Therefore 3.20) means that there does not exist any measure of inductive support that might satisfy conditions 3.5) and that might allow us to discriminate, given the evidence, between these generalisations.

4) Conclusions

We have described how the Fraissè Theorem is not valid in f.o. monadic logic: in general it is in fact always possible, given a structure, to define one elementarily equivalent to it but not isomorphic.

These conclusions can be applied to some well known problems in philosophy of science, where monadic languages have often been used: here we have taken into consideration a simplified version of the Goodman paradox in order to demonstrate how it results from the contrast between incompatible requests about the adequacy of inductive measures. Similarly in the case of verisimilitude⁷, and in particular of Niiniluoto's and Oddie's proposals, it

⁶ Obtained by repeating the same procedure used for defining in the preceding paragraph but exchanging, all each A_i in $A_i(Rx \wedge \neg Tx)$ with A_i in $A_i(\neg Rx \wedge Tx)$ and vice versa. At a second stage we consider each Hintikka formula $qr=1$ in which there appears the formula A_i and that has been involved in the morphism and we associate it with a corresponding formula that has the same cardinality. As regards what has been stated in 2.8), f has a further property: $f(G)$ is an open formula of L^1 if and only if G is an open formula of L^2 . However, 2.8) ii) remains valid.

⁷ See [6] and [7].

could be demonstrated that the paradox raised by Miller results in an analogous manner: verisimilitude ought to be conserved both between isomorphic structures and between elementary equivalently. The existence of elementarily equivalent but not isomorphic structures leads to paradoxes.

The Fraissè Theorem is however used above all to demonstrate that the difference between determinate structures cannot be understood by f.o. logic. In theoretical informatics what, in particular, is highly relevant is the demonstration that the most interesting subclass of so-called regular languages is not definable in f.o. logic, but it is by the second order. For such a demonstration the use of Fraissè Theorem is essential⁸.

The inquiry into the generalisation of these results applied to all f.o. logics, and in particular to the logic of successions, therefore appears particularly relevant in view of a revision of the problem.

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⁸See [3].

Outline of Arguments against Naturalisms: Levels and Classifications

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The debate on naturalism is one of the watersheds in contemporary more or less analytically orientated epistemology and philosophy of science. I suggest to summarize batches of arguments under a collective label. Arguments, which are primarily localized at the semantical, ontological, methodological, epistemological, and metaphilosophical level of discussion, were put into order in ascending strength.

I think that this classification appraises the strength (and quality) of arguments. The last three groups (levels) concern the core of naturalism. A methodological argument is more serious compared with a semantical argument. This classification should enable opponents to see more clearly when debates turn fundamental. The most important topics are (still) the realism-nonrealism-debate and the rationalism-empiricism-debate (concerning the possibility of a priori-knowledge). The point is which problems can be solved by philosophy as a whole or, at least, which problems philosophy should work on (metaphilosophical positions).

One effect in fundamental debates is that opposing and contradictory views seem to be equally justified. We will see, (if and) why problems are still not solved and why adversaries look at their antagonists in an unreconciled manner.

The following table classifies levels of discussion in a way that is missing in the ongoing debates (for a more detailed discussion, see Sukopp 2006). Such an attempt may be considered to be fruitless or even dogmatic. I think, it clarifies the debates though it may look crude because I simplify complex debates which are in great flux. I evaluate arguments in situ. The correlation between argument and level is sometimes ambiguous. In metaphorical speech, the whole looks more like xylograph than like a multi-faceted painting.

1.

Argument: The notion of nature is not clear enough and, accordingly, „nature“ is not understood. „Who does not like to speak about „nature“ should remain silent about naturalism“ (Keil). Pretheoretical assumptions concerning nature are also unclear. When we call everything nature, what follows from this equation? The consequential naturalism is true in a trivial way, because this so-called naturalism excludes nothing.

Main level of the Argument: semantical

Exponents of the (critical) arguments: Lüke 2003; Keil 1993; Janich 2000

Frequency/ quality of the arguments: common/mid

Counter-argument (in note form): Explanation is possible; tu quoque; misleading concept concerning the relevance of the notion of nature.

2.

Argument: Metaphor problems: anthropomorphic interpretation of „nature“ and physiomorphic interpretations of human beings themselves are producing paradoxes. The computer metaphor (or the machine metaphor) e. g. is inevitably connected with a teleological analysis of how machines operate (Keil 1993, S. 301ff.)

Main level of the Argument: semantical

Exponents of the (critical) arguments: Keil 1993

Frequency/ quality of the arguments: Rare/ superfluous

Counter-argument (in note form): Where are the alternatives to the speech of „anthropomorphic metaphors“

3.

Argument: Conflicts with terms: e. g. evolutionary epistemology offers two (contradictory) terms of „cognition“: the first one is anthropologically relativized, the latter is connected with realism.

Main level of the Argument: semantical/ analytical

Exponents of the (critical) arguments: Keil 1993

Frequency/ quality of the arguments: rare/mid

Counter-argument (in note form): Circular conclusion, but virtuous, that means not vicious.

4.

Argument: Against Quine as an exponent of an ontological „desert“ (Koskinen): Quine's ontology accepts nothing else than physical objects and classes. It is therefore more radical than e.g. materialistic ontologies (e. g. Bunge, Mahner 2004) which also encloses ideas, propositions, sense data and meanings. (Antinaturalists and even some naturalists argue for a richer ontology: mental and further entities are real.)

Main level of the Argument: ontological

Exponents of the (critical) arguments: Almost every philosopher, e.g.: Keil (1993, 2000), Chisholm (1989), Carnap, Bunge, Mahner (2004)

Frequency/ quality of the arguments: common/good

Counter-argument (in note form): Quine: if and only if something can be individuated extensionally, it is part of Ontology. (Quine seems to be afraid of ambiguities.)

5.

Argument: Consistency problems: Quine's position is called „self-defeating“ (Moser; Yandell). Accordingly, he reverts to positions, that he should not accept (physicalism, empiricism). Almeder's incoherence thesis:

after Quine's replacement thesis, all answers to legitimate epistemological questions are distilled by scientific methods when we are doing science. The point is that the replacement thesis is no completely scientific assertion, therefore self-refuting. Almeder (1998) calls it "self-defeating" und inconsistent.

Main level of the Argument: ontological/ methodological

Exponents of the (critical) arguments: Sosa 1983; Stroud (2001).Almeder (1998); Sagal

Frequency/ quality of the arguments: common/ sound, there-fore taken to be serious

Counter-argument (in note form): Quine: wrong. He argues for a kind of holism that is more complex than most critiques expect. Furthermore, inconsistency seems to be a logical, not an ontological problem. Logical defects could not be demonstrated persuasively. Quine himself is not acting like a scientist. He sees place for „technology of truth-seeking“ and for (restricted) norms.

6.

Argument: Problems with normativity: if it is true that all epistemological problems are scientific problems, then we cannot judge how we should attack or even solve these problems. (This is again partly a circular, but virtuous conclusion.).

Main level of the Argument: methodological

Exponents of the (critical) arguments: Löffler 2005; Keil, Schnädelbach 2000; Audi 1998; Laudan (1987, 1996)

Frequency/ quality of the arguments: common/wide range: from naive to excel-lent

Counter-argument (in note form): Who would claim this? Quine in "Epistemology naturalized". Important is how much normativity naturalism includes.

7.

Argument: Problems because of circular conclusions: explanative circular conclusion in evolutionary epistemology; (adaptation, explained by evolutionary biology, and assumed reality (where our research is done) cannot be separated). To defend that scepticism is possible, the naturalists' conclusion is inevitably vitious. Quine replies that sceptical doubts are scientific doubts. Hence he cannot force the sceptic using empirical knowledge to accept empirical knowledge.

Giere's thesis of circularity: to demonstrate that methods are effective we have to make sure that we can achieve our aims. Therefore we have to point at our aims/ends/goals. The major scientific goal is usually: let's find „true“ or „correct“ theories. The vitious circular argument of naturalized epistemology consists in assuming the application of effective instruments to achieve our goals. The circularity occurs because Quine cannot judge by what the effectiveness is justified. Even a pragmatic justification of e. g. induction leads to a circular argumentation.

Main level of the Argument: semantical/ methodological

Exponents of the (critical) arguments: B. Goebel (2005); Janich (2000); Audi (1998); Giere; Laudan (1987, 1996)

Frequency/ quality of the arguments: common/ mostly superfluous

Counter-argument (in note form): It is only rhetoric when Quine holds the view that we only („in the framework of science itself“) work on our epistemological problems. His philosophical program looks quite different (Keil 2003).

8.

Argument: What is it that makes science so respectable compared with other disciplines? Why should we only accept science as a leader? According to some critiques, a naturalist should only accept something as reliable as far as it is rational. Then naturalism is a scientism of science and an exponent should explain why only sciences and no other disciplines (e. g. humanities) provide results (and methods), which are epistemologically relevant.

Main level of the Argument: methodological

Exponents of the (critical) arguments: Keil, Schnädelbach (2000); Janich (2000); Löffler (1999); Gräfrath (2005)

Frequency/ quality of the arguments: mid/good

Counter-argument (in note form): Tu quoque: is there any discipline free from these problems (Kant; Lorenzen, Apel)?

9.

Argument: Performative inconsistency: the methodological naturalist raises a claim of justification. The claim is only justified if the naturalist can e. g. specify criteria of rationality. These criteria are accepted within community (e. g. exponents of a methodological naturalism). Rationality criteria demand from any speaker that he has good reasons for an assumption. [Furthermore external motivations for assumptions are not acceptable.] Particularly, utterances caused by activation of innate stimulus-response mechanisms or actions caused by conditioning should not be taken serious. These situations are simply „parrot-situations“. If everything is scientifically explicable, then all verbal actions are causally reducible to previous conditions of the situation. The corresponding naturalism turns us into speaking parrots. These parrots can be dismissed.

Main level of the Argument: methodological

Exponents of the (critical) arguments: Putnam (1982); Apel, Habermas (Hartmann, Lange 2000)

Frequency/ quality of the arguments: mid/mid

Counter-argument (in note form): Tu quoque: are the rationales for truth of a proposition as proposed by Apel, Habermas or Putnam better? Their criteria for rationality are to ambitious.

10.

Argument: Against realism: according to (scientific) realism, we have access (via observation) to a world existing independent from ourselves. This view is moreover connecting with the idea of accessibility of

objectivity and truth (Wagner, Warner). Neurobiological and other scientific evidence advises us that the world is partly constructed by our brains. Therefore we should look closer to internal processes. After a naive copy-model of cognition we cannot, at any case, come up to objective knowledge (Löffler).

Main level of the Argument: ontological/ epistemological in narrower sense

Exponents of the (critical) arguments: Löffler (2005); Wagner, Warner (2005); Constructivists like W. Singer, Roth, v. Glasersfeld; Instrumentalists

Frequency/ quality of the arguments: common/sound

Counter-argument (in note form): The hypothetical-critical realism is superior to most other views (explaining, e.g., the failure of theories etc.). Reality can be separated from notions of truth and objectivity.

11.

Argument: Antipsychologism: the answer to epistemological questions is independent from knowledge about causal relations between mental states of things. It is also independent from knowledge about cognitive capacities of human being. Psychological processes cannot explain or justify epistemic processes.

Main level of the Argument: methodological/ epistemological in narrower sense

Exponents of the (critical) arguments: Eisler; Kornblith; Goldman (Grundmann)

Frequency/ quality of the arguments: mid/naive

Counter-argument (in note form): Causal relations are topics of research. They are partly understood. We desire to revert to causal relations and they are finally required for accessibility of knowledge.

12.

Argument: Separation of genesis and justification of an idea is possible: „One should separate the questions concerning the genesis of an opinion and their justification at least when we start analysing the structure of our knowledge; and we need sound arguments if we nevertheless claim that the answers to both questions are the same. Obviously, the first question is no genuine philosophical question, but rather situated in the domain of empirical psychology. It is anything but self-evident that the second question has to be located there, and Quine's arguments for naturalized epistemology sometimes do not distinguish these both questions clearly enough" (Bartelborth 1996, S. 33ff.)

Main level of the Argument: methodological/ epistemological

Exponents of the (critical) arguments: Bartelborth (1996)

Frequency/ quality of the arguments: rare/unconvincing

Counter-argument (in note form): Because empirical knowledge (genesis) is more important than Bartelborth and other assume, the strict separation is neither possible nor required.

13.

Argument: Reason cannot be naturalized. Against reliabilism, Putnam et al. argue that the sole reliability of an opinion provides no proper reason for rational justification of opinions. Rather reason is relative to culture and language.

Main level of the Argument: epistemological/ metatheoretical

Exponents of the (critical) arguments: Moser, Yandell (1996); Putnam (1982)

Frequency/ quality of the arguments: common/good

Counter-argument (in note form): Perhaps reason cannot be naturalized, but it is universal and objective.

14.

Argument: Against logical naturalisms (logical anthropologisms): naturalism leads into relativism. Corresponding to naturalism contingent structures in the brain of species form the basis of our logic, e.g. our ways to conclude. Against this attempt, Husserl puts forward six arguments (a similar argumentation is partly offered by Putnam): the content of a proposition can be true in the view of one species and wrong in the view of another species. The proposition „true in the view of one species“ does not make sense in our languages.

Husserl's paradox: naturalized epistemology thinks to have found a basal language or a fun-damental „scheme of thinking“ that is obtained from „nowhere“ and we have to assume it before it can be justified.

Main level of the Argument: meta-philosophical

Exponents of the (critical) arguments: Haaparanta (1999); C.S. Peirce; Husserl; Putnam (1982)

Frequency/ quality of the arguments: mid/mid

Counter-argument (in note form): Virtuous circular conclusion: „relativism“ is inevitable if it means that other species could draw different conclusions from the same data if their brains were different from our brains. But this does not change the truth of the conclusion.

15.

Argument: Traditional epistemological questions are justified (against Kornblith, Quine): an epistemologist begins with traditional cluster of questions and takes into account all empirical knowledge that may be useful, e. g. cognitive sciences.

Main level of the Argument: meta-philosophical

Exponents of the (critical) arguments: S. Haack (1993); Haaparanta (1999)

Frequency/ quality of the arguments: common/good, but quite vague

Counter-argument (in note form): This argument affects only radical naturalists

We see that the best arguments attack fundamental naturalistic premises (namely methodological, epistemological und metaphilosophical arguments). They

criticise (scientific) realism or some normative premises that cannot be justified within science itself. Finally, we find on the agenda of some critics the status of reason. We are in the midst of old disputes. Those critics who disagree with naturalistic premises pick up the following problems:

1. Inconsistency
2. Circularity of conclusions
3. Missing or at least inadequate opportunity to consider normativity
4. Neglect of any form of apriorism (a moderate apriorism is held to be true by some naturalists, e. g. Kitcher)
5. Antipsychologism
6. (strong) replacement thesis (attacked also by naturalists, e. g. Almeder)

I offer the following scheme of problems:

Critique of naturalistic premises:

1. against realisms (not all naturalists prefer a certain version of realisms): Constructivism, Instrumentalism, Idealism
2. terminological pre-decision (e. g. the notion of nature).
3. status of reason/experience: Empiricism/Externalism, Rationalism/Internalism

Perhaps the opponents will agree in at least one point: much work has to be done.

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Reason, red in tooth and claw: naturalising reason

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1.

From a historical point of view, it is useful to view contemporary naturalist accounts of rationality as, at heart, an attempt to salvage what was most valuable in traditional enlightenment philosophy from the various critiques of mid twentieth century. In this way, Hooker (1991) places naturalism – in the context of a discussion of Feyerabend – between formalism and anarchism:

I accept that Feyerabend is essentially correct in his insistence that the Western project for reason, as it is encapsulated along the rationalism-empiricism axis, is in serious difficulty and requires some superseding conception or other. But while Feyerabend's response has been to question, in an increasingly radical way, the transcendence project which it theorizes I shall argue that there is an alternative: accept the transcendence project and re-theorize the nature of reason and the life of reason. (Hooker 1991: 44)

The transcendence project Hooker speaks of is the same project that Pascal (1669: 347) had in mind when he spoke of humans as thinking reeds; fragile in body but magnificent in mind. It consists in attempting to understand our predicament with the hope of ultimately escaping it through the use of reason. By the early twentieth century the project came to be embodied in practical terms by science and understood in terms of an intimate relationship between rationality and logic; whose universality was to guarantee that reason would be free of the baser aspects of our nature. The philosophy which many saw as carrying on the project was logical positivism, broadly understood.

Brown (1988) characterises the logic-based view of rationality as having three features:

- 1) Rational solutions should be universal.
- 2) Rationally acceptable conclusions must follow with necessity from the information given.
- 3) The rationality of the conclusions is determined by whether they conform to the appropriate rules. (after Hooker 1991: 44-45)

The search for an inductive logic (Keynes 1921, Carnap 1950) has been one of the attempts to arrive at a model of such rationality. However, for many philosophers the long litany of criticisms that have dogged logic-based accounts of rationality over the major part of the twentieth century (Popper 1935, Goodman 1955, Quine 1960, Kuhn 1962, Feyerabend 1975 and many others) together with the failure to answer Hume's original (1739-40) problem has been enough to make them as wary of such accounts as are Hooker and Brown. To a fair number this rejection has brought with it the rejection of Enlightenment ideals, as well. Naturalists, however, would rather argue that it is incorrect to understand reason as being characterised in the terms that Brown outlines, hoping to thereby maintain the transcendence project.

2.

If one considers the various positions that have gone under the name of naturalism during the last few decades, there is little in common among them all, apart from an overall favourable view of science. Indeed, such a view seems in some cases to be deemed enough to call a position naturalist. Just how wide the scope is can perhaps be gauged when it is considered that Frank Jackson's (1997) defence of conceptual analysis is often considered a good example of naturalism, even while Milikan (2005) and Bishop and Trout (2005) see a robustly critical attitude to conceptual analysis as essential to naturalism. A term is only as useful as the class of things it identifies and, in the case of 'naturalism', the breadth of the common meaning is such as to have made it difficult to have a focussed discussion due to the core of the position being obscured by vagueness. A case study of the difficulties this has caused is provided by the critical articles collected by De Caro and Macarthur (2004), which all too often end up being aimed at nothing more than some vague scientism.

Characterising naturalism as the rejection of logic-based accounts of reason together with a retention of Enlightenment ideals still leaves naturalism a broad church, but it helps to focus the debate around a clear position. The essential question becomes one of how to justify retaining those ideals without the exercise being founded upon logical methods. In effect, the position comes down to, as Hooker (1997: 52) observes, the rejection of a priori justified epistemic methods and their replacement with methods that are only justifiable a posteriori and which, therefore, are context-dependent. This move to give up on a first philosophy brings both riches and troubles. The riches come in the form of the knowledge provided by the sciences and whatever other effective epistemic methods humanity uses, which, given the rejection of a method foundationalism (or *foundationalism* as Haack (1993: 186) calls it), naturalists are free to use in coming to understand what methods are rational. The troubles are primarily those which affect any non-foundationalist position; particularly, the issue of justification that has already been raised. The naturalist must hope that their riches are sufficient to buy their way out of trouble. I will consider both in turn.

3.

Naturalism is, by its very nature, interdisciplinary. It does not have any a priori qualms about the relevance of how we reason to the question of how we should reason. As such, it can draw upon the lessons provided by the history of science as well as the sociology of science, much in the way that Kuhn (1962) suggested it. At the same time, it should also learn from how living beings in general manage to deal with their environment, requiring it to draw upon the work of biologists as well as that of other scientists. This is, of course, exactly what has been done for decades by evolutionary epistemologists of many kinds (Campbell 1974, Plotkin 1982, Callebaut and Pinxten 1987). All of these disciplines provide a great wealth of knowledge about what reasoning and its evolutionary predecessors are actually like.

Naturalised approaches to reasoning are also interdisciplinary in another respect. By considering reason in the specific context of actual reasoning beings rather than as an abstract set of rules, naturalism forces together epistemology and philosophy of mind, making it necessary to consider in close connection to each other such things as epistemic methods, rational decisions and other aspects of philosophy of mind. I would argue that the result is the embodied, situated cognitive science that has come of age during the last decade of the previous century and which is being developed by Andy Clark (1996) among others. Clark views our reasoning abilities through the lens, not of forming complete and accurate models of environments, but of having, at the right time, access to information which is adequate to making the decisions that need to be made at that point. This focus on practical commitment is one that will be seen to run through naturalism.

At this point it might seem that the tag of scientism is one that truly fits naturalism, since it is various sciences that I have mentioned. To understand that this is an unfair accusation it is necessary to consider the relationship between science and naturalised philosophy. Given the rejection of the *a priori*, any methods that are favoured can only be given such status on the basis of their observed results. This means that, in so far as naturalism views science favourably, it can do so only to the degree that science succeeds. The same is true for non-scientific methods, be they the common everyday things that people do when crossing the street or choosing fruit at a grocer's or be the activity under consideration literature and poetry, both of which I would argue have a cognitive, epistemic role. Given that naturalism does not see in science a particular set of universal methods, scientific activity is seen as continuous with other human activities, different only in the degree of institutionalisation, formalisation, self-criticism and self-awareness regarding the particular context-dependent methods it uses.

