



Ethik – Gesellschaft – Politik  
Ethics – Society – Politics

**Ethik – Gesellschaft – Politik**

Ethics – Society – Politics

Martin G. Weiss  
Hajo Greif  
Hrsg.

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Beiträge  
Papers

35. Internationales Wittgenstein Symposium

35<sup>th</sup> International Wittgenstein Symposium

Kirchberg am Wechsel

5. – 11. August 2012

**35**

# **Ethik – Gesellschaft – Politik**

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**Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft**  
**Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society**

**Band XX**  
**Volume XX**

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Beiträge des 35. Internationalen  
Wittgenstein Symposiums

5. – 15. August 2012  
Kirchberg am Wechsel

**Band XX**

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**Herausgeber**

Martin G. Weiss  
Hajo Greif



Gedruckt mit Unterstützung der Abteilung  
Wissenschaft und Forschung (K3)  
des Amtes der NÖ Landesregierung

Kirchberg am Wechsel, 2012  
Österreichische Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft

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Papers of the 35<sup>th</sup> International  
Wittgenstein Symposium  
August 5 – 11, 2012  
Kirchberg am Wechsel

**Volume XX**

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**Editors**

Martin G. Weiss  
Hajo Greif



Printed in cooperation with the  
Department for Science and Research  
of the Province of Lower Austria

Kirchberg am Wechsel, 2012  
Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

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**Distributors**

Die Österreichische Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft  
The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

Markt 63, A-2880 Kirchberg am Wechsel  
Österreich / Austria



[www.alws.at](http://www.alws.at)

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ISSN 1022-3398

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Pre-Proceedings, Abstracta-Heft und Programm wurden mit Hilfe eines von Joseph Wang, Universität Innsbruck erarbeiteten Datenbankprogramms erstellt.  
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Pre-Proceedings, Book of Abstracts and Programme were produced using a database application developed by Joseph Wang, University of Innsbruck, Austria.  
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Visuelle Gestaltung: Hajo Greif, Sascha Windholz  
Druck: Eigner Druck, A-3040 Neulengbach

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# The Idea of a Contract

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According to David Gauthier, moral philosophy faces a "foundational crisis" (Gauthier 1991, in Darwall 2003: 91). The idea of universal objective moral values looks dubious; some version of ethical relativism, subjectivism or nihilism seems better suited to the scientific, non-secular world-view of the modern man. To deal with this crisis, there have arisen (renewed) attempts to ground morality on an agreement or *contract*. To put it roughly, according to these views the fundamental rules of morality are what rational people would agree to in a hypothetical pre-moral choice situation. Modern contract theory is divided into two brands: *contractarianism*, which is based on Hobbes' idea of men as self-interested utility-maximizers (e.g. Gauthier 1986), and *contractualism*, which is based on Kant's idea of the moral equality of men (e.g. Rawls 1971; Scanlon 1982). But in this discussion, surprisingly little attention is paid to the very concept of contract. In this paper I will go back to the "founding fathers" of the two strands of contract theories and look at how Hobbes and Kant literally understand the concept of contract. It will be seen that the core meaning of this term is rather similar for them both, and that it cannot be understood without other (moral) concepts, such as rights or promises. Thus, one cannot solve the "foundational crisis" of morality by appealing *only* to the idea of contract. On the other hand, in so far as modern contractarians or contractualists do not rely on this literal meaning of contract, it becomes dubious why they are called contract theories.

## 1. Hobbes on the nature of contracts

Thomas Hobbes discusses the nature of contracts in chapter XIV of his *Leviathan*. He begins by defining *jus naturale*, or the "right of nature": it is "the liberty each man hath to use his own power [...] for the preservation of his [...] own life" (par.1). Liberty means "the absence of external impediments" (par.2). In other words, in the so-called state of nature, prior to civil society, there are no restrictions or constraints concerning the means of one's self-preservation. (But neither is anyone entitled to the help of others. To use modern terminology, there are only liberty-rights, no claim-rights, in the state of nature.)

On the other hand, a *law of nature* (*lex naturalis*) is a general rule, discovered by reason, which forbids us to do "that which is destructive of [one's] life" (XIV, par.3). If the right of nature (unlimited liberty) conflicts with the law of nature (which forbids us destroying our lives), then we must give up some of our natural rights. And the conflict is inevitable in the state of nature, given Hobbes' assumption that resources are limited, and men's needs and hopes similar (due to their physical and intellectual equality). Men end up competing with one another, and since there are no constraining rules ("every man has a right to everything, even to one another's body" (XIV, par.4)), the result is a war of "every man against every man" (XIII, par.8). According to Hobbes' famous words,

[i]n such a condition there is no place for industry, [...] no culture of the earth, no navigation, [...] no instrument of moving and removing such things as require much force [...] no arts, no letters, no society, and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death,

and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. (XIII, par.9)

Men realize that in order to live longer and more pleasant lives, they need to "seek peace, and follow it"; this is "the first and fundamental law of nature" (XIV, par.4). Seeking peace requires "that a man be willing, when others are so too, [...] to lay down this right to all things, and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself" (XIV, par.5).

So the contractual situation presupposes that there are some natural rights that have to be laid down. Laying down a right can mean either renouncing the right (in which case the person who renounces the right "cares not to whom the benefit thereof redoundeth"), or transferring the right (so that the benefit goes to a certain specified person or persons) (XIV, par.7). Contract is a transferring of right, i.e. an act between specific persons: "The mutual transferring of right is that which men call *contract*." (XIV, par.9) Moreover, it is a voluntary act, and aimed at "some good" of the contracting parties:

Whosoever a man transferreth his right or renounceth it, it is either in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself or for some other good he hopeth for thereby. For it is a voluntary act, and of the voluntary acts of every man the object is *some good to himself*. (XIV, par.8)

The idea that contracts must always be *mutually beneficial* is essential to Hobbes' account, and a direct consequence of the laws of nature. Their purpose is to prevent men from destroying themselves, so the transferring of right must advance this purpose.

Hobbes defines *pact* and *covenant* as types of contract in which the other party gets the benefit not immediately, but in the future: "one of the contractors may deliver the thing contracted for on his part, and leave the other to perform his part at some determinate time after (and in the meantime be trusted); and then the contract on his part is called *pact*, or *covenant*." (XIV, par.11) This means that the concept of *promise* is intertwined with that of contract, as the following quote clearly shows:

all contract is mutual translation, or change of right; and therefore he that promiseth only (because he hath already received the benefit for which he promiseth) is to be understood as if he intended that the right should pass; for unless he had been content to have his words so understood, the other would not have performed his part first. And for that cause, in buying and selling, and other acts of contract, a promise is equivalent for a covenant, and therefore obligating. (XIV, par.16)

The practice of promising seems to be presupposed in contractual relations: people use that practice knowing that they can get benefits from others if the others understand their words as promises. But (in certain contexts) as soon as the words are understood as promises, they thereby become binding on the promisor, and imply a contract. However, Hobbes does not discuss more closely the relation between contracts and promises. In present-day con-

tract law theory the relation between contracts and promises is, instead, one of the most hotly debated issues (see the concluding section of this paper).

The formation of a contract requires that the intention to transfer a right is communicated to the other party, and that both accept the transfer. That is, there must be "a declaration, or signification by some voluntary and sufficient sign or signs, that [the first party] doth so renounce or transfer [the right] to him that accepteth it." (XIV, par.7) Without (verifiable) mutual consent, there is no contract: that is why it is impossible to make a covenant with "brute beasts", because they do not understand our speech (XIV, par.22), and with God (because we would not know whether God has accepted our terms) (XIV, par.23).

Further requirements for contracts are that they are based on *deliberation*, and that one must be able to do what one contracts to do:

The matter or subject of a covenant is always something that falleth under deliberation (for to covenant is to an act of the will, that is to say an act, and the last act, of deliberation) and is therefore always understood to be something to come, and which is judged possible for him that covenanteth to perform. (XIV, par.24)

And therefore, to promise that which is known to be impossible, is *no covenant*. (XIV, par.25)

Hobbes also denies the validity of contracts in which someone voluntarily allows himself to be killed or seriously harmed. In other words, "a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them that assault him by force, to take away his life." (XIV, par.8) This kind of transferring of right would be contrary to whole "motive and end" for the business of transferring rights, which is "nothing else but the security of men". (ibid.) Thus, if someone indicates by his words that he e.g. wants to be voluntarily killed, "he is not to be understood as if he meant it, or that it was his will, but that he was ignorant of how such words and actions were to be interpreted." (ibid.)

To sum up, a contract is, according to Hobbes, a voluntary transfer of rights between certain specified persons, aimed at the benefit of them both. The intention to transfer a right has to be based on deliberation, and communicated to the other party (by promising to do (or forbear from doing) something which the promisor is capable of doing). What one cannot transfer is one's inalienable right to self-preservation. Rather, this right underlies and gives meaning to all contracts.

Why should men keep their promises or contracts? Hobbes claims that it is simply a law of nature that "men perform their covenants made". It follows from the first law of nature, which requires men to seek peace, and from the second, which requires us to lay down (some of) our natural rights:

From that law of nature by which we are obliged to transfer to another such rights as, being retainable, hinder the peace of mankind, there followeth a third, which is this *that men perform their covenants made*, without which covenants are in vain, and but empty words, and the right of all men to all things remaining, we are still in the condition of war. (XV, par.1)

However, since men are easily tempted into breaking their contracts, and as long as there is a fear of nonperformance on either part the contract is not valid, "there must be some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach

of their covenant" (XV, par.3). Thus, "the validity of covenants begins not but with the constitution of a civil power sufficient to compel men to keep them". (ibid.) In other words, the possibility of valid contracts requires a prior (social) contract. At this point, Hobbes' theory encounters several difficulties: isn't it circular to justify the validity of contracts by a prior contract? How can men, who seem not to differ from brute beasts that care only about their own survival, be at the same rational deliberators who can discover and follow the laws of nature? And would it not be rational to break a promise whenever it looks more advantageous to do so rather than keep it?

We shall here deal briefly only with this last problem. Hobbes thinks that the behavior of free-riders, who are ready to break contracts even if others have agreed to keep them, is contrary to reason. This is because in the state of nature (condition of war), "no man can hope by his own strength or wit to defend himself from destruction without the help of confederates" (XV, par.5). In other words, men need to co-operate in order to survive; but "he [...] that breaketh his covenant, and consequently declareth that he thinks he may with reason to do so, cannot be received into any society that unite themselves for peace and defence." (ibid.) So those who break their contracts – or rather, as Gauthier points out, those who have a *disposition*, known to others, to break their contracts (see Gauthier 1986: 173) – will be kicked out from co-operative groups (which are necessary for man's survival). Whatever the merits of Hobbes' solution, it shows that the concept of contract does not by itself solve the "foundational problem" of morality. One needs also to explain why contracts should be kept; and it is difficult to see how this can be done without resorting to other (even more fundamental) moral principles.

## 2. Kant on contracts

Let us now turn Kant's definition of contracts, as formulated in his "Doctrine of Right" in the *Metaphysics of Morals* (MM). The doctrine of right (*Recht*) is, generally, about our *juridical* duties, rather than about our ethical duties (although, as Wood notes, "the values grounding ethics also show themselves in [Kant's] system of right" (Wood 1999: 322)). Right deals with the limits of external freedom; in other words, it is about "the conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom" (MM, §C: 24 [6:230]). A contract is a way of passing external possessions between individuals so that their freedom is preserved. According to Kant's definition, a contract is "[a]n act of the united choice of two persons by which anything at all that belongs to one passes to the other." (MM, §18: 57 [6:271])

So a contractual relationship requires (just like it did for Hobbes) that a person first possesses something rightfully, and then willingly transfers this possession to someone else. According to Kant, if I possess something (external to myself) rightfully, then another's use of that object, without my consent, would wrong me (MM, §1: 37 [6:245]). There are three kinds of objects one can possess: a corporeal *thing*, another person's *choice* to perform a specific deed, or another's *status* in relation to oneself. (MM, §4: 37-8 [6:247])) Although Kant says that one can pass "anything at all" that one rightfully owns to another person, what one at first acquires through a contract is only another person's choice, i.e. his promise to perform something in the future:

By contract I acquire something external. But what is it that I acquire? Since it is only the causality of another's choice with respect to a performance he has promised me, what I acquire directly by a contract is not an external thing but rather his deed [...]

By contract I therefore acquire another's promise (not what he promised), and yet something is added to my external belongings [...] This *right* of mine is, however, only a right against a *specific* physical person, and indeed a right to act upon his causality (his choice) to perform something for me. (MM, §20: 59 [6:273-4])

More simply put, a contract always involves a promise to do something in the future (cf. Hobbes' definition of a "pact" or "covenant"). In this way contracts can be distinguished from mere exchanges of things: a contract is a more complex transaction than just giving a banana for an apple. The formation of a contract consists, according to Kant, of a two-stage process. First, there is a preparatory stage which consists of *offer* and *assent*; what is in question here is a "preliminary judgment that what is offered would be acceptable to the promisee" (MM, §19: 57 [6:272]). Second, there is the concluding or constitutive stage which consists of *promise* and *acceptance*. (ibid.)

Through this process, the choices or wills of the two parties are supposed to become united (contract is, as we saw, the *united* choice of two persons). Although the requirement of mutual acceptance was present in Hobbes' account of contracts as well, Kant emphasizes this feature of contracts much more. He insists that the wills of the contracting parties should be united *simultaneously*. In practice, of course, promise and acceptance follow one another and cannot occur at the same time. The simultaneously united will of the contracting parties is the "transcendental deduction of the concept of acquisition by contract", not an empirical phenomenon (although the empirical, external formalities in concluding a contract – such as shaking hands or breaking a straw held by both persons – attempt to represent the declarations as existing simultaneously). (MM, §19: 58 [6:272])

The idea of simultaneously united wills is needed (at least partly) because the objects that are exchanged in the contract cannot be unowned at any moment. Contracts, in Kant's sense, require individuals who already possess something, and who transfer this possession to other (specific) individuals, without interruptions in the chain of possessors. If there was a gap in the chain of possessors, then the new owner would not have acquired the object through contract, but by means of "original acquisition":

Transfer by contract of what is mine takes place in accordance with the law of continuity (*lex continua*), that is, possession of the object is not interrupted for a moment during this act; for otherwise I would acquire, in this condition, and object that has no possessor [...], hence would acquire it originally, and this contradicts the concept of contract (MM, §20: 59 [6:274])

Original acquisition concerns only corporeal things; it means taking control of them (by giving some sign to others) before anyone else has done that, and it is the result of a *unilateral* choice, whereas a contract is always a bilateral choice. (see MM, §10: 48 [6:259])

So for Kant, a contract requires external possessions that are passed between specific persons through their mutual (and simultaneous) consent. Contrary to Hobbes, Kant is not interested in whether the parties to a contract actually benefit from the transaction. All that matters is that both parties' choices are *free*, and in accordance with a universal law:

in this reciprocal relation of choice no account at all is taken of the *matter* of choice, that is, of the end each has in mind with the object he wants; it is not asked, for example, whether someone who buys goods from me for his own commercial use will gain by the transaction or not. All that is in question is the *form* in the relation of choice on the part of both, insofar as choice is regarded merely as *free*, and whether the action of one can be united with the freedom of the other in accordance with a universal law. (MM, §B: 24 [6:230])

What is Kant's answer to the question why contracts or promises have to be kept? In the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* Kant tries to show that fidelity to one's promises is both prudent ("loss of confidence in me might prove to be far more disadvantageous than the misfortune which I [...] try to avoid [by a false promise]" (14 [402]), and our moral duty. That it is our moral duty can be seen by asking "whether I would really be content if my maxim (of extricating myself from difficulty by a false promise) were to hold as a universal law for myself as well as for others" (15 [403]). If I ask this question, I should, according to Kant, "immediately become aware that I [...] can not at all will a universal law to lie" (ibid.). This is one of the ways in which Kant's ethical theory is connected with his doctrine of right in general, and with the idea of contracts in particular.

### 3. Conclusions

What is the relevance of this clarification of the term "contract" to present-day contractual moral philosophy? At least it shows that if morality is literally thought to be based on a contract, the idea is absurd. All of those to whom moral constraints are thought to apply have not explicitly and voluntarily agreed to transfer their rights or possessions to others (on the expectation of some gain to themselves). On the other hand, if "contract" means only hypothetical, not actual, agreement, how can it be binding? As Kymlicka points out, "a hypothetical promise is no promise at all, for no-one has undertaken an obligation" (Kymlicka 1991: 187).

This analysis also shows that the concept of contract, even if it were only a hypothetical contract, cannot be fully understood without giving some account of its relation to (at least) promises and rights. In legal theory, the close (but complicated and controversial) relation between contracts and promises has been acknowledged and widely discussed. Some contract law theorists see promises as providing the foundation and moral justification for contracts (e.g. Fried 1981). Others deny this, because not all promises are (or are intended by the promisor) to be legally binding contracts, and because mere breaking of promise, before the other party has had time to rely on it (and thus suffers no actual harm or loss from the breach) has been seen as a dubious ground for full compensation or remedies. (see e.g. Atiyah 1995)

The contractual moral theorists could retort here that they are not interested in the relation between contracts and promises, but on the fact that contractual obligations are *conventional* (not divine or natural), and that their purpose is to secure certain important human *interests* (see Kymlicka 1991: 188). The purpose of talking of a contract is only to draw attention to these features of morality (which seem appealing to many). But if the most important feature of morality is conventionality, then there are no convention-independent restrictions as to what kind of moral principles the co-operative groups adopt. It all depends on who has the most bargaining power at the initial

contractual situation. There is no guarantee that e.g. seriously disabled people will get their interests protected: they cannot offer any benefits to others, nor do they pose a threat to others if their interests are ignored. (See Cudd 2007) On the other hand, if the purpose of the hypothetical moral contract is to secure some important interests or to protect everyone's equal moral worth, aren't those interests then more fundamental than the contract? In this latter case, the name "contractualism" seems misleading. As we saw, for Kant "contract" is a judicial, rather than an ethical concept. It does not provide a foundation for morality, but rather presupposes the moral foundation of the categorical imperative and respect for the dignity of the contracting parties.

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# Wittgenstein und die Sprachpolizei

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Dass philosophische Probleme auf sprachliche Verstrickungen zurückzuführen und auf diese Weise aufzulösen sind wie „Knoten in unserem Denken“ (Z §452), sorgt auch heute noch für Unmut. Seit Jahrzehnten sind es im Wesentlichen dieselben zwei Einwände, die gegen diese Methode Wittgensteins – und mit Abstrichen auch Austins – vorgebracht werden. Der erste unterstellt ein Missverständnis über das Wesen der Sprache. Für ein dynamisches System, wie es die Sprache ist, liessen sich kaum statische Regeln aufstellen – und und schon gar nicht könne ihr steter Wandel aufgehalten oder auch nur gelenkt werden. Und hier knüpft der zweite Einwand an. Selbst wenn es möglich ist, eine Grammatik im Sinne Wittgensteins für die Begriffe der Philosophie aufzustellen, so wäre es doch verfehlt, damit eine eigentliche Sprachpolizei zu installieren, die der Philosophie selbst und ihren Nachbardisziplinen vorschreibt, wie über die zu behandelnden Probleme zu reden sei. Eine solche Praxis wäre nicht nur eine Verfälschung der Auffassung Wittgensteins über das Wesen der Philosophie, sondern ihrer überhaupt auch ungebührlich.

Im Folgenden werde ich diese beiden Einwände zurückweisen und zu zeigen versuchen, warum ich sie für verfehlt halte.

Dem ersten Einwand, wie er in jüngster Zeit wieder etwa von Daniel Dennett gegen Peter Hacker vorgebracht worden ist, liegt folgende Behauptung zugrunde: Was wir als begriffliche Verwirrung ansehen und lösen wollen, ist vielleicht gar kein philosophisches Problem, sondern einfach die Folge eines Bedeutungswandels. Denn dass sich die Bedeutungen im Laufe der Zeit ändern können, ist schliesslich häniglich bekannt und lässt sich nicht einfach durch konservativen Sprachgebrauch verhindern. Dennett hält es denn auch für schwierig zu entscheiden, ob im Satz „The cat climbed down the tree“ (Dennett 2007: 84) die Regeln für den Gebrauch des Verbs to climb verletzt wurden. Die Linguistik, so Dennett, enthalte sich hier eines Urteils. Aber damit beginnt er sich ebenso auf linguistisches Glatteis wie Hacker, den er dafür kritisiert. Denn es ist aus linguistischer Sicht überhaupt nicht schwierig zu beurteilen, was mit diesem Verb geschehen ist (vgl. Wierzbicka 1990: 363 ff.). In dem zitierten Satz wurde keine Regel verletzt, sie hat sich nur im Laufe der Zeit verändert. To climb ist verwandt mit dem deutschen (er)klimmen, das tatsächlich nur eine Aufwärtsrichtung wiedergeben kann. Und ohne Adverb entspricht das englische Verb auch heute noch dieser Regel: The cat climbed the tree heisst, dass die Katze den Baum erklimmen hat und jetzt oben und nicht unten ist. Ohne Erweiterung entspricht to climb also genau unserem erklimmen, während es aber mit der adverbialen Erweiterung down ,(abwärts-)klettern' bedeutet. In diesem Fall wurden die Gebrauchsregeln lediglich erweitert. Ähnliches lässt sich auch an Beispielen zeigen, die weit weniger harmlose Bedeutungsentwicklungen durchgemacht haben als to climb. So mündet etwa das lateinische tutari ‚schützen‘ im französischen tuer ‚töten‘, was die Sprachwissenschaft aber durchaus plausibel erklären kann. Der Bedeutungswandel ist kein Hindernis für die Begriffsklärung, sondern eine Argument für die Nützlichkeit dieser Methode. Denn der Bedeutungswandel

ist trotz all der erstaunlichen Wortgeschichten kein quodlibet. Bedeutungen springen nicht, der Wandel vollzieht sich vielmehr schrittweise und ist darum nicht immer, aber doch oft nachvollziehbar und erklärbar. Natürlich bleiben noch viele Bedeutungsentwicklungen rätselhaft oder sind nur mit gewagten Hypothesen nachzuvollziehen. Gleichwohl kann die historische Semantik mit hoher Sicherheit sagen, was nicht passiert sein kann. Es lassen sich auch mit aller Vorsicht kaum Prognosen wagen, wie sich die Bedeutung eines Worts entwickeln wird. Aber eher noch ist absehbar, wohin die Bedeutung nicht gehen wird. Dennett will mit dem Verweis auf alltägliche Umdeutungen zeigen, dass wir Verben wie denken oder urteilen, die ehemals dem Menschen und ihm Ähnlichem vorbehalten waren (vgl. PU §281), durchaus auch auf Computer und Gehirne anwenden könnten, wenn sich im Laufe der Zeit das Anwendungsmuster dieser Ausdrücke entsprechend entwickle. Aber er vermischt damit zwei verschiedene Sprachwandelprozesse, nämlich den ungesteuerten Bedeutungswandel und die expressiv motivierte Bedeutungsübertragung, wie wir sie bei Metaphern und Metonymien finden, die sich gefestigt haben. Entgegen der häufig so angetroffenen Benennung handelt es sich bei Sätzen des Typs Das Gehirn denkt, dass p übrigens nicht um eine Metapher, sondern um eine Metonymie, da hier von einem Teil ausgesagt wird, was eigentlich nur vom Ganzen ausgesagt werden kann. Nun handelt es sich dabei aber nicht um ein Sprachwandelphänomen, das sich einfach so ergeben hat, wie Dennett es darstellt; vielmehr scheint sich hier eine Redeweise zu verbreiten, deren Etablierung wir fördern oder verhindern können. Aus der Einsicht der modernen Linguistik, dass Sprachwandel kein Verfallsprozess ist und sogenannte Fremdwörter nicht den Untergang der abendländischen Kultur bedeuten, folgt allerdings nicht, dass wir jeder semantischen Neuerung gleichgültig gegenüberstehen sollten. Eine metonymische Übertragung kann dort Abhilfe schaffen, wo wir zuvor über keinen passenden Ausdruck verfügten oder die bestehenden nicht das wiedergeben, was wir wollten. Jene neuwissenschaftliche Metonymie von Mensch und Gehirn aber erklärt nichts, sondern verwischt wesentliche Unterschiede zwischen dem Besitzer und dem Vehikel einer Fähigkeit. Ein Verständnis der hier beteiligten Sprachwandelprozesse kann helfen, solch unglückliche Trübungen zu vermeiden.

Damit kommen wir zum zweiten Einwand, denn diese Art von Sprachkritik erinnert manche an eine Art Sprachpolizei, die streng über den Gebrauch der philosophischen Terminologie wacht und Verwendungen verbietet, einschränkt und gegebenenfalls die Regelbrecher mit dem Prädikat der Unsinnigkeit bestraft. Diese „Sprachpflege“, so die euphemistische Selbstbezeichnung, ist durchaus kein neues Phänomen:

Unter den Modewörtern, die jetzt im Schwange sind, ist [bedingen] wohl eines der widerwärtigsten. Es kann alles bedeuten und – gar nichts [...]. Die einen brauchen das unpersönliche bedingen in dem Sinne von: zur Voraussetzung haben. A bedingt B – das heisst: A hat B zur Voraussetzung [...]. Das ist die einzige vernünftige und

berechtigte Anwendung des Wortes. Nun brauchen aber andre das Wort in dem Sinne von bewirken [...]. A bedingt B – das heisst dann: A ist die Ursache von B [...]. Man übertreibt nicht, wenn man unsern gegenwärtigen Gebrauch von bedingen etwa so bezeichnet: wenn der Deutsche eine dunkle Ahnung davon hat, dass zwei Dinge in irgend einem ursächlichen Zusammenhang stehen, aber weder Neigung noch Fähigkeit, sich und andern diesen Zusammenhang klar zu machen, so sagt er: das eine Ding bedingt das andre. (Wustmann 1891: 111 ff, Hervorhebung im Original)

In seinem Buch voll an erstaunlicher Aggressivität zählt Gustav Wustmann „[a]llerhand Sprachdummheiten“ (so der Titel) auf und lässt dabei nie einen Zweifel, was richtiges und was falsches Deutsch sei. Fehlerhafter oder sinnentfremdeter Gebrauch von Wörtern ist Ausdruck der „Verwildierung“ (ebd.: 3) unserer Sprache. Solche Versuche, in die Sprachpraxis einzugreifen, sind in vielen Sprachen und Zeiten dokumentiert – und dass etwa „Sinn machen“ schlechtes Deutsch und überhaupt der Einfluss des Englischen zu bedauern sei, ist auch heute immer wieder zu hören. Hier soll diese Belehrung Wustmanns als Vergleich dienen, welche Norm die Philosophie der normalen Sprache zu behandeln hat und ob sie auf die Sprachpraxis Einfluss nehmen darf.

Wir wollen in unserm Wissen vom Gebrauch der Sprache eine Ordnung herstellen: eine Ordnung zu einem bestimmten Zweck; eine von vielen möglichen Ordnungen; nicht die Ordnung. (PU §132, Hervorhebung im Original)

Dieser Satz Wittgensteins macht auf zwei Unterschiede zwischen seinen und den sprachpflegerischen Zielen aufmerksam: Zum einen ist es nicht die Sprache selbst, in der die Philosophie eine Ordnung herzustellen hat, sondern im Wissen über sie. Zum andern distanziert sich Wittgenstein vom Anspruch einer universellen Ordnung; vielmehr soll die Ordnung dem Zweck dienen, einen bestimmten Sachverhalt besser überschauen zu können. Allerdings ist der Gebrauch unserer Wörter zu vielfältig, als dass wir ihn immer überblicken könnten. Sprachliche Undeutlichkeiten ergeben sich, weil die äussere Ähnlichkeit zweier Ausdrücke die Unterschiede zwischen ihnen verdecken. „Schmerzen haben“ ähnelt äusserlich dem Satz „Eine Nadel haben“ (vgl. Hacker 1997: 208), was dazu verleiten kann, Schmerzen als (geistige) Gegenstände anzusehen, die man, eben wie Nadeln, haben kann. Im Vergleich der Verwendungsweisen dieser Sätze zeigen sich aber die grundlegenden Unterschiede zwischen den beiden Ausdrücken von x haben. Mit der Begriffsklärung soll eine Übersichtlichkeit (vgl. PU §122) erreicht werden, die uns hilft, die relevanten Unterschiede wieder zu erkennen. Die vielfältigen Verwendungsweisen in der Sprache aber bleiben dabei unangetastet – sie ermöglichen uns ja erst die so zahlreichen Formen der Äusserung. Aufgrund der Dynamik des sprachlichen Systems kann eine solche Übersicht aber immer nur für einen bestimmten sprachlichen Kontext gelingen, während die übrigen Sprachspiele ausser Acht bleiben müssen. Nun erschöpft sich die Aufgabe der Philosophie nicht darin, die selbst eingehandelten Probleme wieder aufzulösen. Begriffliche Verwirrungen sind nicht nur ein Problem der Philosophie, sondern auch der übrigen Wissenschaften und überhaupt unserer Lebensform. Um nicht immer wieder in das Labyrinth begrifflicher Fragen zu geraten, muss darum auch geklärt werden, wie diese Verwirrung zustanden kam (vgl. Glock 2000: 347; Hacker 2004: 409 f). Bildlich gesprochen: Wenn wir uns verirrt haben, müssen wir nachvollziehen können, an welcher Stelle wir einem falschen Weg gefolgt sind, um auf den

richtigen zurückzukommen. Und gerade dies macht die Komplexität der Begriffsklärung aus:

Die Philosophie löst Knoten auf in unserem Denken: daher muss ihr Resultat einfach sein, das Philosophieren aber so kompliziert wie die Knoten, welche es auflöst. (Z: §452)

Hieraus ergibt sich ein dritter Unterschied zwischen Wittgensteins Methode und einer „Sprachpolizei“ à la Wustmann, als die die normalsprachliche Begriffsklärung gelegentlich verschrien worden ist: Noch wichtiger als das Erkennen einer sprachwidrigen Verwendungsweise ist das Verständnis ihrer Ursachen. Das Auflösen des Knotens ist kein Eingriff in die Sprache – der Knoten befindet sich ja in unserem Denken. Deshalb lässt die Philosophie in der Sprache zwar „alles, wie es ist“ (PU §124). Aber indem sie die Ursachen einer begrifflichen Verwirrung nachvollzieht, lassen sich die Stolperstellen in der Sprache erkennen. Und so kann die Philosophie „Tafeln aufstellen, die über die gefährlichen Punkte hinweghelfen“ (VB 474).

Als eine Bilanz aus dem bisher Gesagten will ich versuchen, meine beiden Antworten auf die behandelten Einwände zu verbinden. Mitunter dank Mithilfe der Linguistik ist es sehr wohl möglich, die Gebrauchsmuster zu erkennen, die uns im Umgang mit zweifelhaften Begriffen helfen können. Gerade die Dynamik der Sprache ist es denn auch, die uns dazu anhält, semantische Wandelprozesse zu beobachten und zu interpretieren, um philosophisch relevante Ergebnisse erlangen zu können. Eine sprachhistorische Tiefe erlaubt es auch, verschiedene Tendenzen zu differenzieren; da die Sprache sich selbst überlassen, wo sie sich spontan entwickelt, dort aber einzugreifen, wo sie missbraucht wird, um Wissenslücken zu vertuschen. Eine Ordnung in einem bestimmten Bereich unserer Sprache herzustellen, hat durchaus eine normative Kraft, die ihr auch nicht abzusprechen ist. In der Kritik wird aber die Motivation dieser Einflussnahme als genetischer Fehlschluss verkannt. Es ist nicht die Etymologie, aufgrund der eine bestimmte Gebrauchsweise abzulehnen ist, sondern vielmehr eine Schwächung der Erklärungskraft der involvierten Begriffe. Von einem denkenden, urteilenden Gehirn zu reden, vereinfacht nichts, sondern behindert unser Verständnis der zugrundeliegenden Prozesse. Jede Metapher aber, jede Neuschöpfung, die uns die Einsicht in die komplexen Phänomene des menschlichen Geistes erleichtern kann, sind gewiss nicht zurückzuweisen. Gleichwohl ist auch hier Vorsicht geboten, da wir auch darin immer an die Möglichkeiten unserer Alltagssprache gebunden sind und in keiner denkbaren Fachsprache über diese hinauskommen (vgl. PU §120). Umso mehr also ist es ein zentraler erster Schritt für die Auflösung philosophischer Verstrickungen, die schwierigen Begriffsverhältnisse aufzudecken und sich die alltagssprachliche Verwendung der Begriffe klarzumachen. Eine Begriffsklärung, die dem Wandel der Sprache Rechnung trägt, verliert nicht ihre Verbindlichkeit, sondern ihre Kurzsichtigkeit, was gegenwärtige Sprachverirrungen betrifft.

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# Der Ausdruck ‚Logisches Gewicht‘ im *Tractatus*

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## 1. Das Dezimalsystem des *Tractatus*

Wahrscheinlich stellt Wittgensteins *Tractatus* jeden vor die Frage, wie dieses Buch gelesen werden sollte; eine zutreffende Schwierigkeit, wenn man die im Prinzip ungewöhnliche Struktur des Textes betrachtet. Genauer kann diese Frage folgendermaßen formuliert werden: Wie beziehen sich im *Tractatus* die verschiedenen Anordnungen von Sätzen aufeinander? Bzw. was ist die Beziehung zwischen: a) Den Kardinalsätzen untereinander. b) Einem Satz n.1 und dem jeweiligen Satz n. c) Sätzen n.1, n.2, n.3 usw. untereinander. d) Sätzen n.1 und Sätzen n.m1. e) Einem Cluster von Sätzen n.1, n.2, n.3, usw. mit dem jeweiligen Satz n. f) Einem Satz n.m1 oder einem Cluster von Sätzen n.m1, n.m2, n.m3, usw. mit dem Satz n.

Zu Beginn des *Tractatus* findet sich eine Anmerkung, die diese Probleme lösen sollte. Da verwendet Wittgenstein den Ausdruck ‚logisches Gewicht‘, um die Struktur des Textes zu erklären. Diese Anmerkung lautet:

Die Dezimalzahlen als Nummern der einzelnen Sätze deuten das logische Gewicht der Sätze an, den Nachdruck, der auf ihnen in meiner Darstellung liegt. Die Sätze n.1, n.2, n.3, etc. sind Bemerkungen zum Satze No. n; die Sätze n.m1, n.m2, etc. Bemerkungen zum Satze No. n.m; und so weiter. (*Tractatus*, 1n)

Aus dieser Anmerkung wird Folgendes deutlich: i) Das logische Gewicht ist mit dem Nummerierungssystem des *Tractatus* verbunden und wird durch die Dezimalzahlen angedeutet. D. h., in den ohne Dezimalzahlen nummerierten Sätzen (Kardinalsätzen) gibt es kein logisches Gewicht. ii) Die dezimal nummerierten Sätze sind Bemerkungen zu einem vorherigen Kardinalssatz oder zu einer anderen Bemerkung. iii) Das logische Gewicht trifft nur auf die folgenden Beziehungen von Sätzen zu:

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{n.1, n.2, n.3, etc.} \rightarrow \text{n} \\ \text{n.m1, n.m2, n.m3, etc.} \rightarrow \text{n.m} \end{array}$$

Dieses Grundschema wiederholt sich, z. B. in der Form: n.mm1, etc. → n.mm; n.mmm1, etc. → n.mmm; usw. D. h., dass das logische Gewicht nur auf Beziehungen zwischen Sätzen verschiedener Ebenen in der Argumentation, die eine Unterordnungssequenz zeigen, zutrifft. iv) Das logische Gewicht ist letztendlich ein Nachdruck.

Was aber in dieser Anmerkung nicht deutlich hervorgehoben wird, ist, auf welche Art und Weise die Dezimalzahlen das logische Gewicht andeuten, d. h. ob eine Dezimalzahl mehr oder weniger logisches Gewicht als ein Kardinalssatz oder als eine andere Dezimalzahl haben sollte. Aus dieser Anmerkung geht also nicht klar hervor, wie das logische Gewicht den Sätzen zugerechnet werden sollte. Hat z. B. ein Satz n.1 mehr oder weniger logisches Gewicht als ein Satz n.m1 oder als der jeweilige Satz n? Diese Frage, mit deren Beantwortung das Problem der richtigen Interpretation des logischen Gewichts der Sätze gelöst werden könnte, bleibt im *Tractatus* offen.

## 2. Kritik zur Standardauffassung

In der Forschungsliteratur wird das Nummerierungssystem sowie das logische Gewicht der Sätze im *Tractatus* einseitig betrachtet (vgl. Dietrich 1973: 5; Mayer 1993: 114; Kroß 1993: 19-20; Geschkowski 2001: 40). Dabei wird sich in der Regel auf Stenius Aussage berufen. Stenius (1964: 4) interpretiert Wittgensteins Anmerkung im *Tractatus* folgendermaßen:

[N]umbers with few decimals have a greater ‘logical importance’ and ‘emphasis’ than those with more decimals. The existence of propositions numbered 2.01, 2.01, etc., besides propositions numbered 2.1, 2.2 and so on, ought, according to this general characterization, to mean that Wittgenstein divides his comments on proposition 2 into two categories: less important comments, which are given first under the numbers 2.01, 2.02, etc., and more important ones under the numbers 2.1, 2.2, etc.

Charakteristisch für diese Lesart ist, dass ein Satz n.1 mehr logisches Gewicht als ein Satz n.m1 und weniger als der Satz n haben sollte. D. h.: Je weiter vom einzelnen Satz entfernt, desto weniger logisches Gewicht. Die folgende Tabelle (T1) stellt diese Interpretation dar:

$$\begin{array}{l} \text{n} \rightarrow \text{n.1} \rightarrow \text{n.m1} \\ \text{LG} \quad - \text{LG} \quad -- \text{LG} \end{array}$$

An dieser Stelle ist es wichtig daran zu erinnern, dass im *Tractatus* nicht ausgesagt wird, welche Sätze wichtiger sind. Da diese Angabe auch nicht daraus geschlossen werden kann, stellt also die vorherige Auffassung eine ungerechtfertigte Interpretation des logischen Gewichts dar, deren Kriterium, um das Gewicht der Sätze zu bestimmen, nichts anders zu sein scheint als: Welcher Satz kommt zuerst vor. Außerdem wird dem jeweiligen Satz n einer Art von absolutem Wert zugeschrieben. Dagegen lässt sich erstens sagen, diese Zuschreibung sei ungerechtfertigt, denn laut der Anmerkung im *Tractatus* können nur die Sätze mit Dezimalzahlen und zwar nur in Verbindung mit anderen Sätzen, gewichtet werden.

Die Kardinalsätze haben also keine bevorrechtigte Stelle im *Tractatus*. Ihre Rolle kann mithilfe der *Principia Mathematica* erklärt werden, aus denen das Nummerierungssystem des *Tractatus* grundsätzlich übernommen wurde. Dort schreiben Whitehead und Russell (1957: 91): „\*1-01“ will mean the definition or proposition so numbered, and „\*1“ will mean the chapter in which propositions have numbers whose integral part is 1, i.e. the present chapter. Chapters will generally be called „numbers“. Ohne viel Veränderung kann man die Kardinalsätze des *Tractatus* einfach als die sechs Themen, sozusagen die Kapitel des Buches (Sätze 1-6) plus den Schluss (7), betrachten.

Das Zweite, was sich gegen diese Interpretation einwenden lässt, ist, dass das erstmalige Vorkommen eines Satzes auch nicht sein Gewicht in der Argumentation des Textes bestimmen kann. Das allgemeine Missverständnis in der Interpretation Wittgensteins Nummerierungssystems basiert darauf, einer Dezimalzahl bzw. einer Bemerkung

weniger Gewicht als einem einzelnen Satz oder als einer vorherigen Bemerkung zuzuschreiben, sodass eine Bemerkung eine sekundäre Stelle in der Wichtigkeit der Argumentation haben würde und damit auch weniger Nachdruck. Doch wie oben gezeigt, wird eine solche Interpretation im *Tractatus* nicht nahegelegt. In der Tat wird im *Tractatus* nichts darüber gesagt, welche Sätze mehr oder weniger Gewicht haben sollen. Nur im Prototractatus ist darauf eine Antwort zu finden und nur daraus kann das logische Gewicht des *Tractatus* vollständig erklärt werden.

### 3. Die Anmerkung im Prototractatus

Im Gegensatz zum *Tractatus* ist die Anmerkung im Prototractatus deutlich genug, in Bezug darauf, welche Sätze gewichtiger sein sollen. Diese Anmerkung lautet:

Zwischen diese Sätze werden alle guten Sätze meiner anderen Manuskripte gefügt. Die Nummern zeigen die Reihenfolge und die Wichtigkeit der Sätze an. So folgt 5'04101 auf 5'041 und auf jenen 5'0411 welcher Satz «ge»wichtiger ist als 5'04101. (Wittgenstein 2000: MS104, iii)

Im Prototractatus wurde die Anordnung der Sätze ursprünglich mit den Begriffen ‚Reihenfolge‘ und ‚Wichtigkeit‘ gekennzeichnet. Der Ausdruck logisches Gewicht kommt dort nicht vor. Nun, dass die Nummern die Reihenfolge und die Wichtigkeit der Sätze anzeigen, deutet an, dass das Nummerierungssystem ursprünglich als eine Verbindung dieser zwei Aspekte konzipiert wurde. Die Reihenfolge wurde in diesem zweifachen System folgendermaßen erklärt: „So folgt 5'04101 auf 5'041 und auf jenen 5'0411 [...].“ Die folgende Tabelle (T2) stellt die Reihenfolge der Sätze dar:

- a) 5'041
- b)  $\hookrightarrow$  5'04101
- c)  $\hookrightarrow$  5'0411

Wenn auch nicht wörtlich übernommen, wird diese Erklärung der Reihenfolge der Sätze im *Tractatus* beibehalten. Folgender Teil der *Tractatus* Anmerkung ist eine Erklärung der Reihenfolge der Sätze: „Die Sätze n.1, n.2, n.3, etc. sind Bemerkungen zum Satze No. n; die Sätze n.m1, n.m2, etc. Bemerkungen zum Satze No. n.m; und so weiter“. Was beiden Erklärungen gemeinsam ist, ist die Angabe, welcher Satz auf welchen folgen soll.

Streng genommen enthält die Darstellung des Textes im *Tractatus* sowie im Prototractatus zwei Arten von Reihenfolgen: Eine lineare und eine kategoriale. Eine lineare Reihenfolge besteht da, wo es eine Sequenz von Kardinalzahlen gibt. Hier befinden sich die Sätze auf der gleichen argumentativen Ebene, d. h., dass in der Regel alle Sätze dort zum gleichen Thema gehören. Sowohl das Grundgerüst des *Tractatus* (Sätze 1-7) als auch die Kardinalzahlen in Clustern von Bemerkungen (z. B.: 2.221 → 2.222 → 2.223 → 2.224 → 2.225) bilden eine solche Reihenfolge. Diese Weise, die Sätze anzurufen, enthält kein logisches Gewicht, denn dieses wird nur aus Sequenzen von Dezimalzahlen ausgedruckt und nicht aus Sequenzen von Kardinalzahlen, wie bei diesen Beispielen der Fall ist. In der kategorialen Reihenfolge dagegen befinden sich die Sätze auf verschiedenen argumentativen Ebenen, denen verschiedene Themen entsprechen. Aus diesem Grund lässt sich diese Reihenfolge etagenförmig darstellen, wie in T2.

Es ist wichtig zu präzisieren, dass mit Reihenfolge im Prototractatus nur diese letzte gemeint wird, denn mit dieser Erklärung versucht man auf die kategoriale Anordnung der Sätze Nachdruck zu legen. Außerdem wäre eine Erklärung der linearen Reihenfolge komplett überflüssig. Die Idee einer Wichtigkeit der Sätze im Prototractatus bzw. eines logischen Gewichts im *Tractatus* steht also im Prinzip nur mit dieser kategorialen Reihenfolge in Verbindung. Diese Feststellung lässt nun den Schluss zu, dass das logische Gewicht des *Tractatus* ausschließlich mit dieser kategorialen Ebene der Argumentation verbunden ist. Als stärkste Konsequenz ergibt sich daraus, dass die Anmerkung im *Tractatus* nur eine Erklärung der kategorialen Reihenfolge der Sätze ist, womit das logische Gewicht diese kategoriale Anordnung der Sätze andeuten würde.

Die Wichtigkeit der Sätze war seinerseits im Prototractatus in der Erklärung [...] 5'0411 welcher Satz «ge»wichtiger ist als 5'04101<sup>1</sup> enthalten. Das Faksimile des Prototractatus zeigt, dass dieser Teil der Anmerkung anfänglich eine Erklärung der Wichtigkeit der Sätze war, denn Wittgenstein fügt erst später das Präfix „ge“ vor dem Komparativ „wichtiger“ an, um „gewichtiger“ zu bilden. Diese Korrektur zeigt erstens, dass das logische Gewicht in einer initialen Wichtigkeit der Sätze seinen Ursprung hat; zweitens, dass Wittgenstein dennoch mit der Idee einer Wichtigkeit der Sätze letztlich nicht einverstanden war. Folglich erweist es sich als unrichtig, von wichtigeren oder weniger wichtigeren Themen im *Tractatus* zu sprechen.<sup>1</sup>

Es ist wichtig festzustellen, dass im *Tractatus* im Gegensatz zur Reihenfolge eine Erklärung der Wichtigkeit bzw. des Gewichts der Sätze nicht wieder zu finden ist. Wittgenstein nennt im *Tractatus* das logische Gewicht in Verbindung mit den Dezimalzahlen, aber ohne eine Erklärung dafür zu geben. Eine ausführliche Erläuterung des Gewichts der Sätze sollte dann von der initialen Erklärung der Wichtigkeit der Sätze im Prototractatus ausgehend aufgebaut werden.

### 4. Das Gewicht der Sätze

Der Satz 5'0411 ist, so Wittgenstein, «ge»wichtiger als der Satz 5'04101. Die Reihenfolge dieser Sätze wurde in T2 dargestellt. Daraus wird deutlich, dass die drei Sätze dort zu verschiedenen Ebenen in der Argumentation gehören. Nun kann man sagen, ein Satz habe mehr Gewicht als ein anderer, wie es nach Wittgenstein zwischen b-c der Fall ist, wenn ein Satz (c) zu einer nächsten Ebene in der Darstellung des Textes als ein anderer (b) gehört. Das Gewicht der Sätze lässt sich also folgendermaßen erklären: Für jedes neue Niveau in der Argumentation erlangt eine Bemerkungen oder eine Gruppe von Bemerkungen mehr Gewicht bzw. Nachdruck. Die nächste Tabelle (T3) zeigt graphisch diese Erläuterung:

Reihenfolge der Sätze	Gewicht der Sätze
a) 5'041	+
b) $\hookrightarrow$ 5'04101	++
c) $\hookrightarrow$ 5'0411	+++

Auch wenn in der Prototractatus Anmerkung nur die Beziehung b-c explizit erklärt wird, gilt diese Erklärung auch

<sup>1</sup> Fehlerhafte Übersetzungen aus dem Prototractatus und *Tractatus* könnten bei einer solchen Auffassung eine Rolle gespielt haben. Stenius (1964: 4) z. B. bezieht sich auf das logische Gewicht des *Tractatus* als ‚logical importance‘. McGuinness et. al. (Wittgenstein 1971: 41) übersetzen „more important“, wo im Prototractatus „ge“wichtiger“ steht. Gleicher Fall in einer Fußnote in von Wrights „Historical Introduction“ im McGuinness *Prototractatus* (S. 3). Identische Übersetzungen in Kang 2005: 4 und Mayer 1993: 110.

für *a-b*, denn da findet die gleiche Unterscheidung und Unterordnung argumentativer Ebenen wie in *b-c* statt. Damit sollte also *b* mehr Gewicht als *a* haben. Nun wird deutlich, inwiefern Stenius' Auffassung und die sich daraus ergebenen Interpretationen mit Wittgensteins Ansicht nicht übereinstimmen. Aus T3 kann man entnehmen, dass der Satz *c*, so Wittgenstein, mehr logisches Gewicht als *b* haben sollte, auch wenn *c* weniger Dezimalzahlen als *b* hat, während bei Stenius *b* der weniger gewichtige Satz sein sollte und *a* der gewichtigere, denn *b* ist der Satz, der am meisten Dezimalzahlen besitzt und *a* am wenigsten.

## 5. Schlussbemerkungen

In Bezug auf die anfänglichen Fragen dieser Arbeit lässt sich nun sagen, dass das logische Gewicht nur auf die Fragen *b*, *d*, *e* und *f* antworten kann. Charakteristisch bei diesen Fragen ist, dass sie sich durch den Nachdruck der kategorialen Unterscheidung zwischen Ebenen von Sätzen erklären lassen. Sie bilden Fälle der sog. kategorialen Reihenfolge. Die einzeln nummerierten Sätze (Frage *a*) und die kardinal nummerierten Cluster von Bemerkungen (Frage *c*) stellen Fälle linearer Reihenfolgen dar und können nicht mittels logischen Gewichts charakterisiert werden.

Die Darstellung des Nachdrucks der Sätze als Gewicht tendiert im *Tractatus* zum Ersetzen der ursprünglichen Idee einer Wichtigkeit der Sätze im Prototracatus, wie die Korrektur von *wichtiger* zu *gewichtiger* in diesem Manuskript zeigt. So lässt sich bezüglich der Auffassungen, es gäbe im *Tractatus* wichtigere und weniger wichtige Themen, sagen, sie stimmen nicht mit Wittgensteins Ansicht überein. Erstens, weil Wittgenstein besonderen Wert darauf legt, dass im *Tractatus* keine unwesentliche Aussage zu finden ist. Dieses Merkmal, das Sparsamkeit und Lakonismus bei Wittgenstein erklärt, kann man an mehreren Stellen im Buch finden, aber auch ganz explizit in einem Brief vom 07.10.19 an von Ficker, in dem Wittgenstein als zentrales Merkmal seiner Arbeit hervorhebt, dass darin nicht *geschwafelt* wird (Wittgenstein 2004). Zweitens, weil eine solche Wichtigkeit der Sätze einen problematischen Punkt für die inhaltliche Kohärenz des *Tractatus* darstellte. Im *Tractatus* wird die Auffassung vertreten, alle Sätze seien gleichwertig (6.4), was grundsätzlich ausschließen würde, von wichtigeren oder wenig wichtigeren Sätzen zu sprechen.

An dieser Stelle ist die Meinung von Luciano Bazzocchi von Interesse. Bazzocchi legt eine semantische Änderung des Wortes *gleichwertig* in der letzten Phase des Prototracatus nahe (2010: 18ff.). Ab dieser Phase, so Bazzocchi, hätte für Wittgenstein das Wort *gleichwertig*, ähnlich nur in einem formalen Sinne zu verstehen, eine weitere und zwar ethische Konnotation. Diese neue Perspektive, die ab Prototracatus 6.11343 zu sehen ist, würde den Bemerkungen über Ethik, über die allgemeine Form des Satzes, über Kontingenz und Wissenschaft zugrunde liegen, d. h. der umstrittenen letzten Sektion des *Tractatus* (Bazzocchi 2010: 17-19).

Ein zentrales Element dieser Sektion ist eben die Bemerkung 6.4, „Alle Sätze sind gleichwertig“. Der Kern dieser Bemerkung scheint aber bereits in der Korrektur wichtiger-gewichtiger in Prototracatus Anmerkung angedeutet zu sein, in dem Sinne, dass sowohl diese Korrektur als auch die Bemerkung 6.4 schließen aus, dass den Sätzen irgendeine Art von Bewertung zukommen kann.

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# **Der Begriff „Neoliberalismus“ als trojanisches Pferd – Paradoxie und Pointe einer Begriffsverwirrung in der ökonomischen Theorie**

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## **1. Einleitung**

Während der Politische Liberalismus bis dato aus der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise in seinen Grundwerten nicht infrage gestellt hervorgeht, müssen sich die Vertreter des Wirtschaftsliberalismus seit Beginn der Krise erheblicher Kritik stellen. Die Werte und Prinzipien des liberalen Wirtschaftssystems werden in Zweifel gezogen und auf das Heftigste angegriffen. Exemplarisch seien die ersten Zeilen von Gerhard Willkes Neoliberalismus zitiert: „Ein Monster geistert durch die Welt. Sein Wortschatz: Profit und freie Marktwirtschaft, Globalisierung und Laissez-faire! Sein Projekt: Ausweitung der Marktzone. Sein Name: Neoliberalismus.“ (2003: 11)

Von dieser zu erwartenden Entwicklung abgesehen ist die Verwendung des Wortes Neoliberalismus in seiner Doppeldeutigkeit auffallend und irritierend zugleich. Man kann konstatieren, dass die massivsten Angriffe auf das ökonomische Modell des Liberalismus stets unter dem mittlerweile eindeutig negativ konnotierten Schlagwort Neoliberalismus vorstatten gehen.

## **2. Neoliberalismus als Kampfparole**

Neoliberalismus ist seit Jahren einerseits die Kampfparole der globalen Kapitalismuskritik, andererseits ein semantischer Code im Streit um die Deutungshoheit über die richtige Wirtschaftsordnung – und zwar deshalb, weil man bewusst darauf abzielt, den im Rahmen der ordoliberalen Strömung bestehenden historischen Begriff in sein Gegenteil zu deuten. Somit soll das Schlagwort Neoliberalismus sowohl zur Kritik am Kapitalismus als solchem als auch zur Diskreditierung der gesamten Richtung des ökonomischen Liberalismus dienen.

Die Gegnerschaft ist dennoch schwierig, nicht nur, weil der Kampf um diesen Begriff verwirrend ist, sondern auch, da sich gegenwärtig keine einzige Schule des ökonomischen Liberalismus als neoliberal etikettiert. Es handelt sich vielmehr um eine begriffliche Zuweisung seitens der Kritiker, die aber bedauerlicherweise diesen Terminus undifferenziert als anti-kapitalistischen Kampfbegriff über die verschiedenen liberalen Strömungen hinweg verwenden.

Problematisch ist zudem, dass der radikale Kritiker-Flügel teleologisch den Fall des Wirtschaftssystems verfolgt, obwohl kein nennenswerter Alternativvorschlag vorliegt, was dem heutigen System entgegengesetzt werden könnte. Einige Ideen, wie lokale Währungen, Tauschringe, staatsdirigistische Modelle etc., reichen als Alternativen – bestenfalls als komplementäre Instrumente – zur Steuerung und Lenkung moderner Wirtschaftsprozesse heutiger Komplexität nicht aus.

Wie konnte es aber überhaupt zur Wandlung des Begriffs Neoliberalismus kommen? Und welche ursprüngliche Bedeutung hat dieser?

## **3. Die Entstehung des ursprünglichen Begriffs**

Der Terminus wurde 1938 auf dem Pariser Colloque Walter Lippmann von den Ordoliberalen selbst eingeführt. Ziel war es, sich vom Laissez-faire-Liberalismus mit seiner Ablehnung jeglicher staatlichen Einmischung zu unterscheiden, der im unreflektierten Glauben an nicht regulierte Marktkräfte und einer sich ausschließlich spontan ergebenden und selbst erhaltenen Marktordnung in der 1929 einsetzenden Weltwirtschaftskrise desaströs gescheitert war. Zwar stehen die Ordoliberalen gleichfalls Staatsinterventionen in Wirtschaftsprozessen kritisch gegenüber, zugleich aber akzeptieren sie die Notwendigkeit einer Ordnungspolitik, die ausdrücklich die Märkte durch Setzung von normativen Rahmenbedingungen reguliert.

Der Neoliberalismus stellt in dieser Wirtschaftskonzeption eine politisch-ökonomische Handlungstheorie dar, die „den Wohlstand optimal fördert, indem man die individuellen unternehmerischen Freiheiten und Fähigkeiten freisetzt, und zwar innerhalb eines institutionellen Rahmens, dessen Kennzeichen gesicherte private Eigentumsrechte, freie Märkte und freier Handel sind.“ (Harvey 2007: 8) Demnach ist es die Aufgabe des Staates, die wirtschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen zu schaffen: Geldstabilität, Rechtsstiftung, Landesverteidigung, innere Sicherheit, Strafverfolgung, der Schutz des Privateigentums sowie die Durchsetzung des Wettbewerbsrechts sollen primär die hoheitlichen Felder sein, auf die sich der Staat konzentrieren soll. Im ordoliberalen System obliegen alle anderen Felder (wie z.B. die Verteilungsgerechtigkeit) der sich der Marktanpassung anschließenden Dezision der Politik. Als solche sind sie dem Marktfindungsprozess nachgelagert, um die Preisbildung und Güterallokation nicht zu verzerrern.

Dies korrespondiert keineswegs mit der aktuellen Verwendung des Begriffs, der für das allgegenwärtige Primat der Konkurrenz, der Profitmaximierung und Kostenoptimierung, der Flexibilisierung, der Rentabilität, der gewünschten Ungleichheit als Leistungsprinzip sowie für die Herrschaft der Kapital- und Finanzmärkte steht und mit dem Vorrang der Wirtschaft vor der Politik, der Deregulierung und Liberalisierung der Märkte, des Standortwettbewerbs der Nationen, der Niedrigbesteuerung und der uneingeschränkten Befürwortung einer die Welt zu einem Markt machenden Globalisierung einhergeht (vgl. Willke 2003: 11). In diesem Kontext wird der Neoliberalismus oft als „marktdarwinistischer Kult“ (ebd.) oder als Fundamentalismus des freien Marktes bezeichnet. Letzteres hört sich angesichts der zugrunde liegenden Freiheitsliebe wie ein Paradoxon an.

#### 4. Der Kampfbegriff als Erbe der Chicago Boys

Der Vorwurf des Marktfundamentalismus erhält vor allem dadurch Nahrung, da heutzutage Abkömmlinge des ordoliberalen Neoliberalismus den Staat als ein Grundübel betrachten, das möglichst klein zu halten sei. Dem liegt ein negatives Menschenbild zugrunde, das u.a. auf der Prämisse basiert, dass Inhaber öffentlicher Ämter sich selbst bereichern oder nahe stehende Personen bevorzugen. Daher soll die Staatstätigkeit auf ein absolutes Minimum beschränkt werden, um dem Machtmisbrauch durch die Regierenden Einhalt zu gebieten. Oftmals wird nur die Zerschlagung von Monopolen als eine legitime Staatsintervention betrachtet.

Diese libertäre Doktrin hält den Markt für eine hinreichende Bedingung zur Garantie der individuellen Freiheiten und der Menschenrechte, wie wir sie vom Politischen Liberalismus kennen. Empirisch betrachtet hat der Markt solche Wunder nie vollbracht. Weder im Irak der Post-Saddam-Ära, der ebenso mit dieser Ideologie und Wirtschaftspolitik bedacht wurde, noch in Chile, wo diese Wirtschaftspolitik erstmals unter dem Diktator General Augusto Pinochet zum Tragen kam.

Pinochet holte 1975 eine Gruppe chilenischer Ökonomen aus den USA nach Santiago, die man die Chicago Boys nannte, da die meisten in Chicago studiert hatten und glühende Verehrer des dortigen Professors Milton Friedman waren. Das chilenische Modell wurde eine Art wirtschaftspolitisches Versuchslabor, in dem Friedmans Entwurf einer Volkswirtschaft am lebenden Objekt der chilenischen Wirtschaft praktische Anwendung fand. Pinochet wiederum wollte mit Hilfe wirtschaftlichen Erfolgs die nicht vorhandene demokratische Grundlage seines Regimes vergessen machen.

Nach einer „Schocktherapie“ und anfänglichen Erfolgen geriet die chilenische Wirtschaft 1982 in eine tiefe Rezession, die zuerst die Einkommen einbrechen ließ, dann die Arbeitslosigkeit in die Höhe trieb und letztlich den Zusammenbruch des gesamten Finanzmarkts zur Folge hatte. Das Scheitern des ökonomischen Reformprogramms, das in der lateinamerikanischen Schuldenkrise mündete, wurde zur Geburtsstunde des heutigen Begriffs Neoliberalismus. Oppositionelle chilenische Wissenschaftler erfanden diesen Ausdruck zur Formulierung ihrer Kritik an den Radikalreformen der Chicago Boys und ihres amerikanischen ideologischen Übervaters Friedman (vgl. Harvey 2007: 7-51). Gemäß dessen radikal-libertären Konzept ist jeder Staat mit Ausnahme eines „Minimalstaates“ (Nozick 2006) als Feindbild anzusehen. Durch die Doktrin des Minimalstaates ergibt sich die Nähe vieler Marktradikaler zu autoritären Regierungen, die mit aller Macht einen Rückzugskatalog des Staates durchsetzen wollen. Die Hinnahme eines autoritären oder sogar totalitären Staatswesens macht die heutige neoliberale Doktrin zu einem ausschließlich wirtschaftsorientierten Unternehmen – ein Faktum, das dem ordoliberalen Neoliberalismus zuwiderläuft.

#### 5. Der Freiburger Ordoliberalismus

Weder ist die ideengeschichtliche Verschiebung einer Begriffsbedeutung ein neuer noch ein skandalträchtiger Vorgang. Wichtiger erscheint, die historische Strömung des Ordoliberalismus näher zu erfassen: Beim Blick in ein Lexikon findet man z.B. die Definition, dass der Ordoliberalismus „eine nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg in D[eutschland] entwickelte Variante des Liberalismus

[bezeichnet], die dem Staat die Aufgabe zuweist, für die Aufrechterhaltung der marktwirtschaftlichen Ordnung (insbesondere den Wettbewerb) zu sorgen und wirtschaftliche Störungen durch ‚marktkonforme‘ Eingriffe zu beseitigen.“ (Schubert/Klein 2011: 216)

Allgemein versteht man unter Ordoliberalismus vor allem die von der Freiburger Schule um Walter Eucken und Franz Böhm entworfene Wirtschaftsordnung, die in Abwandlung von Ludwig Erhard, Alexander Rüstow und Alfred Müller-Armack politisch als soziale Marktwirtschaft umgesetzt wurde. Oft wird Friedrich August von Hayek den Freiburgern zugeschlagen, wobei er gleichfalls als Mitglied der Chicagoer Schule gilt. Hier verläuft vermutlich die Bruchlinie: Während der frühe Hayek als ordoliberal eingestuft werden kann, scheint mir der späte libertär zu sein. Im Grundsatz stimme ich hier mit Peter Niesen überein, der allerdings Hayek durchgängig als „libertarian“ verortet (vgl. Niesen 2006: 75).

Ziel des ordoliberalen Neoliberalismus ist es, mittels eines starken Staates die Funktionsfähigkeit freier Märkte zu gewährleisten. Der Staat setzt die den Märkten zugrunde liegende Wirtschaftsordnung als auch die Wettbewerbsordnung durch, die als Rahmenbedingungen dem Handeln der Marktteure Einhalt gebieten und zugleich die individuelle Freiheit dieser schützen als auch deren privates Eigentum sichern soll. Innerhalb dieser institutionellen Rahmensetzung soll der Preismechanismus den Markt räumen – sprich: die optimale Allokation der Produktionsfaktoren sicherstellen. Dabei signalisiert ausgerechnet der Begriff Neoliberalismus die Einsicht der Ordoliberalen, die institutionelle Rahmenbedingungen und die Schaffung einer Wettbewerbsordnung durch den Staat (im Gegensatz zum unregulierten Laissez-faire-Liberalismus) hervorzuheben.

#### 6. Zurück in die Vergangenheit – Friedmans Re-Radikalisierung

Milton Friedmans Wirtschaftsentwurf ist nicht mit den liberalen Theoriegebilden von der Freiburger Schule bis zu Denkern wie Wilhelm Röpke und Alexander Rüstow gleichzusetzen. Zwar stimmt, dass sich alle gegen Marxismus und Sozialismus, gegen staatlichen Dirigismus und Interventionismus stellen, dennoch sind die Unterschiede erheblich, wie man heutzutage leichter erkennen kann, seitdem sich der Kampf gegen den „real existierenden Sozialismus“ und den Kommunismus erübriggt hat.

In Kapitalismus und Freiheit von 1962 stellt Friedman folgende Frage: „Wie können wir verhindern, dass die Regierung, die wir geschaffen haben, ein Monster wie ‚Frankenstein‘ wird, das schließlich die Freiheit vernichtet, zu deren Schutz wir doch die Regierung überhaupt erst eingesetzt haben?“ (Friedman 2010: 24) Diese negative Grundeinstellung gegenüber der Regierung als auch jedem Gemeinwesen schlägt sich in einem ebensolchen Menschenbild nieder. Wider der Evidenzen der experimentellen Ökonomie und der Evolutionsökonomik, selbst der Spieltheorie, die die Überlegenheit kooperativer Spiele veranschaulicht, ist der Homo oeconomicus Friedmans ein simpler Nutzenmaximierer, der z.B. bezüglich der Regierung „eine klare und ausführliche Berechnung der Vorteile anstellen“ soll (Friedman 2010: 24), denn „[e]s werden immer neue Regierungsverfügungen erlassen, um unser ‚Streben nach Erfolg und Gewinn‘ zu reglementieren.“ (Friedman/Friedman 1980: 17)

Friedmans Kapitalismusentwurf stellt die Freiheit des Einzelnen absolut. Im Kern geht es darum, „die Rolle des wettbewerblich organisierten Kapitalismus [...] als eines Systems von wirtschaftlicher Freiheit und einer notwendigen Bedingung für politische Freiheit“ (Friedman 2010: 27) herauszustellen. Sein Programm geht sowohl einher mit einer Kommodifizierung fast der gesamten Lebenswelt, „[j]e mehr Aktivitäten durch den Markt erfasst werden, umso geringer ist die Zahl der Probleme, die eine eindeutige politische Entscheidung und Einigung erfordern.“ (Friedman 2010: 47), als auch dem festen Glauben an die Katalaxie, also an die sich selbst erhaltende Ordnung der Tauschwirtschaft, die Koordination ohne Zwang herstellen kann: „Solange die effektive Freiheit des Austausches gewahrt bleibt, ist das Hauptkennzeichen der Marktwirtschaft, dass sich niemand in die Angelegenheiten eines anderen einmischen kann.“ (Friedman 2010: 37) Dementsprechend schreibt er im Autorenkollektiv mit seiner Frau Rose in Chancen, die ich meine, dass er „das politische System auf die gleiche Weise wie das ökonomische System“ auffasst und das „[b]eide Systeme [...] als Märkte angesehen [werden], in denen das Ergebnis weitgehend durch die Zusammenarbeit von Personen, die ihre eigenen Interessen (im weitesten Sinne) verfolgen, bestimmt wird und weniger durch die sozialpolitischen Ziele, die die Teilnehmer vorschützen.“ (Friedman/Friedman 1980: 10)

Friedmans Antrieb, der ordoliberalen Neoliberalismus müsse zum Laissez-faire-Liberalismus zurückkehren, den er trotz dessen Versagen in der Weltwirtschaftskrise geradezu nostalgisch verklärt, lässt sich deutlich herauskristallisieren: „Der Liberale des 19. Jahrhunderts betrachtete die Ausdehnung der Freiheit als den effektivsten Weg, um den sozialen Staat und die Gleichheit zu erreichen. Der Liberale des 20. Jahrhunderts betrachtete die allgemeine Wohlfahrt und die Gleichheit als Voraussetzungen oder als Alternativen zur Freiheit“ (Friedman 2010: 28) Unmissverständlich fordert er das Zurück in die Vergangenheit: „Da der Begriff Liberalismus also korrumptiert ist, werden die Ansichten, die früher mit seinem Namen bezeichnet wurden, heute ‚Konservativismus‘ benannt.“ (Friedman 2010: 29) Die Stoßrichtung zum Minimal- oder Nachtwächterstaat ist erkennbar. Er benutzt das Adjektiv liberal im Kontrast zu den Ordoliberalen als libertär im Sinne des ursprünglichen Laissez-faire-Ansatzes. Dies bestreitet er keineswegs: „Teils, weil ich nicht will, dass der Begriff für Maßnahmen missbraucht wird, die unsere Freiheit zerstören, teils, weil ich auch keinen besseren Begriff finde, möchte ich diese Schwierigkeiten dadurch lösen, dass ich das Wort Liberalismus in seinem ursprünglichen Sinn gebrauche – die Doktrin also damit bezeichne, die zu einem freien Menschen gehört.“ (ebd.)

Das Ehepaar Friedman hat die Finanzkrise 2007, deren geistige Architekten sie zu einem erheblichen Teil waren, nicht mehr erlebt. Unter den Auswirkungen der neuen Spielart des Laissez-faire-Dogmas in Kombination mit dem von Friedman geprägten Monetarismus – eine angebotsorientierte Geldpolitik, die die Geldmenge als zentrale Stellgröße versteht – leiden heute weltweit Volkswirtschaften und werden noch einige Jahrzehnte dafür bezahlen müssen. Die Gegnerschaft zur Zentralplanwirtschaft sowie jeglicher Art von Kollektivismus hat die Friedmans von einem Extrem ins andere geführt.

## 7. Fazit – Warum die aktuelle Debatte ins Leere läuft

Die ideengeschichtliche Rekonstruktion sollte erhellen, warum die Debatte um die Zukunft der Marktwirtschaft unter dem Schlagwort Neoliberalismus ins Leere läuft. Während die Kritik an der libertären Doktrin der Chicago School angesichts der weltweiten Finanzkrise nicht nur berechtigt, sondern überfällig ist, kann man von dieser nicht auf andere wirtschaftsliberale Denkfamilien wie die Freiburger Schule, deren Paradigma die Grundlage für die soziale Marktwirtschaft ist, schlussfolgern. Die Debattenvereinfachung mittels der Neoliberalismus-Keule führt zu der problematischen Entwicklung, dass letztlich alle wirtschaftsliberalen Denkschulen in Sippenhaft mit der Chicagoer Schule genommen werden.

Der hergestellte Verblendungszusammenhang durch die entstandene Begriffserwirrung verstellt den substanzialen Kern der notwendigen Debatte. Die falsche Verortung des Ordoliberalismus als Marktradikalismus (man denke an das sozialdemokratisch anmutende Œuvre Röpkes oder an das durch die katholische Soziallehre geprägte Werk Oswald von Nell-Breunings) durch die Wandlung des Begriffs Neoliberalismus birgt die Gefahr, dass der Ordoliberalismus diskursiv diskreditiert wird.

Die Verkürzung des Gehalts ordoliberaler Theoriegebilde durch die Überhöhung des Freiheitsbegriffs ist eine weitere bedenkliche Entwicklung. An der Wettbewerbsordnung Walter Euckens mit den sieben „konstituierenden“ Prinzipien (funktionsfähiges Preissystem als Grundprinzip, offene Märkte, Primat der Währungspolitik, Privateigentum, Vertragsfreiheit, Konstanz der Wirtschaftspolitik und Haftung) und vier „regulierenden“ (Monopolkontrolle, Einkommenspolitik, Berücksichtigung von anomalen Arbeitsangebot, Korrektur externer Effekte) lässt sich dies exemplarisch festmachen: Die Grundlage des ökonomischen Liberalismus ist zu umfassend, um mit einem simplen Freiheitsbegriff belegt zu werden. Dies deckt sich mit dem Verständnis der Freiburger Ordoliberalen für einen starken Staat sowie Haftungs- und Verantwortungskriterien gegenüber der Allgemeinheit. Das Freiheitsverständnis auf die freie Nutzung des Eigentums zu reduzieren entspricht hingegen nicht dieser Denkrichtung. Beispiele für die unreflektierte Übertragung eines überhöhten Freiheitsbegriffs aus dem Politischen Liberalismus in die Sphäre des ökonomischen Liberalismus gibt es zuhauf. Die Diskussion über die Neuaustrichtung der Marktwirtschaft nimmt dadurch ebenso Schaden wie durch die Reduktion auf den marktwütigen Neoliberalismus, die nur zum Fanal der Unzufriedenen ohne Handlungsalternative wird.

Um aus dieser Sackgasse herauszukommen wäre es hilfreicher, wenn man die Chicago School vom Ordoliberalismus separieren würde. Ähnlich der Aufspaltung in der Politischen Philosophie, wo z.B. die liberalen Denker John Rawls (1975) und Michael Walzer (2006) dem libertären Denker Robert Nozick gegenüberstehen, könnte man Friedmans Schule als libertär bezeichnen. Da sich der Begriff Neoliberalismus semantisch verbraucht hat, ließe die Gegenüberstellung von Ordoliberalismus versus Libertarismus eine bessere inhaltliche Auseinandersetzung um die Ausrichtung sowie die institutionellen Instrumente der Marktwirtschaft zu. Diese wäre zudem nicht durch den bis ins sinnentleerte verbrauchten Kampfbegriff Neoliberalismus vorbelastet.

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# Moral Difficulties and Repression

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1. In this paper, I argue for the pervasiveness of a dynamics of repression in moral life, and for the need to reorient ethics in light of this fact. 'Repression', here, refers to a family of responses to inner conflict in which one refuses to acknowledge crucial aspects of one's relation to others, and actively falsifies one's own view of it. My use of the word does not refer to the Freudian, or any other specific theorisation of the phenomenon. Rather, taking the reality of the phenomenon for granted, I sketch its central role in moral life.

2. I will start by making a distinction between moral problems as usually conceived in ethics, and real life moral difficulties. An agent with a moral problem faces (supposedly) a situation where there is e.g. a conflict of duties, and she has to make a hard decision about what to do. The situation seems to be difficult because it is hard to know how one should act. Moral difficulties in everyday life tend to take a very different form, however. The difficulty is not that one does not know what to do, but that one is caught up in a destructive interpersonal, relational dynamics, driven by morally corrupt attitudes such as envy, jealousy, vanity, greed, resentment, hatred, self-pity, or an anxious wish for respectability. To be sure, in a situation suffused by e.g. resentment and self-pity, it will often be very hard to know how to act so as not to make things even worse, but this is a symptom rather than the cause of the real moral difficulty, which is the corrupt character of the attitudes of some or all of the people involved.

"Not knowing" does figure crucially in such real life moral difficulties, however, albeit in a very different form from that imagined by philosophers. Whereas moral problems in ethics textbooks are something the agent faces, a moral difficulty is typically marked by the fact that there is something in one's way of relating to others that one refuses to face. Indeed, morally corrupt attitudes seem to be partly constituted by the fact that when one is prey to them one does not think one is. Thus, the vain person does not see her own vanity but is expert at finding or imagining vanity in others; the greedy person thinks he is merely looking out for his legitimate interests; the quarrelsome person never thinks she started the quarrel, it was always the other person; the envious person does not think of himself as envious, in his own eyes he is merely rightfully indignant at the "undeserved good luck" of the object of his envy, and so on.

In other words, morally corrupt attitudes would seem to be premised on one's being blind to the real character of one's reactions and involvement in the situation. Such failures of moral perception are not mere errors, mistakes one makes in good faith because one has overlooked relevant facts, but are rather the expressions of one's actively taking a false view of one's relation to others, which causes one to ignore or misrepresent morally salient facts – thus, in my greed I may ignore the human costs of a lucrative business deal. My own active role in bringing about my failure of moral vision is betrayed in the reactions that manifest my resistance to seeing things as they are; in the eagerness with which I try to justify my actions precisely

when I know they are morally speaking unacceptable, and in my general defensiveness when my position is challenged. Thus, when you criticize me for behaving badly I respond by accusing you of behaving even worse.

Most importantly, my own active role in the situation is brought home to me in the sting of bad conscience I feel if I come to acknowledge the true moral character of my actions. In feeling bad conscience I acknowledge that I wronged someone. Morally speaking, this is the only genuine form that an understanding of one's own wrongdoing can take; it makes no sense to suppose that someone could sincerely think they had done something terrible, yet suffered no bad conscience about it; what, in that case, would their "sincerity" amount to? However, bad conscience is liable to be confused with other reactions – because it serves our repressive interests so to confuse it. In contrast e.g. to feeling regret that things turned out in a certain way, bad conscience is a reaction in which the one I wronged, and my relation to her, is in focus. I feel bad about what I did to her; I want to ask her forgiveness for treating her meanly or coldly or condescendingly, thus repairing the damage I caused to our relationship. Insofar as someone feels what they call "bad conscience", but in a way that is disconnected from a feeling for-and-with the other person and a desire for her forgiveness, one's moral insight is reduced to, or rather is repressed through, a self-centred concentration on one's own personal guiltiness (perhaps to the point of a conspicuous wallowing in guilt), or on the supposed shamefulness of failing to live up to one's ideals. "This kind of thing was beneath me; I cannot forgive myself for what I did", one says, thus continuing to ignore the person one wronged.

Bad conscience reveals, and in revealing undoes, a repression. For in feeling bad conscience, I acknowledge that what I did to the other was terrible and that there was nothing that prevented me from seeing this terribleness. If there had been something that really prevented me from seeing this, I would have acted in good faith, "based on the information available to me at the time", and there would be nothing for me to feel bad conscience about, although there might be much to regret, even to the point of desperation (think e.g. of giving someone what one believes is a life-saving drug, but which turns out in fact to be lethal poison). At the same time, however, my bad conscience also disclosed to me that I did not see what I was doing when I wronged the other; I was morally speaking blind. Had I seen then what I see now, I would not have acted as I did. In other words, the experience of bad conscience itself teaches me both that I was blind and that nothing prevented me from seeing. But this is precisely the paradoxical structure of repression: a blindness that is real, yet only exists because one refuses to see. A lie one has told oneself, yet is taken in with – but only as long as one refuses to see through it. Bad conscience is the strange moment when the blind are made to see by the small but decisive act of opening their eyes.

3. Moral difficulties with their inherent repressions are personal difficulties, but one must not confuse the personal, i.e. the realm of personal relations, with the merely private or subjective. Repression is not primarily a private problem, rooted in the difficulty individuals have in adjusting to the symbolic order of the culture with its moral and other demands. Rather, repression is a pervasive dimension of that order itself, and of the language through which we form, uphold and converse about it. This means that repression is not only manifested in refusals to apply moral concepts in standard ways (e.g. in one's describing what others recognize as a mean and cruel joke as a piece of "innocent fun"), but also in the standard use of those concepts.

Consider, to take a random example, one of the central virtues of liberal societies, tolerance. Philosophers (see e.g. Heid 1996; Oberdiek 2001) acknowledge certain difficulties with the concept; How is one to distinguish tolerance from relativism and indifference? Must one tolerate the intolerable, or be tolerant of the intolerant? However, they normally don't discuss the moral background necessary for the question of toleration to arise in the first place. This includes a hostile or otherwise negative attitude towards the other (one can hardly tolerate who or what one approves of) and a sense that one is in a position of power vis-à-vis them (a majority can tolerate the lifestyle of a small minority, but the minority is simply in no position to be tolerant, although they may be thankful for the toleration shown them). Naturally, philosophers are aware of these facts, but their moral implication tends to be ignored. The implication is that for me to be able to think of myself as tolerating you, I must look at you from a position of assumed superiority, from which I determine that the world would be a better place if it did not contain the likes of you – although I then refrain, for the sake of some further consideration or other, from actually turning on you and trying to remove you from "my" world, perhaps congratulating myself on being so tolerant. Such conceit is hardly a great moral achievement, and yet it seems to form the necessary background of the virtue of tolerance. The real "paradox of toleration" would not, then, be that tolerance requires us to tolerate what is intolerable in others, but that it is premised on tolerating our own intolerance. However, a failure properly to acknowledge this paradox, i.e. the repression of this whole problematic, would seem to be a necessary part of the normal use of the very concept of tolerance, a precondition for its status as a bona fide moral virtue.

But doesn't tolerance, on the contrary, mean restraining one's intolerant impulses for the sake of e.g. enabling peaceful coexistence or respecting the other's autonomy? Certainly, but my point is that in conceiving of the moral task as one of restraint in the name of principles, one has already accepted one's own morally problematic demeanour – the contempt, disgust, and other attitudes from which intolerance springs – as given in a way which will be recognized as self-deceived from the perspective of conscience. Of course it is better, i.e. less bad, to show tolerance than open intolerance, but surely the real moral task is to change so as to free oneself of corrupt attitudes, not just to restrain their outer expression.

The case of tolerance illustrates, I suggest, a repressive "logic" pervasively present in our everyday moral thinking. One of its main forms is to present as simply good and laudable attitudes (e.g. tolerance) which are actually prem-

ised on a lack of goodness in oneself, with this lack, denied in oneself, then projected onto others – e.g. onto the "intolerant" others whom "we tolerant ones" must oppose. Elsewhere (Backström 2007), I have tried to show how the same, essentially Pharisaic, dynamics is at work – naturally with important variations in the interplay of specific attitudes involved – in a host of other concepts denoting moral virtues and values, e.g. in loyalty, respect and altruism. The general, but unacknowledged, aim of these and other patterns of repression in moral life is, I have further suggested, to reduce what are felt to be the unbearable demands of a wholehearted openness to the other (which one might also call love of neighbour) to "reasonable" proportions, thus "legitimising" to some extent one's own disgust, self-disgust, cruelty and the other difficulties one has with being open. Our common language functions in a persistently repressive way because or insofar as these difficulties are broadly shared among us.

4. If the above is right, the task of moral philosophy should be reconsidered, making ethics neither a normative exercise, presuming to determine for us what is good and right, nor a neutral description which doesn't challenge, but at most presumes to "clarify the logic" of our everyday moral thinking. Rather, ethics should aim to describe this thinking in such a way as to reveal the repressive dynamics actually (de)forming it, in a description which, as Wittgenstein said, "simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything" (1958, §126) – but which nonetheless does not leave things as they are insofar the way things are, the way we normally conceptualise and live morality, is dependent on our refusing to see what we are doing clearly.

In fact, I have elsewhere argued (Backström 2011 and 2013) that the insistently ethical tenor of Wittgenstein's philosophizing, and his characterisation of himself as a "disciple" of Freud (1978: 41), can best be understood as expressions of his insight into the pervasiveness of the problematic of repression – i.e. of the dynamics of a systematic self-obfuscation – in our thinking, regardless of whether it presents a superficially "moral" or "philosophical" appearance.

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# The Unforeseen Slips of Editors and Scholars about the Representation of the Visual Field in *Tractatus* 5.6331

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The sub-tree 5.6 of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, concerning the self and the limits of language and world, is universally considered very complex and obscure<sup>1</sup>. I think, on the contrary, that that section is perfectly articulated and perspicuous, *provided that* we read it following each different level of commentary, and not in the flat sequential disposition of the propositional list. For instance, the final part of the section seems effectively nonsensical<sup>2</sup> if we follow the arrangement of the printed edition, in this way:

5.634 This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is also a priori. [...] There is no order of things a priori.

5.64 Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.

It is absolutely impossible "to see" the coincidence of solipsism and realism in the fact that "there is no order of things a priori", and nobody could explicate such an incongruous relationship. But that is a wrong manner of reading; the only way to understand the *Tractatus* correctly is reading it by successive levels of commentary, i.e. by following the tree of the decimal numeration (see *The tree of the Tractatus*, Bazzocchi 2010). Here, the correct reading is:

5.63 I am the world. (The microcosm).

5.64 Here we see that solipsism strictly carried out coincides with pure realism. Etc.

Solipsism being, so to say, an overvaluation of the "I", and realism that of the world, on the basis of the identity of "I" and "world" we can well imagine a possible coincidence of solipsism and realism.

A similar misunderstanding is generated by the incipit of 5.634 itself ("This is connected with"), *if we connect it to the wrong proposition*<sup>3</sup>; and so on. In brief, I think that the whole section comes out to be against Schopenhauer's idea of a transcendental Ego, and not at all in favor of it, as the mistaken reading generally suggested. In this way, we can see and appreciate, finally, the effective picture in 5.6331, which until now all critics (with the notable exception of Russell) have completely distorted.

5.6331 For the field of sight has not a form like this:




<sup>1</sup> As claims a champion of the sequential approach, this would be "one of the most obscure, and most discussed, sections of an already obscure and much discussed work" (Kremer 2004: 60). Of course, "without the numbering the book would be an incomprehensible mess" (Wittgenstein 1969: 39), and such appears the book, unavoidably, to they which don't consider numbering.

<sup>2</sup> "Wittgenstein might have added that this way of talking is nonsense", comments Black on this point (1964: 309). See also Williams 2006: 363.

<sup>3</sup> The decimals recommend us to read in this way: "5.633 [...] And from nothing in the field of sight can it be concluded that it is seen from an eye. 5.634 This is connected with the fact that no part of our experience is also a priori. [...] There is no order of things a priori". Nothing allows us to derive the existence itself of a seeing "I" as a-priori condition of the visual field, just as well as there is no form a priori nor order a priori in our experience. This pass is incompatible with Schopenhauer's notion of a transcendental I.

In fact, commentators think that here "the diagram portrays the eye as occurring within the visual field" (Morris 2008: 305), and that its negation ("not a form like this") simply aims to confirm Schopenhauer's thesis about an "I" that is not inside, but lies outside the phenomenological world. But Wittgenstein, indeed, never planned to draw nor drew (as we see from the original figure I reproduce here) such an incongruous representation, of an eye "occurring within its own visual field". He intended negating the usual manner of represent the visual field, including Schopenhauer's representation; what he contests, indeed, is its shape, and the existence itself of an eye that could be deduced as a priori condition of a so-shaped visual field. In any case, it's sure that Wittgenstein always depicted the figure in the usual manner, and not at all with the eye within (?) its own field<sup>4</sup>. See also the prototype of that proposition and its image, on Notebook 12.8.16:



In discussing the figure with the editor Ogden, Wittgenstein was absolutely clear, as we see from the well known printed edition of their correspondence (Wittgenstein 1973: 20):

(8) As to you will see from my correction as well as from the German that the prop[osition] had been mutilated. The figure should be like this and not because this is how people very often imagine the shape of the field of vision to be. This, by the way, has nothing whatever to do with light going in straight lines.

Then, it's a pity (and a true catastrophe for tractarian scholars) that their misunderstanding of Wittgenstein's aim induced the editors of any edition or translation of the *Tractatus* to falsify the picture itself. Since the only error they were capable to imagine in the picture was that of an eye possibly drawn inside its field of sight, they "corrected" the original draft in this sense – enclosing the ill-fated hermeneutical circle. Consequently, there are hundreds of quotations of that statement that are substantially erroneous. This is the manner in which David Pears, for instance, reproduces the picture (2006: 203):



No wonder if his comment, too, is completely off the point.

<sup>4</sup> All the contrary of what scholars take for granted: "I take it that Wittgenstein is not concerned with the shape of the visual field. What makes the picture wrong is that 'the eye' is within the visual field" (Levin 1997: 298).

The outcomes of my brief inquiry are not irrelevant. First, it becomes indispensable a reprint of Wittgenstein's book that makes justice to 5.6331 picture. Second, all the commentaries on this picture are to be substantially revised. From my point of view, furthermore, it will become still more evident that only a tree-like arrangement of Wittgenstein's propositions, following their decimal numbering, allows us to understand his thought, in this one as well as in many others cases.

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# The Knowledge Economy and Africa's Development

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By adopting an action plan on the knowledge economy, African Heads of States have shown their interest for this new economy. To avoid disappointments as those which resulted from the implementation of the development programs at the early 1960s then at the 1980s, it is necessary to examine the significance and the implications of this economy, but also to consider the particular context of African societies. The scrutiny of the actors' play brings out some ethical and ideological stakes.

## 1. The advent of the knowledge economy

The world economy is more and more dominated by systems of production with intellectual investment of high intensity. This evolution, predicted by Schumpeter at the beginning of the past century, is only the expression of one of the heaviest trends in the gradual change of mankind. Since the prehistoric times, progress always appeared through the increasing part of human work in obtaining consumer goods, and in that work, the increasing part of the intellectual work. The affirmation of the capability of human intelligence has grown ceaseless and, concomitantly, the driving role of the intellectual development in all spheres of humans life. For Condorcet (1793), this could be noticed since the invention of writing.

Since the midst of the nineteenth century, one can observe an incredible speeding up in the production of knowledge in all fields of fundamental sciences; it is asserted that this production already doubles every five years (Costa 2001). And economies have become considerably dependent on the use of these knowledge, with the recourse to "intellectual technologies" very different from mechanic technologies which characterized the industrial society.

In that new economy, some concepts and some principles of the classical economical analysis are no longer appropriate. Hence, the sacred "principle of scarcity" cannot be applied to information and to knowledge considered as production factors, given that they are rather on the side of abundance; what is "scarce" is the capability to get to them and to use them; and it is then the concern of learning and of training.

## 2. The knowledge economy and cognitive development

Firms have been naturally confronted to this problem. Being compelled to a merciless competition, they could not skimp over actions to carry out, or over means to display, in order to derive profit from the inputs of the new technologies which were becoming the engine of their productivity gain (Saussois 2000). The resort to theories of learning was imperative. Universities and research centres were cheerfully called on, hereby motivated by commissioned works.

The phrases "cognitive development" and "cognitive education" have been put forward to designate the stream of methods and of experiences set up with these

researches on learning. "Teaching thinking, teaching reasoning", this is their common denominator (Costa 2001; Loarer 1998). The major challenge appears to consist in getting into abstraction, with the aptitude of reasoning on hypotheses, a real bottleneck (Bebbé-Njoh 2002).

With this necessity of learning to think, it is the school education in its whole which is now in question; for the said crucial objective has always been claimed by educational projects; nevertheless it has remained a pious wish constantly advocated in the presentations of school programs or in texts of general orientation such as the Paris Declaration on Philosophy (UNESCO 1995). As for philosophy education precisely and with this concern of learning reasoning, that is learning Logic, it is known that there is a serious problem (Bouveresse 1987).

## 3. The case of sub-Saharan Africa

We have talked about the boom of the knowledge economy in countries of the North, as the fact of a speeding up in an on-going process from at least two millions years ago, with the coming out of particular beings: homo-habilis, homo-erectus, homo-sapiens. These beings were physically too weak comparatively to the other beings with whom they had to share the natural breeding. But thanks to their brain the volume of which was still growing, they gave proof of an efficient adaptation to varied climatic and ecological conditions (Gärdenfors 2007). With homo-sapiens appeared two hundred thousand years ago, "intelligence takes over matter" (Langaney 1998); homo-sapiens, that is some thirty thousand people in the African area, will snatch himself from the hold of the nature, by the cooperation of individual intelligences getting progressively constituted into collective intelligences.

With the speedy multiplication of Homo, and his dispersal all over the globe, there will not take a long time for notably differentiations to appear in the general behaviour of the varied human groups in the making. From the Neolithic period, one can roughly distinguish two types of societies (Childe 1964): those who launch out into the creating of needs and the production of knowledge; those who will be satisfied with an easy adaptation and will get bogged down in a preservative inertia, thus banishing any effort of producing innovations. The sentence "That is what the old time people told us" expresses well this state of mind referred to by Anthropologists when talking of the "traditional mentality" (Horton 1987).

Now, let us listen to an African philosopher characterizing what he calls "the African thought": "This thought doesn't seek its justification beyond what is consecrated by the community. It doesn't feel the need to give proofs by individual argumentation. Its legitimacy is given by what Ancestors have established in other times." (Ndaw 1984) This obvious inhibition of the critical mind constitutes, according to Karl Popper, the main handicap of traditional societies that he also calls "closed societies" and that he opposes to "open societies", those valorising the affirmation of the individual and the intellectual activity (Bouveresse 1986). Here, Ndaw recognizes like many other Afri-

can authors that African societies remain basically traditional societies in spite of appearances. One can say more exactly that with their entering in contact with modernity, these societies are in a somehow evolution, a process far more complex than one can think.

For Karl Popper, the direction of the History of human societies is than of moving from the state of a closed society into than of an open one, and this passage is inescapable, irreversible and globally positive; this thesis is difficult to defend today.

On the basis of his works on prehistoric societies, Childe stated that all transformations occurring in the life of human societies can be explained by the necessity of adaptation to environmental conditions, without advocating extra-historical factors.

In the "Viability Theory" of Aubin (2010), it is also a question of a permanent process of adaptation to environmental constraints, of physical and biological order (with the laws of nature and the objective properties of the matter), and of socio-cultural order. As for social systems, the great inertia of evolution of cultural codes is brought into light and this explains the necessity of situations of crisis for viable changes to be expected. But for Aubin and contrary to Childe assertions, the intellectual dynamism characterizing open societies cannot be simply explained as the product of reactions to external factors. Anyway, Childe himself recognized that a closed society coming into contact with an open society doesn't automatically change into an open society.

The opening of African societies to the modern world has been mainly marked by this phenomenon described by Giri (1986): on one hand a passionate and even greedy quest of the material and social well-being brought by this new way of life; on the other hand, the incapability daily accentuated, to master the implied technologies and even the lack of a real and consistent will of moving towards this mastery. This extraversion of the consummation leads unavoidably to a sustained pauperisation of people and to a growing dependence of Africa (Futurs africains 2003). In all development policies however, the poverty of African countries is rather considered as a data of the nature.

#### **4. The imperative of development and the actors play**

The imperative of development of African societies is only the necessity of their adaptation to a world wherein any autarky life has become almost impossible.

With many African countries acceding to independence in the years 1960s, the Rostow's model of economic growth was adopted and interpreted as reducing the development concern of these countries to that of their industrialization, what was misleading.

At the early 1980s, the failure of development policies built on this model was acknowledged. But for the experts of the World Bank, this failure had to be attributed to the lack of capital of developing economies, and to distortions imposed by the governments on the market play. The inconsistency of their doctrine labelled: "The Washington Consensus" has been established. Joseph Stiglitz and the Neo-Keynesian economists insisted on the necessity of considering the specific freezing of these economies; they even asserted that it is gaps in knowledge between developed and less-developed countries that account for lack of development (Hoff and Stiglitz 1999).

The African Union and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, have adopted, in February 2005, the action plan ARAPKE (African Regional Action Plan on the Knowledge Economy), the implementation of which, through 11 flagship projects, is expected to produce tangible results within 10 years.

With the project concerning Education which is largely heading, it is planned that most primary and secondary schools of the region will be properly equipped, so that "young African graduate with I.C.T. skills and knowledge that will enable them to participate confidentially in the knowledge economy" (African Union Commission 2005).

Such an approach of the manner Africa should achieve its insertion in the knowledge economy doesn't seem to take into account conclusions of available studies. Indeed, in the report Sciences et Pays en développement produced by the French Academy of Sciences (2006), one can read : "One has sometimes imagined that a technological jumping (frog leap) of developing countries crossing over already obsolete stages could accelerate the dynamic of development. Now it is known that the diffusion of these technologies can bring a change to the socio-economic context [...] only with the generating of an education of quality". If the learning of the directions of use of the new technologies can be easy, than of their conception, which needs a far more longer time of maturing and of progress in abstraction, must not be lost of sight, to avoid an increasing of the cognitive fracture.

The anchorage of the contemporary development of some societies on the great intellectual revolutions of the past is emphasized by Aubin and Haddad (2005). We think we have personally explained the necessity of a particular impulsion for a real take off of African societies towards modernity (Bebbé-Njoh 2002).

The general state of infrastructures in African educational systems is not up to the mark. Conditions of work for teachers and lecturers as for students are at the origin of repeated strikes or threats of strike. This situation has rather worsened at the beginning of the new millennium (Académie des Sciences 2006). Then one should think first to palpable improvements of the described situation. Besides, while integrating reasonably the contributions of new technologies, African schools should implement intensively cognitive education, which is taking new wings with the importance now acknowledged, of those factors which can stimulate or in the contrary inhibit the activity of intelligence (Loarer 1998). For when it is stated that intellectual curiosity and the desire of understanding are inherent to the human mind and are rooted in the "phylogeny" (Aubin and Haddad 2005), there is a matter for worrying about the visible lack of these "essential engines of knowledge production" in African societies. And when the rise towards abstraction is presented as the indicator of progress in the building of "knowledge networks", one must think to that aversion for abstraction noticed by Alexis Kamage and by Malanda Dem in their descriptions of the "African mentality" (Bebbé-Njoh 2000, 2002).

One must equally scrutinize sincerely the impact on the activity of intelligence, of this already mentioned trait of traditional cultures consisting in the renouncing to any critical examination of whatever has been stated by Ancestors.

In short, it is a matter for promoting experimental studies on conditions of positive modifiability of those attitudes and behaviours related to the traditional mentality but which are apparently inhibiting of the activity of intelligence.

It is a similar experimental approach that Esther Duflo (2009) has initiated in the Economy of Development, at M.I.T., with the option of going further than the mere description of the real, and the concern for identifying causality relationships between variables in view of some actions. But her attachment to the paradigm of poverty doesn't permit her to be interested to variables which would be pertinent for societies remained traditional. Considerations of this kind are generally eluded, for unavoidable musty of racism. It must be said that adepts of different forms of racism always tried to find arguments in some theory of human intelligence. But it is definitively established that the notion of "race" doesn't exist in genetic (Langaney 1998; Roubertroux 2005).

### Remark

The "International Community", in order to bring democracy forward in the world, can hunt some African dictators down their bunkers. The same community seems rather indulgent when appropriate measures have to be taken to get African countries seriously engaged in the process of an authentic development, that is which doesn't increase their dependence.

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# Life as a Soap Opera: Concerning the “Middle” Wittgenstein’s Concept of Time

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## 1.

The analytical expositions of time often begin with McTaggart’s (1908) distinction between time concepts. There are two principal perspectives on time. Either we may see time as a line, flux of moments, going from the distant future, through the near future and the present to the past. This is called A-series. Or we may see the relations between time moments in terms of “earlier” and “later”. In this B-series, each moment is defined by its position towards earlier and later moments.

Mc Taggart endeavored to prove that both these concepts are incoherent; and proposed to analyze time in an alternative way. In the so-called C-series, time is only an organizational principle of events that we understand as certain specific succession. The succession X-Y-Z means that we understand “Y” as “following X and preceding Z” and it would make no sense to conceive of it otherwise. Since the C-series is a static organizational principle, McTaggart claims time to be unreal, and consequently any concept of time as dynamic or fluent to be incorrect.

Many analytical expositions of time proceed in the light of McTaggart’s distinctions – the authors usually focus on the basic distinction between A- and B-series (e.g. Oaklander 2004), while neglecting his positive C-series proposal. In Wittgenstein’s case, the most important point is one feature of the distinction between A-series on the one hand, and the two other series on the other hand. A-series presents the whole of time (a perspective not quite dissimilar from the conceptions of actual infinity, criticized by Wittgenstein), while B- and C-series offer a perspective from within time. (On the other hand, there may be a problem with the static character of both B- and C-series views.)

The most of – and the most straightforward – remarks on time are found in the “middle” Wittgenstein’s writings. The question whether such a person existed and in what period is still open and hard to solve; for our question the most interesting remarks come from the years 1929-1931, which falls in e.g. Jacquette’s (1997) periodization of the “middle” Wittgenstein. It makes some sense to limit the period of Wittgenstein’s emphasis on time into this alleged “middle” stage, as it is one of the most prominent symptoms of his interest in “phenomenological” topics (unlike the analytical mainstream, the phenomenological tradition has always paid much attention to time). I will refer principally to MSs 105-110 (Wittgenstein 2000) most of which form the background for Philosophical Remarks (Wittgenstein 1964).

## 2.

The “early” Wittgenstein (1961) mentions time as one of the “forms” of objects (TLP 2.0251). Along with space and color, time is a necessary constituent of any object our experience can access. Tractatus doesn’t tell much more about time. The early attempts from late twenties to amend the Tractarian conception (Wittgenstein 1929) suggest that time should enter the correct logical analysis of elementary

propositions as some kind of coordinate or index. Since this pictures time as a line of moments each of which has its own identifier, this may be close to McTaggart’s A-series concept.

However, Wittgenstein soon realized that the correct analysis of time cannot be that easy. In his manuscripts from late twenties and early thirties, he distinguishes between “information time” and “memory time”. He doesn’t propose metaphysics of time (the question what time really is is never asked); the purpose is to provide a grammar of our temporal concepts. According to Wittgenstein, when speaking of time, we operate within – at least – two different conceptual regimes. The rules holding within each of them must not be applied to the other one; they cannot be confused, if we strive for a correct description. The information time is a label for the notion of time used in physics (for example). Here, “time” is a magnitude that can be measured and quantified. It constitutes a line of moments/intervals each of which is as big and as important as any other. The Tractarian view on time as well as the later coordinate proposal seems to be close to this notion.

On the other hand, the much stressed “phenomenology” inclines towards favoring the memory-concept. Unlike physics, whose verification requirements are quite specific, phenomenological grammar is interested in common speaking of time, beyond the strict limitations of science. The experience – the way we normally talk using time concepts – is structured otherwise than in terms of the physical (information) time. The organizational principle here is the memory time; any experience has an inherent temporal dimension, however immediate and momentary it may be.

There are several things speaking against applying the information concept of time here. It has its own relevance, but only with respect to specific context. Its main problem is that it can be understood as picturing time in terms of the line of various presents (present moments), each of which is indexed by itself, but is also equal to each other. Within this framework, the past and the future are only presents carrying indexes differing from the index of the actual present (moment). However, our concepts of the past, the present and the future don’t work this way. The past and the future are rather necessary requirements for understanding the present we live in.

The information time concept has similar problems as the possible-worlds analysis of modalities. There, the difference between possible, actual and necessary is leveled out, in favor of actuality across different possible worlds. What is possible is actual in some possible world; what is necessary is actual in all the possible worlds. However, in our world (the world), no possibility or necessity consists in actual occurrence somewhere beyond the realm of our reality. The possibilities and necessities lay within its boundaries. In the grammar of our language, modalities constitute the semantics of the actual (events, facts, situations, deeds). We wouldn’t be able to think of anything as actual – in the sense we understand it – apart from its functional relationship to what we call “possible” and “nec-

essary". The approach identifying necessary with actual occurrence in all the possible worlds provides no tool for distinguishing between empirical totality and syntactic necessity. In other words, we can ask whether something that holds in all the possible worlds, holds necessarily in all these worlds, or whether it is a contingent fact that it is everywhere. "Necessity" and "possibility" should rather not be interpreted as "actuality, just in some other reality – or aggregate of realities – than this one".

The information concept of time treats the past and future as presents, just in some other time than right now. They are considered to be different – but in themselves equally present – moments of the timeline. Yet "past" and "future" are rather constitutive parts of our understanding of the present. Wittgenstein's "memory-view" on present doesn't see it as a non-dimensional, inconceivable point of the timeline, distinguished by a unique index and surrounded by immense abysses of the past and the future. The present we live in includes also memories and expectations and (its meaning) could not be described and understood without including the levels of memories and expectations (Art des Gegebenseins of the past and the future). The present would have no meaning without the past and the future. As a volatile moment, it would tell and contain nothing. But it does tell and mean something.

### 3.

Wittgenstein depicts this difference by a remarkable movie-metaphor. The present is not just the one film frame, actually projected. The present is the whole movie on the screen. When I watch a movie, I see and understand the whole story. If I watched only the one frame, I would not see meaningful events, situations and personalities. But what makes them meaningful, is not already lost in the past. That what I watch – the movie, the story, the message – is exactly what I watch, not what I watched (after all, even the English tense "has been watching" is present perfect). On the other hand, the understanding and interpretation of the movie is always projected into the future, it builds also upon expectations.

When I look at a movie, the people I see have personality, qualities, abilities, they are "somebody". So Clint Eastwood's character in whatever moment of *The Good, The Bad and The Ugly* is not just the guy in the green poncho. I know I see (presently) the one who shoots the fastest – even if I do not see a gun in his hand in the moment. And though the information that enabled me to do so is in some sense already past, this complex understanding is present. I think that the same is true about most of our experience of time: my present (but also other people's present), as I see it, contains also my past and my future, and without them it wouldn't have the meaning it has – in the present. I can understand my present only as a viewer of (or also a character in) a story with duration in time.

The movie-metaphor proves to have its strength, and it succeeds in illustrating how our concepts of time and the present work. I think that its potential will emerge in a more distinct shape if we follow the metaphor consequently and try to develop it to its very endings. The specificity of Wittgenstein's notion of time lies in its phenomenological focus. The space as we perceive it (speak meaningfully about it) mean space with somehow verschwommen boundaries. The visual space cannot be understood as some part of the "physical" space, with artificially blurred margins. The blurredness belongs to its essence – it is the way we see the world: as emerging from the invisible, without sharp transition. The same is true of time: the past

and the future we are able to conceive of non-trivially are not infinite. Yet, on the other hand there is no sharp beginning or ending. The time within which we live emerges from a larger whole of time that we are able to understand only indirectly. And both these concepts are limited and rather vague.

We must not forget about the role of the information concept. That is, in the everyday life, we commonly suppose that time is infinite line (contamination with the information time concept that definitely is a part of our interpretations/reflections of our phenomenological time). Just the conceivable past and future that has some nontrivial/more specific content is limited. Our experience (interpretation) of the present emerges from (incorporates) a memory of the past and anticipation of the future that partly is and partly is not only mine, while the boundary between mine and not-mine is not sharp. The past and the future comprising the project of my present outsteps the interval of my life, yet I am not able to conceive of the past and the future that I consider as unlimited/infinite – unlike the abstract concept of time we all know from school.

### 4.

What potential does all this offer to the movie concept? The time-movie within which I act has no clear limits I am able to grasp. Though for the time being I may be its principal actor, I could not constitute its meaning just by myself (i.e. I am not the only character), and my concepts of the past and the future as they project into the meaning of my present admits that I have not been present from the very beginning nor I will be until the very end.

So the meaningful stream of my present is rather more like a soap opera stream from which I emerge: we may imagine sagas like *The Young and The Restless*, *General Hospital*, *Days of Our Lives*. The beginning (semantic standards) of the present that define my identity goes beyond the reach of my memory. Hardly anyone acts here from the very beginning to the very end, let alone as the principal agent. And from the other point of view, also regular viewers usually cannot easily point at the precise beginning of their acquaintance with the opera. And the future within such a stream can be expected to process the same way.

One movie often has one principal agent (sometimes it can be the only person acting within it), she/he can also be present in the foreground all the movie time. That is, her/his performance can be limited sharply. So a movie is not enough. Yet the soap-opera model has some more advantages. Let's consider another, alternative metaphor – the James Bond movies. Even there, the present in terms of which I understand the appearance and performances of 007 is constituted by a tradition that outsteps my memory and may outstep my future life as well. Yet the logic of time is considerably disrupted here. The sceneries of the worlds change in time, the character does not. He is the principal actor (defining the show) and indispensable. He is also not a bodily person (remember the multiple alterations of the stars), implied not to grow old and not to develop mentally. Though his personality emerges from a rich context, this context is almost without exception shaped by ritual (cyclic) iterations of untimely present. James Bond seems to be an untimely, private hero.

On the other hand, the flux of life in soap operas thematizes time explicitly in phenomenological terms – we may view the presented world from the centered point of view of any of the actors, yet on the other hand the characters are

born, grow old, come, leave, and die. Also, no one of them stands alone. The world created here outsteps typically the horizon of any individual experience, and the interactions between the agents represent the substantial content of the events course. It is an intersubjective (not just individual) and inherently temporal world.

It is true that the later Wittgenstein was not that interested in the questions of time, so we may only guess whether he would have elaborated his time concept towards a series- or soap-opera-model (let alone the possibility he would have lived long enough to see the boom of real soap operas in TV). Yet I think this would be a legitimate working-out and finalization of his original movie-metaphor of the present, quite consistent with his later philosophy.

Acknowledgement: Work on this paper was supported by grant project No. P401/10/P266 of Czech Science Foundation.

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# Human without Self: From Ethics of Soul to Ethics of Embodied Mind

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"The human body is the best picture of the human soul."  
L. Wittgenstein *Philosophical Investigations*

## 1. Introduction

Certain concepts of personal identity or the self serve as a basis of all ethical and philosophical discussions. Anti-Cartesian uniqueness of the 20th century philosophy as well as a dynamic development of sciences have led to the emergence of a new naturalized picture of man in which the concept of free will has been replaced with human agency. This picture is contradictory to a traditional understanding of man though it does not supplant it. It is discussed by scientists, philosophers in the media and in literature so it indirectly affects a common individual. At the same time, the dualistic language is still used, which leads to an interpretative conflict.

I will present only certain aspects of this transformation of the picture of man and its consequences for the fields of ethics, modern philosophy of mind, epistemology and cognitive science. I will base my arguments on a few concepts: bounded rationality, embodied mind, Ego Tunnel (Thomas Metzinger) and some discoveries in the field of neurosciences not touching upon the subject of such concepts as embedded logic, cognitive grammar, embedded AI, epigenetics, etc. Finally, I will move to explain why this situation serves a pretext for philosophical and social discussions. I shall show how a fully naturalized picture of man functions in society and what ethical issues it raises.

## 2. Cartesian concept of man vs. selfless human

Rene Descartes assumed that the self is identical with a thinking thing (*res cogitans*) which, *mutatis mutandis*, may be defined as a field of mental states. It is independent of its physical carrier – the body (*res extensa*). Such point of view includes an assumption of internal substantialist layer of man which possesses the possibilities of conscious, coherent and objective perceiving and experiencing the reality. Consequently, *cogito* is the main source of all actions of an individual. A similar dualistic concept of man is present in the greatest monotheistic religions. It also emerges from intuitive folk psychology (Hood 2009: 135-137).

From a scientific perspective, human is treated as a biological organism. All behaviors and abilities are perceived as evolutionary adaptation or its adverse outcomes. Thomas Metzinger says about *Consciousness Revolution* (Metzinger 2009: 212) i.e. the level of knowledge of current era. Nowadays, thanks to complex technology we are able to distance ourselves from naive realism and innate ways of perception. The world turns out to be more of a process than substance. Colors perceived by a man do not really exist but they are the result of evolutionary adaptation of an eye to interpret a particular part of electromagnetic spectrum. Some examples of neuropathological disorders show that behind the unity of sensual perception stand

very complex processes whose effect is only realized by a man. Metzinger claims that the self works in a similar way, that it is a naturally experienced illusion and a type of useful evolutionary adaptation to environment.

Metzinger (2009: 208-209) is a follower of "neurocepticism" or "no-self doctrine" as called by Gallagher (2008: 198-199). According to this approach, there is no such thing as a substantialist self, which does not exclude the first-person perspective – *Ego*. It serves as a useful tool: it allows for treating yourself as an individual relatively independent from the environment. On the other hand, *Ego* enables us to understand each other through empathy and mind-reading. As a result, the consciousness and being aware of self-existence is a way of representing the world, while the self is only a temporary process and it does not perform any important explanatory function.

The stand according to which the self is only an illusion has been widely discussed by various modern philosophers like Nietzsche, Husserl, Sartre, Foucault or Gray. Moreover, in academic literature we can often find the influence of neurophysiological determinants on seemingly intimate and independent mental sphere. A man is described as a container for genes (Richard Dawkins), mental body (Antonio Damasio) or chemical mixture comprised of five elements (Hoimar von Dithfurth). These concepts enter into popular culture and are assimilated through language and the media (See section 4). However, they do not replace a popular dualistic model of man but co-exists with it. The consequences of such combination are still difficult to assess.

## 3. Selected concepts supporting selfless image of human

A few concepts are particularly important to discussions on condition of man. One of them is a widely accepted idea of the embodied mind. It assumes that (1) there are no such mental processes or internal properties that could be transcendental, ethereal or autonomous in terms of physicality; (2) they are rooted i.e. shaped in the interaction with social or natural environment (Glannon 2011: 12). This concept or some of its aspects have matured in the views of many profound modern philosophers. In this anti-Cartesian philosophical atmosphere, the idea has been explained in cognitive science for the last 30 years and has gained immense popularity. We can say that it is a new way of perceiving human (and animal) mind which is opposed to computationalism and connectionism. In consequence, it has an effect on such fields as cognitive psychology, embedded AI, linguistics, anthropology (Hutchins), philosophy and even embedded logic.

According to the concept of the embedded mind, it is the primal pre-reflective experience that places a subject in the world and enables him to function efficiently. The body, on the other hand, is a place where subjectivity is born and where it develops. Thanks to the body, the existence is possible. Human being lives in a permanent relationship with the

world and he always exists in relation to it. He may not separate himself from this experience, he may not be a kind of a mental "ascetic", an independent observer nor a moderator of his behavior.

As a result, *cogito* is no longer unique; what is more, it loses its explanatory power. A way of thinking is determined by a type of physical structure of an organism, a situation and a cultural context, etc. In most cases the processes that lead to certain arguments are unclear and subconscious – only the result of the thought becomes conscious. Research of many scientists (e.g. Damasio) show that every rational decision must be tangled up with emotions. Otherwise, paradoxically, it becomes illogical. Adaptation mechanisms, visible in the language itself, stand behind this phenomenon. For example, metaphors are based on the uniqueness of human experience. "Warm" is associated with love; "cold" is associated with hate while "health" with up and "illness" with down, etc. On a similar basis, we come to reason the world. We describe reality, including cultural aspects, according to certain patterns typical for our embodied way of functioning in the environment: "the box model" (inside/outside), "part-the whole", "source-path-aim", etc. (Lakoff, Johnson 1999: 31-34, 118-129).

Another concept connected with the embodied mind is the idea of bounded rationality (H. Simon, G. Gigerenzer, D. Kahneman & A. Tversky et al.). It appeared as the answer to the problems of classical rationality. Within this model objectivity, cohesion and computing abilities of human beliefs are challenged. The model assumes that in the process of evolution the decisions that have survived were the ones that were (1) taken rapidly with (2) unavoidable information deficit. Behaviors are effective when undertaken on time in order to avoid danger. Precise reconstruction of reality and situations has never been necessary. In the process of natural development, tested in human phylogenetics, appeared heuristics – simplified mechanisms of decision-making. These strategies act below the level of consciousness and are responsible for intuitive choices. In the next section, I will show a few examples how the abovementioned concepts are assimilated by societies.

#### 4. Problems with ethics of selfless mind

Summing up my previous thoughts, mainly in the last few decades we have been able to observe a naturalized picture of man that is very much different from the traditional and intuitive approach. The concept of the substantialist self was challenged. As already said, the debate on the matter is not held by scientists only, but in a more simplified form it is present in the media and broadly defined culture. On the one hand, postulates for the naturalized picture of man are visible in educational programs and books. On the other hand, the knowledge on determinants of mental states is simply used to achieve certain goals (e.g. in neuromarketing). Both these perspectives constitute a source of ethical problems and call for international discussion.

Interpretative conflict in adopting these opposite pictures of man is visible in many phenomena. The first is the interference of politics in the media in form of social campaigns. A high increase in problems deemed mental according to the Cartesian division has been observed. Certain correlations have been discovered, like the one between the way and place of existence as well as hormones affecting human mood (cortisol connected with stress, anxiety; estradiol may increase libido, etc.) and the

changes in psyche. Dualistic language is the same, but the boundaries of the definition have faded away – independent mental and separate physical lives have seized to exist. That is why, road signs warn us against fatigue and driving under the influence of alcohol; social campaigns promote a balanced working day to prevent heart diseases, stress and depression.

A phenomenon worth analyzing is the comparison of humans to animals and searching for or erasing the criterion proving superiority of men. A set of qualities of *homo sapiens* believed to be unique (thinking, awareness, using tools, language, etc.) is shrinking. Even so well grounded specific quality as the language is being challenged. It is known that there are animals which have a richer "vocabulary" than small children. Moreover, if we assume that the language makes a man better from e.g. a chimpanzee, why can we claim that a more eloquent person is better than a less educated one (Harris 2005: 178)? And if there are no substantial differences between people and animals, we may pose the question of how much human desires affect our thoughts, value system and morality.

People are overloaded with information about their numerous external determinants often without clearly explained reflection on the consequences of this condition. It turns out that "the self" exists only as a process with no autonomy and objectivity, which is meticulously used by the media. For more than a decade we have been able to observe the development of neuromarketing. While analyzing the effectiveness of an advertisement, a lot of attention is paid to the correlation between the provided message and the neuronal stimulation that is often dependent on gender. Other aspects of functioning of the receivers below the level of consciousness are also closely evaluated. The aim is not to convince but to control human behavior. Such manipulation that employs natural ways of perceiving reality may turn out to be very successful. The question is whether we can use it even with good intentions like discouraging people from smoking.

Another aspect worth discussing is cognitive enhancement. While treating mental states similarly to embodied structures, it was discovered that there can be modified with pharmaceuticals or invasive procedures. Hormones such as dopamine, cortisol or oxytocin stimulate certain types of behavior, which means that chemistry in a way regulates social life. It is an ethical issue of how far we can interfere into our senses. Scientists who have substantial knowledge about cognitive enhancement show a marked tendency in using it in practice. About 20 per cent out 1,400 of respondents from 60 countries admitted to taking pharmacologically unfounded concentration or memory enhancement medicine (Metzinger 2009: 231).

The naturalized picture of man built in modern philosophy and science consistently excludes the possibility of the existence of autonomic mental states. There is no such thing as personality; we can act as different persons depending on the place where we currently are: at work, school, home. A change in character is natural as much as being affected by external influences or having no objective status of decision-making. Appropriate to the new picture of man would be new ethics – selfless ethics. It is within its boundaries – accepting the stability of complex human organism and not its "internality" – new regulations of social life should arise. Many people are aware of the fact that their way of thinking does not depend on their will. They know that it is imposed and it relies on the reception of reality. It is a common knowledge that the Internet changes our perception. We know that sometimes we act automatically and we may play with our mental states by

taking non-addictive pharmaceuticals. The consequences of accepting the labile personality are difficult to predict, however, this process has already started. Media, corporations or many specialized courses teaching techniques of manipulation use this knowledge for private purposes. Such facts make us realize that we must adapt to reality and current knowledge about humans and in the end create selfless ethics.

## 5. Conclusions

There is no doubt that the last century's uniqueness was based mainly on (1) a strong naturalization of mental states. The perspective of certain types of "souls" is becoming highly dubious. It turns out that (2) the self is dependent on the environment and stops being immanent (3) being in constant relation with the world instead. What is more, (4) it loses the status of a real being and is becoming only a process that creates an illusion of an internal homunculus. Meanwhile, (5) only the result of the mechanisms creating the awareness and allowing for the first-person perspective are grasped in conscious reflection. In consequence (6) the bodiliness is a centre of perspective through which the world is given. These (7) discoveries popularized by sciences are reflected in social life. We use their achievements and the implications are in a way real-

ized by a common user of culture. (8) Will turns out to be limited just like rationality, (9) economic heuristics shape our decisions while (10) ethics and values are strongly rooted in and conditioned by human experience and (11) there is a strong need for a wide discussion on what selfless ethics concerning human nature should look like and how to shape the awareness of men.

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# Systeme in der Medizin und deren Vernetzung

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## **1. Historische Vorbemerkung**

In vielen Wissenschaften und auch außerhalb der Wissenschaften spricht man heute von Systemen und arbeitet sowohl mit dem Systembegriff als auch mit Systemen. Carl von Linné (1707-1778) hat 1735 sein *systema naturae*, einen Versuch zur Einteilung oder Klassifikation der gesamten Natur, vorgelegt. Auch Hegel verwendet den Ausdruck System, doch die Bezeichnung *System* wurde in die Biologie und damit in die Wissenschaft überhaupt von dem Austrokanadier Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1901-72) eingeführt und zwar in der Form von *Allgemeine Systemtheorie*. Von Bertalanffy gab auch eine Zeitschrift dieses Titels heraus. Er ging von der Chemie aus, hatte die Systeme nach ihrer Gleichgewichtsart unterteilt und dabei vier Arten von Gleichgewicht unterschieden und damit auch vier Arten von Systemen erhalten. Da biologische Systeme einen dynamischen Charakter haben, sprach von Bertalanffy von *Fließgleichgewicht*.

In der Medizin haben wir es vor allem mit zwei Arten von Systemen zu tun: einmal kann man den gesamten Organismus samt seiner Teile als System auffassen, d.h. nicht nur der ganze Organismus ist ein System, sondern auch die großen Organsysteme und wiederum auch deren Teile, wie alle großen Organe, haben Systemcharakter. Auch die Zelle ist ein System.

Zum anderen spricht man auch von Wahnsystemen, d.h. manches, was ein an Schizophrenie oder an einer Manie erkrankter Patient offensichtlich erlebt, durchlebt und auch bei Befragen offenbart, hat ebenfalls Systemcharakter. Eine wichtige Unterscheidung ist die zwischen normalen Erfahrungssystemen, an denen wir teilhaben und Wahn-systemen, die entweder als Ganzes oder in ihren Teilen Aspekte haben, die dem normalen Erfahrungssystem widersprechen und gravierende Konsequenzen für das Individuum und sein soziales Umfeld haben.

Systeme sind eine bestimmte Art von Ganzen, und sie weisen deshalb eine mereologische Struktur auf, d.h. man muss zunächst fragen, ob sie echte Ganze sind oder nur Aggregate, und wenn sie echte Ganze sind, welcher Art von Ganzen sie zuzurechnen sind.

## **2. Die Mereologie des Aristoteles und das mereologische Dreieck**

Im Buch A seiner *Metaphysik* geht Aristoteles auf verschiedene Arten von Ganzen ein. Er unterscheidet zunächst Ganze von Gesamtheiten, wie das Plato im *Parmenides* schon getan hatte. Gesamtheiten (*panta*) wie Zahlen sind keine echten Ganzen (*holon*). Das zeigt sich schon daran, dass bei der Subtraktion eine neue Zahl entsteht, man also Gesamtheiten im Gegensatz zu echten Ganzen nicht verstümmeln kann.

Bei den echten Ganzen unterscheidet Aristoteles zwischen homogenen und heterogenen Ganzen. Bei ersteren wie z.B. Wasser, Luft, Butter hat das Ganze dieselbe Struktur wie seine Teile, d.h. sowohl das Ganze als auch seine Teile sind homogene Ganze. Die Position der Teile

spielt keine Rolle. Es stellt sich also heraus, dass auch die homogenen Ganzen keine echten Ganzen sondern Gesamtheiten sind. Bei den heterogenen Ganzen, also allen Lebewesen und auch Artefakten, sind die Teile verschieden und können auch wechseln. Im Gegensatz zu den homogenen Ganzen ist neben der Teil-Ganzes Relation auch die Teil-Teil Relation grundlegend, d.h. die Position der Teile spielt eine wichtige Rolle.

Später, im Mittelalter, hat man an diese Unterscheidungen angeknüpft und zwischen quantitativen und qualitativen Ganzen unterschieden. Bei quantitativen Ganzen wie der kürzesten Strecke zwischen zwei Punkten, ist in der euklidischen Geometrie auch jeder Teil der kürzeste, d.h. die Eigenschaft die kürzeste Strecke zu sein, verhält sich transitiv vom Ganzen auf die Teile. Nelson Goodman würde das *dissective* nennen. Im Falle qualitativer Ganzen wie einem schönen Gesicht ist das nicht der Fall. Nicht jeder Teil eines schönen Gesichtes muss selbst wiederum schön sein. Die Eigenschaft schön ist nicht vom Ganzen auf die Teile vererbar. Albert von Sachsen hat sogar darauf hingewiesen, dass dabei die Potentialität eine Rolle spielt, d.h. eine weniger schöne Nase kann durch ein sonst schönes Gesicht schöner erscheinen. Leibniz hat diese Analyse auf die Unterscheidung von natürlichen und künstlichen Maschinen angewandt. Bei natürlichen Maschinen, also bei Lebewesen ist jeder Teil wiederum eine Maschine, bei künstlichen ist das nicht der Fall, nicht jeder Teil ist eine <sup>1</sup>Maschine. Analog ist in der besten aller möglichen Welten nicht jeder Teil der beste. Es gibt mögliche Welten, die nicht die besten sind, in denen Teile besser sind als in der besten Welt.

Eine weitere wichtige Unterscheidung hat Aristoteles in *De Anima* getroffen, indem er zwischen Teilbarkeit und Trennbarkeit von Teilen differenziert hat. Teilbarkeit kann rein distinktionell oder begrifflich sein, wie z.B. die zwischen den drei Seelen oder Seelenteilen wie anima vegetativa, anima sensitiva und anima rationalis, die zwar unterscheidbar, aber die untrennbar sind. Im Falle integraler Ganzer sind manche Teile abtrennbar und manche nicht, bei Aggregaten sind alle Teile abtrennbar und können für sich bestehen, und im Falle von essentiellen Ganzen ist kein Teil abtrennbar, alle Teile sind wesentlich und damit unverzichtbar.

Stellt man diese Analyse homomorph zum logischen Dreieck, dann erhält man das mereologische Dreieck.<sup>2</sup>

**Aqqeqat A** Alle Teile sind abtrennbar      **E** Kein Teil ist abtrennbar  
**Essentielles Ganzes**

| 9

Einige Teile sind abtrennbar und einige Teile nicht  
**Integrales Ganzes**

Wenn Systeme echte Ganze sind, dann haben wir es mit vier Arten von Relationen zu tun: Die Beziehung zwischen dem Ganzen und seinen Teilen und umgekehrt die Bezie-

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. Monadologie §64

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Burkhardt 1989: 176

hung zwischen den Teilen und dem Ganzen, die Beziehung zwischen den Teilen selbst, und letztlich die Beziehung zwischen verschiedenen Systemen. Diese letztere Beziehung kann wiederum durch Systeme bewerkstelligt werden.

### 3. Der menschliche Organismus die großen Organsysteme und die Organe

Der menschliche Organismus ist hierarchisch strukturiert. Man kann elf verschiedene Ebenen dieser hierarchischen Struktur unterscheiden, von denen die ersten neun der biologischen Struktur des menschlichen Körpers angehören und sie damit auch repräsentieren, während die beiden letzten zwar auch Teile der in den darüber liegenden Ebenen vorkommenden biologischen Einheiten sind, selbst jedoch biologisch stumm sind.

1. Der Organismus – z.B. der menschliche Körper
2. Organsysteme – z.B. das Verdauungssystem oder das Herz-Kreislaufsystem
3. Die wichtigsten Körperteile – z.B. Kopf, Thorax, Bauch
4. Organe – z.B. Leber, Lunge, Herz, Nieren, Gehirn
5. Gewebe – z.B. Portionen von Epithel oder Muskelgewebe
6. Zelle – z.B. Neuronen, Nephronen, Fettzellen, Muskelzellen
7. Ansammlungen subzellulärer Organellen – z.B. das endoplastische Reticulum, die Mitochondrien samt der damit verbundenen mikrotubulären Struktur
8. Subzelluläre Organellen – z.B. Mitochondrien, Zellkerne, freie Ribosomen
9. Moleküle – z.B. Proteine, Ribonukleinsäure
10. Atome
11. Subatomare Strukturen<sup>3</sup>

Die entscheidenden Systeme des Organismus, die im Ernstfalle auch über Leben und Tod entscheiden, sind die großen Organsysteme: das kardiovaskuläre System, das respiratorische System, das Nervensystem, das Verdauungssystem, das Urogenitalsystem, das Immunsystem, das endokrine System, das tekonische System, das hämopoetische System und das Muskelskelettsystem. Einige dieser Systeme sind auch autoregulativ, d.h. sie haben Sicherungs- und Kontrollfunktionen eingebaut, die das ganze System stabilisieren. Das gilt vor allem für das Herz-Kreislaufsystem.

Mereologisch interessanter sind die wichtigen Organe als Teile dieser großen Systeme. Auch sie können als Systeme angesehen werden, zeigen aber eigene und unterschiedliche mereologische Strukturen. Ohne Zweifel fungiert das Herz als Pumpe, und einige der anatomischen Teile des Herzens, wie die vier Kammern, sind selbst kleine Teilepumpen und haben damit sicher auch eine Pumpfunktion, sind also funktionelle Teile. Doch nur das Herz als Ganzes ist eine echte Pumpe, die sowohl den kleinen als auch den großen Blutkreislauf mechanisch steuert. Damit ist das Herz ein heterogenes Ganzes, das als Ganzes eine Pumpe ist, dessen Teile jedoch keine echten Pumpen sind, sondern nur zur Pumpfunktion des ganzen Herzen ihren Beitrag leisten. Aus diesem Grunde muss

jeweils das ganze Herz funktionsfähig sein, nur funktionsfähige Teile reichen nicht aus. Aus diesen Beispielen geht hervor, dass Systeme eine finale oder teleologische Struktur haben. Systeme dienen offensichtlich einem Zweck.

Anders verhält es sich mit der Leber. Sie ist als Ganzes ein Labor, das die verschiedensten Enzyme, Hormone und auch die Gallenflüssigkeit produziert. Die Teile der Leber sind ebenfalls ein Labor. Das hat zu Folge, dass für das Überleben des Individuums etwa ein Siebtel der Leber ausreicht. Die Leber ist damit ein homogenes Ganzes, d.h. sowohl die Teile als auch das Ganze sind ein Labor. Entscheidend für dieses Organ sind also sein Gewebe und dessen Funktion.

Man kann also den gesamten Organismus und seine durch Grenzen voneinander geschiedenen Teile, wie das Ludwig von Bertalanffy als erster getan hat, als Systeme und Subsysteme auffassen und kennzeichnen, wobei die Subsysteme sich zum jeweils höheren System als Elemente verhalten. Man kann sie auch näher als zwar autonome, jedoch nicht als autarke Systeme charakterisieren. Sie sind autonom, weil sie zwar eine bestimmte Selbständigkeit aufweisen, aber im Austausch mit ihrer Umgebung sind und in funktionaler Beziehung zu Teilen dieser Umgebung stehen und damit auch von dieser abhängig sind. Sie sind aber genau aus diesem Grunde nicht autark, weil sie nicht selbstgenügsam oder von ihrer Umgebung vollständig unabhängig sind.

Im Falle des Gehirns haben wir es einerseits mit einem Organ wie jedem anderen zu tun. Wenn man nach den Ursachen einer Erkrankung des Gehirns sucht, etwa nach einem Tumor, dann geht man vor wie bei anderen Organen, d.h. man untersucht das ganze Gehirn und seine Teile im Sinne von feineren Strukturen, also die Zellen und deren Teile. Mereologisch spricht man in diesem Falle von zunehmender Granularität oder Feinkörnigkeit. Die Ursache kann auch wie im Falle des Morbus Parkinson bei den Neurotransmittern, also in diesem Falle beim Mangel an Dopamin liegen. Im Vergleich zu anderen Organen spielt beim Gehirn die Vernetzung eine große Rolle. Neben anatomischen und funktionellen Verbindungen gibt es auch solche durch bestimmte chemische Substanzen, nämlich durch Neurotransmitter wie Dopamin und Serotonin.

Dies alles spielt sich im Bereich des Somatischen ab, doch das Gehirn als Ganzes hat eine qualitative Eigenschaft, die anderen Organe nicht haben, und die sich nicht im Bereich des Somatischen erschöpft, nämlich das Bewusstsein.<sup>4</sup> Auch Teile des Gehirns haben kein Bewusstsein. Dieses Bewusstsein wiederum hat Fähigkeiten und Eigenschaften, die wir im Somatischen nicht finden. Es kann perzipieren, wahrnehmen, vorstellen, urteilen, denken und fühlen und verfügt außerdem über ein Gedächtnis für Sachverhalte, die so und nicht anders sein können, also für notwendige Zusammenhänge.

### 4. Normales Erfahrungssystem und Wahnsysteme

Es gibt logische, philosophische, physikalische, meteorologische, biologische, politische und soziale Systeme, wie z.B. unser Rechtssystem. Der Systembegriff hat sich über die Wissenschaften hinweg ausgebretet und wird inzwischen für jede Art geschlossener Struktur verwendet, die eine reichere Datenmenge zusammenfasst und ordnet oder zumindest zu ordnen versucht. So spricht man von

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Burkhardt 2011: 5

<sup>4</sup> Vielleicht sollte man genauer sagen, dass ein Mensch, der ein Gehirn hat, auch über ein Bewusstsein verfügt.

Erfahrungs- und Denksystemen, aber auch von Wahnsystemen. Typisch für Systeme ist, dass es ein Innen und ein Außen gibt. Systeme haben offensichtlich Grenzen, die Inneres und Äußeres scheiden. Diese Unterscheidung ist grundlegend, denn offene Strukturen ohne ein Außen, wie etwas das ganze Universum, sind keine Systeme.<sup>5</sup>

Für unser normales Erfahrungssystem gelten zwei Prinzipien: einmal das Prinzip der Rationalität und zum anderen das Prinzip der Kompossibilität. Während logische und mathematische Systeme konsistent oder widerspruchsfrei sein sollen, und damit das Prinzip vom ausgeschlossenen Widerspruch gilt und auch genügt, nämlich  $\neg(p \wedge \neg p)$  und in manchen Systemen auch das tertium non datur, nämlich  $p \vee \neg p$ , ist es für unsere Erfahrungssysteme nicht ausreichend, denn nicht alles, was möglich ist, ist auch zusammen mit anderem möglich oder kompossible, also

$$M(a,b) = Ma \wedge Mb \wedge M(a \wedge b)$$

So ist es z.B. durchaus absolut möglich, dass ein Individuum 4m hoch spricht, doch es ist nicht kompossible mit den physikalischen Gesetzen auf unserer Erde. Es ist auch der Fall, dass Kolibris in bestimmten Regionen der Welt leben können, doch nicht in unserer Region. Wer also davon spricht, dass er im Winter regelmäßig Kolibris im Freien begegnet ist, teilt offensichtlich nicht unser Erfahrungssystem. Dasselbe gilt für die Behauptung regelmäßig mit Engeln Kontakt zu haben. Christen glauben zwar an die Existenz von Engeln, sind sich aber zusammen mit anderen darüber im Klaren, dass wir reine Geister nicht wahrnehmen und auch nicht mit ihnen kommunizieren können. In solchen Fällen teilt diese Person offensichtlich nicht unser Erfahrungssystem und verfügt über ein erweitertes, jedenfalls über ein verändertes Erfahrungssystem.

Wenn dieses veränderte Erfahrungssystem in Kollision mit dem normalen System kommt oder das entsprechende Individuum und seine Umgebung darunter leiden, können wir von einem Wahnsystem sprechen, das entweder einen generellen oder partiellen Charakter hat. Bei der Hebephrenie oder der jugendlichen Schizophrenie besteht meist ein allumfassendes Wahnsystem. Trifft die schizophrene Erkrankung auf ein ausgereiftes Gehirn, dann entsteht meist eine Paraphrenie oder Paranoia, d.h. ein isolierter, meist religiöser Wahn. Diese Menschen leben dann mit doppelter Buchführung, wie der Psychiater Eugen Bleuler (1857-1939) das ausgedrückt hat. Die Folge davon ist, dass Erkrankte dieser Art oft sozial völlig unauffällig sind.

## 5. Das Bewusstsein und seine Teile

Der Philosoph Franz Brentano (1838-1917) hat das Bewusstsein als die Summe aller psychischen Akte verstanden. Die psychischen Akte hat er in drei Gruppen eingeteilt: in Vorstellungen, Urteile und Emotionen. Die Beziehung ist kumulativ: keine Urteile ohne Vorstellungen, keine Emotionen ohne Vorstellungen und Urteile. Das Bewusstsein enthält daneben auch Stimmungen wie z.B. Melancholie oder Euphorie. Diese Stimmungen sind selbst keine psychischen Akte, sie färben aber diese Akte. So ist es nicht möglich zur selben Zeit euphorisch und melancholisch zu sein, man kann aber zur selben Zeit, sehen, hören, riechen, tasten und denken. Diachronisch oder nacheinander kann derselbe Mensch durchaus verschiedene Stimmungen haben. Wir alle wissen das. Stimmungen betreffen und beanspruchen damit auch im Gegensatz zu psychischen Akten das Bewusstsein als Ganzes. Stimmungen haben mit Emotionen zu tun. Das intellektuelle

Pendant zu Stimmungen sind Überzeugungen. Auch sie färben unsere Denkakte auf bestimmte Weise.

Das führt uns zu einem bisher ungelösten Problem, nämlich zur Erklärung für Tatsache, dass es sehr viele somatische Erkrankungen gibt und nur wenige psychische. Die Psychiatrie hat dafür bisher keine Lösung.<sup>6</sup> Da auch Schizophrenie, Depression, Manie und Demenz das Bewusstsein als Ganzes betreffen oder befallen, kann man diese Erkrankungen in Analogie zu den Stimmungen sehen und auch so behandeln. Es ist möglich, dass eine Person diachron oder nacheinander schizophren oder manisch depressiv ist, aber nicht synchron oder zur selben Zeit. Das Gehirn als Bewusstsein kann wohl nur in einem sehr beschränkten Maß psychopathologisch reagieren. So können z.B. aus drei verschiedenen Ursachen schizophrene Reaktionen im Gehirn und damit im Bewusstsein entstehen.<sup>7</sup>

1. Durch nicht primäre Gehirnerkrankungen wie Multiple Sklerose oder Chorea Hüttington.
2. Durch Drogen wie Cannabis, LSD oder Heroin oder durch Medikamente wie Kokain, Atropin und Amphetamine.
3. Durch Infektionskrankheiten wie AIDS und Borreliose.

Auf heterogene Ursachen regiert das Gehirn also sehr stereotyp mit Hilfe eines sehr eingeschränkten psychopathologischen Reaktionsmusters. Man kann darüber spekulieren, warum dies der Fall ist. Meiner Ansicht nach funktioniert die Schutz- oder Beschützerthese nicht, nach der das Gehirn als letzter evolutionärer Erwerb sich in einer Schutzfunktion sieht und den somatischen Bereich nicht durch eine Fülle von psychischen Erkrankungen irritieren und damit gefährden will. Pathologische Prozesse müssen sich immer an normalen Zuständen orientieren und können nicht etwas völlig Neues aus dem Hut zaubern, und d.h. in diesem Fall an den normalen Stimmungen, und in diesem Bereich ist der Spielraum nicht sehr groß.

Ein anderer Aspekt, der gegen die Schutzthese spricht, besteht in der Tatsache, dass bei alten Menschen als erstes das Bewusstsein ausfällt, und diese Menschen schon bei kleinsten Veränderungen verwirrt und desorientiert sein können. Man kann alte Menschen deshalb durchaus als *chaotische Systeme* auffassen. Das Bewusstsein schützt in diesem Fall offenbar den ganzen Organismus dadurch, dass es nicht mehr funktioniert und ausfällt. Entscheidend für das Überleben sind die großen Organsysteme. Sie müssen funktionieren. Auf ein funktionierendes Bewusstsein kann der Organismus für eine gewisse Zeit verzichten.

## 6. Schlussbemerkung

Systeme finden sich in der Medizin ausgehend vom ganzen Organismus in absteigender hierarchischer Ordnung bis zu den Molekülen. Zwischen den einzelnen Systemen besteht jeweils eine mereologische Inklusion. Wichtig sind vor allem die großen Organsysteme, die Organe und die Zellen. Die großen Organsysteme sind teilweise autoregulativ organisiert. Verschiedene mereologische Strukturen weisen die großen Organe auf. Herz und Gehirn sind heterogene Ganze: das Ganze hat Eigenschaften, die die Teile nicht haben, so z.B. beim Herzen die Pumpeigen-

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Heinz Häfner 2010: 9: „Die Tatsache, dass das menschliche Gehirn nur über eine relativ kleine Zahl psychopathologischer Reaktionsmuster verfügt, die durch eine weitaus größere Zahl von Funktionsstörungen des Gehirns hervorgerufen werden, ist früh erkannt worden.“

<sup>7</sup> Cf. Häfner 2010: 24-25

<sup>5</sup> Cf. Burkhardt 2011: 12

schaft und beim Gehirn das Bewusstsein. Die Leber dagegen ist ein homogenes Ganzes: das Ganze verhält sich homogen zu seinen Teilen und umgekehrt die Teile zum Ganzen.

Eine besondere Form von Systemen sind Wahnsysteme. In diesen Fällen weichen die einfließenden Sinnesdaten und ihre Vernetzung vom normalen Erfahrungssystem ab, das durch das Prinzip der Rationalität bestimmt wird, also vom Widerspruchsprinzip aber zusätzlich auch vom Prinzip der Kompossibilität, d.h. die Daten müssen nicht nur möglich, sondern auch miteinander möglich sein.

Systeme können also homogene und heterogene Ganze sein, aber auch Aggregate. Letztere Form findet man in der Biologie nicht, wohl aber im Bereich des Sozialen, d.h. im Bereich sozialer Artefakte.

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# Moral Philosophy and the Critique of Ethical Theory

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The aim of this talk is to discuss what role – if any – we should assign to ethical theory in moral philosophy. The focal point of the discussion will be a wholehearted defence for the role of ethical theory presented by Martha Nussbaum. After a short introduction of the critique of ethical theory, especially that presented by Bernard Williams and by Wittgenstein-inspired philosophers, I will present Nussbaum's defence and examine whether she is successful in warding off the critical points raised. The aim of this approach is to show that Nussbaum does not address the main issues raised by critiques of ethical theory and that she fails to distinguish between ethical theory and moral philosophy. Nussbaum thus seems to assume that a successful attack critique of ethical theory will mean the end of any critical role for moral philosophy. In contrast, I will in the last part of the paper try to indicate a possible conception of moral philosophy – independent of ethical theory – that still has critical, ethical bite.

## 1. The critique of ethical theory

In the writings of Wittgenstein, we find a view of philosophy quite different from the one prevalent in 20th century philosophy in general. Wittgenstein urges that the aim of philosophy is not the development of philosophical theories, but instead to present descriptions and objects of comparisons motivated by and relevant to particular problems. Philosophical activity have both the deconstructive aim to identify and dissolve misunderstandings of either shared or personal character that hinder us from the seeing a problem clearly, and the constructive aim to regain a perspicuous overview of the phenomena in our interest (Wittgenstein 1953). In ethics, this method has inspired a number of philosophers to question the idea that aim of moral philosophy is to develop general and abstract ethical theories and instead turn their attention towards the fine-tuned description of the many ways in which ethical considerations arise in human life. This way of doing moral philosophy is found in the writings of Wittgenstein-inspired thinkers such as Peter Winch, Cora Diamond, Stanley Cavell and D.Z. Phillips, and it often involves showing the gap between the simplicity of the 'moral' intuitions used as the basis for moral philosophy and the startling complexity of considerations and influences drawn on in actual moral thinking (see Winch 1972, 1987; Cavell 1979; Phillips 1992, 1999; Diamond 1982, 2000, 2003 – a critical discussion of this approach to ethics in O'Neill 1986).

This Wittgenstein-inspired line of thought implies a strong critique of the idea that aim of moral philosophy is to produce ethical theories that presents general explanations of and justifications for ethical considerations. A related critique is raised from a different perspective in Bernard Williams by now classic book *Ethics and the limits of philosophy*. Williams focuses his critical investigation on the question of the possible status of philosophical theory within a normative area such as ethics, and he questions whether ethical theory really have any special authority and neutrality that allows it to work as a standard for the correctness of our fundamental ethical convictions. These critiques of ethical theory arise from different considerations, but they are related in so far as the Wittgensteinians

and Williams both reject ethical theory as the proper aim of moral philosophy.

## 2. Nussbaum's defence of ethical theory

The critique of ethical theory is of a special concern for Martha Nussbaum. One reason is that her own work on the importance of an integration of literature into moral philosophy and her plea for the necessity of a fine-tuned moral sensitivity in moral reflection has lead some to assume that she herself is critical of ethical theory (Nussbaum 1990, 1996). This, she insists is not the case (Nussbaum 2000). Another reason is her insistence that ethical theory fulfils an indispensable role by lying the framework necessary for a critique of unfounded or corrupt ethical practise.

The following discussion of ethical theory takes as its starting point Nussbaum's description of ethical theory. This description has the advantage of being explicit, clear and intended to accommodate the most influential points of criticism raised against ethical theory. Nussbaum lists six criteria that any ethical theory must be able to meet (see also Louden 1990). The first two criteria concerns the aim and status of ethical theory, and these will be of special interest in the following. They assert that an ethical theory should provide "*recommendations about practical problem*" and show "*how to test correctness of beliefs, rules and principles*" (Nussbaum 2000: 234). Ethical theory should be able to offer guidance for ethical practice in order to establish some idea of moral critique and progress, and this is done by the theory providing us with a test for ethical practice – Nussbaum here mentions the example of Rawls' reflective equilibrium. The next two criteria primarily concern the *form* that ethical theory takes; they are to "*systematize and extend belief*" and have "*some degree of abstraction and generality*" (*ibid.*). Nussbaum thus portrays ethical theory as a tool that brings order to the complexities of ethical experience and establishes some form of coherence herein. The requirement that this should be done at a certain level of generality and abstraction is justified with reference to the first two criteria, that is, for ethical to be able to offer guidance for the future. The same justification is provided for Nussbaum's sixth criteria that ethical theory must be *explicit*, because only in this case do we know what guidelines it yields in practice. The last criteria states that ethical theory must be *universalizable* in order to avoid ethics collapsing into cultural relativism – but here Nussbaum makes the important qualification that any notion of universalizability of course involves "*an account of relevant similarities and differences*" of situations, relationships and persons (Nussbaum 2000: 235).

What is noticeable in this account of Nussbaums's criteria is that even if presented in the form a list, the first two criteria still take a central role as they provide the point and much of the justification for the following criteria. In order to avoid what Nussbaum considers a common misunderstanding regarding ethical theory, namely that they merely consist in systems of rules, she proceeds by laying out the crucial difference between the two. Systems of rules simply state that something is to be done or avoided without

providing reasons for such normative guidance, and in contrast, ethical theories answer the question for *the reasons and justification* supporting a certain set of rules or ends. It is unclear who Nussbaum thinks represent the deflation of ethical theory with a system of rules, but her discussion is instructive in two ways. Firstly, because she here makes a threefold – and seemingly exhaustive – distinction between three possible ethical dimensions, namely “our concrete ethical practice, rules of conduct of various types and ethical theories” (Nussbaum 2000: 235). And secondly, because this distinction works as her justification for ascribing ethical theory with the authority to “*to test correctness of beliefs, rules and principles*”.

Let us start by attending to the first point. What is perspicuous by its absence in Nussbaum’s discussion is any notion of moral philosophy as distinct from ethical theory. The only place where she explicitly mentions the distinction between ethical theory and moral philosophy is in a footnote, discussion the views of Williams and referring to the last section of the paper, but here the distinction has once again disappear from consideration as Nussbaums notes that “Williams conveys that strong impression of thinking that when we do away with theory we will be left with people like Bernard Williams: they will lack philosophical theory, but they will still be energetically critical and self-critical” (Nussbaum 2000: 248). Later, she continues: “If we remain on at the level of untheoretical critical discourse and practice, as the anti-theorists recommend, we will always be left, as Kant plausibly claims in the *Ground-work*, with some good thought, corrupted by selfishness, aggressiveness, and urges to dominate” (Nussbaum 2000: 252). This means, secondly, that Nussbaum insists on the need for a tool to correct ethical practices and *common sense* morality as they are filled with bad ethical theory, with the corruption of good thoughts by selfish wishes, needs and judgements. Practice is thus unable to guide the development of good institutions and sound politics. Moreover, as Nussbaum draws up a triadic understanding of ethics as consisting of ethical practice, system of rules and ethical theories – and thus leaves out moral philosophy – the only contender left to take any critical role in ethics is ethical theory.

Here, two critical points are in order. First, the fact that we may have a *need* for something like ethical theory to provide a ethical critique does not in itself establish that it is actually available to us or even possible. We may have a need for many things – absolute certainty or the love of god for example – but this alone does not suffice to say that such things are achievable or even possible. Secondly, the implicit assumption guiding Nussbaum’s defense of ethical theory, that theory is the only alternative to unfounded systems of rules, and the only form of philosophical activity that may serve as a critical tool directed towards ethical practice, is not one for which she argues. Thus two important questions remain. Is ethical theory is really achievable? And is Nussbaum is really justified in the assumption that moral philosophy without ethical theory would be without any critical bite and leave our good thoughts amidst a muddle of selfishness and aggressiveness?

### 3. Nussbaum on anti-theory and what Diamond and Williams really question

In light of Nussbaum’s failure to provide an argument for the possible of ethical theory (even if she does indeed make the case for a need for such theory), we need to retrace our steps. One way to do so is to consider whether

Nussbaum really manages to address the critique raised against the *very possibility* of developing ethical theory. In the following, we will take a closer look at the criticism raised by Bernard Williams and Cora Diamond respectively.

In her discussion of the position of Diamond, Williams and others critical of ethical theory, Nussbaum states that they are unclear in both their definitions of ethical theory and their points of critique. This is why she provides a list of criteria for ethical theory, and why she, in another central section of the paper, sets out to explicate and investigate what she calls “the six primary charges” brought forward against ethical theory (Nussbaum 2000: 242). According to Nussbaum, these charges are that ethical theory “neglect an agent’s own particular projects and her special relationship them”, “ignore moral psychology”, “neglect the plurality of goods”, “give crude guidance”, is overly intellectualising, and is unable “*to persuade bad people*” (Nussbaum 2000: 242-248).

We will here leave aside the question whether critics of ethical theory really have raised the points on the list. More interesting is the fact that all of the points on the list are points of critique that could be raised against an ethical theory for being a *bad* theory, that is, any adequate theory should able to meet at least the first five points.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, none of the points on the lists questions the very possibility of developing ethical theory and the authority of such theory to guide and criticise practice. The list thus allows Nussbaum to argue that ethical theory is indeed possible, because if it is a good one, it will simply take into account all of the points presented by the critics.

To accept this argument, however, we would have to accept that the critique presented by anti-theorists really amounts to the claim that existing ethical theories are crude, narrow, or unconvincing. The simple point pursued here is that this is not correct, and that is apparent if we look at the critique raised by Williams. Williams does argue that the first point on Nussbaums’ list, the need to incorporate a first person perspective on one’s life and one’s projects, poses a challenge for ethical theory. However, he connects this critique to a more general concern about the possibility of a justification of a particular view of ethics that takes up more than half of *Ethics and the limits of philosophy*. In the first chapters Williams is concerned with attempts to provide external, non-ethical justification, for example by an Aristotelian conception of welfare<sup>2</sup> or a Kantian view of reason. Unsatisfied with the prospects of such attempts, Williams turns his attention to attempts to provide a philosophical justification of ethics, that is, justification in the form of ethical theory.

Unfortunately, there is no room to retrace Williams’ investigation here, but he examines a number of prominent theories such as utilitarianism and contractualism and their attempts to establish authority for ethical theory by reference to the meaning of e.g. moral concepts, ideal observer theory or moral intuitions. In each case, Williams shows that what is presented as a neutral justification of ethics relies on some unfounded set of substantial convictions about what would be reasonable to accept in ethics, for example what preferences should count as valid or what intuitions should be allowed to count in a reflective equilibrium. Williams openly admits that his investigations is not

<sup>1</sup> The last point is different. As Nussbaum notes, no theory however sound may persuade everyone.

<sup>2</sup> Many Aristotelians would object to Williams’ idea that Aristotle involves an external notion of welfare and insist that the notion of *eudaimonia* itself is shaped by ethical concerns. However, this would lead them to agree with Williams that *eudaimonia* cannot provide neutral justification for ethics (see e.g. McDowell 1995).

exhaustive, but he does have a more general point to make, namely that when we are talking about fundamental ethical commitments, our ethical practice comes first and theory can only be justified – if at all – by reference to such practice. If ethical theory and fundamental ethical convictions collide, Williams insists, we will revise theory, and rightly so. This is so, Williams insists, because, the aim of ethical thought is “to help us construct a world that will be our world, one in which we have a social, cultural and personal life” – and if our conviction of such question conflicts with ethical theory, theory will have to give way (Williams 1985: 111).

His is challenging not just theories’ ability to consider “*an agent’s own particular projects*”, but the thought that they have any authority if they collide with such projects or with what a person from a practical, first person perspective finds truly valuable. And without such authority, ethical theory is in no position to provide guidance for practice and “a general test for the correctness of basic ethical beliefs and principles” (Williams 1985: 72). Thus Williams’ main critique address the two first features of ethical theory noted by Nussbaum that are crucial for her project because they serve as justification for the necessity of the other features of ethical theory and for the critical potential that Nussbaum pursues. Nonetheless, both of Williams’ critical points are absent in Nussbaum’s intended refutation of anti-theory, and she does not provide any other support for the claim that ethical theory in fact can have these claims. The reason why Williams rejects ethical theory is because it involves a commitment to “the view that philosophy can determine, either positively or negatively, how we should think in ethics” (Williams 1985: 111). This commitment is one, Nussbaum undertakes, but it is importantly not one, she does anything to support or justify.

This leads us to our last question. The reason, why Nussbaum commits to the possibility of developing ethical theory and the view that ethical theory “can determine ... how we should think in ethics” is the assumption that without such commitments, we give up the idea that philosophy can do any critical work in ethics. But is this assumption really warranted? Nussbaum cannot answer this question, because she – as noted – does not distinguish between moral philosophy and ethical theory. Tellingly, in her presentation of Cora Diamond’s position, she notes that “Diamond [...] rejects the whole enterprise of giving even a ‘rough story’ about what ethical theory is” (Nussbaum 2000: 232). The quote is telling because the title of the paper allured to by Nussbaum is “Having a Rough Story About What Moral Philosophy Is” (sic!). Diamonds point is not that we have no idea what ethical theory is, but that theory and definition will distort the experiences that is our fundamental field of study in ethics (Diamond 1983: 373). In contrast, she pictures the possible task for moral phi-

losophy quite differently, namely to show us such experiences and to “make us think about things in a new way, not by giving us *what* to think about them, not by presenting us with new views or doctrines” (Diamond 1983: 371). This may not be much, by Nussbaum’s lights, but it is still a critical endeavour and it may even help to bring about more ‘people like Bernard Williams’ if by that we mean people who engage reflectively and critically in ethical practice. Importantly, it is also an endeavour that does not threaten to distort the very field that interests us in moral philosophy.

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# Wittgenstein, Audi and “Duck-Rabbit”

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## 1. Audi and the concept of self-evidence

Robert Audi in a series of papers tries to refine and categorize the idea of self-evident, since he wants to shape his own view of ethical intuitionism which he has dubbed “*ethical reflectionism*”. According to Audi, self-evident propositions are propositions which sufficient understanding of them provides sufficient justification for believing and knowing them (Audi 1993: 303; 1996: 114; 1998: 20-22; 1999: 283). Sufficient understanding of a proposition, then, is having “the general sense” of that proposition in a clear and impartial way and “being able to apply it to (and withhold its application from) an apparently wide range of cases, and being able to see some of its logical implications” (Audi 1998: 22).

In Audi’s view, we can distinguish the notion of self-evidence into two types from two aspects: firstly we have “hard” self-evident and “soft” self-evident propositions (*ibid.* 24) and secondly we have “immediately” self-evident and “mediately” self-evident ones (*ibid.* 22. See also Audi 1993: 303; 1996: 284; 2004: 48-54). An immediately self-evident proposition is, Audi says, “readily understood by normal adults” and a meditately self-evident proposition “understand only through reflection on them” (Audi 1998: 22). On the other hand, a hard self-evident proposition is (1) strongly axiomatic, (2) immediately understandable, (3) indefeasibly justified and (4) cognitively compelling (*ibid.* 24). However, a soft self-evident proposition obviously has not these features. Audi believes that hard self-evident propositions are often founded in logic and mathematics. So, comparing moral propositions to mathematical propositions is such an epistemically mistake which some classic moral intuitionists (like Ross) did (*ibid.*).

We have to bear in mind that, both “hard”, “soft” and “mediately”, “immediately” self-evident propositions, at the end of the day are self-evident and so they are non-inferentially justified: “If they are even meditately self-evident, they may be taken to be knowable non-inferentially” (*ibid.* 23). However, one proposition that can be understood non-inferentially can be understood inferentially as well (*ibid.*). To understand this idea better, some points must be considered here: firstly, “hard” self-evident propositions are not often justified inferentially, rather like many mathematical and logical propositions justified non-inferentially since “there is nothing epistemically prior to them” (*ibid.* 24). But this does not mean that they *cannot* be justified inferentially at all. On the other hand, “soft” self-evident propositions are propositions which justified inferentially, though intuition has a significant role in their justification.

Secondly, being a self-evident proposition does not mean that it is obvious for all people to know that. Some self-evident propositions may need lots of *further reflection* for understanding it. However, there are some self-evident propositions that can be grasped easily without any effort. Also, some people cannot believe a self-evident proposition since they cannot understand it adequately; or some people cannot know a self-evident proposition because they believe it based on inadequate understanding (see Audi 1993: 303). Lastly, “hard” self-evident proposition are

often understood by many people at first sight, however “soft” self-evident proposition need sufficient *further reflection* and this depends on sufficient mental maturity (Audi 1993: 303; 1996: 115). It is obvious that reflection and mental maturity are matter of degree i.e. for *further reflection* sometimes even we need to draw an inference.

## 2. “Reflectionism” as a method

To make intuitionism more tenable, Audi tries to utilise a method which he calls it “*ethical reflectionism*”. For explaining the method of reflectionism, Audi appeals to what philosophers of science label it “context of discovery” and “context of justification”. In fact, Audi believes that perhaps we have many unjustified ethical intuitions (context of discovery); however, we can justify them by the method of reflection (context of justification). So, the method of reflectionism “is and deserves to be our basic method for justifying ethical judgments” (Audi 1993: 308). Audi believes that *further reflection* plays a basis role for moral judgments, in the sense that by *further reflection* we can reach to a conclusion that some judgments are false, while we thought they are true. Also, this method helps us for “justifying, refining, or discovering general moral principles” (*ibid.*; also see Audi 1996: 121). Audi thinks that the common attack to ethical intuitionism which says that there is a strange faculty that can recognise moral truths is rejected when we enter the method of reflectionism, since in this way we should understand intuition as ability or capacity by which *further reflection* might be improved. Thus, reflections play an important role in understanding of ethical intuitionism (Audi 1993: 308).

The method of reflectionism is somehow similar to “the method of reflective equilibrium” which is coined by Rawls in his *A Theory of Justice*, however, before him Nelson Goodman in his classic *Fact, Fiction, and Forecast* had discussed roughly about this idea (minus the name). Audi is happy to say that his method of reflectionism can be compatible with the method of reflective equilibrium (Audi 1993: 310; also see Audi 1996: 120 & 126). By this combination, Audi thinks that he builds up “the most credible form of ethical intuitionism” (Audi 1993: 311) and this credible form of ethical intuitionism is a “fallibilist, intuitionist moral rationalism that uses reflection as a justificatory method [...] encompassing both intuitions as *prima facie* justified inputs to ethical theorizing and reflective equilibrium as a means of extending and systematizing those inputs” (*ibid.*).

In fact, ethical intuitionism, Audi holds, is the view that there is no need that moral beliefs and justified moral judgments be inferential. However, it is possible that some premises “may” be found for these direct moral knowledge and justification. Moreover, Audi states that *further reflection* can help a believer to have justified moral intuitions i.e. some moral believers are justified since they have beliefs based on reflections.



### 3. Wittgenstein's Duck-Rabbit

What do we see when we look at the above picture? What we see in the above picture, often, depends upon that with which we are familiar. Among those who are not quite acquainted with the picture above, some of them see rabbit (perhaps they are not familiar with the shape of duck) and some of them see duck (with the same reason). Seeing the above image as a duck, and then seeing it as a rabbit, is, in fact, seeing two different aspects of the image. In other words, we can say that these two different aspects can be considered as two different kinds of perception. Perhaps, when Wittgenstein is talking about two kinds of seeing of this image and distinguishes between "continuous" and "dawning", he has such thing in his mind:

I shall call the following figure ... duck-rabbit. It can be seen as a rabbit's head or as a duck's. And I must distinguish between the 'continuous seeing' of an aspect and the 'dawning' of an aspect. The picture might have been shewn me, and I never have seen anything but a rabbit in it. (1953: 194)

When we look at the duck-rabbit image, according to Wittgenstein, without any familiarity that it can be seen two different ways, we can see either a duck or a rabbit. This means that, we see the duck, since we are unfamiliar with rabbits. However, Wittgenstein thinks that by looking at the image in more details and more times, one can find both shapes i.e. duck and rabbit. So, he distinguishes between two kinds of seeing: "continuous seeing of an aspect" and "dawning of an aspect". This means that it might be that someone looks at that picture and just finds a rabbit in it. However, by continuous seeing or noticing other aspects he/she can find a duck as well.

For Wittgenstein, reaching to the conclusion that this image is duck (or rabbit) after "continuous" seeing is not based on premises. One can see the picture non-inferentially. Seeing the duck-rabbit figure as a duck, or as a rabbit, is therefore like having perfect ground, in that there are no inferences being made. This shows that, for Wittgenstein, seeing has not any essential features according to which one can say that this image is undoubtedly a duck or rabbit. The best articulation of having no essential features can be found in Wittgenstein's concept of game. Indeed, for him "seeing" and "game" are similar in the sense that both of them do not have essences.

Let us look at the concept "game" and the way in which we grasp this concept.<sup>1</sup> Suppose that we want to articulate and define the concept 'game'. On the face of it, it seems that in order to do so, we state the common properties of different kinds of games. On the basis of the obtained common properties, we would say that:

If  $x$  meets the condition  $g_1, g_2, g_3 \dots g_n$ ,  $x$  is a 'game'

<sup>1</sup> We should be aware that Wittgenstein usage of the concept of "game" is somewhat metaphysical and semantic. However, I utilise this notion in an epistemic way; i.e., the epistemic implications of the concept of "game" are important here.

This view presupposes that there is something in common which needs to be captured and categorised to arrive at the definition of the concept 'game'. In other words, the general rule acts as the normative standard of the rightness or wrongness of the use of words. However, Wittgenstein rejects the existence of such a set of common properties among different kinds of games, something which can be articulated in a proposition as 'an essence' of the concept 'game'. In rejecting that, Wittgenstein attempts to show that we can define the concept 'game' just through identifying examples and through the ongoing practice of seeing the similarities and dissimilarities. He states:

What does it mean to know what a game is? What does it mean, to know it and not be able to say it?... Isn't my knowledge, my concept of a game, completely expressed in the explanations that I could give? That is, in my describing examples of various kinds of game; shewing how all sorts of other games can be constructed on the analogy of these (1953: 35).

According to Wittgenstein, it is not true to say that I know what a game is and can fully express or define it before being engaged in it in practice. Rather, what we see within practice is all that we have with regard to the concept 'game'. It is not the case that within practice a pre-existing notion of game becomes clearer. Rather, the more we are engaged in the practice, the more we see what a game is. Grasping the concept 'game' is an open-ended process. Moreover, it does not follow from this that any phenomenon can be regarded as an example of a game. In contrast, there is a normative constraint which lies in the way in which we see things as similar.

Let me elaborate this point with one example. Consider the case of a man crossing the road who sees two boys that seem to be fighting with each other. Having seen this scene, he decides to go ahead and stop them fighting. When he tries to restrain them, they tell him they are just playing, not fighting! The man tells them that it looked as if they were fighting, because they were hitting each other. In response, the boys give him some more detail (facts which provide reason) of what they were doing. They try to give him some examples of the games in which players hit each other: boxing, wrestling and American football. According to the boys, it is not the case that whenever the man sees a number of men hitting each other, they are necessarily fighting. In fact, the boys try to convince him that what they were doing is similar to what some players do when they play. They do their job by referring to other similar cases. They do not appeal to common properties and intrinsic features of fighting to improve their argument. By seeing just at this case, the man cannot understand what the case is. So, instead of just seeing at this case over the time, we have to look away at similar and dissimilar cases to arrive at the classification. So, "seeing" like "game" has not essential features which we can spell out them. All we have is continuity in seeing different cases which help us having better understanding.

### 4. Wittgenstein and Audi; finding similarities

It seems that Wittgenstein's use of "continuous seeing" is somehow similar to what I have been discussing about "*further reflection*" in Audi's "reflectionism" framework. Both of them think that by seeing more and more (or reflect on the case) one can apprehend in a better way though non-inferentially. When Audi is talking about "aspectual apprehension" might have such thing in his mind (Audi 2011: 174). In fact, he think that by *further reflection* one can im-

prove the ability to see one, say, proposition from different aspects.

On the other hand, self-evident propositions, like game, have not any essential features or patterns which one can articulate them in a lexical order. All we have in our hands is emerging patterns which can vary from one case to another. Reflecting on cases and finding similarities or doing continuous seeing at different cases is all we can do. There is no pre-existing essence here.

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# The Concept ‘Silence’ in the *Tractatus*

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What we cannot talk about, we must pass over in silence  
Wittgenstein

## 1. Introduction

The last proposition of The *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (henceforth: *Tractatus*) is extremely famous: “what we cannot talk about, we must pass over in silence”. Commentators of Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* have read this proposition differently. Some believe that the “silence” is talked about in the *Tractatus*, is the mystical one; related to the mystical aspect of the world and mystical experience of mystics who try to refer to ultimate reality which is formless and colourless. It follows from this that mystics can only talk about, using Hick’s phrase, “trans categorial reality” in a suggestive way. On the other hand, others believe that Tractarian silence denotes that we are entitled to just talk about possible states of affairs meaningfully i.e. since nothing can be found beyond the realm of sayable, ontologically speaking, we have to be silent. This interpretation can be regarded as the negative reading of the very idea of ‘silence’ in the *Tractatus*.

In this paper we are going to explore four readings of the concept ‘silence’ in the *Tractatus*, as cloudy, negative, mystical and therapeutic readings. These four readings are not discussed in details in the literature. In fact, we deductively distinguish these different readings; though the doors are open and other commentators, in principle, can read the concept ‘silence’ in the *Tractatus* differently.

The structure for this paper is as follows. In the next section, we start by a general Tractarian story with regard to the distinction between senseful and non-sense. In the third section, four readings of the concept “silence” are discussed. Finally, the most plausible account of the concept ‘silence’ in the *Tractatus* is talked about.

## 2. Tractarian story

Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* tries to propose a precise criterion, according to which non-sense propositions can be distinguished from meaningful propositions, semantically speaking.<sup>1</sup> The external world consists of different facts, i.e. different existing states of affairs like “the book is on the table” and “that tree is next to our house”. Language-users utilize different words to make different propositions which correspond to facts. If this proposition is in accordance with a possible state of affairs, then that proposition is meaningful. Following the Frege’s “Context Principle”, Wittgenstein does believe that proposition is the simplest and basic component of the very idea of “meaningfulness”.<sup>2</sup> To explain this, Wittgenstein utilizes the concept ‘depiction’, in the sense that language-users understand the meaning of a proposition like seeing one picture if that picture is related to a state of affairs in the external world.<sup>3</sup> So, according to the Tractarian story, only natural and experiential propositions are meaningful, as these

propositions are related to possible and existing states of affairs. Other propositions are senseless since they are not connected to possible and existing states of affairs: religious, moral and philosophical propositions are amongst these non-sensical propositions. For instance, Wittgenstein clearly denies the existence of moral values as part of the furniture of the world. According to the *Tractatus*, moral propositions like logical and mathematical propositions have nothing to do with what is going on in the real world. In fact, moral propositions like logical and mathematical propositions are transcendental.<sup>4</sup> In other words, we are not entitled to make meaningful propositions via different moral concepts; rather, they just contain subject’s attitude towards the world. Moral propositions cannot talk about the world and the ways in which things are connected in it, rather they only talk about language-users’ moral perspective. Wittgenstein says that if we resort to the consequences of actions in order to explain the very ideas of goodness and badness, we move beyond the realm of ethics (see e.g. TLP, 6.422). In fact, according to the *Tractatus*, we do not have bad and good moral consequences, since in order to do that we need to refer to what is going on in the world, out there, whereas there is no such a thing as real moral properties in the Tractarian story. This means that moral judgments are a-priori and different subjects’ moral judgments are not related to what is going on in the real world.<sup>5</sup>

## 3. Four readings of the concept ‘silence’ in the *Tractatus*

Having seen the Tractarian story, albeit briefly; now, we are going to discuss the concept ‘silence’ and its different interpretations in details. We can distinguish four different readings of silence i.e. cloudy, negative, mystical reading and therapeutic readings. Let us elaborate each of them in turn.

### 3.1. Cloudy reading

According to the cloudy reading, silence in the *Tractatus* focuses on the difference between sayable and non-sayable. We are just entitled to talk about states of affairs and the way in which things are connected together in this world meaningfully, beyond this world, the rules of language are going to be changed. We are not entitled to say anything, either positively or negatively, in the realm of ethics, religion and philosophy meaningfully, as it seems that we are located in a cloudy space, in which nothing can be seen and grasped. It can be said that this kind of silence has an agnostic connotation.

### 3.2. Negative reading

According to the second reading of the concept ‘silence’ which is called negative, silence in the *Tractatus* has a negative connotation and refers to nothingness, i.e. this reading says that there is no such a thing as ethical

<sup>1</sup> See e.g. Kenny 1973; Ricketts 1996.

<sup>2</sup> White 2006: 146.

<sup>3</sup> Anscombe 1959; Schwyzer 1962: 271-288.

<sup>4</sup> See 6.421 and 6.41.

<sup>5</sup> For more details on this issue see e.g. Mounce 1989: 122-25.

properties and metaphysical entities, ontologically speaking. We are entitled to say something in a proposition, meaningfully, when the proposition is testable and can be verified experientially speaking. The propositions which refer to beyond the scope of experience are non-sense and gibberish, semantically speaking. Carnap and some of Vienna Circle's members read the concept 'silence' in the *Tractatus* in this way.

### 3.3 Mystical reading

According to the third reading, the silence that is discussed in the *Tractatus* has a mystical connotation. In order to make this account of 'silence' intelligible, let us distinguish between two kinds of silence which is discussed in the mystical literature, in the first place. Firstly, silence occurs when a mystic is confronted with a unique mystical-existential experience. In this way, the mystic jumps from this world into the formless and colourless one and he/she is united with the infinite reality. The mystic cannot see him/herself separately anymore and just is dissolved in the formless unity. In the mystical literature, this position is called the immersed state.

According to the mystical thoughts, the mystic cannot say anything willingly in such a situation, as he is unconscious and dissolved in the infinite reality. So, he/she will end up with silence. This kind of silence can be called the ontological silence, as it is based on dissolution and unity.

Secondly, the mystic wakes up and becomes aware. Now, he/she is going to talk about the experience which experienced by utilizing some concepts and propositions and present a linguistic version of it. This is exactly the time when the mystic finds that he/she cannot say thoroughly what has been experienced, because of the unending restrictions of the language; the language which is temporal and bounded, and cannot categorize the infinite reality, as it is. Language is not capable of carrying such huge and unique existential and mystical experiences.

According to the mystics, the problem originates from the language itself, though, we do not have any other tools to communicate with each other. In fact, we are confronted with a paradox: on the one hand, we have to use language for communicating with others. On the other hand, linguistic articulation of these mystical and existential experiences is incomplete and inadequate. It follows from this that we have to be silent, when we are going to talk about the transcendence, because of the incapability and deficiency of the language. So, the mystic prefers to talk about the negative aspect of mystical reality rather than the positive aspect of it. Meister Eckhart, a German Mystic, holds that the most similar thing to God is silence. This metaphor wants to focus on the negative aspect of the divine reality, i.e. we cannot say anything positively with regard to the formless, since language-users are incapable of articulating it. In other words, incapability of linguistic articulation of the formless leads to the incapability of understanding of the formless, as it is, in an epistemic sense.

The ones who do believe in the mystical reading of the concept 'silence' in the *Tractatus* focus on the Wittgenstein's mystical manners especially between writing *Notebooks* and *Tractatus*. According to them, Wittgenstein is influenced by the novelists and philosophers such as Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, Schopenhauer and Kant. Also propositions in the *Tractatus* (6.4 onwards) which show his interest in the Transcendental all together are evidences in support of the mystical reading of the very idea

of silence. According to the proponents, based upon the Tractarian distinction between sayable and showable, Wittgenstein is going to give a plausible account of the mystical realm of the universe, ontologically speaking, though it cannot be talked about in the language.<sup>6</sup>

### 3.4 Therapeutic reading

The fourth reading of the concept 'silence' is called the therapeutic reading. According to this account, the most important proposition in the *Tractatus* to understand "saying/showing" distinction is 6.54. According to the proponents of this reading, Wittgenstein wrote the *Tractatus* for this proposition; the proposition which renounced everything which has been said before.<sup>7</sup> It seems that prior to this proposition in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein distinguishes the boundaries of sayable and showable. According to him, we are not entitled to say anything with regard to the phenomena that they have nothing to do with what is going on in the world i.e. they are non-sense. In fact, by distinguishing between showable and sayable things, Wittgenstein emphasizes that the world has two sides: one is the phenomenal one in the Kantian sense which can be articulated and talked about in linguistic expressions; the other one is the showable side of the world. However, the proponents of the therapeutic reading undermine this interpretation of the very idea of "silence".

According to the therapeutic interpretation of 6.54, philosophy is like a ladder which after reaching the top we have to throw it away:

My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)

The last part of this proposition means that one has to put aside these propositions to see the world rightly. Indeed, practicing philosophy shows that language-users cannot practice philosophy. Wittgenstein wants to say to his readers that categorising the surrounding world under the philosophical terms is implausible. Even sayable /showable distinction is a philosophical distinction at the end of the day which is misleading and harmful. Throwing away the ladder, according to the therapeutic reading of the *Tractatus* is associated with the impossibility of philosophy. We have to return to natural language and consider the common-sensical meaning of the words in order to philosophize; philosophy is nothing but curing the language. Wittgenstein discusses the therapeutic attitude towards philosophy in the *Philosophical Investigations* as well. According to him, misusing words by philosophers in different contexts create many problems and make problems, pseudo-problems. Because of this, he holds that practicing philosophy is just illuminating the darkness of the castle of the language and refining it which is an on-going activity. This means that philosophers are not supposed to theorise and philosophize; however, instead, they have to cure this problematic language.<sup>8</sup> So, according to the therapeutic reading, language-users have to be silent in the sense that put aside theorising, and get back to natural language. What we do with words in the ordinary language has the precedence here.

<sup>6</sup> For more details see e.g. Gillies 1993.

<sup>7</sup> See White 2006: 118-134.

<sup>8</sup> See e.g. Wittgenstein 1953: 44-47; Thornton 2004, ch.1&2.

#### 4. Conclusion

We have tried to show that the commentators understand and read the very idea of "silence" in ending proposition of the *Tractatus* in four different ways: cloudy, negative, mystical and therapeutic silence. We are inclined to conclude that, all things considered, cloudy silence is more plausible, as it is more compatible with the spirit of the *Tractatus*, exegetically speaking. In other words, in our view, Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* neither undermines the whole idea of metaphysics and transcendence, nor presupposing the divine realm in the universe. Rather, he tries to delineate the boundaries of the idea of meaningfulness, according to which when we reach beyond the phenomenal world which consists of states of affairs and facts nothing can be said meaningfully, as the semantic rules do not work anymore. If this is the mission of the whole Tractarian story, then cloudy silence is the most plausible reading of the concept 'silence' in the *Tractatus* in comparison with others.

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# Ethical Eliminativism and the Sense of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*

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§1. My claim in this paper is that Wittgenstein is an ethical eliminativist in two senses: first, he wants to eliminate ethical propositions as nonsense; second, he takes it that there is an ethical point to eliminating ethical propositions as nonsense. (And I shall want to suggest that this is not as paradoxical as it might seem.)

More fully, I will argue that Wittgenstein holds that ethical propositions are nonsense, in that they lack any meaning whatsoever, that they are redundant, in that insofar as there is some coherent work for them to do that work is already being done elsewhere by other (by contrast, "non-ethical") features of our language, and that they are harmful, in that they obstruct our ability to appreciate (and so to act upon, or in accordance with) what is genuinely of ethical significance in our lives.

What Wittgenstein calls the ethical "sense", or point, of the *Tractatus* consists in the removal of this obstacle to our appreciation of the ethical.

(Although I focus on Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* here, I think these views are also attributable to the later Wittgenstein.)

The claim that Wittgenstein is an ethical eliminativist should not be controversial, given that he writes in the *Tractatus* that "there can be no ethical propositions" (Wittgenstein 1974: §6.42). But commentators have found it notoriously difficult to come to terms with this remark and still say wherein lies the ethical point of the *Tractatus* itself (see below), commonly resorting to the idea that Wittgenstein held that various ethical propositions, while not having whatever it takes to have sense (and so to be propositions) according to what the *Tractatus* says sense is, are nevertheless somehow right-on-the-money.

But Wittgenstein, as I understand him, even in the *Tractatus*, is not concerned with developing a theory of sense at all, but with our basic capacity for making sense of a sentence. And so his claim that there cannot be any ethical propositions is not the claim that whatever sense ethical propositions have lies beyond the boundaries of sense according to whatever theory he holds there, because he does not hold a theory of sense there at all. His claim is rather that there is no such thing as an ethical proposition, and so that all those things we think of as ethical propositions are either not really ethical or not really propositions, and the sense in which they are not really propositions is the sense in which they are simply empty: we cannot make sense of them because we have not yet given them any meaning. They are, simply, nonsense.

The problem then is this: how could someone think that ethical propositions lack any meaning whatsoever? At least, that is the first problem.

The second problem is this: Wittgenstein, famously, in a letter to his potential publisher Ludwig von Ficker, describes the *Tractatus* as having an ethical point (reprinted in Luckhardt 1996: 94-5).<sup>1</sup> But the *Tractatus* is almost exclusively concerned with issues to do with language and logic, and does not contain anything that could be construed as an ethical proposition at all (unsurprisingly,

since it claims that there can be no such thing). Worse, it ends by declaring that its own propositions are nonsense, and that understanding Wittgenstein consists in recognizing that. Far from making an ethical point, its aim seems to be to correct our misunderstanding of the logic of language, exposing illusions of sense as such and giving us a better grasp of what we are saying when we are saying anything at all. So in what sense could such a book be construed as having an ethical point at all, and what could that point possibly be?

Its ethical point cannot consist simply in the self-understanding that such a book might help us attain: for instance, understanding of ourselves as prone to be taken in, in various ways, by the illusion of making sense where really we are making none. That alone seems insufficiently "ethical". But neither can its ethical point consist simply in the clarity of thought the *Tractatus* enables us to achieve: clarity of thought might be taken to be an ethical ideal insofar as it enables us to get clearer on the content of, and logical relations among our ethical propositions, and on the non-ethical background against which we assent to or dissent from ethical propositions. But if there can be no ethical propositions, then the *Tractatus* cannot be construed as making an ethical point in these ways. So again, the second problem is this: what could the ethical point of the *Tractatus* be?

I think we can begin to address the first of these problems by answering the second, and that is what I do here. My aim is to outline a sense in which Wittgenstein can be seen to be trying, through the elimination of "ethical propositions", to reconnect us with the ways in which ethical commitments are embodied in our ordinary "non-ethical" language, and so the ways in which ordinary language might be taken to be ethically revealing.

§2. Wittgenstein's explanation of the ethical sense of the *Tractatus* (in his letter to von Ficker) begins with a distinction between two parts of his "work": the part that he has written (in the manuscript of the book), and "everything [he has] not written". And Wittgenstein explains what he means by that by drawing a contrast, implicitly, between two ways in which one might imagine one could delimit the ethical.

Wittgenstein's book does this from within, in the same way that it delimits language, by providing (in the general propositional form) a means of saying everything there is to be said. But one might also imagine that one could delimit the ethical from the outside: one might imagine that the ethical is just one part of our lives among others, that it is possible to adopt an external perspective from which to describe what ethics is. That approach would involve assuming that ethics is the subject of some propositions but not others, that there is a subset of propositions that are the ethical propositions in that they alone deal with this specific area of our lives.

In using that contrast to illustrate the distinction between the two parts of his work – the part he has written and everything he has not written – Wittgenstein ties that phrase ("everything I have not written") specifically to the attempt to delimit ethics from the outside, to the production of "ethical propositions". And in doing that, he ties his expla-

<sup>1</sup> For reasons of space, I do not reproduce the letter here.

nation of the ethical sense of the *Tractatus* specifically to its exclusion of ethical propositions, to its not including anything that could be construed as a proposition of ethics.<sup>2</sup>

So Wittgenstein suggests that the ethical point of the *Tractatus* consists in its exclusion or elimination of ethical propositions. But he also suggests three further things that together illustrate what makes that elimination ethical. First, the reason for their exclusion is that they are nonsense. The only way to delimit the ethical is from within; anything else leads only to babbling, to nonsense. Second, although there is no such thing as an ethical proposition, Wittgenstein clearly does not think that there is no such thing as the ethical: his book delimits the ethical from within, and what it delimits is not nothing. Hence, not only are ethical propositions nonsense, they are also redundant, since the work that they are intended to do (here, delimiting the ethical) is already done by other features of our language (in this case, by all of it). Third, ethical propositions themselves stand in the way of our appreciation of what is of genuine ethical significance: von Ficker, for instance, because he has a misconception of what it is to engage in ethics, will not be able to recognize that the book has an ethical point at all, even though, according to Wittgenstein, it says much that von Ficker himself wants to say. Thus, the ethical sense of the *Tractatus* consists in its elimination of ethical propositions as nonsense, as redundant, and as harmful.

I want to illustrate what I mean with three short examples. The first is from (not ethics but) logic and Russell's theory of types. Russell's theory is designed to prohibit certain combinations of words in order to prevent paradoxes such as that involved in the idea of the set of all sets that are non-self-members. But if the combination of words in question makes sense then there is no sense in prohibiting it, and it would be nonsense to try. And if the combination does not make sense, then there is nothing that could sensibly be prohibited (just a string of signs that has not yet been given a meaning) and again it would be nonsense to try. Either the combination of words already makes sense, in which case there is no sense in trying to prohibit it, or it does not make sense, in which case there is nothing to be prohibited; in both cases, the result of trying to prohibit something is sheer nonsense. But not only is the attempt at prohibition here nonsensical, it is also redundant: there is nothing that needs to be prohibited. The work the theory of types was wanted for is already done by our not having given the words a meaning. No further step is required. The idea that more is required, however, is harmful insofar as it encourages us to adopt a picture of the limits of language as limitations, making it more likely that we take nonsense for sense (and vice versa) by encouraging us in thinking that there is some substantial thing that needs to be prohibited. Its attempts to police the boundaries of language make those boundaries harder to see.

My second example is promises. There is no level of commitment conveyed in promising that cannot also be conveyed by other expressions of intentions, and in that sense promises are only ever redundant. Insofar as promises are taken to be of special ethical significance over-and-above those other expressions, no meaning has been assigned to them. But since there is no greater level of commitment that can only be expressed in promising, any greater commitment they do carry can only come at the expense of the commitment embodied in those other

means of expression. The result of that is a severing of the ties between one's words and one's actions in those ordinary cases, and since there is nothing special about promises themselves that may also come to affect promises too. So, as with Russell's attempts to police the borders of language, treating promising as specially ethically significant in this way has the opposite effect to that intended: loosening, rather than strengthening the ties between words and actions.

My final example comes from the word "duty". Sometimes we may want to justify certain courses of action by appeal to a duty arising out of other commitments in our lives. For instance, one might want to justify certain actions in times of war by appeal to one's duty to those one loves. But here again one might think that this talk of duty is both nonsense and redundant: that there is no more than, and nothing more is needed than, the emotion that grounds the supposed duty. If one loves someone, then one will behave in such-and-such a way towards them in such-and-such a situation, and the character and strength of one's love will be revealed in the ways one does behave, or in one's attitudes to the ways one did behave. There is no third thing mediating between the emotion and the action it gives rise to. But imagining there to be such a thing may itself be harmful insofar as it creates a distance between the emotion and the action and draws our attention away from what does ground our actions onto the supposed duty, thereby creating a situation in which they could potentially be construed as coming into conflict with one another so that the attempt to justify certain courses of action in this way opens the path to undermining those same actions.

§3. The outline given here is only a sketch, but it is meant to suggest an alternative to Cora Diamond's views of Wittgenstein's attitude to the ethical and to ethical propositions. Diamond describes Wittgenstein's attitude using phrases such as "an attitude to the world and life", and she takes such phrases to retain their attractiveness even after we recognize their emptiness (Diamond 2000: 153-4). I want an account of Wittgenstein's attitude to the ethical that does not depend on recognizing a continued role for such phrases but that still accounts for the sense that ordinary "non-ethical" language can be ethically revealing. My suggestion is that ethical discourse stands in the way of an immediacy between our words and actions, hindering our ability to perceive both what our words commit us to and when we do not live up to those commitments, so that removing that form of talk from our lives is a way of taking (rather than disowning) responsibility for our words. (It could be called a kind of linguistic existentialism.) Seeing that that form of discourse not only does not serve the needs or interests it is meant to serve but actually opposes them is one way of coming to see how ethical eliminativism could appear to be an attractive alternative, and so one way of understanding how the conclusion that ethical propositions are empty nonsense could be thought to be anything other than simply false.

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<sup>2</sup> What is important about that second part, in my view, is simply that it is *not there*.

# Wittgenstein's Prison. You can Checkout any Time you Like, but you can never Leave

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In their "From Wittgenstein's Prison to the Boundless Ocean: Carnap's Dream of Logical Syntax" (2009), Awodey and Carus developed an interpretation of Carnap's philosophy, which represents Carnap's *Logical Syntax of Language* (1934/37), (hereafter *LSL*) as an effort at by-passing the barriers of meaningful speech as described by Wittgenstein. The Wittgensteinian barrier emerged from Wittgenstein's picture theory of Meaning in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1921/22) (hereafter *TLP*). The theory held that:

- 2.1 We picture facts to ourselves.
- 2.11 A picture presents a situation in logical space, the existence and non-existence of states of affairs.
- 2.12 A picture is a model of reality.

On the grounds of Hans Hahn's notes of 1929, the interpreters came to the conclusion that logical empiricists were eager to utilize Wittgenstein's picture theory, because the theory "solved the old Platonic problem of the cognitive status of mathematics, which was obviously a basic obstacle to any form of empiricism." (Carus 2009: 80). According to Wittgenstein, logical sentences (and according to Logical empiricists, mathematical ones, as well) are tautologies and while "[p]ropositions show what they say", "tautologies and contradictions show that they say nothing." (*TLP* 4.461). Wittgenstein's approach relieved the empiricist's worries about seemingly un-empirical knowledge which is conveyed by logico-mathematical sentences, by showing that there is no such knowledge implied in logic and mathematics. Mathematics and logic represent nothing, and they are devoid of cognitive meaning or any kind of knowledge.

However, in spite, or rather as a result of its helpful content, the picture theory allegedly blocks the way of some kinds of discourses. To be more precise, it does not permit us to speak about the very logical form of the language:

- 4.121 Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them.

What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent. What expresses *itself* in language, we cannot express by means of language. Propositions show the logical form of reality. They display it.

And the cornerstone of Wittgenstein's philosophy, *TLP* 7 established his point beyond any controversy:

- 7. What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.

It is the very nature of language, as it is described in picture theory, which prevents us from stepping outside the barriers of our forms of representations to speak about its logical form. This inescapable framework of language is called by Awodey and Carus "Wittgenstein's Prison" (2009: 90). They suggested that in his works in 1930s (his unpublished "Versuch einer Metalogik" of 1931 and *LSL*), Carnap found a way of escaping Wittgenstein's prison, by constructing a system that makes "the structure of language itself the object of logical study" (Awodey and Carus 2009: 91).

Moreover, according to this interpretation, it was the breakdown of the formalism and logicism in logic and mathematics through the appearance of Gödel's incompleteness theorems (which shows that there could be true arithmetic sentences that were not provable), and development of similar points in Tarski and Hilbert's works which directed Carnap's attention to the possibility of construction of a linguistic system, by sacrificing the completeness of the system (see Carnap 1937, C. § 34a).

In this paper, I proceed to show that Carnap's effort at leaving Wittgenstein's prison not only was not successful in his syntactical period (i.e., *LSL*), but the program could not secure his way out even in the later semantical period, when such a liberating move was much more expectable. In this way I will conclude that in spite of Carnap's efforts, Wittgenstein's prison is still unbroken.

In a more general view, I will conclude that Wittgenstein's insights about the nature of language are deeper than what can be endangered by the breakdown of formalism or logicism<sup>1</sup>, because his insights about language are rooted in his more general views about identity of the limits of world and language (which holds that in principle we cannot speak about what is outside of the world-language, as far as we are alive). The natural result is that the failure of Carnap's two continuous efforts, in spite of their ingenuity, seems like a good evidence for the claim that the prison is in principle unbreakable.

But first, I must show the failure of Carnap's effort.

<sup>1</sup> This point needs a certain amount of clarification. It may seem that Carnap took a logicist route to solving Wittgenstein's problem, and for this reason Carnap's opposition to Wittgenstein, as it is expressed in *LSL*, cannot be inspired by the breakdown of the logicism. To be sure, the influence of logicism on Carnap's *LSL* is beyond controversy. It is highlighted by Carnap himself (in 1937 § 84: 325-328), and then remarked in Feigl's speech at the memorial session of R. Carnap (1970), and again discussed duly by Creath in "Carnap's Conventionalism" (1992). But these observations need not to deviate our attention from the fact that Carnap's project progressed greatly from its logicist origins, via the influence of the pragmatist and especially intuitionist traditions, which were creatively exploited by him in *LSL* (see 1934/1937 § 16, "On Intuitionism"). Carnap made significant efforts at appealing to the intuitionist techniques at the basis of his conventionalism and in the way he construed his linguistic calculus, exactly where the logicist-formalist devices failed him (see 1937, § 16: 46-47). The fact that Carnap criticized the logicist project of reduction of mathematics to logic (1931) three years before the publication of *LSL* shows that he was by no means blind to the shortcomings of logicism, and his effort at constructing the logical syntax of language was much more than a mere logicist-formalist endeavor.

