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**Geist, Sprache und Handlung
Mind, Language and Action**

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Of Context and Content: Wittgenstein and Embedded Externalism

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Introduction

In this essay, I develop an interpretation of Wittgenstein as an advocate of what I call “embedded externalism.” Embedded externalism differs from other forms of externalism in that it treats linguistic practice as embedded within an encompassing environmental context and emphasizes that such practice is, not only interrelated with, but indeed intimately attuned to the encompassing environmental context within which it is situated (cf. Haugeland 1995). Though externalists have been right to criticize the Cartesian conception of the mind as a self-enclosed interiority, they have all too frequently remained wed to distorting traditional philosophical presuppositions. Among these I count the following: the privilege of theoretical cognition over practical-existential involvement and the privilege of the designative over the expressive dimensions of linguistic practice (cf. Taylor 1985). Because of this, however, externalists have generally missed the ways in which linguistic practice is intimately attuned to the world. By contrast, I will argue in this essay that Wittgenstein presents a compelling alternative to other externalist theories in which precisely the intimacy between language and world is insisted upon.

1. Putnam’s Externalism

The most famous and influential argument in favor of externalism was put forth by Hilary Putnam in his “The Meaning of Meaning.” According to Putnam, traditional theories of meaning have rested on two unchallenged assumptions: the assumptions that (1) knowing the meaning of a term consists in being in a mental state and (2) the intension of a term determines its extension. These assumptions, according to Putnam, have been coupled to what he calls “methodological solipsism.” Methodological solipsism is the view that the contents of mental states are constituted or individuated independently of facts or entities beyond the subjects in whom they occur. According to the traditional theory criticized by Putnam, then, to know the meaning of a term is to be in a narrow mental state and this state determines the set of entities to which the term properly refers. Putnam seeks to show that this theory is wrong by demonstrating that the same term may refer to different entities when speakers have exactly identical narrow psychologies. Meaning, as Putnam notoriously puts it, “just ain’t in the head.”

In his argument for externalism, Putnam focuses on “natural kind terms.” These words are used to identify metaphysically real kinds in the environments of their users. According to Putnam, such terms have an indexical component that has been overlooked by traditional theories. Just as one cannot fully know the meaning of a particular use of “he” or “she” without other contextual knowledge, likewise, according to Putnam, one cannot fully know the meaning of a natural kind term without knowing something about the entities to which it refers. As Putnam explains, “Our theory can be summarized as saying that words like ‘water’ have an unnoticed indexical component: ‘water’ is stuff that bears a certain similarity relation to the water *around here*” (Putnam 1975, 234). The use of natural kind terms, that is, must be anchored in the “rigid references” of terms to paradigmatic cases and correct usage is determined by whether or not entities are in fact similar to the paradigms. Average speakers may not know the indexical component of a term’s meaning, but experts are able to recognize entities as being relevantly the same as one another. The expert’s ability to properly distinguish kinds extends to the community on the whole as part of a “division of linguistic labor.”

Thus it appears that issues about meaning are taken, by Putnam, to be issues about how words refer to objects in

the service of adequate representation. Natural kind terms are used to refer to metaphysically real kinds in the environments of users, but speakers may not know which entities are of a kind. Even though ordinary speakers of English will have learned to use the word “water,” for example, they may not know which entities “water” properly refers to or how to tell the difference. “In short,” writes Putnam, “we could have been in the same epistemological situation with respect to a liquid with no hidden structure as we were actually with respect to water at one time” (Putnam 1975, 241). Putnam, then, relies on the idea that our everyday practices and experiences are estranged from their encompassing environmental context in such a way that they may fail to register its real or “hidden” structure. From this very brief presentation of Putnam’s theory, one may now see that it involves the traditional presuppositions rejected by what I call embedded externalism. Wittgenstein, by contrast, rejects these presuppositions and suggests that linguistic practices are intimately attuned to their encompassing environmental context.

2. Wittgenstein’s Embedded Externalism

Wittgenstein famously challenges the designative account of language, which he discusses in terms of Augustine’s account of his own infancy in his *Confessions*. According to this picture, words are primarily names and the things they name are their meanings. John Locke summarized this idea as follows: “The use then of Words, is to be sensible Marks of Ideas; and the Ideas they stand for, are their proper and immediate Signification” (Locke 1975, 405). According to Wittgenstein, the Augustinian picture is an overly simplistic vision of linguistic practice. People use words in many different ways and this complicated multiplicity cannot be reduced to a simple schema (Wittgenstein 2001, §12). Moreover, even though there is a general class of words we call “names” there is no single feature that unites them as such (Wittgenstein 2001, §38). Just as language is full of words with different functions, so too names themselves have a multitude of different uses. Thus, he writes, “Augustine, we might say, does describe a system of communication; only not everything we call language is this system” (Wittgenstein 2001, §3). The designative dimension of linguistic practice, then, has been unduly privileged in the philosophical tradition.

This privilege of the designative, however, is only an extension of the much more entrenched privilege of theoreti-

cal cognition. Traditionally, philosophers have treated cognitive relations to the world as primary. Thus, as Charles Taylor suggests, the main purpose of an account of meaning has been “to show how language can be a vehicle of knowledge as modern epistemology conceives it” (Taylor 1985, 254). Wittgenstein’s thought, however, suggests that our primary relationship to the world is not cognitive. To paraphrase Heidegger, we are first *in* the world and only later do we have *knowledge* of it. The primacy of being-in is, I claim, the basis for Wittgenstein’s well known thesis that the meaning of a word is best thought of as its use, or role in language-games (Wittgenstein 2001, §43). Words are meaningful, from this perspective, because we are practically and existentially involved in a familiar world – not because they designate or represent ideas, entities, or kinds

The highly circumscribed designative uses of language in the modern natural sciences, therefore, are not the most common or the most basic. They are only a recent outgrowth of complicated and irregular “forms of life” – ramified webs of familiar practical scenes. Participation in such a form of life consists, in large part, in the ability to recognize in practice what Wittgenstein calls “family resemblances” – intricately interwoven textures of salience, similarity, and difference (Wittgenstein 2001, §65-7). Wittgenstein uses a metaphor to illustrate this point: “Our language may be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses” (Wittgenstein 2001, §18). Wittgenstein agrees with Putnam, then, that knowledge of the meaning of a word does not consist in the possession of a narrow mental state. For Wittgenstein, however, it cannot be reduced to the ability to discern the real or “hidden” structure of reality. Rather, knowledge of the meaning of a word is the ability to respond to and go on using it in ways that make sense to others in light of their shared familiarity with the world. The designative dimension of linguistic practice, then, is a refinement of this more basic ability.

Importantly, the ability to recognize family resemblances has not developed only to later be applied to the world. Rather, it has developed as part of and in intimacy with the encompassing environmental context of our forms of life. As Wittgenstein writes, “Commanding, questioning, storytelling, chatting, are as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing” (Wittgenstein 2001, §25). Thus, linguistic practices cannot be estranged from the world in the way suggested by Putnam’s argument for externalism. Indeed, it is remarkable that Putnam chooses water as a primary example since it is so important in our everyday practices. Drinking water, swimming in it, using it to cleanse physically and spiritually – these are all fundamental aspects of a human form of life. And, they presuppose that our ability to recognize family resemblances is intimately attuned to the world.

Thus, Wittgenstein thinks, our linguistic practices are responsive to certain general facts of nature. He writes,

It is only in normal cases that the use of a word is clearly prescribed; we know, are in no doubt, what to say in this or that case. The more abnormal the case, the more doubtful it becomes what we are to say. And if things were quite different from what they actually are – if there were for instance no characteristic expression of pain, of fear, of joy; if rule became exception and exception rule; or if both became phenomena of roughly equal frequency – this would make our normal lan-

guage-games lose their point (Wittgenstein 2001, §142).

To illustrate this idea, he imagines a world in which lumps of cheese randomly grow or shrink. In a world so drastically different from our own, it would make little sense to engage in practices of weighing cheese or of setting prices on the basis of weight. Our practices are only meaningful, then, when they are situated within an environmental context to which they are intimately attuned. This is not to say that natural facts determine the forms our linguistic practices take. Rather, they only loosely condition our ways of going on. Analogously, the fact that adult humans normally grow to certain heights and widths conditions the way that doorways are designed and constructed. Even so, people need never have constructed buildings, still use forms of shelter in which there are no doorways to speak of, and erect religious and governmental buildings in which doorways are much larger than necessary.

To be clear, Wittgenstein’s point is not that there are causal mechanisms through which natural facts condition our practices. Rather, his suggestion is that our practices only make sense given certain general facts of nature to which they are intimately attuned. For instance, in a world where humans reproduced asexually our conceptions of sexuality and gender would be out of place. Even though our practices and concepts have not been determined by our biology, it is clear that these practices are responsive to general biological facts. Wittgenstein thus writes,

I am not saying: if such-and-such facts of nature were different people would have different concepts (in the sense of a hypothesis). But: if anyone believes that certain concepts are absolutely the correct ones, and that having different ones would mean not realizing something that we realize – then let him imagine certain very general facts of nature to be different from what we are used to, and the formation of concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible (Wittgenstein 2001, Part II, §xii).

Understanding language, then, amounts to being able to respond to and go on using words in a way that makes sense to others as part of a shared sense of what is salient, similar, or different. But things are only significant in these ways because they occupy specific positions within an encompassing environmental context.

3. Kantian Externalism

On the basis of similar reasoning, Anthony Rudd has argued that Wittgenstein should be interpreted as what he calls a “Kantian externalist.” As he puts the argument,

The Wittgensteinian view that meaning must be manifestable in use not only establishes a kind of externalism (my understanding something is not a private mental act but an ability to participate in a practice); it also demonstrates the vacuity of metaphysical realism. For the way the world is in itself, considered as something distinct from the way it does or may impinge upon us, is something that is irrelevant to our practices (Rudd 2003, 83-4).

For Rudd, Wittgenstein’s conception of meaning as use is externalist because it undermines the importance of the narrow mental states of individual speakers. To know the meaning of a word is to be able to use it in ways that are intelligible to others. This externalism is “Kantian” in that it couples a version of transcendental idealism in which linguistic practices are responsible for the intelligible ordering

of the world to an empirical realism in which an individual's beliefs, theories, or classifications may still be wrong. Though an individual may be wrong in her beliefs, theories, or classifications, it is incoherent to think the broader system of linguistic practices may likewise be wrong. There is no standpoint outside our linguistic practices from which to assess their correspondence to the world.

Rudd is right to insist on the incoherence of this idea. However, he is wrong in as much as he suggests along with Putnam that there is a real or "hidden" structure in things from which we remain estranged. We know things, he claims, as they appear to us given our specific forms of life; we cannot, however, know things as they are independently of their appearance to us. In one sense this is certainly true. It makes as little sense to ask whether our linguistic practices mirror the things themselves as it does to ask whether our systems of measurement do. We can imagine someone asking "How tall is the tree in the lawn?" but refusing to accept any answer. He might go on: "I'm not asking how the tree relates to your tape measure. I want to know how tall it is." Rudd seems to suggest that this person is misguided because we cannot know the answer to his question. As I interpret Wittgenstein, however, his work shows that the question is strictly speaking meaningless. The point is not that the thing in itself is unknowable, but that the idea of the thing in itself only arises when our language "has gone on holiday."

Nonetheless, it is important to insist that our linguistic practices are conditioned by and attuned to the encompassing environmental context within which they are situated. To continue the analogy with systems of measurement: It is indeed ridiculous to reject a system because it fails to correspond to the world. It makes sense, however, to reject a system of measurement if it is cumbersome or necessitates overly complicated calculations. Of course, what is workable or handy reflects general facts of nature as much as it reflects our own capacities, interests, and practices. If certain general facts about humans or our environment were to change, our systems of measurement would lose their point. In like manner, our ability to recognize family resemblances in practice is intimately attuned

to the encompassing environmental contexts within which we find ourselves.

Conclusion

Wittgenstein's externalism, then, rejects the traditional philosophical presuppositions that privilege theoretical cognition over practical-existential engagement and the designative dimension of linguistic practices over the expressive. Wittgenstein, I claim, presents an embedded externalism according to which our linguistic practices are intimately attuned to their encompassing environmental context. If things were quite different from what they are, our practices would lose their point. It is misguided, then, to think of our practices as somehow estranged from the real or "hidden" structures of things as Putnam does. To know the meaning of a word is to be able to respond to it and go on using it in practice in ways that are intelligible to others. But what is intelligible to others – the recognizable textures of salience, similarity, and difference within which things make sense – cannot be divorced from the context within which they have their home.

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A critical note on the new mythology of the ordinary

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Abstract

Following Stanley Cavell's reading of Wittgenstein's writings, there is nowadays a widespread tendency to emphasize the ethical tone of Wittgenstein's philosophical work and to identify it with what is taken to be the rediscovery and acceptance of "the ordinary". In this paper I criticize such a tendency and try to show that it rests on a misunderstanding concerning the idea that philosophical activity requires a transformation of the philosopher's life.

1. The problem

In his "On Going the Bloody Hard Way in Philosophy" James Conant claimed that for Wittgenstein «All philosophical thinking and writing has...its ethical aspect», and that Wittgenstein believed that «learning to think better (...) is an important means to becoming a better - i.e. to becoming (what Wittgenstein calls) 'a real' - 'human being'» (Conant 2002, p. 90). In the same line, Conant adds that «even though Wittgenstein, in one sense, 'has no ethics' (if 'ethics' names a branch of philosophy with its own proprietary subject matter), in another sense, his thinking and writing - on every passage of his work - takes place under the pressure of an ethical demand». Nowadays, there is a widespread tendency to emphasize the ethical tone of Wittgenstein's philosophical work (see Backström 2011). It may have originated with Stanley Cavell's pointing out the «pervasiveness of something that may express itself as a moral or religious demand in the Investigations», and adding that «the demand is not the subject of a separate study within it, call it 'Ethics'» (Conant 2002, p.90, fn.11 referring to Cavell 1988, p.40).

The ethical value of Wittgenstein's writing was long associated with *Tractatus logico-philosophicus*, in accordance with Wittgenstein's own statement in the November 1919 letter to L. von Ficker that the book had an ethical point, consisting in its not talking about what is usually called "ethics". The Ethical, for the author of *Tractatus*, could only be delimited from within, by being silent about it. In Cavell's reflection, by contrast, the ethical point of Wittgenstein's writing is extended to the whole of his production and is associated not so much with the delimitation of an alleged domain of the ineffable but with the rediscovery of the so called "ordinary", that is «the structure of our criteria and their grammatical relations» (Cavell 1990, p.65). Cavell's move was greeted with acclaim by philosophers favouring the "resolute reading" of *Tractatus*, who downplay or even deny any room for the ineffable in Wittgenstein's writings beginning with *Tractatus*. For these commentators, the ethical dimension of philosophical reflection and writing looms so much the larger as it helps the philosopher in curing his own metaphysical sickness by rediscovering and accepting the ordinary. In these author's view, both rediscovery and acceptance entail that one becomes responsible for one's own words: hence the ethical issue of Wittgenstein's philosophical therapy.

Echoing Cavell's analyses, for example, Aldo Gargani wrote: «When Wittgenstein declares that words are to be brought back from their metaphysical to their everyday use he isn't just carrying on the work of philosophy as negative therapy: he is pointing towards an altogether new, alternative scenario, where we do not try to provide our certainties about the world with an epistemological foundation but to

recover a world that, far from being theoretically grounded, is to be "*recognized*" and "*accepted*", as Cavell says». (Gargani 2008, p.XXIII). And he adds: «Consequently, Wittgenstein's work consists in a rediscovery of the ordinary, in singling out the forms of life and practice where men can find their footing, their *Halt*, without once more resorting to foundational endeavours (that do skepticism's job better than skepticism itself)» (*ib.*).

My uneasiness stems from what I would like to call the *uncontrolled use* these interpreters make of certain words in order to buttress their favored picture of Wittgenstein's philosophical work. In fact, when dealing with Wittgenstein, *uncontrolled use* is the same as *metaphysical use*. Relating to Conant's remark quoted at the beginning of these pages, shouldn't we specify what we mean by "think better" and "better human beings"? Think better than whom, or than which other way of thinking? Becoming better human beings than whom?

Analogous issues should be raised about the use of words such as "ethics", "ethical dimension", and "ordinary". Is it true that for Wittgenstein «every use of language is inevitably characterized by an ethical dimension»? Moreover, *whose* "ordinary" are we supposed to recover or accept? Is there a universal ordinary? If there were, what about the antiphilosophical and "against the grain" character of Wittgenstein's investigations, that these interpreters are fond of recalling? If things were this way, wouldn't Wittgenstein be a new kind of metaphysical philosopher, a metaphysician of the ordinary?

2. Transforming one's own life.

Once again, Cavell is chief among the scholars who have stressed the point of transformation of life, elaborating on its connection with the therapeutic character of Wittgenstein's philosophizing but also coloring it with an undue appeal to responsibility. In his discussion of Wittgenstein's remarks on private language in the Investigations, for example, Cavell (1979) claimed that «the fantasy of a private language, underlying the wish to deny the publicness of language, turns out, so far, to be a fantasy, or fear, either of inexpressiveness, one in which I am not merely unknown, but in which I am powerless to make myself known; or one in which what I express is beyond my control» (p. 351); such a fantasy -Cavell added- «would relieve me of the responsibility for making myself known to others» (*ib.*, my italics). Wittgenstein's argument against the possibility of a private language is thus described as a struggle between me and myself, a struggle where wish and fear loom large; though "wish", "fear", and "myself" (and, of course, "responsibility") are not subjected to grammatical analysis in Wittgenstein's sense.

Now my point is not to deny that the kind of philosophical investigation Wittgenstein recommends brings out or requires something like a transformation of (the philosopher's and perhaps his interlocutor's) life; my point is only to stress that such a transformation has nothing to do with responsibility in as much it takes place, first of all, as an *aesthetical* change in the style of thinking, aiming at clarity and transparency as «an end in itself.» (CV: 9).

At many places Wittgenstein presents the philosopher's job as an activity by which the philosopher's interlocutor is lead to see differences or similarities, or as an activity aiming at «persuading people to change their style of thinking» (LC III §40: 28). Synthetically, he presents it as a process of persuasion aiming at *educating the interlocutor's sensibility* so that he comes to sharpen her eye (See CV: 33-34), that is, to see the problems the philosopher sees, and the solutions to such problems the philosopher sees as such. Such education, or shaping of a common sensibility, is what I elsewhere called the *aesthetic commitment* of conceptual inquiry¹; where the word 'aesthetics' does not refer to the philosophy of art but to the dimension of *aisthesis*, the perceptual hook onto the world that -in our case- makes both the philosopher and her interlocutor sensitive to the same phenomena, or rather, to the same grammatical facts.

But then, once we have established that conceptual inquiries have the aesthetical feature of producing a certain sharpening of the eye, of cultivating a sensibility for philosophical problems, shouldn't we wonder whether, for Wittgenstein, this has ethical implications as well?

3. Which ethics?

No doubt, one of the tasks Wittgenstein intended his philosophical activity to be carrying out was that of bringing words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use, in which they are at home [Heimat] (PI 116), so that one could reach a place that gives philosophy peace and makes philosophical problems completely disappear (PI 133). Moreover, there is no doubt that to carry out such an activity one has to overcome «resistances of the will» because the difficulty of philosophy is not simply an intellectual one, but is «the difficulty of a change of attitude» (P § 86:161); this means that philosophizing requires working «on one's own conception. On the way one sees things. (And what one demands of them)» (P § 86: 161-162).

However, it is equally clear that such a task is reinterpreted by Cavell and his disciples as, first and foremost, a *morally valuable* task, connecting us with something that can be called "our nature": «When my reasons come to an end ... I am thrown back upon myself, upon my nature as it has so far shown itself» (Cavell 1979, p.124). But it seems to me that dissolving philosophical problems in Wittgenstein's sense and "rediscovering the ordinary", or our nature, in Cavell's sense, are non-coinciding operations.

The picture of the ordinary that comes out of Cavell's and his disciples' writings is both splendid and perverse: on the one hand it captures our attention and mobilizes our imagination, but on the other it involves a whole mythology by way of its proponents' use of the word "ordinary": a use that they take to be neutral and innocent but which is really philosophical. Is this –one would like to ask- the *ordinary* sense of "ordinary"? Or again: what's the connection between "recognizing" (under Wittgenstein's guidance) a form of expression whose use had been misunderstood,

and taking responsibility for it? It seems to me there is no obvious connection. Recognizing a form of expression in Wittgenstein's sense is relocating it in the language game where it had been "at home"; it involves unravelling a conceptual tangle, which, as we saw, may be an end in itself, or it may be the beginning of further, non-philosophical developments, as Wittgenstein says in the *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, I 950: «... [the] new arrangement *might* also give [my italics] a new direction to scientific investigation ». Moreover, couldn't we decide just to reject a form of expression once it has been recognized, forever excluding it from our language?

Clearly, the last question is a rhetorical and provocative one; yet it serves the purpose of questioning a picture – that of "the ordinary", in the philosophically loaded use that appears to have acquired the rigidity of a mental cramp. It looks as if those who speak of the ordinary in these terms wanted to single out a dimension of the human –of what it is to be a human being- that is both nearest to us, as it is shared and experienced by everyone, and at the same time very far, as it is the endpoint of a very special philosophical itinerary, the terminal point of a particular reading of Wittgenstein's work. But I find it hard to believe that Wittgenstein's teaching could be regarded as issuing in a final conception of what it is to be human, or as reaching a safe place where one could rest and feel forever sheltered from philosophical temptations.

I am not here denying that Wittgenstein, as a human being, lived in a state of constant moral tension, wishing to become a better man. Such a tension is shared by many ordinary people as well as by scholars and scientists. However, I fail to see any obvious transition from this aspect of Wittgenstein's life to the idea that the recognition of ordinary uses of certain linguistic expressions can make the recognizer a morally better person². The view of the ordinary that has been defended by Cavell and his disciples fails to account for Wittgenstein's attempted characterization of the relation between his writings and his readers:

If I say that my book is meant for only a small circle of people (if that can be called a circle) I do not mean to say that this circle is in my view the élite of mankind but it is the circle to which [these are the people to whom] I turn (not because they are better or worse than the others but) because they form my cultural circle, as it were my fellow countrymen [*die Menschen meines Vaterlandes*] in contrast to the others who are *foreign* to me. (CV :12-13)

The home country [das Vaterland] that Wittgenstein is talking about is not the home of every man and woman, and certainly not of supposedly better men and women; it is a cultural circle that includes those who, by reading his works, have been persuaded by his amazing theoretical and aesthetic enterprise. These are people whose sensibility for philosophical problems has become attuned to Wittgenstein's. They have developed a keen eye for grammatical misunderstandings: they can see them where other people do not see any and they see them inexorably, so to speak; they cannot do otherwise.

Only in relation to this last aspect can one speak of the ethical implications of Wittgenstein's philosophy. People belonging to Wittgenstein's "cultural circle" have not reached a base –the ordinary- that could reassure them as to their humanity; on the contrary, whatever results they

¹ See Andronico 2010.

² Wittgenstein remarked: «You cannot lead people to the good; you can only lead them to some place or other; [...]» (CV: 5).

may achieve are each and every time temporary. The shared philosophical sensibility that leads them to see old (philosophical) problems in a new way goes together with awareness of the new perspective's partiality: it requires constantly and individually facing those who do not belong to the circle, the so called foreigners. Thus the mankind Wittgenstein is carving out in his work is no reassured mankind that has found a *Halt*, a footing, in the ordinary; it is mankind facing the task of keeping alert to the constant occasions for misunderstanding that language offers.

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The missing language – Wittgensteinian commentary on Althusser's critique of ideology

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Abstract

The first part of this paper presents an overview of Althusser's programme of the critique of ideology, which brings into focus what I see as a very significant shortcoming related to the absence of the problem of language in psychoanalytical and structuralist perspectives. The second part is devoted to the analysis of Wittgenstein's critique of the metaphysical entanglement of language (including everyday language), as well as inspirations that Wittgenstein drew from Freud's psychoanalysis. The third part provides a contextual comparison of both concepts and points to the need and possibilities of applying Wittgenstein's ideas to programmes of the critique of ideology inspired by Althusser's project.

A general overview of the philosophical propositions of Wittgenstein and Althusser leads to the conclusion that they share more differences than similarities. The two philosophers come from two different traditions. And indeed, on the objective plane, related, for example, to the consistency and mutual adequacy of notions, Wittgenstein and Althusser differ entirely. And although the objective level is important, it is not the only plane on which the mutual relations of philosophical projects can be examined. There is also the functional level, as part of which the real impact of selected concepts is investigated, which creates the basis for further analyses. This is not about traditionally conceived consistency, but a more functional and, significantly, practical concurrence of the examined problems. I posit that considering Wittgenstein's and Althusser's projects from a functional perspective may lead to interesting conclusions. The fundamental issue that brings the two concepts together in the functional aspect, is the critique that focuses on mystifications – metaphysical for Wittgenstein and ideological for Althusser.

I

The strongest conception of ideology was formulated by Althusser: "Ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence" (Althusser 2000). This relationship, i.e. a subjective view of the world that people project and that is usually internally consistent, paradoxically exists materially in Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA), such as school, religion, morality. The fundamental character of this phenomenon is that ideology is not only an effect accompanying political practice, but also constitutes a directly obvious "conception of the world" underlying this practice.

Althusser developed Marx's ideas, because he was the first to notice not only the symbolic, but also the functional aspect of ideology. He also incorporated structuralism and psychoanalysis into the area of historical materialism. Thus, for example, the school (ISA) reproduces ideology and in the process of teaching imposes a set of practices, which are further employed by the subjects, in a conscious and primarily unconscious manner. Althusser proves that Marxist false consciousness is not just a "symbolical fiction" (in Lacanian terms), but also a practical formula that affects people's lives. Upon becoming a pupil, a child assumes a view of the world employed by the school, which is related to the dominating ideological project. Althusser emphasises that in the space of everyday practice there

exists no place, phenomenon, situation, let alone an institution that would appear ideologically neutral. Yet, the multitude and variety of ideological pressures is related to one aspect of this phenomenon, which is virtually non-existent in Althusser's work. What it fails to discuss is a fundamental issue, namely the language.

If we follow Althusser's assumption that ideology functions in the realm of practice, then language – understood as a common way of expressing, recording and critiquing ideology – is of key importance to philosophy and politics. Examining Althusser's concepts, I would like to distinguish two levels of the language of ideology. The first level is related to the area of an institution (ISA). To refer to the aforementioned example: according to Althusser, school teaches not so much literature, history etc., as more practical skills related to these subjects. Althusser's Marxist rhetoric reveals another significant, though less obvious, aspect of ideology. As the child acquires new skills, for example in the field of history, he or she learns a language used for the description of historical events, which claims to be objective. But it is not difficult to imagine that the same historic facts, such as a tsunami in Japan, will be described in a different way in schools in Paris and in Tokyo. This difference in the manner of description, which is *in fact* a difference in language, is – ideological.

The language of ideology, regardless of its aspect, serves primarily to preserve the dominating order, both at the level of practice, as well as unconsciously assumed premises. It involves such a world view that is to symbolically remedy all areas of shortage in every human being's "real living conditions". This language also creates rules that aspire to be universal and define the boundaries of the currently dominating social order. The routine aspect of language use is the aspect of ideology that most visibly impacts the process of the development of the subject's identity.

The institutional language employed by ISA, which enables "the reproduction of subordination to the dominating ideology", creates an individual and everyday level of language, whose significance Althusser fails to notice (Althusser 2000). Subjects who are subject to various types of "ideological interpellation" have, perforce, different views of the world. Communication between those people varies also with regard to ideology. Drawing on Lacan's theory, we could say that the "imaginary fiction of ideology" deforms not only our vision of the world, but also our everyday practice. By postulating the need for the critique of ideology, Althusser ignores the possibility of performing a

critique on the most basic level – the level of everyday language.

While historical materialism sets the direction of Althusserian critique of ideology, psychoanalysis defines its form. Ideology should be critiqued from the weakest point in its structure, one that will allow us to perform further critique – in a centrifugal movement – from alienation to emancipation. However, the problem is that Althusser completely ignores the basic fact that for the critique of ideology to be effective, it cannot limit itself to the level of institution. Everyday language carries various ideological traces. It is impossible to eliminate them because such a project is ideological in itself. The difficulty behind this critique consist in making people aware of the ideological entanglements of the language they use. And here Althusser fails again to provide a satisfactory solution. This significant shortcoming could easily be remedied by referring to a completely different tradition, i.e. Wittgenstein's philosophy.

II

Wittgenstein appears as a theorist who is so far removed from political problems that the very possibility of applying his ideas in the critique of ideology may seem rather risky. In my opinion it is exactly the opposite. Wittgenstein's distance towards political issues and perception of the problem of language use – which still doesn't constitute an obvious issue within the philosophical and political thought – is an excellent complement to the imperfect conception of Althusser.

Althusser's conception of politics is in complete contradiction to metaphysical idealism present in various modern political projects, such as Taylor's communitarianism. Ideology, as an element of politics, resembles a photographic filter that distorts actually existing production conditions that define mutual relations among people. The fact that in his project Althusser ignores the problem of the ideological entanglement of language, which is also a tool that falsifies the realities of the Marxist base, creates an opportunity to use Wittgenstein's anti-metaphysical attitude in the philosophical and political perspective.

It has to be assumed that Althusser had not read Wittgenstein, which paradoxically constitutes the best justification for the present discussion. I would not like to "compile" such disparate traditions, yet, I would like to prove that the deficiencies of Althusser's conception can be compensated with Wittgenstein's ideas. Not the means, but the ends and, to a lesser extent, common inspirations can offer an area of agreement. In opposition to the interpretation by Winch, I would like to present selected fragments of *Philosophical investigations* as a tool in the "linguistic" critique of ideology, which is missing from Althusser's project.

My own position can be situated nearer the "therapeutic" interpretation developed by the authors of *The New Wittgenstein* volume. At the same time, referring to Alice Crary's text, I would like to highlight that Wittgenstein's "lesson of rational responsibility" is not only of practical, but also critical value (Crary 2000). His concepts constitute not so much a dictionary that describes particular phenomena as a context for critical activities that can later be undertaken.

It is worth noting that the concept of language games turns out to be close to Althusser's discussions in *Ideology*...As Wittgenstein writes: "In the practice of the use of language (2) one party calls out the words, the other acts

on them. However, in instruction in the language the following process will occur: the learner *names* the objects; that is, he utters the word when the teacher points at the stone." (Wittgenstein 2009). The reproduction of ideology is similar to language learning. ISA forces to learn subsequent elements of our language. For example, by pointing to marriage with offspring, the Christian religion appears to be saying: "This is the only form of a relationship, which can be called a family". The Church favours this model and condemns or ignores others. Naturally, such vision of the family, just like any other, is merely an ideological formation, fiction created to fulfil the needs of a particular social order. It refers to something which is merely an imaginary surplus [le imaginaire surplus] with relation to the fragment of reality that defines the life of at least two people.

Wittgenstein signalled the critical function of philosophy in his notes from 25 October 1930: "Our method resembles psychoanalysis in a certain sense. To use its way of putting things, we could say that a simile operating in the unconscious can be made harmless by being articulated. And the comparison with psychoanalysis can be developed even further. (And this analogy is certainly no accident.)"¹ This excerpt, which contains everything Althusser's conception is missing, defines the internal mechanism of a critique of ideology, which consist in making conscious what has earlier been a symbolic fiction that distorts our vision of the world. And even though Althusser himself perceived practice as a spatial construct, which enabled him to recognise important differences in the level of determination between subsequent "floors" of the superstructure, his project clearly has some deficiencies. It does not consider language use at the subjective level. Although he never dealt with politics, in his *Investigations* Wittgenstein offered a specific way of looking vertically at language, practice and social rules that determine them, which is a significant contribution to the field of philosophical and political criticism.

Psychoanalysis constitutes a space for the reconciliation of these two disparate conceptions. For Althusser ideology "works" primarily at an unconscious level, which hides and organises its major mechanisms manifested later at a conscious level. Althusserian critique of ideology also draws on the therapeutic function of psychoanalysis – its objective is to expose ideological mechanisms that negatively affect our everyday practice. Not mentioning politics and ideology, Wittgenstein points to similar issues in the context of psychoanalysis. In his commentary to *Investigations*, Baker notes that some statements, including the philosophical ones, refer to the images and comparisons that subconsciously shape the author's thinking (Baker 2004). This means that our mode of thinking is not "transparent", as it contains mechanisms that are unknown to us and that visibly affect our actions. The discovery of these mechanisms is a (critical) challenge for the therapeutic function of philosophy. Baker points out that Wittgenstein would like to "therapeutically" explain certain notions, exposing and criticising their metaphysical entanglements (Baker 2004). Psychoanalysis is as much a therapy as it is a philosophically active critique.

III

Battling ideology, just like battling metaphysics is a task for philosophy. In *Investigations* Wittgenstein writes (§116): "What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use." (Wittgenstein 2009). And then (§124): "Philosophy must not interfere in any way with

1 Translated by G. Baker.

the actual use of language, so it can in the end only describe it." (Wittgenstein 2009). These fragments can be considered the missing element of Althusser's conception. If we treat ideology as a collection of "metaphysical applications of words", its criticism would involve not transforming them, but revealing and reminding about their everyday, that is actual, meanings. By ignoring the linguistic context of ideology, Althusser fails to make an important reservation that arises from the reading of *Investigations*: philosophical criticism of ideology cannot change the structure of ideology; it would be pointless, because there is no point external to it – it has to expose its mechanisms and "bring down to earth" the previous usages of words, at the same time laying bare the fictional nature of previous constructions.

Finally, while analysing the two conceptions, one needs to ask about the point of destination. Is there a common argument for the critique of ideology and critique of metaphysics from *Philosophical Investigations*? Althusser rejects the concept of a space free from ideology, while Wittgenstein posits a non-metaphysical everyday language that expresses the simplest activities. In practice, such language proves insufficient. The key issue, again, is psychoanalysis, on which both Wittgenstein and Althusser cautiously draw. Therapy involves becoming aware, and primarily decoding the content that previously affected us in a subconscious form. The philosophical meaning of psychoanalysis that both philosophers share is universal. The aim of therapy is not to remove subconsciously realised patterns of behaviour, but to uncover them. Therefore, as we examine Wittgenstein's proposition from a therapeutic perspective, we should understand his suggestion from §116 of *Philosophical Investigations* in direct relation to his note

from 1930, which casts new light on the problem of the lack of language in Althusser's conception.

Metaphysical, just like ideological, use of language, is not only inappropriate, but also, and above all, subconscious, which means it does not clarify, but the opposite – makes our understanding of the world even more complicated. The critique of metaphysics, as well as ideology, which involves full affirmation of conscious action, is almost a utopian enterprise, and thus also an ideological one. By rejecting such a possibility *a priori*, it is easy to fall into the trap which Althusser did not avoid. By concentrating on the critique of institutions that reproduce ideology, he completely omitted the existence of ideological contexts at the level of everyday language. Only tools inspired by Wittgenstein's ideas, though originated in a remote tradition, can make Althusser's critical strategy useful, and thus – effective.

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Sprache des Wissens?

Erkenntnistheoretische Implikationen des performativen Sprechaktes

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Abstract

Das Konzept der performativen Dimension der Sprache steht in den Geistes- und Kulturwissenschaften vor allem für die Subversion des wahrheitskonditionalen Bandes zwischen Denken und Sein. John L. Austin, der „Entdecker“ der performativen Äußerungen, avancierte mit seinem handlungsorientierten Sprachverständnis zum prominenten Kritiker jenes philosophischen Ideals, das die Sprache – sofern sie von allem metaphysischen Ballast befreit wäre – ein Instrument des Wissens sein könnte. Wie steht die performative Sprechhandlung zu diesem angestrebten Wissens-Desiderat? Welche erkenntnistheoretischen Implikationen weist das performative Paradigma auf? Welche Konsequenzen hinsichtlich der Frage nach der Erkenntnis einer gegenständlichen Welt, folgen aus der Annahme, dass die Sprache die Tat-Sachen der Welt hervorbringt? Der Vortrag wird diesen Fragen entlang der Lektüre zwischen Austin und Jacques Derrida nachgehen, um zu zeigen, dass das performative Sprachverständnis vom Anspruch der Sprache auf Wissen (als Entsprechungsverhältnis zwischen Äußerung und Sachverhalt) nicht ausgenommen werden kann.

1. Performative Sprechakte: Äußerungen im Kostüm

"What I shall have to say here is neither difficult nor contentious; the only merit I should like to claim for it is that of being true, at least in parts." (Austin 1976: 1) Der Satz ist von John L. Austin, er ist der erste seiner posthum veröffentlichten Vorlesung *How to do things with words*, die er 1955 im Rahmen der William James Lectures hielt. Der vergnügliche Ton, mit dem Austin den Verdienst einer Halbwahrheit für sich in Anspruch nimmt, ist dabei nicht zu überhören. Mit welcher Wahrheit wird man es hier zu tun bekommen? Dabei stellt sich sogleich die Frage, ob das, was Austin zu sagen hat, denn überhaupt ein Körnchen Wahrheit birgt, sofern er gar nicht vor hat die ganze Wahrheit zu sagen? Es ist wohlbekannt worauf Austins provokant anmutender Umgang mit dem Begriff der Wahrheit hier abzielt: das sprachliche Phänomen der performativen Äußerung. Ganz allgemein, so führt Austin diese Klasse von Äußerungen ein, handelt es sich um Äußerungen die im Kostüm, im Mantel – Austin spricht von *masqueraders* (Austin 1976: 4) – von deskriptiven oder konstativen Tatsachenfeststellungen veranschlagt werden, obwohl sie weder etwas beschreiben, berichten, noch überhaupt etwas behaupten. Mit der Einführung der performativen Äußerungen, so lässt sich Austins vornehmliches Ziel formulieren, sollte die sprachphilosophische Analyse der menschliche Rede aus dem Register von wahr und falsch herausgeführt werden. Die Wahrheit scheint – zumindest auf den ersten Blick – nicht das Spielfeld der performativen Äußerung zu sein. Die Theorie der performativen Äußerungen, so kann mit Stanley Cavell dargelegt werden, war dazu angetreten den Wert der Wahrheit zu unterminieren. Cavell: "Austin's work in the theory of performatives is designed precisely to retain 'the value of truth'." (Cavell 1995: 51)

In einer allgemeineren und für die Rezeptionsgeschichte des Begriffs der Performativität in den Geistes- und Kulturwissenschaften seit Anfang der 1990er Jahre zentralen Perspektive formuliert: Die Sprache beschreibt nicht eine Handlung, sondern vollzieht diese und zwar durch den Akt der Äußerung selbst, durch den *lokutionären Akt*. Die Sprache steht der Welt daher nicht *gegenüber*, sondern ist ein Geschehen *in* bzw. *von* dieser Welt. (vgl. Krämer

2001:138) Austin avancierte mit diesem handlungsorientierten Sprachverständnis zum prominenten Kritiker jenes philosophischen Ideals, das die Sprache – sofern wir sie von allem metaphysischen Ballast befreit hätten – ein Instrument des Wissens sein könnte. Was aber kennzeichnet das Sprachverständnis *der Metaphysik* gegen antrat? Was macht einen *metaphysischen Diskurs* aus, demgegenüber Austin seine performativen Äußerungen kontrastiert? Der *metaphysische Diskurs* zielt auf Totalität ab, kurz gesagt, auf die *ideale* Repräsentation dessen, was *ist*. Die Sprache übernimmt in dem Diskurs, den ich im hier um des Argumentes willen sehr allgemein als *metaphysischen Diskurs* bezeichnen werde, die Funktion Gedanken (*Ideen*) zu repräsentieren, die selbst wiederum die Sache vertreten. Aber der metaphysische Diskurs kann beim Sprechen über die partikularen Dinge nicht stehenbleiben. Dieses ist nur ein Zwischenschritt, über den es hinauszugehen gilt, insofern die *Wahrheit* im Ganzen liegt, das in allem *Seienden* absolut eins ist. Das diesem Diskurs implizite Wissens-Desiderat strebt daher nach einer Übereinstimmung zwischen Sprache und *Weltzustand* im Ganzen. Der Wissensanspruch der Sprache sieht sich dann erfüllt, wenn die Sprache zu sagen bzw. zu benennen vermag, was hinter dem *Seienden wirklich ist*. (vgl. Juranville 1990: 95) Es soll hier nun darum gehen, die performative Äußerung zu diesem repräsentationalen Sprachverständnis in Beziehung zu setzen. Dabei leiten mich folgende Fragen: Wie steht die performative Äußerung nun zu diesem angestrebten Wissens-Desiderat? Welche erkenntnistheoretischen Implikationen weist das performative Paradigma auf? Welche Konsequenzen hinsichtlich der Frage nach der Erkenntnis einer gegenständlichen Welt folgen aus der Annahme, dass Sprache *handelt*? Welchen Wissensanspruch erhebt das handlungsorientierte Sprachverständnis, das durch Austin initiiert wurde? In einem ersten Schritt geht es also darum, das Verhältnis der performativen Äußerung zum Wissensanspruch des *metaphysischen Diskurses* nochmals in Augenschein nehmen.

Die Relevanz dieser *Hinsicht* auf das Verhältnis der performativen Dimension der Sprache zum Wissen, sehe ich darin, dass das Begriffskonzept der Performativität *per se* für die Subversion der wahrheitskonditionalen Beziehung zwischen *Denken* und *Sein*, zwischen *Sprache* und *Wirklichkeit* zu stehen scheint. Gerade die Ausweitung der

Theorie des performativen Sprechaktes auf einen außersprachlichen Bezug, die Überwindung der, wie Sybille Krämer formuliert, "magischen Identifizierung von Wort und Sache" (Krämer 2001: 138), kennzeichnet die enorme Wirkungsgeschichte des Begriffs, dessen sprachphilosophische Spuren weit über die disziplinären Grenzen der Philosophie hinaus ins Werk gesetzt wurden. Austins Kritik an der *Fetischisierung des Wahr/falsch-Registers*, die er dem logischen Positivismus des akademischen Umfelds seiner Zeit in Oxford attestierte, erfuhr in den Geistes- und Kulturwissenschaften eine neue Gewichtung. Das Versprechen, das Austins Klassifizierung der performativen Äußerungen bereit zu halten schien, lag weniger darin, sprachliche Äußerungen entlang des Sinnkriteriums zu untersuchen, als vielmehr darin, die natürlich-ableitbare, teleologisch argumentierte Bezugnahme von Sprache und Realität zu subvertieren. Während für Austins Analysen die Frage nach sprachexterner Referenz von sekundärer Bedeutung war, wurde vor allem die Verwendungsweise von *nicht-referentiell* für eine Vielzahl von Disziplinen maßgeblich. Der Begriff der Performativität entwickelte sich auf diesem Weg zu einem, wie Uwe Wirth feststellt, *umbrella term der Kulturwissenschaften*. (vgl. Wirth 2002:10) Mittlerweise gibt es vielleicht ebenso viele Anwendungen wie unterschiedliche Disziplinen, die vom Begriff der Performativität handeln. Dabei erscheint es bemerkenswert wie entschieden metaphysik-kritisch der Begriff rezipiert wurde. Die kulturwissenschaftliche Aneignung – ich glaube das ist nicht zu viel gesagt – verlief überwiegend über Jacques Derridas Austin-Kritik, die er in seinem Vortrag *Signatur Ereignis Kontext* (1971) ausführte. In dieser über Derrida vermittelten Austin-Lektüre tritt allerdings zumeist in den Hintergrund, dass Derrida den performativen Sprechakt erstens, von der Sprache des Wissens nicht ausnahm, sondern im Gegenteil zeigte, dass er lediglich an einer anderen Stelle wieder auftaucht. Zweitens, hat die Sprache des Wissens (der Vernunft) für Derrida kein Gegenteil, sondern scheitert höchstens an sich selbst. Das heißt, für Derrida stellt die performative Äußerung kein Gegenstück zum Sprachverständnis der Metaphysik dar, sondern veranschaulicht vielmehr ihr eigenes Fehlgehen. Derrida verbirgt diese Position nicht, nur expliziert er sie an anderer Stelle¹ – die im Zusammenhang mit seiner Austin-Kritik jedoch zumeist unberücksichtigt blieb.

2. Vom Wissen des Sprechenden Subjekts

In einem ersten Schritt werde ich Derridas Austin-Kritik skizzieren, hinsichtlich der Frage, welchen Wissensanspruch das Performativ erhebt? Wie Torsten Hitz herausgearbeitet hat, sieht Derrida die performative Äußerung in zweifacher Hinsicht vom Wahrheitsanspruch der Metaphysik nicht ausgenommen. Ich resümiere im Folgenden die beiden Einwände Derridas, die Hitz akzentuiert (vgl. Hitz 2005: 50ff.): Der erste Einwand Derridas betrifft die Regel des Kontextes: Jene erste notwendige Bedingung, die Austin aufstellt, damit eine sprachliche Äußerung nicht primär etwas sagen, sondern vielmehr etwas tun bedeutet, d.h. damit die Behauptung aufgestellt werden kann, dass das Gesagte dem Vollziehen einer Handlung gleicht. Es braucht ein übliches, konventionelles Verfahren mit einem bestimmten konventionalen Ergebnis, eine bestimmte Person die dieses Verfahren korrekt anwendet, indem sie unter bestimmten, damit auch bestimmbarsten Umständen, bestimmte Wörter äußert. (vgl. Austin 2002: 37) Derrida wendet hier ein, dass die Regel des Kontextes bereits voraussetzt, dass das Sprechende Subjekt den Kontext seiner

Äußerung vollkommen erfassen kann. Das Wissen um die Wirklichkeit (hier um den konventionellen Kontext), in die das Sprechende Subjekt seine Äußerung entsprechend einsetzt, ist folglich bereits unterstellt. Die Instanz, die das Gelingen des performativen Sprechaktes ermöglicht, ist die Sprecherin, die bereits weiß, was sie zu tun hat. In den Worten von Hitz formuliert: "Das Gelingen der performativen Äußerung ist in diesem Sinne vom Wissen des Sprechenden Subjekts über den Kontext abhängig. Der Anspruch der performativen Äußerung auf Gelingen impliziert daher den Anspruch auf dieses Wissen." (Hitz 2005: 56)

Zum zweiten Einwand, den Derrida gegen Austin vorbringt: Austin nimmt an, dass die Person, die an einem bestimmten Verfahren teilhat und es anwendet, sich darauf beruft und es ausführt, auch wirklich *meinen* muss, was sie sagt. Der von Derrida konstatierte Wahrheitsanspruch gründet hier auf der Entsprechung zwischen Denken und Sagen; auf der bewussten Intention der Sprecherin, die ihren Gedanken zielgerichtet zum Ausdruck bringt. Hitz bringt Derridas Argument auf den Punkt: "Wie jede metaphysische Äußerung erhebt demnach die performative Äußerung einen Anspruch auf Wahrheit als Gegenwart des Gedankens in der Sprache (...)." (Hitz 2005: 56) Die beiden Argumente zusammenfassend: Derrida sieht den Anspruch auf Wahrheit im Fall des performativen Sprechaktes nur auf eigentümliche Weise verschoben, indem der Wert der Wahrheit zum Wert des Gelingens² moduliert wird. Austins Analysen verlangen – folgt man Derrida – immer den Wert eines determinierbaren Kontextes, in dem der Sprecher als verursachende Wissens-Instanz die Totalität seiner Aussage gewährleistet. Im Fall des Performativs bürgt zwar nicht ein sprachexterner Referent für die Wahrheit der Aussage, jedoch wird diese Bürgschaft durch die Souveränität eines Sprechenden Subjekts ersetzt, dessen Intention oder Wille, die Rede tragen. Die bewusste Anwesenheit der Intention des Sprechenden Subjekts und das vorausgesetzte Wissen um den Kontext der Äußerung verbürgen also die Totalität seines lokutionären Aktes, die sich im *Gelingen* entfalten kann. Derrida schreibt: "Dadurch wird die performative Kommunikation wieder Kommunikation eines intentionalen Sinns, selbst wenn dieser Sinn keinen Referenten in der Form eines Dinges oder einer vorherigen oder äußeren Sachlage besitzt." (Derrida 2001: 34)

3. Registerwechsel: Vom Wissen der Sprache

Aber auch für Austin garantiert die Erfüllung der Voraussetzung des Wissens, um einen konventionell gesicherten Kontext, in dem die Sprecher/innen ihren Sprechakt bewusst, d.h. wissend einsetzen, nicht, dass der performative Sprechakt auch missglücken (unhappy) kann. Austin stellt fest, dass der performative Sprechakt immer Gefahr läuft, die beabsichtigte Handlung nicht zustande zu bringen. (vgl. Austin 2002: 39) Bereits in seiner zweiten Vorlesung betrachtet er das Verunglücken als kennzeichnend für das Performativ. Im Zuge des Bemühens performative von konstativen Äußerungen zu unterscheiden resümiert er: "Bisher haben wir das Verunglücken als typisch für die performative Äußerung dargestellt (...)." (Austin 2002: 39) Warum aber typisch? Warum ist dieses Verunglücken gerade für performative Aussagen beispielhaft? Für Derrida liegt die Antwort in der strukturellen Wiederholbarkeit jedes Zeichens. Das Verunglücken resultiert aus der prinzipiellen Wiederholbarkeit jeder Lokution. Während Austin das Ge-

¹ Derrida argumentiert diese Position ausführlich in seinem Vortrag *Cogito* und die Geschichte des Wahnsinns, der in Die Schrift und die Differenz publiziert wurde.

² Ich überspringe hier die Derrida-Lektüre von Stanley Cavell. Während Derrida den Wert der Kraft anstelle des Wahrheitswertes setzt, zeigt Cavell, dass Derrida eigentlich den Wert des Gelingens meinen müsste. (vgl. Cavell 1995)

lingen der performativen Äußerung in die Hände außersprachlicher Prozeduren legt, wird das Performativ bei Derrida zum innersprachlichen Phänomen, das selbst Resultat einer ritualisierten, d.h. wiederhol-, und iterierbaren Praxis ist. Die performative Äußerung kann demnach nur als Wiederholungsfigur einer Lautkette funktionieren. Was Derrida hier gewichtet, ist die wiederholbare Form, die der performativen Aussage, strukturell zugrunde liegt. Damit vollzieht sich ein Registerwechsel – vom außersprachlichen Eingebettet-Sein zur innersprachlichen Autonomie des Zeichens – der auch die Stellung der sprechenden Subjekte verschiebt. Kurz gesagt: Das Zeichen gewinnt an Autonomie, der Sprecher/die Sprecherin verlieren die in ihrem Sprechakt verankerte Souveränität. Denn während bei Austin der geglückte Sprechakt u.a. von den Absichten, dem Wissen und dem Telos des sprechenden Subjekts abhängig ist, speist sich die Kraft des Performativs bei Derrida nun aus der strukturellen Wiederholbarkeit jeder sprachlichen Form (ob Laut, Zeichen oder Lokution). Die Lokution ist demnach nicht auf die Präsenz eines bewussten Sagen-Wollens angewiesen, die sprachliche Äußerung hat in jedem Fall eine Wirkung, denn zu missglücken heißt auch für Austin nicht ohne Folgen, ohne Ergebnisse, ohne Konsequenzen (vgl. Austin 2002: 39) zu sein. Gerade in der Möglichkeit des Missglückens, zeigt sich für Derrida jenes strukturelle Moment der Zeichen, das für jedes beliebige Element der gesprochenen Sprache gilt (vgl. Derrida 2001: 28) und das die bewusste Intention und den Willen des sprechenden Subjekts untergräbt. Die Angewiesenheit jedes Sprechaktes auf seine Wiederholbarkeit, also der Sprechakt als ritualisierbare Form des Vollzugs, ist für Derrida "(...) keine Eventualität, sondern (...) ein struktureller Wesenszug jedes Zeichens (...)." (Derrida 2001: 36) Das Performativ kann demnach nur wirksam sein insofern es iterierbar ist. Daher ist es nun die Form, und nicht der Gehalt der Rede, die nach diesem Registerwechsel im Vordergrund steht.

4. Von Trojanischen Pferden, mit denen die Sprache umgehen kann...

Wenn wir das von Derrida in die performative Äußerung eingeführte Prinzip der Wiederholung jedoch genauer betrachten, stoßen wir auf eine weitere Voraussetzung. Es geht zwar vordergründig nun nicht mehr darum, das Seiende im Ganzen zu denken, noch visiert der performative Sprechakt die Wahrheit im Gegensatz zur Falschheit (als Verfehlen der Wirklichkeit) an. Der Wissensanspruch verschiebt sich jedoch erneut und zwar in die Vorstellung, die Sprache als Ganzes erfassen zu können. Oder anders formuliert: Eine Antwort auf die Frage Was ist die Sprache? geben zu können. Denn unter welcher Voraussetzung kann das Zeichen prinzipiell wiederholt werden? Doch nur dann, wenn es auch ohne die Anwesenheit des bezeichneten Referenten funktioniert: Wenn die Zeichen autonom werden und ihr eigenes Leben zu führen beginnen, wie Saussure sagte. Das Zeichen als wiederholbare Form zu konstituieren, setzt voraus, die Sprache als von sprachexternen Elementen autonomes Ganzes zu betrachten. Derrida schreibt in *Limited Inc.*:

Nicht daß es immer so wäre; aber es gehört zur Möglichkeitsstruktur dieser Aussage, als *leere Referenz* oder *als von ihrem Referenten abgeschnittene Referenz* [Herv. von mir, L.A.] gebildet zu sein um funktionieren zu können. *Ohne diese Möglichkeit* [Herv. von mir, L.A.], die auch die generelle, generierbare und generalisierbare Iterabilität jedes Zeichens ist, gäbe es keine Aussage. (Derrida 2001: 29)

Der Saussuresche Grundsatz – die Sprache ist nicht Substanz, sondern Form – liegt hier offen zutage, wenn Derrida von einem Abschneiden des Referenten spricht (wir erinnern uns an den Saussureschen Schnitt durch das repräsentative Band zwischen Zeichen und Bezeichnetem). Der Ausschluss des sprachexternen Referenten stellt für Derrida die Möglichkeitsbedingung der Wiederholbarkeit des Zeichens dar. Lässt sich denn behaupten, dass die strukturelle Wiederholbarkeit eine Wesensbestimmung des Zeichens ist, ohne damit nicht auch zugleich die Totalität des Saussureschen Sprachuniversums (*langue*) implizit für richtig zu erklären? Mit Saussures Sprachsystem repräsentiert die Sprache (als System) zwar nicht eine vorgängige Ordnung: weder Dinge, noch Ideen. Aber die Sprache wird selbst zum Apriori jeder Erkenntnis, zur transzendentalen Möglichkeitsbedingung jedes konkreten Sprechens (*parole*). Wenn wir sprechen aktualisieren wir das virtuelle Sprachsystem, das jeder Äußerung/Artikulation als Tiefenstruktur zugrunde liegt. Damit verschiebt sich aber, wie Krämer ausführt, das Verhältnis von Denken und Sprache lediglich auf eine analoge Relation im Inneren der Sprache selbst. Das Ableitungsverhältnis von Denken und Sprache und der Erkenntnisanspruch der aus diesem Verhältnis hervorgeht, taucht als Beziehung zwischen der Sprache als Form (als idealisierter Bereich der Totalität aller Elemente) und der Aktualisierung der Form (dem konkreten, partikulären Sprechen) wieder auf. (vgl. Krämer 2001: 97f)

In *Die Schrift und die Differenz* stellt Derrida fest: "Es gibt kein trojanisches Pferd, mit dem die Vernunft (im allgemeinen) nicht fertig würde." (Derrida 1972: 61) Insofern die Struktur der Vernunft, der Sprache nicht mehr vorangeht, sondern ihr inhärent ist, ist die Sprache keine Struktur unter anderen möglichen Strukturen, sondern eine wissenschaftsfundierende Fähigkeit, die die Frage nach der *Einheit der Dinge* allererst hervorbringt. Sie setzt das *Eins-Sein* der Dinge insofern voraus als sie Unterscheidungen setzt. Doch gleichzeitig führt ihr Mechanismus über das besondere Einzelne hinweg. Denn ein Wort bezeichnet nicht nur dieses *besondere* Seiende. Das Wort *Brücke* bezeichnet nicht ausschließlich diese eine Brücke, sondern gilt auch für andere Brücken. Außerdem sagt es nichts über diese *besondere* Brücke aus und auch eine Aufzählung von weiteren Aspekten, könnte die *Unendlichkeit der Hinsichten auf etwas* nicht abschließend benennen. Die Sprache ist der Ort, an dem sich die Frage nach dem *Sein in Hinblick auf seine Einheit* stellt. (vgl. Appiano 2008: 29f.) Derrida schreibt: "(...) es ist sinnlos, auf die Begriffe der Metaphysik zu verzichten, wenn man die Metaphysik erschüttern will. Wir verfügen über keine Sprache – über keine Syntax und keine Lexik -, die nicht an dieser Geschichte beteiligt wäre." (Derrida 1972: 425) Die performative Äußerung ist von der Frage nach der *Einheit der Dinge*, von ihrem impliziten Begehren (Desiderat) nach Wissen nicht ausgenommen. Performative Äußerungen können zwar nicht falsch sein, da das Wahr/falsch-Kriterium nicht das angemessene Beurteilungskriterium für sie darstellt. Aber, wie Rolf Eckard herausstreicht: "Eine Äußerung, die nicht falsch sein kann, kann dennoch, und sei es bloß trivialerweise, wahr sein." (Eckard 2009: 104) Das Wissen, das das Performativ bereit hält, liegt in einer Art tautologischem Verhältnis zur Wirklichkeit, insofern die *Tat-Sachen der Welt* zu einem Erzeugnis der selbstreferentiellen Wirkung von Sprache werden. Aber gerade darin verfehlt das performative Sprachverständnis die genuine Frage der Sprache nach dem *Bezug auf etwas*, das sie als Unterschiedenes kennzeichnet.

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Die Äußerung einer Erinnerung als intuitive Erklärung einer gegenwärtigen Absicht – ganz nach Wittgenstein

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Abstract

Erinnerung ist für Wittgenstein ein komplexer Vorgang, der mit einer Vielzahl von Schwierigkeiten verbunden ist. Dies gilt besonders für seine Überlegungen zur Erinnerung einer Absicht – ein in der Wittgenstein-Literatur bis dato vernachlässigter Aspekt, obwohl er in diversen Manuskripten des Nachlasses hervorsteht. Nach Wittgenstein erlaubt uns der Erinnerungsvorgang nicht, uns eine vermeintliche Absicht „vor Augen zu führen“, dennoch verwenden wir den Begriff, um mittels einer Erinnerungsbeschreibung eine vergangene Absicht zu äußern. – Nur was bringen wir damit zum Ausdruck? Da die Worte sich weder auf Tatsachen beziehen noch mit diesen korrespondieren, kommt es zur paradoxen Situation, dass jemand sich des Inhalts einer Absicht zu erinnern meint, nicht aber der einstigen Worte. Dies wirft im Umkehrschluss die Frage auf, was unter diesen Umständen die Artikulation der Erinnerung einer Absicht überhaupt zum Ausdruck bringen soll und kann.

Von den Vorgängen, die man „Wiedererkennen“ nennt, haben wir leicht ein falsches Bild; als bestünde das Wiedererkennen immer darin, daß wir zwei Eindrücke miteinander vergleichen. Es ist, als trüge ich ein Bild eines Gegenstandes bei mir und agnoszierte danach einen Gegenstand als den, welchen das Bild darstellt. Unser Gedächtnis scheint uns so einen Vergleich zu vermitteln, indem es uns ein Bild des früher Gesehenen aufbewahrt, oder uns erlaubt (wie durch ein Rohr) in die Vergangenheit zu blicken. (PU 604)

Wäre es so einfach, dass das Gedächtnis ein Bild des früher Gesehenen wie in einem Erkennungsprogramm mit dem jetzt Gesehenen vergleichen würde, wären alle Probleme des Wiedererkennens, des Erinnerns und des Gedächtnisses auf einen Schlag gelöst. Wittgenstein benennt diese Illusion, denn unser Gedächtnis erlaubt uns gerade nicht die Rückschau in die Vergangenheit „wie durch ein Rohr“. Während die Bedeutung der Erinnerung sowie des unmittelbaren Wiedererkennens *per se* für unser tägliches Leben unstrittig sein mögen, gilt dies für die korrekte Wiedergabe einer Erinnerung nicht. Es ist äußerst schwer, vergangenes Denken und Fühlen oder das Erlebte in Worten nachzuzeichnen. Es stellen sich Fragen wie z.B. ob das Wiedergegebene den Tatsachen entspricht; wie man weiß, dass es Vergangenes ist; und ob Erinnerung etwas anderes als das in Worten Wiedergegebene sein kann.

Erinnerung – „Bloße Worte“?

Im Spätwerk Wittgensteins findet man die Auseinandersetzung mit diesen Gedanken, wobei die Grundfrage ihn umtreibt, ob ein Mensch ein inneres Bild besitzt und ob dies die Erinnerung vorgibt. Wäre dem so, könnte man den Erinnerungsinhalt anhand des inneren Bildes ablesen. Den Erinnerungsvorgang, von dem wir glauben, dass eine Erfahrung mit ihm einhergehe, verorten wir im Innern, obwohl dies eine unbegründete Vermutung ist. Wittgenstein hinterfragt dieses Gefühl: „Ist die Erinnerung eine Erfahrung? Was erfahre ich?“ (BPP I 119) und sieht eine Antwort darin, sich selbst entgegenzuhalten, „[i]ch habe das und das vor mir gesehen, mir vorgestellt.“ (BPP I 119) Gerade dies ist aber – wie er einräumt – keine Erfahrung, sondern eine Vorstellung, die für den Vorstellungsbesitzer immer mehr bedeutet als „bloße Worte“, da sie eine Ansicht evoziert. Dennoch lässt sich daraus nicht ableiten, dass man etwas Spezielles erfährt:

So *sag* ich es also nur – daß das Wort dies für mich bedeutet hat – und es ist *nichts* geschehen? Es waren bloße Worte? – Bloße Worte nicht; und man kann auch sagen, daß etwas geschehen ist, was ihnen entsprach – aber man kann, daß es nicht bloße Worte waren, nicht damit *erklären*, daß etwas vor sich ging, was ihnen entsprach. Denn die beiden Ausdrücke bedeuten einfach dasselbe. (BPP I 119)

Wittgenstein sieht das Kriterium für die verbale Anerkennung einer Empfindungswiedergabe immer bereits im Sprachgebrauch und dem dazugehörigen Weltbild angelegt: „Von der Erinnerung zu sagen, sie sei ein inneres Erlebnis, beschreibt einen Teil der Grammatik dieses Wortes.“ (MS 120) Eine Prüfung des Vorgangs selbst findet in der sprachlichen Artikulation nicht statt, „[d]enn welches Kriterium haben wir dafür, daß er das Wort ‚erinnern‘ (oder ‚rot‘ oder ‚Vorstellung‘, etc.) richtig anwendet?“ (MS 120). Die epistemische Verlässlichkeit einer solchen Aussage kann nie garantiert werden. Der sich Erinnernde gibt sich zwar „eine hinweisende Definition; wir nehmen an, er erinnere sich dann an sie – aber das soll nicht heißen, er erinnere sich ‚richtig‘, sondern er habe ein Erinnerungserlebnis.“ (MS 120)

Dennoch ist die Akzeptanz einer Empfindungsaussage Teil unserer Lebensform und unseres Sprachspiels, denn wir akzeptieren die Aussagen unserer Mitmenschen mit ihren Geltungsansprüchen nicht notgedrungen, sondern vielmehr mit einer zugebilligten Autorität, die sich aus der ihnen zugeschriebenen Verlässlichkeit ableiten. Auf welchen tönernen Füßen dieses Festhalten am Erinnerungserlebnis trotz mangelnder Evidenzen steht, verdeutlicht ein Stelle bei Wittgenstein, in der er sowohl das Kriterium der Richtigkeit des Erinnerungserlebnisses als auch des zeitlichen Bezugs infrage stellt, um dennoch letztlich zu konzedieren, dass auch dies nichts am Sachverhalt der Gewissheit eines Erinnerungserlebnisses ändert, da dieser über jeden Zweifel erhaben ist:

„Bist Du in Deinem Zimmer gewesen?“ – „Ja.“ – „Bist Du sicher?“ – „Ich wüßte doch wenn ich gestern nicht hier gewesen wäre!“ Dabei brauche ich mich keinen Augenblick in der Erinnerung in meinem Zimmer sehen. Aber nehmen wir an ich sähe mich während ich so spräche in meinem Zimmer am Fenster stehen; wie zeigt mir das Bild daß es gestern war? Freilich, das Bild könnte das auch zeigen, wenn ich in ihm etwa einen Wandkalender mit dem gestrigen Datum sähe. Wenn

das aber nicht der Fall war, wie las ich dann aus dem Erinnerungsbild oder der Erinnerung ab daß ich *gestern* so am Fenster stand, wie übersetzte ich das Erlebnis der Erinnerung in Worte? – Aber übersetzte ich denn ein Erlebnis in Worte? Sprach ich nicht einfach die Worte aus; und zwar in bestimmten Tonfall und dergleichen Erlebnissen der Sicherheit? War das nicht aber das Erlebnis der Erinnerung? (Das Erlebnis der Überzeugung ist von der Art des Erlebnisses des Tonfalls.) Aber was machte Dich so sicher als Du diese Worte sprachst? Nichts; ich *war* sicher. (MS 115)

Insoweit das Erinnerungssprachspiel Bestandteil unserer Lebensform ist, ist es als Sprachspiel lernbar – unabhängig seiner Richtigkeit. Es ist ganz selbstverständlich, dass wir selbst einerseits erlernen, was „sich an etwas erinnern“ heißt, andererseits anderen die Bedeutung beibringen, indem wir den Gebrauch der Worte erläutern (vgl. BPP I 112). Zweifelhaft ist jedoch, ob der Sprachspielernende sinnvoll sagen kann: „Ja, jetzt hab ich's erfahren, wie das ist!“ (BPP I 112). Dies würde die Frage aufwerfen: Was wäre, wenn jemand dies so ausrufen würde? – Nach Wittgenstein müssten „wir uns wundern, und denken ‚was mag er nur erfahren haben?‘ – denn wir erfahren nichts besonderes.“ (BPP I 112; vgl. PU xiii 579) Der Gedanke, eine Art besonderen Zustand des Erinnerns erfahren zu können, amüsiert Wittgenstein, denn dann müsste man berechtigt sagen können: „Ich werde diese Erfahrung (nämlich das Erinnern) nie vergessen!“? (BPP I 118)

Die Annahme, der Ausdruck „Vergangenheit“ verbinde sich mit dem Vorgang des Erinnerns, erklärt nicht das Erlernen dessen, was wir „erinnern“ oder „Erinnerung“ nennen. Wittgenstein fragt daher „Wie lernen wir den Ausdruck der Erinnerung?“, um festzustellen: „Wir haben vor allem die sprachliche Reproduktion der Vergangenheit und an die knüpfen wir einen Ausdruck wie: ‚ich erinnere mich --‘, also ein rein begrifflicher Vorgang, der nichts über das Erinnerungserlebnis aussagt, was ihn hinzufügen lässt: „Ich erinnere mich ...‘ ist nicht die Beschreibung eines Erlebnisses.“ (MS 121)

Das Erinnerungssprachspiel erlernen wir folglich durch das Verknüpfen des Ausrufs „ich erinnere mich“ mit der Beschreibung etwas angeblich Vergangenen. Dies tun wir ohne jede Wahrheitsevidenz. Selbstredend kann jede Aussage jederzeit angezweifelt werden, dennoch akzeptieren wir *a priori* deren Geltungsanspruch, selbst dann, wenn wir dies nur tun, um anschließend darüber urteilen zu können. Dies kann man z.B. in Gerichtssälen erleben, wenn die Zeugenaussage erst aufgenommen wird, um dann bezweifelt werden zu können. Nichtsdestoweniger ermöglicht die Praxis des Glaubens an die Verlässlichkeit der Aussage eines Anderen den Vorgang des Urteilens, der immer bereits an die Akzeptanz eines Sprachspiels rückgekoppelt ist und mit lebensweltlich akzeptierten Handlungsweisen einhergeht – in diesem Fall mit der Erinnerungsartikulation sowie dem Glauben an die Autorität der Aussage.

Demnach ist ein Erinnerungsbild eine Art Hilfsmittel, durch das wir uns gewisse Vorgänge merken oder nachträglich zu rekonstruieren trachten. Eine Erklärung liefert es nicht. Diese Einsicht zur Aussagefähigkeit eines Erinnerungsbildes ergibt sich, da der Vergleich immer „eine bestimmte Vergleichsmethode voraussetzt“ (BT 38). Beim Erinnern aber wird keine Vergleichsmethode angewandt, sondern nur „psychologische Begriffe“ verglichen, deren epistemischen Aussagewerte äußerst bescheiden sind, wie Wittgenstein festhält: „Die *Idee* von einem Inhalt des Erinnerns erhalte ich nur durch ein Vergleichen der psychologischen Begriffe. Es ist ähnlich dem Vergleichen

zweier *Spiele*. (Fußball hat *Tore*, Völkerball nicht.)“ (PU xiii 579) Der Vergleich mit dem Spielbegriff ist nahe liegend, denn wir besitzen ebenso keinen Fixpunkt, der einen Vergleich der Erinnerung mit einem festen Datum erlauben würde, woraus folgt: „Der Vorgang des Vergleiches eines Bildes mit der Wirklichkeit ist also der Erinnerung nicht wesentlich.“ (BT 130)

Erinnerung als Absichtserklärung

Diffizil wird es, wenn die Erinnerung eine vergangene Absicht ausdrückt. Bereits in der Eigenperspektive ergibt sich die Fragestellung: „Ich erinnere mich, ich wollte ihn damals beruhigen ...“ Was zeigt mir meine Erinnerung?“ (TBN 180) Wittgensteins rhetorische Frage ist problematisch, da es sich nicht um das Hilfskonstrukt eines Erinnerungsbildes handelt, das sich auf einer Art Mesoebene befindet. Eine Absicht kann nicht nachträglich Vorgänge rekonstruieren helfen, sondern ist sogar prekär, da nicht einmal klar ist, was „eine Absicht zu haben“ heißen, geschweige denn, wie diese sich darstellen soll:

Du erinnerst Dich, daß Du die Absicht hattest – wie war es also, als Du sie hattest? Wenn du nachdenkst, was fällt Dir da ein? Verschiedenes fällt mir ein; aber nichts davon ist die Absicht. Und doch scheint das, woran ich mich erinnere relevant für die Absicht.

Wenn Du nun später sagst „Ich meinte ...“, *beurteilst* Du da die ganze Situation? (TBN 180)

Der Absichtserinnernde kann nie auf eine Beurteilung der einstigen Gesamtsituation rekurrieren. „Eine Absicht haben“ ist nur ein „psychologischer Begriff“, der eine gewisse Intention zu artikulieren helfen soll. Deshalb sind Sätze wie „Ich entsinne mich nicht mehr meiner Worte, aber ich erinnere mich genau an meine Absicht: ich wollte ihn damals beruhigen ...“ (MS 129) möglich, obwohl sie nichts Vergangenes aussagen. Die Worte verweisen nicht auf Tatsachen, sondern sind nur Worte im Sprachgebrauch, die wir ohne Evidenz als Erinnerungsabsicht anerkennen. Wittgenstein schreibt:

Was *zeigt* mir meine Erinnerung, was führt sie mir vor die Seele? Nun, wenn sie nichts täte, als mir diese Worte einzugeben! (...) Glaub nicht immer, daß Du Deine Worte von Tatsachen abliest; (MS 129)

Genau deshalb kann es zu paradoxen Feststellungen kommen: Der Absichtsartikulierende meint sich zwar an seine Absicht erinnern zu können, nicht aber an seine damaligen Worte. Dies wirft die Frage auf, wie er sich der Absicht ohne Worte erinnern will, obwohl er sich seiner damaligen Absicht nicht einmal sicher sein kann, weil er sprachlich überhaupt nicht in der Lage ist, das Konzept der Absicht zu erfassen. Dies macht das Problem unlösbar, denn die Erinnerung an eine Absicht bleibt ebenso wenig greifbar wie die Erinnerung an die Worte selbst: „Ich erinnere mich nicht mehr an meine Worte, aber ich erinnere mich genau an meine Absicht.“ Das scheint ja ein schwerer Fall zu sein. Die Erinnerung an eine Absicht – beide nicht zu greifen.“ (TBN 180)

Man kann nun sowohl fragen „Wozu sage ich jemandem, ich hätte früher den und den Wunsch gehabt?“ (PU 656) als auch „Wie ist der Mensch je dahin gekommen, eine sprachliche Äußerung zu machen, die wir ‚Berichten eines vergangenen Wunsches‘, oder einer vergangenen Absicht, nennen?“ (PU 656) Anders ausgedrückt: Welchen Sinn hat es überhaupt vergangene Wünsche und Absichten zu äußern? – Wenn wir uns die Äußerung „Ich wäre gerne noch länger dort geblieben.“ eines Urlaubsheimkehrers vorstel-

len, dann wird der Zweck vielleicht einsichtiger. Eventuell drückt dieser sich wie von Wittgenstein angeführt aus: „Ich erinnere mich, ich wäre damals gerne noch länger geblieben.“ (MS 116) Ersteres tut eine Äußerung kund, die seine gegenwärtigen Empfindungen ausdrücken soll. Zweiteres suggeriert ein Gefühl bzw. eine Absicht der Vergangenheit, die beide nicht darauf abstellen, als epistemisch zugänglich beurteilt zu werden. Mit dieser Äußerung teilt man vielmehr dem Gesprächspartner etwas mit, was einen Hinweis auf die Gefühlslage gibt: „Der Zweck einer solchen Mitteilung könnte sein, den Anderen meine Reaktionen kennen zu lehren.“ (PU 657) Wittgenstein schreibt:

Warum will ich ihm außer dem, was ich tat, auch noch eine Intention mitteilen? – Nicht, weil die Intention auch noch etwas war, was damals vor sich ging. Sondern, weil ich ihm etwas über *mich* mitteilen will, was über das hinausgeht, was damals geschah.

Ich erschließe ihm mein Inneres, wenn ich sage, was ich tun wollte. – Nicht aber auf Grund einer Selbstbeobachtung, sondern durch eine Reaktion (man könnte es auch eine Intuition nennen.) (PU 659)

Fazit – Vergangene Absicht als Mitteilung eines Gefühlsbildes der Gegenwart

Eine Absichtserklärung kommt ohne Evidenz aus, denn sie ist nicht auf Verifizierbarkeit ausgerichtet. Insofern stellt sich die Evidenzfrage grundsätzlich nicht – weder für den Adressat noch für den Artikulierer einer Absichtserklärung. Es wäre „hier ein tiefer Irrtum, wenn ich sage, die Evidenz sei ungenügend. Denn ich könnte nicht sagen wofür sie nicht genügt.“ (MS 116). Das ist der besondere Aspekt der Absicht, die dem Anderen ein Gefühlsbild als Reaktion vermitteln kann. Der Absichtserklärer muss sich nur insoweit einschränken, dass er „den Satz ‚Ich wollte sagen: ...‘ nicht „aus den Vorgängen ... ableiten kann“ (MS 116), an die er sich zu erinnern meint. Intuitiv empfinden wir dies als widersinnig, denn „[e]rinnere ich mich daran, daß ich das und das für einen Augenblick habe sagen wollen, so erinnere ich mich oft auch an gewisse ‚Einzelheiten‘. Diese Einzelheiten sind nicht irrelevant in dem Sinne in welchem andere Umstände an die ich mich auch erinnern kann es sind.“ (MS 116) Was aber sagen diese Einzelheiten mir? – Sie suggerieren, dass mein Erinnern durch Evidenzen oder durch eine gewisse Plausibilität gesichert wäre, ob-

wohl dies täuscht, denn ein solcher Satz kann nichts verbürgen, ähnlich dem von Wittgenstein geschilderten Fall:

„Anstalten zur Abreise treffen“ – welches darin bestehen kann daß man Koffer packt, von Leuten Abschied nimmt, etc. etc. – aber auch darin, daß man den Hut aufsetzt und zum Bahnhof geht.

Wenn ich ihn zur Bahn gehen sehe, – weiß ich daß er abreisen will? Ja ich weiß es auch dann nicht, wenn ich ihn eine Fahrkarte lösen sehe. Und doch wird man das Anstalten zur Abreise nennen: Unter gewissen Umständen nämlich. (MS 116)

Gewissermaßen verstärkt Wittgenstein die Idee einer denkbaren Evidenz mittels der Überlegung, Notizen hätten als unbestreitbare Belege dienen können: „Wenn ich damals das und das sagen wollte, so konnte es sein, daß ich dies damals aufschrieb. Schrieb ich es auf, so ist mir das später ein Zeugnis daß ich dies wollte. Wenn ich es nicht aufschrieb, so mußte die Sachlage doch dem der ersten ähnlich sein.“ (MS 116) Auch dieser letzte Versuch eine Evidenz zu imaginieren, die als unstrittig qualifizieren könnte, scheitert, denn es gibt keinen Ausweg vor der Erkenntnis, dass man nicht über die simple Absichtserklärung hinauskommt. Was sollte es denn auch sagen, sich zu erinnern, „alle Anstalten für meine Abreise getroffen zu haben“ (MS 129)? – Auch hier gilt: „Was ich in der Erinnerung vor mir reihe, läßt keinen Schluß auf meine Gefühle zu.“ (MS 116) Wittgenstein erkennt die gedankliche Sackgasse und endet daher abrupt, dass „ehe ich mich an irgendeine von ihnen [Anstalten zur Abreise] erinnere, ja es muß zu diesem letztern überhaupt nicht kommen.“ (MS 129), denn letztendlich bleibt es so oder so immer nur bei der Erkenntnis: „Ich hatte die Absicht ...“ (MS 129)

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A Machine as Symbolizing its Action

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Abstract

In the following essay I will attempt at an analysis of the dictum, "A machine as symbolizing its action" (PI, §193). I will first argue that this idea is introduced, with an important qualification, in the course of a discussion about certain meta-philosophical difficulties: the postulation of certain explicative expressions for which no use model can be presented (§191). The qualification introduced should make clear the difference between the deliberate postulation of expressions as placeholders for an argument and the construction of an argument that does not in fact explain the actual phenomena, but proceeds, via insufficient attempts, at the elaboration of an abstraction (§192). Finally, I shall argue that these remarks constitute an argument in the philosophy of mind that intends to expose the notion of a process as insufficient for explaining how the grasp of a rule is effectively to constitute a practice.

1. Suggestion under philosophical pressure and mismatch of explanations

The dictum "A machine as symbolizing its action" (PI, §193) is liable to numerous applications.¹ It is the beginning of an argument with a meta-philosophical character, and it is an argument that culminates with the typical wittgensteinian advertence about the dangers of doing philosophy.

But the discussion has a more methodological aspect. It introduces a preliminary point in the philosophy of mind by way of considerations regarding the possibility of working out a contrast between the distinct conceptions of the machine: the real machine and the machine-as-symbol.

As the discussion develops, we see how the more determinate conception of the machine-as-symbol, its special status, consists in a systematic retraction from the faults that we do not forget when talking about the real machine. This point may be simplified considering the critique of *superlative* ways of talking preceding the argument. But we have here a different idea that can be isolated: the possibility of abstraction.

It is, as Wittgenstein himself puts it, common to talk in these ways in certain situations. That is, in *these* situations it is common to use the machine-as-symbol, but not because one feels the need for a *super-expression*, but merely because of the explaining one wants or needs to do – the machine-as-symbol in an explanation of the action of the machine does not function as a *super-expression*, but merely as a sort of explanation.

If we liberate these contexts, where such a need is felt from their conflation with the construction of *super-expressions* in philosophy, the meta-philosophical point emerges in a new light. The problem is not simply that philosophical pressure demands *super-expressions*, but rather that in certain contexts the explanation given might leave the philosophical problem untouched. This might be the case where a leap is made, from one sort of explaining, the machine-as-symbol, to the explaining of what the machine actually does. This case is different from a case where a super-expression is introduced to render something explained (in §191 the super-expression is intro-

duced quite deliberately in the course of the discussion [it suggests itself]).

So the machine-as-symbol is not the "it is as if...in a flash".² There is no model for the application of the first one, it just suggests itself under philosophical pressure, but there is a model for the application of the second. In the second case, Wittgenstein's advertence goes in a different direction: the particular passage from the situation where the model for the application of the machine-as-symbol does its job (an explanation in a mechanics manual) to one where it does not. So the diagnostic splits up in the course of the argument spanning from §191 to §194. The first threat is the immediate suggestion of a formulation that releases us from the construction of an explanation; the second is the application of a model to the wrong sort of case or the danger of doing so.

2. The demand for an ordering

This danger is equivalent to the before mentioned possibility of abstraction. Before we arrive at the actual discussion of the abstraction, we go through a series of impasses where the differentiated perspectives somehow demand to be ordered. The use we can make of the machine-as-symbol excludes the possibility of a prediction of the actual movement of the machine. But we can give a prediction of this movement and we can also predict what may impede it. In these last predictions we do not predict the circumstances that may befall it, but we predict the actual behavior of the machine *if* these befall it; this seems to represent a kind of definite knowledge of the movement of the machine, or at least to be dependent upon it.

For instance, the manual of the machine may contain warnings like: (a) If M is in circumstances C it will malfunction, (b) If M in the course of m-ing is in circumstance C it may malfunction. These warnings are not predictions about the obtaining of the circumstances; they manifest the knowledge of the action of the machine before any such circumstances. But in these cases, as Wittgenstein says, we do not forget about the possibility of a distortion. That is, in the actual prediction of the behavior of the machine, we do not forget these possibilities. In the case of a prediction, we derive these possibilities from the action of the machine in what seems to be a much more definite

¹ Hacker and Baker comment the general tendency this course of argument assumes in Wittgenstein's philosophy, reading it as an instance of a form of critique – where the idea that possibilities foreshadow actualities – with various manifestations, see Wittgenstein: Rules, Grammar and Necessity, Volume 2, p. 124.

² David Pears suggests as suitable paraphrase of the "it is as if...in a flash" the idea of an "instant mental talisman" in The False Prison. This paraphrase is suggestive of a more general tendency in the course of the argument of the Investigations, and as Pears suggests various candidates are tested for this position (p. 469).

sense. There seems to be an ordering of the prediction involving the actual behavior of the machine to the much more definite sense of the action of the machine contained in the machine-as-symbol. This is the derivative order mentioned by Wittgenstein: we learn how to derive a series of pictures from the more definite one.

This derivation does not constitute the abstraction. The derivation is imposed, since the actual behavior of the machine, and what ever may befall it, needs an unimpeded counterpart as differentia – as the first picture of the series. But the abstraction may be introduced, and with it the mismatch of explanations, as soon as this first picture is transferred.

3. The possibility of abstraction

The possibility of abstraction of the action of the machine starts to be introduced by a non-reductive argument. At the beginning of §194, Wittgenstein introduces one difference to our previous way of talking. It is not any more the question of a symbolic representation, the machine-as-symbol, and its inertness; we have now passed to a way of talking that makes a point of accommodating actual descriptions of the movement of the machine, of such-and-such movements. The symbolic representation, if used deliberately as such, does not pose the problem about the possibilities of the movement: for instance the drawing of an invented mechanism with arrows indicating the direction of the movement in a computer game.

But at this stage the description of the actual movements, that are said to be contained in the machine, do raise the question about the possibility condition of the movement. The first answer that suggests itself is the reduction to the mere physical conditions. These, Wittgenstein tells us, could be otherwise. However, we can extend the non-reductive argument by noticing that ignorance about the physical conditions of the machine does not imply that the machine cannot function as a symbol of its actions: the drawing of a toaster in an advertisement functions in this way without us having any knowledge of its workings.

The abstraction cannot be reductive, given its special status as a sort of perfect unimpeded working of the machine. An explanation by reduction to the physical conditions of the machine blurs our picture of the action itself; it transforms the action itself into something else. It transforms the advantage of the abstraction, the perfect picture of the action, into a different image: the image of the possibility behind the movement that involves different items from the action itself.

But in this last thought there is something that still resists the attempt to really capture the idea of the action already contained in the machine: the notion of a picture. At this stage a different notion is introduced as a contrast, the notion of a shadow.

The contrast is, once more, based on keeping the purity of the abstraction. The procedure is to mark the contrast between these notions – picture, shadow – by noticing the failure of the picture to capture the uniqueness of the abstracted movement; we never in fact discuss if this is the possibility of this or that movement. The discussion does not arise, and the item under discussion, the shadow, does not really allow for a positioning in a frame of disjunctive alternatives with a common heading, given its uniqueness.

Finally, the idea of a shadow manages to keep out the possibility of doubt that does attach to the notion of a pic-

ture. The picture may be doubted to be a picture of what it is, if it really is an accurate representation of what it announces. And the picture, of course, presupposes the object it pictures. That is, there is a space opened by the application of the notion of picture to introduce criteria for the evaluation of the picturing relation, and this is equivalent to say that enough space has been provided for the application of the notion of a justification: Wittgenstein does introduce the form of prediction “Experience will tell if...”.

So, there is no real discussion about the notion of the shadow. This notion's applicability seems to rely on it being isolated from all of these questions. The shadow, nonetheless, represents a clear advantage to the previously discussed symbolic representation. It offers a non-inert version of the symbolic representation that could, in principle, accommodate, at least in our imagination, the demands of the concept of action or movement. But, of course, the question that immediately threatens is: is the accommodating of the shadow not going to bring with it at least some of the troubles it has kept away?

That is, if the shadow in its imaginative movement is capable of proceeding, capable of offering to our imagination one instance of the action, will it not involve the difficulties of, for instance, the empirical possibilities of the movement, of what exactly will it be shadow?

4. The mismatch of explanations

This is the tension generated by Wittgenstein, and we may remember that right after the idea of a shadow is introduced we are left with an open question: “But do you know of such a shadow?”. This question is an echo from the previous demand for a model for the use of this expression (in §191). It is important, as said, to notice the connection without conflation. At this stage of the argument, when this expression is introduced, some substantial work has already been done. We have seen via a negative argument, that is, through the shortcomings of other notions, such as the contrast with the notion of a picture, that the notion of a shadow is best suited to do the explaining. This was the difference, the expression “it is as if...in a flash” suggested itself as a placeholder for the lack of an explanation, the shadow is the outcome of an attempt at an explanation.

This argument is sketched so as to grant to this notion of a shadow a certain independence. And this independence is then threatened when we realize that the notion of a shadow is not answerable to any questions we might have about the action of the machine.

Nevertheless, some substantiality is accorded to the argument about the shadow, and resisting the intuition from which we started – that we know the meaning of an expression or how to continue the segment of a series but not being able to provide an explanation of this fact – immediately the targeted notion appears: the notion of a process. The latter notion seems to do all the explaining. It is contentful insofar as it has been differentiated from any explanation that relies on empirical conditions of the movement or predictions about it in certain circumstances. But as we have seen, the shadow still needs to accommodate everything that is action-like, and we might not possess any intelligible notion of something action-like that is independent of the discussed problems (apart from the exercise of conceptual differentiation just attempted).

But to say that it does all the explaining, the notion of process is only intelligible if we notice another element in the explanation. The determination of how the meaning is grasped is not related to the future in a causal way. And

with this proviso, we dispel a certain air of automatism in the notion of a process. The proviso is introduced so as to be set aside; it is never asserted. The point is that the presence of the meaning seems to involve, in future instantiations, the work of the subject. The interlocutor sets the intuition about causal determination aside, right away, because this would obscure the intuition about the presence of the meaning.

The causal image represents a different sort of independence: it would have the power to determine independent of its being grasped; we can imagine it as being already at work before being grasped, and this seems to be quite different from the sort of grasping at issue. The grasping in question demands a robust notion of its application and it demands an explanation of what was grasped – it is not the fact of grasping, but *that* it is grasped and *that* it is instantiated in the future in *this* manner.

5. Conclusion

This problem already contains an important bit of the previous discussion at §185.³ The independence of the meaning expressed in the idea of an instant grasp came under proper scrutiny there: in the discussion between student and teacher about what is the understanding of the act just done and its accord with the act expected. So far, it is important to reconstruct exactly how we would arrive at an argument that would postulate a process, since this argument would bypass some of the real difficulty, as we find in the discussion between the teacher and the student. The idea of an instant grasp is, at that stage of the argument, dissolved into the difficulties felt in the instantiation and in the transmission of the practice: there are difficulties in explaining and difficulties in following the rules. This discussion depends on keeping the argument on the side of the actual felt difficulties, and this can only be done if we have not traded this course of argument for the construction of a supposition that would solve the problem.⁴

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³ I should point out that §§191-194 are all to be found also in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Part I, which begins by taking up §189 of the Investigations. The material actually comes from Part II of the prewar Investigations.

⁴ This paper was written within the frame of the research project "Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: Re-Evaluating a Project" of the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology. I especially thank Nuno Venturinha for the helpful commentaries on the present text, as well as for the discussions and work in the project.

“Self-Movers”.

Intentionality and the Nature of Living Beings

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Abstract

Drawing on Anscombe's rehabilitation of an Aristotelian philosophy of action, I shall revisit the notion of intentionality. From the Cartesian perspective in action theory the problem of intentionality is that of understanding how the immaterial mind interacts with the material body and produces voluntary action. On the contrary, from an Aristotelian perspective the movements of living bodies, though somehow dependent on their “mechanical” structure, cannot be explained in the same manner as those of inanimate matter. No activities of the soul could only be contingently related to activities of the body. Here the results of 20th century philosophy of language and the Aristotelian view strikingly converge: intentionality isn't an intimate and privately accessible state of the mind, but rather an essential feature of the activity of any living creature. This raises an interesting question: if intentionality doesn't discriminate human action from other living creature's action, what does?

A traditional issue in the philosophy of action consists in understanding how there can be what Aristotle calls “self-movers”, that can pass by themselves from a state of rest to a state of movement without being moved by anything external to them. The property of being a self-mover is at least shared by humans and some animals.

I want to show how his understanding of self-motion can be revived into a theory of the intentionality of action that avoids the traditional dead-ends of contemporary philosophy of action. What I coin ‘contemporary philosophy of action’ comprises the post-cartesian tradition in analytic philosophy of mind, whose main challenge is to undermine cartesian dualism or render it acceptable from the point of view of the materialistic sciences¹. Within this cartesian paradigm, the main issue of action theory is to understand agency: how can an ‘immaterial mind’ interact with a ‘material body’ and produce *voluntary* action? Cartesian dualism left us with the so-called mind-body problem. At its core lies the issue of the ontological nature of the mind. Many contemporary philosophers are now convinced that the solution to this mind-body problem lies in the naturalisation of the mind. Broadly speaking: to understand how the mind interacts with the body, we must provide a naturalistic account of the mind that explains its power in terms of the laws of nature. Searle's solution is to equate the mind with the brain and to suppose every property of the mind (including consciousness and intentionality) is produced by the brain. Other philosophers, like Churchland, deny the existence the mind and take on a reductionist-materialistic position; others, like Dennett, use the models of artificial intelligence to explain how intentionality could emerge from matter.

These views have in common the idea that to understand intentional action is to provide an account of the mind-body interactions. They believe the solution lies in an ontology of the mind and its properties that accommodates with contemporary naturalistic explanations of movement, life, etc. They share the idea that the mind and its properties could only be the product of the material/biological world. I shall not discuss the details of these post-cartesian debates (see Aucouturier, 2012).

However, drawing on the Wittgensteinian tradition, I want to show that not only the solutions to the cartesian mind-body problem might be misled, but perhaps there is no

mind-body problem in the sense the cartesian paradigm understands it. Then, I will show we may think the intentionality of action outside the cartesian paradigm, within an Aristotelian paradigm.

1. Intentionality

The intentionality of action can be characterised as the capacity of an agent to guide her action towards specific goals. It characterises the specific *teleological* structure of action. One way of identifying this structure is to note that amongst the various descriptions applied to an agent's performance, only some present her action as intentional. This point was notably made by Anscombe in *Intention*:

[An agent] may know that he is sawing a plank, but not that he is sawing an oak plank or Smith's plank ; but sawing an oak plank or Smith's plank is not something else that he is doing besides just sawing the plank that he is sawing. (1957: 12)

According to Anscombe the action of sawing a plank can be intentional under the description ‘he is sawing a plank’ and *not* under the description ‘he is sawing Smith's plank’ (assuming the agent doesn't know the plank belongs to Smith). On that account, the intentionality of an action is characterised by a *description under which* the agent conceives of her action.

Now, within the cartesian paradigm, intentionality is considered a property realised by *minds* or brains. To borrow Searle's definition, it is ‘that property of many mental states and events by which they are directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world’ (1983: 1). This conception forces us into the issue of understanding *how* exactly the mind *produces* intentionality. Intentionality appears to be something that can only be directly grasped from a first personal point of view: only *I* can really know what I intend to do and tell whether my action under description *D* is intentional. Which leaves us with the problem of other minds: how do I know other beings have intentionality? I can only assume or infer they do. Here the cartesian paradigm seems stuck into an alternative based on the mind-body and inner-outer dualisms: either the mind is grasped by a purely internal experience only accessible to *me*, or there really is no such thing as a mind but there are only behavioural and functional processes.

By contrast, Anscombe notices we can legitimately and straightforwardly attribute intentionality e.g. to animal ac-

¹ See e.g. the attempts of Searle, Dennett, Churchland, Fodor, Block, who take explicitly part in the program of naturalising the mind.

tion, without any background knowledge about their physiology or subjective experiences. Which entails one needs not *be* the agent herself to tell under which description(s) her action is intentional. Neither need this be the result of some inference. E.g. the intentional character of action descriptions is ordinarily applied to animal actions, though animals are unable to provide any *descriptions* of what they intend to be doing:

[L]et's suppose that a bird is landing on a twig so as to peck at bird-seed, but also that the twig is smeared with bird-lime. The bird wanted to land on the twig all right, but it did not want to land on a twig smeared with bird-lime. (...) This way of talking does not presuppose that the bird has any thoughts about descriptions. (...) [S]omeone who says the bird's action was intentional (or voluntary) under one description, not under the other, need not enter into that dispute at all. (Anscombe 1979: 209-10)

The key point is that the intentionality of action lies in the fact that the agent's goal isn't something *whatever* its description, but has to be considered *under certain descriptions*. Therefore we cannot neglect the agent's *point of view* when describing intentional actions, but that doesn't mean we need to sound out their mind. The teleological structure of action also applies to animal movements.

2. The Aristotelian Paradigm

Now, in the Aristotelian paradigm, intentionality isn't a property of the *mind*, but of *action*. Aristotle studies the movement of animals to make a distinction between the movements of inanimate natural beings that can only undergo changes (i.e. celestial movements and the movements of plants) and animate natural being, like animals, that can *produce* movement. This is the *spontaneous* character of these self-movers' movements (that can move without being moved) and their *teleological* (i.e. goal-directed) structure that interests him. Indeed, the mere physiological constitution of an animal (its 'mechanical structure') can only account for the *potentiality* of movement but not for its *actualisation*. The movements of *living* bodies (DMA, 7, 701a), though dependent on their 'mechanical' structure, aren't fully explained in terms of those of inanimate matter. Since activities of the soul are not *contingently* related to activities of the body, to determine how the soul moves the body won't consist in looking into the soul only for the principles of bodily movement. It will consist in observing the self-mover's interactions with its environment.

In the *De Motu Animalium*, Aristotle explains how a desired object can be the cause of self-motion. What is key to our interest here is that it can only be the cause of movement as an object of desire and thought. Thought plays the role of *representing* the object 'in the sphere of what can be done' (DMA, 6, 700b). Although Aristotle doesn't himself use the notion of intentionality to characterise the relation of an agent to the desired object of his action, some commentators (Furley 1994: 12) have seen in his explanation of action a theory of intentionality: to grasp the intentionality of an action is to grasp in which respect a goal appears desirable from the *point of view* of the being that aims at it; it applies both to the cat stalking a bird and to the architect building a house. *So intentionality doesn't need to be grasped from the inside, in the first person*. This implies no rupture between the 'mechanical' dimension and the intentional dimension of animal movement. The passive character of the perception of a desired object cannot be separated from the simultaneous release of in-

tentional action. Animal movement is the movement of a natural 'mechanical' and teleological unity, it *isn't a simple mechanical reaction to the environment*.

Thus intentionality cannot be understood as a property of only minds or brains, but only from the point of view of a living being in its environment, be it natural or social. Thus to understand intentionality we must look outside the allegedly private states of the mind into the activities of whole living beings in their environment and not reduce the explanation of these activities to one of their dimension (Nussbaum and Putnam 1992: 28). This raises a last question: if contrary to the cartesian picture, intentionality in action (goal-directedness) doesn't help discriminate human action from other living creature's action, what does?

3. Humans and Animals

Aristotle distinguishes between desiring to act following one's appetite or following one's will. He adds that animals capable of language are also capable of choice and deliberation, that is, e.g., to postpone their action or to choose not to follow their appetite. So although the capacity of reasoning isn't necessarily exclusively human, at some level a difference appears between animal and human action. This difference is most accurately pinpointed by Descombes' idea of degrees of agency (2004: 90-7). Degrees of agency are related to degrees of responsibility (Anscombe 1982a: 261-2). An agent (living or not) can be the mere cause of what happens, like the cracking branch of a tree that breaks a glass. A *rational* agent can be the cause of what happens and we may ask her to account for her action; but she can disclaim responsibility. This case is the domain of what Anscombe calls *actus hominis* (act of a human being). Finally a rational agent can be the cause of what happens and endorse responsibility; this is the domain of *actus humanus* – human action (Anscombe, 1982b: 207-26). These distinctions are key to the understanding of human agency as distinct from animal agency.

In the context of human action, the description under which an action is considered (its intentionality) acquires full relevance. Since what is judged isn't an action whatever its description, but an action under a description: it may be all right to saw a plank but not to saw Smith's plank.

Anscombe remarks that humans exhibit a kind of practical knowledge that animals and young children do not. This knowledge is specifically linguistic. However, conceiving of one's action under a description doesn't entail having that description in mind when acting. Rather, it entails to be able to answer questions like 'What are you doing?', 'Why are you doing A?'.

Like human action, animal behaviour can exhibit the teleological structure of intentional action and be considered under a certain description rather than another. However, verbal *expressions of intention* are liable to a kind of mistake Anscombe calls a 'mistake in performance' (1957: 4-5): what I claim to be doing can be contradicted by what I am actually doing; what I appear to be doing can be contradicted by my account of what I am doing.

My knowledge of what I am doing can be contradicted, not only by the presence of a *fact unknown to me*, that I had not foreseen and that prevents me from succeeding, but also if, by mistake, I *do* something that goes against what I claim/intend to be doing. If e.g. I take some margarine when I intend to take some butter or if I press button B when I intend to be pressing button A (1957: §32). Only

the latter are what Anscombe calls 'mistakes in performance'.

These mistakes are conceptually dependent on the ability to express (verbally) what one is doing, so animals without a language are supposedly unable to commit them. To draw on an earlier example, the bird that, in order to peek at bird-seeds, lands on a twig which (unknown to him) is smeared with bird-lime doesn't make a mistake in performance but a mistake in *judgement*: it lacks the knowledge of some fact, namely that the branch on which it is landing is covered with bird-lime. Now, we may distinguish between a description under which the bird's action is intentional ('landing on a branch to peek bird-seeds') and a description under which *this very same* action isn't ('landing on a branch covered with bird-lime'). But, unlike in the case of pressing button A when one intends to press button B, the bird did not do the wrong *action* to fulfil its purpose, it *misjudged* the facts. The contrast isn't one between an *intended action* and a *performed action* but between two *descriptions* of the performed action.

Mistake in performance doesn't merely consists in thinking one is doing something when in fact one fails to do so: like, e.g. when one is blowing a wheel which happens to be burst. It isn't a failure of action due to factual contingencies; otherwise it would be a mistake non-speaking animals are liable to. Mistake in performance lies in a contradiction between what I think I am doing or want to be doing and what I actually *do*, my *action*. Contrary to the case of a mistake in judgement due to factual contingency, a mistake in performance can only show up where an agent is able to correct or excuse her own action in saying 'Although I did Y, what I intended to do was X not Y'. Such a contrast can only appear in the manifestation of what Anscombe calls 'practical knowledge', which allows an agent to say what he did was not what he intended to do. In this respect the intentionality of action requires a language that can account for that specific sort of discrepancy

between what one *aims* to be doing and what one actually *does*.

The sort of knowledge Anscombe has in mind to point at a difference between human and animal intentionality is a kind of knowledge that requires the ability to provide a certain description of one's action; a description which can be *directly* contradicted (i.e. made false) by one's action. And only creatures mastering certain conventions to *express* their intentions can exhibit such ability. Action-description is a very complex domain of human language in this sense. This is a domain of action which is essentially liable to responsibility judgement.

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On Wittgenstein's Later Criticisms of His Earlier Self

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Abstract

My aim in this paper is to contribute to the ongoing debate about Wittgenstein's later criticisms of his earlier self. I argue for the view that it is possible to explain his later criticisms while simultaneously denying that early Wittgenstein's aim was to establish a theory. I suggest that Wittgenstein is criticizing how he missed to see that his aim to dispense from the problems of philosophy in essence without any metaphysical or theoretical presuppositions had been infected by undetected prejudices embedded in his construal of a single method of analysis. I discuss two examples of his later criticisms that should bring to light that his aim, when he means to confess the "grave mistakes" of his earlier self, is to lay bare how he unwittingly refrained to give up from demanding that things *must* be such-and-such. These demands, Wittgenstein claims, are unfounded, should be systematically revealed, and dissolved thereafter.

1. Two approaches towards Wittgenstein's later criticisms

In the preface to his *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein writes:

Four years ago I had occasion to reread my first book (the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*) and to explain its ideas to someone. It suddenly seemed to me that I should publish those old thoughts and the new ones together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking.

For since beginning to occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen years ago, I have been forced to recognize grave mistakes in what I wrote in that first book. (Wittgenstein 1999: ix)

Wittgenstein has it that his new thoughts "could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of [his] old way of thinking", and furthermore, that what he wrote in his first book contains "grave mistakes". This raises the initial question what his "old thoughts and the new ones" are, and what the "grave mistakes" amount to. It is mandatory for any account of Wittgenstein's writings to give a plausible answer to this question. I want to approximate two possible answers by distinguishing between two approaches towards his writings, with the focus on the difficult relation between his early and later philosophy, and his later criticisms of his earlier self.

A first stance that I want to sketch is adopted by commentators who attempt to integrate Wittgenstein with the more "orthodox" curriculum of contemporary analytic philosophy (cf. Horwich 2013: xiii). These commentators think that the *Investigations* override what Wittgenstein did previously say in the *Tractatus*, and they strive to extract the "arguments" from the text to present them in the most systematic fashion possible. According to them, what Wittgenstein says in the *Investigations* must be directed against the "theory" those commentators find in the *Tractatus* (Horwich 2012: 90-95). Even if one puts the difficult question aside why Wittgenstein would have laboriously polished the material which now makes up the posthumously published *Investigations* if only for the effect to make it a challenge (to say the least) for readers to approach his book in the way just sketched (but with the intention in mind that this actually was the way to read it), it is unclear how this first approach should be integrated with the fact that Wittgenstein says in the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* that he eschews a philosophical theory and that his

early work consists of "elucidations" (Wittgenstein 1981: §§4.112, 6.54; 1999: §109).

The second approach I want to highlight gives a distinct answer to the question what it could mean that Wittgenstein's "new thoughts" should be seen in the light of his "old way of thinking", as it is manifest in the *Tractatus* (cf. Conant 2007). In this approach, it is claimed that his "old thoughts" are best understood, *not* as providing a theory, but as guided by his aim to provide one single method that would enable him to solve all philosophical problems "in essentials" and consequently give up all philosophical thinking (Wittgenstein 1981: preface; cf. §§4.112, 7).

In the preface to his *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein also has it that he does not want to save his readers "the trouble of thinking", but, if possible, to "stimulate someone to thoughts of his [or her] own" (Wittgenstein 1999: ix, insertions in brackets mine). What kind of thoughts does he want to "stimulate"? Consider the following passage from the *Investigations*:

91. But now it may come to look as if there were something like a *final analysis* of our forms of language, and so a *single completely* resolved form of every expression. That is, as if our usual forms of expression were, essentially, unanalysed; as if there were *something hidden* in them that had to be brought to light. When this is done the expression is *completely* clarified and *our task* solved.

It can also be put like this: we eliminate misunderstandings by making our expression *more exact*; but now it may look as if we were moving towards a *particular* state, a state of *complete exactness*; and as if this were *the real goal of our investigation*. (Wittgenstein 1999: §91, translation amended, emphasis added)

It strikes me that Wittgenstein talks a lot about things that may appear to one "as if". In fact, there is much to be said for the view that Wittgenstein is criticizing his earlier self in this passage, how it *seemed* to him "as if" when he was philosophizing in a "dogmatic" way (Wittgenstein 1984: 182-186; 1993: 210-213). What I think this indicates is that his aim is to make perspicuous *how it may seem when philosophizing*—"as if" something *must* be such-and-such—but that it ultimately only seems that way, and that one should recognize and appreciate that fact. My suggestion is that these imaginations in the "as-if-mode" are, of course, not the kind of thoughts Wittgenstein ultimately wants to stimulate; these imaginations are the unwitting

prejudices that Wittgenstein aims to make perspicuous to his readers. If it is necessary for him to self-knowingly evoke such imaginations in his readers, they are only to be found at a *transitional* stage, and later to be recognized as plain nonsense (cf. Wittgenstein 1981: §6.54). This bears on what kind of works most commentators have usually found the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations* to be. My worry is that commentators, who adopt a similar stance to what I have sketched as the first approach above, have tended to treat his works as if these works should be understood as a philosophical theory with substantial doctrines, but this is out of touch with Wittgenstein's aim to make us recognize the moments when we treat something "as if" and imagine how it *must* be, in order to dispel their influence on our thinking.

2. A challenge for the second approach?

There is an argument often made against commentators who favor what I have sketched as a second approach above, who want to take Wittgenstein's advice in the preface seriously, who aim to think it "strictly through" what it could mean for Wittgenstein to say that his new thoughts can be grasped only against the background of his old thoughts. The alleged counterargument has it that commentators who approach the *Investigations* in his way *cannot* integrate the whole of Wittgenstein's writings, because they *cannot* account for Wittgenstein's later criticisms of his earlier self. The argument is run by P.M.S. Hacker, Ian Proops, Roger M. White and others. For instance, White recently wrote in a paper that:

The challenge that Hacker has made [i.e. that the second approach cannot explain Wittgenstein's later criticisms of the *Tractatus*] seems to me simple and decisive, and yet I know of nowhere where the proponents of th[is] reading even attempt to address it. Unless they do so, their interpretation of the *Tractatus* is spinning in the void, out of touch with *the rest* of what Wittgenstein *actually said outside* the *Tractatus*. (White 2011: 47, emphasis and insertion in brackets added)

White thinks that it can only be done, that is, to read Wittgenstein's later writings, if one ascribes to the *Tractatus* a theory—"a vision of the way language relate[s] to reality" (White 2011: 47)—which gets repudiated by the arguments later Wittgenstein presents against his earlier self. Hacker, Proops and White think there is something that commentators which adopt the second approach *cannot* do; and they sometimes write as if it would suffice to simply cite those instances in which Wittgenstein is critical about his earlier self to prove that claim. For example, Proops discusses (parts of) the following passage from the *Philosophical Grammar*:

Formerly, *I myself spoke* of a "complete analysis", and *I used to believe* that philosophy had to give a definitive dissection of propositions so as to set out clearly all their connections and remove all possibilities of misunderstanding. *I spoke as if* there was a calculus in which such a dissection would be possible. *I vaguely had in mind* something like the definition that Russell had given for the definite article, and *I used to think* that in a similar way one would be able to use visual impressions etc. to define the concept say of a sphere, and thus exhibit *once for all* the connections between the concepts and lay bare the source of *all* misunderstandings, etc. *At the root of all this there was a false and idealized picture of the use of language*. Of course, in *particular* cases one *can clarify*

by definitions the connections between the different types of use of expressions. Such a definition *may be useful* in the case of the connection between "visual impression" and "sphere". But *for this purpose* it is not a definition of the concept of a physical sphere that we need; instead we must *describe* a language game related to our own, or rather a whole *series* of related language games, and it will be in these that such definitions may occur. Such a contrast *destroys grammatical prejudices* and makes it possible for us to see the use of a word *as it really is*, instead of inventing the use for the word. (Wittgenstein 1993: 211, emphasis mine; cf. Proops 2001: 383, 388, 395, 402 Fn. 69)

This passage is printed in the *Philosophical Grammar* and the editors estimate that it is "probably written in summer 1936". It should be clear that Wittgenstein is criticizing *something* about what he "used to" say or think in this passage. What is unclear, though, is if this passage can be read only if we presuppose that Wittgenstein is charging his earlier self of putting forward a *theory* of the relation between language and world? Proops thinks that this is one of the passages showing that Wittgenstein's early book contains "various substantive philosophical doctrines" (Proops 2001: 376). But against this, one might say that, as I have suggested in the case of passage §91 from the *Investigations*, this passage too can be given perfect sense if one reads it as expressing Wittgenstein's criticism of his earlier self about some unwitting prejudices that concern his notion of *one single* method of analysis by which he wanted to rid of "*all* misunderstandings" *in essence* "once and for all", whereby he instead succumbed to "grammatical prejudices" and "a false and idealized *picture* of the *use* of language". Thus, there is no need to assume and postulate "philosophical doctrines" in order to make sense of Wittgenstein's later criticisms in this passage.

3. Methods and goals in Wittgenstein's writings

In the preface to the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein expresses that he thinks that "*the problems have in essentials been finally solved*", and he adds that "the value of this work [...] consists in the fact that it shows how little has been done when these problems have been solved" (Wittgenstein 1981: preface, emphasis mine). Why does his book show that? One plausible answer is that Wittgenstein himself fell prey to the illusion of "*finally solving the problems in essentials*" by establishing one single method. Since the worth of such a method hinges on the taken for granted possibility of it's application in every case, providing such a method alone would not be of any help, if it can be shown that this method does not apply to some cases.

Commentators tend to agree that in the passages §§89–133 from the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein discusses his methods; there is a high density of remarks in which Wittgenstein struggles with the "dogmatism" (cf. Kuusela 2008) of his early thoughts, and his aim is to lay bare his "grave mistakes". But there is a difference in the way one takes Wittgenstein to either expound a new method or new methods in the plural in those passages.

If one attempts to derive and reconstruct from the *Investigations* an abstract schema, which presupposes how every philosophical problem arises, I fear that one has not got hold of what the crucial insight of Wittgenstein's new thoughts—or the thoughts that he aims to stipulate in his readers for that matter—consists of, that is, his criticism of his earlier self to have thought that there must be *a single* method which would tell one how every philosophical problem could be solved. Any such method would presuppose how every problem *must* look like and equally that every problem would require the same treatment. Now, in the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein is fully aware that one's aim to dispense from *the* problems of philosophy in such a general fashion with one single method is itself *a further* philosophical perplexity, and he consequently replaces this with his notion of a plurality of methods which can be “stopped” and “broken off” at every point (Wittgenstein 1999: §133; cf. Conant 2011). Therefore, Wittgenstein's later criticisms of his earlier self can be explained while simultaneously denying that his aim, early and late, was to establish a philosophical theory.

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Enactivism in Late Wittgenstein

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Abstract

The knowing-how and knowing-that dichotomy still marks the dividing line separating traditional and enactivist approaches. Both concepts, which appear to exclude one another, determine the respective accounts of how best to understand human cognition. I will pursue two objectives in my paper. First, I will apply the rule-following problem formulated by Wittgenstein in the *Philosophical Investigations* to the aforementioned distinction in order to show that knowing-how can neither be reduced to nor based on knowing-that. Second, and consequently, I want to explain the relationship between these concepts in such a way that avoids simply settling the question as to what is based on what in favor of either one of them. Rather, I will replace the static picture of asymmetrical grounding with a dynamic understanding of interdependence that permits us to see how both domains are interrelated.

1. The Rule-Following Problem

It was Gilbert Ryle who made a compelling case against what he called the *intellectualist legend*. According to this legend, it is possible to reduce *knowing-how* to *knowing-that* by arguing that every performance of a practical activity presupposes, at least tacitly or implicitly, acknowledgement of rules or criteria that must be followed and applied in order for the performance to qualify as successful. Accordingly, the performance of any kind of activity is essentially a one-way street: the starting point of cognitive processing is in any case a certain set of regulations determining the course of action in a definitive manner, i.e. cognitive processing is nothing but the transition from a pre-established rule to its application.

It is argued that although *knowing-that* may not always come first in the *order of explanation*, since the rule-mechanisms operative in actions have to be revealed in most cases by subsequent analysis, it is always prior to *knowing-how* in the *order of execution*. Even in cases in which we cannot explain how we succeeded in performing a certain activity we must possess a prior intuitive grasp of the implicit mechanism. For example, most people who have mastered their mother tongue use correct sentences without being able to cite all the semantico-syntactic rules necessary to form them. Now, Ryle's objection to the *intellectualist legend* is that it implies an infinite regress:

The consideration of propositions is itself an operation the execution of which can be more or less intelligent, less or more stupid. But if, for any operation to be intelligently executed, a prior theoretical operation had first to be performed and performed intelligently, it would be a logical impossibility for anyone ever to break into the circle. (Ryle 2000: 31)

This argument bears a remarkable resemblance to the rule-following problem in the *Philosophical Investigations*. Wittgenstein's attack is directed against an understanding of language based on a computational model, which is also the linchpin of the *intellectualist legend*. That is, to think that "if anyone utters a sentence and *means* or *understands* it he is operating a calculus according to definite rules" (Wittgenstein 1999: §81). In order to counter this simplified understanding of language, Wittgenstein points out that a rule cannot, in principle, *unambiguously* determine the full scope of its application. In other words, a rule always leaves room for applications that have not been implied by the rule. The argument for this sketched below constitutes a dilemma the source of which emerges from the very heart of the computational model.

The essence of a rule is its normativity. A rule distinguishes between correct and incorrect applications, i.e. cases that count and cases that do not count as instances of said rule. Therefore, the basic relation between a rule and its application is subsumption: a rule specifies success-conditions that must be satisfied in order for a given instance to count as an instance of the rule. For example, I apply the concept "table" correctly if this object in front of me satisfies the condition of being composed of a board and legs that are arranged in a certain way. But these conditions do not suffice to select unambiguously every instance of the concept "table" given the potential infinity of cases. For, what should we say when confronted with uncommonly shaped objects that do not satisfy all but, say, some of the conditions required to apply the concept "table" correctly? Is it correct to call a wooden block a "table" if it lacks legs but is shaped such that it can be used as a table?

An obvious objection here would be to say that the application-problem arises only because most everyday concepts are vague and indeterminate; for example, the concept "table" is not specific regarding the number of legs necessary to count as an instance of a table. If there were precise conditions, it is argued, then it would be possible to state definitively which cases are instances of a rule and which are not.

Yet this objection fails because the crucial point is not so much the indeterminacy of rules but, rather, that rules have to be *applied*. Even if the semantic content of a rule is fully determinate, it is by nature an abstraction that cannot cover every particular instance as it would then fail to be an *abstraction*. So the real problem is that the application of a rule is itself a cognitive task that is by definition also rule-bound, and this fact triggers an infinite regress. The reason for this is as follows: although a rule distinguishes between correct and incorrect applications, it does not prescribe *how* to apply it. This has to do with the fact that there is a continual covariance between a rule and its instances, the former being subjected to change when the latter also changes.

That is to say, confronted with a particular case that does not satisfy exhaustively the specified conditions, we need in turn a meta-rule that adjudicates whether the given case counts as an instance. Here, nothing prevents us from interpreting the rule differently or applying it incorrectly. The skeptic, therefore, can always pose the question: How do you know whether your employment of the meta-rules was the correct one? Thus, the problem of alternative rules returns on the meta-level because in order

to decide which rule to use we would need yet another rule. This initiates an infinite regress analogous to Ryle's, preventing us "to ever break into the circle" of speaking.

Wittgenstein's conclusion is that we have to understand the use of language not in terms of "detached rule-following" but rather in terms of "involved and situation-specific way[s] of coping" (Dreyfus 2005: 52). This means that the performance of activities (whether theoretical or practical) is fundamentally rooted in our being embedded in a world. And this relation to the world is not based on propositional attitudes. We must realize "that our relation to the world as such is not one of knowing" (Cavell 1979: 48).

2. The dialectic of *knowing-how* and *knowing-that*

In *On Certainty* Wittgenstein refined his account of the relation between thought and action because he saw that it does not suffice simply to invert the precedence relation of *knowing-that* and *knowing-how*. He also considered it necessary to clarify the interrelation of both concepts. This led him to abandon the notion of linear precedence altogether.

The departure point of his investigations is the so-called *hinge propositions*. Hinge propositions express general facts about the world and ourselves that, under normal circumstances, we do not call into question. For example, propositions like "I have two hands", "Every human being has parents", and "The earth existed for a long time before my birth", i.e. propositions belonging to the "scaffolding of our thoughts" (Wittgenstein 1969: §211). Wittgenstein's basic idea runs as follows.

Hinge Propositions can be understood as constituting the framework in which every cognitive task takes place. They form that part of our engagement with and in the world that we cannot but take for granted if we want to initiate any cognitive task at all. Essentially, *hinge propositions* are presuppositions that determine the *form* of our being embedded in a world and thereby regulate the performance of very different activities such as playing the piano, riding a bike, and speaking a language. For *hinge propositions* to have this regulatory function their being explicit is not necessary; quite the contrary. Not only do many of them remain implicit assumptions on which cognitive operations are based, but the vast majority express facts we have never even thought of. They are at play in every moment of our conscious lives. For example, in reading these lines I'm focused on the words I'm about to articulate, the pace with which I proceed and at some points on the time I have left for my presentation. But there is a large – or, to be precise, indefinite – number of things I take for granted while doing this; for example that, right now, I'm not dreaming or hallucinating, that I'm not a participant in some Truman Show etc.

This does not mean we are never capable of examining the framework conditions guiding our behavior. We can call these presuppositions into question in particular circumstances if necessary. If a sufficient number of people at a philosophy conference started behaving suspiciously and little inquiry raised doubts concerning their being philosophers, then I would be inclined to reassess my judgment that I'm at a philosophy conference. But this investigation would in turn generate new presuppositions like the assumption that I'm in possession of my powers or that I'm not in the Matrix, which would render my whole enterprise pointless. Wittgenstein's crucial point is a very basic fact about the nature of the human mind, namely that every cognitive process relies on presuppositions that cannot be

made accessible without interrupting the very operation being executed. Every attempt to make said presuppositions explicit triggers a new cognitive process also subject to certain conditions.

Now it seems that *hinge propositions* have the same function as the rules in the computational model, that is, implicit rules in the background guiding our actions in the foreground. According to this view, *hinge propositions* are rules stored somewhere in the mind and actualized when required. This is very misleading. *Hinge propositions* are to be understood, rather, as a contextual *a priori* constituting the logic of the language-game. They are *a priori* because they are logically prior to that which they inform; some things must occupy secure coordinates, so to speak, in order that other things can move. They are *contextual* because the status of *hinge propositions* as general facts is in principle open to examination. That the sun revolves round the earth had been a natural presupposition on which many other facts, or more precisely, a whole world-picture turned but it lost this status in the course of scientific discovery.

But this does not imply that we are committed to conceive of *hinge propositions* as being mental entities hard-wired in our brains "operating a calculus according to definite rules". They are nothing but *retroactive descriptions* of action patterns that are in principle propositionally expressible but are nonetheless the non-propositional backdrop of our performances. Wittgenstein provided a very illuminating comparison to describe their ambivalent status:

I do not explicitly learn the propositions that stand fast for me. I can discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates. This axis is not fixed in the sense that anything holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility. (Wittgenstein 1969: §152)

The picture of the axis has two important aspects. First, the propositions so specified are not *external* to that which they regulate. In this respect, the picture of the axis being intrinsically linked to its environment is fundamentally anti-cartesian because it rejects the model of an asymmetrical grounding according to which cognitive processes stand in need of prior foundation in order to be performed properly. Second, and perhaps more important, the axis around which a body rotates is only *virtual*. Yet it determines the whole movement of the rotating body without being a material component of it. By the same token, *hinge propositions* can be understood as the propositional "Doppelgänger" (Moyal-Sharrock 2007: 90) revealing the *form* of our action patterns by putting them into language. However, we should resist the temptation to which many thinkers have succumbed, namely reifying those retrospective descriptions and projecting them into human behavior as a rule-bound, causal mechanism determining our actions. The form of our action patterns is not an additional mental ingredient to them but manifests itself *in* them. In the end, this form is literally nothing, *no thing*, in the same way the difference between two differently shaped tables made of the same material is not an additional material component.

The result of all this is that *knowing-how* and *knowing-that* are not two separate systems of radically different kinds insulated from one another. Rather, the two systems are mutually permeable, thus allowing transformations from *knowing-how* to *knowing-that* and vice versa. We need to account for this interdependency in order not to render *learning* incomprehensible. When I learn how to ride a bike or how to play tennis I follow general rules that

are supposed to guide my behavior in order to perform the task in question properly. Just as *knowing-how* is capable of being expressible in terms of *knowing-that*, so propositionally articulated rules are capable of being transformed in *knowing-how* by internalizing them. Again, "internalizing" here is not tantamount to "storing in the mind"; the process of internalization is not that of conscious rules becoming unconscious but, rather, that of gradually changing one's action patterns. One might even say that in some cases *knowing-how* and *knowing-that* are just different aggregate states of the very same cognitive process.

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“... (The Tractatus too is boring.) It is even mistaken”. The grammatical error of Cora Diamond

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Abstract

In her central contribute to *The New Wittgenstein*, Cora Diamond never quotes the decimal numbers of Wittgenstein's propositions nor seems aware of their use. Of course, without decimals the *Tractatus* “becomes an incomprehensible mess” (Wittgenstein). The *Tractatus* is a hierarchical text and cannot be read as if it were an Indian file of 526 distinct elements. As one can demonstrate looking at Tractatus manuscript, following Wittgenstein a further decimal level is equivalent to a level of *parentheses*. And if you rub out all the parentheses or the punctuation of a text, what remains is only an incomprehensible jumble. Especially, propositions 6.54 and 7 don't belong to the same context: there are two closed parentheses between the former and the latter. They cannot constitute any “frame” at all, because their juxtaposition contradicts the only frame Wittgenstein claims he was care of: “The propositions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 are the cardinal propositions, etc.”

I want now to turn to the end of the book, the other part of the frame. Here we have these sentences:

My propositions serve as elucidations in this way: anyone who understands me finally recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)

He must overcome these propositions; then he sees the world rightly.

About what cannot be spoken of one must be silent.

I want to draw attention to a slight oddness in phrasing...

Cora Diamond

The above quotation represents the turning point of Cora Diamond's chief contribution to the volume *The New Wittgenstein* (Crary & Read 2000, p. 150). Don't be distracted by the “slight oddness” she was looking for: the actual mistake is in front of us, and it will be the issue of the present article. I'll argument that Diamond's “sentences” are *not* a quotation from the *Tractatus*: they represent only a portion of an incomprehensible mess. Namely, that is right what Wittgenstein forecasts in a famous letter to von Ficker: “The decimal numbers of my remarks absolutely must be printed alongside them, because they alone make the book perspicuous and clear: *without the numbering, the book would be an incomprehensible mess*”.¹

Diamond never quotes decimal numbers of Wittgenstein's propositions: she doesn't see them, she doesn't know their use; nevertheless, “*they alone* make the book perspicuous and clear”. Actually, this is the reason why Diamond cannot understand it: “without the numbering, the book *is* an incomprehensible mess”. Which is the difference between a *Tractatus* without numbering and the *Tractatus* with numbering? It's the difference there is between an ordinary, sequential book and a *structured, hierarchical text*.

The *Tractatus* is not a sequential list of 526 propositions, like an Indian file of Sioux warriors marching in the mountains: it is an organised corpus of divisions, brigades, regiments and companies, where each component has a

precise and calculated task (as in Austrian army, so to say). Following Wittgenstein: “The propositions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 are the cardinal propositions, the propositions *n.1*, *n.2*, *n.3*, etc., are comments on proposition N° *n*; the propositions *n.m1*, *n.m2*, etc., are comments on the proposition N° *n.m*; and so on”. The logical pages of the book spring out from its home page – i.e. the page containing the seven cardinal propositions. Then, starting from the remarks belonging to *those* reading units, we find links to more detailed pages of explanation, and so on in cascade. Therefore, we must read the book along the tree of its logical arrangement,² and *not* following simply the store part-list – that is, the alphabetical list of the pieces which should compose the running mechanism of the whole.

As a consequence, New-Wittgensteinians' main strategy fails. They apply a sequential reading from (supposed) initial metaphysical assessments until the intellectual clarification that the reader would reach only at the last sentence of the file. They confuse a *hierarchical ladder* of clarifications with an ascending ladder, an absurd and hazardous 500 feet ladder arching towards the sky (very perilous “to throw away” when we reach the top!)³. Here, I would add a ‘grammatical’ consideration: the sequential strategy implies a true syntactical mistake, which creates great difficulties at every stage of the run.⁴

We'll begin looking at Wittgenstein's insisted use of parentheses. In fact, he has the habit to enclose entire statements (comprised full-stop) between parentheses, in the inner of more general propositions. In their first draft on the *Tractatus* manuscript, these statements – between parentheses now – were autonomous propositions, numbered and classified as detailed ‘comments’. Take for instance the following proposition:

- 4.014. The gramophone record, the musical thought, the score, the waves of sound, all stand to one another in that pictorial internal relation, which holds between language and the world. To all of them the logical structure is common.

2 See Bazzocchi 2010a.

3 See Bazzocchi 2010b.

4 The failure of a pervasive sequential strategy is patent in every attempt to interpret specific sections of the book. Cf. Diamond 2011, about section 5.6 on the self and the limits of language and world, where Diamond concludes her thirty pages of gruelling inquiry in the following way: “There is much in the Tractatus discussion of solipsism and the self that I have not touched on at all. [...] There is also much in the Tractatus use of the notion of a limit or limits that I have not been able to discuss” (p. 273).

1 Letter dated 5.12.1919; Wittgenstein 1969, p. 39.

(Like the two youths, their two horses and their lilies in the story. They are all in a certain sense one.)

In Ms104 manuscript, it was split in this way: "4.01141 The gramophone record, the musical thought etc. [...]. To all of them the logical structure is common. 4.011411 Like the two youths, their two horses and their lilies in the story. They are all in a certain sense one."

To give another example:

- 3.13 To the proposition belongs everything which belongs to the projection; but not what is projected.

Therefore the possibility of what is projected but not this itself.

In the proposition, therefore, its sense is not yet contained, but the possibility of expressing it.

("The content of the proposition" means the content of the significant proposition.)

In the proposition the form of its sense is contained, but not its content.

It has been composed putting together five numbered statements, the fourth of which (without parentheses but with a lower level numbering) was a remark on the third one:

[Ms104 notebook]


- 3.211 To the proposition belongs everything which belongs to the projection; but not what is projected.
- 3.212 Therefore the possibility of what is projected but not this itself.
- 3.213 In the proposition, therefore, its sense is not yet contained, but the possibility of expressing it.
- 3.2131 "The content of the proposition" means the content of the significant proposition.
- 3.214 In the proposition the form of its sense is contained, but not its content.

Similarly, the proposition now numbered 3.143 has the form "a. b. (c.)" and comes from three distinct propositions of the manuscript: 3.161, 3.162 and 3.1621; 4.1272 has the form "a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. (j.)", where the last two paragraphs were numbered 4.1022728 and 4.10227281 respectively; and so on. Brief: following Wittgenstein, a commentary associated with a further decimal level is syntactically equivalent to a parenthesis, i.e. to an incidental reflection that can be omitted without modifying the sense of the upper level remarks. Hence, the hierarchical architecture of the *Tractatus* can be seen as a complex system of nested parentheses.

The semantic and syntactic constraints of a couple of parentheses are very strong. In particular, neither the main proposition can make reference to concepts or expressions that are *contained by* the parentheses, nor the parenthesis can allude to the part of the period that *follows* it. The closing parenthesis is an insurmountable barrier. Suppose I write: "This article is boring. (The *Tractatus* too is boring.) It is even mistaken". Nobody could dig out from this that "the *Tractatus* is mistaken": the parentheses do not consent it. A Pseudo-Stenius who should say: "The

word 'it' refers here *formally* to the *Tractatus*, but in fact the meaning of the statement becomes clearer if we let the word refer to the article",⁵ would make a grammatical error. The 'it' refers formally and semantically to the article, and 'the *Tractatus*' has nothing to do with it.

Correspondingly, one cannot quote the assertion in this way: "(The *Tractatus* too is boring.) It is even mistaken"; it would be only a senseless portion of mess. The worst solution would be rubbing out the parentheses, or their syntactic equivalents, obtaining: "The *Tractatus* too is boring. It is even mistaken", which is a true falsification of the original thought. Well, Diamond's manner of quoting implies exactly an alike falsification of Wittgenstein's text. She deleted the decimal codes, i.e. the logical parentheses of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. Actually, the first two (or three) "statements" she quotes belong to proposition 6.54; the last one, to proposition 7. It is evident that these two propositions, 6.54 and 7, don't belong to the same reflection line: proposition 7 is part of the home page 1-2-3-4-5-6-7, while 6.54 concludes the commentary on the last remark on proposition 6. In a tree-wise representation, the corresponding frame is the following:



In the equivalent parenthetical syntax, the structure is:

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 (... , 6.4, 6.5 (... , 6.53, 6.54)) 7.

In the tree of the *Tractatus*, Diamond's quotation is not achievable; it doesn't exist anywhere. When Diamond 'quotes' propositions 6.54 and 7 as they were consecutive declarations, she doesn't see two closed parentheses, two different levels of commentary between the former and the latter proposition. They cannot refer one to another, and every attempt of to recite them together risks to alter their original sense seriously. It is patent that if one reads a text that is full of parentheses, digressions and afterthoughts without seeing punctuations or closing parentheses, she/he risks understanding nothing.

Namely, proposition 6.54 treats about Wittgenstein's propositions; statement 7 treats on "what cannot be spoken about". It is a dramatic error supposing that "what cannot be pronounced" must match...Wittgenstein's propositions themselves! If we read the main page and its seven cardinal propositions, it is clear that propositions 1-6 represent what can be told eventually, while whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must shut up (7). It is the same

⁵ That is precisely Erik Stenius' solution to the passage 4.01-4.02 ("4.01 The proposition is a picture of reality. 4.02 This we see from the fact that we understand the sense of the propositional sign, without having had it explained to us"), which the sequential reader transforms into the absurd sequence 4.016 (about hieroglyphics)-4.02. Stenius writes: "The word 'this' refers here formally to what was said in 4.016, but in fact the meaning of the statement becomes clearer if we let the word refer to what was said in 4.01" (Stenius 1960, p. 11).

concept anticipated in the Preface: "The whole meaning of the book could be summed up somewhat as follows: What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must shut up". The inner remark 6.54 belongs to a completely different context. It observes that the *Tractatus* is not a scientific text, but a philosophical one; the reader must consider it only as elucidatory, and has to throw it away when it becomes useless (otherwise, it would become metaphysics). Of course, this cannot imply that Wittgenstein couldn't write it (how could the reader enjoy of a text that nobody would have to write?)

Wittgenstein said often that the prohibition doesn't refer to his propositions, and refused the accusation of contradicting himself. He claims having respected proposition 7 in his book; in a letter that Diamond, too, likes to cite, he explicitly says *what* cannot be spoken of: "All that *many* others today are just *inflating*, I have managed in my book to put everything firmly into place by being silent about it" (Wittgenstein 1971, p.16). That is, he respected proposition 7 literally. Proposition 7 runs: *darüber muss man schweigen*, about it one must be completely silent, and the letter says: *Ich darüber schweige*, about it I am completely silent.

Whichever interpretation the reader prefers, the point is that "the frame" Diamond is speaking about cannot be that which she believes, i.e. the incipit and "the end" of a text that *is not* a sequential one. Namely, "the second part of the frame" cannot be constituted by two propositions completely unrelated as 6.54 and 7 are: Wittgenstein explains

very clearly that the frame is constituted by "the propositions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7", i.e. "the cardinal propositions", and then by "the propositions *n.1, n.2, n.3*, etc., [which] are comments on proposition N° *n*; and so on". Supposing a different, arbitrary "frame", building it by capricious selections and reading obstinately the resulting "mess", cannot lead to a reasonable exegesis of any book at all.

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On the Way to the later Wittgenstein: Acquiring Language as a Life-Form

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Abstract

In this contribution, I would like to use Wittgenstein's remarks from his "middle" period concerning the question of language acquisition and of the pre-linguistic, to show that the implicit historicity and contingency of this account of language anticipates his later, mature philosophy.

1.

This contribution would like to point at few moments within Wittgenstein's "middle" period that can be understood as one of the roots of his turn towards his later, mature philosophy.

Wittgenstein's middle period can be subject to a debate, whether there is such a thing, how to delimit it in time and what is characteristic for it. I follow – roughly – Jacquette's (1997) periodization according to which this period starts with Wittgenstein's return to Cambridge in 1929 and ends in 1933 by the *Blue Book*, the first systematical attempt to apply the method of language games. The transition stage in Wittgenstein's thinking inherits the theoretical setting from *Tractatus* (Wittgenstein 1961). He doesn't doubt that language is, *per se*, a picture of the world; the only question left is how this task is accomplished in and by language (because it seems that the Tractarian analysis is not working). Wittgenstein runs a series of more and more complex analyses of our language in terms of his "phenomenology". He starts considering that it's our language – not an ideal language – what serves us with a picture of the world; that the categories of our meaningful experience with the world blend in one with the categories of the language we speak. Significantly, a considerable space is devoted to minutious analyses of conceptual structures in the domains of color, space and time – identified as "forms" of objects in *Tractatus*.

In some respects, Wittgenstein anticipates the key motives of *Philosophical Investigations* (Wittgenstein 1958): e.g. the emphasis on the language we everyday speak as the only language a philosopher can be interested in. But the general notion of language he holds still confines to Tractarian limits: it is a language that is, first and foremost, a picture of the world, that serves as a description of the world. Language is a matter of theory, and phenomenology is a key to this theory. This stage of Wittgenstein's development is captured by *Philosophical Remarks* and *The Big Typescript*.

2.

Though we can get such a "stable" image from the petrified points of his development (the abovementioned "books"), Wittgenstein's thinking undergoes constant transformations traceable in his "middle" manuscripts. Dissenting motives pointing to various directions occur all the time. In the autumn 1930, Wittgenstein loses interest in "phenomenology" and turns to a more general critique of language, along with the newly-discovered conception of philosophy as cleaning our subjects, a proto-therapy.

In his remarks from 1931, he starts to explore language as something we are, so to speak, thrown into. This has two important aspects: 1) Language is *a priori*, meaning it serves as *a priori* to the way we think; 2) it has a temporal or historical dimension. The transgression of the Tractarian framework goes in two directions simultaneously: language not only outsteps individual humans in terms of the inter-subjective arrangement or agreement (the normativity of language), but also as a social and historical fact or artifact. We are, in the first place, born into language, we learn it before we can be aware of having learnt it. And by having learnt it – by having learnt any native, "first" language – we find ourselves "in" it, which is henceforth an irrevocable condition of our lives.

Language should be understood as a peculiar human institution the constitution of which has several temporal and historical layers. This is true also on the ontogenetic scale: the form in which one masters language both reflects and shapes her/his personality. Wittgenstein comments on this in the following way: "Language must be considered and dealt with as a whole institution. [There is a relationship between the faulty spelling/orthography of my youth until I reached 18 or 19 years and the rest of my whole character (I learnt poorly).]" (MS 110, p. 208 – Wittgenstein 2000) In short, language has a lot of peculiar features that had been defined and established before we started to learn it, and there is also a lot of peculiarities marking each speaker's idiolect and telling us something essential about them. It is also difficult to tell whether language is the cause, or the speaker's character; most probably, we cannot decide the determining relationship between the two. It seems that for Wittgenstein, who one is (both as human and as a person) is inseparably interlinked with the language she/he speaks (both the specific empirical language – English, Latin, Chinese – and her/his personal speech habit and mastery).

3.

Considering language as an institution occurring within time, both historical and personal, there must have been time, for each of us, when we haven't been able to speak yet. Just as the effect presupposes its cause, but does not entail it, so the state of linguistic incompetence and the process of language mastering is a preliminary of, but not entailed within the situation of the competent speaker. Wittgenstein suggests that language competence – in the case of the "first", native language – is not a lifelong process, but that it is a discrete characteristic. Once this stage is reached, it is in a sharp opposition to the situation of incompetence. What is it like, not to be able to speak, that cannot be (genuinely) understood by someone who has

already learnt a language. Certainly, one can easily describe and give the chronology of this stage of human life “from outside”; but to grasp it “from within” would mean trying to say what cannot be said. Wittgenstein refers to this problem in his report of a conversation with Maurice Drury:

“Drury told me today that he’s convinced that we couldn’t remember the state when we hadn’t spoken yet. – Of course we can have some memory images from that time, but we cannot remember the feeling of the lack of language, because we can have no concept of language before we speak and certainly, neither we can have it after, because there is no such concept. Nor can we remember the need for a language expression, because where such a need is present, there is also a language in terms of which we think.” (MS 110, p. 89f)

We must rely on Wittgenstein’s shorthand report; the exact Drury’s position is uncertain. Drury seemed to deny the possibility of remembering anything from the pre-linguistic stage of life. Wittgenstein was more cautious: we cannot exactly remember anything that is reported as a propositional attitude, i.e.: what has to be expressed as using concepts. (This is not to say: what we recall today using concepts of our present language; but: what we recall today as something entailing linguistic concepts *then*.) We don’t want to deny (neither did Wittgenstein) that people have a conscious/mental life even before they speak and that it is possible to relate to it, even when they are already adult. There are various ways of conjecturing about it; Christopher Gauker (2005), e.g., speculates about propositional thinking as developing from a more primitive, imagist stage of perceiving the world. Wittgenstein himself stresses the normative, interactional character of our adult language and assumes that it must have developed from more primitive interactive relations: “The origin and primitive form of the language game is a reaction; the more complex forms can grow only from that.” (MS 119, p. 146f) It seems from MS 110, that Wittgenstein himself applies this view in both phylogenetic and ontogenetic framework; on the ontogenetic scale, language is assumed to have developed from the (partly) non-verbal or non-propositional interaction between the child and the parent (mother), where “reaction” has much rather an instinctive or biological than conscious (premeditated) character. We are taught to react instinctively in a structured manner to outer stimuli and we are also taught that this interaction is normative (through sanctions, drill, play and gentle formation of habits). From this basis, propositional language grows.

From another point of view, Wittgenstein says that whatever we can remember from the early childhood, the feeling of lacking language comes out of question, since a child cannot lack anything for which she/he doesn’t have a concept. It is interesting here that many people who have small children (who don’t speak properly yet) can refer the children’s frustration of being unable to tell and get what they want. As if the child was aware of and suffered from the absence of the right word the adults could understand. The frustration does not amount to the explicit awareness of the language lack; but it is something. However, whatever the child feels or whatever we adults think the child feels, we are – from some reason – unable to remember such a feeling from our own childhood. In other words, despite the reasonable secondary evidence, nobody remembers this life stage as (not just: knows that this stage was) “the stage without language” or even “the stage when I was aware of/suffered from my language lack”. Whatever frustration there might have been, we cannot compare it with what we – occasionally – experience as frustration in

present. We cannot also compare – or relate in any way – the alleged past frustration with our present awareness or conjecture that we experienced such a frustration. We cannot assign this past experience to any place in our present system of emotion concepts. Yet we speak of it as of “frustration”. Here we use, as often, a term based on a vague analogy that can be unreliable.

Also: how should we distinguish when we need a concept to remember something and when we don’t need it? Do we need it now, for retrospection, or did we need it then, in the moment of the experience? Is it the same concept? And if not, can the two of them fulfill the same function – so that we can apply the same word (such as “frustration”) and refer to it in the same way? On the one hand, Wittgenstein is far from issuing apodictic claims such as “we cannot remember anything from this or that life stage” or “there is (or there is not) a distinct kind of frustration from language lack in small children”. On the other hand, he is well aware that without well-functioning conceptual distinctions – criteria diagnosing whether the child really experienced frustration or not, just as we diagnose whether an adult experiences frustration – these differences melt. Insofar as language sets a transcendental limit to our questions and answers, we can ask for and state things only through language. It is concepts of our language what “leads us to investigations, is the expression of our interest and guides our interest” (Wittgenstein 1958, § 570).

4.

I wanted to show that Wittgenstein saw language as an *a priori* condition of our access to the world. This intuition was strong enough already in his “middle” phase. The language, according to Wittgenstein, either is there, or is not there. To speak or to understand language is not an act that can be performed (or denied to perform) at an order: “Why can nobody be just ordered to understand a sentence? When hearing a word, I cannot call the explanation of the word out of my memory; it either comes itself, or it does not come.” (MS 110, p. 90). I cannot dispose of language freely – e.g. make someone (myself) understand when they do not understand.

Wittgenstein’s remarks about the temporality of language acquisition point at two directions. I have already mentioned the first one: the crucial role of language acquisition in everybody’s life and in shaping/reflecting their personality and make-up. But not only language acquisition is temporal and contingent; so is the acquired language itself. The process of its origin and development is contingent and situated; there is not just one language, but many, sometimes quite different, coming from various cultural and historical backgrounds (ancient Chinese vs. modern English).

Wittgenstein deals with the historicity of acquired language in his remarks inspired by his reading of *The Golden Bough*. He is aware that language is an institution with a history, and as such it embodies peculiar sediment features: ambiguous terms like “be”, vague terms with blurred boundaries such as color names, but also artifacts he would later call “grammatical fictions”. Not only languages of “primitive people” Frazer speaks about, but also languages of modern Europeans embody and suggest to their speakers a “mythology”. We can label as mythological also the way our psychological concepts work: “mind”, “soul”, “thought”, “spirit”. The way we operate with them offers ground for far-reaching inferences and theories on what or where such a thing as mind is. That we see mind

or soul as a thing/object resided somewhere inside our heads is caused by the mythological drive of our language. Unlike “savages”, we don’t imagine that our soul eats or drinks, but considering it as a located object is much the same attitude.

Since our present language is a result of a long history, the origin of many of its myths reaches to a social reality very distant from the present one. Our picturing of soul as something somewhere reflects the expressive forms of our language that we might not be able to relate to anything in our world. Speaking language is thus not only a mythological, but also a ritual enterprise: we iterate and re-present old myths, meaning we magically keep in life a long-gone worldview (MS 110, p. 205, 256). We tend to distinguish salient “mythological” conceptions from grammatical pre-conceptions of “normality”, but both are mythologies on their own; which is clearer when these frameworks shift (Drury 1973). Malcolm (1993) points out that the foundations of language – *that* there is a language at all – are analogous to the miraculous experiences of the Wittgensteinian ethics: ineffable and irrational after all.

These scattered remarks comprise insights Wittgenstein expressed in a more systematic form only later: 1) That language sets a transcendental limit to our access to the world; 2) that once we learnt it, it is very difficult to capture anyhow the stage before it (not meaning that we could say “there is no awareness/memory before language” – that would be metaphysics); and 3) encompassing as language

may be, it is at once a matter of historical contingency – a) interlinked with the personality one grows into and b) embodying curious mythologies.

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Wittgenstein, Chess & Memory

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Abstract

Bermudez 2006 outlined the role of the chess metaphor in Wittgenstein to explain his thinking about language. The applicability of this metaphor means that the solutions offered by neuroscience to explain mental process, and memory in particular, had simply not been developed during his time. It required a revolution centered on PDP in order for any explanation to be able to address the central questions raised by Wittgenstein. This paper outlines how recent research of chess memory corresponds with the emergent theories based on PDP, and confirms the precision of Wittgenstein's questions in order to arrive at what is only now taking form as neuropsychological theory.

When we made experiments on memory in chess we were able to provide empirical evidence that classic chess knowledge could be effectively transferred and applied to a different complex, yet similar domain such as blindfold chess960. The higher the level of expertise, the higher the rate of transfer. Prior research had only centered on the beneficial perceptual advantage of identifying known chunks of chess positions that could apply to the choice of a chess move. But there is a more ample and far higher and more abstract domain of relevant chess knowledge than simple recognition of chunks. By substituting the familiar positions of classic chess with uncommon random Fischer960 positions for the first 12 moves it was evident that these higher level of abstractions were successfully applied without recourse to familiar chunks.


In the case of blindfold Chess960 any transfer of chess knowledge gained in over 10,000 hours of deliberate practice to the new environment of blindfold Chess960 must be due to transfer to long-term memory. Since the play is blindfolded normal perpetual support has been removed. The subsequent deployment of that knowledge in the new environment then must take place in Long Term Working Memory (LTWM). That is because short-term memory does not have enough capacity to retain constantly the changed initial positions and care is taken in the design of the experiment to allow enough time for the initial Chess960 positions prior to the first move to be committed to long-term memory.

Since the chessboard is never seen during the initial communication of the Chess960 position or afterwards, determination of the moves is then done entirely from LTWM. Since the initial 12 moves usually involve positions never before seen in classic chess, the quality of play depends to an unusual extent upon applying high-level knowledge, rather than brute memory of the consequences of previously seen positions.

The same data of experiment 3 underlying the previous illustrations can thus be used to make a quantitative estimate of the degree of transfer using Fisher's linear discriminant applied as a method of multivariate classification taking as the reference parameter the evaluation of advantage of each ply of the white pieces and as parameter of comparison the rate of error given by cross validation in order to calculate the unexplained variation.


Applying this technique, which relies upon matrix inversion, the rate of transfer from blindfold classic chess to

LTM for blindfold chess960 is calculated to be 29.17% leaving 71.83% of unexplained variability. This latter value is high given that the maximum of expected value for a proportion of the two parameters is 50% each. The reason is apparent from the discrimination diagram in illustration 17, which compares the distribution of value of advantage for the case of blindfold classic chess (BCC) with that of blindfold chess960 (B960C). The range of overlap between the two cases (from about -1.85 to .85) is seen to be relatively small.



1. Discrimination diagram for experts (ELO 2000-2100) playing blindfold classic chess compared to Experts playing blindfold chess960.

On the other hand the rate of transfer for masters (ELO 2300-2400) calculates to 41.67%, a value much closer to the 50% of variability expected between discriminate groups. This higher value indicates that the proportion of recuperation tends toward a common dynamic equilibrium between the two environments when the ELO level increases to that of masters. That can be observed in the discrimination diagram illustration 18.




2. Discrimination diagram for masters (ELO 2300-2400) playing BCC compared to B960C

The rate of illegal moves and/or blunders in the case of experts (ELO 2000-2100) when playing B960C was 25% whereas the corresponding rate for masters (ELO 2300-

2400) dropped to 8.3%. The hypothesis arises that a higher rate of transfer of knowledge translates into less blunders and less illegal moves.

That suggests making the following projection based on the assumption that transfer of chess knowledge to B960C is approximately lineal near to the ranges of ELO ratings for which we have data and the fact that a difference of 200 in ELO rating normally predicts a significant difference in the probability of winning a chess match. We simply project the difference between calculated transfer of 12.5% for players 300 ELO points below the 2000 range actually studied giving 1700- 1800 players (amateurs) a projected transfer rate of 16.7%. By making the same projection for players 300 point higher in ELO, 2600-2700, one would expect a transfer rate of 54.17% for these grand masters.

This is a prediction that could actually be tested and it would be interesting in a future experiment to do so. It would be interesting if the rate of blunders and illegal moves for grand masters were to diminish significantly when playing B960C. Illustration 2.6 graphs the above projection.



3. A lineal projection of transfer of classic chess knowledge to the novel Chess960 environment for the opening (first 12 moves)


The above data for the case of blindfold Chess960 is presented as an analysis on a move by move basis for the first 12 plys that allows fine detail to emerge and projections such as illustration 19 to be made. However the contrast between the ability of our expert subjects with an ELO of 2000-2100 compared with the masters of ELO 2300-2400 to play blindfold Chess960 compared to blindfold classic chess is even more dramatically brought out in a condensed game by game comparison with an overall evaluation for each subject's game in both the classic blindfold case and the blindfold Chess 960 case. Thus the data can be presented for each player and type of chess tabulated on a game by game basis and using the value of the most unfavorable evaluation (for the white pieces played by the blindfolded subjects) reached in each game. The numbers of illegal moves made in each game are also tabulated. The results are as below.

[illegible]

4. Scale for evaluation for Expert and Master by Illegal Moves

The Data is from 16 games, first 12 plies of each game, 192 total plys on the part of blindfolded subjects. The numbers at the left in each box is the lowest calculated advantage (positive numbers) or greatest disadvantage (negative numbers) reached in each game using the Stockfish 2.1.1 chess evaluation program applied to each of the first 12 plys.

It is evident that when Masters (ELO 2300-2400) are playing there appears to be no statistically significant differences between playing classic blindfold chess and Fischer Chess960 blindfold chess. It would require more data to determine if the 4% illegal moves indicate at a statistically relevant trend. However, the videos give the clear impression that even for the ELO 2300-2400 masters the Fischer Chess960 games required far more mental effort and the play was far less fluid.



5. Scale evaluations including blunders and illegal moves between different ELO ranges and type of blindfold chess (First 12 moves)

The box and whisker plot in illustration 20 shows that there is a statistically significant difference on the part of the blindfolded ELO 2000-2100 experts between playing classic blindfolded chess and blindfold Fischer Chess960. Not only is there a clear lack of overlap between the two cases, the 23% rate of illegal moves when playing blindfold Chess960 underlines that occasional really serious error is the major reason for the final overall evaluations to be consistently low when players of the expert (but not master) quality of play Fischer Chess960. Most of the time they make acceptable moves, but when they make an error it normally turns out to be serious.

In summary, when experts (ELO 2000-2100) play, there is a statistically significant difference in the quality of play between classic blindfold chess and Fischer 960 blindfold chess.

In the case of Masters (ELO 2300-2400) the difference in the evaluation of the quality of play over the first 12 plys is no longer statistically significant. The plot of the blindfold Chess960 games is contained within that of blindfold classic chess games. This is a surprising and significant result. It is an argument for a very effective transfer of chess knowledge from classic chess to the novel Chess960 circumstances in spite of the first 12 plys of the Chess960 not replicating familiar chunks, which the standard chunking theory model considers to be a critical element of the superiority of the elite high ELO player. An immediate conclusion is that the transfer of high level abstract aspects of chess knowledge has been demonstrated to be effective in maintaining a high quality of moves in the novel Fischer Chess960 context.

A natural explanation for this empirical result has to do with the theory of schemas that has risen from PDP research. It is thought that the initiation of perception itself must be awakened by association with some familiar but sparse schema already in long term memory. The sche-

mas are sparse because they contain slots that can be filled by variables. Multiple threads of association can be used to fill the slots. That is the essence whereby Damasio's theory of activation of memory comes in. That Wittgenstein 1970 (§608) states that "there is no process in the brain correlated with associating or with thinking" is correct only if the restriction that brain processes are single threaded and structured by logic applies. But on the other hand, Wittgenstein emphasizes the importance of total context and family resemblances. Damasio's theory opens the possibility of dynamic near simultaneous associations having a neural correlate because the semantic correlates of memory activation correspond to an extensive independent network and operate by analogy rather than logical validation. Wittgenstein put his finger on the problem, but the tools for a solution had not yet been conceptualized.

Our empirical investigation of chess memory points to the necessity of a flexible associative theory of schema activation such as that of Damasio to jump over the hurdle posited by Wittgenstein constitute a concrete example of family resemblance linked to a simultaneously multi-threaded process of abstraction.

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Some Remarks on Holocaust Denial in the Lights of *On Certainty*

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to recontextualize and examine a contemporary social phenomenon, the Holocaust denial, in the lights of Wittgenstein's thoughts. I cite several paragraphs from *On Certainty* on the (seemingly) incommensurable clashes of world-pictures, and on the relation between universalism and relativism as the starting point of my investigation, which tries to present a possible socio-critical application and interpretation of the late-Wittgenstein's concepts.

This paper tries to demonstrate that *On Certainty* can be fruitfully read as bearing anthropological (see Plant 2003), ethical and political (see Pleasants 2008) relevance, particularly through focusing on paragraphs depicting radical clashes of world-pictures. I believe that such a (re)reading of *On Certainty* can supply us with adequate means to analyse how the different forms of discrimination evolve and function, and what are the possibilities of reconciliation. Besides, I do not only wish to examine how this application can offer a better understanding of contemporary social dilemmas, but also to show that a Wittgensteinian interpretation of these problems can throw new light on classical Wittgenstein texts; as I attempt to show that Wittgenstein's exotic examples are applicable to actual and more mundane questions.

Although the examination of Holocaust denial mainly concerns the question of 'the positivity of history', in my reading the heart of the matter lies in the problem-field of anti-Semitism—consequently this investigation can be applied to analyse any sort of inhuman ideologies. Let us start this recontextualization with paragraph 92 (other paragraphs, like §§185, 231 and 262, can also be considered in this respect)!

However, we can ask: May someone have telling grounds for believing that the earth has only existed for a short time, say since his own birth?—Suppose he had always been told that, would he have any good reason to doubt it? Men have believed that they could make rain; why should not a king be brought up in the belief that the world began with him? And if Moore and this king were to meet and discuss, could Moore really prove his belief to be the right one? I do not say that Moore could not convert the king to his view, but it would be a conversion of a special kind; the king would be brought to look at the world in a different way. Remember that one is sometimes convinced of the correctness of a view by its simplicity or symmetry, i.e., these are what induce one to go over to this point of view. One then simply says something like: „That's how it must be.” (OC92)

If we place ourselves into the position of Moore, and the Holocaust denier into the King's role, than Wittgenstein's exotically-looking imaginary scenario may become more 'living' and 'familiar'. Though several interpretations argue that the considerations on 'hinge-propositions' concern only those hinges that are 'universal', 'known by everyone' and are of *epistemic* nature, I think that these insights are not merely applicable to the certainties such as 'I have a hand', but we also can rely on them regarding our topic. For the Holocaust denier also tries to doubt an 'empirical statement' (or more accurately: a statement-system, cf. §141.) which stands *beyond any doubt*—as much as Moore's propositions—for us (for those - with a forgivable

simplification—who cannot imagine a situation which would or could make us question whether the Holocaust indeed happened). One can argue that there are gradual differences, but in my reading the point is that the difference is only quantitative, and not essential or qualitative between the *hinge-ness* of such *very general* empirical propositions—which (quasi) belong to the *natural history of mankind* (e.g. no-one doubts her name) —and of 'more local' ones, i.e. hinges typical of 'particular' forms of life (e.g. the wrongness of killing in the Judeo-Christian culture).

One can object the analogy by maintaining that Wittgenstein exemplifies the hinges only with empirical and epistemological propositions, and not with ethical or normative ones. Nevertheless, I believe that it would be contrary to Wittgenstein's intentions attempting to *systematize* these hinges according to their *content*, thus failing to realize that we should only *accept* the (transcendental) *structure* typical of *every* world-picture: that some propositions (*epistemological* and *ethical* ones as well) are always *immune to* (actual, practical) *doubt*. We do not know whether some '*universal*' hinges indeed *exist*—and it is not a concern of Wittgenstein's therapy—, but *On Certainty* suggests us that it is a *universal feature* of every form of life that some propositions are (actually) *functioning* as hinges. Not only propositions can become certainties that are immune to doubt, but authorities as well—cf. §§160-162, 170, 600. Holocaust deniers often demand us—superficially relying on the imperative of *Sapere aude!*—to leave the era of "blind faith" and enter the age of *grounded belief*, of *Rational Truth*. Yet, in the lights of these paragraphs, they seem to fail to understand the above mentioned transcendental structure of all world-pictures and forms of life. Albeit Holocaust denial superficially can be interpreted as a *clearly empirical* doubt (at least that is what Holocaust deniers want us to do), the essential controversy stems from a radical conflict of our *fundamental moral beliefs*. (E.g. in 'our' world-picture 'Every human life is equally valuable' can be such a hinge proposition, while in theirs 'Jews' lives are invaluable' plays this role.)

Our analogy should be further chiselled, because in our everyday lives we do not only face Holocaust deniers educated in (or, as the King, 'born into') a such special, segregated world-picture, but the same situation can arise in case of two individuals raised in a 'shared form of life'; e.g. both of them have (very) similar sociocultural or educational background. Though their upbringing was more-or-less likely, one of them treats standard history books as *authentic* references on Holocaust, while the other choose neo-Nazi news-portals. One of the main insights of *On Certainty* is that our language games and forms of life are in the state of eternal dynamism and diversity (see e.g. §§96-97), thus it is questionable how should we under-

stand 'sharing a common form of life' at all. As Neumer puts it: 'We always play several language games, (...) their borders are blurred, our language games overlap each other'. (Neumer 1991, 131). By the same token, a net of similarities (e.g. the mother-tongue, or, to stick to our example, the shared respect of 'empiricism') and dissimilarities (their authentic sources of 'historical fact' can radically differ) are present in the case of a Holocaust denier and a non-denier coming from a 'shared' background. The radical conflicts can only be articulated before a background of similarities and common grounds. A part of the 'mythology' (§§95-97) is shared, even if multiple incommensurable-looking mythologies can evolve side by side among individuals 'sharing' their form of life.

Certainly, we protest against understanding our own humanist world-picture a mythology similarly to the Holocaust deniers', especially in the lights of paragraphs like 162, which declares that 'the difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing' (OC162). However, in my reading, when Wittgenstein writes 'difficulty', he means 'impossibility'. For if we accept the idea of the transcendental of ethics to be also present in the later thoughts (at least in the sense that the foundation of our world-picture contains moral hinges as well), then we face the following problem: Although the conflicts of the inhabitants of radically different (moral) world-pictures (can) indeed show itself as a sort of ethical relativism, but no-one can *practice* it, and *live* according to it. As Rhees recalls Wittgenstein's comment on ethical relativism:

If you say there are various systems of ethics you are not saying they are all equally right. That means nothing. Just as it would have no meaning to say that each was right from his own stand-point. That could only mean that each judges as he does. (Rhees 1965, 22)

Yet, these conflicts can be indeed confusing:

But what men consider reasonable or unreasonable alters. At certain periods men find reasonable what at other periods they found unreasonable. And vice versa. But is there no objective character here? Very intelligent and well-educated people believe in the story of creation in the Bible, while others hold it as proven false, and the grounds of the latter are well known to the former. (OC336)

Rationality (or rightness, to stick to our analogy), *mythology* and *dogmas* show great diversity in space and time. A universal, objective system of criteria or meta-rationality (or meta-morality), that would grant us an (illusory) viewpoint above all life forms is not available. The horizon of possibility of (rational) conviction is questionable, the outcome of these debates is uncertain.

Whether we refer to history books, to the worldwide consensus or even to personal testimonies (e.g. in the case of a Holocaust survivor), the denier either may not accept them as counter-arguments, or she may see them as new proofs underpinning *her* own truth. If a committed denier can only react to the account of a survivor—who tells her own death-camp experiences bursting into tears by the painful memories—that 'Look! Yet another lying Jew!', than she can interpret *any* experience as not confronting her hinged (moral) conviction (e.g. 'Don't believe the Jews!'), which is just as deeply 'hinged' and certain as her other ones, like 'My name is N.N.'. Because: 'If someone says that he will recognize no experience as proof of the opposite, that is after all a decision' (OC368) and '(...) knowledge is related to a decision' (OC362). Theoretically, all of my hinges can be questioned (though in this case I will be in another language game, and not in a meta-space,

'above' or 'between' language games, consequently there will be hinges, too, yet different ones), and in these clashes of world-pictures one often simply 'makes a decision' for or against a world-picture and its 'conclusions'. Even if this decision is never *clare et distancte*. It is rather something *animalistic*, *visceral*, or *aesthetical*. This decision is likely to a *credo quia absurdum* in the case of such deep-rooted clashes, and we often arrive to a situation depicted in the following paragraph:

'Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one another, then each man declares the other a fool and heretic.' (OC611). However evident we would feel to conclude to a strong form of incommensurability from this passage, I believe that the metonymy should be read as a rhetoric 'warning': Those individuals, who are acting so strictly along their dogmas, and who indeed *can* stop at a point merely declaring each other a heretic and a fool, *always* have another choice. But what sort of possibilities do we have to resolve these conflicts?

If someone said to me that he doubted whether he had a body I should take him to be a half-wit. But I shouldn't know what it would mean to try to convince him that he had one. And if I had said something, and that had removed his doubt, I should not know how or why. (OC257)

It seems to be the case, that we are lacking rational means, and all we have are rhetorical and aesthetic ones, the means of *persuasion* lay in the territory of *aesthetic reasoning*. I can only rely on a kind of *philosophical therapy* by offering new *pictures*, *ways of seeing*, (more and more) perspicuous representation, *objects of comparison*; or I can *show* through the example of my own way of living, what is otherwise *ineffable* (even if we in our ordinary life so often *declare*—indisputably justly—what we think about the inhuman ideas and their followers). The most adequate means of achieving this change in her way of looking at the world is the *change of the aspect*.

Since no matter how evident it would be to prove *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* to be *de facto* false, gibberish, or to bring even more 'evidences' from Auschwitz, or to confront her with even more survivors, the real success would be the following: To become able to make her *treat* and *see* those 'evidences' in a new light—not as lies and simulations—, and to make her regard her formal *Holy Scripture-like* treated books and authorities in a different way.

However uncertain the reconcilability of these conflicts may seem, I believe that the forms of strong incommensurability is just antithetic to the Wittgensteinian therapy. Because a crucial point of this concept is that a language is only a language inasmuch as it can be *learned* and it can be *taught*. Given that—pessimistically viewed—there is no 'guarantee' that could ensure that humankind as a whole won't start playing horrific and inhuman language-games like neo-Nazis and Holocaust deniers, but—through optimistic lens—the opposite is true as well. No-one can be a so committed anti-Semite, that she would not be able—given her *will*, *imagination* and *sincerity* to act so, all of which are important virtues for Wittgenstein—to learn 'into' or 'back to' the language-game(s) of humanism. Chiefly, if we treat the *Investigation's common behaviour of mankind* as a (quasi) universal frame of interpretation of the radically remote (seeming) world-pictures and forms of life, as a transcendental possibility of understanding (or, in a weaker form, of interpretation).

But putting it this way is no more than a vulgar-philosophic, propagandistic *credo of unchained tolerance*.

For the *real difficulty* lies in our ability to recognize, when we should 'suspend', 'bracket' the insight of the equal groundlessness of our beliefs, and simply 'accept our forms of life' (and *moral certainties*), and 'follow the (moral) rule blindly'. And when e.g. the Holocaust denier wants to draw our attention to our former relativism towards others—when she demands to practice it towards them, too—*then* we should be able to realize, that this relativism (our recognizing the contingency of our world-picture) should have limits. As sometimes we should 'see the reason' of anti-foundationalism in so far that we should not criticize the others' belief if our beliefs are (to the same 'extent' and on the same way) ungrounded, too; but other times we should (also in an ungrounded way) treat this 'insight' the other way round. Since in these cases (e.g. when judging anti-Semites) the groundlessness - which is likewise ungrounded as in the former case—of our judging 'should' not bother us.

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Perception in enactivism and extended mind: from internal to external perspective

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Abstract

In my article, I will discuss the concept of perception as presented by enactivism and the approach of extended mind. Although both these theories fall under the same general category of embodiment, they tend to formulate their particular claims rather differently. I will argue here that a turn towards enactivism or radical embodied cognitive science is more valid than an attempt to synthesize neurosciences (or functionalism) with embodiment.

1. Introduction

The last 2 decades have seen a progressing development of cognitive science and philosophy revolving around the idea of embodied mind, i.e. *embodied mind*, *embedded mind*, *extended mind* or *enactivism*. These are often interpreted and described under the singular category of embodiment, and placed in opposition to connectionism or functionalism. Despite certain similarities, however, each of the particular trends is based on different assumptions, which ultimately results in reaching disparate conclusions when considering the nature of cognition and the mind.

The dissimilarities between the approaches become evident in the context of perception. In this article, I will discuss the evolution of the way perception has been interpreted by embodiment (perception in action) as compared to neuroscience. For this purpose, I will focus on two most glaring standpoints within the category: enactivism and extended mind, and attempt to determine which of the two approaches to perception is more valid and what implications for the philosophy of mind are carried by the same.

2. Perception in neuroscience

Neuroscientific theories of perception rely on the assumption that (1) the brain constitutes the central unit processing information in a human agent. It is within the brain that all key operations of perception take place. (2) The operations themselves are performed on representations, i.e. certain mental signs reflecting particular elements of the outside world. To use Susan Hurley's metaphor of the mind as a sandwich, in neuroscience (3) the processes of perception are located between the reception of reality and the action of the agent, but are synonymous with neither. Consequently, the brain is the sole basis for the processes of perception which do not extend beyond the physical confines of the skull and the nature of experience is strictly internal.

It is noteworthy that despite a strong tendency towards neutralisation of cognition, a certain type of dualism is indeed present in neuroscience. Mental processes are based on neural correlates but their characteristics are non-physical and relatively independent of outside realities. Under the model, certain difficulties are apparent in accounting for the relation between perception and the physical world. Nonetheless, its appeal lies in the close correspondence to the vernacular and intuitive understanding of the dualism of human nature.

3. Differences between extended mind and enactivism

The concepts of extended mind and enactivism converge in three most general points: (1) there are no such mental processes or internal properties that could/must be transcendental or autonomous in terms of physicality; (2) they are embedded i.e. shaped in the interaction with social or natural environment. Moreover, (3) both enactivism and extended mind rely on the assumption that evolutionary adaptation requires a certain economy of thought and action. Their depiction of the mind is therefore significantly different from that proposed by neuroscience. They do not allow for mental processes to be discussed in isolation from the body, the outside world and the human agent - ergo the mind cannot be exclusively identified with the brain. Despite certain commonalities, however, the concepts of extended mind and enactivism differ in their explanation of the origin and functioning of cognition.

The greatest contributors to the concept of extended mind are Andy Clark and David Chalmers. The theory posits that mental processes take place not only within the human body but also in its external environment (i.e. Clark 2008: 100). The following particular claims can be derived from the same: (1) at least some mental processes are hybrid, i.e. rather than taking place exclusively within the confines of an organism, they are also actively involved in the environment (internal and external operations), (2) the world itself is a store of information which constitutes an element relevant to mental processes, (3) the external operations are related to the category of actions and constitute a certain form of manipulation, exploitation and transformation of the environment, and (4) at least some of the mental processes serve their purpose only in the course of interaction with said environment (Rowlands 2010: 59). The above points are well illustrated by the famous example of a notebook kept by Otto who suffers from Alzheimer's disease. The notebook serves the function of his memory, it constitutes a store of information to which Otto can refer when the situation calls for it. The belief is not contained in his head. In this way, Otto's mind has been extended.

Clark emphasizes the fact that in the thus understood extended mind, the brain continues to serve a vital role, i.e. it remains the centre of all cognitive processes (Clark 2008: (i.e.) 38-39, 141, 217). However, the entirety of cognition cannot be reduced to it. External objects or tools literally become part of mental processes. On the other hand, they can also influence the content of representation (the postulate of active externalism). Notably, however, despite the reduced significance of autonomous opera-

tions taking place within the brain, representationism remains present in the extended mind. The above theses inevitably lead to the interesting conclusion that extended mind is in fact a form of extended functionalism.

At this point, Clark's position struggles with certain difficulties, chief among which is the assertion that the principle thesis boils down to a mere truism that the outside world influences mental processes. As argued by Aizawa and Adams, mental operations ultimately take place in the brain, while external tools constitute a part of cognition only when consciously employed by an individual. Otherwise, they remain merely ordinary objects, thus rendering the attempt to extend cognition through the addition of artefacts an artificial one. On the other hand, Clark speaks not so much of the influence of tools on the mind, but rather of their active participation and co-organisation of (at least some) cognitive processes. In doing so, the philosopher approaches the mind systematically, with the tools constituting actual elements of the mind itself. Nonetheless, there still remains the valid contention that extended mind lacks determined boundaries that would specify the conditions under which tools or the environment cease to be a part of the same.

A possible solution to the above dilemma can also be provided by the application of an even more radical approach, to which Clark refers as *radical embodied cognition* (although he does not agree with it himself) and which overlaps with enactivism (Chemero 2009: 28-33). The approach assumes that (1) representational and computational theories of the mind are in fact incorrect, (2) cognition ought to be explained by taking into consideration the dynamical systems theory and (3) without assuming mental representations. Consequently, the central function of the brain and the significance of internal operations on representations are both challenged. To once more evoke Hurley's metaphor, cognition would therefore not be found between the agent's reception and reaction, but rather in his action in the world. Mental processes are formed on the basis of sensorimotor knowledge and the ability of an organism to act efficiently within its environment.

4. Perception in enactivism

As was already mentioned above, enactivism negates the assumption that perception is based on a certain form of internal representations of the world. It does not exclude their existence as a particular type of mental activity, but claims them to be insignificant when it comes to defining the nature of perception (Noë 2004: 2). Thus, perception is not located within the organism, it is a form of activity which emerges during an agent's interaction with the world.

To more specifically define perception as understood by enactivism, one ought to recall two of the theory's principal claims, namely that "(1) perception consists in perceptually guided action and (2) cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided" (Varela, Thompson, Rosch 1991: 173). The former suggests that it is not important how an agent obtains information about the particular characteristics of the world, what matters is how he can guide his action in a given situation. An organism is oriented towards perceptual exploration of the world rather than storing information about it. An agent learns this through actively functioning in the world, e.g. by unreflectively noticing that an object will seem bigger when one moves towards it. No internal knowledge is required in the process (Varela, Thompson, Rosch 1991: 174-175).

It would be helpful to invoke at this point certain more recent examples of research on the sense of sight: the so called *change blindness* by Kevin O'Regan and *inattentional amnesia* by Jeremy Wolfe. The former conducted an experiment in the course of which a subject was presented with a detail-intensive image, e.g. a panorama of Paris with the Notre Dame cathedral. Next, in a moment of temporary inattention, e.g. when the subject blinked, the image would be substituted with another, almost identical image which would differ in only one (but significant) element. In the described example the cathedral would be moved by a considerable distance. Assuming that visual perception is based on an analysis of internal representations, such a significant change ought to have been noticed. This, however, was not the case. Thus, the experiment suggested that perception does not take place in the brain but rather that it is aimed at specific action (Myin, O'Regan 2009: 188). Similar results were obtained by Wolfe. In his experiment, he would repeatedly, between 5 and 350 times, present the same presentation to a subject and ask him or her to locate a particular element. If interpretation of a perceived image were based on a specific representation, the pace at which elements were located should have gradually improved in time. Again, this was not the case. On each consecutive presentation, the subjects analysed the situation as if they were faced with it for the first time.

The described experiments demonstrate that the mind does not register significant changes taking place within one's field of vision unless attention is directed to it or movement occurs. Secondly, the role of perception is to serve active monitoring of reality rather than storing information. Based on the theory of evolution, it should also function effectively and economically. The brain itself constitutes only a part of a system together with the body and the world, it does not operate on internal representations. Experience emerges from dynamically perceived reality. The organism learns to see through practice, by adapting to the way in which the given species functions in the world. To recapitulate: perception functions best when it is economical (evolutionary adaptation). It serves the performance of specific tasks such as exploration and monitoring of reality. Perception allows the organism to focus on its current environment without the need for the brain to register every detail of the same.

5. Perception in extended mind

Perception in extended mind is an amalgamation of theses and observations revolving around both the internal and external approach to the mind. Clark adopts the tools and concepts presently employed by cognitive science (Clark 2008: i.e. 38-39, 195, 216-219). On the example of Goodale and Milner's visual perception and their "dual-stream model", he strives to demonstrate the dualism of perception. On the one hand, in the course of a visual experience, information is processed in the brain by the *dorsal stream* related to sensorimotor control (which is an argument in favour of enactivism). On the other, information is also processed by the *ventral stream* which specialises in recognition and identification of objects. In Clark's opinion there is therefore the need not only to study the interrelation between the agent and the world, but also to take advantage of the benefits of such concepts as representationalism, computationalism and the theory of information, as perception is embroiled in memory, thought or planning.

Extended memory comprises elements of both functionalism and neuroscience. These, however, constitute only a part of the same, as perception is simultaneously shaped by external factors and tools. For a blind person, the white

cane is more than just a tool, it is an "extension" of their hand. Objects touched with the cane feel as if they were touched directly. Consequently, in Clark's opinion, even the use of a pen, glasses or an iPhone may indeed constitute an element of perception processes. When analysing these interrelations, he looks to the experiments of O'Regan and Noë but refuses to accept the implications proposed by these researchers. He rejects the enactive approach to perception as he sees it as overly radical. In this context he invokes the presented dual-stream model and the concept of "sensorimotor chauvinism" (Clark and Toribio). However, when describing the dual-stream model, Clark does not account for the results of the mentioned experiments because they repeatedly negate the existence of representation (regardless of the assumptions made in the model). The problem of "sensorimotor chauvinism" derives from the fact that, as stated by O'Regan and Noë, one may speak of the sameness of the perceptual experience of two individuals only in the context of the sameness of sensorimotor processing patterns, *ergo* small changes in the experience of reality condition a different perceptual experience and consequently pose enormous theoretical difficulties when attempting to describe perception, even in terms of categorisation.

At the same time, even Clark himself is not immune to the latter criticism. Despite the philosopher's declarations, it is difficult to employ straightforward criteria that would allow the classification of perception (as is the case with other mental processes). It is not clear how far one can go beyond the natural limits of the skin and skull in the study of perception. Does an iPhone always impact the subjective reception of reality or is the effect only occasional? Will the same iPhone have the same influence on others? Clark fails to give a straightforward answer. Nor does he provide detailed information concerning the mutual relations between the elements of the thus understood experience of perception.

6. Conclusions

In the recent years, attention has been drawn to the significance of the category of bodiliness in attempts to account for the nature of perception as well as the mind as a whole. (1) The embodiment trend, however, is not a uniform one. A gradual departure has been observed from the research perspective within which perception was explained in terms of an organism's internal processes with a particular significance attributed to the brain, and towards a system of interrelations between the body and the environment. (2) Said interrelations can be interpreted differently by different theories, as was evidenced in the above

examples. (3) On the one hand, the theory of extended mind includes the concepts employed to date in the studies of perception (and the mind), such as representationalism, computationalism and theory of information. On the other, it utilises the discoveries made under embodiment. It seems, however, that (4) conciliation of these two entirely different standpoints is not possible, particularly since Aizawa and Adams's argumentation allows any mental process to be described through reference to the concept of representationalism and neurosciences. Tools serve only to stimulate perception, not shape it. It is particularly important to notice that (5) the enactive perspective seems to be somewhat more consistent and entirely abandons any need for permanent representation in the mind. (6) It portrays perception as a form of action suited for the exploration and monitoring of the world, rather than for registering it and storing information. Perception is not an internal state, it is a process, a constant activity emerging from an organism's relations with the world. By relinquishing the burden of accounting for the synthesis of various approaches under enactivism and despite its counterintuitive theses, (7) enactivism provides a consistent research platform on the basis of which experiments may be formulated to either support or refute given assumptions. The same is far more difficult under the framework of extended mind due to its broad interpretative possibilities. (8) It can refer simultaneously to concepts of early cognitivism and embodiment, although (9) Clark avoids specifying the actual relations between the two. On the basis of the above analysis, (10) enactivism or radical embodied cognition seem to offer a more justifiable proposition.

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The “Pragmatic Maxim” in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty

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Abstract

The pragmatic character of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s *On Certainty* is often underlined in literature. What is still missing, however, is a more direct comparison with the pragmatist tradition. This paper focuses on a striking similarity between Wittgenstein and Charles S. Peirce, namely, their respective way of connecting knowledge meaning and practical consequences. In the pragmatist tradition, this connection is known as “the pragmatic maxim”. Many remarks in *On Certainty* are surprisingly in tune with the maxim. I propose an analysis of this attunement as a contribution to the characterization of the so-called “Third Wittgenstein”.

1. Introduction

In spite of the many relevant differences which distinguish Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophical perspective from the pragmatist tradition, and in spite of his explicit denial of being a pragmatist, many affinities can also be identified. By focusing on what has been recognized as the most pragmatic, and, according to some, the most pragmatist of Wittgenstein’s writings, namely, *On Certainty* (hereafter OC¹), I would like to point out one striking but still largely unseen resemblance between the ways in which Charles S. Peirce and Wittgenstein connect knowledge, meaning and practical consequences. In the pragmatist tradition, this connection is known as “the pragmatic maxim” and identifies pragmatism itself as a philosophical method which, roughly, seeks the meaning of a concept in its consequences, and equals the knowledge of the meaning with the knowledge of the consequences. This is akin to an idea explored in some remarks belonging to OC. This paper compares the two perspectives, with the aim of contributing to a richer account of the peculiarities of the “Third Wittgenstein” (Moyal-Sharrock 2004).

2. On Certainty

By the end of February 1951, Wittgenstein decided to give up his therapies against cancer, and affirmed with relief: “I am going to work now as I have never worked before” (Monk 1991: 577). On April, 16th he wrote to Norman Malcolm: “An extraordinary thing has happened to me. About a month ago I suddenly found myself in the right frame of mind for doing philosophy. [...] It’s the first time after more than two years that the curtain in my brain has gone up” (McGuinness 2012: 479). If Wittgenstein is right about himself, we should consider this last part of his work as particularly fruitful and lucid.

On March, 10th, indeed, the fourth and last section of OC begins, with some crucial remarks, such as the categorical distinction between knowledge and certainty, the reflection about empirical and logical propositions, the metaphor of hinges. From March, 15th Wittgenstein repeatedly makes reference to the concept of consequences:

360. I KNOW that this is my foot. I could not accept any experience as proof to the contrary. - That may be an exclamation; but what *follows* from it? At least that I

shall act with a certainty that knows no doubt, in accordance with my belief.

395. “I know all that.” And that will come out in the way I act and in the way I speak about the things in question.

397. Haven’t I gone wrong and isn’t Moore perfectly right? Haven’t I made the elementary mistake of confusing one’s thoughts with one’s knowledge? Of course I do not think to myself “The earth already existed for some time before my birth”, but do I *know* it any the less? Don’t I show that I know it by always drawing its consequences?

409. If I say “I know that that’s a foot” - what am I really saying? Isn’t the whole point that I am certain of the consequences - that if someone else had been in doubt I might say to him “you see - I told you so”? Would my knowledge still be worth anything if it let me down as a clue in action? And *can’t* it let me down?²

Here Wittgenstein is interested in the exploration of the connections among different aspects, namely, our certainty about something, our asserting (or willing to assert) that we *know* that, our acting and predicting consequences in accordance with that. As the many question marks demonstrate, Wittgenstein has not reached a conclusion, but he repeatedly tries to test the idea that asking about consequences could be a method for stating what we know or believe.

As those familiar with the pragmatist tradition have surely already noticed, this is the method put forth by the pragmatic maxim. Not surprisingly, during the same days Wittgenstein famously remarked:

422. So I am trying to say something that sounds like pragmatism.

Here I am being thwarted by a kind of *Weltanschauung*.

3. The Pragmatic Maxim

Charles S. Peirce’s pragmatic maxim first appears in his 1878 paper “How to make our ideas clear” and is subsequently repeated with variations in many later writings. I will mention a few of Peirce’s formulations and William James’ version of it, before proposing the comparison with Wittgenstein.

¹ Wittgenstein’s works are cited by abbreviations and paragraph numbers. References to the Nachlass are in the form “Manuscript number: page”, according to the Bergen Electronic Edition. References to Peirce’s Collected Papers and to Essential Peirce are in standard form (CP volume.paragraph; EP volume: page)

² See also 363, 399, 427, 450, 668.

In its first formulation, the maxim is characterized as a means for obtaining clarity on the content of ideas.

Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object. (CP 5.402)

This definition follows some reasoning concerning belief and action which echoes a previous paper, "The fixation of belief" (1877); in it Peirce stated that "the feeling of believing is a more or less sure indication of there being established in our nature some habit which will determine our actions" (CP 5.371).

After twenty years, William James, endorsing pragmatism, cited Peirce's principle and explained it using these words:

[T]he effective meaning of any philosophic proposition can always be brought down to some particular consequence, in our future practical experience, whether active or passive; the point lying rather in the fact that the experience must be particular, than in the fact that it must be active (James 1975 [1898]: 259).

James' accent on particularity was not appreciated by Peirce, who, probably also dissatisfied with his own characterization of "practical bearings" (Hookway 2012: 168), in subsequent years provided new and more complex versions of the maxim:

Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical judgment expressible in a sentence in the indicative mood is a confused form of thought whose only meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to enforce a corresponding practical maxim expressible as a conditional sentence having its apodosis in the imperative mood (CP 5.18, 1903).

The entire intellectual purport of any symbol consists in the total of all general modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol (CP 5.438, 1905).

I understand pragmatism to be a method of ascertaining the meanings, not of all ideas, but only of what I call 'intellectual concepts', that is to say, of those upon the structure of which, arguments concerning objective fact may *hinge*. (...) [T]he whole meaning of an intellectual predicate is that certain kinds of events would happen, once in so often, in the course of experience, under certain kinds of existential circumstances (EP 2: 401-2 and Peirce 1940: 272-273 [1907]; my emphasis)³.

As for James, in his *Pragmatism* he repeated that "to develop a thought's meaning, we need only to determine what conduct it is fitted to produce" (James 1975 [1907]: 29), and again emphasized his criticism of abstractions (James 1975 [1907]: 31-32). The difference is clear; nevertheless, Peirce also acknowledged that the two versions of the maxim were not so far apart and did not make any difference when applied in practice (Hookway 2012: 183).

4. A Comparison

The most relevant difference which comes into view between the two sets of quotes is Wittgenstein's (surprising)

insistence on knowledge, which is mentioned in all the listed entries, while Peirce speaks of conception, judgment, meaning, symbol, predicate. Wittgenstein's attitude, however, as often underlined in literature, is not to be interpreted as putting forth an epistemic account of our certainties, rather as an exploration or even a denial of the possibility of equating certainty with knowledge. In the quoted passages, indeed, he is attempting to find out if and in which terms what we usually call (but maybe should not call) knowledge could appropriately be reshaped; and these terms turn out to be related to our conduct and our drawing the consequences of what we "know".

Another seeming difference is that Wittgenstein observes everyday behaviour, while Peirce is concerned with intellectual conceptions and generalizations. Nevertheless, a closer look shows that, at least in some respects, they are both looking at the relation between these two aspects. The fact that both use the metaphor of hinges is probably a coincidence, but an interesting one. As we have seen, in Peirce this metaphor describes the connection between intellectual concepts on the one hand, and facts and habitual behaviour on the other. Wittgenstein's metaphor is not so diverse, if we consider that he uses it with reference to scientific investigations and mathematical propositions:

341. That is to say, the *questions* that we raise and our *doubts* depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are *in deed* not doubted⁴.

655. The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of incontestability. I.e.: "Dispute about other things; *this* is immovable - it is a hinge on which your dispute can turn."

Finally, a patent similarity is that both philosophers highlight the existence of a double dimension of consequences: on the one hand, consequences are bound to what is going to happen in the world of facts; on the other hand, they are bound to our own actions, conducts, habits, behaviour. This duplicity, which reflects a perspective in which nature and culture overlap, does not appear to be in need of a conceptual clarification for either of the two.

To sum up, it seems clear that in OC Wittgenstein is working on the theme of consequences in a manner which strongly resembles the pragmatic maxim. His reluctant acknowledgment of this resemblance encourages us to search for direct or indirect influences in his thought.

Wittgenstein's familiarity with James is already well-known (Goodman 2002), and although he never mentions it explicitly, it is likely that he knew *Pragmatism* (in which James quotes and applies Peirce's maxim), at least through Russell and Moore's commentaries (Russell 1910, ch. 4 and 5; Moore 1922, ch. 3). It is also possible that Wittgenstein directly read Peirce, and particularly "The fixation of belief" and "How to make our ideas clear": both are part of a collection of essays, *Chance, Love and Logic*, which appeared in England in 1923 for the same publisher of the *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus* and which he may have known in the late Twenties thanks to Frank Ramsey (Schulte 1999: 306; Marion 2012: 64). Both are also included in volume V of CP (1934) and in another collection published in London as well (Peirce 1940). Although it is possible, it is not so likely that Wittgenstein read Peirce.

3 See also CP 5.412, 1905, and CP 6.481, 1908.

4 See also 340 and 343.

From his few hints to pragmatism, indeed, it appears that what he had in mind was probably James' version, or Russell's and Moore's criticism of James' version (cf. MS 107: 248, MS 114: 158, MS 131: 70 (also in RPP I 266), MS 136: 119b; Misak 2008: 199 ff.). Moreover, a "proto pragmatic maxim", and another possible source of reflection, can be found also in the Preface of Goethe's *Theory of Colours*, which Wittgenstein did read with certainty in 1950 (McGuinness 2012: 456-458): "Strictly speaking – affirmed Goethe – it is useless to attempt to express the nature of a thing abstractedly. Effects we can perceived, and a complete history of those effects would, in fact, sufficiently define the nature of the thing itself".

5. Conclusion

What then? Did Wittgenstein read Peirce, or not? There are good reasons for thinking that he did, and good reasons for thinking that he did not; neither are decisive. But this is not the point at stake. What is at stake, is the question whether Wittgenstein's account of knowledge, meaning and consequences does or does not resemble the pragmatist account, and the answer to this question is undoubtedly yes. There is, then, if not a direct, at least an indirect influence of Peirce's work in Wittgenstein's. Finally: even if this indirect influence is denied due to an excess of caution, what cannot be denied is that there is an objective convergence between Wittgenstein's attitude, as expressed in the last section of OC, and the issues put forth by the pragmatic maxim. And this will suffice for the purposes of this paper. Moreover, other relevant themes – doubt, belief, hinges, prejudices, common sense – which cannot be debated here for obvious limits of space, connect OC with the pragmatist tradition. A deeper inquiry into these themes would represent a further and promising contribution to the characterization of the pragmatic, or allow me to say pragmatist, turn of the (very) late Wittgenstein.

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Two types of rational agency in reasoning

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Abstract

This work aims at exploring the type of agency that we exercise when we reason. I will differentiate between two types of agency that correspond to two levels of rational reasoning. First, I will examine non-critical reasoning. I will argue that non-critical reasoning is correctly understood as being an action – the individual is the one who reasons – even though such an action does not require the individual's control or awareness. Second, I will examine critical reasoning. I will argue that the type of agency exercised at this level is marked by our power to implement the results of our own evaluation in the object of evaluation. In critical reasoning, controlling one's own reasoning and the reasoning itself are part of the same action, which requires the individual's control and awareness of the action.

Introduction

We seem to be doing something when we reason. There is a strong sense in which reasoning belongs to the so-called mental actions. This sort of action has obvious impacts on our mental life. By reasoning we make up our minds (Moran 2001): we form beliefs as well as revise and change them. Understanding the type of agency we exercise over our beliefs while reasoning is not, however, a simple task. In contrast with ordinary agency, reasoning is not guided by the intention to achieve a certain result such as forming a given belief. We do not believe at will, for example (Hieronymi 2006). If we were to succeed in believing at will, we would be engaging in some sort of irrationality. Additionally, much of our reasoning seems to be unaware and out of our control (Burge 1996: 99). If this is so, characterizing what we do when we reason requires some attention since it is not clear what remains of our ordinary idea of agency when we try to apply it in order to understand what reasoning is. In what follows, I will try to contribute to such an understanding.

I. Non-critical reasoning: agency without control

Imagine yourself in the following situation: you arrive in London and need to figure out how to get to your hotel by public transportation. You are at Heathrow airport and you know that the nearest Tube station to your hotel is Baker Street. You have city and underground maps with you. By examining the maps, you find out that you need to take the Piccadilly line to Green Park and then change to the Jubilee line to Baker Street. Then you just need to walk a few blocks to reach your hotel. In this imaginary situation, you might have undertaken a previous reasoning about whether to take public transportation or not. Imagine that you have judged that public transportation is preferable to cabs after considering a few reasons: taking the Tube is cheaper and it is a way of getting to know the city from the very beginning of your trip.

The previous examples of reasoning show several traits related to our ordinary notion of agency. In the example, you have decided what to reason about. You have set up a few questions for yourself: 'Should I take a cab or the Tube?' and 'How do I get to my hotel?' You have also directed your attention to some issues rather than to others. You could have asked someone to help you find your way to the hotel instead of examining the maps. This sort of control over our reasoning corresponds to the fact that we can choose to undertake it and select part of the informa-

tion we will be reasoning about. Those aspects, however, do not characterize the type of agency in place when we rationally reason in a non-critically way. In non-critical reasoning, directing the reasoning is a different act from the act of reasoning itself. Choosing to look at the map is one action; reasoning about the map is another.¹ Additionally, in most circumstances our reasoning is undertaken without us having chosen the topic, directed our attention or even formed the intention to undertake such reasoning even though, in these circumstances, our reasoning continues to be rational and correctly attributable to the individual.

Think of your imagined self in the London underground. You are in your way to the hotel, excited about your trip, experiencing a variety of thoughts that cross your mind. You think, for example, of what you are going to visit first, where to have lunch, whether to call your Londoner friend etc. While you are absolutely immersed in your thoughts, you give up your seat to a pregnant woman. You have not chosen whether to think about what to do when the woman entered the wagon. Nor have you even considered what reasons you would have to give up your seat for her. In fact, you have not experienced any reasoning about the situation at all. You just did it. There might be some controversies surrounding how to interpret this case, but it seems plausible to say that you have reasoned about the situation and acted in accordance with your reasoning even though you were not aware of your reasoning nor directed it.

Unaware and non-directed reasoning also expresses our rational agency. In the previous scenario, even without making much mental effort, you could be praised for your act as well as for the practical reasoning which supposedly preceded your act. The same can be found in theoretical reasoning. One could be blamed for a logical mistake committed in reasoning, even when one is not aware of the reasoning itself. Since the individual is the one who reasons, he/she should be regarded as the agent of such an activity. However, as I have suggested, we can reason without controlling most aspects of that reasoning and without being aware of what we are doing.

The positive characterization of our agency in non-critical reasoning seems to consist in our following some rational rules. By following such rules in reasoning, we can form and revise our beliefs. However, it seems that we are not able to exercise our will over those rules. We are not expected to be able to choose whether we follow such rules or not, or which rules to follow. Aspiring to such a control

¹ This contrast does not correspond to the difference between ingesting and digesting, for example. Digesting is not an action.

mischaracterizes the type of agency we exercise over our beliefs when we reason. In the previous paragraph, I have suggested that, even when some key features of our ordinary notion of agency – control and awareness – are lacking, we are correctly regarded as the agent of our reasoning. Thinking about the negative aspects of our agency in non-critical reasoning seems to teach us something crucial about it. When we reason non-critically, we do something even when we do not have control over what we are doing. At this level, controlling one's own reasoning and the reasoning itself are two independent actions.

II. Critical reasoning: agency and control

In contrast with some available approaches, I have suggested that we are correctly attributed with agency when we reason non-critically *and* that such type of agency does not need to involve any dimension of control.² The individual does something while reasoning, with obvious consequences for his/her life, and for which he/she can be held responsible. However, the way one's own reasoning functions and how one modifies one's own mind is not up to the individual. In this section, I will explore a different level of rational reasoning – critical reasoning – which also displays rational agency but, in contrast with the previous type, does involve control.

Imagine that during your ride to your hotel in London, you start to think of your view about the role of feminism in today's world. You start with the thought – your imaginary thought – that feminism had a huge role in the past, but it is kind of old-fashioned today. This is what you currently believe. In thinking about your view, you think of your own reasons to sustain that belief. You discover that the main reason you have to support your view is that everybody you have contact with knows that men and women should have roughly the same rights, opportunities and freedoms. So, there is no point in fighting for something that people are already convinced is correct. You then start to evaluate that reason. On the one hand, you start to be suspicious of the idea that the people you know are representative of the general population. On the other hand, you start to remember a few facts that you somehow have kept isolated from your view about feminism. Women earn less than men; they occupy less management posts than men, and so on. By the end of your self-evaluation, you judge that the main reason sustaining your view is a poor one. As a result, you change your mind. You now believe that feminism still has an important role.

In critical reasoning, we conduct our reasoning. We identify the focus of our inquiry within our psychology; we identify the belief, reason or reasoning that we are going to evaluate. By evaluating these matters we generate extra reasons to sustain or reject the object of our evaluation. We appreciate reasons as reasons (Burge 1996, 1998). In critical reasoning about a particular belief, the individual recognizes the reasons – or lack of reasons – to hold that belief and evaluates the quality of such reasons. The essential aspect of our control over our beliefs, however, is the power we have to automatically implement the results of our critical reasoning in the belief itself. In the example above, through critical reasoning about a previous thought

regarding feminism, your imagined self has changed his/her mind about feminism. This is because, in undertaking this kind of evaluation, the individual automatically changes or strengthens the belief under evaluation according to the conclusion of his/her critical reasoning. Critical reasoning follows the same rational rules as non-critical reasoning. However, in critical reasoning a particular rational rule emerges: the evaluation resulting from critical reasoning should be transmitted into, and implemented by the belief or reasoning under evaluation (Burge 1996). Otherwise, the individual would not be able to undertake critical reasoning about her or his *own* beliefs and reasons.

In contrast with the previous type of agency, in critical reasoning directing the reasoning is not independent from the reasoning itself: both are part of the same action. Thus, this type of reasoning seems to be incorrectly understood by the notion of managerial control of beliefs suggested by Hieronymi (2009). In critical reasoning we do not exercise the same type of agency and control that we exercise over ordinary objects, such as when I organize the objects on my table. We do not merely manipulate our beliefs when critically evaluating them. Our control is necessarily mediated by reasoning.

III. Conclusions and some possible applications

My proposed framework aims at articulating two seemingly contrasting intuitions. We just cannot reason the way we want – we cannot choose which rules to follow, for example – even though we are the agents of our reasoning. I discussed how agency relates to the exercise of control in two types of reasoning. In non-critical reasoning, reasoning is an activity undertaken by us that affects our minds: we form new beliefs, revise old ones, change our intentions and so on. That activity consists in following certain rational rules of reasoning. However, rational agency on this lower level does not seem to involve the individuals' control over their reasoning.

Nevertheless, when we reason critically we do exercise some kind of control over our minds. Our reasoning on this level consists in following certain rational rules – as in the case of non-critical reasoning. However, we are able to do something else. There is a strong sense in which we conduct our reasoning when we engage in critical reasoning. Nevertheless, on this level, directing our reasoning and the reasoning itself are not independent actions. When we critically evaluate our minds, we are able to generate reasons and automatically implement the results of our evaluation in our minds. We transfer the reasons generated by critical reasoning into the level of thought that is under evaluation. This power of implementation of reasons amounts to a sort of control by the individual over his/her mind when he/she reasons.

Distinguishing between these two types of agency sheds light on cases of recalcitrant beliefs: beliefs that resist one's own critical reasoning. We seem to expect to be able to control our thoughts in a way that allows us to avoid recalcitrant beliefs. There is something puzzling about the situation in which, say, a sincere and convinced feminist cannot help but have sexist beliefs. The literature about some similar cases (e.g. Heil 1984) suggests that recalcitrant belief is a case of theoretical akrasia. However, if the notion of akrasia is linked to the notion of will, those cases are incorrectly understood as akratic cases. As I have suggested, in critical reasoning, we exercise our agency but that agency does not involve the exercise of the will in terms of how we want our reasoning to work. Critical rea-

² This view may contrast with the view advanced by Hieronymi (2009), for example. She would probably claim that the most part of what I call agency in non-critical reasoning is better understood in terms of her notion of 'evaluative control'. According to her, evaluative control involves settling for oneself the questions of whether p (or whether to ϕ) and it constitutes the primary type of agency over our beliefs. However, even though she recognizes that evaluative control does not involve voluntariness or awareness, she does conflate the idea of agency with control, a strategy that I reject.

soning does involve control, but that control amounts to our power of conducting our reasoning and implementing the result of our evaluation in our own minds. Thus, given my characterization, cases of recalcitrant beliefs can be understood as a failure of control over one's own mind without that control being related to the exercise of the will. Once we engage in critical reasoning, the implementation capacity constitutes a further rational norm which imposes itself on us.

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McDowell on Wittgenstein on Understanding

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Abstract

McDowell argues that because, according to Wittgenstein, self-attributions of understanding shouldn't be explained by reference to conscious experiences, there isn't a need to give an account of the nature of states of understanding. I argue that, to the contrary, Wittgenstein's account of the nature of understanding is his reason for denying that self-attributions of understanding can be explained in this way.

1.

In his paper 'Are Meaning, Understanding, etc., Definite States?' (McDowell 2009) John McDowell criticises Warren Goldfarb for attributing a strongly anti-realist conception of understanding to Wittgenstein. According to Goldfarb, Wittgenstein wants to show in the *Philosophical Investigations* (PI henceforth) that understanding is 'in some sense' not a 'particular or definite [state] or [process]' (Goldfarb 1992, p. 109). Goldfarb immediately remarks that '[such] a dark point desperately needs clarification, if it is not to deny the undeniable' (ibid.), but in the rest of his paper mostly concerned to show in what sense it may actually be right. His discussion centres on possible responses to what Goldfarb calls the 'scientific objection' (cf. pp. 109-10): Wittgenstein, in claiming that there are no states of understanding, is usurping the place of the sciences by precluding the possibility that the neurosciences might discover states of our brain that are our understanding of, say, a word, a formula, etc.

McDowell doesn't criticise the responses to the 'scientific objection' Goldfarb advances on Wittgenstein's behalf. He is rather concerned to show that, firstly, focussing on possible responses to this objection misses the main points of Wittgenstein's discussion of understanding, and that, secondly, Wittgenstein doesn't hold the anti-realist conception Goldfarb attributes to him.

According to McDowell Wittgenstein's discussion of understanding in PI is primarily concerned to dispel two related misconceptions. The first is addressed in PI §146, where Wittgenstein is concerned with the question of when we can say of a pupil, who has been taught to write down the series of natural numbers, that he has understood the system of the series. Wittgenstein finds it tempting to think that the pupil has 'got the system' when he is not only able to '[continue] the series up to *this* or *that* number' but is in 'a state which is the *source* of the correct use'. He then writes:

What is one really thinking of here? Isn't one thinking of the derivation of a series from its algebraic formula? Or at least of something analogous? – But this is where we were before. We can indeed think of more than *one* application of an algebraic formula; and while every mode of application can in turn be formulated algebraically, this, of course, does not get us any further. – The application is still a criterion of understanding.

According to McDowell the point of this passage is to show that when we think of our understanding of a formula as state which is the source of its correct use, we are picturing that state as an 'embodiment... of an algebraic formula' (McDowell 2009, p. 81).

McDowell doesn't say what he means by an 'embodiment' of a formula. Perhaps we should imagine something like the physical inscription of the formula in our body (perhaps in the brain) or the production of the formula in our imagination. Whatever the picture of our understanding as an embodiment of a formula may exactly be, McDowell does tell us what's wrong with it: An embodiment of a formula is something that could be identified independently of the actions that are the exercise of the understanding that this embodiment is supposed to be; just like a normal formula can be identified independently of its correct use. This may make it appear as though an embodied formula has to be accompanied by an interpretation before it can determine which actions are in accord with it, because, like a normal formula, it can be interpreted in different ways. This, however, leads to a well-known regress. If a formula has to be interpreted then so does its interpretation, and so on.

This problem, McDowell claims, might lead us to think that understanding *is* an embodiment of a formula but that unlike a normal formula an embodied formula can't be interpreted (cf. ibid., pp. 83-4). McDowell thinks that this idea yields a picture of understanding as something utterly mysterious. It makes it seem as though the understanding of, for example, a word is something in which, as Wittgenstein puts it, the 'future use' of that word is 'in a *strange* way...itself... in some sense present' (PI §195). This idea McDowell finds unacceptable. It makes the mind appear to exercise a 'quasi-magical efficacy' (ibid., p. 85).

The fact that one central misconception Wittgenstein aims to expose is this 'quasi-magical' picture of understanding makes Goldfarb's focus on the 'scientific objection', according to McDowell, misguided. If we're tempted to assume that understanding has quasi-magical powers, we won't be inclined to think that understanding is a state of the brain. After all, there is no reason to think that the brain has such powers (cf. McDowell 2009, p. 86).

2.

Contrary to Goldfarb McDowell believes that Wittgenstein doesn't only expose certain misconceptions of our notion of understanding but also provides us with a way of conceiving of this notion as referring to 'definite and particular states' that isn't confused. McDowell finds the key to this correct view in the discussion of intention towards the end of PI.

In PI §660 Wittgenstein compares recollecting one's intention with remembering having understood something. About the former phenomenon Wittgenstein says in PI §654: 'Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we

ought to regard the facts as 'proto-phenomena'. That is, where we ought to say: *this is the language-game that is played.* This is followed by: 'The point is not to explain a language-game by means of our experiences, but to take account of a language-game' (PI §655). The mistake Wittgenstein is addressing consists in trying to explain statements about one's past intentions by reference to experiences one had at the time. In the discussion leading up to §§654-5 Wittgenstein makes clear that whatever experiences might have occurred at the time referred to in a statement about a past intention are compatible with an absence of that intention. Still, such a statement can be true and authoritative (cf. §§634, 651). That is so because it isn't based on the recollection of certain experiences that, while they may be characteristic of having a certain intention (cf. §636), are compatible with its absence. Hence, we shouldn't 'explain' the language-game of remembering intentions 'by means of our experiences'. We should rather regard it as a 'proto-phenomenon'.

McDowell believes that the picture of understanding as an embodiment of a formula is the result of a similarly mistaken attempt to explain from the 'outside' the language-game of attributing understanding to oneself. He writes:

"I remember having understood". If we stop restricting what we are allowed to find in memory of the past occurrence to something that we could cite to explain, from outside, the language-game that includes "Now I understand!" and its past-tensed counterpart, we make it possible to acknowledge that what we recall as having happened at the time includes not just those fragmentary details – having a formula occur to one and the like – but the onset of the understanding itself. (McDowell 2009, p. 90)

McDowell's idea seems to be this: Just as the language-game of saying 'I intended to do A' shouldn't be explained by saying that the subject remembered some conscious experience, for example a feeling of an urge, so the language-game of saying 'Now I understand!' (cf. PI §151) or 'I could then have gone on' (PI §660) shouldn't be explained by saying that these sorts of statements are made because, for example, a formula occurred to the subject. For McDowell these are explanations from 'outside the language-game'. McDowell isn't very clear about what he means this. But it seems that what makes these explanations for him explanations from 'outside the language-game' is that their *explanans* doesn't mention intentions or onsets of understanding. McDowell urges that once we give up trying to explain self-ascriptions of understanding from outside in this way, we can view them as attributing genuine mental states (cf. *ibid.*).

3.

The most puzzling aspect of McDowell's paper (and Goldfarb's) is that he doesn't tell us what he means by 'mental state', or what Wittgenstein might mean by it. This seems related to the fact that he doesn't take account of those passages in PI in which Wittgenstein explores what kind of mental state understanding is. This leads to serious misinterpretations, to which I'll now turn.

McDowell is right to extend the idea that the language-game of attributing intentions to oneself is a 'proto-phenomenon' to self-ascriptions of understanding. Wittgenstein would agree that we shouldn't try to 'explain' such self-ascriptions 'by means of our experiences'. This comes out in PI §179, where he discusses a scenario in which a person, A, writes down a series of numbers and another

person, B, tries to figure out which series it is. Eventually B says 'I can go on'. Wittgenstein writes:

[One] might think that the sentence "I can go on" meant "I have an experience which is empirically known to lead to continuing the series". But does B mean that when says he can continue? Does that sentence come to his mind, or is he ready to produce it in explanation of what he means?

No. The words "Now I know how to go on" were correctly used when the formula occurred to him: namely, under certain circumstances.

It is a good interpretation of this passage to say that Wittgenstein is here rejecting the idea of explaining saying such things as 'I can go on' by means of our experiences. What makes saying them correct aren't the experiences of the subject, such as a formula occurring to her, but the circumstances of her utterance. Wittgenstein holds the same view of statements about one's past intentions. Here too it is the circumstances of the utterance rather than the subject's experiences that makes them correct (cf. PI §§633-37).

However, it is a mistake to think that once we cease trying to explain self-attributions of understanding from outside, we won't be tempted by the idea of understanding as the source of the correct use of expressions anymore, or some similar conception of understanding as an 'embodiment of a formula'. Other, although related, motivations figure much more prominently in Wittgenstein's thinking. Clearly the most important of these is the idea that assuming such states is necessary to explain how linguistic meaning is at all possible. In the *Blue Book*, for example, he describes the temptation to think that the signs of our language are 'dead' if they aren't accompanied by '*certain definite* mental processes... of understanding and meaning' (Wittgenstein 1969, p. 3). Clearly the desire to explain meaning through underlying mental states and processes is a much more significant motivation for the picture of understanding as a source of the correct use of expressions than the desire to explain self-attributions of understanding.

Furthermore, McDowell thinks that once we see that self-attributions of understanding can't be explained from outside, we'll recognize that there is no need to say what kind of mental state understanding is. This is a misinterpretation. Wittgenstein rather argues *from* his own views about the nature of understanding to the conclusion that self-attributions of understanding should be treated as 'proto-phenomena'.

The question of how we should understand these self-attributions is raised in PI §151 immediately after Wittgenstein compares the verb 'understand' to 'is able to' in §151:

The grammar of the word "know" is evidently closely related to the grammar of the words "can", "is able to". But also closely related to that of the word "understand".

In the sections leading up to this crucial remark Wittgenstein points out that the understanding of a word, the knowledge of the alphabet and the ability to play chess are fundamentally distinct from such mental states as excitement, pain, dejection (cf. p. 65) or processes, such as 'thinking-of-something' (cf. §148). Unlike in the case of these other mental phenomena, it doesn't make sense to say that we know or understand something uninterruptedly or 'day and night' (*ibid.*). And it also doesn't make sense to say that we stop understanding or knowing something

when we cease thinking about it. But we stop being in pain, when we cease to feel it. So, unlike pain, dejection or excitement, which Wittgenstein explicitly calls 'mental states' (p. 65) and thinking-of-something, which he explicitly calls a 'mental process' (cf. §§148), understanding isn't an occurrent mental phenomenon. Neither should it be identified with 'a state of an apparatus of the mind (perhaps a state of the brain)', which might be referred to in order to explain its manifestations (cf. §149). The problem is that we should have, at least potentially, two criteria for the presence of such a state in a person: (a) the structure of the apparatus and (b) the effects of the state. This isn't true of understanding. Here, Wittgenstein urges (cf. e.g. §146), the ultimate criterion of whether or not a person possesses it remains its exercise.

At this point Wittgenstein makes the following observation: 'But there is also *this* use of the word "know": we say "Now I know!" – and similarly, "Now I can do it!" and "Now I understand!"' (PI §151). This is obviously meant as an objection to the account of understanding, knowing and other abilities given in the preceding sections. If understanding isn't an occurrent mental state such as feeling excited nor a state of an 'apparatus of the mind' and if the only criterion for whether I have understood something is what I say or do, how is it then possible for me to be justified in saying 'Now I understand' before I have exercised this understanding? It is in response to this question that Wittgenstein suggests that self-ascriptions of understanding shouldn't be further explained. Once we have acquired the

ability to attribute understanding to ourselves we can do this in right circumstances, but we don't do it on the basis of somehow noticing some occurrent mental state or process, nor in response to a state of the 'apparatus' of our mind.

If this interpretation is right, McDowell gets things backwards. Wittgenstein's belief that self-attributions of understanding are 'proto-phenomena' isn't his reason for assuming that we shouldn't give an account of the nature of understanding. Wittgenstein's account of the nature of understanding is his reason for believing that these self-ascriptions can't be explained 'by means of our experiences'.

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Gedächtnis

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Abstract

In diesem Beitrag wird die dreifache Unterscheidung Seelenteilen, die Aristoteles eingeführt hat, für systematische Betrachtungen verwendet. Diese drei Seelen, nämlich die vegetative, die sensitive und die rationale Seele, verfügen jeweils über eine eigene Art von Gedächtnis. Für die sensitive oder die Tierseele und die rationale oder die Menschenseele ist dies immer schon bekannt gewesen. Neu ist die Erkenntnis der modernen Medizin, dass es auch im Bereich des Vegetativen ein Gedächtnis gibt, das vor allem bei der Entwicklung von Antikörpern eine Rolle spielt, die ein wichtiger Teil des Immun- oder Schutzsystems unseres Körpers sind. Es gibt Gedächtniszellen und damit auf einer unteren Stufe der Granularität bereits ein Gedächtnis. Die Folge davon ist, dass es auch im Bereich der anima vegetativa eine Vergangenheit gibt und folglich auch eine Gegenwart und Zukunft und damit eine vertikale Zeitstruktur, die nicht bewusst ist, also nichts mit Bewusstsein zu tun hat, wie anderen Formen von Gedächtnis im Bereich des Sensitiven und des Rationalen.

Einführende Bemerkung

Beim Menschen unterscheidet man zwischen deklarativem und prozeduralem Gedächtnis. Das deklarative Gedächtnis umfasst alles, was mit Sachverhalten und Fakten zu tun hat. Sie gehören entweder zur eigenen Biographie oder sie beziehen sich auf die Welt. Ersteres heißt auch episodisches oder autobiographisches Wissen. Das andere ist Wissen über die Welt und schließt neben beruflichem Wissen auch alle Arten ein, die mit den Wissenschaften wie Physik, Chemie und Geschichte oder dem täglichen Leben wie Haushaltsführung, mit sozialen Kontakten oder Freizeitbeschäftigung zu tun haben. Dieses Wissen nennt man auch semantisch, weil es die Beziehung zwischen Zeichen und Bezeichnetem, also zwischen Wörtern und Gegenständen betrifft. Es wird durch explizites Lernen erworben. Das prozedurale Gedächtnis bezieht sich auf prozessuale Vorgänge und hat mit Fertigkeiten zu tun, die automatisch, d.h. ohne Einschaltung des Verstandes, eingesetzt werden können wie motorische Abläufe. Sie werden durch implizites Lernen erworben.

Die aristotelische Lehre von den drei Seelen

Geht man von der Unterscheidung zwischen den drei Arten von Seelen aus, die Aristoteles in *De Anima* vorgestellt hat, dann kann man feststellen, dass es in allen drei Seelenteilen Gedächtnis gibt. Bisher hat man nur der anima sensitiva und der anima rationalis ein Gedächtnis zugestanden. Die anima sensitiva, oder die Tierseele, verfügt über ein Gedächtnis im Bereich der Sinneswahrnehmungen und ihrer Assoziationen und vielleicht auch über so etwas wie eine Fähigkeit für Schlussfolgerungen. Tiere können sich offensichtlich durch Gerüche, Geräusche und Bilder an frühere Situationen erinnern und darauf reagieren. Man spricht in diesem Zusammenhang auch von einem *animal consciousness* oder von einem Tierbewusstsein. Wie weit dieses Bewusstsein geht, hängt auch von der Art und Funktion des tierischen Gedächtnisses ab.

Die Auffassung, dass es auch im Bereich der anima vegetativa ein Gedächtnis gibt, ist neu. Sie stammt aus Einsichten aus der Impfpraxis. Man spricht von einem Gedächtnis für frühere Infektionen und Impfungen, die mit der Produktion von Antikörpern zu tun hat. Man kennt auch so etwas wie Gedächtniszellen. Im Grunde ist es klar, dass auch der vegetative Teil des Körpers, der wohl ebenfalls ein System und d.h. eine besondere Art von Ganzem dar-

stellt, und damit auch ein teleologisches Ganzes ist, so etwas wie ein Gedächtnis braucht, denn auch der vegetative Teil existiert in der Zeit und nur irgendeine Art von Gedächtnis sichert die Verbindung zur Vergangenheit und vermittelt damit eine Zeitstruktur.

Die Tradition hat sich vor allem mit der Beziehung der anima sensitiva und anima vegetativa beschäftigt, also zwischen unseren Sinneswahrnehmungen und den vegetativen Funktionen. Besonders die Tradition in Gestalt der Ärzte und Naturforscher des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts sprach erstmals von einer Relation der Domination, d.h. die anima sensitiva dominiert die anima vegetativa. Es geht z.B. darum, dass Sinneseindrücke wie Bilder die Entstehung pathologischer Föten beeinflussen oder gar fördern können. Diese Relation der Domination ist irreflexiv, asymmetrisch und transitiv. Auch zwischen der anima rationalis und den anderen Teilseelen gibt es diese Relation. Leibniz hat sie in seiner Monadologie übernommen, wo sie eine architektonische Funktion hat.

Das Gedächtnis der anima vegetativa

Wir haben also bezogen auf die drei Seelenteile auch drei Arten von Gedächtnis. Im Bereich der anima vegetativa bezieht sich das Gedächtnis von Lebewesen auf die Funktion von Zellen des Immun- und Schutzsystems, das den Organismus vor allem vor äußeren Gefahren und Einflüssen schützen soll. Hat der Körper z.B. einmal eine Infektion hinter sich, den Erreger identifiziert und spezielle Antikörper entwickelt, so kann er ihn bei einer neuen Infektion reidentifizieren und die Infektion verhindern oder mindestens abschwächen. Dieser immunphysiologische Ablauf wird durch die Arten von verschiedenen Impfungen genutzt. Die Konsequenz besteht darin, dass einige Krankheiten wie die Pocken weltweit verschwunden sind, und man bei anderen wie der spinalen Kinderlähmung nahe an einer Elimination der Krankheit ist. Man spricht in diesem Zusammenhang von Gedächtniszellen. Dieser ganze Vorgang verläuft unbewusst. Das entsprechende Lebewesen ist sich dieses Stoffwechselvorgangs nicht bewusst.

Als Träger dieser Fähigkeit des vegetativen Erinnerns wurde eine bestimmte Fraktion von Lymphozyten ausgemacht, die T-Lymphozyten. Sie vermehren sich im Notfall um das 10 bis 100fache. Ein Problem besteht darin, dass die einzelnen Lymphozyten eine kurze Lebenszeit haben, doch einerseits könne sich diese Zellen teilen und damit die Information weitervererben und andererseits ist diese

Fähigkeit wohl auch in den lymphatischen Organen verankert.

Das Gedächtnisphänomen des vegetativen Bewusstseins ist schon seit dem 19. Jahrhundert bekannt. Es wurde nach einer Masernepidemie in den Faröer Inseln dadurch manifest, dass nach einer Unterbrechung von 30 Jahren eine ganze Reihe von älteren Menschen offenbar gegen den Erreger immun waren.

Eine andere, schon erwähnte Art von Gedächtnis, geht nicht allein vom Gehirn aus. Jeder, der einmal eine komplexe Art von Bewegung gelernt hat, weiß, dass sein Körper diese Bewegung nie vergisst, auch wenn er sie jahrelang nicht mehr ausgeübt hat. Es handelt sich teilweise um einfache Körperbewegungen aber auch um mehr oder weniger komplexe Handlungen. Dieses prozedurale Gedächtnis ist im Körper verwurzelt und hat seinen Platz in unteren Regionen des Gehirns und Nervensystems, also im Stammhirn und verschiedenen Bereichen des Rückenmarks.

Das Gedächtnis der anima sensitiva

Auf der Ebene der anima sensitiva haben wir es mit psychischen Akten zu tun, die sich auf alle fünf Sinne beziehen, also auf Sehen, Hören, Riechen, Schmecken und Tasten. Diese psychischen Akte können entweder einzeln oder auch gleichzeitig auftreten. Für das Gedächtnis sind die Assoziationen zwischen diesen gleichartigen und verschiedenartigen psychischen Akten wichtig. Wenn z.B. ein Tier in einer bestimmten Situation einen bestimmten Geruch wahrgenommen hat, also z.B. ein Rotwild oder ein Wildschwein den Geruch eines Menschen, dann wird es entsprechend reagieren können. Dasselbe gilt für den Geruch oder Geschmack einer Pflanze, die es als unverträglich erfahren hat. Das Ganze spielt sich teilweise in einem rudimentären Bewusstsein ab, das man auch als tierisches Bewusstsein oder als *animal consciousness* bezeichnet hat. Stellt man sich etwa ein Rudel von Wölfen vor, das ein Opfer einkreist und nach einer ganz bestimmten Strategie zuerst ermüdet und dann angreift, so ist man in diesem Falle sogar nahe an einem rationalen Bewusstsein, jedenfalls in einem Bereich in dem es so etwas Komplexes wie die Identifizierung des Tieres und seiner möglichen Reaktion und einen Angriffsplan gibt, der von den einzelnen Tieren von Jugend auf eingeübt und dann auch durchgeführt wird. Mindestens drei Dinge sind also die Voraussetzung für eine solches Verhalten: das Erkennen der entsprechenden Tierart, der strategisch verlaufende Angriff und die vorherige Einübung dieses Angriffs. Für jede dieser drei Komponenten ist Gedächtnis Voraussetzung. Tiere verfügen also neben einem prozeduralen Gedächtnis auch über ein Gedächtnis soziale Handlungsabläufe.

Das Gedächtnis im Bereich der anima rationalis

Im Bereich der anima rationalis wird die Sache dadurch wesentlich komplizierter, da wir über unbewusste körperliche Reaktionen, also rein Prozedurales und reine Erfahrung, also psychische Akte, die sich aus Sinneserfahrungen und deren Abstraktion speisen, weit hinausgehen. Wir befinden uns auf der Ebene der Begriffe, die zwar weitgehend aus der Erfahrung kommen, aber *qua* Begriffe frei zu zusammengesetzten Begriffen kombinierbar sind und auch einer weiteren Abstraktion unterzogen werden können. Außerdem gibt es noch eine Ebene der Reflexion, d.h. neben den Perzeptionen auch Apperzeptionen oder reflexive geistige Akte. Sie wurden von Leibniz in die Philosophie

eingeführt. Wer über eine anima rationalis verfügt, kann also die entsprechenden psychischen Akte nicht nur identifizieren und mit einem Namen benennen, er kann sie auch von anderen unterscheiden und ihre Herkunft aus den Sinnen nachvollziehen. Die Verfügbarkeit über Begriffe macht die Menschen fähig sowohl für die Entwicklung von Theorien d.h. von Wissenschaft, als auch für die Entwicklung von Fiktionen, d.h. von Kunst und für die Einführung von Normen, d.h. von Moral. Ethik und Ästhetik.

Gedächtnis und Person

Die gerade beschriebenen Fähigkeiten des Menschen der Begriffskombination und Reflexion führen zu einer besonderen Art von qualitativem Gedächtnis. Auf dieser Seelenebene, in der der Verstand über Begriffe verfügt und mit ihnen arbeitet, haben wir es mit einer neuen Art von Aussagen zu tun und zwar nicht nur mit assertorischen, die entweder wahr oder falsch sind, sondern auch mit modalen, die zusätzlich notwendig oder unmöglich sind. Diese Aussagen beziehen sich auf Sachverhalte, die so und nicht anders sein können, und dies gilt nicht nur für alethische Sachverhalte, sondern auch für deontische, d.h. für Normen. Wichtig für rationales Verhalten ist also auch die Einsicht in moralische und juristische Normen und damit in die Grundlagen der Moral, Ethik und des Rechts.

Gedächtnis ist damit auch grundlegend für das Ich und die Person. Diesen Zusammenhang hat vor allem Leibniz betont. Wir wissen aus der Psychiatrie, dass ein fehlendes Gedächtnis die Person zerstört.

Die Rationalität und die damit verbundene Fähigkeit der Kombination von Begriffen erweitert das Gedächtnis gewaltig. Es gibt nichts, an das wir uns nicht erinnern. Das menschliche Erinnerungsvermögen ist so umfassend und dominierend, dass die Natur die Gefahr einer vollständigen Blockierung unseres Bewusstseins durch unsere Erinnerung verhindern musste und dafür das psychische Phänomen der *Verdrängung* eingeführt hat, um dies zu verhindern und Gehirn, Geist und Gefühl für neue Erfahrungen frei zuhalten. Vor allem ältere Menschen geraten in Gefahr nur noch aus Erinnerung zu bestehen.

Da der Aufbau kumulativ ist, verfügen Individuen mit einer anima rationalis auch über eine eigene anima vegetativa d.h. über einen eigenen Stoffwechsel und eine eigene Art der Fortpflanzung und eigene anima sensitiva, also über eine eigene Art von Sinnesorganen und z.B. über einen außerordentlich ausgeprägten Tastsinn. Dabei ist diese Eigenheit grundlegend und wichtig. Es ist dann sicher aufschlussreich welche Rolle die Relation der Domination dabei spielt. Der Mensch dominiert dank seiner anima rationalis sicher seine anima sensitiva, d.h. wir nehmen meist nur Gegenstände wahr und erkennen Gegenstände, die wir bereits erfahren haben und damit auch schon kennen.

Das Gedächtnis und seine Pathologie

Es ist typisch für die Biologie, dass sich jede Fähigkeit so entwickeln kann, dass sie andere Fähigkeiten dominiert und manchmal sogar verdrängt. So verhält es sich auch mit dem Gedächtnis. Jede Art von Gedächtnis kann übermächtig werden und das Bewusstsein blockieren: das Langzeitgedächtnis, das Kurzzeitgedächtnis, aber auch das episodische oder autobiographische Gedächtnis wie der Fall Jill Price zeigt.

Dass bei alten Menschen die Einordnung und Verarbeitung neuer Erfahrungen nicht mehr so gut funktioniert und

daher die alten Erfahrungen und Gedächtnisinhalte dominieren, ist jedem bekannt, dass aber das episodische Gedächtnis in einem Maße vorhanden ist, das für den Betroffenen unerträglich ist, ist wenig bekannt. In der Literatur gibt es dafür auch wenige Fälle vor allem den Fall von Jill Price, die sich an den Hirnforscher James L. McGaugh wandte. Sie konnte sich an fast jeden Tag ihres Lebens genau erinnern und präzise Angaben über Wetter, politische, gesellschaftliche Ereignisse und eigene Erlebnisse machen. Man spricht in diesem Falle von einem hyperthymestischen Syndrom. Nimmt man die englische Bezeichnung nämlich *Highly Superior Autobiographical Memory*, dann wird der Sachverhalt klarer.