Of course, the continuum of human methods must be seen in the context of the continuum of the methods that are used by living beings in general. As such, human science, human knowledge and – perhaps most importantly – human reason must, likewise be seen as part of that continuum.

4.

Naturalism's openness to various methods also has a down-side. By accepting the input of other disciplines and epistemic methods naturalist accounts of reason are forced to somehow deal with the fact that these various sources often proscribe differing courses of action. This is as true when comparing clinical medicine with homeopathy, or people's fast and frugal heuristics (Gigerenzer 2000) with Bayesian rules of inference, as when the comparison is between how a chemist and a paramecium would locate concentrations of dissolved sugars. An uncritical pluralism regarding methods is quite misplaced here. To use Peirce's (1877) phrase, "real and living doubt" will have real consequences in terms of the sorts of ways one will act and, although in discussion we may eschew commitment, we can not avoid it in action. At the same time an uncritical conventionalism, though quite capable of guiding actions, will not be capable of improving upon the status quo.

Invoking Peirce in this context is most appropriate, as a number of prominent naturalists who have grappled with these issues (Haack 1993, Hooker 1991, Hacking

1983, Hookway 2000, Rescher 2005) have found his pragmatism to be capable of providing the right context for working towards an answer. The vital aspect in this instance is Peirce's (1878) insistence that "the whole function of thought is to produce habits of action". Hooker (1991: 63) presents the point this way:

[A] shift to an alternative paradigm of acceptance as an act of practical commitment leads to a decision theoretic epistemology where consequences play a key role, acceptance strategies can be subject to selective development, and there is no requirement for foundations.

The approach offers the hope that it is possible to get away from a foundationalist model without giving up on the transcendence project since it is now the practical commitment which is to underwrite the necessary normativity (witness for example, the (Collier 2000, Bickhard 2003) biologically inspired project to develop an account of function). Likewise, treating the epistemic methods we use as open to development in much the same way as our beliefs about the world we live in (i.e. thinking that methods are essentially beliefs about how we can go about finding out about our world) provides a way to internalise Kuhn's and other's objections to the logic-based account of rationality.

Other problems that troubled traditional account of reason remain to be dealt with, Hume's problem being the foremost among them. In that particular case naturalism is better placed to provide a reasonable answer due to its modesty regarding the efficacy of epistemic methods, i.e. the fact that it recognises that methods are only going to be effective in certain limited contexts. Hume, after all, did not show that our inferences will fail in all possible worlds but only that there will always be some where they will fail. Together with an argument to the effect that it is reasonable to expect that we exist in a predictable world, naturalism is enough not so much as to solve Hume's problem – since it is strictly unsolvable – but, merely, to learn how to live with it.

5.

Thinking back to Brown's characterisation of logic-based rationality we can consider the features a naturalised rationality will have:

- 1) Rational solutions need not be universal, instead they will be only effective in appropriate contexts.
- 2) Rationally acceptable conclusions do not have to follow necessarily from the information given, as acceptance is not to be understood in terms of a formal relationship between propositions but in terms of a practical commitment.
- 3) The rationality of the conclusions is not necessarily determined by whether they conform to the appropriate rules, indeed the primary focus is removed from conclusions and placed upon actions that are taken on the basis of beliefs and methods that are all subject to further criticism and development.

While this characterisation presents a very partial and rough account it does serve to show naturalism's radical break with previous accounts of reason and to point to the ways in which it seeks to avoid the problems which ultimately brought down the earlier attempt to continue the Enlightenment project.

Importantly, where Pascal saw in human reason more than a little of the divine spark, naturalism shows that we may hope to transcend ignorance without recall to anything but our native facility for reasoning.

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The Significance of Interculturality for the Problem of (In)Transparency

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"We also say of a person that he is transparent to us. However, for our observation it is important that a person can be a complete enigma to another. One experiences this when coming into a foreign country with altogether foreign traditions; and, what is more, even given mastery of the country's language. One does not *understand* the people. (And not because of not knowing what they are saying to themselves.) We cannot find ourselves in them" (Wittgenstein, 2003 – I have modified the translation).

This passage occurs in a discussion treating the apparent asymmetry involving my relationship to my thoughts, intentions, feelings, etc. compared to that which another person has to them. Concepts such as 'inner' and 'hidden', 'knowing' and 'guessing', 'certainty' and 'doubt' dominate the exchanges between undisclosed interlocutors. However, this passage is unique in that it draws a parallel, perhaps even stronger, a connection between the intransparency of another person and the foreignness of another peoples' culture and tradition.

Although this passage has been the focus of much debate over the years, and has by no means suffered from a lack of interpretation, especially in conjunction with other key passages occurring in the *Philosophical Investigations*, my intention here is neither to add yet another to the list, nor comment on them directly. Rather, the purpose of this paper is to exam Wittgenstein's assertion that the opacity and puzzlement another human being presents to me is essentially of the same kind as that of encountering another culture. To this end, I am not so much interested in trying to situate this idea within those surrounding it, as I am with its consequences for the discussion. Is the parallel as he portrays it plausible? And if so, what might be its significance for language and intercultural exchange?

Wittgenstein opens the passage claiming that we can and do talk about another person as being transparent or open to us – we know what they are thinking and feeling. In English this phenomenon is captured by the expressions "you are like an open book" or "he wears his heart on his sleeve." Both expressions employ a very distinctive and explicit imagery, namely that of availability and openness. If someone I know says to me "I can read you like an open book", it means that the motivations "behind" my actions are obvious and on display for them to see. In both instances we can say that a person's transparency is directly associated with the public display of something within them -- something essentially internal. And like a book, the ability to read the intentions of another is completely dependent upon whether or not the he or she is open or closed.

However in what sense am I closed off and are my thoughts hidden? Assuming that a very specific context is lacking, if a friend were to come up to me and ask me about what I was thinking, in most cases, pretty much anything I say would have to be accepted, whether true or false. After all, whereas others can only guess at the content of my thoughts, I am the only one who can be said to actually *know* them. Although Wittgenstein disputes the appropriateness of framing my relationship to my own thoughts and intentions in terms of knowing, the

phenomenon being described is well-known. Indeed, I do seem to have a different kind of access to my thoughts; one fundamentally different from that of another person. In other words, according to this model, my openness is intimately tied to that which is internal and hidden, but which is capable of being disclosed.

Thus, it would seem that if someone can be transparent to us, then the opposite must also be possible. In this case, Wittgenstein refers to the possibility of encountering someone who we simple cannot figure out – they are truly enigmatic. The question is in what sense is this person opaque? In order to treat this question, we must imagine the scenario outlined in the third sentence, where Wittgenstein draws a parallel to that of someone entering a land foreign in every respect with one very unusual exception – language. In what appears to be merely a passing remark, he states that the people and their traditions could be completely foreign to us, even if we have mastered the language. Of course, the qualification Wittgenstein stipulates is somewhat confusing, especially to anyone who has learned another language, much less mastered one.

Assuming that I have the highest level of linguistic proficiency, in what way would the people and their traditions appear foreign? Had Wittgenstein not used such a strong term like *beherrschen* [to master], then it would be easier to imagine a situation where a person with a limited grasp of the language might run into trouble as the result of grave misunderstandings (a situation due primarily to insufficient experience with the language). Or perhaps one learned a foreign tongue without ever having studied the culture, and thus knows how to form grammatically correct sentences, but his or her employment of vocabulary and concepts does not correspond to how the language is actually used (e.g. learning from a grammar book).

However, these situations are not what Wittgenstein has in mind. His use of the term "mastery" appears quite deliberate, and serves the purpose of radicalizing the example in order to make a very specific point. But, as I have just mentioned, the connection between the intransparency of another human being and the foreignness of another culture is by no means obvious. Put differently, given the conditions prescribed above, in what sense could one say that "one does not *understand* the people?"

The significance of this statement is linked to Wittgenstein's use of *verstehen* [to understand]. Does the importance of the term lie in the fact that it is italicized? Certainly Wittgenstein intended to emphasize the term – bring it to our attention. However, this still leaves the question as to why unanswered. Perhaps he wanted to draw our attention to a different meaning of the term. Placed within the context of the passage, it is clear that *verstehen* does not mean here a difficulty in communicating, e.g. "I don't understand/know what this person is trying to say" or "She was speaking so fast that I could not understand/make out the directions to the old market square."

Since Wittgenstein grants that we are highly proficient users of the language, in possession of a considerable vocabulary and know what to say, when to say it, etc., miscommunication would appear to be excluded from the proposed situation. Further complicating matters, Wittgenstein says that our puzzlement does not result from "not knowing what they [the people of this country] are saying to themselves" (Wittgenstein, 2003). Although this last statement invokes the inner/outer model mentioned above, it is not the hurdle that one might at first imagine, for a distinction between an inner and outer realm is not responsible for the enigmatic other.

As Wittgenstein has attempted to show throughout this discussion, inner and outer are concepts which belong to a certain picture or model (see Wittgenstein, 2003, pgs. 188-190). And although this model can lead to potential difficulties, our puzzlement lies elsewhere. We seem, at some very fundamental level, unable to relate to these people – as Wittgenstein put it in the sentence immediately following, "We cannot find ourselves in them." Here, I have intentionally chosen a more literal translation over Anscombe's ("We cannot find our feet with them"), primarily because I find the original German wording more suggestive and yet still very accessible to the English speaking community.

But, if the other's foreignness or alterity cannot be attributed to their hiding something from me, from public view, then what other possibilities exist? I think the key to the highly unusual situation Wittgenstein has sketched out lies with tradition, for it is tradition which even the most proficient non-native speaker lacks.

One could object that such a skilled user of the German language, for example, must have knowledge of the culture and understand the tradition, otherwise they would never have been able reach such a degree of proficiency. To a certain point, I would agree with this objection. It is, indeed, unlikely that a person would be capable of such sophisticated and nuanced language use without having learned about and studied the culture and its traditions. Yet, here I would like to call attention to the term tradition, and pose the following question: Can tradition at all be a matter of understanding? Is it, rather, not the case that understanding evolves out of or even on the grounds of tradition?

Gadamer's hermeneutics (Gadamer, 1990) has exposed that we are situated in a horizon of understanding which pre-figures the way we conceive of the world. The horizon serves as ground for our understanding which means, at the same time, that it does not become explicit. Taking up the perspective of a particular *form of life*, Wittgenstein also regards tradition (being an aspect of a form of life) as something primary or primordial. In other words, I stand within a tradition, a horizon of significance that is its own ground. However, in contrast to Gadamer, Wittgenstein is very mistrustful regarding the category of understanding, and therefore, his later investigations are descriptive endeavours instead of explanatory theoretical approaches.

In the present context, I read Wittgenstein as emphasizing the primacy of tradition, on the one hand, but reluctant regarding the possibility of it being fully grasped, on the other: "What has to be accepted, the given, is – so one could say – forms of life" (Wittgenstein, 2003). With respect to the passage opening the paper, the italicized "understanding" could be read as a clue to the precarious status of understanding.

While it is certainly possible to study another culture and know parts of its tradition, it does not seem that the grounding moment of tradition can be dissolved in an act of understanding.

This aspect appears relevant for intercultural encounters. At this point, we can see that in our encounters with other cultures, we are not only bound to our specific categories of understanding, which make it impossible to encounter the other (culture) outside of this framework. However, what is perhaps of even greater significance is that our idea of cultural encounter is – in a problematic way – dominated by understanding. As a side note, it is interesting that in German, successful communication [*Verständigung*] is conceived in terms of understanding [*Verstehen*]. Since Wittgenstein denies a meta-level discussion regarding language-games, he draws our attention to the fact that understanding is localized, and therefore, is limited when it comes to encountering other cultures.

Returning to the problem of the (in)transparent other, we can now ask whether the parallel to intercultural encounters is plausible. Does the primacy of tradition in some way illuminate the issue of transparency? One would then have to ask what the primacy of thoughts, feelings, intentions, etc. would mean. Posed in this way, the inner/outer model is not what is at issue, but rather the relationship it purports to describe. If a person says that they cannot *know* what I am thinking or feeling, this is not a claim that I am "hiding" something from them (although this could also be the case); rather they are making a remark about an asymmetrical relationship. In a related passage on the same page, Wittgenstein makes the following observation regarding the guessing of other's intentions and actions:

Two points, however, are important: one, that in many cases someone else cannot predict my actions, whereas I foresee them in my intentions; the other, that my prediction (in my expression of intention) has not the same foundation as his prediction of what I shall do, and the conclusions to be drawn from these predictions are quite different (Wittgenstein, 2003).

Thus, it would seem that, according to Wittgenstein, I cannot simply conceive of my thoughts and feelings in terms of understanding. Is there, similar to the instance of intercultural encounter, a grounding moment, which is not at understanding's disposal? It is clear elsewhere that Wittgenstein is critical of a subject that grants meaning and understanding, and thus cannot be considered. The question to be addressed is how this certainty (lack of doubt) regarding my thoughts and feelings -- as *mine* -- is granted. This line of thought gives an entirely new meaning to the issue of transparency as dealt with in the opening passage.

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Wittgenstein, the artistic way of seeing, and the sense of the world

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In proposition 6.421 of the *Tractatus*, in brackets and without providing any explanation, Wittgenstein states that “ethics and aesthetics are one”. In his *Conference on ethics*, the idea is remodelled: Wittgenstein maintains that ethics, understood as research into that which has value, or into the meaning of life, in fact “includes” what he believes to be “the most essential part of what is generally called Aesthetics”. What constitutes this “most essential” part? Why do ethics and aesthetics appear to him to be “one”? What links them together?

Perhaps the use of the word “aesthetics” is deceiving; Wittgenstein was probably not thinking of a philosophical discipline, but of art and art not as an activity aimed at producing particular objects, but rather as a form of vision. In an entry in his *Notebooks 1914-1916* we read: “The work of art is the object seen *sub specie aeternitatis*; and the good life is the world seen *sub specie aeternitatis*. This is the connexion between art and ethics” [Wittgenstein 1961, p. 83e (7.10.16)]. The work of art seems to be the result not of a productive process, but rather of an attitude; it seems that any object can acquire the *status* of a work of art, if it is seen in a certain way – the way qualified by the expression “*sub specie aeternitatis*”. The same seems to be true for the good life; more than the result of particular activities or ways of acting, this seems to be the result of a way of seeing, of the same way of seeing that makes an object a work of art. If we assume that the “good life” is an expression equivalent to “happy life” and that both indicate fundamentally a life that appears meaningful to he who leads it, it may follow from this that art incorporates something like the perspective of sense. I would like to put forward several reflections concerning this connection and what it is grounded on, in part using a comparison which in critical terms is completely extrinsic and yet, I believe, illuminating, between Wittgenstein’s conception of the work of art, as results from several entries in his *Notebooks*, and a particular philosophical interpretation of seventeenth-century Dutch painting. Let us begin with Wittgenstein.

I

Wittgenstein dedicates some particularly evocative observations to (the work of) art. A particularly important one is that whose very Schopenhauerian *incipit* I have just quoted. It goes on as follows: “The usual way of looking at things sees objects as it were from the midst of them, the view *sub specie aeternitatis* from outside. In such a way that they have the whole world as background. Is this it perhaps – in this view the object is seen *together with* space and time instead of *in* space and time? Each thing modifies the whole logical world, the whole of logical space, so to speak. (The thought forces itself upon one): The thing seen *sub specie aeternitatis* is the thing seen together with the whole logical space” (*ibid.*).

The passage presents art and ethics as contexts in which vision *sub specie aeternitatis* is practised and it then tries to clarify the nature of this vision by contrasting it with usual vision. Wittgenstein uses a rather singular expression to define the “usual way of seeing objects”: to see objects *in* space and *in* time is to see them “from the inside”. To see “from the inside” probably means to see things in the context of states, of connections of things, of

which our body is also part and, with it, that which we could call our “empirical I”. On the other hand, the seeing *sub specie aeternitatis* which characterises artistic vision is qualified as a seeing “from the outside”, like a “ripping away” of the thing from the natural context of the state of affairs to which it belongs, from its connection with other objects in time and in space just as with our psychological I, with our desires (cf. Haller 1986, pp. 108-123 and Elliott 2006, pp. 137-154).

Wittgenstein returns to this type of vision in his notes of the following day, clarifying what it involves: “As a thing among things, each thing is equally insignificant; as a world each one equally significant. If I have been contemplating the stove, and then am told: but now all you know is the stove, my result does indeed seem trivial. For this represents the matter as if I had studied the stove as one among the many things in the world. But if I was contemplating the stove *it* was my world, and everything else colourless by contrast with it. (Something good about the whole, but bad in details.) For it is equally possible to take the bare present image as the worthless momentary picture in the whole temporal world, and as the true world among shadows” [Wittgenstein 1961, p. (8.10.16)].

The thing, Wittgenstein seems to be saying, as a thing among things – the stove as one of many objects – remains closed in itself, devoid of meaning; only when it becomes the exclusive object of contemplation does it open itself up, offer itself in its richness of sense. To a transformation in the way of seeing therefore there corresponds a transformation of the object seen, a transformation described in terms of addition of sense. This addition seems to come about because the observer, so to speak, absorbs himself in the object, in such a way that the object, though it be ordinary and habitual, ceases to be an insignificant thing among things and becomes his world. If the entry of August 8th is really a comment on that of the previous day, it does not seem wrong to attribute to Wittgenstein the idea that the artistic gaze renders things significant; but why should it have this capacity? Artistic vision seems to shift the gaze from factuality to the simple subsistence of things, of the world, a subsistence which does not have the nature of fact; this shift, that is to say the seeing of the object not in its ordinary connections with other things, but rather in its simple existence, seems to determine that which Wittgenstein considers to be the miracle, or the wonder of art: “Aesthetically”, he notes, “the miracle (*das künstlerische Wunder*) is that the world exists. That what exists does exist” [*ivi*, p. 86e (20.10.16)]. The meaningfulness revealed by art is thus one and the same with the revelation of the simple existence of things; but where, and how should we understand, in this, the connection with the question of sense and of value, that is, with ethics? That it subsists Wittgenstein confirms in his conversations with Waismann: “For me the facts are unimportant. But what men mean when they say that ‘*The world is there*’ lies close to my heart. I ask Wittgenstein: Is the existence of the world connected with the ethical? Wittgenstein: Men have felt a connection here and have expressed it in this way: God the Father created the world, while God the Son (or the Word proceeding from God) is the ethical. That men have first divided the Godhead and then united it, points to there being a connection here” (Waismann 1965, p. 16).

How the connection of the artistic vision with the theme of sense is to be understood is suggested by the following observation contained in the note of August 20th: "Is the essence of the artistic way of looking at things, that it looks at the world with happy eye? Life is serious, art is gay" (Wittgenstein 1961, p. 86e). Art sees with a happy eye, or rather what makes the difference is not something present in the world, but something in the eye that sees, in the nature of the gaze. The example of the stove is emblematic of the fact that the addition of meaning does not take place by virtue of the object, but thanks rather to the way in which the object is considered. The idea seems to be that sense does not appear from the outside, but only thanks to the involvement of the subject, in so far as he contemplates the stove not as a thing among things, but rather as *his* world. The artistic gaze, we could say, marks the difference between being surrounded by facts and having a world. In it the point is not the response to something that happens, but rather the assumption of the simple existence of things, the amazed attention to the *presence* of things, of the world that *is*. Concerning the suggestion contained in this regarding the question of the sense of the world, there may be a heuristic value in recalling a particular interpretation of the sense of Dutch painting of the seventeenth century. There is indeed, in the attitude considered by Wittgenstein, something very similar to what we find in this painting. In both cases it seems permissible to speak of the artistic way of seeing as a felicitating way of seeing.

II

The above statement rests on an interpretative option which has an important point of reference in Hegel's *Lectures on Aesthetics*. Without going into the details of his interpretation of Dutch painting, it may suffice, to corroborate the hypothesis of an analogy between the way of seeing that it incorporates and that which Wittgenstein attributes to art, to recall perhaps its most determinative element. Hegel stresses the supreme ability of Dutch painting to fix the particular and the momentary: he sees this as "a triumph of art over caducity". The Dutch, he maintains, were not able or did not want to attain, like the Italians, ideal forms or spiritual beauty, but elaborated an expression of the depth of sentiment and the particularity of the individual character, which shows how the individuals depicted also went about their society life, their everyday tasks. Hegel speaks of a feeling "more immersed in the limited", of a "total identification in the *worldly* and the everyday" to which the unfolding of painting in its most varied genres of representation is connected (Hegel 1970, Bd. 15, pp. 124, 127). We read in the *Lectures*: "Precisely this sense of an upright and serene existence is what the Dutch masters also bring to natural objects, adding, in all of their pictorial productions, to their liberty and fidelity of conception, to their love for that which is apparently of little worth and momentary, to the freshness of an open vision and an undisturbed concentration of the whole soul on that which is most closed in on itself and limited, the greatest freedom of artistic composition, a fine sentiment for that too which is secondary, and perfect care in execution" (*ivi*, p. 129).