On my view, it seems that in *LSL*, Carnap was sympathetic to formalists and logicists to the extent that they banished the material mode of speech from their vocabularies. But with regard to the question of the nature of mathematics and logic, and to the question of derivation of the former from the latter, and in adoption of certain technical devices for constructing his system he took sides with intuitionists and pragmatists. Carnap remarked that "A logical foundation of mathematics is only given when a system is built up which enables derivations of this kind to be made. The system must contain general rules of formation concerning the occurrence of the mathematical symbols in synthetic descriptive sentences also, together with consequence-rules for such sentences. Only in this way is the application of mathematics, i.e. calculation with numbers of empirical objects and with measures of empirical magnitudes, rendered possible and systematized. A structure of this kind fulfills, simultaneously, the demands of both formalism and logicism" (1937, § 84: 326). And exactly in building the system and in constructing general rules of formation he took the constructive road that made his work similar to the efforts of Heyting (1930) who tried to give a precise formal formulation to the insights of intuitionists (see Carnap 1937, § 16: 46). (Also for grasping the amount of similarity between the works of Carnap and Brouwer, see ibid.).

As I hinted before, Carnap tried to overcome Wittgensteinian hindrance by formulating the syntax of the language within the language:

According to another opinion (that of Wittgenstein), there exists only one language, and what we call *syntax* cannot be expressed at all—it can only "be shown". As opposed to these views, we intend to show that, actually, it is possible to manage with one language only; not, however, by renouncing syntax, but by demonstrating that without the emergence of any contradictions *the syntax of this language* can be formulated within this language itself. (1937: 53, the emphasis is mine)

A comparison between Wittgenstein's phrase (*TLP* 4.121) and Carnap's shows that what had been called by the former the "logical form of reality" was interpreted by the latter as "the syntax of language". The former estimated the logical form as something indescribable in language, while the latter tried to present an actual formulation of the syntax in his work to falsify Wittgenstein's view. This comparison assumes that the *logical form* and *syntax* are essentially alike and the same. But are they really? Obviously Carnap thought that they are similar enough, but to get an appropriate answer to this question, we shall continue our investigation for a time being, from a seemingly inappropriate place.

In *LSL*, mathematical Truth and Falsity are defined in terms of validity and contra-validity, i.e., in terms of tautologies and contradictions. (Carnap 1937, § 14: 41). In this respect, Carnap's view is not taking a harshly different approach from Wittgenstein's. But one wonders about the destiny of the synthetic sentences which convey the information about the empirical world. These sentences are "*the genuine statements about reality*" (1937, § 14: 41), and they are expressible only within the material mode of speech. But Carnap claimed that in *LSL* his aim amounts to building a linguistic calculus, a formal system free of involvement with the material mode of speech. Hence he came to the conclusion that it is both possible and desirable to decide the situation of the synthetic sentences "without leaving the domain of the formal" (1937, § 14: 41). But how?

Carnap tried to determine the *logical content* of these sentences (i.e., their *sense*) by deriving all of their non-analytical consequences, according to the exemplary paradigm of the general axiomatic system which he advocates in *LSL* (ibid., § 14: 41). For this propose, he added a set of P-rules (that is, the rules of inference, and primitive sentences, adopted from the laws of nature) to the L-rules (logico-mathematical rules) (1937, § 51: 180). These P-rules provide the empirical content of the linguistic system and connect it to the external world. But in absence of any material consideration, and in sheer formal terms, the question of "[w]hether in the construction of a language S we formulate only L-rules or include also P-rules, and, if so, to what extent, is not a logic-philosophical problem, but a matter of convention and hence, at most, a question of expedience." (1937, § 51: 180). This means that the choice of these conventions cannot be justified in our theoretical language. Let me elaborate.

The status of the P-rules cannot be justified as the rules that load the system with information about the empirical world, without making use of the material mode of speech for explaining the relation of the set of rules to reality. For justifying the choice of a set of rules at the base of the system, we should explain that this assumed set of rules

befits the external world more neatly than the alternative sets, and it satisfies a greater amount of verisimilitude than these. But for Carnap, the relation of the set of rules to reality is not something that can be justified or discussed in our formal language, simply because speaking about reality (in a metaphysical sense) contravenes the formality of the formal system. Reality discourse cannot penetrate into the formal system of language, and the question of verisimilitude remains an issue of expedience. One should somehow grasp the appropriateness of the set of rules for herself, and one cannot speak theoretically about her intuition in this regard, she can at best, if I may put the word in Carnap's mouth, show it. This point is reemphasized in his establishment of the important principle of tolerance: "In logic, there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build up his own logic, i.e. his own form of language, as he wishes. All that is required of him is that, if he wishes to discuss it, he must state his methods clearly, and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical arguments." (1937, §17: 52). Stating the methods clearly and setting the rules, is not anything like justifying the choice, it is rather like showing what is one desirable option in an illuminating way. And in my view, this account brings Carnap to Wittgenstein's camp.

Yet the defendant of the Carnapian reforms can insist that Carnap indeed expanded the Wittgensteinian view by speaking about the *syntax*, i.e., about *logical form*, which was unspeakable for Wittgenstein, and this is the point of difference between these two thinkers. There is no possibility of justifying the set of rules at the base of linguistic system for Carnap, but one can at least express her syntactical rules. But I believe that this view is mainly the result of confusion, originally due to Carnap's expression, between logical form and syntax, and it gravely trivializes Wittgenstein's point (obviously Wittgenstein was not yearning for the prohibition of publication of books and speeches that express the laws of logic after all). And this is the crucial part of my paper.

For Wittgenstein, it is not the *syntax* that we cannot speak about. It is the "pictorial form" which is the primary unspeakable. And this violates the alleged synonymy of *syntax* and *logical form*. The pictorial form was defined in following terms:

2.15 The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way. Let us call this connexion of its elements the structure of the picture, and let us call the possibility of this structure the pictorial form of the picture

2.151 Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture.

To justify, explain or examine, and in one word to speak about pictorial form, which is the possibility of similarity of the structure of the picture (language) to the structure of the world, we should be able to check both sides of the relation. *We should be able to compare the inside of the picture with its outside in order to assert that there exists such a similarity.* But this examination simply cannot take place within the picture (language) itself, because the picture (or language) cannot be placed outside of what it represents:

2.174 A picture cannot, however, place itself outside its representational form.

This discussion leads us to the result that the *logical form*, which was considered to be unspeakable by Wittgenstein,

is actually this pictorial form, and when he said that the logical form cannot be represented within the language, he just meant that this pictorial form, which amounts to comparison of language to what is outside of it, cannot be the subject of a discourse which takes place within the boundaries of language.

Now we can see plainly enough that unlike what was advertised by Carnap, there is no serious disagreement between the approaches of Wittgenstein and him in this respect. In the same vein, Carnap held that the rules of the language can always be assessed internally, but their relation to outside, i.e., to the facts that the system constituted by the rules *pictures*, remains always un-assessable. Indeed Carnap is very Wittgensteinian in this aspect.

A syntactical approach could hardly lead anyone outside of the linguistic bonds, in absence of *reference* and *designation*, which are exactly the concepts that bind the linguistic framework to the world (see 1937, § 78: 299). In later years (in the 1940-1950s) Carnap published a series of works, with the attitude of giving a semantical turn to his thought. But even in "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" (1950), which is the corner-stone of his thought in semantical period, Carnap could not leave the prison.

In that 1950 paper, after making a distinction between the external and internal questions, (internal and external with regard to a linguistic framework), he declared that internal questions are about the existence of certain entities *within the framework of an accepted language*. The external ones are questions concerning the existence or reality of *the system of entities as a whole* (Carnap like many others used existence and reality interchangeably). The important point is that, for Carnap, only the first kind constitutes the class of legitimate questions, whereas the latter questions are actually pseudo-questions (1950: 91). The truths of the phrases could only emerge after acceptance of the general framework of the relevant language; "thus the question of the admissibility of entities of a certain type or of abstract entities in general as designata is reduced to the question of the acceptability of the linguistic framework for those entities" (Carnap 1950: 92). But assertion of the truth of the linguistic framework (or mere talking about it) is impossible, because the question of the choice of the framework is "rather a practical question, a matter of a practical decision concerning the structure of our language. We have to make the choice whether or not to accept and use the forms of expression in the framework in question" (Carnap 1950: 86). The practical choice cannot be discussed within the bounds of meaningful language, and Wittgenstein's prison is still unbroken.

We now reach the epilogue. The intactness of Wittgenstein's prison is not due to the want of more serious efforts at breaking it. Carnap's two successive efforts for finding a way out of prison are brilliant in many respects, in my view. That he never could step outside the Wittgensteinian barrier was not a peculiar failure of Carnap's thought, if one can understand that the intactness of the prison is an essential feature of the language. Having a language (in any form that it could be conceived), means being bounded within *the language*, and building any number of layers within the bounds of the language, in the form of so-called meta-languages, still does not take us beyond the limits of the language (this is the main moral lesson that I intend to derive from failure of Carnap's effort). What is out there, in absence of language, is only silence. I cannot step behind the barriers of language, because "The world is *my world*: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of *language* (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of

*my world*."(TLP 5.62). What is out there beyond the limits of the language, along with ethics and aesthetics, would remain always mystical for me, as long as I reside in this world.<sup>2</sup>

Acknowledgements: I wish to recognize the influence of criticisms of Prof. Masoomi Hamedani and Prof. Mehdi Nasrin on the improvement of the content of the first draft of this paper. Most of all, I should recognize the kindness of Dr. Hajo Greif who read this paper several times without having any obligation to do so, and provided valuable assistance to me with regard to expressing my thoughts, both grammatically and materially. All these participations are gratefully acknowledged.

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<sup>2</sup> Interpreting these lines of TLP, in "Wittgenstein on the Self", Hans Sluga wrote: "[H]ence, that which is conceived as the limit of the world must also be conceived as being at the limit of language."(1996: 329). This is a very straightforward interpretation and it could be accepted almost without any controversy. But for relating what lies beyond the limits of language to ethics and aesthetics, I am mostly inspired by the brilliant work of Ben Tilghman, "Morality, Human Understanding, and the Limits of language" (2001). My more general insights about Wittgenstein's theory of ethics and aesthetics and his view about what is mystical root in the work of same author, *Wittgenstein, Ethics and Aesthetics: The View from Eternity* (1991).

# The Saying-Showing Distinction in the *Tractatus*: A Brief Attempt at a Formal Elucidation

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## 1. Introduction

One of the main causes of the cryptic aspect of Wittgenstein's early philosophy lies in the fact that it seems extremely difficult to understand the unity of its philosophical approach in the *Tractatus*. The book deals with many issues related to different areas (*inter alia* ontology, logic and the nature of the proposition, the status of the thinking subject, ethics and 'mysticism') but there is no doubt that Wittgenstein considered himself as fighting against a 'single great problem' and looking for a unique solution. Although the text of the treatise, the *Notebooks*, and the correspondence (especially some letters to Russell and Ludwig von Ficker) provide us with several presentations of this general solution, these presentations are always linked with the distinction between saying and showing (or at least with the idea that we have to recognize limits of symbolic representation). Consequently, the best way to understand the *Tractatus* seems to consist of an elucidation of the saying-showing distinction, i.e. of its 'main contention' which was for Wittgenstein 'the cardinal problem of philosophy'. Even those 'resolute' readers who pretend to throw away the idea of showing with the 6.54's ladder have to raise this central question: do the different uses of Wittgenstein's famous distinction have a common characteristic? Several commentators have recently suggested a negative answer to this fundamental question. In this paper, I try to show that it is possible to reconstruct a unified idea of showing and to emphasize a single formal problem that the saying-showing distinction could intend to solve.

## 2. A central hypothesis to elucidate the saying-showing distinction

When I affirm we can reconstruct a unified idea of showing and identify a unique general problem in Wittgenstein's early philosophy, I don't mean the author of the *Tractatus* would have been capable to explain – i.e. to say or to show in the greatest clarity – the nature of the matter (as he would himself admit in 1931, he was at the time of the *Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung* just 'trying to capture the feature of [a] physiognomy', '[seeing] something from far away and in a very indefinite manner', Waismann 1979, p. 184). In order to give an interpretation of a philosophical work, it is often necessary to develop (and in some cases to exaggerate) its authors' ideas, and that's probably what leads to the central hypothesis I am now going to expose. According to this hypothesis, the saying-showing distinction can be elucidated as follows:

- (1) 'Saying' essentially means referring to an external reality (not necessarily an extra-linguistic fact but something distinct from the symbol which expresses it).
- (2) 'Showing' consists of an ability to reflect itself, to manifest its own identity.
- (3) The idea of showing is firstly related to fundamental logico-philosophical 'data'. (By 'fundamental logico-philosophical "data"' I mean the tractarian – non-empirical and content-less – equivalents of concepts which play a decisive role in foundational matters in

logic or in philosophy, especially: the formal aspect of propositions/pictures, simple objects as conditions of possibility of meaning, logical truths, internal properties, the thinking subject, philosophical discourse itself, the ethical/aesthetic/'mystical' sense of life as a limited whole.)

(1) and (2) can also be expressed in these terms: (1) self-reference is, properly speaking, a logical impossibility; and (2) any  $x$  (a symbol or whatever else) can only show *itself*, i.e. its own nature (there is no showing of "something else", of something external to what effectuates the showing).

In other words, the problem at stake in the saying-showing distinction finds its origin in what Wittgenstein presented as 'the very devil': *Identity*. When we believe ourselves to be able to recognize a case of self-reference (reflexiveness) in discourse or in representation, this illusion comes from the fact that our identification of what seems to refer to itself is very imperfect (we can admit a vague self-reference but no *exact* self-reference). If we think that something can show something else (something external to itself), we fail to see that the two data are in fact in an *internal* relation, that is to say are essentially one and the same datum (in showing, there is no reference *ad extra*, no 'hetero-reference' – i.e. no reference at all).

This formulation of my hypothesis would need to be confronted with a detailed reading of the *Tractatus*. Furthermore, it assumes a very general notion of 'reference', which could apply to such different things as the internal link between simple signs (names) and objects, propositions and facts, functions and arguments, the metaphysical subject and the world. This point seems particularly difficult: is there a single nonsensical idea of 'self-reference' which could be used to elucidate the famous list of paradoxes confronted by Russell by means of his theory of logical types and the transcendental paralogisms involving the problematic self-knowledge of a metaphysical subject? A rigorous answer to this question would require an analysis of the various uses of the difficult notion of self-reference in very different contexts. What I want to suggest here is not that Wittgenstein explicitly raised such a question, but only that the *Tractatus* can be read as an attempt to treat the problem I have indicated, and that such a reading may be helpful to grasp the unity of the work.

## 3. The central hypothesis as a means to elucidate the main occurrences of the distinction in the *Tractatus*

The formal characterization of the distinction between saying and showing proposed in the precedent paragraph appears as a direct result of Wittgenstein's considerations in the *Tractatus*. By means of different uses of the spatial metaphor of interiority/exteriority, and in relation with the logico-philosophical notions of 'logical priority' or 'condition of possibility', the treatise intends to stress the idea that showing has an absolute autonomy (every case of *Zeigen* is actually a case of *Selbst-Zeigen*) and especially that it is

presupposed by symbolic figuration (i.e. reference, various kinds of representation). On the contrary, saying has a heteronomic character: It depends on an external datum and always presupposes some kind of showing. In other terms, the displaying of an identity is presupposed by –and logically prior to– every possible reference.

This character of the distinction is already patent in the picture theory with the introduction of the idea of pictorial form. The identity of a picture lies in its pictorial form (2.1514 & sq.). That's why a picture cannot represent but has to show its own pictorial form (it is important to notice that Wittgenstein doesn't assert that a picture cannot represent the pictorial form of *another* picture). This point is indicated through the spatial metaphor of places 'inside' or 'outside' a given picture:

2.172 A picture cannot [...] depict its pictorial form: it displays it (*weist sie auf*).

2.173 A picture represents its subject from a position outside it (*von ausserhalb*). [...] That is why a picture represents its subject correctly or incorrectly.

2.174 A picture cannot, however, place itself outside its representational form (*ausserhalb seiner Form der Darstellung stellen*).

Contrary to a particular pictorial form, the logical form cannot be represented at all by any picture because it is presupposed by every picture, inherent to every pictorial form (2.18). Logical form, i.e. the form of reality, admits no kind of exteriority: 'In order to be able to represent logical form, we should have to be able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to say outside the world (*ausserhalb der Welt*)' (4.12). Consequently, it has to show itself in every possible picture/proposition:

4.121 A proposition cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in it (*sie spiegelt sich in ihm*). What finds its reflection in language (*Was sich in der Sprache spiegelt*), language cannot represent (*darstellen*). What expresses *itself in* language, we cannot express by means of (*durch*) language. A proposition shows (*zeigt*) the logical form of reality. It displays it (*weist sie auf*).

We find in this last remark a sentence which provides us with a characterization of saying and showing as two modes of expression (*Ausdruck*): '*Was sich in der Sprache ausdrückt, können wir nicht durch sie ausdrücken*'. The single significant difference between saying and showing is here that the former kind of expression refers to something else 'by means' of language whereas the latter is the pure displaying of its own identity. This idea can be seen as a clue to understand the famously obscure remark 4.022 in which the saying-showing distinction seems to disappear. A few pages before asserting that 'what can be shown *cannot* be said' (4.1212), Wittgenstein notices: 'The proposition shows its sense (*zeigt seinen Sinn*). The proposition shows how things stand if it is true. And it says that (*sagt dass*) they do so stand' (4.022). Do we have to admit that saying and showing can sometimes be identical? The only way to avoid this dissolution of the distinction is to recognize that what the proposition shows is *its own* sense – its own identity as a proposition – and that what is said by the proposition is the *external* fact it represents. And Wittgenstein stresses the *logical priority* of the propositional sense over the assertion which connects it to an external fact (4.064, 6.2322). This idea of logical priority, or the notion of 'condition of possibility', was besides already present in the argument for the existence of ineffable simple objects (2.0211-2023, 3.221).

It would not be irrelevant to apprehend such remarks as signs of an original kind of Kantian criticism. But, although

Wittgenstein characterizes logic as 'transcendental' (6.13), his central aim is elsewhere. What he intends to emphasize is the absolute *auto-nomy* of logic ('Logic must take care of itself, *für sich selber sorgen*', 5.473) in which is grounded the fundamental distinction between propositions of logic and factual propositions (*sinnvolle Sätze*). The latter consist of representations and their truth or falsehood depends on external represented facts. The treatise's *Grundgedanke* is that the former do not represent at all (that's why there is no 'logical constant', 4.0312). If we have to compare a proposition with reality in order to judge its truth or falsehood, the 'peculiar mark of logical propositions' is 'that one can recognize that they are true *from the symbol alone*' and – Wittgenstein adds – 'this fact contains in itself the whole philosophy of logic' (6.113). It couldn't be otherwise because there is nothing outside logic, and insofar as the laws of logic have no content they 'cannot in their turn be subject to laws of logic' (6.123). This self-manifestation of logic ('Every tautology *itself shows – zeigt selbst* – that it is a tautology', 6.127) does not concern the arbitrary part of the symbols but their necessary formal correspondence with the world: logic is a field 'in which the nature of the absolutely necessary signs *speaks for itself* (*sagt ... selbst aus*)' (6.124). This is the fundamental meaning of the optical metaphor of reflection in a mirror (logic reflects itself in 'the great mirror', 5.511, it is 'a mirror-image of the world', 6.13).

This formal autonomy of logic (that is to say of the world, because logic is the form of the world, 5.61) consists of the displaying of internal properties or relations which are not, strictly speaking, properties or relations at all. These formal and logical properties of language and world are shown, e.g. by tautologies (that propositions of logic are tautologies 'shows the formal – logical – properties of language and the world', 6.12) or by the use of variable signs (cf. 5.24: 'The operation shows itself, *zeigt selbst*, in a variable'). The general form of a proposition is itself a variable, that is to say expresses no function but an 'operation'. The ideas of an *operation* (corresponding to what Wittgenstein calls 'formal concepts', see 4.126 & sq.) and of a *function* are to be distinguished. The most significant difference between these two notions lies in the fact that 'a function cannot be *its own argument*, whereas an operation can take one of *its own results as its base*' (5.251). As an explicit way of *saying*, a function must refer to something different from itself (it cannot be its own argument, because 'the sign for a function already contains the prototype, *Urbild*, of its argument, and it cannot contain itself', 3.333); as a pure way of formal and content-less *showing*, an operation possesses a power of 'reflexibility', i.e. the possibility to be re-applied to its object. And Wittgenstein's argument against the teratological function sign: '*F(Ffx)*' equally applies to propositions: 'No proposition can make a statement *about itself*, because a propositional sign cannot be contained in itself' (3.332). Here is the main point of the tructarian criticism of Russell's theory of logical types.

But the same way of reasoning is at work in Wittgenstein's critical analysis of the concept of a 'metaphysical subject'. The notion of representation consists of a possible adequacy between a subject and an object (i.e. some determinated fact), so that there cannot be representation without any distinction between what (or who) represents and what is represented. That's why the subject cannot be *itself* an object of *its own* representation. As its field of possible representation is the world as totality of facts, the subject cannot itself be a factual part of the world (5.631 & sq.). The metaphysical subject must thereby show itself as a *limit* of the world.

At this stage, the reader of the *Tractatus* has become able to grasp fully the nature of the world (or more modestly the meaning of the word ‘world’ as Wittgenstein uses it): the world is not only the ‘totality of facts’ but it also possesses formal features which show themselves. It can be contemplated als begrenztes Ganzes, as a ‘limited whole’, i.e. the *totality* of facts (the ‘whole’) is *limited* by the showing of pure form. Furthermore, the formal features of the world presuppose themselves the pure existence of something (*dass etwas ist*, 5.552, 6.44). In reading the last remarks of the book, we have to keep in mind these different aspects of the ‘world’, because when Wittgenstein uses his spatial metaphor to indicate something about the world’s non-factual aspect (its formal limit or its pure existence), this gives rise to an inversion of what is presented as ‘inside’ it and what is presented as ‘outside’: the facts are said to be ‘in the world’ and its other features are metaphorically said ‘outside’ it (see 6.41, 6.4312, 6.432). But Wittgenstein’s way of reasoning remains essentially the same.

#### 4. Conclusion: Towards a genealogy of showing

In this paper, I have only indicated an exegetical orientation to emphasize some significant formal features of the distinction between saying and showing in the *Tractatus*. A

rigorous test of the hypothesis I have here formulated would require a complete analysis of the work which would focus on every occurrence of the distinction, and I would be very happy if I have managed to show that such an analysis is to be realized. To conclude, I would like to make two remarks. Firstly, the interpretation I have here suggested is incompatible with the ‘resolute’ reading of the *Tractatus*, but it isn’t more consistent with the metaphysical reading that presupposes the existence of ‘ineffable truths’, and a third approach of the text is consequently needed. Last but not least, it is possible and necessary to elucidate how the form of the saying-showing distinction finds its roots in several problems in the works of a small number of authors to whom Wittgenstein owes the stimulation of his early way of thinking. So, a considerable task remains to be accomplished in order to achieve a complete understanding of Wittgenstein’s first book.

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# Wittgensteins Anthropologie. Eine Polemik mit Wittgensteins-Lektüre bei Jean-François Lyotard

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Das Thema „Anthropologie“ wird in der Wittgenstein-Rezeption oft mit *Bemerkungen über Frazers Golden Bough* (Wittgenstein 1989: 29-46) nahezu erledigt. Es scheint auf den ersten Blick durchaus nachvollziehbar, denn Wittgenstein im Verdacht zu haben, dass er eine gewisse prägnante Antwort auf die vierte Frage Kants liefert, wäre vollkommen verfehlt. Doch versuche ich in diesem Artikel eine Argumentation zu entwickeln, die einen anthropologischen Standpunkt in Wittgensteins Denken als fruchtbar und inspirativ erscheinen lässt und sich zugleich nicht inhaltlich auf die Kritik von Frazer beruft. In meinem Beitrag beschäftige ich mich also mit einer anthropologischen Sichtweise Wittgensteins Denkens. Die Motivation für diese Perspektive stellt eine Bemerkung in Lyotards Schrift *Le Différent (Der Widerstreit)* dar, wo der Autor behauptet, Wittgenstein sei ein Anhänger eines gewissen „anthropologischen Empirismus“. Diese Kritik werde ich erklären und als Gegenargument für die hier angebotene Interpretation deuten. Schließlich versuche ich mich mit dieser Kritik auseinanderzusetzen.

## 1. Anthropologie als Modell der Erklärung

Im ersten Kapitel werde ich mich zuerst mit Wittgensteins Kritik an Frazer beschäftigen. Ich zeige, dass das Thema der gegen Frazer gerichteten Bemerkungen nicht eine anthropologische Theorie voraussetzt, sondern eine Kritik gewisser philosophischer Erklärungsart darstellt. Ich verteidige also die These, dass es in Wittgensteins Bemerkungen über Frazer primär nicht um Anthropologie oder Ethnologie geht, sondern um eine Kritik bestimmter Erklärungsart. Diese Deutung schafft einen gewissen Freiraum für das Argument, mit dem ich weiterhin eine eigentliche anthropologische Perspektive in Wittgensteins Denken begründe.

Wittgensteins Interesse an Frazer ist auf das Jahr 1931 zu datieren. Die ersten Manuskriteinträge wurden im Juni dieses Jahres aufgezeichnet, nach einigen Überarbeitungen in Typoskript 211 übernommen und heute sind als *Bemerkungen über Frazers Golden Bough* bekannt. Weitere Quellen bestätigen diese Datierung – M. O’C. Drury (1992: 170) hat Frazers Buch gemeinsam mit Wittgenstein zu diesem Zeitpunkt gelesen und Wittgenstein hat eine Kritik an Frazer auch in Vorlesungen vom Studienjahr 1932/33 geäußert (Wittgenstein 1989a: 188-189). Diese Datierung ist für die Auswertung der Bemerkungen entscheidend, denn gerade in diesen Jahren, wie z.B. Wolfgang Knezler in seiner bemerkenswerten Studie detailliert belegt (Knezler 1997: 26nn), setzt sich Wittgenstein mit seinem Frühdenken besonders intensiv auseinander. Gerade diese Auseinandersetzung ist der Ausgangspunkt zum Verständnis von Wittgensteins Frazer-Lektüre.

Wittgensteins Standpunkt in der Polemik mit Frazer besteht in der Kritik der auf Kausalität basierenden „Erklärungstypen“: „Diese Erklärungsweise ergibt sich aus der Tendenz, ein Phänomen durch eine einzige Ursache zu erklären [...]“ (Wittgenstein 1989a: 188). Frazer sollte nach Wittgenstein den Fehler begangen haben, die Phänomene

der religiösen Riten als eine Art Handlung mit einem bestimmten pragmatischen Ziel zu betrachten. Was ist mit der „einzigen Ursache“ gemeint? Es geht um ein Motiv der Nützlichkeit. Rituale werden unter dieser Betrachtungsweise deswegen durchgeführt, weil sie etwas Bestimmtes bewirken sollen. Es handelt sich um strikte Zweckhandlungen. Diese evolutionäre Betrachtungsweise wird von Wittgenstein aus zwei Standpunkten kritisiert. Der erste besteht in einem offensichtlichen Reduktionismus dieser Annahme („Welche Enge des seelischen Lebens bei Frazer! Daher: Welche Unmöglichkeit, ein anderes Leben zu begreifen, als das englische seiner Zeit.“ Wittgenstein 1989: 33). Der zweite Grund liegt darin, dass die rituellen Handlungen als Meinungen oder Theorien angesehen werden. Rituelle Handlungen werden von Frazer als eine Art falscher Theorien betrachtet, die auf einer falschen Überzeugung von ihrer Funktion (etwa von der Macht eines Zweiges) beruhen. Magie sei also in Frazers-Augen falsche Physik. Warum kritisiert Wittgenstein diese Erklärungsart? Der Keim einer möglichen Antwort lässt sich bereits in der *Logisch-philosophischen Abhandlung* finden, wo eine Kritik der Kausalität unternommen wird („Der Glaube an den Kausalnexus ist der *Aberglaube*.“ TLP § 5.1361). Wenn man dies auf Wittgensteins Kritik an Frazer überträgt, lässt sich der springende Punkt folgend formulieren: Die Aufforderung „einer einzigen Ursache“ lässt sich nicht begründen, weil sie nicht aus Tatsachen (etwa aus Verhalten von Stämmen) abgeleitet wird, sondern aus der Erklärungsart folgt. Deswegen kann Wittgenstein in einem späteren Manuskript schreiben: „Ja das Ausschalten der Magie hat hier den Charakter der Magie selbst.“ (Ms. 110: 117).

Wittgenstein schlägt dagegen vor, die rituellen Handlungen überhaupt nicht für Meinungen, Theorien oder Weltbeschreibungen zu halten. Die Riten sind eher ein „Ausdruck tief empfundener Gefühle und religiöser Ehrfurcht“ (Drury 1992: 170). Magie ist deswegen keine Theorie, sondern sie „bringt einen Wunsch zur Darstellung“ (Ms. 110: 183). Wie gesagt, der Rahmen dieser Kritik ist die Auseinandersetzung mit der *Abhandlung* und diese besteht vor allem in der Erweiterung der Sichtweise auf die Sprache. Der problematische Ansatz der *Abhandlung* beruht dann auf einer Tendenz, „die Logik unserer Sprache zu sublimieren.“ (PU § 38). Wittgenstein versucht also, den Reduktionismus (mit seinen Worten: „einseitige Diät“ PU § 593) zu überwinden – und dasselbe Motiv bietet den Anlass für Kritik an Frazers Untersuchung.

## 2. Anthropologische Perspektive – das Argument

Die wohl ausführlichsten sich auf ein einziges Buch beziehenden Bemerkungen in Wittgensteins *Nachlass* betreffen also Anthropologie eher indirekt. Trotzdem will ich begründen, dass sich damit dieses Thema nicht einfach abtun lässt. Im Folgenden zeige ich, dass die Kritik an Frazer bereits einen gewissen formalen anthropologischen

Standpunkt voraussetzt. Das Argument hat folgende Struktur:

Die Handlung ist immer Grund und Basis für eine Sprache.  
Sprache ermöglicht eine theoretische Beschreibung.  
Die Varietäten der menschlichen Sprache lassen sich mithilfe einer Theorie nicht auf deren Basis reduzieren.

Ergo: Eine gewisse Praxis des menschlichen Lebens stellt immer eine Voraussetzung für jegliche Sprache dar. Dies gilt zugleich für deren theoretische Beschreibung.

Anders gesagt: Etwas sinnvoll zu kritisieren setzt Kriterien des Sinns voraus. Wo entstehen aber diese Kriterien? Meiner Argumentation zufolge bestehen diese Kriterien in der *menschlichen Verhaltensweise*. Diese Verhaltensweise kann auch als „gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise“ (PU § 206, Ms. 137: 54b) genannt werden. Diese Handlungsweise lässt sich als ein universales anthropologisches „Bezugssystem“, als ein „Grund fester Lebensformen“ oder „Handlungsformen“ (Ms. 119: 74v) deuten. Es ist sozusagen die Grundbedingung der Sprachregeln und Handlungen für die ganze „Familie von Handlungsweisen“ (Ms. 165: 99).

Wie hängt aber die Pluralität der Sprachvarietäten mit einer menschlichen Lebensform zusammen? Wittgenstein ist in diesem Punkt ziemlich unklar, ich nehme jedoch an, die meisten Manuskriptstellen lassen sich so interpretieren, wie ich bereits in Prämissen 1-3 erwähnt habe: Es gibt eine universale Handlungsform (die menschliche), die jedoch im Allgemeinen nicht inhaltlich bestimmt wird. Sie betrifft den Vorrang der Praxis. Die Handlung geht dem Sprechen voraus. Sie ist die „unbegündete Handlungsweise“ (Ms. 174: 25r), die aber dann auf eine bestimmte Art und Weise in konkreten Handlungsformen oder Lebensformen zustande kommt und sich zugleich manifestiert.

Der Grund für diese Deutung lässt sich auch so erklären: Eine Sprache als eine unverständliche Sprache zu erkennen (oder eine Lebensform als eine fremde), setzt schon eine gemeinsame Basis für den Vergleich der beiden („der unseren“ und „der fremden“) Sprachen oder Formen voraus.<sup>1</sup> Wenn die Menschen erkennen, dass ein anderer Mensch fremd ist, wird er doch als Mensch erkannt – dies geschieht aufgrund dessen, was alle Menschen gemeinsam haben. Genau das ist die anthropologische Perspektive in Wittgensteins Spätdenken.

### 3. Einwand: ein „anthropologischer Empirismus“?

Ich habe gezeigt, dass in Wittgensteins Denken eine anthropologische Perspektive fruchtbar sein kann, denn sie ermöglicht uns einen allgemeinen Rahmen der Sprache zu erklären. Ich nehme an, dass diesen Aspekt auch Jean-François Lyotard gemerkt hat. In seiner bekannten Schrift *Le Différent (Der Widerstreit)* richtet er jedoch gegen Wittgenstein folgende Kritik:

Heute muß ihr [Kant und Wittgenstein – Anm. T.D.] Erbe von der Schuldenlast des Anthropomorphismus befreit werden (der Begriff des ‚Gebrauchs‘ bei beiden, der transzendentale Anthropomorphismus bei Kant, der empirische bei Wittgenstein). (Lyotard 1986: 13)

Lyotard formuliert seine Kritik gegen Wittgenstein (und Kant) als eine Kritik gegen Universalismus aufgrund des strikten Kontextualismus („Kein Satz ist der erste.“ 1986:

<sup>1</sup> Wittgenstein spricht auch über die Möglichkeit, diese Handlungsweise zu ändern. Dann geht es um die „Umwertung der Werte“, die ebenso nur auf einer Basis möglich ist. Vgl. dazu Ms. 183: 23-24.

227). Es fehlt nämlich ein „universaler Diskursart“ (Lyotard 1986: 11), deswegen kann „die Erbe von der Schuldenlast des Anthropomorphismus“ abgeschafft werden. Lyotard behauptet ganz direkt:

The examination of language games, just like the critique of the faculties, identifies and reinforces the separation of language from itself. There is no unity to language; there are islands of language, each of them ruled by a different regime, untranslatable into the others. This dispersion is good in itself, and ought to be respected. It is deadly when one phrase regime prevails over the others. (Lyotard 1993: 20)

Lyotards Kritik soll hier nicht allzu viel ernst genommen werden, denn dieser verfolgt seine Ziele, wobei er manches vereinfacht und übersieht.<sup>2</sup> Doch als einen fruchtbaren Ausgang für ein starkes Gegenargument finde ich diese Kritik ganz plausibel. Ich verstehe sie wie folgt: Empirischer Anthropomorphismus ist eine Art Reduktion (etwa zu Machtzwecken) vielen Sprachvarietäten. Mit Wittgensteins Worten könnte also der Einwand so formuliert werden: Universale oder menschliche Lebensform ist eine Reduktion anderer möglichen Formen. Eine bestimmte Vorstellung über die Sprache (etwa, sie fängt mit einer „primitiven Reaktion“ an<sup>3</sup>) wird für eine allgemeingültige erklärt (etwa, eine Sprache fängt *immer* mit einer primitiven Reaktion an). Lyotards Kritik kann also als eine Kritik impliziter und scheinbar selbstverständlicher Voraussetzungen gedeutet werden.

Es scheint zugleich, dass diese Kritik in dem Punkt plausibel sein könnte, in dem sie Wittgensteins Kritik an dem Reduktionismus bei Frazer konsequent weiterführt. Eine gewisse Form des menschlichen Lebens vorauszusetzen heißt, die möglichen Varietäten des Lebens auf ein universelles Merkmal zu überführen, also reduzieren. Obwohl diese Art von Argumentation bei Lyotard sehr beliebt, ja sogar üblich ist, werde ich sie nun bei der Wittgensteins Lektüre in Zweifel ziehen. Wittgenstein sagt nämlich nicht, *was* ein Mensch sein muss, sondern *dass* es ein Mensch sein muss, was eine sprachliche Kommunikation zustande bringen kann. Wenn Lyotard etwas Allgemeines als Reduktion ablehnt, dann lehnt er damit zugleich eine Möglichkeit ab, überhaupt über Sprachspiele, Diskursarten oder „islands of language“ zu sprechen. Anders gesagt, Wittgenstein hat mit dem anthropologischen Gedanken erkannt, dass sich die Komplexität der Sprache nicht ins Unendliche führen lässt (um überhaupt über eine Sprache sprechen zu können). Im Unterschied zu Lyotard schlägt er vor, nicht nur die horizontale Ebene der Kommunikation, sondern auch die vertikale Ebene in Betracht zu ziehen. Die Primitivität (im Sinne vom Basisschicht) der Sprache macht die Sprache zu einem menschlichen Ereignis: „Was aber will hier das Wort ‚primitiv‘ sagen? Doch wohl, daß die Verhaltensweise vorsprachlich ist: daß ein Sprachspiel auf ihr beruht, daß sie das Prototyp einer Denkweise ist und nicht das Ergebnis des Denkens.“ (Ts. 229: 405).

Wittgensteins Perspektive unterscheidet sich also entscheidend von der Sichtweise Lyotards. Wo der Österreicher in der Allgemeinheit die nötigen menschlichen Merkmale der sprachlichen Kommunikation, „das Prototyp einer Denkweise“, sieht und dadurch sich indirekt mit Relativismus auseinandersetzt, da plädiert der französische Kritiker der *Untersuchungen* für die vollkommene Unabhängigkeit

<sup>2</sup> Lyotard (1986: 135-136) meint wohl, dass Wittgenstein ein Anhänger von Konventionalismus war: [...] man kann die Ähnlichkeit anhand des Verfahrens zur Ermittlung der Wirklichkeit eines Referenten (Nr. 63 ff) und nicht durch den ‚Gebrauch‘ ermitteln, wie Wittgenstein als Opfer des anthropologischen Empirismus glaubt.“ Dies steht jedoch in einem krassen Gegensatz zu PU § 241.

<sup>3</sup> Vgl. Ms. 133: 4v; 134: 111 f; 135: 63 f; 137: 90b; 138: 15b; 144: 82; 167: 9r.

einzelner Sprachspielen. Diese Unabhängigkeit ist jedoch widersprüchlich *per se*, denn sie lehnt die Möglichkeit ab, die einzelnen Spiele als Sprachspiele zu erkennen. Es bleibt nur eine einzige Möglichkeit diesen Widerspruch zu überwinden – es muss eine bestimmte Auffassung des Menschen vorausgesetzt werden. Lyotards argumentative Kritik an Wittgenstein endet also entweder in einem Widerspruch, oder setzt sie gerade das voraus, was Lyotard *in stricto sensu* ablehnt. Pointiert wird das ganze Problem in Wittgenstein Worten wie folgt: „Ja aber hat denn die Natur hier gar nicht mitzureden?! Doch – nur macht sie sich auf andere Weise hörbar.“ (Ts. 232: 714).

#### 4. Zusammenfassung

Die Natur des Menschen ist eine formale Bedingung für eine Sprache, also auch für das, was Lyotard Diskursarten nennt. Sie ist jedoch nicht auf eine theoretische Weise aufzufassen, denn jegliche Theorie setzt sie schon voraus. Sie ist als eine transzendentale Bedingung unseres Weltbildes zu betrachten.<sup>4</sup> Anthropologischer Empirismus – wie ihn Lyotard deutet – setzt einen gewissen Inhalt voraus, eine Substanz des Menschen. Dies ist jedoch gerade der Punkt, den Wittgenstein mit seiner Kritik von Frazer ablehnt und schließlich als eine Reduktion widerlegt. Die Sprache ist ein menschliches Ereignis, also wird ihre Pluralität immer eine menschliche bleiben. Dies ist zugleich der Punkt, in dem in Lyotards Rezeption und Kritik von Wittgenstein *différend* entsteht.

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<sup>4</sup> „Die Sätze, die dies Weltbild beschreiben, könnten zu einer Art Mythologie gehören. Und ihre Rolle ist ähnlich der von Spielregeln, und das Spiel kann man auch rein praktisch, ohne ausgesprochene Regeln lernen.“ Ms. 174: 21v.

# Some Remarks Arising from Hacking's 'Leibniz and Descartes: Proof and Eternal Truths': A Reconstruction of Wittgensteinian Agency

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## Introduction

I am interested to construct a series of remarks which intersect, overlap, and at the end leave a space. The method could be usefully thought of as geometric. A similar method was used by Elizabeth Anscombe in her teaching, but as a Neo-Kantian she required of us an intuitionist 'leap of faith' to fill the space.

There are twelve remarks, divided into three sections. In remarks 1, 2 and 3, aspect perception questions using logical rather than perceptual features are constructed.

## I. Taking an Attitude to Surfaces

1. What is the difference between a conjunction ( $p \& q$ ) and the inclusive disjunction ( $p \vee q$ ) when both  $p$  and  $q$  are true? In this case, the states of affairs that make both the conjunction and the inclusive disjunction true would be the same.

We might want to say that results produced by logical computation are considerably limited, as is shown by the 'mechanical' overlap of a true conjunction and an inclusive disjunction with both  $p$  and  $q$  true masking important differences. The alternative interpretation is that the computational method has shown us the possibility of the two aspects.

2. A similar point can be constructed by considering that within a molecular complex of  $n$  sentences the  $n$  sentences function systematically to produce negation-sentences, conjunction-sentences, disjunction-sentences, implication-sentences or equivalence-sentences (von Wright 1957, 24). We find systemic functioning at *Tractatus*, 1.12, "die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen bestimmt, was der Fall und auch, was alles nicht der Fall ist".

However, while the fact that the atomic propositions can be so combined is a logical property of the *post-combinatorial* forms, do we falsely project this property back onto the atomic units' pre-combinatorial form?

At certain points it is stressed that the possibility of combining with other units "muß dies schon in ihnen liegen" (2.0121). This requirement works very well for the *Gegenständen*, and this condition combined with the cautioning at 2.0121 and 2.0122, that the *Verbindung* of the *Gegenständen* must be logical and not merely by chance, is the most detailed exposition of the construction of atomic units that Wittgenstein provides. However, it does not allow us to infer that the prescription is correctly applied at the level of the atomic units themselves, post-construction after the binding of objects but pre-combination to forming molecular complexes.

Indeed, it is important to see that the atomic units, whether they are the *Sachverhalten* or the elementary propositions which model the *Sachverhalten* are more 'neutral' and unscripted, once constructed. And this is as it

should be if the conditions that the elementary propositions necessarily retain a form of independence in that one cannot infer from one to the other, nor from the existence of one *Sachverhalt* to another, is to be fulfilled. At *Tractatus* 5, we are reminded of a primitive distinction, that while a (molecular) proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions, an elementary proposition is a truth-function of itself.

If the elementary propositions were not independent of one another in terms of inference relations, and secondly, if the possibility of their combining with others was necessarily scripted in them from the beginning, there would not be a sufficiently robust role allowed for human action in the logico-mathematical construction processes. This is an early contribution by Wittgenstein which, while remaining within a computational method, greatly advances a Leibnizian system.

3. In all types of aspect perception questions, we are considering differences between perceiving something which is one possible aspect of (at least) two possibilities, while being unaware of the other, with perceiving something and knowing of the possibility of the other. More generally, this significant question is, What if one was unable (generally) to take an *attitude* to a surface?

From another angle, but related to these aspect perception questions, we could ask, not only what are the differences between and among the various truth functions when propositions are true. This is part of Frege's point when he posits 'The True', for rather than only the differences which are masked by the 'similar surface', the 'similar surface' reveals striking logical similarities and general logical features which require symbolic representation within a complete symbolism.

## II. Epistemological Intuition Contrasted with Intuitionist Mathematics

4. In order to capture an important general feature, the system in *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus* constructs a general propositional form. In this way, Wittgenstein is concerned not with transcendental objects but with immanent forms derivable through computation.

As Leibniz thought and Hacking (1973: 4) points out, "a proof is valid in virtue of its form, not its content". While it has traditionally been argued that for Descartes, one could reach perception of truth through intuition or inference, with no necessity about how, only a 'psychological preference', a Cartesian proof is certainly never going to be a proof in the strict sense of validity in virtue of its form.

In addition, if we posit the traditional connection between form and inference, on the one hand, and content and intuition, on the other, while aligning content with objects, Cartesian eternal truths and Kantian objective principles

are both epistemological objects. This indicates that intuition is necessary rather than contingent.

Leibniz was simply not concerned with things epistemologically. Perceptions and the *cogito*, the external awareness of the modern self, does not play a role in Leibniz's system. He is the soul, mechanically computing, this and that, trying out combinations, to try to reach truth through proof. New connections made mean a better understanding of God. Leibniz's 'reason' is reasoning, a kind of doing. He is not a sceptic trying to find the light of True Reason in order to conquer doubt.

In contrast, Cartesian intuition involves a kind of direct perception or awareness (Russell flirted with this idea in his 'direct awareness of causation').

5. Epistemological intuition is not to be conflated with intuitionist logic and mathematics, which can readily have a computational, proof-theoretic realisation. Indeed, the computational aspect of the successor function of the natural numbers is not only used to construct the intuitionist's possible infinity, but it is a valid proof that infinity is possible in virtue of its very form. The Cartesian would have to group the numbers set-theoretically to create their 'form'/class. For the intuitionist mathematician, infinity's very construction is a proof that infinity is possible in virtue of its (constructed) form. I.e., it is proof-theoretic rather than set-theoretic.

We might say that the form of infinity is able to be seen through the proof. The construction of its existence is the proof of its existence. Occam's razor cuts the extra notion of an infinite set.

6. The Cartesian sceptic must achieve a point of view from which to view the world as discrete natural kinds/classes, for as a first step of modern consciousness, the *cogito* must be established as an *Ur*-class, that of the thinking substance which can objectify first itself, and then all of its contents-which-form-classes. Cartesian scepticism inextricably involves a type of essentialism (eternal truths which God holds in place, Hacking 1973). When this objectified consciousness forms propositions, the *Ur*-proposition has already been the *cogito*'s construction of self-awareness, which must divide up the self into thinking and existence and place this self-as-thinker into the things-which-exist class.

But how does the *cogito* form the idea of class as predicate? Specifically, how does a self-as-thinker ever break out of solipsism to existence as predication?

7. The short (and as far as I can see the only) answer is that the world is conceived as natural kinds created *ex nihilo* and at once – a conception not so far removed from the conception of infinity as a set. It is impossible (logically) to make sense of the Cartesian project without recourse to intuition as an immediate awareness of classes as epistemological objects.

### III. Further Development

8. Leibniz and Wittgenstein used both probabilistic inference and synthetic deduction to construct proofs. In both inference and deduction we make steps, in a computational, mechanical way in order to create proofs in argument. A truth-functional logical calculus is one method of systematising argument. However, while these procedures use molecular propositions built up with elementary, atomic propositions, we can never 'break open' the atomic proposition; it has a kind of syncategoricity (the concatena-

tion of names as links in a chain, when if broken are no longer links).

9. When Russell asked in a letter to Wittgenstein why he had started with the *Tatsachen* rather than the *Sachverhalten*, which make elementary propositions true, Wittgenstein replied to the effect that it would take a lot to answer him and that he should read the book (again).

In fact, the point is that it takes the whole book to suggest an answer. For it is the point at which a 'modern' consciousness intersects with the non-sceptical world of Leibniz, constructing and testing the boundaries by permutations of atomic units whose combinations are not predestined or prescribed by an essentialism of natural kinds nor merely randomly configured. That these atomic units themselves stand in place without the need for epistemological reflection or direct intuitive awareness by the *cogito* appears to be, I suggest, in virtue of the role for atomic entities at the base of our conception of counting and infinity.

On set-theoretic, realist mathematics the condition for the 'unbreakable' atomic unit is often met by positing transcendent mathematical objects, which may then form sets or classes, with the ensuing set-theoretic paradoxes. To the modern Cartesian and post-Cartesian mind this is preferable to a world in which the Leibnizian computing self appears to be devoid of agency.

10. We could, however, take a different view. The Wittgensteinian immanent forms which are created through computational, proof-theoretic rather than set-theoretic methods are created and seen by perhaps an alternative *cogito*, but a nonetheless modern *cogito*. For just as the immanent forms logically replace the transcendent mathematical objects, so is the transcendent self replaced by the immanent, non-composite soul. That this 'soul' is not pre-Cartesian can be seen by the fact that we are able to take up an *attitude* to souls, which involves at least some form of reflection which moves us significantly from the nomadology of Leibniz. However, the Leibnizian computational, proof-theoretical base is retained as a means of counterbalancing an unrestrained transcendentalism which results from both the Cartesian and Kantian projects.

One way we can make sense of this is through analogy: that the modern 'soul' as the Wittgensteinian replacement for the Rationalist self is made 'visible' as an element within his immanent system much in the same way that possible infinity is constructed by the intuitionist mathematician.

11. The point made at the beginning that at one level different logical forms can appear indiscernible but be different at another was to point out that we have an *attitude* to surfaces, which includes modal thinking.

However, I want to end these remarks not with the thought that the modalities of possibility and necessity are on an equal footing logically or epistemically. Necessity is more basic. I have come to understand this through translation, after many considerations, of the *Tractatus* passage 2.012. The problematic word is "zufällig".

In the 1s the *Tatsachen*, not the *Sachverhalten*, are introduced. However, if the world divides into *Tatsachen*, we see at 2 that one of these *Tatsachen* is the existence of the *Sachverhalten*, thus at one level it becomes a matter of science (fact) that the *Sachverhalten* exist. But this, of course, would not be sufficient to make them necessary, because the propositions of science are contingent. What is accomplished at 2 is an epistemological point in that at the level of science a modern alternative soul-as-cogito is

able to think/picture the *Sachverhalten* as a *Tatsache* without any form of transcendentalism. This is crucial because what must be established is the radical contingency of all *Tatsachen* in order to leave room for a deeper level of necessity.

12. This comes at the passage 2.012 and from the three passages leading up to it, in which the non-scepticism of Leibniz resurfaces within the modern alternative epistemological landscape that Wittgenstein has constructed. At 2.01 the key word is "wesentlich". That it is essential of objects that they are able to be bound together, concatenated, form a union ("Verbindung", 2.01) which constitutes a *Sachverhalt*, is not an epistemological fact. We are in the territory of essentialism, and there is no requirement of a *cogito*. We are realists at this point.

We enter a type of constructivism at 2.012, "In der Logik ist nichts zufällig" because while "zufällig" is usually translated as 'accidental', thus 'not accidental' would fit with the essentialism of "wesentlich", there is more to this word than at first meets the eye. "Zufällig" could also mean 'without intention, plan, design, purpose'.

While it is quite possible that the fact (*Tatsache*) that *Sachverhalten* exist is false because of the contingency, the *cogito* doing the constructing at 2.012 is not an intuiting Cartesian, nor the pure Leibnizian believer. We have the modern alternative soul-as-cogito edging towards a tentative, humanly constructed meaning by doing mathematics as a "method of logic" (*Prototractatus*, 6.22), in which "we

know as much as God does in mathematics" (*Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics*, Lecture XI: 104): a modern reflective version of a pre-epistemological Leibnizian cosmology, eschewing recourse to Cartesian intuition.

The deeper level of necessity lies in that it is only through the act of construction that mathematical proof is able to evidence truth and *Wirklichkeit*, which is as close as the modern soul-as-cogito gets to proof of its own and the world's existence. Wittgenstein has moved us from "credo ut intelligam" to "credo ut faciam".

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# Nondualismus in Sprache und Empirie

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Um das Referenzproblem der Erkenntnis und die damit verbundenen Dichotomien von Sprache und Welt zu vermeiden, schlägt der Nondualismus eine Aufhebung der kategorialen Unterscheidung zwischen Sprache und Welt bzw. zwischen Theorie und Empirie vor. Es werden zwei nondualistische Ansätze vorgestellt, die in Theorie und Empirie Anwendung finden; der semantische Nondualismus von Josef Mitterer und die nondualistische Erfahrungstheorie von Franz Ofner. Das Resultat dieser Gegeüberstellung legt den Schluss nahe, dass semantischer und empirischer Nondualismus im Verhältnis zueinander neue Dichotomien bilden.

## 1. Semantischer Nondualismus

Die Ausgangssituation für die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Nondualismus in Theorie und Empirie bildet die Kluft zwischen Sprache und Welt. Neurath zufolge ist Referenz als wahrheitsrelevanter Bezug zwischen Aussage und Wirklichkeit mangels einer direkten Vergleichbarkeit und Abgrenzung zu verneinen, sodass sich Aussagen nur mit anderen Aussagen vergleichen lassen (vgl. Neurath 1931a: 403 f; Neurath 1931b: 299 und Neurath 1934: 355; vgl. auch Beckermann 1995: 545f).

Das Problem der Dichotomie wird auch in Wittgensteins Auseinandersetzung mit den Aspekten eines Dreiecks sichtbar: Die Argumentation, dass ein Dreieck immer nur *als* Etwas (und im Optimalfall als Dreieck) aufgefasst werden kann, verschleiert den Umstand, dass immer noch die Rede von einem nicht gedeuteten Ding hinter der Deutung ist, dem Dreieck (vgl. Wittgenstein 1977: 319 f; vgl. auch Mitterer 2000: 23). Existenzbehauptungen und Verweise auf ein Objekt hinter der Sprache erfordern neue Folgebeschreibungen und daraus resultiert ein infiniter Regress innerhalb von Beschreibungen, die nicht über sich hinaus zu jenseitigen Objekten weisen. Allein die Aussage einer Sprachverschiedenheit von Gegenständen ist schlichtweg paradox (vgl. Mitterer 2000: 60 und 95 sowie Mitterer 2011: 96; vgl. auch Weber 2010: 15 und 30). Die Annahme eines deutungsunabhängigen Gegenstandes, der selbst kein Aspekt mehr ist, entspricht folglich ebenfalls einer Deutung.

Um dem Anspruch Neuraths gerecht zu werden, wird der nondualistische Ansatz von Josef Mitterer herangezogen: Im Rahmen des semantischen Nondualismus wird die Kluft zwischen Sprache und Welt überwunden, indem die Identität von empirischen Gegenständen gegenüber Beschreibungen verworfen wird. In der nondualistischen Rede ist das Objekt einer Beschreibung nicht mehr beschreibungsverschieden, sondern eine bereits ausgeführte Beschreibung – im Folgenden Beschreibung *so far* (vgl. Mitterer 2000: 56). Diese bildet im Verein mit einer Beschreibung *from now on* eine neue Beschreibung *so far*. Der Unterschied zwischen Subjekt und Objekt schrumpft auf diese Weise auf eine zeitliche Unterscheidung zwischen Beschreibungen und Beschreibungen *so far* (vgl. Scholl 2008: 173 f). Diese Auffassung macht es unmöglich, zwischen einem Objekt und seiner Beschreibung während der Beschreibung zu unterscheiden, weil eine selbstreferentielle Beschreibung nur paradox, nämlich erst nach der

ausgeföhrten Beschreibung erfolgen kann (vgl. Mitterer 2000: 95). Eine etwaige Sprachverschiedenheit von Gegenständen kann daher nur vor einem begrifflichen Sprachhintergrund postuliert werden.

## 2. Nondualistisches Untersuchungsverfahren

Wenn bei der Überprüfung von Aussagen die Referenz für irrelevant erklärt und die Voraussetzung sprachverschiedener Objekte ausgeschlossen wird, dann können strittige Beschreibungen nicht mehr unter Berufung auf das beschriebene Objekt geprüft werden, weil das beschriebene Objekt nach nondualistischem Verständnis selbst nur eine Beschreibung *so far* ist. Diskursive Auffassungen darüber, ob die Erde eine Kugel oder eine Scheibe ist, können nur auf einer konsensualen Ausgangsbasis vertreten werden, nämlich im Konsens über den Bestand der Erde. Dieser Konsens ist nun aber selbst eine von beiden Diskursparteien geteilte Beschreibung *so far*, nämlich die Beschreibung „Erde“. Die voneinander abweichenden Beschreibungen „Erdkugel“ und „Erdscheibe“ entsprechen somit diskursiven Abwandlungen von der Konsensbeschreibung „Erde“ (vgl. Mitterer 2000: 71, 101; vgl. auch Mitterer 2011: 93). Die Entscheidung zwischen Erdkugel und Erdscheibe kann folglich nicht unter Berufung auf der bislang konsensualen Beschreibung *so far*, nämlich „Erde“, getroffen werden, weil diese als gemeinsamer Nenner fungiert und damit „Erde“ in beiden diskursiven Beschreibungen „Erdkugel“ und „Erdscheibe“ enthalten ist. Sie steht mit keiner von beiden im Widerspruch und liefert auch keine darüber hinausgehende Information. Eine geeignete Metapher dafür ist eine Weggabelung, bei der einer der beiden aufgegabelten neuen Wege sich unter Rückgriff auf den gemeinsamen Ausgangsweg zu legitimieren versucht (vgl. Mitterer 2000: 72). Dadurch entpuppt sich auch das Kohärenzverhältnis als ein Sonderfall des Referenzverhältnisses. Weder die Erde als beschreibungsverschiedenes Objekt noch die bislang konsensuale Erdbeschreibung *so far* ist ein taugliches Prüfkriterium: vielmehr gehen aus nondualistischer Sicht die Streitparteien von den jeweiligen eigenen Standpunkten als Prüfkriterium aus und prüfen die abweichende Position an der eigenen. Ein prüfender Vergleich zwischen den Beschreibungen „Erdkugel“ und „Erdscheibe“ führt allerdings auf beiden Seiten unweigerlich zum Widerspruch. Die jeweilige Fremdauffassung gilt im Abgleich mit dem eigenen Standpunkt, der als Prüfkriterium herangezogen wird, immer schon als widerlegt (vgl. Mitterer 2000: 76 ff).

Anstatt nun die beschreibungsverschiedene Erde oder den Konsens in den Beschreibungen über sie zur Abwehr gegen abweichende Fremdauffassungen einzusetzen, könnte die bisherige Konsensbeschreibung „Erde“ als Ausgangsbasis für neue gemeinsame Beschreibungen genutzt werden, sodass sich am Ende einer solchen gemeinsamen Untersuchung etwa die konsensuale Beschreibung einer an den Polen abgeflachten und daher ovalen Erdgestalt durchsetzen könnte: Die Entscheidung zwischen diskursiven Beschreibungen wird daher im Nondualismus mittels *Vorgriff* auf neue Beschreibungen ge-

troffen. Diese sogenannten Beschreibungen *from now on* entstehen aber erst im Zuge eines gemeinsamen Untersuchungsverfahrens (vgl. Mitterer 2000: 83 ff.). Für diese Beschreibungen *from now on* ist ein Referenzbegriff nicht mehr von Bedeutung (vgl. Scholl 2010: 148). Die Kritik am Dualismus lautet nun, dass die künftigen Beschreibungen *from now on* als Ergebnis einer gemeinsamen Untersuchung bereits eben dieser Untersuchung vorausgestellt werden, obwohl sie zeitlich erst *nach* dem Untersuchungsablauf auftauchen (vgl. Mitterer 2000: 85). Eine These zu widerlegen oder eine Wahrnehmungswirkung zu konstatieren, bedeutet nunmehr lediglich, dass diese jener späteren These bzw. Rezeption entgegen steht, von der aus ein Scheitern erst festgestellt werden kann (vgl. Mitterer 2011: 124). Dualistische Prüfkriterien leisten somit nicht was sie versprechen: Jeder Verweis auf das Objekt hinter der Beschreibung ist selbst eine bereits ausgeführte Beschreibung und daher ein erkenntnistheoretischer Rückschritt (vgl. Mitterer 2000: 90; vgl. auch Weber 2005: 280 f.).

### 3. Relevanz des semantischen Nondualismus für die Empirie

Die Dichotomie von Theorie und Empirie umfasst eine Dichotomie von Subjekt und Objekt einerseits und eine Dichotomie von Sprache und Welt andererseits: Im ersten Fall haben es dualistische Subjekte mit einem Forschungsobjekt zu tun. Im zweiten Fall stellen diese Subjekte ihrem empirischen Objekt zwecks Beschreibung theoretische Begriffe gegenüber.

Das Objekt der Theorie sind die Theorien *so far*. Durch Hinzutreten weiterer Theorien wird allerdings kein empirisches Ding hinter der Theorie sichtbar sondern nur noch mehr Theorie produziert. Wenn das Objekt der Theorie in der nondualistischen Rede kein empirisches Objekt ist, stellt sich die Frage, ob empirische Gegenstände im Nondualismus überhaupt noch Platz haben und bejahendefalls, ob sie mit den Beschreibungen *so far* ident sind.

Um eine prinzipielle Anwendbarkeit von Nondualismus auch in der Empirie zu prüfen, wird vor dem Hintergrund des Differenzkalküls von George Spencer-Brown eine Interpretation des Nondualismus vorgenommen: Eine weite Auslegung des Begriffs der Beschreibung erlaubt eine Identifikation mit den Begriffen der *distinction* und *indication* bei Spencer-Brown. Diesem zufolge wird Erkenntnis durch *distinctions*, nämlich sogenannte Unterscheidungsoperationen, initiiert (vgl. Spencer-Brown 1997: 1; vgl. auch Schönwälter-Kuntze 2009: 203 und Staude 2008: 232). Dies bedeutet, dass sowohl nondualistische Beschreibungen als auch empirische Objekte als Operationen und somit als Handlungen aufgefasst werden können, wodurch sich auch die Dichotomie von Subjekt und Objekt auflöst. Der höhere Abstraktionsgrad des Begriffs *distinction* erlaubt nun auch eine prinzipielle Anwendung des Nondualismus in der Theorie als auch in der Empirie, weil die Unterscheidungsoperationen ausschließlich Handlungscharakter voraussetzen; etwa in Form von Beschreibungshandlungen, Reflexionshandlungen oder Rezeptionshandlungen. In einem differenzlogisch interpretierten Nondualismus stehen Aussagen, Rezeptionen und Handlungen einander nicht mehr im Referenzverhältnis gegenüber. Sprachen beschreiben keine Aktivitäten, vielmehr *sind* sie diese Aktivitäten (vgl. Strawson 1949: 95). Eine etwaige Sprachverschiedenheit von Handlungen kann *de facto* auch nur innerhalb eines Sprachkontextes proklamiert werden (vgl. Weber 2005: 260). Dadurch ergibt sich ein performativ gebrauchter Wahrheitsbegriff, der zwar Zu-

stimmung oder Ablehnung auszudrücken vermag, aber keine erkenntnisrelevante Aussagekraft mehr besitzt.

Wenn empirische Messungen keine Position außerhalb der Sprache mehr beanspruchen können, dann bleibt trotz Bejahung einer prinzipiellen Anwendbarkeit des Nondualismus in der Empirie weiterhin die Frage offen, welche Bedeutung die semantische Ausprägung des Nondualismus Mitterers für die empirische Forschung hat. In einer differenzlogischen Interpretation von Nondualismus wären nicht nur Beschreibungshandlungen sondern auch Rezeptionshandlungen Unterscheidungsoperationen der Erkenntnis, sofern sie nur als Handlungen aufgefasst werden: Das Objekt der Erfahrung wäre somit die Erfahrung *so far*. Dieser Interpretation zufolge stellt Mitterers nondualistische Rede lediglich einen semantischen Spezialfall des Nondualismus dar, wobei hier die sprachlichen Beschreibungshandlungen in den Vordergrund treten, sodass die Annahme berechtigt ist, dass im semantischen Nondualismus die empirische Welt gewissermaßen in Sprache aufgelassen wird, nämlich in Form von Beschreibungen *so far*.

Daraus leitet sich nun unmittelbar die Kritik ab, dass sprachliche Beschreibungen an keine empirische Beobachtungen mehr anschließen können. Streng genommen spricht die nondualistische Rede auch gar nicht über empirische Gegenstände sondern über Beschreibungen *so far*, sodass sie kein Argument gegen die Dinghaftigkeit von Gegenständen liefert: Sie setzt lediglich Beschreibungen *so far* in Beschreibungen *from now on* fort, ohne über sie hinauszugehen. Das empirische Objekt sind die empirischen Rezeptionen *so far*, sodass Rezeptionen keine Thesen referenztheoretisch prüfen, weil jede Überprüfung nur im Rahmen weiterer Rezeptionen erfolgen kann. Ein Querverweis zwischen Beschreibungen und Rezeptionen ist nicht möglich. Der konsequente Schluss aus dieser Kritik ist, dass der semantische Nondualismus keine Relevanz für die empirische Forschung haben kann (vgl. Müller 2010: 167). Für den semantischen Nondualismus läuft diese Kritik allerdings ins Leere, weil sie von einer (empirischen) Position vertreten wird, die ohnehin keinen Platz in der nondualistischen Rede hat.

### 4. Nondualistische Erfahrungstheorie

Der semantische Ansatz des Nondualismus löst die Kluft zwischen Sprache und Empirie, indem er die Empirie in einen sprachlichen Kontextbettet. Dadurch werden empirische Untersuchungshandlungen gewissermaßen in theoretische Beschreibungshandlungen aufgelöst und die Empirie gibt ihre Eigenständigkeit auf. Nun müsste im Rahmen der differenzlogischen Auslegung des Nondualismus auch der umgekehrte Ansatz eines empirischen Nondualismus möglich sein. Eine solche Alternative legitimiert sich dadurch, dass der semantische Nondualismus nichts über eine sprachverschiedene empirische Welt sagen kann und hiermit die Frage gestellt werden muss, woher die nondualistische Rede ihre Informationen für neue Beschreibungsgehalte erhält, wenn neue Beschreibungen einzig der Sprache entspringen und an Sprache anschließen (Ofner 2010: 66).

Als Pendant zur nondualistischen Rede wird nun Franz Ofners nondualistische Erfahrungstheorie – im Folgenden empirischer Nondualismus – vorgestellt. Ofner schlägt den spiegelverkehrten Weg einer Einlassung der Sprache in die Empirie ein: Der nondualistische Begriff der Beschreibung erfährt in Anlehnung an George Herbert Meads Gesttentheorie der Sprache eine Umwandlung in sogenannte *vocal gestures* bzw. sprachliche Gesten. Dadurch bilden

empirische Untersuchungshandlungen die Grundlage für Beschreibungen (vgl. Mead 1912: 402 f und Mead 1931: 42ff; vgl. auch Ofner 2010: 72). Sprachliche Äußerungen bilden keine eigenständige Instanz mehr, sondern fungieren als Handlungsmomente der Erfahrung: Handlungsmomente deshalb, weil Sprache nicht mit einer bereits ausgeführten sondern mit einer erst angebrochenen Handlung identifiziert wird. Die Theorie beschreibt folglich keine empirische Welt; vielmehr ist sie ein Teil der Erfahrungshandlung und zwar die Einleitungsphase einer Erfahrungshandlung (vgl. Ofner 2010: 75). Unter solchen Initialhandlungen sind insbesondere theoretische Begriffe und Vorstellungen zu subsumieren; sogenannte potentielle oder vorgestellte Handlungen. Durch Sprache werden frühere vorgestellte Erfahrungshandlungen initiiert, die durch Hinzukommen sinnlicher Rezeptionshandlungen vollständig ausgeführt werden (vgl. Ofner 2010: 72 f). Das bedeutet, dass (reflexive) Erfahrungen im Rahmen der eingeleiteten Handlung und sinnliche Erfahrungen, die bei Handlungsausführungen gemacht werden, nicht mehr kategorial voneinander verschieden sind: Sowohl Sprachhandlungen als auch Erfahrungshandlungen sind nunmehr Erfahrungsmodi, die sich einzig in ihrem zeitlichen Vorher-nachher-Verhältnis voneinander unterscheiden (vgl. Ofner 2010: 73).

Sprache wird aufgrund ihres Handlungscharakters in Erfahrungshandlungen aufgelassen, verliert ihre Autonomie und erfährt in ihrer neuen Rolle als Erfahrungsmedium eine materialistische Prägung (vgl. Ofner 2010: 75). Daraus folgt, dass die Irrelevanz der nondualistischen Sprache für die Empirie im Umkehrschluss auch eine Irrelevanz der nondualistischen Erfahrung für die Theorie verlangt. Wenn aber die Sprache ihre Eigenständigkeit verliert und zu einem potentiellen, reflexiven Erfahrungsmoment gemacht wird, dann drohen die Erfahrungshandlungen ihre Aussagekraft zu verlieren.

## 5. Dichotomie von Entdichotomisierungen

Am Ende der Auseinandersetzung mit dem semantischen und dem empirischen Nondualismus werden die Parallelen zwischen beiden sichtbar: Mitterers Begriff der Beschreibung *so far* kann als Analogon zum Begriff der Initialhandlung bei Ofner gesehen werden. Im semantischen Nondualismus wird der kategoriale Unterschied zwischen Sprache und Welt von einem zeitlichen Unterschied zwischen bereits ausgeführten Beschreibungen *so far* und weitergehenden Beschreibungen *from now on* abgelöst. Im empirischen Nondualismus wird der kategoriale Unterschied zwischen Sprache und Erfahrung auf einen zeitlichen Unterschied zwischen Initialhandlungen und Handlungsausführungen zurückgeführt: Theoretische Konzepte sind nicht mehr Gegenstand der Empirie sondern nur mehr ihr zeitliches Einleitungsmoment.

Abschließend kann die Feststellung gemacht werden, dass das Objekt des semantischen Nondualismus ein Objekt der Beschreibung ist und nicht der empirischen Welt. Beschreibungen *so far* können nichts über empirische Gegenstände sagen, nicht einmal ihre Existenz verneinen. Das Objekt des empirischen Nondualismus dagegen kann keine These sein, weil die Sprache selbst zu einem Modus der Erfahrung erklärt wird. Daraus folgt, dass Beschreibungshandlungen des semantischen Nondualismus nicht an Erfahrungshandlungen des empirischen Nondualismus anschließen können und vice versa, weil es nicht möglich ist in beiden zueinander querstehenden Systemen gleichzeitig zu sein. Die Empirie nimmt für semantische NondualistInnen dieselbe irrelevante Position einer *black box* ein

wie die Theorie für empirische NondualistInnen. Querverweise zwischen nondualistischen Beschreibungen und nondualistischen Erfahrungen sind nicht möglich.

Zusammenfassend kann festgehalten werden, dass semantische und empirische Entdichotomisierungen von Sprache und Welt parallel verlaufende Zugänge sind: Einerseits löst die nondualistische Rede Mitterers bei EmpirikerInnen die Kritik aus, dass sie keine Relevanz für die empirische Forschung hat. Andererseits identifiziert der empirische Nondualismus bei Ofner die Theorien mit *Gesten*, die lediglich weitere Erfahrungshandlungen einleiten. Es liegt daher die Vermutung nahe, dass beide Arten von Entdichotomisierungen im Verhältnis zueinander erneut eine Dichotomie aufspannen: Sie spiegeln die Struktur jener Dichotomie wieder, die sie ursprünglich zu entdichotomisieren beabsichtigten.

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# „The History of Editing Wittgenstein’s Nachlass“ – Die erste Runde der Nachlassedierung als interdisziplinäres Forschungsprojekt und Geschichte eines philosophischen Erbes

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## 1. Neues Quellenmaterial zur „ersten Runde“ der Nachlassedierung

Die Veröffentlichung des zweiten Bandes der *Letzten Schriften über die Philosophie der Psychologie* (Blackwell 1992, Suhrkamp 1993) vollendet laut G.H. von Wright die „erste Runde“ der Edierung von Wittgensteins Nachlass (von Wright, 2001: 163). Diesem Einordnungsvorschlag möchte ich folgen und die von den Nachlassverwaltern G.E.M. Anscombe, R. Rhees und G.H. von Wright besorgten Ausgaben als die „erste Runde der Nachlassedierung“ bezeichnen. Davon lassen sich andere Editionsprojekte abgrenzen, und zwar vor allem die großen Projekte zu einer Gesamtausgabe und zu kritischen bzw. kritisch-genetischen Ausgaben. Als wesentliche Meilensteine dieser weiteren „Runden“ zählen somit insbesondere (in chronologischer Reihenfolge, für eine Gesamtübersicht der Wittgenstein-Ausgaben siehe: Pichler/Biggs/Szeltner, 2011): die *kritische Edition* der *Logisch-philosophischen Abhandlung* (Suhrkamp 1989), die erschienenen Bände der *Wiener Ausgabe* (Springer, ab 1994), die *Bergen Electronic Edition* (OUP, 2000) und die *kritisch genetische Edition* der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* (Suhrkamp, 2001).

Das „Wittgenstein und von Wright Archiv an der Universität von Helsinki“ (WWA) macht eine umfangreiche Sammlung von Dokumenten im Zusammenhang mit der ersten Runde der Nachlassedierung zugänglich (Wallgren/Österman 2010; Erbacher 2010). Das ist unter anderem von Interesse, weil editorische Maßnahmen der verschiedenen Wittgenstein-Ausgaben immer wieder fachlich (vgl. z.B. Kenny 1976; Hintikka 1991; Rhees 1996) öffentlich (z.B. Spiegel 1993; Nenning 1994; Wang 2004) diskutiert worden sind. Die Dokumente am WWA erlauben erstmals eine historische Rekonstruktion von philosophischen und nicht-philosophischen Gründen der ersten Edierungsrunde.

Im Folgenden möchte ich skizzieren, welche Herausforderungen und Hoffnungen sich mit der Erforschung der Geschichte der ersten Runde der Nachlassedierung verbinden können. Ich versuche, ein solches Forschungsprojekt durch interdisziplinäre Bezüge in der akademischen Landschaft zu verorten. Der Einfachheit halber nenne ich das Projekt zur „Geschichte der ersten Runde der Edierung von Wittgensteins Nachlass“ abgekürzt GEN-1. Beginnen möchte ich die Verortung mit einem thematischen Trend, den ich im philosophischen Diskurs wahrnehme.

## 2. Medien des Philosophierens

Zwei miteinander verbundene Themenkomplexe scheinen mir seit einiger Zeit verstärkt diskutiert zu werden: die Verständigung über die Darstellungsmittel der Philosophie und die Frage nach der „Exteriorität“ des Denkens (um einen Ausdruck zu verwenden, den ich Sybille Krämer verdanke, vgl. Krämer 2005, 2009).

Die Reflexion über Darstellungsmittel der Philosophie drückt sich in einem verstärkten Interesse an der literarischen Dimension philosophischer Texte aus. Beispielhaft möchte ich hier Gottfried Gabrels Forschungen zur non-propositionalen Erkenntnis und literarischen Formen der Philosophie (z.B. Gabriel 1990) nennen sowie Dieter Henrichs Vorschlag zu einer Literaturgeschichte der Philosophie (Henrich 2011). Als Wittgenstein-Forscher ist uns dieses Bedenken der Darstellungsform in ihrer grundsätzlichen Bedeutung für das Philosophieren wohl vertraut: die Frage nach den Darstellungsmitteln geht selbstverständlich über eine oberflächliche Literarisierung der Philosophie hinaus. Sie schließt in einer sprachphilosophisch ernsten Auseinandersetzung z.B. auch die Reflexion über logische Notation und in neuester Zeit Medien wie Film oder digitale Kommunikationsmittel in ihrer Bedeutung für das Denken mit ein. Um diese neuen Darstellungsmittel einzubeziehen möchte ich von „Medien der Philosophie“ sprechen.

Die sprachphilosophische Reflexion über Medien der Philosophie, zumal von Wittgenstein'scher Provenienz, findet nicht an der Peripherie des Philosophierens statt. Sie bedeutet eine Erforschung der philosophischen Methoden und letztlich die Erforschung des Denkens selbst. Das gilt insbesondere in Verbindung mit einem „exterioren“ und „operativen“ Verständnis des Denkens. Von einem solchen möchte ich sprechen, wenn wir unter Denken ein Operieren mit Zeichen bzw. Bildern verstehen. Dieses Verständnis grenzt sich vor allem ab von einer Auffassung, Gedanken seien geheimnisvoll im Kopfe vorhandene Inhalte und deren Darstellung lediglich verschiedene Hüllen. Die technischen Entwicklungen unserer Zeit laden besonders zu einer selbstreflexiven Neubestimmung des Denkens in dieser Hinsicht ein.

Auch ein Projekt wie GEN-1 nimmt diese Einladungen zur Reflexion über Medien und Orte des Denkens an. GEN-1 hat offenbar das Medium „Buch“ im Blick, und zwar im speziellen Format der Edierung von vererbten Schriften. Dieses Zielformat macht einen wesentlichen, aber häufig vernachlässigten, Aspekt von Medien des Philosophierens deutlich: nämlich die Funktion zur Weitergabe und Empfangnis von Gedanken. Anders als andere formorientierte Forschungen, die sich mit dem Werden eines Werkes unter den Händen des Autors beschäftigen (z.B. mit Wittgensteins Schreibprozessen wie Pichler 2004, mit „Kreation und Komposition“ wie Rothaupt 2008), steht bei GEN-1 die Bearbeitung von empfangenen Gedanken im Vordergrund. Die Leitfrage: „welches Denken zeigen die Schriften eines Autors?“ wird zu den Fragen: „wie und warum entstanden bestimmte Editions-Konzeptionen und welche Bilder des Denkens bewirkten sie?“

### 3. GEN-1 ist eine Editionsgeschichte im weiteren Sinn

Mit diesen Leitfragen rückt GEN-1 in die Nähe der Editionswissenschaften. Es liegt nahe, GEN-1 als Editionsgeschichte zu bezeichnen. Allerdings handelt es sich um eine spezielle Editionsgeschichte.

Die vornehme Aufgabe der Editionswissenschaften ist die Entwicklung von Methoden und praktischen Verfahren zur Rekonstruktion der Entstehung von Texten in ihren Stufen und Varianten sowie die Herstellung von einem „authentischen Text in seiner historischen Gestalt“ (vgl. Plachta 2006: 8). Demnach hätten hauptsächlich die Editoren der auf die erste Runde folgenden Ausgaben ein verstärktes Interesse an den Editionswissenschaften. Sie sorgen sich ja um Ausgaben, die die Textgenese transparent machen sollen. Für GEN-1 ist das nicht das Hauptanliegen. Für GEN-1 geht es vielmehr um die Frage, wie aus Wittgensteins unautorisierten Originaldokumenten Bücher wurden und was diese bewirkten. Dieses Interesse ist uns von großen Büchern unserer religiösen und philosophischen Tradition bekannt. Ich denke an die Evangelien oder die Platonischen Dialoge. Auch hier liegen keine autorisierten Werke vor, sondern postume Editionen von Nachfolgern, Schülern und Verehrern. Ohne nun eine Reihe aus Jesus, Sokrates und Wittgenstein bilden zu wollen, so lassen diese Vergleichsobjekte doch interessante Strukturen erkennen. Es wundert daher auch nicht, dass wir bei einer Erforschung der Editionsgeschichte von Wittgensteins Nachlass zunächst an Textkritik und an die Frage nach der Authentizität der posthumen Editionen denken. Textkritische Auseinandersetzungen, also der kritische Vergleich der Editionen mit den Originalmanuskripten und -typoskripten, fanden auch um die Ausgaben der ersten Runde der Nachlassedierung statt (Kenny 1976; Rhee 1996; Gstöhl 2011). In Textkritik erschöpft sich meines Erachtens das Interesse an GEN-1 aber nicht.

Die Feststellung von Abweichungen vom Original durch editorische Entscheidungen ist wichtig. Für eine Editionsgeschichte im weiteren Sinn geben editorische Maßnahmen aber sozusagen erst einen Anlass für weitergehende Fragen nach Gründen und Motiven der Editoren. Eine Geschichte, die in diesem Sinn nach dem „warum?“ fragt, hat nicht ausschließlich die Editionen vor Augen, sondern erzählt die menschliche und philosophische Geschichte, die sich um die Edierung rankt: die Entstehung von Editionen wird im Kraftfeld ihrer philosophischen, historisch-sozialen und persönlichen Motive beschrieben. Eine solche Geschichte kann auch die Wirkungen der Editionen auf die Rezeption einschließen und gegenwärtige Editionsprojekte informieren. Ein Projekt wie GEN-1 ist also nicht nur Beschreibung der Entstehung von Editionen, sondern auch Reflexion ihrer Gründe und Wirkungen. Eine solche „Editionsphilosophie“ empfängt nicht nur von den Editionswissenschaften, sondern kann sie u.U. in aktuellen Fragen begleiten und in sie zurückwirken (vgl. Plachta 2006, Kap. 10).

### 4. GEN-1 ist eine medienmotivierte Episode der Philosophiegeschichte

Die Geschichte der Edierung von Wittgensteins Nachlass in diesem weiteren Sinn ist nicht nur eine philosophische Episode der Editionsgeschichte, sondern auch eine editorische Episode in der Philosophiegeschichte. Sie ist die Geschichte eines philosophischen Erbes, die am roten Faden der Textentstehung und -bearbeitung erzählt wird. Diese Konzentration auf die Edierung macht GEN-1 allerdings zu einer speziellen Philosophiegeschichte. Es ist

ungeöhnlich die Motivkräfte, die auf die Herstellung einer Edition gewirkt haben, als Ausgangspunkt für die Geschichte eines philosophischen Erbes zu wählen. Dieser Ausgangspunkt wird allerdings im Rahmen der eingangs erwähnten Selbstreflexion des Denkens über seine Medien und Orte auch philosophisch verständlich. Die Medienorientierung lässt die Geschichte der Weitergabe und Empfangnis von Gedanken als eine Geschichte der Weitergabe und Empfangnis von Texten sehen. GEN-1 könnte Prozesse einer so verstandenen „philosophischen Vererbung“ studierbar machen.

Für die Beschreibung dieser Prozesse philosophischer Vererbung ist allerdings eine besondere Quellenlage erforderlich. Die Dokumente am WWA in Helsinki bieten eine solche Quellenlage. Die umfangreiche Sammlung des WWA enthält z.B. den Briefverkehr zwischen den Nachlassverwaltern Anscombe, Rhees und von Wright. Darüberhinaus ist auch der Austausch mit Zeitzeugen und Verwandten Wittgensteins, mit Forschern, anderen Editionsprojekten und Vertretern von Interessengruppen wie Verlegern im WWA dokumentiert. Die Fülle an Material verspricht eine breite Ausgangsbasis für eine Beschreibung der Überlegungen und Motive, die die Herausgeber von Wittgensteins Nachlass in der Zeit der ersten Edierungsrunde bewogen haben. Damit rückt GEN-1 in die Nähe eines Genres der Geschichtsschreibung der Philosophie, die man in Anlehnung an eine Typologie Richard Rortys (1984) „intellectual history“ nennen könnte. „Intellectual History“ konstruiert kein „monumentalistisches Geistergespräch“ zwischen Genies und über Jahrtausende hinweg, sondern beschreibt, „was Intellektuelle zu einer bestimmten Zeit bewegte und wie sie mit dem Rest ihrer Gesellschaft interagierten“ (Rorty 1984: 68, eigene Übersetzung). In diesem Sinn geht es bei GEN-1 darum zu erzählen, was die Edierung von Wittgensteins Schriften für die Herausgeber bedeutete. Die Geschichte der Textbearbeitung ist eingebettet in eine historische Gesprächslage und diese gilt es zu vergegenwärtigen.

Die Beschreibung einer Zeit- und Gesprächslage unter Verwendung einer dichten Dokumentation mit dem Ziel das Kraftfeld von Motiven in einem außergewöhnlichen Moment in der Philosophiegeschichte zu verstehen, ist auch ein zentrales Kennzeichen von Dieter Henrichs „Konstellationsforschung“ (Henrich 1991, 2004). Freilich: Die Gruppe der Verwalter von Wittgensteins Nachlass lässt sich nicht als „Konstellation“ in Henrichs spezifizierten Sinn interpretieren (vgl. Henrich 2005). Dieser Begriff wurde entwickelt, um die außerordentlichen und kontroversen Wechselwirkungen zu bezeichnen, die den Entwicklungsgang der nachkantischen Philosophie hin zum Idealismus bestimmten. Henrichs Konstellationsforschung kann GEN-1 dennoch als Vorbild dienen. Denn in beiden Fällen steht zu Erforschung eine soziale Gruppierung, die sich durch einen massiven philosophischen Impuls konstituiert (in Henrichs Fall die Kantische Philosophie, bei GEN-1: Wittgensteins Philosophie). Die dabei entstehenden philosophischen Texte können als Manifestationen von Verständigungsprozessen zur Bewältigung eben dieses Impulses verstanden werden. Die Gemeinsamkeit der Konstellationsforschung und GEN-1 besteht nun in der Fokussierung auf diese Verständigungsprozesse. Damit rückt das Projekt offenbar auch in eine hermeneutische Tradition (vgl. Frank 2005). Dank der Quellenlage kann GEN-1 bei der Rekonstruktion von Verständigungsprozessen im Zusammenhang mit der Edierung von Wittgensteins Nachlass vielfältige gesellschaftliche, wirtschaftliche, technische und psychologische Motive ausmachen. Die stärkere Einbeziehung solcher Motivkräfte wurde als Desiderat bei möglichen Adaptionen der Konstellationsfor-

schung herausgestellt (vgl. Franks 2005; Muslow 2005; Rush 2005).

## 5. Zur Philosophie von GEN-1

Es gehört zu den Besonderheiten der Geschichtsschreibung der Philosophie, dass der Forscher in seinen Quellen mit Geltungsansprüchen konfrontiert wird, zu denen er sich verhalten muss. In dieser Rolle ist er nicht Historiker, sondern Philosoph. Wenn GEN-1 Argumente für Umgangsweisen mit dem philosophischen Erbe Wittgensteins thematisiert, so muss das Projekt auch sein Verhältnis zu diesem Erbe und den verhandelten Editions-Konzeptionen bestimmen. Meiner Ansicht nach ist das Projekt, wie ich es hier skizziert habe, dazu in der Lage. Allerdings wären argumentkritische Reflexionen der krönende Abschluss dieser Geschichte von Wittgensteins philosophischem Nachlass. Einen Anfang habe ich mit diesem Beitrag zu machen versucht.

Ich möchte abschließend festhalten: Ein Projekt wie GEN-1 ragt in viele Themenfelder und Wissengebiete hinein. Es nimmt aktuelle Fragen an die Philosophie auf und führt diese weiter. Die Realisierung eines solchen Projektes verlangt neue Formen der interdisziplinären Kooperation. Ich hoffe, dass „philosophische Archive“, in denen nicht nur geerbte Papiere, sondern auch geerbtes Denken gepflegt wird (vgl. Erbacher 2011), zu geisteswissenschaftlichen Forschungsinfrastrukturen werden, die dem philosophischen Vererben einen Ort geben.

Danksagung: Dieser Text macht Gebrauch von zwei Pilotstudien, die mit Unterstützung von Nordforsk im Programm „Joint Nordic Use of WAB Bergen and WWA Helsinki“ in den Jahren 2010 und 2011 durchgeführt worden sind; das Projekt „The History of Editing Wittgenstein's Nachlass“ wird 2012 und 2013 mit Förderung der Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung und der Academy of Finland systematisiert und soll mit Finanzierung des Norwegischen Forschungsrats (Forskningsrådet) als „Shaping a domain of knowledge by editorial processing: the case of editing Wittgenstein's Nachlass“ in einem Kooperationsverbund bis 2015 ausgeführt werden. Besonderer Dank für alle genannten Stufen des Projekts gilt „The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen“ (WAB) und „The Wittgenstein and von Wright Archives at the University of Helsinki“ (WWA).

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# Autophilosophy – The Wittgenstein Case

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## Introduction

What do Socrates, Shankara, Maimonides, Pierre Bayle and Wittgenstein have in common? They are all autophilo-sophers. For them, philosophy on all its aspects is not just another activity among all other activities but, rather, a horizon for all aspects of life. All ideas and activities, including those that make up everyday lives, are examined by it. A clear example of the close connection between these components can be found in Indian Philosophy, in which the basic assumption is that the life of a true philosopher is a living example of his thought. This guiding principle gives philosophy a religious lineament. It can be said that an autophilosopher is a philosophical man. His behavior resembles that of a man who makes a vow and that undertaking is what gives purpose and meaning to his life. That, for example, is how Socrates, Buddha and Augustine acted. Autophilosophy has three aspects: consistency, thought and action, which together constitute one whole. The autophilosophical genre aims to differentiate itself from philosophical biography and philosophical autobiography in that it recognizes the philosopher and the philosophy as a whole.

## Biography/autobiography and autophilosophy

From a conceptual point of view, the writings belonging to the literary genres of biography/autobiography differ on a number of points: the author, the subject of the study and the areas of content, as well as the relationship between these focal points and the manner in which they are presented. The genres biography, autobiography, philosophical biography and philosophical autobiography involve two to four centers. While in autophilosophy, all the distinctions between the philosopher, his work and his life are eliminated. The philosopher writes philosophy and implements it in his life as he externalizes his point of view through speech, writing and behavior – in a steadily strict fashion. In this genre, all the essay components seem to be compressed into only center: the philosopher's world.

## Autophilosophy – characteristics

Three indicators are formulated to identify this type of philosophy:

Structure – a feedback relationship exists, starting with the worldview, through meta-philosophy, on to philosophy as a doctrine, and from there to the application of the philosophical doctrine in everyday life, then back to the worldview.

Enabling condition – at least at one stage in his philosophical life, the philosopher experiences transformation, which awakens him to his obligation towards his philosophical standpoints. As a result, a "philosophical pact" is made, which lists the vows for his philosophical path. The nature of this event is ethical, and the pact fuels the enthusiasm of the philosopher to adhere to his philosophical obligation to life and in life.

Consequences – day to day life and intellectual life are awarded equal value and weight; everyday life is the exemplification of thought and the structure of thought is based on action.

A cyclical feeding and flow differentiates between the four factors of the structure. It points to the clear relationships between the various parts – a cyclical order with a direction. The content of each factor is the organizing element of the next factor in line, according to their predetermined order in the cycle. Balance between daily life and a life of thought is an actualization of what was defined, formulated and comprehended in the intellectual dimension. Putting it into practice is accelerated by the occurrence of transformation, which encourages the commitment to cohesion between the intellectual and the practical.

## Rationality and transformation

The core of the autophilosophical process is a discussion of rationality and its enabling conditions, and is connected to the upheaval event the philosopher experienced, like those that occurred to Augustine and Descartes. What was revealed to the philosopher in a conversion becomes fixed in the process of self inquiry down to transformation, which is the realization of the change that takes place in him as expressed in his way of being in the world. The process of self inquiry makes it possible to clarify the basic assumptions and beliefs and begins with making the distinction between rational and irrational, but divides the irrational into two: post-rational and pre-rational. This reveals the connection between rationality, the boundaries of thought and ethics as expressed in the unraveling of the self and the adoption of the linguistic demarcation.

The philosopher is not satisfied with linguistic demarcation as a conclusion and he values its realization. The exposure to the distinction between rationality and what enables it, instills a sense of security and protection from any kind of arbitrary thought because of the ability to ascribe it to its rightful place. The philosopher, to whom this idea is clear, unmistakably distinguishes between what may be spoken of and about what to remain silent. At this point, rationality provides purpose and not only reason. As far as the autophilosopher is concerned, thinking correctly, means to be independent, free and thus a better person; in this way the gap between thought and action is closed.

## The uniqueness of autophilosophical reading

The autophilosopher undertakes to guide his readers how to read his philosophy, while the readers surrender to his guidance and undertake to read his work punctiliously. This reading is based on the criteria that the philosopher himself would want him and his philosophy to be assessed by. Thus, the reader is exposed to the consistency-thought-action principle that is evident in the autophilosopher's activity. This principle is implemented in the way in which the autophilosopher thinks about what he believes,

believes in what he thinks and acts according to the conclusions that arise from the thinking process.

Certain aspects of the philosopher's life and writings that may have seemed puzzling will cease to appear so from the standpoint of autophilosophy. It helps present a less contrived interpretation, which is more precise, harmonious and lucid. The result is improved understanding of the pious philosopher while receiving a more precise interpretation of his philosophy; the philosopher and the philosophy enlighten one another.

### **Wittgenstein is an autophilosopher**

I hear a melody completely differently after I have become familiar with its composer's style.  
(Wittgenstein 1982)

### **Worldview**

Wittgenstein organizes his conduct around two ideas that are the core of his worldview. One of them pertains to the ethical content of how he should behave: sincerely, truthfully, fruitfully productive and firmly stand up to the challenges life presents him with. The other idea is intended to demarcate man's boundary in the world. Thoughts about what exists beyond life occupied Wittgenstein's mind and led him to set the boundaries of his world: to the place man is neither able nor wishes to go – "there the world does not exist" – what is real is what we do not give a thought to. For his part, it is not enough to implement the principles in a state of wakefulness; they must be implemented in all states of consciousness.

Apparently, the tension between aspiring to find the a-priori order and the fact that we are unable to place our finger on such order has left its imprint on most of Wittgenstein's philosophical activity:

The great problem round which everything that I write turns is:  
Is there an order in the world a priori, and if so what does it consist in?  
You are looking into fog and for that reason persuade yourself that the goal is already close. But the fog disperses and the goal is not yet in sight. (Wittgenstein 1969)

The yearning to find the a-priori order is converted into an aspiration for clarity of thought and the motivation for this yearning. Thus, the tension lessens with the acceptance of the dimensions, which cannot be ordered, just as they are.

For Wittgenstein, clarity of thought and the right to life are intertwined. Deepened investigation brings with it clarity of thought and this life is worthwhile; to this, Wittgenstein awards comparable status. He is certain that if he can think clearly he will be able to solve the problems of logic facing him; if not, he is not worthy of life:

I wish to God that I were more intelligent and everything would finally become clear to me – or else that I needn't live much longer. (Wittgenstein 1974)

### **Meta-philosophy**

In Wittgenstein's opinion, the role of philosophy is to make distinctions without interfering in the results of those distinctions. He knows that this goal cannot be completely achieved but it is not enough to deter him from continuing

to present the difficulty and the best way to reach the most accurate measurement possible.

Another difficulty in philosophical work is willful resistance. Willful resistance is emotional and not intellectual because it requires us to cease an activity we have become accustomed to. Wittgenstein finds that people stop the investigative process too early because they feel themselves flung into the heart of chaos. When dealing with philosophy, it is absolutely essential to make a consistent effort to continue thinking:

To say, when they are at work, "Let's have done with it now", is a physical need for human beings; it is the constant necessity when you are philosophizing to go on thinking in the face of this need that makes this such strenuous work. (Wittgenstein 1984)

It may seem as if Wittgenstein is striving for two conflicting forces: to desist and persist. But the instruction to desist refers to erroneous use, while the instruction to persist relates to thinking persistence. The source of this persistence is the security of demarcating areas: rational, post-rational and pre-rational, and the writings, *Tractatus*, *Philosophical Investigations* and *On Certainty* may be applied to them accordingly.

If so, philosophical activity has two aspects: dynamic and static. The dynamic aspect is observation and clarification whose result, the static aspect, is the barrier erected between what may be said and what may not be said.

### **Three aspects of philosophy**

Wittgenstein's three principal writings reflect the three aspects of philosophy as they echo the changes that took place in his thinking over the years. He exchanged the viewpoint of the "Judge" with that of the "Witness" and ended up in the "knower" position – the "Law". While in early philosophy, the question that guided the ethical investigation was, "What am I permitted to say?", to which he answered out of the permitted-forbidden, yes-no dichotomy – in the later philosophy, the guiding question was, "How do I say it?", which he answered with a description of the various manners of use. While the judge's discourse is logical, that of the witness is anthropological. In time, during the last years of his life and nearing his death, he underwent a further transformation related to the radicalization of his thought pattern and his authoritative stand and its results are visible in *On Certainty*.

The degree of resemblance of the philosophy from the three periods can be seen in the following sentences:

All philosophy is a 'critique of language'. (Wittgenstein 1933)  
Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. (Wittgenstein 1968)  
The propositions which one comes back to again and again as if bewitched—these I should like to expunge from philosophical language. (Wittgenstein 1972)

From these sentences, it is evident that Wittgenstein applies his meta-philosophy in philosophy. In each period, philosophy always fills the same function: clarification of the proper use of language and standing by the value of this clarification. In spite of the exchange of theories of meaning and the changes in philosophical style it shows once again, Wittgenstein's deep commitment to the cohesion between obligation and realization in philosophical activity.

## Philosophy in life

Wittgenstein wrote to Engelmann in 1917:

I [...] wish I were a better man and had a better mind. These two things are really one and the same. (Engelmann 1968)

From this letter we learn of the thought-activity coherence. To this end, he was aided by logic and grammar, thus eliminating the separation between logic and ethics.

Wittgenstein's worldview changed following the upheavals he experienced. His self inquiry, part of which is recorded in his notebooks from 1914-1916, contributed to the change in his being in the world. Understanding the quality of the transformation illuminates the essence of the irrevocable change that took place in Wittgenstein's soul and the change that occurred in his philosophy from the "Judge" stage to the "Witness" stage and later to the stage of the authority.

Biophilosophical cyclicity is reflected in Wittgenstein's unique style of writing, since the autophilosopher writes his philosophy under meta-philosophical dictates and implements the philosophical content through his meticulous style, which in turn, displays the self identity in its new meaning; at the same time, the reflexive process is also depicted in while writing.

The application of standpoints regarding the role of philosophy is the backdrop that makes it possible to understand the separation from Russell, which was not the result of a caprice but was based on irreconcilable differences regarding the role of philosophy in guiding behavior patterns. In Wittgenstein's philosophy, this separation is presented as an incident in which the personal and ethical dimension of philosophy is emphasized and also demonstrates the connection between the different layers of autophilosophy.

## Religious priest, artist and autophilosopher

The autophilosopher is both the researcher and the subject of the investigation – the philosopher and the philosophy. The deed was not done for the sake of any achievement but, because it was the right way to think and to act.

By grouping autophilosophers together, a few of which are mentioned here and have no apparent connection between them, helps to illuminate the lives and thoughts of those group members. The methodological and interpretive tool – autophilosophy – makes it possible to find additional autophilosophers of lesser and greater renown. And so it is that a category has been added to single out the people that can not be separated from their occupation: not only the priest and the artist but also the autophilosopher.

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# Intergenerationelle Gerechtigkeit und das Nicht-Identitäts-Problem

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## 1 Einleitung

Ein Problem der Ethik, speziell im Bereich der intergenerationalen Gerechtigkeit, ist die Frage nach der Richtigkeit der folgenden These:

*These 1.* Mindestens eine Person der Gegenwart hat gegenüber mindestens einer Person der Zukunft ethische Verantwortung.

In vielen ethischen Theorien zur intergenerationalen Gerechtigkeit wird versucht, These 1 zu begründen. Als besonders nützlich erweisen sich dabei personenbezogene Ansätze der Ethik. Das sind, kurz erläutert, Theorien, in denen das Grundprinzip gilt: Jede ethisch gute oder schlechte Handlung ist ethisch gut oder schlecht für jemanden. Ein Einwand gegen dieses Grundprinzip ist das sogenannte „Nicht-Identitäts-Problem“. Etwas verkürzt ausgedrückt besagt es Folgendes: Wenn dieses Grundprinzip stimmt, dann sind bestimmte Handlungen, die notwendig dafür sind, dass eine Person lebt, schlecht für diese Person; dies, obwohl intuitiv solche Handlungen als ethisch gut für diese Person bewertet werden – würde diese Person doch ohne Ausführung dieser Handlungen nicht leben. Wir werden im Folgenden eine Begründung von These 1 und das eben genannte Nicht-Identitäts-Problem beschreiben (Abschnitt 2) und anschließend durch genaue Analyse von Beispielen und zugrundeliegenden Prinzipien das Nicht-Identitäts-Problem zu entkräften versuchen (Abschnitt 3 und 4).

*Literatur.* Ein Überblick zur ethischen Diskussion von These 1 mit umfangreicher Verweisliteratur zu vielen Detailproblemen findet sich in (Meyer 2008). Das vorausgesetzte modallogische System ist der aussagenlogische Teil einer multimodalen a.d.1-Logik, beschrieben in z.B. (Schurz 1997: 42ff), mit den Axiomen *D* und *T*.

## 2 Das Nicht-Identitäts-Problem

Was es heißt, dass eine Person Verantwortung gegenüber jemandem hat, wollen wir größtenteils ungeklärt lassen. Nur soviel setzen wir voraus: Wenn eine Handlung einer Person ethisch schlecht für eine Person ist, dann hat mindestens eine Person ethische Verantwortung gegenüber der geschädigten Person. Formal ausgedrückt lautet das Prinzip folgenderweise (*Principle Of Responsibility*):

(POR).  $\forall x(Bxp \rightarrow \exists y\text{Resp}(y,x))$

Innerhalb der Ethik sind jene Theorien zur Begründung von These 1 weit verbreitet, die personenbezogene Ansätze sind. Ein Merkmal von solchen Theorien ist die These, dass jede Handlung, die ethisch relevant ist, d.h. die ethisch gut oder schlecht ist, auch für irgendeine Person ethisch relevant ist. Gemäß personenbezogenen Ansätzen gilt also folgendes Prinzip (*Person-Affecting Intuition*):

(PAI).  $Bp \rightarrow \exists xBxp$

Aus jeder Theorie, die (POR) und (PAI) in der Thesenmenge enthält, folgt unter einer bestimmten Zusatzannahme These 1. Etwas plakativer formuliert: Mit (PAI) lässt

sich intergenerationale Gerechtigkeit begründen. Als Zusatzannahme benötigt man die Voraussetzung, dass es ethisch relevante Handlungen gibt, die keine ethisch relevanten Konsequenzen in der Gegenwart und Vergangenheit haben.

(PAI) ist ein starkes Mittel zur Begründung von These 1. Gegenbeispiele zu (PAI) finden sich nach Meinung vieler in den sogenannten „Nicht-Identitäts-Fällen“: Es gibt Handlungen, die ethisch schlecht sind, ohne deren Ausübung durch eine Person der Gegenwart jedoch eine Person der Zukunft nicht leben würde, sondern höchstens eine andere Person (deshalb auch die Verwendung von „Nicht-Identität“). In diesen Fällen scheinen die Handlungen per se nachteilig zu sein, obwohl sie für die Personen der Zukunft nicht von Nachteil sind. Ein Nicht-Identitäts-Fall zeichnet sich durch folgende Umstände aus:

- ❖ Bp
- ❖  $\neg\text{Lives}(c,t_1)$
- ❖  $\text{Nec}(\text{Lives}(c,t_2) \rightarrow p)$

Eine, dieser Bewertung zugrundeliegende, Intuition scheint zu sein (*Activation is Never Bad*):

(ANB).  $\neg\text{Lives}(c,t_1) \rightarrow (\text{Nec}(\text{Lives}(c,t_2) \rightarrow p) \rightarrow \neg Bcp)$

Gemäß diesem Prinzip ist also keine Handlung, die jemanden erst „ins Leben ruft“, ethisch besehen zu dessen Nachteil. Aus (ANB) ergibt sich, dass jede Handlung, die notwendig zur Ausführung einer für das Leben einer Person notwendigen Handlung ist, wiederum nicht von Nachteil für das Leben dieser Person sein kann. Sloganartig: Keine Teilhandlung einer lebensnotwendigen Handlung ist ethisch schlecht. Formal ausgedrückt:

(ANB-T1).  
 $\neg\text{Lives}(c,t_1) \rightarrow ((\text{Nec}(\text{Lives}(c,t_2) \rightarrow p) \& \text{Nec}(p \rightarrow q)) \rightarrow \neg Bcq)$

Eine Umkehrung von (ANB-T1), dass nämlich jede Handlung, die eine lebensnotwendige Handlung als Teilhandlung enthält, nicht ethisch schlecht sein kann, folgt nicht aus (ANB). Eine solche Umkehrung erscheint auch unplausibel. Auf diese Konsequenz werden wir in der Diskussion von (ANB) in Abschnitt 3 noch zu sprechen kommen. Doch zuvor wollen wir auf „das“ grundsätzliche Problem von Vertretern eines personenbezogenen Ansatzes mit (ANB) eingehen.

Das Prinzip (ANB) erscheint vielen Ethikern plausibel. Auch (PAI) genügt den Intuitionen vieler Experten, ja sogar vielen, die intuitiv (ANB) akzeptieren würden. Und doch sind, wie das nachfolgende Argument zeigt, die beiden Prinzipien (PAI) und (ANB) in den Nicht-Identitäts-Fällen unverträglich.

(Nicht-Identitäts-Antinomie).

1. (PAI), (ANB)
2. Bp (Nicht-Identitäts-Fall)
3. Bcp (aus 2., (PAI))
4.  $\text{Nec}(\text{Lives}(c,t_2) \rightarrow p) \& \neg\text{Lives}(c,t_1)$  (Spez. Nicht-Identitäts-Fall)
5.  $\neg Bcp$  (aus 4., (ANB))
6. Widerspruch

Welche Annahmen dieser Antinomie sind nun zu verwerfen? Drei Fälle sind dabei zu betrachten: Fall 1: Es gibt keine Nicht-Identitäts-Fälle. Fall 2: Das Prinzip (PAI) gilt nicht. Fall 3: Das Prinzip (ANB) gilt nicht. Wir werden uns im Folgenden auf die letzten beiden Fälle konzentrieren, und zum einen zu zeigen versuchen, dass (ANB) nicht gilt, und zum anderen dafür argumentieren, dass (PAI) doch schwächer ist, als man zu denken geneigt ist.

*Literatur.* Eine allgemeinere Form von (PAI), bezogen auf ethisch relevante Handlungen und Interessen, findet sich in (Meyer 2008, Abschnitt 1). Die hier dargestellte Form von (PAI) findet sich sinngemäß in (Roberts 2009a: xiv). Geschichtlich geht die Diskussion um (PAI) zurück auf (Parfit 1987, Kapitel 16). Ein Überblick zur ethischen Diskussion der Nicht-Identitäts-Antinomie mit umfangreicher Verweisliteratur findet sich in (Roberts 2009b). Alle unsere Ausführungen zu Nicht-Identitäts-Fällen, mit Ausnahme der zusätzlich gemachten Einschränkung, finden sich auch in (Roberts 2009a: xv ff). Die Intuitionen, die wir in (ANB) präzisiert haben, finden sich meist verstreut in der genannten Literatur.

### 3 Diskussion von (ANB)

Beginnen wir mit unserer Argumentation im Rahmen von Fall 3! Warum gilt unserer Ansicht nach Prinzip (ANB) nicht? Wie kann z.B. eine Handlung, durch die „genetisch unverträgliche Eltern“ ein Kind zeugen, schlecht für das Kind sein, obwohl diese Handlung notwendig dafür ist, dass das Kind lebt? Wir wollen im Folgenden anhand von zwei der vielen Beispiele der Diskussion um die Nicht-Identitäts-Antinomie zeigen, dass dieses Prinzip in der allgemeinen Form nicht plausibel ist.

Betrachten wir sogleich den angesprochenen Fall der Handlung, dass genetisch unverträgliche Eltern ein Kind zeugen. Es gelte folgende Repräsentierung:

$\text{Procr(d,e,c)} \& \text{Incomp(d,e)}$ : ‘Julia und Romeo, die genetisch unverträglich sind, zeugen Arthur.’

Wir gehen davon aus, dass unmittelbar nach Einnistung gilt:  $\neg\text{Lives}(c, t_1)$ . Weiters ist die mit  $\text{Procr(d,e,c)} \& \text{Incomp(d,e)}$  beschriebene Handlung notwendig dafür, dass Arthur lebt; es gilt also:  $\text{Nec}(\text{Lives}(c, t_2) \rightarrow (\text{Procr(d,e,c)} \& \text{Incomp(d,e)}))$ . Mit (ANB) gilt weiters  $\neg Bc(\text{Procr(d,e,c)} \& \text{Incomp(d,e)})$ , also rückübersetzt: Dass Julia und Romeo, die genetisch unverträglich sind, Arthur gezeugt haben, ist ethisch besehen nicht von Nachteil für Arthur. Warum ist diese Handlung aber einer weit verbreiteten Meinung zufolge ethisch besehen nicht von Nachteil für Arthur? Die einhellige Antwort darauf lautet: Wenn die mit  $\text{Procr(d,e,c)} \& \text{Incomp(d,e)}$  beschriebene Handlung unterlassen wird, dann lebt Arthur nicht, bzw., mit Kontraposition, wieder unser  $\text{Nec}(\text{Lives}(c, t_2) \rightarrow (\text{Procr(d,e,c)} \& \text{Incomp(d,e)}))$ . Man kann nun aber in einer Hierarchie von Teilhandlungen immer weiter aufsteigen, und man könnte so in gleicher Weise begründen, dass solche Handlungen ethisch besehen nicht von Nachteil für das Kind sein können. Beispielsweise könnte man auf diese Weise auch begründen, dass es für Arthur nicht von Nachteil ist, dass seine Eltern ihn gezeugt haben, dass sie genetisch unverträglich sind, und dass sie, weil sie wenig soziale Kompetenzen haben, ihn sozusagen notwendigerweise schlecht behandeln werden.

Wie den Beispielen in der ethischen Diskussion solcher Fälle zu entnehmen ist, ist dem Erfindungsgeist des Ethikers für solche Situationen kaum eine Grenze gesetzt. In allen diesen Beispielen scheint folgender Grundgedanke zentral: Keine Handlung, die als Teilhandlung eine für eine Person lebensnotwendige und ethisch besehen für sie gute Handlung enthält, kann in ethischen Belangen von Nachteil für die Person sein. Z.B. ist die mit  $\text{Procr(d,e,c)}$ , also mit ‚Julia und Romeo zeugen Arthur‘, beschriebene Handlung notwendig dafür, dass Arthur lebt; sie scheint zudem für Arthur gut zu sein. Zudem ist es eine Teilhandlung der mit  $\text{Procr(d,e,c)} \& \text{Incomp(d,e)}$  beschriebenen Handlung. Daher kann gemäß diesem Grundgedanken auch letztere nicht von Nachteil für Arthur sein. Präzisiert handelt es sich bei dem hier leitenden Grundgedanken um die oben schon angesprochene Umkehrung von (ANB-T1); und diese erscheint, wie man anhand von Beispielen veranschaulichen kann, nicht plausibel. Damit gilt, dass dieses Prinzip vielleicht zwar in vielen, sicherlich aber nicht in allen Fällen, d.h. sicherlich nicht für alle Handlungen gilt.

*Literatur.* Das angeführte Beispiel wird z.B. in (Roberts 2009a: xx ff) diskutiert. Weiterführende Beispiele finden sich z.B. in (Kavka 1982: 100–103).

### 4 Diskussion von (PAI)

Unsere Diskussion im Rahmen von Fall 3 hat uns also zu dem Lösungsvorschlag geführt, (ANB) aufzugeben. Diese Antwort könnte ein zufriedenstellender Lösungsansatz für das Nicht-Identitäts-Problem sein, wäre da nicht ein Unbehagen zur vermuteten Stärke von (PAI). Kommen wir nun deshalb zu Fall 2 und unserem Argument dafür, dass (PAI) doch schwächer ist, als die dahinterliegende Leistung zur Begründung von These 1 vermuten lässt. Für unser Argument benötigen wir, wie bereits in der Einleitung schon ausgeführt, einen multimodalen Rahmen. Im Speziellen benötigen wir zu den bereits angesprochenen Axiomen (Systeme  $D$ ,  $T$ ) noch die folgenden: Zum einen benötigen wir das sogenannte Mittel-Zweck-Prinzip. Allgemein besehen und gelinde ausgedrückt: Es ist nicht jedermann Sache. Es genügt aber einigen Intuitionen zu einigen überschaubaren Fällen; akzeptiert man nämlich, dass alle Handlungen, die zur Ausführung einer gebotenen Handlung notwendig sind, auch geboten sind, dann wird man sich mit diesem Prinzip auch anfreunden können. Kommen wir also zu unserer Schwachstelle (*Deontic Means-End principle*):

(DME).  $(\text{Nec}(p \rightarrow q) \& \text{Op}) \rightarrow Oq$

Das zweite benötigte Prinzip ist ein altbekanntes und vielbewährtes Brückenprinzip. Bei Thomas von Aquin heißt es z.B.: ‚Das Gute soll getan und befolgt, das Böse soll gemieden werden!‘; wir beschränken uns wieder auf „das Böse“ und setzen voraus, dass ethisch schlechte Handlungen auch unterlassen werden sollen, also verboten sind. Formal ausgedrückt (*Strong Bridge Principle*):

(SBP).  $Bcp \rightarrow Fp$

Gewappnet mit diesem Rüstzeug, beginnen wir unsere Argumentation. Dafür fassen wir einen Teil der vorhergehenden Abschnitte bündig zusammen: Mit (PAI) lässt sich These 1. begründen. (PAI) erscheint aber zu stark – vor allem, was die Nicht-Identitäts-Fälle betrifft. Deshalb wird für einen Test von (PAI) das Prinzip (ANB) ins Feld geführt. Aufgrund einer genaueren Analyse von Beispielen erscheint (ANB) aber unplausibel. Ist (ANB) deshalb ein ungeeignetes Mittel für einen Test? Unsere Antwort lautet: Nein. Gemäß (PAI) müssen wir nämlich, wenn wir behaupten, dass eine Handlung ethisch schlecht ist, zugleich

mit behaupten, dass sie auch ethisch besehen schlecht für jemanden ist. In den Nicht-Identitäts-Fällen ist die Handlung notwendig dafür, dass eine Person lebt; eine solche Person ist in solchen Fällen von der Handlung hauptsächlich betroffen, und damit meistens auch eine Person, für die gemäß (PAI) die Handlung ethisch besehen schlecht ist. Nun ist aber mit dem Brückenprinzip (SBP) eine solche schlechte Handlung verboten. Gleichzeitig scheint sie aber, zumindest aus der Sicht des Kindes, das ja Interesse daran hat zu leben, geboten. Im Detail:

- (Nicht-Identitäts-Fall: „Kinderperspektive“ mit (PAI), (DME), (SBP)).
1. (PAI), (DME), (SBP)
  2.  $Bp \rightarrow Bcp$  (mit (PAI))
  3.  $OLives(c,t2)$  (Grundvoraussetzung des Kindes)
  4.  $Bp$  (Nicht-Identitäts-Fall)
  5.  $Nec(Lives(c,t2) \rightarrow p) \& \neg Lives(c,t1)$   
(Spez. Nicht-Identitäts-Fall)
  6.  $Op$  (aus 3., 5., (DME))
  7.  $Bcp$  (aus 2., 4.)
  8.  $Fp$  (aus 7., (SBP))
  9. Widerspruch

Um Anhänger von (PAI) scheint es in den Nicht-Identitäts-Fällen aus der Sicht des Kindes also schlecht bestellt zu sein. Um Anhänger des Prinzips (ANB) steht es viel besser; für sie kann es in Nicht-Identitäts-Fällen nie zu einer Folgerung wie in Schritt 8. kommen. Aus der Sicht des Kindes kann also gemäß (ANB) nie ein notwendiges Mittel dafür, dass es lebt, verboten werden. Diese Konsequenz ist es vermutlich auch, die (ANB) für viele Anhänger von (PAI) doch akzeptabel erscheinen lässt.

Wir werden nun zeigen, dass man einen personenbezogenen Ansatz (PAI) vertreten kann, und dabei trotzdem diesen Vorzug von (ANB) nicht missen muss. Unser Hauptkritikpunkt richtet sich dabei gegen (SBP). Es gibt Fälle, in denen dieses Prinzip zu stark erscheint.

Im Detail sind es genau jene Fälle, in denen das sogenannte „Sollen-Können-Prinzip“ nicht erfüllt ist. Es gibt nämlich Handlungen, die ethisch schlecht sind, die aber trotzdem nicht verboten sind, weil sie zu unterlassen unmöglich ist. Die klarsten Fälle dazu sind dilemmatische Situationen: Jemand hat genau zwei Möglichkeiten zur Handlung ( $Nec(pvq)$ ), und doch sind beide Handlungen ethisch schlecht für jemanden ( $Bcp \& Bcq$ ). Deshalb ist (SBP) nicht adäquat. Eine abgeschwächte Form davon ist das folgende Prinzip (*Weak Bridge Principle*):

(WBP). ( $Bcp \& Pos \neg p \rightarrow Fp$ )

Wie man schön sehen kann, führt die Behauptung, dass von der Sicht eines Kindes aus  $p$  unterlassen werden kann, zu einem Widerspruch: Angenommen  $Pos \neg p$ ; dann ergibt sich 9. des obigen Falles (mit der Ausnahme, dass in 1. statt (SBP) das Prinzip (WBP) verwendet wird). Damit

mag zwar eine für das Kind lebensnotwendige Handlung, ethisch besehen, von Nachteil für das Kind sein; dies wird jedoch in keiner Norm tragend. Auf das erste der Beispiele in Abschnitt 3 bezogen heißt dies: Dass Arthur von genetisch unverträglichen Eltern gezeugt wurde, ist ethisch besehen von Nachteil für Arthur. Daraus folgt jedoch nicht, dass aus seiner Sicht die Zeugung hätte unterlassen werden sollen. (PAI) verliert sozusagen in den Nicht-Identitäts-Fällen „an Biss“.

*Literatur.* Der Nicht-Identitäts-Fall aus Kinderperspektive wird hinsichtlich des Problems mit einer Akzeptanz von (PAI) sinngemäß ähnlich zu unseren Ausführungen u.a. diskutiert in (Roberts 2009a: xv ff) und (Roberts 2009b, Abschnitt 2). Eine philosophische Untersuchung von (DME) findet sich in (Schurz 1997: 239 f und 11.3 sowie 11.4); das Prinzip wird dort „(ME-O)“ genannt.

## 5 Fazit

Für zwei Probleme eines personenbezogenen Ansatzes in der Ethik, nämlich zum einen das Nicht-Identitäts-Problem, und zum anderen die damit verbundene Frage zur Lösung des Nicht-Identitäts-Falles aus „Kinderperspektive“, scheinen die folgenden beiden Ansätze vielversprechend: Eine Analyse der Gegenbeispiele wie in Abschnitt 3, in der Handlungen und Teilhandlungen bewertet werden, und eine Abschwächung eines zu starken Brückenprinzips im Sinne des Sollen-Können-Prinzips. Für letzteren Ansatz schlagen wir vor, (POR), (PAI), (DME) und (WBP) zu akzeptieren.

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# Free Will, the Mind-Brain Problem, and Testability

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## 1 Free will and Libet's results

Libet et al. (1983: 623) investigated the readiness-potential "that precedes a freely voluntary, fully endogenous motor act" and found that the "onset of the cerebral activity clearly preceded by at least several hundred milliseconds the reported time of conscious intention to act." This reported time was "the subject's recall [...] of his initial awareness of wanting or intending to move." The authors conclude that cerebral initiation can begin "before there is any (at least recallable) subjective awareness that a 'decision' to act has already been initiated cerebrally." (Maybe a somewhat careless wording: Who could ever be aware of the fact that his or her intention has already been initiated cerebrally?)

These results and interpretations unleashed a controversial discussion about the impact on ethics: Do they question free will, one of the basics of our self-concepts and of moral responsibility? A maybe overshooting reaction in view of the fact that the lags reported rely on subjective memories; also note the authors' qualification "(at least recallable)". It seems, moreover, that readiness- (or motor-) potentials – cf. the terms "expectancy wave" and "Contingent Negative Variation (CNV)" – reflect cortical processes being more generally associated with goal-directed cognitive activities such as problem solving (Fenk 1978) or sentence comprehension (Kutas/Hillyard 1980). Do Libet's measures really guarantee an isolation of components specifically relevant for the initiation of "a freely voluntary, fully endogenous motor act"? Is it, after all, possible to follow the instruction to produce, now and then and "without any preplanning" (Libet et al. 1983: 625), one or two previously defined movements? And could such prescribed movements really be classified as "fully endogenous"?

If, however, in Libet's experiments and in affirmative studies of other laboratories (e.g. Soon et al. 2008) all measures were appropriate and all confounding variables – such as a possible bias in the subjects' recall – eliminated, they would enforce a rethinking: Free will is an illusion, decisions are taken in the brain. But I will show in the next section that they would enforce such a rethinking only within a specific, though very common mind-body theory.

Brembs (2011: 930) emphasizes that the "historical use of the term 'free will' has been inextricably linked with one variant or another of dualism" – positions that have, like the "metaphysical" (in the sense of "untestable") concept of *free will*, "fallen into irrelevance". *Free will* sensu Brembs shows itself in an evolutionary advantageous unpredictability of an animal's actions in "always the same settings" (ibid.: 935) such as in pursuit evasion. Apart from the well-known "sameness-problem": Could such an unpredictability reflect something relevant for those concepts of *free will* dominating the philosophical debate, at least as a prerequisite? Instead of such questions I shall discuss (in Section 2) which variant of dualism would admit the traditional understanding of *free will* as a conscious agent and prerequisite for moral responsibility. Interactionism (physical $\leftrightarrow$ mental) will result as the only possibility. Sections 3 and 4 investigate whether interactionism can, in the light of epistemic virtues such as testability and parsimony, com-

pete with monism, or with epiphenomenalism (physical $\Rightarrow$ mental), where free will is illusory from the onset.

## 2 The assumption of free will in different mind-body theories

Figure 1, left panel, classifies the positions compared in this paper. But is this an exhaustive classification? Popper (1996: 5) for instance describes himself as a "Cartesian dualist", and since he explicitly assumes an "*interaction* between physical and mental states", we can localize his position in our box called "interactionism". But he declares himself, moreover, as a *pluralist* who accepts "the reality of a *third world*, [...] roughly, the world of the *products* of our human minds." Figure 1 does without a further box for "pluralism", because the body-mind problem concerns, also for Popper, the relations between the physical (world 1) and the mental (world 2). The dependency between the physical, including physiological processes, and the psychic – a term that I here use synonymously with the "mental" or the "conscious" – is bidirectional in interactionism and unidirectional in epiphenomenalism.

Genealogical relations would deserve a separate diagram and more space for discussion. For instance: Was (Leibniz's classical) parallelism superseded by monism, and (e.g. Feigl's 1963) monism by functionalism? Or is functionalism only a variety of monism (Bechtel 2010)? Is it still a mind-body theory or rather a structure-function theory? Does Roth's (1987) constructivist approach supersede or only paraphrase (e.g. Rohracher's 1953) epiphenomenalism? I cannot see much difference except Roth's emphasis on the perceptual world as our brains' construct (ibid.: 235); thus my brain that I can watch in a brain-imaging experiment could not be identical with the real brain that produces my mental image (ibid.: 238f).<sup>1</sup>

In his seminal study Feigl (1963) modifies his earlier "double-language theory", i.e., the mind-body problem as the problem of a mentalist language that cannot be reduced to that language we use to describe "macro-behavior" and physiological processes ("micro-behavior"). It would be wiser, says Feigl (ibid.: 447), "to speak instead of *twofold access* or *double knowledge*. The identification, I have emphasized, is to be *empirically justified*, and hence there can be no *logical equivalence* between the concepts (or statements) in the two languages."

Carnap (1963: 886) criticizes "Feigl's reference to certain facts as 'evidence' for the identity view" and suggests formulating the question of a justification of that view "in the metalanguage [...] as a question concerning the choice of a language form. Although we prefer a different language, we must admit that a dualistic language can be constructed and used without coming into conflict with either the laws of logic or with empirically known facts."

Apart from empirical testability, Feigl (1963: 474) claims a further advantage of his solution: It "differs quite funda-

<sup>1</sup> This example recalls Feigl's (1963: 473f) "autocerebroscopic" *gedankenexperiment*. But Feigl is not mentioned in Roth, nor is any proponent of epiphenomenalism mentioned in Feigl and Roth, respectively.

mentally from materialistic epiphenomenalism in that (1) it is *monistic*, whereas epiphenomenalism is a form of dualistic parallelism; (2) the ‘physical’ [is not] the primary kind of existence, to which the mental is appended as a causally inefficacious luxury, or ‘shadowy’ secondary kind of existence.”

This criticism of epiphenomenalism is meant at e.g. Rohracher’s (1953) *Theorie der letzten Wirkung*: The mental is conceived as the ultimate effect of the physical (Figure 1, right panel); the assumption of any retroaction of the mental on the physical is “superfluous” (*ibid.*: 159) and free will a delusion. Rohracher would rebut the qualification of his theory as dualistic “parallelism”, because he understands parallelism exactly as the theory that *denies* any action of the physical on the mental and vice versa. And he explicitly rebuts the qualification “materialistic” (*ibid.*: 154) because of his view of the mental as something fundamentally different from the underlying processes.<sup>2</sup>

To sum up: In epiphenomenalism all mental processes are caused by neural activities; thus it is from the beginning compatible with Libet’s results and incompatible with free will. Parallelism in the usual sense also excludes any influence of the mental on the physical, and thus also any influence of free will. And what could influence what in monism if there is no distinction between different sets of events? Interactionism seems to be the only theory that provides the possibility of free will. But can it cope with epistemological criteria?

### 3 Mind-body theories in the light of epistemic virtues

How could the physical produce/influence the mental? And how could the mental initiate/control the physical? These questions do not arise in parallelism or monism. And where they arise – the first one in epiphenomenalism, both in interactionism – they remain unanswered. But all of these theories make statements concerning the possibility of (mutual) dependencies. Which of them hold in the light of epistemic criteria such as testability, compatibility with “common sense”, and Occam’s principle of parsimony? In Hume’s problem Occam’s razor and common sense favor the very same dissolution (Fenk 2010); in the mind-body problem however they apparently favor different positions.

Ad *testability*: Feigl claims that his monism is empirically justifiable, i.e., in principle testable. But he drastically weakens that claim through his notice “that the identity thesis is a matter of epistemological and semantic interpretation, and does not differ in empirical consequences from a carefully formulated parallelism.” (*ibid.*: 472) Maybe he was, when writing that paragraph, not fully aware of the fact that parallelism, in whatever form, is dualistic. In his comment on Feigl, Carnap rather maintains the linguistic analytical approach and remains extremely vague concerning the possibility of relevant empirical findings: Like Feigl he believes “that the evidence available today provides good reasons for the assumption that this [monistic] language will also function well in the future.” (Carnap 1963: 886) But what are these good reasons? And would a lag of the mental (Libet et al. 1983; Soon et al. 2008) be compatible with monism and with a “carefully formulated” parallelism?

Everyone knows that the mind can be influenced e.g. by drugs – obviously not directly, but via body. And for those actively working in neuroscience it is not really surprising that some of the relevant (sub)cortical processes precede the respective psychical changes. They can study the effects of (experimentally manipulated) neural activities on behavior and on (reports about) mental processes. But never the other way round: How could the “mental” be observed, or experimentally manipulated, without affecting neural processes? In “brain reading” and its applications, which raise “ethical issues concerning the privacy” of thought (Haynes and Rees 2006:523), mental states can be reconstructed only through our knowledge of their correlation with patterns of neural activities. Such correlations as well as effects of the physical on the mental are the only testable thing and the only thing considered as given in epiphenomenalism, while interactionism also claims retroactions that are not testable. But if epiphenomenalism explicitly excludes the possibility of such retroactions, this is a 0-hypothesis and as such again not really testable (Fenk 2010:85), and moreover a 0-hypothesis that disperses a naturalist concept which allows any event to be both, cause and effect.

Concerning *common sense*, at least in the common sense of that term, interactionism is the clear winner. We are convinced that our sensations are evoked by stimuli from inside and outside our body, but that we also can choose between alternatives – e.g. where to look and thus also which stimuli to affect our visual system. Our language regime reflects and reinforces that we experience ourselves as “decision making” and “voluntarily acting”, and it presupposes even involuntary effects of the mental on the physical, such as “psychogenic” factors contributing to “psychosomatic” disorders. From such a perspective, all other mind-body theories must appear rather artificial. These are either incompatible with effects of the mental on the physical, as in epiphenomenalism, or with the idea of effects in general: Parallelism denies such effects in any direction from the very beginning. And which components could act on other components in monism (see below) if there are only two different “ways of knowing the same event”?

The principle of *parsimony*, however, is only realized in epiphenomenalism: It accounts for the actual empirical knowledge with a minimum of existential assumptions. Parallelism pays a high prize for its parsimony regarding mind-body interactions, namely the need to explain the mysterious power that has established synchrony – but see Libet’s results – between the correlated events. Monism also claims parsimony for itself: Feigl (1963) directly addresses Ockham’s razor (*ibid.*: 386) or principle of parsimony when e.g. deleting Spinoza’s “third substance” (*ibid.*: 449), and indirectly when replacing “the duality of two sets of correlated events [...] by the less puzzling duality of two ways of knowing the same event – one direct, one indirect” (*ibid.*: 473). But this new duality is, to my mind, not an attempt to a parsimonious explanation but to avoid anything that would deserve an explanation. And it is again puzzling: Is this “same event” a reintroduction of what he criticizes in Spinoza as the “third substance” or “reality-in-itself” – in order to complete his saying (*ibid.*: 447) concerning a “twofold access” (to what?) or “double knowledge” (of what?)?


### 4 Concluding remarks

Brembs (2011: 935) argues that freedom could be dissociated from both, consciousness and will. Regarding the latter he cites John Locke: “I think the question is not proper,

<sup>2</sup> In Searle (1994: 3) consciousness is also caused by brain processes, but this consciousness “is not some extra substance or entity” – as in logical behaviourism, where “mental properties are physical properties” (Marek 1994: 142).

whether the will be free, but whether a man be free". Such attributions would not be obviated by the results of the neurophysiology of action (cf. Trivers 2011: 55), but would shift some of our problems to the organism as a whole and would raise some new questions concerning determinism: "Empirical" questions, as claimed in Balaguer (2009: 20)? And how to prove once and for all the claims of partial indeterminacy (Balaguer) and unpredictability (Brembs), i.e., the absence of regularity in specific behavioral domains?

Free will as a conscious agent however makes sense only in interactionism. But the assumption of retroactions of the mental on the physical is neither testable nor is it necessary for the analysis of behavioral and mental processes. Thus, the epistemic principle of parsimony favors the less popular epiphenomenalism. An explicit exclusion of the possibility of such retroactions would, on the other hand, amount to an again not testable 0-hypothesis. And if epiphenomenalism is not explicit in that point, then it only recalls what kind of answers are within or beyond the reach of neuropsychology. Such a position would, however, correspond with Wittgenstein's understanding of "common sense", with his last dictum in the Tractatus and with his estimation of possible outcomes of philosophical investigations (Wittgenstein 2006): To aim at "complete clarity /.../ simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear."(§133; see also §119 and 124)



**Figure 1:** Classifies the most influential psychophysical theories (left panel) and illustrates epiphenomenalism (right panel): Physiological(P) processes not only control behavior(B) – which in turn modifies stimulus-patterns(S) – but also cause the mental(M) events; these do not interact with or retroact upon neural activities or anything else.

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# Doing Justice to What there Is: A Wittgensteinian Motto?

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In a 1930's Preface to his envisioned book Wittgenstein tells us: "I would like to say, 'This book is written to the glory of God'" (Wittgenstein 1975, Foreword), and follows this exceptional remark by saying that it means the book is written in good will, also expressing the firm conviction that his contemporaries would wrongfully understand it, possibly expecting something concealed in the humble honouring. The dedicatory sheds light on the matter at hands: such book will follow less ones own inclinations than it pays tribute to what there is, to the way things are – one could say that life, and all that man sees around him (cf. Wittgenstein 1993: 127,129), is more praised than an intellectual search for some hidden domain of significance. This search corresponds to a tendency of man, which consists in seeking out some occult meaning, and finds a translation in a philosophical attitude that ends in confusion, in not knowing our way around – this is how Wittgenstein puts it regarding philosophical problems, as a consequence of our forgetting, due to excessive familiarity, all that stands before us and that we fail to see (cf. Wittgenstein 1997, §§ 123, 129). Moreover, what this search achieves in its unbridled spirit of construction, taking one stone after another (cf. Wittgenstein 2006: 10e), is the adding up of ever more complicated structures: it erects a building moving on and up, leaving us unable of any assimilation from our part, as we are bound up to look above ourselves in bewilderment without any capacity left to make sense of the whole. Perhaps, this is the danger we are faced with when we try to grasp the world "by way of its periphery" (Wittgenstein 1975, Foreword): succumbing to every temptation, to every urge to sublime the isolated (marginal) aspects, can only give an impression of the whole, but can not restore it, as all the manifold details are left out. On the contrary, the spirit of the book strives "after clarity and perspicuity in no matter what structure" (*Ibid.*), it does not seek to raise an edifice, but "in having the foundations of possible buildings" (Wittgenstein 2006: 9e) transparently at sight, and so "it remains where it is and what it tries to grasp is always the same" (Wittgenstein 1975, Foreword), the world at is "centre – in its essence" (*ibid.*). This will require an effort to refrain from building a body of work from which to elevate ourselves beyond, for we already are where we should be: "I might say: if the place I want to reach could only be climbed up to by a ladder, I would give up trying to get there. For the place which I really have to go is the one I must actually be at already. Anything that can be reached with the ladder does not interest me." (Wittgenstein, 2006: 10e) The commitment to what there is, shines through these lines, and through every sentence of the *Philosophical Investigations*: "Each sentence that I write is trying to say the whole thing, that is, the same thing over and over again & it is as though they are as it were views of one object seen from different angles." (Wittgenstein 2006: 9e.) However, writing a book would prove to be a task impossible to reach fulfilment – i.e., a book with a linear movement, one voice, and that would be up to the dedicatory as well –, and in the Preface Wittgenstein wrote on 1945, he comes to terms with such difficulty. Regarding the thoughts in the book, Wittgenstein tells us that they are the "precipitate" (Wittgenstein 1997, Preface) of the investigations that had occupied him in the last 16 years (they are as it were sediments impossible to

dilute in a system). After considering many forms for the book along the way what looked most important, was that the "thoughts should proceed from one subject to another in a natural order and without breaks" (*ibid.*). Nevertheless, these considerations seem to contradict Wittgenstein's description of his movements of thought, as sometimes proceeding with the same subject in a long chain, other times shortly jumping from one topic to another, and resulting in observations in the form of short paragraphs. Thus, he realizes that he couldn't weld his thoughts in a whole for what ultimately mattered most was that they should follow their *natural inclination*<sup>1</sup>. Wittgenstein realizes both that, forcing them "on any single direction" (*ibid.*) paralysed them, made them cripple, and that the best he could write "would never be more than philosophical remarks" (*ibid.*). And here we come to several important points we must notice: to begin with, there is the supposition of a natural order that would surpass the breaks between the remarks, translated in the picture of the welding of thoughts to form an illusionary whole. As Molder reminds us (Molder 2011: 93), welding is not the appropriate operation here, for the remarks seem to repel each other, demonstrating their rightful place in the string of investigation. We then have another use of the word 'natural' to indicate the natural inclination of thoughts recognized by Wittgenstein – contrary to the false order that only seemed natural (maybe because what is expected of books is a linear progression, but this will not be a rule used by Wittgenstein). A key observance is that, this natural inclination emerges from the nature of the investigation itself: not only will Wittgenstein withdraw from a program about writing books, he will not compel his remarks along any single way by fixing some determined aspect and elevating it to a general doctrine in a book, sacrificing the movement of his thoughts, condemning them to paralysis. To better understand what is at stake, we can compare this resolution with the affirmation that the book will only contain the purity of which its author is capable (Wittgenstein 1975, Preface): what enlightens us here is Wittgenstein's conviction that work on philosophy "really is more work on oneself. On one's own conception" (Wittgenstein 2006: 24e), for this shows the philosopher's untiring will to start again anew. Doing justice to the facts, claims for the right to stand directly before things, and it becomes effective in the recognition that facts already have in them the conditions that allow their description (with no need to lay over them a theory), and that the one describing them is involved in that which he describes, since the beginning (Wittgenstein speaks of the "involved journeys" (Wittgenstein 1997, Preface)). This shows philosophy as a work on oneself that is simultaneous with the commitment to say what there is, how things are, while they are. As a philosophical method, it has its feet firmly on description, for really, what it wants to do is letting everything be as it is (cf. e.g. Wittgenstein 1997, Part I, §124).

As we now know, although he plans to finally bring his book to light when he writes the 1945 Preface, he will not see his book published. This is immensely important. After

<sup>1</sup> This essay owes a great debt to Maria Filomena Molder's discussion of this theme: Molder 2011.

all, what proved essential was to always continue and always begin afresh.

Let us now reflect a propos the philosophical remarks that compose Wittgenstein's work: the form he would privilege for his thoughts, inspires the rich and just image of the book as an album, for the natural inclination compelled him to travel through a "wide field of thought criss-cross in every direction". The remarks that thus resulted are really a "number of sketches of landscapes" (this too is important: a *number* of thoughts, is bluntly related with the impossibility of assembling a totally of thoughts in a book, and visibly connected to what constitutes the senseless, or at least the impracticality, of asking how many kinds of sentence there are; cf. Wittgenstein 1997, §23). They testify the continuous coming back to "the same or almost the same points" along the "long and involved journeyings", always "approached afresh from different directions, and new sketches were made" (Wittgenstein 1997, Preface). The collection of the acceptable sketches that constitute the *Philosophical Investigations* (having rejected the uncharacteristic, the badly drawn), are truly a testimony to an endeavour of restitution of the whole, of all the nuances of the landscape, not wanting to leave behind any detail, accounting for every bond, and also for every point of separation – differences are as significant to the investigations as the similarities. This consideration of multiplicity provides the contemplation its width, its amplitude of sight, and its dynamic character. Bringing to mind the precept of staying in the same place, might momentarily confuse, but let's not forget that what really caused Wittgenstein movements to stop, was fixing a route. On the contrary, the spirit alien to the book, whose movements Wittgenstein describes in the above cited 1930's passages, lack mobility: their will to explain with complicated gestures, is bound to end up with a reunion of some fixed aspects, not an organic whole. Thus, the collection, the album, has a dynamic that springs from the constant reposition of the relations between the one who contemplates and that which he describes (cf. Wittgenstein 2006: 14e). Also important are Wittgenstein uses of numerous tools: the various voices, the questions interrupting a line of thought, so as to let other point of view come forward, the refreshing similes, the suggestion of images, etc. And although we cannot imagine this album as containing sketches arranged side by side, in accord to a linear progression of their depicting capacity, the juxtaposition of the drawings of the landscape is in agreement with the criss-crosses of the journey, and so too, the blurredness that is thus attained. However, this does not correspond to a lack of precision: images may not be clear-cut, the book might need a background to be seen in depth, the work a light from above, but this doesn't mean that it won't be able to commit to a profounder sense of precision: a greater ability to describe, to do justice to what there is, is found in the blurred edges: concepts don't have sharp edges (cf. Wittgenstein 1997, Part I, § 71). Even though eschewing the possibility of exactitude, clarity is possible. So too, the possibility of creating a system is left behind, but understanding is still be possible, and finds expression in the exercise of a perspicuous representation (*übersichtliche Darstellung*), truly significant as a possibility of contemplation of the world *sub specie aeterni*, "the way of thought which as it were flies above the world and leaves it be the way it is, contemplating it from above in its flight" (Wittgenstein 2006: 7e), faced as a fundamental exercise of understanding, along the consideration of the work of the artist.

Throughout *Philosophical Investigations* we are faced with a new method that unveils the philosophical misun-

derstandings in which we are thrown due to a lack of recognition of the structure of our language – doing justice to what there is finds in language, as something that is constitutive of our experience, its true support, and so we must see what might help us: "The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things. (Is this a 'Weltanschauung')?" (Wittgenstein 1997, Part I, §122.) The possibility of a perspicuous representation being a worldview is very significant and deeply related with doing justice to the facts being a motto of Wittgenstein's philosophy. As the form of an account it produces "that understanding that consists in 'seeing connections'" (ibid.); connections, whether an outcome of our recognition of the multiplicity of language, whether they come about when we invent intermediate cases, e.g. new similes, help us see where in language we take wrong turns and go astray, sublimating some feature that imprisons us. A perspicuous representation of the uses of words requires that we look at them against the setting of both the activities they're a part of, and everything involved, namely, the atmosphere, gestures, facial expressions, our body, etc. – and we probably should have to add the spirit of the game (language games are fundamental in clearing our sight so that we might see what can enliven the signs of our language: its use). However, there is one part missing, and that is the part that endows it with depth: in his *Remarks on Frazer's 'Golden Bough'*, when referring to the similarities of all the rites, Wittgenstein tells us that what strikes him most are the dissimilarities he sees; these would allow to draw a multiplicity of faces – not one face – with common features. If then one were to draw the lines that connect these common features, there would still be something missing: "that which brings this pictures into connection with our own feelings and thoughts. This part gives the account its depth." (Wittgenstein 1993: 141) What is at stake in doing justice to what there is, is a description of things which encompasses the one that is describing them, rightfully taking place directly before things, for he is already involved in that which he contemplates. Precisely, it is this capacity to connect ones own feelings and thoughts with what we see, that gives the contemplation its depth. We too are part of the landscape. Finally, this contemplation brings forth something else; if we had to say, when does the moment emerge, that one finally says: "Here one can only *describe* and say, this is what human life is like" (ibid.: 121), wouldn't we point to the recognition brought by depth of contemplation?

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# Multikulturalität und Recht: Diskurse um Rechtspluralismus und *Cultural Defense* als Anfragen an die Rechtfertigbarkeit universal verbindlicher Normen

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## 1. Multikulturalität als Herausforderung für die Rechtsordnung

Im Zeitalter der Globalisierung spiegelt sich die kulturelle und axiologische Vielfalt der Welt als Ganze zunehmend im Kleinen, d.h. den einzelnen Gesellschaften und Staaten. Grund dafür sind nicht zuletzt Migrationsbewegungen, seien sie nun bedingt durch koloniales Erbe, Arbeitsmobilität oder Asylregime. Die Frage, wie unterschiedliche Kulturen im weitesten Sinne friedlich koexistieren können, bezieht sich daher nicht mehr allein auf die Ebene von Staaten und Staatenblöcken, sondern zielt auf die Bedingungen, unter denen Menschen unterschiedlicher Weltanschauungen ein Gemeinwesen teilen können.

Im Europa der Gegenwart sind mehr und mehr Menschen überzeugt, dass dies eine schwer zu bewältigende Aufgabe darstellt. Vor diesem Hintergrund haben sich zwei Diskurspole entwickelt, die man als Homogenitätsparadigma einerseits und als Pluralismusparadigma andererseits bezeichnen kann. Während ersteres unter Schlagwörtern wie *Leitkultur* oder *Wertegemeinschaft* firmierend eine Fragmentierung des vermeintlichen weltanschaulichen Konsenses als Bedrohung unbedingt vermeiden will (vgl. Tibi 2002), behaupten Vertreterinnen und Vertreter des pluralistischen Zuganges die Notwendigkeit, die Sphäre legitimen Dissenses auch und gerade in Sachen Moral und Weltanschauung zu weiten. In diese Kategorie fallen im Bereich der Rechtspolitik die – grundsätzlich getrennt voneinander zu behandelnden – Vorstöße für die offizielle Zulassung alternativer Rechtstraditionen, insbesondere der Islamischen Scharia, sowie für die strafrechtlich mildernd zu berücksichtigende Kulturalisation des Täters (*Cultural Defense*).

Diese beiden Antworten auf die Herausforderung der Rechtsordnung durch die faktischen multikulturellen Verhältnisse fordern selbst wiederum jenes Denken heraus, das eine prinzipielle Rechtfertigbarkeit universal verbindlicher Normen bejaht. Aber kann man Menschen, die Grundwerte einer geltenden Rechtsordnung nicht (vollständig) teilen, weil sie anders sozialisiert wurden oder sich anderen Traditionen und Wertesystemen verpflichtet fühlen, daraus fließende Normen mit staatlicher Zwangsgewalt aufzutropfieren? Lässt sich überhaupt eine andere Rechtfertigung denken, als das Recht des Stärkeren – das der Demokratie inhärente Entscheidungsprinzip?

## 2. Die Herangehensweise mittels Pluralistischem Paradigma: Rechtspluralismus und *Cultural Defense*

Als Rechtspluralismus wird hier eine Aufteilung der Rechtsunterworfenen in unterschiedliche Jurisdiktionen verstanden. Dieses Konzept wird heute meist auf indigenes Recht und Islamisches Recht bezogen. Während Länder wie Indien, Malaysia, Singapur oder verschiedene afrikanische Staaten parallele Rechtsordnung für Angehörige

unterschiedlicher religiöser Gruppen kennen, sind Vorstöße in diese Richtung in Europa ein Phänomen jüngerer Vergangenheit, wiewohl es Rechtspluralismus etwa in Form der geteilten Zuständigkeit kanonischer und weltlicher Gerichte, aber auch im Falle jüdischer Gemeinden der Rabbinergerichte, bis ins 19. Jahrhundert auch hier gegeben hat.

Als das ehemalige Oberhaupt der Anglikanischen Kirche, Erzbischof Rowan Williams, 2009 zugunsten der partiellen Zulassung der Scharia in familienrechtlichen Angelegenheiten plädierte – mit Verweis auf die angebliche Unvermeidlichkeit einer derartigen Entwicklung (BBC 2009) – löste er damit nicht nur einen Sturm der Entrüstung des gesellschaftlichen und politischen Establishments aus, sondern erhielt zugleich Zuspruch von Teilen der *Muslim Community*. Williams hat in einem Punkt zumindest nicht Unrecht: In Großbritannien, mit seiner islamischen Bevölkerung von geschätzten 1,5 Millionen Menschen (vgl. Office of National Statistics 2007), existieren so genannte Scharia-Gerichte (*sharia courts*) bereits seit längerer Zeit, jedoch ohne juristische Verbindlichkeit im Sinne einer Exekutierbarkeit der Entscheidungen, die konsultierte islamische Rechtsgelehrte fällten. Inzwischen hat sich auch dies geändert: Seit 2009 exekutiert der Britische Staat Urteile der Scharia Gerichte, jedoch unter der Bedingung, dass sich die Betroffenen zuvor freiwillig deren Jurisdiktion unterwerfen. Derartige Gerichte existieren inzwischen u.a. in London, Birmingham, Bradford, Manchester, Nuneaton und Warwickshire (vgl. Tahar 2008).

Am Kontinent werden Forderungen nach eigener eigenständigen islamischer Gerichtsbarkeit in seltensten Fällen offen erhoben – zu groß erscheint die Furcht der islamischen Gemeinden vor weiterer Stigmatisierung – auch angesichts stetig eindringlicher werdender Einforderungen von Bekenntnissen zur Werte- und Rechtsordnung der Mehrheitsgesellschaft. Berichte über inoffizielle Scharia-Gerichte, die sich nicht nur auf Familienrecht beschränken, sondern sich auch Strafgewalt anmaßen, dringen dennoch vereinzelt an die Öffentlichkeit (vgl. El País 2009).

Für Kritiker derartiger Ansinnen oder Entwicklungen stehen nicht weniger als die Menschenrechte selbst auf dem Spiel. Speziell im Kontext des Islamischen Rechts ergeben sich hier in der Tat Konflikte mit der Idee gleicher Menschenrechte, die weit vor möglichen Körperstrafen anheben. Mit Verweis es werde, wie in Großbritannien, lediglich im Privatrecht nach Islamischen Recht, dessen zwei Hauptquellen der Koran und die Prophetentradition (Sunnah) darstellen, geurteilt, ist dabei nicht geeignet, kritische Bedenken zu zerstreuen. Dies sei an folgenden Beispielen veranschaulicht: Wenn auch die Auslegung dieser Rechtsquellen nicht immer zu übereinstimmenden Ergebnissen seitens der einzelnen Rechtsschulen führt, so existieren dennoch Ge- und Verbote, die mehrheitlich unter den Rechtsgelehrten umstritten sind. Dazu gehört etwa das erweiterte Eheverbot für Frauen, die im Unterschied zu

Männern keine Anhänger der anderen Buchreligionen, insbesondere Christen und Juden, heiraten dürfen.<sup>1</sup>

Ohne hier ins Detail zu gehen hinsichtlich der Implikationen eines solchen interreligiösen Eheverbots, etwa in Form der Zwangsscheidung, sobald ein ehemals muslimischer Ehemann konvertiert, liegt die Verletzung des Menschenrechts auf Familie und Heirat (Art. 16 Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte 1948) klar auf der Hand. In Folge würde dies unter rechtspluralistischen Verhältnissen dazu führen, dass eine nicht-muslimische Frau, die der regulären staatlichen Jurisdiktion unterworfen ist, keine derartigen religiös begründeten Ehehindernisse zu fürchten hat, eine Muslime hingegen, die „freiwillig“ unter der Ägide eines Scharia Gerichts heiratet, schon.

Ähnliche menschenrechtliche Bedenken provoziert der *Cultural-Defense*-Zugang. Mit diesem Begriff, der an die angloamerikanischen Rechtstradition angelehnt ist (*provocation defense, insanity defense*), werden Rechtsfertigungsgründe benannt, die – nach Befürwortern dieses Konzepts, wie etwa Alison Dundes Renteln – der Angeklagte in einem Strafverfahren der Anklage entgegenhalten kann, hier konkret mit kultureller Basis. Auch wenn es in europäischen Ländern bislang offiziell kein derartiges Rechtsinstrument gibt, wird die mildernde Berücksichtigung kultureller Traditionen und religiös geprägter Wertvorstellungen in den letzten Jahren vermehrt im Zusammenhang mit so genannten Ehrenverbrechen thematisiert. So werden etwa in Deutschland immer wieder kulturelle Rechtfertigungen von Angeklagten geäußert, die sich wegen der Tötung meist ihrer Schwestern beziehungsweise Töchter verantworten müssen, deren als zu (sexuell) freiüig oder westlich empfundener Lebensstil die Ehre der Familie verletzt habe (vgl. Maier 2009; zu Problematik der Ehrenmorde siehe Wikan 2003).

Einen prominenten Fürsprecher fand das Konzept der *Cultural Defense* im ehemaligen Vizepräsident des Deutschen Bundesverfassungsgerichts, Winfried Hassemer (2009). Er forderte dazu auf, im Fall von Ehrendelikten das „normative Bewusstsein“ des Täters mit zu berücksichtigen und diesen Verbrechen nicht zwangsläufig niedere Beweggründe zu unterstellen, mit der Folge, dass diese nach Deutschem Recht nicht als Morde, sondern als Totschlag gewertet und ein gemindertes Strafmaß nach sich ziehen würden: „Das ist modern und menschenfreundlich, wenn man sagt: Ich nehme Rücksicht auf den Zustand eines normativen Bewusstseins“ (ibid.).

Während Befürworter rechtspluralistischer Ausdifferenzierungen normativer Heterogenität meist auf die Unumgänglichkeit solcher Entwicklungen verweisen (siehe Williams), d.h. mit pragmatischen Gründen operieren, zeichnen sich Proponenten des *Cultural-Defense*-Zuganges dadurch aus, dass es ihnen explizit um eine Problematisierung der herrschende Rechtskultur aus der Perspektive von Fairness und Gerechtigkeit geht (vgl. auch Harvard Law Review Association 1986). Exemplarisch dazu die US-amerikanische Vordenkerin der *Cultural Defense*, Renteln: „Cultural differences deserve to be considered in litigation because enculturation shapes individuals' perceptions and influences their actions. The acquisition of cultural categories is largely an unconscious process, so individuals are usually unaware of having internalized

<sup>1</sup> Begründet wird dieses Verbot von den meisten Gelehrten mit einem Koranvers, wonach Gott niemals die Ungläubigen über die Gläubigen herrschen lasse, es erhebt sich jedoch erst unter Berücksichtigung der männlichen Vorrechtsstellung im islamischen Recht. Eine andere Begründung des Eheverbots liefert hingegen der einflussreiche Scheich Yusuf Al-Qaradawi. Ihm zufolge beruhe Ehe auf einem harmonischen Miteinander, die islamische und nicht-islamische Lebensweise aber könnten nicht unter einem Dach koexistieren (Al-Qaradawi 1989: 157).

them“ (Renteln 2009: 62). Dieses Fairness-Ideal spricht auch aus dem Vorschlag einer Schweizer Expertenkommission, der 2007 ebenfalls zugunsten einer *Cultural Defense* argumentierte, dass die fremde Herkunft von Straftätern mildernd zu berücksichtigen sei (zit. in Frischknecht 2009: 72). Der Vorschlag im Wortlaut: „Der Richter mildert die Strafe: [...] wenn seine Lebensgeschichte oder fremde Herkunft dem Täter rechtmäßiges Verhalten ausserordentlich erschwert hat“ (ibid.).

Auch in Österreich führte 2010 die Verurteilung eines türkisch-stämmigen österreichischen Staatsbürgers wegen versuchten Totschlages seiner sich in Trennung begriffenen Frau zu heftigen Diskussionen zumal das Urteil folgende Begründung für die rechtliche Qualifikation der Tat beinhaltete: „Gerade Ausländer oder Personen mit Migrationshintergrund befinden sich häufig in besonders schwierigen Lebenssituationen, die sich, auch begünstigt durch die Art ihrer Herkunft, in einem Affekt entladen können. Obwohl Affekte von Ausländern in Sittenvorstellungen wurzeln können, die österreichischen Staatsbürgern mit längerem Aufenthalt fremd sind, können sie noch allgemein begreiflich sein“ (zitiert in Seeh 2010).

Die *differentia specifica* des Deliktes Totschlag im Unterschied zu Mord liegt im Tatbestandsmerkmal der „allgemein begreiflichen heftigen Gemütsbewegung“. Mit diesem Urteilsspruch wird signalisiert, dass das Verhalten des Mannes – qua seiner Kulturalisation – allgemein begreiflich, sprich, es gleichsam natürlich sei, für einen Menschen seiner Wertprägung mit Gewalt auf die Trennungsabsichten einer Frau zu reagieren. Unabhängig von der Kritikwürdigkeit einer solchen Urteilsbegründung im Sinne einer Stereotypisierung weiter Bevölkerungsteile (vgl. auch Phillips 2009) wird dadurch die Verbindlichkeit grundsätzlich universal gültiger Normen insofern eingeschränkt, als es demnach offenbar Menschen gibt, denen aufgrund ihrer Kultur und Sozialisation nicht zugemutet werden kann, nach denselben strengen Maßstäben beurteilt zu werden wie autochthone Staatsbürger.

### 3. Demokratische Rechtfertigung: fair genug?

Der kurze Überblick über aktuelle Diskurse um Multikulturalität und Recht zeigen deutlich, dass kritische Anfragen an die Legitimität rechtsmonistischer beziehungsweise universalistischer gouvernementaler Strukturen nicht nur von Außen vorgebracht werden, sondern aus der Mitte der Gesellschaft. Man könnte diese Anfragen damit abzutun gedachten, indem man auf die gewachsene Stabilität der herrschenden normativen Ordnung sowie der Verbindlichkeit von Menschenrechtsregimen (die Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention gilt nicht nur in Österreich im Verfassungsrang) weist. Damit wird jedoch die eigentliche Problematik zurückgewiesen, noch bevor sie sich in ihrer Dringlichkeit entfalten und verstanden werden kann. Aus philosophischer Sicht jedenfalls lassen sich Normen noch nicht dadurch rechtfertigen, dass ihre faktische Gültigkeit im juristischen Sinne betont wird. Gerade die Diskurse um Rechtspluralismus und *Cultural Defense* fordern dazu auf, sich den Grundlagen der Gültigkeit zuzuwenden: Woran hängt diese schließlich, woran machen wir sie fest? Mit welchem Recht im Sinne von Legitimität im Unterschied zur Legalität zwingen wir Menschen mit der vollen Durchsetzungskraft der Rechtsordnung Normen zu entsprechen, die auf Werten basieren, die sie so nicht teilen?

Eine erste mögliche Antwort wäre der Hinweis auf das höhere Recht der so genannten autochthonen Bevölkerungsteile ihre traditionellen Werthaltungen und Prinzipien

in der Rechtsordnung des Staates verwirklicht zu sehen. Unabhängig davon, dass diese Rechtsordnung bisher keine Vorrechte von Staatsbürgern kennt, die sich auf Abstammung gründen, ist offen, wie lange ein solches Argument Schlagkraft besitzen könnte: Wie lange müssten Zuwanderer hier ansässig sein, um verlangen zu können, dass die Rechtsordnung auch spezifischen Werten ihrer Traditionen Rechnung trägt?

Eine weitere Möglichkeit bestünde darin, diesen Personengruppen abzusprechen, dass es sich bei den von ihnen betonten Werte- beziehungsweise Rechtssystemen überhaupt um berücksichtigungswürdige Faktoren handelt, da diese (partiell) einer absoluten moralischen Wahrheit, konkret der Idee universaler Menschenrechte, widersprechen. Deren Erzwingbarkeit würde dann damit gerechtfertigt, dass man sie als in einem absoluten Sinn, unabhängig vom Dafürhalten Einzelner oder sogar ganzer Gruppen, als vorzugswürdig ausweist. Ihr Anspruch auf Verbindlichkeit liegt dann nicht in einem empirischen Konsens oder einer bestimmten Art der Rechtserzeugung, sondern in ihnen selbst, ihrer inhärenten Güte.

Die Schwierigkeit dieser Position liegt darin, dass sie sich nicht auf Konflikte innerhalb demokratisch verfasster Systeme anwenden lässt: In Ordnungen, in denen es, wie es in unserer Bundesverfassung heißt, alles Recht vom Volk ausgeht, kann das Gute schlichtweg kein Geltungskriterium sein. In demokratischen Ordnungen gelten Normen per definitionem nicht weil sie richtig oder wahr sind, sondern werden ausschließlich voluntaristisch gerechtfertigt. Gustav Radbruch nennt dies die Notwendigkeit des demokratischen Systems den „gordischen Knoten“, d.h. die unversöhnlichen, unentscheidbaren weltanschaulichen Überzeugungen, mit dem „Schwert“, d.h. dem Mehrheitsvotum „zu zerhauen“ (Radbruch 2002: 300). Möglich wäre die Rechtfertigung bestimmter Normen unter Verweis auf deren Wahrheit allein in Systemen, in denen Einzelne oder Gremien als Garanten oder Wächter des – nicht selten religiös fundierten – Guten und Richtigen die Volkssouveränität beschränken.

Ein anderer Weg wäre daher die Rechtfertigung mittels der eigenen Überzeugung, die an kein absolutes Gutes rückgebunden, nur auf das aus eigener Perspektive relativ Gute und Richtige verweisen kann. Wie aber kann es fair sein, ein solches relatives Gutes in Gesetze zu kleiden und allgemein vorzuschreiben? Müsste man sich fairerweise nicht aller Vorgaben enthalten zugunsten eines wertneutralen Staates? Nach Joseph Raz kann die Idee staatlicher Neutralität entweder verstanden werden als Auschluss von Idealen (“exclusion of ideals”) oder als Neutralität zwischen unterschiedlichen Idealen (“neutrality between idols”) (Raz 1986: 134f).

Dass aber ein Staat sich jeglicher Ideale und Versionen des Guten entziehen kann, ist völlig unmöglich, da er selbst rechtfertigungsbedürftig und gerade kein Selbstzweck ist. Aus moderner Sicht ist ein Staat dann legitim, wenn er grundlegende Interessen beziehungsweise Rechte des Menschen schützt und gerade hier ist keine Neutralität möglich. Schwierig bleibt aber auch das Neutralitätsverständnis im Sinne einer Äquidistanz zu verschiedenen Versionen des Guten. Selbst wenn man sie so versteht, dass ein Staat keine materialen Voraussetzungen festlegt, sondern es dem demokratischen Spiel der Kräfte überlässt, Versionen des Guten und Ideale in die Rechtsordnung abhängig von jeweiligen Mehrheitsverhältnissen einfließen zu lassen, kann er diesen gegenüber spätestens in der Um- und Durchsetzung gerade nicht neutral sein.

Wenn man sich den theoretischen Weg der Entscheidungsfindung demokratischer Ordnungen vergegenwärtigt, könnte man an die Kritiker universal verbindlicher Normen und universaler Beurteilungsstandards die Frage richten: Ist denn die diesem System inhärente Fairness, wonach jeder Staatsbürger gleichermaßen seine Werthaltungen in die Rechtsordnung einzuspeisen versuchen darf, nicht ausreichend? Vielleicht würde dann entgegnet, dass diese grundsätzlich faire Ordnung Minderheitenpositionen eben *systematisch* benachteilige und zugewanderte Staatsbürger daher nicht dieselbe reale Chance haben, auf die herrschende Rechtsordnung Einfluss zu nehmen. Diese Argumentation erschien jedoch aus einem Bekenntnis zum demokratischen Prinzip der Gleichheit heraus bedenklich: Demokratie gewährt zwar grundsätzlich dieselbe Möglichkeit der Mitbestimmung, kann aber – wenn sie vom Axiom der allgemeinen Gleichheit der Menschen im Sinne der Gleichwertigkeit ihrer Willensäußerungen nicht abgehen will – nicht gewährleisten, dass faktisch alle Willensäußerungen gleichermaßen wirksam werden.

Die Implikationen, die um einer solchen Haltung der demokratischen Fairness willen erkauft werden, mögen für viele nicht nur auf den ersten Blick unbehaglich erscheinen: Vertreter einer einheitlichen, auf gleichen und individuellen Menschenrechten basierenden Rechtsordnung müssten bereit sein, auch Befürwortern des Rechtspluralismus etwa in Bezug auf den Islam oder Fürsprechern eines kulturalisierten Strafrechtes zuzustehen, ihre Positionen mit demokratischen Mitteln durchzusetzen. Dieses Zugeständnis mag im Bewusstsein eines noch vorhandenen, breiten Konsenses in bezug auf die eigenen Ideale theoretisch leicht zu erbringen sein. Sein Testfall wäre dann gerade nicht der hypothetische Annahme von Mehrheitsverschiebungen, sondern deren praktische Verwirklichung in ferner oder fernerer Zukunft. Bis dahin bleibt es eine wohl undankbare, aber nichtsdestotrotz wichtige Aufgabe der Philosophie, Geltungs- und Rechtfertigungsfragen jenseits des Beruhigungszusammenhangs rechtlicher und rechtspolitischer Selbstverständlichkeiten durch – und vorauszudenken.

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# The Origin of Consciousness and the Breakdown of Private Language

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## 1. Jaynes in Kirchberg

Very nearly 30 years ago, in 1984, Julian Jaynes gave a lecture here in Kirchberg where he summarized his theory on the origin and nature of consciousness, a theory that he had introduced in his best-selling book *The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind*.

He proposed what has been called the “rarest of things: an absolutely original idea” (Stove 2006: 271). His main hypotheses was that consciousness is based on language and that consciousness developed only around three thousand years ago and is in fact a cultural construction. This alone was original and shocking enough, it not only meant that little children and all animals were not conscious but even our ancestors who built pyramids and invented written language were denied the gift of consciousness.

In addition he postulated a preconscious mentality he called bicameral mind, based on a double brain neurological model (people hallucinated the voices of dead rulers giving orders on how to behave in stress situations). He explained the origin of religion, schizophrenia, and he had some definite views on the origin and function of language. A lot of the evidence he drew from his reading of ancient texts analysing for example the difference between the Iliad and the Odyssey. No wonder he himself called his theory preposterous (Jaynes 1976: 76). If true, his views should have had an impact on science comparable only to Darwin, Galileo or Freud.

But more than 30 years after the publication it seems that Jaynes has left few traces. In the vast literature on consciousness he is all but ignored. If he is mentioned even by someone who has obviously absorbed some Jaynesian thought as Antonio Damasio or Daniel Dennett then only in passing or he said to be seen as idiosyncratic and indeed eccentric and treated as a straw man listed among “hardliners” more or less denying the existence of consciousness. (Donald 2001: 35).

The fact that Jaynes is not discussed more widely these days can be explained in a number of ways (see Kuijsten 2006). One of the main reasons, it seems to me, why people do not embrace his theory of consciousness is that it is contrary to a paradigm of science that seems to indicate that man is meant to be removed further and further away from the position he once held as crown of creation. And even worse, it is easy to misread Jaynes in a way that makes his theory ethnocentric.

But few, if any of his main arguments, have actually been proven wrong. And so he might still like Copernicus, or Mendel or Wegener before him be recognized later on.

When I was sitting here listening to Jaynes all these years ago, I thought that Jaynes had deliberately chosen to talk here because he felt that he would find open minds among philosophers used to the unconventional ways of Wittgensteinian thinking. In fact, he was invited to give the

lecture and probably did not give too much thought on the audience he was going to face here.

In a way a philosopher like Wittgenstein, who claimed not to be interested in building up a theory or starting a school but limited himself to asking questions and making us mistrust our deepest philosophical convictions could not be more different from a psychologist like Jaynes who gave us a huge theory with impact not only on philosophy but also on neurology, psychiatry, history and religion among other fields. The difference in style is enormous. Whereas Jaynes is crystal clear, maybe a bit on the pompous side (“Lo, and behold”) Wittgenstein was terse but enigmatic even though he used simple everyday language. Still, there were a lot of things Jaynes had in common with Wittgenstein it seemed to me. And I promised myself that I would work out some of these common traits in the thinking of these two men.

## 2. The Problem of Other Minds

There are two very different views to the question which creatures are to be counted among the ones possessing consciousness.

One school claims that it is doubtful that other conscious minds exist at all. Here is how John Stuart Mill poses the question: “By what evidence do I know, or by what considerations am I led to believe, that there exist other sentient creatures; that the walking and speaking figures which I see and hear, have sensations and thoughts, or in other words, possess Minds?” (Quoted by Malcolm 1966: 371)

His answer is that the conclusion can be drawn by analogy. Since other people seem to behave as he does in certain circumstances he is obliged to conclude that their bodily actions are caused by feelings. He cannot perceive their feelings though and is granting the possibility that other people are automata.

Descartes, of course, after a clever train of thought having convinced himself that he himself exists could only arrive at the conclusion that other people like himself existed by the detour of proving the existence of God first and by being sure that God would not deceive us by populating the world by demons who just behaved like he does. The same, unfortunately, could not be said about animals that were seen by Descartes indeed as automata.

The other school sees consciousness nearly everywhere. John Searle, for example, lets us know: “My dog, Gilbert, is plainly conscious....” (Searle 2011) Thomas Nagel famously thought that we do not know what it is to be like a bat but he was very sure that the bat does know. Only extremists, he says, have been prepared to deny the existence of consciousness even for other mammals (Nagel 1974).

In this sense Jaynes certainly is an extremist. He denies that consciousness evolved through natural selection and

that human consciousness differs only in degree from the consciousness of our fellow creatures.

### 3. What consciousness is not

Not surprisingly Jaynes's solution of the problem of the origin of consciousness starts with a clarification of the notion of consciousness.

He insists that consciousness is not to be equated with sense perception. It is not what he calls reactivity, it is not a copy of experience. Otherwise, how could I imagine things I did not experience? Even in conscious memory we do not relive some thing that happened to us but we reconstruct it. In his lecture he asked his audience to think of the last time they were swimming. And I, for sure, saw myself swimming from a bird's perspective. "Memory is the medium of the must-have-been" (Jaynes 1976: 30). Consciousness is not necessary for learning. All types of learning, he says, conditioning, motor learning and instrumental learning can occur without awareness or assistance from consciousness. He does not deny that consciousness often plays a role in learning. We decide what to learn, we give ourselves rules how to learn or go through the steps of a task to "see" were we are mistaken. But this is not learning. The same, Jaynes thinks, is true for thinking and reasoning. What does happen consciously is that we give us the instruction (Jaynes decided to use a technical term "strunction" for this) for example to solve a particular problem. Whether we have to judge which of two coins is heavier or to solve a complicated mathematical problem, the actual process of reasoning "the dark leap into huge discovery [...] has no representation in consciousness." (Jaynes 1976: 44)

Finally Jaynes says that it is an illusion that we are always conscious. We cannot be conscious of what we are not conscious of. His favourite metaphor is the flashlight in a dark room searching for something that is not illuminated.

This goes almost back to a radical behaviourist position. And Jaynes admits it does. His conclusion is that it is perfectly possible that a race of men existed that spoke and judged, reasoned and did most of the things we do but who were not conscious. And indeed he wants us to believe that humans once were not conscious and not too very long ago.

But if we need not to be conscious what is the advantage of being conscious? And what is consciousness and how did it originate? Before answering this let us see what Wittgenstein has to say about consciousness.

### 4. Wittgenstein on consciousness

Wittgenstein rarely uses the word "consciousness" in a technical sense. "Could one imagine a stone's having consciousness?" (PI § 390) he asks and if so why should that be of any interest to us? And the "feeling of an unbridgeable gulf between consciousness and brain-process: how does it come about that this does not come into the considerations of our ordinary life?" (PI § 412)

Typically Wittgenstein asks how the word consciousness is used:

Human beings agree in saying that they see, hear, feel, and so on (even though some are blind and some are deaf). So they are their own witnesses that they have consciousness" – But how strange this is! Whom do I

really inform, if I say "I have consciousness"? What is the purpose of saying this to myself, and how can another person understand me? (PI § 416)

He goes on explaining that expressions like "I see" or "I hear" or "I am conscious" do have their uses for example when I am telling it to someone who thinks I have fainted.

But is being conscious or having consciousness a fact of experience? "But doesn't one say that a man has consciousness, and that a tree or a stone does not? – What would it be like if it were otherwise? – Would human beings all be unconscious? – No; not in the ordinary sense of the word." (PI § 418)

This is followed by a puzzling paragraph:

In what circumstances shall I say that a tribe has a chief? And the chief must surely have consciousness. Surely we can't have a chief without consciousness! (PI § 419)

If this last remark is meant ironically, which to me does not sound implausible, we would have a good authority backing up Jaynes in thinking that there could have been a world in which people were not conscious.

### 5. The advantages of consciousness

Although, according to Jaynes, a civilization is possible were consciousness is unknown it does not follow that a conscious person is not very different from an unconscious one. Consciousness, for one thing means, the ability to give one self *strunctions*. But in addition it builds duplicates or extensions of already existing mental phenomena.

In addition to feeling pain a conscious being is able to suffer. He can concentrate instead of just giving attention. The anger of a non-conscious being can develop into hate through consciousness. Fear can become anxiety. Shame can be transformed into guilt. Out of affection grows love etc.

These new mental abilities are all analogs of their pre-conscious counterpart. And whereas pain and anger can be described and understood in a behaviouristic way their counterparts cannot. But who is it who suffers and who hates? Just as consciousness creates the analog of pain it creates the analog of the self that feels pain it creates an analog "I". "There is nothing in consciousness that is not an analog of something that was in behavior first." (Jaynes 1976: 66)

It is obvious that these mental abilities have their uses. Instead of fighting when angered and risking to be killed I can have my analog I do the fighting in a fantasy. I can wait till the anger disappears or until it transforms into hate that I can hide until maybe at later time I can have my revenge when circumstances favor me. Jaynes gives the example of a man watching his wife being raped.

But how do these analogs come into existence? Jaynes answers: By the power of metaphor.

Understanding according to Jaynes always means substituting some unknown thing by something we are more familiar with. The explanation of thunderstorm for example by reference to battling gods is perfectly legitimate. It makes a strange phenomenon familiar. And for thousands of years a better explanation was neither needed nor looked for. The important thing of any explanation is that the explained thing changes the meaning of the explaining thing. Once thunderstorm is linked to battling gods it be-

comes part of the meaning of a god to have the ability to create thunderstorms.

Jaynes uses some technical jargon to make this clear. The metaphor consists of what he calls a metaphrand, the unfamiliar that is illuminated by the more familiar metaphier.

With every (complex) metaphor there are associations and attributes attached that he calls paraphiers and these project back as the paraphrands of the metaphrands.

Which just means that once the connection between god and thunderstorm is established, any aspect of the one will flashback and change the concept of the other. So when someone gets killed by lightning it becomes an aspect of the god to kill and from this it is an easy step to interpret the killing as punishment. Once the concept of a punishing god is established bad luck in hunting will be explained by the wrath of god and someone will come up with the idea to offer sacrifices.

Now, when someone uses the metaphor “see” for the finding, for the arriving at a solution of a problem the seeing is a metaphier of our physical world applied to the “otherwise inexpressible mental occurrence” (Jaynes 2012: 159). The word “see” carries with it the association of space and so space becomes a paraphrand of the mental event. The spatial quality becomes, so Jaynes wants us to believe, with constant repetition the functional space of our consciousness: mind space.

And with the next step an analog to the physical body that sees is developed, an analog “I” that does the seeing in mind space.

The important thing in the ability of metaphors to create new entities is that at a certain point the new entity, the analog, can become more familiar, more real, than the original. “For a map-maker the metaphrand is the blank piece of paper on which he operates with the metaphier of the land he knows and has surveyed. But for the map-user, it is just the other way around.” (Jaynes 1976: 59) The map is the familiar that helps to understand the land. And so consciousness can in a sense become more familiar than the world leading in extreme cases to idealism.

## 6. Language

Without language there cannot be consciousness, this is the main idea of Jaynes. But more than this, there could very well be language without consciousness. And Jaynes thinks that for thousands of years this was the case.

Consciousness cannot exist without a living language and consciousness has to be learned. A child, Jaynes says, could even today be raised in a way that it would not develop consciousness. But a child learning language will also learn to develop the analog “I” and the other components of consciousness. This is done partly by drilling. People will ask the child “Do you remember this and that”. What the child learns then is that there is an “I” that is supposed to do the “remembering”. And since there is no “I” in the first place it will construct one. And of course the child learns by watching. People seem to be able to not only do what they are told to do, but they can make their own deci-

sions. They judge, before doing something, what might be a likely outcome of an action and they adjust their doing accordingly. This is something that every child will learn to mimic. And after a while the mimicry will become the real thing.

If all this is true then it is clear that Mill or Descartes are fundamentally wrong. It is senseless to doubt the existence of other minds since my own mind is only created thanks to my parents and my society implanting the “I”.

But are there not “inner” experiences? Experiences independent of language and anything we have learned? Like the pain that I feel? And isn’t the public language I am using to communicate not just a sometimes insufficient tool to explain my thoughts to the world?

How could I have the feeling that something is on the tip of my tongue? Does this not prove that in a way I know what to say is logically prior to language, like some kind of private language that only gets translated?

These, of course, are exactly the questions Wittgenstein deals with.

Interestingly, Wittgenstein quotes William James who mentions a deaf-mute who claimed to have had thoughts about God and the world in his youth before he was able to speak.

And Wittgenstein asks: “Are you sure – one would like to ask – that this is the correct translation of your wordless thought into words?” (PI § 342) Helen Keller, of course is the witness for the defence. She testified that she was not fully conscious before she had learned language (see Donald 2001, who thinks that Keller was naïve in thinking she was not conscious.)

“But doesn’t what you say come to this: that there is no pain, for example, without *pain-behaviour*? – It comes to this: only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious.’ (PI § 281)

And when he gives the objection “But in a fairy tale the pot too can see and hear!” he answers: “Certainly; but it can also talk.” (PI § 282)

Again and again Wittgenstein struggles with the claim that there must be inner processes.

If I only pretend to be weak, for example, in order to rob the man helping me that must be more than just behaviour. There must be an internal difference. And the proof is that I can admit my crime. This is true, says Wittgenstein, but he calls the “inner process” a dangerous metaphor. Does it follow that the intention was some kind of internal process? (RPP, I 824)

“Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren’t you at bottom really saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction?” – If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction.’ (PI § 307)

And this in the end is exactly what Jaynes says. There is nothing in consciousness that was not in behaviour before. So in a sense consciousness is a grammatical fiction.

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# Wittgenstein and the Nonsense of Existential Queries

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Y la vida siguió, como siguen las cosas  
que no tienen mucho sentido...<sup>1</sup>

## 1. Introduction

The meaning-of-life questions are one of the most common topics in philosophy. It is possible to say that they are as old as philosophy is, but, nevertheless, they seem to be unsolvable. Eagleton has referred to them as these inevitable "high-wire-act-across-an-abyss" queries (2007: 33). They seem to be so deep, that almost everyone who raises them is led to an existential abyss of nonsense and absurdity. On the other hand, posing them appears to be inevitable. According to this author, inquiring after them is a permanent possibility for human beings, which makes us the kind of creatures we are, even though there are no easy answers (*ibid.*: 25).

Giving these complexities, being aware that referring to this topic is an ambitious task without any guarantee of success or originality; I will raise these queries again, and relate them to the Wittgensteinian thought.

Although we must consider the two different periods that usually have been distinguished in the philosophical production of this author, I would like to suggest some continuity in his work, especially when related to his critical considerations about these questions.

## 2. Sense and nonsense in the *Tractatus*

The stance that the so-called first Wittgenstein maintained about the meaning-of-life queries is well known; but to answer the question raised in this paper, it is important to recall that he rejected in his first work the possibility of expressing these concerns.

As stated in the *Tractatus*, it is impossible to formulate any query about the sense of the world, because the only problems that humans can solve are those that can be raised and answered, i.e. the scientific problems (6.51). We can just express with our language *how* the world is, and that is a task for science (6.432). Therefore, the only expressable truth corresponds to the totality of natural sciences (4.11). On the contrary, the knowledge *that* the world is, its sense, cannot be expressed. As Wittgenstein maintained: "The sense of the world must lie outside the world" (6.41).

According this interpretation, the only task for philosophy is to make clear and delimit sharply thoughts, which otherwise would be opaque and blurred (4.112); and its right method would be "to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science" and when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, demonstrate that he had given no meaning to certain signs (6.53). Therefore, expressions such as "the world as a whole" should be dismissed as nonsensical<sup>2</sup>.

Does it mean that we must just avoid the existential queries, because of their nonsensical character?

No, because Wittgenstein also stated that: "even if all possible scientific questions are answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at all. Of course there is then no question left, and just this is the answer" (6.52). And he concludes this argumentation asserting that: "the solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of this problem" (6.521); then, all that remains is the silence.

But the feeling of the world as a limited whole (not *how* the world is, but *that* it is) still persists; the philosopher identifies it with the mystical attitude (6.44), which cannot be expressed, but can be shown (4.1212). And moreover, the anxiety caused by this feeling cannot be relieved by this nonsensical attribution.

This fact was experienced by Wittgenstein himself as a vital unease (*vid.* for example his war-time diaries); and it also remains as a topic in his subsequent works. For example, the wondering at the existence of the world was emphasized in his *Lecture on ethics* as an example of ethical experience (1965: 8). He maintained that these queries are nonsensical and hopeless, because they try to go beyond the limits of language, which is impossible; but on the other hand, this impossibility is "a tendency in the human mind", which he "cannot help respecting deeply and would never ridicule it" (1965: 12).

Here we face the same problem: an existential concern is banned for its meaningless expression. To clarify this difficulty, we would refer to Hacker's concept of "illuminating nonsense". According to him a proposition is nonsensical if it violates the syntactic rules; then he establishes a difference between misleading and illuminating nonsense: The first happens when a philosopher tries to express what cannot be said and exceeding the limits of the language, his words become gibberish. On the contrary, the illuminating nonsense emerges when the philosopher does not aim to express any truth, but to guide the reader (or the hearer) to apprehend some kind of sense that cannot be said (1972: 18). Hacker also maintains that every proposition of the *Tractatus* is an example of illuminating nonsense, i.e. pseudopropositions that we cannot express properly, and when one recognizes them as nonsensical, one obtains a clearer picture about the world, although they persist as an ethical and ineffable attitude (1972: 29).

This interpretation is supported by the interrogation that Wittgenstein raises at the end of the *Tractatus*: "Is not this the reason why men to whom after long doubting the sense of life became clear, could not then say wherein this sense consisted?" (6.521)

So, according to this approach, our lives have some sense, impossible to express in our language.

<sup>1</sup> "And life carried on, as nonsensical things carry on" (Sabina, *Diecinueve días y quinientas noches*, 1999)

<sup>2</sup> The word chosen by Wittgenstein in 6.54 to design these expressions is "unsinnig". It is translated in the English version as "senseless". I will follow

Hacker who understands as senseless (*sinnlos*) only tautologies and contradictions; and designs every expression that goes beyond these limits as "nonsense" or "absurd" (*unsinnig, absurd*), see Hacker 1972: 17-20, and *Tractatus* 4.45-4.466

As Eagleton has argued, these existential issues cannot be solved by linguistic clarification; by the contrary, they persist as a vital suffrage. Whoever says that his life is meaningless does not mean that he cannot understand it; but probably that he has nothing to live for. In these cases, the linguistic clarification or the nonsensical consideration would not be enough to relieve this unease. As Eagleton says: "they are more likely to reach for the suicide pills than for the dictionary" (2007: 65).

When this feeling of meaninglessness persists beyond the linguistic analysis, when Wittgenstein admits that there is some kind of nonsense that cannot be apprehended by the language, we face a problem without solution. We will see now whether in his later work this problem could be solved (or dissolved).

### 3. The meaning-of-life questions in the later Wittgenstein's work

As we know, Wittgenstein, in his *Philosophical Investigations*, criticised his first theory because he was misled by a problematic illusion. Philosophers (also himself in the *Tractatus*) were captive to an ideal and tried to force reality to adopt this perfect form (1985: 115). But, this is the "dogmatism into which we fall so easily in doing philosophy" (1985: 131). There is not such an ideal picture, to which reality must correspond. On the contrary, our existence is more complex and less perfect than the ideal and poses questions (for example about the meaning of life) which are really important to us, but cannot be answered in this perfect framework. Philosophy is then understood as a therapy against illusions (1985: 133), which avoids the ideal requirements of the logic. What philosopher should do is "to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use" (1985: 116).

So, how could we understand the meaning-of-life queries from this new framework?

Although the later Wittgenstein has not referred to these existential issues, it is possible to allude to his philosophy of the everyday language, to obtain a better understanding about these questions. In this new approach, when the limits of the logic have been blurred into the variable borders of the language-games, we have a new light to understand these existential anxieties:

It is possible to suggest then that the lack of sense that characterizes our lives is just our human and realistic way of existence. On the contrary, the perfection or wholeness that we used to pursue is nothing but a misguided illusion, some excess of ideality that prevents us to accept the contingency of our everyday lives. As Wittgenstein states: "The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity" (1985: 129).

Given this abandonment of the ideal and this acceptance of the everyday contingency, should we accept that our lives are meaningless?

Not exactly, as Eagleton maintains: "life may not have a built-in purpose, but that is not to say that it is futile. The nihilist is just a disillusioned metaphysician" (2007: 102).

This critic to idealism does not lead Wittgenstein's work (neither our lives) to a complete relativism, but a better understanding about our reality. And moreover, as Wittgenstein asserted: "If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty" (1969: 115).

Here we have a significative feature of the language-games, which will help us to understand how these queries articulate our lives. It is possible to identify therefore these existential questions with the Wittgensteinian certainties.

Furthermore, it is interesting to stress how Villarreal has compared the certainties with the illuminating nonsense that, according to Hacker, characterizes the *tractarian* propositions. According to her, there are some "senseless certainties" (2010: 229), whose truth or falsity we cannot know; because they do not say anything about the world, but show something about language. These certainties contain the norms that govern our discourse and behaviour. They do not belong to our language, but constitute what binds language together; and moreover, we cannot call them into question, otherwise our language-games become nonsensical (2010: 235-236).

So, if we call into question these propositions, they become nonsense, but we cannot deny them because they articulate our language. In Wittgenstein's words: They are "truisms never called in question, perhaps not even ever formulated" that can't be isolated from doubt (1969: 87).

Now, we will try to understand this kind of nonsense present in the later Wittgenstein's work and especially related to our lives. As Hacker suggests, the nonsensical consideration of some propositions persists in the *Investigations*, but lighter than before. In this new period, the nonsensical character depends not upon the essence of the world, but upon the rules of language-games, i.e. our linguistic uses and conventional practices, shared by a group of speakers. (1972:154)

But this conventional conception of the language-games does not imply relativism, because some certainties are related to the human existence. As Villarreal states: "The inquiry comes to an end when we understand that the field of certainty exists and constitutes us; but that we cannot make its nature explicit". (2010: 236)

So, if we explicate them, the certainties become nonsense, but we cannot reject them because they constitute what we, human beings, are. For example, and according to the *Investigations*, some propositions such as "this body has extension", move the speakers to reply: "nonsense", but also: "of course" (1985: 253). This expression is on the boundaries of the sense, but we cannot deny it, without denying the kind of beings that we are.

This naturalistic and nonsensical consideration of the language-games is emphasized in *On Certainty*, where Wittgenstein asserts that some certainties are not conventional facts of the language, but the way that the human beings live and understand their lives. According to him: "Language-games are not based on grounds. They are not reasonable (or unreasonable). They are there, like our life" (1969: 559); and we cannot raise doubts about them, because otherwise, our lives would lose their meaning, or in Moyal-Sharrock's expression, their "hinges".

It is possible to identify now the meaning-of-life questions with these universal hinges that delimit our universal bounds of sense. As Moyal-Sharrock describes them, they are the *ungiveable* certainties for all human beings; they belong to the *grammar* of our language-games about our human form of life and constitute our 'universal grammar' (2007: 103). But, if these certainties are "ungiveable" or indispensable, it is not due to some inscrutable sense; but to the contingent fact that we are human beings who live in communities and share a language. As Hacker states, we have inherited forms of linguistic representation, which are "deeply rooted within us as our nature *qua* social beings"

(1972: 166). That is a contingent condition of the human life, which we cannot renounce without giving up what we are.

The meaning of life could be identified therefore with this shared and social sense, and the queries about it turn similar to the sceptic doubt in the cavellian sense: the failure to recognize other persons as equal human beings (1979: 440).

Although we do not have any guarantees about the existence of some ultimate meaning, in order to accept the everyday contingency of the human existence, and proceed with our lives; we must act as if there were some shared and lived sense, otherwise, our practices would lose their significance and our living together would be problematised.

To conclude, these meaning-of-life queries might be understood as a contingent and immanent certainty, produced by the mere fact of living together. This is the social-naturalist interpretation on the later Wittgenstein that Medina maintains. He argues that our languages are contingent because they are historically constituted forms of life, a mutable tradition of shared practices, but this comprehension of our social nature is “as much source of contingency, as source of solidarity” (2003: 90).

According to this interpretation, we must renounce to any crave of transcendentalism and abandon the ideal of a perfect and complete life, to understand our everyday shared lives. Then, we would discover that the only sense is the mere fact of living together, always with conflicts and problems, and without answers.

To conclude, we could quote an Eagleton claim, according to which: “Modernity is the epoch in which we come to recognize that we are unable to agree even on the most vital, fundamental of issues. No doubt our continuing wrangles over the meaning of life will prove to be fertile and productive. But in a world where we live in overwhelming danger, our failure to find common meanings is as alarming as it is invigorating” (2007: 175).

This paper has been written within the research project: “Normativity and action: the contemporary debate after Wittgenstein”. Ministerio de Ciencia Innovación (FFI2010-15975)

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# Absolute Evil and Justice

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## I.

The years pass and still the Nazi extermination camps, the Stalinist purges, the Srebrenica massacre, the crimes of Francoism and the Rwandan genocide challenge us morally, at the same time as questioning our most established legal and political categories. When we raise the question of how we can or should face the above events, we are at the same time recognizing that with many of them there is something that causes us to doubt the mechanisms through which the State has traditionally dealt with illegality. Perhaps it is the magnitude of the evil, the number of victims or the number of perpetrators; perhaps it is intensity of the evil or the intentions of those who were its agents, but its horror strikes us as something unprecedented in human history.

Because traditional categories of thought no longer serve to deal with such realities, when faced with absolute evil we find ourselves trapped by an irresolvable problem, an impasse between the inappropriateness of traditional moral, legal and political categories by which to grasp the reality of evil, and the urgent need to somehow understand it.

In the words of Richard Bernstein: "There is [...] something about evil that resists and defies any final comprehension" (Bernstein 2002: 7), and yet we want and need to comprehend. As Hannah Arendt says, it means "examining and bearing consciously the burden which our century has placed on us – neither denying their existence nor submitting meekly to their weight" (Arendt 2004: 7). This then is the paradox presented by absolute evil: its unfathomable nature set before our imperative to get to the bottom of it, to know the facts, to condemn its agents, to relieve the victims and in time to avoid the repetition of such horrors. To not respond to evil would be tantamount to succumbing to it.

## II.

II.1. Philosophers, political scientists and especially lawyers are uncomfortable with the term "evil". It seems more appropriate to speak of injustice, the violation of human rights and what is immoral and unethical, than of evil. Evil doesn't sound like a legal expression. We like to say that a trial judges not people but their actions, to the extent that these are violations of legal norms.

The word "evil" without further qualification creates discomfort and concern, and categories of evil or declensions of it do not provide any greater peace of mind.

As we know, it was Kant who, in his *Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason*, used the expression "radical evil" to designate an innate human propensity to evil or to refer to a propensity of the will to disregard the moral imperatives of reason (see Kant 1990: 33, 39).

This concept of evil, radical in that it has its roots in human nature, is, however, insufficient to account for the horrors of events in the twentieth century. In the light of the atrocities of totalitarian regimes, evil takes on a new and

terrible significance. Philosophers and thinkers now talk of absolute evil, or of radical evil in the sense of extreme evil, and also, as we know, of banal evil. It is difficult to say exactly what is new about this reality of evil.

For Emmanuel Levinas, the novelty lies in its enormity. The evil of Auschwitz – using Auschwitz as a representation of gratuitous suffering (see Levinas 1991: 108) – is the very essence of excess and in this sense it escapes the possibility of "synthesis" (see Levinas 1992: 158). The aporia of evil is for Levinas the basis for affirming that the difference between good and evil precedes any ontological difference. The transcendence of evil leads us to recognize that the first metaphysical question is not why there is something and not nothing, but why there is evil and not good. The ethical has priority over the ontological; the ontological presupposes the ethical (Levinas 1992: 160).