Dieses Syndrom ist ein Spezialfall der Hypermnésie, also einer gesteigerten Erinnerungsfähigkeit. Das hängt auch mit dem Phänomen zusammen, dass sich Personen, die zu einem Ereignis befragt werden nach mehreren Befragungen besser erinnern können und mehr Details oder Sachverhalte über das entsprechende Ereignis angeben können. Dieses bekannt memo-psychologische Phänomen schien sich bei Juristen noch nicht herumgesprochen zu haben.

Das wusste auch Freud schon, der sich in seiner Traumdeutung mit dem Phänomen befasste, dass bei seinen Patienten in den Träumen Personen, Ereignisse oder Gegebenheiten erschienen, die diese Personen bewusst noch nie gesehen oder erlebt hatten. Später stellte sich jedoch heraus, dass sie dies doch erlebt hatten. Offenbar kann sich der Mensch an Dinge erinnern, die im Wachsein nicht ins Bewusstsein gelangt sind. Sie wurden offensichtlich im Unbewussten gespeichert und gelangten von dort aus in die Träume.

Ontologischer Status

Wie auch bei anderen Funktionen des Gehirns, arbeiten beim Gedächtnis verschiedene Gehirnteile zusammen, vor allem wenn man an die höheren Formen von Gedächtnis denkt, also an das sogenannte deklarative Gedächtnis, das an Sprache und Begriffe gebunden ist. Kein Teil darf vollständig ausfallen. Kurzzeit- und Langzeitgedächtnis müssen funktionieren, die Sinne müssen immer neue speicherbare Daten liefern, und die Apperzeptionen müssen eine höhere Ordnung bilden, indem sie die Reflexion garantieren und damit auch die Einheit der Person und das Ich. Die Person erfährt dadurch, dass sie ihr eigenes Gedächtnis besitzt und nicht nur an irgendeinem Speicherpool teilhat, aus dem auch andere schöpfen, ihre Einmaligkeit. Insofern ist das Gedächtnis nicht nur individuell, sondern hat auch eine individuierende Funktion. Denn woran sich das entsprechende Individuum erinnert und auf welche Weise es sich nicht erinnert, macht ein wichtiges Charakteristikum seiner Person aus.

Fasst man das Gedächtnis als ein System auf, das aus Teilsystemen besteht, dann suggeriert man damit ein Ganzes oder ein *endurant*. Das gilt wohl für das Gedächtnis als Speichersystem. Dieses Speichersystem gewinnt und verliert andauernd Teile. Während das Gehirn ein *endurant* ist, d.h. ein Ganzes, dass in der Zeit und nicht durch die Zeit existiert, also keine zeitlichen Teile hat, ist das Gedächtnis als Prozess ein *perdurant*, das durch die

Zeit lebt und damit auch über zeitliche Teile verfügt. In diesem Prozess können zeitliche Teile fehlen, die man Gedächtnislücken nennt. Diese Lücken sind jedoch nur virtuell und werden zu einem kontinuierlichen Ganzen vervollständigt. Der Prozess weist damit trotz dieser Lücken eine gewisse Vollständigkeit auf und hat eine wichtige Funktion, weil er im Rahmen der subjektiven Zeit die Vergangenheit repräsentiert und damit auch sichert.

In diesem Aufsatz wird auch auf Gedächtnisformen hingewiesen, die nicht von der *anima rationalis* abhängen, wie z.B. das prozedurale Gedächtnis, das wir mindestens schon bei höheren Tieren finden und das von der grauen Substanz unabhängig ist.

Noch bemerkenswerter ist das Gedächtnis innerhalb der *anima vegetativa*, das vor allem das Immunsystem betrifft, selbst wieder ein äußerst komplexes System, dessen Funktion der Schutz des entsprechenden Individuums einer Spezies und damit auch der Spezies selbst ist. Dieses Gedächtnis findet man im Zellbereich, vor allem im Bereich einer Unterart weißer Blutkörperchen, nämlich einer bestimmten Form von Lymphozyten, d.h. von Körperzellen und damit in einer Stufe oder Ebene von Granularität oder Feinkörnigkeit, der man zunächst sicher nicht eine Art von Gedächtnis zugetraut hätte.

Schlussbemerkung

In diesem Beitrag wird die dreifache Unterscheidung Seelenteilen, die Aristoteles eingeführt hat, für systematische Betrachtungen verwendet. Diese drei Seelen, nämlich die vegetative, die sensitive und die rationale Seele, verfügen jeweils über eine eigene Art von Gedächtnis. Für die sensitive oder die Tierseele und die rationale oder die Menschenseele ist dies immer schon bekannt gewesen. Neu ist die Erkenntnis der modernen Medizin, dass es auch im Bereich des Vegetativen ein Gedächtnis gibt, das vor allem bei der Entwicklung von Antikörpern eine Rolle spielt, die ein wichtiger Teil des Immun- oder Schutzsystems unseres Körpers sind. Es gibt Gedächtniszellen und damit auf einer unteren Stufe der Granularität bereits ein Gedächtnis. Die Folge davon ist, dass es auch im Bereich der *anima vegetativa* eine Vergangenheit gibt und folglich auch eine Gegenwart und Zukunft und damit eine vertikale Zeitstruktur, die nicht bewusst ist, also nichts mit Bewusstsein zu tun hat, wie anderen Formen von Gedächtnis im Bereich des Sensitiven und des Rationalen.

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Memory and Reincarnation

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Abstract

According to reincarnation researchers, thousands of people, typically children, claim to remember previous lives. What are philosophers to make of these claims? Some of those influenced by the later Wittgenstein have been dismissive, asserting that the very idea of remembering previous lives is conceptually confused. In the absence of due attention to the contexts of utterance, such dismissals seem premature. But when the context, the form of life, is a culture different from one's own, how is a grammatical investigation to proceed? This paper engages in critical dialogue with ideas from several philosophers, notably Locke, Ayer, Hacker, and the reincarnation-advocate Robert Almeder. It recommends not conflating talk of reincarnation with that of personal identity, highlights the importance of recognizing when we may not know what to say about a given phenomenon, and proposes that a key challenge for Wittgensteinian philosophy is to develop cross-cultural methods of grammatical inquiry.

Some Wittgenstein-influenced philosophers have been dismissive of beliefs in reincarnation. Peter Hacker, for example, writes:

From time immemorial, human beings have fantasized about ... the transmigration of souls. A variant of the idea is patent in Locke's supposition of the intelligibility of the prince awakening 'in the body' of the cobbler, having retained all his memories. This thought has been given rein in fiction. ... These fantasies are supposed to illustrate the transference of the mind – indeed, of the person, conceived as identical with the mind – from one body to another. Amusing or terrifying as these fictions are, it is doubtful whether they make sense. (2007: 301)

Other Wittgenstein-influenced philosophers might say that Hacker has given insufficient attention to the contexts – the forms of life – in which beliefs in reincarnation arise and have their life.

In certain cultures that recognize reincarnation, it is believed that some people can remember features of a previous life. Many cases of children who purport to have such memories have been investigated by anthropologists and especially by the psychiatrist Ian Stevenson and his colleagues from the University of Virginia. Hacker, it seems, would dismiss such cases as "fantasies" that exhibit conceptual confusions. But other philosophers have taken them more seriously.

In this paper I will consider some central elements in philosophical debate concerning the phenomenon of remembering – or putatively remembering – previous lives.

1

Hacker, as we have seen, associates belief in – or fantasies about – reincarnation with the sorts of thought-experiments devised in philosophical discussions of personal identity. Locke famously deploys certain thought-experiments in his argument for conscious memory's being criterial for personal identity. For Locke, if someone claims to have the same soul as that of Nestor at the siege of Troy but has no recollection of performing any of Nestor's actions, he cannot rightly claim to be the same person as Nestor; if, however, the soul of a cobbler were to depart from his body and be replaced by that of a prince, "carrying with it the consciousness of the Prince's past life ... every one sees," asserts Locke, "he would be the same Person

with the Prince" (Locke 1975: 339-340). A natural way of reading this is as a conceptual claim, that what it *means* for A to be the same person as B is for A to have first-person recall of (at least some of) B's experiences.

Other philosophers, though not doubting the intelligibility of the kind of scenario Locke sketches, have been more cautious about the conceptual claim. A. J. Ayer imagines someone who, purporting to be Julius Caesar, is able not only to describe experiences known to have been undergone by Caesar, but also to provide information about events in Caesar's life that are subsequently confirmed by new discoveries (1956: 194). While Locke, it seems, would be willing to grant that this person is indeed Caesar, Ayer observes that in a case of this sort "we should hardly know what to say." This, again, is a conceptual claim, for Ayer's point is that our concepts, having not evolved in circumstances where such cases arise, are ill-adapted to deal with them. If they did arise, Ayer suggests, then a decision would be called for, whether to extend the scope of the concept of personal identity to cover such cases or not.

Philosophers who take seriously the work of Ian Stevenson and other reincarnation researchers have claimed that cases of the sort imagined by Ayer have actually happened. One such philosopher, Robert Almeder, goes further in his conclusion than does Stevenson himself. Whereas Stevenson maintains only that there are many cases "suggestive" of reincarnation, Almeder contends that, for some of these cases, "it seems unreasonable to accept a belief other than reincarnation to explain [them]" (1992: 62). In arguing for this conclusion, Almeder invokes Ayer's reflections on the Julius Caesar thought-experiment and attributes to Ayer a stronger claim than that which he in fact makes. As we have seen, Ayer's contention is that our concepts concerning personhood are unsuited to deal with cases of the sort outlined, and hence a decision would be needed as to whether the person in question should be regarded as (the same person as) Caesar. Almeder, however, assumes – apparently like Locke – that our concepts are already capable of handling cases such as this and that what Ayer has done is to articulate the conditions sufficient for establishing that the person is indeed Caesar reincarnated (60-61). On the basis of this assumption, Almeder asserts that "it will be sufficient for the truth of reincarnation that the memory conditions laid out by Ayer, and clearly instanced in a number of the cases [documented by Stevenson and his associates], be satisfied" (61-62). Thus, while Ayer in fact maintains that "we should hardly know what to say" in the circumstances outlined,

Almeder takes him to have asserted that we would know exactly what to say, namely that the man is a reincarnation of Caesar.

2

It is important to remember that when Ayer observes that “we should hardly know what to say,” he is thinking specifically of the concept of personal identity. He means that we should not know whether to say that the man before us is the same person as Caesar or not. Although Ayer does subsequently suggest that what is at stake here is “the possibility of reincarnation,” we need not assume that “same person as” and “reincarnation of” are invariably interchangeable expressions. When Locke denies that someone with none of Nestor’s memories could be the same person as Nestor, he does not deny that such a person could nevertheless have Nestor’s soul. Given that Locke’s primary acquaintance with reincarnation beliefs will have derived from classical Greek thought, in which the idea obtained of a “river of forgetfulness” that souls must cross between incarnations, it is unsurprising that he allows for the possibility of a kind of reincarnation without memory of previous lives – and hence, by Locke’s lights, without personal identity.

Whatever we think of Locke’s particular version of the idea, we ought not to assume that denying the possibility of personal identity across biologically distinct lifetimes entails the denial of reincarnation. However, if it is specifically the possibility of *remembering* experiences from a previous life that is at issue, then it is the conceptual connections surrounding talk of remembering that need to be investigated. Locke sees no difficulty in supposing that memories could be relocated from one human being to another: from the body of a prince to that of a cobbler, for example. But this is precisely what philosophers such as Hacker find incoherent. We may be able to imagine such things, but this does not make them logically possible.

One well-worn objection to the claim that someone could have memories of a previous life goes roughly as follows. A distinction exists between genuinely remembering and merely seeming to remember. Clearly, if I merely *seem* to remember a previous life, that alone hardly suffices to show that I really lived that life. So some further criterion is needed to differentiate actual memories from merely apparent ones. The obvious criterion is a bodily one: in normal circumstances, if I am unsure whether my memory is reliable, I may seek evidence of my whereabouts at a given time. For example, if I am unsure whether my apparent memory of having been to the Isle of White with my uncle Fred when I was three years old is reliable, ways of checking would include asking my uncle Fred, or looking for photographs of the occasion, etc. A photograph of me with my uncle Fred on the Isle of White at the age of three would be strong evidence of the veridicality of my memory. In the case of putative past-life memories, however, confirmatory evidence of this kind is ruled out not merely in practice but in principle. With the photograph of me on the Isle of White, if there is any doubt about whether it is really me in the photograph, what would need to be established is whether that human being is physically continuous with the human being that I now am. But now suppose that I claim to remember having visited the Isle of White seventy years before the human being that I now am was born. There is no comparable evidence that could be sought in order to confirm or disconfirm the purported memory; and hence, it would seem, there can be no meaningful distinction between genuinely remembering and merely seeming to remember in such cases. In the absence of the possibil-

ity of such a distinction, some philosophers would maintain that the claim to *remember* a past life lacks sense; the most one can say is that one has apparent memories. They may be exactly similar to those of someone who lived before one was born. But exact similarity is not identity.¹

3

Almeder has responded to arguments of this sort by asserting that they merely beg the question against the believer in reincarnation; they propose “an a priori interpretation of memory that would make reincarnation ... conceptually impossible when in all other respects the hypothesis of reincarnation fits an important body of data not otherwise capable of explanation” (1992: 84-85). Proponents of such arguments, meanwhile, would maintain that they are not offering an *interpretation* of memory; they are simply reminding us of an essential feature of the concept of memory, namely the fact that, internal to the concept, is a distinction between remembering and merely seeming to remember, and that distinguishing the one from the other requires at least the in-principle possibility of verification in terms of bodily continuity. We are thus faced with a conceptual disagreement – a disagreement over the very concept of remembering. Where can the debate go from here?

One direction in which the debate could go – a direction that ought to seem obvious from a Wittgensteinian point of view – would be to examine examples of how talk of reincarnation and remembering previous lives operates within the cultural environments that are its natural home. Moving in such a direction would involve ceasing to abstract the salient concepts from the forms of life in which, if they have any sense at all, they have the sense that they do. It would, we might say, involve bringing words such as “reincarnation” and “remembering previous lives” “back from their metaphysical to their everyday use” (Wittgenstein 2009: §116). The work of Ian Stevenson and his associates offers a valuable resource for that form of investigation. Although Stevenson, along with his advocates such as Almeder, is keen to downplay the significance of cultural context for the interpretation of his data, it is precisely the cultural context to which a Wittgensteinian investigation ought to attend. Almeder has argued for what he describes as a “minimalist reincarnation thesis.” Its formulation is so pared down – indeed, we might say that it is expressed in such vague and bland terms – that it “would be accepted minimally by all major forms of the belief in reincarnation” (Almeder 1997: 503). This approach is unlikely to deepen our understanding of what it means to believe in reincarnation. For Almeder, however, the aim is not to deepen our understanding of the phenomenon in question. The problem with his approach is that he assumes that we already know what it means to believe in reincarnation, and that the crucial issue is whether reincarnation really happens, or whether we at least have good reason to believe that it happens.

On the other side of the debate, the problem with dismissive approaches such as Hacker’s is that they remain culturally blinkered. This may derive, in part, from Wittgenstein’s emphasis on examining the “different regions of *our* language” (2009: §90, my emphasis). The injunction that “Philosophy only states what everyone concedes” (§599), merely “puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything” (§126), may work reasonably well for a mono-cultural investigation; but how does it work when the

1 I take this view to be exemplified by Geach (1969: 1-16) and Williams (1973: 1-25), and endorsed by Phillips (1970: 11-12).

forms of language to be examined operate within a cultural context different from one's own?

There is a place in Hacker's discussion of the concept of a person where he makes a point similar to that which we saw Ayer making: "What is true," writes Hacker, "is that our concept of a person is tailored to creatures like us. We can coherently imagine all manner of circumstances in which it would lose its grip, circumstances under which we would no longer know what to say" (2007: 308). Hacker mentions pathological cases such as multiple personality disorder and imagined scenarios such as "[c]omplete 'memory portfolios' being transferred 'from one human being to another.'" His response to these cases is to admit, like Ayer, that given our existing concepts, we would not know what to say.

The challenge with respect to talk of remembering previous lives is to resist a dual temptation. One temptation is that of dismissing such talk as the product of fantasizing about things that are, ultimately, unintelligible. The other is that of assuming that we know what is being said and that the only pressing question is whether such talk is true to the facts. Having resisted these temptations, the further challenge is to develop genuinely cross-cultural methods of grammatical inquiry.

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Perceptual Content: Phenomenal and Intentional

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Abstract

It is generally held that perceptual states have both phenomenal and intentional features. Though they are inextricably linked in each perceptual state, qualitative states, according to a dominant model of perception, form an important part of the causal link in the production of perceptual beliefs about the world. The model has two inbuilt assumptions: a) qualitative features of a perceptual state can arise without any intentional features; b) awareness of a qualitative state or a qualitative belief is distinct from a qualitative state itself. I argue that none of these assumptions are tenable, and that no perceptual state can arise without the features of awareness, phenomenality and intentionality.

1. A Model of Perception

Perceptual beliefs, which are about states of affairs in the world, are formed because of causal interactions between an organism and the environment in which it is placed. A perceptual belief is taken here an occurrent state, and not as a dispositional one. Being occurrent states, perceptual beliefs may be conceived as states of awareness of properties in the world as well as the similarities and differences among them. According to a dominant view of perception, objective properties produce a set of qualitative states, which in their turn causes beliefs or states of awareness about the occurrence of properties in the world. For example, in visually perceiving an object, it appears in certain way. Following Shoemaker, we shall refer to such an appearance associated with visual perception as 'being appeared-to in a certain way' (Shoemaker, 1975). 'Being appeared-blue-to', 'being appeared-red-to' etc. are specific types of qualitative states produced by corresponding visually perceivable objective properties like being blue, being red etc. Qualitative states are related to perceivable qualities in the world in such a way that stimulation by an object with certain properties under normal conditions produces in the subject the associated qualitative states.

Various perceivable properties or objects possessing such properties stand in similarity-difference relations among them. They are known as objective similarities and differences. These relations are mapped onto corresponding qualitative states because of which the qualitative states themselves stand in similarity-difference relations; the similarity-difference relations among one's qualitative states are called qualitative similarities and differences. It is because of the involvement of the qualitative states and the relations of qualitative similarities and differences among them, a subject becomes aware of different properties of objects and their similarities and differences. What preserves the systematic correlation between phenomenal similarities and differences and objective similarities and differences is the causal relation between objective properties and the corresponding qualitative states. The systematic correlation enables a subject to perceive objects as possessing various perceptual qualities along with similarities and differences among them. (Shoemaker, 1975a)

Qualitative states with a set of qualitative similarities and differences that systematically correlate with objective similarities and differences, in their turn, produce two kinds of beliefs: objective beliefs and qualitative beliefs. A qualitative belief is understood as awareness of qualia whereas an objective belief is taken as of awareness of objective properties in the world. If a person perceives a yellow object, then he is in a qualitative state associated with yellow

color, the state of being appeared-yellow-to which is a product of visual stimulation by a yellow object. This state tends to give rise to the objective belief that there is something yellow present and the qualitative belief that there occurs the qualitative state of being appeared-yellow-to (Shoemaker, 1975). In a given context, qualitative beliefs may also include those about qualitative similarities and differences among one's qualitative states. In the same way, beliefs about objective properties and those about the objective similarities and differences among the visually perceived objects form part of one's objective beliefs. Though both the sets of occur together, an objective belief need not always be accompanied by a qualitative belief and *vice versa*. In Shoemaker's opinion, by shifting our attention from external objects to one's internal qualitative states, one comes to have qualitative beliefs (Shoemaker, 1975). Since qualitative beliefs can occur without objective beliefs and vice versa, they are distinct and separable.

The model of perception currently under consideration has two important built-in assumptions. 1. Qualitative features of a perceptual state can occur without its intentional features. 2. Awareness of a qualitative state or a qualitative belief is distinct from a qualitative state itself (See Nelkin, 1993). In what follows, I shall argue that none of these assumptions are tenable, and that a perceptual state cannot arise without any of its three features, namely, awareness, phenomenality and intentionality (Tomy, 2003).

2. Can Phenomenality Occur Without Intentionality?

I shall, first, argue that phenomenality of perceptual states cannot be separated from intentional and awareness features. But before we proceed further in this direction, it is necessary to know why some philosophers hold that qualitative states can present themselves without intentionality. In order to consider an internal cognitive state to be a veridical perceptual state, it must satisfy two conditions: First, it must represent a certain state of affairs and second, the state of affairs it represents is causally responsible for its production. According to a prominent view, the intentionality of a veridical perceptual state is understood in terms of its power to represent of a certain state of affairs, which in turn, is defined in causal terms; that is, a perceptual state represents a state of affairs if and only if the state of affairs the perceptual state represents causally produces it and the causal relation is 'appropriate' or nomological (Grice, 1961). If intentionality of a perceptual state can be reduced to appropriate causal relations between the states of affairs and the cognitive states they

produce, then it follows that those states in whose case such causal relations do not obtain are not intentional.

Two kinds of internal states are known to us which from the point of view of the subjects having them cannot be distinguished from veridical perceptual states: they are states of illusion and states of hallucination. In both hallucination and illusion, the causal links that nomologically obtain between the perceptual states and the states of the world are broken. In the case of illusion, the state of affairs that produce the cognitive state is not represented by it whereas hallucinatory states, *prima facie*, arise without any causal link between the world and hallucinatory states. The availability of internal states with phenomenal features similar to those that take place in perception but without appropriate causal links with the external world tends to give rise to the view that it is possible that qualitative states occur without intentionality. Thus, one of the reasons that lead a philosopher to the view that there are qualia or pure phenomenal states without intentionality is the possibility of illusion and hallucination together with the view that intentionality can be reduced to causal relation between a cognitive state and a state of affairs.

There is, however, a major issue with the understanding of intentionality in terms of causal relations alone, namely, that it cannot account for the intentionality of all those states that we consider intentional. An important class of states that cannot be taken care of within the casual account is the class of mental states that are about future states of affairs. The intentionality of a state, which represents future state of affairs, cannot be explained in terms of causal relations alone unless one grants backward causation in time. But backward causation does not seem to be intuitively plausible at least from a common sense point of view. So, a plausible theory of intentionality must grant that there must be some factor other than causation at work in intentionality. One might argue that states that represent future or past states of affairs are not significant when we talk about the intentionality of perception because a perceptual state always represents a current state of affairs. Though this may sound reasonable, we cannot be oblivious to the fact that a general reductive theory of intentionality must be comprehensive enough to account for the intentionality of all those states that we consider intentional, and the point is that the causal account fails to do so in the case of beliefs about future.

From a first person point of view, there is no way to distinguish among veridical perceptual states, hallucinatory states and states of illusion. In each of these cases, an object is presented to the subject, which is the crux of perceptual intentionality. It is, therefore, necessary to know how an object is invariably presented in perception or in a perception like state. Phenomenal properties of an internal state signify a set of properties because of which they denote an object or a class of objects that instantiate these properties. But the class of objects that instantiate the properties signified by the phenomenal states is not, perhaps cannot be, restricted to those that instantiate them in a given context. It also includes those objects that instantiate the properties in other possible situations. The possibility of instantiating a set of properties signified by a qualitative state is an important factor of intentionality that cannot be spelt merely in causal vocabulary. Perceptual intentionality, i.e., presentation of an object in a perceptual or a perception like state, is the possibility of instantiating the properties signified by phenomenal features of internal states. This possibility is invariably present in states of perception, hallucination and illusion. The function of causal relations in the context of perception is to provide the propositional content of a perceptual state with truth-

functionality. A perceptual belief is true if and if nomological causal relation is obtained between internal state and the state of affairs that it represents, other wise it is false.

3. Can Qualia and Awareness be Separated?

Let us now come to the second assumption that awareness of qualitative states is distinct from qualitative states themselves. It has two implications: a) A qualitative state can occur without one's being aware of them; b) An awareness of qualitative states can take place without the presence of qualitative states. Both these implications have unwelcome consequences. The implication that a qualitative state can come about without there being the feature of awareness defies the very definition of a qualitative state. A qualitative mental state is understood as an essentially conscious state with their intrinsic qualitative or phenomenal features. If qualitative states can occur without one's being aware of them, then there is nothing like what it is to have those states as Nagel would put it (Nagel, 1974), and consequently they do not qualify to be called qualitative or phenomenal states. It makes no sense to say that one is in a state of being appeared-blue-to, yet one is quite unaware of it. It gives rise to the possibility that there are unconscious qualia. The possibility of unconscious qualia is quite counterintuitive given that a qualitative or phenomenal state is defined as what it is like to be state. It would be absurd to say, for example, that one feels pain without being aware of it.

The second implication that awareness of qualitative states - qualitative beliefs as Shoemaker calls them - can take place even in the absence of qualia, can give rise to the possibility of qualia hallucination and qualia illusion. Qualia hallucination is the possibility of having a belief that there is appearance of qualia though no qualia actually occur. For example, we may say that one believes or becomes aware that one is in a state of being-appeared-red-to without there being any occurrence of being-appeared-red-to. Qualia illusion, on the other hand, is mistaking one set of qualia for another. For example, on the assumption of the distinction between awareness states and qualitative states, it is possible that a person who actually feels tickles believes that she feels or undergoes pain. That is, one is mistakenly aware of one's being-felt-ticklish as being-felt-pain. Qualia illusion and qualia hallucination can make sense only if awareness of qualitative state or the belief that one is having a particular qualitative state is distinct and separable from the qualitative state itself. But both qualia-illusion and qualia-hallucination are absurdities. Qualia hallucination is an impossibility: to have the state of being-appeared-red-to one must be aware that one is in a state of being appeared-red-to, but to be aware that one is appeared-red-to is to be appeared-red-to. Therefore, it makes no sense to speak of qualia-hallucination. Similarly, qualia-illusion too appears to be an absurdity. If one is in a state of being appeared-red-to, then one cannot mistake this appearance for some other appearance because in order to be mistaken there must be a distinction between appearance and reality, but in the case of appearances *per se*, there is no such distinction. Hence, qualia illusion is impossible. Since the assumption that awareness states and qualitative states are ontologically distinct leads to this kind of consequences, this assumption is false and its opposite, namely, that awareness of qualia and qualitative state are identical must be true. The identity of qualia and their awareness implies that our knowledge of qualitative states as well as the similarities and differences among them is direct and immediate, and for this reason infallible

and incorrigible. Since qualitative states and awareness states cannot be distinct, qualitative states like 'feeling in a certain way' and 'being appeared in a certain way' must be mere modes of awareness.

Conclusion

According to the position that I defend here, a qualitative state involved in perception is the awareness of a perceivable objective quality. Being an awareness state directed towards an objective physical property, a qualitative state has a built-in intentionality. An awareness state that we call a qualitative state can be viewed in either of two different ways: a broad relational way and a narrow non-relational way. According to the relational view, an awareness state involved in perception is a qualitative state understood in terms of the objective physical property that produces it and is correlated with it. An awareness state, understood in terms of the causal and referential relations to the objective properties is what we call an intentional state. But if we consider an awareness state in a narrow non-relational way, without taking into account the properties that cause them or those that they represent, it may be viewed as a pure qualitative state without intentionality. When broadly defined an awareness state has a content that is distinct from it, and this distinction leaves room for awareness state to be fallible. When it is narrowly defined, the awareness state, and its content are not distinct and therefore the knowledge or awareness of this content remains infallible.

The intentional content of a perceptual state is the presentation of certain a state of affairs either actual or possible. For a conscious being, a perceptual presentation of an object is possible only with awareness and phenomenal features. Hence, a perceptual state invariably has three features of awareness, intentionality, and phenomenality. From a first person point of view, awareness of an object and the qualitative features of the awareness are given

together in perception and are known directly and immediately. In visually perceiving a blue object, it is not the case that a subject first becomes aware of the qualitative state of being appeared-blue-to, and then makes an inference to the effect she sees something blue. An appearance is always an appearance of something. One cannot, for example, have the qualitative belief 'I am in a state of being appeared-blue-to' without the belief 'I am presented *something* blue'. In other words, being directed towards an object is built into various appearances that one has. In appearances, various properties are presented as belonging to something. But the question is whether this something, which is an intentional object, is identical to the object that is causally responsible for the production of internal state. Such a question cannot be raised from a first person point view but from a third person point of view. The availability of both these points of views makes it possible for us to view one and same perceptual state both narrowly and broadly giving rise to the mistaken view that qualitative and intentional features of one's perceptual states are distinct and separable.

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Direct Smart Perception

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Abstract

This paper argues, against the representationalist views, that pre-reflective perception is not only direct but also smart. Indeed, recent studies (Onishi & Baillargeon 2005, Surian et al. 2007, Baillargeon et al. 2010) demonstrated false belief understanding in young children through completely nonverbal measures such as violation of expectation (VOE)* looking paradigm and showed that children younger than 3 years of age, who consistently fail the standard verbal false-belief task, can anticipate others' actions based on their attributed false beliefs. This gave rise to the so-called "Developmental Paradox" (DP): if preverbal human infants have the capacity to respond to others' false beliefs from at least 15 months, why should they be unable to verbally express their capacity to recognize false beliefs until they are 4-years old, a full 33 months later? The DP teaches us that visual perception plays a crucial role in processing the implicit false-belief condition as opposed to the explicit/verbal-report condition. But if the main job of the mind is the manipulation of representations, then why precisely does the manipulation of further representations make 3-year old children appear less clever than 13-month olds? Why is perception, in some cases, "smarter" than explicit and verbalized thinking? Here I propose a Direct View of perception offers an elegant nonrepresentationalist solution to the DP.

* The VOE task tests whether children look longer when agents act in a manner that is inconsistent with their false beliefs and relies on the basic assumption that when an individual's expectations are violated, she is surprised and thus she looks longer at an unexpected event rather than at an expected event.

Introduction

Perception is the fundamental point of contact with the environment and provides the primary basis on which beliefs, concepts and knowledge may be formed. On the dominant representationalist view, perception is conceived as a process of getting an image, description or symbol of the environmental object into the head or mind of the perceiver. Representations stand for something in the world and constitute the object of awareness. To put it in a slogan: no perception without representations. Call this the *Indirect View* (IDV). According to the IDV, a perceiver is actually only in direct contact with the proximal stimulation that reaches the receptors or with sense-data or with internal images they elicit, but *not* with the distal object itself. Furthermore, perceiving inherently involves or entails objectively representing the world as being a certain way: i.e. perception is necessarily contentful. Indeed, for many contemporary analytic philosophers, if one is to perceive, then the world must be represented as being a certain way.

Recently, however, a new party to the discussion has emerged, challenging the idea that mentality is essentially content involving and hence an exclusively heady affair. The embodied/enactive cognition (EC) holds that perception emerges from the dynamic online interaction or "coupling" between autonomous agents and the environment which they are embedded (Varela et al. 1991, Hutto 2008; Chemero 2009, Hutto and Myin 2013). Perception is *direct* in the sense that a perceiver is aware of or in contact with ordinary mind-independent objects, rather than mind-dependent surrogates thereof (Warren 2005, Withagen & Chemero 2011). Call this the *Direct View* (DV henceforth). Perception is an agent-environment constitutive relation of "keeping-in-touch" with the world (Gibson 1979:239).

This paper is structured as follows. In section 1 I briefly discuss representationalist solutions to the DP. Section 2 illustrates how a direct view of perception allows an elegant solution to the DP.

1. Smart Basic Cognition: Representationalist Strategies

Recent evidence has been mounting to suggest that infants have much more sophisticated social-cognitive skills than previously suspected. A sizeable literature illustrated that before their first birthday, preverbal human infants not only understand what *goals* others have (Carpenter et al. 2005) and what *preferences* others have (Repacholi & Gopnik 1997); they also track what others *know*, in the sense of what they have and have not experienced in the immediate past (Moll & Tomasello 2007). Moreover, preverbal human infants keep track of an agent's epistemic state and motivations not only about locations, but also about number, identity and other properties (Scott & Baillargeon 2009, Scott & Baillargeon 2009, Kovacs et al. 2010).

There have been roughly two main lines of response to the DP¹. Rich interpretation strategy argue that preverbal human infants do represent/understand false beliefs and deny that there is a fundamental change at around 4 years of age when children first pass the SFBT (Leslie et al. 2005; Bloom & German, 2000; Scott & Baillargeon 2009). Opposing this view, others claim that apparent success on VOE/AL tasks in early infancy can be explained without supposing that infants have an understanding of beliefs at all. Call this the *weak* interpretation (Perner & Ruffman 2005, Apperly & Butterfill 2009). Both rich and weak lines of responses are shaped within a *cognitivist-representationalist* framework. Representationalism is roughly the view that "the manipulation and use of representations is the primary job of the mind" (Dretske 1995: xiv). Against the rich interpretation, the weak strategy theorists object that even if we accept that VOE/AL tasks involve false-belief representational states, it is not clear why this does *not* require selection processing and response-inhibition as well. The rich interpretation supporters reply that it is not clear why should we take for granted the fact that preverbal human infants are able to represent and

¹ Due to space considerations, a detailed review of this literature is out of the question here.

reason about an agent's *goals* and *motivations* while questioning their capacity to represent and agent's *false belief*.

The anti-cognitivist/representationalist approaches split into two branches, (i) *reconciliatory* and (ii) *radical*, depending on their commitment to the idea that basic cognition involves or not the manipulation of representations. On the reconciliatory side, some enactivist proponents call on representations to explain behavior, although they call on them in such a way that the need for “mental gymnastics” (Chemero 2009) is reduced. The representations they call on are either indexical-functional (Agre & Chapman 1987), “pushmi-pullyu” (Millikan 1995), action-oriented (Clark 1997), or emulator representations (Grush 1997, Churchland 2002). Opposing this view, radical embodied cognitive science (REC) is “the scientific study of perception, cognition, and action as necessarily embodied phenomena, using explanatory tools that *do not posit mental representations*” (Chemero 2009:29, emphasis added). REC defenders vigorously reject the idea that our capacity for social interaction is based on ascribing mental states. If this is so, then they have to meet the following challenge:

P1. Empirical evidence strongly suggests that basic cognition is smart (since 15-month olds understand false-beliefs).

P2. Smart cognition necessarily involves computations and representations (of false beliefs).

P3. Hence, basic cognition necessarily involves computations and representations (of false beliefs).

In the next section I illustrate how the Direct View of perception offers a satisfactory solution to the DP.

2. Smart Direct Perception: the Radical Enactivist Strategy

Since so much of my argumentation hangs on the distinction between *online* and *offline* processing, it is worth going over familiar ground carefully in preparation for my argument for the Direct Smart Perception approach to the DP. In the Embodied Cognition literature, *online* processing refers to the idea that much cognitive activity operates directly on the real-world environment M. Wilson (2002). *Offline* embodiment is the use of modality-specific representations in order to represent the meaning of symbols whose referents are absent. Sensorimotor functions that evolved for action and perception have been co-opted for use during offline cognition which occurs when sensorimotor functions are decoupled from the immediate environment and subserve what we might call “displaced thought processes,” i.e., thoughts about situations and events in other times and places. Note that there are some significant differences between online and offline embodied cognition. Indeed, while online processing deals with task-relevant inputs/outputs and real-time or run-time tasks offline cognition takes place decoupled from any immediate interaction with the environment (ex: planning, remembering, day-dreaming, etc.) But more importantly, offline processing seems more successful when it builds up and manipulates internal representations *at leisure*. It has been argued that humans do *not* successfully cope with the “representational bottleneck” (Wilson 2002:628). However, if one lifts the demands of time pressure, some of the true power of human cognition becomes evident. With these elements in our pocket let us return to the DP.

I start with the idea that infants are directly coupled with the environment. This direct coupling is established via the

detection of optical patterns which are constitutive of direct perception. Because infants are directly coupled to the perceived information when they track it, there is never call upon representations. In other words, direct perception is a matter of using information in perceptual variables (Withagen & Chemero 2011) to maintain a coupling between organisms and the environment. Now, what are the differences between the VOE/AL and SFBT scenarios? It seems to me that the obvious answer is the following.

First, the infants' situated perspective is dramatically different. While during VOE/AL tasks the perceived information is right there, in the environment, the SFBT requires them to process offline information decoupling. Recall that the traditional cognitive view holds that perceivers are in only *mediated* perceptual contact with the environment. Indeed, some reconciliatory theorists (De Bruin & Kästner 2012) argued that that VOE/AL tasks require infants to process differences between the visual information available to them alone and the visual information available to the other agent, and this can only be accomplished *offline*, since the other's visual information is *not directly* available to the infant and needs to be internally represented by her. Hence they jump to the conclusion that VOE/AL tasks involve a capacity for (i) decoupling from one's own online processing of visual information and (ii) processing offline a representation of the visual information accessible to another agent. Although I agree with De Bruin & Kästner in saying that (a) SFBTs require decoupling, and that (b) verbal interaction during SFBT plays a crucial role in 3-year olds' failure to report false-belief understanding, there is still something missing in the picture. In order to truly solve the DP, they need to answer the following question: why does *stronger* offline decoupling impair (at least in some cases) rather than improve the “mental gymnastics” of representational manipulation? In other words: why do *weaker* forms of decoupling do a better job in a complex task such as false-belief understanding?

Second, whereas VOE/AL tasks allow infants to watch/process a scene *at their leisure*, in the SFBTs they are urged to process offline decoupling on verbal demand and under time-pressure: “Tell me *now* <Where will Sally look for her marble>” (Wimmer & Perner 1983). If the Direct View is correct, then this explain why infants, by being in direct perceptual contact with the environment, successfully pick-up specific patterns in the ambient array, while failing to address them on the representational and verbally explicit level.

Finally, it is not only the “verbal” component which disturbs infants' performance during SFBT, but also and more importantly, the “interaction” component as well. Processing the experimenter' interrogation during the SFBTs becomes a genuine task in itself. Indeed, now infants' first concern is to cope with experimenter's demand: “This chap asks me here and now something about that Sally-doll and her marble then and there.” Consequently, she has to regulate the intricate connection between her own takes on the world (coupling), Sally and Anne's doings (offline decoupling) and experimenter's questions (online recoupling), and he has to do it fast, since the interrogator expects an immediate response (Ciaunica, forthcoming).

Concluding Remarks

I argued here that endorsing a direct view of perception offers an elegant and simple solution to the developmental puzzle, without crediting infants with acrobatic mental gymnastics. I would like to conclude with an embryonic and speculative working hypothesis. Instead of performing

acrobatic conceptual linking between “low-level” sensorimotor processes and the “high-level” cognitive processes, a better solution would be let go the idea that basic cognition necessarily involves “mental gymnastics” in the first place. My view supports the idea that the epistemic situation of a typically developing infant is, to paraphrase O. Neurath’ famous metaphor, similar to that of a sailor who, for better and for worse, has to rebuild his ship on the open sea, without ever being able to “offline” dismount it in dry-dock and reconstruct it from the best components, at their leisure, as philosophers usually do.

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On certainty and subjectivity in taste

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Abstract

A trend in philosophy of language and semantics considers adjectives like *tasty*, and evaluative judgements like “This cake is tasty” or “I find this cake tasty”, to be subjective, where subjectivity is construed along largely Cartesian lines. We sketch a non-Cartesian view of how subjectivity is involved in the meaning of *tasty* and of evaluative judgements by relating them to Wittgenstein’s discussions of avowals and certainties.

1. 1. Avowals and judgements of taste

Recently, semanticists have turned their attention to adjectives like *tasty* (also called “predicates of personal taste”, PPTs henceforth), and have claimed that these are, in a sense, subjective (a.o. Lasersohn 2005, Kennedy to appear).¹ Notwithstanding the differences among theories, many of them share an assumption: PPTs denote something that belongs to an individual’s private realm. The truth-conditions or access to the content of evaluations like those in (1) are subject-dependent. This supposedly explains why there are so-called faultless disagreements as (1) in which interlocutors contradict each other but this does not imply that one of them is wrong:

- (1) A: The cake is tasty.
B: No, it’s not!

The assumption that PPTs denote something private, we argue, responds to the Cartesian view regarding subjectivity which Wittgenstein examines in his remarks on avowals, like A’s in example (2). For the Cartesian, introspection gives A immediate access to her feeling of pain, and hence to the truth of her avowal, making B’s attempted correction absurd.

- (2) A: I am in pain.
B: No, you’re not.

In his later writings, Wittgenstein dismantles the Cartesian account of subjectivity, and also provides an alternative view on the distinctive security of avowals (cf. a.o. Bax 2011, Overgaard 2004, Schulte 1993). According to him, avowals are non-observational and non-descriptive. There are exceptional cases where A could be mistaken about her own pain, but this is not because A has infallible access to what *pain* designates. Avowals are expressions, rather than descriptions, of our embodied and phenomenological undergoings. Normally I do not say that I have a headache after making empirical observations (e.g., noting that I cannot stand direct light). Normally, there is no room for doubting our own pain or that of our fellow human beings (Wittgenstein 1953, §246). I could pretend that I am in pain and lie, saying “I am in pain” just to get your consolation. But if truth hinges only on truthfulness, there is no criterion; hence, there is no room for empirical mistakes.

Here, (in)correctness does not coincide with truth and falsity. Truth and falsity constitute (in)correctness of how a description fits what is the case. Semantic (in)correctness of avowals is not specified in terms on truth and falsity, it is established by the ensemble of practices associated with them, shaped both biologically and culturally. In example

(2), if A’s gestures showed relief or pleasure, we would be puzzled. We may think that A is a bad liar, that he is being ironic, or that simply he does not know the meaning of *pain*. Avowals are only part of the criteria for third-person attributions; our embodied reactions are also part and parcel of the criteria for correct use, which allows new members of our linguistic community to learn these terms (cf. Wittgenstein 1953, §269).

Second- and third-person attributions like B’s in (2) or those in (3) hinge on observations, but they are not mere speculations: they are constitutive of how terms like *pain* get their meaning. The asymmetry between A’s avowal and B’s challenge in (2) is not due to privileged epistemic access, but to how the bodily and behavioural constitute our minds.

- (3) C: A is in pain.
B: No, she is not.

While in (2) A’s and B’s utterances speak about the same but they are an expression followed by a description, in (3) both C and B exchange descriptions. Evidence for these descriptions may be A’s gestures and (linguistic) behaviour. My avowals presuppose that I know the meaning of *pain*, so that when you say it I also expect certain gestures and embodied behaviour. The conventional nature of language is paired up with the natural manifestations of pain. Our natural manifestations are part of the pre-existing practices that give criteria of correct use for avowals.

Subjectivity is said to be central in the semantics of PPTs like *tasty*, in contrast to adjectives like *pregnant* or *empty*. Different formal accounts of the meaning of PPTs have been given, most of them trying to accommodate the peculiarity of so-called faultless disagreements like (1), in contrast with (4):

- (4) A: She is pregnant.
B: No, she is not!

(Lasersohn 2005) and (Kennedy to appear), among others, assume that PPTs denote something that occurs in each of the interlocutors’ private realm. The subject-dependence of the truth-conditions (or access to the content) of *tasty*, absent in *pregnant*, explains the contrast between (1) and (4), and why A and B in (1) may be both right while they assert contradictory statements. It also allows embedding PPTs under attitude verbs like *find*; exchanges like (5) supposedly make explicit the hidden subject-dependence in (1):

- (5) A: I find the cake tasty.
B: I don’t.

This claim is a variant of the Cartesian view on subjectivity in avowals. The subject-dependence in (1) is thought to be

¹ (Lasersohn 2005) initiates a still open debate among contextualists, relativists and absolutists regarding the truth-conditions of sentences featuring predicates of personal taste.

a consequence of the fact that evaluations like “This is tasty” report sensory experience to which each speaker has privileged access (cf. Pearson 2012), or direct experience of the individual’s internal psychological state (Stephenson 2007). Thus, *find* in (5) is thought to mean broadly the same as *believe* except that the embedded proposition is known via direct experience. Such a Cartesian discourse may stem from taking too far this analogy: When I say that an object is long, I compare it with the normal length of other (similar) objects with respect to the relevant dimension. When I say that something is tasty, I compare my current embodied experience with a standard or norm set by past experiences of savouring (similar) things.

3. Certainties about pain and taste

Taste evaluations allow us to express our readiness to act in accordance with certain practices, rather than describe facts about ourselves. Evaluations like “I find this tasty” work like avowals, if we consider how the strangeness of B’s reaction in (6a) is parallel to (2), and the acceptability of (6b) is similar to the contrast introduced by (3).

- (6) (a) A: I find this cake tasty.
B: No, you don’t.
(b) C: She finds this cake tasty.
B: No, she doesn’t.

C in (6b) can take a judgement like A’s in (6a) into account as evidence, together with A’s gestures and behaviour. A non-Cartesian view of subjectivity fits in the picture, and no talk about direct or private evidence is needed to shed light on the strangeness of B’s reaction in (6a).

But if we say that evaluations like “this is tasty” work like avowals as well, we would blur the differences between such unrestricted judgements and “I find this tasty”, while we use them in constrained sequences and to perform different dialogue acts (see 7 below). So the subjectivity of *tasty* displayed in disagreements like (1) remains unexplained.

- (7) (a) A: This is tasty.
B: It’s not tasty!
A: Well, I find it tasty. (Retreat)
(b) A: The cake looks great but I don’t find sweets tasty. (Refusing)
A: The cake looks great but sweets aren’t tasty. (Rejecting)

Wittgenstein’s view on avowals is closely related to his characterisation of certainties. Normally, statements like “This is a hand” or “My name is A” are not descriptions for which I have evidence, but rather assertions that stand fast for myself. They are manifest in my reactions, just like “This is painful”. In our everyday uses of such evaluations, doubt is logically excluded. Like certainties, avowals are learnt in a process of socialisation from which the constitution of our subjectivity results. We are born in communities which already live by certainties, we grow up with these steadfast points in our frameworks drilled into us rather than being taught to us explicitly. Certainties may fluctuate between normative and descriptive uses. In exceptional situations, certainties like “I have not been on the moon” may cease to be such, for instance if I become an astronaut. Avowals are, in a sense, are a subclass of certainties, those like “My name is A” in which “the other person, though not himself having the same certainty as I have, nevertheless blindly presupposes that I am certain” (Stein

1997, p. 266). Other certainties are taken to be shared with everyone, like “The earth has existed for more than five minutes”.

We think that evaluations like “this cake is tasty” function in some respects like certainties.² Taste judgements do not describe individual standards stemming from comparison classes; they express our practical coping, our readiness to act in accordance to patterns of behaviour shared by our community, being thereby informative to others of our readiness to act in particular ways.³ Taste judgements are normally exempt from doubt because they are not empirical generalisations made upon evidence. What could count as evidence? (Wittgenstein 1969, §175) What would a mistake be like? (Wittgenstein 1969, §17) I can tell someone why I like something and this may not take me any further. “The cake is tasty because it has ginger” can be met with a blunt: “Ginger is disgusting!” What is the difference between “This is tasty” and “I know this is tasty”? “I know” here does not mark a justified epistemic claim, it just signals that I have tried the cake.

Communities of public and shared practices are crucial in shaping what we find tasty. Disagreement is possible only against the background of agreement in what we (don’t) call tasty (cf. Wittgenstein 1953, §242). There is a host of gestures, facial expressions and other embodied reactions related to food ingestion that we share (cf. Panksepp 2005). Furthermore, there are naturally and culturally shared aversions (to e.g., very bitter or pungent tastes or coprophagia). When we join basic eating practices, caretakers react to our gestures and behaviour, they call the things we are fed with *tasty* (Wittgenstein 1969, §148). This is not a game of ostension but rather a series of repeated interactions among caretakers, infants and (age-adequate) edible stuff (Wittgenstein 1969, §476).

Early on, young infants show taste preferences and aversions that may not be shared by their caretakers. This is not always noticed or tolerated but in general it is observed and, to some extent, taken into account by caretakers. These responses (when repeated) are responsible for the differentiation that contributes to the shaping of the individual’s subjectivity, but we should stress that these differentiations (a) are normally not massive, they occur against the background of shared reactions and (b) they are not always accommodated, there is a negotiation by which “the individual is able to disentangle itself from the world picture it has inherited” (Bax 2011, p. 171).

Our taste judgements can change, both via taste acquisition and development of expertise (e.g., when learning to appreciate wasabi) and also via circumstantial conditions of our environment and/or ourselves (a wine may become acidic if left uncorked; a wine may taste poorly if tasted after eating chocolate). Change is possible but, like when certainties change, this resembles more a change in a world picture (e.g., because we become more competent as judges) than a blunder, a wrong observation we now see we made in the past (Wittgenstein 1969, §645).

² We do not thereby claim that judgements of taste function exactly like statements like “This is a hand”. Various classifications of certainties deal with systematic differences between certainties and taste judgements, e.g., we normally agree on certainties like these but often we do not agree in our taste judgements. Furthermore, certainties like “This is a hand” are seldom voiced in conversation, unlike taste evaluations.

³ “What is it like when people do not have the same sense of humour? They do not react properly to each other. It is as though there were a custom among certain people to throw someone a ball, which he is supposed to catch & throw back; but certain people might not throw it back, but put it in their pocket instead. Or what is it like for someone to have no idea how to fathom another’s taste?” (Wittgenstein 1980 MS 138 32b)

Taste judgements normally do not describe, so their semantic (in)correctness is not given by their truth and falsity. Correct use of taste judgements is established by the ensemble of shared practices, shaped partly biologically and partly culturally, associated with them. In example (1), if A's gestures and bodily reactions show aversion or disgust, we will probably be puzzled. We may think that A is a bad liar, that he is being ironic, or that simply he does not know the meaning of *tasty*. Correctness conditions hinge on our public and shared practices.

In dialogue (1) none of the dialogue partners is wrong, not because the judgements exchanged are based on subjective evidence, but because these judgements are simply not based on evidence. This exchange marks a disagreement in how the interlocutors are prepared to act and how they expect each other to act. So-called faultless disagreements are not a result of there being a subjective determination of the truth-conditions or cognitive content of the judgements, but rather a clash of different ways to be in the world to which we invite others to participate when we say "This is tasty" rather than "I find this taste". Our subjectivity, the existence of a self that is different from others, is revealed in disagreements like (1). But why does such a conversation start anyway? To create community!

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Self-Governed Agents. A Rylean Approach

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Abstract

Human agents are self-governed agents: they control and organise their action in conformity to certain contextually relevant rules. In their recent attempts to characterise human agency Bratman and Korsgaard have sought to incorporate propositionally formulated norms of conduct into the feature of self-governance. Both these attempts fail to meet the intuitive requirements of agential autonomy and efficiency.

A promising alternative to these views may be drawn from Gilbert Ryle's conception of intelligent action. With the Rylean approach, when appraising performances as done intelligently or unintelligently, we find organisation and control directly in what agents do in various contexts. Instead of being grounded in the propositional formulations thought to play a role in reflective endorsement, both attributes of self-governance become dispositionally embedded within agents through training. The proposal meets the requirements of autonomy and efficiency and can also accommodate reflective endorsement as hinging on a generic higher-order intellectual disposition.

1. Introduction

It has been frequently emphasised that human agents are self-governed agents: They control and organise their action in conformity with certain rules. This normative feature of agency may be elaborated in the intellectualist or non-intellectualist fashion. Generally, intellectualists suggest that self-governed agents must organise and control their conduct by formulating and following relevant normative principles, laws, etc. In contrast, those favouring the non-intellectualist approach aim to demonstrate that such rules must become agent-embedded.

2. Intellectualism: Bratman and Korsgaard

Michael Bratman (2007) and Christine Korsgaard (2009) offer two of the most influential recent attempts to elucidate the idea of self-governance. According to Bratman, human agents are distinctively purposive agents capable of reflectively endorsing their motivation. He interprets this kind of endorsement as emergent on the network of temporally interwoven and cross-referring attitudes with agential authority. Critical to this network are higher-level attitudes with strong justifying significance called "self-governing policies and quasi-policies". Those attitudes — once satisfied — inhibit or activate basic attitudes which can conclude in action. Specifically, for a given self-governing policy or quasi-policy to be satisfied, that policy is to remain unchallenged by others within a given network. Thus, in Bratman's basic proposal, self-governed agents are the sort of agents whose conduct is controlled and organised by appropriately structured policies and quasi-policies.

Korsgaard delivers a conception whereby human agents are distinguished from non-human agents by their capacity to become conscious of the natural dispositional grounds that their actions and beliefs have. She stresses that this capacity brings a fundamental normative challenge, namely, whether to act on those grounds and — if not — how to act instead. In answering the challenge an agent must choose the right sort of maxims, i.e. those that ultimately hinge on two Kantian imperatives: hypotheticalal and categorical. The joint role of those imperatives consists in setting the formal constraints on the maxims to be formulated. In that proposal, self-governed agents control conduct by the choice of maxims in conformity with the two imperatives, where those maxims introduce order to what they do.

Although far from comprehensive, these short characterisations make it clear that both Bratman and Korsgaard seek to incorporate propositionally formulated norms of conduct into self-governance. In short, they claim that self-governed agents must govern themselves through reflective endorsement. Looking at these characterisations it is also possible to notice one vital difference in how the two interpret self-governance. While Bratman conceives of his self-governing policies and quasi-policies as constituting a system which itself controls and organises agents' action, Korsgaard insists that agents themselves play that constitutive role by producing and selecting the right sort of maxims with which to organise their action. Within the former framework, endorsement consists in having our higher-order attitudes with embedded maxims organise and take full control of our conduct. In contrast, the latter conception implies that when choosing a maxim to organise our conduct, our control amounts to endorsing the maxim with which, as Korsgaard adds, we identify ourselves.

Both these intellectualist approaches generate certain worrisome issues, but two objections seem especially relevant in the self-governance context. The first has to do with agential autonomy. Although Bratman's agent may perhaps establish his own self-governing policies and quasi-policies, these ultimately take charge of his reflective endorsement. This is so, because his acceptance of a given policy or quasi-policy simply amounts to its satisfaction. In effect, what was meant to explain reflective endorsement turns into some sort of reflective enslavement — the policies become emancipated action-governing components. On the other hand, Korsgaard's agent is committed to deliberative perfectionism. While her proposal implies that the mastery of imperatives does not require their explicit formulation, their exercise consists in the agent's deliberation to produce such a maxim that yields the formally best means to his own end. It can be easily imagined that this demand will at times generate significant tensions in the agent's maxim choice. For example, the agent may be fully aware of his individual limitations and yet normatively forced to act out a maxim universally best fit to the circumstances, despite its having practically destructive consequences.

The second problem concerns the application of formulated rules in general and so relates to agential efficiency. Conceptually, agential autonomy is tied to efficiency in action: We are reluctant to say that agents could independently do something they ordinarily fail to do. But if effi-

ciency is required for self-governance, the endorsement of a maxim or policy alone cannot warrant it because such propositional formulations have a merely prescriptive and not transformative function, i.e. reflectively, and hence intellectually, endorsing a maxim or policy cannot automatically bring one to produce a non-accidentally successful performance. Even though Bratman and Korsgaard seem to assume endorsement somehow yields action, they do not explain what could play this transformative role. The whole point here is that without a relevant transformative component, reflective endorsement remains detached from action.

Together the objections challenge Bratman and Korsgaard's attempts to accommodate a satisfactory notion of self-governance.

3. A Rylean Approach

A promising alternative to these views is Gilbert Ryle's (1946; 1949) conception of intelligent action. Ryle argues that in order to understand human agency one must begin by drawing a landscape of intelligent performances. Only then can we approach "the Intellect" or, as Ryle prefers to say, a range of higher-order capacities, including those whose exercises concern or consist in operating on actions themselves.

In the basic Rylean sense, when appraising performances as done intelligently or unintelligently, we seek organisation and control directly in what agents do in various contexts. In normative terms, agreeing or disagreeing that a particular performance conforms to the relevant standards, we do not inquire which maxims were enacted by an agent, but only affirm or deny that the rules of conduct are integrated into what he is doing. Given that, self-governance amounts to one's performing intelligently where higher-order, reflective self-governance provides but a special advancement. This last postulate is quite substantial, for it stresses something frequently overlooked by the intellectualist philosophers — namely, that Intellect in the form of reflective endorsement is continuous with Intelligence and not over and above it.

From a Rylean standpoint, both features of self-governance, i.e. organisation and control, can be accommodated without compromising agential autonomy and efficiency. The proposal revolves around the question of what enables us to characterise agents as acting intelligently. At the initial stage, the answer is that we acknowledge that they perform correctly, efficiently, successfully, etc. Their performances exhibit certain order or, somewhat more precisely, they are recognised as contextually stable. From the perspective of occurrent performances, such contextual stability should be equated with organisation. However, stability alone does not suffice to account for self-governance, because types of contextually stable performances that do not merit the label "intelligent" exist. Among them are reflexes, habits and, less frequently, lucky strikes — all of them easily stable. Assuming that self-governance is a form of achievement, those types should remain excluded.

Thus, in order to qualify performances as intelligent we need to further supplement stability with responsibility. Solely those agents who can be held responsible for what they do are genuine achievers. Importantly, responsibility need not have moral character: it can be practical or intellectual. Ryle suggests that unlike pure mechanisms or habituated animals, responsible agents are not regulated to perform successfully, but self-regulate their performances

so as to ensure success. This suggestion can be further explicated by contrast with virtually any intellectualist approach. Generally, intellectualists claim that for S to regulate performance ϕ , S must possess a ϕ -relevant representation, propositional or otherwise, by which he is guided in ϕ -ing or which he actively employs to guide ϕ -ing. A Rylean non-intellectualist disagrees, declaring that no ϕ -relevant representation is required. Given S's proficiency in ϕ -ing, regulating the course of ϕ -ing will involve being in non-representational ϕ -related states such as readiness or alertness. These states are minimally characterised by S's remaining on the right track with respect to the context of ϕ -ing and maintaining stability by instant avoidance and, where needed, correction of errors. For example, when skiing S will be careful to keep off dangerous icy patches, while not necessarily expecting them in any particular area of the slope; S will adapt to the dynamically evolving context of skiing. It is precisely this sort of regulating that stands for control — the component which combined with contextual stability suffices to attribute self-governance.

Naturally, the Rylean conception remains incomplete without supplying the grounds for self-governance, i.e. explaining what warrants organisation and control. To elaborate that, one needs to shift the perspective from occurrent performances to the soft metaphysics of dispositions. In a nutshell, self-governed agents gain stability and control of their performances only by training. The most basic kind of training involves experimenting without simulating — through attempts followed by failure and success, S eliminates unfruitful possibilities and better determines the scope of potentially rewarding ones. Crucially, success enables S's progress in ϕ -ing, bringing him closer to the mastery stage, whereby a ϕ -related disposition has developed. That disposition is what makes S autonomous in performing ϕ . Importantly, it may be further developed.

As suggested, training may include intellectual simulation. In one of its variants, S may employ maxims. Assuming he already possesses some set of dispositions Δ that can jointly contribute to the formation a ϕ -related disposition and an intellectually extracted ϕ -related maxim to operate with, S is in a good position to use that ϕ -related maxim to direct himself in learning to ϕ by joining together individual dispositions within Δ . However, it would be deeply misleading to suppose that by simply directing himself in this intellectual fashion S could produce stable and controllable performances. For although he may efficiently use the maxim to simulate the binding of those dispositions, S must still actually bind them. And that requires experiments of a more or less spectacular sort, which inevitably bring S back to attempts followed by more or less spectacular failures and successes. The advantage of this kind of intellectually directed experimentation is obvious: It helps S to make significantly quicker progress in acquiring new dispositions than he would have had he tried to learn by directly immersing himself in the practice of ϕ -ing. Nevertheless, from the fact that intellectual simulation may often facilitate S's training it does not follow that it could enable him to bypass experimentation. Generally, intellectual simulation may turn out to be socially necessary but never metaphysically necessary or socially and metaphysically sufficient to ground stable and controllable performances.

With or without intellectual simulation, on concluding training S becomes an efficient and autonomous agent: The organisation and control embedded in the ϕ -related disposition make all prospective performances S's own. This gives us a better grasp of what it means to be a self-governed agent in the Rylean sense: It is to be an agent whose stable and regulated performances are grounded in

dispositions that the agent has come to own as a result of training. Moreover, the quality and extensiveness of the manifestations of those dispositions will play a vital role in determining who the he is. To put it somewhat abstractly, the agent's actions will saturate his selfhood.

4. Higher-Order Self-Governance

At this point Bratman and Korsgaard may object that the sketch of the Rylean approach does not really accommodate what they find most distinctive about human self-governance: the capacity for reflective endorsement. But in fact not only can it accommodate this capacity but also bring along a more thorough outlook. On the one hand, it allows for specifically human varieties of self-governance that stand lower on the ladder of social sophistication, e.g. those inherent in tying knots, growing vegetables or paying for goods. On the other hand, it includes many types of higher-order self-governance irreducible to mere reflective endorsement and yet relevant to actions which concern or consist in operating on actions of others or the agent himself. Possible examples include reporting, admiring or blackmailing.

All actions characteristic of higher-order self-governance share their main features with the ones that stand lower in the hierarchy of social sophistication. Most importantly, they need to be contextually stable and agent-regulated in order to be described as intelligently performed. To become such they must be grounded in the agent's dispositions, where dispositions are rules of conduct embedded in the agent through training.

With this Rylean approach, S's reflective endorsement construed as experimenting with prescriptions amounts to training by intellectual simulation and hinges on a generic disposition of S to employ socially available intellectual cues in response to a new context C. Once familiar with C, S ceases to be a merely proficient intellectual learner. He has since become a proficient performer no longer in need of reflectively endorsing whatever he is to do in C. Furthermore, given the growth of S's overall experience in various domains of agency, fewer contexts will demand such endorsement. S will be ready to directly respond to relatively novel contexts in which case the place of reflective endorsement will be frequently taken by broad expertise or wisdom — a generic disposition of S to perform correctly.

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Abbildung und sprachlicher Idealismus im *Tractatus*

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Abstract

Obwohl die Bildtheorie ein zentrales Element des *Tractatus* darstellt, ist ihre Auslegung stark umstritten. In meinem Beitrag stelle ich eine mögliche Interpretation durch Wilfrid Sellars vor, der zufolge wir die Bildtheorie sprachidealistisch lesen können. Auf dieser Grundlage beleuchte ich Ansätze, die den *Tractatus* anti-metaphysisch auslegen, besonders die Interpretation Marie McGinns. In meinen Augen gelingt es einem solchen Ansatz nicht in allen Punkten, den *Tractatus* konsequent anti-metaphysisch zu interpretieren, dadurch könnte er einer sprachidealistischen Lesart sehr nahe kommen. Als Ausweg bietet sich an, ihn in eine breitere, auch empirische Aspekte umfassende Repräsentationstheorie einzubetten.

Die Bildtheorie ist eines der Kernelemente in Wittgensteins *Tractatus*. Auf den ersten Blick scheint es einleuchtend, ja fast trivial, dass unsere Sprache die Welt abbildet. Genauer Hinsehen führt uns jedoch in die Gänge eines Labyrinths, in dem Wittgenstein selbst kaum Wegweiser setzt. Was wird hier abgebildet, und *wodurch*? Fakten durch Fakten (z.B. TLP 2.141)? Oder doch eher Gegenstände in der Welt durch sprachliche Gegenstände (z.B. TLP 2.1514)? Vielleicht sind es Konfigurationen von Namen und Konfigurationen von Gegenständen (TLP 3.21)? Sollten wir diese „Gegenstände“ nominalistisch oder realistisch auffassen, oder läuft diese Frage ins Leere und zeugt von Unverständnis des *Tractatus*? Und: In welchem Abhängigkeitsverhältnis stehen Sprache und Welt zueinander? Existieren die Gegenstände der Welt unabhängig von unserer Sprache oder bilden wir in unserer Sprache etwas ab, was sie uns bereits in irgendeiner Weise vorgibt? Oder lesen wir eventuell nur in den *Tractatus* hinein, dass dort die Beziehung zwischen Sprache und Welt beleuchtet werden soll?

Wilfrid Sellars ist einer derjenigen, die den *Tractatus* radikal nominalistisch lesen; darüber hinaus deutet er Wittgensteins Bildtheorie in seiner eigenen Theorie des *Picturing* zu einer Theorie der Abbildung nicht-sprachlicher Gegenstände durch sprachliche Gegenstände um (Sellars 1967, Kap. V). Bei der Entwicklung seiner Position legt er eine mögliche Interpretation der Bildtheorie des *Tractatus* vor, die er als sprachidealistisch bezeichnet und als absurd verwirft (Sellars 1963, 209). In meinem Beitrag möchte ich zunächst diese sprachidealistische Lesart kurz vorstellen und danach aus der so gewonnenen Perspektive die beeindruckende Interpretation Marie McGinns als Stellvertreterin der anti-metaphysischen Herangehensweise an den *Tractatus* betrachten (1996). Ich möchte dafür argumentieren, dass diese entweder hinter dem zurückbleibt, was sie erreichen möchte, nämlich nicht den gesamten *Tractatus* konsistent anti-metaphysisch interpretieren kann, oder über den *Tractatus* hinauschießt, indem sie eine empirische Repräsentationstheorie als Stütze erfordert. Schließlich ist mein Beitrag auch ein Ausgangspunkt zur Verteidigung von Sellars' eigener *Tractatus*-Interpretation, welche den hier gegebenen Rahmen jedoch sprengen würde.

Zunächst will ich mich kurz der Frage zuwenden, wie Sellars, in seinem Aufsatz *Truth and 'Correspondence'* (Sellars 1963), zu der Möglichkeit einer sprachidealistischen Interpretation der Bildtheorie kommt. Ausgangspunkt ist die oben gestellte Frage: Was wird *wodurch* abgebildet? Und vor allem: Wofür steht „*aRb*“ in „Satz S (in Sprache L) bildet *aRb* ab.“ (Sellars 1963, 209)? Im Rahmen des *Tractatus* sollte es sich laut Sellars hier um „den Sachverhalt,

dass *aRb*“ handeln,¹ als Textbeleg lässt sich zum Beispiel TLP 2.1 („Wir machen uns Bilder der Tatsachen.“) heranziehen. Wenn der Satz S den Sachverhalt, dass *aRb*, abbilden soll, verlangt das Sellars zufolge jedoch, dass wir einen Sachverhalt wie einen „Quasi-Gegenstand“ behandeln. Da aber Wittgensteins Welt laut Sellars nur aus Gegenständen im eigentlichen Sinne besteht, müssen Sachverhalte als Quasi-Gegenstände sprachliche Gegenstände sein. Wollten wir nun das Abbildungsverhältnis als eine Beziehung zwischen Sprache und Welt verstehen, würden wir zu dem Schluss gelangen, dass Sätze nur wieder sprachliche Gegenstände abbilden. Damit scheinen wir in einem sprachidealistischen Bild gefangen zu sein (Sellars 1963, 209).

Diese Analyse ist in ihrer Knappheit natürlich stark lückenhaft. Es ist zum Beispiel nicht klar, warum wir den Sachverhalt, dass *aRb*, als Quasi-Gegenstand und nicht als „bloße“ Konfiguration der Objekte *a*, *b* und eventuell *R* auffassen müssen. So spricht sich zum Beispiel Ricketts (1996, 89) klar gegen eine Interpretation aus, der zufolge Wittgenstein Sachverhalte vergegenständlicht. Trotz dieser Schwächen möchte ich Sellars' konkrete Interpretationsmöglichkeit nicht direkt anfechten. Sicher kann man im *Tractatus* Stellen finden, die eine Interpretation des Textes im Sinne des sprachlichen Idealismus stützen, zum Beispiel den oft zitierten Satz TLP 5.6. Was der *Tractatus* zu metaphysischen Themen sagt oder zu sagen scheint, ist jedoch so unbestimmt, dass wir genauso gut die häufig vertretene Lesart verteidigen könnten, welche Wittgenstein als metaphysischen Realisten betrachtet. Auch Sellars sollten wir in erster Linie auf der Suche nach einer kohärenten Erfassung der Bildtheorie sehen, ohne dass er dabei die Frage in den Vordergrund stellen würde, welche der vielen möglichen Auffassungen Wittgenstein im *Tractatus* tatsächlich vertritt.

Es ist wichtig zu bemerken, dass eine sprachidealistische Lesart des *Tractatus* natürlich nur sinnvoll ist, wenn man Wittgenstein unterstellt, tatsächlich etwas über die Welt und den Bezug von Sprache zur Welt sagen zu wollen. Einige Interpretationen lehnen gerade diese „metaphysische“ Auslegung des *Tractatus* ab, zum Beispiel McGuinness 1981 oder McGinn 2006. Für sie beschäftigt sich Wittgenstein lediglich mit der Aufdeckung der Funktionsweise unserer Sprache und will aus dieser keine Merkmale der Wirklichkeit ableiten (McGuinness 1981, 62). Auch McGinn (2006, 137) fasst den *Tractatus* nicht als Darstellung einer metaphysischen Position oder eines Weltbildes auf, sondern als Untersuchung dessen, wie

¹ Sellars benutzt das Wort „*fact*“ und unterscheidet nicht explizit zwischen Tatsache und Sachverhalt. Ich gebe sein „*fact*“ hier mit „Sachverhalt“ wieder.

Sprache funktionieren muss, wenn sie zur Repräsentation der Welt dienen soll.

Interessanterweise nimmt Sellars diese Interpretation vorweg. Für ihn ist ein möglicher Ausweg aus dem oben beschriebenen „absurden“ sprachlichen Idealismus, den Satz „Satz S bildet den Sachverhalt, dass aRb , ab.“ nicht als Aussage über eine Beziehung zwischen Sprache und Welt zu lesen, sondern als eine Variante der semantischen Wahrheitsdefinition, d.h. als „Satz S (in Sprache L) ist wahr \leftrightarrow S“ (Sellars 1963, 209), bzw. hier „Satz S (in Sprache L) ist wahr $\leftrightarrow aRb$ “. Das fängt McGinns Auffassung der Beziehung zwischen Sätzen und Sachverhalten im *Tractatus* gut ein: Sie begreift diese als eng, als „intern“, und dadurch charakterisiert, dass ein Satz genau dann wahr ist, wenn der abgebildete Sachverhalt besteht. Sachverhalte sind in diesem Fall das, was durch Sätze abgebildet werden kann, und Sätze das, was Sachverhalte abbildet (McGinn 2006, 137f.). Wir können also Sätze und Sachverhalte nicht als unabhängig voneinander begreifen.

Nun findet Sellars selbst diese „Minimalauslegung“ des *Tractatus* unzureichend, denn für ihn geht es Wittgenstein bei seiner Bildtheorie der Sprache eindeutig um mehr (Sellars 1963, 210). Die Herausforderung besteht wohl vor allem darin, dass Wittgenstein Sprache als *Abbildung* und Repräsentation von Objekten auffasst (gleich, ob wir diesen Begriff nominalistisch oder weiter begreifen möchten). Die Schwierigkeit dabei ist nicht in erster Linie, wie diese Objekte aus McGinns Sicht zu fassen sind. Für sie ist ein Objekt kein konkreter Gegenstand in der Welt, sondern das, was wir erfassen, wenn wir einen Namen verstehen, d.h. verstehen, welchen Beitrag dieser Name zum Sinn der Sätze leistet, in denen er vorkommt (McGinn 2006, 114). Das kann uns hier völlig genügen.

Leider ist jedoch nicht klar, wie man auf der Grundlage einer solchen Konzeption überhaupt noch von Sätzen als Repräsentationen oder Bildern sprechen kann. Die Vorstellung von Sätzen als Bildern hat im *Tractatus* eine wichtige Funktion, denn sie ermöglicht es, dass unsere Sätze falsch sein können und dass wir Sätze auch dann verstehen können, wenn wir nicht wissen, ob sie wahr oder falsch sind. McGinns Konzeption wird aber genau an den Stellen vage, wo sie den Bildcharakter der Sätze erhellen möchte und zum Beispiel über das „Vergleichen von Sätzen und Tatsachen“ oder über die „projektive Relation des Repräsentationssystems zur Welt“ spricht. Aus ihren Grundannahmen folgt, dass wir Sätze nur vor dem Hintergrund eines bestehenden Repräsentationssystems als Bilder auffassen können. Sätze bilden unter dieser Voraussetzung einen möglichen Sachverhalt ab, den wir mit der Wirklichkeit vergleichen, und so die Wahrheit oder Falschheit des Satzes feststellen. Hier bleibt die Frage nach dem tatsächlich bestehenden Sachverhalt (oder „der Wirklichkeit“), denn auch zu diesem können wir ja keinen unmittelbaren Zugang haben, der nicht irgendwie auf Repräsentation beruhen würde. Wir können also nur etwas Abgebildetes mit etwas Abgebildetem vergleichen und da dies über das Repräsentationssystem geschieht, könnten wir auch sagen, dass wir immer nur eine Repräsentation mit einer Repräsentation vergleichen. Und wie stellen wir dann nur die Wahrheit unseres ersten Satzes fest, die ja in der Übereinstimmung zwischen Bild und Wirklichkeit bestehen sollte (TLP 2.21)?

Ein möglicher Ausweg scheint zu sein, Wahrheit als etwas zu betrachten, was uns die Regeln unserer Sprache vorgeben, da diese ja auch die Abbildungsbeziehung bestimmen sollen. Doch wenn wir das so nackt stehen lassen, dann scheinen die Gespenster des sprachlichen Relativismus und des sprachlichen Idealismus doch wieder

an die Tür zu klopfen, denn die Welt wird laut McGinn von der Gesamtheit der wahren Sätze repräsentiert (McGinn 2006, 138), die nun durch die Regeln unserer Sprache bestimmt werden. Wo liegt das Problem?

Es liegt meiner Meinung nach nicht in der Ansicht, dass es die Regeln unserer Sprache sind, die bestimmen, unter welchen Umständen ein Bild richtig oder falsch, ein Satz wahr oder nicht wahr ist (McGinn 2006, 87). Wenn wir diese Aussage jedoch so allein stehen lassen, kann sie zu vielerlei metaphysischen Interpretationen einladen. Problematisch erscheint mir dabei besonders, dass Wittgensteins Repräsentationssystem mit seinen Regeln beinahe vom Himmel auf seine Nutzer herabzusteigen scheint. McGinn drückt das so aus, dass Wittgenstein die Bedingungen reflektiert, die jedes Repräsentationssystem erfüllen muss, wenn es zur Repräsentation der Wirklichkeit dienen soll (McGinn 2006, 20). Es kann sich also nicht um ein konkretes, empirisch zu untersuchendes Repräsentationssystem gehen, und vor allem kann auch nicht Wittgensteins Fragestellung sein, wie solch ein Repräsentationssystem entsteht.

Stellen wir uns also einfach kurz vor, solch ein Repräsentationssystem taucht tatsächlich wie aus dem Nichts auf, bereit dafür, von uns genutzt zu werden. Wir sollten dabei zwei Dinge nicht vergessen: Erstens geht es immer noch um die notwendigen Bedingungen eines Systems, dass uns zur wahren oder falschen Repräsentation der Welt dienen soll. Zweitens setzt die Nutzung eines solchen Systems relativ große Fähigkeiten der Nutzer voraus; auch diese gehören zu den notwendigen Voraussetzungen dafür, dass das Repräsentationssystem funktioniert. Nun kann es sein, dass einige dieser Fähigkeiten sozusagen gemeinsam mit dem System selbst auf die Nutzer „herabsteigen“, etwa die Fähigkeit des logischen Schlussfolgerns. Aber was steigt da überhaupt auf uns herab? Ein System an Regeln, das uns sagt, auf welche Weise Namen miteinander kombiniert werden können, ein System also, das uns hilft, den ganzen logischen Raum und damit alle möglichen Sachverhalte abzubilden. Wir wissen aber immer noch nicht, welche dieser Sachverhalte nun tatsächlich bestehen. Und vielmehr noch: Solange wir keine Möglichkeit haben, etwas über die Wahrheit oder Falschheit der vielen Bilder in unserem neugewonnenen Repräsentationssystem zu sagen, können wir den Namen in unseren Sätzen nur schwerlich Objekte zuordnen, ohne Rücksicht darauf, ob wir diese als konkrete Objekte oder wie McGinn als den Beitrag der Namen zum Sinn einer Klasse von Sätzen begreifen.

Es scheint so, als setze das Funktionieren des Repräsentationssystems schon voraus, dass wir über die Begriffe der Wahrheit und der Falschheit verfügen. Könnten diese nicht auch mit dem Repräsentationssystem selbst einfach „über uns kommen“? Das System könnte sicher Sätze wie die oben genannten beinhalten, wie zum Beispiel „ $f(a)$ ist wahr $\leftrightarrow f(a)$ “, und so den Wahrheitsbegriff umreißen. Hier stoßen wir jedoch wieder auf das Hindernis, dass die Bedeutung von „f“ und „a“ noch nicht erfassen können, bevor wir über einen Wahrheitsbegriff verfügen.

Ich will damit auf Folgendes hinaus: Ein Repräsentationssystem ist etwas, das erlernt werden muss. Wenn es dazu dienen soll die Welt zu repräsentieren, und dies für uns erkennbar richtig oder falsch, kann es nicht einfach „auf uns herabsteigen“. Es fußt vielmehr auf einer Unmenge kausaler Regelmäßigkeiten und Interaktionen mit der Umwelt, was im Falle des hochkomplexen menschlichen Repräsentationssystems, um das es McGinn und Wittgenstein geht, natürlich in bedeutendem Maße die Interaktion mit unseren Mitmenschen einschließt. Die Entwicklung

eines solch komplizierten Systems muss *Hand in Hand* gehen mit der Entwicklung des Wahrheitsbegriffs, der dessen Nutzung als ein System, dessen Sätze die Welt richtig aber auch falsch repräsentieren können, möglich macht. Es ist unverständlich, dass ein Repräsentationssystem „über uns kommt“ und wir es dann erst wie ein frisch geschaffenes Werkzeug in Benutzung nehmen und beginnen, seine Sätze im logischen Raum als wahr oder falsch zu bewerten.

Nun mag es sicher sein, dass Wittgenstein nicht die Absicht hatte zu klären, wie Zeichensysteme zur Repräsentation der Welt entstehen, sondern dies den empirischen Wissenschaften überlässt. Das spricht für McGinns Standpunkt, dem zufolge Wittgenstein lediglich die nötigen Bedingungen eines Systems untersucht, das der Repräsentation der Welt dienen soll. Jedoch scheint sich Wittgensteins Abbildungsbegriff dann auf etwas ähnlich Dünnes wie der deflationistische Wahrheitsbegriff zu beschränken. McGinns Vorstellung vom „Vergleich zwischen Sätzen und Sachverhalten“ oder der „Projektionsrelation zwischen Repräsentationssystem und Wirklichkeit“ passt dazu nicht gut. Solche Ausdrücke scheinen im gleichen Atemzug viel und wenig sagen zu wollen. Um ihnen vollen Inhalt zu geben, müssten wir eine umfassende, auch empirische Aspekte betrachtende Repräsentationstheorie entwerfen, was Wittgenstein laut McGinn nicht will.

Im Ergebnis wirkt es so, als wollte McGinn Wittgenstein über die Welt sprechen und sich gleichzeitig eines solchen Sprechens enthalten. Gerade in solchen Momenten ist die Versuchung groß, in McGinns Lesart des *Tractatus* nach greifbareren Aussagen über die Welt zu suchen, die wir ja brauchen, um Vorstellungen wie „Vergleich“ oder „Projektion“ verständlich zu machen. Wir können uns nur schwer der Frage entziehen, was wir denn hier nun mit dem Satz vergleichen sollen. Es scheinen zwei Möglichkeiten zu bestehen: entweder einen Sachverhalt zu dem wir unabhängig von der Sprache Zugang haben, oder etwas, was selbst wieder sprachlich artikuliert, selbst wieder ein Bild ist. Im zweiten Falle würden wir Sellars' sprachidealistischer Interpretationsmöglichkeit gefährlich nahe kommen. Angesichts McGinns allgemeiner „sprach-interner“ Herangehensweise kann man sich an manchen Stellen dann einer in diesem Sinne sprachidealistischen Auslegung ihrer eigentlich anti-metaphysischen *Tractatus*-Interpretation schwer widersetzen.

Meiner Meinung nach ist dies nicht eine Schwäche ihrer Lesart selbst, sondern zeigt die Schwierigkeit, vielleicht sogar Unmöglichkeit, den *Tractatus* konsistent von einem

einigen Ausgangspunkt her zu interpretieren. Einige der Punkte, die ich oben genannt habe, fallen mit Aspekten zusammen, die McGinn als voreingenommene Annahmen des *Tractatus* über das Wesen von Logik und Sprache identifiziert (einen guten Hinweis gibt z.B. McGinn 2006, 149, Anm. 8). Wenn wir eine wirklich stabile anti-metaphysische Auslegung des *Tractatus* erreichen wollen, müssten wir unsere Interpretation jedoch noch stärker beschneiden, und zum Beispiel Punkte wie den „Vergleich“ von Sätzen und Sachverhalten außen vor lassen; das hieße gegebenenfalls aber, dass wir den *Tractatus* einiger seiner Kernstücke berauben müssen. Doch vielleicht ist es ein Fehler, wenn wir einer Auslegung des *Tractatus*, die sich streng „innerhalb“ der Sprache bewegt, nur eine einzige Alternative gegenüberstellen wollen, und zwar eine metaphysisch-realistische Lesart. Warum sollte es nicht möglich sein, McGinns Interpretation zu erhalten und in eine auch empirische Aspekte umfassende Theorie der Repräsentation einzubetten, die eine antimetaphysische Auslegung stützen könnte? Zwar fiel dadurch ein Grundsatz des *Tractatus* („Die Logik muß für sich selbst sorgen.“ TLP 5.473), aber gleichzeitig könnten wir so eine Lesart erreichen, die befruchtend auf andere Ansätze wirkt. Darum geht es Sellars in seiner eigenen Wittgenstein-Interpretation.

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Wittgenstein on Meaning.

From the idea on the mind to the actions of the words

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Abstract

Since the Thirties Wittgenstein has worked to deconstruct the pneumatic idea of the meaning conceived as product of the thought. We will analyze the two discussed theories that Wittgenstein argues, the meaning as use and the meaning as explanation of meaning, observing connections and continuity between them.

1. Introduction

It is known that when Piero Sraffa asked the grammar of the Neapolitan gesture that indicates the indifference, threw Wittgenstein in crisis showing him, as Brian McGuinness underlines in his *Introduction* of Wittgenstein's *Letters*, the need to take leave of the pneumatic theory of thought (2012, 26, 27). This theory is connected with the essentialist conception of language, according to which there would be a kind of mental, internal or however hidden structure from which the meaning of words draws. In this regard, Wittgenstein writes in the *Blue Book* that is «a widespread disease of thought to look for (and to find) behind all our actions a state of mind that is their origin, a kind of tank» (1958, 184).

2. The denominative conception of language

In the first paragraph of the *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein quotes Augustine's conception of language. Augustine describes the learning of language to explain the language functioning: the words heard by adults in the presence of things, accompanied by deictic gestures that illuminate and reinforce the correspondence between words and objects, taught him that they are names of objects and the phrases are connections of such names (1953, §1). In this picture, Wittgenstein says, "we find the root of the idea: every word has a meaning. This meaning is associated with the word. It is the object for which the word stays" (ibidem). The meaning would be an object owned by the word, something distinct and separated from it, to which the word refers: the word is the face, what you see, what is manifest, the exterior of the sign; instead, the meaning is the inner face which gives expression and so life to the word.

We believe, therefore, that the meaning would be the most important part of sign. In the modern conception it is a product of mind: a secondary product when it is an idea that comes from a material object which corresponds to a word; a primary product, when there is not the possibility to have a material object in correspondence to a word and the mind produces an object by itself, by an inner movement of the thought: the idea is directly a meaning. At this purpose, we can think of Locke's theory of ideas, but also of Saussure that writes: "the linguistic sign does not connect a name and a thing, but a concept and an acoustic image. This latter is not the material sound, a purely physical thing, but the psychic trace of this sound, the representation that is given us by the statement of our senses: it is sensorial" (1922, 84). And sensorial, after Descartes, means cerebral. For Saussure, in the circuit of the *parole*,

both terms involved in the sign, concept and acoustic image, are psychological and they are connected in our brain by association binding (ivi, 83). Only at the level of the *langue*, signs become social facts assuming public external form. But the *langue* is constituted nothing more than of words internalized or externalized words, and the sign, taken alone, still remains a psychic entity with two faces: the face of the concept and that of the acoustic image, that, in another way, Saussure called *signifié* and *signifiant*.

The meaning would be a product of thought to which is associated, always by thought, an acoustic image. It would solve itself mentally, in a private, individual, interior space: the place of thought. This idea comes from the need of substantialization based on a parallelism with the physical. In this sense, Wittgenstein asks: "The inclination to think about the meaning as a body is not similar to what you have to think of a place of thought?" (1980, 115). The substantive meaning, like others substantives, leads us to think about a substance in correspondence to the word meaning and the verb to have (we believe that a word *has* a *meaning*) leads us to imagine a possession of something: we think that each word possesses a substance, that is material if the meaning corresponds to a thing or immaterial, metaphysic, if to the meaning corresponds directly an idea.

The meaning would be a portion of thought (Di Cesare 2006). Therefore we think about it as an abstract, ineffable, virtual entity that has nothing to do with the linguistic trade of speakers, of which it would be a kind of transcendental presupposition. The meaning seems an obscure entity that appears essential prior: Wittgenstein speaks, therefore, of a *myth of the meaning*. We have the words on one side and their meanings on the other one. They are in an essential relationship, as Majetschak pointed out (1995, 370): "the essence of a word is its meaning" (Wittgenstein 1969, 22). The word would represent its essence: its content is its meaning (Majetschak 1995; 2000). This idea of the double face of the word, the internal, deep one of the meaning, and the external one, similar to a surface, seems to reflect the dual structure of the man: the soul, the essence on the one side; the body, the appearance on the other one.

As Ernst Konrad Specht writes, in *Philosophical Investigations* (we can see it also in other Wittgenstein's works like, for example, *The Big Typescript*) Wittgenstein contrasts three popular assumptions about the phenomena of meaning: 1) meaning is the designated object; 2) it is identical to a physical product; 3) or it is similar to an ideal identity (1963, 87). The same Wittgenstein, in the *Tractatus*, was victim of the idea that the object is the meaning

of the name in a strict correspondence name-object and so language-world.

Respect the image of the language that emerges from Augustine's quotation, Wittgenstein says that he does not speak about a difference between types of words: "Who describes in this way the learning of language, first of all he thinks, I believe, about nouns like «table», «chair», «bread» and proper names, and only later about names of some activities and properties; and he thinks of the remaining types of words as something that will accommodate itself" (2000, p. 31). In a perspective like that of Augustine, all language is reduced to the only denominative function, which sees a correspondence between designating name and designated object.

To expose the limits of this way of thinking about language, Wittgenstein writes:

I send one to do the shopping. I give him a ticket on which are the signs: five red apples. That one brings the ticket to the fruit seller, that opens the drawer on which there is the sign apples; then he searches in a table the word red and finds, in correspondence to it, a colour sample; he recites the sequence of cardinal numbers – we suppose that he knows it by heart – up to the word five and to every number he pulls out of the drawer an apple which has the colour of the sample. – So it works with words. – "But how does he know where and how to look for the word red, and what have to do he with the word five?" – Well, I suppose that he operates in the way that I described. At one point, the explanations are terminated. – But what is the meaning of the word five? – Here there was no mention of such meaning, but only of the way in which we use the word five (1953, §1, pp. 9-10).

There is not a corresponding object for all words of our language and there is not a causal explanation of their function in the language for all them. At one point, Wittgenstein tells, the explanations come to an end and leave space to the description of the actions of the words: the description of practices of language. Rather than ask what is the meaning of a word, we should observe the ways of use it, the *different* ways of use it: a word does not function as any other.

The philosophical concept of meaning that emerges from the Augustine's idea of language, according to Wittgenstein, is *primitive* (2000, 31). We can also say that this idea describes a more primitive language than our one. The adjective *primitive* can here mean, in fact, as Donatella Di Cesare underlines (2006), either original, with reference to the birth's conditions of language, or not yet evolved, in learning phase, with reference to the language learning's conditions of a child or a foreign speaker. The Augustine's description of language would be valid for primitive language games such as one of the mason and his assistant that Wittgenstein shows us in the second paragraph of the *Philosophical Investigations* (1953, § 2). The idea of the denominative language can explain the most simple language games. The functions of the words are as different as different are the uses of the tools that you might find in a box of tools: an hammer, pincers, a saw, a screwdriver, a measuring tape, glue, and so on (ivi, § 11).

The denominative language has limited value in the description of the language: we can say that it occupies only the periphery of it, in the sense that it is actually valid only in *limit-cases* such as the situation of learning a language by a child or a foreign speaker, or those of misunderstanding of a given language game. It is a kind of preparation for use of the words and, however, it presupposes a certain

knowledge of the language to function (ivi, § 27). In fact, "we are trained to ask: What do you call this?" (ibidem). And the ostensive definition that follows may be misunderstood. Much of the language must already be known and clear to understand and apply an ostensive definition. One could say, as Wittgenstein himself suggests, that "*the ostensive definition explains the use - the meaning - of the word, when it is already clear what function the word should play, in general, in the language*" (ivi, § 30). So, for example, the ostensive definition: "This is called sepia" will help you to understand the word if you know that I want to define the name of a colour. This means that to be able to ask the name of a thing, you should already know (or be able to do) something with it (ibidem). The ostensive definition of sepia functions if you already know the place that the word sepia occupies in the linguistic system: the place of a colour. Each definition refers inevitably to the whole system of signs. Therefore, the request and the understanding of such definition presupposes the mastery of a given linguistic technique: "only one who knows can do something with a name, asks it sensibly" (ivi, § 31). We do not need always an ostensive definition and such definition cannot always be useful to try to use a word.

3. Meaning: use of a word and explanation of meaning

Often we use words and nothing else, without thinking about their meaning like an entity distinct that means them. At this purpose, Wittgenstein writes:

For a large class of cases, the use of the word meaning – although not for all cases of its use – this word can be explained as follows: The meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by showing its bearer (1953, § 43).

Maybe the meaning, just for the fact that it is not something that we think before, after or apart from the word that we pronounce, can be considered the use of the word. This section of the *Philosophical Investigations* has been very successful, because, in the middle of a long series of deconstructive and critical thoughts, seems finally to provide a theory of meaning, a definition of it. But it would be too simply and incoherent, respect what Wittgenstein wrote after this aphorism, as well as in contradiction with what is the spirit of his philosophy, inspired by phenomenology, clearly anti-metaphysical and so devoted to the description and not interested in formulas and theories, to accept this brief thought on meaning as a whole theory about it. The equivalence "the meaning of a word = the use of a word", Wittgenstein says, can be useful in some cases: in these cases it can help to liberate us from the idea of the meaning like an image attached to the word (1995, 261). As it emerges from a verbal of the Moral Science Club, for Wittgenstein can be useful asking the use instead the meaning of a word, "because *the meaning* alludes to a single object, while the use suggests a quantity of objects distributed in the time" (ibidem). The use gives us the *difference*. Instead, the meaning leads us to think of a rigid *identity*. During this meeting of the Moral Science Club on February 1939, Wittgenstein added also that "the enunciation «in a large number of cases is advisable to replace *the use of a word to the meaning of a word*», is a slogan. Sometimes it is ridiculed, other times it is intensified and encouraged. In both cases wrongly" (ibidem). This enunciation is useful for Wittgenstein to bring us back to the actions of the words. It is a method to bring us to understand that the words *are* actions and *have not* images, labels, rigid ideas.

A word changes in the praxis of the speaking: it does not function in the same manner forever. It changes with the speaking of the different speakers and it can also change a speaker. Wittgenstein underlines that "philosophical investigations are boring and difficult and escape from the memory. The slogans are simple and fixe themselves in the memory. If the *use* goes away and the slogan remains, then it is *ridicule*" (ivi, p. 262). We need to preserve the importance of the use, of the actions with and of the words.

In line with these arguments lies the second Wittgenstein's great thesis about meaning: "Meaning of word is what is explained by explanation of meaning" or "if you want to understand the use of the word meaning, look at what is called explanation of the meaning" (1953, § 560). Of this second idea, as Majetschak pointed out, Josef Simon is a witness: according to Wittgenstein, he says that "in so far as we understand a sign, we do not ask what it means" (Simon 1989, p. 61). Therefore, a sign *has not* a meaning independent of it to be referenced (Majetschak 1995, 367): rather, it *is* a meaning. The *difference* between sign and meaning", that is usual regarded, in almost all of the philosophy of language's traditional theories, like an obvious motivated difference of objects, according to Simon, it comes first of all from the "do not understand signs" (ibidem). A sign *is* an understood meaning: there is not the sign of the one part and the meaning of the other one, like an entity that belongs to the sign, which is behind to animate it.

The meaning is a *limit-concept* (Di Cesare 2006) that is not necessary when, in the normal linguistic trade, we speak and understand without stopping us to ask about each sign. In this sense, an understood sign *is* a meaning. When it is necessary an explanation of meaning, for example before an misunderstood or foreign sign, then we explain the sign clarifying the use of it: we think about the linguistic practice in which the sign is played. The two thesis about meaning should be seen in continuity with each other to rethink the idea of meaning.

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Philosophy as Therapy. The Misleading Effect of a Simile

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Abstract

Wittgenstein's comparison of philosophical methods to therapies has been interpreted in highly different ways. I argue that many of these ways are misguided. I explicitly identify the illness, the patient, the therapist and the ideal of health in Wittgenstein's therapeutic methods and answer four closely related questions concerning them: Are philosophers literally ill? Are the patients and therapists philosophers? Are Wittgenstein's philosophical therapies psychological? Does the ideal of health consist in the end of philosophy? The paper shows that, in order to understand the comparison of philosophical methods to therapies, it is important not to extend it beyond its own limits. The comparison has had a misleading effect, because properties of therapies have been illegitimately projected onto Wittgenstein's philosophical methods.

Wittgenstein's comparison of philosophical methods to therapies (PI 133) has become a hot topic of philosophical debate. In this talk, I will show that a lot of interpretations of the comparison are misguided. I will start from the assumption that, in order to meaningfully compare philosophical methods to therapies, the philosophical methods must have at least some structural features in common with therapies. There seems to be no therapy without an *ideal of health* and an *illness* or a *patient* to be cured by a *therapist*. I will identify the illness, the patient, the therapist and the ideal of health in Wittgenstein's philosophical therapies and I will answer four interrelated questions concerning them. Are philosophers literally ill? Are the patient and the therapist philosophers? Are the therapies psychological therapies? Does Wittgenstein's ideal of health consist in the end of philosophy? In answering these questions, I will point at some traps in interpreting Wittgenstein's comparison and explain why commentators are prone to fall into these traps.

What is the illness that philosophical methods, as therapies, are intended to cure? Wittgenstein writes that 'the philosopher treats a question, like an illness' (PI 255). The illnesses to be cured by philosophical therapies are philosophical questions. What is distinctive about philosophical questions and problems, according to Wittgenstein, is that they arise 'through a misinterpretation of our forms of language' (PI 111). In formulating philosophical questions, words ('knowledge', 'being', 'object') are typically used out of the linguistic and non-linguistic, practical contexts in which they are 'at home' (PI 116), which inevitably leads to conceptual unclarity (PPF 202).

An example of a philosophical question in the Wittgensteinian sense is: Is this object composite? (PI 47) The correct answer, according to Wittgenstein, is: it depends on what you understand by 'composite', and 'that is not an answer, but a rejection of the question'. The question cannot be meaningfully answered, because a word like 'composite' is only meaningful in a practical context in which the difference between simple and composite things is clear. Philosophers tend to illegitimately extrapolate words from everyday, practical contexts to theoretical, metaphysical contexts in which these words are not 'at home'. The only way to deal with philosophical questions is to show that they are meaningless. A philosopher need not so much try to *solve* philosophical questions by giving *answers* to them, but to *dissolve* them 'like a lump of sugar in water' (BT 310).

On this account of philosophical questions, the comparison between a philosophical question and an illness holds because they have certain features in common: they both

constitute a *problem* that can be *treated* in such a way that the problem *disappears*. Some commentators hold, however, that the illnesses to be cured by philosophical methods as therapies are mental disturbances and that philosophers are literally mentally ill or, at least, suffer from certain psychological disorders or discomforts (Read and Hutchinson 2010, 153). Gordon Baker writes that philosophical problems are individuals' 'troubled states of mind' and 'internal conflicts' (2004, 212). If philosophical problems are individuals' troubled states of mind, they are simply a more or less distinct kind of psychological problems. As we will see later, this goes against the spirit of Wittgenstein's work, which is aimed at stressing the specificity of philosophy and its problems, compared to those of psychology and the natural sciences. Moreover, this reading of Wittgenstein rests on a literal interpretation of the comparison between a philosophical problem and an illness. The best argument for not interpreting the comparison in a literal way is that Wittgenstein, who is known to have been painstakingly precise about the use of words, would not have written that 'The philosopher treats a question, *like* an illness' if he had meant to say that a philosophical question *is* an illness in the literal sense of the word. Therefore, our first question has to be answered negatively: philosophers are *not* literally ill.

Our second question deals with the patient and the therapist. It is clear that the patient is the person having the illness, the person having philosophical questions. A philosopher is a person whose work it is to deal with philosophical questions and, therefore, a person who often has the illnesses. Philosophers definitely qualify as patients. It would be a mistake, however, to think that *only* philosophers deal with philosophical questions as Wittgenstein understands them. Philosophical questions arise through a misunderstanding of the workings of our language, and may emerge in, for example, psychology and mathematics (to name but two domains that Wittgenstein studied). Wittgenstein's point is that philosophy is not a science about a particular subject-matter, but that it is a method, a way of dealing with a particular *kind* of questions, namely questions engendered by conceptual confusions. These questions are certainly not the privilege of philosophers or professional intellectuals, because 'language has the same traps ready for everyone' (BT 312). All human beings are language-users, and therefore all human beings have to deal with conceptual confusions. What is specific about philosophers is that it is their work to do so and that they are far more often dealing with conceptual confusions than other persons. One could reasonably say that they are, metaphorically speaking, more often ill than others, but the difference between philoso-

phers and other people is, in this respect, quantitative and not qualitative: it is not a difference between the ill and the healthy, as some commentators have claimed. To presuppose that only philosophers are treated by philosophical therapies reinforces the idea that philosophers are exceptions, that they are literally ill, that there is something wrong with them in virtue of their being philosophers. Eugen Fischer, for example, has argued that philosophers suffer from an 'intellectual altitude sickness' (2011, 49). But philosophers and ordinary people are only patients *in so far as* and *when* they are trying to give answers to meaningless questions. They should not be thought of as *essentially* patients, as having a severe handicap that makes them unfit to lead a normal life.

The fact that we are all patients sometimes raises the question of who can help us, of who is the therapist. Here, Wittgenstein is clear: it is the Wittgensteinian philosopher, somebody who understands that philosophical problems are conceptual in the first place. It is not because they often have the illness themselves, that philosophers are not qualified to treat it. As long as the illness is not a mental disturbance or a severe illness in the literal sense of the word, philosophers are capable to treat misunderstandings of the workings of our language, including even their own. The answer to our second question is: everybody is a patient sometimes, but only Wittgensteinian philosophers are able to act as therapists.

Are Wittgenstein's philosophical therapies psychological therapies? Some commentators have argued that they are. They have equated Wittgensteinian therapies with psychotherapy and even with psychoanalysis (Peterman 1992, 19). What has prompted these interpretations was Wittgenstein's sympathy for Freud's psychoanalytic method. Wittgenstein even described himself as a disciple of Freud. But what is important here is that he admired Freud for his 'excellent comparisons' (Monk 1991, 357). According to Wittgenstein, Freud's problems were to a large extent philosophical, conceptual problems, whereas Freud himself thought that he had established a new *science* of psychology. Wittgenstein knew this, and he was 'scornful about Freud's scientific pretensions' (Read and Hutchinson 2010, 151). The danger of unnecessarily interpreting Wittgenstein's philosophical methods as a kind of psychotherapy lies precisely in the reintroduction of Freudian scientific pretensions into Wittgenstein's methods. This goes against the spirit of Wittgenstein's methods, aimed at preserving the specificity of philosophical questions and philosophical understanding.

Wittgenstein writes that philosophical problems are, '*of course, not empirical problems*' (PI 109, my italics) and that the propositions of natural science have 'nothing to do with philosophy' (TLP 6.53). Philosophical problems are not solved by coming up with new discoveries, as are scientific, empirical problems. According to Wittgenstein, 'Philosophy just puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. [...] The name 'philosophy' might also be given to what is possible *before* all new discoveries and inventions' (PI 126). And: 'What we find out in philosophy is trivial; it does not teach us any new facts, only science does that' (Lee 1980, 26). In short, Wittgenstein thought philosophy to be entirely different from science. The problems are different (empirical vs. conceptual), and the methods must also be different. Wittgenstein was radically opposed to the conviction that there could possibly be such a thing as scientific method in philosophy.

We are now in a position to answer the question of whether Wittgenstein's philosophical therapies are psycho-

logical therapies. The answer is no. Philosophical investigations deal with conceptual confusions and are not scientific. Psychological investigations are scientific investigations, largely aimed at solving empirical problems by empirical methods. Wittgenstein even explicitly insists upon the fact that his investigations are *not* psychological (PPF 372). The problem of seeing Wittgenstein's philosophical therapies as psychoanalytic or psychological therapies is that, as a result, ideas connected with psychoanalysis and psychotherapy are likely to infect interpretations of Wittgenstein. If philosophical therapies are a kind of psychotherapy, the illnesses to be treated by them, for example, will easily be thought of as mental disturbances.

We have one question left to answer: Does Wittgenstein's ideal of health consist in the end of philosophy? Wittgenstein writes that philosophical therapies are aimed at 'the discovery of some piece of plain nonsense' (PI 119), at making us understand that the philosophical problem we have been trying to answer cannot be meaningfully formulated. If the methods are successful, the *particular* problem, the problem *at hand*, the problem that has been shown to be based on a misunderstanding, will no longer be a problem, as it will have disappeared completely.

Philosophical questions can be dissolved by applying therapies, but we will never get to the end of our work, because our urge to misunderstand, our conceptual vulnerabilities, will make new problems appear while old ones disappear. Wittgenstein compared his method to 'tidying up a room' (Monk 1991, 299). To elaborate on that comparison: the room of philosophy is a huge one, and it is never tidied up forever, because new things are constantly being brought into it and old dust is falling from the ceiling.

Wittgenstein writes that 'philosophical problems should completely disappear' (PI 133). He wanted to make clear that particular philosophical problems can be dissolved completely. Some commentators, however, among which Richard Rorty (1982, 19-36), have concluded that Wittgenstein wanted to bring philosophy to an end. Wittgenstein wrote that 'the real discovery is the one that gives philosophy peace' (PI 133), but what gives philosophy peace is not the end of it, but the solution of ever more particular problems. The more philosophical problems are shown to be meaningless, the easier it will become to understand that philosophical problems, in general, arise through 'the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language' (PI 109). Once this has been understood, philosophy comes down to 'the calm ascertaining of linguistic facts' (BT 316) and it becomes possible to examine 'one thing after another methodically, and in complete peace' (BT 316).

The results of this paper are, at least, some clear answers: philosophers are not literally ill, patients of philosophical therapies are not always philosophers, the therapies are not psychological and the ideal of health does not consist in the end of philosophy. The answers tell us in the first place what philosophical therapies are *not*. They serve as a warning not to let everything we associate with 'therapies' or 'illness' influence our interpretation of Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein writes that 'by our method, we try to counteract the misleading effect of certain analogies' (BB 28). A convincing interpretation of Wittgenstein's comparison of philosophical methods with therapies has to build on an overall understanding of his methods and draws its evidence from the context in which the comparison has been designed and is at home. I hope to have shown that the comparison should not be interpreted by isolating it, by using the word 'therapies' as a starting point from which

properties can being projected onto the philosophical methods advanced by Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein writes: 'The use of expressions constructed on analogical patterns stresses analogies between cases often far apart. And by doing this these expressions may be extremely useful' (BB 28). The comparison of philosophical methods with therapies is surely useful to clarify aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophical methods, but there are aspects of his method that it cannot capture, and we should not extend the comparison beyond its own limits. Take, for example, Wittgenstein's idea that, in order to dissolve meaningless philosophical questions, we should try to produce a perspicuous representation, an ordered overview of the use of our words. To clarify this idea and to highlight the more positive tasks of the philosopher, it seems more promising to explore other comparisons of Wittgenstein, for example his description of philosophy as 'putting together books in a library which belong together' (BB 44). Although a systematic account will probably never emerge, an overview of Wittgenstein's comparisons and what they do or do not tell us about his methods may prevent us from seeing his views on the methods of philosophy through the glasses of only one comparison. It may prevent us from being held captive by a picture (PI 115).

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Some Remarks on the Resolute Reading of the *Tractatus*

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Abstract

In my paper I address Peter M.S. Hacker's argument against the so-called resolute reading proposed by Cora Diamond and James Conant. The argument is that in "Some Remarks on Logical Form" Wittgenstein reasserts some of the concepts from the *Tractatus* as the articulation of his earnest stance. That is why the *Tractatus* must not be read as plain nonsense. My paper argues for the therapeutic interpretation of the *Tractatus*.

Most recent discussions on Wittgenstein's philosophy (in particular, the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* phase) have focused on the so-called resolute reading proposed by Cora Diamond and James Conant. They contend that the *Tractatus* does not expound any philosophical theories of language and the world, and its goal is purely therapeutic. In this paper, I will address one of the counterarguments put forward by Peter M. S. Hacker, who refers to the post-*Tractatus* period, including e.g. "Some Remarks on Logical Form", and argues that if Diamond's and Conant's interpretation were correct, it would be unintelligible why Wittgenstein should repeat metaphysical, logical-syntactic and logical-metaphysical claims formulated in the *Tractatus* purported to be plain nonsense.

According to Diamond, the interpretation of the *Tractatus* depends entirely on how seriously we treat thesis 6.54, which – together with a passage from the *Preface* concerning the limits of language – forms in her view the framework of the *Tractatus*.

If we apply the criteria of sense that the *Tractatus* formulates, everything that is found in between the two passages (within the boundaries set by the frame, so to say) should be treated simply as nonsense, as statements which are merely „transitional“ and serve to make us realise that having thrown away the ladder we are left with no set of “ineffable truths” about the world, language or thinking. The *Tractarian* theses are solely therapeutic, and the import of the *Tractatus* lies in proving that when we philosophise, we assume a wrong position towards the world. Consequently, the *Tractatus* liberates us from a philosophical confusion. Only this and nothing more.

Diamond's query is: if we reject the ladder, „are we going to keep the idea that there is something or other in reality that we gesture at, however badly, when we speak of ‘the logical form of reality’, so that *it*, *what* we were gesturing at, is there but cannot be expressed in words?“ [Diamond, 1991]. In her view, that would be „chickening out“; that is, we would only pretend to have rejected the ladder while in fact we held on to it firmly. We do not „chicken out“, however, if we claim that throwing away the ladder entails also abandoning any attempts at treating seriously the language which speaks of some features of reality that can be shown but cannot be expressed in words. According to Diamond, we should abolish the distinction between saying and showing as simply nonsense, the distinction being actually crucial in the standard interpretation of the *Tractatus*. Such interpretation was later dubbed as „resolute reading“ by Warren Goldfarb, in contrast to irresolute readings typical of the standard approaches. The irresolution consists here in oscillating between two claims: on the one hand, the *Tractatus* is assumed to propound certain metaphysical theories and, on the other, its propositions are deemed nonsensical.

Like Diamond, James Conant also argues that the understanding of the *Tractatus* depends on whether or not thesis 6.54 is treated seriously. According to Conant, the method of the *Tractatus* can be summarised in a sequence of steps: (1) in step one, Wittgenstein manages to capture a certain extraordinary possibility, i.e. „an illogical thought“; (2) in step two, he assesses it as impossible; (3) in step three, he concludes that the truth of this assessment cannot be situated in the domain of the logical structure of language because it concerns the logical structure of language itself; (4) in step four, the philosopher “shows” but does not “say” what it is that cannot be said. We should notice that step (4) is the ultimate step in the ineffability readings. It is not so, however, for the „new therapists“, as Richard Rorty called Diamond, Conant and their followers. Namely, they append also step five, the most important one in their view. Conant puts it in the following manner: „Rather, what is to happen is that I am lured up all four of these rungs of the ladder and then: (5) throw the *entire* ladder (all four of the previous rungs) away“ [Conant, 2002].

By necessity reduced here to its bare essentials, Diamond's and Conant's interpretation has stirred considerable controversy and provoked many critical voices. One of them was Peter M.S. Hacker's polemic, who emphatically argued that: „If Wittgenstein did not really believe that there are ineffable truths that can be shown but cannot be said, if he intended the ladder metaphor to indicate that the whole of the *Tractatus* was nothing but plain, though misleading, nonsense, then one should expect there to be some trace of this in his numerous later references to the book“ [Hacker, 2000].

Such traces should evidently be detected in “Some Remarks on Logical Form”. According to Hacker, in this article Wittgenstein re-states the central theories of the *Tractatus*; for example, that space and time are forms of objects, that all propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions, or that a proposition must have the same logical multiplicity as what it represents. The text contains also general remarks on language: e.g. that ordinary language disguises the logical structure and makes it possible to produce pseudo-propositions. Side by side with the remarks which reassert the *Tractarian* theses, there are also moments of contention which concern the mutually exclusive statements of degree. „I used to think that statements of degree were analyzable“; „One might think – and I thought so not long ago – that a statement expressing the degree of a quality could be analyzed into a logical product of single statements of quantity and a completing supplementary statement“ [Wittgenstein, 1993].

Addressing Hacker's argument, I would like to thematise two issues. Firstly, it should be emphasized that revisiting

Wittgenstein's philosophy after many years, he had to find a starting point: he had to survey ideas in retrospect and establish some grounds for his revived and resumed reflection. This could be one reason why he treated some of the *Tractatus* elucidations more substantially, that is as an expression of a propounded philosophical doctrine. In "Some Remarks on Logical Form", he harboured on the issue of the mutual independence of elementary propositions. In fact, Wittgenstein refers here not so much to the text of the *Tractatus* as to its spirit. The formulations that Hacker quotes – "I used to think..." or "and I thought so not long ago" – pertain to attempts at elucidating statements about colours in categories of even simpler statements of degree, and they hardly refer explicitly to any remarks from the *Tractatus*. Therein we will find no explanations concerning statements of degree.

Such explanation can, however, be found in the notes that Wittgenstein started taking after he arrived in Cambridge in January 1929. The passages in question come from before "Some Remarks" was written.

Here we come across the second issue. "Some Remarks on Logical Form" can be viewed as representative of the so-called phenomenological period in Wittgenstein's philosophical evolution, which was relatively short, spanning between February and October 1929. In very broad lines, we could say that Wittgenstein's phenomenology is bound up with the perception or seeing of space, which the philosopher dubs the visual space. Wittgenstein addresses not the phenomena as such, but rather a language which refers to the phenomena and the grammar of this language. Wittgenstein's original idea was that the phenomenological language was the primary language, which was supposed to differ from the ordinary, physical language, i.e. the secondary language. The difference was to lie in the fact that the phenomenological language described our immediate perceptions and sensory experiences and was shaped by the phenomena themselves. Such a language would make it possible to avoid the contradictions and ambiguities of the ordinary language, which became a very complicated and intricate structure hindering our access to the things as such due to, among others, the absorption of scientific categories and notions. The phenomenological language purported not so much to give us access to the phenomena as rather to be a more adequate reflection of their logical structure because in itself, it was to be logically correct and its grammar was to correspond to the logical syntax. Although in "Some Remarks" Wittgenstein does not use the term „phenomenological language“, that is actually the language he meant when he insisted on the logical investigation of the phenomena themselves. Such a language does not accommodate constructions like „A is red and A is green in the same place at the same time“, because the syntax of the phenomenological language precludes them. The syntax of the phenomenological language rules out the question „What is the temperature outside?“ being answered with „It is 23° C, but not 25°C“ as well as it makes us answer the question „What time is it?“ without adding what time it is not yet.

The quest for the phenomenological language, which would be free from the imperfections of the ordinary language and would not allow, for example, the mutual exclusion of colour statements, did not progress beyond a very general project outline and was rather quickly abandoned by Wittgenstein. If we focus on the evolution of Wittgenstein's thought, the reasons for abandoning the project are more important than the motives for searching for the phenomenological language in the first place. The chief reason for abandoning the phenomenological project was the categorial mistake, which we commit if we try to speak of

immediate data. Referring to Ernst Mach's *The Analysis of Sensations* and the drawing of the field of vision included in it, Wittgenstein observes that the blurriness of the objects in my field of vision and the blurriness of the objects in the picture are two entirely different things. The blurriness of things within the limits of the field of vision is a way in which the real world is given to us, and it cannot be otherwise; for example, I cannot see clearly the things at the edges while vaguely – the things at the centre of the field of vision. The vagueness of the images in the picture can, however, be always changed, and the hazy contours of objects in it can be drawn more sharply and precisely.

The blurriness of the real picture and the blurriness of the representation are two different things and, likewise, the present of the immediate experience and „the present“ of its depiction are two different things. The language unfolds in time, but our direct experience of the world is outside time. „We find ourselves, with our language so to say, in the domain of film, not of the projected picture“ [Wittgenstein, 1975]. Wittgenstein neither confirms nor negates the statement that phenomena take place in time, but he considers such statements nonsensical. Here we encounter the problem of how language, which unfolds in time, can describe phenomena which are atemporal? Of course, Wittgenstein did not insist on the utter incommensurability of the world and our language, yet he definitely doubted that the phenomenological language as the language of immediate sense data was at all possible. It seems to us that we can describe such immediate experience in our language, to picture what we see now just like Mach did. Of course, we often do that, but doing that we fall into a trap. We imagine that what we symbolically represented can be later compared with reality, and when we fail to do this or it proves difficult and ambiguous, we pose philosophical questions, asking how phenomena can be described by means of our language. Or, in more general terms, we inquire what is the relationship between language and the world. But these queries are merely a shadow of our words, a shadow of our grammar. What we represent, what we symbolise in language, what we draw in a picture, is a model, i.e. a representation of an object; it is only our words, pictures, drawings, models, and they are governed by a different logic than reality is. Confusing these kinds of logic engenders philosophical problems, such as the relationship between language and reality. In fact, we arrive here at the limit of language and transgress it imperceptibly.

As a result, Wittgenstein's attention shifts towards the grammar of expressions referring to sense data, and the problem of representation becomes essentially the problem of using language rules. Statements about single sense data which would neither combine with nor exclude nor presuppose other statements turn out to be a fiction. Applying more contemporary terms, we could say that we cannot speak about the language of phenomena alone without resorting, for example, to some inferential patterns. In renouncing the phenomenological language, or – more precisely – in transforming phenomenology into grammar, Wittgenstein renounces the Myth of the Given, as Wilfried Sellars puts it.

In the notes he took in the phenomenological period (from which "Some Remarks on Logical Form" dates), Wittgenstein not so much restates some of the *Tractatus* theories as rather submits them to critical analysis. Searching for the phenomenological language and to discard it can be, in my opinion, viewed as a therapeutic move. Referring to Conant, we can state that in the first step (1) Wittgenstein manages to grasp a certain possibility, i.e. the phenomenological language which would be

free from the problem of the mutual exclusion of colours; in the second step (2) we realize that such a language commits a categorial mistake; in the third step (3) we perceive that the mistake engenders so-called philosophical problems, such as the problem of agreement or not agreement of the picture and reality. The fourth step (4) consists in rejecting the phenomenological language and abiding by our ordinary language. And finally in the fifth step (5), we comprehend that the so-called philosophical problems are in fact pseudo-problems. Of course, in the notes from the period when Wittgenstein was writing "Some Remarks" the steps are not delineated clearly; nevertheless, I believe that we can grasp the structure of thinking that they reflect.

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Misleading parallels. Wittgenstein, analogy, and philosophical problems

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Abstract

According to Wittgenstein, there are misunderstandings that emerge due to certain analogies in the forms of our language. Misleading parallels that are not recognized as such, are felt as problems by philosophers who are predisposed not to look at the actual use of our words.

Although “expressions constructed on analogical patterns” play an important role in human thought, they might also produce false appearances. In the hope of seeing how to overcome the confusions thus originated, I propose a brief overview of some of Wittgenstein’s remarks that deal with this complex facet of analogies, similes, and a certain tendency for symmetry, characteristic of philosophical investigation when explanations are sought after that serve as a counterpart to what is open to view in our language games (for instance, the inclination to see the inner as what can complement the outer in a symmetric composition).

Introduction*

“Our investigation (...) sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language.” [PI, I, § 90]

“Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intellect by means of language” [PI, I, §109]

Wittgenstein often points out the bewildering effect that analogies might exert on us. In fact, the perils of analogical expressions are a pressing issue in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, who often calls our attention to this, sometimes in a very sustained manner, as in the *Blue Book*, and sometimes in the form of a brief remark amidst other question that is being attended to, and that somehow profits from the recollection that analogies can mislead, or from the suggestion that maybe, we are taking an analogy too far. However, there are also analogical expressions who are not prone to cause confusion; on the contrary, there are analogies, like that between language and games [Cf. PI, I §83], that cast light where confusion reigns. Alas, the boundaries between what can lead us astray and what can refresh our intellect are not sharp. What’s more, we don’t always recognize analogies *prima facie*, let alone overcoming the muddles created when we fail to see how we really use words in our ordinary language games. Nevertheless, having diagnosed analogies as a source of philosophical puzzlement, Wittgenstein suggests a new way of thinking that aims at solving the perplexities thus encountered. Certainly, it is worth noticing that, a discussion of the misunderstandings that emerge due to certain analogies in the forms of our language, is part of the more general argument that there are traps in our language [Cf. P, §90, p. 183], and that philosophy really is “a battle against the bewitchment of our intellect by mean of language”.

I hope that a succinct outline of this matter, by way of looking at some of Wittgenstein’s remarks on the subject, over the years - after his ‘return to philosophy’ in 1929 - and in various texts, will be a helpful one.

1. *Gleichnis*, analogy, simile.

Firstly, let us consider the German word ‘*Gleichnis*’, which is usually translated as analogy but can also be rendered as simile. Wittgenstein uses both words in English; for instance, in the *Lecture on Ethics* Wittgenstein gives “God is our father” as an example of a simile, and in the *Blue Book*, speaks of analogy at length – however without leaving behind the word ‘simile’.

Regarding the example from the *Lecture on Ethics*, Molder (2010, pp. 47-48) reminds us that, “according to the *Tractatus* doctrine (and still acting over the conference) we only recognize as fact that which is describable through another fact with a representative power, that is to say, an image in proposition. (...) Although “God is our father” implies an analogical system, analysing its *ratio* will know no bounds, for it presupposes a vision whose origin lies in an affinity, that one between father and son, which presupposes a constellation of affects, emotions and actions that can not be fully explained by the analysis of facts.” At bottom, this is the reason why Wittgenstein does not accept similes of religious or ethical nature in this conference: if we drop the simile, we find that no fact lays behind it, no “image in proposition” can occupy its place, so much so, that we are lead to conclude that what appeared to be a simile is “mere nonsense”. [LoE, p. 43]

In the *Blue Book*, the *tractarian* image of language is no longer effective, though there is something that the new account of language will preserve from the earlier view. We can say that the intuition that we make pictures of the facts for ourselves [Cf. TLP, 2.1], lingers in the new account of language which Wittgenstein comes to develop after his return to philosophy in 1929, but the grip of this claim is weakened. The fact that analogies and similes are images of the facts they portray, since they might stand for something else, is no longer a good criterion for identifying an expression that will not puzzle us. Indeed, all mediations between ourselves and things (i.e., how we use words in our language games) are possible source of philosophical fascination, precisely because they stand in the way of our recognition and direct access to how things are, representing them. The problem resides in this representation always being partial; after all, if we are not looking to things themselves, we are stuck with substitutes. Indeed, analogies and similes preserve only the shared features of the diverse things they bring together, and we tend to overlook the different regions of language where a word

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functions. A good example is the way in which we speak of the passing of time, and say that time flows, become confused by this and end up with the philosophical problem of the locality of past events. What we usually accept with no further ado regarding time, becomes problematic when our talk of things that pass us by and come to occupy a place in space in relation to us, is used as a simile to happenings in time. The allure of the question that asks 'Where does the present go when it becomes past?' is related with the embodiment of a simile in our language, which makes us look for the 'past' as a 'thing' that is 'somewhere', regardless of the difference between the two. [Cf. BB, p. 107]

2. Analogy and philosophical problems.

However, Wittgenstein acknowledges the usefulness of expressions constructed on analogical patterns: "The use of expressions constructed on analogical patterns stresses analogies between cases often far apart. And by doing this these expressions may be extremely useful." [BB, p. 28]

Notwithstanding this, one difficulty concerning analogies is to see where they can mislead us, and so it's important that we look at them case by case without rushing to generalizations, that is, without pushing analogies too far: "Every particular notation stresses a point of view" [BB, p. 28]. Wittgenstein also warns us that the boundary between the safe and the misleading parallels we follow is not at all precise:

"When we say that by our method we try to counteract the misleading effect of certain analogies, it is important that you should understand that the idea of an analogy being misleading is nothing sharply defined. No sharp boundary can be drawn round the cases in which we should say that a man was misled by an analogy." [BB, p. 28]

Indeed, there seem to be no conditions for exactness concerning concepts and forms of expressions. If we want to recognize the confusing analogies, it will be necessary to look at them case by case, for words are not given precise meanings anywhere, but have a meaning, a life, in our everyday language games. Our investigation should not rush towards subsuming in an image, the richness and variations of our particular forms of expressions; i.e., we will profit from looking at the particular cases, from giving attention to detail and different nuances, not only seeing the similarities, but indeed acknowledging the manifold overlaps and crisscrosses.

3. Symmetry.

An analogy presupposes a cast of reasons that we can enumerate, thus figuring out what is the core of our bringing different things together. The equilibrium that we find in the *ratio* of such analysis underlies our forms of expression constructed on an analogical pattern. Moreover, the proportion between two different things united in an analogy, seems to be based on them functioning as complements or counterparts of each other, and its usefulness, as we have seen, resides precisely in its capacity to join cases often far apart. However, the balance that we seek with our analogies is also something to which we must pay attention, when we translate it in a tendency towards symmetry that makes us see certain words as significant groupings. The perils of this predisposition are exemplified by the pair inner/outer, especially when we couple it with the pair hidden/visible. Such inclination is characteristic of philosophical investigation when explanations are sought

after that serve as a counterpart to what is open to view in our language games, e.g., the inclination to see the inner as what can complement the outer in a symmetric composition¹. For instance, doubt regarding someone else's pain might be instilled by the philosophical question that asks about our access to other person's feelings, supposedly hidden from us. A philosophical inquiry on this matter will usually try to resolve the perplexities of "feeling pain in someone else's body", by entangling the question even further: as it seeks to understand the external cry of pain by means of a private explanation, it ends up with the problem of how mind and body connect. As if only the mind, that is, the mind understood as the hidden seat of real feeling and experience, could be the criterion for our decision on the genuineness of someone else's behaviour. This is a very simplified image of the uneasiness that we can feel when philosophising about this matter, but it helps as a background setting of Wittgenstein's following example:

"'A new-born child has no teeth.' – 'A goose has no teeth.' – 'A rose has no teeth.' This last one at any rate – one would like to say – is obviously true! It is even surer than that a goose has none. – And yet it is none so clear. For where should a rose's teeth have been? The goose has none in its jaw. And neither, of course, has it any in its wings; but no one means that when he says he has no teeth. – Why, suppose one were to say: the cow chews its food and then dungs the rose with it, so the rose has teeth in the mouth of a beast. This would not be absurd, because one has notion in advance where to look for teeth in a rose. (Connexion with 'pain' in someone else's body.)" [PI, II, xi, pp. 221-222]

This example sheds light on several aspects: for one, it counteracts our inclination to seek explanations of that, which is open to view, by means of something private and hidden from our eyes. It is also remarkable in how it plays with what we find to be evident at first glance, and with what we expect of things, reminding us of the value of seeing things from a new perspective, so that we can see what is not so obvious, but that is there nonetheless: "the rose has teeth in the mouth of a beast". Finally, it is very significant to what is the subject of this essay as it is a fine example of a simile that refreshes our intellect. ("A good simile refreshes our intellect." [C&V, p. 3e, Ms 105 73 c:129])

Conclusion:

"If I am correct (...) philosophical problems must be completely solvable, in contrast to all others. (...) The problems are dissolved in the actual sense of the word – like a lump of sugar in water." [P, pp. 182-183]

That they remain insolvable has to do with the nature of the investigation that we engage in when unrest settles in our intellect. Philosophical problems have a unique character and unlike scientific problems, they are not solvable by an increase of information regarding the object we are studying nor are they dealt with by means of a doctrine or theory that stands fast for us as a satisfactory explanation of our confusions. Their uniqueness has to do with the fact that they arise due to deep disquietudes tied with grammatical problems owing in part to the misunderstandings caused by certain analogies between the forms of our language. Hence the need to identify which analogies lead up

¹ "(Remember that we sometimes demand definitions for the sake not of their content, but of their form. Our requirement is an architectural one; the definition a kind of ornamental coping that supports nothing.)" [PI, Part I, §217.]

to philosophical perplexities, and which ones makes us see things anew, refreshing our intellect, freeing us from the “oldest thought habits, (...) the oldest images that are engraved into our language itself.” [P, p. 185]. The fictional concepts that we may invent in order to help us understand our own, belong in this last group [Cf. C&V, p. 85e, Ms 137, 78b, 24.10.1948]. They are of fundamental importance for recovering the lost links between our own concepts, once they are severed by the generalization of similarities and common aspects in our analogies.

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„Tennis ohne Ball“: Wittgensteins Argumentation gegen Behaviorismus und Mentalismus

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Abstract

Der Artikel beschäftigt sich mit Wittgensteins Bezug zu Behaviorismus auf der Basis der Zurückweisung einer privaten Sprache. Seine Kritik an Mentalismus im Kontext von Privatsprachenproblem zeigt starke behavioristische Züge. Ich werde dafür argumentieren, dass dies jedoch nicht als eine hinreichende Bedingung für behavioristische Deutung von Wittgensteins Spätdenken gelesen werden kann. Mehr noch, ich möchte zeigen, dass Wittgensteins Position zu Behaviorismus dieselben argumentativen Züge aufweist, wie Kritik an Mentalismus und Introspektion. Als Schilderung von Wittgensteins Argumentation gegen Behaviorismus wird das Gedankenexperiment „Tennis ohne Ball“ interpretiert. Das Experiment wendet sich zwar primär gegen die Auffassung vom „inneren Sprechen“, ich werde jedoch zeigen, dass es ebenso plausibel für die Argumentation gegen Behaviorismus gedeutet werden kann. An diesem Beispiel möchte ich die Gemeinsamkeiten der Kritik an Mentalismus und Behaviorismus beleuchten.

Einleitung

Wittgensteins Einstellung zu Behaviorismus ist nicht eindeutig. Wenn anfangs der 30er Jahre seine Position vor allem im Kontext des Verifikationismus als eine behavioristische zu deuten ist, wird die Lage während 40er Jahre deutlich komplizierter. In meinem Artikel möchte ich mich mit Wittgensteins Rezeption von Behaviorismus beschäftigen und setze mir zwei Ziele. Erstens möchte ich die wichtigsten Züge des methodologischen Behaviorismus in Wittgensteins Texten deuten. Zweitens werde ich dafür argumentieren, dass Wittgenstein in der Bearbeitung dieses Themas eine ganz ähnliche Argumentation verwendet, die aus der Privatsprachendiskussion bekannt ist. Meine These ist: Wittgensteins Position zu Internalismus ist in gewissem Sinne dieselbe wie zu Behaviorismus. Diese Auslegung hat nicht die Absicht, die behavioristische Position in Wittgensteins Philosophie der Psychologie zu bestreiten oder unkritisch anzunehmen, sondern ihre Voraussetzungen zu schildern und sie aufgrund Wittgensteins Texten einer Kritik zu unterziehen. Mein Beitrag besteht aus drei Teilen. Im ersten Abschnitt beleuchte ich die Gründe für die Kritik am Mentalismus. Im nächsten Teil beschäftige ich mich mit dem Behaviorismus – also mit den Gründen für Wittgensteins Kritik und mit der Schilderung von behavioristischen Zügen in Wittgensteins Philosophie der Psychologie. Hier werde ich das Gedankenexperiment „Tennis ohne Ball“ interpretieren und mit seiner Hilfe die Argumentation gegen Behaviorismus entwickeln. In dem Schlussabsatz möchte ich dann zumindest andeutungsweise Wittgensteins Position zwischen Introspektion und Behaviorismus erklären.

1. Das Argument für die Ablehnung des Mentalismus

Wittgenstein strebt im Rahmen seiner Philosophie der Psychologie nach einer begrifflichen Klarheit bei der Verwendung der psychologischen Begriffe (vgl. zwei Pläne „zur Behandlung psychologischer Begriffe“¹). In diesem Sinne nimmt er eine kritische Haltung gegen eine der wichtigsten Positionen der theoretischen Philosophie seiner Zeit an – dem Mentalismus.

Der Mentalismus geht auf die These zurück, dass geistige Phänomene oder Elemente (wie etwa Vorstellungen) privat sind. Die Psyche ähnelt einem inneren Schauplatz, zu dem man nur durch Introspektion einen privilegierten Zugang habe. Wittgenstein lehnt diese Möglichkeit der privaten Sprachkonstitutionen ab, indem er das Problem der Kriterien der sprachlichen Bedeutung thematisiert. Als ein Beispiel für Wittgensteins Position kann die Annahme dienen, dass die Bedeutung eines Wortes durch ein geistiges Bild bestimmt ist. Laut dieser Vorstellung ist die Bedeutung eines Wortes (z.B. *Apfel*) durch ein geistiges Bild (des Apfels) bestimmt. Das Wort hat die Bedeutung, weil es mit dem Inhalt in meinem Kopf verbunden ist. Wenn ich also das Wort *Apfel* ausspreche, verstehe ich es, weil mir zugleich das Bild des Apfels in meinem Geiste vorschwebt. Es gibt aber auch die Möglichkeit, das Bild durch Prozesse (etwa *Meinen, Denken, Verstehen*) oder durch eine Disposition (etwa *Rechnen, Lesen*) zu ersetzen. Alle Möglichkeiten verbindet jedoch die Annahme, dass das sprachliche Verstehen privat ist, also auf private Vorstellungen, Prozessen oder Dispositionen, die nur mir zugänglich sind, übertragbar ist.

Wittgenstein kritisiert diese Annahme aus zwei Positionen. Das erste Problem besteht darin, dass es sich um ein geistiges Element handeln sollte. Das zweite Problem besteht in der Verbindung zwischen dem inneren Bild und dem äußeren Gegenstand. Beide Positionen verbindet dann ein Problem des Kriteriums für das, was genau das geistige Element bedeuten sollte:

„Wenn man sagt „Der Erlebnisinhalt des Sehens und des Vorstellens ist wesentlich derselbe“, so ist das wahr daran, daß ein gemaltes Bild wiedergeben kann, was man sieht und wiedergeben kann, was man sich vorstellt. Nur darf man sich nicht vom Mythos des inneren Bildes täuschen lassen.

Das „Vorstellungsbild“ tritt nicht dort ins Sprachspiel ein wo man es vermuten möchte.“
(Ts. 232, 628, BPP II. § 109)

Nehmen wir also als Beispiel, dass das Gedachte ein Bild sei. Der Fehler besteht gerade in der Analogie des Bildes – ich kann zwar malen, was ich denke, das heißt jedoch nicht, dass das Gemalte eine Wiedergabe des inneren Bildes sei. Warum nicht? Wenn wir ein gemaltes Bild betrachten, können wir das Gesehene mit anderen Menschen beschreiben und als das Gesehene verifizieren.

¹ Ms. 134, S. 41 (BPP I. § 836); Ts. 232, S. 615 (BPP II. § 63, 148). Die Pläne wurden später abgelehnt, weil sie die Vollständigkeit suggerieren, die Wittgenstein bestreitet (vgl. Ts. 233b, S. 20, Z § 464-465).

Wenn das Bild jedoch etwas innerliches sein sollte, dann bedeutet es eben kein konkretes Bild, denn es fehlen Kriterien dessen, was abgebildet wird. Dies beruht auf der Voraussetzung, dass Intersubjektivität eine nötige Bedingung für eine Kommunikation ausmacht. Die Kommunikation beruht auf einer kommunikativen Übereinstimmung, auf „Übereinstimmung in Urteilen“ (PU § 242). Eine innere Vorstellung des Bildes schließt daher ein (äußeres) Kriterium der Richtigkeit für introspektive Kommunikation aus und deswegen kann sie nicht bedeutungskonstitutiv sein:

„Das Wesentliche am privaten Erlebnis ist eigentlich nicht, daß Jeder sein eigenes Exemplar besitzt, sondern daß keiner weiß, ob der Andere auch dies hat, oder etwas anderes.“ (PU § 272)

Es handelt sich also um das Problem der fehlenden Kriterien. Wenn eine bestimmte Bedeutung als grundlegend für Kommunikation gilt und Kommunikation per definitionem intersubjektiv erfolgt, dann müssen die Kriterien für die Bedeutung auch intersubjektiv zugänglich sein. Derselbe Einwand wird dann auch gegen die Argumentation aufgrund eines geistigen Prozesses oder geistiger Disposition vorgebracht.

2. Das Argument für die Ablehnung des Behaviorismus

Eine radikale Lösung des gerade erwähnten Verifikationsproblems stellt die Theorie des Behaviorismus dar. Behaviorismus im methodologischen Sinne geht auf den Stand der auf Introspektion beruhenden psychologischen Forschung im 19. Jahrhundert zurück, welcher zu einer sicheren und komplexeren Grundlage der Psychologie werden sollte (James 1905: 448²). Der methodologische Behaviorismus – wie ihn Wittgenstein von W. James oder über B. Russell von J. B. Watson kannte – besteht darin, dass das Psychische durch das Physische erklärt wird. Ein seelischer Zustand (*Schmerzgefühl*) ist also eine Disposition sich auf eine Art und Weise zu verhalten (*vor Schmerz stöhnen*), wenn im Körper bestimmte Ereignisse geschehen (*etwas tut weh*). Die Argumentation erfolgt in zwei Schritten. Der erste Schritt besteht in dem Einnehmen des folgenden Sandpunktes: Es gilt, dass die inneren Zustände nicht verifizierbar sind und zugleich, dass sie mit dem körperlichen Verhalten verbunden sind. Der nächste Schritt ist folgender: Die inneren, nicht intersubjektiv verifizierbaren Zustände werden auf das äußere, also verifizierbare Verhalten übertragen. Anders gesagt: Wenn nur das Äußere verifizierbar ist, dann ist es legitim das Innere als das äußere Verhalten zu beschreiben. Der Behaviorismus sagt demzufolge in Wittgensteins Worten, dass „die Beschreibung des Verhaltens eine Beschreibung der Gefühle ist.“ (V&G: 51). Das Problem der Kriterien wird so gelöst, dass von inneren Zuständen in gewissem Sinne ganz abgesehen wird. Die Position kann noch verschärft werden in dem Punkt, dass die Existenz von einigen inneren Zuständen ganz bestritten wird. So Watson (1925: 78): „You already know the behaviourist's way of answering these questions. You know he recognizes no such things as mental traits, dispositions or tendencies.“

Wittgensteins Position zum Behaviorismus nach 1929 ist jedoch nicht so radikal und daher mehrdeutig. Anfangs der 30er Jahre sprach er sich ganz eindeutig für die behavioristischen Kriterien der Verifikation aus (WWK 244), später jedoch versteht er ihn als eine der möglichen Erklärungsorten (VORL 72), am Ende der Dekade lesen wir in Vorlesungen über Mathematik, dass Behaviorismus etwas wie

eine Absurdität sei (LFM 111). Nun möchte ich also die wichtigsten Züge von Wittgensteins Position schildern.

Beim ersten Betrachten der Privatsprachenargumentation könnte man geneigt sein zu sagen, dass Wittgensteins Position ganz nah am Behaviorismus angesiedelt ist, denn das Innere wird als bedeutungskonstitutiv abgelehnt und daher ist zu vermuten, dass es in *stricto sensu* abgelehnt wird.

Doch seine Position beruht seit dem *Tractatus* auf der Ablehnung des cartesianischen Dualismus und gerade in diesem Kontext findet Wittgenstein Anerkennung für den Behaviorismus: „Das Behavioristische an unserer Behandlung besteht nur darin, daß wir keinen Unterschied zwischen ‚außen‘ und ‚innen‘ machen.“ (Ms. 110: 296). Das Behavioristische ist also die Aufhebung des Substanzdualismus, das Behavioristische ist jedoch nicht Behaviorismus an sich. Als ein Beispiel für Wittgenstein Position kann man den Film *Blow-up* von Michelangelo Antonioni in Betracht ziehen. In der bekannten Schlusszene spielt eine Gruppe von Studenten Tennis, jedoch ohne Ball. Sie machen Bewegungen genauso, als ob sie mit dem Ball spielen würden – versuchen den imaginären Ball zu fangen, sind begeistert vom Sieg und traurig bei der Niederlage. Die Frage ist dann, ob beide Spiele (mit und ohne Ball) für die Spieler identisch sind. Erstaunlicherweise, Antonioni möge Wittgenstein zitieren, denn er verwendet dasselbe Beispiel:

„Die Spieler bewegen sich auf einem Tennisplatz ganz wie im Tennis, sie haben auch Rackets aber keinen Ball. Jeder reagiert auf des Andern stroke so, oder ungefähr so, als hätte ein Ball ihre Reaktion verursacht. (Manöver) Der Schiedsrichter der einen 'Blick' für das Spiel haben muß beurteilt strittigenfalls, ob ein Ball ins Netz gegangen ist, etc.etc..“ (Ms. 138: 18b)

Dieses Beispiel wird im Kontext von Äußerungen und Verifikation der geistigen Prozesse diskutiert (Rechnen im Kopf, Reden in der Vorstellung) und im Kontext des Privatsprachenproblems gedeutet (vgl. Budd 1989: 120-121). Ich möchte nun versuchen dieses Beispiel auf die behavioristische Argumentation anzuwenden, was auch Wittgenstein (1988: 14) nicht widerspricht. Wenn wir dies tun, dann ergibt sich nämlich keine Differenz zwischen dem Spiel mit und ohne Ball – die Spieler verhalten sich auf dieselbe Art und Weise. Die entscheidende Frage ist also: Stellt diese äußere Ähnlichkeit eine hinreichende Bedingung für die Identität der geistigen Prozesse der Spieler beider Spielarten dar? Wittgenstein antwortet ganz deutlich: „Das Spiel hat offenbar große Ähnlichkeit mit dem Tennis und ist doch andererseits grundverschieden.“ (Ms. 138: 18b). Laut Behaviorismus bräuchte man keinen Ball und keine Schläger – sie würden z.B. als ein Hilfsmittel für Anfänger angesehen. Dies ist jedoch nicht anzunehmen, denn – wie Wittgenstein sagt – seien die Spiele grundverschieden. Sie sind also nur scheinbar ähnlich. Die Differenz besteht darin, dass Tennis ohne Ball ja gar kein Tennis ist (wie etwa Radfahren ohne Rad kein Radfahren sei). Es ist etwa ein Spiel des Tennisspiels – es wird nicht Tennis gespielt, sondern es wird gespielt, dass Tennis gespielt wird.

Die Analogie zwischen Spiel und Behaviorismus mündet in folgender Frage: Worin besteht die Überzeugung, dass das Innere durch das Äußere *exakt* zu ersetzen sei? Diese Übertragung kann man als eine Reduktion verstehen und genau dies ist Punkt, wo Wittgenstein seine Kritik ansetzt:

„Aber sagst du nicht doch, daß alles, was man durch das Wort 'Seele' ausdrücken kann, irgendwie auch durch Worte für Körperliches sich ausdrücken läßt?

2 Zu diesem Ansatz vgl. BPP I. § 259 und 695.

Ich sage es nicht. Aber wenn es auch so wäre, – was würde es besagen? Die Worte, so wie auch das, worauf wir bei ihrer Erklärung weisen, sind ja nur die Instrumente, und nun kommt's auf ihren Gebrauch an.“ (Ts. 245: 239; BPP I. § 586).

Wittgenstein bestreitet nicht, dass das Innere mit dem Äußeren zusammenhängt, er bestreitet, dass laut Behaviorismus alle geistigen Inhalte („alles, was man durch das Wort „Seele“ ausdrücken kann“) mit dem äußeren Verhalten („durch Worte für Körperliches“) auf eine Art und Weise zusammenhängen. Der zitierte Gedanke ist also als Ablehnung des Behaviorismus für seinen Reduktionismus zu lesen. Es gibt jedoch noch einen anderen Einwand. Auch wenn alles Innere durch das Äußere zu beschreiben wäre, garantiert es nicht, dass wir über die Seele nur durch Worte für Körperliches sprechen würden. Wenn es nämlich bei Worten „auf ihren Gebrauch“ ankommt, dann ist es durchaus denkbar, dass wir über Seele auch mit anderen Worten sprechen. Das Sprachspiel des Körperlichen bedeutet also nicht, dass es nichts anderes außer dem Bereich des Körperlichen gibt. Die Kritik am Behaviorismus ist in diesem Punkt nächstliegend zur Kritik am Mentalismus: Bei der introspektiven Argumentation ist es nicht sicher, dass das Innere konstitutiv für die Bedeutung ist. Bei der behavioristischen Argumentation ist es nicht sicher, dass nur das Äußere für die Bedeutung konstitutiv ist.

Fazit: „kein Etwas, aber auch nicht ein Nichts“

Wittgensteins Position zwischen Mentalismus und Behaviorismus spiegelt sich in PU § 304 wieder, welcher den Unterschied „zwischen Schmerzbenennen ohne Schmerzen und Schmerzbenennen mit Schmerzen“ behandelt. Dieser Paragraph ist als eine Variation zu Tennis mit und ohne Ball zu verstehen. Wittgenstein bestätigt, dass der Unterschied grundverschieden sei („Welcher Unterschied könnte größer sein!“), zugleich gibt er aber zu, was die Kritik am Mentalismus und Behaviorismus verbindet: „Das Paradox verschwindet nur dann, wenn wir radikal mit der Idee brechen, die Sprache funktioniere immer auf eine Weise, die nie immer dem gleichen Zweck: Gedanken zu übertragen – seien diese nun Gedanken über Häuser, Schmerzen, Gut und Böse, oder was immer.“ (PU § 304). Diese antireduktionistische Position schafft dann einen freien Raum für eine neue Richtung in der Auffassung der Innen-Außen-Differenz. Sie wird aufgehoben durch öffentlich zugängli-

che Kommunikations- bzw. Handlungsregeln, die dann als intersubjektive Gepflogenheiten das Innere bestimmen. Der argumentative Weg von der Ablehnung des Behaviorismus hin zu einer originellen externen Bestimmung der inneren Empfindungen ist jedoch greifbar. Die Kritik am Behaviorismus ist also eine notwendige Bedingung und somit der erste Schritt auf dem Weg vom unbegründeten Reduktionismus. Der bestünde darin, zwischen Tennis mit und ohne Ball nicht zu unterscheiden.

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Meaningless Beliefs in Wittgenstein's "Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment"

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Abstract

In Section iv of his "Philosophy of Psychology—A Fragment" Wittgenstein seems to tell us that we do not believe that people have souls. This paper considers how we should understand his claim. It does so by applying the idea from throughout the *Investigations* that meaning is use. The conclusion reached is that Wittgenstein should be understood as claiming that statements of belief about the soul will only make sense in particular contexts, the lesson of which is that beliefs in general are not guaranteed to be ascribable across contexts and, so, do not fit our standard picture of them.

This paper is not meant to be revelatory for the experienced Wittgenstein reader. In large part, it merely traces back over one of the main ideas of the *Philosophical Investigations*—namely, the idea that the meaning of an utterance is tied up with its use (and also with the context in virtue of which it has that use)—and applies that idea to utterances about one's own and others' beliefs. The point of doing so is to clarify a passage of Wittgenstein's on 'belief' and highlight a key point of his treatment of that concept, namely, the point that beliefs are not *things in the head* that we carry around with us and refer to at any time. One way in which Wittgenstein makes this point is by arguing that statements of belief do not make sense regardless of context. Because statements of belief do not make sense regardless of context, correctly ascribing a belief to someone in one context will not guarantee the success of ascribing that same belief to him or her across contexts.

In Section iv of his "Philosophy of Psychology—A Fragment", Wittgenstein seems to hold a problematic view about a fairly common belief. He seems to say that we do not have the belief that people have souls: "My attitude towards [a person] is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the *opinion* that he has a soul" (PoP.iv.22). Though he is speaking in the first-person, it seems clear that Wittgenstein also thinks we are not of the opinion that people have souls and that we could not have such a belief. This is a troubling idea because at least some people want to say that they *are* of the opinion that people have souls. And even most of those who say that we do not have souls want to say that they *could* have such a belief and that other people *do* have such a belief. Thus, we find ourselves resisting what Wittgenstein says.

In what follows, I argue that Wittgenstein's view is more sensible than it might first appear. His general position is the following: *A given statement will make sense only in contexts in which it has a use. The statement of a belief, then, will make sense only in contexts in which it has a use. In contexts in which it does not have a use, the statement of the belief will be meaningless; and in such cases, we cannot be said to have the belief at all, for that too would not make sense.* This explanation of his view provides us with two reasons for which we might find his claim ("I am not of the *opinion* that he has a soul") problematic: (1) We take statements of some beliefs to be meaningful regardless of context, or (2) We misunderstand his claim as an assertion of a particular belief (viz., as "I believe that he does not have a soul") instead of an assertion about the possibility of having a particular *kind* of belief, and then we think of that assertion as being made in a context that allows it to be meaningful (instead of in the

one he intends). I begin by briefly explaining why it is incorrect to have (2) as a reason for rejecting Wittgenstein's claim about souls. I then do the same in regard to (1). I do so with reference to automatons, which Wittgenstein treats (in the passages which I am discussing, at least) as the opposite of souled creatures.

Wittgenstein begins Section iv of his "Philosophy of Psychology—A Fragment" with the following statement: " 'I believe that he is suffering'—Do I also *believe* that he isn't an automaton? Only reluctantly could I use the word in both contexts" (PoP.iv.19). At first it seems that the point of this statement is to draw our attention to the fact that it would be silly to say that we merely *believe* that our friend is not an automaton; for we of course *know* that he is not an automaton. Just a few lines later, however, Wittgenstein makes clear that this is not his point: "Or is it like *this*: I believe that he is suffering, but am *certain* that he is not an automaton? Nonsense!" (ibid.; second emphasis is mine). So he is not trying to draw our attention to a distinction between 'belief' and 'knowledge'. He must, then, be trying to say that we have *no belief whatever* about whether or not our friend is an automaton; we neither believe that he is, nor that he is not. It seems, then, that Wittgenstein is trying to draw our attention to a distinction between things about which we have beliefs and things about which we do not.¹ This becomes clear in the statement mentioned before: "My attitude towards [a person] is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the *opinion* that he has a soul" (PoP.iv.22). We do not have a belief about whether our friend has a soul; we simply *treat* him as having a soul.

Even so, our first response to these claims may simply be to disagree. For instance, when Wittgenstein implies that I do not believe that my friend is not an automaton, I want to respond by saying,

I do too believe that my friend is not an automaton. I would not say, "He is an automaton," so of course I am of the opinion that he is not an automaton.

This response, however, is misplaced. Such a response would certainly make sense if Wittgenstein had said, "Dougherty believes that his friend *is* an automaton," but that is not his claim. Rather, he is claiming that I have no belief about whether my friend *is* or *is not* an automaton. The suitable response, then, seems to be "No, I do have a belief about whether my friend is or is not an automaton."

¹ This is not, however, to say that Wittgenstein is trying to tell us the things about which we could not (ever) have beliefs. This will become evident later in the paper.

Wittgenstein's point, though, is that even this response makes no sense; for I am still claiming to have a belief, the content of which is either 'My friend is an automaton' or 'My friend is not an automaton.' For him, *neither* of these positions makes sense and, so, I could not be said to have either belief.

Throughout the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein emphasizes that statements of any kind only have meaning within the right context; for only in the right context do they have a use. So in order for a statement like 'I believe that my friend is not an automaton' to make sense, it must be spoken in the right context. But what would the right context for such a statement be? To begin to see, we can look at the context in which Wittgenstein thinks such a statement does *not* make sense, the context in which he comments on it:

Suppose I say of a friend: 'He isn't an automaton.'—What information is conveyed by this, and to whom would it be information? To a *human being* who meets him in ordinary circumstances? What information *could* it give him? (At the very most that this man always behaves like a human being, and not occasionally like a machine.) 'I believe he is an automaton', just like that, so far makes no sense. (PoP.iv.20-21)

The question we need to answer, then, is the following: "To whom and in what situations would the statement that my friend is not an automaton convey information?" First we should notice, as Wittgenstein does, that making such a statement *just like that* (i.e., out of the blue) makes no sense. We can see why this is the case by thinking of the following situation: As things stand now, if I were walking with a friend and all-of-a-sudden I said that another friend of ours is not an automaton, the friend with whom I was walking would probably respond with a 'What?' which would best be construed as a 'What could you possibly mean by that?' And it seems he would respond this way because, as Wittgenstein says, the statement that my other friend is not an automaton conveys no information in that setting. He would have responded similarly if I had said, "Gobbledygook." "My friend is not an automaton", then, conveys as much information as "Gobbledygook." One might object that my first statement—that my friend is not an automaton—*does* convey information; it tells the friend something about me: that I think my other friend is not a machine, which is a perfectly sensible thing to think. But, again, what does saying that my friend is not a machine do *in that context*? In what way is it useful? Wittgenstein's point, again, is that 'My friend is not a machine' and even 'I believe that my friend is not a machine' is not informative, because it is not useful.²

Again, then, in what contexts would such a statement be useful? Would it be useful as a response to Wittgenstein's original claim, that I do not have the belief that my friend is not an automaton? I stated earlier that it would not, specifically because Wittgenstein's claim is not that I believe my friend is not an automaton but, rather, that I have *no belief* about whether my friend is or is not an automaton. Thus, my response that I believe my friend is not an

automaton will be no more useful here than it would be *out of the blue* on the walk.

If, instead, Wittgenstein were to claim that I believe that my friend *is* an automaton, would my response *then* make sense? It seems that it would have to, at least insofar as Wittgenstein's instigating comment makes sense. In other words, insofar as "Dougherty thinks that his friend is an automaton" makes sense, so will my "I believe that my friend is not an automaton." In this scenario, Wittgenstein is no longer denying that I have a belief about whether my friend is or is not an automaton; he is instead saying that I do have a belief about the matter, the content of which is that my friend *is* an automaton. As we will see, though, Wittgenstein thinks that this instigating comment would also not make sense; for even though my response would no longer be *out of the blue*, his instigating comment would be.

However, using Wittgenstein's quote from above as a clue, we can imagine contexts slightly different from the way things currently stand in which an instigating comment of this kind would not be out of the blue and, so, would not be nonsense. By thinking of such contexts we can see that when Wittgenstein says we could not have certain beliefs about automatons or souls, he means that we could not have certain beliefs about automatons or souls in *current* contexts. For instance, if we again imagine that I am walking, say with two friends this time, one of which is Wittgenstein, but I live in a world where some human-looking, human-behaving entities actually turn out to be automatons, Wittgenstein's statement might make sense and so might my response. We could imagine that in this world in which we are walking, it is impolite to ask an automaton whether or not he is an automaton, and, additionally, though there are ways of picking out automatons, it is extremely difficult to do so because they look and act so much like humans. Wittgenstein and I have been trying to figure out for the last several weeks whether a friend of ours is an automaton and he is relaying some of the content of our discussions to a third friend who is especially good at picking out automatons. Wittgenstein might conclude his re-telling by saying, "So, Dougherty thinks that his friend is an automaton" to which I may respond that I actually disagree, that I think she is *not* an automaton. Here, unlike in the other scenarios, our statements are useful to the third friend (and even to each other), because there is something that it is *for a friend to turn out to be an automaton*. Thus, my belief that my friend is not an automaton is contentful; it is useful. The third friend can go on and ask more about why we do or do not think that my friend is an automaton, and doing so conveys useful information.

Wittgenstein's position, then, is less radical than it first seemed. His position is not that we could not believe that a friend of ours is not an automaton, but rather that we could not *now* believe that a friend of ours is not an automaton. No one's friend turns out to be an automaton; no human-looking, human-behaving entities turn out to be machines, and because this is the case, believing that one's friend is *not* an automaton makes as little sense as believing that one's friend *is* an automaton. The case is the same then for opinions about the soul. We never find that people do not have souls—in the literal sense at least—so to believe of a particular person that he has a soul makes as little sense as believing that he does not have a soul.

To conclude, I want to note that if we still want to respond at this point by saying, "But I believe that people have souls", we would not have disagreed with Wittgenstein; we would simply have missed his point. He does not deny that people (as a kind of thing) have souls; he even

2 It seems Wittgenstein would admit that "My friend is not an automaton", spoken on the walk with my friend, could have a kind of use even in that context, but it would be the same kind of use had by "Gobbledygook." I may be able to use it to frighten someone or get her attention, but its use will have nothing to do with my friend being or not being an automaton. Wittgenstein would explain our thinking that "My friend is not an automaton" is more meaningful than "Gobbledygook" in the given situation because in the first case, we are inclined to search for a context in which the statement would make sense and apply it to the current context. Presumably, we do this because the statement is made of words that, in certain other contexts, would make sense.

says, "The human body is the best picture of the human soul" (PoP.iv.25). He only denies that it makes sense to say of a *particular* human, "This human has a soul." All humans have souls, so only in contexts in which we might compare a human to something without a soul will saying that the human has a soul be meaningful.

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The face-value theory and the content of propositional attitudes

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Abstract

Propositional attitudes are commonly treated as relations between agents and propositions and propositional attitude reports as stating precisely such relations. This is the basis of what Schiffer calls 'the face-value theory' of propositional attitude reports. A number of philosophers argued that such theory, as it stands, is untenable, or plainly false. Accordingly, they proposed various moderate or radical departures from it. In what follows I will discuss two such moderate departure, and argue that they do not avoid the very problem that their proponents took as the initial reason for departing from the face-value theory.

In the light of a peculiar linguistic phenomenon having to do with explicating certain metaphysical commitments within propositional attitude reports, many authors proposed various departures from what Schiffer (2003, 2006) calls 'the face-value theory' (FVT) of propositional attitude reports. According to FVT, reports such as 'Smith believes/fears/knows/hopes/etc. that snow is white', are to be analysed just as their surface form suggests: SUBJECT TERM / ATTITUDE VERB / 'THAT'-CLAUSE. As such the analysis fits nicely with the popular metaphysical view that propositional attitudes are relations between agents and propositions. Now, given its formulation, FVT itself is not committed to any particular conception of propositions. It only requires that verb's clausal complement ('that'-clause) stands for entities of a single kind, be they Fregean thoughts, Russellian propositions, sets of possible circumstances, sentences, utterances, mental representations or whatever. Since my primary concern is FVT, I will just call the content of propositional attitudes 'proposition', but I will understand it loosely, as *whatever* is the content of a propositional attitude and the referent of a 'that'-clause', remaining therefore neutral about its particular nature.

The linguistic phenomenon in question – call it 'the explication problem' – became popular in recent years among philosophers determined to undermine FVT. Indeed, Schiffer (2006: 282-283) takes it as one of few arguments against FVT itself, rather than against FVT-relative-to-a-particular-view-on-propositional-content. The problem is this (see King 2007, Moltmann 2003, McGrath 2012, and Schiffer 2006): According to FVT, in the report 'A Vs that *p*' the clause 'that *p*' stands for the proposition that *p*; if so, expressions 'that *p*' and 'the proposition that *p*' stand for the same thing, namely the proposition that *p*; now, if 'A Vs that *p*' states a relation between an agent and a proposition, the corresponding report 'A Vs the proposition that *p*' should state the very same relation, only more explicitly, and be at least necessarily equivalent to the original one; yet for some attitudes (e.g. believing, asserting, and doubting), the corresponding reports do state the same, whereas for others (e.g. knowing, fearing, and suspecting), they do not. If FVT is supposed to be applicable to every propositional attitude, this asymmetry seems to go straight against it.

Some philosophers, who exploited the explication problem in attacking FVT, drew fairly radical conclusions from this phenomenon. Moltmann (2003) for example argued that the explication problem shows that propositional attitudes are actually objectual and multiple-relational, while Prior (1971) proposed a non-relational analysis of propositional attitude reports. Other philosophers drew more moderate conclusions against FVT. They still accept that propositional attitudes are relations between agents and

proposition-like contents, but they abandon either FVT's assumption that within attitude reports 'that'-clauses stand for entities of the single kind (e.g. Merricks 2009, Moffett 2003, and Parsons 1993), or FVT's assumption that 'that'-clauses *specify* the content of a reported attitude (Bach 1997). In what follows, I will focus on two departures from FVT, Merricks' (2009) and Bach's (1997), and argue that both face the very problem they were initially designed to avoid, namely the explication problem. So if the explication problem really undermines FVT and thus motivates the search for an alternative conception (e.g. King 2007 and Schiffer 2003, 2006 argued that it does not), the fact that Merricks' and Bach's moderate alternatives face it too, makes a more radical departure from FVT (such as Moltmann's 2003 or Prior's 1971) mandatory. I will start with Merricks' proposal.

According to Merricks (2009), some attitudes standardly taken as propositional are not propositional (e.g. fearing and desiring), whereas others are (e.g. believing, remembering, thinking, or suspecting). Merricks supports this departure from FVT with two arguments. *Firstly*, since propositions are abstract objects, if an abstract object is not a fitting object of an attitude, the attitude is not propositional; abstract objects are not fitting objects of fearing or desiring; so, fearing or desiring are not propositional attitudes. *Secondly*, everything having a proposition for its content has to be truth-evaluable; so if something is not truth-evaluable, it has no proposition for its content; fearing or desiring are not truth-evaluable; so they are not propositional attitudes. Let me examine these arguments in turn, granting for the sake of argument Merricks' background assumptions.

In arguing that fearing and desiring are not propositional attitudes, Merricks (2009: 214-215) tacitly exploits the explication problem:

Jones really fears that a tiger will attack him. No one should really fear any abstract object. Add that Jones does not fear what he should not fear. So Jones does not really fear any abstract object. So he does not fear any abstract object in the way that he fears that a tiger will attack him. [/] Propositions are abstract objects. So Jones does not fear any proposition in the way that he fears that a tiger will attack him. So Jones does not thus fear the proposition *that a tiger will attack Jones*. So Jones's fearing that a tiger will attack him is not a matter of his fearing the proposition *that a tiger will attack Jones*. So fearing that such-and-such is not a matter of fearing the proposition *that such-and-such*.

Such argumentation, however, applies to a number of attitudes Merricks takes to be propositional (e.g. thinking, remembering, or suspecting). This can be demonstrated if

'fear' in the quoted passage is replaced with 'believe', 'assert', 'think', 'remember', or 'suspect'. With the first two replacements, the quoted passage sounds false. There is nothing wrong with saying that Jones believes/asserts the proposition that a tiger will attack him *in the way* he believes/asserts that a tiger will attack him. So abstract objects (in this case propositions) are fitting objects of these two attitudes. With 'think', 'remember', or 'suspect', however, the quoted passage sounds just as compelling as with 'fear' (or 'desire'). Then the argumentation of the passage provides equally good reasons for denying thinking, remembering, or suspecting to be propositional attitudes, as it provides them for fearing or desiring. So the outlined argumentation sweeps away considerably more from the propositional attitude class than Merricks grants, pushing thereby the selection of propositional attitudes to the point where conceding that only they are relations between agents and propositions is highly implausible.

Merricks (2009: 231) suggests that his second argument, based on the truth-evaluability, opens a way out of this problem by providing the ultimate propositionality test for attitudes. According to it, whether or not an attitude is affected by the first argument (and thus by the explication problem), if the attitude is truth-evaluable, it is propositional. Believing, thinking, asserting, remembering, and suspecting are truth-evaluable, whereas fearing and desiring are not, so the first ones are propositional, whereas the second ones are not.

Notice first that if this argument/test could work, it would make Merricks' first argument against FVT redundant, because it would do all the work in distinguishing the class of genuine from the class of bogus propositional attitudes. As such it is essential for Merricks' view. But employed as the propositionality test, it is question begging, and here is why. The test rests on the assumption that an attitude is propositional only if it is truth-evaluable – and if an attitude is not truth-evaluable, it is not propositional. But in order to decide whether an attitude is truth-evaluable, one has to know the truth-evaluability criterion. According to Merricks, something is truth-evaluable only if it is a proposition, or if it has a proposition for its content. Now, if this is the only truth-evaluability criterion at one's disposal, all she can conclude is that an attitude is propositional iff it is truth-evaluable. This, however, is not sufficient to establish that attitudes such as fearing or desiring are not propositional, unless of course one has an additional, independent test/criterion for truth-evaluability, or for propositionality. Merricks provides no such test, but concludes nevertheless that some attitudes are (not) propositional because they are (not) truth-evaluable. So his conclusion is question begging.

But even if Merricks could provide such a test, or avoid the charge on another ground, he would still face the following problem. Whatever the content of fearing or desiring is, it is *content*. But 'Smith fears/desires the content that snow is white' is equally problematic as 'Smith fears/desires the proposition that snow is white'. And, of course, any further specification of the kind of content fearing or desiring have – which seems as a reasonable requirement – would face the same problem (for related points see King 2007: 151, McGrath 2012: sec. 5.3, Schiffer 2003: 93, and Schiffer 2006: 285 and 292).

Now, since Merricks' second argument/test fails to meet its purpose, one is stuck with his first argument and the explication problem underlying it. And the two, I have showed, affect Merricks' view, just as they affected FVT. So Merricks' view is in no better position than FVT after all. But things worsen for Merricks' view, because the explication

problem would affect it even if his second argument would function the way he intended, and even if he had managed to establish that fearing and desiring are not propositional attitudes. The cases such as 'Smith fears/desires the content (or whatever) that snow is white' demonstrate the point. And so a dilemma arises: either the explication problem (or the argumentation based on it) is no substantial threat to FVT as formulated at the outset, or it undermines any plausible form of FVT – including Merricks' restricted version. In any case, Merricks' proposed restriction, and departure from FVT, lacks a firm support. So merely restricting FVT, and applying it only to some attitudes standardly recognised as propositional, as he suggests, will not do. Now I turn to Bach's proposal.

FVT, according to Bach (1997), faces two problems. It cannot adequately account Kripke's Paderewski puzzle (namely the problem how can contradictory reports 'Peter believes that Paderewski had musical talent'/'Peter disbelieves that Paderewski had musical talent' both be true concerning perfectly rational and consistent agent), and there is some 'striking linguistic evidence' against it (which I called 'the explication problem'). They motivated Bach to abandon FVT's assumption that propositional attitude reports *specify* the content of the reported attitude, i.e. that 'that'-clauses within such reports stand for attitude's content. Instead, he argues, such reports merely *describe* the content of agent's state, and the description of the content they provide is incomplete one. Accordingly, in different contexts one and the same 'that'-clause can stand for different contents. Now, this alternative theory still faces the Paderewski puzzle, as Bach himself admits. Indeed, now every case is potentially a Paderewski case. For that reason, the ability or inability of a theory to deal with the Paderewski puzzle cannot be a decisive argument for or against it. Therefore, the question whether one should prefer Bach's alternative to FVT (or vice versa), comes to depend on the explication problem.

Bach thinks that his theory has an advantage over FVT in that respect, because on his theory it is not permissible to replace 'that *p*' with 'the proposition that *p*' in propositional attitude reports, given that within such reports 'the *p*' might stand for different things, whereas 'the proposition that *p*' always stands for the same thing. Therefore, one cannot generate problematic constructions, such as 'Smith fears/suspects the proposition that snow is white'. Bach, however, avoids the explication problem only at the cost of leaving its theory explanatorily incomplete. Nowhere in his paper does Bach specify the kind of attitude's content. He refers to it as 'something' or 'a thing', and remarks then, 'since it is not clear what these "things" are, I am reluctant to call them "propositions"' (Bach 1997: 226). This indeterminacy is not without a reason. As soon as Bach would specify the *kind* of the content the attitudes actually have, his theory would become affected by the explication problem, and here is why.

Assume that one cannot identify the genuine content of propositional attitudes with any proposition-like entity known from metaphysics (a fact, event, situation etc.). Then one can introduce a new term – say 'prop' – and define it as the genuine content of propositional attitudes. Thus props, whatever they may be, are contents of propositional attitudes. But even now it still make no sense to say e.g. 'Smith thinks/suspects the prop that snow has melted', whereas e.g. 'Smith fears/desires the prop that snow is white' still significantly differs in meaning and truth-conditions from 'Smith fears/desires that snow is white'. (Alternatively, instead of 'the prop that *p*', one should perhaps say 'the prop described by 'that *p*'; the problem would nevertheless persist.) So Bach's theory is not immune to

the explication problem, whether or not one could identify attitudes' content with entities of a known kind (for related points see King 2007: 151, McGrath 2012: sec. 5.3, Schiffer 2003: 93, and Schiffer 2006: 285/292).

Indeed, just as in Merricks' case, one can simply notice that whatever the content of propositional attitudes is, it is *content*. Then one should be allowed to explicate this by reporting 'A suspects/fears/thinks/etc. the content that *p* (or described by 'that *p*')'. Yet it cannot be done without deviation from the meaning and truth-conditions of the corresponding report 'A suspects/fears/thinks/etc. that *p*'. Again, such considerations show that if the explication problem is to be taken seriously, and if one cannot accommodate FVT to it, a more radically changed understanding of propositional attitude reports is required. Moderate departures from FVT, such as those proposed by Merricks or Bach, which preserve the idea that propositional attitudes are (dyadic) relations between agents and contents (whatever they may be), will not do. If the explication problem is as symptomatic of FVT as a number of philosophers think it is, it is a reason for thinking that propositional attitudes are either not relational, or that they are multiple-relational.¹

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Two Types of Biosemantic Representation

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Abstract

Biosemanantics as proposed by Ruth Millikan is explaining mental representations and meaning in the context of their evolutionary function. While the teleosemantic account provides a general framework for basic forms of mental representations it has methodological problems with complex representations like beliefs. This paper is proposing a solution through differentiating two distinct levels of function-ascription. While showing the methodological differences in ontogenetic and phylogenetic function-ascription a corresponding dyadic conception of representation is proposed respectively.

Biosemanantics as according to Ruth Millikan (Millikan 1984, 1989, 2004, 2005, 2009) is explicitly based upon the basic assumption that mental concepts, intentionality and representations of living beings cannot be explained without the teleological conception of function as used in evolutionary biology. In contrast to other naturalistic attempts like Dretske's (1981, 1988) or Fodor's (1987, 1990), Millikan is grounding her cognitive semantics not within physics, but in biology, with the result of delivering an explanation of misrepresentation. An explanation the mentioned physicalistic accounts could not deliver. The central assumption of biosemanantics is that meaning and representations are developed by means of natural selection and therefore describable by the function they have been designed to perform in the evolutionary process. Misrepresentation in the Millikanian sense is nothing else than an evolutionary designed representation (mis-) functioning under other circumstances than those in which it was originally shaped to function properly. This view on misrepresentation is important for the suggestion being made here, as we will see below.

As a biologicistic approach to explain mental content, biosemanantics also has a high potential to complement contemporary biology and evolutionary biology. Besides the epistemological significance of the theory as a naturalistic solution to mental phenomena, it in fact seems desirable on its own to reach for a biologicistically compatible and subsidiary philosophical theory of meaning. But, ever since the first works by Millikan in the mid-1980s the approach had basic problems entailed by the equalization of meaning with evolutionary function, which is discussed below with reference to a dyadic teleosemantic theory of representational content and meaning that was roughly sketched in Ebeling 2012 and is proposed here as an extension to Millikan's approach.

To identify the problem some representative citations should suffice. Millikan writes:

"Meaning in the most basic sense, simply is function" (Millikan 2005: 90)

"Ideas, beliefs, and intentions are not such because of what they do or could do. They are such because of what they are, given the context of their history, supposed to do and of how they are supposed to do it. [...] Ideas, and beliefs and intentions are, as such, members of biological or proper-function categories" (Millikan 1984: 93)

"It is the device that use representations which determine these to be representations and, at the same time (contra Fodor), determine their content. [...] Proper functions are determined by the histories of the items possess-

ing them; functions that were "selected for" are paradigm cases." (Millikan 1989: 283 and 284)

Even though this is a very rough and ready compilation of passages, the main problem of defining mental representation in the biosemantic sense can be extracted. It is Sellars' (1963) pragmatistic notion of the survival value of concepts Millikan elaborates into an evolutionary approach for defining representations and their content by their evolutionary function. It is the function for which a certain mental representation once was selected as a trait of the cognitive apparatus. Among the more serious objections against this view there is one fundamental problem, that I will go on to call the problem of unspecified function ascription. The problem of unspecified function ascription is this:

(a) If the function of a representation is described by its evolutionary function, then this function is derived from a certain conception of natural selection. Since this view of possible selectional variables and processes covers only phylogenetic timeframes, ontogenetically evolved representations are not covered by the theory.

Since an evolutionary function is always just ascribed, the problem is obviously one of ascription. The problem that especially complex representations such as beliefs sometimes seem to have no evolutionary function within Millikanian biosemanantics is crucial to the ambit of the approach, which is to deliver a general explanation of representation to such an extent as the laws of natural selection are general to an explanation of things living and evolving. To exemplify the problem, consider this verbalized form of a complex representation:

(1) Wittgenstein is an important philosopher.

Is there an evolutionary function? It is rather easily comprehensible that a complex representation like (1) has no evolutionary function and therefore no explanation of their meaning within the framework of biosemanantics. We will revisit these examples further below.

Millikan's answer to this problem partly resembles her explanation of misrepresentation:

"Natural selection has designed cognitive systems not to turn out particular products, say, particular beliefs and desires [...] In order to turn out beliefs that will vary depending on states of affairs in the environment and in order to tune the systems that use these beliefs during practical and theoretical deliberation and in the production of useful action, humans must first develop adequate empirical concepts." (Millikan 2009: 405)

The notion of representation I want to suggest to account for this ontogenetically acquisition is the following.

There is not just one fundamental form of representation. Instead there are two different and equally fundamental forms of representations, their contents and meaning that have to be differentiated to solve the problem of unspecified function ascription. Both forms of meaning are still defined through a historically evolved function. Therefore they are still of teleosemantic character.

These two basic forms of representations are:

Individually functional Representations (ifR)

Biologically functional Representations (bfR)

These two types of representations reflect the difference between phylogeny and ontogeny as well as the disparities between the first-person and third-person perspective of function ascription. Generally speaking, this means that ifRs, the ontogenetic function and first-person perspective, are one explanatory level, and bfRs, meaning phylogenetic function and third-person perspective, are a second level. These levels are distinct in explanatory ambit, but nevertheless interdependent in terms of a sufficient explanation of representation.

Like the naming suggests, ifRs are the actual mental representations of a conscious being. They always have a function for the representing being and are intentional in this sense. This function equals meaning. An apple that is being represented as eatable for a certain conscious system defines the function of that representation and the meaning of its represented content: to be eatable. Instead, bfRs are determined by their evolutionary function. These are the representations Millikan's explanation is covering.

Contrary to bfRs, ifRs are determined by a phenomenological type of function. IfRs can (but do not need to) have the same function as bfRs. IfRs are first-person phenomena in that they have qualities to them that are closely tied to desires, emotions, preceding and subsequent actions and experiences.

Like the representation of the apple as eatable, the meaning as well as the function of that representation is to represent eatable things as eatable. In this case the function of that representation on the first-person and third-person level of ascription is essentially the same, since the evolutionary function equals the individual function of that kind of representation: to represent eatable things. As in ontogeny, the function of this representation is the same for what it had been selected by means of natural selection: to represent eatable things. So for the most basic cases individually functional meaning and biological functional meaning are indeed the same. In this example ifR and bfR are equivalent.

Unfortunately, this is not the case concerning complex representations. The belief that Wittgenstein is an important philosopher seems to resist an explanation in terms of bfR. How can there be a teleologic function? It is of no advantage in terms of natural selection to have this kind of representation. Just explaining all representations to be definable by a concept like bfR is a one-way-lane. The abbreviated name of the second lane is ifR.

The biological function of simple mental representations, like of an apple being eatable, depends logically on the certain individual function, since all cases of biologically functional representations have to be third-person ascriptions within the framework of phylogenetic evolution that are interpreted by means of regular behavior. But this regular behavior rests upon individually functional representing beings. If there is a biological function for complex representations, then this interpretation of function as

meaning is also necessarily an interpretation of an individually functional representation, which needs to be explicitly analyzed regarding its own conditions.

Biologically functional representations (bfRs) are mind states while individually functional representations (ifRs) are phenomenological states. The latter (bfR) is grounded within the former (ifRs). This ultimately leads to the problem of function ascription. Some types of concepts, beliefs, and representations are solely the results of individual function. Their survival value is foremost ontogenetically founded. There is not always a biological but always an individual function, for to have mental representations is to possess intentions, desires, wishes, emotions, feelings and so on. They are all results of biological and social conditions.

The notion of individually functional representation certainly represents a drift towards interpretivist semantic approaches like that of Dennett (1987) and Davidson (1984) but it is rather connected to fundamental assumptions of conceptual-role semantics. This yet to develop conceptual-role approach would not merely account for the material inferences of propositionally structured concepts but also for pre-propositional representations, that are determined, likewise in function and meaning, through their functional role within a web of pre-linguistic and linguistic concepts as well as constraints and conditions that result from the individual condition of the system in question. This wholly subject-dependent quality of mental representations is genuinely teleological in the sense of a resultative. Since the individual is having basic individually and biologically functional representations that have been selected through evolution to fulfill their function, ifRs might arise under certain circumstances that especially include learning-processes like socialization, preconditions like capacity and differentiation of the memory-system and inferential abilities. Especially the "how"-part of a representation that transcends the mere descriptive character towards individual function is not conceivable without a whole individual story behind it, a story of conceptual determinacy.

A suggestion to build such a type-theory of mental content is found in the inferential or concept-role semantics of Brandom (1998), the other well-known Sellars scholar.

A notion of representation that partly integrates some basic ideas of conceptual-role semantics such as the interdependent, inferentially structured semantic web, in which concepts are arranged, and the historical nature of concept-development might complete the story of a naturalistic and biologically subsidiary theory of mental content to some extent.

To complement the theory with an account for representational tokens a frame theory in the sense of Minsky (1974) or Barsalou (1992, 1993) would be interesting, once the story of how a rudimentary conceptual web is instantiated is told.

Now, what about the belief that Wittgenstein is an important philosopher?

The functional position of that belief within the conceptual web is its meaning for me. It is functional in the foremost sense that everybody else believes it and since part of my condition is to don't get sanctioned within a certain community by telling everybody that Wittgenstein is not an important philosopher at all, the result is a certain belief about the nature of Wittgenstein. The contents meanings are the functions of the consisting conceptual elements. The concept of Wittgenstein and the concept of impor-

tance are determined through and within the web of beliefs, experiences and all sorts of conditions that I underlie. As far as I am concerned, this crudely shortened story seems like a typical case for conceptual-role semantics.

And concerned the superordinate notion of ifR, it generally accounts for the subjective constraints and conditions as well as the personal history of that subject, anchoring the concept of individually functional meaning deeply in ontogeny and the concept of biological function explicitly in phylogeny.

While ontogenetic processes rest on phylogenetic processes, the dependence relation between the types of representation is structured the other way around and reflects the interdependencies of the first-person perspective and the third-person perspective.

Every mental representation has a function for the representing subject, but not every mental representation has a biological function. To represent Wittgenstein as an important philosopher might be of some function to someone speaking at a symposium about Wittgenstein, one would say, but that has to be explained with regard to her or his own condition and history. This history is a conceptual and inferential one and is closely tied to the mentioned constraints and dispositions of that subject.

To resume, biosemantics can and must be extended by a notion like that of individually functional representation to arrive at a framework that as generally as possible explains how mental representation and misrepresentation work and to eschew the problem of unspecified function ascription. The teleosemantic account of Millikan can deliver such a comprehensive and fundamental theory, if it reflects anew the heuristic constraints and necessities stemming from the dyadic interplay of first- and third-person perspective of ascription and the corresponding differences in onto- and phylogeny.

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Facing up to the yet harder problem

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Abstract

If we suppose that there are neural correlates of all our experiences of an outer world; if we further assume the ontological coincidence of the represented brain with the representing brain: Then we get entangled in almost unresolvable contradictions. (The "brain-world-problem".) The way out of this confusion leads to a new view concerning 'brain states' and their ontological status: They turn out to be observer-dependent on the fine grained scale; depending on whether or not my own brain is brought into focus. The fundamental first-person-uncertainty of someone's own 'neural correlates' are based upon the undecidable ambiguity concerning the distinction between 'presentation' and 'representation'.

Preliminary remark.

The following investigation is carried out without assuming any special mental domain. If there are terms used such as 'subjective', 'first-person-perspective', 'imagination', they refer to linguistic as well as extralinguistic *behaviour*. This purely methodological agnosticism aims to show the emerging paradox as independent of one's psychophysical convictions. Finally, the notion "immediate given world" does not mean any phenomenological 'epoché'; rather the sensually experienced present – right now.

1. The brain-world-confusion.

It was *David Chalmers* who emphasized "*the hard problem*" as crucial for the philosophy of mind. It calls into question any reductionistic 'solution':

"It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. ... It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does."

Chalmers' "hard problem" deserves its designation. But there is a yet harder one lurking behind it. In lack of a standard designation I will refer to it as the '*brain-world-paradox*'. *Arthur Schopenhauer* draws a sketch of the issue in the second part of *The World as Will and Representation* (Schopenhauer 1883/1964):

"There are two fundamentally different ways of regarding the intellect, which depend upon the difference of the point of view, and, much as they are opposed to each other in consequence of this, must yet be brought into agreement. One is the subjective, which, starting from within and taking the consciousness as the given, shows us by what mechanism the world exhibits itself in it, and how, out of the materials which the senses and the understanding provide, it constructs itself in it. ...

The method of considering the intellect which is opposed to this is the objective, which starts from without, takes as its object not our own consciousness, but the beings given in outward experience, conscious of themselves and of the world, and now investigates the relation of their intellect to their other qualities, how it has become possible, how it has become necessary, and what it accomplishes for

them. The standpoint of this method of consideration is the empirical."

Schopenhauer realized and analysed one amazing aporia drawn from his 'axioms' earlier than his castigators. In 1873, *Eduard Zeller* formulated a short, but shortcoming, 'refutation' of the apparent circular reasoning in the midst of Schopenhauer's naturalized transcendental philosophy. Zeller's argumentation runs as follows:

- 1) According to Schopenhauer the whole objective world, particularly matter, is constituted as 'representation';
- 2) At the same time, Schopenhauer insists that representation in general is produced by the brain;
- 3) But the brain itself is nothing else than a particular representation;
- 4) Eventually, we come to the circle, that representation is a product of the brain and the brain is a product of representation.

2. Are we 'double-brained'?

The circularity, Zeller criticized, remained an obstacle for every 'neurophilosophical' ansatz until today. That's the *harder problem*: The *representing* brain cannot be reconciled conceptually with the *represented* brain.

Gerhard Roth, a recognized German brain researcher feels himself urged to introduce two ontologically very different entities, in order to take account of our central nervous system's double-aspect: the *real* brain ("das reale Gehirn") opposed to the *actual* brain ("das wirkliche Gehirn"):

"this brain, at which I am looking and that I identify as mine *cannot* be that brain, which produces my mental image of this brain. Identifying both brains, I came to the conclusion that my brain contains itself as a proper subset. For I were at the same time within and without myself, and the operating room where I am located were simultaneous in my brain; and the brain (together with the head and the body) were in the operating room...The result of which is: The same brain, which produced myself is inaccessible for me, as well as the real body in which it is located and as well as the real world within which the body lives."

A dilemma which is still a challenge for all 'neurophilosophers': If we stipulate a 'brain' in itself (so to speak the *cerebrum cerebrans*) -producing the phenomenal world included our visible and tangible wet brain (*cerebrum cerebratum*) - it is located beyond our spatiotemporal intui-

tions; and so it is a misuse of language to call it a 'brain' at all. On the other hand, if we restrict ourselves to the brain as an object in space and time, we have to explain the functional *and* ontological unity of this simple given CNS – without conceptual confusions like infinitely recurring "containing".

3. Wittgenstein's 'natural' supposition.

There is a passage in Wittgenstein's later work (*Zettel* §§ 608ff.), many of his interpreters are worried about. The (in)famous remarks challenge the consensus among most brain researchers and neurophilosophers:

"No supposition seems to me more natural than that there is no process in the brain correlated with associating or with thinking; so that it would be impossible to read off thought-processes from brain-processes. I mean this: if I talk or write there is, I assume, a system of impulses going out from my brain and correlated with my spoken or written thoughts. But why should the *system* continue further in the direction of the centre? Why should this order not proceed, so to speak, out of chaos? ... If this upsets our concept of causality then it is high time it was upset. (Wittgenstein 1969 §§ 608 ff.; Anscombe 1967)

We will see that Wittgenstein was probably right to some extent. It is useful to transform the relation into its appropriate *indexical* form, avoiding all propositions about the mental sphere:

There is no process in *my* brain (perfectly) correlated with the immediate experience of the world; so that it would be impossible *for me* to read off *my* experiences from *my own* brain-processes. The first part of this stipulation must be demonstrated quasi *a priori*; the second will prove its virtual validity by means of a simple thought experiment.

The whole proposition eventually amounts to a kind of ontological relativity in view of 'brain processes'. But first, the premises have to be elaborated carefully.

4. A closer look at the brain-world-paradox.

To get an intuition of the yet unfamiliar brain-world-paradox, let's try to deduce it in a rather concrete manner. (The following argument would hold in view of special assumptions – like *multiple realizability* or *anomal monism* – too. Taking account of them would not make the reasoning less conclusive, but more complicated – and space-consuming!) The one and only precondition: If you are seeing something – we restrict our scope to the visual domain – there is an *analytical* relation between the seen object and your brain state; so that every part of the visual given world has its counterpart in a certain neural correlate. (Or in a member of a precisely defined class of neural configurations – in the case of 'multirealizability'.)

- a) Imagine there is a living being, human, maybe a philosopher, contemplating a cherry blossom tree in the springtime. And you, the neurophilosopher, set to work on the observation of the enchanted tree-observer's brain, making visible the beholder's state of the visual cortex by using a perfectly working brain-scanner. And indeed: You notice an overwhelming correlation between brain states on the fine grained scale and the tree's features – down to the most minute detail. You zoom in and zoom in ...

- b) Now imagine another possible world where the brain state of the philosopher's visual cortex were completely altered. Your scanner confirms: the tree-observer's brain contains not even the slightest representation of its 'object'. There is no contradiction in assuming this odd situation; finally it must be taken in account, that these neural correlates of the outer world are a thoroughly contingent matter... But what would happen, if you were the tree contemplating philosopher *and* the brain-observing neurophilosopher in personal union?

- c) Let's try a fresh attempt. Come back from possible worlds to the actual one for a moment. If there is a tree in sight look at it. Stand – together with a friend – in front of a tree both looking attentively at your common object. Now begin to imagine again several counterfactuals. You cannot look under the bark, but just *imagine* – so to say as the variation of an empty intention – for instance the juices within the tree ascending in *another manner* as the factual (but hidden) one.

Now perform a similar ideal variation concerning the neural configurations in your friend's visual cortex. There are countless possibilities of how the 'correlation' between the tree and its cerebral 'representation' by your friend's brain could be different from the actual one – beyond the blurred line where it would become senseless to speak of any kind of 'correlation' altogether...

- d) But with the next step there appears the conceptual barrier, the unsurpassable logical limitation of conceivability. Try to imagine a corresponding exchange of the state within *your own* visual cortex, *here and now*. It is not so easy to realize the contradictory nature of this concept, because you have to refer to an '*actual possible*' – instead of an absolute imaginary – world: the subtle difference between a really performed thought experiment and a mere simulated one.
- e) To distinguish the *really* performed from the mere simulated thought experiment we could compare this special version of the brain-world-aporia with a very similar one: Moore's paradox! If I consider the possibility, that it is raining together with the possibility, that I do not believe it, then there is no contradiction in the conjunction of both. But it is by no means possible, that I am convinced of a fact and at the same time I explicitly do not believe in it!

Therefore, „It is raining, but I do not believe it“ is a completely incomprehensible utterance (or idea). In an analogous manner I could state 'in general' the compossibility of the outer world as it presents itself in this moment and its 'misrepresentation' within my brain. But to conceive this *actually* given environment coexisting with an entirely different, inappropriate, state of my brain contradicts the stipulated analyticity.

Of course it is not tenable to admit two radically different kinds of correlation between brain and world: the first one – valid for all other perceiving beings – as a mere contingent fact; the other reserved for myself: constituting a necessary truth! Instead of the logical dualism let's assume an ontological complementarity.

5. Brain-world-complementarity.

If I cannot even hypothesize (for pure logical reasons) that my brain state - corresponding with the immediately present world - was altered; then it is just as inappropriate to suppose that it is conceivable as determined in any way. More precisely: excluding all kinds of contrafactual definiteness *a priori*, factual definiteness would become meaningless too.

This leads to the conjecture, that 'my' actual world *can-not coexist* together with its neural correlates *on the fine-grained scale*. Just as Wittgenstein assumed: The system does not continue further in the direction of the center; the order proceeds out of chaos! There is a kind of *unilateral complementarity*: My cerebral processes are underdetermined relative to the immediate given world to such an extent, that there is neither agreement nor contradiction.

We have to redefine the meaning of 'brain-state'. Self-referential brain-state-fuzziness is something like an *ontological deixis*, so to say an 'indexical' phenomenon, neither subjective nor objective; rather the objective limitation of subjective inaccessibility.

To be a little exaggerated: There exist my experiences of the immediate given world *instead of* their neural correlates within my brain. As a consequence, all common 'solutions' of the 'mind-body-problem' must be re-questioned: interactionism, psychophysical parallelism, epiphenomenalism and, last not least, the simple identity hypothesis. For every embodied being for-itself lacks the precondition to give rise to the problem of consciousness in its usual form.

Initially, the brain-world-problem with its ramifications results from the deep ambiguity rooted in the foundations of the *Language game* (in the *singular* sense): It is constitutive for 'linguaging' as such to experience the same phenomena as *presentations* and to reexperience them as *representation* altogether. 'Original' and 'model' are constituted in relation to each other. This undecisiveness is much older than our knowledge of brain functions.

6. The experiment.

For the better understanding of the following thought experiment it is useful to draw a parallel to *Werner Heisenberg's* uncertainty principle. (A pure simile, without stipulating or denying any connection between neurobiology and quantum theory!)

The quantum uncertainty principle can be deduced 'a priori' from the mathematical formalism. However, there is

also the misleading classroom explanation of the principle: that quantum fuzziness emerges from the disturbance of the observed particle by measurement. But in fact, Heisenberg's thought experiment served as a reassurance concerning the correctness of the theoretical assumptions; empirically verifiable disturbance by observation "protects" quantum theory, as *Richard Feynman* states.

In a similar manner, there is a thought experiment to 'protect' 'neural uncertainty' from empirical contradiction: Supposing that we have perfect imaging procedures to make visible the true correlates of someone's experience - nevertheless we could by no means apply these methods to our own brains. (For an elaborate demonstration see *Edelbauer 1997*.) In a nutshell: Observing one's object-representing brainstates in 'realtime' - such as looking at the state of one's own visual cortex representing its observation right now - is fundamentally impossible. For it causes a momentary alteration of its presupposed neural correlate.

If there were no such limits, the observed brain would coincide with the 'observing' brain at this point. This would involve that I could determine my world-representing brain-processes with arbitrary accuracy: The whole hypothesis of reflexive neural uncertainty was falsified.

Outlook.

It is quite appealing to return to Chalmers's *hard problem* and to speculate: Is it possible, that this 'indexical' uncertainty, resulting from the perspectival ('personal') lack of neural correlates on the fine grain scale - this ontological degree of freedom - provides the precondition of the possibility of *qualia*?

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Wittgenstein, Einstein and Leibniz: Härte des Logischen Zwangs and Unendliche Möglichkeit. Some Remarks Arising from the Pivotal Wittgenstein Fragment 178e

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Abstract

Wittgenstein's unrelenting criticism of Cantor, Euler, and Gödel falls within a larger strategy to disarm a philosophy of mathematics which relies on completed infinite sets. Because transfinite numbers are seen to resolve the Zeno paradoxes, creating "a paradise from which we shall not be expelled", according to Hilbert, Wittgenstein's mathematics began to be seen as backward looking, particularly in the period of Turing's work on the Entscheidungsproblem and computable numbers. However, Wittgenstein offered consistent criticism and alternative approaches to paradoxes of the infinitely large and small, placing him within an Einsteinian position of general relativity and a post-Leibnizian position of infinite plenitude.

His sophisticated critique, developed within a type of constructivist mathematics of potential infinity, is explored. It is argued that Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics, cosmology and philosophy of culture are interconnected. Fragment 178e, combined with the correction of a Von Wright error, is used to explore these arguments, from both mathematical and PU *Nachlass* exegesis perspectives.

Placing of the fragment physically and topologically

This particular fragment of notes is unnumbered, written quickly in a particularly loose hand, the content of which sprawls across four pages of a large English diary volume, printed with the dates August 1937, 5-18. The notes and several drawings cover the pages as if the dates are not there. The entries, both at beginning and end, show that there was more text either side of the Fragment.

It is accepted in the literature that MS142 is crucial as source in the genesis of PU 1-188-189a. Relatedly, these PU remarks are the locus of the widely conjectured connection of TSS 220 and 221 (Hacking, Pichler, Schulte). Therefore, with its text spanning this juncture, this Fragment is positioned pivotally.

Secondly, it is argued that the Fragment's key bridging concepts of *Härte des logischen Zwangs*, *Unendliche Reihe*, *Maschine als Symbol ihrer Funktion* and his question "Aber sind denn die Übergänge also durch die Algebraische Formel bestimmt?" function pivotally to allow a consistent and developing philosophy of mathematics by Wittgenstein. Significantly, the importance of these concepts within Wittgenstein's thought, particularly during the time of Turing's publications in the late 1930s, paves the way for the radical reordering of material in the *Zwischenfassung*.



Placing of the fragment historically

The logical and mathematical material which forms the later published *Philosophische Bemerkungen* and *Philosophische Grammatik* had already been written by the

1936/1937 period. The Big TS, 213, with its correlative projects TSS 208-212, had been completed by 1933, including the substance of the mathematically important short essay "Unendliche Möglichkeit" (TS215). The C-series notebooks (MSS 145-152) and the first half of 157a are composed 1933-36, with the remainder of 157a and 157b written in Skjolden in the winter of 1937.

MS 152 provides precursor drawings of the Fragment, and an important discussion of Euler's Proof and of infinity: "And what about Euler's/ 'proof'? Need we ask such a question as/ 'how many cardinal numbers are there?'" (p.19). Furthermore, MS149 provides another precursor drawing, intellectually connected with PB on infinity as a property of space.

Schulte (2001) documents writing of the first half of MS142 from 11.1936 to 12.1936, describing it as a *Reinschrift*, with the second part conjectured as written 2.1937-early May in Skjolden. Hacker (2004) and Pichler (2004) concur. Schulte infers from the diaries of this period that the second half of MS142 was "grosse Mühe". Additionally, the point in the last few remarks at which MS115 ends as source, in both MS142 and PU, is, topographically and intellectually, where the Fragment sits.

The text of the Fragment with its variants written above the lines and underlining appears as such in the finished 142/220, with illustrative examples added, as Wittgenstein often did when consolidating material. While we are left with the question as to the final completion of the last pages of MS142-- the Fragment could have been composed as rough notes during the difficult period of writing in Skjolden or during the summer as a bridge of concepts while the second part of the project was being considered--the importance of the Fragment's key concepts cannot be denied. It is also worth noting variants of TS220 Helsinki/Trinity and that diaries which had been kept, MS183, break off abruptly at 30.4.37, with pages of the Fragment clearly torn from a larger record arguably from this period.

Wittgenstein journeys from Cambridge to Skjolden 10.08.37-16.08.37. Much of the key material that is later developed in MSS 118 and 119 is rehearsed in both written and drawing form in the Fragment.

MS118 is begun en route, 13.08.37, with 0v-2v in code and p.3=MS117,19, about continuing a series ad. inf. and the spurious role of intuition in this process, about doubt and the *Kette der Gründe* coming to an end: if one does not doubt does this mean a ground compels me or that I know it through intuition?

The passages which follow the early *Vorwort*, MS118, 16.9.37 in which a network of numbers is promised, draw together ideas of a picture of a machine and its movements. This is likened to the picture of a continuation of a melody that “schon existiert”. While these passages iterate the danger of equating having no doubt with something being determined in advance, as Hacker points out, we can see in these types of passages the ambiguity between emphasis on something being already determined beforehand and there being a difference between, say, a single note as part of a melody or being merely a single note, or similarly, seeing one aspect yet being unaware of another. These passages move into discussion of *unendliche Reihen*, *unendliche Verwendung* and *logischer Zwang* (96v-98v).

In MS119, 26-40, relations among *die Härte logisches Muss*, with kinematic necessity being harder than causal necessity, *das Bild einer Maschine als Symbol für eine bestimmte Wirkungsweise* and the continuation of a mathematical series are explored. MS118, 88v,89 also introduces “*Aber sind die Übergänge also durch die Algebraische Formel bestimmt?*”, the linking sentence between TSS 220 and 221, and the opening sentence of MS117 and BGM, Part I. These considerations provide plausible evidence that the Fragment precedes these notebooks, placing it within range of the diary's printed dates and the height of Turing's breakthrough.

The decision made to answer the linking sentence by suggesting roles for *Abrichtung* and *Erziehung* marks a departure from the Fragment. As Turing's position moved towards defining a thinking machine as a learning machine (Shanker, 1987), I suggest we are able to understand the shift to rule-following and games as a *mathematical* response, in its elucidation of the internal rule. In addition, a reappraisal of the more overtly mathematical key concepts of the Fragment and passages which are different from the published versions allow us to consider Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics, cosmology and philosophy of culture as seamlessly conceived.

Placing of the Fragment mathematically and cosmologically

Wittgenstein revisited his earlier mathematical work during the transition period 1937/8. The concept of *Verstehen* in TSS 212/213 includes *logisches Muss*, as, e.g., in the understanding of orders (*Das Verstehen des Befehls, die Bedingung dafür, dass wir ihn befolgen*). However, the ‘*logisches Muss*’ of 212/213 is not yet the ‘*logische Zwang*’ of the infinite series which we find in the powerful Fragment 178e.

The connection of Zeno's Paradoxes with Turing's work lies in the fact that Turing's work supports Cantor's actual infinite, set-theoretic understanding of infinities with different cardinalities and the accompanying continuum hypothesis that there are no infinite cardinals between aleph-null and \mathfrak{C} . That the continuum hypothesis cannot be decided within the system from which it originates is the *Entscheidungsproblem*, in Turing's case the Halting Problem. In a very real sense the question: “*Aber sind die Übergänge also durch die Algebraische Formel nicht be-*

stimmt?” and the related questions about musical themes and more generally symbolic systems requiring systemic understanding is an obliquely-posed *Entscheidungsproblem*.

The general mathematical issue which underlies much of these conundra and definitions is bijection (one-to-one correspondence). This is the basis of Cantor's diagonal proof and acts criterially in conceptions of infinity. We know from the *Nachlass* writings on Cantor and Russell that Wittgenstein was concerned with questions of correspondence between classes, to which the recently discovered mathematical papers attest a profound interest (Gibson, 2010). In the lengthy discussion of Euler, Wittgenstein makes clear that questions about how many cardinals or primes there are does not “get hold of the infinite” (MS151,p.19).

Cosmologically, the diary entry of 24.2.37 resonates with the mathematical conception of the construction of an infinite series: “It is strange that one says God created the world & not: God is creating, continually, the world”.

The opportunity of unending division and construction of general proofs without transfinite numbers

The essay “*Unendliche Möglichkeit*” successfully draws together several mathematical issues. Firstly, space is characterised not as itself extended, but that “*Der Raum gibt der Wirklichkeit eine unendliche Gelegenheit der Teilung.*” (TS215,p.19) Secondly, “*Es muss also in dem Zeichen $/1, x, x+1/$ – dem Ausdruck der Bildungsregel/schon alles enthalten sein. Ich darf mit her unendlichen Möglichkeit nicht/ wieder ein mythisches Element in die Logik //Grammatik// einführen*”(p.20). The idea of infinity as a property of space is rehearsed in MS149, one of the precursor drawings to our Fragment drawings of the constructions of series:



The *Maschine als Symbol des ihrer Funktion* is conceptually important, because once the symbol can in some sense offer infinite possibility, the idea of infinite-movement-as-symbolised also becomes infinite constructive possibility. Infinite construction symbolised as the machine- as- symbol- of- its-own- function is very like the construction of the infinite series, which are two bridge concepts of the Fragment.

Relatedly, we should consider the geometric construction of the triangle which is not the construction of merely a particular triangle. This is why it does not matter to *Verstehen* if the triangle is drawn imperfectly; indeed it is unclear what a perfectly drawn triangle would be or what its use might be. Within Wittgensteinian mathematics the construction is a general proof of triangles. As early as MS108 Wittgenstein had conceptualised “*eine allgemeine Geometrik*” (p.117), with space as infinite possibility of movement (TS208,p.16). And to bring this idea back to divisibility, we can view constructive divisibility as “*Die Anwendungsmöglichkeit strahlt durch den Raum. . .*” This

allows for division with periodicity and the irregulars such as π .

The *Ausätze*, MS117, pp. 97-8, is a critique of Cantor which uses no *allgemeinen Begriff* of an unending quantity, *Menge*. In other words, there is no need for an infinitely large (or small) number/set to exist for a perfectly good conception of the infinite to be possible. TS212, Bundle 9, combines a participation in generality, while the demonstration itself is a new application each time: “*Es ist nichts Allgemeines in der Demonstration, sie ist durchaus/besonders; aber ihre Anwendungsmöglichkeit enthält die Allgemeinheit— participation in the general through a rule.*”

For Wittgenstein mathematics and use as unending possibility of application are conceptually seamless. MS121 focusses on infinity through exploration of the concept of *Entwickelung* of a series as a rule bound technique, with this technique demarcating various systems of *Entwicklungen*. And at 41,v, 12.7.38 he begins his assault on transfinite numbers: the absurdity that one infinity is greater than another.

If a general variable or rule is given to me I must every time approach it anew. No act of foreknowledge or intuition will do, rather an act of decision, *Entscheidung*, is needed. This advice appears in the TS212, Bundle 7 section *Grundlagen der Mathematik*, subsection *Beweis der Relevanz*. The use of decision is somewhat heuristic: it is like my constructing a new number using the successor function. The other side of construction is that it connects following a rule with unending possibility: “das Wort ‘unendlich’ sei immer ein Teil einer *R e g e l*” (“*Unendliche Möglichkeit*” p.16). Once this connection is made, the explication of the infinite series without recourse to Cantorian sets is more secure.

Development of the intra-relations within the *Nachlass* after the Fragment

Von Wright’s error: MSS 117 & 213

In an important mathematical section of MS117, pp. 127-148, written after the completion of 221 and with reference to TS pages which von Wright states are to TS221 (p. 18), Wittgenstein instead returns to the earlier work of TS213 when *Denken* and *Grammatik* sat synergistically amongst *Verstehen* and *Grundlagen der Mathematik*.

All references in this section of MS117 point to TS213, starting at the question “*Könnte eine Maschine denken?*” This journey allows him to begin the linking which will eventually produce the strategic re-ordering in the *Zwischenfassung* to mirror the *clustering* of the major concepts of the Fragment [181 inserted; 192/3 shifted forward]. MS122, which follows on from this section of MS117, is a linearly argued, tightly composed volume on proof. Thus we have a clustering of mathematical considerations

alongside questions about what it is to think, what thinking involves, with usually *via negativa* answers.

Rather, the rules provide us with the *opportunity* to constitute meaning; the word has as yet no meaning before application of the rule, as the answer in the Fragment to the obliquely-posed *Entscheidungproblem*: the algebraic formula is *not yet* determined, until we give the apparent variable a value, or in the Tractarian proposition we must give the words meaning. But it is not merely that these elements are empty place-holders.

Wittgenstein participated in the view that the signs constituting systems provide us with the opportunity of *unendliche Möglichkeit* to create symbolic value and meaning, a semiotic of multiplicity. Wittgenstein’s mathematics of constructive potential infinity resonates with a post-Leibnizian infinite plenitude or a God, continually, creating, or with an Einsteinian curve of space-time, bounded but infinitely rich. An actual infinite is completed in advance, exactly what Wittgenstein cautioned against in answering his obliquely-posed *Entscheidungproblem*.

But these are not etherish possibilities. They pertain to the hard light of day. It is in each application of a rule that the infinite is constructed and realised. We do not have to move to the next frame to know we have constructed. Something without unending possibility has a *halting problem*.

Endnote: I wish to thank Vann McGee (MIT) for discussion of the Zeno Paradoxes.

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Language Acquisition, and the Formation of Emotions

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that language acquisition does have a great influence not only on the development of thinking and the constitution of cognitive representations, but also on the development of phenomenal feeling. Phenomenally felt emotions are intersubjectively constituted by language and get an empirical accessible content through language acquisition. The realm of the inner has therefore preconditions in social settings. This is shown by applying the triangulation model for language acquisition by Donald Davidson to emotions, as well as by applying the model of joint attention by Michael Tomasello to emotions.

There is a preverbal, precognitive situation that is a necessary precondition for thinking and language. It is a situation in which two individuals are directed to a third object in the world as well as to each other: "Each creature learns to correlate the reactions of other creatures with changes or objects in the world to which it also reacts." (Davidson 2001, 128) Davidson calls this triangulation, Tomasello joint attention.

The fact that two beings are able to direct their attention to a third object is a precondition for communicating about the third object, to give it a name, a verbal symbol that is a cultural representation for the object (Tomasello 1999, 125). A child learns the historical and cultural use of the symbols while acquiring the concept. And what is important, it links it also with its own experienced perspectives, that is to say with the perceptual and motoric aspects of the situations he or she has lived through. This is the aspect of "internalization", the subjective, individual aspect of representation that is added to cultural and social representation: "The way that human beings use linguistic symbols thus creates a clear break with straightforward perceptual or sensory-motor representations, and it is due entirely to the social nature of linguistic symbols." (Tomasello 1999, 126) The subjective, individual aspect of representation is therefore only attainable because of socially shared situations in which a concept is acquired via symbols that are used intersubjectively. In acquiring symbols one also finds out that they do not represent the world (respectively things and situations in the world) directly as perceptual or sensu-motoric representations do. („It seems significant also that linguistic symbols have a materiality to them, in the form of a reliable sound structure, because this is the only way in which they could be socially shared. These public symbols <...> are available for perceptual inspection and categorization themselves (which is not true, at least not in the same way, for private sensory-motor representations).“ (Tomasello 1999, 127)

The case of emotions is in this respect a very interesting one because they are sensu-motoric processes on the one hand and can be culturally formed via symbol respectively language acquisition on the other. That is to say that they have the aspect of being straightforward and also of being formed by the social nature of symbols. The fact that they are representing directly makes them objective but the fact that they are culturally formed through language acquisition allows for subjective phenomenal experience of these sensory-motor representations. Therefore they are directly representing in the first place, culturally formed in the second and subjectively experienced as a result of the human ability to direct the attention to his or her own mental processes. The latter allows you to experience yourself as yourself and to have emotions as your own emotional

processes and to have your own perspective. The ability to direct yourself to your own mental processes presupposes that one is able to identify the process.

In the tradition of Cartesian philosophy it had been thought that it is doubtlessly possible to experience your own mental processes as your own because they are your own, and you can therefore not err about it. But even in order to identify a mental process like an emotion as your own, you need other human beings and you have to acquire symbols and concepts for it. It is not enough to have an emotional sensation in order to identify it as your own. In order to show this, I will apply what Michael Tomasello has shown about linguistic reference as a social act to basic emotions.

Acquiring language requires situations of shared attention in which the child directs his or her attention together with the caregiver to a third object and each minds the other's attention to the third object (Tomasello 1999, 96-99). Situations of jointly shared attention provide the intersubjective context in which linguistic reference can be understood as such. Joint attention is usually directed at a third object. But this doesn't have to be the case, and thus this linguistic approach can also be used to explain how emotions are semanticized and how even the so-called basic emotions get formed in a particular (linguistic) culture, including the phenomenal sensations themselves.

In the case of physiological emotional reactions this means that the attention and the words of the caregiver can also refer to emotional reactions. It is true that emotions are not an independent third object in terms of reference but rather physical changes in the child's organism that feels them. But the adult can refer to the child's emotional expression linguistically and otherwise and the small child, who cannot see its own expression, can feel its own emotional changes and thus is able to understand what the caregiver is referring to.

Both the child and the adult are paying attention to the emotional process of the child together, but this process manifests itself quite differently for the two of them. One is feeling a sensation and the other is seeing an expression. That the sensation and the expression belong together is not easy to understand because the one who is sensing it is not able to see his or her own expression – and cannot see it without a mirror – and the one who is seeing the expression is not feeling the sensation and can never have the sensation of another person. Therefore much has to be prepared before the child can learn something about his or her emotions. An intersubjectively shared reality has to be established, for example.

And how does the caring person know that the child has a certain feeling? He or she will know it by the bodily ex-

pressions that the child is showing. Here I would like to quote a paragraph by Wittgenstein: "What would it be like if human beings showed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc.)? Then it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word 'tooth-ache'." (Wittgenstein 1958, No. 257). Following this chain of reasoning, one can utter the following thoughts: "What would it be like if human beings showed no outward signs of fear (did not look frightened etc.)? Then it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word 'fear'."

It would not be possible to teach the child the use of the word 'fear' because the other person would not know when the child was feeling fear and would therefore not know when to utter it with respect to the child. Tomasello's model of joint attention as an approach of language acquisition¹ only works because the feelings of the child and his or her bodily expressions are linked. If this were not the case there would not be something we could call a "third object" in these situations, because the sensation and the expression would coincide only sporadically. One could not use the same word to refer to these two phenomena.

The words with which the adult or older children refer to the emotional expression then allow for an intersubjective reference to these sensory-motoric processes just as the emotional expression does. In this way the emotional processes are connected with linguistic expressions, sequences of action, and meaning. At the end of the learning process the meaning of the learned vocabulary of emotion belongs to the sensory-motoric process just as much as it helps to determine how the emotions are phenomenally felt. Hence we can assume that the so-called basic emotions are inborn and hence universally given without having to underplay or even deny cultural and linguistic influence.

Let us take an example to make this point clearer: An infant's reaction of alarm is designated with the concept of fear by means of the sensation being paired with the word through repetition. For the growing child to make this word into a concept, it can't just learn the sound of the word, but rather must also be familiarized not just with the use of the word but also several forms of behavior that help constitute the word's meaning. For example, it will learn when it is entitled to feel the emotion and when it isn't. Maybe when the child looks ready to cry and seeks eye contact with the care giver, the care giver will say: "you don't have to be afraid of the guinea pig." The caregiver might react differently in the presence of a rat. The child will perceive others having a certain facial expression and possibly will get protected and comforted. In this way the word 'fear' is embedded in contexts of actions and situations and "melded" with a certain sensation of emotion. In addition, ways of regulating emotion are learned conceptually, that is, together with the concept, and are actually a part of the full meaning of the concept. Only when the word is introduced in this way can we say that the child has become familiarized with the concept of 'fear'. The sensation of an emotion and the concept ultimately can no longer be separated; hence for the child that has become familiarized with the concept there are no longer any non-semanticized bodily sensations.

Thus the child cannot identify its fear as fear just by feeling it, but only when the reactions of the caregiver allow for a common orientation and thus an identification of the sensation as fear. The emotional process identified in this way takes on its meaning in numerous situations that belong to the acquisition of the concept, based not exclu-

sively on the physiological reaction, but based among other things on the physiological reaction that first allows for reference.²

Ludwig Wittgenstein rightly notes that language also takes on a very prominent role in identifying sensations: "When one says 'He gave a name to a sensation', one forgets that much must be prepared in the language for mere naming to make sense. And if we speak of someone's giving a name to a pain, the grammar of the word 'pain' is what has been prepared here; it indicates the post where the new word is stationed."³

That which we identify as fear, by means of the facial expression of a scared or panicked person among other things, is part of the physical changes that occur in a person under great and acute fear; hence this facial expression belongs as part of an imagined scene in which people break out into panic. And this allows us to identify his or her fear as such. But what these people are feeling can be culturally slightly variable at least, depending on how this basic emotion has been semanticized in the culture – yet since it is a basic emotion, neither the expression nor the sensation can turn out completely differently. This explains how it is we are still able to understand the emotionally relevant descriptions from past cultures and can develop an empathetic engagement to them, just as we can to those from contemporary cultures that our own culture might not share any lines of tradition with. There might and will be nuances of meaning concerning the emotions described and the related sensations, and thus the empathetic engagement might be more or less accurate. But to put the point metaphorically, there is a fundamental and shared human tenor that sets the space of meaning. This space of meaning does not determine completely what is felt. The process that leads to a new nuance of meaning is usually a very complicated one and the process that leads to a new nuance in meaning also leads to a new nuance in feeling but it is not a new feeling altogether.

That there is something as a common space of meaning for emotions that is given by intersubjectively accessible expressions a precondition for having something that plays the role of the "third object" in language acquisition. It is a precondition for our ability to refer to emotions as mental processes and to acquire concepts for them. But the fact that emotions are intersubjectively constituted by language is also the reason why they can be phenomenally felt as our emotions. We need a conceptualization or semanticization for this via language acquisition, otherwise they would just be bodily sensations that we could not identify as such: "For 'sensation' is a word of our common language, not of one intelligible to me alone. So the use of this word stands in need of a justification which everybody understands."⁴

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¹ See also the triangulation-model for language acquisition by Donald Davidson (2001).

² Compare also Wittgenstein's following remark: "(...) But suppose I didn't have any natural expression for the sensation, but only had the sensation? And now I simply associate names with sensations and use these names in descriptions. —" This does precisely not work. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, no. 256.

³ Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, no. 257.

⁴ Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, no. 261.

LLI as Reflected in Wittgenstein's Philosophy

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Abstract

From the biographical information on Wittgenstein the impression may be gained that he possessed the trait of low screening ability for sensory input. When such sensory oversensitivity appears in combination with a high processing level, it manifests in an extraordinary ability to discern details, differences and the complete picture while constructing a highly ramified network of connections between them all. This trait is known as low latent inhibition (LLI) and it makes life difficult for those who have it. This paper deals with the connection between this trait in Wittgenstein and his philosophy. In Wittgenstein's case, we shall see how the trait is disclosed in a form of organization that repeats itself in various domains in his life. The structural element of the way in which Wittgenstein grasps the world due to the LLI trait is reflected in his philosophical terms, especially in "seeing aspects" and "family resemblance," as also in his style of writing and philosophizing.

Foreword

What is common to the entire *Tractatus*, proposition 4.014 in the *Tractatus*, the philosophical method of the *Investigations*, and the term "family resemblance"? All of them have the same organizing form, and it is encapsulated in Wittgenstein's characteristic mode of observation which may be related to the trait of LLI. Biographical keys of different kinds suggest a connection between Wittgenstein's philosophy and his biography, such as his sexual orientation, family origin, and even his upbringing and education. To these may be added psychiatric and neurological distinctions such as: schizoid temperament, autism, dyslexia, synthesis, etc. Both approaches ignore, in effect, the unique aspects of the philosophy. These keys lie on the explanatory continuum between reductionism and compartmentalism. The reductionist predicates the philosopher on his life circumstances, while the compartmentalist disregards the absurdity of isolating the personal circumstances from the philosophy. There is a unique connection between the philosopher and the philosophy, the uniqueness of which lies in the fact that it is not predetermined.

The Autophilosophical Circle

Autophilosophy is a reading method that emphasizes the structural aspect of the whole of a philosophy. It is a mode of circular observation that starts with the consolidation of a worldview, goes through meta-philosophy, proceeds to the formulation of the philosophy as doctrine and from that to the implementation of the philosophical doctrine as everyday practice, and finally returns to the worldview bearing the impressions of experiences. Between the levels and branches of the whole there are clear relations that have a clear direction. The content of each of the four factors is the organizing element of the following factor in order along the circle. In accordance with this mode of observation the boundary between the experiencing in life and the philosophy is penetrable. And that all the information necessary for understanding the philosophical ideas is in plain view. These assumptions make it possible to draw a connection between Wittgenstein's mode of sensory input and his philosophical ideas.

Someone with LLI receives and processes the information from his surroundings with reference to something familiar as if he's seeing it for the first time. His attention is riveted to details that a normal person takes no notice of, and to a network of links that a normal person would not even think of. Together with that, questions of various

kinds arise: what that is, what it does, why it is there, what its meaning is, how it can be used, etc. In Wittgenstein's case, it is even possible to find a similarity between the modes of sensory input and his own directions to himself regarding the proper modes of observation and thinking when doing philosophy:

It is rewarding to keep on looking at questions, which one considers solved, from another quarter, as if they were unsolved. (Wittgenstein 1969)

He also instructed that it is constantly necessary to refresh one's thinking, that is, to think from the beginning each time anew:

Don't worry about what you have already written. Just keep on beginning to think afresh as if nothing at all had happened yet. (Wittgenstein 1969)

The trait is prominently evident, for example, in the form of the *Tractatus* and in the mode of philosophizing in the *Investigations*. A drawing of the propositions of the *Tractatus* in all its ramifications would appear to the beholder from a bird's-eye view like the picture of a network of neurons. It is a "dystrophic" network because it is unidirectional. While the method of philosophizing in the *Investigations* is characterized by intersections and repeated observations of the same matter, as Wittgenstein himself relates in the foreword to his work:

My thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them on in any single direction against their natural inclination. - And this was, of course, connected with the very nature of the investigation.

The same or almost the same points were always being approached afresh from different directions, and new sketches made. (Wittgenstein 1968)

The term "family resemblance" can be seen as very close to LLI from the aspect of a network of connections, differences and similarities, as also the term "seeing aspects" that Wittgenstein develops in the *Investigations* regarding the perception of a whole. Seeing aspects refers to the same phenomenon itself that is manifested differently and not interpreted differently. This term in turn may shed light on proposition 4.014 in the *Tractatus* which says that "the gramophone record, the musical thought, the score, and the waves of sound" can all be grasped as different aspects of music. These philosophical ideas are accorded a fresh look due to the mode of observation, which has a structural link to a personality trait. Of note on this point is Wittgenstein's own critique of his concise style in the *Trac-*

tatus which may be attributed to a broader implementation of his unique mode of observation. Here it is relevant not only as regards the structure of the book, but regarding its contents as well:

Every sentence in the *Tractatus* should be seen as the heading of a chapter, needing further exposition. My present style is quite different: I am trying to avoid that error. (Drury 1981)

Wittgenstein may perhaps have felt that the proper way to write philosophy is to give full and exhaustive answers, and thus to seal any gap calling for unwanted interpretations. Indeed, in the aphorisms of his late philosophy, each describes one state of affairs in full, and that, by directing attention to the matter being discussed from various points of view. Furthermore, the successive philosophical periods can be seen as changing aspects of the philosophical investigation.

LLI, Oversensitivity and Anxiety

Wittgenstein himself attests to his extraordinary sensitivity:

I believe that my mental apparatus is built in an extraordinarily complicated and delicate manner and therefore more sensitive than normal. (Wittgenstein 2003)

This too can be identified with the phenomenon of sensory overstimulation due to low screening of information. When it goes together with high intelligence it is not infrequently identified with genius. Normal people have mechanisms to block out the sensory deluge, but people with LLI absorb several times more. The sensory bombardment imposes a burden and arouses a constant alertness, which together lead to a tiring and exhausting intensity: "Sometimes I think that at some point my brain won't take the strain on it and will give out." (Wittgenstein, 2003)

And yes, for Wittgenstein too the sensitivity was manifested in an ability to see many things simultaneously in different contexts, with alertness to differences and attention to subtleties, constructing a ramified network of connections between things and between their attributes, a network of links and contexts woven at great speed, and no doubt it weighed upon him. Someone endowed with this ability may feel they are lost, burn with frustration, or sink into depression when they are prevented from thinking properly and being creative. In the past, this phenomenon was considered a mental disturbance and not distinguished from schizophrenia, ADHD, bipolar disease and depression.

For Wittgenstein, losing the capacity to do philosophical work meant losing any reason to live. He does attempt, as it were, to comfort himself that life without philosophy is nonetheless possible, but he sees no point in such a life for him. In order to escape the panic which grips him due to the fear of losing his philosophical work, he tells himself that all that's required is to reorganize the concepts, and reorganization is nothing other than a change in the mode of observation. Indeed, on those days when Wittgenstein is unable to do philosophy he is attacked by anxiety. Instead of doing philosophy, at such moments he writes down thoughts about his condition, his anxiety and his fears of descending into insanity. He is desperate for inspiration and aware of changes in his mood, gauging the slightest deviation. In his despair, he turns to God and asks His blessing and protection from losing his sanity, due to the oversensitivity that has overwhelmed him.

Oversensitivity, Philosophy and Life

Malcolm sees Wittgenstein's exceptional way of thinking as lying in his special talent for knowing what his interlocutor was going to say. In his opinion, that stemmed from Wittgenstein's customarily having reviewed in his mind everything that could possibly be said about the topic being discussed, and therefore there was no chance that somebody might think of something he hadn't yet thought of, and that was no boast. This description accords with what was noted above, that due to his special traits Wittgenstein was able to see many connections and from different angles with great rapidity, and thus to encompass the many possibilities. And in the wake of Wittgenstein's recommendation to "see connections," I shall present a possible link between the absolute hearing he was gifted with and his ethics.

Wittgenstein was aware of his unconventional way of seeing things and his style. In his words, his exceptionality stemmed from his genius, and it is related to his being sensitive: "My soul is more naked than that of most people & in that consists so to speak my genius." (Wittgenstein 2003)

It would seem that Wittgenstein, with his oversensitivity, is aware of his different way than others also in regard to words, and the way in which they drive his actions. Wittgenstein feels the words. He sees how they influence him; not just as regards their content, but also in the way they are implemented. He suggests that we allow the words to teach us their meaning. The philosopher, he says, must enable the words to do what they do while he searches for that word which will liberate him, which will bring clarity to the picture: something fuzzy and complicated suddenly becomes clear and bright. The appropriate word, he says, brings that sense of relief. This high sensitivity is evident not only regarding words, but also in his attitude towards music. Absolute hearing involves a higher than ordinary level of precision and joins the exceptional ability to see connections and subtleties.

Music was Wittgenstein's great love: it occupied a special place in his life, and it played a key role in his creative work. He used words in order to write down his thoughts as if they were the notes of a musical composition that needed to be played precisely, with attention to meter, rhythm and dynamics: "Sometimes a sentence can be understood only if it is read at the *right tempo*." (Wittgenstein 1984). In his writing he sought to simulate the multilayered nature of music. He shows that words cannot suffice to say something, but it is also necessary to indicate where the thought is directed. Attention must be paid to the way words are expressed, among other things to the tone of voice, inflections, speed and punctuation as though they were dynamics and harmony. A comparison could even be struck between the power of the liberating word for the philosopher and the chord that resolves the question in a musical composition.

Someone with high acoustic sensitivity is sensitive to and will immediately notice any dissonance. Instances of such sensitivity may be accompanied by sensations of physical or mental discomfort. Wittgenstein seeks to overcome the discomfort caused by dissonance by avoiding the imprecision that creates it or achieving a precision which prevents it. It can be said that Wittgenstein's high sensitivity, which led to his subtlety of distinction, was expressed among other things in his ability to discern any "dissonance" in people's speech and behavior, all the more so when he himself was the "dissonant" one, due to improper thoughts which were tantamount to improper be-

havior. Once he listened to a friend of his play but his playing wasn't serious. When he returned home he whistled a lied by Schubert with his sister Helen, but was unable to concentrate and felt uncomfortable due to that. He condemned himself for its not being the right action, because true and counterfeit thoughts were mixed up in it (Nachlass 108, 47).

This may make it clear why Wittgenstein reacted with fury, a fury which others at times did not understand, when he recognized dishonesty. Wittgenstein's consciousness of these tendencies of his is manifested in that component of his worldview which became a guiding methodological principle, avoidance of error. A mistake in playing or singing sounds like a dissonance, which in effect happens due to an error in execution. If the dissonance appears by dint of an improper action, then the avoidance of imprecision will prevent the error, avoiding the error will point to the correct execution. This approach is reflected in his saying that the *Tractatus* is a book of ethics. In the present framework, what he may have meant is that it was intended to develop an observation and sensitivity to precise distinctions which in turn would lead to the correct actions.

Conclusion

Occam's razor, which is a guiding methodological principle, lends support to LLI as the least which accounts for the most. This perception casts light on Wittgenstein's acute sensitivity from another angle. It may help to understand the links between the multiple domains of his existence. It is possible that the sensitivity to differences and weaving of networks of connections are what led to the development of philosophical ideas, such as seeing as-

pects and family resemblance, as well as to the insistence on precision as a guiding principle in philosophy. With Wittgenstein, the sensitivity to sound and resonance went beyond listening to music. Not infrequently he became infuriated when he recognized a dissonance expressed as an imprecision in the accordance between philosophy and life; philosophy was the musical score and its execution was life itself. This is another example of the high and delicate resolution with which Wittgenstein looks at things and situations, and how it is manifested in his life and his philosophy. This complex and coherent system of reflections between the various layers of existence shows that for Wittgenstein, the autophilosopher, life and philosophical thinking are mutually structured.

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Some observations on developments towards the Semantic Web for Wittgenstein scholarship

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Abstract

The nature of Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* makes it perhaps particularly well-suited for the development of *digital* tools enabling scholars to *navigate* (browse, search, reference) a vast collection of material "criss-cross in every direction" in an informed and efficient manner. (The *Bergen Electronic Edition* of the *Nachlass* is an example of such a tool.) The advantage of an *online* digital platform is being able to do so on different hardware and software systems when- and wherever. And an advantage of *Open Access*, *Open Source* solutions is that these resources are available for free and the underlying code and datasets open to scrutiny by all (see e.g. Wittgenstein Source and the Agora platform). A valuable addition to current technology will be *lemmatized* searching, enabling search for different forms of terms across both the English and German. Moreover, the development of *semantically* driven tools promises opportunities, yet presents challenges.