Hegel stresses how, in the scenes of everyday life, this painting has developed "the magic and the colouristic enchantment of light, illumination, and colouration" and "the entirely living characteristic". This enchantment does not seem unconnected however from that which appears to him to be the theme of Dutch painting: in the representation of "that which is meaningless and

accidental", even the most common scenes "appear so completely penetrated through with pure joy and gaiety, that this joy and gaiety [...] constitute the true object and content [...] it is the Sunday of life which renders all things equal and banishes all evil" (*ivi*, pp. 129-130). Genre painting refrains from representing anything that lies outside the ordinary; it represents individuals involved in their everyday existence and in this it seems to stress the joy of existence. In Dutch painters what is expressed is something like an intense love of life and this not because reality itself is uniformly perfect. As Tzvetan Todorov observes, it is rather the gaze of the painter which, by choosing in the world and transforming it, puts us in contact with beauty; however he does not invent it, he simply discovers it: "Painting is no longer the mirror of beauty, but the source of light that reveals it" (Todorov 2000, pp. 88-89). It is not by chance that the silent admiration that surrounds the praise of the virtues is also found in scenes whose subject is not strictly speaking edifying. The care with which folds of clothing are portrayed or the cleanness of an indoor scene bathed in light, even when what is represented are subjects worthy of condemnation, is tantamount to a praise of the particular and the material. The painter seems to realise that beauty can also be found in the most insignificant object, in the commonest gesture, as long as he is fully able to grasp its quality.

Though within the limits imposed by his systematic construction, Hegel has perhaps come across something important in the message that Dutch painting is sending us. When he speaks of the "triumph of art over the transient and perishable datum of life and nature", he seems to give us to understand that art can raise to the level of beauty even the simplest and most prosaic elements of everyday life. He interpreted this fact as a symptom of romantic interiority, which seeks not so much the objective content valid in itself, but its very reflection, whatever the mirror that produces it. However we evaluate it, one possible lesson to be drawn from Hegel's interpretation of seventeenth-century Dutch painting is the following: nothing is beautiful in itself, but the painter can show that beauty resides even in the most commonplace things, the most ordinary fact. Things seem to be as they were with Wittgenstein's stove: what makes the difference is the gaze. Painters such as Jan Steen, Gabriel Metsu, and Gerard Ter Borch, Pieter De Hooch, and Johannes Vermeer, Rembrandt and Frans Hals help us precisely to discover the beauty of things *in* things, not above or beyond them. One glance is enough to extract it and show it. Hence they teach us to see the world better. The work of art, Wittgenstein was later to write, "forces us – as one might say – to see" the object "in the right perspective but, in the absence of art, the object is just a fragment of nature like any other" (Wittgenstein 1980, p. 4e), it remains part of the accidental "happening and being-so" (*TLP* 6.41).

According to Todorov, Dutch painters were touched by the grace which allowed them to rejoice in the existence of things, to find the sense of the world (of life) in the world itself: they discovered that beauty could inform the totality of existence (cf. Todorov 2000, pp. 115-116). We are not far from the idea of the connection between art and ethics as understood by Wittgenstein.

III

Let us return briefly to Hegel's lectures: in these Dutch painting is connected to the sphere of the romantic form of art which satisfies "the thirst for the present and for reality itself, the contenting oneself with what *exists*, the being satisfied with oneself, with the finitude of man and with what is finite and particular" (Hegel 1970, Bd. 14, p. 196). Hegel speaks of the Sunday of life that renders all equal and that banishes all evil; what follows the Sunday of life however are the working days and for Hegel the romantics were not able to integrate these two antagonistic domains of existence; the question then becomes: how does the reflection of the feast day appear in the days that follow it? What is the relationship between the beauty, the serenity of art and the seriousness of life?

Sebastian Gardner has highlighted the relationship, of both formal analogy and content, which there seems to be between the experience of art and the structure, familiar outside the artistic context, indicated by Wittgenstein's observation: "The world of the happy is quite another than that of the unhappy" (*TLP* 6.43). The formal analogy is that between, respectively, the world of the happy and the unhappy, and the world of art and the experience external to art. The connection of content consists in this: that the problem posed by the difference between happy and unhappy worlds – their mutual exclusion and incomprehensibility – reappears as the problem of relating the experience of art to the rest of our experience, in so far as the experience of art is the experience of the happy man (cf. Gardner 2002, pp. 295-296). Just as there is no identity between happy and unhappy worlds, nor can the distinction between art and ordinary experience collapse, our task is precisely to understand how these antagonistic existential domains can be co-ordinated or can belong to the same totality.

Dutch painting seems to reassure us of the existence of moments of grace in which the beauty of simply being is revealed. For his part Wittgenstein considers that, aesthetically, the miracle is that the world exists; more than a form of integration he seems to be thinking of a sort of gestaltic change, by which, although the facts are the same, yet the world of the happy is quite another than that of the unhappy the world. Everything is as before, nothing has been added or taken away from this change and yet the world has changed *in toto*. Happiness, beauty, sense seem to reside, for Wittgenstein, "in an attitude or style in the acceptance of all the facts" (Murdoch 1993, p. 28). The point is the position taken with respect to the world, facing it as one's own world, a bit like how, in the artistic way of seeing, one is absorbed in the object. This attitude, for Wittgenstein, is not unlike seeing the world, that is to say life, with wonder, like a miracle and not like something merely accidental. Wonder is in fact a sort of response to the particular *non accidentality* with which we grasp the existence of that which exists; this makes it an experience of sense and value, the expression of a form of acceptance of the world, of life. But the wonder for the existence of things seems to be one and the same as that which Wittgenstein calls "art". In this, I believe, the connection between art and ethics which he perceives, has its point.

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A Neo-pragmatist Approach to Intercultural Dialogue and Cosmopolitan Democracy: *a discursive ethics of self-reflexivity*

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1. Introduction

Cultural diversity has traditionally raised two kinds of philosophical concerns. One, epistemological and ontological, regarding the relative superiority or closeness to truth of different normative outlooks and traditions; the other, ethical and political, regarding the proper way to behave towards and co-exist with people following different sets of principles and practices. The traditional philosophical approach to cultural diversity and collective life has been to subordinate the ethical and the political to the epistemological and ontological in two related ways: either through a foundationalist inquiry, typical of metaphysical and religious traditions, aimed at finding that one particular worldview which adheres to how things *really* are and should be and should thus command our allegiance, or by means of a foundational investigation into the ethical and political requirements posed by pluralism and conflict, such as contemporary attempts to derive liberal democratic principles from the presuppositions of rationality (e.g. Gewirth 1978, Habermas 1984)

In what follows I will present an argument for the desirability of an anti-foundationalist approach to cultural difference and intercultural dialogue that gives priority to the ethical and the political over the ontological and the epistemological. It will be formulated in terms of the normative requirements for the fullest realization of the liberal democratic project, when this is adequately conceived. Drawing from both the deliberative turn in democratic theory and the capability approach to human development, I will argue that the normative core of liberal democracy should be the commitment to self-reflexive all-inclusive undistorted practices of collective deliberation and decision-making. By reflecting on the requirements of self-reflexivity we will eventually be able to appreciate that an anti-foundationalist awareness is particularly suitable to bring about the enabling conditions for deliberative democratic and liberal social relations capable to mediate between the universalistic aspirations of human rights and democratic principles and cultural particularism.

Before illustrating the virtuous relationships between an anti-foundationalist conception of normativity and the deliberative core of a genuine liberal democracy, however, I need to present the main tenets of what I regard as a viable anti-foundationalist account of normative validity.

2. A viable anti-foundationalism

Addressing the viability of anti-foundationalism with an eye to liberal democratic values and practices requires showing both the epistemological and political viability of a conception of normativity that rejects the possibility to give absolute foundations to our norms and practices. Defending its epistemological viability amounts to rejecting the charges of radical scepticism and radical relativism, that is, of compromising the normative force of our critical faculties by endorsing the view that *nothing* or *anything* goes. Defending its political viability amounts to answering the charges of *conservative* or *oppressive* ethnocentrism, that is, of closing the door to inter-cultural dialogue and opening them to any kind of oppressive behaviour.

2.1. Epistemic viability

I believe we can find the necessary resources to stop the philosophical pendulum from swinging to and fro between metaphysical realism and radical scepticism and relativism in the pragmatist conception of normativity that can be seen emerging from the dialectical exchange between the two contemporary philosophers that best express the anti-metaphysical and anti-sceptical legacy of the founders of American pragmatism and the second Wittgenstein, that is, Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam.

This conception enables us to appreciate how it is possible to maintain a place for normativity in a disenchanted world. In particular, it offers an anti-foundationalist account of the two necessary moments of normativity, as these have been pointed out by the charges of self-contradiction, violation of law of non-contradiction and erosion of the distinction between *ordo essendi* and *ordo conscendi* traditionally associated to the criticism of relativism and scepticism since its first anti-Protagorean formulation in Plato's *Theaetetus* and in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.

These central dimensions of normativity are conveyed by the universalistic and transcendent aspirations of our normative notions. Taking 'true' as our paradigmatic normative notion, the former dimension of normativity is expressed in our conviction that there is *only one* truth for everyone at any place and time, that "truth is expected to be stable and 'convergent'" (Putnam 1981, p.56), and therefore that, as Rorty (1998a, p.2) puts it "'true for me, but not for you' and 'true then, but not now' are weird and pointless notions." The latter dimension is expressed by Putnam's application of the 'naturalistic fallacy' argument to the notion of truth (Putnam 1978), which shows what Rorty (1991c p.128) calls its 'cautionary use', namely that we can always make cautionary claims such as 'we *think* p is true but *may not be* true.'

The anti-foundationalist view of normativity emerging from the work of the two American neo-pragmatists enables us to account for the universalistic and transcendent moments behind the normative force of our critical faculties by tracing two key distinctions: between universal *ground for* and universal *scope of* normativity, and between transcendence as *self-reflexivity* and as *self-transcendence*. I will expand briefly on these distinctions after having introduced the more fundamental distinction between *physical* and *grammatical* impossibility, on the basis of which only we can appreciate the full significance of the anti-foundationalist rejection of the project of metaphysics.

2.1.1. Grammatical vs. physical impossibility

The Wittgensteinian expression 'grammatical impossibility' conveys the consideration that the impossibility of the foundationalist project of metaphysics should not be regarded as due to some physical deficit in our human cognitive setting, but as inherent to the very concept of reality towards which it aims in its search for certainty. The epistemic assurance which the project of metaphysics has always been after could be offered, in fact, only by a reality

that *by definition* is placed beyond our cognitive reach, for this is supposed to be 'a reality which exists independently of any thought and experience' (Williams 1978, p.64).

With this grammatical awareness we can then start appreciating that it is only if we conceive of the impossibility of metaphysics as of the physical order, and thus still remain in the grasp of the received view of normativity validity as adherence to the dictates of reality as it is 'in itself', that from the rejection of possibility to reach the God's-eye view of that reality we will be led to radical sceptic or relativist corrosive conclusions (see for instance Putnam 1990: 22, Rorty 1991b: 202). If, instead, we break free from the metaphysical framework altogether and endorse a pragmatist view of normativity that places the source of normative authority in that same dimension of practice, laden with our values, needs and interests, which foundationalists attempt to transcend, we are able to avoid the traps of scepticism and relativism.

We come to realize that metaphysical neutrality does not have to entail normative neutrality; that normative validity does not have to rest on transcendent ground; that the fact that our views, principles and practices ultimately rest on some ungrounded set of fundamental – yet *not foundational* – beliefs and values, is not an impediment to the exercise of our reflective and critical faculties, to the formation of more or less precise ideas of what is right and wrong, better and worst in any circumstance of our lives. It is on the basis of this *epistemic* ethnocentrism that Rorty and Putnam are capable to account for the universalistic and transcendent aspirations of normativity without having to give in to metaphysical realism.

2.1.2. Ground vs. scope

The two neo-pragmatists enable us freeing the universalistic aspiration of our normative notions from the metaphysical grasp by helping us distinguish between the *ground for* and the *scope* of normativity. With this distinction in mind we can finally realize that the fact that we cannot have universal *ground for* our views and practices does not mean that we cannot or should not hold them to be valid, and thus *apply*, universally. As Putnam (2002: 45) puts it, 'recognizing that our judgments claim objective validity and recognizing that they are shaped by a particular culture are not incompatible'; for, as Rorty (1998a: 2) points out, "granted that 'true' is an absolute term, its conditions of application will always be relative." Normative claims, then, are indeed universal, but their universality is culturally grounded, not metaphysical. They are universal in *scope* not in *ground*.

Thanks to this distinction we are in a position to answer both the charge of self-contradiction and the more general criticism of violation of the law of non-contradiction. On the one side, in fact, we are able to see that a coherent anti-foundationalist will assert that anti-foundationalism is the correct epistemology (the *universally valid* one) *only* according to (on the *ground of*) its ethnocentric view of normativity, that is, on ethnocentric grounds. Equally, we can see that anti-foundationalists have no problems in acknowledging that foundationalists are legitimated in maintaining that the *universally valid* conception of normativity is the metaphysical one, yet only on the ground of *their* foundationalist standpoint. From the anti-foundationalist standpoint the foundationalist conception of normative validity remains a *grammatical* impossibility.

On the other side, we are able to understand that it is only if we blur the distinction between 'scope of' and

'ground for' normativity, as it is usually conveyed in our normative language by the distinct expressions '*true for*' and '*true according to*', that from a circumstance of normative conflict we will be led to the contradictory statement that '*p* is true *for you* (*not according to you*) and *non-p* is true *for me* (*not according to me*)', intending with it to say '*p* is *at the same time – on the same ground* – both true (for you) and false (for me)'. If, however, we observe the above conceptual and linguistic distinctions our inference from '*p* is true for A' and '*p* is false for B' to '*p* is both true and false' will have to be reformulated as follows: '*p* is true *for everyone according to A*' and '*p* is false *for everyone according to B*', therefore '*p* is *universally true according to A* and *universally false according to B*'. No contradiction is involved here, but only a conflict of standards of normative validity; and the acknowledgement of disagreement, no matter how fundamental, is surely not the same as radical relativism. Indeed, normative disagreement presupposes the normative force of our critical faculties rather than corroding it.

2.1.3. Self-transcendence vs. self-reflexivity

Such an ethnocentric epistemology not only does not violate the law of non-contradiction and does not contradict itself, it also maintains intact the distinction between *ordo essendi* and *ordo conoscendi* that anti-foundationalism is typically criticised of dissolving. The valuable contribution of the two American neo-pragmatists here lies in their distinction between *current* justificatory practices and practices of justification *tout court*, as formulated for instance in Putnam's description of the first of the two key ideas of his idealization theory of truth (Putnam 1981: 56) and in Rorty's account of the cautionary use we make of 'true' and all normative notions in general (1998b: 22).¹

The two American neo-pragmatists by distinguishing between justification *hic et nunc* and justification *sans phrase* allow us to appreciate that the transcendent dimension of normativity does not require us 'to step outside our skins and compare ourselves with something absolute' (Rorty 1982: xix), but only entails our capacity to 'get beyond our present practices by a gesture in the direction of our possibly different future practices' (Rorty 1998c: 61). They allow us to appreciate that 'reason is both immanent (not to be found outside of concrete language games and institution) and transcendent (a regulative idea that we use to criticize the conduct of all activities and institutions)' (Putnam 1983: 234).

With this distinction in mind we can understand that the circumstance that we can always make cautionary claims of the sort 'you *think* p is true, but it *may not be true*' does not require relying on the metaphysical distinction between reality 'in itself' and appearance. We do indeed distinguish between 'thinking that x is y' and 'x being y', but this distinction can only make sense if made from within concrete practices of justification, current ethnocentric

¹ The two key ideas of Putnam's idealization theory of truth are:

1) truth is independent of justification here and now, but not independent of all justification. To claim a statement is true is to claim it could be justified
2) truth is expected to be stable and 'convergent'; if both a statement and its negation could be 'justified', even if conditions were as ideal as one could hope to make them, there is no sense in thinking of the statement as having a truth-value (Putnam 1981: 56)

The second idea can indeed be read as expressing what I have called the universalistic dimension of normativity. Rorty's endorsement of the first idea can be evinced from his claim that "the entire force of the cautionary use of 'true' is to point out that justification is relative to an audience and that we can never exclude the possibility that some better audience might exist, or come to exist, to whom a belief that is justifiable to us would not be justifiable. But as Putnam's 'naturalistic fallacy' argument shows, there can be no such thing as an 'ideal audience' before which justification would be sufficient to ensure truth, any more that there can a largest integer" (Rorty 1998b: 22).

practices of right and wrong. It cannot be applied meaningfully to whole practices of justification, for, on the anti-foundationalist view, there is no other reality or standard of justification to resort to in our attempts at proving the truth of our overall normative settings than the very one conveyed by our whole set of normative standards and justificatory practices itself.

From this epistemic ethnocentric consideration, however, we should not be misled to conclude that we cannot endorse a self-reflexive stance toward our current normative settings, and thus that we are trapped within our normative traditions. According to the anti-foundationalist predicament we surely can reform and change our practices of justification in any of their part whenever there is need to, but like the seamen on Neurath's boat, *only* afloat and piecemeal, always having to stand on some part of it in order not to sink into unintelligibility (Neurath 1959). In this way, through a continuous process of piecemeal reform, we might even end up within a normative standpoint fundamentally different from the one we started with. But, still, we will be making our normative judgements from within a particular, ultimately circular, practice of justification.

The transcendence of normative validity, then, amounts to the self-reflexive use of our critical faculties. This self-reflexivity, however, cannot make us transcend the whole set of values and beliefs that at any point in time constitutes our normative way to look at and behave in the world, for, as Putnam insists, even though 'traditions can be *criticized*' "talk of what is 'right' and 'wrong' in any area only makes sense against the background of an *inherited tradition*" (ibid).

2.2. Political viability

Critics of such an *ethnocentric universalistic* and *immanent transcendentalist* epistemology at this point usually turn from the charge of relativism to that of ethnocentrism. With this charge they intend to accuse anti-foundationalism either for closing the doors to inter-cultural dialogue or opening them to any kind of oppressive and illiberal conduct. It is their conviction that the above ethnocentric defence of an anti-foundationalist epistemology, even if were capable to save our critical faculties from the self-stultifying consequences of radical scepticism and relativism, would condemn us to the worrisome and threatening situation in which everyone would be and feel so entrenched in their points of view and traditions that, at best, they will arrogantly remain deaf to the voices of the 'other' and, at worst, they will aggressively try to impose on others their own views and practices.

This critique, however, is misplaced as it rests on a crucial confusion between *epistemic* and *moral* ethnocentrism. It is intended to be a moral critique of a certain attitude one may have towards oneself and the others, while the ethnocentric dimension highlighted by anti-foundationalism is exclusively of an epistemological order, and as such it remains silent on the normative directions we should follow in our relations with the others and ourselves. The recognition of the inexorable circularity of our justificatory practices has, in fact, no moral and political significance. Anti-foundationalism is a *meta-normative* view, a view about the epistemic status of our justificatory practices, about *how* we justify our normative stances, and as such does not entail any *substantial* normative commitment.

As Rorty and Putnam reminded us, there is no reason why the rejection of metaphysical transcendence

and universality should condemn us either to live in 'individualist [or cultural] solipsistic hells' (Putnam 1981: 216) 'trapped within our monad or our language' (Rorty 1991b: 204) or to be 'viciously ethnocentric' (Rorty, 1991b, p.208) in our relations with our fellow human beings, preventing us from being able 'to engage in a truly human dialogue' (Putnam 1981: 216). In particular, anti-foundationalism, by claiming that we cannot avoid being ethnocentric in our justificatory practices, does not deprive us of the possibility, the *choice*, to endorse a critical stance towards our own points of view and traditions, do our best to overcome a situation of deaf assertion and counter-assertion, open ourselves to other cultures, and commit ourselves to civil practices of conflict resolution that respect everyone's freedom and equality. It only highlights the moral and political dimension of this choice, showing that it has nothing to do with our epistemological or ontological views, but only with our moral, sensibilities, stances and commitments.