For Hans Jonas, the novelty lies in the connection between evil and new technologies and their possibilities. The horrors of totalitarianism require a new ethics, in that for the first time in history we have been able to see new technologies transforming nature and the effects of human action; the destruction of the planet and human life is a possibility. New technologies mean that often the consequences of our acts exceed what we foresee. Hans Jonas formulates a new categorical imperative "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life" (Jonas 1984: 11).

Faced with an evil that goes beyond philosophical categories, that places ethics before ontology or that requires the formulation of a new categorical imperative, the concept of responsibility would also seem to be inadequate. Levinas declares the infinite responsibility of each one of us for the unjustifiable suffering of others, a responsibility that puts the life of another before our own, and does not expect any reciprocity. A demanding concept of responsibility that has a clearly supererogatory dimension, i.e. it exceeds all moral categories and, above all, all legal categories. But can we demand sainthood? (see Levinas 1988: 172-73).

According to Levinas, absolute evil generates infinite responsibility. Similarly, though from different suppositions, Hans Jonas confronts us with an overwhelming responsibility.

The thoughts of Emmanuel Levinas and Hans Jonas, and several other thinkers who are faced with the problem of evil as the most important philosophical problem of our time, perplex us. Though they take us forward in our unavoidable effort toward understanding history, they also place us in a position of impotence. We need to comprehend the incomprehensible, think the unthinkable, but we also need guidelines for action, guidelines for action after the disaster. The appeal of Levinas and Jonas to infinite responsibility is presented as a means to prevent certain actions being repeated. But we need to not only understand Evil, to not only try to avoid it, but also to face its consequences: What happens to the victims? What do the perpetrators deserve? How should the political community deal with the ocean of suffering present in our reality? It is here that the work of Hannah Arendt is fundamental. Like

other thinkers, Arendt wants to understand the link between evil and the human condition, and so looks to the origins of totalitarianism. But Arendt also looks at the legal-political problem of dealing with the consequences of horror. She thinks about evil at the limits of the judicial process and in the context of the rule of law. Her theoretical endeavours bridge the philosophical demands of reflecting on evil with the demands of law.

II.2. Like many others, Hannah Arendt describes the evil that marks the 20th century as an evil without precedents. It is an evil that is sometimes described as radical, in a different sense from Kant, and at other times extreme or banal. The radical evil that Arendt describes is that which is born from totalitarianism, and which manifests as a systematic plan for the destruction of the human.

Firstly, prisoners are denied legal status (see Arendt 2004: 577) and the sanctions or punishments inflicted on victims are no longer the consequence of their actions. In a concentration camp there are no rights, but neither is there crime nor punishment. It is a space outside the criminal law system where "the perpetrator does not justify their treatment of the victim, for if they admitted that the damage they cause is just, then they would be appealing to a shared framework of values and norms" (Marrades 2007: 82). Where the principle of responsibility for one's actions is not recognised there is no legal order.

Secondly, concentration camps seek the destruction of the moral personality, the preparation of living corpses (see Arendt 2004: 82), by quashing the ability to choose between good and evil. Thus a totalitarian system destroys the capacity for moral judgement, corrupting all human solidarity. To do good becomes impossible.

Lastly, the destruction of personal individuality is sought through the denial of spontaneity, "man's power to begin something new out of his own resources, something that cannot be explained on the basis of reactions to environment and events" (Arendt 2004: 586). The clearest manifestation of the destruction of individuality occurs when man is reduced to a ghostly doll (a living corpse), whose behaviour is nothing but a bundle of reactions, the last of which is to go robot-like to his own death in the gas chamber. "Erasing the border between the probable and the improbable, so that absolutely anything can be expected. This is one way of expressing the totalitarian ideal of the denial of the individuality of man" (Marrades 2007: 83) and therefore of the plurality of humanity.

The project of making human beings dispensable realities or superfluous defines the idea of genocide. The will to annihilate a people, a group, presupposes considering its members to be superfluous. The genocidal person considers that certain groups of people should disappear from the face of the earth, that the world can do without them, that their presence on earth is entirely superfluous. For this reason, a project to exterminate a people or group of people transcends the victims. It has effects on an understanding of what humanity is and is an affront to humanity itself.

Indeed, the novelty of evil under totalitarianism was not just limited to the terrible fruition of the project to destroy what is human, but included the motivations and intentions of those who participated in the project. To speak of evil inevitably leads us to speak of intention or of culpability.

The intention of the agents of evil varies. In some cases, Arendt identifies terrible but human feelings, such as resentment, sadism, humiliation, greed or lust for power. In

other cases, the evil inflicted is the result of blind adherence to a particular ideology.

In the second case, death or suffering of the victims is not a means to an end and, therefore, the guards are not guilty of violating, in this sense, Kant's categorical imperative. Furthermore, if doing evil is something to train in it loses one of its traditional defining qualities, as it is no longer a temptation. As Arendt herself goes on to say, we are talking about crimes that "are not provided for in the Ten Commandments" (Arendt/Jaspers 1992: 166).

Ten years after the reflections on evil developed in her work *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Hannah Arendt added her thoughts on the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem (see Arendt 1962). In her endeavour to understand what evil is, Arendt adds further reflections on the possibility of bringing evil to justice or of applying procedural rules. Arendt clearly understands that in the Eichmann trial judges faced a new type of crime that offends humanity, and a new type of criminal who is actually a *hostis humani generis*.

Eichmann's trial would show that the crimes of Nazism do not reflect just moral perversions, psychopathic individuals, hate, uncontrolled passions or ideological fanaticism, but primarily "perfectly normal men" acting on the basis of low or extremely shallow or banal interests.

When Arendt observed Eichmann, whose actions led to the death of thousands, she did not see an evil monster but rather a grey official with no particular ideological convictions and with no fervent anti-Semitism. The personality of Eichmann, who never killed anyone with his own hands, contains a key to the understanding of genocide or crimes against humanity. They are processes in which thousands of people contribute, to a greater or lesser degree, to the death and torture of thousands of others. How do we account for normal citizens joining the ranks of betrayal, collaboration, complicity or direct responsibility? Many of them, Arendt shows, acted banally and the terrible evil that they created and inflicted was made possible simply by the thoughtlessness of their decisions, by the suspension of their own judgement, by renouncing, here too, a defining element of being human.

When we talk about genocide or mass violations of human rights, numbers are a defining element. A large number of victims requires a large number of perpetrators. People who lived peacefully until yesterday, today wake up united against a group and in collaboration with the authorities, willing to negate others. If it is not really plausible to imagine people, who until recently lived a normal life, becoming psychopaths in their hundreds, then we must reason that the Eichmann case has greater explanatory power than that confined to his person and actions.

The banality of evil means denying it any depth. It is not epic or great, there is no place in it for the mythical or for superhuman feats. We are not dealing with demonic individuals, but with human beings whom we might describe as "normal" and at the same time agents of absolute evil. Persons in whose actions we see evil separated, terribly, from culpability or intent.

Recognising that absolute evil is a large-scale denial of humanity, made possible through the collaboration of hundreds of people, many of whom are moved by superficial ends, does not help of course with the task of dealing with the consequences of that evil with the rule of law.

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# “Meaning Is Use” and Wittgenstein’s Method of Describing the Actual Use of Words

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In *Investigations* §43, Wittgenstein famously wrote: “The meaning of a word is its use in the language”. In that same book, Wittgenstein also declared: “What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use” (§116). Now this attempt to bring words back to their everyday use is characteristic for one of Wittgenstein’s ways of dissolving philosophical problems. That is, it is typical for Wittgenstein to approach a philosophical problem by asking if the words which figure in the formulation of the problem are ever *used* this way in everyday circumstances. So what we have then, in the *Investigations*, are these two things: (1) A method of dissolving philosophical problems by reminding us of the everyday *use* of words, and (2) a statement of Wittgenstein’s relating the meaning of words to their *use*. Now the question is: What is the relation between (1) and (2)? The answer which appears to be the most natural is this: When Wittgenstein, in §43, is saying that the meaning of a word is its *use* in the language, he is stating a fact which he has arrived at independently of this method. Naturally then, this fact appears as something which can be cited in *support* of our adopting this method – as something which this method assumes as its *background*.

In the following, I wish to point to some things which have gradually led me to question this seemingly natural assumption. What I wish to show in this paper is this: That if we pay close attention to the full wording of *Investigations* §43, it will come out that Wittgenstein’s statement “The meaning of a word is its use in the language” cannot be thought of as standing in any relation of *support* to his method of describing the use of words.

Let me start by turning directly to *Investigations* §43. The famous first paragraph reads:

For a *large* class of cases – though not for all – in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

What I take to be crucial here is that Wittgenstein has drawing on how “we *employ*” the word ‘meaning’. I take this to indicate that “The meaning of a word is its use in the language” is brought in here by Wittgenstein, not as a deep insight into the nature of linguistic meaning, but as a mere *reminder* of how we *actually use* the expression ‘meaning of a word’ in everyday speech. In other words: What Wittgenstein is doing here is asking the question “How would we actually use the expression ‘meaning of a word’?” And the answer he arrives at is this: In large class of cases – though not *all* of them – we use the expression ‘the meaning of a word’ synonymously with ‘the use of the word’.

Let us then turn to the consequences which this analysis of §43 has for our initial idea of “meaning is use” being a fact which can be cited in *support* of our adopting the method of describing the everyday *use* of words – of it being something which this method assumed as its *background*. Let us imagine someone saying the following: “Wittgenstein had noticed that in everyday situations, we very often use ‘the meaning of a word’ synonymously with ‘the use of the word’. Now this realization made him adopt

a method of dissolving philosophical problems which consisted in asking how the words which figure in the formulation of such problems are actually *used* in everyday situations.” What should we respond to this? What I would say is that something is not quite right here. After all, I would insist, the realization that made this imagined Wittgenstein adopt his method is one about how ‘meaning of a word’ is *used in everyday situations*. Now the fact that Wittgenstein is at all minding how we *actually use* the expression ‘meaning of a word’, I would say, makes clear that the method which he supposedly adopted *after* realizing how this expression is actually used – namely, the method of asking how the words which figure in the formulation of a philosophical problem are actually *used in everyday situations* – is *already being applied here*. And from this follows, I would continue, that this story is mistaken in claiming that Wittgenstein had adopted this method as a consequence of his realization that “meaning is use”. For how can this be if this realization has been arrived at by already *making use* of this method? What I would say is that things are exactly the opposite: *First*, there was this method – and *then* came Wittgenstein’s realization that in everyday situations, we very often *use* ‘the meaning of a word’ synonymously with ‘the use of the word’. Yet if this is so, the realization of §43 cannot figure as something which *supports* the adoption of the method of describing the use of words. Like with any method, it would be a *petitio* to claim that the method of describing the use of words could be *supported* by its own application (in this case, its application to the expression ‘meaning of a word’).

Now as a reaction to this argument, one might be inclined to say this: “It appears that the realization that we very often *use* ‘the meaning of a word’ synonymously with ‘the use of the word’ really cannot be something which we could have *before* practicing the method of investigating the *use of words* – since it is in fact a result of our *already practicing* this method. Yet does this argument absolutely rule out the idea that Wittgenstein could have *first* had an insight of the form “meaning is *use*” – and *then* have adopted the method of investigating the *use of words*? For could he not, after all, have arrived at this insight in *another* way than through applying this method?” Let me now show why this doesn’t work. The idea under discussion is this: There is an insight of the form “The meaning of a word is its use in the language” which can be arrived at independently of the method of investigating the actual use of words. Since it is independent from this method, this insight can be had prior to the introduction of this method. It is an insight which this method assumes as its *background*. At the same time, however, this same insight can also be arrived at *through* the method of investigating the actual use of words: by investigating the actual use of the word ‘meaning’, we find that in a great number of cases, ‘the meaning of a word’ is used synonymously with ‘the use of that word’. In order to see the problem with this idea, let us turn to this idea’s premise that there is an insight of the form “The meaning of a word is its use in the language” which the method of investigating the actual use of words assumes as its background. Now by saying that

*this method* assumes "meaning is use" as its background, shouldn't one mean that the investigation of the actual use of any *particular* expression assumes as its background the insight that "The meaning of a word is its use in the language"? That is, shouldn't one mean, for instance, that the investigation of the actual use of 'to know' assumes as its background the insight that meaning is *use*? And likewise, any other investigation of the actual use of an individual word or expression? Let us then consider the case of the investigation of the actual use of 'meaning'. Should we say that also the investigation of the actual use of the word 'meaning' assumes as its background that "meaning is use"? One thing to say would be this: Since this investigation is an investigation of the *actual* use of a word, everything which has been said about the method of investigating the actual use of words applies here, too: Also the investigation of the actual use of the word 'meaning' assumes as its background that "meaning is use". Since, as we could say, 'meaning' is a word like any other: it has a *use*, and – as with any other word – it is the investigation of this *use* that settles the question what this word means. But then again, there is an equally strong inclination not to say that the investigation of the actual use of the word 'meaning' assumes "meaning is use" as its background: for, after all, isn't this the very investigation whose result *coincides* with the fact that "meaning is use" – i.e. coincides with the very fact which the investigation of the actual use of this word is supposed to assume as its background? So how could we say that also *this investigation* – like any of its type – assumed as its background the insight "meaning is use"? Wouldn't this amount to saying that this investigation assumes *itself* as a background? And would this make any sense? So should we say instead that generally, the method of investigating the actual use of words assumed as its background that "meaning is use" – except for the investigation of the actual use of the word 'meaning', for which the idea of such a "background" makes no sense? But then what about our idea that 'meaning' were a word like any other, with a use which we ought to consider in order to settle the question what this word *means*? Isn't our claim that the method of investigating the *use* of words assumes as its background that "meaning is use" equivalent to the claim that *each* investigation of the use of a word assumes "meaning is use" as its background? And isn't the investigation of the actual use of the word 'meaning' just such an investigation? Before we had thought of *what* the investigation of the actual use of the word 'meaning' revealed – i.e. of just *what* the actual use of this word is –, it appeared completely natural to say that the word 'meaning' had an actual use, and that it is this use which determined what this word means. That is, the idea of "meaning is use" being assumed as a background by the question "How would we actually use the word 'meaning'?" appeared completely unobjectionable at this point. Now why should it become objectionable merely because this question yields a certain answer? (Namely, that in a great number of cases, we use 'the meaning of a word' synonymously with 'the use of that word'.) Isn't this a rather awkward conclusion? So should we then say – as we were first

inclined to – that the investigation of the actual use of the word 'meaning' – like any other of its type – does assume as its background that "meaning is use"? But then we are back with the strange thought that the grammatical insight "meaning is use" appears to assume *itself* as its background. Now at this point, we might be inclined to resort to claiming that these two "meaning is use" – the one which we can arrive at through the method of investigating the use of words, and the one we can arrive at independently of it – are indeed quite *different* insights: One about how we *talk* about 'meaning' in everyday circumstances, the other about how things concerning the meaning of words *really are*. Then, the "pre-methodological" "meaning is use" could indeed be the *background* which the investigation of the actual use of the word 'meaning' assumes: Wittgenstein could have first had an insight into what *really* gives words their meaning, and later have found out that as a matter of coincidence, we *actually use* the word 'meaning' correspondingly. But this, of course, would not solve our difficulty: Because claiming this means retreating from our initial claim that Wittgenstein could have arrived at the *insight* of §43 in another way than through applying this method – that is, at the *same* insight, only in a different way. If we claim that there are *two* insights here, we can no longer claim that *this insight* can be arrived at prior to the introduction of this method. What we could still claim is that *another* insight with a different – yet "similar" – content could be arrived at independently of this method. But this would mean to claim that there are two kinds of insights of the form "meaning is use" – with two distinct contents – in Wittgenstein. The question is: Do we really want to saddle Wittgenstein with this idea – just to save the claim that there were an insight of the form "The meaning of a word is its use in the language" which is independent of this method, to be assumed as *background* by this method?

What I intend this argument to show is that the case of the investigation of the actual use of the word 'meaning' reveals a dilemma with which the idea under discussion is faced – namely, the idea that the method of investigating the actual use of words assumed as its background the insight that "meaning is use" (conceived as arrived at independently of this method, but identical with the insight of §43). The dilemma is this: If we say that the investigation of the actual use of the word 'meaning' – like any other – does assume "meaning is use" as its background, then this "meaning is use" cannot be the same insight which we arrive at *through* this investigation – because for "meaning is use" to be assumed as "background" by this investigation, it should be distinct from its *result*. Yet if we say that this investigation does not assume "meaning is use" as its background, we are retreating from our claim that the method of investigating the actual use of words assumed "meaning is use" as its background – because the investigation of the actual use of the word 'meaning' is *just such* an investigation. As I take it, this dilemma calls into question the whole idea of "meaning is use" being assumed as "background" by this method.

# Rule-following is Not a Practice: Wittgenstein's Method of Grammatical Enquiry and the *Blue Book*'s 'last interpretation'

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The late Gordon Baker wrote:

we should presumably take [Wittgenstein] to avoid asking such questions as ... 'What is following a rule?'; and equally avoid giving answers that formulate the essences of these things. Is it reasonable for us to interpret him as asserting ... 'Following a rule must be a social practice (custom)' (§199)? (Baker 2002: 103)

The crucial mistake of the readings I want to discuss lies in the role they ascribe to the apparent paradox in PI § 201 and the resulting reading of the word 'practice' in PI § 202 as constituting a substantial thesis about *what it is* to go by a rule. Norman Malcolm wrote, "the presence of a community of people who act in accordance with rules [is] a necessary condition for there being any rule-following at all" (Malcolm 1989: 6), and, "*following a rule* [...] is a *practice*, a *custom*, an *institution*. It [...] can have its roots only in a setting where there is *a people*" (Malcolm 1989: 23). He goes on: "Undoubtedly this conception provokes great philosophical resistance but this should not prevent us from seeing that it truly is Wittgenstein's conception." (*ibid.*) However, *I think*, it *should*.

The paradox in PI § 201 is widely thought of as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the hypothesis that all rule-following essentially consists in an act of interpretation. Baker and Hacker write: "What the paradox shows is that not all understanding of rules *can* consist in interpreting." (Baker/Hacker 1985, 125) As in the case of the community-view readings, it is partly because of the role they ascribe to the paradox in PI § 201, or so I argue, that Baker and Hacker comment on the role of "practice" in PI § 202 as follows: "A rule is connected with its applications by means of a practice – a normative regularity of behaviour". (Baker/Hacker 1985: 131) But, as will become clear in the course of my argument, this is, *firstly*, to ignore that Wittgenstein is engaged in a *grammatical enquiry*, and, *secondly*, it is to completely misconstrue the nature of the philosophical problem at issue.

## 1. The last interpretation

In the *Blue Book* Wittgenstein discusses the (confused) idea of a *last interpretation*. After having introduced the apparently paradoxical regress of interpretations, in the form of adding arrow after arrow in order to specify the intended direction of an original arrow, he writes:

What one wishes to say is: 'Every sign is capable of interpretation; but the *meaning* mustn't be capable of interpretation. It is the last interpretation.' (BB 34)

From this idea it can be seen why a simple *reductio* argument cannot do the job; the apparent paradox does *not* automatically, as it were, drive one to accept the conclusion that "not all understanding of rules *can* consist in interpreting." (Baker/Hacker 1985: 125) For, instead of *withdrawing* from the interpretation hypothesis, one can be tempted to think that the apparent paradox merely showed that *there must be something like a 'last' interpretation*, i.e.,

one which *somewhat* cannot be interpreted itself. Hence, by considering the idea of a *last interpretation* as it is expressed in the *Blue Book*, we come to see that the alleged *reductio* of PI § 201 might leave the philosophical problem entirely unsolved because it leaves the underlying confusion entirely untouched. Hence, a different strategy is called for.

In PI § 182, Wittgenstein writes:

The criteria which we accept for 'fitting', 'being able to', 'understanding', [and, one may add, 'interpreting'] are much more complicated than might appear at first sight. That is, the game with these words, their use in the linguistic intercourse that is carried on by their means, is more involved – the role of these words in our language is other than we are tempted to think.

(This role is what we need to understand in order to resolve philosophical paradoxes. And that's why definitions usually aren't enough to resolve them ....) (PI § 182)

Thus, what we need to understand are the complex meanings of certain words that are likely to mislead us. However, as Wittgenstein adds, a mere look in the dictionary, a definition, will not suffice to resolve our problems. A more complex method is needed. One essential ingredient of this method is to compare particular word-uses (both real and imaginary ones) by means of detailed description and variation (cf. PI § 122, 130). This is what Wittgenstein has called "*grammatical enquiry*" ("...clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of words..." (PI § 90)), and this, I argue, is also what goes on in PI § 198-202.

In the *Blue Book*, Wittgenstein clearly states the grammatical nature of the problem he is concerned with. As to the bogus idea of a *last interpretation*, he writes:

You have therefore further to tell me what you take to be the distinguishing mark between *a sign* and *the meaning*. If you do so, e.g., by saying that the meaning is the arrow which you *imagine* as opposed to any which you may draw or produce in any other way, you thereby say that you will call no further arrow an interpretation of the one which you have imagined. (BB 34)

The important implication is that all one would be doing by fixing 'the last interpretation' as referring to one's imagined arrow is, not to explain anything, but merely to explicate the way one is going to use the words "interpretation" and "meaning" on future occasions.

Now, such a definition is, in one important sense, completely arbitrary and useless. Yet, in another it might not be picked just randomly. For example, one might have chosen the *imagined* picture to serve as the *last interpretation* because of certain mentalistic tendencies in one's philosophical outlook. This, as we know, is not altogether unlikely. But again, a look in the dictionary, a counter-definition, as it were, wouldn't be of much help in tackling this confusion.

For, these problems "are as deeply rooted in us as the forms of our language". (PI § 111)

Therefore, pace Baker and Hacker, Malcolm and others, it is a *misunderstanding* to suppose Wittgenstein would simply invoke a regress argument in PI § 201, a misunderstanding which, in turn, stems from a failure to appreciate the real nature of the problem Wittgenstein is actually working on, and a misunderstanding which, on the other hand, will naturally lead to a misrepresentation of the philosophical method employed by Wittgenstein in order to solve such problems.

The problem at issue in PI § 201 is one in the form of a confusion stemming from a misunderstanding of certain expressions. This confusion needs to be dissolved by clarifying the meanings of the words involved. One possible way of doing this is to look at particular word-uses from different perspectives in order to highlight the subtle aspects and differences that we are otherwise prone to neglect. (cf. PI § 132) It is – *partly* – as a recommendation of such a perspective, I argue, that Wittgenstein writes in PI § 202: "following a rule' is a practice". He urges us to look at particular cases of rule-following as embedded in particular practices. These are *usually* both communally institutionalised (Malcolm) and involve a certain degree of regularity (Baker and Hacker). Yet this is *nothing more* than a methodological recommendation.

## 2. Following a rule is not a practice

At the end of PI § 201 Wittgenstein distinctively makes a point about the word "interpretation" when saying that, "one should speak of interpretation only when one expression of a rule is substituted for another." The diagnosed *misunderstanding* in PI § 201b is equally one concerning the word "interpretation", rather than a thoughtless unawareness of an allegedly apodictic *reductio* argument. The point is that there is something wrong with the way the word "interpretation" gets used in the paradoxical interpretation hypothesis:

That there is a misunderstanding here is shown by the mere fact that in this chain of reasoning we place one interpretation behind another, as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another lying behind it. (PI § 201)

For this is just *not* how we normally use the word "interpretation". Though, of course, one can easily imagine a game like this. However, exceptions prove the rule.

This further settles the question of the exact back-reference ("thereby") in the following sentence. Instead of referring to the paradox as such, it goes like this:

For what we thereby [, i.e., 'by the mere fact that ....'] show is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is *not* an *interpretation*, but which, from case to case of application, is exhibited in what we call 'following the rule' and 'going against it'. (PI § 201)

It is *crucial* not to be misled by the form of the first sentence; we should *not* take it as a concluding thesis about *what there is*. This is simply to apply one of the basic insights of Wittgensteinian philosophy. Yet it makes all the difference! For it makes the most sympathetic sense of Wittgenstein's own descriptions of his philosophy as being, in one sense, *exclusively* concerned with words, language, meaning, and, what is more, as being utterly non-dogmatic. Moreover, when discussing the idea of a last interpretation we saw that a dogmatic counter-thesis ("not

all understanding of rules *can* consist in interpreting" (Baker/Hacker 1985: 125); "following a rule is 'essentially social'" (Malcolm 1989: 23)) would entirely miss the point. Analogously, imagine we were to give some supposedly convincing examples of very immediate cases of rule-following. That wouldn't do either! Someone inclined to think that rule-following *must* be interpretation might just reply that *still* there would be an interpretation process going on, only very fast, as it were, at the speed of neurons.

Wittgenstein proceeds: "That's why there is an inclination to say: every action according to a rule is an interpretation." (PI § 201) This is an immediate diagnosis of what could possibly cause the confusion. (cf. Baker/Hacker 1985: 126) When philosophising, there can seem to be an ever present possibility of misinterpretation on the side of the rule-follower. If the rule isn't *misinterpreted*, we falsely conclude, it must be *interpreted* correctly.

Note that this diagnosis is also clearly concerned with the use of words, just like the following last sentence of PI § 201: "But one should speak of interpretation only when one expression of a rule is substituted for another." (PI § 201)

This finally leads over to PI § 202: "That's why 'following a rule' is a practice. And to *think* one is following a rule is not to follow a rule." (PI § 202) As a natural continuation of the foregoing this is, in one sense, merely to say that what we call "following a rule" can be something that we *just do*, as opposed to what we'd rather call "attempting to follow a rule", "thinking one is following a rule" or "interpreting a rule".

However, there is no problem with reading this remark also as pointing to the various aspects of our word-use involving community and/or regularity, as Wittgenstein indeed does in many places (e.g. PI § 207). But there is *no* reason to suppose Wittgenstein would promote a thesis either about a certain number of people, or a certain degree of regularity, *necessary* for someone to follow a rule, or correctly be said to do so. Therefore, "rule-following" is *not* really a practice. It is wrong to suppose it *must* be a practice, be it by an appeal to community or regularity, as though in some mysterious sense "practice" could explanatorily mediate between a rule and its application.

## 3. A gloss on the grammar

Still, doesn't Wittgenstein in PI § 198-9 clearly *state* "that a person goes by a signpost only in so far as there is an established usage, a custom"? (PI § 198) – But he doesn't! Instead he introduces this sentence by saying "I have further indicated..." He is replying to a misapprehension of what he said before. And what he said before is equally introduced by a condition. It is simply not a thesis but an *example*: "What sort of connection obtains here? – Well, this one, for example: I have been trained to react in a particular way to this sign, and now I do so react to it." (PI § 198)

Finally, the following paragraph makes the level of investigation unmistakably clear: "And this is, of course[!], a gloss on the *grammar*[!] of the expression[!] 'to follow a rule'." (PI § 199) In other words, all of these remarks are intended to contribute exclusively to Wittgenstein's method of grammatical enquiry "into the workings of our language". (PI § 109) As in PI § 217, Wittgenstein is *not* interested in answering the question, "How am I able to follow a rule?" (PI § 217), but he wants us to recognise the *idleness* of our philosophical question:

Remember that we sometimes demand explanations for the sake not of their content, but of their form. Our requirement is an architectural one; the explanation a kind of sham corbel that supports nothing. (PI § 217)

Analogously, presenting the supposed fact that a "rule is connected with its applications by means of a practice" (Baker/Hacker 1985: 131) as the one great insight into rule-following is just another symptom of the very philosophical confusion Wittgenstein was working on. And this, in fact, Wittgenstein had already worked out quite soon after his return to academic philosophy in 1929. In a conversation with Schlick and Waismann in January 1931 he explained as to the confusions about rule-following:

Here [one] imagine[s] two things connected by a rope. But this image is misleading. For how is the rope connected with the thing? (WVC 155)

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# Radikale Interpretation: ein Argument gegen den moralischen Relativismus

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## 1. Davidsons Argument und seine Übertragung auf den Bereich der Moral

Donald Davidsons Überlegungen zur radikalen Interpretation nehmen ihren Ausgang von einem Gedankenexperiment, das zeigen soll, wie es möglich sein kann, Sprecher einer völlig unbekannten Sprache bloß auf Grundlage ihres beobachtbaren Verhaltens zu verstehen. Zum Verhalten zählt dabei, wie sie sprachlich sowie nicht-sprachlich auf ihre Umwelt reagieren, und zu dieser Umwelt gehören andere Sprecher der fremden Sprache sowie der Interpret. Zu Beginn dieses Interpretationsprozesses wissen wir – als Interpreten – weder, was die Äußerungen der Sprecher bedeuten, noch, welche Überzeugungen diese Sprecher haben. Um überhaupt einen Fuß in die Tür der uns fremden Sprache zu bekommen bedarf es eines besonderen Vorgehens: wir müssen unterstellen, dass die Sprecher der fremden Sprache in weiten Teilen unsere Überzeugungen teilen. Diese Vorgehensweise ist nicht optional, sondern eine notwendige Voraussetzung der Interpretation (vgl. Davidson 1984). Folgendes Beispiel soll dies illustrieren:

Angenommen wir befinden uns irgendwo in arktischen Gefilden und unterhalten uns mühsam mit einem dort lebenden Eskimo. Der Sprache noch nicht wirklich mächtig glauben wir, dass er mit dem Wort „Nanoq“ Möwen bezeichnet, weil er diesen Laut einmal in Gegenwart einer Möwe geäußert hat. Im Lauf seiner weiteren Erklärungen stellt sich allerdings heraus, dass er „Nanoq“ für große weiße Säugetiere hält, die nicht fliegen können, dafür aber auf Robbenjagd gehen. In diesem Fall sollten wir unsere Interpretation seines Begriffes „Nanoq“ überdenken – wahrscheinlich lautet sie: „Eisbär“ – und nicht unterstellen, dass dieser Eskimo Möwen für flugunfähige Säugetiere hält, die Robben jagen. Denn je mehr falsche Überzeugungen wir dem Eskimo attestieren, desto weniger wahrscheinlich ist es, dass wir seine Äußerungen richtig übersetzen.

Eine Folge dieser Einsicht besteht darin, dass auch Meinungsverschiedenheiten nur vor einem Hintergrund geteilter Überzeugungen möglich sind. Um dies wiederum am Beispiel eines fiktiven Eskimos zu illustrieren: nur wenn wir uns darüber einig sind, was Götter und was Eisbären sind können wir uns sinnvoll über die Frage streiten, ob Eisbären Götter sind oder nicht. Da einzelne Überzeugungen in Beziehung zu einem Netz weiterer Überzeugungen stehen, setzt die korrekte Identifikation einer Überzeugung die korrekte Identifikation vieler weiterer Überzeugungen voraus, und deshalb müssen wir viele Überzeugungen mit unserem Kontrahenten teilen, um sicher zu sein, worüber wir uns streiten.

Gilt diese Überlegung ebenso für Meinungsverschiedenheiten über moralische Dinge, dann lässt sich dieser Gedankengang gegen zwei Behauptungen der moralischen Relativisten wenden. Die erste Behauptung lautet, dass empirisch nachgewiesen sei, dass es fundamentale Unterschiede zwischen den moralischen Ansichten verschiedener Gruppen von Menschen gibt, etwa zwischen verschie-

denen Kulturen. Davidsons Argument spricht wider diesen Befund, denn wenn wir die Äußerungen der Sprecher einer uns fremden Sprache als moralische Äußerungen verstehen, dann dürfen sie nicht zu weit von dem abweichen, was wir unter moralischen Ansichten verstehen – sonst haben wir überhaupt keinen Grund zu der Annahme, dass es sich tatsächlich um Äußerungen über die Moral handelt. Folglich kann es keine fundamentalen Unterschiede zwischen den moralischen Ansichten verschiedener Gruppen von Menschen geben.

Die zweite Behauptung der moralischen Relativisten lautet, dass moralische Urteile nicht universell wahr oder falsch sein können, sondern bloß relativ zu den Traditionen, Praktiken oder Weltanschauungen einer Gruppe von Menschen. Davidsons Argument spricht auch gegen diese These: wenn wir die Äußerungen der Sprecher verstehen, dann teilen wir immer schon gewisse moralische Ansichten. Damit wir einen Begriff der uns fremden Sprache mit unserem Begriff „tapfer“ übersetzen, muss es zumindest einige Fälle geben, in denen Übereinstimmung in der Anwendung dieses Begriffes besteht, denn sonst hätten wir gar keinen Anlass, irgendein uns unbekanntes Wort mit unserem Wort „tapfer“ zu übersetzen. Folglich kann es nicht sein, dass moralische Urteile bloß relativ zu den Traditionen, Praktiken oder Weltanschauungen einer Gruppe von Menschen wahr sind, denn in genannten Fällen teilen wir offensichtlich den Maßstab für wahre und falsche moralische Ansichten.

Aber lässt sich Davidsons Überlegung wirklich so einfach auf den Bereich der Moral übertragen?

## 2. Kritik an der Übertragung in Bezug auf dichte ethische Begriffe

Christopher Gowans zweifelt daran, dass dieses Argument tatsächlich auf rein apriorischer Grundlage – also den Überlegungen Davidsons zur Methodologie der radikalen Interpretation – im Bereich der Moral erfolgreich sein kann. Er untersucht, ob das Argument in Bezug auf dichte ethische Begriffe, und ob es in Bezug auf dünne ethische Begriffe funktioniert und kommt in beiden Fällen zu einem negativen Ergebnis (vgl. Gowans 2004).

Seine Überlegung mit Bezug auf den dichten ethischen Begriff „tapfer“ lautet so: Freilich müssen wir uns darin einig sein, dass nur solche Handlungen als tapfer bezeichnet werden, bei denen es, grob gesagt, darum geht, ein Ziel konsequent auch gegen Widerstand zu verfolgen. Doch diese Einigkeit in Bezug auf die Verwendung des Begriffes lässt viel Raum für tiefe Uneinigkeiten darüber, welche konkreten Handlungen tapfer sind. Während Aristoteles unter einer tapferen Handlung das furchtlose Kämpfen im Kriege versteht, glauben wir – als Pazifisten –, dass gerade die Verweigerung des Kriegsdienstes eine tapfere Handlung ist. Laut Gowans besteht hier ein Dilemma: explizieren wir den Begriff „tapfer“ unter Berufung auf die geteilte Überzeugung, dass nur solche Handlungen tapfer sind, bei denen ein Ziel auch gegen Widerstand ver-

folgt wird, dann stimmen wir sicherlich mit den Menschen aus anderen Kulturen überein, aber das schließt nicht aus, dass wir anderer Ansicht darüber sein können, welche konkreten Handlungen als tapfer zu bezeichnen sind. Explizieren wir den Begriff dagegen unter Berufung auf konkrete Handlungen – wie z.B. Aristoteles das laut Gowans vorschlägt –, dann teilen wir offensichtlich nicht den Begriff der Tapferkeit, denn wir als Pazifisten glauben nicht, dass es tapfer ist, in den Krieg zu ziehen. Deshalb, so schliesst Gowans, scheitert die Übertragung des Davidson'schen Argumentes auf den Bereich der Moral mit Bezug auf dichte ethische Begriffe.

### 3. Eine Unklarheit in Gowans' Argument

In Gowans' Ausführungen bleibt allerdings unklar, wie fundamental die Meinungsverschiedenheit zwischen uns als Pazifisten und Aristoteles sein soll. Besteht sie darin, dass wir uns bezüglich *einer konkreten Handlung*, nämlich dieses Kämpfens-im-Krieg, uneinig sind, ob sie tapfer ist oder nicht? Oder besteht sie darin, dass wir uns bezüglich *eines Handlungstyps*, eben des Kämpfens-im-Krieg, uneinig sind? Oder besteht sie darin, dass Aristoteles *alle* die Handlungen, die wir für tapfer halten, für moralisch verwerflich hält? Sicherlich ist die letzte Variante diejenige, die den Relativisten in die Hände spielen würde, denn sie illustriert die Behauptung, dass Menschen aus anderen Kulturen *fundamental* andere moralische Ansichten haben können als wir. Besteht die Meinungsverschiedenheit dagegen nur hinsichtlich eines Handlungstyps oder gar nur hinsichtlich einer konkreten Handlung, dann scheint eine relativistische Erklärung kaum angebracht zu sein, denn solche Meinungsverschiedenheiten kommen sicherlich auch zwischen Menschen aus der gleichen Kultur vor. Aber kann es wirklich sein, dass jemand all die Handlungen, die wir für tapfer halten, für moralisch verwerflich hält?

Das Davidson-Argument spricht gegen diese Möglichkeit. Angenommen, Aristoteles würde den Begriff „andreia“ immer dann verwenden, wenn wir eine Handlung „tapfer“ nennen würden, aber aus seinen weiteren Äußerungen könnten wir schließen, dass er all jene Handlungen für moralisch falsch hält, während wir sie für moralisch richtig halten. Wären wir dann berechtigt, seinen Begriff „andreia“ mit unserem Begriff „tapfer“ zu übersetzen? Um diese Frage zu beantworten muss man zwei Fälle auseinanderhalten: solche Handlungen, die moralisch richtig sind, weil sie tapfer sind, und solche, die moralisch falsch sind, obwohl sie tapfer sind. Dichte ethische Begriffe können nämlich dem Ausdruck einzelner Gründe dienen, die für oder wider die Ausführung einer Handlung sprechen – im Gegensatz zu dünnen ethischen Begriffen, die charakteristischerweise dazu verwendet werden, um ein Gesamturteil auszudrücken, also ein Urteil, in dem die Abwägung zwischen den einzelnen vorliegenden Gründen getroffen wird. Demnach kann es durchaus sein, dass ein Sprecher einer uns fremden Sprache viele der Handlungen, die wir für tapfer halten, für moralisch falsch hält, weil er in ihnen weitere Gründe am Werk sieht, die zuletzt dafür sprechen, dass das Gesamturteil über die Handlung lautet, sie sei moralisch falsch. In solchen Fällen ist es also durchaus möglich, dass der Begriff „andreia“ auch in der Charakterisierung moralisch falscher Handlungen vorkommt und trotzdem mit unserem Begriff „tapfer“ korrekt interpretiert werden kann.

Es ist aber nicht möglich, dass diese Übersetzung korrekt ist, wenn es sich um Handlungen handelt, die deswegen moralisch richtig sind, weil sie tapfer sind. Denn wenn wir eine Handlung für tapfer halten, dann halten wir sie zumindest insofern für moralisch richtig, als dass sie tapfer

ist. Übersetzen wir Aristoteles' Begriff „andreia“ in solchen Fällen mit unserem Begriff „tapfer“, dann würde er laut Übersetzung so etwas sagen wie: „Das war tapfer und deswegen moralisch falsch.“ Dies ist aber kein sinnvoller Satz. Wir sagen zwar, dass eine Handlung tollkühn oder zu wagemutig war und deshalb moralisch falsch – aber dass eine Handlung falsch sein soll, weil sie tapfer ist, das ist ähnlich unsinnig, wie wenn ein Wissenschaftler sagt: „Deine Theorie ist sehr kohärent und deshalb ist sie falsch!“ In solchen Fällen sollten wir also unsere Interpretation ändern, und nicht annehmen, dass Aristoteles unsinnige Sätze von sich gibt. Dann aber gilt: damit wir Aristoteles' Begriff „andreia“ mit unserem dichten ethischen Begriff „tapfer“ interpretieren können, muss es eine ganze Reihe von Handlungen geben, bei denen wir in unserer moralischen Bewertung mit ihm übereinstimmen, denn sonst haben wir überhaupt keine Anhaltspunkte dafür, dass sein Begriff „andreia“ mit unserem Begriff „tapfer“ übersetzt werden soll. Dies zeigt erstens, dass wir den Begriff „tapfer“ nicht wertneutral, oder gar mit einer negativen Wertung verbunden, verstehen können, und zweitens, dass Meinungsverschiedenheiten nur möglich sind vor dem Hintergrund einer gewissen Übereinstimmung in den Urteilen – und genau das ist es, worauf das Davidson-Argument hinweist. Diese Einschränkung sinnvoller Übersetzungen ergibt sich allein aus den methodologischen Überlegungen Davids zur Interpretation und lässt den Schluss zu, dass es nicht sein kann, dass Aristoteles all die Handlungen, die wir für tapfer halten, für moralisch verwerflich hält. Dieses Argument spricht demnach gegen die relativistische Behauptung, dass die moralischen Ansichten von Menschen aus anderen Kulturen fundamental verschieden von den unseren sein können. Meinungsverschiedenheiten bedürfen der Übereinstimmung!

### 4. Was heißt das für den moralischen Relativismus?

Wie sieht die dialektische Lage in der Diskussion um den moralischen Relativismus aus, wenn dieses von Davidson inspirierte Argument tatsächlich gelingt?

Aus der genannten Überlegung folgt wohlgernekt nur, dass wir *einige* moralische Überzeugungen teilen müssen; moralische Relativisten können also darauf beharren, dass eine solche graduelle Übereinstimmung immer noch genügend Raum lässt für tiefgreifende Unterschiede in den moralischen Ansichten verschiedener Gruppen von Menschen. Diesen Weg geht David Wong in seiner neuesten Version des moralischen Relativismus. Er erkennt explizit, dass die an einer Meinungsverschiedenheit Beteiligten schon immer auch geteilte moralische Ansichten haben müssen, besteht aber darauf, dass die unterschiedliche Gewichtung geteilter Werte dazu führt, dass manche dieser Meinungsverschiedenheiten keiner rationalen Lösung zugänglich sind. Es seien gerade solche Fälle, in denen wir die Werte anderer Menschen akzeptieren und teilen, ihnen aber ein anderes Gewicht zumessen, die keiner rationalen Lösung zugänglich sind und deshalb einer relativistischen Erklärung bedürfen (vgl. Wong 2009). Ob an dieser Stelle allerdings wirklich eine relativistische Erklärung adäquat ist scheint fraglich, wenn man bedenkt, dass solche unterschiedlichen Gewichtungen verschiedener Werte auch in den Naturwissenschaften eine Rolle spielen. Die Arbeit von Wissenschaftstheoretikern zeigt, dass konkurrierende Theorien sich in manchen Fällen hinsichtlich ihrer Einfachheit oder der Voraussagekraft unterscheiden: während eine Theorie die einfachere ist, leistet die andere bessere Voraussagen. Beides sind Werte, die man an Theorien schätzt, doch nicht immer sind beide Werte in

einer Theorie vereint. In solchen Fällen muss demnach eine Abwägung darüber getroffen werden, welcher Wert wichtiger ist. Solange diese Überlegungen uns nicht dazu führen, einen Relativismus hinsichtlich der Naturwissenschaften anzunehmen sollte uns auch der Schluss auf einen moralischen Relativismus suspekt sein.

Zuletzt können moralische Relativisten bestreiten, dass es sich bei den ungelösten Meinungsverschiedenheiten z.B. zwischen Vertretern verschiedener Kulturen tatsächlich um echte Meinungsverschiedenheiten handelt. Dann zieht das Davidson'sche Argument nicht. Dieser argumentative Zug ist aber wenig attraktiv, denn es ist doch gerade die Existenz von langanhaltenden und bis jetzt keiner befriedigenden Lösung zugeführten moralischen Meinungsverschiedenheiten, die die Position des moralischen Relativismus allererst motiviert. Mit deren Leugnung sägen moralische Relativisten an dem Ast, auf dem sie sitzen.

Meines Erachtens sollten wir die Existenz solcher Meinungsverschiedenheiten anerkennen und zugleich sehen, dass selbst Menschen mit sehr verschiedenen moralischen Ansichten einen gemeinsamen Grund teilen, auf den sie sich berufen können, um ihre jeweiligen Argumente zu rechtfertigen. Es mag nicht einfach sein, moralische Meinungsverschiedenheiten zu lösen – aber das heißt nicht, dass dies unmöglich ist.

## Literatur

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# New (Re)search Possibilities for Wittgenstein's Nachlass

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## 1. Introduction

„Nur der Satz hat Sinn; nur im Zusammenhang des Satzes hat ein Name Bedeutung“ Wittgenstein writes in the *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* (3.3). But how does Wittgenstein use words himself, what context does he choose in his own sentences?

In this paper we present to the Wittgenstein research community a new Web-based computational linguistic access to the Big Typescript Ts-213 (BT). We developed a special electronic full-form lexicon WITTLex and the tool WiTTFind to search within the BT for special words, sequences of words, parts of sentences and special sentence structures using methods of computational linguistics. Like usual search machines the user communicates via an internet browser with WiTTFind. However the query

possibilities of our tool exceed the possibilities of search engines by far. Our user queries are not limited to word based queries, they can be lemmatized and grammatically structured.

The WWW-address of the tool is: <http://wittfind.cis.uni-muenchen.de>

Figure 1 shows an example of a lemmatized search for the word “sagen”. The tool finds more than 1600 inflected word forms in the BT, which are displayed with the corresponding “Satzsiglum” and the sentence context in the browser.

By clicking on the “Satzsiglum” the user can view our triptych-display showing scans of Wittgenstein’s original double-sided typescript and annotations. (Figure 2)

The screenshot shows the WiTTFind search interface. At the top, there are two input fields: 'WITTFind' and 'sagen'. Below the search results, there are three entries, each consisting of a 'Satzsiglum' (a small thumbnail of the original typescript page), a list of inflected word forms, and a snippet of the sentence context. The first entry is '(Ts-213,v-r[7],1)' with the context '(7) 6 Man sagt: ein Wort verstehten heißt, wissen, wie es gebraucht wird: Was heißt es, das zu wissen? Dieses Wissen haben wir sozusagen im Vorrat. ( S. 22)'. The second entry is '(Ts-213,v-r[10],1)' with the context '(64) 57 Regel und Erfahrungssatz: Sagt eine Regel, daß Wörter tatsächlich so und so gebraucht werden? ( S. 240)'. The third entry is '(Ts-213,v-r[21],1)' with the context '(67) 60 Sage mir, was Du mit einem Satz anfängst, wie Du ihn verifizierst, etc., und ich werde ihn verstehen. ( S. 265)'. The bottom of the interface has a 'Triptychus' button.

Figure 1: Query to WiTTFind

The screenshot shows the Triptychus display. It features three panels: a left panel showing a scan of the original double-sided typescript, a middle panel showing a list of search results (Satzsiglums), and a right panel showing another scan of the typescript with annotations. The top of the interface has a 'Triptychus' button.

Figure 2: Triptychus display: Text and Scans of original double-sided Typescript and Annotations

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## 2. Preparation of the Big Typescript for computational linguistic work

The XML-Transcription of the BT from the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB; the transcription can be downloaded from [http://wab.uib.no/wab\\_hw.page/](http://wab.uib.no/wab_hw.page/)) offers an excellent basis for computational linguistic analysis, but had to be simplified for our work. From the WAB's normalized edition of the Big Typescript we extracted a html-file, which we transformed into the XML-notation CISWAB with the help of several programs written in the programming language PERL (Hadersbeck 2011). Our simplified text-version structures the BT into remarks and sentences, and still contains WAB's coding of line endings, page breaks, text alternations, mathematical notations and all the text phenomena of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Big Typescript considered relevant.

## 3. The electronic full-form lexicon WiTTLex

Successful computational linguistic work relies crucially on the use of an electronic full-form lexicon. For the work with the BT we constructed a special lexicon called WiTTLex. For the development of WiTTLex we were able to use CISLEX (Guenther 1994), one of the biggest German electronic full-form lexica, which has been developed at the Centrum für Informations- und Sprachverarbeitung (CIS) over the last 18 years. WiTTLex includes all words from the normalized BT edition. Each word-entry in WiTTLex is formatted according to the DELA Format, defined at the Laboratoire d'Automatique Documentaire et Linguistique (LADL, Paris) (Gross, G. 1991). The lexicon entries contain the word's full form, lemma, and lexicographical word form, together with flexion and semantic notations (Langer 2005) for frequent words. With the help of WiTTLex search queries to WiTTFind can be processed lemmatized and grammatically. The following lines show a short extract from the lexicon:

```
sagst,sagen.V+refl(a):2eGi
sagten,sagen.V+tr:1mVc:1mVi:3mVc:3mVi
sage,sagen.V:1eVc:1eVi:3eVc:3eVi
Sprachspiele,Sprachspiel.N:amN:deN:gmN:nmN
Zeichen,.EN+Hum+Nachname
```

## 4. The computational linguistic tool WiTTFind

In order to find and display the searched parts of the text, we developed the computational linguistic tool WiTTFind. The long-lasting successful work at CIS with the Corpus Word Processing Tool UNITEX, developed at the Laboratoire d'Automatique Documentaire et Linguistique (LADL) (Pauquier 2002) formed the basis for our tool: We also work with the technique of local grammars (Gross, M. 1997). For highly-efficient pattern-search with local grammars, we implemented finite state transducers (Guenther 2005; Reffle 2011); to access the electronic lexicon very quickly, we use the data-structure HAT-Trie (Akksit 2007). All our programs are written in the programming language C++ as defined in the latest standard C++11 (Hadersbeck 2012). WiTTFind transfers every query to the BT into a local grammar, represents the grammar as a directed graph and translates this graph into an optimized automaton. With the lexicon WiTTLex in the background this automaton analyses every sentence of the BT and tries to match the search query. The text passages which fit the query are displayed with their sentence context and its "Satzsiglum". To enable browser oriented input and

output we use modules of our WEB-tool CisWeb, which has been developed over the last few years at CIS. The tool CisWeb which is programmed in JAVA uses the Google-Web-Toolkit library gwt (Hanson 2007) and can be configured in a modularized way for different computational linguistic tasks. To refine the directed graph of the local grammar, the tool offers a graph-editor.

## 5. Display of hits in the text

Intensive discussions with Dr. Rothaupt (Rothaupt 2006) from the Philosophische Fakultät, Ludwig Maximilians Universität München, showed that transcriptions of the Nachlass of Ludwig Wittgenstein and resulting editions are still part of ongoing research. WAB offers many alternative or complementary editions (see for example the interactive edition format, accessible from [http://wab.uib.no/wab\\_hw.page/](http://wab.uib.no/wab_hw.page/), and Pichler 2010). WiTTFind only works with the normalized edition format of the BT, so we decided to present beside the sentence concordance of the edition-text also the pictures of the scanned original pages of Wittgenstein's typescript. Wittgenstein used front and back page of his typewriter sheets and had typed on the front pages his script and on the reverse side of this typewritten page he typically placed corrections to the opposite page. We programmed a so called triptych-display, which subdivides the browser window into three parts: On the left page, the facsimile of the reverse side of the last page is displayed, in the middle part you see the extracted page of the normalized edition containing the search hit and on the right side you see the facsimile of the front page of Wittgenstein's original typewritten page (see Figure 2). The triptych-display was developed within the Magisterarbeit of Kaumanns: „Entwicklung einer Ideensuchmaschine im Rahmen des Projekts Wittgenstein in Co-text“ (Kaumanns 2012).

## 6. How to query WiTTFind

With the help of the electronic lexicon WiTTLex in the background, the tool WiTTFind can process classic word and phrase queries as well as very complex lemmatized and grammatical search tasks. We developed a special query language which gives users the possibility to define what they are looking for.

## 7. Full form search (Exact Search)

Users who are looking for a specific word or phrase can use the exact search. The input has to be enclosed in apostrophes. The punctuation characters inside the phrase can be suppressed. Figure 6 shows an example with more than 290 hits:




Figure 3: Full-Form-Search

## 8. Lemmatized search for words (Lemma-Word-Search)

With this kind of search, you can find all text passages where morphological variants of the queried word occur.

With the help of the electronic lexicon WiTTLex, our tool can access the lemma for every specified word, and from this lemma it obtains knowledge of all of its morphological variations. If the user specifies for example the word "dachte", it finds the lemma "denken" and from here it finds all the other morphological variants like: "denkt", „denken“, "denkst", „dachten“, „dachtet" and so on (see Figure 4 with more than 260 hits).




Figure 4: Lemma-Word-Search

## 9. Lemmatized search for phrases (Lemma-Phrase-Search)

With this kind of search, the user can enter word phrases and WiTTFind processes every word in lemmatized form. It finds all combinations of morphological variants of the single words of the entered word phrase. This search technique is particularly useful for "non-native" speakers, who are not familiar with all the morphological variants of German words (see Figure 5 with more than 39 hits).




Figure 5: Lemma-Phrase-Search

## 10. Lemmatized search for phrases including punctuation (Lemma-Phrase-Punct-Search)

Punctuation is very important in Wittgenstein's work, so we decided to define the special linguistic tag <PUNCT>, which has to be used in the search phrase. If the user is looking for a text passage, including punctuation, then the user must specify <PUNCT> at the appropriate position of his query.




Figure 6: Lemma-Phrase-Punctuation- Search

## 11. Grammatical Search (Grammar-Search)

Another important piece of linguistic information about a word is its word form. In the lexicon WiTTLex we store for every word its word-form, according to the definitions in the German CISLEX: N for noun, ADJ for adjective, V for verb, DET for determiner, PRON for pronoun, ADV for adverb, PREP for preposition, KONJ for conjunction and EN for proper name. With the help of tags, labeled with the word-forms, WiTTFind can find grammatically defined words

(see Figure 7a with more than 28 hits and Figure 7b with more than 60 hits).



Figure 7a: Grammar-Search



Figure 7b: Grammar-Search

## 12. Search on the level of sentences (Sentence - Search)

Traditional search engines hide the interpretation of search queries from the user and the user can hardly influence this interpretation. For example you can't specify the position of the word or phrase you are looking for within a sentence. With our tool WiTTFind you can search sentences fitting a special grammatical sentence structure. The focus of our work was to offer the user a wide range of possibilities for specifying exact search patterns at different levels of information, namely word, phrase and sentence level. So we defined special linguistic tags for the search with WiTTFind:

- <BOS> specifies the begin of a sentence
- <EOS> specifies the end of a sentence
- <WORD> specifies a word
- <PUNCT> specifies a punctuation mark
- <ALT> specifies an alternate character

The tag <WORD> includes pre- and postponed punctuation marks and can be followed by quantifiers: ?, +, \*{n} and {n,m} to express the number of repetitions of the tag. The meaning of these quantifiers are: '?' the word can occur once or none, '+' : one or more occurrences, '\*' : allows arbitrary (including no) repetitions, '{n}' : exactly n occurrences, '{n,m}' : minimum n and maximum m occurrences.

Figure 8 shows an example for querying on the sentences level: We search for sentences, beginning with the word "ich" and consisting of 7 words:




Figure 8: Sentence-Search

## 13. Summary

In this article we presented a new Web-based access to search and research Ludwig Wittgenstein's Big Typescript Ts-213, based on methods of computational linguistics. We developed the full-form lexicon WiTTLex, which comprises all words of WAB's normalized edition of Ts-213 with their full-form, lemma, morphologic, syntactic and semantic information. To find and display special words, phrases and sentences in the BT, we programmed WiTTFind, together with a query language, which allows the user to specify exact, lemmatized and grammatical search-queries. WiTTFind can find all inflected forms of words and all combinations of morphological variations of

word phrases. In addition it can detect a wide rage of sentence structures, by the use of grammatical tags. All found text passages in the BT are presented with their sentence context, together with the scanned original pages of Ludwig Wittgenstein's work in a special triptych-display.

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# Philosophie als Sprachkritik im Sinne Mauthners. Eine Bemerkung zu TLP 4.0031

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Ludwig Wittgenstein verzichtet im *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* darauf, Literaturquellen anzugeben und erwähnt im Text nur wenige Personen namentlich. Neben Gottlob Frege und Bertrand Russell, die hervorgehoben sind als Verfasser eines Werks, dem Wittgenstein einen „großen Teil der Anregung [seiner, Anm.] [...] Gedanken schuldet“ (TLP, Vorwort), werden neun andere Namen erwähnt. Einige der genannten Personen werden in Beispielen angeführt (der Satz „Sokrates ist identisch“ in TLP 5.473 und TLP 5.4733), andere im begrifflichen Zusammenhang („Darwinsche Theorie“ in TLP 4.1122, „Newtonische Mechanik“ in TLP 6.341, „Das Kantsche Problem“ in TLP 6.36111). Fünf Namensnennungen sind deutliche Verweise auf Autoren, drei davon betreffen Zeitgenossen Wittgensteins, einer davon ist Fritz Mauthner: „Alle Philosophie ist ‚Sprachkritik‘. (Allerdings nicht im Sinne Mauthners.) Russells Verdienst ist es, gezeigt zu haben, daß die scheinbar logische Form des Satzes nicht seine wirkliche sein muß.“ (TLP 4.0031)

In diesem Satz distanziert Wittgenstein scheinbar seine Auffassung von Philosophie als Sprachkritik von der Auffassung Mauthners. In Anbetracht der wenigen im *Tractatus* genannten Namen ist es eine Überlegung wert, warum Mauthner von Wittgenstein erwähnt wird. Konsens vieler Autor/innen, die sowohl über Wittgenstein als auch über Mauthner geschrieben haben, ist, dass der Einfluss von Mauthners Philosophie auf Wittgensteins Denken überaus bedeutender ist, als es die einzige negative Nennung in Wittgensteins Werk vermuten lässt (vgl. Weiler 2009; Leinfellner/Schleichter 1995; Sluga 2004).

Gershon Weiler äußert die Vermutung, dass Wittgenstein den Beginn der 2000-seitigen *Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache* von Mauthner gelesen und den restlichen Text durchgeblättert hat. Tatsächlich steht die Mehrzahl dessen, was sich bei Wittgenstein als möglicher Einfluss von Mauthner identifizieren lässt, entweder auf den ersten 30 Seiten der *Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache* oder wird von Mauthner an mehreren Stellen thematisiert (vgl. Weiler 2009: 299).

Sprachliche Bilder, die sowohl Mauthner als auch Wittgenstein im *Tractatus* und in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* verwenden, sind nicht zu leugnende Parallelen. Elisabeth Leinfellner (1995: 147f) gibt eine detaillierte Zusammenfassung von Ähnlichkeiten im Denken von Fritz Mauthner und Ludwig Wittgenstein. Obwohl Mauthner in Wittgensteins Spätwerk unerwähnt bleibt, gibt Leinfellner viele Textstellen aus den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* an, „bei denen man raten kann oder könnte, ob sie von Mauthner oder Wittgenstein sind“ (Leinfellner 2000). Dass es Sprache nur als Sprechen gibt, das „zwischen den Menschen“ (B1: 19) stattfindet, dass Sprache nichts anderes sei als „Sprachgebrauch“ (B1: 24) schrieb Mauthner bereits 1901 im ersten Band der *Beiträge*. Ebenso finden sich in Mauthners Werk das Bild von Sprache als einer gewachsenen Stadt (vgl. B1: 27), das Bild von Sprache als Regelsystem einer Gemeinschaft (vgl. B1: 25) und die Beschreibung des Begriffs *Regel* als „ein kurzer Ausdruck für den Sprachgebrauch“ (B3: 71).

Ein sprachliches Bild, das in Wittgensteins *Tractatus* und in Mauthners *Beiträgen* vorkommt, ist die Leitermetapher. Wittgenstein vergleicht das Lesen des *Tractatus* mit dem Hinaufsteigen auf eine Leiter, die am Ende weggeworfen werden muss (vgl. TLP 6.54). Mauthner vergleicht seine Sprachkritik mit einer Leiter, deren Sprossen beim Hinaufsteigen zugleich gezimmert und zertrümmert werden (vgl. B1: 1-2). Inhaltliche Parallelen sind die von Wittgenstein und Mauthner geteilte Annahme, dass ethische und ästhetische Fragestellungen einem Bereich angehören, der außerhalb des wissenschaftlichen Diskurses stehen soll. Für beide sind Gedanken sprachliche Ausdrücke, bei beiden bildet Sprache die Grenze zu einer unsagbaren Mystik.

Trotz dieser vielen Ähnlichkeiten weist Wittgenstein im Satz TLP 4.0031 darauf hin, dass Philosophie nicht als Sprachkritik im Sinne Mauthners zu verstehen ist. Der darauf folgende Satz verweist auf Russell, der zwischen der inneren, logischen Form und der äußeren, sprachlichen Form eines propositionalen Ausdrucks unterscheidet. Die sprachliche Form, von Wittgenstein „scheinbar logische Form“ genannt, muss nicht gleich der wirklichen Form eines Satzes sein – im Gegensatz zur logischen Form, die die wahre Struktur eines Satzes ist.

## Wittgensteins sprachlich-logische Bilder

In den *Tagebuchaufzeichnungen 1914-16* schreibt Wittgenstein, dass seine Aufgabe darin besteht, zu zeigen, wie die Zeichen der Sprache den Gegenständen entsprechen, die sie bezeichnen. Er schreibt von der Schwierigkeit, „einen Zusammenhang zwischen den Zeichen auf dem Papier und einem Sachverhalt draußen in der Welt zu finden“ (TB 27.10.14, ähnliche Stellen sind TB 22.1.15, TB 8.3.15 u.a.). Im *Tractatus* wird die Frage nach der Beziehung zwischen Sprache und Welt mit der Abbildtheorie beantwortet: Sätze der Sprache bilden Sachverhalte der Welt ab. Die Abbildung kommt zustande, weil die logische Struktur der Sprache und die logische Struktur der Welt einander gleichen. Die Form des sprachlich formulierbaren, logischen Bildes entspricht der logischen Form der Welt. Wittgenstein misst damit der Logik in seinem Frühwerk eine transzendentale Rolle zu – „[d]ie Logik erfüllt die Welt“ (TLP 5.61), sie ist Spiegelbild der Welt (vgl. TLP 6.13).

Jene Logik auf die sich Wittgenstein bezieht, ist Freges und Russells Logik, die von ihnen als solide Grundlage der Mathematik fundiert worden ist. Nach Mauthner wäre die Annahme eines strukturellen Isomorphismus zwischen Sprache und Welt unter der Bezugnahme auf formale Logik eine falsche Voraussetzung. Es ist anzunehmen, dass Mauthner sowohl die Schriften von Frege als auch die von Frege formulierten sprachphilosophischen Überlegungen unbekannt waren. 1910 bezieht sich Mauthner mit dem Artikel „Algebra der Logik“ im *Wörterbuch der Philosophie* auf George Boole, Ernst Schröder sowie Hermann Lotze und schreibt dass die moderne Logik „Tautologien der alten Schlussfiguren durch die Tautologien neuer Symbole ersetzt“ (W1: 23). Logische Begriffe seien „[k]larer, [...] weil sie formal sind und so lange sie formal bleiben; aber

eigentlich leer, weil die menschliche Sprache nicht mathematisch ist.“ (W1: 24-25).

Der in TLP 4.01 formulierten Annahme, dass der Satz ein Bild der Wirklichkeit sei, würde Mauthner zwar zustimmen, dabei aber jedes Wort anders verstehen als Wittgenstein. Mauthner entwickelt mit seiner Sprachkritik ebenfalls eine Bildtheorie mit der dafür argumentiert werden kann, dass metaphysische Fragen alleine durch Sprachprobleme entstehen; Mauthners Bildtheorie ist aber gänzlich anders gedacht als jene von Wittgenstein.

## Mauthners sprachlich-psychologische Bilder

Nach Mauthner ist der einzige mögliche Zugang zur Welt das sinnliche Empfinden. Jedes Sprechen, jede sprachliche Beschreibung von sinnlichen Empfindungen ist als metaphorisches Sprachbild zu verstehen: „Wir haben von der Welt keine anderen Bilder als sprachliche; wir wissen von der Welt nichts, weder für uns selbst noch zur Mitteilung an andere, als was sich in irgend einer Menschen-sprache sagen lässt. Eine eigene, etwa übermenschliche Sprache hat die Natur nicht; die Natur ist stumm, nur der Mensch kann etwas über sich und die Natur aussagen, über die Welt.“ (DBW: 2)

Mauthner entwickelt eine Theorie von drei Möglichkeiten, die Welt zu beschreiben, die er *Bilder der Welt* nennt: Das *adjektivische, substantivische und verbale* Bild der Welt. Durch die Analyse einer sprachlichen Welt-Beschreibung lassen sich Bilder der Welt finden, die wiederum auf sinnliches Empfinden zurückgeführt werden können.

In der adjektivischen Perspektive ist die Welt als Summe von Einzeleindrücken gegeben, jenseits des Objektdenkens. „Diese adjektivische Welt zerfällt in Einzeleindrücke, gestaltet sich nicht zu Einheiten, man könnte sie pointillistisch nennen“ (W1: 18). Sinnesdaten, Empfindungen und Werturteile werden adjektivisch bezeichnet. Wer adjektivisch denkt, denkt nicht in der Kategorie von gegenständlichen Begriffen, sondern mit Wörtern, die qualitative Eindrücke isolieren. Adjektivische Ausdrücke alleine erlauben es nicht, begriffliche oder kausale Zusammenhänge herzustellen.

Als sprechende Menschen sind wir dazu gezwungen, über Gegenstände und Objekte zu reden. Mit adjektivischen Ausdrücken werden nur Einzeleindrücke „mit der Stecknadelspitze des Moments“ (W1: 18) bezeichnet. Die substantivische Welt umfasst die adjektivische Welt „noch einmal, unter der Hypothese der Dinglichkeit“ (W1: 17), d.h. adjektivische Ausdrücke werden gebündelt. Die ontologischen Entitäten: *Gegenstände* und ihre *Kategorien*, die -heiten, -keiten und -schaften werden von substantivischen Ausdrücken bezeichnet. Auch wenn es bei Mauthner keinen anderen Bezug als jenen auf die eigenen sinnlichen Empfindungen gibt, werden substantivische Ausdrücke als Namen für Gegenstände formuliert, die als Ursache sinnlicher Qualitäten angenommen werden. Die Erfahrung eines Gegenstands selbst kann nicht gemacht werden. Abgesehen von ihrem adjektivischen Wirken kommt substantivischen Ausdrücken keine Wirklichkeit zu. „Was ein Ding ist, das sagen mir seine Eigenschaften; was es außer seinen Eigenschaften noch sei, das ist eine metaphysische Frage.“ (W1: 17).

Mit Bezug auf Gotthold Ephraim Lessing betrachtet Mauthner jede Handlung als eine „Folge von Veränderungen“ (B1: 56). Verbale Ausdrücke bezeichnen Veränderungen und subsumieren sie unter einem Zweck, auf den die Veränderungen gerichtet sind. „Wir wissen, daß wir z.B. mit dem Worte ‚graben‘ eine Unzahl minimaler Kör-

perbewegungen unter dem menschlichen Gesichtspunkte eines Zwecks zusammenfassen“ (B1: 59). Die Zweckbezogenheit entsteht durch die sprachliche Bezeichnung mit einem verbalen Ausdruck: *Zu graben* ist Bedingung für *die Grube* und *die Grube* ist der Zweck, auf den *zu graben* gerichtet ist. Die Substantivierung verbaler Ausdrücke – wie „Grube“ im vorangegangenen Satz – nennt Mauthner „tautologische Wiederholung des Zwecks in Verbum“ (W3: 362). Worte der verbalen Welt sind „Ausdrucksmittel der Handlung“ (B1: 60) unter notwendiger Hinzunahme einer gerichteten Zweckhaftigkeit.

## Sprache zwischen Logik und Psychologie

Diese drei Bilder der Welt können Formen des menschlichen Denkens sein. Je nach „Richtung unserer Aufmerksamkeit“ (W3: 364) werden adjektivische, substantivische oder verbale Bilder gegenüber anderen hervorgehoben. In allen drei Fällen verweigert sich Mauthner der Annahme, dass einem sprachlichen Ausdruck als Bild der Wirklichkeit eine referierende Bedeutung zukommt. Wittgensteins Begriff des Bildes lässt sich in Analogie zur Mathematik verstehen – so wie eine Funktion etwa das *Bild ihres Arguments* liefert. Mauthners Bild ist weder Funktion noch Abbild, es ist eine Metapher. Das Sprechen „ver-gleicht“ der Wirklichkeit; sie ist dem Sprechen „nur ähnlich [aber] [...] nicht gleich“ (B3: 284). Sprachkritik soll nach Mauthner verstanden werden als „die Arbeit an dem befreien Gedanken, daß die Menschen mit den Wörtern der Sprache und den Wörter ihrer Philosophie niemals über eine bildliche Darstellung der Welt hinausgelangen können“ (B1: XII). Alles, was sprachlich geäußert werden kann, bleibt metaphorisch für sinnliche Eindrücke.

Der Glaube daran, dass Sprache logisch sei, was auch für Wittgensteins Philosophie zentrale Bedeutung hat, entspringt nach Mauthner der aristotelischen Untersuchung der Grammatik. Die abendländische Logik ist aus der griechischen Grammatik hervorgegangen, daraus kann aber weder der Schluss gezogen werden, dass Grammatik logisch sei, noch dass Logik von der Sprache unabhängig existiert. Logik hat erst im Sprachgebrauch Sinn. (vgl. W3: 362)

Wie das Beispiel der Substantivierung „Grube“ des verbalen Ausdrucks „graben“ andeutet, können die drei Bilder der Welt ohne scharfe Abgrenzung ineinander fließen. Mauthner gibt als Beispiel das Ineinanderfließen des Adjektivs „süß“, des Verbs „süßen“ und des Substantivs „Süße“. Jene Wörter können grammatisch deshalb unterschiedlich verwendet werden, weil *drei* sprachliche Bilder für *eine* sinnliche Empfindung formuliert werden können.

Damit ist für Mauthner Sprache als Erkenntnisinstrument ungeeignet. Wahrheit kann sprachlich nicht ausgedrückt werden, weder in den Naturwissenschaften noch in der Psychologie, der Philosophie oder im Denken überhaupt. Gegenstände, Raum, Zeit, Kausalität, die vermeintliche Wirklichkeit werden von Mauthner als metaphysischer Aberglauben dargestellt, der aus der Willkür des sprechenden Menschen entstanden ist.

Sprache ist bei Mauthner die Nemesis der Menschheit. Sie ist vom Menschen als Lebewesen ebensowenig wegzudenken wie der Sauerstoff aus seinem Blut (vgl. B1: 78), sie ist die Verurteilung dazu, niemals etwas wissen zu können und zugleich auch das einzige, was Menschen miteinander verbindet. Miteinander zu sprechen ermöglicht, sich aus der Isolierung der individuellen Sinneseindrücke zu befreien und mit anderen Menschen in Kontakt zu treten.

Mauthners Sprachkritik gipfelt als Erkenntniskritik in einer gottlosen Mystik jenseits der Sprache. In unmittelbaren Präsenzerfahrungen werden Einsichten ohne Erkenntnis offenbar. Die mystischen Einsichten sind sprachlich nicht vermittelbar, die Menschheit muss „daran verzweifeln, je-mals die Wirklichkeit zu erkennen“ (B3: 641). Wehmütiges Lachen (vgl. W2: 104 ff.) oder kontemplatives Schweigen (vgl. B1: 118 f.) sind die angemessenen, menschlichen Reaktionen darauf.

An diesem Ende der Sprachkritik rückt Mauthners Denken an Wittgensteins Frühphilosophie heran. Mit dem *Tractatus* will Wittgenstein die Probleme endgültig gelöst haben und zugleich zeigen, „wie wenig damit getan ist, daß diese Probleme gelöst sind.“ (TLP, Vorwort). Der Schluss des Tractatus, dass man darüber schweigen muss, wovon man nicht sprechen kann (vgl. TLP 7), ist das Verbot, zu versuchen, das Unaussprechliche in Propositionen aufzulösen. Das notwendig scheiternde Sprechen ist bei Wittgenstein und Mauthner gleichermaßen Anlass zum Verstummen.

## Resume

Wittgenstein formuliert seine Bildtheorie auf der Basis von Freges und Russells Logik. Mauthners Bilder der Welt haben einen Sensualismus nach Mach als Grundlage. Dementsprechend hält Wittgenstein Logik für wertvoller als Psychologie und Mauthner hält Psychologie für wertvoller als Logik. Von ihren jeweiligen Voraussetzungen ausgehend, entwickeln beide eine Bildtheorie und üben Sprachkritik mit Argumenten, die für den anderen inakzeptabel wären. Dennoch zeigen beide Sprachkritiken, dass es ethische, ästhetische und mystische Bereiche gibt, bei deren Beschreibung Sprache versagt und dass der Wert einer solchen Welt abseits sprachlicher Bezeichnungen für den Menschen nicht geringer sein soll als ein – nach Wittgenstein – einzig streng richtiges System von Sätzen der Naturwissenschaft.

In Wittgensteins Frühwerk ist Philosophie nicht als Sprachkritik zu verstehen, wie sie im Sinne Mauthners ausgeübt wird. Wohl aber lässt sich das, was der Sinn von Wittgensteins Philosophie ist, auch als das verstehen, was Sprachkritik im Sinne Mauthners ist.

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# Aging as a Disease

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## 1. Introduction

The question whether aging is a disease is still undecided which is, as I will show, not only theoretically but also practically unsatisfactory because how we conceive of the relationship between aging and disease can have tremendous implications for scientific, medical, and political practice. To some extent, our inability to give a plausible response to this question results from empirical uncertainty regarding the causes of aging. However, to some further extent, it is the task of philosophers to clarify the meaning of ‘disease’ and ‘aging’ in order to provide a solid basis for the discussion of the relationship between these phenomena. As long as there is no general consensus about the proper meaning of ‘aging’ and ‘disease’, people will always quarrel about their relationship.

I will discuss an analysis of ‘disease’ here that I regard as reasonable given our current understanding of molecular processes in living organisms and the possible existence of biotechnologies that can be expected to be developed in the not-too-distant future. Afterwards, I will elaborate on the meaning of ‘aging’ and show why it can be convincingly argued that aging is a disease. Finally, I will give an outlook on possible practical consequences of the public acceptance of this kind of relationship between aging and disease.

## 2. A flexible account of disease

One current trend in the medical sciences is what Marianne Boenink calls ‘molecular medicine’: “a complex network of technological, scientific and social developments that mutually interact with each other” (Boenink 2009: 244). According to Boenink, this form of medicine is not restricted to medical practice in a narrow sense but covers several areas of society. Undertaking research, for example, will be the domain of science, whereas medicine will deal with the application of scientific developments, and politics will set the goals of science and medicine altogether. This might be an interaction between different areas of society envisioned by proponents of molecular medicine. A further characteristic of this idea is, of course, that “disease and health are molecular processes and should be dealt with at that level” (*ibid.*: 245). Diseases, if we follow the doctrine of molecular medicine, are not to be regarded as macroscopic entities anymore but as microscopic ones. To give an example, you do not suffer from a cold, which would be a macroscopic entity, but from several molecular changes in your body that force you to sneeze, cough, and drink tea to alleviate the pain in your throat.

From these considerations, Boenink develops a ‘cascade model of disease’ that regards a disease as a developing process starting and generally operating on the molecular level but extending its effects to the organismic level (*ibid.*: 249f.). Diseases are located deeply in the organism, but it is the organism that experiences their symptoms, so that one can speak of a ‘cascade’. There are molecular processes in your cells triggering several higher-level processes and, probably, interacting with other mo-

lecular processes, so that, ultimately, you experience the symptoms of a cold. If the visionary component of molecular medicine is realized one day, doctors will not have to treat your cold on the clumsy, organismic level. Tiny nanorobots will rather be constantly swarming through your body and detect the molecular processes that will eventually make you suffer at a very early stage and, perhaps, eradicate them even before you experience the first symptoms.

Molecular medicine, therefore, has another highly important characteristic: This kind of medicine will be extremely individualised inasmuch there will not be any standard for health and disease on the population level or the species level. Instead, deviations will be measured against the standard molecular processes in the individual itself and will be subsequently categorised as diseases or non-pathological conditions (*ibid.*: 250-252). It will be entirely determined by an individual’s own state – as opposed to certain external features like statistical typicality on the species-level (see Boorse 1977: 555) – whether the individual is healthy or diseased.

Boenink’s account of disease has several advantages: First, the decision whether an individual is diseased is not totally arbitrary or subject to social conventions as naturalists about the meaning of ‘disease’ might fear. There will be clear biomarkers on the molecular level that only have to be detected in order to determine the health-status of an individual. Since the detection of these biomarkers is an objective rather than a subjective issue that has to be performed by experts – be they human doctors or non-human nanorobots – and not by the individual itself, the subjective component of disease is limited. The focus on the individual’s well-being as the standard for health and disease is a second advantage of Boenink’s account because it leaves enough space for personalised treatment. If an individual exhibits certain biomarkers that hint at a disease but does not complain about suffering from any symptoms, then it might not be necessary to treat it. However, if another individual exhibits the same biomarkers and complains about his or her current state, then it should be treated. Therefore, the account is flexible enough to give respect both to the molecular level where diseases are objectively detected, and to the organismic level where it can be subjectively decided whether a disease really has to be treated. Finally, the third advantage is that Boenink’s account allows for states that were not regarded as diseases previous to certain technological developments to be recategorised as diseases as soon as there is enough molecular evidence for their harmful effects. Molecular medicine broadly construed as a scientific, medical, and social complex enables us to flexibly handle and categorise states of an organism as diseases or non-diseases without being totally arbitrary about them.

For one of its central features, the account of disease presented and elaborated here will be further referred to as ‘the flexible account’.

What remains to do now is to clarify the meaning of ‘disease’ according to the flexible account. It shall, however, be avoided to give a definition by stating necessary and

sufficient conditions for an entity to be a disease because this strategy seems to be irreconcilable with an approach to disease theory that feeds upon its flexibility. Rather, an explication of 'disease' shall be given that remains open for further revision.

'Disease', according to the flexible account, refers to a state of an organism that has been conjointly decided by institutions like science, medicine, and technology to be referred to as a 'disease', whose occurrence can be objectively detected on the molecular level, and whose symptoms can become manifest on the organismic level. Objective molecular data and the subjective severity of an organism's suffering are both relevant for the decision whether a disease requires treatment or not.

This explication, although being quite rough, should capture the intentions of the flexible account and appears to be sufficiently clear to work with in the analysis of concrete phenomena that are candidates for being diseases.

### 3. Is aging a disease?

There might be fewer positions of what aging actually is than positions on disease theory, but we still lack a consensus on the most plausible meaning of 'aging'. What will be advanced here is a functionalist account of aging according to which 'aging' refers to the "progressive deterioration of virtually every bodily function over time" (Austad 1997: 6). Functionalism about aging is a reasonable position: It does not require every bodily function to deteriorate but only most of them, which is precisely what people usually experience during the course of their lives. All people become physically frail to some degree when they age, some, but not all of them, also experience mental shortcomings, and some people even lose their ability to feel and express emotions whereas others do not suffer from this deficiency. Interestingly, the functionalist account can also explain – at least to some extent – why aging is often regarded as an unpleasurable experience. Since we need some of our bodily functions to work properly in order to achieve our goals, it becomes increasingly difficult for us to achieve them and, thereby, satisfy our desires when we age. However, some people might tend to develop fewer desires at a certain point in their lives which is why they are not overly disturbed by the deterioration of their bodily functions. With the acceptability of functionalism about aging at least *prima facie* ensured, it is now time to decide whether aging is a disease or not.

It is well-known that aging is not a homogeneous phenomenon but can take various forms of appearance and is constituted by a multitude of processes, like damage dealt to cells by free radicals, copying errors resulting in abnormal and harmful proteins, or the shortening of telomeres (Holliday 2000: 1795f., Donate/Blasco 2011). Strikingly, all of these processes take place on the cellular or even molecular level where they are, at least in principle, objectively detectable. However, their effects are not confined to the cellular level but can be experienced on the organismic level, as well, where they produce the typical signs of aging, like a loss of mobility, increased susceptibility to diseases, or mental shortcomings, even dementia. They lead to a progressive deterioration of bodily functions and, therefore, qualify as constituents of what we usually call 'aging'. From this perspective, aging meets two requirements of the flexible account for being regarded as a disease. It is objectively detectable on the cellular or molecular level, and it is subjectively experienced. Now it is up to certain social institutions – science, medicine, technology,

politics – to discuss whether it is reasonable to call aging a 'disease' or not.

Over the last couple of years, the field of biogerontology has seen an increasing interest in hypothetical technologies that are capable of extending the maximum human life span beyond the current limit of 122 years. Some experts in the field utterly deny the possible existence of such technologies (Hayflick 2004), while others admit that their existence is at least possible in principle (Mitteldorf 2010), and others are extremely optimistic about their existence in the near future (De Grey/Rae 2007). This development in biogerontology shows that there is a debate on whether aging can be treated, indicating a shift in the whole attitude of science towards aging. Even though there is no consensus among social institutions that aging is a disease, the current debates in biogerontology, the appeals of some biogerontologists to the public to become aware of the problems posed by aging (De Grey 2005), and the attempts to develop technologies that are able of combating aging demonstrate that it becomes increasingly plausible to call aging a 'disease', at least if one subscribes to the flexible account.

### 4. Practical consequences

Why is it important whether aging is a disease or not? One could argue that this is merely a classificatory matter bearing no practical importance. However, such a judgment would ignore the common attitude towards diseases and how we deal with them in different areas of society. People who are suffering from a disease do not only have our compassion but are also encouraged to visit a doctor and seek for treatment. Doctors, on the other hand, are often seen as having an obligation to treat diseases in order to alleviate the suffering of their patients. Then there is the area of politics and science funding where enormous amounts of resources are spent for boosting scientific progress. A great deal of money is spent on the investigation of cancer, Alzheimer's disease, or AIDS not only because we think that having these conditions is undesirable but also because we classify them as diseases that have to be treated. Politics and scientific organizations seem to have an obligation to ensure that progress towards effective treating methods of certain diseases is made.

The widespread acceptance of the claim that aging is a disease could lead to an extraordinary trend: People could start to demand a cure for aging because they regard it as their right to be cured. Medical practitioners, science, and politics would start to feel public pressure because of their alleged obligation to find a cure for aging. Finally, society as a whole would become aware of the fact that aging is not just an unfavorable and inevitable condition but rather belongs into the same category like cancer or AIDS and should be treated similarly. The question remains, though, how probable the emergence of such a trend is, and, of course, whether it is desirable.

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# Naïve Action Theory and Its Ontology

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## 1. Primer: naïve vs. sophisticated rationalization

Michael Thompson advances an account of rationalization (reason-explanation of action) that he calls ‘naïve rationalization’, which he contrasts with ‘sophisticated’ rationalization. Naïve rationalization involves ‘unvarnished descriptions of action’ – *doings* – both in the explanandum and explanans part of a given rationalization, as in:

- (1) ‘I’m laying bricks because *I’m building* a monument to the great works of Frege.’ (88, 97-8)

Sophisticated rationalization, in contrast, employs ‘practical-psychical’ verbs (such as *want*, *intend*, *try*, etc.), as in:

- (2) ‘I’m laying bricks because *I want/intend/try to build* a monument to the great works of Frege.’

Both forms can be cast in a purposive rendering, as in:

- (3) ‘I’m laying bricks *in order to* build a monument to the great works of Frege.’

The purposive rendering is noteworthy in several respects. It delineates the scope of what Thompson calls ‘straightforward rationalization’, of which naïve and sophisticated rationalizations are species. Rationalizations are straightforward iff they are amenable to purposive renderings as in (3) (89). Moreover, while concealing the salient difference between naïvety and sophistication (by using infinitival verbs instead of naïve or sophisticated forms), it lays bare the pivotal category of Thompson’s: ‘event- or process-forms’.

For Thompson, standard predicates can only be ascribed to or denied a given subject (e.g. for Socrates, snubnosedness: Socrates either *is* or *is not* snub-nosed) and are inherently *stative* (122). The ‘predicates’ of straightforward rationalization, on the other hand, are action-verbs that admit variations of aspect. Naïve explanantia come in the progressive, which paradigmatically imports *imperfective* (as opposed to *perfective*) aspect. In linguistic theory, this is associated with open-, ongoing- and incompleteness of goings-on (see Comrie 1976: 19-21). Likewise for Thompson: naïve explanantia, with their progressive and hence imperfective character, present and rationalize actions in light – as *parts*, or *phases* – of yet incomplete, open, larger *actions*, whose completion the rationalized actions aim at contributing to (86). A switch to the past tense is needed to illustrate this: either one was  $\phi$ -*ing* intentionally (*imperfective*), or one  $\phi$ -*d* intentionally (*perfective*); due to the openness of the progressive, the former may be true regardless of the latter (the  $\phi$ -*ing* never be completed; see Falvey 2000: 22-5; Galton 1984, ch.8, on open- and broadness of the progressive). The tense-switch is needed as the perfective rendering is unavailable in the present due to its *inherent open- and ongoingness* (‘she  $\phi$ -*s*’ does not relate to a given present perfective action, but rather expresses habituality) (125, esp. n.8). Perfectivity vs. imperfectivity, hence, is not matter of (linguis-

tic) grammatical form alone, but can be ascertained “at the levels of speech, thought and being.” (127)

So the choice of naïvety vs. sophistication arises with event- or process-forms, and naïve rationalizations are cast in the progressive, using imperfective (open, ongoing) actions to rationalize actions as their contributory parts or phases. Now for Thompson, *sophisticated forms* properly understood – and this is the Damascene moment in his story – *do the same*: it is not their purpose to designate causally efficacious mental states, but to recognize the imperfectivity of action and to import imperfectivity into a given rationalization. ‘I am doing A’, ‘I am trying to do A’, ‘I intend to do A’, and ‘I want to do A’, thus, are all markers of imperfectivity.

Many a ‘standard story’ account, such as the classic Davidsonian one (see only his 1963) operate merrily on events alone. On Thompson’s view, this is possible only due to (as Wittgenstein, PI §593, might say) a one-sided diet of considering only perfected actions rendered in the simple past tense. While these actions might be conceived as events (complete, datable particulars, that is), action that is ongoing, open, and incomplete cannot be thus conceived. In this vein Thompson seeks to redress a fundamental shortcoming also concerning the *ontology* of action, by recognizing the malleable category of ‘event- or process-form’. Yet also on Thompson’s account a related problem of event-centredness surfaces, as will be seen shortly.

## 2. A conjecture

Thompson provides an argument for the general possibility of naïve rationalization, that is: the possibility for any given intentional action to figure in the *explanans* of a naïve rationalization. He thus argues against an existential claim along the following lines:

- (I) There is an intentional action which cannot figure as the *explanans* in any naïve rationalization.

Thompson’s strategy to counter (I) is to argue that any given proper (i.e. durative) intentional action *itself* yields other intentional actions for which it can figure in a naïve explanans. Thompson expounds the idea at the example of someone’s pushing something to some place  $\omega$ . The naïve rendering ‘I am pushing it to  $\omega$ ’ there can always figure as a naïve *explanans*, for the following reason. For any such pushing to  $\omega$  there will be a point between the starting point and point  $\omega$ , say,  $\beta$ , and a corresponding pushing to  $\beta$ , for which the pushing to  $\omega$  can figure as the *explanans* and hence yield a naïve rationalization of the form: ‘I am pushing it to  $\beta$  because I am pushing it to  $\omega$ ’. Then, importantly, what holds for the pushing to  $\omega$  also holds for the pushing to  $\beta$ , hence: also pushing to  $\beta$  can generally figure as a naïve *explanans*, as another point and corresponding pushing can be individuated between the starting point and point  $\beta$ . And so forth. In this vein, opposing (I) Thompson makes the following conjecture:

- (C) “[A]cts of moving and of moving things intentionally always have parts of the same character.” (108-9)

\* Unless indicated otherwise, page numbers are to Thompson 2008.

He recasts this thus:

(C\*) "Acts of moving something somewhere intentionally always have an *initial segment* that is also an act of moving something somewhere intentionally." (111, *emphases supplied N.H.*)

(NB: 'Moving something' here is to be construed widely, concerning external objects but also 'mere' bodily movements).

Thompson's characterization of intentional action (proper) follows:

(IA) "X's doing A is an intentional action (proper) under that description just in case the agent can be said, truly, to have done something else *because he or she was doing A*" (112)

'Something else' here, say, B, must also be something done *intentionally*, as X's doing A is supposed to figure as an explanans of an *intentional* action. Given that X's doing B then satisfies the same condition as X's doing A (figuring as an explanans of naïve rationalization), there must be something else again, say, C, which is also done intentionally, and so forth – *intentionally – ad infinitum*. Hence, for any given intentional action there are infinitely many other intentional actions that are parts of that original action. Thus any "intentional action (proper) figures in a space of reasons as a region, not as a point;" (112). Thompson is happy to accept this, as it supports his claim against (I).

### 3. Events all the way down?

Despite his recognition of imperfectionity and of 'event- or process-forms', Thompson's account is surprisingly – and problematically – *event-centred*. Given the common understanding of events as complete, datable particulars (which Thompson shares, see esp. his 2011: 208-9) this seems to hamper Thompson's main objective of helping imperfectionity to its rightful place. Note Thompson's following claims:

(PE) "[A]n action and a proper part of it, if it has any, are always distinct events." (110 n.7)

And:

(PC) "[A]nything that has parts is constituted by them". (112)

And further:

(DS) "[I]f anything ever gets *done*, or gets completed, there will be things in which the *doing* of it can be said to have consisted at different moments, and these will be its sub- events or sub-deeds." (141 n.23)

The problem: these claims support the view that *any completed action* has parts which it is constituted by; and that these parts are events. And what about incomplete (imperfective) action? (IA) does *not* require an intentional action to be completed (to count as such), as it does not require the agent ever to *have done* A; the status of X's doing A as an intentional action (proper) is rather hinged on its having *parts*. From (PE) it follows that these parts will be events; from (PC) that the action will be constituted by them. Thus it is licenced to recognize also imperfective actions as intentional actions (proper); and to regard them likewise to be constituted by events, despite their overall imperfectionity. Hence, for anything that is *already* (*in the process of*) *being* done, regardless of its completion overall there will be something that has already been done. Etc.

Thompson's conception of 'intentional action' thus comprises two importantly distinct kinds of case: firstly, completed events (e.g. in the Davidsonian sense, such as A's having crossed the street); secondly, abundances of nested events that are still incomplete overall (such as A's crossing the street). As to the latter, it might be questioned whether this is the best way of rendering something incomplete overall, or even the completed parts thereof; of coming to terms with the overall *incompleteness* and *imperfectivity*. The worry concerns the possibility of apprehending the relevant kind of *larger unity* that Thompson has in mind – the larger, rationalizing, action that is as yet incomplete, open and ongoing; "the unity that joins the acts [...] and makes an intentional action out of them. This unity spans, or reaches beyond, any of them; it is captured in an imperfective judgment, paradigmatically a progressive judgment." (112)

The problem is one of fundamentally different pulls. Intentional actions proper might be full of completeness, of abundances of (potentially infinite numbers) of (completed) events. Even if events can be regarded as parts of imperfective goings-on, however, it remains essential for these goings-on to be inherently open, incomplete, lacking the over-and-done-with-ness of events. It is difficult to see how a totality of complete (whole) things could account for the fundamental incompleteness involved. Thompson touches upon the problem himself when noting that strategies of mere "quantification over a manifold of events [...] will run into difficulties accounting for the other two [past and present tense imperfective, N.H.] judgments—which are, on reflection, consistent with the non-existence of any such event." (21-2)

### 4. Events, processes, and event- or process-forms

So, following Thompson, events alone won't do to capture action in its imperfectivity. Still his own account seems problematically invested in an event-ontology. His category of event- or process-forms, the prime candidate to come to the rescue, does not provide an effective remedy either, not because of its inherent ineptitude to do so but because Thompson does not elucidate the nature of event- or process-forms in the first place. He makes clear that perfectivity and imperfectivity, and the recognition of event- or process-forms, pertain to 'levels of speech, thought and being' alike. Likewise he indicates a distinction between these and events, talking about "coming to apprehend events *and* event- or process-forms" (133, *emphasis supplied N.H.*). Yet he does not make clear how to conceive of these, or of how to relate them to categories such as events or processes: how, in case events do not exhaust the ontology of action, to complement them with processes (or the like), or to substitute them for event- or process forms.

Leads such as Thompson's association of it to Aristotle and "the categorical space of kinesis, if you like, and not of stasis" (134; see also 125 n. 7; see also Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 0.6, esp. 1048a25-b36; Graham 1980) don't help much either. Albeit true that event- or process-forms might be accounted for in terms of *kinēsis* (rather than *stasis*, or *energeia*), this does not answer the question but only transpose and repeat it within the Aristotelian framework, as a question of how to understand *imperfective kinēseis* (see e.g. Cope 2007 on Aristotle on action).

A fully developed ontology for Thompson's account should, in light of his overall outlook, recognize event- or process-forms as single forms also at the ontological level,

yet as forms amenable to aspectual variation. This would lend support to a characterization of Thompson's account of action as "a species of temporally extended processes that must run their course in order to be actualized in full" and which "can be present only in their imperfective aspect, and can be apprehended in their completion only in retrospect." (Brewer 2009: 203) It would be necessary first to dispense with the infelicitous event-centrism. A felicitous step in that direction, drawing on a related distinction of count-nouns and perfective *things* (such as events) on the one hand and mass-nouns and imperfective *stuff* (such as process, or activity) on the other (see e.g. Mourelatos 1978; Hornsby ms.), would be to distinguish complete events from completed yet open stretches of activity. Where 'having A-ed', akin to 'having done an A-ing' would count-quantify over and relate to some complete event, 'having done some A-ing' would mass-quantify over and relate to some amount or stretch of (stuff-like) activity. Such a distinction would allow Thompson to hold (in the spirit of (IA)) that for any intentional doing A something else – in the sense of some amount or stretch of activity – has been done, without there being some *thing* that has been done.

## 5. Conclusion

I have argued that Thompson's case for the possibility of naïve rationalization suffers from an unsatisfactory rendering of imperfectivity (and perfectivity, respectively) of action at the ontological level. Despite Thompson's stress of imperfectivity and his recognition of event- or process-forms, his account is found to be overly committed to a heavily event-centred ontology. A fuller elaboration of his category of event- or process-form might solve the problem. As one step in this direction, I have suggested a distinction of different forms of perfectivity and imperfectivity, respectively (related to things on the one hand, stuff on the other) to further develop Thompson's ontology of action.

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# Wondering at the Existence of the World: Ethical Vision in Wittgenstein's Philosophy

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This paper argues that at all the stages of Wittgenstein's philosophy, Wittgensteinian ethics can best be understood as a kind of seeing that the later Wittgenstein will call aspect dawning. Because it unites willing, perception, action, and language, this kind of seeing is "like seeing, and again not like." The importance of this contradiction for Wittgenstein's ethics points toward a creative element in Wittgenstein's otherwise deeply embedded ethics, that would respond to a common charge against ethics inspired by Wittgensteinian thought, namely, that their conservative relativism does not allow for action.

In the "Lecture on Ethics," Wittgenstein describes ethics as a temptation, a temptation towards something he respects but a temptation nonetheless. This temptation takes the form of a desire to use the words "absolute good" and "absolute value," even though he is convinced that these words can properly have no signification. For Wittgenstein the temptation arises when in situations when one has the "experience of seeing the world as a miracle," something, as the phrase itself would suggest, that one can articulate with the language games of the divine or profane. And in a condensation eminently appropriate to the early Wittgenstein, this miracle turns out to be the miracle of language itself. It is this miracle that tempts Wittgenstein into saying the forbidden words "absolute value." Wittgenstein, however, is not convinced the words are forbidden until someone comes to defend them, using the language of the *Tractatus*. These words are licit, the defender says, because they are facts. But this claim about fact only convinces Wittgenstein of the illicitness of these words, and this paradoxically justifies them: "Now when this is urged against me I at once see clearly, as it were in a flash of light, not only that no description that I can think of would do to describe what I mean by absolute value, but that I would reject every significant description that anybody could possibly suggest, *ab initio*, on the ground of its significance" (11). Wittgenstein has just asked himself the question: "but then what does it mean to be aware of this miracle at sometimes and not at other times?," and he performs the answer. The awareness of the miracle happens twice – once in the mystical moment, and once in the coming to the self of Wittgenstein when faced with opposition. The opposition, Wittgenstein's own voice of rational purity, confirms the miracle, and he becomes aware of it "see clearly, as it were in a flash of light" (11). This flash of light is, as it were, the fourth dimension that resolves the Kantian problem of right and left hands (*Tractatus* 6.36111), the seeing of an impossible possibility that resolves a philosophical problem.

Much later, in a different world, Wittgenstein will write:

We should sometimes like to call certainty and belief tones, colourings, or thought; and it is true that they receive expression in the tone of voice. But do not think of them as 'feelings' which we have in speaking or thinking. Ask, not: "What goes on in us when we are certain that...?" – but: How is 'the certainty that this is the case' manifested in human action?" (PI ii: 225e)

In the Lecture on Ethics the tone of Wittgenstein's certainty is displayed in his decision to give a lecture on ethics to an undergraduate club called "The Heretics." In his assurance, he takes on a the voice of the higher authority, prefiguring the teacher that provokes one of *On Certainty*'s few grammatically correct scenarios of doubt: "But might a higher authority assure me that I don't know the truth? So that I had to say 'Teach me!?' But then my eyes would have to be opened." (OC § 578). And the flash of light, the opening of eyes that Wittgenstein experiences in his imagined conversation with a bad image of a former self, Wittgenstein tries to share by sowing the right kind of doubt.

Wittgenstein's work in the *Philosophical Investigations*, for all its attention to what one would say when, is also focused around the experience of the right kind of doubt. Explicitly, the *Investigations* gives a step-by step plan for an escape from a illusion-generating philosophical vocabulary based on a faulty, which is to say, technical, picture of language. But "(loosening) the grip of a picture means", as Stephen Mulhall puts it:

effecting a shift in a person's sense of what matters to her intellectual project; it requires not that she respond to criticism, but that she be responsive to the reorientation of her interests. It asks, in short, for a kind of conversion. (Mulhall 2005: 89)

In Wittgenstein's thought, conversion is invited through a careful discipline of listening, through learning how to doubt our first response, and learning how to ask ourselves the right question, to find the occasion that tests the picture, and to pay attention to what we would say when. To escape this picture one must ask: "is the word ever actually used in his way in the language-game which is its original home?" (PI §116). But to know the use of the word requires recognizing its look, its physiognomy, its face:

If I understand the character of the game aright – I might say – then this isn't an essential part of it.  
((Meaning is a physiognomy)) (PI § 568)

With the image of the face, Wittgenstein implies that the most important faculty necessary to know language games, and thus to learn how to escape the picture of language is not speech, or hearing, but sight, or rather the specific kind of sight which he calls "aspect dawning." Aspect dawning is a kind of perception: an interpretation that happens as a sight: "we interpret it, and see it as we interpret it." (PI ii: 193e). It occurs when we recognize faces, sense people's emotions, hear the expression of a theme in music, or interpret schematic drawings. " Wittgenstein claims that because of this "(S)eeing as..." is not part of perception. And for that reason it is like seeing and again not like." (PI ii: 197e). "Seeing as" instead is the perception of a relation between two things, in such a way that the will is involved. In one way, we decide to see, in another, our seeing is thrust upon us, determined by categories we already know. So is our life with words: we know the word because of the nimbus it thrusts upon one when the word is taken up, but we choose it in this situation because it is right here. Using language is simultaneously freedom and

subjection. It requires the kind of sight: aspect dawning: that is based on the same mixture of faith, hesitancy and doubt that characterized the affirmation of the temptation to ethical speech.

Who then, cannot speak ethically? Wittgenstein entertains the possibility that there might be some people who are visually aspect blind, and in the same way there could be some who are linguistically aspect blind.

The familiar physiognomy of a word, the feeling that it has taken up its meaning into itself, that it is an actual likeness of its meaning – there could be human beings to whom all this way alien. (They would not have an attachment to their words.) – And how are these feelings manifested among us? – By the way we choose and value words. (PI ii: 218e)

Someone who would be linguistically aspect blind would not choose and value words. But this lack of choosing and valuing words is the same as to be unconverted, in Mulhalls sense; it is to live a too close attachment to one's words. It is to be a philosopher, to trust the picture of knowledge that language gives us. And we trust this picture, because it is a picture of knowledge that is absolute, and of a world where the rules of thought and the rules of logic and the rules of language and the rules of the world are all one and the something. We declare our faith in this world by insistent repetition. We use the same words over and over again. "Yet we go on wanting to say: Pain is pain – whether *he* has it, or *I* have it; and however I come to know whether he has a pain or not." (PI § 350) This desire to reassert the picture pushes us outside the bounds of the human: "Is God bound by our knowledge? Are a lot of our statements *incapable* of falsehood? For that is what we want to say" (OC § 436). Or, "For then it is as if I wanted insist that there are things that I *know*. God himself can't say anything to me about them."(PI § 554). Philosophers are aspect blind because they cannot doubt the facticity of the world enough to stop repeating themselves and choose new words: They do no value words because they do not choose them, they cannot let the rabbit go long enough to see the duck. This inflexibility has the effect of hiding them from "what is most striking and most powerful:"

The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something – because it is always before one's eyes.) The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless *that* fact has at some time struck him. – And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful. (PI § 129)

The foundations of the philosopher's inquiry is precisely this: they have lost the ability to be struck by language. They have lost the ability to be struck by the world. And they do not see that the foundation of their enquiry, the repetitive assertion of norms and the quest for certainty nails them unwittingly in the language game. The doubt that the insistent philosopher protects himself against is the doubt introduced, not by temptation to speak outside the language game, but to slavishly follow one language game with no awareness that there might be others. This is why Wittgenstein can write: "But if you are *certain*, isn't it that you are shutting your eyes in face of doubt? – They are shut" (PI ii: 224e). Wittgenstein is closed to the need for infinite justification.

Yet the doubt and indeterminacy that is introduced into the world by this doubt allows for a greater capacity for action. "But doesn't it come out here that knowledge is related to a decision?" (OC § 362) Belief makes the world comprehensible: it is the decision to know, but it is not arbitrary. It allows one to engage the world, and allows one to trust in its uniformity. Belief is tied into the bodily experience of the world: without the capacity to believe, one cannot trust one's instinctive reactions to the world. A belief in the uniformity of nature, for example, is only available if one listens to one's body. "The belief that the fire will burn me is of the same kinds as the fear that it will burn me." (PI § 473) And this availability to the world to the self allows for the end of doubt, through the end of "Justification by experience come to an end. If it did not, it would not be justification." (PI § 485). Though "[t]he difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing," (OC §166) the groundlessness of our believing allows us to see possibilities in the world that we cannot see when we are in search of ultimate justification. Both the embeddedness and the relativism of Wittgenstein's thought allows for a real engagement with ethics. And hence, wondering at the existence of the world can be an ethics.

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# Application of Harry Frankfurt's Concept of Free Will to the Problem of Smoking

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## 1. Background – smoking as an ethical problem

Smoking, seen from an ethical point of view, is an especially interesting topic because today's ethicists tend to restrict ethical or moral questions to situations involving other persons. In a classical moral system, such as that of Immanuel Kant, smoking could be interpreted as a breach of one's duty to oneself. In a more modern conception of ethics, smoking would cease to be an ethical question if a person only smokes alone or in smoker's areas and does harm only to herself – at least unless it is taken into account that through public healthcare and insurance systems the health of one person is interrelated with the health of all others. This standpoint is defended, for example, by Candace Cummins Gauthier (2005: 153), who sees the moral responsibility of patients being "justified by the concept of moral responsibility to particular others and to the community". In the era of preventive medicine, we are no longer either healthy or ill; rather, we all are more or less healthy or ill. Therefore it seems convenient to apply Gauthier's idea of the moral responsibility of patients to everybody.

## 2. Motive – working empirically as a philosopher (phenomenologist)

The aim of this research was to consider philosophical concepts as possible methods for investigation and to try to apply them. The method chosen here stems from Harry Frankfurt's famous 1971 paper "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person". Frankfurt's central idea is that the free will of a person works by hierarchizing the person's desires: a person has certain desires, but she prefers some of her desires to others and chooses which of them she will carry out, ruling out others. The desires of a person *in toto* are called "first-order desires"; the desires the person prefers to others are called "second-order desires"; and the desires the person chooses to carry out are called "second-order volitions".

In order to be able to apply this philosophical concept in an empirical study, it seems that we must first agree on the possibility of something like an 'empirical philosophical investigation'. Many philosophers restrict themselves to working on logical or conceptual grounds only, but a phenomenologist needs to leave his/her study and look for phenomena in the world outside.

Phenomenological empirical studies, in my opinion, should not be confused with scientific empirical studies, since the former aim to describe a phenomenon (an appearance) properly, whereas scientific methodology seeks the truth behind the phenomena. Psychological and socio-psychological methods of analyzing qualitative interviews help to find the 'real' motives or inclinations of people (the truth) behind their statements in the interviews (the appearance); if we want to take seriously what people say, we have to choose a method that stays on the level of what people

say (on the level of the appearance). (My concept of phenomenology differs from that of the school of Husserl.)

## 3. The study

My study is a subgroup study. It is part of a large COPD (Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease) study, comprising more than 500 participants, which was undertaken from 2007-10 by the Christian Doppler Laboratory for Cardiac and Thoracic Diagnosis and Regeneration. Between 30 November 2010 and 10 January 2011, I conducted 23 structured narrative interviews with smokers (14 women and 9 men, aged between 27 and 57). The participants of my subgroup had all been subject to High Resolution Computer Tomography because they had shown elevated Heat Shock Protein (HSP) 27 levels (above 3000pg/ml) in the blood serum. HSP 27 indicates inflammation in the human body, and COPD is an inflammation-mediated process of self-destruction of the lungs. According to a study published by our group (Ankersmit et al. 2012), the sensitivity and specificity of HSP 27 for predicting already existing COPD is comparatively high, 0.724 AUC in a ROC curve scheme (maximum: AUC = 1).

The HR-CT pictures of the interview participants showed already existing damage in the lungs (air trapping or air trapping and emphysema) in 20 of 23 cases. The director of studies, Dr Ankersmit, consequently expected that the study participants, learning about the significance of the HSP 27 protein and seeing the already existing damage in their lungs on the HR-CT picture, would give up smoking (refrain from their high-risk behavior) to prevent further harm.

Six months later, in June 2011, I called the study participants again to ask them whether they had given up smoking: 5 out of 23 (21.74%) (or 5 out of 20, the group with pathologies on the HR-CT picture (25%)) had given up smoking. These results were disappointing, because a meta-analysis published in the Clinical Practice Guideline (Fiore et al. 2008: p. 84) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services showed a rate of 22.1% of patients giving up smoking after "higher intensity counseling" (> 10 minutes) by their physicians (that is: by just talking to the patient, without such evidence as we had to offer: the HSP 27-value and a Computer Tomography).

## 4. Results

The question arose whether the study participants had acted rationally. From the perspective of the director of studies, Dr Ankersmit, 5 persons out of 23 had acted rationally because they had given up smoking. His argument was: if a person learns that a high HSP 27 value indicates inflammation processes in the body, and the computer tomography shows damage to the lungs already caused by the inflammation, then it is rational for this person to give up smoking in order to prevent further harm. Dr Ankersmit was taking into account only the outcome of the smokers'

actions, neglecting those who had tried to give up smoking but failed, as well as those who had given up smoking but had done so with no particular intention of preventing further harm to themselves.

By interpreting the interviews in the light of Harry Frankfurt's concept of free will, I was able to show that 9 persons had acted rationally: of the 5 persons who had given up smoking, only 2 had acted rationally; of the 3 others, one had given up smoking for no particular reason, one for a reason other than that specified in the interview, and one despite the fact that she had not originally intended to give up smoking. Additionally, there were 5 persons who, according to Frankfurt, might be termed 'unwilling addicts': they tried to give up smoking, but failed. There were also two further persons who had not understood the seriousness of the study results from what the director of studies had attempted to communicate to them. They reduced their smoking instead of giving it up, but in acting according to their understanding of the study results, they can be said to have acted perfectly rationally.

It is important to note that, although Harry Frankfurt's concept originally concerns the problem of free will, I am using it as a means of discriminating between those persons who prefer some of their desires to others, and those persons who have no preference for any one of their desires above any other. The ability to care about what one wants is seen here as a precondition of the ability to act rationally and, therefore, to act ethically.

## 5. Discussion

My research shows that a totally different judgment of the rationality of a person's actions can be reached, depending on whether an externalist or an internalist approach is applied, that is, whether a person is seen from the outside or from the inside. (Thomas Nagel 1980 discusses a similar topic using different terms: agent-neutral and agent-relevant reasons.) The function of Harry Frankfurt's concept of free will is to advance the internalist approach. The following discussion deals with the question of how Frankfurt's concept actually works, and what an internalist approach to human actions actually is.

Gary Watson mentioned two 'serious defects' in hierarchical accounts of free will such as Harry Frankfurt's: the first problem is the source of the higher-order preferences, since they could also be the result of some kind of brainwashing; the second 'defect' concerns the notion of 'identification'. "Something can only be seen as an impediment, if it is in some way external to the self; 'externality' does not mean outside the body." (Watson 1987: 148)

In my opinion, neither of these two objections is a real defect of Harry Frankfurt's concept of free will and the person; rather, they constitute the basic conditions of its functioning. Of course, it is possible that the source of a person's second-order volitions is some kind of brainwashing. This is a theoretical case which we cannot completely rule out. By applying Harry Frankfurt's concept of free will, the person concentrates on herself and is able to deal only with what she can see in herself; brainwashing can only be seen from outside the person; from inside it can be no more than suspected, for example, in the case of a person detecting irregularities in her own functioning.

On the other hand, the question arises of where the higher-order preferences of a person come from; but it arises in the form of a task for this person (i.e. how the person wants to see herself), not in the form of a defect of Frankfurt's theoretical concept.

The second 'defect' is also a constituent part of Harry Frankfurt's concept, in which a person chooses some of her desires to make them her will and rejects others. Such a person does not identify herself with her own desires but only with those she chooses to identify with.

How does Harry Frankfurt's concept of free will actually work in the interpretation of the interviews? It transforms the (externalist objectivist) question of how a problem should best be dealt with into the question of how a person determines herself. Let us consider the following example: Ms E. (53 years, HSP 27 value: 3987) said in the interview that it would be better to give up smoking but that smoking for her "is a piece of freedom within a world of bondage" and in a free world she would not be smoking. What kind of an argument is this? In objective terms Ms E.'s reasons could be absolutely true, but in my analysis – applying Harry Frankfurt's concept – I ignored that question. Instead, I tried to establish whether or not Ms E.'s statements fit one another. Ms E.'s statement that she would not smoke in a free world indicates that she understands herself as caring for the whole world (or at least for our society). This decision is possible within Harry Frankfurt's concept of free will; it is a way of determining the principle of how a person intends to choose second-order desires from the group of her first-order desires. But in this case, Ms E.'s smoking would have to serve the intention to make our world a better world, maybe by being a behavior of protest. In Ms E.'s interview no indication of such a function of her smoking behavior appears, leaving the only other possibility of interpretation available, namely, that our bad world is the reason for her being unable to give up smoking. Ms E. ascribes the reason for her being unable to give up smoking to a source outside of her own person, but this option is not available within Harry Frankfurt's concept. Harry Frankfurt's concept of free will, thus, reveals Ms E.'s reasons as being a pretext.

It is important to note that, by applying the method proposed in this paper, we do not arrive at a psychological analysis, even though the interview participants may tell us about their feelings and desires. This is because we confine ourselves to the statements our interview participants give us. That means that we do not try to find out what it really looks like for them internally, but rather confine ourselves to a reconstruction of what it looks like for them internally according to what they have told us about it.

## 6. Relevance of this question to ethical theory and medical practice

The problem dealt with in this paper is important because physicians today still advise their patients to give up smoking for health reasons. But the idea of health requires an internalist conception of a person, generated in the internal perspective of the patient, in order to acquire motivational force: "Why do I want to be healthy? What do I still want to do with my healthy body in the rest of my life?" Current ethical theory seems to have moved away from the internal perspective: the first example of a typical ethical question presented by Johann S. Ach and Ludwig Siep in the basic ethics course (2008: 9) edited by them is: "What shall I do? Shall I renounce smoking in order not to imperil the health of my fellow human beings and their wellbeing?" Is it appropriate for physicians today to tell their patients to give up smoking because of their health? Should the physician cite externalist reasons such as public health instead, when advising patients to give up smoking?

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# In Defense of the Ordinary: A Wittgensteinian Approach Toward the Theories of Great Meaning

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## I

In *Philosophical Investigations* we read, “[a] main cause of philosophical disease – a one-sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example” (Wittgenstein 1958, § 593). A good example of this one-sided diet can be seen in the unjustified division that has been made between “great meaning”<sup>1</sup> and the “ordinary meaning” (Levy 2005: 188) in the literature on the meaning of life. For instance, Richard Taylor who is famous for his strongly subjective theory of meaning, in a U-turn shift from his subjectivism announces:

A meaningful life is a creative one, and what falls short of this lacks meaning, to whatever extent. What redeems humanity is not its kings, military generals and builders of personal wealth, however much these may be celebrated and envied. It is instead the painters, composers, poets, philosophers, writers- all who by their creative power alone, bring about things of great value, things which, but for them, would never have existed at all (Taylor 1999: 14; emphasis added).

In the literature the great meaning is not limited to aesthetic creations and it also includes “moral achievements, [and] intellectual reflection” (Metz 2010: 1). In other words, the great meaning is related to three of the great sources of meaning in the “Enlightenment project” (*ibid.*), i.e. “the good, the true and the beautiful”. I call this phenomenon exclusivism in the literature and in the next two sections I raise some objections to the exclusivist theories of meaning. An exclusivist theory is a theory that (1) excludes majority of people from what it deems as great meaning and (2) is outcome- oriented. I argue that the dichotomy between the great meaning and the ordinary meaning is mostly based on ‘one-sided’ examples and thus fails to provide a “perspicuous representation” (Wittgenstein 1958, § 122). The idea of great meaning, I submit, acts like a picture. As Wittgenstein says, “[a] picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably” (*ibid.* § 115).

According to Wittgenstein, However, whenever we hear these kinds of words and concepts we should ask ourselves: “Is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home?” (*ibid.* § 116) In other words, we should “bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use” (*ibid.*). The dichotomy between the great meaning and the ordinary meaning is based on one-sided diet, i.e. one-sided examples, and overlooks the loose boundaries between the great and the ordinary meaning. They fail to see that “nothing out of the

ordinary is involved” (*ibid.* § 94) here, and that they are sending us “in pursuit of chimeras” (*ibid.*). Firstly, the loose boundaries between the great and the ordinary can be seen in the fact that the ordinary people might not be self-conscious about great meaning, but it doesn't necessarily mean that they don't live it. Great meaning does not imply self-consciousness necessarily. My point is that by separation of the great meaning from the ordinary meaning one runs the risk of missing what is great in the midst of the ordinary. Wittgenstein alludes to the same problem when he writes, “[t]he aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity” (*ibid.* § 129).

Secondly, I submit, the ordinary itself can be a source of great meaning. According to some commentators the reason Wittgenstein invites us to shift our attention from what is ‘peculiar’ and ‘profound’ to the ordinary is to show us the wonder of the ordinary. Thus, Philip R. Shields suggests,

When [...] Wittgenstein shows us the strangeness of the familiar, he is trying to shift our perspective from the mundane to the religious and to recapture the special sense of wonder and awe which he felt was extinguished by the prevailing scientific *Weltanschauung* (Shields 1993: 111).

The third objection that I would like to raise with regard to the great/ordinary distinction in the literature on the meaning of life has something to do with our moral sense. As Odo Marquard suggests, here one cannot help but noticing a sense of “contempt” (Marquard 1991: 43) for ordinary answers to the meaning of life. Wittgenstein puts it rightly when he writes in his diaries, “are *all* men great? No. – Well then, how can you have any hope of being a great man! Why should something be bestowed on you that's not bestowed on your neighbour?” (Wittgenstein 1980: 47)

## II

Neil Levy's paper on the problem of “downshifting and meaning in life” is a good example of exclusivism in the literature on the meaning of life. Levy argues that in the Western world people are wealthy and ‘getting wealthier’ and this has led to a ‘rise’ in their ‘happiness’. However, Levy claims, people do not feel the presence of ‘values’ in their lives as much as they feel the presence of ‘happiness’ (this is called a paradox). That's why so many people reorienting their lives, “away from the pursuit of wealth and toward the pursuit of meaning” (Levy 2005: 176) and hence emerges what he calls “downshifting movement”. According to Levy, downshifters probably will be successful in finding meaning in their lives, but “to the extent they seek superlative meaning, the highest, most satisfying [...] they are looking in the wrong place”. They have to search for “supremely valuable” (*ibid.*: 186) open-ended activities such as artistic activity, promotion of justice, or pursuit of truth. In other words, activities that are related to the great sources of meaning, i.e. “the good, the true, and the beautiful”. Pursuit of close-ended activities, Levy suggests, is

<sup>1</sup> Theories of great meaning in life includes but not limited to Sartre (1956); Nietzsche (1968); Murdock (1970); Gewirth (1998); Taylor (1999); Levy (2005); Metz (2010). For an insightful discussion of most of theories of great meaning of life among English-speaking philosophers, see, Metz (2010: 1-21). Metz examines and refutes seven theories of great meaning in life and then proposes his own theory of great meaning in life. According to Metz theories of great meaning of life are either limited and fail to cover three sources of great meaning or they are too broad entailing that the great meaning “could come from something that it cannot come from” (Metz 2010: 13).

"circular" and necessarily leads to the problem of boredom. David Wiggins pithily describes circular activities when he talks about a farmer "who grows more corn to feed more hogs to buy more land to grow more corn".<sup>2</sup> Open-ended activities, on the other hand, are activities that one cannot imagine an end for them. The open-endedness criterion guarantees that we will not face the problem of 'boredom' in activities that we undertake. If Sisyphus were supposed to be given a purpose in his life by being told that he could build a castle with all the stones that he had to roll up, his life would have turned completely meaningful. However, according to Levy, as soon as Sisyphus finishes his castle-building his life would become meaningless again, because he doesn't have anything else to do. On the other hand, one can never reach to the ends of "superlatively meaningful activities" because as our activities evolve, so do the ends at which we aim.

Open-ended activities that confer great meaning to our lives have some common characteristics: They are "hard" (ibid.: 187) and they need intellectual and physical effort. And often they require 'great courage'. The message that Levy wants to convey to the ordinary downshifters is that:

Downshifters are only half right. Meaning in life can be pursued in just the way they have suggested. By cutting work hours, and thereby leaving more time for family, for friends, for the simple joys of life. . . . But we cannot achieve superlative meaning in this way. Such meaning, the meaning which can be looked full in the face by the most reflective without fear or flinching, is only to be found in work (ibid.: 187).

Levy emphasizes his definition of work does not necessarily refers to *paid* work (though, he does not forget to include himself as a few 'privileged' philosophers and artists who get paid to be engaged in the pursuit of superlative meaning). Pursuit of open-ended activities that confer great meaning to our lives require sustained 'effort, concentration, attention, striving and perhaps . . . failing' (ibid.).

Several objects can be raised concerning Levy's account of great meaning. The first objection is the problem of "inegalitarianism" raised by John Cottingham. Levy's account of great meaning is egalitarian because it acknowledges that only an elite can have the most meaningful lives, and this, for Cottingham, is "bleakly restrictive". The assessment that only a small percentage of human beings can achieve a meaningful life, according to Cottingham,

seems both psychologically indigestible and ethically repugnant. It is ethically repugnant because it goes against the long compassionate and egalitarian tradition, rooted in the best of Christian and Islamic thought, that every human creature is eligible for salvation: that the unique and worth of each human being confers infinite value on every one of us. [...] And [it] is indigestible, except perhaps for the most robust of *Übermenschen*, since it expects us, quite unrealistically, to have the confidence to embark on an arduous and demanding voyage with no special reason to hope for a fair wind, no assurance that we have anything beyond our own meager resources to aid us in the struggle (Cottingham 2003: 69).

That is to say, any theory of meaning, Cottingham has it, must take into account the vulnerability of human condition. And "superhuman heroism" of the kind Levy offers denies any possibility of meaning to "countless" numbers of human beings, whereas egalitarian religious traditions

confer meaning to every human being. One might object to Cottingham that egalitarian conceptions of the meaning of life are not necessarily "rooted" in religious traditions, and it is completely possible to believe in a naturalistic and yet egalitarian account of meaning of life. Besides this, I found it very interesting that to my knowledge all the theories of great meaning come from naturalists in the literature on the meaning of life.<sup>3</sup> It seems that, at least as far as the great meaning is concerned, supernaturalists are more generous. In fact, the meaning that supernaturalists refer to has, according to them, an absolute value. It is odd to think of a supernaturalist who says God almighty confers *ordinary* meaning to human life. The meaning that supernaturalists refer to is the 'ultimate meaning'. And surprisingly, the great meanings that naturalists defend and present, sometimes even with a messianic tone,<sup>4</sup> most often have the character of absolute value, almost the same as that of supernaturalists, but in a secular disguise.

The second problem has to do with ambiguity of the term "work" in Levy's account of superlative meaning. Levy's definition of "work" is so broad that so many people would consider their activities as work or fundamental 'projects'. Imagine a philosopher who decides to spend the rest of his life providing the final argument for the existence of God or other minds. According to Levy's standard, he meets all the requirements of a work. It is an open-ended activity due to its philosophical nature and he is interested in his project full-heartedly. It appears that he is doing a great job and thus his life can be viewed superlatively meaningful. However, one (probably a Wittgensteinian) might rightly object that what he considers as a problem is in fact a "pseudo-problem" and that his philosophy is like an engine "idling" (Wittgenstein 1958, § 132).

The third problem arises when we consider the possibility that in the presence of both ordinary and superlative meaning, one might deem the former more significant than the latter. For example, consider a person who is leading a scientific project to find the correlation between antioxidant deficiency and cancer, and she is highly satisfied with her project. Now, Levy would have a problem if the scientist considers her life most meaningful when she is with her family. Levy's response, I think, would be that the scientist rests content with the "ordinary meaning" (Levy 2005: 188), but considering the availability of both great and ordinary meaning in her life, it would be problematic to decide for her which one is more meaningful.

Moreover, I think even the very assumption that people in Western world tend toward downshifting to make their lives meaningful is problematic. Based on Levy's reference, Frank (1998), in 1995 a survey shows 28% of the respondents were downshifters. However, in a statistic survey connecting an observable phenomenon like downshifting to an unobservable variable like the pursuit of meaning seems methodologically irrelevant. And the survey does not indicate why they were downshifters. If, for example, a statistic survey shows that the divorce rate in London is 50% we cannot use it as a premise to prove that people in England have identity problems.

And finally, in Levy's account engaging with a large portion of open-ended activities, except the pursuit of justice, has been considered as a function of "wealth" (Levy 2005: 176). However, this condition seems very limiting and one might suggest basically, one of the reasons we admire some people's lives is precisely because they survive very

<sup>3</sup> For an overview of theories of great meaning in life, see Metz (2010).

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, Nietzsche (1968); Russell (2008).

hard conditions and yet manage to succeed in the pursuit of open-ended activities.

To sum up, in this paper I critically examined Levy's theory as a typical case among the theories of great meaning and I argued that the dichotomy between the great and the ordinary in the literature on the meaning of life is problematic and that the boundaries between the two are loose. I argued that by separation of the great meaning from the ordinary meaning one runs the risk of missing what is great in the midst of the ordinary and that any attempt to *theorize* it or give an account of it *once and for all*, ultimately fails to do justice to the great meaning. A Wittgensteinian approach towards the meaning in life only tries to clarify the existent theories and show their functions in the "stream of life" (Wittgenstein 1990, § 173); it doesn't try to build a new theory. That is to say, it doesn't try to create new buildings to replace those that have been destroyed. As Wittgenstein says, "all that philosophy can do is to destroy idols. And that means not creating a new one – say in the 'absence of an idol'" (Wittgenstein 2005: 305).

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# Logische Analyse und Sprachgebrauch im *Tractatus*

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Im Folgenden beschäftige ich mich mit dem Konzept von logischer Analyse im *Tractatus*. Bei der Erklärung der logischen Analyse geht man oft davon aus, dass mit ihr „einfache Zeichen“ oder „Namen“ bestimmt werden sollen, aus denen „Elementarsätze“ zusammengesetzt sind. Zugleich soll damit die Bedeutung der Sätze unserer Alltagssprache geklärt werden. Dazu sollen diese Sätze als Wahrheitsfunktionen der in der Analyse aufgefundenen Elementarsätze ausgewiesen werden.

Was ein „Name“ oder ein „Elementarsatz“ sein soll und welche Rolle diese Konzepte im *Tractatus* spielen, sind zentrale Fragen, wenn man sich mit diesem Werk beschäftigt. Trotzdem werde ich sie im Folgenden ausklammern. Statt dessen will ich das Konzept der Analyse von einer anderen Seite her verständlich machen: von der Idee her, dass umgangssprachliche Ausdrücke erst zusammen mit einem bestimmten Gebrauch eine bestimmte Bedeutung haben. Diese Idee impliziert, dass bei der Analyse eines Ausdrucks, bei der ja dessen Bedeutung geklärt werden soll, der Sprachgebrauch eine bestimmte Rolle spielt.

## I.

Im Folgenden geht es hauptsächlich um die Rolle des Sprachgebrauchs im *Tractatus*. (Wittgenstein spricht neben dem „Gebrauch“ von Zeichen (3.326, 3.328) auch von „Verwendung“ (vgl. 3.327) und „Anwendung“ (vgl. 3.202, 3.323, 3.5)). Mein Ziel ist es zu klären, was es gemäss *Tractatus* heisst, einen Ausdruck zu brauchen oder zu verwenden, und im Zuge dieser Klärung werde ich einen Vorschlag skizzieren, wie das Konzept der logischen Analyse im *Tractatus* verstanden werden sollte.

Wittgenstein kommt im *Tractatus* an zwei Stellen explizit auf die Schwierigkeiten zu sprechen, die sich aus einer Untersuchung der Umgangssprache ergeben: In 4.002 und 3.323. In 4.002 sagt er, dass es nicht offensichtlich ist, welchen Sinn ein Satz hat:

Die Sprache verkleidet den Gedanken. Und zwar so, dass man nach der äußen Form des Kleides nicht auf die Form des bekleideten Gedankens schließen kann; weil die äußere Form des Kleides nach ganz anderen Zwecken gebildet ist als danach, die Form des Körpers erkennen zu lassen.

Wittgenstein stellt eine Diskrepanz fest zwischen dem umgangssprachlichen Satz und seiner Bedeutung – dem Gedanken, den er ausdrückt. Dies, so scheint es, macht die Analyse erst notwendig.

Worin besteht die Diskrepanz? Welche Beziehung besteht zwischen Sprache und Gedanken? Ebenfalls in 4.002 sagt Wittgenstein, dass die „Sprachlogik“ nicht unmittelbar aus der Umgangssprache entnommen werden kann. Die Diskrepanz scheint also zwischen der Form zu bestehen, die das Satzzeichen direkt aufweist, und seiner logischen Form, durch die es erst etwas Bestimmtes, einen Gedanken, ausdrückt. Weder Sprachlogik noch Gedanke werden in der Umgangssprache unmittelbar ausgedrückt. Anders gesagt: Aus dem Satzzeichen ist in einem gewissen Sinn nicht ersichtlich, worauf wir uns festlegen,

wenn wir damit etwas behaupten. Es ist nicht offensichtlich, welchen Gedanken wir damit ausdrücken.

Doch die Umgangssprache ist nicht logisch ungeordnet. Im Gegenteil: „Alle Sätze unserer Umgangssprache sind tatsächlich, so wie sie sind, logisch vollkommen geordnet“ (5.5563). Trotzdem wissen wir nicht „wie und was jedes Wort“ bedeutet (4.002). Mit der logischen Analyse, so scheint es, können wir das herausfinden: Dadurch, dass wir die Sätze der Umgangssprache analysieren, stellen wir fest, wie die Wörter, die sie enthalten, bedeuten, und was sie bedeuten.

In 3.323 gibt Wittgenstein eine Diagnose für das Problem, das uns die Umgangssprache stellt:

In der Umgangssprache kommt es ungemein häufig vor, dass dasselbe Wort auf verschiedene Art und Weise bezeichnet – also verschiedenen Symbolen angehört –, oder, dass zwei Wörter, die auf verschiedene Art und Weise bezeichnen, äußerlich in der gleichen Weise im Satz angewandt werden.

Die Bedeutung eines Zeichens ist durch dieses nicht determiniert. Weder kann man davon ausgehen, dass dasselbe Wort in zwei verschiedenen Sätzen dieselbe Bedeutung hat (oder dasselbe Symbol ausdrückt), noch kann man davon ausgehen, dass zwei Wörter, die dieselbe grammatische Form haben, auch auf dieselbe Art und Weise bezeichnen, dass sie also Symbole gleicher Art ausdrücken. (Zwei Wörter, die wie Eigennamen aussehen, haben nicht unbedingt dieselbe logische Funktion, drücken nicht Symbole derselben Art aus.) Trotzdem müssen wir auch mit unseren umgangssprachlichen Sätzen einen bestimmten Sinn ausdrücken können. Obwohl die Bedeutung an den Zeichen nicht ablesbar ist, es nicht einmal direkt ersichtlich ist, was für eine Funktion ein Zeichen hat, haben alle Zeichen, die in der Umgangssprache vorkommen eine bestimmte Funktion und eine bestimmte Bedeutung.

In diesem Zusammenhang wird laut Wittgenstein der Sprachgebrauch relevant: Um zu bestimmen, was ein Zeichen bedeutet, muss man betrachten, wie es gebraucht wird (vgl. 3.326). Die Bedeutung eines Zeichens wird dadurch bestimmt, dass es auf eine bestimmte Weise verwendet wird. Daran, dass dasselbe Zeichen auf verschiedene Weise gebraucht wird, erkennen wir, dass es je mit verschiedener Bedeutung gebraucht wird.

Wittgenstein stellt in 3.323 einen Zusammenhang her zwischen der Bedeutung eines Wortes und der Art und Weise, wie es bezeichnet wird. Wenn in der Analyse geklärt werden soll, was ein Wort bedeutet, muss dabei auch erklärt werden, auf welche Art und Weise es bezeichnet wird. Wir haben gesehen, dass nicht unmittelbar, am Zeichen selbst, deutlich ist, was wir behaupten, wenn wir ein bestimmtes Satzzeichen verwenden. Offenbar ist der Grund der, dass wir darin Wörter brauchen, die einmal in einer Art und Weise bezeichnen, einmal in einer anderen. Was heisst das „Art und Weise zu bezeichnen“? Ich werde auf diese Frage am Schluss zurückkommen.

## II.

Oben habe ich festgehalten, dass durch die Analyse geklärt werden soll, welchen Gedanken wir mit einem Satzzeichen ausdrücken. Das lässt sich nun präzisieren: Es soll geklärt werden, was für ein Gedanken wir mit einem Satzzeichen ausdrücken, wenn wir es auf bestimmte Weise verwenden. Ich möchte nun auf zwei Möglichkeiten hinweisen, wie die Rolle des Sprachgebrauchs bei der Bestimmung der Bedeutung aufgefasst werden kann.

Erstens kann die Funktion des Sprachgebrauchs als Mittel verstanden werden, um Mehrdeutigkeiten auszuschalten, welche die Zeichen für sich genommen haben. Wittgenstein scheint in 3.323 eine solche Auffassung zu vertreten. Dort stellt er fest, dass „ist“ mit unterschiedlicher Bedeutung verwendet werden kann, und zählt diese Bedeutungen auf. Dann stellt sich eine Frage: Könnten wir, anstatt dasselbe Zeichen auf verschiedene Weisen zu brauchen, ein Zeichen mit einer Verwendungsweise korrieren, und hätten wir dann eine Sprache, die disambiguier ist? Könnten wir uns also daran machen, die Verwendungsweisen von Wörter zu bestimmen und dann für unterschiedliche Verwendungsweisen neue Zeichen einzuführen? Und falls ja, ist dies das Ziel der logischen Analyse: die normale Sprache, die zwar logisch geordnet, deren Notation aber im Sinne von 3.323 defizitär ist, zu ersetzen durch eine Sprache, deren Notation diese Ordnung direkt aufzeigt? Wenn wir den *Tractatus* so verstehen, dann behauptet Wittgenstein, dass die Umgangssprache in einem gewissen Sinne doch defizitär ist, nämlich dadurch, dass ihre Ausdrücke mehrdeutig sind. Erst zusammen mit dem Gebrauch wird die Bedeutung dieser Ausdrücke endgültig bestimmt. Die Ausdrucksweise der Umgangssprache lässt sich durch eine eindeutige Notation ersetzen. Dazu muss bestimmt werden, welche Symbole in der Sprache ausgedrückt werden, dadurch, dass man den Gebrauch der Zeichen betrachtet. Dann wird jedem Symbol genau ein Zeichen zugeordnet. Die Symbole sind dann direkt an den Zeichen erkennbar, der Sprachgebrauch muss nicht mehr betrachtet werden, die Bedeutung der Zeichen ist geklärt.

Wenn wir den *Tractatus* so lesen, dann gelangen wir zum Resultat, dass die Unterscheidung von Zeichen und Symbol keine für Sprache wesentliche Unterscheidung ist. Der Sprachgebrauch ist dann sozusagen ein Hilfsmittel, mit dem wir zusätzliche logisch-syntaktische Unterscheidungen einführen; ein Hilfsmittel, dass überflüssig geworden ist, wenn wir die Ausdrucksweise der Umgangssprache durch eine Notation ersetzt haben, welche diese logisch-syntaktischen Unterscheidungen durch unterschiedliche Zeichen direkt ausdrückt.

Nun setzt diese Auffassung, dass man die Mehrdeutigkeit umgangssprachlicher Zeichen durch eine logische Analyse überwinden könne, voraus, dass die Bezeichnungsweise von Zeichen endgültig bestimmbar ist. Dagegen weist Cora Diamond in ihrem Aufsatz „Logical Syntax in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*“ (2005) energisch darauf hin, dass die Verwendungsweisen normalsprachlicher Zeichen nicht limitiert sind. Es gibt keinen Regelkatalog, in dem die Verwendungsmöglichkeiten eines bestimmten Zeichens festgelegt wären. Deshalb gibt es auch keinen Gebrauch, der die logisch-syntaktischen Regeln eines Zeichens verletzen würde. Es gibt keinen richtigen oder falschen Gebrauch. Richtig und falsch gibt es erst dann, wenn wir bestimmte Regeln des Gebrauchs stipulieren, so Diamond. Festsetzungen und Stipulationen aber gibt es für eine formale Sprache.

Hat Diamond recht, dann ist die gerade dargelegte Auffassung falsch. Die Bedeutung eines Zeichens kann nicht abschliessend bestimmt werden in dem Sinne, dass alle Symbole, die ein Zeichen ausdrückt, aufgelistet werden. Das Zeichen hat eine bestimmte Bedeutung nur zusammen mit einem bestimmten Gebrauch. Der Kontext seines Gebrauchs wird nicht durch eine Übersetzung in eine andere Notation überflüssig gemacht. Ich denke, Diamonds Feststellung, dass die Verwendungsweise eines Wortes nicht beschränkt ist, impliziert dies: Der Kontext, in dem eine bestimmte Verwendungsweise stattfindet, gehört zur Wortbedeutung. Die Vorstellung, man könnte die Mehrdeutigkeiten der Umgangssprache durch eine Analyse der Bedeutung und einer daraus resultierenden Notation beseitigen, ist also verfehlt.

Die gerade vorgestellte Auffassung beinhaltet zwei ausschlussreiche Fehler: Sie geht erstens davon aus, dass der Unterschied zwischen Zeichen und Symbol kein wesentlicher Unterschied ist. Wenn Diamond recht hat, dann ist dieser Unterschied wesentlich: Der Gebrauch eines Zeichens ist nicht nur dann relevant, wenn es darum geht zu klären, was das Zeichen bedeutet (welches Symbol es ausdrückt), sondern das Zeichen hat nur zusammen mit dem bestimmten Gebrauch eine Bedeutung. Nun wird ein Zeichen dadurch, dass es gebraucht wird, in Beziehung zu anderen Zeichen gesetzt. Deshalb gehört der Kontext, in dem das Zeichen mit einer bestimmten Bedeutung gebraucht wird (oder mit dieser bestimmten Bedeutung gebraucht werden kann), wesentlich zum Zeichen, dass diese Bedeutung hat.

Zweitens ist die Vorstellung, die Analyse sei ein Projekt, das, wenn vielleicht auch nur idealiter, vollendet werden kann, falsch. Der Kontext, in dem das Zeichen gebraucht wird, wird durch die Analyse expliziert aber dadurch nicht überflüssig gemacht. Der Kontext des Zeichengebrauchs geht also nicht in der Notation auf.

Es stellt sich die Frage, was die logische Analyse gemäss *Tractatus* dann leisten soll. Was heisst es, die Bedeutung eines Ausdrucks zu klären, und zu welchem Zweck sollen wir eine solche Klärung vornehmen?

Um diese Frage zu beantworten, gehe ich nochmals auf die Funktion des Sprachgebrauchs ein. Hier also eine zweite Möglichkeit, den Zusammenhang von Sprachgebrauch und Bedeutung zu verstehen. Ich gehe dazu von der Antwort aus, die Diamond im genannten Aufsatz auf die Frage gibt, was Unsinn sei. Sie argumentiert gegen Hacker, dass Unsinn nicht dadurch entsteht, dass wir Zeichen entgegen den Regeln der logischen Syntax gebrauchen. Er entsteht dann, wenn wir einem Zeichen keine Bedeutung gegeben haben. Diamond verweist auf 5.4733: Dort sagt Wittgenstein (unter anderem):

Jeder mögliche Satz ist rechtmäßig gebildet, und wenn er keinen Sinn hat, so kann das nur daran liegen, dass wir einigen seiner Bestandteile keine Bedeutung gegeben haben. (Wenn wir auch glauben, es getan zu haben.) So sagt »Sokrates ist identisch« darum nichts, weil wir dem Wort »identisch« als Eigenschaftswort keine Bedeutung gegeben haben.

Woran erkennen wir, dass einem Satzbestandteil, einem Wort, keine Bedeutung gegeben worden ist? Im Folgenden werde ich versuchen, diese Frage zu beantworten. Diese Antwort bringt uns auch bei der Frage, was wir unter logischen Analyse verstehen sollen weiter. Denn die Antwort auf die Frage, woran wir erkennen, dass ein Ausdruck eine Bedeutung hat, ist auch Teil der Antwort, was es heisst, die Bedeutung eines Ausdrucks zu klären.

### III.

Wir haben gesehen, dass Zeichen erst zusammen mit einem bestimmten Gebrauch eine bestimmte Bedeutung haben. Ob ein Zeichen Bedeutung hat, muss sich also daran zeigen, dass es gebraucht wird. Nun müssen wir explizieren, was „brauchen“ heißen soll. Warum brauchen wir „identisch“ nicht, wenn wir das Satzzeichen „Sokrates ist identisch“ bilden? Woran erkennen wir, dass wir „ist identisch“ hier nicht als Prädikat brauchen?

Ich denke, das zeigt sich nicht unabhängig davon, dass wir das ganze Satzzeichen nicht brauchen. Auch für das Satzzeichen gilt: Nur zusammen mit einem bestimmten Gebrauch hat es einen bestimmten Sinn. Nun ist der Sinn des Satzes durch seine Wahrheitsbedingungen bestimmt (vgl. 4.2 ff). Daraus ergibt sich, dass das Satzzeichen erst zusammen mit einem bestimmten Gebrauch Wahrheitsbedingungen hat und umgekehrt dann, wenn es nicht gebraucht wird, keine Wahrheitsbedingungen hat. Ein Satzzeichen ist dann unsinnig, wenn wir damit keine Wahrheitsbedingungen ausdrücken, wenn wir also damit nichts behaupten.

Nun heißtt Wahrheitsbedingungen haben, in einer logischen Beziehung zu anderen Sätzen stehen (vgl. 5.131). Dass etwas, das wie ein Satz aussieht, tatsächlich Wahrheitsbedingungen hat, zeigt sich daran, dass es in logischen Beziehungen zu anderen Sätzen steht: Es wird nicht unabhängig von anderen Sätzen behauptet, es wird z.B. auf bestimmte Weise durch andere Sätze expliziert oder es wird nicht zusammen mit bestimmten anderen Sätzen behauptet. Wenn „identisch“ keine Bedeutung hat, hat „Sokrates ist identisch“ keine Wahrheitsbedingungen. Und das zeigt sich daran, dass es keinen Kontext gibt, in dem „Sokrates ist identisch“ gebraucht wird: Es wird nicht durch Sätze expliziert und steht auch nicht in Widerspruch zu irgendwelchen Sätzen.

Damit ist klar geworden, was Gebrauch heißen soll: Einen Ausdruck brauchen, ein Satzzeichen verwenden, heißtt, damit etwas Bestimmtes behaupten und sich damit auf bestimmte Wahrheitsbedingungen festlegen. Dadurch wird das Satzzeichen in Beziehung zu anderen Satzzeichen gesetzt, es bekommt einen Kontext, in dem es mit diesem bestimmten Sinn verwendet werden kann. Dass wir ein Satzzeichen mit einer bestimmten Bedeutung brauchen, zeigt sich somit daran, dass es nicht isoliert bleibt.

### IV.

Inwiefern bringt uns das beim Verständnis der Analyse weiter, wenn wir die Funktion des Sprachgebrauchs so auffassen? In der Analyse wird die Bedeutung sprachlicher Ausdrücke dadurch geklärt, dass ein bestimmter Kontext betrachtet wird, in dem sie gebraucht werden und dann explizit gemacht wird, welches die logischen Beziehungen der Sätze sind, die in diesem Kontext gebraucht werden. (Dann wird die „Art und Weise“ wie ein Zeichen bezeichnet, explizit gemacht.)

Ein Satzzeichen kann gebraucht werden, um einen Satz auszudrücken, der bestimmte andere Sätze impliziert. (Ein Zeichen kann in einem Satzzeichen verwendet werden, um einen Satz auszudrücken, der bestimmte andere Sätze impliziert.) Wir behaupten einen solchen Satz dann nicht unabhängig, sondern behaupten einiges mit. Am Satzzeichen allein ist das aber nicht erkennbar. Weder das Satzzeichen als Ganzes noch die Wörter, aus denen es zusammengesetzt ist, lassen erkennen, ob und was der Satz mitbehauptet, den wir mit dem Satzzeichen ausdrücken. Dies wird erst deutlich, wenn wir den Kontext betrachten, in dem das Satzzeichen gebraucht wird, dann zum Beispiel, wenn wir explizieren, worauf wir uns mit der Behauptung festlegen. Wenn wir explizieren, worauf wir uns mit einer Behauptung festlegen, machen wir ihre Wahrheitsbedingungen explizit. Dann wird deutlich, auf welche Art und Weise die Wörter bezeichneten, die wir brauchen, um die Behauptung zu machen. Genau das soll durch die logische Analyse geklärt werden.

Ein Satzzeichen kann also gebraucht werden, um ganz verschiedene Sätze damit auszudrücken. Was wir mit einem Satzzeichen meinen, das zeigt sich erst, wenn wir die Wahrheitsbedingungen des Satzes, den wir ausdrücken wollen, explizieren machen. Wir verwenden das Satzzeichen nicht isoliert, sondern es hat einen logischen Ort in der Sprache: es steht in logischen Beziehungen zu anderen Sätzen. Je nachdem, welchen logischen Ort wir dem Satzzeichen geben, bezeichnet es und bezeichneten die Wörter, die in ihm verwendet werden, auf andere Art und Weise. Wenn wir seine Wahrheitsbedingungen deutlich machen, dann machen wir auch seinen logischen Ort in der Sprache deutlich. Und dann machen wir deutlich, auf welche Art und Weise die Wörter, die es enthält, bezeichnen.

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# Wann ist ein Normensystem ethisch adäquat?

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## 1. Einleitung

Die metaethischen Positionen des Non-Deskriptivismus und Non-Kognitivismus besagen:

- (ND) Es ist nicht der Fall, dass Normsätze objektive Sachverhalte beschreiben.
- (NK) Es ist nicht der Fall, dass Normsätze wahr bzw. falsch sein können.

Unter der zusätzlichen Annahme, dass Sätze genau dann wahr bzw. falsch sein können, wenn sie objektive Sachverhalte beschreiben, sind ND und NK äquivalent (vgl. Morscher 2006: 38).

Franz von Kutschera wandte ein, dass es unter Annahme von NK nicht möglich sei, Normsätze zu begründen, denn „einen Satz begründen, heißt nachweisen, daß er wahr ist“ (Kutschera 1982: 48). Dadurch würde die Ethik der Willkür preisgegeben. Ähnliche Einwände wurden auch gegen ND vorgebracht. Vertreter von ND und NK können diesen Einwänden entgegnen, dass Normsätze sehr wohl begründet werden können, sofern für sie ein anderer Begründungsbegriff verwendet wird. Für die Stichhaltigkeit einer solchen Entgegnung ist freilich die Präzisierung eines alternativen Begründungsbegriffs erforderlich.

Anknüpfend an Vorarbeiten Viktor Krafts erarbeitete ich im Folgenden einen Begriff der Rechtfertigung von Normensystemen, der mit ND und NK vereinbar ist.

## 2. Viktor Krafts Begründungsmodell

Krafts Ansatz ist non-kognitivistisch und non-deskriptivistisch: Ein Normsatz ist „keine Aussage über Tatsachen und kann auch nicht wahr oder falsch sein wie eine solche.“ (Kraft 1963: 35) Normen können aber mehr oder weniger zweckmäßig bzgl. eines Ziels sein. Krafts Begründungsmodell beruht nun darauf, dass Normensystemen (d.h. Mengen von Normssätzen) Ziele bzw. Zwecke zugeschrieben werden. So ist es etwa ein Ziel der Straßenverkehrsordnung, dass der Verkehr sicher und flüssig ist. Ebenso haben auch *ethische* Normensysteme ein Ziel. „Der allgemeine Zweck der Moral ist es, eine Ordnung in den sozialen Beziehungen herzustellen. Was für eine Ordnung hergestellt werden soll, wird durch gemeinsame Ziele der miteinander lebenden Individuen bestimmt.“ (Kraft 1963: 39) Genauer äußert sich Kraft in einem späteren Werk (vgl. Kraft 1974: 319): Das Ziel von Moralsystemen besteht in einer so wenig als möglich beschränkten Befriedigung der Begehrungen (d.h. Bedürfnisse, Wünsche, Interessen, Präferenzen, Ziele) aller Akteure.

Kraft geht davon aus, dass alle Akteure ihre Begehrungen befriedigen wollen. Es können aber nicht alle Begehrungen befriedigt werden (etwa aufgrund der Tatsache, dass Akteure oft einander widersprechende Begehrungen haben). Die Erfüllung der individuellen Begehrungen muss deshalb beschränkt werden. Dazu werden angemessene Regeln benötigt: ethische Normen. (vgl. Kraft 1974)

## 3. Ethische Adäquatheit & ethische Rechtfertigung

Wie muss nun ein Normensystem beschaffen sein, um dem Ziel ethischer Moralsysteme zu entsprechen? Gesucht ist eine Menge von Normen zur Einschränkung der Erfüllung der individuellen Wünsche, Interessen und Ziele, so dass insgesamt so wenig als möglich Einschränkungen für alle entstehen. Dabei sind die subjektiven Präferenzordnungen der einzelnen Akteure zu berücksichtigen. Von einem ethischen Standpunkt aus sind diese Einschränkungen so ausgewogen und gerecht als möglich vorzugeben. Es muss sich ferner um eine minimale Menge von Normen handeln, denn Gebote bringen Einschränkungen der Handlungsfreiheit mit sich, sie sind – wie Tugendhat betont (vgl. 2001: 92) – in gewisser Weise Belastungen; es wäre mit dem Ziel ethischer Moralsysteme unvereinbar, die Befriedigung der Wünsche unnötig durch Regeln einzuschränken. Die Regeln müssen relevant und notwendig für die Erreichung des Ziels sein. Zur Erreichung von Zielen, zur Befriedigung von Bedürfnissen, zur Realisierung von Wünschen sind Handlungen (bzw. Unterlassungen von Handlungen) erforderlich. Ein Moralsystem gibt an, welche dieser Handlungen ausgeführt werden sollen und welche nicht. Deshalb betreffen moralische Regeln stets *Handlungen* und drücken sich in Handlungsanweisungen aus. Gesucht ist also eine minimale, konstante Menge von Handlungsanweisungen, die für Erreichung des Ziels der Moral zugleich dienlich und notwendig ist.

Im Folgenden wird der so skizzierte Ansatz präzisiert. Dabei werden erst Normensysteme im Allgemeinen behandelt und danach *ethische* Normensysteme im Besonderen.

Zunächst muss geklärt werden, was in diesem Zusammenhang unter einer ‚Zielsetzung‘ zu verstehen ist.

*Definition 1:* Z ist eine Zielsetzung gdw Z eine nicht-leere, konsistente Menge von rein deskriptiven Sätzen ist.

Eine Zielsetzung in diesem Sinn beschreibt logisch mögliche Zustände. Wenn die beschriebenen Zustände tatsächlich eintreten, ist die Zielsetzung realisiert. Das besagt die folgende Definition:

*Definition 2:* Eine Zielsetzung Z ist realisiert gdw für alle A in Z gilt: A ist der Fall.

Beispielsweise ist die Zielsetzung {„Ab 2050 gibt es keine Kriege mehr.“, „Ab 2050 gibt es keine Atomkraftwerke mehr.“} genau dann realisiert, wenn es ab 2050 keine Kriege und Atomkraftwerke mehr gibt.

*Definition 3:* Ein Normsatz A ist realisiert gdw das durch A Gebotene der Fall ist.

Zum Beispiel wird der Normsatz „Es ist geboten, dass für alle Akteure x und y gilt: x unterlässt es, y zu belügen.“ eingehalten, falls für alle Akteure x und y gilt: x unterlässt es, y zu belügen.

**Definition 4:** Ein Normensystem N ist hinreichend für die Erreichung einer Zielsetzung Z gdw gilt: Wenn für alle A aus N gilt, dass A eingehalten wird, dann ist Z realisiert.

Beispielsweise ist das einelementige Normensystem {Es ist geboten, dass für alle Menschen x und y gilt: x unterlässt es, y zu töten.} hinreichend für die Zielsetzung {Hans tötet niemanden.}.

**Definition 5:** Ein Normensystem N ist notwendig für die Erreichung einer Zielsetzung Z gdw gilt: Wenn nicht für alle A aus N gilt, dass A eingehalten wird, dann ist Z nicht realisiert.

Zum Beispiel ist das Normensystem {Es ist geboten, dass niemand im Ortsgebiet schneller als 50 km/h fährt., Es ist geboten, dass niemand bei Nacht ohne Licht fährt.} notwendig für die Zielsetzung der Straßenverkehrsordnung (StVO) (nämlich die Sicherheit und Flüssigkeit des Verkehrs). Hingegen ist das Normensystem {Es ist geboten, dass alle Menschen kein Fleisch essen.} nicht notwendig für die Zielsetzung der StVO.

**Definition 6:** Ein Normensystem N ist minimal bzgl. einer Zielsetzung Z gdw es keine voneinander verschiedenen Normsätze A und B aus N gibt, so dass für jede Zielsetzung Z1, die eine Teilmenge von Z ist, gilt: Wenn {A} hinreichend für Z1 ist, dann ist auch {B} hinreichend für Z1.

Im folgenden Begriff werden alle bisherigen Merkmale zusammengefasst.

**Definition 6:** Ein Normensystem N ist schwach adäquat relativ zu einer Zielsetzung Z gdw

- (a) N konsistent und deontisch konsistent ist,
- (b) N notwendig für die Erreichung von Z ist, und
- (c) N minimal bzgl. Z ist.

**Definition 7:** Ein Normensystem N ist adäquat relativ zu einer Zielsetzung Z gdw

- (a) N schwach adäquat relativ zu Z ist, und
- (b) N hinreichend für die Erreichung von Z ist.

Auf Basis dieser Definition lässt sich ein nennenswertes Resultat beweisen: Sind zwei Normensysteme relativ zur selben Zielsetzung adäquat, so werden die Handlungsanweisungen des ersten Systems genau dann eingehalten, wenn auch jene des zweiten Systems eingehalten werden. Solche Normensysteme können also anhand der praktischen Auswirkungen ihrer Befolgung nicht unterschieden werden. Dennoch können sie an sich verschieden voneinander sein. Dieses Resultat erscheint nicht unplausibel, wenn man folgende Analogien in Betracht zieht: Sämtliche Systeme der klassischen Aussagenlogik sind am selben Ziel ausgerichtet – nämlich dass sich durch die Anwendung der jeweiligen Regeln Formeln bestimmter Art als beweisbar herausstellen –, aber nicht alle beinhalten dieselben Schlussregeln. Trotz der unterschiedlichen Regeln können aber genau dieselben Formeln bewiesen werden. Ebenso verhält es sich bei Normensystemen, die adäquat bzgl. desselben Ziels sind. Das nachfolgende Korollar zeigt, dass dies allgemein der Fall ist.

**Korollar 1:** Ist Z eine Zielsetzung und sind die Normensysteme N1 sowie N2 adäquat relativ zu Z, dann gilt: Alle in N1 enthaltenen Normsätze werden eingehalten gdw alle in N2 enthaltenen Normsätze eingehalten werden.

Bisher wurden Normensysteme und Zielsetzungen im Allgemeinen betrachtet. Im Folgenden werden *ethische* Normensysteme im Speziellen behandelt. Diese haben –

grob gesagt – das Ziel, das gesellschaftliche Zusammenleben derart zu regeln, dass alle Akteure möglichst wenig in der Befriedigung ihrer Bedürfnisse und der Erreichung ihrer Ziele eingeschränkt werden bzw. (anders formuliert) dass alle Akteure möglichst viele ihrer Bedürfnisse und Ziele befriedigen resp. erreichen können.

Es sei nun W+ die Menge aller deskriptiven Sätze, die bestehende Bedürfnisse, Wünsche, Interessen und Ziele von Akteuren beschreiben. Es sei ZM (die Zielsetzung ethischer Normensysteme) jene maximale, simultan realisierbare Teilmenge von W+, für die gilt, dass für alle Akteure gemäß ihrer subjektiven Präferenzordnung möglichst viele ihrer Bedürfnisse, Wünsche, Interessen und Ziele realisiert werden. Grundbedürfnisse (etwa die Bedürfnisse nach Unversehrtheit, Sicherheit, sozialen Kontakten usf.) werden dabei Zielen höherer Stufe vorgeordnet.

Bevor nun definiert werden kann, wann ein Normensystem ethisch adäquat ist, wird der Begriff der Handlungsanweisung gebraucht: Bei Handlungsanweisungen handelt es sich um „Aufforderungen, in Situationen einer bestimmten Art s Handlungen einer bestimmten Art h auszuführen.“ (Mittelstraß<sup>2</sup> 2005, p. 1030) Zum Beispiel ist der Normsatz ‚Es ist geboten, dass kein Mensch andere Menschen ermordet.‘ eine Handlungsanweisung, aber der Normsatz ‚Es ist geboten, dass niemand Schmerzen hat.‘ ist keine Handlungsanweisung. Es ist nicht zweckmäßig, Akteuren Normsätze aufzuerlegen, die keine Handlungsanweisungen sind. Damit ergibt sich folgende Definition:

**Definition 8:** Ein Normensystem N ist ethisch adäquat gdw

- (a) N nur Handlungsanweisungen enthält, und
- (b) N adäquat relativ zu ZM (der Zielsetzung ethischer Normensysteme) ist.

Demgemäß ist ein ethisch adäquates Normensystem eine (deontisch) konsistente, minimale Menge von Handlungsanweisungen derart, dass ZM genau dann realisiert ist, wenn alle Elemente des Normensystems eingehalten werden. Daraus ergeben sich ein paar Folgerungen, die den Begriff der ethischen Adäquatheit etwas näher erläutern.

**Korollar 2:** Ist ZM nicht realisiert, dann gibt es kein ethisch adäquates Normensystem, dessen sämtliche Elemente eingehalten werden.

Da im gegenwärtigen Zustand der Welt ZM nicht realisiert ist, kann nach diesem Resultat davon ausgegangen werden, dass derzeit kein ethisch adäquates Moralsystem allgemein eingehalten wird.

**Korollar 3:** Sind N1 sowie N2 ethisch adäquate Normensysteme, dann gilt: Alle Normsätze aus N1 werden eingehalten gdw alle Normsätze aus N2 eingehalten werden.

Aus dem Begriff der ethischen Adäquatheit von Moralsystemen ergeben sich folgende Definitionen dreier Rechtfertigungsbegriffe für Normsätze.

**Definition 9:** Eine Normsätze A ist ethisch gerechtfertigt bzgl. eines Normensystems N gdw N ethisch adäquat ist, und A aus N deontisch-logisch folgt.

Ethisch gerechtfertigt ist ein Normsatz also stets in Bezug auf ein ethisch adäquates Normensystem. Der Begriff der ethischen Adäquatheit von Normensystemen ist insoweit grundlegender als der Begriff der Rechtfertigung einzelner Normsätze. Dieses Ergebnis erscheint vielleicht etwas unerwartet, doch ist es durchaus plausibel, wenn man sich verdeutlicht, dass manche Normen nur im Zusammenhang mit anderen gerechtfertigt werden können.

*Definition 10:* Ein Normsatz A ist ethisch rechtfertigbar gdw es ein Normensystem N gibt, so dass N ethisch adäquat und A ethisch gerechtfertigt bzgl. N ist.

Es ist auch der Fall denkbar, dass ein Normsatz aus allen ethisch adäquaten Normensystemen folgt. Dafür wird der folgende Begriff eingeführt:

*Definition 11:* Ein Normsatz A ist absolut ethisch gerechtfertigt gdw es min. ein ethisch adäquates Normensystem gibt und für alle Normensysteme N gilt: Wenn N ethisch adäquat ist, dann ist A ethisch gerechtfertigt bzgl. N.

Absolut ethisch gerechtfertigt ist also ein Normsatz, der aus allen ethisch adäquaten Moralsystemen folgt. Es ist allerdings nicht gezeigt, dass es solche Normsätze tatsächlich gibt.

Zur weiteren Verdeutlichung dieser Rechtfertigungsbegriffe dienen die folgenden Korollare:

*Korollar 4:* Wenn es keine ethisch adäquaten Normensysteme gibt, dann ist kein Normsatz absolut ethisch gerechtfertigt.

*Korollar 5:* Wenn es keine ethisch adäquaten Normensysteme gibt, dann gibt es keine ethisch rechtfertigbaren Normsätze.

*Korollar 6:* Wenn alle ethisch rechtfertigbaren Sätze absolut ethisch gerechtfertigt sind, dann gilt für alle ethisch adäquaten Normensysteme N1, N2 und alle Normsätze A: A folgt aus N1 gdw A aus N2 folgt.

*Korollar 7:* Wenn alle ethisch rechtfertigbaren Sätze absolut ethisch gerechtfertigt sind, dann gilt für alle ethisch adäquaten Normensysteme N1, N2: Alle in N1 enthaltenen Normsätze folgen aus N2 und alle in N2 enthaltenen Normsätze folgen aus N1.

Die Korollare 6 und 7 besagen, dass es hinreichend für die Äquivalenz aller ethisch adäquaten Normensysteme ist, dass alle ethisch rechtfertigbaren Normsätze auch absolut ethisch gerechtfertigt sind. Unter dieser Bedingung gibt es – vereinfacht formuliert – die „eine richtige Ethik“.

#### 4. Merkmale ethisch adäquater Normensysteme

Es können sechs Merkmale verzeichnet werden, die ethisch adäquate Moralsysteme aufweisen:

(1) *Menschenwerk:* Moralsysteme müssen gemäß der vorgeschlagenen Rechtfertigungstheorie von einem ethischen Standpunkt aus konstruiert werden und es muss überprüft werden, ob sie ethisch adäquat sind. Sie sind nicht durch Offenbarung oder Wesensschau gegeben.

(2) *Nicht-Einzigkeit:* Es kann mehrere verschiedene ethisch adäquaten Moralsysteme geben. Es muss also nicht der Fall sein, dass es (bis auf logische Äquivalenz) genau ein einziges adäquates Moralsystem gibt. Das ist nur unter gewissen Bedingungen der Fall (siehe Korollar 7).

(3) *Metaphysische Sparsamkeit:* Die Existenz objektiver Norm- oder Wertsachverhalte muss nicht angenommen werden. Auch die Bezugnahme auf (metaphysisch zweifelhafte) höhere Instanzen ist nicht erforderlich.

(4) *Interessenabhängigkeit:* Was ethisch adäquat bzw. gerechtfertigt ist, hängt von den Bedürfnissen, Wünschen, Interessen, Präferenzen und Zielen der Akteure ab.

(5) *Holismus:* Nicht (nur) einzelne Normen, sondern ganze Normensysteme sind auf ihre Angemessenheit zu überprü-

fen. Die Rechtfertigbarkeit einzelner Normsätze hängt von der Adäquatheit ganzer Moralsysteme ab. Es ist nicht ausgeschlossen, dass gewisse Handlungsanweisungen nur im Zusammenhang mit anderen gerechtfertigt sind.

(6) *Revidierbarkeit und Zeitabhängigkeit:* Adäquate Moralsysteme sind nach dieser Auffassung nicht ewig und unverrückbar, sondern stets Wandel und Anpassung unterworfen. Der Zeitpunkt wurde in der bisherigen Betrachtung stets festgehalten. Um eine angemessene Theorie zu erhalten, müsste man aber alle betrachteten Prädikate um eine Zeitstelle erweitern, z.B. „N ist zu t ethisch adäquat“ statt „N ist ethisch adäquat“. Es ist nämlich zu beachten, dass sich mit der Änderung von Bedürfnissen, Wünschen und Interessen der kognitiven Subjekte in der Zeit auch eine Änderung der ethisch adäquaten Normensysteme vollzieht. Da Bedürfnisse, Wünsche, Interessen zeitabhängig sind und es von Bedürfnissen, Wünschen und Interessen abhängt, ob Moralsysteme ethisch adäquat sind, müsste auch diese zeitabhängig sein.

#### 5. Offene Probleme

Die Frage, wie die Menge ZM (die Zielsetzung ethischer Moralsysteme) genau zu bestimmen ist, wurde in dieser Abhandlung nicht ausreichend beantwortet. Dies ist gewiss ein neuralgischer Punkt, der vieles an Präzisierungsarbeit erfordert. Nida-Rümelin bemerkt dazu: „Der Zusammenhang zwischen individuellen Interessen, moralischer Begründung und sozialen Normen bleibt allerdings nicht nur bei Kraft unzureichend geklärt, sondern stellt das zentrale Problem auch der zeitgenössischen rationalen Ethik dar“ (Nida-Rümelin 1992: 159).

Nachdem ein Rechtfertigungsbegriff für Handlungsanweisungen und einen Adäquatheitsbegriff für Moralsysteme vorgeschlagen wurde, kann nun der Fokus auf die Beantwortung dieser offenen Fragen gelegt werden. Gelingt es, sie plausibel zu beantworten, so kommt man einer stichhaltigen non-deskriptivistischen bzw. non-kognitivistischen Metaethik einen großen Schritt näher.

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# Ethics as Shown: Against Kelly's Reading of the *Tractatus*

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## 1. Introduction

This paper evaluates John C. Kelly's account of Wittgenstein's early views on ethics. I shall argue against Kelly's claim that, for the early Wittgenstein, ethics does not show itself because showing "requires a common structure" (Kelly 1995: 580). I begin by sketching the context in which Kelly makes this claim in order to show how it connects to his paper's central argument. Following this, I examine Kelly's reading of the *Tractatus* in order to reconstruct his argument as to why showing requires a common structure. I finally show how key passages from the *Tractatus* and "A Lecture on Ethics" can be used to establish that remark 6.522 from the *Tractatus* implies that ethics *does* show itself and, consequently, that Kelly's conclusion is unacceptable.

## 2. Contextualizing Kelly's claim: the big picture

Kelly's main thesis in "Wittgenstein, the Self, and Ethics" is that the *Philosophical Investigations* does not treat of ethics because Wittgenstein's views on this subject remained relatively stable over the course of his philosophical development. On Kelly's reading, the later Wittgenstein believes we can only speak meaningfully about the phenomena which arise in the context of particular activities or practices. One might then think that, for Wittgenstein, ethics concerns what is good, right, or obligatory in these particular contexts; and on such a view, that one could clarify our ethical concepts by studying their use within a number of language-games. Yet according to Kelly, such an approach to ethics is not one which Wittgenstein would have taken himself, since, throughout his life, Wittgenstein took ethics to relate to "a global vision which gives meaning to life [as opposed to] an assortment of disconnected goods, rights, and obligations" (Kelly 1995: 588). Thus, as ethics tries to say something about the meaning of an individual's life as a whole, no shared practice or language-game can confer meaning to our utterances about ethics. Finally, Kelly takes this to echo Wittgenstein's early views on ethics; there, "ethics could not be shown either, since showing, like saying, requires a common structure" (Kelly 1995: 588).

I take issue with this claim that, for the early Wittgenstein, ethics is not shown because a "common structure" is lacking. In the next section, I will sketch Kelly's account of the role played by such a structure in the *Tractatus* and attempt to clarify the connection between this structure and the possibility of showing. Note, however, that my main argument does not attack Kelly's claim that *ethics cannot be shown because showing requires a common structure*; it only attacks Kelly's conclusion that *ethics does not show itself*.

## 3. Constructing Kelly's account

Since Kelly takes logic, unlike ethics, to show itself according to the *Tractatus*, we begin by examining his views on those topics. Kelly claims there are two similarities and one important difference between logic and ethics in the *Tractatus*. Recall that, on the Tractarian theory of meaning, propositions are only meaningful insofar as they make claims about contingent states of affairs. Thus, as neither logical nor ethical matters are contingent (TLP 2.0121, 6.41), whatever appears to address an ethical or logical issue is literally nonsensical (TLP 6.42, 5.5351); both logical and ethical "statements" are pseudo-propositions. Furthermore, according to Kelly, both logic and ethics require a transcendental subject through which they can characterize or condition the world. On the logical side of things, the shared structure of language, thought and world is constituted by a metaphysical subject; and on the ethical side, the meaning to the world rests on the metaphysical subject's view of the world as a whole (Kelly 1995: 573).

But for Kelly, the similarity between ethics and logic breaks down when we consider the status of the subject's position in relation to reality. Although, by the *Tractatus*, there is some truth to solipsism because the underlying structure of the world is given by the metaphysical subject, this subject, as such a structure, lies *outside* the world. This leaves only a "common realm of facts" with limits fixed by the logic of our language; and "in the case of logic there is, in effect, only one metaphysical subject constituting [that] single common domain of facts" (Kelly 1995: 578). Thus, some form of realism is true because every one of us constitutes the same logical space given by the metaphysical subject. However, according to Kelly, Wittgenstein claims the happy and unhappy inhabit different worlds (TLP 6.43) and states that experiences of ethical value vary from person to person (Wittgenstein 1965: 8). Given these remarks, Kelly concludes that, as there are a number of distinct ethical attitudes one may have toward the world, nothing guarantees agreement between the varieties of ethical spaces we constitute and there can be no unique, common domain of ethical values. Wittgenstein is thus a logical monist but an ethical pluralist.

Kelly mentions no other differences between logic and ethics in the *Tractatus*. Thus, since he characterizes the difference between logic and ethics in terms the number of perspectives their subjects may take (and logic shows itself, while ethics does not), it seems we can conclude that something can show itself only when it is common to all subjects. I take Kelly's underlying reasoning here to be as follows. Because there is only one linguistic perspective one can take toward the world – only one way of structuring the world which "fits" it – there is a unique set of conditions which must be met in order for language to be possible at all. We are able to use pictures and propositions because our thoughts are a particular way; and these particularities, these logical features, show themselves. In contrast, I may take one of any number of genuinely ethical perspectives on the world. Thus, nothing can be shown about the character of the unique, correct attitude one can have toward the world from an ethical point of view, because there is no such attitude. So, while some things

about ethics may be shown – that there are many ethical perspectives, for instance – ethics does not show *itself*.

#### 4. EXCURSUS: ETHICAL PLURALISM

Kelly's argument that ethics cannot be shown relies on the premise that Wittgenstein is a type of ethical pluralist. Although my criticism of Kelly will not focus on this premise, I do wish to raise the following issues concerning it. Kelly cites the *Tractatus* and the "Lecture on Ethics" as evidence of Wittgenstein's pluralism because the latter never explicitly states his position on the matter in his early work. Kelly's evidence, however, does not unequivocally support his claim. Firstly, it is difficult to tell what Wittgenstein is driving at in TLP 6.43. Does he mean that the character of the world depends on *one* will, which may be happy or unhappy? Or is he saying something about two different wills – one happy, one unhappy – which characterize different worlds? If he means the first, 6.43 does not entail ethical pluralism. Secondly, it seems hasty to conclude that people have incommensurable ethical worldviews merely because they are struck by very different examples or descriptions of ethical experiences.<sup>1</sup> In fact, in the "Lecture on Ethics",<sup>2</sup> Wittgenstein says he thinks the religious believer who says she *feels safe in the hands of God* refers to the same experience Wittgenstein calls *feeling absolutely safe* (Wittgenstein 1965: 10). Differences in expression need not signal attitudinal differences.

Furthermore, Kelly's "one logic, many ethics" thesis appears to be incompatible with Wittgenstein's pre-Tractarian writings from 1916. For in the *Notebooks*, immediately following a remark about how idealism leads to realism, Wittgenstein says: "And in this sense I can also speak of a will that is common to the whole world. But this will is in a higher sense *my* will. As my idea is the world, in the same way my will is the world-will" (Wittgenstein 1961: 85). Wittgenstein may have changed his mind about the subject by the time he completed the *Tractatus*, but he at least thought in 1916 that if logic is monistic, so too is ethics.

#### 5. ETHICS IN THE 6.52S

Pace Kelly, I will now defend the claim that, for the early Wittgenstein, ethics *can* show itself. More specifically, I will draw from Wittgenstein's early remarks on ethics and experiences of value in order to argue for a particular interpretation of the 6.5s in the *Tractatus*. On this reading, the 6.5s indicate that the reality of ethics shows itself when one has a mystical experience of the world as a whole. The key passage for my interpretation is 6.552 from the *Tractatus*: "There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical" (TLP 6.522). I will argue that the "inexpressible" here is of an ethical sort. Given the *Tractatus'* numbering scheme, 6.522 and 6.52 are elucidations of 6.5: "For an answer which cannot be expressed the question too cannot be expressed" (TLP 6.5). What I wish to maintain is that 6.522 and 6.52 elucidate the *ethical*/aspects of 6.5. Let us first consider 6.52:

We feel that even if all possible scientific questions be [sic] answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at all. Of course there is then no question left, and just this is the answer. (TLP 6.52)

<sup>1</sup> Note that Kelly takes the "Lecture" to make a stronger claim: that the experiences of value vary from person to person.

<sup>2</sup> As Kelly mentions, although the "Lecture on Ethics" was written around 1929, its tone is Tractarian "as far as the topic of ethics is concerned" (Kelly 1995: 575).

What makes this an ethical remark? To answer this, we must note that, for the early Wittgenstein, ethics does not exclusively aim at analyzing our moral concepts; it also concerns the meaning, purpose, or value of one's life. This is obvious given the fact that, when defining ethical enquiry in the "Lecture on Ethics", Wittgenstein says the following definitions gesture in the right direction:

Ethics is the enquiry into what is valuable, or, into what is really important, or [...] the enquiry into the meaning of life, or into what makes life worth living, or into the right way of living. (Wittgenstein 1965: 5)

In the light of his inclination to couch a definition of ethics in terms of the purpose and value of life, Wittgenstein surely conceives of the "problems of life" mentioned in 6.52 as *ethical* problems. Furthermore, in the "Lecture on Ethics", he claims that a complete list of all empirical truths contains no ethical propositions (Wittgenstein 1965: 6) and that ethics "can be no science" (Wittgenstein 1965: 12); it thus seems reasonable to conclude he thinks there can be no scientific solutions to ethical problems. But then, since there are no scientific solutions to ethical problems and the problems of life are ethical problems, we arrive at the content of 6.52: that there are no scientific solutions to the problems of life.

6.52 can now be seen to elucidate the ethical aspect of 6.5 as follows. By the Tractarian semantic theory, every genuine question has a propositional answer (TLP 6.5); and propositions can only express the facts of natural science. As the problems of life lie beyond the reach of science, their "solutions" cannot be put into words (TLP 6.52). In the next section, it will be shown that 6.522 affirms that what is inexpressible in 6.52, the *ethical*, is nonetheless real; it is "the mystical" and shows itself.

#### 6. ETHICS AND "THE MYSTICAL FEELING"

What does it mean for the mystical, the ethical inexpressible, to show itself? Although Wittgenstein says little in the *Tractatus* about the occasions on which this happens, both 6.44 and 6.45 make mention of the mystical:

Not *how* the world is, is the mystical, but *that* it is.  
(TLP 6.44)

The contemplation of the world sub specie aeterni is its contemplation as a limited whole. The feeling of the world as a limited whole is the mystical feeling. (6.45)

Thus Wittgenstein distinguishes the *state* of the world from its bare *existence*, connecting the mystical with the latter; and he also relates the mystical to a feeling of the world as a "limited whole".

We can see what Wittgenstein means by "the feeling of the world as a limited whole" and why this of ethical significance by turning once again to the "Lecture on Ethics". There, when trying to convey what he means by "absolute value"<sup>3</sup>, Wittgenstein presents three examples of his own personal ethical experiences, one of which he describes as "*wonder[ing] at the existence world*" (Wittgenstein 1965: 8). I take this to be the type of experience in which, for the early Wittgenstein, the ethical significance of the world shows itself. For notice that 6.44 evokes the wonderment at the existence of the world mentioned in the "Lecture on Ethics"; and in doing so, 6.44 permits us to connect this wonderment to the showing of the ethical inexpressible in 6.522. Furthermore, on Wittgenstein's view, wondering at

<sup>3</sup> For Wittgenstein, absolute value and ethical value are one (Wittgenstein 1965: 9).

the existence of the world is *not* like wondering at something being the case; it is completely unlike wondering at the size of a dog (Wittgenstein 1965: 8). In contrast, ethical wonderment involves taking a special attitude toward the world; it involves no longer looking *among* the facts, but seeing the world from an eternal perspective (*sub specie aeterni*). In other words, the world shows its ethical significance when one sees it as a whole – a *limited* whole, for the world does not include the eternal perspective.

Wittgenstein reminds us, however, that only contingent propositions are meaningful; although one can wonder at the contingent existence of something, to wonder at the being of the world, which *necessarily* exists, is nonsensical. When attempting to one's mystical experience of the world into words, then, one attempts to move beyond the facts and consequently "misuse[s] language" (Wittgenstein 1965: 8). Thus, for the early Wittgenstein, the world has an ineffable ethical value which shows itself; but we fall into nonsense when we try to put the mystical into words. If this reading is correct, then by TLP 6.522 – *contra* Kelly's interpretation of the *Tractatus* – there is the inexpressible, it is *ethical*, and it shows itself.

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# What about Argumentation in Wittgenstein's Philosophy? On Stephen Toulmin's Connections

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## 1. Introduction

It is well known that Stephen Toulmin felt a great philosophical affinity for Ludwig Wittgenstein, from the moment he was his student (in the late 1940s) until his last book, about 10 years ago (see Toulmin 2001: 206 ff). Toulmin was co-author of one of the leading works about Wittgenstein in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, *Wittgenstein's Vienna*, which today is still an essential reference work (Toulmin 1973; see also Janik 2001). The extent to which Wittgenstein had influenced the development of Toulmin's philosophy is a question that raised – from the Toulminian side – a prolific bibliography that is impracticable to mention here, but – to judge from the specialist literature on the subject from the Wittgensteinian side – is largely awaiting an enlightening and definitive answer. In any case, it still is with respect to the theory of argumentation, in general, of the author of *The Uses of Argument* (1958), *Knowing and Acting* (1976) and *An Introduction to Reasoning* (1979), even though, in the last decade, some argumentation theorists have addressed the issue (see, for instance, Godden 2003). This last facet of Toulmin is, without doubt, the one best known today, specially in academic terms (see Hitchcock and Verheij 2006). Toulmin's views, in *The Uses of Argument*, are not only credited with important contributions to the aforementioned theory (see Eemeren et al. 1996, chap. 5, 129-162) but, indeed, with the idea that rhetoric and argumentation, when interpreted philosophically, are a new paradigm of rationality for the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Ribeiro 2012: 1-19).

It is this last viewpoint that I shall look at here. What is the importance to Wittgenstein's philosophy – and especially that of the later Wittgenstein – of argumentation and its problems, that is, the very problems that Toulmin was concerned with in the books mentioned above? I must hasten to answer: none, apparently at least – not without some surprise from those who study and teach argumentation theory and, at the same time, study and teach the work of Wittgenstein (as I do). I am not ignoring, of course, that the "language games" and other fundamental concepts of Wittgenstein's philosophy can be interpreted and placed at the service of argumentation theory, as Hintikka and others sought to do (see, for instance, Saarinen 1979: 1-26). This was the very angle from which it was argued that Wittgenstein, with *Philosophical Investigations*, had influenced the idea of "argument field" in Toulmin, and that he, in some way, had prepared the ground for the conceptions on argumentation presented in *The Uses of Argument*, in particular, for the actual argument theory upheld in that book (see again Godden 2003; and Toulmin 1958: chap. 3). But, surprisingly enough for us in the beginning of 21<sup>st</sup> century, the idea that meaning in everyday language involves, directly or indirectly, argumentation is completely absent in Wittgenstein's philosophy. If we re-read *Philosophical Investigations*, for example, from this point of view, we may conclude that such idea – that is, that a term, statement, etc., from everyday language is part of a wider discursive context, in the framework of which it has certain formal relationships of inference with other terms or statements, which can be disputed or criti-

cised and, above all, studied for themselves – is nowhere to be seen. It is the question of meaning, not of argumentation or meaning through argumentation, that occupies Wittgenstein. However, it is precisely this idea that to some extent is at the core of Toulmin's work. This relationship, by contrast, between Wittgenstein and Toulmin has been omitted (not to say ignored) in the past by the specialist literature on these philosophers, and it is absolutely essential if we are to understand where the philosophy of the first ends and that of the second begins, that is, to appraise their respective originalities. Indeed, the research which I just mentioned (such as that developed in some reputable contemporary argumentation theories) is based on the presumption that Wittgenstein's influence on Toulmin basically concerned the argumentation model that is presented in *The Uses of Argument*, disregarding its wider philosophical context – not only that of that book but, more generally, that which led Toulmin to write (with A. Janik) *Wittgenstein's Vienna*, almost twenty years later. Therefore, the question I began by posing could perhaps be reformulated as follows: it is a matter of knowing not only what Toulmin saw but, above all, what he did not find in Wittgenstein's philosophy that led him, directly or indirectly, to an argumentation theory like that which he brings to us in *The Uses of Argument* and developed in later books.

## 2. Theory of meaning (Wittgenstein) vs. theory of argumentation (Toulmin)

Before going on to talk about Toulmin's reception of Wittgenstein's philosophy, let me clarify the opposition between meaning theory and argumentation theory that I have just alluded to. The revolutionary starting point of Toulmin (1958) is that the problems of meaning theory that occupied a considerable part of analytic philosophy in the mid-1950s (not merely those authors from the so-called "English ordinary language philosophy", as Austin, Strawson, Ryle and others, *but Wittgenstein himself*) are fundamentally problems of rhetoric and/or of argumentation (theory). From this standpoint, the originality of *The Uses of Argument*, in my interpretation, rests on two main ideas: First, the meaning of whatever is supposed to be part of everyday language can only be understood through its use in *argumentation*, i.e. through the arguments into which it enters. It is not enough to say that meaning is given to us (behaviouristically) through the use of language in context and that – against Russell and others – it is not a metaphysical entity, as the aforementioned philosophers argued, including – I repeat once more – Wittgenstein, though Toulmin certainly would have subscribed to such criticisms. Nor it is enough to describe and characterise in detail in which contexts this use is made, so as to somehow try to build and develop a meaning theory. It was what the English ordinary language philosophers – who are targeted by some Toulmin's criticisms, whether in *The Uses of Argument* or in *Wittgenstein's Vienna* – above all did; and it was what Wittgenstein himself was doing, to some extent, in *Philosophical Investigations* and other works, at least, from a negative viewpoint, i.e. that, finally, we cannot build any meaning theory in systematic terms, and, there-

fore, that philosophy – in the foundational and universalist sense of the concept – is condemned. At any rate, this viewpoint – i.e. the idea that meaning relies on the contexts of the use of language – remained pertinent for Toulmin (for example, for his concept of “field-dependent argument” and, more generally, for his critique of the application of formal logic to argumentation). In fact, such idea is obvious in the very title of Toulmin’s book *The Uses of Argument*. However, the essential point is that, if one does not realise that meaning is not only simply a question of the use of language, but essentially of the *use of language in argumentation*, we run the risk of emptying or eliminating it (looking for it where, in fact, it does not exist) and being unable to build any theory about it – as it was the case, according to an interpretation like the one suggested by Toulmin, of *Wittgenstein's philosophy itself*. On the contrary, for *The Uses of Argument*, a theory of meaning is only possible through (or as) a theory of argumentation. At stake, then, for philosophy (indeed, according to Toulmin (1958) for the future of philosophy in general), is the fundamental task of understanding (1) how we argue or what are the ways we do it, (2) how this uses of argumentation changes from context to context (or is “field-dependent”, in Toulmin’s terms), (3) which (new) role can be played by formal logic in analysing and assessing our arguments, etc. Toulmin sees rhetoric, or argumentation theory (he tends to use the first term: “rhetoric”), as having precisely these fundamentals objectives.

Second, for the Toulmin of *The Uses of Argument*, it is in rhetoric that we are given the foundations of philosophy and, thereby, of knowledge and human action in general. He strives to demonstrate this thesis in the first book by showing how the traditional issues of metaphysics and epistemology can (and should) be reduced to/and reformulated as issues of rhetoric or argumentation theory (see Toulmin 1958, chaps. IV and V). While it is certain that – as especially the analytic philosophers had concluded from the standpoint of meaning theory – it is not possible to know the world’s essence, for Toulmin it is always possible to study *the way we talk and argue in relation to it*. From this point of view, where rhetoric seems to be a new paradigm of rationality, he surely would not have subscribed to the holist thesis of those who, taking the theory of meaning as the matrix of their research, proclaimed – expressly or implicitly – the end of philosophy. This was true of Quine, in the same era (see Quine 1953: 20-46); but, once again, it was also in this direction that some of Wittgenstein’s texts seemed to point. Philosophy, as Toulmin saw it (in some sense, once again, *against Wittgenstein*), continued to be not only possible but also necessary as rhetoric or argumentation theory.

### **3. Toulmin’s reception of Wittgenstein’s philosophy: rhetoric and argumentation as ethics for a new world**

Now, the natural question arising from what has just been said is obviously this: given the opposition and contrast that has been established between meaning theory and argumentation theory, between Wittgenstein and Toulmin, how, in spite of everything, could the philosophy of the first have crucially influenced the second? I have already mentioned some aspects of such influence, which involve the intersection of the two theories, when the first is looked at in light of the second. Nevertheless, that is not enough. As *Wittgenstein's Vienna* shows to perfection, Toulmin saw in the work of Wittgenstein as a whole not only the death certificate (issued by Wittgenstein himself) of the theory of meaning in general – i.e. of a theory like that which, in his reading and interpretation, the philosopher had developed

from the *Tractatus* to the *Investigations* – but of the entire philosophy in systematic terms, too (1973, see chaps. 6 and 7). Such death certificate was, in a sense, the death certificate of Wittgenstein’s Vienna itself – not only that of the *Tractatus*, but mainly that of *Philosophical Investigations*. Indeed, it was not simply a death certificate of the Viennese society, but of the European societies as a whole in the mid-1950s (1973, chaps. 8 and 9). As a result, he basically viewed that work as *an invitation* to conceive new ways of building a philosophy – as that Toulmin offers us in *The Uses of Argument*, which places rhetoric and argumentation at the heart of philosophy – that may match the same ethical imperatives that Wittgenstein had philosophically claimed, from the outset, given the steep moral, cultural and political decline of the Viennese society at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> and in the early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. In an interpretation such as this, Wittgenstein’s meaning theory would be an essential part (for the best and most decisive reasons) of that “suicide of the modern movement” to which the chapter 8 of *Wittgenstein's Vienna* refers (1973: 239 ff). It would be, as Toulmin tells us in that book, not just a “*terminus ad quem*” of modern and contemporary philosophical tradition, but, fundamentally, a “*terminus a quo*”, that is to say, once again, an opening of new horizons and paths to the “historic development” of other “fields of research” (*ibid.*) in philosophy – as (supposedly) was the case of his own in *The Uses of Argument*. It is from this fundamental point of view that Toulmin’s theory of rhetoric and argumentation is playing, *in completely new and original terms*, the role of Wittgenstein’s *old* meaning theory.

### **4. Conclusion**

To sum up, Toulmin’s philosophy is not limited to *developing* certain viewpoints that Wittgenstein had presented previously and *reformulating them in the framework of his conception of rhetoric and argumentation*. This was/is a wrong approach to the connections between the two philosophers. Toulmin was convinced that, with that conception, he had introduced not only a new philosophical paradigm but also, as I noted above, a new paradigm for understanding rationality as a whole. *Wittgenstein belonged to the past*, although he had crucially pointed the way to his own research. In the only citation apropos of Wittgenstein that is in *The Uses of Argument*, Toulmin (rhetorically) alludes to the revolutionary nature of that research and, in particular, to the status which, in light of it, rhetoric and argumentation would henceforth have, in comparison with research in the Western philosophical tradition in general (which includes, in my interpretation, *the philosophy of Wittgenstein himself*). He uses an interesting and memorable analogy for this purpose in the beginning of the “Conclusion”: “The late Ludwig Wittgenstein used to compare the re-ordering of our ideas accomplished in philosophy with the re-ordering of the books on the shelves of a library. The first thing one must do is to separate books which, though at present adjacent, have no real connection, and put them on the floor in different places; so to begin with the appearance of chaos in and around the bookcase inevitably increases, and only after a time does the new and improved order of things begin to be manifest [...]. Initially, therefore, the librarian’s and the philosopher’s activities alike are bound to appear negative, confusing, destructive [...]. In the present inquiries, for instance, we may seem to have been preoccupied entirely with negative questions [...]. But, if this has been so, it is not from any love of distinctions and objections for their own sakes. [...] our excuse lies in the conviction that a radical re-ordering of logical theory is needed in order to bring it more nearly into line with critical practice [...].”

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# A Politics for Paradise: Utopian Questions for Everyday Matters

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A well-known article by Thomas Nagel begins with a phrase which is striking, direct and obvious: "We do not live in a just world". The statement continues with a commentary about which it would be difficult not to agree: "This may be the least controversial claim one could make in political theory" (Nagel 2005: 113). But the fact we agree does not hide the other fact that this complaint is recurring: it could have been made a hundred years ago and it could be made in another hundred years time. The demands of reaching an effective and definitively just society are both a permanent motivation for discussing the very concept of justice and also show that the issue is unending. The fact that the establishment of justice is a kind of *unending quest* does not however prevent us from talking of improvements in relation to other times, or similarly of progress or deterioration regarding the final aim of our social and political aspirations.

The circumstance that we are constantly yearning for justice allows us to point out that a conviction surrounding the possibility of the existence of a Utopian ideal that might possibly come into existence one day appears to be nested in the depths of our aspirations. In this sense, the idea of 'paradise' has not been a simple thought experiment in political theory. The key to this article is to recognise that this idea has continued to exert its influence – in one way or another – on the background of contemporary political decision-making, and influences daily life. One must remember, nevertheless, that in such changeable and unstable times as ours, to talk of millennial plans or proposals makes no sense. We no longer have the hope of the old millennialists, but our aspirations of an ideal life allow for the justification of a craving for recovering a secular vision of paradise as a guiding light.

Traditional iconography presents paradise as a place where there is a brotherly relationship, based on the equality of individuals as creatures under the attentive and generous gaze of God. A fundamental element of that iconography is the abundance of goods and, along with that, the absence of difficulties in living a life which we might consider to be perfect and in which selfishness or self-interest are no longer obstacles for relationships between individuals. This image is frequently presented to us as an impossible dream that belongs to medieval writings and is far removed from the needs and outlines of Modernity. None of this is true. In our times, that image remains constant with almost all of its implications. One of them is the value that an abundance of goods supposes, an aim pursued like few others in the modern era and defended by politicians at both ends of the political spectrum. It is a common element in both capitalist and communist proposals. The difference resides in the role or place that the possession of goods should hold socially, as well as the type of goods that may be possessed, and this further demands we understand which distribution of them might be considered 'fair'.