1. A possible future scenario?

Imagine a future scholar doing research on, say, Wittgenstein's *Brown Book*. Having read the Blackwell paperback edition thoroughly, filling its margins with pencilled notes she now wishes to systematize them into a study of the notion of "grammar" within the *Brown Book* as well as its relation to the remaining *Nachlass*. She accesses the interactive digital Wittgenstein portal and instructs her computer to run a search for all occurrences of "grammar" and its derivatives in the *Brown Book*. Using an integrated tool she annotates the resulting relevant remarks and annotates them with her selected notes. Meanwhile a message pops up on the screen indicating additional information potentially relevant to her: "My information suggests that the *Brown Book*, TS-310, is related to the German MS-115, "Eine philosophische Betrachtung". Would you like me to include results for that as well?" The scholar replies, "Yes, and if applicable, please give me an overview of instances where the one version has an occurrence of the concept of 'grammar' while the other does not in the matching remarks, both from the English to the German and *vice versa*." Making particular note of one of the results, she continues, "I would like to see which notes other scholars have made on this remark." "Would you like to see results both for the primary source and from secondary literature?" the computer asks. "Annotations of the primary source will do for now", she replies. She also decides to narrow down her selection to notes from those who have argued for a contrast between the occurrences in the *Brown Book* and elsewhere in the *Nachlass*. "This should be plenty for now – I'll deal with the arguments for continuity later on", she says to herself, making a mental note. (Our example is inspired by Szeltner 2013.)

2. Browsing and searching Wittgenstein sources today

While some of this is possible already, the reality of today is admittedly far more mundane and irksome than in the above description. Having said that, the Wittgenstein scholar interested in utilizing digital or online tools already has helpful opportunities at her disposal, and additional ones are not far off.

After more than a decade since its publication the *Bergen Electronic Edition* is still a comparably powerful application. Featuring close to the entire *Nachlass* and a varied

set of fine-tuned search functions allowing for detailed access to all 20,000 pages, for the "digital Wittgenstein scholar" it still presents a tool the likes of which are largely unavailable to most other scholars in the humanities. It is undoubtedly a useful application: Consider for instance Peter Hacker's report on his use of it in his revised edition of the commentary volumes on the *Philosophical Investigations* (Hacker 2009, p. xi):

Now, with the publication of the Bergen edition of the *Nachlass* in electronic form, and the consequent availability of a search engine, I have endeavoured to give all the relevant sources of a given section in the table of sources annexed to each introduction to a chapter of exegesis.

However, the BEE in its current shape does face challenges due to technological development and compatibility issues brought with it. Fortunately, the underlying datasets maintained by the Wittgenstein Archives in Bergen are not proprietary and so lend themselves easily to publication on the web. The next logical step in such a development, therefore, is making these resources available online along with supplementary functionality for powerful navigation (see Pichler 2010).

Indeed, parts of the *Nachlass* were published online on <http://www.wittgensteinsource.org> in 2009 (see also Pichler & al. 2012 and Pichler & Smith 2013). While it does not (yet) feature the search capabilities of the BEE, it does offer 5,000 pages available in a browser-friendly environment. And while it does not represent a complete edition of Wittgenstein's work, it does have value in making parts of the *Nachlass* available Open Access (contrary to both the BEE and the Intellex Past Masters edition). It also represents a fruitful resource for joint collaboration with several other projects: a Munich group around Max Hadersbeck (see Hadersbeck et al. 2012 and <http://wittfind.cis.uni-muenchen.de/>) develops solutions for "lemmatized" searching; the Agora project (<http://www.project-agera.org/>) creates online solutions for the publication of secondary (textual and audio-visual) Wittgenstein sources; and in connection with a range of digital library platforms Net7 are developing the online annotation tool Pundit (<http://thepundit.it/>). Moreover, the *Brown Book* was chosen as the data set for the ongoing "Wittgenstein incubator" experiment (<http://dm2e.eu/newsletter-march-2013/>) within which both philosophers and computer scientists have joined in order to work with tools for online Wittgenstein research. When sufficiently developed and brought to-

gether these efforts will produce a helpful digital research environment for the Wittgenstein scholar.

The scholar in the introductory example wants to study the notion of “grammar” in Wittgenstein’s *Nachlass*, the *Brown Book* in particular. Today, the *Brown Book* material is available in its entirety on *Wittgenstein Source* in both its English (TS-310) and German (MS-115, second part) versions. For “our” scholar, one important task will consist in finding the occurrences of the term “grammar” and its derivatives. A truncated search for “gramma*” will yield, among results from other parts of the *Nachlass*, all occurrences of “grammar” in TS-310 or “Grammatik” in MS-115 and their different grammatical forms. For this task, then, a standard search function as we know it from e.g. current browsers will do well enough.

Due to the simple fact that “grammar” and its different forms are all covered by “gramma*” in both English and German, a *lemmatized* search for that term would add little; but if she were to search for other, related terms, e.g. “sprechen”, a truncated search would leave out relevant results, while a lemmatized search for the same word would produce a list also including inflections like “gesprochen”.



Fig. 1: Screenshot of lemmatized search for “sprechen” in the Big Typescript.

But there is also the issue of delimitation here: We do want all the relevant results, but we might also want to leave out those considered irrelevant; and we might want to be guided towards related concepts. Consider if we were to search for instances of ‘thinking’ or ‘learning’. Here, there would be a number of variants in both English and German, some which would be philosophically relevant, and others not. The very first sentence of the *Brown Book* reads like this: “Augustine, in describing his *learning* of language, says that he was *taught* to speak by *learning* the names of things.” ([http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ts-310,1\[1\]_n](http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ts-310,1[1]_n); our emphases) Here we have instances of ‘learning’ which will presumably be philosophically relevant, and we also have an instance of the related concept of ‘teaching’. In another remark a bit later on ([http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ts-310,1\[2\]et2\[1\]_n](http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ts-310,1[2]et2[1]_n)) Wittgenstein introduces the concept of ‘training’. In interpreting Wittgenstein these concepts seldom go one without the other. In the last sentence of the first paragraph, “[Augustine] does not primarily *think* of such words as “today”; “not”, “but”, “perhaps” (our emphasis), however, we have an instance of ‘thinking’ which is probably not as relevant for a study of the *philosophical* concept of thinking in Wittgenstein. If all

“philosophical instances” of English or German terms expressing central concepts like ‘thinking’, ‘learning’, ‘understanding’, ‘teaching’ and so on were “tagged” or “marked up” as such, this would represent a navigational function of a *semantic* nature.



Fig. 2: Screenshot showing Wittgenstein Source within the SwickyNotes annotation tool. The contextual graph shows TS-310,147[3]et148[1] selected as the central “node”. Here we see several “relations” between the remark and other nodes, among them the concept of thinking.

Semantic search: benefits and challenges

We have proceeded from simple string search to lemmatized search and, ultimately, reached semantic search. A fully-fledged “Semantic Web” tool would permit the computer to make the sort of suggestions we introduced this paper with. The idea of “semantic” navigation is the upshot of a vision proposed by the founder of the World Wide Web, Tim Berners-Lee (2001). Roughly, the idea is that while the WWW connects web *pages* to each other, a Semantic Web will interconnect (simple) *data* (within or between those pages) at a much more granulated level. Taken to its conclusion, a future Semantic Web would amount to one large database where all data can be connected to each other and thereby queried. (Berners-Lee termed it the “Giant Global Graph” (ibid.) – imagine an unlimited extension of the graph in figure 2 above.) Such interconnection is to be achieved by “tagging” or “marking up” resources (text, pictures, videos, “anything”) with additional “meta-data” consisting of information about the resource. Think of this along the lines of a library catalogue index card: the meta-data will include information about who the author is, when it was published, within which field, descriptive keywords, and so on. But moreover and different from an indexing card it will also mark the actual contents with additional information (perhaps a rough analogy could be the way a book looks when it has been read meticulously, highlighted with a marker, the margins scrawled with “see also ...”, and so on), e.g. that this concept (e.g. ‘grammar’) or remark is also found somewhere else in the *Nachlass* (e.g. a German version of a remark from the *Brown Book*), etc.

However, although the idea of the Semantic Web is close to 20 years old (see Berners-Lee & al. 2006) its development has been slow, perhaps not surprisingly given the above ambition. They write:

The Semantic Web is a Web of actionable information—information derived from data through a semantic theory for interpreting the symbols. The semantic theory provides an account of “meaning” in which the logical connection of terms establishes interoperability between systems.

Their talk of “a” or even “the” semantic theory of meaning might give one immediate pause here. Some have claimed the theory alluded to as fundamentally flawed (see e.g. Lemire 2007). Converting all of WWW into GGG graphs would imply a view of all knowledge as something which can be put in a traditional subject – predicate – object form; an ontology of the world mirrored in computational language. However, Berners-Lee’s careful stressing of “shared meaning” in a pragmatic manner probably makes the ascription of such a view a bit unfair. Yet reflections on domains within which meaning is often much more vague, ambiguous or contested (e.g. the humanities) than in the fields he considers (“life sciences”, businesses) is remarkably absent.

Within the digital humanities some warn against dangers involved in such a vision (see e.g. Erbacher 2011), while others have endeavoured to demonstrate its utility, even for Wittgenstein research (see e.g. Zöllner-Weber & Pichler 2007 and Pichler and Zöllner-Weber 2012). There need be no principal disagreement here. Certainly there are “facts” about Wittgenstein’s writings; but many other aspects would be of an interpretive and contentious nature. (Does “grammar” in the *Brown Book* mean “the same” in the *Philosophical Investigations*?)

A semantic tool, involving the application of a “Wittgenstein ontology” to the *Nachlass*, should enable the scholar to do research, not do the research for her; yet it would in one sense decide on some results for her: for while it does open avenues of navigation (e.g. efficient browsing), it also closes some (e.g. search delimitation). Therefore these developmental efforts must constantly be tempered by the realization that many interpretive decisions are involved. A main challenge in developing a semantically enriched *Nachlass* thus lies in the constant deliberation of which aspects should be “marked up” in which way – and of course also involve the wisdom to know when *not* to make such attempts. Just as important, the scholar must be aware of the possibility of being “biased” by the ontology implemented. A way of sidestepping the issue would of course be to switch the ontology off and continue to browse the *Nachlass* without it; or an interesting alternative might be to operate with and compare several ontologies, presenting the perspectives of different scholars.

Although the resources currently existing are of a disparate and “R&D” nature, there is hope of bringing them together in the not too distant future. The idea of an online edition of Wittgenstein’s *Nachlass* coupled with both lemmatized and semantic search functions and the opportunity of utilizing ontologies to browse and create relations within it holds exciting potential. Such digital tools must on

the one hand be sufficiently developed in order to attract scholars; on the other it is clear that we need the research community to take active part in this development, i.e. use and evaluate the tools while they are being developed. The Wittgenstein Archives’ own Wittgenstein Ontology can be downloaded from http://wab.uib.no/wab_philospace.page/wittgenstein.owl. We encourage the community to partake and welcome all responses!

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Fooling the Frege-Geach Problem for Expressivism?

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Abstract

This paper proposes two ways out of the Frege-Geach problem. After the challenges of Pettit and Jackson (1998), the more refined arguments against Expressivism are grouped under the umbrella term Frege-Geach problem. The Frege-Geach problem is an objection to theories (Expressivism included) holding that normative sentences are not truth-apt.

We put forward *two* strategies to avoid the problem: one negative, one positive.

First and negatively, the Frege-Geachers are entrapped in a categorial mistake. Logical relations concern propositions, not things. Even if it might be acceptable for Frege-Geachers to speak metonymically of things (beliefs) as truth-apt referring to their content (propositions), this is unacceptable if speaking of other non-propositional mental states (those that Expressivists take to be the source of the normative).

Second and positively, we can try to develop an Expressivist theory of law making that can face the Frege-Geach according to which external negation is explained by means of rejection.

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1 What is the Frege-Geach Problem?

1.1 What is Expressivism?

1.2 The Frege-Geach Problem for Expressivism

1.3 Negation, Attitudes and Rejection for Expressivist

2 Why Does the Frege-Geach Rest on a Mistake

3 A Positive Expressivistic Account: External Negation as Rejection

1 What is the Frege-Geach Problem?

The Frege-Geach problem is thought to be the ultimate objection to Expressivism. In order to evaluate whether this claim holds we first need to figure out what Expressivists maintain and then what the Frege-Geach Problem for Expressivism is. Last but not least, we need to draw some distinction concerning negation, i.e. the main concept around which the Frege-Geach objection revolves.

1.1 What is Expressivism?

For the purpose of this paper, we sketch Expressivism as maintaining three basic tenets:

(i) first, Expressivism expects semantics to explain what 'A' means by reference to what is like to think that A: sentences express mental states.

(ii) second, Expressivism holds that the meaning of a descriptive sentence 'D' differs from the meaning of a moral sentence 'M' because the mental state expressed by 'D' differs from the mental state expressed by 'M';

(iii) third, moral sentences are not truth-apt.

1.2 The Frege-Geach Problem for Expressivism

According to (ii), the meaning of descriptive sentences or terms is different from the meaning of moral (or normative)

ones. The objection of the Frege-Geachers,¹ though, is the following: how (ii) can hold, if there is no linguistic evidence of their difference? Moral (normative) terms and sentences, in fact, can be (syntactically and arguably semantically) employed with no difference from descriptive ones: 'ritebling is wrong' and 'ritebling is pink', for instance, can be negated in the very same fashion: 'ritebling is not wrong', 'ritebling is not pink'. And negation is the simplest issue, but this applies also to conditionals, modus ponens, conjunctions and so on. So why 'wrong' should be linguistically different from 'pink'?

1.3 Negation, Attitudes and Rejection for Expressivist

We endorse a *prima facie* distinction among negation, denial and rejection.² Very roughly, negation [*negazione*] acts on contents. For instance, 'unhappy' is the negation of 'happy'. Among several kinds of negation (internal or propositional, external, metalinguistic, illocutionary) we are concerned here only with the distinction between internal and external negation.

Denial [*diniego*] is, instead, an act. It can be either a linguistic act, or a non-linguistic act (for instance: shaking one's head). Rejection [*rifiuto*] is, instead, a mental attitude.³

2 Why Does the Frege-Geach Rest on a Mistake

The Frege-Geachers are entrapped in a categorial mistake. Logical relations concern propositions, not things. Frege-Geachers maintain that the general picture of Expressivism is wrong. It is wrong because, among other things, it can't account for the negation of (*prima facie*) normative sentences. Since normative sentences can be negated, and since negation is taken to work on the truth-value of a given sentence, then *a fortiori* normative sentences must be truth-apt. If normative sentences are truth-

¹ The problem got its name from Geach's objection exploiting Frege's attention on assertion (see Geach, 1965). The problem got recently a brand new shape following the works of Unwin, Schroeder, Dreier et al. | cfr. for instance Charlow, forthcoming; Horn and Schwartz, 2013; Schroeder, 2008a,b,c; Unwin, 1999, 2001.

² We can't discuss here the possible relationships among them.

³ On rejection, see Gomolifinska, 1998; Incurvati and Smith, 2010; Ripley, 2011; Smiley, 1996; Tamminga, 1994.

apt, then they can't be the Expression of a non-propositional content | in other words, the mental states Expressivists take to be relevant for normativity must be truth-apt, just as beliefs (the Frege-Geacher thinks). Let us restate again what the controversial issue is between Frege-Geachers and Expressivists. Frege-Geachers hold that the following list is the right one to account for normative sentences:

1. beliefs;
2. propositional content;
3. truth-apt propositions.

Expressivists hold that the following list is the right one to account for normative sentences:

1. states of approval/disapproval;⁴
2. non-propositional account of meaning;
3. sentences lacking truth-value.

For us, the debated point is not the logical issue of negation of propositions, i.e. on the step 3 of both accounts (that, for Expressivists, gets quite tricky due to their truth-inapt characterization of propositions). The controversial issue is rather on things themselves, i.e. step 1 of both accounts. Here we are dealing with things, entities, objects.

Our main objection to Frege-Geachers is the following: logical relations (such as truth-aptness) can happen only among proposition-like entities, not among mere things. My laptop, for instance, can't be true or false: my mental states (beliefs, approval, etc), qua things, can't either. It's only the content of my mental states | if it is propositional | to be true or false, for instance the content 'B' of my belief B that that laptop is mine, ie 'B': 'that laptop is mine'. Even if it might be acceptable for Frege-Geachers to speak metonymically of things (beliefs) as truth-apt referring to their content (propositions), this is unacceptable if speaking of other non-propositional mental states (those that Expressivists take to be the source of the normative).

3 A Positive Expressivistic Account: External Negation as Rejection

Expressivism is then often held unable to account for external negation. As Schroeder points out, for instance, while cognitive (= truth-apt) attitudes (such as beliefs) can account for both internal and external negation, non-cognitive attitudes (such as "being for", in his example) can't do the same.

Frege-Geachers contend that Expressivists cannot explain disagreement over normative sentences. The two (truth-apt) sentences: 'the sky is blue' and 'the sky is not blue' (differing only because of negation) are in conflict because their content (a) is propositional; (b) expresses a belief, and beliefs can be inconsistent.

But the inconsistent pair 'abortion is wrong' and 'abortion is not wrong', the Frege-Geachers maintain, cannot be accounted for unless the contents of the attitudes they express are inconsistent, that is, propositional. Let's have a look to why it should be so. Let's suppose that the mental attitude expressed by 'wrong' is disapproval. If 'abortion is wrong' expresses disapproval of abortion, and 'abortion is not wrong' expresses disapproval of non-abortion, then we

could explain away the problem of accounting for their (apparent) inconsistency. But 'abortion is not wrong' does not express disapproval of non-abortion, say the Frege-Geachers. According to them, disapproval of non-abortion is at most expressed by 'non-abortion is wrong'.

1. 'abortion is wrong' = disapproval of abortion;
2. 'abortion is not wrong' = disapproval of x ;
3. 'non-abortion is wrong' = disapproval of non-abortion;
4. 'non-abortion is not wrong' = disapproval of y.

Which mental state, then, is expressed by 'abortion is not wrong', if 'abortion is not wrong' cannot express disapproval of abortion? According to critics of Expressivism: none (see '???' below at (3)). And since Expressivism cannot account for (apparently) inconsistent normative sentences, then either (a) Expressivism is wrong or (b) normative sentences are truth-apt just like non-normative sentences, because they express the (propositional) content of beliefs.

In fact, Frege-Geachers think, beliefs can account for (1)-(4):⁵

1. Mark thinks that 'abortion is wrong';
2. Mark doesn't think that 'abortion is wrong';
3. Mark thinks that 'abortion is not wrong';
4. Mark thinks that 'non-abortion is wrong'.

whether mere disapproval can't:

1. Mark disapproves of abortion;
2. Mark doesn't disapprove of abortion;
3. ??? (not possible according to Frege-Geachers)
4. Mark disapproves of non-abortion;

We think that the main problem lies with external negation. Frege-Geachers are wrong because they think that external negation can be only linguistic and that external negation acts on contents. We extend the pretty common reading of external negation as a possible index of rejection of the assertability of a descriptive sentence⁶ to normative sentences. In our reading, external negation of *prima facie* normative sentences indicates a rejection of the normativity of those sentences. According to our first point (Sect. 2), one can't beat about the bush with logical operations on things such as mental contents. In particular, when one (externally) denies a (*prima facie*) normative proposition, he simply rejects it as normative, he does not accept its normativity.

Here we sketch out idea in a more detailed way. Our assumptions are the following:

1. commands and orders can be conceived as speech acts;
2. the Expressivist can explain orders and commands in terms of Expressivist operators (being for);
3. these operators range on somehow personal entities that determines the approval (we can call them being for states);
4. being for entities cannot necessarily be used to carry out a cognitivist account of the normative, i.e. and

⁴ Of course the specific attitude depends on that particular version of Expressivism.

⁵ Adapted from Schroeder, 2008a,c.

⁶ Proposed for instance by Horn, 1985, 1989.

account according to which value statements are context independently true or false once and forever;⁷

Our thesis is then the following: external negation of a *prima facie* normative judgment signals the rejection of the normativity of that very command or order. Expressivist external negation equals rejecting that the person commanding is going to issue a command, i.e. the receiver even recognizing the command as a command, will not feel obliged to its fulfillment: the casted command will not be binding.

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⁷ We use quite a strong characterization of cognitivism, thus we are not sure whether that approach requires the cognitivist to commit herself on (objective?) moral fact.

The Extended Mind Thesis and Mechanistic Explanations

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Abstract

The Extended Mind Thesis (EMT) is traditionally formulated against the bedrock of functionalism, and ongoing debates are typically bogged down with questions concerning the exact relationship between EMT and different versions of functionalism. In this paper, I offer a novel ally for EMT: the new mechanistic approach to explanation. I argue that the mechanistic framework provides useful resources not just to disambiguate EMT, and to show which objections fail to pose a serious challenge, but also to answer some of the deeper problems that stem from the functionalist roots of EMT.

1. Introduction

The Extended Mind Thesis (EMT), first proposed by Clark and Chalmers (1998), claims that the vehicles of our cognitive processes and mental states can and sometimes do extend beyond the boundaries of our brain and even body (cf. Clark 2008, p. 76). If a physical object plays a part in the machinery realising a cognitive process, then that physical object *is* part of the cognitive process, no matter whether it is inside or outside the head. This is the so-called parity principle (Clark & Chalmers 1998, p. 8), the heart and soul of EMT.

The most well-known illustration is the case of Otto and Inga. When Inga hears about a new exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) she retrieves from her biological memory that it is on 53rd Street and goes to the museum. Her counterpart, Otto, who suffers from a mild form of Alzheimer's disease, uses a notebook to jot down and retrieve information. So when he hears about the exhibition he turns to his notebook, and retrieves the address from there. Clark and Chalmers argue that, just like Inga, Otto walks to the museum because "he *wanted* to go to the museum and *believed* (even before consulting his notebook) that it was on 53rd Street" (Clark 2008, p. 78). Both Otto and Inga have the same long-term beliefs, it is just Otto's beliefs are extended beyond his skull.

2. Objections to EMT

EMT has been widely criticised in the literature. In what follows, I am going to focus on some of the most characteristic objections: a set of related issues raised by Adams and Aizawa (2001, 2009, 2010a, 2010b), and an argument put forth by Mark Spervak (2009).

First, Adams and Aizawa happily acknowledge that Otto's notebook is causally coupled to the cognitive processes of Otto, but resist the further claim that the notebook is part of the relevant cognitive process. Clark and Chalmers, they argue, commit a *coupling-constitution fallacy*: they confuse causal interactions between Otto's cognitive processes and the notebook with an extension of a cognitive process (Adams & Aizawa 2010b, p. 68).

Clark and Chalmers support the constitution claim by emphasising that Otto's notebook plays "roughly" (Clark 2008, p. 76) the same functional role as Inga's biological memory: their content are poised for the control of action, and interact with desires and other beliefs in roughly the same way. Adams and Aizawa agree. However, even if there is rough functional similarity, they argue, i.e. even if

the coarse-grained functional profile of Otto's notebook matches that of Inga's biological memory, their fine-grained functional profiles are so vastly different (e.g. biological memories are dynamic systems prone to reorganisation, interpolation, creative mergers, etc., whereas notebooks are static storage devices) that Otto's notebook does not deserve to be called cognitive at all.

For Adams and Aizawa, fine-grained functional descriptions are important, because they believe that "the cognitive must be discriminated on the basis of underlying causal processes" (Adams & Aizawa 2001, p. 52). Only uncovering these underlying fine-grained causal regularities yields interesting causal laws. From this perspective, EMT, by relying on coarse-grained functional characterisations, and thus permitting nearly anything into the scope of cognitive science (e.g. a range of tools that humans can use as mnemonic aids), loses every chance to be able to uncover interesting regularities (Adams & Aizawa 2001, p. 61). That is, cognitive science allowing for extended cognitive processes just *ceases to be a science*.

Relatedly, Spervak (2009) draws attention to that EMT faces a dilemma: in order to allow for cases of extended cognition EMT needs to set the grain parameter (at which two functionally characterised processes are identical) coarse enough, but if the grain parameter is too coarse, it yields a radical version of EMT by permitting cases of extended cognition which even proponents of EMT would not allow for.

Clark and Chalmers realise that extra conditions are needed in order to make EMT more modest and plausible. They offer the following "rough-and-ready set of additional criteria to be met by nonbiological candidates for inclusion into an individual's cognitive system": (1) "That the resource be reliably available and typically invoked.", (2) "That any information thus retrieved be more or less automatically endorsed [...] and deemed trustworthy", (3) "That information contained in the resource should be easily accessible as and when required.", and (4) "That the information in the notebook has been consciously endorsed at some point in the past and indeed is there as a consequence of this endorsement." (Clark 2008, p. 79; see also Clark & Chalmers 1998, p. 17).

For Spervak, this set of criteria is problematic because the conditions are unjustified: Clark and Chalmers remain silent about why this set is to be accepted. Spervak argues that without providing well-established conditions for designating an intermediate level grain size, which proponents of EMT fail to do, EMT will not be able to balance between the two extremes: *radical-EMT*, where (at too coarse grain size) nearly any artefact could be seen as an extension of

certain cognitive processes, and *no-EMT*, where (at too fine grain size) no artefacts would qualify as constitutive parts of cognitive processes.

3. The New Mechanistic Framework

Now that the stage is set, I turn my attention to demonstrating how the mechanistic framework (Bechtel 2008; Craver 2007; Machamer et al., 2000) is able to help articulating the core idea behind EMT, and formulating systematic answers to the main objections.

The mechanistic approach identifies a phenomenon via identifying the causal roles played by a system producing the phenomenon, and accounts for this phenomenon in terms of the organised activity of the parts of the system. It is a multilevel approach—once the activity of an entity at a given level is decomposed into the lower level organised structure of its parts and their activities it is possible to apply the same methodology again in order to account for the lower level activities in terms of still lower levels, and so on.

If we apply this framework to the case of Inga and Otto, what we get is the following. Inga hears about an exhibition in MoMA and consequently she goes to the museum. This is the personal level phenomenon one can observe. Now in line with the mechanistic approach, it is possible to account for this phenomenon in terms of the organised activity of lower—arguably sub-personal—level entities and activities: e.g. a speech recognition process analysing the auditory input, an act of mental recall searching Inga's biological memory, an act of deliberate planning, and the activity of a motor control system moving Inga's body-parts. One can, of course, dig deeper, to find out what still lower level entities and activities produce the activities of these now middle-level entities. For example, at a lower level one can describe neural mechanisms responsible for how Inga's biological memory responds to recall processes and affects planning, and also for internal processes like consolidation, re-organisation, interpolation, and so on.

Similarly, when Otto hears about the exhibition in MoMA, he also goes to the right place. So the phenomenon as described at this personal level is the same. The underlying mechanism, however is different. Unlike in Inga's case, where at the sub-personal level one can find an act of mental recall searching biological memory, in Otto's case the set of sub-personal level entities and activities constituting the higher level phenomenon partly consists of an act of reaching for the notebook and reading from it. If one digs deeper, it turns out that Otto's notebook is quite unlike Inga's biological memory in the sense that it has no parts the activities of which would be responsible for such dynamic internal processes that are characteristic of biological memories. The notebook is a static storage device.

4. EMT Disambiguated

Distinguishing between these different levels helps systematising the problem space. Mental states typically get ascribed on the basis of personal (here: highest) level descriptions. Literally, neither the sub-personal process of recalling from biological memory, nor reaching and reading from a physical notebook 'has a belief'—or 'is cognitive' for that matter (cf. Adams & Aizawa 2010b for claiming otherwise)—mainly because the terms 'having a belief' and 'being cognitive' belong to a vocabulary characterising the personal level, but not the lower levels. Sub-personal level entities and their activities contribute to 'having believes' or

'being cognitive' by *constituting* a mechanism that, as a whole, is responsible for these phenomena.

EMT focuses on these sub-personal (here: middle) level mechanisms. EMT does *not* commit the coupling-constitution fallacy because what EMT is really interested in are exactly those cases where a physical object does play a part in a sub-personal mechanism. According to the mechanistic framework, mere coupling happens when an entity is causally connected to parts of a given mechanism, but it does not contribute to the overall performance of the mechanism. Contrary to this, constitution happens when the entity in question, and its activities, do contribute to the overall performance of the mechanism. EMT here can even rely on the specific method the mechanistic framework provides for deciding whether a given entity is part of a mechanism: the method of mutual manipulability—the idea that lower level intervention and higher level detection combined with higher level intervention and lower level detection is able to locate mechanism boundaries (Craver 2007, pp. 152-160).

Interestingly, the top-down manipulability constraint readily disqualifies many of the famous counterexamples (e.g. me having standing beliefs about whatever I could find in Encyclopaedia Britannica, or calculate with a supercomputer, etc.), in which cases wiggling the whole mechanism would not necessarily wiggle the content or state of the artefact (cf. Craver 2007, p. 153) due to lack of true read-write integration (as in the case of the Encyclopaedia Britannica), or constant and reliable access (as in the case of a supercomputer).

Note that some of the extra conditions Clark and Chalmers impose on EMT aim at disqualifying exactly these cases—e.g. (4) argues for true read-write integration, whereas (1) for constant and reliable access.

Other conditions—e.g. (2) arguing for automatic endorsement and trustworthiness, or Clark's returning emphasis that what matters from the point of view of EMT is "the achieved functional poise of the stored information" (cf. e.g. Clark 2008, p. 88)—characterise the 'forward looking causal profile' (cf. Shoemaker 2007) of the entities within the mechanism, i.e. how they affect other parts of the mechanism (e.g. how the notebook affects planning and ultimately motor control). Without these latter conditions, bottom-up style manipulability would fail, since if these relations were not in place (e.g. if the information stored was not trusted) wiggling the part would not necessarily wiggle the whole.

That is, the mechanistic framework helps us recognise that—contra Sprevak's (2009) charge,—the extra set of criteria proposed in order to avoid radical EMT is in fact well-founded: it is an alternative formulation of mutual manipulability, i.e. Clark and Chalmers' way of getting a grip on the constitution relation.

Next, note that EMT does not need to be concerned with the levels below the highest sub-personal (here: middle) level. The details about the entities and their activities at lower levels are irrelevant from the perspective of the mechanism EMT focuses on. The only thing that matters is whether entities at this (middle) level contribute to a mechanism that as a whole produces the cognitive phenomenon in question. That is, Otto's notebook extends Otto's cognitive processes as far as it partly constitutes a mechanism that produces the same cognitive phenomenon that is also produced by the mechanism partly constituted by Inga's biological memory. The fine-grained func-

tional profile of Otto's notebook does not need to match that of Inga's biological memory in order to have that.

Abstracting away from features of lower level implementation, contrary to what opponents of EMT claim, does not render EMT unscientific. First, EMT does not permit nearly anything into the scope of cognitive science—only those entities and activities that constitute the mechanisms EMT is interested in. Second, EMT does yield interesting causal regularities at this level (even if not at the levels below).

This is the very message of EMT: there are interesting causal regularities one can uncover when one investigates how the organised activity of (high level) sub-personal entities produces personal level phenomena. These regularities are insensitive to differences in lower level implementation, and most importantly, they sometimes span through the internal-external divide.

5. Conclusion

This paper argues that the mechanistic framework provides useful resources for proponents of EMT. Besides helping to articulate the core idea behind EMT, and revealing why objections based on the coupling-constitution fallacy style arguments trivially fail to pose a serious challenge for EMT, the mechanistic framework also offers a natural solution to the problem of how to set the grain size of the functional descriptions EMT relies on, and provides reasons for accepting the extra criteria that are typically imposed on EMT by its proponents as necessary amendments to general functionalism.

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The Cognitive Functions of Inner Speech

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Abstract

This paper compares Peirce's and Wittgenstein's view of "thinking in words" and "talking to oneself" and relates their positions to contemporary debates on the *cognitive conception of language*. For further clarifications of functions and functioning of inner speech recourse is taken to mechanisms operating verbal working-memory. Main arguments concern the preparatory role of inner speech with respect to a wide spectrum of possible demands of future communication and as a continual adjustment of programming devices to implicit linguistic/statistical knowledge.

1. Introductory notes

In a first step, statements of Peirce and Wittgenstein will be related to contemporary interpretations of language as a vehicle of conscious propositional thinking (Section 2). Could this interpretation mean that the temporal structure of language also shapes the temporal structure of reasoning? (Later Wittgenstein would disagree.) And is even *language-based* reasoning "genuinely computational", as considered in Frankish (2010)? I shall pick up such questions later in the paper. But the computational view will be rather on verbal working memory (Section 3), and main arguments will flow into questions concerning *preparatory functions* of inner speech: "Preparatory" not only with respect to forthcoming utterances and as a superior inner try-out and rearrangement of evidence in the witness box or of arguments in more or less foreseeable debates. I shall suggest (in Section 4) a much more general "side-effect" of this ongoing activity: *It provides continual updating and increased readiness of our highly developed symbol-manipulating system, thus preparing it for a wide spectrum of possible demands of future communication*. It provides repartee, so to say.

2. "Minds who think in words"?

"Language and all abstracted thinking, such as belongs to minds who think in words, [are] of the symbolic nature", says Peirce (1976: 243) at the beginning of a paragraph explaining that words, "though strictly symbols", may realize additional semiotic functions as well: Many of them "are so far iconic that they are apt to determine iconic interpretants /.../; that are *onomatopoetic*, as they say." And there are also words acting "very much like indices. Such are personal demonstrative, and relative pronouns". Language provides, so to say, all the tools necessary for communication and abstracted thinking. But note that Peirce admits the possibility of forms of thinking that are not of the symbolic nature.

Early Wittgenstein takes on a more radical position: "*Die Grenzen meiner Sprache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Welt*" (5.6 in the *Tractatus*). In the *Philosophical Investigations* he is distancing himself from this position: "'Talking' (whether out loud or silently) and 'thinking' are not concepts of the same kind; even though they are in closest connexion." (Wittgenstein 2006: 185) Especially talking to oneself remains inextricably linked with thought and *Verstand*: "When I think in language, there aren't 'meanings' going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought" (§329). And "... couldn't we imagine God's suddenly giving a par-

rot understanding [*Verstand*], and its now saying things to itself?" (§346).

But do we really think "in words" (Peirce) and "in language" (Wittgenstein)? Contemporary authors also propose a *linguistic mind* (Frankish) or *cognitive conception of language* as opposed to a purely communicative conception (Carruthers). They emphasize that a linguistically operating mind is supported by introspection (Frankish 2010: 657) and a "bit of folk-wisdom" (Carruthers 2002: 657). The strong version of the cognitive conception claims that "*all* thought requires language", says Carruthers (p. 661) and places Wittgenstein among the proponents of this "anti-realist" position. Weak versions view language as a conduit of concepts and beliefs, as a cognitive scaffold for the build-up of more complex thoughts, and as sculpting cognition in the course of language acquisition. Carruthers places his own hypothesis somewhere between strong and weak versions: Language is the medium of *conscious* propositional thinking and, moreover, of "*all* non-domain-specific reasoning of a non-practical sort (whether conscious or non-conscious)" (p. 666).

Wittgenstein's dictum on the boundaries of his language as the boundaries of his world (in 5.6 of the *Tractatus*) is in line with what is known – and criticized (Holenstein 1980) – as the doctrine of the *Nichthintergebarkeit* of language. This indeed strongest possible version of a *cognitive conception of language* avoids well-known problems with the empirical basis of linguistic representation. And in Peirce, Wittgenstein's "closest precursor" (Moyal-Sharrock 2003: 126), the "object of a representation can be nothing but a representation of which the first representation is the interpretant" (CP 1.339). In contemporary philosophy, Mitterer's (1992: 56, §13) non-dualistic description of *description* as a continuation of an already given description is reminiscent of Peirce's (CP 1.339) characterization of *representation* as a representation of the representation behind it in a series of representations.

Frankish (2010) characterizes the *linguistic mind* as a *level of mentality* "which operates by accessing and manipulating representations of natural language sentences". After some critical comments on Carruthers' (2002) "central-process modularism" and on Bickerton's (1995) model which assumes that language and central cognition share the very same neural basis, Frankish argues in favor of "the view that the linguistic mind is a virtual system (a 'supermind'), which arose when early humans learned to engage in private speech and to regulate it using metacognitive skills originally developed for use in public argumentation." (p. 206) "Language-based reasoning will thus be genuinely computational, though the computation in question will be carried out at an explicit, personal level." (p. 213)

Guerrero (2005) summarizes the main assumptions of the famous Russian school associated with the names Vygotsky, Luria, and Sokolov. One of these assumptions says: "In planning the spoken or written utterance, inner speech has an essential rehearsal or speech preparatory role." (p. 50) Before taking up again this line of argument and Frankish's hint at computational levels, let us have a "computational" (cf. Tenenbaum et al. 2011) look on perceptual/cognitive mechanisms required for (inner) speech.

3. How to grow a linguistic mind¹

(i) The oldest mechanism required is pattern-detecting, inferential machinery. Its inferences go far beyond the data available. It is not purely data-driven but incessantly generating top-down processes, i.e. "hypothesis-testing". This picture connects with neurobiological descriptions (Buzsáki 2006) of a continual adjustment of the brain's *self-generated patterns* by outside influences.

Powerful statistical learning and pattern recognition show in infants' "co-occurrence statistics between words and referents" (Vouloumanos and Werker 2009), in their acquisition of rudimentary phrase structure (Saffran 2001), and, already in the age of eight months, in the separation of words (Saffran et al. 1996). Saffran et al. characterize this "as resulting from innately biased statistical learning mechanisms". A functionalist interpretation of Chomsky's innate *Language Acquisition Device*?

(ii) Experiments using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) indicate "a direct link between the language and the manual/facial action system" (Rogalewski et al. 2004). But a predominantly auditory-articulatory communication is, other than predominantly visual-gestural communication, functional even without inter-visibility (Wilson 1975). And the hands, the eyes, and thus also the "eye-hand dyad" remain, where necessary, free for other (visually guided) activities such as the flight through the branches or the use and making of tools.

The detection of patterns in the sound stream requires, however, a selective "echoic memory". Such a sensory memory retaining vocal utterances seems to be quite common in a wide range of species – recall the parrot in Wittgenstein's example above – but was most probably augmented in the course of language evolution, and, moreover, specialized for verbal utterances of increasing complexity and duration.²

(iii) *Rehearsal* of utterances, as well as their planning, inner try-out and monitoring, needs a feedback-loop that allows "self-generated patterns" of articulatory circuits to interact with auditory circuits.³ Descriptions of neural circuits (Hickok & Poeppel 2004: 89) rendering such "motor-to auditory mappings" suggest that the respective *auditory-*

articulatory interface connects to an auditory-conceptual interface. Such integration is a prerequisite of *verbal working-memory* in the sense of a relatively autonomous, actively "self-feeding" processor, apt to keep self-generated patterns resonating and circulating within a symbol-manipulating system. Recent experiments by Geva et al. (2011: 3081) indicate, moreover, that the neural processes operating inner speech are initiated in frontal regions before they involve posterior regions that "link speech production to speech comprehension."

4. Inner speech as continual training of the linguistic mind

Frankish's approach provides interesting starting points for further considerations:

(a) He assumes that language at first developed as a tool for interpersonal communication and only then as a cognitive tool. Provided that the latter happened in the very first stages of language evolution, Frankish's suggestion seems to be compatible with the idea (Fenk-Oczlon and Fenk 2002) of a co-evolution of language and (other sub-systems of) cognition that could explain the fast evolution of an apparatus capable for the acquisition of an extremely complex language very early in individual life.

(b) According to Frankish (p. 212), humans internalized their skills in interpersonal argument; on the level of mentality, where linguistic reasoning happens, they experience themselves as intentionally acting (p. 211f). And linguistic clauses or intonation units can be viewed as special cases of action units (Fenk-Oczlon and Fenk 2002). Should we, therefore, assume that the clausal structure of speech shapes inner speech – and thus even thought? Later Wittgenstein would deny at least this last step from linguistic structure to the structure of thought: "Thought and intention are neither 'articulated' nor 'non-articulated'" (Wittgenstein 2006: 185). In Wittgenstein "a thought lacks duration" and hence can neither accompany a sentence nor occur in an accelerated form (Budd 1989: 144). But Wittgenstein could neither know empirical evidence for motor theories of speech perception (Liberman and Mattingly 1985) and cognition nor for a temporal segmentation (Schleidt and Kien 1997) of cognitive activities. Should we thus rather assume that cognition shapes the clausal structure of language? Or again consider co-evolutionary models?

(c) Frankish considers that even language-based reasoning will be genuinely computational. Post-Tractarian Wittgenstein also considers something beyond, prior and fundamental to language and thought. "This something is *grammar*", asserts Moyal-Sharrock (2003: 131), referring to Wittgenstein's *On Certainty*. Many of her explications of *grammar* fit with what is often addressed as "computational" – an indeed appropriate label for Wittgenstein's definition of *meaning* in the *Investigations* (§43): "the meaning of a word is its use in the language." Under this conception, say Manning and Schütze (1999: 17), much of Statistical NLP (Natural Language Processing)-research "directly tackles questions of meaning." And *Google Translate* is, so far, superior: It relies, like the native speakers of one or more than one language, rather on statistical than explicitly rule-based analysis.

The detection of regularities in a given language is a demanding cognitive task. Even more demanding is the integration of this enormous body of "computational" – non-personal, non-conscious, and in the essence statistical – knowledge of language into the production system, i.e., its ongoing transformation into "procedural knowl-

¹ Section 3 includes fragments of a talk at the *International Colloquium "From Grooming to Speaking"*, Centre for Philosophy of Science of the University of Lisbon, 10-12 September 2012: Fenk and Fenk-Oczlon, "Language Evolution Requires and Reinforces Inferential Machinery".

² Echoic memory is assumed to contribute to the recency-effect in the serial position curve, and cumulative rehearsal to the primacy-effect. In the recall of sentences the recency-effect goes even further back than in series of unconnected words (Fenk & Fenk-Oczlon 2006).

³ *Rehearsal* is also required for *musical minds*, e.g. for the "recall" of a melody, for whistling or singing it, for playing it on the piano or writing it down in notes. That this process of "inner singing" involves neural circuits also involved in speech-related rehearsal (Hickok et al. 2003) may, to my (linguistic) mind, explain some of the parallels found (Fenk-Oczlon and Fenk 2009-2010) between language and music.

edge". This is the place to recall an already indicated, very general preparatory function of inner speech: It helps improving linguistic/rhetoric skills and keeping them on a personally high level. This preparation for fast and accurate interpretation and action in future situations comes by

(i) a facilitation of the access to, or retrieval from, implicitly learned, predictive statistical dependencies allowing for instance a fast and automatic check of an expression's possible meaning(s) in a given context,

(ii) a more or less habitual training of those complex interactions between an auditory-motor interface and an auditory-conceptual interface operating our verbal working memory, and

(iii) a continual adjustment of programming devices to a huge and ever growing body of tacit or implicit, statistical/linguistic knowledge.

In point (i) the focus is on the role of the hearer and in (iii) on that of the speaker. But this is anyhow a rather artificial distinction: Not only is the *speaker* always also listener of her own utterances, but also is the *hearer* a tentative and anticipative, though subvocal "co-speaker" of the utterances she is listening to.

This view might well be extended to the special kind of inner speech that accompanies reading. Here its main function is the transformation of a visual code into the auditive-articulatory code of our verbal working memory; but the long-term training- and programming-effects mentioned above will be realized as well.

To summarize: Preparatory functions of inner speech are intuitively plausible. And what else but its preparatory effects would have stimulated the development of linguistic minds "debating with themselves", as Frankish dubs it? In this paper I wanted to draw attention to less obvious benefits, i.e., the priming and fitness of highly developed, "genuinely computational" mechanisms operating language as a cognitive and communicative tool.

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Is There a Role for the Historical A Priori in Wittgenstein's Late Philosophy?

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Abstract

In this paper I investigate whether – and if so, *where* – a notion like that of the historical a priori may be situated in Wittgenstein's thought. I begin by surveying Husserl's account of the historical a priori, and proceed to draw a number of parallels to similar ideas that can be found throughout Wittgenstein's philosophy, pre- and post-1929. Though it has been noted that clarifying Wittgenstein's ambiguous relationship to history, and particularly to the historical dimension of language, is a difficult task, I argue that a number of key Wittgensteinian notions are influenced by his attempt to grapple with just this issue. It is shown that Wittgenstein – like Husserl – returned later in life to affirm that which he had consciously sought to obscure in his earlier work: the role of history and the historical dimension of language. I conclude by suggesting that, although there has been a recently renewed interest in the connections between Wittgenstein's work and phenomenology, this final phase of both thinkers' works remains an unexplored and potentially rich point of comparison.

Despite the great interest in the notion of *Lebenswelt* that Husserl's work from the *Crisis* period inspired, the twin interest in the history of science evoked there remained less attractive for those working in the tradition; to this day, history remains a topic at the margins of Husserlian phenomenology. It is most notably David Carr who has sought to renew an interest in Husserl's historical investigations (1974); following him, David Hyder (2003) has more recently traced the influence of Husserl's reflections on French historicists, such as Cavaillès, Canguilhem and Foucault. Having worked on the role of history in Wittgenstein's thought, I was struck by how certain ideas which figure prominently in this genealogy of the historical a priori resonate strongly with certain others of Wittgenstein. In this paper, I would like therefore to draw a short characterisation of the historical a priori in Husserl, and to inquire whether such a notion might be located in Wittgenstein's thought.

First, we recall that Husserl's interest in history was inspired by a sense of 'crisis'; it is one that he described in terms of a progressive forgetting of phenomenal experience in the sciences in favour of formal languages, which subsequently efface the empirical content they were originally devised to describe. He turns here, famously, to the 'proto-geometers' of early Greece, who determined geometrical regularities from the observation of concrete phenomena (later encoded in a set of a priori formulae that have no further need of evidence), and to Galileo, who, through the mathematization of nature, turned scientists away from phenomenal qualities towards their measurable correlates with the understanding that science will thereby be able to account for everything that is there to be accounted for. Thus, Husserl suggests, "we take for *true being* what is actually a *method*" (Husserl 1970, 51). The crisis follows because primary qualities are posited as the foundation of reality, and the phenomenal life-world is taken for a supervenient illusion to be discarded on the way towards genuine truth.

Husserl's answer, then, is to 'inquire back' (*Rückfragen*) into the founding acts of consciousness upon which these formal languages have been based, and thus into the primal determination of the teleological goals that continue to direct our investigations subterraneously. Passing beyond the limit of the conscious retention of individuals, Husserl says the past *cogitatio* become 'sedimented' in language and are progressively forgotten. What at first demanded phenomenal confirmation recedes deeper into the back-

ground, where it defines all the more strictly the horizon of our present investigations because of its increasingly self-evident character.

Hyder captures the issue succinctly, when he notes that the basic problem concerns how one can account for *meaning* from the phenomenological perspective. "We operate with meaning-bearing signs without any clear idea of their senses," he notes. "And this fact puts pressure on the transcendental theorist: since a speaker of these languages may never consciously have fixed their meanings, the theorist must explain where the meanings of such expressions are to be found" (Hyder, 2003, 113). The meaning of such signs, Husserl responds, are to be found in the past, having first been established by the intentional acts of our forebearers and subsequently handed down through the ages. It is, therefore, these past intentional acts that Husserl wishes to 're-awaken', returning phenomenal appearances to their rightful place in the theory of knowledge, as he conceived it.

Turning to Wittgenstein, I would like to highlight certain resonances between these themes and Wittgenstein's own. I focus on the notion of 'sedimented' sign-systems, for it is a geological metaphor that they share. It is, of course, in Wittgenstein's last remarks that he famously returned to the river metaphor—which he had specifically rejected in his 1930's investigation of the phenomenology of time consciousness—in order to examine not the river, but the *riverbed*:

"The propositions describing the world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology. [. . .]

It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid.

The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other." (OC §§93-97)

This is an arresting metaphor, among the most powerful in Wittgenstein's oeuvre. But what is the message we are meant to take from it?

In the first instance, this image casts a new light on the relationship between change and tradition, and the tension between them. But it is interesting to note, furthermore, that this is not the first time the subject is touched upon in Wittgenstein's work, and that at certain points it seems to have directed his work in significant ways. We might consider the temporal metaphors that are peppered throughout *Philosophical Investigations*: "our language can be seen as an ancient city" (PI §18), for example, or "we extend [a concept] as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre" (PI §67), among others. However, one need not restrict oneself to vague historical analogies. We can see, in fact, that from the very outset historical considerations played an integral role in Wittgenstein's thought—even in such central notions as 'misunderstanding the logic of language' and 'the critique of language'—when we consider Wittgenstein's interest in Paul Ernst, about whom he would note:

"Should my book ever be published its foreword must contain an acknowledgement to the Foreword of Paul Ernst to his edition of *Grimms' Fairy Tales*, which I should have acknowledged already in the *Log. Phil. Abhandlung* as the source of the expression 'misunderstanding the logic of language'." (quoted in Künne, 1998)

The comparison with Ernst is not only interesting as a philological artefact of a powerful Wittgensteinian concept, but also because of the clear link that Ernst draws to the *historical dimension* of that misunderstanding. Let us consider the full passage:

"It is often the extremely ancient legacy of peoples, occurring in enigmatic and still not adequately explained form among the most distant and different peoples, originating from changes of language, when later ages no longer understood the logic of the language of the past and interpreted it through fabrications; through changes in views about the connection of the world, about death, the soul, the afterlife, God, etc., by rationalistically interpreting uncomprehended remnants of previous beliefs; through the migration of this material to other peoples, through retelling in changed circumstances and through adaptation to the new. The process is essentially always this: a problem that is unsolvable by means of the experience of reality is solved by an invented, rationalised story." (Ernst, quoted in Künne, 1998)

Though Wittgenstein thus gestures in some sense towards this temporal development of language in the *Tractatus*, history is overwhelmingly portrayed as a source of error. In other words, Wittgenstein recognised that, given the potential of language about the world to shift, it is necessary to employ a sound logic to gain a clear view of its internal structure and thus help us avoid the contingent historical accidents that have given rise to incomplete signs and muddled meanings over time.

Upon Wittgenstein's return to philosophy in 1929, however, it was not only Ernst's expression 'the logic of language' that returned with him, but also his understanding of what Ernst characterised as the 'mythological' element inherent to it. In the so-called *Big Typescript*, for example, Wittgenstein has to following serve as a subtitle in the chapter "Philosophie": THE MYTHOLOGY IN THE FORMS OF OUR LANGUAGE ((PAUL ERNST)). It is a notion clearly put to work in his iconic analysis of the 'Cornwolf' ritual, for example:

"In ancient rites we find the use of an extremely well-developed language of gestures.

And when I read Frazer, I would like to say again and again: All these processes, these changes of meaning, we have right in front of us even in our language of words. If what is hidden in the last sheaf is called the 'Cornwolf', as well as the sheaf itself, and also the man who binds it, then we recognize in this a linguistic process we know well." (PO, p. 197)

What this implies, I believe, is that along with the various *misunderstandings* of the logic of our language, Wittgenstein increasingly came to see that so too in certain cases is a *correct understanding* historically situated. This insight finds its culmination, I suggest, in *On Certainty*.

As Glock notes, explicating Wittgenstein's ambiguous relation to the historical dimension of language is no easy task (Glock, 2006); and so, without being able to go into the matter in more detail here, I hope that I have demonstrated the plausibility of isolating a significant form of historical reflection in Wittgenstein's thought. But what, then, are we to make of the second half of the Husserlian expression I have employed here? What about the *a priori* part of the historical *a priori*?

This is naturally a much thornier issue; nevertheless, I believe there is a suggesting possibility to be found in Wittgenstein's last writings. It concerns the ambiguous character of the propositions which give expression to the basic, lived certitudes of our life: "The Earth has existed for many years", or "My name is L.W.", for example. These propositions, Wittgenstein notes, belong to the foundational grammar of our language, suggesting that they may be fruitfully compared to those more familiar elements that govern the mechanics of meaning—a priori propositions, such as tautologies and contradictions—though they bear a superficial resemblance to empirical propositions. That is to say, that like the propositions of logic and mathematics, it *does not make any sense* to doubt them.

However, Wittgenstein also suggests that, though it does not make any sense for us at this time to doubt some proposition or other of this or a similar form, this does not mean that such a proposition is excluded from meaningful doubt once and for all, for everyone everywhere—or *everywhen*. For, immediately following Wittgenstein's arresting admission that the "river-bed of thoughts may shift", he continues thus:

"But if someone were to say "So logic too is an empirical science" he would be wrong. Yet this is right: the same proposition may get treated at one time as something to test by experience, at another as a rule of testing.

And the bank of the river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited." (OC §§98–99)

It is important to note that when Wittgenstein says that a proposition may get treated at one time as something to test by experience (i.e. as a posteriori), and at another as a rule of testing (i.e. as a priori), he does not mean to suggest that we are free to choose at will which is to be the case. However, neither is he denying the possibility of dramatic conceptual change, that we ourselves may one day become like those 'strange tribes' evoked throughout his remarks. In fact, I believe that he is suggesting we take seriously this very possibility.

This insight may seem—as Wittgenstein had already made clear in the *Investigations*—"to abolish logic, but it does not do so." (PI §242) Wittgenstein certainly does not

want to ignore the unique status of logical and mathematical propositions with this analogy; however, he does emphasise that their stability is perhaps a relative one, acknowledging that insofar as the foundations are susceptible to change it will in all likelihood be an imperceptible one. It would, therefore, be a mistake to imagine that within this system there is *no limit whatsoever* to the possibilities of alteration. However, as in the case of the ever-so-slowly shifting course of the riverbed, that will depend just as much upon the *time* needed to change direction as it will upon the *hardness* of the material over which the waters of the river flow.

It is in this sense, I believe, that we have good reason to suppose that Wittgenstein understood the force that history exercises, not only on the content, but also the very form of our thought, and that there is therefore a role for the historical a priori in his philosophical reflections, which we would do well to explore if we wish to form a complete picture of his philosophical trajectory.

Finally, what relation do these reflections have to those of Husserl, who also returned later in life to affirm the historical dimension he had earlier sought to obscure? By all accounts, this question has yet to be answered. Despite the recent interest in Wittgenstein's relation to phenomenology, I would submit that the best attempt to address this common concern remains the reading of Ricœur, who drew a parallel between the developments in Husserl's and Wittgenstein's thought in a series of lectures in the mid-1960's (e.g. Ricœur, 1976). However, the inadequacies that Ricœur identifies in Wittgenstein's work when measured against Husserl's in this regard—concerning, as it were, the status of genesis in normative regularity—stem I believe from a failure to consider the very last writings of Wittgenstein. It is a fault for which Ricœur can hardly be blamed, as *On Certainty* had not been published yet.

Nonetheless, taking into account the full trajectory of Wittgenstein's thought here will demonstrate that he was aware of the charge, and how, in accounting for this, his response would differ radically from that of Husserl—while admitting, all the same, the centrality of the very intersubjective phenomena that Husserl felt were essential to understanding the relationship between truth and the historico-cultural *Lebenswelt*. It is, furthermore, Wittgenstein's response to this question that situates him, perhaps surprisingly, alongside figures such as Cavallès, Canguilhem and Foucault, as a strong critic of Kantian idealism, who nonetheless resisted the relativism that can often be found coupled with the critique of transcendental norms.

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On thinking – Evaluating the role of our expressions

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Abstract

This essay is the attempt to approach briefly the question: Is thinking an activity? Using this question I hope to show that in addition to grammatical description [PI 124] we should evaluate the role of our expressions. For this task I point some comparisons between considering 'thinking' as an activity or as an ability with the aim of showing the role of these considerations and the need of evaluating the role of our statements.

In our daily use of language we can identify some pictures about 'thinking' that make us find it mysterious, that it operates in an enigmatic way, that it is occult and private, that it occurs speedily, among others. Conceptions such as, 'thinking is a private activity' and 'thinking is operating with images and concepts' derive from expressions like: 'Don't say anything, think to yourself!' or 'Tell me what you are thinking!' or 'Tell me, truthfully, what were you thinking?' To understand the meaning of these sentences one has to suppose that thinking is private, that it can be hidden, that it is possible to lie about what you are thinking, that speaking comes after thinking and so on. After that, with some induction we can easily wonder that thinking is independent of speaking, because what comes before A usually does not depend on the occurrence of A. If thinking is independent it may operate with images or any mental elements as condition to our language. Among these assumptions we entangle ourselves in "the illusion that thinking can generate mysterious things and we also succumb to the idea that it operates in mysterious ways" (Hacker, 1990)

Wittgenstein holds that these are illusions due to the grammar of our language.

"Language (or thought) is something unique"-- this proves to be a superstition (not a mistake!), itself produced by grammatical illusions. And now the impressiveness retreats to these illusions, to the problems. (PI 110)

For example, the idea that thinking takes time, as talking, or as any activity, and that it can be interrupted and resumed, contributes to our conception of thinking as an activity. But these comparisons, according to Hacker, obscure some important different features. "These parallels between the grammar of thinking and the grammar of activities are misleading, for they induce us to overlook important differences." (Hacker, 1990)

As we know, Wittgenstein proposes the grammatical description of the uses of words. "All explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its place." (PI 109)

Several comparisons between 'thinking' and other similar words like 'talking', 'listening', 'feeling', 'believing', induce us to wonder whether it is an activity, an ability, a process and so on. And several comparisons between different uses of the word 'thought'/'thinking' allow us to clarify our concept of thought and avoid conceptual confusions.

According to Hanfling, even accepting that thinking is a widely ramified concept [Z 110], the analysis of its uses leads us to acknowledge thinking as an activity.

"there is an activity of thinking, which may be either overt, in the form of speech or other behaviour, or

mental, in a sense involving no observable speech or behaviour." (Hanfling, 1993)

First I intend to show that the attempt to state that thinking is an activity using the comparison between observable activities with thought and just thinking without any observable behavior is not enough for the statement that thinking is a mental activity.

What is it like for a person, who is thinking, does not exhibit any thinking behavior? Imagine me seated at the table gazing at a slice of tomato on my plate (dinner is over). You are observing me. Would you say I'm thinking or not? What if I incline my head to the left? The point is: the evidence or criteria considered to justify your statement that I was thinking are external. We learn how to use the words 'think/thought/thinking' by external reference.

What if I don't want you to know I'm thinking? Is it possible to do it without any observable behavior? Well, I can close my eyes and pretend I'm sleeping (not at the table). But this is a way to hide something, as when I'm in pain and just don't want you to know, I pretend feeling well. Does the possibility of hiding imply pain is an activity? Certainly not!

We are not trying to deny that that the word 'thinking' can share some features with words that describes activities, for example it refers to time and duration: 'I was speaking yesterday in my talk at the university' and 'I was thinking yesterday when I was studying at the library'. Our intention is to show that sharing these features with words like 'speaking' is not a sufficient condition for the statement that, just as speaking is an activity, so too thinking is a mental activity.

Another point made by Hanfling is the attempt to distinguish between active and passive mental activity. On this matter, we should say that the reply 'I was thinking' when one is asked if one was day-dreaming is not a description, but something like the statement that one was not wasting time. We must observe the function of the sentence. What role the sentence plays in the language-game.

"(...)--the role of these words in our language (is) other-- than we are tempted to think. (This role is what we need to understand in order to resolve philosophical paradoxes. And hence definitions usually fail to resolve them;" (PI 182)

The main difference between day-dreaming and thinking is not something in one's mental life, but between what we judge as useful and what we judge as not useful. To divide mental life in to passive and active, based on the distinction between day-dreaming and thinking, is misleading, because what we call 'day-dreaming' and 'thinking' are defined by external behavior and/or results.

Hanfling also uses some statements about learning an activity to compare it with thinking, suggesting that like eating, drinking and walking, thinking is not a teachable activity.

“A child learns, but is not taught, to speak his native language. Again, can there be lessons in eating, drinking, sucking at the breast, or going for a walk? Yet these are all activities.” (Hanfling 1993)

This comparison is misleading, besides it doesn't satisfy Hanfling purposes. When Peter Hacker mentions thinking as non-teachable [306, 1990], he is emphasizing that there is no specific content to be learnt in order to learn how to think. Thinking is a kind of training developed by means of other tools: the different activities at school like math and sciences, for example. As tools to develop an ability. That the ability can be seen through an activity is another point! For example: The pianist uses the piano (tool) to practice (activity) his *ability* to play the piano!

The comparison between teaching how to drink with teaching how to think does not justify thinking as an activity! When Hanfling makes this comparison he expects to show that, like drinking, thinking is an activity because, like drinking, thinking cannot be taught. But the comparison does not work based on the notion of teaching! Can't we say that the mother teaches the child how to drink? She gives him the glass, hold it on his hands, leads it to his mouth, slowly, and waits for the liquid to touch his mouth, then the child open his mouth and tries to drink it! Is that not teaching to drink? This comparison just works if one is trying to highlight that to learn how to drink we need a glass, in the same way that to learn how to think we need something to think of/about! But even this comparison is not sufficient for the statement that thinking is an activity!

One can also say that, even though the mother offering this support, the child must develop his own capacity to learn how to drink. And that cannot be taught! But this notion only emphasizes the idea that thinking is not an activity, it is a capacity.

The same comparison can be used to highlight different aspects and defend opposite conceptions. That is why the comparison can't work!

We should mention also Schroeder's example of the observing a builder to show that thinking is not an activity

“(…) we may want to watch a builder in his activity, perhaps to learn how such things are done. And every minute detail in his movements may be important. But there is no such thing as following every detail of a thought-process in someone's mind in order to learn how one thinks” (Schroeder 1995)

Schroeder develops a fine criticism of Hanfling's statement on the existence of mental processes going on beneath the surface of speech. For this purpose he emphasizes the idea of widely ramified concepts as a counter-argument i.e. he uses the idea that concepts have several kinds of application and we can identify different aspects in different uses.

“This apparent anomaly will usually be found where a concept F comprises or has to do with phenomena or aspects of various categories, say, some spatial, some temporal, some dispositional, some social. In the case of such 'widely ramified concepts' there will often be uses of the word that refer to the more tangible phenomena (such as buildings in the case of 'college'), and these perfectly idiomatic uses will tempt us to draw unwarranted grammatical conclusions of the

form: 'At least in some cases an F is simply . . .'" (Schroeder 1995)

That is to say that even if sometimes a word or sentence can be used to refer to a specific feature, (for example when we say that we can think without speaking) it does not mean that this feature defines the word. Sometimes, the reference to some aspect is just to emphasize a difference (for example that one may speak or keep silence). Again we face the need to evaluate the role of a sentence in the context of use!

It means that, in some uses, the word 'thinking' can be identified with the silent talking, but it doesn't follow from these uses, that thinking is a hidden talk.

“But, as in the 'college' case, it does not follow that there is any one instance where the thinking might, without further qualifications, be identified with the (silent) talking. This building is Jesus College, and not Exeter, yet, to be sure, Jesus College is not just a building.” (Schroeder 1995)

After these observations, Schroeder ensnares himself in pointing some criteria for the claim that one is thinking. Which are very convincing! His approach is like Wittgenstein's concerns about saying that someone knows how to add or that someone knows how to go on. They regard the criteria we consider to say so. [PI 322].

“Thinking now that little Miss Muffet sat on a tuffet would normally presuppose the ability to spell out which person of that name one had in mind, and how one came to know, or at least, what made one think that once she sat on a tuffet.” (Schroeder 1995)

He clarifies that the mere notion of duration is not sufficient for the claim that thinking is a process, instead, to say that someone is thinking depends on the public criteria we use to do it. “(…) appropriate expressive behavior is the criterion by which we ascribe thoughts and thinking to a person.” (Schroeder 1995)

Besides, Schroeder shows that by comparison with activity-words, the grammar of thinking is rarely compatible with the grammar of time!

“Yet nothing has been laid down about the precise duration of the occurrence of single thoughts; how it is to be measured or how it is to be decided when the thinking of one thought ends and when the following begins; what is to count as a gap between two thoughts and what as a period of 'thinking transition.'” (Schroeder 1995)

One may insist: 'But you can't deny the similarities between thinking and some activities. So, why not to say that thinking is an activity?' Say as you wish! “(…) thinking may well pass as an activity when taken in chunks and regarded at some distance (…)” (Schroeder, 1995)

You can say it is an activity, but you must not forget what means to say that! As the example mentioned above that when one says one was not day-dreaming but thinking, the expression 'I was thinking' is a tool to state that one was not wasting time and not a description of an activity, also when we compare 'I was thinking' with 'I was running' we cannot extend this analogy to the point in which we expect to see someone running using his legs and someone thinking using some physical organ.

It's not about denying that (1) thinking is an activity or that we can talk about (2) mental processes, or to support that these expressions are senseless; it's about giving

them the right status. They are used to point some differences like (1) between reasoning (thinking actively) and something passive as listening to music, for example; or (2) between an observable process and something private, like thinking. They are not describing facts! Since saying that thinking is an activity makes sense only in some contexts, we cannot say that it describes what is thinking.

Considering thinking as an ability is, at first, used to point out that thinking cannot be observable or described, as we may believe if we consider thinking as an activity. What can be described is the content of thinking. What we are thinking of! (analogy with playing the piano)

Although the concept 'thinking' is formed on the model of a kind of imaginary auxiliary activity [Z107], it is not used always in this sense, as Wittgensteins says. When one is working thoughtfully, is one performing two activities? Obviously, no!

We can observe the limits of use when we are able, by making comparisons, to point similarities and dissimilarities in different uses of a word, as the discussion above. In this endeavor we can realize the role of our sentences. The final target of this essay is, by pointing to these examples, to make clear the importance of evaluating the role of our

statements in their contexts of use. The questions regarding this evaluation are such as 'What are they (these sentences) used for? What is their role in this context? Can they be descriptive? Can they be normative?'

This would allow us to see what aspects are pointed in several uses and maybe we can find something that we can state, descriptively or normatively, in general contexts.

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Language Games and Discursive Practices

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Abstract

This article is devoted to comparison of language games and discursive practices. What do we know about language games and discursive practices in conjunction with each other but not separately? What is the difference between them? What are their similarities? As far as possible the author has tried to answer these questions and make clear distinctions between Wittgenstein's language games and Foucault's discursive practices. The comparison is made by categories such as "play", "rules" and "subject".

Introduction

Nowadays it is widely believed that a human being lives not so much in the world of real things as in the world of language. The main philosophical concepts within which this postulate was made, are Wittgenstein's theory of language games and Foucault's theory of discursive practices. Both theories argue that human representations of the world and how wide such representations are depend on the limits of language we speak. In spite of this general conclusion, it is obvious that Wittgenstein's and Foucault's theories are not the same. Each of these is acknowledged by the author and is considered to be correct. But what do we know about language games and discursive practices in conjunction with each other but not separately? What is the difference between language games and discursive practices? What are their similarities?

We are going to try to answer these questions. We start our studies from Wittgenstein's concept which noted the importance and power of language in human life. No one had done it before Wittgenstein.

1. Initial Statements

1.1. Language Game

Following Wittgenstein, "I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the "language-game"" (Wittgenstein 2011). The game is like a balancing and a coupling of two poles of reality when we give things their conventional names and then dispose of them in accordance with the meanings we give them. It does not mean that everyone invents new words or creates a new language. Everyone comes into the world where a language exists. In such circumstances, it may seem that the main task is to learn how to use this language. But while learning how to use a language we cannot avoid uncertainty and ambiguity although a language was formed a long time ago and much older than we are. It is like in Quine's theory - a person points his finger at the object and names it but cannot get rid of doubts whether he understands the meaning of the word and relates it with the object correctly. We are similar to that person in having to prove our correctness experimentally by including words and their meanings in different contexts and language games (Quine 1969). This system of learning is like a play; it is relational and gives us some freedom. As "the meaning of a word is its use in the language", successful practice of human interactions using the words is the main reason why the words have their specific meanings (Wittgenstein 2011).

1.2. The Discursive Practice as a Play

Whether discursive practice is similar to a language game, we can see in Foucault's *"The Archaeology of Knowledge"*. He thought of discourses "as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak" (Foucault 2002). It tells us that discourse as practice (or discursive practice) takes a sort of the mediating position between the world and a language and, due to discourse, a language and the world come closer in our imagination. That is why we forget both about "conventionality" of names that denote things and "conventionality" of language that is believed to describe the reality in an objective way. Language games influence us in the same way. Moreover in *"The Order of Discourse"* Foucault said that "discourse is no more than a play" (Foucault 1981).

1.3. A Play

If a discursive practice can be interpreted as a play, according to the above mentioned quotations, it means that we have found out the common place where we can start comparing language games with discursive practices. We assume that a play will be the basic category for our comparison. In this case, we need to take a definition of a play and make it a guide of our studies. As for a play, we took the definition by Huizinga who had studied this important cultural element (Huizinga 1955). He believed that every play always has its rules and its own subjects (or players).

We are going to review the language games and discursive practices both in rule and subject aspects.

2. Rules of a Play

2.1. Rules of the Language Game

In *"Philosophical Investigations"* Wittgenstein wrote - "what we do in our language-game always tests on a tacit presupposition" or, as we said in the previous paragraph, on some rules (Wittgenstein 2011). What are these rules?

The answer is simple enough. In the long run there is the only rule. That rule says that a language game does not have any pre-installed rules. A language game is a play with words and their meanings. The words' meanings appear just by means of the direct use of those words in speech and communication. The only way to understand them is to get involved in communication or in a language game. There are many language games. Each of them has its own words; every word has its own meanings as result of communication processes. We talk and name the things. We use words and make statements. Some words can be our favourites, some words can be boring or forgotten. In case of forgetfulness, there is no obstacle for us to

invent new ones: "new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten" (Wittgenstein 2011).

In other words, language game has "tacit presupposition" under which it is not constrained by rules but is relational and improvisational. The rules are likely to become the final results of the language game which can demonstrate the unanimity of game's subjects in the terms of word usage.

2.2. Rules of the Discursive Practices

As for discursive practices, it is exactly the opposite. "The discursive practice...is a body of anonymous, historical rules" which are not known for us because we did not set them (Foucault 2002). Discursive practice is not so much the process of meanings generation as the fact for us. Discursive practices do not define the meanings of the words but do something different. Discursive practices determine what kind of language constructions we can use for making up a sentence; what kind of sentence we have the right to use; what we have the right to talk about; what time and what place we can choose for pronouncing it. Discursive practices are unthinkable without the rules that they dictate and that they are.

3. The Subject of a Play

Every play has its players who are active participants of a play process. A game is impossible without subjects. Who plays language games? Who is engaged in discursive practices?

3.1. The Subject of the Language Game

In "*Philosophical Investigations*" Wittgenstein wrote that "the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity" (Wittgenstein 2011). A language game is an activity. Therefore a language game has a subject in the same way as any other activity.

In the language game, someone who speaks, names things and uses words, makes a mental balancing act with meanings and sets the rules for it, is a language-game subject.

Talking about the subject of the language game and meaning by it an autonomous and self-sufficient identity in singular is a philosophical abstraction. There is a great deal of subjects who do not exist in isolation from one another in the world. The subjects coexist in community, interact with one another and establish cooperation by means of language. The language is an instrument that everyone can use.

In other words, everyone who speaks a language has already joined a play and has become a subject of the language game.

3.2. The Subject of Discursive Practices

Foucault's statement that "perhaps the idea of the founding subject is a way of eliding the reality of discourse" speaks for itself (Foucault 1981). In the given postmodern concept, discursive practice as a play is separated from its subjects, and it is impossible to think of them in conjunction. We remember the famous postmodern formula "the subject is dead". It is a very controversial thesis but it is not the subject of our research.

As for discursive practice, the subject can be presented here not as an active player but as a marionette and ad-

ministrant of discourse rules. "None shall enter the order of discourse if he does not satisfy certain requirements or if he is not, from the outset, qualified to do so" (Foucault 1981). That can be interpreted as a possibility to take statuses, places or positions which are included in the discourse, to use the statements of particular types, to build statements through the agency of completed language constructions providing that there is no opportunity to create or control the discourse.

If we insist on the fact that the subject is not a formal administrant of prescriptions but he is exactly active and free doer, so we can conclude that there is no subject in discursive practices and state that the subject of discursive practice is the discursive practice itself with its own rules.

4. Subtotals

Now we can say that almost total absence of the fixed rules and unlimited number of subjects are about language games and the multiplicity of anonymous rules with total absence of the subject are about discursive practices. On the basis of this analysis, we could make the following conclusion - language games and discursive practices are absolute antipodes.

So our comparison can be over. But we suppose that the relationship between language games and discursive practices are not so blunt and simple. We are going to underline a more radical difference between language games and discursive practices and to find out their indissoluble principal interrelationship.

5. Supplement

Based on Wittgenstein's text, it is obvious that the words in the language game and their meanings which we set by communication with people are used and clarify itself predominantly in oral speech. We learn a language not so much by means of books where all possible meanings and senses of names are registered in writing as by means of speaking when we pronounce accompanying it with an action and getting some expected reaction from the interlocutor. Oral speech is always an open-ending experiment and improvisation. Usage of the words exactly in oral speech constitutes the core of the language-game concept.

Written speech is what specifies discourse. Written speech always requires a high discipline and strict adherence to the rules in contrast to flexible and situational oral speech. The contents of such academic disciplines as political science, economic theory, etc. are fixed in writing. It does not mean that all we can do is just to write about physics or chemistry, for example, and speaking within these topics is forbidden. But in this case, oral speech should be constructed in accordance with the written speech canons which force us to follow the rules while creating a text and applying static grammar schemes, taking into account discursive and non-discursive contexts.

6. Consequences Following the Supplement

It is obvious that contrariety of construction principles makes oral and written speeches very different. But this fact does not make it impossible to coexist. And as well as oral and written speech need each other in spite of contrast, language games and discursive practices coexist with necessity in the same manner.

Language game “works” with words, discursive practice “works” with language constructions. If we use names, we do not shout them separately but place them in the certain sequence. If we create a text, we fill in grammar and syntactic schemes with words and their meanings which we set by including them in language games. Otherwise schemes would be empty, language would not be. Language games and discursive practices are engaged in dialogue of, as it were, contain and form. The words fill in constructions with the meanings; constructions, in turn, shape the words. While language games looks for or creates their rules, discourse has found them. Language games are eternal creativity in depth of discursive practices; discursive practice involves a principle of order in chaos of words.

7. Conclusions

7.1. Language games and discursive practices have a playful nature.

7.2. Language game is not bounded with a list of strict rules about usage of names. Everyone has already joined language game that is why everyone is its subject.

7.3. Discursive practice is like a list of rules prescribing how to construct a statement. There is no active subject.

7.4. Language game sets the meanings of the words and “prefers” oral speech. Discursive practice gives grammar and syntactic schemes and “prefers” written speech.

7.5. As oral and written speeches coexist, language games and discursive practices coexist in the same manner.

7.6. Language games are eternal creativity in depth of discursive practices; discursive practice involves a principle of order in chaos of words. Language games can be characterised as processes. Discursive practices mean some kind of order and statics. Creating and setting meanings language game continues its existence inside discursive practices and integrates into historical epistemological contour.

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Making up the Rules as we go along: The Practicability Approach

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Abstract

There has been a lengthy discussion about Wittgenstein's insights into what it is to follow a rule. In contrast, very little has been said about how Wittgenstein might have conceived of the fact that from time to time we make up new rules which are then integrated into existing social practices. In this paper I will argue first that the difference between established rules and new rules consists in the fact that established rules may be described with reference to the existing social practices, whereas new rules are prescriptive and have to be conceived of as the result of a demand for their future integration into the system of established rules. In the second part, I shall formulate two necessary conditions which have to be fulfilled in order to integrate prescriptive rules into the established system of rules. I will summarize both conditions under the term ›Practicability Approach‹.

There has been a lengthy discussion about Wittgenstein's insights into what it is to follow a rule. In contrast, very little has been said about how Wittgenstein might have conceived of the fact that from time to time we make up new rules which are then integrated into existing social practices. The following examples from the *Philosophical Investigations* (hereafter: PI) show clearly that Wittgenstein himself has considered such developments to our rule-involving activities, particularly in our language practices:

»Our language can be regarded as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, of houses with extensions from various periods, and all this surrounded by a multitude of new suburbs with straight and regular streets and uniform houses.« (PI 18).

»[N]ew types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten.« (PI 23).

»And is there not also the case where we play, and make up the rules as we go along? And even where we alter them – as we go along.« (PI 83).

In this paper I want to give an answer to the following questions. How far can these newer rules be distinguished from the established ones? Is there a difference between these rules and, if so how might that difference be characterized? Furthermore, are there conditions for the establishment of these newer rules? In order to give an answer to these questions, I will argue first that the difference between established rules and new rules consists in the fact that established rules may be described with reference to the existing social practices, whereas new rules are not descriptive but prescriptive and have to be conceived of as the result of a demand for their future integration into the system of established rules. In the second part, I shall formulate two necessary conditions which have to be fulfilled in order to integrate prescriptive rules into the established rule-system where they might then be understood as descriptive rules of a social practice after time. I will summarize both conditions under the term ›Practicability Approach‹.

1. Descriptive and prescriptive rules

Of course, the next few paragraphs cannot explain exhaustively Wittgenstein's thoughts about rule-following. All we need, however, is a rough sketch to make possible a conceptual distinction between descriptive and prescriptive rules. »A rule«, Wittgenstein remarks, »stands there like a signpost« (cf. PI 85). People use the signpost normally if

they want to reach the destination which is named on it by following the direction in which the signpost is pointing. One might suggest that this rule be expressed in the following sentence: »To get to the named place, you must go in the pointed direction«. This sentence can be understood as the description of an established rule, i.e. a descriptive rule. I will come back to this point in a moment.

Although it is very easy for us to understand this and other rules of this kind, questions arise when we think further about how we actually follow them. Is there any doubt, Wittgenstein asks, about the way to go if I use the signpost? How, when and where does the signpost show me where to go? How do I know how to use so? It seems that to follow the signpost presupposes certain knowledge of how to do it. Thus, an answer to these questions might be that one first has to interpret the signpost in order to follow it. An interpretation might be given by the linguistic rule further mentioned, namely »to get to the named place, you must go to the pointed direction«. It is clear, however, that to understand this rule a further interpretation is needed. Since we now seem to be launched on a regress of rules required to understand rules, an *interpretation* in general does not seem to help us to find the bridge between the signpost and a particular action which is supposed to follow in light of the rule. An interpretation just leads to a further interpretation and therefore does not fill the gap.

In order to get clarity here we have to abandon the idea that in this situation there is any gap at all which has to be bridged with certain knowledge. If we take the idea that there is a connection between the signpost and our action as a prompt to look for the connecting element, then we are misguided. Rather, we have to understand the connection differently, as Wittgenstein points out: »What sort of connection obtains here? – Well, this one, for example: I have been trained to react in a particular way to this sign, and now I do so react to it.« (PI 198).

By giving this answer Wittgenstein indicates that there is no propositional knowledge which justifies our following the rule in a certain way. Rather, one is able to follow the signpost because one has been trained into using it in a certain way which means that one just responded to the practice into which one has been inculcated in the light of the established rule mentioned above. No propositional knowledge is needed to use a signpost correctly because it is already used correctly if one acts in the way one has been trained to act¹.

¹ Britt Harrison has pointed out to me that one might usefully regard this as a kind of non-propositional know-how.

From these considerations it follows that the normative character of our actions is rooted in the fact that we have learnt, through training, to follow them. To learn how to use a signpost already presupposes a normatively structured practice which has been established in the social community (cf. Williams 2010, p. 80). Thanks to his or her training the activities of the novice who is inculcated in social practices become normatively structured. How to use the expression ›table‹, how to calculate ›7 plus 5‹ or how to follow a signpost correctly may be described by the rule-governed social practices in which their participants have been inculcated. Against this background, Sabina Lovibond summarizes that ›linguistic rules are not prescriptive but descriptive. They are abstract representations of what is actually done by speakers« (Lovibond 1983, p. 57).

From a similar perspective Stanley Cavell has attacked the view that ›normativeness« (Cavell 1969, p. 22) refers to moral principles. From his point of view, two main confusions are connected with the use of the word ›normative‹: ›(1) that descriptive utterances are opposed to normative utterances; and (2) that prescriptive utterances are (typical) instances of normative utterances«. He uses Kant as a witness for the general temptation to conflate rules with imperatives which bind us to a supreme principle of morality. Kant's Categorical Imperative, however, Cavell tells us, can better ›be put as a Categorical Declarative (description-rule), i.e., description of what it is to act morally« (p. 25). Thus, he reduces normative rules to the natural facts of the grammatical use of our language and other activities.

I agree with Cavell on the point that the rules which describe our linguistic social practices and other activities may be understood as ›descriptive rules‹. I disagree, however, with the further claim that there are no other kinds of rules other than such descriptive ones. As the paragraphs from the *Philosophical Investigations* I mentioned in the beginning show, I think, Wittgenstein would also disagree on this point.

The aspect one has to emphasize here is that Wittgenstein's examples refer to situations in which, in fact, no rules exist. There are fresh situations in which there simply are no rules which may tell us for example how to use certain expressions, mainly because the expressions are being used for the first time, or they have been used before, but are now being used for the first time in a new context. This might be the case with striking metaphors or jokes for example, which have never been heard before. Such a lack of context-based rules into which we have already been trained might also be the case in practical situations which we normally do not appear in our common life and which are therefore often subject of controversial discussion, for example issues surrounding abortion, medically assisted suicide, death penalty, acts of self-defense, etc. Cases in which human life is not threatened are probably considered less dramatic because established rules already exist which structure and guide our practices. This, however, is not the crucial point. The point which has to be emphasized is that there exist practical situations in general in which we have no rules to refer to because they simply do not yet exist.

Wittgenstein's often used example of the chess-game might help here to illuminate this point: It is one thing to call to mind the possible moves of chess pieces to get clear about the way to play chess, but to decide in a specific situation which one of two possible moves one ought to make, however, is quite another. To provide a basis for getting clear about what to do in these cases, agents require their chosen ways of acting be taken as prescriptive

rules; rules which may be further established or consolidated within the growing social practice. Thus, agents anticipate the according normative rule, which in fact does not exist yet and require that their decision to act is justified by the anticipated rule in the future. So, it should be understood that this requirement is not the same as the prescriptive rule. This is important, because not every demand that a particular ›move‹ or ›action‹ be a rule entails that it will automatically achieve legitimacy as a practice-shaping prescriptive, (then later descriptive) rule. For the latter to occur, there has to be at least one necessary condition which has been fulfilled by those demands which became a prescriptive rule. In the next section it will be argued that there are, in fact, two criteria which suffice for any action or move to be potentially subsumed into the practice as a prescriptive rule.

2. The Practicability Approach

Under which conditions may a demand for a certain way to act become a prescriptive rule? One might find a first pass at an answer by reflecting on Wittgenstein's concept of a language-game, as something to be understood as the result of *activities* (cf. PI 23), together with his concept of a form of life. For with the concept of a form of life, we are reminded of Wittgenstein's point that what constitutes our understanding of what it is to be human is our human activities. From this point of view, we might say that it is a necessary condition for the human form of life to be *practical*: we cannot think of a human form of life which is not under the condition of doing something². Wittgenstein expresses this anthropological fact when he quotes Goethe in a remark from *On Certainty*: ›... and write with confidence "In the beginning was the deed."« (Wittgenstein 1969, §402).

If we take this necessary condition for granted, it follows that humans, as part of their own self-maintenance, necessarily have to ensure that their activities never rule out the possibility of further activities. People who do not act in such a way, we might call ›melancholic‹, ›depressive‹, ›tired of life‹, or even ›suicidal‹. Generally, however, we take it for granted that humans strive on their own behalf for the possibility that their own actions, activities and life can continue.

From a Wittgensteinian point of view, we also may understand a speaker's situation as one in which one has the possibility of, and is able to make, a further move, when one has mastered the technique for playing (a) language-game(s) (cf. PI 150). Thus, the choice of any language-user, as with the engagement in the activities of our form of life in general, is to pursue their activities in a way in which one has the opportunity to ensure further possibilities to pursue. This aim is what might best be captured by the expression ›practicable‹.

If we accept the assumption that our ever-present goal as humans is to be practicable³, then a condition for prescriptive rules may be derived from it which may be formulated in the following way:

2 This condition is not alone sufficient, of course, to characterize human beings as human, since all living organisms might be conceived of being practical in some sense.

3 Practicability must not be confused with what is meant by the expression ›practicality« (cf. Smith 1994, p. 6 f). The practicality requirement demands that a moral judgement, which was previously made by a person, motivates the person to an action in virtue of her judgement. A moral opinion is practical when it motivates to a referring action, whereas an action is practicable when it ensures further action-possibilities.

Condition of practicability:

An action may be called practicable if it provides the opportunity for further, following actions.

The condition of practicability alone, however, might lead to a utilitarian theory of morals or to consequentialism; views to which there are substantial and profound objections⁴. Besides, practical egocentrism might be inconsistent with the condition of practicability, since, as already recognized, understanding why certain activities are pursued depends on socially trained practices. For the social practices in which the agent is trained also serve to help constitute the beliefs which the practices reveal. From being a member of a shared practice, in which one has been inculcated, it follows that one shares also common beliefs. This feature requirement points out a second necessary condition, which might be formulated as follows:

Condition of coherence:

The chosen action has to be coherent with one's own system of beliefs and the beliefs of the shared community, into which one is socialized.

When a requirement or demand to act in a certain way fulfills both criteria at the same time it suffices to be considered as a prescriptive rule. Hence, a demand cannot be considered as a prescriptive rule were it to decrease the opportunity for subsequent actions, because this means that the agent would act against her ever-present goal of self-maintenance. Furthermore, the demand has no chance of being considered as a prescriptive rule, if its content is not coherent with one's own system of beliefs

and the beliefs of the shared community. Since these beliefs have their roots in the established social practices, it would be unintelligible and irrational to demand a rule which will stand in contradiction to them. To demand that a practice falls under a prescriptive rule therefore means, first that the amount of established practices will not be decreased, and second that the demand does not contradict the established practices in a way that makes them incoherent. Activities which are not yet part of the established social practices must only be accepted if they are basically intelligible. The Practicability Approach, constituted by the conditions of practicability and coherence, shows how this is guaranteed.

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Universal Grammar vs. the cognitive approach to language acquisition – a survey of problems

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Abstract

The main goal of this article is to compare and contrast two approaches to language acquisition, namely, Noam Chomsky's Universal Grammar paradigm and that of the cognitive view of language proposed by, among others, Ronald Langacker and George Lakoff. The generativist approach in the Chomskyan sense is doubted by cognitivists, since it postulates the issues of modularity of language and the primacy of rules as the main principles governing language. Language acquisition from the perspective of the generative model of grammar can be, thus, defined as a top-bottom deductive phenomenon. Instead, the cognitive approach to language acquisition, emphasising the basic assumptions of Cognitive Grammar, views this process as a bottom-top, inductive model. By referring to Tomasello's (2003) research on the topic, I will refer to Wittgenstein's conception of *meaning as use*.

In the paper, I shall explore the main differences between these two approaches and point to several specific considerations within the two views, by juxtaposing them directly and trying to offer a critical commentary.

1. The opposite views – a basic introduction

Throughout years, the problem of language acquisition has been viewed and analysed from various perspectives. However, the two approaches that appear worth a contrastive analysis are the Universal Grammar paradigm, proposed and developed by Noam Chomsky, and cognitive linguistics, as presented by Ronald Langacker, George Lakoff and many more. Even though at first sight they may seem completely different, there are a few weak parallels that can be drawn between the two models – both are concerned with the notion of the *psychological reality of grammar*, despite of the fact that the treatment of the concept is still noticeably different. In the Chomskyan sense, it encompasses the question of *explanatory adequacy*, i.e. whether a model of grammar explains how language is acquired by a child in the context of various rules and parameters that can describe the *language faculty* in its initial state (Hornstein 1998). This initial state, as far as first language acquisition is concerned, is called Universal Grammar, and can be defined in terms of a set of rules that is an inherent human ability, a prerequisite to learn languages situated in the brain. Chomsky, can be thus claimed as a remarkable representative of the so-called first *cognitive revolution* (Wierzbicka 1999), as he proposed linking human linguistic abilities with the theories of mind and tried to explain how those are connected to mental processes. This provides a common ground and justifies why the two approaches deserve a contrastive analysis. The Chomskyan model of grammar, however, postulates the division of the linguistic system into several independent, *autonomous* modules, where all aspects of language (e.g. syntax, semantics, phonology, etc.) are analysed separately, with syntax being superior to other modules. Cognitive linguistics stands against the modularity thesis and claims that all aspects of language, i.e. phonology, morphology, syntax and semantics and pragmatics are intertwined and should be analysed as inseparable. Linguistic competence is, moreover linked to mental processes and neural activity in the brain, and is grounded in the general preconceptual human experience.

2. The Universal Grammar paradigm in the context of language acquisition

As language acquisition emphasises the creativity of the process, Universal Grammar appears to be particularly worth analysing, since one of the basic assumptions of this theory states that rules that people have in the brain allow to *generate* (create) an unlimited amount of new, grammatically correct sentences. The question of creativity in the first language acquisition led to the development of the *innateness hypothesis*. This construct can be explained by referring to the *poverty of stimulus* argument. Linguists, who are in favour of the Chomskyan conception of Universal Grammar claim that language acquisition must be determined by some inborn set of rules as, despite of the fact that the language around us is characterised by many imperfections, since the utterances that children hear at the early stages of their development are often incomplete, not quite well-formed, suffused with slips of the tongue, grammatical mistakes and merges into all background phenomena, being not easily distinguishable from them (Fromkin et al. 2003). According to Chomsky's theory, there are two parts within Universal Grammar, one being *core grammar* organised in terms of principles, the other *theory of markedness* with certain parameters that impose values on the abovementioned principles. For the purpose of this article, I will concentrate on only a few aspects of the theory that illustrate the general framework of UG.

As it is implied in the discussed theory, the place of language in the mind and its shape is very complex and hard to define. Chomsky tried to encompass it in the notions of *deep structure* and *surface structure*. These levels of sentence structure are defined as:

deep structure – a level of a sentence which shows the basic form of a spoken or written sentence in the language. (...) surface structure is the syntactic structure of the sentence which a person speaks, hears, reads or writes (Richards et al. 1992)

The notions can be explained in the most comprehensible way on the basis of the baommonsic grammatical transformation – passivisation. The surface structure is the passive sentence "*The newspaper was not delivered today.*", while the deep structure of such a sentence can be represented as: "(NEGATIVE) someone (PAST TENSE) deliver the newspaper today (PASSIVE)". The main conclusion

about the two concepts is that the deep structure is more abstract and is said to be of mental nature, while the surface structure is a representation, an actual utterance. The deep structure is determined by what Chomsky called *BASE COMPONENT*, which contains all the possible transformational rules (referring to, for instance, rules for transforming propositions into questions) (Richards et. al. 1992).

These rules and parameters (e.g. the pro-drop parameter enabling the exclusion of subject in a sentences characteristic of some languages, e.g. Polish, Spanish, etc.) are not a matter of learning, as children, according to Chomsky, apply them readily to every language they encounter. The only condition that should be fulfilled for acquisition to take place is the sufficient amount of linguistic input that children are exposed to (Byram 2004).

There are several problems with this conception that Tomasello (2003) points out, namely that such an approach lacks empirical justification and is based only on logical reasoning not actual research. Another argument, which particularly relevant while evaluating the *nativist* approach is the fact that the two basic cognitive abilities used in acquisition (i.e. pattern-finding and intention-reading) develop in children before they start to talk and are visible in other fields of life, and that provides a reasonable alternative to what abilities are in actually innate. The question to be posed is whether it is more probable to be born with a set of grammatical rules or to develop basic cognitive abilities via experience within first months of life?

3. Cognitive linguistics – the usage-based approach to language acquisition

Cognitive linguistics, as it is often referred to as a *functionalist* view of language, has been called a usage-based model of grammar (Langacker 1988a). It claims that an utterance, more specifically referred to as a *usage event* is the most important concept as far as language is concerned. Language acquisition according to this theory is viewed as the opposite to the Universal Grammar approach:

“(…) not as the *activation* of an innately pre-specified system of linguistic knowledge, but instead as the *extraction* of linguistic units or instructions from patterns in the usage events experienced by a child.” (Evans, Green 2006)

As it is emphasised in the cognitive linguistic paradigm, the acquisition of language relies largely upon the sociocultural context and can be described as an additive process of building up the general linguistic competence. The importance of experiential realism in cognitive grammar explains, why there is such a great emphasis put upon the role of the widely understood human interaction with the surrounding environment in reference to language.

First of all, the cognitive science approach towards language learning directly excludes the generativist, Neo-Cartesian idea of innatism, and views acquisition as an active process of learning and making constant inferences via our cognitive abilities, on the basis of social interaction. According to Tomasello (2003), acquisition of linguistic system is a matter of *pattern-finding*. This can be, undoubtedly, linked to the mental ability of categorisation, and is definitely connected with the notion of *cognitive domains* (Langacker, 1988b):

It is, however, necessary to assume some inborn capacity for mental experience, i.e. a set of cognitively ir-

reducible representational spaces or fields of conceptual potential.

There are two types of cognitive domains that pertain to the human conceptual experience – basic and non-basic, the former being the most fundamental notions in human experience (e.g. 3d- and 2d-space, colour, time), the latter less obvious, more specific kinds of reference (e.g. the domain of ‘locomotive cutlery’ for ‘knife’).

Tomasello claims that the nature of the mental abilities involved in the process of language acquisition are *domain-general*, which basically means that are not limited to language, as the domains are deeply rooted in the human conceptual and bodily experience. He stresses the importance of the two cognitive abilities that are crucial to language acquisition: 1) *pattern-finding ability*, 2) *intention-reading ability* (Tomasello 2003). These abilities are visible in the pre-linguistic behaviour of children – 1) building analogies, categorising actions as events, perception of similarities, etc. and, in case of 2) controlling attention (focusing, sharing), following gestures, pointing to objects, imitating others’ actions.

Therefore, according to the cognitivists’ view, children acquire language by means of induction – they engage their cognitive abilities while being exposed to language and via the use of the basic mental capacities such as attention, selective figure/ground organisation and categorisation, they draw inferences and find patterns of usage. Thus, language acquisition happens not by ready-made, innate rules that operate upon structures, but are abstracted later, depending on the previous construction of linguistic structures. These constructions serve as templates applied to other potential constructions to be created. Schematisation, defined as an ability to arrive at a higher level of abstraction (Langacker 2008) is a case in point, while analysing the acquisition of lexical items, can be explained as a matter of building analogies, perceiving common features to *elaborate* a concept to an appropriate degree from basic level categories, to the more specific subordinate and more general subordinate ones. In other words, children tend to acquire basic-level structures first (e.g. a dog), before arriving at different levels of specificity (e.g. an animal – a Dalmatian).

Additionally, Tomasello’s work can be linked to the works of Ludwig Wittgenstein, who in *Philosophical Investigations* (1953) identified meaning with use. The *meaning is use* approach corresponds to the main assumptions of the cognitive linguistics paradigm but it was extended and elaborated upon in an altered sense, by including and integrating the notions of mental representation and reference in the definition of meaning, which in Wittgenstein’s work are largely rejected.

4. Conclusions

From the presented arguments concerning Universal Grammar, as proposed by Noam Chomsky and the cognitive approach to the first language acquisition, several conclusions can be drawn. First of all in the generativist view the human capacity to acquire grammar is defined as a set of inborn rules (Universal Grammar) that can be applied to every language that is acquired by a child. The general attitude towards acquisition can be summarised as a top-down, deductive process, starting from generalisations which are then applied to the specific *modules* of language. The concept of mental lexicon in Chomskyan terms is, therefore, subject to the operation of certain *phrase structure rules* and those mental representation

undergo certain *transformations* and are governed by a clearly defined *constraints* (e.g. the Subadjacency Condition, the Tensed-s Condition, etc.) which allow generating an infinite number of grammatically correct sentences. Cognitive linguistics, on the other hand, reject the notion of grammaticality (understood traditionally as the grammatical correctness), as it perceives language mainly in terms of communication process and relies largely upon semantics (the relationship between conceptualisation and meaning) as and its connections to other aspects of language a tool of successful communication. The issue of inborn capacities is also treated in a different way by the two approaches. In Universal Grammar, what is innate, is the inventory of generalisations applicable to the linguistic input. Cognitive linguistics rely upon the power of the inborn human capacities of the extralinguistic nature and postulate induction as the way of acquiring how language works, it may be well linked with John Locke's conception of *tabula rasa* – people are born with a 'blank space' for language, which is then gradually filled in via induction, and the theoretical rules are abstracted from the data and generalised later, as the product of the mental capacities; language acquisition is unconscious. Mental processes also happen in, at least mostly, in an unconscious way.

Moreover, to further support these conclusions, cognitive linguistics postulate the usage-based nature of language which can be derived to some extent from Wittgenstein's construct of *meaning is use* (Wittgenstein 1958). Even though Chomsky is perceived as a proponent of the *cognitive revolution* in linguistics, as he tried to examine the mental nature of linguistic capacities and language as a system, the cognitive science suggests a different treatment of the mental character of language – it sees language as a product of the human general mental capacities, abilities and processes happening on the ground of mind/brain, but it also stresses the extreme importance of context as far as all facets of language are taken into account. Consequently, language acquisition is anchored to the sociocultural interaction, and can be viewed as an externally-motivated phenomenon. Hence, it is the opposite of the highly internalistic generativist approach.

As it can be immediately seen, the two juxtaposed approaches, even though they embrace different concepts

and consideration have some minor correlations, they do not agree on the nature of the process of language acquisition. Although they differ significantly, the common, most coherent conclusion appears to be the assumption that, independent of the exact characteristics of the process, people have a mental background for language learning, either in the form of Universal Grammar or the basic cognitive abilities.

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Sensory phenomenology and the content indeterminacy problem

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Abstract

Naturalist-externalist accounts of intentionality face the problem of content indeterminacy; i.e. the problem that a tracking-relation between environmental conditions and mental states does not secure that, for example, my belief is about rabbits instead of undetached rabbit parts. Defenders of phenomenal intentionality claim that their accounts are not vulnerable to the content indeterminacy threat since phenomenology secures determinate mental content. The phenomenal aspect of conscious states that is supposed to do the work can be spelled out as *sensory phenomenology* (for example, visual, auditory etc. imagery) or as *cognitive phenomenology*. I argue that sensory phenomenology alone cannot ground determinate mental content. Proponents of phenomenal intentionality who want to secure determinate content have two possible ways to go: either they supplement sensory phenomenology by cognitive elements such as inner-focusing, *taking* or functional characterizations, or they subscribe to the thesis of a distinctive and individuating *cognitive* phenomenology.

Intentional mental states can be characterized as mental states that are about, are directed at or represent, for example, objects, properties or states of affairs. Paradigmatic examples are beliefs, desires, fears etc. Attempts to answer the question how a mental state can be intentional are often divided into two research programs (see Kriegel forthcoming): the *naturalist-externalist research program* (NERP) on the one hand, and the *phenomenal intentionality research program* (PIRP) on the other hand. The former includes all accounts of intentionality that try to naturalize intentionality by focusing on a tracking relation that holds between mental states and external conditions. This tracking relation can be interpreted in various ways and includes influential theories such as causal-covariational theories (Fodor 1990), causal-informational semantics (Dretske 1981) or teleosemantics (Millikan 1984). In contrast, the phenomenal intentionality research program focuses on a subjective feature of mental states in order to explain their intentionality. In particular, the phenomenal character, i.e. the what-it is likeness, of mental states is taken to constitute conscious intentionality.¹ The phenomenal intentionality thesis has it that phenomenal character (or phenomenology) is taken to constitute the attitude type of intentional states as well as their contents. In this paper, I will concentrate on the constitution of the contents of conscious intentional states.

One of the main challenges that naturalist-externalist accounts of intentionality face is the *problem of content indeterminacy*. The starting point of this problem can be found in Quine (1960) who points at what he calls “the indeterminacy or inscrutability of reference”. Quine claims that, given our empirical evidence, there are numerous possible theories about the referent of, for example, the word “rabbit”: rabbits, undetached rabbit parts, time-slices of rabbits etc. Tracking theories are challenged by a problem that is closely related to Quine’s worry. Every tracking relation that holds to rabbits will also hold to undetached rabbit parts. This stands in tension to pre-theoretic intuitions regarding mental content. Intuitively, mental content seems determinate, i.e. our thoughts seem to be about rabbits instead of undetached rabbit-parts. Moreover, we seem to have direct access to the determinate content of our occurrent thoughts. Accounts that ground intentionality in a tracking-relation to external conditions have troubles to account for this intuition.

Notably, defenders of the phenomenal intentionality research program think that their accounts are not vulnerable to this indeterminacy worry. Some (Horgan, Graham and Tienson 2004; Horgan and Graham 2010; Pautz forthcoming; Pitt 2004, 2009) even hold the stronger claim that intentionality that is grounded in phenomenal character can provide an *explanation* as to why mental content is determinate. Moreover, phenomenal intentionality is taken to account also for the fact that the content of one’s occurrent thoughts is immediately accessible:

What is wanted, as a basis of content determinacy, is some feature that not only is accessible to the agent in a special first-person way, and not only secures content determinacy, but also renders such determinacy utterly obvious. (...) Are there features of one’s mental life whose presence is so obvious as to be beyond doubt? Indeed there are: viz., *phenomenal* features, i.e., those features such that there is “something it is like” to undergo them. (Horgan & Graham 2010, 332)

Roughly, according to proponents of phenomenal intentionality the solution to the determinate content problem is the following: Thinking about rabbits is constituted by a different phenomenal character than thinking about undetached rabbit parts. Importantly, the phenomenal character determines or grounds the content and, since phenomenal character is taken to be self-presenting it is introspectively accessible to the subject:

From the first-person perspective it is just obvious that thought and linguistic expression are content-determinate (...). [This is] because the self-presenting nature of phenomenal character figures in one’s belief about that phenomenal character as content determining *mode of presentation*. (Horgan and Graham 2010, 333)

In short: phenomenal character is taken to account for determinate content as well as our immediate introspective access to this content. At first glance, this solution is very appealing. But I think more has to be said to explain how phenomenal character can secure determinate mental content. We need a more detailed analysis of the notion of phenomenal character that is taken to secure determinate content.²

¹ I will confine my investigations to conscious intentional states since according to the phenomenal intentionality thesis those are the basis of intentionality. I will not pursue the issue of unconscious intentional states here.

² For the lack of space I have to leave the argument from accessibility aside and will confine my investigations to the question how phenomenal character can secure determinate content.

1. Sensory and cognitive phenomenology

Let me start my investigation by distinguishing two sorts of phenomenology that can be ascribed to conscious intentional states. On the one hand, we can think of the phenomenology exhibited by conscious intentional states as sense-induced. Paradigmatic examples are inner visual images, auditory images such as the hearing of inner speech or proprioceptive images. I will subsume these phenomenology as accordance with recent literature as “sensory phenomenology”. On the other hand, some philosophers (Horgan and Graham 2010, Pitt 2004, 2009, Strawson 1994, 2008) hold that conscious intentional states exhibit a distinctive and individuating phenomenology that cannot be reduced to visual, auditory, proprioceptive etc. imageries. This phenomenology is taken to constitute a realm of its own and is called “cognitive phenomenology”:

If there is a phenomenology of conscious thought, it remains to be determined whether it is just a phenomenology of familiar sorts (visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, etc.), or a unique and distinctive sort of phenomenology, as different from the familiar sorts as they are from each other. (...) I shall argue that what it is like consciously to think a particular thought is (1) different from what it is like to be in any other sort of conscious mental state (i.e., *proprietary*) and (2) different from what it is like consciously to think any other thought (i.e., *distinctive*). (Pitt 2004, 4)

In the following, I will argue that sensory phenomenology alone cannot secure determinate mental content. In particular, I will illustrate that for phenomenal intentionality to secure determinate content one either has to supplement sensory phenomenology by inner-focusing, taking or functional aspects, or to subscribe fully to the cognitive phenomenology thesis.

2. Sensory phenomenology and determinate content

Defenders of PIRP who hold that intentionality is grounded in sensory phenomenology account for the determinate content of, for example, the belief *there is a rabbit jumping in the green grass* by recurring to an inner image of a rabbit jumping in the green grass, to inner speech or a visual image of seeing the written sentence “There is a rabbit jumping in the green grass” etc. Let me investigate if this is a solution to the content determinacy problem.

Consider the inner image that is taken to determine the content of the belief “There is a rabbit jumping in the green grass!” If this inner image is sense-induced and shares its phenomenology with the actual perceptual image of seeing a rabbit jumping in the grass, then defenders of the PIRP are no better off to explain determinate content than advocates of NERP. The image that represents the rabbit jumping in the green grass represents also undetached rabbit parts as well as rabbit-time slices jumping in the green grass. Moreover, if you think of an inner image as mapping with your actual seeing of a rabbit jumping in the green grass—for example by thinking of the inner image as a reactivation of a stored sensory file—then the concrete inner image would be far more determinate than the content the subject is entertaining. For example, the inner image might involve a specific shade of green of the grass and a specific length of the rabbit’s ears. But the subject does not believe that *there is a rabbit with 2-inch long ears jumping in green-27 grass*. Recurring to concrete inner images turns out to make mental content too fine-grained.

It introduces the problem of multiple possible interpretations of the very same inner image as well as problems of accessibility to mental content that are related to the famous speckled-hen problem.

An alternative would be to think of the inner image as a sort of faint imagination or memory of some perception of a rabbit jumping in the green grass. Unfortunately, this move leads to a far too vague inner image to secure determinate content. Hence, we need to supplement the inner image with some further element.

Maybe some additional *sensory* phenomenal element such as phonological or orthographic imagery of the sentence “There is a rabbit jumping in the green grass” can do the work. First, a monolingual Italian could hear or see the same words in her heads without thereby entertaining the relevant belief (see Pitt 2004). Second, how do we know that the phonological or orthographic image of “rabbit” refers to rabbits instead of undetached rabbit parts? We cannot rely on the inner image of the rabbit, since the content of the image is taken to be determined by the additional element of inner speech or of the seeing the word written down. Note that the claim that we simply know that the word “rabbit” refers to rabbits, without this being entailed by a sensory element, amounts to content-determination by *cognitive* phenomenology.

Also further options turn out to involve some cognitive element: For example one might refer to the sensory phenomenology of *inner-focusing* on the whole rabbit instead of just a part. But in this case we do not rely on sensory phenomenology alone, but introduce a new, inner-focusing element. To analyze this element in purely sensory-phenomenal terms is difficult in the case of focusing on an *inner mental image*, since there are no external stimuli that might change the sensory experience³. But if the inner-focusing is not analyzable in purely sensory phenomenal terms this leads to scenarios in which phenomenal twin-earth duplicate with the same sensory phenomenology but different inner-pointing would not have the same content as her phenomenal earth-twin. That stands in contrast to the key-thesis of PIRP that phenomenal intentionality is shared by and constitutes the same narrow truth-conditions in the case of phenomenal duplicates.

A further option is to refer to the notion of *taking* (e.g. Chisholm 1957, 150ff), and to claim that one *takes* the inner image *to be* an image of a rabbit. But since taking is a cognitive component, this proposal is put forward mainly by defenders of cognitive phenomenology (e.g. Strawson 2008). Moreover, *taking* highlights the issue of concepts involved in determinate content. The problem is the following: if sensory phenomenology can be non-conceptual, the inner image that represents rabbits will represent undetached rabbit parts as well. Moreover, one might think that a baby can have the sensory non-conceptual image of a rabbit jumping, but does not thereby entertain the determinate content *that* a rabbit is jumping. The reason is that it lacks the concept of “rabbit” and thus does not see it as a rabbit.⁴ In short: the employment of concepts turns out to be crucial for extracting determinate content from sensory phenomenology. Thus, the claim that sensory phenomenology secures determinate content has to spell out the

³ The situation cannot be treated analogously to cases of focusing on *external* stimuli as, for example, in Block’s (2010) gabor-patch experiment.

⁴ Notably, one thinks that a baby or animal can undergo conscious, non-conceptual experiences, but also holds that *taking* is used to explain intentionality in general, this amounts to the denial of intentionalism (i.e. the thesis that all conscious states are intentional).

relation between sensory experiences and concepts that on most accounts involves cognitive components.⁵

Finally, one could rely on conceptual roles or functional aspects such as our dispositions which inferences to draw, which further questions to ask etc. But on an account that combines sensory phenomenology with functionalism (e.g. Pautz forthcoming) the explanatory work is also not done by sensory phenomenology.

3. Conclusion

The outcome of my short investigation is the following: Sensory phenomenology alone does not solve the problem of content indeterminacy. Supplementations of sensory phenomenology with inner-focusing, taking, conceptual or functional aspects seem more promising in securing content determinacy. But appealing to a functional aspect weakens the key-idea of phenomenal intentionality significantly by introducing an externalist element, and introducing cognitive elements such as inner-focusing or taking abandons the idea of sensory phenomenology securing content determinacy. In the latter case, instead of adding to sensory phenomenology a further cognitive element to secure determinate intentional content, one might rather directly subscribe to the cognitive phenomenology thesis.⁶

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⁵ Concepts seen as discriminatory abilities face again the indeterminacy problem, since one cannot discriminate between a rabbit and an undetached rabbit part.

⁶ The latter thesis faces problems of its own. For example, contrary to the distinctiveness claim, cognitive phenomenology does not turn out to be modally independent from sensory or functional properties (Pautz, forthcoming). Unfortunately, for the lack of space, here I cannot analyze the merits of the cognitive phenomenology thesis.

Is there a Wittgensteinian Communicative Action?

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Abstract

In this paper I want to trace the Wittgensteinian influence in Habermas' work, especially in his definition of a universal and normative concept of communication, which ultimately leads into a common form of life. Secondly, I will try to understand whether Habermas' interpretation of Wittgenstein is accurate and which are the consequences of this universal (although Wittgensteinian) proposal. Finally, I will refer to some authors who criticize this Habermasian view.

In order to understand Habermas' proposal, it is indispensable to distinguish the two different poles that articulate his concept of communicative action: the "theory" or abstract level, based on some meta-communicative and counterfactual concepts, such as the ideal speech situation; and the "lifeworld", as the pragmatic and realistic side of his work. Both are interrelated and constitute a universal and normative concept of communication. Some elements of the late Wittgenstein's work play a determinant role in the elaboration of this concept.

Habermas' starting point is the argument against a private language-game: if someone follows a rule, it must be possible for someone else to check whether she is following that rule correctly. In Habermas words: "I myself cannot be sure of whether I am following a rule unless there is a context in which I can subject my behavior to another's criticism and we can come to a consensus" (2001:50).

Here we find a new feature of the rule following process, which appears to be alien to Wittgenstein's work, but is essential to the communicative action theory: the possibility of consensus. Habermas admits that Wittgenstein did not explicitly refer to universal consensus; he attributes this omission to his "abstention of theory" (2001:64). Then, he tries to "complete" Wittgenstein's theory, by the elaboration of a universal theory of language-games; asserting that if "Wittgenstein would have developed a theory of language-games, it would have taken the form of a universal pragmatics" (2001:53).

Rejecting Wittgenstein's considerations about the descriptive task of philosophy (1985:124), Habermas states that if someone describes a language-game, she already comprehends and masters it. According to this view, the rules of the game may be described; but the mere description does not really capture what the player does: "A player who understands the rules, one who can make moves in the game, need not also be able to describe the rules. The specific nature of a rule is expressed in the competence of someone who masters it rather than in a description" (2001:54).

This mastering is a competence developed towards a learning process that happens in every culture. Habermas finds a certain *a priori* dimension in the human process of acquiring a language-game; this *a priori* is not individual and conceptual (as Kant would have established), but intersubjective and practical: "In any context of interaction, speaking and acting subjects are *a priori* linked by something shared, namely, a consensus about habitualized rules" (2001:55).

Habermas quotes Wittgenstein's remark about the explorer who visits an unknown country and looks for the "common behavior of mankind" (1985:206). In Habermas'

version of this aphorism, the explorer is an anthropologist who already masters a language-game, because she has learnt it in her community, and therefore she knows that every language-game is based on following rules. She starts from the pre-understanding of her own traditions and practices and tries to look for common patterns, making hypothesis about meanings, while the natives will correct her mistakes (2001:55).

According to Habermas, if this process is possible, if the anthropologist and the natives are able to correct their mistakes, a new and common dimension of understanding has been opened; otherwise they cannot know if they are referring to the same meanings. Therefore, Habermas maintains that all language-games are opened to "the intersubjectivity of the possible mutual understanding" (2001:51). Wittgenstein was aware of this mutual understanding, but reduced the sameness of meaning to the intersubjective recognition of rules in a particular language-game; therefore, he did not examine the cognitive presuppositions of the speakers, neither their reciprocal interactions. As Habermas puts it: "The intersubjectivity of a rule's validity and, hence, the sameness of meaning have the same basis: the fact that rule-oriented behavior can be mutually criticized. What this demands, in turn, is not reciprocity of behavior but reciprocity of expectations" (2001:59).

These expectations correspond to four validity claims (intelligibility, truth, sincerity and normative rightness), which all speakers must mutually respect if they want to be understood and to criticize others (2001:64). These expectations transcend each particular language-game and open a new meta-communicative level, shared by all speakers.

Habermas explains this meta-level with reference to the universal pragmatics (2011:67), one of the most important points of his theory, according to which, every speaker has developed the cognitive competence to understand utterances and to reply to criticisms. Moreover they are already committed to a certain way of communicating, and even to a common form of life. Here is possible to find Wittgensteinian influence again: if according to Wittgenstein: "speaking a language is part of an activity or of a form of life" (1985:23); Habermas concludes that this meta-communicative level is related to some universal rules and a common form of life. Here he defines his ideal speech situation, a counterfactual and regulative idealization where every speaker respects the validity claims and tries to reach mutual understandings (1984: 278).

This Habermasian reference to a common form of life is clarified in his ethical works, where his validity claims are identified with a concrete form of life; and once more, he refers to Wittgenstein's work:

Habermas defines a weak transcendental feature, present in every human language-game. This concept of "transcendental" is not Kantian, but Wittgensteinian: The "transcendental constraints" that according to Kant, the mind imposed on the world of possible objects of experience are now transformed into "transcendental features" of local forms of life situated in space and time, which retain the status of unavoidable epistemic presuppositions for the members of each community (2003:19).

Habermas does not accept the plausible relativistic interpretation of this conception of language-games (that we can find for example in Winch's work). According to the German philosopher, the pluralism of language-games does not lead to a manifold of incommensurable, mutually foreclosed universes; because there are some attitudes that transcend all language-games, such as the will to be understood and the possibility to find and criticize liars. In Habermas words: The detranscendentalized conception of a world-generating spontaneity is compatible with "the expectation that we discover universally occurring transcendental features of how sociocultural forms of life are constituted. [...] All propositionally differentiated language represents an empirically universal form of communication for which there is no alternative in any known form of life" (2003:20).

He has now identified his validity claims with a common form of ethical behavior, which transcends all language-games and pursues a universal consensus. In the pragmatic turn that characterizes his work, Habermas does not presuppose an *a priori* consensus but a common willing to reach fair understandings, whose validity depends upon its universal acceptance (2003:265). In Habermas words: "If all those possibly affected in practical discourses together have reached the conviction that a particular way of acting is equally good for all persons, they will regard this practice as binding. For the participants, the discursively attained consensus is relatively definitive. It does not determine a fact, but 'grounds' a norm that cannot 'consist' in anything but that in its intersubjective recognition" (2003:257).

The author postulates a horizon of consensus, an inclusive and a universal language-game. He defines it as the "ideally projected social world of legitimately ordered interpersonal relationships" (2003:261). Although he admits that this horizon might be unreachable, he explains it as a regulative ideal, in the Kantian sense. In his words: "The fact that the project of a moral world that is equally inclusive of everyone's claims is not an arbitrarily chosen point of reference; it is due to the projection of the universal communicative presuppositions" (2003:261).

He has thus identified the presuppositions of his theory with a common form of behaving, which we must pursue if we want that our communicative processes become more fair and inclusive. These presuppositions seem to be universal and unavoidable, if someone would dare to criticize them, his words would become almost unintelligible. According to Habermas, his critics commit a performative contradiction, because it is not possible to reject the validity claims of his theory and to pretend, at the same time, to be understood and maintain a critique. (1983:97)

Nevertheless, some authors have objected this theory due to its idealism and separation from every-day language games (vid. for example his dispute with Rorty). But, in response to his critics Habermas has defined the second pole of this theory: the lifeworld, which is inspired in the Wittgensteinian concept of certainty.

The German philosopher accepts that in the theoretical level, everybody can criticize his theory and indefinitely

discuss whether the speech ideal situation is real or reachable or whether his interpretation of Wittgenstein is accurate. But, at some point, everybody (including the critics) must stop the theoretical debates and just live; now he has reached the lifeworld and cannot give more reasons.

According to Habermas, the lifeworld is the "dogmatism of everyday background" that is related to life in societies, without which communication would be impossible. Habermas defines it as the implicit and unproblematic knowledge that cannot be represented in propositions (such as "human beings speak" or "the Earth existed before I was born"). We cannot make it explicit, because it is the fundamental background that supplements our knowledge and promotes understandings (1984:366-367).

These understandings would be partial and fallible, but we need them as the condition of possibility of living together. Considering this human need for partial understandings and the duty of making them more inclusive, Habermas asserts that his validity claims are already operative, even in the lifeworld; otherwise, we could not criticize our partial understandings.

But if someone persisted in his critical attitude against Habermas, he (the critic) will lose the common ground, and his words will become problematic and unintelligible; furthermore, he risks being apart from the community. (1983:109-110).

Habermas maintains that the sceptic confronts a dilemma: he must accept the lifeworld or abandon the community, but this second option is impossible (even unlivable). Apparently, there is no way out of Habermas' theory: If we reject the validity claims, our utterances would become unintelligible and we cannot criticise others. But if we reject the lifeworld, it is difficult to imagine how we could survive. So, if we accept the impossibility of a private language-game and the unavoidable and certain dimension of the lifeworld, Habermas' theory seems to be unquestionable.

Despite this risk of becoming unintelligible, some authors have criticized this Habermasian interpretation of Wittgenstein. For example, Alexander (1991:53) rejected this ideal conception of language-games, for its separation of the every-day use of language. He explains this idealist conception of Wittgenstein by the influence that Habermas received from Apel, who first proposed a transcendental language-game.

In a similar vein, Pleasants (1999:160) neither accepts this rationalistic comprehension of language-games. He argues that Habermas misunderstands one of Wittgenstein's fundamental points: The Austrian philosopher never said that the possibility of reaching understanding were inherent to language. Quite the opposite, according to Wittgenstein, language rests upon common practices, "not agreement in opinions but in form of life" (1985:241). Agreements are not rational, but non-justified and non-justifiable practices: "The language-game is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable). It is there, -like our life" (1969:559).

Wittgenstein's point is that people agree in what they do with language, but it is absurd to think that they must (and can) reach universal understandings. The Habermasian concept of rational and universal consensus means a "rationalistic ontological picture," which imposes us an unique way of communicating. Following Wittgenstein, Pleasants reminds us that reaching understandings is just one of the multifarious linguistic practices in which human beings engage (1999:160).

Tully also holds that Habermas is captive by an ideal picture of society, according to which: "we live a free and rational way of political life insofar as the rules in accordance with which we act are based on our agreement" (1989:174). But Habermas is unjustified in his comprehension of rational agreements as the "paradigm standard form of communication", when others, forms of communication (conflict, deception, irony...) are "derivative." We have learnt from Wittgenstein that our every-day processes of communication are conventional and based more on conventional practices than in rationality. Following the *Investigations*, Tully asserts that the grounds of our language-games are "nothing more (or less) than the 'loci of linguistic practices,' the congeries of uses of abilities and skills employed as a matter of course in our activities of confirming and disconfirming, of using words in our multiplicity of ways" (1989:183). Tully accepts that sometimes we engage in practices of rational interpretation and that a high value is placed on these interpretative forms of critical reflection; however, "these practices are not fundamental with respect to language use, neither foundational with respect to other forms of critical reflection" (1989:198). And concludes his critiques stating that "no type of critical reflection can play the mythical role of founding patriarch of our political life [...], because any practice of critical reflection is itself already founded in the popular sovereignty of our multiplicity of humdrum ways of acting with words" (1989:199).

Finally, I would like to remind Wittgenstein's objection against whoever tries to look for "the essence of a language-game", that is, to look for what is common to all the different human activities. According to Wittgenstein, there is nothing common to all what call language, but that different phenomena are related to one another in many different ways (1985:65).

Following this remark, Sluga has concluded that if we can think about a Wittgensteinian political conception, it would be pluralistic and non-reductive, because it contemplates different ways of communicating: "Together with the

idea of political plurality go the notions of communication and mediation, of translation of interpretation, but equally those of misunderstanding, disagreement and conflict" (2011:139).

And moreover, to maintain an ideal and universal picture of human languages, leading to understandings, as Habermas does, just distances us from the pluralism and difference of language-games. In Sluga's words: "Aware of the diversity of our needs and interests, Wittgenstein understands that they do not form a single overall system. Human pluralism is for him a consequence of our diverse capacities and multiple limitations to our understandings" (2011:140).

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Human Agents as Powerful Particulars

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Abstract

In this paper I defend a realist account of agent causal powers, that is, the claim that agent causal powers are attributable directly and irreducibly to the agent herself. In section A I outline O'Connor's account of agent causation, which serves as my point of reference. In section B I outline a general argument against agent causation which lurks behind a wide-spread understanding of the metaphysics of causal powers. In section C I amend O'Connor's account of agent causation and defend it against well-known objections.

Introduction

Research on causal powers is becoming increasingly popular in metaphysics, philosophy of science and the theory of causation. This research is also increasingly influencing debates in the theory of action, particularly in the area of agent causation. Against this background I defend a realist account of agent causal powers. As my reference theory I discuss Timothy O'Connor's account of agent causation (see, for instance, O'Connor 1995, 2002, 2009). Then I present one general argument against agent causation which lurks behind a wide-spread understanding of the metaphysics of causal powers. Finally I amend O'Connor's account of agent causation and defend it against major objections.

Section A: O'Connor's theory of agent causation

O'Connor's theory of agent-causation comprises the following claims:

- An agent is a species of substance with the distinctive power (among other powers) *freely* to cause an intention to carry out some goal-directed action, say to A.
- The causing of the intention to A is not the result of a composition of other causal powers belonging to the agent and her environment. Though such an understanding might be accurate with respect to automatic responses to internal and external stimuli, it cannot encompass the more ambitious concept of free agency, which is a "two-way power" either to cause the intention to A or not to cause it.
- Having reasons for action entails to have the power of evaluating and choosing between different courses of action. Thus, if an agent acquires new reasons for action or dismisses old ones, she comes to have new powers of causing her intention.
- If an agent freely causes an intention to carry out some action, reasons for action do not determine a specific action but merely affect the agent's objective propensity to cause it.
- It is important to distinguish between the agent's power freely to cause an intention to act and this power's specific causal structure, which is determined by the agent's character, motivational states and reasons for action. Employing the familiar distinction between triggering and structuring causes, one could say that the agent's directly causing the intention to A is the triggering cause of A whereas the agent's character, motivational states and rea-

sons for action are the structuring causes to bring the intention to A about.

This outline should make clear that O'Connor (like many other advocates of agent causation) is willing to concede to proponents of the popular causal theory of action that reasons for action and the agent's motivation states are *causally relevant* for bringing an action about. However, contrary to the causal theory of action, these agent's states are not *the causes* of her action. Rather, the agent herself disposes of the causal power to directly producing her intention to A. Nevertheless, it is important to take into account that this causing takes place within a *specific causal context* consisting of the agent's reasons, her character and motivational states, influences from her environment etc. They structure the agent causal powers in terms of an objective propensity to cause A or to refrain from doing so.

Section B: Is agent causation reducible to the agent's properties?

It is generally thought that a metaphysics of powerful qualities according to which properties are both powerful and qualitative provides a suitable framework for a defense of agent causation. However, an advocate of powerful properties could claim that there is no place for genuine agent-causation because the latter can be reduced to the manifestation of the agent's powerful properties and her environment's interacting with them. The argument is roughly this (see, for instance, Buckareff 2012):

- (i) Properties inhere in a substance and thereby confer their causal powers on it.
- (ii) Agents are substances.
- (iii) Thus, from (i) and (ii) agents have the causal powers they do because they have certain properties which confer their causal powers on those agents.
- (iv) Thus, from (i), (ii), and (iii), if an agent had different properties, she would also have different causal powers (given that different properties do not confer the same causal powers).
- (v) Given (iv), the manifestation of the agent's powers is sufficient for agent causation. Thus, it seems wrong to claim that the agent herself causes anything. Agent-causation is reducible to the manifestation of the causal powers of the agent.

This argument should be blocked by questioning premise (i): The metaphysical distinction between powerful properties and substances should be rejected (although they may be conceptually distinct). Proponents of agent-causation should argue that agents are powerful particulars rather than drawing a metaphysical distinction between sub-

stances and powerful properties. If someone accepts powerful properties in her ontology and sees substances as being *merely* their bearer, then a substance does not play a specific causal role itself anymore. As a consequence, a non-reductive account of genuine agent causation cannot be maintained, and agent causation becomes a *façon de parler* for causation by powerful properties. This account is only one step away from the idea that a complex substance such as a human person is nothing other than an agglomerate of many properties. Although causation can still be conceived of in a non-Humean fashion, the agent herself vanishes from such a metaphysical picture of reality, since the universe consists merely of properties which causally relate to each other. Such a conception of reality fits nicely with a trope-ontology but has no need to assume substances as a further ingredient of reality. Thus, an advocate of agent causation should hold that agents are powerful particulars and that their power is not merely the result of powerful properties inhering in them.

Section C: Defending agent causation as basic form of free agency

After defending the view that agents are powerful particulars, I aim to dispel three objections to agent causation (a comprehensive discussion of the most popular objections can be found in Keil 2000, 358-373) and Clarke 2003, chap. 10): (a) Broad's timing objection, (b) the rationality objection and (c) the objection of non-analysability.

The first objection says: "In so far as an event is determined, an essential factor in its total cause must be other events. How could an event possibly be determined to happen at a certain date if its total cause contained no factor to which the notion of date has any application? And how can the notion of date have any application to anything that is not an event?" (Broad 1952, 215. Cf. also Ginet 1990, 13f.)

This objection says: Reference to the cause should explain why a given effect occurred at a given time and not earlier or later. Pointing to a substance *holus bolus* does not provide such an explanation, however, because a substance exists before the effect which ought to be explained and presumably it will also exist afterwards. An advocate of agent causation should respond as follows. What appears to be correct about Broad's objection is the claim that an entity's causing something requires that something must happen: A change takes place because something happens. Doesn't this claim imply that agent causation ultimately turns into event causation because it is an event – something which happens – that causes a given effect? Not necessarily: It is one thing to claim that an agent can only cause something by being active and quite another to claim that only events are causes. If it is true, as previously argued, that agents dispose of irreducible causal powers, then an event can consist of an agent's causing something due to her causal powers and, thus, such an event is parasitic on the agent and her power manifestation.

In other words: There are resources for analysing event-causation in terms of agent-causation, for instance, by saying that an event *c* causes another event *e* if and only if there is an agent *A*, and some manner of acting, *X*, such that *c* consists in *A*'s *X*-ing and *A*, by *X*-ing directly brings about *e*. (Lowe 2008, 136). Rather than deny event causation *tout court*, an advocate of agent causation should say that events are not the right ontological category by which to account for direct causation. Rather, events (at least when it comes to agency in a robust sense) should be considered as exemplifications of agents being active and

by being active directly bringing about certain effects. Thus, a clearer way to express the agent causation view is to say that agent causation underlines the agent's direct and irreducible contribution in bringing about an intention, instead of identifying the agent with this causal contribution itself.

The second objection says: If reasons for an action *X* do not enter into an action's aetiology, then it remains mysterious why the agent does what she does. What are the reasons she acts on? It appears that the capacity to act is dissociated from rationality in acting.

One way to counter this objection is to say that reasons enter into the overall causal network within which an action is embedded but that they only have a structuring, not a triggering, role in bringing an action about (see O'Connor's account outlined above). But this causal interpretation of reasons cannot resolve the objection, for it remains unclear, without referring to the agent's causal profile which is structured by her reasons, how the agent herself is able to bring a rational action about. Reasons seem to provide the circumstances within which the agent is able to act autonomously. For once reasons enter into the aetiology which leads to the action, O'Connor fears that causation by the agent would be parasitic upon the causal contribution of her reasons.

A better way to solve this problem claims that reasons for action are not mental or other inner states of the agent. Rather, they are abstract entities which have certain contents. As such, they do not cause anything by themselves or 'push' the agent into a certain direction. Rather, they can only do something once the agent appreciates them and accepts them as her reasons to act according to them (see e. g. Steward 2012, 141-149). The agent's acting rationally is constituted by her acting in the light of them. What they do is rationalize an action – they make it understandable why an agent did what she did. This claim must not be confused with the much stronger claim that reasons can only do anything if they are to be identified with inner states of the agent which cause a certain behavioural output. Once it is accepted that reasons ought not to be causes for being able to explain an action, it also makes sense to say that the agent's coming to recognize a reason as *her reason* to act elevates an objective propensity for her to form an intention with a content corresponding to this reason. Then a strong objective propensity to act in a certain manner does not reduce the agent's freedom at all. For if the agent decides after careful consideration that acting in this manner is the best thing to do in these circumstances, then her reasons for so acting do not undermine her freedom but demonstrate instead that the capacity to act freely goes hand in hand with the capacity to act rationally. The agent's power to directly cause an intention to act is not merely a spontaneous but also a rational power.

The third objection says: The agent's causing something directly or indirectly bringing something about remains mysterious because there is no way to analyse the causal relation between the agent and her acting. This appears to be a crucial downfall of the concept of agent causation because its main rival theory – event causation – is analysable – for instance in terms of nomological, probabilistic or counterfactual relations.

To this objection I say: It should be noted that a denial that the agent's capacity to directly bring about an intention is analysable is built into the very concept of agent causation. Agent-causation claims that free action consists in the agent's directly causing an intention to *A* and this 'directly

causing' has no internal causal structure which would allow for a further causal analysis. Analogously to a radon atom which apparently has the basic capacity to decay spontaneously, so free agents have the capacity to act in the light of her reasons. The moment in which an agent decides to act is not divisible into two separate moments displaying the structure of a preceding cause and a consecutive effect.

Finally, if the concept of agent causation is embedded within a power-metaphysics, then analysing causation in non-causal terms, as the event causal account suggests, is a non-starter. Undeniably there are major differences between a water's causing a piece of sugar to dissolve and my causing the intention to write this paper. However, the causal understanding of both cases is the product of our general understanding of the wide range of specific ways in which powerful particulars can act upon each other.

Conclusion

We experience ourselves as powerful particulars who are able to act freely and rationally. An agent causation view aims to explicate this experience metaphysically. Rejecting any analysis which loses sight of the agent herself and her capacity to act spontaneously is not a concession to mystery and unintelligibility. Rather, an agent causation view recognizes that rational free agency is a basic capacity which human beings have, to begin an action by themselves which is reducible neither to any other powerful or non-powerful entities. At this point one might be well ad-

vised to follow Wittgenstein's suggestion in *On Certainty* 471: "It is so difficult to find the beginning. Or, better: it is difficult to begin at the beginning. And not try to go further back."

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'Meaning is Use' and Wittgenstein's Treatment of Philosophical Problems

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Abstract

What is the relation between later Wittgenstein's method of dissolving philosophical problems by reminding us of how we would actually *use* words, and his famous statement that "meaning is *use*" in *Investigations* §43? Many answers to this question have drawn on Wittgenstein's criticism of the "atmosphere" conception of meaning in §117. It has been claimed that since this criticism obviously stands in a direct relation to this method, and it is places such as §43 which play a main role in debunking this conception, Wittgenstein's statement that "meaning is use" stands in an equally direct relation to this method. What I intend to show is that this seemingly straightforward answer fails to accommodate one thing: that §43 is itself a reminder of how we would actually *use* a word. I will show how acknowledging this forces us to rethink the relation between "meaning is use" and this method of Wittgenstein's.

In *Investigations* §43, Wittgenstein famously wrote: "The meaning of a word is its use in the language". In that same book, Wittgenstein also declared: "What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use" (§116). Now this attempt to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use is characteristic for one of Wittgenstein's ways of dissolving philosophical problems. That is, it is typical for Wittgenstein to approach a philosophical problem by asking if the words which figure in the formulation of the problem are ever *used* this way in everyday circumstances. So what we have then, in the *Investigations*, are these two things: (1) A method of dissolving philosophical problems by reminding us of the everyday *uses* of words, and (2) a statement of Wittgenstein's relating the meaning of words to their *use*. The question is: How are we to conceive the relation between (1) and (2)? Many answers to this question have drawn on the paragraph immediately following Wittgenstein's programmatic statement of §116. In §117, Wittgenstein writes:

You say to me: 'You understand this expression, don't you? Well then – I am using it in the sense you are familiar with.' As if the sense were an atmosphere accompanying the word, which it carried with it into every kind of application.

If, for example, someone says that the sentence 'This is here' (saying which he points to an object in front of him) makes sense to him, then he should ask himself in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used. There it does make sense.

The idea which Wittgenstein mentions here and then criticizes – namely, the idea that the meaning of a word is something that the words carries with it like an atmosphere into every context of use – has sometimes been called the "atmosphere conception" of meaning. And from the context of this remark it appears clear that Wittgenstein thinks his criticism of this "atmosphere conception" to be directly relevant to the method which he outlined just one paragraph before. It appears obvious that he thinks one of the things which makes philosophers not mind actual circumstances of use of the words which they are employing is the belief that a word carried its meaning like an atmosphere into every context of use. Now one answer to my initial question which readers of Wittgenstein have given in the light of this is the following: Since Wittgenstein thinks that his criticism of the atmosphere conception is directly relevant to this method, and it is places such as §43 which play a main role in our coming to see what is mistaken about the atmosphere con-

ception, his statement "The meaning of a word is its use in the language" must be directly relevant to this method, too.

In the following, I wish to question this widespread view. What I intend to show in what follows is that if we take a closer look at how Wittgenstein conceived the status of §43, the widespread view about the relevance of "meaning is use" for this one method of Wittgenstein's cannot really be sustained. This, as I will try to show, concerns especially the following element of this view: that it is places such as §43 which play a main role in our coming to see what is mistaken about the atmosphere conception of meaning. What I wish to show is that taking to heart the grammatical status of §43 is apt to call into question the view that "meaning is use" stands in the same direct relation to this method of dissolving philosophical problems as Wittgenstein's criticism of the atmosphere conception of meaning of §117.

Let me start by turning directly to *Investigations* §43. The famous first paragraph reads:

For a *large* class of cases – though not for all – in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

What I take to be crucial here is that Wittgenstein is drawing on how "*we employ*" the word 'meaning'. I take this to indicate that "The meaning of a word is its use in the language" is brought in here by Wittgenstein, not as an insight into the nature of linguistic meaning, but as a mere *reminder* of how we *actually use* the expression 'meaning of a word' in everyday speech. In other words: What Wittgenstein is doing here is asking the question "How would we actually use the expression 'meaning of a word'?" And the answer he arrives at is this: In large class of cases – though not *all* of them – we use the expression 'the meaning of a word' synonymously with 'the *use* of the word'.

Let us now turn to the consequences of this for the idea which we are discussing. The idea was this: Since Wittgenstein thinks that his criticism of the atmosphere conception of meaning is directly relevant to the method of asking how words are actually used, and it is places such as §43 which play a main role in our coming to see what is false about the atmosphere conception, his statement "The meaning of a word is its use in the language" must also be directly relevant to this method. As I had said, in my mind, a correct understanding of the status of §43 is especially apt to question the middle part of this reasoning – namely, that remarks such as §43 should be thought of as being the primary means of debunking the atmosphere conception of mean-

ing. That is, I would agree with this idea that the "atmosphere conception" which Wittgenstein mentions in §117 can be thought of as directly relevant to the method outlined in §116 – but, against this idea, I would insist that it is by no means clear that what is at issue in statements such as "The meaning of a word is its use in the language" can be conceived as a primary means of freeing us from the grip of this conception. As I would like to show now, if we take seriously the fact that "The meaning of a word is its use in the language" is a reminder of how we would *actually use* the word 'meaning', the thought that it can be a chief instrument in moving us away from the atmosphere conception of meaning must appear questionable.

Speaking on a general level, the reason why this appears doubtful, in my mind, is that, on the one hand, we are now reading "meaning is use" as a reminder of the *actual use* of 'meaning of a word' – and that on the other, we had taken the atmosphere conception as something which makes us not mind the *actual use* of words. If we want to uphold the idea that what Wittgenstein intended to counter the atmosphere conception of meaning with were reminders of how the word 'meaning' is actually used, then what should be conceivable is the following case: someone who is adhering to the atmosphere conception is moving away from it as a *result of* being reminded of how he would use the expression 'meaning of a word' in actual circumstances. The question is: Is such a case conceivable? For an answer, let us try to spell out such a case. Let us imagine someone whom we are engaged with in a philosophical discussion and who is not minding concrete circumstances of use for a word he is using – let us say "I". And let us also imagine that when we tell him that we think it to be questionable whether this word as used by him still has the sense which we all know, he responds in the same way as Wittgenstein's interlocutor in §117: "You understand this expression, don't you? Well then – I am using it in the sense you are familiar with." And from this, we infer – like Wittgenstein with his interlocutor – that he is adhering to the atmosphere conception of meaning. Now let us further imagine that we tell him this: "You seem to think that the meaning of a word is something like an atmosphere which the word carries with it into every kind of application. But think of how you would use the expression 'meaning of a word' in actual circumstances! Then you will see how ill-founded such a conception of meaning is." Let us now imagine that he responds: "Maybe you're right. Maybe I should really take into account how one would use 'meaning of a word' in actual circumstances. What aspects of this use were you thinking of?" Now at first glance, what this seems to lead up to is just the case which we had wanted to spell out: Someone who is adhering to the atmosphere conception of meaning is now ready to take into account how he would use the expression 'meaning of a word' in actual circumstances. Now, it seems, there is no obstacle – once he sees what the actual use of this expression *is* (namely, that it is – in a large class of cases – akin to that of 'use of the word') – that he will move away from the atmosphere conception. But, as I would say, this is only at first glance. Because the question is: Is he – in this moment – still adhering to the atmosphere conception of meaning? That is: Would we, in this moment where he is willing to consider the *actual use* of the expression 'meaning of a word', still say that he is adhering to the atmosphere conception of meaning? It seems we would not – since we had taken Wittgenstein to think of this conception as making people not mind the actual use of words. So how could we say of someone who now *is* ready to mind the actual use of a word that he is still adhering to this conception? But *if* we say of him already in this moment – where he is willing to *consider* the actual use of 'meaning of a word' – that he is not adhering to the atmosphere conception of meaning, then this is not a case of

someone moving away from it as a *result of being reminded of how he would use the expression 'meaning of a word' in actual circumstances*. For he had already moved away from the atmosphere conception of meaning *before* being confronted with just *how* 'meaning of a word' is actually used. It was the openness to how a word is actually used (namely, 'meaning') that made us say that he was not any more adhering to the atmosphere conception of meaning, not his minding *how exactly* 'meaning of a word' is actually used (namely, in the sense of 'use of the word').

What this consideration points to, as I take it, is that the case which the view under discussion needs to conceive – namely, that of someone moving away from the atmosphere conception of meaning as a result of being reminded of *how the expression 'meaning of a word' is actually used* – is actually quite inconceivable. This is so because the reminder that – in a large class of cases – the actual use of 'meaning of a word' is akin to that of 'use of the word' – can effect the result which we had imagined for it to effect – freeing someone from the grip of the atmosphere conception of meaning – only if this result has already been achieved. Now how, if not in this way, can it be achieved? In any number of ways, I would say – one of them being confronting someone with the question "How would you use this (or that) word in actual circumstances?" That is, as I take from this, *any* grammatical remark – with its insistence on minding the *actual use* of words – must be thought of as being equally able to counter the atmosphere conception of meaning mentioned by Wittgenstein in §117. In other words, reminders of how he would actually use the word 'I', the word 'knowledge', or the word 'being', etc. must all be thought of as being able to move someone away from the atmosphere conception of meaning in the same way as remarks on the grammar of 'meaning'. Remarks on the grammar of 'meaning' – such as "The meaning of a word is its use in the language" – cannot be thought of as playing a *privileged role* in doing this. I say "privileged role" here because it is not that they cannot play *any* role. Since they are reminders of the *actual use* of a word, also they must be thought of as being capable of moving someone away from the atmosphere conception of meaning in the same way as reminders on the actual use of 'I', 'knowledge', or 'being'.

As I hope to have shown, if we take seriously the grammatical status of Wittgenstein's famous dictum "The meaning of a word is its use in the language", the idea that remarks such as this play a privileged role in freeing us from the grip of the atmosphere conception of meaning cannot be so easily sustained any more. And this, I would continue, therefore also holds for the idea that what Wittgenstein says in §43 (and elsewhere) about a relation between the meaning of words and their use must be of the same direct relevance for the method of asking for how words are actually used as is his criticism of the atmosphere conception of meaning. As I take it, this outcome highlights the fact that problems involving expressions such as 'meaning of a name' or 'meaning of a word' are *specific* problems – to be dissolved by the usual means of dissolving philosophical problems, including the method of issuing reminders of how we would use words in actual circumstances. Also, it highlights the fact that the dissolution of these specific problems has no special relevance for the whole of the method which is employed for their dissolution – i.e. no special relevance for the dissolution of *any other* problem via this method.

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Neither minimalism or contextualism: Form of life and Grammar in the *Blue Book*

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Abstract

The thesis that I defend in this paper is that Wittgenstein's considerations about the meaning show the futility of the current distinction between minimalism and contextualism, between what is said and what is meant.

For this purpose: (1) I make an introduction to contemporary debates about the meaning. Specifically, I present the passage from the semantics and pragmatics to minimalism and contextualism, (2) I expose the main thesis of minimalism and contextualism, (3) I present the position of the *Tractatus*, as example of a minimalist conception of meaning and the position of Grice, as example of a contextualist, and (4) I show, from Wittgenstein's thoughts in the *Blue Book*, the belief in the sign inert as the foundation of the confusion that generated endless debates about the meaning in this philosophical tradition.

1. Introduction

The twentieth century analytic philosophy of language can be divided into two camps: the ideal language philosophy (formal) and ordinary language philosophy. In the first camp, consisting of great thinkers, we find Frege, Russell, Carnap and Tarski, who think that natural language is faulty logic to address fundamental problems. In the second, we find Austin, Grice and Searle, who, however, criticize contemporary formal semantics hidden because ordinary language features that are crucial to a full understanding of the meaning of other phenomena of language. Both semantics and pragmatics emerge from this wide range of thinkers.

For ideal language philosophers, parents contemporary formal semantics, the meaning of a sentence is equivalent to the truth conditions of the sentence. In this perspective, the languages are conceived as sets of rules and conventions that determine how a series of signs can be understood as a meaningful sentence, ie well formed. Prayers are a compound and its meaning depends on the meaning of the component parts and how these components are organized, ie its structure. The meaning of each of the component parts is its reference. For example, the meaning of a name is the object that points and a predicate, properties or sets of objects. Thus, "the meaning of a declarative sentence, determined by the meanings of its constituents and the way they come together, equivalent to its truth conditions" (Recanati, 2004). Being a user of a language as well, is to have a theory to establish the truth conditions of any sentence of the language (Davidson, 1973).

In contrast, ordinary language philosophers argue that the reference and truth can not be ascribed to linguistic expressions regardless of the use of such expressions. Without a specific context, they argue, the words do not refer to anything and prayers have no truth conditions. From this perspective it is a mistake to think that the meaning of a word is an entity that pre-exists and that this sentence represents. "The meaning of a word, if there is such a thing, should rather be compared to its potential use or conditions" (Recanati, 2004). However, no one could speak of a radical antagonism between contemporary semantics and pragmatics. Now understand, even as complementary disciplines who share their object of study. "Thus, the ongoing debate about what is the best way to define the respective territories of the semantics and pragmatics betrays the persistence of two trends or prospects clearly recognizable in contemporary theoretical dis-

cussion" (Recanati, 2004), namely: the minimalism and contextualism.

2. Minimalism vs. Contextualism

In contemporary philosophy of language there is interest in explaining the relationship between the linguistic meaning of a sentence-type and what is meant, namely, that proposition expressed by the issuance of such prayer. The first, called by Grice (1957) as the thin line meaning of an utterance-type, is characterized by not depending on the environment where it is used. "This context-independent meaning contrasts with the possible propositions that leads prayer according to the different circumstances of use" (Recanati, 2004). May say so, the goal is to account for the sharp distinction that may exist between what is said and what is meant.

As we saw, the hallmark of the linguistic meaning of the sentence type is its conventional and independent of context. An utterance expresses an indefinite number of propositions, but they are all compatible with the semantic potential of the sentence uttered. There are two strong performances against the relationship between the meaning of the sentence, the meaning of the sentence type and the meaning of the proposition expressed by the issuance of such prayer. On the one hand there is the minimalist interpretation and secondly, contextualist interpretation.

For minimistas, "we can ascribe with legitimate truth-conditional content to natural language sentences is totally independent of what the speaker that emits want to say that prayer" (Recanati, 2004). For the contextualist, are speech acts, carriers conteino primitive, ie a sentence express a determinate content only in the context of such acts.

3. Tractarian position and the position of the blue notebook Grice

The Blue Notebook was dictated by Wittgenstein at Cambridge class of 1933 and 1934. This text is considered part of its production at a time in between, what some call, your first thought, embodied in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and his second thought, embodied in the *Philosophical Investigations*.

Wittgenstein, in the *Blue Book*, starts wondering what is the meaning of a word and from this question, develops

topics such as the nature of thought, the grammar of verbs of expectation, intentionality, solipsism and personal identity. However, his primary concern is the meaning. This is the theme that runs through all your considerations in this text and gives unity to it. Therefore, if might claim considerations to account for any of the above issues, it is necessary to note that such considerations are framed by considerations of meaning.

Such is the case of a piece of text which focuses on the question of intentionality, specifically in how we think about something that does not exist? If we answer this question from a perspective like the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein say, shall we say simply that if a fact is a complex of objects and thought is a fact, then, to think the non-existent is to create a nonexistent combination of existing objects. This is because the meaning of a linguistic expression depends on the meaning of its components and the combination of these components, ie, this is a minimalist position. Let's see.

The central part of the *Tractatus*, for many including Russell, is the semantic theory of figuration and in particular, the statement of structural isomorphism between language, thought and the world as a condition of possibility of any significance. For Ramsey, "this doctrine appears to be dependent on problematic notions of 'figure' and 'form of representation'" (Ramsey, 1923) and this means that we need a detailed study of these terms and derived from them to achieve a better understanding of the theory.

"The logical picture of the facts is the thought" (TLP, 3) and "In the proposition the thought is expressed" (TLP, 3.1), therefore, "the proposition is a picture of reality. The proposition is a model of reality as we use" (TLP, 4.01). Thought can not be known except through propositions that express it, but the language can not encompass the totality of thought for its conventionality. For this reason, the theory of figuration focuses on explaining the relationship between language and the world, for that is derived from that relationship between thought and the world.

So when we say that a proposition is a fact that makes sense, we are saying that on the one hand, there is a structural isomorphism, has a figurative relationship, its elements are related in the same way they relate the figurative elements, and by Moreover, its elements are coordinated one-on-one with the pictured items. "[...] It is clear that 'A believes that p', 'A thinks p', 'A says p' are of the form" p 'says p': and here there is a coordination of an event and object, but the coordination of facts through coordination of its objects" (TLP, 5.542). The meaning of every proposition not thus depends only on its internal structure but also its relationship with the world.

The rejection of the position before we can see it in the *Blue Book* in the following excerpt:

"What is it that makes a portrait a portrait of Mr. N?' The spontaneous response would be: 'The similarity between portrait and Mr. N' [...] It is quite clear, however, that the similarity is not our idea of a portrait, because the essence of this idea is that it would make sense to talk about a good or a bad portrait. In other words, it is essential that the shadow is able to represent things as they are in fact" (BB, p. 62).

Then, Wittgenstein provides another chance to answer the question 'what makes a portrait a portrait such and such?', Namely the intention. This would be the answer I would give a philosopher like Grice, great representative of contextualism. For this thinker, consider the use of signs in communication to decipher the meaning of them. Defi-

ciency as the Tractarian theory would be that only provides an analysis of statements about the standard meaning or general meaning of a sign, that is, it says nothing about how to deal with claims about what a speaker means especially in a particular situation. Thus, a linguistic expression with unnatural meaning is true if one tried to induce the belief expressed in any hearing. That is, for a speaker has meant something with a linguistic expression, not only must have been issued with the intention to produce a certain belief, but also that the speaker must have intended audience recognize his intention upon expression.

In this conception, Wittgenstein sees an error. This is intended to be confused with a state or a mental process and people can not see that there are many combinations of actions and states such men might be called 'intend to ...'. For example, "There are an infinite variety of actions and words, they have each other a family resemblance, which we call 'try to copy'" (BB, p. 62).

4. From what is said and what is meant

If, as we saw in the previous section, the meaning does not equate to the truth conditions nor the intention of the speaker, then what is the meaning? This question begins the *Blue Book* and all he produces is a mind cramp. You need to change that question by the question how do you explain the meaning, as when giving the explanation of what something is surely is taking the meaning of what it is. By giving an explanation, which is explained by explaining the meaning. The explanation for something, and with it its meaning can be given in many different ways, namely: giving examples, ostensive, making comparisons or by paraphrasing. This question is decisive change in the reasoning of the notebook, because when asking for an explanation and not the meaning eliminates the need to explain the meaning or as an elation between words and objects or their truth conditions, or as a relationship between words and mental state or intent process. The explanation, however, appears to give a usage rule, a rule action. To this extent, the explanation is understood when the person can use correct expressions. So, if we can say something of meaning is that it is a matter of rules.

The question that should be asked now, then what is 'following a rule'? For Wittgenstein two things are clear on this point, these are: first, that he who learns a pattern of behavior, learn a mechanism for developing new cases, ie infinite potential significance. Second, to learn to follow a rule is to learn the use of a symbol. Wittgenstein shows that the correction as a practice is an external agent that allows us to follow a rule. Therefore, the practice itself has to generate resources to recover the standards contained in the symbol. So what is the relationship between the rule and actions? A person can follow a rule only if there is a default and follow manner, ie a habit. Consequently, on the one hand, the way we apprehend a rule is not an interpretation, that is, you learn the regulations of the thing doing the same thing and therefore, there must be a practical background prior nonconceptual. On the other, you can not follow a rule privately, ie not believe follow a rule is to follow the rule.

The error minimalism and contextualist positions lies, in this vein, in principle how it raises the question of meaning. The main consequence of this bad design, both in design and the other is the claim that the sign is inert and requires an interpretation that that acquires meaning. In other words, the consequence of this error is the approach of a gap between the 'mean' and 'mean'.

We can now say that whenever you give someone an order showing an arrow and we do 'mechanically' (without thinking), we mean the arrow in one way or another. And this process of mean, whatever may be its kind, can be represented by another arrow (pointing in the same direction as the first or \neg versa). In this representation we make of the 'mean and say' is essential to imagine that say and mean processes take place in two different spheres (...) I put her \neg now that you think the meaning is a process that came to say and which can lead to a further sign, which until then equivalent. Therefore, you have to tell me \neg ra aho what is for you the distinctive between a sig \neg and meaning. If you do, for example, saying that the meaning is the arrow that you envision as opposed to anyone who can draw us \neg ted or otherwise produce, you are thereby saying that it will not call any arrow plus a the inter \neg pretation has imagined (BB, p. 63-64).

In this small section Wittgenstein asks how can aiming or pointing an arrow? At the same time it shows that we can get a similar question regarding the signs. It would be a mistake to think that "if the intent of the signs is not derived from internal processes, then it can be derived from 'acts' of significance (acts of will)" (Hacker, 2000, p. 8). The life of a sign lies in the rules governing their use in practice. Thus "linguistic practices constitute the speaker as such in a context ontogenetic and regulate the linguistic behavior of the speakers in a normalized context" (Cabanchik, 2010, p. 55). In this vein, if a phrase can refer to an object or we 'to mean something with it' is not due to an additional process to perform in uttering this sentence only to the grammar of the words we use, grammar is rooted in a way of life that we share.

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Wittgenstein on Epistemic Agency

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Abstract

The aims of this paper are: (i) to show that in *On Certainty* Wittgenstein attempts to meet the challenge posed by the sceptic to our right to believe hinge-propositions, that is, that he is not opposed to the epistemologist's quest for autonomy and for certainty; (ii) to analyse the transcendental argument advanced by Wittgenstein, an argument whose goal is to demonstrate that a reason to doubt is never able to discredit our certainty; (iii) to make a distinction between two kinds of certainty: moral and metaphysical certainty, showing that they are not two grades of assent.

1. Reflective and psychological certainty

One of the traits that serve to define the inescapable human condition is our capacity to separate ourselves from our consciousness, introducing a sort of division within our minds. We are able to acquire a position to form a higher-order response to our spontaneous life, and to make a reflective evaluation of our feelings, approving or disapproving them.

The role played by this ability is conspicuous in epistemology: we are capable of detaching ourselves from our beliefs, of asking if we have a right to hold them, and of attempting to make them our own. It's not enough that some beliefs are psychologically compulsive, that we can't help to assent to them. We are not satisfied with surrendering our agency to an external power (although this power were entrenched in our human nature), with yielding to necessities that are both irresistible and coercive. We aspire to be fully identified with and responsible for those commitments that we neither choose nor could give up. In this sense, the epistemologist's quest is a quest for *autonomy*: to come into full possession of his beliefs in such a way that they are imposed upon him by himself, namely, by his reason. The subject may be unable to resist the power reasons exert, but it is his own power. In short: the descriptive dimension (how we believe) is supplemented by a *normative dimension* which establishes the sort of attitude we should *rationally adopt* toward a given proposition. Obviously, the discrepancy between what we cannot help believing and what we have a right to believe is the source of a virulent kind of intellectual anxiety incompatible with "*comfortable certainty*" (Wittgenstein 2004, § 357), of a nagging dissatisfaction with our beliefs that results in insecurity. It is not an easy task to acquire a mature confidence. And yet it is our inescapable task, one we cannot easily abandon.

According to a familiar reading of *On Certainty*, one advanced by Peter Strawson (Strawson 2008, 1-24), and that attributes to Hume and Wittgenstein a position called "epistemological naturalism", a way of putting the lesson of Wittgenstein's last remarks for Cartesian scepticism is by saying that, insofar as certain grammatical propositions "of the form of empirical propositions" (Wittgenstein 2004, § 401) —"I have two hands", "The Earth didn't come to exist five minutes ago"...— are psychologically compulsive, and that they play a foundational role in our schemes of thinking, the equation between things that we believe without reason and thinks that we believe heteronomously is misleading. Hinge-beliefs are not *opinions*, beliefs that we could (or *should*) assert or deny depending on the evidence gathered by the cognitive subject. In this sense, they are neither reasonable nor unreasonable to believe,

and so it doesn't make sense either to try to defend them or to cast doubts upon them. As a result, there is no such a thing as the reasons for which we hold these beliefs, and thereby skeptical arguments and traditional proofs against scepticism are equally *idle*. According to this view, Wittgenstein restricted epistemic agency to opinions: the quest for coming into full possession of our hinges is senseless.

Is it senseless? There is a disturbing resemblance between this question and the old problem of the self-validation of reason. In Modern philosophy the deliverances of reason played the same role of hinge-beliefs: they were psychologically indubitable, they were foundational in order to make sense of our way of thinking, they were beyond evidential proof and disproof, there was something suspicious in attempting a higher-order validation of them when they were the last word. And yet we have the nagging feeling that unless we could successfully answer in the affirmative the problem of which attitude we should rationally adopt toward those deliverances, unless we gain a right to reason, those compulsive beliefs fall short of a high epistemic status. After all, it makes sense to think that our truth-tracking faculties could be systematically deceptive, and that, for all we know, our natural trust in them can be unjustified. Most varieties of scepticism have exploited this possibility, advancing far-fetched hypotheses whose goal is to detach oneself from the person (namely, oneself) who entertains such and such beliefs. In the light of those global scenarios it isn't enough to point out that in order to play our language-games some things must be certain, or that in order to judge we are forced to make some assumptions. The question is *if we have the right to believe those assumptions*, if they can be irresistible but not coercive. If the sceptic's goal is to divorce ourselves from our beliefs, the anti-sceptical therapy lies in coming to a full understanding of hinge-beliefs as part of oneself, it lies in coming to see that "a doubt is not necessary even when it is possible" (Wittgenstein 2004, § 392), namely, that the possibility that I might be wrong in my basic assumptions "it is *no ground* for any *unsureness* in my judgment" (Wittgenstein 2004, § 606), it isn't enough to support one's withholding of assent.

In *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein not only is fully aware of the challenge posed by the sceptic to our right to say that we cannot be wrong regarding hinge-beliefs: he is ready to meet the challenge "even if I am in error" (Wittgenstein 2004, § 663), that is, even in the face of sceptical doubts. Wittgenstein advances a *transcendental argument* in defence of trust in our epistemic faculties. His goal is to make radical doubt impossible at the very outset, since it requires him to base his doubt upon the very kind of cognition against which the doubt is directed. According to this argument, radical doubt is self-annihilating.

Three preliminary remarks are apposite before giving an outline of the argument: (i) It is a *transcendental* argument, an argument which appeals to reasons that are not “a form of *evidence*” (Davidson 2006, 232). It would make no sense to turn to evidences when those evidences are *less certain* than the hinge-beliefs they (allegedly) are able to support. (ii) The argument is of the *reductio* kind, which means that it doesn’t appeal to a higher authority than hinge-beliefs, and that it doesn’t attempt to deduce our basic beliefs from logical principles. Both from a *logical* and from an *epistemological* point of view our faculties are *on a par*: there is no difference between the certainty of logic and the certainty that I have two hands. (iii) The goal of the argument is not to demonstrate that our fundamental beliefs are true or indubitable (that there are things that we *know*, where “to know” has a metaphysical emphasis). Its goal is much more modest: to show that from the possibility that our beliefs could be false it doesn’t follow that we are rationally impelled to suspend our judgment. It is our attitude what must be changed, not our knowledge: “There is a chair there” is a claim that it is not true unless there is, “but I have the right to say this if I am *sure* there is a chair there, even if I am wrong” (Wittgenstein 2004, § 549).

2. Wittgenstein’s transcendental argument

In the last remark of *On Certainty* (Wittgenstein 2004, § 676) Wittgenstein considers two sceptical scenarios: the possibility that one has been drugged in such a way that the drug ingested disables one’s cognitive faculties and induces an illusion of coherent empirical reality, and the stock supposition that one is at this very moment dreaming. Both hypotheses are global scenarios: they cannot be ruled out appealing to the deliverances of those very faculties that the scenario makes deceptive without involving bootstrapping or circularity. The question is: taking into account those possibilities, what is the right attitude to adopt toward “My faculties are reliable”?

Talking about right or wrong attitudes it entails that one is implicitly appealing to the Standard Epistemic Imperative. This imperative says that one should adopt any of three epistemic attitudes toward a given proposition: to believe it, to doubt it, or to deny it; and that, in the light of a reason to have doubts on *p*, it makes sense to ask which of those attitudes is more reasonable.

Wittgenstein’s reply to this challenge is misleadingly simple. If one had been drugged one’s truth-tracking faculties would be unreliable, and so the *intra-rational possibility* that one could be drugged would be unreliable. Therefore, if the hypotheses considered are true *one doesn’t have a reliable reason to doubt one’s faculties*. The conclusions are obvious: the sceptic has to assume that he is not drugged in order to raise the possibility that he might be drugged; any reason to doubt the reliability of our faculties that is based on rational considerations must presuppose in its very statement the standards that it attempts to undermine. Another way of putting the argument is by saying that, since the possibility that one has been drugged is itself a deliverance of reason, one cannot claim that such a possibility is reasonable unless one also claims that it is reasonable to believe that the deliverances of reason are reliable. A third way of paraphrasing it, using higher-order terms, would be by saying that, insofar as if one had taken the drug it would make no sense to talk about adopting a right or a wrong epistemic attitude toward “My faculties are reliable”, there is only one rational attitude to take toward this proposition: to believe it. Other attitudes are *a priori* cancelled: whenever one considers the question if one’s cognitive faculties are reliable one is *rationally committed*

to answer in the affirmative. In this respect, the right to believe is fully guaranteed.

It would be very attractive to connect Wittgenstein’s argument to Moore’s approach to the dream hypothesis (Moore 1959, 248-249), by pointing out that his main insight is that a reason to doubt must not itself be (metaphysically) doubtful, and that he says that the sceptic is committed to these inconsistent claims:

- (i) I am uncertain that I didn’t take a disabling drug.
- (ii) I am certain that (i) I am uncertain that I didn’t take a disabling drug.
- (iii) I am uncertain that my epistemic faculties are reliable.
- (iv) I am certain that (iii) I am uncertain that my epistemic faculties are reliable.

Nevertheless, Wittgenstein’s position is much more nuanced. The conclusion of his argument is not that one is not drugged, but that the sceptic is committed to trust in his faculties in order to have a reason to question them, that he is committed to trust them even if they are deceptive. Compatibly with our rational incapacity of suspending judgement on our hinge-propositions it is quite possible logically or metaphysically that one is drugged or that one is dreaming. In other words, what the argument shows is not that reasons to doubt are not possible, and so that the sceptic is committed to the self-refuting claim that a sceptical scenario counts as a reason to doubt the reliability of our faculties if and only if those faculties are *in fact* reliable, but that, since a reason to doubt is reasonable only if trust in our faculties is itself reasonable, a reason to doubt is never able to alter or discredit our certainty. Our certainties are *irreversible* even in the face of sceptical scenarios. It is not that reasons to doubt are inconceivable or self-refuting: it is self-refuting to think that those reasons rationally compel us to withhold assent when *the very conditions of a reasonable doubt preclude this option*.

Wittgenstein’s main insight is that a reason to doubt must not be *morally doubtful*, and that it cannot be morally certain unless our belief that our faculties are reliable is not itself morally certain. The criterion of *moral certainty* is quite different from the stringent criterion of *metaphysical certainty*. There is no contradiction in affirming that (i) one is morally certain that one’s faculties are reliable, that (ii) one is metaphysically uncertain that one’s faculties are reliable, and that (iii) one is morally certain that one is metaphysically uncertain that one’s faculties are reliable. The distinction between moral and metaphysical certainty makes sense of the fact that, for all we know, global hypotheses are a good reason to discredit metaphysical knowledge, namely, the philosophical urge “to insist that there are things that I *know*”, when “God himself can’t say anything to me about them” (Wittgenstein 2004, § 554), while keeping intact Wittgenstein’s main intuition: that we are rationally committed to trust them.

Finally, it is necessary to clarify the difference between moral and metaphysical certainty in order to correct a common misunderstanding, and to support our claim that it is appropriate to use those categories for making sense of Wittgenstein’s procedure.

According to a certain view, moral certainty and metaphysical certainty are *two grades* of certainty, and thus a belief is morally certain when it is much more reasonable to assert it than to deny or doubt it, and it is metaphysically certain when it is maximally reasonable. Beliefs that are

morally certain fall short of the highest kind of assent. Metaphysical certainty is this highest grade of assent.

If this were the correct understanding of the concepts considered they couldn't apply to Wittgenstein's position: he would be committed to demote hinge-beliefs to well-founded beliefs, and to make of them reversible certainties. But it is not. Hinge-beliefs' position is *fixed* at the very end of the epistemic spectrum although they are morally certain. The reason is that moral and metaphysical certainties are on a par: equally irreversible, equally immune to new information. The distinction between them lies in the fact that beliefs that are metaphysically certain are not only irreversible: a reason to doubt them is *inconceivable*. Reaching them, we wouldn't gain the right to believe, but the *right to know*. If to talk about "promotion" it makes sense here, we would say that metaphysical certainty does not promote our *attitude* (sureness), but our *aptness*.

The quest for truth is quite different from Wittgenstein's quest: the quest for certainty.

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Perceptual Illusions, Misperceptions, and the Empirical Strategy

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Abstract

This contribution is concerned with the question of how perceptual illusions and misperceptions are related. Two assumptions shall be vindicated: Firstly, they might be rather distinct affairs. Secondly, they may not necessarily be maladaptive. A theory in cognitive psychology that provides an account that partly captures this twofold intuition is discussed in some detail: the “Empirical Strategy” (as proposed by Purves et al.). The normative qualities of one’s perceptual relation to an object are determined by the actual match or mismatch between the information provided by the environment and one’s dispositions to act upon that information. A history of successful behaviours towards the kind of object under a given set of environmental conditions will take precedence over getting the measurable physical properties right. The latter might even be systematically misrendered in perception.

1 Introduction

I shall be concerned with the question of how perceptual illusions and misperceptions are related, and I will try to demonstrate that they might be rather different affairs. Rather than attempting to devise an answer in analytic terms – what the meaning of either term is, or should be – I will discuss one relatively recent theory in cognitive psychology that provides an interesting, although perhaps not the definite empirical answer to this question. To my knowledge, that theory, known as the “Empirical Strategy”, has not yet received a large amount of attention to date in the philosophy of mind.¹

In intuitively distinguishing between illusion and misperception, I am following a fairly straightforward distinction discussed by David Armstrong (1960) in his interpretation of Berkeley (1709, to whom I will return below): If I see something as red, round and having all the visual qualities of a tomato, and it turns out not to be a tomato but a plastic replica, I am likely to have misperceived it, for having mistaken it for another thing. Yet I have not fallen for a visual illusion – unless I was mistaken about the replica’s redness, roundness etc. to begin with. If however I see something as square, purple and perhaps lacking other visual qualities of a tomato, and it turns out to be a very normally shaped and coloured tomato, I have been subject to visual illusion, in not getting the physical properties of the object right. In either case, I might be at a disadvantage, and it seems natural to assume that this is the standard result of instances of misperception and illusion.

It is the naturalness of this assumption that is questioned by the Empirical Strategy. Both misperception and illusion may not necessarily be maladaptive. The normative qualities of my perceptual relation to the object in question are determined by the actual match or mismatch between the information provided by the environment and my dispositions to act upon that information. Getting the physical properties right might not be all that important.

2 The Strategy of the Empirical Strategy

The Empirical Strategy has been developed by Dale Purves and colleagues (Purves et al. 2001; Purves et al. 2011). This theory of perception is partly aligned with, and

partly departs from, two paradigms in the psychology of perception in instructive ways. With Gibsonian ecological psychology (Gibson 1986), it shares the emphasis on the relation between perception and environmentally embedded behaviour, thus avoiding the cognitivism of computational neuroscience that developed in the wake of Marr (2010). With the latter, it shares the assumption that visual perception is based on the retinal image, and that perceptual processes can be computationally modelled – tenets that were forcefully rejected by Gibson.

In combining an environment-directed outlook with a distinctive set of computational and statistical methods, the Empirical Strategy seeks to explain the peculiarities of perception by reference to a history of organisms interacting with conditions in their environments. The Empirical Strategy is termed “empirical” precisely for rooting the character of perceptions in past experience of the species or the individual. How something *is perceived*, out of a spectrum of variant possibilities, is determined by how it *has been acted upon* – and not merely on how it has been perceived – in the past. Past success in doing something in response to a perception will determine how it is being perceived at present.

The authors commence from the “inverse optics problem”, as it was formulated in George Berkeley’s *Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision* (1709). Berkeley’s initial observation was that distances cannot be directly perceived and that space, as such and in itself, cannot be seen, and that similar conditions apply to other perceptual qualities, such as the magnitude of objects. Identical retinal images can be caused by different objects, under different conditions, in different constellations. Berkeley’s proposed solution is to base the perception of distances on the perceiving subject’s experience. Only from the context of experiencing certain objects in certain constellations, one learns to associate *prima facie* identical visual cues with different perceptual situations, and hence to reliably and appropriately identify the correct distance, magnitude etc. of objects.

Purves and his colleagues follow Berkeley’s lead when identifying the inverse optics problem as the issue “that light stimuli cannot specify the objects and conditions in the world that caused them” (Purves et al. 2011, 15588), and, like Berkeley, they delegate the task of specification to the perceiving subject’s experience. Their solution to this problem is not as much based on subjective experience as is Berkeley’s. Instead, it is fashioned in a more externalist and partly supra-individual way. Purves et al. (2001, 285) argue that “proximal stimuli trigger patterns of

¹ I have to thank Brian McLaughlin for raising my attention to the Empirical Strategy during the workshop “Perception and Knowledge” at the University of Graz, Austria, in October 2012, and I have to thank Martina Fürst and Guido Melchior, the organisers, for placing that workshop and McLaughlin’s paper right when and where I needed it.

neuronal activity that have been shaped solely by the past consequences of visually guided behaviour". These consequences are assessed by reference to their historical context rather than to the measurable physical properties of the perceived objects.

In this circumscribed sense, the Empirical Strategists share Gibson's view that the match between the object or process that is being perceived and the way in which it is perceived is determined by the relation between the perceiving organism and the object under a given set of environmental conditions. However, the qualitative difference between Gibson's ecological context and the historical context mobilised by the Empirical Strategists is that the latter accounts for the possibility that the proximal stimulus or a series of proximal stimuli, including their ecological context, might remain precisely the same while allowing for a process of adaptation of *what is actually seen* to what the perceiving organism requires. On the Gibsonian view, in contrast, the information to be picked up from the environment – that what it affords to the perceiving organism – remains rather rigidly tied to his or her behaviours.

The process of adaptation envisioned here is not to be understood in a strictly evolutionary sense, although it might include evolutionary elements, namely in the case where the "past experience of the species" amounts to differential reproduction between those organisms in a population who did vs. those who did not succeed in connecting the proximal stimulus to a rewarding behaviour towards the assumed source of the stimulus or towards a world affair correlated with that source. The process of adaptation could also be one of, mostly unsupervised, learning from experience – which does not imply inferential processes.

In order to succeed, the perceiving organism does not have to be aware of the relation between proximal stimulus and rewarding behaviour, nor does it need to explicitly draw conclusions from past experience. The retinal image is not analysed. Nor are the physical properties of the perceived object veridically represented. The measurable physical properties of the object only provide a set of boundary conditions that underdetermine the possible ways of perception. They are not represented in vision (Purves et al. 2011, 15592). Again, these assumptions about what perception is *not* bear some resemblance to the Gibsonian view, whereas the notion of information implied (but not explicitly discussed) in the context of the Empirical Strategy is markedly indirect and underdetermined. It does not build upon, nor does it implicitly presuppose, a direct correlation between a perceptual quality and the physical properties of the object.

3 Perception and Probability

On the Empirical Strategy, the relation between perceptual qualities and their target appears at once rather simple and fairly complex and abstract: Some perceptual token will be reproduced if it is closely associated with successful behaviours towards its source or towards some correlate of that source. This condition is sufficient for an empirical adequacy that does not imply veridicality of perception. Divergence between perceptual qualities and the physical conditions at the source is considered unproblematic in principle. Instead, what is decisive for getting things right in perception are the frequency distributions of different retinal patterns, which are mapped not onto different physical variables but onto different behaviours that differentially respond to certain world affairs, in accordance with the probability distributions of these affairs (Purves et al. 2011, 15594). In this specific sense, there is no such thing as

misperception or perceptual illusion: "Since the measured properties of objects are not perceived, they cannot be misperceived" (Purves et al. 2001, 296).

For example, the observable mismatch between differences in lightness or brightness of an object as perceptual qualities on the one hand and measured illumination and luminance of the physical objects on the other is attributed to the relation between two, probabilistically determined, factors:

(1) Frequency distributions can be determined for different luminance values of some object as they obtain for the contexts of the different natural scenes in which it appears. An object is likely to be more often encountered under certain lighting conditions than under others.

(2) Frequency distributions are assumed for the rates of success of behaviours of the perceiving organism or its ancestors towards that kind of object. These latter frequency distributions will have been, and may remain, affected by processes of selection, on phylogenetic or ontogenetic levels, of variant behaviours.

These two types of frequency distributions may be mapped onto each other, so as to see how reliable behavioural success with respect to the object in question will be under the predominant conditions of appearance in the perceiving organism's environment, and what the cost of failure under less frequent conditions will be. In similar fashion, the explanation of other seeming perceptual illusions in Purves et al. (2001; 2011) frequently relies on matching perceived qualities of some object against databases of frequencies of occurrence of retinal images corresponding to commonly occurring natural scenes containing that kind of object.

In the present example, equally luminant objects or patterns are perceived as darker when placed in a brightly illuminated context and lighter when placed in a darker context because the differential rates of occurrence of the retinal projections caused by the same objects under different conditions are matched by adaptive behaviours towards those same objects under the respective conditions (Purves et al. 2011, 15589). At first, the probability distributions of luminance values of objects under different lighting conditions and the perceived brightness will seem to be 'skewed' towards greater perceived brightness than measurement of luminance would suggest for those retinal patterns which occur with the highest frequencies, namely under poor lighting conditions. Perception however is not skewed in terms of the behaviours that respond to the world affairs that are correlated with the named perceptual effects. There will be some use to perceptions of objects under poor lighting conditions as exceedingly bright. The use of this seeming illusion should be expected to lie in more reliable or efficient recognition of the kind of object in question, and hence in more reliable responses to the presence or behaviour of that object.

4 Misperception and Illusion

The bottom line of the Empirical Strategy is this: The perceived length, shape, colour etc. of some object need not match the measurable physical properties of that source object. These properties may be invariably mis-rendered in perception while being appropriately treated on the level of behaviours and their adaptive functions. If the behaviours towards the object are consistent with the overall constitution and dispositions of the perceiving organism, and if this match owes to the phylogenetic or ontogenetic selection of the ways in which the respective properties of the external

environment are rendered to the perceiving organism, the seeming misrendering will be vindicated within the given context. It might even amount to a systematic effect. There will be no distortion in the matching between the behaviours and the environment, nor in the adaptiveness of the behaviours. The apparent mismatch between the experimentally determined perceptual qualities and the physical variables is an epiphenomenon of the operations of properly functioning mechanisms, and may be discounted as such. The necessary precondition for the success of the seeming illusion will be that it is embedded in the context of an environment that is stable enough to allow the organism to reliably handle world affairs within the bounds of his constitution and dispositions.

It is interesting to observe that all examples discussed by the authors of the Empirical Strategy are concerned with cases in which identical targets look different to the perceiver, whereas their point of departure, the inverse optics problem, is identified by Berkeley as the problem that different targets, when placed in a certain relation to the perceiver, may look identical. The Empirical Strategy thus seems to account for only one of two types of cases of misperception, so as to demonstrate that they are not illusions after all (see Purves et al. 2011, 15590). The possibility of different things appearing as identical relates to measurable properties in a different way than in the paradigm cases of the Empirical Strategy: These properties are part of an account considering the specific conditions of spatial geometry under which the projection of an identical retinal image by different objects obtains. Here, perception is not necessarily *at variance* with the measurable properties but becomes ambiguous *by virtue* of their specific arrangement.

Moreover, the Empirical Strategy remains exclusively concerned with isolated perceptual qualities, such as brightness, or perceived angles, length, and motion rather than more complex perceptual affairs in which seeming illusions are mended by perceptual context, and in which an object with complex and perhaps multi-modal perceptual qualities is relevant to the organism in certain ways, as they are claimed to be in Gibsonian ecological psychology. It is the environmental context and the additional cues it provides that helps to correct for perceptual ambiguities of the second, Berkeleyan kind. If that context can be used, the ambiguities are likely to be harmless.

In being so confined to isolated perceptual qualities, the Empirical Strategy is not in a position to consider the possibility that an organism encounters situations in which most or even all of the measurable physical properties of certain objects encountered in its environment are identical on the surface level, and are perceived identically, while actually belonging to objects that are different enough to make a difference to the organism. In such situations, the organism might have genuinely misperceived the object in question.

Any bug replica in an experiment in frog vision that faithfully shares its surface properties with edible bugs, and hence will be perceived and treated identically, however without being nourishing to the frog, escapes this account – unless, that is, we assume that there are other cues available to the frog as to the bug replica's identity as a replica. These are situations of genuinely ambiguous information for perception that is prone to end in misperception – but these are certainly not cases of perceptual illusion. Misperceptions of this kind will inevitably occur, but such situations will be difficult to assess for any theory of perception that does not spell out the specific conditions for perception with respect both to its historical *and* to its ecological context.

Such situations are not limited to frogs in experimental settings but may occur in all cases where environmental conditions are changeable in various ways, by various means, and require adaptive changes in the way the entities in question are perceived. In such situations, firstly, the probabilistic character of natural information is of a different kind than that envisioned in the Empirical Strategy. The overall distribution of informational correlations may be subject to change in ways that are not captured by the frequency distributions used in that account. Secondly, the dependence of perception and the possibilities of action on how the environment stands and develops becomes obvious in a yet deeper sense perhaps than envisioned by Gibson and the Empirical Strategists. Human beings, too, will be exposed to situations in which these conditions obtain.

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Meaning is Not Use: An Illustration of/from Wittgenstein's Exhibition of Arguments in his Philosophical Album for Therapeutic Purposes

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Abstract

I argue that arguments like the ones in *PI* §§40-43 ("meaning is use"), *PI* §§201-202 ("rule-following" is a practice)—even though they may come in the forceful form of *reductio ad absurdum*, and indeed have convinced entire schools of (analytic) philosophers—play a role in Wittgenstein's therapeutic investigations only insofar as they help specifying the sense of what 'we are "tempted to say"' (*PI* §254). It is in this way that Wittgenstein's specific use of arguments forms part of his 'philosophical treatment' (*PI* §255) as arranged in a series of instructing examples in the *Philosophical Investigations* (cf. *PI* §133). Discussing the example of "meaning is use", I intend to illustrate how Wittgenstein can be understood as truthfully sticking to his announced principles of non-dogmatic, therapeutic philosophising, thus using arguments in a way as to merely *exhibit* rather than to assert them.

1. Introduction

In a paper from 1956 entitled 'How I See Philosophy', the later Friedrich Waismann wrote, 'No philosopher has ever proved anything' (Waismann 1956, 22). I believe that when writing this sentence Waismann must have stood under the lasting impression of his reading of Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (1953). The aim of the present paper is to point out one way in which Wittgenstein's use of arguments differs indeed significantly from the ways in which similar arguments have been used traditionally and also from how they are most commonly used in contemporary debates in academic philosophy. For example, Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following in his *Philosophical Investigations* are often presented as culminating in section 202, more precisely in the words "following a rule" is a practice' (*PI* §202). The vast majority of commentators take this remark to state the conclusion of a *reductio ad absurdum* argument by which Wittgenstein supposedly refutes the so-called rule-following paradox. Such commentators comprise Saul Kripke and John McDowell but also Peter Hacker and some other prominent Wittgenstein scholars. (I present an alternative reading in Grève 2012a and Grève 2012b.) More generally speaking, there seems to be significantly large agreement regarding a handful of passages that supposedly contain arguments such as the one just mentioned and that are commonly held to form the most important parts of Wittgenstein's *PI*.

I believe that this is not so. By a careful consideration of Wittgenstein's ("propagandised") conception of philosophy as somewhat analogous to a kind of therapy, I argue that it can be shown that Wittgenstein's use of arguments is in fact much less orthodox than generally supposed anyway. Insofar as in the *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein writes, 'a method is ... demonstrated by examples' (*PI* §133) and further that he 'should not like [his] writing to spare other people from the trouble of thinking' (*PI*, Preface [4]), it would already seem doubtful whether he could truly be said to present arguments in order to establish any true conclusions—not to mention his explicit reluctance to do so (cf., e.g., *PI* §§109, 128; further the 'album'-remark in *PI*, Preface [3-4]; and regarding the latter Pichler 2009, 57-69). In the following however I will discuss one example of an argument that can be found in Wittgenstein's text, in order to illustrate the particular use that he makes of such arguments at some – though, unfortunately, really rather

little – detail. But first I want to briefly indicate the kind of framework according to which I believe this different way of using arguments should be understood.

2. A few words on Wittgenstein's therapeutic practice

It is Wittgenstein's conviction that some philosophical problems can take on the form of philosophical perplexities in the mind of a particular person. Such perplexities, he writes, are 'problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language' (*PI* §111):

'These are, of course, not empirical problems; but they are solved through an insight into the workings of our language, and that in such a way that these workings are recognized – *despite* an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by coming up with new discoveries, but by assembling what we have long been familiar with. Philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language.' (*PI* §109)

Along the same lines of reasoning, Wittgenstein early on describes his philosophical method as 'essentially the transition from the question of *truth* to the question of *sense*' (Ms-105,46[2], *my translation*). But far from philosophising with the dictionary, Wittgenstein in fact developed a *plurality* of "therapeutic" methods (*PI* §133) in order to set out in the struggle against the power that linguistic expressions exert over us (cf. also Conant 2011). The method of constructing 'objects of comparison' (*PI* §130) in the form of (imaginary) language games is really only one amongst many. Another, which is the one I shall focus on here, is *the exhibition of arguments*.

3. "Meaning is Use"

I think that there is something wrong with the way in which many people have dealt with what Wittgenstein writes in section 43 of *Philosophical Investigations*, namely that, as preferably quoted, '...the meaning of a word is its use in the language...' (*PI* §43). See Alston 1963 and Horwich 1998 for two striking instances of this failure to understand Wittgenstein's original intention. I agree with what O. K. Bouwsma noted in 1961 already:

'[n]early everyone these days speaks and writes in this new fashion [*i.e.* "meaning is use"]. And yet nothing has been changed. If before we were puzzled with: What is the meaning of a word? now we are puzzled with: What is the use of a word?' (Bouwsma 1961, 158-9)

Alois Pichler (2004), however, presents a welcome exception. There Pichler correctly points out that it would be a mistake to read the preceding section 40 as anything like Wittgenstein's argument to the conclusion that meaning somehow, if only '[f]or a large class of cases' (PI §43), had to be use (pace Hacker 2005, 117ff.). Instead, on Pichler's interpretation §40 is to be read as a dogmatic misunderstanding of what it is actually supposed to mean when Wittgenstein writes 'the meaning of a word is its use in the language' (PI §43). Pichler is further right in stressing the polyphonic (multi-conversational) structure of the remarks in the PI. It is not only Wittgenstein speaking in section 40. Rather it is the fictional character of the dogmatic linguist, Hans (let us call him). Hans thinks that he could easily refute someone else, Franz, who holds a reference theory of meaning (or, roughly, the idea that the meaning of a word is 'the object for which the word stands' (PI §1)). Hans believes to be able to achieve this by presenting Franz with a *reductio ad absurdum*. Hans argues that Franz's position leads to a paradox because Franz mixes up the meaning of a word with its *bearer*. Thus, in §40 Wittgenstein has Hans saying the following:

'It is important to note that it is a solecism to use the word "meaning" to signify the thing that 'corresponds' to a word. That is to confound the meaning of a name with the bearer of the name. When Mr N.N. dies, one says that the *bearer* of the name dies, not that the meaning dies. And it would be nonsensical to say this, for if the name ceased to have meaning, it would make no sense to say "Mr N.N. is dead".' (PI §40)

It would be wrong to think that this argument was straightforwardly asserted by Wittgenstein, because Wittgenstein is well aware that this is not going to be, or at any rate need not be, the last word between Hans and Franz (note the wide scope of possible individual characters that is expressed in the choice of this proverbial conjunction of German names). After all, it is indeed easy to think of a way in which someone, some individual person that is, might want to escape Hans' proposed *reductio ad absurdum*. According to his therapeutic intents Wittgenstein naturally takes this possibility into account. Pichler, again correctly, comments on the passage as follows:

'The problem is not so much a theoretical one. It is not the case that the one promoting an "object theoretical" account of meaning would simply contradict himself when confronted with sentences like "Mr N.N. is dead". After all, as the *Tractatus* masterly demonstrates, the only thing he needs to do is to put the level of objects further back and the "meaning" will be rescued.' (Pichler 2004, 171-2, *my translation*)

What Pichler is alluding to here is the idea of (*atomic*) objects and (*atomic*) names, the notions on which the so-called picture-theory of meaning in early Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* relied upon.

In PI §42, then, Wittgenstein reminds us that we sometimes even say that a word has a meaning if *by definition* there is no object that it stands for. We might, for example, (commonly) react to such a word by a shake of the head. One might think that Wittgenstein *inferred* from this that meaning *had* to be *use* somehow, and that this then was his *conclusion* in the following section 43. But to think thus

would be a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein's overall (therapeutic) aims and respective philosophical methods applied in this series of remarks. This can be seen from a close look at the final sentence of §43. This final sentence once more illustrates how alive Wittgenstein was to the various ways of misunderstanding (him). After having stated the trivial fact¹ that '[f]or a large class of cases of the employment of the word "meaning" – though not for *all* – this word can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language' (PI §43), Wittgenstein adds:

'And the *meaning* of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its *bearer*.' (PI §43)

...as when I'm being asked, "what does the word 'bottle' mean?", and I simply hold one up. This final sentence is intended by Wittgenstein to make sure that no one thinks he would want to deny such an obvious fact. (Note that his discussion of ostensive definition in PI §§28ff. is equally not intended to deny any such obvious facts but only to point out possibilities of misunderstanding. See especially §29. Cf. also §90.) That is, what he says is not to be understood as a claim about the nature (or, grammar) of meaning. However, this is exactly what those are inclined to think who believe that by virtue of the mentioned *reductio* argument Wittgenstein argued to the conclusion that "meaning had to be use" somehow, or that it even was Wittgenstein's intention to develop a *use-theory* of meaning. Yet, I argue, this is not what Wittgenstein was up to. For one thing: if taken to be arguing towards such general implications, would this last sentence not contradict what, on such an understanding, Wittgenstein would be held to have stated in section 40, namely that 'it is a solecism to use the word "meaning" to signify the thing that 'corresponds' to a word' (PI §40)? On my understanding however, it can be seen to be quite unproblematic that these two statements can seem to contradict each other, since their respective (therapeutic) force is different from each other.

But, one might want to ask, what *is* Wittgenstein up to? what, if anything, is left of Wittgenstein's pointing out *something* about meaning and use then? And the answer will be, negatively put, that if we are looking for a theoretical account that is defended in a series of arguments culminating in the conclusion that meaning (somehow) was use: not much, or rather, nothing. Wittgenstein had simply no business in constructing arguments for such purposes. Rather he solely exhibits arguments, and he arranges them for a particular purpose, or purposes. In the beginning, I have already hinted at what I think this purpose is. O. K. Bouwsma, however, has already expressed it with admirable clarity in the following words:

'["Meaning is use"] is intended ... as an analogy.... [I]t comes to something like this: If you will say "use" and write "use" instead of "meaning" in writing and speaking of words, and can manage to think accordingly, that will help. Help what? It will help you to rid yourself of the temptation to think of the meaning as something in the dark which you cannot see very well. The idea

¹ Pichler writes that it is 'a *triviality* ... [that] in the ordinary use of language "meaning of the word x" means: "use of the word x"' (Pichler 2004, 171, *my translation*). However this seems to be an oversimplification. Rather it is a triviality that, on being asked for its "meaning", we often explain how in fact we use a word. This, or so it seems to me, is really all that Wittgenstein is saying in this passage. – Interestingly, we find Wittgenstein making the same move already in the famous beginning of the *Blue Book*, where, just as in PI §43, he takes a noteworthy (de-)tour over 'explanations' to address the meaning of 'meaning': 'What is the meaning of a word? / Let us attack this question by asking, first, what is an explanation of the meaning of a word; what does the explanation of a word look like?' (BB 1). (Thanks to Alois Pichler for reminding me of this.)

is that if your thinking is dominated in this case by one misleading analogy then you may be led right by another leading analogy. If, of course, that second analogy also misleads one, not much may be gained. ... So we may understand that sentence as one which is intended to help us to a change in perspective. Once that change has come about, the sentence ... is of no further use.' (Bouwsma 1961, 159)

4. Conclusion

In his lectures on the philosophy of mathematics in 1939, Wittgenstein (is reported to have) described the consequence of his therapeutic approach to philosophical problems in relation to what he says in the course of his philosophising in the following way:

'I won't say anything which anyone can dispute. Or if anyone does dispute it, I will let that point drop and pass on to say something else.' (LFM 22)

In other words, in the course of his therapeutic philosophising Wittgenstein has no reason to insist on the truth of anything he says. If thus it may become clear how, due to the specificities of a particular therapeutic conversation, Wittgenstein may just as well remind us that meaning is not use—for example, in the sense that after all there is a reason why there are these two (different) words (rather than one), or to prevent particular misunderstandings as in *PI* §43b or equally in *PI* §§138ff.—then I will have succeeded in presenting the outlines of at least one example of how Wittgenstein can be understood as truthfully sticking to his announced principle of philosophising, thus using arguments in a way as to merely *exhibit* rather than to assert them.

Arguments like the ones in *PI* §§40-43 ("meaning is use"), *PI* §§201-202 ("rule-following" is a practice)—even though they may come in the forceful form of *reductio ad absurdum*, and indeed have convinced entire schools of (analytic) philosophers—play a role in Wittgenstein's therapeutic investigations only insofar as they help specifying the sense of what 'we are "tempted to say"' (*PI* §254). It is in this way that Wittgenstein's specific use of arguments forms part of his 'philosophical *treatment*' (*PI* §255) as arranged in a series of instructing examples in the *Philosophical Investigations*.

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Wittgenstein on Mahler

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Abstract

In this paper I explain Wittgenstein's ambivalent remarks on the music of Gustav Mahler in their proper musico-philosophical context. I argue that these remarks are connected to Wittgenstein's hybrid conception of musical decline and to his tripartite scheme of modern music. I also argue that Mahler's conundrum was indicative of Wittgenstein's grappling with his own predicament as a philosopher, and that this gives concrete sense to Wittgenstein's admission that music was so important to him that without it he was sure to be misunderstood.

Ludwig Wittgenstein was a reluctant modernist; intellectually receptive to, and at times even deeply appreciative of the various cultural manifestations of his time, yet never at peace with any of them; highly proficient and fully immersed in philosophical dialogue, yet never at home in what he perceived as its profound abuse of language.

Wittgenstein's rejection of the modern music of his time is one of the many ways in which he voiced his deep concern with the decline of Western culture. He characterized such cultural decline in terms of a breakdown of artistic necessity through skillful, sophisticated yet hollow artistic reproduction and a corresponding deterioration of sensitivity leading to indifference (LC 7)—a mellowing that has been overtaking the high and great culture of the West, “a dissolution of the resemblances which unite [a culture's] ways of life” (Wright 1982, 116–117). Wittgenstein admitted that he approached “what is called modern music with the greatest suspicion (though without understanding its language)” (CV 6).

In this context, Wittgenstein's remarks on the music of Gustav Mahler are unique. Mahler was the only truly modern composer, who apparently was significant enough in Wittgenstein's eyes to be worthy of philosophic attention. Wittgenstein's somewhat abusive remarks on Mahler exemplify a distinct duality toward Mahler's musical persona that was typical among Austrian literati at that time. Carl Schorske described this as a duality in Mahler's functional relation to the classical tradition; an acute tension between Mahler's acceptance as a conductor—a guardian of the abstract, autonomous music so cherished by the educated elite—and his rejection as a composer, who subversively attempted to imbue abstract high-culture music with concrete vernacular substance (Schorske 1999, 172–174). Wittgenstein clearly had a tremendous respect toward Mahler as a conductor. “Mahler's guidance was excellent, when he conducted,” he wrote, “the orchestra seemed to fall apart immediately, when he did not conduct himself” (MS 122, 96r). Still Wittgenstein's harshly critical attitude toward Mahler as a composer was more philosophically complex than downright negative. He evidently did not like Mahler's music, but he nonetheless attributed philosophical significance to it.

In this paper I set out to explain Wittgenstein's remarks on Mahler in their appropriate musico-philosophical context, and also to hint at their philosophical significance.

A few preliminary considerations are in order.

It occurs to me that the common dismissive reference to Wittgenstein's conservative musical taste involves some sort of ad hominem fallacy. It seems as if one seriously expects that a great, probing mind like Wittgenstein's

ought to own a more daring musical taste, and so one necessarily recoils with discomfort and a sense of irony in the face of Wittgenstein's ‘failure’ to develop a taste for the avant-garde. I beg to differ. First, we need to be reminded that some of the greatest philosophers, who also wrote about music, from Kant to Nietzsche, exemplified quite a pedestrian taste in music. The real, indeed much more interesting question, I maintain, is not ‘what music Wittgenstein ought to have appreciated given the kind of philosophical ideas which he maintained at this or that stage in his career or his life?’ but rather ‘what might be his philosophic justification for delineating musical experience in the way he did?’ The first question presupposes too much: that there is no point in raising the second. But this is unwarranted as it stands. So the second question deserves a fair shot. Actually, it is far more reasonable to expect that a great, probing mind like Wittgenstein's should afford an interesting justification precisely of that sort. Indeed I have argued elsewhere that what sets Wittgenstein and Schoenberg apart from one another, for instance, is far more interesting philosophically than any contingency—historical or philosophical—which would suggest that we may yoke them together (Guter 2004, 2009 and 2011).

Furthermore, qualms about Wittgenstein's conservative musical taste are commonly connected with his equally questionable taste in leisure reading, namely, with his infamous infatuation with Oswald Spengler's ideas on cultural decline (PPO 25; CV 19). The connection is true, but the conclusion which is often being drawn from it, namely, that Wittgenstein's embracing of the idea of cultural decline is immaterial for understanding the philosophic trajectory of his thinking about music (at least since 1930), is plainly false.

It is by now an established fact that reading Spengler's *Decline of the West* during his middle period had a significant impact on the emergence and formulation of some of the most distinctive methodological aspects of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Furthermore, the equally pertinent Spenglerian shadow on Wittgenstein's own pessimistic attitude toward his times has also been considered to be profoundly important for a proper understanding of Wittgenstein's overarching philosophical thinking. There is good interpretive sense in believing that the kind of philosophical grappling, which is ubiquitous in his later work, exemplifies not only Wittgenstein's preoccupation with the very features of civilization that Spengler thought of as typical of cultural decline, but also an overall commitment to philosophize seriously and sincerely in a time of civilization (Wright 1982; Haller 1988, Cavell 1988 and 1989; DeAngelis 2007; Lurie 2012).

In my own work on Wittgenstein's philosophy of music, I followed this line of thinking by arguing that Wittgenstein

actually maintained a unique hybrid conception of musical decline, which was a result of a rebounding his methodological critique of Spengler's idea of a morphological comparison of cultures back onto the music theory Heinrich Schenker, with which, I discovered, Wittgenstein gradually became familiar between the years 1926-1933 (Guter 2004, 2011 and 2013).

Wittgenstein's hybrid conception of musical decline is premised upon the idea that triadic tonality is the focal point for comparing musical instances. He maintained that various musical instances may bear more or less family resemblance to one another, to the extent of the exclusion of certain instances. Yet Wittgenstein denied that the general validity of the concept of tonality depends on the claim that everything which is true only of the abstract Schenkerian *Ursatz* (the prototype) holds for all the musical instances under consideration. For Wittgenstein, tonality—the way we experience and express certain relationships between musical tones—is effected by the way we recognize and describe things, and ultimately by the kind of beings we are, the purposes we have, our shared discriminatory capacities and certain general features of the world we inhabit. Tonality cannot be vindicated by reference to putative facts about the world or about the mind, as Schenker believed. The conditions of musical meaningfulness are found in grammar.

Wittgenstein maintained that when the prototype is clearly presented for what it really is, namely, grammar, and thus becomes the focal point of the observation, the general validity of that concept of tonality will depend on the fact that it characterizes the whole of the observation and determines its form. In this anti-essentialist vein, the Schenkerian *Ursatz* became for Wittgenstein a mere methodic device that can be laid alongside the musical instances under consideration as a measure. Importantly, Wittgenstein's hybrid conception of musical decline unleashed some genuine Spenglerian pessimism on whatever hope, which Schenker may have retained, to reverse musical decline by setting forth his theories as a guide to composers and performers (Guter 2013).

Wittgenstein brought his hybrid conception of musical decline to bear on what he conceived as the music of his time in a curious diary entry from January 27, 1931 (*PPO* 66-69) (Guter 2004, 2009, 2011 and 2013). In this text Wittgenstein makes a distinction between three categories of modern music. 'Bad modern music', presumably exemplified by Richard Strauss and Max Reger (Wittgenstein had some familiarity with their music either by acquaintance or by description), presents itself as non-musical clatter for reasons eminently shown by means of Schenker's music theory. 'Vacuous (*Nichtssagend*) modern music', exemplified by Josef Labor according to Wittgenstein, is the kind of art we get when a culture enters its final phases (civilization), when artists work with the hollow, lifeless forms of the old culture. Wittgenstein saw that as an 'unattractive absurd'.

Wittgenstein clearly followed Schenker by rejecting both the noble yet vacuous rehash of classicism of the conservative composer, and the base contrapuntal tinkering with harmony of the progressive composer as symptomatic of musical decline (Guter 2004 and 2011). Yet Wittgenstein entertained also the striking possibility of 'good modern music', that is, modern music which is genuinely adequate to its times, the time of civilization. This is the peculiar possibility of an artistic afterimage of a wholesale rejection of the internal relations which hold together musical gesture and the life of humankind. Wittgenstein saw that as an 'attractive absurd'. Thus Wittgenstein's hybrid conception of

musical decline markedly transgressed not only Schenker's sense of cultural rejuvenation by means of recoil from contemporary practices of composition, but also Spengler's sense of historical inevitability. The category of 'good modern music' secures the independence of Wittgenstein's hybrid conception of musical decline from its intellectual parents (Guter 2013). It also shows, *pace* common wisdom, that Wittgenstein's philosophic thinking about music was not hindered by his conservative musical taste.

With these caveats in place, I turn to tackle Wittgenstein's remarks on Mahler head on. We have four self-standing passages on Mahler in the *Nachlass*. They can be neatly divided, chronologically and thematically, into two groups. The first group, consisting of the first two earlier passages (*PPO*, 93 and *CV*, 20; both written in 1931), concerns Wittgenstein's puzzlement over Mahler's veering away from the cultural conditions of musical meaningfulness. They also exemplify Wittgenstein's hybrid conception of musical decline. Wittgenstein's emulation of Schenker's way of looking at the masterworks of Western music as extended commentaries on the tonic triad music is evident here despite of the former's non-technical and rather idiosyncratic choice of words (*Stammutter*). From this theoretical perspective, it is indeed true that a Bruckner symphony is much closer to a Beethoven symphony than a Mahler symphony.

Wittgenstein's critique of Mahler voices a train of thoughts, which is familiar in musicology, regarding Mahler's compositional strategies. Mahler's mature works (for example, his fourth symphony) display significant ambivalence in the area of harmony and tonal relationships. While his music often appears deceptively conservative, employing undisguised dominant relationships that still play an essential structural role, his compositional procedures pushes tonality to the brink of dissolution. In this sense, Mahler's "simple harmonic progressions" are indeed contrived and disjointed; the product of an incredibly sophisticated, refined and titillating, yet ultimately abstract design.

Wittgenstein maps Schenker's music-theoretical perspective onto Spengler's scheme of cultural decline by invoking the comparative image of the apple tree, the daisy and the picture of the tree in order to intimate not only the abstract nature of the digression embodied in Mahler's art, but also its cultural extent. Yuval Lurie captured this nicely by saying that "to affiliate Mahler's music with the musical tradition of the West is like putting pictures of apple trees in an orchid, believing they too can yield real apples" (Lurie 2012, 137). The idea that a Mahler symphony might be a work of art of a *totally* different sort is Spenglerian in an important sense: Wittgenstein entertains here the possibility that Mahler's music belongs to an entirely different kind of spiritual enterprise that embodies civilization in the modern period. Schenker similarly felt that "the quest for a new form of music is a quest for a homunculus" (Schenker 1979, 6). The metaphor, which Schenker employed, that of an artificial living being, which embodies the outward semblance of humanity but not the spirit, captures not only the sense of the totality of this new enterprise, but also its uncanny nature.

The very possibility—unlikely as it may have been for Wittgenstein—that Mahler's music might be adequate to its time (the time of civilization), that it might belong to the attractively absurd category of 'good modern music,' does not negate Wittgenstein's justification (from the idealized perspective of what he called "the high and great culture") for saying that Mahler's music is inauthentic and abstract.

Nonetheless, it seriously qualifies the normative force of such a lament.

The second group of passages on Mahler were written later, and more than a decade apart from one another (MS 120, 72v was written in 1937; CV, 67 was written in 1948). These passages continue the thought that Mahler's art is inauthentic, and relate it to the Weiningerian distinction between talent and genius, which is familiar from other passages in *Culture and Value*. Yet they also forcefully bring to the surface the highly personal theme of 'vanity,' which relates the conceptual difficulty involved in determining the value of such purported new kind of art to Wittgenstein's own misgivings about his predicament as a philosophical writer in the time of civilization. This theme already appeared, albeit by implication only, in the first group of passages (PPO, 93).

This theme now takes center stage, allowing us a rare immediate glimpse into the reason why Wittgenstein's considered music to be "so important to him that he felt without it he was sure to be misunderstood," as he told Maurice O'C. Drury (Fann 1969, 67-68). In both passages Wittgenstein clearly acknowledged his own reservations regarding Mahler's music. There is no doubt that he would have liked to reject this kind of art *tout court*. Yet Wittgenstein's argument is ultimately more nuanced. In both passage we see that the main charge against Mahler himself was that he was not courageous enough to know himself (hence he merely shows talent, albeit great talent), settling for the surrogate of a good thing. Interestingly, if we bear in mind that Wittgenstein did not adhere to Schenker's call for an actual U-turn in composition practice, then we can see that his frustration with Mahler's weakness was actually a disappointment with the prodigious composer who ultimately fell short of creating 'good modern music'. In this sense, Mahler serves as a perfect example to justify Wittgenstein's worry in the diary entry from January 27, 1931 (PPO 66-69) concerning the prospect of good modern music: "no one is clever enough to formulate today the right thing" (PPO 66-69), that is, to create great art at a time when that might no longer be possible. In Wittgenstein's view, it seems, the chances that others might succeed where Mahler has failed are slim.

In the 1937 passage we get another idea about the kind of transgression, which Mahler's purportedly inauthentic music embodies: it presents itself as authentic, that is, as if it were a genuine manifestation of its time. The immediate charge of self-deception makes way to a pronouncement of an acute problem: the inability to distinguish what is genuine ('valuable') and what is false ('worthless'). This problem, which (Wittgenstein fears) afflicts his own thinking and writing as well, pertains to the cultural presuppositions for making such a distinction in the first place. As Wittgenstein clearly describes in the 1948 passage, this is a problem of incommensurability: "if today's circumstances are really so different, from what they once were, that you cannot compare your work with earlier works in respect of its genre, then you equally cannot compare its value with that of the other work" (CV, 67). Ultimately, the problem regarding the category of 'good modern music' arises due to our inability to tell, as Lurie put it, "whether the spiritual progression of our culture is still continuing (and it is us who are being left behind), or whether the culture has disappeared (and we are the only ones left to notice it)" (Lurie 2012, 150).

In sum, Mahler was a genuine problem for Wittgenstein. From a musical perspective, with regards to Wittgenstein's tripartite scheme of modern music, Mahler's music clearly did not belong to the category of 'vacuous modern music'.

It also did not simply belong to the category of 'bad modern music' together with Richard Strauss and his ilk. For Wittgenstein, Mahler was a limiting case in the history of Western music. "You would need to know a good deal about music, its history and development, to understand him," admitted Wittgenstein at one point (Rhees 1984, 71). From the perspective of philosophical autobiography, Mahler's conundrum was indicative of Wittgenstein's grappling with his own predicament as a philosopher. In fact, the problem of 'good modern music' and the problem of philosophizing in the time of civilization were one and the same in Wittgenstein's mind. This shows the philosophical depth, importance and relevance of Wittgenstein's musical thinking.

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CV *Culture and Value*

LC *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious*

PPO *Public and Private Occasions*

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Some Conceptual Characteristics of Aspect-Blindness

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Abstract

In his work from the 1940s, Wittgenstein discusses at length the topic of seeing aspects, such as seeing the famous duck-rabbit figure as a picture-rabbit or as a picture-duck. It is in this context that he introduces aspect-blindness. The present paper provides a detailed conceptual (that is, grammatical) rendering of Wittgenstein's notion of aspect-blindness. The precise structure is as follows: Drawing on Wittgenstein's remarks, three fundamental features of aspect-blindness are presented and are then explicated in a grammatical framework. Next, it is shown that seeing 'aspects' for an aspect-blind person is, conceptually, like ordinary perception. Wittgenstein's comment that aspect-blindness is *akin* to lack of a 'musical ear' is subsequently interpreted in light of this analysis. Finally, it is argued that on this account of aspect-blindness, even pre-linguistic children can be aspect-blind.

As a starting point, it is useful to lay out three features that, based on Wittgenstein's remarks, appear to be fundamental to aspect-blindness. Wittgenstein indicates, for example, that an aspect-blind person lacks the ability to see something as *something* (PPF 257; RPPII 478), and she does not understand the words 'Now I'm seeing this figure as ..., now as ...' (RPPI 168). It is therefore reasonable to conclude that (1) an aspect-blind person does not see-as.

Closely related to feature (1) is the issue of seeing aspects. (It may, of course, be that seeing aspects simply is seeing-as. But such a claim should be defended or rejected based on conceptual argumentation. In order to avoid this complication, the present paper treats seeing aspects somewhat apart from seeing-as.) Wittgenstein's term 'aspect-blindness' would seem to imply that an aspect-blind person does not see aspects. Yet Wittgenstein suggests that an aspect-blind person *will* be able to see aspects (e.g., the black cross and the white cross of the double cross figure), in that she will recognize that the double cross figure contains a black cross and a white cross (PPF 257). This apparent conflict can be resolved by considering a first/third person distinction that Wittgenstein makes. Suppose, for instance, that someone had never seen the duck-rabbit figure as anything but a picture-rabbit and had never considered that it might be something else. Then from what one might call a 'first person perspective', the person does not see an aspect or see the figure as a picture-rabbit. But from a 'third person perspective', it does make sense for us (who are aware of the ambiguity of the figure) to say 'She sees the figure as a picture-rabbit' (PPF 120-121; RPPI 1). It also makes sense to say 'She sees the picture-rabbit aspect'. Hence, it is from the third person perspective that an aspect-blind person sees aspects and sees-as, and it is from the first person perspective that she is blind to aspects and does not see-as. This might be expressed with respect to aspects as (2) an aspect-blind person does not see *aspects as such*.

Wittgenstein says as well that an aspect-blind person will not experience a switch from one aspect to another (PPF 258). She will be lacking the experience of transition of aspect (LPP p. 108). Thus, (3) an aspect-blind person does not experience *change* of aspect.

But what exactly do (1), (2) and (3) imply? Or to put it differently, what are conceptual characteristics and consequences of aspect-blindness? The remainder of this paper is devoted to answering this question in a fully grammatical way. (Unfortunately, a comparison between the analysis given here and other studies of aspect-blindness pre-

sented in the literature must be postponed due to limitations of space.)

Consider first an important characteristic of aspects and of seeing-as, namely, the existence of alternatives. Commentators who have explicitly recognized this characteristic express it in a variety of ways. Gordon Baker, for example, says that 'One might even say that [aspects] are *essentially plural*; to speak of one way of seeing something presupposes that there are others' (Baker 2004, p. 280). With respect to the sentence 'Now I see it as a picture-rabbit', Garth Hallett comments that 'Now and see as reflect awareness of an alternative' (Hallett 1977, p. 673). And in a more grammatical vein, Gilead Bar-Elli says, 'Seeing-as is dependent on circumstances: it makes sense to say that we see *x* as *F* only when it is natural to say that we could have seen it also as *G*' (Bar-Elli 2006, p. 236).

For the present paper, the following formulation is proposed regarding aspects: If *x* is an aspect, then 'I see *x* as opposed to *y*' makes sense (e.g., 'I see a picture-rabbit as opposed to a picture-duck'). In addition, regarding seeing-as: 'I see it as *x*' makes sense if and only if 'I see it as *x*, as opposed to *y*' makes sense. Then using this framework, it is suggested that a fundamental conceptual characteristic of aspect-blindness is that the 'as opposed to' form lacks sense for an aspect-blind person. Feature (1) above thus manifests itself in that neither 'I see it as *x* (as opposed to *y*)' nor the variant 'Now I see it as *x* (as opposed to *y*), now as *y* (as opposed to *x*)' make sense to an aspect-blind person. Similarly, feature (2) above shows itself in that neither 'I see *x* as opposed to *y*' nor the variant 'Now I see *x* as opposed to *y*' make sense to an aspect-blind person in contexts where *x* is an aspect for non-aspect-blind individuals.

Now with these points in mind, it will throw even more light on aspect-blindness to consider how seeing aspects and seeing-as contrast (grammatically) with 'ordinary' perception. Wittgenstein mentions, for instance, that 'Now I see it as ...' does not report a perception (LWI 486). A grammatical basis for this is that ordinary perception lacks the 'as opposed to' possibility and consequently is not expressed using the 'see-as' construction. That is, for example, it does not make sense to look at a fork under normal conditions (e.g., in good lighting, on a table and next to a plate) and report the perception by saying 'I see it as a fork'. For what would be the alternative in 'I see it as a fork, as opposed to ...'? Likewise, if someone looks at the duck-rabbit for the first time and (without knowing that it is an ambiguous figure) only sees the picture-rabbit, it makes

sense for him to say 'I see a picture-rabbit' but not 'I see it as a picture-rabbit' (PPF 120-122).

There is also a grammatical difference between aspect seeing and ordinary perception regarding *changes* in what is seen. Specifically, 'Now it is ...' (such as 'Now it is a picture-rabbit, and *now* it is a picture-duck') implies there was a change (PPF 124). Yet 'Now it is ...' is the expression of (experiencing) an aspect, not of a perception (LWI 171; PPF 128). This difference turns on 'it', because seeing different things is indeed part of the language-game involving ordinary perceptions: 'I see a table, and [turning my head] now I see a lamp'. But 'Now *it* is ...' implies that I am seeing the same thing and not the same thing (PPF 129-130; RPPII 474). That is why 'Now it is a lamp' is confusing or is nonsense in normal contexts. Since it is a lamp in contrast to *what* (RPPII 524)? In other words, it is a lamp as *opposed to what*? This is also why expressions that were originally about ordinary perceptions (like 'I see a picture-rabbit') cease to be so once an aspect, as such, is seen (RPPII 473).

This then connects with feature (3) via Wittgenstein's remark that 'Anyone who failed to perceive the change of aspect would not be inclined to say, "Now it looks completely different!", or "It seems as if the picture had changed, and yet it hasn't!" ...' (RPPII 39). Specifically, anyone (including an aspect-blind person) who did not experience a change of aspect will not express what she sees by indicating that it is the same thing and yet a different thing. Rather, she will simply report a series of ordinary perceptions (LWI 174-176; cf. RPPI 169).

These considerations all indicate that an aspect-blind person only experiences ordinary perception. In other words, seeing 'aspects' (that is, aspects from a third person perspective) for an aspect-blind person is, conceptually-speaking, like ordinary perception. So to an aspect-blind person, the picture-duck and the picture-rabbit are not *aspects of one figure*; they are *different figures*.

This entails certain consequences for aspect-blindness. For instance, if an aspect-blind person who is looking at the duck-rabbit says 'I see a picture-rabbit', she will be confused by the question 'Do you see the picture-duck also?' The most she might make out of this is to think that something is wrong with her eyes (e.g., perhaps there is a tiny duck figure drawn there too, and her eyes are just not sharp enough to find it). But she will not be able to understand that the very figure of a picture-rabbit is also the figure of a picture-duck. Furthermore, if the 'aspects' keep alternating for her, she might think that she is hallucinating or has a serious vision problem.

That an aspect-blind person only has ordinary perceptions also illuminates Wittgenstein's comment that 'aspect-blindness will be *akin to the lack of a 'musical ear'*' (PPF 260). In music, one might say 'You must hear this bar as an introduction' (RPPI 1). And someone who lacks a musical ear will not be able to successfully follow this command. The same is true of someone who is aspect-blind. But in particular, an aspect-blind person will not *understand* how the music can be different than how she hears it. That is, she will not even *understand* the command. For either she hears an introduction, or she does not. 'Hear this musical sequence as an introduction (as opposed to the main melody)' makes no sense to her. To her, that command is analogous to either 'See the lamp as a lamp' or 'See the lamp as a table'.

The discussion regarding a musical ear in turn highlights other conceptual characteristics of aspect-blindness. These have to do with voluntariness. For Wittgenstein de-

scribes seeing aspects as voluntary. That is to say, the command 'Now see the figure like *this*' makes sense (LWI 451; PPF 256). This contrasts with, for example, seeing colours, which is conceptually involuntary: If someone is looking at a green leaf, then neither 'Now see this leaf green' nor 'See it blue' make sense (PPF 256; RPPI 899). But it has been argued above that 'Now see the figure like *this*' (or 'Now hear the notes like *this*') does not make sense to an aspect-blind person. Hence, for an aspect-blind person, seeing (and hearing) 'aspects' is in this way conceptually like seeing colours. Namely, it is involuntary. In addition, Wittgenstein says that aspects do not give us information regarding the external world, and this seems to be precisely because aspects are voluntary (RPPI 899; cf. RPPII 79-80). Therefore, since the 'aspects' that an aspect-blind person sees are involuntary, they *do* give her information about the external world. This hangs together with seeing these 'aspects' being conceptually like ordinary perception.

A final question to be addressed here is whether pre-linguistic children are, or (conceptually) can be, aspect-blind. Various possible answers present themselves, depending on exactly how aspect-blindness is characterized. Suppose it was suggested, for instance, that if someone does not understand the use of 'see-as' (e.g., does not understand sentences like 'Now see it as a picture-duck as opposed to a picture-rabbit'), then she is aspect-blind. In other words, suppose that not understanding the use of 'see-as' is a *sufficient* condition for aspect-blindness. Under this condition, either pre-linguistic children are 'by default' aspect-blind (since they do not understand how to use 'see-as'); or, perhaps, it does not make sense to ask whether pre-linguistic children are aspect-blind, because the condition presupposes that the person is otherwise a fully-competent language user. Such a condition seems too strong, however. For Wittgenstein allows that if a child was looking at the duck-rabbit and pointed to a picture of a duck and then to a picture of a rabbit and laughed, we would say that the child experienced a change in aspect (LPP p. 105). So in virtue of feature (3), even if the child does not know how to use language, the child is not aspect-blind.

It is worthwhile to note, in closing, that the laugh is an important factor in this type of case. For Wittgenstein appears to deny that a primitive reaction like pointing is, on its own, an expression of seeing-as. As he says, 'One will surely not be able to call it [that is, pointing] so without more ado. Only when it is combined with other expressions' (RPPI 1046, 1048). Given what has been said above about ordinary perception, it is easy to understand Wittgenstein's hesitation. For instance, if a child is looking at the double cross figure, he might point to a free-standing black cross and then to a free-standing white cross (cf. PPF 215). But without some added expression, the pointing may as well express the experience of two different *ordinary perceptions* instead of an experience of *change of aspect* or of *seeing aspects as such*. So even if the child is *not* aspect-blind and *does* experience a change in aspect, pointing alone will not reveal this.

To summarize, Wittgenstein's notion of aspect-blindness relates to three main features. Expressed in explicitly grammatical terms, these features indicate that an aspect-blind person does not understand the 'as opposed to' construction that goes with seeing aspects and seeing-as, and she moreover does not express the changes in 'aspect' that she sees by saying that she sees the *same* thing and yet a *different* thing. In general, an aspect-blind person's experience of seeing 'aspects' is, conceptually, like ordinary perception. Like perceptions of colour, the 'aspects'

that an aspect-blind person sees are involuntary and thus give her information regarding the external world. Lastly, on a separate note, it was argued that ascribing aspect-blindness to pre-linguistic children does make sense; yet these children are not aspect-blind 'by default', since language is not needed in order to experience a change between (at least some) aspects.

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A Wittgensteinian Critique of Enactivism's Natural Norms

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Abstract

In this paper we want to challenge the notion of natural normativity associated with enactivism. We will start by introducing enactivism and the double definition of 'norm' that it provides: (1) a goal-directed action based on an individual interpretation is sufficient to define a normative sphere and (2) a norm is a successful biological function. Then we will criticize both definitions: (1) leads to the rule-following paradox presented by Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations*; against (2) we will claim that using the pairs of concepts 'right / wrong' and 'success / failure' as equivalent is a conceptual error on the part of enactivism.

1. Introduction: Enactivism's Natural Norms

Enactivism has been defined as the new paradigm for explaining life and cognition (Stewart et al. 2010). 'Enactivism' refers to a family of theories that, on the one hand, take self-assembly, self-production and self-stability to be sufficient for agency and, on the other, endorse the idea that the functions that allow for these processes are intrinsically normative.¹ For enactive authors, life and cognition are tied under the concept of 'agency'. An agent is a set of self-assembled systems that conforms a unity that is self-stable through time. This self-stability is achieved not only by the self-assembly of the system but also by the regulative coupling of the agent with the environment. Hence, there are two kinds of regulative processes that allow for agency and self-stability, internal (those connected with the relations between the different systems among them) and external (perceptual goals in which the agent as a whole is able to act upon the environment and regulate itself in a sensorimotor looping process). The self-assembled systems that produce agency are considered to follow an intrinsic norm: to maintain its own self-stability. Thus, the product of these processes (self-stability) becomes the condition for the sustainability of the system. In other words, "self-production is a process that defines a unity and a norm: to keep the unity going and distinct" (Di Paolo 2005: 434). This normativity is applied both to the functions that support the system and to the goals of the agent as a whole. This is the sense in which, for these authors, life is a normative process (Canguilhem 1965) and, thus, we can talk of natural norms as "a level of performance that is adequate to fulfill a function or a purposiveness, and that constitutes an explanatory relevant kind, independently of any individual's having a positive or negative attitude toward the function or the norm" (Burge 2009: 269).

In summary, these authors share the two following ideas:

(1) Something is a norm when it is established and followed by the agent itself under the basis of its individual interpretation of the environment (Weber and Varela 2002; Di Paolo 2005);

(2) A function can be recognized as 'normative' when it fulfills its goal successfully (Mossio et al. 2009; Burge 2009).

2. Wittgensteinian arguments against biological normativity

Even when nowadays some authors are trying to find a common ground between Wittgenstein's philosophy and enactivism (Hutto unpublished), we are convinced that there are relevant arguments in the late Wittgenstein (1953) that undermine the enactive conception of natural norms. First, we will analyze (1) under the scope of Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations (1953: §§ 185-242) and then we will discuss (2) in a Wittgensteinian way, i.e., attending to the grammar of the concepts in order to clarify if the use of these concepts by enactive authors is correct or pertinent.

As we said, according to enactivism, any purposive or goal-directed action of an agent has an intrinsic normative character (Barandiaran et al. 2009). This is not just a theoretical or terminological claim: recently, Barandiaran and Egbert (in press) designed a cellular model in which the agent was presented as capable of establishing and following its own norm, thus providing empirical support to this conceptual claim. The behaviour of the unicellular agent followed the norm of keeping its own stability. If the agent was able to keep itself in its viability zone, the self-stability was preserved, following its intrinsic norm of self-maintaining itself through time.

From a Wittgensteinian perspective, it is highly problematic to classify the behaviour of this unicellular agent as 'normative'. Wittgenstein provides us with a set of arguments for rejecting the idea that an agent, considered in isolation, is able to establish and follow its own norms. In a much-discussed example, a teacher wants to know why his pupil is not counting correctly. The explanation offered appeals to the student's natural reaction. But acting according to one's natural inclinations is not the same as following a rule. It is not clear how one could err, i.e., fail to act according to its natural inclinations, if it is not through learning how to repress them. In this sense, natural inclinations cannot be rules.

If natural reactions are not a good candidate for explaining how to follow a rule, maybe personal interpretations are. From this perspective, following a rule can be understood as offering an interpretation such that the action of the agent is subsumable by the norm. The example in this case is the one in which a child is learning how to understand the symbol '+'. The main problem comes when the teacher asks him 'how much is 1000+2?' and the child is unable to answer in the right way (he answers '1004'). When he is asked to explain why he didn't give the right answer, he claims that "[he] did as before. Wasn't the rule:

¹ In this sense, authors as diverse as Canguilhem (1965) Jonas (1968), Di Paolo (2005), Maturana and Varela (1980), Mossio et al. (2009), Barandiaran et al. (2009) and Burge (2009) can be classified as enactivists.

add 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000 and so on?" Clearly not. A personal interpretation cannot be considered as a proper rule-following process because any personal interpretation can seem to be consistent with the behaviour of the agent: after many repetitions the agent established a well-built causal relation with the symbol. But this is not sufficient for following a rule, because every agent can develop a personal interpretation of the symbol but there is only one right answer. To make it explicit: this is a paradoxical solution, because if anything can agree with the rule, then also anything can disagree with the rule. All agents would be understanding the sign '+' under their own personal view, and all of them would be right and wrong at the same time. 'Right' and 'wrong' are meaningless in this context, and that means that "there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it' in actual cases" (Wittgenstein 1953: § 201).

Defenders of the enactive view of normativity may respond that Wittgenstein is focusing on the implicit normativity of linguistic concepts or symbols, not on the normativity of biological facts. However, linguistic or symbolic normativity is a special (but not different) case among all the normative processes that can be found in nature: enactive interpretation or 'sense-making', inasmuch as it is the product of an individual agent, is no more than a well-established causal connection between a stimulus or element of the environment and a reaction of the agent. Whether the element or stimulus is natural (the quantity of sugar concentration in a gradient, sounds, patterns of light and movement) or symbolic (the symbol '+'), the logic that underlies the processes of interpretation both in the enactive and in the Wittgensteinian example are the same, and this makes his arguments pertinent for criticizing the enactive notion of 'normativity'.

An isolated agent is not enough for establishing a norm: a whole community of agents with shared practices is a necessary condition for the emergence of a normative practice. An isolated agent can always find an interpretation of its action that can be subsumed by the rule, and this cannot amount to following a rule. The possibility of error and of correction is entrenched in the grammar of norms, and correction has to come from an external source, which is always the community (sometimes instantiated in a single agent, as in the case of the teacher). To say that the source of normativity is the community is to say that criteria of correctness are shared. Norms or rules are always social and external phenomena.