So far, of course, I have not put forth a *definitive* argument in favour of anti-foundationalism. I have only shown that an anti-foundationalist conception of normativity such as that put forth by Rorty and Putnam is epistemically and politically viable. Indeed it was part of our argument that a coherent anti-foundationalism should not be expected to present justifications proving its *absolute* validity. However, I believe to be possible to formulate an argument in its favour in terms of its desirability for liberal democratic morality and politics. I will maintain that there are good reasons to believe that the spreading of anti-foundationalist awareness would facilitate the fuller realization of the liberal democratic project, at all levels of governance. It is time then to outline my view of the normative core of a genuine liberal democracy.

3. The normative core of liberal democracy

The liberal democratic tradition cannot be considered the expression of a clearly defined project characterised by a precise and unquestioned set of values, principles, practices and institutions. There has always been disagreement amongst its supporters on the defining characteristics of its political and moral project, on the content and relative priority of its central values of freedom and equality, as well as on the form of the practices and institutions that should implement them. So we should expect any particular view of the liberal democratic project to be the expression of a prior normative stance.

My reading of its normative core starts from the appreciation of the equal worth of all human beings, and, following a strand in liberal theory tracing back to Immanuel Kant (1964), from a conception of human dignity centred on people's capability to autonomously confer worth to and pursue alternative life projects. Considering that the exercise of individual autonomy so conceived requires the material, social and institutional pre-conditions for both the exercise of one's freedom of choice and action and the capacity to shape the circumstances affecting one's own context of choice and action we are led to the affirmation of familiar civil, social, and political rights.

The appreciation of individual autonomy as a fundamental human right, in fact, on the one side, leads us to claim the universal right to the necessary material and social conditions for successful autonomous agency, such as a certain amount of well-being and freedom (Gewirth 1978). On the other side, it leads us to the deliberative democratic principle of political legitimacy according to

which only those norms and practices can be deemed politically legitimate which are the result of *free* and *fair* processes of public decision-making that include *all* who will *significantly* bear the consequences of their implementation (Habermas 1984).

I hasten to make clear that this derivation of the principle of popular sovereignty and of fundamental human rights from the analysis of the presuppositions of an autonomous life should not be considered, *pace* Habermas and Gewirth, as a resolution of the Humean divide between 'ought' and 'is' by means of a transcendental justification of liberal and democratic principles from the general features of autonomous action, be it conceived of as inherently teleological or communicative (see Gewirth 1978: 28, 3; Habermas 1990: 75-6). The problem with trying to bridge the Humean divide by means of pragmatic-transcendental arguments is that, in Kantian terms, the imperative force of the necessary conditions for rational action is not categorical but conditional on the absolute normatively binding nature of rational action itself. Yet neither Gewirth nor Habermas ever show the absolute rational constringency of their fundamental normative commitment to teleological or communicative autonomy, and indeed this is what from an anti-foundationalist perspective we should expect they would not be able to do.

Nonetheless, once we have endorsed as our fundamental, ethnocentric, commitment the respect and promotion of everyone's autonomy in both its liberal and democratic dimensions, then, Gewirth and Habermas are correct, for that endorsement to be coherent and genuine we must commit ourselves to free and fair conditions of inclusive decision-making and free and fair conditions of living. This means that democratic and liberal rights, as Habermas (1996) and Sen (1999) have correctly observed, co-originate from the principle of individual autonomy, and it is by reflecting on the implications of the process of co-determination entailed in this co-origination that we can establish what I believe should be the fundamental ethos of a liberal democratic society; and eventually grasp the desirability of an anti-foundationalist approach to normativity.

On the one side, the priority given to the respect of individual autonomy tells us that there should be constitutional limits to the political and moral legitimacy of the outcomes reached by collective decision-making. On the other side, though, the same commitment to individual autonomy tells us that there is no other acceptable way to determine the content of the fundamental constitutional rights a society should uphold, as well as the criteria of undistorted conditions of public discourse and the boundaries of the legitimate *demos* admitted to participate in decision-making, except through un-distorted, all-inclusive and constitutionally bound deliberations.

This entanglement of the two normative components of liberal democracy, individual liberties and democratic sovereignty, thus constrain us in a regressive circle of liberal democratic deliberations over the terms and conditions of liberal democratic decision-making and co-existence. This circle – and indeed any pervasive normative conflict in general, such as that over the correct interpretation of the values of liberty and equality and their reciprocal trade-offs – cannot be broken without either relapsing into foundationalism, by drawing the content of constitutional rights once and for all, or violating someone's freedom and equality by conferring a privileged decisional authority to a particular person or group of persons.

It is precisely by attempting to address in the full respect of everyone's autonomy this regressive circularity, and all pervasive normative conflict in general, that we can bring to the fore the fundamental normative commitment of liberal democracy. We come to appreciate, in fact, that in order to give equal consideration to the voices of all those relevantly affected by public decisions, and thus avoid risking that legitimate claims to freedom, equality and fundamental rights are left unheard, unacknowledged and unsatisfied, a political community should be ready to keep open to public discussion and revision the outcomes of its deliberation, its procedural rules and constitutional rights, as well as its conditions of political membership. That is, a focus on individual autonomy in both its liberal and democratic dimensions should make us appreciate that it is a requirement of a genuine liberal democratic society that it should conceive of itself as a *self-reflexive* community committed to the *never-ending* project of devising, through the un-distorted, all-inclusive and *open-ended* confrontation of its members' convictions the most appropriate institutions and principles for the respect of everyone's autonomy; and therefore that it should avoid conceiving of its particular practices and institutions as just *sub specie aeternitatis*, and thus immune from revision.²

It is only by keeping collective debate on matters of public concerns open, and thus avoiding treating some of its outcomes and principles as immune from criticism, that we will be able to keep the Enlightenment's project of self-emancipation and human rights alive, to keep fighting against old and new instances of prejudice and oppression, and find new solutions to the never-ending structural tensions between individual and collective autonomy, freedom and equality, universalism and particularism, the rights of man and of the citizen. Indeed, the moral and political project of the Enlightenment can be kept alive only if we drop its foundationalist epistemological project; only, that is, if we arrive at conceiving of rationality as an immanent *ethos* of collective behaviour rather than a transcendent methodology of knowledge; the liberal democratic *ethos* of the 'never-ending', self-reflexive, reasonable give and take of reasons.

4. The desirability of anti-foundationalism for liberal democracy

It is by reflecting on the normative requirements set by this ethos of reasonableness as self-reflexive practices of collective debate and deliberation that we can appreciate how an anti-foundationalist awareness is particularly suited to, if not required by, a democratic liberal culture. This desirability of anti-foundationalism for liberal democracy comes in two ways, a 'destructive' and a 'constructive' one.

As for the former, anti-foundationalism denying that any particular practice has an absolute epistemic authority over all the others, as well as reminding us of the contingency of our convictions and practices, and thus that every consensus reached is only a temporary resting-point prone to turn into oppressive *status quo*, exhorts liberal

² For similar self-reflexive ways to accommodate, from a deliberative democratic perspective, proceduralism with constitutionalism and collective with individual autonomy see Guttman & Thompson 1996, 2004; Cohen 1996; Benhabib 1996, 2002; and Habermas 2004. See Mouffe 1993 and 2000 for a similar view of the inherent un-finishable nature of the liberal-democratic project – what she calls 'the democratic paradox' – and a similar self-reflexive conception of how to cope with it. I also believe that Etienne Balibar's reflections on the entanglement of freedom and equality, rights of man and rights of the citizens, and universalism and racism, leads him to the same conception of the normative core of liberal democracy (see Balibar 1994).

democrats to keep the outcomes and procedures of collective deliberation open to dissent and revision, permitting them to *remove* the epistemic obstacles to the free questioning of received opinions and institutions and to a fair consideration of all points of view. Foundationalism, instead, with its idea that there is a particular point of view that ought to be given absolute authority because of its correspondence with the metaphysical order of things, compromises the realization of free and fair conditions of inquiry, it closes public conversation, even the conversation within liberal democracy, thus betraying the ethos of a genuine liberal democratic society.

The 'destructive' way in which anti-foundationalism is desirable to the liberal democratic project consists thus in removing the epistemic obstacles to the creation of a non-authoritarian and progressive society. The second, 'constructive' way can be appreciated once we consider that, by placing the source of normative authority in the dimension of practice rather than of theory, and thus stressing the necessary role played by our values, needs and interests in shaping the normative structure of our thought and actions, anti-foundationalism makes us recognise that the resolution of normative conflict do not make appeal to our *cognitive faculty* to look at how things *really* are and should be, but rather to our *moral* and *political sensitivity and commitment*.

Hence, by bringing to the fore the volitional nature of normative conflict, anti-foundationalism helps us both *facing our responsibility* in the creation and support of a liberal democratic culture, and *refocusing our energies* on the only means by which we could ever bring about political and social change, i.e. political will and concrete reformist commitment. It makes us realize that, lacking of the possibility to resort to a transcendent order antecedently given to us, there is no other way to combat oppressive social relations and foster individual autonomy than by *engaging* ourselves in the difficult, dangerous and never-ending *practical* and *political* effort of bringing into existence and defending the right institutions, values and sensibilities for a just society of free and equal persons. This is the practical and political effort of replacing *reasonable conversation* for both, *rational confrontation* with a reality beyond humanity and *violent confrontation* with our fellow human beings, as means of accommodating diversity and managing conflict.

5. The challenges of globalisation: clash of civilisations and democratic deficit

I have illustrated why a conception of normativity that, acknowledging the ineluctable role that is played by our contingent values and interests in shaping our normative outlooks, emancipates morality and politics from epistemology and metaphysics is particularly valuable for the realization of the liberal democratic project, when this is conceived as centred on open-ended all-inclusive practices of deliberation as necessary means for the fullest respect of everyone's autonomy. These virtues are coming especially to the fore in the current era of globalisation, in which liberal democracy is faced with the double challenge of accommodating its universalistic aspirations with the particularistic claims for recognition and autonomy of different communities and of bridging the democratic gaps produced by the corrosion of the domestic/foreign frontier and the asymmetry between decision-makers and decision-bearers.

My contention is that that the anti-foundationalist opposition to essentialism, in both its universalistic and particularistic forms (e.g. the *Moral* law, the force of *Reason*, or the Will of *God* or *National* sovereignty, *Cultural* self-determination), and the liberal democratic commitment to submit decisions of public interests to self-reflexive and un-distorted debate and deliberation among all those who will bear the consequences of their implementation, enable us both to stretch and deepen liberal democratic practices across and within national borders so as to deal with the reconfiguration of state sovereignty and the diffusion of governance, as well as to alleviate the tensions between contemporary opposite processes of integration and fragmentation and thus deal with contemporary threats to international peace and security.

The recognition of the contingency of moral and political projects, both in their universalistic and particularistic form, and of the moral and political primacy of individual autonomy enables us to realise that there is no pre-determinate place or form for liberal democracy, that liberal democratic principles should be applied anywhere a decision of public interest is being made, anywhere the consequences of power are felt, and take whatever form and content satisfies the autonomous will of the people affected by the exercise of power, *regardless* of national and cultural borders and foundationalist injunctions.

It further enables us to neutralize two crucial factors behind the exacerbation of cultural conflicts and most violations of democratic principles and internationally recognized human rights, namely the foundationalist rhetoric which is behind most of the imperialist and oppressive practices that human history has witnessed and is continuing to witness today – included those conducted in the name of freedom and democracy itself – and the cultural relativist rhetoric behind most of the violations of human rights that – alas – are undertaken under the seemingly liberal democratic banner of collective rights to self-determination and cultural autonomy. This is vital in order to restore and win people's trust in the ethics and politics of democracy and human rights, dissociating their normative content from their misuses.

An anti-foundationalist and deliberative perspective also contributes in strengthening the emerging 'human security' and 'responsibility to protect' paradigm in international security and development discourse, pointing liberal democrats the way towards dealing, in the full respect of individual and collective autonomy, with the challenges posed by growing requests of humanitarian intervention, where the tensions between the universalistic and particularistic aspirations of liberal democracy reach their climax.

The anti-foundationalist and deliberative approach to these challenges to political legitimacy and human rights in a globalizing world point towards the same direction, namely, that of bringing back the important choices affecting our lives into the arena of political confrontation. It is exactly by strengthening public spheres, revitalising civil society and empowering individuals through the remittance of the last judgment on policy-choices to the result of a free, fair, and self-reflexive debate among all interested sectors and individuals of transnational society, that we are able to accommodate cosmopolitanism with multiculturalism, to break the arbitrary territorial and ethnocentric cages in which democratic citizenship has been traditionally constrained, opening ourselves to multi-layered, non-territorial and inclusive systems of

governance cutting across all levels and spheres of social organisation, and to refocus the normative priority of global politics from the needs of *raison d'état* and the market to the preconditions of human dignity.

Anti-foundationalist deliberative liberal democracy will surely not extinguish cultural and political conflicts and the difficulties of elaborating and implementing appropriate democratic practices. Yet, I believe it represents our best hope for civilising those conflicts and keeping bridging democratic deficits wherever they appear. It represents our best hope for replacing violent and deaf confrontation with peaceful and fruitful conversation across differences, and making democracy and human rights follow the steps of economic and cultural globalisation. Our best hope for starting building a common ground for cross-cultural debate and cosmopolitan citizenship, and keeping the Enlightenment's project of human rights and emancipation alive

Aber der Löwe spricht eben nicht! Anmerkungen zu einer Kontroverse

Thomas Wachtendorf, Oldenburg, Germany

1. Einleitung

Liest man die Bemerkung "Wenn ein Löwe sprechen könnte, wir könnten ihn nicht verstehen" (Wittgenstein ¹²1999: 568) im zweiten Teil der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*, stellt sich die Frage, wie diese Behauptung zu interpretieren ist. Besonders im Kontext mit dem kurz zuvor stehenden "Wir können uns nicht in sie finden." (Wittgenstein ¹²1999: 568) Wittgenstein behauptet dies von Menschen, die in ein Land mit völlig fremden Traditionen kommen und die dort lebenden Menschen nicht verstehen, obwohl sie deren Landessprache beherrschen. Nicht zuletzt diese beiden Bemerkungen haben eine Diskussion ausgelöst, inwieweit gegenseitiges Verstehen überhaupt möglich ist. Innerhalb der Wittgensteinschen Philosophie wird diese Diskussion im Zusammenhang mit den Termini *Lebensform* und *gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise* geführt. Es besteht Uneinigkeit darüber, wie viele Lebensformen und Handlungsweisen es gibt, und was das spezifisch menschliche daran ist. Beispielsweise ist Garver (Garver 1984) der Auffassung, dass es nur eine Lebensform gäbe, demgegenüber Haller (Haller 1984, später mit Einschränkungen: Haller 1999) die Existenz mehrerer Lebensformen behauptet.

Klärungsbedürftig ist, ob sich bestimmte Lebensformen tatsächlich nicht verstehen *können*, und wie dieses *können* aufzufassen ist: logisch oder faktisch. Im ersten Fall wäre ein gegenseitiges Verstehen grundsätzlich ausgeschlossen; im letzteren dagegen unter bestimmten Bedingungen möglich. Eine Darstellung der Bedingungen gegenseitigen Verstehens im Rahmen der Wittgensteinschen Philosophie soll eine Antwort auf diese Frage ermöglichen und wird zugleich zeigen, dass die Frage nach der Anzahl der Lebensformen oder Handlungsweisen hierfür nicht entscheidend ist.

Dazu ist zunächst zu klären, was eine *Lebensform* wesentlich ausmacht und wie ihr Verhältnis zu der *gemeinsamen menschlichen Handlungsweise* ist.

2. Sprachspiele

Das Wesentliche des *Sprachspiel*-Begriffes ist, dass er auf die Verwobenheit von Handeln und Sprechen hinweist: "Das Wort Sprachspiel« soll hier hervorheben, daß das Sprechen der Sprache ein Teil ist einer Tätigkeit [...]" (Wittgenstein ¹²1999: §23) Sprache könnte nicht verwendet werden – sie wäre bedeutungslos – wenn ihr keine Handlungen zugrunde lägen. Das hinreichend bekannte Beispiel der Bauenden zu Beginn der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* illustriert diesen Zusammenhang. Kurz gefasst gehört zu einem Sprachspiel wesentlich, dass die Sprachspielenden durch und während des Vollzuges von Handlungen Regeln für die Verwendung der Wörter aufstellen und deren Einhaltung zugleich überwachen.

Sprachspiele lassen sich in zwei Typen klassifizieren: primitive und elaborierte. Primitive Sprachspiele sind letztlich an (den Sprachspielenden bekannten oder unbekanntem) Mittel-Zweck-Relationen

orientiert, wie das etwa bei den Bauenden, die ein Haus bauen wollen, der Fall ist. Am Fuße ihres Sprachspiels liegt ein primitives, zunächst noch unreflektiertes Verhalten. "Was aber will hier das Wort »primitiv« sagen? Doch wohl, daß die Verhaltensweise *vorsprachlich* ist: daß ein Sprachspiel *auf ihr* beruht, daß sie das Prototyp einer Denkweise ist und nicht das Ergebnis des Denkens." (Wittgenstein ⁹2002: Nr. 541) Diese Sprachspiele stehen üblicherweise direkt im Zusammenhang mit dem unmittelbaren Lebensvollzug.

Auf diesen primitiven Sprachspielen ruhen die so genannten elaborierten. Sie sind in dem Sinne des letzten Zitats nicht mehr Prototyp des Denkens, sondern dessen Ergebnis. Damit ist nichts anderes gemeint, als dass elaborierte Sprachspiele aus einer Reflexion auf das den primitiven Sprachspielen zu Grunde liegende Verhalten hervorgehen. Die meisten unserer Sprachspiele sind elaboriert.

Eine Konsequenz der Sprachspiel-Philosophie ist, dass die *Bedeutung* von Wörtern als ihr Gebrauch in der Sprache (Wittgenstein ¹²1999: §43) und nicht etwa als Übereinstimmung mit der Welt definiert wird. Diese Tatsache ist dem Umstand geschuldet, dass Handeln und Sprechen sich wechselseitig bedingen. Durch das Verhalten, das als Reaktion auf die Gegebenheit der Welt geschieht, wird in den primitiven Sprachspielen die Bedeutung der Wörter festgelegt, mit denen später in den elaborierten Sprachspielen wiederum die Welt begrifflich geordnet wird. Deshalb kann die Sprache die Welt nicht letztgültig korrekt abbilden. Denn dazu müsste der Sprechende aus der Sprache heraus treten. Aber: "Gesprochenes kann man nur durch die Sprache erklären, darum kann man die Sprache (in diesem Sinne) nicht erklären." (Wittgenstein 2000: 16) Die Sprache bleibt das Vorauszusetzende, das selber keine Rechenschaft gegenüber der Welt schuldig ist. Daraus folgt ein unauflösbarer Zirkel: Denn eine solche Rechtfertigung könnte nur in einer Beschreibung der Welt, wie sie tatsächlich ist, bestehen. So eine Beschreibung kann aber gerade nicht gegeben werden, weil sie nur vermittels einer Sprache gegeben werden könnte. Wittgenstein formuliert den Zirkel so: "Die Sprache, in der wir die Regeln der Grammatik unserer Sprache zu rechtfertigen versuchen könnten, müßte ihrerseits eine Grammatik haben. Keine Beschreibung der Welt kann die Regeln der Grammatik rechtfertigen." (Wittgenstein ²2000: 66)

3. Gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise

Die Bestimmung dessen, was Wittgenstein die *gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise* (Wittgenstein ¹²1999: §206) nennt, kann aus den vorgenannten Gründen nicht empirisch geschehen. Jede empirische Bestimmung geschieht schließlich nur durch das Filter der vorhandenen Sprache. Dadurch bleibt ein solcher Bestimmungsversuch immer innerhalb der Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Grammatik der Sprache. Wittgenstein sagt zwar, dass man die *gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise* so beschreiben könnte, dass man alle

menschlichen Handlungen angebe, und dass “[...] das ganze Gewimmel der menschlichen Handlungen der Hintergrund [sei], worauf wir jede Handlung sehen [...]” (Wittgenstein 2002: Nr. 567). Jedoch müsste diese Bestimmung notwendig ungenügend bleiben, weil es unmöglich ist, alle menschlichen Handlungen tatsächlich anzugeben, und außerdem die Abgrenzung etwa von nicht-menschlichen Handlungsweisen schwer fällt. Wir sähen auch nur die in der Welt manifestierten, für den definitorischen Zweck irrelevanten Folgen der gemeinsamen menschliche Handlungsweise, nicht aber ihren wesentlichen Kern. Dieser ist nur grammatisch-idealtypisch bestimmbar und tritt so an die Stelle einer klassischen anthropologische Konstante.