If the best of all possible societies can be understood as that in which the greatest abundance of goods exists, it is clear that Western society has beaten all comers. The idea of an 'eternal banquet' in paradise has been replaced in our contemporary secular society by the presence of con-

tinuous mass consumption which transmutes our craving for another life into living this one with continuous consumer intensity, given that, generally, it is thought that since there is no 'afterlife', we must try to satisfy our aspirations for fullness in this life. This is one of the reasons why our contemporary society has focused its expectations on consumption levels and on continued feedback between output, demand and appropriation. Surprisingly, this 'consumerist passion' is meant to be further recognised as a manifestation of freedom, as R. Sennett points out in *The Culture of the New Capitalism* (2006)

It can even be argued that a certain social levelling has taken place thanks to this process, which appears to present affluent society as that in which the longed-for justice of other times has finally come to be. The abundance of consumer goods and market competition have allowed a greater number of individuals to participate in that society, which might have helped diminish the true impact of class conflicts generated by differences on the social scale. Using a relatively stable salary, a credit card and deferred payment – amongst other measures – they would have done more for this levelling than many other policies that have been implemented. Social differences expressed in terms of belonging to a group or lineage have been substituted for the capacity to consume superfluous goods, now that our basic needs have been sufficiently resolved in modern society. This is to say that the perception of social position and its relevance would be measured in terms of the capacity and ease with which we may have such superfluous goods at our disposal.

The problem stems from clearing up if this is the correct formula for talking of human happiness, but it appears logical to accept that we would all prefer to live in a world of abundance than non-abundance. Perhaps speaking only of consumption is only a part of the answer. The Human Development Indicators with which development in different countries is measured do not take consumption or its related satisfaction indices into account, although their use of per capita GDP leads to the existence of a greater or smaller chance of developing a comfortable life that lacks for little. Although we might argue with certain ease that describing it all in terms of the figures that denote material well being does not provide a definitive answer to the question of happiness, it is true that in a quite generalised way in Western society, this is largely how the satisfaction of our aspirations is understood.

The extension of this model seems to be what could give us a basis in a certain sense for understanding that justice as a universal aspiration in which all participate in abundance, and that the distribution of goods is fair, which is to say that it responds not only to the basic needs of individuals but also to a certain quality standard that is not strictly set but about which there is a certain level of agreement. Clearly standards vary from one place to another but they can also change within a specific state. At least in the West, there are certain constant estimates in this regard. Once what we might term 'survival' needs are satisfied, other needs related to the comfort and satisfaction produced by the consumption of goods – as J.K. Galbraith (1998) pointed out at the time – that should not

in principle be related to basic aspirations. Galbraith showed these *secondary* needs frequently take the place of the *primary* ones, becoming them. How, then, are we to understand the idea of fair distribution? Which is to say, how many units of consumption – and of what type – are necessary to guarantee the establishment of justice? Who has the right to them and why? If this is not to be the case, it becomes very difficult to resolve any aspirations regarding social equilibrium based on the satisfaction of the fair demands of individuals. Standards of consumption are as enormously variable as the vagaries of the market.

Is it possible to extend this model to the rest of the world? Although the appropriate conditions are possibly not to be adequately found, this is the model that a rich West has been slowly exporting or even imposing. The ease of such an expansion might make us think that the urgency and the fruition of consumption are constitutive elements of the human condition. It is clear that the elements implied by the process are much more than that, although they appeal to moral and emotional conditions. In any case, the substitution of a transcendental perspective for a more earthly one in a society that has become progressively and decidedly secular has made the consolidation of the consumerist mentality much easier. We can, then, argue that secularisation and consumerism have advanced hand-in-hand; something that hasn't prevented the continuation of some elements of religious behaviour, albeit conditional on socio-economic demands outside of its control.

Given that we can currently access consumer goods very quickly indeed, the possibilities for replacing certain consumer proposals for others are greater, making the process of convincing consumers easier and faster, so that they can decide what they prefer and what they wish to consume. This implies that the fleetingness of time acquires special importance as consumer needs accelerate and provoke the sensation that we need everything offered to us but do not have enough time to enjoy it all, so we must hurry to make enjoyment easier. To this end, a process of imaginative anticipation is generated that reinforces desire and is weakened by its use in such a way that the process continues with new anticipation.

Two especially significant problems can be derived from these considerations, from my way of seeing things. The first is related to the way formulas for evaluating personal satisfaction are concentrated in consumption, the latter being the only way to achieve the former. It would appear that stating the contrary would deny both the value of progress and the possibility of facilitating its development. The comforts of Western society would have to be seen as conquests and, therefore, as rights. The discourse on rights presents them as advances that channel satisfaction or, at least, the possibility of satisfaction. To widen access to these possibilities to the whole population would be the demand of a justice conceivable as one that maximises the number of chances of obtaining the largest amount of resources. But to confuse superfluous goods with authentically necessary goods is a serious problem faced by a vision of justice that pretends to be such a thing. If we

leave out the demands of mere survival, what other considerations could we make to understand the type of goods that must be taken into account when we speak of fair distribution?

If the satisfaction of consumption was the primary aim of our existence, fairness would be related to the right formula for allowing all individuals to access those goods. But such a formula is not permanently and definitively definable. Other problems appear alongside it. If we set access for all individuals to a more or less predetermined standard of consumption as the expression of fairness, in reality – as Galbraith (1998) pointed out – we are leaving the definition of fairness and how to apply it to large corporations that then provoke and satisfy our demands, creating expectations that later need to be met. But given that standard is moveable, it wouldn't really be clear when such demands for fair distribution have been met.

If we then consider this issue from a global perspective, the difficulties multiply. On the one hand we must consider the fact that since no-one has chosen to be born but everyone has been born somewhere, it would be pertinent to ask ourselves if fairness consists in rebalancing those imbalances that nature and socio-historical circumstances have created. Which is to say, would a right exist for the inhabitants of certain areas of the world to see their demands satisfied in terms of reaching a Western level of consumption? Given that, as Nagel pointed out, it does not appear possible to talk of justice beyond the limits of state sovereignty, we would have to ask ourselves how far the existence of those demands it backed up by the existence of a prior right. If there are no global principles of justice, we could at least justify the existence of humanitarian duties. But, would these also need to be conditioned by the creation of consumption standards similar to those that characterise Western society? Providing the opportunity to reach a level of consumption similar to that in the Western world to people who are not to blame for having been born in economically more depressed areas would appear to be an adequate basis for talking about global justice. An added problem is whether or not we can reach such a goal without exhausting available resources.

Perhaps the basic error is to think that an increase in consumption possibilities has to work as a model to guarantee individual satisfaction. Now, the creation of a basic welfare environment, as well as the development of personal moral virtues, would have to result in a better representation of a heavenly model than the recourse to the abundance of goods associated with it.

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# Environmental Citizenship: New Challenges for Political Philosophy and Political Ethics

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Applied ethics is no longer regarded as a mere application of doctrines whose foundation has already been outlined in ethics. Instead, Dūwell, i.e., identifies new and critical questions in bioethics which need to be discussed in various types of applied ethics: questions about the moral status of living beings, questions regarding the worth or dignity of entities, and the relationship between nature and humankind in general terms (Dūwell 2008: 100 ff). Moreover, applied ethics does not only serve to generate special principles for various fields of application. Instead, it has also become a driving force in going back to basic concepts in ethics. An example in case is the debate about "doing" and "refraining from doing" which has had an impact on theories of action; another example is the debate about the beginning and the end of life which has had an influence on the interpretation of personhood (Birnbacher 1995; Leist 1990, 1990a).

Applied ethics has not only developed methodologically, but has also gained influence on society and on politics, but – more or less – through commissions which contribute to debating solutions and demands in specified areas of research. This way of delivering knowledge and of presenting it to society is an *indirect way* of transforming the public will. Experts present their well-reasoned opinions in committees and thereby contribute to informing both the public and members of political institutions. Yet, it is not a declared aim to transform political principles themselves; nor is there the desire to present a new version of political ethics which incorporates principles of applied ethics. The argument which I shall discuss in this contribution is that some factors might contribute to changing this situation. As a consequence, *indirect concern* might be completed by a strategy of *direct concern*.

In this contribution, I shall proceed in three steps. I shall first present an example which shows that applied ethics has already started to inform political philosophy. The example stems from debates which build the bridge between environmental ethics and political philosophy. Secondly, I shall discuss some of the implications which approaches in "environmental political philosophy" have. In particular, basic principles in political philosophy are questioned through these recently developed approaches. This second section also aims at elaborating new dimension of applied political ethics. Third, I shall give some ideas about how this new strategy might contribute to transforming both political ethics and the former strategy of indirect concern.

## 1. Environmental citizenship: an example of applied political ethics

In political ethics, citizenship is not elaborated as a descriptive concept. Instead, it relates to a bundle of normative ideas about what persons are in a position to claim for themselves as members of a nation state or another political community and what their duties are. Moreover, recent theories on citizenship try to transcend the nation border,

i.e. by developing concepts of cosmopolitanism (Appiah 2007; Beitz 2000; Pogge 2002).

Quite recently, some authors in the field of political philosophy have discussed a new concept citizenship which was labelled "environmental citizenship" or "ecological citizenship" (Bell 2005; Dobson 2003; Hailwood 2005; van Steenbergen 2004). They intend to build a bridge between environmental ethics and political philosophy. These authors argue that our planet is currently facing a serious of ecological challenges, among them climate change. Even though these events in themselves do not have an impact on concepts of citizenship – this direct link is undermined by what has been called a "naturalistic fallacy" –, the authors claim that the ecological crises contribute to the claim that political concepts need to be overhauled. In particular, the negligence of natural living conditions in theories of political philosophy needs to be corrected. In particular, nature cannot be regarded as part of the "circumstance" of or "conditions of application" for political theory.

Three systematic ways to interpret the relationship between mankind and nature in political philosophy anew have been elaborated – each of them explicating a distinct idea. First, some authors have argued that rights to natural resources must be regarded as human rights. In particular, current approaches to human rights can be completed by a list of *rights to the environment* (Tim Hayward 2005, 2007). This idea also contributes to a significant transformation of concepts of human rights. Secondly, Andrew Dobson argues that what is needed is a concept of citizenship which can respond to global ecological challenges. Instead of rethinking citizenship in terms of basic rights, a post-global concept of citizenship also implies responsibility regarding a frail nature (Dobson 2003). Third, some authors have recently argued that the justification of principles of justice on the basis of a contractarian model needs to be overhauled (Bell 2005). Instead of focusing on persons as right-bearers, a new approach serves to embrace at least animals with person-like capabilities; moreover, some authors argue that the relation between persons and the natural environment needs to be overhauled on a systematic level (Nussbaum 2006).

All three lines of thought are controversial. It is not the realm here to give a conclusive portrait of the arguments which have been exchanged regarding all three proposals. Instead, I shall focus on the central issue in this contribution. Therefore I shall ask what these proposals imply regarding the methodological and theoretical challenges in "applied political ethics."

## 2. What environmental political ethics implies

The first thing to notice is that none of the proposals for revising the concept of citizenship are at the surface of political ethics. Instead, each of them implies a – more or less – deep shift regarding the normative interpretation of citizenship and, moreover, basic normative principles. It is

also not clear, whether or not environmental rights can be said to be in one line with other basic rights at all. Adding environmental rights to the list of citizenship rights also has a severe impact on the role of environmental rules within the legislative bodies. In particular, some proposals imply that citizenship rights and corresponding duties need to be detached from the nation-state. A post-global notion of citizenship even goes further than more general proposals in cosmopolitanism in that it addresses duties in one line with rights (Dobson 2003).

Some proposals for establishing systematic bridges between ecological ethics and political philosophy have the effect that some of the most fundamental justificatory principles will be called into question. Even though the contractarian model has received manifold critique, recently by proponents of civic republicanism (e.g. Pettit 1997), it is still fundamental in sorting out basic political commitments. Yet, Nussbaum argues that the contractarian model needs to be transcended in favor of ideas about justice which also embrace animals and their chances to lead a good life (Nussbaum 2006). In short, the revisions of citizenship which have been proposed by authors who wish to draw a close line between applied ethics (environmental ethics) on the one hand and political ethics on the other side go to the heart of the normative concepts.

*Secondly*, each of the revisions also implies a new understanding of “application” in terms of “applied political ethics”. As for Dobson’s argument, i.e., it is obvious that he sees the necessity of reshaping citizenship from the scratch (Dobson 2003). He also says that politics cannot adequately respond to these challenges unless the need for answering to ecological demands is built into the concept of citizenship itself. In this, he introduces a new meaning of “applied ethics” in the realm of political theory. It is his goal to argue against “application” in terms of just confronting an elaborated theory with new questions and challenges. In particular, he rejects the view that scarce resources belong to a set of constraints to an already elaborated theory on political justice. His proposals are not about the “circumstances of justice” (Rawls 1971: 126ff), but instead about a set of goods which are at the centre of negotiations about fair principles of distribution.

In this respect, authors who work on green citizenship are in one line with authors in applied ethics who think of applied ethics as a field of research which responds to particular challenges, but works through a set of moral principles which do not originate from those challenges, but rather provide genuine answers to them.

*Thirdly*, recent approaches to environmental citizenship also throw a new light on the controversial relationship between ethics and political philosophy. Both disciplines do not understand themselves as prescriptive in that they aim at prescribing what is right – authors in both fields rather provide arguments. Whether or not persons wish to follow the arguments is still up to them. Yet, political philosophy needs to be even more “neutral” in formulating basic principles than ethics is allowed to be. Authors from the camp of political liberalism even refrain from giving moral recommendations. Even when moral rightness could be demonstrated, the moral demands still need to be implemented through a democratic process. Therefore, rightness must be completed by consent; otherwise an ethical principle

cannot be implemented. Yet, authors who work in the field of environmental citizenship actually appear to reject this additional step. They say that green citizenship implies a list of environmental rights and of duties, or at least virtues (see Hailwood 2005). It is this turn which I shall discuss in the final section.

### 3. Applied political ethics as related to principles of political philosophy

Even though political philosophy presents itself as a diverse field of debate, some core insights can be regarded as critical to a theory in that field of research. *First*, ethical principles are not recommended for implementation in political communities primarily because they are right, but rather because citizens agree with it or at least have no reason to willfully rejecting it. This is one version of *the principle of legitimacy* (Scanlon 1998). *Secondly*, political philosophy is focused on core issues which – following Rawls – belong to the level of core issues of constitutions (Rawls 2005: 227 ff). Even though this strategy of limiting the scope of theories of justice is controversial, it is uncontroversial that political principles should not impinge on the realm of private choice unless it is a consequence of protecting basic rights of another person or goods whose political meaning could be proven. This is *the principle of self-constraint of the nation state*. *Third*, the good life and ethical decisions should not be dictated by the state; instead, forming a lifeplan which implies private ethical decisions is a central principle in liberal societies. This is *the principle of permissiveness*.

At first glance, theories of environmental citizenship tend to override all three principles. They say that citizens need to care for the environment and that this care needs to be implemented on the fundamental level of rights and duties. Whether or not this implementation is right will not be decided upon by the citizenry. Moreover, choosing environmental principles or not is not part of the lifeplan or the choice of individuals, but should be part of the very concept of citizenship. Yet, there are two different options to interpret this insight.

*On the one hand*, the result can – of course – be interpreted as a clear case against applied political ethics, at least regarding our example of “environmental citizenship”. In order to inform political bodies, the established, old way of committees who inform the political body and the public is the better and the only reliable practice. *On the other hand*, this conclusion might be drawn too hastily. Similar to developments in applied ethics, it looks as if applied political ethics cannot be regarded as consisting of a canon of political philosophy on the one hand and attempts to build in principles of application on the other hand. Instead, it might be argued that applied political philosophy needs to work on new principles and also needs to overhaul both its core issues and its theoretical framework – at least to some degree. The examples which were discussed in section one and two might serve as examples for first tentative steps into that direction. Instead of giving this direction up, it would be helpful to intensify debates about the underlying principles and concepts.

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# Bemerkungen zu Wittgensteins „Prototractatus“

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## Einleitung

Die folgenden Bemerkungen verstehen sich als ein Beitrag zur Erforschung der Entstehungsgeschichte des „Prototractatus“. Das erste Kapitel enthält Hinweise auf verschollene Manuskripte aus den Jahren 1912-1918; im zweiten Kapitel werden die wichtigsten Textabschnitte des „Prototractatus“ aufgeführt; das dritte Kapitel enthält Hinweise zur Numerierung des „Prototractatus“. Vor dem Hintergrund der kompositorischen Komplexität des „Prototractatus“ ist mit diesen Bemerkungen keinerlei Anspruch auf Vollständigkeit verbunden. Durch die aufgrund mehrerer verschollener Manuskripte schwierige Quellenlage überwiegen außerdem die Vermutungen gegenüber nachweisbaren Thesen. Dennoch erhält der Leser einen zumindest skizzenhaften Überblick über einige besondere Eigenschaften des „Prototractatus“ und unterschiedliche Thesen von Brian McGuinness, Andreas Geschkowsky und Luciano Bazzocchi. Ein wichtiges Ziel des Beitrags wäre erfüllt, wenn dadurch weiterführende Untersuchungen angeregt werden könnten.

## 1. Die verschollenen Manuskripte

Das Manuskript des „Prototractatus“ (MS 104) enthält Sätze, die aus den „Kriegstagebüchern“ (MS 101-103) sowie aus verschollenen Manuskripten ausgewählt und neu zusammengestellt wurden. Für entstehungsgeschichtliche Studien müssen deshalb auch Hinweise auf verschollene Manuskripte berücksichtigt werden.

Aus der Zeit von 1912 bis 1918 sind in Wittgensteins Nachlaß die „Notes on Logic“ (TS 201) von 1913, das Diktat „Wittgenstein on Logic“ (D 301) von 1914, drei „Kriegstagebücher“ (MS 101-103) von 1914-1917, der „Prototractatus“ (MS 104) von 1915-1918 sowie die Typoskripte der *Logisch-Philosophischen Abhandlung* (TS 202-204) von 1918 erhalten. Mit Sicherheit existierte ein weiteres bedeutendes Manuskript, das Wittgenstein am 9. August 1914 erwähnt: „Gab mein großes Schreibebuch Trenkler zur Aufbewahrung.“ (MS 101: 1) Mögliche Vorarbeiten für dieses Buch müssten ebenfalls als verschollen gelten.

Am 22. Oktober 1915 schreibt Wittgenstein an Russell:

Ich habe in der letzten Zeit sehr viel gearbeitet und, wie ich glaube, mit gutem Erfolg. Ich bin jetzt dabei das Ganze zusammenzufassen und in Form einer Abhandlung niederzuschreiben. [...] Falls ich es nicht mehr erlebe, so lass Dir von meinen Leuten meine ganzen Manuskripte schicken, darunter befindet sich auch die letzte Zusammenfassung mit Bleistift auf losen Blättern geschrieben. (Briefe Nr. 74)

Etwa zwei Jahre nach dieser ersten Erwähnung einer *Abhandlung* erstellte Wittgenstein offenbar im Januar 1917 eine Liste für Verfügungen, wer im Falle seines Todes welche Manuskripte erhalten sollte (Familienbriefe, Nr. 10). Diese Liste ist in Form einer Abschrift in Hermine Wittgensteins Handschrift erhalten (Familienbriefe, Nr. 17).

- |                                       |   |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| 1) Buch gross Kanzlei<br>bei Trenkler | Handschriftlich<br>existiert auch<br>Maschin. in Olmütz<br>corrig.  |
| 2) 2 Bücher Quart<br>bei Trenkler     | (Ein Teil davon existiert schon<br>im Maschingeschriebenen Heft)<br>nur handschriftlich   |
| 3) 1 Buch Quart                       | wörtlich jeder Satz in der<br>Reihenfolge ohne jede<br>Korrektur  |
| 4) 1 Buch Octave                      | Russell erhält 3) 4) u. 5) u. 1 u. 2) in Maschinenschrift und<br>die goldene Uhr<br>Pinsent erhält 1 in Manuscript<br>Maschinschrift bei Trenkler zerstören |
| 5) Buch groß Kanzlei                  | enthält die Umarbeitung von 1) u. 2)<br>zur Veröffentlichung.   |

Dieser Liste sind Hinweise auf sechs Manuskripte zu entnehmen, bei deren Bestimmung Brian McGuinness (McGuinness 2002: 259-269) und Andreas Geschkowsky (Geschkowsky 2001) teils unterschiedliche Auffassungen vertreten. 1) Dieses Buch halten beide für das verschollene „große Schreibebuch“; 2) diese zwei Bücher halten beide für MS 101 und MS 102; 3) bei diesem Buch vermutet McGuinness, es handle sich um MS 103, Geschkowsky vermutet ein verschollenes Notizbuch, das die zeitliche Lücke zwischen MS 102 und MS 103 füllt; 4) dieses Buch hält Geschkowsky für MS 103, McGuinness vermutet, es handle sich um ein verschollenes Notizbuch, durch das „die Herstellung der Typoskripte erleichtert werden sollte“ (McGuinness 2002: 264); 5) dieses Buch halten beide für den „Prototractatus“ (MS 104).

Hinsichtlich der Typoskripte vermuten sowohl McGuinness (McGuinness 2002: 263) als auch Geschkowsky (Geschkowsky 2001: 30), dass es sich bei der korrigierten Maschinenschrift in Olmütz und bei der Maschinenschrift bei Trenkler ursprünglich um das gleiche bislang verschollene, im September 1916 entstandene Typoskript gehandelt habe, das auf die Sätze des „Schreibebuchs“, MS 101 und MS 102 zurückging, wobei jene Bearbeitung, die sich 1917 in Olmütz befand, die unbearbeitete Version bei Trenkler in Wien ersetzen sollte. Das „Maschingeschriebene Heft“ hat ebenfalls als verschollen zu gelten.

Im „Prototractatus“ erwähnt Wittgenstein eine „Korrektur“ (MS 104: 103), die mit dem 1917 in Olmütz vorliegenden Typoskript nicht identisch sein kann, da ihre Numerierung bereits jener der Typoskripte der *Abhandlung* entspricht. Die bislang genauesten Angaben zu dieser „Korrektur“ finden sich bei Gerd Graßhoff und Timm Lampert (Graßhoff 2004).

Am 13. März 1919 schreibt Wittgenstein an Russell:

Ich habe ein Buch mit dem Titel „Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung“ geschrieben, das meine gesamte Arbeit der letzten sechs Jahre enthält. [...] Im August 1918 hatte ich das Buch fertiggestellt [...]. [...] Sobald ich nach Hause komme werde ich es veröffentlichen. (Briefe Nr. 96)

Aus dem Zeitraum 1912 bis 1918 können demnach das „große Schreibbuch“, mögliche Vorarbeiten für dieses Buch, ein Manuskript oder mehrere Manuskripte auf „losen Blättern“, ein Typoskript, das Sätze aus dem „Schreibebuch“, MS 101 und MS 102 enthält, eine Bearbeitung dieses Typoskripts und ein „Maschingeschriebenes Heft“ als verschollen gelten. Geschkowski zufolge hat ein 1915/16 zwischen MS 102 und MS 103 entstandenes und ein 1917 nach MS 103 entstandenes Notizbuch ebenfalls als verschollen zu gelten (Geschkowski 2001: 20).

## 2. Der „Prototractatus“

Das von Georg Henrik von Wright im Jahr 1965 entdeckte und bereits 1971 veröffentlichte Manuskript des „Prototractatus“ (MS 104) enthält auf 120 beschriebenen Seiten im wesentlichen bereits fast alle Sätze der *Logisch-Philosophischen Abhandlung*, jedoch nicht in der Reihenfolge ihrer Numerierung. Während von Wright damals angenommen hatte, „daß die Arbeit am Prototractatus der endgültigen Auffassung des Buches im Sommer 1918 unmittelbar vorherging“ (von Wright 1986: 86), wiesen Brian McGuinness und Joachim Schulte als Herausgeber der *Kritischen Edition* der *Logisch-Philosophischen Abhandlung* darauf hin, dass der „Prototractatus“ zwar im Sommer 1918 abgeschlossen, offenbar jedoch schon 1915 begonnen wurde. Trotz unterschiedlicher Vermutungen und Datierungen wurden die Auffassungen der Herausgeber in neueren Forschungsarbeiten im wesentlichen bestätigt. Der „Prototractatus“ enthält mehrere unterscheidbare Abschnitte, die auf einen mehrstufigen Arbeitsprozess über einen Zeitraum von mindestens drei Jahren schließen lassen. Im folgenden werden nur die wichtigsten Textabschnitte aufgeführt.

Die Seite 3, die erste Seite mit numerierten Sätzen nach „Vorsatz“, Titel, Widmung und Motto, enthält mit Nr. 1, 1.1, 2, 2.1, 2.2, 3, 3.1, 3.2, 4, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 5, 6 bereits alle sechs Hauptsätze und bildet somit eine Art „Grundriß“ des gesamten Werkes. Diese fünfzehn Sätze müssen nicht in einem Arbeitsgang notiert worden sein, Wittgenstein könnte einzelne oder kleinere Gruppen von Sätzen während der Arbeit an den Seiten 3-28 auch sukzessive nachträglich ergänzt haben. Da S. 3-28 keine Sätze der Ordnungszahl 6 enthalten, wurde Satz 6 auf S. 3 vermutlich erst während der Arbeit an den Seiten 28-78 hinzugefügt.

Für die Seiten 3-28 sind keine Manuskriptquellen nachweisbar. Diese Sätze gehen möglicherweise auf ein oder mehrere schon vor 1914 oder auch erst 1915 entstandene Manuskripte zurück, vielleicht auch schon auf eine „Umarbeitung“ solcher Manuskripte. Separiert man die nachträglich ergänzten Nummern und Referenzierungsangaben, so enthalten die Nummern der S. 3 maximal zwei, S. 3-4 maximal drei, S. 5-7 vier, S. 8-11 fünf, S. 12-18 sechs, S. 19-20 sieben, S. 21-23 acht, S. 24 neun, S. 25-28 wieder maximal fünf Ziffern. Die Seiten 3-28 dokumentieren deshalb vermutlich einen Arbeitsprozeß, bei dem die numerische Gliederung kontinuierlich weiter ausdifferenziert wurde. Luciano Bazzocchi vermutet, diese Seiten seien bereits vom April oder Mai 1915 bis spätestens Oktober 1915 entstanden (Bazzocchi 2008: 20, 21); er begründet seine Vermutung vor allem durch einen Brief von Wittgenstein an Russell vom Juni 1915, in dem es heißt „Die Probleme werden immer lapidarer und allgemeiner und die Methode hat sich grundlegend geändert.“ (Briefe, Nr. 70), sowie durch Ähnlichkeiten zwischen einer handschriftlichen Korrektur im „Proto-

tractatus“ (MS 104: 12, 5.041) und einer auf 18. Juni 1915 datierten Bemerkung in MS 102 (MS 102: 168r). Bazzocchi vermutet, diese Seiten und die „losen Blätter“ seien in etwa parallel entstanden und Wittgenstein habe das Manuskript der „losen Blätter“ bereits im Frühjahr 1915 begonnen. Geschkowski vermutet zwar ebenfalls einen Zusammenhang mit den „losen Blättern“ (Briefe, Nr. 74), datiert die Seiten 3-28 jedoch auf „Herbst/Winter 1915/16“ (Geschkowski 2001: 73).

Für die Seiten 28-78 sind teilweise keine Manuskriptquellen nachweisbar. Geschkowski zufolge wurde hier der erste Teil eines verschollenen, MS 102 folgenden Notizbuchs verwendet. Die nachweisbaren Quellen stammen aus den vom 9. August 1914 bis zum 22. Juni 1915 datierten Notizbüchern MS 101 und MS 102, einige wenige nach Seite 71 aus MS 103; Ähnlichkeiten mit TS 201 und D 301 lassen auf die Verwendung des „Schreibebuchs“ schließen. Geschkowski zufolge entstanden die Seiten 28-78 nicht vor September 1916, da sie ihm zufolge auf die Bearbeitung einer maschinenschriftlichen Erfassung des „Schreibebuchs“, MS 101 und MS 102 zurückgehen (Geschkowski 2001: 31). Tatsächlich enthalten MS 101 und MS 102 keine Kennzeichnungen der in MS 104 verwendeten Sätze, was darauf schließen lässt, dass die Auswahl der Sätze auf der Grundlage einer Abschrift, Geschkowski zufolge eines Typoskripts erfolgte. McGuinness datiert die von ihm als „Proto-Prototractatus“ bezeichneten Seiten 3-71 auf Oktober 1915 bis März 1916 und vermutet, die Seiten 71-78, die bereits einige Sätze aus MS 103 enthalten, seien eine später entstandene Revision der Seiten 3-71 (McGuinness 2002: 264).

Für die Seiten 78-103 sind teilweise ebenfalls keine Manuskriptquellen nachweisbar. Geschkowski zufolge wurde für diese Seiten zunächst der zweite Teil eines MS 102 folgenden Notizbuchs und später ein MS 103 folgendes Notizbuch verwendet. Die nachweisbaren Manuskriptquellen stammen aus dem vom 19. März 1916 bis zum 10. Januar 1917 datierten MS 103. Im Unterschied zu den aus MS 101 und MS 102 ausgewählten Sätzen entspricht die Reihenfolge der Sätze aus MS 103 in MS 104 mit einigen Auslassungen der chronologischen Folge im Notizbuch, wo die verwendeten Sätze entsprechend gekennzeichnet sind; dies lässt im Vergleich zu den Seiten 28-78 eindeutig auf eine Veränderungen der Arbeitsweise schließen. Geschkowski zufolge entstanden diese Seiten nicht vor Januar 1917, d. h. erst nach dem Abschluss des MS 103 und erst nach der Erstellung der Liste vom Januar 1917 (Geschkowski 2001: 78).

Die Nummerierung der Seiten 103-117 ist ausnahmslos mit jener der Typoskripte der *Abhandlung* identisch. Dies mag auch der Grund dafür sein, dass diese Seiten von den Herausgebern der *Kritischen Edition* der *Abhandlung* nicht mehr dem „Prototractatus“ zugeordnet wurden, obwohl sie eindeutig Bestandteil des MS 104 sind. Für S. 103-117 sind keine Manuskriptquellen nachweisbar. Diese Seiten entstanden 1918 erst nach der Erstellung der verschollenen „Korrektur“. Die Seiten 119-121 entstanden im Sommer 1918 und enthalten das Vorwort der *Abhandlung*. Da der Text den Eindruck einer Reinschrift macht, dürfte es auch hierfür Vorarbeiten auf losen Blättern oder in einem Notizbuch gegeben haben.

## 3. Bemerkungen zur Numerierung

Für die Erarbeitung der *Logisch-Philosophischen Abhandlung* war über einen Zeitraum von mindestens drei bis vier Jahren das Numerierungssystem des „Prototractatus“ maßgeblich. Dieses System wurde erst 1918

vereinfacht (MS 104: 103-117) und von bis zu neun Ziffern im „Prototractatus“ zu maximal sechs Ziffern in der *Abhandlung* reduziert. Schon zu Beginn des „Prototractatus“ erscheint dieses Numerierungssystem zumindest strukturell weitgehend ausgereift, mit 2.01 und 2.02 auf S.4 einschließlich der Verwendung der Null. Die wenigen handschriftlichen Korrekturen dieser Nummern legen die Vermutung nahe, dass sowohl die thematische Gruppierung der Sätze als auch die Bestimmung der jeweiligen Nummern zumindest teilweise in einem anderen Texträger erfolgte.

Da schon die Seiten 3-28 des „Prototractatus“ hinsichtlich Thematik und Numerierung ein systematisch durchdachtes und bis 1918 kaum mehr verändertes „Grundgerüst“ der *Abhandlung* bilden, ist es unwahrscheinlich, dass hierfür keine Vorarbeiten existierten. Dadurch stellt sich die noch weiter gehende Frage, ob Wittgenstein nicht schon vor 1915 die Absicht hatte oder zumindest erwogen hat, seine Sätze numerisch zu gliedern. Wittgenstein kannte die ebenfalls numerisch gegliederten *Principia Mathematica* und es ist möglich, dass Russell ihm auch von arbeitstechnischen Erfahrungen bei der numerischen Organisation dieses Werkes berichtet hat. Im Vorwort der *Principia Mathematica* heißt es:

Every definition or proposition has a number, for purposes of reference. Following Peano, we use numbers having a decimal as well as an integral part, in order to be able to insert new propositions between any two. A change in the integral part of the number will be used to correspond to a new chapter. Definitions will generally have numbers whose decimal part is less than 1, and will usually be put at the beginning of chapters." (Russell/Whitehead 1925: 91)

Die Numerierung der *Principia Mathematica* dient somit einerseits der Referenzierung, andererseits sollen die Dezimalstellen nachträgliche Einfügungen ermöglichen, z.B. 1, 1.01, 1.1 etc.. Wie aus den verschiedenen Arbeitsstufen des „Prototractatus“ ersichtlich wird, war nun aber gerade die Möglichkeit der Einfügung neuer Sätze in ein bestehendes numerisches System für die Erarbeitung der *Abhandlung* geradezu konstitutiv. Falls Wittgenstein tatsächlich durch die *Principia Mathematica* zur Numerierung seiner Sätze inspiriert wurde, hatte er allerdings schon 1915 ein eigenständiges System entwickelt, in das auch die Verwendung der Null integriert war. Wittgenstein notiert am Beginn des „Prototractatus“:

Zwischen diese Sätze werden alle guten Sätze meiner anderen Manuskripte gefügt. Die Nummern zeigen die Reihenfolge und die Wichtigkeit der Sätze an. So folgt 5.04101 auf 5.041 und auf jenen 5.0411 welcher Satz gewichtiger ist als 5.04101. (MS 104: iii)

Da sich die von Wittgenstein erwähnten Nummern auf S. 12 und S. 16 des „Prototractatus“ finden, ist nicht auszuschließen, dass dieser auch arbeitstechnisch bemerkenswerte „Vorsatz“ schon im Jahr 1915 entstand, und sich dann entweder auf die mit S. 3-28 oder Verena Mayer zufolge auch nur auf die mit S. 3 vorliegende Numerierung bezogen haben könnte (Mayer 1993: 111). In der *Abhandlung* erläutert Wittgenstein die Numerierung wie folgt:

Die Dezimalstellen als Nummern der einzelnen Sätze deuten das logische Gewicht der Sätze an, den Nachdruck, der auf ihnen in meiner Darstellung liegt. Die Sätze n.1, n.2, n.3, etc. sind Bemerkungen zum Satze No.n; die Sätze n.m1, n.m2, etc. Bemerkungen zum Satze No.n.m; und so weiter. (TS 202: 1)

Als die Sätze des „Prototractatus“ mit dem Abschluß der *Abhandlung* vollständig numerisch geordnet vorlagen, erübrigte sich nicht nur die Bemerkung „Zwischen diese Sätze werden alle guten Sätze meiner anderen Manuskripte gefügt“ sondern auch die Formulierung „Die Nummern zeigen die Reihenfolge (...) der Sätze an“. Mayer hat darauf hingewiesen, dass gerade diese Formulierung einen indirekten, aber kaum zu unterschätzenden Hinweis auf Wittgensteins nichtlineare Arbeitsmethoden beim Erarbeitungsprozeß der *Abhandlung* beinhaltet (Mayer 1993: 113). Die Numerierung der *Abhandlung* ist somit zwar maßgeblich, aber doch nicht ausschließlich durch das „logische Gewicht“ der Sätze bestimmt. Der Begriff der „Bemerkung“ deutet auch auf teils eher assoziative Aspekte der Gedankenentwicklung und lässt sich indirekt in Verbindung zur Arbeitstechnik der Einfügungen interpretieren.

## Zusammenfassung

Die Erforschung der *Logisch-Philosophischen Abhandlung* ist mit der Erforschung der Entstehungsgeschichte des „Prototractatus“ untrennbar verbunden. Die Quellenlage ist vor allem deshalb so schwierig, weil neben einigen den „Kriegstagebüchern“ (MS 101-103) vergleichbaren Manuskripten, aus denen Wittgenstein Sätze für den „Prototractatus“ ausgewählt hat, insbesondere solche Manuskripte und Typoskripte verschollen sind, die Aufschluß über die praktische Erarbeitung der *Abhandlung* liefern könnten.

Die maschinenschriftliche Erfassung einiger dem „Prototractatus“ vorausgehenden Manuskripte erinnert vergleichsweise früh an Arbeitsmethoden, wie sie für den nach 1929 erhaltenen Nachlaß kennzeichnend sind, und in diesem Zusammenhang stellt sich auch die in der Forschung bislang noch kaum thematisierte Frage, ob für die Erarbeitung des „Prototractatus“ maschinenschriftliche Texte zerschnitten und in Form von Zetteln neu arrangiert wurden. Nach 1929 existieren von bedeutenden Typoskripten meistens zwei Durchschläge und damit drei Fassungen, während in der Manuskriptliste vom Januar 1917 nur zwei Fassungen offenbar des gleichen Typoskripts erwähnt sind. Wittgenstein könnte einen weiteren Durchschlag zerschnitten und die Zettel neu arrangiert haben. Es ist auch nicht völlig auszuschließen, dass das „Maschingeschriebene Heft“ collagierte Zettel enthielt, oder dass bereits die Seiten 3-28 des „Prototractatus“ unter Verwendung von Zetteln erstellt wurden.

Die Numerierung der Sätze des „Prototractatus“ und damit auch die der *Abhandlung* ist keinesfalls nur als ein formales, dem logisch-philosophischen Inhalt gleichsam äußerliches Hilfsmittel anzusehen, sie ist vielmehr ein unmittelbarer Bestandteil der methodischen und philosophischen Erarbeitung dieses Werkes. Für genauere Studien der *Abhandlung* können sich deshalb vergleichende Quellenstudien des „Prototractatus“ als ausgesprochen fruchtbar erweisen, wie dies u.a. Michael Kremer gezeigt hat (Kremer 1997). Verena Mayer zufolge ist Wittgensteins philosophische Gedankenentwicklung anhand der Numerierung des „Prototractatus“ sogar oft besser nachvollziehbar als nach der Vereinfachung des numerischen Systems für die *Abhandlung* (Mayer 1993: 117). Gerade für vergleichende philosophische Quellenstudien sind auch die philologischen Forschungsarbeiten zur Entstehungsgeschichte des „Prototractatus“ von besonderer Bedeutung.

Eine genauere Erforschung des Verhältnisses zwischen Numerierung und Komposition der *Abhandlung* könnte dazu führen, dass mögliche Mißverständnisse bei der

Interpretation dieser Numerierung revidiert und neue Lesarten des Werkes ermöglicht werden.

Die Erstveröffentlichung des „Prototracatus“ bei *Routledge and Kegan Paul* enthält zwar ein Faksimile des Originalmanuskripts, die Wiedergabe des gedruckten Textes folgt jedoch nicht der Reihenfolge der Sätze im Manuscript, sondern der Numerierung der einzelnen Sätze. Die bei Suhrkamp erschienene *Kritische Edition* der *Logisch-Philosophischen Abhandlung* enthält kein Faksimile und gibt den Text des „Prototractatus“ ebenfalls in der Reihenfolge der Numerierung wieder. Auf diese Weise erhält der Leser zwar den vollständigen Text, jedoch nicht in jener ursprünglichen Reihenfolge der Sätze, die Rückschlüsse auf deren Entstehungsfolge über einen Zeitraum von mindestens drei Jahren zuläßt. Um die erwähnten Forschungsarbeiten zu erleichtern, wäre es wünschenswert, dass der Text des „Prototractatus“ der Forschung zusammen mit den wertvollen Quellenangaben und Konkordanzen der *Kritischen Edition* in der ursprünglichen Reihenfolge der Sätze zugänglich gemacht wird.

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# Wissen, was man tut

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## 1.

Über praktisches Wissen verfügt derjenige, der weiß, was er tut. Diese Auskunft ist offensichtlich wenig informativ; sie ist sogar rätselhaft, wenn man beispielsweise fragt, was der Gegenstand dieses Wissens eigentlich sein soll? Es gibt verschiedene Möglichkeiten, zu präzisieren, worin dieses Wissen besteht und wie es sich typischerweise sprachlich artikulieren lässt. Drei davon will ich zunächst durchgehen und der Reihe nach abweisen.

Den Schriften von Davidson (1990) kann man entnehmen, dass praktisches Wissen in begründeten Werturteilen zugunsten einer bestimmten Handlung artikuliert wird. Urteile über praktisches Wissen enthalten demnach immer eine evaluative Komponente, die dazu dient, die rationale Präferenz für eine bestimmte Handlung im Lichte bestimmter Überzeugungen und Proeinstellungen des Handelnden auszudrücken, und damit diese Handlung zu empfehlen. Praktisches Wissen erscheint dann als Ergebnis eines spezifisch praktisch-rationalen Überlegungsprozesses im Hinblick auf verschiedene Handlungsoptionen. An seinem Ende steht ein Urteil darüber, was alles in allem für den Handelnden wünschenswert und damit rational ist zu tun. McDowell (2010: 418 ff) hat dagegen sehr schön gezeigt, dass der sprachliche Ausdruck praktischen Wissens vielmehr die Form einer Tatsachenbehauptung hat: „Ich  $\Phi$ e gerade.“ Darin kommt kein evaluativer Ausdruck vor. Wenn man diesen Gedanken von McDowell akzeptiert, muss auch die zweite hier zu betrachtende Möglichkeit problematisch erscheinen.

Demnach kann praktisches Wissen als Antwort auf die Frage „was soll ich tun?“ rekonstruiert werden. Dieser Vorschlag ist vor allem von Sebastian Rödl ausgearbeitet worden (vgl. Rödl 2011). Ich kann dem hier nicht gerecht werden (ebenso wenig wie dem Ansatz Davidsons), hoffe allerdings, dass die folgenden Ausführungen zumindest indirekt verdeutlichen werden, welche Schwierigkeiten sich mit dieser Lösung verbinden. Einige knappe Bemerkungen ad hoc müssen an dieser Stelle ausreichen. Mir scheint, dass man die Schwierigkeit dieses Vorschlags am besten sieht, wenn man fragt, wie eine sinnvolle Antwort auf die Frage „was soll ich tun?“ lauten könnte. Gewiss nicht: „Ich öffne gerade das Fenster.“ Das gilt auch dann nicht, wenn ich mir vor einigen Minuten tatsächlich überlegt habe, was ich tun soll: sitzen bleiben oder das Fenster öffnen? Die sinnvolle Antwort müsste vielmehr lauten: „Das ist es, was ich tun will!“ Die Frage „was soll ich tun?“ erlaubt es, den eigenen Willen zu artikulieren. Der Bezug auf den Willen desjenigen, der diese Frage stellt, scheint mir der logisch-grammatische Kontext dafür zu sein. Es ist aber gerade fraglich, ob praktisches Wissen, die Artikulation eines Willens ist.

Die knappen Überlegungen zu Davidsons und Rödls Vorschlägen sollten den Verdacht stärken, dass die Form praktischen Wissens nicht die Konklusion einer Überlegung – ob praktisch oder theoretisch – ist, sondern vielmehr eine Behauptung der Art: „Ich  $\Phi$ e gerade.“

Es gibt noch einen dritten Vorschlag: Hier wird praktisches Wissen als eine Gestalt nicht-propositionalen Wis-

sens verstanden, als ein „Können“, ein „skillful knowledge.“ Man spricht dann beispielsweise von einem „knowing how“ im Gegensatz zum propositionalen „knowing that“ und handelt sich damit leidige Diskussionen über das Verhältnis dieser beiden Wissensformen ein. Die unterschiedlichen Bezeichnungen für diese Wissensform kann man getrost als Hinweis darauf fassen, dass ziemlich unklar ist, was damit gemeint sein soll. Diese Auffassung des praktischen Wissens ist aber, abgesehen von ihrer notorischen Unklarheit, auf jeden Fall dann abzuweisen, wenn das „knowing how“ eine ganz besondere Art von Wissen sein soll, zum Beispiel ein unmittelbares nicht-propositionales Wissen, das sich nur in den tatsächlichen Vollzügen seiner Träger manifestiert.

Dagegen will ich von der Idee ausgehen, dass praktisches Wissen von dem ist, „was getan wird“ (Anscombe 2011: 127). Seine sprachliche Artikulationsform ist: „Ich tue was geschieht“ (ebd.: 84); oder mit McDowell: „Ich  $\Phi$ e gerade.“ Ich behaupte nun ferner: Praktisches Wissen ist die Voraussetzung dafür, dass ein Geschehen unter die Beschreibung fallen kann, die es erlaubt, dieses Geschehen als eine absichtliche Handlung zu verstehen. Ohne praktisches Wissen könnte ein Geschehen nicht unter die Beschreibung „Ausführung von Absichten“ fallen. Deshalb ist es auch, wie Anscombe (2011: 135) mit Thomas von Aquin festhält, die *causa formalis* dessen, was es versteht. Diese eigenartige Formulierung besagt zunächst, dass im Falle des theoretischen Wissens das Wissen bewirkt wird von der gewussten (verstandenen) Sache. Beim praktischen Wissen ist es umgekehrt: Das Wissen ist (formale) Ursache der gewussten Sache (dessen, was es versteht). Diese Unterscheidung ist damit verträglich, dass auch praktisches Wissen propositionales Wissen ist.

## 2.

Die Aquinatische Bestimmung verdeutlicht zudem, dass kontemplatives (theoretisches) und praktisches Wissen tatsächlich zwei genuine Formen des Wissens sind. Dieser Unterschied wird nach Anscombe von modernen Philosophen verschleiert. Ihr Fehler besteht darin, ein Vorurteil für das kontemplative, durch das Bestehen von Tatsachen wahr gemachte Wissen zu hegen und daher „im Handeln nach dem anderen Modus des kontemplativen Wissens“ (ebd.: 91) zu suchen. Ihr Ausgangspunkt für diese Vermutung ist, dass Handlungsbeschreibungen aus der Perspektive der ersten Person beobachtungsunabhängig ein Geschehen beschreiben („ich öffne gerade das Fenster“), das seinerseits aus einer drittpersonalen Perspektive als ein beobachtbares Geschehen in der Welt beschrieben werden kann („er öffnet gerade das Fenster“). Es sieht dann so aus, als gäbe es hier zwei Formen des Wissens, und zwar, wie nach Anscombe stillschweigend unterstellt wird, des kontemplativen Wissens: Das beobachtungsunabhängige Wissen von der eigenen Handlung und das beobachtungsbedingte Wissen eines Geschehens in der Welt. Wie können sich aber zwei Formen des Wissens auf „genau dieselbe Sache beziehen?“ (ebd.: 82).

Um Anscombes Erläuterung des praktischen Wissens zu verstehen, sollte man sich nicht zu sehr von ihrer (zugege-

benermaßen nicht leicht zu verstehenden und auch gewiss zentralen) Unterscheidung zwischen beobachtungsbedingtem und nicht-beobachtungsbedingtem Wissen irritieren lassen. Es empfiehlt sich vielmehr von der Aquinatischen Unterscheidung zwischen zwei Richtungen der Adäquation eines Behaupteten mit dem, was der Fall ist bzw. geschieht, auszugehen. Theoretisches Wissen bemisst sich daran, wie sich die Dinge in der Welt verhalten. Wenn jemand etwas Falsches sagt, liegt der Fehler daher immer im Urteil, nicht in den Tatsachen. Wenn dagegen jemand sagt, er öffne gerade das Fenster, dabei aber regungslos auf seinem Stuhl sitzt, dann liegt der Fehler nicht in der Behauptung, sondern in der *Handlung*, die mit dem Gesagten nicht übereinstimmt. Der Sitzende behauptet, dass er das Fenster öffnet, genau das geschieht aber nicht. Anscombes Beispiel des Mannes mit der Einkaufsliste verdeutlicht den Punkt noch besser (ebd.: 88 ff). Stimmt die Liste des Detektivs nicht mit dem Einkauf überein, liegt der Fehler im Protokoll des Detektivs. Sein theoretisches Wissen über das Handeln des Einkäufers ist falsch. Umgekehrt, wenn der Einkäufer anstatt Butter Margarine kauft, liegt der Fehler in seinem Handeln, nicht in der Liste.

### 3.

Mit unseren Handlungen greifen wir in die Welt ein, sie sind immer auch beobachtbares Geschehen. Das hatte, wenn Anscombes Diagnose zutrifft, dazu verführt, praktisches Wissen dem kontemplativen Wissen anzugeleichen und es sozusagen als Modus theoretischen Wissens aus der Perspektive des Akteurs zu betrachten. Dann hätten wir zwei Formen kontemplativen Wissens über einen Vorgang. Ich hatte bereits angedeutet, dass sich die mögliche Reaktion auf diese Herausforderung, praktisches Wissen an einen spezifisch praktisch-normativen Reflexionsmodus zu binden, nicht gut mit der sprachlichen Artikulationsform für dieses Wissen verträgt: „Ich  $\Phi$  gerade.“ Andererseits kann man nicht davon absehen, dass Handlungen als Eingriffe in die Welt immer diesen doppelten Aspekt haben: Als Akteur habe ich Wissen davon, was ich tue, indem ich es tue. Daher weiß ich als Akteur zunächst einmal am besten, ob ich gerade  $\Phi$ e oder  $\Psi$ e. Das ist deshalb gesichert, weil mein praktisches Wissen *causa formalis* dessen ist, was es versteht. Auf der anderen Seite ist meine Handlung als Teil eines Weltgeschehens immer etwas Beobachtbares: „X  $\Phi$ t gerade.“ Der Form nach handelt es sich um eine Tatsachenbehauptung. Das wirft für die hier verhandelte Frage zumindest dann ein Problem auf, wenn man praktisches Wissen gerade nicht mentalistisch internalisieren will, z. B. als einen besonderen Typus von unmittelbarem Bewusstsein oder als Ausdruck eines psychischen Zustandes. Eine solche Lösung ist nicht zuletzt auch für Anscombe ausgeschlossen. Praktisches Wissen ist kein privater mentaler Zustand, der meine Handlungen begleitet.

McDowell will diesen antimentalistischen Punkt betonen und hält daher daran fest, dass praktisches Wissen als Wissen fallibel sein muss. Die Artikulationsform der Tatsachenbehauptung stützt diese Überlegung. Er schlägt daher eine disjunktive Konzeption praktischen Wissens vor (McDowell 2010: 431): Jemand weiß demnach als Akteur, dass er gerade  $\Phi$ t. Seine Absicht umfasst dabei immer auch das, was in der Welt tatsächlich geschieht und von dem er, indem er seine Absicht artikuliert („ich  $\Phi$ e gerade“), behauptet, dass es geschieht, indem er es tut. Das ist nach McDowell damit verträglich, dass seine Handlung irgendwie misslingen kann, er einen Fehler machen kann und in diesem Fall nicht, wie er behauptet,  $\Phi$ t. In diesem

Fall glaubt er nur geöfft zu haben: „Was du *getan* hast, war ein Fehler, denn das Gesagte sollte Dein Tun beschreiben, hat es aber nicht beschrieben“ (Anscombe 2011: 90).

### 4.

Gegen McDowells Vorschlag könnte man den Einwand erheben, dass er hier das Dilemma reproduziert, das Anscombe als irreführende Zwei-Versionen Theorie des praktischen Wissens abgewiesen hatte. Man unterstellt dann, es gäbe „eine Sache [...] – das Ereignis, von dem fraglich ist, ob es eine Handlung sei –, um die dann auf zwei verschiedene Weisen gewusst werden kann.“ (Müller 2011: 3f) Ich will das den Interpretationismus-Einwand nennen, denn er hätte die Konsequenz, dass es letztlich immer eine Frage konfigurerender Interpretationen aus erst- und drittpersonaler Perspektive bleibt, wie das fragliche Ereignis richtig zu beschreiben ist. Dieser Konflikt der Interpretationen wird durch McDowells Vorschlag nur verschärft.

Ich werde abschließend versuchen, diesem Einwand zu begegnen, indem ich noch einmal auf die Frage eingehe, was es heißt, zu wissen, was man tut. Eingangs hatte ich, Anscombe paraphrasierend, behauptet, praktisches Wissen sei die Voraussetzung dafür, dass ein Geschehen unter einer Beschreibung fallen kann, die es erlaubt, dieses Geschehen als eine absichtliche Handlung zu verstehen. Ohne praktisches Wissen könnte daher ein Geschehen nicht unter die Beschreibungsform „Ausführung von Absichten“ fallen. Es wird Zeit, zu erläutern, wie das zu verstehen ist.

Dafür ist eine Erinnerung daran erforderlich, wie Anscombe mit der Frage umgeht, warum es überhaupt Ereignisse gibt, auf die die für absichtliches Handeln relevante Warum-Frage passt und andere nicht. Die Antwort lautet in aller Kürze: Die Beschreibung dieser Ereignisse setzt die Anwendbarkeit dieser Frage voraus. Ohne Warum-Frage wäre es nicht möglich, bestimmte Ereignisse als Handlungen zu beschreiben, so wie es auch nicht möglich wäre zu fragen, was diese Kritzeleien auf der Tafel bedeuten, wenn es nicht schon bedeutungsvolle Zeichen, eine Sprache gäbe. Es gehört zur kategorialen Form von Handlungen, absichtlich zu sein. „Absichtlich“ ist keine Eigenschaft bestimmter Ereignisse oder die Bezeichnung eines mentalen Zustandes, sondern eine Beschreibungsform. Solche Beschreibungsformen funktionieren wie aristotelische Kategorien, denn sie determinieren, was man über die fraglichen Gegenstände bzw. Ereignisse sagen kann (vgl. dazu Anscombe 2011: 128 ff).

Bezogen auf die Frage nach dem praktischen Wissen kann man nun sagen: Ich kann einerseits wissen, was geschieht, weil ich einen Vorgang beobachte und in einer Tatsachenbehauptung repräsentieren kann; es gibt aber Fälle, in denen ich es selbst bin, der das, was geschieht, tut, und, indem ich es tue, durch den Zweck meiner Handlung herbeiführe. Ich kann wissen, dass ich das Fenster öffne, da ich es bin, der das tut. Warum ist dieses Wissen *praktisch*? Weil es die *causa formalis* dessen ist, was es versteht; es kann als Vorgang nur so beschrieben werden, nämlich als ein Vorgang, der für die Warum-Frage zugänglich ist. Diese Beschreibungsform ist aber nicht nur mir zugänglich, sondern gehört zu den „lebensbezogenen Beschreibungen“ (ebd.: 132), mit denen wir alle unser Tun sprachlich artikulieren. Es gibt sie nur deshalb, weil es eine Praxis gibt, auf die solche Beschreibungen anwendbar sind. Wenn es um die Beschreibungsformen geht, bin ich als Akteur also in keiner besseren Lage als die Beobachter des von mir verantworteten Geschehens. Als Teilnehmer an einer entsprechenden Praxis stehen uns jeweils diese

Beschreibungsformen zur Verfügung, um unser Wissen zu artikulieren.

Diese Rekonstruktion des praktischen Wissens scheint mir nun mit McDowells Idee verträglich. Ich habe als Akteur aus meiner Innenperspektive praktisches Wissen, wenn ich die fragliche Handlung ausführe. Ich übe das Wissen in diesem Fall aus, indem ich  $\phi$  e und damit den Begriff dieser Handlung realisiere (McDowell 2010: 431). Das schließt ein, dass ein Beobachter dieses Geschehens ebenfalls über den Begriff dieser Handlung verfügt und mein Handeln demgemäß beschreiben bzw. beurteilen kann. Es muss sogar möglich sein, dass andere ebenfalls über diesen Begriff verfügen, denn ich selbst könnte meine Handlung gar nicht als ein  $\phi$  en beschreiben, wenn diese Beschreibungsform nicht schon zur Verfügung stünde. Erstpersonale und Drittpersonale Beschreibung korrelieren. Ich als Akteur und Er als mein Beobachter können jeweils Handlungen nur deshalb als „absichtliche“ beschreiben, weil wir über die dafür erforderlichen Begriffe und Beschreibungsformen verfügen. Wir verfügen darüber, weil diese Beschreibungsformen in unserer gemeinsamen Praxis öffentlich zugänglich sind. Gäbe es keine solche Praxis, gäbe es auch kein praktisches Wissen und keine Warum-Frage. Dann hätten wir auch nicht die Möglichkeit, bestimmte Ereignisse als Handlungen zu beschreiben. Ausüben kann dieses praktische Wissen freilich immer nur ich als Akteur. Daher ist es auch ein genuin praktisches Wissen: Ich bin derjenige, der, indem er  $\phi$ t, so oder so in die Welt eingreift. Einen privilegierten Zugang habe ich zu meinem  $\phi$  en allerdings nicht. Es gibt daher auch keinen in den Relativismus oder Skeptizismus führenden Konflikt der Interpretationen über ein unabhängig von den Beschreibungen bestehendes Ereignis. Im Übrigen gilt das auch für theoretisches Wissen. Ich bin es ja, der denkt, dass p. Warum sollte man zusätzlich einen privilegiert zugänglichen inneren Zustand des Glaubens annehmen?

Praktisches Wissen wäre im Lichte dieser Überlegungen tatsächlich eine eigene Form des Wissens, aber nicht, weil sie sich auf einen anderen Gegenstandsbereich bezieht (das ist der Fehler derjenigen, die das praktische Wissen als Ergebnis einer besonderen Art normativ-praktischen Überlegens fassen), sondern weil sie auf einer anderen Richtung der Adäquation zwischen Wissen und Gewussten beruht: Das Wissen ist in diesem Fall *causa formalis* des Gewussten. Ohne sie hier noch weiter ausführen zu können, nenne ich zum Schluss thesenartig einige Konsequenzen aus diesen Überlegungen:

- (1) Praktisches Wissen ist insofern propositional, als seine Artikulationsform die Beschreibung einer absichtlichen Handlung ist.
- (2) Die Ausübung theoretischen Wissens ist etwas glauben (oder für wahr halten). Etwas glauben heißt aber, es mit Zustimmung denken (Augustinus). Die Ausübung praktischen Wissens ist absichtlich handeln. Das aber heißt: Etwas mit Zustimmung tun.

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# On what we Have Meant by “Gold” all along. A Pragmatist Reconstruction of Semantic Externalism

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## 1. Background – Semantic externalism from a pragmatist perspective

Semantic externalists claim that we do not just lack control over how our expressions, once out in the open, are interpreted by others; we also – at least sometimes – lack control over how they *should* be interpreted. According to semantic externalism, we are not fully in control over what we ourselves *mean* (Kripke 1972; Putnam 1975).

This thesis stands in rather obvious tension with the – broadly Davidsonian – principle that a speaker must be considered the final arbiter about what counts as a correct and what counts as an incorrect use of an expression (of her idiolect). This principle is a corollary of the thesis that the attribution of an empirical or cognitive mistake to a speaker is always precarious because without the speaker's own eventual acknowledgment of the mistake, it is always possible (and, given charity, plausible) that we have simply misinterpreted her expressions.<sup>1</sup>

Of course, one could deny one or the other of these two theses. In this paper, however, I want to grant both of them and examine how they could be made to cohere with one another.

The most promising way to do so, it seems, is to exploit the idea that meaning-constitutive judgments – or rather: *dispositions* of making or assenting to meaning-constitutive judgments – are typically *complex*. Speakers are not only disposed, e.g., to say that this or that is “gold” or is “the same substance as that other sample”, but are also disposed to apply general principles of rationality to their judgments. These principles of rationality can be reconstructed as second-order dispositions of distancing oneself from, or revising, particular judgments once inconsistencies with other judgments become apparent. For instance, in Sellars' (1953: 314) famous example, there can be situations in which a speaker sees herself forced to take back either her sentence “if it tastes sour, it is acid” or her sentence “if it is acid, it turns litmus paper red”. Such a situation may be the confrontation with an object which tastes sour yet which fails to turn litmus paper red. In such situations of “materially incompatible commitments” (Brandom 2010: 36), speakers cannot avoid re-developing the rules governing the use of their expressions.

On the basis of this thought, one can see how some of a speaker's meaning-constitutive judgments can be overridden while recognizing a sense in which the overridden speaker remains the final arbiter over the interpretation of her expressions. Given token-reflexive elements in language (“*this metal*”, “*that liquid*”) and anaphoric chains by which the content of such expressions can be taken up across speakers and situations, for example, it seems not altogether implausible that we can override some “water”-judgments of travelers from Earth to Twin Earth, or reject some “gold”-judgments of Archimedes, while basing these

interpretative judgments (of ours) on the linguistic dispositions of the respective speakers themselves. The litmus test of what a speaker means is now whether she *would* assent to some interpretative judgment if she were given the information which we interpreters have. Such reasoning can then be employed to argue, say, that a particular token of the expression “gold” as used by Archimedes has the same semantic content as *our* “substance made of atoms of atomic number 79” – or indeed as *our* “gold”. It can also be employed to argue that we can be wrong regarding what we mean when we say “gold”.

## 2. Semantic open-texture as a challenge

Recently, however, it has been argued that this way of reasoning unduly ignores the fact that the development of language includes (many) situations in which there just is no *right* or *wrong* way of dissolving a particular material incompatibility. Joseph Laporte (2004, 2010 a.o.) insists that our linguistic ancestors, when for the first time confronted with whales (which had features some of which were considered constitutive of “fish”-hood and others of which were considered incompatible with “fish”-hood) were completely free in their choice over how to solve the tension by re-framing their relevant vocabulary (“fish”, “mammal”, “animal”, and so on). “[W]e have not,” he writes, “simply discovered that earlier speakers erred in accepting the sentence ‘Whales are fish’. Rather, we have changed what ‘Whales are fish’ means.” (Laporte 2004: 112).

And so with other terms. Laporte considers many examples from biology and chemistry and concludes his investigations with the thesis that generally, speakers' expression-use, including their “baptisms” along the lines of the causal theory of reference, is indeterminate and not “so sophisticated enough to allow the speakers to coin a term in such a way as to preclude the possibility of open texture” (cf. Laporte 2004: 118). For Laporte, the upshot is that it must be wrong to impute determinate and distinct meanings like “substance made of atoms of atomic number 79” to early speakers. Since nothing in the early speakers' way of talking committed them to any *particular* resolutions of the implicit incompatibilities inherent in their way of talking, such an interpretive judgment on our part would constitute an overstretch of the principles of rationality on which the externalist thesis hinges.

This line of reasoning, it seems to me, ought to be scrutinized at (at least) the following two junctions. Firstly, is the thesis of “open texture” correct? And secondly, if it is, does it make it impossible to uphold any interesting form of semantic externalism? In what follows, I shall sketch a worry regarding the first junction and then present the rough sketch of an argument to the effect that even if Laporte is right about the open texture of (early, and by extension any) ordinary speakers' linguistic conduct, we can still uphold an interesting form of semantic externalism, one which supports such theses as that we have discovered that whales are not fish.

1 At least if no account of the nature of the alleged mistake is presented – if we know that a speaker is color-blind, there is less pressure on us to check whether she might mean *green* when she says “red”.

### 3. Open texture

Let us start with the first claim. The main part of Laporte's overall argument – and this is perhaps his most valuable contribution to the debate – consists of a number of detailed studies of actual cases of conceptual disruption (Laporte's term for what I have labeled, following Brandom, "material incompatibilities") and their resolutions. These studies are supposed to teach us two lessons. Firstly, actual speakers do not always speak in the way classical externalists think. For instance, Laporte shows that Hilary Putnam (1975) is quite wrong about actual speakers' dispositions regarding the term "jade". Firstly, according to Laporte's studies, it was always transparent to (the relevant, competent) speakers that there are two distinct substances with the surface characteristics associated with jade – namely jadeite and nephrite –, and secondly, these speakers were happy to allow one term, properly translated as "jade", to cover both substances (Laporte 2004: 95ff). In general, Laporte insists that Putnam and his followers have overestimated the role of microstructure vis-à-vis surface characteristics in resolutions of conceptual disruption. The second lesson is that the history of science shows that there is no *one* policy which can be discerned behind all or most actual speakers' resolutions of conceptual disruption. Instead, there is a chaotic myriad of such policies. Even in so specific an area as mineralogy, all kinds of dissolution policies have been pursued: while "ruby", upon the discovery of stones with the microstructure of paradigmatic rubies yet which are blue, was explicitly restricted to *red* stones of the relevant sort, in the case of "topaz", it was decided that color is no adequate criterion of applicability or non-applicability.

Now, it seems to me that the obvious reply to Laporte's historical studies is that while they help to correct some philosophers' naive view of conceptual development as a simple and linear process, they fall short of supporting the needed "no right answer thesis". By using this terminology, I mean to suggest an analogy between the debate at hand and the established debate in jurisprudence on whether hard legal questions are susceptible to one right answer.<sup>2</sup> In the confines of the present paper, I cannot of course recapitulate the complex jurisprudential debate, but it does look like many of the same arguments are pertinent in Laporte's case. Indeed, if we can adopt one finding from the jurisprudential debate, it is that the mere presence of different dispositions to judge in a given hard case is quite irrelevant to the question of whether there *is* a correct way of judging it. The latter is a philosophical question which must be answered by developing an interpretation of legal practice, and if the best such interpretation implies a right answer thesis, then this philosophical claim can withstand even a lot of difference or even conflict in ordinary speakers' linguistic conduct. Here it is especially important to note that *participants* to legal practice typically interpret themselves as genuinely *disagreeing* with others who favor different ways of judging.

But I do not mean to dwell on this point for too long. The more interesting argument, to my mind, is one to which we are led by observing that Laporte's focus is squarely on the impact of scientific discovery on patterns of language use – and not on its impact on *our* interpretation of *past* patterns of language use. It seems to me that focusing on the latter question can bring to light a way of upholding an interesting form of semantic externalism in the face of the kind of open-texture to which Laporte has drawn our attention.

### 4. The relevance for semantic externalism

One key point to note is that although early speakers were not, by their principles of rationality, committed to ending up speaking as we do, they *were* committed to dissolving incompatibilities and hence re-developing their linguistic dispositions in *some* way. Here, it is important to understand a key point about linguistic dispositions: speakers realize that different ways of redeveloping linguistic dispositions in the face of disruption are possible. When faced with whales for the first time, for example, early speakers were most plausibly aware that they had a *choice* between, among other things, excluding whales from the category of "fish" on the one hand, and allowing that some "fish" happen to be "mammals", on the other. It would have been easy, too, to switch back and forth between these resolutions, and in fact, the only reason why speakers are typically inflexible in their linguistic dispositions (beyond reasons of cognitive economy) is that they are in linguistic contact with *multiple* speakers at the same (or almost the same) time, so that each time a speaker switches to match the dispositions of a diverging interlocutor, she disrupts her communication with *third* parties. (Note, by the way, that adapting to another speaker's formerly foreign dispositions is compatible with remaining capable of having and expressing actual disagreements with her. Disagreements are those differences which are marked by stable attributions of inconsistency, paired with some (however tentative) hypothesis of the nature of the allegedly inconsistent speaker's mistake.)

Having appreciated these points about differences in disposition and the possibility of switching back and forth between them, note now that there are many contexts in which we treat *what we mean* as directly dependent on the contingent dispositions of our interlocutors at hand. For example, let us imagine that we are clarifying what we mean by "dolphin" to a party whose ancestors have opted for a different way of dissolving the whale disruption. We could say that what we mean is the "jumping kind of fish". Now, of course, this seems almost trivial. The way in which this point is yet relevant in the present debate is that early speakers can be imagined as (hypothetical) interlocutors of late (i.e. today's) interpreters. And in this hypothetical scenario, it does seem natural to impute to early speakers the willingness to adapt to their late interlocutors in a way which would make it correct, say, to interpret their "gold" as referring to "the substance with atomic number 79". Note that we are familiar with miniature cases of this structure from everyday experience. Sometimes when a critic shows us that we made a claim to which we were not entitled because of its inconsistency with other professed beliefs of ours, and we attempt to retreat to a consistent, but more modest, secondary claim, we do so by saying "I guess what I meant by X was...".

Now, to be sure, much more needs to be said about the scope and kind of semantic externalism supported by this idea. And much more should be said about the understanding of meaning (and meaning talk) which informs the idea. But I hope to have signaled a way of understanding semantic externalism which is not harmed by the admission that our complex language is the outcome of contingent, chaotic – and often bad – local fixes to countless conceptual disruptions.

<sup>2</sup> See Dworkin 1986.

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# Harms or Risks? On the Ethics of Precaution

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## 1. Introduction

There is no doubt that the so-called precautionary principle has played some significant role in diverse national and international policy decisions and agreements. For instance, it is given an explicit place in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (namely Article 3.3), adopted at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. And the spirit of this principle surely has pervaded also later climate conferences, which, as we know, fell short of delivering concrete results in the sense of setting mandatory emission limits for greenhouse gasses.

An often-cited general formulation of the principle is: "When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically. [...] the proponents of an activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of proof." (see Montague 1998).

Clearly, this formulation leaves a few open questions: How big a threat? What kind of threat or risk? When would we have full scientific proof? Who are the proponents or perpetrators? What kind of measures? Because of such unclarities, critics have claimed that the principle is unscientific, even anti-scientific, myopic, vacuous, or that it would, if stringently interpreted, kill whole industries.

Yet surely, the "precautionary principle" is not a principle directly entailing mandatory measures, but rather a general guiding idea that has to be meaningfully concretized along the dimensions of those questions. As concerns climate change, this means, among other things, determining the required emission limits and measures to be taken. As a general idea, I think, it agrees very much with common rules of due caution and precaution, e.g. with common safety provisions.

## 2. Inadequacy of traditional ethics

Two decades ago, Ulrich Beck (1992) elaborated the notion of "risk society". Climate change, the greenhouse effect, is for him one of the mega-risks that characterizes our "risk society", others being chemical threats to nature and human health, risks of genetic manipulation, crises in bio-industry, internet crashes, also of financial markets. From traditional ethics, Beck expects little help in dealing with mega-risks: an "ethical renewal of the sciences [...] would be like a bicycle brake on an intercontinental jet (Beck 1999: 58).

As concerns risks quite generally, most modern ethical theories indeed are ill-equipped for dealing with them. Like most of our everyday moral judgments, they presuppose that the relevant circumstances of an action, e.g. its particular harmful consequences, be well-defined and certain. (One would not say: "Bad girl: you may have stolen, or may steal, my bike!") Christian Munthe (2011: 58) calls this the "factualism" of classic criteria of moral rightness and wrongness.

Beck himself also sees positive trends in risk society, moving it towards a "reflexive" or "responsible" modernity and a possible new ethics, indebted to the sceptical tradition. He asks suggestively: "Could this utopia of a questioning and supporting doubt form a basis, a fundamental idea for an ethics of a post-industrial and radically modern identity and social contract?" (Beck 1997: 162) I think, doubt can contribute to the formation of a moral stance, lead to modesty and create space, but it cannot give direction – especially not Beck's "reflexive" doubting one's own doubt. Beck arrived by his somewhat strange suggestion by stressing "the gap between knowledge and decision: there is no one who really knows the global outcome [...] the situation is radically 'undecidable' – but we none the less *have to decide*."

A few decades before Beck, Hans Jonas (1979), having ascertained that traditional ethics was not enough to deal with the problems and challenges of our technological age, articulated his "ethics of responsibility", a prospective responsibility. Its new imperative says that we should abstain from technological innovations that could endanger the integrity of nature and the survival and integrity of humankind. This is a forerunner and a particular form of the "precautionary principle", laying down – in Munthe's terms – one "forbidden risk". Notably, Jonas leaves those integrities all but undefined: regarding humans, what matters to him is the preservation of the possibility of responsibility.

As concerns climate change in particular, Stephen M. Gardiner (2011: 6 ff) characterizes this "global environmental tragedy" as "a perfect moral storm", consisting of three problems ("storms"), obstacles to our ability to behave ethically. The first is given by the global power asymmetry between rich and poorer nations, the second by that between the present and future generations, and the third by the lack of robust general theories, especially in the fields of ethics, to guide us. So he, too, considers given ethical theories as inadequate. Gardiner (2011: 399 ff) does not venture to formulate new ethical principles, but sketches an "ethics of transition" for how we might proceed from existing social and political realities in the direction of better solutions. Precaution and considerations of responsibility are given roles in such a tradition.

## 3. Risks and harms

Risks – in their contemporary negative sense – are potential harms. Many traditional ethical theories judge actions in terms of their resulting *actual* benefits and *actual* harms and possibly in some other respects. The "precautionary principle" concerns situations of risk, i.e. *potential* harms and benefits. Thus, if one considers interpreting and justifying this idea in moral terms, one seems to have to do this in the context of a risk ethics or, more generally, some risk theory. During the last decades, a tremendous amount of work has been done in that area (cf. Roeser et al. 2012), far exceeding what can be dealt with in a short paper.

Perhaps to preserve some unity of ethics, there have been proposals to regard inflictions of *actual* harms also as impositions or inflictions of *risk*s of harm (cf. Munthe 2011:

73ff). Yet, to this end, an action like shooting someone would have to be rather artificially divided into a basic action like moving a finger and its "risky consequences", killing someone. My noting this artificiality is not meant to deny that many actions have unforeseeable (further) consequences.

In decision theory some theoretical unity is achieved by directly comparing, say, the *expected utility* of a lottery with the benefit, the *actual utility*, of a straight gift, or by equating this expected utility with the actual rational price one should pay for the lottery. Note that decision theory focuses on the *rationality* of decisions, which may or may not qualify at the same time as moral decisions.

According to the standard approach of decision theory, one should in standard situations of risk choose the action which maximizes expected utility, which is defined in terms of the values (benefits) and disvalues (harms) and the respective probabilities of its consequences. Of course, there also are situations of risk with greater uncertainties, i.e. where the probabilities and/or the beneficialness and harmfulness of the consequences of an action are not known. If probabilities are unknown, decision theory tells us to use a maximin rule.

Now, Munthe (2011: 51f & passim) argues that decision theory, attending exclusively to the magnitudes of possible harms and benefits and their probabilities, leaves out of consideration something of moral importance, namely the very *imposition* of risks. In a simple example of mine, his argument comes down to this: reckless driving is morally unacceptable as such, even when it does or did not cause an expectable accident. Unduly exposing other traffic participants to hazards of damage is not acceptable – if caught, one rightly is fined for this misdemeanor. For Munthe (2011: 78), this shows that there is an "ontological difference" between actual harms and risks.

#### 4. Responsible risk decisions – a new moral quality?

Risk and responsibility seem to be intrinsically connected, as was already apparent in the views of Jonas and Beck. Following up on his distinction between risks and harms and with reference to Jonas and also John Rawls, Munthe (2011: 85 ff) introduces the notion "of decisions to impose risk being more or less responsibly [sic]" as the basic notion of his own moral theory for interpreting and justifying the "precautionary principle" (more precisely, the part of it he calls "requirement of precaution"). Note that, while we mostly speak of the 'responsibility of persons or agencies', Munthe uses the term 'responsible' (and 'irresponsible'), as we may also sometimes do, to name "a special sort of moral quality attached to decisions to impose (or not impose) risks". Thus, to traditional types of moral and normative judgments like 'his action was morally wrong', 'the outcome of his action was bad', 'he acted irrationally', he adds judgements of the type 'his decision to act as he did was *irresponsible*'. He claims that the truth or falsity of the latter judgment is independent of the truth or falsity of the former ones.

I cannot present all details of Munthe's theoretical elaborations, like those of the degree and price of precaution, degrees of responsibility, or the extra negative weight of potential harms (risks) as compared with potential benefits (chances). But let me mention one of the desiderata his theory is supposed to live up to, as part of an interpretation of the "precautionary principle" (Munthe 2011: 91):

In the choice or comparison between different possible decisions, those and only those decisions are irresponsible for which there is at least one other decision that would have been more responsible. [IR]

Clearly, this is a rather formal decision rule, the full action-guiding potential of which will have to come from those just-mentioned more concrete kinds specification of the "responsibility of possible decisions". In this respect it becomes clear again that 'responsible' is not so much a specific new moral quality, but a somewhat formal container notion. It can cover 'doing good (helping)', 'being just' and other morally qualitatively characterized actions.

#### 5. Further critical discussion

Central to Munthe's theory, meant to interpret and justify the "precautionary principle" appears to be a moral evaluation of decisions "to impose risks". Yet, firstly, is it really *decisions* that are being evaluated? Most or all actions are preceded by decisions. But we usually evaluate the ensuing actions and not also the decisions as such. In Munthe's (2011: 120) more concrete examples, it is *not decisions* as such which are being evaluated, but *options*, like e.g. using pesticides or not, introducing genetically modified crops or not. And an option involves actually employing one of those measures, which then might harbour various risks. Thus, it involves an imposition or infliction of risks and actual harms or costs, desirably in a balanced way.

Secondly, Munthe seems to have argued that the assessment of the expected utility of a risky option is not enough and that the *moral evaluation of the risk imposition* should be added. Again, his treatment of more concrete examples shows that no such simple addition of an evaluation can be meant. The examples even show that the circumstance of *imposition* does not play that great a role or at least not a clearly defined role. On whom are which risks imposed, when genetically modified crops are introduced or a nuclear plant is shut down or not? Of course, the evaluation of such options will try to identify all potential consequences, harms, costs and the parties affected. The idea of *imposition* itself seems to play a subordinate role in such evaluation. In this sense, Munthe's (2011, ch. 5) title "The Morality or Imposing Risks" is a bit of a misnomer for his theory.

Finally, caution and precaution very often are not morally qualified attitudes or behavior, but prudential or pragmatic ones: when clouds come up, we take an umbrella along; we lock our front door. The same holds for responsibility: arbiters at soccer games can make many non-moral responsible decisions or not. And clearly, Munthe's theory-desideratum [IR] can also cover pragmatic and prudential decisions. Decisions become morally relevant when morally important goods and values are at stake. Yet, I think that most risk-laden problems, like the climate change, do not have just a moral dimension, but also prudential, pragmatic, economic, political dimensions. The same, then, goes for the "precautionary principle". It is supposed to guide in all those dimensions. This, mostly, is far from straightforward or secure. Think of the financial crisis: are and were the enormous monetary injections to save banks or even countries responsible precautionary measures? There now are many governmental committees set up to figure out and critically evaluate the actual, often unforeseen, consequences of such measures taken a couple of years ago.

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# Richard Rorty and the “Specter of Relativism”

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## 1. Cultural relativism

From approximately 1981 to 2000 there was a big debate between Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty about the importance of the notions of truth and reason in philosophy. Rorty denied throughout the debate that those concepts play an interesting philosophical role. Putnam on the other hand thinks them to be one of the central notions of philosophical thinking and that Rorty simply is a cultural relativist. It is interesting that Putnam is not very clear about this notion throughout the debate, for example he conflates “relativism” and “cultural relativism”. He never gives an explicit definition. All one finds are sentences like the following: The cultural relativist argues “that truth in a language—any language—is determined by what the majority of the speakers of that language would say.” (Putnam 1992: 67) This then is the central relativist thesis according to Putnam:

(Rel) Truth is nothing more than warranted assertibility following the standards of one's cultural peers.

Therefore he writes in *Realism in Reasons*: “Thus I count Richard Rorty as a cultural relativist, because his explicit formulations are relativist ones (he identifies truth with right assertibility by the standards of one's cultural peers, for example), and because his entire attack on traditional philosophy is mounted on the basis that the nature of reason and representation are non-problems, because the only kind of truth it makes sense to seek is to convince one's cultural peers.” (Putnam 1983: 235)

But why is it a bad idea to be a relativist? In *Realism with a human face* Putnam gives insights about his reasons for engaging in this discussion. As James Conant writes in the introduction: „Putnam is alarmed by the *ethical* implications of Rorty's antimetaphysical stance, in particular, the moral it draws concerning how we should view our everyday lives – a moral that depends on a ‘misrepresentation’ of ‘the lives we lead with our concepts.’” (Putnam 1990: xl ix, original emphasis) Putnam himself poses the central question in this book: „If our aim is tolerance and the open society, would it not be better to argue for these directly, rather than to hope that these will come as the byproduct of a change in our metaphysical picture?” (Putnam 1990: 25) So the underlying for Putnam to argue against cultural relativism is an ethical one. For him the following thesis follows from (Rel):

(Irr) It is impossible to designate some cultural practices as better than others.

This follows from (Rel) because if the concepts of truth and reason are relative to culture as all other concepts, then it is impossible to criticize other cultures. Because the concept one applies thereby are relative to the own cultural standards. In other words one has no rational methods of criticizing other cultural practices as wrong. This is certainly a change for the worse and fails to do justice to the life humans lead with their concepts.

The strategy of arguing against cultural relativism is that of performative self-contradiction. The relativist herself needs absolute notions of truth and reason to argue for her position.

## 2. About playing games

With this in mind Putnam explores if the later Wittgenstein was a cultural relativist endorsing (Rel) and (Irr). There is a famous sequence of paragraphs in *On Certainty* which seem to suggest this:

608. Is it wrong for me to be guided in my actions by the propositions of physics? Am I to say I have no good ground for doing so? Isn't precisely this what we call a 'good ground'?

609. Supposing we met people who did not regard that as a telling reason. Now, how do we imagine this? Instead of the physicist, they consult an oracle. (And for that we consider them primitive.) Is it wrong for them to consult an oracle and be guided by it? - If we call this "wrong" aren't we using our language-game as a base from which to combat theirs?

610. And are we right or wrong to combat it? Of course there are all sorts of slogans which will be used to support our proceedings.

611. Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one another, then each man declares the other a fool and heretic.

612. I said I would 'combat' the other man, - but wouldn't I give him reasons? Certainly; but how far do they go? At the end of reasons comes persuasion. (Think what happens when missionaries convert natives.) (Wittgenstein 1969)

Those paragraphs seem to suggest that here are two different notions of truth are involved. If this is the case it would be appropriate to say the following sentences: “It is true in their language game that an oracle is a proper way of gaining knowledge” and “It is not true in our language game that an oracle is a proper way of gaining knowledge. If this is what Wittgenstein suggests here, then he would be a relativist, endorsing (Irr) and implicitly (Rel).

But according to Putnam, this does not follow. Because there is a difference in the form of the two following sentences, to which Wittgenstein is cautious:

- (1) Oracles are a proper way of gaining knowledge
- (2) It is true in this language game that oracles are a proper way of gaining knowledge.

The relativist who endorses (Rel) would utter a sentence of the form (2). But then the relativist has to make a step out of her own language game and reach a higher position – a god's eye view – to see the two language games as relative to another. But this was never Wittgenstein's idea. It is one of the central conclusions one can (but is not bound to) draw from *On Certainty*: That one cannot step out of all language games at once, that some sentences are an fun-

dament for all reasoning and as such beyond doubt. In paragraph 610 Wittgenstein writes he would combat the language game which proposes oracles as viable way of gaining knowledge. This shows that in this case Wittgenstein would not utter a sentence of the form (2) but of the form not-(1). This means he is not seeing himself as judging language games from above where he could set them relative to each other. He sees himself as an involved player who cannot see certain propositions as relative. Also he criticizes the other cultural practices. Therefore, Putnam concludes, Wittgenstein does not endorse (Rel) and (Irr).

### 3. Putnam against Putnam

I now want to argue that this argument can be used to defend Rorty with against Putnam. In his text "Dewey and Posner on Pragmatism and Moral Progress" from 2007, Rorty discusses Richard Posner's views about moral progress. Posner argues – like Rorty – that moral realism – the thesis that there are transcultural moral standards – is not a tenable position. From this, Posner draws the conclusion that all our moral judgments are "provincial" that means they are done in a certain time and cultural place. Therefore cultural relativism is the only tenable position. One can never designate the own moral judgments as better than those of other cultures, for example the moral standards of the Greeks from 2000 years ago.

Rorty denies this conclusion. He argues that Dewey would answer something like the following: "Of course our judgment of our own rightness is provincial. So are all our judgments about anything. But why should the fact that we use the criteria of our time and place to judge that we have made progress cast doubt on that judgment? What other criteria are available?" (Rorty 2007: 920)

Rorty argues that the relativist thesis violates the pragmatic maxim according to which only a practical difference should make up for a theoretical difference. Rorty argues that a relativist thesis like (Rel) makes no difference in practice. One still has to play a language game; one still has to judge other cultural practices. Posner – the pragmatist that he is – should therefore cross out the "provincial" if it leads him to endorsing (Rel). In other words the pragmatic maxim is according to Rorty a maxim that leads to the same attitude that Wittgenstein had according to Putnam. This means one should not hope to arrive at a gods eye view to see language games as relative to each other. Like Wittgenstein in Putnam's view Rorty sees himself as an active player of his language game who combats other language games. Rorty argues that this goes for physics as well as for ethics. If one asks if our up to date physics is better than that of Aristotle, one should according to Rorty say "yes". And he would give the same answer to the question if our culture of liberal democracy is better than the ancient Greek culture where it was possible to take slaves. Taking slaves, Rorty argues, was wrong already 2000 years ago. This means Rorty argues for a sentence of the form not-(1) and not of the form (2) – exactly like Wittgenstein according to Putnam.

In this vein Rorty says: "It was true before the foundations of the world were laid both that  $2+2 = 4$  and that I should be wearing this particular tie today. [...] Eternal and absolute truth is the only kind of truth there is, even though the only way we know what is true is by reaching a consensus that may well prove transitory." (Rorty 2007: 923)

But this certainly sounds strange – why should it be "true" that it was already wrong to take slaves 2000 years ago? Is he proposing anything like "moral facts" here? No. Here Rorty is not talking about moral facts that make ethical propositions true but he is talking about the grammar of "true". According to Rorty the word "true" is a very vague term, meaning roughly the same in all cultures, like the words "you", "here" and "I". The two main functions of the word "true" are praise and warning. "Yes, this is true" then says the same as "Ok, I believe you, no more justification is needed". On the other hand "Is this really true?" means something like "I want more justification, I don't believe you". This function of warning works as counter-weight to the warranted assertibility following the standards of one's peers. Therefore Rorty argues against (Irr) and (Rel).

True, one can argue that Putnam's reconstruction is flawed or that (Rel) and (Irr) are bad formulations of the main ideas of cultural relativism. But this doesn't concern my argument. Because all I wanted to show is that if Putnam says this about Wittgenstein he cannot at the same time accuse Rorty of cultural relativism without being inconsistent.

### 4. Science and discussion

I now want to come back to Putnam's central question: „If our aim is tolerance and the open society, would it not be better to argue for these directly, rather than to hope that these will come as the byproduct of a change in our metaphysical picture?“ (Putnam 1990: 25)

My answer will be rather sketchy. I think the underlying idea of Putnam is the following: There are certain standards everyone who participate in a discussion has to live up to. Cultural relativists cannot live up to these standards because they deny the whole fundament of this discussion. Rorty's philosophy undermines according to Putnam the rational basis of discussion in exactly this way. In other words, ethical wrongdoers like rational Nazis (Putnam's example!) can agree with Rorty on an abstract level. Putnam's underlying intuition is, that the paradigm for reasoning in ethics as in all other philosophical disciplines is science. There is one big picture of the world in which everything can be fitted. But Rorty is doubts exactly this: that science is a good paradigm for philosophy. He himself proposes another paradigm: discussion. But – this is at least my thesis – Putnam is not paying attention to this paradigm shift.

According to Rorty Putnam had better given up the idea of truth and reason of notions which should provide a rational framework for all our reasoning: "I argue that since Putnam has dropped the notion of a God's-eye point of view, a way the world is apart from our descriptions of it in language, he had better give up on the idea of true sentences as representations of reality, and give up trying to charge the idea of "truth" with what he calls "normative" meaning. He had better looked elsewhere for regulation and criticism – away from traditional topics of philosophical reflection." (Rorty 1990: 633f)

In a discussion concepts like truth and reason are up for grabs like all other concepts. Rorty argues in other words that it's true that ethical wrongdoers can agree with him on an abstract level. But it's the same with Putnam's own view – ethical wrongdoers can agree with him about his normative notions of truth and reason. But disagree about the

conclusions which are to be drawn from this idea. Both philosophical theories are on par in this situation. In my opinion Rorty's idea of changing the whole metaphysical picture seems to be more promising here, because he pays attention to the fact that our concepts always are preliminary. Rorty is cautious to this fact, he is not trying to rescue some concepts from this tentativeness, and for me this is the central ethical impetus of his whole philosophy.

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# **Wittgenstein, Geertz and Challenges Facing the 2005 FARO Convention on “The Value of Cultural Heritage for Society”**

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## **Introduction**

Since 1945, the problems that have challenged reflective thinkers on a deep philosophical level, with the same urgency that cosmology and cosmopolis had in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, are matters of practice... none of them can be addressed without bringing to the surface questions about the value of human life, and our responsibility for protecting the world of nature, as well as that of humanity (Toulmin 1990: 186).

The 2005 FARO Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society (Council of Europe. 2005) is changing the way practitioners and others think about heritage. Signatories to the FARO Convention recognise the need to put people and human values at the centre of an enlarged and cross-disciplinary concept of cultural heritage; they recognise that... heritage should be inclusive not exclusive, and that the everyday and the ordinary has merit alongside the special and the iconic (Schofield 2012).

This paper explores the relevance for some of the most remarkable aspirations of the 2005 FARO Convention on “The Value of Cultural Heritage for Society” (henceforth FARO) of comparing Wittgenstein and Geertz’s conceptions of ‘culture’, in light of a project designed to widen public participation cultural heritage based solutions to the pressing social and ecological problems confronting the culturally diverse indigenous communities of the region in northwest India where the newly designated World Heritage Site of Champaner Pavagadh is located.

To this broad aim, it will: contextualise FARO and key themes of the 2012 IWS meeting (“Ethics, Society, Politics”); compare Wittgenstein and Geertz’s conception of culture; and examine the relevance of similarities and contrasts between their treatments of ‘culture’ for challenges facing FARO (and the humanities, more broadly) in light a project James Westcoat designed to widen public participation in developing new forms of conflict conciliation in contexts where cultural heritage and life quality issues are enmeshed.

## **FARO and themes of “Ethics, Society, Politics” in contexts**

Until quite recently, few would have expected the concerns of such institutions as the IWS to converge with such developments as the 2005 FARO Convention. Likewise few would have expected such convergence to bear directly on problems that polemic over the “two cultures” of the humanities pose for realising FARO’s aspirations.

The situation is not surprising. The most influential versions of the humanities’ ‘two cultures’ have been grounded in dichotomising science versus art, timeless universals versus culturally relativistic particulars, individual subjective experience and moral freedom versus causal necessity, and ‘pure’ versus ‘applied’ research. In such views,

‘pure’ research is seen as “surrounded by a kind of semi-permeable membrane” – as “a world unto itself, largely insulated from the society in which it was embedded” (Daston 2006: 529).

There are many examples of consequences. One is the storm of protest in response to Evans-Pritchard’s claim that difficulties of cross cultural translation’ of ‘primitive languages’ made anthropology ‘closer to certain kinds of history than to the natural sciences’ (Beidelman 1971). Another was the response to a 1989 social anthropology conference on questions about “how the past has led to the present” and “how history is used, experienced, remembered, or created” (Tonkin et al. 1989: 2) with polemic over the dichotomies of fact/fiction; history/myth; reality/symbol; individual/society that perpetuated notions that the humanities are forced to choose between modelling themselves on either science or art, which envisage “science as revealed truth and art as ‘mere’ individual statement” (Jones/Galison 1998: 21). More broadly: “Ever since Plato decreed that for the sake of social stability in the state, ‘we must begin [...] by censorship over our mythmakers’, and then invent another, new mythology, a ‘golden lie’ which would lead to right behaviour – the debate about the use and abuse of political myths” and diverse interpretations of history “has never been safely laid to rest” (Mali 1989: 41).

Today the situation is undergoing radical change. Three challenges that Michael Fisher identified as crucial for the future of anthropology and the humanities relate directly to FARO and the themes, “Politics, Society, Ethics”: (1) the ubiquity of concerns that the world is undergoing changes that are ‘going beyond’ disciplinary orientations and pedagogical ideals, that have hinged upon such dyads as those of art versus science, the individual versus society, ‘pure’ versus ‘applied research’; (2) awareness that “complex societies (especially our own) always involve dynamic relations between diverse past, present and future historical processes” (Fischer 2003: 40); (3) arguments that “in the years to come, some of the most crucial intellectual, moral and ideological battles about human rights issues are likely to turn on their cross-cultural intelligibility and justifiability, a radically new and far more dynamic approach to culture is needed” (Preis 1996: 268). All three raise ethical and moral issues. For Fischer, we need “translation and mediation tools” to make “differences of interests, access, power, needs, desires, and philosophical perspectives” visible (Fischer 2007: 1). These arguments have considerable precedents in discussions of the problem of ‘the privatisation of ethics’ (Arendt 1961; Rorty 1989; Habermas 2003; Koerner 2004).

## **Polemic over ‘relativism’ and Wittgenstein and Geertz’s conceptions of culture**

Twentieth century social and cultural anthropology has promised its still largely Western readership enlightenment on two fronts. The one has been the salvaging of distinct forms of life from a process of apparent global Westernisation.... The other promise of anthropology...

has been to serve as a form of cultural critique for ourselves. In using portraits of other cultural patterns to reflect self critically on our ways, anthropology disrupts common sense and makes us re-examine our taken for granted assumptions (Marcus and Fischer *Anthropology as Cultural Critique: An experimental moment in the human sciences* 1986: 1).

There are few more difficult challenges for FARO than disputes over 'relativism' based on: notions that see the humanities as forced to choose between envisaging "science as revealed truth" and "art as 'mere' individual statement" (Jones and Galison 1998: 21); and claims about languages and the societies which they sustain are closed or mutually untranslatable to each other (Apel 1973). In a review of approaches to culture and human rights since 1947, Karen Engel (2001) noted that one of the most troubling issues is the charge of cultural relativism, which is often said to lead to moral nihilism and the inability to defend the principles of the Enlightenment and of the UN Declaration of Human Rights and other ethics conventions from Nuremberg to Helsinki.

Due to strongly relativist interpretations of Geertz and Wittgenstein, little attention has been devoted to the light their conceptions of 'culture' can throw on such problems. While a detailed analysis lies far beyond this paper's scope, we can identify similarities and contrasts relating directly to these problems. At the heart of many similarities is the idea that methods and theories appropriate for the physical sciences are not so for understanding human cultural behaviour. This idea relates to Wittgenstein's emphasis on the "normative [social, ethical] character" of all forms of human expression and intentionality; "insistence on the normative character of language and intentionality"; and "pragmatist commitment" to understanding the efficacy of norms "in terms of practices" (Brandom 1994: 55).

In *The Interpretation of Cultures* (1973: 89), Geertz defined culture as "a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms" that enable human beings to "communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life" in ways that compare with Wittgenstein's concepts of 'language games', 'forms of life' and 'family resemblances'. Building upon Ryle's concept of 'thick description' (and Wittgenstein's 'language games'), Geertz developed a novel approach to the tasks of social anthropology outlined in the passage above by George Marcus and Michael Fisher.

On the other hand, there are deepest contrasts that relate to the challenges facing FARO outlined above, including extreme relativistic interpretations of Wittgenstein's notions of 'language games' as meaning that all languages and the societies which they sustain are closed or mutually untranslatable to each other (Apel 1973). Examples include contrasts in Wittgenstein and Geertz's perspectives on: (1) history's philosophical significance; (2) conflict; and (3) differences between science, the arts and the humanities. There are striking clashes between Wittgenstein's arguments for treating language and human activities as context dependent normative practices; and his highly ahistorical orientations (Toulmin 2001: 8). He seems also to have systematically avoided relating his work to contemporary social, political and moral problems (Hacking 2006). In addition, his later writings tend to polarise the arts and sciences: "It is all the same to me whether the typical western scientist understands or appreciates my work since in any case he does not understand the spirit in which I write [...]. I am aiming at something different than are the scientists and my thoughts move differently than do theirs" (Wittgenstein 1998: 9c).

By contrast, in Geertz, diversity of historical experience is crucial for appreciating: the philosophical significance of culture; the roles conflict plays in rendering cultures supposedly mutually untranslatable; the implications of 'thick description' of the experience near and the experience far for fresh approaches to overlaps and contrasts between the arts, sciences and humanities. Geertz's often cited essay "Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight" (1973) is a classic example of these orientations and the descriptive and ethical force of his idea that 'thick description' in art and ethnography depend on that "one of the most significant mysteries" of human life ways and cultures is that of "how other people's creations can be so utterly their own and so deeply part of us" (Geertz 1983: 45).

For Geertz, this idea was important for fresh approaches to the arts and the humanities, and how they contrast with science. While a key aim of physical sciences is to reduce variability to simple models and explanations, the arts and humanities have special advantages for taking contextual circumstances seriously by bringing their complexity often disturbingly to notice. Further, while physical sciences are especially useful for addressing 'can do' questions, the arts and the humanities can place complex situations in contexts that render them intelligible as bearing upon 'should do' issues.

### **The 'mystery' of "cross cultural translation" and fresh approaches to history and conflict conciliation**

Few projects are more useful for relating these comparisons to challenges facing FARO than the one Wescoat designed for widening participation in heritage based solutions to social and ecological problems facing indigenous communities of the region of northwest India where the World Heritage site of Champaner Pavagodh is located.

Amongst other things, the project bears directly upon challenges posed by such dichotomies as those of social versus ecological problems, pure versus applied research and heritage conservation versus conflict conciliation. All these dichotomies impede fresh solutions to problems as stake with Champaner Pavagodh. For example, in 2002, the state of Gujarat where the site is located was shaken by violent cultural conflict. Thousands of people were killed, wounded, and rendered homeless, and hundreds of mosques, shrines, tombs, and heritage sites were destroyed (Sreenivas 2004): "Violent cultural conflict, even a hint of it, can bring a halt to cultural heritage projects. At the same time we know that some cultural heritage conservation actions purposely or unwittingly aggravate cultural conflict while others ameliorate it" (Wescoat 2008: 61)

In order to address these challenges, the project was designed with aims that compare closely with the features of Geertz's work outlined above, including to: (1) harmonize such contemporary cultural interests as tourism and pilgrimage; (2) use the region's diverse cultural histories to address its complex social and ecological problems; (3) generate new linkages between cultural landscape conservation and appreciation of the region's pluralistic histories (Wescoat 2008: 53, 65).

These aims face challenges posed by numerous connections between conflict and heritage conservation. Importantly, the project's emphases on contextualising the roles of conflict in dividing the experience near from the experience enables it to foreground *the most* rather than *the least* tractable problems. Put in more general terms,

there are direct connections between contextualising problems and tractability.

### Some concluding observations

Both Wescoat and Geertz take the importance of history and conflict to the emergence of situations where social barriers render cultures and languages supposedly mutually untranslatable extremely seriously in ways that engage problems claims about languages and societies being closed or mutually untranslatable to each other (Apel 1973). 'Thick description' – and the aims of the Champaner Pavagodh project – appreciate the roles conflict play in dividing historical experiences, as well as the importance of the 'mysteries' of cross cultural translation for rendering these roles intelligible in ways that relate directly to "questions about the value of human life, and our responsibility for protecting the world of nature, as well as that of humanity" (Toulmin 1990).

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# Proof beyond a Context-relevant Doubt. Old Wine in a new Bottle? Examining what Shifts when Changing the Standard of Proof

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## PART I

### The grammar of criminal law

For every criminal policy, liberal or conservative, there are only two ingredients in the mixture: liberty and security. Because the L-coordinate (liberty) and the S-coordinate (security) are dependent on each other –since imposing security measures leads to limitations of liberty and vice versa– we can conceive criminal law as a non-Cartesian Coordinate System. Both variables constitute the grammar rules of criminal law which express the norms of meaningful language. Every criminal law system must depict its *point* [S, L] in this area of tension so that we can avoid indexical terms like “here” and “now”. Otherwise, we couldn’t even be able to understand, for example, why someone favors torture or is opposed to legalizing drugs: “If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.” (Pl at 225).

### The tasks of criminal law



These two variables of liberty and security correspond to the double task of criminal law: a) to respond to crime and convict the guilty and b) to protect the innocent from wrongful conviction. Understandably: The fundamental aim of legal adjudication is to render substantive justice by delivering true verdicts. However, as soon as we scratch the surface a complex picture is revealed. On the one hand in demanding both, public confidence is a stern taskmaster with contradictory expectations of the administration of justice (Roberts/Zuckerman 2004). On the other hand these tasks take a metaphysical view. Goldman (1999) points out that it is important to distinguish between metaphysically easy and epistemologically easy cases. The task: “convict the guilty and protect the innocent” is perfectly intelligible. Nevertheless, how can the fact-finder distinguish who did what? (Ho 2008). The jury assumes the situation of the Ignoramus (Ernst 2012).

It is clear that no one would be so naive as to “acquit the guilty” and “convict the innocent”. “The fact-finder cannot acquire unassailably accurate knowledge of what happened” (In re Winship, hereinafter: IrW). In other words the factual determination will be made to a degree of probability. For that reason it is meaningful to speak only of the risk of convicting the law-abiding-citizen (Type I Error) and acquitting the perpetrator (Type II Error). We can model this decision-theoretically as following:

[Ω]	Situation of the Knowner (Set of Facts)	
	Perpetrator ↓	Law-abiding Citizen ↓
Situation of the Ignoramus (Verdict)	Guilty →	Correct Decision Type Error I
	Not Guilty →	Type Error II Correct Decision

### The trade-off

The decision whether we should minimize one or another error is a political one, since that answer depends on the magnitude of harm that each type error brings with – decision theory/epistemology have nothing relevant to say. Generally speaking, an authoritarian regime will try to minimize Type II Errors, whereas a liberal state will do quite the opposite (Roberts/Zuckerman 2004). How is a Criminal Policy supposed to implement this complex decision? For that purpose we need techniques of risk allocation. The main device in this direction is the standard of proof (hereinafter, “SoP”). The United States Supreme Court has famously declared that SoP is conceived as a means of attaining desired ends: “The standard of proof influences the relative frequency of these two types of erroneous outcomes” (IrW). Since both kinds of error will despite our best efforts occur, SoP depicts the cut-off point for determining that risk allocation. The following graphs show the effect of changing the SoP:



Every government aims for the optimal trade-off between liberty and safety and must establish a proper balance for Type I and Type II erroneous outcomes. The graphs satisfy our basic intuition that these two risks are inversely

proportionate: raising the SoP (shifting to the right) increases the risk of acquitting perpetrators whereas lowering it increases the risk of convicting law-abiding citizens.

In particular the proof beyond a reasonable-doubt standard is considered to be the main instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error: "If for example, the standard of proof for a criminal trial were a preponderance of the evidence, rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, there would be a smaller risk of factual errors that result in freeing guilty persons, but a far greater risk of factual errors that result in convicting the innocent" (IrW). It means that for any liberal state the SoP will be steeply asymmetrical, since it reflects the political view that the relative disutility of error tilts strongly against wrongful convictions in criminal trials (Roberts/Zuckerman 2004).

## PART II

### What shifts?


So far so good. We implement political decisions about the positioning of a Criminal-Law-System by using the SoP in order to allocate accordingly the risk of verdicts based on factual errors between the parties. The next question is: how do we move from one SoP to another? What shifts along the horizontal axis when we choose a different cut-off point? Which epistemic gear do the wheels of SoP turn? (cf. Schaffer 2005).

### The grade of probability

According to the usual interpretation the SoP in civil and criminal adjudication is distinguished by the degree to which the fact-finder must be satisfied that the necessary facts have been established. The two basic standards are:


- a) Preponderance of evidence in civil trials
- b) Proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal trials

The level of degree of belief is represented by real numbers between 0 and 1(00%) (Laudan 2006). According to this view the SoP in civil trials only poses the question as to whether the existence of a fact is more probable than its non-existence. It means that in the civil law that threshold is set at 50+% because the risk allocation between errors that favor the plaintiff and those that favor the defendant is symmetrical:



In contrast the SoP in criminal adjudication is steeply asymmetrical because in liberal states the disutility of convicting a law-abiding citizen is viewed as being much greater than the disutility of acquitting a perpetrator. In

other words, any probability exceeding 95% will satisfy the criminal standard. If we want to reduce or raise the risk of a factual error we can slide the SoP along the 0-100 to the right or left accordingly:



### Objections

The Standard Model suggests that in order to make a knowledge-claim in adjudication fact-finders use degrees of probability (measured on the interval [0, 1]) and that the SoP is a threshold that we select for "proven" on this interval: over 0,5 for civil and 0,95 for criminal cases. I will show that this understanding meets three insurmountable problems.

### Aleatory-probability?

The first objection concerns the very idea of probability to which the Standard Model refers to. Indeed when people make probabilistic judgments, they think naturally of numbers between zero and one. This is not true in every case, since we are talking about the dual nature of uncertainty which is approached by the following definitions: a) aleatory uncertainty which results from the fact that a system can behave in random ways and b) epistemic uncertainty which results from the lack of information (Kramosil 2001). Aleatory probabilities receive values from 0 to 1(00%) but involve processes that are necessarily repetitive and replicable. Much recent criticism concerns the fact that aleatory probabilities are not capable of capturing epistemic uncertainty, because the idea of a frequency being attached for a single event is bizarre. In contrast, legal systems decide matters of past facts which are unique and we cannot play the world over and over again to calculate their aleatory probability (Kadane/Schum 1996). Epistemic probabilities indicate the intensity of an agent's belief by using odds-likelihood ratios that concern the probative force of evidence  $e$  on hypotheses  $H$  and  $\neg H$ . An attempt to grade the probative force of evidence by real numbers between 0 and 1 neglects our inability to make precise numerical judgments. Most people can only make ordinal judgments or nonnumerical "fuzzy" judgments (Kadane/Schum 1996). We conclude that although all statistical reasoning is probabilistic not all probabilistic reasoning is statistical (Schum 1994). It is a category mistake applying aleatory probabilities to single events.

## Disutilities

The second problem concerns the risk allocations on the basis of disutilities. When we once again consider *In re Winship*, we find that the choice of the SoP to be applied in a particular kind of litigation rationally should reflect an assessment of the comparative social disutility of each error type. For that reason we need to determine what is at stake, in order to predict the potential magnitude of harm that might result. We also saw that the allocation in civil litigation is symmetrical between plaintiff and defendant. However, those two propositions do not fit together! If social disutility is decisive then we cannot have a categorical distinction between the criminal and civil SoP. (Ho 2008). Truth be told, a criminal conviction has always had an important censuring function (which a finding of civil liability lacks) and sometimes graver consequences. (Redmayne 1997). Nevertheless, "sometimes" does not mean "always". A conviction in a criminal court leads to imprisonment only in a small number of cases. Furthermore, the most usual punishment is a relatively low fine. On the other hand, it is difficult to deny that being liable for the tort of battery is not far more serious than being found guilty for a minor offence. Civil cases often involve issues which are crucial to individuals such as custody cases in family law. Consequently, in order to justify a categorical distinction between two SoPs, one would need to demonstrate that every criminal case is more serious than any civil case (Ho 2008). I have serious doubts about that.

## Acceptability


The third problem concerns the acceptability of verdicts as a primary goal of a legal system. Setting the threshold at 50%+ raises serious doubts about the truth-value of the knowledge-claim of the fact-finder. Verdicts in civil litigation do not seem to differ from games of chance, and we should keep in mind that doubts concerning the factual accuracy of a verdict immediately translates into doubt about the justice of adjudication system (Roberts/Zuckerman 2004). If it is true that society attempts, to project a behavioral message that will influence individuals' conduct through the judgments of its courts, the 50%+ SoP does not face the task of forging a link between a finding of liability and this message (Nesson 1985).

## PART III

### Epistemological contextualism

Contextualist strategies against skepticism are the new vogue in epistemology. Here we may focus on a common element of two leading theories. Both semantic (SC) and inferential Contextualists (IC) agree that standards for attributing knowledge are subject to contextual variability. The way SC sees it, context shifts in accordance with rules governing conversational presuppositions; this has to do with the indexical character of "know", whose truth conditions vary from one context to another. In contrast, IC concerns the structure of justification and suggests that it is not fixed, but instead subject to circumstantial variation. The very same belief can change from default to non-default justificational status so that we can speak of a remote foundationalist structure (Williams 2001). Although I favor IC we can postpone the fight.

Both theories agree that the mechanism for raising and lowering standards consists in the expansion and contraction of the range of error-possibilities (defeaters) in play. The theories can be used to alter the dialectical context and generate doubts that must then either be excluded by the evidence of an agent in one context, or be properly ignored in a different one (Williams 2001). Furthermore, both theories acknowledge the utilities for a given knowledge-attribution: what is at stake. Lewis (1996) explicitly uses an example from criminal adjudication and suggests that when an error would be especially disastrous, fewer possibilities may be properly ignored. The set of context-relevant defeaters is more extended in a criminal-court-context than in a daily one. Like Lewis, Williams does not neglect the economic parameter as a contextual factor: "If the costs of error are high, more demanding standards may be in order" (Williams 2001). By applying the basic idea of contextualist strategies to legal adjudication we conclude that what shifts with SoP is the Set of Epistemic Defeaters (SED) in play. The epistemic gear that the wheels of context turn is not the degree of probability but the SED (Schaffer 2005).



## What do we gain?

Contextualist theories manage to explain satisfactorily, how we can move to less demanding SoPs without suffering a loss of acceptance for the verdicts. We do not demand that our evidence has a smaller probative force, but rather that it eliminates a different Set of Context-relevant Doubts: In any given context probative force must be sufficiently high. Until now, it seemed impossible to understand –let alone define– the standard of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt". This was not because of its fuzzy nature, namely because a precise numerical probability cannot be found. The problem had to do with the very notion of the term "reasonable" which is context-dependent. Circumstantial variation, default-entitlement and open-endedness of our inquiries have been prominently stretched by Wittgenstein:

"This doubt isn't one of the doubts in our game." OC 317  
 "This is to say: only in such-and-such circumstances does a reasonable person doubt that." OC 334

"But what men consider reasonable or unreasonable alters." OC 336

Wittgenstein warns us from searching for objective criteria. The concept of knowing which is "coupled with that of the language-game" is not based on grounds. "It is there like our life"! (OC 559, 560)

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# Religious Man Ludwig Wittgenstein

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Ludwig Wittgenstein is one of the prominent philosophers of the XXth century and he is one of the most many-sided and contradictory personalities of modern philosophy. One of the philosophical approaches influenced by Wittgenstein was founded in the University of Swansea (Wales) and was named by the critics "Wittgensteinian fideism" had engaged with the sphere of Philosophy of Religion. Despite the high interest in religion among several students, Wittgenstein's attitude to religion seemed to be unclear. "I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every problem from religious point of view", he said to the former student and close friend Maurice Drury in the completion period of Philosophical Investigations. These words became one of reasons of great attention to the questions of Wittgenstein religiosity among his former students.

What do we find surprising in these words? We don't think about Wittgenstein as a religious thinker, as a philosopher who stands on religious point of view. Even vice versa, the philosophical enlightenment of Wittgenstein's early period which was shown in *Tractatus* was perceived in the positivist key and influenced the forming of Vienna Circle. But it touches only the first part of statement which was examined by Norman Malcolm in his book "Wittgenstein: A religious point of view?" And the exact problem – whether it was possible to name his position "the religious point of view" – caused a discussion, in which the major followers and researchers of Wittgenstein's philosophical legacy took part at: Peter Winch, Tim Labron, Stephen Mulhall, Walford Gealey. Nevertheless, the first part of the statement is also important. Malcolm devoted the first chapter of the book few articles to the question of Wittgenstein's religiosity and. The researcher Walford Gealey thought that Wittgenstein certainly wasn't religious (Gealey 2001: 140). Malcolm comes to the conclusion that Wittgenstein was religious. There was a question of Wittgenstein's religiosity even for his friends like Paul Engelmann (Engelmann 1999: 11-19). The study of the first part of the statement – the assertion "I am not a religious man" – is interesting both as itself, according to controversial judgments made by researchers and with relation to the second part about religious point of view. This statement becomes a problem only if the first and second parts are true. It's not only surprising for us because we do not consider Wittgenstein as a philosopher who stands on religious point of view, but also because it contains contradiction. How a non-religious person can look from the religious point of view? Only if he intentionally tries to stand on this point. Being not religious, he tries to look from another position, to put himself on another place, the place of religiosity. It does not seem that Wittgenstein tries to put himself into another's position, and being not religious, intentionally tries to consider questions from the religious point of view. He said "I cannot help seeing", it means that his position which he considers as "religious point of view" is natural for him. It wasn't his decision to stand on this point and he can't cease it. So, if the first part of the statement is true and the second is true then accepting that he is not religious and he has a religious point of view leads us to obvious contradiction. Whether the first assertion is true, whether Wittgenstein was religious or not, I will try to make clear in this article.

The position of Gealey is nearly acceptable if we consider, that religiousness is something determined by one's belonging to a certain confession. In spite of the Jewish roots, Wittgenstein's family was Christian. His father, Karl Wittgenstein, was a protestant, his mother – a catholic. Under the mother's influence a baby Ludwig was baptized in Catholicism (Nedo 1999: 32) but turned aside. If we think that to be religious for someone means to practice certain formal religion, to have a confession then Wittgenstein was certainly irreligious. How does Malcolm, a man who knew Wittgenstein personally, ground his position that Wittgenstein was religious? He offers a selection of biographic material which can be divided into three groups.

## 1. Religious experience

First of all, this is Wittgenstein's feeling related to religion, which he names "feeling of safety", "I am safe, nothing can injure me whatever happens" (Malcolm 2002: 7). These words remind for Malcolm the Psalm 23. The second is the feeling of surprise from the fact that the world exists, which can be found in *Lecture on Ethics*: "I wonder at the existence of the world." He thought that this experience lay behind the idea that God created the world; that it was the experience of 'seeing the world as a miracle' (ibid: 7-8).

## 2. Acts which can be motivated by his religiousness

Wittgenstein's disclaimer of a huge inheritance after father's death. To show religiousness of his actions, Malcolm quotes the Gospels again. It looks like his strategy: all that Ludwig talked or did which can be correlated with the theme of religion, Malcolm compares with the Gospels. And in this case he found resemblance in Wittgenstein's deeds and Matthew 19:23-4 and Luke 14:13. Nevertheless, returning to the Wittgenstein's actions, Malcolm doesn't think that religiousness was single motive for rejecting inheritance. Motives for this action were complex (Malcolm 1999: 193).

## 3. Reflection about religion and religious life

This is where Wittgenstein shows his preference to the personal virtues, life, full of doing good deeds, but not to the talking about religion. Also Wittgenstein noticed that "People are religious to the extent that they believe themselves to be not so much imperfect, as ill [...] Any half-way decent man will think himself extremely imperfect, but a religious man believes himself wretched" (Malcolm 2002: 17).

If Wittgenstein understood religiousness as the awareness of imperfection, then in this sense it follows that he was religious. He personally was worried with his own imperfection. "What is it? You want to be perfect? And he pulled himself proudly, saying: 'Of course I want to be perfect'" (Pascal 1999: 240). Malcolm remembers that Wittgenstein was awfully critical. He was critical to himself either to the person, or to the philosopher. He never regarded any of his works as good ones. His aspiration to perfection was endless. It seems that basing on this criterion, which was very important for Wittgenstein in understanding religiousness, he was religious. But he names himself irreligious. If to be religious means to see failings, be dissatisfied with yourself, – what was present in his life,

– Malcolm thinks his words “I’m not a religious man” could be considered as the expression of his dissatisfaction and criticism.

Malcolm also noticed that and wrote that even the majority of the Holy Men did not consider themselves to be Saints and Malcolm asserted: “I am inclined to think that he was more deeply religious than are many people who correctly regard themselves as religious believers” (Malcolm 2002: 22).

Good analytic tradition has been started by G.E. Moore: we must be attentive to the way, how we ask a question. It seems to me that our way to ask about Wittgenstein’s religiosity is not quite correct. Setting a question just like this leads us to the remark of Malcolm that “determines his religiosity is not within our competence” (Malcolm 1999: 205).

The point is that in this way of questioning about “religiousness” is perceived as something special, exceptionally intimate, about what it is possible to talk only approximately. Indeed, it seems that religiousness is something so hidden, that all external information can not give us a complete image. None of the proposed arguments can give as a strong ground for the answer. We can search for something more again and again because religiousness seems to be elusive. In fact, his experience, for example, the experience of safety does not simply lead to the conclusion, that he was religious. The experience of safety an irreligious man also may have. The similarity between his thoughts about religion and the Gospels also is not indisputable proof.

It seems to me that the word “religiousness” charms us; we give some special meaning to it. I prefer to change the statement of a question and propose another: “Can we consider Ludwig Wittgenstein to be a religious man?” During such changing the clearest argument will be an answer to the question whether Wittgenstein behaved in the way as religious people usually behave. The foregoing reminds me an approach of Gilbert Ryle. And he, in spite of the unpopularity in our time, in this case renders a good favor. Gilbert Ryle in the “Concept of mind” similarly coped well with the problem of rationality, which in a Cartesian paradigm was something enigmatically hidden in us. He writes that rationality is not some essentially hidden in us, but rather a way of behavior. That is, to be rational means to behave rationally. Accordingly, to be religious equals to behave like religious people do. This modification makes our task clearer. We do not set questions about something deep and intimate; do not feel the incompetence in the searching of truth about religiousness. Religiosity as something personal I would prefer to leave alone with every person.

In searching for the answer to the question, we set our attention to behavior, but not because we can see a religious motivation behind it. When we speak about motives, we look for something hidden again, something which stands beyond the behavior. And here we are essentialists too. I propose to judge certain actions without relation to the motivation, but rather with attention to how these actions were done. We are looking for the behavior which is usual for religious people.

## 1. Confessions

During his life Wittgenstein made confessions. Standing on the fact that he did not belong to any church, he did it in the original way. He confessed to his friends in oral or written form. Everything what he wanted to confess, he wrote on a paper and asked someone to read it in his presence. Sometimes he accomplished the same confession with different people.

In 1931 he confessed to Maurice Drury in a written form and also to Herr Direktor Koder together with several Wittgenstein’s family members. Also he came to Moore and Francis Skinner, in 1937 to Paul Engelmann and to Fanya Pascal the same year (Pascal 1999: 238). Confessions were very important for Wittgenstein.

## 2. Desire to retire to a monastery

Von Wright mentioned that the desire to retire to a monastery was important for Wittgenstein during his whole life. In 1926 he went to a monastery as helper, but didn’t stay there long, because he was dissatisfied with “inner conditions of monastic life” (von Wright 1999: 69).

## 3. Prayers and appeals to God

Private Diaries 1914-1916 are filled with numerous records of the extraordinarily personal content which also includes religious writings. In his hour of need Wittgenstein appealed to God for the support, though during his life he was tormented by the ideas about own imperfection which he tried to overcome with the help of confessions. Desire to abandon the world and retire in a monastery was important too but wasn’t completely realized. His seclusion in Norway could be understood as the expression of this desire.

It seems that his behavior reminds us the behavior of religious people. Despite the fact that he didn’t belong to any formal religion, his actions and desires claimed importance which religion played in his life. Another Cambridge philosopher, teacher and friend of Wittgenstein — Bertrand Russell shows an example of a behavior of a non-religious man. We find in him nothing that resembles Wittgenstein’s confessions and monastery intentions. And this evidence leads for a positive answer on our non essentialist question.

So, how can we understand his words “I am a not religious man”? I think that it can be understood in two senses, as a claim of Wittgenstein’s relations with formal religion and as a claim of dissatisfaction with himself. But if we accept the first variant, it turns out that the whole statement is contradictory, if only he uses the word religious in a combination of words “religious point of view” in another sense. Obviously that if *religious* is understood in a formal way, it follows that religious point of view includes belonging to the doctrine of certain religion, whereas to have a point of view, means to look from the position of a concrete religion. But Wittgenstein did not belong to any of them, so he couldn’t look from the religious point of view if we understand it in such way. As an expression of imperfection looks more coherent, but being familiar with Wittgenstein’s self-criticism I propose not to accept it seriously. In fact if we agree with his imperfection we have to accept not only a fact that he was irreligious but also that he was a mediocre philosopher. Based on the reinterpreted question, after denying the essentialist form of it, I propose to ask whether we can consider him religious. Based on his behavior I think we can. That’s why I consider that Wittgenstein’s statement “I am a not religious man” is false.

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# “Rendezvous with Fear”

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## 1. Introduction

In what follows, a contribution to the philosophy of emotions will be made on the basis of a mixture or aspect change between emotions of hope and fear. This contribution includes comments on some of Wittgenstein's notes on fear and hope, with an illustration from cinematography. The basic question, for which Wittgenstein seems to suggest an affirmative answer, is the following.

(1) Is it possible that hope and fear (anxiety, and dread as well) are two aspects of one more primordial emotion manifested when something unknown is getting closer to us?

## 2. Wittgenstein: hope/fear aspect change

Just one expression, namely “getting closer” or “approaching”, is the 122<sup>nd</sup> fragment among fragments of Heraclitus of Ephesus. The fragment is authentic, but even the Heraclitus scholars aren't sure what it means (Marcovich 2001: 566). Furthermore, many scholars conclude that there is “no hint of a sentential context and hence no way to construe it as a meaningful fragment.” (Kahn 2001: 288) In short, we don't know what it means. Here a possible interpretation will be supplied, namely, *something getting closer* is what gets one closer to a mixture of hope and fear since one naturally wonders about it – about an unknown that is *getting closer*.

Wittgenstein seems to be interested in emotions, especially in hope and fear. Let us list some of his observations.

“The language-game *I am afraid* already contains the object. *Anxiety* is what undirected fear might be called, in so far as its manifestations are related to those of fear.” (RPP II: 14) “It might be an incorrect use of language to say “I see fear in this face”. We would be taught: a fearful face can be ‘seen’; but the fear in a face, or the similarity or dissimilarity between two faces, is ‘noticed’.” (RPP II: 552) “Fear behavior on fearful occasions (etc.) is a phenomenon of our life. But fear?” (RPP II: 17) “What is fear? What does ‘being afraid’ mean? If I wanted to define it at a single shewing – I should play-act fear.” (PPF: 77) “We should distinguish between the object of fear and the cause of fear.” (PI: 476) “I feel a fear, but I don't know what I'm afraid of”, or again: “I feel fear, but I'm not afraid of anything in particular.” (BB: 22) “*Anxiety* is what undirected fear might be called, in so far as its manifestations resemble or are the same as those of fear.” (Z: 489, for some comments see Gustafsson, Kronqvist, McEachrane 2009, for some general relations between Wittgenstein and psychoanalysis see Heaton 2010; for fear, reasons and causes see Bouresse 1995: 69-83)

In short, emotions are manifested in our language-games, and in our forms of life (RPP II: 14, 552), and there is a kind of “noticing of an aspect-change”. One can say that a dread without a terrifying object is anxiety, while if an object is present, than it is fear (BB: 22, Z: 489). These Wittgenstein's passages can make clearer the following one,


which is of importance at the moment for it combines hope and fear (especially as aspects in RPP II: 552), no matter if the remark is private.

“Description of my state of mind: the alternation of fear and hope, e.g. in the morning I was full of hope, and then....” [...] “Anxiety borrows the pictures of fear. I have the feeling of impending doom.” (Wittgenstein, RPP I: 595, 724, concerning differences between anxiety, fear and dread see Read 2009).

Wittgenstein seems to suggest that hope and fear as reactions to the unknown are mixed in a dual-aspectual way. Yet, there are differences. For instance, anxiety, as “prestimulus” emotion, contrary to fear which is a “poststimulus” emotion (Öhman 2000: 574 concerning RPP II: 14) is closer to wonder and curiosity over something unknown, and as such it can “borrow” pictures of fear. Anxiety can follow a simple perception of threat, while fear needs a real object since it is an emotion of avoidance and escape. Dread can be prestimulus and poststimulus.

Surely it is possible that one is curious without fear, and that one is frightened without any curiosity, but is it also possible that one has mixed emotions and appropriate actions following these mixed emotions. If this is possible, then surely one can be at first more curious and snooping, then upset and frightened, and later on more frightened than curious (as shown in Figure 1, concerning the possibility of an aspect-change see Brock 2005, and in psychology see Prinz 2004).

(2) Therefore, the question is – in which way are hope and fear mixed on the background of wonder over something unknown approaching, or – what connects getting closer/approaching, hope, and fear? Perhaps nothing philosophically relevant, yet it seems that a contribution to the philosophy of emotions can be made.



**Figure 1:** Possible aspects and developments of anxiety and expectation

Question (2) will be answered in what follows. Namely, what connects these three concepts is a pattern of a mixture of hope and fear turning one into another. What one can “interpret” here is the pattern of basic human emotions. The philosophical issue here is one of human emotional and practical response to the unknown (pattern).


(3) The basic context is that of something unknown *approaching*. First reaction to it, in most cases, is wonder, *hope* and surprise, almost as a kind of primordial optimism. The second reaction that follows, in most cases, is a gut feeling of something horrifying approaching, anxiety, dread, *fear*, and panic, almost as a kind of pri-

mordial pessimism. This pattern of basic emotions can be traced in early child development, namely fear emerges from distress at 6 month of age (McNally 2000: 341-4; for anxiety and fear in children see Muris 2007: 1-31).

In what follows we do not want to "over-interpret" the film by using just two of Wittgenstein's remarks on hope, anxiety, and fear, but rather, to connect the film as an illustration of what was Wittgenstein writing about.

### 3. "Alien": a primordial mixture of hope and fear

Without entering into issues of the philosophy of film and music, one can say that art is essentially media that can manifest, initiate, and even produce emotions. Ridley Scott's horror/Sci-Fi film "Alien" (20<sup>th</sup> Century Fox 1979, for a mixture of horror and sci-fi genres see McIntee 2005: 10-44) is the right media for presenting emotions of surprise, wonder, hope, anxiety, and fear since "describing accurately the experiential side of emotion is a privilege of poets" (Öhman 2000: 573-94; Solomon 2000: 3-16). However, this reaction of curiosity and wonder splits into hope and fear, i.e. a hope about something possibly interesting, and fear of something possibly dangerous, probably terrifying (Figure 1). Emotions as the oldest mental states during mind development, and wonder, hope, and fear as primordial emotions deserve special treatment, which they got in "Alien". It seems that "Alien" expresses the hope-fear terms of aspect-change (as shown in Figure 2).




**Figure 2:** The basic plot of "Alien" as a two-aspectual movie

Figure 2 shows the basic plot and dynamics of "Alien" which consists of being a canonical(aspectual) mixture of sci-fi and horror genres. Both aspects are present during the whole film. However, a sci-fi aspect is dominant in the first part, while a horror aspect is dominant in the second. The parts aren't strictly separated since there is the crucial stage of an aspect change. Namely, the transformation section marks the change of genres as a change of aspects of mixed emotions. To be precise, eggs are found, the facehugger attacks, an alien cub is born, the crew is *reduced*, and the character Ripley becomes stronger and more aware of what is really going on and decides to do something about it. Now, there are important double-aspects here.

(4) Ripley has two aspects. She changes from disciplined astronaut confronted with the alien to a powerful woman fighting the monster. The alien has two aspects as well: an aspect of an alien specimen, a sci-fi aspect at the beginning of the film, and an aspect of a horrifying evil, a horror aspect at the end it. The point is that

the creature itself unifies these two genres by its dual aspectual function.

Sci-fi movies are about searching for and exploring new worlds, planets, and species. It's about something interesting, surprising, bright, optimistic, and joyful in human nature, about human imagination, curiosity, and creativity. Horror movies are about expectation of something horrifying and about panic when encountering it. They are about something dark, and pessimistic in our nature, about human distrust, fear, panic, anger and escaping the inevitable. As a work of art, "Alien" expresses and raises the aspectual blend of hope and fear (Figure 3).




**Figure 3:** "Alien" as a two-aspectual movie

It seems that the slow transformation from hope to fear on the background of curiosity via contact with the unknown (facehugger scenes in the spaceship) manifested by worry, anxiety and fear (when Ash character turns from a sci-fi to a horror character), and various almost all basic reactions to it, present a unique *perspicuous presentation* of similarities and dissimilarities between these two emotions in film.

(5) In that manner "Alien" indeed describes something humanly primordial, namely the hope/fear blend during the contact with unknown. Therefore, the whole movie describes not just a possible relation of hope and fear, but serves as a metaphor of human primordial contact with the world in which there is certain struggle between interest and distress, surprise and disgust, hope and fear/anger (Figure 4).

This struggle in the film goes on with a certain pace, becoming faster and faster in rhythm and tempo. (Kaveney 2005: 131-149; McIntee 2005: 20)



**Figure 4:** mixture of basic SF/horror emotions in "Alien"

This blend and aspect change of basic emotions of hope and fear expressed and *initiated in viewers* by Ridley Scott as the director of the film goes on in the following way. The alien, by being a biomechanical and efficient creature that wants to survive, represents the unknown, and indeed the world, which in some situations, like the one in the film, is better to fear than to be curious about. Characters and viewers are confronted with their basic reactions to the world, to the unknown, and with the choice between hope and fear. One can be deeply disturbed by the movie,

namely the emotionally primordial and narrative mythical nature of the plot.

(6) On one hand, humans in "Alien" are *ironical heroes* because: the film perhaps helps us to understand, not just what is an emotion, which are the oldest and primordial emotions, or what is the natural mixture of hope and fear as the primordial human mixture of emotions on the background of wonder, but to understand the force and power of emotions over us as well. It shows us that the natural mixture of hope and fear is something which we (characters and viewers) naturally "have", which we cultivate, and which we create and sometimes even have complete control over. The film helps us to know ourselves, to confront and to cope with our deepest fears and hopes, strengths and weaknesses.

(7) On the other hand, the monster in "Alien" is a *tragic hero* because by being an alien "it" stands for pure human anger in front of something unknown which is not surpassed by fear and with unknown interest which is not encouraged by curiosity. Perhaps alien is showing us humans what we can turn into if in a contact with the unknown we are guided only by anger or certain naïveté, without an appropriate mixture of hope and fear, what we can turn into if our only goal would be a sheer survival. "Alien", as a movie about psychological history, archaeology, and prehistory of a human species is maybe pulling out and mirroring a part of our nature, indeed the oldest and the most primordial one, commonly buried in oblivion of our childhood and in the prehistory of the species, the part with which we are not so proud of, yet the part which was necessary to have and to overcome in the course of our development.

"Alien" describes this choice between wonder and fear as fictive since we humans wonder and fear in the same time from our early childhood to our death; this process builds our basic character traits, since we are "meant" to grow and learn, to escape dangerous situations if possible, and if not, to confront them, destroy their objects, and survive whether they are horrifying or not. (Izard 1992: 561-5; Izard/Ackermann 2000: 353-64)

#### 4. Concluding remark

Based on example of "Alien" it is possible to say that a blend or an aspect change of hope/fear on the background of wonder over something unknown approaching is surely possible, and that if the aspect change is the right interpretation, than there can be some kind of more primordial "amorphous" emotion capable of having these aspects.

(8) Consequently, as far as "Alien" is good indication of mixture and aspect change of hope/fear, it seems that Wittgenstein is right. On the background of curiosity and wonder (that something unknown is getting closer) there is an alternation, a mixture, or an aspect change of hope/fear that is brilliantly artistically presented because raises some primordial reactions in us and makes us wonder about them.

Acknowledgment: We like to thank Professor Anja Weiberg for her objections, and criticism, and Professor Janice McCormick for proofreading the text.

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# The Role and Status of Institutions

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People share common social space by constituting it while being practically involved in it. Such participation can not be avoided, it is foundational to our way of being, of living our lives. That is why attempts to explicate crucial features of mentioned participation could be helpful to increase its fruitfulness and effectiveness. We will try to realize such task by treating the role and status of institutions. The notion of institution is widely used, but its meaning remains to be quite vague and gets different interpretations. We will appeal to its understanding by L. Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein 1978a, 1978b, 1969); in view of the Wittgensteinian understanding by T.R. Schatzki (Schatzki 1996), D. Bloor (Bloor 1996); in comparative perspective to the approach of J. R. Searle (Searle 2010, 1995). The general stream of our investigation is the approach called 'Ethics without principles' (Dancy 2004; Stroll 1996; Laktionova 2011a), which is becoming more and more questioned during the late decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of 21<sup>st</sup> centuries. The general background of our investigation is Practical Philosophy, as philosophy of action, agency in its contemporary revived status (Toulmin 1996; Laktionova 2011b). The ideas of two last sentences are not the proper topic of the paper, so we leave them just stated without special explanations.

Lets express some previous ideas about the role and status of institutions. Our participation in social space could be seen via institutions. Institutions constitute social space, our common world shared with other participants. Social space and common world are represented by an ordered collection, a 'mosaic' of institutions. Institutions provide samples of activities for particular situations; institutions are practically accomplished samples of appropriate agency, customs; the latter are not just repeated from case to case, but are similar, analogical, over separate cases. Conceptualizing the role and status of institutions involves considerations about their representation by means of linguistic units, that seem to be crucial for understanding of their functioning (in a broadly general way of understanding of functions). Institutions organize the social context for our actions.

The term 'institution' can be met in some paragraphs of the *Philosophical Investigations* of L. Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein 1978a, par. 199; 337): "To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions)"; "An intention is embedded in its situation, in human customs and institutions". There is no definition of 'institution' in the works of Wittgenstein. This fact is not a defect of his approach, but it corresponds to his understanding of philosophy as a therapy (Wittgenstein 1978a, par. 133), that does not need to consist of formal definitions; it should rather clarify, demonstrate its topics performatively (in use, in accomplishment). So, in accordance with the latter, our philosophical investigation about 'institutions' strives to maintain their performative nature. Performativeness is accomplished as self-reference, self-validation, self-demonstration, self-realization of the matter to which it is prescribed as its feature. Institutions are created by references to them whether implicit or explicit. Self-reference could be understood as not vicious circularity, but rather hermeneutic circularity according to which

understanding of a matter is the internal process of its functioning; understanding can be reached from inside the practicing of what we try to understand.

D. Bloor expresses ideas about the performative model as an account of institutions (Bloor 1996); in doing so he refers to works of G.E.M. Anscombe (Anscombe 1976, 1978), K. Bach (Bach 1975), J.R. Searle (Searle 1995) and others.

It is possible to give an example about 'money'. Wittgenstein appeals to situations related to money quite often (for instance Wittgenstein 1978a, par. 584), along with other figures we want to involve into our considerations. Bloor (Bloor 1996: 64) says: "If a group of people treat something as money, then it is money. It is correctly called money, because (collectively) calling it 'money' – and treating it as money – makes it into money". The given quotation is an example of his performative model of treating institutions. For Searle (Searle 2010: 93), money is an example of a 'nonlinguistic institutional fact'.

In his approach institutional facts are metaphorically seen as "a sea" we live in (Searle 2010: 90). Their constitution is reached by means of language. Having a common language is an evidence of society (Searle 2010: 122). "Performing speech acts is the basis of all the institutional facts" (Searle 2010: 91). Nonlinguistic institutional facts go beyond facts about meanings but are linguistically created and maintained (Searle 2010: 93). Institutional facts are generated by institutions, so they are particular examples of their concrete realizations. Nevertheless there is nothing prior to the creation of an institutional fact (Searle 2010: 106). Institutional facts create reality "*by representing it as existing*" (Searle 2010: 93). Institutional facts imply deontology in terms of conceptualized by declarations "status functions", based on rules, norms in the regulative as well as constitutive modes.

According to Searle (Searle 2010: 97), regulative rule is directive; it is a function of bringing about a certain form of behavior. The behavior must match the content of the rule. Thus in regulative rule a direction from world to a word is fitted. Constitutive rule is declaration; it is a function of making something the case. The consequences of the case are accepted necessarily. Thus in constitutive rule directions from world to a word and vice versa are fitted. So a constitutive rule makes something particular the case *by representing it as* being the case. The given understanding of regulative and constitutive functions of normativity does not contradict our account (Laktionova 2009), according to which regulative and constitutive modes of normativity complement each other with the priority of constitutive function, because it provides for the possibility of its object. We treat norms as practical, internal, implicit.

Coming back to Searle, certain institutional facts are created in contexts specified by declarations. In this sense all institutional facts are created by declaration. "The rule declares that satisfying such and such conditions counts as a certain sort of institutional fact" (Searle 2010: 98). So far, to declare is to count something as such, as it is; that creates collective (common in our terms) recognition and acceptance, thus relates the latter – positively, negatively,

conditionally – to actual people (Searle 2010: 102 calls such relating “assigning powers”). In other words, a declaration assigns status function of an institutional fact. An institutional fact works as long as it is collectively recognized or accepted (Searle 2010: 106). A similar anti-individualistic position is advocated by Bloor as well (Bloor 1996: 72-73).

For Searle (Searle 2010: 110-111) language is not an ordinary institution, it is not created by declaration, rather it is a meaningfulness that is need for language to be. Institutional facts need linguistic representation in order to exist; their representation is collectively accepted and recognized by competent speakers. Language and its units do not need such representation to be what they are, otherwise we fall into regress of languages of different levels. To be meaningful is to function as an appropriate utterance in a given context, to have a propositional content in an illocutionary mode.

From our point of view, language is an institution, linguistic units can be treated as institutional facts. All institutional facts are linguistic, language provides their evidence, and is neither prior nor posterior to them, but necessarily accompanies them. Those institutions which are properly reflected by means of language are analogous to what is ‘said’ in terms of Wittgenstein (1922, section 4.1212), ‘saying’ is the way of ‘showing’, but mostly institutions exists as institutional facts, institutional facts ‘show’ institutions.

Moving back to the idea stated in the beginning about social world as ‘mosaic’ of institutions as a way of an organization of social order, we agree with Schatzki (Schatzki 1996) that the conceptualization of social order is connected with grasping it as a linkage of different practices, activities. They are habituated as acknowledged customs, institutions that we do not usually reflect upon, but we rely on them, and take them for granted. In this sense the analogy with well-known metaphor of ‘hinges’ (Wittgenstein 1969, par. 341-342) could be made.

Institutions constitute common social world, they are ‘hinges’ on which it ‘hangs and turns’. Their value and status is contextual. They are presupposed as a commonly shared and accepted and doubtlessly relied-on framework of the social world. If we question their validity, we shift the context, which is also possible due to some other ‘hinges’, understood as silent institutions.

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# Mathematical Proof and Intuition

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To resolve a “looming tension,” as Floyd calls it, in Wang’s interpretation of Wittgenstein, I wish to distinguish mathematical knowledge proper from mathematical knowledge qua intuition. That’s nothing new, for the attitude toward mathematical knowledge is that it is incontrovertible, but not so the attitude toward intuitive knowledge. This is because our theoretical mathematical knowledge entails all and only what has been established by proof, while some intuitive knowledge involves imagination. But theoretical knowledge does not in and of itself close off all access provided by our intuitions. Still, any such access is marked by degrees of certainty. Intuitive access to mathematical reality is not characterized by the certainty of proof.

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Hao Wang contributed to the proceedings for three of the five International Wittgenstein Symposia held between 1986 and 1992 (1987b, 1990b, 1993e). In addition, he published interpretations of Wittgenstein in 1981, 1984, and 1991 (1981e, 1984c, 1991b) and discussed Wittgenstein extensively in other places. Wang (1961b) (see also 1955e and 1958a) analyzes Wittgenstein’s remarks as anthropologism, a minimalistic approach to the foundations of mathematics like the restrictive strict finitism isolated by Bernays (1935) (associated with Wittgenstein by Kreisel 1958) and contradistinguished from four other increasingly broad approaches to the foundations: finitism, intuitionism, predicativism, and platonism (Link 2009: 226-227). Indeed, there is a pronounced strain of anthropologism in Wittgenstein’s writing. This anthropologism, the curtailing of arithmetic to what is human, is the first phase of Wang’s interpretation of Wittgenstein (Floyd: 159-160). In this phase Wang (1961b) identifies the “perspicuousness” that a proof gives.

Kripke reads Wittgenstein as being a skeptic about rule-following, even in arithmetic: “This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule” (PI, sec. 201). Kripke concludes that language does not determine concepts, not even such concepts as addition and multiplication (Kripke: 107; for the skeptical paradox, see pp. 7-9). On this picture there is nothing more than interpretation. Let’s continue the quote from section 201:

The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here.

It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is *not* an *interpretation*, but which is exhibited in what we call “obeying a rule” and “going against it” in actual cases.

A problem for Wittgenstein interpretation is the problem of what is left if skepticism is rejected, if it is not rules all the

way down (see RFM, VII.47). Already in (1945) (2005: 147) Wang wrote with approval of “possible sources of knowledge besides language,” although his reading of Wittgenstein at that time was quite different than in his two main stages.

Tait provides an alternative to Kripke (Link 2009: 227). Tait says that such skepticism is coordinate with a picture of language and reference like the primitive Augustinian account. But for Wittgenstein not all of language is like that. In a 16 November 2011 lecture at Harvard, Tait noted that for Wittgenstein our “language can be seen as an ancient city” (PI, sec. 18). It is not all uniform. By collapsing finitism with platonism (Parsons 2009), Tait (2005) argues that Wittgenstein is a platonist. This answers the question left from the quote above, namely what is the extent in actual cases of what is exhibited in grasping a rule that does not count as an interpretation. Wang ultimately viewed Tait’s Fregean approach negatively because of its appeal to language (Floyd: 172).

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Wang gave another solution to the question posed above. According to Floyd (p. 175), “Wang read Wittgenstein as holding, in his early philosophy as well as later on, that something intuitive always remains after conceptualization.” His second phase, beginning in 1981, culminates in his statement that Wittgenstein “begins and ends with the perceptual immediacy of our intuition of the actual use of words in a given situation,” which Wang took as a “way of pursuing the traditional quest for certainty in philosophy” (LJ: 329, quote on p. 175 of Floyd). What Wang meant by “intuition” in this passage is not clear to me (for more see Floyd, sec. 5): he did seem to take the perspicuous representations as intuitive which Floyd (p. 172) points out created a “looming tension” in his philosophy, for his behaviorist approach to Wittgenstein was at odds with his picture of the introspective nature of Wittgenstein’s philosophy.

Does mathematics require intuition? For Kant in the *Prolegomena*, ‘ $7+5=12$ ’ is synthetic but still universal and apodictic because mathematical *constructions* occur as a synthesis through the pure forms of space and time. But for Frege the *propositions* of arithmetic, and indeed of all of mathematics, are founded on logic and require no synthesis. Wittgenstein ruled out intuition as a requirement for arithmetic early in his career. On his analysis, the *iteration* of an operation formally replaces intuitions about elementary arithmetic (TLP 6.02-6.03, 6.233-6.2331, 6.241; see Link [2007]). This reading is known as Wittgensteinian minimalism. Then no synthesis is required. Historically this can be appreciated as continuing but focusing Frege’s response to Kant.

What is the range of intuition? In *Mathematical Thought and Its Objects* Parsons makes new room for intuitions. He says he uses:

the term ‘intuition’ [...] so that it is not *ipso facto* knowledge, and one’s having the intuition that  $p$  doesn’t imply the truth of  $p$ . Within this usage, differences are possible as to how much is or ought to be claimed for intuition as a source of knowledge or as a guide to the truth.

Philosophers' intuitions are not claimed to be an autonomous source of knowledge, and their reliability will vary greatly. But, as we noted, the intuitions of native speakers of a language do create a presumption of truth. Moreover, it could be that in some domain, intuition, if carefully enough cultivated, is a source of knowledge and a quite reliable guide to the truth, without actually constituting knowledge in the sense (again) that an agent's having the intuition that  $p$  implies  $p$  (2008, 5.24.9).

On this account, in certain carefully circumscribed domains, intuition is a "source of knowledge." An intuition is not in general a source of theoretical mathematical knowledge but of intuitive knowledge. Parsons argues that this domain includes addition and multiplication. Two quick comparisons with Descartes may be helpful, a difference and a similarity. First, there are no mistaken Cartesian intuitions. A mistake implies that there was no real Cartesian intuition in the first place. Second, for Descartes intuitions are unlike deductions. An intuition is not the conclusion of an inference. By his own admission, Parsons's use of 'intuition' is more like that of Gödel than Descartes (5.24).

In this respect intuitions are *immediate*. Parsons continues that intuition is "independent of any articulation of its grounds, possibly coupled with expression of doubt as to whether it *could* be reinforced by grounds of another kind, that is, by argument" (5.24.11). To explain *intuition* Parsons begins with Kantian intuition of objects. For Parsons intuition is neither universal nor apodictic, unlike Kant's case; again, for Parsons intuition does not curtail pure reason, unlike Kant's case and those of Hilbert and the intuitionists (Parsons 2008, ch. 5; see Mühlhölzer, the last four paragraphs of section 2). Parsons's realism stands not among the minimalist approaches of the twentieth century but among the contemporary philosophies of mathematics, which are more oriented to structures and details (Mühlhölzer, the last sentence of sec. 1).

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Hilbert's strokes, said by Parsons to be quasi-concrete, appear in Wittgenstein (e.g., in RFM: 48, and 149-151), but Wittgenstein is not normally thought to be a friend of intuition, which he called an "unnecessary shuffle." For him the nature of the operation showed that no intuitions about arithmetic are required. In a sharp review of Parsons, Felix Mühlhölzer attempts to close off any opening into intuitive knowledge. Mühlhölzer appeals to the later Wittgenstein for confirmation of his account of arithmetic and his attack on intuition. He identifies Gowers (2002) as an adherent of Wittgenstein. Mühlhölzer writes: "Gowers develops and defends in his book what he calls the *abstract method in mathematics*, which he encapsulates in slogans like 'a mathematical object *is* what it *does*' (I.c.: 22), or, less metaphorically, 'think about the rules rather than the numbers themselves' (I.c.: 22)." He presents a rule-based account that presupposes the following of rules taken as basic mathematical practice. On his interpretation Wittgenstein rejects intuitions outright. On this account intuitions can be formalized by and replaced completely with operational systems. These systems can be described without appeal to intuition.

The basic idea is that, no matter what phenomena is under discussion, to communicate that phenomena will require an operational presentation or something like it: a description writ large. This is appealing on first sight. Still, the rule-based account faces some of the same hurdles as finitism. One of these is the status of arithmetical equations. Another hurdle is that advances in mathematics de-

cide philosophical problems. The rule-based account repudiates intuitive mathematical knowledge in any guise. One cannot know what has not been proven.

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A description can be corrected by sufficiently circumscribing the phenomena that are being generalized. Wittgenstein says: "the question arises 'Is this an appropriate description or not?' The answer is: 'Yes, it is appropriate, but only for the narrowly circumscribed region, not for the whole of what you were claiming to describe'". "You can make your definition correct by expressly restricting it to those games" (PI, sec. 3). The rule-based account hopes to capture all that is meant by intuition. So for the description to be appropriate, this account has to rule out mathematical phenomena often associated with intuition as *not really* intuition. In that case the situation arises that intuition is *nothing more than that*, namely the rule-driven behavior. The rule-based account seems to be a form of skepticism. Why is imagination ruled out by fiat? What about a dream or sudden insight? Of course, one can reverse engineer an intuition into a formal structure of operations, the mould of form. But a correct intuition can be like a change of state. Sometimes such a change of state precedes the theoretical demonstration, such that the correct intuition gets the facts straight, even by breaking the mould. But we can't know that without argumentation and historical confirmation. This interpretation does not serve as a description of all that is involved in mathematical thought; moreover, it rests on the idea that rules are philosophically clarificatory, but that seems to push an epistemological agenda harder than Wittgenstein would be inclined to do; further, with intuition carefully circumscribed in the way Parsons does, his position is not really liable to the critique stated above. In what follows I respond by advancing a different philosophical thesis about mathematical thought. I propose a compromise within Parsons's own framework.

On 26 April 1951, three days before his death, Wittgenstein wrote: "The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of incontestability. I.e.: 'Dispute about other things; this is immovable – it is a hinge on which your dispute can turn'" (OC, sec. 655). For Wittgenstein "obeying a rule" is a practice" (PI, sec. 202). In mathematics the practice is connected to proof. Proofs "change the way we work with concepts" (RFM, VII.45). Intuitions do not seem to carry with them the certainty of mathematical knowledge that arises once a theorem is demonstrated. Parsons's realism has so far not featured that hinge, as Parsons himself mentioned in a critical discussion in San Francisco over the Easter weekend in 2009. Intuitive mathematical thought is not like mathematical knowledge *per se* because it does not secure the facts in every case. As Parsons points out, there is no certainty when intuition is involved. Yet, at key junctures he explicitly appeals to proof. Then why not dispense with intuition? The issue is coherence (see Shapiro: 95, 132-136). Without instances of a concept to cleave together, the concept would not seem to cohere. Though Wittgenstein's philosophical presentations of the concept of natural number change widely in several distinct phases, it is during the middle phase that he comes closest to suggesting that the natural numbers are incoherent. But that can be understood as a dialectic attack against the picture that mathematical concepts retain their clear-cut boundaries in other contexts. In the later philosophy (RFM) he discusses diagonalization arguments as in Cantor and Turing, making use of the operation he had developed for the *Tractatus* (Link 2009: 227). So while he said that the "word 'concept' is too vague by far" (RFM, VII.45), he does not seem to

mean thereby that a concept is ineluctably vague, for the context can be constrained to make the description fit.

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I conclude with counterproposal to the rule-based interpretation. I begin with Akihiro Kanamori's "(re)definition" of mathematical knowledge: "Mathematics is historically given and *mathematical knowledge* is what has been widely communicated by proof." In a debate on this topic Barry Mazur responds in large agreement with Kanamori's thesis under the proviso that some proofs, and so some mathematical knowledge, exist even before they have been completely formalized in writing or conversation. Kanamori rejects Mazur's proviso along the following lines. A proof could be in Barry Mazur's head, but until it is widely disseminated and examined and accepted, it does not seem to be what should go for mathematical knowledge. Under this account mathematical knowledge is a rather curtailed and very human thing (Correspondence dated 17 December 2010). Without Mazur's proviso mathematical knowledge is completely consonant with certainty, whereas the addition of Mazur's proviso suggests some uncertainty about mathematical thought. By way of contrast, a bypass around this debate arises by hewing to Kanamori's "(re)definition" but allowing that unproven mathematical thoughts could very well hold within the mathematical frame of reference. These thoughts, however intuitively correct, are not theorems until proved so. This is not to urge that "proof is the criterion of truth" because formal systems are incomplete (Parsons 2009: 225).

Wittgenstein said that "a mathematical proof moulds our language" (RFM III.71). Proofs are empirical objects, which means they can be read, handled, and communicated. They help communication (RFM III.71). This is a way to avoid Mill's problem with mathematics. The proof concerns infinite matters – it "talks about" the continuum hypothesis, for example; however, the proof itself exists in space and time, constituting our empirical access to mathematical reality. Under such circumstances proofs manifest and determine mathematical knowledge. Of course, one might make a mistake when one communicates the theory to someone else, or one might just misunderstand it, but this is to be corrected by later appeal to the same theorem. Knowledge, then, arises in doing, learning about, and communicating proofs. Proofs are the cutting edge of mathematical knowledge and its empirical manifestations.

The realm of mathematical knowledge consists of proofs. Mathematical knowledge of these facts is theoretical. So, contra Hilbert, mathematics does not require imagination. But theoretical mathematics is not all that we call mathematics. Once intuitive knowledge is divorced from mathematical knowledge proper, the outcome is that mathematics remains factual, but not all mathematical phenomena share in knowledge proper. Mathematical intuitions of facts are not required theoretically, but not barred by theory, either.<sup>1</sup> That is how I am trying to make ends meet while avoiding the looming tension in Wang's interpretation of Wittgenstein (Link 2009: 227-228).<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> On one Kantian scenario, they are a condition for the possibility of apodictic arithmetical knowledge.

<sup>2</sup> Thanks to Akihiro Kanamori, Richard H. Jandovitz, Steve Balash, and Brian Kiniry.

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# Authentizität: Ein Vergleich zwischen der Stoa und Ludwig Wittgenstein

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Der Begriff der „Authentizität“ spukt immer wieder herum. Zwar wird er primär außerhalb der Philosophie verwendet, meist sogar außerhalb der „Wissenschaft“, aber spätestens seit dem Existenzialismus ist er zu einem relevanten Gegenstand geworden.

Im Folgenden soll hinterfragt werden, wie sich der Begriff im Laufe der Geschichte gewandelt, resp. inwieweit er eine konstante Bedeutung behalten hat. Die Probleme, die sich ergeben, liegen auf der Hand. Offensichtlich ist vor allem das terminologische Problem: Man findet normalerweise nicht diesen Begriff, sondern muss ihn aus den Texten extrapolieren. Dieser Fall tritt allerdings öfters ein und ist somit keine Besonderheit.

Ein anderes Problem besteht in der Auswahl sowohl der Schule als auch ihrer Vertreter. Dass gerade die Stoa und Wittgenstein ausgesucht wurden, hat Gründe: zum einen ihre zeitliche Position: die Stoa mehr oder weniger am Anfang der Philosophiegeschichte, Wittgenstein eher am vorläufigen Ende. Zum anderen sind beide auch insofern interessant, als ihre Philosophie immer eine praktische Komponente hat.

Dass bei der Stoa vor allem ein Fokus auf Panaitios, resp. Cicero liegt, kommt aufgrund der zu dieser Fragestellung passenden Texte.

Dass man die Konzepte nur umreißen und nicht vollständig wiedergeben kann, ist klar. Das Ziel der Arbeit ist dann erreicht, wenn man eine ungefähre Vorstellung von den Gemeinsamkeiten, aber auch von den Unterschieden gewonnen hat.

## Etymologie

Um mit der Etymologie des Begriffs „Authentizität“ zu beginnen, muss man sich dem Griechischen zuwenden. Das Wort leitet sich von „ἀὐθεντικῶς“ ab, was nichts anderes als „zuverlässig, nach einem sicheren Gewährsmann“ bedeutet.<sup>1</sup> Auch das lateinische „authenticus“ heißt nichts anderes als „zuverlässig, verbürgt“ bzw. „urschriftlich, eigenhändig.“<sup>2</sup> Die heutige Verwendung hängt zwar noch prinzipiell mit der ursprünglichen zusammen, allerdings scheint sie in Richtung „echt“ verschoben. Wenn man im Duden nachschlägt, findet man unter anderem Synonyme wie „echt“, „glaubwürdig“, „unverfälscht“, und „wahr“.<sup>3</sup>

Die Bedeutung, die im Folgenden eine Rolle spielen wird, geht eher in Richtung „unverfälscht“ und „entsprechend“. „Authentisch leben“ soll so etwas Ähnliches heißen wie sich nicht verstellen, dass man nicht versucht, etwas Anderes zu sein, als man ist. Hier soll es aber in erster Linie um den Begriff, resp. um das, was darunter im philosophiehistorischen Kontext verstanden wird, gehen.

<sup>1</sup> Vgl. Pape Griechisch-Deutsch: Bd. 1, 392.

<sup>2</sup> Vgl. Georges Lateinisch-deutsches Handwörterbuch Bd. 1, 749.

<sup>3</sup> Duden Synonymwörterbuch, Eintrag „authentisch“, 164.

## Das Konzept der Authentizität in der Stoa

Wenn man dieses Thema bei den Stoikern beleuchten will, kommt man nicht umhin, sich mit dem Begriff der „Rolle“, resp. lateinisch „persona“ auseinanderzusetzen. Dieses Wort kommt aus dem Bereich des Theaters und wird seit der griechischen Antike auch in der Philosophie verwendet.<sup>4</sup> Allerdings wird der Begriff immer schärfer umrisSEN und mit der Zeit „werden vor allem die Stoiker die Ethik der R[olle] ausformulieren. Sie beschreibt die Pflichten und Grenzen eines Handelns, das in seiner Uneigentlichkeit erkennbar wird, nicht aber aufgegeben werden kann.“<sup>5</sup>

Zenon prägt die Formel, man müsse „einstimmig leben“ (ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν), was, nach Hossenfelder, nichts anderes bedeutet, als dass es um eine „Einstimmigkeit von Wollen und Können“ geht.<sup>6</sup> Anders gesagt, man soll so leben, dass man nichts erreichen will, was man nicht erreichen kann. Es wäre etwa im höchsten Maße unsinnig, nie krank werden zu wollen, denn das liegt (zumindest meistens) außerhalb unseres Einflusses. Epiktet bringt es auf den Punkt, wenn er schreibt, „[w]er also frei sein will, soll weder etwas erstreben noch meiden von dem, worüber andere gebieten; sonst wird er zwangsläufig zum Sklaven.“<sup>7</sup>

Ein zentrales Ziel der Stoiker war die Apathie, also das affektfreie Leben. Die Affekte sind es, die dafür sorgen, dass wir unkontrolliert handeln, weshalb wir möglichst keine haben sollten. „[D]ie Affekte lassen sich vollständig vermeiden, und zwar nicht in der Weise, daß sie durch eine innere Kraftübung unterdrückt [...] werden müssen, sondern sie entstehen gar nicht erst bei richtiger Vernunfthaltung.“<sup>8</sup>

Obwohl das hier elaborierte Konzept prima facie nicht genau mit dem aktuellen Konzept der „Authentizität“ deckungsgleich ist, stechen einige Parallelen sofort ins Auge. Es geht um ein Leben, das „einem entspricht“ und „auf einen passt“. Man soll nicht so leben/handeln, als wäre man jemand anderes. Vertauscht man „authentisch“ mit „unverfälscht“ oder „wahrhaftig“, so sieht man die Gleichheit.

Deutlich interessanter wird es allerdings, wenn man sich der „mittleren Stoa“<sup>9</sup> zuwendet. Hier ist vor allem Panaitios zu nennen, bei dem sich das Modell der 4 Personen, resp. Rollen findet.

Panaitios war der Erste, der den Einzelnen in den Mittelpunkt rückte. Er „erfaßte das Individuum in seiner vollen Konkretion und sucht den Besonderheiten des Einzelwesens Rechnung zu tragen.“<sup>10</sup>

Pohlenz zeigt, dass dieser neue Fokus auch mit Panaitios’ Leben zusammenhängt. Er bereiste viele Länder und

<sup>4</sup> Vgl. Konersmann 1992, Sp. 1064.

<sup>5</sup> Vgl. Konersmann 1992, Sp. 1064.

<sup>6</sup> Vgl. Hossenfelder 1995: 46.

<sup>7</sup> Epiktet 1992: 14.

<sup>8</sup> Hossenfelder 115: 50.

<sup>9</sup> Dass der Begriff „mittlere Stoa“ oder „Mittelstoa“ problematisch ist, zeigt Pohlenz (1950: 191).

<sup>10</sup> Hossenfelder 1995: 97.

lernte verschiedenste Menschen kennen, was „ihn von der alten hippokratischen Erkenntnis überzeugt [hatte], daß der Charakter eines Volkes durch Landschaft und Klima beeinflußt werde.“<sup>11</sup>

Cicero beschreibt diese Rollen in *De officiis*<sup>12</sup> und stellt, da das Original verloren ist, damit die wichtigste Quelle bereit. Cicero behandelt dies in dem „der modestia und unddem decorum geltenden Abschnitt.“<sup>13</sup> Mit dem historischen Wörterbuch der Philosophie kann man die vier Rollen/Masken folgendermaßen bestimmen: 1.) als die allen Menschen gemeinsamen „Gattungsmerkmale“, 2.) die jedem eigentümlichen Eigenschaften, 3.) das „Milieu“, in dem man lebt, und 4.) die „eigene Entscheidung und Wahl“.<sup>14</sup> Cicero beschreibt die ersten beiden Rollen so: „die eine davon ist eine gemeinsame daher, weil wir alle teilhaftig sind der Vernunft und des Vorzugs, durch den wir uns auszeichnen vor den Tieren [...]; die andere aber eine, die in besonderem Sinne den einzelnen zugeteilt wird.“<sup>15</sup> Die anderen beiden Rollen sind dann die, „die irgendeine Zufall oder ein Zeitumstand auferlegt, ferner eine vierte, die wir uns selbst aufgrund unseres persönlichen Urteils zumessen.“<sup>16</sup>

Fuhrmann weist darauf hin, dass es Cicero allerdings nicht um einzelne Individuen ging, sondern um „Charaktertypen“, da er den Begriff „genus“ verwendet.<sup>17</sup>

„In den Erläuterungen zur vierten Maske schärft Cicero abermals ein, daß nichts so wichtig sei wie die Wahrung der Identität, die Übereinstimmung mit sich selbst während des ganzen Lebens – sonst ‚hinke‘ man bei der Wahrnehmung seiner Pflichten. [...] Die Identität, um die es hier geht, ist, wie ersichtlich, keine subjektive Kategorie, kein aus dem eigenen Inneren gesehenes Ich, keine Einheit des Erlebens und Bewußtseins [, sondern] die perpetuierte soziale Rolle.“<sup>18</sup>

Man darf aber Fuhrmanns Einschränkung, dass diese Text für die oberen Gesellschaftsschichten geschrieben wurde, nicht vergessen.<sup>19</sup>

Für Panaitios ist in diesem Kontext auch das bereits oben genannte καθῆκον (Pflicht)<sup>20</sup> ein zentraler Begriff. Für ihn ist es „die Handlung, bei der die Vernunft als die naturngemäße Herrin den Trieben Maß und Richtung gebe und diese sich ihr kampflos fügen.“<sup>21</sup> Panaitios betont aber auch die Wichtigkeit der *Besonnenheit*.

„Innere Geschlossenheit und die Homologie, die Konstanz der Lebensführung, verleiht aber erst die Sophrosyne, die es bewirkt, daß die Triebe [...] sich willig dem Gebole des Logos fügen. [...] Auf ihr beruht die Einheitlichkeit des Charakters und der Lebensführung, die wir auch von den Personen des Dramas erwarten. Und mehr noch als dort mag es unser ästhetisches Wohlgefallen wecken, wenn uns das Leben eine geschlossene Persönlichkeit zeigt, die ihren ganz festen Lebensstil hat, so daß wir jede einzelne Lebensäußerung, jedes Wort und jede Handlung, aber auch die ungezwungene Würde des Auftretens, die Liebenswürdigkeit des Umgangs, den Takt im Verkehr mit den Mitmenschen, den Geschmack in der Kleidung und

Wohleinrichtung als Ausfluß derselben seelischen Haltung und als äußere Erscheinungsform derselben inneren Harmonie und ‘Schönheit’ empfinden.“<sup>22</sup>

Das Konzept der *Authentizität* in der stoischen Philosophie kann man zusammenfassend als ein objektives, also eines, das vorgefunden werden kann, bezeichnen, das, wie wir bei Panaitios gesehen haben, auch das Individuum im Auge behält.

## Wittgenstein und die Authentizität

Die Authentizitätskonzeption bei Wittgenstein unterscheidet sich von der der Stoa in verschiedenen Punkten. Auch sie liegt nicht eindeutig vor, sondern muss herausgearbeitet werden. Ulrich Arnswald vertritt etwa die Auffassung, dass Wittgenstein ein sehr eigenwilliges Konzept gehabt habe. „Für Wittgenstein differiert die Authentizität signifikant von dem, was die meisten Autoren darunter verstehen. [...] Es] hat die fundamentale Bedeutung von Authentizität mit der Bedeutung des In-der-Welt-Seins und der ‚Bedeutung des Lebens‘ für jeden Einzelnen zu tun.“<sup>23</sup> Auch ist „Authentizität für Wittgenstein [...] ein Instrument, ein Versuch, eine Art praktisches Wissen zu erlangen, das [...] in der Lage ist, dem eigenen In-der-Welt-Sein einen Sinn zu geben [...].“<sup>24</sup> Arnswald betont, dass es wichtig sei, sich nicht zu verstellen und die „Schauspielerei“ aufzugeben, also sich nicht für andere Menschen zu inszenieren, sondern permanent seine eigene Lebens- und Denkweise zu überprüfen, da „Leben und Philosophie untrennbar miteinander verbunden“ seien.<sup>25</sup>

Arnswald versucht auch die Frage zu beantworten, inwieweit „Reinheit als Bestandteil von Authentizität“ dienen kann. Arnswald nimmt hier einen Brief<sup>26</sup> Wittgensteins an Malcolm als Beispiel, in dem es um die „Kindlichkeit“ Moores geht und Wittgenstein zwischen einer „innocence a man has fought for [and] an innocence which comes from a natural absence of a temptation“ unterscheidet. Arnswald meint, dass es eine solche „natürliche Unschuld“ in der Praxis nicht geben könne, da ein solcher Mensch nichts von der Welt verstünde und mit ihr nichts anfangen könnte (umgekehrt würde die Unschuld in dem Augenblick aufhören, in dem die Person andere verstehen würde).<sup>27</sup>

Arnswald will hier zeigen, dass ein äußerer Einfluss wichtig ist und dieser als „existentieller Selbstvollzug [...] etwas höchst Persönliches“ sei, das man nicht theoretisch begreifen und untersuchen könne.<sup>28</sup> Als Beleg dafür dient hier eine Stelle aus den *Philosophischen Bemerkungen*, wo Wittgenstein die verschiedenen Arten der Autobiographie behandelt und meint, man könne „die Wahrheit über sich selbst [...] in dem verschiedensten Geist schreiben.“<sup>29</sup>

Arnswalds Resümee geht in die Richtung, Wittgensteins Überlegungen als existentialistisch zu betrachten, denn seine „Philosophie basiert [...] auf einer Lehre der Tat.“<sup>30</sup> Der Existentialismus ist hier immer schon mit dem Authentischen verknüpft und hängt auch mit einem „Streben nach Selbstfindung“ zusammen, das man bei Wittgenstein an seinem Leben ablesen könnte, da er „sich immer wieder innerlich wie äußerlich zurückgezogen“ habe.<sup>31</sup> Für Wittgenstein wären die Handlungen zentral gewesen und er

<sup>11</sup> Pohlenz 1950: 201.

<sup>12</sup> Cicero 1976: 107-125.

<sup>13</sup> Vgl. Fuhrmann 1979: 98.

<sup>14</sup> Vgl. Fuhrmann 1989, Sp. 271.

<sup>15</sup> Cicero 1976: 107.

<sup>16</sup> Cicero 1976: 115.

<sup>17</sup> Vgl. Fuhrmann 1979: 100. Fuhrman meint an dieser Stelle, „der Verschlagene, Berechnende – wie Themistokles – ist ein genus, ein ‚Typ‘, der Wende, Ausdauernde – wie Lysander ist es auch (1, 108f.).

<sup>18</sup> Fuhrmann 1979: 101.

<sup>19</sup> Vgl. Fuhrmann 1979: 101f.

<sup>20</sup> Cicero hat diesen Begriff als *officium* ins Lateinische übersetzt.

<sup>21</sup> Pohlenz 1950: 202.

<sup>22</sup> Pohlenz 1950: 203.

<sup>23</sup> Arnswald 2007: 146.

<sup>24</sup> Arnswald 2007: 146f.

<sup>25</sup> Vgl. Arnswald 2007: 147.

<sup>26</sup> Wittgenstein an Norman Malcolm, 18.02.1949.

<sup>27</sup> Vgl. Arnswald 2007: 149ff.

<sup>28</sup> Vgl. Arnswald 2007: 151.

<sup>29</sup> MS 108, 46f.

<sup>30</sup> Arnswald 2007: 152.

<sup>31</sup> Vgl. Arnswald 2007: 153f.

habe sich darüber definiert; die „Gesamtheit der Handlungen ist für Wittgenstein nichts anderes als sein Leben, und somit seine Ethik und seine Authentizität.“<sup>32</sup>

Statt von Authentizität kann man auch von „Wahrhaftigkeit“ sprechen, wie es etwa Anja Weiberg macht. Weiberg meint, dass Wahrhaftigkeit „im wesentlichen seiner [Wittgensteins] Verwendung des Wortes Wahrheit entspricht.“<sup>33</sup> Interessant ist hier die Funktion der „Schauspielerei“. Solange man eine Rolle spielt, ist man nicht authentisch, und gibt „man die Schauspielerei nicht auf, [...] wird man nach Wittgenstein nie zur Wahrheit im Sinne von Wahrhaftigkeit gelangen. [...] Die Suche nach Wahrheit ist also durch ethische Kriterien definiert.“<sup>34</sup>

Auch bei Weiberg wird die Wichtigkeit der Verbindung von Leben und Philosophie betont. „Nimmt man Wittgenstein bezüglich seiner Aussage über die Untrennbarkeit von Philosophie und Leben ernst, so ist jede rein ‚theoretische‘ oder rein akademische Philosophie Täuschung oder Selbstdäuschung. Ihr fehlt das Leben. Philosophie wie Leben müssen überdies wahrhaftig sein, um wahr sein zu können.“<sup>35</sup> Diese Konzeption entspricht vermutlich sehr stark der allgemeinen Verwendung des Begriffs.

Von einer ganz anderen Seite nähert sich Ilse Somavilla dieser Thematik. Es geht bei ihr vor allem um einen Zugang über die Literatur und eine Art des Schreibens, die man als eine „authentische Art“ bezeichnen könnte. Somavilla geht von einem Brief<sup>36</sup> Wittgensteins an Ficker aus, in dem Wittgenstein über Gedichte Trakls schreibt, dass er sie nicht verstehe, „aber ihr Ton beglückt mich. Es ist der Ton der wahrhaft genialen Menschen.“ Wittgenstein schreibt hier über etwas, das offensichtlich nicht objektiv einholbar ist, sondern das ihn „beglückt“, also emotional bewegt.

Für Somavilla ist das ein starker Hinweis darauf, „wie wichtig Wittgenstein die Wahrhaftigkeit eines Schreibenden [...] war: eine Wahrhaftigkeit, die sich im ‚Ton‘ desselben ausdrückt [...].“<sup>37</sup> Den Zusammenhang von Wahrhaftigkeit mit der künstlerischen Sphäre sieht man auch daran, dass Wittgenstein seine „Vorstellung vom rechten Ton mit Wahrhaftigkeit und Genialität [verbunden hat], wobei das eine das andere bedingt.“<sup>38</sup>

Somavilla weist darauf hin, dass Wittgenstein in seinem Œuvre „im Zusammenhang mit Musik, Farbe, Sprache sowie hinsichtlich des Ausdrucks von Gefühlen“ öfters von Ton spricht, wobei er es „stets innerhalb ästhetischer und ethischer Fragen verwendet“.<sup>39</sup>

Auch wenn Wittgenstein offensichtlich weder ein klares noch ein einfaches Authentizitätskonzept hat, ist es doch in vielen Bereichen unserer Auffassung viel näher. Bei Wittgenstein scheint die Authentizität stark mit einem Prozess verknüpft zu sein, der eine intensive Auseinandersetzung der Person mit sich selber verlangt. Gerade das Überwinden der (Selbst-)Täuschung ist hier ein zentrales Element und gibt seiner Konzeption ein sehr subjektives Moment.

## Resümee

Grundsätzlich kann man in den Authentizitätskonzepten der Stoa und Wittgensteins einen gemeinsamen Kern entdecken. Beide zielen auf das Leben des Menschen und lehnen, soweit als möglich, eine Inszenierung ab. Beiden ist auch gemeinsam, dass die Authentizität das Resultat einer Entwicklung und einer Arbeit an einem selber ist.

Dennoch bestehen auch einige Unterschiede. Grob könnte man sagen, dass die Stoa eine objektive Konzeption hat, Wittgenstein vielmehr eine subjektive. Zwar berücksichtigt Panaitios die individuellen Eigenschaften (in der zweiten Person), aber wenn man sie kennt, ergibt sich daraus der Weg, wie man leben soll. Es scheint wie ein Art Formel mit vier Variablen zu sein, die, je nachdem, was man einsetzt, ein Resultat liefert. Noch deutlicher ist es in der früheren Stoa, in der durch die Forderung, der Natur gemäß zu leben, die Kriterien objektiv vorliegen.

Bei Wittgenstein scheint das Konzept viel – subjektiver im modernen Sinne – zu sein, wenn es etwa darum geht, die Schauspielerei abzulegen und nicht allein von Konventionen geprägt zu sein. Auch das Sich-Selbst-Stellen und die Forderung, sich gegenüber ehrlich zu sein, legt den Schwerpunkt auf das Innere eines Menschen.

Wir haben es bei der „Authentizität“ mit einem Begriff zu tun, der im Kern seine Bedeutung behalten hat, bei dem sich die Kriterien aber verschoben haben. Man könnte vielleicht sagen, er hat noch dasselbe Materialobjekt, aber ein anderes Formalobjekt.

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<sup>32</sup> Arnswald 2007: 154.

<sup>33</sup> Weiberg 2001: 286.

<sup>34</sup> Weiberg 2001: 288.

<sup>35</sup> Weiberg 2001: 290.

<sup>36</sup> Wittgenstein an Ludwig von Ficker, 28.11.1914.

<sup>37</sup> Somavilla 2009: 412.

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# Formal Ethics And Non-Monotonic Politics. Of Public Power And Private Property

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"Property is Theft!" (Proudhon 1994: 17)

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"The distinguishing feature of communism is not the abolition of property generally [...] The theory of the communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property" (Marx/Engels 1959: 21).

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"Private vices are public benefits" (Mandeville 1934: 5)

The above-cited short exclamation of Proudhon may be enhanced by his discourse: 'If I were asked to answer the following question "What is slavery?" and I should answer in one word, "Murder!", my meaning would be understood at once. No further argument would be required to show that the power to take from a man his thought, his will, his personality, is a power of life and death, and that to enslave a man is to kill him. Why then, to this other question: "What is property?" may I not likewise answer, "Theft"?' (Woodcock 1972: 45)

Comparing the above citations one can notice the difference between the *monotonic* moral evaluations of Proudhon, Marx and Engels, on the one hand, and the *non-monotonic* moral evaluations of Mandeville on the other one. However this feeling some difference is not clear and hence it is worth explicating it by means of discrete mathematical representing formal ethics of private property.

Outstanding thinkers of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries used to criticize K. Marx's political theory of ownership. One of such critiques is presented in (Mises 1981). Mises's profound political, economic, historical and philosophical analysis of the moral-legal institute of private ownership in human society is interesting even today. However, today, constructing and investigating discrete mathematical representations of formal-ethical aspect of political theory of property enhances Mises' arguments.

Criticizing K. Marx's political struggle against private property, the present paper submits investigating Marxist theory of property by representing it in two-valued algebra of formal ethics (Lobovikov 2009a; 2009b; 2010). This algebra is based on the set of actions. By definition, actions are such and only such operations which are either good or bad (in moral meaning of the words) from the viewpoint

of some either individual or collective person (evaluator)  $\Sigma$ . Elements of the set {g (good), b (bad)} are called *moral-legal values* of actions (and of action forms). The *moral-legal variables* take their values from this set. Values of the *moral-legal evaluation-functions* belong to this set as well. Moral-legal variables are nothing but elementary moral-legal forms, i.e. moral-legal forms of elementary moral-legal actions deprived of their contents. Compound moral-legal action forms represent moral-legal evaluation-functions determined by the moral-legal variables. Below italic letters {a, c, d} are used as symbols standing for moral-legal action forms deprived of their contents. It is recognized that changing the evaluator  $\Sigma$  can result in changing moral-legal values of some elementary actions. However there are such compound actions and action forms which acquire the moral-legal value "good" under any possible evaluator  $\Sigma$ . Such and only such actions and action forms are called *laws of algebra of formal ethics*. They are universal and eternal ones as they do not depend upon changes of  $\Sigma$ .

Let us introduce the following symbols standing for unary moral-legal operations of algebra of formal ethics. The symbol  $D^E a$  stands for "destruction (annihilation), extermination (abolition) of a".  $O^P a$  stands for "opposite (opposition) of/for a".  $P^P a$  – "property of (what, whom) a (i.e. a's property)".  $P^W a$  – "(what, who) a as property of somebody or something (i.e. a's being a property)".  $O^M a$  – "(who's) a's owning (having), possessing".  $O^W a$  – "ownership of (what, whom) a, i.e. owning (having), possessing (what, whom) a".  $P^S a$  – "private, particular (what, who) a".  $P^U a$  – "public, common, general (what, who) a".  $L^R a$  – "labor of (what, whom) a".  $W^R a$  – "work (operating) with (what, whom) a, or work transforming (what, whom) a".  $D^V a$  – "division, split of (what, whom) a".  $O^N a$  – "own (what, who) a".  $A^L a$  – "alien (what, who) a".  $A^P a$  – "appropriating, usurping, capturing (what, whom) a".  $D^F a$  – "definition (limitation), definiteness of a".  $F^O a$  – "formal, form of a".  $E^X a$  – "existence, life of a".  $N^a$  – "non-existence, death of a".  $M^S a$  – "means of/for (what, whom) a".  $P^D a$  – "production (creation) of a".  $F^R a$  – "freedom from a".  $F^F a$  – "freedom of/for a".  $P^O a$  – "power over a".  $P^M a$  – "power (might) of (what, whom) a".  $P^I a$  – "people of (what, whom) a".  $D^C a$  – "democracy of (what, whom) a".  $B^E a$  – "benefit of/for a".  $V^C a$  – "vice of a".  $T^I a$  – "theft of (what, whom) a".  $M^O a$  – "monopoly on (what, whom) a". The evaluation-functional sense of these unary operations is defined below by the tables 1-3.

Table 1

a	$D^E a$	$O^P a$	$P^P a$	$P^W a$	$O^M a$	$O^W a$	$P^R a$	$P^U a$	$L^R a$	$W^R a$
g	b	b	g	b	g	b	b	g	g	b
b	g	g	b	g	b	g	g	b	b	g

Table 2

a	$D^V a$	$O^N a$	$A^L a$	$A^P a$	$D^F a$	$F^O a$	$E^X a$	$N^a$	$M^S a$	$P^D a$
g	b	g	b	b	b	g	g	b	g	g
b	g	b	g	g	g	b	b	g	b	b

Table 3

a	$F^R a$	$F^U a$	$P^o a$	$P^M a$	$P^P a$	$D^c a$	$B^E a$	$V^a$	$T^a$	$M^P a$
g	b	g	b	g	g	g	g	b	b	b
b	g	b	g	b	b	b	b	g	g	g

In algebra of formal ethics, by definition, moral-legal forms ( $\omega$  and  $\beta$ ) are called formally-ethically equivalent if and only if they ( $\omega$  and  $\beta$ ) acquire identical moral-legal values under any possible combination of moral-legal values of the variables occurring in  $\omega$  and  $\beta$ . Let the symbol “ $\omega=+\beta$ ” stand for the formal-ethical equivalence of  $\omega$  and  $\beta$ . By virtue of the above definitions it is easy to demonstrate the following formal-ethical equations. In the below list of equations their translations from the symbolic language into the natural English one are submitted. The translations are placed to the right from the corresponding equations (after the sign “colon”).

- 1)  $P^R O^W a=+=D^V W^R a$ : private ownership of  $a$  means division of work (operating) with  $a$ .
- 2)  $D^V W^R a=+=P^R O^W a$ : division of work (operating) with  $a$  means private owning (what, whom)  $a$ .
- 3)  $O^W a=+=N^0 a$ : owning (having), possessing (what, whom)  $a$  means nonbeing (destruction) of  $a$ . Thus (Fromm 1995) represents the *monotonic* reasoning about owning.
- 4)  $P^T a=+=E^X a$ :  $a$ 's property is life (being) of  $a$ .
- 5)  $P^T a=+=P^R O^W a$ :  $a$ 's property is equivalent to private owning (what, whom)  $a$ .
- 6)  $E^X a=+=P^R O^W a$ :  $a$ 's life (existence) is equivalent to private ownership of  $a$ .
- 7)  $D^E P^R O^W a=+=N^0 a$ : destruction (annihilation) of private ownership of  $a$  – death (nonbeing) of  $a$ .
- 8)  $E^X a=+=P^R O^W M^S P^D M^S E^X a$ :  $a$ 's life (existence) is (formally-ethically equal to) private ownership of means of production of means of life of  $a$ .
- 9)  $D^E P^R O^W M^S P^D a=+=D^E P^D a$ : destruction of private ownership of means of production of  $a$  – destruction of production of  $a$ .
- 10)  $D^E P^R O^W M^S P^D M^S E^X a=+=D^E a=+=N^0 a$ : extermination (annihilation) of private ownership of means of production of means of life (existence) of  $a$ , is equivalent to extermination, annihilation of  $a$  (and, consequently, to death, nonbeing of  $a$ ).
- 11)  $P^U O^W a=+=D^E a=+=N^0 a$ : public owning (what, whom)  $a$  – destruction (non-being) of  $a$ .
- 12)  $F^O D^F P^U O^W a=+=N^0 D^E a$ : formally defined (limited) public owning (what, whom)  $a$  – non-being of destruction of  $a$ .
- 13)  $O^W a=+=O^P R^W a$ : ownership of  $a$  – an opposite of private ownership of  $a$ .
- 14)  $P^T a=+=O^P O^W a$ : property of (what, whom)  $a$  – an opposite of (for) ownership of  $a$ .
- 15)  $O^W a=+=O^P P^T a$ : ownership of  $a$  – an opposite of (for) property of  $a$ .
- 16)  $P^R O^W a=+=O^P O^W a$ : private ownership of  $a$  – an opposite of ownership of  $a$ .
- 17)  $P^U P^T a=+=P^R O^W a$ : public property (of  $a$ ) is equivalent to private ownership of  $a$ .

18)  $P^R O^W a=+=P^U P^T a$ : private ownership (of  $a$ ) is (formally-ethically equivalent to) public property of  $a$ . This is in perfect accordance with the above-cited paradoxical *non-monotonic* evaluation-statement of Bernard Mandeville (Mandeville 1934).

19)  $P^T a=+=P^U P^T a$ : property of  $a$  (i.e.  $a$ 's property) is equal to public property of  $a$ .

20)  $P^U P^T a=+=P^T a$ : public property of  $a$  – property of  $a$ .

21)  $P^T a=+=P^R O^W a$ :  $a$ 's property is private ownership of  $a$ .

Unfortunately, Marx (1959), Proudhon (1994) and Fromm (1995) did not recognize the fact that the words “property” and “ownership” are *homonyms*: each of the two has a couple of opposite formal-axiological meanings – moral-legal-evaluation-*functions* determined by moral-legal evaluation *variables*. For instance, the function  $P^T a$  – “property of (what, whom)  $a$  (i.e.  $a$ 's property)” is formally-ethically equivalent to the function  $E^X a$  – “being (life) of (what, whom)  $a$ ”. But the function  $P^W a$  – “(what, who)  $a$  as property of somebody or something (i.e.  $a$ 's being a property)” is formally-ethically equivalent to the function  $N^0 a$  – “nonbeing (death) of (what, whom)  $a$  (i.e.  $a$ 's nonbeing)”. (In its turn, the word “ownership” can mean either the above-defined function  $O^M a$ , or the one  $O^W a$ .) Taking the above-said into an account, by intentional constructing, one can create the following couple of formal-ethical equations.

22)  $D^E P^R P^T a=+=E^X a$ : abolition of private property is life (being).

23)  $D^E P^R P^W a=+=N^0 a$ : abolition of private property is death (nonbeing).

Which of the two equations is the formal-axiological meaning of the above cited important sentence from the “Manifesto of the Communist Party” (Marx/Engels 1959)? This question is addressed not to them: they were able neither to answer nor to understand it. In the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries “asking-and-answering” this question was accomplished by real social experiments with big masses of humans. This was too expensive and inhuman (too bloody). From my point of view, it is more economical and less bloody to make mental experiments with mathematical simulations of real social systems and political projects of their perfection. For instance, abstractly speaking in principle, if the above formal-ethical equations 6-12 had been understood adequately by the human society at the very beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century, then the terrible history of that century could not have happened. However it is not realistic to think that the indicated equations of two-valued algebra of formal ethics could be understood adequately at that time. It was very difficult to understand them adequately because they were paradoxical from the viewpoint of commonsense of the “grass-roots”. However gradually historical conditions undergo changes and nowadays the famous paradox of Bernard Mandeville is already not a scandal. Nevertheless even today it is not easy immediately to grasp the idea of *non-monotonic* ethical-political discourse resulting in the following formal-ethical equations representing “Mandeville's paradox”.

- 24)  $P^R V^C a=+=P^U B^E a$ : "private vices are public benefits" (In 1714 this statement was a scandal).
- 25)  $P^R M^O a=+=P^U B^E a$ : private monopolies are public benefits (Lobovikov 2009b).
- 26)  $P^R M^O a=+=P^R O^W a$ : private monopoly is equivalent to private ownership (Lobovikov 2009b).

To prevent the scandal-making illusion of contradiction with moral commonsense, here it is relevant to emphasize that in all the above-given translations of equations (into the natural language) the word "is" (or "are") stands for the above-defined *formal-ethical equivalence*. Chaotic mixing and substituting (for each other) the formal-logical and the formal-ethical meanings of the word "is" is strictly forbidden by the following principle of formal-logical autonomy between corresponding facts and moral evaluations.

Let  $E\omega$  stand for an act of informing (true or false affirming) that action  $\omega$  takes place in reality. The autonomy-principle may be formulated as the following rule A—B. (A): From the truth of  $\omega=+\beta$ , it does not follow (logically) that the logical equivalence of  $E\omega$  and  $E\beta$  is true. (B): From the truth of the logical equivalence of  $E\omega$  and  $E\beta$  it does not follow that  $\omega=+\beta$  is true.

The submitted discrete mathematical simulation of the natural-law-and-morals of ownership illuminates the main mistake of Marx's political-economy doctrine, namely, the *monotonic* character of his economic ethics. In contrast with his moral doctrine, the real politics of ownership is the *non-monotonic* one: *composition of two inversion functions gives the positive result*. This discrete mathematical simulation presents a significant correction and fundamental generalization of Marx's moral-legal philosophy of property and power.

It is a particular but also important point that the given paper corrects the significant misprint in (Lobovikov 2009a). Unfortunately, both parts of the table in (Lobovikov 2009a: 188) were completely destroyed. This fact made the abstract not understandable. My present paper definitely corrects this misprint and further develops the idea.

According to the given paper, many of critical statements, concerning the Marxist-Leninist conception of private ownership, are true. However, being expressed in the natural language the political intuition of the opponents (of Marx and Lenin) was not sufficiently precise and convinc-

ing as the natural language was necessarily ambiguous one. Therefore today it is worth explicating the positive moral view of private ownership by means of contemporary discrete mathematical machinery and, especially, by the above-used two-valued algebra of formal ethics. In this respect it is very important to understand that the positive moral view of private ownership is establishing private ownership not as a *positive-moral-constant* (absolute goodness), but as such a *moral-evaluation-function*, the moral value of which is identical to the moral one of its variable.

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# Outline of a Grammar of Privacy

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## Introduction

One of the most pressing social and legal questions that new technologies give rise to is the question of privacy. In both the US and Europe political, philosophical and legal debates about privacy are definitely on the rise. But the core concept of the debate, "privacy" is ill-defined at best.

It has been suggested that this is because there is no one thing such as privacy. Daniel Solove (2008) used Wittgenstein in making the point that privacy – much like the concept "game" – is a word that can be used in many different ways, referring to things that are perhaps only united by a family likeness more than any unitary definition. While true this does not really help the discussion forward. In order to do that we need to collect a series of reminders about how we use this word, and examine its grammar, the language games in which it figures and how we use it in different contexts.

The purpose of this short essay is to do that, and to examine the grammar of privacy in order to give an overview of its use, and suggest some consequences for the debate that such a grammar seems to have. This is a first attempt to collect some of those reminders, and more work is definitely needed.

## Belief, doubt, identity and privacy

Privacy is often referred to as an isolated concept. We need to "protect our privacy" and ensure that it is not violated in different ways. This way of thinking has so captured us that we do not ask what the object of privacy is. In a sense this means that the privacy debate is left in a Cartesian model. Just as Descartes argued that we could doubt everything and find a solid foundation for our belief, the privacy advocate will argue that we can protect privacy in order to safeguard our selfhood or identity.

In fact it seems as if it is quite reasonable to assume that it is the other way around. Wittgenstein points out that in order to doubt something we need to first believe it. (See e.g. *On Certainty* 160) Belief precedes doubt. It is exactly the same with privacy and identity. In order to have privacy we first need something to protect, an identity. The same order as Wittgenstein suggests in the pair doubt-belief is appropriate also in the case of privacy and identity. In order to have privacy you need to have an identity, a set of facts that can be disclosed, behavior that can be said to be about you. It is impossible to imagine someone who has perfect privacy, much as it is impossible to imagine someone that doubts everything and believes nothing.

In many ways it seems that we must know much more about how identity is formed in language games in order to be able to think about how we best protect privacy. This leads to another observation.

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## Privacy and *echte Dauer*

How does it feel to lose privacy? Does the loss of privacy feel like pain? Or more like sorrow or expectation? Wittgenstein uses a specific term to describe the difference between different kinds of experiences, and says that pain has what he calls *echte Dauer*, or real duration (*Zettel* 81-82). The notion, here, is that we can say when pain starts and stops. But we cannot say when we lost our privacy or point to a moment in time when our sorrow suddenly ceased to exist.

This observation tells us something about privacy that is important. It is embedded in a series of practices, in a series of actions over *time*. And it is the same thing with identity. Our identity is built over time by many different people. Just as there is no private language, there is no private formation of identity. Our identity is constituted with others in the stories we tell. As Paul Ricoeur (1992) has observed identity is "narrative", a view that I think is close to how Wittgenstein would have thought of identity. Just as theology is the grammar of "God", identity becomes the grammar of "me".

If this is true our privacy is also something that we establish or lose over time, it is a certain lack of control over how our identity is built, over the language games that are about us. This definition of privacy, in fact, allows us to understand why privacy is so complicated in a modern communication society. It is not only about states, companies and the collection of data, it is about the power over language games in society.

In many ways that is increasingly becoming the main public policy issue that we engage in, and that we need to understand in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The power over language games also impacts free expression, copyright and liabilities in this new world. How we assign that power, and how we sanction it, the control we allow others to exercise over language becomes our legal world's boundaries.

The notion of *echte Dauer* also allows us to understand how we can observe privacy harms. It is over time, in the behavior of someone, their reluctance to do certain things, to take risks and to participate in society. The loss of privacy is discernable in changes of the patterns of behavior we exhibit over time. You can see how someone changes his or her behavior and say "he has lost his privacy". But there is no way to observe a single moment in time and make that determination.

Privacy is embedded in time and not a concept that can be understood as discrete.