These two ideas are tightly related to the concept of 'sense-making' (Di Paolo 2005). Sense-making is a phenomenon placed in between a brute inclination and an individual interpretation. An agent's capacity for sense-making is determined both by its internal structure and its well-established causal connections with the environment. Enactivist thinkers aim at naturalizing agents' phenomenology appealing to these relations. We think this is a promising avenue, but insufficient for granting normativity for the reasons given above.

Earlier on this paper we claimed that functions are taken to be normative by some enactive authors (see Burge 2009 and Mossio et al. 2009). However, as we have seen above, a norm cannot be just a well-established causal relation, as functions seem to be. In this sense, success appears to be something different from following a rule in the right way, even when success is necessary, although not sufficient, for following a rule. Let's consider the following cases:

- (a) The heart fails at pumping blood
- (b) The heart is pumping blood in the wrong way
- (c) The heart is mistaken at pumping blood

If we pay attention to the grammar implied in the pairs of concepts 'success / failure', 'right / wrong' and 'right / mistaken', we can notice different uses of the pairs depending on the contexts. Let's assume that the pair 'right / wrong' and 'right / mistaken' can be used interchangeably in most contexts: in our previous discussion, somebody who systematically follows the addition rule wrongly is mistaken about the meaning or use of the plus symbol. In this sense, 'right / wrong' and 'right / mistaken' are properly terms related to normative practices because they point to cognitive states in which an agent can be corrected by its own community in order to follow a rule properly. Based on this, let's consider the following: the word 'fails' in (a) is used in the same manner as 'wrong' is used in (b); this is, it is used to reveal that the function is not successful at all. But taking into account that 'right / wrong' and 'right / mistaken' can be interchangeable, why the transition between (b) and (c) is not guaranteed? The use of 'mistaken' in (c) is, at best, non-standard or metaphorical, as when we say that 'the computer isn't talking to the printer'. The uses of 'talk' and 'mistaken' in these examples are metaphorical uses, not canonical. On the other side, given the fact that 'mistaken' and 'wrong' have the same canonical use, the word 'wrong' in (b) is also been used metaphorically, as if it were another way to say that the function failed. Some enactivists would claim that this last use of 'mistaken' is as standard as the canonical one, but we may persuade the enactivist to follow us if we compare (c) with (c'):

- (c') The heart is mistaken when failing at pumping blood

In this last example the metaphorical use of 'mistaken' is clear: the term refers to a failure of the function, not to a cognitive state. In this sense, 'mistaken' and 'wrong' can be recognized as sharing a canonical use and also a metaphorical one when they refer to failures of well-established causal connections. Anyway, this is not the same as saying that the metaphorical shared use is the same as the canonical one, as we have seen at the beginning of the section. Thus, it seems that the pairs 'right / wrong' and 'right / mistaken' are properly terms that refer to normative practices, and the pair 'success / failure' applies merely to causal connections. Most of these connections are present in contexts where there cannot be any cognitive state or practice (with its own correction criteria) associated. This is why a well-established causal connection cannot be normative the way a norm or a rule are. The alleged equivalence of 'right / mistaken' and 'success / failure' when typifying these cases seems to result from a conceptual confusion. Furthermore, such equivalence ignores cases in which an agent is mistaken but all its internal processes are functioning in a successful way: optical phenomena like mirages in the desert are a clear example of those situations.

3. Conclusion

We can conclude summarizing the main points of our discussion. As we have seen, the claim that a goal-directed action based on an individual interpretation is a case of following a rule is problematic because individual interpretations of different stimuli or elements of the environment are not sufficient to distinguish between correct and incorrect courses of action. Goal-directed actions are just causal relations, not instances of acting according to a

norm. Based on this, the idea that a function can be recognized as 'normative' when it fulfills its goal successfully cannot be a good candidate to define normativity either because a causal relation is not a normative practice: normative practices are related to 'right / wrong' situations and causal connections are just related to 'success / failure' criteria were no mistake or error is implied. In this sense, there cannot be room for natural norms such as they are defined within the enactive view.

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“He even feigns the pain Of pain he feels in fact”: Wittgenstein and Pessoa on Other’s Minds and Pain

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Abstract

On this paper, I’ll assess Wittgenstein’s remarks on “other’s minds” and “pain”. How do I assess others’ minds behaviour? In order to clarify Wittgenstein’s considerations of pain, more perspicuously, the idea of a rule that can be understood only by a person is unintelligible, I’ll consider the poem by Fernando Pessoa orthonymous “Autopsychography”.

Athwart the poem, in which we behold all layers of pain, videlicet, a cry that is shown by pain in a “pretence” that ends up, inadvertently, overcoming the shackles of solipsism, I’ll state (i) that something about nothing can be said is meaningless at best and ontologically equivalent to nothing at worst; (ii) that what we observe in others is not “simple body movements” as if they were hidden behind the mind, they are, rather, expressions that breathe into, thereupon, the possibility of pretend cannot be a ground for scepticism about other’s minds.

Others Minds and Language-game

Wittgenstein deals with the self, or more perspicuously, with aspects of the use of the word “I” and “my” analysing the concept of the “visual room”. On §398, with “only I have got THIS”, Wittgenstein elucidates that this is the illusion, since one cannot see one’s mental images or visual impressions, one does not have something that one’s neighbours may not equally have. In this extend, the experience has no owner and no object to which “I” might denote. Notwithstanding, when one are absorbed in philosophical reflection, some representational idealist, and ultimately solipsist illusions may turn up.

Saying “I am in pain” (§404) is no different from when I groan, since when I say I do not point to a particular person. “But surely, what I want to do with the words “I am...” is to distinguish between yourself and other people” §406. The §407 considers the relationship between a groan and an avowal of pain: who is in pain? (§408-9) It is evident that when I say “I am in pain” I have no doubt that I am in pain, I know that I am, but this is nonsense. “It makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself” (§246).

When I express my pain in an avowal, I do not do so by choosing this mouth rather than another, any more than when I manifest pain by groaning I choose the mouth from which I groan. When I use the first-person pronoun, I employ no principle of differentiation to select one person from among others. Hence too, “It has no sense to ask ‘How do you know it’s you who sees ... ?’” (LPE 311).

“It is not, of course, that I identify my sensation by means of criteria; it is, rather, that I use the same expression. But it is not as if the language-game ends with this; it begins with it. But doesn’t it begin with the sensation which I describe? I say «I describe my state of mind» and «I describe my room». So one needs to call to mind the differences between the language-games” (§290).

The formulation “I have a pain” is perceived as a description of the state of mind of the one who pronounces it. Accordingly, the language-game begins with the sensation, videlicet, by his observation and identification. Therefore, the question of how things go with me does not arise. The first personal pronoun, although used, is not a referring expression and in the recognition of “I have a pain”, I cannot assign an experience to other than myself. A description of my behaviour enables, therefore, the possibility

of an internal and external description. To this extent, when I assign a name to a body part, I can indirectly appoint a private experience. The language-game begins with the saying that he has pain, not with his recognition apropos his pain. Thereby, the fundamental point of analysis consists, precisely, in the recognition that to show an inside object through the derivation of a description is possible: the language-game begins indeed in the private subject.

From §293, we are inclined to think that we know the meaning of “pain” only from our “case of pain”. It seems that our contact with our own sensations has such intimacy that “no one has my sensation”, for “No one can ever look into anyone’s box”. On this assumption, it is my private example that defines “pain”. Now this conception is what Wittgenstein intends to depose: the semi-solipsism. According to Hacker (1990) a corollary of the idea of first-person “privileged access” is the idea of “indirect access” to other people’s states of mind, thoughts, beliefs, or experiences. This aberration, which Wittgenstein referred to as ‘semi-solipsism’ (MS. 165, 150), is one of the targets of his critical investigations.

The generalization as of “my case” raises the problem of how do I know the meaning that others attribute to “pain” (much more than the recognition problem of others’ pain), the crux of private experience lies precisely, not in the fact that each one have “their case”, but in the ability to know if anyone else has this or that (PI § 272).

Moreover, no one would deny that when someone wedges his finger and screams of pain, this is really a cry of pain (§ 294). Pain enters into the language-game with sensation-words, but that a private picture of pain does too. It gets described and it also functions as a private sample or paradigm that defines what ‘pain’ means. In MS. 124, 259F.

Wittgenstein and Pessoa on “Pain”

There are several aspects that allow us to find a connection between Wittgenstein and the Fernando Pessoa’s poetry. This approach is not limited to the fact that both deal with issues of language, but also in how both grasp the pain concept. Fernando Pessoa’s poem “Autopsychography” allows to clarify and supplement some of Wittgenstein’s remarks about this sharing, this “pooling”.

Fernando Pessoa, using poetic language, builds the later stages of construction of the inner worlds through heteronymy. Heteronyms explore the outside world and carry the symbols of this world to the interior, doubling it. In language games poetic words cannot be restricted to a univocal meaning, given that nothing that is said has to be demonstrated, and even if it were, it would be in the imagination field.

Autopsychography

The poet is a feigner
Who's so good at his act
He even feigns the pain
Of pain he feels in fact.

And those who read his words
Will feel in his writing
Neither of the pain he has
But just the one they're missing.

And so around its track
This thing called the heart winds,
A little clockwork train
To entertain our minds.

Being a "faker", the poet does not pretend the pain he did not feel. He pretends the one from which he had a direct experience. The recognition of that pain (or emotional experience) as the starting point of poetic creation is well expressed in this first block. "The poet is a Feigner/ Who's so good at his act/ He even feigns the pain/ of pain he feels in fact.

According to Wittgenstein in §300, "The picture of pain enters into the language-game with the word «pain». Pain, in the imagination, is not a picture, and it is not replaceable in the language-game by anything that we'd call a picture." Thus, imagined pain certainly enters into the language-game in a sense, only not as a picture.

The poet, since what he intends is to write about a felt pain, should seek to represent it, materializing it, that pain, not in the spontaneous lines but in the imagined contour that he gives, turning to himself and seeing himself as having had some pain (the sensitive of the intelligible).

However, the metamorphosis to which he submits his pain, faking it, representing it, only changes the plane where the pain arises. Real pain, i.e. the pain of sense, is the imaginary pain (pain in pictures). The poet materializes his emotions in images likely to cause the reader (and the poet is his first reader) the return to the initial thrill.

On the model of his initial pain, or rather, the original, the poet pretends pain in pictures and do it so perfectly that the pretence is presented to him more real than feigned pain. Thus, feigned pain becomes new pain (imaginary), which potential of communication absorbs all the features of the initial pain. In the case of a transformation of the living plan to an imagined plan, this transformation prepares the impersonal fruition of pain.

In this poem, we witness all layers of pain. There is a description of an image which traps, for the impotence description in regard to the access to other's pain and to the showing of our own. Consequently, we witness a cry that is shown by pain, while, simultaneously we read a solipsistic description. There is a pretence that ends up turning around, because inadvertently overcomes the shackles of solipsism. Through this solipsist pain description the poet would like to be able to cry out and show it by his own mouth, however, even this pretence of pain is, in fact, the

pain itself that is expressed. The pretence is complete for even the real pain is feigned and the feigned pain is itself real. Those who read the poem feel this "malingering" as the real pain.

It is clear that the poet do not consider the possibility of sharing or access to other's real pain, nevertheless we are bystanders of such a pain description that it makes this pain, that the poet wants to convey, not lost, but rather manifested and met. In the last stanza of the poem "And so around its track / This thing called the heart winds, / A little clockwork train / To entertain our minds", there is an emotional membership of the pain that is entertained by the reason. It may seem to be pointing out the state of a pain entertained by the reason instead of affectivity.

Poetry, being a manifestation of intimacy doesn't need to make the leap to something hidden, or encourage us to dig because the inner is there with no arrangements. "If one has to imagine someone else's pain on the model of one's own, this is none too easy a thing to do: for I have to imagine pain which I don't feel on the model of pain which I do feel." (§302). Pain behaviour may point out the place of pain, but it is the person who suffers who externalizes the pain. So I can only believe that another person is in pain, but I know when I have pains: "I can only believe someone else is in pain, but I know it if I am" (cf. § 246).

Thus, in order to know whether another is in pain, one would have to see clearly into the breast of another, and observe the succession of perceptions, which constitutes his mind. So it appears as if the form of expression we use were designed for a god, who knows what we cannot know (§ 426). This is an ataxia since the insistence upon substituting 'I believe he is in pain' is the confident assertion "He is in pain" (or, indeed, for "I know he is in pain") is not an expression of epistemic justifiable caution based on experience.

To this extent, it is incoherent to think that to know the meaning of my pain is knowing the meaning of others' pain. The third-person psychological expressions are justifiably asserted on the basis of behavioural criteria in context: the cry of pain, or the shriek of agony, among others. According to Hacker (2010), an externalization of experience and an externalization of identity of an experience is not based on any criteria, but such externalizing, together with other forms of expressive behaviour, constitute similarity and difference criteria to the experiences of others.

It is important to note that what we observe in others is not "simple body movements" as if they were hidden behind the mind, they are rather expressions that infuse. Nevertheless, the pain is not the same as pain behaviour because someone may be in pain and not show it. Still, when it's externalized some form of pain, one cannot say that there is a simple utterance of words and that the inner is hidden. It cannot be said about a 'cry of agony that the person "may not be in pain", therefore, the possibility of pretend cannot be a ground for scepticism about the minds of others.

Wittgenstein insists on the distinction between pain and pain behaviour and he does not support the internal is an illusion, but rather that a certain image is a grammatical fiction. Wittgenstein notes that if we speak of a rule for the use of a word, then there should be a distinction between the correct and the incorrect enforcement. This idea of a rule (for example, the grammar) that can be interpreted only by a person is unintelligible. The private language argument subvert the idea that the foundations of language lie in the private experience and knowledge has private databases.

In fact, something about nothing can be said is meaningless at best and ontologically equivalent to nothing at worst. "Sensation is not something nor it is nothing" (§304), Wittgenstein doesn't seem to want to outright deny mental processes like pain, joy, or excitement (§308), but he seems to be denoting that whatever is that we experience is, otherwise, something about which nothing can be said (§306). This is a rough pill to swallow because we want very much to be able to "point privately to the sensation" even if it doesn't seem to yield information (§298). If we do resist the temptation to see grammatical expressions as ostensive indicators of experiential sensations (§304), we would feel the freedom of a fly shown the way out of a fly-bottle (§309).

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The logical inferences in Edmund Gettier's counterexamples to the standard analysis of knowledge and human action

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Abstract

This paper argues against the view that the Gettier problem deals with the problem of human knowledge by showing that there do not appear any human actions in the Gettier counterexamples against the standard analysis of knowledge. Therefore, the persons in Gettier's counterexamples cannot be human beings either. This task is achieved by the analysis of the logical inferences in Edmund Gettier's original paper from 1963. As a consequence of this insight, the question should be posed about what problem epistemologists are actually talking when discussing the so called 'Gettier problem'. As I was socialized in philosophy as a phenomenologist, this paper should be understood as an attempt in philosophical 'intercultural communication'.

1. Introduction

Alan Hazlett, organizer of the conference "The Gettier Problem at 50" (Edinburgh, 20 – 21 June 2013), when asked by me whether the logical inferences in Edmund Gettier's two original counterexamples are processes or actions, responded: "I don't think people who write about the problem assume anything about this one way or another" (email, 8 Feb. 2013). I also asked him whether the Gettier problem is about human knowledge, and his response was that "the theory that Gettier is attacking is meant as an analysis of knowledge, not just human knowledge" (email, 5 Feb. 2013).

I would like to know if Gettier's article from 1963 deals with human knowledge (and Smith, the protagonist of Gettier's two counterexamples, is a human being) because if, what Gettier wrote, is not true for human knowledge, how can it be true for knowledge in general?

2. Many verbs of action are substituted by "logically implies"

"(f) Jones owns a Ford.

[...]Let us imagine, now, that Smith has another friend, Brown, of whose whereabouts he is totally ignorant. Smith *selects* three place names quite at random and *constructs* the following three propositions:

(g) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston.

(h) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona.

(i) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.

Each of these propositions is entailed by (f). Imagine that Smith *realizes* the entailment of each of these propositions he has *constructed* by (f), and *proceeds to accept* (g), (h), and (i) on the basis of (f). Smith has *correctly inferred* (g), (h), and (i) from a proposition for which he has strong evidence. Smith is therefore completely *justified in believing* each of these three propositions. Smith, of course, has no idea where Brown is." (Gettier 1963)

This quote of Gettier's second counterexample stems from his original 1963-article. It suggests that many actions have to be performed in order to establish the logical inference: the places have to be selected, the propositions

have to be constructed, they have to be (actively) accepted and (consciously) believed.

Compare to this to the following quote which shows how the Gettier problem is nowadays usually taught in philosophy classes.

"Suppose Smith has strong evidence following:

(c) Jones owns a Ford

Suppose that Smith has a friend named 'Brown', and Smith does not know where Brown is. The proposition expressed by (c) *logically implies* the following:

(d) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston.

(e) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona.

(f) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk." (Agler 2010)

In David Agler's teaching script, Smith does not do anything to establish the logical inferences, (d-f) are just "logically implied" by (c). The example indicates the disappearance of the human contribution in the Gettier problem by pointing to the extinction of the verbs of human action.

But doesn't the logical function "or" (disjunction introduction) require some form of restriction? I am no logician, but to me it seems that from "Jones owns a Ford" it follows that "Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona or in Boston or in Brest-Litovsk or in Tokyo or on the North Pole or in Kirchberg/Wechsel, and so on. In short, that "Jones owns a Ford or Brown is anywhere". This is correct, but it is not knowledge. If in the selection of the places in Gettier's second counterexample human creativity is involved, it would mean that the logical inferences are not of purely automatic character.

3. What does Smith believe - (h) or (g-i)?

In Gettier's paper the conditions for justified true belief in the second counterexample are fulfilled in the following way: Smith accepts all three propositions (g-i). What happens now is that Jones in reality "does not own a Ford, but is at present driving a rented car", and Brown "by the sheerest coincidence" happens to be in Barcelona. These two facts are interpreted by Gettier as follows: "...Smith does not know that (h) is true, even though (i) (h) is true, (ii) Smith does believe that (h) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified that (h) is true." (Gettier 1963)

I wonder if Gettier's interpretation that "Smith does believe that (h) is true" is correct, because actually Smith did not believe (h) but (g-i). If someone said that Brown is in Barcelona or in Boston or in Brest-Litovsk, we would not say that he believes that Brown is in Barcelona.

4. The lack of motivation for drawing those logical inferences

Human actions usually have motives. Therefore we might ask for Smith's motives for performing his logical inferences. Does Smith learn anything about the whereabouts of Brown by constructing the proposition "Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona"? No, I cannot see that this inference would help Smith in any way to widen his scope of knowledge.

The same is true for the first Gettier counterexample. Does the inference "(e) [t]he man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket" provide any additional evidence to Smith about who will really get the job, Smith and Jones have both applied for? No.

5. Human beings actually could not draw those logical inferences

When asked by me whether real human beings would draw those logical inferences presented in Gettier's article, Alan Hazlett responded that Gettier assumed that someone *could* draw those inferences, because the situations Gettier described are *possible*. Then he asked me: "Would you argue that no human being 'could' believe that the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket, in the situation Gettier describes" email, 5 Feb. 2013)?

In fact, I would argue against the belief that human beings could draw those logical inferences. My evidence for this argument is that people I asked whether they would draw them, refused to do it. They also offered an argument for their refusal by saying that these two things (job and coins, or car and cities, respectively) "haven't got anything to do with each other". This reply points to the fact that human beings are not ready to draw inferences until the objects of those inferences are causally or, at least, probabilistically connected. If this is true, human beings do not think logically in general, as professional logicians do, but only under specific conditions.

6. The principle of "epistemic closure"

The principle questioned here in logics is called "epistemic deductive closure". It is explicitly mentioned in Gettier's second assumption at the beginning of his 1963-article.

Epistemologists claim that this principle is intuitively very plausible for all of us, in everyday life as well as in philosophical arguments. But the examples they use for it, usually differ from the inferences in Gettier's counterexamples insofar as every non-logician would also admit that they are true: If I know that all balls in a box are red, and I know that it follows logically from that, that any specific ball in this box is red, then I also do know that this ball is red (Grundmann, 2008, 166).

7. The indifference for what Smith means to know

If we read Gettier's counterexamples based on the assumption that Smith is a real human being, the indifference exhibited in Gettier's article towards the content of what Smith actually thinks to be true is striking. This can be made explicit, when we analyze how the three conditions of the standard analysis of knowledge are fulfilled.

In the first counterexample, Smith has strong evidence for the fact that Jones will get the job, he and Jones have both applied for, and Smith has seen ten coins in Jones' pocket. From that he infers that "(e) [t]he man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket." This proposition turns out to be true insofar as, in the end, not Jones but Smith gets the job, "[a]nd, also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket". Gettier concludes: "In our example, then, all of the following are true: (i) (e) is true, (ii) Smith believes that (e) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (e) is true." All the conditions of the standard analysis of knowledge which claims that knowledge is justified, true belief are fulfilled, but even though "it is equally clear that Smith does not *know* that (e) is true".

Did Smith, at some point of the story, count the coins in his own pocket? Gettier's article does not tell us that he did. The most probable interpretation of the story is that there are ten coins in Smith's pocket and Smith does not even know that. Only the omniscient observer of Smith's story who is able to see everything, and who is the subject ascribing knowledge to Smith, knows that Smith has ten coins in his pocket.

Therefore, if we confronted Smith with the fact that all three conditions of the standard analysis of knowledge are fulfilled in the first counterexample, he would respond that they are not because it's him who has got the job, and he does not know how many coins there are in his pocket.

It is astonishing that the perspective of the protagonist of Gettier's stories, Smith, does not count at all in the interpretation of the counterexamples. Knowledge, or the lack of knowledge, is ascribed to Smith without consideration of what Smith could possibly believe to know. In other words, Smith's belief that "(e) [t]he man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket" is interpreted solely according to its literal meaning. This makes it unlikely that Smith could possibly be human being, for judging a person, without taking into account her intentions in what she is saying, means not taking her seriously.

8. Does Smith suffer from amnesia?

In both of Gettier's counterexamples, there is a step in the procedure in which Smith suffers from amnesia. The amnesia-part of the story is located the logical inferences in the following way. Smith is justified to believe P, and P entails Q, and Smith deduces Q from P and believes Q – and forgets P, or forgets that Q was deduced from P.

If Smith had not forgotten that he deduced "the man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket" from the fact that he has seen ten coins in Jones' pocket, the conditions of the standard analysis of knowledge would not be fulfilled in the same manner as in Gettier's article, by Smith getting the job and having ten coins in his pocket. The amnesia-part of Gettier's counterexample would be alright, if the real concern of the Gettier problem was to write a computer program imitating the process of knowing, without running routines to check back for earlier states of affairs of the same process.

9. Inadequate treatment of the aspect of time

Smith's belief is recorded at specific points in time, when he still does not really know anything, in order to deny him the ascription of knowledge in the face of what turns to be true later. The omniscient observer is not inside time but outside of it, already knowing the end of the story.

Here is my solution for the Gettier's first counterexample: When Smith gets the job, he has the justified true belief that he has got the job (and he does not care about coins in pockets, anymore). The reason for that is that one should not claim to have knowledge about who is getting a specific job until the job contract is signed. There are points in our lives when things we believed turn out to be true or false, but the moments chosen in Gettier's counterexamples by the omniscient observer are definitely not points in time of that kind.

10. Nothing less than perfection is required

Epistemologists after Gettier interpreted the consequences of his counterexamples in the same way as he did:

"These two examples show that definition (a) [the standard analysis of knowledge, remark.] does not state a *sufficient* condition for someone's knowing a given proposition." (Gettier 1963)

For me, this conclusion is too strong. The standard analysis of knowledge does suffice, if human knowledge is considered to be something (humanly) imperfect that works under normal conditions. Epistemologists seem to have the intuition that knowledge has to be perfect: "To talk about 'relative' or 'imperfect knowledge', is a linguistic absurdity" (Grundmann 2008, 164).

11. The question whether it is possible to establish a true premise for the logical inference is not asked

Additional evidence for the fact that in the discussion about the Gettier problem no attention is paid to the question of

human action can be found in the so called "no false lemmas"- solution. It consists in the idea that a justified true belief should not be inferred from a false premise. Instead of asking whether human beings are able to comply with this requirement, the proposal was refused by Gettier theorists with reference to more general Gettier-style cases (such as Alvin Goldman's 'fake barn'-example) which do not contain any logical inferences.

12. Note

I am aware of the fact that analytic philosophers might consider all arguments in this paper to be irrelevant for the Gettier problem. This points to the question whether the problem of human action is part of their understanding of the Gettier problem.

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„Jede Variable ist das Zeichen eines formalen Begriffes.“ Über die Funktion der Sagen-Zeigen Unterscheidung in Wittgensteins Auffassung von Variable.

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Abstract

In meinem Beitrag will ich darlegen, wie Wittgensteins Bemerkungen zum Unterschied von Sagen und Zeigen mit seiner Auffassung von Variablen in der *logisch-philosophischen Abhandlung* zusammenhängen. Im Zentrum meiner Überlegungen steht die Passage 4.12–4.128. Dort führt Wittgenstein zunächst die Unterscheidung von Sagen und Zeigen ein, wobei er das, was sich zeigt, mit der logischen Form einer Sache (eines Gegenstandes, einer Tatsache, eines Satzes, der Wirklichkeit) identifiziert (4.121–4.123). Dann überführt er die Rede von logischer Form zunächst in die Rede von formalen Eigenschaften (vgl. 4.122) und schließlich in diejenige von formalen Begriffen (vgl. 4.126). Formale Begriffe werden durch Variablen bezeichnet (4.126, 4.1271f.). Wittgenstein scheint mit der Sagen-Zeigen-Unterscheidung die Auffassung, dass Variablen formale Begriffe bezeichnen, vorzubereiten. Das Ziel dieses Beitrages besteht im Nachweise, dass dieser Eindruck richtig ist. Die Sagen- Zeigen- Unterscheidung beleuchtet den Begriff der logischen Form, den Wittgenstein schon im Abschnitt zur Bildtheorie eingeführt hat, auf eine Weise neu, dass es möglich wird, ihn mit dem Konzept der Variable zu verknüpfen und so zu klären. Um diese These zu begründen soll im Folgenden zuerst dargelegt werden, welches Problem die Unterscheidung von Sagen und Zeigen motiviert. Dann soll aufgezeigt werden, dass Wittgenstein in der *Abhandlung* eine Auffassung von Variablen präsentiert, die auf diese Problematik antwortet.

In meinem Beitrag will ich darlegen, wie Wittgensteins Bemerkungen zum Unterschied von Sagen und Zeigen mit seiner Auffassung von Variablen in der *logisch-philosophischen Abhandlung* zusammenhängen. Im Zentrum meiner Überlegungen steht die Passage 4.12–4.128. Dort führt Wittgenstein zunächst die Unterscheidung von Sagen und Zeigen ein, wobei er das, was sich zeigt, mit der logischen Form einer Sache (eines Gegenstandes, einer Tatsache, eines Satzes, der Wirklichkeit) identifiziert (4.121–4.123). Dann überführt er die Rede von logischer Form zunächst in die Rede von formalen Eigenschaften (vgl. 4.122) und schließlich in diejenige von formalen Begriffen (vgl. 4.126). Formale Begriffe werden durch Variablen bezeichnet (4.126, 4.1271f.). Wittgenstein scheint mit der Sagen-Zeigen-Unterscheidung die Auffassung, dass Variablen formale Begriffe bezeichnen, vorzubereiten. Das Ziel dieses Beitrages besteht im Nachweise, dass dieser Eindruck richtig ist. Die Sagen- Zeigen- Unterscheidung beleuchtet den Begriff der logischen Form, den Wittgenstein schon im Abschnitt zur Bildtheorie eingeführt hat, auf eine Weise neu, dass es möglich wird, ihn mit dem Konzept der Variable zu verknüpfen und so zu klären. Um diese These zu begründen soll im Folgenden zuerst dargelegt werden, welches Problem die Unterscheidung von Sagen und Zeigen motiviert. Dann soll aufgezeigt werden, dass Wittgenstein in der *Abhandlung* eine Auffassung von Variablen präsentiert, die auf diese Problematik antwortet.

Zuerst möchte ich den Anfang der Passage 4.12ff. genauer unter die Lupe nehmen. Wie führt Wittgenstein die Sagen-Zeigen-Unterscheidung ein? In 4.12 hält er fest, dass der Satz die gesamte Wirklichkeit darstellen kann, aber nicht das, was er mit der Wirklichkeit gemein haben muss, um sie darstellen zu können, das ist: die logische Form. Das ist der Kern der Bildtheorie des Satzes und eine Wiederholung der Passage 2.17ff. Was die logische Form sein soll, das bleibt in Bemerkungen unter 2 schwer fassbar. Sie durchwirkt zwar alles, doch kann sie nicht dargestellt werden, nicht Gegenstand einer Behauptung werden. In 4.121 beginnt Wittgenstein, den Begriff der logischen Form in einer positiven Weise zu charakterisieren, die

zwar in der Passage 2.17ff. schon angelegt ist, dort aber nicht weiter entwickelt wird.

4.121 beginnt mit derselben Wiederholung: Der Satz kann die logische Form nicht darstellen. Doch dann folgt: Aber sie spiegelt sich in ihm. Der Satz zeigt die logische Form der Wirklichkeit. Zwar steht der negative Aspekt immer noch im Vordergrund: Was sich in der Sprache spiegelt, kann die Sprache nicht darstellen, was gezeigt werden kann, kann nicht gesagt werden. Doch unbestreitbar ist nun ein positiver Aspekt hinzugekommen. Der Satz teilt in gewisser Weise die logische Form doch mit, sie drückt sich im Satz, in der Sprache aus. Von 4.12 zu 4.121 verändert sich etwas der Betrachtung der logischen Form. Das wird auch deutlich, wenn man auf die Begründung dafür achtet, dass die logische Form nicht darstellen lässt: Zuerst ist es die Unmöglichkeit, einen Standpunkt einzunehmen, von dem aus die logische Form dargestellt werden könnte. Die zweite Begründung nennt Dichotomie von Sagen und Zeigen und verbindet also den negativen mit dem positiven Aspekt: Weil die logische Form sich schon zeigt, kann sie nicht durch einen Satz dargestellt werden. Der positive Aspekt wird im folgenden weiter herausmoduliert: Die logische Form, die formale Eigenschaft ist ein Zug, der sich an Tatsachen bemerken lässt und sich an den Sätzen, mit denen auf diese Tatsachen Bezug genommen wird, wiederfindet (vgl. 4.122f.). Sie ist ein Merkmal, mit dem all das gezeichnet ist, dem die formale Eigenschaft zukommt. Und dieses gemeinsame Merkmal, dieser konstante Zug, lässt sich mit einer Variable bezeichnen (vgl. 4.126).

Im letzten Abschnitt habe ich versucht Wittgensteins Strategie aufzuzeigen. Mit der Sagen-Zeigen-Dichotomie führt er eine zweite Begründung an, warum die logische Form nicht dargestellt werden kann. Aber zugleich leitet er damit auch die Erörterung dazu ein, wie die logische Form doch bezeichnet werden kann. Die beiden Begründungen – die logische Form darzustellen würde einen Standpunkt außerhalb der Welt voraussetzen; die logische Form zeigt sich, und was sich zeigen lässt sich nicht sagen – diese beiden Begründungen würden beide eine Diskussion verlangen. Sie sind beide in einer suggestiven, bildhaften Sprache vorgetragen, die zwar den Punkt – über die logi-

sche Form lässt sich nichts „sagen“ – sehr deutlich macht, doch zugleich schwer zu durchdringen ist. Hier ist also einiges an Interpretationsarbeit zu leisten. Auf die erste Begründung werde ich in diesem Beitrag nicht mehr zurück kommen. Doch die Sagen-Zeigen-Unterscheidung soll Thema des anschließenden Teils sein

Bevor dargelegt werden kann, was das heißen soll, dass eine Variable die logische Form bezeichnet, muss geklärt werden, warum nicht gesagt werden kann, dass etwas (eine Tatsache, ein Gegenstand, ein Satz, die Wirklichkeit) eine logische Form hat. Was motiviert die Unterscheidung von Sagen und Zeigen? Die Antwort auf diese Frage, wird verdeutlichen, warum das, was nicht gesagt werden kann, sich gerade „zeigen“ soll.

Zuerst die Frage: Warum möchte man überhaupt etwas über die logische Form sagen? Der Begriff der Logischen Form ist zentral für Wittgensteins Bildtheorie, seine Auffassung von Sätzen als Bilder. Ein Grundgedanke dieser Auffassung ist: Bild und abgebildete Wirklichkeit haben etwas gemeinsam. Logische Form ist also etwas, das Sätzen zukommt, insofern sie Bilder sind. Und da alle Sätze (alle Aussagen) Bilder sind, ist sie etwas, das allen Sätzen zukommt. Der für mich wichtige Punkt ist genau der: Logische Form ist etwas Allgemeines, oder vielleicht würde ich besser sagen, Wesentliches. Sie kommt *jedem* Gegenstand, *jedem* Bild, der *gesamten* Wirklichkeit zu. Ich werde nicht weiter auf die Bildtheorie sondern nur diesen Punkt mitnehmen.

Eine Erläuterung des Begriffes der logischen Form wird durch die eben erwähnte Allgemeinheit erschwert. Über etwas, das dermaßen allgemein ist, lässt sich nicht reden, so scheint es, wenn gelten soll, was die *Abhandlung* über Sätze festlegt. Mit diesem negativen Befund beginnt auch die Passage 4.12ff, wie eingangs dargelegt wurde. Doch gerade vor dieser Passage hat Wittgenstein der Philosophie eine Aufgabe zugewiesen, für die es zentral ist das zu bezeichnen, was gesagt oder gedacht werden soll. In Satz 4.116 heißt es: „Alles was überhaupt gedacht werden kann, kann klar gedacht werden. Alles, was sich aussprechen lässt, lässt sich klar aussprechen.“ Dieses „alles“ darzustellen (4.115), es ab- oder einzugrenzen (4.114) ist die Aufgabe der Philosophie. Das setzt voraus, dass das Denk- und Sagbare sich als Gesamtheit zusammenfassen lässt; dass es ein charakteristisches Merkmal hat. Ein Merkmal, das allem, was gesagt werden kann, zukommt. Dieses Merkmal ist die logische Form. Doch der Versuch, etwas über die logische Form zu sagen bringt einen in Schwierigkeiten, wie sich gleich zeigen wird.

Die Schwierigkeit über die logische Form zu reden kommt daher, dass hier eine bestimmte Art von Allgemeinheit im Spiel ist und es nicht klar ist, wie diese Allgemeinheit ausgedrückt werden soll. *Jeder* Satz, *jedes* Bild, *jeder* Gegenstand, die gesamte Wirklichkeit hat eine logische Form. Die Allgemeinheit, die hier einen Ausdruck sucht, ist nicht dieselbe wie etwa die des folgenden Satzes: Alle Mäuse lieben Käse. Mit einem solchen Satz wird eine Behauptung gemacht. Dabei ist es möglich, dass es Mäuse gibt, die keinen Käse lieben oder, dass keine Maus Käse liebt. Diese Möglichkeiten sind als falsch ausgeschlossen, wenn es wahr ist, dass alle Mäuse Käse lieben. Dass der Satz sinnvoll ist heißt für Wittgenstein so viel, dass er etwas Bestimmtes (das sich also durch einen Satz dargestellt werden kann) als etwas Mögliches ausschließt.

Die Rede, dass jeder Satz eine logische Form hat, soll gerade keine Möglichkeit als falsch ausschließen. „Es gibt Sätze ohne logische Form“ – oder – ‚kein Satz hat eine logische Form‘ – sind keine Möglichkeiten, keine Alternati-

ven dazu, dass jeder Satz eine logische Form hat. Vielmehr ist es gerade undenkbar und also nicht als Möglichkeit in Betracht zu ziehen, dass es einen Satz gebe, der keine logische Form hat. Entsprechend drückt die Rede,weise „Jeder Satz hat eine logische Form“ nicht etwas aus, das wahr oder falsch sein kann. Gemäß dem Kriterium der *Abhandlung* für Sätze handelt es sich bei der Formulierung „jeder Satz hat eine logische Form“ nicht um einen Satz. Denn es gilt ja: Ein Satz ist sinnvoll, heißt, dass er wahr oder falsch ist, und zwar ist er wahr oder falsch unter bestimmten Bedingungen. Genau das soll die Bestimmung, dass jeder Satz eine Wahrheitsfunktion ist, ausdrücken – und dass jeder Satz eine Wahrheitsfunktion ist konkretisiert ja die Bestimmung, dass jeder Satz eine logische Form hat. Jedoch: Indem man dieses Charakteristikum formuliert, hat man sich bereits über die Grenzen des Sagbaren hinaus gegeben. Diese Formulierung genügt selber nicht dem Kriterium, das sie für Sätze und somit für Sagbares aufstellt. Mit ihr werden keine Bedingungen bestimmt, unter denen Sätze Wahrheitsfunktionen sind. Und es ist undenkbar, dass Sätze keine Wahrheitsfunktionen sind. Aber was soll das heißen: Es ist undenkbar? – Es ist nicht klar, was das sein sollte, was man da mit „Satz“ bezeichnen möchte, wenn es zugleich keine Wahrheitsfunktion sein soll. Eine Zeichenfolge hört auf, ein Satz zu sein, wenn sie keine logische Form mehr hat, möchte man sagen. Der Ausdruck „wesentliche Eigenschaft“ drängt sich auf. Es ist Sätzen wesentlich, dass sie Wahrheitsfunktionen von Elementarsätzen sind. Es ist ihnen wesentlich, dass sie wahr nur unter bestimmten Bedingungen sind. Doch damit ist, so Wittgenstein, nichts gewonnen. Wenn man sich Klarheit darüber verschafft, wie Aussagen funktionieren, in denen behauptet wird, dass ein Gegenstand eine eigentliche Eigenschaft hat, wird deutlich, dass es sich in den Fällen von Zuschreibungen „wesentlicher“ oder „internen“ Eigenschaften um etwas ganz anderes handelt, als um Aussagen (vgl. 4.124f., 4.126). „ist eine Wahrheitsfunktion“ bzw. „hat eine logische Form“ ist gar nicht eine Eigenschaft, die sich von Eigenschaften wie „ist rot“ oder „mag Käse“ bloß dadurch unterscheidet, dass sie ihrem Gegenstand notwendigerweise zukommt. Diesen Anschein erweckt bloß unsere Redeweise, der Umstand, dass wir jedes Mal in Subjekt-Prädikatsätzen reden, ob wir nun sagen: „Mäuse sind Käseliebhaber“ oder „Sätze sind Wahrheitsfunktionen“. Aufgrund der äußerlichen Ähnlichkeit dieser beiden Formulierungen entsteht der Eindruck, als ob einmal eine Behauptung über Mäuse, einmal eine Behauptung über Sätze gemacht würde.

Über die logische Form möchte man dann reden, wenn man bestimmen möchte, was alle Sätze oder alle Sätze einer bestimmten Form auszeichnet. Die vorangegangenen Überlegungen mögen klar gemacht haben, warum sich dann aber gerade nichts über die logische Form „sagen“ lässt, warum solche Bestimmungen keine Behauptungen über Sätze sein können. Doch warum sollte etwas über die logische Form „gezeigt“ werden können? Statt von logischer Form kann man in gewissem Sinne von einer formalen Eigenschaft reden (vgl. 4.122), von einem charakteristischen Zug, den alle Sätze dieser Form haben (vgl. 4.1221). Sätze der gleichen logischen Form zeigen ein gemeinsames Merkmal und ihre logische Form lässt sich auffassen als formaler Begriff, der dieses Merkmal bezeichnet. Dieser formale Begriff soll sich durch eine Variable ausdrücken lassen (vgl. 4.126).

Die logische Form zeigt sich nicht nur an Sätzen, welche diese Form haben, sondern sie lässt sich auch zeigen (oder bezeichnen), nämlich mit einer Variable. Eine Variable bestimmen heißt, einen Ausdruck für eine logische Form finden.

Da der Platz für eine Auseinandersetzung mit Wittgensteins Auffassung von Variable hier fehlt, möchte ich anhand eines Beispiels deutlich machen, wie die Variable diesen gemeinsamen Zug bezeichnen. Das Beispiel soll auch verdeutlichen, wie die Rede über die logische Form anhand einer Variable geklärt werden kann.

Alle Sätze, welche die Variable fx beschreibt, haben trivialerweise ein Merkmal gemeinsam: Sie enthalten das Zeichen f . (Zur Illustration: Die Variable „ x ist rot“, beschreibt alle Sätze – die Gesamtheit der Sätze –, die entstehen, wenn „ist rot“ durch einen geeigneten Ausdruck zu einem Satz ergänzt wird, also z.B. „Die Rose ist rot“, „die Margerite ist rot“, „der Ferrari ist rot“, vgl. 3.311–3.313). Dieses Zeichen zu enthalten ist nun nicht eine eigentliche Eigenschaft dieser Sätze. f zu enthalten ist nicht etwas, das wie eine eigentliche Eigenschaft auf diese Sätze zutreffen kann oder nicht. Wie gesagt, ist das schon darum ausgeschlossen, weil Sätze keine Gegenstände sind, Eigenschaften aber auf Gegenstände zutreffen oder nicht zutreffen. Doch es gibt noch einen weiteren Aspekt in dieser Sache: Da die Sätze durch das Merkmal definiert sind, f zu enthalten, ist f zu enthalten nicht zugleich etwas, das jeden dieser Sätze zutreffen kann oder nicht. Ganz im Unterschied zur Beschreibung einer Gruppe von Gegenständen durch eine gemeinsame Eigenschaft, wie z.B.: Alle Kinder, die kleiner als ein Meter sind. In diesem Fall ist „ist kleiner als 1 Meter sein“ eine eigentliche Eigenschaft, und jedes der Kinder könnte auch größer als 1 Meter sein. Es wäre immer noch dasselbe Kind, aber nicht mehr Teil der Gruppe. Dagegen ist es für einen Satz der Klasse, die durch fx beschrieben wird, nicht möglich, nicht zu der Klasse zu gehören.

Mein Beispiel hinkt aber, so scheint es. „ist rot“ ist doch, könnte man einwenden, kein formaler, sondern ein eigentlicher Begriff. Ich glaube, das Zeichen „ fx “ („ x ist rot“) lässt sich auf zwei Weisen auffassen. Zum einen als Ausdruck eines eigentlichen Begriffes, unter den bestimmte Gegenstände (Rosen, Tulpen) fallen oder nicht fallen (Margeriten) (vgl. 4.124 und 4.126). Es lässt sich aber auch als Zeichen eines formalen Begriffes auffassen. Dann wird es gemeinsames Merkmal einer Klasse von Sätzen verstanden, eben das Merkmal, den konstanten Ausdruck f zu enthalten. Dieser Ausdruck ist aber gerade der Begriff.

Wenn wir fx als eigentlichen Begriff auffassen, dann betrachten wir die Sätze der Satzklasse fx unter dem Aspekt, ob sie wahr oder falsch sind. Wenn wir es aber als Zeichen eines formalen Begriffes auffassen, dann betrachten wir die Sätze nur insofern sie zu der Satzklasse fx gehören. Auf den formalen Begriff Bezug nehmend haben wir also

die ganze Satzklasse im Blick und interessieren uns nicht für den Wahrheitswert der Sätze.

Wenn wir nun anstatt von den Sätzen der Klasse von den Gegenständen reden, auf die in diesen Sätzen Bezug genommen wird, wird unsere Redeweise uneigentlich. Wir übertragen das Merkmal der Sätze auf die Gegenstände und sagen etwa, dass alle diese Gegenstände die formale Eigenschaft hätten, möglicherweise ein f zu sein. „ x ist rot“ beschreibt die Klasse der Sätze, welche den Begriff „ist ein rot“ enthalten. In diesen Sätzen werden Gegenstände benannt, für die es möglich ist, rot zu sein. Diese Gegenstände sind nicht unbedingt rot, aber *unbedingt* haben diese Gegenstände die interne Eigenschaft, *möglicherweise* rot zu sein (etwas, das eine Sonnenblume ist, hat die Eigenschaft, möglicherweise Rot zu sein), – oder anders gesagt, sie sind farbig. In diesem Sinne können wir Farbigkeit die Form bestimmter Gegenstände ist. Dem müssen wir dann hinzufügen, dass damit nicht eine Eigenschaft im eigentlichen Sinne gemeint sei und dass die Sätze, in denen von interne Eigenschaften die Rede ist, auch nicht Sätze im eigentlichen Sinn sind. Solche Sätze können ja, zumindest in Wittgensteins Verständnis, nicht verneint werden. Wir übernehmen die Redeweise, welche Wittgenstein in 4.122 – 4.128 braucht, aber auch in den Bemerkungen unter 2, wo er formale und materiale Eigenschaften von Gegenständen unterscheidet.

Die logische Form zeigt sich also an einem Satz. Man kann sie „sehen“ insofern man bemerkt, dass der Satz ein charakteristisches Merkmal mit anderen Sätzen teilt und ihn so als Element einer Klasse von Sätzen begreift. Ich habe an einem Beispiel dargelegt, was das konkret heißen könnte. „Die Rose ist rot“ teilt mit einer Klasse von Sätzen das Merkmal, dass sie den Begriff „ist rot“ enthält. Dies wird durch die Variable „ x ist rot“ ausgedrückt. Ebenso ist die allgemeine Satzform ein charakteristisches Merkmal. Diesmal ein Merkmal, das alle Sätze teilen. Alle Sätze sind Wahrheitsfunktionen, das heißt, sie können durch logische Operationen aus Elementarsätzen erzeugt werden. „Eine Wahrheitsfunktion sein“ ist also ein formaler Begriff und dieser kann durch eine geeignete Variable ausgedrückt werden (vgl. 6). Sie umreißt das Denkbare.

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The Inner Light of Tacit Rules

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Abstract

Wittgenstein famously said that in the end we follow rules blindly. Some philosophers interpret Wittgenstein's thoughts about rules as containing the idea of tacit rules. The article tries to analyze what a tacit rule can and can not be. It is suggested that tacit rules are created by the philosophers in a process of logical construction, rather than observed. Then a critique of tacit rules, inspired by the work of Nigel Pleasants, is offered. The main points of the critique derive from the absence of rule-related practices that could be connected with tacit rules.

Wittgenstein famously said that in the end we follow rules blindly. The meaning of this slogan is not entirely clear, or better to say it does not lead to only one clear interpretation. Some theorists understand it as saying that in fact we are not that blind after all. More precisely we are never blind completely, since we have an inner sight. The inner light in us are tacit or implicit rules¹. So they understand Wittgenstein as saying that not all rules are explicit, but there have to be also tacit rules - those are the ones we follow when we follow a rule blindly. The aim of this article is to provide and account of theoretical construction of tacit rules, followed by, inspired by the work of Nigel Pleasants, critique of the concept.

First of all we should ask what a tacit rule is. To answer it is not an easy task and it is not so only because there may be something wrong with the what-is question, but for much simpler reason - it is not easy to give a direct example of a tacit rule. That means it is not easy to give an example of a tacit rule without providing a rule in explicit form, or without providing only a redescription of practices in which rules play no explicit role in terms of implicit rules. The basic thought behind the tacit rules is that they are somehow, as Sellars writes, "written in nerve and sinew rather than pen and ink" (Sellars 1949, 299). This is of course only a metaphor which does not give us any explanation how the tacit rules behave "at work", it only tells us they are not explicit.

One way how to think about the tacit rules would be to take them as similar to unwritten rules. Jaroslav Peregrin, an important Czech analytic philosopher, suggests in his recent work (Peregrin 2011a, 2011b) exactly that we can for better understanding imagine the tacit rules as very similar to unwritten rules (Peregrin 2011b, 88). However, the comparison has one serious flaw. When we think a little about the so-called unwritten rules we find that the word "tacit rules" is sometimes used in the same fashion - one can find articles about unwritten rules of flirting as easy, as one can find articles about tacit rules of business. In this sense they are similar, because sometimes we use both words to name the same rules. But another important thing rises while reading through such examples as articles mentioned above - the rules we find in them are all written down! Rules like "do not wear hat in church if you are male" or "the elections winning party should be the first to try to create the government" can work thanks to their explicit form. One can learn them by sharing. If one was asked to put down his hat just by gestures he could think the gestures mean his hat is dirty. And when the interpretation of gestures stops - as for sure it sooner or later will -

there is no reason why not to take the language of gestures as an attempt to express the rule quite explicitly. Think of what would be a test of his understanding it as a rule - the most simpler test is to ask him after the mass whether he understands what the issue was.

Another possibility is that the tacit rules are "at work" when no explicit rules are "at work" and we do things we would describe as being in accordance with a rule. This is a key distinction. I do not want to say it is used sharply in the ordinary language. We sometimes say that we followed a rule about cases that for philosophical reasons would be better described as being in accordance with a rule, or by saying that our act complied with a rule. Philosophers focus to much on examples as chess and can not imagine that it can't be played without the process of following rules. But to know to play chess is to have an ability. For example to be good at openings (especially in quick chess), one can not think not even about the rules of chess, but not even about the moves themselves. I can not see any reason why to look at the process differently than say at the process of operating a car gear - to master it you just can't think about what is the correct order of pushing the clutch. Take example of dancing. When we are in the process of learning to dance a classical dance, say waltz, what we probably do in the beginning is we think about the rules, we count 1-2-3 in our head. But once we really learn it, we stop thinking about the rules, we just dance, move our body. We can improvise and as long as we do not break the rules of waltz (e.g. we do not use steps from some other dance), we dance in accordance with the rules of waltz. The borders are so open, that even if we invent new steps, it is always an open question whether to say we did not danced waltz or we just added new features to waltz. And if asked, why did we danced as we did, could we answer something more than "I followed my body"?

So if the theories are not based on observation of tacit rules, what are they based on? I suggest to look at the theories about tacit rules as offering a logical construction of tacit rules.

1. Logical construction of tacit rules

What do I mean by logical construction of tacit rules? We can explain it by a better known example, that of a proposition. After seeing the fact we can say the same sentence twice, or that we can say the same thing in more languages, we come to think that the occurrences *must* have something in common and the usual answer is - it is a proposition. This answer of course does not explain anything as long as *proposition* remains a rather mystic logical

¹ The concepts of tacit and implicit rules are being used interchangeably. I will not try to prove the claim in this article.

concept. My claim is that the tacit rules are created in the theories similarly.

To see the first Wittgensteinian attempt to construct tacit rules we have to go back to Peter Winch. In his famous book *The Idea of a Social Science* (Winch 1990) Winch claims, that “all behaviour which is meaningful (therefore all specifically human behaviour) is ipso facto rule-governed” (Winch 1990, 51-52). This may not at the first sight look as saying something about tacit rules, but we just need to add premise that not every meaningful act is governed by an explicit rule and we come to following argument.

(P1) All meaningful acts are rule-governed.

(P2) Not every meaningful act is governed by an explicit rule.

(C1) There have to be tacit (not-explicit) rules.

He adds to the idea that following a rule does not have to contain a explicit rule, that “the test of whether a man’s actions are the application of a rule is not whether he can formulate it but whether it makes sense to distinguish between a right and a wrong way of doing things in connection with what he does” (Winch 1990, 58). So the actor does not have to know she is following a rule, or when asked she does not have to be able to recognize she was following a rule or be able to provide it. Winch famously tried to teach us that we should understand a society in terms the society uses. But it is a simple fact he admits by this, that we do not use rules related vocabulary to describe the practices that are supposed to be governed by tacit rules.

Another logical construction of tacit rules comes from the Kripke’s thoughts about rules (Kripke 1982). Kripke is aware, that we do not interpret a rule always when we can say we follow it. However, his basic idea of following a rule includes the process of interpretation. Only by including it can he put the skeptical paradox with a force as big as he does. Let’s stop by the very well know example of an arrow sign showing a way in a forest. How do we know which way should we go? If we always had to interpret the arrow sign and the interpretation had form of another sign, a job to interpret this new sign would remain. So how is it possible we understand the sign? Kripke does not say anything about tacit rules - he is satisfied with the social nature of rules. It is Peregrin who adds to the social nature of rules a theoretic concept of tacit rules, that rests on the social practices of approving and disapproving. (This is a very Winchian thought.) With this concept in hands we can state the following argument.

(P3) When we follow an explicit rule, we interpret it.

(P4) The interpretation process can not be stopped by another explicit rule.

(P5) The interpretation process is stopped.

(C2) There have to be tacit rules, that do not require interpretation.

What we see here is a change from process to substance, from practice to an object standing behind the practice. We should add that tacit rules do not only create a way how to speak about some social practices in a undifferentiated way. Both Winch and Peregrin (and many others, e.g. Giddens or Davies) speak about tacit rules as separate. Peregrin writes also about possibility of making the tacit rule explicit (the tacit rules and making them explicit is a basic theoretical tool of adherents of critical social theory).

2. Critique of tacit rules

The tacit rules were recently vehemently criticised by Nigel Pleasants (Pleasants 1999). He does not oppose only the idea of tacit rules, but strongly objects to the possibility of knowing a structure of an act or of some social practice before we look at the practice as such. Before I mentioned that the theory of Winch was a Wittgensteinian one. Now it is time to reconsider this claim - it was presented and received as Wittgensteinian, but Pleasants provides a detailed account how Winch provided a grounded stone of theory that goes against Wittgenstein’s thoughts. The basic of this claim is based on the clash of theoretical and non-theoretical approaches to philosophy. So Pleasants says that “Winch’s hermeneutical project is primarily animated by a *Kantian*, not Wittgensteinian, conception of philosophy” (Pleasants 1999, 38). It is driven by the question “how is such an understanding (or indeed any understanding) possible?” (Winch 1990, 22). Winch thus promotes what Wittgenstein opposed. So Winch, says Pleasants, did not bring a Wittgensteinian revolution to social sciences, he just offered a new theoretical program for it.

Tacit rules are supposed to be deep structure of some practices. If we take the logical construction of them to be correct, we just suppose they are “there” and already look at the practices with this assumption. The manner in which the tacit rules are supposed to interact with individuals is mysterious (Pleasants 1999, 62). More troubles come if we think about the process of translation into explicit form. If we can not know the tacit rules directly and can only somehow translate them into an explicit form, how do we know if the explicit rule matches the implicit? What more, if the tacit rules are ontologically superior to their formulations and we can never know them directly, how are we even able to interpret them? And what is the criterion of a correct interpretation? (Pleasants 1999, 69).

Following a rule is usually the only rule-related practice philosopher talk about. But in fact it is not the only one. We know how to create rules, how to make an exemption from a rule, how to teach someone a rule, etc. None of these practices is connected with tacit rules. Le Du (Le Du 2010) offers an account according to which we do not grasp the tacit rules, we only somehow follow them, the rules are somehow present. What does it mean that a rule is present? If we can not grasp the rules, how are we able to follow them? Why should we even call them rules?

To think of tacit rules (or of any other type of practice) as always present, we hide all other categories of practices into the one. It is the same philosophical mistake as to think about free will in dichotomic terms - either all our acts are free or they are not free. Every meaningful act is either rule-governed or it is not rule-governed. Well, some of our acts are free and some not and some of the acts we call meaningful are rule-governed and some of them are not.

3. Conclusion

Think about a group of people going up on an escalator. All of them stand on the right side of the stairs. 1) A stands right because she has compulsions (let’s say she suffers from OCD); 2) B stands right, because she feels safer there; 3) C just does what she sees everyone else doing; 4) D watched other people and deduced a rule “I should stand on the right side”; 5) E saw a sign saying “Stand on the right side of the escalator”; 6) F tried to stand on the left side several times before, but someone always asked her to move to the right side. We can say that all of them follow, or comply with the rule to stand on the right side.

But all of them in a sense do something else, from different reasons. The supposition of one common deep structure hides the differences. Following Wittgenstein, we should try to see the differences. Especially when the supposed common feature is as unclear as tacit rules.

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Externalism of Content and the Pragmatic Point of Meaning Talk

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Abstract

While most readers of Putnam's Twin Earth thought experiments find themselves in initial agreement with his semantic intuitions, this agreement is less stable than it seems at first. It is not difficult, for instance, to get oneself to see XYZ as within the extension of our word »water«. This paper explains this instability with the — only rarely studied — pragmatics of meaning talk. Once we appreciate the *calibrational* nature of meaning talk, it is no longer mysterious that simply imagining oneself to be in linguistic contact with people with initially foreign linguistic dispositions (intuitions) has the effect of unsettling our own linguistic dispositions (intuitions). This is also true with respect to our intuitions about the content of intentional mental states. What emerges is a novel way of reconciling internalist and externalist intuitions in the theory of content and meaning.

1 Introduction

Most philosophers recognize the importance of Hilary Putnam's Twin Earth thought experiments.¹ However, there is not only a remarkable degree of controversy regarding how exactly to think about the significance of Putnam's work — with opinions ranging from the insistence that we should drop all commitment to a *a priori* access to semantics, to the claim that all that is needed are modifications to the classical way of doing conceptual analysis. It also appears that although most commentators find themselves in broad agreement with Putnam's semantic conclusions, once one starts to think a little bit longer about Twin Earth scenarios, our intuitions tend to become less stable. Initially, that is, one finds oneself agreeing with Putnam that Oscar's, and hence our, »water«-tokens have H₂O as their extension, while the extension of Twin Oscar's »water«-tokens is XYZ. But after a little prodding, most people can get themselves to see Twin Earth's XYZ as a kind of water, just as nephrite is a kind of jade. After all, Twin Earth is located within our universe, not in some non-actual possible world, and its watery stuff is so similar to H₂O that we could mix it with the latter without noticing much of a difference (to biological functions, for instance). Not so different (one wants to say) from the »jade« case as told by Putnam (Wikforss 2010; LaPorte 2004, 2010). Traders and artisans of jade always knew that nephrite was only similar to the more traditional variety of jade.

In this short paper, I want to suggest that both the persistence of the theoretical controversy and the instability of our intuitions may be a consequence of a problematic over-stretch, and hence partial misunderstanding, of semantic vocabulary, and talk of »content« in general. To speak with Wittgenstein, it may be that semantic vocabulary is taken out of its »home language game« into contexts where it is not properly understood or understandable. The same, I will suggest, is true for attributions of mental content, which (arguably!) ride on our attributions of semantic meanings.

I will start by suggesting that there is a (virtuously) circular relationship between linguistic dispositions on the one hand, and meanings on the other: with their linguistic dispositions, multiple speakers institute meanings; the meanings in turn make certain linguistic dispositions correct (and others incorrect). This is an instance of a general story about a (virtuously) circular relationship between practical attitudes and normative statuses. If this is roughly true, then we can make the case that semantic vocabulary is

best seen as a tool for *linguistic calibration*. With it, we not only report (our conception of) the ordinary uses of expressions. We also express our own linguistic dispositions. Thereby, we invite others to adapt their own dispositions to ours. The consequence is that in a sense, semantic claims contribute to making themselves correct. But since, in addition to their role as reports, they serve as invitations, there is also a sense in which they can fail. This, by itself, may already cast doubt on the use of semantic vocabulary in standard Twin-Earth-style thought experiments, which typically do not address this feature of semantic vocabulary. But perhaps more to the point, our own linguistic intuitions / dispositions crucially depend on our expectation of their *uptake* by other speakers, and that is, on other speakers' linguistic intuitions / dispositions. It is for this reason that seriously entertaining the possibility that, say, Twin Earth's XYZ could be seen as a kind of water, as nephrite is a kind of jade, could unsettle our initial intuition that XYZ is not water, because doing so amounts to imagining interlocutors for whom Twin Earth's XYZ *is* a kind of »water«. I will finish of the discussion which some considerations in favour of extending this story of meanings to intentional mental contents.

Before plunging into the discussion (section 3), though, I want to give an outline of semantic externalism which serves as preparation for the discussion (section 2) — in particular, I want to discuss the role of linguistic dispositions in the context of semantic externalism.

2 Semantic externalism — some basics

One of the origins of semantic externalism is Hilary Putnam's observation that there is nothing which simultaneously plays the two roles of a) supervening only on a speaker's psychological states, narrowly construed, and b) determining the extension of the speaker's expressions (Putnam 1975, 219). Putnam shows this by envisioning Twin Earth cases in which two speakers are identical in all the respects registered under (a), including their dispositions of using their words in discourse, yet refer to different things with a given expression-type.² When Oscar (who grew up on Earth) uses the word »water«, that word denotes H₂O, yet when Twin Oscar (who grew up on Twin Earth, where the watery stuff consists of XYZ-molecules) uses a word »water«, that word denotes XYZ. What is crucial to semantic externalism is that according to it, a speaker can be fully competent in the use of her expres-

¹ This short paper takes Putnam as representative of semantic externalism — I (intend to) discuss Kripke and Burge in a longer version.

² [How is an expression-type individuated? By more than mere sound or sign-design, but by less than its complete semantics. Perhaps: only by intra-language rules, not entry- or exit-rules.]

sions,³ yet be ignorant or mistaken about certain semantic features of them, namely their denotation.

I want to emphasize that even though the point of semantic externalism is to deny that speakers are fully in control over the semantic features of their own words, an attribution of externally determined meanings to their expressions requires that the speakers meet certain conditions. In particular, there must be reason to locate a *deferential attitude* in Twin-Oscar's own linguistic dispositions. This means that once given the relevant external information, Twin-Oscar himself would have to agree that his »water«-tokens indeed denoted XYZ, not the similar but different stuff on our Earth.

The deferential attitude can be described as a feature of Twin-Oscar's linguistic dispositions. Note that linguistic dispositions are typically complex. Twin-Oscar, for instance, is not only disposed to call *this* or *that* sample of liquid »water«, or to assent to statements like »if it's a clear liquid that quenches thirst and..., then it's water«, but also to apply general principles of rationality to his judgments. These principles of rationality can be reconstructed as second-order dispositions of distancing oneself from, or revising, particular judgments once inconsistencies with other judgments become apparent. As our model, we can take Sellars's (1953, 314) famous example in which a speaker sees herself forced to take back either her claim »if it tastes sour, it is acid« or her claim »if it is acid, it turns litmus paper red« after the confrontation with an object which tastes sour yet which fails to turn litmus paper red. Just like the speaker in Sellars's example, Twin-Oscar can be interpreted as liable to finding himself with »materially incompatible commitments« (Brandom 2009, 36), if, for instance, he thinks that sameness of substance does not tolerate difference in molecular structure. Since he himself can be expected to retract at least one of his inconsistent claims once the relevant chemical information becomes available, we are justified in a semantic interpretation which presupposes such a retraction on his part.

3 Semantic vocabulary as a tool for linguistic calibration

3.1 The idea

I have claimed in the introduction that Putnam's thought experiment, or rather the semantic questions which it is supposed to help answer, may take semantic vocabulary out of its »home language game« and thus be guilty of an »overstretch« of such vocabulary. The »home language game« of semantic vocabulary, I have claimed, is one of linguistic calibration. Let me spell out what I mean by this.⁴ and then think about the significance for present purposes.

The background idea is that meaning can be understood on the model of (monetary) value in the following respect. In order for a note of paper money to be valuable, it has to be treated as valuable by multiple agents. That means, multiple agents have to have certain dispositions to exchange the note for goods. It is important that it is *multiple* agents who display such dispositions. If I alone had them, that would not be enough, because I can only buy something for a Dollar if there are sellers, and I can only sell something for a Dollar if there are buyers. But once I can do these things, I can speak of value. And this means that certain exchanges (on my part, and anybody else's) will come out as appropriate, and others inappropriate. What

we can see in this context is a virtuous circularity: agents' exchanging dispositions make it the case that a note of paper money attains value; the value, in turn, makes it the case that certain exchanging dispositions are appropriate (and others inappropriate); given rationality, agents will converge on these dispositions.

The same virtuous circularity can be observed in the relation between linguistic dispositions on the one hand and meaning on the other. Multiple speakers' linguistic dispositions institute meanings; the meanings, in turn, make these linguistic dispositions appropriate (and others inappropriate); given rationality, speakers will converge on just these (or roughly these) linguistic dispositions.

What is important to note in this context is the role of normative *vocabulary* — both »value« and »meaning« (and their respective cognates), but also talk of »appropriateness« and »inappropriateness« in general (and their cognates). Talk of value must be seen as essentially located *within* the virtuously circular system of trade; talk of meaning must be seen as essentially located *within* the virtuously circular system of linguistic transactions. The role of these kinds of vocabulary in both cases can be described as *calibrational*. Let me first make the point with respect to »value«. By saying that a particular object — say, a copy of the *Tractatus* — has a particular value — say, 5 Dollars — I do not only report my impression of the going price of copies of the *Tractatus*. I also signal my own exchanging disposition. And by doing so, I invite others to enter into exchanges with me. That, in turn, contributes to making copies of the *Tractatus* *actually* worth 5 Dollars. The mechanism is particularly perspicuous in cases where my impression of the going price, and hence my own exchanging disposition, differs from that of other traders.

An analogous story can be told with respect to the vocabulary of meaning. A statement about the meaning of some expression is not only a report of the way the expression is used. It is also an expression of its author's linguistic dispositions. And as such, it serves as an invitation to (potential) interlocutors to adapt to, adopt, these dispositions. Again, this mechanism is particularly perspicuous in cases where there is a difference between the claim's author's linguistic dispositions and those of other speakers. Thus, just like the value statement, a meaning statement (defeasibly) contributes to its own correctness.

If this account is roughly correct about statements of the form »the meaning of X is Y«, it is surely also true of statements about reference or denotation.

3.2 The consequences

Now, I should make clear that the sketched »calibrational« account of meaning talk (embedded in the »circulatory« account of dispositions and meanings) is, in the first place, an account of »non-personal« semantic claims (»X« means Y«, »X« refers to Z«), rather than claims like »By »X«, Bob means Y« or »With »X«, Bob refers to Z.« The latter kinds of claims are best understood as aids to translation for third parties.⁵ However, even if this is the case: since our musings about what Twin-Oscar means by »water« are really a way of thinking about what *we* mean by »water«, or more clearly: of what »water« *means*, the calibrational use of meaning-vocabulary ought to have some relevance to the debate of semantic externalism. I want to

3 Caveat: see footnote 2.

4 This summarizes parts of an earlier paper of mine; see [REDACTED FOR BLIND REVIEWING].

5 There are, of course, also the constructions, emphasized by Bob Brandom, of the form »The man he referred to as »X«, which serve as anaphoric inheritors of name-tokens. See Brandom, 1994, ch. 7.

suggest that it helps explain the instability of the intuitions underlying semantic externalism.

If the above sketch of semantic externalism in section 2 is correct, then linguistic dispositions play an important role in it. We can only interpret some speaker's terms as sensitive to external information if she has the appropriate linguistic dispositions. The fact that our »water«-tokens have H_2O as their extension, and that our Twins' »water«-tokens have XYZ as their extension, for example, can be seen to reflect the fact that upon learning about the molecular structure of the relevant substances — in particular, about the difference in molecular structure — we would take back certain judgments which initially struck us as correct.

Now, these dispositions are conditional on our expectation that they are shared. We would only take back certain claims, we would only stick to other claims, if or because we expect that by doing so, we can communicate what we want to communicate. Without an expectation of how our linguistic responses to our environment are taken by our concrete interlocutors, we do not have a reason to make any particular linguistic response to our environment. And so we do not have any reason to make any *specific* change to our first-order disposition (only to make *some* change) when we hit a material incompatibility in our use of our terms. And if we do advocate a *specific* adjustment, it must be seen as a tentative proposal — an invitation — which may well fail in the sense in which any invitation can fail: it can be ignored. If it is, the utterance, even when taken as a descriptive claim, comes out unsuccessful, now in the sense of *false*.

It is this dependence of our own linguistic dispositions on those of others which explains the instability of our intuitions regarding Twin Earth cases. In particular, as soon as we are forced to take seriously the possibility that, say, XYZ might be a kind of water, we imagine being faced with actual interlocutors with linguistic dispositions of just this kind — and immediately, our own initial response to the thought experiment is put in question.

Let me close with a few words about how to extend the story told so far (a story about semantics) to attributions of

intentional mental contents. What we should note in this context is that in cases of incompatible commitments of the kind discussed by Sellars, we make exactly the same moves in relation to the question what we were *thinking about* (fearing, hoping etc.) as we do in relation to the question what we *meant*, or what some word *meant*. We do *not* typically say that it turns out we weren't thinking about anything, but determine which of the commitments wins in the relevant circumstances. Of course, some philosophers insist on the possibility of a »narrow« construal of mental content, typically in response to worries about the causal efficacy of mental contents, or about the possibility of knowing the content of one's mental states. In this paper, I do not want to address the possibility or role of such a construal. I just want to suggest that there is good reason to think that mental contents (widely construed) have the same sensitivity to other speakers' linguistic dispositions as the meanings of people's words: faced with the possibility of a speaker who treats XYZ as a kind of water, it is not wildly implausible for me to take back my initial supposition that Twin Oscar was not thinking about water.

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Consciousness Dethroned? Questions of Unconscious Thought, Unconscious Decision Making, and the Like

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Abstract

Many processes we are not conscious of influence us. Modern psychologists have begun to study the unconscious in much broader manner than Freud. In particular, they conducted experimental studies of decision making, on the basis of which Dijksterhuis concluded that in complex decision “unconscious thought” outperforms conscious thought. This and other results led him to propagate the dethronement of consciousness. Especially on the basis of the studies of decision, Dijksterhuis and Nordgren formulated their unconscious-thought theory.

I shall present one example of a decision-making experiment and a summary of that unconscious-thought theory. I shall critically discuss a number of their aspects and conclusions drawn, also referring to analyses of other authors. I conclude that consciousness still is very much in control.

1. Introduction

Mental conditions and processes that we are not conscious of influence our thoughts, feelings, perceptions, behavior and actions. For Freud, the unconscious was a repository of mainly disruptive repressed traumatic experience and primitive drives. Modern psychologists have taken a *broader* approach. E.g., they have studied how unconscious racial stereotypes influence our judgment of persons, or they found that subjects having been “primed” with scenes of old age walked away more slowly to the lift than “youth-primed” subjects.

Also, they see many workings of the unconscious as something *positive*, such as eureka experiences, lucky sudden remembrances or inspirations. They have, in particular, carried out experimental studies of decision making. In a seminal study, Dijksterhuis (2004) concluded that in complex decision the “unconscious thought” outperforms conscious thought. This and related findings fed his general intention to make consciousness tumble off its high Cartesian pedestal. Furthermore, especially on the basis of their research on decision making, Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006) formulated their unconscious-thought theory.

I shall present one example of a decision-making experiment and a summary of that unconscious thought theory. I shall critically discuss a number of their aspects and conclusions drawn, also referring to comments and analyses of other authors.

Concerning our general theme “Mind, Language and Action”: An operational characterization of things conscious is that they can be verbalized or reported, thus expressed in language, whereas unconscious matters cannot. Still, subjects in experiments exploring the unconscious are usually given spoken and written instructions, which they of course are conscious of. Also in everyday situations, one can thus roughly say that language often triggers, or sets to work, the unconscious which might mold actions.

2. Choosing an Apartment

Lab experiments concerning decision making figure as paradigm experiments in the unconscious-thought research and literature (Dijksterhuis 2004, Dijksterhuis 2007/2003, 126ff.), e.g.:

Three groups of subjects were presented with the *complex* decision about which of four (fictitious) apartments – A, B, C or D – is the best. They were quickly presented with twelve different, positive and negative, attributes of each apartment (like ‘A is situated in a quiet neighborhood’, ‘C has a tiny kitchen’). The best apartment had 8 positive and 4 negative characteristics, all others three 5 positive and 7 negative ones. The first group had to decide immediately after having read the information. The second group got four minutes to deliberate, think consciously about the choice. The subjects of the third group were told that they would have to indicate their choice later, after first having been solving puzzles for four minutes. They are regarded as “unconscious thinkers”, the idea being that they, though being distracted, were nonetheless unconsciously thinking about the apartments.

Dijksterhuis reports the outcome of his experiment: the best apartment was chosen by 37% of the immediate deciders, 47% of the conscious thinkers and 59% of the unconscious thinkers. And somewhat overenthusiastically, which maybe typical of some psychological experimenters, he concludes: “The unconscious thinkers made the best decision! ... Unconscious thinkers make better decisions than conscious thinkers and quick deciders.” (Dijksterhuis 2007/2003, 128)

However, such *absolute* conclusions cannot be drawn from those *statistical* results. A legitimate conclusion is: 12% more unconscious thinkers than conscious thinkers chose the best apartment. Also, *contra* Dijksterhuis’, we must conclude: some unconscious thinkers made worse decisions than conscious thinkers and quick deciders. Such legitimate conclusions raise questions. Would those 47% of the consciously deliberating subjects have done just as well, and the remaining 53% just as badly, in the unconscious condition? Did the unconscious of 41% of the unconscious thinkers not work properly, and what does this mean? Such questions were left unexplored.

Note that psychologists found that in *simple* choices – e.g., among oven mitts, with just prices and quality as attributes – it is *conscious* deciders who do best.

Other psychologists did comparable experiments, partly with the same, partly with different results. Waroquier et al. (2010), e.g., found, first, that immediate deciders scored just about as good as distracted deciders. They verified, secondly, that distracted deciders made better choices than conscious deliberators. However, because of their

first finding they concluded that there is no deliberation without attention ("unconscious thought") during distraction; rather, they suggest, that consciously ruminating about one's immediate judgment can deteriorate the quality of one's decision. This suggested explanation does not appeal to "unconscious thought".

Acker (2008) also replicated Dijksterhuis' study, with a choice of cars instead of apartments. He found no convincing statistical evidence in favor of unconscious thought. He also conducted a very detailed meta-analysis of 17 published and und unpublished experiments. These compiled findings also "cast doubt on the unqualified claim that unconscious thought is the superior way of processing information for important and complex choices" (ibid. 302). Acker suggested that the influence of other factors, such as manners of presenting information, should be studied.

Thus, the empirical evidence for unconscious thought and its superiority in complex choices has remained ambiguous and inconclusive. Yet, these ideas certainly are of hypothetical, if not theoretical interest. At any rate, they have been codified in the following theory.

3. A Theory of Unconscious Thought

Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006) formulated their unconscious-thought theory by way detailed descriptions of six principles. It is supposed to be "applicable to decision making, impression formation, attitude formation and change, problem solving, and creativity" (ibid. 95). I can only give a brief summary:

(A) The Unconscious-Thought Principle

There are two kinds of thought: conscious and unconscious. Conscious thought is defined as "object-relevant or task-relevant cognitive or affective thought processes that occur while the object or task is the focus of one's conscious attention", whereas unconscious thought refers to such processes occurring when the object or task is outside of attention, e.g. "while conscious attention is directed elsewhere" (ibid. 96).

(B) The Capacity Principle

Conscious thought "is constrained by the low capacity of consciousness. Unconscious thought does not have this constraint because the unconscious has a much higher capacity." Thus, conscious thought "often takes into account only a subset of the information it should take into account." (ibid. 96)

(C) The Bottom-Up-Versus-Top-Down Principle

Because of its low capacity, conscious thought, like an architect, has to operate top-down, guided by schemas and expectancies. Unconscious thought, like an archeologist, works bottom-up: it "slowly integrates information to form an objective summary judgment" (ibid. 98)

(D) The Weighting Principle

"The unconscious naturally weights the relative importance of various attributes. Conscious thought often leads to suboptimal weighting because it disturbs this natural process." (ibid. 99f.)

(E) The Rule Principle

"Conscious thought can follow strict rules and is precise, whereas unconscious thought gives rough estimates." (ibid. 101) Unconscious thought is associative, cannot do arithmetic. While it cannot follow rules,

it can conform to rules, and it may yield the same results as conscious thought.

(F) The Convergence-Versus-Divergence Principle

"Conscious thought, and memory search during conscious thought, is focused and convergent. Unconscious thought is more divergent." This principle is "more relevant for creativity than for choices or decisions." In incubation, while "conscious thought is directed elsewhere", "unconscious activity continues" (ibid. 102), bringing less obviously related items to bear on the problem, task or goal at hand.

I shall mainly make two comments, partly critical, concerning this theory.

4. What is "Conscious Thought"?

The main general question is: what is the thing called "unconscious thought"? The authors in question admit that we know next to nothing about what kind of process it is.

Many would say that 'unconscious thought' is almost contradiction in terms. For the authors, it *is* thought, inasmuch as "demonstrating active unconscious thought entails showing that the mental representation of the presumed object of thought changes", e.g. by leading "to a better organization of information in memory." (ibid. 99)

However, a process changing a mental representation need not be thought. A spot far away seems to be a cow; on getting closer, you see it is a horse and remember this. No thought need be involved, only movement and perception.

Dijksterhuis (2007/2013, 204) states that the unconscious is not one undifferentiated whole: unconscious thought is just one of several unconscious modules, others being modules for perception, language, coordination of the body, testing goal-achievements. Still, one question would be whether the same unconscious-thought module both weighs options in complex decisions and produces surprising relationships in ingenious scientific discoveries.

More generally, there is the question of identifying unconscious thought as a process or as a module. So far, the unconscious-thought psychologists have been arguing *from the deliverances* of supposed unconscious processes (which suggest properties like bottom-up, weighting, divergent). Methodologically, this is not quite satisfactory. An *independent* identification of the processes in question would help. However, identifying them by introspection is excluded by definition, and brain scans do not yet seem to be able to do the job.

Some identification of unconscious thought would also be needed to answer the following crucial questions. In the study of the apartments, it is assumed that two processes are going on in the unconscious, distracted deciders: conscious puzzle solving and unconscious thinking about the apartments. Could it be that also in the conscious deciders two processes were going on: conscious thinking about the apartments and unconscious thinking about them? In the study, one seems to assume that this cannot be the case. But why not?

5. What About Processing Capacities?

Principle (B) states that the unconscious has a much higher capacity than conscious thought. Which capacities are meant? What is the evidence, and what is the quantitative comparison?

The authors (ibid. 96f., also Dijksterhuis 2007/20013, 22f.) refer to the fact that we usually are not able to think consciously of more than one thing at a time and to G. Miller's "magical number seven, plus or minus two", which is the number of items an average human can hold in working memory. These, then, are capacities of *considering* consciously and of *having directly available* in memory.

Yet, the authors switch to talking about "processing capacities". They claim that consciously, as when reading, we can "process" maximally 60 bits per second, whereas unconsciously we can "process" about 11,2 million bits per second – our visual faculty alone already about 10 million bits per second. This is 200 000 times as much as what consciousness is capable of. "As to processing capacity, our unconscious is a modern computer, and our consciousness nothing more than a lousy old-fashioned abacus. It is only good that our consciousness is not the boss in our brain!" (Dijksterhuis 2007/20013, 24)

However, bits per second is a measure of the speed of information *transmission* (channel capacity), *not* one of *processing* information. As a measure for the processing capacity of a computer processor, e.g., one uses, instructions per second or calculations per second ("flops"). So, this comparison in terms of bits per second is quite obscure.

The comparison could be suggested by an analogy with the difference in the disk space needed for *storing* a piece of text and a picture, although this might involve only a factor of 1000. Similarly, it could concern the difference between the amount of information *taken in* (thus, *transmitted*) per second when reading and the amount *taken in* when looking or watching. Only, the estimate of 60 bits per second for conscious "processing" in reading is explicitly based on coding letters, on the fact that 5 bits are needed for every letter, whereas it is not made clear how pictures are supposed to be coded (maybe as in digital television channels). Anyway, we do not read letter for letter. So, coding letters is not the proper way of determining the information acquired in reading.

Furthermore, it is not so straightforward to tell what is conscious and what unconscious. According to Dijksterhuis (2007/20013, 24), when watching television, we are only conscious of one or two things ("Brad Pitt kisses Angelina Jolie"), while "we process numerous details unconsciously". I think we are conscious of much more, also things not in the focus of our attention. Do we really, as Dijksterhuis suggests, consciously read letters or words, the meanings being supplied by the unconscious? Is memory, also access to it, something altogether unconscious?

6. Final Remarks

Psychologists have not established something like a clear superiority of so-called unconscious thought over conscious thought, not even in the paradigm case of complex decisions.

Dijksterhuis (2007/20013, 192ff.) tops off his attempt at dethroning *res cogitans* by defending an epiphenomenalist view, a stage model, concerning *consciousness in general* – pointing out: B. Libet and others showed that also conscious decisions are the result of unconscious processes; it is on and off that consciousness is confronted with just the final products of unconscious work; when one unconscious module discovers that something does not go well, then consciousness is also the stage on which this module can inform other modules.

Abstractly speaking, this epiphenomenalist view seems to undermine the experimental studies with their clear distinction between conscious and unconscious thought. If now conscious thought is supposed to be also just the result of unconscious work, what is the difference then? Dijksterhuis could of course respond that two different unconscious modules are involved, one weighing options and one producing conscious thought.

But Dijksterhuis stresses himself that consciousness does play other important roles in those experimental studies: the subjects must *consciously* be informed and instructed. And even if so-called unconscious thought comes up with an apartment as the best option, this option will still have to be *consciously* endorsed and further *conscious* steps will have to be taken, say, towards a rental of the apartment. Thus, consciousness stays very much in charge, frequently delegating things to non-conscious work places.

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Calling to mind: Wittgenstein's philosophical investigation PI90.

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Abstract

An expedition in search for enlightening similarities between the concepts expressed by Brentano, early Husserl, Twardowski and Wittgenstein's PI 90. Wittgenstein claims that our investigation is directed not towards phenomena, but rather as one might say towards the possibilities of phenomena. We call to mind the kinds of statement that we make about phenomena. Can we understand Wittgenstein's use of "calling to mind" in the context of the concept of intentional inexistence in descriptive psychology, logic and philosophy in late 19th century Viennese circles around Brentano, Twardowski and Husserl? What are the relations to the empirical world and how is the other person involved when we talk about the possibilities of phenomena?

PI90: We feel as if we had to see right into phenomena: yet our investigation is directed not towards phenomena, but rather as one might say, towards the possibilities of phenomena. What that means is that we call to mind the kinds of statement that we make about phenomena. So too, Augustine calls to mind the different statements that are made about the duration of events, about their being past, present or future. (These are of course not philosophical statements about time, the past and the future). Our inquiry is a grammatical one. And this inquiry sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstanding concerning the use of words, brought about, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of our language. Some of them can be removed by substituting one form of expression for another; this may be called 'analysing' our forms of expressions, for sometimes this procedure resembles taking a thing apart.

Are there similarities between the concepts expressed by Brentano, (early) Husserl, Twardowski and Wittgenstein's PI 90? Is there a relationship between Wittgenstein's use of "calling to mind" and the concept of intentional inexistence in descriptive psychology, logic and philosophy in late 19th century Viennese circles around Brentano, Twardowski and Husserl? These are the questions we are dealing with in this paper. The emphasis will be on the use of the phrase "calling to mind". What are we calling to mind in this philosophical investigation PI90 with the kinds of statement we make about phenomena, about the possibilities of phenomena? Do we hear here a bell ringing reminding us of the intentional inexistence thesis worked out in the late 19th century (early) phenomenology? Our investigation is directed not towards phenomena but to the possibilities of phenomena. What that means is that we call to mind the kinds of statement that we make about phenomena. Do we use our imagination to do so? What actually happens if we call to mind the kinds of statement that we make about phenomena? In the last part of the sentence about the possibilities of phenomena we can even jump further back in philosophy: to Leibniz possible worlds and to the monad as the expression of the world. For Leibniz possibles do not exist in the real world. The question is how actual realism is for Wittgenstein. In "Remarks on the foundation of mathematics" he states: *Not empiricism and yet realism in philosophy, that is the hardest thing*. But let us focus now first on early phenomenological links and after that go on an expedition and jump back- and forwards in time.

Of course there is an abyss between PI90 and the question of intentionality in early phenomenology. In the history of philosophy this moment marks what is later called the

linguistic turn and this has separated continental philosophy from analytic philosophy. So we are aware of the gap between Wittgenstein and his predecessors and they have different methodological orientations. But we are on this journey exploring the echoes from the late 19th century phenomenology in order to shed some light on PI90 and try to understand what "calling to mind" can mean from a phenomenological point of view. We want to explore if "calling to mind" can be understood as a continuity with the concept of presentation (Vorstellung) in early Husserl. Do we have to understand this "calling to mind" in a logical or a more psychological way? What is the philosophical dimension? When Wittgenstein is speaking of "calling to mind" in combination with the "possibilities of phenomena" in this first sentence in PI90 there is an echo of Brentano's concept of intentionality as the meaning-giving act for all intelligent being. Brentano's concept consists of two theses: the intentional inexistence thesis and a synsemantic one. This synsemantic one comes pretty close to Wittgenstein's "language in use thesis". The first thesis assumes that if we think, imagine, judge, *something* is being thought of and this something has to be an object "existing" in our mind. This object has an intentional (in)existence. When we judge something is affirmed or to be denied; when we love something is loved. The intentionality is always part of psychic phenomena and it makes the difference with physical phenomena, that do not have intentionality.

Twardowski develops his view concerning the intentional inexistence in his dissertation "Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellung" that appeared in 1894. He influenced Husserl (both were students of Brentano in Vienna) who has been working on "Intentionale Gegenstände". Husserl changed his view after reading Twardowski's dissertation. Twardowski follows Brentano in the classification of the psychic acts. The ground act is the presentation (Vorstellung). Presentations are characterized by their directedness to a content or an object. Yet this view seems to be contradicted by what Bolzano had called "objectless presentations". Can a theory of intentionality be upheld if a good many of those objects (like unicorns or round squares) we apparently call to mind or present to ourselves manifestly do not exist?. Twardowski tries to solve, this so called Brentano – Bolzano paradox and tries to prove that there are no objectless presentations (Gegenstandlose Vorstellungen). In order to prove this he makes a tri-parted classification in act, content and object of the presentation. This reflects according to Twardowski the three functions that names have in the description that Anton Marty, another disciple of Brentano, made: 1. the name: manifests a presentation occurring in the users mind. 2. It produces a psychic content in the listener (who thereby grasps the meaning of the name). 3. And it names the presented object.

Twardowski states that according to the first function of the name every presentation is an act that contains (possesses) an intentional object. According to the second function this intentional object is the sense of the act, by which the act refers to something. The third function is the meaning that represents the object. Twardowski analyses what is represented: the content or the object? He suggests that you can think in this analogy: a painter is painting a painting and he is painting a scenery. His intentionality is directed towards two things: the painting and the scenery. Twardowski is speaking of a presenting activity moving in a double direction. In this way Twardowski solves the Brentano – Bolzano paradox: there are presentations that have objects without an object in reality, cf. unicorns, round squares etc.. These objects have an intentional inexistence.

Against the duplication of the object. Husserl.

At the time of his Logical Investigations, at least, Husserl advocated a two-level ontology: objects (or beings) are either real or ideal. Real objects are divided into the physical and the psychic, where idealities are of one sort only: they are meanings and everything logical connected therewith.

This later development in Husserl's thinking does not contradict his early writings. He saw meanings not so much as constituting a special class of entities but rather as functions possessed by presentations in certain judgmental contexts. Thus in the Twardowski review he states that objects inhere in presentations only in a functional way, namely insofar as this presentation functions in judgments positing the identity of certain presentations. This is the position he had already taken in the early 1890s. Therefore Husserl is against the duplication of the object in the presentation in the sense Twardowski states. According to Husserl Twardowski is completely overlooking the ideal concept of meaning in the presentation. Here Husserl seems to come nearer to Wittgenstein's "calling to mind" in PI90 than Twardowski because Twardowski enlarged ontology by a special kind of object, the intentional ones. The important point is that for Husserl meanings are never real or constitutive part of presentations conceived as psychic entities. Since objects do not inhere in the acts presenting them either, Husserl concludes that a presentation cannot be such that there exists any real pictorial relation between something inside the presentation and something outside it. It is therefore useless to distinguish between an immanent or intentional object of a presentation and a corresponding real one. Presenting activity does not move in two directions at the same time: to a content and to an object; it is directed exclusively towards the object. Remember that Twardowski introduced this intentional inexistence in order to solve the Brentano-Bolzano paradox. The term inexistence is used in an improper way in this context. Husserl sticks to the normal meaning of our statements about existence and non-existence. To say that Zeus does not exist does not mean that this God would exist in certain mental acts. Moreover he also does not exist extra mentem, for he does not exist at all. (Hua XIX/1, p.387). How can we have a presentation of Zeus then? Well we can pass a positive judgment on the existence of Zeus when we install ourselves on the given soil of Greek mythology. So there are judgments possible about non-existing objects. We will not go into detail here how Husserl worked this out. But what is important in relation to Wittgenstein's PI90 is that Husserl reduces the difference between presentations having an object and those

which do not. Objects inhere in presentations only in a functional way, namely insofar as this presentation functions in judgments positing the identity of certain presentations. This paves the way not only for Husserl's own phenomenology which is a doctrine of acts, and of objects only insofar as they are correlates of acts, but also for us to grasp the idea where Wittgenstein is heading in PI90. Existence, this is to say for Husserl, cannot be modified. Speech however can.

This leaves us with another problem mentioned above: the possibilities of phenomena and intersubjectivity. We will jump over here to Deleuze. According to Deleuze: we have to consider a field of experience taken as a real world, no longer in relation to a self that is "calling to mind kinds of statement that we make about phenomena" but to a simple "there is". There is, at some moment, a calm and restful world. Suddenly a frightened face looms up that looks at something out of the field. The other person appears here as neither subject nor object but as something that is very different: a possible world, the possibility of a frightening world. This possible world is not real, or not yet, but it exists nonetheless: it is an expressed that exists only in its expression. This brings us to a philosophical problem that is also involved in phenomenology: I can only know your experience of the phenomena by spoken words, by what you tell me. "The other is a possible world as it exists in a face that expresses it and takes shape in a language that gives it a reality. In this sense it is a concept with three inseparable components: possible world, existing face, and real language or speech" (Deleuze). This concept of the other person goes back to Leibniz, to his possible worlds and to the monad as expression of the world. In Leibniz possibles do not exist in the real world. It is also found in the modal logic of propositions. These do not confer on possible worlds the reality that corresponds to their truth conditions. "Calling to mind kinds of statement about possibilities of phenomena": even Wittgenstein envisages propositions as fear of pain not as modalities that can be expressed in a position of the other person because he leaves the other person oscillating between another subject and a special object. This leaves the other person out there. What is the ethical consequence of this? How is this related to the intentional inexistence of phenomena in the subject? Husserl stated that there is no intentional inexistence, because he is against the duplication of the object. Objects only inhere in a functional way. Wittgenstein goes on in PI 90 "Our inquiry is a grammatical one. And this inquiry sheds light on our problems by clearing misunderstandings away. Misunderstanding concerning the use of words, brought about, among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of our language. Some of them can be removed by substituting one form of expression for another; this may be called analyzing our forms of expressions, for sometimes this procedure resembles taking a thing apart". So in Husserl maybe the concept of the other presupposes the determination of a sensory world as a condition. Empiricism! Here the similarities between early phenomenology, PI90 and Deleuze's on concepts in "What is philosophy?" seem to form a triangle in our search for similarities. When we stay within this vicious triangle we are heading towards an infinity because every concept extends to infinity and concepts being created are never created from nothing. So we have to install ourselves on the given soil of a sensory world out there that we share. And this is what phenomenology stands for.

Working Notes:

I took "calling to mind" PI90 very literal in order to be able to explore PI90 against an early phenomenological background. I understand the way Wittgenstein prefers the expression "calling to mind" as the translation for the German verb *besinnen* PU90 rather than "remind ourselves". But for me as a native Dutch speaker the German verb *besinnen* PU90, also has a connotation that has to do with reflection and giving sense. Of course we have to reflect what we do when we speak about the world. When there is a world out there and we have a language and we can imagine things in presentations in our mind we have to reflect on the way these speech acts, acts of presentation and judgments about true or false relate to each other.

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On Envatment, Experience and Epistemology

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Abstract

This paper is about the relationship between anti-sceptical arguments that reflect on the (alleged) possibility that we might be a brain in a vat, and different conceptions of perceptual experience. I argue that while the former fail in their remit as anti-sceptical, their significance can instead be understood in terms of a conception of experience on which sceptical issues do not arise.

This paper is about the relationship between certain anti-sceptical arguments, and different conceptions of the relationship between our perceptual experience and our environments. Very briefly put, I will be arguing for a conception of the latter that renders concerns about knowledge of the external world otiose.

Hilary Putnam (1982) is famous for arguing that we cannot be brains in a vat; that the hypothesis is in a certain sense incoherent. David Chalmers (2005) has argued somewhat similarly that if we were brains in a vat, or in the *Matrix*, or more generally 'envatted', most of our everyday beliefs would remain true. But he also claims, *pace* Putnam, that such hypotheses make sense and moreover that we cannot rule out that we are so envatted on the basis of our experience. Both thinkers see themselves as offering anti-sceptical arguments, not perhaps cogent against all forms of scepticism, but at least certain kinds of *external world* scepticism to the effect that for all we know most of our beliefs about the world beyond our skins might be false.

In the first section of this paper I first want to clarify the relationship between Putnam and Chalmers. I will be arguing that there is not really the light between them that Chalmers sees, even though his way of putting things also makes the claim made by Putnam clearer. In section 2 I argue that their (common) view is nevertheless open to a kind of objection that has been levelled by John Campbell (2002), to the effect that it secures only knowledge of the world's causal structure, not its categorical nature. Unfortunately the strongly externalistic consequences of the kind of direct realism Campbell recommends instead are also difficult to accept. My diagnosis (section 3) is that the Putnam/Chalmers argument does involve an important insight, but that this should be viewed not as part of a rebuttal of a sceptical argument, but as reinforcing a phenomenological account of experience in which the question of the relation to the world as it in itself simply does not arise.

1.

Putnam argues that the supposition that we are and always have been brains in vats is self-undermining. If I suppose that situation to be true and think 'I am a brain in a vat', my thought will be false, for my words (or concepts) 'brain', 'vat' and so on will not refer to brains, vats and so on. This is because such words gain their reference and meaning from the things in the environment with which they are regularly causally connected. So whether I am or am not a brain in a vat, when I say or think 'I am a brain in a vat' I speak falsely. So the claim is necessarily false, and I cannot be a brain in vat.

Chalmers argues that the brain in a vat hypothesis, or any similar hypothesis such as the idea that we are 'empodded' bodies stimulated by a computer programme to give the impression of living in the 'real world' (cf. 'The Matrix') is not a sceptical but a metaphysical hypothesis. As such it consists of three components: the physical world is in its underlying structure computational or 'bit'-like; our cognitive apparatus are separate from this structure but interact with it; all this was created by some kind of *deus ex machina* (I won't make use of this last element here). Chalmers argues that all this is metaphysically possible and might for all we know from experience be true. But even if it is true the vast majority of our everyday beliefs remain true, including those about our surroundings, the objects in it and their gross characteristics. I still have hands, sit on chairs, drive cars etc. – it is just that what these things are in their fundamental structure is other than we standardly take it to be.

Chalmers thus agrees with Putnam that the (putative) possibility that we might be brains in a vat does not entail problems for everyday knowledge (at least insofar as it aims to show everyday beliefs might be systematically false). However, he rejects Putnam's view that we cannot be in such a scenario; that the supposition makes no sense. While Putnam's argument for this may work for specific metaphysical hypotheses involving terms like 'brain' and 'The Matrix' it cannot rule out the generic idea of being envatted. More generally Chalmers' argument, he says, does not rely on any claims in the theory of reference.

I think there are two interrelated problems with this line. To start with, how are we to make sense of being envatted in purely generic terms? Unless one specifies particular ways of being envatted the idea would seem to lack discriminatory content – it would simply refer to the idea that being a thinking thing involves having some kind of central nervous system lodged in a wider system (the body) which itself is part of an environment. This is something that applies to us as we take ourselves to be anyway, so can hardly be used as the substance of a conception of how things might otherwise be. On the other hand, if it is specified, one would want to know how Putnam's constraints of causal links on reference are to be avoided.

Secondly, if Chalmers is right that most of my everyday beliefs remain true in an envatted world – that I sit on chairs, drive cars and so on – it seems a very pertinent question to ask why I should be identified with the cognitive system that is envatted. What or where my brain is is one thing, but when it comes to what I am, there seems no reason to deny for any of the scenarios Chalmers envisages that I am a 'physical' individual in just the way chairs, hands and other people are (and the same goes for them if they are in a similar situation). If we accept this, then it is false that I am a brain in vat, empodded or in any other

way envatted in the various scenarios Chalmers envisages. So Putnam's argument would still go through. Of course, if 'envatted' just means the trivial thing I mentioned above, then I might be envatted, but this would not be to say anything significant.

Perhaps Chalmers could object to this that his metaphysical hypothesis doesn't have to be framed in terms of what *I* am, but just what my broader metaphysical situation is. However, it seems fairly clear that his disagreement with Putnam would then evaporate. What is left open on both views is that we might, *at some level*, be deceived or at least ignorant about our environments. I think Chalmers' presentation more clearly brings this out, though, as we shall see, it remains unclear in what sense being envatted really deserves to be called a metaphysical hypothesis – something of philosophical significance.

2.

How does the Putnam/Chalmers response fare as an answer to scepticism? According to John Campbell (2002), though perhaps successful on its own terms, it doesn't go far enough. Though it means we can be said to avoid falsity with respect to many of our everyday beliefs, we really expect more from experience:

The reason Putnam's Proof is intuitively so unsatisfactory is that we ordinarily take experience to provide us with more than merely the functional structure of the medium sized world. We take ourselves to have knowledge of the categorical objects and properties around us. We ordinarily think we know what the world is like. If the world is that way, it is not a bit like a vat. (ibid., 151)

For Campbell the problem is that though Putnam holds an externalist conception of *content*, he has a thoroughly internalist conception of *phenomenal experience*, as something which does not differ whether one is a brain in a vat or not. The alternative to this is the *Relational View of experience*:

On the Relational View, the phenomenal character of experience is thought to depend not just on the intrinsic states of the brain, but on which objects and properties there are in its surroundings. So a human subject and a brain in a vat would on this view have qualitatively different phenomenal experiences, because there are different categorical objects and properties in their environments. (ibid., 153)

I think that Campbell's objection to the Putnam/Chalmers line is a good one insofar as the latter is meant to rebut traditional external world scepticism. If experience is meant to provide us with knowledge of the world, then it should tell us how this world is; it is not enough that it stand in a sufficiently correlative relation with this world for our utterances about everyday things to be deemed true.

Unfortunately for Campbell however I also think his alternative Relational View faces grave problems. There is not space to discuss this in full here (see Knowles 2013), but I think the main problem stems from the idea that objects and properties in our surroundings are what furnish the phenomenal character of experience:

On a Relational View, the qualitative character of experience is constituted by the qualitative character of the scene perceived. (ibid., 114) [...] The phenomenal character of your experience, as you look around the

room, is constituted by the actual lay-out of the room itself. (ibid., 116)

It is hard to understand Campbell's claims here otherwise than as attributing phenomenal qualities to what ought to be mind-independent objects and properties in the world itself. This seems bizarrely panpsychistic, and a reason itself to reject the view, but it is not the only problem. The Relational View is motivated by epistemological concerns: by the idea that objects and their properties in the world, understood as being *completely independent* of us or our conscious minds, are such that we nevertheless could come to know them as *such*. But in making ordinary objects phenomenal it becomes unclear how contact with them could provide us with a route to understanding the world that is not phenomenal – which is presumably the case for most of what physics postulates at least. For both these reasons, Campbell's line is also unsatisfactory as a response to scepticism.

3.

What to do? One might give another kind of response to scepticism, but I suggest something more radical: Don't try to give a response to scepticism (at least of the kind we are considering here). Indeed, in some sense, avoid epistemology. Instead, focus on the phenomenology of experience and you will see that the problems evaporate.

Phenomenologically, experience involves being presented with a world or environment as part a living, physical body, and acting in and upon it through that body. The traditional, 'Cartesian' conception of experience as something consisting of sensory episodes that quite generally I might be having *whatever is going on around me* makes no phenomenological sense, and is therefore unavailable as the basis for philosophical theorizing. This is a theme in the works of philosophers like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and more recently Charles Taylor and Hubert Dreyfus. Here is Taylor (cited by Dreyfus & Dreyfus 2005 at pp. 73-4):

My ability to get around this city, this house comes out only in getting around this city and house. We can draw a neat line between my picture of an object and that object, but not between my dealing with the object and that object. It may make sense to ask us to focus on what we believe about something, say, a football, even in the absence of that thing; but when it comes to playing football, the corresponding suggestion would be absurd. The actions involved in the game can't be done without the object; they include the object. (Taylor 1995, 12)

Nor do we need to take seriously the idea that this 'phenomenology' might in its totality simply be a product of my brain, or brain plus body (something that could be put in a pod) – some kind of representation as of an external world of a certain kind (including me), that might not actually exist but that is projected somehow upon what does. Here we can make use of Chalmers' insight, namely, that even if something like the envatment hypothesis were true, we would still have a body, and we would still be perceiving and interacting with objects in world. What the phenomenologist will add to sidestep Campbell's charge above is that *from the perspective of experience* there is nothing more that might be revealed. That the world might be a virtual reality created by a computer or whatever just doesn't come into the issue at this level (cp. Dreyfus & Dreyfus op. cit., p. 77). Focusing just on experience, the sense in which we are embodied agents perceiving and

interacting with ordinary objects is the *only* sense there can be of such objects and of such interaction.

Campbell is thus right that experience necessarily involves the world. However – or at least I would contend – it does so, not in the sense of embracing objects and properties understood as things in themselves – things which raise puzzles about how we could ever come to know them as they are – but rather as things that are *essentially* perceivable and actable upon (not of course necessarily perceived or acted upon). Thus as far as the relationship between the world and experience is concerned, general epistemological issues don't arise. By the same token, worries that a relational view of experience involves a pernicious kind of panpsychism evaporate, insofar as what experience relates is a 'world-for-us'. Putnam's proof and Chalmers' commentary on this should therefore not be viewed an attempted rebuttal of scepticism about a world putatively referred to in experience – establishing thereby only a conclusion that falls short of what we might hope for. It should rather, says the phenomenologist, be seen as pointing up the vacuity of such speculation about experience and its correlative world.

Does this view amount to a kind of idealism? No, because it does not say that all things are partly constituted by ideas or our consciousness. In addition to objects necessarily correlative with our experience, there are also physical things, or 'things in themselves' whose nature is given quite independently of cognizing, biological beings. These constitute the world as conceived of by physical science. What we know of this world certainly can and should mesh with what we know about the world of experience (that we are embodied perceivers and actors in an environment of people, cars and teapots). But they are different 'realms' and we should not expect either one to reduce to the other.

One might wonder more precisely how experience and physical science relate on this view. Doesn't experience have to *ground* our view of the world as it in itself? If so don't we get a new epistemological puzzle? My answer is that the world for us given in experience, and the world as it is in itself delineated by physics, simply correspond to two different categories of theoretical knowledge, neither of which grounds the other – except in the sense that what we say about experience is itself ultimately part of science, and everything has to connect with and thereby 'ground' everything else. Following Quine (1953), I hold that sci-

ence – our systematic knowledge *in toto*, evolving over time – is our only ultimate standard when it comes to charting what is true: a web of belief, most of which we must take to be true, and which it is utterly pointless to wonder whether is in fact true or not. (I am not, for the record, in agreement with Quine about the nature of experience or about physicalism.)

In conclusion then: Chalmers' idea that envatment is a 'metaphysical' hypothesis comes down to saying that physics hasn't ruled out (or perhaps even made unlikely) that we live in something like a fundamentally computational reality. This is a claim of whose veracity I am not competent to speak. However, even if it is true, it is not *philosophically* significant, but rather reflects simply a lacuna in our knowledge of the physical world. Nor does the compatibility of the hypothesis with the veridicality of our beliefs about everyday things in experience either threaten (Campbell) or vindicate (Putnam/Chalmers) any kind of knowledge of the world. For the everyday world we encounter in perception and action does not admit of that kind of question with respect to its objects; while its relation to the world as it in itself is not that of being a ground for it.

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Rethinking 'Rule Following' and Forms of Agency: "Ethical Expertise" and "Technologies of Humility" in Science Policy Processes

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Abstract

This paper's broad aim is to explore the usefulness of insights drawn from Wittgenstein's conception of 'rule following' for developing fresh means to balance the immense but unpredictable potential of science and technology with appreciating that not everything that can be done should be done. To this aim, it examines the bearing that Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus' approach to Wittgenstein's insights of "rule following" and "ethical expertise" has upon Shielá Jasanoff's (2003: 240) arguments for "technologies of humility" (rather than "hubris") in addressing questions in science policy processes, which confront "every human enterprise that intends to alter society: what is the purpose; who will be hurt; who benefits; And how can we know?"

The approach builds upon comparing several International Wittgenstein Symposium 2013 (IWS) organising themes with Julian Nida-Rumelin's analysis of "moral dilemma and practical reason" in IWS 2012; and work on a Manchester University course and edited volume (*Revisiting Pandora's Hope: technological choice and agency in an irreducibly complex world*).

Historical Challenges

Until rather recently few would have expected to find solutions to complex ethical issues woven into science policy processes (Irwin and Wynne 1996) in alternatives to paradigms for human agency, intentionality, the scope of the mind, and memory, which have been based on such dichotomies as those of nature versus society, mind versus body, risk versus ethics; and notions that we are restricted to vexed options of context independent ethical principles and running risks of versions of moral relativism that see conflicting views on moral norms and values as being mutually closed to one another (Apel 1973; Hollis and Lukes 1991).

Seen in historical perspective, the situation is not surprising. Such dichotomies have long restricted humanities' roles to: providing information to physical sciences on human activities said to perturb natural processes; identifying social and economic consequences of these perturbations; 'educating' publics about scientific knowledge and prescriptions (Felt and Wynne 2008). These restrictions relate to the notions of the "two cultures of risk analysis... that 'hard' analysis represents risks as they 'really are', where as 'softer work' in politics and sociology mostly explains why people refuse to accept the pictures of reality that technical experts produce (Jasanoff 1993: 123).

Such notions did not emerge in an intellectual and social vacuum. They share roots with the parting ways of interpretations of modernity as either a triumph or as a tragedy, and the roles the above mentioned dichotomies have played in divided paradigms for key IWS 2013 themes. During the 20th century, they resulted in such paradoxes of the humanities' 'two cultures' (Snow 1964; Friedman 2000) as that beneath seemingly irresolvable differences: "the opposition between nature and culture shadows that between the real and the constructed, nature stands as the eternal, the inexorable, the universal; culture for the variable, the malleable, and the particular" (Daston 2000: 3).

According to Renato Rosaldo (1989), such dichotomies result in notions that we must choose between vexed options of adhering to a supposedly timeless order or falling into the chaos of disorienting subjectivity; which impede appreciating that "in everyday life the wise guide themselves as often by waiting to see how events unfold as by plans and predictions. When in doubt people find out about their worlds by living with ambiguity, uncertainty, or simple lack of knowledge until the day, if and when it arrives, that their experiences clarify matter.... [W]e improvise, learn by doing, and make things up as we go along" (Rosaldo 1989: 92). Even early works of anthropologists who have been major contributors to interdisciplinary interest in Wittgenstein and the indeterminacy of culture and society exhibit this difficulty (e.g., Geertz 1973).

For instance, in Geertz' (1973: 44) early work: (1) culture is best seen not as complexes of concrete behaviour patterns... but as a set of control mechanisms – plans, recipes, rules, instructions (what computer programmers call 'programmes') for governing behaviour...) and (2) "man is precisely the animal most desperately dependent upon such extra-genetic, outside-the skin control mechanisms, such cultural programmes".

The problem also occurs in interpretations of Wittgenstein (1953), which beg the question: "Must one agree that without cultural plans humans become grotesque creatures, disoriented beyond any capacity for desire, or feeling, or thought? Do our options really come down to the vexed choice between supporting cultural order or yielding to the chaos of brute idiocy?" (Rosaldo 1989: 98)

Changing Conditions

Today the situation is undergoing change so deep and diverse that only a few examples can be mentioned. Ulrich Beck's *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity* (1992) marked a turning point in perspectives on 'globalisation', 'information society' (IWS 2007), and several IWS 2013 themes. For Beck (1992: 55), instrumental employments of science and technology in "risk society" exceed hitherto predominant institutions' control and protection. At the same time "reflexive modernisation" produces knowledge about modernity's dynamics and conflicts, dissolves many tradition institutions, and transforms contexts of decisions and actions. Individuals and groups need to reframe beliefs, activities and 'forms of agency' under insecure existential conditions. An important example of a reflexive re-

sponse (relating to "ethical expertise" and "technologies of humility") is Funtowicz and Ravetz's (1992) approach to distinctions between: 'normal science' (ordinary scientific research in Kuhn's sense of the term); "consultancy science" (research applied to clearly defined problems); and "post-normal science" (uncertain and/or contested forms of knowledge and practice, employed to addressing complex health, safety, and jointly social and ecological issues). Another example is increase awareness that: physical risks are always created and affected in social systems; the magnitude of the physical risks is therefore a direct function of the quality of social relations and ecological processes; a critical risk is social dependency on institutions who may be alien and inaccessible to most people affected by the risks in question (Felt and Wynne 2008). In tandem with these developments, the humanities are being called upon to help balance attention to both can do and should do questions in policy processes, and exhibiting increased awareness of obstacles posed by the problems outlined above (e.g., Koerner 2010).

Wittgenstein and Strengths and Limitations of the 'Practice Turn'

Few developments have been more influential than 'the practice turn' (Schatzki 2002) in widening awareness of the usefulness for addressing such problems of work on Wittgenstein's insights of 'language games, 'forms of life' and 'rule following' for addressing such problems. Despite the diversity of practice approaches, we can identify features shared by even such divergent approaches as David Bloor and the Dreyfus's. These include what Brandon (1996: 55) describes as Wittgenstein's emphasis on the "normative character" of all forms of human expression and intentionality; "pragmatist commitment to understanding the efficacy of norms in terms of practices," and emphasis on the social and historical contingency of norms.

It is also possible to identify such areas of divergence relating to our present concerns as contrasts between those who interpret what Bloor (2001: 96-99) calls a tension in Wittgenstein conception of 'rule following' between "awareness and blindness" as supporting a perspective on thought and action that prioritises rationality theory; and those who believe that Wittgenstein addresses this tension in ways that prioritise practice. According to Bloor, Elizabeth Anscombe's (1981) analysis of Wittgenstein's (1953: § 5-6, 143-5) approach to childhood learning and game playing addresses this tension in support of the latter. For Anscombe (1981: 17), Wittgenstein's description of 'rule following' in terms of playing a game make "clear that what you are do is not a move in a game unless the game is being played and you are one of the players, acting as such in making the move. That involves that you are acquainted with the game and have appropriate background, and also appropriate expectations and calculations in connection with e.g. moving this piece from point A to point B. To have these is to think you are playing the game".

This divergence relates to another contrast amongst 'practice' approaches, namely, the extent to which they take the social and cultural causation to be unproblematic. For McGuire (1992: 163), "It is not.... Just how do social influences bring about or cause human beliefs? How do beliefs relate causally to institutionalised ways of behaving in society?" Interestingly, Bloor (2001: 96-99) notes that, while Wittgenstein's accounts of game playing, childhood learning, and so on, resolve "the tension between awareness and blindness" along lines that support priority of practice approaches to thought and action; they leave

such critical questions as that of how learning institutions emerged unaddressed. This raised further questions: How are learned practices anchored to one another as 'forms of life'? How is it possible for human beings to identify contradictions amongst social norms and ideals (or moral dilemma), make these explicit, and transform the circumstances under which they arise? These questions are eclipsed by deterministic notions of both nature and society mentioned earlier (e.g. Rosaldo 1989); and are now at the heart of many changes in approaches to culture, social agency, technological choice, skills acquisition (apprenticeship) explored in the volume and Manchester University course (*Rethinking Pandora's Hope*) mentioned at the onset.

The anthropologist, Tim Ingold notes that one of most problematic features of deterministic paradigms for culture and society is that they attribute human behaviour to designs that are passed from one generation to the next as the content of traditions. For Ingold (as for Bernstein 1950, Malafouris 2008, Menary 2012 and the Dreyfus's, much socio-cultural variation involves variations of skills): "Becoming skilled in the practice of a particular form of life is not a matter of furnishing a set of generalised capacities, given from the start as compartments of universal human nature, with specific cultural content.... [Instead, skills] are re-grown, incorporated into the *modus operandi* of the developing human organism (Ingold 2000: 6).

Similarly, the abundant evidence that the human body (and skilled practice) does not replicate a physical event undermined the notion that any human behaviour follows a context independent rule: "Because of a huge redundancy of the degrees of freedom in our effectors, *no motor impulses to the muscles, no matter how accurate they are, are able to assure a correct movement* corresponding to our intentions.... [B]ecause the external conditions are so variable that the movement can be controlled only on the basis of sensory corrections, repetition of the same movement will be accompanied by *different motor impulses from the brain to the muscles*" (Bernstein 1996 [1950]: 180).

They are also the sorts of questions, which have motivated several phenomenological approaches to 'practice' (e.g., Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1972, 1986, 2004) and key themes of IWS 2013, which stress the importance of ethics for alternatives to deterministic paradigms for human agency and history based on the dichotomies mentioned above (cf. Husserl (1970 [1936])).

Edmund Husserl's (1970 [1936]) emphasis on the importance of ethics for understanding the dynamics of human life-worlds, in *The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology* (1970 [1936]) is a famous example. Husserl challenged traditions structured around such dichotomies as those of subject versus object, mind versus body, and the individual versus society. For Husserl, human beings are not atomistic, interchangeable nodes through which culture and society operate. Human life-worlds are prisms of diverse fields, including the inanimate world given in sensation, the vital world given to embodied living beings, and an ethical dimension in which other human beings are apprehended as sources of meaning and value. Ethical fields depend on the others, but are prior to the other fields in the dynamics of thought and action and in the ways in which practices are anchored to one another in contexts. This opens prospects for understanding how human agency can identify relationships between conflicting ideals and injustice; make these explicit; and transform the conditions involved. It suggests that single discrepant experiences and ethical acts can 'irradiate' other fields and transform human practices ('lan-

guage games') on the very scales on which the meanings and values of life worlds ('forms of life') occur.

Skills Acquisition, Ethical Expertise, Prospects for 'Technologies of Humility' in Policy Process

Dreyfus and Dreyfus's study "The Ethical Implications of a Five-Stage Skill Acquisition model" (2004) focuses on a corollary of the contrasts mentioned above: that between notions of context independent ethical principles, and approaches that stress situated involvement. In what follows, emphasis falls upon how the ways in which their study supports the latter relates to Jasanoff's argument for the need of 'technologies of humanity' in science policy processes in order to focus attention on normative dimensions of technological choices; the possibility of unforeseen consequences; and contributions diverse points of view can make to collective learning and democratising life quality.

Dreyfus and Dreyfus (2004) use driving and playing chess as examples of 'language games' to illustrate key features of their model of five key stages in the acquisition of the skills required for expertise (including "ethical expertise" "moral maturity"), and why such an approach can address problems with presuppositions about altogether timeless ethical principles. In Stage 1 ("Novice") the instructor isolates features of a skill (which the beginner can manage without previous experience) and rules for actions relating to these. In Stage 2, the "Advanced Beginner" gains experience with real situations, and identifies (or is told about) additional features and connections. In Stage 3 ("Competence"), the range of features and connections learned demands becoming competent in terms of selection and organisation along lines that simplify - improve performance. In Stage 4 ("Proficiency") the "performer stops reflecting on problematic situations as a detached observer" and holistic experiences of competence enhance skill. In Stage 5 ("Expertise"), "with enough experience with a variety of situations, all seen from the same perspective but requiring different tactical decisions, the proficient performer seems gradually to decompose this class of situations into subclasses, each of which shares the same decision, single action, or tactic. This allows an immediate intuitive response to each situation (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 2004: 251-253). For the Dreyfus's (2004: 251), what bears stressing is that an approach to ethics that is based on explicit rules, "corresponds to a beginner's reliance on rules and so is developmentally inferior to an ethics based on expert response that claims that, after long experience, the ethical expert learns to respond appropriately to each unique situation." Their approach "supports an ethics of situated involvement" rather than traditions of "detached, rationalist ethics" (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 2004: 251); and may be equally relevant for developing alternatives to deterministic paradigms for human agency, which have been based on dichotomising nature versus culture, mind versus body (and materiality); the individual versus society, risk versus ethics, and so on.

According to Jasanoff 2003: 239-40), "to date, the unknown, unspecified, and indeterminate aspects of science and technology remain largely unaccounted for in policy making; treated as beyond reckoning, they escape analysis. The problem is perpetuated by what she identifies as key consequences of "technologies of hubris": "peripheral blindness to uncertainty and ambiguity"; tendencies to "pre-empt political discussion"; "limited capacities to internalise challenges that arise" in contexts that initial framing assumptions cannot or do not take into account" (*Ibid*). For

Jasanoff (2003: 226), the "time is ripe for seriously re-evaluating exiting models and approaches to knowledge and power, and expertise and public policy" and for responding to the demonstrated fallibility of decision-making institutions, without abandoning hopes for improved health, safety, welfare, and social justice." Building upon approaches to change in the dynamics of science, society; and knowledge production (eg., Funtowicz and Ravetz 1992; Nowotny et al. 2001), Jasanoff (2003: 223, 240) argues for the need of "technologies of humility" to complement the predictive approaches, which bear directly on such questions as "what is the purpose; who will be hurt; who benefits; and how can we know?" by focusing on "framing, vulnerability, distribution and learning."

Interestingly the Dreyfus's (2004: 254) focus on comparable questions: "How does one learn from successes and failures in ethical situations where outcomes are observed only much later? Does one engage in detached reflection on one's feelings of satisfaction or regret?" They argue that if their account of skill acquisition is correct, there are at least two important reasons why an expert cannot improve future performance on the basis of abstract reflection on previous actions and outcomes. One reason indicates how closely Jasanoff's concerns compare with Nida-Rumelin's IWS 2012 analysis of "moral dilemmas and practical reason." In many situations, decisions about instrumental employments of science and technology may share features of such dilemmas as: "practical conflict" (a situation where one is morally required to do two or more things that are impossible to do at once); "absence of meta-criteria" or context independent principles to resolve the conflict; "existential" stakes – foundation life quality issues of meaning, purpose and value; and "continuity of some form of regret, guilt," ethical involvement afterwards regardless of decision (Nida-Rumelin 2012). Relating to these features, the Dreyfus's stress that contrary to notions that abstract reflection improves performance in such situations "the ability to remember with involvement the original situation while emotionally experiencing one's success or failure is required if one is to learn to be an ethical expert." Their second reason is very straight forward: the idea that abstract reflection upon principles above and beyond contexts is an unsubstantiated assumption. They note that most important insights that can be gained from Wittgenstein is that, in concrete contexts of ethical conflict, "if one has to stop the regress of rules for applying rules by, at some point, simply knowing how to apply a principle" why not admit that acquisition of ethical expertise should have advantages for addressing the issues at stake, or at least for making the nature of disagreements of those involved explicit" (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 2004: 261).

In these and other lights outlined here, fresh insights of ethical expertise (and related IWS 2013 themes) might open prospects for the sorts of "technologies of humility" that: "would give combined attention to substance and process, and stress deliberation as well as analysis. Reversing centuries of contrary development, these approaches would seek to integrate 'can do' orientations with the 'should do' questions of political and ethical analysis. They would engage the human subject as an active imaginative agent, as well as a source of knowledge, insights and memory" (Jasanoff 2003: 244).

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Computation vs. Embodied Cognition

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Abstract

In this paper I will investigate whether the extended mind hypothesis and the enactive approach share a common theoretical ground. Although the idea of embodied cognition appears to be a common foundation, I suggest this is only apparently the case. I propose that the notion of embodiment, as the enactive approach construes it, provides an adequate framework within which different aspects of cognition (from primordial physical engagement to highly abstract reasoning) can be considered in a coherent continuity.

In my argument, I will first highlight the incompatibility of the extended mind hypothesis and the notion of embodiment, then I will outline how the notion of embodiment helps create a comprehensive notion of cognition, and finally I will relate it to the issue of the explanatory gap as it hangs together with the role language plays in reasoning.

1. Cognitionism vs. Enactivism

In his 1991 book *Origins of the Modern Mind*, Merlin Donald wrote about human minds as *hybridizations*. (Donald 1991: 355f.) On the basis of the social brain hypothesis, he suggests that cognitive capacity evolved in accordance with representational skills. New representational skills later transformed into external storage devices and, due to biological constraints, these means played an active role in cognitive tasks and the formation of a cultural setting. A few years later, Andy Clark suggested that “[w]e build ‘designer environments’ in which human reason is able to far outstrip the computational ambit of the unaugmented biological brain. Advanced reason is thus above all the realm of the *scaffolded* brain: the brain in its bodily context, interacting with a complex world of physical and social structures. These external structures both constrain and augment the problem-solving activities of the basic brain, whose role is largely to support a succession of iterated, local, pattern-completing responses.” (Clark 1997: 191)

The idea of the *scaffolded brain* bears a striking resemblance to Donald’s notion of *hybridization*. In both cases representational means play a crucial role: language provides significant support for both social coordination and individual thought, and computational devices are expedients of the cognitive capacity – just to name two important topics. Clark explicitly commits himself to representationalism: “Our approach is much more sympathetic [as compared with the enactive approach] to representationalist and information-processing analyses” (Clark 1997:173); or as he later states: “The goal ... was ... to display a positive vision in which appeals to embodiment and cognitive extension go hand in hand with appeals to dynamics *and* to internal and external processes of representation and computation.” (Clark 2008: 165)

Clark hopes he can convince us “that the old puzzle, the mind-body problem, really involves a hidden third party. It is the mind-body-*scaffolding* problem. It is the problem of understanding how human thought and reason is born out of looping interactions between material brains, material bodies, and complex cultural and technological environments.” (Clark 2003: 11) This third party is the result of and a scaffold for human reasoning. It *mediates* between the internal computational and the external physical and cultural spheres, though the precise manner of mediation is unclear. Moreover, as individual reasoning is considered to be “some kind of fast pattern-completing style of computation”, an additional “hard problem” of consciousness arises, *i.e.* the question of how “subpersonal, computa-

tional cognitive processes and conscious experience” can communicate. (Thompson 2007: 6f.)

The terminology and the explicit commitment to representationalism and a computational frame of reference impair the demand for continuity between cognitive processes and the environment; questions of location and supervenience obviously arise. Embodiment in a computationalist framework can be understood as a part of the bringing into effect, but not as part of cognition itself.

Although Clark and Chalmers (1998) mention that there are some “[p]hilosophical views of a similar spirit”, such as the enactive approach, that hold “cognition is often taken to be continuous with processes in the environment”, there are important differences stemming from sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit presuppositions. I believe the main difference between the views of extended and enactive cognition is their relation to the dualist and representationalist traditions.

2. From Autonomous Systems to Reasoning

The enactive approach has a radically different notion of embodiment. The idea goes back at least to Merleau-Ponty. He posed the question: “But can the object be thus detached from the actual conditions under which it is presented to us?” If we consider the mere symbolic definition of a cube we can notice that “[i]t is a question of tracing in thought that particular form which encloses a fragment of space between six equal faces. Now, if the words ‘enclose’ and ‘between’ have a meaning for us, it is because they derive it from our experience as embodied subjects. In space itself independently of the presence of a psychophysical subject, there is no direction, no inside and outside. A space is ‘enclosed’ between the sides of a cube as we are enclosed between the walls of our room”. (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 236) That is, we perceive the world in accordance with our physical bodily conditions and even abstract terms gain their meaning from this embodied experience. As Varela and his co-authors define it, “[with] the term embodied we mean to highlight two points: first, that cognition depends upon the kinds of experience that come from having a body with various sensorimotor capacities, and second, that a more encompassing biological, psychological, and cultural contexts”. (Varela et. al. 1993: 171f.) The enactive approach emphasizes “that cognition is not the representation of a pre-given world by a pre-given mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the

basis of a history of a variety of actions that a being in the world performs.” (Varela et. al. 1993: 9)

As Thompson emphasized, the enactive approach tries to unify the ideas of autonomous agents as generating and maintaining themselves and thus their cognitive domain, the nervous system as a dynamic system which creates meaning, cognition as “the exercise of skilful know-how in situated embodied action”, the world conceived as a relational domain enacted, and experience, as being crucial in the understanding of the mind, which must be investigated phenomenologically. (Thompson 2007:13)

Against the background of the above sketched scenario, the “transformation of the world into an environment happens through the organism’s sense-making activity”. (Thompson, Stapleton 2009: 25) Accordingly, cognition does not happen internally but rather it “is a relational process of sense-making that takes place between the system and its environment”. (Thompson, Stapleton 2009:26) Since cognition is defined as a *relational process*, the cognizing agent and its environment are not separable. Additionally, the *coupling* between them is without any gap, because this cognizing agent is a physical system, therefore it has direct access to its physical environment.

Recent research results suggest that emotion and cognition are inseparable, which ill fits computational, information-processing models of cognition. Having in mind that cognition is embodied and that having a body implies desirable and non-desirable conditions, the role of motivation is beyond question; and since “cognition as embodied action comprises motivated action tendencies”, it is essentially emotive. (Thompson, Stapleton 2009:26) In this sense, we are capable of reasoning because we have emotions.

Moving from the level of self-sustaining autonomous systems towards reasoning, cognitive metaphor theory provides a promising foundation. Embodied cognition is considered as based on patterns of experience, or more precisely on *schemas*. Schemas are not propositional, *i.e.* “they are not abstract subject predicate structures... [and t]hey exist ... in a continuous, analog fashion in our understanding”, (Johnson 1987:23) and crucially, they are not identical with images. They “[contain] structural features common to many different objects, events, activities, and bodily movements”. (24) These schemas are kinaesthetic, *i.e.* based on bodily experiences and much less malleable than mental or recollected images. The latter two are easily and considerably influenced by description, *i.e.* with propositions, while image schemata are not.

As we can see, schemas have a radically different structure compared with propositions. They are directly related to bodily experiences and skills, and bear a generally image-like structure. However, in abstract reasoning we use propositions intensively, sometimes algorithms, and the primordial cognitive functions are based on schemata; cognitive metaphor theory suggests that our most abstract notions are rooted in bodily experiences as well: they are based on kinaesthetic image schemas and basic level categories, and are generated by cross-domain mapping. Image schemas create the basis of our understanding, since they provide general structures by which we are able to arrange our experiences. (Johnson 1987: 208) They play “two roles: They are concepts that have directly understood structures of their own, and they are used metaphorically to structure other complex concepts.” (Lakoff 1987:283)

Although the extended mind hypothesis is a computational model of cognition, thus based on informational input-output processing, and accordingly, embodiment can only appear to play a role in cognitive processes, the idea of embeddedness and the permanent interplay between the cognizing agent and its environment is beyond question even for extended mind theorists. Moreover, as Thompson and Stapleton suggest, “[b]oth the nervous system and the body are compositionally plastic. They can alter their structure and dynamics by incorporating (taking into themselves) processes, tools, and resources that go beyond what the biological body can metabolically generate”. (Thompson, Stapleton 2009:28) Similarly, we can accept that higher cognitive processing (e.g. reasoning) also incorporates externally established systems, such as language. Therefore, I suggest that language has considerable modifying potential; it can impose unsolvable puzzles on reasoning.

3. Dualist Intuition and Bewitching Language

The burden of the explanatory gap is a result of the extensive usage of language. If we take into account the curious nature of concepts¹ and grammar as Wittgenstein construed it (Wittgenstein 1979: 31f., 114), and accept that in certain cognitive tasks we use language to organize our ideas, language seems to be able to exert its structure on our thought processes. As Bergson suggested “[a] the difficulties raised by this problem [an impassable abyss of the body and the soul] ... come from considering, in the phenomena of perception and memory, the physical and the mental as duplicate of one another”. (Bergson 1991: 226)² The problem of the explanatory gap, I think, is based on this duplicating inclination; and this inclination is based on “some deep feature of our cognitive system” (Papineau 2008:58). I venture to suggest that it is rooted in the extensive usage of language.

While David Papineau was deliberating whether the so-called explanatory gap is sufficient as an argument against materialism, he suggested that we consider the relation between the brain and the mind to be mysterious because we are not able to be rid of dualism. As he writes “we are all in the grip of an intuition of dualism. Some of those who profess materialism at a theoretical level may be surprised to be told that they are closet dualists. But it is not hard to back up this diagnosis. Consider the terminology normally used to discuss the relation between mind and brain. Brain processes are standardly said to ‘generate’, or ‘yield’, or ‘cause’, or ‘give rise to’ conscious states. ...To speak of brain processes as ‘generating’ conscious states, and so on, only makes sense if you are implicitly thinking of the consciousness as ontologically additional to the brain states.” (Papineau 2011: 12) Despite Papineau’s reference to terminology as a telltale fact, some paragraphs later he added “I suspect that the intuition derives from some *deep-seated* feature of our cognitive architecture, and will continue to press on us even after the arguments for materialism becomes orthodox and familiar. If this is right, then materialists will just have to live with the intuition. In a sense, they will be stuck with contradictory beliefs.” (Papineau 2011: 14; italics mine)

¹ The constructed genera entail concepts, and “concept[s] can only symbolize a particular property by making it common to an infinity of things. It therefore always more or less deforms the property by the extension it gives to it. ... Thus the different concepts that we form of the properties of a thing inscribe round so many circles, each much too large and none of them fitting exactly.” (Bergson 2007: 12)

² We can find similar ideas by Wittgenstein as well. See PI 412, Wittgenstein 1998:606, 1958: 41f. for more detail see Kondor 2009.

Against the background of embedded, embodied, and enacted cognition, the explanatory gap can be eliminated since duplicating the mental and physical is gratuitous. When considering cognition as being a relational process (like the mind is intentional for phenomenologists), the question of how brain processes relate to mental states is senseless. Brain states, motor movements, environmental changes and mental states create a continuity within which each element has an equally important role, since abandoning either of them implies an underdetermination of the process. Not surprisingly, in this framework language as part of the environment and as a cognitive and motor capability can play a part in reasoning in accordance with its special characteristics.

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Identifying bodily states

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Abstract

It is a common assumption in philosophy that: The human who is trying to understand her inner beliefs needs a standard for knowing whether her assumption of her mental state is correct or incorrect. The underlying assumption in my study is that the question of embodiment is crucial to the theory of 'scientific introspection', since many mental states find anchor in human's body (Ricoeur 1992, 319).

I ponder the question: What could be the philosophical basis for the body-introspection or interoception? Firstly, I will introduce the general idea of how many different ways the introspection of bodily states can be understood. Secondly, I come to the philosophical remarks that could be drawn from interoception, that is, bodily introspection.

Introspection has been critiqued in a multitude of philosophical and psychological studies from different perspectives. The claim of these critiques is that objective science needs methods that are, in one way or another, intersubjective¹. The possibility of introspection, claims Alvin I. Goldman, has been a taboo among philosophers even though nowadays cognitive scientists support the view of self-monitoring close to the traditional conception of introspection². Yet, I see that in the recent discussion the conception of introspection differs from the traditional introspection. I focus on how the identifying present mental states is, in some of the cases, identifying current physical states of body³.

Introspection can be defined as immediate self-knowledge of one's inner feelings, beliefs or assumptions. However, self-knowledge or introspection refers to various different approaches; 1) reporting on one's inner thoughts 2) reporting on the process of self-observation. Furthermore, especially in the case of some authors such as A.D Craig's studies on neuroscience: 3) the self-observation of bodily reactions or inner thoughts that correspond with bodily reactions. This is called the *interoceptive* awareness of body states. In its minor the reflective self-knowledge could be the third option of the observation of self that is based on the body-awareness. It does not exclude the possibility that we may have introspection without bodily-introspection, but that the body is within the introspective process more often than assumed. Furthermore, the bodily-introspection gives at least some objective manners for investigating the process of introspection. The mere observation of the bodily reactions might not be enough, but it is a good starting point for the study of introspection. I assume that the consciousness needs intersubjective response from other bodies, from other people to form consciousness.

The underlying assumption in my study is that the question of embodiment is crucial to the theory of 'scientific introspection', since many mental states find anchor in human's body⁴. This general perspective is often seen as a part of various continental thinkers, but also for example David Armstrong has written on the subject. Paul Ricoeur's body-phenomenology for example assumes the behaviouristic reflection of mental states in body and in body relations to other people. I ponder the question: What could be the philosophical basis for the body-introspection or interoception? Firstly, I will introduce the general idea of how

many different ways the introspection of bodily states can be understood. Secondly, I come to the philosophical remarks that could be drawn from interoception, that is, bodily introspection.

1 Introspection with bodily criteria

Doubt of immediate self-knowledge (introspection) belongs to the group of the philosophical doubts of first order statements, such as "I have a pain" or "I have a desire for p". This can be also called the Cartesian model, which means the process of identifying one's inner states, affects, pain, emotions or beliefs⁵. The question of self-knowledge can be presented in two primary ways: the first assumes immediate self-knowledge, and the second assumes reflective self-knowledge. I will mainly speak here of the possibility of understanding introspection as a part of body-awareness, and hence investigate how this distinction between immediate and mediate should be understood in the case of introspection with some scientific criteria.

Philosophical commentators widely still speak about introspection as perception. Armstrong in 1962 uses term "bodily perception" and Goldman in 2006 uses term "a perception like recognition process" or "self-monitoring"⁶. I prefer to use term "observation", or just "body-awareness", since it is not clear whether the process of recognizing bodily states or mental states correlating to mental states would be perception like process. Introspection could be understood its own kind of observation, not analogy to the perception.

The embodied existence is something as immediately given to us, as is our mental life. The immediate body experience is a part of a stream of experiences. How then the inner feelings can be recognized in the body? I separate three different ways to see the role of body in the process of introspection:

- 1) Self-knowledge without embodiment and other people. In early phenomenology the focus was only on the regressive process "to the things themselves". This means reducing the body out of the object of phenomenological reduction. Husserl presented that we can go to the things in themselves in our experience and try to think of the way our attention is focusing on a certain object, let's say a tree. We can try to

¹Goldman 2006, 229.

² See Goldman 2006, 223.

³ Cameron 2002, 263.

⁴ Ricoeur 1992, 319.

⁵Madison 1996, 80.

⁶ Armstrong 1962, 10.

think of this object, tree, as itself, and try to capture its essence.

2) Self-knowledge with immediate knowledge of embodied mind. An example of the pure phenomenological description of embodied existence would be just to pay attention to our breathing, how it changes and moves in our body. The connection between our voluntary way of breathing and normal involuntary breathing is an example about the voluntary actions. A person can breathe consciously by paying attention to the diaphragm expanding and contracting, or just breathe normally. This immediate experience of our body means that I can actually move my attention around the body, for example in viscera, in muscles, in diaphragm, and in heart.

3) Self-knowledge of embodied mind through other people's bodies. The critique of the two above-mentioned phenomenologies includes the idea that we cannot reach a presuppositionless starting point in the consciousness, since the consciousness, and body are always a part of some outer reflection, influence. This critique leaves open what exactly is this presuppositionless starting point.

To get up and running, I leave aside the naïve illusion of personal objectivity. We can introspect, but it is not a perfect method. A philosopher needs some criteria, some reflection in order for her to discuss scientific introspection. Many continental figures, as well as Goldman, speak about the self-knowledge based on the reflective self-knowledge. While for Merleau-Ponty the embodied perception was the subject of inquiry, for Ricoeur the emphasis was on the primacy of a reflective embodiment. Especially useful is the distinction that Ricoeur draws from Merleau-Ponty (and Husserl): here the distinction between the concepts "flesh" and "body" represents the two sides of the body-awareness. Flesh refers to the experience of our own body. Flesh is most originally one's own and of closest of all⁷. Body, meanwhile, signifies that my flesh is turned into a part of the world. When flesh appears as a body among other bodies and intersubjectively in relation to them, it is called a 'body'⁸. The aspect of flesh does not guarantee the objective criteria for the introspection. Inside the experience of my own flesh it is possible to separate mediate and immediate perception of our body⁹. My suggestion is to narrow the introspective method to those reactions that can be intersubjectively studied. Present mental state reflected by bodily state (which can mean reported experience of a body's physical state or neuroscientific model of the representation of our bodily state in our brain).

The unreliability of immediate mental self-knowledge is challenged by certain empirical psychological experiments that consider the very same question of self-knowledge. However, the critique of denying the self-introspection does not exhaust the idea that the self must be reflected at some point: the criteria for the reflection allows it to be a very minimalistic act. One way for the objective study on body-awareness is simply to report inner feelings immediately after they occur in a test situation. Background assumption in this kind of tests is that people might have reliable introspection when they are aware of their mental states, if the conscious state in which they are experiencing thought is accompanied by higher-order consciousness.

An obvious example of the body-introspection is caught from the widely empirically investigated mindfulness practices in which a person tries to concentrate on a certain simple aspect that helps her to keep consciousness in one place. However, now the idea is not to search for one's inner feelings, but to just let them go by¹⁰. This act is often a bodily experience since counting breathes forces the meditator to be present in one part of the body, and then she often becomes more aware of the body.

3 Interoception and philosophy of bodily observation

Until now, I have shown that the study on the body-introspection assumes at least the following criteria: 1) Ability to report a mental state. 2) The introspective thought must have a reflection to some outer testimony. 3) Furthermore, some kind of testimony of the relationship between a present mental state and body-state is needed. Let's now focus on the question of how the recognition of a present mental state can be dependent on the embodiment.

The idea of the embodied mind is presented more specifically for example in neuroscientist A.D. Craig's conception of *interoception*. The perspective that subjective experience may correlate in time with the specific brain areas has been notified in distinction between *interoception* and *introspection*. The main idea in Craig's study is that behind emotional state and mood underlies physical condition. Interoception refers to a) muscles and the physical condition of the entire body and viscera and b) organs and their functions, while introspection is a further respond to these sensations¹¹. Craig's view is one example of the theory in a special science that assumes that the introspection can be presented objectively through the bodily reactions. The same conception of interoception is used for example by Oliver Cameron. *Interoception*. According to him, "interoceptor" means any sensory receptor which receives stimuli arising within the body, or specifically within the viscera. The definition he gives to the interoception is "perception of the functions physiological activities of the interior of the body."¹² Cameron mentions the conception according to which interoception is awareness of some visceral sensation¹³. Here I will only narrow down the possibilities on considering the interoception as related to explicit body-awareness.

There are several philosophical points, which have to be considered in the case of interoception: in the end I will mention just some of them. Firstly, to be precise, we can conceptualize two ways of feeling our body: The surface of body, skin, is the organ of touch. For example touching the heat or the water by toes. Another mode is actual awareness of the inner feelings of our body that could be called as the feeling of flesh in the phenomenological context. For example becoming aware of the back pains, or muscle tension could be this way of feeling the body. The latter mode matches with the interoception. A common sense example of observing the present bodily states are for example the recognition of the movement of human's diaphragm that grows bigger and smaller while breathing. Breathing can be felt (and often also seen and touched) in different parts of our body. Other examples could be the muscle tension, feeling of warmth or stomach pains.

7 Ricoeur 1992, 324.

8 Ricoeur 1992, 326.

9 Armstrong 1962, 2.

10 See for example Siegel 2010, 27-28.

11 Goldman 2006, 252.

12 Craig 2003, 503.

13 Cameron 2002, 5.

Craig's distinction gives perspective to the phenomenologists' flesh/ body distinction mentioned before. As I pointed out: Flesh refers to the experience of our own body. Hence the flesh can be seen as an inner experience of muscles of the whole body and viscera, and body as the objectified knowledge of interoception that can be presented in neurological level.

Secondly, the bodily observation that takes into account the interoception could be distinguished from different forms of perception, since it has no organ of perception naturally associated with it. Thirdly, the reporting of mental states in a test situation, and the interoception poses the following question: how do reports of bodily states influence on human's body-awareness. The reasonable question that Cameron points out, is whether some individuals have more interceptive sensitivity than others? Does linguistic reporting influence on the bodily experience? For example, the metaphor of a human's diaphragm as a big balloon that grows bigger and smaller while breathing can actually produce a new way of schematizing our embodiment. The new conceptual schema repeated again and again redirects the way a human being breathes.

Fourthly, I introduce the philosophical model that aim to explain the interoception as a part of philosophical framework. Goldman has his own model for the scientific introspection based on Craig's views. Goldman presents that the "organ" of introspection is attention. In his framework attention is analogous to the sense perception.¹⁴ This monitoring is the system or process that identifies current mental states by inner recognition.¹⁵ Yet, there are restrictions on what can be monitored. In the case of unconscious states Goldman has the similar assumption that all of our beliefs, desires and the like cannot be monitored¹⁶. Only the conscious and activated states can be monitored. I suggest that at least many of our interoceptive states are more reliable for the monitoring¹⁷.

Conclusion

I found it useful to examine the awareness of a present feeling with the body-awareness. The idea was to sort out some tentative philosophical scenarios for the more specific studies. Firstly I presented the problems of pure introspection in its most simple form. My study concentrated on how the present/ aware mental state can be seen as a part of bodily reactions.

What does this kind of interoception imply? For what purposes the theoretical philosophical work on bodily introspection should aim at? As a concrete example, I suggest that this framework offers an application of a philosophical conceptual analysis for practices that combine psychological viewpoint on bodily exercises. The simple visualization, repeated and enhanced in mind, body-awareness produces a new image of our embodiment.

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¹⁴ Goldman 2006, 244. Goldman accepts this analogy that goes still much further what interoception actually is presented in Craig's or Cameron's case.

¹⁵ Goldman 2006, 246.

¹⁶ Goldman 2006, 245.

¹⁷ According to Goldman Introspection understood as a perception like process, which there be some amount of input properties.

Is Truth a Condition for Knowledge? Demythologizing Epistemological Thought

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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that inherent in the structure of the Gettier-examples there is an asymmetry. I suggest that we have been Gettierized because we evaluate the epistemic responsibility of an epistemic agent by employing double standards. This is a result of our hinge-proposition, according to which knowledge presupposes truth. In real life though, we do not have knowledge because we have justified beliefs that are true; on the contrary, we maintain propositions that are taken to be true because we or someone else has provided good reasons, in order to make a knowledge claim. The theoretical diagnosis of this presupposition seems to dissolve the Gettier-problem.

Part I

Introduction Although it is arguable whether the main problems of philosophy include the nature of 'knowledge', no one could seriously deny that *the* main problem of epistemology is, since Gettier's seminal paper "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", the tripartite analysis of "knowledge". The diminutive success of anti-Gettier strategies can explain why epistemology has lately become an uncomfortable terrain. In this paper, I will try to show that there is still considerable amount of hope.

The Gettier example Since they play a neuralgic role in the analysis of knowledge, I intend to start with an example (Baumann 2005: 40–1). Let us suppose that people with many red spots on their arms and legs have measles. When David wakes one day, he sees his arms and legs full of red spots and thus concludes justifiably that he has measles. We can reconstruct his syllogism as following.

People with many red spots on their arms and legs have measles (1)

David has many red spots on his arms and legs (2)

-----1,2, MP-----

David has measles

David goes later that day to his physician and finds out that he indeed has measles, but the red spots had absolutely nothing to do with it. He had epistemic luck! The red spots on his arms and legs were due to „an allergic reaction”: a typical Gettier-case. However, in this example we do have two different variants, a deductive and a probabilistic one. In the deductive variant, David maintains a justified true belief that he has measles but that does not amount to knowledge. He has been Gettierized! On the other side, if we operate inductively, we shall see that the epistemic agent will refrain from making a claim about the cause of his red spots. More specifically, we are handling in this medical example with a differential diagnosis. From the evidence (red spots) we conclude to a probandum (disease). Since red spots can be used as evidence not only for measles but at the same time they indicate some other things (e.g. an allergic reaction), I think that David is not justified to say „Oh no, I have measles“, because he cannot differentiate between measles and e.g. an allergic reaction (*nota bene*: base rate statistics are on the single-case scenario not conclusive). His belief would be true, but not justified. David is Gettier-safe. We can reconstruct his syllogism as follows:

People with red spots on arms and legs have, among other things, measles (1)

D has many red spots on his arms and legs (2)

-----1,2,MP-Prob-----

D has possibly measles.

The physician on the other hand will make – under normal circumstances – a right diagnosis. He will find out that David has measles and that the red spots relate with an allergic reaction, namely all these things that we already know to be true.

Judgment under uncertainty This example highlights, as I think, an asymmetry of the Gettier-cases, whenever we operate in a non-monotonic environment, namely when we make judgments under uncertainty. Fogelin (1994: 22) remarks that “Gettier-like situations arise [...] because inductive inferences are nonmonotonic: it is this that drives them.” Although I argue along the same line with Fogelin's view, namely that Gettier-counterexamples depend on taking the notion of justification the wrong way, I want to show that Gettier-like situations arise, because we all, so as Gettier himself, while we accept the inductive character of Smith's (i.e. Gettier's epistemic agent) syllogism, evaluate Smith's epistemic performance with double standards: *it is this* that drives the confusion all along.

A hidden asymmetry? Examples in epistemology follow an established recipe. E.g. Kate sees an object from a long distance and takes it to be a sheep. However, what she sees is a rock. So Kate is wrong and *we know it*. But at the same time her proposition “there is a sheep on the mountain” is true, so she has epistemic luck. *We* know all these things. The same pattern lies at the heart of Gettier-examples. The story goes like that. *Smith* applies for a job and is justified (“has strong evidence”) in believing that the following proposition is true

Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket (d)

Since proposition d entails the following proposition

The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket (e)

we conclude that Smith is justified in believing that (e) is true. Surprisingly, it is Smith himself, not Jones, the one who will get the job. And the biggest surprise is that he himself has unknowingly ten coins in his pocket. Gettier suggests that Smith maintains a justified true belief that

does not amount to knowledge. He is justified in believing *d* and is also epistemically responsible to infer *(e)* from *(d)*. “But it is equally clear that Smith does not *know* that *(e)* is true; for *(e)* is true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith’s pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith’s pocket, and bases his belief in *(e)* on a count of the coins in Jones’ pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get the job.” (Gettier 1952: 122).

Infallible Knowledge? If we look carefully at the “empirical knowledge” of things around us, e.g. the undisputable fact that “smoking causes health problems”, we will see that it vanishes, as soon as we try to eliminate uncertainty. Once more: Gettier doesn’t seem to operate in such a way. After all, he accepts justification on the ground of strong evidence (non-conclusive reasons). However, what he implicitly does is judging Smith’s epistemic responsibility by using double standards. Although it seems that we allow Smith to make judgments under uncertainty – Fogelin (1994: 21) suggests that “the Gettier problems do not, after all, depend on deductive chauvinism, the claim that the only good argument is a deductively sound argument.” – we put ourselves outside the epistemic scene and assess Smith’s epistemic performance from a detached point of view. *We know*, that Smith has also ten coins in his pocket; *we know* that Smith will take the job; *we know* about the double coincidence. Smith operates as an epistemic agent (i.e. in a fallibilistic way) but *we* assess his epistemic performance from a point of view that is free from uncertainty. This is a very peculiar asymmetry.

Two uses of knowledge This insight brings us to the neglected two different uses of “knowledge”. By adopting classifications previously used by Ernst (2012), I am distinguishing two main categories: a) whenever we argue under uncertainty about what is the case, we are in the situation of the Ignoramus and b) whenever we argue without uncertainty and we already know which propositions are true, we are in the situation of the knower. In the first situation we examine, while we ourselves are knowers, if someone else is justified in holding a belief, which we already know to be true. E.g. *We know* that the object on the mountain, which someone takes to be a rock, *is* actually (beyond any doubt) a sheep. Our certainty is an ontological feature of the world. Secondly we have these situations, in which we are tracking a credible informant in order to acquire a piece of information for reasons of action. E.g., I declare publicly as a press officer of a Court of Justice “The Jury knows that the Defendant committed the Crime”. Blatantly neither the public nor the press officers possess knowledge of the same proposition. But even more importantly, not even from their detached point of view does the Jury know that the claimed proposition *is* true. Nevertheless do they claim truth through their knowledge-ascription. Due to our neglect of this very distinction for a long time, it becomes fathomable why among forensic and scientific contexts epistemology has remained has rather uninteresting. We should keep in mind that “knowledge” has two main uses in language, so that the proposition “K knows that P” may have (at least) two different meanings.

Part II

Agrippa revisited. Is knowledge a function of truth? The parameter which creates the whole confusion is the hinge-proposition that knowledge presupposes (among other things) truth, while at least since Agrippa and the Hellenistic Epistemology quite the opposite is being argued: truth is, if not redundant, a function of knowledge-claims. The

decisive parameter for the ascription of knowledge at time t_1 is the epistemic performance of an agent, operating on an underlying structure of justification, and being assessed from an epistemic point of view. On the contrary, a) the truthfulness of our beliefs, or b) even information, which was acquired at time t_2 , are not issues that we could raise in a meaningful way, as long as we make judgments under uncertainty. We have been Gettierized, because we have neglected the various ways in which we use the proposition “S knows that P” (see Ernst 2012). Gettier-cases make sense only if we artificially exclude uncertainty. They are thus devastating but totally uninteresting (as inapplicable) because, in real life, we make or assess knowledge ascriptions without knowing already, from a non-epistemic view, which propositions *are* true or false. In daily, forensic, and scientific contexts we ascribe knowledge iff an epistemic agent meets the standards of justification which dictate his epistemic duties, without knowing already, whether or not the proposition is “really true”. This has been pointed out by Wittgenstein:

OC 191 “Well, if everything speaks for a hypothesis and nothing against it – is it then certainly true? One may designate it as such. – But does it certainly agree with reality, with the facts? – With this question you are already going round in a circle.”

OC 197. It would be nonsense to say that we regard something as sure evidence because it is certainly true.

The tripartite analysis Going back to the classical definition of knowledge, i.e. the doctrine that justified true belief is equivalent to knowledge (Theaitetos 210ab), we will not encounter any difficulty in seeing that one of the structural elements of this view is that truth is a condition for knowledge. If the use of language as a rule-governed activity is decisive for our understanding of the meaning of a word, we should reconsider the structural affiliation between these two neuralgic concepts, truth and knowledge. In real life, it is not the case that we have knowledge because we have justified beliefs that *are* true; on the contrary, we maintain propositions that are taken to be true *because* we or someone else has provided good reasons, in order to make a (justified) knowledge claim. As Williams (2001: 239) remarks, “reaching conclusions that fit well with our available evidence is a way of finding propositions that are true not the other way round”. We do not know that Higgs particle exists because the proposition “Higgs particle exists” *is true*. We accept this proposition as true *because* experts meet the requirements of justification (level of significance) for scientific knowledge. Truth is not an epistemologically interesting notion (Williams 2001: 238).

Part III

Inferential Contextualism versus Gettier? Going back to Gettier’s first example, we conclude that the confusion is not about Smith *having* ten coins in his pocket or all the things that we know from our detached point of view. Ascribing knowledge to him is a function of his providing good reasons for his belief *(e)* at time t_1 . Gettier is trying to examine knowledge from a non-epistemic point of view. It does not work for the Cartesian Scepticism. It does not work for Gettier either. We conclude that the challenge in epistemology is to provide a stable structure of justification that manages to (dis-solve) the sceptical problem. In his final notebooks published as ‘On Certainty’, Wittgenstein offers a contextualist conception of the structure of justification that gives an answer to the ancient and modern scepticism. After all, Wittgenstein’s strategy can be thought

to be pyrrhonian itself. Michael Williams (2001) uses these remarks and offers a complete theory of justification. Inferential Contextualism suggests that the structure of justification is not fixed, but, instead, subject to circumstantial variation. Whether or not a belief enjoys a default status depends on a large number of contextually variable factors, e.g. the current state of knowledge or the particular inquiry in which we are engaged. The very same belief can change from default to non-default justificational status so that we can speak of a remote foundationalist structure. IC dissolves scepticism and seems to work against the Gettier-problem too.

In a nutshell: We have been Gettierized because we evaluate the epistemic responsibility of Smith by employing double standards. This is a result of our hinge-proposition, according to which knowledge presupposes truth. However, as soon as we shed light upon the problematic concepts, we dissolve the conceptual puzzlement. If, among others, *Michael Williams* is right in suggesting, that we do not need a theory of truth in epistemology, then we certainly do not need truth, as a condition for knowledge. In everyday life, science, and legal adjudication, we only have opinions and we only care about making accurate decisions. That is the case, not when propositions are true, but when they are adequately justified:

204. Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i. e. it is not a

kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.

205. If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, not yet false.

Wittgenstein poses a dilemma. Either we choose to ontologize epistemological thought, or to contextualize the search for truth. I have chosen the second.

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What's wrong with Wittgenstein?

An answer from the Soviet perspective

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Abstract

I address the problem of Wittgenstein unpopularity in recent analytical tradition by examining the hostility toward his philosophy shown by researches from Soviet Union. I explore the criticism of Wittgenstein's philosophy put in the frame of Marxist-Leninist methodology that the Soviet scholars shared. While having completely different, ideologically biased, background the Soviet researches expressed roughly similar dissatisfaction by the view on philosophy of the *Philosophical Investigations* with their contemporaries from the analytical tradition. In addition, the slight overview of the history of perception of Wittgenstein in Soviet Union and its peculiarities is provided.

The great diversity of interpretations of Wittgenstein philosophical legacy is well-known. Besides the variety of interpretations among people who usually subscribe themselves to the title 'wittgensteinians', the criticism of the opposers of Wittgenstein is multilateral as well. It addresses different sides of his philosophy and comes from different backgrounds. Despite the great influence of Wittgenstein, his place in contemporary philosophy is far from being satisfactory. The mainstream of analytic philosophy nowadays doesn't seem to appreciate the person who usually counted as the founder of two streams within the tradition. Wittgenstein scholars indicate an unpopularity of Wittgenstein in philosophical circles of the English-speaking world and Scandinavia (Hertzberg 2006: 82-83). While it is not a pleasant fact, it is quite understandable that philosophy may suffer from waves of fashion, when a figure of one philosopher is on stream, and the other does not. However, there is a whole tradition when Wittgenstein had never been in favor. While the Western Europe has been discovering new Wittgenstein's manuscripts, publishing them and coming with the new interpretations, in the Eastern Europe, in the Soviet Union namely, philosophers were far from delight of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Their view on the matter was a perspective of outsiders. Even it was impossible to deny his influence, the advantages of his philosophy were extremely understated. Having a ground in Marxist-Leninist philosophy, Soviet researchers were hostile to the Western 'bourgeois' philosophy in general and to Wittgenstein in particular.

In this talk I shall explore the attitude toward Wittgenstein from perspective of philosophers from Soviet Union. Beyond the pale of purely historical purpose of presenting the peculiar properties of another research tradition, different from the Western ones, I have another aim. I hope that knowing the perspective of the Soviet Union scholars toward Wittgenstein can contribute to understanding the problem of unpopularity of Wittgenstein nowadays. This aim is rather modest than ambitious, I don't provide any solutions on this important matter by now, but I think that this research contributes to the problem by showing what philosophers with another background have seen on the surface of Wittgenstein's philosophy and found unsatisfactory. I said 'on the surface' because, as I aim to show, they were very limited by their ideological perspective and haven't gone very deep into the nuances of Wittgenstein's thought. Georgiy Zaichenko one of the authors who wrote on Wittgenstein said that Marxist methodology is alien "to the artificial complication of its (bourgeois philosophy – I.K.) problems" (Zaichenko 1971: 51). That is exactly what we will see.

Before I turn to the question of the talk, I need to mention, even very briefly, the history of Wittgenstein perception in Soviet Union. The problem is that the manner of exploring Wittgenstein wasn't entirely the same thought the years. It began in a very abusive form of writing 'pamphlets' against Western philosophers from fifties approximately and till sixties. At that period the ideological influence was enormous and the authors of such pamphlets aimed only to reject the philosophy of Western, 'bourgeois' thinkers, but not to study it (see Tractenberg 1951; Byhovskij 1947).

For our purpose the most interesting is the period between sixties and seventies. Even being far from numerous, the literature of those times combines the decent investigation, 'decent' in comparison with the ones of the previous years, the period of ideological abusing, and it still contains the strong background of Marxist ideology. It still follows the hostility toward the 'bourgeois' philosophy expressed earlier, but does an investigation into it. The authors from sixties and seventies (Mshvenieradze 1961; Kozlova 1968, 1972; Zaichenko 1971; Bogomolov 1978) didn't count sufficient the rejection based purely on ideological inconsistency. To the contrary, in eighties, before Soviet Union collapsed, the ideological influence declines and scale of interest between research and ideology turned to the research for good and all. Therefore, it is not so easy to find a refined ideological criticism in the literature of eighties (see Grjaznov 1985).

So, let's look closely on what the authors of the books written between sixties and seventies viewed as wrong in Wittgenstein's philosophy.

'Idealism' of the *Tractatus*

Marxism-Leninism in its perception of the 'bourgeois' philosophy was inclined to see the development of philosophy as a struggle between 'idealism' and 'materialism'. The border line between those two perspectives is an answer on the 'basic question of philosophy' i.e. "what is the relation between the mind and being" (Il'ichjov 1983: 468) or what is primary between the spiritual and the material? 'Idealism' argues for a mind or spiritual to be first, where 'spiritual' can be understood very broad. It can be the 'Spirit' (Hegel) or 'a priori conceptions' (Kant). 'Materialism' to the contrary defends the primacy of the matter. In these frames the early Wittgenstein was perceived as 'an idealist'. The Soviet authors stressed such features of the *Tractatus* as logical apriorism and linguistic solipsism.

1) By the apriorism the authors meant that the philosophy of Wittgenstein goes from the inner logic of the language to the world. The logic of the language works as a web that penetrates our view on the world. Seeing the logic, but not the world, as a point that comes first, when as 5.552 states "Logic precedes every experience" determined Wittgenstein to be put in the camp of the proponents of idealism.

"The world' appears to Wittgenstein as somewhat 'translucent', shining through the prism of linguistic expressions... As a result, the 'world' is constructed through language" (Kozlova 1972: 133).

2) The priority of the logic of the language in the *Tractatus* leads to linguistic solipsism; there is no path from the world how it is given to us in the language to the world how it actually is, how it exists "objectively". The Soviet scholars referred to the aphorisms 5.62 and 5.64. They claimed for Wittgenstein to be a 'subjective idealist', i.e. to argue that the world doesn't exist independently of mind.

"But the idealistic principles of the concept of knowledge built up in the *Tractatus* ... they inevitably lead into the dead end of common subjective idealism in its new, linguistic version. Semantism with its 'opposite' research direction – 'from language to the world' - has led Wittgenstein ... to logical and linguistic anthropocentrism and solipsism" (Kozlova 1968: 268).

'Naturalism' of the *Investigations*

The turn of Wittgenstein to the ordinary language, to the numerous ways of how we use words in different situations and what meaning we give to the words in different contexts was perceived as a turning toward subjectivism and relativism. The desire of Wittgenstein to not provide a theory caused a very strong opposition.

1) Both subjectivism and relativism was seen as a consequence of Wittgenstein's defense of plurality of language games. His notion of meaning in use seemed to ignore the cognitive, i.e. descriptive feature of the language.

"...Wittgenstein almost eliminates the relation between the sign and the object from the concept of meaning. In any case, it remains in the shade. ...the cognitive information about the objects, properties and relations is missed behind the functional, the operational nature of language. Hence emerge the elements of subjectivism, and relativism" (Kozlova 1972:199).

Soviet philosophers rejected the *Tractatus* as containing 'subjective idealistic' view where our knowledge about the objective world is bound by the limitations of the sense build up by the borders of the abstract ideal language. To the contrary, the *Investigations*, in their views, proposed the perspective when no knowledge, no theory is possible.

2) 'Antitheoreticity' was seen as Wittgenstein's unwilling to work out 'serious problems'. Connected with relativism of language games conception it leads to the cognitive skepticism. Soviet philosophers believed that the *Investigations* express the inability to gain knowledge.

"...is not only the fact that 'later' Wittgenstein is 'tired of serious thoughts'. It means surrender to the difficulties, to the problems of science" (Zaichenko 1971: 63).

Wittgenstein's 'inability' to create a theory goes hand by hand with the enormous attention he pays to the differences; he was too much deepened into particular facts. Being immersed into discovering the facts without stating a

theory explaining them and exploring some regularities was blamed as 'naturalism'.

"Later Wittgenstein to the contrary focuses on empirical, naturalistic study of specific cognitive-speech activity" (Kozlova 1968: 294).

These examples of criticism share in common the sight of Wittgenstein as a philosopher who runs into extremes. His early views on language were too 'narrow', i.e. they restricted the language by its descriptive function. The later ones were too 'broad'; they are dissolved in different examples of the using of language. However, the thing, the Soviet authors the most heatedly rejected, was Wittgenstein's view on philosophy itself.

Wittgenstein's view on philosophy and Marxism-Leninism

According to Marxism-Leninism, philosophy goes hand in hand with science. The aim of philosophy is exploring of the most general laws of nature and society. Its function is to generalize the results of different sciences and to discover the most general regularities (Konstantinov 1970: 342). Philosophy should be grounded in science and be applicable to the contemporary world outlook.

In this light, the views of Wittgenstein that 1) philosophical problems are merely improper use of the language, 'linguistic puzzles' (*PI*, §111, §122); 2) the aim of philosophy is a clarification of the ways we use words (*PI*, §126, §133); 3) philosophy doesn't create science-like theories and doesn't depend from science (*PI*, §109); run counter Marxism. For the Soviet scholars this way of understanding of philosophy was fruitless.

However, these features, promoted by the *Investigations*, found its critics among Wittgenstein's colleagues from the analytic tradition. They expressed the same dissatisfaction by the view on the nature of philosophical problems and the aim of philosophy. His views were taken as a limitation of philosophy (Ayer 1986: 145), and the sight on philosophical problems as 'merely linguistic' was rejected (Popper 2002: 143-144), (Russell 1956: 216-217), (Russell 2009: 110-111). Moreover, a trace this view is visible in our days as well (Graying 2001: 130-133).

Despite these similarities, the Soviet sight goes further in rejection of Wittgenstein. For Marxism, another function of philosophy is a "developing of a holistic view on the world and the place of a human in it" (Konstantinov 1970: 332). Wittgenstein's unwilling to work out the worldview problems both in the *Tractatus* and *Investigations* was another completely unacceptable feature of his philosophy. And it was understood not only as an indication of the decline of the bourgeois worldview but as a doctrine serving to it.

"Wittgenstein objectively defended the interests of the bourgeoisie as the enemy of Marxism-Leninism, when he announced all the philosophical problems to be meaningless." (Mshvenieradze 1961: 14-15).

Conclusion

The understanding of Wittgenstein's legacy in Soviet Union was put in the boundaries of Marxist-Leninist ideology. The view on the historical developing of philosophy as a struggle between idealism and materialism determined the perception of the *Tractatus* as a subjective idealism and the *Investigations* as a naturalism. Soviet philosophers claimed that Marxism-Leninism overcomes the extremes of

the *Tractatus*, its 'solipsism' and turn to the abstract logic of language and the extremes of the *Investigations*: 'dissolution of philosophy' in numerous language facts. Marxism-Leninism postulated itself as a doctrine combining both the differentiations and generalizations. Philosophy is to create worldview and it is grounded in science. Wittgenstein's desire to solve philosophical problems, or rather 'puzzles' by analyzing them and clarifying the ways we use our words, was rejected as a skipping the 'real problems' of philosophy.

I don't think that the Soviet scholars can contribute to the exegetical issues of the contemporary Wittgenstein scholarship. Their reading was superficial. However, as I stated at the beginning of the paper, such survey can be an example of what one would see if he or she doesn't share a common ground with Wittgenstein. The Soviet reading emphasizes the possible consequences of the reading Wittgenstein from without. Moreover, it shows what features catch the eye first if one doesn't aim to go into very deep nuances of Wittgenstein's writings. And it is indicative that their dissatisfaction with Wittgenstein's philosophy reminds the one spread among other analytical philosophers who didn't accept the *Philosophical Investigations* and the tradition it contributed. The Soviet researches had no common ground with Wittgenstein, the problems occupied him weren't in an attention among Soviet scholars. To the contrary, aiming to reject the view of bourgeois philosophy, they had no need to stand on the same side with Wittgenstein and let themselves to be occupied by the problems of sense and meaning. In difference of them, analytic philosophers who were in stream with the tradition influenced by the themes of the *Tractatus*, and therefore were engaged in the issues of sense and meaning (Russell and Ayer above all), repudiated the view on philosophy from the *Investigations* for nearly the same reasons as the Soviet thinkers. It is clear, that the perfunctoriness of the Soviet reading is explained by the ideological background the scholars stood upon. But what can explain the reading of their contemporaries from the West?

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Wittgensteins Privatsprachenkritik – Verkappter Behaviorismus?

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Abstract

Das Privatsprachenargument steht im Zentrum von Wittgensteins Betrachtungen zum Leib-Seele-Problem. Verschiedene Strömungen innerhalb der Leib-Seele-Debatte haben Wittgensteins Privatsprachenargument in der Vergangenheit für sich vereinnahmt, insbesondere der naturalistische Behaviorismus. Jedoch kann Wittgenstein kaum als Behaviorist bezeichnet werden, wie er an mehreren Stellen explizit betont; in PU 308 liefert er zudem ein stichhaltiges Argument gegen den Behaviorismus und jede sonstige naturalistische Spielform innerhalb der Leib-Seele-Debatte. In dem vorliegenden Aufsatz argumentiere ich dafür, Empfindungen bei Wittgenstein lediglich als ‚grammatische Fiktion‘ zu verstehen, während eine philosophische Erklärung zugunsten einer Beschreibung zurückzutreten hat. Zutreffend hat Lütterfelds 1995 Wittgensteins Position als ‚Durcheinanderbeziehung‘ zwischen dem mentalen und dem physikalischen Sprachspiel bezeichnet – während der Nutzen der traditionellen Leib-Seele-Debatte in der Sprachpraxis durchaus vernachlässigbar ist.

Das Privatsprachenargument steht im Zentrum von Wittgensteins Betrachtungen zum Leib-Seele-Problem. Verschiedene Strömungen innerhalb der Leib-Seele-Debatte haben Wittgensteins Privatsprachenargument in der Vergangenheit für sich vereinnahmt, insbesondere der naturalistische Behaviorismus. Jedoch kann Wittgenstein kaum als Behaviorist bezeichnet werden, wie er an mehreren Stellen explizit betont; in PU 308 liefert er zudem ein stichhaltiges Argument gegen den Behaviorismus und jede sonstige naturalistische Spielform innerhalb der Leib-Seele-Debatte. In dem vorliegenden Aufsatz argumentiere ich dafür, Empfindungen bei Wittgenstein lediglich als ‚grammatische Fiktion‘ zu verstehen, während eine philosophische Erklärung zugunsten einer Beschreibung zurückzutreten hat. Zutreffend hat Lütterfelds 1995 Wittgensteins Position als ‚Durcheinanderbeziehung‘ zwischen dem mentalen und dem physikalischen Sprachspiel bezeichnet – während der Nutzen der traditionellen Leib-Seele-Debatte in der Sprachpraxis durchaus vernachlässigbar ist.

Wittgensteins Privatsprachenargument wurde von ganz unterschiedlichen Strömungen innerhalb der Leib-Seele-Debatte vereinnahmt. Kenny bezeichnet die *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* (PU) daher zu Recht als „klassisches Werk nicht nur der Sprachphilosophie, sondern auch der Philosophie des Bewußtseins“ (Kenny 1974:26). Insbesondere der Naturalismus und seine Sonderform des Behaviorismus haben sich immer wieder auf die Privatsprachenkritik berufen. Dies liegt insofern nahe, als Wittgenstein selbst gewisse Gemeinsamkeiten mit dem Behaviorismus einräumt, indem er sein Alter ego fragen lässt:

Bist du nicht doch ein verkappter Behaviourist? Sagst du nicht doch, im Grunde, daß alles Fiktion ist, außer dem menschlichen Benehmen? (PU 307)

Im Folgenden werde ich argumentieren, dass Wittgensteins Position innerhalb der Leib-Seele-Debatte keineswegs behavioristisch ist, sondern einen eigenen Erkenntnisansatz begründet. Lütterfelds 1995 bezeichnet sie als Durcheinander verschiedener Sprachspiele. Wittgenstein geht es dabei um die sprachlichen Bedingungen, unter denen das Leib-Seele-Problem überhaupt diskutiert werden kann. Mentale Phänomene sind für ihn daher keine Fiktion im eigentlichen Sinne, sondern lediglich eine ‚grammatische Fiktion‘ (PU 307) – wie am Ende dieses Aufsatzes deutlich wird.

1. Widersprüchlichkeit privatim Regelfolgens

In der Sprachpraxis treffen Menschen aufeinander, die verschiedene Tätigkeiten ausüben. Dies bezeichnet Wittgenstein als Sprachspiel:

Ich werde auch das Ganze: der Sprache und der Tätigkeiten, mit denen sie verwoben ist, das „Sprachspiel“ nennen. (PU 7)

Ein (Sprach-)Spiel steht dabei in mannigfaltigen Beziehungen zu seinen Regeln. Regeln bestimmen das Spiel nicht vollständig, wie ein intuitives Vorverständnis es nahe legen könnte. Zum einen ist nicht jeder Aspekt eines Spiels durch Regeln bestimmt, zum anderen „gibt es [...] auch den Fall, wo wir spielen und – ‚make up the rules as we go along‘“ (PU 83).

Sprachspiele gleichen also keinesfalls einem exakt festgelegten Kalkülspiel. Ein Autofahrer hält vor einer roten Ampel, weil er gelernt hat, bei Rot stehen zu bleiben. Dabei handelt es sich allerdings um eine Deutung des Ampelzeichens, nicht um eine Regel (vgl. PU 85), da eine rote Ampel genauso gut „Gas geben“ besagen könnte. Menschen lernen jedoch durch die Praxis, was eine Ampel ist und wie sie sich bei rotem Ampelzeichen verhalten müssen. Richtiges Verhalten hat demnach nur wenig mit Regeldeutung zu tun, sondern Regelfolgen ist vielmehr eine durch – wie Wittgenstein sagen würde – „Abrichtung“ erlernte praktische Fähigkeit.

Weil Regelfolgen aber eine Praxis darstellt, ist privatimes Regelfolgen widersprüchlich. Die Sprachgemeinschaft ist unumgängliche Kontrollinstanz hinsichtlich des richtigen Regelfolgens – zwar nicht in jeder einzelnen Situation (ein besonnener Autofahrer würde auch an einer roten Ampel halten, wenn er sicher sein könnte, keine Geldbuße oder gar einen Unfall zu riskieren), aber gewiss im größeren Gesamtzusammenhang (ohne Kontrollen und Unfallrisiko würde niemand an einer roten Ampel halten). Deutet jemand die Ampelzeichen für sich selbst falschherum, indem er beispielsweise bei Grün hält und bei Rot fährt, so glaubt er nur der Ampelregel zu folgen, aber „der Regel zu folgen glauben ist nicht: der Regel folgen“ (PU 202). Im Folgenden werde ich die Bedeutung dieses Problems für Wittgensteins Privatsprachenkonzept aufzeigen.

2. Empfindungen und Privatsprache

Das Privatsprachenkonzept führt Wittgenstein wie folgt ein:

Wäre aber auch eine Sprache denkbar, in der Einer seine inneren Erlebnisse – seine Gefühle, Stimmungen, etc. – für den eigenen Gebrauch aufschreiben, oder aussprechen könnte? [...] Die Wörter dieser Sprache sollen sich auf das beziehen, wovon nur der Sprechende wissen kann; auf seine unmittelbaren, privaten Empfindungen. Ein Anderer kann diese Sprache also nicht verstehen. (PU 243)

Dieses Konzept der Privatsprache kann sowohl als ein konsequentes Fortführen des klassischen Empirismus (vgl. Kenny 1974:209) als auch des kartesischen Dualismus angesehen werden: Wenn es eine mentale Welt gibt, in der „Bewusstseinszustände introspektiv nur dem betroffenen Subjekt zugänglich [sind], dann kann die Sprache, die sich auf derartige Bewusstseinszustände bezieht, aus begrifflichen Gründen [...] ausschließlich diesem Subjekt verständlich sein – sie ist privat“ (Lütterfelds 1995:107).

Mit seinem Privatsprachenargument kritisiert Wittgenstein allerdings diesen Dualismus: Ein privates Lernen von Sprache ist nicht möglich, da Sprache und deren grammatische Regeln durch Abrichtung erlernt und durch fortwährende Anwendung eingeübt werden. Die gebräuchlichste Methode dürfte dabei die hinweisende Definition sein: Wenn eine Mutter auf ein Auto zeigt und dabei „Auto“ laut ausspricht, wird das Kind auf den Begriff des Autos abgerichtet, bis es ihn beherrscht.

In einer privaten Sprache müssten diese hinweisenden Definitionen jedoch ebenfalls privat sein: Ein Sprecher müsste sich also selbst auf einen Begriff wie „Schmerz“ abrichten. Dies aber ergäbe keinen Sinn, da die Mutter zunächst selbst eine Vorstellung des Begriffs „Auto“ besitzen muss, bevor sie ihr Kind darauf abrichten kann. Der Sprecher einer Privatsprache müsste also schon eine Vorstellung von „Schmerz“ besitzen, um sich „Schmerz“ beizubringen. Wie beim privaten Regelfolgen fehlt hier aber jede Kontrollinstanz. Es ist, wie Wittgenstein schreibt, „[a]ls kaufte Einer mehrere Exemplare der heutigen Morgenzeitung, um sich zu vergewissern, daß sie die Wahrheit schreibt.“ (PU 265)

Dass privates Regelfolgen in der Privatsprachenkonzeption problematisch ist, veranschaulicht Wittgenstein anhand des Tagebuchgedankenexperiments, demzufolge einer „das Wiederkehren einer gewissen Empfindung“ durch das Zeichen „E“ in einem Tagebuch festhalten will (vgl. PU 258). Dafür müsste er aber einer Regel folgen, nämlich immer wenn er eine gewisse Empfindung verspürt, ein „E“ ins Tagebuch eintragen. Dieses Regelfolgen ist zwangsläufig privat, da er sich die Regel nur selbst geben und ihre richtige Anwendung sich nicht in der Praxis bewähren kann (sonst würde es sich nämlich nicht um eine Privatsprache halten).

3. Wittgenstein und das Leib-Seele-Problem

Trotz dieser Absage an die Privatsprachenkonzeption spielen Empfindungen in Wittgensteins Philosophie eine wichtige Rolle. Wittgenstein hält daran fest, dass Empfindungen nicht ohne ein gewisses Empfindungsbenehmen ablaufen (vgl. PU 281). Stößt ein Mensch mit dem Kopf an

die Wand, wird er ein bestimmtes Schmerzbenhmen zeigen (zum Beispiel mit der Hand über die angestoßene Stelle reiben), während Leblosem, etwa der Wand, Schmerzbenhmen nicht sinnvoll attestiert werden kann.

Das Wesen von Schmerzen aber beschreiben zu wollen, käme einer Fotografie eines brennenden Hauses gleich: Obwohl Haus und Flammen auf dem Foto wirklichkeitsgetreu scheinen, brennt es auf der Fotografie nicht wirklich. Ähnlich ist es mit dem Versuch, Empfindungen in Worte zu fassen: der wesentliche Aspekt der Empfindung geht dadurch verloren. Daher darf die „Grammatik“ (also die Verwendungsweise) des Ausdrucks der Empfindung „nicht nach dem Muster von ‚Gegenstand und Bezeichnung‘ gedeutet werden“ (Schulte 2001:199). Wittgenstein benutzt dafür sein Käfergedankenexperiment:

Angenommen, es hätte Jeder eine Schachtel, darin wäre etwas, was wir „Käfer“ nennen. Niemand kann je in die Schachtel des Andern schaun; und Jeder sagt, er wisse nur vom Anblick seines Käfers, was ein Käfer ist. – Da könnte es ja sein, daß Jeder ein anderes Ding in seiner Schachtel hätte. Ja, man könnte sich vorstellen, daß sich ein solches Ding fortwährend veränderte. – Aber wenn nun das Wort „Käfer“ dieser Leute doch einen Gebrauch hätte? – So wäre er nicht der der Bezeichnung eines Dings. Das Ding in der Schachtel gehört überhaupt nicht zum Sprachspiel; auch nicht einmal als ein Etwas: denn die Schachtel könnte auch leer sein. (PU 293)

Der (Referenz-)Gegenstand eines Empfindungsausdrucks fällt aus der Betrachtung heraus. Allerdings müssen sich Sprecher eine ungefähre Vorstellung von Schmerzen anderer machen können, damit „Schmerz“ nicht nur ein sinnloser Ausdruck einer verkappten Privatsprache ist.

Jedoch gibt es einen wesentlichen Unterschied zwischen eigenen und fremden Schmerzen: Jemand kann lediglich glauben, ein anderer empfinde Schmerzen, während er von eigenen Schmerzen nur wissen kann (vgl. PU 303). Savigny schreibt:

Schmerzbenhmen mit Schmerzen und *offen gespieltes* Schmerzbenhmen ohne Schmerzen (Simulieren) unterscheiden sich z.B. dadurch, daß anders als im ersten Fall die Umwelt im zweiten Fall sehr böse wird, wenn es herauskommt. (Savigny 1988:353)

Da allerdings „ein Unterschied ist, zwischen Schmerzbenhmen mit Schmerzen und Schmerzbenhmen ohne Schmerzen“ (PU 304), kann die Schmerzempfindung nicht einfach nichts sein. Dass Empfindungen aber auch nicht etwas sind, über das sich sinnvoll reden lässt, führt Wittgenstein in ein Paradoxon („Sie [sind] kein Etwas, aber auch nicht ein Nichts!“, PU 304), das er wie folgt auflöst:

Das Paradoxon verschwindet nur dann, wenn wir radikal mit der Idee brechen, die Sprache funktioniere immer auf *eine* Weise, diene immer dem gleichen Zweck: Gedanken zu **übertragen** – seien diese nun Gedanken nun über Häuser, Schmerzen, Gut und Böse, oder was immer. (PU 304)

Wittgenstein bestreitet den mentalen Aspekt von Empfindungen also nicht, sondern behauptet lediglich, dass über ihr Wesen nicht gesprochen werden kann. Wittgensteins Position innerhalb der traditionellen Leib-Seele-Debatte zu verorten, ist daher nicht unproblematisch.

4. Absage an den Behaviorismus

Bevor ich mit dem Konzept des Durcheinanders am Ende eine Verortung dennoch zumindest ansatzweise versuche, will ich Wittgenstein zunächst vom Behaviorismus abgrenzen, da diverse behavioristische Spielarten die PU immer wieder für sich vereinnahmt haben (vgl. Schulte 2001:202). Als Vergleichsposition bietet sich der klassische Behaviorismus von Skinner an, dessen *Science and Human Behavior* kurz nach Wittgensteins Tod erschienen ist.

Der Behaviorismus basiert auf der Grundannahme, dass „[m]enschliches Verhalten [...] das allgemeinste Charakteristikum der Welt“ (Skinner 1978:9) darstellt, und macht sich dabei ein empiristisches Post-hoc-ergo-propter-hoc zunutze. Ziel des Behaviourismus ist es, mittels exakter Beobachtungen und dem Aufstellen allgemeingültiger Verhaltensgesetze menschliches Verhalten zu wissenschaftlichen. Dies hat große Auswirkungen auf unser Verständnis von seelischen Zuständen und Empfindungen, wie Skinner deutlich macht:

Wir unterstellen, daß andere Menschen genau das empfinden, was wir empfinden, wenn sie sich so verhalten, wie wir uns verhalten. Doch wo sind diese Empfindungen und seelischen Zustände angesiedelt? Aus welchem Stoff sind sie gemacht? (Skinner 1978: 17)

Gemein ist gegenwärtigen behavioristischen Strömungen, dass Empfindungs-ausdrücke „bestenfalls eine abkürzende, meist aber irreführende Vokabel für bestimmte Verhaltensdispositionen“ (Vollmer 1988:78) darstellen. Dabei verfolgt der Behaviorismus zumeist das naturalistische Ziel, „mit fortschreitendem Kenntnisstand [...] mentalistische Termini durch neurophysiologische“ (ebd.) zu ersetzen, wobei – ähnlich wie Wittgenstein – auch der Behaviorismus das „Problem der Privatheit“ (Skinner 1978:32) durch die Kontrollfunktion der Sprachgemeinschaft löst.

In der naturalistischen Antwort, die der Behaviorismus auf das Leib-Seele-Problem gibt, spielen Empfindungen nur dann eine Rolle, wenn sie von bestimmtem Benehmen gekennzeichnet sind, sie werden also auf Verhalten reduziert. Der Behaviorismus behauptet also, um mit Wittgenstein zu sprechen, „daß alles Fiktion ist, außer dem menschlichen Benehmen“ (PU 307).

Wittgensteins Bild des Behaviorismus stimmt in etwa mit dem eben skizzierten Ansatz Skinners überein: Wittgenstein versteht unter Behaviorismus „das Leugnen des Seelischen zugunsten der wahren Existenz nur des Benehmens“ (Savigny 1988:355). Dass dieses Leugnen scheinbar Wittgensteins eigenem Ansatz ähnelt, liegt an der Rolle, die Wittgenstein Empfindungen zuschreibt. Als Gegensatz kommen sie im Sprachspiel nicht vor: Wenn von Empfindungen die Rede ist, sind „vielmehr äußere Kriterien, nämlich Aspekte [...] (sprachlichen oder nichtsprachlichen) *Verhaltens*“ (Kurthen 1984:62) entscheidend. Deshalb scheint der Schluss nahezuliegen, Wittgenstein lasse Empfindungen ganz unter den Tisch fallen.

Doch mit einer solchen Lesart tut man Wittgenstein Unrecht: Empfindungen sind für ihn lediglich „grammatische Fiktion“ (PU 307), also etwas, worüber nichts ausgesagt werden kann; deshalb sind sie aber nicht nichts. In dem behavioristischen Ziel, alle Empfindung mit fortschreitender Wissenschaft auf menschliches Verhalten zu reduzieren, erkennt Wittgenstein sogar einen eindeutigen Widerspruch:

Wie kommt es nur zum philosophischen Problem des [...] Behaviourism? – Der erste Schritt ist der ganz unauffällige. Wir reden von Vorgängen und Zuständen, und lassen ihre Natur unentschieden! Wir werden vielleicht einmal mehr über sie wissen – meinen wir. Aber eben dadurch haben wir uns auf eine bestimmte Betrachtungsweise festgelegt. Denn wir haben einen bestimmten Begriff davon, was es heißt: einen Vorgang näher kennenzulernen. (PU 308)

Indem der Behaviorist einen bestimmten Begriff vom Kennenlernen eines Vorgangs hat, setzt er voraus, dass ‚geistige Zustände‘ erfahrbar sein können, da ein Kennenlernen ohne etwas über das Kennenzulernende zu erfahren nicht möglich ist. Da die Wissenschaft sich allerdings nur innerhalb ihrer eigenen Sprachgrenzen bewegt, dürfen auch die kennenzulernenden Vorgänge nicht hinter diesen Grenzen liegen und müssen somit körperlicher Art sein. Doch durch die Voraussetzung, dass geistige Zustände artikulierbar und somit körperlicher Art sein müssen, „scheinen wir also die geistigen Vorgänge geleugnet zu haben“ (PU 308), obwohl sie gar nicht geleugnet werden können, da sie hinter den nicht einsehbaren Grenzen der Sprache liegen.

Es verhält sich wie mit dem Käfergedankenexperiment (vgl. PU 293): Der Behaviorist sieht nur von außen auf die Schachtel und leugnet dennoch, dass sich ein Käfer darin befindet. Jedoch fällt der Käfer für Wittgenstein aus der Betrachtung heraus und ist somit weder ein Etwas noch ein Nichts.

Damit aber bestreitet Wittgenstein keineswegs die „Existenz der Bewußtseinszustände, so daß das mentale Sprachspiel für ihn ebenso seine Berechtigung hat wie jedes andere.“ (Lütterfelds 1995:112f) Allerdings lassen sich Empfindungsausdrücke „keineswegs ohne semantischen Verlust in Sprachzeichen des Verhaltens-Sprachspiels [...] überführen“ (Lütterfelds 1995:107). Jede Aussage über den Referenzgegenstand von Empfindungsausdrücken ist sinnlos und führt dazu, dass die Fliege sich im philosophischen Fliegenglas verfängt, aus dem Wittgenstein ihr den Ausweg zeigen will.

5. „Durcheinander“ als Ausweg aus dem Fliegenglas

Dieser Ausweg führt für Wittgenstein nicht über Erklärungen, sondern über genaue Beobachtung und Beschreibung des jeweiligen Sprachspiels. Wie bereits angedeutet, ist eine Einordnung Wittgensteins in die traditionellen Positionen des Leib-Seele-Problems problematisch, wenn gleich die PU keinesfalls in einen Behaviorismus führen. Stattdessen wird man Wittgenstein am ehesten gerecht, wenn man das ‚Durcheinander der Sprachspiele‘ ernstnimmt. Ähnlich wie Sprache und Tätigkeit in einer Wechselbeziehung stehen und somit Sprachspiele bilden, stehen das (mentale) Sprachspiel der Empfindungen und das (physikalische) Sprachspiel des Benehmens zueinander und bilden ein „gegenseitiges Durcheinander“ (Lütterfelds 1995:111). Wittgenstein veranschaulicht dieses Durcheinander an folgendem Beispiel:

„Ich merkte, er war verstimmt“. Ist das ein Bericht über das Benehmen oder den Seelenzustand? (PU 497)

Während scheinbar eine Entscheidung für eine der Alternativen erforderlich ist, will Wittgenstein demonstrieren, dass beide Sprachspiele sich gegenseitig bedingen und beeinflussen; der Bericht über das Verstimmtsein handelt also genau deshalb von einem Seelenzustand, weil er von einem Benehmen handelt, und umgekehrt (vgl. Lütterfelds

1995:110-111). Demnach bedeutet „vom Seelenzustand einer (fremden) Verstimmung berichten [...], daß man dies notwendig durch einen impliziten Benehmensbericht hindurch tut, indem man sich auf [...] Verhaltensweisen der betroffenen Person bezieht“ (Lütterfelds 1995:112).

Ob es dabei tatsächlich Empfindungen (im mentalistischen Sinn) gibt, spielt für die Sprachpraxis keine Rolle, da diese hinter den Grenzen der Sprache und damit nicht sagbar bleiben. Das Problem bleibt ein rein sprachliches, da in „Wittgensteins Konzept des ‚Durcheinanders‘ [...] die Privatheit des eigenen Seelenzustands bzw. die begriffliche Unmöglichkeit, fremdes Erleben zu ‚erfahren‘, bestehen bleibt.“ (Lütterfelds 1995:116)

Dass das mentale Sprachspiel also in einer „Durcheinander-Beziehung“ zum naturalistischen Sprachspiel steht, führt in das Paradox, „daß wir in *einem* Bericht Körper- und Bewußtseinszustände kunterbunt durcheinander mischen“ (PU 421). Gerade diese scheinbare Widersprüchlichkeit ist es aber, aus der als Gesamtergebnis eine zufriedenstellende Beschreibung (nicht Erklärung!) des Sprachspiels übrig bleibt, die fernab aller behavioristischen und anderen traditionellen Ansätze innerhalb der Leib-Seele-Debatte liegt.

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Know-how I: Wittgenstein and practical certainty

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Abstract

In this paper, the authors examine the common-sense concept of know-how (first part) and Wittgenstein's concept of practical certainty (second part). They then compare these two concepts and identify some similarities and differences (third part). The most important similarity is that Wittgenstein's concept of practical certainty is a type of know-how, while among dissimilarities the most important is his concept is a kind of primordial know-how almost as "something animal." This analysis supports the Framework reading of *On Certainty*.

According to Danièle Moyal-Sharrock and William H. Brenner, the editors of *Readings of Wittgenstein's On Certainty* (2005) there are four possible readings of *On Certainty* (OC). The division from their "Introduction" runs as follows.

...the 'Framework reading' gathers chapters that either expound or critically examine foundational and grammatical views of *On Certainty*; the 'Transcendental reading' offers neo-Kantian and neo-Realist interpretations of the work; the 'Epistemic reading' examines the epistemic versus nonepistemic nature of the certainty in question; finally, the 'Therapeutic reading' approaches *On Certainty* in the spirit of 'New Wittgenstein' commentators, nudging us away from framework and transcendental readings, and towards a less theoretical, more dialectical and open-textured interpretation of Wittgenstein's aims. (Moyal-Sharrock, Brenner 2005:3)

The two texts from the Framework reading of the book that we will use are first, that of Joachim Schulte "Within a System" (Schulte 2005:59-76, see Krkač 2012:201-233), and second that of D. Moyal-Sharrock "Unraveling Certainty" (Moyal-Sharrock 2005:76-101). These enable a kind of pragmatist-cultural-anthropological reading of OC concerning the common concept of know-how (KH) and Wittgenstein's concept of practical certainty (PC) as a primordial type of KH. The first text we will use concerns the difference between experiential, hinge (rule-like), and axis remarks, and the second text concerns the blind trust aspect of practical certainty.

1. KH and Wittgenstein's common concepts of practice and certainty as PC

If, for instance, know-that (KT = an automobile runs in such and such way) is *relevantly dissimilar* from KH to drive it and *vice versa*, and if similar cases create an important sector of human knowledge, then there must be a *kind of implicit epistemology of KH* that humans are manifesting by their actions that can and should be distinguished from their actions. The expression *relevantly dissimilar* means that that KH can be explained without mentioning KT. However, this stands only in some cases, no matter if these are the most important and belong to the biggest sector of KH.

There are actions (A) and practices (P) that humans perform without explicit KT and KH of them or of how to perform them. Concerning KH of such Ps, this kind of knowledge can be called implicit KH. So a human S can KH to do something and at the same time S doesn't KH how the P is performed. Examples of such implicit KHs can be

many things that children can do without explicit knowledge of how these things are performed (this concerns cases of learning by imitating). A child may KH to perform an A without explicit KH of how A is to be performed. There are cases of half implicit and half explicit KH such as all cases of acquiring and knowing a P by trial and error. Finally, there are cases of explicit KH. Such KH requires that S isn't just able to perform an action but that S knows what s/he is doing.

Surely, S doesn't explicitly KH to perform P if S isn't able to perform P. So, *ability* seems to be a condition of explicit KH. On the other hand, ability to perform P isn't sufficient for explicit KH, since there are cases in which S is able to perform P without explicitly knowing it (knowing how to perform a P and knowing one's own ability to perform it). Finally, besides ability, explicit knowledge of how P is to be performed (say in terms of a short manual), and of one's ability to perform P (say in terms of explicating one's own prerequisites of performance), there must be some additional condition because if S explicitly KHs to P, then S should be in a position to explicitly justify such ability and KH to perform. Justification is needed because, if under these two conditions, S under particular circumstances is willing to perform P and isn't relevantly prevented in performance of P and cannot actually perform P, then S doesn't explicitly KH P. Since, there is no point in giving a justification in terms of KT, the only possibility is that S supplies a practical justification. The possibility that S can actually perform P can be taken as a practical justification of S's KH to P. So, a preliminary or common sense morphology of KH can be the following.

- S explicitly KHs P if: (1a) S is *able* to perform P. (2a) S is (at least implicitly) *acquainted* with her/his ability to perform P. (3a) S can justify his/her ability to perform P by *actually performing* P.

Wittgenstein didn't use expressions like KH or practical certainty (PC). However, PC can be a shortened for his notions of practice and/as certainty, practical justification, and justification of/by practice from OC (PI 325-6, 472-4; OC 45-7, 49, 110, 139, 148, 196, 232, 359, 395, 422, 475-6) that are closely related to the concepts of language-games (OC 204, 501, 519, 559), and forms of life (OC 358).

- Section 395 of OC is the closest to the concept of KH and it runs as follows: "I know all that." And that will come out in the way I act and in the way I speak about the things in question." The first part of section 196 of OC seems to be the most promising concerning PC: "Sure evidence is what we *accept* as sure, it is evidence that we go by in acting surely, *acting* without any doubt."

- Finally, besides empirical/experiential and rule-like or hinge remarks from OC there are also axis remarks (OC 152) such as “Cats don’t grow on trees” that are implicit in our Ps and manifested by them. Such remarks as far as they are a third type between empirical and hinge remarks can perhaps be interpreted as remarks concerning our human completely absolute yet only practical certainty (they are changing aspects like the sand in the river-image in OC 99).

So, if these preliminaries are sufficient to take his concepts of certainty as PC and PC as KH, then precisely this point needs to be researched in more detail in order to test it.

2. Wittgenstein on practical certainty as know-how

Now, is Wittgenstein in PI and OC suggesting a morphology of PC similar to the one of KH as just sketched? He wrote on certainty, and perhaps he was trying to create a grammar or a perspicuous presentation of PC. One among many facets of his attempts to supply morphology of PC concerns its practical element, namely knowledge as PC. At least three issues should be mentioned here.

The first issue concerns the concept of certainty and the difference between KT and KH. First, Wittgenstein starts his analysis in OC by making the remark that common-sense use of “to know” is in fact misuse because in all such cases (of Moore-type propositions) we are at best only practically certain. Wittgenstein didn’t use notions of KT and KH, yet with some reservations it can be argued that the distinction is quite similar to his distinction between “to know” and “to be practically certain.” For him, *to be certain* isn’t *to have a kind of special justification* but *to manifest certainty by ways in which one speaks and acts*, yet PC is similar to knowledge since “to know” is closely related to “being able to”, “to understand”, and “to master a technique” (PI 150).

The second issue is about the nature of certainty-remarks. It seems that such remarks (e.g. “Cars don’t grow from the ground.”) are not empirical or grammatical (rule-like, hinges, Stroll 2002:134-9), but practical (axis). If a system of PCs (a world-picture) is manifested in speaking (language-games) and living (forms of life) of a community, then it makes no sense to ask what is its epistemic nature or strength; rather it makes sense to ask about the community’s culture, routines, their inventions, art, etc. Concerning known section 152 of OC and the differences between “hinges” (OC 341) and “axis” (OC 152) one should take into account J. Schulte’s analysis because PCs seem to be overviewed in the form of “axis-remarks” (Schulte 2005:71, OC 70–73). In short, besides empirical remarks (e.g. “The cat Willard is in the tree.”) and hinge remarks (e.g. “A bachelorette is an unmarried woman.”), there are also axis remarks (e.g. “Cats don’t grow on trees.”) that are such that by acting in accordance with them and by explicitly uttering them one is manifesting and explicating PC.

The third issue is about the nature of PC as a phenomenon. Some sections of PI and OC can be quoted here since it seems that Wittgenstein’s standpoint is obvious. “What does this mean?” – “The certainty that fire will burn me is based on induction.” – Does it mean that I reason to myself: “Fire has always burned me, so it will happen now too.”? Or is the previous experience the cause of my certainty, not its reason?” (...) “What people accept as a justification shows how they think and live.” (PI 325) “Ask, not: “What goes on in us when we are certain that...?”—but: How is ‘the certainty that this is the case’ manifested in

human action?” (PI p. 225) “I shall get burned if I put my hand in the fire – that is certainty. That is to say, here we see what certainty means. (Not just the meaning of the word “certainty” but also what certainty amounts to.)” (PI 471-4) “Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to hastiness or superficiality, but as a form of life.” (OC 358) “But that means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or unjustified; as it were, as something animal.” (OC 359)

PCs can be described as manifested in each and every case of standard or daily actions that humans learn by simple imitation, or by inventing a skill, or by discovering a technique, and manifested especially in routine and standard actions that are transparent and easily transferable to other members of a culture (OC 358). Therefore, it seems that Wittgenstein’s PC has something in common with KH. At the same time PCs are immensely important for humans and are close to a common sense concept of half-explicit KH. So, instead four current readings of OC (Moyal-Sharrock, Brenner 2005), but only concerning the present topic, a pragmatic-cultural-anthropological reading starting from his notion of practice in OC is suggested here.


- This is so because for Wittgenstein “to be certain” first and foremost means “to act with PC”, and only later on it means “to be explicitly certain how to do this or that” (PI 471-4). So, his account is similar to the common conception of KH, yet it is diverse from it as far as he tries to point to something more primordial and yet still epistemically significant (OC 359, PI 325).

3. Is Wittgenstein’s concept of PC a primordial concept of KH?

There are cases which are better described as cases of half KT and half KH without the possibility of reduction of KH to KT. They represent a kind of blended primordial PC *implicit in* and *manifested by* our standard daily practices or as a kind of knowledge of manual (KM). This leads us to another question – is KH a special case of PC? Now, let us start from a simple observation of daily routines.

Humans perform their daily practices with no hesitation at all, calmly and without *uncertainty*. Even children manifest this feature of action, of course in terms of practices that are routines for their age. This is so because majority of these practices can be learned “purely practically, without learning any explicit rules” (OC 95). So, there is no continuity between KT and KH. They function independently of each other.

In a majority of daily practices, PC and an implicit knowledge of manual (KMI), as being opposite to an explicit knowledge of manual (KME), is in fact divided and independent of KT since there is not any kind of explicit acquaintance of a doer with his/her ability to perform a P as shown in possibilities (a) and (d) hereafter.



Along this series PC–KMI–|–KME–KH–KT PC is transformed into knowledge but only in possibilities (b) and (c). Other way around, it seems that PC, due to its “blindness” and “power”, which “is use” and gives “usefulness”, is the most primordial form of knowledge (Krkač 2003, Moyal-Sharrock 2005). Therefore, PC achieved by learning (by imitation or by trial-and-error) is the purest form of PC as shown in possibility (a). Moreover, occurrences of PC suggests that epistemology should be concerned with KH rather than with KT, and as far as Wittgenstein is concerned, it should be concerned with epistemology, culture, and theory of action rather than with classical epistemology of true-justified-belief.

- Like J. L. Austin’s “descriptive fallacy,” we can say that Wittgenstein pointed to a kind of “propositional fallacy” that would say that epistemology should be concerned with propositional knowledge or KT, not with non-propositional knowledge or KH and PC. Concerning the belief condition, in justified-true-belief epistemology a belief is an explicit belief-that while in Wittgenstein’s case it seems to be an implicit and manifested belief-in as trust. (Moyal-Sharrock 2005) Concerning the justification condition, in the first case it is a justification-by-reasons, while in Wittgenstein’s case it is a justification-by-doing. It is about the simple fact that any standard practice is by itself “powerful” and “blind” in the same time, and by being so it is also *certain for practical purposes*.

Consequently, it seems that Wittgenstein supplies elements for the morphology of PC that is similar with preliminary common-sense analysis of KH.

- S is PC concerning P if: (1b) S is able to perform a P (Wittgenstein surely claims that, PI 150), (2b) S is implicitly acquainted with her/his ability to perform P (he claims this as well), (3b) and S can justify his/her ability to perform P by simply performing it (he claims this also, PI 325). So, in principle, Wittgenstein’s account of PC can be interpreted as the philosophical grammar of “certainty” (PI 471-4), and as the morphology of KH as PC (PI p. 225, OC 358-9)

He suggests that KT is a special and rare case of KH which is itself a special and rare case of PC that is the most common form of human *knowing*. In symbolic fashion his argument would run as follows.

If $(SPC \rightarrow SKMIP \bullet SKMIP \rightarrow SKHP)$, then $(SPC \rightarrow SKHP)$.

$SPC \rightarrow SKMIP \bullet SKMIP \rightarrow SKHP$.

Therefore, $SPC \rightarrow SKHP$.

SPC.

Therefore, SKHP.

This argument applies for majority of cases of routine daily Ps that can be understood as PCs that by being PCs are also primordial KH. Moreover, if this description of PC and

the argument is correct, then perhaps Moyal-Sharrock and Brenner are also right since *grammatical* and *transcendental* are “interchangeable” and “the Framework and the Transcendental readings collapse into one.” (2005:3)

Finally, some conclusions are needed. For S to KH P often means to be PC in P, or: to be able to perform P, to be acquainted with S’s ability to perform P, and to be able to actually perform P. For Wittgenstein, PC is in fact a primordial type of KH as presented at the beginning. The following sections seem to back up this reading. “Not only rules, but also examples are needed for establishing a practice. Our rules leave loop-holes open, and the practice has to speak for itself.” (OC 139) “So I am trying to say something that sounds like pragmatism. Here I am being thwarted by a kind of *Weltanschauung*.” (OC 422)

Perhaps these conclusions can serve for further research on the possibilities of an epistemology of KH as PC in terms of placing it in the context of the philosophy of action, philosophical anthropology and philosophy of culture. In this sense the proposal by D. Wiggins that in these matters we should supplement the word “practical” by the word “agential” seems to be rather convenient. (Wiggins 2012:114)

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Creative Aspects of the Form of Life. Some Remarks on Philosophical Investigations § 244

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Abstract

Wittgenstein's late philosophy addresses the subject of connection between the psychic life of the individual and social context, represented by language games which are played within a form of life. Sensations and passions are part of the psychic life of the individual; far from being hidden psychological objects of a private Cartesian, they are inseparable from their social redefinition. In fact, they become visible in the context of the game. Wittgenstein argues that there is a transformation of subjective psychic life by learning language games. The psychic life of the individual is then re-organized by learning a socially defined praxis. In my view this transformation is a creative process which is socially developed within the form of life.

1. The “pain” of the Philosophical Investigations

In paragraph 244 of *Philosophical Investigations*, after having addressed the subject of rule following, Wittgenstein begins a long passage which involves the problem of the relationship between a sensation, which is part of the psychology of the individual, and its redefinition, its “extension” (Z: § 545) or its “refinement” (CE 1993: 414), in the public and social space.

At one point Wittgenstein asks himself:

How do words *refer* to sensations? — There doesn't seem to be any problem here; don't we talk about sensations every day, and name them? But how is the connection between the name and the thing named set up (*hergestellt*)? This question is the same as: How does a human being learn the meaning of names of sensations? For example, of the word “pain”. Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, natural, expressions of sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour.

“So you are saying that the word ‘pain’ really means crying?” — On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying, it does not describe it. (PI: 244)

The English translation quoted translates the verb “herstellen” as “set up”. In my view, the verb “set up” gives a conventional semantic nuance to the connection between sensation and name, which are preferably avoided for reasons to be explained. “Eine Verbindung herstellen” can also be translated as “create a connection”, since “herstellen” has among its meanings “produce, create, make”. The following pages try to develop the idea that naming a sensation is a creative act which defines a grammar of behaviour. That behaviour pattern takes place during the production of language games, which is a social fact within a form of life. The sphere of sensations — “whatever it is” (PI: § 293) — is qualitatively transformed in the public and social space (De Carolis 2004: 134-166). Through education and learning, sensation is channelled into the *form of life* which creates a praxis to express it. This praxis is repeated in language games, whose purpose is to organize existence. Thus, the connection between the level of personal sensations and the social level is a creative process which transforms and redefines the contours of the psychology of the subject during his subjectification. Subjectification is the

process which constitutes subjectivities through the relationships which we have together with others in language games.

This connection is far from being an act which constitutes conventions, as perhaps, the English translation suggests, and it seems more like a creative act. The difference is not trivial, since words like “set up” and the like suggest the idea that there is a kind of decision making act that combines *two elements with a defined structure*: on the one hand, therefore, there would be the sensations with a predetermined shape and, on the other, the names that are associated with them. For instance, reading a few paragraphs of the *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, I'm convinced that Wittgenstein imagines the sphere of sensations as *undefined* and then organized and named within language games. Thus, the original and spontaneous sensation is replaced with a *socially defined praxis*, and, in any event, recognized as meaningful (RPP: I, §§ 305, 313). Let us read what Wittgenstein writes in paragraph 165:

“But weren't there all these appearances—of pain, of wishing, of intention, of memory etc., before there was any language?” What is the *appearance* of pain?—“What is a table?” — “Well, *that*, for example!” And that is of course an explanation, but what it teaches is the technique of the use of the word “table”. And now the question is: What explanation corresponds to it in the case of an ‘appearance’ of mental life? Well, there is no such thing as an explanation which one can recognize straight away as the homologous explanation (RPP: I, § 165).

What is pain? How can we identify the meaning of the word “pain”? It would not be as simple as identifying the meaning of the word “table”, since in this case, through a gesture, we can point to a table and say “this is a table”. Even if we pointed at a table to identify the meaning of the word “table”, Wittgenstein says, we would not settle its meaning once and for all, but we would define the way in which we use an expression that refers to an object in a particular language game. By pointing at a table to settle the meaning of the word “table”, we are only defining the contours of the grammar of use of an expression within a language game (see Gargani 2008: 152). However, let us assume that the meaning of the word “pain” is an object; in this case where would we find this object? And, what kind of object would it be? Maybe a mental picture? Perhaps, an experience of the psyche? Perhaps, a neuronal configuration of the brain? Well, reading *Philosophical Investigations* and *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, we

realize that when Wittgenstein talks about the meaning of words and the expressions which refer to phenomena of psychic life — such as meaning, understanding and thinking, he seeks to clarify that the meaning of those words is settled in the circumstances, contexts and practices of life within which we usually use those expressions. In other words, Wittgenstein seems to suggest that even though we busy ourselves looking for a valid psychological object that could be the meaning of the words which refer to a mental phenomenon, in the end, we realize that there is *nothing* that we can isolate, identify, and, so to speak, hold in our psychological world which provides a good candidate to offer “meaning” to these expressions (see Cimatti 2007).

For these reasons, I am lead to believe that the psychological world, conceived by Wittgenstein, is undefined. That world has no *form* before the intervention of language which *creates* an organization. In late Wittgenstein, as is well known, language is represented by language games and by the practices which interweave them: the *form of life* is the human social sphere which organizes and gives a form to the undefined psychological world. Thus, the meaning of psychological expressions is set in the context of language game practices. These practices are: saying these expressions in certain situations, making certain movements, assuming certain stances, carrying out tasks required by the language game, etc. etc. Thus, the undefined subjective psychological sphere is qualitatively transformed when it learns language games. Human social relations act to create semantic behaviour — which is organized in language games — which replaces the original and undefined sensation. This discussion leads Wittgenstein to the idea that a psychology which concerns the individual taken in isolation, out of context, turns out to be an abstraction which has nothing to do with the reality of interactions which occur within language games. The subject is immediately inserted into language games; his psychology immediately engages in a relationship with games. His psychology has been transformed within language games through a process of subjectification. The subject is always a “Mitmensch” (see Savigny 1996), or a “Mitspieler” (see Gebauer 2005), a peculiarity which cannot be separated from its public and social dimension.

2. The praxis of joy

Now, I want to summarize and redefine what I have said, to better clarify the concepts expressed so far. Wittgenstein refutes the idea that sensation can be an object that resides in a private space in the individual's psyche (*PI*: §§ 261, 275, 293). He denies the idea that within the individual there is a specific object, stored somewhere, which is shown every time we talk about pain, anger, intention or the colour red. Thus, Wittgenstein avoids reducing the level of the semantics of sensations and passions to psychological objects or events, as if, for example, the meaning of joy was a psychological object that is defined in private Cartesian space (see Kenny 2006: 13, 141-159; Budd 1961: 66). However, in my opinion, Wittgenstein goes further. He says that whatever happens in the psyche of the individual, this is then redefined and transformed in the social space (*PI*: § 293). The meaning of “joy”, for example, is then a mosaic of semantic praxis: saying something in certain contexts, facial expressions, gestures and body posture, actions towards others who share their joy. That praxis is performed in the sphere of language games and involves people who live an established form of life.

“I feel great joy”—Where?—that sounds like nonsense. And yet one does say “I feel a joyful agitation

in my breast”.—But why is joy not localized? Is it because it is distributed over the whole body? Even where the feeling that arouses joy is localized, joy is not: if for example we rejoice in the smell of a flower.—Joy is manifested in facial expression, in behaviour. (But we do not say that we are joyful in our faces) (*Z*: § 486)

“But I do have a real feeling of joy!” Yes, when you are glad you really are glad. And of course joy is not joyful behaviour, nor yet a feeling round the corners of the mouth and the eyes.

“But ‘joy’ surely designates an inward thing.” No. “Joy” designates nothing at all. Neither any inward nor any outward thing (*Z*: 487).

The behaviour of joy, the praxis of joy, have been learned and experienced through actions which involve players of the language game. How do I teach someone the meaning of the word “pain”? Wittgenstein asks. Certainly not by pushing him to view his inner and private psyche; but “Perhaps by means of gestures, or by pricking him with a pin and saying, “See, that's pain!”” (*PI*: § 288). And the person who is learning the meaning of the word “pain” will show his understanding not by showing his sample of pain that resides in his private psyche, but “he will show it by his use of the word, in this as in other cases” (*PI*: § 288).

This process of redefinition and transformation is, from my point of view, a creative process that a form of life goes through when it has to organize existence. The original instinctual world of the individual is imagined by Wittgenstein as something corporeal, which assails the *actions* of the body: “In the beginning was the deed.” (...) “The basic form of the game must be one in which we act” (*CE*: 21.10). And this original instinctual world is, as I believe, something disordered, undefined, which receives shape in the form of life. Through the creation of a praxis that is considered meaningful, the form of life gives order to that original semantic world of spontaneous bodily reactions (on the relationship between body and meaning in late Wittgenstein's philosophy see Fabbrichesi Leo 2000; Fortuna 2002, Virno 2003: 91-110. On the relation between embodiment and Wittgenstein's Philosophy see Hutto 2013 and Moyal-Sharrock 2013):

The origin and primitive form of the language game is a reaction; only from this can more complicated forms develop.

Language —I want to say— is a refinement (*CE*: 21.10).

Let us consider, for example, how pain is socialized after a death in certain farming and fishing communities in Italy in the last century. There is in fact an elaborate and meticulous organization of behaviour, considered socially meaningful and necessary, which must be adopted in the presence of pain in bereavement. It is an organization which deeply affects the life of the whole community and modifies habits, places and routine to ensure that the pain can be properly expressed. This organization penetrates every aspect of the community's life. Every member of the community must behave according to the rules which mourning requires.

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To mean is to act linguistically

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Abstract

Linguistic expressions are relevant only in the process of their realization. So their value consists in particular realization of our ability to utter something. And this value is the only instance of their significance. Mostly meanings are just titles. Meaning as a philosophical category is redundant. Linguistic expression is significant in every realization of it by a speaker. We mean in the process of particular speech realization of a linguistic expression. Speech is performative. Philosophy of language is philosophy of action. Our words mean, but do not have meaning. Meaning is a linguistic, speech acting.

Philosophy of language plays crucial role among other philosophical disciplines of contemporary analytic philosophy. For example, it takes into consideration main problems of the theory of knowledge; or, rather, classical epistemological issues have been analyzed under investigations of philosophy of language. Development and growth of the philosophy of language is connected and corresponds with the phenomena of 'linguistic turn' relevant in a wide understanding to the most of philosophical traditions and streams of 20th century. One of the main topics for philosophy of language is 'the problem of meaning': how do we mean by our words. The scope of the interpretations of meaning is very broad: from the substantial understanding of a 'third world', world of meanings or senses, to pragmatic understanding of meaning as use. Supporting a minimalist line of doing philosophy, it seems relevant to skeptically question the need of the notion of meaning. If it appears so complicated to get a satisfactory theory of it (or escape from some unsatisfactory aspects of the present approaches to meaning) maybe it is possible to avoid this notion in philosophical elaborations as redundant without trying to reduce or naturalize it to some other entity. The task is not to criticize existing interpretations of meaning, but to show redundancy of this notion and the possibility to get fruitful philosophical investigations of language without involving of it. To do that it is needful to trace some general background of the understanding of philosophy of language acceptable to show redundancy of appealing to the noun 'meaning' in the role of important philosophical category. At the same time showing meaning as redundant does not reduce the significance and value of philosophy of language. Redundancy of meaning does not presuppose a substitution of the issue of its problem – how do we mean by our words – by some other problem, for instance by some of problems of philosophy of mind. The last could be what implicature or presupposition stays behind linguistic expressions. Philosophy of language is seen crucial because language is not just a tool of evidence of what we mean when speak. What we mean coincides with how we mean when speak. There is no thought, idea etc. apart from being expressed linguistically.

Contemporary philosophical analysis of language can go as an analysis of speech, language in use. From the other side, human activity, agency cannot be understood without paying attention to the language engaged in it. Using of language essentially influences the perspective of speaker. We are not dealing with the 'given', we are engaged in the constituting of the item which is the subject of our interest. Such constitutive human activity cannot be understood without paying attention to the language engaged in it. At least if understanding is connected with explanation, and we take them as complimentary mechanisms, explanation presuppose linguistic explicating, thus

even inner understandability of human activity, agency depends on its reflective linguistic expressing. Philosophy of language could be seen as philosophy of action, if not vice versa.

As it was stated the significant part of contemporary philosophical analysis of language goes as an analysis of speech, language in use. The analysis of locutionary (in J. Austin terms) language is not effective, it is fruitful to analyze illocutionary speech (even descriptions have illocutionary power and it corresponds to the principle of economy in language: we speak about something, describe it, when it is needful, when what we are speaking about provokes us, is extraordinary). Locutionary language is abstract. There is no place for the adequate philosophical analyses of it. Speech is performative, it is a realized agency. We mean when speak because we are doing, producing the uttering. Speech act is meaningful not because of the meaning of the words engage in speech agency, but due to significance of uttering this words to mean something that we need, that provokes us to point about it. It is because we point to it within our words. And what we are speaking about is actualized in this speech action. What we are speaking about gets its status, accomplishingness by being expressed, explicated in particular expression, linguistic unit. A speaker is an agent, he acts when speaks, when he expresses linguistically he means something, points to it in particular context. Whatever is a subject he is speaking about is meant in a unique risky way even when there is a special specific context, maybe some professional institutional field. Reflecting about himself as a speaker he could get his identity realizing his personal ability to express linguistically and mean by it.

Performative character of speech as agency provides for its justification. Linguistic unit is justified because it is realized by being accomplished by a speaker as an utterance made in special contextual situation. By being realized expression is self-justified, what is meant by it is shown by saying it. Relation between the processes of meaning and saying is internal. We say something to mean it. Further external justification would be redundant and would have less power.

On the mentioned background about speech as an action, the problem of meaning could be shown as redundant. We mean by words using them realized via linguistic unit, but 'meaning' is a redundant category. The meaning of each word is not the cause of its use. Neglecting of work with it, to view it as an entity, could be more fruitful than trying to grasp or formalize its nature. A speaker means the needed (intended according to his interest) by uttering linguistic units. He accomplishes by the *process* of meaning while speaking according to his goals, purposes or un-

realized explicitly intentions. To mean does not presuppose referring to the meanings of the words, words are meaningless until used in a context of communication. Vocabularies provide us with the samples, scope of previous instances of using words, which we acquire in life-experience. Words organized into linguistic unit are meaningful when something is meant by this linguistic unit, not because it has its meaning. Avoiding "meaning" in philosophical analysis could be seen as a minimalist "line" of investigation.

When we analyze a content of linguistic expression, we consider how it was meaningfully used, how it meant, not the meaning it refers to. At the same time there could be some special context when we operate with the process of linguistic meaning conceptually: what in principle could be meant by uttering some linguistic expression. In such a case we might need the noun 'meaning' as a conceptual term. But meanings as concepts do not have external substantial reality, or coincide with objects around us. Semantics as a field of meaning receives its ontological conceptual status. "Conceptualism" is understood as a common view which emphasizes concepts when analyzing something, such concepts have no connection with external things because they are exclusively produced by us, so they exist only within the mind and have no external or substantial reality, we do not know whether they have a real value; we do not know whether or not our concepts as the mental objects have any foundation outside our minds or whether in nature the individual objects possess distributively and each by itself the realities which we conceive as realized in each of them. But concepts are significant in every usage of them. The usage of them is appropriate in every particular example of the utterance, in which they play a constitutive and regulative role of implicit practical norm for this utterance. Utterance is understood in a broad sense of expression. We can produce the utterance in a given context. Apart from the situation where it is used it has no such a status of significance. Linguistic expressions are relevant only in the process of their accomplishment. So their value consists in *particular realization* of our ability to utter something. And this value is the only

instance of their significance. Mostly meanings are just titles. Meanings are redundant. Linguistic expression is significant in every realization of it by a speaker. We mean in the process of particular speech realization of a linguistic expression. Our words mean, but do not have meaning. Meaning is a linguistic, speech acting.

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When Picture and Application Clash: The Paradox of Observation

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Abstract

In his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein distinguished among three linguistic possibilities: that which can be verbalized; that which can be shown; and that which must remain silent. By contrast, in the *Philosophical Investigations* he examined clashing states of consciousness which cannot be decisively categorized as enabling verbalization. Such mental contents cause tension which challenges attempts to understand and formulate it in everyday language being part of the "struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language" (Wittgenstein 2009, &109). Wittgenstein indicates a clash between picture and use; image and sense-impression; unity of body/soul and linguistic practices based on their separation. The discussion will trace the formulations of these tensions and Wittgenstein's suggestions for resolving them so as to enable mental content that is compatible with the external criteria of everyday language.

If someone observes his own grief, which senses does he use to observe it? With a special sense - one that *feels* grief? Then does he feel it *differently* when he is observing it? And what is the grief that he is observing - one which is there only while being observed? 'Observing' does not produce what is observed... The object of observation is something else. (Wittgenstein 2009: PPF &67)

In Wittgenstein's later investigations, he devoted special attention to the different ways which can be used for describing inner processes, such as emotions and dispositions; while emphasizing that, in fact, it is not possible to differentiate between state-of-consciousness and the observed 'object'. The present discussion will focus on two key issues raised in the context of the tension between the individual aspect of these processes (which happen and are experienced as first-person certainty) and the possibility of verbalizing them in everyday-public language. The first question is: how can one be a voluntary observer of an involuntary process? For the source of these processes is subjective will, lying beyond the limits of language (Wittgenstein 1961: & 6.374, Moyal-Sharrock 2004: 163).

A second question is: what happens when, during a mental process of this kind, there is a clash of two states of consciousness, such as image and sense-impression, or picture and application.

For Wittgenstein, investigating problems of understanding states which resist verbalization, since they challenge the limits of language, occupied the focus of philosophical enquiry (Wittgenstein 2009: &119). Further to this, I would like to demonstrate how Wittgenstein's suggestions for curing the "bumps that the understanding has got by running up against the limits of language" (Ibid) can be seen as *clarification* yet also as *expansion* of the limits of language. This will be done by severing the connection between language and world, then, for such cases, establishing it as inner experience (Wittgenstein 2009: &308). This will be done in three stages: first, I will present three examples of a clash between states of consciousness. Second, I will demonstrate Wittgenstein's *clarification*. Third, I will propose what can be termed *expansion* of the limits of language, in light of Wittgenstein's later writings.

In his *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein formulates the paradox of the existence of inner processes, and ostensibly resolves it:

The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or whatever. (Wittgenstein 2009, &304)

However, Wittgenstein's methodical suggestion for containing the idea that language operates in several ways fails in fact to prevent a clash between picture and application, picture and usage, or image and sense. In the first case, Wittgenstein points to the clash deriving from the expectation of a certain kind of language use coming up against an unexpected use: "Can there be a clash between picture and application? Well, they can clash in so far as the picture makes us expect a different use; because people in general apply *this* picture like *this*" (Wittgenstein 2009, &141). An example of this is our feeling that something is happening 'suddenly' in our consciousness, as in the following description: "If the most general form of proposition could not be given, then there would have to come a moment where we suddenly had a new experience, so to speak a logical one" (Wittgenstein 1979: 75).

A new experience does not come 'out of nowhere', although at times it seems to come when we lack a general form of proposition; this would later be called 'external criteria' for an inner process (Wittgenstein 2009, & 580). We feel that something is happening 'suddenly' although in fact we are dealing with understanding something that already exists: "Only of someone *capable* of making certain applications of the figure with facility would one say that he saw it now *this* way, now *that* way. The substratum of this experience is the mastery of a technique" (Wittgenstein 2009, PPF &222).

Another kind of clash occurs when a picture prevents the use of words, as, for instance, in memory process:

It is this inner process that one means by the word "remembering"... What we deny is that the picture of an inner process gives us the correct idea of the use of the word "remember". Indeed, we're saying that this picture, with its ramifications, stands in the way of our seeing the use of the word as it is (Wittgenstein 2009, & 305).

In order to understand what 'remembering' is, we picture an inner process. This use is correct, for it enables us to understand what takes place in our consciousness when we remember. We observe the picture, which is independent of reality outside our consciousness, so that there may

be cases where this picture fails to blend with external reality. For instance, memory of trauma may hamper or even prevent other uses of the word 'remember', since trauma is by definition an ineffable event:

Traumatic memory is a vanishing point at which extreme experience is known and communicated just as it disappears. Memory seeks to enter mutual knowledge, and yet it defies mutual knowledge because annihilation surpasses human knowing (Grand 2002, p. 961)

A traumatic picture in fact prevents access to words and memories which would enable coming to terms with it. It seems that despite language functioning in different ways, at times several functions are activated simultaneously, resulting in a clash, for instance, between picture and use. This clash is between two of language's modes of action, which cannot act simultaneously. The result is that one mode of action prevents the other – despite the speaker's apparent wish to move from one mode of action to the other, given that Wittgenstein describes this as prevention. The clash therefore arises between speaker's wish to apply the picture in actual words and the involuntariness of picture resisting use, leading to prevention of use. We must now ask whether the impossibility of simultaneous acts is based on the arbitrary rules of grammar which fully constitute meaning; or, perhaps, the impossibility obtains in actual reality – not in grammar.

I wish to demonstrate that grammar in fact enables expression which cannot take place in actual reality, since the rules of grammar enable the containment of paradoxes, while our understanding of reality as answerable to the laws of logic does not (Wittgenstein 2009, &429).

Another case of difficulty in using words is the attempt to describe what goes on in the human 'soul'. Wittgenstein asks, in certain cases, what is the difficulty of applying the picture through everyday use of words, alongside the certainty of the existence of a mental picture:

What do I believe in when I believe that man has a soul?... The application of the picture is not easy to survey. *Certainly* all these things happen in you... The picture is there. And I am not disputing its validity in particular cases. Only let me now understand its application (Wittgenstein 2009, &422-423).

Another example of a clash between picture and application arises with the use of the general term 'soul', which binds together all mental processes. Wittgenstein claims that there is a picture in consciousness which raises difficulties for understanding how it should be used, since, according to him, it is impossible to speak on two levels: one for describing the body and the other for describing the mind. What is this pictorial dimension? Why does it function in a more primary, natural way than the applied dimension, given Wittgenstein's sweeping statement: "It is in language that an expectation and its fulfillment make contact" (Wittgenstein 2009, &445)?