Selbst wenn wir alle menschlichen Handlungen beschreiben könnten und das auch täten, stießen wir dadurch nicht zu einer eigentlichen Bestimmung der gemeinsamen menschlichen Handlungsweise vor, weil wir eben die Grenzen der Grammatik unserer Sprache nicht verlassen können. Die Bestimmung der gemeinsamen menschlichen Handlungsweise kann also nur grammatisch geschehen. Die meines Erachtens einzige Möglichkeit einer Bestimmung kann als nicht weiter begründbare *Gleichheit* in Bezug auf bestimmte Handlungsweisen erfolgen. Eine fundamentale gemeinsame Handlungsweise ermöglicht erst die Sprachspielpraxis. Dass tatsächlich eine gleiche Handlungsweise besteht, zeigt die Tatsache der Erfahrung, dass sich Sprecher verstehen.

Im Anschluss an diese Bestimmung ist es nicht mehr nötig, von einer gemeinsamen *menschlichen* Handlungsweise zu sprechen, sondern vielmehr von einer gemeinsamen Handlungsweise. Um die Existenz einer gemeinsamen Handlungsweise erklären zu können, ist zwar die Annahme einer gemeinsamen *Naturgeschichte* notwendig, diese kann aber ihrerseits nicht letztgültig empirisch, sondern nur grammatisch bestimmt werden. (Vgl. dazu: Schulte 2000)

4. Lebensform

Der in den Philosophischen Untersuchungen eingeführte Begriff der Lebensform ist notorisch schwer zu bestimmen, wie unzählige diesbezügliche Aufsätze zeigen. Er steht in einem bestimmten Verhältnis zur gemeinsamen Handlungsweise, das jedoch nicht darin besteht, dass ein Schluss von dieser auf das Wesen der Lebensform möglich wäre.

Stattdessen lässt sich aus der Sprachpraxis – dem tatsächlichen Sprechen einer Sprache – ein Licht auf die Lebensform des Menschen werfen: “[...] in der Sprache stimmen die Menschen überein. Dies ist keine Übereinstimmung der Meinungen, sondern der Lebensform.” (Wittgenstein 1999: §241) An anderer Stelle: “Und eine Sprache vorstellen heißt, sich eine Lebensform vorstellen.” (Wittgenstein 1999: §19) Die obigen Ausführungen zur Sprachabhängigkeit unseres Weltbezugs und der Verwobenheit von Sprechen und Handeln verdeutlichen, warum Sprachpraxis notwendig ist, um verschiedene Handlungsweisen überhaupt erkennen, vielleicht sogar überhaupt erst ausprägen zu können (beispielsweise lügen, versprechen). Bestimmte gemeinsame Handlungsweisen hängen in dieser Weise von der Lebensform der Sprachpraxis ab, aus der ja darüber hinaus folgt, dass es Regelmäßigkeit und mehrere Sprecher geben muss. Zwar behauptet von Savigny in diesem Zusammenhang: “[d]ie Lesart »die Lebensform des Sprachverwendens« ist ausgeschlossen” (von

Savigny 1996: 76), weist stattdessen aber kurz darauf Regelmäßigkeit zwischen Lauten und Handlungen (also eine Sprache zu haben) als eine gemeinsame Handlungsweise aus (von Savigny 1996: 88f). Eine Sprache zu haben ist aber laut §207 (Wittgenstein 1999) gerade kein Teil der gemeinsamen Handlungsweise. Dort erwähnt Wittgenstein Menschen, die “gewöhnlichen menschlichen [In diesem Kontext: mit uns gemeinsamen, T.W.] Tätigkeiten” nachgehen, die aber keine Sprache besitzen. Er betont sogar an anderer Stelle: “Und doch könnte es ja solche, im übrigen menschliche, Wesen geben.” (Wittgenstein 2002: Nr. 390). Folglich kann eine Sprache tatsächlich zu sprechen nicht notwendig eine gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise sein, sondern erst eine Folge der Lebensform der Sprachspielpraxis.

5. Verstehen

Ausgehend von diesen Vorbemerkungen, kann nun der Versuch einer Charakterisierung der Besonderheiten des Verstehens unternommen werden. Zunächst ist zwischen zwei Arten des Verstehens zu unterscheiden:

(a) Sprachverstehen

Man versteht eine Sprache, wenn man die Regeln der anderen Sprache erlernen und deren Wörter richtig gebrauchen kann. Für dieses Verstehen ist an erster Stelle eine gemeinsame Lebensform der Sprachpraxis Voraussetzung. Diese teilt, wer jeweils eine Sprache spricht. Sprache ist in diesem Sinne zuallererst als regelgeleitete Kommunikation (Wittgenstein 1999: §207) zu verstehen, durch Reflexion auf deren Regeln die Möglichkeit besteht, zu elaborierten Sprachspielen zu gelangen. Eine solche Sprache ist für uns aufgrund ihrer Regelmäßigkeit erlernbar. Wer immer eine Sprachpraxis hat, kann die Sprache von anderen (weil sie ebenfalls eine Sprachpraxis haben) prinzipiell verstehen. Es ist in gewissem Maße ein “gemeinsamer Geist” (Schulte 2000: 60ff.) vorhanden. Für diese grundsätzliche Verständigungsmöglichkeit ist noch keine darüber hinaus gehende gemeinsame Handlungsweise erforderlich.

Zudem liegt eine gemeinsame Handlungsweise in dem oben skizzierten Sinne einer Gleichheit vor, wenn man dieselbe Sprache spricht. Sie besteht in gemeinsamen, grundsätzlichen Urteilen, denn: “Zur Verständigung durch die Sprache gehört [...] eine Übereinstimmung in den Urteilen.” (Wittgenstein 1999: §242) Wer die gleiche Sprache spricht, verständigt sich zumindest auf rudimentäre Weise, was zumindest Gleichheit in grundsätzlichen Urteilen voraussetzt.

(b) Handlungsverstehen

Um Handlungen anderer verstehen zu können, muss es gemeinsame Handlungsweisen geben. Die Handlungen der anderen müssen meinen in einer Weise gleichen. Das Verstehen erfolgt sprachlich dann so, dass wir den von uns beobachteten Handlungen Sätze unserer Sprache zuordnen, mit denen wir solche Handlungen, wenn wir sie tun, üblicherweise beschreiben würden. In einem zweiten Schritt deuten wir die Sätze der fremden Sprache, die dieselben Handlungen beschreiben, indem wir ihre Sätze mit unseren korrelieren, also beide Sprachen ineinander übersetzen (So beschrieben in: Wittgenstein 1999: §206) Unsere Handlungen bilden so unser Bezugssystem für die Interpretation (Vgl. Raatzsch 1993: 59f.). Handlungsverstehen ist folglich zugleich eine Hilfe zum Sprachverstehen.

Aus dem Verhältnis von Sprachverstehen und Handlungsverstehen ergeben sich vier mögliche Fälle des Verstehens anderer, die es in einem nächsten Schritt genauer zu betrachten gilt:

- (1) Man beherrscht die Sprache der anderen und versteht die Handlungen der anderen auch.
- (2) Man beherrscht die Sprache der anderen nicht, versteht die Handlungen der anderen aber trotzdem.
- (3) Man beherrscht die Sprache der anderen nicht und versteht die Handlungen der anderen auch nicht.
- (4) Man beherrscht die Sprache der anderen und versteht die Handlungen der anderen nicht.

6. Ergebnis

Von diesen vier Fällen sind die ersten drei möglich, der letzte jedoch nicht.

- (1) ist der alltägliche Fall und bedarf keiner weiteren Behandlung.
- (2) Ein Beispiel hierfür ist etwa der Besuch eines nicht Englisch sprechenden Deutschen in den USA, der eine Hochzeit sieht. Er wird die den seinen ähnlichen Handlungen aufgrund der Ähnlichkeit verstehen. In einem zweiten Schritt kann er die fremde und seine Sprache ineinander übersetzen.
- (3) Der dritte Fall könnte etwa eintreten, wenn Lebewesen, die unsere Sprache nicht sprechen und keine weitere Handlungsweise mit uns teilen (Außerirdische etwa) mit uns in Kontakt treten. Der Zustand des Nichtverstehens ist aber nur vorübergehend, weil keine prinzipielle Unmöglichkeit des Verstehens vorliegt. Wenn die anderen die Lebensform einer Sprachpraxis teilen, müssen sie eine Form von Regelmäßigkeit kennen und zur Reflexion fähig sein. Es besteht hier die Möglichkeit, darüber hinaus gemeinsame Handlungsweisen auszubilden.
- (4) Dieser Fall ist schließlich der von Wittgensteins Löwen. Unsere Unfähigkeit, diesen zu verstehen, ist eine *faktische* und keine prinzipielle. Weil er eben keine Sprache spricht, deswegen können wir ihn nicht verstehen. Oder mit Wittgenstein: "sie [die Tiere, T. W.] sprechen eben nicht. Oder besser: sie verwenden die Sprache nicht – wenn wir von den primitivsten Sprachformen absehen." (Wittgenstein ¹²1999: §25) Wenn der Löwe jedoch eine Sprache spräche, dann würde er mit uns zumindest in der Lebensform der Sprachpraxis übereinstimmen. Eine grundsätzliche Möglichkeit des Sprachverstehens bestünde.

Allgemein gilt: Wird von Sprechern die gleiche Sprache gesprochen, besteht kein Problem des Sprachverstehens. Es werden bereits Urteile geteilt und mindestens eine gemeinsame Handlungsweise liegt vor. Handlungsverstehen ist darauf aufbauend nun eine Folge des Sprachverstehens.

Wird nicht die gleiche Sprache gesprochen, aber liegt mindestens eine gemeinsame Handlungsweise vor, dann besteht ebenfalls kein Problem des Sprachverstehens, das hier aus dem Handlungsverstehen folgt.

Wird nicht die gleiche Sprache gesprochen und liegt über die aus dem Sprechen einer Sprache folgenden gemeinsame Handlungsweisen hinaus keine weitere gemeinsame Handlungsweise vor, besteht immerhin die durch die Sprachpraxis geteilte gemeinsame Lebensform, die ein Verständnis des anderen grundsätzlich ermöglicht.

Es zeigt sich an dieser Stelle, dass die Frage nach Anzahl und Art der gemeinsame Handlungsweisen und Lebensformen völlig unerheblich und allenfalls für eine Binnendifferenzierung des Begriffes interessant ist. Das gleiche gilt für die Frage, ob sich verschiedene Lebensformen prinzipiell oder faktisch nicht verstehen können, weil eine Betrachtung des Begriffes *Lebensform* zeigt, dass dessen wesentliches Merkmal in der tatsächlichen Sprachpraxis liegt. Somit liegt immer nur eine faktische, aber keine logische Unmöglichkeit des Verstehens anderer vor. Denn wer immer spricht, teilt diese Lebensform, die grundsätzlich Verständnis ermöglicht. Mag diese Lebensformen in Abhängigkeit von anderen zu Grunde liegenden Verhaltensweisen unterschiedlich ausgeprägt sein, in der Sprachpraxis haben sie doch etwas gemein.

Es ist folglich eine zu starke These, eine Unmöglichkeit des Verstehens ausreichend fremder Lebensformen zu behaupten, weil Lebensformen gar nicht ausreichend fremd sein können. Sie bauen auf der fundamentalen gemeinsamen Handlungsweise der Sprachspielpraxis auf und bilden davon ausgehend "Modifikationen dieser komplizierten Lebensform" (Wittgenstein ¹²1999: S. 489) Die Lebensform der Sprachpraxis ist deshalb allein Garant der grundsätzlichen Möglichkeit des Sprachverstehens aus dem Handlungsverstehen folgen kann.¹

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From Anti-Metaphysics to Non-Pyrrhonian Polyphony - remarks on the difficulty of receiving Wittgenstein

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1. Here is one way of looking at the difficulty of receiving Wittgenstein. We ask: Does Wittgenstein argue for the truth of certain philosophical theses and theoretical positions? Should we gather from his work new solutions, whether skeptical or not skeptical, to philosophical problems or does Wittgenstein rather attempt the dissolution of those problems?

I think we can draw the following conclusion from the debate: Exegetically the case for interpretations of Wittgenstein, in particular the later Wittgenstein, that do not see him as searching for solutions, for true theories or theses, through cogent argument, is quite strong. It does not follow that we cannot mine Wittgenstein's work in our search for theoretical solutions to philosophical problems. However, if we do so our guiding interest is different from that of Wittgenstein. (See for instance Bloor 1996, 377 and Pichler 2004, 21.)

When the solution / dissolution issue is the focus of attention the difficulty of receiving Wittgenstein has the form: Should we or should we not share his anti-theoretical orientation? On this perception the two main camps in Wittgenstein scholarship are the non-scholastic, constructive, Wittgensteinians and the anti-theoretical or "true" Wittgensteinians.

Here is another way of looking at the difficulty of receiving Wittgenstein. We ask: Was Wittgenstein an anti-metaphysical philosopher?

This question and the one first mentioned induce different patterns of attention. My suggestion is that the second question can serve us well in bringing forth similarities between some views advocated by "true Wittgensteinian" and those advocated by constructive Wittgensteinians, as well as the importance of certain differences between some main variants of true Wittgensteinianism that have not received as much attention as they deserve.

2. Despite the many important differences there are between P.M.S. Hacker on the one hand and James Conant and Cora Diamond on the other—differences that, so far, may be more distinct in their interpretation of the *Tractatus* than in their interpretation of the later Wittgenstein—I think it is fair to say that Hacker and Diamond share the view that the later Wittgenstein was by and large an anti-metaphysical philosopher.

Anyone who follows Hacker or Diamond in portraying Wittgenstein both as a "no theses" -philosopher and as an anti-metaphysicist can be confronted with the question: Can you have both?

The charge has often enough been brought against Hacker that if we insist that clarification of grammar can define bounds of sense our philosophy will not be as readily distinguishable from a philosophy in search of true theses as one might have hoped for. (E.g. Baker, 2004, 104–105.) Here, we might say, grammar appears to become the new metaphysics, ruling over truth, including over what we can rightly say about "the true make up of reality" or "the scaffolding of the universe" and over what

can and what cannot be meaningfully undertaken in empirical science.

The idea that Wittgenstein's philosophical method is designed as a therapy that serves to liberate us from illusions has been suggested as a corrective to the Hackerian interpretation. Differences have been seen between regarding philosophy as laying bare when grammatical rules have been transgressed (Hacker)—this is philosophy as "policing the bounds of sense" (Baker)—and seeing philosophy as elucidating that where we thought there was sense no such thing is to be found.

However, the therapeutic interpreter, too, remains answerable to our questions above. We ask: Whence the philosophers' authority over sense and nonsense? (What is the difference Baker, using Waisman's simile, invites us to see between Hackerians "beating with the stick of grammar" and Bakerians "gently leading someone with his own consent?" Baker 2004, 93, 104.) How, if I claim no access to privileged, perhaps metaphysical, insight, can I know that you are wrong if you share every step of our joint investigation and in the end disagree with me over questions of illusion and sense?

First answer. We read Wittgenstein as speaking on his own behalf and in a "voice of correctness" (Cavell), when he writes this and similar remarks: "My aim is: to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is patent nonsense." (*Philosophical Investigations*, # 464. See also # 500.)

Problems with first answer: We assume that there are cases when disguised nonsense can, objectively perhaps?, be revealed as patent nonsense. But what gives us confidence in saying in any particular case that the result we arrive at, namely that *this* utterance is a case of patent nonsense and not a case of patent sense? Can we have this confidence without running into very much the same problem that haunts Hacker's interpretation: If we say that we can use philosophy to liberate ourselves from illusions of sense it becomes difficult for us to escape the charge that we are, at the end of the day, putting forward controversial theses about where sense can and cannot be found. We can say: We searched for timeless truths about the scaffolding of the universe or about the relation between mind and world. But now we know that the notions of timeless truth and scaffolding of the universe and of normative (structured) mind and non-normative (unstructured) world as distinct but related are confused, that talking about them will be (disguised) nonsense. How is that not a thesis?

The same point can be arrived at from, as it were, the opposite direction by asking: Does Wittgenstein show, prove or elucidate, that there are things we cannot do in philosophy, such as proving metaphysical theses? For instance, when he talks about philosophical theories as "houses of cards", is the message that Plato was confused, that the idea that there is a higher reality is an idea that we cannot entertain without falling into disguised nonsense? Again: If that is Wittgenstein's position, how is that not a philosophical thesis? If that is not his position, what happens with our idea of philosophy as therapy?

What gives us the assurance that we can say with right, even in one case, that here philosophy dispels illusion and achieves its therapeutic goal?

Second answer: There is no voice of correctness. PI # 464 does not inform us that Wittgenstein thought that philosophical investigations will be able provide definite answers to questions about meaning and illusions of meaning. But it does not follow that we must read PI 464 as part of a dialogue that excludes the possibility that philosophy will be able to provide definite answers to such questions. PI 464 has a role in a dialogue where we inform ourselves and others about different aspects of what is involved in saying that there is, in a certain case, a definite truth about sense or illusion as well as of what is involved in saying that there is not such a truth. Seeing these aspects may be exactly what we need in order to attain a clear command of the concepts we investigate.

The second kind of answer may free us from the burden of explaining how we can say that Wittgenstein was against metaphysics while also maintaining that he had no theses. We can now say: the point is not being for or against metaphysics or anti-metaphysics. The point is also not of being for or against policing about sense. And it is not about being for or against elucidations about sense and illusion. The point is gaining an enhanced understanding of what these different options, in any particular case (including, perhaps, the completely general and the absolutely necessary case) involve and what we wish to make of them.

The difference between the first and the second answer is, to put it as a slogan, the difference between interpretations that do, and others that do not, place a particular emphasis on polyphony in Wittgenstein's later work. On the polyphonic interpretation all main lines of interpretation of Wittgenstein, the ones that see him as arguing for distinct theses and theories, the ones that see him as advocating a policing of sense, and the ones that see him as engaged in a therapy against "the bewitchments of our intelligence by means of language" (PI, # 109), including, in particular, the metaphysical cravings espoused in some forms of philosophy, are in the right, but all get only part of his enterprise into view. Wittgenstein is, on the polyphonic interpretation, engaged in an effort to understand what each of these options mean. He studies: *What is it to support this philosophical position? What are the merits, what is the burden, of it?*

Work on these topics may or may not bring agreement. If I become clear about the answers I can give to these questions I may find myself holding on to the same views that you find yourself holding onto in the light of the same considerations. Or: I may find that you arrive at what you consider to be a clear view in the light of considerations that I find utterly unsatisfying. And so on.

Polyphonic philosophy can easily be misunderstood if we understand it merely as an intellectual tool that we use to explain why certain philosophical views may seem attractive to others. (See Stern, 2004, 170.) It will then hardly be distinguishable from arguments preparing the way for an explication of our own position. Only if we can explicate polyphony as addressing in moral earnestness ourselves and any other who may care for what we say simultaneously, will it be something distinct.

The explication will need to consider two intertwined issues. One issue is what understanding of the meaning of our concepts, including e.g. "metaphysical philosophy," each one of us is willing to go by in her life. The other is a

search for community. The sense of community that may emerge on the basis of our philosophical enterprise can take many forms. A community may emerge that is shaped by answers to conceptual issues we could go by together for the time being. Or a community may emerge that is shaped by answers that, as we agree, we must, necessarily, as long as we wish to be rational creatures, go by together. Or a community may emerge that is shaped by the recognition that despite our philosophical efforts we have no prospect of answers we could go by together, or even individually.

3. How does the distinction between the perspectives on the difficulty of receiving Wittgenstein that I have proposed make a difference?

Exegetically the distinction has some advantages. It makes it easy to explain why Wittgenstein should have said in 1929 that the *Tractatus* was deeply mistaken and in 1936 that some of his more recent efforts were of no value at all. We can now see the years in-between, the 1929–1936 period as a period when Wittgenstein answers to the descriptions proposed by "grammatical" interpreters. This is Wittgenstein as an anti-metaphysical philosopher seeking to provide definite answers concerning philosophical issues, given either in terms of policing of sense or disclosure of illusion. We can also explain in what sense Wittgenstein's self-understanding undergoes an important shift in the autumn of 1936. The shift consists in an abandonment of the idea of speaking at any time in the voice of the "Olympic narrator" and replacing this project with an engagement in "polyphonic controversy." (Pichler 2004, 147.) Pichler argues well for the exegetical benefits of this idea.

Substantially, the gain is that we can shift our attention from what Wittgenstein was against—e.g. philosophy as theory or philosophy as metaphysics—to what he was in favour of, and why. I shall close with two suggestions about the directions in which I think one can then move.¹

The first suggestions can be made by announcing a misgiving I have with two important pioneers of the polyphonic interpretation. Stern (2004) and Pichler (2004) both refer to Pyrrhonism in order to explicate their views. This move seems to me rather unhelpful. In the Pyrrhonism Stern and Pichler present Wittgenstein's philosophy serves as a vehicle for moral withdrawal from the world. The Pyrrhonic philosopher suspends judgment and engages in the "distanced work" of a "director" of philosophical polyphony (Pichler, 2004, 147) or he is "a patient anti-philosopher" who is "dismissive of both foundationalism and anti-foundationalism" (Stern, 2004, 37 and 35, see also 170).