## Identity, privacy, law and technology

In order to complete our grammar of privacy we also need to start sketching the broad outline of how new technologies change the way privacy and identity interact in language. This is really a larger project, understanding how technological change is absorbed by language, but we can sketch a quick outline here.

Wittgenstein approaches language very much as embodied practice. We see that for example in paragraph 2 in *Philosophical Investigations* where he describes a language game as a practice where A asks B about slabs in a builder's game. The paragraph serves as a useful starting point for our sketch:

The philosophical notion of meaning is at home in a primitive idea of the way language functions. But one might instead say that it is the idea of a language more primitive than ours.

Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right. The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building stones: those are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass him the stones and to do so in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they make use of a language consisting of the words "block", "pillar", "slab", "beam". A calls them out; B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. – Conceive of this as a complete primitive language.

The legal system is, in itself, a very peculiar language game in which there are many mechanisms meant to simplify and turn our ambiguous everyday language into something more precise. Legal definitions, analysis of precedent and other elements in the legal system strive to make this a game that can be played consistently. Indeed, a legal system that could not simplify and come to a conclusion would be useless to us. We use the legal system to disambiguate. That is why we have a need of binary categories in the legal system. As Niklas Luhmann (2008) has observed, the legal system needs to be able to process the world of phenomena and classify them with a binary method: legal or illegal. If a legal system allows for things that are alegal and is unable to handle, for example, new practices or technologies, it quickly becomes useless.

It is actually possible to argue that the same holds for any language game. If a language game is not able to handle the introduction of something new and breaks down it would not be very useful. This ability of a language game to adapt to and absorb a changing world is actually quite amazing. When Wittgenstein says that the use of a word stands in need of a justification that everybody understands (PI 261) he makes exactly this point. Something that was entirely new, devoid of any connections to any game could not be understood. It would be private, nonsensical.

Here is something I think is important. Language games, language, abhor the lack of meaning. All innovation is necessarily understood in the light of what already exists. There is nothing reflective about this, it just happens. Law is not unique here, this holds for all language games.

Let's combine this idea with that of grammar. Wittgenstein writes "Essence is expressed by grammar [...] Grammar tells what kind of object anything is." (PI 371, 373) One way of understanding the question of how technology and law interact would be to say that law is forced to understand new technologies with old grammar, and to organize the new practices opened by innovation into existing categories.

Lastly, Wittgenstein notes that grammar is not abstract (PI 23), but embedded in the activity that speaking a language is. It is a form of life.

Our theory can then be quickly sketched with these three concepts: technology changes our forms of life, and thus the grammar of our concepts. That affects our language

games and when the language games are less adaptable, less flexible, like the legal language game, tensions arise that are difficult to resolve. In *On Certainty* 65 Wittgenstein writes:

When language games change, then there is a change in concepts, and with the concepts the meanings of words change.

I would suggest that one way language games change is through technological change, and that we need to understand this process more in-depth to also understand what happens with the concepts of identity and privacy. One example of this will suffice to show what kinds of analysis we should engage in. Take the word "location". It used to refer to something quite imprecise, and difficult to capture. With new global position technologies we can capture, save and store locations and so we have changed the meaning of the concept, the word and ultimately the language game, and we have introduced this concept in language games about individuals, they now can have location attached to them, they can check in and store and share their locations in different ways.

A thorough examination of how technological change changes our language games of identity and privacy is an important project for the philosophy of technology and law going forward, I believe.

## Privacy and law

The way we regulate privacy reflect a very different understanding of the concept, than that we have sketched here. In European law the focus of the legislation is on the processing of data and on data subjects. The basic rules state that such processing can only happen if the data subjects consent to the processing, or one of a number of legitimate grounds for processing exist in the individual case. The image that this gives of privacy is a privacy that is made up by individual small pieces of data and privacy is protected only if the processing of that data is limited overall.

This conceptual structure comes with a number of different problems.

First, it seems to assume that privacy is discrete, that the collection of data in a binary fashion is a threat to privacy. As we have seen this is not true. As we tell stories of each other, or engage in language games where we narrate the other, we engage in building their identity as well as selectively shaping the privacy an individual is afforded in that context. The collection and processing of data is necessary for both processes, and very little seems to be gained by imposing a limit on data collection.

Secondly, the conceptual structure is one where there are data subjects and data processors, and they are thought to be different. In reality we are all a little of both. The special and limiting cases of corporations collecting data for advertising or better services (think doctors, lawyers, banks and other advisors) or the state imposing technologies of surveillance are important cases to regulate, but the law makes no distinction between all the different participants in the identity language games.

Thirdly, the notion that consent is the basis of shaping privacy seems to imply that all individuals have the ability to predict the outcome of these language games and to understand what their participation will lead to. That does seem an optimistic view of how social contexts shape identity, and hardly one that helps, not least since it seems to leave the individual responsible for his or her privacy

alone. The more realistic case seems to be one where there is a collective responsibility for the agreed on levels of control over your identity that a community will tend towards.

In summary this view of a human being as a set of discrete data bits, which can be processed with consent, is far removed from the more liquid and integrated way that privacy and identity are entangled in our life forms.

### Some conclusions

The current debate about privacy is focused on privacy without discussion of identity, and largely ignores the important element of time in understanding the formation of identity and the protection of privacy. Both of these shortcomings risk creating a confusing and unsatisfactory debate.

That does not mean that privacy is – by any stretch of the imagination – an unimportant subject. Quite the contrary. I think that the notion of privacy factors into some of the most fundamental human ethical concerns. Our right to exert a certain control over how we are used in language games and how we acquire meaning in society is a basic pre-requisite for a democratic society – but our current discussion lead us to spend more time on thinking about how to limit data collection, than on thinking about how our identities are formed in and our privacy given by the language games where we are the objects of the game, and how these games are forever changed by technology.

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# On the Idea of Analysis in the Late Wittgenstein

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Wittgenstein is committed to the idea of analysis in the *Tractatus*. His logical analysis aims to reveal a hidden form of the proposition in terms of ultimate elements and their mutual logical relations. Wittgenstein abandoned this metaphysical commitment in his late philosophy. The aim of this paper is to show that Wittgenstein put forward a restricted idea of analysis throughout his philosophical writings. This idea relies on two theoretical distinctions. The first is that between cause and reason and the second between external and internal relations. I shall argue that the former distinction is a special case of the latter and so, for our purposes, we can take it as one fundamental difference. This difference might be confused in the surface grammar. The aim of Wittgenstein's analysis is to reveal the difference. Finally, I will indicate some philosophical problems that can be surmounted using this difference.

It is often argued – even by the most *resolute* interpreters<sup>1</sup> – that in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein is committed to the idea of analysis. In this respect, he was inspired by Russell's treatment of propositions containing definite descriptions. For Russell an analysis is “the discovery of the constituents and the manner of combination of a given complex” (Russell 1984: 119). This manner of combination of a complex proposition is its logical form, whose revelation is the goal of logical analysis. The logical form is given in terms of ultimate elements and their mutual logical relations. Wittgenstein adopted this idea with one important difference. While Russell was convinced that ordinary language does not need to reflect the proper logical form, for Wittgenstein ordinary language was perfectly in order. Ordinary language has to be, according to Russell, transformed into a logically ideal language in order to reflect the proper logical form. His logical analysis starts from ordinary language and proceeds to ideal language, from which the logical form can be derived. Wittgenstein did not see any need for this intermediate step. His logical analysis derives the logical form from ordinary language. Indeed, Wittgenstein maintained that a “proposition has one and only one complete analysis” (TLP 3.25).

Wittgenstein repudiated much of this picture in his later philosophy. The ultimate goal of a philosophical investigation is to clear away misunderstandings that can be caused by false analogies between different regions of language. In order to dismantle a false analogy, some expressions can be removed or substituted for other expressions. This method may be called “analysis” only in a derived sense (see PI § 90). Such an analysis bears no metaphysical commitment to ultimate logical elements and actually to the whole idea of one and only one correct logical form. Wittgenstein wrote indeed that “nothing is hidden” (PI § 435).

I would like to argue that false analogies and *ipso facto* philosophical misunderstandings may be caused by ambiguous words and sentences and, further, that it was Wittgenstein's intention to tackle such ambiguities. To do so, first one has to detect an ambiguity and, second, there has to be a rule to resolve the ambiguity. Sometimes it is enough to point out that an expression causing problems

is ambiguous. But even this presupposes a generic distinction that makes it possible to detach separate meanings. In what follows I will examine two such distinctions in Wittgenstein's works.

## Cause and reason

The distinction between cause and reason can be found in Wittgenstein's remarks from the 1930s onwards.<sup>2</sup> It has proved to be a very powerful tool to surmount philosophical problems. First, take a look at expressions that could be ambiguous this way. The conjunction “because” may introduce a statement of the cause or of the reason. The conjunction “why” has the same ambiguity. Even the word “cause” itself shows the cause-reason ambiguity. Consider the following examples from Wittgenstein's *Lecture and Conversations on Aesthetics*:

- ‘Cause’ is used in very many different ways, e.g.
- (1) “What is the cause of unemployment?” “What is the cause of this expression?” [Experiment and statistics]
  - (2) “What was the cause of your jumping?” “That noise.” [Reason]
  - (3) What was the cause of that wheel going round?” You trace a mechanism. [Mechanism] (LA 1966 II.12)

Wittgenstein wants to reserve the expression “cause” for a (relation of) mechanical causality between two events. A cause in this sense can be found statistically or by tracing an underlying mechanism. The relation of “being a reason for” connects two propositions. Apart from the reason, Wittgenstein speaks sometimes of the *motive* or the *ground*.<sup>3</sup> Between a proposition and its reason there must be a conceptual (logical or even mathematical, e.g. a calculation) relation. Let me outline the differences between these two sorts of relations. One could say that a proposition *somewhat* contains its reason unlike a cause, which is not contained in its effect. The cause-effect-relation is only probabilistic; a cause and its effect are only cases of comitance. This is true when we arrived at this relation statistically, but also when we know the mechanism. A logical relation of having a reason is, on the other hand, rigid and strict. Here is an example:

“I write the number '16' here because it says 'x<sup>2</sup>' there.” It might appear that some causality was operating here, but that would be a confusion between ‘reason’ and ‘cause’. (PG § 61)

If I calculate the second power of four, the result will be 16, because this is the correct way of performing this opera-

<sup>2</sup> The identification or unification of cause and reason is embodied in the Latin expression “causa sive ratio” of modern times which can be found in Spinoza or Leibniz. They used this expression *inter alia* in formulating the *Principle of Sufficient Reason*, which states that “everything must have reason or cause”. Schopenhauer, who might have inspired Wittgenstein here, in his dissertation *The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* accuses the philosophical tradition of confusing different kinds of reasons.

<sup>3</sup> “The difference between the grammars of ‘reason’ and ‘cause’ is quite similar to that between the grammars of ‘motive’ and ‘cause’.” (BBB, 15) “Or is the previous experience the cause of my certainty, not its ground?” (PI § 325)

<sup>1</sup> See Conant/Diamond 2004: 82.

tion, i.e. this result is in accordance with the rule of squaring. I might, however, make a mistake, because I did not pay much attention to the calculation. There is a certain probability of making a mistake. The first "because" introduces a reason, the second one a cause. That the second power of four is sixteen holds with certainty. And again, the mistake also has a ground: The second power of four is not 17 because this violates the rule of squaring (see OC § 74).

The next dissimilarity between reason and cause, which can hardly be overstressed, is that not all propositions need to have a reason as opposed to all events having a cause or causes.<sup>4</sup> Wittgenstein writes: "A reason can only be given *within* a game. The links of the chain of reasons come to an end, at the boundary of the game. (Reason and cause.)" (PG § 97) There are propositions that cannot (or do not need to) be justified within a given language-game: "And this again joins on to the confusion between cause and reason. We *need have no reason to follow the rule as we do*. The chain of reasons has an end." (BBB, 143) Rules are precisely propositions we do not need to give reasons for – in a given language-game. This does not exclude the possibility that there could be a reason required in another language-game. The chain of reasons reaches (sooner or later) the boundary of a language-game. If this boundary were exceeded than it would be nonsense or at least another language-game. This implies that there could be unexplainable facts.<sup>5</sup>

Wittgenstein uses this difference to cope with philosophical confusions. Let me mention some of these: (1) The meaning of a word is for him given in the explanation of meaning. The same word might be connected with a characteristic sensation. There is the cause-effect relation between the uttering of a word and its characteristic sensation, but an explanation of meaning might give a reason for the uttering of the word (PG: 60). (2) Pleasure is not a sensation, for pleasure is always "in something", which means it has a reason. Between a sensation and pleasure is only the cause-effect relation (Z § 507). (3) Wittgenstein sees no way for causal relations to achieve the certainty of logical relations. This would presuppose a sort of super-mechanism – that is, a mechanism that cannot break down. Our mind is, however, no such super-mechanism. Therefore, mechanical processes in our brains cannot explain the rigidity of human reasoning (LA 1966 II.23ff).

## Internal and external relations

The terminology of internal and external relations was common among Wittgenstein's philosophical colleagues in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Most significantly, Russell and Moore argued against Neo-Hegelians that all relations cannot be internal. The distinction plays a very central role in Wittgenstein's early *Notebooks* and in the *Tractatus* as well. Wittgenstein defines an internal relation (and internal property) so that "it is unthinkable that its object [or objects] should not possess it." (TLP 4.123). There lies an internal relation between language and the world in the heart of the *Tractatus*. Internal relations persist, however, between (typically) two structures as abstract objects, i.e. forms (4.122). Therefore, what an expression (a sign) shares with reality is its logical form.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Wittgenstein hereby denies the Principle of Sufficient Reason for propositions and facts while he preserves the Principle for material objects and events.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. PI § 1: "Explanations come to an end somewhere."

<sup>6</sup> "Since language stands in internal relations to the world, it and these relations determine the logical possibility of facts. If we have a significant sign it must stand in a particular internal relation to a structure. Sign and relation

There is elementary disagreement among scholars concerning this internal relation of depicting. According to the traditional (metaphysical) readings of the *Tractatus*, this internal relation connects the logical structure of language and the logical form of the world, which comprises how elementary objects are combined in states of affairs. According to recent opposite approaches, the relation of depicting persists between a sign and what it signifies (the anti-metaphysical approach, McGinn) or the distinction between internal and external relations as such is inconsistent (the resolute reading, Diamond).<sup>7</sup> Although I believe the textual evidence supports rather the traditional metaphysical view, the metaphysical and anti-metaphysical views can be reconciled here. Consider once again Wittgenstein's remark quoted in footnote 6. A sign signifies something due to its internal property (i.e. unary relation), which is identical (i.e. related by the internal relation of identity) to the same property of a state of affairs.

Whatever the case may be, Wittgenstein in his late philosophy conceives internal relations within language only. Already in the *Tractatus* (4.123), he gives an example of an internal relation between two color shades. Much later in his last *Remarks on Colour* (§ 1), he points out that the same proposition may express an internal as well as an external relation. The proposition "X is lighter than Y" could be a temporal proposition expressing an external relation between two objects or an internal relation between two color shades. Wittgenstein varies this example in other places: A similarity between two faces could be an external relations between two men or an internal relation between two shapes (LW I § 155nn). The outward form of the proposition is the same. The proposition is, however, ambiguous with respect to the expression of an internal or external relation. This ambiguity occurs and causes confusion only if one treats such a proposition in insolation. If a sufficient context of a language-game were provided, no such confusion could arise.

Thus, a given proposition can express an internal relation in one language-game and an external relation in another. For a relation to be internal, it must express internal properties of language or of a language-game. Propositions expressing internal relations are, strictly speaking, not genuine propositions at all. They are expressing rules of a language-game. To put it simply, internal relations are directed to language, external relations to what language is about. To reveal this, in conclusion, is the ultimate goal of logical or linguistic analysis, which Wittgenstein always maintained.

An internal relation is a conceptual relation, since it holds between language forms, and there must be operations transforming one form into another and revealing that these forms are, in fact, identical. Then the relation between a proposition and its reason must be an internal relation, for it is conceptual and such a connection cannot be contingent. On the other hand, the cause-effect relation holds between separate objects or events and thus must be external. The cause-effect relation is actually an instance of external relation par excellence.

Like the reason-cause distinction, Wittgenstein used this more general and abstract distinction between internal and external relations to make philosophical problems clear. Here are the most important ones: (1) Russell's causal account of intention is based on external relations. Hence, intention and its object are, for him, distinct objects or events. Wittgenstein maintains, to the contrary, that there

determine unambiguously the logical form of the thing signified." (TB 25.4.15, p. 42)

<sup>7</sup> For an overview see McGinn 2010.

must be an internal relation of identity: "For expecting that *p* will be the case must be the same as expecting that this expectation will be fulfilled" (PB 1975, 25: 65).<sup>8</sup> (2) Mathematical calculations demonstrate internal properties of structures (RFM I, 99) rather than external properties of objects. The relation between a mathematical proposition and its proof is an internal one (RFM VII, 6ff). (3) The importance of the phenomenon of seeing-as lies in the fact that some apparent descriptions of objects (i.e. ascribing external properties) are actually expressions of internal relations. If one sees a picture of a rabbit as a duck, then it is a case of perceiving an internal relation between this rabbit-shape and the concept of a duck – or a duck-shape. (See PI II: 212.)

Acknowledgement: Supported by research grant no. P401/11/P174 of the Czech Science Foundation.

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<sup>8</sup> Cf. „It is in language that an expectation and its fulfillment make contact.“ (PI § 445)

# Waismann; not Vagueness! Reconsidering the Philosophy of Friedrich Waismann

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Friedrich Waismann is known as a spokesman of Ludwig Wittgenstein. He recorded detailed discussions on various topics between Wittgenstein, Moritz Schlick and himself and he wrote a first extensive introduction to Wittgenstein's philosophy. However, this was the time of close collaboration with Wittgenstein in Vienna before the Second World War. In 1936 Wittgenstein broke tie and Schlick, Waismann's all-important mentor, was assassinated. In 1938 he emigrated to the United Kingdom and from 1939 until his death in 1959, he lived and lectured in Oxford. Little is known about these two decades of Waismann's life. He had to cope with a completely different intellectual environment, which alienated him in various respects. Nevertheless, he started dealing with the ordinary language philosophy of the time in Oxford; he turned towards old passions for poetry and wrote numerous poems and aphorisms; he elaborated further on topics dealing with the philosophy of physics and mathematics and he became a resolute critic of logical positivism as well as of Wittgenstein's early and later philosophy. From this period only one idea has remained closely associated with Waismann: the concept of *open texture*.

The idea of open texture is in turn closely associated with the problem of vague terms. In his book on vagueness, Timothy Williamson (1996) counts Waismann's concept among other attempts to frame this problem and states that it fails to provide a satisfying solution. Stewart Shapiro draws on Waismann's idea and bases his book *Vagueness in Context* (2008) on the concept of open texture to tackle problems with the relation between the amount of hair on a man's head and the proper employment of a vague predicate like 'bald'. His answer combines David Lewis' idea of a *conversational scope*, i.e. the sum of agreements and commitments in a particular conversation, and Shapiro's own account of open texture, which describes the possibility of competent speakers to attribute different predicates to the same object in unsettled cases of attribution: "The rules of language use, as they are fixed by what we say and do, allow someone to go either way. Let us call this the *open-texture* thesis. [...] As I see it, open-texture is a more or less empirical claim about the proper use of vague terms in language. [...] My purpose is to provide a formal framework that accords with open-texture, and let the entire package stand on its merits." (Shapiro 2008) Since Shapiro works with his own definition of open texture, my objection does not touch his project on vagueness. However, to me the very term of open texture seems to suffer from the indefiniteness in meaning it denotes. As I see it, open texture is an empiricist claim and Waismann did not provide an insufficient or inchoate characterization of vagueness, because he never intended to.

My argument in this paper is as follows: a) the concept of open texture is an element in Waismann's broader conception of *language strata*. b) The notion of language strata is crucially inspired by Carl Friedrich Gauss' *theorema egregium* and by Gilbert Ryle's views on language and philosophical method. c) Therefore, the current notion of open texture lacks awareness of its original purpose. Waismann touched on the idea of 'grouping' sentences

according to different logical behaviour as early as in 1936 in Vienna. What he had in mind was the difference between an empirical statement and a hypothesis, both of which can nevertheless be expressed by the same sentence. My assumption is that Waismann's later elaboration of this idea was inspired by Gilbert Ryle. He introduces the topic of language strata in 1946 in a short outline of the history of the philosophy of language from Berkeley to Wittgenstein and continues: "I would rather call attention to a new stage towards which, it seems to me, the present development moves. Instead of going only into individual cases of word usage, we may approach the matter in a more general way: we may ask ourselves if philosophical questions arise, so to speak, at random or whether some broad principle can be discovered in the way they are arranged on the language map." (Waismann 1968)

The most explicit exposition of such a proposal I was able to find is Ryle's inauguration speech as Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy titled *Philosophical Arguments* in 1945 in Oxford; the year before Waismann published *Language Strata*. Ryle's famous claim is that philosophical problems are problems of a special kind, not ordinary problems with a special subject matter. He compares the philosopher to a cartographer who comes to a village, not to map merely the church, but to "put together in one map all the salient features of the area: the church, the bridge, the railway, the parish boundary, and perhaps the contours." (Ryle 1971) Furthermore, the cartographer knows how to join her depiction with maps of the neighbouring areas and how to coordinate them along with the standards of measurement and corresponding instruments. If she does a bad job, her studies will result in cartographical contradictions. Analogous to this, the philosopher avoids bad reasoning by checking her ideas against a *reductio ad absurdum*. Both, however, should end up in a coherent synoptic representation. "The discovery of the logical type to which a puzzle-generating idea belongs is the discovery of the rules governing the valid arguments in which propositions embodying that idea (or any other idea of the same type) can enter as premisses or conclusions. It is also the discovery of the general reasons why specific fallacies result from misattributions of it to specific types. In general the former discovery is only approached through the several stages of the latter." (Ryle 1971) I consider this to be a plausible match to Waismann's suggestion, although he never mentions Ryle (or any other author) in this respect.

Moreover, I consider *Language Strata* to be a rigorous revision as well as an ambitious continuation of Ryle's proposal. On the one hand, Waismann adopts his notion of *systematic ambiguity* and the idea of an abstract and all-encompassing approach towards language, and on the other, he strongly rejects the *reductio ad absurdum* argument as an adequate criterion. Instead, he widens the task by introducing the language strata of laws of nature, material object statements, sense-datum statements, statements describing a dream, a blurred memory picture, sentences which occur in a novel, a geometrical proposition, etc. Roughly speaking, it seems as if he sticks to the idea

of mapping the whole of language use, but substitutes the picture of a two-dimensional correctness with a three-dimensional framing: strata. Abruptly Waismann goes on: "It was a memorable achievement of mathematical thought when Gauss succeeded in characterizing a curved surface merely 'from within' without any reference to space outside, which amounted to this, that he showed that if two-dimensional beings were living on the surface of a sphere, an egg or a wine-glass, etc., they could learn the 'intrinsic geometry' of their habitation without any reference to three-dimensional space." (Waismann 1968)

This sudden move in Waismann's theory is a popular illustration of Gauss' *theorema egregium*: a theorem from cartography. He explains his notion of language strata by reference to a mathematical distinction: if in geometry we want to study the behaviour of a curve we can either search for *local* properties at a particular point, i.e. whether there is a tangent, whether it is continuous, what its measure of curvature is and so on, or we can study the curve *globally* as a whole and ask whether it is closed or convex, etc. Waismann now supposes that such a distinction is also viable for a non-deductive phenomenon, such as a natural language. Gauss' theorem states that the local study of a surface leads to its intrinsic geometry, the Gaussian curvature, which remains invariant if the surface is developed upon any other surface. A vivid demonstration of this is the experiment in which a sheet of paper is wrapped around a tennis ball. The different curvature of the surfaces results in the crumpling of the paper. This curvature can be found without any reference to the three-dimensional coordinate system of Euclidean space. By integrating bigger and bigger intervals it is possible to describe the whole surface. "Now the analogous problem in our case would be this: Can a given language stratum be characterized, not by reference to something outside the subject-matter by dubbing it 'material object', 'memory picture' or the like, but by purely formal motifs?" (Waismann 1968) I would explain this suggestion as follows: 1) The intrinsic curvature on the geometry-side of the analogy corresponds to the *formal motifs* of strata on the language-side. 2) The means of embedding of extrinsic curvature, e.g. the Euclidean space, correspond to the subject matter of a language stratum. (Accordingly the definition of the formal motifs might be extrinsic while they themselves are intrinsic properties of language strata. This is why Gauss named his theorem *egregium* 'remarkable'.) To reduce (concepts from) one language stratum to another, such as material object statements to sense-data statements or descriptions of mental phenomena to descriptions of behaviour, means to distort the intrinsic characteristics of language like the sheet of paper around the tennis ball. Instead, we have to make decisions and projections like we do with our atlases where we either have correct angles or correct sizes of the areas. Consequently Waismann states his idea: "What I now suggest we do – and this is a programme for the future – is to reverse the whole situation by saying: 'The formal motifs which we have been considering all combine to impress a certain stamp on a stratum; they give us the means to characterize each stratum "from within", that is with no reference to the subject'." (Waismann 1968)

Two questions remain open. Firstly, intrinsic curvature is a local measure of surfaces, while formal motives are meant to be global characteristics of language strata. I cannot explain this asymmetry (if it is significant and I am right so far), but maybe Waismann intended to clarify this point before he died unforeseeably. Secondly, what are formal motifs? The answer to this relies on Waismann's further elaborations on the philosophy of language and

mathematics, so I can only mention the upshot of this material and his own list from a private notebook I found in his Nachlass in Oxford. (1) The sort of logic, e.g. the number of values. (2) The completeness of description, e.g. a building as opposed to a game of chess in a corresponding notation. (3) The paths of verification among and within language strata. (4) Whether a complete verification is possible. (5) Whether the fundamental logical unit of a language stratum is a statement or a class of statements, i.e. whether vague statements are permissible. And most importantly, (6) what is the structure of the concepts involved, i.e. whether the concepts are of an open texture. Hence, I claim that *open texture was at a significant and most elaborated stage in the development of this idea thought of as a global characteristic of language strata*.

Finally, there is a second route to defend this reading of open texture. Already in his Viennese introduction to the philosophy of Wittgenstein, *Logik, Sprache, Philosophie*, we find a chapter by Waismann on vagueness. It starts with "We do not consider [...] the class of typically uncertain concepts, which under the heading 'How many grains make up a heap of sand?' constitute from ancient times sceptic objections. The vagueness we have in mind is of a different, less striking nature." (Waismann 1976, translation by author) He continues by discussing proper names and natural kind terms and I think this is consistent with his later examples for open texture: "Suppose I have to verify a statement such as 'There is a cat next door'; suppose I go over to the next room, open the door, look into it and actually see a cat. Is this enough to prove my statement? Or must I, in addition to it, touch the cat, pat him and induce him to purr? And supposing that I had done all these things, can I then be absolutely certain that my statement was true? Instantly we come up against the well-known battery of sceptical arguments mustered since ancient times. What, for instance, should I say when that creature later on grew to a gigantic size? Or if it showed some queer behaviour usually not to be found with cats, say, if under certain conditions, it could be revived from death whereas normal cats could not? Shall I, in such a case say that a new species has come into being? Or that it was a cat with extraordinary properties?" (Waismann 1968) The next two examples are a repeatedly disappearing friend and a sample of gold with a new radiation. Any vagueness here? I cannot go into a detailed discussion, but according to my point of view the concept of open texture denotes the degree of the possibility for a concept to enter and adopt new and meaningful descriptions. Waismann might have introduced it as a means for an empiricist philosophy of language to account for speculative and sceptic reasoning absent of hard empirical evidence.

In short, we do not go either way with cats. There is no openness with the attribution of 'cat' to a particular cat, which has to be settled from conversation to conversation. To speak with Shapiro's terminology, open texture is a feature not of unsettled cases, but it is, on the contrary, a settled case which can evade our descriptions by speculation, sceptical reasoning, science fiction, fantasy, research, and so on. We either speak of this concrete cat or of its smile wended up in the tree as with Lewis Carroll's cat. Waismann points out, that our best descriptions will not prevent any cat from smiling at us before it disappears.

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# All Truths are not to be Told. An Epistemological Reflection on the Concept of Legal Truth

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## 1. The concept of truth according to Susan Haack

A trial to specify the concept of truth so that it can be used in the legal language may raise doubts or be treated with reserve. However, a kind of anxiety and care for the truth motivates people to address this problem. Susan Haack has put many observations about the issue of truth in her article *The Unity of Truth and the Plurality of Truths*. She claims: "There is one truth-concept, but many true propositions; whether a proposition is true or false (or neither) is an objective matter; our efforts to discover truths about the world are fallible – the conclusions here are simple enough, in a way. But the arguments needed to reach these conclusions, far from being simple and one-dimensional, are complex and twisting, sometimes technical, sometimes subtle." (Haack 2008a). The author emphasizes that the fact of holding erroneous beliefs (one's own or somebody else's), which in a particular context are true or not, not necessarily leads to the conclusion that the truth is dependent on such factors as culture, context or time.

In principle, parties to legal proceedings are in dispute. Generally speaking, the parties to or participants in any legal proceedings present a so-called "their truth". In other words, they claim what is true to them and not anyone else. In this way we express our beliefs. It is a subjective and one-sided view of some events or the actual state of affairs. However, it would be a mistake to claim that a subjective use of the concept of truth excludes the validity of the concept of universal truth. Obviously, contradictory statements may not be at the same time true. In this respect, the truth is not dependent on the point of view but on what we accept as true, what we believe in and are convinced of. To be more precise, a belief and truth are two different, though not too distant, concepts.

As S. Haack believes, we may talk about the plurality of truths e.g. in the context of many different and at the same time true claims, statements or beliefs. A set of such truths can include the statements about a legal system or, broadly speaking, legal order. Though, it does not change the fact that there is only one unambiguous and non-relative concept of truth. It is in conformity with a classical Aristotle's understanding of this term i.e. the judgment is in line with the actual state of affairs. Therefore, S. Haack claims that the variety of true statements and ways of using the truth does not require many concepts of truth (Haack 2008a). The thesis on the plurality of truths and only one truth is to emphasize the difference between many existing language conventions as well as ways of using the truth and only one objective truth-concept.

We should notice the fact that the entities within a particular legal system are not always interested in discovering the truth. This phenomenon concerns both the plaintiff and the defendant. First of all, investigating officers and prosecutors whose job is to detect crimes and catch the perpetrators do not need to feel obliged to go to extremes to establish all facts. The aim of the investigation to is

gather a sufficient amount of evidence to incriminate an alleged criminal. Secondly, evidence proving quite the opposite will suffice the suspect. In other words, discovering the truth may be troublesome (requires time and means) or is simply unnecessary. It is quite paradoxical from the epistemological point of view. We may ask ourselves what criteria of truth are employed in law and whether the truth in courtroom may be cognizable. What is more, many ethical issues arise. How should we judge the decisions that are taken on the basis of incomplete data?

It can also be claimed that the concept of truth is nothing more than a rhetorical expression used by society. Pursuant to this approach, the truth is used only to sustain the esteem accorded to the law. Within this classical meaning, the truth is the perfection you strive for, but almost never reach. It is replaced by the truth that is relative to a specific system. In this case, it is the legal system that is organized according to certain norms and regulations. An extreme example of such truths is a legal fiction while a less extreme one could be a presumption of law. As it stems from the above, the entities responsible for the plurality of truths are the institutions that enact and enforce the law. That being so, the concept of one truth, which is postulated and supported by S. Haack, amounts to ideological manipulation. In this sense, discovering the objective truth is a type of a theoretical assumption. It can be used for analysis and description of a legal system, but it does not play a key role in courtroom.

## 2. The principle of adversary proceedings and legal truth

The principle of adversary proceedings is sometimes referred to as trial by combat. It is one of the primary principles used in civil and criminal proceedings. It is present both in the continental codified law and common law that is based on precedents (though there are many exceptions to this rule). Certainly, it is an oversimplification. The aforementioned principle assumes that the parties are in dispute i.e. they present contradictory views. Because of this fact, they are to prove their arguments in front of an impartial judge. According to the principle of adversary proceedings, the trial takes form of a dispute between two parties with equal rights before an independent judge. This type of proceedings is believed to be the most successful. It enables the parties to fight for their rights and interests in free dispute. A party is no longer an entity with no subjectivity that is manipulated by the judicial bodies. Generally speaking, the activity of the carriers of rights should create favorable conditions for solving the case and discovering the objective truth.

If we reject the most important elements of accusatorial system, it will negatively affect the realization of the above function. This approach undermines the objectivity and may be argued with the lack of rationality as well as lead to unjust judgments. It should also be underlined that the principle of adversary proceedings is employed in different forms with a different level intensity. In its extreme form,

the court does not conduct evidentiary proceedings nor does it provide information to the parties. It means that the core of the analyzed information are the actual statements and evidence presented by the parties. In line with the principle of adversary proceedings, the parties have the right to respond to the evidence presented by the opposing party. In other words, the parties in dispute give statements about certain facts, oppose the motions and statements put forward by their opponents. The parties should have equal rights in this matter. This approach allows for mutual completion, control and balance. As it can be seen from above, this principle burdens the parties with additional trial duties.

The main goal of adversary proceedings is discovering the legal truth. In the legal language it is the knowledge that is in line with the actual state of affairs. It stands in opposition to the procedural (formal) truth i.e. the knowledge that is based on presumptions, a legal fiction or settlements between the parties. The intention of the legislator was to see the parties fight and consequently present relevant information. Next, the content is blended by an impartial arbiter. The final effect of such process is the overall picture of the events.

### 3. The consequences of using legal conventions

It is an ideal, though it does not always work in practice. Haack undertakes to perform an epistemological analysis of the truth in order to defend its notion of objectivity. The author claims that the truth is independent of the beliefs. One objective truth co-exists with many true and false convictions. Even though it is indivisible and non-graduated, expressions used in the language may suggest quite the opposite. The following examples illustrate this phenomenon: "more true", "close to the truth", "indirectly true", "partly true". Haack notices that such language leads to accepting incomplete information and treating it as true knowledge. She writes: "The most obvious way of telling less than the whole relevant truth is simply to omit relevant information [...]" (Haack 2008c). One of the consequences of this approach is the depreciation of the status of truth in law. In this sense we would rather find the truth in "legal theory" than in "legal practice".

The problem of truth in law is also addressed by an American lecturer and expert in constitutional law – Jack M. Balkin. He claims that "[...] law's capacity to create truth and make things real is the flip side of its power. Law has power because it can make things true or false in ways that matter to us; conversely, law can make things true or false in ways that matter to us because it has power over us." (Balkin 2003). As Balkin emphasizes, the statements concerning law are true by virtue of legal conventions. He claims that law is a system of socially sanctioned conventions. This system creates legal categories which in turn allow for the assessment of particular states of affairs in the context of truth and falsehood. It must be assumed that such a situation leads to serious consequences also beyond the legal system.

As Balkin concludes, the process of creating the truth through the law is ongoing despite historical changes, though it is accompanied by the changes of norms and structures in the law itself. Nonetheless, the events do not have much of influence on the scope and strength of the effect of the legal system. Integration of legal order with everyday life leads to many consequences. One of them is regarding the legal truth and classically defined one as identical. Balkin believes that the law gives people tools

which can be used to understand social processes that surround individuals. Therefore, the law has a wide scope of influence that is still increasing. Despite this fact, as Balkin claims, this process is not to distort the truth but to disseminate it. Balkin says that the law "[...] not only colonizes the mind, it can also colonize other forms of knowledge" (Balkin 2003). The decisions of the court are commonly respected also because they are supported by the state authorities. We may agree with the author that legal norms are being more and more widely used in the fields of various sciences. We should also expect many consequences of this process in the field of epistemology and ethics.

Because of these reasons, factual findings in criminal and civil cases are of great importance. Nevertheless, discovering the truth in the courtroom is a difficult task. Problems start to occur during the preparatory proceedings. Investigators make mistakes while gathering evidence. Additional trouble are caused by recklessness and intentional mistakes. We are also aware that the evaluation of given information depends on the way in which it is presented. This view is supported by Carlson and Russo study on the biased interpretation of evidence by mock jurors (Carlson/Russo 2001) as well as Tversky and Kahneman study on how people make decisions under uncertainty (Tversky/Kahneman 1974). Social reality is extremely complicated. Haack writes: "In determining factual truth, in both criminal cases and civil, courts very often need to call on scientists [...] on just about every subject imaginable" (Haack 2008b). Unfortunately, science does not always know the answer. That is why, the law must suffice with proving facts to a certain extent of probability so that it is possible to make a reasonable decision. At the same time the legislator takes an explicit epistemological stand. Pursuant to the applicable legal order, the truth exists and it is cognizable. Current data on the subject of the problem of truth seem to undermine this view.

Summing up, we can arrive at a few conclusions:

1. There are many true and false beliefs but there is only one objective and independent from the point of view truth-concept.
2. Interests of the main ruling body and other entities in the legal proceedings are contradictory. The former cares about facts, while the latter reveal incomplete data.
3. Judicial practice and pragmatics forces the ruling bodies to make use of incomplete data. It is essential as the law is a system of conventions that shape human beliefs.
4. In the end, making the concept of truth more precise is necessary because of the unique status of the law. Statements deemed true or legitimate by the law affect other types of knowledge acquired by people.

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# „Fakten, Fakten und nochmals Fakten, aber keine Ethik“. Überlegungen zu Ethik und Normativität mit Wittgenstein und Christine Korsgaard

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Der *Vortrag über Ethik* (Wittgenstein 1989) nennt klar den Bezugspunkt ethischer Überlegungen nach dem *linguistic turn*: Faktenbezug, nicht Absolutheitsstreben ist die bleibende Referenz von Gedanken, die, nicht mehr im Banne der Dichotomie von Gut und Böse, den manichäischen Ausweg scheuen, um die sprachlich hergestellte Realität mit Begriffen zu beschreiben, die nicht vorgeben, diese Realität zu transzendieren.

Die Faktenbezogenheit der mit der *Lecture on Ethics* einzig noch möglichen Weise über ethische Belange zu sprechen, hat indes eine Kehr- und Rückseite, die wir als „Mystik“ in Wittgensteins Werk kennen (vgl. McGuinness 1966 (1989)); die *Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung* (1921/22) wird gleichsam gehalten von einer mystischen Klammer, dem, was wichtig ist und nicht gesagt werden kann, was dem Bereich des Schweigens zugehört und aufgewiesen wird oder den Gestus des Zeigens (Mersch 2001) braucht, um wahrnehmbar zu werden. Die These meiner Überlegungen ist, daß gerade diese Doppelstruktur erklärter Faktentreue und dem gleichzeitigen Wissen um die Macht des Unaussprechlichen, des Schweigens, zu einer bestimmten – nachmetaphysischen – Auffassung von Normativität führt, die hier skizziert werden soll. Die Schweigennotwendigkeit in Fragen, die *sub specie aeterni* gestellt werden und nicht der Tagesgesellschaft gelten, bringt eine Form von Geltung und normativer Absicherung der Gegenstände, denen Wert zugeschrieben wird, hervor, die der Orientierung an grammatischen, nicht mehr ontologisch-metaphysischen Standards in Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie entspricht.

## 1. Quellen der Normativität

Christine Korsgaard schreibt in *The Sources of Normativity*: “It is the most striking fact about human life that we have values. We think of ways that things could be better, more perfect, and so of course different, than they are; and of ways that we ourselves could be better, more perfect, and so of course different, than we are. Why should this be so? Where do we get these ideas that outstrip the world we experience and seem to call it into question, to render judgement on it, to say that it does not measure up, that it is not what it ought to be?” (Korsgaard 1995)

Wenn Korsgaard ihre Überlegungen über die Quellen der Normativität, die sie auf Konzepte von Aristoteles, Kant, Mill, Moore, Rawls, Wittgenstein und anderen rekurren lassen, durch eine Reihe von Fragen einleitet, ist damit eine Haltung ausgedrückt, die bereits dem Sprachgestus Ludwig Wittgensteins in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* (1953) nahe ist: Zwei (oder mehr) Stimmen sprechen miteinander, gegeneinander, mit sich selbst – keine Wahrheit wird autoritativ bekannt gemacht, als könne man nicht an ihr zweifeln. Stanley Cavell etwa unterschied zwischen *voice of temptation* und *voice of correctness*; beide Pole, der verführende und der normativ einholtende, sind in Wittgenstein fortwährendem Gespräch in den

Untersuchungen enthalten. Andere Interpreten sprechen vom „Gegner“ oder „interlocutor“; in jedem Fall geht es darum, kommunikative Gegebenheiten zu beschreiben, sie dialogisch auszuhandeln und nicht einfach zu behaupten. Der fragende Gestus Korsgaards einleitender Worte ist deshalb programmatisch für die Frage nach Ethik und Normativität im Werk Wittgensteins in einer Zeit, die nicht mehr nach der Essenz der Dinge, dem aristotelischen Wesenswas, dem Was-es-ist-dies-zu-sein (Aristoteles, Metaphysik, 988a) fragt, als sei dieses die ganze Wahrheit. Andere Antworttypen konturieren sich, wo Fragen anders gestellt werden: Korsgaards Frage nach den Quellen der Normativität weist bereits die spezifisch moderne Formulierung des Problems auf, die keine endgültigen Antworten mehr implizieren will. Das Problem von Normativität (und ihrer Quellen) wird vielmehr sichtbar in der Artikulation einer bestimmten Form von Dialogizität, die eine paradigmatische Darstellungsform modernen Denkens aufruft. Der neuzeitliche Mensch, der cartesianisch auf sich als *substantia* aufmerkte und an diesem Status – über den Zweifel, die Kraft der Natur oder das Wissen um die Mechanizität seiner Ausstattung – festhielt, verlor nach der Wendung zur Sprache die Fähigkeit von sich zu sprechen, als sei er zunächst allein. Nun wußte er sich eingebunden in eine mitunter fordernde, ideell verpflichtende Sozialität, die die Vorstellung von Gerechtigkeit individualisierte und zugleich den Subjekten nahelegte, von sich zu sprechen im Denken an den Anderen – Sozialraum war als Kommunikationsraum konstituiert. Das individuelle Sprechen (Performanz) geschah mit Blick auf jene Verknüpfungen von Regeln, die die Linie der Kompetenzen, die in einer Lerngeschichte angeeignet wurden, die weitgehend als Konfrontationsgeschehen begriffen wurde (PU 5). Korsgaards Bemerkungen zu den Quellen der Normativität, die in den Zusammenhang der Komplementarität von Individuum und Gesellschaft, Mikro- und Makrostruktur, Individualismus und Kollektivismus gestellt werden, erinnern daran, daß Werte, ethische Fragen, Fragen nach dem Guten nicht in Aussage- und Antwortform zu formulieren sind. Der fragende Gestus entspricht vielmehr ihrer relativen Qualität wie der Relativität der Werturteile, auf die sich die ethischen Fragen mit Wittgenstein einzig beziehen können, da „keine Faktenaussage [...] je ein absolutes Werturteil implizieren“ könnte (Wittgenstein 1989: 12). Diese notwendige Orientierung an relativen Werturteilen bedeutet auch eine andere Beurteilung der Quellen von Normativität. Die Quelle einer Norm kann als Ursprungsort der Entwicklung einer Semantik, einer sich langfristig qua sprachlicher Tradierung in den Sozialkörper einschreibenden Wertestruktur verstanden werden. Wenn nun das ethische Urteil nicht mehr in den Raum vorgestellter absoluter Werturteile gehört, müssen auch andere Vorstellungen von dessen Ätiologie gewonnen werden. Der vertikale Begriff einer fortschreitenden Entwicklung von der Tiefe zur Höhe hin, wird durch die Erfahrung einer gleichbleibenden Flächigkeit, einer Horizontalqualität des Begriffs ersetzt. „Quellen“ dagegen sind Fundierungen, die scheinbar nie versiegen, Ursprungsorte eines Wissens über Verhalten und Handeln, die selbst

jenseits des legitimatorischen Anspruchs zu stehen scheinen. Trotz des „criterion of explanatory adequacy“ (Korsgaard 1995: 3), das Korsgaard etwa in der von Hume ausgehenden Diskussion des Quellenproblems als positiv an den „moral ideas“ beschreibt, scheint die praktische Frage des moralischen Handelns von Adäquatheitskriterien wenig berührt zu sein. Die Frage, ob wir gerechtfertigt sind, zu tun, was wir tun, kommt zunächst nicht vor. Rechtfertigung scheint mehr zu verlangen als die Übereinstimmung zweier – kontingenter – Größen; sie stellt eine Reihenfolge unseres wünschbaren Verhaltens her, die als Erwartbarkeit normative Aufladung erfährt. Das Bedürfnis der Rechtfertigung (und Gerechtfertigkeit) unseres Handelns hat eine ethische Pointe, die eine umfassendere Übereinstimmung verlangt als die zwischen der Angemessenheit einer Erklärung im Verhältnis zu ihrem Gegenstand. Ethisch gerechtfertigt leben heißt, in Übereinstimmung mit einer Welt zu leben, die wir als unsere zu sehen gelernt haben. Lebensform- und weltbildrelativ mit anderen übereinstimmen zu können und sich in dieser Übereinstimmung zu finden ist die pragmatische Variante des Kriteriums der Erklärlungsangemessenheit der „moral ideas“ (Korsgaard). Wenn die Quellen der Normativität nicht mehr als unwandelbare angebbar sind, da sie im sich fortwährend verändernden Handeln gründen, wird zunächst ein Rechtfertigungsverlangen enttäuscht. (Die Stoßrichtung der neueren „resolute readings“ geht in diese Richtung: Die Rechtfertigungsrede wird gestört, indem Sätze, hier des *Tractaus*, als Therapie begriffen werden, deren Sinn darin besteht, sie als Äußerungsformen eines nicht mehr legitimatorischen Sprechens zu begreifen und die Leiter wegzuerwerfen.) Korsgaards Fragen greifen sozusagen die Idee der Erklärbarkeit an, die uns nicht mehr befriedigt. Auch eine genetische Erklärung moralischen Verhaltens etwa würde dieses nur erklären, nicht rechtfertigen. Diese Sichtweise hat eine Pointe, die jenes Individuum betrifft, das sich postneuzeitlich abhängen kam: „While it is true that a theory which cannot justify moral conduct normally also cannot explain why anyone [...] believes that theory acts morally. The basic philosophical problem here is not one of explanation. The case of the evolutionary theory shows that a theory could be adequate for the purpose of explanation and still not answer the normative question.“ (Korsgaard 1995: 5) In diesem Sinne ist Normativität bei Korsgaard die Frage nach der Vermittlung dringlicher Handlungsempfehlungen (und ihrer legitimen Anwendung); bloße Erklärungen, die formal zufriedenstellen, besitzen diese Dringlichkeit nicht und können ihr nicht entsprechen.

## 2. Ethik oder Normativität?

Wenn Korsgaard vor allem gelegen ist am persönlichen Bezug der moralischen Erklärung, ihrer Dimension von Erfahrbarkeit, muß es, im Falle der philosophischen Äußerung zur Ethik, wirklich jemanden geben, dem an einem ethischen Ratschlag gelegen ist. Wittgensteins Abneigung gegen die Ethik-Lehrbücher (die in einen Bereich des Schweigens vordringen, zu dessen Erläuterung sie nichts beitragen können) geht in diese Richtung: Ethische Erklärungen, mit aller szientifischen Aufladung des Wortes, die auf Traditionen der Wissenschaftsgeschichte rekurriert, laufen leer, weil ihre Artikulation den Bruch eines impliziten Gebots darstellt, das Sprache erst funktionsfähig macht: „Wäre jemand imstande, ein Buch über Ethik zu schreiben, das wirklich ein Buch über Ethik wäre, so würde dieses Buch mit einem Knall sämtliche anderen Bücher auf der Welt vernichten.“ (Wittgenstein 1989: 13) Der „Knall“, mit dem alle anderen Bücher vernichtet würden, liegt in der absoluten Suggestivität eines solchen ethischen Buches:

Es wüßte alles über die ethisch bedürftigen Individuen und wäre als Lösung all ihrer Probleme derart potenziertes Wissen, daß es mit gewöhnlichen Maßstäben nicht mehr zu messen wäre. Um die Bewahrung dieses Maßstabs geht es bei Wittgenstein. Er spricht vom „Trieb“ und „Drang“ der Menschen nach ethischen Erklärungen (Wittgenstein 1989: 19). Menschen haben die Angewohnheit, mehr zu fordern als ihnen guttut, da sie, in Unkenntnis ihrer von Wittgenstein gesehenen Konstitution, verlangen, was nicht in den Bezirk der Worte, sondern in den des Schweigens gehört. Interessant ist, wie Wittgenstein Christine Korsgaards Betonung des individuellen Faktors der moralischen Erklärung variiert: Korsgaard wußte, daß die Erklärung nicht reicht, da das Legitimationsbedürfnis des Menschen größer ist und durch die Erläuterung eines rein sachlich aufgefaßten Explanans nicht befriedigt wird. Wittgenstein sah in diesem Sinne philosophische Erläuterungen zur Ethik an der Wirklichkeit vorbeigehen. Ebendies erläutert Korsgaard, wenn sie die Erklärungen moralischer Fragen als Antwort auf ein Selbstbewußtsein und ein Selbstgefühl versteht, das sich mit diesen Erklärungen ins Benehmen setzen möchte: „[...] the answer (of a justification, S.M.) must appeal, in a deep way, to our sense of who we are, to our sense of our identity.“ (Korsgaard 1995: 6) Das ethische Verlangen nach Verankerung des Ich in Gesetzen, die den menschlichen Maßstab sichern, wird von den gleichsam technizistisch operierenden Erklärungen (man denke an die Diltheysche Differenzierung von Natur- und Geisteswissenschaften in solche des Erklärens und des Verstehens) ohne expliziten Subjektbezug nicht getroffen. Maßstabs- und Verhaltenssicherung, die nicht zuletzt als Teil einer Lösung des tradierten „Hobbesian problem of order“ (Parsons), d.h. eines neuzeitlich-staatlichen Ordnungsproblems gesehen werden kann, hat in der Moderne ihr Gesicht gewechselt: Der Einzelne möchte sich nun von einer Lösung, einer Erklärung, berücksichtigt sehen, möchte, daß wirklich sein Problem verhandelt wird und nicht kalte Abstraktion. „Drang“, „Trieb“ und das „Anrennen“ gegen die Grenzen der Sprache, von denen der Vortrag über Ethik spricht, wollen berücksichtigt sein in einer Form, die den Einzelfall zwar übersteigt, aber diesen nicht verrät – was wie eine Quadratur des Kreises anmutet, läßt sich lösen, wenn man die Unterschiede von Ethik und Normativität hervorhebt: Wenn unser Selbstgefühl auf dem Spiel steht, wenn auf dem Spiel steht, daß wir uns selbst noch erkennen, werden letzte Fragen angesprochen und die ethische Überlegung gewinnt jene Dringlichkeit, die die moralische, an Normativität und ihrer Durchsetzung orientierte Erklärung nicht besaß: „The thought is ‚this would not be me anymore‘ and one would rather be dead.“ (Korsgaard 1995: 6) Der Tod allein vermag dann jene Authentizität zu verbürgen, die für Korsgaard am Grund der moralischen Frage liegt – ebenso ist für Wittgenstein die ethische Frage keine der Wissenschaft (deren Standards dem Tod nicht standhalten). Sie geht nicht auf Durchsetzung von Normen, sondern das Zutreffen auf einen Zustand des Menschen, der ethisch bedürftig ist. Wie Wittgenstein im Kapitel „Philosophie“ des *Big Typescript* sagt: „Das Seltsame an der philosophischen Beunruhigung und ihrer Lösung möchte scheinen, dass sie ist, wie die Qual des Asketen, der, eine schwere Kugel unter Stöhnen stemmend, da stand und den ein Mann erlöste, indem er ihm sagte: ‚Lass‘ sie fallen‘. Man fragt sich: Wenn Dich diese Sätze beunruhigen, Du nichts mit ihnen anzufangen wusstest, warum liessest Du sie nicht schon früher fallen, was hat Dich daran gehindert? Nun, es war das falsche System, dem er sich anbequemen zu müssen glaubte, etc....“ (Wittgenstein 1989a: 187) Wieder ist es ein System, das statt des Blicks, der den Menschen in seinem Anrennen gegen die Sprache ernstnimmt, ein Durchhalten fordert (die Sicherheit der Kohärenz der Erklärung fordert),

das jenes „criterion of explanatory adequacy“ enthält, in dem der Mensch sich nicht finden kann.

Ethische Erklärungen verpuffen, wo sie ihre normative Orientierung als systematische Notwendigkeit behandeln, nicht als Gewordenheit wie etwa die Stufen der Moralentwicklung des Kindes. Die Orientierung an einem bestimmten Stand der Moral entsteht hier, im Gegensatz zur Unvermitteltheit des ethischen Gebots im Lehrbuch, aus einer Situation, die *de facto* Ontogenese meint, tatsächliche individuelle Entwicklung, mithin aus der Praxis stammt. Im Gegensatz dazu kommt die Erklärung des abstrakten Sittengesetzes und der – gleichsam anlaßlosen – ethischen Erklärung wie leer daher; sie scheinen nicht auf dringende Fragen zu antworten, die tatsächlich bestehen, sondern sind Äußerungsmittel eines Wissens vom Menschen, das an sich nicht zweifelt. An dieser Stelle orientiert sich Wittgenstein an einem Ethikbegriff, der mit dem der Normativität fast ganz zusammenfällt, der Verhalten verordnet, da es moralischen Prämissen entspricht, auf die sich Menschen zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt geeinigt haben. Dieser Ethikbegriff wird dann distanziert und die Orientierung am relativen Werturteil ins Feld geführt: Mit diesem haben wir uns zu begnügen, wenn wir keinen Unsinn reden wollen – auch wenn die Reichweite unserer Erklärungen ohnehin begrenzt ist. Wittgenstein nimmt die normative Aufladung der Ethik ganz ernst und kann sie darum distanzieren: Relative Werturteile wie „Er spielt gut Tennis“ machen keinen überweltlichen Anspruch, der nie einlösbar wäre. Die Handlungen der Menschen sind im Wortsinn nicht absolut, nicht losgelöst von ihren Kontextbedingungen zu denken: „Wenn wir z.B. in unserem Welt-Buch mit sämtlichen physischen und psychischen Einzelheiten lesen, wird die bloße Beschreibung dieser Fakten nichts enthalten, was wir als *ethischen* Satz bezeichnen könnten. Der Mord wird auf genau derselben Ebene stehen wie jedes sonstige Ereignis, wie das Fallen eines Steins. Gewiß, es kann sein, daß die Lektüre dieser Schilderung Kummer oder Zorn oder sonst ein Gefühl in uns hervorruft, oder es wäre möglich, daß wir etwas über den Kummer oder den Zorn lesen, die durch diesen Mord bei anderen hervorgerufen wurden, als sie davon hörten, doch das sind bloß Fakten, Fakten und nochmals Fakten, aber keine Ethik.“ (Wittgenstein 1989: 13) Von der Faktenbasiertheit unserer gewöhnlichen Schilderungen führt kein Weg zu jenen absoluten Werturteilen, die uns eine Richtschnur über das vorgaukeln, was nur auf der Ebene unseres alltäglichen Lebens entschieden werden kann. Aussagen über das absolut Gute würden den metaphysischen „Drang“ und „Trieb“ des Individuums befriedigen, aber nur um den Preis, den Bereich des sinnvollen Sprechens zu verlassen. Hier zeigt sich, daß Korsgaards Anspruch, eine rechtfertigende Antwort müsse den Handlungen des Individuums entsprechen, statt nur dem formalen Kriterium der Adäquatheit von Erklärungen, noch von der Wittgensteins verschieden ist, auch wenn beide die Orientierung am System, das die Handlungen des Menschen nicht sieht, distanzieren: Korsgaard sieht im Systementwurf ethischer Theorie den Einzelnen nicht gemeint (auch nicht über das Einfallstor der geteilten Lerngeschichte), Wittgenstein betont, daß der Einzelne von Rechtfertigungsrede, ethischen Sätzen ohnehin nie so getroffen werden kann, daß, metaphorisch gesprochen, seine tiefsten Gründe berührt würden. Korsgaard glaubt in ihrer Beschreibung dessen, was eine Untersuchung der Quellen der Normativität ausmache, den Einzelnen berücksichtigen zu können. Wittgenstein trennt die Faktenrede von den Bedürfnissen des einzelnen Menschen ab: Wo es nur Fakten gibt, kann es keine Ethik geben.

### 3. Nachmetaphysisch: Praxis und Grammatik

Wittgensteins Empfehlung für den Umgang mit ethischen Fragen und der Rede, die unser Tun rechtfertigt, lautet also nicht, das Individuum in ethischer Rede gehörig zu berücksichtigen. Vielmehr geht es – im Gegensatz zu Korsgaard – um die Einsicht, daß wir, more philosophico, die Kugel fallenlassen können, die das „falsche System“ uns als notwendige Traglast suggerierte. Maßstabssichernd wirkt nicht die Berücksichtigung individueller Lebenswirklichkeit vor den Abstraktionen eines Systems, sondern der Verzicht auf zu hoch angesetzte Erklärungen, die nicht zufriedenstellen können, da sie der konkreten Sprach- und Handlungspraxen der Menschen enthoben sind. Jenseits absoluter Werturteile (wie in Moores Versuch, in den *Principia Ethica* das allgemeine Wesen des Guten zu definieren (Moore 1996)) trägt uns nicht eine Vorstellung von uns selbst, zu deren Verteidigung der Tod ein geziemender Einsatz wäre (Korsgaard). Es ist die praxeologische Fundierung unserer Werturteile, die nur den relationalen Status erklärender Rede zuläßt. Grammatisch, an Verwendungsweisen orientiert, sind die Werte der Menschen fundiert. Verwendungen von Wörtern in der Sprache lassen sich nur durch Rekurs auf andere Verwendungsweisen von Wörtern rechtfertigen. Damit ist man auf die Ebene der Fakten verwiesen – der Mord und die Reaktion darauf liegen auf einer Ebene. Rechtfertigende Rede ist hier in erster Linie Rede und in zweiter erst Rechtfertigung. Die Sprachfähigkeit unserer ethischen Überlegungen bindet uns an die weltlichen Sprachzwecke, deren Funktionalität die Rede vom Absoluten nur als Ausnahme zuläßt und von der normsetzenden Funktion unserer Alltagsbegriffe trennt. Die Faktenrede Wittgensteins bewahrt umso mehr ihre Kehrseite, das Mystische, die keine normsetzende Kraft besitzt. Grammatisch im weiten Sinne ist das Subjekt bestimmt, das den absoluten Werturteilen abgeschworen hat und darin keinen Verlust sieht, sondern eine zutreffende Beschreibung des eigenen nachmetaphysischen Standpunktes. So werden Korsgaards Überlegungen zu den Quellen der Normativität in der Perspektive Wittgensteins pragmatisiert: Ein Selbstgefühl, das sich berücksichtigt sehen will, um Rechtfertigung als angemessen empfinden zu können, besinnt sich nun auf die Unhintergehbarmkeit der sprachlichen Ausdrucksform, die Bedingung der Möglichkeit von Erkenntnis und Rechtfertigung ist – wiederum lesbar und hier schließt sich der Kreis, als Variante jenes „reflective endorsement“ (Korsgaard 1995), das mit Korsgaard als Ursache normativer Gründe unverzichtbar ist.

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# The Interdependence of Normalcy and Exclusion – Some Political Thoughts Inspired by *On Certainty*

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In *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein develops the concept "world-picture" that stands in a similar position as the notorious "form of life" in the *Philosophical Investigations*. This concept, however, is closer related to what we know, what we learned as children and throughout our life, than the more behavioral "form of life." The "world-picture" is our "inherited background" that we rely on without having satisfied ourselves of its correctness (OC 94). It is deeply rooted in our daily speaking *and acting* (OC 204), for the stability of those beliefs is established and maintained within those common practices. But once established, the world-picture plays a normative role, describing how those practices are done right (Kober 1996; Volbers 2009: 92f, 160ff). Wittgenstein illustrates this interdependence of our speaking or acting and the world-picture by the famous image of a riverbed guiding our acting – the water. The riverbed, however, is nothing but "hardened" beliefs that eventually might "dissolve" again (OC 95-7). Yet, the ground *is* the ground for us. This is the normative role of the world-picture: If some act would contradict it, the act is wrong and not the world-picture. This is what "normal" means for us. But since there is no qualitatively different ground, eventually it could change.<sup>1</sup>

So we have two cases: The "normal" one, when the "water" follows the course of the "solid ground," and the case where the "ground" is dissolved. The difference between these two cases is inherently social, because the world-picture is social (cf. Schulte 1988). When someone refuses an act as wrong or nonsense she does so as member of a community acting routinely in agreement with the world-picture that would be challenged. The notion of "relevant community" expresses the fact that we might well know that there are or have been people holding different beliefs. But that does not suffice for us to give up our world-picture.

This inherently social aspect of the world-picture has an important consequence: If somebody's speaking or acting conflicts with the world-picture, the refusal of this single act is easily extended to the person as a member of the relevant group. If somebody keeps insisting on something that conflicts with our most basic beliefs, the reaction changes from: "Now, look, that's not right." to "That person must be crazy." Wittgenstein himself often uses the conclusion that an imagined other must be mentally disturbed (e.g. OC 155, 467). However, this is a rather specific explanation of somebody's behavior. Thus, I want to formulate what happens here in the more generic terms used above: someone is excluded from the relevant community that is united by their common language games and practices. Deeming somebody to be mentally ill is only one of many ways in which this can happen.

Returning to the initial question – what happens when the world-picture is challenged – this social perspective yields two interesting results that I will elaborate in what

follows: 1. We get some new insights on what makes the world-picture "basic" or "ground". 2. The specific person in conflict and her social relation become important.

Concerning the first point, we see that our daily life is not just the explanation of how we acquired those beliefs but the deciding factor. A challenge to the world-picture means a challenge to normal speaking and acting. The "grounding" property of fundamental beliefs *is* their interdependence with the lives of people (Volbers 2009, 92ff): In OC 110 Wittgenstein writes that giving grounds comes to an end sometime. "But the end is not an ungrounded proposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting".

This is different from logical axioms or the foundations of a science. Wittgenstein states that justification or explanation has to stop at a certain point: when it reaches the ground, the world-picture (cf. OC 204, 563). This sounds similar to reaching the most fundamental parts of a system, like the axioms of logic. Yet, in *On Certainty* the criterion is not fundamentality, but that justification stops: not that we *cannot* go on, but that we *do not* go on.

Andreas Krebs has elaborated on Wittgenstein's point that we can always find other reasons which however do not count necessarily as justification: Commentating on Wittgenstein's reflections on our certainty that the earth has existed one hundred years ago (OC 138), Krebs states that our scientific measurements of the age of the earth of course entail that it is much older than one hundred years. Yet, we need all kinds of evidence for this, like fossils or the ratio of <sup>14</sup>C-atoms. Now Krebs concludes that this is no more certain than that the earth existed one hundred years ago, and further: those methods wouldn't make any sense, if we were in doubt about this (Krebs 2007: 32ff). Of course Rush Rhees is right in noting that we live in a "scientific age" and our speaking and acting is determined by this (Rhees 2005: 79). The scientific results that play a role in peoples lives do not have the same role there as in science. A scientific result may as well be a challenge to our world-picture as any other proposition and thus be refuted – no matter how certain it may be within the respective scientific axiomatic. If our acting is influenced by science, it is because scientific results have been integrated in the interplay of world-picture and daily practice. But this is an additional step that happens in the daily practice, not in the respective scientific practice. And thus Rhees goes on to show that our living in a "scientific age" cannot prove our acting to be right. (Rhees 2005: 79ff). It just shows that our acting is scientific.

However, I do not see any kind of "ordinary language" approach in *On Certainty*. The world-picture is not a monolithic, complete whole. It is a "nest" (OC 255) that is – like the nest of bird – made out of stuff from everywhere that sticks, touches, and clings to the other parts in various points and forms – and may have a considerable amount of tension as well. So when I talk about scientific results being integrated in our daily practice I do not intend one singular "ordinary" practice, but just that those results play a different role in the lives of non-scientists as they do in science.

<sup>1</sup> I do not follow interpretations of *On Certainty* that consider only propositions that express what is common to all human beings (biologically or anthropologically) as part of the world-picture or that are foundationalist in some other sense. Volbers (2009) and Kober (1996) are in important parts close to my view.

Returning to the chains of justification, that could go on forever but do not, we now can see that it is not having reached the most basic things that makes us stop explaining and refute any further questions. We stop at a point where adding more evidence would mean to add a lot of special, elaborate practices and knowledge to the argument, which again may have a lot of particular presuppositions – like <sup>14</sup>C-atoms. So the point where justification stops is not axioms or fundamental premises. It is the point where the conflict with the life of the specific group is too high. This can be a life highly influenced by natural sciences, but might as well be religion or something else. And it is important to note that those beliefs often form quite complex, logically “high level” constructs of ideas. (Think of religious world-views.) Yet, the logically more basic beliefs would not provide any more certainty for us.

Since the world-picture is thus interdependent with our lives, a challenger to those beliefs also challenges these ways of living. Since we cannot go “deeper” than our acting when looking for justification, we cannot find some elementary premises that could show our acting to be wrong and the challenger right or the other way round. The argument has to take place in the “thick” contexts of the lives of the people sharing the respective world-picture and the challenger.<sup>2</sup> This entails that the particular persons and their social relations play a role. The argument becomes a personal effort and risk, because the social relations and the way of life are at stake.

This leads to my second point: the importance of the challenging person and her social relations. Although we have seen that at the “ground” argument is limited, it is not impossible. Many communities – like scientific ones – do have elaborate mechanisms that allow the world-picture to evolve as part of their established practice. Yet, they initially have to deal with somebody that does things that are wrong or even nonsense according to the current view. And already the access to these mechanisms may be bound to social status. (E.g. a scientific expert may be given more possibilities to explain his ideas than a newcomer.) If those mechanisms fail or lack, then refusal of an act is always prone to an exclusion of the acting person: arguments did not convince (or were not even tried) and “obviously” the acting person does not or cannot know how things are done right. And this scenario is not only a question of firm or less firm certainties. It is structured by social relations and power. This is the point where Wittgenstein’s philosophy leads to politics. (In *On Certainty* this only figures shortly in paragraphs 611 and 612 where Wittgenstein writes that “at the end of reasons comes persuasion” and in his allusion to missionaries and the declaration of the other as “fool and heretic”.)

But political problems do not start here. They are always already hidden in what has been said before, because language and acting are inherently social. Hannah Arendt has shown that people acting together, “acting in concert,” is equivalent to power (Arendt 1998, sec. 28). Acting together in this context is not the teleological effort of concentrating various actors on one aim. It is the establishing and stabilizing of a common world. This is a completely plural idea, without leaders, only with some exemplary acting persons that took the risk to do something completely new. They provide the leitmotif of the “concert”, but still everyone tunes in with their own “instrument” and capabilities. This acting according to common practices yields power that keeps the world stable. Should the common way of acting stop, this space will vanish again (Arendt

1998: 200). Thus, the power is constantly “actualized” in people’s action (Arendt 1998: 204): every act conforming with the established ways sustains it. The common acting provides a space in which the role as persons is established and their acts make sense and can be witnessed and accepted by the others.

Arendt discusses this in the context of consciously using this power against or instead of violence (Arendt 1998, sec. 28): The common acting produces a reality even weapons cannot destroy – lest they destroy all acting persons. (Arendt’s prime example is civil disobedience.) But it has also a small scale, everyday side: It is this very power that somebody encounters when challenging the established ways of acting. It is this power that may make it difficult for the challenging act to appear at all in the common world: The only way that those acts might have an effect is that others witness them, recognize them at least as something to deal with, and eventually some of them follow their example (Arendt 1998: 189) on the long way of establishing a new view. But even recognition is threatened by the power of the existing and the ease of reactions like “crazy” or “mentally disturbed” that allow ignoring all implications.

So the power in question is not power used deliberately to exclude or to protect a way of life (which would be violence in Arendt’s terms). It is inherent in the common world. Thus, every time when someone refuses an act that is in conflict with the world-picture, the power one has as a member of a community can be used to exclude the acting person from this community – or to refuse entrance in the first place. It is important to note that doing so is not wrong. It happens all the time in our normal acting and gives stability to human life.<sup>3</sup> So the problem here is not using this power. One problem of course is to find adequate ways of using it. But another big problem is to think one does not or should not use it. And it is this problem that Arendt has dealt with politically when she criticizes the efforts of replacing human action with technology and bureaucracy as allegedly neutral or “scientific” means to decide how people live together (Arendt 1998, ch.6). And it is the problem that is present in Wittgenstein in different shape: the idea that philosophy could escape present speaking and acting which haunts the skeptic and relativist (in negative form) as well as the universalist (in positive form).

This problem then links the two central points of my paper. Because it is often the claim of having found a really fundamental view or solution that is linked with the claim of having found a common ground for “all”. For example finding a biological or anthropological common feature of “all mankind” is always an effort of a particular (most often scientific) practice. But if one thinks that those results have wider implications, they have to be bound back to the way of living in question. And this has to be done not in general terms, but concerning the specific lives of particular persons. This is a personal commitment and risk: One cannot attack socially established ways of living – that is, attack social relations – without risking one’s own. But similarly for the “defender”: one cannot defend oneself on generic terms ignoring the power at stake. Thus, it is dangerous to forget that one might be yielding powerful means of persuasion that, however, are normal arguments for those already sharing the respective world-picture. It is this dismantling of the “look” of arguments that can be found in *On Certainty*. But it is in Arendt’s work where the political implications of this “look” become visible.

<sup>2</sup> Volbers (2009, ch. 2,3) has a similar point regarding the most radical challenger to our world-picture, the sceptic.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Allen (2002) and Neve (2002) linking Arendt’s view to similar (and maybe more prominent) points made by Foucault.

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# Philosophie als Harmonielehre

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Ein Hauptmotiv des Wittgensteinschen Philosophierens besteht darin, die Philosophie als eine sprachkritische Tätigkeit zu betreiben, die einerseits zwar mit der theoretischen Tätigkeit durchaus auf vielfältige Weise verwandt ist, andererseits aber in merhfacher Hinsicht ein klar unterschiedenes Projekt darstellt. Gerade die unkritische Übernahme theoretischer Muster und Methoden führt beim Philosophieren häufig in völliges Dunkel. Wittgenstein zeigt gerade mit Blick auf die *Harmonielehre* und die Verwendung von Analogien zu musikalischen Mustern diese Verwandtschaften und Unterschiede auf.

Wir werden mit Blick auf ein bestimmtes Basismuster der Musik – das Akkordmuster – die Harmonie als eine äußerst komplexe Form von Ähnlichkeit zwischen Akkorden plausibel machen, die in einer sehr ausgeprägten Version zur Familienähnlichkeit wird. Als Grundlage für diese Analyse dienen die ersten Takte der *Mondscheinsonate* von Ludwig van Beethoven.

## 1. Wittgenstein über Goethes Farbenlehre und Harmonielehre

Wittgenstein führt in seinem Gesamtwerk immer wieder bekannte Beispiele für einflussreiche Konzeptionen an, die er irreführenderweise unter dem Label "Theorie" eingeordnet sieht. Ein prominentes Beispiel ist die *Farbenlehre* Goethes in seinen *Bemerkungen über die Farben* [BüF]. Wittgenstein versucht zu zeigen, dass ein philosophischer Vergleich von physikalischen Theorien der Farben (z.B. Newtons Theorie) mit der Version Goethes aus prinzipiellen begrifflichen Gründen in die Irre läuft. Was uns hier fehlt ist ein explizites Kriterium der Vergleichbarkeit. "Die Schwierigkeiten, denen wir beim Nachdenken über das Wesen der Farben begegnen (mit denen sich Goethe durch die Farbenlehre auseinandersetzen wollte), liegen schon darin beschlossen, daß wir nicht nur einen Begriff der Farbengleichheit haben, sondern deren mehrere, miteinander verwandte." (BüF III, 251) Die verschiedenen Kriterien der Farbengleichheit (z.B. Helligkeit, Sättigung usw.) liegen gewissenmaßen in verschiedenen Dimensionen und sind dennoch aufeinander bezogen, eben "miteinander verwandt". Halten wir fest, dass sich der Begriff *Verwandtschaft* und auch der Begriff *Familienähnlichkeit* nicht nur auf die Phänomene selbst (hier die Farben), sondern auch auf die *Kriterien der Gleichheit und Ähnlichkeit* bezieht.

"Die Goethesche Lehre von der Entstehung der Spektralfarben ist nicht eine Theorie, die sich als ungenügend erwiesen hat, sondern eigentlich gar keine Theorie. Es lässt sich mit ihr nichts vorhersagen. Sie ist eher ein vages Denkschema nach Art derer, die man in James's Psychologie findet. Es gibt auch kein experimentum crucis, das für, oder gegen diese Lehre entscheiden könnte." (BüF I, 70; vgl. III, 125) Wittgenstein nimmt für eine (empirische) Theorie offenbar eine Reihe notwendiger Bedingungen an: Sie muss Vorhersagen erlauben und sie muss über Verifikations- bzw. Falsifikationsbedingungen verfügen. Dem stehen bestimmte vage Denkschemata gegenüber, wofür als paradigmatische Beispiele solche aus James' Psychologie genannt werden. „Wer mit Goethe übereinstimmt,

findet, Goethe habe die *Natur* der Farbe richtig erkannt. Und Natur ist hier nicht, was aus Experimenten hervorgeht, sondern sie liegt im Begriff der Farbe.“ (BüF I, 71; vgl. III, 125) Hier wird die Erkenntnis der *Natur* der Farbe nicht mit einer auf Experimenten beruhenden Information verbunden, sondern auf die *interne Komposition des Begriffs* („im Begriff liegen“) der Farbe bezogen. Wittgenstein deutet die Analyse Goethes als eine phänomenologische, in der Form einer Begriffsanalyse, die „der Physik weder bestimmen noch widersprechen“ kann (BüF II, 16).

Bezugnehmend auf ein unterstelltes Vorverständnis von Harmonielehre mit Bezug auf Musik bildet Wittgenstein in analoger Weise den komplexen Begriff „Harmonielehre der Farben“, wobei *Harmonielehre* als zugleich verwandt mit und verschieden von *empirischen Theorien* verstanden wird: „Gäbe es eine Harmonielehre der Farben, so würde sie etwa mit einer Einteilung der Farben in Gruppen anfangen und gewisse Mischungen oder Nachbarschaften verbieten, andre erlauben. Und sie würde, wie die Harmonielehre, ihre Regeln nicht begründen.“ (BüF I, 74) Eine Harmonielehre bietet somit eine gewisse Form von Systematik, allerdings gekoppelt mit Erlaubnis- und Verbotsregeln. Im Unterschied zu Theorien steht sie allerdings nicht unter dem Druck ihre Regeln gesondert zu begründen. Der Begriff *Harmonie* steht in Wittgensteins Gesamtbild in unmittelbarer Nähe zu *Ähnlichkeit* (PU 9, 11, 66, 67, 90, 130, 185, 430, 444), *Verwandtschaft* (PU 38, 47, 64-68, 76, 81, 88, 108, 150, 167, 224, 527, 538, 630, 660), *Zwischenglied* (PU 122) und *Familienähnlichkeit* (PU 67).

## 2. Zu einigen Analogiebildungen zu musikalischen Begriffen in den Philosophischen Untersuchungen

Beim eher oberflächlichen Lesen der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* [PU] ist man zunächst recht verblüfft, wieso Wittgenstein scheinbar zusammenhangslos und ohne sichtbare Vorbereitung unvermittelt Analogien aus den verschiedensten Bereichen in die philosophische Betrachtung einbezieht. Thematisiert werden so immer wieder neue Aspekte des Schachspiels, der Musik und der darstellenden Kunst. Ein Beispiel: „Gedankenloses und nicht gedankenloses Sprechen ist zu vergleichen dem gedankenlosen und nicht gedankenlosen Spielen eines Musikstücks.“ (PU 341) Hier werden also ganz bestimmte Aspekte – „gedankenloses und nicht gedankenloses ...“ – benannt, in denen sich Tätigkeiten aus recht verschiedenen Bereichen – „Sprechen“ und „Spielen eines Musikstücks“ – als äußerst verwandt erweisen.

Bereits im *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* hat Wittgenstein in seiner Bildkonzeption versucht die Form der Abbildung – die logische Form – als etwas zu beschreiben, was keinerlei Kontextes bedarf, sich also allein aus der internen Struktur des Bildes selbst ergibt: Das Bild weist sie auf. Wenn wir versuchen von der Bedeutung der Musik zu sprechen, so können wir dies als Frage nach der Möglichkeit der Abbildung von Musik formulieren. Diese Frage wird häufig in dem Sinne als eine theoretische Frage missverstanden, indem man einem Linguisten folgend fragt,

was die *externe* Bedeutung (die oft beschworene referentielle Bedeutung) eines musikalischen Ausdrucks analog zum sprachlichen sei. Dagegen hat ein reiner Syntaxtheoretiker durchaus Sympathie für die *interne* Fragestellung, wenn er scheinbare semantische Phänomene allein unter Rückgriff auf die bereits vorliegende Struktur des sprachlichen Ausdrucks – seine Syntax – zu erklären versucht. In diesem Kontext könnte man die Auffassung von Eduard Hanslick stellen, der Musik als „tönend bewegte Formen“ auffasste (1922, 59) und die Doppelung zwischen Darstellendem und Dargestellten zu überwinden trachtete.

Wittgenstein möchte nun beiden Betrachtungsweisen unter Berücksichtigung der relevanten Unterschiede einen Raum geben: „Wenn wir den Satz mit einem Bild vergleichen, so müssen wir bedenken, ob mit einem Porträt (einer historischen Darstellung) oder mit einem Genrebild. Und beide Vergleiche haben Sinn. / Wenn ich ein Genrebild anschau, so ‚sagt‘ es mir etwas, auch wenn ich keinen Augenblick glaube (mir einbilde), die Menschen, die ich darin sehe, seien wirklich, oder es habe wirkliche Menschen in dieser Situation gegeben. Denn wie, wenn ich frage: ‚Was sagt es mir denn?‘“ (PU 522)

Ein Porträt hat eine klare referentielle und damit *externe* Bedeutung. Zur Bestimmung dieser Bedeutung brauchen wir weiteren Kontext. Bei der Bestimmung der Bedeutung des Genrebildes steht uns ein solcher Kontext nicht zur Verfügung. Wir können nur auf die *interne Komposition* des Bildes zurückgreifen. „Das Bild sagt mir sich selbst“ – möchte ich sagen. D.h., daß es mir etwas sagt, besteht in seiner eigenen Struktur, in *seinen Formen und Farben*. (Was hieße es, wenn man sagte „Das musikalische Thema sagt mir sich selbst?“) (PU 523) Halten wir fest: Genauso wie das Bild verfügt das musikalische Thema über eine eigene Struktur. Insoweit wir das Bild bzw. das musikalische Thema isoliert betrachten, erfahren wir kontextfrei nur „was es uns durch sich selbst sagt“. Diese interne Struktur bestimmt seine Einbindmöglichkeiten in einen weiteren Kontext, sie verhindert und erlaubt – gerade mit Blick auf eine Harmonielehre – bestimmte vorherige und nachfolgende Strukturen. Und umgekehrt werden die strukturellen Eigenheiten eines engeren oder weiteren Kontextes benötigt um die komplexen Einbettungsmöglichkeiten der Ausgangsstruktur sichtbar / hörbar zu machen. Erst dann können wir das Thema, welches mir sich selbst sagt, als Thema einer ganzen Sinfonie erleben.

Wenn ich jedoch ein musikalisches Thema *verstehen* möchte, muss ich klar zwischen verschiedenen Kontext-abhängigkeiten unterscheiden, die wiederum miteinander verwandt und zugleich voneinander verschieden sind: „Nachdem er das gesagt hatte, verließ er sie wie am vorigen Tage.“ – Verstehe ich diesen Satz? Verstehe ich ihn ebenso, wie ich es tätte, wenn ich ihn im Verlaufe einer Mitteilung hörte? Steht er isoliert da, so würde ich sagen, ich weiß nicht, wovon er handelt. Ich wüßte aber doch, wie man diesen Satz etwa gebrauchen könnte; ich könnte selbst einen Zusammenhang für ihn erfinden. / (Eine Menge wohlbekannter Pfade führen von diesen Worten aus in alle Richtungen.)“ (PU 525) Erneut stellt Wittgenstein hier (unerwartet?) eine enge Verwandtschaft zwischen dem Verstehen eines Satzes und dem Verstehen eines Themas in der Musik fest (vgl. PU 527). Üblicherweise schauen wir bei der Diskussion des Verstehens von Sätzen auf die Ersetzbarkeit eines Satzes durch einen anderen (theoretische Vorgehensweise). Die so unbeachtet bleibende Perspektive, dass ein Satz – wegen seiner ganz spezifischen inneren Struktur und seinem harmonischen Zusammenspiel mit der näheren und ferneren Umgebung – eben gerade nicht ohne mehr oder minder große Verluste durch einen anderen ersetzt werden kann, wird erneut mit

Blick auf das musikalische Thema eindrucksvoll unterstrichen: „Wir reden vom Verstehen eines Satzes in dem Sinne, in welchem er durch einen andern ersetzt werden kann, der das Gleiche sagt; aber auch in dem Sinne, in welchem er durch keinen andern ersetzt werden kann. (So wenig wie ein musikalisches Thema durch ein anderes.“ (PU 531) Im Extremfall zerstören wir das gesamte Stück. Wittgenstein weist sofort wieder die naheliegende Suggestion einer theoretischen Einordnung zurück, die darin besteht, eben von zwei verschiedenen Weisen des Verstehens zu reden: „Ich will lieber sagen, diese Gebrauchsarten von ‚verstehen‘ bilden seine Bedeutung, meinen *Begriff* des Verstehens“ (PU 532)

### 3. „Akkorde sagen sich mir selbst“

In den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* gibt es eine einzige Stelle, an der Wittgenstein auf eine Analogie zur Musik unter Verwendung des Begriffs *Akkord* zu sprechen kommt: „Ich sage: ‚Dieses Gesicht (das den Eindruck der Furchtsamkeit macht) kann ich mir auch als ein mutiges denken.‘ Damit meinen wir nicht, daß ich mir vorstellen kann, wie jemand mit diesem Gesicht etwa einem Andern das Leben retten kann (das kann man sich natürlich zu jedem Gesicht vorstellen). Ich rede vielmehr von einem Aspekt des Gesichtes selbst. Was ich meine, ist auch nicht, ich könnte mir vorstellen, daß dieser Mensch sein Gesicht in ein mutiges, im gewöhnlichen Sinn, verändern kann; wohl aber, daß es auf ganz bestimmtem Wege in ein solches übergehen kann. Die Umdeutung eines Gesichtsausdrucks ist zu vergleichen der Umdeutung eines Akkords in der Musik, wenn wir ihn einmal als Überleitung in diese, einmal in jene Tonart empfinden.“ (PU 536) Wittgenstein spricht hier gewisse harmonische Einbettungen eines Akkords in bestimmte Umgebungen / Kontexte an, die aber offenbar darauf beruhen, dass der *Akkord selbst* schon eine Struktur darstellt, dass der Akkord auch ohne die Berücksichtigung eines Kontextes „sich mir/uns selbst zeigt“. Daraus ergibt sich die interessante Frage, welche Bezeichnungen von Akkorden sich rein auf die interne formale Struktur des Akkordes beziehen und welche bereits die Berücksichtigung des Zusammenhangs zu weiteren Akkorden oder gar der Tonart eines musikalischen Stücks beinhalten. Ist *Durakkord* eine kontextfreie Charakterisierung? Lässt sich ohne den Bezug zu weiteren Akkorden bzw. zu der Tonart entscheiden, ob eine *Subdominante* vorliegt? Paradox sind sogenannte *Neapolitanerakkorde* in einer Mollumgebung (z.B. im 3. Takt des 1. Satzes von Beethovens Mondscheinsonate (cis-Moll) einer, der „mir sich selbst“ als D-Dur-Akkord präsentiert, allerdings üblicherweise harmonisch als fis-Moll-Subdominante mit kleiner Sexte statt Quinte gedeutet wird). Wir haben immer die Töne D, Fis und A.

Welche Eigenschaften hat nun ein Akkord ohne die Berücksichtigung eines Kontextes? Was können wir von einem Akkord sagen, wenn wir ihn sozusagen aus einem musikalischen Stück herausschneiden? Wenn analog zu den Gegenständen der Sachverhalte die Töne die Substanz der Intervalle und Akkorde bilden, dann besteht die elementarste logische Form in der Bezogenheit eines Tones auf einen weiteren und wir erhalten ein *Intervall*. Vorausgesetzt wird hierbei ein quasi-logischer Tonraum, z.B. derjenige, der durch die chromatische Tonleiter konstituiert wird. Akkorde bestehen substantiell gesehen aus mindestens drei Tönen. Die invariante logische Form ist nun aber nicht etwa eine dreistellige Relation zwischen Tönen, sondern die jeweils spezifische Aufeinanderbezogenheit von mindestens einem Intervall auf mindestens ein weiteres (möglichweise gleichgroßes) Intervall. Diese Charakterisie-

rung erlaubt zunächst jede Struktur, in der ein Intervall mit der Mindestgröße +1 (kleine Sekunde bzw. ein Tonschritt auf der chromatischen Tonleiter) auf mindestens ein weiteres mit derselben Mindestgröße bezogen ist, als *Akkord* anzusehen. Jeder Akkord umfasst damit mindestens 2 aufeinander bezogene Intervalle, d.h. in der tonbezogenen Sprechweise mindestens 3 Töne, wobei außer dem Anfangston  $x_1$  (tiefster Ton) und dem Endton  $x_n$  (höchster Ton) jeder andere Ton zugleich Endton eines Intervalls und Anfangston des Folgeintervalls ist. Der Akkord mit den Tönen  $x_1, \dots, x_n$  ( $n \geq 3$ ) besteht dann auf der ersten Stufe aus einer geordneten Menge von Intervallen  $\langle x_2 - x_1, x_3 - x_2, \dots, x_n - x_{n-1} \rangle$ .  $x_n - x_1$  gibt das Gesamtintervall des Akkords auf der  $n-1$ -ten Stufe an. In Abhängigkeit von der Größe von  $n$  können sich weitere Intervallstufen ergeben:

$$\left[ \begin{array}{c} x_5 \\ x_4 \\ x_3 \\ x_2 \\ x_1 \end{array} \right] \begin{array}{l} y_4^1 = x_5 - x_4 \\ y_3^2 = x_5 - x_3 \\ y_2^3 = x_5 - x_2 \\ y_1^4 = x_5 - x_1 \\ y_3^1 = x_4 - x_3 \\ y_2^2 = x_4 - x_2 \\ y_1^3 = x_4 - x_1 \\ y_2^1 = x_3 - x_2 \\ y_1^2 = x_3 - x_1 \end{array}$$

Dies ist die allgemeine Form eines Akkordes bestehend aus den fünf Tönen  $x_1, \dots, x_5$ , den 4 Binnenintervallen der 1. Stufe, den 3 Binnenintervallen der 2. Stufe, den 2 Binnenintervallen der 3. Stufe und dem Gesamtintervall des Akkordes auf der 4. Stufe. Die Angabe der Binnenintervalle der 1. Stufe genügt, um eine ganze Klasse von Akkorden zu fixieren, die zwar dieselbe Intervallstruktur (logische Form) aufweisen, aber gänzlich tonverschieden sein können. Die weitere Fixierung irgendeines  $x_i$  ( $1 \leq i \leq n$ ) genügt, um genau ein Element dieser Klasse zu spezifizieren.

Wir kürzen die obenstehende Akkordmatrix ab durch

$$\left[ \begin{array}{c} x_5 \\ x_4 \\ x_3 \\ x_2 \\ x_1 \end{array} \right] \begin{array}{l} +y_4^1 \\ +y_3^1 + y_2^2 \\ +y_3^1 + y_2^2 + y_1^3 \\ +y_2^1 + y_1^2 + y_1^3 \\ +y_1^1 \end{array}$$

Die Töne der chromatischen Tonleiter notieren wir wie folgt:

...	c	cis	...	c'	cis'	...	c''	cis''	d''	...
...	0°	1°	...	0°	1°	...	0°	1°	2°	...

Damit gibt z.B.  $\left[ \begin{array}{c} x_3 \\ x_2 \\ x_1 \end{array} \right] \begin{array}{l} +3 \\ +4 \end{array}$  die Klasse aller Durdreiklänge in Grundstellung an und

$$\left[ \begin{array}{c} 7° \\ 4° \\ 0° \end{array} \right] \begin{array}{l} +3 \\ +4 \end{array} + 7$$

$\left[ \begin{array}{c} 1° \\ 10° \\ 6° \end{array} \right] \begin{array}{l} +3 \\ +4 \end{array} + 7$  den C-Durdreiklang in Grundstellung auf-

bauend auf dem eingestrichenen C (c') bzw. den Fis-Durdreiklang in Grundstellung aufbauend auf dem eingestrichenen Fis (fis'). Unsere Darstellung hat sich auf nur

zwei Aspekte eines Akkordes beschränkt: die Tonhöhen bzgl. der chromatischen (wohltemperierten) Skala und die internen Intervallabstände. Viele andere mögliche Aspekte wie z.B., ob der Akkord ein Zusammenklang bzw. ein sog. gebrochener Akkord ist, die Tondauer u. a. wurden nicht berücksichtigt. Wenn wir nun jedoch Akkorde aufeinander beziehen, erhalten wir zunehmend komplexere harmonische Zusammenhänge allein mit Blick auf die beiden genannten Aspekte.

#### 4. Zur Harmonie der Akkorde

Wittgenstein sprach in PU 536 davon, dass ein Akkord umgedeutet werden kann. Dies ist mit Blick auf die oben dargestellten Akkordmuster, die sich mir selbst (kontextfrei) zeigen, völlig ausgeschlossen. Einzelne Akkorde können nur mit Blick auf weitere Akkorde bzw. als Teilmuster komplexerer Akkorde oder bzgl. anderer relevanter Kontextbedingungen gedeutet bzw. umgedeutet werden. Das Muster eines Durdreiklangs in Grundstellung kann in einem Musikstück als Teilakkord eines komplexeren Akkords (vgl. den Beginn der *Mondscheinsonate* mit z.B. dem Teilmuster  $\langle +5, +3 \rangle =$  Molldreiklang in Quartsextstellung), als Tonika, Subdominante, Dominante, Moll-Tonika-Parallele usw. vorkommen. Weiterhin kann die Verwandtschaft zwischen den Akkorden auf der Basis von partieller Tongleichheit und/oder Intervallgleichheit unter der Berücksichtigung der Intervallstufen geprüft werden. Wir sehen bei recht einfachen Kompositionsmustern bereits eine Vielzahl von Gleichheiten und Verschiedenheiten, von nahen und fernen Verwandtschaften. Bestimmte Akkordstrukturen können in Kompositionen als *Zwischen-glieder* eingefügt werden um die harmonischen Zusammenhänge zu variieren bzw. bestimmten Geboten und Verboten einer *Harmonielehre* zu folgen. Ein Akkord prägt allerdings schon auf Grund seiner *internen* Struktur seine harmonischen Verwendungsmöglichkeiten. In dieser Verwendung ähnelt er wiederum Sätzen: „Nachdem er das gesagt hatte, verließ er sie wie am vorigen Tage.“ – Verstehe ich diesen Satz? Verstehe ich ihn ebenso, wie ich es tätte, wenn ich ihn im Verlaufe einer Mitteilung hörte? Steht er isoliert da, so würde ich sagen, ich weiß nicht, wovon er handelt. Ich wüßte aber doch, wie man diesen Satz etwa gebrauchen könnte; ich könnte selbst einen Zusammenhang für ihn erfinden.“ (PU 525) In dieser Bemerkung können wir leicht „Satz“ durch „Akkord“ ersetzen. Einen isolierter Akkord kann z.B. nicht von einer Dur-Tonika handeln. Es lässt sich jedoch leicht eine Kadenz (ein Folge von zumindest drei aufeinanderfolgenden Akkorden mit der Tonika im Zentrum) erfinden, die diesen Akkord bereits als Dur-Tonika ausweist. Allerdings muss dieser Akkord selbst schon auf Grund seiner eigenen Form eine Tonika sein können, also „sich mir als Dur-Akkord zeigen“.

Um „die Menge wohlbekannter Pfade“ – in meinem Sinne die möglichen Verwandtschaften bzgl. partieller Ton- und/oder Intervallgleichheit auf den verschiedenen Stufen – zu veranschaulichen, wird im Anhang die Darstellung des Beginns des ersten Satzes der *Mondscheinsonate* (Ludwig van Beethoven, Klaviersonate Nr. 14 op. 27 Nr. 2 in cis-Moll, 1801) in Notenschrift, mehrdimensionaler Darstellung und Auflistung der partiellen Ton- bzw. Intervallgleichheit gegeben. Die Gleichheiten über mehrere Takte bzw. Taktabschnitte hinweg zeigen die (Verwandtschafts-) „Fasern“ auf, die sich eindrucksvoll zu einem mehrschichtigen Verwandtschafts-, „Faden“ (vgl. PU 67) ergänzen. Bemerkenswert ist vor allem die tonale und mehrfache intervallische Vernetzung des Neapolitaners in der zweiten Hälfte des drittens Taktes. Es sei vermerkt, dass hier wohl

keine Entsprechung zur Wittgensteinschen Metapher, dass im Falle der *Familienähnlichkeit*, „viele Fasern einander übergreifen“ (PU 67), vorliegt. In Max (2010) wurde gezeigt, dass dies aber zumindest in einem späteren Werk Beethovens (Streichquartett Nr. 15 in a-Moll op. 132, 1823) der Fall ist. Aber auch schon hier finden wir *komplexe Formen von Ähnlichkeiten*, die auf Grund verschiedener, zwingend aufeinander bezogener Gleichheitskriterien zustande kommen.

## 5. Harmonielehre und Philosophie

Der kritische Einwand lässt sich sofort formulieren: Die Darstellung unseres kontextfreien Akkordbegriffs ist ein typisch theoretischer Akt. Damit scheint eine *Theorie* der Harmonie und nicht bloß eine *Harmonielehre* möglich zu sein. Auch sie beginnt ja mit einer „Einteilung [...] in Gruppen“. Allerdings können wir die vielfältigen harmonischen Zusammenhänge eines Musikstücks offenbar wieder *nur veranschaulichen* (vgl. Anhang) und *nicht sagen*. Wenn wir darauf abzielen die Harmonie einer Komposition zu charakterisieren, dann zielen wir nicht mehr auf eine partielle Angabe der Klarheit einer Struktur ab, sondern auf eine eher holistische Sicht, die (zumindest) das gesamte Stück im Blick hat. „Wir wollen nicht das Regelsystem für die Verwendung unserer Worte in unerhörter Weise vereinfachen oder vervollständigen. / Denn die Klarheit, die wir anstreben, ist allerdings eine *vollkommene*. Aber das heißt nur, daß die philosophischen Probleme *vollkommen* verschwinden sollen. / Die eigentliche Entdeckung ist die, die

mich fähig macht, das Philosophieren abzubrechen, wann ich will. – Die die Philosophie zur Ruhe bringt, so daß sie nicht mehr von Fragen gepeitscht wird, die sie selbst in Frage stellen. – Sondern es wird nun an Beispielen eine Methode gezeigt, und die Reihe dieser Beispiele kann man abbrechen. – Es werden Probleme gelöst (Schwierigkeiten beseitigt), nicht *ein* Problem. / Es gibt nicht eine Methode der Philosophie, wohl aber gibt es Methoden, gleichsam verschiedene Therapien.“ (PU 133). All dies lässt sich auch von der Harmonielehre sagen.

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Takt 1 Tonika: Cis-Moll QS Interval: -7 / +2, +9	Takt 2 Durchgang Ton: +11 Interval: -7 / +2, +9	Takt 3/1+2 tG / A-Dur GS Ton: -8, -11 / +9 Interval: -2, -5, -9 / +4, +7	Takt 3/3+4 sn: D-Dur QS Ton: -1, -4 / +6 Interval: -4, -7 / +5, +8, +9	Takt 4/1 D7: DS-Gis ohne Terz Ton: -2, -6 / +0, +8 Interval: -3, -5, -8 / +1
$\begin{bmatrix} 4^0 \\ 1^0 \\ 8^{-1} \\ 1^{-1} \\ 1^{-2} \end{bmatrix} + 3 + 8 \\ +5 + 0^1 + 3^1 \\ +7 + 0^1 + 7^1 + 0^2 + 3^2 \\ +0^1 + 7^1 \\ +0^1 + 7^1 + 0^2 + 3^2$	$\begin{bmatrix} 4^0 \\ 1^0 \\ 8^{-1} \\ 11^{-2} \\ 11^{-3} \end{bmatrix} + 3 + 8 + 5^1 \\ +5 + 2^1 + 5^2 \\ +9 + 2^1 + 2^2 + 5^2 \\ +0^1 + 9^1 + 2^1 + 5^2 \\ +0^1 + 9^1 + 2^1 + 5^2$	$\begin{bmatrix} 4^0 \\ 1^0 \\ 9^{-1} \\ 9^{-2} \\ 9^{-3} \end{bmatrix} + 3 + 7 \\ +4 + 4^1 + 7^1 \\ +0^1 + 4^1 + 4^2 + 7^2 \\ +0^1 + 0^2 + 4^2 + 7^2 \\ +0^1 + 0^2 + 4^2 + 7^2$	$\begin{bmatrix} 6^0 \\ 2^0 \\ 9^{-1} \\ 6^{-2} \\ 6^{-3} \end{bmatrix} + 4 + 9 \\ +5 + 9^1 + 0^2 \\ +3^1 + 8^1 + 0^2 + 0^3 \\ +0^1 + 3^2 + 8^2 + 0^3 \\ +0^1 + 3^2 + 8^2 + 0^3$	$\begin{bmatrix} 9^0 \\ 0^0 \\ 8^{-1} \\ 8^{-2} \\ 8^{-3} \end{bmatrix} + 9 + 1^1 \\ +4 + 4^1 + 1^2 \\ +0^1 + 4^1 + 1^2 \\ +0^1 + 0^2 + 4^2 + 1^2 \\ +0^1 + 0^2 + 4^2 + 1^2$
Takt 4/2 Tonika: Cis-Moll QS Ton: -0, -9 / +1, +4 Interval: -1, -4, -9 / +5, +8	Takt 4/3 DS-Dis ohne Terz Ton: -4 / +3 Interval: -3, -8 / +2, +7	$\begin{bmatrix} 3^0 \\ 1^0 \\ 8^{-1} \\ 8^{-2} \\ 8^{-3} \end{bmatrix} + 2 + 7 \\ +5 + 5^1 + 7^1 \\ +0^1 + 5^1 + 7^1 \\ +0^1 + 0^2 + 5^2 + 7^2 \\ +0^1 + 0^2 + 5^2 + 7^2$	$\begin{bmatrix} 3^0 \\ 0^0 \\ 6^{-1} \\ < 8^{-2} > \\ < 8^{-3} > \end{bmatrix} + 3 + 9 \\ +6 + 4^1 + 7^1 \\ +10 + 4^1 + 4^2 + 7^2 \\ +0^1 + 10^1 + 4^2 + 7^2 \\ +0^1 + 10^1 + 4^2 + 7^2$	$\begin{bmatrix} 1^0 \\ (8^{-1}) \\ 4^{-1} \\ 1^{-1} \\ 8^{-2} \end{bmatrix} + 5 + 9 \\ +4 + 7 + 0^1 \\ +3 + 8 + 0^1 + 5^1 \\ +5 + 8 + 0^1 + 3^1 + 7^1 + 0^2 \\ +7$
Takt 4/4 Ton: -1 / +3 Interval: -2, -5 / +4, +6, +9	Takt 5/1 Ton: -0, -3, -6 Interval: -6, -10 / +5, +8			

- Der obere Index markiert den zusätzlichen Oktavabstand (jeweils 12 chromatische Töne) vom Grundton bzw. vom jeweiligen Intervall.
- Angaben der Form „Takt n/m(+l)“ geben den n-ten Takt mit dem m-ten (und eventuell l-ten) Viertel an.
- Die Angaben hinter „Ton“ bzw. „Intervall“ geben die Veränderungen relativ zum vorhergehenden Takt (ohne Oktave) an.
- „GS“ = „Grundstellung“ des Akkords, „QS“ = „Quartextstellung“, „tG“ = „Tonkagegegenklang“, „D7“, „DS“ = „Dominantseptakkord“

	Takt 1	Takt 2	Takt 3/1+2	Takt 3/3+4	Takt 4/1	Takt 4/2	Takt 4/3	Takt 4/4	Takt 5/1
tonal	$4^0$	$4^0$	$4^0$				$3^0$	$3^0$	
	$1^0$	$1^0$	$1^0$			$1^0$	$1^0$		
	( $1^{-1}$ )								
	( $1^{-1}$ )								
	$8^{-1}$	$8^{-1}$			$8^{-1}$	$8^{-1}$	$8^{-1}$		
					$8^{-2}$	[ $8^{-2}$ ]	$8^{-2}$	[ $8^{-2}$ ]	$8^{-2}$
					$8^{-3}$	[ $8^{-3}$ ]	$8^{-3}$	[ $8^{-3}$ ]	
			$9^{-1}$	$9^{-1}$	$9^0$				
intervallisch									
	1. Stufe	+3	+3	+3	(+3 <sup>1</sup> )			+3	+3
					+4	+4		+4	
			+5	+5			+5	+5	
			+0 <sup>1</sup>	+0 <sup>1</sup>	+0 <sup>1</sup> +0 <sup>1</sup>	+0 <sup>1</sup>	+0 <sup>1</sup> +0 <sup>1</sup>	+0 <sup>1</sup> +0 <sup>1</sup>	+7)
	2. Stufe	+8	+8	+9	(+4 <sup>1</sup> )	(+4 <sup>1</sup> )	+5 <sup>1</sup>	+5 <sup>1</sup>	+4
									(+7)
			+0 <sup>1</sup>	(+0 <sup>2</sup> )	(+3 <sup>2</sup> )	+0 <sup>2</sup>	+0 <sup>2</sup>	+0 <sup>2</sup>	+9
									(+9)
3. Stufe									
		(+3 <sup>1</sup> )							
			(+5 <sup>1</sup> )						
			+0 <sup>2</sup>	(+4 <sup>2</sup> )	+0 <sup>2</sup>		+5 <sup>2</sup>	+5 <sup>2</sup>	
					(+0 <sup>3</sup> )				
			(+3 <sup>2</sup> )	(+5 <sup>2</sup> )					
4. Stufe									
5. Stufe									

- Dunkelgraue verbundene Zellen geben die Fasern gleicher Töne bzw. gleicher Intervalle an.
- Hellgraue markierte Zellen geben oktavverschiedene Töne bzw. Intervalle an, die einer Faser oktavverwandt zugeordnet sind.
- Pfeile zeigen die Faserverbindungen gleicher Intervalle an, die sich aber auf verschiedenen Intervallstufen befinden.
- oktavverschiedene Töne in Fasern ohne die Konstituierung einer eigenen Faser: in geschweiften Klammern
- Töne, die gehalten werden: in eckigen Klammern
- oktavverschiedene Intervalle (+12 Halbtöne) in Intervallfasern ohne die Konstituierung einer eigenen Faser: in runden Klammern
- identische Intervalle auf höherer Stufe: unterstrichen
- gerade Pfeile verbinden dasselbe Intervall auf verschiedenen Stufen / geschwungener Pfeil verbindet oktavverschiedenes Intervall.

# Ist Glück ein ethischer Begriff?

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„Es wird tausende von Millionen glücklicher Kinder geben und nur hunderttausend Leidtragende, die den Fluch der Erkenntnis auf sich genommen haben. Man sagt, dass Du kommen und von neuem siegen werdest, dass Du mit Deinen Auserwählten, Deinen Stolzen und Mächtigen kommen wirst. Wir aber werden dann sagen, daß sie nur sich selbst, wir aber alle gerettet haben. Dann aber werde ich mich erheben und, zu Dir gewandt, auf diese Tausende von Millionen glücklicher Kinder, die die Sünde nicht gekannt haben, hinweisen. Und wir, die wir ihre Sünden auf uns genommen haben, um sie glücklich zu machen, wir werden dann vor Dich hintreten und Dir sagen: ‚Verurteile uns, wenn Du es kannst und wagst!‘“ (dies und alles Folgende: Dostoevskij 1980, 5. Buch, 5. Kapitel, Seiten 401-432). Mit diesen Worten definiert der Großinquisitor in Fjodor Michajlovič Dostoevskij’s Roman „Bratja Karamzovy“ seine Position gegenüber Christus, welchen der betagte Kirchenfürst in Gewahrsam genommen hat.

Der lebensorfahrene Greis hat auch einige schlagende Beispiele zur Hand, welche er seinem göttlichen Gegenüber mit Nachdruck entgegen hält. Die Menschen, deren Sinn nur nach irdischem Brot, also nach so notwendiger wie banaler alltäglicher Sättigung steht, beschimpfen beispielsweise den, der ihnen das Feuer gebracht hat, als Ungeheuer. Und diese Menschen werden in den nächsten Jahrhunderten eine von diesem alltäglichen Hunger geprägte Wissenschaft entwickeln, welche verkündet, dass es keine Verbrecher, sondern nur Hungrige gibt. Sie werden dies für einen Ausfluss ihrer eigenen Weisheit halten. Ihre in dieser Weise denkenden Wissenschaftler werden – Gott zum Hohne – auf ihre Fahnen schreiben: „Sättige sie zuerst, dann kannst Du von ihnen Tugend verlangen.“

Dostoevskij antizipiert hier in prophetischer Weise die ein halbes Jahrhundert später von Bertolt Brecht in dessen „Dreigroschenoper“ postulierte Maxime

„Erst kommt das Fressen,  
dann kommt die Moral.“

Der Großinquisitor ist mitnichten ein Unwissender im Hinblick auf leibliche Entbehrung, wie etwa den Hunger. „Wisse, daß auch ich in der Wüste war, daß auch ich mich von Heuschrecken und Wurzeln genährt“ schleudert er eben durchaus mit Recht dem Gottessohn entgegen.

Wenn dieser gesagt hat: „Der Mensch lebt nicht vom Brot allein“, so steht dem entgegen, dass „Brot“ im allgemeinen Verständnis der Glücksuchenden nicht nur die tägliche und somit banale Speisung in ihrer primitivsten Form – ohne geschmackvolle Beilage gewissermaßen – bedeutet, sondern eben auch dies: die geschmackvollen Beilagen und Vieles darüber hinaus, all das, was gemeinhin – und somit gemein – unter dem Begriff „Glück“ zusammengefasst wird.

Dostoevskij legt dem Sohn Gottes kein einziges Wort in den Mund – er ist dem Großinquisitor gegenüber ausschließlich ein Hörender und noch mehr ein Schauender. In dieser Position verkörpert er die absolute Freiheit, welche nicht gezwungen ist, zu reagieren. Dies erkennt der Greis sehr wohl – und daraus vermag er auch seine eigene Anschauung darzulegen. Die Freiheit, für die Chris-

tus steht, definiert er als das Gegenteil des Glückes der Menschheit schlechthin. Jesus hat bei der Versuchung durch den Satan in der Wüste die Steine nicht in Brot verwandelt – und dies nach vierzigtägigem Fasten und angesichts des eigenen Hungers. Genau das wirft ihm der Kirchenfürst aber vor. Denn was der Mensch braucht, ist eben das Alltägliche, das täglich Notwendige. Der Gottessohn hat es in seiner Erdenzeit verabsäumt, den Menschen dieses Glück zu garantieren. Damit hat er auch alle seine Chancen bei jenen Menschen, die nicht auserwählt sein können oder wollen, verspielt.

Dostoevskij lässt mit diesen Aussagen den Großinquisitor nichts weniger postulieren als den unvereinbaren Gegensatz von Freiheit und dem, was gemeinhin – und damit, nochmals sei es gesagt, auch gemein – als „Glück“ bezeichnet wird. Dadurch aber, dass er den lebensorfahrenen Greis den Begriff des Glückes auf eine unzählbare Mehrheit der Menschen anwenden lässt und er erkannt hat, dass für jene Mehrheit von Menschen diese Art Glück folgerichtig etwas Gutes bedeutet, bekommt dieser Begriff eine ethische Qualität. Und gerade so – und nur so – kann er sich gleichwertig dem Begriff der von Gott angebotenen Freiheit entgegenstellen. Nur so darf und kann im Namen des Glückes die Forderung aufgestellt werden, dass Freiheit verzichtbar sein muss, weil diese ja Brotlosigkeit nach sich ziehen kann.

Da Glück sich aber in der Sättheit verwirklicht, so erhält auch diese als das erfahrbare in die Welt Treten des Glücks eine ethische Dimension.

Auf diese weist der Großinquisitor nachdrücklich hin, wenn er die Satten als die sündenlosen Kinder bezeichnet. Sie sind nach seiner Auffassung die einzigen Geretteten – gerettet durch die konsequente Handlungsweise von Seinesgleichen, gerettet deswegen, weil sie durch ihn und Seinesgleichen durch die Gabe des Brotes im Zustand sündenloser Kindlichkeit erhalten worden sind.

Genau diese sündenlose Kindlichkeit aber garantiert das Glück, weil sie eine alternative Frage nicht kennt. Sättheit ist sich als Glück selbst genug.

Auf dieser denkerischen Grundlage können – wie es der weltkluge Kirchenfürst sehr richtig sieht – Erscheinungen wie der Feuerbringer Prometheus von den hungrenden kindlichen Glücksuchenden tatsächlich nur als Ungeheuer wahrgenommen werden.

Denn hier tritt die Verkörperung des Verlustes eben jener Kindlichkeit herausfordernd vor diese Kindlichkeit selbst hin.

Johann Wolfgang von Goethe hat dies in seinem Gedicht „Prometheus“ mit Nachdruck formuliert:

„Da ich ein Kind war,  
Nicht wusste, wo aus noch ein,  
Kehrt ich mein verirrtes Auge Zur Sonne, als wenn  
drüber wär  
Ein Ohr, zu hören meine Klage,  
Ein Herz wie meins,  
Sich des Bedrängten zu erbarmen.“

Aber Prometheus meint, dass seine Kindlichkeit von den Göttern bitter enttäuscht worden ist – und aus dieser Enttäuschung resultiert jene Selbstbewusstheit, die das Leid ebenso auf sich nimmt wie das Werk der Selbsterlösung.

„Ich dich ehren? Wofür?  
Hast du die Schmerzen gelindert  
Je des Beladenen?  
Hast Du die Tränen gestillt  
Je des Geängstigten?“

Dieser Prometheus in seinem Mut, welcher die Grenzen zwischen Über- und Hochmut beständig aufhebt, indem er sie negiert, ist kein „Glücklicher“. Was er von den Menschen, welche er sich formen möchte, erwartet ist deren Gleichheit mit ihm. Diese drückt sich in der Fähigkeit aus:

„Zu leiden, zu weinen,  
Zu genießen und zu freuen sich,  
Und dein nicht zu achten,  
Wie ich!“

Leiden und Weinen werden hier durch Genuss und Freude keineswegs ausgeschlossen. Dies kann auch soviel heißen wie: Sattheit vertreibt den Hunger keineswegs dauerhaft.

Der Verlust der Kindlichkeit durch Enttäuschung seitens des göttlichen Wesens ist auch der Verlust des eindimensionalen Glücks, in welchem all das, was dieses Glück ausmacht seinen Widerpart nicht mehr kennt.

Nun ist Prometheus selbstverständlich frei – oder vielleicht besser gesagt; er wähnt sich „unabhängig“ von Gott. Aber er benötigt ihn eben doch, um ihn anklagen und sich so seiner eigenen Position vor einem Anderen versichern zu können.

Christus, der in der Wüste nach seinem vierzigägigen Fasten den Versuchungen Satans widerstand, war von diesem nie abhängig und musste sich daher auch nie von ihm befreien. Seine Freiheit ist jene des eigenen Willens, welcher über das Alltägliche und Banale hinauswill.

Keineswegs hält Christus die tägliche Sättigung für etwas Unnotwendiges. Wie sehr ihm daran liegt, dass die Menschen ihr Brot bekommen zeigt er an den beiden wunderbaren Brotdurchbrüchen und daran, dass er die Seinen lehrt, im Gebet an den Vater auch um das tägliche Brot zu bitten.

Aber er sagt eben auch: „Der Mensch lebt nicht vom Brot allein.“ So ist das Brot zwar ein Ingrediens des Lebens, aber eben bei weitem nicht das einzige und schon gar nicht das entscheidendste. Zudem: der Mensch soll es im Schweiße seines Angesichtes verdienen – so verlangt es Gott vom sündigen Menschen, der sich seiner Sünde bewusst ist. Auf diese Weise kann er seine Freiheit auch unter den Bedingnissen der Sünde bewahren. Die durch andere garantierte regelmäßige Sättigung dagegen macht unfrei. Das weiß auch der Großinquisitor, weil er die Menschen gut kennt – besser als Christus. Er weiß, dass die Masse der Menschen Wunder will, nicht einen Gott der Freiheit. Auch wenn sie Empörer sind, so sind sie doch Sklaven – Sklaven ihrer eigenen Wundersüchtigkeit, die das Wunder dort sucht, wo es sich finden lässt. Wenn nicht bei Gott und in Freiheit, dann eben bei jeglicher Autorität, welche das Wunder garantiert – auch um den Preis der Freiheit, die ja ohnehin keinen Wert hat. Die stetige Betrachtung des Wunders, die eigene Teilhabe und Teilnahme daran – das ist das Glück der Kinder, die angesichts des Wunders an die Bedingnisse der Sünde nicht mehr zu denken vermögen. Insofern sind sie tatsächlich

sündenlos, wie es der Kirchenfürst sagt, aber eben nicht durch freie Entscheidung. Damit sind sie aber auch nicht erlöst, weil unfähig, am Erlösungswerk Christi als Freie und Wissende teilzuhaben.

Jesus spricht daher auch nie vom „Glück“ oder vom „Glücklichmachen“. Im 5. Kapitel des Matthäus-Evangeliums preist er *selig* und definiert, wer *selig* ist. Der griechische Originaltext verwendet das Wort „Μακάριοι“ = die *selig* zu Preisenden, welches Hieronymus adäquat mit „beati“ – *selig* ins Lateinische überträgt.

Die Wortwahl zeigt den Unterschied auf zwischen dem, was Gott und dem, was der Großinquisitor will – gerade weil beide etwas für die Menschen in deren Vielheit wollen. Aber Gott will die Menschen nach seinem Ebenbilde und daher in deren Willen frei. Der Großinquisitor als Mensch und Menschenkenner will die Menschen glücklich – nicht nur um den Preis der Unfreiheit für die vielen Glücklichen, sondern auch um jenen des eigenen Widerstandes gegen Gott. Aber mit seinem Widerstand, den er ja auch zu artikulieren weiß, ermöglicht er das schweigende Annehmen des Glücks seitens der Masse der Menschen.

Denn auch darin wird sich das „Glücklichsein“ äußern: dass die beglückten Menschen nicht mehr nachfragen, sondern als beglückte Unfreie schweigen. Nur im Schweigen können sie nämlich ungestört am Glück teilhaben.

Ein notwendiges Zusammenwirken von „Amüsierbetrieb und Schweigespirale“ konstatieren demnach auch die beiden Journalisten Markus Metz und Georg Seeßlen in ihrem 2011 erschienen Buch über die „Fabrikation der Stupidität“. Letztere wird durch die von den beiden sogenannten „Blödmaschinen“ erzeugt. Die aktuellen Medien der Glücksverheißung sind derartige Blödmaschinen, welche die glücklich werden Wollenden in den Bann ihrer Abläufe zwingen und damit zum widerspruchlosen Schweigen und zur Unfreiheit, was beides aber als Ingrediens des Glücks ohne jegliche Reflexion von den glücklichen Kindern ertragen werden soll (z.B. Metz/Seeßlen 2011, Kapitel 8/6). Die in diesen ihren definitorischen Bestandteilen von den glücklich werden Wollenden akzeptierte Form des Glücklichmachens ist gemäß Metz und Seeßlen eine allgemein akzeptierte Form populärer Kultur: akzeptiert sowohl seitens der Glücklichmacher, die zum Behufe des Glücklichmachens ihre Blödmaschinen einsetzen, wie auch seitens der glücklich werden Wollenden, welche sich den eingesetzten Blödmaschinen aussetzen. Den Qualitätsunterschied zwischen dieser Form einer „Popkultur“ und einer Kultur des freien Willens beschreiben die beiden Autoren ohne Umschweife mit der Feststellung: „Pop kann nicht, was Dostojewski konnte“ (Metz/Seeßlen 2011: 477).

Gibt der russische Dichter aber eine Antwort auf die Frage, ob Glück ein ethischer Begriff ist?

Im sprechenden Sinne des Wortes durchaus nicht. Und dies ist im Kontext dieses Kapitels vom „Großinquisitor“ nur folgerichtig. Denn der Einzige, der eine Antwort geben könnte, nämlich Christus, spricht hier kein einziges Wort. Dieses ist ausschließlich beim uralten Kirchenmann. Aber Jesus handelt – und dieses Handeln ist, wenn schon durchaus keine Antwort, so doch etwas wie ein Auslöser weiterführender Überlegungen. Der Großinquisitor hat gesehen, wie Christus ihn die ganze Zeit anhörte. „Der Greis hätte aber gewünscht, daß er ihm etwas sage, und wäre es selbst etwas Bitteres, Furchtbare. Er aber nähert sich schweigend dem Greis und küßt ihn still auf die blutleeren neunzigjährigen Lippen“ (Dostoevskij 1980: S 428). Der Kirchenfürst wird auf seiner Ansicht weiterhin beharren – er ist dabei aber keineswegs ein Glücklicher und noch we-

niger ist er durch Jesu Kuss glücklich geworden. Auch das ist eine Folgerichtigkeit seinerseits – Glück und Glücklichkeit ist etwas für die von ihm so genannten sündenlosen Kinder. Wer diese als solche erkennt und für deren Glück sorgt, der ist – ja, nun was? Jedenfalls einer, der dem wiederkommenden und richtenden Christus entgegenschleudern darf: „Verurteile uns, wenn Du es kannst und wagst.“ Dass er das tun kann, das entbehrt keineswegs der Logik: er und Seinesgleichen haben sich durch ihr Wirken für die sündenlosen Kinder, für das Bemühen um deren Glück außerhalb jener Kriterien gestellt, welche eine Verurteilung oder eine jegliche Art von Freispruch zulassen. Der Richter hat hier ebenso wenig zu sagen wie der Erlöser – genauso wenig wie Jesus etwas zu sagen hatte im Gespräch mit dem greisen Mann.

Ethik ist aber ein Kriterium, an welchem und nach dem sich ein Urteil zu orientieren vermag, weil sie notwendigerweise selbst um ein Urteil bemüht ist. Demnach gehören auch „gut“ und „böse“ zu ihrem Begriffsschatz, der es ermöglicht, eine Handlung zu „bewerten“, ihr also einen ethischen Wert oder Unwert beizumessen. Im Falle kindlicher Sündenlosigkeit gemäß den Kategorien des Großinquisitors werden diese Begriffe aber obsolet, weil mit ihnen nichts mehr unterscheidbar bewertet werden kann. Das Sündenlos-Kindliche ist jenseits von „gut“ und „böse“.

In einem solchen Zusammenhang wäre dann Glück folgerichtig *kein* ethischer Begriff, weil dem Gesamtzusammenhang des Sündenlos-Kindlichen zugehörig.

Ist aber ein solches „Glück“, welches nicht als ethischer Begriff aufgefasst werden kann, ein Glück?

Goethe, der freiheitstrunkene Dichter des freiheitstrunkenen „Prometheus“, der doch auf die Götter angewiesen ist, weil er sie anklagen muss, erkennt letztendlich auch die Abhängigkeit dieser Art von Freiheit. In seinem Gedicht „Grenzen der Menschheit“ findet er zu Kindlichkeit, aber zu einer, die selig macht, weil sie Erkenntnis zur Voraussetzung und damit wahre Freiheit als Fundament hat. Diese freimachende Erkenntnis ist eine solche, welche unterschiedsfähig und daher sicher macht.

„Wenn der uralte  
Heilige Vater  
Mit gelassener Hand  
Aus rollenden Wolken  
Segnende Blitze  
Über die Erde sät,  
Küß ich den letzten  
Saum seines Kleides,  
Kindliche Schauer  
Treu in der Brust.  
Denn mit Göttern  
Soll sich nicht messen  
Irgend ein Mensch.“

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# „Wenn Ethik und Ästhetik eins sind.“ Eine Studie zu Tradition und Aufgabenstellung eines keineswegs nur Wittgenstein’schen Gedankens

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„Sed veluti tractata notam labemque remittunt atramenta,  
fere scriptores carmina foedo splendida facta linunt“  
(Horatius 1998: 98).

Quintus Horatius Flaccus stellt nichts weniger fest, als dass in sich selbst beschmutztes künstlerisches Handeln das Behandelte – und sei dieses noch so hehr – beschmutzt. Dies kann jedoch nur aufgrund eines tiefen Zusammenhangs zwischen dem Handelnden und dem Behandelten geschehen. Gibt es aber diesen Zusammenhang, so muss es Unterscheidbares geben, damit vom „Zusammenhang“ gesprochen werden kann. Und doch existiert auch für den römischen Dichter etwas über diese Unterscheidbarkeit Hinausgehendes. Der festgestellte Status der Beschmutztheit betrifft in seinem Beispieldafalle ja Beschreiber und Beschriebenes gleichermaßen, sodass beide gemeinsam diesem Status subsumiert werden können, welcher sich damit als einheitsschaffend zu erweisen scheint.

Horatius richtet seine Worte an Caesar Augustus. Er setzt dem politisch Mächtigen seine Gedanken über den Wert eines poetischen Kunstwerkes, der dessen ästhetisches Erscheinungsbild bestimmt, auseinander – und folgerichtig eben gleichermaßen seine Überlegungen zu den ethischen Voraussetzungen, welche ein künstlerisch tätiger Mensch mitbringen muss, um den ästhetischen Forderungen künstlerischen Tuns gerecht zu werden.

Die Möglichkeit, ethische und ästhetische Eigenschaften einem Qualitätsbegriff gemeinsamen Erscheinens zu subsumieren lässt auch eine ethische Betrachtung des Stoffes und eine ästhetische des künstlerisch Handelnden nicht nur zu, sondern auch als geboten erscheinen. Darauf macht einer der bedeutendsten Komponisten nicht nur des 20. Jahrhunderts, Olivier Messiaen, aufmerksam. An Person und Werk von Wolfgang Amadé Mozart stellt er fest, dass ein großer Komponist seinen Stil nicht ändert, gleich, ob er eine Symphonie, ein Divertimento oder eine Messe schreibt. Die ästhetische Qualität ist demnach seitens des Künstlers immer als dieselbe gegeben. Da die Frage nach ebendieser ästhetischen Komponente nun schon gestellt ist, muss jene nach der ethischen – Horatius folgend – hinsichtlich des behandelten Stoffes erfolgen. Messiaen tut dies nicht nur anhand von Mozart, sondern auch von Alban Berg. Und so stellt er des wiener Klassikers Opern „Don Giovanni“ und „Cosi fan tutte“ und die Bühnenwerke „Wozzeck“ und „Lulu“ des Vertreters einer schulbildenden österreichischen Moderne in den Dienst seiner Betrachtungen. „Don Giovanni“ und „Wozzeck“ erscheinen ihm – als Conclusio dieser Überlegungen – als Werke mit weit aus höherem Gesamtwert als die beiden Anderen.

Messiaen unterwirft als „né croyant“ seine Betrachtungen den Forderungen seines katholischen Glaubens, an welchem er auch sein immenses Wissen um die Musik misst. Und so kommt er zum Schluss, dass in „Cosi fan tutte“ und in „Lulu“ ästhetische und ethische Ansprüche weit auseinanderfallen und zwischen ihnen keine Einheit entsteht, was den beiden Werken ein entschiedenes Man-

ko zufügt. Sich philosophisch gebärdendes Spiel mit den heiligsten Gefühlen der Liebe unter dem Anspruch des Aufklärens über das, was angeblich üblich ist bei Mozart und voyeuristisch dargebotene Erotik in deren verwirrtesten und daher widerwärtigsten Erscheinungsformen bei Berg werden durch die ästhetische Qualität der Musik, die ja keineswegs geringer ist als in den beiden anderen Opern, nicht ethischer.

Verirrte Erotik und zum Klang gebrachte eruptive Geschlechtlichkeit prägen durchaus auch „Don Giovanni“ und „Wozzeck“. Aber dort rufen sie – und mit ihnen die grandiose Musik – die Zuhörenden auf zum Mitleiden mit den durch die materielle, geistige und körperliche Ausbeutung Schmerz und Qual ausgesetzten Menschen. Dem hohen ethischen Anspruch der Stoffe wird die hochqualitative Musik in diesen Fällen ästhetisch vollkommen gerecht. Und das ergibt für Messiaen den Schluss, dass „Don Giovanni“ und „Wozzeck“ die bei weitem tatsächlicheren Kunstwerke sind als „Cosi fan tutte“ und „Lulu“.

Nicht die Ingredienzen des Stoffes sind also das ethisch Mindernde, sondern die Grundtendenz von dessen Zurichting. Ist diese ethisch mangelhaft, so kann der Stoff mit der Musik nicht eins werden, denn Ethik und Ästhetik sind hier uneins.

Messiaen sah sich als gläubiger Katholik stets dazu veranlasst, sein Künstlertum in den Dienst der Ehrerbietung vor allem Menschlichem als etwas von Gott Geschaffenem zu stellen. Daher war ihm auch – und hier folgt er einer durchgehenden katholischen Tradition – die menschliche erotische Leidenschaft ein leidenschaftlich behandeltes Thema, sodass die geschlechtliche Vereinigung von Frau und Mann sogar inhalt- und formgebendes Thema des V. Satzes „Joie du sang des étoiles“ seiner „Turangalila-Symphonie“ ist – und dies mit dem allerhöchsten Anspruch, dessen „kosmischem Charakter“ gerecht zu werden.

„Ce caractère cosmique est exprimé ici par un hymne à la vie, au mouvement, à la joie. C'est une longue et frénétique danse de la joie“ (Schlee 1998: 185).

Wenn Søren Kierkegaard – gerade im Hinblick auf Mozarts „Don Giovanni“ – festhält, dass es eines „erotischen Ohres“ bedarf, um „darauf zu achten, an welcher Stelle man einen Hinweis bekommt auf jenes leichte Spiel der Lust“ (Kierkegaard 1999: 11), so kann man erstens dieses „erotische Ohr“ gleichermaßen Messiaen getrost zubilligen, und nicht nur hinsichtlich der Mozartoper, sowie zweitens postulieren, dass man ebenso für Messiaens „hymne à la joie“ und die jenen bedingenden erotischen Vorgänge solch ein „erotisches Ohr“ haben muss. Nur so ist es möglich, Inhalt und Sinn in ihrem kosmischen Charakter, dessen Wesen den Menschen gemäß Messiaen auch in seinem geschlechtlichen Tun mit Gott verbindet, zu begreifen.

Dieser Komponist, welcher in seinem monumentalen Orgelzyklus „Méditations sur le mystère de la Sainte Trinité“ Überlegungen des Thomas de Aquino musikalisch re-

gelrech nachschreibt, kann mit Fug und Recht einer mehr als 1500jährigen katholischen Denkkontinuität zugerechnet werden. „Als klingende Theologie bildet sein Werk oftmals ein musikalisches Äquivalent zu den Kommentaren der großen mystischen Schriftsteller, wie denen des Hl. Bernhard von Clairvaux“, wie es demnach zurecht der österreichische Pianist Jean-Rodolphe Kars feststellte, welcher aufgrund seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Messiaens Werken seine Musikerkarriere beendete, zum Katholizismus konvertierte und Priester wurde (Schlee 1998: 18). In dieser Denktradition spielt – wie es schon angesprochen wurde – auch das Leiblich-Menschliche eine definitiorische Rolle, und zwar eine grundsätzlich positive, weil sinnlich erfassbare. Die gleichermaßen positive Bewertung der geistigen und leiblichen Gegebenheiten des Menschen ermöglicht Überlegungen zur Frage nach Einheit – nach jener im Menschen selbst, sowie nach jener seines ethischen Handelns und seines ästhetischen Wollens et vice versa. Aus der Beantwortung dieser Frage kann dann jene nach der Einheit Gottes in dessen Dreifaltigkeit und jener zwischen diesem einen dreifältigen Gott und seinem Ebenbild, dem Menschen, gestellt werden.

Die geschlechtliche Einheit zwischen Mann und Frau ermöglicht demgemäß Bernhard von Clairvaux die Definition einer bestimmten Art von Einheit, welche dann auch auf die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von Ethik und Ästhetik angewandt werden kann: „Est unitas, quae collectiva potest dici...et coniugativa, qua fit ut duo iam non duo sint, sed uno caro“ (Bernhard 1990: 804). Um die Einheit im Fleische zu erreichen, bedarf es zweier unterschiedener Subjekte, welche diese gemeinsame eheliche Einheit bilden. Erst durch sie kann von einer solchen gesprochen werden. Die Qualität dieser immerhin sakramentalen Einheit muss aber auf der jeweiligen besonderen Qualität jedes Teiles beruhen, und gleichermaßen muss das Verbindende höchsten qualitativen Ansprüchen genügen, sonst könnte Bernhard nicht zur Aussage gelangen: „Ubi unitas, ibi perfectio“ (Bernhard 1990: 686).

Demnach fordert er im Zusammenhang mit Überlegungen zum angemessenen Gebrauch der Musik im Gottesdienst „et eloqui dignitas et auctorit“ (Bernhard 1992: 782). Ist diese Einheit der Würde von Stil und Verfasser gegeben, dann entfaltet das Kunstwerk seine angemessene Wirkung auf die Zuhörenden, welche ihnen in der unterscheidbaren Einheit von „gratiora“ und „utiliora“ erlebbar wird (Bernhard 1992: 782).

Die „unitas coniugativa“ von Ethik und Ästhetik wendet sich demnach auch an die Einheit menschlicher Beschaffenheit als „animal rationale“ in der ebensolchen „unitas coniugativa“ von Sinnengeist und Geistseele. Wenn sie dies mittels eines Kunstwerkes tut, so soll jenes gemäß Bernhard grundsätzlich und sinnvollerweise dermaßen beschaffen sein, „sic mulceat aures, ut moveat corda“ (Bernhard 1992: 782).

Der christliche Denker des 12. Jahrhunderts weist den unterscheidbaren Bedingnissen der „unitas coniugativa“ des Menschseins unterscheidbare Rollen zu, welche sie zum Wohle des Ganzen in jedem gegebenen Falle wahrzunehmen haben. Die Sinne sollen das „Beschmeicheln“ wahrnehmen, das Herz – Metapher für die Seele in deren Fähigkeit, sinnliche Eindrücke zu verwerten – in Bewegung geraten. Beiden wird demnach ein jeweils gemäßes Handeln im Sinne der Einheit abverlangt. Den Sinnen kommt dabei die Verwirklichung ästhetischer Komponenten als Aufgabe zu. Das Ethische kann ihnen nicht Aufgabe sein, da es ihnen – wie Anselm von Canterbury feststellt – etwas von Haus aus Gegebenes ist. „Quia sensus, quidquid renuntiare videantur, sive ex sui natura hoc

faciant, sive ex aliqua causa: hoc faciunt quod debent et ideo rectitudinem et veritatem faciunt“ (Anselm 2001: 32).

Diese grundsätzliche Disposition ist keine ethische, weil darin kein ethischer Handlungsspielraum gegeben ist. Dieser kommt der Geistseele zu, welche in ihrem ethischen Handeln im Sinne der Einheit des Menschseins mit den durch die Sinne erworbenen ästhetischen Erkenntnissen umzugehen hat. Die ästhetischen und die ethischen Forderungen provozieren demnach sinnvoll sinnlich-ästhetisches und geistig-ethisches Handeln, welches grundsätzlich unterscheidbar im Menschen als dem „animal rationale“ eins wird als das Handeln eines bestimmten Menschenwesens.

Eine sich daraus ergebende Aufgabenstellung und deren Bewältigung ließe sich anhand der von Messiaen gegebenen Beispiele der beiden Opern Mozarts und Bergs wie folgt beschreiben: die Sinne nehmen die gegebene hohe Qualität der gehörten Musik wahr und tun damit die Wahrheit. Hier ist festzuhalten, dass sich dieses „die Wahrheit Tun“ als ethisches Handeln im Hinblick auf die Geistseele in deren Ergänzung erweist.

Die Geistseele reflektiert und bewertet im Kontext ihrer ethischen Überzeugung diese ihr seitens der Sinne durch deren ergänzendes ethisches Handeln wahrheitsgemäß mitgeteilte ästhetische Qualität, indem sie überprüft, ob diese ästhetische Qualität – also hier jene der Musik – mit der ethischen Qualität des Stoffes eine „unitas coniugativa“ bildet. In dieser Weise setzt die Geistseele eine ästhetische Handlung im Hinblick auf die Sinne und diese ergänzend.

Auf solche Weise formuliert auch Søren Kierkegaard die Frage nach dem „Verhältnis von Stoff und Form“ im „Don Giovanni“ (Kierkegaard 1999: 11).

Und wie Messiaen kann er sie hinsichtlich dieses Werkes positiv beantworten. Es ist nämlich gerade in dieser Mozartoper eine qualitative Eigenschaft der Musik besonders nachhaltig in ihrer Wirkung wahrzunehmen, dass nämlich die Musik „in der Einheit der Stimmung die Mehrheit der Stimmen zu bewahren vermag“ (Kierkegaard 1999: 116f) – womit nochmals das Phänomen einer „unitas coniugativa“ als Qualitätskriterium beschworen wird, welches auch am „Wozzeck“ in vollkommener Weise wahrgenommen werden kann: jene zwischen dem Einen und dem Mehreren.

Im Falle von „Cosi fan tutte“ und „Lulu“ wird das „Verhältnis von Stoff und Form“ nicht als „unitas coniugativa“ erkannt, sondern als ein solches, welches darin besteht, dass kein Verhältnis besteht.

Die Konsequenz ist nun jene, diese paradoxe Gegebenheit als solche in ihrer qualitätsmindernden Bedeutung zu erkennen. Das verlangt eine gegenüberstellende Betrachtung der Konstituenten dieses „Nicht-Verhältnisses“. Und hier vermag es sich zu zeigen, dass Stoff und Form in „Cosi fan tutte“ und „Lulu“ einander nicht gleich behandeln, sondern der ethisch minderwertige Stoff sich der ästhetisch hochwertigen Form der Musik bedient und so die Rezipierenden zu täuschen imstande sein kann.

Für Kierkegaard und Messiaen ist dies eine Aufforderung zur Stellungnahme gegenüber den betrachtend-bedachten Werken.

Diese schlussfolgernde Stellungnahme ist notwendigerweise in sich wieder als „unitas coniugativa“ aufzufassen, da sie ja ethisches und ästhetisches Erkennen zum Endpunkt dieser Schlussfolgerungen zusammenführen muss.

Und an diesem Endpunkt steht die Erkenntnis: die Einheit erkennt das in sich Uneine.

Was bedeutet dies aber hinsichtlich des anhand des horazischen Beispieles konstatuierten „Zusammenhangs“, der zwischen Handelndem und Behandeltem gegeben sein muss, sodass auch der Stoff die Form beschmutzen kann et vice versa? Zur Beantwortung dieser Frage kann wiederum Horatius herangezogen werden:

„Virtus est medium vitiorum et utrimque reductum“ (Horatius 1998: 66).

Das heißt demnach: die Gegenüberstellung von „unitas coniugativa“ und dem, was als „Zusammenhang“ erkannt werden muss macht auf keinen Gegensatz aufmerksam, sondern auf ein „Nichtbeisammensein“ - und somit auf das Fehlen des Einsseins. Das Mangelhafte, welches als bloßer „Zusammenhang“ erkennbar wird, macht in seiner Entfernung auf das Fehlen der „unitas coniugativa“ aufmerksam und damit auch darauf, dass es mangelhaft ist.

Wozu kann das gegebene Beispiel herausfordern, wozu die Stellungnahmen der hier aufgerufenen Persönlichkeiten unterschiedlicher zeitlicher und geographischer, aber vielleicht doch gleicher denkgeschichtlicher Herkunft?

Da ist zweifellos einmal der Blick darauf zu werfen, dass Kierkegaard und Messiaen ihr Denken und den Endpunkt ihres Denkens an etwas bedeutendem, nämlich Mozart, entlangführen. Das ist ein Vorbild, welches nicht so schnell nachahmbar ist. Somit ist die Gefahr nicht gegeben, dortige Fehler mit eigenen gleichzusetzen, sodass der Stein am Erkenntnisweg keiner der Weisen sondern ein Stolperstein wird. Denn, so nochmals Horatius, „decipit exemplar vitiis imitabile“ (Horatius 1998: 76).

Des Weiteren ist der denkerischen Kontinuität höchstes Augenmerk zu schenken. Der gemeinsame Kern der bernhard'schen „unitas coniugativa“ und der messiaen'schen „Turangafila-Symphonie“ – dort denkbar, hier hörbar – macht auf die nachhaltige epochenübergreifende Vorhandenheit der Idee einer Einheit aufmerksam, welche vom Menschen in höchster Sinnenlust ästhetisch und als Freude ethisch erlebt werden kann. Die Freude ist nämlich – so muss Messiaen verstanden werden – ein ethischer Zustand, weil sich in ihr die rückhaltlose Dankbarkeit der in der „unitas coniugativa“ einander liebenden Menschen ge-

genüber Gott als dem Schöpfer und Geber dieser sinnlich-geistigen Einheit äußert – und zwar ebenfalls liebend. In dieser Einheit vermag der Mensch das Höchste auf seine Weise zu artikulieren – etwa in einem musikalischen Kunstwerk.

Und tut dies nicht auch Wittgenstein auf seine Weise? Er, der das Verhältnis der Themen einer Brucknersymphonie als ein solches von „Mann und Frau“, also als ein eheliches bezeichnet (Wittgenstein 2011: 95f, Z-227) und der eben auch sagt: „Ethik und Ästhetik sind eins“?

In einem Lied Joseph Haydns wird davon gesungen, dass sich in der Gestalt der Gottesmutter Maria „Weibes Schönheit“ und „höchste Tugend“ „schwesterlich“ vereinen.

Dieser in der österreichischen Frömmigkeitstradition festverankerte Gedanke ist ganz sicher einer von etlichen weiteren Gründen, darüber nachzudenken, dass und warum das Einheitsdictum des Österreicher Wittgenstein nicht nur klanglich auf eine fundamentale Aussage der christlichen Frohbotschaft bezogen werden kann, nämlich auf das Jesuswort „Ich und der Vater sind eins“ (Joh. X / 30) (vgl. Mayer 2011).

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# Foundations of Normative Ethics: Deductive Construing (Systemic-Informational Approach)

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When speaking of ethical problems, *two points* seem to be of principal importance:

- I. *Status* of the model discussed. Here *two versions* are possible:
  1. a *descriptive approach* dealing with concrete *social reality*. Appropriate investigations are devoted to 'reflection' of ethical norms, attitudes, etc., inherent to various human communities.
  2. a *normative approach* which is 'purely theoretical' (hypothetical). It is 'intentional,' dealing with those ethical norms and attitudes which *would* respond to definite *social goals* (though sometimes these norms and attitudes cannot be observed in social reality).
- II. Principles of *singling out* those *units* (separate subjects or some social communities) whose *relations* are considered. Here we should distinguish between *two classes* of units:
  - a) Units possessing different *positions in the space* (i.e., spatial co-ordinates in reality). For instance, there exist models for interrelations between persons, or between the person and the society, or between social groups, or between societies (countries).
  - b) Units relating to different *temporal positions*, i.e., *time of functioning*. For instance, we can build models for attitudes of contemporary generation – towards previous ones (a kind of a 'debt to ancestors'), or attitudes of the present generation – towards future ones (sons, grandsons, etc.).

In the present paper we shall build a general basis for various ethical models, but primarily for classes 2a and 2b (which will be considered in Petrov 2012a, in this volume) relating to the contemporary scientific and social situation.

## 1. Maximization of the information and resulting fundamental tendencies

Once upon a time, the great mathematician Leonhard Euler (1707-1783) – who was a member both of Berlin and Saint-Petersburg academies of sciences – proposed rather ambitious project: to *construe* all the laws and regularities of the Universe, proceeding from a certain initial postulate and using purely deductive logic. It was proposed "to come to the regularities of Nature not 'from the bottom,' i.e., by induction, or generalization of empirical facts – but 'from the top,' by deduction, i.e., proceeding from certain extremal principles" (Golitsyn/Levich 2009: 60). In other words, this project consisted in deducing the structure of the Universe "as logical necessity" (expression often used by Albert Einstein), concerning the features of nature, culture, mentality, social life, art, etc. However, though this project seemed to be rather easy and promising, 'neither Euler nor his followers could realize it' (op. cit., p. 61). So, during almost three centuries, this program was considered to be utopian.

Meanwhile, recently the situation started to change, and there exists an opinion that "in contemporary science some presuppositions appeared – ideas and explorations – to revisit Euler's project" (Levich 2010). Numerous attempts were made to realize such 'ideal construing,' at least in application to some fragments of the Universe, which relate to theoretical physics. As well, rather promising attempts were connected with the *systemic-informational approach* which was applied in the wide range both of sciences and the humanities. In particular, among phenomena which were theoretically deduced in the framework of this approach, we find the so-called Zipf's "principle of least efforts" determining various kinds of social behavior, avalanche processes in physical systems and social ones, regularities of biological evolution, cyclic processes in social life and art (see also in the next paper), semantic mechanisms of languages and their phonetic structures, features of women's beauty, and so on (see, e.g., Golitsyn / Petrov 1995, 2005; Petrov 2007; Petrov / Mazhul 2007).

In the present paper (as well as in Petrov 2012a), we shall follow exactly the line of investigations based on the systemic-informational approach. So, the system of ethics would be 'constrained' as a part of future general construction which would hopefully embrace the entire social and cultural Universe.

The basis of this approach is the so-called '*principle of the information maximum*' which is valid for any system, be it an animal, ensemble of gaseous molecules in a vessel, a forest, human collective, factory, society, language, kind of art, and so forth. In any case, the system considered interacts with its environment, and the above principle describes these interactions – as the system's 'responses' (reactions) to 'outer stimuli': "*the system aspires to choose such response y which provides the maximal valuable information about the given stimulus x*" (Golitsyn/Petrov 1995: 10).

Mathematical formalization of this principle results in *maximization* of a certain value – the so-called '*Lagrangian*':

$$L(X,Y) = H(Y) - H(Y/X) - \beta R(X,Y) \rightarrow \max,$$

where  $H(Y)$  is the entropy of the system's states,  $H(Y/X)$  the entropy of the system's errors in responses,  $R(X,Y)$  the average resource expense for the system's states  $Y$  and the environmental states  $X$ , and  $\beta$  the indicator of the deficit of the resource which is at the system's disposal. (This indicator varies from  $\beta=0$  when the system possesses unlimited resource, to  $\beta=1$  when strong resource deficit). The role of resource can be played by different 'substrates,' depending on the nature of the system studied: in economics it might be money, in mechanics – energy, in physical chemistry – substance, in ergonomics – the number of operations to be fulfilled, in sociology and cultural studies – the number of active (or creative) persons in the society, etc.

As far as the sum of the above *three items* should be maximized, we have *three fundamental tendencies* inherent in the behavior of any system:

- A. *Expansion* – the aspiration to increase the *number and the variety of the states* of the environment in which the system can exist. This is made possible by the corresponding increase in the *number and the variety of the system's responses*  $H(Y)$ . This tendency is often named 'search behavior.'
- B. *Idealization* – the aspiration to increase the 'exactness' of the *system's responses*, i.e., to decrease the entropy of the system's behavioral errors  $H(Y/X)$ .
- C. *Economy* of resources. This item contains two multiplied factors. That is why it can be expressed on the one hand in the choice of combinations  $(x, y)$  of the system's states and environmental states, with minimal resource expenses and hence, *minimal average resource expense*  $R(X, Y)$ ; on the other hand – in the aspiration to decrease the deficit of resource  $\beta$ , i.e., to *increase resource supply*.

Now our task is to *deduce* some *ethical models* proceeding from these tendencies.

## 2. "Orientation" of fundamental tendencies and types of ethical problems

This set of three tendencies – how does it work in relation to the *structure of the system* considered? Of course, usually these tendencies are tightly connected, interwoven. [Thus, the first tendency (A) provides conditions both for the idealization (B) and the economy of resources (C): due to enlarged range of the system's states, it occurs possible to realize more exact behavior of the system, as well as to make this behavior more economic.] However, possibly in some situations these tendencies may have different 'weights' in relation to the *system's structure*?

Yes, really sometimes each of the above three tendencies, in application to certain concrete situations (i.e., under definite "boundary conditions"), can possess its own 'specialization.' Thus, when 'deductive construing' (proceeding from the principle of the information maximum, i.e., the above equation) general subjective *concepts of everyday life*, it occurred possible to come to the concept of *Perceptual Space* by using such a basis as the first tendency (A), i.e., growing diversity of the system's states – combined with the third tendency (C), i.e., the economy of the resource needed to keep appropriate (spatial) information (Petrov 2012). Meanwhile, the concept of *Perceptual Time* occurred to be the sequence of the second tendency (B), i.e., decreasing entropy of the system's errors – also combined with the economy of resource needed to establish appropriate (temporal) regularities connecting different objects (phenomena) with each other. [So, both perceptual concepts which were considered by Kant as a-priori categories of our mentality, occurred deduced form the principle of the information maximum.] In both cases the basis for construing was one of the first two tendencies (A, B), whereas the third tendency (C) was used simply to put some limitations when choosing resulting versions.

In general, such results seem to be not surprising. Really, the first tendency (A) would possess a kind of a '*spatial inclination*' – because it deals mainly with the diversity of the system's states, which usually requires appropriate *space*. On the contrary, the second tendency (B) works with certain distinctions between different situations and 'replying' behavioral acts, which need due *time*; hence, this tendency would show '*temporal inclination*.' And of course, in most cases it is necessary to involve the

third tendency (C) causing some limitations both for the states to be chosen and the behavioral acts to be realized. In each concrete case, the researcher deciding about the strategy of deductive 'construing,' should take into account the peculiarities of the phenomenon to be construed, and first of all its *systemic destination*.

As far as ethics is usually treated as '*standards of moral judgements*,' it seems reasonable to suppose that the *destination* of normative ethics would be to *contribute to improving the situations* in inter-element relations (e.g., inter-subject ones, or inter-clan ones, or international ones), meaning their shifts towards definite *ideal social goals* which are hypothetically put either by the society or the researcher. (The role of cultural standards in social development was stressed by Harrison 2006.) These goals would include, for instance, the very *existence* of the entire system, the *safety* of its constituents, providing good *conditions for their development, etc.* These goals can be either understood (shared) by the entire system (e.g., the society or the international community) or not understood. But irrespective of concrete nature of these goals and their reflexion in any mentality, the best way to approach to these goals is to '*penetrate*' the *entire mental life* either with ethical concepts or their practical consequences.

Hence, we should deal with rather strong role of *immediate perception, emotions*, so-called '*primordial processes*' (according to the concept derived by Martindale, 1990), and so on. That is why we should be focused mainly on *immediate impacts* of the above three tendencies – into mentality of a person and/or the society.

Evidently, only the first tendency (A) and the second one (B) deal *immediately with the system's states*, whereas the third tendency (C) is capable of influencing upon these states *indirectly*, via the resource requirements. That is why it seems reasonable to proceed from the *first tendency and the second one* – to come to some *fundamental purposes* concerning the nature of our "ethical thinking," and afterwards we should take into account certain '*additional influences*' of the third tendency. And out of these two '*leading tendencies*' (A, B), the first would be '*responsible*' for *spatial ethical problems*, whereas *temporal topics* would be at the disposal of the second tendency.

## 3. Hierarchy of ethical systems and substances to be distributed

Evidently the most important parameter of our '*spatial consideration*' should be the *size* of those units whose relations are analyzed. Here various scales are possible embracing the *hierarchy of levels*, e.g.:

- human and his personal (individual) environment;
- society consisting of different social groups;
- a set of tightly connected societies, up to the global system.

Here we see a certain hierarchy of levels (scales) which reminds "*matryoshka*" – the traditional Russian doll where several images of a peasant girl are hidden each within another one. (In Petrov 2012a, we shall be focused mainly on the most large-scale steps of this hierarchy.) Maybe, there exist certain 'substances' (or categories) inherent in all these units?

In the framework of the systemic-informational approach, the functioning of any system involves *two key constituents* ('main personages'):

- *information* which characterizes the structural features of the system considered (inter-elements links within

- the system), as well as the rules of interactions ('habits') of this system with its environment;
- resource available, i.e., a certain 'substrate' spent by the system while the above interactions.

As far as our consideration is focused on normative ethics, we should analyze, first of all, 'due' distribution of these both constituents *between the elements* of the system, e.g., we should clear up what is the debt of one element (a subject, a group, a country) for some other elements, meaning both the debt of the resource and the information. For the system of any size, two points would be of primary importance:

- \* 'relative weight' of the resource and information in real functioning of the system considered;
- \*\* 'ideal goals' of the system, i.e., those goals which are capable of becoming certain 'beacons' for normative ethics, as well as social and cultural politics.

In other words, we should deal both with our ideal goals and the reality to be 'improved' by means of ethics. So, first of all, what are the relationships between the above 'key personages' in the reality?

While the evolution of any social system, the relations between the 'weights' of the information and the resource, should pass through three phases (see in detail: Golitsyn/Petrov 2005):

- the 'resource phase,' when the system's functioning is determined mainly by the resource available (e.g., the life of a certain primitive tribe is fully determined by the amount of berries in the forest);
- the 'resource-informational phase' when both 'key personages' play important role in the functioning of the system (because a part of the resource can be produced by the system due to the information which is at its disposal);
- the 'informational phase' when information dominates the entire functioning of the system.

Most contemporary societies are living in the last (third) phase, and appropriate consequences relate to various aspects both of human behavior and mentality. For instance, the process of globalization is facilitated: usually the information is capable of crossing borders more easily than most kinds of resources. Besides, globalization becomes rather influential factor both for economic and social life; hence, the role of processes involving many societies,

is constantly increasing. So, in any case, it seems reasonable to focus on the functioning of the *information* within certain *multi-element system*.

As well, our '*temporal*' consideration would also be based on the leading role of *informational processes*, rates of their growth, and their scales. Both types of consideration will become the objects of our further paper in the given volume.

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# Speaking of Pain and the Preconditions of Language

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Ambivalence shrouds the later Wittgenstein's reflections on the preconditions of our concepts. I argue that a major reason for this is that it appears to him, as it appears to the Wittgenstein of the *Philosophical Remarks*, that these reflections confusedly try to specify a reality that can be shown, but not said, to exist. Later Wittgenstein is uneasy with the saying / showing distinction, but is driven by his reflections on the origins of language to tolerate it.

Most often, Wittgenstein is tempted to describe these foundations of language as follows: "The origin and the primitive form of the language-game is a reaction; only from this can more complicated forms develop". He continues: "Language – I want to say – is a refinement, 'in the beginning was the deed'" (Wittgenstein 1980, 31e; cf., Wittgenstein 1975, § 475). The hesitant view is that language is *based* upon these primitive, pre-linguistic types of behavior, first expressed by historically early human beings (Wittgenstein 1967, § 391). We are given, for example, the primitive reaction of attending to another's pain:

([I]t is a primitive reaction to tend, to treat, the part that hurts when someone else is in pain; and not merely when oneself is [...].) (Wittgenstein 1967, #540)

But what is the word 'primitive' meant to say here? Presumably that this sort of behavior is *pre-linguistic*: that a language-game is based *on it*, that it is the prototype of a way of thinking and not the result of thought. (Wittgenstein 1967, #541)

[...] Being sure that someone is in pain, doubting whether he is, and so on, are so many natural, instinctive, kinds of behavior towards other human beings, and our language is merely an auxiliary to, and further extension of, this relation. Our language-game is an extension of primitive behavior. (Wittgenstein 1967, #545)

The last of these remarks indicates that the relation between these primitive pain behaviors and the language-games of doubting or being certain about whether someone is in pain, are supposed to illuminate something quite general about the foundations of language as a whole. But what, exactly, is the point being illuminated?

Although it is a view about the natural history of concept formation, this account is not intended as a causal, or otherwise scientific, *explanation*; nor is it intended as any other kind of hypothesis (Wittgenstein 1958, 230, § 415; Wittgenstein 1975, § 400-402.). The view is "of logical interest" (*ibid.*). Wittgenstein is interested in these primitive, pre-linguistic behaviours for their role as the *grounds* of language; the facts that make all operating with thoughts *logically* possible (*ibid.*, § 401-402, § 618). When he elsewhere indicates that the above used notion of a *prototype* is intended as a synonym for what he more often calls a *paradigm* (Wittgenstein 1980, 14e), we can see the nature of the view on offer. Wittgenstein is construing these primitive reactions of early human beings as standing in a relation to the possibility of language as a whole in the same way as the paradigm of the standard meter stands in relation to the possibility of the particular language-game of measuring things in meter lengths (see, Wittgenstein 1958, § 50).

Now, it seems that Wittgenstein is *partly* concerned about this idea that language is based upon the primitive reactions of early human beings because he is not always convinced that such apparently *empirical* facts fall amongst the self-evident *grammatical* facts which it is the philosopher's business to describe (Wittgenstein 1975, § 35, § 308-309, § 319; cf., Wittgenstein 1967, § 447, Wittgenstein 1958, § 109). Second guessing his opinion that these propositions about the grounds of language express grammatical truisms, Wittgenstein asks himself: "Indeed, doesn't it seem obvious that the possibility of a language-game is conditioned by certain facts?" (Wittgenstein 1975, § 617, cf., *ibid.*, § 400-402). Importantly, though, the next remark indicates that there is more to the uncertainty in these reflections on the grounds of language than just this occasional doubt about whether apparently empirical propositions can be of logical, philosophical, interest. Presuming that it *is* an obvious grammatical truism that language is pre-conditioned by certain facts, Wittgenstein continues: "In that case it would seem as if the language-game must 'show' the facts that make it possible. (But that's not how it is)" (*ibid.*, § 618; cf., Wittgenstein 1956, III-§ 26). Here Wittgenstein is setting aside his second thoughts about whether his propositions on the basis of grammar express grammatical truisms, and revealing what we shall find to be a more substantive cause of his concern: it *seems* to him that those propositions aim to describe what could actually, at best, only be *shown*. Uneasy with the saying / showing distinction of his early work, he adds that 'that's not how it is'. However, certain allusions he makes to his middle period phenomenism convey that he is not merely warning us against this false appearance, but genuinely fighting to resist it himself.

Circa 1930, Wittgenstein believed that language was grounded not in features of a natural world before language, but in features of the immediately given specious present experience (Wittgenstein 1975a, V-§ 48, § 54; Wittgenstein 1980, 16e). He was, at times, tempted to begin his reflections in philosophy by specifying these phenomenal foundations of thought (Wittgenstein 1980, 8e). However, he recognized that a specious present sense impression could not be intelligibly described (Wittgenstein 1975a, V-§ 54).<sup>1</sup> Like the man who strikes his breast and says "another person can't have THIS [logically private] pain!" (Wittgenstein 1958, § 253), if we try to account for this phenomenal *given*

[i]nstead of a description, what would then come out would be that inarticulate sound with which many writers would like to begin philosophy. ('I have, knowing of my knowledge, consciousness of something.'). (Wittgenstein 1975a, VII-§ 68)

But, Wittgenstein's recognizes, we cannot intelligibly specify this phenomenal given as the ground of language. The above passage continues: "You simply can't begin before the beginning" (Wittgenstein 1975a, VII-§ 68).

<sup>1</sup> For a detailed explanation of this position, see Stern 1995, 160-192.

At the time of this remark Wittgenstein still seems to embrace the saying / showing distinction that he seemed to embrace in the *Tractatus*, so the difficulty describing this foundational flux of sensory experience does not dissuade him from believing it exists. He concludes by endorsing his impression that "what is inexpressible [...] is the background against which whatever I could express has its meaning" (Wittgenstein 1980, 16e): "We cannot ask about that which alone makes questions possible at all. Not about what first gives the system a foundation. That some such thing must be present is clear." (Wittgenstein 1975a, XIV-§ 168; cf., ibid., XIV-§ 166; Wittgenstein 1974, VI-§ 71).

Nodding at this middle period temptation to specify the inexpressible basis of thought, the later Wittgenstein tells us he is still concerned that his thoughts on this topic of what makes language possible 'go farther back than the beginning'. Uncomfortable about this, he admits:

[Here there is still a big gap in my thinking. And I doubt whether it will be filled now.] (Wittgenstein 1975, 62e)

It is so difficult to find the *beginning*. Or, better: it is difficult to begin at the beginning. And not try to go further back. (ibid., § 471)

I want to regard man here as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination. As a creature in a primitive state. Any logic good enough for a primitive means of communication needs no apology from us. Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination. (ibid., § 475)

The concern, it seems, is that the description of our foundational primitive behaviors tries to specify something unspecifiable; no less than a description of the foundational specious present, or a logically private pain. This is no confident dismissal of this temptation, but a genuine struggle to resist it.

We see further signs of this struggle when Wittgenstein deviates from his usual temptation to picture these foundations of thought *clearly*; that is, as particular forms of primitive human behavior. We see such deviations when he considers picturing language as grounded, no longer in these specifiable forms of primitive reaction, but in certain indescribable *somethings* located in a background 'bustle of life'; itself something at which Wittgenstein can only gesture with what, in the context of his arguments against private language, he disparages as 'an emphatic stressing of the word 'this'' (Wittgenstein 1958, § 253):

[...] this background is not monochrome, but we might picture it as a very complicated filigree pattern, which, to be sure, we can't copy, but which we can recognize from the general impression it makes.

The background is the bustle of life. And our concept points to something within *this* bustle. (Wittgenstein 1980a, II-§ 624-625; cited in Stern 1995, 191)

Uncomfortable with the saying / showing distinction, rather than admitting that talk of this indescribable background of behavior is roundly unintelligible, Wittgenstein is trying to sensibly picture it; namely, he is trying to picture it as a complicated filigree pattern that cannot be copied. And how are we to imagine the place of this indescribable background from which language first evolved in our larger world-picture of human history? We are told in the *Investigations*:

The evolution of the higher animals and of man, and the awakening of consciousness at particular level. The pic-

ture is something like this: Though the ether is filled with vibrations the world is dark. But one day man opens his seeing eye, and there is light" (Wittgenstein 1958, 184).

There is little more comfort with this effort to picture the background as an indescribable bustle than there is about picturing it clearly, as an order of pre-linguistic activity. The above passage continues as follows:

What this language primarily describes is a picture. What is to be done with the picture, how it is to be used, is still obscure. Quite clearly, however, it must be explored if we want to understand the sense of what we are saying. But the picture seems to spare us this work: it already points to a particular use. This is how it takes us in (ibid.).

In what sense is the meaning of this picture of language as emerging from a dark background, to be pictured as a blurry filigree pattern of vibrations, *obscure*? In what sense does the use we make of the picture 'take us in'? Again, the middle period struggles with phenomenism point us toward answers here.

The Wittgenstein of *Philosophical Remarks* speaks to the problem when he realizes that the background – at this point construed as the phenomenal given that we find in raw 'visual space' – cannot even be sensibly pictured as a Euclidean plane, vibrated such that the plane and its features are so blurred as to be unnoticeable.

We might think that the right model for visual space would be a Euclidean drawing-board with its ideally fine constructions which we make vibrate so that all the constructions are to a certain extent blurred (further, the surface vibrates equally in all the directions lying in it). We could in fact say: it is to be vibrated precisely as far as it can without its yet being noticeable, and then its physical geometry will be a picture of our phenomenological geometry.

But the big question is: Can you translate the 'blurredness' of phenomena into an imprecision in the drawing? It seems to me that you can't. [...]

(Indeed, an imprecise drawing is seen with precisely the unclarity we are trying to represent by its imprecision.). (Wittgenstein 1975a, XX- § 217)

The trouble here is, I think, this: Imagining the flux of experience as an imprecise array of vibrations is supposed to capture its status as the indescribable manifold, logically prior to language, to which concepts are applied. But, as we have been finding, this picture can no more represent something logically prior to language than a stressed demonstrative can represent a logically private pain. The trouble, is that the substantive *identity* of what we mistakenly think of as a background 'logically prior to language', like the substantive identity of what we might mistakenly call a 'logically private pain', can only be intelligibly explicated as something that stands in internal relations to other grammatical facts amongst what Wittgenstein calls the 'stage settings' of our existing public language (1958, § 257). Wittgenstein drives the point home by telling us that the person striking his breast in an effort to refer to his logically private pain would make no more headway if he conceded that the referent of his 'pain' talk was *something* that he *has* and that "that is all that can be said" (PI, § 261). The response this plea for private language echoes the aforementioned response that the Wittgenstein of the *Philosophical Remarks* issued to the person who wished to speak about the phenomenal background in which lan-

guage is supposed to be originally grounded: this attempt to speak about what is supposed to be logically independent of the categories of grammar is an attempt to speak with inarticulate sounds:

'has' and 'something' also belong to our common language. – So in the end when one is doing philosophy one gets to the point where one would like just to emit an inarticulate sound. – But such a sound is an expression only as it occurs in a particular language-game, which should now be described. (1958, § 261)

If we are inclined to take such a sound as meaningful at all, that only goes to show that it does not refer to anything logically independent of the grammatical facts in terms of which that referent might be characterized. If there really were a logically private pain we would be wholly unable to represent such a thing in language.

For the same reasons, the blurry flux of phenomena which the *Philosophical Remarks* construes as the grounds of language cannot be represented even by a blurry linguistic picture. Any linguistic picture, if it makes sense at all, would fail to capture the supposed language-independence of the background, for it characterizes the background in terms of internal, grammatical, relations that exist *within* language; namely, relations that the concept of this imprecise background is supposed to bear to our concepts of precision and imprecision.

Now, the same trouble explains the ambivalence in the later work about picturing the 'bustle of life' as an array of vibrations in the ether of a dark world logically prior to the historical evolution of language. No less than when we try to represent the background as specifiable types of primitive behavior, when we try to represent it as an indefinite blur, the descriptive content of our picture evaporates under scrutiny. And so, in the later writings, as in the middle writings, the attempt to picture something that genuinely preconditions thought terminates in a senseless inarticulate sound.

Once we recognize these bounds of sense, we can appreciate why Wittgenstein thinks our dark picture of what makes language possible is obscure and 'takes us in'. The trouble is that that picture *seems* to make reference to the kind of thing that the Wittgenstein does not want to countenance in his ontology: something that can be shown but not said. We are mislead to this false appearance in just the way that Wittgenstein was mislead by his middle period picture of the phenomenal given. Grammatical truisms about that we recognizes in our everyday talk about the origins of language seem to commit us to the idea that *something* genuinely preconditions language, but, on the other hand, it seems that such a *something* would have to be feature of reality that language could not actually represent.

We now arrive at the interesting asymmetry between these two stages of Wittgenstein's thought about the foundations of language. Where he ultimately abandons the idea that our concepts are derived from an indescribable sensory flux of experience, logically-prior to the linguistically structured experience that we come into when we learn our first language, he is oddly unsure of how to dissolve the appearance that our concepts are derived from an natural-historical epoch that we are imagine as an indescribable 'bustle of life', logically prior to the evolution of language. Rather than forfeit the latter idea, he reluctantly retains it, appending that aforementioned reminder that that picture does not point to the incomprehensible reality to which it seems to point, and adding that this obscure

picture "must be explored if we want to understand the sense of what we are saying" (1958, 184). Again confessing his difficulty 'beginning at the beginning' he writes:

The great difficulty here is not to represent the matter as if there were something one *couldn't do*. As if there really were an object, from which I derive its description, but I were unable to shew it to anyone. – And the best that I can propose is that we should yield to the temptation to use this picture, but then investigate how the *application* of the picture goes" (ibid., § 374).

Why is this the best Wittgenstein can do? If our talk of something logically prior to language seems to reduce to an inarticulate sound, why persist in that talk? It would seem that Wittgenstein should extend good quietist respect to our *clearly* descriptive talk about the behavior that preconditions language, as he is so often tempted to do, but recognize that those preconditions are no more *logically* prior to language than our private mental states are *logically* private. Why does he not heed that corrective he offers the logical atomist, who shares the illusion that language is preconditioned on something inscrutable, because independent of all internal relations: "What looks as if it *had* to exist, is part of the language" (Wittgenstein 1958, § 50)?

A complete account of the puzzlement over the foundations of thought will have to answer these questions. My effort here has only been to show an element of this puzzlement. It seems to Wittgenstein that this picture points at a shown, ineffable, reality from which our concepts are derived; an appearance he thought mistaken, but difficult to dissolve.

**Acknowledgement:** I am grateful to James Stuckey for the many hours he has spent discussing with me the issue I deal with here, and for his customarily clear thoughts on the matter.

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# Wittgenstein and Social Courage

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Social courage is unusual because it involves helping others despite significant risks. The risks include ostracism, loss of job, and in certain cases, even the loss of life and limb. Social courage is associated with conflicts characterized by inequality of power. The powerful uses his superiority to cause physical or psychological harm to the weaker party, and agents who witness this injustice feel pressured to take non-conformist action in behalf of the aggrieved at the risk of also facing harm from the stronger party (Meyer/Herman 2002). Social courage becomes problematic because it seems to be an altruistic act that is unintelligible from the perspective of rational agency. How is it possible for agents to go against the basic tenets of self-preservation and dare on to help others even if those others are complete strangers? Is social courage merely a matter of stupidity? Or, can it also be an important act of obligation and autonomy?

Wittgenstein's method of language-games can help us have a better understanding of social courage without reducing it to a plain case of moral altruism along with its dilemmas on rationality. Social courage is different from moral courage. Moral courage ignores the various situational factors that contribute to socially courageous action in favor of emphasizing pro-social attitudes of an individual (*ibid.*). Social courage, on the other hand, considers personal satisfaction, indignation, and even rage as legitimate reasons for action. It also acknowledges the many contexts that contribute to socially courageous behavior. It involves acts of benevolence that go beyond the concerns of individual and family life. Yet, it also expresses a high concern for one's identity (*ibid.*).

The 'risky benevolence' characteristic of social courage becomes obligatory even for strangers and distant agents because we can feel connected to them in various ways. Wittgenstein's language-games can be viewed as a method that enables us to establish such a connection so we can feel obligated to help whoever is suffering injustice. Obligations do not just come from the system of rules codified and expressed by particular legal institutions. On a more fundamental level, they are created by means of our entry and participation in specific practices. These practices allow for attachments and relationships that constitute specific obligations and responsibilities. Where no such attachments are de facto shared, the task of morality is to establish such connections by engaging and reflecting on the more primitive practices we share with others. This becomes a basis for developing 'normative competencies' (Shields 1998) that allow for the very possibility of following a rule and determining what counts as our obligation in a particular instance. Understanding is a task that cannot be relegated to a system of codified rules. Such attitude fragments our view of action and renders important obligations empty.

There will always be indeterminacy in language and in all the human activities that involve language. Wittgenstein's language-game approach acknowledges the fact of this indeterminacy by being comfortable with a set of examples and instances that illustrate the different conditions for the meaningful application of a concept (PI 133). The learner becomes a competent user of a language not by means of

the ability to cite rules for every instance of action, but by acquiring a receptivity for applying a rule 'with certainty' (PI 211-213). Thus, the method of language games involves a drill in the different examples and actions that are associated with a concept, but this training is not meant to result to a mechanical application of rules. On the contrary, it is meant to enable the learner to apply the rule with flexibility while not viewing this flexibility as something contrary to the objective application of rules (PI 232). It is a matter of acquiring 'reflective mastery' over an activity so we can acquire the competencies necessary for applying a rule as 'a matter of course' (*ibid.*). Language is characterized by a natural and inescapable indeterminacy, and it is important to recognize our judgment as partially constitutive of objectivity so as not to make impractical demands on understanding.

Similarly, research on the bystander effect shows that a major deterrent of helping is the ambiguity in defining what counts as a 'private' or 'public' concern (Meyer/Herman 2002). Conflicts involving violence deter social courage because they are perceived as domestic affairs where intervention amounts to intrusion of privacy (*ibid.*). In the case of Kitty Genovese for example, many witnesses did not interfere because they thought it was 'a lover's quarrel' (Cherry 2011). Anonymous victims of violence are also often viewed as partly to blame or responsible for getting themselves out of the situation (Meyer/Herman 2002). Help does not come only because of the fear of risks, but also because of doubt in the legitimacy of action. The fact that many people do not intervene is taken as a sign of what counts as the socially appropriate way to act in the situation (Cherry 2011).

Thus, the problem of social courage can be construed in terms of indeterminacy in meaning and perception. Because there is always ambiguity in interpreting action, we always exercise choice in perceiving and understanding a situation. Wittgenstein illustrates this in terms of the many ways one can interpret the same expression, rule, or picture. Awareness of this indeterminacy does not imply absolute subjectivity in perception. On the contrary, it invites us to be critical about the extent to which we have excluded others' views in coming up with an accurate account of the situation. Hence, Wittgenstein rejects the conception of understanding as a form of private language because of its uncritical way of dealing with the indeterminacy of language. The apathy shown in the many cases of the bystander effect is precisely a form of solipsism that comes from an uncritical manner of viewing the world. Because all that exists are one's needs and interest, social courage does not make sense. Bystanders 'choose' to perceive a risky situation as private because of the disadvantages involved.

Research on social courage also shows a Wittgensteinian resolution to the problem of the bystander effect by emphasizing the importance of 'closeness'. When the persons involved are our family and friends, violence and the gravity of danger do not prevent social courage (Meyer/Herman 2002). Female friends regularly stand up against the harassment of their female friends and males help their buddies as part of an unspoken code of honor.

When we are socially close to the person's involved, people said that social courage is 'natural' and 'goes as a matter of course' (*ibid.*). In these cases, obligation to help is so evident that it needs no justification despite the risks involved. 'Closeness', however, is not always conceived in terms of actual 'social closeness'. People were also willing to help strangers: 1) when the situation involved a conflict agent's felt 'emotionally close' with, 2) when agents had similar experiences and thought of themselves in the position of the victim currently in need and in want help, and 3) when agents thought of the victim in terms of people they are actually close with (*ibid.*).

'Closeness' is important because it puts us in better position to deal with the task of clarifying human action. The 'closer' we are with people or the situations they are in, the better we understand the person, and the clearer we are about how to act in the situation. In such cases, even the supposed 'diffusion of responsibility' ceases to be deterrent (*ibid.*). Our social or emotional closeness enables to be clear about our role in a situation and gives us 'sense of confidence' and 'conviction' about the legitimacy of intervention. This is essential during emergency and urgent situations where the need for response is immediate. In those cases, productive action often has to be instinctive and even 'unthinking'. Otherwise, doubt will lead to a paralysis in action characteristic of the bystander-effect. Closeness enables us to help others spontaneously regardless of the risks because recipients of help are no longer viewed as an 'other' whose being is independent and separate from our own.

Accordingly, 'socially reflective modes of learning' are important in facilitating social courage because they enable us to clarify our role in social processes (*ibid.*). These modes of learning aid in the task of judgment via the practice of perspective taking, the articulation of different interests, and the development of skills and competencies that gives a feeling of strength and confidence in action. This is usually done in role playing & simulations, dialogues, and training in conflict mediation. In these activities, emphasis is given not just on the cognitive but on the emotive, i.e. 'that we feel what the excluded and threatened person feels'. We are often unconscious of the various factors and structures that prevent social courage (e.g. our fears and interests and the structure of power and authority in groups). Socially reflective learning enables us to become more conscious of these factors so we can be more proactive in our interaction with others (*ibid.*).

It is interesting to note how Meyer and Herman (2002) intentionally broadens the scope of social courage to include courage to help others in everyday and ordinary contexts. They claim that everyday behavior on how we respond to conflicts on the job, at school, and at home more important than violent conflicts in the public realm (*ibid.*). This is consistent with their emphasis on the importance of social learning in clarifying the ambiguous definitions of the 'private'. Social learning involves greater awareness of the various continuities between the private and the public. This, in turn, broadens the scope of moral obligation. Hence, though social courage occurs in the public, what often moves us to intervene even in violent conflicts is our perception that they belong to our 'area of life' (*ibid.*).

This implies that social courage requires a broadening of the 'private'. Wittgenstein's method of language-games is precisely a socially reflective mode of learning which enables us to challenge conventional definitions of the private so we can be sensitive to the needs and interests of the excluded. Strangers and distant agents also belong to the scope of moral consideration, but they are often neglected because of unfamiliarity. Language-games enables us to understand the unfamiliar so we can better acknowledge the agency of other beings. Hence, Wittgenstein emphasizes the importance of understanding differences by comparing and contrasting various contexts in the use of language. The familiar is put under the context of the unfamiliar (PI 1, 185), while the unfamiliar is viewed under the familiar (PI 89, 107-8). The same concept is viewed anew from different directions (PI vii), existing modes of understanding are constantly challenged, and we are forced to use imagination. This process enables us to stretch our concepts and ways of looking at things so we develop a sensitivity to the similarities and differences that constitute our shared forms of life (PI 67, 130).

Wittgenstein bridges the gap between the private and the public by emphasizing the interdependence between an agent and the linguistic practices of his community. The agent influences a practice in as much as a practice partially constitutes the agent's identity. Here, Wittgenstein uses the word 'practice' in two difference senses. On the one hand, it refers to the established agreements in behavior that we simply need to follow and acknowledge to learn and use a language. On the other hand, it also refers to the agreements in action we develop and constitute as we master the practices associated with the relevant uses of language. The first one refers to the customs and practices of our community, or of mankind, which provide the regularity for making sense of an expression (PI 198-9, 206). The other one refers to the practice of making judgment itself which the individual can only learn on his own (PI 232). The creative tension that exists between these two senses of 'practice' is where language-games does its work. Within this framework, it becomes possible to have a conception of agency that avoids the reductionist tendencies of foundationalist thinking.

Hence, the method of language-games is not to be understood as a communitarian thesis on objectivity. Understanding by means of language-games involves participation in the various practices and forms of life of our community. But part of this form of life is the development of techniques in judgment unique to every person. Indeterminacy and difference in judgment is still present when we use the language-games of our community. This indeterminacy amounts to freedom. It provides the space for innovation and creativity while allowing for a temporal conception of agency. Our identity can be defined in terms of the manner by which we are able to respond to this indeterminacy. At some point in the learning of language, rules are absent and we act without guidance (PI 228). This act is not fixed but the ability from which it comes from constitutes our agency.

## Conclusion

Social courage can be conceived as a duty only by means of an individual's fundamental connection with others. Fostering social courage implies developing social and emotional closeness with others or with particular issues in our society. Wittgenstein presents a method for developing such closeness by means of participation in the various language-games of our community. This method does not consist in the blind obedience to rules and conventions, but to the development of a sense of agency that is capable of owning the needs and interests of others. Hence, social courage does not amount to self-denial and irrationality. It is actually an expression of autonomy. Here, autonomy is not just conceived in terms of physical integrity. It is also defined in terms of the promotion of values and feelings one shares with the rest of humanity.

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# Tractatus 5.1362

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- 5.1362 The freedom of the will consists in the impossibility of knowing actions that still lie in the future. We could know them only if causality were an inner necessity like that of logical inference. – The connexion between knowledge and what is known is that of logical necessity.  
(‘A knows that p is the case’, has no sense if p is a tautology).<sup>1</sup>

Section 5.1362 of Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* has been regrettably neglected by commentators.<sup>2</sup> Among the most recent books on the *Tractatus* only Pasquale Frascola’s most sophisticated *Understanding Wittgenstein’s Tractatus* (2006) devotes to 5.1362 the space it deserves. Nevertheless, I think that Frascola misconstrues Wittgenstein’s argument and Wittgenstein’s conception of *free will*. In his book, Frascola argues that 5.1362 seeks to establish that the causal nexus is not a necessary nexus, and that 5.1362 suggests a verificationist reading of the *Tractatus*. In contrast to him, I will argue that, in the section in question, Wittgenstein seeks to prove that we do have free will, and that Wittgenstein’s conception of *free will* sits squarely within truth-conditional semantics.

Frascola represents Wittgenstein’s argument as follows:

- (1) The causal nexus is a necessary nexus, whose necessity can be matched to that of the relation of logical entitlement.
- (2) If the causal nexus were a necessary nexus, then a subject X could know his/her own future actions.
- (3) If a subject X could know his/her own future actions, then his/her will would not be free.

From the three premises of the argument, the conclusion can be easily drawn that the will of the subject X is not free, but this is the negation of a statement which, although on merely epistemic grounds, is accepted as true by Wittgenstein; one of the premises, then, must be false. According to Wittgenstein, both premises (2) and (3) are true, hence the *reductio ad absurdum* is to be directed at premise (1), which must be recognized as being false (Frascola 2006: 132).

So, Frascola first uncritically assumes that Wittgenstein took the existence of free will for granted and then, in the subsequent pages, he contends that the existence of free will requires a verificationist interpretation of Wittgenstein’s semantics. In particular, he argues that since the rigid semantic determinism of the *Tractatus* seems to preclude the existence of free will, Wittgenstein’s conception of *free will* suggests a verificationist approach to future contingencies.

<sup>1</sup> Wittgenstein (1921): 47, translation by David Pears and Brian McGuinness.

<sup>2</sup> White’s *Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (2006) does not discuss 5.1362. Morris’ detailed *Wittgenstein and the Tractatus* (2008) refers only to Wittgenstein’s use of the word “sinnlos” in 5.1362 (see note 25, 379). Even Kenny’s *Wittgenstein* (2006) ignores 5.1362. On page 80, Kenny only refers to Wittgenstein’s parenthetical remark that ‘A knows that p is the case’, has no sense if p is a tautology. There is no trace of 5.1362 also in Fogelin’s *Wittgenstein* (1976) or in Anscombe’s *An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus* (1959).

The claim is noteworthy, but, as I will attempt to show later, false. In any case, there are some more palpable problems with Frascola’s reconstruction of 5.1362. (2) says that if the causal nexus is necessary, then a subject X can know his or her future actions. But Wittgenstein claims the converse: “We could know them only if causality were an inner necessity like that of logical inference” (my italics). In addition, (3) appears to be weaker than “The freedom of the will consists in the impossibility of knowing actions that still lie in the future” (my italics). Frascola’s (3) is a conditional. In contrast, Wittgenstein’s claim appears to be a biconditional.<sup>3</sup>

These discrepancies strongly suggest that Frascola’s reconstruction is inadequate: it takes an unwarranted amount of textual manipulation to claim that in 5.1362, Wittgenstein seeks to prove that the causal nexus is not a necessary nexus. So, in order to fully appreciate the structure of Wittgenstein’s argument, we should re-consider Wittgenstein’s plan for 5.1362.

Let us suppose that 5.1362 seeks to establish the following thesis: *X has free will*. Nowhere in the *Tractatus* does Wittgenstein explicitly claim that we in fact have free will. However, this conclusion logically follows from these premises:

- (A) A subject X has free will if and only if he or she cannot know his or her future actions.
- (B) If a subject X could know his or her future actions, then the causal nexus would be a necessary nexus.
- (C) The causal nexus is not a necessary nexus. (In the sense that propositions about future cannot be logically derived from propositions about the present).

(A), (B) and (C)’s structures faithfully mirror Wittgenstein’s text. (C) is derived from section 5.1361: “We cannot infer the events of the future from those of the present”. While (A) and (B) are directly derived from 5.1362. In contrast to (2), (B) has the same direction of Wittgenstein’s implication; and in contrast to (3), (A) is a biconditional that better captures Wittgenstein’s *consists* (“besteht”). So, once we assume that 5.1362 argues for the existence of free will, we can fully appreciate Wittgenstein’s argument. Nevertheless, unless we explore Wittgenstein’s understanding of *free will*, we cannot properly assess Frascola’s claim that 5.1362 suggests a verificationist reading of the *Tractatus*.

In order to bring forward Wittgenstein’s conception of *free will*, Frascola attempts to trace (3) back to the venerable Aristotelian argument of the sea battle. If it is true *now* that a sea battle *will* take place tomorrow, then regardless of what we do, a sea battle *will* take place tomorrow. More generally, if future contingencies have *now* a determinate truth-value, then fatalism is true. Accordingly, Frascola argues that in order to avoid fatalism, and consequently, to allow for free will, the notion of *truth* of the *Tractatus* must have a hidden temporal dimension; that for Wittgenstein,

<sup>3</sup> In an Italian paper on the same subject, Frascola himself highlights these discrepancies. But then, he chooses to brush them aside accusing Wittgenstein of negligence (“trascuratezza”). His paper, “Un argomento del *Tractatus* su causalità e libertà del volere” (2005), is available on the internet at: lgxserve.ciseca.uniba.it/lei/biblioteca/cxc/public/f/frascola1.pdf

future contingencies lack of truth-value;<sup>4</sup> and finally, that Wittgenstein's treatment of future contingencies "provides [...] a significant clue for understanding the absence of a clear-cut opposition in the *Tractatus* between a truth-conditional and a verificationistic approach in the theory of meaning" (Frascolla 2006: 134).

In summary, in Frascolla's interpretation of 5.1362, free will depends upon the fact that since future contingencies lack of truth-value (and since knowledge implies truth)<sup>5</sup>, we cannot know the future. If reality could now settle the question of the truth-value of a sentence concerning the future, then we could know the future. But how could reality do that? For Frascolla, it cannot. He thinks that for Wittgenstein, "only states of affairs which either obtain or do not obtain *now* constitute reality" (2006: 133). But Frascolla unduly restricts Wittgenstein's *Wirklichkeit* to present reality. For Wittgenstein, "the sum-total of reality is the world" (2.063), and the *world* is neither the totality of present events, nor the totality of past, present and future events, for that matter, but the totality of facts *in logical space* (1.13).

So, in contrast to Frascolla, I contend that Wittgenstein's conception of *free will* squarely places future contingencies within the boundaries of truth-conditional semantics. In fact, for Wittgenstein, free will does not depend upon an indeterminate future, but upon the impossibility to logically infer the future from the past: "We *cannot* infer the events of the future from those of the present" (5.1361). In other words, we can safely assume that for Wittgenstein, "There will be a sea battle tomorrow" has *now* a determinate truth-value without calling into question the existence of free will. Since our inferences from the present to the future are merely hypothetical, they do not guarantee truth, and a *fortiori* knowledge: "It is an hypothesis that the sun will rise tomorrow: and this means that we do not *know* whether it will rise" (6.36311). Accordingly, even if "There will be a sea battle tomorrow" is true now, since we cannot know that there will be a sea battle tomorrow, we can act as free agents.

Finally, like Frascolla, I would also like to bring forward the ancient background of Wittgenstein's claim that *the freedom of the will consists in the impossibility of knowing actions that still lie in the future*. Its origin is not in Greek philosophy, but in Greek tragedy: in the *Oedipus Rex* of Sophocles. In order to escape his destiny, Oedipus made all the necessary steps to fulfill the prophecy of the oracle. His destiny inexorably prevailed on his will.<sup>6</sup> However, in spite of what many believe, the so-called "tragedy of fate" does not deny human freedom *tout court*.

In "On Misunderstanding the *Oedipus Rex*" (1966), Eric Dodds argues that although it may not satisfy the *analytical philosopher*, "neither in Homer nor in Sophocles does divine foreknowledge of certain events imply that all human actions are predetermined" (1966: 42). Accordingly, Dodds argues that Oedipus acted as a free agent and that it is wrong to think that his tragedy denies human freedom.<sup>7</sup> But even if it might be true that divine foreknowledge is compatible with free will, Dodds fails to take into account the peculiar fact that not only the gods, but also Oedipus knew about his future. The oracle put Oedipus in an extraordinary epistemic position. We do not know our futures. Oedipus did; and according to Wittgenstein, this made all the difference.

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<sup>4</sup> "That Wittgenstein invokes the old argument [the venerable Aristotelian argument of the sea battle] which shows how fatalism cannot be avoided if a truth-value is accorded to future contingencies, proves that the notion of truth of the *Tractatus* has a hidden temporal dimension. Reality cannot now settle the question of the truth-value of a sentence asserting that *X* will do action *A* at a future instant *t* simply because only states of affairs which either obtain or do not obtain *now* constitute reality: since now it is not a fact either that *X* carries out action *A* at the future instant *t*, or that *X* does not carry it out at the future instant *t*, the sentence asserting that *X* will do *A* at *t* is now neither true nor false. The treatment of propositional logic in the *Tractatus* clearly shows that Wittgenstein was not willing to admit the Possible as a third value besides the True and the False: future contingencies and all complex sentences built up by applying truth-operations to them simply are to be dealt with as lacking truth-value. Contingent sentences which are not decidable now are confined by Wittgenstein to the limbo of neither true nor false sentences" (Frascolla 2006: 133-134).

<sup>5</sup> Or as Wittgenstein puts it, *The connexion between knowledge and what is known is that of logical necessity*.

<sup>6</sup> Accordingly in 6.373, Wittgenstein writes: "The world is independent of my will".

<sup>7</sup> According to Dodds, in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1899), Freud is among the many who fell for this *heretical* interpretation of Sophocles' tragedy (see 1966: 42).

# Wittgenstein and the Doctrine of Niṣkāma Karma

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I would like to work out a significant link between later Wittgenstein's approach to absolute morality and the doctrine of niṣkāma karma (desireless action) as set forth in *The Bhagavad-Gītā*. For this I need to perform two parallel exercises: The first would be to re-construct the ethical propositions in the model of mathematical paradigms where the result and process are merged into each other. Secondly I shall take the liberty to expunge the notion of niṣkāma karma off its ontological loads and postulates in order to strike a chord of harmony between these two anti-thetical genres of philosophy.

## I

In the *Tractatus (TLP)* and *Lectures on Ethics (LE)* Wittgenstein held ethical propositions to be meaningless for the simple reason that they purport to speak about the absolute value when there is none. We can attribute 'good' to a tennis-player, to a singer, where the meaning of 'good' is determined in relation to certain norms of playing or singing. But absolute or non-relational goodness *qua* goodness is a non-entity and if ethical propositions claim to be *about* such an entity they cannot have meaning in the sense of a descriptive content. While in *TLP* Wittgenstein, in rather a positive tone, suggests them as 'transcendental' or as 'shown' in our actions (*TLP* 6.421, 6.41, 6.42) he ruthlessly dissects them as meaningless in *LE*. Let us follow him with respect to two examples which typically claim to be about absolute values. (1) "How extraordinary that the world should exist". (2) "I am safe, nothing can injure me whatever happens". Now two particular things can be paired as ordinary and extra-ordinary, but we cannot juxtapose the entire world as a whole against its absolute negation and attribute a predicate of 'absolute extraordinariness' to it. Similar remarks will apply to (2). Even a patently ethical proposition 'Murder is ignoble' is meaningless in this style of analysis. "If for instance in our world-book we read the description of a murder with all its details physical and psychological, the mere description of these facts will contain nothing which we could call an ethical proposition." (*LE*) In fine, all these propositions like (1) and (2) apparently forge a metaphor with ordinary cases, cases which are surprising, safe or valuable in the ordinary sense, but unlike a standard metaphor these propositions cannot get rid of the other term of comparison to establish an independent literal meaning of their own, from which metaphors can legitimately take off. It is in this way that such sentences go on misusing language. (*LE*)

It is interesting to compare (2) with Wittgenstein's reflections on 'will' in *TLP* in so far as both address the dominant metaphor of ethics in its de ontological versions in the West and its Indian counterpart of niṣkāma karma. A will which is unconditioned by any antecedents – a mental foundation of actions, itself sanitized of all actions and consequences – is not a component of the real world. Moreover, Wittgenstein's observations on good or bad exercise of will achieving nothing signify that the supposedly undetermined operation of the will, absorbing all consequences, 'waxed and waned' in the action cannot actually shape up an intrinsically valuable entity. (*TLP* 6.43) Simi-

larly an absolute safety (in the bosom of God) irrespective of any actual incidences, (death, illness, natural disasters) does not belong to the factual content of the world. Ethical propositions in so far as they purport to speak about such entities cannot but be meaningless.