A third case of a clash is between image and sense-impression, which, Wittgenstein claims, cannot exist at one and the same time: "While I am looking at an object I cannot imagine it" (Wittgenstein 1967, &621). Sense-impression gives us knowledge of the external world – knowledge which can find form as picture, while an image – is subject to our will. An image is not a picture although a picture can be used to describe an image (Wittgenstein 2009, &301). An image is not a picture because it tells us nothing about the object.

There has been much discussion of Wittgenstein's investigations of the picture; an exhaustive summary of different kinds of pictures can be found in Egan (2011). However, the types of clash described above cannot be resolved by the suggestion that we are dealing with different kinds of pictures, as pictoriality is only one type of mental content. Consciousness as a system operates in several ways at the same time, just like language's different modes of action (Wittgenstein 2009, &305). Therefore, I wish to claim that when Wittgenstein argued that language works in several different ways, he is in fact reviving two radical claims: first, that a paradox can be contained in language because it can operate simultaneously in two different, even contradicting grammars. This claim resolves the difficulty by clarification of language's mode of action. The second claim is that the autonomy of language enables creating a grammar compatible with inner experience, lacking any binding commitment to reality. This claim resolves the clash between states of consciousness by expansion of grammar. Expansion means realization of the autonomy of grammar to create new rules, for example, for the description of several simultaneous inner processes. This, despite the fact that such use does not accord with reality (in which body and soul are one and the same). The first claim is embodied in Wittgenstein's discussion of observation, with the question of what one observes in observing one's intentions:

You do not observe. Then the idea is, you observe your will which is the source of your voluntary movements... This paradox hangs together with voluntary and involuntary activity, and intention, and (the fact) that intention is a predication – not a predication based on hypothesis (Wittgenstein 1988: 196)

Ostensibly, one can examine one's own intentions, but in fact our will can be introspected only with hindsight. Will is not 'chosen' from among a number of possibilities. Rather, it simply exists. The paradox is that will is the source of actions carried out by conscious choice, yet the structure of will as source of action is not voluntary.

Wittgenstein offers another example of imposition of a paradoxical picture in the context of body-soul separation. While 'body' has no meaning as separate from 'soul', (Wittgenstein 2009, &283), the picture of separation imposes itself on us in the sense that it serves us. For instance, for understanding the demands of religion, or for understanding bodily expressions of the soul:

Religion teaches that the soul can exist when the body has disintegrated... pictures of these things have been painted... Why should it not do the *same* service as the spoken doctrine? And it is the service that counts. If the picture of thoughts in the head can force itself upon us, then why not much more that of thoughts in the mind or soul? The human body is the best picture of the human soul. (Wittgenstein 2009, PPF &23-25)

Wittgenstein examines the possibility of speaking of 'soul' in the context of religious doctrine, that is, a specific language-game. This move is understandable in light of the fact that earlier in the book he speaks of "theology as grammar" (Wittgenstein 2009: &373). Yet Wittgenstein expands this possibility beyond the limits of religious language-game, specifying two external criteria for the inner process enabling one to believe in separation of body and soul. One criterion is making the claim perceptible, since such pictures "have been painted." A second external criterion is that the picture serves the believer's consciousness. Pictoriality as a conceptual 'service' is an external criterion which leads to the expansion of the rules of

grammar. Accordingly, a picture serving any ethical or voluntary decision is possible, based on the autonomy of grammar, and can reflect human decisions even if there is no connection to reality. The claim for such expansion is based on the autonomy of grammar in relation to reality, which Wittgenstein reiterates several times:

It is *all* its rules that characterize a game, a language, and... these rules are not answerable to a reality in the sense that they are controlled by it, and that we could have doubts whether a particular rule is necessary or correct... Grammar is not accountable to any reality (Wittgenstein 2005: 185). It is grammatical rules that determine meaning (constitute it) and so they themselves... to that extent are arbitrary.' (Wittgenstein, 1974: 184)

The present discussion shows that the autonomy of grammar in the description of inner processes can also be embodied in the containment of paradoxes (voluntary and involuntary); in describing a picture with no basis in reality (separation of body and soul); or in the verbalization of two states of consciousness which, in reality, could not exist simultaneously. Thus, the rules of grammar enable the description of a picture which prevents use, although in actual reality, prevention of the possibility of use means ineffability.

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Unarticulated constituents and language games

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Abstract

In recent theories of language use, a distinction is made between the meaning of an uttered sentence, the semantics, and the enriched meaning of its utterance, the pragmatics. The latter is supposed to be systematically underdetermined by the former. One strategy to bridge the gap between the semantic and the pragmatic side of the utterance is to assume unarticulated constituents which are understood by the addressee. I argue that this strategy is problematic because the choice of the correct unarticulated constituent is underdetermined itself. A proposal is made for capturing the relation between the semantic and the pragmatic side of the utterance by means of the notion of a pragmatic template. It is understood as a holistic structure of context elements which are assumed by addressees in order to enrich semantically underdetermined utterances.

If someone is asking me

(i) "Do want to eat something?" and I reply

(ii) "I've had breakfast",

we mutually assume that my utterance means that I've had breakfast *today*, and my addressee infers from this that I don't want to eat anything at the moment. The reason for this is that, if I am uttering a sentence like (ii) in a verbal interchange, nobody assumes that solely the uttered signal is relevant for the interpretation of the utterance. Instead, the participants of the verbal interchange will go beyond the words they hear (or read) and enrich the perceived utterance so that they are able to grasp what was obviously meant. In recent theories of language use, this very common fact has been reflected by developing a number of categories which all serve the purpose of distinguishing the meaning of the uttered sentence, its 'semantics' – which in case of (i) only says that S has had breakfast once in his life – from the enriched meaning of the utterance itself, its 'pragmatics' – which adds a temporal restriction of the breakfast. In my contribution, I want to reflect on this distinction and I shall make a proposal concerning the nature of these enrichments leading to the pragmatic interpretation.

What is articulated – what is expressed

Terminologically, I distinguish between *what is articulated* (pure sentence meaning, 'semantics') and *what is expressed* by a speaker with his or her utterance (complete utterance meaning relying on relevant context-information, 'pragmatics'). In everyday conversation as a rule only part of what is expressed is also articulated (s. example (ii)). Many if not most recent theories assume that these parts which are expressed but not articulated are nevertheless part of the utterance as an *unarticulated* constituent (e.g. a single word like *today*). I want to demonstrate that this strategy gives rise to severe problems of description and finally cannot be maintained. One of the problems is that usually a lot of unarticulated constituents are good candidates for having been meant by the speaker, and we are not able to decide which of them exactly was expressed. From this and other problems follows that we should not assume unarticulated constituents hidden in the uttered sentence, but only articulated ones overtly coded in the sentence.

I shall argue for an alternative account which sees unarticulated information outside the uttered sentence, as part of the background of the respective utterance. I suggest a

conception which sees the relevant information responsible for the reading of *today* as part of the language game in which utterances like (ii) are performed. In our example the background is a culturally shared practice concerning regular meals which is known by the participants of the verbal interchange. Thus the strategy of assuming unarticulated constituents has to be replaced by the strategy of assuming rich language games in which the respective utterances are embedded. In my proposal, these language games are called *pragmatic templates*.

As to the (short) tradition of semantic / pragmatic reasoning, the level of what is expressed but not articulated has been categorized differently: It has been dubbed unarticulated constituent (Perry, Récanati), explicature (Sperber/Wilson, Carston), implicature (Bach), the Austinian proposition (Barwise, Récanati). I begin with a discussion of the concept of unarticulated constituents as formulated by Perry and Récanati, and then pass on to the concept of an Austinian proposition (Barwise, Récanati). After this, I try to clarify the concept of pragmatic templates and give further explanations of the related term of the *central use* which is a core notion of pragmatic templates. Finally, I present arguments which demonstrate that by means of pragmatic templates one may explain at least some central cases of language use better than by means of unarticulated constituents.

Unarticulated constituents

One example of an utterance containing allegedly unarticulated constituents was already given. Further examples are:

(iii) It is raining.

(iv) They are serving drinks at the local bar.

In order to understand (iii) or (iv), we must know where the speaker is and which place is meant. So these sentences could be paraphrased as follows:

(iii') It is raining *here*.

(iv') They are serving drinks at the bar *near here*. (see Perry 1998)

The expressions *here* and *near here* are unarticulated constituents of (iii) and (iv). However, these paraphrases are not always valid because it is possible that (iii) or (iv) refer to places different from where the speaker is – then it has to be *there* or *near you*. An appropriate localisation depends on the intention of the speaker. In any case, a

constituent must be added to what is said to assign a truth value to the proposition. This constituent must be supplied by the context because the sentence does not contain a morpheme carrying the necessary information. Perry writes: "... we don't articulate the objects we are talking about, when it is obvious what they are from the context" (Perry 1998: 11).

F. Récanati who develops Perry's notion of an unarticulated constituent further, makes a distinction between two sorts of consequences, when one or more constituents are not articulated. Either the utterance is vague, so that information has to be added to determine the fact the speaker is talking about, or the utterance is incomplete, so that information has to be added to identify the fact at all (see Récanati 2002: 307 f.) The first type (the A-type) occurs in those cases Récanati gives as example of unarticulated constituents. It contains the types of usage which are given as examples in pragmatic literature since Sperber and Wilson. Beneath our breakfast example, we have:

- (v) Mary took out her key and opened the door, in which case it is expressed that Mary managed to open the door *with this very key*.

The second type of unarticulated constituents (the B-type) contains cases in which facts cannot be identified without the unarticulated constituent, which means that no proposition has been expressed. This is given in the case of the rain-example: No truth value can be assigned to the proposition without occupying the argument role of the place. It is decisive for Récanati's further argumentation to ignore unarticulated constituents of the B-type – they are irrelevant for the question how much pragmatic information a proposition must contain to be assigned with a truth value.

If unarticulated constituents are only those which are not triggered by an expression within the sentence, pragmatic saturations (mandatory expansions in his terms) cannot be (or at least only in the weak sense) cases of unarticulated constituents. Thus, the only possible candidates for unarticulated constituents are free enrichments (optional expansions in his terms).

Récanati uses a very restricted concept of unarticulated constituents. If an argument within the propositional structure is not filled (e.g. *She finishes* $__$), this signals that the constituent is not really unarticulated. Only if the proposition does not contain an empty argument place (e.g. *She eats* in the intransitive sense), we can call it unarticulated, and we may speak of pragmatic enrichment if we want to add *what* she eats. Récanati sums up his position in a subheading: "True Unarticulated Constituents are Never Mandatory" (2002: 313). The decisive question is however: Why should addressees enrich an expression by means of adding an unarticulated constituent – which means that they have higher processing costs – if the speaker has chosen an expression which *doesn't* contain this argument (intransitive sense of *to eat*). He or she seems to have reasons to choose an intransitive version and not the transitive one: It may be relevant that a person eats, but completely irrelevant, what she eats. So enriching the utterance in this case is pointless. The principle that unarticulated constituents are never mandatory seems to conflict with the idea of the rational choice of verbal means for communicative purposes.

Austinian propositions

In his book 'Perspectival Thought' (2007), Récanati uses a different terminology for determining the role of unarticu-

lated constituents. He distinguishes between the explicit content of an utterance which he dubs with a stoicist term the *lekton*, and the complete content of that utterance, which is called the *Austinian proposition* (after J. Barwise 1989). The complete content of the Austinian proposition encompasses the circumstance of evaluation in which the utterance has been performed – or, in terms of Perry, the situation the utterance concerns (s. Perry 1986). Following Récanati, utterances like (iii) are context-sensitive because the (explicit) content, which is called the *lekton*, is evaluated with respect to varying circumstances. The result of this strategy is that we have three levels of meaning of an utterance: the meaning of the sentence type, the context-dependent *lekton* and the Austinian proposition. Concerning the third level, it contributes to the truth conditions of the uttered sentence, i.e. it is true or false concerning the respective circumstance of evaluation. Consequently the locus for unarticulated constituents is not the *lekton*, but the Austinian proposition, the circumstance of the utterance which co-determines its truth-value: "... there are no unarticulated constituents in the *lekton* – all unarticulated constituents belong to the situation of evaluation." (Récanati 2010, 23).

If one conceives of the items of the environment of an utterance as constituent parts of an (Austinian) proposition, as Récanati does, they are something what-is-said by an utterance, analogous to free pragmatic enrichments, at least as I understand these notions (s. Récanati 2010 cites the critique of Kölbel 2008 in this respect). So in my view there does not exist a fundamental difference between the 2002 account of unarticulated constituents (in which they are part of what is said, i.e. free pragmatic enrichments) and his 2007 / 2010 account (in which they are part of the Austinian proposition, external to the *lekton*). To put it in another way: the borderline between the *lekton* and the Austinian proposition is underdetermined, it reduces eventually to the older distinction between the meaning of the sentence on the one hand and free pragmatic enrichments on the other. Also in the new account, unarticulated constituents are not really excluded from the realm of what-is-said. The information belonging to unarticulated constituents is not part of what-is-said, it isn't anything which might be part of a single proposition wherever it might be located in the architecture of an utterance. Rather it is "outside" from the utterance, "outside" from what-is-said or an Austinian proposition. It isn't anything speakers mean and addressees grasp, but it is part of a type of knowledge addressees make use of if they are going to interpret what might have been meant with the utterance. And this is exactly what speakers presume if they choose their words.

Pragmatic templates

In the following section, I will give some reasons in favour of the conception that the information which speakers do (sometimes) not articulate in their utterances, although they want the addressee to get that information, should not be represented as part of the utterance. It is nothing the speaker says. It is rather something the addressee hypothetically assumes or already knows, which thus does not need to be articulated because it can be derived from the context. The speaker is calculating with this knowledge, it is part of the "nonlinguistic infrastructure" (see Tomasello 2008) to which speaker and addressee are referring. Now we have to explain what that something is that can be derived from the context.

The rational usage of linguistic means in utterances is subject to certain conditions, which restrict their usage. These conditions may not be represented as an unsorted

collection of constraining propositions, but they form structured clusters of conditions of usage. They contain the obligatory context elements in which a certain expression can be used appropriately. These clusters are a part of what I call *pragmatic templates*. If we want to identify such a template, we have to assign the utterance to a specific type (form type). We also have to be able to give criteria of what is part of a template and what is not. I propose to consider the content of pragmatic enrichments or unarticulated constituents as a part of such a pragmatic template – it is part of the knowledge of language users which is activated when they hear or read an utterance in which not everything is articulated that could be relevant in that situation.

The notion of a pragmatic template has some ancestors, e. g. the notion of a “language game” (Wittgenstein PI: § 23), or that of a “script” as a device for handling “stylized everyday situations” (Schank and Abelson 1975: 151). The common trait of the notion of a pragmatic template with its ancestors is the fact that a set of properties or entities forms a structured whole with characteristic features which is acquired and used as a linguistic or semiotic unit together with pragmatic factors of its use. If an expression is used in accordance to the stereotypical pragmatic template, I speak of its central use (borrowing from Grice’s notion of a central speech act, s. Grice 1989). The notion of a central use, roughly speaking a use the type of utterance is made for, has some analogies to the term “proper function”, which Millikan used on a different theoretical background (see Millikan 2004).

I am of the opinion that utterances of sentences such as (ii) and related ones can be interpreted correctly because of their assignment to a relevant template. When we interpret an utterance in using a pragmatic template, we trace it back to an acquired holistic structure of characteristics of the environment it is used in. We do not have to add an unarticulated constituent in every situation, but we can use our standardised conversational knowledge. That knowledge provides us with prototypical applications (the central use) of specific types of utterances. Of course there are always parts of the meaning related to the situation that have to be represented ad hoc. But I claim that a major part of the interpretation can be accomplished by identifying a type of utterance as part of a specific pragmatic template.

The central concern of my contribution is that items like *today*, *here* etc. are not unarticulated constituents which

have to be adjoined to the articulated part of the utterance. Rather this additional information is gained through the situational context or our world knowledge, and my aim was to show that a systematic account of this connection of utterance type and situation type is possible along the lines of pragmatic templates.

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Wittgenstein und die "Lectures and Conversations" bezüglich Freud

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Abstract

Wittgenstein und Freud zählen zu den bedeutendsten Denkern Wiens ihrer Epoche. Im Folgenden sollen ihre Beziehung und auch Wittgensteins teilweise wechselnde Positionen gegenüber der Lehre Freuds beleuchtet werden.

Das Thema, die Beziehung – im allgemein gesprochen – von Wittgenstein und Freud, entpuppt sich gleich als ein großes Unterfangen, wobei dies in erster Linie an den zahlreichen Nuancen liegt, die es bereit hält. Abgesehen von der Psychoanalyse im Sinne eines psychologisch-therapeutischen Zugangs gibt es noch viele andere Aspekte und Anwendungen – man denke hier nur etwa an die Literaturwissenschaft, die Kunst oder Gesellschaftswissenschaften –, wo sie eine wichtige Rolle spielt und von denen sie sowohl beeinflusst wird als sie auch beeinflusst. Grundsätzlich muss man hier bereits im Vorhinein die eigentlich selbstverständliche Einschränkung machen, dass hier nur ein kleiner Ausschnitt beleuchtet werden kann, wobei weniger ein Spezialthema aufgegriffen werden soll, sondern vielmehr ein allgemeiner Einstieg versucht wird.

Der Beitrag ist in mehrere Teile aufgeteilt. Eingangs soll versucht werden, beide Personen geschichtlich zu verorten, dann wird die Rezeption Freuds in den Schriften Wittgensteins betrachtet, und abschließend werden die *Conversations on Freud* exemplarisch für dieses Thema herangezogen. Freud selber, bzw. der Versuch, seine Lehre darzustellen, sind nicht Thema dieser Arbeit.

Es scheint am Anfang oft sinnvoll zu sein, die Frage zu betrachten, wie sich die Gegenstände, oder wie hier die betroffenen Personen, rein äußerlich zueinander verhalten. Freud und Wittgenstein weisen zahlreiche biographische Gemeinsamkeiten auf. Ihrer beider Lebenszeit hat eine relativ große Überschneidung, und beide lebten auch länger in der gleichen Stadt. Zwar war Wien auch zu dieser Zeit – um die Jahrhundertwende, Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts – eine Großstadt; in dieser erfreute sich Freud bereits, zumindest in der gehobenen Gesellschaft, einer größeren Bekanntheit. Inwieweit Freud Wittgenstein gekannt hat, wäre eine eigene Frage, der hier nicht nachgegangen werden soll.

Wittgenstein habe, so schreibt Rhees, Freud das erste Mal 1919 gelesen. Dies änderte auch seine Meinung über Psychologie, die Wittgenstein zuvor für eine „Zeitverschwendung“ hielt (Vgl. LC 61). Brian McGuinness weist auch in seinem Aufsatz *Freud and Wittgenstein* darauf hin, dass Wittgenstein zwar Freud gelesen hat, aber „he will have known a good deal more simply by osmosis.“ (McGuinness 27)

Gesichert ist die persönliche Bekanntschaft zwischen Freud und der Familie Wittgenstein. Eine besondere Rolle kommt hier Margaret, Ludwigs Schwester, zu. So verweist etwa Ursula Prokop in ihrer Stonborough-Wittgenstein-Biographie *Margaret Stonborough-Wittgenstein: Bauherrin, Intellektuelle, Mäzenin* auf ein Interesse der Wittgensteins an Hypnose und Träumen, die sich auf die Beschäftigung mit Freud zurückführen lasse. (Vgl. Prokop

71f.) Auch Margarets Sohn Thomas war, da er stotterte, bei Freud in Therapie – sie schien aber nicht sonderlich erfolgreich gewesen zu sein. Margaret hatte, wenn wir Prokop folgen, generell eine ambivalente Beziehung zu Freud, was sich u.a. an ihrer Haltung bezüglich der erfolglosen Therapie bei Thomas zeigt. (Vgl. Prokop 202) Interessant ist auch die Ablehnung der „Interpretation des Unterbewußten und des Traumes“, was Prokop auf Margarets asexuelle Züge zurückführt und mit einem Tagebucheintrag vom 20. 09. 1918 untermauert: „A propos Träume. Schade dass der Freud so ein Tepp + so verrannt ist. Da gäbe es ganz andere Sachen herauszuholen als den sexuellen Stiefel. Es ist ja zu begreifen, dass man sich verrennt, wenn man es immer mit hysterischen Menschen zu tun hat.“ (Vgl. Prokop 100)

Die bekannteste Begebenheit, die in diesem Kontext erwähnt wird, dürfte die rund um die Emigration Sigmund Freuds nach England zugetragen haben. Margaret setzte sich stark für den von den Nazis verfolgten Freud ein und vermittelte ihn an die „richtigen“ Personen, damit er aus Wien emigrieren konnte, was bei Freud zu einer Dankbarkeit bis zu seinem Lebensende führte. Diese ging so weit, dass er am „Tag seiner Abreise aus Wien [...] Margaret [...] eine Widmung ‚zum vorläufigen Abschied‘“ schrieb. (Vgl. Prokop 221 ff.)

Es soll nun versucht werden, einen zumindest stellenmäßigen Überblick über die Freud-Rezeption bei Wittgenstein zu geben. Die Problematik erkennt man leicht, wenn man sich allein die ersten Sätze zu einschlägigen Texten anschaut. McGuinness, meint „Wittgenstein's remarks about Freud amount to no systematic or reasoned criticism of psychoanalysis.“ (McGuinness 27) Frank Cioffi schreibt, „Wittgenstein's remarks on Freud do not form part of one continuous exposition. Most of them were not intended for publication.“ (Cioffi 184) Er fügt hier noch hinzu, dass er manche für inkonsistent hält. Und Jacques Bouverese meint, „[i]t would be futile to search the work of Wittgenstein for a thorough discussion or systematic critique of psychoanalysis.“ (Bouverese 3)

Im Briefwechsel taucht Freud in der Korrespondenz mit Ramsey, Drury, Malcom und seiner Schwester Helene auf. Wenn man den Nachlass durchsucht, findet man zu Freud einige Hinweise und Bemerkungen. Häufig kommt Freud auch in den sogenannten *Vermischten Bemerkungen* vor (wobei dies durch das Vorkommen im Nachlass grundsätzlich bereits gedeckt ist). Vor allem wertend äußert sich Wittgenstein in den Gesprächen mit Drury und in den *Denkbewegungen* über Freud. Am systematischsten wird Freud dann in den *Lectures and Conversations* besprochen. Auf die Auflistung der einzelnen Stellen wird hier verzichtet. Wittgenstein äußert sich verschieden zu Freud:

Den teilweise sehr positiven Kommentaren stehen definitiv vernichtende gegenüber, wobei es hier nicht nur um Freud geht, sondern um die Psychoanalyse als Methode oder Wissenschaft.

Am bekanntesten ist vermutlich das positive Verdikt, das man bei Rush Rhees in den *Lectures and Conversations* findet. Dort heißt es, dass für Wittgenstein „Freud einer der wenigen Autoren [blieb], die er für lesenswert hielt. Er sprach zum Zeitpunkt dieser Diskussionen von sich als einem ‚Schüler Freuds‘ und ‚Anhänger Freuds‘.“ (LC 61)

Ambivalent urteilt Wittgenstein, wenn er in seinem Tagebuch schreibt, „Freud irrt sich gewiss sehr oft & was seinen Charakter betrifft so ist er wohl ein Schwein oder etwas ähnliches aber an dem was er sagt ist ungeheuer viel. Und dasselbe ist von mir wahr. There is a lot in what I say.“ (DB 21)

Negativ ist dann etwa die Stelle, an der Wittgenstein schreibt, „Freud hat durch seine phantastischen Pseudo-Erklärungen (gerade weil sie geistlich sind) einen schlimmen Dienst erwiesen. (Jeder Esel hat diese Bilder nun zur Hand, mit ihrer Hilfe Krankheitserscheinungen zu 'erklären'.)“ (MS 133 21, VB 63)

Auch nicht uninteressant ist die Parallele, die Wittgenstein zwischen sich und Freud zieht. Wittgenstein spricht über seine Originalität als eine „Originalität des Bodens“, in der andere Ideen auf ihre Art aufgenommen werden. Wittgenstein schreibt: „Auch die Originalität Freuds war, glaube ich, von dieser Art. Ich habe immer geglaubt — ohne daß ich weiß warum — daß der eigentliche Same der Psychoanalyse von Breuer, nicht von Freud herrührt. Das Samenkorn Breuers kann natürlich nur ganz winzig gewesen sein.“ (VB 42) Das erinnert an die berühmte Stelle, an der Wittgenstein meint, er habe „nie eine Gedankenbewegung erfunden sondern sie wurde mir immer von jemand anderem gegeben [...]. So haben mich Boltzmann, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell, Kraus, Loos, Weininger, Spengler, Sraffa beeinflusst.“ (MS 154 15v)

Soviel zu Wittgensteins Positionierung gegenüber Freud. Als letzter Teil soll nun versucht werden, Wittgensteins Auseinandersetzung mit Freud etwas genauer in den *Conversations on Freud*, die in den *Lectures and Conversations* erschienen sind, zu betrachten.

Die Gespräche über Freud fanden zwischen Wittgenstein und Rush Rhees statt und erstreckten sich von 1942 bis 1946. Rhees war es auch, der die Gespräche danach aufzeichnete. Insgesamt sind uns vier Gespräche überliefert.

Interessant ist vor allem im ersten Gespräch die Unterscheidung zwischen Psychologie und Physik. Wittgenstein hat hier offensichtlich das Gefühl, dass man etwas durcheinanderbringt und auch psychologische und physikalische Fragen gleich behandelt, „weil wir die Physik für die ideale Wissenschaft halten. Wir denken daran, Gesetze zu formulieren, so wie in der Physik.“ (LC 62)

Wittgenstein bringt es in seinem ersten Gespräch folgendermaßen auf den Punkt: „Freud behauptet fortwährend, wissenschaftlich zu sein. Aber was er liefert, ist Spekulation — etwas, das sogar der Formulierung einer Hypothese vorausgeht.“ (LC 64)

Wittgenstein spricht Freud eine Wissenschaftlichkeit ab und meint, was dieser geschaffen habe, sei in erster Linie ein sehr starker Mythos. Im abschließenden Absatz steigert er sein Urteil und meint sogar, die „Analyse richtet

wahrscheinlich Schaden an.“ Man erfährt zwar vieles über sich, aber es wird einem ein Mythos angeboten. „Man ist verleitet zu sagen ‚Ja, natürlich, so muß es sein.‘ Eine mächtige Mythologie.“ (LC 74)

Da die Fragestellung der Wissenschaftlichkeit und ihrer Abgrenzung für Wittgenstein in diesem Kontext wichtig zu sein scheint, soll hier kurz darauf eingegangen werden. Für McGuinness war Wittgensteins Haltung zur Wissenschaft kritisch: „Not that there was anything wrong with science, only with its Status in our culture.“ (McGuinness 39)

Damit hängt auch die Frage nach dem Wert bzw. der Wertlosigkeit der Wissenschaft zusammen. McGuinness meint etwa, Wittgenstein wäre der Meinung, „all the moral and social problems [...] were not even touched by science.“ (McGuinness 39) Eine Gleichsetzung von „unwissenschaftlich“ und „sinnlos“ sollte hier vermieden werden.

Was Wittgenstein am ehesten zu stören scheint, ist eine Art Missverständnis, das Freud passiert. Bis zu einem gewissen Punkt folgt er Freud und ist von ihm fasziniert, vielleicht auch aus den oben erwähnten, vermeintlichen Parallelen zwischen beiden. McGuinness schreibt, in Wittgensteins Sicht habe Freud und seine Schüler dort, wo begonnen wurde über ihre Ausführungen wissenschaftlich zu sprechen, einen Fehler begangen, der analog zum Fehler sei, über magische Vorgänge wissenschaftlich zu sprechen. (Vgl. McGuinness 39)

Vermeide man aber den Fehler einer „Verwissenschaftlichung“, den Wittgenstein im Auge hat, würde nach McGuinness Folgendes passieren: Erstens hätte man allein durch das Aufzeigen dieser Denkmöglichkeit einiges getan. Zweitens würde, in Sinne einer Reduzierung, eine geistige Verarmung eintreten („if it were adopted and followed in a consequential manner, a certain impoverishment of our mental life [...] would ensue.“). Und drittens würde ein Mensch viel über sich lernen, allerdings nur, wenn er es schafft, der Mythologie zu entkommen. (Vgl. McGuinness 38) Ob dies so zutrifft respektive ob es auch eine Entwicklung in diese Richtung gibt, kann man verschieden bewerten. McGuinness trifft hier einen wichtigen Punkt, der über Wittgenstein hinaus weiter verfolgt werden sollte.

Auch beschäftigt sich Wittgenstein mit der Frage, was von den Interpretationen, die der Analytiker liefert, zu halten ist. Vor allem, welche Analyse „wahr“ sei und welche nicht. Wittgenstein vermisst bei Freud offensichtlich einen Beweis bzw. ein Kriterium, das ihn zufriedenstellt. Er meint, „[d]as ist *Spekulation*. Es ist die Art von Erklärung, die wir geneigt sind zu akzeptieren.“ (LC 63) In der gesamten Analyse gibt es hier auch so etwas wie die Befürchtung, dass das, was man findet, erst hineingelegt wird.

Man betrachte folgendes Zitat als Erläuterung: „Aber es handelt sich um eine Idee [Angst sei eine Wiederholung der Geburtsangst], die einen auffallenden Reiz hat. Sie hat den Reiz, den mythologische Erklärungen haben, Erklärungen, die sagen, daß alles, was passiert, die Wiederholung von etwas zuvor Geschehenem ist. Und wenn die Menschen das annehmen oder sich zu eigen machen, dann erscheinen ihnen gewisse Dinge viel klarer und einfacher.“ (LC 63)

Wittgenstein glaubt auch nicht, dass Freud die einzige und allgemeingültige Erklärung gefunden hat und meint auch, dass es „viele verschiedene Arten von Träumen“ gäbe, wobei er eine Erklärung für alle ablehnt. (Vgl. LC 69)

Auch in seinen Notizbüchern kann man solche Ansichten finden, etwa wenn Wittgenstein schreibt, man sieht etwas immer nur von einer Seite, die andere ist dann mehr oder weniger unsichtbar und ein „Bild kann an sich faszinieren und sich uns zum Gebrauch aufdrängen, ganz unabhängig von Richtigkeit und Unrichtigkeit. So ein Bild entwirft die Psychoanalyse und es wäre interessant seine Macht durch Überlegungen, ähnlich denen der Psychoanalyse, zu erklären.“ (MS 163 69 r,v)

Was die Konstruktion angeht, ist vor allem noch das vierte Gespräch interessant, welches 1946 stattgefunden hat. Wittgenstein glaubt, Freud habe die Meinung, „daß der Traum nach der Analyse so sehr logisch erscheint. Selbstverständlich tut er das.“ Aber er lässt dies nicht so stehen, sondern fügt hinzu, jemand könne „mit irgendeinem der Gegenstände auf diesem Tisch, die bestimmt nicht durch deine Traumaktivität dahin gelangt sind, beginnen, und du könntest herausfinden, daß sie sich nach einem ähnlichen Muster verknüpfen lassen; und das Muster wäre in gleicher Weise logisch.“ (LC 73)

Hier ist gut ersichtlich, wie sich das Thema mit den anderen Wittgensteinschen Themen ineinander fügt.

Die wichtigsten Punkte sind die, dass Wittgenstein zwar an Freud interessiert war, aber dass er weder zu einem glühenden Anhänger wurde noch ihn bekämpft hat. Wittgenstein hat sich mit der Freudschen Theorie auseinandergesetzt und versucht, Gedanken daraus fruchtbar zu machen. Auch seine Entwicklung über die Zeit muss man immer beachten. Man sollte nicht von einer einzigen Haltung sprechen, sondern immer den jeweiligen Zeitpunkt mitbeachten.

Der Nutzen der Lektüre Wittgensteins liegt hier vermutlich gerade im Korrektiv einer einseitigen Exegese.

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wREcTtgenstein

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Abstract

REC or Radical Enactive (or Embodied) Cognition (Hutto and Myin, 2013) aims to show that lots of what Hutto and Myin call "sophisticated doings" (ibid, pxiv), such as reaching, grasping, visual perception, are possible without the positing of informational content. However, they also allow that for some types of behaviour, the positing of informational content is possible and in some cases necessary. Crucially, they link contentful behaviour to linguistic behaviour. This raises the following question: how does non-contentful behaviour give rise to, or make possible, contentful behaviour? I am going to refer to this as the "cognitive gap". Later Wittgenstein claims that there is indeterminacy in our use of psychological concepts. I shall argue that this indeterminacy ensures that there are some linguistic behaviours about which it is indeterminate if those behaviours are or are not evidence of contentful thinking. I will claim that these behaviours demonstrate that the distinction between non-contentful and contentful behaviour can break down and this suggests that it is not always clear what is meant by the cognitive gap. Hence, if REC is understood from a Wittgensteinian perspective - a wREcTtgenstein - then it can potentially discharge the apparent debt it owes to close the cognitive gap.

Section 1

REC or Radical Enactive (or Embodied) Cognition (Hutto and Myin, 2013) aims to show that lots of what Hutto and Myin call "sophisticated doings" (ibid, pxiv), such as reaching, grasping, are possible without the positing of informational content. They claim that, "a surprising amount of mental life (including some canonical forms of it, such as human visual experience) may well be inherently contentless" (ibid, pxviii). In which case, "[o]ur most basic ways of responding to worldly offerings are not semantically contentful" (ibid, p82).

However, they also allow that, "some cognitive activity – plausibly, that associated with and dependent upon the mastery of language – surely involves content" (ibid, pxviii). They do not deny the "importance of contentful and representationally based modes of thinking" (ibid, p13), and accept that "some problems (perhaps whole classes of problems) are best addressed through advanced careful planning – planning of the sort that requires the rule-governed manipulation of truth-evaluable representations" (ibid, p40). For, "[a]s natural language users, we humans are representation mongers of this sort" (ibid, p41).

Putting these ideas together, this suggests the following distinctions:

1. The distinction between non-contentful behaviour and contentful behaviour.
2. The distinction between non-linguistic behaviour and linguistic behaviour.

Whatever else can be said about the link between non-contentful and non-linguistic behaviour, it is clear that, for REC, contentful behaviour is linguistic behaviour. These distinctions give rise to what I will call the 'cognitive gap'. The cognitive gap is the following concern:

"In abandoning the representationalist's starting point it can seem that enactivists owe a different sort of explanation, one that accounts for *how* – and *not just that* – contentful thinking emerges or 'comes into being' under the right conditions. That obligation seems to follow for any enactivist who admits that contentful thinking is a feature of some sophisticated minds while denying that the capacity for thinking contentful

thoughts is a feature of primitive minds" (Hutto, 2013, p20, emphasis in original).¹

The cognitive gap then is the query that if our most basic ways of engaging with the world are devoid of content, then how does contentful thinking emerge, or 'come into being'?

I think there are two possible readings of this query.² On the first reading, there is the question: how do primitive minds give rise to sophisticated minds? On the second reading, there is the question: how does non-contentful behaviour give rise to contentful behaviour? Answering both questions is dialectically significant for REC. For, as the above quote from Hutto makes clear, it seems enactivists, "owe a different sort of explanation", and if such an explanation should turn out to be wanting, then this would raise serious doubts about the merit of, "abandoning the representationalist's starting point".

I do not propose to answer the question raised by the first reading. But I do propose to show why no final answer can be given to the question raised by the second reading. Later Wittgenstein suggests that there is indeterminacy inherent in our use of psychological concepts. I will argue that this indeterminacy ensures that there are some linguistic behaviours about which it is not possible to determine if they do or do not involve the manipulation of informational contents. If contentful behaviour is, as REC claims, linguistic behaviour, then this indeterminacy raises doubts about the gap between non-contentful and contentful behaviour. For if the distinction between non-contentful and contentful behaviour can break down, then it is not clear that what is meant by asserting that there is a gap between these two types of behaviour. Yet, following Wittgenstein, this indeterminacy is not a defect but simply a feature of our complex form of life. Hence, if REC is understood from a Wittgensteinian perspective – a wREcTtgenstein – then it can potentially discharge or right off the cognitive gap debt it apparently owes, at least as regards the second reading.

¹ Hutto and Myin (2013, p36) also recognize this issue: "The ultimate task is to explain how basic minds make the development of contentful forms of cognition possible when the right supports, such as shared social practices are in place."

² Thanks to Karim Zahidi for helping clarify this issue for me.

Section 2

According to Hutto and Myin, “[a]t its simplest, there is content wherever there are specified conditions of satisfaction. And there is true or accurate content wherever the conditions specified are, in fact, instantiated” (Hutto and Myin, 2013, px).

They offer the following example. I am sitting in my office and I wish to plan the best route from the train station to a hotel in a foreign city (Hutto and Myin, 2013, p40). They claim that such “intelligent planning” is an example of contentful thinking. First, it involves the manipulation of informational contents. That is, it involves determinate conditions of satisfaction. For example, the route that I plan from the comfort of my office can be accurate or inaccurate, true or false. Second, it is dependent on symbolic representations, that is, it is linguistically based. A creature with no such linguistic abilities would, quite plausibly, not be capable of such abstract planning. Thus, for REC, contentful thinking requires language.

In Wittgenstein’s later work, he thinks that the use we make of a word is not an object or a thing that accompanies the word (Blue Book, p5). Rather the use refers to the role that the word plays in the language-game (Blue Book, 17-18). Or, as Braver (2012, pp103-104) puts it, the work that the word does. However, when it comes to our use of psychological concepts, Wittgenstein maintains that there is indeterminacy but that this, “is not a defect, but an essential part of our language-game, something which characterizes the essence of human psychological phenomena” (McGinn, 1997, p167). In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein offers the following example:

“I see a picture which represents a smiling face. What do I do if I take the simile now as a kind one, now as malicious? Don’t I often imagine it with a spatial and temporal context which is one either of kindness or malice? Thus I might supply the picture with the fancy that the similer was smiling down on a child at play, or again on the suffering of an enemy.” (Philosophical Investigations, s537)

Yet, as McGinn notes, “[t]he role of our reaction in how we conceive a situation does, however, open up a possibility for disagreement and uncertainty, which is characteristic of our psychological language-game. Someone who is naturally trusting may, for example, see a simile quite differently from someone who is naturally suspicious” (McGinn, 1997, p168). For Wittgenstein, “[i]t is a characteristic feature of our complex form of life that ‘there is in general, no agreement over the question whether an expression of feeling is genuine or not’ (PI, p227). It may be the case that ‘I am sure, *sure*, that [someone] is not pretending; but some third person is not’ (PI, p227)” (McGinn, *ibid*). Thus, there is an inherent indeterminacy that is shown through our use of psychological concepts. This indeterminacy emerges, according to Wittgenstein, because:

“...‘evidence’ here includes ‘imponderable’ evidence...Imponderable evidence includes subtleties of glance, of gesture, of tone. I may recognize a genuine loving look, distinguish it from a pretended one (and here there can, of course, be a ‘ponderable’ confirmation of my judgment). But I may be quite incapable of describing the difference. And this is not because the languages I know have no words for it. For why not introduce new words?” (Philosophical Investigations, Part II, pp193-194)

Thus, although we may be able to distinguish a genuine loving look from a false one, the ‘imponderable evidence’

involved ensures that we can only show through our judgment that the look is loving. If asked why we think the look is genuine and not fake, we may be quite incapable of describing this difference. And this isn’t because there are no words. Rather it is because the evidence involved can be extremely subtle, particular to the person or to the situation.

Recall that for REC, contentful behaviour requires language. I now want to show why not all linguistic behaviour can be determined to involve the manipulation of contents. This is because there are examples of linguistic behaviour about which it is indeterminate whether the behaviour in question does or does not involve content.

Consider the following example. Paul has been tried by a court of law for the murder of his wife and found guilty. Paul is asked by the judge if he, Paul, is remorseful for what he has done and Paul replies, “Yes, I am remorseful.” Is Paul’s linguistic behaviour contentful or non-contentful?

Suppose two jurors observe Paul as he makes his statement. Juror A says to juror B: “I didn’t think Paul’s expression of remorse was genuine. Paul was smiling and fidgeting throughout the trial.” But suppose juror B entirely disagrees and replies: “Paul was not smiling; he was grimacing and his fidgeting was evidence of how guilty he felt.”

If Paul’s linguistic behaviour is understood to be contentful, then there have to be conditions of satisfaction for that content. For Wittgenstein, as I earlier pointed out, the meaning of a word is the role it plays in the language-game. It follows that if there is a complete lack of agreement about this role, then this entails lack of agreement about the word’s meaning. In the case of our two jurors, there is no agreement about Paul’s expression of remorse. Juror A thinks Paul’s behaviour displays no remorse whereas Juror B thinks the very same behaviour does display remorse. In terms of content, this entails that there is no agreement about what are the conditions of satisfaction for this content. If there is no agreement about what are the conditions of satisfaction, then there is no agreement about what the content of Paul’s statement is. That is, there is no answer to the question: is Paul’s statement a genuine expression of remorse or not?

Yet if we then say that Paul’s linguistic behaviour is non-contentful, this too looks problematic. After all, for juror A, Paul’s remorse is not genuine whereas for juror B it is. One is seemingly convinced Paul is lying whereas the other thinks Paul is telling the truth. It seems clear then that both jurors do regard his linguistic behaviour as evidence of contentful thinking.

I think here we have an example of the sort of indeterminacy that Wittgenstein regarded as characteristic of our use of psychological concepts. Moreover, this indeterminacy may emerge not only for those who sit in on judgment of the speaker. It may also emerge for the speaker (McGinn, 1997). That is, Paul too may wonder: am I truly remorseful for what I have done or am I merely saying this to appease the court and perhaps lessen my sentence?

One could object that there must be a fact of the matter, which could settle this issue. That is, even if there is uncertainty among the jurors about the content of Paul’s statement, and even if Paul is uncertain about what is the content of his statement, there must be a fact of the matter which could potentially resolve what that content is. Put in these terms, the indeterminacy looks to be only epistemic and perhaps only temporary. However, I would argue that once we understand Wittgenstein’s view aright, then this objection no longer looks plausible.

Ter Hark (2004, p139) notes that Wittgenstein distinguishes between subjective uncertainty and objective uncertainty. Subjective uncertainty is epistemic, that is, it arises when a lack of information ensures that we cannot determine whether a term applies or not. Importantly, such uncertainty may only be temporary since new techniques or information may arise which could allow us to resolve this uncertainty. Yet for Wittgenstein,

"[t]he uncertainty of psychological judgments, by contrast, is not (just) due to lack of knowledge or evidence; rather, the uncertainty betokens a difference in the manner of judging motives and feelings on the one hand, and, say, the length of physical objects on the other. As Wittgenstein puts it, it is 'an indeterminacy in the nature of the game, in the admissible evidence' (LW I, 888)" (Ter Hark, 2004, p139).

For Wittgenstein, indeterminacy is a constitutive feature of our use of psychological concepts. It is what distinguishes psychological judgments from, say, judgments we make about colour or about physical objects. As such, indeterminacy is "not to be seen as a defect disguising the underlying and determinate structure of psychological thought" (ibid, p130). This is because there is no underlying determinate structure to psychological thought just as there is no underlying reality that determines the grammar of language (ibid, p129). Thus, "[t]he absence of conclusive criteria, therefore, is not a shortcoming of the evidence, but is akin to the impossibility of scoring a goal in tennis" (ibid, p141).

If indeterminacy is a constitutive feature of the language-games we play with psychological concepts, then it is nonsensical to insist that there must be a fact of the matter, either in the mind of Paul, in the minds of the jurors, or even in the environment, that could settle the content of Paul's statement. This would be akin to insisting that we must be able to score a goal in tennis. Paul's statement then is an example of a linguistic behaviour about which it is indeterminate if that behaviour does or does not involve the manipulation of informational contents.

Conclusion

On the second reading of the cognitive gap, the question is: how does non-contentful behaviour give rise to content-

ful behaviour? If, as REC claims, contentful thinking requires language, then the existence of indeterminate linguistic behaviours ensures the existence of behaviours about which it cannot be determined if they are or are not evidence of contentful thinking. Yet if so, then there can be no final answer to the cognitive gap question. For if there are such behaviours, then the distinction between non-contentful and contentful behaviour can break down and it will not always be clear what is meant by insisting that there is a cognitive gap. Following Wittgenstein, the indeterminacy of certain forms of behaviour is a consequence of the language-games we play with psychological concepts. This indeterminacy constitutes a limit of these language-games; something that is shown by the playing of those games. It simply is a feature of our complex form of life. Hence, once REC is understood from a Wittgensteinian perspective – a wRECTtgnstein – then it can potentially discharge or right off the cognitive gap debt it seemingly owes.

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Vertical relations of language-games

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to look at Wittgenstein's use of language-games as objects of comparison. I shall use several examples to demonstrate that it is reasonable to understand language-games in the smallest possible units. In particular, I will focus on a language-game of training a rule vertically related to a language-game of applying of this rule. It is important to keep these language-games apart in order to avoid misunderstandings originating from the fact that one and the same sentence may have different meanings in these language-games. Such a sentence may be an admissible "move" in the former language-game whereas it may be an expression of a rule in the latter one.

The analogy between language and game pervades Wittgenstein's later philosophy. The aim of this paper is to look at Wittgenstein's use of language-games as objects of comparison (as opposed to taking language-games for literal parts of our language, e.g. language of religion, science etc.). I shall use several examples to demonstrate that it is reasonable to take language-games in the smallest possible units—in accordance with Wittgenstein's hint: "In order to see more clearly, [...] we must focus on the details of what goes on; must look at them *from close to*." (PI §51)

Wittgenstein delimits the role of language-games by claiming that they "are rather set up as *objects of comparison* which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities (PI §130)." Accordingly, language-games are objects which are compared with (some parts of) our language. Language-games are invented or fictional, which means that it is not important whether such an activity actually happens. What kind of objects are they? In most of the examples Wittgenstein gives they are simplified or better schematized descriptions of language use together with relevant extra-linguistic activities. Such schemata are compared with (descriptions of) actual language use.

What language and language-games have in common is that they are rule-guided activities. Provided that we are interested in rules of grammar, then language-games *can* be individuated by their rules. Here is the idea of how the individuation works: Provided that we are able to split a given description of a linguistic activity into two parts so that (at least partly) different grammatical rules are active in these parts. Then we can take these two parts as different language-games.¹ One can, however, take these two language-games as one game if she has a reason to do so.

Language-games are conceptual tools in philosophical analysis for surmounting philosophical confusions. I would like to focus on one kind of such confusions which is central to Wittgenstein's later writings. A philosophical confusion (but also a simple problem of understanding) may arise if we are not able to assign to a given linguistic expression its appropriate context of use. If the meaning of a word is its use in the language, we have to be able to put this word into place in order to understand the word at all. It is obvious that we do not need to imagine the whole context in all its details; a schematic description of an appropriate language-game is usually enough. A philosophical confusion may arise, now, if we do not provide a language-game or if we provide a wrong one. Wittgenstein labels

such a diagnosis as "crossing of different language-games" (PI §191; LWPP I, §148) or "fall between several games" (LWPP I, §761).²

We shall now consider sentences that are prone to such confusion—sentences that may express a genuine proposition in one language-game and a grammatical proposition in another. If language-games were individuated by their rules, such sentences would also fall between within more language-games. The risk of confusion would be bolstered if these two different language-games differed only in this one sentence. We will focus exactly on such sentences and language-games. Suppose the following general setting: One has to teach or learn a certain rule in order to apply it afterwards. We can distinguish two stages of this process: the *language-game of training* and the *language-game of applying* the rule. These language-games are different for what is a rule in the latter one is not a rule in former one. Although it is not necessary to mention the would-be rule explicitly during the process of training, in many cases it is done so. Such a mentioning would have a declarative character (using Searle's terminology). Hence, one can easily imagine that one and the same sentence expresses a genuine proposition in the *language-game of training* and a grammatical proposition in the subsequent *language-game of applying* a rule.³ To put it in other words: The form of a sentence is the same, but it expresses an external property in the former language-game and an internal property in the latter one. The language-game of applying a rule logically presupposes the language-game of training. There is, thus, a *vertical relation*⁴ between these two language-games.

Being equipped with this general setting, we can approach its various instances in Wittgenstein's writings. I shall focus on language-games introduced at §§48-50 of the PI.⁵

(1) My first example is a language-game of describing combinations of colored squares (introduced at §§48-49). We have four colors: white, black, red, and green. The syntax of this language-game is very simple. A sentence is

2 This exposition of the concept of language-game draws on (Glock 1994, 193-198).

3 This setting has not escaped the attention of commentators. See, e.g. (Hintikka 1982) or (Baker and Hacker 2005, 62): "The training activity antecedent to the language-game of §2 is itself a language-game." There are even different kinds or stages of training which Wittgenstein subsumes under the family-concept "general training" (BBB 1969, 98). Some of these stages may involve testing applying a rule.

4 The expression "vertical relation" is from ter Hark (1990, 34). The failure to consider vertical relations between language-games is called the "ground-floor fallacy", e.g. naming and describing within the same language-game.

5 Other numerous examples can be found in Wittgenstein's treatment of the ostensive definition, e.g. sentences "this is red" (BBB 1969, 2) or "this is blue" (PI §37), further word "there" (BBB 1969, 80).

1 We can individuate language-games by another principle than their rules, e.g. by kinds of extra-linguistic activities in which they are woven.

only a series of the initial letters of these colors. So for instance sentence “RRG” means that there are two red squares followed by one green square. We may, however, hesitate regarding what a sentence consisting of one single letter, e.g. “R”, means. This expression could *describe* a complex consisting of only one square on the one hand, or it could also be a *name* of the very square on the other hand.

Wittgenstein considers, then, the possibility that naming (of a square) is a limiting case of describing (of a complex of squares). This would, in effect, dismiss the difference between describing and naming. To say that there is a complex consisting of one red square would be tantamount to saying that the square is red. This stance could easily lead to confusion. We can use expression “R” or sentence “There is a red square” in the course of ostensive teaching explaining the meaning of “R” or “red”. In short: We could use the sentence “R” either as a genuine proposition or as a rule (i.e. as a grammatical proposition). This situation fits exactly within our general setting.

To avoid misunderstanding we are invited to take naming and describing as different activities. In Wittgenstein’s words: “For naming and describing do not stand on the *same* level: naming is a preparation for description. Naming is so far not a move in the language-game” (PI §49). Naming is not a move in the language-game of describing colored squares. It is, however, a move in the language-game of training. In this preparatory language-game, one has to learn what “R” or rather “This is red” means. It is crucial that in this language-game, the demonstrative “this” refers to the color of the square, not to the square itself. “This is red” actually means “This color is called red”.

After the rule has been mastered we can go over to the language-game of describing colored squares. Red is an internal property of the color shade one was pointing at in the preparatory language-game. “R” or “This is red” now means that there is a complex consisting of one red square. “This” refers now to the complex one is pointing at, and “R” or “This is red” ascribes an external property of containing a red square to this complex.

(2) The second example immediately follows the previous one at §49: “Naming is so far not a move in the language-game—any more than putting a piece in its place on the board is a move in chess.” Putting the pieces on the board is a preparatory activity. The pieces have to be placed on the board and arranged properly. It may happen that some of these relocations of pieces are the same as correct moves of chess. So, for instance, in the course of setting up the chessboard one might move the white queen from d3 to d1 in order to reach the correct initial formation. This is a legitimate move in this setup. After this is done, another game is going to be played. The same relocation of the white queen from d3 to d1 may be (in certain circumstances) a correct move of this play as well.

This example is intended to shed light on the previous one (and also on the following ones). Nobody would confuse putting pieces on the board with playing chess although they may allow (partly) the same moves. If so instructed, nobody should confuse naming with describing although they might have the same verbal manifestations.

(3) The third example concerns the standard meter. Introducing an analogy to the previous language-games Wittgenstein says: “There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre in Paris.” (PI §50) We can say, of course, of the standard meter that it is one meter long—most likely without any misunderstanding.

This is analogous to naming being a limiting case of describing. Sentence “This (rod) is one meter long” can be, however, either a grammatical or a genuine proposition, depending on the context of a language-game.

We can, then, distinguish the preparatory language-game of fixing a unit of measure and the language-game of measurement. In the preparatory language-game not only the unit of measurement but also its standard, and the whole method of measurement have to be fixed. In particular, one has to pick out a particular rod—let us call it the standard meter henceforward—and one of its dimensions. “This rod is one meter long” is to understand as “The length of this rod is stipulated (=named) to be one meter”. Formulations of such a definition can be found in Wittgenstein’s manuscripts from the early thirties.⁶ In the course of this training, we can say only of one thing that it is one meter long, namely of the standard meter.

And again, after the fixing has been done we can proceed to the language-game of measurement. “This is one meter long” now means that the object one is pointing at has the same length as the standard meter or it is *described* as having this length. Being one meter long is an internal property of (the length) the standard meter and a possible external property of all other spatial objects.⁷

If we allowed applying the expression “one meter long” to all objects without exception within this language-game of measurement, we would have to be aware of this expressions’ ambiguity. Applied to the standard meter, “one meter long” expresses an internal property of its length; applied to another object it expresses an external property of this object.

(4) The fourth and last example is the standard sepia. Suppose we have defined this color in the preparatory language-game in a similar way as we did the meter. The standard meter is a rod that is the sample of one meter; the standard sepia is a plate that is the sample of color sepia. Wittgenstein, then, says that “it will make no sense to say of this sample either that it is of this colour or that it is not.” (PI §50)

The sample has various external properties, e.g. it has a definite size or weight. Why, then, can we not refer to its color as to an external property in the language-game of measurement? Let us suppose (with Kripke) that we can. To say of an object that it has the external property of having color sepia is tantamount to say that this object has the same color as the standard sepia. Then, to ascribe this external property to the standard sepia would be to say that the standard sepia has the same color as the standard sepia. To say of an object that it has the same color as it has is not to ascribe any property at all. Hence we have failed in ascribing the external property of having a color to the standard sepia. Note that the same point can be made regarding to the standard meter.

The conclusion is that within the language-game of measurement we can use expressions “meter” or “sepia” to ascribe either respective internal properties to their samples or external properties to other objects. On the other side, expressions “meter” or “sepia” express external properties to its samples in their preparatory language-game of fixing the unit.

In this paper I hope to have shown through examples how the concept of language-game can be employed as an object of comparison. In particular, I tried to show how

6 Viz. Wittgenstein’s definition “1m ist die Länge des Pariser Urmeters” (MS 113, 23r).

7 Cf. (Jolley 2010, 116).

we can master a rule in one language-game and apply this rule in another language-game. These language-games are connected by a vertical relation. They are objects of comparison, not literal parts of our language. Therefore the activity of training and applying a rule (which is continuous indeed) can be artificially split into two parts. It is important to keep these language-games apart in order to avoid misunderstandings originating from the fact that one and the same expression may have different meanings in these language-games.⁸

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Skizze einer neoexpressivistischen Werttheorie

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Abstract

Unter Rekurs auf Wittgensteins Feststellung, dass der Gebrauch psychologischer Verben unter gewissen Umständen expressiv und nicht deskriptiv zu deuten ist, werden auch Werturteile expressiv gedeutet. Werturteile zum Unterschied von Urteilen über Werte sind demnach keine Beschreibungen von Werten, sondern drücken eine zumeist intersubjektive Werthaltung in verbal-propositionaler Form ohne unmittelbaren Wahrheitsanspruch aus. Es sind nicht objektive Werte, die unsere Werthaltungen determinieren, sondern die Werthaltungen selbst, die die Welt als werthaft bestimmen. Werturteile funktionieren in dieser Hinsicht nicht wie Beschreibungen, sondern wie Befehle. Mit einem Befehl wird kein direkter Wahrheitsanspruch erhoben, obwohl ein propositionaler Gehalt zum Ausdruck gebracht wird. Und wie bei Befehlen kann man auch bei Werturteilen sich fragen, ob der propositionale Gehalt zutreffend ist bzw. inwieweit die Sprechhandlung geglückt ist. Werte sind u.a. subjektiv, weil sie subjekt-abhängige Gegenstände sind: Zu ihrer Konstituierung und Aufrechterhaltung bedarf es der wertenden Stellungnahme (Werthaltung) von *Subjekten* bzw. *Gruppen von Subjekten*, wobei die wertende Stellungnahme eine Aktualisierung von Gefühlen, Absichten und Ansichten ist.

Die Ausgangsfrage samt einer subjektivistischen Antwort

Inwieweit sind Werthaltungen von Werten bestimmt oder Werte von Werthaltungen?

Mit dem Schlagwort „Werthaltung bestimmt Wert“ wird *eine* Art von Subjektivität von Werten angesprochen. Genau genommen handelt es sich hier bereits um mindestens zwei Arten von Subjektivität:

- (1) Erstens sind Werte subjektabhängige Gegenstände oder Tatsachen, zu deren *Konstituierung* (*Existenz* und *Geltung*) die Intentionalität von Subjekten notwendigerweise beiträgt.
- (2) Zweitens ist von subjektiv insofern die Rede, als etwas, das Wert hat, immer nur *Wert für jemanden*, also für ein Subjekt (eine Gruppe von Subjekten) hat.

Gemäß dieser subjektivistischen Auffassung sind Werte konstituiert durch psychische Haltungen, insbesondere Werthaltungen, und somit psychisch-soziale Gegenstände wie andere soziale Institutionen und Kulturgüter. Werte sind zum einen als etwas Subjektives bestimmt, aber zum anderen auch als etwas objektiv Vorfindliches, als etwas konkret Reales wie andere von Subjekten hervorgebrachte bzw. von ihnen abhängige psychisch-soziale Gegenstände und Tatsachen.

Zu bemerken ist noch: Der Ausdruck „Wert“ selbst ist systematisch mehrdeutig. Wir verwenden u.a. diesen Ausdruck im Sinne eines Standards der Wertschätzung. In einem anderen Sinn verwenden wir „Wert“ für das Ding selbst, das den Standard so und so realisiert. So sagen wir, dass etwas ein Wert ist, weil es Wert hat, d.h. von Wert ist – wir nennen also auch den Wertträger einen Wert.

Werthaltungen und Werturteile

Werthaltungen sind psychische, intentionale Einstellungen, und Werturteile nennt man die sprachlichen Äußerungen von Werthaltungen. Beispiele für Werturteile:

„Dies ist gut, hässlich, in Ordnung“ bzw. auch „Ich finde das gut, ...“

Derartige Werturteile sind also sprachlicher Ausdruck von Werthaltungen und bekunden somit, dass eine Sache von

Wert bzw. Unwert ist. Werturteile haben immer einen normativen Charakter, da Werthaltungen einen Komplex von emotiven, volitiven, präskriptiven und kognitiven Momenten darstellen. Das eine Werthaltung ausdrückende Werturteil hat als ein Sinnganzes keinen deskriptiven, sondern einen expressiven wie auch performativen Charakter.

Wittgenstein über Ausdrücken und Beschreiben von Erlebnissen

Wittgenstein schreibt in seinen BPP 2, §63:

„Psychologische Verben charakterisiert dadurch, daß die dritte Person des Präsens durch Beobachtung zu identifizieren ist, die erste Person nicht.

Satz in der dritten Person Präsens: Mitteilung, in der ersten Person Präsens Äußerung. ((Stimmt nicht ganz.))“

Zum einen meint Wittgenstein, dass Erlebnisse der erlebenden Person unmittelbar (ohne Beobachtung und Schließen vermittelt) sind, und zum anderen, dass psychologische Verben Ausdruck (und nicht unbedingt Beschreibung) von Erlebnissen sein können. Indem ich ein Erlebnisverb wie „hassen“, das üblicherweise zur Beschreibung von Hassausbrüchen dient, in der ersten Person Präsens verwende, kann ich damit das Erlebnis (meinen Hass) zum Ausdruck bringen und den Sachgehalt sprachlich darstellen, ohne dass ich auf Beobachtung und Schlüsse rekurrieren muss. Ich gebe das Erlebnis zum Ausdruck, wie ein Schrei es z.B. tut, zugleich aber wird der semantische Gehalt, dass man so und so erlebt, ausgesprochen. Interessant bei diesen expressiven sprachlichen Äußerungen von Erlebnissen ist – und sog. Neo-Expressivisten wie Dorit Bar-On (etwa in 2009) weisen besonders darauf hin –, dass sie einen intentionalen (semantisch-propositionalen) Gehalt aufweisen, der zwar mit keinem expliziten Wahrheitsanspruch verbunden ist, dem aber natürlich Wahrheit oder Falschheit sowie eine gewisse logische Strukturierung und Folgerbarkeit zugeordnet werden kann.

Wittgenstein über das Moore'sche Paradoxon

Anhand der Interpretation von Wittgensteins Zugang zum Moore'schen Paradoxon kann man die Relevanz der expressiven Rolle deutlich machen. „Es regnet, aber ich glaube es nicht“ ist eine der Wittgenstein'schen Formulierungen des sog. Moore'schen Paradoxons. Eine Behauptung wie „Es regnet, aber ich glaube es nicht“ sei nicht als Widerspruch zwischen ausgesprochenen und implizierten Glaubenshaltungen zu verstehen, wie es G. E. Moore vorschlägt, denn Wittgenstein leugnet, dass „Ich glaube ...“ bzw. „Ich glaube nicht ...“ in den üblichen Kontexten als eine *Behauptung der Sprecherin über ihren Glaubenszustand* aufzufassen ist. Vielmehr handle es sich hier um eine bloße Glaubensbekundung in verbaler Form, also um ein Expressivum und nicht um ein Deskriptivum. Gemäß Wittgenstein kann man sagen, die Äußerung

„Es regnet“

ist ein *Sagen (Beschreiben)*, dass es regnet, und ein (nicht semantisch eigens ausgedrücktes) *Zeigen* (eine *Expressivon*) des Glaubens, dass es regnet, und

„Ich glaube nicht, dass es regnet“

ist ein *Zeigen* (explizites Ausdrücken) des Nicht-Glaubens, dass es regnet.

Das implizit ausgedrückte *Glauben* und das semantisch explizit ausgedrückte *Nicht-Glauben* sind in einer bestimmten Weise als inkonsistent anzusehen. Einerseits wird zum Ausdruck gebracht, dass die Sprecherin glaubt, dass es regnet, und andererseits, dass die Sprecherin nicht glaubt, dass es regnet. Wittgenstein schreibt dazu:

Das Mooresche Paradox legt eine falsche Deutung der Behauptung eines Satzes nahe. Man ist versucht zu fragen: Gibt es also eine Logik der Behauptung außer der Logik des Satzes selbst? Hier ist es, glaube ich, nützlich, sich an den Begriff des Sprachspiels zu halten.“ [Wittgenstein, MS 132, S. 326.]

Konsequenzen aus Wittgensteins Expressivismus – Logik intentionaler Einstellungen

Wittgenstein meint wohl, dass logische Strukturierbarkeit, Deduzierbarkeit und Konsistenz nicht auf propositionale Verhältnisse beschränkt werden sollen. Nicht nur Propositionen stehen in logischen Verhältnissen, sondern auch Behauptungen, Fragen, Imperative, Normen, Wünsche und sogar Gefühle. Um zu sehen, dass es so etwas wie Widerspruch, Folgerung und logische Struktur nicht nur auf dem Gebiet des Kognitiven gibt, betrachte man folgende Modus-ponens-Schlüsse:

- (1.1) Wenn dieses Metallstück erwärmt wird, wird es sich ausdehnen.
- (1.2) Dieses Metallstück wird erwärmt.
- Also
- (1.3) Dieses Metallstück wird sich ausdehnen.
- (2.1) Wenn Du kommst, ruf an!
- (2.2) Du kommst.
- Also
- (2.3) Ruf an!
- (3.1) Wenn grüner Koriander scheußlich ist, dann sind auch mit grünem Koriander gewürzte Speisen scheußlich!

- (3.2) Grüner Koriander ist scheußlich!
- Also
- (3.3) Mit grünem Koriander gewürzte Speisen sind scheußlich!

Ist der unter Punkt (1) dargestellte Modus ponens auf Aussagesätze beschränkt, so ist das in (2) nicht der Fall, hier wird er auch auf Normen (Befehle) bezogen. Deutet man (3.1) – (3.3) nicht als Aussagen, sondern als Geschmacksurteile im expressiven Sinn, so ergibt sich hier ebenfalls eine Erweiterung in der Anwendung des Modus ponens. (Eine interessante logisch-semantische Rekonstruktion findet sich in Blackburn 1993.)

Werturteile versus Urteile über Werte

Gemäß meiner expressivistisch-performativen Deutung ist ein Werturteil nicht als Aussage über „Wertverhalte“ oder Werttatsachen aufzufassen, sondern als Ausdruck einer komplexen intentionalen Haltung, die letztlich – also als ein Sinnganzes genommen – keine Glaubenshaltung darstellt und somit nicht als deskriptiv mit Wahrheitsanspruch gedeutet werden kann, sondern als Expression einer emotiv-volitiv-normativen Stellungnahme samt der sie voraussetzenden Glaubenseinstellungen. Allerdings ist das Werturteil keine bloße Interjektion, es werden propositionale Gehalte mit ausgesprochen und auch ein spezifischer Wertcharakter. Demgemäß wird in Prädikationen wie „A ist in Ordnung“ oder „A ist nicht in Ordnung“ insbesondere Wertschätzung (Billigung und Empfehlung) bzw. Missbilligung, Ablehnung und Abraten selbst ausgedrückt. Obwohl auch ein semantischer, propositionaler Gehalt zum Ausdruck gebracht wird (dem durchaus Wahrheit oder Falschheit zuordenbar ist), beschreibt die wertende Person damit weder den Wert noch ihre Werthaltung noch den Gegenstand der Bewertung.

Von diesen wertenden Urteilen (Werturteilen) sind zu unterscheiden kognitive Urteile über Werte (die deskriptiver und faktischer Natur sind), also Glaubenseinstellungen etwa über die Entstehung von Werten, über Wertwandel, eventuelle Universalität von Werten, über psychische und soziale Abhängigkeiten von Werten. Wie andere psychische und soziale Gegebenheiten auch – etwa Handlungen und Handlungsprodukte, Institutionen – sind Werte etwas Objektives im Sinne von etwas Tatsächlichem und damit der empirischen Erfahrung, der äußeren wie der inneren Erfahrung, Zugänglichem.

Der semantische, propositionale Gehalt – Die Ausrichtung bei intentionalen Einstellungen

John Austin, Elisabeth Anscombe und John Searle haben auf die Ausrichtung von propositionalen Einstellungen hingewiesen. Wenn man normiert, etwas wünscht und – ich meine auch – wenn man etwas wertschätzt, dann wird die Welt durch die intentionale Haltung bestimmt: die Welt ist sozusagen auf den Geist „ausgerichtet“, „richtet sich nach ihm“ (Welt→Geist-Ausrichtung). Wenn man aber eine Glaubenshaltung hat, dann wird diese intentionale Haltung durch die Welt bestimmt: der Geist ist also auf die Welt ausgerichtet (Geist→Welt-Ausrichtung). Siehe Anscombes Vergleich (1986, § 32) der Einkaufsliste eines Mannes mit der Liste des Detektivs: Der Einkaufszettel bestimmt die Welt, d.h., was gekauft wurde, ist nach dem Geist ausgerichtet. Dagegen ist die Liste des Detektivs bestimmt von dem, was gekauft wurde: der Geist ist nach der Welt ausgerichtet.

Da mit Werturteilen ein wertender, evaluativer Anspruch erhoben wird und darin auch etwas Normatives, Festsetzendes liegt, das von der wertenden Person ausgeht, ist die Welt nach den Werturteilen ausgerichtet, orientiert sich an den Werturteilen. Werturteile („Das ist gut“, „Ich finde das schlecht“) funktionieren in dieser Hinsicht nicht wie Beschreibungen, sondern wie Befehle („Komm!“, „Ich befehle Dir zu kommen!“). Mit solch einem Befehl wird kein direkter Wahrheitsanspruch erhoben, obwohl ein propositionaler Gehalt zum Ausdruck gebracht wird. Den mit „Das ist gut“ (bzw. „Ich befehle Dir zu kommen“) ausgedrückten semantischen Gehalt kann man auch betrachten, als wäre er in einer Glaubenshaltung eingebettet, oder einfach, man betrachte den propositionalen Gehalt und ändere die Ausrichtung, indem man sich fragt: „Inwieweit entspricht der propositionale Gehalt überhaupt den Tatsachen, trifft es zu, dass das gut ist (bzw.: dass ich Dir befehle zu kommen)?“ Die Sprechaktheorie zeigt, dass es viele Fälle des Verunglückens, Fehlgehens gibt (ich kann mich versprechen, mich in der Person täuschen, nicht berechtigt sein zu befehlen, heucheln etc.) Und in ähnlicher Weise gilt, dass „Dies ist in Ordnung“ „Ich finde das in Ordnung“ einerseits keine Aussage ist, dass aber der mit dieser Äußerung gegebene propositionale Gehalt auf Wahr- oder Falschheit geprüft werden kann.

Werturteile als Ausdruck intersubjektiver, interpersoneller, kollektiver Werthaltungen

Die in Werturteilen ausgedrückten Standards können individueller Art sein (*Ich-Intentionalität*). Aber aufgrund unseres Eingebettetheits in sozialen Gruppen, Gemeinschaften sind Werthaltungen zumeist kollektiv-intentional zu verstehen (*Wir-Intentionalität*). Indem ich urteile „Das war eine gute Tat“, „Dies ist ein schönes Bild“, „Leid zu vermindern ist besser als Leid zu vermehren“, drücke ich mit meinem Werturteil in der Regel nicht nur meine individuelle Wertschätzung aus („Ich halte es für gut“), sondern eine Wertung in der Wir-Form („Wir halten es für gut“), und damit wird letztlich der Anspruch erhoben, eine Werthaltung einer Gruppe zu teilen, der man anzugehören meint. Ich, als wertende Person, mache damit keine deskriptive Aussage über die betreffende wertende Wir-Intentionalität, sondern drücke meine Wertung aus und beanspruche dabei eine kollektive Norm, vereinnahme gleichsam eine Gemeinschaft mit spezifischen Standards. Welche Kollektivität gemeint ist, variiert von Fall zu Fall, wird kaum explizit gemacht, sie ergibt sich aus dem Kontext. Wir-Intentionalität verlangt noch nicht ein überindividuelles psychisches Wesen, das erlebt und etwas zum Ausdruck bringt. Der minimale Gehalt von „wir“ kann mit „ich und andere (Personen)“ umschrieben werden. Was für eine Gruppe von Personen mit „wir“ aber ausgedrückt wird, geht in der Regel über das „ich und andere Personen“ weit hinaus. Die mit diesem unausgesprochenen „Wir“ gemeinte Gesamtheit kann sogar die ganze Menschheit umfassen oder die Personen, die man für rational hält, für moralisch, für ästhetisch, für besonnen, für qualitätsbewusst, für revolutionär, für innovativ etc. Die Gemeinschaft kann durch eine mehr oder minder ausgeprägte soziale Praxis bestimmt sein, wobei die soziale Praxis viele Werte bestimmt (vgl. dazu Raz 2003).

Subjektive, intrapersonelle Werturteile

Subjektive „Geschmacksurteile“ als wertende Äußerungen können auf Gegenstände und Sachverhalte der Außenwelt gerichtet sein („Ich mag Koriander“), sie können aber auch auf das subjektiv-sinnliche Empfinden selbst gerichtet sein: „Dieser Geruch ist wunderbar, dieses leuchtende Rot gefällt mir“. Geschmacksurteile können auf die momentane Situation bezogen sein, können aber auch über das momentane Empfinden hinausgehen.

Wieder gilt, dass ich mit meinen Geschmacksurteilen die Gegenstände bestimme, d.h., die Gegenstände richten sich nach der intentionalen Einstellung. Man dreht die intentionale Ausrichtung um, wenn man den propositionalen Gehalt von „Ich mag dieses Blau“ betrachtet und sich fragt, ob dies auch wirklich zutrifft. Fehlermöglichkeiten sind schon bei einfachen Geschmacksempfindungen möglich: Ich bin mir etwa über den Gegenstand nicht im Klaren; ich mag die Farbe eigentlich nicht, aber in dieser Umgebung gefällt sie mir.

Noch mehr Fehler können sich einschleichen, wenn man über die gegebene Empfindung hinausgeht und Gegenstände und Tatsachen der Außenwelt bewertet, wenn es also um den Geschmack von etwas, etwa Koriander (Wanzenkraut!) geht. Was als angemessen und was als nicht angemessen gilt, ist aber nicht etwas objektiv Vorgegebenes, sondern wird von der Person selbst bestimmt.

Wenn es sich nicht bloß um ein individuelles, intrasubjektives Werturteil handelt, sondern um ein kollektives, wird ein intersubjektiver Anspruch erhoben; es geht dann etwa um die Frage des sog. „guten Geschmacks“.

Streit- und Fehlermöglichkeiten bei Werturteilen

Wenn man sagt, dass man über Geschmacksurteile nicht streiten kann („de gustibus non est disputandum“), so meint man, dass aus dem Umstand, dass dem einen etwas gut schmeckt, etwa das Wanzenkraut, dem anderen aber nicht, sich noch kein Widerstreit ergibt.

Die interessante Frage ist nun: Wann kommt es aber zu einem Widerstreit, und welche Möglichkeiten des Streits gibt es? Auch vor dem Hintergrund einer neoexpressivistischen Position, die als subjektivistisch bzw. intersubjektivistisch zu deuten ist, erweisen sich Werturteile als in vielerlei Hinsicht kritisier- und bestreitbar. Der Streit kann sich insbesondere drehen (1) um die *Geltung der vorausgesetzten, mitgemeinten Fakten*, (2) um die *Geltung der vorausgesetzten, mitgemeinten Wertstandards* und (3) um die beanspruchte *Zugehörigkeit zur in Frage stehenden Gruppe*.

Zu (1): Ich beurteile einen Freund als hilfreich und gut, weil er mich finanziell großzügig unterstützt hat, erkenne aber nicht, dass er es nur getan hat, um mich als der Bestechung schuldig dastehen zu lassen. Man kritisiert hier die spezielle Werthaltung insofern, als man die faktischen Voraussetzungen der Bewertung als falsch aufweist. Ein Irrtum kann aber auch deshalb entstehen, weil die für die Standards vorausgesetzten Fakten nicht richtig erkannt wurden. Man mag z.B. die Nebenwirkungen von Medikamenten faktisch falsch einschätzen. Weitere Fälle sind, dass man zu wenig an die Folgen einer Handlung denkt. Bei einer Maßnahme eines Arztes denkt man etwa nur an die unmittelbaren unerwünschten Folgen, bedenkt aber nicht spätere heilbringende Konsequenzen, oder man berücksichtigt nicht die latenten Langzeitwünsche, die mit aktuellen Wünschen in Widerstreit stehen können.

Zu (2): In der Debatte um die Geltung der vorausgesetzten, mitgemeinten Wertstandards zählen zu den hauptsächlichsten Streitpunkten die Fälle, wo die individuelle Präferenzordnung des wertenden Subjekts selbst in Konflikt gerät, etwa gewissen selbst gestellten Konsistenzanforderungen nicht genügt. Besonders erwähnenswert sind die Fälle, wo Diskrepanzen zwischen der individuellen Präferenzordnung und den Präferenzen der angesprochenen Wertegemeinschaft auftreten. Sowohl im intra- wie im intersubjektiven Fall kann sich der Streit auch darum drehen, ob die Wertpräferenzen so klar und deutlich gegeben sind. Da wir eine Vielzahl von Werten in Einklang zu bringen haben, ist es nicht immer klar zu entscheiden, welcher Wertkonstellation man den Vorrang geben will. Solange niedriger Preis und hohe Qualität bei der Auswahl einer Speise zusammen gehen, hat man kein Problem, wohl aber wenn es entgegengesetzt läuft.

Zu (3): Man beruft sich auf eine Gemeinschaft, die es vielleicht gar nicht gibt. Man meint, dass es eine Gemeinschaft rational handelnder Personen gibt, aber de facto gibt es sie nicht, oder kann es sie gar nicht geben, weil gewisse Entscheidungen gar nicht mehr rational begründbar sind.

Vergleich zwischen der subjektiven/inter-subjektiven und objektiven Deutung von Werten

Nimmt man als Beispiele Äußerungen von Sätzen wie: „Das ist in Ordnung!“, so gilt:

(1) Wenn das Werturteil subjektiv bzw. intersubjektiv gedeutet wird, dann drückt es eine persönliche, individuelle bzw. kollektive, interpersonelle Werthaltung aus, es beansprucht die Welt als in Ordnung seiend, d.h., der Geist bestimmt die Welt (Welt→Geist-Ausrichtung). Betrachtet man nur die Proposition

selbst und dreht die Ausrichtung um (Geist→Welt-Ausrichtung), d.h. fingiert man eine Glaubenseinstellung oder macht die Annahme, dass das in Ordnung sei, lässt sich nun der semantische Gehalt bezüglich Faktizität untersuchen. Man kann etwa prüfen, inwieweit anerkannte Korrektheitsstandards eingehalten werden. Zu beachten ist, dass diese Festsetzungen *nicht objektiv vorgegeben sind, sondern von der wertenden Person bzw. der Gruppe festgesetzt sind*.

(2) Im Fall der objektiven Deutung von Werten: Gemäß einer unpersönlichen, objektiven Wertung würden derartige Sätze Glaubenshaltungen ausdrücken, die auf ihre Wahrheit überprüft werden können. Die Sätze sind bestimmt durch die Welt, es besteht hier *nur* die Geist→Welt-Ausrichtung.

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Grammatik und Erinnerung. PU 127 im Kontext

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Abstract

Entgegen einer ersten Intuition bezieht sich der Abschnitt 127 der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* nicht nur auf individuelle Erinnerungen, die der Philosoph argumentativ nutzbar macht, sondern auf diese individuellen Erinnerungen, insofern sie an den kollektiven Sprachverwendungsweisen einer Sozialität teilhaben. Im Lichte dieser Partizipation wird klar, welche Rolle PU 127 im Kontext der Abschnitte 120-133 zukommt. Die Sicht auf Sprachspiele als Vergleichsobjekte (PU 130) stellt den Rahmen dar, in dem die Sprache in einem Wechselspiel fortlaufender Modifikationen, nicht einem eindeutig zuschreibbaren autoritativen Akt eines sprachlichen Akteurs, neuen Gebrauchsweisen, die neue Erinnerungen an Sprachverwendungsweisen in die Sprache hineinbringen, geöffnet werden kann.

1. Die Rolle der Erinnerung

PU 127 spricht von der Rolle der Erinnerung in der philosophischen Tätigkeit: „Die Arbeit des Philosophen ist ein Zusammentragen von Erinnerungen zu einem bestimmten Zweck“ (Wittgenstein 1984, 303). Die Begriffe „Arbeit“, „Zusammentragen“, „Erinnerungen“ und „Zweck“ sind nicht selbsterklärend, sondern im Blick auf ihren Kontext in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* zu erläutern. Der Satz, daran erinnernd, daß ein „Zusammentragen von Erinnerungen (...) oft mehr Arbeit als bloßes Hinschauen auf offenes Daliegendes“ fordert (v. Savigny 1988, 170), enthält einen wichtigen Orientierungspunkt für die Arbeit des Philosophen nach dem *linguistic turn*: Die Beantwortung der Frage, welche Rolle Erinnerungen in seiner Tätigkeit spielen, gibt Antwort auf ein Selbstverständnis des Philosophen, das über einen gegenwärtig gegebenen Korpus von Untersuchungsmaterial hinausreicht. Über die präsentische Aufladung des philosophischen Tuns hinaus ist die Vergangenheit von Sprechweisen, die mit Handlungen verschwistert sind, wichtig: Der Rekurs auf Erinnerungen erweitert den Untersuchungsspielraum philosophischer Untersuchungen, indem ihre Gegenstände nun mit ihrer Gewordenheit gesehen werden im Blick auf Gebrauchsweisen sprachlicher Zeichen, die vor den gegenwärtigen existierten und diese mitbestimmen und im Blick auf eine methodische Kompetenz, die in der Tätigkeit des Zusammentragens von Erinnerungen besteht: Was als Erinnerung bewahrt wurde, stellt das Wissen um Sprachverwendungsweisen dar. Die Erinnerungen aus PU 127 sind nicht nur jene des einzelnen, der etwa an die Ferien denkt, die er als Kind in Amalfi verbrachte. Neben diesen individuellen Erinnerungen, die einzelne Erinnerungsbilder in einem inneren Theater scheinbar immer wieder vorführen, gibt es jene Erinnerungen, die sich auf ein Kollektiv von Sprachbenutzern beziehen, die frühere Handlungen (auch sprachliche Äußerungen im Gegensatz zu Sätzen) beglaubigen oder verwerfen. Diese Fähigkeit von Erinnerungen, die Erinnerungen anderer zu konturieren und zu schärfen, ist wichtig für die Möglichkeit philosophischer Untersuchungen – Erinnerungen repräsentieren nicht nur ein in der Vergangenheit Gewußtes, das propositional in daß-Sätzen formuliert werden kann, sie geben in der philosophischen Untersuchung einen Hintergrund für das philosophisch zu Sagende ab: Frühere Sprechweisen ermöglichen es, gegenwärtige Sprechweisen einzuordnen und zu bewerten. Um diese Nuance des Wortes „Erinnerung“ zu verstehen, soll nun der Kontext von PU 127 herangezogen werden.

2. Das offen Daliegende und die Sprache des Alltags – PU 120-126

Erinnerungen, die sprachlich mitgeteilt werden, sind durch die Beschaffenheit jener sprachlichen Mittel geprägt. Dies bedeutet, daß Überlegungen darüber, wie man von der Sprache redet, einen Einfluß darauf haben, wie von Erinnerungen gesprochen wird. Einen Hinweis auf die Natur der Erinnerungen gibt PU 120: „Wenn ich über Sprache (Wort, Satz etc.) rede, muß ich die Sprache des Alltags reden. Ist diese Sprache etwa zu grob, materiell, für das, was wir sagen wollen? Und wie wird denn eine andere gebildet? - Und wie merkwürdig, daß wir dann mit der unseren überhaupt etwas anfangen können!“ (Wittgenstein 1984, 301)

Die Annahme, daß, wenn ich über Sprache rede, ich die Sprache des Alltags rede, betrifft die Rolle der Erinnerungen: Auch über sie kann nur in der Sprache des Alltags gesprochen werden. Die Befürchtung, diese Sprache könne zu grob und zu materiell sein, übersieht die Gewordenheit unserer Empfindungsfähigkeit mit der Sprache, die wir als Sprache des Alltags verwenden. Der nachdrücklich kursivierte Satz „Und wie wird denn eine andere gebildet?“, versucht eine Ätiologie der Sprachbildung anzudeuten, die anders sei, als die scheinbar zu schlichte alltägliche Sprache. Der Folgesatz „Und wie merkwürdig, daß wir dann mit der unseren überhaupt etwas anfangen können!“ ist die ironische Antwort auf die Bedenken in Satz zwei von PU 120, die schon im Gestus des zweiten Satzes gefunden werden kann: „Ist diese Sprache etwa...“ beginnt die rhetorische Präsentation der Ansicht, die Sprache sei grob und materiell – die Ansicht wird in dem Wort „etwa“ als etwas Übertriebenes, Fehlgeleitetes dargestellt, an das man nicht ernsthaft glauben könne. An die ironische Tönung knüpft dann der kursivierte Satz an, der von dem offenen ironischen „Und wie merkwürdig...“ beschlossen wird und die Intuition in Satz zwei negativ beantwortet. Der erste Absatz in PU 120 diene der Prüfung einer Intuition durch ihre Konfrontation mit einer gegenteiligen – hier sind Sprecher und *interlocuter* am Werk, oder, mit Cavell, *voice of correctness* und *voice of temptation*. Für die Frage nach der Art der Erinnerungen in PU 127 ist wichtig, daß die Versuchung, über Sprache *nicht* in der Sprache des Alltags zu reden, eine Bringschuld bedeutet: Welche Sprache sollen wir sprechen, wenn nicht die des Alltags? Hier werden die Erinnerungen näher bestimmt hin auf den „bestimmten Zweck“. Die formale Seite der Empfehlung in PU 127 kommt heraus: Die Erinnerungen sind charakterisiert

durch einen vordergründig definierenden „bestimmten Zweck“, einen Gebrauch der Erinnerungen, der nicht von vornherein feststeht. In PU 120 heißt es weiter: „Daß ich bei meinen Erklärungen, die Sprache betreffend, schon die volle Sprache (nicht etwa eine vorbereitende, vorläufige) anwenden muß, zeigt schon, daß ich nur Äußerliches über die Sprache vorbringen kann“. Wie kommt die Sprecher-Stimme auf den Gegensatz innerlich-äußerlich? Hier zeigt sich das konstituierende dialogische Geflecht ineinander verschränkter Behauptungshandlungen (Böhler 1995, 147ff.) und daß das „Äußerliche“ zur Beschaffenheit unserer Sprache gehört: Nur wer von der Sprache zuviel erwartet, kann eine Innerlichkeit vermissen, auf die erklärend rekurriert werde. Die Frage: „...wie können uns diese Ausführungen dann befriedigen?“ führt das Problem – die Beharrungskraft des Mentalismus – zu seinem Zentrum zurück. Nicht den Gegenständen einer Erklärung ist im Gefolge traditioneller *Adaequatio*-Logik Genüge zu tun, sondern einem Bedürfnis des Subjekts, sich in seinen Erklärungen zu erkennen. Hier kollidieren individualistische und kollektivistische Formen der Erklärung; letztere scheinen den einzelnen nicht zu meinen und nicht zufriedenzustellen. Befriedigung ist auch Zufriedenheit im Blick auf den Fragenden, der jenes Sich-nicht Auskennen vermeiden möchte, das nach PU 123 die Form des philosophischen Problems ist. Erinnerungen schließen auf zur Konstitution der untersuchenden Subjekte: Sie wollen sich durch eine Erklärung trösten, die mehr sagt als „nur Äußerliches“ (PU 120). So ist ein wichtiger Aspekt in den *Untersuchungen* die Rehabilitation des Äußerlichen, insofern dieses nicht mehr als subjektfremd gesehen wird. „Bloß“ ist, womit wir uns nicht nur zufriedengeben *müssen*, sondern womit wir uns *de facto* zufriedengeben (Fogelins De-Factoism, vgl. Fogelin 2009).

Neben der Thematisierung der „Skrupel“, die sich als „Mißverständnisse“ entpuppen, bereitet PU 120 den Boden dafür, von den „Erinnerungen“ nicht zuviel zu verlangen. Auch diese gehören letztlich zu jenem Äußerlichen, das über die Sprache vorgebracht werden kann und der Schluß lautet: „Deine Fragen beziehen sich auf Wörter; so muß ich von Wörtern reden.“ Es ist der Leitsatz eines Philosophierens nach dem *linguistic turn*, mit dem das Subjekt seine überlieferte Subjektstärke an die wörterbezogene Qualität philosophischer Reflexion abgibt: Die Grenzen des zu Sagenden gehören zu der wörterförmigen Qualität der Untersuchung, nicht in den kognitiven Haushalt eines sich erkennen wollenden kontingenten – nicht mehr als stark und autoritativ vorgestellten – Subjekts.

Daß die Philosophie „(alles) läßt (...) wie es ist“ (PU 124) und den „tatsächlichen Gebrauch der Sprache“ nicht begründe, gehört zum Hintergrund von PU 127: Die Erinnerungen münden nicht in ein theoretisches Begründungsspiel (die Normativität der begriffsanalytischen Methode ist ein eigenes Kapitel). PU 124: „Ein ‚führendes Problem der mathematischen Logik‘ ist für uns ein Problem der Mathematik, wie jedes andere.“ Probleme als „führend“ zu bezeichnen, sichert die Standards einer Disziplin, verteidigt ein Untersuchungsfeld gegen andere. In der philosophischen Untersuchung wird jedoch mit Wörtern über Wörter geredet, ohne daß eines dieser Wörter als Leitbegriff ausgezeichnet wäre. In PU 125 ist von der „bürgerliche(n) Stellung des Widerspruchs“ die Rede: Wir handeln, als dürfe es keine Widersprüche geben, als gehörten sie nicht zur Sprache. *De facto* aber gibt es sprachliche Möglichkeiten, Widersprüche zu berichtigen, etwa wenn wir sagen: „So hab ich's nicht gemeint“. Diese Widersprüche bestehen auf einer Ebene, auf der Berichtigung immer möglich ist. PU 126 bestätigt dann die explizite Qualität des Materials, mit dem sich philosophische Untersuchungen befassen:

sen: „Die Philosophie stellt eben alles bloß hin, und erklärt und folgert nichts. - Da alles offen da liegt, ist auch nichts zu erklären.“ Dieser Satz sieht einfacher aus als er ist. Alles „hinstellen“ - auf welcher Bühne, in welcher *Umgebung*? Eine Antwort findet sich in PU 125: Der Philosoph macht Zustände übersehbar. Dies ist eine Variante des Leitbegriffs der „übersichtlichen Darstellung“ (PU 122) in Wittgensteins Spätwerk, um die es dem Philosophen gehe. Was wird mit dieser Übersichtlichkeit getan? In PU 125 heißt es, das Zustände-übersehbar-Machen helfe, daß wir uns nicht „in unseren eigenen Regeln verfangen“. Hier ist das Wort „eigene“ wichtig: Die Regeln sind nicht von fremder, höherer Stelle uns gegeben, sondern über mehrere Generationen durch erfolgreich durchgesetzte Gebrauchsweisen eingeschliffen. Die „eigenen“ Regeln sind solche, die uns nur zum Teil gehören und jene objektive Qualität annehmen, von der wir glauben uns nicht entfernen zu dürfen. Die Abschnittfolge PU 120-126 zeigt, daß wir Widersprüche in der Sprache nicht fürchten müssen, da wir sprachliche Möglichkeiten haben, damit umzugehen wie die nachträgliche Korrektur anderen Sprechern gegenüber. Das philosophierende Subjekt stellt sich in eine über Generationen reichende Kette von Sprachbenutzern, die vor seiner individuellen Lebenszeit da war und nach seinem Tod weitergehen wird. Das Ziel der übersichtlichen Darstellung reicht über individuelle Lebensspannen hinaus. Der Wert der übersichtlichen Darstellung zeigt sich langfristig und korreliert mit modifizierenden Gebrauchsweisen. Der Satz „Da alles offen da liegt, ist auch nichts zu erklären“ (PU 126) hat eine scheinbare Einfachheit: Was soll der Philosoph noch tun, wenn sein Untersuchungsgegenstand nur eine Anordnungsleistung von ihm verlangt, seine Kompetenz zu Deutung und differenzierter Darstellung aber nicht zu brauchen scheint? Eine Antwort gibt PU 127: Die Tätigkeit der übersichtlichen Darstellung läßt sich als ein „Zusammentragen von Erinnerungen“ bezeichnen. So bekommt das scheinbar ohne ein deutendes Subjekt auskommende Herstellen einer Übersicht einen Aspekt des Sammelns, des Kompilierens, der ohne das Subjekt nicht auskommt. Das Material der übersichtlichen Darstellung ist nicht vollständig gegeben, es wird durch die Tätigkeit des Philosophen ermöglicht. Die „Erinnerungen“ verbinden die Herstellung einer Grammatik, der es nicht an Übersicht fehlt (PU 122) mit dem, was einzelne als Akteure in einem sprachlichen Zusammenhang erlebten und was ihnen ermöglichte, sprachliche Zusammenhänge zu erkennen und herzustellen.

3. Viele mögliche Ordnungen, Sprachspiele als Vergleichsobjekte, verschiedene Therapien – PU 128-133

Nach dem bisher über die Erinnerungen Gesagten ergibt sich ein Bild, das von der expliziten Thematisierung des „Gedächtnisses“ bei Wittgenstein, etwa in den *Philosophischen Bemerkungen*, abweicht, wo der Zeitbegriff „nicht in der Welt der Vorstellung angewendet werden“ könne (Wittgenstein 1984b, 82). In PU 127 wird der Begriff der Erinnerungen kollektivierte und verschlicht: sie werden gleichsam formal betrachtet, haben nicht in erster Linie individuelle Zeugnisfunktion, sondern beziehen sich auf das, was an Erinnerungen vergleichbar ist. Das Zeugnis geht nicht auf Lebensgeschichte, sondern auf überindividuelle Sprachverwendung. PU 130 erläutert dies: „Vielmehr stehen die Sprachspiele da als Vergleichsobjekte, die durch Ähnlichkeit und Unähnlichkeit ein Licht in die Verhältnisse unserer Sprache werfen sollen.“ (Wittgenstein 1984, 304) Unser Gedächtnis besitzt ein Wissen von Gewesenem, das durch Vergleiche von Sprachspielen gewonnen wurde und das man als soziale Anamnese be-

zeichnen kann – es ist implizit und prägend und ermöglicht den Sprachbenutzern das Sich-Auskennen in einer Gemeinschaft. Wenn das Gedächtnis durch in Vergleichen erworbenes Wissen geprägt ist, das den Abgleich der Differenzen und Ähnlichkeiten in ein praktisches Wissen über unsere Sprache münden läßt, wirft dies ein Licht auf die „Erinnerungen“: Es sind Bausteine, nicht nur Vorstufen zu dem, was der Philosoph in ihrem Zusammentragen gewinnen möchte. Es geht um „Einfachheit und Alltäglichkeit“ (PU 129), nicht um Kompliziertes, Gesuchtes. Die „Erinnerungen“ sind erfahrungs- und urteils gesättigt und reichen über den Status der „Vorstudie“ (PU 130) hinaus. Sie sind Beispiele, deren Ähnlichkeit und Unähnlichkeit untereinander auf überindividuelle Regelmäßigkeiten der „Verhältnisse unserer Sprache“ hinweist, Vergleichsobjekte, nicht ein „Vorurteil, dem die Wirklichkeit entsprechen *müsse*“ (PU 130). Die normative Komponente wird schwächer, die zusammenzutragenden Erinnerungen sind wirklichkeitsgeprüft und durch konkrete Gebrauchsweisen beglaubigt. Wie wir keine Thesen in der Philosophie aufstellen, ist die sprachliche Ordnung „eine von vielen möglichen Ordnungen; nicht *die* Ordnung.“ (PU 132). Die Sprache *arbeitet* und kennt unterschiedliche Arbeitsweisen. Diese Arbeitsweisen sind *gegeben*, daher kann eine Reformierung der Sprache nicht stattfinden, weil sie sich in fortlaufenden Modifikationen *im Gebrauch* reformiert, ohne daß ein handelnder Akteur eingriffe. Veränderungen sind nicht in den Händen von Menschen, die „...das Regelsystem für die Verwendung unserer Worte in unerhörter Weise verfeinern oder vervollständigen“ (PU 133). Eine solche Verfeinerung ist angesichts der gebrauchsorientierten Methoden sprachlicher Selbstveränderung nicht vonnöten. Wie „nun an den Beispielen eine Methode gezeigt“ wird, kann man die Reihe der Beispiele abbrechen, sie sind Ausdruck einer Sprachpraxis, die Erinnerungen zueinander in ein Verhältnis setzt, wie es (PU 130) die Sprachspiele untereinander betrifft: Es sind Vergleichsobjekte, die nicht auf frühere normative Bindungen strikt rekurren, sondern die sich verändernde Sprache zeigen, was durch Erinnerungen deutlich wird, die auf eine Sozialität verweisen, in der das Mit- und Nebeneinander verschiedener Sprachformen produktiv wird. Die „verschiedenen Therapien“ der Philosophie (PU 133) entsprechen der Art und Weise, wie das Material philosophischer Untersuchung gewonnen wird: Philosophie, deren Ziel das Zur-Ruhe-kommen, das Sich-Auskennen, nicht das Erneuern der Sprache ist, sieht nicht mehr Vorstellungsbilder mentalistisch als bedeutungskonstitutiv und -differenzierend an. Die individuelle Erinnerung an den Urlaub in Amalfi verweist auf eine umfassendere Bedingungsstruktur ihrer Konstitution, die im gemeinsamen Regelfolgen und geteilten Auffassungen besteht. Die Differenzen und Ähnlichkeiten der individuellen Erinnerun-

gen verweisen auf jene, die in der von mehreren geteilten Sprachpraxis zusammentreffen, in der sich der Sprachkörper konturiert, den wir kennen. Er steht nicht fest, sondern benötigt verschiedene Methoden, verschiedene Therapien. Aus der Mannigfaltigkeit der Umstände und der heterogenen Qualität der Sprache, die eine Einigung nicht festschreibt, ergibt sich die Funktion des individuellen Gedächtnisses für die philosophische Untersuchung: Erinnerungen an Sprachverwendungsweisen stellen Bausteine für Modifikationen der Erinnerungen untereinander dar. Der „bestimmte Zweck“ (PU 127) läßt sich nun näher bestimmen: Er ist Zweck einer Mehrzahl von Menschen, deren Erinnerungen sprachmodifizierende Prozesse wiedergeben. Die „Erinnerungen“ changieren zwischen der Individualform der Erinnerung und dem methodischen Ziel des Zusammentragens des „bestimmten Zweckes“. Was das Gedächtnis bewahrt, wird aktiviert im Blick auf die soziale Seite der Erinnerungen; diese *arbeiten* in einem größeren Zusammenhang und werden auf überindividuelle Vergleichbarkeit hin befragt. PU 127 erinnert daran, daß philosophisch mit Wörtern über Wörter gesprochen wird; Erinnerungen können die Aufgabe übernehmen, das Un auffällige qua Vergleich hervortreten lassen (PU 129) durch das konturierende Spiel von Unterscheidungen und Ähnlichkeiten in der Sprache. Wittgenstein durchreist ein Gebiet von Gebrauchsweisen, in denen Merkmale philosophischer Untersuchung deutlich werden: Sich an diese Landschaft zu erinnern heißt, sich an sprachprägende Gebrauchsweisen zu erinnern, die von der Vorstellung autoritativer sprachentscheidender Subjektstärke in den Resonanzraum geteilter, heterogener und verhandelbarer Ordnungsformen einer Sozialität übergegangen sind, die, nachmetaphysisch, durch grammatische Standards bestimmt ist.

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Sind Kopfschmerz, die Bedeutung des Wortes „Kopfschmerz“ und Erkenntnis eigenes Kopfschmerzes privat?

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Abstract

Das Ziel dieses Textes ist eine Erklärung Wittgensteins Hauptgedanken über psychologische Begriffe wie „Kopfschmerz“ in seinen *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*. Dabei wird betrachtet, inwiefern der Kopfschmerz selbst, die Bedeutung dieses Wortes und die Erkenntnis der Empfindung eines Kopfschmerzes tatsächlich privat sein können. Nach Wittgenstein kann nur der Kopfschmerz ontologisch privat sein. Die Bedeutung des Wortes „Kopfschmerz“ und die Erkenntnis eines eigenen Kopfschmerzes sind jedoch nicht privat. Diese Überlegungen über psychische Ausdrücke scheinen uns folgende Vorteile zu bringen: (1) Er bietet uns eine entmystifizierte Erklärung psychischer Begriffe an. (2) Da die Bedeutungen psychischer Begriffe nicht privat sind und es keinen privilegierten epistemischen Zugang auf unsere psychischen Zustände gibt, muss das „Ich“ nicht skeptisch darüber sein, ob die anderen auch einen Kopfschmerz wie das „Ich“ empfinden kann. (3) Allerdings mündet diese Position nicht in einem Solipsismus, denn nicht nur die eigenen Empfindungen sind wirklich, sondern auch die Empfindungen der anderen.

„Wenn sie mich verlassen hat, ist der Schmerz nur mein Schmerz und sonst von niemandem mehr. Den Anderen gebe ich ihr Mitleid zurück. Ich habe meinen eigenen Schmerz“
(Marisa Monte und Arnaldo Antunes).¹

Einleitung

Das oben zitierte Sambastück drückt eine Idee aus, die fast jeder normale Menschverstand vertreten würde. Wittgenstein ist aber skeptisch, ob man aus dieser empirischen Tatsache schließen kann, dass wir einen epistemischen privilegierten Zugang auf unsere eigenen mentalen Zustände haben. Allerdings können die andere über unsere eigenen mentalen Zustände Bescheid wissen. Der Hauptgrund dafür ist: „mentale Zustände“ sind auf Verhaltensdispositionen zurückführbar und beziehen sich auf keine private Episode. Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es eine Erklärung Wittgensteins Hauptgedanken über psychologische Begriffe wie „Kopfschmerz“ in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* anzubieten und zu überlegen, inwiefern die Erkenntnis mentaler Zustände wie zum Beispiel die Empfindung eines Kopfschmerzes tatsächlich privat ist.

Diese Fragen umfassen die folgenden Bedeutungen des Begriffes „privat“:

- (a) X ist privat, wenn nur ich x *haben* kann. Die anderen können nur etwas ähnliches wie x haben (Ontologieebene).
- (b) Ein Wort x ist privat, wenn die Bedeutung von x unmitteilbar ist (Sprachebene).
- (c) Die Erkenntnis eines mentalen Zustandes x ist privat, wenn nur ich *wissen* kann, dass ich x habe. Die anderen können nur eine Ahnung davon haben (Epistemologieebene).

1. Ist ein Kopfschmerz privat?

Auf diese Frage haben wir eine klare *affirmative* Antwort, denn es geht hier um eine *empirische Tatsache*, dass wir einen Kopfschmerz nicht empfinden können, der in einem anderen Wesen lokalisiert ist. Dies heißt jedoch nicht, dass

sowohl die Bedeutung des Begriffes „Kopfschmerz“ als auch die Erkenntnis des eigenen Kopfschmerzes privat sind. Die nächsten Punkte mögen dies deutlicher erklären.

2. Ist die Bedeutung des Wortes „Kopfschmerz“ privat?

Auf diese Frage bietet Wittgenstein eine *negative* Antwort. In seinen *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* lehnt er eine Konzeption der Sprache durch das Modell „Bezeichnung und Gegenstand“ ab. Dieses Muster beruht nur auf die Beobachtung der primitiven Bezeichnung. Die Bedeutung des Wortes wird in den meisten Fällen durch seinen Gebrauch bestimmt. Genauso werden die Bedeutungen psychologischer Begriffe in den intersubjektiven Sprachspielen begriffen. Der Begriff „Kopfschmerz“ ist nun nicht privat, d.h., er gehört nicht zu keiner Privatsprache. Unter „Privatsprache“ versteht man eine Sprache, die nicht mitteilbar oder nicht intersubjektiv ist. Die Existenz einer Privatsprache ist jedoch unmöglich, da die Verwendung der Wörter einer solchen Sprache sinnlos wäre. Das entscheidende Argument dafür ist, dass man nicht einer Regel *privatim* folgen kann, denn es gäbe kein Kriterium für ihre Richtigkeit oder für den Unterschied zwischen einer *Regel folgen* und einer *Regel zu folgen glauben*. Das Muster der Korrektheit einer Regel muss gemeinsam sein, d.h. verifizierbar. Dabei sollte man beachten, dass man die Erfahrung der Empfindung eines Kopfschmerzes nicht haben muss, um zu verstehen, was das Wort „Kopfschmerz“ bedeutet. Man muss auch nicht wissen, was das Wort „Kopfschmerz“ bedeutet, um einen Kopfschmerz zu empfinden.

3. Ist die Erkenntnis eigenes Kopfschmerzes privat?

Nach Wittgenstein muss man auf die obere Frage eine *negative* Antwort geben. Obwohl nur wir in der Tat den eigenen Kopfschmerz empfinden können, ist das Haben eines Kopfschmerzes nicht wie ein Käfer, den eine Person in eine Schachtel getan hat, und kein anderer wissen kann, was in dieser Schachtel existiert (PU: §293). Betrachten wir die folgenden Aussagen:

- (1) „Ich habe Kopfschmerzen“.

¹ Eigene Übersetzung des Liedauschnitts „De mais ninguém“ („Von niemandem sonst mehr“).

Das „Ich“ bezieht sich eigentlich nicht auf einen bestimmten Gegenstand, sondern auf denjenigen, der dieses Wort spricht (BB: 107). In manchen Situationen kann ein „Ich-Satz“ eine *Beschreibung* sein. Wenn ich z.B. sage:

- (2) „Ich bin Angela Merkel“.

In diesem Fall referiert sich das „Ich“ auf mich selbst. Diese Aussage ist aber falsch, da ich nicht Angela Merkel bin. Wenn diese Aussage aber von Angela Merkel behauptet wird, wird sie nun wahr sein. Das Beispiel zeigt zwei wichtige Eigenschaften der Beschreibungen: Sie sind (i) *informativ* und (ii) *korrigierbar*.

Nach Wittgenstein sind die „Ich-Sätze“ über die ganz aktuellen bewussten mentalen Zustände, in denen das „Ich“ als das grammatikalische Subjekt fungiert, keine Beschreibungen, sondern natürliche *Manifestationen mentaler Zustände, Äußerungen oder Ausdrucksformen*, denn aus der Perspektive des Subjektes sind sie nicht informativ und unkorrigierbar. Betrachten wir noch andere Sätze:

- (3) „Aua“.
(4) „Sie hat Kopfschmerzen“.

Abgesehen davon, dass der Sprecher den Satz (1) ernst meint, ist sie prinzipiell nicht zweifelhaft und korrigierbar, aber keine Beschreibung von kognitiven Einstellungen, sondern nur eine Äußerung, denn sie drückt keinen Erkenntnisprozess aus. Die Erkenntnis einer Tatsache x setzt die Möglichkeit der Ignoranz von x voraus. Im Fall des „Haben“ eines Kopfschmerzes ist es jedoch unmöglich. Der Satz (1) hat keine deskriptive Bedeutung, sondern eine expressive Bedeutung wie der Ausdruck (2) „aua“ oder ein Verhalten wie stöhnen, schreien. Damit wird nicht gesagt, dass das Wort „Schmerz“ identisch mit dem Schreien ist. Vielmehr ersetzt das Wort „Schmerz“ das „Schreien“ (PU: §243). Statt (1) zu sagen, kann eine andere Person die *Beschreibung* (4) aussprechen. Die Möglichkeit von (4) in der gemeinsamen Sprache zeigt schon, dass es etwas wie ein gemeinsames natürliches Schmerzverhalten gibt, das uns die Kommunikation dieser Tatsachen ermöglicht. Der Umgang mit psychologischen Vorgängen ist nicht intern und subjektiv, sondern intersubjektiv, denn ein innerer Vorgang bedarf äußerer Kriterien (PU: §580).

Ein Vertreter der These des epistemischen privilegierten Zugangs auf unsere mentalen Zustände kann dagegen argumentieren, dass es in der Aussage (1) um eine sichere Erkenntnis geht und die Aussage (4) aus einer Vermutung besteht. Der Aussage (4) würde nun entsprechen:

- (5) „Ich vermute, dass sie Kopfschmerzen hat“.

Ein Gegenargument wäre: Die Verwendung des Wortes „vermuten“ steht aber hier nicht im Gegensatz zu der des Wortes „wissen“. In der Aussage (4) wird nicht behauptet, dass das Wissen ein Ziel war, das erreicht werden konnte. Trotzdem kann man wie Brentano so argumentieren:

- Wir haben eine direkte innere Wahrnehmung von unseren psychischen Akten. Unter „innere Wahrnehmung“ versteht man keine Introspektion, sondern eine natürliche, bewusste psychische Tätigkeit.
- Da wir eine direkte Wahrnehmung von unseren psychischen Akten haben können, ist die Erkenntnis über unsere psychischen Akte evident. Wenn ich zum Beispiel einen Apfelkuchen wünsche, habe ich eine direkte Wahrnehmung zu diesem Wunsch und kann nun sicher sein, dass ich diesen Wunsch habe. Das nennt er *evidentes Urteil*. Aus der Tatsache unserer Selbsterfahrung

durch die innere Wahrnehmung gehen wir nun davon aus, dass, wenn jemand sich am Kopf verletzt und stöhnt, er auch eine direkte Wahrnehmung von seinen Schmerzen hat.

- Obwohl wir zu fremden psychischen Akten keine direkte Wahrnehmung haben, können wir eine *indirekte Erkenntnis* davon haben, welchen Schmerz z.B. jemand empfindet, der den Kopf verletzt hat. Der Andere kann es uns nicht nur sprachlich kundgeben, sondern auch durch sein Verhalten und seine Gesten. Eine dritte Möglichkeit besteht in unseren physiologischen Veränderungen wie zum Beispiel dem Erblassen des Gesichtes aus Schreck, der Errötung des Gesichtes vor Scham usw. Die psychischen Akte sind nun privat, aber *kommunizierbar* (PSE: §4).

Statt (5) kann man nun sagen:

- (6) „Ich habe eine indirekte Erkenntnis davon, dass sie Kopfschmerz hat“.

Nach Wittgenstein kann man nur sinnvoll sagen, dass wir eine *indirekte Erkenntnis* anderer mentalen Zustände haben, falls man auch von einer direkten Erkenntnis unserer mentalen Zustände reden kann. Im Bereich des Psychischen haben wir aber keine Erkenntnis eigener mentaler Zustände, sondern wir haben sie einfach (PU: §246). Schauen wir den folgenden Satz an:

- (7) „Ich weiß, dass ich Kopfschmerz habe“.

Die oben genannte Aussage referiert auf dieselbe Tatsache wie (1) und ist überflüssig. Der Ausdruck „ich weiß es“ bedeutet „ich bezweifle es nicht“, was in dem Fall unmöglich wäre. Das Verb „wissen“ hat nun hier einen ungewöhnlichen Sinn. Das „Wissen ist ja sein eigener Seelenzustand“ (Z: 408). Man könnte hier dagegen einwenden, dass die Aussage (1) falsch sein kann, denn es ist auch möglich, dass ich lüge. Aus diesem Grund müsste (1) jedoch eine Beschreibung sein. Bei solchen Fällen stellt man aber nur die Ehrlichkeit des Sprechers in Frage. Es wäre sinnvoll zu fragen, ob die Person damit tatsächlich eine wahre Aussage spricht, aber nicht, ob sie sicher ist, dass sie Kopfschmerz hat. Außerdem kann man nur über x lügen, wenn man zuerst an x glaubt. Die Aussage:

- (8) „Ich weiß nicht, ob ich Kopfschmerzen habe“

ist genauso wie die Aussage (7) weder wahr noch falsch, sondern sinnlos. Von mir kann man solche Aussagen nicht behaupten. Es sei denn es um Ironie geht. Dies heißt: Das, was Brentano *evidentes Urteil* in seiner *Psychologie* nennt, wird von Wittgenstein nicht als eine Erkenntnis erkannt.² Man könnte aber sagen:

- (9) „Ich bin bewusst darüber, dass ich Kopfschmerz habe“.

Die Sätze über bewusste Zustände sind nach Wittgenstein keine Beobachtungssätze, denn das Bewusstsein ist nicht etwas, das man privat bemerken und auffinden kann. Was man beobachten kann, ist die Verwendung des Wortes „Bewusstsein“ und dessen Manifestationen. Das Wort „Bewusstsein“ bezieht sich auf keine private Episode, die in uns passiert. Diese Gewissheit des Bewusstseins „ist wie eine große Kraft, deren Angriffspunkt sich nicht bewegt; die keine Arbeit leistet“ (Z: §402). Aus diesem Grund sind die Aussagen (7) und (9) teilweise redundant.

Beim Fall eines Kopfschmerzes gibt es keinen Platz für einen Fehler oder ein Zweifel, weil das Haben eines Kopf-

² Wir wollen hier auf einen Vergleich zwischen diesen beiden Philosophen nicht eingehen.

schmerzes und die Empfindung eines Kopfschmerzes untrennbar sind. Statt (1) sollte man nun einfach sagen:

(10) „Ich empfinde einen Kopfschmerz“.

Da eine andere Person meinen Kopfschmerz nicht empfinden kann, ist das „Ich“ in (1) redundant und nicht informativ. Das „Ich“ ist eliminierbar, denn durch eine Introspektion kann man kein „Ich“ finden und es referiert sich hier auf einen Körperlosen, der jedoch einen Sitz in unserem Körper hat (BB: 110). Das „Ich“ ist nun durch die Beschreibung eines Körpers nicht ersetzbar. Statt (1) kann man nun auch behaupten:

(11) „Es gibt einen Kopfschmerz“.

Mann kann aber dagegen einwenden: Das Wort „Ich“ unterscheidet dasjenige, das den Schmerz empfindet, von den anderen. Außerdem bedarf der Kopfschmerz einen Träger. Wer ist aber der Träger eines Kopfschmerzes? Nach Frege ist der Träger eines Kopfschmerzes derjenige, der den Kopfschmerz empfindet. Nach Wittgenstein scheint der Träger eines Schmerzes derjenige, der den Schmerz manifestiert, zu sein. Diese These ist für einige schwer zu akzeptieren.

(...) Ich habe gesehen, wie jemand in einer Diskussion über diesen Gegenstand sich an die Brust schlug und sagte: >> Aber der Andre kann doch nicht DIESEN Schmerz haben! << - Die Antwort darauf ist, daß man durch das emphatische Betonen des Wortes >> diesen << kein Kriterium der Identität definiert. Die Emphase spiegelt uns viel mehr nur den Fall vor, daß ein solches Kriterium uns geläufig ist, wir aber daran erinnert werden müssen (PU: §253)

Nach Wittgenstein ist das Betonen des Wortes „diesen“ hier hilflos. In diesem Kontext ist der Unterschied zwischen *numerischer* und *qualitativer Identität* erwähnenswert. Die qualitative Identität ist eine *Gleichheit* (x ist *das gleiche* wie y). Wenn man sagt:

(12) „Anna und Maria empfinden *den gleichen* Kopfschmerz“.

Dies würde nur sinnvoll sein, wenn sie dieselben Symptome aufzeigen. Bei der numerischen Identität geht es um eine *Selbigkeit* (x ist *dasselbe* wie y) wie zum Beispiel:

(13) „Anna und Maria empfinden *denselben* Kopfschmerz“.

Numerisch gibt es nun zwei „Kopfschmerzen“: (i) den Kopfschmerz, den Anna empfindet, und (ii) den Kopfschmerz, den Maria empfindet. Die Aussage (13) wäre nur sinnvoll, wenn sie entweder dieselbe Person oder siamesische Zwillingen sind, die denselben Kopf haben. Nach Wittgenstein scheint sich dieser Einwand jedoch vielmehr gegen eine sprachliche Konvention zu richten. Es wäre unproblematisch zu sagen, dass sie denselben Kopfschmerz erfahren, selbst wenn sie unterschiedliche Personen sind. Das Problem bei der numerischen Identität im Bereich des Psychischen ist, dass man auf eine Empfindung nicht *zeigen* kann. Dies wäre nicht der gewöhnliche Sinne des Wortes „zeigen“.

Jetzt kann man vielleicht besser verstehen, warum der Träger eines Kopfschmerzes in diesem Sprachspiel vielmehr derjenige zu sein erscheint, der einen Kopfschmerz manifestiert, denn eine Person selbst kann auf ihren eigenen Kopfschmerz nicht zeigen. Aus der Perspektive der dritten Person ist der Träger eines Kopfschmerzes derjenige, der ein Verhaltens des Kopfschmerzempfinden aufzeigt. Diese These sieht aber immer noch nicht ganz überzeugend aus, denn eine Person kann einen Schmerz emp-

finden, ohne das entsprechende normalen Schmerzverhalten auszudrücken. Wobei sie trotzdem noch der Träger ihrer Schmerzen bleibt. Die Tatsache, dass es möglich ist, dass eine Person ihre Empfindungen nicht äußert, wird von Wittgenstein nicht übersehen. Er beharrt trotzdem darauf, dass dieses Paradox sich aufgelöst wird, wenn man sich von der Idee der Sprache als das Modell „Bezeichnung und Gegenstand“ befreit (PU: §304). Denn eine Empfindung ist nicht wie ein Buch, das gezeigt und genauso bezeichnet werden kann.

4. Schlussbemerkungen

Insgesamt lässt sich *resümieren*: Die Bedeutung des Wortes „Kopfschmerz“ ist nicht privat, aber der eigene Kopfschmerz schon. Die Erkenntnis der Empfindung eines Kopfschmerzes ist auch nicht privat. Seiner Meinung nach wissen die anderen sehr häufig, wenn wir Schmerzen erfahren. Die Erkenntnis über eigene aktuelle psychologische Zustände, die Wittgenstein eigentlich akzeptiert, kommt aus der Perspektive der anderen, denn von mir kann man nicht sinnvoll sagen, dass ich weiß, dass ich Kopfschmerzen habe. Beim Fall der Anwendung des Wortes „wissen“ beschränkt er sich nun auf die grammatische Konvention dieses Wortes. Man könnte aber auch behaupten, dass diese Kritik sich nur auf eine grammatische Konvention richtet. Außerdem können wir weder eine direkte Erkenntnis über unsere eigenen Empfindungen noch eine indirekte Erkenntnis für fremde Empfindungen haben, denn die extreme gegenseitige Verdoppelung „Innenwelt“ und „Außenwelt“, die eine lange philosophische Tradition hat, ist zweifelhaft.

Wittgensteins Überlegungen über psychische Begriffe scheint uns folgende Vorteile zu bringen: (1) Er biete uns eine entmystifizierte Erklärung psychischer Begriffe an. (2) Da die Bedeutungen für psychische Begriffe nicht privat sind und es kein privilegierten epistemischen Zugang auf unsere psychischen Zustände gibt, muss das „Ich“ nicht skeptisch darüber sein, ob die anderen auch einen Kopfschmerz wie das „Ich“ empfinden kann. (3) Allerdings mündet diese Position nicht in einem Solipsismus, denn nicht nur die eigenen Empfindungen sind wirklich, sondern auch die Empfindungen der anderen.

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A Machine as a Symbol. Philosophical Investigations # 193=194: A Close Reading

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Abstract

In this paper I will deal with remarks # 193-94 of the *Philosophical Investigations* on a machine as a symbol. I will make first a distinction that is inspired by Hans Vaihinger (1852-1933) given in his book *"The Philosophy of As If"*. He distinguishes between; A) thought processes. B) Creative processes. C) Symbolic fictions, or between functional-functions, applications and fictional-symbolic-functions. In PI # 193 I will mainly deal with the symbolic-fictions which directly correspond to the; "as if". The "as if" I will connect with our way we talk about a machine by our picture-symbols. In PI # 194 there is a clash between the machine as a picture-symbol and a machine as a model to which modal-modes are attached but still operate by picture-symbols while the modal-modes are logical functions. The use of possible movements by pictures and in daily life both in terms of the modal-modes is the main part of my interpretation of PI # 194. I take it that Wittgenstein had in PI # 193 the picture theory of the 'Tractatus' in mind while in PI # 194 his language game method.

The machine as a symbol P.I. # 193/94

This paper will deal with two remarks of the *Philosophical Investigations* # 193-194 which have as a topic the 'machine-symbol', they first appear in Ms. 119. Volume XV and were written in Skjolden on the 26th September 1937. Wittgenstein originally planned these remarks for the mathematical part of the PI (TS 221). After he decided not include this part in what we now call the Early Version of the PI, he used them for the PI (TS 227) as we now have it.

Picture-Symbol

A) The term 'symbol' is used by Wittgenstein in the technical sense, when it is a logical proposition expressed in logical symbols. Logical symbols are besides symbols for properties also functions as signs of negation, conjunction etc. and can function only together with the calculus. When logical symbols are defined they are contradictions. B) Symbols that represent ideas, imaginations or images (*Vorstellungen*) can be easily made by us, for instance when we imagine a dream kitchen than that kitchen-picture will be the symbol for this or that ideal kitchen, or when we start with our ideas and link these ideas directly up with our pictures, these pictures are symbols for these ideas when we describe them. The relations between these ideas as picture-symbols, and our convictions grounded in belief, make us talk 'as if' that what we describe also exists the way we describe it, 'as if' our propositions correspond to the functioning of that machine but in fact we are as children talking to their dolls. Descriptions by picture-symbols are by definition contingent as the calculus cannot be used. C) Here we can also make a distinction between picture-symbols and symbols that are used in combinations with pictures of series or as models or samples, than they can be read by rules while picture-symbols cannot be read by rules. Or when we are faced with picture-symbols we cannot speak of rule following.

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A machine as a symbol of its mode of operation. The machine I might say for a start seems already to contain its own mode of operation. What does that mean? If we know the machine, everything else – that is the movements it will make – seems to be already completely determined. We talk as if these parts could only move in this way, as if they could not do anything else. Is this how it is?" (PI # 193).

A machine as a symbol is the direct product of our idea of a machine, while when we start with a real machine and know how it works, our descriptions follow from the rules of its modes of operation. Our idea-symbol of a machine in time is on the other hand so to speak a whole given all at once, and all our descriptions refer by symbols to that fictional idea, and we forget how it actually works as a physical object. But when we describe a real machine in time by a factual model of that machine, than our description are related directly to that machine, to which we can point and show that it works that way, our descriptions are factual and referential. When we talk about a machine like a philosopher does with no technical knowledge, functions are attributed by convictions, that rest on belief and not on knowledge. The applications consist then of symbolic-fictions. Here we have to lay the stress to "as if" meaning our symbolic-fictions and our symbolic fictional-functions. This we may contrast with what Hans Vaihinger said in his "The Philosophy Of 'As if'": "The concept on which the whole of mechanics and mathematics is based of 'empty time' as a firm and lasting construction, a form as Kant assumed it to be, is a fiction based on an abstractive and one sided isolation. All these concepts are contradictory fictions" (*Philosophy of As If*. p. 51). "We use a machine or a picture of a machine, as a symbol of a particular mode of operation". (193). Namely in our idea of a machine as a symbol, we forget all the technical details, just as when we are love with a design of a car for the sake of its design, or when we talk about bodily beauty we forget the functions of the body. When our assertions and belief grounded

convictions have pictures as its source, than our propositions are symbolically related to these pictures or ideas of it, and our descriptions describe its mode of operation by symbolic-fictions. For instance pictures of computers in a commercial leaflet without technical details, they are then presented to us as ideal-symbols. Or when we compare plans with plans, or objects with objects we produce automatically projections that we attach to images onto our private-objects and in relations to their names that are independent of our images and function by symbols, while our projections are functions of our picture-symbols. In this sense also the *Tractatus* is not a workable model but consists out of ideas that are expressed in picture-symbols and present it as a critical ideal. As Anscombe remarked in her introduction to the *Tractatus*; "Wittgenstein used to say that the '*Tractatus*' was not 'all' wrong: it was not like a bag of junk professing to be a clock, but like a clock that not tell you the right time" (Introduction p. 78). Anscombe continues: "But if the models are themselves working mechanisms, the 'precedent' to which one would want to appeal would be in the models themselves. And so it is, Wittgenstein says, with 'significant' propositions". (Introduction p. 159). From an idea that we use as a picture when we describe that idea, our expressions do not contain functional propositions as they are only descriptions of images (*Vorstellungen*), that refer to ways we look at things from the outside. But a picture can also be applied as a formula that stands in symbolic relations to series. "For instance we give someone such a picture and assume that he will derive the successive movements of the parts from it. (Just as we can give someone a number by telling that it is the twentieth-fifth in the series 1, 4,9,16, ...)". (193) The person who cannot calculate would not be able to do so after the sample-picture, and when he does know how to calculate he does it not do by means of the sample-picture, but by calculating and for this he does not need a sample-picture. What the sample-picture will do is to show how it should be done, by that picture he can go on when he knows that series and can carry out what is requested from him at any point in time, the picture is a reminder of what he already knows. "The machine seems already to contain its own mode of operation means: we are inclined to compare the future movements of the machine in their definiteness to objects which we have lying in a drawer and which we take out". (193). This passage has puzzled many interpreters but what Wittgenstein means is, I think, that we have on the one hand the machine as a picture-symbol, and on the other the elements of that machine that we can name. This we can link up with Lecture XX of the LFM: "But isn't it queer – that a mechanism is treated as a general explanation? What do I show you when I show you a mechanism? I show you cogwheels and pins" (p.195). These elements, the names as cogwheel and pin we can take, so to speak, out of a drawer, as the names for these elements are not fixed to this or that machine, and we can produce propositions that we first fix in our mind. We have then our propositions formulated by the use of general ideas and names while a physical real machine functions by a specific program. But my descriptions that can give the impression 'as if' a machine 'behaves' and not how the machine 'functions' as a machine. "But we don't say this kind of thing when it is a matter of predicting the actual behaviour of a machine. Then we do not general forget the possibility of a distortion of the parts and so on" (193). As what we say presupposes dispositions and not mechanical functions, or we have here the same word 'distortions' in the *anima* and in the mechanical sense. When we talk for instance about a robot we compare it by analogy with human behaviour, our symbols can consist out of a series of ways of moving for instance. "We do talk like that, however, when we are wondering at the way we can use a machine as a symbol

of some way of moving – since it can, after all, also move quite differently" (193). Here we can convince ourselves by our language use that follows from our picture-symbols as a series, is restricted to those pictures, as they are fixed in our mind, this order forces particular applications (PI 140). While a robot can move multi-functional, our series as pictures-symbols are blind to that multi-functional mechanism, that is a whole that consist out of parts of which our complete idea is just the opposite. Here in contrast we can place the use of language games that follow out of rules, and are not like the use of picture-symbols, or the use of pictures in the *Tractatus* that can only be applied by elementary propositions, that produce facts and are either true or false, thus without the use of modal-modes, without the use of the calculus an herein lies in fact Wittgenstein's critique in the PI. The picture-symbol also due to our projections make it seem as if its real functions are hidden inside the machine; "But when we reflect that the machine could also have moved differently, it may now look as if the way it moves must be contained in the machine qua symbol still more determinately than in an actual machine" (193). We relate our descriptions to the machine, and are convinced, that our descriptions are related to the operations of the actual machine, the crucial difference is however that symbols are not functions of a calculus but our own projections. Wittgenstein concludes; "And it is quite true: the movement of the machine qua symbol is predetermined in a different way from how the movement of any given actual machine is". (193). How we as philosophers talk about machines Kripke also ironically remarked; "The term 'machine' is here, as often elsewhere in philosophy, ambiguous. Few of us are in a position to build a machine or to draw up a program to embody our intentions" (On Rules p. 33).

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In # 194 there is a clash between the idea-picture-symbol of a machine, dealt with in # 193, and now Wittgenstein deals with the machine-symbol-model in relations to the modal-modes; necessary and possible. The clash lies in the fact that in the idea of a machine as a model it remains a symbol, while its modal-modes are logical functions, or we can speak of a clash between sign and symbol. In these differences I take it that Wittgenstein had in mind in # 193 the *Tractatus* and in # 194 his language game method. "When does one have the thought that a machine already contains its possible movements in some mysterious way? – Well, when one is doing philosophy." (194). The projection of our complete idea of a machine by picture-symbols is here by a model-machine to which modal-modes, like possible, are attached, and they can be related also for instance to; 'how is it possible that?' than again picture-symbols are used and not mechanical functions. The possible movements of a machine are based for an empirical philosopher on physical models that are clothed in a physicalistic language. In terms of language games however for the empirical condition of movement, one could imagine by the possibilities of use of the word 'movement' also other kinds of movements. This means that our philosophical empirical uses of the word 'rigid' always will have loopholes, as it does not go by mechanic rigid functions. The notion of 'all' is a logical notion which is only complete when 'all' correspond to logical necessity (internal). Or how do we apply all possible movements and how do we understand this? "We say for instance that the machine has such-and-such possibilities of movement; we speak of an ideally rigid machine which can move only thus-and-so" (194). The word rigid was also a topic in Lecture XX of the LFM where Wittgenstein applied it both to a

machine and laws with total different meanings, or when we apply the word rigid we use it as a symbol, only we do not understand it as a symbol, as the applications are wrapped up in it. It is only when we apply the symbol, the identity of the subject is on the propositional level revealed to us, while the name of the symbol remains the same, its relations consist of symbolic-functions and our understanding is descriptive. For Wittgenstein and for Hertz models function by rules the applications of these rules are governed in our understanding by pictures. How do we as philosophers understand 'possible movements' as Wittgenstein claims by pictures? The term picture is a stronger version from the word image (Vorstellung). When we imagine movements of a machine or when we see by our pictures these movements, than in both cases we imagine these movements as shadow-like of their actual functions as we do not know them. But what about possible movements? "And by a shadow I do not mean some picture of the movement – for such a picture would not have to be a picture of just this movement (See how the seas of language run here!)" (194). This picture of this movement is at the same time also a possible movement of my picture of the functions of possible movements, or from the picture point of view you cannot count a possible movement. When I reason by my picture only than both a possible and an actual movement are pictures of movement, as I understand the functions of a machine by pictures, and its relations I understand by means of symbols. Or the modal-mode 'possible movements' in combination with pictures breaks here down as we have both a contradiction and a vicious circle. And here we have an indirect critique of his picture theory. "The waves subside as soon as we ask ourselves: how do we use the phrase 'possibility of movement'". (194). Here we must make a sharp difference between the criteria for understanding rules by pictures, that is by symbols and rules, that we follow by signs or consist in interactions of understandings by relations between symbols and signs. The topic in # 194 is our general understanding in relations to our understanding by pictures that function as symbols. In the usual sense we see possible movements as external movements. The external use of the possibility of movement in time is just any movement that we daily observe, as a second before it happened we would not have guessed it, that we would see just this movement and; "We never discuss whether this is the possibility of this or that movement" (194). The understanding of the phrase 'possible movements' in terms of daily movements is closer to our understanding than pictures of these movements. From the picture point of view the subject is the symbol, as the same words can be used for different subjects, that is have the same symbol, it is only when we apply words the subject is revealed. Therefore the subject of pictures can always be doubted as I can guess just as in paintings the subject of this or that painting. Or we hold a picture by symbolic relations analogue to seeing the contents of a painting by symbolic relations. But here we operate on a meta-level of abstractions, that is not on our concrete daily life where rule following goes by signs not by symbols, as than we would never be able to find our way about. Wittgenstein next point is that signs show how they work once we have understood the rules. And we have to lay the stress here on showing as our experiences of signs we remember by pictures. "We say, Ex-

perience will show whether this gives the pin this possibility of movement, but we do not say, experience will show whether this is the possibility of this movement; so it is not a matter of experience that this possibility is the possibility of just this movement"(194). Experiences cannot show possible movements as they are already movement as part of our experiences. In terms of experiential or empirical propositions this means that we can also imagine the opposite (RFM IV, 4). In his first remarks about the machine as a symbol Wittgenstein finished it with; "In all cases the difficulty comes from the confusing 'is' and 'is called' (MS 109/PO). We call our experiences our experiences and they go by selecting, and they can only be made understood by the use of symbols. The extensions of possible in philosophy is that of appearance and the as if as Wittgenstein remarked; "It is only apparently possible 'to transcend any possible experience' even these only seem to make sense, because they are arranged on the analogy of significant expression." "The 'philosophy of as if' itself rests wholly on this shifting between simile and reality" (Z. 260/61). The last part of # 194 Wittgenstein relates this looking in the pictorial way at machines and describes them from outside from anthropological point of as that what savages and primitive people also did. "Though we do pay attention to the way we talks about these matters, we don't understand it, but misinterpret it. When we do philosophy we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the way civilized people talk, put a false interpretation on it, and then draw the oddest conclusions from this" (195). This we can relate to; "Primitive languages are picture languages. And the idea then that we translate these pictures into words" (MS 160/PO p.419). May we conclude that philosopher go wild by their pictures and then draw the oddest conclusions as our language use is by definition ambiguous?

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Wittgenstein's Conception of Space and the Modernist Transformation of Geometry via Duality

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Abstract

Wittgenstein's disagreement with the set-theoretical view of mathematics led him to the idea that space is not an extensional collection of points, but the intensional realisation of a law. Brouwer's theory of the continuum is arguably based upon the point-free conception of space qua law; this would exhibit yet another case of Brouwer's influence on Wittgenstein's philosophy (in particular of space). I consider the conception of space qua law to represent epistemology of space, and the conception of space qua points to represent ontology of space. From this perspective, modern geometry, such as Topos Theory, Algebraic and Non-Commutative Geometry, and Formal Topology, some of which are conceptual ramifications of Brouwer's intuitionism, yields rich instances of duality between epistemology and ontology of space. Links with Brentano, Husserl, Whitehead, Cassirer, Granger, Lawvere, and Japanese philosophers are briefly touched upon as well.

1. Introduction

Since the ancient Greek philosophy, there have been a vast number of debates on whether or not the concept of a point precedes the concept of the space continuum. On the one hand, one may conceive of points as primary entities, and of the continuum as secondary ones understood as the collection of points; on the other, the whole space continuum may come first, and then the concept of a point is derived as a cut of it. This is analogous to the dichotomy between Newton's absolute space and Leibniz's relational space.

Wittgenstein gives a fresh look at the issue of "space versus points":

What makes it apparent that space is not a collection of points, but the realization of a law? (Wittgenstein 1975, p.216)

Wittgenstein's intensional view on space is a compelling consequence of his persistent disagreement with the set-theoretical extensional view of mathematics:

Mathematics is ridden through and through with the pernicious idioms of set theory. One example of this is the way people speak of a line as composed of points. A line is a law and isn't composed of anything at all. (Wittgenstein 1974, p.211)

In the present article, I attempt to examine and explicate Wittgenstein's conception of space (in his intermediate philosophy) in relation to Brouwer's theory of the continuum and its mathematical descendants in a broad sense in modern geometry.

Wittgenstein's intensional conception of space is closely related, in its core idea, with "the modernist transformation of mathematics" (Gray 2008), especially the resulting revolutionary change of the concept of space in geometry: space is not a collection of points any more, but a sort of abstract algebraic structure, such as a C^* -algebra, topos, locale, formal space or scheme. One of the first steps was taken by Brouwer in his intuitionistic conception of the continuum in terms of his notions of spreads and choice sequences, which may be seen as based upon the concept of a law rather than that of a point.

Although the enterprise of intuitionism did not succeed so much in convincing mathematicians of its significance, nevertheless, similar ideas on space have won widespread

acceptance with the crucial help of duality theory, which enables us to derive points from an abstract algebraic structure, thereby establishing a tight (or functorial) link between point-set and point-free concepts of space; we could even say that duality justifies to regard an algebra as space, since it tells us certain algebras carry the same amount of information as space itself. In this article, I aim at articulating the philosophical significance of such advances in modern geometry.

It is widely believed that Brouwer's intuitionism influenced Wittgenstein. Although the main point of this article is not on historical discussion, nevertheless, it could still be said that Wittgenstein's philosophy of space in particular was affected by Brouwer to some degree; his *Philosophical Remarks* and *Philosophical Grammar* contain relevant descriptions, and even refers to Brouwer explicitly at several places.

The rest of the article is organised as follows. In Section 2, I discuss the relationships between Wittgenstein and Brouwer. Section 3 is devoted to explicating how modern geometry with duality conceptually involves Wittgenstein's philosophy of space. In Section 4, I conclude the article with remarks on future work.

2. Wittgenstein's and Brouwer's Point-Free Conceptions of Space

Brouwer's influence on Wittgenstein is almost unquestionable, as Rodych (2011) says, "There is little doubt that Wittgenstein was invigorated by L.E.J. Brouwer's March 10, 1928 Vienna lecture." At the same time, however, connections between their philosophies of space in particular have remained untouched and to be investigated; the present article embarks upon this project, taking a first step towards a full-fledged account of the relationships.

First of all, what Wittgenstein calls a law should be clarified. He says, "In order to represent space we need--so it appears to me--something like an expansible sign" (Wittgenstein 1975, p.216); here, the concept of a sign already suggests relevance to algebra. What precisely is a sign, then? As he proceeds in the same page, it is "a sign that makes allowance for an interpolation, similar to the decimal system."

To elucidate what he means, his discussion on coin-tossing seems crucial:

Imagine we are throwing a two-sided die, such as a coin. I now want to determine a point of the interval AB by continually tossing the coin, and always bisecting the side prescribed by the throw: say: heads means I bisect the right-hand interval, tails the left-hand one. (ibid., pp.218-219)

The point here is that a point is being derived from the coin-tossing game, namely a law, which Wittgenstein thinks realises space. The process of tossing the coin, of course, does not terminate within finite time, so Wittgenstein remarks, "I have an unlimited process, whose results as such don't lead me to the goal, but whose unlimited possibility is itself the goal" (ibid., p.219). To put it differently, such a rule for determining a point only gives us the point in infinite time, but we may regard a rule itself as a point; this idea of identifying points with rules or functions is now prevailing in mainstream mathematics, such as Algebraic and Non-Commutative Geometry. It should be noted that a shift of emphasis is lurking behind the scene, from static entities like points to dynamic processes like laws.

Those who are familiar with Brouwer's theory of the continuum would have already noticed that there is a close connection between Brouwer and Wittgenstein on the nature of space. The above illustration of tossing a coin almost defines the Cantor space in terms of contemporary mathematics: the Cantor space is the space of infinite sequences consisting of zeros and ones only, which correspond to heads and tails of a coin in Wittgenstein's terms.

Now let me quote a passage which, together with the quotations above, strikingly exhibits a remarkable link between Brouwer's and Wittgenstein's ideas of space (Brouwer 1918, p.1; translation by van Atten 2007):

A spread is a law on the basis of which, if again and again an arbitrary complex of digits [a natural number] of the sequence ζ [the natural number sequence] is chosen, each of these choices either generates a definite symbol, or nothing, or brings about the inhibition of the process together with the definitive annihilation of its result; for every n , after every uninhibited sequence of $n-1$ choices, at least one complex of digits can be specified that, if chosen as n -th complex of digits, does not bring about the inhibition of the process. Every sequence of symbols generated from the spread in this manner (which therefore is generally not representable in finished form) is called an element of the spread.

For Brouwer, a law is a rule to make a sequence of digits. The difference between Brouwer's and Wittgenstein's laws basically lies in which to use two digits only (the Cantor space in modern terms) or all natural numbers (the so-called Baire space). Although this yields a certain technical difference, however, there is no doubt that the underlying conceptual view of capturing the concept of space in terms of laws is fundamentally the same in their thoughts.

It may thus be concluded that Wittgenstein's and Brouwer's conceptions of space build upon the same core idea of regarding space as a law to form infinite digital sequences (important differences between them shall be remarked in Section 4); interestingly, their philosophically motivated idea has become a standard method, in Computer Science, to implement exact computation over continuous infinitary structures.

3. The Modernist Transformation of Geometry via Duality

Modern mathematics has encountered drastic changes in both conceptual and technical senses. Prominent among them are the shift of emphasis from space itself to the structure of functions on it. In Algebraic Geometry, properties of varieties are proven through analysis of their function algebras; this was already noticed by Riemann in his study of so-called Riemann surfaces. Duality expressed in terms of category theory is lurking behind the efficacy of function algebras; in the case of Riemann surfaces, there is category-theoretical duality between Riemann surfaces and rational function fields, which tells us Riemann surfaces can be reconstructed from the purely algebraic information of rational function fields on them, and vice versa.

The modernist transformation of geometry has led mathematicians to regard algebras themselves as spaces which do not presuppose the concept of points; points are derived as prime ideals of algebras under suitable conditions. In Non-Commutative Geometry, spaces are indeed defined as certain algebras, and commutative spaces are equivalent, via Gelfand Duality, to locally compact Hausdorff spaces. The same duality phenomenon exists in mathematical logic, and is pursued under the name of Stone Duality, which is duality between syntax and semantics, functioning as strengthened completeness theorems. We can regard logical systems (syntax) as spaces of their models (semantics); classical logic amounts to the Cantor space.

Philosophically phrasing, we have both ontology and epistemology of space. As in many philosophies of space, points could be seen as metaphysical ultimate constituents of space, therefore an ontological account of space may be given in terms of points. At the same time, however, we cannot really see points with no extension, and hence the point-based concept of space is not acceptable from an epistemological point of view. In a sense, we can actually recognise regions with some extensions, or properties of space, so that a region-based or property-based notion of space, which has been implemented in algebraic concepts of space, is suitable for an epistemological account of space.

In the context of topology, regions (i.e., open sets) bijectively correspond to properties or predicates on space (i.e., Boolean-valued continuous functions). Wittgenstein (1974) says, "A line as a coloured length in visual space can be composed of shorter coloured lengths (but, of course, not of points)" (p.211). This gets closer to the idea of Locale Theory and Formal Topology, which replace topological spaces by the structures of (basic) open sets. Formal Topology is a descendant of Brouwer's intuitionism, contriving a predicative framework for topology. Locale Theory models intuitionistic propositional logic, and closely connected with Topos Theory, which models intuitionistic predicate logic, and gives a category-theoretical concept of point-free space.

Just as intuitionism is an epistemological enterprise, so Wittgenstein's intensional conception of space is arguably epistemological in its nature. In contrast, Cantor's or Hausdorff's set-theoretical extensional concept of space is ontological. Duality theory establishes a categorical-theoretical dual equivalence (or adjunction) between point-free and point-set spaces, and may thus be interpreted as exposing a remarkable link between ontology and epistemology of space.

The idea of duality between the ontological and the epistemological makes sense in surprisingly diverse disciplines. In Quantum Physics, there is duality between quantum states and observables, which are ontological and epistemological respectively. In Computer Science, there is duality between computer systems (or programs) and their observable properties. All this can be understood as duality between set-theoretical extensional concepts of space and algebraic intensional concepts of space.

4. Concluding Remarks

Wittgenstein's epistemological conception of space has been articulated in comparison with Brouwer's and other mathematical concepts of space in modern geometry. The philosophical significance of duality in mathematics and sciences has been explicated in terms of duality between ontology and epistemology of space.

Several remarks are to be made here. First and foremost, it should be emphasised that Wittgenstein's and Brouwer's conceptions of space are not claimed to be absolutely the same in any sense. I am aware of discussions as in Rodych (2011) regarding discrepancies between Brouwer and Wittgenstein on real numbers (and lawlike or lawless sequences).

I have deliberately avoided to talk about real numbers so far, not just for this reason but crucially because Wittgenstein carefully distinguishes between real numbers and points (or positions), and between arithmetical space and geometrical visual space (even though they are often identified in set-theoretical modern mathematics).

In the light of the distinction between arithmetical space and geometric space, the claim here is concerning geometrical space, and indeed consistent with the orthodox view of discrepancies in terms of numbers or arithmetical space. I believe Wittgenstein's true characteristic as opposed to Brouwer's lies in this conceptual articulation of the notion of space.

From a historical perspective, Brentano and Husserl also rejected to see space as a collection of points for phenomenological reasons; a link between Brouwer and Husserl is pursued in van Atten (2007).

Whitehead developed his process philosophy, putting strong emphasis on dynamic processes (like laws) rather

than static entities (like points); he advocated the shift from Being to Becoming. He considered a point to be a bunch of shrinking regions; it is a prime filter in mathematical terms.

Cassirer weaved his philosophy based upon the dichotomy between substances and functions, which roughly amounts to the dichotomy between objects and operations in the more recent case of Granger. Lawvere discussed duality between the conceptual and the formal.

Hajime Tanabe in the Kyoto school of philosophy was influenced, as uncovered in Susumu Hayashi's philological research, by Brouwer's theory of the continuum, in contriving "logic of species"; he saw a parallelism between individuals and points, and between societies and regions.

Kitaro Nishida in the Kyoto school of philosophy asserts "it is not that experience exists because there is an individual, but that an individual exists because there is experience."

Wataru Hiromatsu similarly propounded the shift from things to events, which is analogous to the shift from points to laws in Wittgenstein and Brouwer, and to the shift from substances to processes and functions in Whitehead and Cassirer.

These philosophers seem to share certain ideas; however, a coherent perspective is yet to be explored in future work.

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Zur Entmythisierung der Bedeutung von Verneinungen in Wittgensteins *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*

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Abstract

In den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* (PU) konzentrieren sich Wittgensteins Ausführungen zu Verneinungen vor allem auf die Paragraphen 547 bis 557 und eine zugeordnete Bemerkung auf S. 447. Er thematisiert dort die "Versuchung, einen Mythos des »Bedeutens« zu erfinden." Verneinungen charakterisieren wir durch *Reduktionsregeln*, d.h. Regeln ihrer *syntaktischen* und *kontextabhängigen* Verwendung. Es wird davon ausgegangen, dass diese unorthodoxen Formalisierungen geeignete Werkzeuge darstellen, um sowohl auf zu therapierende philosophische Fragestellungen als auch auf Wittgensteins eigene Argumente ein neues Licht zu werfen. Die Berechtigung dieser Vorgehensweise speist sich aus Wittgensteins Akzeptanz der Konstrastierung eines idealisierten Gebrauchs mit dem tatsächlichen Gebrauch im Kontext der Philosophiekritik (Lichtenberg). Es werden mit Bezug auf Wittgensteins Verneinungen "X" und "Y" zwei – durch verschiedene, aber dennoch verwandte Reduktionsregeln charakterisierte – Negationen "–" und "¬" eingeführt. Vor dem Hintergrund der Spezifika dieser Negationen erfolgt die Beleuchtung der Ausführungen in den PU und verschiedener Gebrauchsweisen von Verneinungen in der normalen Sprache.

1. Verneinung und der Mythos des »Bedeutens«

In Wittgensteins Gesamtwerk sind *Fasern* (vgl. PU 67) eingewoben, die die Termini "Verneinung" und "Negation" enthalten. Ein frühes Netzwerk bildet die holistische Bestimmung *nicht*bestehender Sachverhalte durch die Gesamtheit der bestehenden Sachverhalte (Tatsachen) *ohne* Verwendung der klassischen Negation "¬" (vgl. u.a. T1.2). In den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* (PU) konzentrieren sich Wittgensteins Ausführungen zusammenhängend auf die Paragraphen 547 bis 557. Es gehen Überlegungen ein, die z.B. auf den Anhang I der *Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik* (BGM) zurück greifen. Für Wittgenstein bettet sich die Beschäftigung mit Verneinungen in den Gesamtkontext der philosophisch-grammatischen Kritik von Mythen des »Bedeutens« ein: "a) »Daß drei Verneinungen wieder eine Verneinung ergeben, muß doch schon in der einen Verneinung, die ich jetzt gebrauche, liegen.« (Die Versuchung, einen Mythos des »Bedeutens« zu erfinden.)" PU, S. 447. Ehe wir mit einer durchaus formalen Analyse beginnen, wollen wir die Berechtigung der Verwendung logischer Mittel mit Blick auf Wittgensteins eigene Skepsis gegenüber dieser Vorgehensweise prüfen.

2. Licht und Schatten idealisierter Sprechweisen

Wittgenstein scheint in seiner Spätphilosophie die Verwendung formaler Mittel prinzipiell abzulehnen bzw. ihnen mit großer Skepsis entgegenzutreten: "The solution of a mathematical problem never helps us in philosophy. Every mathematical problem is on the same level in this respect and is of no importance to us." WL, S.121. Seine Probleme sind keine mathematischen Probleme, sondern philosophisch-grammatische Probleme, die entstehen, wenn "die Sprache feiert" (PU 38). Allerdings lässt der Einsatz logischer Mittel bzw. allgemein von Idealisierungen nicht darauf schließen, dass wir es mit mathematischen Problemen zu tun haben. Zumindest zwei Hinweise Wittgensteins

legen den Einsatz idealisierter Mittel sowohl für philosophiekritische als auch interpretatorische Zwecke nahe:

(1) Wittgenstein präsentiert in seinen *Bemerkungen über die Farben* (BüF) unter Verweis auf Lichtenbergs Konstruktion eines idealen Gebrauchs von reinem Weiß einen belehrenden Rückkoppelungseffekt auf unseren tatsächlichen Gebrauch. "Lichtenberg sagt, nur wenige Menschen hätten je reines Weiß gesehen. So verwenden also die meisten das Wort falsch? Und wie hat er den richtigen Gebrauch gelernt? – Er hat nach dem gewöhnlichen Gebrauch einen idealen konstruiert. Und das heißt nicht, einen bessern, sondern einen in gewisser Richtung verfeinerten, worin etwas auf die Spitze getrieben wird." (BüF, I 3) "Und freilich kann ein so konstruierter uns wieder über den tatsächlichen Gebrauch belehren." (BüF, I 4) Es geht also um die Konstrastierung eines idealisierten Gebrauchs mit dem tatsächlichen Gebrauch, der als Methode der Philosophiekritik in manchen Fällen Verwendung finden kann. Statt von "konstruiertem idealen Gebrauch" spricht Wittgenstein in einer anderen Textfassung auch von "Idealgebrauch" (BüF, III 35), allerdings mit dem Verweis, dass mit "Ideal" ... hier nicht etwas besonders Gutes, sondern nur etwas auf die Spitze getriebenes gemeint ist.

(2) Die Konstrastierung des konstruierten Idealgebrauchs mit dem tatsächlichen Gebrauch lässt unmittelbar mit Fassungen von Metaphern in Verbindung bringen, die das Wort "Licht" enthalten. Bereits im Vorwort der PU heißt es, dass "es dieser Arbeit in ihrer Dürftigkeit und der Finsternis dieser Zeit beschieden sein sollte, Licht in ein oder das andere Gehirn zu werfen ...". Andere Ausdrucksformen sind: "... kann aber erst dann im rechten Licht erscheinen, wenn ..." (PU 81) im Kontext mit der von Ramsey vorgenommenen Charakterisierung der Logik als "normative Wissenschaft"; "Steckt uns da nicht ... ein Licht auf?" (PU 83); "... bringt Licht in unser Problem, indem ..." (PU 90); "als sei in ihnen etwas verborgen, was ans Licht zu befördern ist." (PU 91); "Und diese Beschreibung empfängt ihr Licht, d.i. ihren Zweck, von ..." (PU 109); "Es wirft ein Licht auf ..." (PU 125); "... ein Licht in ... werfen sollen." (PU 130); "Dies wirft ein Licht auf ..." (PU 513).

Wenn wir (1) und (2) zusammenführen, dann wird die Formulierung akzeptabel, dass ein konstruierter Idealgebrauch uns nicht nur "belehrt", sondern auch "ein Licht wirft" auf den tatsächlichen Gebrauch bzw. den tatsächlichen Gebrauch in einem neuen Licht erscheinen lässt, der philosophische Probleme *vollständig* zum Verschwinden bringt (vgl. PU 133). Wir müssen somit die Bereitstellung von logischen Mitteln nicht zwingend als Zeichen einer anzugebenden Lösung logisch-mathematischer Fragestellungen sehen, sondern können diese als Idealisierungen betrachten, die sowohl auf zu therapierende philosophische Fragestellungen als auch auf Wittgensteins eigene Argumente ein neues Licht werfen. Gemäß Wittgensteins Methode des Nachweises von Familienähnlichkeit ist es ohnehin so, dass idealisierter und tatsächlicher Gebrauch in bestimmten Hinsichten verwandt sein müssen.

3. Negationen als Reduktionsoperatoren, die durch Regeln charakterisiert werden:

Wir führen nun ein recht unorthodoxes Muster für Negationen ein, dass einerseits in mehrfacher Hinsicht recht deutlich von dem Bild der klassischen Negation ("¬") bzw. der nahe verwandten Verneinung "X" (PU 556) abweicht, andererseits allerdings in bestimmten Kontexten genau die Rolle der klassischen Negation übernehmen kann. Die klassische Negation wird üblicherweise als ein zweiwertiger, extensionaler, einstelliger Operator verstanden, der aus Sätzen (Formeln) wieder Sätze (Formeln) generiert. Dabei tauschen die beiden Werte *wahr* (W) und *falsch* (F) ihre Positionen.

Klassische Negation ~	Zweidimensionale Negationen #
Argumente sind eindimensionale Elementarsätze p bzw. eindimensionale Formeln A .	Argumente sind zweidimensionale Formeln, im einfachsten Falle geordnete Paare klassischer, eindimensionaler Formeln A und B in der Form $\begin{bmatrix} A \\ B \end{bmatrix}$.
einstellige Form $\sim A$	zunächst einstellige Form $\# \begin{bmatrix} A \\ B \end{bmatrix}$; intern zweistellige Verarbeitung möglich
Die semantische Charakterisierung erfolgt z.B. über eine Wahrheitstafel.	Es erfolgt eine syntaktische Charakterisierung über eine Reduktionsregel, die eine Eliminierung von $\# \begin{bmatrix} A \\ B \end{bmatrix}$ auf $\begin{bmatrix} C \\ D \end{bmatrix}$ gestattet. Dabei darf zumindest für die Bestimmung von C auf A und B zugegriffen werden (implizite Zweistelligkeit).
Die Charakterisierung von \sim erfolgt in jedem Falle kontextfrei bzw. ohne Hintergrundannahmen.	Die Negationen der Form $\# \begin{bmatrix} A \\ B \end{bmatrix}$ können als Reduktionen der Form $\begin{bmatrix} \sim A \odot B \\ B \end{bmatrix}$ dargestellt werden, wobei \odot irgendein zweistelliger klassischer Junktor ist.

Varianten dieses Musters lassen sich durchaus als Idealisierungen analog zum reinen Weiß Lichtenbergs verstehen. Zwei Versionen solcher Verneinungen wollen wir nun verwenden, um uns mit unmittelbarem Bezug auf PU 547 bis 557 und S. 447 "über den tatsächlichen Gebrauch belehren" zu lassen. In diesem interpretatorischen Sinne werfen unsere formalen Spiele ein – hoffentlich erhellendes – Licht auf den Wittgensteinschen Text.

4. Wittgensteins Ausführungen zu Verneinungen im Lichte zweidimensionaler Negationen

"Denk dir eine Sprache mit zwei verschiedenen Worten für die Verneinung, das eine ist »X«, das andere »Y«. Ein doppeltes »X« gibt eine Bejahung, ein doppeltes »Y« aber eine verstärkte Verneinung. Im übrigen werden die beiden Wörter gleich verwendet." (PU 556). Zunächst sei "–" der Verneinungsreduktionsoperator als mögliche X-Entsprechung:

$$- \begin{bmatrix} A \\ B \end{bmatrix} \Rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} B \equiv \sim A \\ B \end{bmatrix}$$

Hier stehen " A " und " B " für beliebige klassische Formeln, " \sim " für die klassische Negation, " \equiv " für die klassische (materiale) Äquivalenz und " \Rightarrow " zeigt an, dass für den links stehenden Ausdruck in einer Formel (Teilformel dieser Form) der rechts stehende Ausdruck eingesetzt werden darf. Die Negation "–" kreiert die klassische Negation von A ($\sim A$) genau in der (möglicherweise empirischen) Situation B : A ist falsch genau dann, wenn die *Kontextbedingung* B wahr ist (zutrifft).

Damit hängt das Gesamtverhalten der Negation "–" von der konkreten Angabe für " B " ab. "Die Negation, könnte man sagen, ist eine ausschließende, abweisende, Gebärde. Aber eine solche Gebärde verwenden wir in sehr verschiedenen Fällen!" (PU 550) Die verschiedenen Fälle ergeben sich relativ zu der Kontextbedingung B und ihrem Zusammenspiel mit A !

Die Regel rechtfertigt allein, dass die Verdoppelung die Bejahung ergibt:

$$\begin{aligned} - - \begin{bmatrix} A \\ B \end{bmatrix} &= - \begin{bmatrix} B \equiv \sim A \\ B \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} B \equiv \sim(B \equiv \sim A) \\ B \end{bmatrix} = \\ &= \begin{bmatrix} B \equiv (B \equiv A) \\ B \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} A \\ B \end{bmatrix}, \text{ d.h. } - - \begin{bmatrix} A \\ B \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} A \\ B \end{bmatrix}. \end{aligned}$$

Für das »Y« bieten wir die Negation " \neg " an, die durch folgende Reduktionsregel charakterisiert wird:

$$\neg \begin{bmatrix} A \\ B \end{bmatrix} \Rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} \sim A \wedge B \\ B \end{bmatrix}$$

Auch hier liefert die Regel allein im Falle der Verdoppelung die *Möglichkeit einer Verstärkung*:

$$\neg \neg \begin{bmatrix} A \\ B \end{bmatrix} = \neg \begin{bmatrix} \sim A \wedge B \\ B \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \sim(\sim A \wedge B) \wedge B \\ B \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} A \wedge B \\ B \end{bmatrix}.$$

Wir können sagen, dass wegen $(A \wedge B) \models A$ in der ersten Dimension und B -Gleichheit der zweiten Dimension $\begin{bmatrix} A \\ B \end{bmatrix}$ aus $\begin{bmatrix} A \wedge B \\ B \end{bmatrix}$ folgt. " \vdash " zeigt die klassische Folgerungsbeziehung an, welche besagt, dass der Ausdruck " $(A \wedge B) \supset A$ " mit der materialen Implikation " \supset " eine Tautologie ist. Die tatsächliche *Realisierung der Verstärkung* hängt von den Eigenheiten der Kontextbedingung " B " ab. Im Falle eines leeren Kontextes, der einer *logischen* Lesart der Negation entspricht, liegt keine Verstärkung vor, da " B " zur Tautologie " \top ":

$$\begin{aligned} \neg \begin{bmatrix} A \\ \top \end{bmatrix} &= \begin{bmatrix} \sim A \wedge \top \\ \top \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \sim A \\ \top \end{bmatrix} \\ \neg \neg \begin{bmatrix} A \\ \top \end{bmatrix} &= \neg \begin{bmatrix} \sim A \\ \top \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \sim \sim A \wedge \top \\ \top \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} A \\ \top \end{bmatrix}. \end{aligned}$$

Außerdem stimmen diese beiden Negationen sowohl im einfachen Falle als auch im Falle der Verdoppelung überein:

$$- \begin{bmatrix} A \\ \top \end{bmatrix} = \neg \begin{bmatrix} A \\ \top \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \sim A \\ \top \end{bmatrix} \text{ und } - - \begin{bmatrix} A \\ \top \end{bmatrix} = \neg \neg \begin{bmatrix} A \\ \top \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} A \\ \top \end{bmatrix}.$$

Auch in Fällen einer empirischen Kontextbedingung " B " muss bei geeigneten " A " nicht unbedingt eine Verstärkung vorliegen:

$$\neg \neg \left[\begin{smallmatrix} p \wedge q \\ p \end{smallmatrix} \right] = \neg \left[\begin{smallmatrix} p \wedge \neg q \\ p \end{smallmatrix} \right] = \left[\begin{smallmatrix} \neg(p \wedge \neg q) \wedge p \\ p \end{smallmatrix} \right] = \left[\begin{smallmatrix} p \wedge q \\ p \end{smallmatrix} \right].$$

Zu klären wäre dann, was es mit Wittgensteins Zusatz "Im übrigen werden die beiden Wörter gleich verwendet." auf sich hat. Es lassen sich Bedingungen für "A" und "B" formulieren, so dass immer: $\neg \left[\begin{smallmatrix} A \\ B \end{smallmatrix} \right] = \neg \left[\begin{smallmatrix} A \\ B \end{smallmatrix} \right]$. Sogar im Falle der Verdoppelung gibt es Formelpaare bzgl. derer die Negationen übereinstimmen:

$$\neg \neg \left[\begin{smallmatrix} p \wedge q \\ p \end{smallmatrix} \right] = \neg \neg \left[\begin{smallmatrix} p \wedge q \\ p \end{smallmatrix} \right] = \left[\begin{smallmatrix} p \wedge q \\ p \end{smallmatrix} \right].$$

"Haben nun »X« und »Y« die gleiche Bedeutung, wenn sie ohne Wiederholung in Sätzen vorkommen?" (PU 556) Darauf lässt sich nun aus unserer Sicht antworten, dass dies generell im kontextfreien Fall und weiteren kontextsensitiven Spezialfällen gilt. Allerdings haben wir Fälle, in denen dies nicht zutrifft. Der drastischste Fall ist die Verwendung eines von "p" logisch unabhängigen Kontextes "q":

$$\neg \left[\begin{smallmatrix} p \\ q \end{smallmatrix} \right] = \left[\begin{smallmatrix} q \equiv \neg p \\ q \end{smallmatrix} \right], \text{ aber } \neg \left[\begin{smallmatrix} p \\ q \end{smallmatrix} \right] = \left[\begin{smallmatrix} q \wedge \neg p \\ q \end{smallmatrix} \right].$$

Schon die einfache Negation "¬" erweist sich hier als eine Verstärkung von "–". Bei Wittgensteins Ausführungen in PU 556 ist nicht ganz klar, ob er die Verdopplung von »Y« noch als Verstärkung der Bejahung oder als Gleichheit mit der einfachen Verneinung auffasst (vgl. "(ne ne) p = ne p" und die Addition zweier halber Drehungen im Anhang I der BGM, S. 102).

Unsere Darstellung beinhaltet sogar ein Phänomen, dass Wittgenstein gar nicht in Betracht zieht: die *Verstärkung einer Behauptung mittels einer einfachen Negation*. Hier haben wir es mit einem äußerst energischen Schütteln des Kopfes (vgl. PU 547) bzw. einer nachhaltigen "ausschließende[n], abweisende[n], Gebärde" (PU 550) zu tun. Linguisten sprechen dann von "Korrekturnegation" bzw. "metalinguistischer Negation" (Horn 1985). Dabei kann eine einfache Verneinung mittels "–" ausreichen, um eine *Verstärkung* auszulösen. (Vgl. auch die Bemerkung zur Tonhöhe eines Satzes als Mittel, eine Verneinung auszudrücken in PU 554.) Als Beispiel nehmen wir die Negation einer skalaren Implikatur: "Es trifft nicht zu, dass Anton oder Beate zur Party kommen. Sie kommen *beide*." Die Kursivierungen geben hierbei den Haupt- bzw. Kontrastakzent des Satzes an und damit die Position, an der eine *Korrektur* von "oder" zu "und" erfolgt. Wir können den Satz "Anton oder Beate kommen zur Party" paraphrasieren durch "Anton kommt zur Party (p) oder Beate kommt zur Party (q)" und in der ersten Dimension formalisieren durch " $p \vee q$ ", wobei zudem vorausgesetzt wird, dass der Fall, dass beide kommen, ausgeschlossen bleibt. Der Kontrastakzent führt hier zu $B = (p \neq q)$. Die Formalisierung des gesamten Satzes, der negiert wird ergibt dann $\left[\begin{smallmatrix} p \vee q \\ p \neq q \end{smallmatrix} \right]$.

$$\neg \left[\begin{smallmatrix} p \vee q \\ p \neq q \end{smallmatrix} \right] = \left[\begin{smallmatrix} (p \neq q) \equiv \neg(p \vee q) \\ p \neq q \end{smallmatrix} \right] = \left[\begin{smallmatrix} p \wedge q \\ p \neq q \end{smallmatrix} \right].$$

Wegen $(p \wedge q) \models (p \vee q)$ bei identischer zweiter Dimension ist

$$\neg \left[\begin{smallmatrix} p \vee q \\ p \neq q \end{smallmatrix} \right] = \left[\begin{smallmatrix} p \wedge q \\ p \neq q \end{smallmatrix} \right] \text{ eine Verstärkung von } \left[\begin{smallmatrix} p \vee q \\ p \neq q \end{smallmatrix} \right].$$

Allerdings kann die Negation "–" im Falle anderer Hintergrundannahmen schon bei einfacher Anwendung auch eine *Abschwächung* auslösen:

$$\neg \left[\begin{smallmatrix} p \wedge q \\ \neg p \wedge \neg q \end{smallmatrix} \right] = \left[\begin{smallmatrix} (\neg p \wedge \neg q) \equiv \neg(p \wedge q) \\ \neg p \wedge \neg q \end{smallmatrix} \right] = \left[\begin{smallmatrix} p \equiv q \\ \neg p \wedge \neg q \end{smallmatrix} \right],$$

wegen $(p \wedge q) \models (p \equiv q)$.

"Man möchte sagen: Das Zeichen der Verneinung ist eine Veranlassung, etwas – möglicherweise sehr Kompliziertes

– zu tun." (PU 549) Erst wenn dieses sehr Komplizierte durch eine Regel – in unseren Fällen durch die entsprechenden *kontextsensitiven Reduktionsregeln* – charakterisiert wird, liegt die jeweilige Verwendung fest. Ohne diese Regel tritt der Fall ein, den Wittgenstein philosophisch für problematisch hält: "Es ist, als veranlaßte uns das Zeichen der Negation zu etwas. Aber wozu? Das wird nicht gesagt. Es ist, als brauchte es nur angedeutet werden; als wüßten wir es schon." (PU 549) Auch Wittgenstein plädiert dafür, dass die Regelangaben konstitutiv für die Bedeutungsfixierung sind und dass es keine prinzipiell richtigen Regeln gibt: "Es kann keine Diskussion darüber geben, ob diese Regeln, oder andere, die richtigen für das Wort »nicht« sind (ich meine, ob sie seiner Bedeutung gemäß sind). Denn das Wort hat ohne diese Regeln noch keine Bedeutung; und wenn wir die Regeln ändern, so hat es nun eine andere Bedeutung (oder keine), ..." (PU, S. 447) Die Negationen "¬" und "–" bleiben verschieden, auch wenn sie in bestimmten Kontexten das gleiche Verhalten zeigen.

"Ist es die *gleiche* Verneinung: »Eisen schmilzt nicht bei 100 Grad C« und »2 mal 2 ist nicht 5«?« Soll das durch Introspektion entschieden werden; dadurch, daß wir zu sehen trachten, was wir bei beiden Sätzen *denken*?" (PU 551) (1) Der Satz »Eisen schmilzt nicht bei 100 Grad C« hat eine empirische (physikalische) kontextuelle Bedeutung. Hier könnte "B" gewisse Normalitätsbedingungen über Eisen ausdrücken (z.B. Druck): $\neg \left[\begin{smallmatrix} p \\ B \end{smallmatrix} \right] = \left[\begin{smallmatrix} B \equiv \neg p \\ B \end{smallmatrix} \right]$, wobei B weder Tautologie noch Kontradiktion ist. (2) Der Satz »2 mal 2 ist nicht 5« kann (muss aber nicht) als kontextfreier mathematischer Satz ($B = \top$) aufgefasst werden. Dieser Satz wäre dann ein *logischer*. In beiden Fällen tritt an die Stelle der problematischen Introspektion die Explikation des jeweiligen "B".

"Daß drei Verneinungen wieder eine Verneinung ergeben, muß doch schon in der einen Verneinung, die ich jetzt gebrauche, liegen." (Die Versuchung, einen Mythos des »Bedeutens« zu erfinden.) / Es hat den Anschein, als würde aus der Natur der Negation folgen, daß eine doppelte Verneinung eine Bejahung ist. (Und etwas Richtiges ist daran. Was? *Unsere* Natur hängt mit beiden zusammen.)" (PU, S. 447) Im Falle unserer Verneinung "–" ergibt sich die Gleichheit von doppelter Verneinung und Bejahung *allein aus der Reduktionsregel für "–"*. Im Falle der Verneinung "¬" ergibt sich diese Gleichheit nur unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen. "Statt zu sagen »Diese Verdoppelung ist als Verstärkung gemeint«, kann ich sie unter gewissen Umständen [unseren Kontextbedingungen "B", I.M.] als Verstärkung *aussprechen*." (PU 557) Dagegen ergibt sich hier die Gleichheit von drei Verneinungen mit einer einfachen Verneinung wiederum allein aus der Reduktionsregel:

$$\neg \neg \neg \left[\begin{smallmatrix} A \\ B \end{smallmatrix} \right] = \neg \left[\begin{smallmatrix} A \wedge B \\ B \end{smallmatrix} \right] = \left[\begin{smallmatrix} \neg(A \wedge B) \wedge B \\ B \end{smallmatrix} \right] = \left[\begin{smallmatrix} \neg A \wedge B \\ B \end{smallmatrix} \right]$$

und damit $\neg \neg \neg \left[\begin{smallmatrix} A \\ B \end{smallmatrix} \right] = \neg \left[\begin{smallmatrix} A \\ B \end{smallmatrix} \right]$

Falls alle Elementarsätze p_i der eindimensionalen Logik nunmehr als Ausdrücke der Form $\left[\begin{smallmatrix} p_i \\ \top \end{smallmatrix} \right]$ aufgefasst würden und die diese umgebende Logik entsprechend "eingerrichtet" würde, ergäbe sich sowohl bei der Verwendung von "–" als auch "¬" eine zur klassischen Aussagenlogik äquivalente Logik.

5. Anstelle eines Schlusswortes: Hypothetische (fiktive) natürlich- sprachliche Verneinungssituationen

Stellen wir uns einen Volksstamm vor, der die Konjunktion "und" immer nur in Berichten bzw. Erzählungen verwendet, die eine lineare zeitliche Abfolge aufweisen. Man berichtet z.B.: "Anton kam ins Zimmer und (er) öffnete das Fenster." Dieses "und" wird temporal interpretiert im Sinne von "Anton kam ins Zimmer und (er) öffnete *danach* das Fenster". Da die Vertauschung der Konjunkte zu "Anton öffnete das Fenster und (er) kam ins Zimmer." recht ungewöhnlich klingt und zur Erfindung eines komplexeren Kontextes auf-fordert um eine befriedigende Lesart zu erhalten, entsteht leicht der Mythos eines nichtsymmetrischen "und". Dieser Volksstamm könnte nun sehr verwundert sein, wenn wir ihm erklärten, dass die Verneinung von "Anton kam ins Zimmer und öffnete das Fenster." z.B. in der Form "Es ist nicht der Fall, dass (Anton ins Zimmer kam und das Fenster öffnete)." gemäß der deMorganschen Regel "eigentlich" bedeute "Anton kam nicht ins Zimmer oder er öffnete das Fenster nicht.". Vielmehr möchten die Vertreter des Volksstamms in diesem Falle vielleicht nur das zweite Konjunkt bestreiten: "Anton kam ins Zimmer und (er) öffnete das Fenster nicht.". D.h. aus Sicht des klassischen Logikers entsteht ein logisches Darstellungsproblem, da wir dann eine Negation "*" mit $(p \wedge q) = (p \wedge \sim q)$ bräuchten, wobei sich "*" nicht mehr funktional verhält:

*	(p	^	q)	≡	p	^	~	q
F		W	W	W		W	W	F	F	W
W		W	F	F		W	W	W	W	F
F		F	F	W		W	F	F	F	W
F		F	F	F		W	F	F	W	F

Dem Wert "F" der Konjunktion " $p \wedge q$ " müsste die Negation "*" sowohl den Wert "W" (einmal) als auch den "F" (zwei-mal) zuweisen. Eine mehrdeutige Abbildung ist aber keine Funktion.

In unserem zweidimensionalen Rahmen haben wir die Möglichkeit temporal verstandene konjunktive Satzverknüpfungen in folgender Form darzustellen: $\begin{bmatrix} p \\ p \end{bmatrix} \wedge q$. Die Konjunktion " \wedge " bleibt selbstverständlich symmetrisch. Allerdings verhält sich der gesamte Ausdruck nicht mehr symmetrisch, denn die kontraintuitive Verknüpfung "Anton öffnete das Fenster und (er) kam ins Zimmer." erhält dann die Darstellung $\begin{bmatrix} q \\ q \end{bmatrix} \wedge p$.

Sowohl die Reduktionsnegation "—" als auch die Version "¬" erzeugen jedoch nur die Negation des zweiten Konjunks:

$$\begin{aligned} - \begin{bmatrix} p \wedge q \\ p \end{bmatrix} &= \begin{bmatrix} p \equiv \sim(p \wedge q) \\ p \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} p \wedge \sim q \\ p \end{bmatrix} \\ \neg \begin{bmatrix} p \wedge q \\ p \end{bmatrix} &= \begin{bmatrix} p \wedge \sim(p \wedge q) \\ p \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} p \wedge \sim q \\ p \end{bmatrix}. \end{aligned}$$

Selbst im Falle der Verdoppelung stimmen diese beiden Negationen überein:

$$\begin{aligned} - - \begin{bmatrix} p \wedge q \\ p \end{bmatrix} &= - \begin{bmatrix} p \wedge \sim q \\ p \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} p \equiv \sim(p \wedge \sim q) \\ p \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} p \wedge q \\ p \end{bmatrix}. \\ \neg \neg \begin{bmatrix} p \wedge q \\ p \end{bmatrix} &= \neg \begin{bmatrix} p \wedge \sim q \\ p \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \sim(p \wedge \sim q) \wedge p \\ p \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} p \wedge q \\ p \end{bmatrix} \end{aligned}$$

Sollten die Vertreter des Volksstamms später die logische Konjunktion für sich entdecken (tautologischer Kontext = "Nullkontext"), so würde sich immer noch kein sichtbarer Unterschied ergeben:

$$- \begin{bmatrix} p \wedge q \\ \top \end{bmatrix} = \neg \begin{bmatrix} p \wedge q \\ \top \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \sim(p \wedge q) \\ \top \end{bmatrix}.$$

Sollten sie sogenannte vollfokussierte Sätze verwenden wollen – die Behauptung in der ersten Dimension und die Hintergrundannahme in der zweiten sind identisch –, dann wären sie sehr verblüfft. Linguisten wären übrigens auch verblüfft, da sie als vollfokussierte Sätze meist nur Beispiele wie "Es blitzt.", "Es donnert." parat haben, in denen "Es" nicht die normale Funktion eines Subjekts erfüllt:

$$- \begin{bmatrix} p \wedge q \\ p \wedge q \end{bmatrix} = \neg \begin{bmatrix} p \wedge q \\ p \wedge q \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \perp \\ p \wedge q \end{bmatrix}.$$

Diese Negation einer Konjunktion würde zu einer Inkonsistenz in der ersten Dimension führen. Immer noch zeigt die Verdoppelung keinen Unterschied:

$$- - \begin{bmatrix} p \wedge q \\ p \wedge q \end{bmatrix} = \neg \neg \begin{bmatrix} p \wedge q \\ p \wedge q \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} p \wedge q \\ p \wedge q \end{bmatrix}.$$

Erst wenn die Idee aufkommt, dass *wenn-dann*-Sätze in einer analogen Weise dargestellt und negiert werden sollen, entsteht eine Abweichung in den beiden Negationskontexten:

$$\begin{aligned} - \begin{bmatrix} p \supset q \\ p \end{bmatrix} &= \begin{bmatrix} p \equiv \sim(p \supset q) \\ p \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} p \supset \sim q \\ p \end{bmatrix} \\ \neg \begin{bmatrix} p \supset q \\ p \end{bmatrix} &= \begin{bmatrix} p \wedge \sim(p \supset q) \\ p \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} p \wedge \sim q \\ p \end{bmatrix}. \end{aligned}$$

Die Logiker des Volksstamms würden sich vielleicht gern für "¬" entscheiden, müssten dann allerdings mit

$$\neg \neg \begin{bmatrix} p \supset q \\ p \end{bmatrix} = \neg \begin{bmatrix} p \wedge \sim q \\ p \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} p \wedge q \\ p \end{bmatrix}$$

leben, da die doppelte Verneinung von " $p \supset q$ " unter der Kontextbedingung " p " die Verstärkung zur Konjunktion " $p \wedge q$ " liefert!

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Was sich überhaupt sagen lässt, lässt sich klar sagen – es fragt sich nur, in welcher Sprache

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Abstract

Ziel fremdsprachlichen Unterrichtes muss es sein, dass sich auch in dieser etwas „klar sagen lässt“. Ein zu schaffendes Vertrauensverhältnis mit kulturellen Gegebenheiten der Zielsprache, das soweit geht, dass Alltagshandlungen sprachlich verständnisvoll gelöst werden können, ist dafür eine der ersten Voraussetzungen. Im Verlauf des Eindringens in die Fremdkultur wird einer lernenden Person auch klar, welche Defizite die Ausgangssprache und die Zielsprache haben – etwa durch Tabuisierungen. Ein Lernerfolg lässt sich dann letztlich auch daran feststellen, wie eine lernende Person im gegebenen Falle die Fremdsprache dazu benützt, um etwas „klar zu sagen“.

Einem wittgenstein'schen Ausspruch gemäß lässt sich bekanntlich „alles, was sich überhaupt sagen lässt, klar sagen“ (Wittgenstein 1984, 9). Die Frage, welche sich daraus ergeben kann – zumal für Menschen, welche Fremdsprachen unterrichten – ist jene: hat jegliche menschliche Sprache in ihren unzähligen Ausformungen, Systemen und Wortschätzen für alles, was sich klar sagen lässt in jeder Lebenslage das klarheitschaffende Wort?

Im Fremdsprachenunterricht wird von Lehrenden und Lernenden die Erfahrung gemacht, dass jeder Sprache die Fähigkeit zu autochthoner Produktivität innewohnt. Diese ist – wie es der österreichische Germanist und Spezialist für Deutsch als Fremdsprache Günter Lipold ausdrückt – eine „geistige Kraft, die durch Sprache frei wird und sich durch Schöpfung manifestiert, dem Ereignis der Schaffung einer sinnvollen, geordneten Beziehung zwischen einem Ding der ‚realen Welt‘ einerseits und dem ‚Wort‘“ (Lipold 1978, 3).

In Paraphrasierung eines wittgenstein'schen Wortes ist dazu festzustellen, dass jede Sprache die Welt auf ihre Weise begrenzt. Dies beinhaltet auch, dass sich in jeder Sprache eine ganz eigene, letztlich im Tiefsten unvergleichbare Art und Weise der Wahrnehmung und Beschreibung der Welt und wie sie in allem und durch alles „der Fall ist“ ausdrückt.

Für Lehrende und Lernende einer Fremdsprache äußert sich dies nicht zuletzt in jener von Günter Lipold beschriebenen Erfahrung und der aus dieser gewonnenen Folgerung: „Zu jeder Fremdsprache gehört die ihr eigene Fremdkultur. Aus diesem Grunde hat der native speaker als DaF-Lehrer eine wichtige Funktion, ist er doch Träger nicht bloß einer deutschen Sprachkompetenz sondern auch (und vor allem) einer Kulturkompetenz“ (Lipold 1991, 15f).

Diese Kulturkompetenz beinhaltet beispielsweise ein Wissen um Tabus in der eigenen Sprache und ebenso die Fähigkeit, Tabus in den Ausgangssprachen der Lernenden auszuloten und mit diesen umzugehen. Das bedeutet aber einen Umgang mit etwas „Unberührbarem“, mit etwas, über welches in einer bestimmten Kultur in deren Sprache nichts klar gesagt werden kann – und dies folgerichtig durch Vermeidung des bezeichnenden Wortes -, da Begriff und Wort unrein machen und daher auf ihre Weise gefährlich sind (vgl.: Schischkoff 1991, 711).

Was ist also zu tun, wenn dennoch das Bedürfnis besteht, etwas „klar zu sagen“, auch um den Preis eines sprachlichen Tabubruches, die Verbundenheit mit und der Respekt vor jenem der eigenen Sprache innewohnenden Kultur aber doch groß genug sind, um diesen Schritt nicht

so ohne Weiteres tun zu können? Ein Erfahrungsbeispiel möge Aufschluss geben, aus welcher Richtung Hilfe in einem solchen Dilemma kommen kann.

Eine junge Koreanerin studierte in Österreich Musik. Sie war sich im Klaren darüber, dass ein solches Studium im Land von Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven und Schubert ein großes Privileg darstellte, welches ihr von ihren Eltern gewährt wurde. Sie bekam von einer Muttersprachlerin intensiven Privatunterricht in der deutschen Sprache. Im Sinne der von Lehrenden erwarteten Kulturkompetenz wurde sie auch in Phänomene der österreichischen Alltagskultur und den dort gebräuchlichen Wortschatz eingeführt. Der Unterricht fand deshalb auch oft in einem traditionellen Kaffeehaus statt. So konnte sie letztendlich Briefe ihres Lieblingskomponisten Johannes Brahms in der deutschen Originalsprache lesen wie auch im Kaffeehaus Mehlspeisen oder eine der vielen österreichischen Kaffeespezialitäten bestellen (vgl.: Mayer 2006, 107-121).

Zwischen Lernender und Lehrender entstand ein solches Vertrauensverhältnis, dass die junge Koreanerin während des Unterrichts sowohl Phänomene des Lernens als auch des Alltags besprechen konnte.

Es ist nicht unüblich, dass Studierende aus diesem Land längere Zeit von einem älteren Familienmitglied am Studienort betreut werden. Dies dient letztendlich auch einer gewissen Kontrolle, dass der für die Eltern kostspielige Studiengang mit dem nötigen Fleiß durchlaufen wird und die Studierenden durch nichts von ihrer Tätigkeit abgelenkt werden.

So erzählte denn auch das hier beschriebene junge Mädchen ihrer Deutschdozentin, dass demnächst ihre Großmutter nach Österreich kommen werde. Diese möge sie zwar wirklich sehr gerne, aber sie wisse auch, dass sie ab nun doch ständig unter Aufsicht sein werde. So manche Nachlässigkeiten, die sie sich hin und wieder selbst erlaubt hatte wären dann gänzlich unerlaubt. Aus dem willentlichen Bedürfnis heraus, ihre prekäre Lage sprachlich jetzt und gleich zum Ausdruck zu bringen entschlüpfte ihr unmittelbar und gleichsam mit allerhöchster Geschwindigkeit ein ihr offenbar in dieser geforderten Unmittelbarkeit passend erscheinendes deutsches Wort. Erschrocken über sich selbst legte sie gleich danach den Finger auf den Mund. Dem Erstaunen ihrer Dozentin antwortete sie mit der Feststellung, dass man in ihrer koreanischen Kultur ein solches Wort – und schon gar nicht als Frau – überhaupt nicht gebrauchen dürfe.

Wie also nun? Es wollte doch etwas „klar gesagt“ werden. In der eigenen Sprache war aber ein den eigenen

Gefühlszustand adäquat wiedergebendes Wort, das zudem noch spontan handhabbar sein sollte, absolutes Tabu. Dem drängenden Bedürfnis gemäß, ihre Lage gefühls-echt und unmittelbar ihrer Deutschdozentin gegenüber auszudrücken sah sich die junge Koreanerin – um es mit Worten von Edith Stein aus ihrem Buch „Zum Problem der Einfühlung“ auszudrücken – vor die Aufgabe gestellt, „aus einem Subjekt, das Empfindungen hat, zu einem zu werden, das Akte vollzieht“ (Stein 2010, 79). Aber – um einen weiteren Gedanken von Stein aufzugreifen -: „Handlung ist immer Schaffen eines Nichtvorhandenen. Dieser Prozeß kann sich in kausaler Abfolge vollziehen, aber die Einleitung des Prozesses, das eigentliche Eingreifen des Willens ist nicht als kausales, sondern als ein Wirken besonderer Art erlebt. Damit ist nicht gesagt, daß der Wille nichts mit Kausalität zu tun hat“ (Stein 2010, 73).

Im gegebenen Falle kann der Wille der koreanischen Musikstudentin als kausal bewirkt und kausal bewirkend angesehen werden. Bewirkt durch das Bedürfnis nach spontaner Evidentialisierung durch ein adäquates Wort unter den schwierigen Bedingungen, dass ein passendes Wort in ihrer Muttersprache tabuisiert ist und bewirkend, weil sie willentlich aus Notwendigkeit zur Handelnden wurde.

Worin bestand nun ihr Handeln? Es kann beschrieben werden als ein aufgrund des „Nichtsagenkönnens“ in der eigenen Sprache von ihr wegen ihres dringenden Bedürfnisses vorgenommener, also situationsbezogener Kulturwechsel. Wenn hier mit Edith Stein von einem Prozess gesprochen wird, so ist festzuhalten, dass dieser Prozess im gegebenen Fall durch das Bedürfnis nach Unmittelbarkeit in einer kaum messbaren Zeit ablief.

Der russische Psycholinguist und Germanist Aleksej Aleksejewič Leont'ew beschreibt einen solchen prozessualen Vorgang von einem grundsätzlich vorhandenen Ausgangspunkt her, indem er feststellt: „Wir verfügen über eine gewisse syntaktisch-semantische Struktur, d.h.: wir haben die Wörter, die wir auszusprechen haben, zumindest teilweise bereits ausgewählt. Diesen Wörtern sind zugeordnet (oder besser: diese Wörter sind selbst) einerseits semantische oder assoziative und andererseits lautliche Charakterisierungen“ (Leont'ew 1975, 250). Und des Weiteren: „In Abhängigkeit von der konkreten Strategie können verschiedene Prozesse als konstant (bzw. labil) gewählt werden“ (Leont'ew 1975, 246).

Im Hinblick auf das hier gegebene Beispiel kann der stabile Prozess hinsichtlich einer Fremdsprache, welche gerade erlernt wird, solchen Bereichen zugeordnet werden, wie jenen zuvor beschriebenen hinsichtlich der Lektüre der Brahmsbriefe oder des Bestellens von Mehlspeisen, die labilen einer Gegebenheit, welche aufgrund ihrer plötzlichen Aktualität nach spontanem Ausdruck verlangt. Der labile Prozess wäre demgemäß einzustufen als ein solcher, welcher dann abläuft – und zwar, wie gesagt, in kaum messbarer Zeit – wenn ein Individuum das Bedürfnis nach unmittelbarem und angemessenem Ausdruck hat.

Das Beachtenswerte an der Situation der jungen koreanischen Musikstudentin ist deren Verbundenheit mit der Kultur der Zielsprache, ein gleichsames „Insitzen“ in derselben. Nur durch ebendieses „Insitzen“ stand ihr das fremdsprachliche Wort zur Verfügung. Durch den kulturspezifischen Unterreicht, das Lesen der Brahmsbriefe gleichermaßen wie das Bestellen von „Melange“ oder „Topfenstrudel“ im Kaffeehaus war zweifellos eine Voraussetzung für eine allmählich sich steigende Intimwerdung mit der Zielsprache.

„Kultur ist all das, was das Individuum wissen und empfinden können muß, damit es beurteilen kann, wo sich Einheimische in ihren verschiedenen Rollen so verhalten, wie man es von ihnen erwartet und wo sie von den Erwartungen abweichen“ (Göhring 1980, 70f). Diese feststellende Definition des deutschen Germanisten und Fachmannes für Deutsch als Fremdsprache Heinz Göhring kann und muss aufgrund eines solchen wie des hier gegebenen Beispiels geradezu mit Notwendigkeit noch dahin erweitert werden, dass Kultur auch Selbstreflexion bedeutet, ein sich selbst Rechenschaft geben Können über ein berechtigtes erwartetes Rollenverhalten, aber auch über ein berechtigtes Abweichen davon.

Wenn dergleichen auch in der Lernsprache einmal möglich ist, dann kann von einem Einwurzeln derselben in die lernende Person ganz zu Recht gesprochen werden.

Und dann erst erweist auch die Zielsprache sich im Sinne von Günter Lipold als die von ihm so beschriebene „geistige Kraft, die sich durch Schöpfung manifestiert“ und in einem Ereignis der Welt als Fall dem Individuum helfen kann zu bestehen.

Im Verlauf des Eindringens in die Fremdkultur wird einer lernenden Person auch klar, welche Defizite sowohl die Ausgangssprache als auch die Zielsprache haben – etwa durch Tabuisierungen.

Das Erlernen und Anwenden einer Fremdsprache hebt somit die jeweils gegebene „Grenze einer Sprache als Grenze einer Welt“ – um Wittgenstein zu paraphrasieren – nicht auf, aber es schafft eine neue Fähigkeit, mit Grenzen umzugehen und Grenzüberschreitungen schöpferisch zu nutzen.

Der durch die letztendlich stattgehabte Intimwerdung mit der Zielsprache im hier gegebenen Beispiel ermöglichte über all das hinaus den schnellen individuellen Weg von der Empfindung zum Akt und – was ja die Notwendigkeit für diesen schnellen Weg war – die Umgehung eines Tabus in der eigenen Sprache. Und so war es der jungen koreanischen Musikstudentin eben möglich geworden, das, was sich in ihrer Sprache eben nicht klar sagen läßt auf Deutsch gewinnbringend doch klar zu sagen: mit dem Wort „Scheiße!!!“

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Aphorismus, Fragment und opus progrediens. Ein kulturhistorisch-vergleichender Versuch über die Form im Œuvre Wittgensteins

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Abstract

Die Form sucht ihr Wesen an Inhalten. Diese geben der Formwerdung ihr spezifisches Gepräge. Die Vielbedeutsamkeit Ein- und Desselben oder Ein- und Dasselbe als Formenvielfalt hat in der österreichischen Kulturgeschichte eine Tradition mit reichlicher Hinterlassenschaft. Wittgenstein, dessen Kulturbegreifen ja österreichisch geprägt ist, kann mit seinem Werk, der Art und Weise seiner Ausarbeitung verständnisbildend einigen großen Emanationen dieser vielfachbedeutsamen Kulturprägtheit zur Seite gestellt werden.

„Ein Gedanke kann nicht erwachen,
ohne andere zu wecken“
(Ebner-Eschenbach 1953, 399).

Mit der von Wittgenstein hochgeschätzten Marie von Ebner-Eschenbach, welche zu einer der ganz wesentlichen Gestalten der österreichischen Literatur- und Kulturgeschichte gehört, sei gleich die Probe auf's Exempel gemacht.

Der österreichische Musikwissenschaftler Heinrich Schenker, ein Schüler Anton Bruckners hat schulbildende Überlegungen zur Struktur musikalischer Kunstwerke angestellt. Felix Salzer, Sohn von Wittgensteins Schwester Helene, hat in seinem Buch „Sinn und Wesen der abendländischen Mehrstimmigkeit“ diese Gedanken kommentiert und weiterentwickelt. Beide sehen die europäische Musik als ein vertikales, fast punkthaftes Phänomen, welches in seinem Wesen stets gleich bleibt. Die unterschiedlichen Stile sind eine Art horizontale Verwerfung dieses Zentralkpunktes.

Schenkers Vorstellungsgebäude beruht auf „Schichten“. Demgemäß baut sich alle europäische Musik auf einem „Ursatz“ auf, definiert durch die harmonischen Grundschröte. Über diesen stölpfen sich „Mittel-“ und „Vordergrund“, die in der Komposition durch Stimmführungs-„Züge“ individuell ausgestaltet werden.

Der „Ursatz“ kann mit Augustinus verstanden werden als unabdingbare gottgegebene Voraussetzung für Kunstschaffende. Der Idee einer solchen Voraussetzung ist auch Adalbert Stifter verpflichtet.

Wie Josef Rothaupt entdeckt hat, „nimmt Wittgenstein selbst in einem handschriftlichem Nachtrag im ‚Big Typescript‘ (TS213,258v) an höchst prominenter Stelle - wo es nämlich um die Spenglersche Methode und um die Aristotelische Logik bzw. Syllogistik geht - explizit auf die ‚Schenkersche Betrachtungsweise der Musik‘ Bezug“ (nach freundlicher Mitteilung von Josef G.F. Rothaupt).

Dieser Gedanke erweckt jenen, dass jeder Epochen- oder Personalstil letztendlich nichts anderes ist als ein jeweiliges „auf den Punkt Bringen“ des „Ursatzes“. Dieser im Werk auf den Punkt gebrachte „Ursatz“ verleiht dem Werk folgerichtig und unbeschadet von dessen Länge die Qualität eines Aphorismus, eines epochen- und personalstilistisch bestimmaren punktuellen Bezuges zum Ganzen des „Ursatzes“, welcher Ursache seiner jeweils aktuellen Evidenz im bestimmten Werk ist. Damit ist jedes Werk als aktuell mögliches Kettenglied mit dem „Ursatz“ verbunden und über ihn mit anderen eigenständigen „aphoristischen

Evidenzen“ desselben, hervorgebracht auf langen Gedankenwegen.

Auch für die erfahrene Ebner-Eschenbach ist ein Aphorismus „der letzte Ring einer langen Gedankenkette“ (Ebner-Eschenbach 1953, 391). Die präzise Kurzform bringt demnach eine Fülle von Gedanken in den Stand eines „punctum saliens“. In cusanischer oppositioneller Coincidenz ist dieses die kleinste vollkommene Übereinstimmung mit einer sukzessiv geknüpften Gedankenkette, die Realisierung des Größten im Kleinsten, die Einmündung der Sukzessivität ins Zeitlose. Das „punctum saliens“ ist damit letzter Ausdruck und reinsten Extrakt dieser als „opus progrediens“ (- ein von mir in die Brucknerforschung eingeführter Begriff -) sich in dieses ergießenden Gedankenkette.

Wittgenstein gibt in einer Tagebucheintragung Auskunft darüber, wie groß sein Respekt vor bedeutenden Aphoristikern ist: „Der Verkehr mit Autoren wie Hamann oder Kierkegaard, macht ihre Herausgeber anmaßend. Diese Versuchung würde der Herausgeber des Cherubinischen Wandersmannes nie fühlen noch der Confessiones des Augustinus. Es ist wohl das, daß die Ironie eines Autors den Leser anmaßend zu machen geneigt ist....Es ist dann so: sie sagen sie wissen daß sie nichts wissen bilden sich aber auf diese Erkenntnis enorm viel ein“ (Wittgenstein 2000, 41).

Der von Wittgenstein angesprochene „Cherubinische Wandersmann“ stammt von Angelus Silesius (1624-1677), dessen Heimat Schlesien dazumal ein habsburgisch-österreichisches Land war. Der studierte Mediziner bekleidete das Ehrenamt eines Hofarztes von Kaiser Ferdinand III..

In der Denktradition Bernhards von Clairvaux, Meister Eckharts, Nicolaus Cusanus und Jakob Boehmes stehend nimmt sich der Dichter das Paradoxon zum Thema seiner meisterhaft als strenge Alexandriner gebauten Epigramme, um die Notwendigkeit eines Paradoxons für die Beziehung zwischen Gott und den Menschen glasklar darzustellen.

„Nackt darf ich nicht vor Gott und muß doch unbekleidet ins Himmelreich eingehn, weil er nichts Fremdes leidet“ (Silesius 1986, 97).

Sich des Paradoxons bewusst werden durch dessen Komprimierung zum „punctum saliens“ mittels Positionierung als „einen letzten Ring in einer langen Gedankenkette“, dies erfordert einen gleichsam sezierenden Umgang mit der langen Reihe der einzelnen gedanklichen Kettenglieder. Der Arbeitsgang an einem jeden einzelnen Glied und von einem jeden zum anderen ist als „opus progre-

diens“ zu verstehen, als Werk im Fortschreiten, ausgehend von Einzelnen, welches den Fortschritt zum Ganzen befördert.

Zwei Erscheinungen der österreichischen Kulturgeschichte, die Wittgenstein wohl bekannt waren, können hier vertiefend-beispielhaft angeführt werden: der Komponist Anton Bruckner und das Stift Klosterneuburg in Niederösterreich. In der Augustinerchorherrenniederlassung an der Donau arbeitete Wittgenstein im Sommer 1920 als Gärtnergehilfe. Er kannte dieses für die österreichische Geschichte so bedeutsame Stift sicher schon als Kind. Dies deshalb, weil seine Mutter Leopoldine hieß, also den Namen des Kloster- und Stadtgründers von Klosterneuburg, des Hl. Markgrafen Leopold (ca. 1070-1136), welcher dort auch seine Hauptresidenz und Familiengrablege einrichtete, trug. Sein Gedenktag am 15. November war und ist ein vielbesuchtes Volksfest mit tiefem religiösem Hintergrund, zumal für Menschen, die selbst den Namen dieses heiligen Politikers tragen und für deren Familien.

Ludwigs mit Höchstwahrscheinlichkeit anzunehmende Verbundenheit mit diesem österreichischen Monument ist für die Geschichtswissenschaft – wie es der österreichische Historiker Karl Brunner ausdrückt – als „Nacherzählung des Offensichtlichen“ (Brunner 2009, 241) zu verstehen, als Phänomen, welches – unbeschadet vorhandener oder nichtvorhandener Quellen – zu jenen gehört, bei denen wir – um ein weiteres Wort Brunners aufzugreifen – „immer bedenken müssen, dass das Gesagte eher das Außergewöhnliche betrifft, während große Teile der Lebenswirklichkeit gar nicht zu Wort kommen“ (Brunner 2009, 249).

Hinsichtlich von Form und deren Gebung ist Stift Klosterneuburg zweifach bedeutsam.

Da ist einmal die Klosteranlage selbst. Sie ist ein wahrhaftes „opus progrediens“ mit erhaltenen Bauteilen vom Gründungsjahr 1114 bis hin zur Gotik des 19. Jahrhunderts und jedwelchen moderneren Zubauten. Im Mittelpunkt steht ein mächtiger Barockteil, von Kaiser Karl VI. als „Österreichischer Escorial“ geplant, von seiner Tochter Maria Theresia aber aus ästhetischen und finanziellen Gründen nicht vollendet. So paart sich hier das Phänomen des Fortschreitens durch die Epochen mit dem Unvollendetsein.

Vollste Vollendung erreichte aber Nikolaus Verdunensis mit seinem „Verduner Altar“, dem herausragendsten Kunstwerkes des leopoldinischen Stiftes. Die 1181 vollendete Emailarbeit verbindet in einzelnen Bildern sub specie aeternitatis in strukturell-verdeutlichender Hinsicht Elemente des Epigrammatisch-Aphoristischen mit solchen des Fortschreitens und der Zusammenschau, um dadurch dem Inhalt und seiner Vermittlung sowie dessen gedanklicher Weiterführung im Glauben gerecht zu werden.

Dieser Inhalt ist nichts Geringeres als die Heilsgeschichte, deren Gestaltung und Durchschreitung seitens Gottes und der Menschen sowohl in ihrer Individualität als auch in der Gesamtheit ihres einzelnen und gemeinsamen Fortschreitens. Die Eigenschaft dieses Inhaltes ist demnach die eines „opus progrediens“, gleich dem Hindurchwandern der Menschen durch die Epochen ihrer Geschichte, welche auch Heilsgeschichte ist. Der Künstler legte diesem seinem Hauptwerk ein philosophisch-theologisches Konzept des Gerhoch von Reichersberg zugrunde, welches seinerseits auf „De civitate dei“ von Aurelius Augustinus fußt.

Drei unterscheidbare Epochen der Heilsgeschichte werden aufeinander bezogen: oben – augustinish gespro-

chen jene „ante legem“, unten die „sub lege“ und in der Mitte jene „sub gratia“ (Röhrig 1984, 44ff). Jedes einzelne Bild wirft dabei ein gleichsam aphoristisches Schlaglicht auf etwas Einzelnes in dieser Heilsgeschichte. So strahlt in diesem Einzelnen etwas vom Ganzen des Heilszieles, der Erlösung, als „punctum saliens“ auf. Jedes Bild aus den Themenbereichen „ante legem“ und „sub lege“ erweist sich demnach ebenso als Teil eines „opus progrediens“, jenes fortschreitenden Werkes, welches Gott in der Zeit an den Menschen heilsam wirkt. Jeder Darstellung ist ein Epigramm beigegeben, welches die aktuelle Bildszene beschreibt und mit den anderen beiden Bildern der Serie in historische Beziehung bringt.

Das Ereignis „Nativitas Ysaac“ – „ante legem“ – trägt die Unterschrift:

„HERAEDEM SERUM
LACTAT SARA PLENA DIERUM.“

„Sub lege“ steht die Begebenheit „Nativitas Samson“ und bei ihr die Beifügung:

„HIC PUER HEBREIS
FIT PARMA RUINA GETHEIS.“

„Sub gratia“ vollzieht sich schlussendlich die „Nativitas Domini“, bei der es erklärend heißt:

„NASCITUR ABSQUE PATRE
DEUS INFANS VIRGINE MATRE.“
(Röhrig 1984, Bild 5 ff).

Die Durchdringung des Einzelnen mit dem Ganzen und durch dieses ergibt für ebenjenes Einzelne den paradoxen Zustand, zugleich evidentieller Bestandteil eines „opus progrediens“ und aphoristisch-epigrammatisches „punctum saliens“ zu sein. In diesem Paradoxon repräsentieren sich vor den betrachtend Bedenkenden geschichtliches Werden und erreichter erlöster Zustand im Hinblick auf das Heilsziel.

Enthält somit das Einzelne in nuce das Ganze, dann kann auch gesagt werden, dass die dargestellten Einzelheiten „ante legem“ und „sub lege“ sich in der gleichsam ganzheitlichen Vollendung in den Verbildlichungen der Szenen „sub gratia“ wiederfinden.

Eine notwendige Einmündung der Teile in das abschließende Ganze und deren Sinnenthüllung dortselbst vollzieht sich auch in den formalen Konzeptionen der Messen und Symphonien Anton Bruckners. Einen diesbezüglichen monumentalen Höhepunkt erreicht der Komponist in seiner VIII. Symphonie, wo am Ende alle Hauptthemen der vier Einzelsätze dank kontrapunktischer Meisterschaft gleichzeitig ertönen.

Damit erweist sich folgendes: die Teile sind nichts weniger als gleichsam partiell-aphoristische Komponenten einer Ganzheit, auf welche sie musikalisch-logisch ausgerichtet sind, sodass eine bruckner'sche Symphonie oder Messe bis vor dem Erreichen des Zusammenschlusses, welcher das Ende wahrnehmbar macht, als „opus progrediens“ begriffen werden muss.

Dabei zeigt sich hörbar, dass die ins Innere des schlussendlichen „punctum saliens“ hineinschreitenden einzelnen Teile keineswegs in diesem aufgehen. Im Gegenteil: sie evidieren gerade dort erst ihre ureigenste Qualität, ihre besondere Leistung für das „punctum saliens“ des Erreichten. Der letzte Ring der Gedankenkette ist die Gleichzeitigkeit der Glieder.

Wie im Einzelnen eines Werkes verfährt Bruckner aber auch im Gesamtbau seines Œuvres. Noch in seiner letzten

Symphonie, der „IX.“, begonnen 1884 und unvollendet hinterlassen, verwebt er sinnstiftend Elemente aus früheren Kompositionen, wie seiner ersten großen Messe, jener in d-moll von 1864, das Frühere solcherart mitnehmend in das Spätere. Und auch dieses Ineinandersein des Früheren mit Späterem erfolgt nicht nur im Detail thematischer Zitate, sondern auch dadurch, dass Bruckner mit wenigen Ausnahmen seine Werke in mehreren Ausformungen hinterließ. Durch die Überarbeitungen holte er frühere ganze Werke in die gedanklichen Bedingungen und Zusammenhänge späterer Zustände herein. So erweist sich eine Messe oder Symphonie selbst als gewaltiges „opus progrediens“, dessen Fortschreiten nur durch den Tod ans irdische Ende kommt.

Ist das eine Zusammenfassung im „Ursatz“, wie es der Brucknerschüler Heinrich Schenker nannte?

Bruckner hinterließ ausgerechnet seine „IX.“, welche er dem Lieben Gott widmete als Lobpreis auf Ihn unvollendet. Dass gerade sie ohne Ende blieb, darin mag ein Paradoxon gesehen werden, welches ein religiös glaubender Mensch dahingehend auflösen vermag, dass die Musik des letzten Schrittes eben nurmehr eine Angelegenheit zwischen dem gläubig-frommen Komponisten und dem Lieben Gott gewesen ist.

In der Tat hat Bruckner mit hochprozentiger Wahrscheinlichkeit den Schluss seiner letzten Symphonie zumindest im Kopf fertig konzipiert gehabt – es fehlt nur die manuelle Umsetzung, um sie irdisch realisieren zu können.

Gleich wie Bruckner seine „IX.“ wollte auch Wittgenstein sein geplantes großes Buch zur Ehre Gottes schreiben (Wittgenstein 2011, § 75). So wie Bruckner in den unterschiedlichen Fassungen seiner Kompositionen hat auch der Philosoph um eine letztgültige Formulierung gerungen, sodass viele seiner Gedanken in unterschiedlicher Verwörtlichung vorliegen.

Die *letztmögliche* Formulierung muss eben – zumal sub specie aeternitatis – keineswegs die *letzte* sein im Hinblick auf die Umwandlung des Fortschreitens in das „punctum saliens“. Jede Ausformung erweist sich bei Wittgenstein wie bei Bruckner als eine folgerichtige Möglichkeit von möglicherweise vielen, welche als qualitativ gleichwertig zur Evidentwerdung drängen. Das „punctum saliens“, auf welches dieses Knüpfen einer Gedankenkette hinarbeitet – vielleicht ist es ein wittgenstein'sches „Mystisches“, welches sich in seiner Unsagbarkeit eben oftmals nicht nur in *einer* Form den künstlerisch denkenden Menschen zur Verfügung stellt. Als „punctum saliens“ mag ihm gerechtfertigter Weise die Fähigkeit zustehen, im gegebenen Falle gleichsam von *einer möglichen* Form in *eine andere genauso mögliche* zu springen.

Thomas de Aquinos Lehrsatz „anima forma corporis“ kann als ein Gedanke, der andere erweckt verkettet werden mit der Überlegung, dass die „anima“ als Ziel und letztlich allumfassender Inhalt auch „forma formae“ sein könnte.

Dass Wittgenstein, ähnlich wie Bruckner seine „IX.“, sein geplantes großes Buch mit Gott als letztendlichem Adressaten in Verbindung bringen wollte, dies vermag eine geistig-kulturelle Verbindung zwischen dem Philosophen und dem Komponisten noch zu verdeutlichen.

„Der Philosoph zieht seine Schlüsse, der Poet muß die seinen entstehen lassen“ (Ebner-Eschenbach 1953, 400).

Dieser ebner-eschenbach'sche Aphorismus als letztes Glied einer langen Gedankenkette kann auch auf Anton Bruckners Musik und deren Werdung in der Struktur angewendet werden.

Ludwig Wittgenstein bestätigt diese Aussage der Schriftstellerin von seiner Seite her, wenn er feststellt: „Das Denken faßt in gewissem Sinne nur zusammen“ (Wittgenstein 2011, § 191).

Eine solche Aussage kann durchaus mit vielen Bemerkungen des Philosophen zur Musik und da auch zu Bruckner in Übereinstimmung gebracht werden und damit auch in Zusammenhang mit einem Gedankenspiel von Josef Rothhaupt: „Was passiert, wenn man Wittgensteins Gesamtnachlass nicht nur als Philosophie, sondern als Literatur, als Dichtung betrachtet und liest? Man würde nichts verlieren und vieles gewinnen“ (Rothhaupt 2006, 297).

Zu ergänzen wäre – um zu den hier stattgehabten Gedanken den Zusammenhang, die Vergliederung zur Kette herzustellen – dass Wittgenstein dann auch als ein Mensch begriffen werden muss, der fähig ist, strukturell im musikalischen Sinne zu denken.

Dies bedeutet im Letzten, dass „Form“ kein Phänomen der Zeit ist, sondern der zeitlosen kleinst-größten Kompression im „punctum saliens“.

Bruckners Gleichzeitigkeit von vier Themen wird dann vielleicht besser verstehbar, ebenso wie die Aussage des künstlerisch denkenden Wittgenstein, wenn er zur Erkenntnis kommt:

„Wer seiner Zeit voraus ist, den holt sie einmal ein“ (Wittgenstein 2011, § 80).

Ihr nicht vorauszu sein heißt aber mit nichts ihr nachzuhinken. Es heißt außer ihr bleiben, wie es Angelus Silesius erkennt:

„Gott ist noch nie gewest und wird auch niemals sein und bleibt doch nach der Welt, war auch vor ihr allein“ (Silesius 1986, 219).

Wenn Wittgenstein in seinem Philosophieren als jemand begriffen werden darf, der die musikalische Kunst in sein Denken zum Behufe von dessen Strukturalisierung wesentlich einbezogen hat, dann erlaubt dies die Frage, ob die Art und Weise, wie er seine philosophischen Gedanken textlich zu gestalten trachtete, auf ihre eigene Weise nicht auch künstlerisches Handeln durchaus im musikalischen Sinne ist, eine Handhabung der Möglichkeiten von Aphorismus und „opus progrediens“ mit der Option auf das Fragmentarische auch als letzter angemessener Möglichkeit.

Die hier an markante Erscheinungen der österreichischen Kulturtradition gerichtete Fragestellung ganz im Hinblick auf den kulturell österreichisch sozialisierten Ludwig Wittgenstein - nach deren letztendlichen Formen lassen den zusammenfassenden Schluss zu, dass schließlich das, was etwas ist, seine Art der „quiditas“ vielfach erst durch Zusammenhänge, die Vergliederung mit einer Kette preisgibt.

Aphorismus – Fragment – „opus progrediens“: nicht, dass sie sind, ist das „Mystische“, sondern wie sie sind, die Form verschiedentlich ausnützend durch ihr Ausgerichtetsein gleichsam in „Familienähnlichkeit“ (Wittgenstein) auf das „punctum saliens“.

Damit ihre jeweilige eigene Bedeutung für das Andere und das Ganze erkannt werde, dazu bedarf es – um dem Schluss nochmals einen Gedanken des Historikers Brunner als Kettenglied einzufügen -, „des Wagnisses einer Gesamtschau, die ebenso unmöglich wie unverzichtbar ist“ (Brunner 2009, 51).

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Acting *sub specie boni*

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Abstract

On a traditional view of human agency, intentional actions are performed *sub specie boni*: The agent, in acting intentionally, must see some good in what he is doing. The major challenge to this view arises from cases where, *prima facie*, the agent acts fully intentionally, but, out of perversity or depression, either acts precisely because his action is bad or doesn't care about whether it has some good feature or not. I will argue that, even for these cases, there are crucial features of intentional agency that we can make best sense of by accepting the *sub specie boni* view, while it remains unclear whether critics of this view can account for these features at all.

1. What is often called the 'classical' conception of human agency, ties intentional agency to acting *sub specie boni*: When the agent is acting intentionally, there must be something about acting in this way which he believes to be good. In this talk, I want to review what I take to be the main challenge to this view and argue that it is not compelling. After specifying which version of the *sub specie boni* view will interest me here, I will present this main challenge. I will go on to argue that, despite the apparent possibility of fully intentional actions that the agent does not, in any respect, consider as good, there are nonetheless strong reasons for accepting the *sub specie boni* claim even for these cases, if we want to account for some essential features of intentional action.

2. While the *sub specie boni* view appears in various versions, and is sometimes advanced as a claim about desires, the version which will concern me here is the one pertaining to intentional agency and intentions (compare Raz 2010). It claims that, in order to do X intentionally, or to have the intention to do X, the agent must see some good in doing X. This version is normally connected to a certain view about the nature of motivating reasons – i.e. the nature of reasons for which (or 'in the light of' which) agents act – and to a certain conception of how reasons-explanations work. These two elements combine to yield the following motivation for accepting the *sub specie boni* view:

(i) When an agent acts intentionally, he acts for a reason.

(ii) Only perceived or supposed values of the agent can provide reasons for action.

Most plausibly, the *sub specie boni* claim in this version is seen as expressing a condition on the intelligibility of reasons-explanations of intentional actions: Intentional actions are those we can make sense of by reasons-explanations, and we could not make sense of an agent who acted for a consideration that he did not himself consider to show something good about the action.

3. It should be noted that this version of the *sub specie boni* claim is compatible with admitting two possibilities that the claim is often held to rule out. First, this version of the claim clearly does not rule out that agents, in acting intentionally, often act irrationally, choosing what is, according to their own standards, a 'lesser good'. Even if I judge that I ought to begin marking exam papers instead of finishing the whodunnit novel I bought yesterday, this will

not put into question the intentional character of my going on with reading the novel, since I obviously see *some* good in my going on (after all, the novel is thrilling and a good read).

Second, this version of the *sub specie boni* claim is not, *per se*, connected to any view about whether *moral* reasons must play a role in intentional action. In particular, it does not imply that agents cannot act against their moral judgements – for, even if moral reasons should always override or preempt other considerations, we may still see some good in the morally bad actions we perform.

Many opponents of the *sub specie boni* claim have overlooked that this claim, in one interesting version at least, is compatible with admitting these two possibilities. Thus, one common objection to this claim has been based on cases where an agent does something he knows to be *morally* wrong, though acts fully intentionally (e.g. Stocker 2004). Such cases, however, do not necessarily constitute counterexamples to the *sub specie boni* claim as defended here. In particular, that an agent must see *some* good in his action, when he acts intentionally, is quite compatible with (1) his believing the action to be morally wrong, despite its supposedly good aspect, and (2) his believing the action to be wrong overall, because the supposed good might, even in the agent's own view, be outweighed by other negative aspects of the action.

4. The real difficulty for defenders of the *sub specie boni* claim arises from the fact that while we can undeniably make sense of an action by showing what good the agent saw in his action, it is far from clear that this is the only way of making sense of an action. The point of actions, a range of cases suggest, can also be supplied by something the agent himself considers to be bad or, at least, neutral.

Three kind of cases are particularly relevant in this respect: (1) cases where the agent – e.g. from depression – doesn't care about whether what he is doing has value; (2) where an agent does something precisely because it is bad – either from perversion or from depression; and (3) cases of compulsive obsessions.

I will set aside (3) here, because such cases are, arguably, not cases of full-blooded intentional actions, and therefore can be assessed by defenders of the *sub specie boni* view as simply deficient *qua* intentional action. Instead, I will concentrate on (1) and (2). In such cases, it seems, we can perfectly well make sense of an agent, even though he does (allegedly) not see any value in what he is doing. To require his seeing such a value for intentional agency,

would, as many authors (e.g. Stocker 1979 and 2004, Velleman 1992) have argued, amount to an overrationalistic, or even moralistic picture of human agency, which, at the very least, imposes an unrealistic uniformity on intentional actions. Another argument for rejecting the 'guise of the good' requirement comes, at least *prima facie*, from taking the nature of intentional agency to consist in its being 'teleologically' or 'calculatively' structured agency. (Such views have recently become influential in the accounts of philosophers following Elizabeth Anscombe or Georg Hendrik Von Wright, e.g. Vogler 2002.) For it seems that an action can well display the feature of being teleologically 'aimed at' something, even when the agent doesn't consider what he is aiming at as – in some respect – good.

5. I want to argue, however, that the nature of intentions and as well as the teleological structure of intentional agency, provide, in fact, strong arguments *in favour of the sub specie boni* thesis. I will try to establish this result by showing that intentions and intentional agency are essentially connected to constraints that we can best make sense of by supposing that the agent ascribes some value to his action. The chief constraint on intentional agency that will interest me here is that an intentional action is, necessarily, one that can be assessed for rationality or irrationality in various respects. (Mark: This is very different from claiming that an intentional action is one that necessarily is rational to a sufficient degree.) Such assessment for rationality or irrationality requires a 'common currency' for comparing the importance of the pursuit of one's intention with the sacrifices involved in this pursuit. Such a 'common currency' can be provided when the agent assigns to his pursuit of his intention a positive value, while it is unclear what this 'common currency' could be when the agent acts *sub specie mali* – or so I will argue.

Two aspects of intentional agency are particularly relevant to showing the need for such a 'common currency': (a) that intentions cannot, rationally, be abandoned *ad libitum*, and (b) that intentional agency is essentially adaptive.

(a) Intending to do X brings with it a number of rational requirements, which follow from the role intentions play for our 'self-management' in the light of continually changing desires (cf. Bratman 1987). In particular, once I have formed an intention to do X, I will, *ceteris paribus*, be irrational if I abandon this intention when facing obstacles or disadvantages which I had either already considered when adopting the intention, or which are of much lesser weight than pursuing my intention is to me (cf. Raz 1975). Unless a rational requirement of this form were tied to possessing an intention, it would never be irrational to abandon one's intention once one has a momentary stronger inclination to act otherwise; and this would completely undermine the role intentions can play as distinct from desires (cf. Holton 2003).

Now, in order to assess, e.g. whether my abandoning my intention would be rationally permissible in the light of some new obstacles I encounter, I must be able to make comparisons: Specifically, I must compare the 'value' or 'importance' of pursuing my intention with the 'disvalue' connected to the tediousness and effort involved in overcoming obstacles, in order to see whether the latter are 'bad enough' to justify my abandoning the pursuit of my intention. To make such a comparison, both the importance of the intention and tediousness or sacrifice involved in overcoming the obstacles must be amenable to an

evaluation according to a 'common standard' on which the former, but not the latter is assigned a positive value. For if reaching my aim is itself considered by me to lack value, we would, it seems, always be rationally permitted to abandon our intentions in the face of obstacles, which can only add to the disvalue of carrying on. But in this case, we could no longer distinguish cases where it is rationally permissible to abandon my intention in the face of unforeseen obstacles, from cases where it is not, and this distinction, as I have claimed, is crucial to the very nature of intention as distinct from desires.

The most straightforward 'common standard' of assigning (relative) positive value or 'importance' to an intention or aim is a standard of 'goodness', on which reaching the aim is assigned a positive, and the effort or other costs a negative value – and application of such a standard is precisely what is ensured if the *sub specie boni* thesis is correct.

(b) Teleological structure, on which, as we have seen, some contemporary philosophers focus in order to explain the nature of intentional agency, is primarily a matter of the 'plasticity' of one's behaviour. Plasticity is an adaptiveness to changing circumstances, and involves, for agents, a rich structure of such things as taking the means that are suitable in the circumstances, trying again when one has failed, changing one's course of action in order to avoid or overcome obstacles to the attainment of one's end etc.

This rich structure, within which intentional actions are embedded is, in the case of fully intentional agency, not isolated from the rest of the agent's behaviour, but, in its turn, embedded in his overall behavioural structure and biography. Within this overall structure, we can distinguish between 'obsessive' behaviour *coute que coute*, where an agent single-mindedly pursues a certain aim at the expense of other aims and concerns which are, in fact, more important to him than the aim which he is pursuing at the moment, and behaviour which not merely pursues one aim, but is, at the same time, adaptive to other aims and concerns. Only the latter kind of behaviour is full-blooded intentional behaviour, while obsessive pursuit *coute que coute* is not. (What characterises people such as drug-addicts is their incapacity to shape their pursuit of their aims, or, if necessary, abandon this pursuit, in the light of what other things they consider as valuable.)

Now, as in (a), making sense of an agent's behaviour as being adaptive in this more encompassing sense and thus being fully intentional, requires that the agent can make assessments of comparative weight or importance. For only then can we assess whether he acts *coute que coute*, despite having other aims he considers to be more important, or whether he pursues an aim which is sufficiently important to him to warrant sacrificing these other aims. And, again, possibility of this comparison requires a 'common currency' in which the weight of these different aims for the agent can be assessed – and such a 'common currency' is most straightforwardly provided by a standard of goodness.

6. One might object to the argument from the preceding section that even if accepting the *sub specie boni* claim is the most straightforward way to ensure that a 'common currency' is available for assessing the comparative weights of the agent's aim or intentions and the costs involved in pursuing these aims, there can be alternative ways to ensure such a common standard. It would thus be

question-begging to presuppose that an agent's comparative weighting has to be made in the 'currency of the good'. But it is hard to see what an alternative common standard could look like. In particular, we cannot simply substitute the 'currency of the good' by a 'currency of the bad'. For, as the considerations in 5. (b) show, the standard cannot just be a local one, but must be extensively applicable by the agent over longer stretches of his life. And, as e.g. Davidson's considerations about interpretation of agents suggest, once an agent extensively applies a standard of 'X' as action-guiding and generally makes the relevant comparisons in terms of a 'currency of X', we cannot help ascribing to him the view that X is good (this will just be his 'revealed preference'). The arguments in the last section, it turns out, provide a strong case for excluding that, even at a local level, there can be fully intentional actions *sub specie mali*.

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Skeptical doubting and mindful self-reflection

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Abstract

The skeptic argues that we cannot have any external world knowledge because we cannot know that we are not brains in a vat. The intuitive appeal of this skeptical argument is essentially based on the comprehensibility of the process of skeptical doubting, where we focus our attention on our experiences and experience-based beliefs and raise questions about the sources of these experiences. I propose that skeptical doubting is an instance of a mental attitude that contemporary psychology characterizes as mindfulness. I suggest that mindful self-reflection is not a single phenomenon but rather a cluster of related phenomena that are characterized by an epistemic gap of one kind or the other. I conclude that the persuasiveness of the skeptical argument is based on undergoing the mental process of mindful self-reflection. The undesired skeptical results are gained by overemphasizing the epistemic force of this mental attitude.

1 Descartes on doubting

Descartes (1984) famously characterizes the method of doubting as follows:

Suppose [a person] had a basket full of apples and, being worried that some of the apples were rotten, wanted to take out the rotten ones to prevent the rot spreading. How would he proceed? Would he not begin by tipping the whole lot out of the basket? And would not the next step be to cast his eye over each apple in turn, and pick up and put back in the basket only those he saw to be sound, leaving the others? In just the same way, those who have never philosophized correctly have various opinions in their minds which they have begun to store up since childhood, and which they therefore have reason to believe may in many cases be false. They then attempt to separate the false beliefs from the others, so as to prevent their contaminating the rest and making the whole lot uncertain. Now the best way they can accomplish this is to reject all their beliefs together in one go, as if they were all uncertain and false. They can then go over each belief in turn and re-adopt only those which they recognize to be true and indubitable. (Replies 7, AT 7:481)

According to Descartes' understanding of doubting, we abandon all our beliefs "as if they were all uncertain and false" and, consequently, also all our *external world* beliefs, despite still having experiences.

2 Mindfulness through meditation

The concept of mindfulness is an essential part of Buddhist meditation. It is nowadays used in clinical psychology and psychiatry in various fields including stress reduction. The method of reaching the status of mindfulness is meditation. Bishop et al. (2004, 235) point out that though only a few processes have been explicitly conceptualized "each has generally been described as a process of stepping outside of the automated mode of perceptual processing and attending to the minute details of mental activity that might otherwise escape awareness."

Mindfulness approaches teach various meditation practices, but they are similar in their basic procedures and goals. Bishop et al. for example describe them as follows:

A description of sitting meditation will illustrate the basic approach. The client maintains an upright sitting

posture, either in a chair or cross-legged on the floor and attempts to maintain attention on a particular focus, most commonly the somatic sensations of his or her own breathing. Whenever attention wanders from the breath to inevitable thoughts and feelings that arise, the client will simply take notice of them and then let them go as attention is returned to the breath. This process is repeated each time that attention wanders away from the breath. As sitting meditation is practiced, there is an emphasis on simply taking notice of whatever the mind happens to wander to and accepting each object without making judgments about it or elaborating on its implications, additional meanings, or need for action [...] The client is further encouraged to use the same general approach outside of his or her formal meditation practice as much as possible by bringing awareness back to the here-and-now during the course of the day, using the breath as an anchor, whenever he or she notices a general lack of awareness or that attention has become focused on streams of thoughts, worries, or ruminations. (Bishop et al 2004, 231f)

Bishop et al. characterize the resulting state of mindfulness as follows:

These procedures ostensibly lead to a state of mindfulness. Broadly conceptualized, mindfulness has been described as a kind of nonelaborative, nonjudgmental, present-centered awareness in which each thought, feeling, or sensation that arises in the attentional field is acknowledged and accepted as it is. [...] In a state of mindfulness, thoughts and feelings are observed as events in the mind, without over-identifying with them and without reacting to them in an automatic, habitual pattern of reactivity. This dispassionate state of selfobservation is thought to introduce a "space" between one's perception and response. Thus mindfulness is thought to enable one to respond to situations more reflectively (as opposed to reflexively). (Bishop et al 2004, 232)

Through the process of meditation we reach the cognitive state of mindfulness which is according to Bishop et al. (2004, 234) a "mode of awareness" that can also be characterized as a particular cognitive attitude we have towards our own mental states. Bishop et al (2004, 235) point out that there has been some speculation that "effective psychotherapy may also enhance the capacity to evoke and utilize mindfulness to gain insight and alternate responses to subjective inner experiences."