Pichler and Stern make less than is called for of the element of spiritual and moral struggle in Wittgenstein's work. Pace Pichler (and Wittgenstein's own "coolness ideal" notwithstanding), Wittgenstein's philosophy does not produce a distance to the vagaries of human life. His philosophical enterprise is rather, as Baker emphasised, an engagement "full of far-reaching consequences" (Baker 2004, 46) in which, as Kierkegaard and Socrates—in method and moral purpose more closely akin to Wittgensteinian polyphony than many other great philosophers—in their different ways emphasised, questions of will and questions of intellect are inseparably intertwined.

¹ I have worked on this and related issues more in Wallgren 2006. Cavell 1979 and now, Baker 2004 (a book I could not consider in my 2006 book) are important references for anyone interested in these topics.

Pace Stern Wittgenstein is not dismissive of philosophical effort. On the contrary, for him, lack of clarity about concepts can be a lack of clarity about the most important things in our lives. It may well be, as Socrates would have agreed, that we cannot find our way to an upright life unless we take on the effort of philosophical clarification. (Just one example: Consider the significance for Wittgenstein of getting at a conception of philosophy he could live with.) But whether the result of our effort will be Pyrrhonic or non-Pyrrhonic, metaphysical or not metaphysical, theoretical or therapeutic, is not for the philosopher to judge about before the facts or on the behalf of others—including on behalf of herself as the partly transformed person she may become through the philosophical work.

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Respective Justice through Thick and Thin: A Critique of Rawlsian Justice

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How can we envision a liberal democratic society interacting with other societies that do not share the same background assumptions of political enlightenment? It is a reasonably easy task to unite two groups of liberal citizens behind a common conception of liberal justice. The more difficult assignment is that of uniting entirely different societies and civilizations behind a common order. John Rawls maintained that the point at which peoples of differing background assumptions must meet, if there would be a meeting at all, is a common rule or order. It would be a *law of peoples*.

Rawls attempts to describe the conditions under which such diverse peoples would find common interest with each other. These interests would be the unifying factor of peoples at an international level just as Rawls' theory of common interests serves as the unifying factor of citizens on the domestic level. The structure of the society of peoples would follow the structure of the individual liberal society: free and equal citizens would engage their interests and values in the market of public reason and discourse founded on the basis of and facilitated by a veil of ignorance. Just as at the domestic level the society assumes that the citizen is free and equal, in a law of peoples the society of peoples would assume that each collective of citizens is essentially a free and equal actor, albeit an extremely dynamic and complicated entity whose subjectivity is often conditioned by millions of individual voices. Just as in a single society the aim is to avoid societal transgressions through the systematic treatment of citizens as free and equal, by acknowledging similar fundamental rights among peoples, a just law of peoples would succeed in preventing "unjust war and oppression, religious persecution and the denial of liberty of conscience, starvation and poverty, not to mention genocide and mass murder." (Rawls 1999, 7).

The greatest weakness of such a liberal Law of Peoples as Rawls proposes is that in order to fulfill the requirements of the liberal conception of justice among peoples, all peoples must in some way accept liberal democracy at the international level. This includes liberal democratic peoples but also the peoples whose own societies are neither liberal nor democratic. While granting peoples the right to be citizens of non-liberal non-democratic societies on the one hand, Rawls demands with the other that these peoples abide by a rule of law that belongs to the liberal societies. It is as if the society of peoples is a club of the liberal democratic societies of the world (almost exclusively of the West) which deign to admit those other countries which appear to be just good enough to join. The sole criterion by which the decent societies are allowed to play along in this club is that they play according to the rules already established by the peoples who have long traditions of liberal democratic constitutions. While asserting that all actors in the society of peoples should be free and equal peoples relative to each other, Rawls suggests a system whose success depends entirely on that which he assumes, i.e. the freedom and equality of all of the collectives and their willingness to enter into rational discourse.

Rawls suggests that true societal stability rests upon the popular acceptance of the legal norms which his system presupposes. This is to be facilitated through what could be called a culture of instruction in the principles of the Law of Peoples. In order for this international body to properly function, there must be a collective moral learning within the non-liberal societies. But what is it that is to be learned? There must be, over time, a general acknowledgement within the collectives of norms and sets of mores that come to be "honored", i.e. naively accepted, as part and parcel of the cultural heritage.

However, within any system of justice, "we must always start from where we now are." (Rawls 1999, 7). That is, every conception of global justice must have some origin within some culture.

Michael Walzer presents a thesis tying morality and political realities to the cultures in which they exist. Unlike Rawls, Walzer posits reason as playing neither a universal nor a comprehensive role in the conceptions of morality or political structure. Instead of looking to shape morality through a method, Walzer focuses on concrete morality itself. In so doing, he suggests that morality is to be conceived as having two aspects: the thick and the thin.

In providing a catalyst for his own recognition of these aspects Walzer points to a moment in history: the streets of Prague in 1989. As protesters marched through the streets, they carried signs for the reporters to film and for the world to see. Some said "Truth". Others said "Justice". Walzer provides this historical example as one of an applied thin morality. "Truth" and "Justice" are two concepts with which everyone can agree. Indeed in the revolutions against the Soviet republics and communist regimes that took place during those years, such signs were commonplace. Equally as common was the identification which others throughout the world felt with these sign carriers. Peoples of different cultures and languages, people who had been ideologically removed from one another for decades, could feel like each other's brothers and sisters because of the signs, which read "Truth" and "Justice". People everywhere, who had never had anything to do with one another, suddenly felt united behind this cause. "Justice" in the face of oppressive governments and arbitrary arrests is understood easily enough. Thin morality is not a collection of the most basic concepts of morality. Thin morality is the source of emotions and desires which repeatedly unite the most diverse of people – if even for a moment – behind a single cause such as "freedom". A thin morality is a minimal morality. It provides the 'minimal' standards, by which one can judge a situation. It includes those things that are most basic, most essential in life.

Thick morality, as understood by Walzer, is just as real as thin morality. It is perhaps even more present in the daily experience of the normal person. Whereas thin morality is simple, thick morality is complex. Whereas thin morality is determined by the universal human experience, thick morality is conditioned by the experiences unique to a person, societal, religious, and familial experiences. In the case of the protestors in Prague, they were all united by a thin morality that rose up against their current

conditions in order to cry out to the world – “Justice”! However, they were united insofar as their thin moralities came to be emphasized over and above their thick moralities. Inevitably, the same protestors, who would have fought together unto death in battling the communist regime, eventually were to fight against each other once their goal had been achieved as they then had to determine the structure of the new government and so on. Thin moralities are needed for the revolution of a people. Thick moralities are needed for determining a tax code. Whereas thin moralities are minimal, thick moralities are maximal. Morality maximally defined (thick morality) includes the entire moral complexity of a person from the desire for truth to the desire that dinner begin with the salad fork.

It is not as if thick and thin moralities were two different entities. They are rather two aspects of the same thing. “Minimalist meanings are embedded in the maximal morality, expressed in the same idiom, sharing the same (historical, cultural, religious, political) orientation.” (Walzer 1994, 3). There is one morality and it is thick. Yet, dependent upon any given occasion, thicker or thinner versions of the same morality will manifest themselves.

Related to the minimal and maximal understandings of morality is the extent to which one understands certain values as universal or relative. (Walzer 1994, 8) Thin morality is minimal morality that expresses those values which are considered to be most universal. Thick morality is maximal morality expressing those values which are considered to be more relative. This is not relativism. One should hope and expect from other societies that, within their governments, there would be some structure in place by which justice could be obtained. Yet, even though one might support the system of trial by jury in the United States, one would not necessarily fight for the cause of such a system in other countries whose societies embody other traditions of jurisprudence. Just as morality has thicker and thinner manifestations, it also has some aspects which are more contingent than others.

The thicker the morality, the more likely it will be understood relative to given societal or cultural phenomena. The more relatively a set of values is understood, the less likely it is that these values will carry with them an intensity of feeling or emotion when traveling across other cultures. Likewise, the more minimally values are understood, the more universally people will attempt to realize them. This universality requires an abstraction of sorts. Yet, the abstraction does not entail a loss of intensity associated with the value. On the contrary, the perceived universalizability of a given value, e.g. truth, tends to ignite citizens’ emotions even more. It is this tendency which allows citizens of the world to unite in a common cause. “The members of all the different societies, because they are human, can acknowledge each other’s different ways, respond to each other’s cries for help, learn from each other, and march (sometimes) in each other’s parades.” (Walzer 1994, 8). Unfortunately, it is also this tendency that creates conflict on a global scale when citizens from two different places consider two conflicting values to be universal in their own right.

The most congenial method in developing a theory of political justice is not simply in finding a societal structure with universal applicability. This results in too strong a focus on the thinness of a given morality and results in one-dimensionality; nor is it best for a theory of political justice to aim at reflecting the values that a particular society holds near and dear. Since societies change over time in their ideals and affections, such a

theory would always be conditioned by its own temporal context.

Instead of attempting to export systems of justice, it would be better to allow the first criticism to come from within. There has to be internal criticism in which the onus lies with the citizens themselves to criticize their own society using their own thick conceptions of justice, equality or whatever else. To this point it is useful to look again at the protesters in Prague. The first dissenters of the contemporary regime protested not Leninist, but Stalinist Communism. In arguing against the Stalinist regime, they looked to Lenin as an example or ideal of their state. It was only very late in the process that the protesters also rejected Lenin and thus sought reform outside of their own maximalism. It was only here that they drew closer to liberalism, democracy, and what could be called the ‘bourgeois civil rights’.” (Walzer 1994, 46).

The example from Prague shows just how well the process of internal criticism can work. Criticism works best when it comes and indeed can perhaps only come from within. People within a society know whether or not their society is realizing its ideals. When the situation becomes severe, people protest in one form or another. It was only after the system had organically ceased to function in Czechoslovakia that the West could have been of any help. The external function of maximalist criticism is very much incapable of transcending borders. “Social critics mostly work out of a Home Office.” (Walzer, 1994, 49).

Any conception of justice must allow for self-determination in the development of social norms. After all, to be such, a *social* norm must come from within a given society. Individual collectives must decide how they will exist and of which mores they will consist. Although this idea fits well into democratic conceptions of justice, it does not limit itself in appeal to democrats alone. “The principle has been reiterated in many different times and places, always in some local idiom and with a set of maximalist accompaniments.” (Walzer 1994, 67). The principle of self-determinism is an ancient principle that is included in most forms of government to some extent.

From ideological conflicts to regional independence movements, maximal moralities are most always, at least in the short term, impermeable. Not only foreign troops, but also foreign ideas can be easily perceived as occupying forces in a homeland. In order to have some sort of success with some sort of international organization, the actors involved must show genuine respect for the cultures and societies of all of the parties concerned. This respect goes beyond a feigned verbal respect. There must be an actual concern for the entire complexity of the thick moralities of the societies in question.

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Normativity and Novelty

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1. Aspect Seeing and Imagination

We humans are able to transform our ways of seeing, because we have what we call 'imagination': we are able to imagine things, situations or events that do not exist in reality. At the same time we use pictures that are based on convention. That is why it is sometimes hard to see things 'differently'.

The tension between imagination and convention provides us with the possibility for novelty, something we can come to see by means of our ability of *aspect seeing*. We situate what we perceive in a different context, and because of this are able to discover new connections (cf. *PI* 122). We can regard the concept of *continuous aspect perception* that Luntley (2003) describes, as a *constant* understanding, whereas an aspect switch can be understood as a *coming to* understand. We need them both if we want to get a hold on the problem of novelty.

Normally we are capable of performing an aspect switch, someone who is not, we call 'aspect blind'. He or she is not able to make the switch from one aspect to the other. Wittgenstein discusses the phenomenon of aspect switch in *Philosophical Investigations* part II, in connection with aspect dawning and aspect change. In *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* he discusses the related, but more specific phenomenon of 'meaning-blindness':

'If you say "As I heard this word, it meant ... for me" you refer to a point of time and to an employment of the word. - The remarkable thing about it is of course the relation to the point of time. The 'meaning-blind' would lose that relation.' (*RPP* I, 175 - italics in original) (Cf. *PI*, p175a)

Meaning is connected with time because a word may have different meanings at different points in time. In principle we all have the ability to assign different meanings to words at different points in time and in various circumstances. This ability also allows us to perform an aspect change. Think for instance of the word 'bank' in the sense of a bank near a river, or a bank as an institution where you can deposit your money. Although the word has one meaning at a time, both are available in that we can switch between them. Someone who is meaning-blind cannot make this aspect switch. For such a person there is only one meaning in each case.

One consequence of meaning-blindness Wittgenstein discusses we can find in *RPP* I, 178, where he indicates that instead of the 'Blitzschnelle' of a thought, the aspect-switch 'in a flash' from one meaning to the other, the meaning-blind person has to describe what goes on step by step; at every point in time anew reorienting himself, because he misses a certain kind of imagination. In this way it is shown that our ability for aspect seeing and aspect change is connected with our power of imagination.

But it is not just the one who has some disorder and therefore fails to perform an aspect change who can be called meaning-blind. We *all* can become meaning-blind the moment certain words have become so obvious for us that they, as it were, have disappeared from our sight. Think for instance of the notion of 'God', or the concept of

'poiesis'. Whenever we lose the meaning of a word - when it is changed into 'an empty, even corrosive convention', so Steiner (2001) - this can have far-reaching consequences and implications.

We should distinguish between our use of our power of imagination and something that calls for our imagination. The first can be triggered by the second in such a way that it can give rise to change and renewal in unexpected ways. We could call this dialectical relation a *reflexive dynamics*: referring back to itself by means of a different aspect. Especially artists make use of this reflexive dynamics, breathing back life - that is to say, re-assign meaning - into notions such as 'God' or 'poiesis' by means of their ability to switch between continuous aspect perception and their *artistic aspect perception*. Something that can be called *poetic understanding* and is hinted at by Wittgenstein, but is never made explicit.

One of his remarks I want to discuss here in some detail that points to these matters, is in *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* part I. Whereas we usually take diagrams such as the Duck-Rabbit and the Double Cross showing just two possibilities within one picture, Wittgenstein observes in remark 1017 that we can look at the latter in more than two ways:



[...]; the figure can be seen, not just in two but in very many different ways.

This observation squares with my own experience. The first association I had when I saw this picture was that of a sunshade on the beach. Thus, not so much a depiction I can see in two different ways, but more a picture evoking a *sphere*. To see a sunshade on the beach is, of course, due to my personal background, rooted in a European culture and tradition. Someone from a different culture, with another background, would probably have seen something completely different in this picture.

This re-assigning meaning by means of our power of imagination, something we are all capable of, is extended by the artist by way of his *artistic aspect perception*, something that is, of course, only possible against the background of our everyday perception, which is based in a continuous aspect perception. The artist lives and functions in an 'everyday community', at the same time, however, he or she experiences the world also in a different, in some respect *intensified* or *heightened* light and is able to switch between the former and the latter. Whether we should indicate this intensified attitude as something qualitatively or something quantitatively different remains to be investigated. It is the philosopher, subsequently, who reflects on these insights and brings them into perspective.

To recapitulate: we have a continuous aspect perception that can be understood as a continuous understanding; an aspect switch, which is a coming to understand and an artistic aspect perception that has its equivalence in a poetic understanding.

2. Normativity and Novelty

How are new perspectives and possibilities related to what we already know, to our rules and conventions? Wittgenstein always emphasises the need to select the right focal point for understanding and inquiry. A fruitful 'paradigm', object of comparison, 'prototype' or 'Urbild' is vital (CV p14, 26; PI 122, 130, 131, 385). As he stresses in CV, p26: 'The real achievement of a Copernicus or a Darwin was not the discovery of a true theory but of a fertile new point of view'.

For Wittgenstein, human behaviour is both individual and social: it arises from patterns of social life intertwined with individual actions. He characterised these patterns as requiring for their identification the participation in a 'conceptual world' (Begriffswelt). On that model, institutions as Bloor understands them, could be called *conceptual worlds* (cf. Z 567-580). But, although we share the same concepts within a certain community, future applications of a term are not 'in some *unique* way predetermined, anticipated - as only the act of meaning can anticipate reality' (PI 188).

Questions of normativity and novelty relate to the problem of the epistemological inaccessibility of the future and the compulsion, that is to say, the hardness of the logical must (cf. RFM I, 121). This 'must' constitutes the form of life against which error, truth and falsity can be discerned. What must be, stands fast for us. But how then can we account for innovation and creation, especially in such a 'social-stage-setting', constituted by conventions and logical must? When we are taught in a practice, we have learned things that are already known within the community, by our teachers. Yet, in learning a rule there is always the problem of the next step, the move from past to new instances of a concept (RFM VI 29; PI 29). From this, where something 'new' can come from becomes an intriguing question.

The discussion whether rule-following is primarily individual or social expands to the problem of novelty. For Luntley, who takes up the individual stance, we have an active, directed attitude to the world that has to do with aspect perception: it is a form of aspect switch when I suddenly see how to play a game. Luntley exchanges Cartesian transparency for opaque uncertainty: understanding consists in how you go on, it will depend on what you will do and that is something that is not always transparent to you, for you cannot know for sure how that will go until you do it (Luntley, p104ff). Loosing transparency about my own experience we thereby loose the gap between the world and ourselves. The exchange of transparent Cartesian certainty for opaque uncertainty implies that the subject must be an active agent, with an attitude, a goal-directness to the world. It is this opaque uncertainty that gives us the possibility of novelty and that is bearer of the *meaning potential* of the language.

According to those who take up the social stance, like for instance Bloor, new inventions and creations are scarcely done by one single person and they need a community to get consensus in order to get accepted. Creativity for Bloor cannot be an individual accomplishment, because for him the community decides whether a creation is an error, confusion, or misinterpretation of a rule, the innovative following of an old rule, or the beginning of a new rule. Innovation for him is a communal process. Being a process, it has a historical dimension and an internal structure. This internal structure for Bloor, is essentially social (Bloor, p96-97).

One ground for challenging Bloor's analysis is that he understands individual innovation as an *event*. But, this cannot be correct: individual innovation, too, has the properties of a *process*.

On the individual level the problem of creativity has been connected with two concepts: the concept of intuition and the concept of the unconscious. Intuition is understood as an instinctive form of knowledge or insight - something not gained by reason. The notion of intuition is contrasted with rational thinking and is considered as something that cannot be tested, proven or refuted. Moreover, the process by which intuition works is supposed to be unconscious. Much more should be said about this, but I cannot do so here. Therefore, I want to restrict myself to the most important point for my argument, namely, that the various steps from intuition, through the unconscious towards a consciously verifying of the conclusion or the insight, is not a 'thing' that happens - an event - but a series of actions or steps that lead to a particular end and that evolve over time; thus a process. Also, there is no absolute difference, no split or opposition, between what we call intuition and conscious reasoning: it is a matter of degree, a continuum. In any problem-solving some varying degree of intuition is involved. On the other hand, intuitions may present us with a problem, but they do not offer a verified solution or proof.

If this is right, it provides an argument for saying that the same holds for the individual and the social. The individual innovation is not a point event, but much more a continuum, a matter of degree. When no 'need' for individual innovation in a person is triggered, there is no possibility for the community to pick it up and accept it. And the other way around: the individual, being part of the community uses his continuous aspect perception as well as his (artistic) aspect switch for ideas evolving in time and over persons. From this we see, that it is impossible and even misleading to distinguish categorically between the individual and social.

In the rule-governed practice the dynamic becomes reflexive through the creative aspects brought in that can account for transgressions in meaning and change in form of life. Something Wittgenstein takes up explicitly in his remarks every time he urges us to imagine something: 'we could imagine that..' (PI 2), 'suppose that..', 'think of..'

3. Conclusion

Perhaps we should consider creativity not as an ability, but as a particular kind of cognitive *sphere*. Tools for creativity and artistic power, thus for 'renewal' and 'change' are complexity, for instance in the artistic creation of a new rule; surprisingness: think of the aspect switch, when we 'suddenly' see something we didn't notice before; incongruity of domains; ambiguity of meaning and reference and variability in problem-solving and artistic appreciation - the very same notions we can detect in an analysis of aspect perception, of rule-following and its connection with the individual and the social.

In the reflexive dynamics between what is obvious, conventional and everyday, and what is uncertain, opaque and inexpressible, poetic understanding can emerge. This poetic understanding is possible due to the meaning potential of the language use. Because of this meaning potential, it is always possible to see something more 'than what it is'. Because of this, we are able to take a different point of view in which the obvious can be seen anew: everything can be new - even the most ordinary (Baz, 2000).