## II

As Wittgenstein's philosophy moved towards a dismissal of absolute simple/complex dichotomy, the hypotheses of irreversible atomic facts making up the world along with the equation of meaning and assertive content were also abandoned. In tune with the later developments, I now go on to demonstrate the ethical propositions as paradigms of description – very much in the manner of the mathematical propositions. We know that for Wittgenstein, mathematical propositions too (like ethical ones) are not about ideal numbers or triangles, nor analytic, nor about the contingently uniform behaviour of empirical objects. Mathematical propositions like  $2+2=4$  turn the regular experience of two and two (solid) objects adding up to four objects into a cinematographic picture, where the two experiences (of two and two and of four) are locked into a cycle of mutual transition. Instead of being generalizations on particular experiences, it contrives a paradigm of judging experience in a particular way so that the recalcitrant experiences are absorbed into the picture. If two and two apples coalesce into one or spawn into a thousand small bits, we either say they were not two and two in the first place, or we insist that the four ideal units are hidden in the unnatural outcome, or we decide that it is a hallucination. A necessary transition is created between one experience and another, and helps to see the old experience of  $2 + 2$  in a new aspect, i.e., as different from and yet identical with the new experience of 4. Infusing the result of the process into the process itself the mathematical propositions virtually serve as grammatical paradigms of description and meaning. (Wittgenstein, 1956, I- 28, 36, 82-87, II-22, III-32,33)

Like the regular behavior of apples, sticks and stones certain actions and behaviours too have characteristic feelings and consequences associated with them. Killing humans are usually associated with feelings of extreme repugnance and practical inconveniences, whereas the opposite actions generally bring about favourable feelings and consequences. This however does not turn ethical propositions into generalizations on external incidents and psychological happenings. We can reasonably say that ethical propositions too freeze certain actions and their accompanying feelings and consequences into a configurational paradigm. They are not meaningless, but tools of reading our feelings, actions, and consequences in as much as they no longer stay apart but are seen as different dimensions of the same thing. If preserving human lives is considered to be a moral duty, the exceptional consequences are 'waxed and waned' into the pattern; unpleasant experiences are reconstructed into a different phenomenology or the action itself is recast into a new identity. Ethical propositions purporting to speak about intrinsic values are virtually games of fusing the result into the process, of forging the action and the consequence

into an aspectual interlock. Thus the ‘waxing and waning’ exercise referred to in *TLP* is now purged off all suggestions of ineffability.

For Wittgenstein just as meaning cannot be derived from pre-interpretive foundations, morality too cannot be derived from pre-moral grounds, an insight which should not be interpreted as making ‘good’ indefinable or ineffable. Nor can the moral worth of a particular action be derived from rules of morality, whether global or local. The art of seeing goodness as a paradigmatic configuration of actions and consequence is not an exercise of extracting the putative essence of the action – the essence that will encapsulate all its particular instances in its reservoir. Rather this paradigm fleshes out bit by bit through every act of judging a particular as falling under the paradigm. In accordance with Wittgenstein’s basic insight of treatment of rule-following: the generic moral quality of an action derives its content through each particular application. Actions do not lie out there as pre-given chunks ready to receive the attributes of goodness or badness, their very identities are shaped and re-shaped in and through the moral predication. (Ambrose 1982: 35)

### III

As we attempt to put the essence of niṣkāma karma in simplest possible terms, its basic paradox leaps to the eye. For the performer of such actions the result generated from the deed ceases to be the end for the simple reason that it is not desired, and there can be no end conceivable apart from desire. (*Bhagavad-Gītā* ii 47) Now since one cannot act, whether in the sakāma or niṣkāma fashion, without conceiving a specific result of that action, in what sense does *Gītā* enjoin one to abandon the end of an action? Instead of entering into the answers suggested within the transcendental framework of Karmayoga let us stick to our Wittgensteinian construal of absolute morality as the best possible reconstruction of niṣkāma karma. To repeat, a niṣkāma karmī (desireless agent), in our construal, is one who, starting with the minimal conception of the consequences fleshes it out through an incomplete and continuous flow of actions. It is in this sense that a niskāma karmī does not project the end as outside, but absorbs it into the action itself, so that the action is seen not as a means to an end, but as an end in itself. Only when the end is externalized from the action that it becomes the object of desire.

Besides, the traditional doctrine of karma-yoga is cast into a foundationalist framework which is quite alien to later Wittgenstein’s temperament. In the theory of Karmayoga actions are caught up in an intricate web where each of them comes as a manifestation of past samskāras (mental traces) left by the past cognitions. Each present action in its turn will generate suitable traces which will fructify into further cognitions and actions through an incessant process. There is only one kind of action (termed as ‘aśukla-akṛṣṇa’, defying the dichotomy of virtuous and the vicious) where our sensory and motor organs become inoperative, where the very sense of ‘I’ or subject dissipates, without which there cannot be any cognition of objects. Without any cognition of objects there is no scope of their sedimenting in the form of samskāras awaiting fructification into further actions or sakāma karmas. With all samskāras exhausted even the foundations of life-preserving activities (like digestion, respiration etc.) are withdrawn. Thus ironically, actions to be niṣkāma in the strict sense of the term need to nullify all representations, and ultimately all actions. (*Gītā* iv.37)

### IV

Given the limited purview of the paper the best we can do now is to briefly indicate how Wittgenstein’s reflections on the issues of consciousness and ‘I’ can help us construct a neat and light version of Karmayoga purged off the ontological baggage of disembodied and de activated consciousness.

For him the patent metaphysical claims about consciousness being the ultimate pre-condition of all experience, itself beyond experience and objectification, can simply be laid down as a game of super-reference. ‘I’ does not identify anything through a description, nor does it mis-describe, nor does it ever fail to refer. (Wittgenstein 1984, 401-411) We know that for Wittgenstein the difference between reference and description is not ontological, but that between two different roles that expressions come to play – the roles that can smoothly be switched over across different games. But the ‘I’ plays the constant role of marking the *origin* of all referring games. For instance – putting pieces on the board, uttering words in a memory-game, ostensive teaching or learning of words, bringing blocks and slabs at the call of the builder, are all referring-games (Wittgenstein 1984, sections 49, 2, 6 respectively), each of which may be recast into a descriptive move in another context. But the use of ‘I’ will be like highlighting or stamping a label on the space from which the hands’ movement in putting the pieces on board or the activities of builder’s assistant start off. It is this super-referring function of ‘I’ remaining constant over the mutual interplay of referring and descriptive moves that creates the myth of pure consciousness and transcendental subjectivity. (See Glock 2005)

Further, to ‘turn my attention to my own consciousness’ is to engage in a particular mode of behaviour: ‘staring fixedly in front of me – but not at any particular point or object’, glances are vacant, like someone admiring the illumination of the sky or drinking in the light (Wittgenstein 1984, 412). For him, it is through a series of progressive contrasts that the talk of pure subject or dissolution of subject/object dichotomy gets its sense. To use a very interesting example to fortify our point: “[A] proof that 777 occurs in the expansion of  $\pi$ , without shewing where” works through evoking an image of a “dark zone of indeterminate length very far on in  $\pi'$ , where we can no longer rely on our devices for calculating.” Then further out we imagine another zone where we can again see something “in a *different way*” (Wittgenstein 1956, IV-27). The proof of absolute subject also thrives on a process of posing subjects of subjects [...], as a tantalizingly long zone with a blurred edge where we magically cross over the indeterminate region and bump our head against the absolute subject – the terminus of karma. Here suddenly our discourse takes a different turn – from an innocuous play of grammatical contrasts to an ontological commitment. We think that after all we must be weaving a piece of cloth (the pure subject so to speak) ‘because we are sitting at a loom – even if it is empty – and going through the motions of weaving.’ (Wittgenstein 1984, 414)

On this construal, a niṣkāma karmī would be one who ceases not to represent or to act, but one who ceases to ossify objects and actions into a closure. He sees all the proposed foundations (real essences, ostensions, verbal rules, intentions, and volitions etc.) not as external geneses of but as merged with, the action itself – a single and seamless continuum. A niṣkāma karmī knows how to play the super-referring games with ‘I’, or to negotiate with the progressive phrase of grammatical contrasts with certain ‘mentalistic’ terms without lapsing into an ontological

commitment. In fine, Wittgenstein's treatment of ethics falls within his general programme, where philosophical problems are solved, not by filling gaps or building bridges, but by a more expansive narration of what we already know, recasting it in a new aspect. (Wittgenstein 1956, IV 52; Johnston 1989)

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# Nye's Concept of Smart Power and Normativity

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The concept of smart power is very popular in today's analyses of US foreign policy. The term was coined by Joseph Nye in 2004 and it was supposed to introduce normativity in power politics. This concept was supposed to make the use of power subject to higher principles and standards. We believe that Nye's attempt was not successful and that the concept of smart power per se has nothing to do with normativity. Generally speaking, power is the ability to affect others to get what you want. When we think about power, the very first thing that comes to our minds is a physical power, that is a brute force that allows us to command, control or force others to do what we want them to do. That is the reason why this concept of power is called hard power. Hard power is a public face of power and it is very easy to identify the source of power – we know who is in charge. Hard power is a use of carrots (money) and sticks (force) to change the behavior of others (according to our interests). A state can use its military and economic power to get what it wants, that is, it can pay others to do something or it can coerce others by using guns or threats. Hard power is power over others.

Though realists in international relations usually think of power in this way, this is not the only face of power. It is possible to affect others' behavior without commanding them to change. Nye (Nye 2011: 16-25) claims that there are two additional faces of power: the hidden face of power, and the invisible face of power. The hidden face of power (though it is very hard to identify its source) is a kind of power that controls the agenda of action by limiting others' choices of strategy. It is possible to control others not by direct control over them but by controlling structures in which others operate and make choices. For example, one can use this kind of power by setting the rules of game in the international financial sphere. The third face of power is the invisible face of power; it is impossible to identify the source of this power. Invisible power is associated with creating and shaping others' basic beliefs, perceptions, values and preferences; for example, a consumer's preference to buy a certain kind of car can be shaped by advertising, manufacturers' decisions, tax incentives, etc. These two faces of power are associated with Nye's concept of soft power. Nye defines soft power as "the ability to affect others through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes." (Nye 2011: 28) If hard power is power over others, soft power is power with others. Hard power is about commanding and controlling and soft power is about attraction and persuasion. "Hard power is push; soft power is pull." (Nye 2011: 28) If we accept these definitions of concepts of power, there are at least seven ways to exercise power:

- 1.A has enough military force to compel B to do x.
- 2.A has enough economic force to compel B to do x.
- 3.A limits B's choices by setting the agenda/framework of relationship.
- 4.A is attractive enough to motivate B to accept A's ideas and values as his own.
- 5.A is persuasive enough to change B's mind, and B accepts A's reasons as his own.
- 6.A's culture is attractive enough for B.
- 7.A's policy is perceived as legitimate by B.

It was important to describe these concepts of power because Nye alleges that there is nothing normative about them – they are purely descriptive concepts. Hard and soft powers are not good or bad per se. It is the way we use them that makes them good or bad.

But beside hard and soft power there is an additional concept of power that is supposed to have a normative character: the concept of smart power. Smart power is "the ability to combine hard and soft power resources into effective strategy" (Nye 2011: 31). That is, a use of a combination of hard and smart power in a way that will maximize the preferred outcomes while minimizing the costs. Common sense suggests the following meaning of smartness: an instrumental rationality that demonstrates the most effective way to achieve what we want. This form of rationality allows us to calculate what we can do, with what resources, in what way and when in order to obtain preferred outcomes. It is a context-relative cost/benefit analysis of hard and soft power usage. But it seems that this is not all we can say about smart power because Nye claims that "Unlike soft power, smart power is an evaluative as well as a descriptive concept. Soft power can be good or bad from a normative perspective, depending on how it is used. Smart power has the evaluation built into the definition." (Nye 2011: 31) If we properly understand this definition, smart power is good per se because it has the evaluation built into the definition. Does it mean that smart power is necessarily a good power? What does the concept of smart power tell us about the right way to use our soft and hard power?

If hard and soft powers are descriptive concepts without the evaluation built into their definitions, how can smart power, as an effective combination of hard and soft power, be a normative concept? The question we have to ask is: What *ought* a man who uses smart power do? In what way *ought* he or she use his or her soft and hard power?

One way to resolve this question is to analyze questions that Nye (2011: 292-294) suggests that every man who wants to use smart power has to answer. First, we must distinguish between normative and descriptive questions. A descriptive question is one that can be answered in descriptive terms, that is by describing what there is. A normative question is a question that can be answered in normative terms, that is by prescribing what there should be. If at least one of Nye's questions can be described as a normative question that can be answered in the normative terms of what should be, then the concept of smart power has the evaluation built into the definition. If all of the questions can be answered by describing what there is or what can be done, then the concept of smart power is not a normative concept but only a descriptive concept. Nye's questions are as follows:

## 1. *What outcomes are preferred?*

This question can possibly be a normative question about clear objectives and priorities, values and interests but only if the form of the question is: what outcomes *should* be preferred? An answer to the first of Nye's questions does not have anything to do with normativity because desired outcomes do not have to have any normative content at all. For example, it is

possible to have a list of national interests that does not include any interests defined in normative terms. The preferred outcomes are not automatically defined normatively; therefore, this is not a normative question that reaches out for normative answer.

#### *2. What resources are available and in which contexts?*

This is also a descriptive question about what kind of power is available in which contexts. What we can do with what we have? This question also emphasizes the importance of the context in which smart power is going to be used. It is very hard to define smart power as a normative concept if one describes it as a context-relative concept, that is, different norms for different contexts. If norms are context-dependent, then norms cannot be the guiding principles of power usage. This sounds like the old power politics story where circumstances, not abstract principles, define our ways of resolving problems. This is not a normative question.

#### *3. What are the positions and preferences of the targets of influence attempts?*

This is a descriptive question about minds and hearts of targets of influence attempts (To whom it has to be done?). But this could be a question with a possible normative burden because it deals with positions, interests, needs, preferences and values of targeted people. On the other hand, this could also only be a variable in our cost-effective calculus and not something that needs evaluation. We do not have to ask ourselves whether the minds and hearts of targeted group of people are in the right place. It is enough to know what their positions and preferences are and how strong they are to decide what we can do about it. This is not a normative question.

#### *4. What forms of power behavior are most likely to succeed?*

This is a descriptive question about the most effective way to use our power. That is, whether to use hard or soft power or how to use both kinds of power in the most effective way (In what way it can be done?). This could be a normative question if things to be done are morally unacceptable to the population of the smartpowermen's state, but this also could be a descriptive question about our power usage. Politicians are not going to use a certain form of power because it is morally unacceptable for them to use it but because the result of this certain form of power can be politically unacceptable. The only criteria of our power behavior is an outcome of our action, but that outcome does not have to have a normative character and the way we obtain that outcome does not have to have anything to do with normativity.

#### *5. What is the possibility of success?*

This is also a descriptive question about the general possibility of success of achieving the preferred outcome by a state's power conversion in a certain context. Although this is one of the norms mentioned in Just War Theories, by itself it doesn't have any normative content. If something cannot be achieved we won't do it because it is immoral, but because it is unachievable. This question also needs no normative answer.

According to this analysis, it seems that all of the five questions that are important for smart power use can be answered in purely descriptive way. If that is the case, then there is nothing necessarily normative in the concept of smart power and the concept of smart power is not good

per se. The only normativity that Nye mentions is actually a form of instrumental rationality. This kind of normativity, however, does not include any kind of content (especially not moral content) except the rational/effective use of a combination of different kinds of power. And if that is the case, than the concept of smart power is not good per se.

The paradox of smart power normativity is in this:

The concept of smart power is (at least partly) a normative concept.

But, there is no normative content that is necessarily connected to the concept of smart power.

Therefore, the concept of smart power is a normative concept without any defined normative content.

We could say that the concept of smart power is open to the normative content, that the normativity of smart power means that it is possible to attach normative content to the concept of smart power. Smart power could be a moral power, but it is not necessarily so. Then to what kind of normative content is the concept of smart power open? Perhaps the best way to answer this question is to first answer the following one: Who can fill the concept of smart power with normative content? One obvious answer is: smartpowermen or people who have found the most effective way to use their hard and soft power resources. Smartpowermen, then, possess some kind of privileged knowledge about the fears, needs, preferences and values of others and about the ways these fears, needs, preferences and values can be used to obtain smartpowermen's own preferred outcomes. In order to have effective use of the power described above, smartpowermen must have a targeted group of their smart power that is very confused, because the targets must recognize that their initial needs and preferences are not their 'real' needs and preferences and that smartpowermen's needs and interests are their real interests. And that process of the recognition should be done in dark, without knowing that it is in the best interest of smartpowermen. This is a problem of cognitive dissonance because the targeted group of smart power politics must rationalize actions that are opposed to its initial interests, needs, preferences and values. And if the difference between smartpowermen's beliefs and the targeted group beliefs is too big, then any kind of persuasion will not be helpful. Then the only smart thing left is to use hard power.

Without accepting the context of universal standards of morality and universal theory of human nature, Nye's smart power concept seems to be emptied of normativity. If smart power is to be a good power, it needs the universal context of international morality to work. In this universal context of international morality it is possible to talk about global public goods and morally acceptable ways of obtaining desired outcomes without denying that others do the same. Smart power has a chance to become a good power. But the very concept of smart power per se is not a normative concept.

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# The Revival of Metaphysics, and its Remedy

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## 1. Introduction

Hacker recently criticized Williamson's claim that the "linguistic turn was just the first phase of the *representational turn* [...] on which the goal of philosophy is the analysis of [...] representation" (Williamson 2004: 4). Instead of taking a representational turn Hacker summons his readers to go "back to the linguistic turn". This would renew (or preserve) a commitment to a conception of philosophy the aim of which should be "the clarification of the forms of sense that [...] are conceptually puzzling"; its charge "the extirpation of nonsense" (Hacker 2005: 19).

Both Hacker and Williamson refer for their understanding of the 'linguistic turn' to Rorty. The interest of these references, for the purpose of this paper, is that they are framed in a context in which assertions are made about the desirable course of philosophy. This concerns in particular the "revival of metaphysical theorizing" which Williamson (2004: 9) welcomes as one of the "most creative achievements of the final third of the twentieth century".

Rorty (1967: 36) sees future philosophy, philosophy, that is, after it has taken the linguistic turn, as confined to a "merely critical, essentially dialectical, function". This prompts the question how this function is appreciated in the positions taken in the controversy about the revival of metaphysics and how it can be made productive. It is this question which it will be the purpose of this paper to provide some answer.

## 2. The linguistic turn

The positions in the controversy which is sketched above both take, albeit obviously in different directions, their point of departure in an assessment of the linguistic turn. Rorty attaches the label 'linguistic turn' to linguistic philosophy (LP). By 'LP' Rorty understands "the view that philosophical problems [...] may be solved (or dissolved) either by reforming language [i.e. philosophy-as-proposal (about how to talk)] or by understanding more about the language we presently use [i.e. philosophy-as-description (of specifically philosophical truths)]" (Rorty 1967: 1, 3, 34, 38; cf. Hacker 2005: 10).

Hacker observes that Rorty's conception of the 'linguistic turn' covers only the "logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle and its affiliates" and "Oxford analytic philosophy" with a corollary emphasis on the conflict between Ideal Language Philosophy (ILP) and Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP) (Hacker 2005: 10). Admittedly, Rorty's picture of the 'linguistic turn' might be too restrictive as to cover the entire 'analytic movement' if it were confined to Logical Positivism and Oxford Analysis, which Hacker discusses as comprising only two of its phases. However, conceded that the received view tends to associate linguistic reform with ILP and linguistic description with OLP, Rorty's account seems to focus on metaphysical aspects of LP, in particular the method by which the solution or dissolution of philosophical problems may proceed. Notice Rorty's remark that from his "metaphysical standpoint" it is "unclear why [a continuing] controversy" between ILP and

OLP should exist (Rorty 1967: 12). Rorty's conception of the linguistic turn could, therefore equally be interpreted as aiming at a common feature, shared by ILP and OLP (for which Logical Positivism and Oxford Analysis are exemplary), rather than as denoting phases in the history of philosophy. This common feature, which Rorty discusses at some length, is a metaphysical assumption of LP, viz. its 'methodological nominalism'. For a method to be nominalist it should satisfy the following requirements: (i) a non-commitment to "substantive philosophical theses" in doing philosophy (presuppositionlessness); (ii) the availability of criteria for success which can be rationally agreed upon; (iii) the assumption that philosophical investigation is concerned with "questions about the use of linguistic expressions" (Rorty 1967: 5, 8, 11, 14).

## 3. The revival of metaphysics

Hacker (2005: 15) deems it advisable that "philosophy after the linguistic turn, the sooner it makes another turn – to the study of the history of philosophy – the better". A mere repetition of the historic stance of the linguistic turn as regards traditional metaphysics would not suffice, though, for an answer to the new metaphysics. For, however the new metaphysics is "continuous with traditional metaphysics" (Hacker 2005: 17; cf. Williamson 2004: 9), it not only has benefitted from the "theoretical advances" of "modern logic from Frege onwards" (Williamson 2004: 35) but it is also informed about the "displacement" of the philosophy of language by the "new philosophy of mind" with 'mental representation' as its central notion. Williamson (2004: 4) contends that thought and language can together be classified "under the more general category of representation". And it is to this contention indeed that Hacker (2005: 17) objects, stating that this classification rests on the mistaken supposition that "one can coherently classify both thought and language under the more general category of representation". For, whereas language is "a medium of representation", and "a segment of the grammar of a particular language [...] a form of representation [...] thought is neither a form nor a medium of representation".

Williamson (2004: 36) recognizes that many philosophical questions are about thought and language. Accordingly, he does not want to sacrifice the "logical rigour and semantic sophistication", characteristic of analytic philosophy (Williamson 2004: 37). On the other hand, Williamson conjectures (in connection with Strawson's conceptual analysis) that, due to the intrinsic aboutness of thought and talk "one cannot perhaps reflect on thought or talk about reality without reflecting on reality itself" (Williamson 2004: 10). It does not seem obvious that this conjecture suggests, as Hacker argues, that "so reflecting yield[s] knowledge of the world" (Hacker 2005: 14); at the least a clarification by linguistic analysis is demanded of the use of the modal verb 'cannot' in the statement of this conjecture. This statement thus fuels perhaps Hacker's allegation about the confusions of the new metaphysicians about their use of the modal verbs (Hacker 2005: 17f.).

One can notice that Williamson's detachment of the notion of 'representation' from that of 'linguistic expression'

amounts to a non-compliance with requirement (iii). However this does not involve a non-compliance with requirement (i), it seems to be an assumption of LP that compliance with requirement (iii) warrants the ‘topic-neutrality’ of linguistic analysis, and hence, its compliance with requirement (i). On this assumption non-compliance with requirement (iii) would, within the framework of LP, increase the risk of an unreflective commitment to substantive philosophical theses. Thus, by the lights of Hacker’s objection against the detachment of representation from linguistic expression we are faced with a dilemma. Either we are content with the analysis of linguistic expressions as mediums or forms of representation without bothering about knowing what these expressions represent (‘linguistic metaphysics’), or we engage in representational analysis without bothering about knowing by the force of which expressions and in what forms these representations are representations (‘representational metaphysics’) (cf. Hacker 2005: 19).

#### 4. ‘Going beyond’ or ‘overcoming’ metaphysics?

Hacker’s reservations about Rorty’s focus on the contrast between ILP and OLP do not spoil his support (which incidentally, coincides with his amazement about Williamson’s leaving these changes unnoticed) for the prominence in Rorty’s account of the “dramatic changes in analytic philosophy that occurred in the 1930s” (Hacker 2005: 12). The ‘linguistic turn’ in Rorty’s rendering, applies to a “sea-change”, a shift in the conceptions of “the problems and methods of philosophy [...] that to some extent bridged the gulf” between logical empiricism and Oxford Analysis (Hacker 2005: 10).

This episode manifests the tolerance of methodological nominalism of rearrangements of philosophy-as-proposal and philosophy-as-description that cut across the ILP/OLP-distinction. Since it marks the failure of empiricist foundationalism to turn philosophy into a science (Rorty 1967: 6), one might ask what can be learned from this failure with respect to a desirable standpoint concerning the new metaphysics in connection with Rorty’s understanding of philosophy’s dialectical function. This concerns in particular the contribution of linguistic metaphysics “to a distinctive form of understanding” (Hacker 2005: 11) as compared to the contribution of linguistics, and its stance towards aspects of general linguistic interest which are discussed by philosophers who took the “kind of linguistic turn [in] [...] ‘continental (supposedly non-analytic) philosophy’ (e.g. those which “[i]n the hermeneutic study of interpretation [...] take[s] a more specifically linguistic form (Williamson 2004 4f.). (Notice, in connection to this, the contrast between Kant’s figurative description of thinking as ‘speaking with oneself’ at (Kant 1798: 192) with the arid exposition of the ‘I think’ in the first *Critique*.) Representational metaphysics may be asked about its connection with brain sciences, inspired as it is by the idea of a “language of thought (the brain’s computational code)” (Williamson 2004: 4; cf. Hacker 2005: 18). A further question could be at which point and on the basis of which methodological requirement it is decided that one should go ‘beyond’ linguistic analysis and set out for representational analysis.

It can be learned from the case of logical positivism that the above rearrangements cannot be made arbitrarily. Thus in logical positivism requirement (iii), viz. verificationism, restricted the scope of acceptable philosophical discourse to a point at which the vocabulary to philosophize about metaphysical issues became unavailable. It thus put the acceptability of its method at risk (ii), the more so because it was ridden with a substantive philosophical assumption (i) which, moreover, put prevalent moral convictions to a stress. Consider, as an example of a purportedly metaphysical statement the sentence “God disapproves of our conduct” (Wittgenstein 1965: 10). Since, on Carnap’s view, this sentence contains the metaphysical concept ‘God’ he would probably agree with Wittgenstein that it does not express a factual statement (cf. Carnap 1931: 226). The mere assertion that Carnap “does not say more” than that this sentence is “not capable of stating facts” (Ayer 1956: 74) or Carnap’s qualification of it as an “expression of a life-feeling” (Carnap 1931: 238) are, however, scarcely convincing. For if Carnap does not say more, he does do more, namely exhibit a tacit emotivism about ethics. Since for Carnap metaphysics encompasses ethics (Carnap 1931: 220), this tacit emotivism undermines the rigour of the distinction between factual and metaphysical statements if the language in which it is stated introduces an instance of the metaphysics he wants to eliminate (cf. Man 1978: 27 for a similar formulation in connection with Kant).

To judge from his taking this statement as a “document of a tendency in the human mind” Wittgenstein (1965: 12) and a manifestation of “the urge to thrust against the limits of language” one might expect Wittgenstein’s approach to go in another direction, the more so since this “thrust [...] points to something” (Waismann 1965: 12f.). Pianalto’s analysis of the phrase “speaking for oneself” as a philosophically interesting form of the use of moral language seizes upon this expectation (Pianalto 2011). Following on Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘theology as grammar’, telling “what kind of object anything is” and “expressing [aussprechen] its essence” (Wittgenstein 1968: 116), Hartshorne (1966: 20) uses this notion to qualify Anselm’s ontological proof of God as a “discovery that atheism is bad grammar”. This is because “[i]f ‘God’ is the term for the referent of worship, then a unique mode of existence, excluding even the conceivability of nonexistence, is part of the import of that term”.

Using Vattimo’s rendering of the term ‘Überwindung’ one could call Carnap’s way out of the above dilemma a ‘going beyond metaphysics’ as it seeks to leave metaphysics behind. However, this course is parasitic on the (broadly speaking) onto-theological assumption that the sentence “God disapproves of our conduct” should presuppose God’s physical existence. Wittgenstein’s strategy, by contrast, rather is an ‘overcoming’ (Verwindung), which does not have the connotation of ‘leaving behind’ but rather of the recuperation from an illness. For Nietzsche and Heidegger “thought has no other ‘object’ than the errances of metaphysics recalled to memory in an attitude that is neither that of criticism which surpasses nor that of mere acceptance” (Vattimo 1987: 7ff.).

In view of the above, an exercise of the dialectical function Rorty envisages could consist in an intensified dialogue between LP as proposal and LP as description in an effort to continuously re-describe the metaphysical tradition in Western philosophy.

## 5. Concluding remarks

To conclude, the central question of this paper can now be answered. The controversy about the revival of metaphysics does not significantly appreciate Rorty's reflections about the dialectical function of philosophy after it has taken the linguistic turn. It leaves the perplexity of the sort Wittgenstein expresses in an acquaintance with the 'moral of language' (e.g. as expressed in Wittgenstein's metaphor about a book on ethics, see Wittgenstein 1965: 7) unthought.

A refinement of the dialectical function is suggested as a remedy to cope with the revival of metaphysics. Hacker's appeal to study the history of philosophy – infrequent in the analytic literature – surely is not done in vain; it can form an incentive for an intensified dialogue between linguistic analysis as proposal and linguistic analysis as description and thus contribute to the sophistication of LP's method. If taken seriously, the study of the history of philosophy should not commence with the emergence of analytic philosophy in the 1890s (cf. Hacker 2005: 1) but around 620 BC when Thales started philosophizing. If this study could not prove the problematicity of an allusion to Kant's frequent appeal to the Tribunal of Reason to intimate that he should have staged a 'Tribunal of Sense' (Hacker 2005: 19), it could perhaps reveal the anachronism of an appeal to Kant to push forward the cause of analytic philosophy. Instead of rushing to go beyond metaphysics, a backward step out of metaphysics (cf. Heidegger 1957: 41) might be needed to become aware of its nature. But more importantly it could help to become aware of the onto-theological dimension in the Western philosophical tradition.

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# Early Wittgenstein, Pragmatist

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## 1. Introduction

Charles Sanders Peirce introduces the pragmatic method by claiming that a thought's meaning consists solely in the conduct that it is fitted to produce. This means that if two sentences have different meaning they have to have different practical consequences. Peirce develops a theory of what a thought is. Thought starts with doubt, which needs to be appeased. The result of such appeasement is belief. Belief will then again be challenged by doubt. William James relied heavily on Peirce's idea of what a thought is and how habit appeases doubt for his pragmatic method.

After outlining Peirce's and James' account of pragmatism in the first part of the paper, I look at more recent pragmatic literature that discusses Wittgenstein's work in terms of pragmatism in the second part. While Richard Rorty connects pragmatism and late Wittgenstein, Richard Bernstein's discussion of three languages in the *Tractatus* is aimed at connecting Wittgenstein's early and late work. I argue that Bernstein's discussion of language in the *Tractatus* gives us a way to understand the projection method of the *Tractatus* in connection with pragmatism. With the help of Bernstein I show that Wittgenstein's method shares an important goal with the pragmatic method: to settle metaphysical disputes in the most straightforward way by eliminating what Wittgenstein calls nonsense and James would have called idle disputes.

## 2. What is a Pragmatist?

The Greek word *pragma* means action and our words *practice* and *practical* come from it, says James in his 1907 lecture *What Pragmatism Means*. William James introduces us to the pragmatic method, which he uses to settle metaphysical disputes that, as he claims might "otherwise [...] be interminable". The pragmatic method consists in an attempt "to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences" and that if there are no practical differences, then the "alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle." (*Ibid.*)

James' pragmatic method relies on Peirce's idea that beliefs are rules for action or that a thought's meaning consists solely in the conduct that it is fitted to produce. Let us look at Peirce's involved idea of what a thought is.

Peirce says, "The action of thought is excited by the irritation of doubt, and ceases when belief is attained." (Peirce 1878) Peirce calls thought an action and then describes what kind of action it is. It starts with doubt, which is an irritation that so to say jumpstarts thought into being. Once we doubt, we are in the process of forming a belief. The belief is the solution we come to after we get rid of the doubt. Peirce says, belief "appeases the irritation of doubt, which is the motive of thinking." (*Ibid.*) Belief is therefore a state of thought at rest, either before or after the irritation of doubt. But belief is not the kind of rest that is the ultimate solution to a problem. Peirce's interesting upshot on what happens when we think lies in that the thought, or the doubt that was irritated in the thought, comes to rest because we have established a habit. Habits, according to

Peirce are rules of actions or things we do again and again and which we do not doubt. From that Peirce goes on to say that the effects of our beliefs are that which is real. For the pragmatist the meaning of a thought is therefore whatever conduct it is fitted to produce or whatever effect it has.

This is why for the pragmatist there is only practical meaning since if there is no difference in practical consequence, it makes no difference to us should there be a theoretical difference. The meaning of words are determined in the following way: they need to be making a difference in terms of our practical realities, in terms of the effects they have on how we act.

James used Peirce's ideas to get to his pragmatic idea of truth: "any idea which carries us from one part of our experience to another part and links the experiences satisfactorily is true instrumentally. The truth means thus the power to work." (James 1907)

## 3. Wittgenstein, Pragmatist

Philosophy is not a theory but an activity (*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* 4.112)

Wittgenstein was not a big reader of other philosopher's work. One book that he did read and discuss in detail is James' *Varieties of Religious Experience* (James 1902). Wittgenstein read James' book before he wrote the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (Wittgenstein 1921) and I argue that despite the common idea that the *Tractatus* is the opposite of a pragmatist book<sup>1</sup> there is a pragmatist strand in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. It is Wittgenstein's later work that is usually called pragmatist.<sup>2</sup> One can easily see the resonance of Peirce's notion of habit in Wittgenstein's notion of the language games. My goal is to show that even the author of the *Tractatus* was already a pragmatist.

James wants to discover how we can stop doing the sort of metaphysics to which Kant and other philosophers are attracted. I think Wittgenstein is trying to have a similar effect. His discussion of the unity of the proposition in the *Tractatus* is an attempt to uncover the sort of metaphysics that leads us into transcendental claims.

Richard Bernstein in his 1961 article *Wittgenstein's Three Languages* argues in a similar vein. Wittgenstein is neither a logical positivist nor a logical atomist, although the *Notebooks 1914-1916* (Wittgenstein 1961) make it look like he is. There it looks like "Wittgenstein was primarily concerned with the logical and meta-logical problems

<sup>1</sup> T.P. Crocker claims that Wittgenstein's philosophy in the *Tractatus* could not be further from the philosophy of American pragmatists. He argues that "Wittgenstein's rigid structure of language as representation is precisely one of the philosophical errors pragmatists such as Charles Peirce were attempting to overcome." (Crocker 1998: 475)

Whereas R.B. Goodman writes in *What Wittgenstein learned from William James*: "to note the irony of the more rationalist Wittgenstein reading and loving James's pragmatic book *Varieties of Religious Experience* at just the time that he was developing the doctrines that he would later fault for their rationalist ("crystalline") and dogmatic ("one-sided") character". (Goodman 1994: 346)

<sup>2</sup> Rorty's point in *Pragmatism, Categories and Language* is that Peirce's thought is close to insights and philosophical mood in the *Philosophical Investigations*.

raised by Frege and Russell rather than with traditional epistemological issues." (Bernstein 1961: 279) Against this Bernstein insists that Wittgenstein's main interest in the *Tractatus* is in metaphysics, especially when he pursues the question of what objects (*Gegenstände*) are. Bernstein argues that if they are particulars, as Anscombe 1959, Copi and Beard 1966 and Sellars 1956 think then we must reject the claim in the *Notebooks* that relations and properties are also objects. He subsequently focuses on what he calls the *picture theory* of the *Tractatus* with the following leading questions: "What is Pictured? What Pictures? And, What is involved in Picturing?" (Bernstein 1961: 281) Bernstein suggests that Wittgenstein's "insights contained in the *Philosophical Investigations* were anticipated or suggested in the *Tractatus*" (Bernstein 1961: 282). He argues that it is the adequacy of ordinary language that is suggested in both works. Wittgenstein does not criticize ordinary language, but rather the misuse of ideal language.

Bernstein gives a classification of three languages that Wittgenstein uses in the *Tractatus*: *perspicuous language*, which is the language that shows perspicuously what is hidden. *Ordinary or colloquial language* and what he calls the *ladder language*. According to Bernstein, Wittgenstein uses ladder language more than any other language. Ladder language is a meta-language to describe perspicuous language. Wittgenstein discovers an old problem couched in new terms, the distinction between *mention* and *use*. Bernstein explains, "The ladder language only elucidates or shows, while the perspicuous language describes or says." (Bernstein 1961: 284)

Bernstein's main concern is the question: what is pictured in the *Tractatus*? The answer is: Wittgenstein pictures elementary (or atomic) propositions. They only occur in perspicuous language and picture atomic states of affairs, which consist of configurations of objects. The main question in the background remains: "What are objects?" Are they particulars, properties, or relations? Quoting Sellars Bernstein proposes, "Objects are internally related to sets of *external* properties." (Bernstein 1961: 286) The point of this is to show how radically different naming and saying are. We learn a lesson about the nature of predication. Bernstein elucidates that elementary propositions "are conceived thought, but not exhibited in actuality." (Bernstein 1961: 290) Corresponding to elementary propositions are atomic states of affairs.

Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* does not start with entities in the world, which are then represented, as the picture method is often interpreted and even though this seems to be so from the order of propositions in the *Tractatus*. Instead, Wittgenstein wonders how is it possible for propositions, even in ordinary language, to have meaning? (Bernstein 1961: 290) The answer is that we must presuppose the existence of elementary propositions. Atomic states of affairs correspond to presupposed elementary propositions. The picture is then true or false only through comparison with reality. Wittgenstein refers to Occam's razor: "unnecessary elements in a symbolism mean nothing" (Wittgenstein 1921, 5.47321) and Bernstein adds that if they mean nothing then there is nothing in reality that corresponds to them. In short: "We cannot transcend our language or thought, but by the construction of the perspicuous language we lay bare the structure of reality." (Bernstein 1961: 291)

Bernstein points out in the end: "A truth-operation is not something that is contained in any proposition; it is a *doing*, an operation performed upon elementary propositions" (Bernstein 1961: 293). Logical operations therefore work in

a way different from propositions that describe reality. "A truth-operation is essentially a type of action," says Bernstein and the truth-functions are the result of these operations and part of the logical scaffolding of propositions, not proper parts of the propositions.

Through this Bernstein is able to locate a connection between early and late Wittgenstein. He finds it in the essential role of rules in determining the relation of language to reality. The picture or projection method can be understood as a test that shows whether a proposition has sense, no sense or is nonsensical.<sup>3</sup>

This means that Bernstein reads in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* a performative level in which the active comparison of a proposition with reality is performed. However this performative level is to be found within the proposition, its uniting of itself with that which it is about so to say. That itself is a piece of metaphysics and Wittgenstein rightly decided to throw away the ladder in the end. "He must so to speak *throw away the ladder*, after he has climbed up on it" (Wittgenstein 1921, 6.54).

#### 4. Conclusion

Richard Rorty recalls in *Pragmatism, Categories and Language* what Peirce says about language: "Language is incurably vague, but perfectly real and utterly inescapable." (Rorty 1961: 204) "The nominalist and reductionist [who] succumb to belief in metaphysical figments – namely the belief that beneath all the evident fuzziness, vagueness, and generality which we encounter in language (and, therefore, in all thought) there are nonfuzzy, particular, clearly intuitable reals." (Rorty 1961: 209)

Rorty underlines that Peirce's realism holds that language cannot be transcendent.<sup>4</sup> I aimed to show that this is something Wittgenstein already knew in the *Tractatus*.

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<sup>3</sup> I establish this reading of sense, no sense and nonsense in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* in Moser 2009.

<sup>4</sup> Peirce apparently said that if we assume that by naming we are slicing up nature in certain ways, and thereby developing certain habits of expectation – we have to figure in the fact that nature has already sliced itself up by developing habits on its own. (Rorty 1961: 211). In short: assigning a name creates a habit of expectation. Wittgenstein put this elegantly in PI 242: "If language is to be a means of communication, there must be agreements not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments." (Wittgenstein 1953)

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# Warum „Lebens-Form“?

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## 1.

Die wenigen Verwendungen des Ausdrucks ‚Lebensform‘ in den Überlegungen Wittgensteins haben die Funktion, die Frage, wie die Unhintergehrbarkeit sprachlich vermittelte menschlicher Praxis zu begründen sei, als sinnlos abzuweisen. Es gebe hier nichts weiter zu fragen: „Habe ich die Begründungen erschöpft, so bin ich auf dem harten Felsen angelangt, und mein Spaten biegt sich zurück. Ich bin dann geneigt zu sagen: ‚So handle ich eben.‘“ (Wittgenstein 1984b: 350). Freilich reicht der Verweis auf faktisches Handeln nicht aus, um der Begründungssehnsucht Inhalt zu gebieten, weil er wieder bloß einen (überdies schlechten) Grund anzugeben scheint. Der Witz des Bildes ist nicht, dass erst der „harte Fels“ ein guter Grund wäre, sondern dass es praktisch unsinnig ist, überhaupt graben zu wollen, wo man – an äußersten Umständen scheiternd – nicht graben kann. Die Rede von ‚Lebensform‘ markiert einen Wechsel der methodischen Einstellung: Statt den „harten Felsen“ gleichsam zähnekirischend als faktische Grenze sachlich gebotener Begründungsansprüche festzustellen, sei er anzuerkennen: „Das hinzunehmende, gegebene – könnte man sagen – seien Tatsachen des Lebens//seien Lebensformen“ (Wittgenstein 1984a: 122; vgl. Wittgenstein 1984b: 572).

Unklar ist dabei der Status der Rede vom ‚Leben‘. Ich möchte zwei naheliegende, spiegelbildliche Interpretationen diskutieren und gegen sie vorschlagen, dass der Ausdruck ‚Leben‘ formal den Aspekt der Unmittelbarkeit der Praxis anspricht, genauer: Der Ausdruck ‚Leben‘ verweist auf den unmittelbaren Vollzug des Tuns, der formal zwar sprachlich angemessen artikuliert ist; der wirkliche Vollzug ist aber kategorial etwas Anderes als seine sprachliche Artikulation, auch wenn er seine Form in der Artikulation hat.

## 2.

Die erste Deutung versteht die Rede von ‚Lebensformen‘ (im Plural) als faktive („empirische“) Benennung. Sie behauptet: „Es gibt faktisch vorfindlich identifizier- und beschreibbare Lebensformen; ihre Beobachtung und generalisierende Beschreibung ersetzt die Letztbegründung unserer Praktiken“. Der Referenzbereich des Ausdrucks ‚Lebensform‘ kann dabei durchaus verschieden bestimmt werden: Er kann sich auf biologische Arten, auf menschliche Kulturen, auf typisierte Handlungsweisen, auf Sprachhandlungsweisen („Sprachspiele“), oder auf ein Schichtmodell aller dieser Ebenen beziehen (vgl. etwa Gier 1980). In allen Varianten soll die Unhintergehrbarkeit unserer sprachlich vermittelten Praxis durch einen „von der Seite blickenden“ Rekurs auf einzelwissenschaftliche Wissensbestände begründet werden (vgl. McDowell 1996: 34); alle Varianten verschieben also das Begründungsproblem, akzeptieren es aber grundsätzlich als lösungsbedürftig. Die geltungstheoretischen Folgeprobleme – Naturalismus, ein epistemischer Lebensform- oder Kultur- oder Sprachspiel-relativismus – sind dabei das Ergebnis eines begrifflichen Missverständnisses: Um sagen zu können, was z.B. mit einem ‚Konflikt der Lebensformen‘ gemeint sein soll, muss man angeben können, inwiefern sie im selben Sinn ‚Le-

bensform‘ sind; man muss den Begriff „Lebensform“ kennen. Das leisten wissenschaftliche Modellierungen nicht: Sie präsupponieren den Begriff in der Identifikation des Modellierten. Dass die Erläuterung des Begriffs ‚Lebensform‘ in „Bemerkungen zur Naturgeschichte des Menschen“ besteht (Wittgenstein 1984b: 411), widerspricht dem nicht: der Ausdruck „Natur“ nennt keinen empirischen Gegenstandsbereich, sondern die Thematisierungsweise von Sachen als *natürlich*, d. h. als indisponibel und sachlich vorgängig. Versuchte man, die Bedeutung des Ausdrucks ‚Lebensform‘ inhaltlich zu konkretisieren, dann illustrierte das nur das von Wittgenstein ironisch vorgeführte grammatische Missverständnis, ein Bild für die Sache selbst zu nehmen (vgl. Thompkins 1990: 196). Naturgeschichtliche Urteile folgen einer anderen Grammatik als naturwissenschaftliche Aussagen (vgl. Garver 1990: 196); wir können „Naturgeschichtliches für unsere Zwecke auch erdichten“ (Wittgenstein 1984b: 578), weil es nicht (wenigstens nicht primär) auf empirische Übereinstimmung mit ‚Tatsachen‘ zielt, sondern auf den Status der logischen Grammatik unseres Handelns und Sprechens.

Die zweite Deutung der Rede von ‚Lebensform‘ berücksichtigt das durch die Konzentration auf den Aspekt der ‚Form‘, verstanden als kategorialer Rahmen, in dem unsere Praxis überhaupt thematisierbar ist (vgl. Williams 1982). Sie vernachlässigt indes, dass die kategoriale oder logisch-grammatische Form unserer Praxis, die unhintergehrbare Art und Weise, in der unser Tun und Handeln überhaupt thematisiert werden kann, umgekehrt wenigstens auch als *naturgeschichtlich* zu begreifen ist. Der kategoriale Rahmen ist ‚natürlich‘, d. h. indisponibel und sich selbstbewegt entwickelnd – er kommt, könnte man sagen, in unserer Praxis, deren Form er ist, zustande, aber nicht *durch* sie. Insofern ist er ‚geschichtlich‘: als sich entwickelnd ist er praktisch je unhintergehrbar, zugleich aber höherstufig – wie Regeln der Grammatik – in gewisser Weise „willkürlich“ (Wittgenstein 1984c: 347). Insofern er sich entwickelt hat und noch entwickelt, ist der kategoriale Rahmen ‚unsrer Lebensform‘ *nicht notwendig* (es ist z.B. möglich, sich *andere* Lebensformen analog zu unserer vorzustellen). Zugleich aber gibt der Rahmen – die logische Grammatik unserer ‚Lebensform‘ – „das Wesen“ dessen an, was in ihm überhaupt angesprochen werden kann (vgl. klassisch Wittgenstein 1984b: 398).

## 3.

Der Ausdruck ‚Lebensform‘ zeigt also zunächst ein Spannungsverhältnis an: *Einerseits* ist, was wir überhaupt thematisieren können, unhintergehrbar und unmittelbar: etwas „hinzunehmendes, gegebenes“. *Andererseits* ist diese kategoriale Form nicht *bloß* gegeben, sondern wesentlich auch Produkt unserer Praxis (unseres Handelns und Sprechens). Elizabeth Anscombe weist darauf hin, dass eine solche Beschreibung in gefährlicher Nähe zu einem linguistischen Idealismus steht (Anscombe 1981). Er würde die Unhintergehrbarkeit des kategorialen (grammatischen) Rahmens unserer ‚Lebensform‘ so erläutern, dass ‚wir‘ diesen Rahmen doch selbst ‚immer schon‘ her- und so seine Angemessenheit sichergestellt hätten. Dabei ist

strukturell gleichgültig, ob das Personalpronomen ‚wir‘ ein ‚transzendentales Subjekt‘ oder eine (biologische) Spezies bezeichnet; das wäre nur die Alternative zwischen einer empiristischen und einer idealistischen Auffüllung des Ausdrucks ‚Lebensform‘ als Begründungsinstrument. Der anthropologische Hinweis auf menschliche Gattungsgegenschaften trägt zum Verständnis der logischen Grammatik der Reden, in denen sich unsere Praxis artikuliert, nichts bei – sondern umgekehrt wird, was ‚(wesentlich) menschlich‘ heißt, in einer logisch-grammatischen Klärung erst verständlich. Der Verweis auf ‚Lebensform‘ soll nichts begründen; er markiert, dass die Suche nach Begründung dann, wenn auf *unser Leben* verwiesen wird, sinnlos ist.

Dass der Verweis auf *unser Leben* weder ‚idealisch‘ noch ‚empirisch‘ verstanden werden kann, beruht auf der Funktion des Ausdrucks ‚Leben‘ in der Rede von „Lebensform“ und „Tatsachen des Lebens“. Die beiden diskutierten Deutungsvorschläge verstehen den Genitiv attributiv, und erläutern – in Analogie zur referentiellen Verwendung des Ausdrucks ‚Lebensform‘ – die fraglichen Tatsachen als solche einer bestimmten Gegenstandsklasse: als Sachen, denen die Eigenschaft ‚Leben‘ zukäme – woraus sich jeweils der Zwang ergibt, den Sinn des Ausdrucks ‚Leben‘ durch Rückgriff auf z.B. die Nominaldefinitionen wissenschaftlicher Sprachspiele zu erläutern. Fasst man den Genitiv „Tatsachen des Lebens“ dagegen qualitativ auf, dann gibt er nicht eine Sorte von Tatsachen an, sondern den Modus dieser Tatsachen: als ‚lebendig‘. Diese Metapher hat ihren Ort etwa in der Klärung, wie zu verstehen sei, dass wir in unserem alltäglichen Handeln *unmittelbar*, d. h. ohne ausdrückliches vorhergehendes Urteilen, wissen und sagen können, z.B. ‚dass ich gerade dies schreibe‘ oder ‚dass dort ein Tisch steht‘. Solche „Äußerungen“ seien „[g]lanz so wie ein unmittelbares Zugreifen“ zu verstehen; und in solchem Zugreifen zeige sich – weil zum Begriff des „Wissens“ die Möglichkeit des Zweifels gehört – nicht ein regelreiches „Wissen“, sondern „Gewißheit“ (Wittgenstein 1984c: 222). Der Ausdruck „unmittelbar“ qualifiziert hier nicht ein irrtumsmittunes Wissen, sondern eine Perspektive auf die betrachtete Sachlage: Sie wird thematisiert „gleichsam als etwas Animalisches“, das „jenseits von berechtigt und unberechtigt liegt“ (Wittgenstein 1984c: 191; Hervorh. JM). Besprochen wird der Aspekt des reinen Vollzugs eines Handelns – das aktive ‚Tun selbst‘ unabhängig davon, dass und wie es Gegenstand einer Beschreibung ist.

#### 4.

Die Thematisierung des Aspekts des reinen Vollziehens soll einen methodischen Anfang bieten, der nicht durch (philosophische) Modellierungen überformt ist. Die Verwendung negativer Charakterisierungen wie „gleichsam animalisch“, „vorbewusst“ u. ä. verpflichtet daher gerade nicht zur Bejahung anthropologischer, bewusstseinsphilosophischer oder epistemologischer Vorannahmen. Solche Charakterisierungen machen im Ausprobieren verfügbarer Modellierungen deutlich, dass deren eigener methodischen Anfang jeweils kategorial vor oder außerhalb der Modelle zu verorten wäre. Versuchte man, diesen Anfang – als einen ‚Anfangspunkt‘, z.B. ostensiv – positiv zu bestimmen, dann ergäbe sich bloß wieder die skizzierte Alternative zweier Begründungsprogramme; jede positive Bestimmung könnte Angemessenheit nur beanspruchen relativ zu einem bestimmten Sprachspiel. Die Verschiedenheit der Sprachspiele aber ist nicht das Problem, sondern nur Symptom des Problems; das Problem ist, „daß das Sprachspiel sozusagen etwas Unvorhersehbares ist. [...] Es ist nicht begründet. Nicht vernünftig (oder unver-

nünftig). Es steht da – wie unser Leben“ (Wittgenstein 1984c: 232): Es geht nicht darum, welches Sprachspiel gespielt wird, sondern dass ein Sprachspiel gespielt wird. Dass ein Sprachspiel gespielt wird, lässt sich nicht begründen, sondern nur anerkennen, mehr noch: Es lässt sich nicht nicht anerkennen; es ist, und sei’s unausdrücklich, immer schon anerkannt, wenn und indem wir die grammatisch fehlgehende Frage nach seiner ‚Begründung‘ zu stellen versuchen.

Kann man fragen, was genau hier anerkannt ist? Die gefährliche Nähe zum linguistischen Idealismus entsteht genau im Versuch, mögliche Antworten zu formulieren. Sie stünden alle notwendig im kategorialen Rahmen unserer sprachlichen Lebensform, und könnten daher – wie man relativistisch sagen würde – ‚nur für uns‘ relevant sein. Es geht aber darum, dass zur Form der Tatsache – der Art und Weise, wie wir etwas als Handeln ansprechen und beurteilen – gehört, dass das Sprachspiel wirklich gespielt wird. Das ist das mit ‚Lebensform‘ angesprochene Spannungsverhältnis: Einerseits muss man formal unterscheiden können zwischen dem *Angesprochenen* (dem wirklichen Tun) und der Art und Weise seiner Thematisierung („als Handeln“); andererseits lässt sich das Angesprochene prinzipiell nicht ‚rein‘ ansprechen: Es ist, was es ist, in unserer und durch unser Sprachspiel; es ist *nichts als das*, als was es ansprechbar ist. Der linguistische Idealist folgert daraus, dass unser Sprachspiel das Angesprochene faktisch und gleichsam ‚ursprünglich‘ bestimmt. Er versteht die „Sicherheit“ und „Gewißheit“ unserer „Lebensform“ faktiv als Produkt unserer Praxis, und kann nicht mehr erläutern, wie dann noch Irrtümer möglich sind. – Diese Folgerung ergibt sich jedoch nur, wenn das Spannungsverhältnis der kategorialen Form faktiv als konstitutionstheoretisches Abfolgeverhältnis begriffen wird. Anscombe hält dagegen fest, dass der praktische Vollzug zwar durch die Form determiniert, aber nicht durch sie hervorgebracht wird: „That one knows something is not guaranteed by the language-game“ (Anscombe 1981: 133), und analog: dass einer etwas tut, ist nicht sprachlich hervorgebracht – es ist aber durch das Sprachspiel ermöglicht, wenn und indem das Sprachspiel wirklich gespielt, der kategoriale ‚Rahmen‘ im Vollzug wirklich und wirksam ist. Diese Wirklichkeit – dass das Sprachspiel gespielt wird – kann nicht nicht anerkannt werden.

Die Rede von ‚Lebensform‘ zeigt diese formale Bedingung der philosophischen Reflexion menschlichen Handelns an. Die kategoriale Form menschlichen Handelns ist die Art und Weise seiner Thematisierung: man handelt im Vollsinn genau dann, wenn man auch sagen kann, was man tut. Diese Thematisierung ist (in gewisser Weise) „willkürlich“: Das formuliert eine Klausel gegen das Missverständnis, man könne die reflexiv beschreibende Explikation unserer Praxis daran bemessen, was irgendwie, implizit schon in ihr vorhanden oder angelegt sei. Was wir alltäglich in unmittelbarer Gewißheit tun, urteilen und wissen, hat die Form der sprachlichen Artikulation und ihrer Beurteilung. Das ist keine faktive, sondern eine begriffliche These. Die logische Grammatik seiner Artikulation gibt das „Wesen“ des Tuns an: jedes Tun ist „Teil einer Tätigkeit, oder einer Lebensform“ (Wittgenstein 1984b: 250), und der Ausdruck ‚leben‘ drückt das „gleichsam animalisch“, also abgesehen von allen weiteren (und notwendig folgenden) Bestimmungen dieses wirklichen Tätigseins aus. Das ateleische Verb ‚leben‘ exemplifiziert dabei in imperfektivem Gebrauch, aristotelisch gesprochen, eine *energeia*, ein wirkliches, aktuelles Tun. ‚Lebensform‘ nennt nicht eine Form, die ‚das Leben‘ hat; ‚Leben‘ ist die attributive Modifizierung der Rede von ‚Form‘.

## 5.

„Hinzunehmen“ ist der Umstand, dass der wirkliche Vollzug unseres Tuns die Form seiner Artikulation hat: was als ein Tun ansprechbar ist, ist *nichts anderes als* das so Angesprochene. Andererseits geht das wirkliche Tun logisch in seiner Artikulation nicht auf. Die Beschreibung ist nicht das Beschriebene – das lebendige, wirkliche Tun. Dass das Tun als ‚lebendig‘ begriffen werden soll, verhindert, dass aus der Einsicht in die Unhintergehrbarkeit unseres Sprechens (radikal-) konstruktivistische Missverständnisse erwachsen (wie etwa in der Meinung, erst die Beschreibung ‚konstituiere die Handlung‘). So, wie „Gewißheit“ nicht ein irgendwie unbezweifelbares, unmittelbares Wissen bezeichnet, sondern den Modus angibt, in dem sich unsere Praxis wirklich vollzieht, und damit eine Geltungsbedingung möglicher Beurteilungen von Wissensansprüchen erläutert, so bezeichnen ‚leben‘ und ‚lebendig‘ nicht einen schlecht-metaphysischen, jede Thematierung ‚übersteigenden‘ Prozess, sondern weisen auf den Umstand hin, dass die reflexive („theoretisch beschreibende“) Thematierung unseres Tuns und Handelns – die Thematierung *als* (intentionales) Handeln, *als* Sprachspiel etc. – eben eine logisch nachgeordnete Repräsentation des wirklichen Vollzugs ist. Der wirkliche Vollzug *selbst* ist unmittelbar – das heißtt: er ist nur aus dem Gebrauch der Mittel seiner Artikulation und Repräsentation zu erschließen (vgl. Thompson 2008, Kap. 1 u. 2); er liegt nicht als Maßstab der Angemessenheit seiner Repräsentation vor.

Muss man nicht argwöhnen, die Repräsentation eines solchen ‚unmittelbaren Vollzugs‘ könnte *prinzipiell* unangemessen sein? Ich skizziere abschließend zwei Gegenargumente: (1) Dass die Artikulation eines Handelns die Form des Handelns bestimmt, ist eine begriffliche These: Der Vollzug selbst ist kategorial dadurch bestimmt, dass er unter Handlungsbegriffe fallen kann. Ob ein faktisches Tun unter diesen oder jenen Begriff fällt, ist kein kategoriales, sondern ein *praktisches* Problem, das nur unter dieser kategorialen Voraussetzung verständlich ist. (2) Ein solches *praktisches* Problem ist dann aber auch unser (philosophischer) Versuch, die Form unseres Lebens logisch-grammatisch zu explizieren: Als Explikation einer Vollzugsform hat er sein Material an den Artikulationen des Vollzugs; und diese Artikulationen können nicht ‚falsch‘ sein.

„[T]he error is in the performance, not in the judgement“ (Anscombe 2000: 82): Freilich kann eine Artikulation situativ unangemessen sein – sie kann aber nicht *keine* Artikulation sein. Darum wird nicht ihre ‚Wahrheit‘ als lebendiger Ausdruck unseres unmittelbaren Lebensvollzugs beurteilt, sondern die Güte des praktischen Vollzugs, den sie ausdrückt. Sie kommt unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Praxis in den Blick, nicht unter dem Gesichtspunkt ‚philosophischer Reflexion‘ – als ein praktisches „Lebensproblem“, das mit der Klärung „alle[r] möglichen wissenschaftlichen Fragen“ nach der Grammatik der Form unseres Lebens „noch gar nicht berührt“ ist (Wittgenstein 1984b: 85). Die Grammatik gibt die Form des Lebensproblems – nicht, dass es sich wirklich stellt, oder wie es wirklich gelöst wird.

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# The Use of Spare Embryos for Medical Research: A Phenomenological Approach

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The use of spare embryo for medical research remains a controversial issue, for it concerns the age-old debate over the moral status of the human embryo. It is a topic that raises the question of whether the embryo merits the same treatment as a more developed human being or whether in virtue of differences between it and more developed members of the species (children or adults), it deserves different moral treatment. After showing reductionist components involved in ontological, biological and relational approaches to the issue, I will argue that to deal with the complexity of the question of using spare embryos for medical research we need a phenomenological attitude.

By ontological approach is meant the definition of the moral status of the embryo that is based on description of human nature. For proponents of this account, human nature lies in the essence of the human being. It is present in each and every human being independently of the biological development, culture and relationships that influence their lives. It is an attitude that could be termed essentialist. Thus the Magisterium (the teaching office) of the Catholic Church, which I take in this paper as a representative of this approach, maintains that whatever the stage of its development, an embryo has a right to the same respect as a child already born and any human person (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 1987)<sup>1</sup>. Consequently, for the Magisterium it is morally illicit to use spare embryos for research as long as it involves their destruction (Congregation 1987). According to this understanding, human beings are made in the image of God, for they have spiritual souls created by him and which they receive at conception. So, we are human beings from conception and therefore, embryos must be respected in the same way as adult human persons. "Thus the fruit of human generation, from the first moment of its existence, that is to say from the moment the zygote has formed, demands the unconditional respect that is morally due to the human being in his bodily and spiritual totality. The human being is to be respected and treated as person from the moment of conception; and therefore from that same moment his rights as a person must be recognized, among which in the first place is the inviolable right of every innocent human being to life" (Congregation 1987).

This position is based on the concepts that are problematic. One of them is that of the beginning. For the Magisterium, it is at the fusion of a sperm with an egg that human life begins (Congregation 1987). But the ovum is already alive before conception and it undergoes a process of development without which conception would be impossible. The sperm is also alive before fertilization. It is therefore better to regard life as a continuum than as a beginning (Harris 1992).

But essentialists insist on the importance of the beginning by arguing that from the moment of conception begins a new individual. Once fertilization has taken place, a genetically new human living individual cell is formed that has the proximate potential to become a mature human person

with the same genetic constitution. As has been shown by Harris, however, there is no need to "sacralize" the moment of fertilization. "A number of things may begin at conception. Fertilisation can result in the development not of an embryo but of a tumour, called a hydatidiform mole, which can threaten the mother's life" (Harris 1992). Fertilisation is not necessarily the beginning of a human being.

True, the Magisterium does not deny that one becomes a human being gradually, but it maintains that this graduality is not incompatible with the idea that from fertilization, by virtue of immediate rational ensoulment, we ontologically have the presence of a fully fledged human being. "From the moment of conception, the life of every human being is to be respected in an absolute way because man is the only creature on earth that God has wished for himself and the spiritual soul of each man is immediately created by God" (Congregation 1987). This argument of God's immediate animation seems to me very questionable. To begin with, at conception, it is not determined whether one or more human individuals are formed from a single egg. The zygote can give rise subsequently to two individual daughter cells that may develop separately and be born as identical twins. If "from the moment of conception" is meant the penetration of the sperm in the ovum, it is difficult to see how the idea of immediate creation of a spiritual soul can apply to twins, since being spiritual the soul cannot be divided. In addition: how about the embryos *in vitro* that are created for the sole purpose of research? Does God create also souls for them? Souls for the embryos that will be objects of scientific manipulation!

As far as I can tell, the essentialist account has the merit of seeking to establish an objective criterion for moral evaluation of our relation to embryos. However, this attitude leads to considerations that are counter-intuitive and unrealistic. For example to say that the cell produced when the nuclei of the two gametes have fused has a right to the same respect as a child already born or an adult person. In this way the human being is reduced to some features that we have in common with the embryo, such as the genetic heritage and the spiritual soul.

As to what I call a biological approach, it is the stage of the development of the embryo that determines its moral status. Mary Warnock, for instance, argues that the human embryo begins to matter morally after 14 days (Harris 1989) and John Harris goes much further by maintaining that "the moral status of the embryo and indeed of any individual is determined by its possession of those features which make normal adult human individuals morally more important than sheep or goats" (Harris 1992). Therefore, for him a spare embryo does not have a moral status superior to that of animals. It is different from animals only by belonging to human species and by its potentiality to develop in human adults. Consequently, for Harris, it is morally licit to use spare embryos for medical research. To do otherwise would be wicked, for it would be refusing to search for the means of saving millions of people in distress. To defend this position Harris uses the argument of the early embryonic loss in human pregnancy. To have a

<sup>1</sup> In what follows, the reference will simply be Congregation.

child by normal sexual act, he says, one has to accept to sacrifice from one to three embryos in early miscarriage or failure to implant and it is not considered immoral to have a child at this cost. It is therefore legitimate to save lives of many people at similar cost (Harris 1992).

I argue that the biological approach is not sufficient for the definition of the moral status of the human embryo. Biology can only provide descriptions of phenomena that are normative in the knowledge domain but not in the domain of conduct. Another objection that can be addressed to Harris is to say that even if an embryo is not a human person, it has at least the potentiality of becoming one if all conditions are fulfilled. In relation to this Harris argues that the moral status of the human embryo should be determined not according to what it might become but according to what it is. According to him, the fact that an entity can undergo changes that make it considerably different does not constitute a reason to treat it as if it has already undergone these changes. We are all potentially dead, but this is no reason to treat us as if we are already dead (Harris 1992). Another way of refuting the potentiality argument is to say that whatever has the potentiality of becoming an embryo has also its potentiality. Thus an ovum and a sperm taken together but not yet united have the same potentiality as the fertilized egg. Therefore to give a moral status to an embryo by virtue of its potentiality would be an attempt to give a moral value to human gametes, what we do not usually do. On the whole, Harris has a vision that is realistic and full of common sense. Obviously, spare embryos do not deserve the same respect as the children in the crèche. However, by defining the moral status of the embryo in terms of self-awareness (Harris 1985), Harris seems to reduce the human embryo to the only biological dimension. I believe the value of the human embryo goes beyond its physical constitution and development.

Proponents of relational approach argue that human being is constituted by exchange of words and relations with other people (Thévoz 1990). Consequently, the moral status of the human embryo is founded on the relation between parents and the embryo. Its value relies on the project of the parents. Having lost this parental project that had brought them into existence, spare embryos are relationally and humanly dead and therefore they can legitimately be used for medical research. However, given the potentiality of the embryo to become a fully fledged human being, one cannot claim that an embryo is simply a collection of cells. It is a precious being that should be respected. The first respect due to it and which precedes its existence is to undertake fertilization only with the intention and goal of allowing it to develop and grow in the family. It is therefore morally illicit to create embryos for the sole purpose of research (Thévoz 1990).

The relational attitude is not without weaknesses. How is a parental project different from other human projects? Thévoz accepts the use of spare embryos for research but he opposes the creation of embryos for the only purpose of medical research, for he believes it is a violation of human dignity. If a parental project can legitimate the destruction of the spare embryo, why could not a medical research project? Besides, the relational approach seems to open the door for moral relativism. If we do not have to consider what the embryo is in itself and if only the parental choice can legitimate its destruction, what can hinder the same parental project from legitimating infanticide? It is

for this reason that the Magisterium of the Church maintains that the moral status of the human embryo must not depend on the only sincerity of intention or on the only appraisal of motives, but on the objective criteria, drawn from the very nature of the human person. Therefore, even if it does not exhaust in itself all the values of the person, the physical life by which the embryo commences the venture in the world constitutes for it, nonetheless, in a certain way, the "fundamental value of life, precisely because upon this physical life all the other values of the person are based and developed" (Congregation 1987). Otherwise, if it is the parental project that determines the meaning and intelligibility of the embryo, the latter seems to be reduced to a cultural construct.

In my opinion, these three attitudes I have presented share the same weakness of defining the moral status of the embryo by only one element. From the phenomenological point of view, the foregoing approaches overlook the ambiguity of the phenomenon, that is, the capacity of any data or situation to appear in a different way. Whatever is given to a perceiving subject is given in limited aspects and in a perspective (Merleau-Ponty 1962). A phenomenon can always appear otherwise, it is never circumscribed. Thus for Merleau-Ponty, to perceive is to perceive on the horizon. He takes up the idea of Gestalt psychology according to which sensations are always linked to one another and not atomized. Every perception of something implies the positioning of that thing in a larger environment. What is primary in the perception is the environment, the totality of the phenomenal field in which emerges the explicit content of perception. This idea made Merleau-Ponty oppose the idealistic attitude for which to perceive is to constitute something by conscience. For him an object gets its perceptuality both from itself and the environment. From the point of view of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, one can speak of the flesh of the embryo. He introduced the concept of the flesh to formulate the experience of the world that precedes any thought on the world. The flesh is the common background of the meaning and the world (Merleau-Ponty 1968). It makes me draw the meaning of the world to which I also give the meaning by perceiving it. The subject and the world make a system. One has a meaning only in relation to the other (Merleau-Ponty 1962). With regard to the moral status of the embryo, by the concept of the flesh both the essentialist and idealist attitudes are superseded. This concept makes us aware that reality and value make one thing and that it is precisely there that lies the enigma of the human embryo.

The phenomenological attitude that I am proposing would refuse to define the moral status of the embryo by one element. It is an approach that makes us evaluate our moral relation to spare embryos by considering many possible aspects of human existence. Research on embryos does not simply fulfill a certain function, such as to improve the quality of human life. It is also symbolic and it has a meaning that calls for a hermeneutic perspective. It can involve the change of the perception that a society has of itself. To borrow a linguistic distinction, the practice of such a research has both a denotation and connotation. The connotation is another cultural horizon that the practice can bring about. The phenomenological approach could enable us going about the issue of the moral status of spare embryos in non-reductionist manner.

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# Zur ethischen Problematik des indikationslosen Schwangerschaftsabbruchs

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Eine Schwangerschaft kann – sofern sie erwünscht ist – großes Glück für die werdenden Eltern bedeuten. Im Falle einer unerwünschten Schwangerschaft kann diese jedoch vor allem für die Frau zu einer großen Belastung werden. In einem solchen Fall wird ein Schwangerschaftsabbruch oft nicht nur in Erwägung gezogen, sondern häufig auch realisiert.

Die gesetzlichen Regelungen sind sehr unterschiedlich; selbst in Europa reicht die Bandbreite von einem strikten Verbot wie etwa in Liechtenstein bis hin zu einer weitgehenden Liberalisierung. In Deutschland und Österreich gilt die sogenannte „Fristenlösung“, nach welcher ein Schwangerschaftsabbruch indikationslos bis zum dritten Monat nach Schwangerschaftsbeginn straffrei ist. Sofern eine medizinische oder embryopathische Indikation vorliegt oder die Schwangere zum Zeitpunkt der Zeugung unmündig war, kann eine Schwangerschaftsunterbrechung bis zum Geburtstermin vorgenommen werden.

Ähnlich den verschiedenen rechtlichen Grundlagen werden auch divergente ethische Positionen vertreten. Sowohl Privatpersonen, die direkt oder indirekt von der Thematik betroffen sein können oder sind, als auch EthikerInnen, TheologInnen und PolitikerInnen haben begründetes Interesse daran, eine akzeptable und moralisch vertretbare Antwort auf die Frage nach der ethischen Rechtfertigbarkeit indikationsloser Schwangerschaftsabbrüche zu finden. Die beiden populären und zugleich gegenläufigen Antworten auf diese Frage sollen kurz angeführt werden.

## Argumente gegen indikationslose Schwangerschaftsabbrüche

VertreterInnen einer christlich-konservativen Position erachten einen Schwangerschaftsabbruch als ethisch nicht rechtfertigbar, solange keine vital-medizinische Indikation vorliegt. Aus christlicher Perspektive kommt dem Menschen durch Gott eine immanente und unaufhebbare Würde zu, die bereits dem Embryo innewohnt und die durch einen Schwangerschaftsabbruch verletzt wird.<sup>1</sup>

Die säkularen Argumente für die Ablehnung des indikationslosen Schwangerschaftsabbruchs werden von Damschen und Schönecker unter dem Akronym SKIP zusammengefasst (vgl. Damschen/Schönecker 2002). Es handelt sich hierbei um das Spezies-, Kontinuums-, Identitäts- und Potentialitätsargument.

**Speziesargument:** Da jedes Mitglied der menschlichen Spezies Würde hat und ein menschlicher Embryo zur Spezies Mensch gehört, hat auch er Würde.

**Problem:** Wie kann begründet werden, dass aus einer biologischen Eigenschaft ein moralischer Status folgt?

<sup>1</sup> Ein Schwangerschaftsabbruch im Falle einer vital-medizinischen Indikation ist nach dieser Auffassung nur deshalb ethisch gerechtfertigt, weil die gesetzte Handlung mit dem Ziel der Lebensrettung vollzogen wird. „[...] während der Tod des anderen nur als einziger möglicher Ausweg im Sinne einer Nebenfolge hingenommen wird.“ (Gründel 2000)

**Kontinuumsargument:** Da jedes menschliche Wesen, das aktual würdestiftende Eigenschaften besitzt, Würde hat und ein menschlicher Embryo sich unter normalen Bedingungen kontinuierlich, das heißt ohne moralisch relevante Einschnitte, zu einem Wesen entwickelt, das würdestiftende Eigenschaften besitzt, hat ein menschlicher Embryo Würde.

**Problem:** Die These, dass keine moralisch relevanten Einschnitte vorliegen, ist zweifelhaft. Die Entwicklung eines Bewusstseins oder *Selbstbewusstseins* wird in der Literatur häufig als solcher Einschnitt vorgeschlagen.

**Identitätsargument:** Da jedes Wesen, das aktual würdestiftende Eigenschaften besitzt, Würde hat und viele Erwachsene, die aktual würdestiftende Eigenschaften besitzen, mit Embryonen in moralisch relevanter Sicht identisch sind, haben diese Embryonen Würde. Wenn aber irgendein Embryo Würde hat, dann haben auch alle anderen Embryonen Würde; also haben alle Embryonen Würde.

**Problem:** Das Identitätsverhältnis reicht zur Ableitung einer normativen Forderung nicht aus. Auch das Bestehen eines Identitätsverhältnisses zwischen einem Erwachsenen und *seinem* Embryo, speziell in dessen frühestem Entwicklungsstadium, lässt sich bezweifeln (vgl. Stoecker 2003).

**Potentialitätsargument:** Da jedes Wesen, das potentiell würdestiftende Eigenschaften besitzt, Würde hat und ein Embryo ein Wesen ist, das potentiell würdestiftende Eigenschaften besitzt, hat jeder menschliche Embryo Würde.

**Problem:** Wie ist von der Voraussetzung, dass jedes Wesen, das aktual x ist, Würde hat, zur Behauptung, dass jedes Wesen das potentiell x ist, Würde hat zu kommen?

## Argumente für indikationslose Schwangerschaftsabbrüche

Zwei ungleiche Argumentationslinien fordern die Legitimität des indikationslosen Schwangerschaftsabbruchs:

**Das liberale Argument:** Die Legitimität des indikationslosen Schwangerschaftsabbruchs aufgrund der negativen Folgen restriktiver Gesetze verlangt, oder aufgrund der Zugehörigkeit dieser Entscheidung zum Bereich der privaten Moral oder wegen des Vorrangs der Selbstbestimmung über den eigenen Körper.

**Problem:** Dieses argumentative Muster zielt auf die Verhinderung eines gesetzlichen Verbotes ab, kann der Klassifizierung eines Schwangerschaftsabbruchs als Mord jedoch nichts entgegenhalten.

**Das utilitaristische Argument:** Eine Möglichkeit, indikationslose Schwangerschaftsabbrüche für ethisch unbedenklich und gerechtfertigt zu erklären, liefert die utilitaristische Argumentation von Peter Singer (vgl. Singer 1994). Ein zentrales Element dieser Strategie besteht darin, einen Unterschied zwischen der Zugehörigkeit zur menschlichen Spezies und dem Personsein zu machen. Nach biologischen Kriterien menschlich zu sein, habe

keine moralische Relevanz. Personen hingegen zeichnen sich dadurch aus, dass sie einen Begriff von sich als Subjekt in der Zeitlichkeit (Selbstbewusstsein) haben. Aus diesem Grund gebührt ihnen Schutz, im Sinne von Wahrung ihres Interesses an der Zukunft. Da Embryonen und Föten nicht aktuell über ein solches Interesse verfügen könnten, wäre ein Schwangerschaftsabbruch moralisch unbedenklich.

Wenn ein Wesen unfähig ist, sich selbst als in der Zeit existierend zu begreifen, brauchen wir nicht auf die Möglichkeit Rücksicht zu nehmen, daß es wegen der Verkürzung seiner künftigen Existenz beunruhigt sein könnte. Und zwar deshalb nicht, weil es keinen Begriff von seiner eigenen Zukunft hat. (Singer 1994)

Selbst im Falle eines vorhandenen Bewusstseins beim Embryo oder Fötus würden seine Interessen durch jene einer Frau mit *Selbstbewusstsein* überboten.<sup>2</sup>

**Problem:** Singers Personenbegriff grenzt nicht nur Embryonen und Föten, sondern unter anderem auch Säuglinge und Menschen mit Behinderungen vom Personsein aus. Ob eine Ethik erstrebenswert ist, die auf diesem Begriff fußt, ist ebenso fraglich wie seine, als unproblematisch suggerierte, Zu- und Aberkennung von Interessen.

Die Phase, in der dieses Thema im Fokus einer aktuell debattierten Gesetzgebung stand, ist zumindest in Österreich und Deutschland vorbei. Sowohl die Pro- als auch die Contra-Argumente haben eine relativ stabile Anhängerenschaft gefunden. Die entgegengesetzten Grundannahmen scheinen Konsequenzen zu fordern, die nicht miteinander in Einklang gebracht werden können. Der Spagat zwischen den verschiedenen moralischen Intuitionen, die den Positionen zugrunde liegen, wird oft weder forciert noch bewältigt. All das trug zur Verfestigung der jeweiligen Auffassungen bei und förderte die Etablierung eines ideo-logisch getünchten Freund-Feind-Denkens.

When the battle lines are largely ideological, as they are in the abortion conflict, there is little room for rational argument. The result is that rather than search for a middle ground, both sides of the conflict have simply dug their heels in deeper. (Johnson 2004)

Das Größenausmaß des Phänomens Schwangerschaftsabbruch – über 40 Millionen Fälle pro Jahr weltweit – und insbesondere der alarmierende Umstand, dass nahezu die Hälfte aller durchgeführten Schwangerschaftsabbrüche unter unsicheren Bedingungen stattfinden (vgl. World Health Organisation, Guttmacher Institute 2012), verleihen diesem Thema Aktualität und Bedeutung.

Der Zusammenhang zwischen restriktiven Gesetzen, welche Schwangerschaftsabbrüche in den meisten Fällen verbieten, und der hohen Anzahl der unsicheren Schwangerschaftsabbrüche<sup>3</sup> in den betreffenden Ländern zeigt deutlich die negativen Konsequenzen eines solchen Verbots. Darüber hinaus ist die Anzahl an Schwangerschaftsabbrüchen nicht signifikant geringer als in Ländern mit liberaler Gesetzgebung (vgl. ebd.). Die Anzahl an Schwangerschaftsabbrüchen ist allerdings auch dort, wo liberale Gesetze gelten, beträchtlich. So werden beispielsweise in Europa, wo liberale Gesetzgebung überwiegt, ca. 30 % aller Schwangerschaften abgebrochen (vgl. ebd.).

Sofern Schwangerschaftsabbrüche nur im Fall einer medizinischen Indikation nicht als unmoralisch angesehen werden, kann eine hohe Abbruchrate nicht wünschenswert

<sup>2</sup> Bei bewussten Föten, also jenen, die leidensfähig sind, würde Singer jedoch einen möglichst schmerzfreien Tod fordern (vgl. Singer 1994).

<sup>3</sup> „The World Health Organization defines unsafe abortion as a procedure for terminating a pregnancy that is performed by an individual lacking the necessary skills, or in an environment that does not conform to minimal medical standards, or both.“ (World Health Organisation, Guttmacher Institute 2012)

sein. Es dürfte auch wenig Überzeugungskraft bedürfen, die Senkung der unsicheren Schwangerschaftsabbrüche zum gemeinsamen Ziel zu erklären. Warum die Senkung der Abbruchrate aber insgesamt anzustreben sein soll, bedarf vielleicht weiterer Begründungen. Es wird wohl kaum jemand behaupten, dass ein Schwangerschaftsabbruch etwas ist, das um seiner selbst willen anzustreben ist. Normalerweise wird er durchgeführt, um das größere Übel zu vermeiden, welches mit der Fortsetzung der Schwangerschaft verbunden ist. In jedem Fall bedeutet er für die Frau einen medizinischen Eingriff, der negative gesundheitliche Konsequenzen zur Folge haben kann; der eine gewisse psychische Belastung mit sich bringt; der Kosten verursacht und der eine Handlung ist, die von ihr selbst und/oder von anderen Menschen als unmoralisch empfunden wird. Es scheint daher ratsam, einen Weg zu suchen, der die Anzahl an Schwangerschaftsabbrüchen auf eine Art und Weise senkt, die weniger negative Konsequenzen und Risiken beinhaltet, als eine Durchführung der Schwangerschaftsabbrüche. Ein solcher Ansatz ist die Reduktion der Anzahl von Schwangerschaftsabbrüchen durch eine Reduktion der Anzahl von ungewollten Schwangerschaften.<sup>4</sup>

Ein ethisches Modell, das zum Ziel erklärt, dies zu leisten, muss die Geltung folgender Rechte fordern:

1. Das Recht auf Leben der Frau.
2. Das Recht auf Selbstbestimmung der Frau.
3. Das Recht auf ungehinderte Entwicklung des Embryos.

Diese drei Rechte bilden eine hierarchische Ordnung. Das heißt, das erste Recht hat mehr Gewicht als das zweite Recht und dieses wiederum mehr als das Dritte. Nur wenn das erste Recht unverletzt ist, kommt das zweite Recht zur Geltung, und nur wenn das zweite Recht unverletzt ist, kommt das dritte Recht zur Geltung. In einer verantwortungsbewussten Gesellschaft sollen Rahmenbedingungen geschaffen werden, die die Unverletztheit aller drei Rechte begünstigen, das heißt, auch Bedingungen zu schaffen, die dazu beitragen, dass sich die Rechte in möglichst geringem Ausmaß gegenseitig ausstechen. Wann ist von einer Unverletztheit der Rechte auszugehen?

## Das Recht auf Leben der Frau

Das Recht auf Leben der Frau kann dann als unverletzt gelten, wenn von der Schwangerschaft entweder keine gesundheitliche Gefährdung ausgeht oder die gesundheitliche Gefährdung durch die Schwangerschaft mithilfe medizinischer Eingriffe behoben werden kann. Sie hat Anspruch auf Schutz ihres Lebens durch Inanspruchnahme aller verfügbaren medizinischen Maßnahmen, auch wenn sie zum Abbruch der Schwangerschaft führen.

## Das Recht auf Selbstbestimmung der Frau

Das Recht auf Selbstbestimmung der Frau ist durch eine Schwangerschaft unverletzt, wenn ihr Zustandekommen dem Willen der Frau entsprach, also die Schwangerschaft entweder von ihr geplant oder in Kauf genommen wurde. Damit davon gesprochen werden kann, dass das Risiko einer Schwangerschaft bewusst in Kauf genommen wurde, müssen folgende Bedingungen erfüllt sein.

<sup>4</sup> Unter *ungewollten Schwangerschaften* sollen jene verstanden werden, die im Falle ihres Zustandekommens abgebrochen werden würden. Dass eine Schwangerschaft nicht geplant war, ist hierbei nicht hinreichend. Eine Frau kann zum Beispiel den Plan haben, binnen der nächsten drei Jahre nicht schwanger zu werden, aber gleichzeitig wissen, dass sie sich, würde sie dennoch schwanger werden, für die Geburt des Kindes entscheiden würde.

Eine Frau muss:

- mündig sein und die sexuelle Handlung freiwillig vollzogen haben.
- ungehinderten Zugang zu Verhütungsmitteln, die sowohl eine entsprechende Sicherheit bieten als auch von ihr selbst angewandt werden können,<sup>5</sup> gehabt haben.
- über uneingeschränkten Zugang zu allen Informationen über die Themen Verhütung, Geschlechtsverkehr, Schwangerschaft, mögliche Formen der Kindsbabgabe und Elternschaft verfügt haben.

Das heißt zum Beispiel, dass im Falle einer volljährigen zurechnungsfähigen Frau, die über alle Informationen zum Thema Verhütung, Geschlechtsverkehr, Schwangerschaft usw. verfügt, die ohne Hindernis Zugang zu allen Verhütungsmitteln hat, inklusive solcher, die sie selbst anwenden kann, aber bei ihrem freiwilligen Geschlechtsakt auf jene gleichermaßen verzichtet, wie auf die Inanspruchnahme der *Pille danach* und schwanger wird, keine Verletzung des Rechts auf Selbstbestimmung durch die Schwangerschaft oder deren Zustandekommen vorliegt, auch wenn der Geschlechtsverkehr nicht zum Zwecke einer Schwangerschaft stattfand. Fälle ähnlich diesem sollen unter Inkaufnahme einer Schwangerschaft verstanden werden.

## Das Recht auf ungehinderte Entwicklung des Embryos

Dieses Recht gilt dann als unverletzt, wenn der Embryo nicht durch einen Eingriff daran gehindert wird, sich zu einem geborenen Menschen zu entwickeln.<sup>6</sup> Für VertreterInnen einer christlich-konservativen Position ist die Zuordnung von Rechten an einen Embryo nicht nur unproblematisch, sondern dezidiert gefordert. Auch liberal Argumentierende dürften kein Problem darin sehen, so lange das Recht des Embryos nicht über den Rechten der Frau angesiedelt ist und keine gesetzlichen Maßnahmen daraus abgeleitet werden können, die die Rechte der Frau verletzen.

Um Utilitaristen davon zu überzeugen, dieses Recht zu akzeptieren, könnte vielleicht das Speziesargument mit dem Potentialitätsargument verbunden werden, indem versucht wird, Hans Jonas' Argumentation für das Seinsollen der Menschheit im Kapitel *Sein und Sollen* (vgl. Jonas 2003) für diese Diskussion fruchtbare zu machen.<sup>7</sup> Oder es wird auf die Problematik hingewiesen, dass das Zu- oder Absprechen von Interessen eine heikle Sache ist. Dies gilt insbesondere, wenn sich die betreffenden Wesen selbst nicht dazu äußern können.<sup>8</sup> Den Personenbegriff

ausschließlich an eine derart vage und heikle Behauptung zu koppeln, scheint zumindest nahezulegen, ein gewisses Sicherheitsnetz zu befürworten. Ein solches wird durch dieses Recht, aber insbesondere durch die Funktionsweise dieses Ansatzes selbst gegeben.

## Implikationen dieses Modells

Aus der Argumentation dieses Modells ergibt sich, dass Schwangerschaftsabbrüche dann ethisch gerechtfertigt sind, wenn durch das Zustandekommen der Schwangerschaft oder durch die Schwangerschaft selbst das Recht auf Leben der Frau gefährdet oder das Recht auf Selbstbestimmung der Frau verletzt wurde. Ist dies aber nicht der Fall, so ist ein dennoch vorgenommener Schwangerschaftsabbruch ethisch nicht gerechtfertigt. Bedingungen müssen geschaffen werden, die dazu beitragen, dass das Recht auf Selbstbestimmung der Frau das Recht des Embryos auf ungehinderte Entwicklung nicht überbietet muss. Dazu ist ein ungehinderter Zugang zu Verhütungsmittel unerlässlich. Diese müssen eine entsprechende Sicherheit bieten und von der Frau selbst oder einer Ärztin/einem Arzt angewandt werden können. Außerdem müssen umfassende und verlässliche Informationsangebote geschaffen werden. Dazu ist die Verankerung eines Sexualkundeunterrichts schon im Pflichtschulbereich notwendig. Dieser müsste über die Themen Sexualität, Verhütung, Geschlechtsverkehr, Schwangerschaft, Schwangerschaftsabbruch, Möglichkeiten der Kindsbabgabe und Elternschaft informieren und ausreichend Raum zur Diskussion und selbstständigen Reflexion der Themen bieten. Natürlich sind weitere soziale Maßnahmen wünschenswert, wie zum Beispiel eine ausreichende finanzielle Unterstützung für jedes Kind, ein umfassendes Beratungsangebot für Familienplanung, die Verminderung der beruflichen Nachteile einer Frau durch Schwangerschaft, ein Ausbau der Kinderbetreuungsmöglichkeiten und vieles mehr.

Weder das Verbot indikationsloser Schwangerschaftsabbrüche, welches durch christlich-konservative Argumentation nahegelegt wird, noch eine Entproblematisierung der ethischen Aspekte des Eingriffs durch utilitaristische Argumente bringen uns dem Ziel näher, die Anzahl von ungewollten Schwangerschaften und dadurch bedingt die Anzahl von Schwangerschaftsabbrüchen zu reduzieren. Daher habe ich ein Modell vorgeschlagen, das vorrangig Rücksicht auf die Interessen der Frau nimmt, aber auch dem Embryo gewisse Rechte zugesteht. Bei idealer Umsetzung dieses Modells bliebe die Zahl der Geburten unbeeinträchtigt, während die Anzahl der abgebrochenen Schwangerschaften minimiert werden könnte.

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<sup>5</sup> Ein ungehinderter Zugang zu Kontrazeptiva muss unter anderem deren Leistbarkeit unabhängig vom Einkommen beinhalten. Die sogenannte *Pille danach* ist auch zu den Verhütungsmitteln zu zählen, da hier die Nidation als Beginn einer Schwangerschaft gelten soll. Hinsichtlich der Sicherheit der verschiedenen Verhütungsmittel liefert zum Beispiel der PEARL-Index eine Orientierung.

<sup>6</sup> Der Anspruch des Embryos auf ungehinderte Entwicklung hat prima facie keinen Einfluss auf die Debatte um Labor-Embryonen. Das Recht auf ungehinderte Entwicklung besagt lediglich, dass kein Eingriff unternommen werden sollte, der den Embryo von seiner Entwicklung zum geborenen Menschen abhält.

<sup>7</sup> Ob und inwiefern das möglich ist, sollte eingehend untersucht werden. Elemente seiner Argumentation, die eventuell nützlich sein könnten, wären etwa die Verteidigung des Gedankens, dass aus *Sein Sollen* folgen kann; sowie seine Argumente dafür, dass die *Fähigkeit zu Wert* selbst ein Wert ist (vgl. Jonas 2003).

<sup>8</sup> Wie problematisch solche Zuschreibungen sind, zeigt sich zum Beispiel bei den Annahmen über den frühestmöglichen Zeitpunkt, ab dem von einem bewussten Embryo oder Fötus gesprochen werden kann. Peter Singer attestiert dem Fötus frühestens ab der 18. Schwangerschaftswoche Leidensfähigkeit (vgl. Singer 1994), wohingegen Hans-Martin Sass vorschlägt, von der 8. Wo-

che auszugehen (vgl. Sass 1989). Wann, ob und welche Interessen ein Wesen hat, ist sicherlich eine noch heiklere Zuschreibung.

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# Rule-Following and Forms of Life: Wittgenstein's Critique of AI Theory

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## 1. Introduction

According to classical theory of artificial intelligence (AI) the human mind is a formal system made of symbols, which operate according to a set of instructions whose role is to guide the combination of symbols. The instructions were thought to be algorithm-type procedures, which allowed the manipulation of symbols according to their physical form. Processing symbols following syntactic rules used to be thought sufficient to guarantee both the transition from premises to conclusion and the semantic coherence of a sequence of symbols. The consequence of approaching the human mind from the perspective of computational relationships was its transformation into an invariant structure, independent from the context it operates within.

Against the approach of the human mind as a syntactic sequence following formal rules, Hubert Dreyfus, in his work *What Computers Can't Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason*, although placing himself on the positions of phenomenology, he brings more counter-arguments based on Wittgenstein's conception of language. The closeness between Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty's conception, on one hand, and Wittgenstein's on the other, is due to the position of the anti-representationalist reaction they manifested with respect to the epistemological position of traditional metaphysics. Therefore, the idea that the knowledge of the world is achieved by applying a set of objective rules to some simple elements, which correspond to the world state of affairs and to the relations among them emerged ever since Plato and has been a constant presence throughout the development of western thinking. This conception of knowledge can be also found in the first part of Wittgenstein's philosophy, as it was presented in the work *Tractatus*, where the world is considered as being made of atomic facts connected by means of logical relations (TLP § 2.01). On this idea, called by Dreyfus the ontological assumption, the belief of the artificial intelligence theory that language can be formalised and that its functioning can be described in terms of rules operating both at the syntactic and semantic level was built up.

## 2. Grammar of the language

Leaving behind the representationalist position in the *Tractatus* led, during the second part of Wittgenstein's philosophy, to contesting the idea of a univocal relationship between language and the state of affairs that can be contained in a set of strict rules. Language is now seen as made of tools, that can be used in carrying out various operations (PI § 12). This means that language is characterised by language-games, whose rules it follows need to be understood within the context they are used (PI § 7). The rules the elements of language (symbols, words, sentences) follow cannot be contained in a finite and determined class, as they diversify according to the situations they are used in (PI § 23). Language consists of the ability to multiply grammar rules which contain the experiences we have when we use a word (PG § 12).

Moreover, Wittgenstein does not discuss the rules of using language as being unconscious as in the computationalist approaches. There is no universal grammar of language, made up of innate rules which we follow when we learn a language. Rules are seen rather as skills of using words in certain situations, whose performance is not justified by an inner state of the subject, but by criteria dependent on circumstances where this activity is carried out. Therefore, language appears rather a practice where its elements, following various and unlimited rules, are engaged in different games which help us to describe reality (PG § 2). This does not mean that language mirrors reality or that by means of rules it connects to the states of affairs in reality. It would be fairer to say that each of its elements has its own grammar which results from the way they are used (PG § 23). Just as handles in an engine cabin perform various types of jobs, words or expressions have different functions as well (PG § 20).

In this respect, grammar does not refer to the syntactic rules of arranging words that need to be followed by the entire body of language but by rules that need to be followed by each word, phrase or sentence alike (PG § 10). Grammar rules are not strict rules that control the way words are combined according to their form, but they merely show, in the absence of an exhaustive definition of words, how terms should be used according to a certain context.

This does not mean that language implies learning some rules or their mechanical application, but their acquisition and use according to a certain context. Wittgenstein compares the use of language to traffic regulation and finds them similar, as, although implying the existence of some rules, the latter does not control each action of the participants to traffic. Traffic regulation implies rather some general rules, which create the framework, or context, within which other people's actions are to be interpreted. (Dreyfus 1972: 183)

Therefore, learning language is not conducted in an ostensive manner, by indicating an object and by associating it with a word, as assumed by Augustine in his theory, and how we can find in Turing's conception. This is merely a way of explaining how language functions, but it does not explain the entire mechanism underlying language (PG § 20). For a complete explanation of how language works we need to bear in mind that it is characterised by ambiguity, which is reduced by cues dependent on the situation they are used in, and which are not necessarily of a linguistic nature. Therefore, learning a language implies the intrinsic comprehension of the natural and cultural environment of the speakers.

## 3. Context and forms of life

Starting from the above, an important feature of language results, i.e., that understanding language cannot be achieved independently from the everyday situation. This means that language cannot be separated from the unfold-

ing of life, as it grasps life in its varied stances, that means its varied forms of life (PI § 19). The condition of communication and agreement among people is not only the fact that they share the same language, but that language is what facilitates sharing their forms of life (PI § 241).

Hence, language renders more than the meaning of a word or phrase as it grasps the situation the individual is involved in as a whole, it bears the mark of the individual's interests and preoccupations. This relationship with the form of life, which is an immediate and non-inferential one, cannot be decomposed into its elements and then reproduced in an algorithmic sequence. Such an approach will do nothing but removing the pragmatic elements of the context, which are dependent on subject involved. The relationship of the language with the forms of life is a holistic one as it implies understanding the wider context where a language game is produced.

Dreyfus identifies this skill to grasp the whole with what Wittgenstein called "perspicuous grouping" (PI § 122), which implies identifying an object within language and not within a one-to-one correspondence, but by grasping the meaning relationships that are determined by that object or state of affairs with other elements in the reality or with the context where they occur. This capacity of the language is discussed in the context of the approach of the difference between the manner of computer and a human being carry out pattern recognition. In the case of a computer, this operation relies on the comparison with a list of determined traits. This is not valid in the case of man, who uses insight, fringe consciousness and context reduction. With the help of insight, man distinguishes between what is essential and what is non-essential in order to recognize a pattern directly, without resorting to the heuristics of a programme. Fringe consciousness implies that the perception of a pattern is done holistically and not by identifying some particular traits. In addition, context-dependence refers to the capacity of the human mind to grasp the context, by means of which language ambiguities are reduced. (Dreyfus 1972: 33-35)

These three elements are identified as being specific only to people and cannot be computer simulated. They determine the pattern recognition possibilities that cannot be met in the case of machines operating based on some formal programmes. Thus, the traits we identify as essential are in fact the results of our interests and preoccupations. In Wittgenstein's terms, the difference between a symptom and a criterion is not fixed, but it is an arbitrary one, as the two can substitute each other according to the circumstances (Dreyfus 1972: 36)

Pattern recognition can also mean recognition of resemblances. This can be achieved with the help of context as it happens in the case of face traits that can convey an individual's mood (PI § 583). Another case of resemblance is when objects are considered to belong to the same class

despite their not sharing common traits, nor does the context contribute to their association. This is the case of family resemblance, which does not imply the formation of concepts based on some necessary and sufficient traits, but by their closeness to a case considered paradigmatic (PI § 67). A last case of recognition that does not even imply overlapping traits is recognition of similarity. This would mean that members of the same class do not possess any identical trait, but that class is made up only of a network of crisscrossing similarities (Dreyfus 1972: 39).

The shared feature of all these recognition forms described by Wittgenstein is that none of them resembles the forms of recognition used by the AI theory. In other words, none of them operates based on a fixed list of determined traits. This is possible because of the three elements Dreyfus identified as insight, fringe consciousness, and context reduction, and which, in Wittgenstein's conception, are met under the name of "perspicuous grouping."

#### 4. Conclusion

The conclusion that can be reached from these considerations about Wittgenstein's philosophy is that the way language operates, which implies a set of rules and its understanding within a form of life cannot be compatible with the description of the mind in the AI theory terms. Language does not follow a finite set of universal rules but language rules are seen rather as practices or skills that show how a word or a sentence should be used within a given context. Achieving the connection with forms of life and approaching them holistically are characteristics of language that exceed a computer's limited capacity of data processing and its possibilities to simulate cognitive processes.

**Acknowledgements:** This paper was made within the project "Developing the Innovation Capacity and Improving the Impact of Research through Post-doctoral Programmes", supported by the Sectorial Operational Programme Human Resources Development, under the number POSDRU/89/1.5/S/49944.

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# Realism without Logical Objects: Tractarian Philosophy of Logic(al Form)

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## Introduction

What is a core idea of Tractarian philosophy of logic? The “fundamental idea” that “the ‘logical constants’ are not representatives” and that “there are no ‘logical objects’ ” is easily remembered (TLP 4.0312, 5.4). But it is only a negative thesis. What is Tractarian positive thesis concerning the philosophy of logic? I’d like to identify it as thesis of the “shared logical form” and to take this thesis as a core idea of Tractarian philosophy of logic, by combining the “logical form” of the remark 2.18, which is ordinarily read in context of general theory of pictures, with the “logical form” of the remark 4.12, which is ordinarily read in connection with what cannot be said.

## 1. Logical form, logic, and the world

What is the “logical form” of the *Tractatus*? “What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it – correctly or incorrectly – in any way at all, is logical form, i.e., the form of reality” (TLP 2.18). Thus, first, we must distinguish the logical form from a “pictorial” form or a “representational” form (“what any picture, of whatever form, must have...”) and take it to be more general than the latter forms. Second, the logical form must be thought to be the “form of reality”, i.e., something shared also by “reality”.

When these two points are mainly taken into account, a kind of interpretation tends to be adopted. The point of such an interpretation can be summarized by saying that we can reach to the logical form by removing extra-logical factors from a pictorial (or a representational) form (cf., Hacker 1986: 59; Glock 1996: 213; Black 1964: 91). For example, in case of a three-dimensional picture (e.g., NB 29/9/14), we can identify roughly as its “representational” form the possibility of a three-dimensional combination of *elements of the picture* and as its “pictorial” form the possibility of a three-dimensional combination of *elements of reality* that are named by elements of the picture (cf., Nomura 2011). Then, how should we identify the logical form? According to this type of interpretation, it is identified as that which can be given by removing the phrase “three-dimensional” from above formulations of forms, i.e., the possibility of a combination of elements *simpliciter*.

If we take into consideration how to read the remark 2.18 only, this type of interpretation, which might be called a “remnant” interpretation, could be thought to be correct. Moreover it is an interpretation that we are forced to adopt if we are to remain within framework of general theory of pictures (as explaining truth-conditions of pictures containing no logical operations). But if we take into consideration also another important remark of the *Tractatus*, in which the phrase “logical form” also occurs, i.e., the remark 4.12, the “remnant” interpretation will be revealed not to be adequate.

Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it – logical form. /

In order to be able to represent logical form, we should have to be able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere outside logic, that is to say outside the world. (TLP 4.12)

Here at least two things are suggested. First, the “logical form” has some close connection with the “logic” of the *Tractatus*. This point especially seems not to be taken into account adequately by the “remnant” type of interpretation. Second, the “logic” of the *Tractatus* has some close connection with the “world”. In fact, in the remark cited above the phrase “outside logic” is connected with the phrase “outside the world” by means of “that is to say” (cf., TLP 5.61). Anticipating a conclusion, this point will result roughly in the fact that the “logical form”, which has some close connection with the “logic”, is shared also by “reality” (TLP 2.18).

Thus combining the remark 2.18 with 4.12, we can list the three important conditions that an adequate interpretation of the “logical form” must satisfy. (A) We must distinguish the “logical form” from a “pictorial” form or a “representational” form and take it to be more general than the latter forms. (B) The “logical form” must be shared also by “reality” or the “world”. (C) The “logical form” must have some close connection with the “logic” of the *Tractatus*. In order to understand the concept of “logical form” in a way that satisfies these three conditions, we like to start with the condition (C).

## 2. Truth-operation

In order to reach to a conception of the “logical form” that satisfies the condition (C), we must make it obvious what the “logic” of the *Tractatus* is like. As is known, it is characterized by the “truth-operation” and the operation has two important roles. Namely the first is to demarcate the class of “propositions” in general that can be produced out of elementary propositions and the second is to characterize logical internal relations between propositions thus produced.

We like to begin with the first role. According to the *Tractatus*, every proposition is seen as a result of successive applications of “truth-operation” to elementary propositions (TLP5.3). Wittgenstein adopts as the “truth-operation” that can construct any truth-functional propositions the “negation” operation, which negates all of the given n propositions simultaneously (i.e., the conjunction of negations) (TLP5.5). In fact, as Wittgenstein says, we can construct any truth-functional propositions by “successive applications” of this operation. This means: “The general form of a truth-function is  $\neg \neg \neg \neg \neg \neg p$ . / This is the general form of a proposition” (TLP 6, cf., 5.47-5.472).

The fact that the truth-operation is the only way to produce new propositions brings its second role, i.e., to characterize logical internal relations between propositions thus produced. The “logical internal relations” are such as “A implies B”, “A follows from B”, “A is inconsistent with B”, “A is equivalent with B”, and “A is independent of B”, etc.

We can find in the *Tractatus* the following comments concerning consequence relations:

If the truth of one proposition follows from the truth of others, this finds expression in relations in which the forms of the propositions stand one another: nor is it necessary for us to set up these relations between them, by combining them with one another in a single proposition; on the contrary, the relations are internal, and their existence is an immediate result of the existence of the propositions. (TLP 5.131, cf., 5.13)

Consequence relations are said to be *internal* relations between propositions in question and to coexist with the *existence* of the propositions themselves. The relations come from the existence of the propositions and what produces these propositions is just the truth-operation in question.

These internal relations can be given prominence by "represent[ing] a proposition as the result of an operation that produces it out of other propositions (which are the bases of the operation)" (TLP 5.21). In fact, the truth-operation is not only "what has to be done to the one proposition in order to make the other out of it" (TLP 5.23), but also "the expression of a relation between the structures of its result and of its bases" (TLP 5.22).

And of course there are logical internal relations other than consequence relations. "The structures of propositions stand in internal relations to one another" (TLP 5.2). Any proposition stands in a particular internal relation to any proposition, and it is an efficient method for giving prominence to the internal relations to represent a proposition as the result of an operation that produces it out of its bases. But we can find in the *Tractatus* a general theory concerning these logical internal relations, i.e., the semantics of "probability".

### 3. Probability

Logical internal relations between propositions introduced by the truth-operation can be formulated in general by means of Tractarian concept of "probability". The definition of the "degree of probability" given in the remark 5.15 can be reformulated in the following way:

If we represent the truth-possibility of a proposition 'r' and that of 's' in one truth-table together whose truth-arguments are all the elementary propositions contained in 'r' or 's', and if  $T_r$  is the number of the truth-grounds of a proposition 'r', and if  $T_{rs}$  is the number of the truth-grounds of a proposition 's' that are at the same time the truth-grounds of 'r', then we call the ratio  $T_{rs} / T_r$  the degree of probability that the proposition 'r' gives to the proposition 's'.

According to this definition, how should we think about the degree of probability that a proposition p gives to the proposition, say, pq? (here let p and q be elementary propositions.) If we represent the truth-possibility of a proposition pq (=N(N(p, q))) and that of p in one truth-table together whose truth-arguments are the elementary propositions p and q, then the following table will be given:

p	q	$N(p, q)$	$N(N(p, q))$ (=pq)
1	1	0	1
1	0	0	1
0	1	0	1
0	0	1	0

Here the number of the truth-grounds of a proposition pq is 3, and the number of the truth-grounds of a proposition p that are at the same time the truth-grounds of pq is 2. Thus the degree of probability that the proposition pq gives to the proposition p is 2/3. Therefore if pq is true, then the degree of probability of p's being true is 2/3. Conversely, since the degree of probability that p gives to pq is 2/2, i.e., 1, so if p is true, then pq is necessarily true.

This definition can be said to lay foundations of Tractarian *holistic* characterization of "propositions". If all elementary propositions are given, then the class of all propositions can be identified as containing as its members all (and only) of what can be given by means of successive applications of the truth-operation to the elementary propositions. Besides that, the class of all "propositions" thus given is structured by the network of logical internal relations formulated by the concept of "probability" defined above. (This structure can be visualized partially with a help of, e.g., Hasse Diagram.)

Thus, if the "world of propositions" (NB 7/6/15) is given that is structured by the network of logical internal relations, we can characterize any proposition by examining what logical "place" it occupies in it (TLP 3.4-3.42, 4.0641). This can be called Tractarian holistic characterization of "propositions".

### 4. Logical form

On the basis of the above preparations, I like to return to the problem of how to understand Tractarian concept of the "logical form". An adequate interpretation of the "logical form" is said to need to satisfy the conditions (A) – (C) given in the last paragraph of the section 1.

In the beginning, I like to characterize the "logical form" in a way that can meet the condition (C), and doing so is not difficult if we make use of Tractarian holistic characterization of propositions given in the last section. Thus we can define the "logical form" of a proposition as the logical "place" that it occupies in the "world of propositions". Namely we can give the following definition of the "logical form" that shows what logical internal relations it has to any proposition q.

The logical form  $LFp$  of a proposition p is the function from any proposition q to the pair of the degree of probability that p gives to q –  $WS(p; q)$  – and the degree of probability that q gives to p –  $WS(q; p)$  – . In symbols,  $LFp =_{df} \{<q, <WS(p; q), WS(q; p)> : q \text{ is a proposition}\}$

According to this definition, the logical form of a proposition p gives, for any proposition q, the probability that p gives to q and the probability that q gives to p (e.g.,  $LFp(pq)=<1, 2/3>$ ). Therefore the logical form of p expresses the logical "place" that p occupies in the network of logical internal relations between all propositions belonging to language in question. While the  $LF$  itself, which is just the function from any proposition p to its logical form  $LFp$ , i.e.,  $\{<p, LFp> : p \text{ is a proposition}\}$ , is nothing but the logical form *simpliciter* that encompasses logical forms of any propositions and can be seen as the *totality* of logical internal relations introduced by the truth-operation (in other words, the general form of propositions ). As will be seen, this totality of logical internal relations is nothing but the "logic" of the *Tractatus*.

It is easy to see that the concept of logical form thus defined meets the rest two conditions. The following comment is important for the condition (B): "The existence of an internal relation between possible situations expresses

itself in language by means of an internal relation between the propositions representing them" (TLP 4.125).

Therefore a logical internal relation between propositions "expresses" a logical internal relation between "possible situations" that they represent respectively. In other words, the logical internal relations giving a structure to the "world of propositions" gives at the same time the same structure also to "reality" depicted. Thus the "logical form", which is *a priori* order of the "world of propositions", is shared also by "reality". This is, I think, the thesis of the "shared logical form" (TLP 2.18).

The condition (A) is also satisfied by the above conception of the "logical form", because it is obviously the case that the "logical form" thus defined is different from both of a "pictorial" and a "representational" form (unlike the "logical form", the latter two forms concern mainly an internal structure of a given picture) and is more general than the latter two forms (i.e., a picture, whatever pictorial or representational form it has, has its "logical form" defined above).

## 5. Tractarian philosophy of logic

Given the above conception of "logical form", how should we understand logical truths (i.e., truth-functional tautologies, in the *Tractatus*)? Especially, where can we find truth-grounds of logical truths? They can be found in the fact that *propositions stand in the logical internal relations in which they stand actually*, i.e., in the fact that the logical truth in question (or the propositions of which it is composed) occupies the logical "place" that it occupies actually in the network of logical internal relations.

In fact, the "logical form" of a proposition is called also its "structural properties" and the properties are said to be truth-grounds of logical truths. "If propositions are to yield a tautology when they are connected in a certain way, they must have certain structural properties. So their yielding a tautology when combined *in this way* shows that they possess these structural properties" (TLP 6.12, cf., 4.121).

It is the reason why propositions yield a tautology when combined in a particular way that they possess the "structural properties" (= the "logical form") that they do actually. In other words, what combination of propositions yields a tautology is determined by what logical places they occupy in the network of logical internal relations. (Based on this view, Wittgenstein dismisses inference rules and axioms as unnecessary (TLP 5.132, 6.127, cf., 6.1262).)

Though truth-grounds of logical truths (and validity-grounds of correct inferences) are said so far to be the network of logical internal relations that orders the "world of propositions", but rather it is more important for Tractarian philosophy of logic that it comes from the network of *the world simpliciter*, i.e., the isomorphic network of logical internal relations that *orders the world*.

The fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies shows the formal – logical – properties of language and the world. (TLP 6.12)

The propositions of logic describe the scaffolding of the world, or rather they represent it. They have no "subject-matter". [...] It is clear that something about the world must be indicated by the fact that certain combinations of symbols – whose essence involves the possession of a determinate character – are tautologies. This contains the decisive point. (TLP 6.124)

That certain combinations of propositions are tautologies shows "something about the world", "the scaffolding of the world", and "the formal – logical – properties of language and the world". We have already known the reason for being said so. Up to the last section we have re-grasped the "logical form" as *a priori* logical order shared by language and the world by taking into account the remarks 2.18 and 4.12 together. Thus having re-grasped the "logical form" in the above way, the thesis of the "shared logical form" can be understood as meaning that *a priori order of the "world of propositions" is at the same time a priori order of the "world"* (TLP 2.18).

In this way, the "logic" of the *Tractatus* is said to be a "mirror-image of the world". "How can logic – all-embracing logic, which mirrors the world – use such peculiar crotches and contrivances? Only because they are all connected with one another in an infinite fine network, the great mirror" (TLP 5.511, cf., NB 24/115). "Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror-image of the world" (TLP 6.13, cf., 5.61). I like to understand this as a core idea of Tractarian philosophy of logic, i.e., the idea that the network of logical internal relations built into language is a mirror(-image) of the network of logical internal relations built into the world.

Thus taking into account the remarks 2.18 and 4.12 together, I have defined the "logical form" on the basis of a *a priori* logical order shared by language and the world (it is formulated explicitly by the concept of "probability") and re-grasped the thesis of the "shared logical form" as a core idea of Tractarian philosophy of logic. I hope it has been shown that realism of the *Tractatus* is founded rather on the "logical form", i.e., logical internal relations shared by language and the world, not on any "logical objects" (cf., Pears 1987: 23, 29, 31).

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# Philosophy and the Uncovering of Conscience

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## Introduction

Moral understanding is mostly taken to be in some way or the other dependent on common norms and values. On the other hand it is equally characteristic to think that moral understanding is in an important sense a personal responsibility. The tension between these views has not been much discussed. Also the recently widespread interest in evolutionary psychology, and neuroscience has missed this tension and instead focuses on the relationship between morals and nature. The title of Richerson's and Boyd's book (2005) exemplifies this: *Not By Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution*. The title also indicates the tendency to give nature and culture similar roles. It is as if it were clear that it is either nature or culture (or then both) that is the "source" of moral understanding. But if morals is just a common way of regulating behaviour, why is it felt to be so urgent? – Emphasising the personal side again seems to weaken moral meaning and favour moral (self-) admiration and other Nietzschean figures of thought. It appears as if moral philosophy would content itself with thinking, or rather hoping, that a combination of collectivity and individuality will somehow add up to a plausible account of moral understanding.

The aim of the present paper is to show that there is in morals indeed a tension between a collective aspect and a non-collective aspect but the latter cannot be characterised as personal. It would be better characterised as an I-you perspective. The tension could be described from many angles. I will do it by showing that there is a dynamic relationship between conscience and a conscience-like feeling. The latter is collective while the former is expressive of the I-you perspective. "Collectivity" refers to a "moral" perspective, and is not analogous to "togetherness of people". "Dynamic relation" means that the collective feeling (that I will henceforth call collective pressure) is a repression of conscience. I will try to outline what this means and how it is related to philosophical clarification.

## The confusion

/People are deeply imbedded in philosophical, i.e., grammatical confusions. And to free them from these presupposes pulling them out of the immensely manifold connections they are caught up in. One must so to speak regroup their entire language. – But this language came about //developed// as it did because people had – and have – the inclination to think *in this way*. Therefore pulling them out only works with those who live in an instinctive state of rebellion against //dissatisfaction with// language. Not with those who following all of their instincts live within the herd that has created this language as its proper expression.  
(Wittgenstein 1999, p. 185.)

One could elaborate much on this very rich remark by Wittgenstein but I shall try to clarify only some thoughts that I think underlie the remark. – Consider a situation where a new employee enters an organisation that has gone corrupt in ways that it is unimportant to specify. Let us assume that she at first is shocked and confused, then

critical but finally falls in with the corruption. Her succumbing to the corruption can be said to occur under the pressure of various seemingly moral claims: demands to loyalty, being criticised for lacking humility and thinking that she is morally better than others, being accused of being hypocritical, being scorned for being gullible, etc. These claims are at the same time implicit invitations to join common guilt. Guilt is the repressed social glue between the persons. Guilt also expresses the mood of the depersonalised self-understanding of the persons. If the new employee in some later connection would ask a person if she feels all right with the way the organisation functions, the person in question could be irritated and threatening, warning the interrogator from pursuing such questions and emphasising the importance of keeping together. When the I-you relationship creates anxiety it is averted by keeping to collective understanding which thus establishes itself as a rejection of the I-you perspective.

The "morals" of the organisation expresses its authority in terms of observing your actions in a threatening and judgemental spirit. This means simply that it functions collectively. Your solidarity with the collective and your observance of its norms is observed and judged. It is solidarity that makes this morals possible. This means that you yourself share it. Sharing this morals involves that you are prepared to take on common guilt. That you share the common guilt shows in your *feeling guilty* when you violate collective norms. The mere awareness that others disapprove of your actions may be distressing but it is not the same as feeling guilt for the actions. When you feel guilt, it is not only about others blaming you but about your blaming yourself too. This shows your collective belonging.

The sense of being observed and judged should be understood grammatically. The grammar of your moral reasoning expresses an understanding that is determined by objectifying moral agents to objects of observation and judgement. Within this grammar, moral understanding takes the form of ascribing, admitting and denying guilt, giving reasons for acting and accepting blame, honouring and despising actions and persons, shaming others and trying to avoid being shamed, etc. These are the concepts you use whether you reflect on your own or argue with others and whether you judge yourself or others. To take a picture from Kant (2000: 189), you act as if you stood before a law court and defended your action. It is as if your moral reasoning was carried out by an "internal judge" (loc.cit.) or "internal observer" (to speak with Jonathan Lear 1998: 208) who expresses the moral perspective in terms of accusation, blame, judgement, guilt, etc. And it is part of the grammar of this perspective that if you do not agree with the accusation you defend yourself; you act as your own defence counsel.

Both Kant and Lear take themselves to characterise conscience and most moral philosophers and non-philosophers certainly would agree with their characterisation. Nevertheless, there is confusion here. Conscience is not about being judged and seen, nor about defending oneself by moral arguments, but about *seeing the other*. In the light of conscience I see and feel (one could also say perceive) you. Conscience is about standing in this open-

ness with the other; about desiring to feel *her* and know *her* as she is. At the same time I also show who I am. Conscience is a name for the love we feel towards each other. Wittgenstein (1980: 46) says "A man can bare himself before others only out of a particular kind of love." The specification "particular kind" is superfluous in my view.

When we betray this openness we feel bad; we have a bad conscience. If we do not follow conscience and ask for forgiveness, we will preserve the betrayal and feel guilt; the bad feeling stays with us. Moral violation is the cause of repression and therefore has a secretive side to it even when it appears to be explicit. In guilt the repression of moral violation is preserved. Explicit demands to sharing guilt is nevertheless repressed for there certainly could not be an open I-you discussion about the meaning of sharing guilt.

In hearkening to conscience I am active; *I see and perceive the other* in a preparedness to meet her in openness. It is obvious that here grammar means something else than what it means in connection to collective pressure. However, the idea of an internal observer is not illusory. We do experience something like an internal judge and we tend to think it is a moral "voice" and it can indeed be as pressing as anything. My point is that what we perceive is not conscience but collective pressure. Collective pressure does not protect the subject against moral accusation but, rather, "transforms" bad conscience to accusation and guilt, the point being that guilt appears to be more manageable than bad conscience. To understand oneself in collective terms means that one depersonalises oneself and since moral difficulty is about being and I for a you, the depersonalisation is comforting despite the guilt that goes with it. (And in fact guilt can give a masochistic satisfaction.)

## Repression

Meeting the other in openness is, despite the fact that we all long for it, the most difficult thing there is. As a response to this difficulty we create a multitude of avoidance reactions with their corresponding web of concepts. But since the concepts with their interrelations are repressed, they are not related to each other in a straightforward sense that could be demonstrated either by conceptual analysis or phenomenological description. How then could these relations be revealed? This is what I have tried to sketch out above, but I shall still try to show how repression creates a whole network of concepts that have a collectivising essence.

Think again on the case with the corrupt organisation. The collective spirit can be maintained only to the extent that people do not start to talk openly, i.e. on I-you terms, with each other. Collectivity restricts, in the sense of represses, I-you relationships. The person, who becomes annoyed by being asked about her feelings about the corruption in the organisation, both reveals and manifests this fact. She does not want to make contact to her own moral thoughts which means, that she does not want to talk to the questioner in an open way either but, rather, threatens her by referring to collective pressure. But she does not acknowledge anything of this. Even more, she does not want to acknowledge that she does not want to acknowledge. This double denial is characteristic of repression and is one aspect of depersonalisation.

An indefinite amount of concepts are interwoven into the collective togetherness. I already mentioned loyalty and humility but it is obvious how concepts such as respect,

honour and duty serve the collective perspective in that they repress the I-you relationship. To take a classic example, Kant thinks that friendship is possible only if "excessive familiarity" and love are constrained by respect (Kant 2000: 216). Kant is right about respect constraining love and openness but *advocating* such a constraint is an instance of repressed thought. Respect is only one in a whole family of concepts that manifest the collective perspective. We have for instance honour, excellence, admiration, recognition, duty, moderation, modesty, obedience, selflessness and reliability. Respect recognises the honour of a person and if the person is particularly reliable, obedient, dutiful, etc. the person is said to be worthy of admiration. All these concepts rely on how the moral subject is seen and judged. Violation of a person's honour is shameful and in many cultures it has been taken to be justified and even imperative, to avenge it. Honour-killings and duelling are examples of how far this can be taken, i.e., how important esteem is on collective terms.

Everything that strengthens collective bonds is appreciated in collectivity. Collectivity gathers together all concepts that contribute to a self-understanding determined by the grammar of being seen and judged. We see how the very existence of the corrupted organisation depends on a repressed conscience which means; on people not being open to either each other or themselves. At the same time it is clear that the organisation depends on concepts such as the ones mentioned above; they form the "morals" of the organisation. It is of *first importance* for the collective that the meanings of its fundamental concepts are collectively assessable. This is a way of securing that it is the "we together" – not the individual with her conscience – that determines what is moral. (The anxiousness to establish this order of things has been explicitly expressed by among others Hobbes, Mill, Hegel, Freud and Heidegger.) This means that the moral perspective is identified with the third person perspective; the perspective where you are seen and judged.

It is actually misleading to speak about a family of concepts that "are collective". As may have become clear, "collectivity" names a way of seeing language as a *whole*. (The family of concepts I referred to were chosen because they in my judgement revealed collectivity very clearly to the expected audience of the paper.) This is why uncovering collectivity presupposes that one is in a "state of rebellion against //dissatisfaction with// language".

## Conclusion

I hope that the above sketch can give some sense of how collectivity is connected to guilt-orientated morals and to repressing conscience. Society is collective in the same sense as a corrupt organisation. Though it can be very difficult to find one's way out of a corrupt organisation, the task of achieving philosophical clarity is much more encompassing. To take a critical look at one's society is not even to take a first step towards clarity. Philosophical clarity is not a political concept (though it certainly has political consequences). Instead, one must begin the unending struggle to see how collectivity creates its repressive forms of language, forms that are common by way of conception and mythological in that we are prone to accept them even before we can talk. Philosophical clarity involves that one "frees oneself of the immensely manifold connections one is caught up in. One must so to speak regroup one's entire language" to paraphrase Wittgenstein.

To the extent I have managed to account for the tension between conscience and collectivity together with its de-

personalised self-understanding, it should not surprise us that the common moral views emphasise collectivity, admitting some essential but wholly unaccounted for importance to an aspect of morals that is presumed to be personal. The collective-personal (or third person-first person) dichotomy is a dichotomy *within* collectivity. It is also an instance of the subject-object dichotomy and reproduces its problems. If we elaborate the grammar of the I-you relationship on its own terms instead of describing it from the third person perspective (which is what different forms of inter-subjective philosophy and interpersonal psychology usually do) we will have to regroup not only our whole language but also our way of understanding each other and ourselves.

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# How to Make Conceptual Analysis Relevant to One's Life. Georg Henrik von Wright on Moral Goodness

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## 1. Introduction

Besides his role as one of Ludwig Wittgenstein's three literary executors, the Finnish philosopher Georg Henrik von Wright (1916-2003) is internationally best known for his work in philosophical logic, and specifically as the inventor of deontic logic. Somewhat surprisingly, however, von Wright did not see his publications on logic as his highest achievements. Instead, he was convinced that a work on value theory and ethics published in 1963, *The Varieties of Goodness* (henceforth abbreviated as the *Varieties*), was the best book he ever wrote (von Wright 2001: 202).

So, what were his grounds? Obviously, the ranking was not based on the immediate success of the book. On the contrary, von Wright was very conscious of the lukewarm reception of the *Varieties*, or as he writes in his characteristically moderate manner – “It is [...] with mild surprise, but without bitterness, that I must note that this book has left hardly any trace in subsequent ethical and value-theoretic discussion” (von Wright 1989: 34). (As shown by Thomson 1996, von Wright was here unduly pessimistic.)

Von Wright describes the *Varieties* as the only book of his he enjoyed writing, and also as the one that is “best argued”. Interestingly, however, he also characterizes it as the *most personal* of his scholarly works. Thus, we may expect to find a dimension of individual expression and life-related relevance in the *Varieties*. In the following, I will undertake to show how this is possible, in a work that still remains firmly rooted in analytical philosophy. Before turning to the *Varieties*, I will, however, provide a background for the significance of the work by describing the internal tension present in von Wright's philosophical activities, which I will call his *problem of philosophy*. Eventually, I will also bring in Wittgenstein in the picture in the form of a famous quote, which von Wright evidently saw as relevant to what he was doing in the *Varieties* – although his application of it may not be entirely true to the spirit of Wittgenstein.

## 2. von Wright's problem of philosophy

As already indicated, internationally the philosopher von Wright was mainly acknowledged for his professional works in logic and analytical philosophy. However, throughout his career, he also cultivated a parallel branch of philosophical activity as an essayist. His essays, which mainly were written in his native language Swedish, made him widely known as a philosopher and intellectual especially in the Nordic countries (for some essays published in English, see von Wright 1993).

The style and topics of these essays are often very different from the works which earned him international fame. From the early essays of the late '40s and early '50s on, the great Russian masters of literature, Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy, and the speculative views of history of Spengler and Toynbee, the essayist von Wright gradually moved towards topics relating to the cultural impact of modern science, culminating in a critique of scientific rationality

during the last decades of the 20th century. Von Wright has himself used the characterization “*Weltanschaung* aspects of philosophy” for this wide range of topics (von Wright 1993: 2).

On the face of it, von Wright's splitting of his philosophical writings into the logic and analytical philosophy of his professional works, and the world view aspects he cultivated in his essayistic writings, might seem fairly easy to maintain. As a native speaker of a small language he had the advantage of being able to separate his professional work from more personal writings also on a linguistic level, and to write for different audiences. The division was, however, anything but unproblematic for von Wright. To him it was an expression of a “rift in his philosophical personality”, which always bothered and, occasionally, even tormented him (von Wright 1989: 54).

But how, exactly, should the rift be described? It is clear, that it has to do with an incompatibility between the scope of von Wright's professional work and his fundamental philosophical ambitions – or, as he expresses it, between “an awareness of the narrowly restricted scope of my professional work and a craving for a more ‘visionary’ grasp of the totality of human existence” (von Wright 1989: 54). In order to see the gravity of the problem, it is important to realize that von Wright obviously did not see the scope of his professional work as a mere *matter of choice*, but as limitations set by the ideals of rationality and methodology he was devoted to, i.e. his adherence to the tools of analytical philosophy and logic. In consequence, he was often prepared to belittle his own essayistic achievements, as being of a “nonprofessional nature” (von Wright 1989: 18, see also 2003: 87). Accordingly, the rift emerges as a *problem of philosophy*, conceived as an inherent conflict between fundamental objectives and commitments to prevalent methodological ideals. Hence, the prospects of a healing are dependent on methodological innovations and reconceptions, but, naturally, also sensible to changes on the level of goals. Hence, it is only natural, that von Wright's own attitude to the promise of a healing was subjected to changes during his career.

Nevertheless, it seems obvious that the value based on personal relevance von Wright saw in the *Varieties* is directly connected with the problem of philosophy, and the prospects of a healing of the rift. In fact, the *Varieties* forms an integral part of the most optimistic statement von Wright ever made on the matter, a paragraph probably written already in the early 70's, which was included in the “Intellectual Autobiography” of *The Philosophy of Georg Henrik von Wright* (for the dating, cf. von Wright 2001: 278). At this point, von Wright even seemed prepared to give up his essay-writing as no longer needed,

I think one motive behind my essay-writing activities was a feeling of the discrepancy between the narrowly restricted relevance and scope of my professional activity, and the drive which I always felt to make philosophy relevant to my life and my understanding of the world. Perhaps one reason why I gradually abandoned these

activities was that this rift in my philosophical personality – though still there to this day – has begun to heal. A perceptive reader of *The Varieties of Goodness* and *Explanation and Understanding* will, I think, see what I mean. (von Wright 1989: 18.)

In fact, as shown already by the short "Postscript 1980" to the same article, von Wright soon entered a more pessimistic phase in respect of the healing (and he also took up his essay writing). However, his reference to the Varieties remains interesting as the purest work of analytical philosophy, which, to von Wright's mind, had a bearing on the problem of philosophy.

### 3. Healing the rift with conceptual analysis

Now, what is it that readers of the book are *supposed to see*? Or, in other words, what is it that makes the Varieties "relevant to [von Wright's] own life and [his] understanding of the world"?

Generally speaking, the Varieties is an inquiry into the various uses of the word "good", or, what von Wright calls the *Varieties of Goodness*. He starts by compiling the following list of familiar uses: *instrumental goodness* ("a good knife"), *technical goodness* ("a good carpenter"), *utilitarian goodness* ("being good for something or someone") – with the sub-forms the *useful*, the *favourable* and the *beneficial* –, *medical goodness* ("good lungs"), the *hedonic good* ("a good smell") and the *good of some being* (welfare). The division is based on both semantic and logical considerations. (von Wright 1963: 8-11, see also Österman 1999, and Österman, forthcoming). So far, this only appears to be an elaborated, but equally detached, map of various *non-moral* uses of the word "good". In order to grasp the sense in which the investigation of the Varieties may become personally relevant we have to turn to von Wright's analysis of moral goodness, which also reveals the *philosophical and ethical purpose* of the mapping.

Von Wright (1963: 119) suggests that the moral goodness or badness of an act "depends upon its character of being beneficial or harmful, i.e. [...] the way in which it affects the good of various beings". On the face of it, this surely looks as just a meta-ethical result among others, advanced in a for analytical philosophy characteristically detached and theoretical spirit. However, von Wright views the matter differently. He does, for instance, not claim only to be reporting an existing language-use, or to be *uncovering* a meaning which lies there behind the "bewildering complexities of common usages". To von Wright's view, the very fact that the grounds for calling something "morally good" are *not* fixed – we are, so to say, "at loss" concerning the use – is the challenge that calls for *philosophical reflection*. Thus, in the case of moral goodness, the philosophers task is to *mould* the concept "in search for a meaning", by establishing its logical connections with *other concepts*. The philosophical purpose of the taxonomy of the (non-moral) varieties now becomes clear. It is, precisely, to provide the frame or *field of concepts* within the limits of which the meaning of "morally good" should be fixed. (von Wright 1963: 4-6.) In this way "the so-called *moral* sense of 'good' is a derivative or secondary sense, which must be explained in the terms of non-moral uses of the word" (von Wright 1963: 1).

Still, the personal aspect of the Varieties remains somewhat implicit in the book. In fact, there does not seem to be much which goes beyond the *normative* dimension included in the idea of a *conceptual moulding*. Some later reflections on the work, however, shed some further light

on this issue. In the "Intellectual Autobiography" von Wright underlines the connection between conceptual investigations and behaviour – "by explicating our conceptual intuitions in moral matters, we shape the way in which we react to the conduct of our fellow humans" (von Wright 1989: 51, my italics). Most explicitly, however, the personal dimension of the Varieties is revealed in a much later interview (in German), where he states that the reflection brought by the Varieties also involved taking a stand on his own self-understanding and moral judgements, an activity which also *changed himself* (von Wright 1997: 270).

### 4. Concluding comparisons with Wittgenstein

The question about Wittgenstein's influence on von Wright is complex and interesting. On the one hand, it is obvious that von Wright, as a philosopher, maintained an independence, which seems quite unique among the students of Wittgenstein. On the other hand, traces of Wittgenstein are still abundant in the writings of von Wright. Sometimes a reader, however, may get the impression that von Wright is more interested in using Wittgenstein's remarks as mottoes or aphorisms, than he is concerned about providing a scholarly accurate interpretation (resembling his way of using Goethe or Melville).

A Wittgenstein passage which fairly easily comes to mind in connection with the Varieties is one of the most famous remarks selected by von Wright for the Wittgenstein compilation *Culture and Value* (16e),

Working in philosophy – like work in architecture in many respects – is really more a working on oneself. On one's own interpretation. On one's way of seeing things. (And what one expects of them.)

That von Wright also saw this connection, is supported by the fact that the passage is quoted (in German) at the beginning of his article "En filosof ser på filosofien" ("A Philosopher Looks at Philosophy"), which, basically, is only a Swedish version of part III of the "Intellectual Autobiography", where the method of the Varieties is discussed. Still, it may be argued that the remark is less applicable to the Varieties when viewed in its original context, the *Philosophy-section of Big Typescript* (Wittgenstein 2005, Ch. 86, § 407: 300e). For here the context is, evidently, the work on oneself which is involved in overcoming the resistance of the *Will*, i.e., what we *want* to see, which almost appears as the opposite of the kind of *explication of conceptual intuitions* the method of the Varieties amounts to.

It may, however, be added that von Wright's later struggle with the rift in his philosophical personality took a rather different direction, which perhaps also is somewhat closer to the spirit of Wittgenstein. For, starting in the late 60's, von Wright gradually became more concerned with exposing the presuppositions of our thinking and challenging what we take for granted, a development which started with the other work that was mentioned as evidence of the healing above, namely *Explanation and Understanding* (1971) (cf. von Wright 1989: 21).

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# The Two Distinct Meanings of the Term “*Psychological Impossibility*” as Used by Wittgenstein

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Wittgenstein's interest in mathematical (logical) impossibilities is his way of working on the consequences of Gödel's famous theorems from 1931 onwards. He compares Gödel's impossibility with the impossibility of constructing a heptagon by using ruler and compasses only. Wittgenstein develops this problem of the heptagon as a philosophical trademark, as a symbol of incompleteness.

Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem and the Corollary (as Ivor Grattan-Guinness 2000 suggests they should be called: sections 9.2.3-9.2.5: 509-513) lead to a third truth value in addition to “proved” and “refuted” – namely, “undecidable”. This means that through Gödel's discovery, Brouwer's epistemological position was asserted, whereby Brouwer had demanded that the “*tertium non datur*” should not be used in mathematical reasonings. This affirmation of Brouwer's viewpoint is explicitly commented on by Waismann (1951: 98).

I would now like to throw light on the timing of Wittgenstein's reception of Gödel's discovery. Gödel first communicated his “bombshell” (Grattan-McGuinness 2000, loc.cit.) to Carnap on 26th August, 1930, just prior to the congress in Königsberg from 5th to 7th September. It is fairly astonishing that, in his discussions with Waismann, Wittgenstein works to such an extent on the issue of consistency proof, which gives the impression that Wittgenstein had a premonition that this was a weak point of mathematical calculi.

In Gödel's *CW*, we can find a footnote stating that, at the Königsberg congress, Waismann presented a talk in order to give an idea of Wittgenstein's viewpoint on the foundations of mathematics (Gödel, *CW*, Vol. 1: 196). On the one hand, Grattan-Guinness confirms this talk given by Waismann on behalf of Wittgenstein (2000: 523). However, in his section on the Königsberg congress, he does not mention Waismann, which may be interpreted as meaning that Grattan-Guinness partly doubts that Waismann's talk really took place (2000, Section 9.2.2: 508).

There are only two chapters in the *Big Typescript* (2000) where Wittgenstein refers to Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem, namely chapter 120 and Appendix 3. In Chapter 111, he writes on the problem of a *Consistency Proof*, which may be taken as a comment on Gödel's 2<sup>nd</sup> Incompleteness Theorem.

At the end of my contribution on the reception of Gödel by Wittgenstein, I would like to present a quotation by Gödel, which dates back from 1931, but is not contained in his famous paper.

(Assuming the consistency of classical mathematics), one can even give examples of propositions (and in fact of those of the type of Goldbach or Fermat) that, while contentually true, are unprovable in the formal system of classical mathematics. Therefore, if one adjoins the negation of such a proposition to the axioms of classical mathematics, one obtains a consistent system in which a contentually false proposition is provable. (“Discus-

sion on Providing a Foundation of Mathematics”, Gödel *CW*, Vol. 1: 203)


See Curt C. Christian's 1996 paper on this theorem.

In mathematics, proven impossibilities are of absolute certainty, though perhaps with a single weak point, which is that the calculus that contains the impossibility proof may be flawed by contradictions. Wittgenstein mentions the danger of a “hidden contradiction”. However, if a contradiction is found, then the constructions of even indirect proofs can be re-used after the possible collapse of the system due to a contradiction.

Michio Kaku is an eminent physicist who works as Professor of Theoretical Physics at City University of New York. In his book, *The Physics of the Impossible* (2008), he deals with the question of whether there are proven impossibilities in physics, such as for example the possibility of time travel or of travelling faster than light.

To sum up Kaku's epistemological position, he asserts that in physics there are no absolute impossibilities at all, there are only technological fantasies which are extremely unlikely to ever be realised (2008: 12-19).

The essential vehicle for proving a mathematical (logical) impossibility is a calculus. If we consider a solvable problem, then we can constructively prove its solvability within the calculus. A statement on the insolubility of a problem does not lie within the calculus, but is situated outside the calculus. If we have a psychological impossibility, such as thought transference, then its impossibility cannot be demonstrated through trying out all possible interactions between two individuals, instead, we have to go beyond the realm of all interactions between individuals and rise to a meta-level.



In *The Big Typescript*, Chapter 104 on experiencing pain (2000: 334), Wittgenstein employs the word “metapsychology”. The prefix “meta” does not occur in Wittgenstein's texts at all as often as one might think. The term “metapsychology” is nevertheless important for Wittgenstein's argument, because the impossibility of thought transference cannot be proved through trying to transfer thoughts from one mind to another without speaking. A

series of failures to do so might well convince us that thought transference is impossible, but even a repeated sequence of many failed trials does not, by far, establish a proof of impossibility.

If I may just comment briefly on the above drawing: in the problem without a solution within the calculus under investigation, there is a close and intimate inter-correlation between the negation of the solvability question on the one hand, and the fact that the negative solvability statement lies outside the calculus, on the other. It is not possible, for example, to prove the impossibility of the trisection of the general angle (within Euclidean geometry) within Euclidean geometry! (See Wittgenstein 2000, chapter 124: "Trisection of the Angle".)

Wittgenstein uses the term "psychological impossibilities" in two different ways. One of these, which I'd like to explain first, can be turned into a sociological impossibility, because here the kernel is a consensus among experts that a certain problem cannot be solved. This consensus is a sociological fact (but not a mathematical fact). Here, sociology of science is being used as a very high meta-level of mathematics. For example, if I state that "Gödel's theorem of 1931 is called the 'famous theorem'", I am employing a sociological argument which can never be mathematised: yet the statement is true.

In 1494, a book on algebra was published by a gifted mathematician (Pacioli), who erred on one important point. He stated (more or less as a matter of fact) that it would never be possible to solve cubic equations through radicals. Now, today we know that such a solution was published by Cardano in 1545; according to historical records, it was discovered through a complicated process, whereby Cardano swore an oath not to publish the result – an oath that he broke when a second person discovered the same formula (van der Waerden 1985: 55).

The *Encyclopaedia Britannica* states: "Italian algebraists, for instance Lucas Pacioli in 1494, had expressed the belief that the general cubic equation could not be solved algebraically by means of radical expressions" ("Mathematics, History of", Vol. 11: 662g). For a second source on this issue, see Masotti (1956: 5).

Now let us reflect on the situation before 1545, when the mathematical public were surprised to learn that there was a solution. The situation was not only created by the fact that Pacioli stated this impossibility, which can hence be called an "alleged mathematical impossibility". The problem that arose from his statement was the fact that he achieved acceptance in his claiming the impossibility. In the statement in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, we are told that a considerable number of algebraists held this opinion. We can say that there was, at a sociological meta-level, a consensus that this formula did not exist. The fact that this view was held by a multitude of mathematicians served to hamper research even more.

In the book written by Cardano in 1545, which survives, we are informed about this hindrance of research. Right at the very beginning of the text, he states that he was "deceived" by Pacioli (1545: 8, in the translation by Witmer).

This process of consensus is used to offer an example of an alleged mathematical impossibility. In mathematics, we have the opportunity of proving things, but in other sciences, this is not possible. It was not possible to prove that flying through the air is impossible for human beings, because it is possible, but the question at stake here is too vaguely defined, too physical to fix things in a clear

mathematical proof. (To attempt to fly was considered heretical.)

Wittgenstein poses the problem as to whether at some point in the future it will ever be possible for a human being to swim across the Atlantic Ocean without any kind of technical aid (1958b, *Blue Book*: 54). In another passage he states: "The future is hidden from us" (PU, II, xi: 223). Although it is probably realistic that it will never be possible to fulfil the "*Kunststückchen*" (See 118 116r of Wittgenstein's *Nachlass*) of swimming across the Atlantic Ocean, it isn't possible to prove it. We are left with a situation in which only a consensus of most or all experts establishes a sociological impossibility. This construction of a consensus that a certain thing will never be possible is the concept to which Wittgenstein assigns the term "psychological impossibility".

Wittgenstein comments on the alleged impossibility of a flight to the moon (see OC: 16, Section 106).

Now let's focus our attention on the *second meaning* of the expression "psychological impossibility." It is, as contrasted with consensual impossibility, a psychological impossibility in a narrower sense – namely, the impossibility of thought transference: i.e. the impossibility of sending information about the inner world of one person to the brain of another person without any oral communication. Sigmund Freud works on it in *Psychoanalysis and Telepathy* and in *Dreams and Telepathy*. (*Standard Edition*, Vol. XVIII) and in N° XXX of his Lectures, *Dreams and Occultism*. (*Standard Edition*, Vol. XX). Such a communicative capacity, by means of which person A can perceive the emotions of person B without B speaking about his inner feelings, might be called a "remote perceptive ability".

Wittgenstein is fairly optimistic about the capability of humans to communicate about their inner worlds if they talk to each other. At least, while writing sections 193f of his *RPP1*, Wittgenstein had a moment of optimism. I would like to report here on his comments on the human ability to communicate in *MS 176*, written during the last weeks of Wittgenstein's life, in 1951. This manuscript is included in the *LWPP2* (= "The Inner and the Outer"). Here, Wittgenstein writes:

Is the impossibility of knowing what goes on in someone else physical or logical? And if it is both, how do the two hang together? (94)

Wittgenstein's conceptual framework for the different variations of impossibilities stems from mathematical impossibility, which is his starting point and which is synonymous with logical impossibility. On page 22 of *LWPP2*, he contrasts logical with psychological impossibilities. It seems that the central distinction is between logical=geometrical=mathematical impossibilities on the one hand, and psychological/physical/physiological impossibilities on the other.

Now, when interpreting this concept of Wittgenstein's, the question arises as to whether we should adopt a more optimistic or a more pessimistic attitude. The terminology used by Wittgenstein ("impossibility") partly suggests a negative answer to the question concerning the ability of humans to communicate with one another about their inner worlds.

Wittgenstein primarily investigates situations involving opportunities to communicate, in which only two people are present. There are only a handful of occasions where three people are present. This dealing with two people

displays a strong similarity to the situation of a psychoanalyst with his client.

Wittgenstein's reason for investigating mainly two-person situations is due to the following (logical) consideration: if communication is possible at all, then it is possible in the intimate atmosphere of a two-person conversation. If three persons are present (let alone a group of five or seven people), things will be more complex by far and Wittgenstein wants to clarify the hopefully more simple question of communication between two persons only.

Wittgenstein's reflections on this possibility give rise to both an optimistic and a pessimistic conclusion. In his *PU* (part II, Section v), he writes “The doubting has an end” which might give reason for optimism. Yet it is clear that the central theme of Wittgenstein's metapsychology is the investigation of the possibility of communicating the inner world of the human being both with and without oral communication.

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# Art, Aesthetics and Culture: A Critical Study in Wittgenstein's Philosophy

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Art is the most overt expression of culture. It is the emotive side of the cultural values expressed through various ways like paintings, sculpture, literature, music. Modern media also includes technological dimensions of art like movies, graphics, internet etc. Art is the most significant component of a culture and has a definite function to perform. It both work as a practical skill like art of sewing good clothes, doing embroidery, culinary skills, making furniture and so one, and also as institution like the fine arts of paintings, sculpture, architecture etc.

Arts exist within a culture, and culture is carried forward to coming generation through various art media. The art expressions like stories, myths, folk tales, and folk songs are the bearer as well as the carriers of cultural values. Both art and culture need each other and depend on each other for their existence. However, in some measure, art has the power of getting free of societal sanctions, as any artistic work of radical differentiation would show.

Aesthetics is the study of art in a given socio-cultural setting. It studies art and art experiences, of artists as well as general people, with respect to various physical, social and cultural milieus. It studies the significance of art or particular art genre in a particular epoch and also examines and evaluates the creative process underlying that. However, the aesthetic experience of an onlooker cannot be simply reduced to analyzing various physical, social and cultural elements in his experience.

Seeing from this perspective, aesthetics has a significant role to play in studying the emotional, social and cultural aspects of a culture. Wittgenstein considered aesthetics to be of central importance in philosophy and life in general. Aesthetics, if taken generally as way of appreciating the emotive expression of a person, then pervades centrally in one's life. The language itself is replete more with the expressions of these kinds than other words or terms. "A characteristic thing about our language is that a large number of words under these circumstances are adjectives – 'fine', 'lovely' etc." (Wittgenstein 2007: 3). Although, he immediately admits at the same time that their references are not absolute or even necessary as all that depends upon the context of language game in which they are being used. This admission neatly coheres with the opening remark on his Lecture on Aesthetics wherein he avers that, "The subject (Aesthetics) is very big and entirely misunderstood as far as I can see." For if the meaning of aesthetic words or adjectives and aesthetic judgments crucially depend upon the context of their language games, then the subject of aesthetics is definitely very big. This is because language games are forms of life, which are as infinite as the situations would be any person's life. And also, the subject would be misunderstood, since words when interpreted outside their context generally yield ambiguity and therefore misunderstanding.

The traditional philosophies have neglected relativity that is found in concrete reality, which Wittgenstein advocated by his introduction of the concept of language games. Any word depending upon the context can function as a word

of aesthetic expression, exclamation or simple approval or disapproval. Wittgenstein gives the example of 'beautiful' and argues that it normally functions as an adjective, but how do we learn to use it this way. This is because, normally when a child is taught the meaning of word *beautiful*, he learns it, "roughly as interjection?" Now, how does one comes to learn its use later as adjectives, or even interjections of approval? To this, Wittgenstein answers that the words like *beautiful* or *good* are not inherently beautiful or good. "Language is a characteristic part of a large group of activities – talking, writing, traveling on a bus, meeting a man etc. We are concentrating, not on the words 'good' or 'beautiful', which are entirely uncharacteristic, generally just subject and predicate ("This is beautiful") but on the occasions on which they are said – on the enormously complicated situation in which the aesthetic expression as a place, in which the expression itself has almost a negligible place." (Wittgenstein 2007: 2)

The characteristic feature of language games brings in the rule-following nature of the terms used therein. Although this may work well for general language games with the particular words following certain rules to be a part of those language games, Wittgenstein holds that such may not be possible in the case of aesthetic appreciation, or aesthetic judgment. For what rule, for instance, could be there of "correct" way of reading poetry, or appreciating music or painting. There might be correct way of appreciating the suit, for instance, made by the tailor in terms of "That's the right length", "That's too short" or "That's too narrow." (Wittgenstein 2007: 5) Words of approval like "correct" play no role in aesthetic judgment, although the speaker "will look pleased when the coat suits him." Thus, the words like "correct" which demand to-the-point and specific measure-bound appreciation hardly have any role in the language game of aesthetic judgment. "When we talk of a Symphony of Beethoven, we don't talk of correctness. Entirely different things enter." (Wittgenstein 2007: 8) Such a judgment is primarily and more explicitly given by the activities of the speaker himself, like his decision of trying the coat rather than leaving in the tailor's shop. Facial expressions have a significant role to play in showing the approval or disapproval of the speaker, thereby making aesthetic judgment implicitly on the behalf of the speaker.

What these words, "correct", "marvelous", "beautiful" etc mean whereby aesthetic judgments are pronounced are not definable. The whole form of life may need a reference while attempting to describe these words since most of them are influenced by socio-cultural background of the speaker. "It is not only difficult to describe what appreciation consists in, but impossible. To describe what it consists in we would have to describe the whole environment." (Wittgenstein 2007: 7) Wittgenstein here brings in the cultural significance in origination and appreciation of art through the medium of language games – the forms of life that are specific to a culture temporally. As he says:

The words we call expressions of aesthetic judgment play a very complicated role, but a very definite role, in what we call a culture of a period. To describe their use

or to describe what you mean by a cultured taste, you have to describe a culture. What we now call a cultured taste perhaps didn't exist in the Middle Ages. An entirely different game is played in different cultures.

What belongs to a language-game is the whole culture. In describing musical tastes, you have to describe whether children give concerts, whether women do or whether men only give them, etc etc. In aristocratic circles of Vienna, people had [such and such] a taste, then it came into bourgeoisie circles and women joined choirs, etc. This is an example of tradition in music. (Wittgenstein 2007: 8)

What sciences try to do with the different "forms of life" is entirely redundant in case of aesthetics. Aesthetics is not concerned with providing an objective criterion of what is or ought to be "beautiful", "charming", "correct" or "marvelous" in painting, literature, music or other forms of arts. That is the work of sciences. Aesthetics is rather concerned with the appreciation aspect of the art object – how that appreciation comes about in the onlooker. But that appreciation cannot be causally inferred from the behavior of the onlooker. Rather, it cannot be inferred in any way. Aesthetic experience just goes out of the purview of such problems those explain themselves in terms of cause and effects. In *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein puts it thus, "There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical." (Wittgenstein 1961: 73, Sec.6.522)

That is why Wittgenstein does not go in the underlying mechanism of the origination of appreciation. But he maintains that such an appreciation can be caught by the artist by looking at the reaction of the audience. The facial gestures are the foremost criteria to judge whether and how much the art object, whether it is work of literature, a painting, or a piece of music, has been appreciated by the onlooker. Finding mechanism of phenomena requires unearthing the causal laws of its origination. But then causes are of variety of ways. Causes related to occurrence of earthquakes is totally different from the causes of phenomena like economic regression, poverty etc. Now, precisely what kind of cause could find beneath someone appreciating a work of art? Should it be physical like that of earthquakes, or abstract like that of poverty etc? Wittgenstein reasons, "Saying 'I know the cause' brings in mind the case of statistics or tracing a mechanism. If I say, 'I know the cause,' it looks as if I had analyzed the feelings (as I analyze the feeling of hearing my own voice and, at the same time, rubbing my hands) which, of course, I haven't done. We have given, as it were, a grammatical explanation [in saying, the feeling is 'directed'].'" (Wittgenstein 2007: 14) Aesthetic experience goes by the parameters set by empirical studies. Nor by that it can be evaluated therefore.

Not causal laws of origination of appreciation then, aesthetics, is thus, more concerned with the *aesthetic reaction* of the onlooker. Experiments of psychology or social sciences cannot answer aesthetic queries. This is because the kind of answer one is looking for in an aesthetic query like, "Why do only bright colors appeal to the painter Van Gogh?" are not to be found either in the troubled psyche of the painter, or in the historical background of the painter. Though, this could be found within the cultural background of the artist. Considering that Van Gogh was painting in an era where Impressionist paintings were gradually invading and making their presence felt, it could be presumed safely that Van Gogh's fascination for bright colors is the product of that era.

Reducing every query to neatly crafted propositional answer of sciences and experimental psychology has its own charm although, but as Wittgenstein maintains, it does not help much. Were it working, sciences, by reducing psyche to brain events, had already been successful in producing what Wittgenstein called, "mechanics of the soul", but this is really "funny". (Wittgenstein 2007: 19) This is because of the peculiar nature of aesthetic experience and the queries related to it. It asks different sorts of answer than physics or psychology, and demands equally different sort of answers. Aesthetic queries and puzzles are of different kind than those of rational queries which may be answered by the aesthetic reaction of the onlookers but not the causal history of those reactions. Any aesthetic discourse then rightly should concentrate upon the emotive experience of the onlooker without going into the background causal details of that. These emotive experiences may be socio-culturally influenced. Understanding art objects and the aesthetic experience of the onlooker in terms of the socio-cultural background of both is not to invite relativism in aesthetic discourse however. It is not like cultural relativism that two persons merely talk past each other when one of them likes the musical symphony of Beethoven and the other does not. At one level, they do, but that's the end of it. That's the fact that they are contradicting each other explains nothing about their respective aesthetic experience and adds nothing of value to the art object itself. When one says that he likes the food and the other says that he does not, their apparent contradiction does not make them either more or less of food experts, or make the food more or less tasty.

Here one more aspect of culture and art relationship needs to be disentangled. Our culture do influences our aesthetic tastes, but does not condition them forever. Had it been so, all art would have nothing more than the manifestation of cultural dictatorship, and artists merely the culturally conditioned automata.

Aesthetic experience has a character of revelation to it, a surprise element which is not captured by the ordinary experience of life. In sudden flashes, an aspect of a thing comes to dominate our thoughts and we start seeing the thing in an entirely different way. This usually happens with melodies, pictures. Wittgenstein here distinguishes between, "continuous seeing of an aspect and the 'dawning' of an aspect." In *Philosophical Investigations*, regarding duck-rabbit figure, he remarks, "The picture might have been shewn me, and I never have seen anything but a rabbit in it." (Wittgenstein 2006: 194e) However with the, "change of aspect" he comes to see the duck also in the same picture. This "change of aspect" brings the suddenness and surprise in the otherwise dull, monotonous perception of ordinary experience and converts the ordinary experience into aesthetic experience.

It takes awhile to let people know of your discovery or aesthetic aspect in an object. For that, one might need a lot of persuasion to other. It is different thing to dictate people the parameters whereby they should approach an art object, and quite another to persuade people to pay attention to that particular aspect which has made that object special to you. Former would be like tyranny which at one point in history or another all the societies and cultures have indulged in. Latter refers to educating or enlightening people to an aspect which is unknown to people, but which can upgrade and add to their aesthetic sensitivities. One who is not sensitive to that aspects, even after persuasions, Wittgenstein called "Aspect Blind" and related it with, "lack of musical ear" as if. (Wittgenstein 2006: 213e)

This persuasion element could have a lot to contribute to aesthetic education since by it people can be taught to bypass the mundane aspects in a work of art and look for those aspects that are right now hidden from the view. That might need training people specifically for those aspects, as training a musical ear or painter's eye. However, it should be kept in mind at the same time that training (whether explicitly by educational institutions or implicitly by culture) is not sufficient in cultivating an aesthetic taste in the individual. It only primes, sharpens and give direction to what is already inherent in the individual.

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# F.P. Ramsey on Taxation: An Algorithmic Point of View on Formal Arguments

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In *A Mathematical Theory of Saving* (1928), Frank P. Ramsey addresses two key issues of Social Policy (Value Theory and Income Distribution):

1. How much is enough?
2. How does the discounting of future utilities substantially change the answer to 1?

Since Ramsey's considerations are embedded in Keynesian Economics and, more generally, in the frame of utilitarian thinking, one can assume the following betterness relation as being crucial for Ramsey's Theory: ... ... ... is at least as good as ... ... ... (I follow here Broome 1991). The betterness relation is a construction and does not appear, implicitly or explicitly, in Ramsey's paper. By using this concept I do not aim at an interpretation of Ramsey's text, but at constructing a frame for possible effectual uses of a theory.

As for 1., the debate about egalitarianism in the past two decades has shown that a substantial theory of justice has to avoid the Scylla and Charybdis of indexing individual well-being by constructing a middle path between welfarism and perfectionism: the interpersonal evaluation of preferences has to be an ordinal one (see for instance Fleuray 2008). Questions of type 1. are thus to be understood as an appeal to an algorithmic approach to algebra rather than to a quantization of partial structures.

By taking the betterness relation as the distinctive trait of utilitarianism I don't intend to assign Ramsey's seminal paper on taxation to any framing tradition. In fact, as it will become clear, Ramsey's mathematical construction of a solution class to the questions 1. and 2. is both highly innovative and *sui generis*.

As to the problem of agent relativity (which clearly surfaces as a structural trait of utilitarian thinking in the first part of the 1928 paper) Ramsey, by disregarding as irrational time preference ("a practice which is ethically indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of the imagination"), assumes that the community or society comprises every generation (to come) and that, as a consequence, each should be given equal weight in the social welfare function.

In order to find the allocation across generations which maximizes social welfare, Ramsey had to cope with an incommensurability problem from the start: a direct sum of utilities yields the difficulty that this sum can be infinite, which precludes the computability of an optimum over infinities. In the part of his analysis which allows for time preference, Ramsey says: "In assuming the rate of discount constant, I mean that the present value of an enjoyment at any future date is to be obtained by discounting it at the rate  $p$ . This is the only assumption we can make, without contradicting our fundamental hypothesis that successive generations are activated by the same system of preferences. For if we had a varying rate of discount – say a higher for the first fifty years – our preference for enjoyments in 2000 A.D. would be at the higher".

The following reflections are in order: Considering intertemporal dependent preferences, if one conceives of welfare economics as a type of theory for which the right is the best (which is the concept underlying the betterness relation); then it follows that rightness being determined by goodness poses a structural constraint on welfare objectives. This means that any articulation of allocation and distribution in terms of a mathematical formalism must reflect the structure of "good" in a very specific fashion, namely by encoding an ordering of acts. The very formal fabric of a theory must, in other words, exhibit an algorithmic mechanism which defines an ordering over a set for any given set of goods and preferences.

It has been repeatedly noted that Ramsey was (one of) the first to introduce the calculus of variations into economics. The fact that a betterness relation has a foundational function in Ramsey's argument (which is but a consequence of its conditioned interest in time preference), implies that this same structure must have algebraic properties (being an ordering). Although this isn't a mathematical structure strictly (for incommensurability still plays a role in the representation of goods, such that this same representation cannot be a complete ordering by definition), a representation of goods is still in the first place functional to a reduction of incommensurability in terms of a constraint for the representation frame. Another way of phrasing the same point is that standard teleology is but one (maybe very reductive), way of coping with incommensurability, since a sufficient general theory of goodness tells us only how to keep indifferent to any two given sets of preferences (which is, in effect, the so called Ramsey pricing rule). In other words, an effective rule or set of rules for policy makers claims validity for some agent  $a$ , who relates to sets of preferences in a given market (production function). This would suggest that, in order to bypass the formalism of teleology a ought to develop some sort of meta-preference, or preference of preferences.

Back to the taxation problem, there is yet another point I wish to make. Since Ramsey's argument bears upon the aggregation of goods across states of nature, one should move beyond the restricted task of looking in it for considerations about the coherence of good.

As I said before, in order to sidestep the issue of infinite sums, Ramsey had to introduce some device in the social welfare function. This was, technically, a social unwelfare function with a bliss point, where bliss is the distance from maximum social welfare if society consumes a certain amount of the total social utility available. Social welfare is maximized if every generation is "at bliss". However, the society's initial capital stock (the initial income) may be too low to achieve bliss level of consumption within the first generation. As a consequence, we might be tempted to try and achieve bliss as quickly as possible by holding back consumption and producing a lot of capital today (a kind of differential accumulation by depth regime, as it were). The more we save now, the sooner society (later generations) will reach bliss. This is, of course, unfair for the first generations, who sacrifice their own consumption utility to

make social welfare converge to bliss. The sacrificed consumption utility of initial generations is the cost of bliss. The Ramsey Taxation-and-Growth-Problem is thus: Balancing the cost of lost consumption with quick convergence to bliss. It should be pointed out that the problem of intertemporal preferences has yet another dimension beside that of aggregate wealth functions. Ramsey's differential approach to the problem of utilities over times allows both to take a fresh look at the issue of policing as a means of controlling production (and accumulation) and to model the accumulation process itself dynamically. The partially conflicting objectives of generations can be modelled as a struggle for power within the accumulation process itself, whereby the social issue of wealth production and distribution (local justice) is just one among others within the global economy of accumulation by increasing production control (politics). Whether or not this reconstruction of Ramsey's economics is sympathetic to its original spirit, the commitment of the 1928 paper to a crucial role of labour cannot be denied.

It seems *prima facie* that Ramsey's construction of the convergence problem assumes some version of the Bernoullian hypothesis about the expectation of utility. But if this is the case, then Ramsey's mathematical tour de force (transversality conditions for the Euler-Equations) only results in a kind of opportunistic metric for computing, not an optimal welfare distribution, but conditions for taking systematic advantage of a status quo. In other words, the assumption that utility and „good“ are identical for the sake of algebraic representation, together with its implication that a person's good is an arithmetical quantity, isn't actually a metric of good, but a geometry of power and accumulation and, lastly, a tool for establishing equilibria for oligopolistic agents. Bernoulli's hypothesis, supposedly a tacit assumption in Ramsey's model, reads: One alternative is at least as good for a person as another if and only if it gives the person at least as great an expectation of her good. Now, standard reconstructions and extensions of Ramsey's model, such as H. Ryder and Heal, R. Barro (2004) and others, by stressing the centrality of so called median rules like Ramsey pricing, do in fact explicitly assume a coherence relation holding between expected utility and good (the betterness relation). Which gives Bernoulli's theory of risk measurement and risk neutrality a central role in articulating what one (society) ought to do.

In *Truth and Probability* (1931), Ramsey actually defends (against his great mentor J.M. Keynes) a subjectivist version of probability and thereby seems to be in the Bernoullian mainstream. However, a closer look on Ramsey's treating of expectation and subjectivism is in order.

In deriving the betterness relation from beliefs about the probability of an event and the expected utility for a person, Ramsey at the same time developed a construction which permits to isolate both from one another, while still maintaining a subjectivist view on probability. The core idea is that, by observing the behaviour of betting agents, say at a horse race, one can make abductive inferences on the beliefs they hold about the possible outcomes. Betting at a horse race displaces a typical failure of shared

common knowledge with well informed players. Almost the inverse holds for markets, if one assumes that markets neutralize guesses and display pure information in the end.

The situation from which Ramsey started constructing his argument is as follows: the derivation (matrices manipulation) of utilities from probabilities and from action-indifferent probabilities to expected utilities, depends upon a pretty strong condition: the actor must be indifferent between two actions. (Remember that this constraint poses also serious limits on the possibility of computing optima for a collective actor, society). Ramsey's construction aims exactly at eliminating this bottle-neck in order to build a powerful tool for choice making. The solution was for him to embed the utility matrix for a betterness relation in a proper game of luck. Again, Ramsey doesn't stress the effectiveness of computing betterness over a utility range; central to the idea of getting rid of the indifference-constraint, is rather the device of properly assigning a probability to a betterness relation by aptly choosing a game with a given number of outcomes. The point is that there are different games which would portray the competitiveness of preferences with finer or coarser "grain".

What Ramsey shows is, moreover, how to bypass the presupposition of numerical probabilities. The key idea here is to consider of games between options not only as additional results, but also as additional consequences. I will not expand further on this point.

Instead of jumping to the conclusion that the Ramsey approach is one of revealed belief (parallel to the revealed preference approach of consumer theory), one should stress that the idea of constructing proper games helps bridging the normative gap between utility and good, or preference and betterness. This is what is meant by labelling Ramsey's style „algorithmic“. Ramsey's deduction of the saving rate for a social welfare function thus displays both the highest algebraic refinement and an ingenious discrete modelling of normative situations. Whether this reading of Ramsey's mathematical theory of saving is to be paralleled to Rohit Parikh's idea of social software (2002, interpreting Wittgenstein's PI 88), I let to others to decide.

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# Grundlos oder haltlos? Wittgenstein über abergläubische Praktiken

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## 1. Das Chesterton-Dilemma

Eine Karikatur ethnologischer Erklärungsweisen inspirierte womöglich Wittgensteins *Bemerkungen über Frazers 'Golden Bough'*. Darin offenbart sich ein heiter stimmendes handlungstheoretisches Dilemma:

Der Mann der Wissenschaft, der nicht begreift, daß rituelles Verhalten im Kern etwas ist, das keinen rationalen Grund hat, muß für jedes Ritual einen solchen Grund finden; wie zu erwarten, ist dieser Grund zumeist äußerst absurd – absurd nicht deshalb, weil er dem schlichten Gemüt des Barbaren entspringt, sondern dem hochkomplizierten Geiste des Professors. Zum Beispiel wird der gelehrte Mann erklären: 'Die Eingebohrten von Mumbojumbo hegten die Vorstellung, daß ein Toter essen kann und für seine Reise ins Jenseits Proviant braucht. Das wird durch die Tatsache belegt, daß sie auf dem Grabe Nahrung deponieren und daß sich jede Familie, die dieses Ritual nicht befolgt, den Zorn der Priester und des Stammes zuzieht.' Jeder, der mit den Menschen vertraut ist, weiß, wie völlig verkehrt diese Darstellung ist. Genauso gut könnte man sagen: 'Die Engländer des 20. Jahrhunderts hegten die Vorstellung, daß ein Toter riechen kann. Das wird durch die Tatsache belegt, daß sie das Grab stets mit Lilien, Veilchen oder anderen Blumen bedeckten. Die Vernachlässigung dieses Brauches zieht offenbar einigen Unwillen von Seiten der Priester und des Stammes nach sich, denn uns liegen Berichte über mehrere alte Damen vor, die außer sich waren, weil ihre Kränze nicht rechtzeitig zum Begräbnis eintrafen.'

(Chesterton 1998: 139 f.).

Entweder geben die Trauernden ihrem Verstorbenen Blumen/Speisen mit, weil sie absurderweise meinen, der Leichnam könnte essen/riechen, oder sie handeln 'einfach so'. Einmal billigen wir ihnen zu: ihr Tun hatte seine Gründe. Dann müssen wir uns allerdings damit abfinden: die Gründe, die wir zu Tage fördern, spotten jeder Beschreibung: 'Nie wird es aber plausibel, daß die Menschen aus purer Dummheit all das tun' (BF 118, vgl. 130). Oder wir gestehen ein: Für die Täter selbst war ihr Handeln grundlos. Wenn man Handlungen erklärt, indem man ihren *Beweggrund* identifiziert, verzichten wir damit jedoch auf eine *Erklärung* ihres Tuns: „Nur beschreiben kann man hier und sagen: so ist das menschliche Leben“ (BF 120). Wir sehen uns dann weder einer Theorie gegenüber, die durch Beispiele veranschaulicht würde, noch Wittgensteins später These, Beispiele seien die einzige mögliche Form der Erklärung („Das Exemplifizieren ist hier nicht ein *indirektes* Mittel der Erklärung, – in Ermangelung eines Beseren“ (PU § 71)). Das Allgemeine, von dem diese Beispiele zeugen, ist die *Unmöglichkeit der Erklärung*:

– „Gegen morgen, wenn die Sonne aufgehen will, werden von den Menschen Riten des Tagwerdens zelebriert, aber nicht in der Nacht, sondern da brennen sie einfach Lampen“ (BF 136). Die Primitiven sind nicht so primitiv, mittels einer Zeremonien die Sonne zum Aufgehen bewegen zu wollen. Andernfalls würden sie immer tanzen, wenn sie Licht brauchen, nicht nur in der Frühe, wo es ohnehin bald hell wird. Warum tanzen sie dann?

- „Der selbe Wilde, der, anscheinend, um seinen Feind zu töten, dessen Bild durchsticht, baut seine Hütte aus Holz wirklich und schnitzt seinen Pfeil kunstgerecht und nicht in effigie“ (BF 124). Wilde durchbohren Voodoopuppen, die ihre Feinde darstellen – warum? Weil sie die naive Überzeugung hegen, ihren Feinden Schaden zuzufügen? Kaum, sonst würde der jagende Wilde auch seine Beute symbolisch zur Strecke bringen wollen anstatt mit echtem Pfeil und Bogen. Warum dann?
- „Wenn die Adoption eines Kindes so vor sich geht, daß die Mutter es durch ihre Kleider zieht, so ist es doch verrückt zu glauben, daß hier ein *Irrtum* vorliegt und sie glaubt, das Kind geboren zu haben“ (BF 124). Warum tut sie's dann? Dass „nichts so schwierig [ist], wie Gerechtigkeit gegen Tatsachen“ (BF 128), meint nicht, das Leben sei zu vielgestaltig, um mit dem Rüstzeug einer Theorie bewältigt zu werden (Spätphilosophie!): Das Problem ist weniger, dass magische Praktiken, wenn sie erklärt werden, verarbeiten, sondern dass sie *armseliger* wirken als sie sind, nicht die Bedrohung der *Vielfalt*, sondern die Unterstellung von *Einfalt*.
- „Das Bild der Geliebten küssen. Das basiert *natürlich nicht* auf einem Glauben an eine bestimmte Wirkung auf den Gegenstand, den das Bild darstellt.“ (BF 122). Warum überdecken wir in Abwesenheit der Geliebten ihr Portrait mit Küssen? Weil wir glauben, unser Kuss bahne sich einen Weg zu ihr? Kaum! Wir „handeln eben so und fühlen uns dann befriedigt“ (BF 122).
- „Wenn ich über etwas wütend bin, so schlage ich manchmal mit meinem Stock auf die Erde [...] Aber ich glaube doch nicht, daß die Erde schuld ist oder das Schlagen etwas helfen kann. 'Ich lasse meinen Zorn aus'. [...] eine historische Erklärung, etwa daß [...] meine Vorfahren früher geglaubt haben, das Schlagen der Erde helfe etwas, sind [...] überflüssige Annahmen, die *nichts erklären*“ (BF 136 ff). Warum schlage ich auf den Tisch, wenn ich weder glaube, den Richtigen zu treffen, noch, dass das hilfreich sei?
- Ein Irrer, der sich ehedem für ein Samenkorn hielt, wird geheilt aus der Psychiatrie entlassen. Er hält sich nun für einen normalen Mann. Kaum jedoch ist er über die Schwelle hinaus, hämmert er panisch an die Tür: 'Was ist los?', fragt der diensthabende Arzt. 'Drüben steht ein Huhn'. – 'Ja, aber Sie wissen doch, dass Sie kein Samenkorn sind' – 'Natürlich weiß ich das, aber weiß es auch das Huhn?' (Žízek 2009, 351).
- „Bei der magischen Heilung einer Krankheit bedeutet man ihr, sie möge den Patienten verlassen. Man möchte nach der Beschreibung so einer magischen Kur immer sagen: Wenn *das* die Krankheit nicht versteht, so weiß ich nicht, wie man es ihr sagen soll“ (BF 128). Der Patient sagt sich: 'Ich glaube nicht an diesen faulen Zauber, hoffentlich fällt meine *Krankheit* darauf herein...'. Hier wirkt nicht mein Glaube an die Heilwirkung, sondern mein Glaube an den *Glauben der Krankheit* – potenziert Placeboeffekt. Doch glaube ich auch nicht, Krankheiten hätten Überzeugungen. Warum handele ich so?

Entweder hinter diesen Verhaltensweisen stecken *keine* oder *absurde* Überzeugungen. Grundlos oder hältlos, das ist hier die Frage.

## 2. Magie als Symbolhandlung?

Ergeben sich die absurden Konsequenzen des Dilemmas, weil man vernachlässigt, dass es neben *instrumentellen* Handlungen mit Anspruch auf *Wirksamkeit* auch *expressive* Handlungen mit Anspruch auf *Wahrhaftigkeit/Selbsterkenntnis* gibt? (Habermas 1987: 128ff) „Magie bringt einen Wunsch zur Darstellung“ (BF 124), soll ihn also nicht *erfüllen*. Wegen solcher Bemerkungen wird gesagt, Wittgenstein *erkläre* magische Praktiken durch eine Theorie expressiver Handlungen (Cook 1983: 5; Mounce 1978: 70; Clack: 1999) Ich küsses das Bildnis meiner fernen Geliebten nicht, um etwas zu bewirken, sondern um *meiner Liebe Ausdruck zu verleihen*. Nicht Unwirksamkeit, allenfalls Unwahrhaftigkeit/Selbsttäuschung wäre mir vorzuwerfen. Anstatt vom Glauben an ein postmortales Riechvermögen zu zeugen, sollen Grabbeigaben in Form von Blumen ungeheuchelt unsere Trauer *bezeugen*. Sonnenriten sollen nicht die Sonne zum Aufgehen bewegen, sondern *darstellen*, wie sehr es uns bewegt, dass sie wieder aufgeht. Auch hier ist mit der Handlung nicht ‚echt‘ die Sonne, sondern unsere Freude echt gemeint.

Die angebliche Erklärung birgt zwei Rätsel: Das eine betrifft den mutmaßlichen *Adressaten* meiner Symbolhandlungen (1), das andere den *Effekt*, den diese auf mich ausüben (2).

(1) Selbst wenn ich ‚bloß symbolisch‘ eine Rose ins Grab werfe, fragt sich: *Wem* symbolisiere ich Trauer? Dem Verstorbenen? Das würde mir abgeschmackte Ansichten zuschreiben. *Mir*? Kann ich Schmerz nicht unmittelbar empfinden? Den Trauergästen? Letzteres ist ausgeschlossen, wenn ich *allein* bin: beim einsamen Durchstechen des Feindessbildes, beim Kuss des Portraits. *Wem* symbolisiere ich *damit* meine Liebe? Der Geliebten? Doch der Bezug auf die Symbolhandlung sollte mich *bewahren* vor der Schlussfolgerung, mein Kuss wurzele im Postulat einer telepathischen Verbindung. *Mir*? Wüsste ich sonst nichts von meiner Zuneigung? Wenn diese Symbolhandlungen *niemandem* etwas symbolisierten – warum sie *Symbolhandlungen* nennen?

(2) Warum stellt mich eine bloß *symbolische* Ersatzhandlung *wirklich* zufrieden? Weshalb vermag der Kuss aufs kalte Portrait meine Sehnsucht nach dem leibhaften Menschen zu stillen, obwohl ich weder das Bildnis mit ihm verwechsle noch überzeugt bin von Telepathie? Hier ist auch unsere Sprachverwendung zweideutig: ‚Im Gedicht drücke ich meinen Schmerz aus‘, bedeutet nicht nur, dem Gefühl auf symbolische Art und Weise *Gestalt zu verleihen*, sondern es auszudrücken wie eine Zahnpastatube. Warum kann ich das Gefühl *verbannen*, indem ich es *in Symbole banne*? Es wäre Schummeln mittels des Begriffs der symbolischen Geste die *Darstellung* des Wunsches von seiner *Befriedigung* abkoppeln, wo die schiere Darstellung ihn befriedigen kann!

## 3. Magie als Ventil?

Küsse ich das Portrait meiner Geliebten, um meiner brennenden Liebe Luft zu verschaffen? Reagiere ich beim Durchstechen des Feindes-Portraits meine Feindseligkeit ab? Leben wir mit den Riten des Sonnenaufgangs unser Warten auf den Tagesanbruch aus? Solch eine Ventiltheorie der Magie erblickt den Zweck der Magie darin, eine sich

meldende Spannung mittels von Ersatzhandlungen abzubauen. Sie wird Wittgenstein häufig zugeschrieben, bedeckt von seiner Aussage: „Frazers Erklärungen wären überhaupt keine Erklärungen, wenn sie nicht letzten Endes an eine Neigung in uns selbst appellierten“ (BF 126, vgl. 138; Drury 1974: x; Rudich et al. 1971: 86; Ayer 1980: 91).

Wütend schlage ich auf den Tisch. Was bringt die Behauptung, das sei aus Neigung geschehen? Wenig. Mit Blick aufs Geschehen möchte man sagen: ‚Ich haue nicht auf den Tisch, um etwas an meiner Situation zu ändern oder weil er eine Schuld trüge, doch lässt sich meine naive *Wut* dadurch zufriedenstellen (sodass ich mich nicht zu einer unüberlegten Handlung hinreißen lasse)‘. Oder: ‚Nicht *ich* täusche mich darüber, bloß ein Bildnis zu küssen anstelle der wunderbaren Frau aus Fleisch und Blut, aber *meine Liebe* ergeht sich in dieser schönen Illusion (sodass ich in Ruhe meinen Alltagsgeschäften nachgehen kann und die Ersehnte nicht überstürzt aufsuchen muss)‘.

Der Rekurs auf die Neigung übertüncht diese Personifikation der Gefühle. Unsere Neigung fungiert als naive Kraft, die *an unserer Stelle* der Täuschung erliegt. Damit steht diese ‚Erklärung‘ auf gleicher Stufe wie der doch aufzuklärende Fall des Patienten, der den Glauben an die Wirksamkeit der Heilungskur ebenfalls auslagert, in seine Krankheit. Entweder postulieren wir in Gestalt der Neigung Absurditäten: *meiner* absurd Theorie, dass meine Gefühle absurde Theorien/Gefühle haben können (‘die Wut lässt sich durch die lächerliche Geste täuschen’), *oder* sind der Personifikationen von Neigungen abgeneigt, retten uns auf die Position, solchen Handlungen läge „keine Meinung zu Grunde“ (BF 122).

## 4. Erklärungen? Erübrigen sich!

Wittgenstein sagt nicht nur, zwei bestimmte Erklärungsversuche unserer Beispiele seien gescheitert, er hält, „das Unternehmen einer Erklärung“ *schlechthin* für „verfehlt“ (BF 120). Wir erklären Taten gemeinhin, indem wir ihre Beweggründe festmachen. Wenn meine konkrete Erklärung einer Tat fehlschlug, weil ich den falschen Beweggrund identifizierte, kann ich doch *andere Gründe* auftun! Wie wollte man begründen, es sei falsch, Handlungen *überhaupt* zu ergründen? Doch die Gründe unserer Beispiele sind nicht nur *unhaltbar*, sondern *unersetzbare* durch vermeintlich bessere Gründe:

(1) „*Natürlich* weiß ich, dass ich kein Samenkorn bin!“ Wenn selbst der Handelnde sich distanziert von seinen vermeintlichen Beweggründen, sollte ich dann nicht nach *bessereren suchen*? Doch die Beteiligten *streiten* die Gründe, auf die wir sie festnageln wollten, nicht nur ab, sondern *schieben* sie ab: Der Patienten glaubt nicht an den Erfolg des Heilungzaubers, aber sagt, die *Krankheit* tut's. Der Psychiatrie-Patient ist nicht so verrückt, sich mit einem Samenkorn zu verwechseln, aber verrückt die Verwechslung auf ein dummes *Huhn*. Wer nach *anderen* Gründen sucht, verkennt, dass hier die Gründe *eines anderen* im Spiele sind. (Pfaller 2002) Dass sie sich von diesen schlechten Gründen nicht nur distanzieren, sondern sie in sicherer Distanz installieren, zeigt: Sie besitzen diese Gründe ohne ihnen aufzusitzen. Nicht umsonst heißt es: „Aber-Glaube“: „Ich weiß zwar, dennoch aber-glaube ich...“ (Mannoni 2003).

(2) So *abwegig* die Gründe sein mögen, so *naheliegend* sind sie doch: Welch *anderer* Grund könnte hinter den Riten des Sonnenaufgangs stehen als der von seiner Wirksamkeit, ist es doch ein *Sonnentanz*. Aus welch anderer

Überzeugung würde der Irre vor dem Huhn zittern, wenn nicht aus Furcht, aufgepickt zu werden?

(3) Ein weiterer Hinweis, dass aus dem Spiel gehaltene Gründe im Spiele sind, bilden die starken Gefühlsreaktionen, wenn der Unsinn, vom dem man sich zu distanzieren können meinte, aller Wahrscheinlichkeit zum Trotz eine scheinbare Bestätigung erfährt (Pfaller 2002: 56; Cioffi 1998: 168f). Ein älterer Herr schnappt Freuds „Rattenmann“ das Hotelzimmer vor der Nase weg. Dem entfährt die Verwünschung „Dafür soll ihn aber der Schlag treffen“ (Freud 2000: 92). Dahinter steckt nicht der Irrglaube, seine Worte könnten Schaden anrichten, doch auch keine triftige Überzeugung. Andernfalls ließe sich nicht erklären, warum ihn Allmachtsgdanken und Schuldgefühlen plagen, sobald den alten Mann kurz drauf wirklich der Schlag trifft...

(4) Schließlich werden absurde Gründe nicht durch bessere ausgestochen, weil magische Praktiken zu evident sind, um von (kritisierbaren) Gründen abhängig zu sein: „Die Erklärung ist im Vergleich mit dem Eindruck, den uns das Beschriebene macht, zu unsicher.“ (BF 122, vgl. 138). In einer magischen Praktik kommt zur fehlenden Überzeugung starkes Überzeugtsein hinzu. Die Überzeugungen, von denen unsere Beispiele Kunde geben, sind für die Beteiligten ‘unglaublich’, unhaltbar und unwiderstehlich: So sehr sie den Sinn dieser Handlungen in Zweifel ziehen, so sehr ziehen diese sie in ihren Bann. Warum kommen uns diese absurden Handlungen so selbstverständlich vor? Dem Chestertondilemma zufolge können wir das gleichmütig hinzunehmen, „so ist das menschliche Leben“ (BF 120), oder um den Preis von Merkwürdigkeiten erklären: ‘Du verstehst nicht, wie Handlungen selbstverständlich sein können, ohne durch Rechtfertigungen gedeckt zu sein? Nun, du musst es auch nicht verstehen, weil es sich von selbst versteht, stellvertretend für dich!’

## Siglen

BF=Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1993 „Bemerkungen über Frazers Golden Bough“, in: ders., *Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951*, J. Klagge, A. Nordmann (Hg.), Indianapolis/Cambridge 1993, 115-155.

PU= Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1984 *Philosophische Untersuchungen*, Werkausgabe, Bd. 1, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 225-580.

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# Contemporary Normative Ethics: Cornerstones for Large-scale Spatial and Temporal Models (Systemic-informational Approach)

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In the present paper, the consideration is focused on the *normative ethics* as a “beacon” for *socio-psychological attitudes* capable of influencing upon the life of any system – towards its more *perfect functioning*. As it was mentioned in Mazhul/Petrov (2012), two aspects of ethical problems are important for social reality: *spatial and temporal*, and in both cases there exists the whole set of levels. Now we shall construe the *cornerstones* mainly for *large-scale ethical models*, both spatial and temporal – because exactly such models are the most substantial for practical applications.

## 1. First spatial cornerstone – the phenomenon of centralization

As it was shown in Mazhul/Petrov (2012), ‘spatial models’ should proceed from the *tendency of expansion (A)*, i.e., growing diversity of the system’s states, or its entropy  $H(Y)$ . For any *multi-element system* it means, first of all, attention to the growing *number of the system’s elements*. Besides, we shall take into account the *tendency (C) of economy of the resource*  $R(X, Y)$  which is spent by the system. As far as we deal with societies existing in the third phase of information-resource relationships (when exactly information dominates the entire life of the society), we should consider mainly that part of the *resource* which is spent to support *inter-elements links*.

Namely for such a goal, a special ‘optimizing device’ was theoretically deduced – ‘centralization’ (Golitsyn/Petrov 1995): sooner or later, in any system a certain ‘central element’ would appear, through which all other elements occur connected with each other – instead of immediate inter-element links at the previous stage. The example of this phenomenon is illustrated with Fig. 1 – two stages of the development of the *telephone net*.




Figure 1. Example of a multi-element system: telephone net before the centralization (a) and after it (b).

It is clearly seen that at the early stage, the number of links connecting  $n$  elements with each other, equaled  $N=n(n-1)/2$ , whereas at the ‘mature’ stage  $N=n$ . [For instance, when  $n=5$ , at the early stage  $N=5(5-1)/2=10$  links are needed, but after introducing a ‘central exchange,’ only  $N=5$  links, i.e., 2 times less!] The growth of the number of the system’s elements is accompanied with increasing advantage of the centralization, approximately as  $n^2$ .

This phenomenon is inherent in various systems, for instance, it was observed:

- in the *biological sphere* – the evolution of the nervous system from diffused to centralized;
- in *economics* – at first one product was exchanged for another one directly, but with the growth of the commodity numbers, one of the products stood out among others (usually it was gold) and became the ‘centre of exchange’; each product was exchanged for gold and then gold – for any other product;
- in *religion* – after the stage of polytheism, monotheism came, and it is Abraham who searches a single God controlling the multifarious natural and spiritual phenomena;
- in *science* – it is Newton who searched for a single Law of Universal Gravitation which explains the fall of apples, the motion of the moon and the planets, the tides and many other facts.

So, the phenomenon of centralization is widespread; it is *universal systemic device* of self-organization, because it is advantageous!

Of course, this phenomenon would be valid for the entire system of *inter-subject relations* in the socio-psychological life of the society: these relations would be ‘centered around ethics’ – meaning such constituents as style of business matters, aesthetic attitudes, inter-clan relations, international ones, etc. As well, the life of a *multi-country system* would be also optimized when resorting to the help of centralization. This phenomenon is so important that its sequences would ‘penetrate’ all the above hierarchy of scales (Mazhul/Petrov 2012). So appropriate *ethical criteria should be descended* from higher levels – to lower ones. In other words, certain ethical criteria should become ‘throughout pivot’ for the above hierarchy; upper levels would dominate all other levels. That is why, for instance, such declarations of some national leaders like “*First of all I am Chinese (or Russian)*,” undoubtedly contradict the above ethical recommendations. Quite analogous considerations are valid for relations of other levels.

[Meanwhile, sometimes we meet a system which possesses *more than one kind of the resources*; such a system may be *multi-centered*. For instance, our global system can possess one center (country) for economics, another center for military force, and the third center for artistic life. Appropriate ‘reconciling means’ require separate consideration.]

## 2. Second spatial cornerstone – sharp inequality in activity


Another sequence of the *tendency of expansion (A)* permits to concretize the previous phenomenon: it deals with the *distribution of activity* among the system’s elements. The heart of the matter is in that for any kind of *creativity* (in science, technique, art, and so forth), the so-called Biblical “*Mathew effect*” is valid: success generates

new success (Merton 1968). Mathematical formalization of this phenomenon (proceeding from the tendency of expansion, see Golitsyn/Petrov 1995) comes to Zipf's law (1949) – a variant of 'stable non-Gaussian distributions.' One of its versions can be formulated as follows: let's build a ranking of all the persons which participate in a certain field, in accordance with the intensity of their creativity (ascribing rank  $r=1$  to the most active participant,  $r=2$  to the next one, and so on); then the intensity of activity for a participant with  $r$ -th rank, would be  $P_r = P_1/r^\alpha$ ,  $P_1$  being the intensity of the first-rank participant,  $\alpha$  the coefficient describing the creative inequality of the massif of participants. Turning to logarithmic co-ordinates, we come to linear dependence:

$$\log P_r = \log P_1 - \alpha \log r,$$

with the slope  $\alpha$ .

Fig. 2a presents such a dependence for '*mass poetic life*' in Russia – a sample representing 150 poems published in Russian literary journals in 1911–15, written by 99 poets (see Petrov 2004): each of most poets (70) was represented by one poem, 18 by two poems, and so on. The dependence is really linear (correlation with empirical points .987, 1%-level of significance), with slope about 2.3 – in good agreement with theoretical prediction for such situations. Another distribution relating to '*high music*,' is shown by Fig. 2b: 'fame' ( $F$ ) of 52 eminent German and Austrian composers born in 1770–79 (see Kovalenko et al. 2010); the fame of each composer was measured by the number of lines devoted to him in a musical encyclopedia (the most famous was Beethoven – 9761 lines). Again the dependence occurred linear (slope about 1.1, close to theoretical prediction, and correlation .845, 1%-level of significance).




**Figure 2.** Inequality: creativity of 99 Russian poets (a) and fame of 52 German-Austrian composers (b).

So, the distributions of creative activity (as well as appropriate phenomena, including fame) are rather far from homogeneity. These data are in agreement with the so-called "law of concentration" which was discovered by Price for scientific creativity and occurred valid for many other creative fields (see Martindale 1995): If in a certain field,  $M$  participants are engaged, then 50% of the entire production belongs to  $\sqrt{M}$  most active participants. (For instance, if the massif of poets consists of 1000 participants, 50% poems are written by  $\sqrt{1000}=32$  'top poets'.) In other words, as far as we are living in creative era, its character is rather elitist, which sharply contradicts to '*democratic basis of traditional ethics*'. [We shall not dwell upon another aspect of participants' inequality – their distribution over pecuniary gains, which is optimal when subdued to 'parabolic law' – see Golitsyn & Petrov 1995.]

### 3. First temporal cornerstone – steep monotonic trends and personal experiences

Turning to temporal models, we should proceed (Mazhul/Petrov 2012) from the tendency of *minimization of the entropy of the system's behavioral errors*  $H(Y/X)$ . But what can be fundamental roots of errors connected with time? – Naturally, these may be caused mainly by certain sharp changes in reality: otherwise the system would pass through self-organization and it would be in agreement with new conditions. Such 'suspected changes' can be of three kinds: monotonic, cyclic, and stochastic (chaotic).

In the light of the systemic-informational approach, the most important *monotonic temporal changes* are connected with *relationships between our two 'key personages'* – *information and resource*. At the contemporary stage ('information phase'), in some countries the *information processed* ( $I$ ) shows two-fold growth each 1.5–2 years. One of the most substantial components of such evolution is presented by Fig. 3a: the number of scientists  $N$  which were active during the 15<sup>th</sup>–18<sup>th</sup> centuries (according to S.Ertel, see Petrov 2011), reveals exponential growth shown by a dashed curve (against the background of which some periodical oscillations are seen). Meanwhile, the *energy available* ( $E$ ) usually increases two times only in 15–20 years. This difference is schematically illustrated with Fig. 3b. Of course, such discrepancy should inevitably influence upon the *socio-psychological sphere*, including ethics. Here two aspects occur to be substantial: genuine temporal and spatial.



**Figure 3.** Long-range trends: growing number of scientists (a) and information-resource relations (b).

The 'zest' of *genuine temporal aspect* is in that practically all the *information* used for current functioning of contemporary social system, is created during the *life of current generation*. This circumstance deals a blow upon the roots of *traditional ethics*, which was formed in the epochs when almost all present wealth had been produced previously. So in traditional conditions it was possible to satisfy harmoniously two principal *ethical preferences*:

\* from the side of the *society*, it is desirable to provide *positive social estimations* for the activity of previous generations, and appropriate attitudes usually possessed due basis (except some 'exotic' situations like 'lost generations,' as it was, e.g., in West Europe in 1920's, and in contemporary Russia);

\*\* from the side of *personality*, it would be desirable to provide *increasing social status* associated with age (because of well-known regularity: the need for positive emotion is satisfied mainly by dynamics, i.e., certain social growth), as it was, for instance, in traditional Eastern cultures.

Nowadays 'natural presuppositions' for such 'social harmony' are destroyed – because of a set of conditions (apropos, including growing longevity of the population); hence, new ethics should provide their revival. In addition, difference in the *proportions* between the roles of information and the resource, is capable of influencing upon the entire 'spirit' of the society (its *Zeitgeist*), of course, including ethics.


As for *spatial aspect* of the above dynamics, its 'zest' concerns *regional inequality*: some cultures experience more rapid changes than other ones, and hence, some informational achievements can be borrowed by 'cultural acceptors' from 'cultural donors.' Ethical problems of such processes are considered in a separate paper (Petrov 2011).