3 Varieties of mindful self-reflection

Mindful self-reflection is characterized by the fact that the reflecting person establishes a certain gap between the mental states about which she reflects and the judgements she makes about these mental states. This gap can be established in various different ways. Hence, mindful self-reflection is rather a family of cognitive phenomena than a single phenomenon. Accordingly, we can distinguish various cases. For the purpose of this paper, I will focus on mindful self-reflection about experiences and beliefs and exclude other mental states such as emotions. However, many of the following cases can also be modified in a way to apply for emotions.

The following cases are examples of cognitive gaps that can occur as a result of mindful self-reflection about one's own experiences and beliefs:

1. S has an experience as of p and S believes that she has an experience as of p, but S does not believe that p.
2. S believes that p and S believes that she believes that p, but S does not believe that her belief that p is true.
3. S believes that p and S believes that she believes that p and S believes that her belief that p is true, but S still considers that her belief that p might not be true.
4. S believes that p and S believes that she believes that p but S does not accept that p.
5. S believes that p but S does not act according to this belief (given certain desires).

This list of cognitive gaps is not meant to be complete. Moreover, several cases can constitute single stages of a complex process of mindful self-reflection.

We can now reflect on these cases in more detail:

Case 1:

In case 1, there is a gap between what S experiences and what S believes. For example, I have the experience as of a computer in front of me, but by mindfully reflecting on this experience, I do not come to believe that there is a computer in front of me based on this experience. This is the case, if we treat our experiences like an inner movie, watched through our inner eye. In mindful meditation, we can establish this gap either by not forming a belief that p based on the experience as of p or by abandoning a belief that p, which we earlier formed on the basis of our experience as of p. Furthermore, it is possible to establish a gap between our thoughts that p and our beliefs that p. In this case, thoughts (maybe about future events or memories) pop up during our stream of consciousness but we do not take the doxastic attitude of believing (i.e. of taking as true) towards them.

Case 2:

In case 2, S performs mindful self-reflection about her belief that p, but maintains this belief. The resulting gap is one between her belief that p and her judgment about her belief that p. I can, for example, have an experience as of p, believe that p on the basis of this experience but still do not believe that this belief is true. Such a gap can also be established for beliefs that are not experience-based.

There is a crucial difference between this instance of mindful self-reflection and unconscious beliefs. In case of unconscious beliefs, there also exists a gap between believing that p and believing that this belief is true, but

this gap is established by the missing higher-level belief that I believe that p. In case 2, in contrast, S does not believe that her belief that p is true, despite believing that she believes that p.

Case 3:

In case 3, the cognitive gap arises between S's believing that her belief that p is true and her considering that her belief that p might be false. This situation can occur, for example, as a first step of a process of psychotherapeutic reflection, when a client has a belief that p and still believes that this belief is true, but the therapist makes the client taking the possibility hypothetically into account, maybe as an exercise, that her belief might be false.

Case 4:

Case 4 is based on the distinction between *believing* that p and *accepting* that p, which some authors draw. Lehrer (2000), for example, distinguishes "accepting something for the *epistemic* purpose of attaining truth and avoiding error" from mere believing, which one can also do for other reasons. For example, S can believe that her brother did not commit the crime for the psychological reason of avoiding painful insights about her brother, although S does not accept that her brother did not commit the crime, since S has significant evidence that he is guilty. In this case, S might be aware of the non-epistemic nature of the reasons for which she believes, but still cannot help maintaining this belief. This kind of epistemic gap not only can arise between believing that p and not accepting that p, but also between believing that p and accepting that *not-p*.

Case 5:

In this case, the gap is established between one's beliefs and desires on the hand and one's actions on the other hand. One can, for example, desire to have a hotdog, think that he can get a hotdog around the corner, but still does not walk around the corner. This case is slightly different from the cases presented before, since the gap is not established on the theoretical level of one's beliefs, but on the practical level of one's beliefs and desires and one's actions.

These cases of not acting according to one's desires and beliefs can also occur because of a gap between one's first-order desires and one's higher-level desires. I can, for example, desire to have a chocolate and believe there is one in the kitchen, but still keep working, because I do not desire to have this desire, and, therefore, do not follow this first-order desire.

The presented cases can be related to each other in different ways. For example, some can constitute stages of one single process of mindful self-reflection. A client, for example, can first consider that one of her beliefs might be false, although she still believes that this belief is true, which is an instance of case 3, and in a second step, abandon her higher-level belief that her belief that p is true, while still maintaining her belief that p, which is instance of case 2. The client might then, in a third step, abandon her belief that p, which means to close the cognitive gap. Moreover, a client can move from case 2 to case 1 during mindfulness meditation, when she first abandons her belief that her experience-based belief that p is true, and second, abandons her belief that p, only maintaining her experience as of p. In this respect, the cases above can manifest different stages of a single process.

4 Doubting and mindful self-reflection

The main thesis of the paper is:

- Cartesian doubting is a cognitive process where we perform mindful self-reflection about our experiences and experience-based external world beliefs.

By performing the process of Cartesian doubting, we give up our ordinary 1st-person perspective, which automatically leads from our experiences and experience-based beliefs to beliefs that these experiences are veridical and that the experience-based beliefs are true.

The shift of perspective away from our ordinary 1st-person perspective to the perspective of mindful self-reflection can be understood as shifting the focus away from my seeing a computer and focusing on the fact that I have a computer *experience* and a computer *belief*.

I argued that mindful self-reflection is not a single phenomenon but rather a bundle of phenomena which can be characterized by a gap that we establish between our experiences (and beliefs) and our judgements about them. Accordingly, this gap can be established in different ways. The same holds for Cartesian doubting. I do not claim that Cartesian doubting always establishes the *same* cognitive gap. Rather, we have to understand it as a bundle of phenomena and each process token of doubting leads to one of these cognitive gaps. This means that when we perform the process of Cartesian doubting, we establish a cognitive gap of a particular type.

According to this interpretation, Descartes might think that doubting has to be interpreted as an instance of case 1, where S has an experience as of p and S believes that she has an experience as of p but S does not believe that p. However, this is one possible instance of skeptical doubting among others. For psychological reasons, it seems hard or nearly impossible for most of us to actually abandon our experience-based beliefs about our current surrounding; still we are able to perform the process of skeptical doubting. When performing the act of doubting, most of us do not actually abandon their beliefs about their current surrounding, but rather maintain these beliefs, but abandon their higher-level beliefs that these beliefs are true or at least consider that they might be false. Hence, in most cases, skeptical doubting is rather an instance of case 2 or case 3, than one of case 1.

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The Sense of Commitment in Joint Action

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Abstract

The paper aims to establish the theoretical need for a minimal analogue of the concept of commitment, and to develop the notion of a sense of commitment as such a minimal analogue. The paper focuses on commitments within the context of joint action, i.e. within a context that is both fundamental and paradigmatic for human sociality in general. The paper aims to articulate the functions that commitments fulfill, and thus also the functions that a minimal analogue of commitment should be able to fulfill, as well as the demands that can be placed upon such a minimal analogue. In developing the notion of a sense of commitment as a minimal analogue, the paper focuses on emotions and action-related cues as constitutive components of the sense of commitment.

Background

The phenomenon of *commitment* is a cornerstone of human social life. Commitments make people's behavior predictable in the face of fluctuations in their desires and interests, thereby facilitating the planning and coordination of actions among multiple agents. Indeed, the importance of commitments for human sociality may run deeper still by virtue of their role in *joint action*, a characteristically human form of interaction in which multiple agents act together to realize a *shared intention*, such as painting a house together (Bratman 1993; cf. also Butterfill 2012; Tuomela 2005; Gilbert 1990). Joint action is of fundamental importance to human cognition and culture since joint actions in early childhood facilitate children's development of everyday psychological concepts such as 'belief', 'desire' and 'intention', 'knowledge' and 'perception' (Moll and Tomasello 2007; Tomasello et al. 2005), and foster language learning as well as the development of higher forms of cognition in general (Tomasello 1999; Butterfill 2012). It has even been suggested that one reason why cumulative culture is uniquely human is that only humans are intrinsically motivated to engage in joint actions (Tomasello 2009). Thus, insofar as a joint commitment to realizing a shared intention is constitutive of joint action (Gilbert 1990; Bratman 1993; Warneken et al. 2007), commitments may play a fundamental role in the phylogeny and ontogeny of uniquely human forms of cognition and culture. And yet, despite the crucial importance of the phenomenon of commitment, relatively little research has been devoted to conceptualizing it. The present paper will contribute to filling this gap.

Central Theoretical Issues

An agent makes a commitment when she pledges to perform one action at the expense of other options. This simple definition creates a puzzle: it appears irrational to engage in and follow through on commitments since they foreclose options which may maximize an agent's interests. In some cases, this problem is solved by *externalizing* commitments, as when alternative options are removed (e.g. when a general burns her bridges behind her) or when the payoff values of options are altered (e.g. by signing a contract that entails penalties for renegeing). In many other cases, however, people engage in and follow through on commitments without such externalized motivational support. Why do they do so? Often, they are motivated by *emotions*, in particular moral emotions such as guilt, shame, pride or empathy. Other times, it is likely that people act as though committed out of *habit*, responding to

and reproducing interaction patterns without considering whether their actions conflict with their interests. The core of the current paper is the proposal that such emotions and habitual interaction patterns constitute the basis of a *sense of commitment*, which may help to account for people's robust tendency to commit irrespective of their interests.

Conceptualizing the sense of commitment also promises to shed light on a second theoretical problem: given that many, perhaps most, commitments are implicit, it is unclear how people decide whether to commit, determine whether a commitment is already in place, and assess the appropriate level of commitment. The present proposal is that the *sense of commitment* constitutes a heuristic that helps to solve this problem. An example will help to illustrate this: Susan often volunteers as an assistant at a local retirement community. One of the residents, Peter, is celebrating his birthday today. Susan was not explicitly invited, but she knows that Peter would be delighted if she dropped by. She is clearly not committed to doing so, but she may decide to anyway. In deciding whether or not to attend the party (and if so, for how long), Susan is guided by her emotions and/or habitual interaction patterns – in short, by her sense of commitment.

Finally, the sense of commitment also promises to be helpful in resolving a further theoretical puzzle: children engage in joint actions, such as tidying up toys together (Behne et al. 2005) and taking turns at pulling strings to make a puppet sing (Brownell et al. 2006), by around 9-12 months, and by 18 months exhibit signs of understanding *implicit* commitments (Warneken et al. 2007), but may not at that age be capable of understanding *explicit* commitments (Gräfenhain et al. 2009). Thus, it is theoretically desirable to articulate a *minimal analogue of commitment* that is applicable to such cases. The present proposal is that the sense of commitment may play this role, and that investigation of the emotions and interaction patterns underlying the sense of commitment may shed light on joint action in early childhood, and thus help to explain the ontogenetic and phylogenetic origins of the concept of commitment.

The rest of the paper aims to articulate the notion of a *sense of commitment within joint action*, i.e. within a context that is both fundamental and paradigmatic for human sociality in general. It focuses on three objectives:

Objective (1): To establish the need for a minimal analogue of commitment and to articulate the functions it should be able to fulfill, the demands that can be placed upon it, and its theoretical significance, and to

develop the concept of a *sense of commitment* as such a minimal analogue;

Objective (2): To conceptualize the link between commitment and emotion, and specifically to develop the concept of *feeling committed* as a component of the sense of commitment;

Objective (3): To conceptualize the link between habitual interaction patterns and commitment, and to develop the concept of *acting committed* as a further component of the sense of commitment.

Ad Objective 1

According to standard accounts, joint actions are constituted (in part) by shared intentions. Shared intentions, in turn, are commonly taken to be constituted (in part) by joint commitment to a goal (Gilbert 1990, Bratman 1993, Warneken et al 2007). Often, commitments are functional insofar as each person's contribution to the joint action is based upon the expectation that the other person is committed to making her contribution. Thus, if two people are carrying a two-handed basket together, each person is likely to grasp one handle – a sensible strategy only if both people do so (Knoblich and Sebanz 2008). If one person lets go of her handle, this may cause the basket to fall, since the other person's action is no longer adequate to the task. It is likely, then, that the other person would rebuke the person who let go of her handle for reneging on a commitment to carry the basket together. Thus, it is common to analyze commitment to joint action in terms of the obligations and entitlements which they appear to entail: participants are committed if they recognize the obligation to work toward the joint goal and to support each other in doing so (i.e. to correct and compensate for each other), as well as the entitlement to rebuke the other for abandoning the joint action, or for free-riding or refusing to give support, etc. (Gilbert 1990).

But if commitments require participants to draw inferences using sophisticated concepts such as 'obligation' and 'entitlement', then it is doubtful whether pre-linguistic children are capable of commitment. And indeed one study has found that 24 month-olds are not sensitive to verbal expressions of commitment (Gräfenhain et al 2009). And yet, as noted above, children engage in some joint actions by around 9-12 months, and by 18 months exhibit some signs of understanding implicit commitments (Warneken et al. 2007). Clearly, then, it is desirable to articulate a minimal analogue of commitment that is applicable to young children, and which could be a stepping stone in the development of the concept of commitment. In developing the sense of commitment as such a minimal analogue, it will therefore be necessary to minimize the cognitive demands imposed by commitments. I therefore reject the intuitive view that one must understand explicit commitments in order to sense that one is committed. Rather, I endorse the working hypothesis that the sense of commitment is more basic than explicit commitments, and that explicit commitments build upon and extend this more basic phenomenon. In contrast to cognitively rich standard accounts, such a minimal approach also promises to shed light on the motivational factors supporting commitments as well as on the heuristics by which people to decide whether to commit, and on the processes that enable them to identify and to express commitments.

In order to qualify as a minimal analogue of commitment, the *sense of commitment* should have some of the same functions as explicit commitments. What, then, are the

functions of commitments? Since credible *explicit* commitments render an agent's behavior predictable despite fluctuations in desires and interests, a minimal analogue of explicit commitments should have analogous effects. Secondly, commitments increase others' confidence that an agent will remain engaged in an action. Thirdly, by doing so, commitments influence others, making them willing to perform actions that they would not otherwise perform. Fourthly, commitments may facilitate coordination by increasing agents' tendency to use '*coordination smoothers*', e.g. exaggeration of one's movements or reduction in their variability in order to make them easier for others to interpret; giving signals, such as nods; and synchronization, which makes partners in a joint action more similar and thus more easily predictable to each other (Vesper et al. 2010).

Ad Objective 2

A guiding assumption of mine is that commitments are intimately linked to emotions. Emotions motivate us to engage in and follow through on commitments, and influence our judgments about when commitments are in place. Moreover, emotional expressions may signal commitments. This assumption can be motivated by appealing to research suggesting that emotions influence moral judgments and may be necessary for normal moral reasoning (Greene and Haidt 2002; Prinz 2006; Nichols 2002; Gibbard 1990). Theoretical approaches advanced under the umbrella term 'neo-sentimentalism' explain this intimate link between moral judgments and emotions by arguing that emotions, or judgments about emotions, are constitutive of moral judgments or moral concepts. The current proposal draws upon neo-sentimentalism in conceptualizing the role of emotion in commitment, but will develop the moderate proposal that emotion is not a necessary constituent of commitment but of the *feeling of being committed*, a component of the sense of commitment.

In developing this proposal, it will be necessary to consider how/whether the feeling of commitment may be integrated with explicit reasoning, and also whether it may constitute an evolutionary and/or developmental precursor of explicit commitments. This latter proposal is corroborated by some phylogenetic and ontogenetic observations. With respect to phylogeny, it has been suggested that moral emotions may have played an important role in stabilizing cooperative behavior, namely by motivating people to practice reciprocity and to follow through on threats to punish dissenters even if it was not in their interest (Frank 1988; Sterelny 2003). Even prior to language, emotional expression could have provided an equivalent signal (e.g. anger would signal an intention to punish deviations from reciprocal behavior), and thereby influenced others' behavior just as an explicit commitment would. With respect to ontogeny, the suggestion is that children experience emotions typical of commitment prior to understanding explicit commitments, and that this facilitates the development of a conceptual understanding of commitment.

Ad Objective 3

A further guiding assumption is that people sometimes engage in and follow through on commitments out of habit, i.e. by responding to and reproducing interaction patterns characteristic of *acting committed*. For example, if one notices that one is investing or has invested significant effort in a joint action, one may be reluctant to abandon the joint action before the goal is achieved. In other words, the investment of effort may function as a cue to remain en-

gaged. In such cases, people may not even notice that they are foreclosing options which would maximize their expected benefits, so they do not need externalized or emotional motivation in order to commit. Similarly, the use of 'coordination smoothers', such as exaggerating one's movements to make them more easily intelligible, may not only facilitate coordination but also function as ostensive signals of commitment, which could thereby trigger commitment-like behavior from another person, who may then increase her use of coordination smoothers, etc. In view of research suggesting that pre-linguistic children are sensitive to such ostensive signals (Csibra and Gergely 2009), such effects could be important for understanding the processes underpinning joint action in early childhood.

In sum, like feeling committed, acting committed may indicate to oneself and signal to others that one is committed, and may be a (phylo- and/or ontogenetic) stepping stone on the way to mastering the concept of a commitment.

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Pre-Existed Patterns of Language and (Moral) Actions

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Abstract

Non-realism is a new approach for finishing the ongoing debate between realism and anti-realism. Non-realism, based on the well-known terms of “seeing” and “seeing as” presented by L. Wittgenstein, argues that the word “real” has been used in a wrong structure in the mentioned debate. As the language creates its own reality, hold non-realists, there are no pre-existed patterns to be discovered or rejected by a realist or anti-realist respectively. In this paper, I argue that it is possible to defend both Wittgensteinian heritage and pre-existed patterns of language.

Let us pause for a moment to review the debate between realism and anti-realism from the ethical standpoint. If there are moral facts, at least in some moral actions, how can we know them? For a realist, “moral facts are as certain as mathematical facts. Moral facts and mathematical facts are abstract entities, and as such, are different in kind from natural facts. One cannot literally display moral facts as one could display, say, a plant. One can display a token of the type, for example one can write “lying for personal gain is wrong” or one can write an equation; however, one cannot observe moral and mathematical facts in quite the same way as one can observe, with the aid of a microscope, chlorophyll in a leaf. Such limitations of experience do not stop realists and antirealists from disagreeing on virtually every aspect of the moral practices that seem to presuppose the existence of moral facts.” The moral realist may argue for the view that there are moral facts as follows:

- (1) Moral sentences are sometimes true.
- (2) A sentence is true only if the truth-making relation holds between it and the thing that makes it true.
- (3) Thus, true moral sentences are true only because there holds the truth-making relation between them and the things that make them true.

Therefore,

- (4) The things that make some moral sentences true must exist.

Realists' opponent is antirealists. In the past, many antirealists were noncognitivists, holding that moral judgments are not cognitive states like ordinary beliefs: that is, antirealists hold that unlike beliefs, the essential function or aim of moral judgments is not to represent the world accurately. Moral judgments are, according to the noncognitivist, mental states of some other kind: they are emotions, desires, or intentions of the sort that are expressed by commands or prescriptions. If moral judgments are expressed by commands or prescriptions, then there cannot be literal moral truths. If there are no literal moral truths, then no moral judgments may be cited as evidence for knowing how the world is.

The moral antirealist can respond to the argument by denying any of the three premises. “The antirealist could be a non-descriptivist in rejecting premise (1): no moral sentences are true for they do not describe how the world is; or, she may reject a version of the correspondence theory of truth by denying premise (2): she may argue that a sentence can be true even if there holds no truth-making relation between it and the thing that makes it true. For instance, she may be a proponent of the coherence theory

of truth, which holds that a sentence can be true only when there is a truth making relation between it and other sentences relevant to it. Or, she may even reject as illegitimate the inference from “things that make some moral sentences true” to the “existence of moral facts”.”

In the light of Wittgenstein's philosophy, another approach based on the correct form of the grammar of “real” named as “Non-Realism” appears. Let us turn to the concept of “seeing” and “seeing as” in Philosophical Investigation (PI: part II, xi). Recall the (duck-rabbit) picture which can be seen as a duck or a rabbit. What is the *reality* behind the picture? They argue that according to Wittgenstein's philosophy, *reality* has not been used in the correct form of linguistic grammar. There is *no* reality behind the picture. The picture does not have the ontological entity. So it can be seen as a duck or a rabbit. The same claim can be presented for the moral properties. The question “what is the reality behind the moral properties” is incorrect. There is no reality behind them. The reality depends on what can be “seen as” by the agent who uses the language. According to the correct grammar-structure of “reality”, it can be concluded that the reality cannot be explained without the agent who plays the language game.

Based on the non-realism's viewpoint, the same phenomenon happens in the language and (moral) actions. Behind language and (moral) actions, there are no pre-existed patterns of reality. The reality is exactly what the player of language-game expresses during the process of “continues seeing”.

Couple this with another argument which holds that Wittgenstein used the metaphor of a language game to suggest that games create their own reality. (Klein 2003, p. 62). If so, it can be concluded that there is *nothing* behind language and (moral) actions. They create their own reality.

However, there is an important question before the mentioned separation “seeing” and “seeing as”. If there is no reality behind the duck-rabbit picture, why do we limit ourselves to only two possible answers? Why do we consider the other possible answers as wrong ones? It is possible to argue that there is *something* behind the duck-rabbit picture. That *something* tells us to restrict the answers. If so, that *something* can be known as the pre-existed pattern. So, even in the light of Wittgenstein's philosophy, realism would be the winner of the debate.

Pre-existed patterns of language and (moral) actions will be discovered, not invented, by the agent while (s)he doing the process of “continues seeing”. It only *seems* that the language and the (moral) actions create their own realities. Indeed, the language and (moral) actions follow the

pre-existed patterns. These patterns can be named differently from different standpoints. They can be named "truth-making" or "values" from ethical perspective; or "a complicated network of similarities" from linguistic point of view. It is up to the agent whether discovers the pre-existed patterns or not. Failing to observe the patterns behind the language and (moral) actions never implies that there is no "reality" behind them while there are clues for the existence of it.

There are clues for the existence of such patterns. Justifying an answer or considering an answer as an acceptable one can be considered as a clue for such existence. If there is nothing as reality for our (moral) opinions to be true of, to what can we point if we wish to justify our (moral) views? Furthermore, our experience of the world does seem to involve experience of reality, which has been expressed by different names, both in moral and non-moral actions. If there is nothing as reality, how do we determine whether some aspect of our experience represents, or fails to represent, a real property to us? (McNaughton 1991: pp. 18-20 & 30-36)

As we saw, it is still possible to defend both Wittgensteinian heritage and pre-existed patterns of language and (moral) actions. Consequently, it is possible to consider the realism as the winner of the debate while non-realism stands in need of justification. For there are clues which prove the pre-existed patterns.

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The Ontological Basis for the Extended Mind Thesis

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Abstract

The extended mind thesis (EMT) was firstly stated in Clark and Chalmers (1998). Since then, philosophers have been holding intensive discussions on this topic. EMT is formulated as a denial of the computational and representational theories of mind that have been the dominant view of the philosophy of mind and artificial intelligence (Wilson and Foglia 2011). Against this traditional view, EMT states that the local mechanisms of mind are not all in the head (Clark 2008: xxviii). In other words, EMT states that the mind is not closed in the brain but extended to the body and the world. In this paper, at first, I point out the ontological obscurity of EMT. Then, I clarify EMT by interpreting the *extended mind* as *mind of an extended agent*. Thereby, I use a four-dimensional framework and define extended agents as four-dimensional objects.

1. The Extended Mind Thesis

EMT (extended mind thesis) states that the local mechanisms of mind are not all in the head (Clark 2008: xxviii) and that the mind is not closed in the brain but extended to the body and the world. The best way to understand EMT would be to examine some examples of EMT. Here, let us consider two simple examples. The first one is based on a story about Otto who suffers from Alzheimer's disease (Clark and Chalmers 1998:12-16). The following is a compressed version of this story (Clark 2008: 78): "Inga hears of an intriguing exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art (MOMA) in New York. She thinks, recalls it's on 53rd Street and sets off. Otto suffers from a mild form of Alzheimer's, and as a result he always carries a thick notebook. When Otto learns useful new information, he always writes it in the notebook. He hears of the exhibition at MOMA, retrieves the address from his trusty notebook, and sets off. Just like Inga, we claimed, Otto walked to 53rd Street because he *wanted* to go to the museum and *believed* (even before consulting the notebook) that it was on 53rd Street. The functional poise of the stored information was, in each case, sufficiently similar (we argued) to warrant similarity of treatment. Otto's long-term beliefs just weren't all in his head."

According to EMT, not only Inga but also Otto knew where MOMA was, even before consulting his notebook. Thus, Otto's mind includes his notebook. To justify this conclusion, Clark and Chalmers propose the following Parity Principle: "If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it to go on in the head, we would have no hesitation in accepting as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (for that time) part of the cognitive process." (Clark 2008: 77)

According to this Parity Principle, Otto's notebook is a part of his mind and plays the similar cognitive role like a part of Inga's brain. In other words, with respect to the knowledge of MOMA's address, Otto's notebook can be considered as functionally equivalent with a part of Inga's brain.

Even if we accept EMT, we would still ask ourselves how far we may go. Clark and Chalmers propose, therefore, four criteria for application of *extended mind* (Clark and Chalmers 1998: 17). Clark generalizes these criteria, so that we can apply them generally to nonbiological candidates as criteria for inclusion into an individual cognitive system (Clark 2008: 79).

(1a) The resource should be reliably available and typically invoked. (Otto always carries the notebook and won't answer that he "doesn't know" until after he has consulted it.)

(1b) Any information thus retrieved should be more or less automatically endorsed. It should not usually be subject to critical scrutiny (e.g., unlike the opinions of other people). It should be deemed about as trustworthy as something retrieved clearly from biological memory.

(1c) Information contained in the resource should be easily accessible as and when required.

(1d) The information in the notebook has been consciously endorsed at some point in the past and indeed is there as a consequence of this endorsement.

Our second example is taken from a famous exchange between the Nobel Prize-winning physicist Richard Feynman and the historian Charles Weiner. In an interview with Feynman, pointing Feynman's original notes and sketches, Weiner said that the materials represented "a record of [Feynman's] day-to-day work." Then, Feynman responded to this question: "I actually did the work on the paper." Clark interprets this episode as follows: "Feynman's suggestion is, at the very least, that the loop into the external medium was integral to his intellectual activity [...] itself. But I would like to go further and suggest that Feynman was actually *thinking* on the paper. The loop through pen and paper is part of the physical machinery responsible for the shape of the flow of thoughts and ideas that we take, nonetheless to be distinctively those of Richard Feynman. It reliably and robustly provides a functionality which, were it provided by going-on in the head alone, we would have no hesitation in designating as part of the cognitive circuitry." (Clark 2008: xxv)

In Otto's example, Otto's cognitive task is something that is normally realized without any help of a notebook. Oppositely, in Feynman's example, the external resource in question plays an essential and inevitable role for the realization of the given cognitive task. Without writing some information on a paper, the fulfillment of the cognitive task in question would be unachievable.

2. Ontological Obscurity of the original Extended Mind Thesis

First, let us examine the Parity Principle. This principle contains the phrase "that part of the world is (for that time) part of the cognitive process" (Clark 2008: 77). In this phrase, Clark uses the word "part" twice. However, what

does Clark means with this word? Is the *part of the world* a three-dimensional or a four-dimensional object? Is the *cognitive process* a four-dimensional entity? How can be an object (= *that part of the world*) a part of a process? In this way, we can form many questions about ontological status. The sentence is certainly not nonsense, but it is ambiguous in the sense that it can be interpreted in many different ways.

Actually, we can find this kind of ambiguity in many places in papers related to EMT. For example, Clark and Chalmers (1978) ask, where the mind stops and the rest of the world begins. However, this question sounds strange. Is the mind a kind of material entity that can be located in the world? A physicalist would deny it and would reply that the mind is a mental state or a mental process of a certain living thing. He would say something like the following, "A living thing is located in a world and its mental process is carried out solely by it or alternatively by its interaction with a part of the world." The first position is a traditional one and the second position corresponds to EMT. In section 3, I make precise this idea with help of a four-dimensional framework.

3. Four-dimensionalism and Extended Agents

There is an ontological distinction, which deals with persistence, namely the distinction between *endurantism* and *perdurantism*. According to Hawley (2010), *perdurantists* believe that ordinary things have temporal parts (things persist by 'perduring'). *Endurantists* believe that ordinary things do not have temporal parts; instead, things are wholly present whenever they exist (things persist by 'enduring'). Most *endurantists* are three-dimensionalists, and most *perdurantists* are four-dimensionalists (See also Sider (2001) and Nakayama (1999, 2009, forthcoming)). According to Sider, four-dimensionalism is a name for the thesis that things have temporal parts (Sider 2001: xiiv).

I propose in this paper a four-dimensional interpretation of *extended agent*. This interpretation is based on a four-dimensional mereology, a framework proposed in Nakayama (2009) (You can find the main idea also in Nakayama (1999)). Mereology is a formal framework for parthood relation that is originally developed by Leonard and Goodman (1940). In this paper, I presuppose a *General Extensional Mereology* (See, for example, Varzi (2009)) and interpret the notion of *part* as a *four-dimensional part relation*. However, we do not describe here the formalism of four-dimensionalism in detail. In this place, it will be enough just to mention that a four-dimensionalist considers physical objects and events as spatiotemporally extended and that this view justifies uses of notion *temporal part*. We need this notion in order to interpret extended agents as *four-dimensional objects that exist only for certain amount of time*. You can easily see the usefulness of this proposal, when you consider some examples of EMT. When we describe Feynman's calculation on a notebook in time t , we could say that *the temporal part of Feynman in t + the temporal part of his pen in t + the temporal part of his notebook in t* is calculating in t , where $+$ means (four-dimensional) mereological sum. Generally, the notion of *extended agent* can be recursively defined as follows.

(2a) [Atomic Agent] An atomic agent is an agent. Any spatial part of an atomic agent is no agent. (Here, we simply presuppose that there are atomic agents and that an atomic agent constitutes the core of any agent.)

(2b) [Agents and Tools] Let *temporal-part* (x, t) denotes the *temporal part of object x in time t* . Let A be an agent that uses a tool B in time t to perform an action. Then, the (four-dimensional) mereological sum, *temporal-part* (A, t) + *temporal-part* (B, t), is an agent.

(2c) [Collective Agent] If agents A_1, \dots, A_n perform a joint action, then $A_1 + \dots + A_n$ is an agent.

(2d) If an object satisfies neither (2a) nor (2b) nor (2c), then it is no agent.

(2e) [Extended Agent] An agent that is not atomic is called an *extended agent*.

A typical example of atomic agents is an individual person (see (2a)). An example of extended agents is a person who is hitting a nail with a hammer (see (2b) and (2e)). Also, a group of three people who are carrying a piano is an extended agent (see (2c) and (2e)). Because the above definition allows to construct a complex hierarchy, a quite complex system can be accepted as an extended agent.

4. The Extended Mind as the Mind of an Extended Agent

In section 3, I introduced the notion of *extended agent*. In this section, I point out that we ascribe mental states and mental processes not only to atomic agents but also to extended agents.

(3a) When A is an extended agent and A is performing an action, we sometimes ascribe mental processes to A .

(3b) We ascribe mental states to extended agents, when certain conditions are satisfied.

(3c) The conditions for adequate ascriptions of mental states and mental processes to extended agents are context dependent.

Based on this observation, we consider some ascriptions of belief states and mental processes to atomic and extended agents. Let t_1 be a time interval just before Otto consulted the notebook and t_2 be a time interval just after Otto consulted the notebook. Then, using four-dimensional representation, we can describe ascriptions of standing beliefs and mental actions in two examples in section 1 as follows.

(4a) *temporal-part* (Inga, t_1) believes that MAMO is on 53rd Street.

(4b) *temporal-part* (Otto + his notebook, t_1) believes that MAMO is on 53rd Street.

(4c) *temporal-part* (Otto + his notebook, t_2) believes that MAMO is on 53rd Street.

(4d) *temporal-part* (Otto, t_1) believes that the address of MAMO is in his notebook.

(4e) *temporal-part* (Otto, t_1) does not believe that MAMO is on 53rd Street.

(4f) *temporal-part* (Otto, t_2) believes that MAMO is on 53rd Street.

(4g) *temporal-part* (Feynman + his pen + his notebook, t_3) is thinking

(4h) *temporal-part* (Feynman, t_3) is performing a partial task of thinking

I accept all of these statements as true. In these descriptions, Inga, Otto, and Feynman are interpreted as atomic

agents, while *temporal-part* (Otto + his notebook, t_1) and *temporal-part* (Feynman + his pen + his notebook, t_2) are interpreted as extended agents. For example, (4a) ascribes a belief about MOMA's place to the temporal part of Inga in t_1 , while (4b) ascribes the same belief to the temporal part of the *fusion of Otto and his notebook* in t_1 . According to this interpretation, the extended mind in this case is identified with the mind of the *temporal part of the fusion of Otto and his notebook* in t_1 . Note that our interpretation does not deny the mind of the temporal part of Otto in t_1 . We accept that both *temporal-part* (Otto, t_1) and *temporal-part* (Otto + his notebook, t_1) desire to go to MOMA. However, according to our interpretation, Otto as an atomic agent did not know in t_1 the place of MOMA, while *temporal-part* (Otto + his notebook, t_1) knew it.

Let t_4 be a time interval that contains both t_1 and t_2 . Then, we can show that exactly the same explanation schema can be applied to Inga's case and Otto's case: *temporal-part* (Inga, t_2) walked to 53rd Street, because *temporal-part* (Inga, t_4) desired to go to MOMA and *temporal-part* (Inga, t_4) believed that MOMA was on 53rd Street; similarly, *temporal-part* (Otto + his notebook, t_2) walked to 53rd Street, because *temporal-part* (Otto + his notebook, t_4) desired to go to MOMA and *temporal-part* (Otto + his notebook, t_4) believed that MOMA was on 53rd Street.

5. Concluding Remarks

In this paper, I pointed out that the ontological basis for EMT was unclear. Then, using a four-dimensional framework, I interpreted the *extended mind* as *mind of an extended agent*. Our interpretation allows the multiplication of agents in a single situation. In Otto's example, both *tempo-*

ral-part (Otto, t) and *temporal-part* (Otto + his notebook, t) are accepted as bearers of mental properties, even if they bear slightly different mental properties.

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Augustine's too simple language-game

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Abstract

This paper examines language-games as containing the Augustinian picture of language in *Brown Book*. I focus on the notion of completeness regarding these games and explore two different ways of conceiving completeness: one is seeing it as belonging to the individual language-games, the other is seeing language-games as a monolithic method. Completeness is a feature of the Augustinian games, but Wittgenstein gives no indication that all games are to fit together.

In this paper I look closely at descriptions of the so-called Augustinian picture of language found in *Brown Book* and surrounding manuscripts. Here language-games are described as languages too simple, fitting Augustine's incomplete description of language use, yet with the added "ingredient" of completeness. I explore two possible ways of conceiving completeness: one is seeing it as belonging to the individual invented language-games, the other is seeing language-games in *Brown Book* as Glock does, as a monolithic language-game method.

1. The issue of completeness

Brown Book is divided into two parts. The first consists in 73 "languages" or "cases", which, when we get to the sixth language, are named "language-games". The point of each one is not clearly stated. The cases themselves revolve around different language-learning and use situations, and take up – in and after the initial builders-language series – word meaning and sentences, how to be guided by something, "can" and "being able to", and much more. Part II contains 18 paragraphs, traversing themes such as familiarity, aspect seeing and mental states. This part has a very different tone. It quite often refers to "games" or cases as examples, and sometimes to the numbered cases from Part I, but more often in the style of suggestions like "Then ask yourself at what time during all this...", or "Suppose I said, 'Smith and Jones always enter my room in different ways'"¹ which indicate that we to a larger degree are in the domain of ordinary language.

Glock writes in *A Wittgenstein Dictionary* (1996:195) that one way Wittgenstein conceives the work of fictional language-games is to "build up our complicated discourse (...) out of more primitive language-games" and that this is what dominates *Brown Book*. He calls this a "monolithic language-game method". (1996:194-5). Here I disagree. In the beginning of Part I there is some increase in complexity, but this does not continue all the way to the end.

I will now turn to the so-called Augustinian descriptions of language learning. After presenting them, I will describe the problems Wittgenstein finds with them and how the language-games are seen as a remedy for such problems. The last point will bring me back to the issue of completeness, since there is something paradoxical in the way the language-games are defined. They are to be representative of the Augustinian way of describing language, which is incomplete, yet are to be regarded as complete.

2. Augustinian descriptions of language learning

Brown Book opens with: "Augustine, in describing his learning of language, says that he was taught to speak by learning the names of things."² This is a description of learning, not of language as such, which suggests that the issue for Wittgenstein is an *implication* of a view rather than an actual claim made by Augustine.

Ms-141, an early version of *Brown Book*, but which only contains a few "languages", confirms this. Here Wittgenstein chooses other words: "Augustinus' Beschreibung des Lernens der Sprache. Diese Auffassung ist einem großen Teil der Menschen die natürliche."³

Augustine is not presented here as the single adherent of this conception, but rather it is a conception which is both fairly common and natural. When, however, we come to Ms-115⁴, where he translates and rewrites *Brown Book*, he leaves the common and natural out, and adds a quote from Augustine, which again seems to narrow it down.⁵

I will add one more source; Ms-140⁶. As is evident here, the sentences are tried over and over again in order to find the best possible way of putting it. He also here starts with Augustine, and then goes on:

Wir erhalten hier dieses Bild der Sprache: Ihre Wörter benennen Gegenstände, die Sätze sind Verbindungen solcher Benennungen.

[Hier haben wir das] Das ist das Bild dem der Begriff| die Idee der Bedeutung seine überragende Rolle in der Philosophie verdankt. Denn die Worte ... haben Bedeutungen & ihre Bedeutungen sind die Gegenstände| Dinge. |

//Das| Dies ist das Bild in der die| unsere Idee der Bedeutung des Wortes als des Fundaments der Sprache wurzelt.//⁷

These are just three out of six remarks on the same theme, which shows the importance of the subject. Putting it in other words: From a description of language learning like the one Augustine gives, we get the image that words have meanings, that the meanings stands for things, and that these meanings are connected in sentences. This de-

¹ [http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ts-310,127\[2\]et128\[1\]et129\[1\]_n](http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ts-310,127[2]et128[1]et129[1]_n)

² [http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ts-310,1\[1\]_n](http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ts-310,1[1]_n)

³ [http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-141,1\[1\]_n](http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-141,1[1]_n)

⁴ The beginning of the second half of Ms-115, page 118, where the translation and reworking of *Brown Book* starts, named "Philosophische Untersuchungen", Versuch einer Umarbeitung, Ende August 1936". [http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-115,118\[1\]_n](http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-115,118[1]_n)

⁵ [http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-115,118\[2\]_n](http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-115,118[2]_n)

⁶ Volume 41, *Grosses Format* 1934 and 1936; a rewriting of the second part of Ms-114.

⁷ [http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-140,39v\[1\]_n](http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-140,39v[1]_n)

scription is responsible for the conception of meaning in philosophy where this type of word meaning is regarded as a foundation of language. Although Augustine is still figuring here as the one who gives the description, the impact on philosophy, and on Wittgenstein himself, is the more important part. But, as we have seen, it is also equally clear that Wittgenstein is keeping Augustine's *name* on the problematic description.

3. The problems with this description

All that has been established so far is that the conception of language that is problematic does not rest on Augustine alone. *Problems* regarding this language conception are described thus in Ts-310:

Suppose a man described a game of chess, without mentioning the existence and operations of the pawns. His description of the game as a natural phenomenon will be incomplete. On the other hand we may say that he has completely described a simpler game. In this sense we can say that Augustine's description of learning the language was correct for a simpler language than ours.⁸

This tells us that there is not necessarily a problem with the description itself, if one only has in mind that it works just for a part of language. This has clearly not been the case for the view of philosophy that had been relevant for Wittgenstein. In Ms-141 Wittgenstein offers a slightly different clarifying example. In the case of a forest with many different kinds of trees one could say that is was correct that parts of the wood were pine, but not the whole. The point of the simile stays the same, though; the description of *something* as a natural phenomenon is not complete. The missing part from the description is next framed in this way:

Man denkt daran, wie das Kind die Namen von Personen & Worte wie "Mann", "Sessel", "Zucker", lernt. An Bestandteile der Sprache wie "jetzt", "nicht", "aber", "alle" "vielleicht" denkt man dabei nicht.⁹

Ms-115 makes the same point, the missing part being classes of words. Whoever describes learning of language in such a way, thinks first and foremost of one class of words, and does not think about words like "not", "but", "maybe" and "today".¹⁰ The similarity between the examples is that something is missing, parts of a whole. The parts that are missing from language are the parts that it is difficult to see through a learning process of pointing and naming, that is: ostensive teaching. How could you point to "maybe"? Thus we can see why an incomplete description "hides" important elements of language seen as a natural phenomenon.

4. Are the language-games Augustinian games?

To sum up: we have a natural phenomenon, language, which is conceived partly wrong. The wrongness does not lie (wholly) in its description, but in that the description is right only for parts of the phenomenon. It is lacking in completeness, and because of this we get a strange image of language, as something simpler than it is. This too simple view of language has lead philosophy astray; enter the language-games. Ms-141 states it this way:

Es ist aber wichtig, daß wir uns eine Sprache (System der Verständigung) denken können, für die Augustins Beschreibung gilt.¹¹

This is intriguing. The languages are to be instances of something *fitting* the Augustinian description. One would have expected that they would be the *opposite*, something that would remind us of the "invisible" word classes. But Ms-115ii indicates the same:

Und in diesem Sinne| so kann man sagen Augustins Beschreibung gelte für eine einfachere Sprache als die unsere. — Denken wir uns die folgende Sprache:| So eine einfache Sprache wäre die: ...¹²

followed by the builders-language. The "So eine einfache" is clearly pointing back to the simple image of the Augustinian way of thinking. Peeking forward to PI, §2, the same thing is said: «Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right: the language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B.»¹³

If the Augustinian description is right, but incomplete, the languages to follow are meant to be instances of (more or less) correct descriptions of language use, but with fairly important defects: they are lacking in completeness. But yet, as we are told, they are to be *conceived* as complete. Hence:

We are not, however, regarding the language-games which we describe as incomplete parts of a language, but as languages complete in themselves, as complete systems of human communication."¹⁴

5. Completeness and language-games

The issue of completeness, I think, was important. It was supposed to make clear why the so-called Augustinian description was problematic; exactly when - and perhaps even because - completeness is insisted on does all the invisible parts of our ordinary language stand out. The simpler language-games make clear that our language is not so simple.

I will discuss two different issues regarding completeness. The first one expresses my difficulty in understanding what it means that language-games are to be conceived as complete, and the second deals with Glock's claim that *Brown Book* is construing a complicated discourse-whole out of fictional language-games.

Comparing the descriptions of language-games in *Brown Book* with the earlier Ms-141 and the later Ms-115, we find that they don't differ much. Ms-141 has "Formen des sprachlichen Verkehrs" and Ms-115 "Systeme der Verständigung" for "systems of communication", but otherwise they are the same:

"Systems of communication as for instance 1), 2), 3), 4), 5) we shall call "language-games". They are more or less akin to what in ordinary language we call games. Children are taught their native language by means of such games, and here they even have the entertaining character of games."¹⁵

In this description, or indeed any other, there is no mention of any difference between imagined and real language-

8 [http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ts-310,1\[2\]et2\[1\]_n](http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ts-310,1[2]et2[1]_n)

9 [http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-141,1\[1\]_n](http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-141,1[1]_n)

10 [http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-115,118\[3\]_n](http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-115,118[3]_n)

11 [http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-141,1\[1\]_n](http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-141,1[1]_n)

12 [http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-115,118\[4\]_n](http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-115,118[4]_n)

13 Wittgenstein(2009:6e).

14 [http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ts-310,7\[3\]et8\[1\]_n](http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ts-310,7[3]et8[1]_n)

15 [http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ts-310,7\[3\]et8\[1\]_n](http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ts-310,7[3]et8[1]_n)

games. But: Language-games are set up against what we call games in ordinary language, as something more or less akin to them. Regarding completeness the claims are also almost in the same words in both Ms-141¹⁶ and Ms-115: — “Wir betrachten aber die Sprachspiele nicht als die Fragmente einer Sprache,| eines Ganzen ‘der Sprache’, sondern als in sich geschlossene Systeme der Verständigung, als einfache, primitive, Sprachen.”¹⁷ It was natural to assume that completeness was a trait that belonged *only* to these invented Augustinian language-games, and that there was a difference to be found between the invented and what we could call ordinary language-games. They would be examples or cases from ordinary language, which then would be seen as parts of the whole of our language; as not complete.

But even if Wittgenstein seems to expect us to have some problems imagining completeness – and therefore tips us how to think¹⁸ – he after all continues like this: “Auch der welcher die Zeichenschrift der Chemie, darstellende Geometrie, das Lesen der Wetterkarte lernt, etc., lernt neue Sprachformen, Sprachspiele.”¹⁹ Likewise in the later Ms-115: “Wenn wir in der Schule spezielle technische Zeichensprachen lernen, wie den Gebrauch von Diagrammen & Tabellen, Darstellende Geometrie, chemische Gleichungen| Formeln, etc., lernen wir weitere Sprachspiele.”²⁰

This is not referring to invented language-games. It is talking about *more or less* self-sufficient sign systems. They can, perhaps, be complete in the sense that once you know them you can communicate with anyone else who knows them. Taking for granted that the claim of completeness does stretch to all the language-games he talks about, to be complete cannot necessarily imply to be cut off from any other means of communication in these cases; uses of tables and reading weather maps are never the only forms of communication. So Wittgenstein is either not claiming “complete” completeness for *all* language-games, or he is assuming a separation between the too simple language-games and partial ones from ordinary language.

About the invented language-games the author has freedom to state the terms of communication, how things are to be done and what words and actions mean; and that they are to be regarded as “the entire” system of communication. This is not the case when we speak of “ordinary” language-games, like the technical languages. Here everyone can have a say, like myself just now; claiming that it is harder to understand completeness when it concerns ordinary language than it is regarding the invented ones. The technical languages can be simple, but would one take them to represent the whole?

Lastly, there is one other way of conceiving completeness, the one Glock mentions in *his A Wittgenstein Dictionary*. That is the completeness of a language which is put together by many simple language-games. I can agree

that the first words in some of the “languages” in *Brown Book* point in this direction, like “Let us now look at an extension of language 1)” and “Let us introduce a new instrument of communication”(language 3). But the languages and cases that make up the language-games in Part I do not all fit together to make a large whole, in something resembling a real language. This we see when we look at other games, like 8): “If in a language game similar to 1)...”, and 11): “Consider this variation...”, and 17): “Imagine on the other hand...”. Similarities, variations and imaged cases do not make up a complete discourse. In the section of *Big Typescript* called “The Nature of Language” we have yet another description of language-games, which is relevant in this connection:

Wenn ich bestimmte einfache Spiele| Sprachspiele beschreibe, so geschieht es nicht, um mit ihnen nach und nach die Vorgänge der ausgebildeten Sprache — oder des Denkens — aufzubauen, (Nicod Russell) was nur zu Ungerechtigkeiten führt, — sondern ich stelle die Spiele als solche hin, und lasse sie ihre aufklärende Wirkung auf die besonderen Probleme ausstrahlen.²¹

The almost exact same remark is also found in Ms-113 (S.45v; 1.3.1932) and in the first part of Ms-115²². The emphasis is clearly that the games do not build, bit by bit, into a whole. The language-games are instead to be set forth *as they are*, to be allowed to work by radiating light on the problems in question, because:

The difference of kind is much more obvious when we contemplate such a simple example than when we look at our ordinary language with innumerable kinds of words all looking more or less alike when they stand in the dictionary. —²³

Concluding; tracing the descriptions I found that Augustine's name is used as a token to identify a problematic view of language, that the so-called Augustinian description is only partially wrong, and that the language-games are meant to fit this description as too simple. I also found that completeness is only really functioning well in the invented, Augustinian language-games.²⁴

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16 [http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-141,2\[2\]_n](http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-141,2[2]_n)

17 [http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-115,125\[3\]et126\[1\]_n](http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-115,125[3]et126[1]_n)

18 “To keep this point of view in mind, it very often is useful to imagine such a simple language to be the entire system of communication of a tribe in a primitive state of society. Think of primitive arithmetics of such tribes.” ([http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ts-310,8\[1\]_n](http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ts-310,8[1]_n))

19 [http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-141,2\[2\]_n](http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-141,2[2]_n)

20 [http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-115,126\[2\]_n](http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-115,126[2]_n)

21 [http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ts-213,202\[1\]_n](http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ts-213,202[1]_n)

22 [http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-115,81\[2\]_n](http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-115,81[2]_n)

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24 Participating in Brown Book Incubator, supported by DM2E - Digitised Manuscripts to Europeana.

Religion als Praxis des Negierens

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Abstract

In einer Reflexion über den religiösen Glauben behauptet Wittgenstein, die *Praxis* verleihe den Worten ihren Sinn. Um zu verstehen, was damit gemeint ist, müssen wir die der Religion eigentümliche *Grammatik* beschreiben. Meine These lautet: Die *Grammatik* der Religion besteht aus (mindestens) zwei Regeln des Negierens: (I) Eine Regel des *Negierens des gewöhnlichen Fragens*, und (II) eine Regel des *Negierens jeder gewöhnlichen Bewertung von Lebenserfahrungen*. Daraus lässt sich zeigen, weshalb Worte in der Religion auf *Praxis* angewiesen sind, d.h. die Negation tatsächlich *gemacht*, und nicht etwa nur gedacht oder festgestellt werden kann.

Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie versteht die (zunächst deskriptive) philosophische Auseinandersetzung mit Phänomenen als Offenlegung der Grammatik der sie konstituierenden Sprachvollzüge (vgl. PU 109, 122, 124). Für die Religionsphilosophie (bzw. Theologie) bedeutet dies die Aufgabe, eine Grammatik des Wortes Gott anzugeben – wie Wittgenstein es im Anschluss an Luther formuliert (vgl. VC 187). An dieser Aufgabe will ich mich in meinem Vortrag abarbeiten und eine Grammatik des Wortes Gott skizzieren, die einen erhellenden Blick auf Religion (und Theologie) eröffnet. Meine zu entfaltende These lautet: *Die Grammatik der Religion besteht wesentlich aus zwei Regeln des Negierens*. Da Negieren ein Umgang mit Differenzen ist, beleuchten meine Überlegungen auch die erläuterungsbedürftige religionsphilosophische These, Religion sei *Differenzkompetenz*.¹

I. Das Negieren des gewöhnlichen Frage-Antwort-Spiels: Religiöses Fragen

Wittgenstein beginnt seine zu diskutierende Bemerkung über den religiösen Glauben folgendermaßen:

Wenn der an Gott Glaubende um sich sieht und fragt „Woher ist alles, was ich sehe?“, „Woher das alles?“ verlangt er keine (kausale) Erklärung; und der Witz seiner Frage ist, dass sie der Ausdruck dieses Verlangens ist. Er drückt also eine Einstellung zu allen Erklärungen aus. (BF 317/CV 96f.)

Die religiöse Frage nach dem „Woher“ von allem ist keine Frage normalen Typs. Normalerweise stellen wir Fragen, die mit Aussagen beantwortbar sind. „Woher“-Fragen sind paradigmatisch dafür. Wenn wir fragen, woher die Schokolade kommt, die auf dem Tisch liegt, ist die Aussage, dass X sie gekauft und dort hingelegt hat, eine adäquate Antwort. Eine Antwort solchen Typs erwartet man, wenn man die religiöse Frage stellt, gar nicht, im Gegenteil: Es würde dem religiös Fragenden anmaßend erscheinen, seine Frage mit dem Hinweis auf einen kausalen Ursprung zu beantworten. Doch nicht nur kausale, sondern auch andere kurze und bündige Erklärungen stellen keine angemessene Antwort dar. So wäre der religiös Fragende sicherlich nicht damit zufrieden, wenn man seine Frage mit der Kurzantwort „Von Gott“ – oder gar ergänzt mit der Rückfrage: „Woher auch sonst? Du bist doch gläubig!“ – beantwortet. „Gott“ ist keine adäquate Antwort auf die religiöse Frage nach dem „Woher“ von „allem“, sondern: „Gott“ kommt erst dadurch ins religiöse Sprachspiel hinein, dass in einer Weise gefragt wird, die es ausschließt, auf alltägli-

che oder wissenschaftliche Weise zu antworten. Genau dies leistet die religiöse Frage. Sie erzeugt aus sich einen immanenten Widerstand gegenüber normalen Antwortformen, ohne dadurch nahezulegen, dass es keinen Sinn macht, nach etwas zu fragen, nach dem man nicht mit der Logik des Alltags und der Wissenschaften fragen kann. Die religiöse Frage ist vielmehr das Bekenntnis, dass es etwas gibt (und zwar das Wichtigste überhaupt), das nur und genau dann sinnvoll sprachlich thematisiert werden kann, wenn im Sprachvollzug implizit deutlich wird, dass es unsinnig wäre, dasjenige, worum es geht, mit alltäglichen oder wissenschaftlichen Frage-Antwort-Sprachspielen zu thematisieren.

An dieser Stelle mag der Verdacht aufkommen, meine Beschreibung beruhe auf der dogmatischen Setzung der Wirklichkeit Gottes oder aber nehme die Konstruktion derselben in Kauf. Diese Vorwürfe sind im Rahmen von Wittgensteins Philosophie unsinnig, denn sie beruhen auf dem Paradigma der nachträglichen Abbildung oder Referenz auf Gegenstände durch die Sprache. Genau dieses ist das Hauptziel von Wittgensteins Kritik in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*.² Auch religiöses Sprechen ist nicht als referentielle Bezugnahme auf den Gegenstand „Gott“ zu verstehen.³ Sondern: Ob Gott wirklich ist und Sinn macht, entscheidet sich durch das auch qua Tradition gesicherte Sinnganze, d.h. die Kohärenz derjenigen Sprachvollzüge, in denen er vorkommt. Solche haben ihren Ort jeweils in konkreten Gestalten des Religiösen und dem ebenso konkreten Leben des Menschen.

Bevor wir diesen Lebensbezug näher bedenken, sei festgehalten, was ich die *Erste Negationsregel der Religion* nennen will:

(NRI) Religiöses Fragen negiert alltägliche und wissenschaftliche Frage-Antwort-Logiken und zeigt eo ipso die Exklusivität dessen, worum es dabei zu tun ist, an. Ob „Gott“ sinnvoll erscheint (und damit als „wirklich“ bezeichnet werden kann), entscheidet sich mit der Kohärenz des religiösen Sprachvollzugs und seiner Anschlussfähigkeit an das Leben des Menschen.

Sehen wir uns den gesuchten Anschluss an das Leben näher an. Er hat zwei Funktionen: Zum einen macht er plausibel, warum es *sinnvoll* ist, die religiöse Frage zu *stellen*; zum anderen ist er dieser Frage als solcher immer

² Vgl. exemplarisch Baker/Hacker (2009: 1-28).

³ „Gott“ ist kein Name für ein Ding, wie viele Philosophen und Theologen vor Wittgenstein bereits erkannten. Doch die Suche nach Dingen, denen Substantive entsprechen, hat Wittgenstein besonders scharfsinnig und fundiert kritisiert sowie zurecht als eine der „Quellen philosophischer Verwirrung“ (BB 15) ausgemacht. Zur religionsphilosophischen und theologischen Dimension dieser Kritik, besonders die Frage nach Gottes Existenz betreffend, vgl. Kerr (1997: 151-156).

¹ Vgl. Wenz (2009: 90f.)

schon notwendig *eingeschrieben*. Denn sie hebt sich ja negierend von Alltag und Wissenschaft ab, d.h. von denjenigen Vollzügen, die zu unserem Leben hinzugehören. So wird deutlich, dass Religion nicht Weltflucht (oder Flucht vor dem eigenen Leben) bedeutet: *Negative Abhebung von der Welt (und dem Leben)* ist nämlich nicht identisch mit utopisch-träumerischer Weltflucht *unter Absehung von der Welt (und dem Leben)*.

Wir haben es also mit einer wechselseitigen Durchdringung von Religion und Leben zu tun: Religion ist nicht einfach abstrakt neben dem Leben, und das Leben nicht außerhalb ihrer situiert. Wittgenstein formuliert dies an anderer Stelle so:

Das Leben kann zum Glauben an Gott erziehen. Und es sind auch Erfahrungen, die dies tun; aber nicht Visionen, oder sonstige Sinneserfahrungen, die uns die „Existenz dieses Wesens“ zeigen, sondern z.B. Leiden verschiedener Art. Und sie zeigen uns Gott nicht wie ein Sinneseindruck einen Gegenstand, noch lassen sie ihn vermuten. Erfahrungen, Gedanken, - das Leben kann uns diesen Begriff aufzwingen. (Z, 571)

Wir müssen nun genauer verstehen, was sich an der Kontaktfläche von Religion und Leben ereignet, wie das religiöse Negieren ins Leben eingreift.

II. Das Negieren jeder gewöhnlichen Bewertung von Lebenserfahrungen: Die gedoppelte Perspektive auf das Leben

Verfolgen wir Wittgensteins Bemerkung weiter:

Aber wie zeigt sich die [sc. die Einstellung] in seinem Leben? Es ist die Einstellung, die eine bestimmte Sache ernst nimmt, sie aber dann an einem bestimmten Punkt doch nicht ernst nimmt, und erklärt, etwas anderes sei noch ernster.

So kann einer sagen, es ist sehr ernst, dass der und der gestorben ist, ehe er ein bestimmtes Werk vollenden konnte; und in anderem Sinne kommt's darauf gar nicht an. Hier gebraucht man die Worte „in einem tieferen Sinne“. (BF 317/CV 97)

Da religiöses Fragen, wie wir gesehen haben, die Form des alltäglichen Fragens negiert, operiert das religiöse Fragen auf einer anderen Ebene als das alltägliche. Daher steht es auch nicht in Konkurrenz zum alltäglichen Fragen in dem Sinne, dass Alltägliches nicht zugleich alltäglich und religiös befragt werden könnte. Wittgenstein verdeutlicht dies anhand der *negativ* aufeinander bezogenen Terminologie von „ernst nehmen“ und „(doch) nicht ernst nehmen“. Der religiös Fragende teilt die Welt nicht in einen „heiligen“ und einen „profanen“ Bezirk auf, sondern ist sich bewusst, dass *alles* in der Welt religiös und nichtreligiös befragt werden kann. Z.B. ist die Frage danach, welchen Verdienst ein bestimmter Autor für die Welt gehabt hätte, wenn er sein Werk vollendet hätte, eine, die so beantwortet werden kann, dass sein Tod als furchtbare Tragödie für die Welt erscheinen muss. Aus Perspektive des religiösen Fragens hingegen tritt dieser Mensch nun etwa als ein Erlöser auf, der in das Reich Gottes eingeht wie jeder andere Mensch auch – unabhängig von seinen Leistungen, ja ohne dass sein Werk im Reich Gottes von Bedeutung sein würde. Dies impliziert jedoch nicht rückwirkend, dass das Nichtvollendetsein seines Werks der Welt gleichgültig zu sein hat. Umgekehrt gilt: Das irdische Bedauern darf nicht das religiöse Negieren ausschließen, sondern: Die eigentümliche religiöse Befragung des Falls negiert die *normative Logik* der nichtreligiösen Befragung, z.B. die Logik des

individuellen Verdienstes für die soziale Umwelt. An dieser Stelle möchte ich festhalten, was ich die *Zweite Negationsregel der Religion* nenne:

(NRII) Die religiöse Auseinandersetzung mit einzelnen Sachverhalten oder Erfahrungen in der Welt besteht wesentlich in einer Negation derjenigen Auseinandersetzungen (und Wertungen), die aus einer nichtreligiösen Perspektive erfolgen.

Diese Negation ist, wie gesagt, keine, die die Welt und ihre Sachverhalte als vollends bedeutungslos ausweist und uns dazu anhält, uns aus ihr zurückzuziehen. Aber sie *relativiert* (im Wortsinne) die Welt. D.h. der religiös Fragende muss beispielsweise nicht demjenigen, der darüber klagt, dass der Forscher sein Werk nicht vollendet hat, direkt widersprechen, sondern er könnte darauf hinweisen, dass diese „ernste“ Betrachtung nicht die einzig mögliche und nicht die letztlich Wesentliche ist. Religiöses Fragen bewährt sich im Leben also dadurch, dass es sich selbst in eine Spannung zum Leben derart stellt, dass es selbst seine Bedeutung in negativer Abgrenzung von ihm erhält und so die Bedeutung einzelner Erfahrungen im Leben relativiert. Wittgenstein hat dies an anderer Stelle so ausgedrückt:

Das Unaussprechbare (das, was mir geheimnisvoll erscheint und ich nicht auszusprechen vermag) gibt vielleicht den Hintergrund, auf dem das, was ich aussprechen konnte, Bedeutung bekommt. (VB 472)

Es gibt zudem einen weiteren Grund, weshalb das religiöse Negieren nicht dazu führen darf, dass der Mensch sich aus der Welt zurückzieht: Das Negieren ist nämlich nicht mit dem Menschen selbst zu verwechseln: Nicht der Mensch stellt durch das Negieren eine Differenz zwischen sich und der Welt her, sondern das Negieren stellt eine Differenz zwischen Gott und der Welt her. Deswegen sagt Wittgenstein tiefsinnig, dass *die Worte* den Unterschied machen, nicht der Mensch *mittels* der Worte. Es gehört zum religiösen Sprechen konstitutiv hinzu, dass das sprechende Ich und das sprechende Wir sich nicht selbst als Quelle oder Träger der negierenden Kraft begreifen, sondern diese als aus sich selbst wirksam (oder von Gott her kommend) beschreiben. So heißt es bei Wittgenstein an anderer Stelle:

Das Wesentliche, für Dein Leben Wesentliche, aber legt der Geist in diese Worte. Du SOLLST gerade nur das deutlich sehen [...]. (Z, 494)

Daraus erhellt, dass es gemäß der beiden Negationsregeln als *Pathologie* der Religion zu gelten hat, sobald religiöse Menschen *sich selbst* als annihilierende Kräfte verstehen und gerieren.

III. Warum Negieren Praxis ist und nicht durch eine Theorie des Negierens ersetzbar

Sehen wir uns den weiteren Gedankengang Wittgensteins an, mit dem er schließlich zur These, die Praxis verleihe den Worten (der Religion) ihren Sinn, gelangt:

Eigentlich möchte ich sagen, dass es auch hier nicht auf die Worte ankommt, die man ausspricht, oder auf das, was man dabei denkt, sondern auf den Unterschied, den sie an verschiedenen Stellen im Leben machen. Wie weiß ich, dass zwei Menschen das gleiche meinen, wenn jeder sagt, er glaubte an Gott? Und ganz dasselbe kann man bezüglich der drei Personen sagen. Die Theologie, die auf den Gebrauch gewisser

Worte und Phrasen dringt und andere verbannt, macht nichts klarer. (Karl Barth.) Sie fuchelt sozusagen mit Worten herum, weil sie etwas sagen will und nicht weiß, wie man es ausdrücken kann. Die Praxis gibt den Worten ihren Sinn. (BF 317/CV 97)

Wittgenstein setzt damit ein, dass er den „Worten, die man ausspricht“ und dem, „was man dabei denkt“, die Fähigkeit abspricht, das für die Religion Wesentliche, den Sinn des Religiösen, zu erzeugen oder zu garantieren. Stattdessen komme es „auf den Unterschied, den sie an verschiedenen Stellen im Leben machen“, an. Ein derartiger Unterschied im Leben, also ein lebendiger Unterschied, kann nur *gemacht*, nicht *gedacht*, *verwaltet* oder *durch Formeln fixiert* werden. Diese These ist offensichtlich ein Echo der beiden religiösen Negationsregeln, die einen immanenten Lebensbezug haben. Mit dem „Unterschied, den sie [sc. die Worte] an verschiedenen Stellen im Leben machen“, tritt nun wieder ein *Negationsverhältnis* auf, das aus den beiden Negationsregeln resultiert. Es besteht zwischen einem religiösen und einem nichtreligiösen Leben, wobei nicht in erster Linie der Unterschied zwischen einem bestimmten religiösen *Menschen X* und einem nichtreligiösen *Menschen Y* gemeint ist, sondern der zwischen der *Wirklichkeit* und der *Nichtwirklichkeit* der Religion, die auch (und gerade) für einen religiösen Menschen eine bekannte Erfahrung ist und sich etwa in Glaubenszweifeln manifestiert. Wittgenstein stellt nun der Wirklichkeit der Religion im Leben als Beispiele für die Nichtwirklichkeit das Denken und die Theologie gegenüber. Diese intellektuellen Vollzüge (darunter auch unsere hier unternommene Offenlegung der religiösen Grammatik) dürfen sich nämlich nicht *mit Religion verwechseln* und die Dynamik des Negierens zugunsten fixer Formeln und Worte zurückdrängen. Jede (philosophische oder theologische) *Beschreibung* dessen, was sich in der Religion wirklich ereignet, und dieses Ereignis selbst sind *kategorial verschieden*. Dies erhellt anhand folgender Analogie: Wenn ein Mensch ein bestimmtes Argument versteht, und er beschreibt nachträglich, wie sich das Verstehen einstellte, so ist eben diese Beschreibung nicht das Erlebnis des Verstehens oder Einleuchtens selbst, allenfalls eine Erinnerung daran. Das implizite Erleben ist wesentlich für den Geist, weshalb Wittgenstein sagt: „Es ist eine große Versuchung den Geist explicit machen zu wollen.“ (CV, 11)

Deshalb sagt Wittgenstein auch für die Religion: „Die Praxis verleiht den Worten ihren Sinn.“ Dass Menschen die Erfahrung machen, in der Religion mit dem unendlich Wichtigen und dem einzig Wesentlichen zu tun zu haben, geschieht zwar *nicht ohne Worte*, aber eben auch *nicht*

ohne deren praktischen Kontext. Denn: Die Negation ist eine *Operation*, d.h. sie hat ein wesentlich praktisches, dynamisches Moment, welches nicht durch eine theoretische Beschreibung substituierbar ist. Deshalb lässt sich mit Wittgenstein dasjenige sagen, was schon große Religionstheoretiker wie Schleiermacher, Luhmann und Lübbe auf ihre Weise zu zeigen versuchten: Dass Religion niemals durch Theorie, sondern nur durch Religion selbst substituierbar ist.⁴ In diesem Sinne hat Religion Autonomie, die sie in ihrer Lebendigkeit und konkreten Ausgestaltungen beweist. Die hier skizzierte „Grammatik des Religiösen“ kritisch auf konkrete Gestalten des Religiösen zu applizieren, wäre wohl eine interessante und erhellende Aufgabe – für unsere Theorie und die zu applizierende religiöse Gestalt gleichermaßen.⁵ Soweit waren meine Gedanken ein Beitrag dazu, die Grammatik einer sehr wichtigen Sache übersichtlicher zu machen.

Bibliographische Angaben

A. Siglenverzeichnis der Werke Wittgensteins

BB: Das Blaue Buch / BF: Bemerkungen über die Farben / CV: Culture and Value / PU: Philosophische Untersuchungen / VB: Vermischte Bemerkungen / VC: Vorlesungen Cambridge 1930-1935 / Z: Zettel

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4 Vgl. dazu Wenz (2005: 63-103).

5 Ein bemerkenswertes Beispiel für einen derartigen Versuch stellt Anthony Kennys Aufsatz „Wittgenstein on Life, Death and Religion“ dar (Kenny (2004: 197-216)). Stärker am Kanon der christlichen Dogmatik orientiert ist Labron (2009: 61-131).

Mainstays for a translation theory on Wittgenstein's line

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Abstract

Since it is a language phenomenon, translation should be understood in a way coherent with the concept of language underlying our theories or philosophy. Nonetheless, much of what is written or said about translation questions its bare "possibility" – as if there could be a practice based on the impossible. I shall argue for a change in approach based on Wittgenstein's notion of meaning as actual *use* in language.

1. On the (in)compatibility of the concepts of language and translation

Western theories of translation often result in an impasse, due to the tension between conflicting notions of language and translation within the same cultural framework. As Kopetzki (1996) states, concepts of translation depend upon the explanation one gives to the incredible diversity of existing languages (p. 9). Universalist positions understand the particular as an *occurrence* of the general; relativist positions see the particular as a *limit* to the general. Each of these perspectives leads to a different notion of *translation* and the *interrelation of language and thought*. In the universalist view, translation amounts to the transport of stable meanings from one language to another, recovering the universal in different linguistic systems, whereas for the relativist position, translating is a hermeneutic activity and leads necessarily to new meanings (10).

Kopetzki's further hypothesis, that our concept of translation should be coherent with our understanding of language, seems to me a sound one: if translation *occurs* within language, being, as it is, a language phenomenon, translation theories should not invoke anything outside the boundaries of language itself. We have to deal with one notion (*translation*) that *necessarily* builds on the other (*language*).

This kind of coherence is not always present in the more than 2.000 years of translational thinking the author has reviewed. In very general terms, one can say that nomads tended to accept the diversity of languages as inevitable and assumed a relativist position, whereas sedentary, centralizing societies have often assumed a religiously-based bias favoring a single language – their own. Combined with other factors, this finally led to a universalist conception of *language* in Judaism and a relativist one in Christianity. But the practical need of evangelization introduced a universalist concept of *translation* in Christianity, since the *same* contents of the Bible should be expressed in different languages (26) *without* adherence to the Jewish universalist conception of language. This position is known as the "refusal of the word" and stays in diametrical opposition to the Jewish "universalism of the word" which subsumes the idea that the Torah, for instance, is "untranslatable". In short: Christianity has a universalist concept of translation on the basis of a relativist view of language; Judaism has a universalist concept of language that makes translation relative or even impossible (especially in the case of the sacred text).

Similar internal tensions can be found in translation theories of eminent scholars such as Georges Mounin, to mention a single example (cf. Arrojo 1998, Cruz 2012). Mounin's case is especially interesting, because he solves

the impasses of incompatibility by discarding one of the conflicting concepts, or reducing it to a secondary level. This clearly shows how some convictions lie deeper than others. Mounin states, for example, that "if we accept current theses about the structure of lexicon, morphology and syntax, we'll be lead to the conclusion that translation is impossible" (Mounin 1975 19). As a solution, he thinks of "condemn[ing] the theoretical possibility of translation in the name of Linguistics" (20). This theoretical "impossibility of translation" is then explored, not only on the basis of Saussurean like structuralism, as just quoted, but also in comparison with the main features of other approaches, such as Bloomfield's strong formalism that *abstracts from the meaning* (because the access to meanings would presuppose a kind of omniscience and thus make their "transport" impossible; 38). Later on, Mounin turns the reasoning upside down, mobilizing even the radically different, *meaning based*, relativist hypotheses of Sapir-Whorf and Humboldt for the sake of the same argument:

Is it true that we think in a universe shaped firstly by our linguistics [sic.]? Is it true that we only see the world through the deforming lens of a particular language, so that the different images (from the same reality) we obtain in each particular language can never be exactly superposed? Finally, is it true that when we speak of the world in two different languages, we are never speaking precisely about the same world, so that translation is not only illegitimate from one language to another, but also, scientifically speaking, not practically possible? (56)

All these variations from the "impossibility of translation" in Mounin's argument can be reduced to a single point, which is his very deep conviction that *translation* can't possibly be anything else but the transport of objective and stable meanings from one language to another. And his case is just one example among numerous others.

Should we, on the other hand, accept the idea that translation is, *in fact*, "something other than carrying identical meanings", as Cruz (2012 39) rightly suggests, then the whole problem is very rapidly *dissolved* and we can move towards Kopetzki's sound hypothesis that our concept of translation should be coherent with our concept of language.

2. Wittgenstein's understanding(s) of language – and translation

Although commentators occasionally use questions of translation to criticize competing readings or to reinforce their own, there aren't as yet many approaches that try to use Wittgenstein's philosophy of language to establish a systematic, coherent *theory* or *philosophy* of translation.

One rare exception is the contribution of Mathias Kroß (2012) to the thematic volume on *Translating Wittgenstein*. In a direct comparison with Walter Benjamin's translation theory, Kroß detects two different concepts of translation in Wittgenstein, a "weak" one and a "strong" one (2012 32-50).

The first comes up in the framework of the picture theory in the early philosophy and means practically the same as projection rules (cf. T 3.343, 4.014, 4.0141, 4.015, 4.025, 4.026; see also Oliveira 2007 188-192; 2012 129-132). The second derives from the famous definition of meaning as *use* (PI 43) and "regards as essential translation's *opening* towards both source and target language" (Kroß 2012 47), as it is "the temporary result of a concrete communication", being therefore also an "open translation" which will never come to an end, since it understands itself as a communicative event in time" (48).

Wittgenstein's early concept of translation is thus very akin to the universalist positions characterized by Kopetzki, whereas relativist traits –also in the sense of a hermeneutic process– permeate the latter one. As Kroß rightly points out, the translator is, under this latter perspective, an acting Subject who delivers to the target text's reader "not merely a 'poor copy' of the alleged original", but "one/his own world of signs and meanings" (48), even if he apparently disappears as an effect of the "paradoxical figure of the self-elimination" (49) – a very interesting concept we unfortunately cannot discuss here.

Finding explicit textual evidence of Wittgenstein's notions of translation isn't an easy task, since he doesn't develop any specific reflection on this topic. The best thing one can do is to analyze how he *uses* the term and its variants in different contexts (c.f. Oliveira 2007 187-216, 2012 129-142). In doing so, we remain in the realm of the *definition of meaning as actual use in language* (PI 43) and guarantee the *coherence of the concepts of language and translation*, just as Kopetzki suggested.

I disagree with Kroß only in relation to his apparent acceptance of the use of both "weak" and "strong" concepts of translation within the *same* theoretical framework, with the "weak" one being responsible for those cases which demand an "equivalent translation", thus serving as a "prophylactic measure against translational arbitrariness" (2012 48).

My restriction is based on the central point I'm trying to make here: concepts of translation must *necessarily* build upon and be coherent with a deeper lying concept of *language*. In other words: the view of language is the normative framework in which we can develop a concept of translation.

If we consider Wittgenstein's early view of language as isomorph to the world inadequate, we can *not* mobilize the old, "weak" concept of translation anymore and must replace it with precisely the "strong" concept, which must also account for the cases where "exactness" or "objectivity" are at stake. But objectiveness will *not*, of course, be the old objectiveness – given *a priori* und independent of an interpretation. On the contrary, it will be the result of the shared notions that go under the labels *normative* and *grammar* in the various language games we play. So the "equivalent translation" will no longer be *the* game (that of logical form), but rather *one* translational language game among many others.

The language game view is very akin to –but not identical with– the relativist conceptions from linguists like Sapir-Whorf and Humboldt, who caused Mounin's perplexity.

This does not mean that translation, especially an "exact" one, is "impossible", but only that we'll have to *redefine translation* in a coherent sense with the underlying conception of language. Kroß is right in saying we should give up talking around the "possibility of translation" and pay more attention to the "signature of the translator" (2012 49). His concern with a theoretical well-founded limit to arbitrariness in translation is also very legitimate, taking into account the excesses of radical deconstructivist claims (cf. Oliveira 2005). And that may be the best argument for developing a sound theory of translation "on Wittgenstein's line": his latter conception of language is able to account for *both* relativity and objectiveness, since it does not pose an insurmountable abyss between theoretical claims and actual practice.

Frank Ramsey states that "Wittgenstein has no theory of higher maths[,] but I tried to construct one on his line" (in Nedo 2012 272). Arley Moreno (2011) laid the basis for an epistemology based on *use* in Wittgenstein's terms. I'm now proposing we should work on a theory or philosophy of translation along this same line, even though Wittgenstein didn't tackle this field in any systematic way.

3. Translation as construction of the comparable

Once we accept Wittgenstein's latter concept of translation as presupposing the hermeneutic work of a translating Subject, we open the dialog to a long hermeneutic tradition of systematic translational thinking. Here, we can retrieve some of the thoughts of Paul Ricœur and so close our argument – approaching these thoughts with a Wittgensteinian perspective. As already suggested, we should *redefine translation*, if it is not to be understood as just "carrying identical meanings".

In his late years, Ricœur gave some conferences in which he carried out a rich dialog with translation scholars, linguistic theories and philosophical positions. He clearly stands close to the concepts of Humboldt and Sapir-Whorf (cf. 2011 34, 38), but finds "unsustainable" the idea that "each linguistic sectioning imposes a [specific] view of the world" (38). He also discards the idea of "complete homology" between "the sign and the thing" or "language and the world" (41), proposing that, "in the absense of a complete description, we only have perspectives, partial visions of the world" (53). His approach is thus not identical with Wittgenstein's insight that language *constitutes* the world we can think and talk about, but it certainly allows a productive dialog with a Wittgensteinian point of view.

In a passage that reminds us of Wittgenstein's remarks on the "extremely general facts of nature" (PI 142), Ricœur states that "cultural kinship dissimulates the real nature of equivalence, that's more properly *produced* by translation than presumed by it" (2011 66). This position amounts to the abandonment of what we might call the *prejudice of commensurability*, such as in arguments relaying on Quine and Davidson (cf. Kusch 2012). In this changed perspective, a "good translation can only aim at presumed equivalence, not founded on a demonstrable equivalence of meaning[;] an equivalence without identity" (Ricœur 2011 47, 64). We come then to a formula that understands "translation's greatness [as] translation's risk", being at the same time a "creative betrayal of the original [and] equally [a] creative appropriation by the receiving language: [the] *construction of the comparable*" (68).

This definition accepts the plain fact that languages and cultures *are* different, but we try to make mutual compre-

hension possible – as in the case of the man from Mars in Wittgenstein's experiments of thought. Notice we're here still far from "equivalence"; we're talking about *comparability*, about the possibility of thinking one thing in the terms of another (cf. *seeing as*). The definition also has the merit of relying on *practice*, on what we actually *do* when we translate. And to a large extent, we *compare*. We see certain aspects as relevant on the basis of our familiarity with similar objects (cf. PI 130), even if the comparison isn't always conscious, since most of the time we do it automatically (blindly following rules). This process occurs repeatedly at the most varied levels, from the simple recognition of graphic patterns in reading, to the levels of text, gender and discourse. And when we produce a (translated) text, we again compare on various levels (cf. Oliveira 2012 143-150). When we *review* the translated text, we again *compare*; when we *criticize* translation, we *compare*. Looking at these basic operations, we should be able to mobilize many of the concepts offered by Wittgenstein's language therapy in his latter philosophy: *language games, forms of life, aspect perception, objects of comparison, intermediate cases, family resemblance, etc.* Those should be the mainstays for a translation theory "on Wittgenstein's line".

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Hinge Propositions

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Abstract

In *On Certainty* Wittgenstein provides us with reasons to reject global scepticism. One of his main arguments relies on the notion of so called "hinge propositions". The aim of this paper is to provide an interpretation of Wittgenstein's argument to the conclusion that hinge propositions are indubitable. Particular attention is paid to the problem of whether we should think about hinge propositions as truth apt or not.

One of Wittgenstein's lines of arguing against scepticism consists in showing that certain propositions are exempt from doubt. Those propositions are according to Wittgenstein like hinges on which the rest of the enquiry turns and hence were named by Wittgenstein's commentators "hinge propositions". Unlike traditional foundationalists however, Wittgenstein claims that being a hinge proposition is about playing certain role not having certain property. It means that the same proposition can function as a hinge in one context but not in the other. For example proposition "I have two hands" which is Wittgenstein's staple example of these special propositions is not a hinge proposition in the context where I have just woke up after surgery and my body is covered with bandages (it is not certain at all and can easily be doubted). What is more a proposition that plays a role of a hinge can cease to do so with time (Wittgenstein 1969, 97). This makes drawing a line between hinges and non hinges harder and Wittgenstein does not present any precise criterion for being a hinge proposition however he does offer some hints on how to recognize them.

Wittgenstein characterizes hinge propositions as propositions we are most certain of, where certainty is understood as objective certainty (in the sense that we share it with others) rather than subjective. As Wittgenstein emphasizes in various places (Wittgenstein 1969, 71, 155), this certainty is so great that if someone were to claim the contrary we would not simply think that he is mistaken but rather we would "*feel ourselves intellectually very distant*" (Wittgenstein 1969, 108). This remark already gives us one sense in which hinge propositions are indubitable - we cannot seriously doubt them under pain of being excluded from the community of intellectually capable beings. That is however not enough to convince the sceptic, after all philosophers have been doubting hinge propositions with impunity for ages. We need a reason for which such practice should not be seen as legitimate. Wittgenstein gives such reason by showing that accepting hinges is necessary for there being a possibility of making judgments at all.

In order to see why judging would not be possible without hinge propositions we need to first acknowledge that making judgments is a rule governed practice, by which it is meant that some of the potential judgments are correct or successful and some not, that certain norms stay in place no matter whether we obey them or not. If we want to be successful in making judgments we need to take care of two things - we need to make sure we do not make a linguistic mistake and that we "get things right" so that our judgment is true.

We also know that for Wittgenstein there is nothing more to a rule than its application. The reason for that is that a general formulation of a rule can always be interpreted in many different ways so that it incorporates any application we want and therefore cannot determine the rule. That is

why "*Not only rules, but also examples are needed for establishing a practice*" (Wittgenstein 1969, 139). Of course no finite number of examples is capable of determining potentially infinite number of future applications of a rule - to have examples, is not sufficient, but it is nonetheless necessary to have a rule. So it seems that in order to have a rule that would govern for example the use of a word "cow" we need to have linguistically correct judgments with the word "cow" - in fact we need the practice of making judgments about cow, which exhibits which judgments we treat as correct and which as incorrect. However it still does not follow from this that we need to accept some propositions as true, maybe it is enough to simply judge them as linguistically correct?

In fact in the recent debate on normativity of meaning some defenders of it emphasized the independence of meaning norms from truth norms. One of the reasons given for that is a strong intuition that after all knowledge of a word's meaning does not oblige us to produce only true statements - I can know exactly what the word "cow" means but I can still say "That is a cow" when there is a dog at some distance from me and it seems that I do not break linguistic rules but rather I make some extra linguistic mistake (I "get things wrong"). In order to illustrate this independence Hans-Johan Glock compares our linguistic practice to a game of chess and claims that just as it is possible to play chess correctly (that is without breaking any chess rules) but badly- (that is never getting even close to winning) it is also possible to make judgments that are linguistically correct but nonetheless false.

Alan Millar provides an example that further clarifies this difference. Millar asks us to imagine a patient with pain in his legs that is not caused by arthritis but some other disease. The patient himself has a wrong understanding of the word "arthritis"- he believes that any pain in the legs is called "arthritis", and on this basis he makes a following claim "I suffer from arthritis". His doctor on the contrary has a perfectly good understanding of the word "arthritis" however he makes a mistake in his examination and on the basis of a wrong diagnosis he comes to a following conclusion "My patient has arthritis". We have a very strong intuition that both of them make a mistake, but those mistakes are of different kinds, that by making the same judgment one of them breaks linguistic and the other extra linguistic rules. The author of this example advises therefore to distinguish between correct use and correct application of a word- in the above example the patient misused the word "arthritis" and the doctor misapplied it.

Now we can reformulate our problem as follows- thus far we established that in order for there to be meaning rules we need examples of correct uses of words. However if we want to argue that what is needed are hinge propositions (which we regard as true and not only linguistically correct)

we need to show that we need judgments that are examples of both correct use and application of words.

In order to see that it is exactly the case we can use the same example that Millar created to distinguish the two concepts in question. When we have a statement "X has arthritis" and we know that it is false we cannot determine (by the statement and the fact that it is false alone) which kind of mistake was made- misuse or misapplication. Therefore false statements (even if they are linguistically correct) will never be able to help in constituting meaning. What we need are correct and true propositions- hinge propositions. The doctor from our example can misapply the word (and the patient misuse it) only because there are cases that are uncontroversial and about which doctors generally agree that they are cases of arthritis.

Moreover the fact that false but linguistically correct judgments are not enough shows that Glock's chess metaphor is not exact enough- in case of a chess game even if we have an uncontroversial bad move (for example someone is in a position to check mate his opponent but does not) we can still determine whether his bad move was correct or not. I think that a better analogy holds between the game of making judgments and a slightly modified game of three cards (assuming it is an honest game). The game takes place between two players- let's call them the Player and the Dealer. The game starts with three different cards lying on the table faces up. At this stage the Player is asked to read the names of the cards from left to right. Then the Dealer reverses the cards and starts rearranging them very quickly. The task of the Player is to guess the correct order of the cards after the dealer stops rearranging. After the Player makes his guess the Dealer reverses the cards and if the sequence accords with what the Player claimed the Player wins.

Now we can think of hinge propositions as analogous to those expressed by the Player at the first stage of the game, when he simply reads the names of the cards. We can see that it is necessary that the players agree on those judgments for them to be able to communicate later on when the Player will make his guess. If one of them were to doubt those propositions the whole game would not be possible- we would not have a way of understanding the Player's answer. On the other hand there is no reward at this first stage of the game because them being true is something trivial. Neither are they the goal of the game. The same holds for hinge propositions- it is awkward to even state them because they are so obvious. There is also no "reward" for them- to state them is not an achievement at all. Also they are not an aim of enquiry but rather agreement on them conditions enquiry. Nonetheless if we are to doubt them we make the whole game impossible.

So hinge propositions are necessary for our words to have meanings. We can now turn to a question that has been a subject of a big discussion among commentators, namely are hinge propositions true? Although it is obvious that they are not false it is controversial whether they have any truth value at all. On one hand there is a strong intuition that a statement "I have two hands" has a truth value. On the other hand, as has been emphasized by Wittgenstein's scholars such as G.H. von Wright (von Wright 1982 p.179) or Marie McGinn (McGinn 1898) they seem to function more as rules than as fact stating propositions, and rule stating propositions are not supposed to be truth apt- rules are not something that can be true or false- they can be played by or not.

Although I agree that hinge propositions function like rules I do not think it hampers them to be truth apt. It is so

because I do not think that in case of the game of making judgments Wittgensteinian distinction between rules and empirical proposition is that between something that is truth apt and something that is not. As has been mentioned before for Wittgenstein rules are given in practice, and in the case of making judgments they are simply given by judgments themselves- those that we accept as true (Wittgenstein 1969, 149). Therefore I think that we should think about hinge propositions as expressing rules in the following sense- if they are doubted then we do not have rules, they take the rules away with them. Wittgenstein's rules vs. empirical judgments distinction is a distinction between something that is subject to testing and something that is much less so; rules are simply more resistant to revising.

Another metaphor used to support the non truth apt reading is that of a picture and a frame- hinge propositions frame or condition the game of judging but are not part of the game (just as a frame is not part of a picture)- we try to determine the truth value of other propositions but not those of the frame.

As far as this line of argument is concerned I agree that hinge propositions are not part of enquiry, just as what I called first stage of the "game of three cards" is not a proper part of the game (and can even be totally omitted). However I do not think that it has to mean that framework judgments are not truth apt. It can simply mean that them being true is not all that interesting, and is not a fruit of any enquiry. However from the fact that something is a platitude it does not follow that it is non truth apt but rather that its truth is trivial.

One last analogy may be useful here- we can think of the role of the hinges as similar to a role that the proposition "A one meter measuring tape is one meter long" plays in our practice of measuring- of course there is nothing interesting about this proposition and it is hard to imagine circumstances in which stating it would be appropriate. Moreover it also functions as a rule in the abovementioned sense- when we have something that we think is one meter long and then we actually measure it with the tape and we read of the tape that it is only 90cm long we are much more likely to say that we were wrong about the length of the thing than that the tape is not one metre long. But it plays the role it plays exactly because the proposition "one meter measuring tape is one meter long" is true.

This last example allows to explain off one more intuition that is often given in support of non truth apt reading of the hinges. The reasoning goes as follows: if hinge propositions constitute (or at least co-constitute) our practice of making judgments than maybe they are true if we look from the inside of this practice but are not *generally* so. If we look from the outside they just define a game that can be played or not.

However if Wittgenstein is right then all we have is this internal perspective- our words have meaning only within the system framed by hinge propositions so any attempt to get outside this system would be also a step outside language. To try to ask external questions would be the same as asking whether a one meter long measuring tape is one meter long outside our practice of measuring. It is senseless because the only notion of being one meter long is the one we have from our practice of measuring things. Therefore the game we are playing unlike any of the games used in the analogies is not something we can step outside of, at least not without losing the possibility of talking. To play it is therefore not a matter of decision rather "*it is there- like our life*" (OC 559).

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Hearing it rain – Millikan on Language Learning

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Abstract

In her 'Spracherwerb' (2012) Ruth Millikan gives a compelling account of language acquisition based on our ability to track objects. I argue that, and how, it is undermined by her insistence on equating understanding language utterances and sense perception, point to idealist hazards, and plead against propositionality and for imagism in order to safeguard the account's important potential for giving a comprehensive explication of meaning.

1. Introduction

In her 'Spracherwerb'/'Learning Language' (2012), Ruth Millikan expands on a theme raised already in her *Varieties of Meaning* (2004). There, she argues that "understanding language is simply another form of sensory perception of the world" (p.113) This is not a metaphorical statement but meant quite literally. She is telling us that when we hear (and understand) a report about the world, this is simply another form of perceiving what is being reported. Later in the same chapter this becomes quite unequivocal when she famously says:

Rain does not sound the same when heard falling on the roof, on earth, on snow, and on water, even though it may be directly perceived as rain through any of these media. Exactly similarly, rain has a different sound when the medium of transmission is the English language ("It's raining!"). And it sounds different again when the medium of transmission is French or German. What world affairs sound like when transmitted through language depends on where we focus our minds. (p.122)

So Millikan is telling us that there are various forms of audible perception of rain: we can hear the sound the rain drops make when they fall on the roof or on any other surface, or hear a person say "It's raining!" or "Il pleut!". "It's raining!" is simply another sound rain makes. All of these sounds "exactly similarly" transmit the falling of rain to us, what varies is only the medium of transmission. Out of context, this claim appears nothing less than preposterous. In the framework of Millikan's larger philosophy, however, it follows neatly from her views on signs and purposes. In her account of language acquisition, she builds on it arguing that children learn words in much the same way as they learn about their surroundings through sense perception.

In this paper, I will show that her account does not do justice to perception, yet that it contains compelling ideas concerning language acquisition. I shall begin by outlining her account of language learning. I will then argue that Millikan's focus on information makes her overlook the difference between present particulars and memories or abstract concepts; that sense perception differs from understanding verbal reports not only in spatiotemporal aspects and richness, but in terms of epistemic access. I will end with a plea against propositionality and for imagism in the interest of knowledge as well as language.

2. Millikan's account of language acquisition

Ruth Millikan's first question, I believe, is this:

Given that we have beliefs, what chain of purpose-serving processes brought them about?

With answers involving perception and understanding language, hence also language learning, a follow-up question is therefore:

Given that we understand what other people say, what chain of purpose-serving processes brought about this ability?

These questions take for granted what I want to explain and vice-versa, an opposition presenting pitfalls in grappling with her views, but maybe also helpful in seeing tensions. With this caveat, let me try and sum up her account of language learning:

Millikan explains language acquisition from our ability to track objects. Already very young infants can track objects visually, for instance. Once they can track an object through perception by different senses, they can acquire more information about it. They learn to understand what they are seeing by finding out how the object sounds, feels, tastes and smells. (2012, p.31/114) Children also possess the ability to recognise directedness and purpose. They can therefore observe their parents do things and speak about what they are doing. In this way, they learn how their parents refer to objects and processes and can track referents through language. (p.24/108)

This account therefore compellingly ties the meaning of words for the learner to experiences involving what they describe. An obvious question is how children learn to understand words about what is not physically present. This is explained by 'filling in'. Just as children learn to fill in gappy sensory information, for instance perceiving a dog, although only its head and tail are visible, they also learn the meaning of new words which don't have perceptible referents by 'filling in' the holes in the context of words they know.

If this were to explain merely how we learn words from context, it would have much going for it. But Millikan's aim is to explain *belief* generation. This makes her claim that 'filling in' occurs by interpretation, as indeed does all perception: You 'interpret what you see through the medium

of the structured light that strikes your eyes'. (p.4/87) This doesn't seem right on two accounts. First, it regards perception as delivering signs, thereby losing the distinction between particular and concept, and second, she has to restrict her account to propositions, thereby losing most of perception. Let us look at this in detail.

3. Issues

Millikan's account builds on the idea that all contact with the world only yields signs which our brains then have to interpret. (p.27/111) It is this psychological processing or 'filling in' which turns signs into beliefs/information. Psychological processing is equally direct for light reflected on the retina, sound waves hitting the eardrum, or words. Therefore, rain just sounds different depending on whether it falls on the ground, on a roof, or on an English-speaker, prompting her to say "It's raining!". (p.5/88) In each case, our hearing the sound is a sign of rain falling and serves the same purpose – to inform us that it is raining.

'Direct' is to be understood as involving no theory of mind for language (2012) and no inferences in sense perception (2004), as *indirect* perceptual beliefs would. Instead, direct perceptual beliefs involve at most translations of signs, possibly through various stages, into representations, such as when a certain sound from the kitchen is a sign that the fridge is working and thereby also a sign that the power cut is over. Likewise, mediation, for instance when we perceive an object in a mirror, on television, photographs or through language (p.7/90), makes no difference in terms of the directness of psychological processing. In all cases, Millikan thinks, we are processing signs into representations. The idea seems to be that, one way or another, we only perceive bits and pieces and have to complement them to obtain information.

The trouble with this account is that whatever we fill in must clearly be taken from memory or our stock of concepts. The difference between hearing Fido bark and hearing someone say "A dog is barking" is that Fido is a particular, as is the sound he now produces; hearing Fido, by Millikan's own explanation, *adds* to my understanding of barks, while the statement evokes barking dog memories (this is what understanding consists in). Perceiving Fido bark *adds* to my stock of memories, concepts, or whatever we call it, of barking dogs and dog barks, while the sentence *draws* from it.

But Millikan considers herself an imagist. She might object that both Fido and the sentence create an image of a barking dog in my mind. I agree, but Fido's present barking creates a *new* image as part of our interaction with Fido, while the image the statement evokes is abstracted from multiple barking dog memories. Disregarding the difference is, metaphysically, pure idealism.

Epistemologically, it obstructs Millikan's account of information, which is her main concern. From the observation that we cannot perceive the essence/'real nature' of Fido, she concludes that what carries the information is irrelevant. (p.7/92) It seems to me that it is the way she poses her question that gets in the way here. If the question is what generated our belief that a dog is barking, hearing someone truthfully say so is indeed as conducive as hearing a dog bark. But if what counts is the information we have, the richness of my perception of Fido compared to the poverty of the statement makes an important difference. Hearing Fido bark means that I can form plenty of beliefs – that Fido is agitated, hoarse, has sneaked into the kitchen, etc. – not just that a dog is barking.

There is also the aspect of epistemic access. Millikan herself points to the fact that we can shift our focus from the message to the words or phonemes carrying it, or from the news we watch to the dots on the TV screen. The same applies to rain and Fido. This is a classical shift from object to form, and even if the object were the same (which I disputed above), the form would be radically different. Hearing someone say "It's raining!" or "A dog is barking!" I can shift my focus to words or phonemes, but hearing the rain or Fido the attention shift to form takes me to the quality of the sound.

But there is another important difference. We mustn't overlook that hearing the rain on the roof need not evoke any belief at all, it may simply be part of our diffuse perception of our surroundings. But even if the rain becomes salient for whatever reason, we need not form propositional beliefs about it. Typically, belief formation occurs when something prompts us to describe specific aspects of our experience. Interestingly, we can do so not only *during* exposure. The rain may leave traces in our memory such that when asked later, say, whether it was heavy or not, we would be able to tell. We do this by bringing particular aspects of our experience into focus. But this is not a simple shift of attention as from object to form in the case of language. Here, our focus delimits the scope of what we attend to, it singles out an aspect. We might focus on everything we hear (as opposed to what we see or smell, for instance); or we might focus on the rain (in all its perceptible aspects); or to the rain on the roof; and transitions between these focuses are smooth. This variability does not exist in object/form shifts of attention. There is a neat division between the object (e.g. message) and the form (words/phonemes), and attention shifting from one to the other requires a mental switch: we can only attend to one, not on both at the same time.

Millikan pre-empts objections about variations in reliability between perception through sensation and language, and about the richness of experience, in particular concerning spatiotemporal relations to the perceiver. But, she insists, "There is no shift in directness of perception, but only a lessening of content in what is perceived. Information about relations to self have dropped out." (2004, p.124) I hope to have shown that a lot more has dropped out.

But let us return to perception and beliefs. Millikan grants an important difference between obtaining information from language or perception. When we see a dog, the "structure of the light impinging on the retina [...] would vary [...] according to variations in a good number of different properties of the perceived object. The word 'dog' has no such significant structure." (2012, p.9/92) Consequently, she restricts her account to sentences, and these correspond to propositional beliefs. But this means that she loses most of perception and also the connection to her account of language learning. Let me explain.

I have pointed out that perception is diffuse while we don't attend to particular aspects of it. Even the salience of an object does not give us propositional thought. Propositionality requires attending to an aspect of that object. Perception as such does not yield propositions.

But, it may be objected, Millikan has every right to give an account of propositional beliefs only. Correct, but I suspect that her account was meant to be one of our knowledge of the world, and there such a restriction is highly undesirable. Imagism takes perception to yield images of the world. But an image would of course not be translatable into a belief if one takes beliefs to be inherently pro-

positional. Those who take beliefs, and beliefs only, to be the ingredients of knowledge can only accept as knowledge what is propositional in structure: an object of which something is predicated. But this rules out important things we usually also consider 'knowledge'. It may, of course, be said that the English word "knowledge" is notoriously polysemous and covers what at least two, if not three words convey in other languages (*connaître/savoir* in French, *kennen/wissen/können* in German, etc.) – hence the standard distinction between 'knowing by acquaintance', 'knowing that' and 'knowing how' in Anglophone philosophy. But even a restriction to *savoir/wissen* would still include knowledge of what things are like, for instance. *Je sais/ich weiss*, what strawberries taste like. I cannot describe their taste, I cannot form a propositional thought about it, but I certainly know it in the same way in which I don't know the taste – or smell – of durians (although I am visually acquainted with them).

But even if one squeezed 'knowledge of what something is like' into 'knowledge by acquaintance' for the sake of a neat tripartite division, it will have to be conceded that prior to 'knowing that' we must have knowledge by acquaintance of very many (some say all) things we know. And it seems to me that Millikan's account of language learning corroborates this, starting, as it does, from tracking objects. Also her 'signs' are surely best understood as fragments of images.

But disregarding this and restricting knowledge and perception to what is propositional means losing most of perception and makes it possible to ignore the connection to what we perceive. Where all that counts is the belief, it is indeed of little importance what brought it about – whether it results from our 'hard-wiring', divine inspiration, direct contact with an object, or a statement we hear. But if its origins are unimportant and all methods of bringing it about are fallible anyway, the tie to reality has been severed and we have taken a step into idealism. So perceptual knowledge of the world is my first reason for pleading against propositionality.

The second, more important one here, is that propositionality undermines the compelling account of how words obtain meaning for us in language learning. We can only track an object through space, time *and* language, if its name suffices to evoke an image just as seeing or hearing it would evoke the name. This is an excellent foundation for an account of meaning comprising much more than reference relations. But it requires giving up beliefs as the output of sense perception and understanding language alike. Rather than interpreting signs to yield propositions, psychological processing would complement images instead.

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Wittgenstein's cane and other memorable things. The animating power of memorabilia

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Abstract

Michael Jackson's glove, Elvis Presley's Bible, John Lennon's tooth, and the slice of bread Prince Charles left on his plate the day he married Diana, are examples of memorabilia recently sold in auctions. But *what* are these objects, and why do people want to own them, or see them? Starting from a case study involving the Austrian writer Stefan Zweig's *room of devotion*, described in his autobiography *The World of Yesterday*, I will argue that the value of memorabilia is related to their *animating power*, or the way in which they serve to bring their subjects to our minds. As my primary examples of memorabilia I will use the memorabilia preserved at the von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives of the University of Helsinki (WWA) – von Wright's typewriter, Wittgenstein's cane, and Wittgenstein's handkerchief.

1. Introduction

Michael Jackson's glove, Elvis Presley's Bible, John Lennon's tooth, and the slice of bread Prince Charles left on his plate the day he married Diana. These are all examples of memorabilia recently sold in auctions. My own interest in memorabilia, however, is not the interest of a collector or an auctioneer. It is related to some objects in a show case that stands next to my desk in the von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Helsinki (WWA), comprising Georg Henrik von Wright's travel typewriter, and a cane and a handkerchief, which belonged to Ludwig Wittgenstein. I have started to wonder *what* these objects really are, why people want to see them, and why they react as they do. Some of my results are included in this paper.

I will start by a small presentation of our treasures, followed by a case study based on a collector's description found in Stefan Zweig's famous autobiography *The World of Yesterday*. From this I will move to explore the various ways in which memorabilia may *animate* the persons related with them. Finally, I will take the reader back to WWA, to consider our memorabilia in the light of what has been said.

2. A typewriter, a cane, and a star-spangled handkerchief

With computers writing has become the processing of words. Consequently, we tend to be much more emotional about software than the actual machines we are using. Today it even seems difficult to imagine the importance the Finnish philosopher Georg Henrik von Wright attached to his typewriter. In his autobiography von Wright describes how he, as only 9-years old, started to work on the travel typewriter bought by his father in New York 1919. It would faithfully serve him throughout his life. Thus, there could hardly be a more suitable picture for the cover of his autobiography than von Wright sitting by his typewriter in the Finnish archipelago.

The two other items of the show case, the cane and the star-spangled handkerchief, relate to von Wright's teacher and friend, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Both derive from Joan Bevan, the wife of von Wright's and Wittgenstein's physician, Doctor Edward Bevan. As well known, Wittgenstein died in April 1951 in the house of the Bevan's at Storey's end, where the items assumedly simply were left behind. Still, it would be wrong to associate Wittgenstein's cane

with illness or an old age. Wittgenstein was, in fact, using a cane long before the 1950's. "He nearly always walked with a light cane", Norman Malcolm remembers from his first encounters with Wittgenstein in the late 30's (Malcolm 1958, 25). Moreover, the photos showing Wittgenstein with a cane all stem from the early 20's (Nedo and Ranchetti 1983, 168 and 176–177).

Whereas there are numerous references to Wittgenstein's cane in the biographical literature on Wittgenstein – only Malcolm refers to it at least 3 times – no one, to our knowledge, has ever mentioned a star-spangled handkerchief. Thus, all information we have origins from Joan Bevan. However, it seems clear that it was Wittgenstein's own handkerchief. More interesting, perhaps, is the fact that it was used to cover Wittgenstein's face after his death.

3. Visiting Stefan Zweig's room of devotion

Memorabilia are memory related objects connected with famous people and events. In this context I will only speak about memorabilia related to particular persons, which I will call the *subjects* of the memorabilia. Thus, for instance, Michael Jackson is the subject of the memorabilia object Michael Jackson's glove, Elvis of Elvis's Bible, and so on.

A very familiar memory connection between objects and people is formed by personal experience, as when we remember a late relative through some objects she kept, or clothing she used to wear. Obviously, the value people attach to Elvis' Bible, or Wittgenstein's cane, does not depend on this kind of *autobiographical memory*. But then we have to ask what memorabilia actually *do*? It is with this question in mind that I now turn to Stefan Zweig's well known memoirs.

The famous Austrian author Stefan Zweig was also known as a collector of manuscripts, motivated by his great interest in the genesis of the work of art. To these "earthly manifestations of genius" he had also, however, added a small collection of memorabilia, which he kept in a separate room. These "objects of devotion" included items like Beethoven's desk, his little money box, a page from his household accounts, and a lock of his hair. In his special room he also kept Goethe's quill pen, however "in a glass case ... to avoid the temptation of taking it in [his] own unworthy hand". (Zweig 2009, 186–187.)

Now, there is a religious touch to Zweig's description, which may prompt us to look for similarities between

memorabilia and another kind of memory related objects, the *relics of saints*. The impression of a similarity grows even stronger, when Zweig turns to his "most valuable museum piece", which, in fact, was an old lady living some floors above him, who turned out to be no one less than the daughter of Goethe's physician. Once having been christened in the presence of Goethe himself, she now formed a last living link between Zweig's suburban building, and "the Olympian world of Weimar". (Ibid. 186–187.) Interesting as the parallels to the relics of saints may be, I will, however, follow another visible thread in Zweig's description, which also neatly fits with his interest in the *biographical* and *psychological aspects* of the genesis of the work of art (ibid. 184).

What I have in mind, is the way in which the "museum pieces" Zweig was surrounded by *work on his imagination*. Thus, Beethoven's little money box is also the box "from which he would hand small sums to his maidservant as he lay in his bed, his shaking hand already touched by Death". Similarly, the old lady upstairs is, in particular, someone "at whom Goethe's dark, round eyes had looked with affection" (ibid. 186–187). It is almost as if Zweig was trying to recall memories he impossibly could have had.

I think these passages may be seen as examples of the ways in which memorabilia may bring their subjects to our minds, or what I will call the *animating power of memorabilia*. However, it also immediately seems clear that this is a function which might be served in many different ways. I will now turn to this question.

4. The animating power of memorabilia

Memorabilia, or *good* memorabilia, have the power of animating their subjects. With the animating power of a memorabilia object I mean its capacity to bring its subject to our minds in various ways. Animation of the subject may be realized by the object in at least the following five ways

- i. By creating a sense of presence.
- ii. By evoking our imagination.
- iii. By allowing for position entering.
- iv. By indication.
- v. By relating to the subjects life story.

The *sense of presence* is induced by our belief in a physical connection between the memorabilia object and the subject, as when we are touched by the fact that a certain glove has been worn by Michael Jackson, or that we stand in front of a lady who once has been the object of the friendly gaze of Goethe. Obviously, it is this very sense of presence created by a physical connection which is responsible for the "pleasant disbelief" by which we typically respond to memorabilia ("No, it *can't* be!").

Again, Zweig's vivid fantasies of the money transaction between Beethoven and his maidservant may be seen as an example of how a memorabilia object, in this case the money box, may *evoke our imagination* solely by its appearance. This way of animation should be distinguished from the third way, which involves *position entering*, or the kind of feeling for the life of other persons we can get, for instance, by visiting places where they have lived, following their daily routines, or using their tools. In fact, the surroundings of Kirchberg provide lots of opportunities for entering the position of Wittgenstein, for instance by following his daily walk along the Wittgenstein Rundwanderweg, or visiting the Trattenbach house in which he once lived. In fact, Zweig could, indeed, have gotten a glimpse of the being of Goethe, had he only dared to take the quill pen in

his hand. Position entering is, I believe, related to the way in which, for instance, a tool may become a "quasi-part of the body" (see Jager 1989, 219). In this sense, trying out the quill pen of Goethe's has a touch of simulating his bodily experience.

Whereas position entering brings us experiential knowledge of the subject, *indication* refers to what we may *infer* from the memorabilia object. Thus, for instance, the bed preserved in the Trattenbach museum may give us an indication of the size of Wittgenstein, but certainly also of his aesthetical standards.

The last item of the list refers to the situation where the memorabilia object is known to have played a particular part in the subject's life story, as, for instance, the already mentioned glove, which was worn by Michael Jackson when he received the American Music Award for *Thriller*. Obviously, this knowledge adds something to the "aura" of the object. It may, however, also contribute to our conception of the particular occasion in question. Sometimes it is also possible to establish a relation between a memorabilia object and stories which have been handed down in the form of anecdotes. Clearly, for instance, the poker Wittgenstein allegedly once used to threaten Karl Popper, would have been popular as a memorabilia object – had it only been preserved (for the story, see Edmonds & Eidinow 2001, 2–3).

5. Back to WWA

So, what can be said about the WWA memorabilia in the light of my distinctions? Obviously, in all three cases there is a distinct physical connection, which may be experienced as a sense of presence. About the typewriter it may be pointed out that it is the only clear example of a working tool in the collection. As such it may provide access to von Wright's writing activities both on the level of our imagination and by position entering. Clearly, its worn out keys and absence of correction tape also give indications about his style, and skills, of writing.

About Wittgenstein it has often been said that biographical knowledge is of particular importance, as part of the endeavour to understand *the spirit* in which he wrote (Monk 2001, 4–5). Consequently, Wittgenstein memorabilia would also seem to be of a special interest. In any case, Wittgenstein's cane seems to be something of an ideal example of a memorabilia object, exemplifying all the different ways of animation. By its connection to a personal style of walking it forms an excellent example of how an object may disclose a life world through position entering. The cane also gives indications of the way Wittgenstein wanted to appear – and it certainly suggests that Wittgenstein was not a very tall man. In addition, it is a wonderful example of the way memorabilia may be related to a life story. Thus, for instance, Malcolm tells an affectionate story about how Wittgenstein would stop during a walk in order to eagerly measure the height of a tree with the help of the cane, whereas there is story of a peculiar misunderstanding involving the cane during a visit to Norway in one of Wittgenstein's own MSS (Anna Rebni believed Wittgenstein had threatened her with the cane, see Wittgenstein 2000, item 119, 119v–120r).

Owing to its double status, the star-spangled handkerchief forms a more complex case. As a mere handkerchief it, clearly, seems inferior to the cane in respect of position entering (we would have to try out various gestures of drawing it from our pocket, or something). Again, it is not quite easy to know what to make of a position entering in-

volving the dead body of Wittgenstein. As Wittgenstein's handkerchief it does suggest something about his general style, especially due to its surprisingly colourful pattern. Its most important testimony, however, is, I believe, the very fact that it *has* been preserved, in its capacity as the handkerchief used to cover Wittgenstein's face after his death – indicating that he truly was a remarkable man. Naturally, there is also a strong connection between the handkerchief and the vivid stories that have been told about Wittgenstein's death by his biographers (see especially Monk 1991, Ch. 27).

Given the close relation between life and philosophy in Wittgenstein it does, perhaps, not come as a surprise that it also is possible to find an immediate relation between Wittgenstein memorabilia and his philosophical remarks. Thus, there is at least one passage in the *Nachlass* where the actual knowledge of the type of cane he was using influences our understanding of the content. I will conclude with simply quoting this passage of the MS 133,

Häng dich nicht an einen unwürdigen und laß einen
Würdigen im Stich. Sei nicht zu
feig eines Menschen Freundschaft auf die Probe zu
stellen. Verträgt es eine
Stütze nicht, daß man sich an ihr stützt, so ist sie
nichts wert, so traurig das auch sein mag.

Der Stock, der hübsch aussieht, so lange man ihn
trägt, aber sich biegt,
wenn du dich auf ihn stützt, ist nichts wert.
(Wittgenstein 2000, item 133, 36r–36v.)

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The Subject/Object use of “I” Distinction

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Abstract

Traditional interpretations have mistaken Wittgenstein’s remarks on the use of “I” for some kind of non-cognitivism. It is often held that Wittgenstein thinks I-sentences function like primitive, natural expressions of the subject’s mental states, and they do not express propositions about the subject. I will challenge this reading and argue that the point of the use of “I” discussion is to show that we do not have an epistemic relation to our mental lives, and these passages must be read as part of his general attack on the traditional metaphysics that tries to model the mental on the physical.

The dominant philosophical reception of Wittgenstein’s subject and object uses of the “I” distinction can be captured by the following three claims:

1. Wittgenstein makes the distinction between the object uses of “I” and the subject uses of “I” by pointing to a phenomenon that is coined later by Shoemaker, as immunity to error through misidentification.
2. Wittgenstein holds a particular view of reference, and according to this view, if the use of an expression does exhibit the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification, then the expression does not refer.
3. Since according to Wittgenstein the subject uses of “I” do not refer, we must understand him as a non-cognitivist with respect to sentences which contain the subject uses of “I”.

In this paper I will show that all of these claims are false, and they are distracting us from understanding Wittgenstein’s project. I claim that the subject/object use of the “I” distinction is not an idiosyncratic distinction that is given in the *Blue Book* and later disappears in *Philosophical Investigations*. It is rather an instance of a core idea of Wittgenstein’s thought that is persistent from *Tractatus* to *Philosophical Investigations*. I claim that since *Tractatus*, where he writes “The thinking, presenting subject, there is no such thing,” Wittgenstein has been occupied with exposing the most pervasive mistake we make in theorizing about ourselves as self-conscious beings, that is, our tendency to try to understand the mental on the model of the physical. The subject/object use of the “I” distinction is drawn to mark how differently language works in the first-person expressions of mental activities and in expressions of thoughts about the objects of public space. I claim that the aim of this distinction is not to give a theory of reference, but rather, to mark the difference of the grammar of I-talk and thing-talk in order to warn us against importing the structures from our dealings with objects, which are independent of our cognition of them, to our understanding of the nature of the mental.

Let us start with the text that gives rise to the standard reading and its natural accompaniment, the expressive reading. The object /subject uses of the “I” distinction appear in the *Blue Book*. After giving some examples of the object use—“my arm is broken,” “the wind blows my hair about,” “I have grown six-inches”—and the subject use—“I see so-and-so,” “I try to lift my arm,” “I think it will rain”, “I have a toothache”—Wittgenstein gives us a clue to the difference between these two sets of uses:

One can point to the difference between these two categories by saying: The cases of the first category [object uses], involve the recognition of a particular person, and there is in these cases the possibility of

an error, as I should rather put it: The possibility of an error has been provided for... On the other hand, there is no question of recognizing a person when I say I have toothache. To ask “are you sure that it’s *you* who have pains?” would be nonsensical. (Wittgenstein 1969 67)

This is the text that seems to support the first tenet of the standard reading that I mentioned above, that is, the distinction is based on whether the recognition of a particular is involved in the use of “I”. Moreover, we know that in the subject uses of “I”, there is no such recognition, *because* were there a recognition, there would be a possibility of misrecognition. And if there were a possibility of misrecognition, it would make sense to ask whether the subject is sure that it is *she* who thinks, sees, has a toothache, etc. So it looks like Wittgenstein, in fact, draws the distinction by appealing to immunity to error through misidentification in some uses of “I”.

But how can we move from this point, that there is no recognition of an object involved in the subject uses of “I,” to the idea that in these uses “I” does not refer and that the sentences in which these uses appear have no truth value? The standard reading finds support for these two further points by looking at the texts in which Wittgenstein compares the use of “I am in pain” with instinctive pain behavior. We find this comparison both in the *Blue Book* and later in *Philosophical Investigations*:

To say, “I have pain” is no more a statement *about* a particular person than moaning is... (Wittgenstein 1969 67)

“...I did not say such and such person was in pain, but “I am...” Now in saying this I don’t name any person. Just as I don’t name anyone when I *groan* (stöhnen) with pain.” (Wittgenstein 1953 §404)

Now the question is, given these and similar passages, how far we should push the comparison between instinctive pain behavior and verbal expressions of pain. I will argue that the comparison is made to make a very limited point, and in fact does not support an expressivist reading.

This very distinction between subject and object uses of “I” is drawn because Wittgenstein wanted to take our attention to the different ways in which we use first person pronoun, and urge that we should not assimilate one use to the other. Given his sensitivity to the varieties of use, he cannot be insensitive to the obvious differences between the use of instinctive pain behavior and the use of “I am in pain.” In order to understand what the comparison is meant to achieve, we should be sensitive to the obvious differences as well as the similarities Wittgenstein points to. According to Wittgenstein the verbal expression of pain

and moaning are similar in that their use does not require the subject to go through any epistemic work of figuring out *who* is in pain in order to use them. But granting this similarity does not commit us to the further claim that "I am in pain" has no semantic structure at all. Unlike a moan, "I am in pain" is a linguistic expression. Its use is governed by linguistic rules and conventions. In this respect it is akin to exclamations, such as "Ouch!" Just like it would be wrong to express pain by saying "Hurray!" it would be wrong to say "I is in pain." Moreover, unlike exclamations, "I am in pain" has a predicative structure. That is, "I am in pain" can go into truth-preserving inferential relationships, figure in conditionals, and can be contradicted. Consider the conditional "If I am in pain, the nurse will give me medication." It follows from my utterance "I am in pain" that Eylem is in pain. When a child tries to avoid school by saying "I have a stomachache", an experienced mother will be quick to contradict him, "No, you don't." Now given that our pain-talk is permeated with these truth-apt uses, I think we can safely claim that the use of "I am in pain" cannot be the same as the use of a natural expression of pain in every respect.

But perhaps I was too quick to dismiss the expressivist reading. Perhaps there is more to the comparison of moaning and uttering "I am in pain." An expressivist would insist that the role of uttering "I am in pain" in our pain-talk is not to *describe* a person, me, as being in pain; but simply to *express* that pain. By uttering "I am in pain" I do not say how things are with the person I am but *show* it. It is in this respect, the expressivist might press, "I am in pain" is like a groan. However, saying that something is an expression rather than a description is not very illuminating. As Wittgenstein himself pointed out, we use the words "describe" and "express" for an array of diverse practices: describing a sensation, describing a room, expressing pain, expressing concern, expressing thoughts.

But isn't the beginning the sensation—which I describe?—Perhaps this word "describe" tricks us here. I say "I describe my state of mind" and "I describe my room." You need to call to mind the differences between language games." (Wittgenstein 1953 §290)

The legitimacy of the use of a certain expression in different cases is assessed in diverse ways. In each case we need to see on what occasion, on what basis we give the description, what reactions it elicits, what further questions it admits. In certain cases there is room for doubt; in certain cases there isn't. Sometimes it is reasonable to ask, "How do you know?" Sometimes it isn't. I propose that the distinction the expressivist wants to draw between a description of pain and an expression of pain can be drawn in a principled way in terms of the applicability of the question "How do you know?"

Compare the following cases:

1. I am in pain—How do you know?—I feel it.
2. The surface is smooth.—How do you know?—I feel it.
3. Emma is telling the truth.—How do you know?—I feel it.

In 2 and 3, feeling is a way of knowing something independent of being felt. Feeling is how one finds out how things are. Feeling pain, on the other hand, is not the way I find out that I am in pain. Here, to answer 'I feel it' is nothing but saying "I am in pain" once more. So in Case 1, the "How?" question provokes not a genuine answer but a protest, or insistence. Feeling the way I do is to be in pain. Feeling does not tell me that a certain object is in pain. Feeling, here, is not an epistemic link between me, the subject that knows, and the object which is in pain. Here,

the awareness itself is what is expressed with "I feel pain" or "I am in pain". So, "I am in pain" is a direct expression of pain just like a moan, in the sense that its use is not based on any epistemic work.

This distinction which I draw in terms of the how-question marks an epistemic asymmetry between "I am in pain" and "She is in pain" where both expressions are used to describe the same person's pain. "She is in pain," which is uttered by someone else to state the same fact that I would state by saying "I am in pain," is based on that person's cognition of me as an object. How-things-are-with-me is available to him through some epistemic link. I claim that Wittgenstein's aim here and in the surrounding passages is to point to this epistemic asymmetry to show us how different our relationship to our mental lives is from our relationship to our physical being, to other physical beings, and to the mental lives of others. By emphasizing the difference he is cautioning us against introducing a private realm in which our mental activities would be given to us, just like the physical realm is given to us, but only privately.

Now there is a purely semantic notion of reference which does not involve anything about how we come to know what we know, how we are related to the object about which we have thoughts, etc. I see no reason to think that if we understand the notion of reference this way, Wittgenstein's position would be that "I" does not refer in its subject uses. There is nothing in Wittgenstein's writings to prevent us from accepting the following point: In every unembedded context, the occurrences of "I" can be replaced by the referring expression "the person who is speaking" *salva veritate*. If this is all we mean by "I" refers, then "I" is a referring expression in both its subject and object uses. However, note how thin this notion of referring is and how unhelpful it is in a project of learning about the nature of the mental by revealing what sort of cognitive work grounds the use of "I" in the expression of our mental lives. The following passage supports my point:

The word "I" does not mean the same as "L.W." even if I am L.W., nor does it mean the same as the expression "the person who is now speaking". But that doesn't mean: that "L.W." and "I" mean different things. All it means is that these words are different instruments in our language. (Wittgenstein 1969 67)

If I am right in my reading of Wittgenstein, he does not defend a simple theory of reference according to which immunity to error through misidentification is incompatible with reference. Given his insistence on how important it is to notice various ways in which language works, he would gladly embrace the varieties of reference Gareth Evans introduces. In his book *Varieties of Reference*, Evans gives a brilliant analysis of the various ways in which the objects might be involved in object-directed thoughts. Evans shows that in certain ways of receiving information about objects, the way the subject receives information about the object may not leave room for an act of identification, and so the thought based on this information link will be immune to error through misidentification, and yet object-directed. Demonstrative thought is one such case.

According to Evans, self-reference is also one such variety which is immune to error through misidentification. Here we must apply the lessons we learn from Wittgenstein: when I-sentences are used in a way that the how-question does not apply, their use entails neither an identification of the person to whom the predicate pertains, *nor a verification of the predicate's application*. So in the case of "I am in pain", neither the question "how do you know who

is pain?" nor the question "how do you know whether someone is in pain?" is applicable. In the face of this, how does the notion of information link have any foothold in explaining our awareness of our mental lives? What is this way in which I am informed that someone is in pain, someone thinks, someone sees without leaving room for the question of *who* is in pain, who thinks, who sees? What is this way in which I, and *only* I, am informed about myself? Insisting that there is a coherent notion of information link which is available for self-thought, is yet another instance of modeling the mental on the physical. Consider a striking feature of pain to which we did not pay much attention so far: the awareness of pain is to *be* in pain. This awareness is not primarily an epistemic relation we have to ourselves. This awareness does not take the shape of

knowing-something-which-is -independent-of being known-yet-necessarily-accompanied-by-the-knowledge-of-it. What Wittgenstein urges us to see in the grammar of I-talk is that at the fundamental level I am not *given* to myself, I *am* myself.

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Wittgenstein and Modern Psychoanalytic Theory of Thinking

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Abstract

The author argues that there is an essential similarity of Wittgenstein's thought and the ideas of contemporary psychoanalysis. The most essential similarity is seen with the Kleinian school of psychoanalysis in the light of its theory of thinking that postulates that an infant, in order to form its thinking apparatus properly, needs its mother's ability to receive and process into an expressible form too frightening feelings of her infant. Attention is drawn to the hypothesis that there is a profound concurrence of their research interests and scientific and personal aspirations that goes far beyond multiple similarities in background and style. The conclusion is made that Wittgenstein's speaking about himself as a follower of Freud could refer to the fact that Wittgenstein not only deeply understood Freud's ideas, but also developed them in a direction coinciding with the essential lines of psychoanalysis advancement.

In this talk I am going to offer a look at Wittgenstein's work in the light of the theory of thinking developed by one of the most influential schools of contemporary psychoanalysis. I believe that there are striking and seemingly non-coincidental similarities between the works of Wittgenstein and the theory of thinking of W. Bion, one of the leading post-Freudian psychoanalysts.

Let me start with some comments about the positioning of my approach. It is a common view that traditional psychoanalytic essays are rather unsatisfactory due to excessive pathologization. For example, Mancia (2002) professes recognition of Wittgenstein as an outstanding philosopher, but paints his personality solely in the light of personal failures and problems. From the other hand, Bouveresse (1995) is mainly focused on Wittgenstein's critical reading of Freud, and does not seem to pay ample attention to the positive aspects of Wittgenstein's relation to either Freud or his followers. Sass (1992, 1994), as he explores the similarities between madness and the culture of modernism and postmodernism, including Schreber's delusions and Wittgenstein's ideas, and aims to reach 'the understanding which consists in seeing connections' (Sass, 1992) in order to show familiar phenomena from a new point of view, remains for me a deeply respected source of inspiration. Derrida (1981) provided permission to undertake this comparative analysis due to the following: a) his deconstruction of the classic text of *Phaedrus* that disengages from the 'intentions of an author who goes by the name of Plato' (Derrida, 1981) allowed me to look at the meanings of Wittgenstein's texts outside their strictly philosophical understanding; b) Derrida's connection of separate parts of *Phaedrus* through a single word, which was never uttered by Plato himself, encouraged me to look closer at the similarities under the discussion through something that was not uttered by Wittgenstein either.

Speaking of Wittgenstein and psychoanalysis, authors usually relate his ideas mainly to doctrines of Freud, and not of his followers, partly because they are considered belonging to the same generation. This might agree with Wittgenstein's own opinion, as in his diaries he wrote: '... Freud and myself all belong in the same class, which is characteristic of this time' (Mancia 2002: 169). However, for juxtaposition of Wittgenstein's work with ideas of the later generation of psychoanalysts, there are several reasons, including many biographic ones. For example, Freud was born 33 years earlier than Wittgenstein, while Wilfred Bion, a prominent representative of the Kleinian school and the author of the theory of thinking under discussion, was only eight years younger than Wittgenstein, he served

as an officer in WWI, and during WWII he worked as a psychiatrist in a London hospital.

The works of Wilfred Bion bear a great stylistic resemblance with Wittgenstein's works. The most obvious is their extensive borrowing from the language of mathematics. Besides it, there are many parallel uses of many notions and expressions, such as learning from experience (the title of one of Bion's books), knowing about other person's pain (Bion's concept of projective identification containment) and many others. Each of them deserves a special research project but here I would just mention them because they prompted me to look for deeper similarities which I am going to discuss now.

1. Transition from a pictorial to an instrumental model. This transition seems to be the most salient common feature in evolution from early to later Wittgenstein and from classical Freudian psychoanalysis to psychoanalysis of the second half of XX – the beginning of XXI centuries. The idea that only factual propositions can have sense is strongly associated with early Wittgenstein, regardless whether we believe that early Wittgenstein held that idea or that he just used it as a ladder to climb on and then throw away. Later Wittgenstein may be read as stressing the ideas that are highly relevant to the content of the modern psychoanalytical thinking, for example: the meaning of words is determined by their use (PI, § 43); our actions are mostly based not on knowledge (we are 'bewitched' by the word 'know', OC, § 435), but on our assumptions (the assumption 'forms the basis of action', OC, § 411) as well as on involuntary acceptance ('being content to accept many things', OC, § 344). In the classical Freudian psychoanalysis a pictorial model of language was strongly implied in the idea of neurotic disease being a result of repression of a past traumatic event (which firstly was believed to be a real fact). The next generation of psychoanalysts underlines in free associations not so much a connection with real or imaginary events as the patient's conscious and unconscious attempt to manipulate his psychoanalyst. While earlier the patient who was believed to only 'act out' and be 'unable to associate', was considered to be unsuitable for analysis, later the analysis of countertransference (the analyst's unconscious feelings and actions in response to the patient's unconscious) became an essential instrument of psychoanalytical treatment (Hinshelwood, 1991). That is, in psychoanalysis as well, the major change took place in the form of shifting from a pictorial model (of the neurotic symptom initial trauma) to an instrumental model (of working through of the countertransference).

2. Transition from monosemantic to polysemic reality. The next important similarity in Wittgenstein's works and the development of psychoanalytic thought consists in transition from a clear-cut monosemantic to a polysemic many-valued understanding of reality and human communication in particular. This similarity is not as salient as the transition from the pictorial to instrumental model, but no less significant. The monosemantic model as a starting point of his future thought development seems to be rather well outlined by Wittgenstein in his concept of atomic fact (TLP). Further, building on the simplified language model formulated by St. Augustine, he is increasingly turning to ambiguity, vagueness and fuzziness of linguistic reality. His later works seem thoroughly imbued with the explicit and implicit references to the problem of ambiguity and uncertainty, for example, such as his reflection on a language-game 'concept with blurred edges' (PI, §71), or pre-conception of crystalline purity' of logic (PI, §108), or such leading questions as: 'can't his hearer still interpret the explanation differently?' (PI, §34), and 'do I always talk with very definite purpose? – And is what I say senseless because I don't?' (PPF, §80). In psychoanalysis, there is also a strong tendency to turn from monosemantic to polysemic model. Classical psychoanalysis believed that the patient's insight, leading to his cure, is achieved when the patient 'recalls' the repressed past trauma, implying a single traumatic event. Likewise, it was implied that there is only one 'latent content' of each dream which could be discovered with proper analysis of the patient's free associations. In the contemporary psychoanalysis multi-valuedness is stressed in various ways: a) instead of interpreting a single event the interpretative efforts are focused on the traumatic environment in total (Hinshelwood, 1991); b) the technical recommendation for the psychoanalyst to allow a kind of free-floating awareness of the different levels of his experience of his patients' experiences were proposed (Roth, 2001); c) the ideas of fundamental antinomy of human beings and the world due to their simultaneous functioning in two incompatible modes were introduced stating that our unconscious is a set of bi-logical structures, with one aspect of them corresponding to the rail of classical logic and the other being the expression of the symmetry principle (where part equals whole, negations are absent, etc.) (Matte-Blanco, 1999).

3. Common psychological constellation. The next common feature in Wittgenstein's and modern psychoanalysts' works that I am going to discuss is a particular psychological constellation described in psychoanalysis as a failure of projective identification containment and its working through. This means a situation when the mother is unable to receive and process into an expressible form too frightening or otherwise unacceptable feelings of her infant. Such containment is thought to be a vital factor in the infant's emotional well-being and its thinking apparatus formation (Hinshelwood, 1991). This psychological constellation became an important concept of the modern psychoanalysis through the work of the Kleinian school and Bion's theory of thinking. I believe that this common psychological constellation is the most essential of all mentioned here similarities and its role could be seen as an equivalent to the role of the single word in Derrida's analysis of the Plato's text (Derrida, 1981).

A person who has suffered from this containment failure has two options: to become either a borderline (at the best scenario) psychologically disturbed person or a very creative person who overcomes this shortage through his work. I think that was the case with Wittgenstein and Bion. They both had a higher than usual degree of containment failure in their early upbringing (and no human being is absolutely free from it), but during their life they reached a deep understanding of this condition in themselves and (through it) in the humankind in general and used this understanding in their creative work.

The usual way to show that a person has a particular psychological state is to point to the personal traits and their expression in the professional interests. As for psychoanalysts dedicated their lives to studying these phenomena, the presence of such problems in their work is going without saying. Demonstration of such psychological state in works of the philosopher who has never used those concepts, for sure, is more difficult. Of course, here too we can relate to such well-known biographical data as suicide of his brothers and his own suicidal thoughts, or his desire at a certain time of his life to become a psychiatrist.

However, in this particular case we have a stronger argument. The presence of the first two similarities themselves serves as a sound indicator of the existence and working through of this psychological state. The person whose feelings were not contained properly in his infancy will always struggle with underlying uncertainty regarding the purpose of ongoing communication and experience difficulty in discerning the main conventional meaning of verbal and nonverbal communication. Such a person will usually struggle between common sense notion of speech as conveying information (and more or less clear meaning of communication) and his own personal way of using speech as putting his own feelings into another person (projective identification) or seeing endless number of meanings in each phrase. That is to say, he will always, at the best scenario, undertake a transition from what he is supposed to feel to what he really feels (and what basically represents a fundamental antinomy of all human beings).

Bion's theory of thinking has a notion of so called β -elements. If the infant's mother is not able to transform this raw feelings (Bion calls them β -elements) in an acceptable form (α -elements) the person 1) becomes unable to think properly; he will just defensively manipulate his β -elements and may formulate very sophisticated propositions but that still will not be a proper thinking; 2) will never be able to either wake up or fall asleep properly (unable to differentiate being awake and dreaming). Let's compare these ideas with Wittgenstein's wish to cure himself from philosophizing. I believe that Wittgenstein may have sensed in himself (and in philosophical discourse in general) disturbing traces of this proclivity to just obsessively manipulate his raw β -elements without proper thinking, and used his brilliant intellect and creativity to overcome it. Additionally, what Wittgenstein wrote in his last days about difficulty in distinguishing after awakening which was imagination and which was reality (OC, 643, 676) may be seen not only as an expression of feelings of a terminal medicated man but also as his powerful mind's verbalization of his

last vision of the human reality. His last written remark would acquire additional symbolic meaning when we think of the pervasiveness of (depicted in the highly popular *Matrix* trilogy) β -mentality (Cartwright, 2005) or when we take into consideration that analytic patients tend to voice their most essential feelings exactly at the end of the analytical session in a form of a last minute revelation.

To conclude, I mention that I think this brief demonstration of similarities in Wittgenstein's and modern psychoanalysts' work may show another significant common feature uniting early and late Wittgenstein. Namely, overcoming of the projective identification containment failure is not just an important feature uniting Wittgenstein's works from his earliest interests to his latest works, but a motive that runs through all his intellectual and emotional life. The need for further intellectual work on working through of deeper psychological conflicts could be explained by limitations of the classical Freudian model of the psyche, no matter how brilliant it was, as well as by the development of the humankind accompanied by actualization of problems from another level. For Wittgenstein, classic psychoanalysis was not an adequate therapeutic tool, but served as a catalyst of his creativity, a sort of the staircase that cannot be an end in itself, but without which it is impossible to move forward.

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Acting on One's Own: A Response to Eleonore Stump's Critique of the Flicker of Freedom

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Abstract

Eleonore Stump challenges "Flicker of Freedom" defenses of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities by noting that a) such defenses are committed to holding that doing an action on one's own is an action in its own right and b) that this commitment has a counterintuitive consequence. This paper challenges Stump's critique of Flicker Strategies on the grounds that she has mischaracterized the nature of the alternative possibilities involved in Flicker of Freedom defenses and that once the alternative possibilities are correctly characterized, the alleged counterintuitive consequence disappears.

In a now classic article, "Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," Harry Frankfurt challenged the widely held intuition that an agent ought to be held accountable for an action only if he or she could have avoided performing the action. (Frankfurt 1994) Dubbing this belief the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (henceforth PAP), Frankfurt constructed thought experiments detailing cases in which we are intuitively ready to hold an individual morally accountable even though she could not have avoided acting as she did. The type of scenario Frankfurt proposed involved an individual freely performing some action, unaware that should she have shown any hesitation in the performance of the action, there was a mechanism in place guaranteeing that she would do the action. Frankfurt's initial salvo inspired a barrage of defenses of PAP as well as numerous defenses of Frankfurt's strategy through the development of ever more nuanced Frankfurt-style counterexamples (henceforth FSCs) to PAP. This paper focuses on a particular FSC advanced by Eleonore Stump and her argument to show that one tempting strategy for responding to this FSC – the Flicker of Freedom Defense of PAP – ultimately runs afoul of our intuitions. After presenting an overview of Stump's argument below, I proceed to show that a Flicker of Freedom response to her FSC does not have the counterintuitive consequences she alleges.

1. Stump's FSC and the Flicker of Freedom.

The base version of Stump's FSC, which is a revision of one presented by John Martin Fisher (Fisher 1982, 26), runs as follows: a neurosurgeon, Grey, has fitted his patient, Jones, with a neuroscope that enables Grey to both detect and initiate firings of neurons in Jones's brain. Grey is particularly interested in making sure that Jones votes Republican in an upcoming election and has established that Jones's decision to vote Republican is uniquely correlated with the sequential firing of neurons a, b and c and that Jones's decision to vote Democratic is uniquely correlated with the sequential firing of neurons x, y and z. When the election arrives, Grey stands at the ready. Should he detect the firing of neuron x and thus the beginning of the neural sequence correlated with Jones's voting Democratic, Grey will immediately intervene to abort the neural sequence of x, y and z, and he will also initiate the neural sequence of a, b and c that correlates with Jones's decision to vote Republican. As it turns out, neuron x never fires, and the neural sequence of a, b, and c, fires in Jones's brain without any intervention from Grey. Given that it makes perfectly good sense to hold Jones accountable for his choice even though he could not have chosen otherwise, we have a counterexample to PAP.

One strategy that might be used in responding to this FSC is what John Martin Fisher calls, "The Flicker of Freedom" (Fisher 1994, 134). The contention is that this FSC fails because Jones really did have an alternative. Even though he could not have avoided voting Republican, he could have avoided making this choice "on his own" and without Grey's intervention. This is a real alternative, according to Flicker strategists, and thus the requirements of PAP are satisfied. Jones did have an alternative course of action; namely, not performing the action *on his own*. As a defense of PAP, however, Stump finds this response problematic. Specifically, she contends that treating *doing an action on one's own* as *an action in its own right* (i.e., an action that is distinct from its neurologically coerced counterpart) has a counterintuitive consequence.

2. Stump's Critique of Acting on One's Own as an Action in Its Own Right.

Stump contends that flicker of freedom attempts to salvage PAP are committed to both of the following principles:

- a. Doing W-on-his-own is something the victim does.
- b. Doing W-on-his-own is not identical to doing W.

In what follows, I will gloss the conjunction of these principles as the view that doing something on one's own is an action "in its own right." That the flicker strategy requires both these principles is evident, Stump contends, from the following considerations.

If doing W-on-his-own weren't an *action* the victim does, then there wouldn't be something the agent does in the actual sequence but omits to do in the alternative sequence, as the flicker of freedom proponents argue. And if doing W-on-his-own weren't different from doing W, then what the victim does in the actual and the alternative sequences would be identical, and the victim wouldn't have *alternative possibilities* available to him (Stump 1999, 314).

But once we recognize this – that the flicker strategy requires that doing something on one's own be treated as an action in its own right – we have lighted the way to a problem for flicker of freedom defenses of PAP. The problem, according to Stump, is that there is a counterintuitive consequence of contending that doing something on one's own is an action in its own right. To see why, she asks us to conceive of the reverse of a typical FSC. She asks us to conceive, that is, of a case in which an agent *is* coerced neurologically into choosing to perform some action. When we do so, says Stump, we find that treating doing an ac-

tion on one's own as an action in its own right leads to highly counterintuitive consequences.

In outlining Stump's case below, I will modify her FSC slightly. Since the intuitive case Stump makes trades heavily on issues of moral responsibility, I will construct a case having a clearer moral content so as to sharpen our intuitions; nonetheless, the case is – in all other relevant details – no different from Stump's FSC.

Imagine Lew and his wife, Samantha, both annoyed that their neighbors have planted a holly hedgerow which will be ablaze annually with red berries that simply don't do a thing for their orange shutters. Having taken what seemed like the only reasonable course, they've soaked the neighbor's shrubbery in gasoline and Lew now stands with a book of matches, deliberating about whether to ignite the offending hedgerow. In the past, Samantha might have worried about her husband changing his mind; however, she recently had his brain fitted with a choice chip, a computer chip that provides feedback on Lew's neurological state and that can also be used to induce the neurological sequences corresponding to specific choices. She activates the chip – with a tad too much perverse delight – with Lew's beloved television remote control. Should Samantha see the beginning of the neurological sequence correlated with Lew's choice not to act, she will enter channel 13 and the ghastly hedgerow will soon be history. In a typical FSC, of course, Lew is man enough for the job, Samantha never has to press 13, and the resulting action is one for which Lew is responsible even though he could not have avoided performing it. That is the typical FSC. But to see what's wrong with the flicker strategy, Stump suggests, we must imagine that the coercive alternative is triggered. On the basis of neurofeedback – scrolled across the bottom of channel 10 -- Samantha realizes that her husband is beginning to choose not to go through with the act; so, she presses channel 13 and thereby brings it about that Lew chooses to light the hedgerow.

What's instructive about this scenario, according to Stump, emerges when we reflect on the fact that a flicker theorist would have to maintain that the same two alternatives are available to Jones in this case as would be available if the scenario played out as a typical FSA. That is, even though the choice and hence action are externally triggered, the flicker theorist would have to say that Lew could have done otherwise. But this, Stump believes, is counterintuitive, for he "would be entirely within his rights in claiming, afterwards, that he couldn't have done otherwise than he did" (Stump 1999, 314). And he wouldn't be moved, she suggests, by our noting that there was an alternative possibility that consisted of his doing the action on his own.

3. A Response to Stump

While Stump takes it to be intuitively obvious that Lew would be right to respond as she has indicated, our intuitions on the matter are not as clear as she would have us believe. Of course, what Lew would be right to respond depends in part upon the context in which he is questioned about his action. The most likely context, I suggest, is one in which he is concerned with denying that he ought to be held responsible for the action that was performed. On this, I admit that Lew might well express his innocence by insisting that he couldn't have done otherwise. However, were the notion of the flicker of freedom explained to him,

he might well be content to say roughly the following: "Yes, I could have done otherwise in *that* sense. I could have set the hedgerow on fire on my own. But surely you can't fault me for me not pursuing that alternative course of action. We'd still have a burnt hedgerow, but we'd have the added evil that would have been my choosing to bring about some overt evil on my own. As it is," Lew insists, "at least it wasn't my flicker that led to the flame."

Moreover, Lew might suggest that when he insisted initially that he couldn't have done otherwise, he only meant to draw attention to the fact that there was no action he could have performed so as to prevent the burning of the hedgerow. He did not mean to suggest that there were absolutely no other actions he could have performed. There was, after all, one; i.e., doing the action on his own. It just so happened that it was less desirable, morally speaking, than the action that was actually performed, and, Lew would have rightly insisted, he can't be faulted for choosing the less evil of the only two alternatives before him.

To set the matter in clearer relief, we might alter the scenario so that the coerced action is something good. Perhaps Lew's brother is in desperate need of a bone marrow donor, and though he's a perfect match, Lew is in the process of deciding that he can't take time from his Wall Street schedule to help his youngest brother. Appalled when she sees the start of the relevant neurological sequence scrolling across the television screen, Samantha coerces him into making the charitable choice. Just as we were unwilling to assign Lew blame in the hedgerow incident, now we are unwilling to assign him any credit for helping out his brother. The charitable action is no less coerced than the inflammatory one; however, here again it's far from intuitively obvious that Lew had no other course of action. In fact, it seems counterintuitive to suggest that he couldn't have avoided doing what he did. If after the fact Lew were to complain that others were treating him coldly and ask what his accusers would have had him do differently, they would be justified in responding: "We'd have preferred that you do this on your own, without having to be forced; without making Samantha use that awful device." And that alternative, of course, is one that Jones would have been able to pursue and one for which he would have rightly received credit.

So, contrary to Stump's contention, our intuitions do not line up against treating doing an action on one's own as an action in its own right. In fact, when the situation is properly analyzed, our intuitions support the notion that doing an action on one's own is an action in its own right. Stump's argument, therefore, poses no problem for using a Flicker strategy to identify two alternative courses of action in the FSC she endorses.

Literature

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A list of correspondences between Wittgenstein Ts-310 and Ms-115_{ii}

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Abstract

The paper describes and includes a list which correlates remarks in the Wittgenstein *Nachlass* Ts-310 and its German translation / revision in the second part of Ms-115. It sketches some of the list's application areas and presents as one case the Wittgenstein Archives' ontology work. It also gives an introduction into the reference system ("sigla") of the Wittgenstein Archives' edition *Wittgenstein Source* and its URL convention.

1. Introduction

The following list correlates remarks in the Wittgenstein *Nachlass* Ts-310 and Ms-115 (second part).¹ In August 1936 in Skjolden, Norway, Wittgenstein started on a German translation, partly also revision, of the *Brown Book* which in 1934/35 he had dictated in English to his Cambridge students Francis Skinner and Alice Ambrose. This translation runs from page 118-292 in Ms-115: We refer to it in the following as Ms-115_{ii}.² On p. 292 the translation / revision is suddenly aborted, and it is never taken up again; by this time Wittgenstein had translated the text which in Ts-310 runs from page 1 to roughly 118.³ In the left column of the table below we list remarks from the English Ts-310, in the right column we have listed the corresponding remarks from Ms-115_{ii} in German.⁴

2. "Sigla"

The remarks are referred to by what we at the Wittgenstein Archives in Bergen call "Bemerkungen sigla". A "Bemerkung" or "remark"⁵ is the lowest Wittgensteinian text unit and is typically divided from the previous and the subsequent remark by one or more blank lines. Let's look at some examples:



Illustration 1: Facsimile of Ms-115,3 (CCPL BY-NC-SA) http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-115,3_f, reproduced by permission of the Master and Fellows of Trinity College, Oxford University Press and the University of Bergen

¹ Ts-310 was published in 1958 as the so-called Brown Book, the second part of Ms-115 was published in 1970 (in German only) as *Eine Philosophische Betrachtung*. Both *Nachlass* items are included in the Bergen Electronic Edition as well as on Wittgenstein Source.

² This way of identifying and separating different parts of a Wittgenstein *Nachlass* item is introduced and described in more detail in Pichler 1994: 105ff.

³ Ts-310 has in total 168 pages. About the moment and significance of the disruption on page 292 of Ms-115, see more in Pichler 2004. There it was assumed that Wittgenstein had indeed used Ts-310 as source for his translation / revision. Arthur Gibson (oral communication) has shown that it may rather have been a handwritten notebook by Francis Skinner which today is in the Skinner Archives in Cambridge (see Gibson 2010).

⁴ Part of the work leading up to this paper has been made possible through the EU projects Agora and DM2E (see http://wab.uib.no/wab_agora.page and http://wab.uib.no/wab_dm2e.page) and the Bergen Meltzer foundation. We want to thank Helle Nyvold, Sarah Szeltner and Sebastian Greve for comments.

⁵ Here we use the two synonymously.

The remark starting “Ich sehe, was ich sehe ...” has been assigned by us the siglum (name) *Ms-115,3[4]*. The convention for naming the Bemerkungen is the following:¹ proceed from higher to lower granularity – thus start with (1) the *Nachlass* item in which the Bemerkung is found, then go to (2) the page on which it occurs, then go to (3) the text block(s) or segment(s) of which the remark is composed. The first part, the *Nachlass* item, is identified through a prefix “Ms-” for manuscripts or “Ts-” for typescripts, respectively, followed by the number given to the *Nachlass* item by von Wright in his catalogue (1982). For example, “Ms-115” refers to the *Nachlass* item which in the von Wright catalogue has the number 115 and is handwritten, thus a manuscript. In our case here, the page name “3” is derived from Wittgenstein’s own pagination, but in other cases page names may be derived from the librarian’s or the Wittgenstein Archives’ pagination. In the siglum, the page name follows immediately after the name for the *Nachlass* item, separated by a comma: “Ms-115,3” is then the page in Ms-115 which has the page name “3”. But this is not all: the reference system continues down to *Bemerkungen*-level and gives each single Wittgenstein Bemerkung a unique and telling name. “Ms-115,3[4]” is then exactly that Bemerkung on p. 3 of Ms-115 which is composed of the *fourth* text block on that page, counting from top to bottom. Often a Bemerkung goes across a page break; also this is mirrored in the siglum. The Bemerkung which immediately follows after is Ms-115,3[5]et4[1]: it is composed of the fifth text block on p. 3 and the first text block on p. 4.²

3. Wittgenstein Source

On *Wittgenstein Source*, each Bemerkung appears in a specific version – currently either normalized or diplomatic or facsimile. [http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-115,3\[4\]](http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-115,3[4]) alone will only lead to a blank page, while [http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-115,3\[4\]_n](http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-115,3[4]_n) links to the normalized, [http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-115,3\[4\]_d](http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-115,3[4]_d) to the diplomatic, and [http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-115,3\[4\]_f](http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-115,3[4]_f) to the facsimile version of Ms-115,3[4]. In the list below, only the siglum name is rendered, but any of the remarks referred to can be inspected on *Wittgenstein Source* by applying the above mentioned URL conventions. For example, entering [http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-115,291\[2\]_n](http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-115,291[2]_n) will bring one straight to the normalized version of Ms-115,291[2], thus the remark beginning “Was dieses Experiment aber tut ...”. *Wittgenstein Source* contains 5,000 pages of the Wittgenstein *Nachlass* and is entirely organized around the remarks found on these pages as their basic units.³ In total, *Wittgenstein Source* contains about 9,600 remarks or Bemerkungen, and the entire *Nachlass*, as edited in the *Berger Electronic Edition*, about 54,000.

4. The list

The list should be easy to understand: the remark named in the Ms-115_i entry column contains a German translation, sometimes also a further revision, of the remark

named in the Ts-310 entry column. One example of a correlation between Ts-310 and Ms-115_i is the following:

Augustine, in describing his learning of language, says that he was taught to speak by learning the names of things. It is clear that whoever says this has in mind the way in which a child learns such words as “man”, “sugar”, “table”, etc. He does not primarily think of such words as “today”, “not”, “but”, “perhaps”. (http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ts-310,1[1]_n)	Das Lernen der menschlichen Sprache beschreibt Augustinus so: Augustinus beschreibt das Lernen der menschlichen Sprache so: (Confessiones I.8) “... cum ... appellabant rem aliquam et cum secundum eam vocem corpus ad aliquid movebant, videbam et tenebam hoc ab eis vocari rem illam, quod sonabant, cum eam vellent ostendere”. (http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-115,118[2]_n)
	Wer das Lernen der Sprache es so beschreibt, denkt vorerst an eine Klasse von Wörtern, wie etwa ‘Mann’, ‘Brot’, ‘Tisch’, & erst in zweiter Linie nur entfernt an Wörter, wie ‘nicht’, ‘aber’, ‘vielleicht’, ‘heute’. (http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-115,118[3]_n)

In this case, the text of the remark in Ts-310 correlates with the text of two remarks in Ms-115_i. This is not an exception. If a Ts-310 remark has more than one correlating Ms-115_i remarks, or the other way around, this is indicated in the list by the repetition of the siglum of the remark which has several correlate remarks. Examples include Ts-310,43[2]et44[1]et45[1] to which several remarks in Ms-115_i correspond, or Ms-115,222[4] where the reverse is the case.

Sometimes it becomes difficult to decide where the correspondence starts or ends. Whenever we found too little or no correlation, we put a dash; this can mean that there is no correspondence at all, or that the discussion develops considerably differently. A substantial example is the discussion of reading which in Ms-115_i is much more extensive than in Ts-310 (see Ms-115,205[4]et206[1] and those following). Some of the Ms-115_i remarks do not occur in Ts-310, but were previously drafted in Ms-152.⁴ These remarks from Ms-152 could be included in a third column between the Ts-310 and Ms-115_i columns, but we have not done so here.

We consider this list useful to anyone who wants to pursue Wittgenstein’s development of ideas or texts in the period 1934-1936, just before he embarked on his “Philosophische Untersuchungen” proper. It will also be useful for a study of the Wittgensteinian text and thought genesis as a whole, or for studying his English and German terminology side by side, or for a study of his translation practices from English to German, to mention just a few possible areas of application. One exciting field of using the list is its inclusion in Wittgenstein ontology work. In the Wittgenstein Archives’ Wittgenstein ontology (see Pichler & Zöllner-Weber 2012), each *Nachlass* remark will eventually be connected to other remarks with regard to their text genetic relations, cross-references, publication in the so-called “works”, common points of reference (persons, works, topics, dates, ...), as well as to secondary literature and other “external” resources. In this way, these nodes will become multi-directionally connected with each other, and the user will be able to access the “Wittgenstein do-

¹ This convention was adopted from the HyperNietzsche project (see D’Iorio 2002).

² Ts-310 and Ms-115_i are special cases in regard to their division since they lack blank lines to structure the text into remarks. In these cases, as well as for some other *Nachlass* items, we have used paragraphs as our unit of reference. In very few cases where no paragraph division was available (e.g. Ms-139a, the so-called “Lecture on Ethics”, http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-139a_n), divisions had to be made according to theme changes in text.

³ Note that we have experienced problems with running *Wittgenstein Source* in Internet Explorer. It is tested for Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome and Safari.

⁴ Also Ms-152 is available on Wittgenstein Source; for the normalized version go to http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/Ms-152_n.

main” using any of the nodes as point of departure – be it a Bemerkung or a person or a work referred to by Wittgenstein. Today a part of this ontology, produced with *Wittgenstein Source* as its main focus, is already available for download at http://wab.uib.no/cost-a32_philospace/wittgenstein.owl. It can be installed in ontology browsers such as SwickyNotes (<http://www.swickynotes.org>). Its structure can be studied in depth in ontology editors such as Protégé (<http://protege.stanford.edu/>). The screenshots below are from SwickyNotes; the first shows the relations within Ms-115,118[2], among them also the relation to its earlier English version (“hasOtherVersion”) in Ts-310,1[1], while the second has the Ts-310 version in the center of focus.⁵



Illustration 2: Screenshot from SwickyNotes graph with Ms-115,118[2] in the center of focus



Illustration 3: Screenshot from SwickyNotes graph with Ts-310,1[1] in the center of focus and enlarged graph view

The list:

–	Ms-115,118[1]
Ts-310,1[1]	Ms-115,118[2]
Ts-310,1[1]	Ms-115,118[3]
Ts-310,1[2]et2[1]	Ms-115,118[4]
Ts-310,1[2]et2[1]	Ms-115,118[5]et119[1]et119[2]
Ts-310,2[2]et3[1]et3a[1]et4[1]	Ms-115,119[3]et120[1]
Ts-310,2[2]et3[1]et3a[1]et4[1]	Ms-115,120[2]
Ts-310,2[2]et3[1]et3a[1]et4[1]	Ms-115,120[3]et121[1]
Ts-310,4[2]et5[1]	Ms-115,121[2]
–	Ms-115,121[3]
Ts-310,5[2]	Ms-115,121[4]et122[1]
Ts-310,5[2]	Ms-115,122[2]
Ts-310,5[3]et6[1]	Ms-115,122[3]et124[1]
Ts-310,5[3]et6[1]	Ms-115,124[2]
Ts-310,5[3]et6[1]	Ms-115,124[3]
Ts-310,6[2]et7[1]	Ms-115,124[4]et125[1]
Ts-310,7[2]	Ms-115,125[2]
Ts-310,7[3]et8[1]	Ms-115,125[3]et126[1]
Ts-310,8[2]	Ms-115,126[2]
Ts-310,8[2]	Ms-115,126[3]
Ts-310,8[2]	Ms-115,126[4]
Ts-310,8[2]	Ms-115,126[5]et127[1]
Ts-310,8[3]et9[1]	Ms-115,127[2]
Ts-310,9[2]et10[1]	Ms-115,127[3]et128[1]
Ts-310,9[2]et10[1]	Ms-115,128[2]
Ts-310,9[2]et10[1]	Ms-115,128[3]et128[4]
Ts-310,9[2]et10[1]	Ms-115,128[5]
Ts-310,9[2]et10[1]	Ms-115,128[6]et129[1]
Ts-310,10[2]et11[1]	Ms-115,129[2]
Ts-310,10[2]et11[1]	Ms-115,129[3]
Ts-310,10[2]et11[1]	Ms-115,129[4]
Ts-310,11[2]	Ms-115,129[4]
Ts-310,11[2]	Ms-115,129[5]
Ts-310,11[3]et12[1]et13[1]et14[1]	Ms-115,129[6]et130[1]
Ts-310,11[3]et12[1]et13[1]et14[1]	Ms-115,130[2]et131[1]
Ts-310,11[3]et12[1]et13[1]et14[1]	Ms-115,131[2]
–	Ms-115,131[3]
Ts-310,11[3]et12[1]et13[1]et14[1]	Ms-115,131[4]
Ts-310,11[3]et12[1]et13[1]et14[1]	Ms-115,132[1]
Ts-310,11[3]et12[1]et13[1]et14[1]	Ms-115,132[2]
Ts-310,11[3]et12[1]et13[1]et14[1]	Ms-115,132[3]
Ts-310,11[3]et12[1]et13[1]et14[1]	Ms-115,132[4]et133[1]

⁵ For a short overview of the ontology's classes and relations and for further application samples, see a presentation by Alois Pichler from January 2013, available at <http://www.slideshare.net/DM2E/berlin-16161631>.

Ts-310,14[2]et15[1]et16[1]	Ms-115,133[2]	Ts-310,31[2]	Ms-115,151b[4]
Ts-310,14[2]et15[1]et16[1]	Ms-115,134[1]	Ts-310,31[3]et32[1]	Ms-115,151b[5]
Ts-310,16[2]et17[1]	Ms-115,134[2]et135[1]et136[1]	Ts-310,31[3]et32[1]	Ms-115,151b[6]et152[1]
Ts-310,17[2]et18[1]	Ms-115,136[2]	Ts-310,32[2]	Ms-115,152[2]et153[1]
Ts-310,18[2]et19[1]	Ms-115,136[3]et137[1]	Ts-310,32[3]et33[1]	Ms-115,153[2]
Ts-310,19[2]	Ms-115,137[2]et138[1]	Ts-310,33[2]	Ms-115,153[3]
Ts-310,19[3]et20[1]	Ms-115,138[2]	Ts-310,33[2]	Ms-115,153[4]et154[1]
Ts-310,20[2]et21[1]	Ms-115,138[3]et139[1]	Ts-310,33[2]	Ms-115,154[2]
–	Ms-115,138[3]et139[1]	Ts-310,33[3]	Ms-115,154[3]
Ts-310,20[2]et21[1]	Ms-115,139[2]	Ts-310,33[4]et34[1]	Ms-115,154[4]et155[1]
Ts-310,20[2]et21[1]	Ms-115,139[3]	Ts-310,34[2]et35[1]	–
Ts-310,20[2]et21[1]	Ms-115,139[4]et140[1]	–	Ms-115,155[2]
–	Ms-115,139[4]et140[1]	Ts-310,35[2]	Ms-115,155[3]et156[1]
Ts-310,20[2]et21[1]	Ms-115,140[2]et140[3]	Ts-310,35[3]et36[1]	Ms-115,155[3]et156[1]
Ts-310,21[2]et22[1]	Ms-115,140[4]	Ts-310,36[2]	Ms-115,156[2]et157[1]
Ts-310,21[2]et22[1]	Ms-115,140[5]et141[1]	Ts-310,36[3]et37[1]	Ms-115,157[2]
Ts-310,21[2]et22[1]	Ms-115,141[2]	Ts-310,36[3]et37[1]	Ms-115,157[3]
Ts-310,22[2]et23[1]	Ms-115,141[3]et142[1]	Ts-310,36[3]et37[1]	Ms-115,157[4]et158[1]
Ts-310,22[2]et23[1]	Ms-115,142[2]et143[1]	Ts-310,36[3]et37[1]	Ms-115,158[2]
Ts-310,23[2]et24[1]	Ms-115,143[2]	Ts-310,37[2]et38[1]	Ms-115,158[3]et159[1]
Ts-310,24[2]	Ms-115,143[2]	Ts-310,38[2]	Ms-115,158[3]et159[1]
–	Ms-115,143[3]et144[1]et145[1]	–	Ms-115,158[3]et159[1]
Ts-310,24[3]et25[1]et26[1]et27[1]	Ms-115,145[2]	Ts-310,38[3]et39[1]	Ms-115,159[2]et160[1]
Ts-310,24[3]et25[1]et26[1]et27[1]	Ms-115,145[3]	Ts-310,38[3]et39[1]	Ms-115,160[2]
Ts-310,24[3]et25[1]et26[1]et27[1]	Ms-115,145[4]	Ts-310,38[3]et39[1]	Ms-115,160[3]et161[1]
Ts-310,24[3]et25[1]et26[1]et27[1]	Ms-115,145[5]et146[1]	Ts-310,39[2]et40[1]et41[1]	Ms-115,161[2]et162[1]et163[1]
Ts-310,24[3]et25[1]et26[1]et27[1]	Ms-115,146[2]	Ts-310,41[2]et42[1]	Ms-115,163[2]et164[1]
Ts-310,24[3]et25[1]et26[1]et27[1]	Ms-115,146[3]	Ts-310,42[2]et43[1]	Ms-115,164[2]
Ts-310,24[3]et25[1]et26[1]et27[1]	Ms-115,146[4]	Ts-310,42[2]et43[1]	Ms-115,164[3]et165[1]
Ts-310,24[3]et25[1]et26[1]et27[1]	Ms-115,146[5]	Ts-310,43[2]et44[1]et45[1]	Ms-115,165[2]
Ts-310,24[3]et25[1]et26[1]et27[1]	Ms-115,146[6]et147[1]	Ts-310,43[2]et44[1]et45[1]	Ms-115,165[3]et166[1]et167[1]
Ts-310,24[3]et25[1]et26[1]et27[1]	Ms-115,147[2]et148[1]	–	Ms-115,165[3]et166[1]et167[1]
Ts-310,24[3]et25[1]et26[1]et27[1]	Ms-115,148[2]	–	Ms-115,167[2]
Ts-310,27[2]et28[1]et29[1]	Ms-115,148[3]et149[1]	Ts-310,43[2]et44[1]et45[1]	Ms-115,167[3]et168[1]
Ts-310,29[2]	Ms-115,150[1]	–	Ms-115,168[2]
Ts-310,29[2]	Ms-115,150[2]	–	Ms-115,168[3]
Ts-310,29[3]et30[1]	Ms-115,150[3]et151a[1]	Ts-310,43[2]et44[1]et45[1]	Ms-115,168[4]
Ts-310,30[2]et31[1]	Ms-115,150[3]et151a[1]	Ts-310,45[2]et46[1]et47[1]	Ms-115,168[5]et169[1]
Ts-310,30[2]et31[1]	Ms-115,151a[2]	Ts-310,45[2]et46[1]et47[1]	Ms-115,169[2]
Ts-310,30[2]et31[1]	Ms-115,151a[3]	Ts-310,45[2]et46[1]et47[1]	Ms-115,169[3]et170[1]
Ts-310,30[2]et31[1]	Ms-115,151a[4]et151b[1]	Ts-310,47[2]	Ms-115,170[2]
Ts-310,30[2]et31[1]	Ms-115,151b[2]	Ts-310,47[2]	Ms-115,170[3]et171[1]
Ts-310,30[2]et31[1]	Ms-115,151b[3]	Ts-310,47[3]	Ms-115,170[3]et171[1]

Ts-310,47[4]et48[1]	Ms-115,171[2]	Ts-310,62[3]	Ms-115,189[2]
Ts-310,47[4]et48[1]	Ms-115,171[3]	Ts-310,62[4]	Ms-115,190[1]
Ts-310,48[2]	Ms-115,171[4]et172[1]	Ts-310,62[5]et63[1]	Ms-115,190[2]
Ts-310,48[3]	Ms-115,171[4]et172[1]	Ts-310,62[5]et63[1]	Ms-115,190[3]
–	Ms-115,171[4]et172[1]	Ts-310,62[5]et63[1]	Ms-115,190[4]et191[1]
Ts-310,48[4]	–	–	Ms-115,190[4]et191[1]
Ts-310,48[5]et49[1]	–	Ts-310,62[5]et63[1]	Ms-115,191[2]
Ts-310,49[2]et50[1]	Ms-115,172[2]et173[1]	Ts-310,63[2]et64[1]	Ms-115,191[3]et192[1]
Ts-310,49[2]et50[1]	Ms-115,173[2]	Ts-310,64[2]	Ms-115,192[2]
Ts-310,50[2]	Ms-115,173[3]et174[1]et175[1]	Ts-310,64[3]et65[1]	Ms-115,192[3]et193[1]
–	Ms-115,173[3]et174[1]et175[1]	Ts-310,65[2]et66[1]	Ms-115,193[2]et194[1]
Ts-310,50[2]	Ms-115,175[2]	Ts-310,65[2]et66[1]	Ms-115,194[2]
Ts-310,50[2]	Ms-115,175[3]	Ts-310,66[2]et67[1]	Ms-115,195[1]
Ts-310,50[3]et51[1]et52[1]et53[1]	Ms-115,175[4]et176[1]et177[1]	Ts-310,67[2]et68[1]et69[1]	Ms-115,195[2]et196[1]et197[1]
–	Ms-115,175[4]et176[1]et177[1]	Ts-310,69[2]et70[1]	Ms-115,197[2]et198[1]
Ts-310,50[3]et51[1]et52[1]et53[1]	Ms-115,177[2]	Ts-310,69[2]et70[1]	Ms-115,198[2]
Ts-310,50[3]et51[1]et52[1]et53[1]	Ms-115,177[3]	Ts-310,70[2]	Ms-115,198[3]et199[1]
Ts-310,50[3]et51[1]et52[1]et53[1]	Ms-115,177[4]et178[1]	Ts-310,71[1]et72[1]	Ms-115,199[2]et200[1]
Ts-310,50[3]et51[1]et52[1]et53[1]	Ms-115,178[2]	Ts-310,71[1]et72[1]	Ms-115,200[2]
Ts-310,50[3]et51[1]et52[1]et53[1]	Ms-115,178[3]	Ts-310,71[1]et72[1]	Ms-115,200[3]et201[1]
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Vom Prototractatus zum Tractatus

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Abstract

Für den Übergang von *Prototractatus* zum *Tractatus* im Frühjahr bzw. Sommer 1918 wird ein Vorschlag unterbreitet, der davon ausgeht, daß Wittgenstein in ähnlicher Weise wie später beim Übergang von TS 208 zu TS 209 ein Typoskript diktiert und dieses dann zur Revision des Texts in Streifen geschnitten und neu angeordnet hat. Damit konnte die Rekonstruktion einer Übergangsfassung erarbeitet werden, die die Umordnung der Sätze aus dem *Prototractatus* und die Einfügung der aus dem Überarbeitungsteil von MS 104 bekannten Sätze sowie den Übergang von PT-Nummern zu TLP-Nummern als einheitlichen Revisionsprozeß nachvollziehen erlaubt.

Die im Jahr 1965 entdeckte Handschrift Wittgensteins MS 104 enthält neben dem *Prototractatus* (bis S. 103) auf weiteren 19 Seiten noch einen Überarbeitungsteil mit 79 Bemerkungen und das fast wortidentische Vorwort des *Tractatus*. Von diesen Bemerkungen finden sich 71 (beinahe) unverändert im *Tractatus* wieder.

Der *Prototractatus* gilt als selbständige Frühfassung des *Tractatus*, in der im wesentlichen schon alle Gedanken enthalten sind, die aber doch in ihrer Numerierung und Textanordnung so weit sich von den im Sommer 1918 entstandenen Typoskripten (TS 204 bzw. TS 202¹) unterscheidet, daß erst letztere als die ersten eigentlichen Fassungen des *Tractatus* gelten. Die Fertigstellung des *Prototractatus* wird mit Frühjahr bis Sommer 1918 datiert. Der Überarbeitungsteil nimmt deutlich eine intermediäre Stellung ein, indem er, wenn auch vielfach in neuen Formulierungen, auf konkrete Sätze des *Prototractatus* bezogen ist, bzw. Ergänzungen vornimmt, die in der Folge dann der *Tractatus*-fassung entsprechen. Auf S. 103 von MS 104 findet sich die interessante Fußnote, daß die Numerierung sich auf die "Zahlen in der Korrektur" bezieht und nicht mehr auf das bis dorthin als Referenzsystem geltende Nummernsystem (PT-Nummern). Mit dem Wort "Korrektur" kann natürlich abstrakt die Revision als Prozeß angesprochen sein, oder aber ein physisches Korrektorexemplar, etwa ein geordnetes Typoskript, an und in dem die Umarbeitung durchgeführt wurde. Die Annahme eines solchen Typoskripts als Zwischenfassung ist in jedem Fall spekulativ, da sich keines erhalten hat und auch keine konkreten Hinweise auf seine Existenz vorliegen.

Es gibt im Wesentlichen zwei Probleme beim Übergang von *Prototractatus* zum *Tractatus*. Erstens die erhebliche Komplexität der Zuordnung von PT-Nummern zu TLP-Nummern, die Wittgenstein bewältigt haben muß. Einen Eindruck davon vermitteln die umfangreichen Vergleichstabellen im Anhang von Geschowski 2001. Das zweite Problem liegt in der Kürze des Überarbeitungsteils selbst, gemessen am *Tractatus*. Man fragt sich, warum sind gerade diese Bemerkungen handschriftlich festgehalten worden und warum nicht auch andere Änderungen und Ergänzungen.

Bisherige Erklärungen

Ein direktes Diktat von TS 204/202 aus MS 104 scheint ausgeschlossen, da die Handschrift den *Prototractatus* nicht in geordneter Form enthält, sondern die Bemerkun-

gen in einer auf den ersten Blick wirren Anordnung festhält, die letztlich der Reihenfolge des Entstehungsprozesses entspricht. Ein Diktat hätte also ein fortwährendes Hin- und Herblättern erfordert und zudem noch die geänderte Nummernstruktur berücksichtigen müssen. Die Forschung ist deshalb immer schon davon ausgegangen, daß Wittgenstein mit Paralleltextrn in geordneter Darstellung gearbeitet hat. Daß diese geordnete Parallelstruktur auch bei der entscheidenden Umarbeitung eine Rolle gespielt haben wird, liegt nahe.

Über den konkreten Ablauf der Überarbeitung gibt es unterschiedliche Auffassungen. Während von Wright von einem Typoskript vor Korrektur (TS_{v,k}) ausgeht, an dem die Änderungen vorgenommen wurden ("changing the formulations, grouping remarks which carried separate numbers under one single number, rearranging the order in places" von Wright 1971 S. 8), diente nach McGuinness das Typoskript dazu, die korrigierte Fassung selbst festzuhalten, es wäre demnach ein Typoskript nach Korrektur gewesen (TS_{n,k}). Dieses "would contain the final *Tractatus* less the propositions shown in the last pages of Bodl. 103–121 as additions to the 'Korrektur'" (McGuinness 2002 S. 281). Im Übrigen hält er diese Fassung für nicht rekonstruierbar. Bazzocchi kritisiert beide Auffassungen und argumentiert dafür, daß die Überarbeitung allein an einer schon vorhandenen Parallelstruktur vollzogen wurde, die er als nach PT-Nummern geordnete Loseblattsammlung deutet (Bazzocchi 2006). Sein Hauptargument ist, daß "we would need to imagine new restructurings and complex re-writings taking place for each 'addition', or to suppose that Wittgenstein had left holes and gaps, suspended materials and provisional versions" (Bazzocchi 2009, S. 48). Hingegen sei eine Loseblattfassung eine effiziente Form der Textrepräsentation nicht nur zur Komposition, sondern auch zur Restrukturierung.

Damit ist auch die Frage der Reihenfolge der Umarbeitungsschritte angesprochen. Der Revisionsprozeß gliedert sich in Umordnungen, Ergänzungen, Reformulierungen, Textkorrekturen und Neunummerierung – aber in welcher Reihenfolge? Michael Potter vertritt in seinem jüngsten Aufsatz die Auffassung, daß nach Herstellung eines eigenen *Prototractatus*-Typoskripts (nach seiner Variante also ein TS_{v,k}), vermutlich entstanden im März 1918 bei einem Aufenthalt in Wien, die Revision damit begonnen habe "to remodel the numbering [...] This phase of work does not seem to have involved adding propositions but only revisions to the typescript" (Potter 2013, S. 31). Erst in einem zweiten Schritt (nach Rückkehr von der Front und neuerlichem Zugang zu seinen Manuskripten) wäre Wittgenstein dazu übergegangen neue Sätze hinzuzufügen und diese ("curiously", wie Potter vermerkt) im MS 104 festzuhalten.

¹ TS 202 ist der Durchschlag von TS 204 und bildete in weiter korrigierter und ergänzter Gestalt die Druckvorlage für die beiden Publikationen 1922; dazu Grasshoff/Lampert 2004.

Allen Erklärungsansätzen gemeinsam ist, daß der Prozeß mit dem Diktat von TS 204/202 seinen Abschluß gefunden hat und daß die Reihenfolge der Bemerkungen im Überarbeitungsteil von MS 104 etwas über die Abfolge im Revisionsprozeß aussagt, also als Leitfaden für jeden Rekonstruktionsversuch dienen muß.

Alternativvorschlag

Der jetzt zu unterbreitende Vorschlag zur Rekonstruktion des Übergangs greift ebenfalls die Annahme des Diktats eines geordneten *Prototractatus*-Typoskript im Frühjahr 1918 auf. Allerdings läßt sich der darauffolgende Revisionsprozeß am besten dadurch erklären, daß dieses TS_{v,k} am Beginn mit jenem am Ende der Umarbeitung identifiziert wird (TS_{v,k=n,k}). Dies ist dann möglich, wenn man annimmt, daß Wittgenstein den maschineschriebenen Text in Streifen geschnitten und die so entstehenden Textblöcke in neu angeordneter Reihenfolge fixiert hat (z.B. durch Einkleben in ein Schreibbuch). Diese Technik ist bekanntlich für die spätere Zeit verbürgt und von ihm z.B. beim Übergang von TS 208 zu TS 209 benutzt worden (Pichler 1994 Kap. 2.1: "TS 209 besteht also aus Zetteln, die aus einem Durchschlag von TS 208 ausgeschnitten wurden, dann neu geordnet und in ein Kassabuch eingeklebt wurden").

Eine solche – zugegeben sehr simple – These müßte dann vertretbar sein, wenn (1) bekannte Umstände ein solches Verfahren nicht ausschließen, (2) der Textbefund (insbesondere die Abfolge der Bemerkungen in MS 104) damit nicht unvereinbar ist und (3) der Umarbeitungsprozeß kohärenter erklärbar ist als in den Alternativvorschlägen².

Der Vorschlag erklärt jedenfalls das Schicksal des *Prototractatus*-Typoskripts, das bei der Umarbeitung zerstört wurde und den Umstand, daß nur bestimmte Sätze im MS 104 festgehalten werden müssen, d.s. einerseits reine Ergänzungen, dann Sätze, die so weitgehende Korrekturen erfahren, daß eine Neuformulierung einfacher zu handhaben ist, als handschriftlich korrigierte Streifen und zuletzt sind es grundlegende strukturelle Revisionen, die im Überarbeitungsteil von MS 104 ausgearbeitet werden.

Die Reihenfolge der Arbeitsschritte wäre demnach die gewesen, daß nach dem Zerschneiden und Umordnen des teilkorrigierten Texts, sowie notwendigen Ergänzungen, die Neunummerierung zumindest vorläufig abschnittsweise den Schlußpunkt gesetzt hätte, wobei man davon ausgehen darf, daß Wittgenstein sich von vorne nach hinten durch seinen Text gearbeitet hat. Das Wiederherstellen einer konsistenten Numerierung am jeweiligen Ende von Überarbeitungsabschnitten stellt einen vergleichsweise einfachen Vorgang dar, da die neue Textanordnung ja fertig vorliegt – die Berücksichtigung komplexer Konkordanztabellen zwischen PT-Nummern und TLP-Nummern entfällt völlig. Zugleich läßt sich das System straffen, denn ein Hauptzweck der PT-Nummern fällt jetzt fort, nämlich der, für eine eindeutig identifizierbare Position jeder Bemerkung während der Kompositionsphase zu sorgen (Mayer 1993 S. 113).

Über gerade die konkrete Art und Weise, wie in der Umarbeitung Blöcke von Sätzen unter einer TLP-Nummer zusammengefaßt werden, spricht gegen Bazzocchis Annahme, die Loseblattsammlung sei auch das geeignete Instrument für die Revision gewesen. Denn diese Zusammenfassungen orientieren sich, wie man sehen kann, sehr oft genau an der entstandenen Streifenstruktur. Diese bilden quasi natürliche Einheiten im Text. V.a. kurze Textschnipsel mit zwei oder drei PT-Sätzen werden oft unter einer Nummer zusammengefaßt. Eine Umordnung eines solchen Blocks von mehreren Sätzen in einer Loseblattsammlung (bei der konsequent ein numerierter Satz einem Blatt im Stoß entspricht) hätte diese Sätze nach dem Transfer letztlich wieder isoliert im Gesamtstoß aufgehen lassen; mit der Streichung der PT-Nummer wäre für diese Sätze aber nicht mehr der Ort ihrer genauen Einordnung in den Stoß abzulesen gewesen. Wittgenstein hätte zusätzliche Markierungen anbringen müssen (Satz a zu Nr. n.nnn, Satz b zu Nummer n.nnn usw.).

Als weiteres Indiz für die Methode des Zerschneidens kann man die Mehrfachverwendung von einzelnen PT-Sätzen anführen und die Weise, wie manche Sätze in andere Hauptabschnitte transferiert werden.

Spätestens mit Satz 3.1 wird klar, daß Wittgenstein mit einer bloßen Umordnung von Abschnittsfragmenten und gelegentlicher Textkorrektur allein nicht das Auslangen findet. Abschnitt 3 und 5 zeigen eine tiefgreifende Restrukturierung im ganzen Aufbau. Die Hauptdezimalen 3.1, 3.2 und 3.3 (aber auch 5.2, 5.3, 5.5) werden völlig neu formuliert. Die dafür herangezogenen Vorlagen fallen i.d.R. fort. Manche der Textstreifen werden aus ihrem ursprünglichen Kontext entfernt und an anderer Stelle integriert. Beispiele dafür sind PT 4.1011 (kommt zu 3.221), PT 4.102274 (wird 3.315) oder PT 5.4102 (wird 4.211). Es ist dabei eine Tendenz erkennbar das Material des PT möglichst vollständig zu verwerten. Im Zuge der Auflösung des umfangreichen Blocks von 34 Eingangsmerkungen zu Hauptsatz 5 (also PT-Sätze vom Typ „5.00“) kommt es zu einer regelrechten Diaspora dieser Bemerkungen über drei Abschnitte hinweg: wir finden sie in 3.316, 3.317, 4.1252, 4.1273, 5.21, 5.232ff., 5.25ff. und 5.501. Wittgenstein verschiebt auch die korrespondierenden neun Eingangsmerkungen zum Hauptsatz 6 (PT-Sätze vom Typ „6.00“) in einen anderen Abschnitt (5.54ff.). Allerdings bleibt ihre innere Anordnung in diesem Fall erhalten.

Bemerkenswert ist das Schicksal der Sätze PT 5.004 – 5.0053. Diese betreffen die Festsetzung der Satzvariablen und sind als Vorlage für die Neufassung von 5.501 deutlich erkennbar. Wittgenstein verwendet aber den entsprechenden Textstreifen noch ein zweites Mal zur Gestaltung jener Passagen im Abschnitt 3, mit denen die "Satzvariable" erstmals im *Tractatus* eingeführt wird.

In ähnlicher Weise kommt es zu einer Vorverlegung der vier Sätze PT 5.4101 – 5.4103, die den Elementarsatz betreffen, als Anmerkung zu den Sätzen 4.21 bzw. 4.22.

Die Umarbeitung ist also kein simpler linearer Prozeß, sondern erfordert gelegentlich die Rückkehr zu früheren schon umgearbeiteten Abschnitten, die so neuerlich modifiziert werden.

² Die hier vorgebrachte Vermutung beruht nicht auf abstrakten Überlegungen, sondern ist das Resultat einer konkret durchgeführten Textrekonstruktion. Auf der Grundlage einer vollständigen Neutranskription sowohl von MS 104 als auch von TS 202 wurde in einem ersten Schritt ein hypothetisches PT-Typoskript rekonstruiert (unter der Annahme, dieselbe Schreibmaschine mit ihrem eingeschränkten Zeichensatz und dieselbe Schreibkraft wären zur Verfügung gestanden wie im Falle des Diktats von TS 204/202). In einem zweiten Schritt wurde eine hypothetische Zwischenfassung mit umgeordneten Textblöcken (virtuellen Textstreifen) des hypothetischen PT-Typoskripts erstellt, in die Korrekturen (in der Art, wie sie aus TS 202 bekannt sind), darunter insbesondere jene aus dem Überarbeitungsteil von MS 104, so eingefügt wurden, daß ein abermaliges Diktat genau zur noch unkorrigierten Fassung von TS 204/202 führt.

Die Umarbeitung im Detail

Aus Platzgründen kann hier nur auf eine Passage im Detail eingegangen werden, die Sätze 3.3 – 3.318, in denen das Kontextprinzip eingeführt wird. Es ist zugleich derjenige Abschnitt, der die größte Komplexität in der ganzen Umarbeitung aufweist. Es lassen sich sechs für den Entstehungszusammenhang bedeutsame Textschichten ausmachen. Mit dem Beispiel soll belegt werden, daß eine Rekonstruktion nicht nur durchführbar ist, sondern den Ergebnissen auch interpretatorische Relevanz zukommt.

Es ist schon früher bemerkt worden, daß mit 3.3 das Kontextprinzip ("Nur der Satz hat Sinn; nur im Zusammenhange des Satzes hat ein Name Bedeutung.") eine starke Aufwertung erfährt (Kremer 1997). PT 3.202 enthält zwar denselben Satz, aber auf vergleichsweise niedrigerer Stufe als eine von vielen Anmerkungen zu PT 3.2 und nicht im Rang einer Hauptdezimale.

Bei der 1. Textschicht handelt es sich um Textstreifen des *Prototractatus*-Typoskripts, von denen letztlich aber nur PT 3.2017 (als 3.318) direkt verwendet wird. Die Sätze PT 3.20121, 3.20122 und 3.202 dienen als unmittelbare Vorlage für die 2. Textschicht, die als Neuformulierungen auf S. 104 von MS 104 (3.3 und 3.31) festgehalten sind – allerdings in dieser Korrekturphase noch nicht in ihrer endgültigen Form. Man kann an Satz 3.31 deutlich Überschreibungen erkennen, mit denen an drei Stellen das Wort "Symbol" durch "Ausdruck" ersetzt wurde und an einer vierten durch eine Einfügung "Ausdruck" als Synonym von "Symbol" definiert wird.

Die 3. für den Entstehungszusammenhang relevante Textschicht enthält direkte Übernahmen von Sätzen aus dem Kriegstagebuch MS 102 (3.22 entspricht einer Eintragung vom 29. 12. 1914, 3.221 Eintragungen vom 26. und 27. 5. 1915). Diese Textschicht ist vermutlich deshalb nicht in MS 104 festgehalten, weil es sich nicht um Neuformulierungen handelt. Sie muß jünger sein, weil die Einfügung eine Änderung in der Numerierung verursacht hat (aus 3.25, wie die Nummer auf S. 104 in MS 104 lautet, wird 3.26). Dieser Textschicht gehört wahrscheinlich auch die Bemerkung 3.262 ("Was in den Zeichen nicht zum Ausdruck kommt, das zeigt ihre Anwendung.") an, obwohl hier keine Vorlage aus Tagebüchern bekannt ist. An der Bemerkung, die zusammen mit 3.263 schon zu 3.3 überleitet, ist die Verwendung von "Ausdruck" auffällig. Es könnte dieser Satz der Auslöser dafür gewesen sein, daß Wittgenstein "Ausdruck" als *terminus technicus* in sein System einführt und deshalb die angesprochenen Korrekturen in 3.31 vornimmt.

Die Ausbesserungen müssen jedenfalls schon vollzogen gewesen sein, als die 4. Textschicht hinzukommen ist. Denn Wittgenstein fügt an Satz 3.31 den Zusatz "Der Ausdruck kennzeichnet eine Form und einen Inhalt" an, wobei er in MS 104 kaum noch Platz findet, das Wort "Inhalt" hinzuschreiben. Im hinzugefügten Satz wird gleich das Wort "Ausdruck" verwendet und nicht ein vorgängiges "Symbol" überschrieben. Der Zusatz ist aber identifizierbar als verkürzte Wiederverwendung einer Passage aus PT 3.253 ("Zeichen kennzeichnen die Gemeinsamkeit einer Form und eines Inhalts"), die dort (bei der Umarbeitung zu 3.327) gestrichen wurde. Die Wendung ist bis in MS 102 zurückverfolgbar (Eintragungen zum 23. bzw. 30. 5. 1915).

In der 5. Textschicht werden zwei Textstreifen aus späteren Überarbeitungsphasen in den Abschnitt integriert und zwar PT 4.102274 und der schon erwähnte Block PT 5.004 – 5.0053. Diese Passagen bedürfen für ihre Integration jedoch noch eines verbindenden Textes und eben diesen enthalten die Sätze 3.311 – 3.314, die die abschließende 6. Textschicht bilden und die wir auf S. 108 von MS 104 lesen können. 3.311 greift mit der "Klasse von Sätzen" einen Schlüsselbegriff von PT 102274 auf, 3.313 leitet zur "Satzvariable" über, die der zweite Textstreifen behandelt. Durch diese Ergänzung wird der letzte Satz in 3.31 zum "variablen Satz" (in der Fassung von Textschicht 2 bzw. 4) überflüssig und wird gestrichen, ebenso PT 3.2016 (aus Textschicht 1).

Für die Interpretation von Wittgensteins System ist dieser genetische Zusammenhang deshalb von Bedeutung, weil erst mit der Einfügung der letzten Textschicht (mit 3.314) das erweiterte Kontextprinzip ("Der Ausdruck hat nur im Satz Bedeutung.") formuliert wird. Der Ausdruck "Ausdruck" hat, was hier nicht mehr näher ausgeführt werden kann, verschiedene Funktionen, darunter die, als generalisierter Name zu fungieren (dazu van der Does 2011, S. 68 f.).

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On the Integration of Mind, Body, and Language

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Abstract

Dominating Twentieth Century thought, positivism presupposes ontological incompatibility of mind and body. Resolution of presumed incompatibility abandons mind and preserves body. Constant body inconstantly appearing as whole and parts, however, renders body derivative, not primitive. As derivative, body presupposes conscious mind as constitutive.

Initiating with primitive elements, consciousness proceeds by analogical extension of element to element within a stream of thought. Language replicates the continuous and discontinuous transmutational character of consciousness, neither consciousness nor language being governed by a priori syntax. Evinced is analogy, the extension of or contraction from one element to another, this characterizing both thought and language. Mirroring consciousness, language is the material expression of thought, integrating mind and body.

1. Positivism

Positivism distinguishes the physical as observable and metaphysical as unobservable. As observable, the physical is verifiable. As unobservable, the metaphysical is unverifiable. Verification is a qualitative sensory experience. Error being possible, verification is by (1) like qualitative sensory experience by the same individual in like circumstances, and (2) like qualitative sensory experience by different individuals in like circumstances. No two qualitative sensory experiences being the same, when a source of a qualitative sensory experience is unobservable beyond the qualitative sensory experience, the object is a set of possible qualitative sensory experiences.

Each qualitative sensory experience being an isolated event, qualitative sensory experiences are related by logical operators into a set constituting an object. Logical operators not being constituent of sensory experience, they are unobservable. Despite this, "the assumption of such objects is quite as legitimate as the assumption of physical bodies and there is quite as much reason to believe in their existence" (Gödel 137).

Also real are theoretical entities integrating objects into theoretical axiom systems. Constituting unobservable entities with unobservable properties whose effects are observable, like logical operators, theoretical entities are real although unverifiable. Relevantly, however, assumed by positivism is, "tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions" (Hamlyn 117-118).

Thus, when logical operators and theoretical entities are unverifiable, on the positivist assumption, assertions of logical operators and theoretical entities are nonsensical. Therefore, scientific objects and theoretical entities are nonsensical. Hereby, science is nonsensical. Understandable is why, "it . . . seems . . . unlikely . . . any metaphysician would yield to a claim . . . of the criterion of verifiability as a methodological principle" (Ayer 129). This, when the nature of such "detailed analyses" is not provided, and is difficult to imagine.

Resolution is possible if substituting for abstract logical operators are real and/or imaginable continuous transitions from element to element, adding and subtracting intervening constituents as necessary. Limiting elements transforming into a fused whole by such a transit, there is no need for theoretical entities to integrate apparently unrelated elements. Applicable to all abstractions, abstract entities are unnecessary. Breaking down is distinction be-

tween physical and metaphysical, positivism failing. Breaking down as well is distinction between science ("calculating probabilities") (Feynman 78) and natural philosophy ("an irreducible metaphysical element to all physical concepts") (Gribbin and Gribbin <http://www.friesian.com/feynman.htm>).

2. Best Explanation

Space and time being infinitely reducible, particulars are distinguishable within both when constituents are separated by exclusive disjunction from other particulars, and integrated by inclusive disjunction into a particular. Particulars being distinguishable within both space and time in an infinite number of ways, how particulars are distinguished is nominal. Constituted nominally, a constituted particular is real.

As nominal, how particulars are distinguished is a value, an "ought." A particular being an "ought," constituents deduced from a particular are individually an "ought." Constituents being particulars, and particulars being an "ought," a particular induced from constituents is an "ought."

A particular being distinguished within space and time in a finite way, how the particular is distinguished is real. As real, how a particular is distinguished is a fact, an "is." A particular being an "is," constituents deduced from the particular are individually an "is." Constituents being particulars, and particulars being "is's," a particular induced from constituents is an "is."

Constituted is an axiomatic systemic set, whose consistency is not determined by converting its postulates into true statements about a model (Nagel and Newman 15-16). Doing so constitutes the model a meta-system. Converting the postulates of an axiom system into true statements about the model extends the axiom system onto the model, engendering the infinite regress of Gödel's indeterminacy theorem. Proof infinitely regressing, consistency of an axiom system is indeterminate.

An axiom system's consistency is determined by deduction of the theorems from the axioms. If the theorems cannot be deduced from the axioms, then the axioms are incomplete and/or inconsistent. If incomplete, consistency is determined by the logical operation of assumed premise from the heretofore isolated meta-system. If inconsistent, consistency is determined by the logical operation of indirect proof. Proof of the inconsistency of an initial axiom is

proven by the logical operation of assumed premise of its contradictory, from which the theorems of the axiom system are deducible. Inconsistency of an initial axiom being proven, it is subtracted into the meta-system.

Operant by means of assumed premise and indirect proof within an otherwise isolated axiom system is the function of best explanation. Insofar as "In a sense, every valid argument is conditional, since the truth of the conclusion is conditional on the truth of the premises on which the conclusion depends" (Hausman, Kahane, and Tidman 127), and "You can assume anything provided . . . each assumption is eventually discharged properly" (Ibid. 129), when "Every proof can be solved using IP (indirect proof)" (Ibid. 139), then contradictions are made consistent by adding and/or subtracting constituents. Thus, the best explanation of the universe is neither as dense (fused) nor as discrete (diffused), but both.

Adding constituents converts the universe into a dense set. Subtracting constituents converts the universe into a discrete set. Either extreme, as well as any intermediate state, being as good an explanation as any other, there is no static best explanation of the universe. The best explanation of the universe is a continuous circular transmutation from extreme state through all intervening states to extreme state, and back.

Discontinuity of mind and body challenges such a reciprocal transmutation. Mind and body encompass the content of the universe. Being ontologically incommensurate, though, how is a coherent universe possible?

3. Mind and Body

Spatially extended, matter is irreducible into the spatially unextended. Spatially unextended, mind cannot be induced into the spatially extended. Integration proceeds by noting mind is understandable as a material byproduct, just as immaterial electromagnetism is a byproduct of rotation of a material copper mass within another material copper mass.

Alternatively, matter is understandable as a byproduct of mind, just as, "The observer can . . . ignore the indivisible quantum links between himself and the classically describable part of the observing apparatus," by conceptual distinction from the rest of "the entire universe" (Ibid. 139). Mind and matter understandable as byproduct of one another, neither has primacy. Simplest is assuming a neutral monism wherein each identifies different states of a common experience.

As both William James and Ferdinand de Saussure observe, identity occurs within consciousness *ab initio de novo*. James notes manifestation as "a kind of jointing and separateness among the parts, of which . . . I refer to the breaks . . . produced by sudden *contrasts in the quality* of . . . successive segments of the stream of thought" (Ibid. 142). Saussure similarly indicates, "Thought, chaotic by nature, is made precise by [a] process of segmentation" (Saussure 110-111). Concerning James' "breaks" in the "stream of thought," and Saussure's mysterious "process of segmentation," "Reason . . . is an *active* capacity, in that we can, within limits, employ it successfully at will" (Audi 119. See also 90-91). To be emphasized is "at *will*," when decisions are not only guided by logic.

Occurrent within this "*active* capacity" isolating a particular within the continuum of experience is introduction of abstract operators which are not constituent of the sensory experience. An operator is a state of being, or sequential

states of being. As so, an operator constituent composes or operator constituents compose "the primitive terms for subsequent use in definitions [and] primitive propositions for subsequent use in demonstrations" of the axiom system (Blanche 22).

4. Logical Operators

Rather than autonomous entities, logical operators are subject or predicate modifiers. Sometimes assumed is they can, "be conceived as real objects," whose assumption "is quite as legitimate as the assumption of physical bodies and there is quite as much reason to believe in their existence" (Gödel 137).

Often not indicated is the ontological status of these "real objects." Unapparent in sensory experience, they are not "physical bodies." Presumably they are, "real but have their reality only within the mind" (Barker 31).

Being real objects, they require logical operators relating them to another real object. These logical operators, correspondingly, require logical operators relating them to another real object, etc. Infinitely regressing, if logical operators are "real objects," they cannot relate other objects. Thus, if there is relation, logical operators cannot be "real objects."

Unapparent in sensory experience, however, if occurrent, they are so only in "the mind." They appear thus insofar as,

Between two perceived perspectives which are similar, we can imagine a whole series of other perspectives, some at least unperceived, and such that between any two, however similar, there are others still more similar. In this way the space which consists in relations between perspectives can be rendered continuous (Russell 73).

Logical operators occur "within the mind" only insofar as *imaginative* states of being.

These states of being manifest themselves as subject and predicate modifiers. Determining both subject and predicate is an object, a dense set of states of being. Constitutive of a subject modifier is a state of being encompassing the object. Constitutive of a predicate modifier is a state of being encompassed by the object. A subject modifier is a macro state of the object; a predicate modifier is a micro state of the object.

Understood thus, grammatically a sentence is like a decimal (object) expansion. Representatively, it is reductive to the right of the decimal, and constructive to the left of the decimal. Only when considered thus is distinguishable a subject modifier and a predicate modifier. A modifier is simply a modifier otherwise, none ascribable to subject or predicate.

5. Language

Mind and body are alike as abstract elements distinguished by simple identity, and the elements with which these simple identities can be sequenced. They are unlike in substitutability of abstract elements in sequences initiated by the abstract elements. For any sequence initiated by any abstract body, the same sequence would have occurred if initiated by another abstract body. But for any sequence initiated by any abstract mind, the same sequence need not have occurred if initiated by another ab-

stract mind. Bodies are freely substitutable for each other, but minds are not.

Neither is consciousness and behavior unrelated. Testimonial knowledge is possible because consciousness and behavior are strictly related. Only when they are not is consciousness privileged. This is when consciousness is ambiguous. Consciousness and behavior being continuous in and of themselves, this identity is justified if consciousness and behavior are relatable. Consciousness of a certain sort, C_1 , strictly occurring when behavior of a certain sort, B_1 , occurs, when exhibiting B_1 , C_1 is known to have occurred.

Mind and body can continue to exist as irreducible theoretical entities, while their concomitant qualitative manifestations can transmute into one another, converting mind into body, and body into mind. As theoretical entities, mind and body are not only irreducible to each other, they are irreducible to qualities. Thus, they function as limits of qualitative sequences, avoiding the infinite progression of Gödel's indeterminacy theorem.

In this, they function like unknown numbers in algebraic formulas. Qualities neither can be added to nor subtracted from them, because of the ontological incommensurability of qualitative and abstract occurrences. Quality, taking up space and time, is divisible, whereas abstraction, taking up neither space nor time, is indivisible. Therefore, there cannot be transit beyond the sequence. Now a sequence becomes a self-determining, self-contained whole.

Qualitative representation of this transit constitutes language. Meaning can occur within consciousness in a circumstance, and not again. Meaning occurring in a circumstance and again is a rule. Language being a rule, meaning can occur without language.

Elements occurring sequentially and again is observationally indistinguishable from same elements occurring neither sequentially nor again. Elements occurring sequentially and again or not is meaning. Same observation having different meanings without different constituents, whether parts as whole or whole as parts, meaning is constituent, not conveyed. It is *identity* as parts or whole, identity being an abstraction.

Assuming elements occurring sequentially and again is language, meaning determines language. Language is analogic, not axiomatic, its rules defeasible ex post facto generalizations, not indefeasible a priori definitions. It is organic, not mechanic, living, not dead, inconsistencies identifying different evolutionary pathways.

Representing qualitative transit, integrating mind and body is language. To be identical is to exhibit the property of haecceity, the "unshareable intrinsic property of being the very thing that [each object] is" (Lowe 102). To be alike is to share the property of similarity, "of the same kind in appearance, character, or quantity, without being identical" (Soanes and Stevenson).

Similar things not being identical, their characterization as the same is a function of their inclusive disjunctive identity, and their characterization as different is a function of their exclusive disjunctive identity. Sameness identifies an imaginable transmutative continuum from one thing to another. Difference identifies an imaginable transmutative discontinuum from one thing to another.

Characterization as same or different being imaginary, neither is necessary. Being unnecessary, categorization as either is primitive, manifesting James' "stream of thought." Language is symbolic representation of the

"stream of thought" composing consciousness. Thus, language is not a rule system because infinite divisibility and multipliability of quality renders a precise axiomatic system practically impossible.

Rather, language progresses organically, not mechanically. Exhibited is the continuous and discontinuous transmutative character of consciousness, "the intentional . . . what we might call . . . reference to a content" (Brentano 88). Evincing is analogy, extension of or contraction from one thing to another, this being what characterizes language.

Analogical extension proceeds by injection, surjection, or bijection. Injection integrates elements by a common constituent. Surjection transfigures an element by adding and/or subtracting constituents. Bijection transforms an element by rearranging constituents.

Considering language a communicative device, a private language is impossible because not communicative. Considering language a semantical and syntactical system, a private language is possible. Whether consciousness constitutes a private language, therefore, is nominal.

6. Conclusion

Whichever, language resolves several classical problems by mimicking "the intentional" analogical functioning of consciousness. Incorporating analogical extensions, all language is pragmatics. In this language provides a window into consciousness.

Being theoretical entities, mind and body are unobservable. Imagined abstractions, neither is reducible to the other. Mutually reducible, however, are the observable manifestations of each. Convertible into one another by tropic transition, mind and body are mutually determining.

Distinction between physical and metaphysical is also resolved. Distinguished by observational elements sequenced subsequent to different abstract entities, both the physical and metaphysical contain an initial metaphysical constituent. Observable elements sequenced subsequent to the initial unobservable metaphysical element separate them. These elements transmuting into one another eliminates the physics/metaphysics distinction.

Finally, insofar as a constant observational experience can uninterruptedly transmute into different understanding(s), any understanding of the observational experience is a value, an "ought." All observational "fact" is a "value," then. Thus, the is/ought distinction breaks down.

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Phenomenal Concepts and Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument

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Abstract

David Papineau argued that phenomenal concepts are inconsistent with Wittgenstein's private language argument, and that the problem is with Wittgenstein's argument. Against Papineau, we argue that phenomenal concepts are consistent with Wittgenstein's private language argument. Inconsistency can appear when either Wittgenstein's argument or phenomenal concepts are incorrectly or restrictively understood.

1. Introduction

In a recent paper Papineau (2011) argues that "phenomenal concepts" are inconsistent with Wittgenstein's private language argument. At first glance this claim is plausible, because it is plausible that the use of phenomenal concepts supposes the use of introspection, and Wittgenstein, as it is thought, argued against introspection, which from his point of view is not public and, which is equivalent for him, meaningless.

Unlike some Wittgensteinians who reject the phenomenal concepts, Papineau, however, thinks that the problem is with Wittgenstein's argument. According to him, Wittgenstein is setting the bar for meaningfulness too high, so that only the use of an exterior "objective" criterion would allow making the act of identification of an experience meaningful.

We will argue that such understanding of Wittgenstein is very restrictive and Papineau's own argument in favor of phenomenal concepts can be understood as Wittgensteinian.

2. Frank Jackson's argument and phenomenal concepts

A famous thought-experiment by Frank Jackson (1986) is as follows. Imagine a scientist, Mary, who knows everything there is to know about the experience of seeing red from the scientific third-person point of view. However, Mary has spent her whole life in a black and white laboratory and has never seen colored things. One day she is shown a red rose, and she learns something new, namely what it is like to see something red.

On the basis of his thought-experiment Jackson proposes the following argument in favor of dualism of properties.

Before Mary is shown a rose she knows everything about the material properties of the experience of seeing red (premise 1). Then she learns that this experience has one more property – the phenomenal aspect of the experience, that is, what it looks like to see something red (premise 2). Therefore the new property she learns about is a non-material one (conclusion).

Papineau's point of view is that the intuition that Mary gains some new knowledge neglects a distinction between concepts and properties. He argues that when Mary is shown a red rose she learns something new at the level of concepts, not at the level of the properties of the experience of seeing red. So, the premise 2 would be false.

More precisely, for Papineau, first of all, Mary acquires a new – phenomenal – concept, and then she learns that this concept refers to the experience of seeing red, that is, has the same referent as her scientific concept of the experience of seeing red. This is knowledge at the level of concepts.

However, Papineau's conceptual dualism is not a satisfactory position, because the so-called explanatory gap problem, that is, the problem of explanation of phenomenal properties of experiences in terms of their neurological properties, moves to the conceptual level. In addition, one can argue that conceptual dualism entails dualism of properties and, therefore, cannot be a materialistic solution to the problem. One can also argue that new knowledge cannot be purely conceptual. There is always a new property which a phenomenal concept refers to. Therefore, when Mary is shown a red rose she indeed learns about a new property of the experience. This does not necessarily imply that dualism is true, since one can argue that in her black and white laboratory, being deprived of any phenomenal experience, Mary cannot gain knowledge about all material properties of the experience of seeing red (this is our position), or one can argue, as Lewis and others did, that she does not gain any new knowledge when she is shown a red rose.

For the physicalists Lewis and Nemirov Mary acquires the capacity of a direct identification of the experience of seeing red, that is, some "know-how", not "knowledge that". However this view does not take into account the properly phenomenal aspect of a phenomenal experience.

To demonstrate that Mary also gains some new "knowledge that" it is proposed that we modify Jackson's thought-experiment. In place of Mary, Marianna enters into play. The only difference between them is that Marianna is shown not a red rose, but a piece of red paper, and she is not told that it is red.

It seems obvious that Marianna acquires some new "knowledge-that" as well as some new now-how. Let us assume that she denotes her experience with the symbol *F* or the word *senso*. Then one can say that Marianna acquires a new concept – a phenomenal concept *F*(*senso*) –, or "know-how", because she cannot, for example, form the non-indexical judgment "Everybody else I know has had *F* (experience *senso*) before" with the help of her theoretical concepts. In addition, when Marianna is told that what she denotes by the symbol *F* is the experience of seeing red, that is, the same thing that she denoted by a theoretical concept, she gains some new "knowledge that". This is knowledge at the level of concepts.

In the thought experiment with Mary it might look as if Mary gained some new knowledge about properties of the experience of seeing red. According to Papineau, in reality she, too, gains some knowledge at the level of concepts used for the identification of the experience.

It seems however that Papineau does not take into account the very process of the formation of a concept. For him, phenomenal concepts are concepts *sui generis*. However, conceptual dualism as well as ontological dualism contradicts to Wittgensteinian understanding of concepts as naturalized rules. (We resume the private language "argument" as follows: (1) every meaningful language obeys rules, and (2) these rules are natural, or can be naturalized.)

Papineau also applies the conceptual dualism view to give a materialistic response to the zombies argument, proposed by dualists, according to which zombies are *conceivable*, and, therefore, the properties of consciousness are non-physical, that is, materialism is false.

A materialist answer is that conceivability implies only the conceptual possibility. Zombies are not possible. The illusion of their existence might appear only because there is no *a priori* relation between theoretical and phenomenal concepts. According to the *a posteriori* materialists, this relation between them is established *a posteriori*.

The Wittgensteinian position (see also Jocelyn Benoist's Wittgensteinian contextualism (Benoist 2010/2011, 2011)) is that the genuine concepts are anchored in reality and alimanted by it. And this means that the question about the conceivability of zombies, if it is a conceptual question, cannot be a purely *a priori* one. Zombies are imaginable, but it is not obvious that they are conceivable according to the appropriate natural rules, which themselves cannot be purely *a priori*.

Zombies are conceivable only if the phenomenal concepts are understood in an approximate, abstract sense, that is, if their very nature is ignored.

3. Phenomenal concepts and private language argument

Papineau quotes §§ 270 and 271 from *Philosophical Investigations* by Wittgenstein, which from his point of view support his thesis that Wittgenstein's private language argument is inconsistent with phenomenal concepts.

Papineau interprets Wittgenstein in the sense that the use of the symbol S (see § 270) is meaningless until it is established (with the help of a manometer) that it is associated with a high blood pressure. He writes (Papineau 2011, pp. 181-182):

Wittgenstein is clear that, while this introduction of a public criterion might succeed in giving "S" a meaning which relates it to blood pressure, the supposed earlier connection with a sensation is of no significance. What has happened is that the term now has a public meaning, in virtue of the new criterion, not that it always referred to a sensation. The supposed connection with a sensation is an idle part.

In reality Wittgenstein says just the opposite: "So I shall be able to say that my blood-pressure is rising without using any apparatus." (§ 270) There is a sensation the symbol S refers to. It does not depend on whether the manometer is used or not, though its use allows one to establish the physiological nature of the sensation. So, the use of S cannot be completely meaningless; it is meaningless at the

reflective/introspective level, but not at the instinctive one. The exterior criterion does not establish the meaning, but does confirm that there is a meaning.

In § 270 Wittgenstein writes: "And now it seems quite indifferent whether I have recognized the sensation *right* or not. Let us suppose I regularly identify it wrong, it does not matter in the least." It is said here about the lack of the meaning on the reflective/introspective and only reflective/introspective level.

In § 271 Wittgenstein imagines "a person whose memory could not retain *what* the word 'pain' meant—so that he constantly called different things by that name". In this case also one can say that this is not important, if the word "pain" is used in accordance with the usual symptoms and presuppositions of pain (see § 271). The person knows *instinctively* (and only instinctively) what the word "pain" means.

The exterior criterion permits one to introduce the use of the symbol S in the domain of the reflective consciousness (but this use does not amount to the first-person reflection of the instinctive experience). If earlier the person used the symbol instinctively (but not arbitrarily, not meaninglessly), within an instinctive "language game", now she can attribute to such a use the following explicit meaning: "My blood pressure is high".

What has been said above does not mean that the person cannot develop a properly phenomenal reflective/introspective concept (the first-person point of view) and use it to refer to her experience not instinctively, but reflectively/introspectively.

Wittgenstein's example with a person whose memory cannot retain what the word "pain" meant presupposes that such a person is exceptional and usually we are able to retain what the word 'pain' means. That is, for Wittgenstein the reflective (introspective) use of the term "pain" (not only instinctive) is not meaningless.

This is corroborated by other texts of Wittgenstein. Let us take, for example, § 177:

I should like to say "I experience the because". Not because I remember such an experience, but because when I reflect on what I experience in such a case I look at it through the medium of the concept 'because' (or 'influence' or 'cause' or 'connexion'). (PI 177)

We interpret Wittgenstein's "remember" (in German: "Nachdenken") as reflection/introspection in the sense of *making explicit*, not in the sense of the classical *look inwards*. Papineau uses the expression *look inwards* and does not specify how he understands introspection. Nor does he refute Wittgenstein's critiques of introspection.

For Wittgenstein a correct introspection is a look through the medium of a concept. This "look" is not Kantian. The concept does not create an epistemic gap between a thing-for-us (conceptualized) and a thing-in-itself (non-conceptualized). On the contrary, it allows us to grasp a thing and to grasp it as it is, that is, in its very reality. For instance, the concept "because" allows one to grasp the experience of using the word "because".

One can use "because" instinctively, by analogy with the use of the symbol S in the example from § 270, but one can also use it reflectively (introspectively), as it is meant in the example from § 177.

What has been said above is applicable to the perceptual experience of seeing something red. Papineau does

not deny that for Wittgenstein ordinary language can describe phenomenal experiences, and the word "red" refers to red. However, he thinks that for Wittgenstein the use of phenomenological terms, in particular, the term *senso* cannot be introspective. In disagreement with Papineau, we think that for Wittgenstein Marianna would be able to elaborate a correct reflective/introspective use of the term *senso*. This term would be meaningless only in the case of an arbitrary, not obeying any rules "inward gaze".

Papineau justifies the possibility of a direct identification of a phenomenal experience by means of phenomenal concepts (without using any exterior criterion) with the help of Millikan's (2000) theory of contentful judgments.

Very briefly, Millikan's theory says that we have a "shelf-supply" of many different categories (or "ready-made concepts") for *potential* concepts. The categories are distinguished by the kind of information we are inclined to attach to them. They allow for the identification of some objects whose concepts we do not have. For instance, having only the *animal species* ready-made concept ("category") we might be able to use it to form the concept that is locked on to the *species* "horse", that is, the concept of a horse.

Papineau applies this theory to phenomenal concepts and experiences. A "shelf-supply" of types of experience could permit one to identify a new kind of experience (without using any exterior criterion).

We agree with Papineau's generalization of Millikan's theory. However, we notice that in the cases of Mary and Marianna there is no such "shelf-supply" of phenomenal categories for potential phenomenal concepts. Both scientists have never seen any colored objects before they are shown a red rose.

Papineau opposes his approach to another one, according to which contentful judgments are constituted by rules governing such judgments. Papineau takes it that such rules require "some publicly applicable standards by which we can determine whether a subject is using the relevant terms in accord with their meaning" (Papineau 2011, p. 182).

It seems to us that Papineau/Millikan's approach is, in reality, based on the notion of rule-following understood in the pragmatic Wittgensteinian sense: a rule can be applied in a new situation without using any rule for its application. The role of the rule is played by the "shelf-supply" of categories for potential concepts. (For example, for Papineau "my ability to refer to horses does not involve rules of any kind." (Papineau 2011, p. 182) In our view, this is false.)

By contrast, Papineau's interpretation of the "rule-following" approach is not Wittgensteinian. If by "publicly applicable standards" Papineau means some pre-established standards, then they are just the rules for applying a rule, criticized by Wittgenstein (and already by Kant).

Wittgenstein's solution to the rule-following problem amounts to his private language argument. So, phenomenal concepts are consistent with the private language argument.

4. Conclusion

Papineau's interpretation of the private language argument is restrictive. Phenomenal concepts are consistent with Wittgenstein's argument. In particular, they are not concepts *sui generis*, but natural rules for direct identification of phenomenal experiences.

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To “make up the rules as we go along” – aesthetic language games and the arbitrariness of grammar in Wittgenstein’s thought

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Abstract

This paper intends to clarify the relation between the construction of aesthetic language games and the notion of arbitrariness of grammar in the context of the several testimonies concerning Wittgenstein’s aesthetic thought. Throughout the several classical sources for the study of the Wittgensteinian aesthetics, such as the *Lectures on Aesthetics* and G. E. Moore’s “Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930-33”, one finds several clues to understand the connection between the aesthetic problems and the notion of language games, which are the consequence of Wittgenstein’s criticism of the essentialism and psychologism in art. Thus, bearing in mind Wittgenstein’s anti-essentialism and anti-psychologism, it will be clarified how Wittgenstein conceives the construction of aesthetic language games not only in the level of the speech about aesthetics, but also in the level of the construction of the work of art.

Wittgenstein’s interest in aesthetics is expressed in a well-known remark, published in *Culture and Value*, which says:

Scientific questions may interest me, but they never really grip me. Only *conceptual & aesthetic* questions have that effect on me. At bottom it leaves me cold whether scientific problems are solved; but not those other questions. (Wittgenstein 1998, 91)

This remark shows the crucial importance of aesthetics in Wittgenstein’s thought, considering that he puts side by side the conceptual and aesthetic questions, a fact which is rather strange if one bears in mind that the aesthetic concerns play almost always a secondary role in Wittgenstein’s writings, serving as mere illustrations and examples of the questions raised about language in the writings of the Austrian philosopher. In fact, the most significant testimony for the study of the Wittgensteinian aesthetics is the *Lectures on Aesthetics*, which correspond to a set of four lectures delivered in private rooms to a small group of students in Cambridge in the summer of 1938 (Wittgenstein 1967, vii). But the text of the *Lectures on Aesthetics* poses many problems, since the testimonies that are in the origin of these lectures correspond to the notes taken down by some students that attended those classes – namely Yorick Smythies, Rush Rhees and James Taylor –, not to Wittgenstein’s own writings. There are also other significant testimonies for the study of aesthetics in Wittgenstein’s thought such as ‘Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930-33’, published by G. E. Moore in the years of 1954 and 1955 in “Mind” (Moore 1954; Moore 1954a; Moore 1955; Moore 1955a), and *Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1932-1935* (Wittgenstein, 1979), edited by Alice Ambrose. But these testimonies raise the exact same questions as the *Lectures on Aesthetics*, for they are based on notes taken down by people who attended Wittgenstein’s lectures. The selection of remarks published in German under the title *Vermischte Bemerkungen* and in English as *Culture and Value* is also a useful source for the study of Wittgenstein’s aesthetics, for it contains a selection of remarks about art present throughout Wittgenstein’s posthumous remains. The role of these and other sources for the study of the Wittgensteinian aesthetics have already been noticed by Wittgenstein’s scholars. An example of this is the book *Wittgenstein, Aesthetics and Philosophy*, edited by Peter Lewis. In the introduction to this edition, Lewis establishes a systematic presentation of the main sources for the study of the Wittgensteinian aesthetics, which are, as

well, discussed throughout the book (Lewis 2004, 1-7). In fact, this edition and the studies contained in it are a clear example of the importance of the Wittgensteinian aesthetics in the context of and relation with the questions and concepts developed throughout his work, though the book focuses mainly in the strict analysis of Wittgenstein’s concept of aesthetics and discussion of the art, leaving by side the discussion of subjects such as the importance of the Wittgensteinian considerations about aesthetics to the constitution of language games. Thus, taking all these questions into consideration, one may ask: what’s the importance of Wittgenstein’s aesthetic thought to clarify the possibility of producing a certain kind of language games? Is there something like aesthetic language games? If so, what’s the kind of use of language that underlies the constitution of something such as an aesthetic rule? The discussion of the phrase “language game” and its significance for aesthetics was already noticed by Garry Hagberg in his book *Meaning and Interpretation: Wittgenstein, Henry James, and Literary Knowledge* (Hagberg 1994, 9–44), which presents some important clues for understanding the constitution of artistic language games, exploring the connection between the language games and the notion of forms of life in the field of art. But if it’s true that we can speak of something as artistic or aesthetic language games, one can ask: what kind of game is the aesthetic language game? In order to answer this question, one must take into consideration Wittgenstein’s aesthetic thought.

According to the *Lectures on Aesthetics*, Wittgenstein’s considerations about the aesthetic experience are characterized by the criticism of two tendencies in the aesthetic domain. The first tendency criticized by Wittgenstein is the essentialism in aesthetics. This tendency, which is the subject of Terry Diffey’s chapter published in *Wittgenstein, Aesthetics and Philosophy* with the title “Wittgenstein, Anti-essentialism and the Definition of Art” (Lewis 2004, 37-51), considers the adjective “beautiful” as a property common to a universe of objects, that is, a property or attribute belonging to a group of objects considered as the beautiful ones. Regarding this tendency, one reads in the *Lectures on Aesthetics* the following observation:

The use of such a word as ‘beautiful’ is even more apt to be misunderstood if you look at the linguistic form of sentences in which it occurs than most other words. ‘Beautiful’ [and ‘good’ – R] is an adjective, so you are

inclined to say: "This has a certain quality, that of being beautiful". (Wittgenstein 1967, 1)

The second tendency criticized by Wittgenstein is the tendency to consider that "aesthetics is a branch of psychology" (Wittgenstein 1967, 17), in other words, that experimental psychology, through the clarification of the causal connections, will one day explain the aesthetic judgment. That's exactly what one reads in the following remark of the *Lectures on Aesthetics*:

People still have the idea that psychology is one day going to explain all our aesthetic judgments, and they mean experimental psychology. This is very funny – very funny indeed. There doesn't seem any connection between what psychologists do and any judgment about a work of art. (Wittgenstein 1966, 19)

Thus, bearing in mind the criticism of these two tendencies, Wittgenstein argues that the aesthetic questions must be considered in the context of the several language games. That's what G. E. Moore tell us in "Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33", where one reads:

He [Wittgenstein] introduced his whole discussion of Aesthetics by dealing with one problem about the meaning of the words, with which he said he had not yet dealt. He illustrated this problem by the example of the word "game", with regard to which he said both (1) that, even if there is something common to all games, it doesn't follow that this is what we mean by calling a particular game a "game", and (2) that the reason why we call so many different activities "games" need not be that there is anything common to them all, but only that there is "a gradual transition" from one use to another, although there may be nothing in common between the two ends of the series. And he seemed to hold definitely that there is nothing in common in our different uses of the word "beautiful", saying that we use it "in a hundred different games" (...). (Moore 1955, 17)

According to Moore, Wittgenstein introduced his discussion of Aesthetics by dealing with the problem about the meaning of the words and by illustrating this problem by the example of the word "game". The fact that Wittgenstein chooses the word "game" as an example to illustrate the discussion of aesthetics proves that there is a connection between aesthetics and the notion of language games.

The connection between aesthetics and language games can be considered, at least, in two different levels. The first and most obvious level is the level of the speech about aesthetics, most specifically the uses of the word beautiful. According to Moore, Wittgenstein argues that the word "beautiful" can be used "in a hundred different games" (Moore 1955, 17), which is a consequence of Wittgenstein's anti-essentialism. In *Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1932-1935*, one reads:

The word "beauty" is used for a thousand different things. Beauty of face is different from that of flowers and animals. That one is playing utterly different games is evident from the difference that emerges in the discussion of each. We can only ascertain the meaning of the word "beauty" by seeing how we use it. (Wittgenstein 1979, 35-36)

The second and perhaps less obvious level, which reveals the connection between aesthetics and language games, is the level of creation, that is, the production of the work of art. Indeed, the production of works of art corresponds to the creation of language games. There are several possi-

bilities of producing works of art and therefore hundreds of aesthetic games that can be played. But if it's true that the creation of a work of art can be considered as an aesthetic language game, one can ask: what kind of rules underlies the creation of something such as the aesthetic language games? In the remark 83 of the *Philosophical Investigations*, which specifically deals with the analogy between language and game, one finds a clue to understand the creation of the aesthetic rules. There one reads:

Doesn't the analogy between language and games throw light here? We can easily imagine people amusing themselves in a field by playing with a ball like this: starting various existing games, but playing several without finishing them, and in between throwing the ball aimlessly into the air, chasing one another with the ball, throwing it at one another for a joke, and so on. And now someone says: The whole time they are playing a ball-game and therefore are following definite rules at every throw.

And is there not also the case where we play, and make up the rules as we go along? And even where we alter them – as we go along. (Wittgenstein 2009, 43^e-44^e)

In this remark Wittgenstein explicitly speaks about the cases where we make up and even alter the rules as we go along. The example provided by Wittgenstein to raise the question about the possibility of making up and altering the rules as we go along is the case where children start various existing games without finishing them. But we have reasons to believe that this is also the case of the aesthetic language games connected to the creation of a work of art, for two reasons: first, because the creation of works of art corresponds to making up new aesthetic rules and, therefore, to the creation of new aesthetic language games; secondly, because, the rules of each specific and individual work of art are made up as we go along, that is, the artist alters the rules as he goes along opening a multiplicity of possibilities for the several artistic languages, something which is clear in the literary works where the authors constantly change the rules for the use of the words. But to understand the possibility of making up the rules as we go along as the condition of the artistic creation one must bear in mind the notion of arbitrariness of grammar developed in *The Big Typescript*.

The notion of arbitrariness of grammar was the subject of detailed consideration in the book *Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar* written by Michael Forster, but curiously Forster leaves by side the relation between the arbitrariness of grammar and the questions related to the creation of aesthetic language games. Nevertheless, the arbitrariness of grammar is fundamental to understand not only the creation of aesthetic rules, but also the production of aesthetic language games. An important clue to understand the relation between the artistic rules and the arbitrariness of grammar is provided by Wittgenstein in the remark 56 of *The Big Typescript*, where one reads:

How can there be a discussion whether these rules, or others, are the correct ones for the word "not"? For without these rules the word doesn't as yet have any meaning, and if we change the rules it has another meaning (or none), and then we might just as well change the word. Thus these rules are arbitrary, because it is the rules that first give meaning to the sign. (Wittgenstein 2005, 185^e)

According to this paragraph, the meaning of a word is established by the rules that one uses and, if one changes the rules, the meaning is just as well changed. Wittgen-

stein gives the example of the word “not”, but what he says about that word applies to the words in general. Thus considering that the meaning of a word is established by the rules, there is no necessary rule and, for that reason, the grammar is arbitrary and this is especially clear in art. Art explores the arbitrariness of grammar by making up rules that create new meanings for the several artistic languages. The arbitrariness of grammar is, therefore, a crucial condition of possibility of making up aesthetic rules, that is, of creating new aesthetic language games developing a multiplicity of different meanings throughout the works of art and new possibilities for language and thought.

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Zum Lernen einer Sprache und zum Lehren von Sprache

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Abstract

In meinem Beitrag möchte ich Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede zwischen dem Lernen einer fremden Sprache und dem Lehren einer ersten Sprache aufzeigen. Ich werde mich dabei hauptsächlich auf Überlegungen Donald Davidsons beziehen. Damit sollen auch einige Besonderheiten in seiner umfangreichen Theorie natürlicher Sprachen betont werden.

Es muss ein versteinender Moment für Pygmalion gewesen sein als die von ihm modellierte Statue plötzlich ob seiner Küsse errötete, und, um Ovid zu zitieren, „zu dem Lichte die leuchtenden Augen schüchtern empor hebt“ und „mit dem Himmel zugleich den Geliebten“ (Ovid 1990: 10. Buch) anschaut. Über weitere Details des Wandels der Statue zur Galatea schweigt Ovid allerdings, auch darüber, ob und welche Fähigkeiten, Wünsche und Gedanken Galatea nach der *Metamorphose* hatte und welche weiteren Handlungen sie vollzog. Vielleicht hatte sie auch überhaupt keine Gedanken und die Statue wandelte sich bloß in eine Marionette. Um das zu entscheiden, hätte Ovid wohl die Idee eines Tests vorwegnehmen müssen, der erst zwei Jahrtausende später von Alan Turing in „Computing machinery intelligence“ (1950) vorgeschlagen wurde. Das Besondere an diesem Test ist aber gerade nicht bloß die Idee der Möglichkeit der Entscheidung der Frage, ob ein bestimmtes Wesen – im Fall hier die sich verwandelnde Statue – denkt. Folgt man der Einschätzung Davidsons, dann besteht die Besonderheit des von Turing vorgeschlagenen Tests darin, dass

[...] in taking as the only test for the presence of thought and meaning the interpretive powers and abilities of a human interpreter (Davidson 1990)

Anders ausgedrückt, man kann nur dann entscheiden, ob ein Wesen Gedanken hat, wenn man auch angeben kann, was dieses Wesen denkt und das kann man natürlich wiederum nur, wenn man die sprachlichen Äußerungen dieses Wesens versteht. Die Frage, ob Galatea oder ein anderes Wesen denkt und ob das mittels eines solchen Tests entschieden werden kann, wird im Aufsatz „Turing's Test“ (1990) von Davidson daher auch nur nachrangig behandelt. Vielmehr diskutiert Davidson die zu erfüllenden Bedingungen, um anzugeben, was eine Maschine – Turings Maschine – denkt. Denn wenn man den Inhalt der Gedanken angeben kann – weil man die Äußerungen eines Wesens versteht – dann wird man auch nicht verneinen können, dass dieses Wesen auch tatsächlich denkt.