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Towards an Intercultural Phenomenology – The problem of Interculturality from a Methodological Perspective

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I

Although Husserl's philosophy was extensively discussed throughout the last decades, the question of interculturality apparently has not been regarded as a core competence of phenomenology. Maybe this is due to the fact that Husserl has been often criticized for his latent Eurocentrism. Nevertheless, the aim of this essay is to ask for the relevance of Husserlian phenomenology with regard to the question of interculturality. I want to shed some light upon the phenomenological reduction, the main phenomenological concept which is in my opinion useful when it comes to the question of how intercultural understanding (in the widest sense) is at least possible.

However, if one wants to address questions like these from a phenomenological point of view, one first and foremost has to distinguish between two different levels of argumentation: First, phenomenology can be regarded as a "science of description", where the meaning of "description" has to be clarified very carefully. To bring it in a nutshell, phenomenology provides us with a method of "sense-decomposition" (*Sinnabbau*) in order to reveal the proper content of certain phenomena like "evidence", "truth", "the Other", "culturality" and so on.¹ Second, on a methodological level, phenomenology wants to reinstall the idea of the "philosophia prima". Even in his last work (the *Crisis*) Husserl strove for the goal of a "rigorous science" (*strenge Wissenschaft*), a science which should provide us with a secure basis for all subsequent theoretical endeavors. It is this last methodological claim I want to investigate with regard to the question of interculturality.

II

On a pragmatic level, there is neither a radical problem of interculturality, nor of historicity. We have never heard – as Gellner once noted (Gellner 1997, 185) – of an anthropologist who returned from a field study and reported that he understood simply nothing. The same holds true for history: The pictures of Hieronymus Bosch seem strange, but we never cast doubt on the fact that we are able to understand the stories within these pictures, even if it takes hard work of interpretation. The problem, as I see it, lies elsewhere: Could it be that whenever I think I have understood a culturally diverse Other, the only one I have really understood is myself, i.e., my cultural or historical background? To put it differently: Could the systems of beliefs and convictions, culturally diverse Others share, be so radically different that a translation between me and the Other is a priori doomed? To be sure, this question is not only relevant with regard to the problem of translation. It is not only the question of Quine's and Davidson's field-linguist (Quine 1973, 26 ff; Davidson 1984, 125 ff), it is also the question whether it is possible to speak of truth in a traditional sense or to hang on to one of our most basic intuitions: that there is one world we all share at least in its basic structures.²

There is a well-known passage in the *Crisis*, where Husserl indirectly suggests that the encounter with foreign cultures can be regarded as one possible motivation for the phenomenological reduction (Husserl 1954, 141 f). In the same passage Husserl grants that there are different truths and fixed facts for the "normal" European, for the "normal" Hindu, for the "normal" Chinese etc. and that an all-embracing theory like phenomenology has to account for this fact. To be sure, Husserl argues as well, that a sphere of unconditionally valid truths and facts has to be uncovered by what he calls "objective science". "Objective science", however, cannot be equated with "positive science", i.e., neither with natural, technical, social or cultural sciences, nor with the humanities. Positive sciences are exclusively directed to their objects and therefore cannot clarify their own fundamentals and presuppositions. They at least have to presuppose the existence of the objects with which they are dealing (even if these presuppositions occur on a non-thematic level) as well as certain subjective structures (e.g. a basic trust in sensory perception and memory). Without these necessary presuppositions, not only the positive sciences prove to be impossible but also every natural reference to the world in which we live. Consequently, the aim of phenomenology consists in the search for a theoretical basis which allows for a clarification of these presuppositions without falling prey to certain hidden presuppositions itself. Obviously, this project is of highest relevance for the question of interculturality, since such a presuppositionless basis could serve as a starting point for the comparison of culturally diverse systems of beliefs.

In order to attain such a basis, the methodical operation of the phenomenological reduction has to be performed. In his *Logical Investigations*, Husserl believed that it would be enough to simply state a "principle of presuppositionlessness", i.e., to suspend all scientific and pre-scientific convictions for the time of phenomenological analysis (Husserl 1984, § 7). Against this, one could object that it is impossible to *know*, whether the goal of presuppositionlessness is eventually reached. Due to this objection, Husserl broadened his principle of presuppositionlessness in the *Ideas 1* and stated that the root of all presupposing has to be discarded. This root can be identified with the "general thesis of the natural attitude" (Husserl 1976, 60 ff). Characterizing the "general thesis", one has to realize at first that this "thesis" is no thesis at all. The "general thesis" is only a retrospective generalization of the fact that we assume every intended object to exist in a certain manner without ever expressing this assumption. However, the reason for this is not a twist to notorious self-deception, it is part and parcel of our natural engagement in and our exclusive directedness towards the world.

whether the concept of phenomenological attitudes substitute for the metaphor of "many worlds"; the concept of the life-world; the phenomenological concept of truth which is not – as often claimed – a theory of evidence; the question of relativism – most notably in Husserl's later works; a detailed examination of Husserl's evidence-based foundationalism which can't be regarded as a classical foundationalist position; the concept of evidence which neither leads to an introspectionism, nor to an intuitionism. All of these topics are relevant with regard to the problem of interculturality, whereas I restrict myself to the methodical operation which precedes every phenomenological analysis.

¹ Cf. the essay of Eva Schwarz in this volume.

² However, it is not possible to address the following important topics within this short essay: the phenomenological concept of rationality; the question,

As everyone is able to verify in every-day or even scientific experience, we are necessarily and exclusively directed to the objects of our experience and not to the experiencing itself.³

Accordingly, the exclusion of the “general thesis” has nothing to do with doubting the world, worldly objects, our cognitive skills or other minds (e.g. Husserl 1962, 71). Husserl, the mathematician, expresses this in saying that the “general thesis” and all worldly convictions have to be “put in brackets”: Putting *x* in brackets neither implies that *x* is negated, nor does it mean that *x* vanishes. *X* is still there, it is solely put out of action for the time of phenomenological analysis. The reason for this theoretical move is obvious: A theory which strives for the goal of the clarification of natural presuppositions has to make available a theoretical point of departure which is not presupposition-laden itself.

However, one has to be very careful with the interpretation of the consequences of the phenomenological reduction: First and foremost, the phenomenological reduction enables us to distinguish between the transcendent and the immanent, i.e., between the object in time and space and the *momentary given*, i.e., the object *how it appears to us*. Consider for example the experience of a coffee cup: In the natural attitude, the cup is given to us as the intended cup. Switching to the phenomenological attitude, it becomes obvious that there is a remarkable difference between the transcendent object which is intended and the immanent experiences of what is really given in direct intuition (*direkte Anschauung*). Physical objects are always given in adumbrations (*Abschattungen*), i.e., what is directly given in one perceptual act is only the front side of the coffee cup but never the whole object in all its aspects and perspectives (Husserl 1976, 85 ff). To be sure, what we intend perceptually *is* the coffee cup. It is a characteristic of the natural attitude to treat the object in its perspectival completeness, although only adumbrations are given in direct intuition. Accordingly, the transcendent can be described as the “surplus of intentional reference” which has to be put out of action for the time of the phenomenological analysis.

Consequently, the performance of the reduction is tantamount with a restriction to the sphere of immanence. This, however, does not mean that within this sphere we are able to attain certainty or absolute truth about the objects in question. The restriction to the sphere of immanence (i.e. to that which is directly given) is a consequence of the exclusion of presuppositions and thus a fundamental change of the theoretical perspective. The self-restriction of the reduction alters the theoretical interest from questions of *what the objects are to how they can be given*. After the reduction is performed we restrict ourselves to the analysis of the correlations between the givenness of certain objects and the possible modes of how they can be intended. The temporary exclusion of the *transcendent* opens the gate to the level of the *transcendental*. Within this transcendental sphere a clarification of the basic modes of world-reference and the correlations between attitudes (e.g. the scientific attitude, the aesthetic attitude, the attitude of every-day praxis) and objects takes place.

III

To what extent can this kind of philosophical analysis help us to solve problems of interculturality? First of all, one has to see clearly what kind of contribution one cannot expect from phenomenological analysis: It is not the aim of phenomenology to step into the breach for the positive methods of explanation and understanding. Nor does phenomenology solely provide us with all-encompassing descriptions of the objects, actions and symbols in question. It is important to bear in mind that phenomenology is a non-objectifying science. Rather, it deals with the necessary conditions of the possibility of any kind of directedness to the world. Consider two anthropologists arguing over whether a certain object is a sacred artifact or simply a cooking pot. There is nothing a phenomenologist could add to this question. The dispute whether a certain object has a certain function at a certain time or whether a certain concept (e.g. the occidental concept of subjectivity) is translatable into a foreign language or a certain conceptual framework is an *empirical* question and not a transcendental one. Phenomenology can only provide us with an understanding of what it means to speak of an object, of a human action, of symbolic reference, of meaning etc. To be sure, in the history of mankind, and even within several cultural spheres, there are for example highly different forms of symbolic reference. The comparison and systematization of these forms is an empirical endeavor, whereas transcendental phenomenology limits the scope in which speaking of “reference” makes sense at all.

Thus, phenomenology is by no means incompatible with a “principle of charity” (Quine 1973, 59 ff). From a phenomenological point of view, the “principle of charity” is an expression of those assumptions which we indicated to be the basic characteristics of the natural attitude. Within an empirical framework following the “principle of charity” is a promising endeavor. But from our point of view it is promising insofar as it already presupposes those transcendental structures phenomenology aims to clarify.

After this strong differentiation between empirical, i.e., positive science and transcendental phenomenology, one could critically ask whether there is any connection between these two spheres at all. In order to react to this objection, two levels of argumentation have to be distinguished: Phenomenology is concerned with the clarification of the conditions of the possibility of any world-reference. In this sense, phenomenology is a non-objectifying *meta-science*. However, this basic focus makes sense only insofar as phenomenology is able to deal with its own presuppositions. This leads us to the second level of argumentation: “Reflecting upon its own presuppositions” means to mark a point of presuppositionless departure gained via the phenomenological reduction. Phenomenology has to give up the natural, objectifying world-directedness in order to get a grip upon what “world-directedness” means at all. This perspective on the basic structure of every possible reference to the world is the bedrock for all further theoretical inquiry, a bedrock which is resistant against all historical, cultural, social and linguistic variations. Without these most basic structures we were not even able to distinguish between cultural variations, between identity and difference, between self and other, between my culture and foreign cultures, between my life-world and the ecological niche of a spider etc.

³ Even if we try to focus on our experiencing within the natural attitude, this has to occur in an objectifying manner.

It is important to realize, however, that these basic structures cannot be regarded as a theoretical codification of a certain occidental ideal of the subject. On this level of argumentation, phenomenology cannot even be regarded as a *theory of the subject*. Phenomenology deals with the very basic structures of world-involvement and world-directedness (intentionality, inner time-consciousness, embodiment, activity and passivity and so on). Or – as Eugen Fink has stated – neither the subject is the topic of phenomenology, nor the world. The proper phenomenological topic is their mutual relatedness (Fink 1933, 378).⁴

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Das Problem des metaphysischen Subjekts im Wittgensteins „Tractatus“

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Das Problem des Subjekts erscheint erst in letzten Teilen des *Tractatus*, in denen auch transzendente und mystische Motive auftreten. Die Anwesenheit dieser Motive weist darauf hin, dass das Problem des Subjekts - in der Auffassung von Wittgenstein - sehr eng mit dem Begriff der Grenze der Welt zusammenhängt. In diesem Vortrag stelle ich zwei Auffassungen zum Thema des Subjekts dar. Im ersten Teil analysiere ich (werde ich analysieren) die Konzeption des Subjekts als philosophisches Ich, die aus den Bemerkungen Wittgensteins über Transzendentalismus, Solipsismus und Realismus hervorgeht. Dies geschieht auf dem Weg der erkenntnistheoretischen Überlegungen. Im zweiten Teil untersuche ich (werde ich untersuchen) hingegen dieses Problem von der ontologischen Seite. Der Ausgangspunkt ist die Analyse des Begriffs des Gegenstands und der logischen Form. Mein Ziel ist, eine Interpretation zu finden, die die Übereinstimmung dieser zwei Wege darstellen soll. Der Punkt, zu dem diese zwei Wege führen, ist die Konzeption des Willens als das absolute Subjekt. Dieses Ergebnis weist auf den Einfluss von Schopenhauer auf das Schaffen des jungen Wittgenstein hin, in *Tagebücher 1914-1918* und in *Tractatus*.

1.

Wittgenstein beginnt seine Untersuchungen des Subjekts mit der Ablehnung der These von der Existenz des Subjekts im psychologistischen Sinne (vgl. 5.5421 u. 5.631). Wittgenstein leitet diesen Schluss von der Kritik der traditionellen Konzeption des Urteils ab. Überlegend den Akt des Urteils bemerkt er, dass die Formel 'A glaubt, dass p' dasselbe wie 'p glaubt p' sagt (vgl. 5.542). Daraus lässt sich schließen, dass A mit p identisch ist und jedes Mal, d.h. im jeden darauf folgenden Akt des Urteils, etwas anders. Das Subjekt, das von 'A' und 'p' symbolisiert wird, wird sich als ein immer wechselnder komplexer Zustand herausstellen. Also lehnt Wittgenstein dieses psychologische Verstehen des Subjekts bzw. der Seele ab, denn:

Eine zusammengesetzte Seele wäre nämlich keine Seele mehr (5.5421)

Das grundsätzliche Überlegen der Ansichten Wittgensteins auf das Thema des Subjekts kann man mit dem Zitat aus *Tagebücher* illustrieren:

Der Weg, den ich gegangen bin, ist der: Der Idealismus scheidet aus der Welt als unik die Menschen aus, der Solipsismus scheidet mich allein aus, und endlich sehe ich, dass auch ich zur übrigen Welt gehöre, auf der einen Seite bleibt also nichts übrig, auf der anderen als unik die Welt. So führt der Idealismus streng durchdacht zum Realismus. <15.10.1916>

Im Licht dieser Notiz wird die Analyse des Subjekts auf drei Ebenen durchgeführt:

1. transzendental-idealistisch;
2. solipsistisch;
3. realistisch.

Ob es noch eine höhere Ebene existiert, bleibt zurzeit als eine offene Frage.

Die transzendente Auffassung des Subjekts tritt in den darauf folgenden Thesen auf:

Das Subjekt gehört nicht zur Welt, sondern es ist eine Grenze der Welt. (5.632)

Die Grenzen meiner Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Welt (5.6)

Die Logik erfüllt die Welt; die Grenze der Welt sind auch ihre Grenzen (5.61)

Die Logik ist transzendental (6.13)

Das Subjekt, in der transzendentalen Auffassung, bildet die Grenze der Welt im Sinne von einer Sammlung der Bedingungen, die alle möglichen Erfahrungen bestimmen, d.h. die Welt. Dass dieser Idealismus/Transzendentalismus „scheidet aus der Welt als unik die Menschen aus“, soll auf diese Weise verstanden werden, dass diese Grenzen von Inneren, d.h. von Inneren der Welt bestimmt werden, so werden diese Grenzen vom Menschen als Gattung bestimmt. Die Grenze der Sprache soll als die Grenze der Gedanken verstanden werden. Die Gedanken soll man dann als objektiv gelten lassen, weil sie von der ganzen Menschengattung geteilt werden. Das Subjekt wird demzufolge aus dem Zentrum der Welt in deren Peripherie verschoben. Um das in der Sprache Kants ausdrücken zu wollen, kann man sagen, dass dies ein Übergang von einem empirischen Ich zum transzendentalen Ich ist, d.h. zur transzendentalen Einheit der Apperzeption ist. Die transzendente Einheit der Apperzeption als Subjekt zeigt in der Philosophie Wittgensteins ein neues Gesicht als Logik oder als die Grenze der Sprache. Demzufolge soll hier die Logik nicht als die Sprache, sondern als ihre Grenzen verstanden werden; mit anderen Worten: das transzendente „Gerüst“ der Welt (vgl. 4.023 u. 6.124). Die letzte Formulierung entdeckt eine andere Seite der Logik - ihre Immanenz, weil sie (die Logik) „erfüllt die Welt“ (vgl. 5.61). Dasselbe gilt für das transzendente Subjekt - das ist die Grenze der Welt und durchdringt die Welt zugleich, denn diese wird von der Welt geprägt.

Es gibt eine gewisse Schwierigkeit, die mit dem transzendentalen Subjekt als Grenze der Welt, verbunden ist. Sie besteht darin, dass Wittgenstein die Welt vom logischen Raum unterscheidet. Die Welt ist nur ein winziger Bruchteil des logischen Raumes. Die Welt ist „eine Insel im Meer der Möglichkeiten“. Demzufolge wenn Subjekt, d.h. die Logik, die Grenze der Welt wäre, bliebe so der enorme Teil des logischen Raumes außerhalb ihrer Grenze. So wäre das transzendente Subjekt die Grenze zwischen der Welt, d.h. zwischen den verwirklichten Sachverhalten und dem anderen Teil des logischen Raumes, d.h. den nicht verwirklichten Sachverhalten. Das transzendente Subjekt würde so die Bedingungen für einen Übergang von der Möglichkeit zur Aktualität bestimmen. Nur dann kann man rechtmäßig sagen, dass die Aussagen über das transzendente Ich/Subjekt sinnvoll sind. Allerdings andererseits, wenn die Logik als Grenze der Welt verstanden werden soll, so - dem

Hauptgedanke des *Tractatus* zufolge – gibt es außerhalb der Logik gar nichts. D.h. es gibt keine möglichen Sachverhalte, keinen logischen Raum außer Welt. Auf jeden Fall kann man darüber nicht sprechen. Wie es scheint, kann man diese Aporie nur in dieser Weise überwinden, und zwar, der logische Raum wird als die Grenzen der Welt anerkannt, d.h. als das transzendente Subjekt.

Vom Standpunkt des Solipsismus aus präsentiert sich die Frage nach dem Subjekt etwas anderes. In den folgenden Thesen stellt Wittgenstein fest:

Dass die Welt meine Welt ist, das zeigt sich darin, dass die Grenzen der Sprache (der Sprache, die allein ich verstehe) die Grenzen meiner Welt sind. (5.62)

Die Welt und das Leben sind Eins (5.621)

Ich bin meine Welt. (Der Mikrokosmos) (5.63)

Hier beginnt Wittgenstein mit dem Ich als Zentrum im psychologischen Sinne und dann übergeht zur Beschreibung der Welt als „meine Welt“. Das ist „die Methode, das Subjekt zu isolieren“ (5.631). Diese beschreibt, dass in der Welt, d.h. im Bereich der Tatsachen, es kein Subjekt gibt. Dieses Verschwinden von Subjekt kann zweierlei verstanden werden. (1) als Auflösendes Ichs/Subjekts in der Welt; im Sinne, dass es eine strenge Identität des Ich und der Welt dargestellt wird; oder (2) als Zusammenschrumpfen des Ich zu einem „ausdehnungslosen Punkt“ (5.64). Wenn es um den (1) Fall geht, kann dieses Auflösen des Ich/Subjekts gemäß dem neutralen Monismus interpretiert werden. Der neutrale Monismus, der beispielsweise von W. James und B. Russell vertreten wird, lautet, dass das Subjekt/Ich nur eine andere Art und Weise der Ordnung des neutralen Stoffes, d.h. das reine Gegebene, ist. Das Subjekt/Ich und die Welt sind demzufolge zwei Seiten des Gleichen: die Welt ist die objektive Seite, das Ich ist hingegen die subjektive Seite. Das Ergebnis wurde von Wittgenstein als „Realismus“ bezeichnet, der als „das Verschwinden des Subjekts“ wohl interpretiert werden soll. Es scheint jedoch, dass das erreichte Ergebnis als Naturalismus bzw. als Reduktionismus bezeichnet werden soll. Denn das in beiden Fällen erschienene Bild der Wirklichkeit unterscheidet sich von der Beschreibung der Wirklichkeit, die durch die Naturwissenschaften gegeben wird, nicht.

Zusammenfassend kann man sagen: Der Idealismus ergibt sich im gewissen Sinne als Realismus, d.h. wird wesentlich zum Naturalismus. Wittgenstein versucht Solipsismus als eine Version des Idealismus darzustellen, die kein traditioneller Subjektivismus, sondern Naturalismus ist. Was kann darüber hinaus gesagt werden? Das ist die Wiederholung des Wegs von Hume, - das Subjekt verschwindet. Es soll aber betont werden, was allerdings Wittgenstein selbst folgendermaßen formulierte:

Was der Solipsismus nämlich meint, ist ganz richtig, nur lässt es sich nicht sagen, sondern es zeigt sich (5.62)

Der Hauptgedanke des Solipsismus, der auf die Identität des Ich und der Welt zurückführt, kann Wittgenstein zufolge nicht ausgesprochen werden. Wittgenstein beruht sich hier auf dem Grundunterschied zwischen dem, was man *sagen* kann, und dem, was sich nur *zeigen* lässt. Die Identität zwischen Ich und der Welt ist eine innere Relation. Diese Relation kann nicht ausgesprochen werden. Es ist der gleiche Fall, wenn wir die logische Form als etwas Gemeinsames für den Satz und die Tatsache auszusprechen versuchen. Es ist so, als

müssten wir außerhalb des Satzes und der Welt stehen können, um die logische Form zu erfassen, so müssten wir annehmen, dass wir eine Fähigkeit besitzen, über sich selbst und der Welt hinauszugehen. Allerdings lautet die These 5.641 vollkommen anderes:

Es gibt also wirklich einen Sinn, in welchem in der Philosophie nichtpsychologisch vom Ich die Rede sein kann.