#### 4. Second temporal cornerstone – non-monotonic changes and problems of adaptation

Out of non-monotonic sharp changes in the reality capable of influencing upon ethics, it seems reasonable to single out *periodical processes*: their regularity provides the system's 'half-readiness' for adaptation. That is why we may suppose the need for appropriate *ethical means* in order the social system would be equipped with due 'devices' – psychological attitudes.

In the framework of the systemic-informational approach, there exists the main class of periodical processes – alternating cycles of 'analytic' and 'synthetic' styles of thinking, or *left- and right-hemispheric dominance* (Maslov 1983; Petrov 2001, 2004). These cycles have full period of 48-50 years: about 24-25 years of prevailing left-hemisphericity, and 24-25 years of right-hemispheric prevalence. The nature of such cycles is '*purely mental*': their necessity is rooted in the need for '*stylistic innovations*' which is inherent in the socio-psychological sphere. (Appropriate oscillations are analogous to those ones shown by Fig. 3a.) Besides, these cycles are superimposed upon monotonic trends inherent in the entire socio-psychological life and its various branches.

The cycles discussed usually embrace all the branches, including political 'climate,' international relations, style of art, etc. Fig. 4 presents fragments of evolutionary curves for Russian socio-political 'climate' and architecture of the 18<sup>th</sup>-20<sup>th</sup> centuries (monotonic trends are eliminated, only periodical components are shown – measured by Maslov 1983). Presented is the so-called "*index of asymmetry*"  $K$  capable of varying from -1 ('pure' right-hemispheric dominance) to +1 ('absolute' left-hemisphericity). The synchronism of 50-year cycles in both spheres is evident (and statistically significant).



**Figure 4.** Cycles in Russian socio-political 'climate' (upper curve) and architecture (lower curve).

In application to the tendency of idealization (*B*), such periodical oscillations mean the *need to change stylistic orientation*, and the periodicity of 'switches' should coincide with the changes of *generations* (each dominating about 25 years). In turn, the 'negation' of some *moral values* of the previous generation, should be evidently compensated by due efforts in the framework of *new ethics*.

As for 'genuine chaotic' environmental changes (i.e., absolutely unpredictable ones), the *preparedness* of the social system for them requires separate analysis. [Some systemic means for this class of changes were construed – and proved empirically – by V. Geodakyan: he derived an informational model for gender differentiation.]

Our consideration dealt mainly with the *methodology* of 'construing' models for normative ethics, besides mostly *large-scale* ones. Undoubtedly, quite analogous construing is capable of embracing other levels of ethical models. However, from the *gnosiological standpoint*, the most important are not concrete results themselves – but the very *possibility to deduce* them proceeding from *general principle of optimality*, and hence, to insert normative ethics into the entire future concept of the Universe realizing Leonhard Euler's project.

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# Elements of an e-Platform for Wittgenstein Research

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## Introduction

WAB has for many years engaged in the task of building an Open Access (OA) platform for digital Wittgenstein research and learning. This paper presents some of the elements WAB considers key in such a platform. They are partly in the making, partly already in place: 1) Primary sources (5000 pages of the Wittgenstein *Nachlass*, contributed within the DISCOVERY project); 2) Metadata (a new and extended catalogue of the Wittgenstein papers, in the making through an ongoing international cooperative project); 3) Secondary sources (a selection from WAB's *Working Papers / Publications* series and audio-visual materials as well as several hundred papers from the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society's (ALWS) Wittgenstein symposia, contributed within the ongoing AGORA project); 4) A Wittgenstein journal (the new *Nordic Wittgenstein Review*, established within the ongoing AGORA project, in cooperation with the Nordic Wittgenstein Society); 5) Wittgenstein ontologies (for both textual sources and conceptual domains); 6) Software. These elements and resources are provided OA. In the following, they are presented and discussed in more detail.

## 1. Primary sources

Within the framework of the DISCOVERY project (see Smith 2007), 5000 pages of the Wittgenstein *Nachlass* were made freely available OA through Wittgenstein Source (<http://wittgensteinsource.org/>). Twenty *Nachlass* items are included in the *Bergen Facsimile Edition* and the *Bergen Text Edition* which are found on Wittgenstein Source:

- From the Notes on Logic complex: Ts-201a1, Ts-201a2 (1913-14)
- From the Lecture on Ethics complex: Ms-139a, Ts-207 (1929)
- From the Big Typescript complex: Ms114, Ms-115 (first part), Ms-148, Ms-149, Ms-150, Ms-153a, Ms-153b, Ms-154, Ms-155, Ms-156a, Ts-212, Ts-213 (1931-34)
- From the Brown Book complex: Ms-115 (second part), Ms-140 (p.40), Ms-141, Ms152, Ts-310 (1934-36)

These items are rendered in both normalized and diplomatic versions.



Fig. 1. Screenshot: Wittgenstein Source Bergen Text Edition (Diplomatic version)

## 2. Catalogue

In September 2011, a meeting took place in Bergen regarding WAB's work on a new *Bergen Electronic Edition*. It was stressed that today's user of the Bergen edition suffers from a lack of accompanying commentary materials. This meeting led to a cooperative online international project on developing a new, extended and more flexible *Nachlass* catalogue; project partners include Trinity College Cambridge (Smith 2012), the Austrian National Library (Schmidt 2012), WAB, Joachim Schulte, Brian McGuinness, James Klagge (Klagge/Nordmann 2003), Arthur Gibson (Gibson 2010), Nuno Venturinha (Venturinha 2010) and others. This catalogue will permit users not only to achieve an "übersichtliche Darstellung" of *Nachlass* items, but also to choose different access points to them (chronological, text-genetic, document type, genetic context, archive affiliation, ...). The project proceeds through a collaborative web space and, once its basics are in place, will be opened for collaborative input, both in terms of data, method and technology. The new catalogue will be fully compatible with the existing von Wright catalogue, but will also allow for alternative and radically different perspectives.

## 3. Secondary sources

Within the framework of the AGORA project, WAB makes available OA a selection of its own *Working Papers / Publications* series (which have a strong focus on Wittgenstein *Nachlass* studies) and a selection from its audio-visual recordings of conference and seminar lectures, as well as, in cooperation with ALWS, several hundred papers from ALWS' annual international Wittgenstein symposia; these materials will be enriched with keywords which enable thematic browsing and their interlinking. The materials are being interlinked with primary sources available on Wittgenstein Source. Each text item is rendered in both PDF of the original print and an HTML version; the latter are produced from an XML transcription of the text prepared at WAB specially for this purpose. In the transcription we record (in TEI P5, see TEI 2007) both bibliographic (author, author affiliation, place of publication, ...) and content metadata (references to literature, citation, graphics, emphasis, structure and division of the text, ...). This permits not only the production of both screen and paper text outputs, but also prepares the item for further analysis: for instance the ability to query the resource for all items which refer to a certain book or article. The entire resource is built and offered in the Open Journal Systems (OJS, see Willinsky 2005); through the AGORA project further rendering and processing possibilities will be produced (such as Linking Open Data LOD clouds).

## 4. Journal

Within the framework of AGORA, WAB has also established the new Wittgenstein journal *Nordic Wittgenstein Review* (<http://www.nordicwittgensteinreview.com/>) in cooperation with the Nordic Wittgenstein Society (NWS). The journal is interdisciplinary in character, and publishes con-

tributions in philosophy and other human and social sciences including philology, linguistics, cognitive science, among others. Each issue includes an invited paper, an interview, a peer-reviewed articles section, a section in which seminal works are re-published or where previously unpublished archive materials are presented, as well as a book review section. The journal is published as a printed journal at ontos Verlag and OA online (three months delay after print). Like all other secondary sources in the AGORA project, the journal contributions will be tagged with keywords and interlinked with primary sources. The journal platform runs on OJS and includes functions for submission, review, editing and all elements standard in the production of a journal. As of May 2012, the journal has about 150 registered users, including authors, editors, reviewers, or just readers. The first issue, to appear in August 2012, contains an invited paper by Stephen Mulhall and an interview with Gottfried Gabriel. The invited paper and articles section of the first issue were open for public pre-review and commenting in April 2012. The first two issues are edited by Alois Pichler and Simo Säätelä from Bergen and the editor-in-chief of the journal is Yrsa Neuman from Åbo. Beginning with the third issue, the journal will travel from the University of Bergen on to other Nordic institutions. The editor-in-chief will, however, not change and the OJS platform shall continue to be run and maintained from Bergen.

## 5. Ontology and metadata

Bringing work on *Nachlass* metadata (such as remark dating, references to external works or persons, text-genetic relations, semantic content, adherence to philosophical debates, and claims made or questions posed by remarks) and Wittgenstein research in general together with Semantic Web ideas and methods provides the user with the possibility not only to browse materials, both primary and secondary sources, in interlinked ways within the materials, but also with reference to additional external resources. Thus, on the Semantic Web, not only a reference by Wittgenstein to one of his other works can be "linked" together, but also a reference to e.g. one of Goethe's poems. Moreover, within the Semantic Web any of its nodes can be taken as starting point or primary focus of research or learning: the Goethe scholar may start with the Goethe poem and from there find the Wittgenstein remark; the Wittgenstein scholar may work the other way round. At least some Semantic Web browsing is currently provided for in the 5000 pages of Wittgenstein Source – i.e. the Wittgenstein user can browse these pages by dating, reference to external persons or works, and in parts also text-genetic relations. A scholar interested in Wittgenstein's use of Goethe will, for example, be able to find a list of Goethe's works referred to by Wittgenstein (on the basis of Biesenbach 2011), go to the places where they are referred to, and – provided Semantic Web implementation is in place – also to the actual work referred to. WAB is working on the creation of two ontologies (which can be merged): "Source" and "Subject".




Fig. 2: The overall structure of WAB's Wittgenstein ontology



Fig. 3. Screenshot: Browsing WAB's Wittgenstein ontology with Philospace

The Source ontology houses "encyclopaedic" features such as the ones just mentioned; the Subject ontology houses the more contested and debated ones such as: the topic of a certain remark, the claim it makes, the philosophical subject it refers to, the philosophical debate it adheres to. It is designed to contain subjects one typically expects to find in the "subject index" of a comprehensive study of Wittgenstein's philosophy. 'Elementary proposition', 'logical independence', 'picture' and 'state of affairs' thus belong in the latter. Naturally, ontologies in philosophy will be different from ontologies in pharmacy or the food industry: their domain is much more dynamic, non-hierarchical and unstable (even more so in Wittgenstein's case). We wish to take this into account, and our ontology allows for e.g. both "Elementary propositions are independent from each other" and "Elementary propositions are not independent from each other" in its domain. WAB's vision is that users of the ontology will be enabled to browse and access the Wittgenstein ontology in a language of their preference; each label for ontological "nodes" can in principle be rendered in any language ("picture" (English)/ "Bild" (German) / "immagine" (Italian), ...), and in this way the same ontology can provide a key to browsing Wittgenstein's work in different languages. Naturally, different languages model the world in different ways, and this is one of the interesting challenges of applying computational and Semantic Web thought and technology to humanities domains (see Pichler/Zöllner-Weber 2012 and Wang/Lobis 2012). For our work to succeed, the instances of Wittgenstein's work referred to need be identified through absolutely unique and stable labels – we call them 'sigla' (see Pichler 2010).

## 6. Software

Naturally, no e-platform runs without software. This includes basic software for the platform to run at all (and on different systems), and to make its single components work well together. In addition there are specific software tools that take care of specific research and learning tasks. Here we want to draw attention to a tool developed recently in cooperation with the Centrum für Informations- und Sprachverarbeitung (CIS) at the LMU Munich (<http://uschebti.cis.uni-muenchen.de:10302/WittgensteinIndex/>).

One of the deficiencies of the *Bergen Electronic Edition* and actually most electronic editions or online resources is that they do not permit lemmatized searches, e.g. if one wants to find all the places where Wittgenstein discusses "sprechen", one would need to search for "sprech\*", "sprich\*", "sprach\*", "gesprochen". This poses challenges not only to those who have insufficient knowledge of German, but also to the native speaker – simply because of time and attention constraints. Now, with the project "Witt-

genstein in Co-text", a tool has been developed which permits exactly that (and much more): lemmatized searches of the Wittgenstein corpus, be it with regard to verbs or nouns or other inflected word classes (see Hadersbeck et al. 2012).

Another specific tool is WAB's "Interactive Dynamic Presentation" (IDP): using WAB's IDP site <http://wab.uib.no/transform/wab.php?modus=opsjoner> it is possible to create from WAB's transcriptions of the *Nachlass* text editions which differ from the diplomatic, normalized etc. versions pre-prepared by WAB. This is for example relevant for inclusion/exclusion of handwritten annotations (cf. Kenny 1984) or inclusion/exclusion of line breaks. Text representations which follow the original line order have many advantages, one of them being that they easily permit comparison of edited text and facsimiles. At the same time, the positions of line breaks are often inessential to one's research interests, and it is therefore desirable that one is able to suppress them.

IDP can also be used to filter or rearrange *Nachlass* texts according to the marks and numbers which Wittgenstein often assigns to his *Bemerkungen*. Being able to do so can be of tremendous benefit for research on Wittgenstein's principles for the composition, i.e. arrangement, of his works, and thus also the status of specific items. This is even more important since we don't yet know enough about the function of certain marks (like, for example, the asterisk sign in the "Bände" from the early thirties). Such a filtering tool can permit easy extraction of all *Bemerkungen* and only the *Bemerkungen* which are marked by Wittgenstein with a slash, or an asterisk, or a backslash, etc., or a specific combination of them. Or it can be used to arrange the *Nachlass* texts, on *Bemerkung* level, in chronological rather than document order.

For a site which functions as a portal to all single *Bemerkungen* of the *Nachlass*, visit [http://wab.uib.no/cost-a32/overview/NL-mss\\_overview.page](http://wab.uib.no/cost-a32/overview/NL-mss_overview.page) and [http://wab.uib.no/cost-a32/overview/NL-tss\\_overview.page](http://wab.uib.no/cost-a32/overview/NL-tss_overview.page) (for memory capacity reasons the portal had to be divided in two sites): here the user can sort the *Nachlass* according to parameters of date, *Bemerkung* identifier ("siglum"), publication in "work", or other parameters.

## Conclusion

With these elements in place or currently in the making, an OA Wittgenstein research and learning platform is just around the corner. Two of its assets are that its resources will be strongly interlinked, and that both research and learning can be carried out within a potentially multilingual ontological framework which embeds the materials into a larger web of resources and domains, both philosophy and others. During the presentation at the Kirchberg symposium, we will show samples from all five key elements toward integrated Wittgenstein research in an OA digital environment. We look forward to receiving feedback on their value as such as well as the ways we conceived them.

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# Seeing Rape as Rape

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## 1. Interpreting vs. seeing

The traditional legal philosophies are inclined to search for essential facts. Wittgenstein would wonder whether they are actually *seeing* something different in each issue they discuss or merely see the same thing and *interpreting* it in one way or another.

Wittgenstein makes a clear distinction between the words 'to see' and 'to interpret'. As Wittgenstein explains, *interpreting* is an action. When we are interpreting we are acting by following our opinions, which could be different from others'. This distinction is relevant since, as Matoesian has maintained, "rape and sexual violence against women are reproduced and legitimated through culturally mediated interpretative devices which justify, excuse, and glorify male violence against females" (Matoesian 1993).

Rape myths and patriarchal thought provide the linguistic rationalization and interpretative framework for assessing the individual cases of rape. In this way, rape has often been legitimated by blaming the victim – just as we have previously seen while discussing the use of the sexual history evidence. Conversely, when we see a legal case of marital rape in one way instead of another, we are not actively producing an interpretation of it. Rather our seeing it in such and such way is an expression of our experience.

This differentiation between 'seeing' and 'interpreting' can be discussed in more specific terms by making reference to Wittgensteins' *Philosophical Investigations* – in which the aspect of seeing is a dedicated theme. An often mentioned example taken from that work is the duck-rabbit puzzle. It consists of a drawing that can be seen either as a duck or as a rabbit depending on which direction one looks at it. The sudden awareness of the previously unseen animal in the picture is what Wittgenstein considers "the dawning of an aspect".

To see the image both as a duck and as a rabbit, is to see two different aspects of the image. When we normally speak of seeing in our everyday language-game, we are not inclined to say, 'I see the picture as a duck' but rather we simply say, 'I see a duck'. Looking at a friend, we don't tell ourselves 'she might be seen as a human being', but simply 'I am looking at my friend'.

In order to deal with the aspect-dawning Wittgenstein does not focus on how the images can be interpreted. Rather, he focuses on the *perspicuous view* that people make when they are experiencing the dawning of an aspect. In this way, it makes as little sense to claim that one aspect of the concepts of objectivity and rationality is the 'true' aspect as it does to argue that the duck in the duck-rabbit figure is what the figure is 'really' representing. However, the fact that there is not one 'true' aspect such as 'objectivity' or 'rationality' does not mean that the meaning of these words is relative. From a Wittgensteinian view, the argument presented here is not that the philosophy of law is non-normative, but that the normative tendency of

philosophy of law can lead to aspect-blindness. If the legal philosopher defends one aspect of objectivity and rationality as normatively superior at all times and in all places, then he or she is aspect-blind. The point is to know which aspect of legal philosophy should be used in which circumstance.

## 2. Using different aspects of objectivity/rationality in marital rape jurisprudence

To 'see' objectivity and rationality 'as' means more than simply respecting other's interpretations of such concepts. It means being able to use different aspects of objectivity and rationality and to know which situations require them to be used in a specific way. By focusing only on different aspects of objectivity and rationality, legal theorists have been trapped into a debate about which is correct. Instead, taking a Wittgensteinian view, legal theorists should be asking how a change that occurs in the aspect of objectivity and rationality an individual is using, would affect how they think and act. This shift in the questions asked would have significant effects on how legal theory is practiced in rape jurisprudence. Moreover, the legal philosopher, through a perspicuous representation of the different aspects of objectivity and rationality being used in the debate, might be able to demonstrate how the debate is to a large extent the result of confusions between the parties involved. Each side experiences aspect-blindness with respect to the way in which the other side sees objectivity and rationality. Women could examine the different aspects of objectivity and rationality, see a new way of looking at the debate, and propose an alternate way of seeing objectivity and rationality.

The difference between legal theory and legal philosophy is a significant one, and it partially reflects a shift that occurred in the seventeenth century. The theory-centered approach to law poses problems and seeks solutions in universal terms. In this way a culture that favored patriarchal theories has provided both rapists and 'normal' males with vocabularies and motives with which to rationalize, make objective and justify their sexually aggressive behavior, without considering that women see rape as sexual violence even when deviant interpretations are imposed by law. While conducting their intellectual and practical studies in various fields, legal theorists have assumed that exclusively rational and objective interpretations of problems exist.

The intellectual shift in the seventeenth century still influences how legal theory is approached today in the sense that there is no universal, comprehensive account of concepts such as objectivity and rationality. However, the work of philosophers such as Wittgenstein has made a move away from this theory-centered approach to law possible. Legal philosophy can once again see itself as a practical activity.

### **3. Seeing women as victims of violence: common law and how to use entrenchment rights**

'Seeing rape within marriage as violence' is the first step in acknowledging a crime during a trial. This step is crucial in order to identify which part of the legislation judges should apply in the trial, distilling it from the common law and/or using 'entrenchment rights'. The courtroom experience and examination is an expression of how an event is interpreted from a legal point view and the result of this view is expressed by choosing one piece of legislation instead of another (Ivi: 278- 279).

In the past, sexual history evidence was used to examine the moral behaviour of the complainant in cases of rape, although – as analyzed in detail the second chapter – it does not contribute to verification of the credibility of the victim. At present, a rape shield against using the sexual history evidence has been promoted by the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and by entrenched international rights borrowed from other legislations. As investigated in the second part of this work, the use of such entrenched rights has been a support in seeing rape as violence in those cases in which the national law was "blind".

It has been beneficial to use entrenched rights (Alexander 2012) even though they can exclude common law from starting democratic reforms. According to McColgan, this exclusion has been noted "even in those cases where judges confine their attention to procedural matters such as those relating to the admissibility of evidence" (McColgan 2002: 290). However, the used of entrenched rights is based on the premise that these international rights have compatibility with the 'fundamentals principle' of the common law background. When there are contradictions between them it is necessary to decide which has precedence.

For example, when the European jurisdiction has been used to support the UK law, one of the most frequent question was:

"what might be expected in the UK for the implementation of the human rights act 1998?"  
(McColgan 2002: 291)

The use of entrenched rights needs to consider the context in which the borrowed jurisdiction has been implemented. For example, with the European 1951 Convention on Human Rights, it is important to remember that it was drawn up after the Second World War when Europe was scarred by Nazism. Within this historical context the original scope of the Convention was to guarantee essential freedoms, more recently it has come to cover some 'social rights' such as, minimum working social conditions. It is important to consider whether the application of other contextualized jurisdiction in UK would actually be useful to improve its legal landscape, and whether "this same approach to rights is acceptable in the UK in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century" (McColgan 2002: 306).

However, according to McColgan, with the Human Rights Act 1998 social rights have been marginalized (McColgan 2002: 306). Within the human rights act 1998, both article 6 and 14 support women as victims of violence in the determination of the criminal charges. In England and in Wales the matter of sexual history evidence has been the subject of criticism. Even though the traditional common law position is that sexual history was generally irrelevant to consent, there have been requests to demonstrate that the complainant was not a prostitute or person

with immoral character, and that therefore sexual history evidence was relevant to the issue of consent.

Today, although attempts have been made to enrich the UK legislation with the European one, this can leave women vulnerable as there is a trend to leave difficult decisions to the judge (McColgan 2002: 205). In addition, the Human rights act 1998 does not directly express a rape shield in the case of the sexual history evidence. In fact, we can observe that:

"it is hard to image that any Human rights act 1998 challenge to the legislation could found a declaration of incompatibility: s 2 does not require the exclusion of any evidence which is regarded as being relevant to an issue at trial." (McColgan 2002: 291)

The reform of British law through the incorporation of Human Rights law could reduce the situations under which evidence of complainant sexual history could be introduced. According to Clare McGlynn in those cases in which it can be deemed the sections 41-43 of the 1999 Act contravenes the defendant's right to a fair trial, a possible step could be to consider the compatibility with sections 3 and 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998. In this case, it would be necessary to consider the justification for the restrictions, and the balance of interests among people involved. Investigations of rape cases should particularly try to find an equilibrium between providing a impartial trial for the defendant and defending the rights of the victim. McGlynn noted that as one contrasts the legislation in Canada and UK, some differences emerge that could be useful in order to improve the latter. As we explored in details in next chapter, it is worth comparing legislations if an improvement is to be achieved. However, it has no been easy to say with any confidence how British law could be affected by Human Rights Act 1998 when it is used. In fact within the national framework there was a wide space to determine what evidence was relevant because they had not been determined expressly.

According to McColgan the European Court has reiterated on every occasion that rules of evidence are a matter for national law, subject to the obligation to provide a fair trial and the wide discretion afforded thereto. It is not possible to say that there are no any benefits when incorporated European right are used (McColgan 2002: 304). However, if such an incorporation is not clearly expressed it would be unrestrained by the margin of error and responsibility. In fact, entrenched rights when adopted every time differently, have limited impact on the national jurisdiction and political action to secure substantive protection to women rights. Sometimes Parliament has preferred to use its common law because when it did not, there was not the possibility to predict in which way the European law could be applied in beneficial manner for women. In this sense McColgan said "whereas Parliament has attempted to regulate the introduction of sexual history evidence, judicial shortcomings in this matter having become evident prior to the passage of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1976, judges have reacted by preferring their common law (and at times highly questionable) notions of relevance over the expressed will of the Parliament. And in doing so have rendered the 1976 provisions largely ineffective". To the extent that the Human Right Act 1998 will give judges the power to intervene in the face of attempted amendments in this other areas, the outcomes are unlikely to benefit women. It seems that for achieving substantive equality, entrenched rights is a good mechanism but it is not the unerring one.

#### 4. Conclusion

This chapter proposed to approach the interpretive questions in law from a perspective which is different from those usually encountered in the legal tradition, by challenging the ability of legal reforms to accept or integrate the way in which oppressed persons see rape. In this sense, "by dismissing subordinate persons' accounts as non realities, legal representatives remove the possibilities of addressing particular claims of injustice" (Frohmann/Mertz 1994). In particular, a Wittgensteinian approach would pay attention to the shape of gendered lives as they are experienced (PI, 157), and could not accept just one legal interpretations to address marital law because such a view would neglect the requirements of particular lives, as well as the details of several contexts. Therefore, routinized modes of interpreting objectivity and rationality in law are not an expression of our internal experience and represent the institutionalized discrimination and legitimating of rape. Differently, Wittgenstein "underlined the importance of possibilities that exist for projecting concepts into the world in different ways" (Patterson 2001).

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# How Should We Understand the Concept of Forgiveness in Politics?

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The problem included in the title, in my opinion, should be analyzed from the ethical point of view and connected to ethical deliberations on politics in general. The concept of forgiveness is related to the following dilemma: should we continue to hold hard feelings in international relations or should we leave them behind? If we should remember our resentments, then how should we understand the postulate of memory? On the other hand, if we should forget, then how should we understand the postulate of forgiveness?

Why ethical point of view in this case is so important? – Mainly, because ethics binds interpersonal and international relations with the good deeds and subjects them to moral values. Many philosophers emphasized the relationship of ethics with politics. Above all, Kant brought up this link in his works (Kant 1795). According to him, ethics and its values ought to be more important than political rules, which form international relations in general. Worth mentioning is Kantian idea of "eternal peace," understood as permanent reconciliation, which ought to be a main value in international relations and Kantian postulate of the superiority of ethics over politics. Let's refer to his standpoint expressed in a metaphor that politics should "bend knees" in front of ethics (Kant 1795: 26). We will be able to solve our dilemma, taking into account Kantian considerations in general, while focusing particularly on his two theses: the first – reconciliation is a value, is the state towards nations should aim, and the second – politics should comply with ethics (Teminski 2012: 280).

It is also worth to stress that we live in times of advancing globalization and for the first time in the history of mankind we have to build global civilization and establish fundamental rules of coexistence not only for particular states but for all the people, independently of their nationalities. Therefore, in my article I will refer to universalistic, global ethics and its principles. This global ethics is possible only under one condition: that we promote attitudes, which exceed beyond egoism, not only individual and communal, but also national.

Why is it so important? – Because, the postulate of going beyond individual, communal and especially national egoism in the globalizing world becomes essential pattern of acting in the more and more complex interpersonal relations.

This is really necessary condition, but, in my opinion, it is not sufficient to answer the main question posed in the topic. I think that *one should change the meaning of some words such as: to remember, to forget and to forgive.*

First of all, the notion of remembering we should bind with the postulate of being in the truth. Because, remembering without being in the truth can lead to selective, exaggerated and distorted interpretations of the past. Secondly, we should understand the postulate of oblivion in the right way. The argument is not to forget. However, the point is to teach people the proper understanding of forgiveness.

Now, it is time to discuss the first condition for international reconciliation that is the postulate of exceeding beyond national egoism. In all moral theories, moving beyond egoism in general is regarded as a basic determinant of moral evolution. I would like to point out two theories of moral development – normative theory which is founded on Albert Schweitzer views and Lawrence Kohlberg's descriptive theory.

In the first case, moral development is connected with sensitivity to other's possible suffering. It is the ability to identify with more and more people and sensitive beings. On the lowest level of moral development feelings of others are not respected and acknowledged. A person on this level cares only for his own interests at the expense of restricting the needs of others and is even capable to inflict suffering. Ruthlessness, insensitivity, indifference to others' situations are the main features of this lowest level of moral development. The higher stage characterizes those who can identify with some others people, with relatives, members of certain group or members of the own national society. In this case, a person is able to empathize with only those people who belong to his/her family, and speaking more broadly – his/her group and nation. In the above theory, founded upon Schweitzer's views, international reconciliation will not be possible unless people exceed beyond selective relations (Schweitzer 1923). They should acquire the ability to imagine themselves on the others person's place, regardless of their affiliation. On this level, people would become responsible not only for themselves, for their family, and even not only for members of the same nations, but they would also be responsible for every human being. Injustice and harm of everyone would be equal. A typical feature of this preferable moral level would be solidarity with all suffering people.

In the second theory of moral development based on Kohlberg's psychological and empirical research, moral evolution has a universal dimension (Kohlberg 1981). In all cultures people develop morally in the same way. What is different is the pace of their development. Referring to L. Kohlberg's theory, all people act and think according to the same patterns and exceed them in the similar way reaching higher levels of moral development. But this evolution doesn't occur automatically by itself. What must happen are axiological conflicts and attempt to solve them. Those conflicts are connected with moral choices in which one has to choose one value and reject the other. The more complex axiological dilemma compels the greater mobilization of higher modes of moral thinking. Since, staying on the lower stage would be insufficient to solve these conflicts. According to Kohlberg, the greatest value for every human beings is life and freedom regardless of his nationality. The right to live and right to freedom are the basic rights of all the human beings, not only of members of particular nation. On the highest level of moral development a man has a capacity to imagine oneself in the position of the other human being independently of his nationality. In this case, moral consciousness exceeds beyond family, community and national solidarity. The reason for such action is not collective and national identification but the

conviction that moral rules are right because they work for the good of all people in the world, not only in the interest of family, group or nation.

Let's consider the next issue. It is also connected with the main topic of our deliberation. This problem can be expressed by the following question – *how should we understand the postulate of remembering and the postulate of oblivion?* Their proper understanding will be necessary condition leading to honest reconciliation. I would like to underline that the reconciliation is a long term process. It does not happen automatically. We could compare it to a healing of a painful and deep wound. This symbolic wound, signifying suffering, can exist in both personal and national relations. The proper healing process requires cleaning and caring. Otherwise, the wound may get infected. It would mean hostility and hatred between people and nations.

There are two the most common ways of dealing with suffering, resulting from unhealed wound. Both ways are inappropriate. They proof of individual or social immaturity. The first way rests on ignoring, neglecting and repressing certain historical events from the individual and national consciousness. Let's call it *ideology of oblivion*. The second way rests on scratching a wound, reproaching painful, national blames. Let's call it *ideology of dwelling on the past*.

Every single ideology is biased and partial. It distorts some historical events and therefore it is false. Either it omits or exaggerates certain dimensions of previous events. Ideologies are theoretical interpretation of the way of social actions which is often distorted by fear and hatred. They form common thinking habits and affect to collective subconscious. In my opinion, promoting these two above mentioned ideologies is a serious political and moral mistake. Why is it so? – Because, those methods never lead to reconciliation, never heal the symbolic wound. On the contrary, they will exacerbate the inflammation. What should we do to heal this wound in international relations? – We ought to disinfect it. At this case, it means binding *the postulate of remembering with the courage to being in the truth*. Only truth can relieve us from the evil just like disinfection removes toxins from the wound. Only due to the truth we will be able to avoid the evil in the future. Why? – Because, social consciousness of wrong – doing in the past can persuade to reflection and bring change in social behavior in the future. The memory of the past deeds, understood as being in the truth, is the necessary condition for not repeating the same mistakes in the future. The collective and individual amnesia makes learning from mistakes impossible. This amnesia causes people to become morally blind. If societies forget their mistakes and they will not be aware of committing them, then they will repeat them. Therefore, *retrieving memory* means teaching people a sense of responsibility. It necessary to over come the moral evil. Erasing some embarrassing facts from the past out of the social consciousness signifies silent agreement to what we have done to other nations. This silent agreement to commit evil is a proof of social immaturity and implies avoiding responsibility. From the psychological point of view, mature individuals and mature societies have courage to take the blame for their past wrongdoings and they are willing to change themselves. Only infantile human beings or societies deny certain facts and try to persuade others that those facts have never occurred. Cherishing this infantilism limits the individual and social development.

Another problem concerns distorted and exaggerated memory which is postulated by ideology of dwelling on the past. This ideology creates mentality of the victims in the case of some individuals or nations. Therefore, it decreases individual and collective self – esteem and makes establishing partnership relations impossible. *The postulate of being in the truth* is in opposition to dwelling on the past and to oblivion. It is a new proposition moving away from alternative – either to forget or to dwell on. Being in the truth does not mean zealous brooding over some events. It makes impossible using some historical facts and connected with them traumatic experiences to obtain some particular, political aims. The truth is equivalent to an honest examination of harm and blames. Being in the truth assumes memory which is not connected with act of revenge and does not serve anyone's interests. It is bound with self-esteem, with respect to the ancestors and history of one's nations. If we make reference to Plato's philosophy we would have to acknowledge that memory and wisdom which go together lead to virtue, whereas foolishness founded on lack of memory leads to evil. I would like to add – for Greek word *aletheia* designating the truth was not the opposite to the false but to oblivion expressed by the term *lethe*. In the Greek mythology, *Lethe* is a river crossing which the dead lost their memory. Therefore, being in the truth and cherishing the memory is the same. If we want to be in the truth we have to remember. If we want to remember we have to do so being in the truth. This is a declaration of "healthy" nations, willing to improve, having a sense of self-esteem. These "healthy" nations do not cherish sense of harm and are not contaminated with a sense of guilty. They are healthy and therefore open minded, creative and not afraid of the truth. I would like to underline that courage to be in the truth is a necessary condition for mental health of individuals and nations. Denying the truth must lead sooner or later to spiritual and psychical disintegration, to cognitive and moral dissonance in which some individuals and nations can not exist. History teaches us that some political and social systems were losing their spiritual power when turning away from this value. We should also point out – being in the truth is a proof of higher moral justice given to the victims of the evil. Justice in law not always is possible and then in order to pay respect to victims, symbolic justice is needed. This symbolic justice is revealing the truth. Revealing is not connected with an act of revenge and retaliation. It is symbolically bringing back of the existence of those people whose suffering and dead have been forgotten. Respect to another human demands telling others about his suffering, demands revealing the committed evil. In this sense, moral justice means enabling people to tell others about their own tragic fate.

Now, I discuss the last condition for reconciliation between nations – *the postulate of forgiveness*. It means leaving behind one's own pain in the name of agreement as a superior value. And this consent doesn't have to be understood as a great, warm friendship between nations. It is mutual respect founded on cooperation and based on fair rules and reciprocal understanding. There isn't any fear and any compulsion. To forgive is not to forget, is not to accept other people and their morally disgraceful acts. Forgiveness signifies not cherishing negative emotions such as hatred, anger, desire of revenge addressed to perpetrators. This is an attempt to work on oneself in order to eliminate one's own anger, to abandon pitting and cultivating grief. Person with the capability to forgive knows that desire to make things evil is the worst strategy in personal and international relations.

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# Does Thomas Nagel Develop a ‘Hybrid’ Ethical Theory?

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In *The View from Nowhere* Thomas Nagel develops his main project in ethics, one started earlier in his classic *The Possibility of Altruism*. The main features of his method are the idea of the grounding of morality in the sphere of practical reasons and the idea of objectivity. According to the complex and formal definition introduced in *The Possibility of Altruism* any valid reason for action must be universal in two respects, that is with regard to both agents and cases (Nagel 1978: 47). Another important feature of his approach is its purely rational character: it is free of any empirical components in the sense that it does not have any explicit references to an agent's desires. In contrast to the classic position of Kant, this is not enough to ground morality, since purely egoistic reasons can be universal as well. There is a belief grounded in natural language that the main source of morality is connected with the impersonal care that we have for others. In Nagel's method this is reflected by the technical condition of the objectivity that he stipulates for all the valid reasons for action. The difficult and ambitious task of *The Possibility of Altruism* is to show that it is equally rational to care for one's own good as it is to care for the good of another person. What Nagel does attempt to do is nothing less than showing that this is a fundamental form of practical reasoning and the main target of his challenge are those common theories that ground practical rationality or ethics within the sphere of the agent's own interests.

In *The View from Nowhere* Nagel continues his effort to ground morality within the domain of the objective reasons for action (Nagel 1986). Some of the most important changes introduced by him to his method are the idea of the point of view with regard to practical reasons and the idea of objectivity as impartiality among persons. Now a reason is objective if it can be ‘understood’, ‘affirmed’ or least ‘tolerated’ from an ‘external’, ‘impartial’ point of view. In comparison to his earlier position, this move considerably extends the scope of the objective, practical reasons and makes his position more complete. *The View from Nowhere* offers an outline of a theory of reasons for action. What Nagel does in his outline is to present a theory of the types of practical reasons and to undertake significant effort to bring into the light ‘the proper form[s] of generality for different kinds of practical reasoning’ (Nagel 1986: 156).

Leaving aside the most difficult problem of grounding morality in the domain of practical reasons and the question as to whether Nagel's attempt is ultimately successful, I shall concentrate here on the question about the general outlook of morality that emerges from Nagel's writings. The most difficult questions are likely to remain open but the new approach in terms of practical reasons does enable Nagel a wide and interesting insight into the philosophy of morality and some of its problems; or so at least I shall argue.

What is the outline of the general, normative picture of human action that appears in Nagel's writings? In his helpful monograph, Alain Thomas construes it as an attempt to build a ‘hybrid’ ethical theory (Thomas 2009). In what follows, I shall offer a different interpretation arguing that Nagel's position in moral philosophy should be rather under-

stood as a wide form of pluralism. Finally I shall indicate some consequences of this pluralism for the description of moral action and for the content of the idea of a moral subject.

The most important change introduced in *The View from Nowhere* is that brought with the distinction between agent neutral and agent relative reasons for action. In Nagel's earlier position, all valid reasons for action had to be agent neutral, and now he also recognizes the validity of agent relative reasons. (Agent neutral reasons are valid for all and they are the same for all agents, whereas agent relative reasons are only valid for those who are in special situations). Both these types of reasons are objective in the sense that each can be ‘understood’ and ‘affirmed’ from the objective point of view. Besides agent neutral reasons, there are three types of agent relative reasons: ‘deontological’, reasons of ‘obligation’ and reasons of ‘autonomy’. Each of these types does have a different source in ‘the world’ and the main distinction between agent neutral and agent relative reasons has also its internal sources in the divided nature of the human mind. In Nagel's stance in the philosophy of mind, the central feature of any mind is its internal point of view, giving rise to its internal perspective. But human the mind has a divided nature as it is capable of adopting more and more objective points of view. At the same time, however, we are not able to give up our internal, personal point of view, since it is also deeply rooted in our nature. Although it is ignored in the methods of science, it cannot be ignored either in metaphysics or in ethics. And this brings us to the problem that is at the source of the whole of Nagel's thinking: the problem of the relation between subjectivity and a broader conception of reality containing that subjectivity as well. This central problem takes a particular form in ethics. The external, impersonal point of view gives rise and justifies the insight of utilitarianism and consequentialism, whereas the importance of the internal, personal perspective justifies the insight of the deontological theories of ethics and the reasons of autonomy.

The task of ethics is to integrate from the impartial point of view all of these different types of reasons coming from different agents. This task itself is nothing short of overwhelmingly complex and, given the divided nature of the human mind and the respective different sources of morality, it cannot be achieved within a single, systematic theory. The conflict must remain and this can be seen as a particular form of Nagel's central problem. The universal character of reasons stipulated by Nagel would be enough to significantly differentiate his position from that of particularism or virtue ethics. There are, however, some higher forms of order within the domain of reasons, which he identifies as ‘the proper forms of generality for different kinds of practical reasoning’. In his search, Nagel attempts to bring into the light these ‘proper forms of generality’, and particularly with regard to the relation between reasons and desires, between neutral and deontological reasons, and between the neutral and the reasons of autonomy. This work is started in *The Possibility of Altruism* revealing ‘objectivity’ and care for others as consequences of the ‘proper forms’ of practical reasoning.

What is the overall result of his attempts? The most suitable name for it seems to be 'a wide form of pluralism'. What in fact it contains is an interesting and ambitious attempt at integrating the perspectives of both consequentialism and deontology. This means nothing less than an attempt to adjudicate the central debate of XX century ethics. In his philosophy of morality, assuming that morality has different sources and is divided, Nagel does find a proper place for both its consequentialist and deontological part. The rationale for the former is clear and he takes every effort to discover an independent rationale for deontological reasons as well. However, the consequentialist part of morality in Nagel's position is significantly reduced in comparison to that of classic utilitarianism. This is so because the vast majority of an agent's desires does not constitute neutral reasons and values and do not count in the calculus from the impersonal point of view. This emerging form of consequentialism deserves indeed the name 'minimal'. In spite of this and given Nagel's global perspective, the reasons and demands of this consequentialist part of morality are still of no small weight. The neutral reasons have to be recognized by any rational agent who adopts 'the external' or 'impersonal' point of view, which is in part the nature of the human mind. But there is also the internal, personal perspective of any agent that cannot be escaped and that is of no lesser importance. And this constitutes the basis for the recognition of the objective, agent relative reasons of three types. Reasons of 'autonomy' are derived from agents own plans and projects, 'deontological' reasons come from the demands of others not to be maltreated, and the reasons of 'obligations' are generated in an agent's special relations with other people.

In seemingly adopting the position of virtue ethics in his reading of Nagel, Thomas concentrates on the reasons of autonomy arguing that Nagel attempts to build a form of 'hybrid' ethical theory. This term has been introduced in S. Scheffler's insightful investigation of ethical theories. (Scheffler 1982). Scheffler distinguishes three types of ethical theory: consequentialism, deontological and 'hybrid' theories. A 'hybrid' theory attributes to an agent 'agent-centered prerogatives' to prefer its own good more than utilitarianism would allow in order to save its integrity. A deontological theory, in turn, recognizes 'agent-centered constraints' in pursuing the best overall result, if this would lead to the violation of any deontological norm. Scheffler's conclusion is that, although there is a valid rationale for 'agent-centered prerogatives', there is no such a rationale for 'agent-centered constraints'.

The problem with Thomas' interpretation is that he apparently underscores the importance of deontological reasons in the whole of Nagel's thinking. In *The Possibility of Altruism* Nagel has already signaled that utilitarianism is not the correct way for integrating the reasons of different agents and in his early essays *War and Massacre* and *Ruthlessness in Public Life* he has strongly argued for absolutist ethical norms and against utilitarianism (Nagel 1979). In *The View from Nowhere* he addresses the problem directly and makes every effort to disclose the hidden rationale for the common moral deontological intuitions. He finally finds the rationale in terms of 'agents' and 'victims'; it 'expresses the direct appeal to the point of view of the agent from the point of view of the person on whom he is acting' (Nagel 1986: 184). This rationale refers to the acts of harming an innocent victim for the sake of better overall results, but Nagel believes that 'the form of generality' that it discloses will also be valid for other deontological norms. In each of the cases that he analyses in greater detail, he defends the supremacy of deontological reasons. All these together place him on the deontological side of the debate

with consequentialism. The outline of his overall position in moral philosophy that emerges from his writings is what I would call a wide form of pluralism. It does have an important deontological part and at the same time it attempts to accommodate a minimal version of consequentialism. (For this reason I claim that Nagel's moral philosophy contains an ambitious attempt at an integration of both the deontological and consequentialist perspective). But the potential conflict between them must remain and Nagel carefully avoids a systematic solution, in which deontological reasons would always have primacy over the neutral. He leaves open the possibility in which the consequentialist reasons will be of greater weight than the deontological ones as well as for those cases in which there will be no possible solution to the conflict at all (Nagel 1979).

Scheffler's 'hybrid' theory is a modification of consequentialism to accommodate for the integrity of the subject. Nagel's overall position in moral philosophy apparently is on the deontological side but at the same time it also attempts to do justice to the moral insight of consequentialism; the nature of morality is divided as we, humans, are beings of a divided nature. In his reading of Nagel, Thomas concentrates on the agent relative reasons of autonomy and their relation to neutral reasons in the light of virtue ethics. He also sympathetically analyses Nagel's rationale for deontological reasons but finally he fails to recognize their role in his overall interpretation of Nagel's thinking. Why are deontological reasons that important? One of the most important features of moral thinking introduced in *The Possibility of Altruism* is that of a 'full recognition of the reality of other persons' and it is still valid in *The View from Nowhere* despite all the changes in Nagel's methodology (Nagel 1986: 159). The important change in *The View from Nowhere* is that he holds now that there also are reasons that 'fully recognize the reality of other persons' but they are agent relative at the same time. And this apparently must refer to the deontological reasons and not to the reasons of autonomy. The latter are of great importance for an agent's integrity and personal development or expression but not for morality. What they can do is 'the full recognition' of the reality of the agent itself but not of other persons; and this does not pose any problem, as any egoistic theory does it perfectly well. What are the implications of this? This means that from the ethical point of view the deontological reasons are of the same importance as neutral ones, they are at the same 'basic' level.

The task of a real agent is not easy indeed, what it has to do is the integration of many moral reasons of two different types, in addition finding a place for its reasons of autonomy. It has to do it in accordance with 'the proper forms of generality for moral reasoning', however, in cases of conflicts it also has to resort to its power of practical judgment. Thomas criticizes Nagel's position arguing that he attaches too much weight to the objective point of view in his method. But there is not any other way: objectivity is at the heart of Nagel's method and at the heart of morality itself. Self-improvement, however important, cannot be the only task of morality and the care for others is also of importance. This is roughly what objectivity brings into Nagel's method. This tendency to objectivity is nothing alien to us, since it is deeply built into the nature of the human mind and it enables the development of the sciences. The art of living seems also to involve the integration of objectivity with something that is deeply personal.

Acknowledgement: This paper has been supported by the Cracow University of Technology.

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# Ziele des Zeigens – Von der Fliegenglasmetapher zum Lösungsbild

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Wittgensteins Werk ist für seine aphoristischen Formulierungen bekannt. Während Aphorismen ihre Themen aber knapp und präzise vortragen, gehen Wittgensteins Formulierungen aus langwierigen Prozessen des Um- und Abschreibens, der Selbstauslegung, Variation oder auch der versuchsweisen Dekontextualisierung hervor. Dies ist auch bei der prominenten Fliegenglasmetapher der Fall, die, meist zitiert nach den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*, das „Ziel in der Philosophie“ damit angibt, „der Fliege den Ausweg aus dem Fliegenglas [zu] zeigen“ (PU § 309). Ich möchte im folgenden Beitrag vier Varianten aus der Entstehungsgeschichte der Sätze untersuchen, um die Bildlichkeit dieses Zeigens hervorzuheben.

Der Satz von der Fliege im Fliegenglas variiert in Wittgensteins Manuskripten und Typoskripten hinsichtlich seiner Schreibweise und seines thematischen Bezugs. Dabei treten im Wesentlichen zwei disparate Verwendungen auf. Einerseits die aus den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* bekannte Redewendung, die als Selbstbefragung mit Wittgensteins ethisch-therapeutischem Programm einer Philosophie als „Arbeit an einem selbst“ korreliert. Andererseits findet sich die Fliegenglasmetapher auch als metaphorische Umschreibung für die Evidenz- und Überzeugungseffekte von Lösungsbildern und schematischen Darstellungen.

Beide Lesarten treten in ihrer thematischen Verschiedenheit bereits im Manuskript 118 auf. Die folgenden Überarbeitungen des Satzes im MS 117 zeigen, wie die Zielangabe der Philosophie und das Thema der visuellen, bildlichen Evidenz deutlicher miteinander verknüpft werden. Spätestens im Typoskript 222 wird der bildliche Bezug des Satzes dann explizit gemacht, während die späteren *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* auf diesen Kontext gänzlich verzichten. Eine gründliche Durchsicht der verschiedenen Varianten lässt erkennen, dass Wittgenstein wiederholt die Orientierungsleistungen eines bildlichen Zeigens und besonders die eines Sich-Zeigens thematisiert.

## 1. Variante A

Im Manuskript 118, einem Notizbuch, das von Wittgenstein am 13.8.1937 auf der Fahrt nach Skjolden begonnen wurde, tritt das Fliegenglas-Motiv als letzter Eintrag der Aufzeichnungen vom 8. September 1937 auf. Es schließt damit jene umfangreichen Notizen des Tages ab, die sich mit der Überzeugungskraft und den Überraschungseffekten bildgestützter Beweise beschäftigen. Sie enthalten 11 zeichnerische Illustrationen, darunter Mengenabbildungen, geometrische Darstellungen, ein Geduldspiel und ein Puzzle. Solche Abbildungen diskutieren etwa die Zusammensetzung von Teilen zu einer Figur und die Frage, inwieweit die Zeichnung damit „als Beweis wirkt“ und eine gezeichnete Figur „überzeugt“.




Abb. 1: MS 118, 141.

Abb. 2: MS 118, 142.

Diese von mir als Ursprungssequenz des Fliegenglas-Motivs interpretierten Sätze lauten:

„Was ist Dein Ziel in der Philosophie? – Ich zeige der Fliege den Ausgang aus dem Fliegenglas. Dieser Weg ist, in einem Sinne, *unmöglich* zu finden + in einem anderen Sinne, ganz leicht.“ (MS 118, 143 f.)

Der Selbstbefragung der beiden ersten Sätze folgt eine Wegbeschreibung, die zugleich den Status einer methodischen Auskunft hat. Zudem hat sie für die Metapher durchaus einen deskriptiven Wert, indem sie sich direkt auf die Architektur und Funktionsweise eines Fliegenglases einlässt. *Unmöglich* ist der geradlinige Weg der Fliege im Fliegenglas, also der, der sie mit der hinter Glas sichtbaren aber unzugänglichen Welt verbinden würde. *Ganz leicht* ist der Umweg, der über die untere, immer offene Seite des Fliegenglases führt.

Im Unterschied zu ähnlich prominent gewordenen Insektenmetaphern zur Darstellung von Auswegen bzw. Ausweglosigkeit<sup>1</sup> ist für das Verständnis von Wittgensteins Redewendung also eine schematische Darstellung eines „Fliegenglases“ hilfreich, um zu wissen, von welchem Ausweg er spricht und dass dieser überhaupt mit nützlichem Effekt *gezeigt* werden kann. Die gläserne Grenze der Biene kann nicht mit einer Anleitung überwunden werden, man hilft ihr nur durch das Öffnen des Fensters. Die von Wittgenstein erwähnte Grenze ist zwar auch gläsern, sie lässt sich aber tatsächlich durch die Wahl eines Auswegs überwinden, dessen Topografie bildlich mitteilbar ist. Sie kann *gezeigt* werden.

Diese Sätze unterstellen einen gemeinsamen Erfahrungswert zwischen dem, der den Ausgang zeigen möchte und jener Fliege, der der Ausgang gezeigt werden soll. Denn der Philosoph muss sich einmal auf jenen ausweglosen Umwegen der Fliege befinden haben, um den Ausgang zu kennen und ihn der Fliege auch zeigen zu können. So spricht Wittgenstein über *sein Ziel* in der Philosophie zunächst in Form einer distanzierten Selbstbefragung und nicht von einer bereits erreichten, sicheren Position

<sup>1</sup> Vgl. z. B. Georg Lukács, *Die Theorie des Romans*, München 2000 (1920), S.79: „[...] und eine leere Durchsichtigkeit, hinter der lockende Landschaften sichtbar waren, wird auf einmal zur Glaswand, an der man sich vergeblich und verständnislos – wie die Biene am Fenster – abquält, ohne durchbrechen zu können, ohne selbst zur Erkenntnis gelangen zu können, dass es hier keinen Weg gibt.“

aus. Die Zielvorgabe wird genannt, weil sie angibt, worum sich die philosophische Arbeit allererst bemüht. Diese Arbeit ist aber noch nicht erledigt, wie die Nachsätze zur Auffindbarkeit des Weges zeigen. Offen bleibt dabei zumindest das Wie des Zeigens, das immer schon auf ein Handeln verweist und aus diesem hervorgehen muss.

Zu Beginn des Eintrags vom 10. September 1937 befindet sich die erste von zwei Zeichnungen des Tages. Sie illustriert die Frage: „Wie lernen wir den Schließen?“ Konkreter fragt Wittgenstein, wie überzeugt man ein Kind, dass aus der doppelten Verneinung die Bejahung folgt? Sein Vorschlag lautet: „wohl doch dadurch, dass man ihm einen Vorgang zeigt“, dann folgt in Klammern die Skizze, mit der Bemerkung, „etwa diesen da“:




Abb. 3: MS 118, 152.

Die Skizze zeigt eine Bewegung, das Kreisen eines Körpers um sich selbst, das nach zwei halben Drehungen der ausgestreckten Arme um die Körperlängsachse wieder in der Ausgangsposition anlangt. Das Bild soll einem Kind die Negation lehren, und sowohl Wittgenstein als auch uns Lesern deutlich machen, wie solch ein Lehren funktioniert. Letztlich lernen wir also Schließen, indem wir das bildlich Gezeigte ‚annehmen‘, uns von ihm orientieren und überzeugen lassen.

Die zweite Illustration des Tages korrespondiert eigentlich mit der ersten, weil Wittgenstein sich nun selbst mit einem Bild davon überzeugt, dass eine fortgesetzte Verfehlung doch noch zu einem Ergebnis führt. Auch hier wird mit einem Pfeilschema eine Bewegung dargestellt, die nun die Arbeitsweise des Philosophen illustriert, der sich selbst etwas lehrt, bzw. bildlich zeigt:




Abb. 4: MS 118, 155, unterer Seitenrand.




Abb. 5: MS 118, 156, oberer Seitenrand.

Es fällt auf, dass Wittgenstein hierbei das Problem der Fliege im Fliegenglas wiederholt, sowie die Beziehung von Ziel und richtigem Weg. Wie dem Philosophen, so ist auch der Fliege der geradlinige Weg versperrt, bzw. sie wird ihn gehen und will ihn gehen, aber er wird spätestens an der Glaswand unterbrochen. Sie muss stattdessen einen Umweg nehmen, um aus ihrer Falle herauszugehen. Wittgenstein beschreibt seine Arbeit nun als ein ebenso umwegiges Kreisen. Und etwas anderes fällt auf. Wer die Architektur eines Fliegenglases kennt, sieht, dass der von Wittgenstein nachgezeichnete Weg exakt die Bewegung in die Falle beschreibt.

Was lernt Wittgenstein aus der schematischen Zeichnung zum eigenen Vorgehen? Wofür steht dieser Bewegungsverlauf? Unprätentiös gesprochen steht die Zeichnung für eine selbstkritische und resignative Stimmung, denn es erfreut Wittgenstein wohl kaum, dass er an seinen Fragen „in immer näherem Abstand“ vorbei schreibt. Es handelt sich also um eine Momentaufnahme im Produktionsprozess. Sie scheint nicht eitel oder kokettierend zu erfolgen, denn Wittgenstein ist mit seinem Verfahren und dessen Resultaten keineswegs glücklich. Aber er ist dabei nicht ziellos, vielmehr möchte er schneller etwas erreichen, was ihm schon klar vor Augen steht, aber noch nicht adäquat expliziert werden konnte – er hat also immer wieder das Problem der Fliege, sie sucht einen Weg, er eine geeignete Methode der Darstellung.

Am 14. September folgt ein Eintrag, der die Arbeitsfähigkeit des Philosophen als „philosophische Sehkraft“ bezeichnet und eigentlich mit der resignativen Stimmung vom 10. und dem Fliegenglas-Eintrag vom 9. September korreliert: „Es ist grauenhaft, dass ich die Arbeitsfähigkeit, d.h. die philosophische Sehkraft, von einem Tag auf den andern verliere.“ (MS 118, 188), heißt es dort. Und wenige Sätze später: „Das Leben stellt uns Bilder vor Augen als Ziele + macht uns danach laufen + dann verlieren wir die Kraft.“

Dann ist es also richtig – kann man sagen – sich nicht verlocken zu lassen + nichts als Ziel zu nehmen.“ (ebd. 189) Wünscht sich der bildgeleitete Philosoph in seinen resignierenden Momenten Ziellosigkeit oder eine neuerliche Zunahme an philosophischer Sehkraft? Er spricht jedenfalls aus der Position einer im Fliegenglas gefangen Fliege, der von allen Seiten visuelle Ziele geboten sind, die sich in der Hoffnung, sie zu erreichen, in Bewegung begibt und dann, wie jedes Insekt an einer gläsernen Grenze, unvermeidlich die Kraft verliert. Die philosophische Sehkraft würde in dieser Bewegung irgendwann den richtigen, eigentlich unmöglich zu findenden und doch irgendwo ganz einfach vorhandenen Ausweg erkennen. Ein erster Schritt bestünde im Verstehen der Glasarchitektur und ihrer Form.

Es ist in diesem Zusammenhang nicht unwichtig, dass Wittgenstein seinen Aufenthalt in Skjolden wiederholt in Frage stellt und dabei sein Selbstverständnis, seine Arbeitsmöglichkeiten und seine Lebenssituation hinterfragt. So notierte er am 27.8.1937: „Dass das Leben problematisch ist, heißt, dass Dein Leben nicht in die Form des Lebens passt. Du musst dann Dein Leben verändern, + passt es in die Form, dann verschwindet das Problematische.“

Aber haben wir nicht das Gefühl, dass der, welcher nicht darin ein Problem sieht, für etwas Wichtiges, ja das Wichtigste, blind ist? Möchte ich nicht sagen, der lebt so dahin – eben blind, gleichsam wie ein Maulwurf, + wenn er bloß sehen [aufschauen] könnte, so sähe er das Problem?

Oder soll ich nicht sagen: dass wer richtig lebt, das Problem nicht als *Traurigkeit*, also doch nicht problematisch empfindet, sondern vielmehr als eine Freude; also gleichsam als einen lichten Aether um sein Leben, nicht also einen fraglichen Hintergrund.“ (MS 118, 35f.)

## 2. Die Varianten B und C

Die zeitgleich und in den folgenden Monaten vorgenommene Ab- und Umschrift der zitierten Einträge in das Notizbuch 117, begonnen am 11.9.1937, bezieht die Fliegenglasmetapher nun direkt auf die heuristische Dimension der Bildevidenz. Wittgensteins negatives Kreisen um sich selbst schlägt zeitweilig in produktive Bejahung um, wenn auf ein bildgestütztes Zeigen verwiesen wird, das orientiert, Neues denkbar macht, Lösungen bietet und von der Blindheit (des Maulwurfs) befreit.




Abb. 6: MS 117, 062.

Nach Überlegungen zur Überzeugungskraft von Zeichnungen, die durch das Zusammenlegen der Teile eines Geduldspiels illustriert werden, erhält das Fliegenglas-Motiv einen neuen Kontext: „Kann man nicht sagen: die Figur, die Dir/uns die Lösung zeigt, beseitigt eine Blindheit; oder auch, sie ändert Deine Geometrie? Sie zeigt Dir gleichsam eine neue Dimension des Raumes. (Wie wenn man einer Fliege den Weg aus dem Fliegenglas zeigte.)“ (MS 117, 064f.)

Diese Variante B stellt nun einen direkten Bildbezug her. Nicht mehr ist vom „Ziel in der Philosophie“ die Rede, auch die Wegbeschreibung wird unnötig, denn das angesprochene Lösungsbild (die gezeichnete Figur) zeigt sie ja selbst auf und macht damit weitere wortsprachliche Ausführungen überflüssig. Was Wittgenstein im ursprünglichen Notat als sein Ziel der Philosophie ausgegeben hatte, wird nun mit der „Überzeugungskraft“ (BGM 174) einer gezeichneten Figur assoziiert, also mit ihrer Evidenz und Heuristik verbunden. So ist es konsequent, dass als Instanz des Zeigens, nicht mehr das „Ich“ des Philosophen erscheint, sondern eine gezeichnete Figur. Dem entspricht der Wechsel des Philosophen auf die Seite der Belehrten, wo er sich in das „Uns“ aller möglichen Bildrezipienten einreiht. Diese bildliche Kontextualisierung der Fliegenglasmetapher demonstriert also die vorherige Souveränität philosophischen Verweisens, indem sie die heuristischen Leistungen des Bildes herausstreckt.

Im gleichen Manuskriptbuch 117 wird der Satz an späterer Stelle noch einmal im Wortlaut von Variante A ab- und anschließend überschrieben, indem nun der deskriptive Nachsatz eine dritte Option aufnimmt:




Abb. 7: Variante C, MS 117, 096.

„Diesen Weg zu finden, ist unter gewissen Umständen/Verhältnissen unmöglich, unter anderen ganz leicht und unter wieder anderen ungemein schwer.“, schreibt Wittgenstein über die bereits abgeschriebenen Zeilen. Worin die Schwere der dritten Option besteht, bleibt offen. Eventuell liegt sie im Verfahren des Schreibens selbst, weil das Medium der der Schrift dafür sorgt, dass am eigentlichen Ziel ‚immer wieder vorbei‘ geschrieben wird. In den folgenden Varianten werden die Beschreibungen des Weges weggelassen.

## 3. Die Typoskriptfassung (Variante D)

Aus dem Spektrum der Schreibweisen wählt Wittgenstein Variante B aus und übernimmt sie in jenes Typoskript, das der ersten Fassung der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* angehört und posthum als erster Teil der *Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik* publiziert wurde. Hier folgt die Fliegenglas-Metapher nun eine Seite nach der zeichnerischen Abbildung eines Geduldspiels, die ebenfalls, was für Wittgensteins Arbeitsweise keineswegs selbstverständlich ist, in das Typoskript übernommen wurde.

„Es gibt ein Geduldspiel, das darin besteht, eine bestimmte Figur, z.B. ein Rechteck, aus gegebenen Stücken zusammenzusetzen. Die Teilung der Figur ist eine solche, dass es uns schwer wird, die richtige Zusammensetzung der Teile zu finden. Sie sei etwa diese:




Abb. 8: TS 222, 036; vgl.: BGM 55f.

bis... DIE  
Lösung zeigt, beseitigt eine Blindheit; oder auch, wie  
ändert Deine Geometrie? Sie zeigt Dir gleichsam eine neue  
Dimension des Raumes. (Wie wenn man einer Fliege den Weg aus  
dem Fliegenglas zeigte.)

Abb. 9: Variante D, TS 222, 037.

Eine überzeugende Übersehbarkeit des Bildes verbindet sich hier mit einem synoptischen Effekt, den Wittgenstein zugleich als den Begründungsmoment einer „neuen Geometrie“ (BGM 187) auffasst. Die Neuheit des „neuen Bildes“ (BGM 64) ist dabei nicht als künstlerische Originalität zu verstehen, als Innovation im Bereich der bildlichen Darstellungsmittel, sondern sie wird von Wittgenstein als eine vom Bild eröffnete neue Denkmöglichkeit annonciert. Sie hat damit ein epistemisches Format.

Kennzeichen dieser Neuheit ist unter anderem, dass ein bildlich evozierter Sinn nicht angestrebt wurde, sondern im Sehen des Bildes plötzlich widerfährt: „Ich meine, ich habe an diese Art der Zusammensetzung gar nicht gedacht.“ (BGM 55), heißt es. Wittgenstein thematisiert, dass jedes überzeugende oder „einprägsame Bild“ (BGM 68) immer auch eine überraschende Begegnung mit allererst Neuem schafft. Solch ein „Beweisbild“ (BGM 161) hat damit offensichtlich poetische oder heuristische Qualitäten, mit denen es auf überraschende Weise konfrontiert: „Die neue Lage

ist wie aus dem Nichts entstanden. Dort, wo früher nichts war, dort ist jetzt auf einmal etwas" (BGM 56), heißt es.

Dass das Beispiel zunächst nicht von der Geometrie handelt, sondern von einem trivialen Geduldsspiel ausgeht, und anschließend aber direkt auf sie abzielt, lässt sich durchaus als Anspruch dieser Überlegungen auf eine allgemeine Begründung der Bildevidenz auffassen, die eine quasi-geometrische Abbildung nur als einen argumentativen Kontrast gebraucht, um allgemeine Merkmale einer bildbasierten Heuristik aufzuzeigen.<sup>2</sup>

Der Fliegenglas-Metapher folgt nun, verkürzt und eingeschlossen, einem Eintrag, der konzentriert die heuristische Evidenz eines Bildes benennt. Der direkt angesprochene Leser (im Manuskriptband 117 schrieb Wittgenstein zuerst „Dir“ und darüber „uns“, im Typoskript dreht er die Hierarchie wieder um) darf sich hier als die metaphorisch genannte Fliege verstehen. Das von Anbeginn problematische Zeigen wird nun aber als Handlung des Bildes ausgegeben. Denn in dem ersten Eintrag hieß es noch: „Ich zeige“, und meinte damit eine Aktivität des Philosophen. Die zweite Variante weist eine Überschreibung (ohne die sonst bei Wittgenstein übliche Durchstreichung des Überschriebenen) auf, die den Satz effektiv nur um ein Wort kürzer werden lässt, das Personalpronomen „ich“. So wird das Zeigen entpersonalisiert: „Der Fliege ... zeigen“. Im Typoskript „zeigt“ dann tatsächlich „die Figur“, also das gezeichnete und evidente Beweisbild, und die Fliegenglasmetapher wird analogisiert: „Sie [also: die Figur] zeigt Dir, wie wenn man einer Fliege ... zeigte“. Das unpersönliche Man, an dessen Stelle sich in den Notizbüchern noch das Ich des Philosophen mit seinen ambitionierten Zielen verbarg, ordnet sich nun in seinem didaktischen Vorgehen dem Zeigen des Bildes unter.

Wittgensteins persönliche Erfahrung, dass man mit Bildern nicht nur Etwas zeigen kann, sondern dass sich in ihrem Sich-Zeigen auch Möglichkeiten eröffnen, an die vorher nicht gedacht wurde, führt dazu, dass im späteren Kontext der Fliegenglasmetapher nicht mehr von einem bestimmten, situationsspezifischen Ausweg gesprochen wird. Vielmehr besteht das Ziel des Zeigens nun darin, „Dir“ das Zeigen oder vielmehr Sich-Zeigen des Bildes zu zeigen. Dieser Hinweis ersetzt die orientierende Qualität des konkreten Fliegenglasauswegs. Er zeigt, dass die „Blindheit“ für die Begrenzung des vorher Gedachten „besieglt“ werden kann, wenn „philosophische Sehkraft“ auf bildliche „Überzeugungskraft“ trifft.

Die späteren *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* präsentieren den Fliegenglas-Aphorismus dann als eigenständigen, in sich abgeschlossenen Paragraphen: „Was ist dein Ziel in der Philosophie? – Der Fliege den Ausweg aus dem Fliegenglas zeigen.“ (PU § 309) Alle Angaben zum Weg fehlen nun ebenso wie das zeigende Bild aus der Entstehungsgeschichte des Aphorismus.

## Literatur

Manuskripte und Typoskripte wurden nach der Bergen Electronic Edition zitiert. BGM und PU nach der Suhrkamp Werkausgabe, Frankfurt a.M. 1984 ff.

<sup>2</sup> Beispiele dieser Art, in denen die Evidenz des Bildes eine Veränderung der „Anschauungsweise“ bewirkt, gibt es bei Wittgenstein viele. „Ich wollte dies Bild vor deine Augen stellen, und deine Anerkennung dieses Bildes besteht darin, dass du nun geneigt bist, einen gegebenen Fall anders zu betrachten [...]. Ich habe deine Anschauungsweise geändert. (Ich habe irgendwo gelesen, dass gewissen indischen Mathematikern zum Beweis eines Satzes eine geometrische Figur dient mit den Wörtern: 'Sieh dies an! Auch dies Ansehen bewirkt eine Änderung der Anschauungsweise.')“ (Zettel 381f. (§ 461))

# Wittgensteins philosophisches Œuvre im Spiegel experimenteller Literatur

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Falls Umfang oder Ton des Werkes den Leser zu der Annahme führen sollten, der Autor habe eine Summe angestrebt: ihn schnellstens darauf hinweisen, daß er vor dem umgekehrten Versuch steht, nämlich dem einer unerbittlichen *Subtraktion*.

Julio Cortázar: *Rayuela*, § 137

## 1. *Tristram Shandy* von Laurence Sterne. Ein von Wittgenstein rezipiertes Werk experimenteller Literatur

Was man mit dem Begriffen „experimentelle Literatur“ bezeichnen kann, bezieht sich primär auf das Erproben neuer literarischer Gestaltungs-, Aussage- und Kompositionsmöglichkeiten. Es geht dabei um ein Experimentieren mit sprachlichen und grammatischen Gegebenheiten, mit literarischen Konventionen und mit gesellschaftlichen Erwartungshaltungen. So hat sich in der Literatur weltweit eine beachtliche Sammlung gebildet, ein umfassendes Reservoir angereichert an Werken, die vorrangig experimentelle Interessen verfolgen. Wittgenstein selbst hat nachweislich Werke bestimmter experimenteller Literatur gekannt, gelesen und geschätzt. Auch für seine eigene Art und Weise zu Schreiben und zu Philosophieren hat er gerade aus solcher Literatur nachhaltige Anregung bekommen und großen Gewinn gezogen. Ein Beispiel muss hier genügen, nämlich: *The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman* (Erstausgabe 1759-1767) von Laurence Sterne.


Im Jahre 1936 – jenem Jahr in welchem Wittgenstein höchstwahrscheinlich die so genannte Urfassung der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*, MS142 also, begonnen hat –, gibt er seinem Schüler und Freund Maurice O'Connor Drury folgende Auskunft: „Now a book I like greatly is Sterne's *Tristram Shandy*. That is one of my favourite books.“ (Drury 1984: 133) Und Wittgensteins Schüler Theodore Redpath macht in seinem Buch *Ludwig Wittgenstein. A Student's Memoir* (Redpath 1990: 50) ebenfalls über Wittgensteins Hochschätzung von Sternes *Tristram Shandy* wertvolle und aussagekräftige Angaben:

He [Wittgenstein] told me he had read *Tristram Shandy* about a dozen times. [...] I could understand something of the appeal *Tristram Shandy* could have had for him: such as the preposterous conception of the whole book, the freedom and surprise of the writing, the whimsicality, the engagingness and vividness of the characters and the nimble and subtle wit. [...] At all events he said to me that he had been struck with a passage in it which seemed to be a quotation from Aristotle which said that a man looks *up* when he is thinking of the future and *down* when he is thinking of the past. [...] He said that the passage was quoted in *Tristram Shandy* as from ‚Aristotle's Masterpiece‘.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Genaue Angaben über Wittgensteins Aussage „from ‚Aristotle's Masterpiece‘“ bei Redpath 51f. Die erwähnte Stelle findet sich im *Tristram Shandy* im siebten Kapitel des zweiten Buches. Mit detaillierter Recherche ließ sich sogar eine markante Textstelle in Wittgensteins Nachlass aufspüren, in welcher auf das „Aristotle's Masterpiece“ Bezug genommen wird, denn die deutschsprachige Umarbeitung des *Brown Book* enthält in MS115(II), 176 folgende Formulierung (in einen größeren Kontext eingebettet): „(Hier ist es nützlich, an die Worte zu denken, daß der <ein> Mensch, der an die Vergangenheit denkt, den Blick zur Erde richtet; der Mensch aber, der an die Zukunft denkt, ihn nach oben richtet'. Denn wenn Du Dich erinnernd, & voraussagend, denkst, wirst Du sehen, daß daran etwas Wahres ist.)“ Es ist von großer Bedeutung, dass eben diese Textpassage noch nicht im *Blue Book* vorhanden ist, sondern erst in dessen Umarbeitung in MS115, 118-292, welche in der zweiten Hälfte des Jahres 1936 entstanden ist. Dass Wittgenstein gerade zu dieser Zeit (wieder) Sternes *Tristram Shandy* rezipierte geht aus dem Bericht von Drury dazu hervor. Eine genauere Ausarbeitung dieser Angelegenheit kann hier leider nicht erfolgen.

Auf die Frage, warum Wittgenstein gerade dieses literarische Werk intensiv rezipiert hat, kann man also nicht nur antworten, dass ihn eben die Darstellung der Charaktere und des Humors von Personen darin interessiert haben, sondern ihn auch die ganze unkonventionelle, experimentelle Bau-, Erzähl- und Ausdrucksweise dieses Romans fasziniert haben.

Das vierzigste und letzte Kapitel im sechsten Buch des *Tristram Shandy* ist jene höchst amüsante, ungewöhnliche, konterkarierende und dadurch treffende Ausführung über die bisher erfolgte und weiterhin zu realisierende Gestaltung dieses Buches. Wittgenstein, der ja um die Mitte der 30er Jahre nicht nur nachweislich bereits den Roman *Tristram Shandy* gut kannte, sondern auch intensiv mit verschiedenen Versuchen der Gestaltung seines Buches bzw. eines seiner Bücher beschäftigt war, hat sicher – so die hier vertretene und belegte These – auch daraus für die Komposition seines eigenen Werkes Anregung bzw. Kritik erfahren.






Abb. 1a/b: Kapitel XL. im *Tristram Shandy*

Schaut man sich nämlich eben dieses Kapitel im *Tristram Shandy* genauer an (hier wird dieses „CHAP. XL.“ als Faksimileabbildung der Erstausgabe wiedergegeben), so wird deutlich, was für Wittgenstein bei der Erstellung seines eigenen Buches inspirierend gewirkt hat und ausschlaggebend war. Es wird in diesem Kapitel nämlich die problematische Frage nach dem Nutzen der Erstellung einer „geradlinigen“ Gestalt eines Werkes bzw. das vergebliche Ringen um eine „geradlinige“ Erzählweise – in einer erfrischend humoristischen und köstlich selbstironischen Darbietung – sichtbar.

„I am now beginning to get fairly into my work, [...] in a tolerable straight line.“ lautet der Anfang dieses den sechsten Bande abschließende Kapitel – wohlgemerkt nachdem sechs Bände des *Tristram Shandy* geschrieben sind. Und dann sieht man vier geschnörkelte Linien von denen es heißt: „These were the four lines I moved in through my first, second, third, and forth volumes.“ Und weiter: „In the fifth volume I have been very good, – the precise line I have described in it being this“. Und abermals sieht man eine gewundene Linie, deren einzelne Schnörkel dann auch in ihrer Entstehung – nämlich bedingt durch Umherreisen – erklärt werden. Für den vorliegenden sechsten Band wird konstatiert: „In this last volume I have done better still [...] I have scarce stepped a yard out of my way.“ Und für das Folgende, noch Kommende wird gemutmasst: „If I mend at this rate, it is not impossible [...] but I may arrive hereafter at the excellency of going on even thus“. Nun wird man einer waagrechten Linie ansichtig und bekommt die Erklärung: „which is a line drawn as straight as I could draw it, by a writing-master's ruler, (borrowed for that purpose) turning neither to the right hand or to the left.“ Und alsdann finden sich noch Ausführungen die richtige, beste, kürzeste Linie und alsdann die Gravitationslinie betreffend. Nämlich:

This *right line*, – the path-way for Christians to walk in! – say divines –  
– The emblem of moral rectitude! says Cicero –  
– The *best line!* say cabbage-planters – is the shortest line, says Archimedes, which can be drawn from one given point to another. – [...] – What a journey!  
Pray can you tell me, – that is, without anger, before I write my chapter upon straight lines – by what mistake – who told them so – or how it has come to pass, that your men of wit and genius have all along confounded this line, with the line of GRAVITATION.

In der Zeit 1936/37 gab Wittgenstein seine Bemühungen ein Buch so in geradliniger Form zu schreiben, „daß die

Gedanken darin von einem Gegenstand zum andern in <einer> wohlgeordneter<n> Reihe fortschreiten sollten“, dann auch endgültig auf, da er zur Einsicht kam, dass das Ergebnis „ein unbefriedigendes“ war und weil er „zur Überzeugung gelangte, dass es vergebens sei“ und er „alle solche Versuche aufzugeben hätte“ (MS117, 121-122; PU-Vorwort; August 1938). So versuchte Wittgenstein beim Schreiben und Komponieren seines Buches *Philosophische Untersuchungen* seine eigene „Gravitationslinie“ zu finden, denn ihm wurde klar, dass beim Philosophieren wie beim Schreiben auch „der Natur des Gegenstandes“ Genüge zu tun und Rechenschaft zu tragen ist. Und so heißt es dann auch ein Jahr später im frühen Vorwort vom August 1938 für sein Buch *Philosophische Untersuchungen* weiter: „Dieser Gegenstand zwingt uns, das Gedankengebiet kreuz & quer, nach allen Richtungen <hin> zu durchreisen“ (MS117, 122).

## 2. Rayuela von Julio Cortázar. Ein durch Wittgenstein inspiriertes Werk experimenteller Literatur

Aus der Fülle zeitgenössischer experimenteller Literatur kann und soll hier nur ein ausgewähltes Exempel, das eine besondere Affinität zu Wittgensteins experimenteller Philosophie aufweist, erörtert werden. Der Schriftsteller Julio Cortázar (1914-1984), einer der bedeutendsten argentinischen Autoren des 20. Jahrhunderts, schrieb den experimentellen Roman *Rayuela* (1963; *Rayuela. Himmel und Hölle*, dt. 1981).<sup>2</sup> Dieses Werk wurde zu einem Meilenstein der Weltliteratur und kann – so die hier nun vertretene und dargelegte These – zu einem Grundstein für ein anderes, neues, adäquateres Verstehen des Œuvres von Ludwig Wittgenstein werden, indem es zum Stolperstein für das bisher weitgehend veranschlagte Verständnis von und die allgemein praktizierte Umgangsweise mit „Werken“ bzw. „Büchern“ dieses Philosophen wird.

Das Wort „Rayuela“ meint in deutscher Übersetzung das Himmel-und-Hölle-Spiel; bezieht sich also auf jenes, wohl aus alten Ritualvorstellungen hervorgegangene, Spiel, in welchem Kinder hüpfend streben über mehrere am Boden aufgezeichnete Felder von der „Hölle“ (bzw. der „Erde“) in den „Himmel“ (und gegebenenfalls wieder zurück zur „Erde“) zu gelangen. Als Metapher wird dieses Hüpfspiel im Roman für das Wandern des auf der Suche nach dem Sinn des Lebens zwischen Erde und Himmel, ja zwischen Himmel und Hölle, in Freiheit und Selbstbestimmung denkenden und handelnden Menschen veranschlagt. Der Roman versteht sich zudem als „metaphysische Ohrfeige“, er lehnt den passiv konsumierenden Leser – „einen Typen, der keine Probleme, sondern nur Lösungen will“ (§ 99) – ab, fordert einen aktiven Leser, will Komplizenschaft zwischen Autor und Leser. *Rayuela* ist „ein Roman, der seinen Lesern alle Freiheit lässt, ihnen viel zutraut und noch mehr zumutet, vor allem den Mut, von dieser Freiheit Gebrauch zu machen und perspektivisch das eigene Leben, zunächst aber das Buch selbst in die Hand zu nehmen und zu entscheiden, welches von den vielen man lesen will.“ (Hansen 2010: 639) Wichtige Momente sind – verwoben in eine Erzählhandlung – die Fokusse auf menschliches Denken und menschliche Sprache und damit auch auf eine Sprachkrise, eine Vernunftkrise, eine Realitätskrise, eine Kulturkrise bezogen auf die westlich-technologische Zivilisation. Im Roman *Rayuela* kommt die fiktive Figur des Denkers, Schriftstellers, Philosophen Morelli vor; ihr kommt besonderes Gewicht für das Einbringen

<sup>2</sup>Rubén Aguiar verdanke ich den Hinweis auf diesen nicht-nur-linear gestalteten Roman.

der von und über sowohl Schriftstellerei als auch Philosophie handelnden Kapitel zu. *Rayuela* ist damit ein Werk, das „in den Begriffen des Romans die Fragen, die andere – die Philosophen – in den Begriffen der Metaphysik stellen“ behandelt. In Kapitel 99 wird mit den Formulierungen „Mit Wittgenstein zu sprechen, bilden die Probleme eine Kette nach rückwärts [...]“ und „Wir wollen Morelli nicht die Probleme von Dilthey, Husserl oder Wittgenstein anhängen“ explizit auf diesen Philosophen Bezug genommen und in Kapitel 66 nimmt implizit Morelli, der Schriftsteller und Philosoph im Roman mit einer „Mauer aus Worten“ folgendermaßen Bezug auf Wittgensteins Œuvre:

Er [Morelli] plant einen Abschluß von vielen für sein unvollendetes Buch und hinterläßt, eine Maquette. Die Seite enthält einen einzigen Satz: ‚Im Grunde wußte er, daß man darüber hinaus nicht gehen kann, weil es das nicht gibt.‘ [„En el fondo sabía que no se puede ir más allá porque no lo hay.“] Der Satz wiederholte sich über die ganze Seite und erweckte den Eindruck einer Mauer aus Worten, die den Sinn des Satzes veranschaulicht, den Aufprall an einer Barriere, hinter der nichts mehr ist. Aber weiter unten rechts fehlt in einem der Sätze das Wort *das*. Ein scharfes Auge entdeckt die Öffnung zwischen den Ziegelsteinen, das einfallende Licht.

Literarisch ist hier Cortázar ein mindestens ebenbürtiges Äquivalent zum Schlussatz der *Logisch-Philosophischen Abhandlung* gelungen.

Aber nicht nur vom Inhalt her, sondern auch seiner nicht-linearen bzw. nicht-nur-linearen Form nach ist dieser Roman ein komplexes literarisch-philosophisches Werk. Gerade in seiner formalen Gestaltung steht dieser Roman in Wahlverwandtschaft zu Wittgensteins Werk *Philosophische Untersuchungen*. Cortázar macht nämlich gleich am Anfang des Romans mit einem „Wegweiser“ darauf aufmerksam, dass man es bei diesem Buch mit vielen Büchern zu tun hat. Und er schlägt konkret zwei Umgangsweisen mit diesem Viele-Bücher-Buch vor (siehe die Reproduktion dieses „Wegweiser“ aus *Rayuela*).



Abb. 2: „Wegweiser“ aus *Rayuela*

Während die erste Art und Weise den Roman *Rayuela* zu lesen der Struktur nach linear ist, handelt es sich bei der zweiten Art und Weise *Rayuela* zu lesen um eine nicht-(mono)lineare bzw. nicht-nur-lineare Konzeption. Betrachtet man die Kapitelabfolge dieser zweiten Lesart nach dem Leseverzeichnis genauer, so zeigt sich, dass diese Abfolge wie sie in der ersten Lesart als aufsteigend numerische Abfolge angelegt wurde, unverändert beibehalten ist. Zusätzlich wurden aber die Kapitel 57 bis 155 in nicht-nummerischer Abfolge – entweder vorangestellt oder eingeschoben oder angehängt. Weiterhin kann man im Detail konstatieren, dass in der zweiten Lesart Kapitel 55 nicht und Kapitel 131 (am Ende der zweiten Lesart von *Rayuela*) zweimal vorkommt. Die zweite Art diesen Roman zu lesen bereitet eine ganz eigene, springende und verknüpfende Leseerfahrung, die viel Eigenaktivität erfordert, die gelernt und geübt werden will.

Die Verwandtschaft mit der Konstruktion und Komposition von Wittgensteins *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*, präziser mit der Extension von der PU-Zwischenfassung in die PU-Schlufffassung (TS227), ist verblüffend. Und ein Dokument in Wittgensteins Nachlass gibt dazu besondere, anschaulichen Aufschluss, nämlich MS182 (hier als Faksimileabbildungen wiedergegeben). Manuskripte MS182 ist ein vierseitiger Doppelblattbogen bei dem allerdings nur die ersten beiden Seiten handschriftlich in Tinte beschrieben sind. Diese zwei Seiten enthalten unter der Überschrift „Numbers of Remarks from I.“ Seitenreferenzen (in MS182(I), 1-2 von „to p. 21“ bis „to p. 194“) und Bemerkungsnummernreferenzen (zunächst im ersten Teil von MS182(I), 1-2 von „No. 422 432“ bis „No. 273“ und alsdann im zweiten Teil von MS182(II), 2 von „No. 156“ bis „No. 690“). Während sich die Seitenreferenzen auf das Typoskript der „Zwischenfassung“ der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* beziehen, sind die Referenzen auf Bemerkungsnummern (bis auf wenige Ausnahmen) auf die Bemerkungen in Typoskript TS228, nämlich das Typoskript mit dem Titel „Bemerkungen I.“, zu beziehen. Beim ersten MS182-Teil handelt es sich um die „Einschiebung von Bemerkungen“ in die PU-Zwischenfassung und beim zweiten MS182-Teil handelt es sich um die „Anhangung von Bemerkungen“ an die PU-Zwischenfassung. Aus diesem Einschiebung-Anhangungs-Prozess, der nicht wie bisher allgemein angenommen 1945/46 stattfand, sondern nachweisbar erst im Jahre 1949 ausgeführt wurde, ist in Etappen eben die so genannten PU-Schlufffassung TS227 hervorgegangen. Vergleicht man nun diese Technik des Konstruierns von TS227 mit der von Cortázar konzipierten zweiten Leseweise von *Rayuela*, so wird die enge Wahlverwandtschaft beider Werke offensichtlich; und hält man die Nummernabfolge des Leseverzeichnisses im „Wegweiser“ von *Rayuela* neben die Auflistung für die Anhangung von Bemerkungen in MS182, so ist die Familienähnlichkeit der Kompositionsweise beider Werke förmlich in die Augen springend. Beide Werke sind „einer unerbittlichen Subtraktion“ verpflichtet, dulden keine Rezipienten, die „keine Probleme, sondern Lösungen“ erwarten. Das „aktive Einholen“ von Kurztexten in einen variablen Lese- und flexiblen Denkverlauf und das „eigenständige Realisieren“ einer nicht-(mono)linearen Werkrezeption wird sowohl in Cortázars *Rayuela* als auch in Wittgensteins *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* (zumal beim Transitus von der Zwischen- zur Spätfassung<sup>3</sup>) initiiert und favorisiert.

<sup>3</sup> Genaueres in Rothaupt 1999 und 2006.

Number of Researches from I.

U.p.21	No. 532
U.p.42	No. 545
U.p.75	No. 71-72, 82, 67, 211
U.p.96	No. 363
U.p.97	No. 267
U.p.105	No. 79, 31
U.p.125	No. 575
U.p.143	No. 587 - 531 - 51 - 23 - 488 - 546 - 554 - 57 - 56 - 508 - 576 - 510 - 52 - 511 - 512 - 524 - 40 - 243 - 294 - 295 - 567 - 630 - 295 - 560 - 561 - 562 - 58 - 99 - 525 - 527 - 518 - 519 - 529; 569
U.p.164	No. 265 - 246 - 267
U.p.180	No. 477 - 478; 237 - 506 - 597 - 598 - 599 - 403 - 419 - 339 - 282; 413 - 467; 268 - 421 - 339 - 404 - 422 - 409 - 619 - 620 - 436 - 477 - 278 - 412 - 405 - 464; 331 - 277; 36
U.p.202	No. 426
U.p.213	No. 63 - 45; 689; 305 - 138; 252
U.p.239	No. 498 ± 252
U.p.255	No. 493 - 180 - 77 - 177 - 492 - 179 - 181 - 583
U.p.16.0	No. 695
U.p.367	No. 155
U.p.385	No. 627; 154; 155 - 157
U.p.390	No. 192 - 176 - 258 - 487
U.p.392	No. 315
U.p.393	No. 550 - 351 - 25
U.p.395	No. 528 - 256
U.p.396	No. 90 - 509; 595
U.p.397	No. 284
U.p.398	No. 309
U.p.400	No. 451 - 452 - 453 - 454 - 455 - 456 - 457; 198 - 199 - 120 - 121
U.p.403	No. 562 - 44 - 47 - 685 - 686 - 686 - 687; 370; 242
U.p.402	No. 13
U.p.405	No. 633 - 677 - 698 - 209 - 175 - 269 - 174 - 261 - 263 - 264 - 262 - 396 - 95 - 96 - 97; 224; 171 - 173

(P.T.O.)

**Abb. 3:** Wittgenstein: MS182,1 – Bemerkungen aus TS228 als „Einschiebung“ in TS227

**Abb. 4:** Wittgenstein: MS182,2 – Bemerkungen aus TS228 als „Anhang“ in TS227

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# Can Science Undermine Morality?

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In this essay we are going to address the question of whether a moral system can be found and detailed using scientific theories. It has been a long time since David Hume said that we could not make prescriptive statements (about what *ought to be*) on the basis of descriptive statements (about what *is*). In recent years society has become more secular and the question of which entity should be entrusted with making moral systems instead of religion, is frequently discussed. Science seems to be a suitable candidate for this as it possesses a lot of trust because of its unbiased and rational approach. Indeed, arguments in favour of science's ability to undermine morals usually spread quickly and tend to cause a stir. Books focused on this become bestsellers, like, for example, the one by Sam Harris, whose attitude we will examine in more detail (Harris 2010b). Although we are going to reject a part of his argumentation, we see in his attitude an inspirational idea, which could lead to the redesign of ethics.

## Starting point

Sam Harris introduced his idea in the book *The Moral Landscape*. However, for the purpose of this essay we are focusing on his paper in the project *TED*, for there Harris summarises his argumentation in a brief and easily accessible way (Harris 2010a). According to this author the separation between science and moral values is nothing but an illusion. His main hypothesis says: "Values are a certain kind of fact. They are facts about the well-being of conscious creatures." (Harris 2010a) By *values* he means concepts underlying human moral, for example "Thou shalt not kill." etc. By *facts* he means something we can meaningfully research and describe using true/false propositions. Speaking of consciousness, Harris supposes that all human values can be reduced to a concern about conscious experience and its possible changes. These changes are important, because they are related to well-being – a moral act is linked with the awareness of a reward (before or after death) and vice versa. Religions are viewed negatively, for it was just an effort of religions to gain influence, what separated between discussed and real moral questions. "This is why we spend our time talking about things like gay marriage and not about genocide or nuclear proliferation or poverty or any other hugely consequential issue." (Harris 2010a)

The term "well-being" needs not to refer merely to an individual, but to the whole of society. Harris shows that by saying there is a kind of truth we should know, and which relates to how human communities prosper (i.e. what increases their welfare). Therefore, if we know which behaviours increase welfare, we would know which behaviours are moral. What is the nature of experience of well-being? It is a product of the brain. Any human is a product of his brain. If culture changes us, it does so by changing our brains. Let us note here that Harris is a neurologist. "And we can therefore visualize a space of possible changes in the experience of these beings [...] as kind of a moral landscape, with peaks and valleys that correspond to differences in the well-being of conscious creatures, both personal and collective." (Harris 2010a) Briefly, Harris

suggests that science should hold a more important role in the making and detailing of moral systems.

## Science

Sam Harris is convinced that values relate with specific conscious experiences (e.g. well-being). He also believes that science can discover these relations, for instance, by some sort of brain scanning. However, even if we could scan a brain so precisely and were able to say, for example, that some deed was connected with "nine units of well-being", it would not mean that Harris is right. We can discuss only briefly here what science is and what we could use it for. For more details see my thesis (Ruzicka 2010).

Roughly speaking, scientific theories are models of a part of nature, as it appears to the observer. These models are reducible on a model of the same type like the one we show here using a thought experiment. Let us imagine a healthy man sitting opposite an LCD monitor in a closed room. He has a standard keyboard. Sequences of colours are displayed on the monitor. The subject does not know the sequences. After each colour the subject has two options: he can do nothing or write the next colour. If he is successful, he gets a "survival kit" (food and water). Failing that, he gets an acoustical shock.

What strategy should our man adopt? He obviously cannot refrain endlessly, for he would die of dehydration. Whether he likes it or not, he must try to guess. If he writes just random colours, he would mostly be rewarded by a shock. Clearly, the subject will try to sit in front of the LCD monitor and find some uniformity in the colour sequences. Perhaps he will begin to connect one colour with another and build a structure "behind them", i.e. consider non-random relations among them. This way he maximises his survival chances and minimises the suffering from shocks. In the end he will make a model of the sequences based on the observations he will have made. Why does he do that? He wants to force his will and these theories can help do that. To a larger extent, he can decide what he wants. Nonetheless, no theory can suggest that he should have the desire to eat or suffer from shocks. For us it seems rational that he would have the desire to eat, but for him it may be just delaying the inevitable, so he decides to starve.

## Category mistake

In other words, a scientific theory may help us get whatever we want, but it cannot suggest what we ought to want. Gilbert Ryle would say that we have an evident case of so-called category mistake. This fallacy consists in a situation, where we approach some things of one kind as belonging to another kind. Ryle illustrated this using the example of a visitor of Oxford University. The visitor, upon viewing the colleges and library, inquired "But where is the University?" The mistake of the visitor is presuming that Oxford University is a part of the category of "buildings"

rather than the category of "institutions" (Ryle 1963: 20-24).

Harris would argue that human will is produced by the human brain, for it is describable as a *conscious experience*. Therefore, if science succeeds in analysing the human brain, it would be capable of understanding and describing a will. However, that does not alter the fact that we have the category mistake here. Even if we know what our subject wants and what structure his will has, we would not be able to imply what he ought to want – how should his will be oriented. Let us return to Harris again. He says that the investigated matter should be to what extend some values facilitate well-being. By doing this we would be able to arrange individual values. Nonetheless, such arrangement would be purely in relation to well-being. Science may make this arrangement, but it would not indicate, in any respect, that someone should behave in accordance with well-being (i.e. that this concept should be an essential value).

## Myth

As far as we know, a myth does not offer expedients to the enforcement of will. Of course, we do not count these consisting in influence of some myth over people, as shown by Susan Blackmore with her theory of memes, for instance (Blackmore 1999). On the other hand, a myth works broadly with will as such (i.e. power). That can be demonstrated by the fact that the major religions of the world were and are based on the idea of gods as rulers. The directing of human will is then made in accordance with some superordinate will of a supernatural entity. By doing this, myths seem to be fit for selecting essential moral values.

By the word "myth" we do not mean just a classical myth like Christianity. Even atheism can be interpreted as a myth. A form of atheism is, for example, humanism, which says that the most important values are a human, his life and dignity. Besides a cultural point of view, we can note a biological perspective, which tries to prospect the natural basis of human and supposes that a human will is manipulated by instincts. Some theories of this field even present a sovereign of man, for example in the so-called *selfish gene*, which actually plays the role of a god (Dawkins 1989). Economists have written quite a few impassioned essays on how a man should behave, taking values of rationality and economy for granted (Kolm 1994). In accordance with the category mistake, scientific theories are used as myths here. In the case of Harris, we can clearly see it when he says: "Values, therefore, are (explicit or implicit) judgments about how the universe works and are themselves facts about our universe (i.e. states of the human brain)." (Harris 2010c)

## Replacing a myth with science

Why should science have better prospects to make an efficient moral system than a myth? Considering the fact that a myth works with power and does not give space for rational argumentation, there is only one way of dealing with a disagreement of two myths: a conflict. It is not a coincidence that so many wars were waged in the name of truth of one myth against the other. Moreover, disagreements of myths are inevitable, for any myth must deploy some methods of forcing people to accept it, follow it, protect it and pass it around. The most successful myths (Christianity, Islam etc.) are furthermore universalistic, which means

that they mark who is not following them as "bad", and promise him a punishment (Marquard 1989).

However, in history we can even find conflicts where both sides held the same values and differed only in how should have been these values applied to daily life. It is possible that Harris agrees with 90 % of the values held by Christianity. Traditionally, a religion does not consist of a selection of values only. It could not work this way. It also consists of a formulation of a moral system, which applies these values to daily life. It must show the follower, how he is supposed to live in accordance with these values. It must be said that religions are relatively badly equipped for making and detailing the application of these systems. Their systems are somewhat clumsy and include contradictions. These aspects cause conflicts and pose favourite targets of critique from the atheistic perspective. From this point of view, it is possible to make these systems either better or worse. Religions do not play a positive role here by denying a discussion on the base of coherent argumentation.

## System ethics

The ideal compromise would be a separation between values (operated by a myth) and their application (operated by science). Nevertheless, both disciplines will not work so synergically in practice. We can see an analogical situation in the relationship between politics, selecting which values should be essential to manage the state, and economics, developing the best possible application systems of these values to the real economy. Mostly, we can see that economics is not satisfied with the pure application of given values. As time goes by, the economics begins to develop theories on which the best values to select would be. For example, welfare economics says when interventions of government are convenient and when it is necessary to keep the free trade economy (Kinkor 1996). However, this quarrelsome relationship works better than if politicians make the whole system.

If a myth (or a world view) plays the role of a value selector, a type of ethics would be suitable for playing the role of an application system developer. Before that, ethics should give up the thousands years lasting effort to discover indisputable moral values as such. It seems to be a vain effort. This purged ethics would be awaited by at least two related tasks. The first consists in making effective application systems for moral values and the second consists in an analysis of the systems already existing. In particular, moral systems produced by religions should be examined in order to define their essential values and criticize the shortcomings of their application systems.

Let us conclude this short study by noting that even Sam Harris demands a science of a kind like the ethics we have introduced here. On the one hand, he has given the highest value in *well-being* (although he perhaps does not note it). On the other hand, he says that we should conduct scientific research into morality because there are truths we should know and which relate to how human communities prosper.

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# Wittgenstein and Epictetus on Healing the Soul: What Philosophy Can (not) Do for You

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## 1. A healed soul

In what follows I'll somewhat touch on these three points to argue that Wittgenstein and Epictetus aim both for the same way of living and for the very same answer to an unhappy life, and that healing a soul is more a matter of a willing personal achievement than of a philosophical project. Surely, the assumption here involved is in this case that Wittgenstein's ethics is better understood when seen as stoical in character, – mainly so as read in his prime works – basically pursuing stoical aims and proposing stoical exercises for their achievement.

Let's start with Wittgenstein's remarks in the *Notebooks 1914-1916*, where the answers given to his own questions seem to establish at the same time a diagnosis as well as, in the long run, a course of treatment.

The diagnosis is that there is something of problematic in the world or in the way we see life; this something, says Wittgenstein, is that which we call its "meaning" (*Notebooks*, 11.6.16). This could also be said as follows: what is here of problematic is *our search for* the meaning of life or *our thinking that* there is finally no meaning at all to be found. But the second part of the diagnosis comes to say that this is only problematic because of the search itself. It is not then that the meaning of life is problematic – on the contrary, it should constitute the solution to all of our problems – but that we too often look for it in the wrong places. This is why Wittgenstein will say, here (25.5.15) as in the *Tractatus*, that there's no science which could ever come close to answering "the problem of life":

6.52: We feel that even if *all possible* scientific questions be answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at all. Of course there is then no question left, and just this is the answer.

Following this, says Wittgenstein, "the solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of this problem". Now, this is indeed something the search for the meaning wishes to achieve, but in a misleading manner: what Wittgenstein as the Stoics will propose as a "solution" concerns not a specific science of the world or life nor one dogmatic doctrine among others offering the best of all explanations why the world exists or why there's life any way – and why those things shouldn't be seen as problematic. The "solution" concerns instead a certain attitude *vis-à-vis* this all. Because, if it true that for Stoicism the "moral" goes hand in hand with the "physical", the understanding and the acceptance of the latter require mainly a *moral* understanding and acceptance. If Epictetus would say that we have to learn *how to want* everything in the world so as it happens (Epictetus, I, 12, 14-17), Wittgenstein would call for a *good will* to take the world as a whole as given – so as it is given. It is then a matter of *willingly* see it as devoid of good and evil – these can only be the traits of the subject of the will itself (or, in the case of Epictetus, the traits of one personal character [*prohairesis*]).

But if this is a matter of seeing and if happiness cannot be achieved without more ado (14.7.16), the course of

treatment engages one in the understanding and acceptance of specific (and necessary) stages of healing – those which themselves constitute a way of living and which should in this sense be chosen for their own sake, so that not only being happy is tautologically the only correct life to be lived (which is how Wittgenstein talks about *eudaimonia* as the purpose of existence (30.7.16; 6.7.16)), but being by *these means* happy is the only way to fully and permanently to accomplish peace of mind – which is again how Wittgenstein pictures the purpose of existence: the happy man is he who accomplishes the purpose of existence, that is to say, the one who has no more needs besides life itself, or else the one who is content (6.7.16).

Those stages of healing require then a deep commitment to certain attitudes to be pursued and maintained by means of exercise, self-analysis and self-critique, self-convincement and self-persuasion, attitudes which bring each by itself a part of health and tranquility, but which compose at the end a picture of a whole and coherent character. Those traits in Wittgenstein are essentially stoic and meet a general characterization of a virtuous man such as found in Epictetus, for instance.

In a summarized manner we could say that a healed soul is then one which acquires necessarily a (moral) understanding about, mainly, the further topics: that life has to be lived in accordance with the world, such that our will adapt itself to the happenings of fate, chance or destiny – according to a wittgensteinian or stoical view; that it has to be lived in the present, for there's only a present time to live and all worries about the past and the future are in this sense illusions to be dissolved by understanding that which exactly depend on us or not; that a happy life can only be lived if no fear or hope are to be experienced – especially when these are related to a misunderstanding of the previous factor (time) and when fear means mainly "fear of death", since death is not one of the events we really live through (be it in terms of the *Tractatus* or in the general terms of Stoicism); finally, that good and evil are not the traits to be found *in* the world, but in the willing subject or the personal character of the Stoic agent.

Of course, this is a very sketchy way of characterizing the elements of a happy, non-problematic and appeased way of living life, but they serve already to see how a healed soul depends on that which the individual can himself to achieve – and, in this sense, those elements are at the same time the means to the whole of happiness as the steps chosen by themselves because of their "intrinsic" value as values of appeasement.

## 2. On the role of philosophy

But how is philosophy supposed to help us with this all? Well, maybe it isn't.

For both Epictetus and Wittgenstein, philosophy has only a restricted role to play on healing a soul sick of the problem of life, fear of death, unsatisfied desires, lack of resignation, complaint, unhappiness and disturbance all the

long while. If some lessons are to be learned as to how the world really is and what our own place in it amounts to being, philosophy stops short of teaching one a whole way of living and the attitude to life itself. And the reasons are to be found in both cases in the despise for philosophy's pretension in answering our human needs for meaning – as science and religion would both try it too – and in the attribution of a much more personal task to the individual as such.

If philosophy can furnish (natural and moral) principles to be followed, following them can only depend on oneself alone. And if philosophy would enable the conditions to studying life for the sake of understanding one's "proper function" in the universe, what matters most in learning is to learn how to want – or, more clearly, to learn how to adapt one's will to the events of the world (Epictetus, I, 12, 22-23). For that purpose no possible philosophical teaching will do: this is a personal and individual task which only the person itself can accomplish. In fact, this is one's own function and duty as a person. In the case of Epictetus philosophy comes even after some healing has already been achieved, when commitment to oneself as a "personal character" is in due course of happening. Thus the despise for those who intend to head to a philosophical status even before fulfilling the status of "a man"; that is to say, those who cannot even accomplish the function of being human, desiring nevertheless the much heavier burden of being a philosopher (Epictetus, II, 9, 22). Because the task is not here one of erudition – this might lead one to further unsatisfaction and unhappiness – but one of achieving a fully perfect character; not then to display by heart a host of doctrines, but fulfilling humans proper function: mainly virtuous and plain rationality.

Of course, a "moralist" such as Epictetus would not leave his pupil unhelped: but instead of offering this help by means of a "philosophical language" (Epictetus III, 1, 11), guidance and correction are to be given by means of a Socratic learning and progression. Thus the first and foremost important task attributed to the learner: "Know thyself". Before even trying to approach philosophical learning, says Epictetus, one has to learn to know who she is, because that's the only way of consequently knowing *how to live*. Now, this is not a matter of abstract thinking and theoretical, general understanding, but of concrete, personal and practical living, that is, a matter of exercise and habit, of constant self-examination, self-scrutiny and self-persuasion. Because, says Epictetus, the fruits of the human will require a long time to ripe (Epictetus I, 15, 8). In this sense, philosophical (stoical) knowledge might count only as a basis from which to depart towards moral practice – but nothing else. Knowing oneself, convincing oneself of the value of a stoical way of living, becoming constant and permanently appeased, turning one's habits and actions the mirror of a moral correct decision taken from the start for the sake of happiness – because a virtuous happy life is a proper and unshared *human* task – this is the task of the individual alone, accepted and recognized as prior to any philosophical or theoretical task.

Similar things can be said on the part of Wittgenstein, despite the fact of his distinction being radically founded on his approach to language as merely descriptive and representational. In the *Tractatus*, philosophy comes to an end as a theory, a doctrine or a "manual" of any kind by means of the distinction between saying and showing; all that which remains is the activity of clarification and analysis in view of both the linguistic clarity of the scientific and the salvation of the (higher) domain of ethics (cf. 4.112; 6.53). From this point of view, any philosophical investigation of that which cannot be said is necessarily superfluous and misleading, being in fact the sign of a frustration: that

of not being able to overcome, by means of language, the problems of our life.

Now, Wittgenstein's own despise for this kind of superfluous and desperate trial is very well known. Some of his personal notes about the role philosophy can (not) play in solving crucial religious or moral problems appeal to the fact that this role has been on the whole misunderstood; those issues are in fact the task of individuals – not necessarily philosophers, something which lead us to a comparable conclusion as that of Epictetus: one cannot intend to achieve particular and specialized knowledge in philosophy being not able to fulfill, first and foremost, his own task as a being human. This is, for instance, what Wittgenstein himself writes to Russel about his own duty as an individual:

Perhaps you regard this thinking about myself as a waste of time – but how can I be a logician before I'm a human being! Far the most important thing is to come to terms with myself! (McGuinness 2008: 63).

But in view of what we saw above, philosophy is unable to account for the ethical in another way as well: healing a soul is not a matter of putting an end to that which is in life and the world problematic by means of "answering" a question, but it is a matter of making the question itself to disappear, so that the "solution" might at last become clear: that this is not a philosophical, theoretical question, and not even "a question" at all: that the requirement is here that of a personal task – a moral, individual, essentially humanly duty, therefore not only (if in any case) answerable by means of a philosophical doctrine, principle or language:

6.521 – The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of this problem. (Is not this the reason why men to whom after long doubting the sense of life became clear, could not then say wherein this sense consisted?)

The role attributed here to philosophy would then be a critical role only, in view of distinguishing that which can effectively be sorted out by its own means and that which is always the task of an individual *qua* human individual. In this sense, if philosophy can be of any help on healing one's soul, this would be the help of showing or pointing out directly to one's *moral import*: one's own *decision* for the sake of a correct way of living life – and then acting accordingly, in a permanent, stable and determined manner. And "decision" is a term Wittgenstein refers to repeatedly in the *Secret Notebooks* as a way of convincing himself of his previous attitude of being indifferent to the facts of world and of complete passivity for the achievement of a peaceful soul. And "attitude" is then the term used to talk about the *will itself* (4.11.16).

Given this all, a healed soul is a soul fashioned by its own good will and positive attitude to the world. A soul fashioned by its own will of happiness and serenity. A soul half appeased already.

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# Subjekt und Person bei Wittgenstein im *Blue Book*

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Im *Blue Book* unterscheidet Wittgenstein zwei wichtige Gebrauchsweisen des Wortes „ich“: den Objektgebrauch und den Subjektgebrauch (Wittgenstein 1958: 66). Er gibt u.a. zwei folgende Beispiele für den Objektgebrauch von „ich“: „Ich bin zehn Zentimeter gewachsen“ und „Ich habe eine Beule auf meiner Stirn“ (Wittgenstein 1958: 66). Bei diesen Verwendungen von „ich“ besteht die Möglichkeit eines Identifikationsfehlers, denn es könnte sein, dass gar nicht ich zehn Zentimeter gewachsen bin oder dass es gar nicht ich bin, bei dem (z.B. in einem Spiegel) eine Beule auf der Stirn zu sehen ist. Es handelt sich hierbei gewissermaßen um den Bezug des Wortes „ich“ in der Perspektive der dritten Person, in dem das „ich“ auch zu „er“ werden könnte, und aus dieser Sicht einen Bezug auf einen spezifischen Körper oder Leib hat. Durch den Objektgebrauch von „ich“ beschreibt man körperliche Eigenschaften.

Im Objektgebrauch von „ich“ sagt man etwas Erfahrungen über sich selbst in der Perspektive der dritten Person aus. Man kann Kriterien anwenden, um eine bestimmte Person zu erkennen. Man identifiziert sich in der Perspektive der dritten Person, ähnlich wie man die anderen Personen identifiziert. Deshalb ist es möglich, einen Identifikationsfehler zu begehen, selbst wenn man selbst die identifizierte Person ist.

Im Subjektgebrauch von „ich“ dagegen besteht die Möglichkeit eines solchen Identifikationsfehlers nicht, weil man hierbei laut Wittgenstein keine bestimmte Person identifizieren kann. Er gibt folgende Beispiele des Subjektgebrauchs: „Ich sehe so-und-so“, „Ich denke, dass es regnen wird“, „Ich habe Zahnschmerzen“. Man redet also aus der Perspektive der ersten Person, und man redet im wesentlichen nicht über eigene körperliche Eigenschaften (Wittgenstein 1958: 69). Im Subjektgebrauch bezieht sich das Wort „ich“ auf keine bestimmte Person, z.B. in einer solipsistischen Verwendung des Satzes „Ich habe Zahnschmerzen“ oder im Satz „Wenn irgendetwas gesehen (wirklich gesehen) wird, dann bin immer ich es, der es sieht“, da man das Wort „ich“ nicht z.B. durch „Fernando“ ersetzen kann. Außerdem wäre nach Wittgenstein im *Blue Book* die Verwendung des Satzes „Ich habe Zahnschmerzen“ auf solipsistische Weise kein sinnvoller Satz, da man von dem gewöhnlichen Gebrauch abweichen würde, weil man auf dieselbe Weise nicht behaupten könnte „Er hat Zahnschmerzen“. Nach Wittgenstein sollte man, wenn man behauptet „Ich habe ...“, auch behaupten können „Er hat ...“. Wenn man das nicht kann, dann verwendet man „Ich habe ...“ auf eine Weise, die nicht von anderen anhand von Kriterien überprüft werden kann, und die anderen können dann meine Verwendung von „Ich habe ...“ nicht verstehen. Mit anderen Worten: Wenn der Satz „Ich habe Zahnschmerzen“ sinnvoll sein soll, ist auch der Satz „Er hat Zahnschmerzen“ sinnvoll. Wittgenstein will damit zeigen, dass der Solipsist, der mit dem Satz „Ich habe Zahnschmerzen“ sagt, dass nur er (der Solipsist) diese Zahnschmerzen hat und andere sie nicht haben oder fühlen können, den Satz auf eine andere Weise verwendet als den gewöhnlichen Gebrauch, und sein Satz sei daher nicht sinnvoll für eine sprachliche Gemeinschaft, sondern ein Ausdruck von Schmerzen, denn z.B. statt „Ich habe Zahnschmerzen“ zu sagen, hätte man mit einer geschwol-

lenen Backe auch bloß zu stöhnen brauchen. Dann wäre dieser Satz als der Ausdruck von Schmerzen gebraucht worden, nicht als Aussage über den Zustand einer bestimmten Person, und in diesem Sinne bezieht sich dann das Wort „ich“ nicht auf eine Person (Wittgenstein 1958: 66). Die Personenkonzeption und die dazu gehörigen Identitätskriterien werden von Wittgenstein im Kontext der Kritik am Solipsismus untersucht. Wittgenstein meint, dass der Gebrauch des Ausdrucks „dieselbe Person“ und der Name einer Person sich auf Eigenschaften beziehen, die als Identitätskriterien verwendet werden und die in den meisten Fällen übereinstimmen. Die Eigenschaften, die als Identitätskriterien einer Person verwendet werden, sind meistens körperliche Eigenschaften. Die Angabe der Identitätskriterien einer Person sind die Rechtfertigung für den Gebrauch des Ausdruckes wie „dieselbe Person“ und „Person“. Da diese körperlichen Eigenschaften sich nur allmählich und nur wenig ändern, können wir auch die Personennamen wie gewöhnlich, also mit einer gewissen Konstanz, gebrauchen. Wenn sich aber diese Eigenschaften schnell verändern würden, dann müsste man die Personennamen anders verwenden, oder sie wären vielleicht nicht mehr nützlich. Nach Wittgenstein ist der gewöhnliche Gebrauch von „Person“ oder „Persönlichkeit“ einer, der sich auf körperliche Eigenschaften, Charakterzüge usw. bezieht und der sich an die Umstände anpasst (Wittgenstein 1958: 62).

Nach Wittgenstein benutzt man, wenn man „ich“ sagt und auf den eigenen Körper zeigt, das Wort „ich“ durchaus auch wie ein Demonstrativum, wie „diese Person“. Deshalb könnte man glauben, dass „ich“ stets im Objektgebrauch verwendet wird, weil man glaubt, dass man dann eine bestimmte Person identifiziert hat. Wendet man diesen Gedanken auf den Subjektgebrauch von „ich“ an, kommt es zur Annahme, dass das Wort „ich“ sich auf ein körperloses Ego beziehen müsste.

In dem Satz „Ich habe Schmerzen“ aber bildet das Wort „ich“ kein Demonstrativpronomen und bezeichnet keinen Körper (Wittgenstein 1958: 68). Es scheint, dass das „ich“ (was Schmerzen hat) geistiger Natur ist, weil man „ich“ in „Ich habe Schmerzen“ nicht durch die Beschreibung eines Körpers ersetzen kann (Wittgenstein 1958: 74). Wittgenstein denkt bei den Wörtern „Körper“ und „Geist“ nicht an Entitäten auf die sich die Wörter beziehen, sondern betrachtet sie als Wörter, die ihre Bedeutungen durch ihren verschiedenen Gebrauch in der Sprache erhalten.

Beim Subjektgebrauch des Wortes „ich“ ist es nicht möglich, zu überprüfen, ob z.B. der Satz „Ich habe Schmerzen“ falsch oder wahr ist, denn hierbei könnte der Satz ja, wie schon erwähnt, durch ein Stöhnen ersetzt werden. In diesem Sinne hat der Gebrauch des Wortes „ich“ in der Perspektive der ersten Person keinen Bezug auf einen spezifischen Körper. Es fehlen folglich Identifikationskriterien in der Perspektive der ersten Person, denn die Identifikationskriterien sind nur möglich in der Perspektive der dritten Person, also beim Objektgebrauch von „ich“. Dieser fehlende Bezug, der im Folgenden „Problem des Selbstbezuges“ genannt werden soll, macht es auch unmöglich, dass etwas Verifizierbares ausgesagt wird. Und so scheint es, wenn man den Subjekt- und den Objektgebrauch nicht

unterscheidet, als ob etwas Metaphysisches ausgesagt wird.

Wegen des Problems des Selbstbezuges sind die Verwendungen von „ich“ im Subjektgebrauch immun gegen Fehler, weil die Anderen ja gar keinen unmittelbaren introspektiven Zugriff auf die möglichen Bedeutungen der „ich“-Äußerungen haben und deswegen auch keine Kriterien über Wahrheit oder Falschheit dieser Sätze festlegen können. Dem „ich“ im Subjektgebrauch gelingt es folglich nicht, mit Anderen behauptend zu kommunizieren, denn dann würde es sich um metaphysische Behauptungen handeln, die, wegen der fehlenden Referenz, nicht verifizierbar sind. In diesem Sinn bleibt das „ich“ in seinen Äußerungen über sich selbst im Subjektgebrauch isoliert. Die vermeintlichen „Ich-Behauptungen“ im Subjektgebrauch sind deshalb auch keine Behauptungen über Erfahrungen. Wittgenstein sagt deshalb im *Blue Book* auch, dass das „ich“ im Subjektgebrauch sich auf keinen spezifischen Körper bezieht. Nach dem *Blue Book* ist das „ich“ im Subjektgebrauch folglich auch keine rechtfertigende Instanz, weil ja das „ich“ isoliert ist bzw. nicht Teil einer sprachlichen Gemeinschaft ist. Was uns glauben macht, dass das „ich“ einen besonderen Zugriff auf sich selbst oder auf seine Seele hat, ist insofern nur ein metaphysischer Glaube. Er entspringt aus der falschen Analogie, die man zwischen metaphysischen und empirischen Sätzen macht (Wittgenstein 1958: 49).

In diesem Sinn bedeutet der Ausdruck „ich“ nicht dasselbe wie „Ludwig Wittgenstein“, obwohl Ludwig Wittgenstein als Antwort auf die Frage „Wer ist Ludwig Wittgenstein?“ „ich“ sagen könnte (Wittgenstein 1958: 67). Deshalb verneint Wittgenstein, dass der Ausdruck „ich“ im Subjektgebrauch ein Name ist, obwohl es für eine Erklärung eines Namens verwendet werden kann. Ein Personenname bezieht sich auf eine Person, die anhand von bestimmten Kriterien identifiziert wird. Hierbei würde „ich“ im Objektgebrauch verwendet werden. Das Wort „ich“ im Subjektgebrauch aber bezieht sich nicht auf eine bestimmte Person.

Der Ausdruck „ich“ im Subjektgebrauch bedeutet auch nicht „dieser Körper“, weil man z.B. den Satz „Ich denke an y“ nicht sinnvoll durch „Dieser Körper denkt an y“ ersetzen kann. Denn die Beschreibung eines Körpers ersetzt nicht die Einstellungen des Subjekts „ich“ (Wittgenstein 1958: 74). Das Wort „ich“ bedeutet dann nicht „die Person, die jetzt spricht“, und deswegen kann sie auch nicht durch diesen Ausdruck ersetzt werden. Der Ausdruck „die Person, die jetzt spricht“ könnte vielmehr eine komplexe Form sein, etwa um zu sagen „Jetzt spreche ich“, oder um eine Antwort auf die Frage „Wer spricht jetzt?“ zu geben.

Wittgenstein unterscheidet im *Blue Book* zwischen dem Gebrauch von „ich“, der den Körper als Bezug hat, und dem Gebrauch von „ich“, der keinen Bezug hat, der als Subjekt gebraucht wird, und daher scheint der letzte eine vage Verwendung (Bedeutung) zu haben. Auf den Objektgebrauch, der einen körperlichen Bezug hat, stützt Wittgenstein im *Blue Book* seine Konzeption von Person.

Ein Interpret und Kritiker Wittgensteins, Klaus Puhl, meint, das Pronomen „ich“ habe gar keine referentielle Funktion, und deswegen könne „ich“ auch aus der Sprache eliminiert werden. Puhl vertreibt die These, dass, obwohl Wittgenstein im *Blue Book* eine kritische Absicht mit der Frage nach dem Subjekt verfolge, er dennoch durch die Unterscheidung vom Objektgebrauch und Subjektgebrauch des Wortes „ich“ auf ein körperliches Subjekt zeige (Puhl 1999: 92). Puhl argumentiert, der Subjektgebrauch der ersten Person sei in Wittgensteins *Blue Book* durch die fehlende Selbstidentifikation des Subjekts markiert (Puhl 1999: 92).

Nach Puhl findet man bei Wittgenstein drei Thesen über den Subjektgebrauch des Wortes „ich“. Die erste These lautet, dass das Wort „ich“ eliminierbar sei, weil es überflüssig sei. Diese These wird „Eliminierbarkeitsthese“ genannt. Die zweite These behauptet dann, dass das Wort „ich“ im Subjektgebrauch keinen Bezug habe bzw. kein referentieller Ausdruck sei. Dies ist die „Bezugslosigkeitsthese“. Die dritte These schließlich behauptet, dass die Selbstzuschreibung von psychologischen Prädikaten der ersten Person wie „Ich habe Schmerzen“ vorsprachliches Ausdrucksverhalten wie Stöhnen ersetze. Das ist die „Expressivitätsthese“.

Um die Eliminierbarkeitsthese des Wortes „ich“ bei Wittgenstein zu verteidigen, beruft sich Puhl auf folgende Textstelle bei Wittgenstein aus dem Jahre 1929: „Das Wort ‚ich‘ gehört zu denjenigen Wörtern, die man aus der Sprache eliminieren kann“ (Wittgenstein 1984: 49). Ähnliche Textstellen finden sich in den *Philosophischen Bemerkungen* (1929/30): Dort behauptet Wittgenstein, dass die Notationen das Wort „ich“ nicht brauchen, aber sie brauchen trotzdem eine Person, die das Zentrum der Notation sei (Wittgenstein 1984a: 89). Die Frage ist freilich, ob Wittgenstein im *Blue Book* (1933/34) die Eliminierbarkeitsthese des Wortes „ich“ weiterhin vertritt. Puhl ist vielmehr an einer allgemeinen Entschlüsselung von Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie interessiert und verteidigt die Eliminierbarkeit des Wortes „ich“ bei Wittgenstein. Allerdings redet Wittgenstein im *Blue Book* nicht offensichtlich über die Eliminierbarkeit des Wortes „ich“.

Klaus Puhl betont sehr eine Bezugskonzeption, in welcher der Bezug zu einem Gegenstand durch öffentliche Kriterien erfolgt. Dennoch muss man vorsichtig sein bei dieser Interpretation, damit man nicht eine Reduzierung der Sprache zu einer Bezugskonzeption macht, was Wittgenstein vermeiden will, da nach Wittgenstein die Bedeutung der Wörter durch ihren Gebrauch gegeben wird. Je nachdem, welche Art Wörter einer sprachlichen Gemeinschaft gebraucht werden, z.B. wenn sie nach einer Bezugskonzeption gebraucht werden, dann erhalten sie zweitrangig ihre Bedeutung durch den Gegenstand, die ihm entspricht. Würde man Klaus Puhls Interpretation folgen, sieht so aus, dass Wittgenstein im *Blue Book* weiterhin eine Bezugskonzeption hat, welche den Wörtern ihre Bedeutung gibt, obwohl die sich im *Blue Book* verändert, indem nur öffentlicher Bezug möglich ist bzw. es ist kein privater Bezug möglich, deshalb auch ist der Subjektgebrauch des Wortes „ich“ ein Problem.

Zusammengefasst kann man sagen: Die Unterscheidung zwischen Subjektgebrauch und Objektgebrauch des Wortes „ich“ besteht in der Perspektive des Sprechers. Wenn er sich in der Perspektive der ersten Person ausdrückt, dann steht der Ausdruck „ich“ im Subjektgebrauch, wenn er sich dagegen in der Perspektive der dritten Person ausdrückt, im Objektgebrauch. Die Identifikation eines Bezugs des Wortes „ich“ in der Perspektive der ersten Person ist nicht möglich. Sie ist nur in der Perspektive der dritten Person möglich. In diesem Sinn können die anderen Sprecher (Personen) den Sprecher (Person), der „Ich habe Schmerzen“ sagt, identifizieren. Sie verstehen „Ich habe Schmerzen“ als wahre oder falsche Aussage. Aber die Person (Sprecher) in der Perspektive der ersten Person kann sich selbst nicht identifizieren. Es gibt verschiedene Identifikationskriterien für Personen in der Perspektive der dritten Person, aber keine Identifikationskriterien in der Perspektive der ersten Person. Das Wort „ich“ im Subjektgebrauch ist kein referenzieller Ausdruck und verweist nur auf eine Perspektive, die Perspektive der ersten Person.

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# Wittgenstein's Nachlass Catalogue – Some Suggestions

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## 1. Introduction: the “aura” of the originals

Most of the literally estate of Ludwig Wittgenstein today is kept in the Wren-Library of the Trinity-College in Cambridge and in the Wittgenstein collection of the Austrian National Library in Vienna, which was established through continuous acquisitions since 1979<sup>1</sup>. The original manuscripts and typescripts have a high price on the antiquarian market<sup>2</sup> and are carefully preserved as precious treasures almost like philosophical relics.

Of course one could ask, what is the importance of these original manuscripts and typescripts in a age of digital editions? What is the meaning of the originals, if we have already complete digital editions, including high quality facsimiles etc.? The original manuscripts in the Archives in Cambridge and Vienna – I suppose – are rarely used for the research since the BEE was published. Are they more than auratic objects of adoration? Concerning the usability digital facsimiles of high resolution are of course superior, you can zoom in and see details much better. On the other hand archives and libraries pay a lot of money to collect these originals and preserve them for the future.

What remains is maybe something analog to the gold backing of our money – we must have some evidence that we are not speaking about digital phantoms – so the original physical original items are in a way important which goes far beyond a direct use of them.

## 2. The Non-philosophical Wittgenstein's Nachlass

What are we speaking about, when we speak about the Wittgenstein's Nachlass?

Usually we mean the **philosophical** papers of his Nachlass. Of course there is also a **non-philosophical** Nachlass consisting of different sorts of items:

Occasional (non philosophical) writings, like:

- Wittgenstein's Matura
- Wörterbuch für Volksschulen (incl. "Vorwort")
- Wittgenstein's Russian vocabulary exercise books (Nedo 1983.)
- Wittgenstein's recipe book in Guy's Hospital (Nedo 1983: 313)
- ...

Documents:

- Aeronautic patent
- Wittgenstein's last will<sup>3</sup>
- ...

<sup>1</sup> Two important items are in the Bodleiana in Oxford: MS 104 ("Prototrac-tus") and TS 202 (the "Engelmann Typescript" of the Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung).

<sup>2</sup> It seems Wittgenstein was anticipating this situation. A letter to Alice Ambrose from 17.1.1935 he finishes with the remark: "P.S. This signature is worth £ 100." (In 2005 the Austrian National Library bought 4 letters of L.W. to A. Ambrose – the price was much beyond that.)

<sup>3</sup> Original at District Probate Registry of the High Court of Justice at Carmarthen.

Collections:

- Wittgenstein's library
- Wittgenstein's photo album (Nedo 1993: 252 a.o.; Keicher 2012)
- "Collection of nonsense" (mentioned in his Last Will, handed to R.Rhees; McGuinness 2006 )
- ...

All these are interesting biographical documents telling us a lot about the person of L. Wittgenstein. A complete list of all these items, as far as they are published or available would be a great desideratum, but should be separated from the philosophical Nachlass.

## 3. The philosophical Nachlass: starting with von Wright's catalogue

The question what is Wittgenstein's philosophical Nachlass, of which parts does it consist?, is essential for any digital Wittgenstein edition. A complete as possible catalogue and overview of the whole Nachlass must be the backbone of a new Bergen Electronic Edition.

Also – as Jon Smith (2012) argued – we are not quite happy with von Wright's Nachlass catalogue today, it must be initial point anyway – there is no other. Von Wright's catalogue was the first – and so far last – attempt to give an overview of the whole Nachlass materials; an immense effort and achievement for the Wittgenstein community. In his article from 1969 (Von Wright 1969, 1981) he was actually identifying and determining what we call the Wittgenstein-Nachlass since then.

My suggestion is to slightly improve this catalogue aiming a web-based online catalogue as a backbone of a new digital Nachlass-edition.

A closer look at von Wright's catalogue first. Von Wright establishes three kinds of classifications concerning the Nachlass-items:

- (a) Physical type of document
- (b) Type of text
- (c) "Strata"

### (a) Physical type of document

Von Wright distinguishes between:

- Volumes
- Large notebooks
- Pocket notebooks

As suggested already by Alois Pichler (Pichler 1994) , I think it useful to add:

- Loose sheets
- Cuttings / Arrangements of cuttings (like TS 212, 222, 223,224, 233,...)
- Bound copies ("Blue book" , "Brown book")

These categories are part of an analytic description (meta-data) of each item. So it is not problematic to increase this categories.

### (b) Type of writing

The second category of von Wright the – “type of writing” as I want to call it – is his main aspect of order in his catalogue, well established in the Wittgenstein community. He distinguishes between:

- MS – manuscripts
- TS – typescripts (“dictated to a typist or otherwise prepared by Wittgenstein himself”)
- DIC – dictations (“verbatim records of dictations to colleagues or pupils”)

Von Wright mentions two more types – not collected by himself:

- Notes of conversations and lectures (“more or less verbatim”)
- Correspondence

I would suggest to add 3 more:

- MAR – marginalia: annotations of LW to texts of other authors (understandable only in connection with the commented text)  
e.g.: Notes on Frazer's *Golden Bough* (MS 143)  
Notes on Ludwig Hänsel's articles: *Wert und Wertgefühl* and *Newton – Goethe – Pascal. Die Farbenlehre und das Problem der Mitte* (Sommavilla 1994: 190-212; 339-245)  
Notes on Lamb's *Hydrodynamics*  
Notes on Hard's *A course of Pure Mathematics*  
...?

- MPT – materials concerning the publication of the Tractatus like corrections, page proofs .

The ANL owns the following documents, not yet included in the BEE:

	Austrian National Library, code number	date
Print of the Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung in “Annalen der Naturphilosophie” ed. by Wilhelm Ostwald, Vol. XIV 1921, with corrections of L.W.	Cod. Ser. n. 39.597	April 1922
Engl. Translation of the Log.-philosophischen Abhandlung by Frank Ramsey with annotations of L.W.	Cod. Ser. n. 39.598	Dec. 1921 – April 1922
List of questions of C.K. Ogden concerning the engl. translation of the Tractatus [Attached to his letter to L.W. from 3.5.1922]	Cod. Ser. n. 39.037	3.5.1922
Page-proofs of the Tractatus (of the bilingual edition 1922 with annotations of L.W. and Ogden.)	Cod. Ser. n. 39.039	July / Aug 1922

- MIN – minutes of meetings (like Moral Science Club Meetings) – to be separated from private notes from conversations and lectures.

It is evident, that not all of these types are at the same level, concerning their authenticity as a part of Wittgenstein's Nachlass. I think we have to make a clear difference between:

Authentic Wittgenstein texts	Not authentic Wittgenstein texts
MS – manuscripts	SOC – Notes of conversations and lectures
TS – typescripts	MIN – minutes of meetings
DIC – dictations	
MAR – marginalia	
MPT – materials re. the Tractatus publication	
Correspondence	

Digital edition of Wittgenstein's writings	
(here) Bergen electronic Edition	Compl. Ed. of Correspondence (Brenner Archives)

### (c) “Strata”

Von Wright mentions a third type of classification, what he calls “Strata”:

- first drafts
- more finished versions

He postulates that there is a relation between category (a) “type of material”, and (c) “strata”, although it is not very reliable one: “All manuscripts classified as “volumes” are of the more finished type; but to the same category belong also notebooks, pocket notebooks and writings on loose sheets.”

Pichler (1994: 105) has apply this categories to the manuscripts, taking “loose sheets” as a third one.

Anyway this aspect “strata” in von Wright terminology indicates an important other dimension in the Nachlass catalogue which should be picked up. We need a more “organic” view on the Nachlass – here I agree completely with Jon Smith. I want to call it a “text-genetic view” showing the complex relations between the items.


### 3. Identifying the Nachlass items

But at a first level I think we still do need an analytic catalogue, i.e. a complete list of all Nachlass items including metadata descriptions of every single Nachlass item.

But already at that level problems begin: what is the unit of one item? Of what kind of units does Wittgenstein's Nachlass consists of? Here we necessarily have to deal with the difference of “texts” and “skripts” as Alois Pichler introduced it (Pichler 2004: 52 ff). At the one hand we have physical documents (volumes, notebooks etc.) with a determined sequence of words, on the other hand we recognize the intended texts of the author. This difference is important.

One of the problems of von Wright's Nachlass catalogue is, that it does not clearly distinguish between these two levels. While the first one is just the unit of one physical object, the “intended text” is an intellectual unit. Different kinds or relations are possible between this two levels:

It becomes clear looking at MSS 105 +106 as an example:



Only if we read the three (virtual) parts of MS 106 in this sequence, which Wittgenstein indicates by exact advices, we can get the intended text, i.e. in this case a simple chronological order of his remarks.

So we see, the way von Wright describes these items in his catalogue

MS 105 Volume I. “Philosophische Bemerkungen”.

Begin 2. Februaray 1929, 135 pp.

MS 106 Volume II. Unated, 1929.298pp.

is slightly inexact, because: MS 105 ≠ I. Band Philosophische Bemerkungen

and MS 106 ≠ II. Band

There are two possible correct ways of describing the catalogue items:

a) taking the physical document as a unit,		or b) the intended texts:	
MS 105: I. Band Philosophische Bemerkungen [pages verso 1-125]		I. Band Philosophische Bemerkungen MS 105 [recto pages]	
II. Band [part 3, pages verso 6-124]		II. Band	
MS 106: II. Band [part 1, recto] [part 2, verso]		MS 106 [recto pages] MS 107 [verso pages]	
catalogue of (physical) documents		catalogue of texts	

I think there are good reasons to stay on the left side, the catalog should be a catalog of physical items not of texts, because it is the lowest, basic level , free of interpretations.

What does that mean for a digital edition?

The BEE consists of three parallel levels:

Faksimile = physical copy      Diplomatic  
Transcription  
Normalized Transcription

Pichler declares (2004: 56) in the BEE the diplomatic transcriptions depicts the "script" i.e. the physical sequence in the document, the normalized transcription depicts the text. I also think that should be like that, but it is not the case in the BEE now.

Faksimile – physical copy	Diplomatic Transcription	Normalized Transcription
MS 105	105 recto pages	105 recto pages
105 verso	105 verso	105 verso
106 verso	106 verso	106 verso
106 verso	106 verso	106 verso
As it should be	same	same
		105 recto pages 105 verso 106 verso 106 verso

The diplomatic transcription should keep the unit of the document, put gives the correct sequences of the pages; the normalized transcription should give the correct text (= correct succession of the remarks ), even transcending the borders of the document units.



Case 2 is not problematic for the electronic edition, for case 3 and 4 solutions have to found.


#### 4. The text-genetic view

Von Wright's third type of category, "strata", indicates another dimension in W's Nachlass:


All the Nachlass items build a very complex text-genetic network, which we can try to reconstruct.

Michael Nedo text-genetic diagrams give a good idea what that could mean:

Example: Big Typecript (Nedo 2002: VIII):



But it will have its chronological place in the total map, like that:



## Conclusion

What I want to suggest is a combined interactive catalogue of three linked access points to the Nachlass:



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# Der Mutmassliche Wille im Deutschen Transplantationsgesetz

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In Deutschland wird in der Praxis der erweiterten Zustimmungslösung zur Organspende das folgende dreistufige Verfahren angewendet: Ist ein Organspendeausweis vorhanden oder der tatsächliche Wille des Verstorbenen beispielsweise aus Gesprächen zu Lebzeiten bekannt, muß er unter allen Umständen befolgt werden. Ist aber ein solcher tatsächlicher Wille nicht bekannt, ist bei der Entscheidungsfindung des nächsten Angehörigen der sogenannte ‚mutmaßliche Wille‘ zu beachten. Falls auch dieser nicht feststellbar ist, wird dem nächsten Angehörigen unter Verweis auf das Totensorgerecht die freie Entscheidung überlassen, ob der Leichnam für eine Organ- und/oder Gewebeentnahme zur Verfügung stehen soll. In diesem kurzen Artikel möchte ich dafür argumentieren, daß die Berufung auf den mutmaßlichen Willen im zweiten Schritt unzulässig ist.

Der mutmaßliche Wille ist ein relativ kontroverses juristisches Konstrukt, das in vielerlei Kontexten auftritt, aber nur gewohnheitsrechtlich geregelt ist (Mitsch 2012). Einführend läßt er sich analog zur sogenannten ‚Geschäftsführung ohne Auftrag‘ (§§ 677-687 BGB) verstehen, bei der ein ‚Geschäftsführer‘ die Geschäfte eines ‚Geschäftsherrn‘ führt, ohne explizit beauftragt worden zu sein. Beispielhaft wäre ein Fall, in dem der Geschäftsherr während eines Interkontinentalflugs unerreichbar ist, sein Nachbar (der Geschäftsführer) aber zulässigerweise glaubt, daß er ein Feuer in dessen Gartenhaus auch dann durch Wassereinsatz löschen darf, wenn er sich dabei die Hose schmutzig macht. Er ist dann berechtigt, für den betriebenen Aufwand eine Entschädigung einzufordern, insofern die Geschäftsführung dem Interesse und dem tatsächlichen oder mutmaßlichen Willen des Geschäftsherrn entspricht (bzw. durch öffentliches Interesse oder Unterhaltspflichten gerechtfertigt wird). Generell gilt, wie §677 BGB ausführt, daß „das Geschäft so zu führen [ist], wie das Interesse des Geschäftsherrn mit Rücksicht auf dessen wirklichen oder mutmaßlichen Willen es erfordert.“

Der ersatzweise Bezug auf den mutmaßlichen Willen soll hier gewährleisten, daß (im Regelfall) das Selbstbestimmungsrecht des Geschäftsherren, dessen tatsächlicher Wille nicht in Erfahrung gebracht werden kann, ansonsten aber alleine ausschlaggebend gewesen wäre, soweit wie möglich gewahrt bleibt. Der Geschäftsführer kann daher nicht jegliche Veränderungen am Eigentum des Geschäftsherren vornehmen, die er selbst für angebracht hält, sondern nur die, die dem (tatsächlichen oder) mutmaßlichen Willen entsprechen. Beispielsweise wäre es wohl unzulässig, unter Berufung auf den mutmaßlichen Willen des Nachbarn einfach dessen Gartenhaus mit einem neuen Anstrich zu versehen.

Da er indirekt ermittelt werden muß, ist es naturgemäß schwierig, über den mutmaßlichen Willen verlässliche Aussagen zu treffen. In diesen Paragraphen wird der mutmaßliche Wille daher vereinfachend stets als dem *Interesse* des Geschäftsherrn entsprechend aufgefasst. Dies ist aber in anderen juristischen Kontexten nicht erforderlich, wie der Bundesgerichtshof ausgeführt hat: „Objektive Kriterien, insbesondere die Beurteilung einer Maßnahme als gemeinhin vernünftig und normal sowie den Interessen eines verständigen Patienten üblicherweise entsprechend,

haben keine eigenständige Bedeutung, sondern dienen lediglich der Ermittlung des individuellen hypothetischen Willens“ (BGHSt 35, 246, 249f). Der mutmaßliche Wille muß also, um einen Anspruch auf Beachtung zu haben, genausowenig den ‚objektiven‘ Interessen einer Person entsprechen wie ihr tatsächlicher Wille im täglichen Leben.

Im deutschen Transplantationsgesetz (TPG) spielt der mutmaßliche Wille eine entscheidende Rolle. Laut TPG muß bei Unkenntnis des tatsächlichen Willens der mutmaßliche Wille ‚beachtet werden‘:

## § 4 Entnahme mit Zustimmung anderer Personen

(1) [...] Ist auch dem nächsten Angehörigen eine solche [schriftliche oder mündliche] Erklärung nicht bekannt, so ist die Entnahme [...] nur zulässig, wenn ein Arzt den nächsten Angehörigen über eine in Frage kommende Organ- oder Gewebeentnahme unterrichtet und dieser ihr zugestimmt hat. [...] Der nächste Angehörige hat bei seiner Entscheidung einen mutmaßlichen Willen des möglichen Organ- oder Gewebespenders zu beachten. Der Arzt hat den nächsten Angehörigen hierauf hinzuweisen.

Der ‚mutmaßliche Wille‘ eines Verstorbenen ist, wie ich nun ausführen möchte, ein äußerst fragwürdiges Konstrukt.<sup>1</sup> Wie bereits erwähnt, geht es bei der Ermittlung des mutmaßlichen Willens in erster Linie darum, den derzeit unbekannten – und deswegen derzeit nur ‚mutmaßlichen‘ – aber dennoch plausiblerweise zumindest dispositionell vorhandenen Willen zu ergründen. Der tatsächliche Wille sollte sich also im Idealfall vom mutmaßlichen Willen nur dadurch unterscheiden, daß der tatsächliche Wille unzweideutig kundgetan wurde.

Mutmaßungen wären nicht erforderlich, könnte man den Betroffenen über seinen Willen befragen. Es liegt also nahe, den mutmaßlichen Willen als gemutmaßte Antwort auf eine hypothetische an den Betroffenen gerichtete Frage zu verstehen: Wenn ich ihn jetzt darüber befragen könnte, was er möchte, was würde er wohl antworten? Nun ist bei einem Toten eine solche Befragung offenkundig widersinnig, denn ein Toter hat trivialerweise keinen Willen. In diesem speziellen Falle kann der mutmaßliche Wille also nicht der Wille sein, den er kundtäte, würde er gefragt. Auch in der Zukunft wird ein Toter nie wieder einen Willen kundtun können, man kann also auch nicht auf eine zukünftige Bestätigung der Entscheidung abzielen. Um dem mutmaßlichen Willen eines Toten überhaupt etwas entsprechen lassen zu können, muß es sich daher um den Willen des Verstorbenen zu Lebzeiten handeln.<sup>2</sup>

Nun stehen wir aber vor einem epistemischen Problem: Wie soll der mutmaßliche Wille eines Verstorbenen ermittelbar sein, wenn eine tatsächliche Willensäußerung zu Lebzeiten nicht stattgefunden hat? Welche Anhaltspunkte lassen sich nun noch ausmachen? Dieses epistemische

<sup>1</sup> Ich gehe hier nicht auf die ebenfalls problematische Tatsache ein, daß auch unter Juristen keine Einigkeit darüber herrscht, wie ‚beachten‘ in diesem Kontext zu verstehen ist, wobei u.a. ‚Folge leisten‘ und ‚zur Kenntnis nehmen‘ vertreten werden.

<sup>2</sup> Auch dies gilt nur, wenn der Verstorbene zu Lebzeiten zumindest zeitweise einwilligungsfähig war. Andernfalls kann die Berufung auf einen ‚mutmaßlichen Willen‘ keinerlei Sinn ergeben (Merkel 1995).

Problem stellt sich prinzipiell ebenso bei auslegungsbedürftigen Patientenverfügungen, bei der Organ- und Gewebespende ist es aber besonders verzwickt, wie mit dem folgenden Beispiel verdeutlicht werden soll.

Stellen wir uns eine Person vor (nennen wir sie zur Veranschaulichung Frau Maier), die viele Jahre in leitender Position in der Deutschen Stiftung Organtransplantation (DSO) tätig war und in Folge eines Unfalls einen Hirntod stirbt. Frau Maier führt weder einen Organspendeausweis bei sich, noch hat sie sich gegenüber ihren Angehörigen je explizit zu einer möglichen Organspende geäußert. Über einen tatsächlichen Willen ist also nichts bekannt. Was lässt sich dann über ihren mutmaßlichen Willen aussagen? Einerseits scheint die Antwort auf der Hand zu liegen, schließlich hat sie sich beruflich für die Transplantationsmedizin engagiert. Also darf man wohl davon ausgehen, daß sie den Organ- und Gewebespender nicht völlig ablehnend gegenüber stand. Andererseits hätte man auch von ihr – gerade von ihr! – erwarten dürfen, daß sie einen Organspendeausweis ausfüllt. Wenn *Frau Maier* es nicht tut, wer dann? Aber ist angesichts dieser Tatsache vielleicht gerade das Fehlen eines Spenderausweises ein Zeichen dafür, daß sie – möglicherweise, weil sie detaillierten Einblick in die Problematik hatte – gegenüber der Organ- und Gewebespender gewisse, aus beruflichen Gründen vielleicht nie offen ausgesprochene Vorbehalte hatte?

Wie lautet der mutmaßliche Wille von Frau Maier? Es erscheint in diesem Fall praktisch unmöglich, eine Aussage darüber zu treffen, was Frau Maier zu Lebzeiten „wohl gewollt hätte“. Allem Anschein nach *hat* sie nämlich nichts gewollt. Sonst hätte sie wohl einen Organspendeausweis ausgefüllt.

Man mag nun weitere Gründe für oder gegen eine postmortale Einwilligung in die Organ- und Gewebespender in Betracht ziehen. Eine Berufung auf Weltanschauungen (wie Zugehörigkeit zu einer Religionsgemeinschaft), kulturelle oder soziale Hintergründe erscheinen jedoch ebenfalls kaum tragfähig. Selbst wenn sich eine Religionsgemeinschaft ganz explizit für die Organspende ihrer Mitglieder ausspräche, ließe sich (wie gesagt: bei Unkenntnis eines tatsächlichen Willens, der natürlich auch in religiösen Glaubensbekenntnissen erklärt werden kann) nicht mit hinreichender Sicherheit voraussetzen, daß jedes ihrer Mitglieder *für sich selbst* eine Organspende wünscht. Da die Ermittlung des mutmaßlichen Willens aber zwangsläufig ungewisser ist als die des tatsächlichen Willens, muß gerade die nur subsidiäre mutmaßliche Einwilligung besonders sorgfältig überprüft werden.

Der Fall von Frau Maier ist somit zwar konstruiert, aber keineswegs tendenziös. Es wäre zu erwarten gewesen, daß in einer solchen Konstellation die Ermittlung des mutmaßlichen Willens besonders unproblematisch ist. Bei Personen, die mit der Organspende zu Lebzeiten nie direkt zu tun gehabt haben, dürften die Schwierigkeiten noch größer sein. Es ist nicht zu erkennen, welche Anhaltspunkte zur Ermittlung eines mutmaßlichen Willens bei einer Organspende zulässig sein könnten.

In der Tat glaube ich, daß die folgende noch stärkere These gelten muß: eine Person, die sich nie explizit zu Organ- und Gewebespender geäußert hat, einen *tatsächlichen* Willen also nicht erklärt hat, kann überhaupt keinen *mutmaßlichen* Willen im Sinne des TPG haben. Falls sie Wünsche darüber gehabt haben sollte, ob ihre Organe nach ihrem Tode entnommen werden sollten, aus welchem Grund hätte sie mit dieser Überzeugung hinter den Berg gehalten? Es handelt sich schließlich um eine Entscheidung, bei der, *insofern sie denn wirklich getroffen*

wird – und zwar unabhängig davon, wie sie ausfallen mag – mit Sicherheit davon auszugehen ist, daß es der betroffenen Person wichtig ist, daß genau das geschieht, was sie sich selber wünscht. Wenn sich jemand also einmal dafür (bzw. dagegen) entschieden hat, seinen Leichnam zur Organentnahme freizugeben, ist es ihm vermutlich wichtig, daß seinem Leichnam auch wirklich (oder eben nicht) Organe entnommen werden (insofern medizinisch möglich). Darüber hinaus gilt auch, daß das Umsetzen des eigenen Wunsches vergleichsweise einfach ist – es muß ja nur ein Organspendeausweis ausgefüllt werden. Ein kostspieliger Gang zum Notar oder eine entblößende öffentliche Erklärung vor Zeugen ist nicht erforderlich.

Das Fehlen eines Organspendeausweises bzw. einer ausdrücklichen anderen Erklärung würde somit nicht nur zeigen, daß der potentielle Spender zu Lebzeiten keine relevanten Wünsche hinsichtlich einer Organspende *ausgedrückt* hat, sondern daß er schlicht gar keine *hatte*.<sup>3</sup> Aber wenn es guten Grund zu der Annahme gibt, daß er gar keine Wünsche hatte, dann muß die Frage nach dem *mutmaßlichen Willen* zwangsläufig negativ beantwortet werden. Der „*mutmaßliche Wille*“ ist letztlich eine Mutmaßung über den tatsächlichen Willen; wenn klar ist, daß es keinen relevanten tatsächlichen Willen gab, können solche Mutmaßungen nur ins Leere gehen.<sup>4</sup>

Dies gilt im Übrigen ganz besonders dann, wenn wir mit Sicherheit sagen können, daß der potentielle Spender sich tatsächlich mit der Frage der Organspende auseinandergesetzt hat, wie es die im Deutschen Bundestag unlängst allseits befürwortete „Entscheidungslösung“ vorsieht. Zu sagen, daß eine Person, der ein Organspendeausweis in den Briefkasten zugestellt wird (ideal: die ihn per Einschreiben mit Rückschein empfangen hat), ihn aber nicht ausfüllt, vermutlich für (bzw. gegen) eine Organ- und Gewebespender sei, ist nachgerade absurd. Wenn sich jemand trotz Aufforderung weder für noch gegen eine Spende ausgesprochen *hat*, es aber hätte tun können, kann es kaum zulässig sein über ihn zu behaupten, daß er sich wohl für (oder gegen) eine Spende ausgesprochen *hätte*. Wenn er das wirklich getan *hätte*, dann hätte er es *getan!*

Der Bezug auf einen mutmaßlichen Willen im TPG erscheint also unbefriedigend. Insofern wir annehmen wollen, daß (im Falle der Organ- und Gewebespender) in Abwesenheit eines erklärten Willens von einem mutmaßlichen Willen überhaupt sinnvollerweise gesprochen werden kann – was mir zumindest sehr gewagt erscheint – ist es jedenfalls selbst im oben geschilderten Idealfall schwer zu erkennen, wie sich dieser ermitteln ließe. Als generelles Instrument für nicht-ideale Szenarien wäre er also auf jeden Fall ungeeignet.

Dieses Argument mag aber, gerade Praktikern, etwas spitzfindig erscheinen. Da, insofern kein mutmaßlicher Wille ermittelbar ist, ohnehin die nächsten Angehörigen die Entscheidung treffen müssen bzw. dürfen, ist es für das weitere Vorgehen unerheblich, ob der Angehörige nun den mutmaßlichen Willen des Verstorbenen akkurat wiederge-

<sup>3</sup> Ähnlich verhält es sich beim Abfassen eines letzten Willens. Es wäre völlig abwegig, bei Nichtvorliegen eines Testaments oder einer anderen expliziten Äußerung unter Berufung auf den mutmaßlichen Willen des Verstorbenen zu behaupten, daß der Erblasser sein Vermögen wohl dem Roten Kreuz vermachen wollte. Wäre dem so, wäre doch unter praktisch allen denkbaren Umständen ein explizites Testament zu erwarten gewesen.

<sup>4</sup> Man mag es für möglich halten, daß der nicht geäußerte aber tatsächlich vorhandene Wunsch war, daß der nächste Angehörige nach seinen eigenen Wünschen entscheiden solle. Da der Angehörige im zweiten Schritt aber zuerst den *mutmaßlichen Willen* beachten muß, bestünde dann die Gefahr, daß der Angehörige sich über diesen täuscht. Er würde dann vielleicht nicht, wie beabsichtigt, nach *seinen* Maßstäben und Wünschen die Entscheidung treffen. Auch in einem solchen Szenario wäre also eine entsprechende Erklärung die einzige sinnvolle Maßnahme. Ein plausibler mutmaßlicher Wille kann also auch dies nicht sein.

ben kann oder nicht. Denn wenn der Angehörige nach reiflicher Überlegung nichts über den mutmaßlichen Willen aussagen kann, steht ihm de jure eine Entscheidung zu, bei der er sich gar nicht mehr durch den (tatsächlichen oder mutmaßlichen) Willen des Verstorbenen leiten lassen muß.

Gerade moralisch besteht aber ein wesentlicher Unterschied zwischen dem zweiten und dem dritten Schritt der dreistufigen Entscheidungsfindung. Viele Angehörige mag die Entscheidung, ob der Leichnam einer – typischerweise unerwartet und durch einen tragischen Unfall – verstorbenen (z.B.) Tochter oder Ehefrau für eine Organentnahme verwendet werden sollte, in eine gewisse emotionale Zwangslage bringen. Einem Angehörigen dürfte es nicht ohne weiteres einsichtig erscheinen, daß in einer solchen Situation gerade das getan werden sollte, was er persönlich wünscht. Wieso sollte ausgerechnet bei der emotional und ethisch hochkomplexen, ja buchstäblich intimen Frage der Organspende er das Sagen haben? Zu Lebzeiten hat die Tochter sich ja auch (z.B.) gegen den Willen des Vaters die Nase piercen lassen. Wenn er bereits auf diese Aspekte des Lebens seiner Angehörigen keinerlei moralisch oder rechtlich legitimierten Zugriff hatte, wieso nun gerade wenn es um die Organ- und Gewebespende geht, bei der der gesamte Körper einer ‚Totaloperation‘ unterzogen wird? Wieso sollte ihm diese unangenehme Entscheidung *aufgezwungen* werden können? Einer Person, die solche Überlegungen anstellt, dürfte sicher emotional geholfen sein, wenn ihr die Möglichkeit gegeben wird, sich auf einen mutmaßlichen Willen des Verstorbenen zu berufen. Man kann sich so auch ohne explizite Willensäußerung des Verstorbenen zumindest im Unterbewußtsein den Eindruck verschaffen, daß der Verstorbene ‚es sicher so gewollt hätte‘.

Wie emotional wünschenswert dies für den Angehörigen auch sein mag, verlagert es doch in einer unzulässigen Art die moralische Verantwortung für die Organentnahme. Nur vermeintlich trifft (oder befürwortet) der Verstorbene die Entscheidung, tatsächlich trifft sie aber der Angehörige – und zwar bereits im zweiten Schritt, wo ihm dies auch de jure nicht zusteht. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist es also durchaus bedenkenswert, daß fast 70% aller Organ- und Gewebespenden durch den ‚mutmaßlichen Willen‘ des Verstorbenen rechtlich abgesichert werden (laut DSO, siehe Breyer und Kliemt 2007: 473). Äußerst selten tritt hingegen der Fall ein, daß der dritte Schritt des TPG benötigt wird. Angesichts der oben ausgeführten Schwierigkeiten wäre das Gegenteil zu erwarten gewesen.

Des Weiteren besteht hier ein nicht zu vernachlässigendes Problem der Beeinflussung durch die beteiligten Ärzte. Die ‚soziale Erwünschtheit‘ der Organ- und Gewebespende – die unbestrittene Tatsache, daß es als politisch korrekt angesehen wird, sich für die Organ- und Gewebespende auszusprechen,<sup>5</sup> könnte dazu führen, daß sich die Angehörigen tendenziell ebenfalls für eine solche Spende aussprechen, wenn sie über den mutmaßlichen Willen des Verstorbenen befragt werden.<sup>6</sup> Es ist ein nachvollziehbares Bestreben, den Verstorbenen durch eine (von ihm wohl befürwortete) lebensrettende Spende in ein gutes Licht rücken zu wollen. Die nun gewissermaßen ‚überflüssigen‘ Organe mit ins Grab nehmen zu wollen mag hingenegen als selbstsüchtig angesehen werden.

Ich fasse zusammen: Der mutmaßliche Wille, der, insfern er überhaupt als hier konzeptionell zulässig angenommen werden darf, kaum je mit hinreichender Gewißheit ermittelbar sein dürfte, kann als Feigenblatt für Angehörige dienen, um ihre Entscheidung – wie immer sie ausfallen mag, und aus welchen Gründen auch immer – dadurch zu rechtfertigen, daß es der Verstorbene ‚wohl so gewollt hätte‘. Er könnte auch als Instrument der Beeinflussung der Angehörigen durch die Ärzte gebraucht werden, die ihnen eine bestimmte Entscheidung nahelegen. Angesichts dieser Schwierigkeiten plädiere ich dafür, keine Entscheidungen über Organ- und Gewebespende unter Berufung auf den mutmaßlichen Willen des Verstorbenen zuzulassen.

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<sup>5</sup> Sehr freimütig hier gerade der Nationale Ethikrat (2007: 39): „Das Ergebnis ist deutlich: Die Bereitschaft zur postmortalen Organspende ist ethisch als die objektiv vorzugswürdige Alternative anzusehen.“

<sup>6</sup> Es ist natürlich schwer zu sagen, ob dies in der Realität tatsächlich ein Problem darstellt. Aber auch das ist ein Problem.

# The Normativity of the Truth Predicate

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## 1. Introduction

Many theorists about truth take the truth predicate to be a descriptive predicate, i.e. it is a predicate which is used to describe truth bearers. "True" names a certain property which can, just as its contradictory "false", be ascribed of whatever the respective truth theorist prefers as a truth bearer, such that a further truth apt expression results. Conceived this way, "true" is used solely as a linguistic device to state a fact or to inform a hearer of a fact.

Another nowadays widespread position towards the nature of truth is, roughly, that is has none. These other truth theorists claim that the truth predicate is more or less semantically redundant, because it predicates nothing or hardly anything to that of which truth is ascribed to.

In what follows I want to argue that both views are incorrect. Truth is neither a solely descriptive notion nor is it semantically redundant. Instead, I want to argue for the intrinsic normative nature of the concept of truth and explain what is meant by it. Normativity is an essential feature of the concept of truth which unfortunately has been neglected in most of the recent analytical literature on truth so far. But no theory or analysis of truth could be called complete unless it takes this feature into account.

First I want to explain what I mean by "the normative nature" of the concept of truth. Then I will bring some arguments in favour of a normative conception of truth and, finally, I will spell out some consequences of its normative nature for our general understanding of the concept of truth.

## 2. What is meant by normative nature of truth and why does it have it?

I've already said what is commonly understood by "descriptive predicate". There's another class of predicates, which I'd like to call with Hare 'prescriptive' (Hare 1952). Ascription of predicates of such a kind to a subject term don't result in a linguistic expression which again is truth apt, but fulfills another linguistic function, namely it gives answers of the right kind to the question "What should I do?" The force of utterances containing a predicate of which prescriptive use is made is not assertive or declarative but prescriptive. According to Hare's meta-ethical theory about the meaning of moral predicates like "good", "right" and "should", the prescriptive force of an utterance containing such a predicate (of which prescriptive use is made) is imperative. Hare's thesis is that, roughly, the meaning of e.g. "good" is to be explained by the effect that if "good" is inserted into a sentence, it will give the property to the whole sentence, that its utterance in an appropriate context is the performance of an imperative speech act.

My thesis now is that the meaning of "true" is to be explained in the same way, i.e. the meaning of "true" is at least partly to be explained by its performative effect. A truth predication of the form "X is true" is primarily not used to ascribe a property to some kind of truth bearer, but is used to perform the speech act of an epistemic commen-

dation. By epistemic commendation I understand an utterance with imperative force which is apt to answer questions of the form "What should I believe?" The truth predicate is thus not contingently normative – it does not happen to be so that most people value truth highly – but the truth predicate is intrinsically normative.

Before I give some arguments in favour of the prescriptive character of the truth predicate I want to stress that I in no way claim that "true" has no descriptive meaning at all. I am not saying, like radical deflationists or the early Strawson did, that truth predication can have no descriptive meaning at all (Strawson 1949: 92). Like Hare held of moral judgements, sentences of the form "X is good" may very well be used to inform the hearer that X has certain descriptive properties (Hare 1952, ch. 7.1). Especially when both speaker and hearer share a common standard according to which both would call something X good, one speaker can inform the other that that certain standard is actually fulfilled by X by saying "X is good". A standard consist in a set of descriptive properties which have to be instantiated by the thing which is called "good". That this is so can be seen from the fact that we always evaluate things on the basis of their descriptive properties. So, it wouldn't make sense to call a car "good" and answer to the question: "Why do you call it 'good'?" "Oh nothing – there's no further reason" – "But do you want to say that none of its properties has something to do with its goodness?" – "Yes, it is just good because it's good". But this is absurd.

Nonetheless, the meaning of "good" is just not equivalent to some set of descriptive properties, as descriptivists claim. The reason for this is that we usually want to *commend* things when we use the predicate "good". And to commend something means to guide choices. When we say "X is a good thing to do" we normally want to express that X is to be done or should be done. Or when we say "That is a good car" we want to express something like "Choose this car (if you have the opportunity)". It would be contradictory to say "That's a good car but don't choose it (if you had to choose one)" or "X is a good thing to do but don't do it." The case is even clearer with the predicate "right". "To do this would be right" is to commend this action and it would be just contradictory to say "To do this would be right but don't do it". The case is strikingly similar to that of "true". When we say that something is true we normally commend it in a way. Of course we don't commend actions of any kind but beliefs. Truth predication deliver answers of the right kind to the question "What should I believe?" – just like "good"-predications deliver answers of the right kind to the question "What should I do?". When we tell someone what is true then we are telling him what he should believe. It would be a contradiction to say "X is true but don't believe it", for one would have to reply: "Why do you call it 'true' then?" Of course, sometimes it might seem that it is not contradictory to say "X is true but don't believe it." – Sometimes truths are too cruel or disgusting or boring or even too dangerous that we surely do not commend it to anyone to believe. But in these cases we have a special *non-epistemic* reason that prevents the commendation. If we rule out all non-

epistemic aspects which might occur in the context of a truth predication then it becomes more obvious that we usually commend something by calling it true. It would be contradictory to say: "X is true but X is not epistemically preferable" or to say "X is true, but if the question arises to believe X or not and no non-epistemic considerations are relevant: still do not believe it".

That "true" is used for commanding can also be seen from this: When we say: "Beliefs that have the descriptive property F are true" we don't want to utter the tautology "Beliefs that are F are F." – just like when we say "Actions that have the descriptive properties G are good" we don't want to utter the tautology that "Actions that are G are G". What we in fact want to do is to *commend* beliefs that are F and that is to issue a speech act of an imperative kind. It is to say something like "Choose, if you have the opportunity, to believe, that p!" or short "Believe, that p!" We *affirm*, *confirm* or *endorse* the proposition that p, when we call it true, not just describe it. This is the normativity of the truth predicate.

Like I said, "X is true" may sometimes be used to merely describe X or to inform a hearer that X has certain descriptive properties. This has to do with the fact that we have standards for predication truth of beliefs. Just like it would be absurd to call a car good because of its goodness it would be absurd to call a belief true just because of its truth. It is always legitimate to ask why someone calls a belief true and then we expect the specification of some descriptive properties of that belief, in virtue of which it is true. The speaker could e.g. answer that he perceived that p himself or that some expert told him that p or that he read it in a reputable newspaper or something else. We are epistemic beings, i.e. we don't use the truth predicate in a way in which it was totally independent from any justification procedures. We are bound to give reasons for truth claims if challenged and this means we're bound to state descriptive properties of our beliefs which form the criteria for use of the truth predicate.

Like all evaluative predicates also the truth predicate thus *supervenes* on descriptive predicates which function as justification. When we call a belief true just because it has the descriptive property F we will have to call all other beliefs that instantiate F "true" as well. This feature of the truth predicate follows from its supervenient character and can be called with Hare "universalizability" (Hare 1952, ch. 5.2). Our truth standards must be universalizable – otherwise we would be committing a logical error. It is for logical reasons that we can't say: This belief b1 is true, because it is the result of a reliable belief-forming process (such as perception), but that belief b2, which has the same descriptive properties as b1 regarding the way it was formed is not true.

I said that the prescriptive meaning of "true" has a primacy over its descriptive meaning. Here are two arguments for this:

(1) When the standards for truth in a speaker community don't change over a long period of time, it is still possible to issue commendations with the truth predicate – as long as the use of "true" in this community of speakers is still similar to ours. Let's assume (very simplistically) that in history there was a time in which it was a sufficient condition for a sentence to be true that it you could find it in the bible, and that after a while these truth standards changed towards the doctrine, that it was a sufficient condition for a sentence to be true that you have a corresponding sensual experience. It would not be adequate to say that the speakers in earlier days outright misused the truth predi-

cate or that they misunderstood the truth concept. It would not be adequate to say that the proponents of the bible theory of truth didn't know yet what truth really was for they identified truth with the wrong set of descriptive properties. In fact we today understand what proponents of the bible theory of truth were after: they wanted to commend propositions of a certain kind – we surely wouldn't accept their commendation, but we surely are able to understand the meaning of their truth predication.

Imagine an argument between a proponent of the bible theory and the sense experience theorist. Both parties have different epistemic standards about the basic principles of what can legitimately count as knowledge and their argument must be regarded as a real, substantial quarrel. But, if the truth predicate was synonymous with a certain set of descriptive properties we would have to interpret their argument as a mere fight over words. In that case their argument could be settled by a third speaker who would make both aware of the fact that the one disputant attaches another meaning to the word "true" than the other and that they're simply not talking about the same thing. But it is clear that in fact the disputants want to commend to each other the beliefs which are specified by their respective epistemic standards. Thus, unless they have a shared common notion of truth which consists in its prescriptive power, they could not be in a real argument for they would not even contradict each other.

(2) We use the truth predicate to teach and learn new epistemic standards and it could not be seen how this was achieved if the meaning of the truth predicate was completely descriptive and not a bit prescriptive.

We are able to introduce new epistemic standards by statements of the form "All beliefs which have the descriptive property F are true". Think of the period of time in which the bible theory of truth is about to be replaced by the new sense experience theory of truth. Imagine you are a proponent of the new sense experience theory and that you want to teach the new epistemic standard to a proponent of the old theory. You could do that by saying "I know that you think that a belief is true its written in the bible – but, listen, beliefs are true only if they are the result of sensual experience." If the epistemic standards of the listeners would be so fix and consolidated that they use "true" not longer as a prescriptive but totally synonymous with the descriptive predicate "written in the bible" – it would be impossible for them to understand what you were up to: For them, you would always say something contradictory when you say "All beliefs which are the result of sensual experience are true". They couldn't understand that you want to introduce a new epistemic standard. But, when their use of "true" is similar to ours they will understand: "Aha! It's the beliefs from sensual experience that we should have." The possibility to teach and learn new epistemic standards by saying "All beliefs which are F are true" shows that the meaning of truth predicate really consists of two components: a variable descriptive one and a constant prescriptive one. For when one says "All beliefs which are F are true" he commends a descriptively identifiable set of beliefs epistemically. This means, that we can use the prescriptive meaning of "true" to change its descriptive meaning. That's why the prescriptive meaning is primary. Again, if the truth predicate was entirely descriptive, this kind of epistemic teaching would be impossible.

Truth is thus a concept with a prescriptive and a descriptive meaning in which the prescriptive meaning has a primacy of the prescriptive meaning. That means while it can have a certain descriptive meaning, it must have a prescriptive meaning because we use it for commanding truth

bearers. We issue imperatives of an epistemic kind when we call something true and it is only in a secondary sense that we ascribe properties to a truth bearer by calling something true.

### 3. Philosophical consequences of the normativity of truth

If the foregoing arguments for the prescriptivity of the truth predicate are sound then it follows that there is an irreducible semantic content of the truth predicate which is not accounted for by most truth theories. I have not only in mind the classical candidates for truth theories like correspondence and coherence theories but especially most truth theories of the deflationary sort. Of course, there are differences among all the theories which can be classified as deflationary, but pretty much all of them hold that all or almost all there is to say about the truth predicate is expressed by the deflationary scheme "X is true iff p" (where

X is a name of the proposition that p) or one of its technically motivated varieties. I don't want to go into the many technical varieties of the deflationary schema that different deflationary or minimal accounts of truth put forward, because the point is perfectly general: To ascribe truth to a truth bearer means to ascribe to it a status of rightness, correctness or appropriateness – and it is precisely this what couldn't be realized if the truth predicate was either semantically redundant or a purely descriptive predicate. That's why the "deflationary", "disquotational", "redundancy", "minimal" or "modest" accounts of truth are semantically inadequate.

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# What can be Meaningfully Said about the “Nelböck Case”? Wittgenstein’s and Waismann’s Analyses of Ethics in Practice

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The murder of Prof. M. Schlick, committed in 1936 in a tense socio-political situation, sealed the fate of the Vienna Circle and caused a sensation in the Viennese society. In the following text the tragic incident is presented in the context of the expositions of ethics and the possibilities of its expression in language given by Wittgenstein and Waismann – Schlick’s close associates.

## I. What can be stated about the ineffability of ethics?

“Is the existence of the world connected with what is ethical?”, is a question addressed to Wittgenstein by Waismann during their conversation on December 17, 1930, and answered in a rather religious manner: “Men have felt that here there is a connection and they have expressed it thus: God the Father created the world, the Son of God (or the Word that comes from God) is that which is ethical. That the Godhead is thought of as divided and, again, as one being indicates that there is a connection here.” (Waismann 1979: 118) This reply seems to illustrate further the mystical message of Wittgenstein’s logical-philosophical treatise in which, unlike his later writings, ethics plays a key role. In his letter to Ludwig von Ficker, written in 1919, Wittgenstein says about his book that its “point is ethical” and that it “consists of two parts: of the one which is here, and of everything which I have not written. And precisely this second part is the important one. For the Ethical is delimited from within, as it were, by my book, and I am convinced that strictly speaking, it can only be delimited in this way. In brief, I think: All of that which many are babbling today, I have defined in my book by remaining silent about it.” (Luckhardt 1979: 94-95)

To be more precise, Wittgenstein’s silence is not strict and a few final propositions of *Tractatus* are explicitly devoted to what is ethical and mystical, or rather, these “pseudo-propositions” try to elucidate why propositions of ethics are impossible. We can paraphrase the account as follows: While all factual that happens within the world is accidental and meaningfully expressible, the “higher”, the sense of the world and any value “that does have value” lie outside the world and are transcendental. Therefore ethics and aesthetics, that are one and the same, cannot be put into words. Likewise logic, they just try to express preconditions of the world which could not be otherwise and are ineffable. (Although, in contrast to logic, ethics is not just transcendental but it is also transcendent and it does not show itself on any meaningful proposition but it may be manifested in actions.) There must be some kind of ethical reward, something pleasant, and ethical punishment, something unpleasant, but they must reside in the action itself. It is impossible to speak about the will as it is a bearer of the ethical, the will as a phenomenon is of interest only to psychology. The good or bad exercise of the will can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts expressible in language. The effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world and it must wax and wane as a whole. The world of a happy man is different from that of

an unhappy man, and it comes to an end at death which is not an event in life. (See TLP 6.41-6.4311)

In “A Lecture on Ethics”, presented on November 17, 1929 in Cambridge, Wittgenstein went on to argue that ethics, as well as religion, is supernatural and ineffable because our words can only express facts: “as a teacup will only hold a teacup full of water [even] if I were to pour out a gallon over it.” (Wittgenstein 1965: 7) In that perspective even a murder is only a fact which is on the same level as any other event and its description does not contain any proper ethical proposition. However, Wittgenstein distinguishes two different senses of terms, such as e.g. “good” or “bad” that we use in the course of judging and appreciating. The first one is “trivial” or “relative”, as in the claim “This is a good football player”, and it can be easily reformulated in a factual proposition describing satisfaction of some definable standards. The second one is “ethical” or “absolute”, like in the statement “This is a good fellow”, but this sense is intangible and elusive, because it lies beyond meaningful-factual language. Such an attempt to express the absolute sense, which is a “misuse of our language”, is characteristic of ethical and religious statements in which we constantly use similes and allegories. When we try to drop the simile and find some facts that would stand behind it and that could be meaningfully described, we are not able to find any.

Wittgenstein analyzes descriptions of three experiences to illuminate the absolute sense of values. The first one is postulated as “I wonder at the existence of the world” and rephrased in religious terms as “God had created the world”. The second experience was described by Wittgenstein as “I am safe, nothing can injure me whatever happens” or “We feel safe in the hands of God”. The third one is the feeling of guilt which is expressed as “God disapproves of our conduct”. Although for Wittgenstein these three attempts to convey personal feelings and mystical experiences, and generally any desire to say “something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable”, will always be considered unscientific and hopeless “running against the walls of our cage”, he would treat them as “a document of tendency in the human mind” which he respects and would never ridicule. (Wittgenstein 1965: 12)

Waismann’s essay “Ethics and Science” which was written at the end of 1930s, also profoundly resonates with Wittgenstein’s view. In it, Waismann clearly and systematically gives reasons for a negative answer to the question whether ethics, after the religious and metaphysical phases of its justification, can be justified scientifically. Waismann argues that norms and value judgments, to be derived, presuppose only other value judgments and not empirical statements, i.e. they cannot be justified by an appeal to the state of affairs. The way out of this circle seems to be in choosing the smallest possible number of value judgments which would form the deductive basis of the science of values. Once we acknowledge the truth of these fundamental judgments, they will serve as axioms and yield all the rest of the ethical systems with logical ne-

cessity. At this point we have run into the unsolvable problem which Waismann reduced to the following question: "Is there some means of recognizing value ascriptions, precepts or norms as right? In other words, is there knowledge of what is morally good?" (Waismann 1994: 38)

Waismann criticizes intuitionist attempts to solve the problem by means of "a peculiar kind of evidence indicative of genuine values" that could be compared with mathematical self-evidence, and he shows that even in the fields of logic and mathematics some propositions which seem to be absolutely evident truths are errors leading to logical contradictions. (E.g. the seemingly evident principle "each predicate has a corresponding extension: the class of all things that fall under the predicate" leads to Russell's paradox.) Subsequently Waismann refuses that it could be scientifically decided between incompatible ethical systems, such as e.g. Epicurean, Stoic, Christian and Nietzsche's, because "ethics is the matter of the will, not of the understanding. This is why ethical sentences have nothing to do with knowledge and error nor with 'true' and 'false'." (Waismann 1994: 45) Unlike the negation of factual statements, such as "He did not kill" - "It is false that he killed", the negation of norms and precepts loses a connection with falsity and takes totally different meaning: hardly anybody would say "It is false that thou shalt kill" instead of "Thou shalt not kill".

Similarly as Wittgenstein, according to whom all we can do in ethics is to speak in the first person (Waismann 1979: 117), Waismann draws the conclusion, that ethics cannot be rationally proved but only personally chosen and professed. Reformulating Schopenhauer's motto "It is easy to preach, but difficult to found, morality" he says: "It is difficult to preach, but impossible to found, morality. Ethics, like religion, is something you can only profess." (Waismann 1994: 50; comp. Waismann 1979: 118)

## II. What can be said about the Nelböck case?

(D1) On June 22, 1936, at 9:20 a.m., Dr. Johann Nelböck shot and killed Prof. Moritz Schlick who was walking up the stairs to the School of Philosophy of the University of Vienna being on the way to his lecture. Nelböck passed Schlick, turned around just in front of him, drew the pistol of the caliber 6.35 mm, system Singer, and fired a few shots at Schlick from a short distance. Two bullets went through the heart, opening both ventricles, the third bullet pierced the colon and the stomach and ripped apart the pylorus, the fourth bullet entered the left lower leg. The first three injuries were absolutely lethal. The murderer also shouted a remark at the collapsing Schlick which expressed his embitterment towards his victim. – Paraphrased from "Bill of Indictment". (Stadler 2001: 885-899)

(D2) Young and lonely Dr. Nelböck turned into a psychopathic murderer under the influence of Schlick's radically destructive and nihilistic philosophy which has brought about that young students have lost all faith in God, the world and humanity. Prof. Schlick who was not a philosopher by training, but only a physicist, gathered around him all elements hostile to metaphysics and Christian Weltanschauung, particularly all the Jews and freemasons. He denied all objective and God-given moral laws, and ethics was only a part of physics for him. The whole situation is a consequence of the Jew's dangerous intellectual influence upon the Vienna University. It is to be hoped that the murderer will quicken the efforts to find a truly satisfactory solution of the Jewish question! – Paraphrased from the article

"The Case of Professor Schlick in Vienna – A Reminder to Search Our Conscience" by Prof. Dr. Austriacus. (Stadler 2001: 871-877)

(D3) In 1928 [Nelböck] had become acquainted with the student Sylvia Borowicka who also attended the lectures of Prof. Dr. Schlick. He soon came to feel a deep affection towards her, even though Sylvia Borowicka left him in no doubt that she was ready to be a colleague to him, but nothing more. The accused felt even more unhappy when Borowicka told him in 1930 that she felt a certain interest for her teacher, Prof. Dr. Schlick, and that Prof. Schlick appeared to reciprocate this interest. [...] Dr. Schlick's behavior so outraged him that he told Borowicka in 1931 that he was going to shoot Prof. Schlick and then commit suicide. – Quoted from "Bill of Indictment". (Stadler 2001: 888-889)

(D4) On October 11, 1938, Nelböck was released on probation and employed in the geological department of the wartime economic oil authority. On October 11, 1943, the period of probation ended. In 1947 there was no police record according to the certificate of character. In 1951 Nelböck sued Kraft, who called him a "paranoid psychopath" in his book *Der Wiener Kreis*. Kraft agreed to an out-of-court settlement because he felt threatened by Nelböck. (Stadler 2001: 909)

Now, let's try to perceive these four descriptions through the prism of Wittgenstein's and Waismann's account stated above (having in mind that the two had a close relationship with the victim).

Thus D1 should be seen only as a description of an event which is on the same level as e.g. "the falling of a stone" regardless of emotions it might cause in us. There are stated only facts here and nothing malicious or bad in the ethical sense. While to add that "Nelböck is a *bad* shot" is meaningful statement in which a word "bad" has only the relative sense, to claim that "Nelböck is a *bad man*", or, after taking account of D4, to say that "Nelböck is a *lucky* man" is the misuse of language because of the attempt to put the absolute sense into words "bad" and "lucky". If taking D1 and D4 as premises based on facts, and trying to prove that Austrian wartime authority was "wrongful", our conclusion is not an objective truth because it is not possible to deductively draw a moral judgment from empirical statements. Furthermore, if we want to justify our conclusion by appealing to the moral that "murder is the evil that deserves punishment" which seems to be widely accepted its validity can be contested by an attitude of Prof. Austriacus in D2 who perceives the murder as useful for "a truly satisfactory solution of the Jewish question". Also in the perspective of D3, Nelböck's action could be vindicated by the evolutionary theory law of some kind. If we put D2 and D3 into a conjunction we do not gain a logical contradiction because both the descriptions contain, or appeal to, personal attitudes and mere value judgments, the truth of which is impossible to verify. If we read the descriptions D1-D4 in a changed order, or if we left some of them out, the world would still remain the same.

It seems to be clear that what really happened and what was described – the act itself in D1, its causes in D2 and D3 (however incompatible the descriptions might be), and its effect in D4 – cannot be in harmony with anything "higher", "ethical" or "mystical". Although there is a strong tendency to believe that it must be possible to formulate this incongruity objectively and understandably, such an attempt would be just going against the logic of language.

All we are able to do, is to personally adopt particular precepts and profess them. However free it seems to be, the process of choosing the right values is a tough inner fight. Especially when considering such precepts as "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour".

Acknowledgement: This paper has been accomplished with the support of the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic, project No. P401/11/P097.

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# On Semantic Skepticism: Wittgenstein's Paradox of Rule Following and Kripke's Semantic Paradox

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## 1. Introduction

Two lines of criticism can be used to argue against Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein (KW) (Kripke 1982). The first is based on §201 of *Philosophical Investigations* (PI). KW thinks that the skeptical paradox about meaning constitutes the central problem of PI (page 7), and he accepts this as a valid conclusion (pages 70-1). On the other hand, in the second paragraph of § 201, Wittgenstein (LW) rejects the skeptical paradox as a misunderstanding (Baker/Hacker 1984; McDowell 1984; McGinn 1984). Therefore, if KW's semantic paradox were essentially identical to LW's paradox of rule following, these thinkers would disagree with each other regarding the paradox.

However, notwithstanding his own insistence, KW's semantic paradox is fundamentally different from LW's paradox of rule following. If this view were correct, LW's denial of the latter paradox, based on the aforementioned misunderstanding, would not entail his rejection of the former. In this case, criticism of Kripke's interpretation based on PI § 201 must be seen as missing the point. I illuminate the difference between the two paradoxes by discussing the formulation of LW's paradox of rule following in the next section.

The second line of argument for opposing KW against LW concerns KW's skeptical solution to the skeptical paradox. As many scholars (Wright 2001; Harrison 1991) have pointed out, if the skeptical solution were inconsistent with LW's view of meaning, and if the skeptical solution were integrated into KW's skeptical paradox as a theory of meaning, then it would follow that LW ought not to accept KW's skeptical paradox as valid. Indeed, I think that the skeptical solution is invalid both as an interpretation of LW and as an independent argument that attempts to solve the skeptical paradox. I believe that KW diverges from LW most dramatically with regard to the skeptical solution. However, according to my view, KW's skeptical paradox is separable from the skeptical solution. It seems to be possible to provide another skeptical solution while maintaining the skeptical paradox as a valid argument. I believe that another skeptical solution is, at least, compatible with LW's view about meaning, even if LW did not propose it explicitly. In section 3, I will formulate KW's semantic paradox and examine LW's possible response to it. I will then show that we cannot help but confront an aporia regarding the interpretation of LW. In section 4, I will show that this aporia can be avoided by a new skeptical solution.

## 2. Wittgenstein's paradox of rule following

Wittgenstein's paradox of rule following (WP) is presented in the first paragraph of § 201. In the second paragraph, LW describes how to dissolve it by pointing out a misunderstanding in WP, namely that "we give one interpretation after another" when we follow a rule. In other words, he insists that WP arises from the thought that "every act of grasping a rule is interpretation." Thus, if the thought that "every act of grasping a rule is interpretation" were ne-

gated, WP could be dissolved as a disguised paradox. Of course, some room exists for the interpretation of § 201. However, in the context of the aforementioned points and of the descriptions in PI that precede §201, WP and the dissolution thereof can be formulated as follows:

[WP]

Premise 1: Every act of grasping a rule is interpretation.  
Premise 2: Whether a rule might be expressed as a picture or an illustrated formula or sign (literal or phonetic) and whether it might occur in one's mind or stand explicitly outside of the mind, it is always possible for us to interpret an application that differs from the one that naturally strikes us. (cf. PI § 86, 139-141, 146, 185)

Thus, an application that strikes me as natural on the occasion on which I am going to apply the rule is equally valid as an interpretation of the rule as are other applications that are logically consistent with past applications. For example, "1002, 1004, 1006, ..." may initially be interpreted as an attempt to apply the rule "+2" after 1000. However, this is only one of many possible interpretations of this rule; other possibilities include as "1004, 1008, 1012, ..." Even if I appeal to "a rule for interpreting a rule" to justify the former interpretation, the meta-rule itself can be interpreted in various ways. Thus, the process by which presentation of a rule opens possible interpretations of it will continue without end. Therefore, like Buridan's ass, I cannot help but keep confronting possible alternatives without being able to select any one.

Conclusion: A rule cannot determine any course of action.

This conclusion is said to express the paradoxical situation that arises in advance of applying a rule in that we cannot select a particular way to apply it in a new circumstance. The question of PI §198 clearly demonstrates this feature of WP: "But how can a rule shew me what I have to do at this point? Whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule."

However, a fallacy is evident in this inference because in the daily praxis of language "I obey the rule blindly" (PI § 219) and thus "a rule can determine a course of action." This outright fact contradicts the conclusion of WP. To avoid this conclusion, one of the premises must be denied. Premise 2 is the thesis that LW draws from his preceding consideration of rule following. Thus, premise 1 is supposed to be negated. It follows from it that grasping a rule is *not* an interpretation. "A way of grasping a rule which is not interpretation" can be said to be exhibited in our applying rules or in our reference from a meta-level perspective to "obeying the rule" or "going against it" in circumstances involving the praxis of language.

Once WP is formulated in this way, it is not indispensable to showing the essential difference between WP and Kripke's semantic paradox (KP) to formulate KP and compare it with WP. Indeed, it can be easily shown that WP can be dissolved within the schema of KP.

Kripke evidently admits that an individual who is separated from a community and who therefore cannot be provided even with a skeptical solution can apply a rule to new examples without hesitation (1982: 87). The circumstance in which an individual unhesitatingly applies the rule to a new example contradicts the conclusion of WP. Thus, following the same inference described above, KW is also supposed to attain "a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation." One must be attentive to the fact that the individual discussed here, who is isolated from a community, remains under the influence of KP. Indeed, those individuals who are thought to be isolated from a community are not admitted even of a skeptical solution. Therefore, I can conclude that KP is fundamentally different from WP.

Of course, it does not follow from the fundamental difference between KP and WP that LW is supposed to consider KP valid while rejecting WP as a disguised paradox. It is conceivable that PI as a whole is incompatible with KP, even if LW does not directly argue KP.

### 3. Kripke's semantic paradox

Let me formulate KP for the purpose of examining the relationship between LW and KP.

[KP]

Premise 1: No facts about meaning exist.

Premise 2: A semantic statement is true if and only if a fact about meaning exists.

↔ a picture of language based on truth conditions

Conclusion: Every sentence has no meaning.

Because KW does not formulate KP in this way, I will offer a few explanatory remarks. Needless to say, premise 1 is nothing but the conclusion that KW draws in Part II of the book. Premise 2 was not referenced explicitly when KW examined the counterargument to draw premise 1. It is not until the skeptical solution is proposed that the existence of premise 2 is revealed. The conclusion is drawn based on the following inference<sup>1</sup>:

(1) For any S, p: [“S” means that p] is false.

This is the case because although a semantic statement [“S” means that p] is true iff a fact about meaning exists (premise 2), no such fact exists (premise 1). Then, the disquotational properties of the truth predicate guarantee that (1) entails the following:

(2) For any S: S has no meaning.

However, because (2) is supposed to apply to any sentence, a self-refuting consequence follows: the argument that draws (2) has no meaning. No other option but to deny premise 2 exists if one is to avoid this paradoxical consequence because KW has accepted premise 1 as valid. Thus, by converting an understanding of language based on truth conditions to one based on assertibility conditions, KW makes it possible to distinguish "following a rule" from "thinking one is following a rule" by resorting to the mutual confirmation of community members. As a consequence, the condition under which semantic statements can be considered as true is barely secured under the skeptical constraint that all statements cannot be infallible.

How is LW supposed to respond to KP when the latter is formulated in this way? As indicated in section 1, despite defenses of Kripke's interpretation, I cannot help but conclude with many scholars that LW would reject such a

<sup>1</sup> The inference is basically based on Boghossian 1989: 523.

skeptical solution as that proposed by KW. First among the most potent grounds for criticizing KW is that in PI § 243, a solitary language (individual language),<sup>2</sup> which stands in contrast to a private language that cannot be understood by anyone except the individual who uses it, is explicitly admitted to be possible. Second, the insistence corresponding to the communitarian theory of KW that "human agreement decides what is true and what is false" is definitely denied in PI § 241. Third, the skeptical solution is thought to have its own deficiency (Blackburn 1984; Goldfarb 1985; Boghossian 1989) as an independent argument that attempts to avoid the paradoxical conclusion of KP. If the criticism of the skeptical solution were valid, we would be compelled to believe that LW advocates such a defective argument when the skeptical solution is attributed to LW.

In the absence of LW's proposing the skeptical solution that resorts to the existence of community to negate premise 2, no other options seem to exist save negating premise 1 to avoid the self-defeating conclusion of KP. In other words, LW's refusal to accept the skeptical solution is supposed to provide convincing grounds for his denial of premise 1.

For the purpose of providing the entire structure of KW's argument, I formulate KP as I did in section 3. Although this formulation might prevent clarity in this regard, the crux of KP is, no doubt, premise 1. This is because KW believes that we cannot help but accept the skeptical conclusion with respect to meaning expressed by premise 1, whereas we can avoid the self-defeating conclusion of KP at least, although in a skeptical way. I will refer to premise 1 as "KSC" (Kripke's skeptical conclusion) to avoid confusion with KP.

Although not attributing the skeptical solution to LW provides the grounds for believing that LW negates KSC, as I have shown, does LW really do this? Negation of KSC amounts to believing that it is possible to provide a "straight solution" to KSC. Does LW present a straight solution anywhere? I cannot reply in the affirmative. In my view, not only can a straight solution not be found anywhere in PI, but also the very assumption that LW proposes such a straightforward solution is incompatible with the later views of Wittgenstein. Therefore, Kripke's interpretation that LW accepts KSC is certainly valid, at least in that respect. Let me confirm the grounds for this conclusion.

Two candidates for the straight solution to KSC can be identified: 1) a non-intentional, reductive fact (a variety of a dispositional view) and 2) an intentional, primitive fact (Soames 1998). Scholars who claim that LW provides either of these solutions basically identify the grounds for this claim in the fact that LW dissolves WP as a disguised paradox (Horwich 1998; McDowell 1984). As described in section 2, the fact that "we follow a rule blindly" in a normal situation based on our natural disposition (non-intentional, reductive fact) is opposed against the paradoxical conclusion of WP that "a rule could not determine any course of action." Thus, *reductio ad absurdum*, the insistence that our grasping a rule is not an interpretation follows. Grasping a rule in a way that is not an interpretation seems to indicate the existence of intentional, primitive facts about a meaning that can be grasped only in a peculiar manner.

Here however, the fact that WP differs fundamentally from KP, which was pointed out in section 2, must be

<sup>2</sup> For example, Goldfarb 1985: 475 and McGinn 1984: 79 make it clear that the solitary language that KW thinks to be impossible is essentially different from the private language whose impossibility LW attempts to prove.

noted. In fact, KW begins to prove KSC under the presupposition that WP can be dissolved as a disguised paradox. The “I” who responds to the skeptical challenge is acknowledged as immediately producing the answer “125” to the question “ $68 + 57 = ?$ ” based on his natural disposition. Therefore, “a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation” is exhibited in the answer “125.” Presupposing this, he sets out to provide a counterexample to a skeptical argument, but his attempts ends in failure.

At this point, I can provide a more definite description of the difference between WP and KSC. WP represents the paradox that arises in advance of applying the rule, namely that one cannot select any one of the logically possible alternatives. On the other hand, KSC signifies the paradox that one cannot prove *afterword* and *retrospectively* that the application of the rule applied without hesitation ( $68 + 57 = 125$ ) accords with your previous intention. To be more exact, you cannot prove that only the application that you have performed accords with your previous intention and that it is logically impossible that any other alternative accords with your previous intention. Therefore, whereas WP can be dissolved only if the conditions for blind obedience to a rule are satisfied, the skeptical doubt that leads to KSC can be said to begin where WP is dissolved. Thus, I cannot help but conclude that attempts to identify the argument that enables us to dissolve WP as a disguised paradox with the rationale for negating KSC misses the point completely.