Die Idee, die Frage, ob ein Wesen Gedanken hat mit der Frage, welche Gedanken es hat, zusammenfallen zu lassen, soll allerdings nicht über den Umstand hinwegsehen, dass wir bestimmten Wesen ohne Weiteres Gedanken zuschreiben und anderen wiederum nicht. Andererseits aber auch, dass es möglich ist, dass ein Wesen, dem man zunächst keine Gedanken zuschreibt und das auch nicht spricht, zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt es doch tut. Um einen solchen Fall handelt es sich bei der Erzählung über Pygmalion und Galatea. Überlässt man jedoch fabelhafte Episoden und Metamorphosen den Literaten, ist der Übergang von einer Phase zur nächsten gar nicht so leicht zu erklären. Auch worin diese Schwierigkeiten genau bestehen, ist nicht ohne Weiteres zu anzugeben, ein Problem ist aber sicherlich, dass das Haben von Gedanken an Bedingungen geknüpft ist, die selbst wiederum die Präsenz von

Gedanken zur Bedingung haben. Die These, von der hier die Rede ist, wird auch *Lingualismus* genannt und ihr zufolge bedingen sich Gedanken und Sprache gegenseitig. Ich finde diese These grundsätzlich richtig und werde hier nicht explizit für sie argumentieren. Ich werde mich jedoch im Folgenden der Frage widmen, wie unter Annahme dieser These das Erlernen von Sprache beschrieben werden kann. Zu diesem Zwecke werde ich zwei Situationen beschreiben und miteinander vergleichen: zum einen die Situation der *Radikalen Interpretation*, in der ein Linguist eine ihm fremde Sprache entschlüsseln versucht und zum anderen die Situation, in der einem Kind erste Worte beigebracht werden. Beide Situationen sind dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass die Interdependenz von Sprache und Gedanken eine scheinbar unüberwindbare Hürde darstellt, aber schlussendlich doch überwunden wird, denn dass wir als nicht-sprachliche Wesen geboren werden und dass wird dann doch *verstehen* kann nicht in Abrede gestellt werden.

Ich werde mich in diesem Beitrag hauptsächlich auf Überlegungen von Donald Davidson stützen und beginne mit dem Gedankenexperiment der *Radikalen Interpretation*. Anhand dieses Experiments soll das Problem deutlich gemacht werden, das im zweiten Fall besonders virulent wird.

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In einem Interview umschreibt Davidson *Radikale Interpretation* wie folgt:

Radical interpretation is a way of studying interpretation by purifying the situation in an artificial way. Imagine trying to understand somebody else when you have no head start: there is no translator around; there's no dictionary available; you have to work it out from scratch. It would beg the question, in trying to study the nature of interpretation, to assume that you know in advance what a person's intentions, beliefs, and desires are. I hold that you never could get a detailed picture of any of those things unless you could communicate with the person first. [...]. You've got to work your way into the whole system at the same time. (Kent 1993)

Um anhand dieses Ausschnittes *Radikale Interpretation* genauer zu skizzieren: Radikale Interpretation ist ein Gedankenexperiment, in dem gezeigt werden soll, wie eine Interpretationstheorie für natürliche Sprachen angewendet wird. Es geht nun gerade nicht um einen tatsächlich durchgeführten Versuch als Bestätigung einer Theorie, denn auch die geglückte Interpretation einer Äußerung wäre bloß ein Einzelfall und hätte daher nur eingeschränkten Erklärungswert. Es sollen vielmehr jene Bedingungen herausgearbeitet werden, die beim Verstehen von Äuße-

rungen erfüllt sein müssen. Die Figur des radikalen Interpreten entspricht einem Linguisten oder Feldforscher, der mit bestimmten Fähigkeiten und Begriffen ‚ausgestattet‘ ist. Das heißt auch, die Situation ist keine, in der ein Linguist mit einem Kind oder einem Wesen gleichgesetzt wird, das nicht über Begriffe verfügt, das heißt, auch keine erste Sprache hat. Es ist wichtig zu betonen, dass der radikale Interpret spricht und auch sprachphilosophisch oder linguistisch gebildet ist.

Um aber die Gefahr zu vermeiden, dass jene Begriffe vorausgesetzt werden, die eine philosophische Theorie der Sprache gerade erst erklären soll, wird der radikale Interpret mit der Aufgabe betraut, eine ihm fremde Sprache von Grund auf zu entschlüsseln. Es stehen also keinerlei Hilfsmittel wie Wörter- oder Übersetzungsbücher zur Verfügung; und im Gegensatz zum Feldlinguisten bei Quine, auf den die Idee eines solchen Gedankenexperiments zurückgeht, ist die Aufgabe eine, in der es nicht um die Zuordnung von Sätzen einer Sprache zu Sätzen einer anderen Sprache geht (Übersetzung), sondern um die Grundlage einer solchen Zuordnung überhaupt. Es ist daher nicht verwunderlich, dass Davidson das Problem der Interpretation nicht nur im Zusammenhang mit unbekannten Sprachen sieht:

The problem of interpretation is domestic as well as foreign: it surface for speakers of the same language in the form of the question, how can it be determined that the language is the same? (Davidson 1973)

Das Gedankenexperiment ist also auch als *Verfremdung* aufzufassen, um Voraussetzungen zu vermeiden, die erst erklärt werden sollen. Radikale Interpretation ist eine Methode, notwendige Voraussetzungen des gegebenen Sprachverstehens zu ermitteln:

All understanding of the speech of another involves radical interpretation. But it will help keep assumptions from going unnoticed to focus on cases where interpretation is most clearly called for: interpretation in one idiom of talk in another. (Davidson 1973)

Bekanntlich erklärt Davidson die Interpretation sprachlicher Äußerungen einer Sprache mit der Kenntnis einer Wahrheitstheorie für Sätze dieser Sprache. Der Interpret versteht die Behauptungen des Sprechers, wenn er ihre Wahrheitsbedingungen kennt. Aus der Perspektive des Sprechers betrachtet, findet diese Annahme ihre Rechtfertigung darin, dass er einen Satz dann äußern wird, wenn er ihn für wahr hält und wenn er annimmt, dass seine Äußerung vom Interpreten derart verstanden wird, wie dies von ihm beabsichtigt wird. Das führt allerdings zum im Interview skizzierten Dilemma und dem eigentlichen Problem: Der radikale Interpret versucht das wiederzugeben, was der Sprecher mit der Äußerung meint und das, was der Sprecher meint, ist das, was er glaubt, befürchtet, weiß, hofft, erwartet, etc. Zu diesen *propositionalen Einstellungen* hat der Interpret keinen *unmittelbaren* Zugang. Er muss zunächst die Äußerungen des Sprechers verstehen. Diese Interdependenz – der Interpret kann die Äußerungen des Sprechers nicht verstehen, weil er seine propositionalen Einstellungen nicht kennt und seine propositionalen Einstellungen kennt er nicht, weil er die Äußerungen nicht versteht – gilt es zu durchbrechen:

If all we have to go on is the fact of honest utterance, we cannot infer the belief without knowing the meaning, and have no chance of inferring the meaning without the belief. (Davidson 1974)

Ich denke, dass jede Theorie der Sprache – auch eine, die nicht auf einen voranalytischen Wahrheitsbegriff zurück-

greift – mit dem Problem konfrontiert ist, eine ähnliche Interdependenz zu durchbrechen. Davidson verweist auf Beobachtungssätze oder okkasionelle Sätze, deren Wahr- oder Falschheit von den unmittelbaren Umständen abhängt, unter denen sie geäußert werden. Der Interpret unterstellt dem Sprecher, bestimmte Überzeugungen über Gegenstände und Geschehnisse in der unmittelbaren Umgebung zu haben und stellt auf diesem Wege eine Verbindung zu seinen Gedanken her. Wie die Interaktion zwischen Sprecher, Interpret und Umgebung abläuft, verdient hier näherer Betrachtung, denn das sich so ergebende Dreieck bildet auch die Grundlage der Situation, in der einem Kind erste Worte beigebracht oder gelehrt werden. Zunächst ist es wichtig zu betonen, dass eine solche Dreiecks-Situation die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Interpretation thematisiert. Umgekehrt ausgerückt, bloß weil sich etwa ein Hase in der Nähe eines Sprechers befindet, heißt das nicht, dass der Sprecher auch tatsächlich etwas über den Hasen denkt. Stimmt man allerdings der These zu, dass die Umgebung, in der ein solcher Dialog stattfindet, prinzipiell die Möglichkeit eröffnet, mittels der ein Interpret sich Zugang zum Geflecht der Gedanken des Sprechers verschaffen kann, dann kann auch nicht verneint werden, dass ein bestimmtes Verhalten oder eine bestimmte Einstellung zur Umgebung, die sich durch das Verhalten des Sprechers äußert, auch eine Bedingung ist, um die gegenseitige Abhängigkeit zu durchbrechen.

Es müssten natürlich weitere Bedingungen erfüllt sein, etwa dass der Sprecher nicht bloß eine singuläre Äußerung tätigt, sondern immer nur dann verstanden werden kann, wenn er mehrere Sätze äußert. Auch muss der Interpret die Worte, die er durch einen solchen Prozess lernt, auch selbst anwenden und die Reaktionen des Sprechers auf seinen Gebrauch der so gelernten Wörter und die Umgebung beobachten, um zu wissen, ob er die Äußerungen richtig oder falsch interpretiert. Der Anwendung der gelernten Worte und dem ‚Feedback‘ des Sprechers kommen hier also bestimmende Bedeutung zu. Mit einem bloßen Dreieck ist das Szenario daher auch nur unzureichend beschrieben.

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Es ist aber gerade dieses Bündel an Bedingungen, die eine Erklärung des Erlernens einer *ersten* Sprache erschweren. Die Hürde ist folgende: Ein Kind verfügt nicht über Begriffe, auch oder gerade weil es *nicht* spricht. Die oben skizzierte *Triangulation*, in der etwa ein Elternteil versucht, die Gedanken des Kindes zu eruieren, kann also so nicht zustande kommen. Auch kann ein Kind weder wissen, worauf kompetente Sprecher reagieren noch kann es sich in eine ‚nachdenkliche‘ Position begeben, in der es überlegt, was die Äußerungen anderer Personen bedeuten könnten.

Ich möchte zwei Punkte hervorheben, die zeigen, wie das Unterrichten erster Worte eines Kindes *nicht* funktioniert: In „Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages“ (1965) beklagt Davidson, dass die Eigenschaft natürlicher Sprachen, prinzipiell erlernbar zu sein, und zwar sowohl von einem kompetenten Sprecher einer Sprache als auch von einem Kind, das seine erste Sprache erlernt, nur allzu oft ignoriert wird. Davidson umschreibt die so genannte „building-block theory of language learning“ als Paradebeispiel, in der genau dieser Fehler begangen wird. Dieser Theorie zufolge werden einem Kind zunächst Namen von Dingen in der unmittelbaren Umgebung mittels hinweisender Definitionen, oder allgemein gesprochen, mit nicht-sprachlichen Mitteln, beigebracht, danach Prädikate und Namen für Gegenstände, die nicht unmittelbar beobachtet

werden können. In einem späteren Stadium des Lernprozesses folgt dann der Übergang von bloßem Benennen von Gegenständen zu ganzen Sätzen. Aber weder ist eine hinweisende Definition ausreichend, um einen Gegenstand zu benennen (siehe dazu §30 der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*), noch kann der Übergang vom bloßen Benennen von Gegenständen zu Sätzen, deren wesentliches Merkmal die Wahr- oder Falschheit ist, verständlich gemacht werden. Was Davidson in seiner Auseinandersetzung mit diesen Theorien zurecht ablehnt ist das Erlernen in Stufen (zunächst einzelne Wörter, dann ganze Sätze). Die Frage ist allerdings, ob die alternative Erklärung, dass auch ein Kind mit ganzen Sätzen anfängt, nachvollziehbar ist. Dass Davidson dieser Ansicht ist, zeigt sich wiederholt in seinen Aufsätzen, etwa in „Reality Without Reference“ (1977) - „it is inconceivable that one should be able to explain this relation [between the name ‚Kilimanjaro‘ and the mountain] without first explaining the role of the word in sentences; and if this is so, there is no chance of explaining reference directly in non-linguistic terms“. Der Unterschied zwischen den Situationen, in der einerseits eine weitere Sprache gelernt wird und andererseits dem Lehren einer *ersten* Sprache ist folglich keiner, der auf dem Unterschied zwischen Sätzen einerseits und bloßen Worten andererseits aufbauen kann, denn die Verbindung zwischen Sprecher, Interpreten und Welt kann nicht mit einer bloßen Zuordnung von Namen zu Gegenständen erklärt werden. Vielmehr spielt wohl in beiden Szenarien ein voranalytischer Wahrheitsbegriff eine Rolle, für den auch andere Personen und deren Reaktionen eine Rolle spielen:

Without other people with whom to share responses to a mutual environment, there is no answer to the question what it is in the world to which we are responding. (Davidson 1997)

Erst die Reaktionen anderer Personen eröffnen sowohl dem Interpreten als auch dem Kind die Möglichkeit, zwischen richtiger und falscher Anwendung von Begriffen zu unterscheiden, was das Haben von Begriffen *überhaupt* erst ermöglicht.

In diesem Punkt sind Radikale Interpretation und Lehr-Szenario nicht zu unterscheiden. Was ist aber dann der wesentliche Unterschied? Ich denke, es ist die unterschiedliche Art der Rückmeldung. Im Szenario, in dem einem Kind erste Worte beigebracht haben, lässt sich die Rückmeldung in das Schema von Belohnung und Zu-rechtweisung einordnen, in der Situation der *Radikalen*

Interpretation wird sich die Zustimmung zu den Äußerungen anderer nach anderen, wohl diffizileren Kriterien ordnen lassen.

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Folgende Punkte möchte ich zum Abschluss hervorheben: Weder in der Situation einer *Radikalen Interpretation* kann sich der Interpret *passiv* verhalten und bloß die Äußerungen des Sprechers den beobachteten Umständen zuordnen, noch können dies das Kind oder der Lehrer in einer Lehr-Situation. Sowohl der radikale Interpret als auch das Kind müssen die gelernten Wörter wiederum anwenden und die Rückmeldung Anderer beobachten, um zwischen richtiger und falscher Verwendung unterscheiden zu können. Der wesentliche Unterschied besteht dann in der unterschiedlichen Form der Rückmeldung, die ein Interpret oder ein Kind bekommen.

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Cryptographical Remarks. Wittgenstein's Preference for Seemingly Capricious Rules

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Abstract

In their seminal commentary on § 87 - 133 Baker and Hacker (2004) classify these paragraphs as revision of the TLP and sketch of the new philosophical method of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. They claim a criticism of the sublime as the pivotal point, where the way of looking at philosophical subjects had to be turned around completely. These concepts shouldn't any longer be the normative anchors of a philosophical system, but subjects of an analysis of their sense. Further the paragraphs focus on contradictions. Wittgenstein neglects the 'quod libet' that is usually emphasised concerning contradictions. He shows how a contradiction can signal a wrong vision of what has been meant (Wittgenstein 1999, §100) and how it may work as sign with a new meaning. In published and private notes he accepts and obviously likes principally unlimited and unusual signs and rules, that differ like any cryptographical sign or rule from the daily ones just in the grade of accessibility at first glance.

Like Baker & Hacker 2004 have shown, Wittgenstein re-thinks the so-called sublime concepts (Wittgenstein 1989, §89). Between 1930 and 1937 he searched for a strategy, how to rotate the way of looking at them (Wittgenstein 1989, §108), and how to avoid a reinstitution of the concepts he wants to prove of making sense at all. Instead of repeating expressions like 'induction' and 'recursion', 'proposition' a.s.o, Wittgenstein prefers in § 125 to frame them with allusions to theories like marxism and psychoanalyses:

125. Es ist nicht Sache der Philosophie, den Widerspruch durch eine mathematische, logisch-mathematische, Entdeckung zu lösen. Sondern [del.UR] vor der Lösung des Widerspruchs, übersehbar zu machen. [del.UR]

Die fundamentale Tatsache ist hier: daß wir Regeln, eine Technik, für ein Spiel festlegen, und daß es dann, wenn wir den Regeln folgen, nicht so geht, wie wir angenommen hatten. [del.UR] es kommt also in jenen Fällen anders, als wir es gemeint, vorausgesehen, hatten. Wir sagen eben, wenn, z.B., der Widerspruch auftritt: »So hab' ich's nicht gemeint.«

Die bürgerliche Stellung des Widerspruchs, oder seine Stellung in der bürgerlichen Welt: das ist das philosophische Problem." (Wittgenstein 1989, § 125)

We know him to have declared within the time span, in his lectures on the foundations of mathematics, "All the puzzles I will discuss, can be exemplified by the most elementary mathematics - in calculations which we learn from ages six to fifteen, or in what we easily might have learned, for example, cantor's proof". (Monk 1991, 417) 'Cantor's proof' means the "one-to-one correspondence", the enumerability of the natural numbers IN. Thus, in a way, Wittgenstein shows mathematics to be simple, and rides roughshod over the sublime concepts of logic and mathematics generally. He attempts to isolate the sublime concepts, to get more clarity about them, and to analyse within the paragraphs §88 - 133 (and again within the Lecture of the Foundations of Mathematics (Diamond 1976)), what contradictions mean for them. The astonishing parallel he draws to psychoanalysis and the social construction of contradictions within a civil society, the "bürgerliche Stellung", is part of this. How are these related to mathematical logic?

First, psychoanalysis and marxism take contradictions as something that emerge from an unconscious attempt to pretend. Intentions and actions are contradictory and disconnected from the fact they pretend to belong to, and connected to something real, that is just shown unconsciously, as shift of symbols in psychoanalyses, or analysable as the real social cause in marxism. Thus, Wittgenstein mentions two theories which use contradictions as very significant, though not explicit forms of thought and self-explanation. Is there anything similar in so called formal thought?

While the TLP's aim to clarify continues, the method is new - Wittgenstein collects and seemingly distorts, to delete the impression of accessibility. Not completely new - such seemingly capricious rules (Diamond 1976, 176) of methodology and the distortion of symbols are known from the TLP and its time. Wittgenstein used from early on a so called Caesar Code for private notes, when he wrote them into a philosophical text. As we find an emotionally loaded, graphical separation of the syllable "los" ("less") not just in such private notes, but even in the TLP (Wittgenstein 1989, 4.128), we are allowed to handle the coded texts not as completely private, but as showing that all texts may just have a different mode of accessibility, without being completely different as an instrument of meaning. The phrase, "the logical forms are number/ess", sentence 4.128 of the TLP (Wittgenstein 1989), stands for the moment of hesitation within the early philosophy's optimism - asking whether there are numbers or logical forms at all, or perhaps too many, not just the elementary sentence's form. Thus 4.128 gives an example for a cryptic sign even in Wittgenstein's early philosophical, published texts. The graphical emphasis for "los" is used again (for example) in his private notes between 1941 and 1942, when he expresses his grief about Skinner's death. The notes in MS 125 show additionally a kind of second code within the Caesar Code. This is a sequence of unencoded letters within the encoded phrases, especially the letter "S" used twice, nearby the name "Koder", an Austrian friend of him¹.

Wittgenstein's interest in new or rather unusual rules doesn't stop with the graphical signs of natural language.

¹ "Qmwwi szg tv. svrizgvq [...] emi rsu tvvgivcn rsg. [Em.a.del. UR] "Koder hat ge heiratet [...] vor ihn getreten ist [Hrvh. UR: "s" not encoded]" "Dziv vi tvsgmiyvn [...] "Wäre er gestorben [Em.a.del. UR, "s" not encoded]". (Wittgenstein 2000, MS 125, jpg 006); "Uivfnw.pmh + uivfwpmh", plaintext: "Freund.los + freudlos." (Wittgenstein 2000, MS 125, JPG 056)

With Skinner, he seems to have worked on a kind of numerical cryptographical system.

Gibson (2010) gives in *Wittgenstein after his Nachlass* (Venturinha 2010) a precise description of the social and historical context of Skinner's Wittgenstein-Archive (Gibson 2010, 65). Within a manuscript "MS VII" Skinner and Wittgenstein worked on calculations that pass as ancestor of Turing's machines (Gibson 2010, 72), and of our contemporarily most popular system of numerical cryptography RSA².

Following Gibson, Skinner and Wittgenstein especially calculate modulo 257 in MS VII. Gibson explains that $2^{23} + 1 = 257$, what obviously means $2^{(2^3)} + 1 = 257$, thus $2^8 + 1 = 256 + 1 = 257$. 257 is a Fermat prime (Gibson 2010, 72), as $2^{(2^3)}$ has the structure to be a power of powers of 2, an integer of the type $2^{(2^n)}$.

They note that $2^{256} \bmod 257 = 1$. This is not a calculation or proof, but just a statement, the theorem applied to special numbers. Wittgenstein talks in his XXIInd lecture (Diamond 1976, 216) about using Fermat's theorem as an axiom and about different ways to multiply as applying new rules (Diamond 1976, 238). $2^{256} \bmod 257 = 1$ is just true because 257 is a prime. Additionally, with 256 and 257 Skinner and Wittgenstein had numbers for the inversion operation they needed for a mathematical encoding (if intended):

With 256 and 257 we have m and n , such that m is $n-1$ and we can easily find some factors

e, f with $1 < e < m$ such that

$$e \cdot f = x \cdot m + 1,$$

what means, that they are like $n \pmod{m}$, and can be used as powers for an invers encoding and decoding.

We search for a fitting x , such that $x \cdot m + 1$ can be factorized. This x is 4, and hence $x \cdot m$ ($4 \cdot 256$) equals $(2^5)^2 = 32^2 = 1024$. $1024 + 1 = 1025$, not a prime and with possible factors e, f . To avoid high powers, we use $25 \cdot 41 = 1025$ as e, f .

Thus, our numbers e, f , are 41 and 25 - both are definitely big enough to be difficult to calculate with as exponents in Wittgenstein's time. The list of power-sums in MS VII offers ways to find factors (with the diophantic equation $x^2 - y^2 + (x \cdot m + 1) = 0$) or to transform numbers like 7^8 into lower powers like $(2^3 - 1)^2 \cdot (2^3 - 1)^2 \cdot (2^3 - 1)^2 \cdot (2^3 - 1)^2$, equal to $(2^3 - 1)^{(2+2+2+2)}$ (Gibson 2010, 72). Without computers they were in such needs.

"SKINNER" would be transformed by using the factors e, f as exponents. Encoding could start with an enumerating and shifting of letters, for example with $c=00, d=01, e=02, f=03$, a.s.o. until $b = 25$. The letter "C" at the beginning of some of Wittgenstein's coded texts could be a sign for such an alphabetic shift. Venturinha (2010) mentions the so-called "*Kringel-Buch*", discovered by Rothhaupt, and a remark:

"It is preceded by an intriguing 'C', a mark that actually precedes quite a lot of remarks in MSS 136-8 as well as in MSS 167 and 169, eventually forming a virtual arrangement like the '*Kringel-Buch*'. He says: 'I do not have any right to publish a book which simply expresses and repeats over and over again the difficulties I feel' (MS 136, p. 144a, Venturinha 2010, 151)

Or we could use Wittgenstein's code to have numbers that are smaller or equal to the smallest factor. Wittgenstein uses the same code for "i" and "j" and has therefore one number less.

$$z=00, y=01, x=02, w=03, \text{ a.s.o., } ij=16, h=17, \text{ a.s.o., up to } a=24$$

Using Wittgenstein's code, "Skinner" would look like "103017051051091249", calculating with exponent " 25 " (factor e) on the alphabetic numbers: $006^{25} \bmod 257 = 103$; $015^{25} \bmod 257 = 17$; $012^{25} \bmod 257 = 51$; a.s.o. and adding noughts. We could decode this with the inverted power, the exponent 41 (factor f): $103^{41} \bmod 257 = 006$; $017^{41} \bmod 257 = 015$, a.s.o., to get "006015012012020008" and along the alphabetical rule, "SKINNER".

The calculations of MS VII entail thus, with 256, 257, and a list of squares, the most important elements of modern numerical cryptography.

The rule-scepticism that is sometimes claimed for Wittgenstein (and rejected by Baker & Hacker 1984, Hacker 2010) can now be read the other way round. Multiplication like " $3 \times 3 = 7$ " was claimed to be a possible new rule by Wittgenstein (Diamond 1976, 238), because he was convinced, that nearly every seemingly capricious rule could fulfill the attempt to communicate meaning or at least 'work'. The historical importance of cryptography and his personal preference for such language-games explain this rule-optimism.

Further mathematical samples help to understand in what way his argument "Aber bist du sicher, dass sich die Gruppe beim Dazuschreiben jener Zeichen nicht geändert hat?" (Wittgenstein 2000, MS 117, JPG 028) could make sense at all. A rule like mathematical induction for n and $n+1$ can change the meaning it has for us with a change in our knowledge about numbers, and in this sense, at a certain moment in our life. We might start to have doubts about the legitimacy of the inductive proof in the moment when we get knowledge about the reell numbers. We understood the rule because we know, that the natural numbers have the same recursive structure as the inductive proof. But now the proof isn't any more absolute, but a proof for enumerable numbers with a direct neighbour. Restricting ourselves to the earlier use, we are doing something "like simply saying when confronted to a contradiction: 'This is no use - and we won't draw any conclusions from it?'" (Diamond 1976, 209). This argument with history and experience thus doesn't exclude that some uses are better justified than others. On the contrary it shows that we can handle seemingly capricious rules, because we are obviously actually quite sure which ones we should or shouldn't use to work with and when, and where to apply.

Now its even contradiction, which may happen in different circumstances like "taking Fermat's law as an axiom", that can have sense. In Lecture XVIII Wittgenstein discusses in what way a contradiction can work and how we usually behave against contradictory demands :

"In giving a contradictory order, I may have wanted to produce a certain effect - to make you gape, say, or to paralyze you. One might say, 'Well, if this effect is what is wanted, then it does work.' - [del UR] In a sense, it is untrue to say it doesn't work; for if we gave rules for behaviour in the case of a contradictory order, then everything would seem to be all right. for example, 'Leave the room and don't leave the room' is to mean 'Leave the room hesitatingly'. (Diamond 1976, 175).

² comp. Churchland 2002, 170-189.

The idea, that contradictory rules can be advisory like uncontradictory orders, is common especially with the approach to language and dreams of psychoanalysis. Psychologists would say, the emotions towards leaving are contradictory in itself, they are unsteady. Whereas the psychoanalyst might say, the dream picture just showed a remembering of a situation in a room that let the dreamer feel constrained (he had a strong wish to leave but were obliged to stay or the other way round). Thus, the contradiction was a kind of quite intelligible sign for feeling constrained. Likewise, Wittgenstein explains, that a statement about the weather like "Well its fine and it's not fine" (Diamond 1976,176) just means that the weather is "mediocre". He declares, "And one might even introduce this use into mathematics" (Diamond 1976, 176).

Thus, we have a strong optimism of rule-competence, and a strong argument is given against the absoluteness or rigidity of logic: To distinguish the when, where, to whom and how to apply is more important than any absolute exclusion of contradictions.

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Saying and showing: Early Wittgenstein and Rabindranath Tagore

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Abstract

It is a well known fact that Wittgenstein while responding to the questions asked by the members of Vienna circle, often turned his back on them and read the poems of Rabindranath Tagore. A few Wittgenstein scholars like Ray Monk (1990), Garth Hallett (1992) Rudolf Haller (2003) have mentioned Wittgenstein's fascination for Tagore's poems, and his special liking for some of Tagore's symbolic plays like 'The king of the dark Chamber.. But so far no one has explored the reasons for Wittgenstein's interest in Tagore's writings and it has not also been given the attention it deserves. What I hope to claim in this paper is that more sense can be made of Early Wittgenstein's distinction between saying and showing in the Tractatus, if we juxtapose them with thoughts of Rabindranath Tagore in these matters.


The thesis defended in this paper is that more sense can be made of Wittgenstein's controversial remarks about the distinction between saying and showing which he thinks is 'the cardinal problem of philosophy' (which also shows how human beings attempt to go beyond language), if we juxtapose them with thoughts of Rabindranath Tagore in these matters. With this end in view, I would like to give a brief exposition of Wittgenstein's distinction between saying and showing in first section, then what Rabindranath has to say on these matters in the second and I will attempt to bring the two together in the final section.

I

The distinction between saying and showing is fundamental to the philosophy of Early Wittgenstein. During the period of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein held that there is a sharp distinction between what can be stated sensibly in Language (Sinnvoll) and what cannot (Sinnlos and

Unsinn). If someone uses a sentence meaningfully, he uses it to picture a state of affairs and this means that here is a special kind of correlation between psychic elements in his mind, elements of language and objects in the world. A sentence which in this way pictures a state of affairs would be true or false depending on whether the state of affairs obtained or not (depending upon whether or not the sentence pictures a fact.).

This idea of what had to be the case for a sentence to make sense also led to the view that many collections of words which might seem in one way or other to be sensible sentences, were not so. This was because they were not pictures or representations of states of affairs. According to Wittgenstein these are pseudo-propositions (*Scheinsätze*) as they say nothing about the world. Among these pseudo propositions he distinguishes between *sinnlos* (senseless) and *Unsinnig* (non-sense). In order to elucidate this distinction, I would like to draw a diagram after Tractatus.



This distinction between sense and non-sense in the realm of language corresponds well with the distinction between saying and showing in the Tractatus. What is within the limit, i.e., what is sensible is sayable, and only empirical propositions fit the bill. However what lies on the other side of the limit, are the non-sensible. They show themselves.

One important point to note over here is that under the head of inexpressible, we have on the one hand the logical aspect of the Tractatus : logical form, pictorial form, the form of a law, the form of the world and on the other hand Ethics, Aesthetics, Religion, Metaphysics which Wittgenstein simply refers to as 'the mystical'. This creates problems for the interpreters: they feel puzzled why a treatise on the philosophy of logic should contain remarks on 'the

mystical' and also how to reconcile the logical and the mystical part of the Tractatus? This problem has often been regarded as 'the riddle of the Tractatus'. We will see how the riddle loses its importance if we look at it from the point of view of Tagore.

II

Here I would like to concentrate on Tagore's famous distinction between fact *and* truth in ontology and its corresponding distinction in Epistemology between Science *and* Art, Ethics, Aesthetics, Metaphysics, and Religion. These distinctions, we will see later, will come closer to the Tractarian distinction between saying and showing and reflect a new light on the philosophy of manifestation of the formless in form.

Rabindranath defines fact as 'the characterisation of whatever exists, in the manner it exists'.¹

To state it clearly in Tractarian terminology a fact is the existence of state of affairs (T1.13.i, e, a fact is an existent state of affairs). If the state of affair is of the form 'S is P' [i.e. S has the characteristics P], the fact will be S is P and that S exists and here we are not talking about one's thinking or feelings for 'S' or 'P'. Thus a fact is something which is objective and impersonal which becomes the base of our scientific discourse and inter-subjective communication.

Now it is very easy to examine a picture or an object of art by reference to facts. We have only to find out whether it agrees with state-of-affairs or not. If it does, it is true, if not it is false². This goes with the view of the Tractatus.

T2.21 A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, true or false.

The above discussion shows that there are close affinities between the views of the early Wittgenstein and Rabindranath Tagore as far as facts are concerned. Coming to truth, Rabindranath states that Truth goes beyond the domain of facts in the sense that it is personal and subjective. He clarifies

I had a servant whose looks or intelligence were hardly worthy of notice. He would go home at night, return the next morning and go about his chores with a dusting cloth on his shoulder. ... I registered the fact of his presence on the day he did not turn up. That morning I found the water had not been drawn for my bath, the rooms had not been swept. He showed up around 10 in the morning. I asked in a rather brusque voice "Where were you all the time? He said 'my daughter died last night'. And he promptly picked up the dusting cloth and went quietly to work. My heart stopped for a moment. The veil of necessity that had covered the servant was lifted, revealing a father. My self discovered its likeness with his. He became a perceptible presence, something distinctive.....that day at the touch of the rasa of compassion that rustic man was united with the self that dwells in my heart: beyond the bounds of need, on the plane of imagination, *Momin Mia* became real for me.³

Rabindranath treated the ultimate truth as 'the Truth of relationship, the truth of harmony in the Universe' . . He

thinks that it can be grasped only if we leave the domain of facts which is limited within the bounds of space-time, objectivity and necessity.

He believes that we can catch hold of the Supreme One which resides in our own inner selves when the veil of necessity, and objectivity is lifted, and then we can feel that there is the union of our own inner world with the outside world..We feel happy when we see a rose; we see the beauty of harmony in colour, smell, contour i.e.in the form of a flower. The unity which we find residing in colour, smell, petals of a rose is the same unity that resides in inner core of the world. The music of the world finds affinity with the tune of the rose. .

Now this Truth which is beautiful and our source of delight, has got nothing to do with facts.. When an artist draws pictures, he does not want to give us information. That is, if the picture possesses the beauty of the harmony of colour, painting, drawing, and music, then our heart recognises it as real or true. But if it does not have this harmony, then however accurately facts are represented, it will be rejected by an artist as it fails to capture the Truth.

Now the scientist also seeks an impersonal principle of unification, which can be applied to all things. For instance he destroys the human body which is personal in order to find out physiology, which is impersonal and general. Whereas the artist finds out the unique, the individual which is yet in the heart of the universal. When he looks on a tree, he looks on the tree as unique, not as the botanist who generalizes and classifies. A scientist can make known what he has learnt by analysis and experiment. But what an Artist has to say, *he cannot express by merely informing and explaining*. There it deals with taste which can be realised only by testing. . Hence we can give a pragmatic, impersonal and objective description of a flower and that might suit a botanist's purpose, but that description will be incomplete. While elucidating Tagore gave an example of a doctor who treats his own ailing son impersonally as a human body and Tagore concludes that he can have only scientific knowledge of his son's body but not the *realization of a truth*. It is only:

in his intimate feeling for his son he touches an ultimate truth---*the Truth of relationship, the truth of harmony in the Universe, the fundamental principle of creation*. It is not merely the number of protons and electrons which represents the truth of an element; it is the mystery of this relationship which cannot be analysed.⁴ (italics mine)

Science is determined by the necessity, be it causal or material where as Art is free and belongs to the domain of 'surpluses'. Tagore believes that human beings are different from all other creatures of the universe in the sense that although human beings have hunger, thrust and bodily cravings like animals, still they crave for completely different things like knowing for the sake of knowing, for being good just for the sake of being good.. Animals also have emotions which they use for self preservation. Man has a fund of excess emotional energy which does not get satisfied with simple preservation. It seeks outlet in creation of Art, Literature, Music and Dance. For man's civilization is built upon his surplus. And it is something which cannot be stated in factual terms. Hence they are unsayable, but they show themselves in various forms of Art, Ethics, Aesthetics and Religious discourses.

1 Tagore Rabindranath, 1923 'Tathya o satyo', *Sahityer Pathe*, (Rabindra rachanavali, vol. 14), p. 387.

2 Ibid, p. 388.

3 2001 "The philosophy of literature" trans. Swapan Chakravorty, *Rabindranath Tagore, Selected writings on Literature and language*, Sukanta Chowdhury, OUP, pp.306-7.

4 1931 *The Religion of man*, London, George Allen&Unwin Ltd, p.100.

III

Although it is not stated explicitly anywhere in Tagore's writings that science falls within the domain of sayable in terms of facts, still it is obviously so. Same is the case with Art, Ethics, Aesthetics and Religion which are also unsayable in factual terms, but showable. One can easily notice the distinction between saying and showing implicit in the distinction between fact *and* truth, science *and* art. It is surprising to note over here that Rabindranath was keen on making this distinction in early 1920s!

Not only that, both the thinkers had their reservations against scientific culture of the society and also with the scientific notion of progress. It is true that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein regarded empirical and scientific discourse as the only meaningful discourse, and he was primarily a student of Science and Engineering; still he rejected the belief in progress and abhorred societies' obsession with science, which he regarded as 'both a symptom and a cause of cultural decline' (CV6-7/9,49/56.56-64,63/72).

Rabindranath valued Art as an 'expression' of Truth more than science, so does Wittgenstein. In a letter to Engelmann Wittgenstein admits that 'only the work of Art compels us—as one might say—to see it in the right perspective,' (C&Vpp6-7).

Wittgenstein expressed his worry that the advancement of science and technology 'marginalise ethics and the Arts and thereby endanger the human spirit'

Whereas Rabindranath says:

Science sets up an impersonal and unalterable standard of space and time which is not the standard of creation. Therefore at its fatal touch the reality of the world is so hopelessly disturbed that it vanishes in an abstraction where things become nothing at all.⁵

For Tagore, Facts are inadequate tools for the expression of truth. They are 'like wine cups that carry it, they are hidden by it, it overflows them'.

For Wittgenstein 'Our words will only express facts; as a teacup will only hold a teacup full of water and if I were to pour out a gallon over it.'

Now coming to the riddle of the Tractatus, we can take the help of Tagore where he explains the relation between finite and infinite, the logical and the mystical., Rabindranath quotes:

Those who pursue the knowledge of the finite for its own sake cannot find truth. This knowledge merely accumulates but does not illuminate. It is like a lamp without its light, a violin without its music... This is the pursuit of the finite for its own sake...

Similarly the abso lute infinite is emptiness. The infinite and finite are one as song and singing are one'.⁶

If we apply this to Wittgenstein's distinction between saying and showing, between the language of science and that of ethics, aesthetics we will see that the logical part in itself is informative but not illuminating (*Sinnloss*) whereas the mystical part is simply empty non-sense (*Unsinn*).

We have earlier noticed that logical form, pictorial form, the form of a law *and* ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics, religion, the propositions of the Tractatus, all come under one head because they all attempt to express what is inexpressible. The in expressible, in the terms of the Tractatus, is *to feel* the world as a limited whole, 'i.e., the world as limited by the coincidence of the limits of language with those of thought and the Self. Here it will be sufficient if we simply mention that this inexpressible, *the feeling of the world as a limited whole* is the 'Truth' of Rabindranath where

'Feeling yearns to become a part of form.
But form desires to surrender itself to feeling'
(*Utsarga*, poem no.17)

Hence we also notice a kind of philosophy of harmony in the Tractatus which includes harmony of fact and form, of form and feeling, and above all a harmony of expressible and the inexpressible, the sayable and the showable.

⁵ 1923 *Personality* (Lectures delivered in America) Macmillan and Co., Ltd. pp.50.

⁶ Ibid, pp. 56-57.

Wittgenstein on Language Acquisition

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Abstract

When teaching a first language, parents or educators often point to things, uttering words so that children can learn to use words properly. From the so-called “transition period” to the late period, Wittgenstein considers the subject of ostensive gestures, such as pointing. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the characteristics and the problem of teaching with ostensive gestures in line with Wittgenstein’s considerations, and to clarify how Wittgenstein deals with this problem.

1. Introduction

When teaching a first language, parents or educators often point to things, uttering words so that children can learn to use those words properly. From the so-called “transition period”¹ to the late period, Wittgenstein considers the subject of teaching with ostensive gestures, such as pointing.

The purpose of this paper is to clarify the characteristics and the problem of teaching with ostensive gestures, and to clarify how Wittgenstein deals with this problem. The argument consists of three parts. First, I clarify the characteristics of teaching with ostensive gestures in line with Wittgenstein’s consideration. Second, I present the problem of teaching with ostensive gestures. Third, I clarify how Wittgenstein copes with this problem by investigating into the role of ostensive teaching as training.

2. The characteristics of teaching with ostensive gestures

In the transition period, Wittgenstein raises a problem of the teaching of language:

The connection of word and thing that is established by teaching a language. What sort of connection is this, of what kind is it? What kind of connections are there? (TS213 173)²

It is said that by teaching language, words and things are connected. Some examples of “word” here are color words, such as “red,” whereas examples of “thing” are red or green chips. In order to consider the connection between words and things, Wittgenstein focuses his attention on the way language is taught.

Wittgenstein considers ostensive definition to be the way language is taught, observing that the ostensive explanation of words is a remarkable phenomenon of our language (TS213 55). “Ostensive definition” here is a form of education in which educators utter a word while pointing to a thing.

What constitute ostensive definition are ostensive gestures, such as pointing, and things that are pointed to (PG 46). These two components, that is, ostensive gestures and things that are pointed to, are called “primary signs”

while translation from words in one language to words in another is called “secondary signs.”

A red colour chip is a primary sign for red, the word a secondary one, because pointing to a red chip, etc., explains the meaning of the word ‘red’, but saying that ‘red’ is the equivalent of ‘rouge’ doesn’t. (TS213 45)

The reason that ostensive gestures and things that are pointed to are called primary signs³ is that ostensive gestures, such as pointing, are thought to explain the meaning of words, and learners seem to be able to learn a first language through this type of teaching. By contrast, translation from words in one language into words in another can be regarded as the teaching that gives names in another language only if learners have already acquired a first language.

Ostensive gestures as a crucial component of ostensive definition must be “unambiguous”; in other words, ostensive gestures do not allow for multiple interpretations, encompassing misinterpretation (PG 48; TS213 54). Why are ostensive gestures regarded as having this characteristic? Suppose that ostensive gestures, such as pointing, can be misinterpreted. Then, teaching with ostensive gestures is not sufficient for learners to acquire a first language. The reason is that in order for learners to learn to use words correctly, a necessary condition to prevent ostensive gestures from being misinterpreted by learners is required. From this, in order for learners to be able to learn a first language through ostensive definition, ostensive gestures must not allow for multiple interpretations.

Hence, if this characteristic of ostensive gestures could be acknowledged, ostensive definition, consisting of ostensive gestures and things that are pointed to, would allow us to make a much more real step towards learning the meaning of words than translation (BB 1). Wittgenstein, however, raises a problem of the unambiguous interpretation of ostensive gestures. Let us clarify the problem of ostensive gestures.

3. The problem of teaching with ostensive gestures

Remember that ostensive gestures do not allow for multiple interpretations, encompassing misinterpretation. Concerning this supposition, Wittgenstein asked:

Are the signs one wants to call ‘primary’ incapable of being misinterpreted?

1 The period between 1929 and 1933 is called the “transition period” because, in this period, Wittgenstein recommenced his philosophical investigations and moved toward his later thought (Glock 1996, p 21).

2 The following standard abbreviations of titles to Wittgenstein’s works are used throughout:

PG: Philosophical Grammar.

TS213: The Big Type Script TS213.

BB: The Blue and Brown Books.

PI: Philosophical Investigations.

RFM: Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics.

3 Ostensive gestures are also called a “primary sign” in other considerations (cf. PG 46).

Can one perhaps say, they don't really any longer need to be *understood*?—If that means that they don't have to be further *interpreted*, that goes for words too; if it means, they *cannot* be further interpreted, then it's false. (Think of the explanation of gestures by words and vice versa). (PG 48)

At issue here is whether ostensive gestures cannot be misinterpreted. This issue divided into two parts. First, whether ostensive gestures, once interpreted, no longer need to be further interpreted. Wittgenstein's view is that ostensive gestures do not need to be further interpreted once the interpretation is determined, but it is true in the case of the translation of words into words in another language. Second, whether ostensive gestures cannot be interpreted differently. Wittgenstein's view is that it is false to think that ostensive gestures cannot be further interpreted, that is, they *can* be subject to multiple interpretations. Recall that in the preceding section, ostensive gestures do not allow for multiple interpretations. Wittgenstein is skeptical of this position. In *The Blue and Brown Books*, he asks clearly:

Question: Need the ostensive definition itself be understood? — Can't the ostensive definition be misunderstood? (BB1)

There are two problems concerning ostensive definition. The first problem is whether ostensive gestures, such as pointing, can allow for multiple interpretations. For example, pointing can be interpreted as a sign to make a person look in the direction of the line from the fingertips to the wrist, not from the wrist to the fingertips (PI 185). Alternatively, pointing can also be interpreted as a sign to indicate the direction in which you should go. From the possibility of these multiple interpretations, it follows that teaching with ostensive gestures can be misunderstood by learners.

The second problem concerns what ostensive gestures point to. For example, suppose that a teacher points to various leaves while uttering the sound "green" and orders learners to bring green things (PI 50). The teacher intends to point to the leaves as a sample of green, but the teacher's gesture of pointing can be interpreted as pointing to the shape of the leaves, not to their color. Thus, teaching with ostensive gestures can lead to learners' misunderstanding how the samples are being referred to.

Wittgenstein does not intend to present a skeptical argument concerning ostensive definition, however. Rather, he emphasizes that despite the fact that problems of multiple interpretations of ostensive definition can arise, we rarely doubt about whether pointing indicates a shape or a color under normal conditions, and even if we have some doubts about the interpretation of the gesture, we only require some explanation to clarify the matter:

It may easily look as if every doubt merely *revealed* an existing gap in the foundations; so that secure understanding is only possible if we first doubt everything that *can* be doubted, and then remove all these doubts.

The sign-post is in order—if, under normal circumstances, it fulfills its purpose. (PI 87 emphasis original)

What can be inferred about ostensive definition from this passage is not that we should remove all doubts about ostensive gestures, such as pointing, that would occur in our teaching practices but that we should realize how ostensive gestures serve their purpose under normal circumstances. What Wittgenstein directs our attention to is the fact that there is a way of grasping a rule of ostensive ges-

tures that is exhibited in actual cases other than interpreting the rule.

In order to show us how teaching a first language is actually done, Wittgenstein introduces "ostensive teaching" as a part of training. Let us observe the characteristics of ostensive teaching and the role that ostensive gestures play in teaching.

4. Ostensive teaching as forming our second nature

Let us first introduce the idea of ostensive teaching:

A child uses such primitive forms of language when he or she learns to talk. Here the teaching of language is not explanation, but training. (PI 5)

An important part of the training will consist in the teacher's pointing to the objects, directing the child's attention to them, and at the same time uttering a word; for instance, the word "slab" as he points to that shape. (I do not want to call this "ostensive definition", because the child cannot as yet *ask* what the name is. I will call it "ostensive teaching of words". — I say that it will form an important part of the training, because it is so with human beings; not because it could not be imagined otherwise.) (PI 6)

Ostensive teaching is supposed to be an important part of training, not explanation, so that children can acquire primitive forms of language. There are two things to note. First, even in ostensive teaching, a teacher points to things, and thus there could be room for doubt about the gesture of pointing. Second, what makes ostensive teaching unique is that it is a part of training. Let us clarify why ostensive teaching is training in order to clarify the relationship between doubt about ostensive gestures and ostensive teaching.

Training in this context has at least two roles. First, it enables learners to learn to react to an expression of a rule. Wittgenstein frequently mentions this type of training in the argument on rule following:

Let me ask this: what has the expression of a rule—say a signpost—got to do with my action? What sort of connection is there here? —Well, perhaps this one: I have been trained to react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it. (PI 198)

Wittgenstein considers the relationship between a signpost, such as "→," and our behavior in going right. The signpost can be subject to multiple interpretations other than to make one turn right. However, on seeing the signpost on a street, a person will turn right without hesitation. Wittgenstein calls such behavior "reaction." The point of Wittgenstein's argument is that we act in a particular way not because we first interpret signs unambiguously and follow the interpretation but because we follow the signs without interpreting them, that is, "blindly" (PI 219).⁴ Training allows us to react in a particular way without interpretation, so I call this the "training of reaction." Analogously, in ostensive teaching as the training of reaction, learners are trained to react to a sound that a teacher utters and ostensive gestures. The ostensive gestures, such as pointing,

4 With respect to the interpretation of the important, albeit vague, term "blindly," I refer to Fogelin (1995). Fogelin argues that "The metaphor of acting blindly is, to my mind, an inelegant way of pointing to the fact that when we follow a rule—as opposed to interpreting a rule—our actions come without reflection, as a matter of course" (Fogelin 1995, pp. 158–9).

are regarded as a sign to which we react without reflecting on any interpretation.

Second, training teaches learners to apply a rule in future applications as well, so that expressions such as “and so on” make sense to them.

In the course of this instruction, I shall show him the same colours, the same lengths, the same shapes, I shall make him find them and produce them, and so on. I shall, for instance, get him to continue an ornament pattern uniformly when told to do so. (PI 208)

In this example, instruction is designed for us to apply in the same way beyond the given examples. Expressions, such as “continue it in the same way” or “and so on” in teaching, make sense to only those who can do this. Let me call this instruction the “training of repetition” because, in this instruction, we learn a technique to continue future applications in the same way (REM V 21). As this type of training, ostensive teaching enables learners to apply a word and ostensive gestures beyond the examples taught. Wittgenstein puts it this way: “Teaching which is not meant to apply to anything but the examples given is different from that which ‘points beyond’ them” (PI 208 emphasis original).

Hence, the reason ostensive teaching is a part of training is that ostensive teaching allows learners to react to words ostensive gestures, such as pointing, and continuously apply them in future applications without reflecting on interpretations of words or ostensive gestures. There could be room for doubt about the interpretation of ostensive gestures, but what is important is that only those who have been trained can doubt, and they actually doubt only if they are confronted by unusual conditions in which further explanations are required to avoid misunderstandings.

5. Conclusion

I have so far examined teaching with ostensive gestures, such as pointing, according to Wittgenstein’s thoughts and reflections. It can be thought that learners are trained to react to words that are uttered and ostensive gestures under normal circumstances so that they can apply them correctly beyond the cases given. It does not mean, however, that they are first taught to interpret signs unambiguously and follow the interpretation. Neither could ostensive teaching as training remove all doubts that might occur in future applications. It could be said that, ostensive teaching, in a sense, forms our second nature in order for us to participate in language practices as a matter of course under normal conditions, which will be the foundation of our doubts and our creative language activities.

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Bewusstsein und Subjekt bei Wittgensteins Werk Philosophische Untersuchungen

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Abstract

Auf den ersten Blick könnte man sagen, dass das, was die Identität als ein Subjekt, als ein Ich ausmacht, das eigene Bewusstsein ist; dies formuliert zum Beispiel John Locke in seiner Philosophie. In der Geschichte der Philosophie findet man die Konzeption des Bewusstseins als Möglichkeit eines Selbstbezugs beziehungsweise die Konzeption des Subjekts, welches als Subjekt charakterisiert wird durch das Bewusstsein, oder mit anderen Worten: Ein Subjekt wäre als ein solches identifizierbar, wenn es sich selbst erfahren könnte und über seine Handlungen entscheiden könnte. Doch bei Wittgenstein sieht es anders aus. Er untersucht das Problem der Identität des Ichs anhand der Verwendung des Wortes Ich, also aus der Sprachebene heraus, und kritisiert in den philosophischen Untersuchungen die Konzeption des Ichs als Bewusstsein. In meinem Paper werde ich mich mit Wittgensteins Kritik an der Konzeption des Ichs als Bewusstsein befassen, in diesem Kontext soll auch das Problem der persönlichen Identität thematisiert werden.

Wittgenstein behandelt das Problem des Bewusstseins, das aus dem Versuch des Gesprächspartners (Gegners) besteht, das Bewusstsein als eine Entität zu konzipieren, die den Selbstbezug ermöglicht, und damit auch als einen privaten Gegenstand, auf den ich meine Aufmerksamkeit richten (lenken) kann. Für den Gegner bin ich ein Subjekt, weil ich ein Bewusstsein habe. In diesem Sinn gehören die Probleme des Bewusstseins, des Ichs und des Selbstbezugs zusammen. Die Existenz eines Ichs wird für den Gegner durch das Bewusstsein bestätigt. Man kann aus der Perspektive des Gegners ein „Ich“ ohne Bewusstsein nicht konzipieren. Beispiele für diese Konzeption sind John Lockes und William James' Philosophie.

Der Textabschnitt *PU* 412 bis 420 behandelt das Bewusstsein in seiner Möglichkeit als Selbstbezug und reflektiert verschiedene Kritiken gegen diesen Selbstbezug des Bewusstseins. In dem Zusammenhang steht der Textabschnitt in Verbindung mit den vorherigen Paragraphen *PU* 398 bis 411, die auch das Problem des Selbstbezugs thematisieren. In beiden Textabschnitten wird eindringlich über die Verwendung der Wörter „ich“ und „selbst“ diskutiert.

Wittgenstein klärt seinen Gesprächspartner (Gegner) darüber auf, dass das Wort „Bewusstsein“ sich nicht auf einen privaten Gegenstand bezieht, zu dem man durch Introspektion Zugang erhält, also dadurch, Aufmerksamkeit auf sein Bewusstsein zu lenken. Es gilt vielmehr, das Wort „Bewusstsein“ und den Satz „Ich bin bei Bewusstsein“ in ihren Verwendungen zu analysieren. Hierauf baut Wittgenstein seine Argumentation auf. Er beobachtet nicht empirisch das Phänomen des Bewusstseins, sondern analysiert vielmehr die Verwendung des Wortes „Bewusstsein“. Und die Bedeutung des Wortes „Bewusstsein“ wird im Hinblick auf seine Verwendungen erklärt.

Für den Gegner, zum Beispiel William James (James 1981, S. 300-302), sei sich auf seinen Bewusstseinszustand zu konzentrieren eine empirische Erfahrung. Mit dem Satz „Ich bin bei Bewusstsein“ wolle der Gegner, um die Richtigkeit des Satzes zu zeigen, auf eine empirische Erfahrung durch Introspektion verweisen. Wittgenstein dagegen analysiert die Grammatik oder die Verwendungen der Wörter. Im Experiment des Gegners gibt es ein Ich, das sich seiner selbst bewusst ist und das nur allein durch Introspektion Zugang zu seinem Bewusstsein hat.

Folgen wir dieser Argumentation anhand der Interpretation einiger Paragraphen zwischen *PU* 412-420. In § *PU* 412 kritisiert Wittgenstein seinen Gesprächspartner, der eine Kluft zwischen den Gehirnvorgängen als etwas Materiellem und dem Bewusstsein als etwas Immateriellem konzipiere. Die Idee dieser Kluft erzeuge ein Gefühl („einen leisen Schwindel“), der nach Wittgenstein auftritt, wenn ich meine Aufmerksamkeit auf mein Bewusstsein zu lenken versuche. Das Problem liege darin, dass der Satz „Ich lenke meine Aufmerksamkeit auf mein Bewusstsein“ verwendet wird, als wäre mein Bewusstsein ein privater Gegenstand und meine Aufmerksamkeit ein privates Zeigen (deiktischer Akt) auf mein Bewusstsein. Deshalb sagt Wittgenstein, dass etwas Merkwürdiges daran sei, dass es so etwas wie „meine Aufmerksamkeit auf mein Bewusstsein zu lenken (zu richten)“ geben soll.

Wittgenstein kritisiert James im § *PU* 413: „Hier haben wir einen Fall von Introspektion; nicht unähnlich derjenigen, durch welche William James herausbrachte, das ‚Selbst‘ bestehe hauptsächlich aus ‚peculiar motions in the head and between the head and throat‘. Und was die Introspektion James' zeigte, war nicht die Bedeutung des Wortes ‚Selbst‘ (sofern dies etwas ähnliches bedeutet wie ‚Person‘, ‚Mensch‘, ‚er selbst‘, ‚ich selbst‘), noch eine Analyse eines solchen Wesens, sondern der Aufmerksamkeitszustand eines Philosophen, der sich das Wort ‚Selbst‘ vorspricht und seine Bedeutung analysieren will. (Und daraus ließe sich vieles lernen).“ Wittgenstein sagt, dass aus der Analyse James', die durch Introspektion erfolge, sich der Aufmerksamkeitszustand von jemandem, der das Wort „ich“ oder „Selbst“ sagt, erklären oder analysieren lasse, dass aber dadurch noch nicht die Bedeutung des Wortes „Selbst“ oder „ich“ erklärt sei. Denn für Wittgenstein lässt sich die Bedeutung eines Wortes nicht durch Introspektion, durch die Perspektive der ersten Person, gewinnen, weil man aus der Perspektive der ersten Person keine Kriterien hat, um die Verwendung der Wörter zu überprüfen. Was hier auch wichtig zu betrachten ist, ist Wittgensteins Konzeption von „Bedeutung“, die in diesem Fall eine entscheidende Rolle spielt. Es geht um die Bedeutung des Wortes „Selbst“. Und Bedeutung ist für Wittgenstein nicht allein die Bewegungen des Gehirns oder ein psychischer Vorgang im Gehirn.

Im *PU* 416 kritisiert er die Konzeption, dass der Satz „Ich habe Bewusstsein“ eine Mitteilung einer privaten Erfahrung sei, die als privaten Gegenstand das Bewusstsein

haben. Erstens ist nach Wittgensteins Philosophie der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* der Ausdruck, der einen privaten Gegenstand benennt, nicht möglich, weil man keine Regeln oder Kriterien in der ersten Person Singular („ich“) feststellen könne, deswegen wäre auch das Vorsprechen des Satzes „Ich habe Bewusstsein“ keine Mitteilung. Wenn ich den Satz „Ich habe Bewusstsein“ sagen würde und damit eine unbezweifelbare private Tatsache dem anderen mitteilen wolle, sei das nicht möglich, weil ich in der ersten Person keine Kriterien oder Regeln für die Beschreibung eines privaten Gegenstands oder einer privaten Erfahrung feststellen könne. Außerdem könne der andere mich nicht verstehen, weil er keinen Zugang dazu habe, welche Regeln oder Kriterien ich verwende, da ich selbst keine Kriterien oder Regeln verwende, und er habe keinen Zugang zu meinem Inneren.

Für den Gegner (zum Beispiel John Locke, René Descartes, William James (John Locke, weil für ihn das Bewusstsein die Wahrnehmung dessen, was im eigenen Geist vorgeht, ist (Locke 1976, Book II, Chap. I, 19); René Descartes, weil das Ich als denkende Substanz sich selbst als solche bestätigt bzw. seine Existenz als unbezweifelbar behauptet; William James, weil er es für möglich hält, durch Introspektion das zentrale Selbst zu beobachten, sei „Ich habe Bewusstsein“ eine unbezweifelbare Tatsache. Dieser Satz ist laut Wittgenstein aber durch den Gegner in einem solipsistischen Sinne konzipiert: Indem er sich selbst durch das Lenken seiner Aufmerksamkeit auf sein Bewusstsein beobachtet, mache er die private Erfahrung, dass er bei Bewusstsein sei, und diese Erfahrung scheine für ihn eine Tatsache zu sein, an der man nicht zweifeln könne. Wittgenstein argumentiert in diesem Paragraphen dagegen, indem er zeigt, dass dieser solipsistische Satz keine Mitteilung ist, weil er nicht seinen Zweck – etwas einem anderen mitzuteilen – erfüllt, und mir selbst brauche ich nichts mitzuteilen. Die Mitteilung erfülle ihren Zweck nicht, weil, wie oben schon erwähnt, sie dem anderen keine Anhaltspunkte, Kriterien oder Regeln liefere. Um das zu erklären, kann ich zum Beispiel sagen: „Ich habe X“ statt „Ich habe Bewusstsein“, in ähnlicher Weise würde der andere nicht verstehen, was „X“ überhaupt bezeichnen soll.

Im § PU 417 wird die Konzeption des Gegners näher dargestellt, indem der Gegner von Beobachtung und Wahrnehmung des eigenen Bewusstseins redet. Der Gegner beobachtet sich selbst und sagt, dass er wahrnehme, dass er bei Bewusstsein sei, und überlegt sich, was er damit mitteilen will, und er stellt fest, dass er mitteilt, dass seine Aufmerksamkeit so oder so eingestellt sei oder so oder so gerichtet sei, und nicht, dass er bei Bewusstsein sei.

Für den Gegner sei „Ich bin bei Bewusstsein“ eine Erfahrung, die er selbst durch seine Beobachtung und Wahrnehmung seiner selbst gemacht habe. Er wolle seinen Satz „Ich bin bei Bewusstsein“ expliziter erklären, indem er sie mit „Ich nehme wahr, dass ...“ ergänze. Dann wäre der Satz so: „Ich nehme wahr, dass ich bei Bewusstsein bin.“ Aber der Gesprächspartner stelle fest, dass die Ergänzung „Ich nehme wahr, dass ...“ beschreibt, wie seine Aufmerksamkeit ausgerichtet ist, aber nicht bestätigt, dass er bei Bewusstsein ist. Also helfe ihm die Erfahrung oder Wahrnehmung des Gesprächspartners in diesem Fall nichts für die Bedeutung des Satzes „Ich bin bei Bewusstsein“ und für die Mitteilung dieses Satzes an einen anderen.

Trotzdem wolle der Gesprächspartner festhalten an der These, dass es eine bestimmte Erfahrung ist, die ihm ermöglicht zu sagen: „Ich bin wieder bei Bewusstsein“. Wittgenstein deutet eine Kritik an dieser Position an, als er fragt: „Welche Erfahrung?“ oder „In welcher Situation sa-

gen wir es?“ Wittgenstein fragt also nach einer Kontextualisierung der Verwendung des Satzes „Ich bin wieder bei Bewusstsein“, damit analysiert werden kann, ob es sich tatsächlich um eine bestimmte Erfahrung handelt. Andererseits ist die Frage auch eine starke Kritik, weil sie bezweifelt, dass es eine solche Erfahrung gibt.

Für Wittgenstein ist Erfahrung nicht die Beziehung zu einem inneren Gegenstand, zu dem nur ich Zugang habe. Nach Hacker konzipiert Wittgenstein Erfahrung in einer Form, die auch für den anderen nachvollziehbar ist (Hacker 1990, S. 534). Der Gesprächspartner (er könnte teilweise William James, aber auch John Locke sein) konzipiere den Satz „Ich bin bei Bewusstsein“ als eine Erfahrungstatsache, die man durch Beobachtung habe oder durch das Lenken meiner Aufmerksamkeit auf mein Bewusstsein. Mein Bewusstsein werde dann ein Gegenstand, der in meinem Inneren sei und zu dem nur ich Zugang habe. Um diese Konzeption zu kritisieren, will Wittgenstein in diesem Paragraphen zeigen, dass seinem Gesprächspartner ein Missverständnis unterläuft: Wenn „Ich bin bei Bewusstsein“ eine Erfahrungstatsache wäre, dann könnte der Gesprächspartner nicht erklären, wieso man von Menschen sagt, dass sie Bewusstsein haben, und nicht von Tieren oder Steinen. Auch wenn alle Menschen diese Erfahrungstatsache für sich selbst machen würden, wäre es nicht möglich, diese Erfahrung der einzelnen Menschen zu verallgemeinern und daraus eine Regel zur Verwendung des Satzes „Ich bin bei Bewusstsein“ zu erstellen (siehe § PU 418).

Von der empirischen Tatsache „Ich bin bei Bewusstsein“ könne ich nicht ableiten, dass dieser Satz nur in Bezug auf Menschen verwendbar sei, auch wenn alle Menschen diese Erfahrung für sich selbst machen würden. Andererseits könne ich auch nicht wissen, dass andere Menschen auch die Erfahrung „Ich bin bei Bewusstsein“ machen, wenn ich keinen Zugang zu ihrem Inneren, ihren Erfahrungen habe. Durch ihr Benehmen könne man nicht feststellen, ob sie diese Erfahrung machen. Auch Automaten (Roboter) könnten sich genauso benehmen wie jemand, der diese Erfahrung hat (siehe dazu § PU 420).

Wer behauptet, dass das Bewusstsein eine Erfahrungstatsache sei, muss auch bereit zu sein zu erklären, wie es wäre, wenn das nicht der Fall wäre. Denn wenn man von einer Tatsache redet, ist die Tatsache entweder der Fall oder nicht der Fall. Daher muss der Gesprächspartner, der sagt, dass der Satz „Die Menschen sind bei Bewusstsein“ der Fall ist, auch erklären können, wie es wäre, wenn „Die Menschen sind bei Bewusstsein“ nicht der Fall wäre. Wären dann die Menschen bewusstlos? Der Satz „Die Menschen sind bewusstlos“ wird nach Wittgenstein nicht in der gewöhnlichen Sprache verwendet. Also habe der Gesprächspartner ein Problem in seiner Argumentation, er könne nur erklären, wie es ist, wenn der Satz „Die Menschen sind bei Bewusstsein“ der Fall ist, aber er könne nicht erklären, wie es im anderen Fall wäre. Nach der Konzeption des Gesprächspartners (zum Beispiel könnte das hier John Locke sein, weil Locke eine Sprachkonzeption hat, in der die Sprache aus Namen von Ideen im eigenen Geist besteht (Locke 1975, Book III, Chap. I, 3)) sei der Satz „Die Menschen sind bei Bewusstsein“ wahr, wenn es Gegenstände gibt, die dem Satz entsprechen, und daher erhalte für den Gegner auch jedes Wort seine Bedeutung, bzw. durch den Gegenstand, der dem Wort entspricht. In dieser Konzeption hätte das Wort „Bewusstsein“ nur Bedeutung, wenn ein innerer Gegenstand dem Wort entspräche. Also wenn „Die Menschen sind bei Bewusstsein“ nicht der Fall wäre, dann wären dieser Konzeption zufolge die Menschen bewusstlos. Dazu kommt: Wenn „Die Menschen bewusstlos sind“, dann wäre ich auch nicht

bei Bewusstsein, also hätte das Wort „Bewusstsein“ keinen entsprechenden Gegenstand, durch den es seine Bedeutung erhält. Dass ich kein Bewusstsein habe, wäre die schwierigste Folge der Argumentation des Gesprächspartners, weil seine Argumentation über das Bewusstsein auf der inneren Erfahrung des ichs von seinem Bewusstsein beruht – da nur ich die Erfahrung von meinem Bewusstsein haben kann.

Um die Behauptung des Gegners, dass das Bewusstsein ein innerer Gegenstand sei, zu widerlegen, führt Wittgenstein als Beispiel die Vorstellung ein, dass alle Menschen bewusstlos wären. Nach dieser Vorstellung handeln alle Menschen um den Sprecher herum automatisch, das heißt mit anderen Worten, dass sie kein Bewusstsein haben, ihre Handlung nicht rechtfertigen können und nicht über ihre Handlung reflektieren können. Um das Beispiel zu verdeutlichen, fordert Wittgenstein seinen Gesprächspartner auf, sich vorzustellen, dass er in einer belebten Straße ist und dass die Kinder, die er sieht, automatisch handeln, dass ihre Lebendigkeit automatisch ist. Dieses Beispiel führt uns an die Grenzen des sinnvollen Gebrauchs des Wortes „Mensch“ im gewöhnlichen Sinne (siehe § PU 420).

Nach der Konzeption des Gesprächspartners (zum Beispiel John Locke) ist das Bewusstsein eine Erfahrung von sich selbst, die das Subjekt macht. Wittgenstein kritisiert diese Konzeption und macht uns darauf aufmerksam, dass es keinen Gegenstand gebe, der dem Wort Bewusstsein entspreche. Man könnte nun fragen, warum kein solcher Gegenstand möglich ist. Die Antwort ist, dass ein Sprecher allein sich nicht in einer Sprache auf einen Gegenstand beziehen kann, zu dem nur er Zugang hat, weil man kein Kriterium hat, um zu überprüfen, ob die Verwendung des Wortes richtig oder falsch ist.

Zusammenfassend haben wir gesehen, dass die Identifikation eines Selbsts, einer Person, nicht durch das Bewusstsein erfolgt, so wie in der Konzeption von William James, nach der man durch Introspektion sein eigenes Selbst identifizieren bzw. wahrnehmen könne, oder wie bei John Locke, der eine Person anhand ihres Bewusstseins identifizieren möchte. Die Gründe dafür sind laut Wittgenstein, dass man aus der Perspektive der ersten Person keine Kriterien habe, um sich selbst zu identifizieren. Diese Identifikation sei nur möglich in einer sprachlichen Gemeinschaft. Hier bemerken wir, dass die Identifikation einer Person laut Wittgenstein auf einer sprachlichen Ebene stattfindet und es sich nicht um eine empirische Erfahrung handelt im Sinne von einer Introspektion oder Wahrnehmung des eigenen Selbsts als eines inneren Gegenstands, zu dem nur ich Zugang habe.

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Die These von der Relativität sekundärer Qualitäten, am Beispiel der Farben und der Töne

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Abstract

Eine wichtige klassische Stütze des Dispositionalismus in der Debatte um die primären und sekundären Qualitäten ist der Relativismus in Bezug auf die sekundären Qualitäten, die These also, dass die als sekundäre Qualitäten eingestuften Eigenschaften relativ auf mögliche Wahrnehmende und Wahrnehmungssituationen sind. In meinem Beitrag will ich zeigen, dass das Standardargument zugunsten dieser These verfehlt ist, wodurch der Dispositionalismus an Plausibilität verliert. Ich nutze für meine Argumentation als Beispiele die Farben und die Töne.

1. Einleitung: Die These des Dispositionalismus.

Die Frage nach dem ontologischen Status der so genannten „sekundären Qualitäten“ beschäftigt Philosophen bereits seit der Antike (Aristoteles 1995, II 6) und verstärkt seit dem 17. Jahrhundert, wo sie von Locke (⁴1981) ins Zentrum der philosophischen Überlegungen über den Geist gerückt wurde (vgl. etwa Reid 2012). Locke machte die bereits vor ihm bekannte Unterscheidung zwischen primären und sekundären Qualitäten populär und prägte so die Art und Weise, in der die entsprechende Debatte bis heute geführt wird. Zu den primären Qualitäten zählt Locke (Locke ⁴1981, S. 147) Festigkeit, Ausdehnung, Gestalt und Beweglichkeit. Zu den sekundären Qualitäten zählt er unter anderem Farben, Laute, Gerüche und Geschmacksrichtungen (ebd., S. 150).

Zu den klassischen philosophischen Thesen, die man von Locke herleitet, zählt der Dispositionalismus in Bezug auf die sekundären Qualitäten. Zwar sind sich Lockeinterpreten uneinig, ob Locke diese These selbst überhaupt vertreten wollte (vgl. Steinbrenner 2007), aber so oder so handelt es sich um eine der einflussreichsten Thesen in diesem Bereich.

Vereinfachend lautet diese These, dass die sekundären Qualitäten relationale Eigenschaften sind, genauer Dispositionen, die durch die Bezugnahme auf mögliche Beobachter ihrer Träger identifiziert sind. Eine mögliche Form der Formulierung dieser These etwa in Bezug auf die Farben lautet:

Die Farbe F eines Objekts ist seine Disposition, normalen Beobachtern unter Normalbedingungen als F zu erscheinen.

Farben und entsprechend die anderen sekundären Qualitäten sind nach Locke demnach subjektive Eigenschaften, in dem Sinne, dass Subjekte für sie eine integrale Rolle spielen. Die Grundlage für eine solche These ist gewöhnlich die Idee von der Relativität der sekundären Qualitäten (vgl. Hacker 1991, Kap. 5), die Idee also, dass es etwa Farben für Menschen und Farben für Tauben gibt. In diesem Beitrag möchte ich dafür argumentieren, dass diese These, so plausibel sie auf den ersten Blick erscheinen mag, falsch ist. Wenn dies gezeigt werden kann, verliert die These des Dispositionalismus viel von ihrer Attraktivität.

2. Das Argument aus der Wahrnehmungsstreuung

Das wichtigste Argument zur Stützung der Idee von der Relativität der sekundären Qualitäten ist das Argument aus der Wahrnehmungsstreuung (vgl. Cohen 2009, Kap. 2). Dieses Argument stützt sich auf den Hinweis, dass ein und dasselbe Objekt verschiedenen Beobachtern z. B. hinsichtlich seiner Farbe unterschiedlich erscheinen kann. Daraus wird geschlossen, dass der Nonrelativist darauf festgelegt ist, zu meinen, dass in solchen Fällen mindestens einer der Beobachter einer täuschenden Wahrnehmung anheimfällt. Nun können solche Situationen systematisch sein. So haben etwa Tauben ein völlig andersartig strukturiertes Feld der für sie wahrnehmbaren Farben als Menschen. Der Nonrelativist wäre demnach darauf festgelegt, in Bezug auf Situationen wie die oben beschriebene zu meinen, dass entweder eine Taube, die ein Objekt x betrachtet, hinsichtlich der Farbe des Objekts immer einer Täuschung obliegt oder aber jeder normale menschliche Beobachter oder aber beide. Das ist nicht plausibel. Darum sollte man mit dem Relativismus in Bezug auf die Farben bzw. die sonstigen sekundären Qualitäten eine Position wählen, die nicht auf eine so seltsame Annahme festgelegt ist (vgl. McGinn ⁴1991, Kap. 1).

Dieses Argument lässt sich relativ leicht auf die anderen sekundären Qualitäten übertragen. Es findet sich bei zahlreichen klassischen wie modernen Philosophen (vgl. etwa Russell 2010, S. 2f.). Ich hoffe, zu zeigen, dass dieses Argument nicht zwingend ist. Dabei nutze ich aus Gründen der Kürze ausschließlich Beispiele aus dem Bereich der Wahrnehmungsstreuung zwischen Spezies. Zudem beschränke ich mich auf die Beispiele der Farben und der Töne.

3. Die Schwachstellen des Arguments aus der Wahrnehmungsstreuung für den Bereich der Farben

Das Argument aus der Wahrnehmungsstreuung hat zwei Schwachstellen. Die erste ist, dass man mit ihm anscheinend ebenfalls zeigen könnte, dass die Formen der uns umgebenden Dinge als relative Eigenschaften betrachtet werden sollten. Auch hier können systematische Unterschiede in ihrer Wahrnehmung auftreten. Der Relativist in Bezug auf die Farben wäre also in Erklärungsnot. Er müsste entweder einen Grund angeben können, warum sich die Formen in relevanter Hinsicht nicht für ein entsprechendes Argument eignen sollten, oder aber behaupten, dass auch die Formen eines Dinges relativ auf die

Beschaffenheit ihrer möglichen Beobachter sind. Ersteres wurde von vielen Philosophen versucht, auch in der aktuellen Debatte um das Argument aus der Wahrnehmungsstreuung. Mir scheinen diese Versuche aber nicht erfolgreich, meistens darum, weil sie häufig ein *petitio principii* enthalten. Zu letzterem wären nur die allerwenigsten derer bereit, die das Argument aus der Wahrnehmungsstreuung nutzen.

Die zweite große Schwachstelle des Arguments aus der Wahrnehmungsstreuung ist die folgende: Man überlege sich das folgende Gedankenexperiment. Hans und Georg stehen auf einer Wiese und betrachten eine Blume. Hans ist ein Mensch. Georg eine sprachbegabte Taube. Würde man die beiden nach der Farbe der Blume fragen, dann würde Hans antworten, sie sei gelb, Georg aber, sie sei grot. Nach dem Argument aus der Wahrnehmungsstreuung muss nun ein Nonrelativist einen solchen Fall so deuten, dass einer von beiden Recht hat oder keiner, nicht aber beide.

Bei genauerer Betrachtung ist dieser Schluss aber nicht zwingend. Nach der Art, wie dieses Gedankenexperiment gedacht wurde, sind gelb und grot Farbbegriffe. Sie sind beide jeweils Teil einer Sprache, genauer eines Begriffssystems von Farbbegriffen. Man kann sich nun vorstellen, dass Hans mit der Zeit Georgs Sprache erlernt. Bei einem solchen Prozess sind drei mögliche Fälle denkbar.

Fall I: Der korrekte Gebrauch von „grot“ kann vom Menschen vollständig gemeistert werden.

Fall II: Der korrekte Gebrauch von „grot“ kann vom Menschen prinzipiell nicht gemeistert werden.

Fall III: Der korrekte Gebrauch von „grot“ kann vom Menschen teilweise gemeistert werden.

Tauben können mit ihren auf vier im Gegensatz zu den menschlichen drei Zäpfchen basierenden visuellen System zum Erkennen von Farben mehr Farben unterscheiden als wir. Insofern wäre es nicht verwunderlich, wenn sie, könnten sie sprechen, uns ihre visuelle Erfahrung nicht vollständig mitteilen könnten, und zwar nicht durch eine geistige Unzulänglichkeit auf ihrer, sondern durch eine biologische auf unserer Seite. Andererseits ist nicht gesagt, dass nicht ein Großteil ihres Farbvokabulars, über das sie in einem solchen fiktiven Fall verfügen würden, für uns beherrschbar werden könnte.

In allen drei Fällen kann der Nonrelativist jedoch Antworten geben, warum seine These hier nicht zu problematischen Implikationen führt. Im ersten Fall gibt es eine objektive Antwort darauf, ob das Objekt nun gelb ist oder nicht. Auch wenn die Worte „gelb“ und „grot“ nicht dieselbe Farbe bezeichnen sollten, dann sind sie in diesem Fall ineinander übersetzbar, so dass kein prinzipieller Konflikt zwischen Hans und Georg hinsichtlich der Farbe des Objekts vorliegt. In ähnlicher Weise kann man die verschiedenen Worte des Russischen für helleres und dunkleres Blau übersetzen und sich nach der Übersetzung begründet darüber streiten, welche Farbe ein Objekt hat.

In dem zweiten Fall ist keine Übersetzung möglich. Wir führen unsere Farbbegriffe zuallererst durch Hinweise ein, etwa indem wir Kindern Spielklötze mit der entsprechenden Farbe zeigen und sie benennen. Wenn Georg ein derart anderes visuelles System hat, dass uns seine Hinweise nichts nützen, dann können wir seine Farbbegriffe auch nicht zu gebrauchen lernen. Aber auch in einem solchen Fall ist der Nonrelativist nicht darauf festgelegt, zu meinen, dass hier nur entweder Hans oder Georg oder keiner von beiden richtig liegen können. Vielmehr kann es

zwischen beiden keinen genuine Konflikt geben. Da die Begriffe des Gelben und der Gröte zwei völlig verschiedenen Begriffssystemen angehören, bestehen keine logischen Beziehungen zwischen ihnen. Demnach können aber auch keine Ausschlussbeziehungen zwischen ihnen bestehen. Es ist eine begriffliche Wahrheit, dass etwas nicht gleichzeitig vollständig rot und grün sein kann. Aber solche begrifflichen Wahrheiten, die logische Ausschlussbeziehungen artikulieren, können in Bezug auf zwei auf diese Weise verschiedene Begriffssysteme gar nicht bestehen.

Im dritten Fall nun entsteht ebenfalls keine Erklärungsnot für den Nonrelativisten. Wenn ein Teil der Sprache von Georg in eine menschliche Sprache übersetzbar ist, dann kann es über diesen Bereich genuine Konflikte geben, über den nicht übersetzbaren Diskursbereich kann es wie im II. Fall keine solchen Konflikte geben. So oder so entsteht nicht die Notwendigkeit für den Nonrelativisten, zu behaupten, dass nur einer von beiden Beobachtern richtig liegen kann. Das Argument aus der Wahrnehmungsstreuung ist für den Bereich der Farben daher nicht zwingend.

4. Die Schwachstellen des Arguments aus der Wahrnehmungsstreuung für den Bereich der Töne

Ich möchte nun zeigen, wie man diese Strategie gegen das Argument aus der Wahrnehmungsstreuung auch im Bereich der Töne, welche von Locke ebenfalls als sekundäre Qualitäten angesprochen werden, übertragen kann. Dabei möchte ich damit beginnen, auf ein mögliches Problem der These des Dispositionalismus im Bereich der Töne hinzuweisen. Töne können keine Dispositionen sein. Dispositionen sind Eigenschaften, Töne sind Ereignisse (O’Gallaghan 2010; Hacker 1991, S. 101ff.). Zwar kann man von dem Ton einer Orgelflöte sprechen. Doch ist hier gemeint, dass es sich um denjenigen Ton handelt, den die Flöte erzeugen würde, würde man die entsprechende Taste an der Orgel betätigen. Der Vorteil der Dispositionalismthese, auf den in der Debatte um die Natur der Farben immer wieder hingewiesen wurde, ist, dass sie die Farben als kategoriale Eigenschaften ausschließt und so weniger genuine Eigenschaften in unserer Ontologie erlaubt und zugleich ermöglicht, die Farben als Eigenschaften der uns umgebenden Objekte anzusehen. Das Beispiel der Orgelflöte legt nahe, dass dies für die Töne in der gleichen Weise geleistet werden könnte. Doch handelt es sich hier um eine eher außergewöhnliche Aussage über die Töne. Was ist in dem Satz „Der Aufprall des Autos auf der Wand klang fürchterlich.“ als Träger der entsprechenden Disposition zu denken: das Auto, die Wand, der Aufprall selbst? Keine dieser Lösungen scheint befriedigend. Am ehesten könnte man sagen, dass das Auto und die Wand zusammen die Disposition besitzen, unter bestimmten Bedingungen (einer hohen Geschwindigkeit des Autos und dem Vorhandensein entsprechender Hörer) einen entsprechenden Ton zu erzeugen. Eine solche Antwort ist zumindest weit weniger intuitiv als die entsprechenden Überlegungen Lockes für den Bereich der Farben.

Wenn man diese Schwierigkeit umgehen kann, dann ist erneut darauf hinzuweisen, dass das Argument aus der Wahrnehmungsstreuung zwar auch in Bezug auf Ereignisse formulierbar ist, aber auch in Bezug auf diese mehr zeigt, als es soll. Jedes Ereignis kann von verschiedenen Beobachtern prinzipiell unterschiedlich wahrgenommen werden. Daraus müsste der Relativist *prima facie* schließen, dass die Existenz eines jeden Ereignisses von Beobachtern abhängig ist. Auch dies würden nur wenige Pro-

ponenten eines entsprechenden Arguments tun wollen. Unabhängig davon ist aber auch für den Bereich der Töne das klassische Argument für die These der Relativität der sekundären Qualitäten verfehlt.

Man kann, mit einigen Einschränkungen¹, sagen, dass Hunde Töne von höherer Frequenz hören können als Menschen. Doch man wäre wohl nicht geneigt zu sagen, dass es Töne geben kann, die prinzipiell von niemandem gehört werden können. Das Argument aus der Wahrnehmungsstreuung würde nun so einsetzen: Hans und Bello sind ein Mensch und ein sprachbegabter Hund. Beide hören einen Ton. Hans bezeichnet den Ton als Knall, während Bello den Ton als Knüll bezeichnet. Hans erlernt nach und nach nun auch die Sprache der sprachfähigen Hunde. Wieder sind drei mögliche Fälle denkbar:

Fall I: Der korrekte Gebrauch von „Knüll“ kann vom Menschen vollständig gemeistert werden.

Fall II: Der korrekte Gebrauch von „Knüll“ kann vom Menschen prinzipiell nicht gemeistert werden.

Fall III: Der korrekte Gebrauch von „Knüll“ kann vom Menschen teilweise gemeistert werden.

Und wieder verhalten sich die Lösungen aus Sicht des Nonrelativisten ähnlich. Im ersten Fall ist ein genuiner Konflikt zwischen den beiden Sprechern möglich, wodurch für den Nonrelativisten kein Problem entsteht. Im dritten Fall ist er teilweise möglich. Im zweiten Fall ist er unmöglich, wodurch ihre Ansichten aber auch in keinem Widerspruch stehen.

Nun kann man einwenden wollen, dass es hier doch, anders als bei den Farben, auch den Fall geben kann, dass Hans einen Ton nicht hört, der für Bello aber hörbar ist: muss hier nicht ein Fall vorliegen, in dem man plausibel für die Relativität der Töne argumentieren kann, da hier nicht die Beschaffenheit, sondern die Existenz des entsprechenden Phänomens selbst infrage steht. Man könnte das Argument aus der Wahrnehmungsstreuung demnach folgendermaßen abwandeln: Nach Ansicht des Nonrelativisten muss einer von beiden Beobachtern hier einer täuschenden Beobachtung unterliegen. Es gibt aber keinen guten Grund, einem von beiden zugunsten des anderen Unrecht zu geben. Darum ist der Nonrelativismus nicht plausibel.

Ich denke, dass hier kein fundamentales Problem für den Nonrelativisten entsteht. Falls das erweiterte Spektrum hörbarer Töne Bellos Sprachgemeinschaft zum Einführen und Nutzen von Begriffen verleitet hat, die sich nur auf die für Menschen unhörbaren Begriffe anwenden lassen, dann können wir diese Begriffe prinzipiell nicht gebrauchen. Aber auch in diesem Fall wäre es falsch, zu meinen, dass ein genuiner Konflikt zwischen Hans und Bello darüber vorliegen kann, ob da ein Ton war oder nicht. Denn Hans hat nicht das entsprechende Begriffssystem um mit Bello begründet über diesen Punkt zu streiten. Somit können Bellos Aussagen über diese Töne niemals im Konflikt zu Aussagen von Hans oder einem anderen Verwender menschlicher Sprachen stehen. Darum hat das Argument aus der Wahrnehmungsstreuung auch in diesem Bereich keine Kraft, wodurch die Idee von der Relativität und ebenso die These des Dispositionalismus ihre wichtigste Stütze in diesem Bereich verlieren.

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¹ Die wichtigste Einschränkung, die man bei einer solchen Aussage machen muss, ist, dass es im engeren Sinne keine Töne geben kann, die der Mensch prinzipiell nicht hören kann. Denn unsere Sprachen definieren, was ein Ton ist. Andererseits ist das Verhalten von Hunden dem menschlichen Verhalten beim Hören von etwas in Fällen von Schallphänomenen von höherer Frequenz definitiv hinreichend ähnlich, um hier von dem Hören von Tönen einem weniger anspruchsvollen Sinne zu sprechen. Letztere Konzeption von Tönen kann man dem menschlichen Spektrum des Hörens von Tönen gegenüberstellen und diese als die anspruchsvolle Konzeption von Tönen bezeichnen. Im Sinne der anspruchsvollen Konzeption von Tönen ist es also sinnlos, zu meinen, dass ein Lebewesen Töne hören kann, die vom Menschen prinzipiell nicht gehört werden können; im Sinne der anspruchslosen Konzeption ist eine solche Aussage unproblematisch.

Mathematik und Empirie beim späten Wittgenstein

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Abstract

In den späten Nachlassbemerkungen (etwa 1937-1944) betont Wittgenstein wiederholt die Relevanz der Gegebenheiten der Welt, der Erfahrung und der Bewährung für die Mathematik. Dies ist in den letzten Jahren auf verschiedene Weise als Abkehr oder zumindest Relativierung der These, mathematische Sätze seien grammatische Sätze und damit der Empirie gegenüber autonom, gelesen worden. Ich werde zunächst argumentieren, dass der Empirie zwar eine pragmatische Relevanz für die Entwicklung von Mathematik zukommt, die Gültigkeit mathematischer Regeln und mithin ihre Unumstößlichkeit davon aber völlig unabhängig bleibt (contra Weiberg 2008). Dann werde ich untersuchen, wie weit diese pragmatische Rolle reicht. Dabei werde ich zeigen, dass es nicht nur einen Einfluss der Empirie auf die Entwicklung der Mathematik gibt, sondern die Mathematik auch ihrerseits unsere (wissenschaftlichen) Beschreibungen der Empirie beeinflusst und dass die Tätigkeit des Mathematikers eine echt kreative Tätigkeit ist, die folglich durch empirische Gegebenheiten zwar motiviert aber nicht vorgegeben wird (contra Steiner 2009).

1. Bewährung und Gültigkeit

Auch wenn die Mathematik auf den ersten Blick manchmal weltfremd erscheinen mag, wäre unser Alltag ohne sie nicht denkbar. Wir verwenden sie u.a. bei der Aushandlung von Tauschgeschäften, beim Kochen, beim Tennisspielen, aber auch in der Konstruktion technischer Geräte oder bei der Verschlüsselung sensibler Daten beim Online-Banking und an zahlreichen anderen Stellen. In allen diesen Anwendungen hat sich die Mathematik für uns bestens bewährt. Sie ist also alles andere als ein reines Formelspiel, vielmehr ist es – auch für den studierten Ingenieur Wittgenstein – „der Gebrauch außerhalb der Mathematik [...], was das Zeichenspiel zur Mathematik macht“ (BGM V §2).

Wenn die außermathematische Anwendbarkeit einen zentralen Aspekt von Mathematik darstellt, scheint irgendein Zusammenhang zwischen Mathematik und empirischen Gegebenheiten zu bestehen. Aber welcher?

In BGM I §37 entwirft Wittgenstein das folgende Szenario:

Lege 2 Äpfel auf die leere Tischplatte, schau daß niemand in ihre Nähe kommt und der Tisch nicht erschüttert wird; nun lege noch 2 Äpfel auf die Tischplatte; nun zähle die Äpfel, die da liegen. Du hast ein Experiment gemacht; das Ergebnis der Zählung ist wahrscheinlich 4. (Wir würden das Ergebnis so darstellen: wenn man unter den und den Umständen erst 2, dann noch 2 Äpfel auf den Tisch legt, verschwindet zumeist keiner, noch kommt einer dazu.) Und analoge Experimente kann man, mit dem gleichen Ergebnis, mit allerlei festen Körpern ausführen. – So lernen ja die Kinder bei uns rechnen, denn man läßt sie 3 Bohnen hinlegen und noch 3 Bohnen und dann zählen, was da liegt. Käme dabei einmal 5, einmal 7 heraus, (etwa darum weil, *wie wir jetzt sagen würden*, einmal von selbst eine dazu-, einmal eine wegstäbe), so würden wir zunächst Bohnen als für den Rechenunterricht ungeeignet erklären. Geschähe das Gleiche aber mit Stäben, Fingern, Strichen und den meisten andern Dingen, so hätte das Rechnen damit ein Ende.

„Aber wäre dann nicht doch noch $2+2=4$?“ – Das Sätzchen wäre damit unbrauchbar geworden. –

Hier werden in Bezug auf den Zusammenhang zwischen Rechnen und empirischen Gegebenheiten zwei Fälle unterschieden. Der erste Fall ist unkontrovers: Wenn die Bohnen sich auf die oben problematisierte Weise verhielten, würden wir an unserem Rechensystem festhalten und Bohnen als für den Rechenunterricht ungeeignet erklären, bzw. feststellen, dass Bohnen *kein Anwendungsfall* für die Arithmetik sind. Ebenso ist die Arithmetik ja beispielsweise auch nicht auf Wassertropfen anwendbar, bei denen zwei Tropfen und zwei Tropfen einfach einen großen Tropfen ergeben. Im zweiten Fall, wenn sich Dinge mehrheitlich spontan vermehren oder dezimieren würden, hätte das Rechnen keine Anwendung mehr und „damit ein Ende“. Wie ist nun dieser Fall zu verstehen?

Weiberg (2008) sieht hierin eine „Relativierung“ des normativen Charakters des Rechnens und Zählens; unter bestimmten Umständen würden wir „unser Rechensystem verwerfen“ (2008:29-30, meine Hvb.). Unser Rechensystem wäre also nur zum Teil regelartig und zum Teil auch eine (sehr allgemeine) Beschreibung der Natur. Mathematische Sätze wären folglich nicht mehr systematisch von empirischer Zurückweisung ausgeschlossen.

Diese Interpretation scheint mir jedoch nicht dazu zu passen, dass Wittgenstein auf die Nachfrage seines Dialogpartners zum zweiten Szenario: „Aber wäre dann nicht doch noch $2+2=4$?“ präzisiert, dieser Satz sei damit *unbrauchbar* geworden. Es ist nicht ohne weiteres einzusehen, weshalb mit der Unbrauchbarkeit zugleich die Ungültigkeit der mathematischen Regel einhergehen sollte. Da Wittgenstein eine solche Abhängigkeit zwischen diesen beiden Eigenschaften hier nicht thematisiert, erscheint es mir naheliegend, dass er das „Ende“ des Rechnens als ein praktisches Ende verstanden wissen will. D.h. wir würden in diesem zweiten Fall nicht mehr rechnen, weil das Rechnen keine Anwendung hätte; wir könnten mit unseren Rechenregeln also nichts mehr anfangen, sie wären damit aber nicht *falsch* bzw. *ungültig*. Ähnlich verhielte es sich, wenn der empirische Druck auf die Regeln – wie in der Bemerkung angedeutet – sogar noch verschärft würde und nicht einmal unsere Rechenhilfsmittel wie Finger oder Strichsymbole statisch blieben. In diesem Fall hätte das Rechnen vielleicht sogar insofern ein Ende, dass wir keine Rechnungen mehr *durchführen*, das Rechnen also nicht einmal mehr als inhaltsloses Formelspiel betreiben könnten. Zumindest kompliziertere Mathematik scheint ohne das Hinschreiben von Symbolen zur Visualisierung unmöglich zu sein. Es gibt folglich so etwas wie eine anthro-

pologische Grenze, was unsere Möglichkeiten anbelangt, Regeln zu folgen. Aber selbst wenn ein solcher Zustand, der uns das Rechnen aus anthropologischen Gründen unmöglich machte, plötzlich eintreten würde, wären die Rechnungen nicht ungültig, sondern *nicht mehr ausführbar*.

Dass die Unterscheidung zwischen Brauchbarkeit/Ausführbarkeit und Gültigkeit mathematischer Regeln in dieser Bemerkung keinesfalls aufgegeben wird, wird noch deutlicher, wenn man sich vor Augen führt, welchen Zweck die Diskussion dieser obskuren Fälle verfolgt. Sie sind nicht um ihrer selbst Willen interessant, sondern dienen dazu, uns etwas über *unsere* Mathematik zu verdeutlichen. In einer Welt wie im zweiten Fall beschrieben, würden wir keine Arithmetik herausbilden (ebenso wenig wie die Begriffe „dazukommen“ und „wegkommen“, wie Wittgenstein in seiner Klammerbemerkung festhält). Im Umkehrschluss lässt sich daher sagen, dass die Anwendbarkeit bei der Entwicklung von Mathematik eine sehr wichtige Rolle spielt.

Diese Rolle mag sogar soweit gehen, dass wir nur solche mathematischen Regeln bilden, die sich auch in der Praxis anwenden lassen (und natürlich nur solche, die wir überhaupt bilden können). Der Inhalt der Mathematik wäre dann *pragmatisch abhängig* von der Empirie. Doch selbst ein solche pragmatische Abhängigkeit würde die Frage nach der Gültigkeit mathematischer Regeln nicht mal tangieren, wie der Blick in die mathematische Praxis zeigt: Nach den Regeln dieser Praxis ist das Vorliegen eines Beweises das notwendige und hinreichende Kriterium für die Wahrheit eines mathematischen Satzes bzw. für die Gültigkeit einer mathematischen Regel. Nützlichkeit mag zwar einen pragmatischen, psychologischen oder gar moralischen Grund darstellen, bestimmte Teilgebiete der Mathematik zu verfolgen und andere nicht (und gänzlich unnütze Systeme werden möglicherweise gar nicht erst entwickelt), aber sie ist kein *mathematischer* Grund, einen Satz anzunehmen. Selbst einer mathematischen Vermutung wird nicht auf Grund ihrer Nützlichkeit der Status eines mathematischen Satzes verliehen: Ganze Dissertationen wurden „unter Annahme der Riemannschen Vermutung“ geschrieben – aber eben nur *unter der Annahme*. Es gehört zu den Kriterien mathematischen Schließens, dass wir keine Bezugnahme auf empirische Gegebenheiten als Argument zulassen.

Die mathematische Praxis passt also nicht zu der Behauptung, dass die Aspekte der Anwendbarkeit oder Bewährung die Normativität mathematischer Regeln relativieren. Und aus Wittgensteins Bemerkung folgt auch keinesfalls, dass diese Aspekte zu den „Kriterien“ des Rechnens gehören, wie Weiberg behauptet (2008:31).

2. Wie weit reicht der Einfluss der Empirie?

In wie weit ist der Inhalt der Mathematik nun aber tatsächlich von der Empirie beeinflusst?

Steiner (2009) vertritt die These, dass die Gegebenheiten der Welt *bestimmen*, welche mathematischen Regeln wir überhaupt aufstellen können. Ihm zufolge sind zwar wir diejenigen, die die Sätze, die „empirische Regularitäten“ ausdrücken, zu mathematischen Regeln „verhärten“ und ihnen so ihre Normativität verleihen (vgl. 2009:1-2), welche Regeln überhaupt möglich sind, wird aber durch diese Regularitäten bestimmt – also empirisch.

Die Situation stellt sich nach Steiner wie folgt dar: Regularitäten in der physikalischen Welt führen auf ein gleichförmiges Verhalten. Dieses Verhalten wiederum nehmen

wir zum Anlass, die Regularität zur Regel zu erklären: Das was zunächst meistens der Fall ist, so dass Abweichungen als Ausnahmen angesprochen werden können, erklären wir nun „richtig“ und Abweichungen für „falsch“. Regeln dürfen also nicht als willkürliche Setzungen gelesen werden und ihre Anwendbarkeit auf die Welt ist keinesfalls Zufall. Sie sind vielmehr „grounded in empirical regularities“ (2009:3).

Soweit könnte man Steiners Interpretation so auffassen, als würden uns die empirischen Gegebenheiten bei der Entwicklung der Mathematik, bzw. der elementaren Arithmetik, indirekt anleiten, weil wir mit der Arithmetik bestimmte Zwecke in der Anwendung auf feste Körper verfolgen, die sich aus unserer Erfahrung mit festen Körpern ergeben. Tatsächlich geht seine Interpretation aber noch wesentlich weiter: „Mathematical theorems [...] are ‘dependent on experience’. [They] are rules which are ‘supervenient’ on experience“ und folglich „the only rules available“ (2009:10,12).

Seine Interpretation des späten Wittgenstein findet Steiner vor allem durch zwei Punkte bestätigt:

- 1) Während Wittgenstein noch in den PB davon ausgeht, dass es nicht „zwei unabhängige Beweise eines mathematischen Satzes geben“ kann (PB:184), erklärt er in den BGM, dass es „natürlich Unsinn [wäre] zu sagen, dass *ein* Satz nicht mehrere Beweise haben kann“ (BGM III §58).

Laut Steiner würde seine Interpretation hier eine Erklärung bieten. Wenn mathematische Sätze als zur Regel verhärtete Regularitäten auf physikalischen Tatsachen basieren, liefern diese Regularitäten eine Möglichkeit „to identify a mathematical proposition independently of its proof“ (2009:3). Es wäre dann möglich, einen mathematischen Satz unabhängig von seinem Beweis als mathematischen Satz anzusprechen und über diesen Satz zu sagen, dass er mehr als einen Beweis haben kann.

Ich werde an anderer Stelle versuchen darzulegen, dass diese in der Tat interessante Textbeobachtung auf andere Weise erklärt werden kann. Steiners Lesart bietet jedoch auch nur scheinbar eine Lösung. Wenn nämlich die Unabhängigkeit von Satz und Beweis darauf beruht, dass mathematische Sätze über die ihnen zugrunde liegenden physikalischen Regularitäten identifiziert werden können, macht das die Beweise zugleich überflüssig; zur Entdeckung dieser Regularitäten genügte schließlich die Beobachtung. Unterstellt man den Mathematikerinnen in ihrem Bemühen um Beweise bei gleichzeitiger Außerachtlassung der Empirie nicht kollektive methodische Blindheit, ist diese Interpretation daher inkompatibel mit der mathematischen Praxis, die Wittgenstein gar nicht in Frage stellen will (vgl. PU §124).

- 2) In den BGM und LFM gibt es zahlreiche Stellen, an denen Wittgenstein auf die für das Rechnen charakteristische große Übereinstimmung in den Handlungen und Ergebnissen hinweist.

Nun ist Übereinstimmung in der Handlungsweise bei Wittgenstein eine Voraussetzung für das Regelfolgen im Allgemeinen und folglich *allein schon deshalb* auch für die Etablierung mathematischer Regeln. Denn wie er in den PU darlegt, ergibt es sich nicht aus der richtigen Deutung des Regelausdrucks, was als das richtige Befolgen einer Regel gilt, sondern es zeigt sich in den übereinstimmenden Handlungen. Daraus folgt aber keinesfalls, dass allen Regeln physikalische Regularitäten zugrunde lägen. Steiners Interpretation hängt also maßgeblich von seiner These ab, dass in Bezug auf *mathematische* Regeln gilt: „The-

se regularities in behavior presuppose, in turn, physical regularities.“ (2009:22, vgl. auch 2009:15)

Ist diese These haltbar? Wie oben dargelegt, lässt sich aus Stellen wie dem eingangs diskutierten Bohnen-Beispiel lediglich schließen, dass aus Wittgensteins Sicht bei der Entwicklung der *Arithmetik* Erfahrungen mit festen Körpern eine wichtige Rolle gespielt haben. Doch darauf, dass dies auch für alle anderen Teile der Mathematik gilt und dass die relevanten physikalische Regularitäten gar *festlegen*, welche mathematischen Regeln überhaupt möglich sind, finden sich in Wittgensteins Bemerkungen meiner Einschätzung nach keine ausreichenden Hinweise. Vielmehr ist dieser Schluss inkompatibel mit zwei anderen Erwägungen aus den BGM, nämlich (i) mit der These, dass der „Mathematiker [...] ein Erfinder [ist], kein Entdecker“ (BGM I §168) und (ii) mit der Überlegung, dass die Mathematik erst bestimme, was wir Tatsachen nennen: „Warum soll [die Mathematik] nicht, statt uns ‚Tatsachen zu lehren‘, die Formen dessen schaffen, was wir Tatsachen nennen?“ (BGM VII §18)

Für Steiner besteht die einzige Freiheit darin, die vorgefundenen Regularitäten nicht zu Regeln zu verhärten: „The only degree of freedom is to avoid laying down these rules [i.e. the only rules available], not to adopt alternative rules. It is only in this sense that the mathematician is an inventor, not a discoverer.“ (2009:12) Dass die Natur keinen physischen Zwang auf uns ausübt, Regeln zu adaptieren, wir also in dieser Hinsicht „frei“ sind, kann wahrscheinlich als ein ziemlich unstrittiger Punkt gelten. Es leuchtet allerdings nicht ein, weshalb eine solche prinzipielle Möglichkeit der Annahme-Verweigerung Wittgenstein veranlassen sollte, die Tätigkeit des Mathematikers wiederholt als einen kreativen Akt des „Erfindens“ zu beschreiben. Nach Steiners Interpretation wäre „Entdecken“ die näher liegende Tätigkeitsbeschreibung. Und so schreibt er selbst auch an anderer Stelle: „Once the appropriate empirical regularities are *discovered*, the apparent ‘freedom’ to extend mathematics any which way vanishes.“ (2009:13, meine Hvb.)

Davon zu sprechen, dass die Mathematik „die Formen dessen schafft, was wir Tatsachen nennen“, erscheint Steiner unproblematisch. Gemäß seiner Interpretation ist ja die Mathematik ihrerseits von den Tatsachen bestimmt: „the internal relationship between the regularities and the rules makes it impossible to think of an ‘alternative arithmetic’“ (2009:12). Wie aus dem Kontext der Bemerkung hervorgeht, will Wittgenstein genau dies aber bestreiten und deutlich machen, dass der sinnlogische Zusammenhang dieser internen Verbindung zwischen Mathematik und Empirie anders herum verläuft. Weiter oben in derselben Bemerkung heißt es nämlich:

Wenn nun die Mathematik erst den *Charakter* dessen bestimmt, was du ‚Tatsache‘ nennst! ‚Es ist interessant zu wissen, *wieviele* Schwingungen dieser Ton

hat.‘ Aber die Arithmetik hat dich diese Frage erst gelehrt. Sie hat dich gelehrt, diese Art von Tatsachen zu sehen. (BGM VII §18)

Hier wird hervorgehoben, dass mathematische Regeln sinnlogische Voraussetzungen für das Sprechen über bestimmte Tatsachen sind. Sie liefern die Formen möglicher Beschreibungen von Tatsachen und sind so (mit-)bestimmend für „den *Charakter* dessen was wir ‚Tatsache‘ nennen“. Die Natur ist also mathematisch strukturiert, weil wir sie mit mathematischen Mitteln beschreiben. Anstatt dass, wie es bei Steiner heißt, „arithmetic can not be in contradiction with empirical regularities because arithmetic rules are stipulated to be derived from these very facts“ (2009:12), können mathematische Regeln nicht an der Erfahrung scheitern, weil sie eben nicht aus der Natur gewonnen wurden, sondern in der Beschreibung von Natur vorausgesetzt sind. Letzteres schließt allerdings nicht aus, dass empirische Gegebenheiten bei der Entwicklung dieser Regeln eine Rolle spielen.

Anders als Steiners Interpretation ließe diese Interpretation auch die Möglichkeit von Mathematik zu, die (zunächst noch) keine Anwendung hat. Auch Wittgensteins Beschreibung der Mathematik als Teil des „*apparatus of language*“ und „*preparations for a use of language*“ (LFM:249-250) lässt dafür Raum. Ob Wittgenstein die Möglichkeit von Mathematik, die erst nachträglich eine Anwendung findet, tatsächlich mit bedacht, ist fraglich und es wäre darzulegen, wie sich die Entwicklung solcher Mathematik aus Wittgensteinianischer Perspektive erklären ließe. Aus systematischer Sicht kann aber zunächst mal festgehalten werden, dass seine Position, so interpretiert, zumindest mit der Möglichkeit solcher Mathematik kompatibel ist. Sie müsste mithin nicht gleich für unhaltbar erklärt werden, weil sie ein relevantes Phänomen nicht erklären kann, wie das nach Steiners Interpretation der Fall wäre.

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Gedächtnis und Erinnerung als Bedingungen personaler Identität? Überlegungen am Beispiel von Demenzbetroffenen

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Abstract

Von John Locke ausgehend wird als Konstitutivum von personaler Identität häufig Gedächtnis bzw. Erinnerungsvermögen genannt. Betrachtet man aber personale Identität unter diesem Aspekt, wäre Demenzbetroffenen zum einen der Personstatus abzuerkennen und zum anderen auch ihre Identität. Im folgenden Beitrag wird dafür argumentiert, Gedächtnis nicht als notwendige Bedingung für personale Identität aufzufassen, weil das Gedächtnis auch bei kognitiv gesunden Menschen nicht immer in idealer Weise funktioniert. Es wird abschließend eine andere Möglichkeit vorgeschlagen, personale Identität zu verstehen.

Personsein impliziert nach John Locke (Selbst-)Bewusstsein. Menschsein hingegen ist nach Locke nur an die biologische Funktion des Körpers gebunden. Personsein aber ist die Voraussetzung für Identität. Daher muss man,

„um festzustellen, worin die Identität der Person besteht, zunächst untersuchen, was Person bedeutet. Meiner Meinung nach bezeichnet dieses Wort ein denkendes, verständiges Wesen, das Vernunft und Überlegung besitzt und sich selbst als sich selbst betrachten kann“ (Locke 1981, 419).

Die Person ist gemäß Locke also ein rationales Wesen, das sich über sich selbst Gedanken machen kann und auf diesem Weg des Stellungnehmens zu sich und seinen Handlungen Identität konstituiert. Locke beschreibt Identität als die Erfahrung der Person des „Sich-selbst-gleich-Bleibens“ (Locke 1981, 420), sie kann sich als dieselbe „zu verschiedenen Zeiten und an verschiedenen Orten“ (Locke 1981, 419) denken. Das Bewusstsein (consciousness) der Person, das im Sinne von Selbst-Bewusstsein zu deuten ist, ermöglicht es ihr, sich als Einheit zu erleben, indem sie die Gedanken und Handlungen ihrer Gegenwart mit jenen ihrer Vergangenheit verknüpft. Nicht der Körper, sondern das Bewusstsein der Person macht ihre Identität aus (Locke 1981, 422).

Diese Verknüpfung von Gedächtnis bzw. Erinnerung mit Personsein und personaler Identität ist in der Philosophie auch gegenwärtig nicht unüblich. In diesem Sinne schreibt z.B. der Philosoph Dieter Teichert

„dass Erinnerung oder Erinnerungsfähigkeit eine notwendige Bedingung von Personalität ist. Ein Wesen, das unfähig ist, sich zu erinnern, wird nicht als Person behandelt werden. Erinnerung wird mit guten Gründen als *Konstitutivum von Personalität* betrachtet.“ (Teichert 1999, 241)

Was aber bedeutet dies für Demenzbetroffene? Sind sie keine Personen, weil im Krankheitsverlauf ihr Gedächtnis immer schwächer und lückenhaft wird, weil sie sich kaum mehr an die nächsten Angehörigen erinnern können, diese nicht erkennen können? Verlieren Sie ihre Identität, weil sie sich nicht mehr an ihre Vergangenheit erinnern können? Diesen Fragen soll im Folgenden nachgegangen werden.

An Beispielen aus der wissenschaftlichen Literatur, aus Romanen und Erfahrungsberichten Angehöriger wird deutlich, wie der Zustand von Demenzbetroffenen sein kann und dass die Frage nach ihrem Status durchaus berechtigt

ist. So zeigen erschütternde Beispiele, wie verwirrt Demenzbetroffene sein können:

„Liliane erzählte von ihrer Mutter die Alzheimer hatte. Hin und wieder habe die Mutter sie angeschaut und gefragt: ‚Bin ich schon gestorben?‘ Einmal habe die Mutter Liliane gebeten: ‚Bitte, wenn ich gestorben bin, sag es mir.‘ Liliane habe ihr versichert: ‚Natürlich, Mama, wenn du gestorben bist, werde ich es dir sagen.‘“ (Geiger 2011, 138)

Ein weiteres Beispiel mag neben der Verwirrtheit von Demenzbetroffenen zudem illustrieren, wie wenig verlässlich deren Gedächtnis ist:

„Mrs B, aged 82, woke one morning and turned to her husband in alarm. ‘What are you doing there? Get out of the bed. I don’t know you.’ The husband’s distress was compounded when the GP arrived and Mrs B greeted him warmly: ‘How nice to see you doctor. Why are you here?’“ (NSW 2003, 25)

Gemäß diesen Schilderungen, wäre Demenzbetroffenen, die sich nicht mehr zu verschiedenen Zeiten an verschiedenen Orten als sich selbst denken können, tatsächlich ein Verlust ihres Personseins und ihrer Identität zu diagnostizieren.

Im Folgenden möchte ich jedoch argumentieren, dass Gedächtnis und Erinnerung nicht in diesem Ausmaß wesentlich für personale Identität sind. Denn auch gesunde Menschen vergessen vieles, das in ihrem Leben geschehen ist und das wichtig für ihr Leben war und ist. So können sich erwachsene Menschen oftmals nur an wenige Ereignisse der Kindheit erinnern. Dennoch gehen wir davon aus, dass Personen über die Jahre hinweg mit sich identisch sind und schon gar nicht würden wir ihnen deswegen ihren Personstatus aberkennen. (vgl. auch die Beiträge in Gasser/Schmidhuber 2013). Aber auch Erlebnisse, die erst gestern gewesen sind, können unserem Gedächtnis vollkommen abhanden gekommen sein. So könnte ich gestern einen interessanten Buchtitel von einem Kollegen gehört haben und ich kann mich heute beim besten Willen nicht mehr an den Titel erinnern. Aber würde mir jemand deswegen meine Identität absprechen wollen? Warum schreiben wir Erinnerung eine so große Bedeutung für personale Identität zu?

Dieter Teichert zeigt, dass trotz allem Dissens in den Debatten um Personalität und Identität hinsichtlich Erinnerung als Kriterium sowohl für Personsein als auch für Identität ein allgemeiner Konsens herrscht (Teichert 1999, 241-244). Aber welche Art von Erinnerung ist es, die konstitutiv

für Personalität sein soll? Teichert unterscheidet zwei Formen der Erinnerung (vgl. Teichert 1999, 244): Zum einen *Erfahrungserinnerung*, die auch als direkte Erinnerung oder Erinnerung der Innenperspektive bezeichnet werden kann. Das wären beispielsweise ganz konkrete Erinnerungen an die Kindheit, die Erinnerung an die nette Begegnung mit einem alten Bekannten gestern, an das gute Frühstück heute morgen. Zum anderen lassen sich *Faktenerinnerungen* als indirekte bzw. als Vergangenheitswissen nennen. Dazu zählt z.B. historisches Wissen über die Weltkriege oder auch die Erinnerung daran, dass die Uni-Bibliothek früher anders ausgesehen hat als heute.

Nun weiß man, dass bei Demenzbetroffenen das Kurzzeitgedächtnis stark nachlässt, dafür aber alte, scheinbar vergessene Erinnerungen aus der Kindheit wieder auftauchen und sehr klar sein können. Sowohl an Erfahrenes als auch an Fakten aus früheren Zeiten kann sich der Demenzbetroffene möglicherweise plötzlich sehr deutlich erinnern. Martin Suter greift dieses Phänomen in seinem Roman *Small World* auf, indem er in dem an Demenz erkrankten Hauptdarsteller Kindheitserinnerungen wach werden lässt, die einen Kriminalfall aufdecken.

Interessanterweise erkennen Demenzbetroffene oftmals Angehörige auf (alten) Photos wieder, nicht aber, wenn sie vor ihnen stehen:

„Norbert erzählt von einem Freund, dessen Mutter Alzheimer hat. Den Sohn erkennt sie seit längerem nicht mehr. Aber wenn er der Mutter ein Foto von sich zeigt, sagt sie: ‚Das ist mein Sohn!‘ Auch neue Fotos: ‚Das ist mein Sohn!‘ Die anwesende Person jedoch ist ihr fremd.“ (Geiger 2011, 138)

Auch kognitiv gesunde Personen können gerade Erlebtes vergessen, manche Erinnerungen aus der Vergangenheit hingegen können durch bestimmte Verfahren, wie z.B. Psychotherapie, sehr deutlich wieder ins Gedächtnis gerufen werden. Ebenso gibt es eben Vieles, an das sich Personen zwar nicht mehr erinnern können, das sie aber sehr geprägt hat, wie z.B. traumatische, aber verdrängte Kindheitserlebnisse. Das Vergangene spiegelt sich schließlich in der Persönlichkeit, im Charakter der Person wider. Ähnlich macht dies Arno Geiger am Beispiel seines an Demenz erkrankten Vaters deutlich. Sein Vater habe viel aus seinem Leben, seiner Vergangenheit vergessen, aber: „Er hat seine Erinnerungen in Charakter umgemünzt und der Charakter war ihm geblieben. Die Erfahrungen, die ihn geprägt hatten, taten weiterhin ihre Wirkung.“ (Geiger 2011, 73)

„Oft sehe in dem armen, seines Verstandes beraubten Menschen den Vater früherer Tage. Wenn die Augen klar blicken und er mich anlächelt, was ja zum Glück sehr oft geschieht, dann weiß ich, dass sich auch für ihn mein Besuch gelohnt hat. Oft ist es, als wisse er nichts und verstehe alles.“ (Geiger 2011, 186)

Aber nicht nur das Erinnern an Vergangenes, auch das Antizipieren von Zukünftigem spielt oftmals eine Rolle für das Verständnis personaler Identität. Die Idee des Selbst-Gleich-Bleibens und sich zu verschiedenen Zeiten und Orten als dieselbe Person denken zu können, scheint für gesunde Menschen vor allem auch deshalb wichtig, weil sie ihr Leben planen wollen. Demenzbetroffene hingegen leben sehr stark im Moment, im Augenblick. Im Gegensatz zu geistig gesunden Menschen, die ihr Leben planen und selbst bestimmen wollen, was sie heute, morgen und in drei Monaten, vielleicht sogar in fünf Jahren mit ihrem Leben anfangen wollen, können Demenzbetroffene den Augenblick scheinbar genießen, ohne an ihre Zukunft oder Vergangenheit zu denken. In literarischen Beispielen

wird das besonders deutlich. So etwa in Lisa Genovas Roman *Mein Leben ohne Gestern*, in welchem das Leben und der Krankheitsverlauf einer Frau namens Alice beschrieben wird, bei welcher die frühe Alzheimer-Krankheit mit 50 Jahren diagnostiziert wird. Sie war noch bis vor einem Jahr Psychologie-Professorin in Harvard, musste ihren Beruf aufgrund des Nachlassens ihrer kognitiven Fähigkeiten aufgeben und kann sich nur schwach an ihre Zeit als Professorin erinnern. Eines Tages sitzt sie mit ihrem Mann am Ufer eines Flusses, und Alice genießt ein Eis in der Sonne. Plötzlich hat sie das Gefühl, das Gebäude, das sie sieht, habe etwas Vertrautes und fragt deshalb ihren Mann danach. Er erklärt ihr, dass es sich um einen Teil von Harvard handle, worauf sie fragt:

„Oh. Habe ich in diesem Gebäude unterrichtet?“
 „Nein, du hast in einem anderen Gebäude unterrichtet, auf dieser Seite des Flusses.“ „Oh.“ „Alice, wo ist dein Büro?“ „Mein Büro? Das ist in Harvard.“ „Ja, aber wo ist Harvard?“ „In einem Gebäude auf dieser Seite des Flusses.“ „In welchem Gebäude?“ „Es ist eine Halle, glaube ich. Du weißt doch, ich gehe nicht mehr dorthin.“ „Ich weiß.“ „Dann spielt es doch keine Rolle, wo es ist, oder? Warum konzentrieren wir uns nicht auf die Dinge, die wirklich wichtig sind?“ (Genova 2009, 292)

Wertigkeiten verschieben sich, Gefühle werden anders und/oder intensiver erlebt, wie eine weitere Textpassage aus *Mein Leben ohne Gestern* zeigt, in der Alice – noch im früheren Stadium ihrer Demenzerkrankung – im Meer schwimmt:

„Sie sah über das dunkle Wasser hinaus. Ihr Körper, kräftig und gesund, hielt sie Wasser tretend an der Oberfläche, kämpfte mit jedem Instinkt um ihr Leben. Na schön, sie konnte sich nicht erinnern, heute Abend mit John gegessen zu haben oder was er gesagt hatte, wohin er noch wollte. Und es konnte gut sein, dass sie sich morgen früh nicht mehr an diese Nacht erinnern würde, aber in diesem Augenblick fühlte sie sich nicht verzweifelt. Sie fühlte sich lebendig und glücklich.“ (Genova 2009, 162)

Es ist also nicht die Erinnerung, die Alice als Person ausmacht, sondern ihr Leben im Augenblick. Alices Identität hat sich insofern verändert, als ihr nun andere Dinge wichtig sind.

Die Perspektive von Angehörigen ist besonders wertvoll, weil sie die Person vor und nach ihrer Demenzerkrankung kannten. Sie wissen um die Veränderung der Person in ihrer Identität am besten zu berichten, wie das Beispiel einer Frau zeigt, die ihren demenzkranken Ehemann pflegt:

„if you'd said to me ten years ago at the beginning of this illness, in ten years' time my husband will become immobile, speechless, doubly incontinent, unable to do anything for himself, and really has only got his music and nourishment and human touch as the three pleasures. He's also practically blind as well... And if somebody said to me, 'Does somebody in that state have any quality of life?' I think ten years ago I'd have said, 'No'. But working with him now, caring for him now, there is still quality of life there, there are still things that he appreciates. He likes the feel of the sun on his hands, he likes to see what he probably distinguishes as bright colours, but what they are he has no idea. He likes his music, he likes to be sung to, he likes to be played with in a way that you play with a small child and he loves human contact and cuddles and tickles and all these sorts of things. And yes,

there is still a quality of life there.” (Hughes/Baldwin 2006, 100f)

Es lässt sich diesbezüglich eine fast kindliche Einstellung zum Leben konstatieren. Verbundenheit mit der Natur, menschliche Nähe, das Genießen des Augenblicks und das volle Aufgehen im Moment – ohne schon an die nächsten Termine oder Vergangenes zu denken.

Nur weil sich Demenzbetroffene nicht mehr an ihre ältere und/oder jüngere Vergangenheit erinnern können, kann das nicht bedeuten, dass sie keine Personen sind und ihre personale Identität verloren haben. Vielmehr haben sie sich in ihrer personalen Identität verändert.

Ich schlage deshalb vor, Peter Strawsons Begriff der Person zu folgen. Denn Strawson beschreibt die Person als Wesen, dem sowohl mentale als auch körperliche Zustände zugeschrieben werden können. Wir schreiben Wesen, die wir als Personen verstehen, sowohl Handlungen und Absichten, Empfindungen, Gedanken, Gefühle, Wahrnehmungen und Erinnerungen zu, als auch Ortsangaben, Körperhaltungen, Größe, Gestalt und Gewicht (vgl. Strawson 1972, 113f).

Dieser Personbegriff von Strawson ist sehr weit und hat deshalb, z.B. von Harry Frankfurt, Kritik erfahren. Aber für diesen Begriff spricht, dass es gerade wegen dieser Offenheit möglich ist, auch Demenzbetroffenen den Personstatus zuzuschreiben. Denn auch ohne ausgeprägtes Erinnerungsvermögen verfügt der Demenzbetroffene noch über mentale Zustände. Zudem habe ich zu zeigen versucht, dass auch die Erinnerung mental gesunder Menschen bruchstückhaft ist. Deshalb ist es ratsam, Personsein und Identität nicht (allein) auf Erinnerung zu stützen.

Legt man den Personbegriff von Strawson zugrunde, lässt sich auch ein Begriff personaler Identität entwickeln, der es erlaubt, *Personen als von ihrem Leben geprägte Wesen zu verstehen*. An manches von dem, das Personen in ihrer Identität ausmacht, können sie sich erinnern, an anderes nicht und vieles haben sie selbst bestimmt und selbst in die Wege geleitet. Demenzbetroffene können sich in der Regel im fortgeschrittenen Stadium ihrer Erkrankung nicht mehr daran erinnern, was ihnen einst wichtig war, wie sie ihr Leben gelebt haben – wie das Beispiel der Harvard-Professorin Alice zeigt – dennoch haben sie eine Identität entwickelt, die sie ausmacht. Personale Identität so zu verstehen, setzt freilich voraus, sie als flexibles, dynamisches Gebilde aufzufassen. Denn dann ist es auch möglich, auch Demenzbetroffenen ihre personale Identität nicht abzusprechen, sondern lediglich eine Veränderung ihrer Identität zu konstatieren.

Personale Identität als ein wandelbares Gefüge zu verstehen, hat weitreichende Folgen für verschiedene Situationen von Demenzbetroffenen. Beispielsweise wenn es darum geht, ob eine Meinungsänderung des Demenzbetroffenen berücksichtigt werden soll, die einer Anweisung in seiner Patientenverfügung widerspricht. Manche Autoren sind davon überzeugt, dass die von Demenz betroffene Person ihre Meinung ändern kann, aber ihre Identität nicht verloren hat. Das spricht dafür, auch der demenzbetroffenen Person einen Widerruf ihrer Patientenverfügung zuzutrauen. Andere Autoren wiederum vertreten die Ansicht, dass die Meinung der noch nicht von Demenz betroffenen Person mehr wiegen soll. In dieser Sicht soll der Widerruf einer Patientenverfügung von demenzbetroffenen Personen nicht akzeptiert werden (vgl. Schmidhuber 2013). Diese ethischen Konflikte werden in philosophischen Debatten, wie der Dworkin-Dresser-Debatte, aber auch in der aktuellsten Stellungnahme des Deutschen Ethikrates zu Demenz sehr anschaulich (vgl. Deutscher Ethikrat 2012) und zeigen, wie wesentlich es ist, wie wir personale Identität verstehen.

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Are supererogatory acts grounded in moral hinges?

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Abstract

This paper seeks to answer the question; are supererogatory acts grounded in moral hinges? In answering this question I first set out what I mean by supererogatory acts and then propose an account of Wittgenstein's hinges, specifically an interpretation of moral hinges. I define supererogatory acts as those acts that go beyond the call of duty, literally and figuratively. I understand the concept of a *hinge* in accordance with what I take to have been Wittgenstein's intention in introducing this word to describe a particular kind of 'action-proposition' unity.

Throughout this paper I seek the limits of contextualization in understanding moral practices, suggesting that the answer to the question posed above is yes; supererogatory acts are grounded in moral hinges.

Supererogatory acts are those that are good to do but not (strictly) required by any legal code or religious authority. They are praiseworthy if done, but not obligatory in the sense that one is condemned or punished for not doing them. In some circumstance however, one may be despised for failing to carry out a supererogatory act, for example cowardice in not helping in a rescue when not required to do so. In J.O. Urmson's article *Saints and Heroes*, he defines these acts as those that are good to do but not bad not to do. (Urmson, 1958, 198-199) Supererogatory acts have the following characteristics. First, they are voluntary; the person performing the act has the discretion to go beyond the call of duty, i.e. beyond what is required by their position in the local society, their roles in local institutions and so on. They cannot be under any external constraints in their actions such as obedience to the written law, or to the internal demands of reason, i.e. Kantian moral law. Second, the merit of the act is independent of the praise assigned to the person who performed the act. Praise is an assessment of the quality of the way a person dealt with the situation she faced. Merit on the other hand is an assessment of the quality of the act itself. The third characterization of supererogatory acts is that the value of the act comes from the fact that it lies beyond the limits of duty as these are currently conceived for the relevant context. Since this act is not required, its omission does not call for a personal exemption or an excuse.

These acts are beyond any impersonal or egalitarian notion of duty; instead they call for privileging individual relationships between persons. Those relations create an imperative that is in opposition to the myriad of reasons (including non moral reasons such as causing physical harm or financial loss to the actant) not to act, and therein lies the special moral value of supererogatory acts. They are acts that are done from ideals of self-imposed morality not from principles of law or in accordance with justice.

Wittgenstein's notion of a hinge is developed in *On Certainty* where he helps us understand that the hinge beliefs of a local culture are neither conceptual nor experiential in their origin. Instead they are tacit beliefs that are usually not formulated explicitly and a fortiori they are not tested empirically but are manifested in hinge practices. Those practices are acts performed in a manner that is in accordance with some particular local moral order. Furthermore, hinge propositions are the discursive doppelgangers of hinge practices and are the wherewithal for empirical defenses of those practices should they come into question. Those hinge practices are not just grounded in local customs; they are the grounds of actions that define a local moral order. Therefore they are not rational in that they are

not derived from reasoning about the moral or prudential character of a potential activity. Instead they are simply the things (practices) we do if we are to live easily in a particular form of life without attracting criticism for what we do. For example, in some cultures walking around a black cat so as not to cross its path is an act that requires no deliberate thought, one simply acts that way because of a hinge belief (expressed as the hinge proposition 'black cats are bad luck if you cross their path') in the local culture in which one lives. Whether it is true or not that these animals exert a baleful influence is irrelevant since the role of propositional doppelgangers of dutiful actions is normative, though they masquerade as empirical.

It is the *actions* by which we perform morally worthy, unworthy or indifferent acts inhering in these hinge practices that come first, even before the *concepts* in characterizing our behavior in a given venue or activity. In other words we act before we think about or conceptualize what we are doing as we go about living in our world. Wittgenstein would support this assertion and the implication that it leads to an inversion of conventional wisdom in Western culture (Wittgenstein, 1975, 402). With Wittgenstein we now imagine that the *act* is before the *logos* and it is in the act itself that we find the ground of moral practices, not in the words or proposition that describes it or even enjoins it. This is the fundamental difference between a moral hinge (in practice) and its doppelganger, the hinge proposition. Throughout this paper, hinges are taken to be unattended matters of fact that function like a priori principles in covertly shaping human practices. Some of these practices will indeed be moral, in particular the claiming of rights and the acceptance of duties on the part of the actants.

One last explication is in order and that is for the concept of a moral practice. Moral practices are characterized by at least one or at best all of the following three qualities. 1. They are person preserving (moral) or person destroying (immoral) practices, 2. They are person enhancing (moral) or person disdaining (immoral) practices, 3. They permit autonomous choices (moral) of action or they deny autonomous (immoral) choice. (Harre` 2012) A moral hinge is one that is realized in a hinge practice characterized as moral according to the above criteria. How that hinge is manifested in action or practice determines whether or not it is moral.

Supererogatory actions are grounded in moral hinges and as such are in tension with the deliberate and rational reasons one might have to do other than act in that way. Those reasons are not necessarily moral. A case in point would be when someone did not perform an act because they were afraid of losing their own life. Supererogatory

acts can for the most part be considered as ways of fulfilling duties. Their dutiful character depends on the position of an individual in their local community. Imagine if the firefighters in a small town happened upon a house fire when their crew was off duty, they would still be expected, because of their position in the local community as firefighters, to rush into the burning house to try to save the occupants. They would not pause to reflect on whether their duty extended beyond normal working hours but instead they would act because acting in that way is a hinge practice for them if they are to live in that community as firefighters.

On the other hand if a group of local tax accountants happened by the burning house they would be celebrated as heroes if they exhibited supererogatory behavior, and ran into the burning building to save a young child. There might appear to be behaviors that seem universally good to do and not bad not to do, i.e. those that are considered 'above and beyond' the behavior expected of most people. However, we see from this brief example that the local contextualization of an act leads to different interpretations of what constitutes supererogatory behavior. Those interpretations do not fall within any clearly defined criteria, i.e. what is good to do and not bad not to do. In fact as suggested earlier, one could even be despised in the local community for not helping out with a supererogatory act such as rescuing a child from a burning house even if at great personal risk.

This discussion highlights the myriad possibilities of interpretation of a given act and should give us pause about the viability of uncovering universals in general and universal moral principles in particular. I would contend that there are no strictly universal moral hinges. There are instead local customs that influence the moral hinges assimilated into the way of life of that local moral order. Since supererogatory acts are grounded in moral hinges those acts are subject to interpretation (and characterization) by local criteria. Within a local moral order there are universal moral hinges only in the sense that they comport universally with local customs. In that sense there can be universal moral hinges but they are only imperative within the particular local moral order in which they are practiced.

Hinges function like a priori principles in shaping human practices. Since some of those practices are moral, they would involve the claiming of rights and duties associated with the person(s) performing those acts. In the example of the firefighters we saw a case where in the act of rushing into the burning house they displayed their tacit acceptance of their duty in the community as firefighters. Their duty did not however include sacrificing their own lives, although that may be an unintended but foreseeable possibility as a result of their actions. Their duty was to try to save the occupants and put out the fire. The characterization of their action as supererogatory was subjective and based on the positioning of the persons who performed the act. The acts themselves, saving the occupants of the house and putting out the fire were evaluated objectively based on empirical data, i.e. did the occupants survive, and did they put out the fire.

I would suggest that all supererogatory acts are heroic but not all heroic acts are supererogatory. A heroic act can either be considered as a supererogatory act or as an act from ordained, i.e. not freely accepted duty. In order to be heroic an act originates in an individual, it is an expression of an individual's autonomous choice. As supererogatory acts, some heroic acts are not strictly necessary and as such the absence of such acts from the biography of a person is not a cause for criticism or censure. It may even

be inappropriate to call any act done as the fulfillment of an ordained duty as 'heroic'.

A heroic act, to be considered as such, changes as the horizon, i.e. the ascription and assumption of one's duty changes. For example we can imagine a case where 'doing one's duty' could conceivably bring benefits to an actor, whereas performing a heroic act outside the range of ordained duties not infrequently could and in many cases does destroy the hero. Think of Captain Oates going out into a fierce blizzard (and certain death) from the relative shelter of the group's tent during Robert Scott's ill-fated expedition to the South Pole in 1912.

The final part of this paper explores the relation between universal and local hinges in order to further illuminate the relationship between supererogatory acts and their grounding in moral hinges. I borrow the definitions from Daniele Moyal-Sharrock's concept of universal and local hinges. She defines local hinges as constituting "...the underlying framework of knowledge of *some human beings at a given time*. They are culture-variant and many of them seem to be the product of empirical observation..." (Moyal-Sharrock, 2007, 136) On her view hinges are never justified by facts and therefore cannot be falsified by any fact. (Moyal-Sharrock, 2007, 143) I would suggest however that they could be justifiable or falsifiable if expressed as explicit propositions.

As opposed to local hinges, universal hinges are those hinges that we must believe in if we are to make *sense* of the world in which we live. For example, the hinge belief that there is an external world that exists beyond me as an individual is one such universal hinge. (Moyal-Sharrock, 2007, 149) If we did not believe in that hinge we would not be able to think of ourselves as anything more than a brain in a vat. Similarly, if we did not believe that some actions are praiseworthy, for whatever local reason, and others are not there would be no moral life. As Gilbert Ryle once quipped one cannot imagine someone forgetting the difference between right and wrong. (Ryle, 1971, 381)

The distinction between universal and local hinges is important because it clarifies the different types of moral hinges and provides context for their characterization as the grounds of supererogatory acts. Human behavior is not wholly determined by a priori ideas or categories, rather it arises from actions taken by individuals that are grounded in non-rational hinge beliefs. Those acts occur before we think or reason about our behavior.

A universal hinge would be for example, one that expresses the belief that there are autonomous and sentient beings living on the planet earth. This universal hinge influences our behavior towards other persons because it leads to our taking them as autonomous, meaning that they have and exercise free choice as sentient beings. We do not ask for proofs of a hinge proposition were it to be formulated explicitly. The universal hinge defines a worldview more than it influences the immediate behavior of individual human beings. On the other hand the local hinge that holds that dogs are special animals and should be treated like humans has an immediate influence on cultural behavior. This hinge is firmly grounded in Western culture whereas in many Eastern cultures dogs are seen as both an unclean nuisance and as a source of food and not as human-like companions.

The hinge belief in Western culture about dogs could indeed be the grounds for the supererogatory act of saving a dog that fell through the thin ice of a frozen pond and was unable to swim to shore. This act is doubly grounded in a moral hinge because it is person-preserving since acting in

this way defines that individual's (the one performing the supererogatory act) sense of their personhood, and, it reflects the widespread anthropomorphism with which we treat our dogs. Both the strong (human) and the weak (anthropomorphic) sense of personhood is understood in the context of the universal hinge that there are other sentient beings external to and independent of the individual. At the same time it accounts for dogs as sentient beings. Hinges then are not true or false in the context in which they are grounded. They are simply grounded in the local community of moral beings whose actions they influence. Supererogatory acts are consequently grounded in moral hinges, both universal and local.

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Warum Alle mit philosophischen Thesen einverstanden wären - Versuch einer Interpretation von PU 128

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Abstract

§ 128 der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* gehört zu den rätselhaftesten Bemerkungen dieses Werkes. Es scheint eine auf den ersten Blick vollkommen unbegründete und kontra-faktische Feststellung zu sein. Es wird eine konsistente Interpretation für PU 128 im Kontext von Wittgensteins Spätwerk gegeben, die nicht von ihrer grotesken Falschheit (Savigny) ausgeht, sondern im Gegenteil darin ein zentrales Merkmal von Wittgensteins philosophischer Methode sieht.

Zwei plausible Lesarten von PU 128 werden gegenübergestellt:

- (1) Eine negative Lesart versteht PU 128 als generelle Zurückweisung der Möglichkeit philosophischer Thesen. Das entspricht z.B. Baker/Hackers Kommentar zu PU 128: „*The possibility of any theses in philosophy is now rejected.*“ (Baker/ Hacker 2009, S.271). In der Philosophie werden – nach Wittgenstein – keine Thesen aufgestellt, weil der Philosoph nichts behauptet, sondern nur sprachlich bedingte Verwirrungen beseitigt.
- (2) Dem gegenüber steht eine positive, wörtliche Interpretation von PU 128, die schlicht besagt: wenn man Thesen in der Philosophie aufstellen würde, wären diese so trivial und selbstverständlich, dass es immer einen Konsens über sie gäbe. Philosophie kann nur das beschreiben, was wir ohnehin schon alle wissen, was offen vor uns liegt, nämlich die Verwendungsregeln unserer Wörter (Grammatik).

Beide Lesarten stimmen aber näher betrachtet überein. Wittgenstein distanziert sich von einer „dogmatischen“ Art des Philosophierens und bestimmt ab etwa 1931 die Klärung der Grammatik als ihre eigentliche Aufgabe. Wittgenstein Begriff „Grammatik“ wird dabei in einem engen Verhältnis zur Analogie zwischen Sprache und Schachspiel, die Wittgenstein ab 1930 sehr häufig heranzieht.

Philosophische Untersuchungen § 128:

„Wollte man Thesen in der Philosophie aufstellen, es könnte nie über sie zur Diskussion kommen, weil Alle mit ihnen einverstanden wären.“

von PU128, das nicht von dessen „grotesker Falschheit“ ausgeht, sondern gerade wegen seiner scheinbaren Absurdität einen Schlüssel zum Verständnis von Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie liefert.

Dabei lassen sich zwei Interpretationsansätze gegenüberstellen:

i. Eine negative Lesart versteht PU 128 als generelle Zurückweisung der Möglichkeit philosophischer Thesen. Das entspricht etwa Baker/Hackers Kommentar: „*The possibility of any theses in philosophy is now rejected.*“ (Baker/ Hacker 2009, S.271). In der Philosophie werden – nach Wittgenstein – keine Thesen aufgestellt, weil nichts behauptet, sondern nur sprachlich bedingte Verwirrungen beseitigt werden.

ii. Dem gegenüber steht eine positive, wörtliche Interpretation von PU 128, die schlicht besagt: **wenn man** Thesen in der Philosophie aufstellen **würde**, könnten diese nur trivial und selbstverständlich sein, sodass es immer einen Konsens gäbe. Philosophie kann nur das beschreiben, was wir ohnehin schon alle wissen, das, was offen vor uns liegt, nämlich die Verwendungsregeln unserer Wörter (Grammatik).

Gezeigt werden soll im Folgenden, dass beide Lesarten berechtigt und mit einander kompatibel sind.

1. Explikation der Fragestellung

§ 128 der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* scheint eine auf den ersten Blick vollkommen unbegründete und kontra-faktische Feststellung zu sein. Warum sollten „Alle“ mit philosophischen Thesen einverstanden sein? Intuitiv erscheint eher das genaue Gegenteil plausibel. In der Geschichte der Philosophie wurden laufend Thesen aufgestellt und wieder in Frage gestellt (z.B.: Kants These: Es gibt synthetische Sätze a priori.).

Einer der Wittgenstein-Kommentatoren meint daher kurz und bündig zu PU 128:

„Hier irrt Wittgenstein in Bezug auf die gesamte Philosophie, die laufend Thesen aufstellt, die dann angegriffen und widerlegt werden.“ (Bachmaier 2005, S.71)

Eike von Savigny, kommentiert etwas vorsichtiger:


„Der Satz ist grotesk falsch, aber absichtlich und offenkundig falsch und als übertreibend und eine Feststellung überspitzend zu verstehen.“ (Savigny 1998, S.179)

Es ist aber evident, dass Wittgenstein mit PU 128 keine Beobachtung zur Philosophiegeschichte ausdrücken wollte, sondern seine eigene Methode des Philosophierens charakterisiert. Es geht im Folgenden um ein Verständnis

2. Textgenese und Kontext von PU 128

Die Bemerkung PU 128 lässt sich in identischem Wortlaut bis zum Band VI. der *Philosophischen Bemerkungen* (=MS 110) zurückverfolgen, entstand also bereits im Frühsommer 1931.

Skizze zur Textgenese von PU 128:



PU 128 steht am Ende eines Abschnitts der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* (etwa von §98-133), in dem Wittgenstein die Methode bzw. Aufgabe der Philosophie charakterisiert. In der Endfassung der PU von 1953 steht sie im unmittelbaren Kontext einer Bemerkung über Philosophie als „Zusammentragen von Erinnerung“ und einer Bemerkung über die Verborgenheit des Grundlegenden/Wichtigsten im Alltäglichen. Auch dieser Kontext ist vom ersten Auftauchen der Bemerkung 1931 an nahezu konstant. Was mit dem „Zusammentragen von Erinnerungen“ gemeint ist wird in MS 142 deutlich, wo PU 128 unmittelbar der Satz vorausgeht:

„Das Lernen der Philosophie ist wirklich ein Rückerrinnern. Wir erinnern uns, daß wir Worte wirklich auf diese Weise gebraucht haben.“ (MS 142, S. 109)

3. Die negative Interpretation von PU 128

Den fehlenden Kontext zu PU 128 liefert vor allem ein Gesprächsprotokoll von Friedrich Waismann vom 9.12.1931. Darin stellt Wittgenstein den Bezug zu PU 128 ausdrücklich her, wenn er sagt:

„In bezug auf Ihre Thesen habe ich einmal geschrieben: Wenn es Thesen in der Philosophie gäbe, so dürften sie zu keinen Diskussionen Anlass geben. Sie müßten nämlich so abgefaßt sein, dass jedermann sagt: Ja, ja, das ist selbstverständlich. Solange man über eine Frage verschiedener Meinung sein und streiten kann, ist das ein Anzeichen dafür, dass man sich noch nicht genügend klar ausgedrückt hat.“ (WWK, S. 183)

Wittgenstein bezieht sich mit dem Ausdruck „Ihre Thesen“ auf einen von Waismann um 1930 erstellten Text mit diesem Titel, in dem er den Inhalt des Tractatus – inklusive einiger Neuerungen – in komprimierter Form darzustellen

versuchte¹. Wittgenstein kritisiert nun sehr scharf diese Art des „dogmatischen Philosophierens“. Er distanziert sich nun von einer falschen Auffassung der Philosophie die auch sein eigenes Frühwerk den Tractatus einschließt, nämlich der Vorstellung, man könnte in der Philosophie etwas Neues entdecken. („Ein Irrtum, der auch mein ganzes Buch [nämlich den TLP, Anm. AS] durchzieht“ (WWK, S. 182).

„Man kann in der Philosophie nichts entdecken. Die falsche Auffassung, gegen die ich mich in diesem Zusammenhang kehren möchte, ist die, dass wir auf etwas kommen könnten, das wir heute noch nicht sehen, dass wir etwas ganz neues finden könnten. Das ist ein Irrtum. In Wahrheit haben wir schon alles, und zwar gegenwärtig, wir brauchen auf nichts zu warten. Wir bewegen und im Bereich der Grammatik unserer gewöhnlichen Sprache, und diese Grammatik ist schon da.“ (WWK, S. 183)

Nur in den empirischen Wissenschaften kann man Neues entdecken und auch Thesen formulieren, die irgendwann später bestätigt oder widerlegt werden können. In der Kernphysik etwa die These über die Existenz von Neutrinos, die erst 23 Jahre experimentell bestätigt werden konnte. Ähnliches ist in der Philosophie nicht möglich, meint Wittgenstein. Dies hängt unmittelbar mit der strikten Abgrenzung der Philosophie von allem Erfahrungswissen zusammen..

„Fragen, die durch Erfahrung beantwortet werden, schließe ich aus unserer Diskussion aus.“ (VO 30-35, S.147)

„Es ist das Wesen der Philosophie von der Erfahrung unabhängig zu sein und eben das ist damit gemeint, wenn man sagt, die Philosophie sei apriori.“ (VO 30-35, S. 271)

Die Berechtigung der negativen Lesart von PU 128 liegt also darin, dass es offenbar keinen Sinn ergibt, Thesen dort aufzustellen, wo es nichts Neues zu entdecken gibt.

4. Die positive Lesart von PU 128

Wittgenstein sagt in PU 128 aber **nicht**, dass der Klärungsprozess philosophischer Fragen **zu keinen** Ergebnissen führt, sondern, dass das, was wir dabei letztendlich herausfinden, ganz triviale Beschreibungen der Grammatik bestimmter Wörter sein werden, denen alle zustimmen werden.

„Sie [die Philosophie] stellt nur fest was jeder ihr zugibt.“ (PU 599)

Die übersichtliche Darstellung der Grammatik bleibt als positive Aufgabe der Philosophie bestehen, allerdings liegt in diesen Beschreibungen nichts Hypothetisches mehr (PU 109), und es lässt sich daher zurecht bezweifeln, ob man in diesem Zusammenhang überhaupt noch von „Thesen“ sprechen kann?

Baker / Hacker stellen zu PU 128 fest:

„...the only possible „theses“ would be grammatical propositions (so which everyone would have to agree), and they are not really theses at all.“ (Baker /Hacker 2009, S. 272)

Nach der positiven Lesart von PU 128 behält die Philosophie als „Verwalterin der Grammatik“ also durchaus ihre

¹ Abgedruckt als Anhang B in WWK, S. 233 ff

Aufgabe², auch wenn die grammatischen Klärungen, zu denen sie gelangt, nicht den Charakter von „Thesen“ haben.

5. Das Schach-Paradigma

Ich möchte im Folgenden die These vertreten, dass Wittgensteins Hinwendung zu einer philosophischen Grammatik ab etwa 1930³, ganz wesentlich geprägt ist von der Analogie zum Schachspiel. Das Schachspiel wird für Wittgenstein in den 30er Jahren zum zentralen Paradigma für die Regel-geleitete Verwendung sprachlicher Ausdrücke und liefert damit auch einen Schlüssel zu einem adäquaten Verständnis von PU 128.

Welche Aspekte lassen die Analogie Sprache-Schachspiel so überzeugend erscheinen (eine Auswahl!)⁴:

(a) Bereits am 15.1.1930 stellt Wittgenstein fest⁵: „Die Frage : ‚Was ist eigentlich ein Wort?‘ ist analog der ‚Was ist eine Schachfigur?‘“

Beide nämlich - Wörter wie Schachfiguren - sind durch ihre Verwendung definiert.

„Wörter und Schachfiguren sind einander ähnlich, zu wissen wie ein Wort gebraucht wird, das ist so, wie zu wissen, welche Züge man mit einer Schachfigur ausführen kann.“ (VO 30-35, S. 147).

Die Bedeutung einer Schachfigur ist in den Schachregeln festgelegt. Was ein Läufer ist, erklärt sich aus seinen möglichen (=erlaubten) Spielzügen.

„Die Schachregeln sollen nicht dem Wesen des Schachkönigs entsprechen, denn sie geben ihm dieses Wesen.“ (MS 117, S. 140)

Genauso wie die Schachregeln, die möglichen Spielzüge festlegen, bestimmen die grammatischen Regeln, den Raum der sinnvollen Sätze.

(b) Für das Regelsystem, nach dem wir spielen, gibt es keine Begründung, oder Rechtfertigung. Der Schachspieler beschäftigt sich nicht mit der Frage „Warum zieht der Läufer diagonal?“ Ebenso wenig kann die Philosophie, den tatsächlichen Sprachgebrauch rechtfertigen.

„Sie kann ihn [den Sprachgebrauch] am Ende also nur beschreiben.“ (PU 124)

„Grammatik lässt sich nicht rechtfertigen.“ (VO 30-35, S. 70)

(c) Philosophie kann den tatsächlichen Sprachgebrauch auch nicht ändern, so wenig wie der Schachspieler die Regeln des Schachspiels ändern will.

„Wir wollen nicht das Regelsystem zur Verwendung unserer Wörter auf unerhörte Weise verfeinern oder vervollständigen“ (PU 133),

Wenn ich Schach zu spielen beginne, stehen die Regeln außer Streit. Wenn ich andere Regeln aufstelle, spiele ich eben nicht länger Schach, sondern ein anderes Spiel :

„Wenn ich die Regeln ändere, ist es ein anderes Spiel, und damit ist der Fall erledigt.“ (VO 30-35, S. 41)

(d) Welche psychischen Vorgänge im Schachspieler vor sich gehen, während er spielt, ist für die Schachpartie genauso irrelevant, wie die psychischen Zustände des Sprechers für die Bedeutung eines Satzes.

„Was würden wir denn Einem entgegen, der uns mitteilte bei ihm sei das Verstehen ein innerer Vorgang? — Was würden wir ihm entgegen, wenn er sagte, bei ihm sei das Schachspielkönnen ein innerer Vorgang? — Daß nichts, was in ihm vorgeht, uns interessiert, wenn wir wissen wollen, ob er Schach spielen kann.“ (MS 144, S. 15)⁶

(Und das ist der Grund, warum auch Computer Schach spielen können.)

Was bedeutet dies nun für die Interpretation von PU 128 ?

(e) Geübte Schachspieler geraten über die Spielregeln nicht in Streit,- das wäre kindisch und würde nur zeigen, dass sie das Spiel noch nicht beherrschen. Genau in diesem Sinne kann Wittgenstein in PU 128 von einem Konsens aller ausgehen: wenn Philosophie nämlich nichts anders tut, als die Verwendungsregeln unserer Wörter (=Grammatik) klarzustellen, so sollte es dabei zu keinen Meinungsverschiedenheiten kommen.

Hier wird aber auch ein Unterschied augenfällig:

(f) Die Regeln im Schachspiel sind klar und eindeutig definiert, jedes Kind kann sie in kurzer Zeit erlernen. Die Verwendungsregeln unserer Wörter aber sind unübersichtlich und oft irreführend, wie W. immer wieder bemerkt:

„Es ist eine Hauptquelle unseres Unverständnisses, daß wir den Gebrauch unserer Wörter nicht übersehen. Unserer Grammatik fehlt es an Übersichtlichkeit.“ (PU 122)

Dies hat seinen Grund vor allen darin, dass die Grammatik im Sinne Wittgensteins nicht in expliziten Regeln niedergeschrieben, sondern nur implizit im Sprachgebrauch fixiert ist. Genau der Prozess der Besinnung auf die Verwendungsregeln unserer Wörter - den Wittgenstein als eigentliche Aufgabe der Philosophie sieht - fehlt im Schach, das über explizite Regeln verfügt, also völlig.⁷

(g) Ein zweiter auffälliger Unterschied ist der Umstand, dass Sätze wahr und falsch sein können, d.h. in einer Relation zur Wirklichkeit stehen, während Schachzüge auf nichts außerhalb des Spiel bezogen sind.

„Die Sprache ist gewiss nicht nur Spielkonvention ... Was sie vom Spiel unterscheidet ist ihre Anwendung auf die Wirklichkeit“ (VO 30-35, S. 34)

Andererseits spricht man im Schach von guten also sinnvollen Zügen und schlechten. Genauso wenig wie ein regelkonformer Zug automatisch schon ein guter ist, folgt aus der grammatikalischen Korrektheit eines

2 Vgl. z.B. „Das Wesen ist in der Grammatik ausgesprochen.“ (PU 371)

3 Wittgensteins Begriff der „Grammatik“ ist sicherlich grundlegend für seine Spätphilosophie, aber auch komplex und schillernd. G. E. Moore wandte bereits ein (VO 30-35, S.117f.) , dass Wittgenstein den Ausdruck „Grammatik“ offenbar in einem nicht alltäglichen Sinn verwende . Die Interpretation was genau Wittgenstein unter „Grammatik“ verstand, ist bis heute nicht abgeschlossen, vgl. dazu z.B. Engelmann (2011) S. 71-102.

4 Zur paradigmatischen Bedeutung des Schachspiels für Wittgensteins Sprachspieltheorie vgl. Orlik (2006), Kap 9.1.1. „Das Schach: Wittgensteins Prototyp ‚des Spiels‘“, S.210ff . Interessant u.a. ist sein Hinweis, dass Wittgenstein sich auf einige logisch wesentliche Züge des Schachspiels konzentriert, andere Aspekte , wie z.B. der Dialogcharakter des Spiels, konsequent ausgeblendet bleiben.

5 Ursprünglich in MS 107, S.240 (ebenso PU 108) . Dieses Datum markiert den Beginn einer langen Reihe von Einträgen über die Sprache-Schach-Analogie, besonders in den Jahren 1930 bis 1936, von denen viele auch in die Endfassung von Teil I der PU übernommen wurden. In Wittgensteins Nachlass finden sich insgesamt 796 Stellen mit dem Ausdruck „Schach“ (inklusive der Komposita „Schachspiel“, „Schachfigur“, „Schachbrett“ usf. , inkl. der engl Form „chess“ sind es 828).

6 Vgl. dazu auch eine prägnante Stelle im Blue Book (DIC 309, S.110): "I want to play chess, and a man gives the white king a paper crown, leaving the use of the piece unaltered, but telling me that the crown has a meaning to him in the game, which he can't express by rules. I say: 'as long as it doesn't alter the use of the piece, it hasn't what I call a meaning'".

7 Wittgenstein bezweifelt allerdings bisweilen auch die Vollständigkeit bzw. Eindeutigkeit der Schachregeln; vgl. MS 142, S. 119 .

Satzes, dass er wahr ist.⁸. Letzteres ist für Wittgenstein aber ausschließlich eine Frage der Empirie und damit beschäftigt sich die Philosophie nicht⁹.

Dann allerdings sind der Konsens aller und die „vollkommene Klarheit“ (PU133), die Wittgenstein anstrebt, wieder in Frage gestellt.

Resümé

Der allgemeine Konsens bezüglich philosophischer Thesen, der in PU 128 behauptet wird, ist deswegen unproblematisch – so können wir jetzt sagen –, weil über die Regeln im Schachspiel gewöhnlich keine Meinungsverschiedenheiten bestehen. Auch wenn es keine vergleichbaren expliziten Regeln für unsere sprachlichen Ausdrücke gibt, setzt Wittgenstein diesen Konsens bezüglich der Verwendungsregeln unserer Wörter ebenso voraus. Es geht also in der Philosophie nach Wittgenstein nicht darum, bestimmte Theorien oder Thesen zu formulieren, und zu versuchen andere davon zu überzeugen¹⁰, sondern alleine darum, sich über die Spielregeln Klarheit zu verschaffen. D.h. der Philosoph beschränkt sich auf die Rolle des Schiedsrichters, spielt aber selbst gar nicht mit.

Was das „Wesen eines Läufers“ ist, ist in den Schachregeln vollständig beschrieben. Alles was sich sonst über einen Läufer sagen ließe – z.B. aus welchem Material er hergestellt ist –, ist für den „Schach-Philosophen“ irrelevant. Etwas Neues in der Philosophie entdecken zu wollen, ist daher genauso unsinnig, wie eine neue Spielregel im Schach entdecken zu wollen, oder eine neue Eigenschaft des Läufers.

Im Schach zeigt sich allerdings, dass es zwischen den Spielregeln und den einzelnen Schachpartien einen Zwischenbereich gibt. Schach-Theoretiker wie Wilhelm Steinitz oder Aaron Nimzowitsch¹¹ haben komplexen Schachstrategien ausgearbeitet und darin Thesen wie etwa diese formuliert:

„In einer geschlossenen Stellung sind Springer den Läufern überlegen, in einer offenen Stellung ist es umgekehrt.“

Sätze dieser Art sind nicht Teil der Schachregeln. Sie beschäftigen sich mit der Frage, wie man gewinnt, nicht wie man regelkonform spielt. Diese Schachtheorien stehen aber keineswegs außer Streit, wie die Spielregeln, sondern werden kontrovers diskutiert und laufend weiterentwickelt.

Es scheint, dass auch Wittgenstein die scharfe Trennung zwischen Spielregeln und den einzelnen Spielzügen, zwischen Grammatik und Erfahrungssätzen in der letzten Phase seines Philosophierens aufzulockern beginnt.

In den Bemerkungen „Über Gewissheit“ heite es etwa:

„Aber müte man dann nicht sagen, da es keine scharfe Grenze gibt zwischen den Sätzen der Logik und Erfahrungssätzen? Die Unschärfe ist eben die der Grenze zwischen **Regel** und Erfahrungssatz.“ (ÜG 319)

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⁸ Vgl. Ms 117, S. 176: „Man könnte sagen: alle möglichen Spielstellungen im Schach können als Sätze aufgefat werden.“

⁹ Bereits im MS 105, also 1929 notiert Wittgenstein programmatisch: „Meine Art des Philosophierens ist mir selbst immer noch und immer wieder neu. ... Diese Methode ist im wesentlichen der Übergang von der Frage nach der Wahrheit zur Frage nach dem Sinn.“ (MS 105, S.46)

¹⁰ Vgl. auch: „I won't say anything which anyone can dispute. Or if anyone does dispute it, I will let that point drop and pass on to say something else.“ (LFM 1976, S. 22)

¹¹ Vgl. Tarrasch 1916, Nimzowitsch 1925, auch die so genannte „Eröffnungstheorie“ wäre ein Beispiel in diesem Sinn.

Ornament in Mathematics

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Abstract

The subject of my talk is a peculiar resemblance between what Wittgenstein says about some (logico-) mathematical calculi and Adolf Loos' critique of fancywork in modern architecture. The aim is to point out that Wittgenstein's critique of foundational approaches in mathematics might be better understood when seen in the light of his aesthetical commitments. This is not to say that his criticism is merely an outflow of an aesthetical uneasiness. On the contrary, he provides a long chain of solid arguments, showing that the feigned foundation is neither needed nor securer than what's said to be founded. But I want to show that his critique stems from an aesthetical aversion against a *fashion* of mathematics that provides useless and idling calculi. That is to say: his *motive* for criticising those foundational approaches is an aesthetical one.

Remember that we demand an explanation not always due to its content but due to its form of an explanation. The demand is architectonical in character and our explanation is a feigned cornice. The cornice demanded by the eye, though it does not support anything. (BEE 124, 5; cf. PI, §217)

I shall start with the aesthetical attitude as expressed by Loos in his famous speech on *Ornament and crime* (Loos 1908) and some other of his theoretical writings. Afterwards I will try to point out some similarities to and remarks by Wittgenstein in Manuscript 124 (BEE, Item 124), written between June and July 1941. Most of the remarks I cite in this paper had not been included in the material that was published posthumously as part VII of the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* (Wittgenstein 1978). It proves salutary again to neglect the published text while consulting the original manuscripts.

1. Loos' critique of ornament in modern architecture

In his famous speech on *Ornament and crime* (Loos 1908) and in many of his theoretical articles Adolf Loos (1870–1933) argues for an aesthetic that does away with ornament. In earlier days ornament had been a surrogate for art. People expressed themselves artistically by decorating buildings, apartments and clothes with ornaments. The erotic expression of art found its place on any little object of practical usage, just like the child ornaments everything within reach. But what had been innocent once has become a sign of decadence in the meantime.

In the child this is a natural phenomenon: his first artistic expression is to scribble erotic symbols on the wall. But what is natural to [...] the child is a symptom of degeneracy in the modern adult. [...] *The evolution of culture is synonymous with the removal of ornament from utilitarian objects.* (Loos 1908, 20)

No art is dismissed here but the prevalent estimation that art has to pervade everything we do. Loos is not arguing against art *per se*. Beethoven's *Ninth Symphony*, as erotic in origin as the child's scribbling, is expression of human grandeur. What he ridicules are attempts to mingle together products of art with objects of everyday use. For the result would be a degradation of both. People would lose their sense of art and what it longs for. And at the same time it would become increasingly hard to estimate the real (practical) value of an object sprinkled with ornaments which add nothing to its actual utility.

Modern men, says Loos, perceive it as the worst humiliation of art by mixing it up with the articles of daily use (see Loos 1931, 115). In earlier days it was proper to ornament cigarette cases or faces of humans and houses. But what had been an original expression of earlier man's desires has become an idle ceremonial without any impact on what is in fact going on within our world today.

Since ornament is no longer organically linked with our culture, it is also no longer the expression of our culture. The ornament that is manufactured today has no connexion with us, has absolutely no human connexions, no connexion with the world order. (Loos 1908, 22)

Our world order asks for usability. Hence the first precondition for that an object of ordinary life can be said to be beautiful is that its appearance does not contravene its use. The beauty of the functional object cannot be estimated without relating it to its purpose. To attach a cornice that satisfies no constructional needs to the face of a newly built house is therefore, in Loos' view, a sign of decadence and insincerity (see Loos 1898a, 74). It is cheating others as well as oneself by making something appear to be useful, although it does not have any use at all.

2. Wittgenstein's critique of foundational approaches in mathematics

I now want to show that some of the aspects of Loos' arguments against ornament in architecture could also be detected when it comes to Ludwig Wittgenstein's critique of foundational approaches in mathematics. I think that many examples all over the *Nachlass* (BEE) could be found, demonstrating similarities between Wittgenstein's approach and the one of Loos. But for reasons of time I want to focus on one single manuscript here.

In manuscript MS 124 Wittgenstein deals amongst other things with the problem of so called "hidden contradictions" in mathematics. Once Russell had deduced a contradiction (see Frege 1976, 211) from Frege's Basic Law no. 5 (see Frege 1893, 35), one of the main concerns of philosophers as well as mathematicians was to construct (or at least to prove the possibility of) a calculus that is capable of mapping every true arithmetical proposition and which at the same time contains no hidden contradiction.

Wittgenstein asks himself what is the motivating reason for such a demand, or rather: what kind of solution it actually is that is looked for here. He answers that this asking

for more rigour is not a question of right or wrong, but rather what we want to call mathematics, what it should look like. The craving for a calculus that makes it impossible ever to construct a contradiction is not itself a mathematical need. In fact, as long as mathematics is considered as a tool that we use for guiding our observations outside mathematics, a contradiction produced within a specific calculus does no harm at all. That is to say, if we took its practical applicability as the measure to evaluate the status of a mathematical proposition, a contradiction could simply be singled out as useless once it was deduced.

From this it is clear that a contradiction derived from a basic law should not by itself provoke too enormous irritations. But what is the disturbing aspect then, if every single contradiction could be handled in an unproblematic manner? According to Wittgenstein, what leads us to think that a contradiction is harmful is the following:

Russell's paradox is not disturbing because it is a contradiction, but because it makes the whole growth of which it is the end into a cancerous ulcer that appears to grow out of the normal body without purpose and sense. (124, 54)

What is interesting about this picture is that it gives the impression that what could be deduced within a given calculus is already prefigured in its axioms. The individual derivations do not appear as something that we create but something that is *there* from the very beginning. The idea is that the axioms must somehow *contain* the contradiction; for how else could it be possible that we deduce one! — Wittgenstein confronts this picture with a different one in which the mathematician is no longer considered as a discoverer but as a creator or, even more specific, he is compared to a composer.

Take a theme, like the one by Hayden (Choräle St. Antoni), take the one part of the variations by Brahms that corresponds to the first part of Hayden's theme, and then set the task to construct the second part of the variation in the style of its first part. This problem is of the sort of mathematical problems. When the solution is given, as, for example, the one given by Brahms, nobody doubts; — this is the solution. We approve this way. And still it's clear that there may be different ways which all are approvable; all of which we could call consequent. (124, 55)

By presenting this analogy Wittgenstein wants us to change our attitude towards what's going on in mathematics. We should see that it is *us* (humans) who develop mathematical progressions, not some arcane super-law, dictating, once and for all, how to proceed at any conceivable step. There are different possibilities in extending a given calculus, different ways that make us say: this is how *it* goes. And if one way led to a contradiction, let's better not take it!

But via the comparison with musical composing we are not only invited to look at mathematicians as inventors. The analogy also suggests that the way in which they in fact build their calculi may be apprehended as an expression of their aesthetics. — I will try to point out what this could mean.

The attempt to exclude every contradiction from the very start is based on the idea that the axioms of mathematical systems determine all their further applications. The derivation of mathematical propositions by means of rule-governed combinations of the system's axioms is thus seen as unambiguously contained in these axioms them-

selves. It may be us who *apply* the rules, but the rules prescribe *how* to apply them: we undertake the manual labour, but still the applications carried out in this way are already predetermined by the mechanics of the system. People merely enforce what "the law" demands of them — not the other way round. Wittgenstein characterizes this understanding as „[t]he idea of mechanizing mathematics. The fashion of the axiomatic system.“ (124, 59)

By calling it a *fashion* Wittgenstein reminds us that the axiomatic method is not outstanding. It is not more fundamental or deeper than any other way of doing mathematics. At the same time, a mathematician who aligns his job with this idea(l) cannot be blamed by behaving wrongly or unjustified. That is to say, Wittgenstein does not attack this outlook as being nonmathematical. Rather, he wants us to see that this account separates mathematics from its actual utility within our world. The demand to prove of a given calculus that it is ultra-consistent (meaning that a possible contradiction could never ever be deduced from its axioms) becomes important not earlier than it is isolated from the plain applications that are in fact made of it. Just in case that the variables of the system are considered as mere signs which do not have any use outside of mathematics, and if it is neglected that their original ordering answered to a practical purpose, does the question arise how a nonsensical arrangement of these signs could be avoided.

This means that Wittgenstein's critique is not itself mathematical. He tries to focus on the actual role that mathematical reasoning plays within our lives and he wants to show that the demand of proving all calculi's consistency is not responding to a practical concern. Rather, this demand seems to satisfy an architectonical need: it results from looking at the calculus as a mere aggregation of signs, while the actual role of these rules within our everyday practice is neglected.

It is at this point that Loos comes in. For the aforementioned fashion of doing mathematics gives rise to mathematical constructions which do not respond to a problem of everyday life. Proof is given and mathematical systems are built without ever having attacked the question why one should take any interest in them. Mathematics is no longer treated as a toolbox that serves human purposes, but as an end in itself. Proof and systems are not created for the sake of people but for the sake of the transcendent beauty and dignity of the creator's profession. The demonstrations are not needed, but all the same they are presented as expressing the pure core of mathematics: the feigned reason for why it does in fact yield so many useful instruments. In fact, the resulting constructions are like ornaments. They cannot be used, because they are merely an expression of their creator's idea(l) of mathematics. Thus, it is not by accident that Wittgenstein describes this attitude with words that are strongly reminiscent of Loos:

A style of constructing machines, where operative wheels, levers, etc. are surrounded by a number of others, only mounted due to an aesthetical effect. (Like a dead window in a façade.) (124, 69)

The picture of idling wheels is a recurring theme in Wittgenstein's writings. Here it shows that following the axiomatic ideal can lead to constructions which do not intervene with our lives but are mere ornaments in the mathematical landscape. They might satisfy an aesthetical need. But only to those who look for such a satisfaction within mathematics.

3. Conclusion

Though the space is very limited here, I hope to have at least shown that there is a peculiar resemblance between Adolf Loos' critique of fancywork and Wittgenstein's critique against foundational approaches in mathematics. The similarity consists therein that both thinkers take usability as the paradigm to judge about the value of either architecture or mathematics. According to Loos, the task of architecture is not to decorate housings with ornaments but to arrange solid materials in a comfortable way. Similarly the value of mathematics lies, according to Wittgenstein, not in constructing super rigour calculi but in providing us with the forms of judgements by means of which we are able to handle everyday phenomena. This is of course done by moving within a mathematical system. But the practical demand should always be the leading guard.

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Reasons for actions and reasons for beliefs

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Abstract

Both beliefs and actions are things we can and sometimes are being asked to give reasons for. It seems promising to investigate both kinds of reasons and to get clearer about how reasons for actions and reasons for beliefs are interrelated. I will therefore compare some aspects of both kinds of reasons. Reasons for actions may be given sometimes by teleological explanation, sometimes by redescription. In the first part of my talk I want to show, that both these forms of reasons can not be given for belief, mainly for a conceptual reason: beliefs cannot be had *in order to* achieve some logically independent aim. In the second part of my talk I want to show that, despite the differences, both kinds of reasons are similar in a very important respect: both provide answers of the right kind to the question “Why should one do / believe this?”, i.e. they are normative in character. A general account of how the normative “force” of reasons for actions and reasons for beliefs comes about is given.

Both beliefs and actions are things we can and sometimes are being asked to give reasons for.

It seems promising to investigate both kinds of reasons and to get clearer about how reasons for actions and reasons for beliefs are interrelated. I will therefore compare some aspects of both kinds of reasons.

1) Differences between reasons for actions and reasons for beliefs

To get clearer about the relationship between reasons for actions and reasons for beliefs we should first note that not everything that can serve as a reason for action can also serve as a reason for belief. Reasons for actions may be given sometimes by teleological explanation, sometimes by redescription and sometimes by saying: “I just wanted to” or “Just for fun.” None of these types of reasons can serve as reasons for beliefs. I will discuss the first two of them in detail:

1) One cannot give reasons for beliefs by teleological reasons: Sometimes, reasons for actions are given by presenting purposes, goals, aims or ends. I can go to London in order to see the Turner exhibition or I can put a brick at the door in order to prevent it from shutting. But beliefs can't be explained or justified by purposes. I cannot say that I believe that dinosaurs once inhabited the earth *for the purpose* of something else or *to achieve* some further goal. Sometimes it is said in epistemological literature (Price 1956, p. 13, Bieri 1997, p. 39; Steup 2005, p. 253; Grundmann 2008, p. 247), that there is something like non-epistemic justification for beliefs like moral or prudential justification. So, for example, a patient may have a prudential justification for his belief that he will get well again soon (although he lacks any evidence) because his belief may actually help him to recover more quickly (a case of supportive autosuggestion).

But I think there is no such thing as non-epistemic justification for beliefs. All we can do is belief that *p* plain. That's because beliefs are conceptually bound to represent things as they are, to represent the world, to represent states of affairs. To believe that *p* is to hold *p* true. And you cannot hold *p* true *for the purpose* of anything. This is a matter of conceptual necessity, for if a belief could be something which we acquire or have for another purpose than to represent the world, we wouldn't and couldn't describe it as a belief in the first place. If we would be aware of one single non-epistemic reason why we had a belief, we couldn't regard that belief which is supported by such

kind of basis not as a belief anymore, but as wishful thinking, as prejudice or something similar.

But, more important: It would be even misleading to speak of beliefs as something we have for the sake of *representing the world* (or something similar) – because to have or to acquire a belief is not something we do *in order to* get a view from the world. To believe that *p* is not a means (among potential others) by which we represent the world. To believe that *p* just is to think of *p* as a matter of fact or as an existing state of affairs. Aims and means can be described independently of each other (like going to work and earning money or the hitting something with a hammer and the opening of a nut) – which is, for conceptual reasons, not possible for beliefs and facts. To think of *p* as a fact or as an existing state of affairs of the world and to believe *p* cannot be described independently of each other – to do the one thing *is* to do the other. The purposes we aim at *by* doing a certain action are, so we suppose, the causal effects of our actions. Since cause and effect are identifiable and describable independently of each other, the relation between cause and effect is a contingent one, not one of conceptual necessity – for causes don't produce their effects by logical implication. We don't “view the world” *by* believing something, but to believe is to “view the world”.

2) One cannot give reasons for beliefs by redescription: Sometimes reasons for actions are given by redescription: “Why are you lying on the sofa?” – “I'm doing yoga” or “Why is he playing piano?” – “He's practicing for a concert” (Anscombe 1963, § 22; White 1967, p. 10). Here a human action is explained by describing it in another way. One can speak here of two acts, if you wish, which are exact the same in their physical properties of the bodily movements which are involved, but differ in other respects. E.g. one can intend the one without the other: I can lie on the sofa without having the intention of doing yoga. One could call the first action the more fundamental action, and the other the less fundamental. Both descriptions are related in the following way: *In* doing the more fundamental action one does the less fundamental action under these specific circumstances. *In* lying on the sofa I do some yoga, *in* playing the piano I practice for a concert – given some specific and contingent circumstances. The less fundamental action is not the causal effect of the more fundamental action, but that which the more fundamental action *amounts to*, given some specific circumstances.

Beliefs cannot be explained by redescription: We cannot, when being asked “Why do you believe that *p*?”, give an answer in which we state something else that we do *in* be-

believing that p. I may show naïveté *in* believing that diesel engines are more eco-friendly than gasoline engines, but I cannot in principle explain why I believe the latter by saying: “I show naïveté in believing that.” Or *in* believing that the plane will actually take off I may trust aviation engineering in general but I cannot explain my belief that the plane will take off by saying “In believing this I trust in aviation engineering”. At least this explanation is not called for ordinarily when we’re asked to explain beliefs.

I said that in believing that p we represent the world, but this is no “explanation by redescription”, because to believe something is to represent the world as a matter of conceptual necessity, while redescriptions are a matter of contingent circumstances.

2) Similarities between reasons for actions and reasons for beliefs

It should be noted, that to give an explanation for an action or for a belief is not the same as to give reasons for an action or for a belief. Actions can be explained in various ways: Except for the ones I already mentioned, there are also: explanations by dispositions, habits, traits, by motives and sometimes by causes. As we saw, beliefs cannot be explained teleologically, by redescription, by answers like “just for fun” and they cannot be explained by dispositions, habit, traits, by motives and sometimes by causes. Some of these explanations state reasons for actions, such as the teleological explanation, the others don’t.

But despite all these differences, beliefs and actions are things one can give or be asked to give reasons for. In what sense then can reasons be given for both? I will now tackle this question, and in passing, I will touch on the question, why explanations of actions and beliefs by dispositions and by causes do not deliver reasons.

Since epistemology is foremost concerned with the question “What can we know?” (Ernst, 2008, p. 8) it is that epistemologists are primarily not interested in how beliefs as psychological entities come about and what explains their occurrence. Epistemologists are, of course, in these kinds of explanations which *justify* the beliefs, i.e. in explanations why one *should* have this belief rather than not. Epistemologists want to know what good reasons for beliefs are, and thereby want to learn beliefs of what kind we *should* have. This is a difference of epistemology to philosophy of action in which philosophers want above all to know in what ways actions can be explained and how these ways are interrelated. Epistemology is in that respect more similar to ethics, for moral philosophy also seeks to know what justifies actions, why one should act in that way rather than not. Moral philosophers want to know what good reasons for actions are, and thereby want to learn actions of what kind we *should* do.

It is in this justificatory sense that reasons for actions and reasons for beliefs are of the same type: both tell us what we *should* do – respectively *should* believe. That means, epistemology is concerned with normative issues, namely the norms of belief respectively belief acquisition. After all, we have the practice of ascribing responsibility towards each other concerning our doxastic households. Furthermore, the concept of epistemic justification is held to be semantically equivalent with the concept of *good* reason, which contains the evaluative expression “good”, which is another hint for its normative character. It is precisely this sense of explanation that is of interest here. When we ask for reasons of this kind, when we ask “Why did you do this?” respectively “Why do you believe this?”,

we’re not content with answers that state a disposition, trait or character, like: “Well, I’m just a racist” or “I’m just a man”. Neither are we content with answers that state causes, such as “Why do you go to church every Sunday?” or “Why do you believe that Jesus rose from the dead?” “Well, I was brought up in a catholic family.” In fact we want to know, why it is a *good* or *the right* thing to do X respectively to believe, that p.

When we’re asked to give reasons for our actions or our beliefs, we are asked to *justify* them and not, as some philosophers hold (most prominently Davidson 1963), to present the causes of our actions and beliefs. While we always know our reasons for doing X or believing that p, we often don’t know the causes of our actions and beliefs. It doesn’t make sense to say: “Maybe this is the reason why I believe that p – but I could be mistaken about it.” We *never* know our reasons for doing X or believing, that p, from observation, but we know the causes for our actions and beliefs *only* from observation. Actions and beliefs can be right or wrong, i.e. they’re items for which it makes sense to set *normative* standards – be it those of moral, politeness, prudence, wittiness for actions, or normative epistemic standards (in terms of truth conduciveness) for beliefs. No such standards are appropriate for nomic relations like that of cause and effect. Reasons for actions and reasons for belief can both be *convincing* or *not*, *good* or *bad*, *plausible* or *utterly stupid* (although in this last case they cease to be reasons in a way) – but it is not appropriate in principle to apply these predicates to causes.

3) Understanding reasons of beliefs from reasons of actions

Now, how do these justificatory or normative reasons work? Let’s first investigate reasons for actions. For a reason to be a reason it is necessary that the reason necessitates the action in question (*pace* Anscombe 1957, § 33). What one wants to justify has to follow logically from the given reason. After all, this is what arguments and reasonings are. Admittedly, when we give a reason for an action of ours in everyday life we often give incomplete answers. “Why did you run like that across the street?” – “There was a truck coming”, neglecting the further premises “And I didn’t want to get hit” and “If I wouldn’t have run like that across the street, I would have been hit by the truck.” But usually these other premises which are required to make the conclusion follow from our answer are so obvious or can be regarded as shared by the dialogue partner that they don’t need to be stated explicitly. Nonetheless, if we wish to give a complete reason for an action, we would have to make them explicit.

Every practical inference for actions will contain a premise which mentions something wanted or unwanted by the agent. But this in turn just means that this premise expresses a principle of conduct to which the agent sticks. In other words, the premise “I didn’t want to get hit” could be just expressed by the (self-) prescription “It’s not a good thing for me to get hit” or “I should not get hit.” Thus, one of the premises of the PI will contain evaluative notions like “good” or “should” and is therefore of prescriptive character.

In expanding and applying Richard Hare’s “universal prescriptivism” to the field of epistemic justification, I want to argue that beliefs are justified in the same way. To justify a belief is not to *describe* it in a certain way, but to *evaluate* it. To call a belief “justified” or to say that there are “good reasons” for it is to make a commendation or prescription. Just as it would be contradictory to say “To do

this would be right, but don't do it" it would be contradictory to say: "To believe this would be justified, but don't believe it". Predications of epistemic justification deliver answers of the right kind to the question "What should I believe?" – just like "good" or "right"-predications deliver answers of the right kind to the question "What should I do?". It would be a contradiction to say "There are good reasons for believing that p – but don't believe that p", for one would have to reply: "Why do you call the reasons for it 'good' then?"

Now, evaluative notions have two important features themselves: 1) It always makes sense to ask *why* something was evaluated as good or as bad and then its descriptive features that are asked for. It wouldn't make sense to say "That thing or action is good – just because it's good" or "just because of its goodness – there is no further reason" (cf. "red" in contrast) or to say these two things share the same relevant descriptive properties but one of them is good / bad while the other isn't.

2) Because evaluations are bound to "stick" to some set of descriptive properties, they always apply to *sorts* or *kinds* of things or actions. Properties are due to their nature universals i.e. they are expressions which always can be applied to a class of things and never only to one thing in particular. Therefore evaluative predicates cannot be applied to something *because it is this action in particular* and not to at least to possible other actions.

In its simplest form a complete reason given for an action (which is supposed to *justify* the action) thus has the logical form of a modus ponens with two premises, in which the first premise is of a) general character and b) contains an evaluative notion and the second, which is a) of particular character and b) contains only descriptive notions.

This also applies to epistemic reasons. A certain belief thus is justified by delivering an epistemic evaluation principle or standard as praemissa major and a descriptive particular praemissa minor. Now, since to evaluate something is to give a prescription and not to describe some-

thing, a description, taken by itself, never can be semantically equivalent to an evaluation. Therefore, no evaluative predicates follow logically from the description of a thing, although we evaluate something, *because* it has one or more descriptive properties. Thus in epistemology, I want to argue, we will have to form our epistemic standards for beliefs just as we have to form moral standards for actions (and not to derive from some "natural" fact). The most important requirement there is for our epistemic standards is that they must be universal, i.e. we will have to apply them equally in the same cases. Every one of us already has some beliefs and thereby epistemic standards. To justify a particular belief now just is to show its concordance to our existing epistemic principles. Since we accord among each other in the vast majority of our every day beliefs, we all share the same epistemic standards in the end, so that there still is objectivity in epistemic standards. The requirement of universalizability prohibits the possibility that everyone may literally "believe what he wants".

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Waismann's Criticism of the Causal Interpretation of Language

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Abstract

The paper focuses on the conception of language as a mechanism of causally connected signs that seems to be the grounds for current research in the field of speech technologies. The aim is to expound the criticism of this conception which was previously propounded by Wittgenstein and Waismann in the middle of the thirties, i.e. in the period of collaboration between the two on the project *Logik, Sprache, Philosophie*. Although the originator of the criticism is probably Wittgenstein, Waismann's exposition, which presents it in a lucid and systematic way, is followed. The causal interpretation of language is presented as misleading because of the confusion of the cause with the reason, the description of causal nexus with the justification stating the rules for our action, etc. At the end of paper the idealistic foundations of this criticism are considered.

Current research in the field of speech and communication technologies, such as automatic speech recognition, text-to-speech synthesis, and natural language processing, brings remarkable results. Nevertheless, this immense development seems to be tacitly based on the idea that language is just a fine mechanism of signs and these signs are nothing more than physical marks and noises associated with the causal nexus. The aim of this paper is to expound the criticism of such causal interpretation of language which was propounded by Wittgenstein and Waismann already in the middle of the thirties, i.e. in the period of the collaboration between the two on the project *Logik, Sprache, Philosophie (LSP)*. Although the originator of the criticism is probably Wittgenstein (see the references for comparison in brackets) Waismann's exposition, especially Chapter VI. of *LSP* (translated in English as Waismann 1997, 111-128), which presents it in a lucid and systematic way, will be followed. At the end of paper the idealistic foundations of the criticism will be considered.

1. Language as a Mechanism of Signs

Waismann as well as Wittgenstein introduce analogies that lead us to consider a meaning of expressions as a purpose they have or an effect they produce. When we observe how animals communicate we can for example say a hen clucks in order to gather her chickens together, because we see the results of the clucking and we thus recognize its purpose in collecting chickens. If we were asked what the meaning of the clucking is, then it would be natural to state that the meaning lies in its purpose. (Waismann 1997, p. 111; comp. Wittgenstein 2009, § 493) Or we can think of an automatic music player – a pianola, with its roll on which is written a musical notation in the form of perforations that cause the hammers and keys to move into the particular positions. We would be inclined to say that the keys carry out the command given by the signs of the notation or that the meaning of the perforations is the effect created by them. (Comp. Wittgenstein 1974, pp. 69-70; Waismann 2003, 343)

In further support of a mechanistic view of language Waismann demonstrates the way signals work by describing the system of railway signals and their effect on a machine. The engine-driver stops the train at the sight of a red signal which seems to cause him to put on the brake. It is natural to say that the red signal means "Stop!" and that the meaning of this command is in the effect it brings. Moreover, the engine-driver who is, as it were, "a carefully adjusted piece of machinery", can be superseded by a machine yet the meaning of the red signal will remain

"Stop!" and at the same time it will have nothing to do with *understanding*. Whether driven by a human or entirely by a machine the train would stop and exactly in this effect would lie the meaning of the signal. (Waismann 1997, p. 112)

Waismann aptly depicts what is typical of the recent engineering approach: Signs are considered integrated in mechanical processes and movements and their meanings constituted by the causal nexus. Understanding language is just "the operation of a mechanism of association" in which the sound of a word, say "red", lets an image of red spring into being as well as pressing a button does with a motor impulse. Teaching a word is similar to "the establishing of an electric connection between a switch and a bulb", while forgetting the meaning of a word would be like breaking the contact.

Words as stimuli cause events and at the same time they are reactions caused by other words. This can be easily shown by pronouncing printed words aloud when the sounds are released by the written letters. Moreover, our descriptions of objects are prompted by the sight of these objects, i.e. words are results of the nature of objects they describe. (Waismann 1997, pp 112-114)

2. Criticism of the Causal Conception of Language

According to Waismann the best characterization of the causal interpretation of language is represented by the proposal that the proposition (2), which concerns a causal nexus and a chain of clear-cut physical processes, should be regarded as a translation of the proposition (1), which refers to a command and the meaning of a sign:

- (1) The letter "a" means the command to move in such and such a way.
- (2) The machine is so arranged that the appearance of the letter "a" brings about such and such a movement.

Nevertheless, these propositions are not equal in significance because we have to apply different ways of verification to them. In the case of the proposition (2) only an *observation* of the machine can tell us whether it is true or not. On the other hand, the truthfulness of proposition (1) has nothing to do with the observation because that "a" should mean a command is laid down by *convention* and it would remain a command even if the machine never obeyed it. If the meaning of a command lay only in the ef-

fect it brings about there would exist no disobedient children.

When we ask "What is the carrying out of the command?" it is a question as to the meaning of the command and the answer to it is not a statement about what will happen in the future and can be experienced but it is a *grammatical* transformation or explanation of the command. (Waismann 1997, pp. 115-119)

As the upshot of the above arguments is that Waismann distinguishes between *cause* and *reason* and in the process he analyzes the idea of following a rule. Let's paraphrase his example: someone writes the numbers 1, 4, 9, 16, 25, in this order. If we, observing him, described the particular processes that are going on in his brain and stimulate the muscles of his arms and fingers, then we would state the cause of his action. Anyway, it is quite easy to be mistaken about the causes of our action and they are hypothetical in the sense that only further experience can confirm or refute the causal nexus. On the other hand, we are able to give the reason for his writing by saying that he has been following a certain rule, e.g. square the integers in order. Nevertheless, the series of figures is always subsumable under an infinite number of mathematical laws. The reason thus can be stated merely by the calculator that is the only one who is able to determinate which rule he has been following, e.g. by saying "I have substituted for x the first five integers into the formula $y = x^2$ ". The calculator cannot be mistaken about the reason for his own action, and at the same time the reason is not observable by others.

In order to demonstrate other aspects of the cause-reason distinction let's come back to Waismann's example with the engine-driver. Suppose we would ask the driver "Why did you stop here?" and he would answer "Because the signal was at 'Stop!'". We could think that the answer states the cause but this is not the case, the driver knows why he braked and he gives the reason for his action. What misleads us here is the expression "why" that asks for both cause and reason and we can easily confuse causal consequences with logical ones. It also applies to the word "explanation" and others similar to it. Moreover, by his answer the driver justifies his action. On the contrary, describing the cause of his action would not bring the *justification*. (Waismann 1997, pp. 119-122; comp. Wittgenstein 1958, pp.13-16)

Thus, the distinction between justification by giving a reason, i.e. stating the rule which we follow in our action or the definition of a word we use, and explanation by describing the nexus of cause and effect, seems to be for Waismann a clue to questions such as "What is the difference between a pianola playing a piece of music and a human playing it, between a calculation carried out by a machine and by a man?" Hence we can easily deduce how Waismann would cope with the question "Can a machine think?" which made Turing famous. (Comp. Wittgenstein's answer in: 1958, pp.16 and 47)

Let's yet supplement the exposition with Waismann's line of reasoning applied during one of the discussions within the Schlick Circle (Protocol from 5. 3. 1931), in which Neurath defends his (and Carnap's) thesis that all statements must be transformable into physical statements, i.e. into spatio-temporal concepts. Waismann argues that every linguistic expression can be considered from two perspectives: as a physical expression and as the bearer of a meaning. However, the first, behavioristic, conception that treats language as a reaction in a causal sense, like every other physical process, does not lead anywhere be-

cause we do not understand language if we have only described it in terms of speakers' behavior. If we could describe the understanding and the meaning of expressions by statements, then it would be possible to express the meaning of one statement by a second statement and the meaning of this second statement by a third one and thus we would reach an infinite regress. Waismann concludes that escape from this circle is possible by conceiving language that bears the meaning not as a purely physical process. (Stadler 2001, pp. 260-261)

Later on Waismann states that "meaning" (similarly "sign", "expression" etc.) is a grammatical term and it can be apprehended only when we consider language from a normative point of view. "Meaning" is not used in natural sciences and it is always felt to be something alien in scientific reasoning. (Waismann 1997, p. 128)

3. Idealistic Foundations of the Criticism

Waismann in his argumentation does not explicitly deny the causal approach to language. He just emphasizes that what he is interested in is "the geometry of language" not "the physics of language". He prefers to compare language to a calculus guided by rules rather than to a mechanism. On the other hand, in the later Waismann's texts ("The Decline and Fall of Causality" and "Causality" in: Waismann 2011) we can find serious criticism of the principle of causality itself. Waismann for example declares that "causality has definitely come to an end", at least in science, due to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics formulated in 1927. (p. 53) In another place he treats the idea of causality as "a function of language" which "varies when you pass to a language of a new logical stratum". (p. 143)

But if we give up the causes and retain just reasons, definitions and rules do we not find ourselves caught in the language? In the other words, does not Waismann's criticism of causal interpretation of language presuppose some kind of linguistic idealism?

Signs can be defined only by means of other signs. Ostensive definition does not allow us to connect expressions with objects or events because gestures are a part of our language. Or as Waismann puts it: "Explanation explains only within language." (Waismann 1997, p. 126) Although Waismann distinguishes between sign and symptom he simultaneously admits that there is no sharp boundary between them and the same fact can be both, e.g. a lighted window can be symptom of our presence at home as well as the sign by which we express that we are at home. (comp. Waismann 1997, p. 128) Concept of objects can be treated as hypothesis, i.e. a law for constructing statements which allows us to assume that the particular aspects we perceive are connected in a law-governed manner and thus form objects around us. (comp. Waismann's "Theses" in: 1979, pp. 254-260)

Moreover, when we focus on the way in which Waismann treats meaning in his criticism, we can easily bring it into accord with some kind of an idealistic interpretation, e.g. one that would endow language with life as an autonomous and self-nourishing principle:

"...This is only an explanation for someone who understands these words. What we call the 'meaning of a sign' is always already suspended in the atmosphere of our customary language, such as English. The meaning is here, as it were, the locus of the sign within the mists of language. (...) The sign is surrounded as it were, by an aura which in turn consists of explanations of it in signs of the

system. If we remove the mist, the nimbus of light surrounding our sign vanishes at the same time." (Waismann 1997, p. 126)

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Sounds as Phenomenal and (Inter)subjective Objects: An Anthropological Argument

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Abstract

Roger Scruton has proposed the most prominent non-physicalist ontology of sounds. I agree with Scruton that an ontology of sounds has to account for their phenomenal character, but I also see shortcomings in his theory. Discussing these problems, I propose an alternative ontology of sounds as phenomenal and (inter)subjective objects.

Sounds matter in human life. Sounds matter in our struggle to stay alive by helping to identify dangers that are out of sight but within hearing distance. Sounds matter in language and they matter in music. They mattered also to Joan of Arc when she heard god's voice and they matter to our contemporaries who hear voices or music without any physical source, no matter whether they interpret these phenomena as divine or demonic revelations or as hallucinations. In all these cases sounds are the primary intentional objects of hearing.

Given that sounds matter in human life, it is a sound question to ask what sounds are. Nevertheless, sounds and auditory perception have long been a relatively marginal topic in Western philosophy, especially in comparison to the deep engagement with visual perception and its objects. Yet, there has been a growing philosophical interest in sounds and auditory perception during the last two decades. Philosophers have proposed a variety of theories on the ontology of sounds. Many of these theories can be called physicalist theories, since they identify sounds with some kind of physical entity: sonic waves, vibrational events in a material object, etc., and there is plenty of debate among the physicalists about the advantages and disadvantages of their respective theories (see Casati and Dokic 2012 for an overview of many current theories). Non-physicalist theories that reject physicalism as insufficient for an ontology of sounds are relatively rare. Roger Scruton's (1997, 2009) theory of sounds as secondary objects and pure events is the most notable example.

In this paper I follow Scruton in arguing that if one wants to propose an ontological theory that accounts for sounds as they matter in human everyday practice (such as in language or music), then sounds cannot be reduced to entities describable in purely physical terms. While I agree with Scruton's criticism of physicalism and think that he is generally on the right track in rejecting it, there are also a number of shortcomings in his theory of sounds as secondary objects. These flaws come to light when one extends the anthropological arguments against physicalism to Scruton's theory. Drawing on such a critique of Scruton's theory, I will propose an alternative non-physicalist ontology that describes sounds as phenomenal objects that exist always subjectively, though sometimes – but not necessarily – intersubjectively.

Scruton against Physicalism

There are many problems with physicalist ontologies of sound. Some of these problems affect only certain theories while other problems affect the physicalist approach in general. Scruton argues against the physicalist approach in general, and his main reasons are (see 2009: 57-58):

(1) Physicalist theories entail that sounds are no longer essentially objects of hearing; that they are no longer *audibilia*. Scruton writes: "The physicalist view has the consequence that deaf people could be fully acquainted with sounds (e.g., by using a vibrometer which registers pitch and overtones), and also that people could see sounds without hearing them. [...] Both suggestions seem to relegate to the 'purely phenomenal' level everything in sounds that distinguishes them – not merely their relation to hearing, but [...] their internal order, their ability to speak to us, and much of their information-carrying potential" (2009: 57). Vibrational events, e.g., in a guitar string, are certain forms of movement in a material body that can be described as having a fundamental frequency and overtone frequencies, as having a maximal elongation, etc. Without doubt, there is a causal link between these properties and phenomenal qualities of perceived sounds such as pitch, timbre, and volume. But these phenomenal qualities are neither identical with the properties of a vibration – it makes no sense to say that a movement is loud – nor can the phenomenal be fully reduced to the vibrational properties. The causal link is not as rigid as commonly assumed, but more of that below. (2) Secondary qualities of sounds are neither attributed to the material sound sources nor to the events occurring to these sources. Rather they are attributed to "the sounds themselves, conceived as independently existing events, located in a region of space" (Scruton 2009: 57). (3) Research in psychoacoustics indicates that sounds do not typically convey information about a vibrational event and that sound grouping is much stronger influenced by other variables than the respective sources of the grouped or separated sounds. (4) One can listen to sounds without attending necessarily to their sound source, a fact exploited in music. One can listen to sounds, to use Pierre Schaeffer's (1966) term, *acousmatically*, and this acousmatic experience removes nothing from the sounds themselves. One can listen to the music playing on one's radio without attending to the vibrating loudspeaker membranes.

These four reasons all refer to the insufficiencies of physicalist ontologies of sounds in relation to human auditory experience and sound-related practices. In agreeing with Scruton's criticism, I do not argue that the entities identified by physicalist ontologies as sounds do not exist. But I argue that these ontologies cannot account for the role that sounds play in human life, because they cannot account for those properties of sounds that are most important in human life and these are the properties of sounds *as they appear* to humans and not the properties of their causes. One does not have to know how the vocal apparatus physically works or how guitar strings vibrate in order to talk to another person or listen to Hendrix soloing. If the physics changed, but the appearances stayed the

same, there would be no difference for the act of talking to each other or listening to Hendrix.

Scruton's Theory and Its Flaws

In Scruton's non-physicalist account, sounds are – like rainbows – secondary objects, and more precisely, they are pure events (see 1997: 6-13; 2009: 58-62). They are secondary objects and not secondary qualities because they are perceived as objects of their own that bear properties. Sounds are *pure* events for several reasons: Sounds have an event-like character since they are necessarily temporal and are individuated at least in part interest-relative. But unlike a car crash that necessarily happens to and includes a car, sounds do not happen to anything. When one sees a car crash, one automatically sees a car crashing. But when one hears a roar, then the roar is the object of hearing and the lion we attribute as the roar's source might actually be a loudspeaker. The source is not given in auditory perception. Furthermore, sounds can be identified without referring to their sources, even though the terms for types of sounds often refer to their usual sources. Because of all this, sounds are *pure* events. According to Scruton, sounds exist objectively in spite of their essentially phenomenal character and he establishes this objectivity by referring to a hypothetical normal observer. If a normal observer would hear a certain sound in a certain location, then this sound exists objectively in this location, no matter whether there is an actual observer or not. If someone hears a sound where a normal observer would not hear one, then this is a case of hallucination. Thus, Scruton draws the distinction between reality and hallucination on the phenomenal level without referring to the actual causes of a perceived sound.

Scruton's theory seems to capture the phenomenal character of sounds, which is relevant in human life, without turning sounds into merely subjective entities. However, Scruton's strategy of saving objectivity is flawed. The problem is exactly his conception of the normal observer. He conceives the normality of an observer in the case of auditory perception as physiological normality. Scruton contrasts physiological with cultural normality (2009: 54). When saying, e.g., that a joke is funny, this means that a *culturally* normal observer will find the joke funny, where "normal" means educated in the appropriate cultural norms. Thus, finding a joke funny is tied to the history of the perceiving subject and is open to change by rational argumentation. But in Scruton's view perceiving sounds and their qualities is unlike finding a joke funny, in that hearing is only related to normal *physiological* capacities that are (this is implied) universally distributed among all humans. Therefore, the normal observer has to be *physiologically* normal and does not introduce subjectivity. Two questions arise regarding Scruton's account: (1) What does physiologically normal mean? (2) Are the physiological aspects of auditory perception really independent from cultural aspects?

Scruton leaves unclear what normal means. Does normal mean average or optimal? The audible frequency range is usually defined as 20 Hz to 20 kHz, meaning that stimuli within this range and with sufficient sound pressure cause auditory perceptions. The problem is that due to the process called presbycusis the frequency range's upper limit gradually lowers with rising age. This phenomenon is exploited in devices like the *Mosquito*, which produces intense high-frequency sounds that are meant to deter loitering teenagers but shall leave older people non-annoyed. Thus, if the normal observer is an optimal observer, then there are objectively many sounds in the world that most

people except some children cannot hear. If normal means average, then many young people hallucinate by Scruton's definition, since the normal observer would not hear any sounds even though there are objective stimuli causing these young people's sound perceptions. One could introduce a number of normal observers representing different age classes, thereby multiplying the objective phenomenal realities and leaving the question unanswered how many age classes should be introduced in the face of the continuous character of presbycusis. This line of argumentation could be continued further, e.g., by including the evolutionary development of human auditory capacities, but it should have become clear that the decision on what is physiologically normal is in the end an arbitrary decision with, to say the least, counter-intuitive consequences when using it as a criterion for the objective existence of sounds.

But does auditory perception really work in the way it is implied in Scruton's account? Is the way a sound appears to someone only a matter of physiological processing and is the thus appearing sound then on a distinct and cultural level heard as, say, speech or a musical tone? I mentioned earlier that the causal link between a physico-mechanical stimulus and the sound heard is not as strong as often assumed. Scruton, e.g., says that a stimulus with given properties will cause people with the same physiological capacities to hear sounds that are the same, and these perceived sounds' properties cannot be corrected, criticised, educated, etc. (2009: 54-56). This may be the case in colour perception, which is the example Scruton discusses in analogy to sound perception, but research indicates that sound perception includes some aspects that make it at least partially similar to finding a joke funny, i.e., it is not solely a physiological process but informed by the perceiving subject's *cultural* history.

Within this paper's limited space I will mention only one example for the entanglement of cultural and physiological factors in sound perception, namely the categorical perception of pitch intervals. Empirical research (see, e.g., Burns and Ward 1978) has shown that the perception of intervals is not solely related to the ratio of the fundamental frequencies of two stimuli but is also dependent on learned interval categories that vary in the musics of the world. Objective and in principle perceivable differences in frequency ratios do not necessarily cause phenomenal differences in the heard pitch relations. The property of pitch can – at least in musical listening – therefore not be described as a physiologically hardwired function of physical properties of a single stimulus or a stream of stimuli. Perceived pitch is dependent on physical properties, physiological capacities, as well as learned cultural categories. This means that two physiologically identical observers – if positioned at the same location and exposed to the same stream of stimuli – might perceive differently appearing sounds, depending on their individual cultural histories. Since sound perception is not completely a physiologically hardwired function, a physiologically normal observer is insufficient to establish the objective and qualitatively determined existence of sounds.

Conclusion

Scruton's try at introducing objectivity to his ontology of sounds by way of a normal observer is unsatisfying regarding his own professed interest in an ontology of sounds "that makes sense not only of ordinary hearing, but also of all those special acts of attention of which sounds are the object" (Scruton 2009: 60), e.g., music. But is the objective existence of sounds a necessary condition for such an ontology?

My alternative proposal is that sounds are phenomenal objects, i.e., they exist in the phenomenal reality of a subject perceiving the world. This phenomenal reality is, as Peter Lanz (1996) has argued, not reducible to that part of the world that is describable in purely physical terms. Sounds exist subjectively, i.e., listener-relative, and there are as many sounds as there are sounds perceived by subjects. This does not mean that sounds are unrelated to the physical and objective reality, quite the contrary. Usually a sound is caused by a physico-mechanical stimulus and the properties of the stimulus inform partially, but not solely, the properties of the sound we hear. Sounds tell us something about the physical world we live in. Furthermore, two people who are exposed to a given stimulus and who have roughly similar physiological and cultural capacities will hear roughly similar sounds. Insofar, sounds sometimes have an intersubjective character. Nevertheless, people who hear sounds when a physico-mechanical stimulus is missing actually hear sounds. What should they hear if not sounds? This does not mean that we cannot call this case hallucinatory within the proposed ontology. The criterion is the existence or non-existence of a physico-mechanical stimulus, but this leaves the fact untouched that the hallucinating person hears sounds that are as much sounds as those caused by physico-mechanical stimuli. Would we deny that a person experiences pain, if she suffers from phantom pain? I guess not. I think that if we want an ontology that makes sense of sounds as they matter to humans, then it has to take the shape just outlined.

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Family Resemblance and Value Theory

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Abstract

In the *Lecture on Ethics*, Wittgenstein expresses a pessimistic attitude about the prospects of constructing a philosophical account of moral value. His conclusion—talk of ‘absolute value’ is nonsense—has been widely interpreted. Yet, despite the attention paid to Wittgenstein’s early remarks on ethics, his later skepticism of philosophical attempts to define the good has, in David Stern’s words, “attracted relatively little attention” (Stern 2013). This paper attempts to reconstruct the thought behind Wittgenstein’s observation that ethical concepts like ‘the good’ ‘have a family of meanings’ (§77)*, and assess its implications for the prospects of constructing a philosophical theory of value. I’ll suggest that a certain type of value theory is rendered problematic by Wittgenstein’s critique.

* All citations from *Philosophical Investigations* unless otherwise indicated.

Philosophical Investigations mentions ethics explicitly only once (§77) as an aside in a larger discussion beginning in §65. That discussion begins when the interlocutor objects—that Wittgenstein “takes the easy way out” discussing “language games” in absence of an account of “what is common to all these activities” that “makes them into language” (PI, § 65). Wittgenstein concedes the objection, but seeks to defuse the charge’s sting:

Instead of pointing out something common to all that we call language, I’m saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common in virtue of which we use the same word for all— but there are many different kinds of *affinity* between them. And on account of this affinity, or these affinities, we call them all ‘languages’ (§65).

To clarify this point, Wittgenstein recommends we consider the activities we call “games,” and “look and see” whether a single feature is “common to all”. No such feature presents itself. Instead, “we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing” (§66).

Wittgenstein characterizes these similarities somewhat analogically as ‘family resemblances’ (§67), and concepts formed by such similarities have often been termed ‘family-resemblance concepts’. In everyday use, “the extension of [this class of] concept[s] is not closed by a frontier” (§68). Their ‘boundaries’ are instead “blurry” (§71). Although such concepts *can* sometimes be given “rigid limits” (§68), such limits can be contestable, arbitrary, and distorting when they attempt to exhaustively capture the word’s meaning in everyday use (§76). Thus, “if someone were to draw a sharp boundary I could not acknowledge it as the one that I too always wanted to draw...his concept can then be said to be not the same as mine, but akin to it” (§75). In other cases, comparison fails; “anything – and nothing – is right” (§77).

With these thoughts in mind, Wittgenstein, after a long dash indicating a shift, makes the following remark:

And this is the position in which, for example, someone finds himself in ethics or aesthetics when he looks for definitions that correspond to our concepts.

In this sort of predicament, always ask yourself: How did we *learn* the meaning of this word (“good,” for instance)? From what examples? In what language-games? Then it will be easier for you to see that the word must have a family of meanings (§77).

The suggestion here is clearly that everyday uses of ethical concepts are ‘family resemblance concepts,’ and that this fact has implications for the prospects of defining the good. However, Wittgenstein’s claim in §77 is undetermined, and we have to look at other passages to know precisely what he means. Other discussions – notably, notes from 1932-1935 reproduced in notes from MacDonald, Ambrose and Moore as well as the collection of notebook materials known as *Philosophical Grammar* – make clear that Wittgenstein has multiple, logically independent points in mind. They ought to be carefully distinguished.

First, in everyday use, we don’t call different things good in virtue of some shared property they all possess. This point is explicitly suggested in Moore’s lectures, excerpted in David Stern’s recent work: “It’s not the case that (1) if we use a word [say, good] for a whole range of things, it must be because they have something in common” (Wittgenstein in Stern forthcoming). Second, our uses of the word good are related to each other by an assemblage of meanings with no clear borders – that the moral concept “good” is a ‘family resemblance concept’. Finally, Wittgenstein suggests considering ‘how we learn’ the word ‘good’ might help us see these points more clearly. Some have found this suggestion unconvincing,¹ but let’s assume for argument’s sake some version of this last claim is correct, and lends support to both of the above claims. Crucially, the first claim about our use of good does not entail the second: that we don’t *call* different goods good in virtue of a shared property does not imply that such a property cannot be found. So we ought to begin by looking at the two claims independently, and seeing what follows from each.

I’ll be concerned with the implications these claims might have for value theory. By ‘value theory,’ I simply mean a philosophical account of the sorts of things we call morally valuable. I’ll assume that a non-trivial version of Wittgenstein’s claims apply not just to structurally different uses of the good – for example, claims that some x is ‘good for’ someone, claims that some x person is a good x, and claims that x is good – but also to what I’ll call *apparent value claims*. These are uses of ‘good’ of the form ‘x is good’ (e.g. ‘pleasure is good’), uses which are often held to express propositions about intrinsic value. I’ll make this

¹ E.g. Baker and Hacker: It is not...obvious that the rudimentary uses of ‘good’ to express approval...will show that ‘good’ has a family of meanings or is an instance of a family-resemblance concept (Baker and Hacker, 170).

assumption for the sake of philosophical interest, for it is widely acknowledged that different structural uses might possess different meanings. Finally – and more controversially – I'll also assume that our uses of 'good' set some limits on the account we can arrive at philosophically, for we don't want to discover some 'new' concept, but to elucidate the one we had.² So, what follows, if Wittgenstein is right, for the prospects of a theory of moral value?

Wittgenstein's first claim – that we don't call various things good in virtue of some shared property – is not particularly interesting, for the value theorist has an obvious reply. Just because we do not use the word good in virtue of some shared feature does not mean there is no shared feature to be found. So, the value theorist might agree that we ought to 'look and see' if the good has a general meaning. But let's suppose that Wittgenstein's third point is correct: that considering how we learn the word 'good' supports the claim that the good must have a family of meanings. What follows from this second claim?

If we buy that our general use puts restrictions on an account of what is in fact good, this point has an important implication. It rules out one type of theory of value – *foundational monism*. Foundational monism holds that different goods are good in virtue of some shared property. Such a property or relation – goodness – is what makes the various items in question – the goods – good. This view, held by G.E. Moore and others, is one Wittgenstein rejects. No single property explains what makes different goods good. The point is of philosophical interest. We ought to reject value monism, as most moral theories do.

However, to say more about the implications of this claim requires a further characterization of family resemblance, for we need to know what it is for a term to have 'a family of meanings' and why terms with such a structure resist definition. One way to make sense of this claim common in early interpretations of *Philosophical Investigations* holds that the family resemblance considerations can be "paraphrased into a doctrine" opposed to the view that concepts apply to things on grounds of shared properties possessed by them (Bambrough 1961, 192). This "anti-essentialist" view – very roughly – runs as follows. Suppose that A, B, C and D are features in virtue of which we correctly attribute a property P to something. Then, some set of items might share no single common property, but nonetheless be rightfully all Ps in virtue of each item having one or more of the properties ABCD, which overlap in various combinations.

If this is the right way to read family resemblance,³ a certain kind of foundational pluralism remains a viable candidate for a theory of value, one which many moral philosophers find attractive. That view holds that the 'good' is a complicated disjunctive property, which picks out different kinds of things which matter in morally in very different respects. To illuminate, suppose that knowledge, pleasure, desert, and virtue are all properties in virtue of which we deem things good (alternatively, different types of goods). Suppose that each of these properties is *independent* of and *irreducible* to the others – e.g. something's being pleasurable does not imply it is virtuous – and that each of

these types of goodness functioned in discrete, distinct language games. If this were so, different goods would be united merely by a network of similarities. Furthermore, our ascription of "good" to pleasure might *mean* something quite different than our ascription of good to virtue, for they might each possess quite distinct *kinds* of goodness. However, a definition of the good could be constructed as a disjunctive property, one reductively analyzable in terms of a series of further properties, rather than some single one. If this is the right way to put Wittgenstein's point, it has quite limited implications for the prospects of a foundationalist account of value *as such*.

However, there is reason to doubt that this is *all* that Wittgenstein has in mind. In his recent discussion, Stern notes secondary scholarship tends to "underestimate the significance...the far-reaching implications of the notion of family resemblance" (2013). The previous account of family resemblance has gone awry, partly because Wittgenstein's use of the term is systematically ambiguous (Sluga 2006). Yet, this much is clear: family resemblance terms are *not* disjunctive terms. Wittgenstein himself dismisses the possibility as "playing with words" (§67), for the point about family resemblance is not merely that they are composed of many sub-predicates; rather, it is that the network of similarities that binds them is itself open and dynamic. Similarities "crop up and disappear" (§66) because the family resemblance terms are open ended with respect to future applications, as well as with respect to *relevance*. Since the set of relevant features is not exhaustively determined, such terms are susceptible to accretion not just of new members, but of new features in virtue of which the concepts apply. This is why they resist definition, and why, as Wittgenstein notes in Moore's documentation "It's not the case that...if we use a word [say, good] for a whole range of things, we can say, the word = either this, or that, or that" (Wittgenstein in Stern 2013). Ambrose and MacDonald's notes from Wittgenstein's lectures suggest this point even more clearly:

In view of the way we have learned the word 'good' it would be astonishing if it had a general meaning covering all of its applications. I am not saying it has four or five different meanings. It is used in different contexts because there is a transition between similar things called 'good', a transition which continues, it may be, to things which bear no similarity to earlier members of the series....The reason for using the word 'good' is that there is a continuous transition from one group of things called good to another (Ambrose 1979, 33).

Here, Wittgenstein denies not only that the meaning of good can be explained by an appeal to a single property, but that it can be explained by *any* property at all, even a complicated disjunctive one. The different language games in which we employ 'good' are not clearly bounded by different properties like virtue, knowledge and the like – there are not "discrete groups" of language games in which our moral terms operate. Instead, the transition between different uses is open, gradual and dynamic: "In the course of argument [about the good], the word may begin to acquire a new grammar" (Ibid 33). If Wittgenstein is right, the prospect of *reductively* analyzing the good, and of *exhaustively* enumerating various intrinsic goods, whether in a monist or a pluralist manner, is absolutely hopeless.

If the prospects of analyzing the good in this way are as bleak as Wittgenstein suggests, one must carefully assess what follows from that conclusion, and what does not. I'll content myself to a few brief remarks. The function of Wittgenstein's remarks on family resemblance and the good is,

2 This is actually a fairly large assumption, but I think it is one which it would have been natural for Wittgenstein to make. (C.f. §89 – We want to *understand* something that is already in plain view. For *this* is what we seem in some sense not to understand). However, contemporary commentators might seek to make a distinction between two points. On the one hand, a *linguistic* point about how we use the word good. On the other, a metaphysical point about the nature of the good as such. I find an absolute version of this distinction implausible – our linguistic practices in which we use 'good' are, in some sense, the bedrock with which we begin ethical reflection. Specifying this point in any more detail would require much more work.

3 This is the kind of reading Renford Bambrough offers (1961).

flatly, to cure us of a certain set of philosophical temptations – to *dissolve* the misguided urge to define the good reductively. Like his other uses of ‘family resemblance’ (the term is, at least partially, metaphorical), the point is not to offer a theory, but to draw our attention to certain features of our everyday linguistic use. This does not imply that talk of the good is “nonsense,” or that ‘the good’ ought to be relegated to the realm of the inexpressible. Indeed, the family resemblance considerations aim to show that our understanding of such concepts does not require strict definition in the first place.

Giving up on the prospects of concocting a definition of the good does not imply we ought not think deeply about value. It implies we ought to attune ourselves more readily to cases of everyday use, with an eye to the good’s plural and polysemic nature, and the practices in which such uses are embedded. This no doubt means value theory must change its approach – we cannot begin with definition and go from there. Standard approaches must no doubt change. But perhaps the lesson is that thinking in this way was an unhelpful dead-end from the start.

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Formulation of the Grammar of Sensations

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Abstract

I think that two different kinds of significant insight can be extracted from the considerations on sensation in *Philosophical Investigations* (PI), independently from exegetical legitimacy. The first is a positive one in terms of which a basic grammar of sensations can be determined. The second is a negative one, which provides the ground for criticizing a certain notion of private sensation, which is supposed to be given as a matter of course. Obviously the argument is closely related with the so-called private language argument. These two insights, I think, complementarily help us to understand distinctive features of sensation. In this paper I will concentrate on the former and attempt to provide a framework of the grammar as a set of definite theses, related to the thesis that 'sensations are private' is a grammatical proposition (PI248). Based on the framework, I will show that the familiar arguments of the inverted spectrum and (phenomenal) zombie (cf., Chalmers, 1996) are fundamentally nonsensical and, therefore, inconceivable. However, this misunderstanding is thought to be placed at the opposite end of the other misunderstanding, which the private language argument attempts to criticize.

1. Introduction

All of us, as participants in a language-game, are supposed to have sensation. It seems to be inconceivable that any subject without sensation could participate in a language-game. By 'sensation', I mean both an exteroceptive sense-impression, such as a visual impression of color, and an interoceptive sensation, such as a pain or an itch.

I think that two different kinds of significant insight can be extracted from the considerations on sensation in *Philosophical Investigations* (PI), independently from exegetical legitimacy. The first is a positive one in terms of which a basic grammar of sensations can be determined. The second is a negative one, which provides the ground for criticizing a certain notion of private sensation, which is supposed to be given as a matter of course. Obviously the argument is closely related with the so-called private language argument. These two insights, I think, complementarily help us to understand distinctive features of sensation.

In this paper I will concentrate on the former and attempt to provide a framework of the grammar as a set of definite theses, related to the thesis that 'sensations are private' is a grammatical proposition (PI248). Based on the framework, I will show that the familiar arguments of the inverted spectrum and (phenomenal) zombie (cf., Chalmers, 1996) are fundamentally nonsensical and, therefore, inconceivable. However, this misunderstanding is thought to be placed at the opposite end of the other misunderstanding, which the private language argument attempts to criticize.

2. Sensations are private

In PI248 Wittgenstein (LW) says '[t]he proposition "Sensations are private" is comparable to: "One plays patience by oneself". This means that 'sensations are private' is not an empirical proposition but rather a grammatical one. In other words, it is a proposition whose opposition we cannot imagine (PI251), and therefore is nonsense. We can find a euphemistic expression of the thesis in PI302 ("If one has to imagine someone else's pain on the model of one's own, this is none too easy a thing to do"). It is euphemistic because to be precise we should insist 'it is impossible to do it' rather than 'this is none too easy a thing to do.' I will call the thesis (that 'sensations are private' is a grammatical proposition) '[thesis P]'. Since the substantial implications of [thesis P] are indefinite so far, I

will make them clear in connection with the other distinctive features of the grammar of sensations.

3. Incorrigibility of first-person avowals of sensations

One distinguished feature of the grammar of sensations is that under the presupposition that a person is accepted as one having acquired the meaning of given words of sensations by a given community (Presupposition C), her first-person avowal is granted an authoritative status. To put it more precisely, if a subject sincerely avows her own sensation under Presupposition C the avowal is considered to be true without any further evidence. The formulation of the feature is the following conditional,

F1: S (sincerely) asserts that she* feels a pain (prickle, itch...) → S feels a pain (prickle, itch...),¹

which necessarily holds. The same type of conditional does not hold in general. When S ascribes a sensation to others, it does not hold either. The asymmetry between first-person avowal and the second/third person statement of sensations is exhibited here. The asymmetry applies to the judgments whether the premise of the conditional holds or not. (Of course the feature can be found in the case of self ascription of intentional states such as intention, desire and so on. Although this is also a significant subject to explore the distinction between intentional states and sensations in PI, I abstain from arguing this.) The same kind of conditional about exteroceptive sensations can be formulated in a similar way. For example, about publicly observable objects *o* the following conditional holds.

F2: S (sincerely) asserts that *o* looks blue to her* → *o* looks blue to S

However, it is possible for this type of conditional (conditional F) not to hold. That is to say, a subject can err in her sincere self-ascription of sensations. The case of a slip of the tongue is one example. Considering this, it seems that I can claim that conditional F necessarily holds except for mistakes about the meaning of words that the assertion contains. I will formulate the claim in the following way.

¹ 'she*' is the notation invented by Castañeda (1966) that represents a reference by a subject's self reference with self-awareness.

[thesis F] Under Presupposition C, a sincere first-person assertion of sensations necessarily holds except in the case of a mistake about the meaning of a word that the assertion contains.

Let me show the grounds for [thesis F]. Assume that conditional F does not hold under Presupposition C. Under what circumstances is this assumption realized? The first is the case, for example, where after a point of time t_1 S suddenly begins to ascribe an itch to an infant who exhibits behavior of pain and a pain to one who exhibits that of an itch. Then after t_1 , S's sincere self-ascription of pain will become dubious because her uses of the word 'pain' evidently deviate from those of the community. This case clearly can be classified into the one of mistakes about the meaning of words.

Another circumstance is one in which S's use of 'pain' does not accord with the secondary intension² of 'pain' when it has already been determined. Assume that the secondary intension of 'pain' is defined as activations of type *c* fibers based on neurophysiological studies about sensation and it is discovered S's *c* fibers never activate when she sincerely avows her pain. If, under this assumption, S's ascriptions of 'pain' to other persons deviate from the primary intension of 'pain' of the community—for instance, she ascribes an itch to an infant who exhibits the behavior of pain—her self-ascription will be considered as doubtful as in the previous assumption. However, how will it be judged when S's ascription of 'pain' to other persons is in accord with the primary intension of the community? It is highly probable that judging S's self-ascription to be correct, the neurophysiological theory based on which the secondary intension is stipulated will be questioned.

Yet it is still possible in this case that S's self-ascription of pain is denied while maintaining the stipulation of the secondary intension. Then can we say that S misidentifies a sensation that is different from a pain (= activations of *c* fibers) as pain? To talk in that way, it must be conceivable that we feel the identical sensation (not just the same type of sensation) carefully again and find it not to be a pain but to be a different kind of sensation. However since sensations by nature are ephemeral phenomena a sensation cannot remain identical throughout the passage of time. Even if it is possible that the same type of sign, for example 'E,' is applied to both an occurrence of sensation at t_0 and one at t_1 , they simply belong to the same type of sensation but cannot be identical to each other. Therefore there is no room for such forms of misidentification of sensations, as required here. Thus, it is only mistakes about the meanings of words that we can ascribe to S, even in these assumed circumstances. I think that these considerations suffice to justify [thesis F].

4. Reference to sensations

LW points out another distinctive feature of the grammar of sensations. He says that "[t]hinking of a description [of sensations (or mental states)] as a word-picture of the facts has something misleading" (PI291). The remark is followed by "[d]on't always think that you read off what you say from the facts; that you portray these in words according to rules" (PI292). The remarkable fact here is that LW never totally denies the notion of description "as a word-picture of the facts." He thinks there are cases to which the notion can and cannot be appropriately applied. Obviously sensation is considered not to fit the notion.

I will attempt to give this idea more concrete and definite content. Under what condition can a sentence be a description as a word-picture of the facts? For a sentence to be such a description, it seems that it is necessary that a certain referential relation between a word as a constituent of a sentence and an object as a constituent of a fact is established. Then under what condition can we claim the referential relation without presupposing any metaphysical entity beyond language?

Under certain conditions, instantiations of disquotational T-schema ("Fa' is true if and only if Fa') can be accepted as platitudinous truth. (Roughly sketching, the conditions are supposed to be, 1, 'Fa' is accepted as a well-formed figure, and either 2, each constituent of it has been used meaningfully in the actual formation of judgments ('Fx' is true/false, '#a' is true/false) so far, or 3, how to use each of its constituents can be effectively explained by other individual constants or predicates that satisfy condition 2, and 4, the concept of truth in T-schema must not be interpreted as one with inflationary implications.) Then we are allowed to claim that any sentence ' $\phi\alpha$ ' whose instantiation of T-schema is accepted as valid corresponds to the fact $\phi\alpha$ in the same T-schema and each word (individual constant) ' α ' refers to the object α . Yet, since this referential relation holds for any sentence whose instantiation of T-schema is accepted as platitudinous truth, we cannot distinguish, by this criterion, the case in which the notion of description as a word-picture of the facts is applied appropriately from the case where it cannot be. So, how can we distinguish between them? According to my view, the following criterion is effective.

The criterion is: whether the possibility of making mistakes in ascribing a property, *F*, to an identical object, *a*, is meaningfully assumed at the same time as a judgment, 'Fa' is true, is made with appropriate justification. For example, let me assume that I judge an object *a*, which I encounter for the first time, to be blue based on my perceptual experiences. Then I can assume meaningfully that ascribing the blueness of *a* might be rectified by detecting a disorder of my visual organs afterwards. It can be assumed meaningfully that my judgment that object *b* is a cuboid might be revised by observing it from a different position. It can also be assumed meaningfully that my judgment that object *c* is a horse might be revised by realizing that it is an elaborate artifact, my judgment that object *d* is a book might be revised by finding out that all of its pages are blank sheets, my memory that object *e* was bought at store X at time point t_1 might be revised by a new piece of evidence, and our judgment that Kurt Gödel proved the incompleteness theorem might be rectified by discovering new historical material at the same time as these judgments are made.

When this criterion is satisfied, the room for the thought that '*a*' refers to an object *a* independently from the correctness of my judgment that 'Fa' is true is secured. When my judgment is correct, '*a*' is supposed to refer to *a* in a meaningful state of affairs, Fa (*a* is blue, *b* is a cuboid, *c* is a horse, *d* is a book...). When my judgment is wrong, '*a*' is supposed to refer to *a* in a meaningful state of affairs, \neg Fa. Let me summarize the argument about reference so far.

A sentence is a description as a word-picture of the facts → A referential relation holds between a word as a constituent of a sentence and an object as a constituent of a fact → Both affirmation and negation of the

² This term is based on the two-dimensional semantics (cf., Chalmers 1996, pp.56-69).

judgment by the sentence including the word are supposed to be meaningful at the same time.³

Under Presupposition C a first-person avowal of sensation cannot satisfy the criterion for reference. For, since it is necessarily true, except in the case of a mistake about the meaning of words that it contains ([thesis F]), the negation of a first-person avowal of sensation cannot be supposed meaningfully at the same time as the avowal is made. For example, suppose that being affected by a disorder of my sense organs, I sincerely assert an itch on my hand when pricked by a needle. Then, I cannot assume that the sensation I feel might turn out not to be an itch afterwards. Alternatively, when I sincerely avow a pain, I cannot suppose that the sensation I feel might turn out to be an elaborate artifact of sensation (!). Indeed my memory that I felt pain in my tooth at t_1 can be wrong. But the mistake is not about the sensation I felt at t_1 but just about the fact that at t_1 I felt pain in my tooth.

Therefore both affirmation and negation of a first-person assertion of sensation cannot be meaningful at the same time. Only one or the other of them can be meaningful. Thus, I can conclude of a first-person assertion of sensations that a referential relation cannot hold between a word as a constituent of a sentence and an object as a constituent of a fact. I will summarize the conclusion as the following thesis.

[thesis R] Referential relation cannot hold in sincere first-person assertions of sensations.

5. Relation between the three theses

I will examine what kind of relation between the two theses I have derived ([thesis F] and [thesis R]) and [thesis P] holds.

I assume the negation of [thesis R]. Then, a referential relation would come into existence about first-person avowals of sensations. The language-game of beetle (PI293), which is seen not figuratively but literally, can represent this assumption appropriately. Suppose that each person has her own box on whose surface a sign 'e' is carved and only its owner can look at the object within it that is called 'e'. Then, each person will ascribe various properties to the object within her own box and communicate information concerning it to others. For instance S makes such judgments as *Fe*, *Ge*, and *Re* about her own object *e*. Then, we can assume meaningfully that she might make various kinds of mistakes about *e*'s color, form, material, and history as described above.