Das Ich tritt in der Philosophie dadurch ein, dass die Welt meine Welt ist. (5.641)

Die These 5.62 scheint über das Ich im Solipsismus zu sprechen, nicht zu erlauben, die These 5.641 lässt hingegen solche Aussagen zu. Es gibt also die Aporie. Es wird in diesem Kontext (Zusammenhang) die Doppelsinnigkeit der letzten These des *Tractatus* markant:

Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen.

Otto Neurath bemerkte bereits, dass es nicht bekannt ist, was eigentlich die These 7 ausschließt (Haller R., 1989). Es sieht danach aus, dass die Thesen 7 und 6.54 (vorletzte These des *Tractatus*) davon zeugen, dass die einzelnen Thesen des *Tractatus* miteinander nicht übereinstimmen. Wittgenstein würde somit einen minimalen Grad von Inkohärenz zulassen. (Burckhardt A., 1990).

Jetzt übergehe ich zur metaphysischen Interpretation des Subjekts. Diese hängt sehr eng mit Mystizismus Wittgensteins zusammen. Dieser Auffassung zufolge ist das metaphysische Subjekt keine bequeme Konstruktion mehr, die über den gewissen Standpunkt sprechen lässt, oder die Perspektive, die man annehmen kann. Sie wird mehr zu einem außerweltlichen, beinahe göttlichen Standpunkt. Die These 6.45 setzt so das interpretierte metaphysische Subjekt voraus:

„Die Anschauung der Welt sub specie aeterni ist ihre Anschauung als - begrenztes - Ganzes.

Das Gefühl der Welt als begrenztes Ganzes ist das mystische“ (6.45)

Das metaphysische Subjekt ist bereits keine Grenze der Welt, aber etwas vollkommen außerhalb der Welt. Also ist es kein transzendentes Subjekt mehr, sondern ein transzendentes Subjekt. Es ist bemerkenswert, dass die mystische Erfahrung eine Art des Erlebnisses - eine Tatsache ist -, die nicht so einfach ignoriert werden kann. Deshalb kann diese Erfahrung ein wichtiges Argument für die Anerkennung des metaphysischen Subjekts (im strengen Sinne) sein.

Die Interpretation, die hier vorgeschlagen wird, ist folgendermaßen: das metaphysische Ich ist ursprünglich und wesentlich das Subjekt des Willens. Dieses Subjekt ist eine kosmische Kraft. Diese ist blind und unbewusst, jedoch schöpferisch. Deshalb kann diese Kraft bilden.. Dies, was diese Kraft bildet, ist die Welt, d.h. die Tatsachen. Die Welt soll als phänomenale Beschränkung dieser Kraft, ihrer Grenzen und auch gleichzeitig als ihre Repräsentation verstanden werden. Die Welt und Tatsachen sind die „Objektivierung des Willens“. Die nächste Etappe der Entwicklung des Willens ist eine Art des dialektischen Spiels zwischen dem Subjekt des Willens und der Welt/Tatsachen. In dieser gegenseitigen Beziehung zwischen ihnen erscheint das Niveau des Bewusstseins (und Selbstbewusstseins). Wittgenstein schweigt darüber, wie es zur Erscheinung des Bewusstseins kommt. Dagegen finden wir eine spekulative

Lösung dieses Problems bei Schopenhauer. Er bedient sich einer Metapher des Erzeugens von Ton. Schopenhauer vergleicht „die vibrierende Seite“ zum Subjekt des Willens, und „das Resonanzboden“ zur Welt (Schopenhauer A., 1924, B.2, 195). Den entstandenen Ton vergleicht er mit dem Bewusstsein. Dann wird das Subjekt des Willens zum transzendentalen Ich, d.h. die transzendente Einheit der Apperzeption als die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Welt, die bewusst werden. Auf diese Art und Weise enthüllt sich der doppelte Aspekt des metaphysischen Subjekts: (1) als Subjekt des Willens und (2) als erkennendes Subjekt. Das erkennende Subjekt ist etwas sekundär, deshalb betont Wittgenstein, dass es kein solches Subjekt gibt; das ist nur ein Schein (vgl. Tgb. 5.08. 1916; u. Tr. 5.631).

Um den doppelten Aspekt des metaphysischen Subjekts zu enthüllen, ist es notwendig die Welt als die Grenze zu betrachten. Die erstaunliche Analogie kann man zwischen der Formulierung von Wittgenstein und dieser von Schopenhauer beobachten (feststellen): (1) die Welt als Spiegel des Willens (Schopenhauer); (2) die Logik als Spiegel der Welt (Wittgenstein). Hier kommt zum Vorschein, dass der Wille ursprünglich und die Logik hingegen sekundär ist. Schopenhauer bemerkt jedoch, dass die Identität des Subjekts des Willens und des erkennenden Subjekts etwas ist, was wir am Ende nicht verstehen können. Diese Identität ist wesentlich „das Wunder (kat egzechon)“ (Schopenhauer A. 1924, B. II, 195). Das ist somit ein Postulat oder R. Collingwood zufolge, eine absolute Prasupposition. Die Anerkennung dieser Identität könnte von Wittgensteins Standpunkt aus, als eine Konsequenz der mystischen Erfahrung gelesen werden. Mit anderen Worten, diese Identität wäre die Konsequenz „der Anschauung der Welt sub specie aeterni (...) als - begrenztes - Ganzes“. Erst angesichts dieser Erfahrung könnte man über die Relation der Identität von den Subjekten sprechen.

In der Annäherung Wittgensteins zum Problem des Subjekts können zwei gegensätzliche Wege angedeutet werden; (1) von innen (der immanente Weg); (2) von außen (der transzendente Weg). Auf dem ersten Weg erfolgt das Markieren der Grenzen von innen (vgl. 4.114). Diese Methode wurde von J. Hintikka „der semantische Solipsismus“ genannt, weil man auf diesem Wege die Grenze erreicht, welche die Logik ist (Hintikka J, 1996, 98). Der zweite Weg dagegen beruht sich auf die mystische Erfahrung und gründet in der Anschauung der Welt von außen. Aus diesen zwei Wegen ergeben sich zwei verschiedene Konzeptionen des Subjekts. Mit anderen Worten, diese zwei Wege, zwei Auffassungen setzen zwei verschiedene Weise des Verstehens des Subjekts voraus. Der semantische Solipsismus - könnte man vermuten schließt den Mystizismus aus, und umgekehrt. Ist es möglich, diese beiden Auffassungen zu vereinbaren?

Versuchen wir uns noch diese Auffassungen anzusehen. Der semantische Solipsismus (A) erlaubt nur Grenzen zu erreichen, aber sie können nicht überschritten werden, weil die Logik es nicht erlaubt. Andererseits setzt der Mystizismus (B) die Möglichkeit des Überschreitens der Grenzen voraus. Wie soll das Problem entschieden werden? Das ist die Alternative 'A v B' und wir könnten eine Frage stellen: welches Glied dieser Alternative soll man wählen -A oder B? Den semantischen Solipsismus oder Mystizismus? Soll man überhaupt zwischen ihnen wählen? Allerdings hat Wittgenstein absichtlich diese zwei Wege im *Tractatus* dargestellt. Also wenn wir voraussetzen würden, dass er der Mystizismus und den Solipsismus gleich ernst nimmt, und seine Stellung

kohärent ist, dann soll man beide Glieder der Alternative akzeptieren. Mit anderen Worten, soll man die ganze Alternative annehmen, weil das gerade keine *non-exclusive* Alternative ist.

Dank des Hinweisens auf diese zwei Wege wollte Wittgenstein zeigen, dass das Denken, das auf der Logik stützt, seine Grenze hat. Das, was innerhalb diesen Grenzen sich befindet, schöpft das Ganze nicht aus. Um es deutlicher darstellen zu wollen, worum es sich hier handelt, muss an dieser Stelle auf Schopenhauer erneut zurückgegriffen werden. Die Lösung auf Grund der Interpretation des „Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung“ ist folgendermaßen: Der Auffassung von dem semantischen Solipsismus, d.h. der immanenten Auffassung entspricht das reine erkennende Subjekt. Dieses Subjekt existiert nicht im eigentlichen Sinne des Wortes. Was dies betrifft, sind sich Wittgenstein und Schopenhauer einig. Dieses Subjekt ist nur eine Konstruktion, eine Perspektive, „das geometrische aber keine physische Auge“ (Pears D., 1993). Der mystischen Auffassung entspricht hingegen das Subjekt des Willens. Beide Philosophen behaupten, dass das Subjekt im starken Sinne existiert. Daraus kann man schließen, dass das Subjekt des Willens für die mystische Auffassung verantwortlich ist, die hingegen der Logik widerspricht. Diese Auffassung existiert jedoch. Die mystische Erfahrung von Überschreiten der Welt der Tatsachen, d.h. die Welt als Vorstellung, kann auf dem Weg erreicht werden, der sich selbst auf etwas beruht, was allein keine Vorstellung ist. Dieses „etwas“ ist genau genommen der Wille, das Subjekt des Willens. Denn dieser Weg kann nicht vorgestellt werden, kann man darüber lediglich außerhalb der Logik „sprechen“. Man darf also diesen Konflikt zwischen der Logik und dem Mystizismus nicht vergessen.

2.

Die Überlegungen, die sich auf das metaphysische Subjekt beziehen, blieben allerdings unvollständig und einseitig, wenn sie mit der Frage nach den Gegenständen und nach der logischen Form nicht verbunden wären. Wir beginnen mit der Frage, was für ein Verhältnis zwischen Gegenständen und dem metaphysischen Subjekt besteht. Wittgenstein äußert hierzu folgendermaßen: „Die Gegenstände bilden die Struktur der Welt“ (2.021). Die Gegenstände bestimmen die Grenze der Welt. „Die Grenze zeigt sich wieder in der Gesamtheit der Elementarsätze“ (5.561). Diese Übereinstimmung ist nicht zufällig, dass - einerseits - die Gegenstände die Grenze der Welt bilden und - andererseits - das Subjekt die Grenze der Welt ist. Daraus ergibt sich, dass die Gegenstände das Subjekt sind. Mit anderen Worten, die Substanz (=Gesamtheit der Gegenstände) ist die Grenze der Welt und deren Subjekt. Darüber hinaus sagt Wittgenstein: die Grenze der Welt und deren Subjekt ist die Logik. Die Logik ist auch a priori und transzendental (vgl. 5.552). Die Gegenstände sind ebenfalls a priori und transzendental. Welcher Zusammenhang ist zwischen den Gegenständen und der Logik? Die Logik ist eine Entwicklung von dem, was a priori und transzendental in den Gegenständen steckt. Das, was in den Gegenständen steckt, ist ihre logische Form. Die logische Form der Welt ist eine Summe der logischen Formen der Gegenstände. Also bestimmt diese Summe alle Konfigurationen der Gegenstände, d.h. der Sachverhalte. Der Logik ist „der Spiegel der Welt“ (vgl. 6.13) daher ist die Welt im gewissen Sinne in einem großen Spiegel enthalten. Die Logik bestimmt also die äußeren Grenzen, in Form eines Raumes, in dem sich die Sachverhalte befinden. Die

Gegenstände bilden dagegen, als Quelle der Sachverhalten wahrscheinlich die Grundlage, also die innere Grenze der Welt/Wirklichkeit. Das Bild stimmt im Allgemeinen mit der Aristotelischen Interpretation der Metaphysik Wittgensteins überein. Eine andere Auffassung vom Problem der Relation: Logik - Gegenstände kann aufgrund der Bemerkungen von J. Hintikka formuliert werden. Hintikka bemerkte, dass die Gegenstände neben der: (1) Apriorität und (2) Transzendentalität auch von der (3) direkten Bekanntschaft (*by acquaintance*) charakterisiert werden können (Hintikka J. 1996, 106). Vorgeschlagene Interpretation besteht darin, dass die Gegenstände für die Kantianische Kategorien gelten. Die Kategorien sind bei Kant dies, was dem Intellekt direkt gegeben ist. Deshalb scheint Kant zu sagen, dass sich Kategorien weder ausdrücken noch definieren lassen können; sie können lediglich genannt werden. Die Einfachheit und die direkte Bekanntschaft entscheiden darüber, dass sich die Gegenstände bzw. Kategorien nicht ausdrücken lassen. Deshalb befinden sich die Logik und Gegenstände (als Kategorien) auf derselben Seite: die Gegenstände sind Punkte in einem großen Spiegel der Logik. Wenn Wittgenstein sagt, dass die Logik transzendental ist, versteht er damit, dass die Logik des Traktatus die Logik der Kategorien ist. Die transzendente Interpretation der Gegenstände weist auch eine Ähnlichkeit mit Standpunkt Platons nach. Wir lesen in *Sophistes*: „Aus der Mitwirkung der Ideen haben wir Logos“ (vgl. *Sophistes*, 259e 5-6). Die Analogie wird hier deutlich: Gegenstände als Ideen und Logos als die Form der Welt. Diese Motive im *Tractatus*, die auf das Denken von Platon und Kant hinweisen, sind Argumente dafür, Ontologie Wittgensteins als Ontologie Platons und Kants zu sehen. Die Gegenstände als ewige unveränderte und einfache Objekte sind keine Aristotelische Substanze. Sie ähneln hingegen Ideen und Kategorien. Wenn die Gegenstände a priori und transzendental sind, so befinden sie sich wohl 'außerhalb' der Welt und bilden deren äußere Grenze. Die Welt der Tatsachen beschrieben im *Tractatus* ist im Sinne von Aristoteles' Lehre nicht substanzial. Die Welt ist also eine Projektion von dem Transzendentalen, d.h. eine Projektion von Gegenständen und Logik in einer empirischen Sphäre (die in ihrem Wesen leer ist).

Wenn die Gegenstände mit der in ihnen gegründeten Logik das Subjekt als die äußere, d.h. transzendente Grenze der Welt bilden, dann bleibt noch eins festzulegen. Und zwar: gibt es noch ein Subjekt des Willens, das sich von dem Subjekt unterscheidet, das als Gegenstände zusammen mit Logik verstanden wird? Es ist merkwürdig, dass Wittgenstein eine wesentliche Frage nicht beantwortet und zwar: Warum folgt ein Übergang von einem Zustand der Welt in einen neuen anderen? Man kann annehmen, dass die Summe der logischen Formen eine Handlung ist, die den Wandel des Zustands der Welt erzwingt. Das Subjekt des Willens spielt diese Rolle gerade in der Metaphysik Schopenhauers. Es ist nicht eindeutig, ob Wittgenstein diesen Teil der Lehre Schopenhauers wirklich akzeptiert. In Tagebüchern findet sich doch eine Notiz, die diese Ansicht wohl bestätigt:

„Es gibt wirklich nur eine Weltseele, welche ich vorzüglich meine Seele nenne, und als welche allein ich das erfasse, was ich die Seelen anderer nenne“ <23.05.1915>

Möglicherweise versteht Wittgenstein die Seele der Welt als das Subjekt des Willens und als die Form der Welt zugleich. Wie es scheint, gibt es ein wichtiges Argument gegen die Unterscheidung zwischen dem

Subjekt des Willens und der Form der Welt. Diese Unterscheidung würde zum Regressus ad infinitum führen. Und zwar, die Form der Welt als die wechselnde den Zustand der Welt Handlung würde von dem Willen als die Handlung der höheren Ordnung bestimmt. Das wäre die Lage, die man als die Handlung der Handlung definieren kann, was fraglich erscheint.

Andererseits besinnt sich Wittgenstein auf die Möglichkeit des Bereichs, der sich noch weiter und tiefer befinden könnte. In *Tagebücher* finden wir die folgende Notiz:

Aber könnte es nicht etwas geben, was durch einen Satz sich nicht ausdrücken lässt (und auch kein Gegenstand ist)? Das liesse sich eben durch die Sprache nicht ausdrücken; und wir können auch nicht daran fragen.

Wie, wenn es etwas außerhalb der Tatsachen gibt? Was unsere Sätze nicht ausdrücken vermögen? Aber da haben wir ja z.B. die Dinge, und wir fühlen gar kein Verlangen, sie in Sätzen auszudrücken.

Was sich nicht ausdrücken lässt, das drücken wir nicht aus -. Und wie wollen wir fragen, ob sich DAS ausdrücken lässt, was sich nicht AUSDRÜCKEN lässt?

Gibt es kein Bereich Außerhalb der Tatsachen? <27.5.1915>

Eine ähnliche Äußerung Wittgensteins gibt es in *Vermischten Bemerkungen*:

Das Unausprechbare (das, was mir geheimnisvoll erscheint und ich nicht auszusprechen vermag) gibt vielleicht den Hintergrund, auf dem das, was ich aussprechen könnte, Bedeutung bekommt. <VB, 38>

In dieser Notiz versucht Wittgenstein das Problem der Existenz außerhalb der Tatsachen in Frage zu stellen. Das Unbestimmte kann mit dem Willen oder Subjekt des Willens identifiziert werden. Diese Interpretation Gedanken Wittgensteins weist darauf hin, dass das Subjekt des Willens etwas anders als Gegenstände ist. Denn die Gegenstände und die Logik lassen sich bis zu einem gewissen Grade bestimmen. Der Wille entwischt hingegen jedem Versuch ihn zu bestimmen. Dieser zweiten Interpretation zufolge gibt es zwei Stufen des metaphysischen Subjekts: (1) das transzendente Subjekt als die Grenze der Welt und (2) das Subjekt des Willens. Das letzte kann „das absolute Subjekt“ genannt werden. Die These 6.43 bestätigt die obige Interpretation:

Wenn das gute oder böse Wollen die Welt ändert, so kann es nur die Grenzen der Welt ändern, nicht die Tatsachen; nicht das, was durch die Sprache ausgedrückt werden kann. Kurz, die Welt muss dann dadurch überhaupt eine andere werden. Sie muss sozusagen als Ganzes abnehmen oder zunehmen. (6.43)

Die Unterscheidung des Subjekts des Willens von der Summe der Formen der Gegenstände ergibt sich als eine vielmehr überzeugende Hypothese als eine gegensätzliche, die ihre Identität voraussetzt. Wittgenstein nennt als Formen beispielsweise: Farbe, Raum und Zeit (vgl. 2.0251). Wenn in diesem Sinne Formen als der endgültige Grund und Ursprung der Welt gelten sollten, dann scheinen diese nicht genügend zu sein. Es ist durchaus wahrscheinlicher, dass Wittgenstein eine Kraft berücksichtigt, welche die Gegenstände und deren Formen beeinflusst oder aus welcher die Gegenstände entstehen. Daher kann man dieser Kraft, die den

Hintergrund für Gegenstände und logische Formen bildet, die Rolle des Subjekts des Willens zuschreiben. Diese Interpretation der Ontologie des *Tractatus* ähnelt der Metaphysik des Willens bei Schopenhauer.

Die Interpretation, in der das Subjekt des Willens den Gegenständen und der Logik gegenüber als ursprünglich gilt, stimmt nicht nur mit der Metaphysik Schopenhauers überein, sondern sie bildet auch eine Unterstützung für ein transzendentes Merkmal der Gegenstände wie Kantianische Kategorien. Es soll hier erinnert werden, dass Kant, indem er die Kategorien, Formen der Anschauung und die transzendente Einheit der Apperzeption erwähnt, endet damit seine Erzählung über die transzendentalen Bedingungen der möglichen Erfahrung noch nicht. Er lässt noch einen Platz für die transzendente Einbildungskraft. Diese Einbildungskraft bleibt im Hintergrund, fungiert aber zugleich als Koordinationsfunktion und führt die Synthese durch. Die Synthese tritt auf zwei Ebene auf: auf der Ebene der Logik und auf der Ebene der Formen der Anschauung. Die transzendente Einbildungskraft, ebenso wie das Subjekt des Willens, bildet also einen absoluten Hintergrund. Als dieser Hintergrund aktiviert die Einbildungskraft eine elementare Handlung, die Kategorien (Gegenstände im Sinne Wittgensteins) und in ihnen versteckte Formen. Allerdings kann man sich die Einbildungskraft nicht vorstellen; mit anderen Worten, sie kann nicht ausgedrückt und nicht dargestellt werden. Auf diese Weise erlangt die transzendente Kantianische - Schopenhauersche Interpretation des *Tractatus* eine Bestätigung, insbesondere die Konzeption des metaphysischen Subjekts als Subjekt des Willens.

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