I think a still more convincing rationale for endorsing LW's acceptance of KSC can be identified. For the sake of argument, let us assume that LW negates KSC; that is, let us assume that Wittgenstein thinks that a fact about meaning exists. Then, for example, the answer “125” that I produce at  $t_1$  (present) to the question “ $68 + 57 = ?$ ” is justified by the fact about meaning, “+,” at  $t_0$  (past). Of all the possible alternatives, only “125” is given the status of truth. However, is it conceivable that the person who reaches such a conclusion goes on to persistently investigate the certainty of a calculation (e.g.,  $12 \times 12 = 144$ ) (*On Certainty* (OC) § 43, 447, 651, 653-4)? Alternately is it conceivable that the same person states “even when the calculation is something fixed for me, this is only a decision for a practical purpose” (OC § 49) about such a calculation or asks, “[w]ould the certainty really be greater for being checked twenty times?” (OC § 77) (For example, with respect to the latter question, it is thought that the problem of whether the degree of certainty of a calculation depends on how many times recalculation is performed ought not be investigated philosophically when the certainty is believed to be conferred by a fact about meaning.) That is to say, the assumption that LW negates KSC renders the ardent investigation of the certainty of an elemental kind of arithmetical equation, which he undertook after PI, totally incomprehensible.<sup>3</sup>

#### 4. An aporia of KP and another skeptical solution

Based on the grounds described above, I cannot help but agree with Kripke that LW accepts KSC. However, under these circumstances, a serious aporia about KP presumably arises. LW is not thought to accept the self-refuting consequence of KP, namely that every sentence has no meaning. To avoid this consequence, one of the two premises must be negated. Yet neither negating premise 2 and

attributing the skeptical solution to LW nor negating premise 1 and attributing the straightforward solution against KSC to LW can be consistent with LW. It thus seems to be impossible to avoid the self-refuting consequence of KP. This is an aporia for LW regarding KP.

The interpretation that LW has remained under this aporia without being aware of the predicament is possible because it is not LW who explicitly formulated KP. Therefore, this inconsistency in LW can be revealed only when the whole of LW's arguments is seen from the perspective provided by KP. But this is the worst interpretation of the subject. Given this, how should we avoid adopting the worst interpretation? In fact, an easy way out of the aporia can be found.

The aporia of KP stems from the assumption that the negation of premise 2 implies the adoption of KW's skeptical solution. However, it is possible to negate premise 2 without adopting KW's skeptical solution. Thus, when the bi-conditional, “a semantic statement is true iff a fact about meaning exists,” and the assertibility condition, which resorts to the existence of community, are denied, what kind of condition is possible? This condition is that meaning can come into existence if and only if a subject understands the meaning of a sentence. This condition is expressed in this way:

For any  $x, S, p$ :  $\llbracket S \text{ means that } p \rrbracket$  is true iff  $x$  understands  $\llbracket S \text{ means that } p \rrbracket$

Even when this condition is satisfied and “S” ‘s meaning that  $p$  comes into existence, the meaning that  $x$  understands cannot be immune from correction in the future because premise 1 (KSC) is maintained as valid. In other words, every meaning that  $x$  understand cannot be infallible. Thus, the proposed solution is nothing but a *skeptical* solution.

By himself, LW does not formulate KP differently from WP. Therefore, it is not the case that LW explicitly advocates this kind of skeptical solution. However, it seems to be the only interpretation that is consistent with LW and that enables him to avoid the aporia of KP.

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# Radical Democracy and Agreement in Practices

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I consider radical democracy, radical pluralism or agonistic politics to be a new approach to politics which includes focusing on practices of conflicts, processes of adjustment and modification through conflicts, on the modes of rule in a non-state sphere and informal relations, disensus and agonism instead on a rationally based consensus. According to this, connections between mutuality and belonging to a political association are not based on agreement on common good and values, basic principles of social order, procedures of cooperation and consensus regarding the constitution. Authors who advocate this concept of democracy emphasize the essential contestability of political concepts, paradoxes of liberal democracy and the necessity of revising standard rationally-consensual theories of democracies. The authors who claim that agonistic pluralism is inspired by Wittgenstein's philosophy are: Connolly (Connolly 1993), Tully (Tully 2008) and Mouffe (Mouffe, 2000). In order to be concise, the subject of my paper will be the position of the last author, although this position can rarely differ from those of the two first theoreticians.

Mouffe, Connolly and Tully just like some other contemporary authors emphasize that liberal democracy as theoretical and political project conceals the tension between insisting on the politics of human rights on one hand and the sovereignty of people on the other. The concepts of rights, laws and universal morality in liberalism are traditionally considered to be independent of their historical and cultural basis, whereas judicial institutions have the priority in relation to democratic decision making. This is 'formalization' and 'rationalization' of democratic decision making which, however, appears as the main obstacle of affirmation of democracy.

Radical democracy, however, indicates to a permanent paradox situation of liberal democracy which imposes the consensus about rights necessarily confronting with the right to disensus in a democratic system. The possibility of imposing limitations on people's sovereignty in the name of freedom reveals paradox nature of democracy itself. This paradox cannot be solved in the way which would be rationally binding, in the way of a general social consensus: paradox is contained in the very core of contemporary political order.

Contemporary liberalism tends to hide this agonism by constantly reducing the domain of democracy. According to Mouffe, through 'the alternative to rationalistic approach' Wittgenstein can strongly encourage thinking about politics in a different way, about consolidation of democratic institutions and renewal of democratic impulses (Mouffe 2000: 60). Wittgenstein's approach opens up the possibility of non-homogenizing and non-generalizing political theory, of a different view of forming political community and legitimization of democratic society from universalistic and rationalist-consensus. In line with this understanding, the affiliation towards democratic ideals and values would not have a basis in arguments and in binding universally valid reasons for their acceptance. Instead the basis would be in participation in a given form of life and rational consensus follows the initiation into language-game. Wittgenstein's analysis of the rule-following is extremely important for democratic pluralism because it considers different forms

of initiating in a democratic game as well as non-identical ways in which it can occur.

The second important encouragement of Wittgenstein's philosophy is more of a methodological nature and it is about the emphasizing the importance of example as a more appropriate form of explication in relation to generalized theoretical explanation. In this sense, Wittgenstein's position could be used as a counterbalance to universalistic perspectives of Rawls and Dworkin, according to which the theory of justice must rely on basic principles from which can derive criteria for assessment of justifiability of certain social systems or concrete political measures and actions. On the other hand, Wittgenstein's contextualist approach in political philosophy (the most typical representative of which is Walzer) assumes that the criteria of justice are internal, contextually dependent and they must be determined based on the given political culture and the field of application.

Another target of radical agonistic criticism is insisting on formal procedural features of democracy. Procedural interpretation, contrary to a more substantial and ethically comprehensive understanding, emphasizes a neutral character of democratic procedures, that is, it first assumes that democracy should not have a meaning bigger than instrumentalist one and the second that democratic ethos carries the residuum of majorization and ethical dictations which are incompatible with individual rights and freedoms. In this case, too, Mouffe's criticism is initiated by Wittgenstein. In order for a language to function, according to Wittgenstein, it is necessary to have the agreement in judgments (and adds: no matter how strange it sounds), which does not mean that what people agree is true, is in fact true. Instead, here we speak about agreeing in practices, in linguistic actions, that is, the rules which people use when playing language-games. Agreement is not related to opinions – transferred into the field of political philosophy, in the result of reflection or contract based on rational interpretation – it is in forms of life (cf. Wittgenstein 1958: § 241).

Democratic procedures gain legitimacy through their roots in agreements on forms of life and remain unaccepted unless the custom supports them (Mouffe 2000: 68-69). A strict division into procedure and substance, morality and custom, universal legally-political norms and cultural background, rationality and reasonableness as two moral features of a citizen (Rawls), that is, legal, moral and ethical discourse (Habermas) most often ends with attributing the priority to the first party, with the risk of 'rationalizing' social connections too much. However, if we accept Wittgenstein's 'weak' political rationality based on contingent practices, specified and non-homogenous linguistic games and rules the base of which is pragmatic acceptance by the community, we gain a different image of democratic institutions and political actions from proceduralistic one and from standard-liberal one.

A strictly agonistic or radically-pluralist reading, however, faces the fact that different interpretations of Wittgenstein could be legitimately constituted as well as the application of this philosophical stance on the sphere of social theory.

Certain interpretations, namely, have a good justification to claim that social rules are based on a tacit commonly accepted ‘know-how’, that is, with unquestionable background practices, at which point it is necessary to have at least some elements stable, firm and fixed, ‘immunized’ of criticism. The clash with agonism lies in the assumption that rules of these practices must be to a great extent, if not fully, accepted by members of a community which can imply homogeneity of a community which is diametrically opposite to radical democracy. According to Plant, our natural reactions (that is, quasi-natural, as they refer to our social nature) towards other person or people lies the uniformity of reactions and not differences as it is believed by Lyotard and advocates of radical pluralism. This is why it would be inappropriate to call Wittgenstein a philosopher of disensus *par excellence*. (cf. Plant 2005: 89).

A more adequate interpretation of relation of Wittgenstein and radical democracy points at the significance of variable manners in which the rules of democratic practice can be interpreted and applied and that the identity of ‘democratic game’ just like the identity of any language-game, relies on ‘family resemblances’, loose connections, overlaps, similarities and interconnections. In this unequal way, citizens ‘read’ and interpret the rules of ‘democratic game’ which makes it non-homogenous. There is no binding, universal consensus about what being a citizen means, what respecting the will of majority and acting justifiably mean. Still, personal and collective rights, the status of property, domain of competences of a state, etc. in a liberal thought often have the status of ‘essentially contestable’ concepts which makes the necessity of introducing ‘radical democracy’ as distinct from liberalist questionable.

The second ambiguity is related to the importance and character of common symbolical space which the citizens of non-homogenous social, ethical, political, religious, etc. beliefs share. Overcoming the significance of this space and non-questioning its scope would be a serious omission which, as it seems, the advocates of radical democracy occasionally allow themselves. Mouffe believes that in a conflict which is not hostile but adversary instead ‘all participants will acknowledge the position of the others in their competition as legitimate’ (Mouffe 2000: 74). If we remain on a pure acknowledgement of different positions, we would also remain on *modus vivendi* principle of procedural liberalism. On the other hand, if we accept that the connection of citizens has a more substantial nature, the most important thing would be to determine the character of this mutuality while avoiding hegemonic and homogeneous strategies which eliminate differences. However, a true task would now lie in examining a common symbolical field as ‘a general’ because this symbolic field would overcome the partiality of collective ethos and horizons of understanding adjusting them to beliefs, values and interests of other individuals or communities. The discourse which expresses a particular position or interest could go through major changes or even to create a new discourse (moral, as well as legally-political, according to Habermas) a new ‘language-game’ with its grammar, vocabulary and rules. This connection of citizens would be ‘rationally’ based in that sense because it would assume the adjustment of individuals and groups where deliberation about the most adequate form of respect and cooperation has a significant position. The lack of deliberation, arguments and reasonable consensus would represent a bigger loss than the advocates of radical pluralism would assume.

It could be noticed that rational consensus, according to Wittgenstein is not through, that is, it represents a narrow segment of practice on which language-games cannot be based. However, contrary to agonistic interpretations it is

not unrealisable and it is not necessarily repressively-homogenizing. Wittgenstein did not intend to identify the consensus of practice with rational basis, nor deny the possibility of rational agreement in a certain adequate context. When criticizing rationalistic approach, it compares it with the position which pays attention only on measuring rod, ignoring all other phenomena and samples in measurement (Wittgenstein 1993). Analogue to this, it can be said that some theoreticians pay too much attention to rational arguments hence they all other conditions – environment and practice on which rationality relies – consider to be irrational or unimportant for discussion. However, measuring rod cannot be avoided or neglected, and what is extremely important is the very relation of argumentation and background practices. In the same sense, procedural consensus is important, that is, the agreement on the very practices of discussion about what represents argumentation, in which way it is channeled, accepted or rejected.

Wittgenstein described this procedural consensus as ‘agreement about the idea of agreement’. However, it is not *per se* the guarantee of correctness: the product of accepted rational argumentation can be the ‘images that capture us’ and block our understanding and practical orientation. Wittgenstein constantly invented different strategies of removing these seducing images, where a particular place belongs to aspectual observing, that is, “seeing as” is particularly important for politics and social theory. Although philosophical therapy has the function of ‘working on itself’ it can rightly be said that there is a collective captivity by the picture, about the case in which we accepted dominating pictures which disturb us and confuse us. Just as in the case of an individual, releasing therapy of this captivity is contained in transformation of a way of life (collective or individual) and not in a pure acceptance of rational argument.

The polarization of Wittgenstein’s allegedly affirmative perspective regarding the consensus (which, according to Gellner, Niyri and Habermas, implied Wittgenstein’s conservatism) and allegedly negative perspective (Connolly, Tully and Mouffe believe that Wittgenstein advocates the position of agonism and radical democracy), some interpretations consider Wittgenstein to be standing in the perspective of value neutrality of consensus. Still, this position is derived from Wittgenstein’s analysis of language and its grammar which are as such non-evaluative, the purpose of which is to achieve communication and not ethical or social goals. As the political discourse requires evaluative examination of consensus, an achieved agreement about a valuable positive things such as the affirmation of autonomy, critical opinion, egalitarianism, tolerance, etc. can represent the starting point or ‘vital element’ of that discourse.

As we can see, in the dialectics of consensus and disensus, radical pluralism places the accent on the second factor. This position, tending to emphasize the danger of placing obstacles to dialogue, overlook that, according to Wittgenstein, the goal of discussion is achieving a certain result. Saying that there is no last explanation, is analogue to the statement that there is no last house in this street because it is always possible to build another one (Wittgenstein 1958, § 29). Wittgenstein would say that interpretation, explanation and justification still stop at some point, that there is a justification and also that it has its own end (Wittgenstein 1969, § 192). However, according to the consequences of radical pluralism, not only is the dispute not closed and rounded off, but it is not even desirable to solve it. Still, it is less likely that Connolly, Mouffe and Tully would accept that it would be desirable that issues of women equality, racial segregation or illegality of slavery to be still current, open and principally unsolved. The con-

sensus on these and related issues is not only one of the most important political achievements, but a civilizational value, too.

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# Documenting Macroprocess: A Note on Cataloguing Wittgenstein's *Nachlass*

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## 1. Introduction

The catalogue of Wittgenstein's literary remains by Georg Henrik von Wright will be familiar to all users of the *nachlass*, whether they have consulted the originals in Cambridge, Vienna and elsewhere, or the facsimiles and electronic texts provided by the Wittgenstein Archives at Bergen. First published in 1969, the catalogue was absolutely vital at a time when the literary trustees had achieved much that they wanted to do in terms of publishing and wanted to bring together material that was divided amongst them and their collaborators, eventually deciding to deposit it in Trinity College Library. Rarely challenged in the literature, the catalogue has been used ever since, the reference numbers becoming synonymous with the *nachlass* items themselves. As further *nachlass* material has emerged, the catalogue has periodically been updated – for example in Klagge and Nordmann's *Philosophical Occasions* – to accommodate new items. Yet this process has not always kept pace with the discovery of new material. Moreover, it may be claimed that the correct decisions have not always been made in deciding what should be included in or excluded from the *nachlass*. It is clear in the current age that maintaining the von Wright catalogue online could be a comparatively simple process, allowing for rapid updates as new material is found. However, I would like to argue that the catalogue as it stands is fundamentally flawed in the way that it purports to represent the reality of the *nachlass* and in the way it guides users through it and that it is time that it was radically revised.

## 2. Macroprocess

A number of textual theories, such as those of the French genetic school, concentrate on the continuously-developing process of the author in the production of their text. Such approaches are rewarding to scholars seeking to edit the text and those who seek to understand the text through the process of its author alike. An understanding of Wittgenstein's process has clearly contributed to our understanding of his philosophy. Here I mean by process not that which he employed while 'doing philosophy' but that by which he sought to communicate it through the written word, though there is clearly a causal connection between the two. We might call to mind some of the work of Gordon Baker, which always shows an awareness of Wittgenstein's process, or papers such as "Wittgenstein's paperwork" by Herbert Hrachovec which is intimately concerned with the philosopher's process, while the recent Krügel Book project of Josef Rothaupt, where a new understanding of an aspect of Wittgenstein's process is central to the work, is also an example of its importance. Certainly in the cases of Baker and Rothaupt, the aspects of Wittgenstein's process that fall under the spotlight are what we might call elements of microprocess. The use of italics, for example, in the work of the former, or the marks by which Wittgenstein indicated whether or not a remark was to be used in a subsequent text in the latter. Similar elements of microprocess include Wittgenstein's ways of

marking in a text the way in which he wished to re-arrange remarks – "to page 172 vol X" or "continued from page 14 in the Grosses Format" – and his means of indicating alternative readings and of rewriting the text.

Less often considered are what by analogy we must call the elements of 'macroprocess' as revealed in the *nachlass*. Namely elements of process that exist at document or higher level or which substantially affect the nature of the document as a whole, for example the predetermined choice of arrangement *in extenso* (for example alphabetically). One important aspect of macroprocess relating to the survival of Wittgenstein's later philosophy is Wittgenstein's choice of what to preserve. Another concern is the relationship between the various documents that Wittgenstein created and the way he organised these documents when they were in use. A third is the purpose for which a document or series of documents are created or used.

Although elements of macroprocess are implicitly acknowledged – von Wright does so in his historical introduction to the catalogue – its importance is rarely explicitly discussed. Often the evidence of macroprocess is ignored in favour of microprocess, but it is fundamental to our understanding of the *nachlass*. Let us look first on what makes up the totality of Wittgenstein's *nachlass* which was created by the philosopher in the course of his work, and which he made a deliberate effort to preserve – I am thinking here of bonfires in Norway and Ireland – and to deliver into the hands of a group of people he thought might make something of it. This material originates from a fundamental single intellectual provenance, that of Wittgenstein himself, though the posthumous provenance of certain caches of *nachlass* material might differ slightly from each other, and it is the evidence of this provenance which gives the manuscripts their authority. Thus it is only by establishing the true identity of the manuscript that the elements of microprocess recorded in it have any authority. Or, put another way, all the detailed analysis of the elements of microprocess within a document is worth nothing if a study of the origins of the document itself prove it not to be by Wittgenstein.

The second element of macroprocess I would like to consider is the way in which Wittgenstein arranged his manuscripts as he worked on them over time. And it is important to stress that here I refer to the arrangement as made by Wittgenstein in contrast to one imposed by any later intervention. Even a brief acquaintance with the *nachlass* reveals a number of series of documents that Wittgenstein created: the large notebooks, the pocket notebooks, papers for the *Lecture on Ethics* and the like. Although many authors acknowledge their existence, yet rarely do they comment on the importance of these series. However, Wittgenstein created them for a purpose, and it is important to understand the significance for each document and its contents of inclusion in a particular series. It is clearly material that he chose to copy a particular remark from a pocket notebook to one of the large notebooks, but the significance of this is only revealed when we understand the purpose for which he created both the series of

pocket notebooks and the series of large notebooks – his books of record as Brian McGuinness refers to the latter – which may only be revealed by the understanding the nature of each series. So the identity of the series is also important to our understanding of the individual documents within the series and to the remarks therein. It is also important in helping us to form an understanding of the *nachlass* as a whole.

These elements of macroprocess also reveal a further, most important aspect, which is the interrelationship and interdependence between it and microprocess. Archives do not, by and large, come with a rule book. Rather we need to understand them by interrogating internal factors which allow us to build up a picture of how they work. Such an examination is often cyclical, later discoveries forcing us to reinterpret earlier ones, which in turn inform new discoveries. As part of this process of discovery, elements of microprocess inform macroprocess and vice-versa.

### 3. Macroprocess and the catalogue

It is my contention that the evidence of macroprocess that is internal to the *nachlass* is extremely important in our understanding of the *nachlass* as a whole and of the individual items within it. Therefore we should take steps to document it. One way to do this would be to embed it within the catalogue. Traditionally archivists have attempted to do this by creating catalogues which seek to represent the organic nature of the material they represent, rather than imposing a synthetic arrangement on the archive. This is achieved by bringing together documents with a similar purpose into series, which might themselves be grouped into classes, forming a catalogue with a hierarchical structure, not unlike a family tree. Though in more positivistic times this methodology was seen as rendering the archivist's work invisible, we now acknowledge that this cannot be so, though the same method goes a long way to preserving the context of each document.

An examination of the *nachlass* soon shows that the von Wright catalogue does not fulfill this purpose. It may be argued that it is clearly not meant to do so and is merely a list of items within the *nachlass* divided into manuscripts, typescripts and dictations. However, whatever the author's intentions, because of the way that we respond to texts – both their verbal and the non-verbal content – I do not believe that such a text can be so neutral. Instead I believe a catalogue is a discourse which has a semiotic dimension. In its layout, grouping-together and splitting-apart of individual items it provides us with symbols in the Piercean sense in that interpretation of them requires an understanding of convention. Correctly contextualised and decoded, these symbols carry meaning. Indeed, due to the formal nature of a catalogue it might be said that not only is it likely to carry a great deal of symbolic material, but also that the reader is more likely to decode it – whether with the outcomes the author intended or not – than in a literary manuscript. It may very well be the case that the

symbols in a badly constructed catalogue may be so powerful as to mislead us in our interpretation of the archive and bring about incorrect assumptions about its nature. We might ask ourselves whether the von Wright catalogue is giving us the correct information and whether it is sending us correct and consistent signs.

Considering the catalogue in these terms leads me to another aspect of the task, that of making it computer-readable. I have indicated that we take into account a number of aspects when we read a catalogue including semiotic references. Without our common life experiences, a computer is not able to correctly interpret these aspects in all their richness, so how do we persuade it to do so and how do we persuade it to read the signs correctly? In the world of linguistics this is achieved by using a mark-up language, such as XML, together with a supporting ontology. This is very similar to the method used to produce the machine-readable texts that underpin the Bergen Electronic Edition. For archivists, a ready-made solution is available in the case of Encoded Archival Description, which has rapidly become the international standard for the mark-up of archival texts. It is important that any catalogue produced should conform to such standards for, amongst other reasons, it will ensure interoperability with the texts of a new version of the BEE.

### 4. Concluding thoughts

The challenge of producing a better catalogue of the *nachlass* is, I think, threefold. First we have to produce a catalogue using the most up-to-date standards, which will allow easy linking with a web-based BEE and other similar projects. Secondly we need to preserve all evidence of macroprocess that we can, not only because of what it adds to our knowledge of the *nachlass* as a whole and the individual items within it, but also because the evidential authority of *nachlass* items relies on it. Finally, we need to ensure that the catalogue is easily interpretable, that the signs it carries can be easily read. Let us look on the catalogue as a small-scale map of the whole terrain that is the *nachlass*, one which points us in the right general direction to proceed and places our journey in the context of the land around us.

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# Wittgensteins ethischer Anspruch

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„[...] wie kann ich Logiker sein, wenn ich noch nicht Mensch bin!“ – diese, vermutlich um Weihnachten 1913 an Bertrand Russell gerichteten, des öfteren zitierten Worte Wittgensteins sollen zu Beginn meiner Überlegungen zu Wittgensteins ethischen Anspruch stehen, einem Anspruch, der sein Leben wie sein Philosophieren bestimmte.

„Mensch sein“ bedeutete bei Wittgenstein, ein Leben zu führen, das Ethik sichtbar macht, sie zeigt. Erst dann könne man sich mit Philosophie, insbesondere mit Logik befreien, da die Auseinandersetzung mit diesen Problemen die kompromisslose Suche nach Wahrheit erfordert, die wiederum Wahrhaftigkeit, Authentizität und Glaubwürdigkeit des Philosophen voraussetzt. Inwieweit die Orientierung an einem derart hohen Ethos in Wittgensteins Leben und Philosophieren deutlich wird, soll im Folgenden an Beispielen aus seinen persönlichen und philosophischen Aufzeichnungen untersucht werden.

Mensch-Sein im Sinne einer ethischen Lebensweise, für die es keine theoretischen Richtlinien gibt, sondern die sich im Verhalten, somit in „Handlung“ zeigt, hat bei Wittgenstein Priorität vor intellektueller Tätigkeit, auch wenn der eingangs zitierte Satz die Interpretation nahelegen könnte, der Logiker befindet sich auf einer höheren Stufe.

Zudem kann „Mensch-Sein“ bei Wittgenstein auch als eine Bejahung zum Leben verstanden werden, von der er im Akt des Philosophierens Gefahr lief, sich zu entfernen. Erst durch ein aktives, bewusstes „Leben im Leben“ können man den Sinn des Lebens verstehen, d.h. diesem zumindest näherkommen – wie Aljoscha Karamasoff in dem von Wittgenstein hochgeschätzten Roman Dostojewskis *Die Brüder Karamasoff* beteuert.

Das Leben – vor der Logik – über alles zu lieben, sei Voraussetzung für ein Verständnis des Sinns des Lebens, der, mit nüchternem Verstand betrachtet, angesichts des Leids der Welt nie und nimmer zu begreifen sei, wie Iwan Karamasoff seinem Bruder Aljoscha erklärt. (Dostojewski 1994: 374)

Es geht mir in diesem Beitrag doch nicht um eine Diskussion des Theodizeeproblems, das im Zentrum der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Iwan und Aljoscha stand und Anstoß zum Paradox des Liebens zum Leben, d.h. zum unüberwindbaren Problem der Liebe zum Leben gab, von der Iwan trotz allem Abscheu vor dem Elend der Welt erfüllt war, sondern um die Diskrepanz sowie den Zusammenhang zwischen „leben“ und „philosophieren“ – zwischen „Mensch sein“ und „Logiker“, wovon Wittgenstein sprach.

Die Frage ist – wie löste bzw. versuchte Wittgenstein, dieses Problem zu lösen? Indem er mit sich selbst „in's Reine“<sup>1</sup> zu kommen trachtete, somit Klarheit über sich selbst anstrehte, um demnach auch Klarheit in philosophische Konfusionen zu bringen?

Vielelleicht aber erreichte er Klarheit über sich selbst erst durch bzw. nach der Klärung philosophischer Probleme – dem Klarwerden von Sätzen, die er durch logische Analyse im *Tractatus* verfolgte. Oder es verlief das Streben nach Klarheit in persönlicher und philosophischer Hinsicht parallel, das eine das andere bedingend.

Bei Einsicht seiner Schriften – philosophische Manuskripte, Tagebücher sowie Briefe – lässt sich durchgängig ein ethischer Anspruch beobachten, inhaltlich wie auch formal.

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Wittgensteins Schriften bestechen durch Intensität und Präzision – dies zum einen durch die Konzentration auf das Wesentliche, in der Philosophie klar Aussagbare, zum anderen durch den achtsamen Umgang mit Sprache, in der Reduzierung sprachlicher Mittel auf ein Minimum, in der Vermeidung alles Phrasenhaften, jeden überflüssigen Worts. Sein ethischer Anspruch im Schreiben entspricht Karl Kraus' Auffassung von Sprache, in der sich die Moralität des Menschen zeige.

Bei Einsicht seiner Manuskripte wird jedoch deutlich, wie viel an Arbeit dahintersteckte, wie viel an Überlegungen nicht nur hinsichtlich der philosophischen Erörterung, sondern auch hinsichtlich der sprachlichen Darstellung. Wittgenstein ändert fortlaufend Wörter und Sätze oder gibt mehrere Varianten der Formulierung an. Der unermüdliche Prozess des Schreibens bzw. des sprachlichen Ausdrucks korrespondiert dem ebenso unermüdlichen Prozess seiner philosophischen Gedankengänge – beides gemäß dem hohen Anspruch an seine Arbeit, der Forderung des „Gehens“, im Gegensatz zu einem „Sitzten“ (DB: 207f.), der nimmermüden Bewegung und Veränderung.

Im Prozess der Überarbeitungen, Streichungen, Kürzungen – einem Prozess unaufhörlichen Suchens und Reflektierens nach dem adäquaten Ausdruck wurde ihm Philosophieren und Schreiben zur „Arbeit an sich selbst“ (vgl. MS 112: 46), als Klarheits- und Wahrheitssuche.

In Anlehnung an Ricarda Huchs Worte über Gottfried Keller „Seine Wahrhaftigkeit, die den Ton nicht um eine Schwung lauter werden lässt als sein Empfinden“, schrieb Paul Engelmann, dass „eben diese Wahrhaftigkeit, diese völlige Angemessenheit des Ausdrucks an das Empfinden“ das war, was Wittgenstein in der Kunst suchte, und dass „dieses Suchen auch der Motor seines Philosophierens“ gewesen sei. (Vgl. Somavilla 2006: 103)

Wittgenstein selbst wies auf das hohe Ethos hin, das er vom Schreibenden wie jedem künstlerisch Tätigen forderte: „Stil ist der Ausdruck einer allgemein menschlichen Notwendigkeit. Das gilt vom Schreibstil wie vom Baustil (und jedem anderen). Stil ist die allgemeine Notwendigkeit sub specie eterni gesehen.“ (DB: 28)

<sup>1</sup> Vgl. Wittgensteins Brief an Russell [Weihnachten 1913] in Seekircher 2004.

Der von Spinoza geprägte Begriff – übrigens einer der wenigen philosophischen Termini, den Wittgenstein häufig verwendete (Engelmann 2006) –, spielt meines Erachtens in seinem Philosophieren eine bedeutende Rolle.

Die Orientierung an einer Haltung *sub specie aeternitatis* ist eine ethische, die im ontologischen Sinn wie bei Spinoza mystisch-religiöse Züge trägt, doch bei Wittgenstein im Speziellen auch für kreative Tätigkeit gilt – richtungsweisend für den „*Stil*“ des Schaffenden wird.

Unter „*Stil*“ ist neben Wahrhaftigkeit und Authentizität auch Mut und Originalität zu verstehen, wobei Wittgenstein öfters den Begriff des „*Ton*“ verwendet. So schrieb er einmal über Tagore, dass dessen Ton nicht der eines „von der Wahrheit ergriffenen Menschen“ sei (Somavilla 2006), während er sich über die Gedichte Georg Trakls folgendermaßen äußerte: „[...] Ich verstehe sie nicht; aber ihr *Ton* beglückt mich. Es ist der Ton der wahrhaft genialen Menschen.“ (von Wright/Methagl 1969: 22)

Diese Bemerkung weist nicht nur auf Wittgensteins Feingespür für Wahrhaftigkeit des Autors und für geniale Dichtung hin, sondern auch darauf, was er unter „wahrhafter Genialität“ im Gegensatz zum Geniekult Schopenhauers und Weiningers verstand. Wahrhafte Genialität im Sinne Wittgensteins setzt zum einen Wahrhaftigkeit bzw. Authentizität des Charakters (des Dichters oder Philosophen) voraus, zum anderen wahrhafte Auseinandersetzung mit der Wirklichkeit einschließlich der düsteren Seite des Lebens, ohne diese zu beschönigen. Dies zu erreichen, erfordert nicht nur Authentizität im Sinne einer Existenz, die dem Tod ins Auge blickt (Heidegger, zit. nach Arnswald 2007: 134), sondern auch Religiosität im genuinen Sinn, d.h. fern von jeglicher Orientierung an dogmatischer Orthodoxie, sondern Religiosität im Sinne von Geistigkeit gepaart mit der Erfahrung von Leid, dem Bewusstsein und der Akzeptanz der Gegebenheiten. Dass das Schwere überwiegt, geht bereits aus Wittgensteins frühen Tagebüchern hervor, wo die „Annehmlichkeiten der Welt“ nur als „so viele Gnaden des Schicksals“ gesehen werden. (NB, 13.8.1916)

Neben Trakl ist Beethoven einer der Wenigen, denen Wittgenstein die Fähigkeit genialer Werke zugesteht. Desen Musik sei „ganz wahr“, „ganz Religion & gar nicht religiöse Dichtung“ (DB: 72). Darum könne er „in wirklichen Schmerzen trösten wenn die Andern versagen & man sich bei ihnen sagen muß: aber so ist es ja nicht.“ Er wiege in keinen schönen Traum ein sondern erlöse „die Welt dadurch dass er sie als Held sieht, wie sie ist.“ (DB, ebenda).

Es ist die Auseinandersetzung mit Religion – dem „reinen geistigen Licht“ – die „ergreift“ und Werke von Dauer schafft, wie Wittgenstein in einem Brief-Fragment schreibt. (Vgl. Somavilla 2004) In diesem Zusammenhang wären noch Autoren wie Dostojewski und Kierkegaard zu nennen, wobei Wittgenstein Letzterem eine „Reinheit“ zuschreibt, deren „Härte“ so schwer zu ertragen sei, dass sie „schneide“ (DB: 204).

Er selbst vermisst diese „Reinheit des Herzens“, so dass bei der Abfassung seiner Schriften seine Gedanken ihm „unrein“ erscheinen (DB: 217); an anderer Stelle bezichtigt er sich des Fehlens an „Ernst & Wahrheitsliebe“ in seiner philosophischen Arbeit, wie „er auch in den Vorlesungen oft geschwindelt habe“, indem er „vorgab etwas zu verstehen“, was ihm noch gar nicht klar war. (Vgl. DB: 145)

Es ging ihm also stets um das Streben nach „Klarheit“ und „Durchsichtigkeit“, wie er auch im Vorwort zu den *Philosophischen Bemerkungen* festhielt – in der Philosophie als Aufdeckung aller Dunkelheiten, Konfusionen, im Leben

als Suche nach Klarheit im Sinne einer moralischen Reinheit, wobei der enge, ja untrennbare Zusammenhang zwischen beiden Bereichen schon aus der jeweiligen Verwendung der Begriffe wie „Klarheit“, „Durchsichtigkeit“ sowie „Reinheit“ hervorgeht.

Die Sehnsucht nach Reinheit des Herzens (vgl. DB: 216f.: „Ich dachte gestern an den Ausdruck ‚ein reines Herz‘; warum habe ich keines? Das heißt doch: warum sind meine Gedanken so unrein!“) sowie die Befürchtung, „unreinlich“ zu denken, bestimmt sein Philosophieren, insbesondere bei der Auseinandersetzung mit religiösen Fragen, die er nur durch eine „Geste“ im Sinne des Wortes „unsagbar“ behandeln könne, sich gleichzeitig aber Gedanken macht, ob diese Distanzierung von Worten in diesem Bereich nur „eine Flucht vor einer Realität“ wäre und er bittet inständig, nicht „abergläubig“ zu sein: „Ich will nicht unreinlich denken!“ (DB: 173). Denn, wie erörtert, erfordert Wahrhaftigkeit des Autors eine wahrheitsgetreue Auseinandersetzung mit der Realität, weshalb Wittgenstein offenbar in einen Widerspruch mit sich selbst geriet, da Fragen der Ethik und Religion seiner Ansicht nach sich außerhalb der „Welt der Tatsachen“ befinden, worüber er sich des Versuchs einer philosophisch-begrifflichen Annäherung enthielt.

Den Anspruch der Reinheit und Durchsichtigkeit stellte Wittgenstein vor allem auch an die Logik – nicht nur im *Tractatus*, wo ihr die Aufgabe zukommt, die Gedanken zu ordnen und zu klären (vgl. TLP, 4.112), sie als „Spiegelbild der Welt“ (TLP, 6.13) fungiert, sondern auch später in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*, wo sie bei seiner Klarheitssuche weiterhin eine entscheidende Rolle spielt: Sie stellt für ihn die „Ordnung a priori der Welt“ dar, „d.i. die Ordnung der Möglichkeiten, die Welt und Denken gemeinsam sein muß.“ Obwohl sie vor aller Erfahrung ist und sich durch alle Erfahrung hindurchziehen muß, darf ihr selbst „keine erfahrungsmäßige Trübe oder Unsicherheit anhaften. – Sie muß vielmehr vom reinsten Kristall sein.“ (PU, § 97)

Auch in persönlicher Hinsicht verwendet Wittgenstein nicht nur Begriffe wie „Reinheit“ und „Klarheit“, sondern auch „Kristall“ – u.a. als Ausdruck dafür, mittels einer Melodie sein Leben zusammenfassen und es „krystallisiert“ hinstellen zu können, auch wenn es nur ein „kleines schäbiges Krystall“ wäre. (Vgl. DB: 3f.)

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Der ethische Anspruch in inhaltlicher Hinsicht wird insbesondere in Wittgensteins Haltung gegenüber philosophischen Fragen deutlich, deren Erörterung die Grenze des wissenschaftlich Erklärbaren überschreiten würde. Diese Distanzierung von Aussagen, die nicht eindeutig verifiziert werden können, gilt vor allem für das Gebiet des sogenannten „Unaussprechlichen“ – also für ethische, religiöse und vielfach auch ästhetische Probleme –, wo die Anwendung von Sprache zu einem Missbrauch von Sprache bzw. zu „Unsinn“ führt.

Wittgensteins Weigerung, diese Fragen innerhalb eines philosophischen Diskurses zu erörtern, entsprang einer Haltung des Respekts vor diesem Bereich, dessen Grenze er wahrte, um nicht in ein „Schwefeln“ darüber zu geraten.<sup>2</sup> Dieser Verzicht, den Drury als „eine ethische Forderung“ bezeichnete (Drury 1992: 124), ist auch im Sinne Kierkegaards zu sehen, der auf die subtile Grenze zwischen Reden und Schweigen hinwies und die Erkenntnis und Ein-

<sup>2</sup> Vgl. dazu Wittgensteins Brief an Ludwig von Ficker [vermutlich um 1919] über den *Tractatus*. In: Von Wright 1969: 35.

haltung derselben mit ethischem Handeln in Verbindung brachte:

Was ist das, S ch w ä t z e n ? Es ist die Aufhebung der leidenschaftlichen Disjunktion zwischen Schweigen und Reden. Nur der, der wesentlich schweigen kann, kann wesentlich reden, nur der, der wesentlich schweigen kann, kann wesentlich handeln. Verschwiegenheit ist Innerlichkeit. (Kierkegaard 1922: 49)

Dieses Zitat Kierkegaards trifft nicht nur auf Wittgensteins Schweigen über metaphysische Fragen in der Philosophie zu, sondern insgesamt auf seinen Umgang mit Sprache – in der Vermeidung alles Überflüssigen, das als „Geschwätz“ verurteilt wird. Die Ökonomisierung von Sprache führt zu einer inhaltlichen Prägnanz und stilistischen Intensität, wobei sein Anliegen – die Scheidung des Sagbaren von nur Zeigbarem sowie das „Klarwerden von Sätzen“ – deutlich werden. Sein Streben nach „Durchsichtigkeit“, nach „Transparenz“ wird in der Sprache vollzogen.

Die Unterscheidung zwischen Reden und Schweigen bzw. die Einhaltung der Grenze zwischen dem, was sich sagen lässt und dem, was sich verbaler Erfassung bzw. philosophischer Erkenntnis entzieht, war Wittgenstein auch in späteren Jahren bewusst: „In der Philosophie liegt die Schwierigkeit darin, nicht mehr zu sagen, als was wir wissen“, notierte er im *Blauen Buch*. (BB: 75)

Bei allen Veränderungen im Laufe seines Philosophierens ging es ihm stets um Sprache und um Ethik, wobei diese Bereiche nicht voneinander zu trennen sind, sondern unmittelbar zusammenhängen. Dies wird auch im *Vortrag über Ethik* deutlich, wo er an drei Beispielen den Unterschied zwischen sinnvollen und unsinnigen Ausdrücken, zwischen relativen und absoluten bzw. ethischen Werten erläutert. Während sinnvolle Aussagen sich auf den Tat-sachenraum beschränken, führen Versuche, ethische und religiöse Fragestellungen zu verbalisieren, zu einem Missbrauch von Sprache bzw. zu Unsinn. Und doch liegt gerade in den durch Wissenschaft nicht erfassbaren Fragen der eigentliche, absolute Wert. Als wichtigstes Beispiel seiner persönlichen Erfahrung, als sein „Erlebnis par excellence“ für absolute Werte nennt Wittgenstein das „Staunen über die Existenz der Welt“ – eine ethische Betrachtungsweise, bereits im *Tractatus* als Gefühl des Mystischen definiert: „Nicht wie die Welt ist, ist das Mystische, sondern daß sie ist“ (TLP, 6.44). Sein Hinweis auf das ethische Staunen über die (sogenannte) Selbstverständlichkeit der Welt kann als Appell gesehen werden, dieser in einer achtsamen Haltung zu begegnen. Obgleich dies – im *Vortrag über Ethik* sowie im *Tractatus* – im transzendenten Sinn zu verstehen ist, so gilt dies – immanent betrachtet – auch für die achtsame Begegnung mit der phänomenalen Welt in den späteren philosophischen Untersuchungen, wo er die einzelnen Erscheinungen aus unterschiedlichen Perspektiven beleuchtet, begleitet von einem regen, nimmermüden Staunen.

Nicht von ungefähr verwendet er dabei die Metapher des Lichts – um den Dingen auf den Grund zu gehen, ihre Bedeutung zu erhellen und somit Klarheit und Transparenz zu erreichen.

Wittgenstein ist bemüht, die Probleme in der Tiefe zu ordnen, sie „an der Wurzel“ auszureißen.:

Die Schwierigkeit *tief* fassen, ist das Schwere.

Denn seicht gefäßt, bleibt sie eben Schwierigkeit. Sie ist mit der Wurzel auszureißen; & das heißt, man muß auf neue Art anfangen, über diese Dinge zu denken. Die Änderung ist z. B. eine so entschiedene, wie die

von der alchemistischen zur chemischen Denkungsweise. – Es ist die neue Denkweise, die so schwer festzulegen ist. (VB: 98)

In Zusammenhang mit seinen Gedanken über Geistigkeit und Genialität vergleicht er das „reine, geistige, religiöse Ideal“ mit „weißem Licht“, während er die „Ideale der verschiedenen Kulturen“ mit „gefärbten Lichtern“ vergleicht, durch die seiner Ansicht nach diejenigen die Welt betrachten, die sich nur mit Kunst und Wissenschaft befassen. (Vgl. Somavilla 2004)

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Trotz der Distanzierung von Fragen der Ethik als Gegenstand philosophischer Diskussion – deren Ausklammerung aus der Philosophie – wird der hohe Stellenwert dieser Thematik in Wittgensteins Schriften in vielfacher Hinsicht deutlich. Doch nicht nur, wie erörtert, in inhaltlicher und stilistischer Hinsicht, sondern auch in seiner Haltung gegenüber der Welt, in seiner Lebensweise – dem Bemühen, Ethik im Tun, nicht in abstrakter Theorie umzusetzen.

Sein Streben nach Vollzug dieser Vorstellung von Ethik in persönlicher Hinsicht – ein Streben nach moralischer Vollkommenheit<sup>3</sup> – wurde von Zeitzeugen wiederholt beobachtet.

Und seit Veröffentlichung seiner verschlüsselten Tagebuchaufzeichnungen während des Ersten Weltkriegs ist Wittgensteins akribische Art der Introspektion bzw. Gewissenserforschung, sein hoher moralischer Anspruch im Denken, Schreiben und Handeln bekannt. Parallel zu den philosophischen Aufzeichnungen auf den jeweils rechten Seiten in Normalschrift, führte er auf den linken Seiten minutios Protokoll über Fortschritte und Versagen in philosophischer und persönlicher Hinsicht. Im Streben nach philosophischer Erkenntnis sowie nach „Erlösung“ in moralischen Problemen bittet er abwechselnd Gott und den Geist um Erleuchtung. Der dabei zutage tretende enge Zusammenhang zwischen Philosophieren und Leben wird jedoch auch in späteren Aufzeichnungen deutlich, und er selbst wies darauf hin: „Die Denkbewegung in meinem Philosophieren müßte sich in der Geschichte meines Geistes, seiner Moralbegriffe & dem Verständnis meiner Lage wiederfinden lassen.“ (DB: 125)

Paul Engelmann hat bereits 1948 auf die ethische Grundhaltung des *Tractatus* hingewiesen – zu einer Zeit, als die Rezeption rein analytisch orientiert war. Gleichzeitig wies er darauf hin, dass der hohe ethische Anspruch, den Wittgenstein im Leben an sich stellte, zu einem „drücken-den Bewusstsein der eigenen dauernden Entfernenheit“ davon führte. (Somavilla 2006: 217)

Dieses Bewusstsein des Scheiterns mag in ihm zu den „Leiden des Geistes“ beigetragen haben, von denen er einmal sprach. (vgl. DB: 191)

Wittgensteins ethischer Anspruch ging meines Erachtens über die von Monk postulierte „Pflicht gegen sich selbst“ im Sinne Weiningers hinaus, auch wenn der Aspekt der Pflichterfüllung eine nicht unwesentliche Rolle gespielt gehabt haben mag.

Wittgensteins Ethos orientierte sich über die Erfüllung von Pflicht hinaus an absoluter Wahrhaftigkeit im Denken, Schreiben und Handeln, an einer Reinheit (des Herzens),

<sup>3</sup> Auf die Frage Fania Pascals, „Wollen Sie etwa vollkommen sein?“, antwortete Wittgenstein: „Natürlich will ich vollkommen sein!“ (Pascal 1992: 67). Vgl. auch Berichte von Hermine Wittgenstein, Engelmann, Hänsel, Drury, von Wright u.a.

die mit den Zielen seiner Philosophie – der Suche nach Klarheit und Durchsichtigkeit – eng zusammenhing.

Der Gedanke, dass das ethisch gute Leben auch ein glückliches ist, als solches den Zweck des Daseins erfülle (TB, 6.7.1916), ist implizit auch im *Vortrag über Ethik* enthalten, wo die Beschreibung des Staunens über die Existenz der Welt als Beispiel für die ethische Betrachtung der Welt auch als Paradigma für ein glückliches Leben im Sinne des Bewusstseins von dessen Einzigartigkeit gesehen werden kann, das des Menschseins wert ist – ungeachtet jeder Logik.

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# Climate Engineering and the Imposition of Risks of Rights Violations

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## Climate change and the risks of rights violations

The environmental and socio-economic effects of anthropogenic climate change due to greenhouse gas (GHG) emission are subject to uncertainties due to different reasons including incomplete knowledge, disagreement among experts, or due to the inherent unpredictability of the Earth system, the socio-economic system and human behaviour. These uncertainties make it particularly difficult to analyze the consequences through conventional risk assessment techniques and to imply cost-benefit analyzes (Broome 1992). In such a situation of uncertainty we have not the adequate empirical or theoretical basis for assigning probabilities to outcomes and in some respects even lack knowledge about possible different outcomes altogether, putting us in a state of ignorance (Mason 2002).

This situation of uncertainty is of great importance in the context of intergenerational justice where we face the problem that the determination of what we owe to future people is complicated by our limited knowledge of the future. Even though we know that climate change implies the risk of basic rights of future people – their rights to survival, health, sufficiency and autonomy – being violated (IPCC 2007), we lack certain what the consequences of our actions and policies today will be in the future and what risks linked to their likely or possible consequences will materialize. For this reason we cannot say, that we harm future generations directly, but rather impose a risk of harm on them by our actions. Even though there is a great number of resent publications on aspects of intergenerational justice in the context of climate change (e.g., Page 2006; Meyer and Roser 2006; Meyer 2009; Gosseries and Meyer 2009; Gardiner 2011b), this theoretically as well as practically important problem of the imposition of risks of rights violations of future people has not received its due attention. Many important research questions can be put forward in this regard: Does the imposition of risks of rights violations constitutes a rights violation (Thomson 1986; Perry 2007; Steigleder 2011)? Can one say that the imposition of risks of rights violations harm future people by negatively affecting or setting-back future people's well-being (Zimmerman 2006)? How to determine the size of a risk of a rights violation? How to make trade offs between risk of a rights violation, considerable costs and forgone benefits?

Answers to these questions will depend on the theory of justice employed. Derived form the consideration of different approaches of intergenerational distributive justice in the context of climate change as well as important principles of intergenerational justice (eg. non harm principle, precautionary principle; strong and weak sustainability) and their possible contribution to an answer to the problem of the imposition of risk of rights violations of future people a sufficientarian conception of justice seems to be a promising approach to deal with those basic questions (eg. Frankfurt 1987; Anderson 1999; Crisp 2003; Temkin 2003; Benbaji 2006; Casal 2007).

Sufficientarianism considers the protection and realization of basic rights to be intrinsically valuable. Rather than gradually giving more weight to benefits, the lower the level of access to intrinsically valuable goods of its recipient is – as the priority view would demand –, sufficientarianism introduces thresholds: Benefits to people below a threshold have lexical (absolute) or very strong priority before benefits to people above the threshold (Shiffrin 1999; Meyer 2009). It can be assumed that from a sufficientarian perspective we should avoid risks with respect to intrinsically valuable goods. Of two outcomes with the same estimate in terms of the intrinsically valuable goods, it seems plausible to choose the one that does not exhibit uncertainty or exhibits less uncertainty. Additionally, a risk-averse interpretation of sufficientarianism is based on an asymmetry between potential losses and potential gains with respect to these goods. Potential losses weigh more heavily than potential gains.

## Potential risks of Sulphate-Aerosols Injection

Such a risk averse sufficientarian position can be employed to Climate Engineering (CE) – proposals for the planetary-scale engineering of the climate aimed at intentionally counteracting the undesired side effects (global warming) of other human activities (emitting GHG emissions). As the normative evaluation of CE is influenced strongly by the perception of risk and uncertainty and as the potential risks vary enormously across different proposals in the estimates of the impacts, cost, effectiveness, and timeliness the rest of the paper will concentrate on Sulphate-Aerosols Injection (SAI), the most prominent and criticized among solar radiation management (SRM) methods. SAI strategies carry potentially large risks that are deeply uncertain (Bala et al. 2008; Crutzen 2006; Robock et al. 2008; Victor et al. 2009).

Large-scale SAI is expected to result in complex spatio-temporal patterns of changes in temperature, precipitation, and climate patterns such as El Niño and monsoons (Adams et al. 2003; Oman et al. 2006; Robock et al. 2009). Those changes can have effects on regional food and water availability, potentially leading to droughts and famines. A side effect of SAI might also be a massive ozone depletion (Crutzen 2006; Robock 2008; Wigley 2006). Furthermore, SAI alone would not reverse all adverse effects of carbon dioxide emission, like the acidifying effect of carbon dioxide on the oceans (Caldeira and Wickett 2003).

The unknown harms and *unexpected* consequences from large-scale SAI could be even more grave than the predictable effects (Davies 2010). SAI creates an artificial balance between greenhouse warming and reduced solar radiation in order to maintain lower temperatures. Many potential effects will be be non-linear and have complex effects throughout the ecosystem (Royal Society 2009).

Potential risks from SAI also derive from the differences in the life span of aerosols, years-to-decades, and CO<sub>2</sub>

emissions, centuries-to-millennia. In order to compensate for a given quantity of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions SAI strategies would have to be maintained over the atmospheric lifetime of CO<sub>2</sub> (Bengtsson 2006). This creates a ‘termination problem’, as the failure to maintain the aerosol counterforcing could result in abrupt and potentially very damaging warming (Matthews and Caldeira 2007; Victor 2008; Goes et al. 2011; Svoboda et al. 2011).

Another problem is the potential unilateral deployment of SAI (Swart and Marinova 2010) based on the relative low costs, technical feasibility (Barrett 2007) and the possibility to sidestep collective actions problems and cost-intensive investments in mitigation or adaptation efforts (Virgoe 2009; Kraemer 2010). As unilateral SAI is highly likely to impose costs on other countries and to run risks with the entire planet’s climate system it is in danger of triggering conflicts as well as counter-engineering and may become a threat to achieving global solidarity on other aspects of climate policy (Royal Society 2009). The possibility of conflicts is reinforced by uneven distribution of costs and benefits as well as the problem of tracing consequences and assigning responsibilities (Schneider 1996 and 2008).

### The need for the further development of a risk-averse sufficientarian approach

Due to the great uncertainties and the severe risks, that the deployment of SAI extends below the sufficiency threshold, this risk-averse approach of intergenerational sufficientarianism seems to imply a plausible interpretation of the evaluation of the imposition of risks of rights violations by SAI. However, the answer to the question of how to interpret giving the protection of basic rights of future people strong priority in our decision-making when we can only compare SAI to other policies in terms of the imposition of risks of rights violations rather than in terms of the rights violations that they will bring about with certainty is complicated for various reasons:

- a) A strict interpretation of a rights-based sufficientarianism that gives the threshold an absolute priority might be understood as categorically prohibiting the pursuance of any policy that comes with any probability of causing people to fall below the threshold. However, we have to assume that not only SAI and other proposed CE methods but all policies in the context of responding to climate change – or at least most of them – imply such risks (IPCC 2007: 20). Thus in working out a risk-averse approach on the basis of rights-based sufficientarianism one will have to investigate what risk of a rights violation can be justifiably imposed on others.
- b) Despite the fact that there are cases in which it is fully clear that imposing risks on others is impermissible, it often seems permissible or non-avoidable to impose certain risks on others or on ourselves. The acceptance of certain risks seems to depend on the evaluation of the interests (rights) that are under threat of being violated and the interests (rights) being fulfilled by carrying out certain risk-imposing actions. Given that we can often minimize risks only at considerable further costs, one needs to investigate how large a risk of a rights violation can be justified. These costs may include reducing the probability of achieving outcomes that benefit people above the threshold and reducing the opportunity to provide measures of compensation in case people’s rights will be violated, by enabling future people to adapt to the changed circumstances.

- c) Moreover, the answer to these question is complicated by the fact that in the case of SAI we are dealing with a mixed situation of taking and imposing risks. People living at the time of deployment take certain risks themselves to avoid possible future damages; at the same time they impose the risk of serious damages on future people.
- d) Furthermore, the deployment of SAI is likely to take place in a situation where we have to choose between two evils, ongoing severe effects of global warming or the consequences and risks associated with SAI (Gardiner 2010, 2011a and b). Future people are threatened to be harmed not only by SAI but also by the effects of global warming. Therefore, one needs to specify criteria for choosing the least unjust option available in such a situation.

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# Notes On Wittgenstein's Notion of Grammar and Moyal-Sharrock's *Third Wittgenstein*

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## 1

In 2004, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock introduces the notion of a *Third Wittgenstein*. She summarises the reasons for her revaluation of Wittgenstein's philosophical development as follows: First, according to her, the writings after the PI have to be emphasised and set apart; second, it should be realised that Wittgenstein has philosophically exceeded the limits of the *Philosophical Investigations* (PI) in his latest writings; and third, Wittgenstein has after the PI switched over to a more conservative method in philosophy (cf. 2009: 558).

In this paper I will concentrate on the second point. As a crucial reason for defending it, Moyal-Sharrock suggests that Wittgenstein holds an extended notion of grammar in his latest writings. After elaborating on this claim in section 2, I will show that it needs to be modified due to textual evidence. Section 4 will show that Wittgenstein's consideration to understand grammar as going beyond the mere elucidation of the use of individual words reaches back to 1933, from which it follows that an extended notion of grammar cannot be a demarcation criterion to distinguish a third philosophical period in Wittgenstein's work. After demonstrating that Moyal-Sharrock's own possible modifications of the *Third Wittgenstein*-thesis would still be unable to justify it, I will finally point out that her ideas about Wittgenstein's notion of grammar are nevertheless important and perhaps seminal for a new perspective on Wittgenstein's notion of grammar in general.

## 2

In her monograph *Understanding Wittgenstein's 'On Certainty'* Moyal-Sharrock elaborates on her thesis that in his post-PI writings Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein III) has gone beyond the PI (2004b: 164). According to her, a major difference between Wittgenstein II and III is their unequal notions of grammar. While the second Wittgenstein called only those propositions "grammatical" which obviously elucidate the use of particular words, e.g. "Red is a colour", the third Wittgenstein's understanding of grammar is said to be much broader: now grammar includes all objective certainties that stand fast for us, "hinges", as Moyal-Sharrock calls them, following the English translation of Wittgenstein's hinge-metaphor (cf. OC 341, 343). She divides them into four categories: The grammatical propositions of Wittgenstein II, and only these, fall into the category of *linguistic hinges*, while all other hinges are non-linguistic and either belong to the category of *personal hinges* which stand fast for "me" (e.g. "I have never been on the moon"), or to the category of *local hinges* which stand fast for the people of a particular time (e.g. "The earth is round"), or to the category of *universal hinges* which are incontrovertible for all normal human beings (e.g. "Things don't systematically disappear when we're not looking") (cf. 2004b: 102f, 165). Accordingly, one important reason for Moyal-Sharrock to distinguish Wittgenstein II from Wittgenstein III is her claim that Wittgenstein III counts not only linguistic, but also non-linguistic hinges

to grammar. This claim is therefore pivotal in justifying the *Third Wittgenstein*-thesis.

## 3

In fact we do find several text passages in OC in which Wittgenstein emphasises the particular role of some empirical propositions, or propositions of the form of empirical propositions, and even passages in which he relates these propositions to logical (grammatical) propositions (OC 136, 308, 319, 401). These remarks seem to support Moyal-Sharrock's thesis that Wittgenstein considered *non-linguistic hinges* as belonging to grammar. It is, however, important to notice that, although identifying a certain *resemblance* between some empirical propositions and logical or grammatical propositions, Wittgenstein never explicitly says that some empirical propositions or propositions of the form of empirical propositions are propositions of logic or grammar. Moreover, his remarks are to the largest extent cautious and interrogative. Only OC 401 seems to make a stronger claim. Here, Wittgenstein begins with the words "I want to say", which suggests a quintessence of his late thinking. Yet a closer look at the context of this text passage quickly scatters this impression. In the preceding remark, Wittgenstein laments his own inability to find the right words: "Here I am inclined to fight windmills, because I cannot yet say the thing I really want to say" (OC 400). Furthermore, in the remark subsequent to OC 401 Wittgenstein immediately criticises and corrects himself. We can therefore assume that in OC 401 Wittgenstein has tried to express his point in a concise way but was dissatisfied with the result. Even if we take the passage as a key remark, this would not support the thesis that Wittgenstein in OC counts non-linguistic hinges to grammar, for Wittgenstein does not suggest that "propositions of the form of empirical propositions" are propositions of logic or grammar, but only that both "form the foundation of all operating with thoughts (with language)", i.e. they are similar in regard to their function.<sup>1</sup>

To recapitulate, Wittgenstein has indeed identified and repeatedly highlighted the similarity between some empirical propositions and grammatical propositions. However, we are lacking textual evidence that would justify the claim of an extended notion of grammar in his latest writings. We rather have reasons to assume that Wittgenstein was himself uncertain about his notion of grammar. This is also suggested by a remark from Ms 173 which has been published in the *Remarks on Colour*: "Here it could now be asked what I really want, to what extent I want to deal with grammar." (RC III 309)<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This is in fact clearer in the German original text: "[...] gehören zum Fundament alles Operierens mit Gedanken (mit der Sprache)". A more literal translation would be that they both „belong to the foundation of all operating with thoughts (with language)“.

<sup>2</sup> Interestingly, Moyal-Sharrock quotes the same remark in order to support her thesis of the *Third Wittgenstein*'s extended notion of grammar (cf. 2004b: 164). However, the interrogative character of this remark is very clear.

## 4

These results remind us not too quickly to assume an extended notion of grammar in Wittgenstein's latest work. Given alone, however, they do not undermine the second point of the *Third Wittgenstein*-thesis; for even if it is admitted that there is no textual evidence to support the assumption of an extended notion of grammar, the claim could still be modified: Wittgenstein III may be characterised as considering an extended notion of grammar which has not *occurred* to him before. He may be said to have had a particular notion of grammar which he did not consider to extend in any way before approximately 1946, but afterwards.

This claim is, however, problematic in two ways. First, it rests on the assumption that Wittgenstein II used to have a clearly defined notion of grammar. Yet, as Mauro Engelmann has already shown, Wittgenstein II's understanding of grammar is far from obvious. We rather have reasons to assume, or at least cannot exclude, that in the early 30s Wittgenstein understood grammar quite differently from the time that he was working on the PI (cf. 2011: 97). Second, it is wrong to assume that Wittgenstein has considered an "extended" grammar only in his latest writings. In a remark from 1933 we read:

„Der Sessel/Regen existiert unabhängig davon, ob ihn jemand wahnimmt.“ Ist das ein Erfahrungssatz; oder eine verschleierte Festsetzung der Grammatik? // Ist das ein Erfahrungssatz? // Soll es sagen, die Erfahrung habe gelehrt, daß ein Sessel nicht verschwindet, wenn man sich von ihm wegwendet? (Ms 115: 75)

(„The chair/rain exists independently of anyone perceiving it“. Is that an empirical proposition; or a concealed determination of grammar? // Is that an empirical proposition? // Is it supposed to say that experience has taught us that a chair does not disappear when we turn away from it? [my translation])

Already in 1933, Wittgenstein asks whether a particular proposition (a proposition of the form of empirical propositions, as it were) really is an empirical proposition or rather a proposition of grammar. Moreover, in this passage he explicitly expresses the thought which we do not find anywhere in OC, i.e. that a particular "empirical proposition" may in fact be grammatical, and not just similar to grammatical propositions. In Moyal-Sharrock's classification, the proposition "The chair (or rain) exists independently of anyone perceiving it" belongs to the category of *universal hinges*, and thus of *non-linguistic hinges*, which, according to her, Wittgenstein II has not considered as being grammatical. Yet the remark just quoted shows that in fact he has considered it as early as 1933. What is more, instead of discarding it he has transferred it into several other writings: We find it (with slight variations) again as a handwritten note on the backside of page 265 in the *Big Typescript* (Ts 213) as well as in two typescripts from the summer of 1945 (Ts 228 and 230). This reveals that throughout many years Wittgenstein has considered counting a particular empirical proposition to grammar. The idea that certain empirical propositions, or propositions of the form of empirical propositions, are similar to grammar reaches back at least to his notes in the *Big Typescript* and thus cannot serve as a criterion to mark a third period in his work.

## 5

Even with this result, Moyal-Sharrock could still try to justify her claim. She could admit that Wittgenstein did have certain ideas and wrote them down before 1946, but she could emphasise that he has not elaborated on them. From this perspective, Wittgenstein III would differ from Wittgenstein II in having different philosophical foci. In fact, in her introduction to the *Third Wittgenstein*-conference Moyal-Sharrock reacts in such a way to the objection that many of the ideas expressed in OC are anticipated in the passage from Ms 119 which has been published as *Cause and Effect*.

To say, for example, that some of the ideas in *On Certainty* were present in earlier notes does nothing to negate the originality and importance of that work. Many momentous achievements have their germ or roots in earlier thoughts/works – this in no way diminishes the later momentousness. Incipient thoughts on a subject are different from breaking new ground. Whatever was said in 'Cause and Effect' is of little consequence to philosophy; it does not do the trick; only the later 'compilation' known as *On Certainty* does. (2009: 558)

She admits here that certain ideas in OC have their roots in earlier writings, but for her this fact does not lessen the importance of the later notes. That is true; and it is unlikely that many would deny the importance and new focusing of the OC-manuscripts. However, with this assumption the claim that "Wittgenstein has gone beyond the *Investigations*, philosophically" (2009: 558) appears to be quite weak. If admitted that parts of the ideas of OC are already present in earlier writings, then what is philosophically new in Wittgenstein III seems to be nothing more than a shift in focus, which indeed can hardly be denied.

Yet the phrasing "some of the ideas" in the passage just quoted is vague. It does not allow us to gather from it whether Moyal-Sharrock counts the idea of an extended notion of grammar among these ideas, or whether she sticks to the view that Wittgenstein III has a notion of grammar essentially different from Wittgenstein II. If the first is the case, Moyal-Sharrock's explanation of the *Third Wittgenstein*-thesis in 2009 deviates considerably from her claims in earlier texts (2004a and 2004b). Her thesis would eventually come down to nothing but a shift in thematic focus since 1946. Yet such a demarcation seems arbitrary since thematic shifts can be found in many places within the *Nachlass*. If we allow such shifts as demarcation criteria to distinguish different periods in Wittgenstein's work, we would end up with a lot more than just three Wittgensteins. I agree with Moyal-Sharrock that Wittgenstein's latest works deserve great attention, and I also agree that in his latest writings he focuses on partly different philosophical themes than he does in the PI, but I do not agree that these two points can justify the claim of a third Wittgenstein.

If, on the other hand, Moyal-Sharrock's admittance that some of the ideas in OC have their roots in earlier writings does not include the idea of an extended notion of grammar, the latter would rather still be an essential characteristic of Wittgenstein III. Referring back to section 4 of this essay, we can object to this by saying that Wittgenstein has already in 1933 considered to count certain empirical propositions to grammar.

## 6

These results are not only interesting because they may overthrow one of the pillars of the *Third Wittgenstein*-thesis, but also – and more importantly – because they encourage us to rethink the standard conception of Wittgenstein's notion of grammar in general. Grammar and logic may not be restricted to obvious explanations of our use of words, but may reach deep into what stands fast for us in our everyday life. This at least is an idea that Wittgenstein comes back to at different stages of his philosophical work and never wants to exclude. Although we lack textual evidence to claim that Wittgenstein had an extended notion of grammar, indeed as early as 1933, we do have all reasons to assume that he had only a vague and by no means definite understanding of it. Not only the passages from OC and RC mentioned above point to this assumption, but also a remark Wittgenstein put down shortly before his death: "Am I not getting closer and closer to saying that in the end logic cannot be described? You must look at the practice of language, then will you see it." (OC 501)

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# **Ein Konzept mehrdimensionaler gradueller Handlungsfähigkeit menschlicher und nichtmenschlicher Akteure als Beitrag zur Technikethik**

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## **1. Einführung**

Die Delegation von Handlungsoptionen an technische Agenten ist bereits weit fortgeschritten. Der Facettenreichtum sogenannter Multiagentensysteme belegt dies. Ein Multiagentensystem ist ein lose gekoppeltes Netz von Softwareagenten, die interagieren, um Probleme zu lösen, die über die Fähigkeiten und das Wissen der individuellen Agenten hinausgehen. Die Kooperationsmechanismen bilden i.a. Metaphern der Zusammenarbeit unter Tieren (Bionik) oder der menschlichen Kooperation (Sozionik) nach.

Multiagentensysteme erlauben es, die Kooperation von Agenten mit unterschiedlichen Eigeninteressen zu modellieren. Die koordinierte Entscheidungsfindung und Ressourcenverteilung in sich dynamisch verändernden Umgebungen wird u.a. für das technisch unterstützte Katastrophenmanagement benötigt (Jennings 2010). Verfahren zur dezentralen Allokation von Ressourcen auf Basis von agentenbasierten Auktionsverfahren (Wooldridge 2009) werden z.B. für die sogenannten Smart Grids genutzt: automatisch werden die Angebote einer Vielzahl kleiner und kleinstner Stromanbieter und die sich dynamisch ändernde Stromnachfrage abgeglichen (Mainzer 2010: 218).

Die Multiagentensimulation umfasst die Modellierung, die Implementierung und Validierung von Multiagentensystemen. Technische Problemlösungen können unter Laborumgebungen ausgetestet werden, um in einem späteren Schritt in einer Echtzeitumgebung eingesetzt zu werden. Simulationsexperimente erlauben die Erkundung unterschiedlicher Szenarien. Im Echtzeiteinsatz können die Softwareagentensysteme zu hybriden Multiagentensystemen erweitert werden: menschliche Agenten lassen sich zur Klärung nicht formalisierter Konflikte einbinden; Roboter können statt der Softwareagenten zum Einsatz kommen. In verteilten Handlungsvollzügen finden sich also menschliche und nichtmenschliche Akteure.

Das Ziel dieses Aufsatzes ist es, einen begrifflich-systematischen Ansatz vorzustellen, der den heutigen Phänomenen komplexer Verhaltensregulation und Ausführungskontrolle durch soziotechnische Systeme in computervermittelten Umgebungen gerecht wird und offen für zukünftige Erweiterungen ist. Auf seiner Basis kann Delegation von Handlungsoptionen an nichtmenschliche Akteure beschrieben und bewertet werden. Dies stellt eine notwendige Voraussetzung für Zuschreibung von Handlungsträgerschaft und Verantwortung dar.

## **2. Potentialität und Aktualität technischer Agenten**

In (Hubig 2006) wird die Technik als Medium vorgestellt. Vertiefend wird in „Technik als Medium und ‚Technik‘ als Reflexionsbegriff“ unterschieden zwischen dem „Möglichkeitsraum der Realisierung möglicher Zwecke“ und „Wirk-

lichkeitsraum der Realisierung möglicher Zwecke“ (Hubig 2010: 4).

Virtualität in technisch induzierten Kontexten lässt sich unter Einsatz dieses Konzepts pointiert charakterisieren. Durch den Einsatz der Computertechnik als Medium entsteht mittels des Designs die Potentialität der virtuellen Umgebungen oder auch eines Softwareagenten. Formal wird sie als IT-Programm(system) gefasst. Aus ontologischer Sicht handelt es sich um einen abstrakten, intangiblen Objekttyp. Jedes Programm(system) hat eine logische Struktur. Diese ist von ihrem materiellen Substrat unabhängig. IT-Programm(system)e bieten einen „Möglichkeitsraum der Realisierung möglicher Zwecke“. Zur Laufzeit des Programm(systems) entsteht ein „Wirklichkeitsraum der Realisierung möglicher Zwecke“, d.h. eine konkrete virtuelle Umgebung oder eine Instantiierung eines Softwareagenten. Die virtuelle Aktualität bildet sich heraus. Diese kann in eine materielle Umgebung eingebettet sein: ein Beispiel ist die Steuerungssoftware eines Roboters oder ein Softwaresystem zur Steuerung großer Produktionsanlagen. In diesen Fällen entsteht ein Wirklichkeitsraum hybrider Aktualität, der sowohl virtuelle wie materielle Anteile enthält.

Die Handlungsfähigkeit individueller technischer Agenten – seien sie nun Roboter oder reine Softwareagenten – ist stets vermittelt. Sie zeigt sich situationsbezogen. Durch den spezifischen Agententyp ist sein Potential definiert. Abhängig von diesem Potential können sich während des Einsatzes die aktuellen Fähigkeiten zeigen. In experimentellen Umgebungen tritt der Softwareagent als virtuell aktual auf. In Echtzeitumgebungen, d.h. gekoppelt mit der materiellen Welt, realisiert sich die hybride Aktualität von Softwareagenten oder auch Robotern.

## **3. Zuschreibung von Handlungsfähigkeit in soziotechnischen Systemen**

Latour und seine Kollegen, die die Akteur-Netzwerk-Theorie (ANT) entwickelt haben, können als Pioniere der ernsthaften Zuschreibung von Handlungsfähigkeit an *non-humans* gelten. Nichtmenschliche Entitäten werden in Handlungsvollzügen als den Menschen gleichberechtigt dargestellt. Die Handlungszuschreibung erfolgt auf Basis von Vernetzungszusammenhängen, den Akteur-Netzwerken. Das Ziel des ANT-Ansatzes (Latour 2005) ist es, die Koevolution von Gesellschaft, Natur und Technik möglichst vorurteilsfrei und möglichst ohne Bezugnahme auf in den jeweiligen Feldern gebräuchlichen Theorien und Überzeugungen zu beschreiben und so zu ihrem eigentlichen Wesen vorzudringen. Wissenschafts- und Technikentwicklung gelingt in dem Maße, indem sich die beteiligten Komponenten zu entsprechenden Netzwerken ausbilden.

Latours symmetrische Ontologie und sein ungestuftes Konzept der Handlungsfähigkeit bedeutet für Rammert,

wesentliche Aspekte von Handlungsmacht nicht erkennen zu können (Rammert 2011: 6). Rammert und Kollegen haben ein gestuftes Modell erarbeitet, das zwischen drei Ebenen der Handlungsfähigkeit unterscheidet:

- verändernde Wirksamkeit – die von kurzfristigen Irritationen bis zu langfristigen Restrukturierungen reichen kann,
- Kontingenz, der (zusätzlichen) Fähigkeit, auch anders handeln zu können - die von der Wahl zwischen vordefinierten Alternativen bis zu selbsterzeugten Aktionen reichen kann, und, additiv, auf der obersten Ebene
- Intentionalität als Basis rationalen und selbstreflektiven Verhaltens (Rammert/Schulz-Schäffer 2002: 26; Rammert 2011: 1 ff).

Im Gegensatz zu Latour, der nicht zwischen Potential und Aktualität von Technik unterscheidet, sondern (meist flüchtige) „Weisen der Existenz“ von Akteurnetzwerken im Blick hat, wird im Folgenden zwischen Handlungsfähigkeit (Potentialität) und Handlungsbeteiligung (Aktualität) klar unterschieden. Das gestufte Modell von (Rammert/Schulz-Schäffer 2002) wird nicht verwendet: dessen weitgespannte Ebenen erlauben keine klare Abgrenzung gegeneinander. Überdies sollen einzelne Agenten nicht wie bei Rammert (2011) „medias in res“ als black boxes in den Fokus gerückt werden, sondern der Blick wird auf ihre Konstruktion und ihre sich in der Zeit potentiell wandelnde Konstitution gelenkt. Nur so kann ihr „Genotyp“ und ihr „Phänotyp“ differenziert in den Blick genommen werden. Im Gegensatz zu den Arbeiten vom Rammert und Kollegen soll überdies der Begriff der kollektiven Handlungsträgerschaft ausdifferenziert werden.

#### 4. Multidimensionale, graduelle Handlungsfähigkeit

Der Fokus liegt im Weiteren auf der verteilten Handlungsträgerschaft in computervermittelten Umgebungen und dem Handlungsvollzug in hybriden Systemen: Das Handlungspotential smarter, autonomer Technik, insbesondere das Adoptions- und Entwicklungspotential von Multiagentensystemen, steht im Mittelpunkt.

Im Gegensatz zu Rammert wird die Handlungsfähigkeit von Technologie nicht als „pragmatische Fiktion“ (Rammert 2011: 8) wahrgenommen, sondern als eine Abstraktionsebene im Sinn von Floridis „Methode der Abstraktionsebenen“ (Floridi 2011: 44 ff). Mittels des folgenden Konzepts der multidimensionalen, graduellen Handlungsfähigkeit kann diese Abstraktionsebene genauer gefasst werden. Es ist festzuhalten, dass im Folgenden die Granularität der Achsen, die den verschiedenen Dimensionen entsprechen, nur beispielhaften Charakter aufweisen. Sie können den Gegebenheiten der Systeme, die es zu analysieren und/oder vergleichen gilt, angepasst werden.

Das Aktivitätsniveau technischer Artefakte ist entscheidend, ob ein Artefakt rein passiv benutzt werden kann oder aktiv interagiert. Zur Charakterisierung von Handlungsfähigkeit reicht es nicht aus, nur die Aktivitätsniveaus der beteiligten Entitäten zu betrachten. Es sind überdies ihre Adoptionsfähigkeit, ihre Interaktionsfähigkeiten und ihr Potential zur Personifikation anderer sowie, davon abhängig, ihre Möglichkeit zu individuellem und abgestimmten Handeln in den Blick zu nehmen.

Die Berücksichtigung der Adoptionsfähigkeit ist für die individuelle Verhaltensregulation und nuancierte Ausführungskontrolle notwendig, insbesondere wenn das Umfeld

selbst sich verändert. Interaktionsmechanismen werden für Koordination und verteilte Kontrolle benötigt. Sie beginnt bei einfachsten Anpassungen an Umweltveränderungen und reicht bis zur Adaption langfristiger Strategien und der korrespondierenden Ziele basierend auf Erfahrungen und der Selbstreflexionsfähigkeit des Menschen. Die Fähigkeit, sich aktiv und klug an Situationsveränderungen anzupassen, ist aus Sicht vieler Techniker und Soziologen die Basis für die Unterscheidung zwischen Verhalten und Handeln.

Die Fähigkeit zum individuellen Handeln kann auf Basis des Aktivitätsniveaus und der Adoptionsfähigkeit definiert werden. Jeder individuelle (technische) Agent ist durch seinen Typus, sein Modell definiert. Seine Handlungsfähigkeit zeigt sich nicht erst im gemeinsamen Handlungsvollzug, sondern es soll (bereits) der individuelle (technische) Agent als handlungsfähig gelten, wenn er situationsangepasst agieren kann und durch das Agieren und Interagieren einen eigenen Phänotyp entwickeln kann. Um die Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen menschlichen und nichtmenschlichen Agenten zu betonen, soll ein Agent als handlungsfähig, anstatt nur fähig sich zu verhalten, gelten, wenn die folgenden Bedingungen bezüglich seiner Ontogenese gelten: „der einzelne Akteur [entwickelt sich] als komplexes adaptives System (KAS), das zur regelgesteuerten Informationsverarbeitung und darauf aufbauend auch zum Problemlösen im Sinne von angepasstem Verhalten, in einem dynamischen Prozess von Konstitution und Emergenz, in der Lage ist“ (Kappelhoff 2011: 320). Ein Beispiel hierfür sind lernende *automatic bid agents*, die als Bieter in elektronischen Auktionsverfahren auftreten.

Die Fähigkeit zur Interaktion ist die Vorbedingung jedes koordinierten Vorgehens. Die Spannweite reicht von völlig unkommunikativ über die strukturierte Kommunikation anhand vordefinierter Skripte wie bei den elektronischen Auktionsverfahren bis hin zur ad-hoc Kommunikation beliebig vieler, heterogener Elemente zur bedarfs- und fallweise Koordination und Kontrolle.

Personifikation, die Wahrnehmung des Anderen als Anderen und gegebenenfalls als Gegenüber, das einem selbst ähnlich ist, ist aus Sicht von Evolutionspsychologen und Philosophen wesentlich für Konstitution eines Selbst oder – bescheiden er ausgedrückt – die Entwicklung eines eigenen Phänotyps. Darüber hinaus bietet sie einen Ausgangspunkt für die Entdeckung und Einschätzung von Verhaltensmustern. Auch der Jurist Gunther E. Teubner argumentiert ähnlich: „Personification of non-humans is best understood as a strategy of dealing with the uncertainty about the identity of the other [...] Personifying other non-humans is a social reality today and a political necessity for the future“ (Teubner 2006: 497).

Manche heutigen technischen Agenten haben mehr oder minder primitive Modelle anderer. Die Fähigkeit, anderen Agenten Verhaltensdispositionen unterstellen zu können, mag als unterste Stufe der Personifikation betrachtet werden. Die nächsthöhere qualitative Stufe findet sich z.B. bei Menschenaffen, die nach neueren Erkenntnissen (Call/Tomasello 2008) das Potential für verbundene Intentionalität (*joint intentionality*) besitzen. Dieses Vermögen bietet die Grundlage für themenzentrierte Gruppenentscheidungsprozesse, die auf rein egoistischem Verhalten basieren. Andere als intentionale Akteure wahrzunehmen, ermöglicht bereits Kindern an sogenannten geteilten Aktionen (*shared actions*) teilzuhaben (Tomasello 2008).

Andere als mentale Akteure zu verstehen, ist für den Menschen fundamental, um intentional zu interagieren und gemeinschaftlich zu handeln (Tomasello 2008). Dieses

Vermögen setzt in den Worten Tomasellos *collective intentionality* voraus. Basierend auf dem Vermögen des Agenten zu joint intentionality bzw. der Fähigkeit, den Anderen als intentionale Akteur oder sogar als mentalen Akteur einzuschätzen, kann ein Akteur in Tomasellos Diktion als fähig zu *joint action*, *shared* respektive *collective action* gelten.

Diese Anregungen werden aufgenommen, um kollektive Handlungsträgerschaft anders als in (Rammert 2011) nicht als rein emergent, sondern als gestuft geordnet zu beschreiben. Sie beginnt bei fest verdrahteten Handlungs routinen zwischen individuellen Agenten, über ad-hoc Kooperationsmechanismen bis zu Konzepten des gemeinschaftlichen Tuns (*joint action*), des geteilten Tuns (*shared action*) und des kollektiven Handelns (*collective action*). Diese Konzepte inspirieren Forscher in der Robotik, die Zusammenarbeit zwischen Mensch und Roboter als Prozess des Lernens experimentell zu erproben.

## 5. Handlungsbeteiligung und Urheberschaft in verteilten Handlungsvollzügen

Konstellationen verteilter Handlungsträgerschaft reichen von sogenannten Swarm Intelligenz Ansätzen, in denen die einzelnen Agenten meist nur sehr primitive Fähigkeiten besitzen, über Systeme, in denen gewisse Aufgaben an Softwareagenten oder Roboter delegiert werden bis zu flexiblen Partnerschaften zwischen Menschen und Maschinen. Mittels des vorgestellten Ansatzes kann die individuelle und gegebenenfalls gemeinsame Handlungszuschreibung erfolgen resp. erkannt werden, welche „Agen ten“ nur rein instrumentell zum Einsatz kommen.

Soziotechnische Systeme bieten Ermöglichungsräume für sich im Vollzug herausbildende Praktiken. Die in komputationellen Artefakten angelegten Freiheitsgrade können sich im individuellen Handeln, im mandatierten Agieren und im kollaborativen Handeln aktualisieren. Jedem technischen Agenten ist für den Handlungsvollzug eine Rolle zugeschrieben und gewisse Muster der Aufgabenerfüllung. Durch zielorientiertes Verhalten kann der technische Agent seiner Rolle gerecht werden. Falls er durch Erfahrung lernt, erwirbt er zunehmend Handlungskompetenz. Wenn der technische Agent sein Handlungsziel dynamisch neuen Erfordernissen anpasst, kann er nicht nur Rollenverantwortung, sondern auch Zielverantwortung übernehmen. Im abgestimmten Handeln können verschiedene Grade von sozialer Verantwortung, insbesondere in einer (heute noch stark eingeschränkten) Fürsorgeverantwortung als virtueller Begleiter (Wilks 2010) zum Vorschein treten. Verantwortungskonzepte für im rechtlichen Sinn handelnde künstliche Agenten und Regularien für Softwareagenten, die mandatiert handeln, werden bereits entwickelt (z.B. Chopra/White 2011 resp. Kratz 2009). Zusammenfassend kann man feststellen, dass in Multiagentensystemen Urheberschaft im verteilten Handlungsvollzug zuschreibbar ist. Ähnlich wie in technischen workflow-Systemen kann die Verantwortung gemäß der zugeschriebene Rolle differenziert definiert werden. Jede Basis für eine Seinsverantwortung, eine Selbstverantwortung im ethischen oder religiösen Sinn fehlt für heutige technische Agenten jedoch vollkommen.

## 6. Zusammenfassung

Dieser Ansatz zeigt, wie Handlungsfähigkeit aus der technischen Vermitteltheit erwachsen kann. Der Konstitution der Individualität lernfähiger technischer Objekte, der Emergenz neuer Eigenschaften wird Raum gegeben.

Der philosophische Mehrwert des multidimensionalen, graduellen Ansatzes zur Kategorisierung von Handlungsfähigkeit und Handlungsbeteiligung liegt aber nicht nur in der Rekonstruktion, sondern kann den Erstellungsprozess begleiten. Verantwortungszuschreibungen und informierte Annahmen über das weitere Verhalten können getroffen werden. Somit ist die Basis gelegt, solche Systeme auch aus juristischer und technikethischer Sicht im Detail einzustufen. Dies ist bei der heute zu beachtenden zunehmenden Systemautonomie eine Notwendigkeit.

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# Philosophy and Everyday Language

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Surely one of the most shocking and at the same time one of the most intriguing features of Wittgenstein's later philosophy is his insistence on "everyday" or "ordinary" uses of language as somehow importantly linked to a search for clarity. The shock here is, I gather, generated by the fact that a great deal of western philosophy/metaphysics has since the beginning been in *rebellion* against "ordinary" or "everyday" beliefs, conceptions and concepts. In other words, metaphysics has been understood as a correction of and a pathway over and against that of (deceitful) public opinion, *doxa* (Dooyeweerd 1980: 113). So how is it with Wittgenstein's notion of bringing "words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use" (PI § 116)? Is Wittgenstein here proposing that we do exactly the opposite to what western metaphysics has been doing? My suggestion will be that the answer is both negative and positive. It is negative, if we think that Wittgenstein meant that in contrast to traditional metaphysics, what should be done is simply to affirm how language is used in our everyday lives; as if this would bring the clarity philosophy sought for. On the other hand the question is positive in the sense that Wittgenstein does place the everyday central to how we can come to locate *where* the root-causes of our problems lie and *how* we can work with them. That is to say, Wittgenstein is suggesting that the source of our problems in philosophy is in one sense or another situated in our uses of language, not in our lack of insight of truths hidden in the higher realms of reality, as western metaphysics often has had us think. What then needs to be clarified is what is meant by the need to bring words back to the everyday, to "stick to the subjects of our everyday thinking" (PI § 106), if it does not fall back on the idea that everyday uses of language are to be affirmed. My suggestion will contain the idea that Wittgenstein is not in opposition to a rebellion against everyday uses of language, in fact, I suggest, by sticking to the everyday we come to see just how much transformation is called for.

Even though I cannot here argue at length why I believe that Wittgenstein's reference to everyday uses of language does not come to an affirmation of such uses – that such uses might be in need of great transformation – I shall briefly touch upon the matter. First of all, when reading the *Philosophical Investigations* one is struck by the lack of explicit outlays of what everyday language use is supposed to be. That is to say, Wittgenstein does not seem to aim at giving us an account of how words are in fact used in our everyday lives, which is puzzling if we are inclined to think that the everyday would provide us with a specific and determined ground on which words are/must be used – why, if this would be Wittgenstein's conception, does he then not lay out for us what this ground is like! All we seem to get out of the text are nothing more than vague and short proposals such as "That means something like [...]" (PI § 251), "In so far as it makes sense [...]" (PI § 253) or "If, for example, someone says that the sentence [...] makes sense to him [...]" (PI § 117). Nowhere do we find Wittgenstein determining, on account of how words are used in their everyday sense, what particular meanings come to. At times we even get the impression that the notion of everyday language use, as the ground on which language stands, is a grammatical one. As is expressed in

remark § 120: when doing philosophy, one has to "use language full-blown", which in turn shows that one "can adduce only exterior facts about language" (PI § 120). – So what would be the interior facts which we cannot adduce, or what would it be like if we didn't have to use language full-blown? One then asks, as is asked in remark § 251 of the *Investigations*: if we cannot imagine the opposite, can we imagine the thing itself? From this perspective the everyday shows itself as neither a "something" nor a "nothing" (c.f. PI § 304). That is to say, my proposal here is that Wittgenstein does not mean for the notion of everyday language to be understood as forming an *object of study*, one which we could observe from an impersonal, neutral perspective.

I don't want to say that we "cannot" think about everyday language as forming a clear object of study. Rather, what I'm aiming at is that Wittgenstein urges us to think of meaning, of what place it has in our lives, from another perspective. Nothing can stop us from conceptualising meaning – living thereby, forming our relationship to others and to the world accordingly – in terms of fixed structures, which determine how we *must* speak – structures which could be looked at from a third person perspective, as if following a rule book. In fact, one could say, this *freedom* is just as much a(n active) problem for or a threat to everyday uses, as it is for metaphysics. Or one could say that this is what metaphysics in a sense amounts to. My suggestion here will be that the perspective on meaning and understanding that Wittgenstein tries to raise with the help of everyday language use, is one essentially connected to a search for moral self-understanding. By this I mean that instead of understanding the notion of "sticking to everyday language" as one in which our main task is to identify and observe such language, what I see Wittgenstein essentially insisting on with this notion is that we are to *place* ourselves *in* the "deed" of language use, as active participants saying things to each other, as one human being speaking to another/others. We might bring to mind remarks such as "Yes, but there is *something* there all the same accompanying my cry of pain [...] – Only whom are we informing of this? And on what occasion?" (PI § 296) or "But can't I imagine that the people around me are automata, lack consciousness, even though they behave in the same way as usual? [...]" But just try to keep hold of this idea in the midst of your ordinary intercourse with others, in the street, say!" (PI § 420). The spirit in these remarks, as I read them, is what I mean by *placing* ourselves *in* actual occasions of language use, and not simply just to look at them from outside, as if language was a calculus performed by automatons.

Recall remark § 125 of the *Investigations*: "The civil status of a contradiction, or its status in civil life: there is the philosophical problem". We should then be reminded though of the fact that *placing* ourselves *in* actual uses of language is nothing more than (re)locating ourselves in a life, a life potentially not of harmony and clarity, but a life where the way we speak to and are with each other is filled with problems. Clarity cannot then be determined by morally independent and impersonal criteria, for it is very likely that what we find in our everyday uses of language,

in our engagements with each other, in our "original homes", is a language use that is *shaped and formed* by moral corruption, by fear, envy, greed, jealousy, power struggles, and so on. The fact that everyday language is a language community's "proper expression" of itself, does not amount to the kind of clarity Wittgenstein sought for (c.f. PO: 185). Think of the following remark:

To say "This combination of words makes no sense" excludes it from the sphere of language and thereby bounds the domain of language. But when one draws a boundary it may be for various kinds of reason. If I surround an area with a fence or a line or otherwise, the purpose may be to prevent someone from getting in or out; but it may also be part of a game and the players be supposed, say, to jump over the boundary; or it may shew where the property of one man ends and that of another begins; and so on. So if I draw a boundary line that is not yet to say *what I am drawing it for*. (PI § 499, emphasis added)

The emphasised challenge here cannot be answered without a moral self-examination and the moral question put to us applies to each of the imagined reasons in the quote. At the same time as we may come to recognise the moral problems in our ways of speaking, in our ways of engaging with others, we may come to recognise that these problems are not separate, but intrinsically linked to our norms, conventions and traditions, as well as to our social structures and institutions, political and economical establishments, our consumption habits, social and ecological crisis' etc. I shall exemplify this with something that touches most of us in the modern (western) world. Economical growth and cheap consumption possibilities, enabled to us by ecologically and socially destructive industries, is a part of our everyday language/life. We not only speak about consumption and economical growth a certain way but affirm their uses through our everyday habits – the concepts, so to speak, are at work. Nearly everyone is by now acquainted with the destructive consequences of this form of life and yet both the habits as well as the language use stays intact. All too often we find this way of life "legitimised" by notions such as "necessary steps of progress", a notion quieting the conscience of states, businesses and individuals. Insofar as this is the case, it exemplifies the "logic" of metaphysics, against which Wittgenstein places the everyday: "necessity" becomes a means of not having to engage oneself with the moral difficulty but rather seeing the morally corrupt as something which "must" be there in order to, say, maximise the overall happiness. In this sense metaphysics is a way to deal with real and important problems, but a way which turns its focus away from our moral constitution. That is why one needs to be in "an instinctive state of rebellion against// dissatisfaction with// language" (PO: 185).

The above mentioned example should, I think, be seen as illustrating how Wittgenstein's search for clarity invites a political dimension to open up. For inasmuch as the search for moral self-understanding calls for a transformation of ourselves it simultaneously might, in many cases, call for transformation of the "everyday", i.e. a transformation of how we as a (language) community speak and act. Naomi Scheman has written that "while it cannot be the task of philosophy to change the homes to which our words need to be brought back, such changes are, in many areas of our lives, urgently called for, and that Wittgenstein is best read as recognising that fact" (Scheman 1996: 391). Even though I agree with Scheman that Wittgenstein is best read as acknowledging the need for transformation of the everyday, I think that the division between philosophy and "acting" or "doing", which Scheman seems to be making, is

unfortunate (c.f. PI § 23). The political dimension which I referred to has its urgent place *in* philosophy, or is part of it, because one's moral constitution is always in relation to others. So if I see corruption, oppression, injustice etc. being exercised, I cannot, this is my claim, place myself morally neutral to it, for this would mean to repress or suppress my moral relation to others. In other words, searching for clarity, searching for moral self-understanding, is not in any clear sense separate from "acting" upon the wrong one comes to realise, and the way one acts always reveals something about how one has understood the situation. Thus the term "politics" here may find its nearest brethren in the figure of M.K. Gandhi, who famously declared that "those who say that religion has nothing to do with politics do not know what religion means" (Gandhi 1972: 53).

To some extent, I have been trying to narrow down the gap between traditional metaphysics and Wittgenstein's anti-metaphysical attitude. That is to say, I have been suggesting that just as much as western metaphysics, Wittgenstein's notion of the everyday encourages a challenge and a rebellion against everyday language (PO: 185). Nevertheless, the gap is very wide in another respect. To begin with, Western metaphysics has, as far as I can see and according to the proposed understanding of philosophical problems, imposed its rebellion against *doxa* from top-down, meaning that a necessary order of things – given to us through the means of rational reason – has been the model upon which the rebellion has been built. Secondly, and in a sense because of reference to this disengaged, impersonal, rationalistic order, western metaphysics has masked its "overcoming" of the problems inherent in the everyday by *repressing* or *suppressing* the expression of these problems and conflicts, as they come to expression in the language of the everyday. In other words, instead of working with these problems, metaphysics has sought to abolish them by re-forming language so that the problems would *not show* themselves or burden us any longer.

Wittgenstein, I suggest, on the other hand introduces another way of both conceptualising and working with our philosophical problems. In his philosophical self-understanding philosophical problems are not problems separated from our everyday lives, but rather situate themselves in it. Thus he urges us to keep ourselves *in* the everyday, seeing that it is only by doing so that we may truly come to uncover our problems, and thus, through a transformation of ourselves and the everyday, reach clarity.

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## Abbreviations

- Philosophical Investigations PI  
 Philosophical Occasions PO

# Hume and Religiously Significant Miracles

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What determines the religious significance of miraculous events? This paper argues that religious significance is largely determined by a subject's calling the event a miracle; that is, by the ascription of religious significance to an event when one calls it a miracle. I also draw out an important implication of this thesis for philosophical attempts to ground religious claims. I argue that if a Humean miracle should be proved by religious testimony this would not commit us to believing in a religious event, since belief in a religious miracle requires an ascription of religious significance, and this is an essentially personal matter.

## I. A Humean religious significance

David Hume's "Of Miracles" (in his *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, henceforth EHU) argues against attempts to prove miracles, especially religious miracles.<sup>1</sup> His objection is not logical, but empirical.<sup>2</sup> Belief in religious miracles is unjustified because of the unreliability of religious testimony.<sup>3</sup> Part II specifies four conditions of reliable testimony,<sup>4</sup> grounded in past experience, which religious testimony ultimately fails to satisfy. In this section I argue that Hume's "Of Miracles" presupposes an account of religious significance, which is incomplete at best. His implicit account can be reconstructed from (a) his discussion of what he refers to as 'religious miracles' and (b) his considered definition of a miracle. I call it an 'implicit' account because Hume's essay nowhere discusses the nature of religious significance; this despite the fact that he clearly distinguishes between religious and non-religious miracles.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Hume writes (EHU: 185): "But should this miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion; men, in all ages, have been so much imposed on by ridiculous stories of that kind, that this very circumstance would be a full proof of a cheat, and sufficient, with all men of sense, not only to make them reject the fact, but even reject it without farther examination [...] As the violations of truth are more common in the testimony concerning religious miracles, than in that concerning any other matter of fact; this must diminish very much the authority of the former testimony, and make us form a more general resolution, never to lend any attention to it, with whatever specious pretence it may be covered."

<sup>2</sup> Part I does not offer an *a priori* argument against miracles. See Robert J. Fogelin's critique of this reading in 2003: 17-20. I should also note, in passing, that my reading of Hume's essay is largely indebted to Fogelin's book. Perhaps the most important points of agreement are (a) that Hume offers a single and sustained argument against miracles, which is detailed in the two parts of "Of Miracles," and (b) that Hume's critique of miracles is meant to be a critique of religious miracles (i.e., miracles that provide objective evidence of religious claims). See Chapter 1 of his *A Defense of Hume on Miracles* (2003).

<sup>3</sup> Hume writes: "But if the spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of common sense; and human testimony, in these circumstances, loses all pretensions to authority. A religionist may be an enthusiast, and imagine he sees what has no reality: He may know his narrative to be false, and yet persevere in it, with the best intentions in the world; for the sake of promoting so holy a cause [...]" (EHU: 175).

<sup>4</sup> These are conditions such as agreement among witnesses, witnesses of good and honorable character, and so on. Such conditions, if uniformly met, constitute a full proof of the event. Hume, of course, argues in Part I that uniform testimony is not enough to ground belief in a miracle. For even if a miracle were established by uniform testimony – sufficient to warrant a full proof of the event, as well as to outweigh the intrinsic improbability of the event – it would still be opposed by a full proof from uniform experience – that is, by the evidence in favor of the law of nature, which the putative miracle is said to violate.

<sup>5</sup> Here is a clear instance of this: "I beg the limitations here made may be remarked, when I say, that a miracle can never be proved, so as to be the foundation of a system of religion. For I own, that otherwise, there may possibly be miracles, or violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony; perhaps, it will be impossible to find any such in all the records of history." (EHU: 184)

Hume defines a miracle thus: "A miracle may be accurately defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent. A miracle may either be discoverable by men or not. This alters not its nature and essence." (EHU: 173)<sup>6</sup> Call Hume's definition of a miracle ((1) a violation of a law of nature, (2) which has a supernatural cause) the *philosophical use of the word 'miracle'*, and any event that satisfies his conditions a *Humean miracle*. Hume's use of the term 'religious miracle' identifies members of the class of evidentially significant miracles, which constitute a just foundation for a system of religion; such miracles, if proven, provide evidence for certain religious claims. Now, clearly, part of what evidentially significant miracles provide evidence for is their religious significance. But what renders certain miracles religiously significant and others not? What does their religious significance consist in? Given what Hume calls the very "nature and essence" of miracles, it seems that it is *in virtue of supernatural causation* that miracles become religiously significant. Call this *Hume's ontic account of religious significance*: The religious significance of miracles consists in their being the products of supernatural causation.<sup>7</sup> Despite its initial plausibility, however, Hume's ontic account of religious significance is insufficient to guarantee knowledge of religious significance. For a subject who knows that a miracle occurred thereby knows that it had a supernatural cause, but not that this being is a religious deity. Therefore, Hume needs an epistemological account of religious significance.

Hume does not specify distinctly necessary conditions under which people ought to believe in religious miracles, for his criticism of religious miracles is no different in kind than his criticism of miracles generally, suggesting that the necessary conditions of proving miracles and religious miracles are identical. For example, he considers two hypothetical miracles, each of which is supported by analogo-

<sup>6</sup> The quote continues: "The raising of a house or ship into the air is a visible miracle. The raising of a feather, when the wind wants ever so little of a force requisite for that purpose, is as real a miracle, though not so sensible with regard to us." (EHU: 173, footnote 23, italics in original)

<sup>7</sup> One might object to my claim that Hume has an account of religious significance, as derived from supernatural causation. For one might think that Hume only presumed the validity of this inference, for the purposes of his argument. Perhaps he thought that even if (for the sake of argument) we suppose that it is justifiable to infer religious significance from the occurrence of a miracle, the fact of the matter is that no miracle has ever been, or could ever be, established. If this is Hume's argumentative strategy, then I am wrong in attributing to him *any* account of religious significance, including the view that religious significance is determined by supernatural causation. I would agree that we cannot attribute to Hume any account of religious significance with absolute certainty, since he doesn't directly discuss it. But the relevant question is whether his argument relies on such an account. I think it is clear from his thesis that it does, for, as Fogelin (2003) observes, his critique is first and foremost a critique of *religious* miracles. Furthermore, Hume's tacit acceptance of the claim that religious significance can be inferred from supernatural causation surely commits him to *some* such account. And yet Hume does not seem to have an adequate account of a religious miracle. His first necessary condition of a miracle suggests the following distinction: A 'natural event' is one that comports with the laws of nature and a 'supernatural event' is one that violates those laws. His second necessary condition suggests a further distinction: A 'natural event' is one that has a natural cause, and a 'supernatural event' is one that has a supernatural cause. Yet neither of these distinctions is religiously significant – or so I argue below, for the only sense of 'natural event' that contrasts with 'religious event' is a mundane and non-religious event. I argue below that an everyday event is transformed from a mundane to a religious event, not in virtue of violating a law of nature and/or having a supernatural cause, but in virtue of having a religious point for the subject.

gous evidence of the same strength (uniform testimony). The first is a religious miracle involving Queen Elizabeth's being raised from the dead, and thereafter presiding over England for three more years. The second is a non-religious miracle involving eight days of sheer darkness. Hume says he would accept the latter miracle, but unequivocally rejects the former, and yet the standards of reliable testimony are the same in either case.<sup>8</sup> Religious testimony is rejected, not because religious miracles are held to a higher standard than non-religious miracles, but because eyewitnesses, where religious miracles are concerned, are prone to lie and deceive or be lied to and be deceived. Religious testimony is more likely the result of self- or intentional deception, for it is more reasonable to ascribe interested religious motives to the eyewitnesses and/or to believe that the death was a staged 'hoax' rather than accept that a miracle occurred. But how does Hume know the Queen Elizabeth miracle is religiously significant and the eight-day miracle is not? The evidence of testimony may establish that a law of nature was violated, but this is not evidence of religious significance, for non-religious miracles also meet this condition. Perhaps, then, Hume locates religious significance in religious ascriptions, that is, in eyewitness' attributing religious significance to the events they report. Thus, Hume rejects the Queen Elizabeth miracle *because* it is ascribed religious significance. But this cannot be his only basis for identifying religious significance, because he distinguishes two uses of the Queen Elizabeth miracle, namely, its uses with and without ascribed religious significance. He says he would reject *both* instances, and not merely the latter, though he admits the latter is more certainly a hoax.

I think the religious significance of the Queen Elizabeth miracle (*without* ascribed religious significance) is, for Hume, determined by its religious context. For even *without* ascribed religious significance, Hume recognizes that its religious context clearly suggests the God of Catholicism caused it in order to confirm the Queen's political authority. Therefore, religious significance is determined by the religious purpose or point of the event, which reveals the intentions of its supernatural cause. This Humean insight that religious context is essential for religious significance can be motivated by examples. The act of hand-washing is not ordinarily called a religious event. But if the act occurs within a distinctly religious context, its religious significance is immediately evident. Even nonbelievers recognize that hand-washing, under certain circumstances, is a distinctly religious event. Therefore, whether an act acquires religious significance depends, in large part, on whether it occurs in a religious context. Similarly, suppose we witness a Humean miracle involving a weeping statue of the Virgin Mary. Given Hume's second definition of 'miracle' we ought to immediately infer that the event was supernaturally caused. But what determines whether the

<sup>8</sup> Fogelin explains how Hume's eight day miracle satisfies his four conditions of reliable testimony: "For notice the care that Hume has taken in tailoring his example of eight days of total darkness to satisfy the demands of the direct method of evaluating testimony laid out above. [1] In the case as he describes it, there will be testimony from 'a sufficient number of men, of such unquestioned good sense, education, and learning, as to secure us against all delusion in themselves.' As the example states, all such men will attest to the occurrence of this event. [2] We may also assume that a great many of these witnesses to the event are of sufficient integrity to foreclose any question of deceit. In any case, the event reported was open to all to observe, and an attempt at deceit could hardly have gone undetected. [3] Because it was a worldwide phenomenon, the original reports of such an event would not be limited to 'ignorant and barbarous nations.' [4] Finally, as described, there are no religious motives involved that might raise suspicions on that score. Against all these direct reasons for taking the testimony to be reliable, we have only the countervailing force of the reverse reason against it based on the improbability that well-established laws of nature have been violated. In such a circumstance (if one were ever to occur), Hume here acknowledges that the testimony may fully outweigh the reverse argument based upon the improbability of the event" (Fogelin 2003: 25-6, brackets mine).

supernatural being is a *religious deity*? Presumably, it is our knowledge of the appropriate religious tradition, which is, in this case, the religion of Catholicism. In order for any eyewitness to acquire knowledge of the deity's involvement, the following minimal facts, it seems, must be known by the subject: the nature of the identity of the God of Catholicism, the miracle tradition of Catholicism, the significance of the Virgin Mary in Catholicism, and the importance of veneration of religious statues in Catholicism. Given such knowledge, it would be justified for the observers of the miracle to infer *particular* supernatural causation; that is, it is plausible to believe that a particular religious deity, namely, the God of Catholicism, caused the event.

Knowledge of the religious context of a miracle thus appears to be partly constitutive of the justification believers have in making religious ascriptions. Hence, Hume appears committed to the following principle: A subject *S* ought to believe that a particular religious deity (not some unidentified supernatural agent) caused a miracle *M* only if *S* has sufficient knowledge of the religious context of the event. Attributing this view to Hume readily explains why there is no discussion of it in his essay: There was no pressing reason why he *should* identify the necessity of a religious context, since the significance of an event is typically 'swallowed up' with one's understanding of the context. In short, religious significance is usually not in question; certainly not in those cases of putative miracles which religious enthusiasts rely on to ground religious claims. Just as we do not ordinarily need to be reminded of the fact that an act of arm-raising must occur within a certain context in order to *be a vote*, as opposed to a request to ask a question, we do not ordinarily need to be reminded of the fact that a miracle must occur within a religious context in order to be a religious miracle. Religious significance ordinarily takes care of itself.

I now argue that Hume's implicit epistemological account of religious significance can, at best, only explain a weak form of religious significance. Suppose one thinks that religious significance amounts to nothing more than mere knowledge that (a) a miracle occurred, which was (b) caused by a particular supernatural deity. Then a well-established miracle may justify the inference that the God of Catholicism caused the event, if it occurs within a Christian context. In this sense Hume's use of 'religious miracle' enables us to identify evidentially significant events: That is, a miracle that occurs in a religious context enables us to acquire knowledge of a religious deity's identity. Call this Humean account a *weak account of religious significance*. It is weak, because knowledge of a Humean miracle is not yet evidence for *belief in* this deity; that is, it is not warrant for religious ascriptions which obligate religious commitment in relation to this deity. These are, after all, categorically distinct commitments. Consider the following analogy: I may have no trust or faith in Jose, and I may have good reason to disregard Jose or to allow him no significant role in my life. Still, my belief that Jose exists commits me to many things: to the acknowledgment of his existence, to his occupying some spatio-temporal location, and so on. Thus, if I *believe that* Jose exists, it does not follow that I should *believe in* Jose.

Similarly, if I *believe that* God exists, why should this commit me to a religious form of life? Why should I place my *faith in* God? A truly *religious* miracle ought to inspire, confirm and/or justify *faith in* God; therefore, let us call any account that inspires such religious commitment a *strong account of religious significance*. Then we can state our objection thus: Hume's account of religious significance does not impose any demand on believers of Humean miracles to ascribe *strong* religious significance to them;

that is, it does not rationally obligate them to *believe in* God. For example, Hume's Queen Elizabeth miracle (even with ascribed religious significance) does not commit one to *believe in* God, only to *believe that* God exists, for knowledge of the religious identity of a supernatural being is not identical to a religious commitment. D. Z. Phillips also argues that satisfying the conditions of a Humean miracle is insufficient to establish religious significance. In *The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God*, Phillips (2005: 14-7) criticizes Hume's definition of a miracle as a violation of a law of nature. His criticism is not that the definition is false, but that it fails to account for the religious significance of miracles. In considering John Perry's example of a miracle (Perry 1999: 39-40), Phillips asks us to suppose that some person witnesses the gentle rising and setting back of the Rock of Gibraltar 'for no apparent reason' and then observes that by 'no apparent reason' Perry

[...] means that no causal explanation has been found for it rising. He does not mean that God has done it for no apparent reason, but for all he says about the religious significance of the miracle, Perry's character could be read in this way. He has no idea what it means to attribute the miracle to God. But, then, how does he know he is describing a miracle? Apparently, because he thinks it makes sense to do so. But what sense is that? Where does Perry's character get it from? Certainly, not from religion. (Phillips 2005, loc.cit.)

When Phillips says that a violation of a law of nature is not a miracle, he does not mean that Perry *cannot* stipulate his own definition of a miracle. Neither does he mean that a religious miracle *must* be something more or other than a violation of a law of nature. Rather, he means that Perry's event is not a miracle in the ordinary sense of the word, that is, in a religious context of use, because calling it a miracle in *that* sense amounts to ascribing strong religious significance to it. Belief in Perry's event does not commit one to any particular religious tradition and religious deity, since his description lacks a religious context. Phillips' point, then, is not that believers *cannot* call it a miracle, but that they *will not* do so outside a religious context. And insofar as believers are willing to call it a miracle, they will not be using the term in the relevant sense, to ascribe strong religious significance to it. Therefore, mere knowledge of Perry's violation of a law of nature is not yet 'seeing' its religious point. Phillips calls this a grammatical remark, for he is reminding Perry of the meaning of the word 'miracle' – of the fact that religious significance requires a religious context regardless of whether the event is a natural or supernatural birth. That being said, none of this is to suggest that the mere presence of a religious context is sufficient for strong religious significance, because seeing the religious point of an event also requires the subject's acceptance of the religious context, i.e., a confession of faith. As Phillips writes: "In the case of certain miracles, it is a necessary condition of so regarding them, that no causal explanation of them has been found. But although that is a necessary condition, it is not a sufficient condition. To be a miracle, the event must reveal something about God." (Phillips 2005: 15)<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> The quotation continues: "Otherwise, what would be religious about it? Why would it be a miracle? What does the 'rising up' and 'settling back' of the Rock of Gibraltar show us about God? We are given no idea. Why, in that case, should we put it in the conceptual category of 'the miraculous'?" (Phillips 2005: 15) Notice that Phillips' conception of religious significance is compatible with my claim that natural miracles are possible. For he explicitly says that the inexplicability of an event is a necessary condition for *some* miracles, not all miracles.

To summarize: Hume fails to explain how *believing that* a miracle occurred rationally commits one to *believing in* God. Furthermore, his account of religious significance does not seem to have sufficient resources to justify this claim, for acknowledging certain facts about miracles and their causes is one thing, committing to a religious form of life is another. An understanding of the religious context of an event may contribute to inferential knowledge about the identity of its cause, but this does not amount to an acceptance of its religious point and purpose.

## II. Essentially personal religious ascriptions

Hume accepted the logical possibility of grounding religious miracles even though he argued against their being proved in actuality. This section argues that Hume was wrong in thinking that it is logically possible to prove a miracle on the basis of eyewitness testimony, because *believing in* God is an essentially personal matter. I offer two arguments in support of this claim, both of which are inspired by Wittgenstein's writings (especially his "Lectures on Religious Belief", 1972). When I say that believing in God is *essentially personal*, I mean that subjective considerations largely determine whether an event *is* a religious miracle (for the subject). Thus, an event *E* that a person *S* calls a miracle is not necessarily one that a person *P* calls a miracle, for it all depends on whether *S* and *P* ascribe religious significance to *E*, and this in turn depends on their personal religious orientations at the moment of utterance (and not merely on *S* and *P*'s knowledge of the religious tradition and the context of *E*).<sup>10</sup> Subjective considerations are also personal in the sense that they are of absolute importance to the believer,<sup>11</sup> but this is not the crucial sense in which I use the term.

The first of my two arguments is derived from what I call the *ordinary use of the word 'miracle'*, which is its use to ascribe strong religious significance to an event. I call those events that fall under the extension of this term *ordinary miracles*. Thus, an ordinary miracle is an event that is called a miracle by a believer in order to ascribe strong religious significance to the event.<sup>12</sup> The word in its ordinary, religious, use is applied to both natural and supernatural events. This enables us to distinguish two kinds of ordinary miracles: ordinary natural miracles and ordinary supernatural miracles. *Natural miracles* are ordinary mira-

<sup>10</sup> Religious ascriptions may of course be influenced by the subject's religious upbringing, spiritual intuitions, religious epiphanies, and so on, but they are always understood in the context of some particular religious tradition, which the subject personally accepts. I, thus, use the term *religious ascription* to denote the ascription of religious significance to an event by a subject when he or she accepts it by calling it a miracle.

<sup>11</sup> By 'absolute importance' I mean something similar to what I think Wittgenstein is getting at in his "A Lecture on Ethics" (1965). Wittgenstein argues that religious and ethical beliefs are matters of 'absolute value,' as opposed to convictions which are merely of relative value. Religious convictions, for Wittgenstein, are essentially personal in the sense that they *ultimately matter* to the individual. The absolute importance of religious beliefs explains why we hesitate to call persons religious when they say: 'I believe in God, but I'm not religious.' Such minimalist belief is said to consist in mere assent to the proposition 'God exists.' But this hardly seems to be a religious reaction, because the so-called 'believer' has nothing to show for her assent.

<sup>12</sup> Ordinary miracles can be contrasted with Humean miracles. One important difference is that Humean miracles are *events* whereas ordinary miracles are *religious ascriptions*. Another important difference is that Humean miracles are *objectively detectable* whereas ordinary miracles are *subjectively detectable*. By this I mean that the first necessary condition of a Humean miracle (a violation of a law of nature) could in principle be detected by anyone (and supernatural causation is inferred from this fact). However, in the case of ordinary miracles, if a person *S* is capable of identifying it (by calling an event a miracle), it does not follow that *P* is capable of identifying it. Thus we see an important difference in the grammar of 'identification' ('knowledge,' 'seeing,' etc.). A religious use of 'identification' of a miracle amounts to a subject's expression of a religious ascription, i.e., a confession of faith. But an evidential use of 'identification' ('knowledge,' 'seeing,' etc.) amounts to an epistemic awareness. The latter (though not the former) is connected to epistemic concepts such as principles and methods of verification, falsification, justification, and so on.

cles consisting of *natural events* (that is, naturally caused events) that are ascribed strong religious significance by the subject.<sup>13</sup> An example is the birth of a child, for natural births are often called miracles by religious believers in order to ascribe religious significance to them. *Supernatural miracles* are ordinary miracles consisting of *supernatural events* (that is, supernaturally caused events) that are ascribed strong religious significance by the subject. An example is a subject's calling the resurrection of a dead man a miracle in order to ascribe religious significance to it.

Natural miracles provide particularly good support for the claim that religious significance is grounded in personal religious ascriptions, because the source of their significance is obviously not causal. No theist would dream of denying that the birth of a child is naturalistically explicable. Theists know just as much as atheists do that child-births happen all the time and that these events are part of the natural world. They do not think that establishing natural births ought to *rationally* persuade atheists to believe in God, yet they are ascribed religious significance, for all that. Therefore, the religious significance of natural miracles is logically independent of their causal source. Whence then their religious significance? The believer, I submit, is the source of significance, for it is the believer who determines her personal religious ascriptions, and does so *in light of her personal, logically-antecedent, religious convictions*. Thus, we have some reason to think that religious significance is determined in part by essentially personal ascriptions.

One might object that theists are committed to a causal account of religious significance, for they say that 'God is ultimately responsible for all things,' which implies that it is in virtue of God's supernatural intervention that events acquire religious significance. I reply: In saying that the universe was created by God the believer is not committing to the view that *it is in virtue of supernatural causation that natural events acquire strong religious significance*, for should a theist be asked *how* God brought about the natural birth, her reply would surely be, 'In the same way that God brings about all natural births.' In other words, the sense in which God is responsible for natural births is the sense in which God is responsible for every event. But, of course, not every event is said to be evidence of God's existence; certainly, natural births are *not* heralded as objective proof of theism. So God's causal relation to the universe is not *evidentially* significant. Neither is it *religiously* significant, for merely saying that God *is* causally responsible for every event does not explain why *this* natural event has been called a miracle but not *that* one. After all, not just any natural event is called a miracle. Most natural events are mundane events, and only a small class of them, those which acquire religious significance for the subject, are singled out for religious ascriptions. Whence,

<sup>13</sup> One might object to my use of the term 'ordinary,' in this regard, if one thinks that miracles are first and foremost unique singularities or extraordinary and unusual events. Consider Corner's comments in his encyclopedia article, "Miracles" (2009). He says this about the etymological roots of the word 'miracle': "As a rough beginning, however, we might observe that the term is from the Latin *miraculum*, which is derived from *mirari*, to wonder; thus the most general characterization of a miracle is as an event that provokes wonder. As such, it must be in some way extraordinary, unusual, or contrary to our expectations. Disagreement arises, however, as to what makes a miracle something worth wondering about. In what sense must a miracle be extraordinary?" The upshot of Corner's discussion would seem to suggest that my discussion of natural miracles run against the ordinary (or at least the etymological) use of the term. For the birth of a child is not extraordinary, unusual, or contrary to our expectations. My reply is that Corner has too narrow a conception of what wonder consists in. For many of us *can* and *do* wonder about ordinary, natural events, such as the birth of a child; even the ordinary use of 'extraordinary' permits us to refer to the birth of a child as extraordinary. Therefore, to Corner's list of wonder-provocations we should add profoundness, for it makes sense to talk about wondering at the profoundness or religious significance of an event.

then, the religious significance of natural miracles, if not personal ascriptions?

My second argument is really a defense of a second of Phillips' arguments. Phillips cites Rush Rhees, who imagines himself witnessing Lazarus's rising from the dead. Rhees says he would not *believe in* this miracle even if he were to witness it himself, although he would certainly be amazed by it; but his awe, he says, would be directed at a mere natural event (Rhees 1997), which he does not mean an event that comports with the laws of nature, but rather a mundane or insignificant event, for he sees no reason to make a religious ascription (the Christian message does not enthrall and captivate him). The point of the example is not merely that a Humean miracle can obtain without acquiring religious significance, but that its significance is determined by its having a religious point for believers rather than by its causal source.

One might object that Rhees's reaction is irrational. After all Jesus' ability to perform miracles (i.e., violations of the laws of nature) clearly confirms his religious identity, as the 'Son of God', for it vindicates his claim to acquire power and authority from the Father. But Rhees shows no interest in denying that a supernatural being inspired a Humean miracle. He does not close his eyes and pretend that the event *could not* have happened; in fact, Rhees says, if it happened, it happened, and it would be foolish to say that it logically could not have happened.<sup>14</sup> His reaction can be contrasted with the following example. Suppose that a Christian and an atheist witness the same miracle, involving a supernatural being who strikes numerous unbelievers dead, and threatens to kill all unrepentant individuals remaining if they do not convert. Suppose further that the atheist stubbornly refuses to believe what she observes. She denies that the 'miracles' are taking place and denies the existence of the being who brings them about; she closes her eyes and says to herself that it is more likely that she is going mad than that a supernatural being exists. Here we have the kind of example that suits the objector. For one wants to say that the stubborn atheist's refusal to 'accept the facts' renders her reaction irrational. She thus faces an *evidential and epistemic problem*, which is a lack of knowledge that can only be resolved by means of sufficient evidence. Since the atheist denies the evidence out of sheer stubbornness, she is irrational.

Rhees' *disbelief in Lazarus'* resurrection is not an epistemic disbelief, for he meets his epistemic obligations without denying any pertinent factual claims. His knowledge of the Christian context of Lazarus' resurrection does not compel him to accept Christian values, and Jesus' death on the cross as a sacrifice for his sins. I thus submit that Rhees' reaction involves a distinctly *religious problem*, which is the essentially personal problem of failing to be convicted by Christianity's fundamental religious tenets. He is, therefore, more like the atheist in this example: Suppose sufficient evidence proves that the God of Christianity destroyed all Muslims. Then even an atheist *should* infer that the God of Christianity is causally responsible for their

<sup>14</sup> Rhees' reaction to this Christian miracle is not the only possible non-religious reaction. Wittgenstein (1972: 60-1), for example, speaking of the miracle in Lourdes, France, says that he would treat the event as a poorly executed experiment, implying that he would not take the event to have supernatural implications at all. This position has more recently been defended by Parsons (1982, "Chapter 3: Three Criticisms"): "So far as we know the cosmos could contain beings whose intelligence and powers exceed our own as much as ours exceed an ant's. Yet these beings could have evolved within the cosmos over a long period of time just as we have...In fact, however, those events would have been brought about in accordance with the laws of nature by beings who are just as much a part of the cosmos as we are." So, whereas Rhees accepts supernatural causation but denies religious significance, Parsons does not even accept this because we have no criteria by which to distinguish supernatural causation from natural causation.

deaths, which of course commits her to a *belief that* God exists. Does it follow from this that the atheist should also *believe in* God?

To tell the atheist that she *must believe in* God is to insist that she ought to ascribe religious significance to God's Humean miracles and commit to a religious form of life. But this seems to go beyond her epistemic duties. For suppose she deems God's actions morally reprehensible. Then her refusal to call God's Human miracles 'miracles' is not a refusal to accept the relevant facts, including Hume's necessary conditions. She unequivocally acknowledges the events, as violations of the laws of nature and the direct product of supernatural intervention by a particular religious deity (the God of Christianity). And, yet, her *belief that* God exists cannot be genuinely described as a religious belief, without thereby committing blasphemy, for no Christian could say that the atheist has 'seen and believed.' Furthermore, her reaction is neither hardened nor stubborn, for it does not fly in the face of the evidence since it is largely based on, and determined by, thoughtful consideration of the evidence. It is because she has seen God's moral face that she concludes: 'This "deity" – despite whatever anyone else may call it – is a horrific monster.' God's moral fruits have provided confirmation of her long-standing, moral suspicion that the God of Christianity is a self-serving and immoral tyrant. So, despite her knowledge of God's Humean miracles, and their religious context, it is not at all clear that her failure to *believe in* God is irrational, for she arguably meets her epistemic duties inasmuch as she accepts the reality of God. In short, *believing that* God exists is not indicative of a religious orientation and form of life. The atheist's refusal to call God's Humean miracles 'miracles' is an inability to use the word in its ordinary sense to ascribe religious significance. Rhee's reaction is like the hypothetical atheist who objects to God on moral grounds rather than the atheist who denies the reliability of her senses. Rhee's failure to see the religious point of Jesus' miracles renders him religiously inept, not epistemically irrational.

It can now be shown that Hume's critique of miracles is superfluous. For suppose that a philosopher should say to Rhee that he ought to call Lazarus' resurrection a miracle, only that by 'miracle' he should understand a Humean miracle. In that case, Rhee should not deny that a Humean miracle occurred and that it had a supernatural

cause. On the other hand, Rhee should reply that his calling the resurrection of Lazarus a miracle, in the Humean sense of the term, is entirely superfluous, for the philosophical use of 'miracle' is entirely irrelevant to his religious plight. Calling the event a Humean miracle does not help him see that the event is religiously significant. Mere acknowledgement of a Humean miracle is not sufficient motivation for him to devote his life to the God who raised Lazarus from the dead; anymore than my hypothetical atheist's acknowledgment of God is sufficient motivation for her to accept that the God who murdered every last Muslim is a god worthy of her worship. A religious sensibility is missing in each case, for both events fail to acquire religious significance for their subjects; indeed, for my hypothetical atheist, the evidence confirms her gravest doubts and fears about that 'vicious and vindictive monster' that religious believers call God. The problem with the philosophical use of 'miracle,' therefore, is not that it is false but that it is not a religious use of the term.

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# Sustainable Development and the Cultural Contradictions of High Modernity: Beyond Brundtland and Limits to Growth

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## 1. The civilisational challenge of the green movement and its domestication

Environmentalism and the critique of growth, progress and development both have a long history. Nevertheless, the rise into prominence of the discourse of a crisis of environment and development in the 1960s was a unique event in modern history in two respects. Firstly, environment and development were for the first time connected politically in a way that gave rise to an internationally significant new social movement. Secondly, a distinguishing feature of this "alternative" or "green" movement was its claim to go beyond the classical modern political constellation inherited by the modern West from the French Revolution. According to it a division between left and right is the main tool for orientation and for defining the dynamics of contest in politics. The green movement challenged this constellation.

Paradigmatic and globally influential in the articulation of the self-awareness of this movement are the contributions from the Norwegian eco-philosophical movement in the 1950 to the 1980s. Central to this articulation are the notions that both great modern political traditions, the socialist left and the liberal right subscribe to a vision of an Industrial Growth Society and that is the task of the new green movement to move beyond this vision and beyond a politics defined by the competition between right and left to a new ecologically sustainable vision and political practice. (Reed/Rothenburg 1992; see also, e.g., Goldsmith 1992 and Sachs 1992)

The eco-philosophical articulation of the identity of the green movement thus gained its political relevance from its polemical relation to the shared civilisational commitments of high modernity that have shaped the political imagination of both the left and the right.

The cultural formation called high modernity crystallised, after a long period of formation, in the first part of the 19th century. High modernity unleashed a capacity to change the conditions of social life and ecosystems everywhere on the planet that has no precedence in the history of the human species. This capacity was propelled by the enthusiastic commitment and support by people across the world to a new combination, defining of high modernity, of some of the ancient values of the Western tradition, including rationality, ethical universalism and democratic governance with some values and cultural aspirations that were new to this era, including self-determination and individual liberty. Other defining features of high modernity are its idea that secular, linear, historical time is an area in which self-determination can be exercised, and the idea that the realisation in real human history of ever-increasing affluence for all is desirable and possible thanks to technological and organisational advances. The ambivalent quality of the tremendous force of high modernity was recognised early. In the mid 19th century Baudelaire, Marx, Whitman and other key witnesses of their times agreed that the dawning new era combined high promises with a high sense of risk and danger. (Habermas 1985a; Wallgren

1999) One and a half century later Charles Taylor summarised a vital aspect of the experience of high modernity well when he wrote that it has brought "grandeur et misère", both to an unforeseen degree. (Taylor 1989)

Much of the political history of high modernity can be narrated as the story of struggles along two axes. One is the struggle between morally regressive movements critical of the aspirations towards equality and individual liberty typical of high modernity and the "progressives" from the left and right of politics who have defended the modern ambitions. The other axis of struggle has been within the camp of progressives about the right way to understand and realise the promises of the new era.

We can then say that the distinguishing feature of the green movement was the following. It was the first movement in the political history of high modernity to go beyond both of these axes of struggle. It could do so thanks to its claim that two ideals of high modernity have proved incompatible and that, therefore, the cultural project of high modernity has to be abandoned or at least thoroughly reshaped. The argument for this claim can be reconstructed in various ways. Here is one influential way of doing it: There are objective limits to growth. Because of these limits two goods that are intrinsic to ethical universalism as its should be conceived of in modern times, (i) protection of biodiversity and (ii) the fulfillment of the basic needs of all people on the planet today and in future generations, are incompatible with a third good which we have also pursued in the era of high modernity, namely (iii) increased affluence for all. Hence, we must choose between two features that define the culture of high modernity: the pursuit of affluence and the commitment to ethical universalism.

For 150 years progressive political discourse had been shaped around debate about *how* best to realise the promises of high modernity. When the green movement rose into prominence it came as a shock to progressives, left and right. They were now challenged for the first time not about the *how* of development but about its *what*, i.e. about goals. Worse still, the challenge could not outright be rejected as morally regressive.

The shock lasted only twenty years. In 1987 the tide turned when the United Nations Report on Sustainable Development, often referred to as the Brundtland report, was released. The report proposed that societies should seek "sustainable development." Sustainable development was defined essentially as a continuation of development, progress and growth as pursued by both dominant political traditions of modernity, only with the new addition that progress should not lead to a depletion of natural resources that threatens cosmopolitan aspirations. (WCSD 1987)

The effect of the Brundtland report was the domestication of the green discourse within the confines of the cultural project of high modernity. The idea that ecological sustainability was a reason for putting limits on growth was abandoned. It was replaced with the idea that ecological responsibility is compatible with growth, now pursued un-

der banners of sustainability, ecological transformation, green economy, green growth etc.

The change in the discursive landscape was swift. The discourse of sustainable development dominated the UN conference on environment and development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, only five years after the release of the Brundtland report. In comparison, "limits to growth" was a marginal concept in the Rio conference. Fifteen years later when the aims of the European Union were defined the power effects of the discourse of sustainable development had already become entrenched. Article 2(3) of the treaty states bluntly that "the Union shall [...] work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth." (Treaty of Lisbon 2007, O.J. (C306) 1)

What made the domestication of the green challenge possible and how should we assess it? Our answers will depend on how we understand a wide range of intrinsically connected empirical, moral and conceptual issues.<sup>1</sup> Here, I will suggest a way of mapping the controversial issues that may be helpful for taking the debate about sustainability in a new direction. The direction I propose could be characterised as "double post": post-sustainable and post-limit-to-growth. At the core of the proposal is a reminder that cultural debate about value and purpose remains irreducible to technical debate about economic indicators.

## 2. Prudence, risk and the undecidability of limits

One aspect of the new discursive constellation that emerged after 1987 was that the following narrative was established as a mainstream, common-sense framework for the discussion. "The growth of population and consumption of energy and raw materials has not lead to the collapse of human population or of economies. In fact, today more people lead longer and more comfortable lives than ever before. Hence, we know now that the limits to growth -alarmists were wrong. Admittedly, there is a problem with distributive justice. The past decades have brought about much huger income gaps than ever before. Nevertheless, the lowest end may also have benefitted in terms of most relevant social and economic indicators and may be better off on average than before. So, there is room for controversy about absolute and relative figures about poverty. But by and large development has been a success. There is also room for controversy about how best to respond to climate change and about species extinction. But here too, the mainstream consensus among academics and in public debate is that even though climate and biodiversity issues may well be reasons for qualitative changes in how we measure and pursue economic progress they are not reasons to abandon growth as a goal. The idea that "degrowth" is required is today a minority position." (UNDP 2007; Berg 2011; Drèze/Sen, 2011; Reddy/Minoiu 2007; Sen 2001; Ulvila/Pasanen 2010)

Where does this story leave us with respect to the idea of sustainable development? Here is one possible line of response: It is unhelpful to say that we have learnt that the idea of limits to growth was wrong. Limits that have not been trespassed yet may be trespassed tomorrow. What we have learnt is to become more reflective. We do not choose between levels of risk that can be quantified with respect to set limits. We choose between kinds of uncertainty. (Margin 2008) Risks will be there, but, so the re-

sponse continues, at the heart of a rational reaction to the crisis of environment and development is not risk assessment but prudent handling of uncertainty. Moreover, we must admit that the power unleashed by economic growth, institutional innovations and technological development lies at the heart of the first wave of planetary extinction of species caused by humans and probably also destabilises the climate. Nevertheless, it is always also possible that these same powers will later provide the resources to deal with and overcome the problems. The debate between Schumpeterians, who advocate pursuit of growth through the creative destruction effected by the dynamics of free markets, and others, who advocate policies guided by the principle of precaution (or the minimising of maximal risk) is objectively undecidable. Even if there is a limit to how much energy humans can use in a short period of time without making the planet too warm for mammal life this sets no definite moral limit to the pursuit of growth, since we cannot exclude that the flight to other planets will become possible and attractive if we have enough growth and innovation.

There is truth in this imagined response. Indeed there is enough truth in it to warrant a clear conclusion: What we have learnt since the 1960s from the debate about limits and sustainable development is that there is no limit to growth such that it makes the pursuit of economic growth objectively irrational for people committed to cosmopolitanism. This is true regardless of what we make of the debate about material vs. immaterial growth. i.e. of the possibility and relevance of achieving economic growth with relatively or even absolutely speaking less use of energy and resources. This seems to explain why the debate about limits has become obsolete and why the green issues no longer destabilise confidence in a comprehensive cultural project of high modernity that includes continued commitment to development with economic growth. Arguably however, the explanation is too strong. It fails to capture the abiding sense of crisis and to explain why no new consensus has emerged about the kind of development we now want and need.

## 3. The tension between self-determination and growth as a challenge to high modernity

In this section the following key proposal will be briefly explored: The notion that there is a tension in the cultural project of high modernity between affluence and cosmopolitanism captures only one of two equally important ingredients in the message concerning the civilisational underpinnings of politics coming from the new green movement since the 1960s. The other ingredient is the perception that the search for prosperity through growth has become destructive for self-determination.

First, let us specify a little more in what sense we may speak of a tension in the contemporary world between the aspiration to increase affluence of all through growth and the aspiration to enhance self-determination. On most reasonable characterisations it is not these aspirations as such that stand in a tensed relation. But it seems to us that the kind of affluence that has been achieved in the modern West, that is imitated ubiquitously, and whose sustenance and further growth is still sought by most governments, requires deployment and large-scale use of highly complex technical devices and organisational designs. Satellite-transmitted communication, automated trade in derivatives, mining and processing of rare earth elements, international agreements on investment and patents are some random examples of extremely complex technologies (in a

<sup>1</sup> We may distinguish between two questions here. Are empirical questions (questions of facts) and moral questions (questions of value) separable? Are empirical and conceptual questions separable? For some discussion, see Wallgren 2006.

broad sense) needed to sustain and enhance current forms of affluence. Hence, the daily lives of some billion human beings are deeply embedded in a web of functional dependence that is difficult to leave behind and difficult to comprehend.

It is of course debatable whether this dependence is such that all efforts to break with it will have catastrophic consequences. It is not very clear what the issue is, or how precise it is. But to the extent there is truth in the dependence thesis, as often suggested via the obscurest of political catchwords – the “we can’t go back” –, this in itself would show that in a very precise sense the cultural project of high modernity has come to an end. That is the case to the extent that the high modern notion of self-determination comprises the idea that we are free to choose the kind of society we wish to be part of and the direction in which we wish to develop it: If we cannot say farewell to Industrial Growth Society, then we have lost much of our freedom to take responsibility for our destiny and to give direction to our culture.

Now, let us assume that breaking the web of dependence is possible. What can we say about the desirability of moving in this direction? If we restrict ourselves to a discussion with self-determination as the normative referent two issues need to be addressed. One: the question of complexity. Two: the question of responsibility for unintended consequences. But first we must pause for a brief reflection on the conditions of debate.

One characteristic of the debate about limits to growth from the 1960s to the 1990s was the sense many had that this was in essence a debate about facts. The idea was that there is a background agreement that growth is desirable if access to its fruits it can be universalised, in time, for future generations, and in scale, for all people and, as many wanted to add, all species. The question was whether the desirable is possible.

This discursive constellation built on the idea that both the ideals whose relation had become problematic, i.e. affluence and cosmopolitanism, have a hard empirical core such that success in their attainment can be judged objectively, by neutral scientific means: We may say that on a reasonable definition people are more affluent when they can exercise more freedom of choice on abundant markets. And we may say that on reasonable definitions cosmopolitanism is better realised when basic needs of all are fulfilled than when they are not so. Success seems on both counts to have a significant quantifiable and objectively measurable core.

We may say that the debate about the compatibility of growth and cosmopolitanism follows the conceptual grammar of empirical decidability. When we turn our attention to the relation between self-determination and growth the conceptual grammar is quite different. Here, questions of objective facts play a relatively smaller role. This is so partly because self-determination is conceptually more contested and complex than is the idea that there are objective needs whose fulfillment is a prerequisite for human flourishing. (von Wright 1982; Tugendhat 1979) One axis of contest is the relation between individual and political self-determination and the importance of the latter for the former. Arguably, self-determination is fuller for any individual if participation in democratic communities is possible for her than if this is not the case. (Rawls 2005) If this is accepted, what follows for sustainability debates?

If growth requires complexity it stands in a tensed relation to self-determination due to shortage of intellectual capacity and time. It may be the case, in principle, that

there is no limit to fair agreement between equal citizens about the extent to which they may exercise their democratic sovereignty indirectly via democratically accountable bodies advised by experts. But some amount of insight into what one is involved in – insight into what has happened and how it has happened and into what one may next expect – is a precondition for the rationality of democratic participation of citizens that remains the fundamental, irreplaceable basis for democratic governance. Complexity attenuates insight. (Habermas 1981, 1985b, 1991; Kvaløy 1992) A current example is the climate debate. Citizens face grave pressures on their time and intellectual capacity if they wish to achieve a reasoned position on key issues such as what weight to give to climate sceptics and to alarmist views or how much hope and resources to invest in carbon reduction through voluntary commitments and market solutions as compared with regulation through binding legislation and taxation.

Clearly then, the call for self-determination puts no objectively definable limit on the rationality of the continued pursuit of economic growth in a society dependent on a highly complex division of labour. But it would be a mistake to conclude from this that the topic can be ignored without loss in terms of the discursive rationality that is constitutive of the link that people living in the age of high modernity have tried to forge in the course of history between freedom, democracy and human reason.

Another way of seeing why this is the case is this: We remind ourselves that aspirations are not self-legitimising, even if traditions can make them seem so. When the Soviet-bloc imploded many asked how long socialist idealists should tolerate the gap between their dream and the realities created in its name. Gandhi generalised the same argument a hundred years ago into a question about what he called modern civilisation and its confidence that the complexity it builds can serve our moral ambitions well. He wrote:

I am so constructed that I can only serve my immediate neighbours, but in my conceit I pretend to have discovered that I must with my body serve every individual in the Universe. In thus attempting the impossible, man [...] is utterly confounded. (as quoted in Sharma/Suhrud 2010: 44)

It seems to me that the modern world has for a long time been deaf to Gandhi’s early concern but that it is a legitimate concern nonetheless.

I turn, finally, to responsibility for unintended consequences. Here, the hard question for those who place their bet on the compatibility of growth and sustainability can be formulated as a question about technology. (I assume here without argument that technological development is a prerequisite for growth and that one aspect of technological development is enhanced capacity to influence the world.) Let us distinguish analytically between four kinds of consequences that the development of new technology can have. They are (i) the foreseen consequences due to use of the new technology by rational, well-meaning people acting perhaps legitimately in democracies; (ii) the unforeseen consequences due to the same; (iii) the foreseen consequences due to the irrational use of new technology or due to its use with destructive intentions and (iv) the unforeseen consequences due to the same. Now, if we accept the assumption about the intrinsic connection between the pursuit of growth, technological development and capacity to change the world we see that the pursuit of growth brings a responsibility for increase of consequences of types (i) but also of types (ii), (iii) and (iv).

The question how much weight we should give to concern for consequences of all these various types relative to the weight we give to concern about the risks we take if we choose for or against a policy of complexity reduction is, needless to say, quite challenging. I shall restrict discuss to the following conceptual note. We assume that growth requires technological development. Technological development brings constantly growing responsibility for unintended consequences. It follows that unless the tension between the pursuit of increased affluence and the ambition to enhance self-determination is addressed that will imply that the latter ambition gradually gets diluted. That is one more way of explicating how the debate about sustainability is also a debate about the possibility and desirability of the cultural project of high modernity.

#### 4. Conclusion

I first argued that the deployment of the discourse of sustainable development through the Brundtland report and the UN conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 domesticated the challenge to the cultural imagination of high modernity that had followed from the discourse of limits to growth in the 1960s and 1970s. I then tried to show that the original intuition that shaped the green movement, according to which the crisis of environment and development constitutes a challenge to the cultural ambitions of high modernity, was not adequately captured by the idea that there is a tension in high modernity between two of its aspirations only: those of growth and cosmopolitanism. The claim was that in order to understand the challenge we need also to attend to the tension between affluence and self-determination. If we do so we need to address again, from new angles, the question whether the pursuit of economic growth is compatible with all other ideals that define the cultural project of high modernity. The implied suggestion is that the crisis of environment and development remains, at its core, a crisis of civilisation. If we respond to the crisis only technically, i.e. with no attention to debate about the order of priority among the aspirations that characterise high modernity, that will be suicidal to this cultural formation.

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# Keyword Centrality Analysis with Wittgenstein's Conversation on Freud

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In 1966 Cyril Barrett published Wittgenstein's *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*.<sup>1</sup> This remarkable book consists of notes taken from Wittgenstein's students Rush Rhees, James Taylor and Yorick Smythies during three different courses: 1) in 1938 Wittgenstein has given a course on aesthetics, 2) around the same time a series of lectures on religious belief has taken place, and 3) private "conversations" on psychoanalysis was held sometime between 1940 and 1942 (cf. LC, 9). Although it is reported that Wittgenstein thought these subjects are of eminent importance in philosophy, neither in *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus* (TLP) nor in *Philosophical Investigations* (PI) can we find full treatises on these problems. The project *Lectures on Aesthetics in Context* (funded by FWF, P21038) aims at an electronic edition of LC using XML/TEI.

## 1. Indexing LC/Creating the Ontology

An electronic edition should also provide indices of different kinds. In this paper we want to focus on the creation of index of subjects, or index of keywords. In previous projects the GABEK method was used to analyze Wittgenstein's *Culture and Value* (CV; cf. Mayr 2008). The "by-product" of this analysis was a complete list of keywords which can be used to create the index. So we used the same technique for LC to create the keyword list, but left out the awkward "causal relation analysis". In fact, since the subjects in LC are quite obvious and the text itself is rather coherent, a time consuming full GABEK analysis would probably not provide any advantage.

Using GABEK method means that we divide the text of LC into several so-called "sense units". A sense unit is a piece of text which expresses a thought or an argument. Normally a sense unit consists of one paragraph, but this can vary. In each sense unit keywords are marked for indexing purpose. There are several "rules" when marking the keywords:

1. Only words which are expressed in a thought more marked. Words like "and", "or", "not" and articles will not be marked, neither do we enlist any form of "to be", except the thought is about "being". Phrases like "as soon as possible" or "as a matter of fact" will not be indexed, even if "possible" and "fact" are included.
2. The words are indexed usually by their basic forms. For verbs the keyword enlisted is the infinitive, and for nouns it is the singular nominative. Thus, in the keyword list we can find "to call", but not "calls" nor "called". There are exceptions, though. We separated e.g. "Menschen" (people) from "Mensch". The reason for doing so is that Wittgenstein often uses "Menschen" when he refers to general opinions which are contrasted by his own opinion; but "Mensch" is referring to human being.

3. Names and technical terms are kept together. The keyword "judgment day", e.g., is marked as "judgment day", but not as two keywords "judgment" and "day".

After the process of dividing LC to sense units and marking the keywords there are in sum 316 sense units and 1759 different keywords marked in LC.

The keywords and the sense units are organized with the *Semantic Web Technology* according to the *OWL specification* (W3C 2004). From a technical point of view we have created a so-called "flat ontology" for LC. This ontology is rather simple: There are just two classes: *sense\_unit* and *keyword* with one object property *appears\_in*.

While *sense\_unit* and *keyword* do not need comments, *appears\_in* should be explained. The object property *appears\_in* requires an individual of the class *keyword* as subject and an individual of the class *sense\_unit* as object. If a keyword appears in a sense unit, we will make an *appears\_in* object property statement.

## 2. Modeling Data/Creating the Graph

With the creation of the ontology we have actually also created a index of keywords: On the one hand we can define further object properties in OWL and use an ontology browser (e.g. Protégé) to navigate through LC. But we can also draw graphs of different kind with the data. In this paper we will focus on keyword-graphs.

From a mathematical perspective a graph is a set of two sets: One set is the set of nodes, and the other is the set of lines. In a keyword-graph keywords are represented as nodes in the graph, while a line between two keywords means that there is at least one sense unit in which both nodes (connected by the line) appear. It should be noted that a keyword-graph in this sense is an undirected and un-weighted graph.

If we take all sense units and keywords in the chapter *Conversations on Freud* (CoF; LC 61-52) into account, we can create a graph with 489 nodes and 7448 lines. A simplified version of this graph is shown below which contains only keywords that appear in at least 5 sense units, while connections are only shown if they appear in at least two sense units together.

## 3. Applying the Centrality Analysis

After having created the keyword-graph we expect that *prima facie* those keywords which are more central to our keyword-graph should also be more important or relevant in CoF. But how can we find out which nodes are more central than others?

In the graph theory there are several ways (no less than 20) to compute the center (or centers) of a graph (cf.

<sup>1</sup> Throughout this paper, "LC" will be referring to the second German translation of Wittgenstein 1966.

Wasserman/Faust 1994: 169-219; Mutschke 2010). The large number of centrality analyses (CA) reflects the different intuitions we have regarding centers of a graph drawn. In this paper we want to discuss three different kinds of CA which we have also applied to CoF-keyword-graph.

The first CA is called "degree-centrality" (DC). Each node in a graph has a "degree", according to the lines to which it is connected. A node with lines to two other nodes has a degree of two, a node with no connection has a degree of zero. According to DC, the node with the most connections is also most central.

"Closeness-centrality" (CC) is a second way to compute CA. According to CC a node is most central if the mean shortest paths from it to all other nodes is shorter than others. CC is arguably the explication of centrality which most people would find sound.

Nevertheless, there is a third way to compute CA: "betweenness-centrality" (BC). A node is regarded as more central than another, if there are more shortest paths passing through it than through the other. Thus, the node which acts more often as "relay station" for other nodes in the graph is most central according to BC.

Here are the results of CA on CoF, showing only the first 18 ranks. The numbers in brackets are the computed rounded score.

	DC	CC	BC
1	Traum (313)	Traum (0.736)	Traum (27159)
2	Freud (272)	Freud (0.693)	Freud (22903)
3	Interpretation (149)	Interpretation (0.590)	Interpretation (4277)
4	Wunsch (124)	Wunsch (0.572)	Ding (3752)
5	betrachten (118)	zeigen (0.566)	bedeuten (3339)
6	Grund (115)	betrachten (0.563)	Analyse (3135)
7	zeigen (114)	Grund (0.562)	zeigen (3032)
8	Analyse (107)	bedeuten (0.555)	Grund (2967)
9	Analytiker (106)	Erklärung (0.554)	Teil (2750)
10	Sprache (104)	Analytiker (0.553)	betrachten (2525)
11	Bild (104)	Analyse (0.553)	Wunsch (2497)
12	bedeuten (102)	Ergebnis (0.553)	Bild (2381)
13	Ding (96)	Bild (0.552)	Erklärung (2374)
14	Erklärung (95)	Sprache (0.550)	Analytiker (2338)
15	Ergebnis (93)	Ding (0.548)	Ergebnis (2245)
16	erzeugen (90)	Assoziation (0.545)	Sprache (2121)
17	Assoziation (87)	erzeugen (0.544)	Schwierigkeit (1770)
18	Wiederholung (87)	Träumende_der (0.539)	Mann (1749)

#### 4. Comparing Results with Orthodox Interpretation

To be able to use the results we ought to compare them with human readings. To compare the results of the CA with an "orthodox" analysis, we must have a look at the

text. To be fair we are only allowed to compare results which both methods can deliver.

It seems to be clear that the CA can only process data from the ontology, so it will not "explain" anything which was not there before. It would also be surprising if a computer based analysis would provide us with substantial interpretation. Nevertheless it is well possible that CA can link data which do not seem to belong to each other at first.

If we read the CoF the following could serve as summary: In the first of the four conversations Wittgenstein talks about whether psychology is a science and whether there is a correct analysis of dreams. He also tangles on dream language and its symbolism. The second conversation deals with dreams, their interpretation, their nature, and their connection to language and science. Freud is right about the importance of wishes and their fulfillment for understanding dreams. The third conversation treats the question whether dreaming is a kind of language. Although they are similar to some extent, Wittgenstein denies this possibility. He also argues that maybe there is no "correct interpretation" for every dream and there is no single reason or causation for a dream. In the last conversation Wittgenstein talks about the interpretation of dreams again and says that a free association will lead to the same results as an analysis by Freud. Wittgenstein also claims that Freud's explanation of myth is a myth itself.

If we try to enlist important words, they would be the following: Freud, Traum, Analyse, Interpretation, Sprache, Symbol, Wunsch, Grund/Ursache. If we compare this list to results of CA we see that they seem to be quite similar.

#### 5. Conclusion

The comparison shows that although CA of the keyword graph of CoF can capture the "important words", it does not provide us with any new information. This may be due to the fact that the text is simply too small so there can be no hidden main theme in it.


We can describe the result as trivial at best. Compared to the ontology CA does not provide any new data nor does it provide new research facilities. A deeper comparison to the collocation analysis is yet to be done, though.

Compared to human reading, CA suffers from the fact that only literal words are used for keywords, it disregards "analogous use" of words, i.e. words which could be interchanged in that special context, like "Grund" and "Ursache" or "Analyse" and "Interpretation". Negated sentences pose another problem: CA does not take into account that sometimes a keyword is put in the converse sense. But, to be fair, this seems to be a problem of nearly every computer-based analysis.

In sum the result of CA represents the text in a quite good way, but it does not seem to be helpful for achieving a better understanding of the texts.

Acknowledgement: This paper is written during the project *Lectures on Aesthetics Contextualized* (P21038), granted by the Austrian Science Fund FWF, carried out in the Research Institute Brenner-Archives of the University Innsbruck.

## Graph



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# On the Conceptual Clarification of Human Environment, Action Space and Quality of Life

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## Contents

- 1. Introduction
- 2. Definition of Environment
- 3. Action Space
- 4. Quality of Life (QL)
- 5. Lack of Quality of Life

## 1. Introduction

A Clarification of these termini is necessary, because:

- they are frequently used in many disciplines (sociology, psychology, geography, medicine, philosophy ...)
- they are often used in an ambiguous way without precise meaning

Further tasks are:

- a suitable restriction of environment with reference to man, community and society
- incorporating values w.r.t. definitions of quality of life

## 2. Definition of Environment

Human environment  $\neq$  physical or biological or geographical or topological environment. This would be too wide or too narrow (cf. Weichhart 1979).

(D1) Let  $x$  be a human person, or a community or a society. Then the environment of  $x$  are those things  $y$  (where  $x \neq y$ ) such that:

- 1.  $y$  acts on  $x$  (or on a part of  $x$ ) or
- 2.  $x$  (or a part of  $x$ ) acts on  $y$

Examples for parts of my environment:

the things on my desk, the members of my family, the climate of living place, the books (or their "contents") which I study ...

### 2.1 Classification of things of the human environment

- (NO) natural objects without consciousness: stones, mountains, lakes, plants, lower-level animals ...  
(concrete properties of concrete NO belong to NO)
- (NB) natural objects with consciousness
- (NB-) without rationality: higher-level animals
- (NBR) With rationality: humans
- (KA) Concrete artefacts: concrete (individual) computers, microscopes, houses, roads, cars ...  
Observe: whereas a concrete microscope is a KA a microscope is usually understood as a conceptual object CO
- (CO) conceptual objects: concepts, hypotheses, theories, thoughts, meanings, ideas ...  
(tokens are KAs, types are COs)
- (SO) supernatural objects: angels, god  
SOs belong to the environment of religious people

### 2.2 Physical/biological and mental environment

(D2) Let  $x$  be a human person, a community or a society. Then the physical/biological environment of  $x$  are those things  $y$  (where  $x \neq y$ ) such that:

- 1. D1 is satisfied
- 2.  $y$  belongs to NO or  $y$  belongs to KA

(D3) Let  $x$  be a human person ... (as above). Then the mental environment of  $x$  are those things  $y$  ( $x \neq y$ ) such that:

- 1. D1 is satisfied
- 2.  $y$  belongs to CO or to SO

(D4) Let  $x$  be a human person ... (as above). Then the physical/biological-mental environment of  $x$  ( $x \neq y$ ) are those things  $y$  such that:

- 1. D1 is satisfied
- 2.  $y$  belongs to NB, to NB- or to NBR

There are a lot of possible interactions among the things of the environment:

- 1. NOs act on NOs
- 2. NOs act on NBs, NB-s, NBRs
- 3. NOs act on KAs
- 4. NOs cannot act on COs or SOs
- 5. NOs can act via NBs (2.) on COs  
(cf. Popper/Eccles 1977)
- 6. KAs act on NOs, NBs, KAs
- 7. KAs can act via NBs on NOs, KAs, NBs, NBRs
- 8. NB-s can act on NOs, NB-s, NBRs, KAs
- 9. NB-s can act on COs  
(cf. Popper/Eccles 1977)
- 10. NBs can act on COs  
(cf. Popper/Eccles 1977)
- 11. NBRs can act on NOs, KAs, NB-s, NBs, NBRs, COs
- 12. COs can act via NBs (NB-s, NBRs) on NOs, KAs, NBs, NB-s, NBRs
- 13. It is a question of theology whether SOs act on other objects

Examples:

- ad 5. NOs can act via NBs (2.) on COs  
(cf. Popper/Eccles, 1977)  
A climate change motivates a scientist (an animal) to invent a hypothesis on predictability of climate changes (to look for a new niche for living)
- ad 7. KAs can act via NBs on NOs, KAs, NBs, NBRs  
Defects of computers motivates scientists to improve them
- ad 12. COs can act via NBs (NB-s, NBRs) on NOs, KAs, NBs, NB-s, NBRs  
Scientific results guide technicians, to improve bridges (KAs) or landscapes (NOs) or medical skills

### 3. Action Space

We understand action space as a subdomain of the human environment. We define three types:

- active action space
- passive action space
- action space w.r.t. quality of life

#### 3.1 Active Action Space

(D5) Let  $x$  be a human person (or community or society). Then the active action space of  $x$  are those things  $y$  ( $x \neq y$ ) such that:  $x$  or a part of  $x$  acts on  $y$ .

#### 3.2 Passive Action Space

(D6) Let  $x$  be a human person (or ... etc.). Then the passive action space of  $x$  are those things  $y$  ( $x \neq y$ ) such that:  $y$  acts on  $x$  or on a part of  $x$ .

#### 3.3 Action Space (Active and Passive)

(D7) Let  $x$  be a human person (or ... etc.). Then the action space of  $x$  are those things  $y$  ( $x \neq y$ ) such that both:

1.  $y$  acts on  $x$  (or on a part of  $x$ )
2.  $x$  (or a part of  $x$ ) acts on  $y$

Observe that Action Space  $\neq$  Environment (cf. D1) since Action Space is the intersection of (1), (2) whereas Environment is the union. Thus:

$$\text{Action Space} \subset \text{Environment}$$

#### 3.4 Action Space w.r.t. Quality of Life (QL)

(D8) Let  $x$  be a human person (or ... etc.). Then the Action Space QL of  $x$  are those things  $y$  ( $x \neq y$ ) of the environment of  $x$  (D1) such that:

1.  $y$  contributes positively to QL of  $x$   
or
2.  $y$  contributes negatively to QL of  $x$  (see D9 below)

### 4. Quality of Life (QL)

To give a suitable definition of QL we have to introduce values:

- On the basic level of QL: basic values
- On a higher level of QL: higher values

General definition D9 of Quality of Life:

(D9) Let  $x$  be a human person (or ... etc.). Then the QL of  $x$  is a certain level of realisation of values or goals of  $x$  within the life-time (or part of it) of  $x$

According to D9 QL of  $x$  can be:

- a state of  $x$  at time  $t$
- a property of a period of life of  $x$

#### 4.1 Basic Values

(D10)  $v$  is a basic value for  $x$  ( $x$  like in D9) iff (cf. Bunge 1989: 35)

1. meeting  $v$  is necessary for  $x$  to stay alive in the environment of  $x$   
or
2. meeting  $v$  is necessary to keep or regain health for  $x$  in the environment of  $x$

Examples: Clean air, water, adequate food, shelter, clothing

(D11)  $/$  is a basic level of QL for  $x$  iff  $/$  is the realisation of basic values for  $x$

- Humans have a natural inclination towards the realisation of basic values
- This holds like a statistical law
- However there are exceptions in extreme situations: Hunger strikes, martyrdom, acts of terrorism

#### 4.2 Higher Values

There are several types of higher values. One important type concerns values which are legitimate and accessible for the person belonging to a society:

(D12)  $v$  is a higher value for the human person  $x$  who belongs to society  $g$  iff

1.  $v$  is desired (or viewed as desirable) by all or statistically most members of  $g$
2.  $v$  is legitimate in  $g$
3.  $v$  can be realised by all or statistically most members of  $g$
4. for some  $v$ , the realisation of  $v$  by members of  $g$  may be obligatory

Examples: Increasing knowledge according to ability and interest, improving control about natural forces, human life in peace, average welfare

(D13)  $v$  is legitimate for person  $x$  living in society  $g$  iff  $v$  can be met by  $x$  in  $g$

1. without hindering the satisfaction of any basic value or need of any member of  $g$
2. without endangering the integrity of any valuable subsystem of  $g$  much less of that of  $g$  as a whole (cf. Bunge 1989: 35)

More specific legitimate values are listed in the Human Rights.

### 5. Lack of Quality of Life:

#### 5.1 Lack of Basic Values

A deficit or an evil for person  $x$  may be understood first as a basic evil.

A basic evil may be defined as a lack of basic values:

(D14)  $e$  is a basic evil for  $x$  iff

1. avoiding  $e$  is necessary for  $x$  to stay alive in the environment of  $x$
2. avoiding  $e$  is necessary for  $x$  to keep or regain health in the environment of  $x$

#### 5.2 Lack of Higher Values (Higher Evils)

Two types are important for human life: (cf. Weingartner 2003, ch.2)

- Necessary Evil: this is neither a basic evil nor a moral evil but it is necessary for achieving or protecting a basic value.

Examples: struggling for food, operation (to regain health), interruption of studies in order to take care of children.

- Legitimate Evil ( $l_e$ ):  $l_e$  is neither a basic evil nor a moral evil.  $l_e$  is either a necessary evil or  $l_e$  is necessary for achieving or protecting some legitimate value  $v$  in society  $g$  and  $v$  is more valuable in  $g$  than the avoidance of  $l_e$ .

Examples: Execution of school-attendance, bungling and botching of apprentices, justified punishment, imprisoning murderers...

Generally, the quality of life does not seem to be in danger because of the existence of necessary evil and legitimate evil. In the particular case the quality of life can be seriously restricted by these types of evil.

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# Ethics and Relativism in Wittgenstein

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## 1. Ethics

Wittgenstein saw ethics as transcendent, ineffable, and mystical. Ethical matters cannot be expressed in the form of propositions. They must be experienced and one had better remain silent about them. "Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen" (TLP 7). Ethics and value in general are not part of this world. They transcend it. "Die Ethik ist transzental" (TLP 6.421). Ethics is not a fact among facts. Even this-worldly ideas of reward and punishment do not touch it (TLP 6.422). These views of Wittgenstein remained stable throughout his life. At least Rush Rhees, D.Z. Philips, and Cyril Barrett have argued for this, and I think convincingly. Thus Barrett writes:

I am prepared to go so far as to say that Wittgenstein did not abandon his earlier views on ethics and religious belief with their attendant notions of the mystical, transcendental, inexpressible, viewing *sub specie aeternitatis*. I wish to state that [...] all the features of the earlier views can be fitted into the new conceptions of language-games and forms of life." (Barrett, xiii)

This fitting of views on ethics into conceptions of language games will be important in the third part of my talk. It is in this fitting, or combination, that I think problems arise.

For Wittgenstein, ethics, aesthetics, and religion were very close to each other, if not identical. Thus he wrote: "Ethik und Ästhetik sind eins" (TLP 6.421) and later (in 1946) he thought:

Es ist schwer, sich recht zu verstehen, denn dasselbe, was man aus Größe und Güte tun könnte, kann man auch aus Feigheit oder Gleichgültigkeit tun. Man kann sich freilich so und so aus wahrer Liebe benehmen, aber auch aus Hinterlist und auch aus Kälte des Herzens. Sowie nicht alle Milde Güte ist. Und nur wenn ich in Religion untergehen könnte, könnten diese Zweifel schweigen. Denn nur Religion könnte die Eitelkeit zerstören und in alle Spalten dringen. (*Vermischte Bemerkungen/ Culture and Value* 1946)

Ethics and aesthetics "are one", and ethical doubts and ethical wrongs can only be resolved and corrected by religion. Wittgenstein does not only move ethics very close to religion, he even subordinates it to religion. Thus he is reported by Friedrich Waismann to have said:

Schlick sagt, es gab in der theologischen Ethik zwei Auffassungen vom Wesen des Guten: nach der flacheren Deutung ist das Gute deshalb gut, weil Gott es will; nach der tieferen Deutung will Gott das Gute deshalb, weil es gut ist. Ich meine, daß die erste Auffassung die tiefere ist: gut ist, was Gott befiehlt. Denn sie schneidet den Weg einer jeden Erklärung, 'warum' es gut ist, ab, während gerade die zweite Auffassung die flache, die rationalistische ist, die so tut, 'als ob' das, was gut ist, noch begründet werden könnte. (WWK 115, December of 1930)

"Good is what God commands" and we better avoid trying to give explanations. Here we find again the idea from the *Tractatus* that we had better keep silent about ethical mat-

ters. Wittgenstein rejects any kind of explanation or theory in ethics. At best something can be "shown".

Wittgenstein can make his point for instance against Kant, who indeed tried to argue for the categorical imperative and its validity and value. I think Kant cannot derive morality and the categorical imperative. But I think he nevertheless succeeded in something that I think is important. First, Kant succeeds in pointing out the categorical imperative and its implications in our daily lives. He succeeds in making morality more visible to the reader. Second, even though he thinks morality is evident to common sense, he does not leave it there. He goes on to unfold the various meanings and implications of the categorical imperative, and he does so not only abstractly but also by giving examples and discussing concrete situations. He makes the reader undertake thought experiments in which one has to ask oneself while imagining concrete situations whether one wants a certain maxim as a universal law or not. One has to reflect and one gets involved. This I think is important. One takes a first-person perspective in such thought experiments, and in doing so one can obtain new insights and change not only one's own mind but also one's own character. I think this is due to the fact that the categorical imperative has two aspects. One is the *rational* and abstract aspect of universalizability. The other is about our *attitude*. It speaks to our attitude, our motivation, and our willingness or unwillingness, when we ask ourselves whether we really want a maxim at hand to be a law or not.

This double aspect (rationality and attitude) is something valuable in Kant's theory, and something that I think is missing in Wittgenstein's views. Wittgenstein falls silent right away about the nature of morality. He does not want any explanation. He does not want any theory. He rejects any such attempts of rational explanation. Thus he goes on, as Waismann reports: "Was immer man mir sagen mag, ich würde es ablehnen, und zwar nicht darum, weil die Erklärung falsch ist, sondern weil sie eine Erklärung ist" (WWK 116), and he even says "Für mich hat die Theorie keinen Wert. Eine Theorie gibt mir nichts" (WWK 117). Wittgenstein talks a good deal about himself. But this makes me wonder whether theorizing might not help others. I do not mean that ethical explaining and theorizing should be undertaken by others to help themselves. I mean that Wittgenstein should undertake such considerations so that others might benefit from this. If Wittgenstein reflected about the universalizability of maxims in concrete situations, this would most likely benefit others who are affected by what he does to them, directly or indirectly.

Wittgenstein's likening ethics to religion makes him turn to God. "Gut ist, was Gott befiehlt". It becomes a personal matter. Others come second. But in ethics this is different. There the other person should come first, and questions about God are left open. This of course is Schlick's point, and it is also Kant's. For Kant the categorical imperative is "holy". God is secondary. God comes in only with the question of the highest good, when God's existence is postulated by us to make our striving for the highest good realistic to us. This move depends on our human conditions and needs. God is demanded as a guarantee of proportionality between moral worth and happiness. God is

not the source of morality. Instead, morality is the source of God, or rather of our need and demand for God. For Kant morality can to some extent be analyzed and explained. He does so by discussing the criterion of universalizability and by offering the three maxims of "common understanding" (*gemeiner Menschenverstand*), namely: "1. Selbstdenken; 2. An der Stelle jedes andern denken; 3. Jederzeit mit sich selbst einstimmig denken". (*Kritik der Urteilskraft*, section 40: 294.) Thus some work of analysis can be undertaken, abstractly and in concrete situations. The level of theory and abstraction is not left out.

Cyril Barrett thinks there is in Wittgenstein a development from ineffability to awareness of variety of language games (Barrett 247). This might be true, but this development is not good enough regarding ethics. The threat of naivety might be diminished. But the threat of relativism remains. Wittgenstein sticks to his rejection of any sort of criteria regarding ethics (Barrett 247).

## 2. Language games and relativism

In the essay "On Wittgenstein on Certainty" (Wenzel 2011) certain features of "inner relativity" of language games have been pointed out. In *On Certainty* Wittgenstein writes "Was feststeht, tut dies nicht, weil es an sich offenbar oder einleuchtend ist, sondern es wird von dem, was darum herum liegt, festgehalten" (ÜG 144). Support is given by the surrounding. In another passage he famously writes "Ich bin auf dem Boden meiner Überzeugungen angelangt. Und von dieser Grundmauer könnte man beinahe sagen, sie werde vom ganzen Haus getragen" (ÜG 248). The foundations are "supported" by what they are supposed to support. Roof and foundation walls depend on each other. Similarly, a river carries water and the water shapes the river (ÜG 96-9). Obviously there is an inner relativity here (water – river bed, foundation – house), and there is nothing wrong with that. Quine pointed out similar ideas. Also meanings of words and feelings of certainty depend on situations and contexts. Wittgenstein shows great sensitivity here, which can be seen as some progress over Moore in *On Certainty*. But Wittgenstein refrains from offering a systematic theory. He does not like the idea of meta-levels. He does not like Gödel's incompleteness proof, which formalizes meta-talk by means of Gödel numbers.

An awareness of such inner relativity and the situatedness of one's habits and understanding is a good thing. But I think it is not enough for an ethics. When two cultures meet, they have to agree on a common ground, say of measuring. How should such a ground be found and decided upon? Should we leave this to sheer force and evolutionary mechanisms? Wittgenstein teaches us to be aware of our habits and of where we come from, which is fine. But we also have to think of others and future generations. We have to look into the future as well, not only into the past. For that theorizing can be useful.

The existence of varieties of language games and their inner relativities (house and foundational walls, river and river bed) leads to outer relativity (measuring in one culture and measuring in another culture, see Wenzel 2011), and for that having an awareness of inner relativity is not enough. I do it my way, you do it in your way. Here we have that legal system, there we have another. But who is right? How shall we meet? Places used to be more separate and isolated from each other, but they are less distant today. People come from all kinds of backgrounds and increasingly interact.

## 3. Ethics and relativism

In moral matters the inner and outer relativisms mentioned under point 2 become obviously problematic. Who is right when two forms of life meet? Can science decide? Not so easily in ethics. Usually the more powerful will simply suppress the weaker. In science this struggle usually leads to a more powerful and in that sense "better" science. But in ethics things are different. There the powerful is not necessarily the good. It is not obvious that evolutionary mechanisms will lead to a better ethics. Maybe they will, but by then much will have been destroyed and some things cannot be fixed. Just think of pollution and the extinction of species! And with the vanishing of an environment certain values will disappear as well, and this is not always for the better. There is for instance something to be said for the beauty of nature and the value it has for us and our moral views. Kant had a theory about this (see his *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, sections 42 and 59). He argued that when we find nature beautiful, it will give us "hints" telling us that we fit into the given natural environment. Such metaphorical talk of "hints" and "traces" (*Winke und Spuren*) can be explained and justified by showing that aesthetic judgments and moral judgments have certain ingredients in common and that an exercise of one kind of judgment can help the development of the other kind. Thus we should be interested in preserving nature and the feeling of beauty it can give to us. It is an "intellectual interest" that we should take. This is theory, and it is valuable theory. Even though Kant thought of morality as *a priori*, he did not drift into mysticism.

When I think of Kant's moral theory, I shall have reservations when someone simply says: "Für mich hat die Theorie keinen Wert. Eine Theorie gibt mir nichts" (WWK 117). Such a position might be too self-centered. What Wittgenstein has in mind as ethics proper is an "absolute" ethics, which is an experience, such as expressed by "I wonder at the existence of the world" or "I am safe, nothing can injure me whatever happens" (LE: 8). These are personal experiences, and in their light, ethics, aesthetics, and religion can indeed appear identical. But such experiences are self-centered, and I wonder whether they should be called "ethical" at all.

Wittgenstein went to war with the hope to die, while Russell demonstrated for women's rights and against war. Wittgenstein was primarily concerned with himself and his philosophical religion, or religious philosophy. But ethics is about others. Wittgenstein rejected all ethical theories and traditional metaphysics. But I think they should not be so readily rejected. Recently Hilary Putnam came to realize this as well: "This is precisely the double standard (religious language is meaningful, metaphysical language is not – or not in any serious sense of "meaningful" – that I now find unwarranted and unfortunate in Wittgenstein" (Putnam, to appear).

What does traditional metaphysics have to offer? As I said above, Kant's moral theory for instance reveals the ramifications and implications of the idea of the categorical imperative and makes the reader reflect about questions of universalizability in imagined situations. This includes first-person and third-person perspectives. The situations are only imagined, but still the reader gets involved and this has effects, and I think these effects are mainly positive. Wittgenstein rejected explanations in ethics due to his understanding of free will, which was informed by Schopenhauer. This is deep metaphysics, inspired by Plato, Kant, and Buddhism. But regarding morality, Kant did not only offer the transcendental-metaphysical theory as unfolded in his second *Critique*. He also wrote *Zum Ewigen Frieden*

(1795) and *Metaphysik der Sitten* with *Rechtslehre* and *Tugendlehre* (1797). Thus he tried to give concrete answers and applications in practical and legal matters. Wittgenstein could have learned something from this, it seems to me. In our modern life we need regulations and rules, and they better be explicit. Even if the deep metaphysical questions about free will, for instance, are still not solved, simply stopping our attempts to answer them seems to me to be wrong, if not impossible.

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# Wittgenstein as Poet

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A great deal of attention has recently been paid to how Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote his later philosophy. Stanley Cavell (2001: 250) maintains that the style of the *Philosophical Investigations (PI)* is not ornamental but essential, as there is no “aesthetic concern of the text that is separate from its central work”. The reader needs to make a matching aesthetic effort in order to understand the book. Wittgenstein’s later work may have more affinity with the Vienna in which Wittgenstein grew up – of the dramatist Johann Nestroy and the literary satirist Karl Kraus – than it has with the Cambridge of the logician Bertrand Russell, which is the conclusion of Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin (1973).

Wittgenstein himself notes in *Culture and Value* (CV: 65) that his sentences are designed to be read slowly. Writing to be read slowly is a mark of literary writing, just as reading slowly is a mark of literary reading. When I buy a thriller, I want a page-turner, but with a literary novel I may be more concerned about its style: John Mullan (2011) argues that a novel is literary when it asks its readers to attend to the manner of its telling, giving the example of Kazuo Ishiguro’s *Never Let Me Go* (2010). Similarly, Wittgenstein remarks, in *Zettel* 160, that a poem is not about giving information, even though it appears to be written in the language of giving information. Comments such as Cavell’s above raise the question as to whether the *PI* itself is or is not an exercise in giving information. Perhaps it is philosophy as literature; or literature as philosophy; or a blend of both.

In this context it is useful to look at the one poem that Wittgenstein is thought to have written. Georg Henrik von Wright, in his Foreword to CV: xiii, writes of “this unique document” in the words given as (1).

(1)

At the end of the remarks there is a poem which was in the possession of Hofrat Ludwig Hänsel, to whom Wittgenstein had given it. We assume that it was written by Wittgenstein. Here the poem is reproduced as a facsimile of the surviving typescript. There is supposed to have been a handwritten version too, which has probably been lost.

A single poem, but it suffices to place Wittgenstein in the company of those philosophers who not only write philosophy in a literary manner but also produce literature in the canonical sense, such as Nietzsche the poet or Sartre the novelist.

Wittgenstein’s poem is given as text (2). The German has been glossed.

(2)

EIN GEDICHT  
a poem

Wirfst du mir der treuen Liebe  
throw you to-me of-the true love  
duftigen Schleier übers Haupt  
fragrant veil over-the head  
wenn die Hände sich bewegen  
when the hands themselves move

wenn die Glieder sanft sich regen  
when the limbs softly themselves stir  
ist die Seele sinnberaubt.  
is the soul sense-robed

Kannst du’s fassen wenn sie wehet,  
can you-it grasp when it blows  
sich beweget leise nur  
itself moves softly only  
und ins Herze präget tief sie ihre Spur.  
and into-the heart impresses deep it its trace

Wenn der Morgen seine Glocke läutet  
when the morning its bells rings  
Zieht der Gärtner durch des Gartens Raume  
goes the gardener through of-the gardens spaces  
Röhrt mit leichten Füssen seine Erde //dann die Erde/  
touches with light feet his earth then the earth  
und die Blumen wachen auf und sehen  
and the flowers wake up and look  
fragend ihm ins helle,  
questioningly him into-the bright  
ruhige Antlitz:  
calm face  
Wer wob um den Fuss Dir doch den Schleier  
who wove around the foot to-you yet the veil  
der uns zahrt berührt wie Windesfächeln  
which us tenderly touches like wind-fans  
Stehet Zephir selbst in Deinen Diensten?  
stands Zephyr itself in your service  
War’s die Spinne, war’s die Seidenraupe?  
was-it the spider was-it the silkworm

It is a love lyric in which lover and beloved are united in a natural setting, reminiscent of the world of Eduard Mörike (1804-1875), whom in a letter to Russell of January 1914 Wittgenstein describes as “really [...] a great poet” whose poems are “among the best things we have” (McGuinness 2008: 65). In Mörike’s work we find gardens, gardeners, the mist of early morning and the longing for oneness with nature and the other. Text (3), my translation of the poem “September-Morgen” (Mörike, 1975:5), sums up this aspect of the Swabian poet.

(3)

SEPTEMBER MORNING

The misty world is still asleep  
with dreaming fields and dreaming woods.  
The veil will fall: then you will see  
the blueness of the sky revealed,  
the force of autumn setting free  
the world within a golden flood.

In CV, Wittgenstein’s poem is presented in unglossed German opposite a translation by Peter Winch, who stresses that “the rhythms of the original are only roughly suggested” in his rendering, and that “no attempt has been made to reproduce the rhymes in the original” (CV: 100). Winch’s strategy seems to me to be a sensible one. I would rather have an unrhymed translation of a rhymed poem than a rhyming version that twists the English to fit in

the rhymes and which can all too easily result in a deforming translation. Winch's translation is certainly not deforming and I give it as (4).

(4)  
A POEM

If you throw the fragrant veil of  
true love on my head,  
at the moving of the hands  
the soft stirring of the limbs  
bereft of sense becomes the soul.

Can you grasp it as it's drifting  
as it stirs with scarce a sound  
and deep within the heart its imprint fixes.

At the sounding of the morning's bell  
The gardener through the garden's space is passing  
Touching with light feet his ground //the ground//  
the flowers rouse themselves and gaze  
inquiring on his radiant,  
peaceful face:  
Who was it then who wove the veil around your foot  
touching us gently like a breath of wind  
Is even Zephyr too your servant?  
Was it the spider, or was it the silkworm?

In the context of this bilingual presentation, the reader is enabled to see Wittgenstein's poem with greater clarity, to map the translation onto the source text, to work out the meaning of individual terms, to compare the shape of the two poems. The presentation is itself a Wittgensteinian strategy, a type of surveyable representation (*PI* 122) which shows links between source and target text. There is an evident disadvantage to Winch's strategy, however, because it fails to signal to the Anglophone reader one of the poem's most striking features: that it begins with rhyme and then abandons it. Elsewhere, Winch's translation successfully documents other stylistic features of the source text, such as differing line length, the textual variant in line 10 or the inconsistency with capitalisation at the beginning of lines.

To read 'Ein Gedicht' in order to garner information about Wittgenstein would be to miss the literary point. Adrian Pilkington (2000: 75-83) sees poems as characterised by weak implicatures, following relevance theory (Sperber/Wilson 1975: 182). A weak implicature leaves meaning open. If we are playing the board game Cluedo and I state that Miss Scarlett committed murder in the conservatory with the revolver, then the implicature is strong. I expect you to confirm or to refute my accusation, to close down possibilities. If, however, I ask you – as Wittgenstein does as the end of his poem – who wove the veil around your foot and speculate on whether it was the spider or the silkworm, then the implicature is weak. It would be a category error to wonder which of these creatures did the weaving and to try to answer the question. More important are such factors as: the recurrence of the word "veil", which takes the reader back to line 2, where the veil is an image of "true love"; the possibility that the natural world may serve the beloved; the alliteration of *Spinne* and *Seidenraupe*, which is preserved in the English "spider" and "silkworm". Wittgenstein is opening up possibilities when he asks us who wove the web, the spider or the silkworm, not closing them down. That is the point of the poetic language-game (cf. *PI* 23).

Is this a great poem, to be put in the canon of German literature alongside the lyrics of Mörike? I do not think so. It reads to me more like a competent imitation of a genre, a

competent pastiche, unsurprising in view of the competence Wittgenstein brought to everything he undertook: engineering, logic, aeronautics, philosophy, architecture, whistling or playing the clarinet. It reads as if it were a translation itself, an unfinished draft of a missing source text, with Wittgenstein initially making an effort to reproduce the rhymes of that text, and then abandoning the attempt in order to concentrate on imagery. Brian McGuinness (2011: 21) describes it as one of Wittgenstein's jokes in a high-flown manner, revealing that it was written to say thank you for a gift of socks, when Wittgenstein was working as a gardener. However, it does have literary features and the importance of those features can be brought out by the way we may choose to read it: if we read it as a literary artefact rather than as an exercise in retrieving information. Derek Attridge (2004: 96) argues that it is possible to read even a canonical work like George Eliot's *Middlemarch* (2003) in a non-literary way – by concentrating on the story, on what happens to the characters – and that the work only becomes a literary event when read in a certain way. Similarly, 'Ein Gedicht' manifests itself as literary when we read it in a certain way: slowly; repeatedly; making links between Wittgenstein's choices of words; allowing the rhymes to lead our reading etc. In brief, when we read so that linguistic stimuli within the text can trigger cognitive events in us (Pilkington, 2000: 189), even when we read what comes over as a serious joke, which is again in the spirit of Mörike.

Perhaps by reading this poem as literature we can better appreciate the arguments of those like Cavell who argue that the style of the *PI* is not ornamental. To read the *PI* as a set of strong implicatures is to go astray. To read it as a set of weak implicatures, demanding aesthetic effort, is a better way of approaching the work. The point of the work is to be changed by it (*PI*: 4), just as a reader's cognitive state may be changed by reading a poem. The overtly fictive form of a text such as Nietzsche's *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (2008) makes it difficult to treat it in the way we would typically treat a work of analytic philosophy. In spite of the highly unconventional form of the *PI* – its numbered paragraphs, unanswered questions, stories etc. – it has proved all too easy to read it as the work of an analytic philosopher.

Terry Eagleton (1994: 153) claims that Wittgenstein is "the philosopher of poets and composers, playwrights and novelists". Perhaps the prevalence of weak implicatures in his writing can account for this popularity with artists, as well as for his misreading by philosophers. To take the example of Wittgenstein's story of the beetle in the box (*PI* 293). Martin Cohen (2005: 109) describes it being "too sparse and too ambiguous to lead to any conclusion" and this is perhaps the point: it is not designed to lead to a conclusion, because it is a literary artefact, which resists exegesis. Cohen himself misses that point by seeing the ambiguity as a fault, rather than as a sign of literariness, referring to the story as a "thought experiment" and pushing its boundaries in an analytic way contrary to its spirit (2005: 106ff). We should be open to readings of Wittgenstein, rather than seeking a definitive reading. Text (5), for example, is my own translation of Wittgenstein's poem and represents one reading of this poem.

(5)  
POEM

Whenever you wrap my head in the veil  
that they call TRUE LOVE  
and your hands start to move  
the fragrance is such all my senses fail.

The morning rings its bell: in the breeze  
I trust you sense the stirrings of the heart,  
the calm west wind of the gardener's art  
and the flowers looking up into his face.

They question which weaver wove  
the veil that flutters in Eden  
round the feet that walk through the garden  
and your face shines out and I am alive.

Does Zephyr stand in your command?  
Does spider or silkworm wrap when you demand?

I have transformed the poem into a rhymed sonnet. My intention is not to displace Winch's translation, but for my rendering to stand alongside it, a variation upon a theme. As Walter Benjamin (2004: 76) argues, works of art live on in the afterlife of translation, however we define that term. 'Ein Gedicht' has its own Wittgensteinian afterlife. It can train us in how we may read a philosopher who felt that "one should write philosophy only as one writes a poem" (CV p. 28).

Many thanks to Jean Boase-Beier and Rupert Read of the University of East Anglia for discussions on issues arising in this paper.

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# Between the Private Morality and the Common Day Ethics

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## Beyond realism-solipsism

Ludwig Wittgenstein, widely recognized as one of the most influential thinkers of the past century, seems to be one of the most rashly read authors. His texts, laconic yet so rich in metaphors have frequently fell victim to the receptions adjusted to a beforehand given interpretation: Wittgenstein – a logician, Wittgenstein – a language philosopher, Wittgenstein – irrationalist and mystic. This sort of selectiveness needlessly introduces apparently impassable tensions between realism and solipsism, logicism and mysticism, naturalism and conventionalism. But a careful lecture of Wittgenstein's major works, complemented by various remarks taken from his personal notes, enables one to reconstruct a specific linguistic perspective within which all these divisions disappear replaced by a peculiar fusion of horizons. What is crucial for this analysis is the very ethical core of Wittgensteinian philosophy; the core that had been so vividly emphasized by the philosopher himself even though so unwaveringly neglected by his interpreters.

The incomparability of languages is one of the major issues raised up by Wittgenstein. At the ground of *Philosophical Investigations* these incomparable ways of talking about 'the world' are complementary to each other. And precisely this is the way, in which one of the fundamental problems of metaphysics – the opposition between realism and solipsism – meets a commonplace solution when confronted with Wittgenstein's thought. According to *Tractatus* they coincide (Wittgenstein 1922, §5.64).

Thus the distinction between the narratives given by realism and solipsism, often recognized as totally divergent, can only be made on the linguistic basis for any subject does not dispose with any practical criterion distinguishing any of these narratives. Hence it is not that a *proper* choice is kind of a problem here, but rather that the term '*proper*' makes completely no sense in this regard. This technique of settling a dispute, which became so useful in hands of Wittgenstein in his crusade against the edifice of speculative philosophy, corresponds with a classic pragmatic criterion, which refers to the practical consequences of a potential settlement, formulated by James long ago.

It is crucial to take into account also another aspect of Wittgenstein's approach. The world, which "could be other than it is", is being understood not as a 'metaphysical whole' but rather as 'everything that can be described'. Of course 'everything' could be other than it is. What is however much more important is that this world is not 'everything'. Beyond the world and beyond 'everything' there is something hidden: something inexpressible, hence something indescribable, and in consequence something that cannot be subject to a constatation "could be other than it is". Thus beyond the realistic/solipsistic world there spreads a sphere of what is inexpressible and mystic. Here ethics manifests itself only within an inaccessible margin of the horizon. At the same time it is capable of shaping the world for – according to Wittgenstein – ethics is nothing else than a storm against the limits of the language (McGuinness 1967). A moral law could be perceived as a solipsist impression of a solitary subject then.

In *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein opens up another perspective, which in turn enables to perceive human moral behaviour as a product of social processes, inscribed into a net of subtle *language games*. A particular morality is being shaped by a particular *form of life*. A world is not given but is rather being formed. At the dawn of this process there is an individual with its unique set of impressions rather than a community. It is however the community that settles the scope of *seeing* as (Wittgenstein 1969, § 94-95).

In this way 'everything' splits into what is linguistic – and therefore is subjected to the rules of logic, ethics, and aesthetics – and into what is unembraceable – and goes beyond the sphere of factuality. By storming the frontiers set up by the language – for example by pointing at something – we can slightly shift forward the margins, which keep embracing us. The *names* and *rules*, which we well know, occur as being muzzled by what is inexpressible and comes from the unified domain of transcendence; ethics, aesthetics and logic become one there, become an *attitude towards the world* (Wittgenstein 1922, 6.421).

Wittgenstein says: "The rules of grammar are arbitrary in the same sense as the choice of a unit of measurement" (Wittgenstein 1974: 29) indicating the contingent nature of any chosen narrative. On the other hand one can conduct an archaeological investigation to construct a metanarrative explaining the relation between available interwoven descriptions and certain forms of life in terms of nature, convention or fate. At the end, however, an initial, socially uniformized choice of a *measure* determines all possible settlements (O'Neill 2001: 14).

## The beetle in the box and the private morality argument

Thus having at our disposal two alternative narratives – let us say the 'mystic' one and the 'pragmatic' one – we raise the question of private character of morality and, in particular, if anything like 'private morality' is in any way meaningful. It seems that a lot can be explained if we can learn how to apply Wittgenstein's famous *private language argument* (Wittgenstein, 1983, § 121) as well as make use of the *beetle in the box* metaphor (Wittgenstein 1983, §293) here.

According to the metaphor, the grammar of the language game determines the rules of making use of *the beetles* and thus enables one to communicate. But how one can verify whether a user of a *private language* is describing a beetle in an appropriate way? To answer this question one has to ask further: how one could use a *private rule*? The very concept of a rule has to presume an independent instance, an outer criterion, which is lacking in an evident way in case of a *private language*; for what makes a rule meaningful is its practical and social dimension (Soin 2001: 124).

As Wittgenstein is pointing out, this issue becomes even more complicated if one takes into account that actually any action can be adjusted to any rule by a careful selec-

tion of an appropriate interpretation (Wittgenstein 1983, § 198). However, if this is true, then any action can be interpreted as contrary to any given rule (Wittgenstein 1983, § 201). A misunderstanding, which is being revealed here by Wittgenstein, comes from the fact that an action is often perceived as an outcome of a process of interpretation of a rule (Wittgenstein 1983, § 199). At the same time a common use of the expression "to be guided by a rule" refers to some kind of practice (Dehnel 2006: 192-211).

But after all rules are only a linguistic reconstruction, which is possible due to the existence of the *solid rock* of human form of life. Moreover, in practice abstract rules can be – and actually are being – broken, what does not necessarily affect the accuracy of communication or actions. Anyway, as Wittgenstein says, we can always "*make up the rules as we go along*" (Wittgenstein 1983, § 83).

In fact many of these remarks refer *mutatis mutandis* to ethics. Since the dawn of mankind morality has not only been *expressed* in a language, but also captured in the form of a *rule*, soon becoming a sacred law, and engraved in golden letters. If we refer again to *the beetle in the box* metaphor, we can compare the 'mystic' perception of morality with the 'pragmatic' one by reference to the perception of the beetle. The owner of the box perceives the beetle – being the metaphor of morality – as the only possible beetle, truly and genuinely. It is particularly important to recognize this subjective impression in order to understand the "solipsist" ethics.

On the other hand, by saying 'the beetle' the owner can easily communicate with other owners. However, when different owners start to describe their beetles in more details, it slowly comes to their minds that the content of each single box is in a way unique. In practice it is difficult to accept for all owners, hence they start to consider a selection of *the ultimate beetle*, whose name could be engraved in golden letters. Some of them are extremely zealous. Some of them claim that all others see only a shadow of the *real beetle*. This is precisely the moment when all the underlying relations of power transpire and the issue of meaning gains a very practical dimension. At the same time existing rules become instruments of communication violence.

These considerations provide a basis to the formulation of a *private morality argument*. First of all the argument shows the indispensability of social nature of any possible morality. It therefore proves that *limits of the world* and a *form of life* are in a close relation. Thus the solipsist ethics, oversaturated with ultimate values, becomes as contingent as an associated *form of life* of a given subject. However, though stripped of ultimacy, ethics finds its genuine, empowerment in the authenticity of the common day social life.

Secondly, the *beetle in the box* metaphor helps us to understand that independently on how subjective or alienated are the beliefs of an individual they still provoke one to perform actions in the social sphere. Instead of excluding narratives concerning certain moralities, we should rather follow Rorty and supplement our "private" dictionaries with pluralism of narratives. Any particular *attitude towards the world* of a subject – this unique tangle of private impressions – is a carrier of a private moral attitude rooted in a socially constructed form of life. This is the kind of ethical dialectics that in each historical case could be very well described by investigating and sketching the topology of Bourdieu's *habitus* in the social *field of power*.

## Reflections in front of practices

If philosophy is to be a therapy and an art of restoring language to its everyday use, then ethics has to care about everyday problems. And this is precisely what the title 'common day ethics' means. There are two practical reflections exhibited below, which can serve as a practical illustration and provide points of reference for further developments.

**Symbolic fiction.** A machine production of forms of life, *beetles in the boxes*, adjusted to the actually obliging and imposed trends is an alarming example of commodification processes that also affect the existing moral attitudes. Today, assimilation of every available thought and reforging it for the benefit of the market runs extremely smoothly. It is the *branding* of the reality that plays a crucial role here (Klein 2000). It is also visible at the field of journalism and scientific discourse: due to the growing conceptual deficit and intellectual vacuum, every idea or stripe of reflection is being immediately raised up as a sublime topic of investigations.

The sphere of moral reflection is not an exception here. Together with the package containing a branded beetle, a preferred *lifestyle* is being sold. So what can we learn from Wittgenstein then? First of all we need to identify *symbolic universes* constructed by media and the markets as a language game arranged to support consumptionist forms of life. It explains why the choices, which are being made by the people, do not belong to the rational sphere and cannot be questioned – on the contrary they have been assimilated and became a part of individuals' identities. A common day grammar of today includes possessing luxury goods and spending time in the shopping moles. These habits are now far beyond rationality and should be treated as a source of actual and genuine values, even though they have very little to do with wellbeing of the society. Moreover, shaping of the consciousness, which equalizes freedom with the free access to commodities, translates into a deterioration of moral sensitivity and social solidarity. At the same time the "sweeping rationality, which propels efficiency and growth, is itself irrational" (Marcuse 1991).

It can be observed then that the one-dimensional lifestyle reconstructs a subjective world by infecting the form of life of the subject. Thus any moral therapy – meant for example to overcome suffering-blindness – cannot be developed by means of rational discussion or argumentation only. A thorough change in the everyday practice, the *aspect of life* or the *form of life* of all those, who were bewitched by the language of consumption, becomes an emerging moral challenge.

**Differentiation.** Wittgenstein's reflection on the ability to differentiate states of affairs is a contribution of great importance for the moral epistemology. On the other hand moral epistemology, as the ability to create/recognize a moral obligation, is prerequisite of an ethical insight. Wittgenstein asks: „But would it ever occur to colour-blind people to call themselves «colour-blind»?“ (Wittgenstein 1977, § 286). Similarly, adjusting this question to the moral context, one could ask: "But would it ever occur to suffering-blind people to call themselves «suffering-blind»?". And even though many of those who see suffering remain passive in front of it, some of the language games we play request at least some kind of justification in such circumstances. There are therefore two tasks, which moral philosophy is facing: the "traditional" – to oppose suffering – but also the "Wittgensteinian" – to recognize the suffering, which have been neglected and excluded from the public discourse, carefully concealed behind the veil of instru-

mentally constructed narratives. Again, it is about changing the very *form of life* then.

As a matter of fact the social ability to differentiate is depleting. It was heralded by Herbert Marcuse more than half of a century ago that the critical potential of modern societies is decreasing and any existing alternative is being tamed and absorbed by a one-dimensional "system" (Marcuse 1991). The present at least confirms this dismal diagnosis as a peculiar lethargy of horizons overwhelms our world leading to the suffering-blindness. Thus the development of the ability to recognize suffering becomes a substantial issue.

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