Under this supposition, whether objects within boxes are private can be decided based on empirical inquiries. For example, suppose that each person can set a code number for her own box privately. Then, a world in which every person never looks into any box except her own is imaginable. In such a world, *e*, a referent of 'e', can be called 'private', because each person acquaints herself only with the object in her own box. On the other hand, it can easily be imagined that a person's *e* is perceived directly by others through her code number being decoded, her showing it to them capriciously, and so on. Then *e* cannot be called 'private'. Thus, the negation of [thesis P] ('sensations are private' is not a grammatical proposition but an empirical one) follows from the negation of [thesis R]. Therefore the implication [thesis P]→[thesis R] can be claimed to hold.

Next, assume the negation of [thesis P]. Under this assumption, sensations can be assimilated to an object *e* within a box 'e' on the model of the aforementioned game. Within the game, there is room for the various kinds of cognitive error for first-person statements of sensations -- statements regarding object *e* in one's own box -- besides the possibility of mistakes in the meaning of the words that those statements include. Thus, the negation of [thesis F] follows from the assumption. Therefore, the implication [thesis F]→[thesis P] can be claimed to hold. Integrating these two claims, I can conclude that the logical relation that [thesis F]→[thesis P]→[thesis R], at least, holds between the three theses.

6. Inverted spectrum and zombie arguments

Based on the grammar of sensations that has been formulated so far, I can easily demonstrate that both the inverted spectrum argument and (phenomenal) zombie argument are nothing but nonsense. Let me confirm this. Given that I (=K) and another person M exist, the inverted spectrum argument can be illustrated in the following way. I and M communicate with each other smoothly without any serious disagreement about the meanings of words, including words for colors, although our opinions sometimes might disagree. Under this condition, each phenomenal quality (qualia) that both of us feel, respectively, when we use 'red' about an identical object might be consistently different from each other.

The counter argument against the assumption goes as follows. I will insist that this qualia that I feel when I call an object 'red' is nothing but red. M will insist in the same way, from his own perspective. According to [thesis F] each first-person avowal that 'the qualia that I feel when I call an object 'red' is red' cannot be false except for the possibility of mistakes about the meanings of words. Presupposing that the criticism of a Platonic entity of meaning by the rule-following consideration is valid, the meaning of words is nothing but the use of them. But, since the inverted spectrum argument presupposes that my use of color words accords with M's use, there is no room for doubt about mistakes about meanings. Consequently each first-person avowal about qualia cannot be false. Thus, I can conclude that the inverted spectrum argument is nonsense.

I can make a similar objection against the (phenomenal) zombie argument. The zombie argument also presupposes that both of us are functionally isomorphic, and that, therefore, our uses of words, including those of sensations and mental states, agree with each other. Under this presupposition, according to the zombie argument, I think that M might completely lack phenomenal qualities; namely, he could be a zombie.

In this case M will insist as well that 'the sensation I feel when I call an object 'red' is red. Of course, there certainly exist qualia.' According to [thesis F] there is no possibility of a mistake in the avowal of M, except for ones about the meanings of words in the avowal. However, under the presupposition of the argument, there is no room for mistakes about the meanings of words. Thus, the zombie argument must be considered nonsense as well.

7. Concluding remarks

If the grammar of sensations that I have formulated in this paper is valid, any idea incompatible with it has to be con-

³ This condition only provides one necessary condition for a word's reference to an object to come into existence.

sidered a misconception. Fallacies or misconceived pictures regarding sensations will arise from believing that the privacy of sensations is empirical knowledge or admitting that, in a first-person avowal of sensations, there is room for mistakes other than mistakes about the meanings of words or supposing a certain referential relation in sentences concerning sensations. Both the inverted spectrum and zombie arguments are thought to be produced by such misconceptions. However, when the grammar of sensations is applied faithfully with its exact implications, a notion at the opposite extreme seems to appear. It is the notion of *this* sensation without which I could not even apply signs in accordance with the grammar of sensations. I think that one of the most significant insights that we can draw from the private language argument lies in criticizing this notion at the opposite extreme. I would like this paper to serve as a preliminary consideration for illuminating this insight.

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The Tractarian Collapse: On Contradictions, Contrarities, Absurdities and Mutilated Truth Tables

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Abstract

My aim here is to investigate the collapse and abandonment of the *Tractatus* held as a project to develop the attractive picture of a logic completely combinatorial, syntactical and neutral. There is in this project an unsolvable tension between this image of a neutral logic and the demand that it must be used to completely analyze the facts in the world. There are more logical connections than the tractarian logic, with its tautologies, contradictions and truth-functionality, can express. The notation though there to show the essence of language let us judge absurdities. It collapses *Sinnlosigkeit* with *Unsinnigkeit* in some contexts. The truth table notation has not enough sensitivity to difference contrarities from contradictions. I hold it as the core of the Color Exclusion Problem. Logic could not at last take care of itself.

The meaningfulness of elementary propositions does not guarantee in some contexts the meaningfulness of the complex propositions built through their articulations. Some articulations have to be *ad hoc* forbidden in the construction of some complex propositions, for we cannot judge nonsenses. A complex proposition could not thus be built exclusively over its elementary base. Moreover, logical operators could not freely vary over propositions without being sensitive about which propositions they are connecting. This represents a challenge, in general, for any theory which defends an all-encompassing truth-functionality and, in particular, for the influential tractarian Philosophy of Logic. We know that propositions in the *Tractatus*, and also in Wittgenstein's article of 1929 (*Some Remarks of Logical Form*) are either elementary or molecular. These must be possible so we can reduce truth-functionally molecular propositions to elementary, bipolar and logically independent propositions. Thus, the truth value of these elementary propositions would always be compatible with the distribution of truth values of others.

At the bottom of language we could not have implications or exclusions among propositions. These would have no logical complexity, for they don't possess logical operators. What is inside of these propositions should play no relevant logical role. Along this lines, we would have, then, tautologies and contradictions as extreme cases of this combinatorial neutral game with elementary propositions. Nevertheless, the ascription of colors could not be trivially a case for displaying atomic logical independence, i.e., we would still have implications and exclusions in this context. In any form, the output of the passage 6.3751 is unsatisfactory in at least two lines of argumentation: with numbers and with velocities of particles, because they imply, as Wittgenstein claims in 1929, the restriction of the articulatory horizon of the truth tables. They block *ad hoc* the free distribution of values of truth to propositions, as planned in the *Tractatus*. Contradictions belong to symbolism, while nonsense or absurdities should not. This necessary mutilation of truth tables shows interesting cases of logical dependency between some propositions and their internal components.

What is evident here is the ineptitude of the truth table or of any scheme of truth-functionality to explain the exclusion of color in particular and of degrees in general. For example, the logical product and logical sum do not have sufficient sensitivity to explain the exclusion of non-exhaustive colors. If I take "this is white" as p and "this is black" as q , the logical product cannot be TFFF (p, q), precisely because the conjunction's parts cannot be true to-

gether. A row in the truth table should be completely eliminated (or mutilated as Von Wright often writes). Moreover, if p is the case, we have that q cannot be the case and vice versa. So there is a picture of exclusion and implications in the mosaic of colors. The result for the *Tractatus* seems to be trivial: if elements of a proposition are mutually exclusive, they are not elementary, so one must keep on analyzing to sublimate the operational complexity and display the elementary propositions at its base. As von Wright (1996) claims:

"This is red and blue (all over)", we feel is a contradiction. Its two component sentences are not logically independent. Hence "this is red" cannot be an atomic sentence. But since it is not atomic the sentence must be molecular "in disguise", i.e. it must be possible to analyze, exhibit it in the form of a truth-function of atomic sentences." (pp. 9-10).

However, this problem is just postponed. All analysis of propositions of gradation will generate necessarily exclusions – while these are, of course, not exhaustive, they are still exclusions. According to our approach, as there is no truth functional treatment for exclusion of degrees in the truth table, there is none in the *Tractatus* either. Since truth tables can be a very perspicuous exegetical key to its Philosophy of Logic and its limitations (cf. Silva, 2012). Clearly referring to passage 4.442 of the *Tractatus* on reduced forms of writing down the scheme of T and F, in § 79 of the PB Wittgenstein claims:

"Das würde aber heißen, dass ich zwei bestimmte Sätze zwar anschreiben darf, aber nicht ihr logisches Produkt. Die beiden Sätze kollidieren im Gegenstand. Der Satz $f(g).f(r)$ ist nicht Unsinn, weil ja nicht alle Wahrheitsmöglichkeiten wegfallen, wenn sie auch alle abgewiesen werden. Man kann aber sagen, dass hier das "." eine andere Bedeutung hat, denn im allgemeinen bedeutet "x.y" (WFFF), dagegen hier (FFF). Und Analoges gilt für "xvy", etc." p.107

It is revealing to note here that there is a clear movement towards the softening or mitigation of the relation of opposition. We can subsequently include a multiplicity of possible contrarities, such as color, or any case of ascription of degrees to qualities. Here the limitations of tractarian logic are clear: limitations appear in dealing not only with the colors mosaic (6.3751), but also with the entire opposition paradigm which can be encountered in the exclusion by contrariety. An empirical proposition can have many, possibly even infinite, negatives or propositions which are not completely outside of it. The phrase "not completely" is

relevant here, because it shows a tension in systems of propositions: although some propositions belong to the same system, they exclude each other, but not in a radical way like the exclusion by contradiction. This possibility of multiple oppositions to a proposition is contrary to that which is expressed in passage 5.513. The emergent image of a system of propositions (*Satzsystem*), which hallmarks Wittgenstein's return to Philosophy, are clear development of the tractarian notion of logical space (*logischen Raum*) after the Color Exclusion Problem (cf. Silva, 2012).

The absurd construction here was the conjunction of empirical propositions, which ascribe two different degrees to a single quality. Such propositions cannot be true together but can be false together. The contrariety of certain empirical arrangements cannot be expressed in compositional terms. We could then try to think of a kind of operator of contrariety, expressed in truth-functional terms, as the negation of the conjunction of two propositions, something like (FTTT) (p, q). This corresponds to the second element in the exhaustive list of combination of binary operators that Wittgenstein draws in 5.101. However, this does not solve the problem either. Still, we should mutilate any row of the truth table for such an articulation. For example: assigning two colors to the same point is simply not authorized by the system of propositions in which we operate. There is a restriction in the distributions of truth-values in such molecular propositions. This notation does not capture the logical multiplicity of the system in which it is used, i.e., it allows the articulation of symbols of things that cannot be articulated in reality. It is evident that the problem is less with the falsehood than with the absurdity. It is a nonsense that the truth tables thought as a notation does not prevent, even though being created to prevent it (cf. Silva, 2012).

Here we clearly see how the limitation of the truth table shows a limitation in the conceptual framework of the *Tractatus*, and vice versa. As we saw, the conjunction among colors in a color systems has to be different than the truth functional conjunction. And this incapability for preventing non-senses is a serious problem throughout the tractarian project. Marion agrees with this view, writing:

"In the 'analysis' was conceived as decomposition from complex to simple; and, since complex propositions are concatenations of elementary propositions by means of truth-functional operators, to say that 'statements of degree' are analyzable means therefore that they are logical products of even more elementary propositions". (Marion, p.120)

For example, I cannot analyze 3cm truth-functionally with the truth of their conjunction parts as equivalent to 1cm.1cm.1cm, which means trivially 1cm, and not 3 cm as intended. Nor can I analyze 3cm as 1cm.2cm, which would be absurd (by contrariety, not by contradiction!). Similarly, if a table is 3 meters long it cannot be correctly analyzed as (1 meter.2 meters.3 meters), for that would mean that the analysed is in the analyzing. The statement "The table is exactly three meters" excludes the table from measuring any other length. But saying the table measures "at least three meters" implies other possibilities. Here we reveal a serious problem for the truth-functionality or a metaphysics of truth table (cf. Silva, 2012). It's not just a momentary problem of incapacity. One just cannot analyze statements about the ascription of grades to empirical qualities by means of logic products. The characteristic of the addition, essential for these systems, is thereby lost. We have then necessities that are not grasped by the truth functional paradigm. As Wittgenstein affirms in PB §76:

"Und verschiedene Grade von Rot sind miteinander unverträglich. Das könnte man sich etwa so erklärt denken, dass irgendwelche kleine Quantitäten von Rot addiert, einen gewissen Grad von Rot ergeben. Was heißt es aber dann zu sagen, dass etwa fünf solcher Quantitäten von Rot vorhanden sind? Es kann natürlich nicht ein logisches Produkt sein, dass die Quantität No.1 vorhanden ist, und die Quantität No. 2 etc. bis 5; denn wie würden sich diese voneinander unterscheiden? Es kann also der Satz, dass der Grad 5 von Rot vorhanden ist, nicht so zerlegt werden. Und ich kann also keinen abschließenden Satz haben, dass das das ganze Rot ist, welches in dieser Farbe vorhanden ist; denn es hat keinen Sinn zu sagen, dass kein Rot mehr dazukommt, da ich nicht durch das logisch "und" Quantitäten von Rot addieren konnte. *Es heißt auch nichts, zu sagen, dass ein Stab, der 3 m lang ist, auch 2 m lang ist, weil er 2 + 1 m lang ist, denn man kann nicht sagen, er ist 2 m lang und er ist 1 m lang. Die Länge von 3 m ist etwas Neues.*" (p. 105. My italics.)

In this way, it is justified why new alternative interpretations of logical operators of limited validity and corresponding to some systems should be adopted, as pointed out by PB § 83, where there is clearly a demand for logical operators that would not be truth-functional. The well-known *Color Exclusion Problem* is larger than the secondary literature claims, because it encompasses not only the articulation of colors, but also any proposition of gradation, as of temperature, length, volume, etc., the cases of trichotomies (eg. soccer matches results) or exclusions within taxonomic systems (eg. "The animal over there is a cat, therefore it is no dog" or "Today is Monday, therefore it is not Tuesday" or "He is my cousin, therefore he is not my brother, or "this is a circle, therefore it is no triangle"). These are all catastrophic counter-examples to the tractarian theses about exclusive paradigm of truth functionality in propositional analysis and about contradictions and tautologies composing exhaustively the horizon of logic. This shows why his image of logic and the role of a perspicuous notation to show systematically the essence of language and to prevent nonsenses should be deeply changed in his return to Philosophy in 1929.

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A Philosophical Investigation of the Concept of Memory and the Possibility of "Collective Memory"

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Abstract

Although numerous philosophers, anthropologists, neurobiologists etc. still regard collective memory as a highly contested concept, advocating its avoidance, it is possible from Wittgenstein's remarks to reconstruct reasons justifying validity of discourse on collective, i.e. social and cultural memories. He exemplifies multiple purposes and uses of the concept of memory, as well as inseparability of mental processes of recalling from external stimuli. As the founder of social memory research, Halbwachs anticipated certain of Wittgenstein's standpoints. According to Halbwachs, memory is an ability which should be analyzed in the context of recall, not through examination of an individual's mental pictures or neurophysiological stances. His analysis was focused mainly on the social dimensions of memory, whereas Wittgenstein's remarks dealt with general conceptual problems. However, both of them rejected concept of memory as encoded inner representations and considered the objects and actions of recalling as parts of memory.

In Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology Wittgenstein wrote:

"I want someone to take note of a text that I recite to him, so that he can repeat it to me later, I have to give him paper and pencil, while I am speaking he makes lines, marks, on the paper; if he has to reproduce the text later he follows those marks with his eyes and recites the text. But I assume that what he has jotted down is not writing, is not connected by rules with the words of the text; *yet without these jottings he is unable to reproduce the text*; and if anything in it is altered, if part of it is destroyed, he gets stuck in his 'reading' or recites the text uncertainly or carelessly, or cannot find the words at all--This can be imagined!--What I called jottings would not be a rendering of the text, not a translation, so to speak, in another symbolism. The text would not be stored up in the jottings. And why should it be stored up in our nervous system?" (Wittgenstein 1980: 908; also in Wittgenstein 1981: 612.)

As for many theories and received models in philosophy, Wittgenstein's investigations turned out to be iconoclastic for traditional philosophy of memory. According to this model, past experiences are stored, recorded or carved into a mind (traditionally conceived of as a wax tablet), and as such they can be recalled in each situation in their original – or in fading and reshaped by virtue of forgetting – form. In the modern age, this traditional thesis appears in cognitive and representational perspective according to which during learning or obtaining experience the brain stores certain contents in the form of traces, as representations of previously experienced events. Memories occur due to the activation of these traces of past experiences, so that traces or representations are causes of our recalling. There should be particular "memory records" which would connect experiences in our personal past with the rendering of memory in actual cases.

Wittgenstein questions this perspective in a radical manner by claiming that "nothing seems more possible to me than that people some day will come to the definite opinion that there is no copy in either the physiological or nervous systems which corresponds to a particular thought, or a particular idea, or memory." (Wittgenstein 1982: 504) He even claims that we can presuppose instead causation of spoken or written thoughts by brain activities, that mental states proceed "out of chaos". According to Stern and

Moyall-Sharrock this does not imply that memories, as well as other activities of thought, are not connected to the brain whatsoever, as particular critics suggest (Stern: 1991; Moyall-Sharrock 2009). Wittgenstein is in fact rejecting the representational theory of mind and memory, which is the idea that our brain mechanically stores representations which one uses when he/she thinks. When we talk about brain processes as causes of mental states, that every mental state has got its correlate in a brain, we are inadequately applying a causal neuro-physiological explanation to language games with psychological concepts. There is no physical copy of my thoughts (or my memory), a strict correlation, 'psychophysical parallelism' or isomorphism of a state in my brain and my particular memory, meaning that scanning the brain cannot reveal the content of my thoughts: thought processes cannot be read off brain processes (Wittgenstein 1980: 903).

Regardless of recent (and highly probably future) scientific discoveries of the synapses responsible for retention, of modifications in the brain as a result of learning, it is disputable if those changes could be marked as the causes of memory. Even less will these traces be true memories: "Whatever the event does leave behind in the organism, it isn't the memory" (Wittgenstein 1980: 22). Changes in synapses understood as, according to refined concepts of representation, interest-dependent and motivational-dependent traces, would be ineffective without interests and motivations actually initiated in the environment. There would be no sense in talking about stored traces, mere potentials independent of their own actualization, or about sources or causes of memories, let alone about memories themselves.

Along with numerous collective memory theorists, Wittgenstein pays attention to retrieval or activation (meaning both use and action), instead of encoding and storing. Neurobiology and neurophysiology researches formation of memory, how input of environment becomes registered and codified in the brain, which cellular, biochemical and molecular processes are generated when an animal or a person learn and obtain new experiences. As some neurobiologists have admitted, their work has got almost nothing to do with recall and retrieval of already learned experiences (cf. Rose 1998: 159-160).

However, does "out of chaos" also mean "randomly", "without any sense", "not connected with anything"? Rather, it is suggested that the conceptual framework

where memories are "caused by", "reducible to" or "represented in" something (such as traces in an individual's brain) need to be replaced. Memories are activated in a certain context, when there is an interaction with external images, narratives, sounds, etc. but not even external objects could be considered as causes of memories, but only indicators or initiators of recalling. We are talking about motivational events, different from causal determinations in the physical world. The jottings mentioned in the introductory quote are not stored as symbols or representations in the mind, and meaning is not "carved into" the jottings – nevertheless, a person who writes them and associates random curves with certain word sequences or meanings is able to reproduce the text I am saying only if jottings are presented before him. These jottings can be observed as inseparable parts of the system that constitute memories because it is only with them that we can talk about memory in the full sense.

What simple incomprehensible jottings represent for a plain reproduction of memory, material objects, in which cultural memories are embedded, represent the evocation and reminiscence of highly complex understandings and affection. The innate mechanical ability of reproduction will not suffice: beside an organic, neuron basis, what individual memory requires is social interaction as a dissemination of memories among members of a certain social group as well as cultural interaction mediated through institutionalized symbols and signs. This leads to the idea that memory must be considered not only as individual, but also as collective, that is, social and cultural memory, but this use has not been entirely accepted. Numerous authors claim that to consider memory as collective implies the anthropomorphist mistake of postulating supra-individual mind, that it is incorrect to attribute the process of thinking, unique for each individual, to a body of persons. However, other authors advocate the interdisciplinary approach, questioning dualism in subjects of inquiry, where cognitive and neurophysiological sciences, psychology and psychoanalysis examine individual memory, whereas intersubjective group (generational, family, etc.) experiences with their influence on an individual's memory, as well as social apprehension of history, are the subject of social sciences (cf. Sutton: 2004). According to the those defending the concept of collective memory, it is justifiable to use the concept of memory flexibly, and among other things, in the context of collective experiences and receptions of the past of social groups. Therefore, personal memory will be just one type of memory – there are other forms of keeping, conceiving and reliving memory, including, as notably important, forms of understanding of the group's past which constitute its common identity. In addition, the idea that memories consist only of a subject's experiences fails to notice that in order to recall his/her own past, a person has to involve memories of other persons. French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs, as the founder of research of collective memory, criticizes the perspective that there is one 'specific element' of memory, one individual consciousness which is self-sufficient. Isolated consciousness implies "memory employing no frameworks" (Halbwachs 1925/1992: 60) as separate and unconnected from objective, social and historical collective framework. Memories which seem to be entirely intimate, such as autobiographic memories about some events from our personal life, have often been reconstructed due to retelling, that is, they are recollections 'borrowed' from the memories of other people – they are not directly experienced, but 'induced' instead. Our memory is formed through, and relies on, 'exchange of memories' in social interaction, where abovementioned transfer occurs, as well

as comparison, conflict, reevaluation and revision of memory.

Just like his teacher, Bergson, Halbwachs believes that activating memories does not belong to the brain, nor to records of pasts piled up in an inner medium, and that it belongs to events in actuality: we observe and interpret the past according to the present. Memory is an ability, which actualizes due to perceptions (Bergson) or social events (Halbwachs). People always adapt memories according to the present, their past is led by current motives and interests.

In scrutinizing the role of social framework, Halbwachs points at the reconstructive nature of memory. Memory cannot be created, transferred or activated outside of the influence of a social framework and, since that framework is constructed through the narratives of other people, memory itself is structured discursively. As Wittgenstein claimed after him, Halbwachs considered that it makes no sense in searching for a part of the brain where memory could be stored, adding that memories are "recalled to me externally" (Halbwachs 1925/1992: 38). Halbwachs argued against the possibility of us having complete and constant images of what we experienced. What remains in our mind is only indications of the reconstruction of particular parts of reality which we see in an undefined manner even when 'images of reality' do not exist at all in our mind. When a person has a memory of his/her father, this memory won't be saved just as it was experienced, it will not be consistent and permanent in the flux of time. While growing up, the image of a person's father changes, both due to the change of the status of this person in the family as well as due to this person belonging to different groups which enable observing family and role of each member of the family from different points of view. Instead of static memory as a saved image, what we are dealing with in fact is development and dynamic modification in compliance with circumstances and changes of the very person who remembers. The image changes even if a person does not acquire new knowledge about his/her father: what has changed is context, which has a crucial influence on memory.

In a similar vein, Wittgenstein wrote: "Memory can be compared with a storehouse only so far as it fulfills the same purpose. Where it doesn't, we couldn't say whether the things stored up may not constantly change their nature and so couldn't be stored at all." (Wittgenstein 1935-6: 17, quoted in Stern 1991: 204) According to this, any conception of traces contained in a brain is unacceptable, since memory itself has got multiple separable purposes. One memory is evoking father's physical appearance when we try to describe him to an other person; the second memory appeared when, during conversation, we quote what father thought about politics, art, neighbours etc.; the third emerges when we relive some particular episode in his life; the fourth when we sing his favourite song. This multiplicity makes a thesis of unitary remembrance of father inconceivable, beside the fact that the subject can claim that his comprehension of him is distinct and compact. With a change of purpose memory has been changed as well and, in consequence, the idea of a memory of father contained as complete in person's mind has lost any sense.

As Wittgenstein stressed, in examination of the concept of memory, various sorts are to be distinguished (Wittgenstein 1979: 56). He differentiates various purposes of memory, which means that memory is a heterogenous phenomenon, encompassing multiplicity of uses and actions, different sorts of recalling, various abilities for re-

membering, irreducible kinds of evocation, recollection or relivings. The different means of memorisation and objects with "embedded memory" are used by individuals and social groups, from rhymes, sketches and mnemonic codes, to memorial sites, monuments, performances, landscapes, films, and each have various purposes. Some of them are constructed for automatic reproduction, some are made up for evoking images, some, such as sites and objects of memory, are produced or introduced on purpose to initialize reminiscence of past historical events. Remembering sequences of events is different from repeating words on oath, as well as from reviving details of some picture or a person's traits of character. Reproduction of a melody is far different from evoking a historical event: minor misremembering of tones could devastate reception of all musical performance, but it is superfluous for a significant number of historical details to have any retention in collective memory. Verbatim memory, or reproducing with extreme exactitude, is necessary only on specific occasions. Successful memory often involves selection, separation and isolation of a particular place, event, object, etc, which means removal of redundant details and treating particular segments of the past as irrelevant for retention. In this sense memory could be determined as something by which past experience or knowledge is recalled or activated, and in which content, capacity and accuracy depend on the purpose of this use.

Contemporary neuropsychological research corroborates the concept of memory as function or ability manifested as interaction of subject and environment, inseparable from the context in which recall has proceeded. Determination of memory as a way of acting, as ability merged with specific context, is of importance for collective (social and cultural) memory in particular. This memory has been constituted in accord with the present, its content is selected, reconstructed and refined in conformity with the current norms and claims of the social group. The aim of collective memory is to induce, effect, or instigate action – therefore the invoking of this memory involves appeal to emotions and the motivational structure of the subject. Accuracy and veracity of content, as well as achieving the authenticity of remembrance, is not the main goal of remembering, insistence on accuracy and consistency could even debilitate the group's adaptability to new conditions and preclude acceptance of new ideas.

Along with various repositories and purposes of memory, the use of different methods for checking and reviewing memory is inevitable: checking the accuracy of rendered text, reviewing the description of a particular person, verifying accuracy of certain memorized date, determining if cultural symbols embedded in landscapes or other material

objects can evoke appropriate memories. In certain cases, the only possibility for verification is comparison of one particular memory with memories of the other subjects. In legal practice, as well as in memoirs and reports of individuals which on particular occasions serves as substance for historical knowledge, we are bound to the other memories, to compare, confront and review them simultaneously. "One witness is no witness" is an ancient Roman legal principle, which has its application in historiographical methodology as well. Finally, other memories are crucially significant for understanding a person's own memories. Subject is bad or good-for-nothing critic of his own memories: he is in need of confronting them with unidentical memories in order to achieve reliability. Appreciation of other memories doesn't imply liability to their authority; with the help of memories of other persons and different groups subjects de-center each other, which gives them the opportunity for refined understanding of their own memories. However different their methods, aims and research approach might be, this is an outcome which both Wittgenstein and Halbwachs achieved.

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Language games in Ts-310: a heuristic method for philosophizing

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Abstract

In this paper I will provide a sketch for Wittgenstein's use of language games in the first part of Ts-310, Brown Book. I will show that his achievement in Ts-310 is one of method, one in which language games are used heuristically. By lying before us and discussing fictive cases, which progressively come to resemble real cases, he teaches the reader how to "go on". In this way he establishes a method for considering our language on its own terms, not philosophy's, and thus provides the philosopher with a tool for considering language anew. This can in turn help the philosopher resist essentialism and other philosophical dogmas.

Very few if any interpretations of Wittgenstein's Ts-310, Brown Book, investigate it on its own terms. Some tie Wittgenstein's extensive use of language games there to anti-essentialism, others to terminology used in later works and/or to a particular stage in the development of his thought. What I want to show is how we can understand Ts-310 on its own merits, and thus see its achievement as one of method, not of terminology or development. My focus will be on Part I of Ts-310. I will begin by giving an overview of Ts-310 and then present some discussions of which role(s) language games play therein. Finally, I will present and defend my own view that language games have a heuristic function.¹

1. Brown Book (Ts-310)

Ts-310 was written in 1934-35. Part I, on which I will be focusing in this paper, was written during Michaelmas term 1934 and Part II commenced at the beginning of Lent term 1935. It was dictated to students Alice Ambrose and Francis Skinner. Unlike Ts-309, Blue Book, which was intended as a set of lecture notes, Ts-310 was a draft text intended for possible publication. (Monk 1990, p. 336; Rhees 1958, p. vii) Also, unlike Ts-309, which mainly introduces the term language games (p. 17), the axis of Ts-310 is 73 numbered language games. The second part of the title for the published version of Ts-309 and Ts-310, *The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies for the 'Philosophical Investigations'* already hints that Ts-309 and Ts-310's importance for researchers has been for studying the development of Wittgenstein's thought since the preserved Ts-310 does not have a title and the preserved Ts-309's title is simply "Wittgenstein Blue Book". (BEE 2000)

2. Rhees, Hacker and Monk on Brown Book

Rush Rhees' discussion in his introduction to *The Blue and Brown Books* approaches language games in Brown Book by comparing them to Blue Book on one side and Philosophical Investigations (PI) on the other. Rhees writes that for Wittgenstein, "philosophy was a method of investigation" and that he introduced the notion of language games "in order to shake off the idea of a necessary form of language." (p. viii) Language games as a method in Blue Book move from primitive to complex, the later built on the former. This is not the case in Brown Book where "understanding" is not one single thing, achieved and explained through observing a movement from simple to complex

language games. Individual language games in Brown Book are languages complete in themselves, not parts of a general system of communication. Concepts like "understanding" thus have many faces. In a quotation from an earlier Ms of Wittgenstein, Rhees finds an apt description for what he feels is Wittgenstein's method in Brown Book, "I simply set forth the games as what they are, and let them shed their light on the particular problems." (p. x) This rather than pursuing a specific inquiry by asking questions regarding e.g. how understanding is possible. According to Rhees, the ways in which Wittgenstein in Brown Book presents language games, "show that one *need* not be led into asking those questions, and that it would be a misunderstanding if one were. But the trouble is that we are left wondering why people constantly *are*. And in this the *Investigations* is different." (pp. x-xi) For Rhees this difference is that language games in PI are steps toward a discussion starting in §65 regarding the "big question" of what language is" and is there e.g. "concerned with the 'philosophical conception of meaning'" (p. xi). Rhees is clearly occupied with connecting Wittgenstein's use of language games to anti-essentialism as well as using them to trace the development of Wittgenstein's thought.

In "Wittgenstein's Builders", Rhees focuses on individual language games in Brown Book, repeatedly questioning their viability by comparing them to how our ordinary language actually functions. Regarding the builders' language, the first language game introduced in Brown Book and used several times therein, Rhees writes

"But I feel there is something wrong here. The trouble is not to imagine a people with a language of such a limited vocabulary. The trouble is to imagine that they spoke the language only to give these special orders on this job and otherwise never spoke at all. I do not think it would be speaking a language." (p. 176)

He continues,

"In fact it seems as though Wittgenstein has described a *game* with building stones, and not the sort of thing people would do if they were actually building a house. [...] But this will not do what Wittgenstein wanted. It does not show how speaking is related to the lives which people lead." (p. 176)

I think it is quite clear here that Rhees is holding the Wittgenstein of the Brown Book to the standards of PI Wittgenstein, that languages are intimately connected with the form of life the speaker lives ("...what Wittgenstein wanted"). But Rhees has missed an important point and that is that the builders' and other language games in Brown Book are *complete* exactly because they are *imaginary* and not necessarily embedded in a form of life.

¹ This paper is written within the scope of the DM2E project at the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (http://wab.uib.no/wab_dm2e.page). Thanks to guest researcher Jakub Mácha and colleagues, especially Helle Nyvold, at the archives for helpful discussions regarding language games.

And this is where Peter Hacker is more sensible to Brown Book's character. Like Rhees he delves into the evolution of language games prior to and after Brown Book, albeit more deeply. He also, but more clearly than Rhees, refers to Wittgenstein's development of language games as a technique ("a novel technique of philosophical analysis" p. 51) as well as a method ('the language-game method' p. 52) and goes so far as to claim "It is only in the *Brown Book* (1934-5) that the language-game *method* achieves maturity" (p. 53). Unlike Rhees, he sees no difference between language games in Brown Book and PI, nor does he take language games in Brown Book literally. The point of invented language games is that they are "surveyable" and it is this, not completeness or exactness, that is important for Hacker. The interest they hold for us rather lies in "seeing connections, analogies and disanalogies that will display the articulations of our language which give rise to, and resolve, philosophical problems." (p. 53) Hacker reminds us that the term language game is also used to refer to fragments of our ordinary language, giving many examples from PI. For Hacker the similarities between imagined language games and fragments of our own language are sufficient to justify extending the term language game from the former to the latter. He concludes that the measure of success for such an extension "is the degree of naturalness in describing puzzling fragments of our language as language-games." (s. 56) However he warns that with such transfer of terminology, there are attendant dangers and writes, "We are moving in the realm of analogy; language is not a game, nor typically are the activities into which its use is woven." (p. 56) Here I think that Hacker expects a substantial result from the language game method and begins to question the viability of such results. Also, by so extensively comparing Wittgenstein's use of language games in Brown Book to other works, Hacker considers language games in Brown Book mainly as a step or phase in Wittgenstein's reflections on language. There is also more than a hint of Wittgensteinian terminology, e.g. perspicuous presentation and objects of comparison.

In *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius* Ray Monk writes, "The *Brown Book* is divided into two parts, corresponding, roughly, to the method and its application." (p. 344) Monk characterizes Part I as a "text book" with 73 numbered exercises. He recounts several such exercises that invite the reader to "imagine" different language use scenarios, but complains that Wittgenstein rarely spells out the point of imagining these situations. Wittgenstein merely "leads the reader through a series of progressively more complicated language-games, occasionally pausing to remark on various features of the games he is describing. [...] It is as though the book was intended to serve as a text in a course designed to nip in the bud of any latent philosophizing." (pp. 344-5) Not until Wittgenstein presents language games introducing infinite series and notions of 'past', 'present' and 'future' does Monk feel Wittgenstein explicitly connects language games to philosophical problems. By contrasting telling time in a primitive language game to those in our own language, Wittgenstein shows how our language permits the construction of questions that give rise to philosophical puzzlement, e.g. "Where does the present go when it becomes the past?", "What is the 'now'?" (p. 345) And this, writes Monk, comes as a relief those reading Brown Book as a work of philosophy. Monk concludes with a quote in which he feels Wittgenstein "spells out his procedure". There (between language games 56 and 57) Wittgenstein writes that we obscure the real role words like "now" play in language use "when instead of looking at the *whole language game*, we only look at the contexts, the phrases of language in which the word

is used." (Brown Book p. 108, [http://wittgensteinsource.org/Ts-310,49\[2\]et50\[1\]_n](http://wittgensteinsource.org/Ts-310,49[2]et50[1]_n))

3. The heuristics of language games

So where does this survey of Rhees, Hacker and Monk leave us? All three seem to expect a concrete result, that we should emerge from reading these 73 language games with a specific understanding of how language actually works, of some specific problem within philosophy, or at the very least of the corpus of Wittgensteinian terminology. Rhees and Hacker are especially concerned with the development of Wittgenstein's thought, where his use of language games in Brown Book is a stage, but in practice a dead end in relation to understanding his later writings. If language games in Ts-310 are neither viable descriptions of language nor clearly isolate specific problems within philosophy nor offer us new insights into what Wittgenstein writes elsewhere, what are they but a curiosity, a road best left untraveled? If we look at the character of the language games in question, we find that many include a teacher and a pupil or a person giving an order and another following it, respectively A and B. Teaching and learning language, giving and receiving training are also clearly themes. Monk's intuition that Part I of Brown Book is like a book of exercises therefore fits well. The language games can be divided roughly into the following categories: builders' language (1-11, etc.); fetching fabric: games for following patterns (12-17); games using tables (7, 18-21); games with numerals: closed and open card games (22-24), finite and infinite games with an abacus (25-30), other games with numerals (31-32); rule games (33-40); general training games (41-43); 'can' games (44-49); temporal games: past, present and future (50-56); games of conjecture (57-61); games of discovery (62-64); family likeness games (65-66); reading games (67-70); derivation games (71-73). Through these Wittgenstein introduces a toolbox for language containing words, numerals, proper names, indexicals, questions and answers. He then moves to contemplate how a pattern can be learned from a sample, which leads into a discussion of rule following via learning to follow a table. Next, through card games and abacus use, he considers how one can teach an infinite series from a closed. Returning to tables and rules, Wittgenstein wonders what the difference is between a rule, its expression and its following or for that matter an order and its execution. Can a rule be followed without training? This leads to the question whether we need rules and training to learn to follow rules in general. The theme of 'can' is not far off and from there it is only a short distance to a discussion of future and past, conjecture, pattern discovery and derivation.

One wants to find a pattern in all this, e.g. a movement from simple to complex, or like Monk one "progressively more complicated", a systematic consideration of language learning or as mentioned earlier, substantial philosophical themes related to how we use language. One is seemingly thwarted at every turn. We meet familiar strands from Wittgenstein's thought, e.g. family resemblance appears several times, aspects of rule following related to reading a table, continuing a series, and reading a text, as well as repeated discussions regarding whether something mental secures, lies behind, being able to follow a pattern, rule, complete or continue a series, etc. Yet none of these are predominant. What one finds instead is a movement from clearly fictive language games toward ones that increasingly resemble our own. In Hacker's words this is a movement from imagined complete language games, to fragmentary real ones. The change occurs around language

game 50 and is gradual thereafter. Not only are the language games from 50 to 73 not clearly fictional, the discussion is also more clearly concerned with how we actually use language as opposed to how it is being used in the language game under consideration. The language games in Part II of Ts-310 are almost exclusively real ones, or what Hacker refers to as fragments of language. For this reason I think, in Monks terms, that both method and application are found already in Part I. Starting with fictional language games has a heuristic function. It puts us at ease in a situation where the stakes are low and we are open-minded. But once we have gone along with him on these, see the sense in the many discussions and remarks, it is hard to suddenly dig in our heels when they come to resemble our own language, whether they are actual language games or a hybrid. Wittgenstein's command to look at the whole language game, not just the structure of the phrase, is something that would make no sense unless he had already presented a range of such "whole" language games and discussed them. This kind of set up could be called a language game for philosophers where he teaches or trains us, like the pupil in so many of these games, how to go on. Similarly to the open and closed games he introduces, he builds us up slowly toward a point where the method is familiar. As Hacker writes, neither completeness nor exactness is the point. Wittgenstein could have used different language games to the same effect. Thus efforts to discover specific themes in these games are wasted. If this is correct, then Wittgenstein's primary achievement in Brown Book is one of method. By lying before us and discussing fictive cases, which progressively come to resemble real cases, he teaches us how to "go on". In this way he establishes a

method for considering our language on its own terms, not philosophy's, and thus provides us with a tool for considering language anew. That this in turn helps us fight essentialism, mentalism and other problematic philosophical doctrines may be a consequence, but is not a primary concern in Part I of Brown Book, although it seems to be in Part II and in PI.

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„Und den Wahnsinn sollst Du nicht fliehen!“ Wittgensteins Leiden des Geistes

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Abstract

Wittgenstein befasste sich häufig mit dem Wahnsinn – dies in persönlicher wie auch philosophischer Hinsicht. Während er diesen in existentieller Verzweiflung als „strengsten Richter“ darüber, ob sein Leben recht oder unrecht sei, also als eine Art ethische Instanz betrachtete, sah er die philosophische Methode als eine Methode des Wahnsinns, die darin bestünde, diesen wieder zu heilen. Die Situation in der Nähe des Wahnsinns – ob im persönlichen Leben oder im Philosophieren – war mit Wittgensteins „Leiden des Geistes“ verbunden, die vielfach ethisch und religiös begründet waren.

Am 20.2.1937, während eines längeren Aufenthalts in Norwegen, schrieb Wittgenstein in sein Tagebuch:

Du sollst so leben, daß Du vor dem Wahnsinn bestehen kannst, wenn er kommt.

Und den Wahnsinn sollst Du nicht fliehen! Es ist ein Glück, wenn er nicht da ist, aber fliehen sollst Du ihn nicht, so glaube ich mir sagen zu müssen. Denn er ist der strengste Richter (das strengste Gericht) darüber ob mein Leben recht oder unrecht ist; er ist fürchterlich, aber Du sollst ihn dennoch nicht fliehen. Denn Du weißt ja doch nicht, wie Du ihm entkommen kannst; & während Du vor ihm fliehst, benimmst Du Dich ja unwürdig. (DB, 185f.)

Obwohl diese Sätze in persönlicher Verzweiflung geschrieben worden sind, stehen sie mit seinen philosophischen Gedankengängen, insbesondere mit seiner Auffassung von Ethik und Religion, in engem Zusammenhang.

Im Folgenden geht es mir nicht um die Frage, ob der bis dato ohnehin nicht eindeutig gefasste Begriff Wahnsinn auf Wittgenstein zutrifft oder nicht, sondern um die aus seinen Schriften hervorgehende Auseinandersetzung mit Wahnsinn, dies zum einen in persönlicher, zum anderen in philosophischer Hinsicht und dabei kritischen Betrachtung der philosophischen Methode – sozusagen aus einer Meta-Ebene. Beide Aspekte haben mit seinen „Leiden des Geistes“ (DB, 191) zu tun.

Wahnsinn in existentieller Hinsicht

Bereits in den *Tagebüchern 1914-1916* wird deutlich, dass Wittgenstein in vielfacher Hinsicht litt – im Leben wie im Philosophieren: an der Unlösbarkeit philosophischer Probleme, dabei an den Grenzen der Sprache, die vor allem Fragen der Ethik berührten. Sein Streben nach Klarheit in der Philosophie, nach Wahrhaftigkeit im Leben wie im Schreiben war mit einem Ethos verbunden, das er nie zu erreichen vermeinte, einem Anspruch der Vollkommenheit, der allzu oft ein Gefühl des Scheiterns in ihm auslöste.

Der bereits 1914 auftretende und noch in späteren Jahren wiederkehrende Begriff des „erlösenden Worts“ steht für die besessene Suche nach Erkenntnis und adäquater Darstellung seiner philosophischen Gedankengänge, wie auch für die Suche nach Antwort in moralischen Fragen.

Wittgensteins geistiges Ringen erfolgte in einer Intensität, die ihm das Gefühl gab, als ob sein Verstand ein Glasstab wäre, der jeden Moment brechen könnte (vgl. DB,

142), oder, dass sein Gehirn die geistige Beanspruchung nicht länger aushalten und nachgeben werde. (Vgl. DB, 4)

Mehrmals in seinem Leben bewegte er sich am Rande des Wahnsinns, doch wie er die Furcht vor dem Tode als „Zeichen eines falschen, d.h. schlechten Lebens“ sah (TB, 8.7.16), wollte er auch den Wahnsinn nicht fliehen, da die Konfrontation mit diesem wie mit dem Tod von ethischer Bedeutung für ihn war.

Wahnsinn als ethische Instanz

Anfang 1914 schrieb Wittgenstein an Bertrand Russell, dass er sich „nur einen Schritt vom Wahnsinn“ entfernt fühle, so dass er nicht arbeiten könne, da er die „Stimme der Vernunft durch den Lärm der Gespenster“ nicht mehr zu hören vermochte. (Briefe, 48)

Wie José María Ariso ausführt, sind für das Verständnis von Wahnsinn bei Wittgenstein Weininger und Lenau wichtig. 1946 wies Wittgenstein ja ausdrücklich auf Lenaus *Faust* hin und bekannte, ganz ähnliche Gedanken bezüglich seiner Furcht vor dem Wahnsinn gehabt zu haben sowie der Vorstellung, dass das Gefühl eines nahen Abgrunds einer optischen Täuschung entspringen könnte. (Vgl. VB, 107)

Liest man Lenaus *Faust*, so erkennt man diese Parallelen zwischen ihm und Wittgenstein. In der unlöslichen Sehnsucht nach Erkenntnis, die die Wissenschaft ihm nicht zu bringen vermag, bietet Mephistopheles Faust seine Hilfe an – mit der Bedingung, sich von Gott und schließlich auch von der Natur los zu sagen. Nur mehr auf sein Ich zurückgeworfen, gesteht Faust, durch eigene Schuld in abgrundtiefe Vereinsamung geraten zu sein. Da er seinen Schmerz nicht ertragen kann, beschließt er, alles für eine Täuschung, für Schein zu halten und ersticht sich, in dem Glauben, durch die eigene Vernichtung gerettet zu sein. Er kann die Wahrheit nicht ertragen.

Diese Situation, durch Hinabsteigen in die eigenen Tiefen sich selbst in all seiner Unvollkommenheit, ja Sündhaftigkeit zu erkennen und auch zu ertragen, kommt in Wittgensteins Auseinandersetzung mit dem Wahnsinn zum Ausdruck und an diesem Punkt zeigt sich die Ethik, d.h. es zeigt sich, weshalb er den Wahnsinn als strengsten Richter darüber, ob sein Leben recht oder unrecht sei, betrachtete.

Die Erkenntnis der Schuldhaftigkeit der eigenen unänderlichen Natur ist analog der Verantwortlichkeit der Taten des empirischen Charakters, der laut Kant und Schopenhauer zwar als einzelne, zeitliche Erscheinung unfrei

ist, insofern nicht schuldig wäre, doch da er im Sein, als intelligibler Charakter frei ist, zeigt sich in seinem Gewissen, dass er verantwortlich für sein Vergehen ist. Und nur durch Änderung der Gesinnung wäre es möglich, anders, ethisch gut – frei – zu handeln, denn die Freiheit liegt im Sein, im *Esse*, nicht in der individuellen Existenz – der *existentia*. Diese Änderung der Gesinnung komme plötzlich, wie eine Gnade, wobei Schopenhauer auf den Begriff der „katholischen, transzendentalen“ Veränderung bei Matthias Claudius hinweist. (WWV I, 2, 498) Ebenso könnte man auf den Aspekt der Bekehrung bei William James' *Varities of Religious Experience* verweisen, die, abgesehen von der Toleranz gegenüber verschiedenen Formen religiöser Erfahrung vermutlich auch für Wittgensteins steile Betonung der Wichtigkeit von Veränderung von Einfluss war, wie die unentwegten Überarbeitungen seiner Schriften belegen.

Als Wittgenstein 1936/37 fast ein ganzes Jahr in der Einsamkeit von Norwegen verbrachte, befand er sich häufig an der Grenze zum Wahnsinn, wobei seine Furcht, in Wahnsinn zu enden, so groß war, dass diese schon als paranoide Vorstellung interpretiert werden könnte. Ebenso paranoid mag Wittgensteins Vorstellung anmuten, Gott könnte – ähnlich wie bei Abraham im Alten Testament – von ihm das Äußerste verlangen und dass er im Falle des Nichterfüllens dieser Forderung für immer unglücklich werden würde (vgl. DB, 177ff.) Louis Sass diagnostizierte Wittgenstein bereits vor Bekanntwerden dieser Tagebuchaufzeichnungen als eine schizoide Natur, doch – obgleich Psychiater – wies er im Gegensatz zu herkömmlichen Definitionen in der klinischen Psychiatrie auf die unterschiedlichen Nuancen bei Schizophrenie und Wahnsinn hin, sah diese auch aus philosophischer Sicht, wobei er sie u.a. als eine andere Art der Betrachtung darstellte und im Falle Wittgenstein im Zusammenhang mit Solipsismus sowie dessen Auseinandersetzung mit Tautologie brachte. (Sass 1996, 34ff., Sass 2001, 126-130)¹ Allerdings sieht er dabei den Solipsismus nicht in der abwertend-spöttischen Haltung von Schopenhauer, der diesen als Sichtweise des Irrsinnigen erklärte, die nicht widerlegt, sondern vielmehr geheilt werden müsse. Wittgensteins Bemerkung über die Methode des Philosophierens als Wahnsinn, der geheilt werden müsse, geht zwar in eine ähnliche Richtung, erfolgt jedoch aus einer Meta-Ebene und im Grunde affirmativer Einstellung dazu. Die aus existentieller Verzweiflung entstandene Konfrontation mit Wahnsinn hingegen ist in erster Linie für sein Verständnis von Ethik von Bedeutung, insofern aber auch von philosophischer Relevanz.

In seiner Funktion als strengster Richter über Recht und Unrecht hat der Wahnsinn aus ethischer Sicht etwas Gutes, weshalb Wittgenstein ihn nicht fliehen wollte. Denn nur die in der Nähe des Wahnsinns verursachten Leiden könnten die an ihm verhasste Eitelkeit beseitigen, die sich sobald wieder regte, wenn es ihm besser ging. Somit bewirkt dieser Zustand eine Art Bescheidenheit, die aus dem Hinabsteigen in „furchterregende Abgründe“ hervorgeht, wo die Selbsterkenntnis zur Einsicht der eigenen Nichtigkeit oder Schlechtigkeit führt. „Selbsterkenntnis & Demut ist Eins. (Das sind billige Bemerkungen)“ notierte er am 12.10.1931. (DB, 97)

So gesehen wird deutlich, dass Wahnsinn als ethische Instanz darin besteht, wie man mit der Erforschung des Gewissens und der dabei gewonnenen Selbsterkenntnis umgeht: Ob man sich seine Schwächen – in Demut – eingesteht oder nicht, wobei es im letzteren Fall zum Wahnsinn kommt. Insofern hängt dieser mit Eitelkeit zusammen, da die im Abgrund des eigenen Ich erkannte Nichtigkeit der eitle Mensch nicht erträgt und daher wahnsinnig wird. Während die zu Bescheidenheit und Demut führende Einsicht der Unvollkommenheit den Wahnsinn verhindert, sozusagen zur geistigen Gesundung führt, wobei die religiöse Komponente eine wesentliche Rolle spielt, wie aus Wittgensteins Bemerkungen hervorgeht, in denen er über den Sturm der Empörung angesichts der Vollkommenheit Christi spricht, vor der der sündige Mensch in krassem Gegensatz stehe. Dies anzunehmen erfordere (an die Erlösung) zu glauben, doch die Zweifel und Eitelkeit des Skeptikers lassen dies nicht zu. In diesem Sinne ist auch Wittgensteins Bemerkung „Nur Religion könnte die Eitelkeit zerstören“ (VB, 40) zu verstehen sowie die Behauptung, der christliche Glaube sei für den in höchster Not befindlichen Menschen die größte Zuflucht. (VB, 93f.)

Demgemäß ist das Christentum keine Lehre, „keine Theorie darüber, was mit der Seele des Menschen geschehen ist & geschehen wird, sondern eine Beschreibung eines tatsächlichen Vorgangs im Leben des Menschen. Denn die ‚Erkenntnis der Sünde‘ ist ein tatsächlicher Vorgang & die Verzweiflung desgleichen & die Erlösung durch den Glauben desgleichen.“ (VB, 64)

Weininger sah jedes „wahre ewige Problem“ als „eine ebenso wahre, ewige Schuld; jede Antwort eine Sühnung, jede Erkenntnis eine Besserung“ (Weininger 1918, xi), und dass ein Mensch irrsinnig werde, sei nur durch eigene Schuld möglich.“ (ebenda, 40)

Die schonungslose Auseinandersetzung mit sich selbst ist entscheidend, um sich auf wahrhafte Weise nicht nur mit sich, sondern mit der Welt und somit mit philosophischen Problemen zu befassen. Ein Denker, der ohne Selbsterkenntnis schreibt, oder ein Künstler, der ohne Selbsterkenntnis etwas schafft, ist nach Wittgenstein nicht glaubwürdig. Er bewegt sich an der Oberfläche, es mangelt ihm an Tiefe und folglich an Moral, während die Eitelkeit präsent ist, ihn beherrscht. Sein Werk ist ebenso unwahr und unecht wie er selbst, da er etwas vorgibt, was nicht der Wahrheit entspricht. Eitelkeit vernichtet „den Wert der Arbeit“, betonte Wittgenstein, wobei er Karl Kraus als Beispiel nannte, den er nur als „ausserordentlich begabten Satzarchitekten“ bezeichnete, dessen Arbeit zur „klingenden Schelle“ geworden sei. (Vgl. DB, 205) In dieser Hinsicht zeigt sich der Unterschied zwischen Genie und Talent – ein Unterschied, auf den Wittgenstein immer wieder, in unterschiedlichen Kontexten, zu sprechen kommt, wobei diese Unterscheidung seiner ebenso häufig verwendeten Begriffe „tief“ und „seicht“ entspricht.

Abgesehen von Selbsterkenntnis, Wahrhaftigkeit und Authentizität des Charakters sowie Religiosität fordert Wittgenstein Originalität und Mut zum Überschreiten von Grenzen.

Er selbst beklagt, diese an den Genialen gestellten hohen Anforderungen nicht zu erfüllen, wie er überhaupt sich in ethischer Hinsicht unvollkommen, schwach sah. Anders als Kierkegaard wolle er nicht auf den Genuss oder sonstige Bequemlichkeiten verzichten – im Gegensatz zu den frühen Tagebüchern, wo er das gute Leben im Verzicht auf die sogenannten „Annehmlichkeiten der Welt“ sah, die nur als „so viele Gnaden des Schicksals“ anzunehmen seien

¹ Insgesamt diagnostizierte Sass zahlreiche Bemerkungen Wittgensteins über seine Ängste, seinen Hang nach Zurückgezogenheit und Distanz sowie seine Ideale persönlicher Integrität, Gelassenheit gegenüber Gefahren und schweren Schicksalsschlägen etc. als Merkmale des schizoiden Charakters. Ebenso sieht er Wittgensteins philosophische Gedankengänge der frühen Jahre mit der Betonung auf ein Leben in der Erkenntnis, im Geistigen, der Abkehr von Leidenschaften, Unabhängigkeit von der Meinung anderer und vor allem seine solipsistischen Tendenzen als schizoide Merkmale. (Vgl. Sass 2001, 109-113)

(TB, 13.8.16), entsprach damals also mehr Weiningers Auffassung vom Genie, das nach Sittlichkeit, nicht nach Glück streben solle, da Genialität „höchste Sittlichkeit“, mit universeller Verantwortlichkeit identisch sei. (Weininger 1980, 236f.) Daraus folgernd werde das Genie, das statt Sittlichkeit das Glück wolle, zum Irrsinnigen. „Denn aller Wahnsinn entsteht nur aus der Unerträglichkeit des an alle Bewußtheit geknüpften Schmerzes.“ (ebenda, 237)

Im Zustand des Leidens bzw. der Nähe zum Wahnsinn, zeigt sich der Charakter, zeigt sich die Ethik – im erkennenden Subjekt als „Träger der Ethik“, über das Wittgenstein schon in den frühen Tagebüchern in Zusammenhang mit dem Subjektbegriff philosophierte.

Zu der Zeit wird neben dem Einfluss Schopenhauers auch der Weiningers besonders deutlich, dies hinsichtlich solipsistischer Tendenzen, des Mikrokosmos im Makrokosmos sowie der Betonung auf einem Leben im Geistigen; die Stringenz hinsichtlich einer ethischen Orientierung im Leben wie im Philosophieren – der Zusammenhang zwischen Logik und Ethik – bleibt jedoch weiterhin bestehen.

Wittgensteins Phasen der Verzweiflung muten häufig als Beispiele von *Icheinsamkeit* (Ferdinand Ebner) des nur am „Traum vom Geist“ orientierten Menschen an, dem der Dialog mit einem Du, vor allem auch der Dialog mit Gott, fehlt. Allerdings geht die ausgeprägte ethische Komponente bei Wittgenstein, wie erwähnt, in eine religiöse Richtung, und die Suche, mit einem Du in Dialog zu treten, wird in seinen späteren philosophischen Schriften durchwegs spürbar, wobei diese insgesamt von der Position des vom Ich ausgehenden, der Welt als einzelnes philosophierenden Subjekt Gegenüberstehenden (wie es in der Definition des philosophischen Ich als metaphysisches Subjekt an der Grenze zur Welt zum Ausdruck kommt) sich verabschiedet und nun zu einer Auseinandersetzung mit den Problemen des alltäglichen Lebens, den konkreten Fällen der phänomenalen Welt führt. Dies hat ein Herabsteigen von einer metaphysischen Betrachtung der Wörter auf ihre alltägliche zur Folge, ein Hinuntersteigen „von den kahlen Höhen der Geschtheit in die grünenden Täler der Dummheit“ (MS 137, 111b), wie er verlangte – eine Forderung, die jedoch impliziert, wieder von vorne im Philosophieren zu beginnen, d.h. wie als Unwissender bzw. Dummer die Dinge zu hinterfragen, wodurch neue Einsichten gewonnen werden, sozusagen grünen, fruchtbar werden.

In dieser Hinwendung auf das Alltägliche „Hausbackene“ wird das abstrakte Denken traditioneller Philosophie in Frage gestellt, die philosophische Methode an sich als eine Art Wahnsinn befunden, die mit dem Ziel der Heilung von diesem jedoch unerlässlich ist.

Philosophieren als Wahnsinn

„Die Methode der Philosophie ist, sich wahnsinnig zu machen und den Wahnsinn wieder zu heilen.“ (MS 127, 76)

Die aus sogenannter normaler Sicht des Hausverstands als Irrsinn betrachtete Methode ist also notwendig, um sich mit Philosophie zu befassen, denn der Mensch, der nicht von philosophischen Fragen gepeitscht wird, brauche die Philosophie ja nicht, wie Wittgenstein einmal notierte. Und nur „wenn man noch viel verrückter denkt, als die Philosophen, kann man ihre Probleme lösen.“ (MS 167, 19r)

Demgemäß kontert er George Edward Moore hinsichtlich seiner Diskussion über Gewissheit, die immer eine

Frage des Ausgangspunktes ist, d.h. was vom common sense her nicht angezweifelt, sondern für sicher gehalten wird, muss aus philosophischer Sicht in Frage gestellt werden, auch wenn man dabei zu keinem Ende kommt. Wittgensteins Kritik an Moore bestand u.a. darin, dass Moore keinen Unterschied zwischen Wissen und Gewissheit machte, Wittgenstein jedoch zwischen subjektiver und objektiver Gewissheit unterschied, wobei Bedingung für letztere ist, einen Irrtum auszuschließen. Nur irgendwann müsse der Zweifel enden, und die beruhigte Sicherheit einkehren, indem man sich auf etwas verlässt – auf das Sprachspiel – denn dieses könne nicht auf Zweifeln aufgebaut werden. „Daß Gewisses *in der Tat* nicht angezweifelt wird“, gehöre zur Logik unserer wissenschaftlichen Untersuchungen. (ÜG, § 342).

Wittgenstein unterscheidet zwischen der „beruhigten“ und der „noch kämpfenden“ Sicherheit. Die erste ist die des „vernünftigen“, nicht-philosophischen Menschen, der sozusagen über gesunden Hausverstand verfügt und nicht von philosophischen Fragen gepeitscht wird. Die beruhigte Sicherheit, die sich in der Feststellung „Ich weiß...“ ausdrückt, stellt für Wittgenstein eine Lebensform dar, die aber nicht als der „Oberflächlichkeit“ verwandt anzusehen sei, sondern als etwas „Animalisches“ (ÜG, § 359).

Während die beruhigte Sicherheit ihrem Charakter nach irrational ist, sucht die noch kämpfende Sicherheit nach rationaler Begründung und beunruhigt sozusagen den Geist, doch dies ist Voraussetzung für den Philosophen, der danach strebt, den „Geist über bedeutungslose Fragen“ zu beruhigen. (DB, 65)

Obwohl Wittgenstein unsere „Sicherheit“ anhand von zahlreichen Beispielen bzw. unterschiedlichen Situationen untersucht, in denen wir die Ausdrücke „ich weiß...“ oder „ich glaube...“ verwenden, kommt er letztlich doch zu keiner befriedigenden Antwort, wenn es um eine alles erschöpfende Begründung geht. Denn es sei „immer von Gnaden der Natur, wenn man etwas weiß.“ (ÜG, § 505).

Nicht von ungefähr war seine Haltung gegenüber der Philosophie wie überhaupt gegenüber den Wissenschaften ambivalent – widersprüchliche Äußerungen dazu finden sich immer wieder. Auch seiner philosophischen Methode stand er kritisch gegenüber – man könnte insgesamt in seinem Fall von einem Anti-Philosophen oder teilweise auch Anti-Antiphilosophen sprechen. (Vgl. auch Sass 2001, 124)

In ähnlicher Weise, wie Wittgensteins Auffassung von Ethik nur in einer in der Tiefe des eigenen Selbst gehenden Erkenntnis und daraus hervorgehenden Änderung der Lebensweise bestand, sah er die Philosophie nur durch tiefgehende, radikale Änderung in der Auseinandersetzung mit philosophischen Problemen als sinnvoll an – durch *Tätigkeit* in Form von fortlaufender Arbeit an den Problemen, durch ein „Nagen“ an ihnen, nicht durch eine Theorie. Man müsse die Probleme an der Wurzel fassen, denn seicht gefasst, blieben sie Probleme. (Vgl. VB, 98)

Das stete in die Tiefe Gehen, an die Grenzen seiner Denkkraft, verlief in einer Intensität, die ihn zeitweise auch im Philosophieren an den Rand des Wahnsinns geführt zu haben scheint.

Somit erfolgte seine Auseinandersetzung mit dem Wahnsinn nicht nur in persönlicher, ethisch-religiöser Hinsicht, sondern gerade auch in Zusammenhang mit philosophischen Problemen, dabei zum einen aus einer Meta-Ebene über die „verrückte“ Methode des Philosophierens, zum anderen auch als Folge des bis an die Grenzen des Verstandes gehenden geistigen Ringens. 1944 notierte er:

„Wenn wir im Leben vom Tod umgeben sind, so auch in der Gesundheit des Verstands vom Wahnsinn.“ (VB, 91)

Die Nähe des Wahnsinns beim Philosophieren droht somit in zweifacher Hinsicht: als Folge der Überbeanspruchung des Gehirns bei intensiver geistiger Tätigkeit sowie in Form der philosophischen Methode als eine aus „normaler“ Sicht betrachtete Methode des Wahnsinns bzw. Krankheit des Verstandes.²

Um sich von der „Verhexung unsres Verstandes“ (TS 220, 77) zu befreien, die der inkorrekte Umgang mit Sprache ja herbeigeführt hat, muss man jedoch die Sprache untersuchen – dies durch Fragestellungen bzw. auf eine Art und Weise, die dem nicht reflektierenden Menschen, doch eigentlichen Verursacher sprachlicher Verwirrungen als „wahnsinnig“ erscheinen würde.

Denn diese zeigen sich erst durch einen kritischen Umgang mit Sprache, durch Hinterfragung des Schriftstellers oder Philosophen, dessen Sprache in krassem Gegensatz zur Sprache im Gebrauch steht. Dies nicht nur im direkten, konkreten Sinn – als poetische Sprache oder als philosophischer Diskurs – sondern in der Haltung des Denkenden gegenüber Sprache, die von vornherein „belastet“ ist, d.h. Sprache kritisch reflektierend gegenübersteht und somit Probleme sieht, die Andere nicht wahrnehmen. Doch es ist Aufgabe des Philosophen, auf die durch unreflektierten Sprachgebrauch entstandenen philosophischen Konfusionen aufmerksam zu machen, unser Bewusstsein dafür zu schärfen. Und Wittgenstein gab nicht auf, mit Sprache zu kämpfen, auf die unzähligen Nuancen an Bedeutung von Wörtern und Sachverhalten hinzuweisen und die der Allgemeinheit als Selbstverständlichkeiten erscheinenden Phänomene zu hinterfragen.

Die Aufforderung, den Wahnsinn *nicht zu fliehen*, gilt demnach nicht nur in persönlicher, ethisch-religiöser Hinsicht, sondern auch hinsichtlich seiner philosophischen Methode – als Appell, keine Mühe zu scheuen, sich mit philosophischen Problemen auf eine vom *common sense* her gesehene Methode des Wahnsinns zu befassen – ungeachtet der Gefahr, sich dabei den „Leiden des Geistes“ auszusetzen.

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² Vgl. MS 127, 76r: „Der Philosoph ist der, der in sich viele Krankheiten des Verstandes heilen muss, ehe er zu den Notionen des gesunden Menschenverstandes kommen kann.“

How can symbolism be a life-activity?

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Abstract

In my paper, my contention will be to unfold presuppositions, shared by some linguistic views (Humboldt and Cassirer after him) and philosophy of language (Wittgenstein), that make possible to articulate expression of signs (or symbolism) with life or a life-activity (as opposed to a mechanistic conception of « symbolism »).

The musical model of such an articulation will contribute to make explicit the meaning of such an activity, understood through the « movement » of musical forms (here the strong influence of Eduard Hanslick. Only movement can make form and matter communicate and perhaps create « formal content » (G. Granger for whom « formal content » is what mathematics deal with, in analogy with music).

« Life of Forms » will then give us an argument in favour of a conception according to which philosophy is an aesthetic activity of understanding comparable to art.

We also hope to show how the anthropological dimension of such an activity is not absent, for Wittgenstein, from artistic situations.

« Language and life »

Wittgenstein wrote : « I live intensely a melody ». The later remark about Tolstoy shows a turn from the autonomy of the musical thesis to an anthropological stance in a ritual situation.¹ In the 40's, « experiencing the theme intensely » is suspect of a temptation to look into oneself (1946). But life here is not introspectively emotional. « Intensity » rather refers to the increasing proportion (*Gleichmässigkeit*) of the reaction in resonance (*schwingen*) with a gesture of felt expression in a ritual situation as a visit, in response to an action (C & V, p 58).

That's why Wittgenstein prefers to replace « Ausdruck eines Gefühl » (Tolstoyan) with « eine Gefühlsdruck », if not, perhaps better, « eine gefühlte Ausdruck » in order to alleviate the expression « expression of a feeling » of the affective weight of the sentiment. Another sense then is dismissed : the « experiential content », « *Erlebnis* ». Expressing signs so as to share them in the public space of communication, in language activities or arts, seems to be incompatible with just experiencing a « vécu », beyond the non-articulated something I am perhaps alone in experiencing « in my inner forum ». So far, the kind of life we deal with here that allows us to express signs and build up forms, is different from expressing a « vécu ». By reformulating the Tolstoyan expression « Ausdruck eines Gefühl », Wittgenstein offers us a new articulation between emotion and expression, an articulation that gives emotion, stripped off its pathological ingredients, a cognitive kind of expressive capacity, in the anthropological context of a form of life. That is how the musicologist Boris de Schloezer understands it through his devotion to music when saying that it is one thing to experience a « vécu », another one to live in the sense of expressing signs. Such is probably what Wittgenstein wants us to understand when he confesses his aspiration to « living a melody intensely ».

However before understanding how life could be said of an activity connected with expressing signs, one has first to clarify how forms can be said to be « living ». The transition from living forms to forms of life remains an open question, that prompts us back to our initial problem : how the word « life » can be applied to signs and expressions,

back then to what I propose to call « formal life ». What is a form that is « living » ?

One way of understanding the connection between forms and life is music and the « movement » it requires. We can indeed trace back the idea of living forms to musical aesthetics. « Formalism » designates this musical conception attributed to Eduard Hanslick in 1854, long before (logical) formalism proper appeared. Hence the aesthetical source of « forms » in movement as a key to understanding the aesthetical conception of « form as content » and vice versa according to which (musical) form, as in Beethoven's 5th symphony, is « moving sound-forms »², that is an already full and active one, instead of an empty entity like a mould to be filled with content.

Talking of contentual form or formal content in music – an expression the reader finds in Henri Focillon's book³ – is the interesting point that cannot be grasped separately from the wellknown thesis Wittgenstein endorses (after Hanslick) according to which music says nothing but itself, and is therefore inexpressive semantically speaking. That's « formal content » Gilles Granger, a great reader of Wittgenstein in France, will much later sees at work in mathematics as in musical aesthetics⁴. The movement of forms witnesses their life.

My contention here is to show how, under the spell of « life in use », a living form and a form of life tend to shape one and the same *gestural move* in the process of understanding.

1- Wittgenstein's steps:

In 4.0311, Wittgenstein uses the French expression « Tableau vivant », in fact a musical expression applying to the situation when everybody is singing in the sung theater.

¹ See C & V, pp 58-59. Note that for Eduard Hanslick, in contrast with the traditional view, that emotion is not the real « content » of music. See also Aaron Ridley on these lines, in his *Philosophy of music*, Edimburgh U. Press, p 30.

² « Tönend bewegte Formen », « forms moved in sounding », an expression of the musical idea that is « fully demonstrated », and the content of which is not emotion as musicians used to think, but the very forms of sounds conceived on the model of the tonal material. Cf. Vom musikalisch-Schönen, 1854), this in opposition to Daniel Schubart or Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach, who at that time, represented the current of aesthetics taking emotion as the true content of a musical idea.

³ La vie des formes (PUF, 1943, pp 8-9, 12-19) applied to visual arts. A « living form » is a form expressed in painting that « witnesses its own life in movement », while it is seen as moving, waving before our eyes, or in process of becoming otherwise.

⁴ although he pretends to owe this notion to the Danish linguist Hjelmslev. See his *Formes, opérations, objets* (Vrin 1994)

Then time is suspended. Here it characterizes the fact that in a sequence of names - each one standing for one object - a state of things finds itself presented, « comme un tableau vivant of the world ». The reader knows that Wittgenstein will soon reproach himself for having failed to make such sequences express the life he meant. So the formulation is not adequate.

In 6.21, « A proposition does not express a thought », it says nothing. It is only a matter of inferences and we do not look for inferences in « real life ». This view will reappear in the context of his critique of Alan Turing. The thought to which mathematics are said to be indifferent, is life, yet not distinguished here from « real life » « *im Leben* ».

Later on, in the Blue Book, Wittgenstein praises Frege for having realized that the formalists were wrong in confusing unimportant signs with meaning (*Sinn*). Frege has rightly tried to give life to mathematical signs, yet in terms of « thought ». If they are treated as dashes on a bit of paper, mathematical signs are, he says, « dead and utterly uninteresting ». Frege thought on the contrary that it is possible to give signs a « kind of life ». « Thought » was for him such a kind of life without which « a proposition is utterly dead and a trivial thing ». « No adding of an inorganic sign can make the proposition live ». There must be in addition some immaterial function added to those signs, and endowed with a dynamic quality. This dynamic quality consists in the activity of use. Only use can give a sign a life. So far, use is absent from symbolism when it is mechanized (Alan Turing, as a case of Frege's erroneous conception of symbolism). In contrast: « Grammatik is nicht Mechanismus » (B.T. 1933, Mn 213). It has life for itself.

The shift of meaning, from « real life » « *im Leben* », to life of a proposition if, as for Frege, a thought is expressed, is noteworthy. The error then is the following: we look for an object corresponding to a sign and coexisting with it, while we should look for the « use of the sign ». Use is life if treated in relation to a system to which the sign belongs. Then Wittgenstein focuses on this « use », in other words, the « activity of operating with signs », rather than a mental activity which, he says, remains cloudy and « a queer thing ». That's « motivation » of a sign, as modern linguists would say.

If signs expressing thoughts do more, for Frege, than just contribute to constructing a system of signs for the mere mechanical purpose of inferential calculus, Frege's search has to be reformulated in different terms, not at the level of the relation name/object, but through articulating propositions in the context of an activity of using signs for a given purpose. Two conceptions of « life » then come to collide: real life, as when the child goes to the grocer to buy 6 apples, and life as use of signs in this pragmatic context. Hence, for the first time, the emergence of « Language games ». When one describes them, the mental mist disappears. The life of these activities gets enhanced at the expense of « thought ». The same for mathematical signs to which Wittgenstein has first applied the idea of a grammatical activity.

Interestingly enough, the claim for an immaterial aspect added to signs does not prove the defenders of immateriality of meaning right. Such is Patrice Maniglier's interpretation in his book La vie énigmatique de signes. Assuming against Jacques Bouveresse that signs should not be reduced to their empirical reality (contrarily to what he believes they say), his claim mostly inspired by the second

Saussure⁵, is that signs on the contrary have indeed their immaterial part. He therefore argues that perceptuality of signs, as stressed by Bouveresse after Wittgenstein, is not a sufficient reason for them to be attributed a « life ». But perceptuality is not a plea for empiricism in the case of signs. Such an interpretation attributed to Bouveresse (and Wittgenstein), reveals Maniglier's blindness to the dimension of perceptuality of signs within contexts, in other words « aspects ». It is on the contrary this very perceptuality that constitutes an argument in favor of their life. Life of a symbolic grapheme showing the meaning, as Max Black has already pointed out, finds its best expression in use. The neglect of it is a symptom that shows a widely shared failure among linguists: that of seeing the importance of « use » in linguistic matters. What Wittgenstein himself calls « *Verneinung* » (in the case of the sign for negation).

2- Humboldt's anticipations of language as a life-activity

This « life » is shown in the creativity of language, that is the capacity of creating new senses with signs we already know as well as that to understand propositions never heard until now (L 3.318, 4.027-4.03...). This feature has been especially recognized by the linguist W. von Humboldt whom Wittgenstein has probably not read (but the historian of music, Eduard Hanslick has!). Humboldt himself owes to Herder the idea of « *energeia* » of symbols as opposed to « *ergon* » applying to an already projected system of signs. This « *energeia* » underlies the active capacity of signs to make communication possible and thereby language living. Wittgenstein's interconnections between language as a life-activity, culture, and « *Lebensformen* » have probably such linguists as ancestors. However « creativity » of language is a difficult expression, and explaining « life » by « creativity » does not tell us much more.

Humboldt's conception of language as a life-activity casts a light on Wittgenstein's quest for life through expressing signs in relation to culture, in a way that shows us how, stemming from a Kantian problem, language could become an object for philosophy, what Ole Hansen-Love, a great reader and translator of the German linguist, called the « Copernician revolution of language ».

It is clear that the notion of life as regards language and the arts first comes to mind as something lacking. Galatea's sculpture is made of marble. Pygmalion suffers from its impassibility. He would like to instill life into it. That's Rousseau's very short lyrical theater play (1762) which ends in the division of Pygmalion's self: he can give life to his creature only by transferring his own life to her. In other words, by dying. To put it in traditional terms of matter and form, we yearn for life when we deal with material and form given as separate items, without any living relation between them. Form taken in isolation from matter, is abstract. Hence sterile formalism. While matter alone leads to naïve empiricism. Knowledge as well as creation are not possible by just extracting form directly from matter. It requires a médiation (same assumption in Tractatus, 4.002).

This is what Humboldt (1767-1835), whom I see here as a precursor of Wittgenstein objected to Kant's articulation between intuition thanks to which an object in experience is received, and a concept that is a spontaneous creation of the understanding. To put it briefly, Humboldt looked for a mediation that he thought was lacking in Kant's explana-

⁵ See Ole Hansen-Love's Humboldt The Copernican Revolution of Language.

tion of the articulation (*Verbindung*) between intuition and concept in order to make possible the knowledge of an object in experience. To make the synthesis of judgement by which knowledge is made possible, a dynamic process, an efficient productive mediation is necessary. Only language as « *energeia* » (activity), and not its results such as systems of signs (« *ergon* »), can do the job of mediating between intuition and concept. Hence Humboldt's call for « *Energeia* » a word first used by Herder⁶.

By saying so, Humboldt the comparatist linguist inaugurates no less than philosophy of « language » long before the linguistic turn ! Cassirer's analysis of Humboldt adds that, with Humboldt, the transcendental use of understanding binding intuition to concepts finds itself transferred to language. Of course, then, the objects cease to be « given ». They are now « conquered » by way of a creative activity of an organic or quasi-organic sort. Hence, instead of objects given, we have a process of the constitution of objectivity which is the work of a sort of linguistic reasoning operation. That's the way Humboldt sees language as an activity the organic function of which is supposed to generate sense⁷. Culture then emerges from that work which is also a « formation », *Bildung*, resulting from a dynamic movement of expression.

Yet, one has to take into account here the oral dimension of the *energeia* of language. It is how it contributes to « life of the language »⁸, and this, only in virtue of the perceptual character of expressed signs, as we have noticed. It is therefore through this claim of life, in reaction against Kant's « static » theory of *Darstellung*, that language is introduced into the realm of philosophy, but at the cost of substituting a force (*Bildung*) for a classical concept of form (first conceived as an empty mould). This early critique of the object as a given entity, the stress on use already in the *Tractatus*, joined to Wittgenstein's critique of a material nuclear « content » that would be graspable « in se » separately from the « Formal » and would give us the key of meaning, are precious indices of affinity that help the reader to capture Humboldt's insights as a contribution to the forthcoming philosophy of language in the modern sense as we know it.

Now, that 4.002 sounds to us so Humboldtian in spirit, is therefore no surprise. The reference to organism and a quest for mediation (through symbols)⁹ are not the only reasons for such an affinity. There is also, underlying the whole argumentation, the anti-Fregean (avant la lettre) stance that many a reader has noticed in Humboldt's conception of *Sprachsinn*, namely François Rastier¹⁰ and, in a very different style, Henri Meschonnic¹¹.

6 Born in 1744-1843, On these variations that are language and art, see what Cassirer writes in his chapter on « The problem of language in history », in *Philosophy of symbolic forms*, 1, Language. But Herder was Leibnizian, and Humboldt rather Kantian. Whereas for Herder, the *energeia* means the capacity for the substance to produce its own diversity, for Humboldt, *energeia* bridges the Kantian gap between intuition and concept.

7 Cassirer « Kantian elements in Humboldt's philosophy of language », ed. Binder, in *Festschrift für Paul Hensel*, Göttingen, 1923.

8 Or « *Sprache* » in the sense of national language for Humboldt. See his Introduction on *The Kavi work*, posthumous, publ. Alexander Humboldt.

9 Gilles Granger himself suggests that, thanks to the symbolic activity, the objectivity of knowledge instantiated in a work, is no longer a visionary dream of the failed artist. Therefore, some sense of « activity » in view of achieving forms is required in knowledge as well as in arts.

10 François Rastier, see his *Sémantique interprétative* (PUF, 1995) has suggested to see in Humboldt a foreshadowing expression of the later critique of the analytical principle of Russell's compositionality of sense.

11 For him, Humboldt is an « antilinguistic » kind of linguist (« Humboldt ou le sens du langage », in *Le signe et le poème*, Gallimard, 1975).

3- From the life of forms to forms of life on the model of arts

How could a dynamic theory of representation, issuing from a « Copernician revolution of language » afford a conception of active meaning ? Only if the forming activity turns into a force of expression through signs. The organic aspect of language reveals itself in its growth. Its growth is a kind of genesis by self-creation in such a way as to embody the spirit (*Sprach-Geist*) of a nation, since its essence consists in giving form to the content of thought like « casting the metal of the phenomenal world into the mould of the form of thought ». This quotation uses Humboldt's own famous image in which Husserl who commented it in his 4th *Logical Investigation* on pure Grammar, suggests to see the immanent feature of Humboldt's « *Innere Sprachform* », close to his own conception of « *Innere Struktur* ».

-Yet, life is variety rather than organic life : such is Saussure's objection to Humboldt : « if signs have a life, it is not because they are organisms but because signs being effects of thinking unceasingly vary ». That's how signs are living, he writes, in social life (ELG, 262)¹² and that is independent from a national *Geist*. Hence Saussure's appeal to a « semiology » beyond the scope of a nation. Language is always to be remade, like a dress that needs to be patched up with its own shreds. The role of variation increases with the oral dimension of expressivity of signs in social exchanges through the sounds of language and popular tales. Grammar alone (as Humboldt understands it) is unable to convey life through the medium of sounds. Orality supports the sociality of language. In contrast Wittgenstein, assuming after Mauthner¹³ the idea of a language irreducible to a national organ, and opposed to an artifact like esperanto, entrusts to « grammar » as he conceives it, the task of keeping language alive. Far from explaining the forms in terms of a primitive germ, grammar prompts us to grasp the network of interwoven signs as in a tapestry. No doubt that the image of tapestry (which is also phenomenological image)¹⁴ is a metaphor for life. Governed by a principle of indetermination at the heart of variation, it contrasts with the reproducibility of a fixed pattern in the history of, for example, a floral motive (ex. the lotus), as shown in Alois Rieg's *Stilfragen*.

Hence the thema of complexity in Wittgenstein's conception of language, a complexity which, after the rejection of the ladder (of reconstruction by erecting a syntax), expands from the surface downward to the very ground of its ramifications. Grammar is to renounce explanation in favor of a synoptic description of bustling infinitely interrelated forms. Yet, to be able to do so, the grammarian has to resist the myth of the unity of thought and let himself branch off into a plurality of directions that different uses of an expression open to him at every juncture. The guarantee for life lies in the context-bound kind of use, which means that a living form of language (*lebende Sprachform*) is tied up to a form of life (*Lebensform*) in a context or an activity that is not only linguistic. That's how living forms make forms of life possible.

12 The Lectures (1908-9) are published in 1916 by his students after their notes. The Writings are another book, published later in 2002 (Gallimard).

13 Language is a « sensorium commune » of the people (Volk), Mauthner writes, the organ of human thought and so far is the social bond the most lively we have. See his *Die Sprache* 1907. Mauthner used to compare the language to a big city. The book has been written in 1906 for Martin Buber's collection called *Die Gesellschaft*.

14 see Heidegger after the poet Stefan George.

Naturalized Phenomenalism and the Talk of Impressions

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Abstract

In this paper I intend to show that Russell's called neutral monism in the philosophy of mind isn't, as presented in *The Analysis of Mind* (1921), a metaphysical reductionism that establish sense-data as a kind of indefinite entities that are the basis of mental and physical world. On the contrary, sense-data are established as a necessary link between physical and mental discourse because of the lack of a scientific link between these two discourses, but scientific discourse is presupposed to be the fundamental discourse in a philosophy of mind. It is just because of the limitations of scientific theories that philosophical analysis must intervene and establish sense-data as the link between what is called a physical fact and what is called mental fact.

1. Russell's Theory of Perception: The swing between naturalism and idealism

In *The Analysis of Mind* (1921), Russell claims that "we perceive things more or less, but always with a very considerable amount of vagueness and confusion" (Russell 1921: 135). It is not easy to derive a realist position concerning perceived empirical content from Russell's theory of perception, despite the fact that he oscillates between classical empiricism and physicalism. He claims that:

When a mental occurrence can be regarded as an appearance of an object external to the brain, however irregular, or even as a confused appearance of several such objects, then we may regard it as having for its stimulus the object or objects in question, or their appearances at the sense-organ concerned. When ... a mental occurrence has not sufficient connection with objects external to the brain to be regarded as an appearance of such objects, then its physical causation (if any) will have to be sought in the brain. In the former case it can be called a perception; in the latter it cannot be so called. (Russell 1921: 136)

Russell's description of the events of perception demonstrates the oscillation between empiricism and physicalism in his philosophy of mind *circa* 1921. It also shows that he was adopting a kind of physical, non-idealist and non-solipsistic naturalism since, although he refers to appearances, and to the obscureness of the contents of perception as appearances, he has no hesitation in affirming the primacy of physics for establishing the causal links between objects and mental phenomena.

In Russell's work, there is no mere parallelism between the physical and the mental, and appearances are to be explained by means of the laws of physics. However, in spite of the physicalism, which is present in his theory of perception, the gap between the causal theory of perception and the form of appearances remains.

Russell's neutral monism places sensations at the centre of reflection on the content of empirical knowledge:

Sensations are what is common to the mental and physical worlds; they may be defined as the intersection of mind and matter. This is by no means a new view; it is advocated, not only by the American authors I have mentioned (ex: William James), but by Mach in his *Analysis of Sensations*, which was published in 1886. ... It [sensation] is not itself knowledge, but it supplies the data for our knowledge of the physical world, including our own bodies. (Russell 1921: 144)

Notwithstanding, Russell does not begin the discussion of the content of the human mind only from the perspective of the first person. He gradually becomes involved in an explanation of the correlation between the content of the mind and what it designates or should designate. This was also part of Carnap's attempt (1928) to show the correlation between the experienced human world and scientific and conceptual knowledge. The classical tradition, in both its rationalist and empiricist modes, takes as given the certainty concerning the perspective of the first person, and "constructs" the world and/or knowledge on the basis of this. This always happens with the help of the cognitive content, which this perspective makes available. In other words, when we explain how we acquire knowledge from the content of phenomena, we take for granted that we know just what type of knowledge will emerge from the process. Carnap, for example, shows that it is possible to explain how we feel and perceive by presupposing the knowledge we already possess concerning the physical process of sensation and perception. However, the philosophical explanation should not only be based on the facts described by a third person, but should also demonstrate how the process takes place inside the subject who is actually feeling and perceiving. There is an obvious circularity in the expository methodology, which no anti-naturalist claim can avoid. Thus the accusation that neo-empiricists adopt an idealist or solipsist position by beginning the description of the content of the human mind from the perspective of the first person cannot be proven, especially if we bear in mind that every first-person description has recourse to so-called third-person knowledge, and this knowledge concerning the relationship between the subject and the environment can only be provided by science.

The first-person discourse regarding mental phenomena of perception goes as follows:

"I am perceiving a cat"¹

Which could be rephrased, in a physicalistic discourse, as "There is a cat in front of me".

Obviously the referential relation above can only be explained if the third-person perspective is already available. This means that the analysis of the first-person discourse depends on the presupposition of third-person knowledge, which, in turn, means that the discussion concerning the sensory sense-data that are part of the perception of objects is, in fact, a third-person discussion which *appears* to be in the first person.

1 According to Sellars (1997 [1956]), this kind of formulation suggests doubts about what is perceived.

2. Sellars as Russell's Interpreter

To a certain extent, Sellars also demonstrates the first-person/third-person relationship, but only to the point of denying that the discussion of sensations is useful in explaining empirical knowledge, whilst identifying fallacies in the empiricist way of upholding the Myth of the Given. This is partly because the empiricist affirms the existence of particular entities, sense-data, which are, in fact, the result of a *theory* concerning perception. Sensory data cannot be detected either from the perspective of the first or of the third person. They are therefore arbitrary stipulations (or postulations) of empiricist philosophy, and are treated by the empiricist as if they themselves constituted a form of evidence. Sellars makes use of the Myth of Jones to explain how the Myth of the Given originated, and how the theory concerning sense-data derives from the attempt to explain the logic of ordinary language when it speaks about immediate visual experiences (Sellars 1997 [1956]: 109):

From this standpoint it is sufficient to suppose that the hero of my myth postulates a class of inner — theoretical — episodes which he calls, say, *impressions*, and which are the end results of the impingement of physical objects and processes on various parts of the body, and, in particular, to follow up the specific form in which I have posed our problem, the eye. (Sellars, 1997 [1956]: 109)

I do not agree that it is a categorial illusion to claim that sensory data are first and foremost the content of empirical knowledge, *as long as* third-person knowledge could prove (direct or indirectly) that sense-data do, in fact, exist.

I will now analyze the following passage from Sellars' article "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" (1956):

...some philosophers have thought it obvious that we can expect that in the development of science it will become reasonable to identify *all* the concepts of behavior theory with definable terms in neurophysiological theory, and these, in turn, with definable terms in theoretical physics. It is important to realize that the second step of this prediction, at least, is either a *truism* or a *mistake*. [...]

To ask how *impressions* fit together with *electromagnetic fields*, for example, is to ask a mistaken question. It is to mix the framework of *molar* behavior theory with the framework of the *micro*-theory of physical objects. The proper question is, rather, 'What would correspond in a *micro*-theory of sentient organisms to *molar* concepts pertaining to impressions?' And it is, I believe, in answer to this question that one would come upon the *particulars* which sense-datum theorists profess to find (by analysis) in the common-sense universe of discourse (cf. Section 23)." (Sellars 1997 [1956]: 113-114)

We can see from the above quotation that Sellars does not reject a description of sense-data which is part of a scientific theory concerning human perceptions. This data may be part of the technical vocabulary used to describe how sentient organisms react internally to external forces. However, this does not mean that the sensory data provide the specific reference for expressions such as "red" or "triangle". Impressions of redness or of a triangular form may be part of a *micro*-theory, which can explain the reaction of sentient organisms to the environment, even though it would be fallacious to deduce that ordinary language is incorrect to attribute properties to external objects which are inherent to the impressions resulting from our sentient relationship with these objects.

It would be correct to conclude that the *micro*-theory can explain the relationship between physical objects and the perceptive qualities they induce in us, and that, *in line with the micro-theory*, common sense *could* be wrong to attribute to objects any qualities which may belong to perception. However, this should not lead us to "correct" ordinary language, since in this case we would merely be substituting one theory for another, or substituting the physicalist argument concerning the qualities of external objects for a third-person phenomenalist argument concerning perceived qualities attributed to the external objects which cause them, such as:

"When *s* observes the candle, she has sensations which together constitute her perception of the candle".

If we interpret the philosophy of perception propounded by Russell in 1921 as a kind of physicalist scientificism which does not completely reduce sensations to physical events, but which allows us to think of sensations as a phenomenal or mental aspect of the physical/material world, then Sellars' criticism of the Myth of the Given does not run entirely counter to Russell's perspective. This perspective does not use only introspection as a methodology, but relies, rather, on evidence from physical science to explain perception. Nevertheless, Russell could still be criticized by Sellars for giving pride of place to the physicalist perspective, to the detriment of the perspective of common sense, and for not seeing that both perspectives are essentially just two different languages and theories with different pragmatic goals, where one is no truer than the other.

If we analyze Sellars' claims about the differences between ordinary language and scientific language, we can conclude that what happens in both cases is that each of them must refer to distinct objects. *Ordinary language* must refer to physical objects as both its aim and its function; *scientific language* (which investigates the process resulting in the attribution of sensible qualities to physical objects) focuses on describing the process of perception, and not on the intersubjective process of speaking about perceived physical objects. Scientific language wishes to explain the process of perception, even though this process may not be clear to the subject who perceives it, whilst ordinary language allows the sentient subject to communicate what is happening in the physical world to her interlocutors. The fact that in scientific language the subject attributes to objects qualities which appear to her in a unique form does not mean that she knows which process led to her singular perception of these qualities, or to the attribution of specific words for describing them. Learning how to associate words with specific experiences does not require the ratification of a theory of sensory impressions, which a naturalized philosophy of perception would seek to conceive with the assistance of the sciences. We are thus left to solve the question of what kind of information a scientific language point of view can add to an ordinary language point of view.

3. The Renewal of Naturalism

There is already a vast body of literature regarding the gap between the ordinary point of view of perceptive experience and the scientific point of view concerning how the system of perception operates. No argument has so far succeeded in unifying these two perspectives, either by means of a complete reduction or by means of an all-embracing theory, which would demonstrate the interactions between the objects established by each point of

view. On the one hand we have the objects of subjective experience, such as impressions, sensations and perceptions, which are mediated by intersubjective linguistic learning, and on the other hand we have the objects of anatomical and physiological theories, such as skin tissue, nerves and electrical impulses.

Modern neuroscience can follow how “subjective” impressions are generated from a causal network, which can be scientifically mapped. Although this does not prove the existence of sensory data like that described by Russell, it nevertheless corroborates the *type* of causal theory of perception, which Russell was working on in 1921.

Russell’s scientificism, for example, led him to deny the existence of nominal entities such as “subject”:

The subject, however, appears to be a logical fiction, like mathematical points and instants. It is introduced, not because observation reveals it, but because it is linguistically convenient and apparently demanded by grammar. Nominal entities of this sort may or may not exist, but there is no good ground for assuming that they do. The functions that they appear to perform can always be performed by classes or series or other logical constructions, consisting of less dubious entities. If we are to avoid a perfectly gratuitous assumption, we must dispense with the subject as one of the actual ingredients of the world. But when we do this, the possibility of distinguishing the sensation from the sense-datum vanishes; at least I see no way of preserving the distinction. Accordingly the sensation that we have when we see a patch of colour simply *is* that patch of colour, an actual constituent of the physical world, and part of what physics is concerned with. (Russell 1921: 142).

Why does Russell eliminate the subject while maintaining the sense-data? The reason is that it appears to be both correct and necessary to him, based on the principle of epistemological atomism, that sensations are real and, in a certain sense, physical. Without this premise, the causal link between objects and perception becomes compromised.

Although modern neuroscience cannot prove the existence of sensory data, it continues with Russell’s mission of discovering the causal network, which leads us from physical objects to their “mental” perception, a network that must include various forms of “representation” of the prop-

erties of objects. Observation of neuronal activation during the process of perception of physical objects has led us to the conclusion that perception passes through a number of different stages and that, *lato sensu*, objects are really constructed gradually in our brains by means of interrelations established between their various parts, where each part has its own function.

It seems still obvious that access to one’s own perceptions or sensations is the exclusive prerogative of the first person, and this demonstrates that Russell’s claim that sensations form the intersection between what is mental (from the first person) and what is physical (from the third person) is remarkably up-to-date. It also seems obvious that the search for the causal link that leads us from objects to their perception must include investigation into what is called “representation”, a concept that is still considered extremely controversial both in philosophy and in the neurosciences. It is for this reason that every method and test must take into account what the first person has to say about “subjective” representational experiences.

The scientific community is currently on the horns of a dilemma: *either* we accept the ordinary *descriptions* made by human beings about their own subjective experiences (their “talk of impressions”), and correlate them with what we can observe scientifically about the physical alterations they manifest (as if they were parallel events), *or* we can try to investigate from a behaviorist standpoint what happens physically and in terms of behavior during the process of perception, thereby disregarding the first person description of the mental states and linking theoretically initial physical behavior with resultant physical behavior. Anyway, the link between subjective experiences and initial or final physical behavior still remains to be discovered, even though Russell believed he had found this link in those sensations described as sense-data.

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Shared Extended Minds: Towards a Socio-Integrationist Account

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Abstract

The last years have witnessed the emergence of a new, 'third-wave' current within the thriving extended mind and distributed cognition debate. It aims to socially extend the bounds of cognition, involving not only extra-organismic technological props (notebooks, etc.) but, moreover, other individuals, groups and social institutions (cf. Cash 2013; De Jaegher 2013; Gallagher 2013). Drawing on an ingenious proposal in social ontology (Pettit 2003), here, I shall propose a novel social-integrationist model for shared extended minds, which not only is immune against typical objections but also allows, in contrast to standard approaches, to drive home the insights from 'first-' (parity-type) and 'second-wave' (integrationist) construals of the extended mind thesis.

1. Introduction

The last years have witnessed the emergence of a new current within the thriving extended mind and distributed cognition (EM/DC) debate, most recently labelled as a 'third-wave' approach to (socially) extending the bounds of cognition and the mental (Cash 2013).

Roughly, 'first-wave' accounts of EM/DC championed the view that certain cognitive or mental processes extend beyond the bounds of individual organisms (their skull or skin), eventually incorporating extra-mental scaffolding, in particular, artefacts or technological devices. First-wave accounts by and large draw on the functional parity or similarity between the latter and the former regarding their roles in the constitution of cognition. However, as the infamous 'parity principle' (PP) (Clark/Chalmers 1998) increasingly has come under the lash, 'second-wave' approaches set out to stress the differences and, eventually, the complementarity, rather than the functional parity of intra- and external vehicles of cognition. Moreover, by focusing on the various (socio-)cognitive practices involved, they stress the aspect of the dynamic integration of intra- and extra-mental entities, thus aiming at a process-oriented or constitutional model of EM/DC (e.g. Menary 2007; Rowlands 2010). Finally, 'third wave' accounts take a yet more radical as well as liberal stance on the project of extending the (individual) bounds of the mental. Building on enactivist approaches to cognition, they argue that cognition often not only involves social interaction but also the acting and relying upon complex collective or institutional forms of practices, norms and conventions (democratic or legal systems, etc.) which, *qua* 'social affordances', enable, enhance or even co-constitute (individual) cognition, thus constituting full-fledged socially extended minds (e.g. Gallagher/Crisafi 2009; De Jaegher 2013; Gallagher 2013).

First, second and third-wave construals of EM/DC are typically presented if not as exclusive at least as substitutive accounts (Menary 2007, 2010). In the face of this, I shall sketch an alternative route. I will argue that we need not leave behind the core heuristics of first- and second-wave accounts for establishing (third-type) socially extended minds (cf. also Rowlands 2010). In particular, I shall show that a suitably modified version of PP (section 2) is not only immune against standard objections (sec. 3) but also represents a 'heuristic springboard' for a more specific social-integrationist account of shared extended minds, one, to wit, that takes its cue from an ingenious (integrationist) proposal in social ontology (sec. 4).

2. The 'Social Parity Principle'

Consider the ordinary case of a long-standing couple, Jane and Joe. Suppose that, in contrast to the original example of Clark/Chalmers (1998), Jane and Joe both have non-pathological biological memories, are in constant personal dealings with each other and trust each other's cognitive abilities. Joe, being the more social type of the two, is about to fix a date for a dinner with friends, when he realizes that he has not the slightest idea whether Jane and him have any plans for the respective evening, but knows that Jane could tell him. So he calls her, gets the information and fixes the date. An everyday life episode, in which Jane's internal or external memory system (maybe her well-organized notebook) serves as an easily available and epistemically trustworthy belief-state of Joe, that is causally responsible for fixing the date, while Jane heavily relies on Joe for socializing – together thus forming a functionally more efficient team for organizing their social life than each of them separately would do.

Now, in reference to PP I suggest the following principle, the *social parity principle* (cf. also Theiner/Allen/Goldstone 2010), for determining whether two or more cognizers belong to a genuinely *shared* cognitive environment or whether they just temporarily cooperate for the sake of their individual cognitive goals, i.e. whether a cognitive system ought to be construed not as an aggregate of disparate (Harnad 2005) if coordinated cognitive processes but, rather, as a non-organism-bound shared extended cognitive system:

(SPP) If, as two cognizers A and B confront some task *T*, they perform cognitive processes *P* and *P** in a way that, taken separately, *P* and/or *P** would not be functionally sufficient in performing *T* (as successfully or at all), and, were *P* or *P** performed by a single cognizer (*either A or B*), we would have no hesitation in recognizing *P* or *P** as part of A or as part of B respectively, then *P* and *P** are socially distributed over a *single* cognitive system/process (i.e. they are 'parts' of a shared extended cognitive system).

3. Some Objections

There is, to be sure, cluster of interrelated objections, raised against such PP-type formulations of EM/DC, notably the 'mark of the cognitive' or 'demarcation challenge' and the well-known 'coupling-constitution fallacy' (CCF) (Adams/Aizawa 2008; Rupert 2009).

First, consider, however, that SPP (just as little as PP for that matter) is not meant to demarcate (social) cognition from non-cognitive processes but rather to demarcate *socially* distributed from *individual* or *merely aggregate* forms of cognitive processes.

Moreover, what is crucial is that SPP (again, just as little as PP) is not a thesis on the *localization* of cognitive processes but, rather, a claim about the possibility of the cognitive *integration* of some, arguably distinct, processes (with distinct vehicles respectively). SPP, thus, is a criterion for testing whether two entities may or may not integrate into a single cognitive coupled system: if there is an interactive causal-functional relation between two distinct (intra- or extra-corporeal) components or cognizers such that they jointly and actively guide the cognitive behaviour of the respective agents, then, no matter where they are localized, brain-/organism-bound or otherwise, they are components of a single (shared) cognitive system.

Finally, indeed, no constitutive relation between properties can be inferred from their mere causal and/or functional coupling, and yet the CCF-objection is misguided. For the punch line of parity-formulations of EM/DC is not to show that *any* external component/vehicle can become cognitive or be a (compositional) part of the mental, *just because* or *as long as* it is coupled to something *already* or *intrinsically* cognitive. If that were so, the extended mind thesis would, in fact, soon lead to a 'cognitive bloating' of the world or, worse, to a sort of 'pancognitivism' (cf. Wilson 2010, 111). But that's not the point of PP. Rather, it is meant to explain *when* and *why specific* cognitive or non-cognitive entities are thus integrated and interact, that they *jointly* fulfil a cognitive function for an agent, or a collective of agents – a function that none of them could perform the very same way separately (cf. also Clark 2008; Menary 2010; Rowlands 2010).

4. Towards a Socio-Integrative Account

This having said, what is needed in order to get a more substantial conception of socially extended minds, is to supplement SSP with a full-blown (socio-)integrationist account of social distribution of cognitive properties. For this purpose, I suggest to take the cue both from the growing body of empirical work on group cognition as well from work within the extensive socio-ontological literature on collective intentionality and collective mentality (cf. also Tollefsen 2006).

Thus, there is much evidence from recent work in cognitive science that supports the group cognition thesis, i.e. the thesis that there are collective forms cognition, (such as 'transactive' memory, learning, control, problem-solving or creativity), which are not reducible to and/or exceed the cognitive faculties of the (total) aggregate of the respective individual cognizers (for overviews of the rapidly growing literature see Theiner/Allen/Goldstone 2010 and, critically, Rupert 2011).

On the other hand, there is a well-established account of 'collectivizing' the mind within social ontology, which is congenial to third-wave integrationist accounts, and yet, surprisingly, has largely been neglected within EM/DC-research. I am referring to the account of 'social integrates' as advocated most prominently by Pettit 2003. Social integrates (of individuals) are intentional subjects in their own right, ultimately constituting a group 'with a mind of its own'. That is, they bear intentional states (beliefs, desires, etc.) and perform actions that those states rationalize. Moreover, they have an own intentional 'vision', or, display

an own intentional point of view, which is (explanatorily) not reducible to the first-person point of views of individuals thus integrated (cf. also Rovane 1998 and Szanto in review).

Against this background, then, and in addition to SPP, I propose the following (*gradually* reinforcing), admittedly rough-and-ready criteria for two or more individuals to mentally integrate, such that they literally can be said to share one and the same mental domain. I take these requirements of gradual complexity, ranging from such cases as in the above example of distribution of simple cognitive tasks in two-person interactions to institutionalized processes of social integration, to be basic building blocks of an epistemological framework for sharing minds:

- (1) *Availability*: constant and ready to hand availability (and user-friendliness) of external cognitive tools or of the respective (systemic) structures afforded by others or social institutions;
- (2) *Accessibility*: constant and easy (practical and epistemic) access to the shared cognitive environment (for all cognizers in question);
- (3) *Robustness*: relatively constant availability of the participants for one another and persistence of the social integration (1–3, at least until success regarding the given task); or, in the case of social institutions, robustness of their respective structures;
- (4) *Transparency and Publicity*, both of the cognitive tasks and all other relevant information and of the means by which it may be achieved for all (or most of) the participants, either a.) non-communicatively, by (pre-)fixed, possibly customary, habitualized or formally institutionalized, roles or b.) via (verbal) communication, discursive documentation or symbolic representation;
- (5) *Direct (Mutual) Endorsement* of the other member's cognitive capacities (by all or most members) and/or the group's collective cognitive capacities and, ultimately, of its own intentional point of view in a more or less automatic or habitual fashion;
- (6) *Coordination* between individual cognizers and their cognitive tools/abilities; and/or: (higher-order) coordination among (sub-groups of) cognizers and shared cognitive tools; and/or: (spontaneous or predetermined) division of (cognitive) labour;
- (7) (Direct epistemic) *Reliance* of the members on the group's intentional, or an institution's rational, normative, etc. point of view;
- (8) (Direct epistemic) *Guidance* of the member's attitudes (e.g. in the formation of further attitudes) by the cognitive/rational/normative standards of the group/institution in an automatic or habitual fashion;
- (9) *Control and (Self-)Correction*: capability and possibility to control the execution of the cognitive processes and/or (spontaneous or predetermined) division of control-mechanism; if necessary, correction of the performance of (all or some) others regarding a given task and/or appropriate self-correction (of the individuals or the group);
- (10) (*Normative*) *Commitment* (explicitly articulated or not): a.) *Personal* commitment to participation, with view to a shared cognitive/epistemic/practical goal and to endorsing means by which to achieve such;

b.) *Joint* commitment to given goals, means, beliefs, etc. and the deliberative standards for their formation (where it may be that there are no personal commitments to the given goals, etc., but where joint commitments may generate such) (cf. Gilbert 1989); c.) *Group/Institutional* commitment to the group's/institution's integrated point of view via (discursive, deliberative) processes that ensure and eventually strengthen mental integration;

(11) *(Individual) Knowledge* of (some or all of) these criteria;

(12) *Mutual/Common Knowledge* as to (11).

Surely, there needs more to be done in fleshing out these requirements. What should be clear, though, is that cognizers who satisfy (most of) these conditions are appropriately integrated so as to constitute an instance of a shared extended mind. Moreover, I contend that the cognitive, epistemic and, not least, normative robustness of such integration, blocks any threat of cognitive bloating.

In concluding, consider that shared extended cognition is not about the bearer or location of the vehicles of cognitive processes. For, in successful cases of social integrates the bearer is not some separate extra-individual entity over and above the individual cognizers engaging in joint cognitive or pragmatic action. Rather, just as the 'vehicle' of such joint or cognizing, viz. the shared extended mind, is constituted by the very engagement and integration of those cognizers in socio-cognitive and normative practices, so are the contents of the respective cognitive processes. Joint or group (or, incidentally, individual) "cognition is not about (...) content being carried by (...) vehicles" (Gallagher 2013, 8), but rather about the socio-practical and cognitive interaction of subjects within a shared environment and, above all, their socio-normative integration into a shared mental domain, which, in turn, is constituted by that interaction and integration in the first place.

Thus, a properly understood socio-integrationist account, above and beyond the positive elements it yields for the outlook of socially extending minds, eventually affords to undercut the infelicitous content-vehicle distinction, which not only underlies standard (esp. first-wave) EM/DC-approaches but, moreover, typical objections against them.

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"Grammar" in the Brown Book

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Abstract

Even though the notion of grammar is abundant in Wittgenstein's writings, it is neither spread evenly across the *Nachlass* nor used consistently by Wittgenstein. The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of Wittgenstein's use of the word "grammar" in both the *Brown Book* (Ts-310) and Wittgenstein's revision and translation of the *Brown Book* into German (Ms-115).

A close look at Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* reveals that the notion of grammar is remarkably abundant in his writings. According to the *Bergen Electronic Edition* (BEE), Wittgenstein uses the word "Grammatik" in 1487 remarks on 1269 pages.¹ If we include the derivatives of "Grammatik" as well as their English translations in our search, we get even much higher numbers. These results suggest that the notion of grammar plays a prominent role in Wittgenstein's philosophical approach, and that getting a clearer understanding of what Wittgenstein means by "Grammatik", and "grammar", respectively, is indispensable for any profound interpretation of his work. However, we have to consider that the word "Grammatik" and its derivatives are not evenly spread across the *Nachlass*, and that Wittgenstein uses it in very different ways. In this paper I will investigate Wittgenstein's use of "grammar" in the so-called *Brown Book*. I will not only consider Ts-310² but also Ms-115 (pp. 118-229), which is Wittgenstein's revision and translation into German of Ts-310.³ Given the large number of occurrences of "Grammatik" in the *Nachlass* as a whole, it is perhaps surprising that the term is not very prominent in the *Brown Book*. In Ts-310 the word "grammar" appears only nine times in five text passages; if we want to include alternative wordings by Wittgenstein we count twelve occurrences. Derivates of "grammar" do not appear in Ts-310 at all. This paper is not an attempt to account for this meagre presence of "grammar" in the *Brown Book*, but an attempt to provide an overview of Wittgenstein's use of this word during one particular period of his writings.

Let me start by quoting the five passages in Ts-310 where Wittgenstein uses the term "grammar" (numbers and underlining added by me):

- (1) Remember, however, that the grammar of our temporal expressions is not symmetrical with respect to an origin corresponding with the present moment. Thus the grammar of the expressions relating to memory does not reappear 'with opposite sign' in the grammar of the future tense.//Thus there is nothing in the grammar of the future tense corresponding to the grammar of the word 'memory'. This part of the grammar of the past tense does not recur 'with its sign changed' on the future side.//[...]
If a philosopher says that propositions about the future are not real propositions, it is because he has been struck by the asymmetry in the grammar of temporal expressions.
(Ts-310,50[3]et51[1]et52[1]et53[1]; cf. BBB: 109)

- (2) We are treating here of cases in which, as one might roughly put it, the grammar of a word seems to suggest the "necessity" of a certain intermediary step/stage, although in fact the word is used in cases in which there is no such intermediary step.
(Ts-310,82[3]; cf. BBB: 130)
- (3) It is one of our tasks here to give a picture of the grammar (the use) of the word "a certain".
(Ts-310,90[3]; cf. BBB: 135)
- (4) But here you are misled by the grammar of the word "to know".
(Ts-310,100[3]et101[1]; cf. BBB: 142)
- (5) Just as the statement, "These ticks follow at equal intervals", has got one grammar if the ticks are the tick of a pendulum and the criterion for their regularity is the result of measurements which we have made on our apparatus, and another grammar if the ticks are ticks which we imagine.
(Ts-310,144[3]et145[1]et146[1]; cf. BBB: 171)

What is perhaps most striking about these passages is that Wittgenstein does not talk about grammar in any general sense, but about the grammar of particular parts of our language: the grammar of our temporal expressions, of the future tense, of the word "memory", etc. To illustrate why this is remarkable let me briefly point out that there are at least three different ways in which he uses "grammar" in the *Nachlass*: First, the use of "grammar" in the general sense, comprising the grammar of our language as a whole, as in: "Grammar is not accountable to any reality."⁴ Second, the use of "grammar" in the particular sense, referring to the grammar of a particular part of our language, as in the occurrences of "grammar" in the *Brown Book*. Third, the use of "grammar" as a discipline, as in "Phenomenology is grammar".⁵ The boundaries between these different uses are, of course, vague. It is especially difficult to decide whether Wittgenstein uses "grammar" in the general sense or as a discipline in some particular text passages. Yet I want to claim that in all the passages from Ts-310 cited above Wittgenstein obviously uses grammar in the particular sense and is not at all inclined to make either a general claim about *the* grammar of our language, or about grammar as a discipline. Thus, we can not only state that in the *Brown Book* he uses "grammar" far less than in earlier writings, but we can also diagnose a use of the word which appears to be remarkably one-sided compared to other parts of the *Nachlass*.

In (3) of the quotations above it becomes particularly evident that Wittgenstein's use of "grammar" in the *Brown Book* is of a special and restricted kind. Wittgenstein

1 The normalized transcription gives us the number of the remarks, the diplomatic transcription the number of the pages on which the word "Grammatik" appears.

2 First published in 1958 as "Preliminary Studies for the 'Philosophical Investigations'". Generally Known as The Blue and Brown Books".

3 First published in 1970 as "Eine philosophische Betrachtung".

4 "Die Grammatik ist keiner Wirklichkeit Rechenschaft schuldig" (Ts-213,iii-r[17]).

5 "Phänomenologie ist Grammatik" (Ts-213,437[r1]).

seems here to regard the words "grammar" and "use" as synonyms since he gives us the hint that instead of the word "grammar" we could as well employ the word "use". In fact, if we replaced every instance of "grammar" in Ts-310 by the word "use", all the five passages cited above would still be coherent. This suggests that in the *Brown Book* "grammar" is of no particular significance since Wittgenstein could easily have done without it by using the word "use" instead.

In Wittgenstein's translation of the *Brown Book* into German we find that only in two of the quotations above he adopts the word "Grammatik" in his revision:

- (1a) Aber vergessen wir nicht, daß die Grammatik der zeitlichen Ausdrücke/unserer Zeitbegriffe nicht symmetrisch ist in Bezug auf die Gegenwart. Denn in der Grammatik der Zukunft tritt der Begriff des ‚Gedächtnisses‘ nicht auf, auch nicht ‚mit umgekehrten Vorzeichen‘. Vielleicht wird man sagen: „Was hat das mit Grammatik zu tun? Wir *erinnern* uns eben nicht an die Zukunft!“ Nun das kommt darauf an, wie man das Wort erinnern gebraucht. (Ms-115,175[4]et176[1]et177[1])

(But let us not forget that the grammar of temporal expressions/our concepts of time is not symmetrical with respect to the present. For the concept of 'memory' doesn't appear in the grammar of the future, even not 'with the signs turned around'. Perhaps one would say: "What has this to do with grammar? We just don't *remember* the future!" Well, this depends on how one uses the word 'to remember'.⁶)

- (4a) Du wirst von der Grammatik des Wortes 'wissen' irregeführt. (Ms-115,257[3]et258[1])

(You are misled by the grammar of the word 'to know'.)

However, although Wittgenstein decided against using the word "Grammatik" in his translation of three of the relevant *Brown Book* remarks, he employs it in four other text passages:

- (6) Die Grammatik unserer Sprache läßt eben Fragen zu, und sie verleitet uns zu ihnen durch ihre/die Bildhaftigkeit. (The grammar of our language just allows questions, and it tempts us to ask them because of its/the figurativeness.)
- (6a) Unsere Sprache läßt Fragen zu, zu denen es keine Antwort gibt. Und sie verleitet uns diese Fragen zu stellen durch die Bildhaftigkeit des Ausdrucks. (Ms-115,171[4]et172[1])
- (Our language allows questions to which there is no answer. And it tempts us to ask these questions because of the figurativeness of the expression.)
- (7) Wenn uns nun nicht eine falsche Auffassung der Grammatik des Wortes ‚Bedeutung‘, verführt, daß wir glauben, es *müsse ein* Wenn-Gefühl geben, so werden wir nun sagen: Es gibt Wenn-Gefühle und zwar in dem Sinne, in dem es Wenn-Gebärden gibt, oder/& Wenn-Tonfälle. (Ms-115,264[2])

(Now, if no wrong conception of the grammar of the word 'meaning' seduces us, so that we think there *must* be *one* if-feeling, we will say: there are if-feelings, namely in the sense in which there are if-gestures or/and if-tones of voice.)

- (8) So nun verhält es sich auch mit dem Gebrauch der Wörter ‚meinen‘, ‚glauben‘, ‚intendieren/beabsichtigen‘ etc.: eine falsche – falsch vereinfachte – Auffassung ihrer Bedeutung, d.h. ihrer Grammatik, verleitet uns, zu denken, es müsse jedem dieser Wörter/dem Wort/einem Wort// ein bestimmtes charakteristisches Erlebnis entsprechen. (Ms-115,264[3]et265[1])

(Now this is also the case for the use of the words 'to mean', 'to believe', 'to intend/to purpose', etc.: a wrong – wrongly simplified – conception of their meaning, i.e. their grammar, tempts us to think that every one of these words/the word//a word// had to correlate with a certain characteristic experience.)

- (9) Denk an die Grammatik/den Gebrauch des Ausdrucks: ‚jemand matt setzen‘. Er bezieht sich auf eine gewisse Handlung im Spiel. Aber wenn jemand, sagen wir ein Kind, mit Schachfiguren & einem Schachbrett spielt, dabei ein paar Figuren aufs Brett setzt & die Bewegungen/Handlung des Mattsetzens macht/macht/ausführt, werden wir nicht sagen, es habe jemand matt gesetzt. (Ms-115,278[3]et279[1])

(Consider the grammar/the use of the expression: 'to checkmate someone'. It refers to a certain action within the game. But if somebody, say a child, plays with chess pieces and a chess board, putting some pieces on the board and making/making/performing the movements/action of checkmating someone, we will not say he had checkmated someone.)

With the exception of (6), Wittgenstein is again concerned with grammar in the particular sense in all of these remarks. (9) is especially noteworthy since here we have a case similar to (3): in the manuscript we see that Wittgenstein considers to put "Gebrauch" ("use") as a possible alternative to "Grammatik". Even though he later crosses out "Gebrauch" and clearly decides to use "Grammatik", we may understand this as a hint that he is still conceiving of the grammar of a particular part of our language as its use. However, (7) and (8) suggest a different reading. In (8) Wittgenstein relates grammar closely to meaning: he clarifies the word "meaning" by suggesting "grammar" as its synonym in this particular case, just as he had suggested "use" as a synonym for "grammar" before. In (7) we are dealing with a similar case since, like in (8), Wittgenstein speaks again of the wrong conception of the grammar of a word, and it is likely that he has also its meaning in mind. When we recall PI §43 it is not surprising that Wittgenstein suggests a close relation between meaning and use. What we can clearly see now, however, is that there seems to be not only a twofold relation between meaning and use, but a threefold relation between meaning, use and grammar – at least in regard to grammar in the particular sense as it appears in the *Brown Book*.

⁶ All translations of Ms-115 passages are mine.

As indicated before, (6) differs significantly from the other remarks cited since this is the only passage in the whole *Brown Book* complex⁷ where Wittgenstein does not speak of the grammar of a particular part of our language, but about the grammar of our language on the whole. Yet he seems dissatisfied with his wording because he immediately crosses out the word "Grammatik" in "Die Grammatik unserer Sprache" and just writes "Unsere Sprache". We can be sure that this was an immediate change because, as the manuscript reveals, the new version (6a) appears in the text just behind the old version and Wittgenstein does not squeeze it in later. This may lead to the assumption that he was either trying to dismiss the idea of grammar in the general sense, or that he simply found it inappropriate to use the notion of grammar in this particular remark. The second reading, however, is less plausible because Wittgenstein does not use "grammar" in the general sense in any other remark of the *Brown Book* complex, which makes it seem more likely that he is generally rejecting it at this time of his philosophical work. Later in the PI, however, he takes it up again, albeit his use of grammar in the general sense is still not as prevalent as in his writings from the early 1930s.

Another remark that sticks out from the others is (1a) in which the word "Grammatik" appears three times. In the first two instances, Wittgenstein uses the word clearly in the particular sense. In the third instance, however, he does not: here the interlocutor asks what all this had to do with grammar. We may understand "grammar" here in the general sense, or in the sense of a discipline, or even in the traditional (linguistic) sense, if we imagine an interlocutor who conceives of the word "grammar" in the way he got introduced to it at school. However, I would like to suggest that this instance of grammar is not as relevant as the other ones since Wittgenstein is not presenting his own views, but imagining a response to them.

Finally, it is worth pointing out, even though I cannot go into detail, that apart from the six remarks in Ms-115 in which the word "Grammatik" appears, there are five more remarks which contain various forms of the adjective "grammatisch": Ms-115,228[1], Ms-115,241[7]et242[1], Ms-115,242[4], Ms-115,259[3]et260[1], Ms-115,276[3]. This is interesting in that in Ts-310 Wittgenstein does not use the adjective "grammatical" at all. Thus, including variations we count twelve occurrences of "grammar" and its derivatives in Ts-310 and 17 occurrences of "Grammatik" and its derivatives in Ms-115.

To conclude, Wittgenstein's infrequent use of the word "grammar" in the *Brown Book* complex is restricted to grammar in the particular sense, i.e. the grammar of a particular part of our language. Moreover, in Ts-310, Wittgenstein seems to conceive of the grammar of a word or expression as its use, while in Ms-115 he also relates meaning closely to grammar. Since Wittgenstein's specific use of "grammar" in the *Brown Book* complex is in sharp contrast with his earlier writings which contain many instances of "grammar" in the general sense, or in the sense of a discipline, we can assume that his conception of grammar has already changed when he started dictating the *Brown Book*. It is the grammar of a particular word or expression that interests him, not the grammar of our language as a whole.

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7 By "Brown Book complex" I mean Ts-310, Ms-115 (second part) and Ms-141. Ms-141 is the beginning of an early German version of the Brown Book. I refer to the Brown Book complex because this paper is affiliated with the "Wittgenstein incubator project" where the Brown Book is in focus. The project is run by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen and DM2E (<http://dm2e.eu/>).

The Irreducible Mental Aspect of Rules

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Abstract

Wittgenstein's proposal for how we should use 'rule', based on community behaviour patterns, with mental stuff excluded, is well known to make a putative 'Private Language' senseless. But if we investigate whether the word 'rule' is actually used in this way in the language which is its original home, we find that it is not: Ordinary use routinely incorporates mental stuff. Therefore, far from bringing words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use, describing their use, and leaving everything as it is – his own principles – he is inspecting the everyday use, considering it unsatisfactory, and offering philosophical arguments for a specific, controversial, reform. But his arguments are unconvincing. Following his own guiding principles more consistently than he does, we conclude that a return to Ordinary use, incorporating irreducible, *sui generis*, mental stuff, provides our best view of rules – and sanctions private languages.

In his *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein develops a view of Rules based on community behaviour patterns, which has the consequence that he denies the possibility of a Private Language. In this paper we argue, following Barry Stroud, that his view is a mistake; it is not what perhaps it should be – an exposition of Ordinary use – but rather is a philosophical thesis, and unconvincingly supported by arguments. We defend the Ordinary view, according to which rule-following involves mental stuff, and hence a person can coherently devise private rules, and have a Private Language.

Exegesis of Wittgenstein is notoriously tricky, but it is relatively uncontroversial that he proposes that a rule essentially involves relatively stable patterns of behaviour, primarily of a community. An individual may then possess a tendency to display these behaviour patterns, but this is merely for her to tend to follow what already exists: A community behaviour pattern as rule. What a rule particularly does *not* involve is an individual person's mental state, where this is commonly regarded as private. Thus, since rules are essentially expressions of *public* behaviour patterns, there *cannot* be private rules.

We will argue this by firstly agreeing with Wittgenstein in four important ways. Then we will use these agreed ideas in our criticism of him.

Firstly, Wittgenstein does not deny the *existence* of the mental. He enjoins us, however, to be careful if we attempt to *describe* it, because in our choice of words we will tend to smuggle in presuppositions from the use of our language publicly. This will tend to happen at the very first step – the one we do not properly notice.

§305 ...The impression that we wanted to deny something arises from our setting our faces against the *picture* of the 'inner process'.

§308 ...The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We *talk* of 'processes' and 'states' and leave their nature undecided. (My emphasis and inverted commas)

We fully endorse this view: We agree that there is the mental, and we agree that almost *any* description of it is unwise: Better not to talk of mental 'states', mental 'processes', or mental 'events'. This is why, in what follows, we choose to use the curiously vague term, mental 'stuff'.

Secondly Wittgenstein is also, we propose, inclined to feel that, beyond merely being *careful* not to illicitly import public language when we try to describe mental stuff, we

may, in trying to describe it, be unwittingly reaching language's limit – and certainly a limit of language's *usefulness*. Again, this is a view that we endorse; it is essential to our argument in this paper.

§610: Describe the aroma of coffee. – Why can't it be done? Do we lack the words? And *for what* are words lacking? – But how do we get the idea that such a description must after all be possible? Have you ever felt the lack of such a description? Have you tried to describe the aroma and not succeeded?

Suppose, he writes elsewhere, he is looking at the sky on a fine day, and he chose to invent a word to refer to his own private sensation – the mental stuff – associated with seeing the sky; at least, temporarily *suppose* that he could. (This is, of course, from his point of view, counterfactual). Suppose he calls the mental stuff 'wue'. What follows? There are now *two* words associated with his pleasant experience when he raises his eyes to the heavens: The first, 'blue', does a useful public job of recording and communicating; admittedly perhaps it is limited; perhaps it doesn't describe, or capture, the private mental stuff; perhaps, indeed, when different individuals look at the sky they could have *different* stuff in their individual mental box; some individuals – with so-called blind sight – or robots, could even have *nothing* in the box. (Compare the beetle-in-the-box passage §293) Despite these limitations he can still use the word 'blue' when he says, telephoning his friend in Austria: "There were wonderfully blue skies in Cambridge yesterday"; his friend *is* informed by it, up to a point, because they both learned the use of the word 'blue' in the same public way, by using the same children's books. But it is only communicating "up to a point". Wittgenstein's parents didn't climb into his head as he looked at the book, and attach the label 'blue' to his mental stuff.

§272: The essential thing about private experience is really not that each person possesses his own exemplar, but that no-one knows whether other people also have *this* or something else. The assumption would thus be possible – though unverifiable – that one section of mankind had one sensation of red and another section another.

Wittgenstein can also, as an aide-memoire, write down "Blue skies today!" in his diary – which certainly doesn't have 'S' in the margin anywhere!

But what of the *second* word 'wue'? He could write 'wue' in his diary. But what *purpose* would this serve? Not only does it seem to be no more use to him than writing 'Blue',

but also no-one else will understand it. There is no human language which actually describes our private, mental, stuff; it may purport to, but this is an illusion; "I have a stabbing pain", for example, does not *describe* my private sensation any better than the bare "I have a pain" - it just *refers* to whatever mental stuff you have in the publicly observable situation when you are stabbed; this stuff may, or may not, be similar to *my* mental stuff in the same situation.

This is why, in what follows, once we have proposed that mental stuff exists, and that rules involve it, we absolutely – apparently perversely - refuse to say anything more *about* it. It is like 'vue' - *sui generis*. It defies further analysis; it is irreducible.

Thirdly Wittgenstein proposes, and again we agree, that many words in Ordinary use are family-resemblance terms. Like 'game', and 'language', they are not concepts with an essence; their meaning is their use, and their use is to refer to various proceedings which are all related, but are not contained in a boundary. In particular there is no single property that they all have in common. (§66 & 67)

This is why, in what follows, we suppose that the word 'rule' is a family-resemblance term, with no essential meaning: An element of community behaviour pattern, an element of individual propensity to behaviour, and an element of mental stuff.

Fourthly Wittgenstein proposes, and we agree, that philosophers must be very wary of taking words on holiday, out of their Ordinary contexts.

§116: When philosophers use a word...and try to grasp the *essence* of the thing, once must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language which is its original home?
What we do is to bring words back from their meta-physical to their everyday use.

§124: Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it....It leaves everything as it is....

§128: If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them.

This is why, in what follows, we insist, ironically unlike Wittgenstein himself, on bringing the word 'rule' back from his odd philosophical use to its everyday use. We are more Wittgensteinian than Wittgenstein!

Enough agreement! Now for the parting of the ways. We are both interested in investigating the area of human life roughly referred to by the Ordinary word 'rule'. Given our agreed fourth principle, above, let's take a look at the way that Ordinary people use it. We immediately find that, unfortunately for him, *it ordinarily makes good sense to say* "I have just invented the rules of a game, in my imagination. I may write them down tomorrow", and "Each time I have this odd sensation, I've settled on the rule that I'm going to write 'S' in my diary". In Ordinary usage – and what other usage is there? as Wittgenstein challenges us – these sentences are correct uses of 'rule'.

Wittgenstein is now in trouble; he cannot claim that these uses are nonsense:

§464: My aim is to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is patent nonsense.

It seems that it is precisely *his* uses that are taking language on holiday; it is *his* sentences that are in danger of being nonsense. We know that this is true, not only directly from discussion with our long-suffering non-philosophical friends and relations, but also indirectly from the fact that Wittgenstein's view of the incoherence of a "private language" is widely seen as exciting, revolutionary, and controversial - as a fascinating contribution to thought. This is the opposite of a good sign, because according to the fourth principle our best philosophy should not be exciting and revolutionary – it should leave everything as it Ordinarily is. Far from being controversial, it should be immediately agreed. Hoist with his own petard, Wittgenstein's only option is to deny his own principle, and set about criticising Ordinary usage philosophically, offering philosophical reasons for his proposed substantial alternative. This is exactly what he does – and we have sympathy with the project. But we don't think he succeeds.

What is it, then, about the Ordinary view of 'rule', indicated by these uses, which Wittgenstein, now become a conventional philosopher, does not like? It is, of course, the involvement of one particular element: Mental stuff. Doubtless people Ordinarily sometimes involve patterns of community behaviour, and an individual *tendency* to a pattern of behaviour, but these are not bones of contention between us and Wittgenstein, so we will say no more about them. It is the mental stuff that Wittgenstein objects to.

But people Ordinarily don't say anything much about it. We have already agreed with Wittgenstein in following their lead. Barry Stroud, an exponent of this view considers (2000 pp. 191-2) that literally nothing can be added in description, explanation, or analysis. Hannah Ginsborg (2012) suggests that the mental stuff is "Awareness of Appropriateness", which does not get us much further. People reckon that they are able, in the privacy of their own minds, to do a curious thing, which is the thing that privately happens when, after our parents have been putting things in front of us, and saying "Blue", we suddenly smile, say "I see", and start using 'blue' in the same way as our community. (Saul Kripke's sceptical concerns are correct, but, like all sceptical concerns, irrelevant to our discussion) *Something* has happened mentally. But what can we say, at the agreed limit of language, *about* it? Almost nothing. We say "Don't you know? It's that private thing that happens!". We say "We now understand what 'addition' is". We say "I somehow focused my attention on the sensation, rather like focussing a torch on just one object in a dark room, and then I decided to - as it were - label it 'S', as though I was sticking the label onto it". But what this queer internal ritual is, and what purpose it serves, we refuse to answer, following Wittgenstein's agreed view that we are here at - or beyond - the limits of language: "How do you describe an aroma?" he asked. My charge sheet alleges that he persistently unfairly criticises attempts made by his interlocutor to describe mental events, when he knows that such descriptions are doomed. For example, concerning a putative private attempt to give the infamous 'S' a meaning, he writes:

§258: ...But still I can give myself a kind of ostensive definition. – How? Can I point to the sensation? Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak, or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate my attention on the sensation – and so, as it were, point to it inwardly. – But what is this ceremony for? For that is all it seems to be!..

§ 262: ...you must inwardly undertake to use the word in such-and-such a way. And how do you undertake this?

What else does Wittgenstein, turned conventional philosopher, dislike about the Ordinary view, incorporating, as it does, mental stuff. We finish by mentioning, and responding to, three concerns.

Firstly he worries that the Ordinary view is incoherent, because it contains an infinite regress. If – *if* – a rule exists as a guiding, descriptive, statement in our mind, then it will still be open to many interpretations. If what then determines the *definitive* interpretation, in turn, is *another* guiding, descriptive, statement, it will be open to *further* interpretations, and so on.

We respond, following Stroud, that this regress relies on the initial picture of the way our mind works. If we deny – as we should – the *picture* of the rule in our mind as a kind of guiding instruction which we, somehow external to the instruction, need to interpret, the incoherence disappears.

Secondly he is concerned about checkability. While individual behaviour can be publicly checked for correspondence with a community behaviour pattern, a supposedly private mental process of setting up a rule and following it would be uncheckable. There is something very unsatisfactory with a putative claim which is supposed to be sometimes right and sometimes wrong, but where this can only be established by an individual, and where for this individual there would be no difference between *seeming* to be right, and *being* right.

We respond that philosophically this is a weak objection to Ordinary usage. We are familiar with being able coherently – meaningfully – to conjecture things that cannot be checked. In other words, meaningfulness and existence are one thing, while checkability is another. While we cannot claim that something exists using meaningless sentences, we can, using meaningful sentences, claim that something exists, when its existence cannot be checked.

Only the Logical Positivists attempted to tie meaning to verifiability.

Wittgenstein finally worries that the Ordinary view, checkable or not, only becomes meaningful by presupposing unacceptable metaphysics. The person quoted above as claiming, supposedly sensibly, that she has privately established a meaning for ‘S’, such that she is going to write ‘S’ when she has some type of sensation, is inevitably presupposing a difference between her *seeming* to do this correctly and her *actually* being correct. This implies a truth-maker – but where is it?

We respond not by invoking a mysterious, metaphysically problematic, Third World, but by appealing to a familiar Second World ability: Imagination. If humans are able to *imagine* fictional entities like golden mountains, and *imagine* the thoughts of long-dead kings, they are perfectly capable of *imagining* a projection of themselves, aware of their intended meaning of ‘S’, monitoring their behaviour, and determining correctness.

In summary, Wittgenstein’s view of rules, with mental stuff excluded, is inconsistent with Ordinary use. Therefore it must be a *philosophical* theory, intended to *reform* this unsatisfactory use. But his arguments for his reform are unconvincing. Therefore Ordinary use, incorporating mental stuff, remains our best view of rules. It sanctions private languages.

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Enacting Conjoint Agency in Heterogeneous Constellations

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Abstract

Novel varieties of interplay between humans, robots and software agents are on the rise. It is demonstrated that the enactment of conjoint agency in these heterogeneous constellations is well past its embryonic stage. Humans have developed from naturally born cyborgs to adaptive, co-dependent sociotechnical agents. Computer-based artifacts are no longer mere tools but may be capable of individual and conjoint action, too. The coordination dynamics of interacting humans and nonhumans, and the co-regulation of their coupling is depicted and described as a specific form of socio-cognitive interaction. The resulting enactive account shows that social interaction is not bound to biological individuals.

1. Introduction to enactivism and the extended mind in sociotechnical environments

A new kind of interplay between human beings and „computational objects“ is emerging: „Computational objects do not simply things *for* us, but they do things *to us* as people, to our ways of seeing ourselves and others. Increasingly, technology also puts itself into a position to do things *with* us“ (Turtle 2006, p. 1). Virtual Companions, cars on autopilot and the collaboration of humans and virtual caregivers in health-monitoring systems exemplify these three stages.

Both multi-robot systems and software-based multiagent systems are on the rise. They may rely on information on the Internet for completing their tasks. The information stored there serves as an extended memory bank - both for humans and non-humans. Virtual environments offer the option of rehearsing different behavioural options both for the human user and the technical agent. Software agents may also be effective in and for real socio-technical systems: automatic bid agents actively bid in electronic markets. They completely reside in the Internet making use of the information available there. Robots, too, profit from external resources for their cognitive processes. „RoboEarth – A World Wide Web for Robots“ (Waibel 2011) is under construction: „Bringing a new meaning to the phrase „experience is the best teacher“, the goal of RoboEarth is to allow robotic systems to benefit from the experience of other robots, paving the way for rapid advances in machine cognition and behaviour, and ultimately, for more subtle and sophisticated human-machine interaction“ (RoboEarth 2013). Thus we find examples of the „web-extended mind“ (Smart 2012) and the „extended (artificial) mind“ of technical agents already in place.

Agent-based demonstrators for the coordination of emergency response services in disaster management systems have been built. Humans may be integrated for clarifying and/or deciding non-formalized conflicts in an ad-hoc manner. Novel contexts realizing collective and distributed agency materialize. It becomes vital to understand „participatory sense-making“ (De Jaegher, Di Paolo 2007) and social cognition in these contexts.

„The autonomy of the interaction process“ is perceived as „possible“ for biological multiagent systems by Tom Froese and Ezequiel Di Paolo (2011). They name this phenomenon „multiagent recursive interaction“: „the manner in which one agent’s movements affect the environment can result in changes to sensory stimulation for the other agent, and vice versa, creating the basis for a multiagent

recursive interaction“ (Froese /Di Paolo 2011, p. 11). From their perspective „the enactive approach assigns a certain amount of autonomy to socio-cultural processes while firmly linking them to biological individuals“ (Froese/Di Paolo 2011, p. 29).

In my perspective „socio-cognitive interaction“ i.e. „interacting with others who are recognized as such“ (Froese/Di Paolo 2011, pp. 21) is not bound to biological individuals. It can also arise in heterogeneous multiagent systems where humans and nonhumans interact. The following elaboration wants to do justice to socio-cognitive interaction in heterogeneous multi-agent systems.

2. Human Agent: from naturally born cyborg to adaptive, co-dependent socio-technical agent

In the eyes of Andy Clark we humans have always been naturally born cyborgs: „Human thought and reason emerges from a nest in which biological brains and bodies, acting in concert with nonbiological props and tools, build, benefit from and then rebuild an endless succession of designer environments. In each such setting our brains and bodies couple to new tools, yielding new extended thinking systems. These new thinking systems create new waves of designer environments, in which yet further kinds of extended thinking systems emerge. By this magic, seeded long ago by the emergence of language itself, the ratchets engage and the golden machinery of mind-design, mind redesign and mind re-redesign, rumbles into life“ (Clark 2003, p. 197). We as cyborgs do not live as hermits but integrated into societies. Sociotechnical environments are constitutive for human life.

Man has always been dependent on his or her body in an existential way. However, humans are capable of exploiting it, changing it and enhancing it using all kinds of enhancements and artificial body parts. Due to their instinct reduction humans need tools to create a world to live in (Gehlen 2009, p. 38). The „cyborgisation“, i.e. the incorporation of certain technical modules, is merely a late phenomenon of the cultivation of nature (Spreen 2004, p. 335). Such components may be of existential importance to their users. Pacemakers are a case in point. Any incorporated technological solution must be controlled, maintained, and be provided with an external source of energy and other substances in order to function well. Such unions of live bodies and technical elements increase the awareness of our dependency on technical solutions. Therefore engineers continuously work on improving these technologies. This drives the co-evolution of humans and

technology, and the evolution from naturally born cyborgs to adaptive, co-dependent socio-technical agents.

3. Computer-based artifact: from tool to inanimate social agent

Many current artifacts rely on their software components for adaptive, goal-directed behaviour. Purely computational artifacts such as software agents as well as partially computer-based artifacts such as robots are neither (passive) tools nor solely reactive components. For material artifacts or software agents (sensor) input is coupled to (actuator) output due to an artificial "cognitive" system. The technical agents actively pursue their goals - often based on quite sophisticated "perceive-predict-(re)plan-act"-loops - thus displaying machine-based cognition and adaption.

It may be said that such agents are capable of acting instead of just behaving, if the following conditions concerning their ontogenesis hold: "the individual actor [evolves] as a complex, adaptive system (CAS), which is capable of rule based information processing and based on that able to solve problems by way of adaptive behavior in a dynamic process of constitution and emergence" (Kappelhoff 2011, p. 320).

Technical agents may not only possess the potential for individual action but also for conjoint action. Collaborating software agents and coordinated actions of robots demonstrate this. The potential for interaction, i.e. the coordination by means of communication, ranges from hard-wired cooperation mechanisms up to ad-hoc cooperation.

Interactive planning, sharing strategies and adaptive action can be described based on the potential for the personification of others: „Personification of non-humans is best understood as a strategy of dealing with the uncertainty about the identity of the other ...Personifying other non-humans is a social reality today and a political necessity for the future" (Teubner 2006, p. 497). It starts with the attribution of simple dispositions and goes up to perceiving the other as a human-like actor. Today this capability is underdeveloped in most material and software agents: some agents have more or less crude models of others, e.g. realized as so-called minimal models of the mind; some are capable of topic-focused group decision making based on egoistical behaviour. Incidentally, this qualitative level can also be found in great apes (Call, Tomasello 2008).

To summarise: The capabilities for individual action and conjoint action in sociotechnical systems may be defined based on activity levels, the potential for adaptivity, interaction and personification of others possessed by the involved actor(s) (see also (Thürmel 2012) and (Thürmel 2013)).

4. From distributed agency to enacting conjoint agency in heterogeneous constellations

Constellations of distributed agency range from swarm intelligence systems where the individual agents possess rather primitive capabilities to flexible partnerships between humans and software agents up to loosely coupled complex adaptive software-agent-systems. The latter may model so diverse problem spaces as predator-prey relationships of natural ecologies, legal engineering scenarios or disaster recovery systems. If autonomy is defined as organizational closure (Varela 1979, p.55) both these

overall systems and the individual agents may be described as autonomous. The degrees of freedom built into the computer-mediated artifacts can materialize in individual acts, mandated actions or collaborative interaction.

In line with a well accepted approach in enaction research "social interaction" may be defined as follows: "two or more autonomous agents co-regulating their coupling with the effect that their autonomy is not destroyed and their relational dynamics acquire an autonomy of their own. Examples [include] conversations, collaborative work, arguments, collective action, dancing and so on" (De Jaegher, Di Paolo, Gallagher 2010, p. 441). While pondering the question "Can social interaction constitute social cognition" these authors do not exclude cross-species interactions or interactions with robots (De Jaegher, Di Paolo, Gallagher 2010, p. 441), but they do not provide any examples or further elaborations of these constellations.

The fact that current technical agents "lack humans' consciousness, intentionality and free will" (Moor 2006, p. 20) does not mean that they do not possess a degree of "social autonomy in a collaborative relationships". This form of goal-autonomy was defined by Falcone and Castelfranchi as having two components: "a) *meta level autonomy* that denotes how much the agent is able and in condition of negotiating about the delegation or of changing it; b) a *realization autonomy* that means that the agent has some discretion in finding a solution to an assigned problem, or a plan for an assigned goal" (Falcone/Castelfranchi 2001, p. 407). Even certain current software agents may possess this kind of social autonomy thus displaying a certain proto-social behavior.

Current collaborative constellation between humans and technical agents are asymmetric. Their acts are based on different cognitive systems, different degrees of freedom and only partially overlapping spheres of experience. Moreover, most technical multiagent systems model rational behaviour under uncertainty, whereas humans do not rely on a fixed utility function as guidance for their acts. They may be guided by other considerations and experiences than the ones fundamental to the technical multi-agent system.

The coordination dynamics of interacting humans and nonhumans, the co-regulation of their coupling is often contextual. Examples include virtual assistants or robopets. In disaster management systems where the dispatch function may be interchangeably exercised by human and nonhuman agents (proto-)social interaction may be thought of as an enabler of (proto-)social cognition. Social performance constituted by fully fledged social interaction lies in the future. However, participatory sense making e.g. between humans and robots is an active research field: The behavioral and cognitive processes that underlie human communication are studied in order to develop methods to synthesize such abilities in machines (Sociable Agents Group 2013). The dynamic of social interaction and learning might allow "to bootstrap the cognitive system" of technical systems as described e.g. in a "roadmap for developmental robotics" (Cangileosi et al. 2010). Dominey and Warneken intend to explore „the basis of shared intentions in human and robot cognition" (2011). They demonstrate how "computational neuroscience", robotics and developmental psychology influence each other in a very fertile way.

New capabilities may emerge over time on the individual level (e.g. emergent semantics, emergent consciousness). Self-organisation and coalition forming on the group level

can occur. New cultural practices and novel institutional policies may emerge. Thus enacting conjoint agency in heterogeneous constellations is well past its embryonic stage.

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Rewriting the script while the act is in play. On Judith Butler's concept of performative agency

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Abstract

According to Martha Nussbaum, Judith Butler fails to offer a convincing notion of agency and therefore "collaborates with evil". She presents nothing but a handful of severely constrained agents that try to change society by the means of the repetition of the given. Like actors with a bad script, they have no other choice but to go on stage where they find their freedom in a slightly odd presentation of their bad lines.

I will show that Butler's concept of performative agency is not just a sad depiction of trapped agents that are doomed to repetition. I elaborate how Butler refuses to work with the notion of universal identity categories and instead pleads for the radical opening of these categories.

When Martha Nussbaum published her polemic critique on Judith Butler, *The Professor of Parody* in 1999, it sparked a fierce debate on the role of post-structuralist theory in academic feminism. Although Butler's approach has been widely discussed and gradually adopted by various academic disciplines, that debate does not seem to be over yet. It is being kept alive by critics of third wave-feminism who raise some of the very same points of critique as Nussbaum. One main objection concerns Butler's notion of performative agency and the question whether it provides a convincing concept for social change. By addressing this topic, I hope to demonstrate the possibilities that Butler's theory provides and that are often overlooked or misinterpreted until today.

Nussbaum presents a harsh critique full of scornful remarks that goes as far as stating that while Butler is trained as a philosopher, her work belongs to the field of sophistry and rhetoric, fails to contribute important philosophical insights that help shape social reality and thus "collaborates with evil" (Nussbaum 1999, 45). While Nussbaum demands an elaborated practical theory of agency that allows immediate use in the most severe social situations, Butler refuses to offer a "normative theory of social justice and human dignity" (Nussbaum 1999, 42). Nussbaum condemns Butler's focus on language and the abstract level of verbal categories and accuses her of "quietism and retreat" as well as of "moral passivity" (Nussbaum 1999, 42). According to Nussbaum, Butler doesn't only miss out on devising a concept of group agency that helps to envision large social movements and radical social change, but also offers a rather unconvincing concept of individual agency. She compares Butler's notion of the parodist reiteration of power structures with the idea of "actors with a bad script" who can "subvert it by delivering the bad lines oddly" (Nussbaum 1999, 41). The actor's parodist performance does nothing to change the big picture: "the script remains bad, but the actors have a tiny bit of freedom" (Nussbaum 1999, 41). In Butler's determinist theory, we are "doomed to repetition of the power structures into which we are born" (Nussbaum 1999, 40). Many readers are surprised by Butler's strong emphasis on the repetition of the power structures that are supposed to be subverted. One might ask: Why not just write a new script? Why not let the actors rewrite the whole play independently from the old one?

I want to address that question in three steps. At first, I will take a closer look at the actor's status. Who is Butler's performing agent, and which restrictions does she have? I

will then proceed to take a look at the script. Is there some sort of freedom within the ongoing iteration of the power structures, or are we really doomed to repetition? In the last part of this paper I will address Butler's alleged quietism and ask: Does the insistence on working on a formal and abstract level necessarily lead to a disconnection with the real struggles, the "messy things", or does it instead offer some sort of agency? And ultimately: Does the refusal of a normative ethical theory result in the loss of political agency?

I. Outlining the actor's role - agency without an agent?

In her early works, Judith Butler famously criticizes the distinction between sex and gender. Originally introduced to oppose the idea of anatomy as destiny, this distinction defines sex as the biological and anatomical features ascribed to male and female creatures and gender as a social factor. This factor concerns a person's social role, position, behaviour or identity, is regarded as historically and culturally constructed and as entirely independent from sex. Butler points out that if we follow the logic of the sex-gender-distinction and take gender's independence from sex seriously, we have to conclude that "there is neither an 'essence' that gender expresses or externalizes nor an objective ideal to which gender aspires" (Butler 1988, 522), which leads the distinction to collapse. Butler doesn't only claim that "from within the terms of culture it is not possible to know sex as distinct from gender" (Butler 1988, 524), but goes as far as stating that gender doesn't express a foregoing essence or a core of gender identity. Butler has been heavily criticized for her assumption that the impossibility of an unmediated, pre-discursive access to nature would imply that there is no such nature. While the introduction of surface politics and gender performativity in her first book *Gender Trouble* didn't satisfy the critics, her subsequent *Bodies that matter* clarifies that she does not proclaim the loss, but a reformulation of the materiality of the body through ritualised reiteration.

With the concept of performativity, gender distinctions can take the form of multiple, maybe even indefinite unanticipated types of gender that are not a form of being, but a way of acting or performing. This concept is based on the notion of surface politics, a criticism of the Cartesian dualism of body and soul. Surface politics question the idea that gender, as a part of culture, is accredited with an agency which acts upon a nature that is itself imagined as

a "passive surface, outside the social and yet it's necessary counterpart" (Butler 1993, 4). This surface portrays materiality as passive, somewhat ahistorical, stable, unambiguous, external and causally prior to culture and as subjected to culture's agency. Butler rejects this dualism and replaces it with the idea of gender as a "free-floating artifice" (Butler 1990, 9) that "is in no way a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts proceed; rather, it is an identity tenuously constituted in time - an identity instituted through a stylized repetition of acts." (Butler 1988, 519). Butler's emphasis on the repetition stems from a certain, rather free interpretation of J. L. Austin's theory of speech acts. She focuses on the concept of performative speech acts in which the utterance of a sentence becomes the doing of an action. Performatives like wedding ceremonies, declarations of ownership and bets "constitute a moral bond between speakers" (Butler 1988, 519) and carry out laws and social norms just by stating them. According to Butler's reading of Austin, to understand what "makes the force of an utterance effective, what establishes its performative character, one must first locate the utterance within a 'total speech situation'" (Butler 1997, 3). Influenced by Jacques Derrida's reading of Austin, Butler questions whether the limitation of a total speech situation is possible. She denies Austin's criteria of success for performative speech acts, which entail the speaker's intention and social role, appropriate context and certain social and linguistic conventions, and instead finds that the power that fuels these acts lies in language itself - in its basic connection to repetition through citation. No performative utterance, independent from its success, could ever work "if it's formulation did not repeat a 'coded' or iterable utterance", "if it weren't identifiable in some way as a 'citation'" (Derrida 1988, 18). To maintain that social norms and conventions owe their existence to their ongoing stylized reiteration means that neither the speaker's intention nor any social or linguistic circumstances account for or limit the performative speech act's citational context. We never know all the meanings a performative draws from or every meaning it will produce - its force simply cannot be contained.

If gender was a repetition of acts that could be intentionally and autonomously executed to attain a certain, precisely foreseen effect, the possibilities for the acting individual would be endless. Instead, Butler questions the idea of materiality as a passive surface, takes over Derrida's idea of the uncontainable force of citationality and consequently negates precultural agency. What does this mean for the actor? Is she even needed in order for the play to be staged?

II. Rewriting the script

Taking a closer look on Butler's concept of gender performativity, we see that Nussbaum's analogy of actor and script doesn't hold. Performativity is based on the assumption that the discursive practice of performative speech acts "enacts or produces that which it names" (Butler 1993, 13). This means that actor and script maintain a very complex relationship in which the supposed internality of the actor's mind and the externality of the world she's confronted with are actually intertwined. The discursive framework tends to hide this fact by positioning deceptive and falsely naturalized significations onto material surfaces which generates what is perceived as substance. It produces a seemingly natural coherence of sex, gender, and sexuality as an indubitable, unchangeable truth of human condition "in the service of reproductive interests" (Butler 1988, 524). It then compels one's belief in the necessity

and naturalness of this coherence by regularly concealing its own genesis. Butler states that "gender is a performance with clearly punitive consequences" (Butler 1988, 522) and draws from Michel Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* the idea that subjects are formed by internalizing disciplinary structures. This internalization turns the supposedly external power structures into elements of the individual's identity. Performativity blurs the boundaries between self and world not by suggesting that "I do my body", but rather by assuming that my "I" is a mode of embodiment that has been instituted by a stylized repetition of acts and "what" I embody are my historically conditioned possibilities. It is the notion of a *stylized* repetition of acts that links performativity with historical conditions, since a style is "never fully self-styled, for living styles have a history, and that history conditions and limits possibilities" (Butler 1988, 521). My historical preconditions are "nothing other than those punitively regulated cultural fictions that are alternately embodied and disguised under duress" (Butler 1988, 522). This does not mean that they necessarily restrict me, they rather enable me to act in the first place. Butler addresses what Nussbaum would view as a viable concept of agency by stating: "We may be tempted to think that to assume the subject in advance is necessary in order to safeguard the agency of the subject. But to claim that the subject is constituted is not to claim that it is determined; on the contrary, the constituted character of the subject is the very precondition of its agency" (Butler 1992, 12). Holding on to the notion of agency as an active force that autonomously interferes with a stable external nature means holding on to an agency that is an effect of the very same power regime it seeks to undermine. In order for a subject to attain agency, it must lay bare the genealogy of its own production. To understand that the subject is "regulated and produced in advance" means to understand that it is "fully political; indeed, perhaps most political at the point in which it is claimed to be prior to politics itself." (Butler 1992, 13). Accordingly, the most potential for agency lies within the acknowledgement of the unpredictable, uncontainable force of citationality and the critical analysis of what we commonly view as natural.

IV. Defending Judith Butler's quietism

The deconstruction of identity categories through their genealogical analysis can have many forms. Most prominently, it comprehends the parodist reiteration of power structures, like in drag shows, and the resignification of identity categories, like the reappropriation of the word "queer". These strategies can disrupt the naturalization of identity categories by drawing attention to their performativity. But they might just as well have the opposite effect and reinforce the alleged nature of those identities.

Butler's theory eschews specific instructions on how to act in order to change social reality. By virtue of Derrida's concept of iterability, Butler's theory cannot predict a performative's effect. Based on Foucault's notion of the omnipresence of power structures, Butler believes that "Identity categories are never merely descriptive, but always normative, and as such, exclusionary" (Butler 1992, 16). Therefore, any subversive act might "end up serving power in new and insidious ways" (Nussbaum 1999, 38). Here lies the very danger of the radical force of citationality: If we decide to open up identity categories for their permanent resignification, we have to accept that we have no control over them. But by putting these categories - and with them, our selves - at risk, we open up the possibility for the forgotten others to be included. Nussbaum depicts Butler's agents as very few individuals, just like actors on a

stage. It is indeed true that Butler envisions a minority. She locates the most powerful form of agency within those individuals that have been excluded from certain identity categories and are thus not fully recognized as human. This does not mean that agency is nearly impossible. It means that Butler expects the real social change to be instantiated by the outsiders and their demand to be included. Butler does not offer a normative ethical theory that tells right from wrong. While one might charge her with quietism and moral passivity, I maintain that the strength of Butler's theory lies precisely in this refusal to establish a common foundation, be it a normative ethical theory or universal identity categories. Butler's theory formulates the radical opening of space for possible identities as well as for a democratic discussion of ethical principles. She therefore offers the irrefutable precondition for any inclusive theory of identity politics. By analysing materiality as a sight of agency, she allows us to reconsider what we view as the most stable preconditions of culture.

Let us return to Nussbaum's analogy one last time: With Butler, there is no "outside" of the actor's script. We cannot simply step out of the reality that surrounds us to change it, but we can find the possibility for social change within its very own foundations. We have to change social reality while being part of it – and change the script while the act is still in play.

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Ostensive teaching and the shopping scene

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Abstract

In this paper I argue that the shopping scene in §1 of the P.I. is meant to show that even though Augustine could have learned through ostensive teaching some uses of “five red apples”, he could not have learned solely through ostensive teaching the particular uses of these words which are depicted in the shopping scene.

In §1 of the P.I., Wittgenstein first quotes in original, in Latin, a passage from Augustine's *Confessions* (translating the quote then to German), then he comments on this quote in two ways and in the end he presents one shopping scene followed by some dialogical comments. In the quote, Augustine describes how he learned (presumably) his mother tongue. In the shopping scene, Wittgenstein presents a particular use of language which involves some particular uses of three words - “five”, “red” and “apples”.

In this paper I link the shopping scene to Augustine's description of his learning of language. I show that some specific uses of the three words used in the shopping scene can be taught the way Augustine describes in the quote. On the one hand I show that according to Augustine's description of his learning of language grown ups taught him words through ostensive teaching, and on the other hand I show that some specific uses of the three words used in the shopping scene - “five”, “red” and “apples” - can be taught ostensively according to Wittgenstein.

The results I present in this paper shed a new light on the role of the shopping scene. To my knowledge, commentators so far have been concentrating on linking the shopping scene to the picture of the nature of language that Wittgenstein tells us that we get from Augustine. They have been concentrating on showing that not all the words in the shopping scene are used as names. Most notably, Baker and Hacker have argued that the shopping scene is meant to show how different kinds of word have different functions (Baker and Hacker 2005). In contrast to the secondary literature I link the shopping scene to Augustine's description of his *learning* of language. I argue that the shopping scene is meant to show that even though Augustine could have learned through ostensive teaching some uses of “five red apples”, he could not have learned solely through ostensive teaching the particular uses of these words which are depicted in the shopping scene.

1. Ostensive teaching in the quote from Augustine and in Wittgenstein

In the quote from the *Confessions*, Augustine describes how he learned language. First he learned which words name which objects and second he learned to articulate those words. According to Augustine, he learned which words name which objects in the following way. Grown ups named some object and they *moved towards* that object. Augustine was able to grasp which was the object the word named because grown ups wanted to *point it out* (when moving towards it). And he gathered that they wanted to point out that object, with the help of their body language, which he calls “the natural language of all peoples”. Augustine also tells us that he heard words repeatedly uttered at specific places in different sentences.

From the quote from Augustine we can tell that the grown ups taught language to Augustine by purely ostensive means: they name objects, move towards them while uttering words. What Augustine calls “the natural language of all peoples” is meant to help Augustine grasp which object the grown ups are pointing out and *is part of* the ostensive teaching, not a separate method for teaching language. This natural language of people involves the play of the eyes, the moves of the limbs, the tone of voice and the facial expression.

I distinguish in what follows a strict conception of ostensive teaching from a broader one and I show that both Augustine in the quote I just summarized and Wittgenstein in his comments on ostensive teaching in the P.I. hold a rather broad conception of ostensive teaching.

A strict conception of ostensive teaching of a word would contain merely pointing to an object and uttering that word. Such a conception would discard things like tone of voice, facial expression, moves of the limbs and the whole context of the pointing gesture. According to such a conception, all these aspects play no essential role in ostensive teaching. Such a strict and over-simplistic conception invites questions like: what distinguishes pointing to the object from pointing to its colour, its shape, the number of objects and so on. I show in what follows that neither Augustine, nor Wittgenstein have such a strict, over-simplistic conception of ostensive teaching.

According to the quote, the role of the language of all peoples is to help Augustine grasp which object the grown ups are pointing out. This is apparent from the following passage in the quote: “This [that grown ups meant to point out a particular object], however, I gathered from their gestures, the natural language of all peoples ...” (Wittgenstein 2009). Hence, what Augustine calls the language of all peoples is for him part of the ostensive teaching of words. Furthermore, Augustine does not talk about grown ups *pointing* to an object, but of *moving towards* the objects which they want to point out. This implies that when Augustine talks about grown ups moving towards objects, he has more than the pointing gesture in view.

I have argued here that Augustine has a broader conception of ostensive teaching. Wittgenstein, though, has an even broader conception of ostensive teaching, which includes the context of ostension. On the one hand, in P.I. §6 Wittgenstein tells us the following with regard to the ostensive teaching of some particular uses of words: “An important part of the training will consist in the teacher pointing to the objects, directing the child's attention to them, and at the same time uttering a word”. Wittgenstein does not specify here what he has in mind with the teacher directing the child's attention to the objects, he does not say for example how this is attained. But one can easily imagine that the body language is one way to attain it.

Many things which are part of the “natural language of all peoples” may be part of the pointing gesture and the uttering of the word: a certain tone of voice, a certain facial expression, a certain kind of body movement and so on. For example our faces might become lively when we point to a fruit which appeals to us, or our tone of voice might become serious when we point to a sharp knife, we might move our finger when we trace the shape of an object and so on.

On the other hand, in §35 of the P.I., Wittgenstein comments on pointing to the shape of an object: “... even if something of the sort did recur in all cases [one characteristic process], it would still depend on the circumstances – that is on what happened before and after the pointing – whether we would say “He pointed at the shape and not at the colour”.” (Wittgenstein 2009). In other words, not only is the body language part of ostensive teaching, but also the context of the teaching.

Showing that both Augustine and Wittgenstein have a broader conception of ostension makes it easier to understand how come Wittgenstein tells us in §1 of the P.I. that someone describing the learning of language the way Augustine does, has various kinds of word in mind: certain nouns and people’s names, certain names of actions and properties. It makes it easier to understand that one can teach ostensively number-words or colours. Following such a broad conception of ostensive teaching as Wittgenstein has, it becomes unproblematic to point to the same objects for “apples”, “five” and “red”, while pointing out different things each time.

2. Teaching some uses of “five”, “red” and “apples” ostensively

Let us now consider the following question: can the three words “apples”, “red” and “five” be taught ostensively? I shall answer this question with an eye on §§ 2, 6, 9 and 49 from the P.I. I shall show that according to Wittgenstein some uses of these words can be taught ostensively.

Wittgenstein does not explicitly say that one can teach ostensively “apples” or “red”, but this follows from certain passages in the P.I. According to Wittgenstein in §6 of the P.I. one teaches ostensively the use of “slab”, “block” or “pillar” in language game (2) (Wittgenstein 2009). In this language game the builder A calls out “slab” to his assistant B and this one brings the stone that he has learned to bring. Hence such a use of “apples” which is similar to the use of “slab”, “block” or “pillar” in language game (2) can be taught ostensively too. Imagine a similar language game which is played with “apples”, “bananas” and “cherries”, where A is a greengrocer and B is his assistant. When A says “apples”, B brings a bunch of fruits that he learned to bring on such a call, and so on. If we are to follow Wittgenstein’s comment in §6 of the P.I., then this use of “apples” is taught ostensively.

Furthermore, according to Wittgenstein’s comments in §49, one teaches ostensively the use of “R” in language game (48). In language game (48), combinations of “R”, “G”, “W” and “B” represent arrangements of coloured squares (red, green, white and black squares) on a surface. Relative to language game (48) Wittgenstein comments in §49 of the P.I.: “... But if he is memorizing the words and their meanings, or if he is teaching someone else the use of the words and uttering them in the course of ostensive teaching, we’ll not say that they are sentences...” (Wittgenstein 2009). Hence, according to Wittgenstein the use of “R” in language game (48) is taught

ostensively. Imagine a similar language game which is played with the words “red”, “green”, “white” and “black” (instead of “R”, “G”, “W” and “B”). For a use of “red” similar to the use of “R” in language game (48), this use of “red” would be taught ostensively too.

Of all three words, “five” is the only word of which Wittgenstein explicitly says that it can be taught ostensively. In §9 of the P.I., Wittgenstein talks about the ostensive teaching of the use of the first five or six number-words to signify groups of objects which can be taken in at a glance: “Something more like the teaching of the words “block”, “pillar”, etc. would be the ostensive teaching of number-words that serve not to count but to signify groups of objects that can be taken in at a glance. Children do learn the use of the first five or six elementary number-words in this way.” (Wittgenstein 2009). Hence, according to Wittgenstein, “five” when used to signify groups of objects which can be taken in at a glance, is taught ostensively. For example such a use of “five”, where it signifies a group of five apples (or five bananas, or five nuts, or five grapes and so on) can be taught ostensively.

So far I have shown that following Wittgenstein’s comments in the P.I., all the three words “five”, “red” and “apples” (that is certain uses of these words) can be taught ostensively. I will now show that “five red apples” (taken as a compound name) can be taught ostensively too. Let us imagine a language game played with the expressions “five red apples”, “two yellow bananas” and “three green pears”. When the greengrocer A calls out “five red apples” or “two yellow bananas” and so on, his assistant B brings a group of fruits which he was trained to bring on such an order. We could imagine that the fruits are already arranged in groups (they could be even tied together) and B only needs to recognize the different groups. In such a language game the three separate words “five”, “red” and “apples” have no use.

It follows from what I have shown that Augustine could have learned all the three words which are used in the shopping scene: “five” “red” and “apples”, for all three words could be taught ostensively. But, it also follows from what I have shown, that Augustine could have learned only some specific uses of these three words through ostensive teaching.

3. Teaching the use of “five red apples” in the shopping scene and the role of the scene

In show that the uses of the words in the shopping scene cannot be taught according to Wittgenstein solely through ostension. In the shopping scene described by Wittgenstein in §1 the greengrocer uses the three words “five red apples” in the following way: he opens a box which has the sign “apples” on it, he looks for the word “red” into a table, where he finds a colour sample opposite to the word; then he says out loud the series of number-words up to “five”, while taking at the same time for each number-word one apple of the colour of the sample found in the table (Wittgenstein 2009).

According to Wittgenstein’s comments in §9 of the P.I., “five”, as it is used in the shopping scene cannot be taught solely ostensively. In the shopping scene “five” is used for counting purposes, not for signifying a group of objects which can be taken in at a glance. Such a use of the word cannot be taught according to Wittgenstein solely ostensively. The teaching involves teaching the series of num-

ber-words and correlating objects with numbers, as Wittgenstein tells us in P.I. §9.

“Red” as it is used in the shopping scene cannot be taught solely ostensively either, although ostensive teaching can be involved. The teaching of this use of “red” in the shopping scene has to involve teaching the following: to use the table, how the table is read and the use of a sample. These involve much more than ostensive teaching. As Wittgenstein remarks in §86, part of the training for looking up the sample in the chart, may consist in teaching the pupil how to pass with his finger horizontally from left to right.

Following my arguments in this paper, we can say that Wittgenstein constructs the shopping scene in order to show that even though Augustine could have learned

through ostensive teaching some uses of “five red apples”, he could not have learned solely through ostensive teaching the particular uses of these words which are depicted in the shopping scene.

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Wittgenstein and the study of local grammars

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Abstract

In this paper I propose a local grammar approach to language studies by discussing the relations between Wittgenstein's theory of meaning, the British contextualism and Zellig Harris' work on distributionalism. What is common for these three theories is that the context plays a crucial role for the study of meaning. The local grammars that I propose provide a description of meaning of linguistic units by explicating the contexts in which they occur.

Introduction

Contemporary grammar and syntax studies have been strongly influenced by formal logic. Some of examples are the influence of Carnap's logical syntax on Noam Chomsky's (1955) and Bar-Hillel's (Bar-Hillel and Carnap, 1953) grammar theories or the significance of Ajdukiewicz's approach to meaning for the categorial grammar (e.g. Carpenter, 1992: 168-242). But, beside these formalist approaches to grammar there is also a strong influence of the later Wittgenstein to the empirically-oriented linguistics studies. In this respect, especially important is the work of the British linguist John Rupert Firth (1957). In this paper I want to demonstrate that the language in use theory of meaning can be used as a resource for a new approach to grammar that deals with the description of local contexts in which linguistic units occur. I will first briefly discuss the relationship between Wittgenstein and the British contextualists. After that I will demonstrate how this relationship can be further developed by connecting it with the distributionalist approach to grammar.

Language in use

J.R. Firth's statement that "You shall know a word by the company it keeps" (Firth [1957]. 1968:179) can be found on the same page on which he quotes Wittgenstein (1953, 109) who claimed that "the meaning of words lie in their use". Relying on Wittgenstein Firth, therefore, claims that the most suitable way to study the meaning of a word is to observe the context in which it is used. The idea itself seems to derive from Frege's Context Principle (Reck, 1997) stated as: "it is only in the context of a proposition that words have any meaning" (Frege, 1950:73). However, Frege and Wittgenstein develop the notion of 'context' in different ways which is not the focus of the present paper. Two main components of Wittgenstein's notion of meaning are: the language in use and the role of contexts. For Wittgenstein, there is no point in asking the question What is a meaning of X? because "[i]f you want to know what a word means, look and see how it is used" (Waismann, 1965:157).

Both Wittgenstein and Firth considers words as entities with their own behavior. This is, of course, only a metaphor because the phrases, sentences and texts are after all products of somebody's use of language. However, by using this metaphor linguistic units become our object of observation and investigation. This is different from the referential theory of meaning in which the words stands either for ideas in mind or objects that located in non-linguistic reality. It is words in their context that we need to study if we want to decipher their meaning and not their relation to some non-language entities. Firth further suggests that the

study of linguistic units means a description of "physiognomy of words" (Firth, 1957:179). This metaphor again derives from Wittgenstein and his claim that words "look at us!" (1953:181). In addition, Wittgenstein also considered that different characters of a word were related to different contexts in which it is used. For him, "[m]eaning is a physiognomy" (ibid., 151). This metaphor has its usage in nowadays empirical linguistics where the scholars talk about 'profiles of words' or 'behavioral profile' 'lexical profile or 'concurrences profile'. The profile of something is a description which does not provide all but only most important details.

Grammar rules

A description of these characteristic features is what the task of a grammar is. These features can be interpreted as characteristic contexts in which a linguistic unit occurs. As a result, a grammar of linguistic unit would be a description of their occurrences in these contexts. It is the task of a linguist to discover these typical occurrences and to explicate them by relying on the previous uses or representative examples of the linguistic units (Caillieux, 1974:37). In addition, we can define the meaning and grammar of an item by checking how many uses it has. This may be performed by testing if a word can be substituted with a new word. Here we can conclude that "a word *a* means different things in different contexts, if in the one case it can be replaced by *b* and in the other by *c* but not by *b*" (Waismann, 1956:154). The observation of examples and the substitution principle are, therefore, two basic operations that we need to study grammar.

The importance of examples is nowadays well-recognized in linguistics and many large collections of texts called corpora have been compiled for this purpose. Corpora are suitable for the observation of occurrences of words in contexts because they "consist of traces of linguistic behaviour (Hanks, 2008:130). As such they provide a direct access to the real occurrences of the lexical items.

The issue of substitution has been addressed in distributional theory to language proposed by the American linguist Zellig Harris. The distributional hypothesis claims that "if we consider words or morphemes A and B to be more different in meaning than A and C, then we will often find that the distributions of A and B are more different than the distributions of A and C. In other words: difference of meaning correlates with difference of distribution" (Harris, 1970: 786). A distribution of an element is defined as all textual environments in which it occurs (Harris, 1952). As we can see, this thesis is almost identical to the aforementioned Waisman's sentence. Both authors claim that the lexical items that have same distributions would be semantically similar. According to Harris (ibid), the linguistic items

we focus on the first form we can also say that it may occur either in a subject or object position, that it co-occurs with a verb and that it can be modified by an adjective. But, this is true for more or less all nouns not only in English but in all languages. If we want to provide a profile of this word we need to describe all language games in which it is used. Thus, looking at how this word is used in my corpus I find that it is mostly used in an object position. In the subject position we find an *animate subject* if we talk about fear that someone *overcomes*. If, on the other hand, it is heightened than in the subject position we have items concerned with *events or occasions*. In addition, we usually talk either about *intense* fear, *irrational* or *rational* fear. These italicized words are the names of the classes of words that create a typical context for 'fear'. The individual members of these classes are represented below.

<OVERCOME> = 'overcome', 'calm', 'allay', 'assuage', 'ease', 'dispel', 'alleviate', 'conquer';

<HEIGHTEN> = 'heighten', 'instil', 'fuel', 'spark', 'struck';

<INTENSE> = 'intense', 'nagging', 'terrible', 'widespread', 'constant'

<IRRATIONAL> = 'groundless', 'unfounded', 'groundless', 'superstitious', 'irrational';

<REAL> = 'well-founded', 'genuine', 'real', 'understandable', 'legitimate'.

Finally, in the same context as 'fear' we also find the nouns 'concern' 'anxiety' and 'worry'.

Now, we can use the name of these classes and represent the local grammar of these words in the following way:

<ANIMATE> ^ <OVERCOME> ^
[<INTENSE>|<IRRATIONAL>|<REAL>] ^
'fear|concern|anxiety|worry'

<EVENT> ^ <HEIGHTEN>
[<INTENSE>|<IRRATIONAL>|<REAL>] ^
'fear|concern|anxiety|worry'

The caret symbol indicates that a given category is followed by the next one. The names of the classes are written in capital letters and enclosed between more than and less than symbols. Square brackets indicate that the classes are optional in a given language game and the vertical bar indicates alternation.

Conclusion

In this paper I demonstrated how Wittgenstein's theory of language in use can be operationalized in a form of an approach to the study of local grammars of linguistic units. By combining this theory with the distributional approach I have shown that we could arrive at the "method of analysis [which] is based only on the occurrences of the words, and not on conceptions of their meanings or any other considerations contributed by the analyst" (Harris, 1988).

The local grammar categories can be produced by observing the occurrences of the items in corpus for the whole of language. In addition to focusing on singular words one could also select as the point of departure a specific class of words. The local grammars approach does not need to be limited to the study of words but can be applied to the description of sentences, discourses or whole genres and even other semiotic resources that also have their own grammar. For example, Bambrook (2002)

demonstrated that the definition sentences from dictionaries also have own local grammar. Although my primary interest is a linguistics study of language there is no reason why the same approach would not be used in the study of local grammars from a more theoretical view.

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Mind Embedded or Extended?

The tension in the Theory of the Situated Mind

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Abstract

The Situated Mind is a new direction in the philosophy of mind. Sometimes it is perceived as a revolution in the field or even a paradigm change. Philosophers working on this new perspective are trying to create a unified and fruitful interdisciplinary project which is aimed at shedding a new light on the problems of cognition. Even if possible this task cannot be easy. The Situated Mind is composed of at least three descriptions which could hardly be thought to present unified picture of the mind: the Embodied Mind, the Extended Mind and the Embedded Mind. They reveal the tension within the project which weakens its integrity. In the paper I will point out the solution to this tension which could be found in a broad form of the Embedded Mind supported by Extended Functionalism. This position should not, however, be confused with the Extended Mind. Eventually, I agree with Rupert and Rowlands that the Mind Embedded is enough and the Mind Extended is going too far.

1. Computer or The Dance – how to understand the mind?

In the early 20th century, the development of cognitive science raised hopes for a justified, scientific depiction of the mind which was metaphorically called Mind as a Computer. The mind was perceived as a program operating within the hardware, that is a brain. This program, however, could exist in various physical forms independently of particular hardware. This depiction of the mind strongly influenced the debate on cognition in the 20th century. However, in of its second half the critical voices have started to be voiced. Critics objected to the idea that the human mind could be captured in a series of problem-solving steps such as those found in the computer program. They proposed a new metaphor – mind as a dance between the brain, non-neural body resources and environmental structures. Hardware is no longer identified with the brain, but extended to other parts of human body or even to the objects and processes beyond the body (Rupert 2004, pp.1-3). The main goal of the new vision of mind, called Situated Cognition, is to explain how the brain, body and environment work together to produce intelligent behavior.

Situated Cognition is not a unified position. It is composed of two main strands of thought which are potentially in tension. One – the Embodied Mind – depicts the body as a major constraint to the nature of an organism's mind. For the other – the Extended Mind – cognitive processes could extend beyond the cognizer's body, though the body is only one partner in the dance between body, brain and environment. Both theses agree that mental processes are constituted partly by sensorimotor knowledge and by an organism's ability to act properly on environment. There are many similarities which encourage regarding these theses as distinct aspects of the same depiction of the mind. Nevertheless, divergences between the Embodied Mind and the Extended Mind are deeper than it is often thought.

2. Embodied Mind versus Extended Mind – how to understand functionalism?

The basic assumption of Embodied Cognition is that humans' subjective experience of their bodies in action provides an important part of the grounding for language and thought. Human language emerges from recurring patterns

of embodied activity that constrain intelligent behavior. Cognition could be properly explained only by describing the ways in which language and other cognitive processes are shaped by embodied action (Shapiro 2011, p.4, Gibbs 2005, p.9). To justify these theses, proponents of Embodied Cognition point to empirical work in cognitive and developmental psychology or psycholinguistics. New developments in these disciplines illustrate how focusing on embodied experience leads to a richer depiction of human cognition.

The Embodied Mind seems to be inconsistent with functionalism based on the multiple realizability thesis. It posits that the human mind can be realized not only by the human brain but also by many other kinds of things. Mind and brain are connected rather loosely and the body has little impact on the nature of the mind. Proponents of the Embodied Mind contradict this view by demonstrating empirically that bodies are more integrated with minds that it is often acknowledged. Some of them even claim that the human mind is integrated with the human body to such an extent that it may invalidate the very distinction between them, hence functionalism in its standard form has to be abandoned (Shapiro 2000).

The Extended Mind thesis is more compatible with functionalism, though its proponents interpret it in somewhat differently from the way it was done in the computational model. In short, Extended Mind states that some mental processes are extended into cognizer's environment. It means that they are hybrid – composed partly of internal operations and partly of manipulative, exploitative and transformative operations performed by a subject on environmental structures (Rowlands 2009). The Extended Mind is often understood as an ontological thesis showing that the mind exists partly beyond the body of the subject. The famous argument in favor of this position is given by Andy Clark and David Chalmers in *The Extended Mind* (Clark, Chalmers 1998). The argument is called The Parity Principle and it indicates that if a part of the word functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then part of the word is part of the cognitive process. Clark understands this principle as the next step in the development of the functionalist theory of mind. As long as a process has a cognitive function and is integrated with other cognitive processes, it is a part of the cognitive system not matter where it is located. Consequences of this claim are so revolutionary, as far as the concept of mind,

belief, subject and self are concerned, that many proponents of Situated Cognition are not willing to accept them. This ontological claim carries epistemological implications, they are however not part of the Extended Mind itself for they are consistent with another more moderate position – the Embedded Mind.

The Embedded Mind thesis does not claim that external operations on environmental structure constitute cognitive processes. Its proponents argue for a weaker thesis of dependence between cognitive operations and the environment. Namely, the Embedded Mind states, that some mental processes function only in tandem with certain environmental structures so that they belong and are essentially dependant on the wider system that facilitates the operations of these processes. This wide integrated system is cognitive, nevertheless, its external elements are not parts of the mind or cognitive processes as such.

3. Embedded Mind – extended functional cognitive system

Dependently on how the cognitive system is understood, the Embedded Mind can be expressed narrowly or broadly. The narrow thesis is proposed by Robert Rupert who states that cognitive processes depend, in a deep and complex way, on the organism's use of the external resources but they are not literally extended into the environment (Rupert 2009, pp. 5-7). The Embedded Mind harmonizes with the Embodied Thesis, for if cognition depends on exploitation of external resources the structure of the human body is explanatorily relevant. On the other hand, it could be fruitfully composed with functionalism into a unified depiction of the mind – Extended Functionalism. Supporters of this standpoint - Richard Menary, Robert Wilson, Mark Rowlands among others - argue in favor of a hybrid science of cognition which would analyze the broad functional system that includes bodily internal and external processes complementing one another in completing cognitive tasks. Within Extended Functionalism, cognitive process are still discriminated by their functional profile, the difference being that this profile belongs not to the neural system alone but to the wide embodied cognitive system embedded in the world. Many proponents of the Embodied Mind disagree with Extended Functionalism claiming that by underestimating the role of the body it repeats the old functionalist mistake in the new, extended setting. Functionalists agree that bodily details determine the subjective conscious experience but not cognition considered more generally as a realization of an abstract algorithm. The body should be depicted as an element which plays a complex functional role in a wide cognitive system. According to such a view, two systems are mentally identical if their neural, bodily and environmental resources are balanced in the same way. The body plays a crucial role in determining this balance, but there is no reason to think that mental sameness requires bodily sameness (Clark 2008). Contrary to standard *chauvinistic* functionalism, proponents of its extended version argue in favor of a more liberal form of the same, one that does not privilege human-specific inner but is locationally uncommitted.

Extended Functionalism is also known as Wide Computationism (Wilson 2004). It posits, that at least a part of the computational system that drives cognition extends beyond the organism. A human subject is embedded in an information-rich and complex environment, hence computations that occur in his brain are not exhaustive of his cognitive system, but they extend beyond the organism and involve relations between him and his environment.

The mind-world computational system itself, and not just its inside-the-head part, is genuinely cognitive (Wilson 2004, p. 167). The unit of cognition is a broad cognitive system and not exclusive to human organism, which makes it tempting to think of the mind as literally extended beyond the organism into the world. This line of thought could nevertheless be misleading.

4. Why is the mind not extended?

There are proponents of the Situated Mind who argue that the Extended Mind is unnecessarily extravagant and undermotivated (Rupert 2009, p.8). Human cognitive processes are embedded in the environment which means they are composed of brain activity, acquired or innate bodily dispositions and environmental feedback. Nonetheless, this does not make them extended. The most controversial thesis of Extended Mind states that some beliefs are literally located beyond the organism. Critics point out, however, that even proponents of the Extended Mind themselves admit that internal processes are privileged, for in order to be a belief, information has to have been consciously endorsed at some point in the past (Clark, Chalmers 1998, p. 17). This criterion undercuts the motivation of the Extended Mind which it to deny the special status assigned to the boundary between body and the world. If, however, extended belief requires conscious endorsement, the traditional subject is still privileged and this concept of mental processes fits better into the explanatory framework of the Embedded Mind. Given the costs to intuition, there is no reason to view external resources as parts of mind rather than just as useful tools (Rupert 2004). Proponents of Extended Mind characterize memory as a conglomeration of both internal and external stores, where internal memory is strictly limited and supplemented by external resources. Nevertheless, there are contexts – Rupert points to conversation - where external resources are useless and internal storage irreplaceable (Rupert 2004, p. 26). Hence, it seems that we should distinguish two different explanatory kinds: internal memory and external resources used as memory aids, but there is no reason to view these aids as constitutive part of cognitive processes. Clark and Chalmers (1994) tried to avoid this complexity, however, it could shed light on the reasons for differences in the way internal and external stores are accessed and used.

Proponents of the Extended Mind should justify the thesis that external systems are cognitive and demonstrate how it could be understood, for it is not at all obvious. Although the broad form of the Embedded Mind accepts the existence of extended cognitive systems, it does not agree with the conclusion that the external parts of this system could themselves constitute cognitive processes such as beliefs. Much of the empirical research to which advocates of Extended Mind refer is motivated by the interest in the environmental influence on human cognitive processing. This interest, however, is shared by many proponents of the Situated Mind. Adopting the Extended Mind could have negative consequences as well. Insistence on the extended view may distract researchers' attention from the asymmetric relation between organismic parts of the extended cognitive system and its extended parts (Rupert 2009, p. 105-107). The Embedded Mind, in contrast, motivates researchers to focus on these differences in analyzing the interface between the organism and its environment. However, should we adopt this latter line of thought, we would conclude that the revolution promised by some situated theorists, has never taken place.

The Embedded Mind together with Extended Functionalism make up a standpoint which preserves effective explanatory concepts of traditional cognitive science. It is unreasonable to give up such fruitful and unified framework under which so many psychological phenomena are explained. On the other hand, the narrow computational picture of the mind has to be modified in a situated manner. The best depiction of Situated Mind presents the broad form of Embedded Mind which skillfully composes the Embodied Mind with the Extended Functionalism. This position views mind as a part of a wide computational cognitive system which integrates internal cognitive processes with bodily manipulations of external vehicles of cognition. These external stores are indispensable; in many cases they determine and shape cognitive processes in an essential way. Nevertheless, the external cognitive system is not a part of the mind, the mind is a part of the extended cognitive system.

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Lost in transcription: Language between speaking and writing

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to substantiate the thesis that contemporary linguistic philosophy has not been consistent enough in researching the relations between language, speech and writing. Speech and writing are two distinct ways of representing knowledge, they also encourage a different organisation of the cognitive processes. The problems of the relationship between written and spoken word are of particular concern to philosophy in the light of recent studies conducted under the theory of literacy. Finally the paper poses the question about the sources of philosophy's indifference towards the problem of writing and literacy.

1. Introduction

In the late 1960s, when the ideas of Kuhn and Feyerabend were under intensive scrutiny, Margaret Masterman decided to take a closer look at the way that Kuhn had used the term "paradigm". Based on a meticulous analysis of the text of *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Margaret Masterman (Masterman 1970) demonstrated that Kuhn had used the word "paradigm" in at least twenty one distinct meanings. She then proceeded to argue that much of the difficulty with Tomas Kuhn's relativist theory of science originates from his multifarious use of that particular term. Masterman's analysis has been broadly discussed and often quoted by philosophers of science, mostly, however, in a somewhat anecdotic form. What is often overlooked is the fact that M. Masterman's work would not have been possible, had she not had at her disposal a whole arsenal of written tools and practices. Without the same, her task would not just have been more difficult, in a culture utterly deprived of writing technologies, her work would have been downright unthinkable. The case of Margaret Masterman shows that certain cognitive tasks are only possible as far as proper communication technologies are employed in their performance. In this sense, Masterman's deliberations are instructive for philosophers of science as well as philosophers and theoreticians of communication. However, the problems of writing and literacy practices, with a few notable exceptions, lie outside the scope of mainstream research in the philosophy and history of science (Chemla 2009).

2. Writing: philosophy's blind spot

Philosophers are usually unaware of questions concerning the relationship between speech, writing, language and cognition. They tacitly assume that writing is but a regular tool of language representation and considering writing as such does not carry any significant philosophical implications. The absence of issues related to writing in contemporary philosophy is even more perplexing given the fact that it was language that 20th c. philosophy turned to in its accounts of what the mind is and how it works.

The linguistic turn in philosophy means relinquishing mentalist vocabulary in favour of explanations depicting thought in terms of linguistic activity. Since the early 20th century, researchers in various fields of humanities have highlighted the fact that language is neither a transparent vehicle for knowledge nor a neutral instrument of its generation. At the very root of the linguistic turn lies the general conviction that the medium of cognition and communication exerts significant influence on the cognitive process

as such. It seems, however, that linguistic philosophy have failed to derive the ultimate consequence from this line of thought. Generally speaking, various vehicles of meaning (media) lie outside the scope of interest of linguistic philosophers. In particular, the cognitive significance of writing and literacy remains highly underappreciated, despite the fact that most philosophical work actually takes place on paper.

Even pragmatically oriented contemporary philosophers of language, who are particularly invested in the study of the relationship between cognition and systems of symbolic representation, seem to consistently steer clear of the problems of literacy. For instance, the questions of writing and literacy are virtually absent in the works of Andy Clark (Theiner 2011:159–160). Interestingly, writing as a cognitive artefact and literacy as a cultural competence both play key roles in the conceptual experiment constructed by Clark and Chalmers (1998), whose aim was to express the basic intuitions which constitute the backdrop for the idea of the extended mind. On the other hand, the concept of literacy does not even appear in *Supersizing the Mind*, one of Clark's works developing the ideas put forward in his 1998 article. In the same work, writing understood as either process or product is mentioned almost exclusively as a mere illustration (Clark 2008:126, 127, 159, 225). Writing and literacy also seem to be absent from the deliberations of Daniel Dennett (1996) which pertain to the linguistic aspects of cognition, even though he does highlight the fact that "it's important to remember that speaking and writing are two entirely distinct innovations (...) and that each has its own distinct set of powers. We tend to run the two phenomena together, especially when theorizing about the brain or mind" (Dennett 1996:147). And yet, despite this critical self-awareness, what follows is a description of the cognitive functions of language, which accentuates its analytical powers and its distancing qualities, but fails to account for the distinction between speaking and writing and seems more an analysis of the cognitive consequences of literacy, rather than those of the spoken word (Dennett 1996:147–153).

And Dennett is not alone in doing so. Cognitive science and classic epistemology clearly tend to depict mental processes in the categories of a certain language of thought. It is intriguing, however, that on the one hand the language of thought is understood as a particular form of internal speech, while on the other it turns out that thinking is far more equivalent to writing and rewriting graphic symbols. The works of Jerry Fodor and Alan Turing clearly reflect the tensions between these two ways of interpreting the mind.

According to Jerry Fodor, thinking and cognition are carried out by series of transformations of internal mental representations, taking place in accordance with clearly specified principles. In this depiction, the mind is in a way reminiscent of a computer programme computing and transforming symbols. Fodor's conception has received strong criticism both in terms of its theoretical and empirical dimensions. It is apparent that Fodor's metaphor offers no explanation to the question how formal language is capable of carrying meaning (Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Johnson 2008). Moreover, if thinking is primarily a transformation of symbols in the mind, the most pressing question would be what abstract principles are in place to control such transformations. Should we additionally assume that the material vehicle for the language of thought is of no significance, the relationship between the mind, the body and the outside world would altogether cease to matter. The only question of importance is what processes take place within the isolated and individual subject. The conclusion is particularly severe if we tacitly assume that the language of thought is a form of silent speech, a private conversation that the mind holds with itself. In other words, if the language of thought is understood as internal speech, then we completely lose sight of the interaction between the mind and the outside environment. The language of thought may, however, be interpreted in the categories of the written word, as writing, rewriting and transforming graphic symbols. It is rarely emphasized that the metaphor of writing used to represent thinking is more compatible with the description of the mind proposed by Fodor. After all, the language of thought is much like a computer programme or the formal language of logic, both of which were first formulated on paper and continue to this day to exist primarily as graphic transcriptions.

Edwin Hutchins (Hutchins 1995) commented on the literary metaphors present in the works of A. Turing. The concept of artificial intelligence is based on an introspective observation of the way a mathematician's mind operates. The individualistic and internalistic programme of artificial intelligence became the focus of attacks by pragmatists and externalists. What the critics failed to notice, however, was the fact that at the very basis of the artificial intelligence concept lies the depiction of the process of mathematical demonstration, which in turn is based on written practices. Hutchins argues that Turing refers to the image of a person writing down and reading mathematical formulas, rather than a person completely isolated from its milieu. Evidently, the interaction between the man, the environment and cognitive instruments is the very foundation of the classical, computational theory of the mind. The subject, as described by Turing, does not perform symbolic transformations exclusively in his head. As argued by Hutchins (1995), what actually lies at the source of the computational concept of the mind is the model of the socio-cultural system; i.e. a literate person, equipped with the necessary tools and practices to write, rewrite and transform symbols in the outside world. Such a literate mind must come into complex visual and manual interactions with the external environment. In order to see that, however, one must first appreciate the gravity of the distinction between the spoken and the written language.

3. Literacy theory: How writing restructures thought?

Most of philosophical work silently assumes that the medium as such, writing particularly, is a factor of no significance to the cognitive process. Research carried out under the heading "literacy theory" (also known as the To-

ronto School) has been able to convincingly question this assumption. Detailed studies conducted by researchers such as Eric Havelock, Jack Goody, Walter J. Ong, and David R. Olson, and pertaining to discrepancies in terms of the way in which oral and literate minds function, provide plentiful material to challenge the commonsense belief that a written message simply constitutes an exact copy of a spoken utterance. Numerous analyses performed by literacy theorists corroborate the thesis that writing is not merely a convenient representation and transcription of a spoken message. While it facilitates certain forms of symbolic operations, the process of transcription can also hinder others, thus significantly altering not only the cognitive acts of cognizing subject (increasing his memory load, facilitating exchange of ideas etc.), but also modifying the very tasks faced by actors engaged in it in order to make it easier to accomplish the task (Norman 1991). The thesis constitutes an exemplification of a more general proposition that in the process of re-description of representation (transcription) what is changed is not merely the material vehicle of the message (the medium) but also its actual content and the nature of cognitive processes engaged in by the individuals. Intensive research is currently under way within the literacy theory into the conceptual and cognitive consequences of media of communication and the cognitive practices correlated with the same.

4. What is lost in transcription?

It is worth to consider one telling example. David Olson's (Olson 1994) deliberations on decontextualisation of written communication provide characteristics of its cognitive consequences. It shows that writing, being a material vehicle for communication, brings along both restraints and opportunities for cognition therefore contributes to crucial reconfigurations in human cognitive faculties.

According to John Austin's speech acts theory any language statement carries, alongside its literal meaning (the locutive aspect), and specific communicational intention of the sender (illocutive force). The same sentence uttered in a different situation will have the same literal meaning (locutive) but may also carry varying illocutive force. It may after all serve as simple information, a warning, a piece of advice etc. (Austin 1975). Olson claims that in the context of oral communication, it is relatively easy to recognize the illocutive force of an utterance as every sentence always operates within a broader, nonverbal context. It is that context that allows us to determine the illocutive force to be attributed to a given statement. Writing is very effective in transmitting the locutive aspect of a statement, but it also separates the utterance from its living context. As a consequence, the literal transcription of a spoken utterance will not carry its original illocutive force. Writing a spoken statement down is enough to blur its illocutive force (Olson 1994:266). The lack of a dynamic situational context and nonverbal semantic cues necessitates additional specification of a written sentence's meaning to ensure its proper interpretation. In oral communication, the illocutive force of an utterance is attributed and read intuitively. On the other hand, having resorted to writing induces the participants of communication to translate the nonverbal context of an oral utterance with the use of a more or less accurate terminology. Illocutive force of oral utterances disappearing in the act of transcription produced a need for various cultural practices aimed at accurate reconstruction of complex, paralinguistic contexts of oral communication. This in turn leads to the creation of a sophisticated metacognitive vocabulary designed to describe the intentional states of individuals (Olson 1994). Moreover literacy can foster

metalinguistic awareness as well. For example, Olson (Olson 2013) demonstrated that illiterate adults and young children display similar levels of phonological awareness. Studies showed that the word awareness of early literate children (4 to 6 years old) depends on their attempts to develop connections between written and spoken language (Homer and Olson 1999). In general, recent research suggests that literacy contribute to general meta-cognitive and metalinguistic changes (Homer and Olson 1999; Ungureanu 2013). These changes can be observed on the cultural, social as well as on the individual levels.

5. Final questions

In 1982, one of the founders of the theory of literacy asked the following question: "Philosophical thinking cannot be carried on by the unaided human mind but only by the human mind that has familiarized itself with and deeply interiorized the technology of writing (...) What does this precisely intellectual need for technology have to say about the relationship of consciousness to the external universe?" (Ong 2002, 170). The question has yet to find an answer.

Despite the fact that language is a pivotal element in the deliberations of contemporary philosophers, philosophy consistently fails to account for the significant differences between the spoken and written language. Although there is reliable evidence indicating close interrelations between speaking, writing and thinking, philosophy seems bent on ignoring it. What is the theoretical source of this philosophical blindness to writing (as well as other media of communication)? Is it due to the specifics of philosophical problems? Or rather, can the blame be placed with certain deeply rooted assumptions concerning the relationship between language and its material vehicle?

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Bilateralism and the Acquisition challenge

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Abstract

Bilateralism defends classical logic against Michael Dummett's challenge which stems from considerations about the acquisition of language. The defence is based on an advantageous application over intuitionism. Ian Rumfitt argues that bilateral classical logic yields a better understanding of historical discourse than intuitionism. This advantage motivates the key element of bilateralism, an independent rejection. In this paper, it is shown that this advantage turns out to be illusory.

1. Introduction

In Michael Dummett's view, the meaning of language is based on use which is explicated by the rules of language. The rules are restricted by an acquisition constraint: Language is learnable only if its use is faithful to the previous use, i.e. the current rules are faithful to the previous rules. The idea behind the constraint is simple. How can we learn language if the rules of use change arbitrarily. That is, how can we learn language if it is *not* governed by the acquisition constraint? Let us call this question an acquisition challenge. (See details in Dummett 1991, 215-244.)

One of the key features of semantic realism is commitment to classical logic (classicism) while Dummettian anti-realist confines to intuitionism. Dummett's idea is that the classical rules for negation do not satisfy the acquisition constraint. They do not keep faith with the previous use (more in Section 2). Bilateralism promises a novel defence for classicism. Unilateralism holds that the meaning of a connective is based on the assertion conditions of the sentence containing the connective. In contrast, bilateralism is based on the assumption that the meaning of logical connective is based not only on assertion conditions but also on rejection conditions. The difference between unilateralism and bilateralism is that bilateralism introduces a rejection which is independent of assertion. Unilateralism sees rejection of A as an assertion of $\neg A$. Bilateralism, on the other hand, introduces an independent notion of rejection and, furthermore, the assertion of $\neg A$ is justified only if there is evidence for the rejection of A.

I evaluate Ian Rumfitt's bilateralism. Rumfitt argues that bilateralism offers an advantageous application over intuitionism. This advantage motivates the key element of bilateralism, the independent rejection. However in this paper, it is shown that this advantage turns out to be illusory.

2. Unilateralism, bilateralism and harmony

Rumfitt shares Dummett's inferentialist view that the *use* of the connectives should explain their meaning. According to unilateralism, the sense of a sentence is determined by its assertoric use. (Rumfitt 2000, 785-796.) If we look at the debate between classical logic (CL) and intuitionistic logic (IL, respectively) in unilateral terms, intuitionism has the upper hand. The sense of the sentential connective is laid down by giving the introduction and the elimination rules that *govern the use* of the connective. These rules should satisfy the harmony constraint defined as

HARMONY: any consequence derived from statement containing C as a principal connective using C's elimination rule would already appear in a direct derivation of the premise from which the statement is de-

rived by C's introduction rule or can be derived directly from this premise without using the rules for C.

The introduction and the elimination rules can be seen as ways of packing and unpacking information. The elimination rules just unpack the evidence that was packed in with introduction rule. (e.g. Rumfitt 2000, 789.) HARMONY stems from the intuitive view that deductive reasoning only manipulates information already at hands. Furthermore, in the present context HARMONY is equated with the acquisition constraint. If the elimination rule is not harmonious with the introduction rule then it does not keep faith with the previous use (see Dummett 215-220 and Wright 1981, 58-60). Intuitionistic unilateralism satisfies HARMONY but unilateral CL does not.

The standard introduction rule for classical negation, and for intuitionistic negation too, is *reductio ad absurdum*:

RAA: from $X, A \vdash \perp$ infer $\neg A$.

After this, classicism and intuitionism go separate ways. The classical elimination rule is double negation elimination:

CNE: from $\neg\neg A$ infer A

while the intuitionistic elimination rule is

INE: from A and $\neg A$ infer \perp .

Only INE is harmonious. It unpacks only what the introduction rule packed in. The classical negation, on the other hand, looks anomalous. The elimination rule unpacks more than the introduction rule packed in. According to the introduction rule, $\neg A$ may be asserted iff A leads to inconsistency. So an assertion that $\neg\neg A$, contains (according to RAA) the evidence that it is consistent to assert A. However, the evidence for the consistency of A is not yet a proof for A. But that is what CNE suggests. Thus, CL is not harmonious.

Rumfitt proposes to fill this jump in CL with bilateralism. If rejections are considered to be independent and equal to assertions, then we can lay down the introduction and the elimination rules of connectives of assertions *and* rejections so that the crucial classical rules, such as CNE, are validated. Let "+A" stand for "Is it the case that A? Yes.", i.e. for assertion of A and let " $\neg A$ " stand for "Is it the case that A? No.", i.e. for rejection of A, then the bilateral rules for negation can be laid down as

$$\begin{array}{ll} +\neg\text{I}: \neg A \vdash +(\neg A) & +\neg\text{E}: +(\neg A) \vdash \neg A \\ \neg\neg\text{I}: +A \vdash \neg(\neg A) & \neg\neg\text{E}: \neg(\neg A) \vdash +A. \end{array}$$

From these rules the classical negation can be derived in a harmonious way. Given the assertoric elimination rule $\vdash\vdash\vdash$ -E, by substituting $\neg A$ with $\vdash\vdash\vdash\neg A$ we get

$$+(\vdash\vdash\vdash\neg A) \vdash \vdash\vdash\vdash\neg(\neg A)$$

and $\vdash\vdash\vdash$ -E yields

$$\vdash\vdash\vdash\neg(\neg A) \vdash +A.$$


From these we get

$$+(\vdash\vdash\vdash\neg A) \vdash +A$$

which is CNE. The idea is that bilateral system is symmetrical. It functions like “a toggle switch” swinging back and forth the two opposite poles of assertion and rejection. This again is important in obtaining the bivalent nature of classical logic. The crucial element in obtaining symmetry is that the sign “ \vdash ” should not be confused with a negation sign “ \neg ”. The negation can be iterated: “ $\neg A$ ”, “ $\vdash\vdash\vdash\neg A$ ”... In contrast, the rejection sign cannot be iterated. Rumfitt says that “Is it the case that is it the case that two is a prime number? No? No.” is just gibberish. (Rumfitt 2000, 802-803.)

3. The bilateral justification depends on $\vdash\vdash\vdash$ -I

In short, intuitionism accepts $\vdash\vdash\vdash$ -E which says $+(\neg A) \vdash \neg A$. This is more precise expression of the claim that intuitionism views the rejection of A as the assertion of $\neg A$. But the bilateralist thinks that the relationship between $+(\neg A)$ and $\neg A$ is interdeducibility $+(\neg A) \vdash \vdash\vdash\vdash\neg A$ which can be obtained by adding the right-to-left reading to the relation. This is done with $\vdash\vdash\vdash$ -I which says that $\neg A \vdash +(\neg A)$. So the pressure really is on the assertoric introduction rule of the bilateral system which expresses the independent rejection. For *if* this rule is justified, then the assertoric elimination rule only has to satisfy the harmony constraint and in our case it does. And *if* the assertoric introduction rule is justified, then given the fact that the rejective sign cannot be iterated, the rejective introduction rule is obvious. This is based on the previous linguistic intuition. Graphically, the situation is this:



Here the arrows point the justification and the brackets show the basis of the justification. The picture highlights the problem: Every arrow originates *from* $\vdash\vdash\vdash$ -I but there is no arrow *to* $\vdash\vdash\vdash$ -I. So the whole justification of the bilateral system depends on the justification of $\vdash\vdash\vdash$ -I, i.e. “finding” an arrow to $\vdash\vdash\vdash$ -I. Needless to say, Rumfitt’s own account is much more thorough and detailed; but due to lack of space, these details have to be omitted. Furthermore, the facts are the same even after the details have filled in. As Rumfitt says, if someone already doubts classical rules for negation then the details might just reinforce her doubts (rumfitt 2000, 816). That is why the justification for $\vdash\vdash\vdash$ -I is still needed.

4. Justification of bilateralism: historical discourse

According to Rumfitt, some discourses are better to be understood in an unilateral manner and some are more suitable for bilateral understanding. Rumfitt takes an example of the historical discourse. Past reality is thought as one of the prime examples in which Dummettian anti-realism has a strong hold. But contrary to Dummett’s thought, Rumfitt proposes a bilateral treatment of historical discourse. (Rumfitt 2000, 817-818.) He takes an example

Elisabeth I was bald when she died

and makes the assumption that all the evidence concerning the historical figure Elisabeth I has been carefully collected and destroyed. Rumfitt thinks that this is a strong case for bilateralism because unilateral IL gives a rather odd result. Because the intuitionist accepts $+(\neg A) \vdash \neg A$, the intuitionist can assert $\neg A$ just in the case there is evidence that A cannot ever be asserted and this is just the case concerning Elisabeth. It is known that all the evidence has been destroyed. So it is known that A cannot be proven. Hence intuitionist can assert $\neg A$ and this is the oddity. The right answer should be that the sentence cannot be asserted nor its negation.

Bilateralism can accommodate this. Because bilateral system contains the interdeducibility rule $+(\neg A) \vdash \vdash\vdash\vdash\neg A$, bilateralism has to be able to secure also the right-to-left reading. But as the additional assumption says there is no evidence for the rejection of A which means that right-to-left reading does not hold. Therefore, the bilateralist is not in a position to assert $\neg A$. This is Rumfitt’s justification for the independence of rejection. With the rule $\neg A \vdash +(\neg A)$, the bilateralist can avoid the oddity which the intuitionist faces. Earlier we saw that the whole justification of bilateral system depends on the assertoric introduction and now we have strong incentive to accept the assertoric introduction rule. The virtue is that bilateralism respects Dummett’s insight that sometimes bivalence fails.

5. Dummett’s Response

Dummett does not accept that it is known that there can never be evidence for the baldness of Elisabeth. He says:

“What view of the matter should be taken by a determined anti-realist about the past [...]? He may well concede that we shall probably never be in a position to assert or deny the sentence: but he will not claim to know that grounds for one or the other can never come to light. The possibility [...] remains open that such grounds may be discovered; and so he [...] will not take himself to be justified in asserting the negation of the sentence.” (Dummett 2002, 292.)

Rumfitt’s idea is that the matter of evidence is at some point closed, if no evidence appears. Dummettian historian, on the other hand, keeps on looking for evidence either to assert A or to assert $\neg A$. As Crispin Wright notes, undecidables do not come with a four minute warning (Wright 1981, 51). By “n minute warning”, he means that after n minutes (or years) of investigation, it can be ruled that there is no evidence for or against A. Now, I think that the crucial question here is that at what point Rumfittian historian should decide that there is no evidence for or against some fact. It seems odd that there is a time limit for a historical investigation or for a scientific investigation in general. So the intuitionist is not entitled to assert $\neg A$ either. Thus, unilateral intuitionism and bilateralism amounts

to the same. If this is correct, then the advantage of bilateralism disappears and this means that the justification for the interdeducibility between $\neg A$ and $+(\neg A)$ also disappears.

6. Bilateralism disarmed: CL and bivalence

The fact that unilateral intuitionism and bilateralism amounts to the same creates another problem for Rumfitt and I think that this is a decisive problem. The central feature of CL is bivalence. But Rumfitt's intended strategy is to make no appeal to bivalence in his defence for CL. (Rumfitt 2000, 791 and 2002, 308-309).

The resistance to appeal to bivalence, of course, makes Rumfitt's project more ambitious but, at the same time, it is also a weakness. Let us now follow Dummett and call bivalence accepted by the anti-realist *expressive* bivalence (Dummett 2002, 293). This can also be called constructive bivalence because it is based on constructive notion of truth, i.e. epistemically constrained truth. This means that truth roughly coincides with proof or justified assertion. So when expressive bivalence says that every sentence is true or false, the truth here is epistemically constrained. Following Neil Tennant, we can clarify the relationship between expressive bivalence and decidability. The obvious way to show that (unilateral) bivalence for a discourse D

$$\text{BIV}_D: \forall x(x \text{ is in } D \rightarrow (x \text{ is true} \vee \neg(x \text{ is true})))$$

holds is to show that discourse in question is decidable. Decidability requires that there is an effective method for determining a truth value for any given sentence of the discourse. The decidability claim can be regimented (in unilateral terms) as

$$\text{DEC}_D: \exists \text{ effective method } \mu(\forall x \text{ is in } D \rightarrow$$

$$(\mu(x) = T \rightarrow x \text{ is true} \wedge$$

$$\mu(x) = F \rightarrow \neg(x \text{ is true}))).$$

There exists a valuation $\mu(x)$ for every sentence in D and the range of μ is the set $\{T, F\}$ of values. Thus, the discourse is bivalent. (Tennant 2004, 173-176.) This is what decidability means: we are able to decide which one of the values T or F any given sentence in D has. When the discourse is decidable, there is no difference between CL and IL because the intuitionist too grants that if the discourse is decidable (and, hence, bivalent) then DNE is valid (Tennant 2004, 175). But most of the interesting discourses contain sentences which resist the method of ef-

fectively deciding which one is it. Here the classicist's and the intuitionist's response to undecidability diverge. The intuitionist holds on to the anti-realistic idea that only decidability entails bivalence and the truth predicate in BIV_D has to be construed as epistemically constrained. The classicist, on the other hand, makes a realistic assumption of evidence-transcendent truth. Although the discourse is not decidable, the realist has the confidence that the bivalence holds *across the board*, even to part which is, at the moment, undecidable. The realist does not really need the demonstration of decidability because the evidence-transcendent truth predicate in BIV_D makes bivalence independent of decidability.

But Rumfitt's bivalence is only expressive bivalence. He has not shown that his bilateralism captures the distinctive feature of CL: that bivalence holds across the board. Rumfitt claims two things: "We do need to recognize two ways of judging and to adopt a classical logic for negation" (Rumfitt 2002, 320). But even if both claims are true, Rumfitt has not demonstrated any relation between these claims. His bilateralism entails not classic but intuitionistic understanding of bivalence and, therefore, the range of his bilateral negation is the same as the intuitionists.

The conclusion is that although bilateral negation satisfies HARMONY, and thereby the acquisition constraint, it does so at a high price. Rumfitt's bilateralism understands bivalence in the same way as intuitionism. Thus, this understanding makes bilateralism somewhat redundant because this understanding includes the restriction of DNE only to decidable discourse but this is what the intuitionist has been insisting all along.

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Experience and thought in Wittgenstein and Dewey

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Abstract

It is shown how Dewey's and Wittgenstein's philosophy, through their differences, are able to shed light on one another. This requires a common problem, a shared point of departure. This common point can be found in the philosophical problem of "experience" and its relation to logic and language. On the basis of this commonality, I reconstruct a general temporal logic of thinking which can be found in both Dewey and Wittgenstein. Both, Wittgenstein and Dewey, are concerned with the problem how logic and experience can be *binding* for us, for our actions, for our judgments, for our thinking; and both authors, I claim, resort to a temporal logic of being *prompted* to act and to reflect, in order to account for this binding force. To put it differently: Dewey's and Wittgenstein's philosophy can be seen as a joint, but distinct inquiry into the conditions which allow to transform parts of experience into an *object* of thought at all, and vice versa. This allows a non-anthropological and non-transcendental reading of the logical role of the body, its "training" and its "primitive reactions" in Wittgenstein.

It is not any news that Wittgenstein's late philosophy and classical American Pragmatism (Peirce, James, Dewey) have quite a bit in common. There has been extensive historical research about possible pragmatist influences on Wittgenstein through William James (Goodman 2002); and there has been, of course, the neo-pragmatist revival of pragmatism in the 1980s from philosophers of language like Rorty or Putnam. But despite these attempts at rapprochement, there still remains a sense of difference in the dividing camps. This applies especially for those who are not willing to follow the neo-pragmatist appropriation of classical pragmatism. (Hildebrand 2003)

One of the key concepts of classical pragmatist thinking is "experience": James called his pragmatism "radical empiricism", and one of Dewey's standard accusations against traditional philosophy is that it shies away from the confrontation with experience. Now authors like Rorty, or more recently Brandom, boldly claim that in their brand of pragmatism there is no use for the notion of experience; and they claim Wittgenstein as one of their principal inspirations in that move. Further, this Wittgenstein-inspired pragmatism shares an overly holistic view of language, which stresses the commonly shared structure of language at the expense of the individual's concrete situation. This preference for the collective has led some critics to accuse Wittgenstein and the Wittgenstein-inspired philosophy of an overly conservative attitude, one which systematically emphasizes the need of conformity (think here of "rule following" and "forms of life"). Consequently, theorists like Luc Boltanski (Boltanski 2010) trying to strengthen the role of criticism begin to turn to pragmatism, and especially to Dewey, who explicitly conceives philosophy as a "generalized theory of criticism" (Dewey 1981, 9). So despite all their similarities, the philosophies of Wittgenstein and the classical pragmatists show, in the end, decisive and far-reaching differences.

In this paper, I want to show that this impression is misleading. In a sense, then, I want to continue the work of rapprochement which has been furthered especially by some pragmatists (Pihlström 2012). The idea is to show that Dewey's and Wittgenstein's philosophy, through their differences, are able to shed light on one another. This requires a common problem, a shared point of departure. I believe that this common point can be found in the philosophical problem of "experience". Both, Wittgenstein and Dewey, are concerned with the problem how logic and experience relate to each other. More specifically, the ques-

tion is how logic and experience can be *binding* for us, for our actions, for our judgments, for our thinking.

Both authors express the worry that experience and logic are, somehow, detached from each other. Wittgenstein approaches this question from the side of logic: He is troubled about the possibility that logic and language cannot be put "to use", that thinking remains idle, fruitless, without friction. Dewey's perception of the problem highlights the other side: For him, philosophy should contribute to our understanding of how experience can form our thinking and finally force us to change it. To put it differently: Dewey's and Wittgenstein's philosophy can be seen as a joint, but distinct inquiry into the conditions which allow to transform parts of experience into an *object* of thought at all.

I will proceed in two steps. First, I will prepare the common ground which unites Wittgenstein and Dewey. I will highlight that both authors are concerned with the binding character of thought, and I will also argue that both believe that this problem cannot be resolved on a purely formal level. Rather, they highlight the irreducibly temporal (or, if you want, performative) dimension of thinking. It is something which has to be *done*, and it is due to this condition that we can finally understand how logic and experience are, in their respective ways, binding for us. Secondly, I will apply this insight into the temporal (and experiential) dimension of thinking to Wittgenstein's famous claim that we have to learn the language-game, before we can even try to make sense of what we do. It is argued that his constant reference to "primitive reactions" is not an anthropological grounding of language, but rather a logical condition of thinking. –

I want to begin with the basic term of my investigation, which is "thought" or "thinking". It is a central term in Dewey's pragmatism, who considers "thinking" to be synonymous with the practice of inquiry. The practical scheme of inquiry is well known: According to pragmatism, inquiry begins when we encounter a dubious situation. We are in state of confusion, bewilderment, or just confronted with a contradiction which inhibits further action. Inquiry, or thinking, then sets out to relieve the pressure of doubt. It does so by first trying to identify the logical and factual relations which have led to the present impasse. In this sense, then, Dewey is right to identify the logic of inquiry with "criticism": Reflection, or thinking in this normative sense, serves to identify the wider context which has led up to the present problematic situation. But it is important to keep in mind that thinking remains idle, and that criticism remains dogmatic, as long as it does not interfere with the problematic

situation. So inquiry is bound in two directions: It is bound by the laws of logic, language and the available tools at hand (such as mathematics, or certain similar methods). But it is also bound by the problematic situation, to which the practice of inquiry refers.

The goal of inquiry is to change the situation, to transform it, to intervene. Such an intervention does not have to be an overt bodily movement. It might suffice to gain a new or better understanding, so that the intervention remains, in traditional terms, in the realm of the mind. The important and necessary condition is that the result of inquiry has to have some perceptible *consequences* – be this that we do something or that we are able to lift the veil of confusion due to our better understanding. It is the pragmatist credo, that all acts have to be judged by their consequences – "Ye shall know them by their fruits." (Mt 7:16)

To many readers of Wittgenstein, such a word like "thought" has a strange ring. It is too charged, and it embodies too much tradition in order to be of any use. Or so it seems; for doesn't Wittgenstein ask us in the *Philosophical Investigations* to discard all these high-brow philosophical words or lead them back to their ordinary use? But his own cautionary note does not prevent Wittgenstein from continuously reflecting on what it means to give a rational judgment, which is exactly what Dewey calls thinking. So it is all right to talk about "thinking" as long as we are aware that the expression denotes a *norm* of judgment. The notion of "thought" is very close to what can be called "reflection" in a Wittgensteinian sense: We do not "think" if we bump into a car; the sentence "Hey, there is a car!" is an unreflected judgment. But we do "think" if we are confronted with a problem. And here a further commonality between Dewey and Wittgenstein shows up: Where Dewey states that every inquiry – thinking in the normative sense – begins with a situation of doubt, Wittgenstein claims that philosophy starts when "we don't know our way around" (Wittgenstein 1967, sec. 124).

After these initial remarks, let us proceed to the actual subject: Experience and language. The problem of experience is, at least since Kant, that it does not easily lend itself to conceptualization. Concepts are general and allow us to make inferences in abstraction from lived experience; whereas experience -- at least in the traditional understanding -- is local, particular and not logically structured. This problem is far from being solved, as the ongoing discussions about the possibility of "non-conceptual content" show (Bermúdez 2007). The problem is forced on philosophy all the more by the rise of empirical sciences. Empirical science follows -- schematically speaking -- the conviction that we have to *test* ideas and hypotheses in order to decide about their validity, and that new substantive knowledge is only gained by empirical means. This simple idea gives rise to a deep philosophical confusion: How can we *learn* from experience? How can it bind our thinking? Learning implies a change in our concepts; it implies a transformation of our understanding. How can experience trigger such a change?

There seems to be a substantial dilemma. If we assume an empiricist stance, we can say that experience is our only teacher. But there is a Kantian lesson which is also repeated by Wittgenstein: In order to learn, we have to understand *what* it is that experience tries to convey; there is no such thing as immediately given knowledge of the world. This observation gives rise to an idealist position which seems to deny that there is something to be learned from experience, since its very *form* has to be already established for us. Only then can we understand what it tries to convey.

There are attempts to read Wittgenstein's late philosophy as such a Kantian answer to this question (i.e. McDowell 1994). Especially his notions of "grammar" and "language game" seem to justify such a reading: Doesn't Wittgenstein reject the empiricist idea of ostensive definition by arguing that we already have to know the game which is actually being played? The contact with the world is mediated by our language games and by the grammar of language, which define, according to this reading, the formal conditions of the possibility of an informative empirical contact. It is this reading of Wittgenstein which promotes the widespread impression that for him, experience is not important or only fulfills the passive role of affirming propositional claims (such as in McDowell's "passive empiricism").

I do not think that such an understanding is entirely wrong. But its truth depends on how we construe the exact relation between language, or language games, and experience. Here Dewey's pragmatism makes a strong and valuable point. Dewey's philosophy of experience is not an empiricism in the simple, traditional form which Kant rejects. Dewey's notion of experience is not atomistic, but rather holistic; it is not subjective, but rather objective. In an unfinished draft for a new introduction to "Experience and Nature", Dewey expresses his worries that his notion of experience has been consistently misunderstood, and that he should have used the concept of "culture" instead. Dewey knows and accepts the Kantian critique of traditional empiricism. He stresses that experience, insofar as it is meaningful and significant, is always already mediated by prior training and learning.

Consequently, Dewey claims that the *immediate* experience cannot be *directly* grasped and conceptualized. In order to understand what we experience, we have to relate to it, to reflect upon it. It is this refined and reflected form of experience which, according to Dewey, becomes the object of thought. So inquiry, as Dewey understands it, is better thought of as an attempt to articulate what our primary experience means, what it signifies. We experience something inarticulate, something which we do not understand, and *in turn* reflect upon it. Experience is always mediated, and thinking is a way to consciously control that mediation, to experiment with it.

This Deweyan conception lays tremendous importance on the *temporal* dimension of experience and language. Thinking is not just a passive form, but a temporal process. Language and language games are not just transcendental structures, but products of a collective and individual history. With this result in mind, we can also find temporal aspects in Wittgenstein's later work. Let us turn to *On Certainty* (1969), which is in my eyes his most insightful exploration of these issues. There he famously claims, quoting Goethe, that "in the beginning was the deed" (sec. 396) He talks about the instinctive basis of our language-games, which children acquire by learning "to react in such-and-such-way" (sec. 538) – blindly, so to speak. Wittgenstein wants to regard "man as an animal; as a primitive being to which one grants instinct but not ratiocination." (sec. 475)

I take these remarks, and similar ones which can be found throughout Wittgenstein's work, to be indicating the same relation which Dewey highlights. It does not make sense to talk about a foundation of our language-games, especially if we construe this foundation in epistemic terms. This is the Kantian lesson: Experience can only be understood through concepts, but concepts are a distinctively human product, a contribution from *our* side of the divide. ("The trail of the human serpent is over everything", as James puts it.) If we want to understand how experi-

ence contributes to our more explicit understanding, we have to think in temporal dimensions: Every articulated form of knowledge – i.e., knowledge in its propositional form – is *secondary* with respect to these primary, animal ways of changing the world. This is why Dewey emphasizes that reflection begins with an immediate experience which is not understood; and this is why Wittgenstein highlights the "primitive reactions" of animal life. These immediate happenings are not conceptual, but they form the very beginning of thinking – since thinking, as both Wittgenstein and Dewey agree, begins when we do not know our way around.

For both Wittgenstein and Dewey, thinking and reasoning primarily is a responsive process, not a static form. Both discuss thinking in its temporal form: In the beginning was the deed, and *then* there is reflection, identification, assessment, judgment. These moments of reasoning are consequences of the initial deeds and experiences *on which* we react. It is Kant's error – according to this conception – to conceive of thinking and its form as a static faculty, an error which has been repeated by contemporary Kantians, such as McDowell, who conceive of the formal conditions of experiential understanding as if they were outside of time, as if they did not develop.

In the temporal perspective, we can make perfect sense of one of Wittgenstein's most famous claims – the necessity of "blind" rule-following. Wittgenstein continuously emphasizes that the beginning of the language-game is just "training", a form of reaction, *not* a form of understanding. To take just one example: "I learned an enormous amount and accepted it on human authority, and then I found some things confirmed or disconfirmed by my own experience." (sec. 161) Meredith Williams (Williams 1991) calls this initial training "blind obedience", stressing its a-logical character. We have to be trained and initiated into a *form* of behavior in order to be finally able participate in that practice, as it were, on the level of *content*.

This claim has been often greeted with distrust, since it seems to downgrade human rationality and to undervalue the reflective power of the individual. My proposal is to

place these remarks in a temporal frame. The "blindness" of initiate learning is not the blindness of the irrational, but the blindness of the animal which as of yet has no *reason* to think. "Language did not emerge from some kind of ratiocination ." (sec. 475) The discipline and training – Wittgenstein talks about "dressage" ("Abrichtung") – is an expression of this temporal condition. It does not hold our eyes shut through authority, but rather establishes the logically necessary antecedent to thinking. Only if experience assumes *some* form to begin with can we learn to react on this initial "deed" in reflection. Thinking, as a capacity, is *prompted by experience, and experience is, from a logical point of view, prompted by nothing but the a-rational "deed"*.

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A Rylean Intellectualism: Abandoning the Dualism of Theory and Practice

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Abstract

I make three related claims concerning the recent debate over knowing how. The first is that it is largely terminological. The second is that Gilbert Ryle's *reductio* arguments against the 'Intellectualist' thesis that knowing how is reducible to propositional knowledge frame that thesis within a dualism of theory and practice, or cognition and action; they reveal the incoherence of dualistic accounts of knowledge in general, not the incoherence of Intellectualism. The third is that Intellectualism can do without the dualism of action and cognition.

Introduction

In the last decade or so there has been a resurgence of interest in the nature of practical knowledge, often denominated 'knowing how', and in particular, in the question whether it is or is not a species of propositional knowledge or 'knowing *that*'. I shall make three related claims concerning this debate. The first is that it is largely terminological. The second is that Gilbert Ryle's¹ original *reductio* arguments against the 'Intellectualist' thesis that knowing how is reducible to propositional knowledge frame that thesis within a dualism of theory and practice, or cognition and action; they reveal the incoherence of dualistic accounts of knowledge in general, *not* the incoherence of Intellectualism. The third is that Intellectualism can do without the dualism of action and cognition. To bring this out I will indicate how John Hyman's account of propositional knowledge, which is Rylean in spirit though not in details, might be taken to entail the view that knowing how is a species of propositional knowledge.

1. Preliminaries

Two preliminary points are in order.

First, when Gilbert Ryle argued that propositional knowledge ('knowing that') and practical knowledge ('knowing how') comprise distinct and mutually irreducible categories, his first interest was in intelligence concepts, e.g. shrewdness, acumen and prudence (Ryle 1949, p.16), which he argued belong to the second of these categories, while philosophers under the combined pressures of Platonism and Cartesian dualism have routinely attempted to force them into the first. In this paper I shall *not* be concerned with intelligence concepts or with the question whether intelligence is reducible to propositional knowledge.² My view is that it is not, but that Ryle's equation of intelligence with knowing how is equally mistaken. Intelligence is not knowing how to do anything or how to do things in a particular way. I shall not argue for these points here.³

Second, 'knowledge', like other cognitive attitude terms, has both an "object" and an "act" sense⁴. It may be used to refer to the objects or contents of knowledge, i.e., to what is known, such as that the Battle of Hastings took place in 1066, that water boils at 100 degrees centigrade, or that the bishop in chess moves on his own colour. In its "act" sense, on the other hand, 'knowledge' refers to the state or power of the person who knows these things: to his ("act" of) *knowing*. Accordingly, the suggestion that the construction 'knows how' is typically used to ascribe a distinctive kind of practical knowledge may mean either one of two things. According to the first, the construction is used to ascribe knowledge of a distinctively practical, or non-propositional 'object'; according to the second, it ascribes a distinctively practical grasp of what is known, or a distinctively practical way of *knowing*. The view rejected by neo-Intellectualists is the first⁵; Intellectualists argue that *what one knows* when one knows how to V can be expressed propositionally⁶. The view advanced by Ryle is the second: he insisted on the distinction between, e.g., knowing *that* such-and-such is a rule of chess, and knowing *how* to apply the rule in practice.⁷ As I hope will become clearer in what follows, there is no substantive conflict between the positions.

2. Intellectualism and the Dualism of Theory and Practice

By 'Intellectualism' I shall mean a weaker thesis than was targeted by Ryle. It is the thesis that when a person engages in sophisticated actions or activities (e.g. fishing, dancing waltzes, playing chess) so that we say he knows how to do them, he is employing propositional knowledge. This is shown by the possibility of specifying the content of knowledge how ("object" sense) in propositions. The dualist version of the thesis, which Ryle targeted, maintains that when a person engages in sophisticated actions he is not doing one thing but two things: he is engaging a bit of theoretical knowledge and he is doing something practical, the latter phenomenon being in some way due to, or steered by, the former one (Ryle, e.g. 1945-6, p.1; 1949,

¹ Ryle 1945-6; 1949.

² David Wiggins has argued that there is an irreducibly practical knowledge: knowledge that cannot in principle be specified propositionally. To the extent that the arguments are successful I think they concern varieties of intelligence, e.g. good judgement and practical wisdom. They do not concern knowing how to V. See Wiggins 2012 and 2009 for further discussion.

³ Bengson and Moffett (2012) discuss the problems with Ryle's assimilation of skills and skill, or knowing how to V and knowing how to V intelligently.

⁴ The act/object distinction between uses of cognitive attitude terms was drawn by Aquinas (1953[1475], Q. 17, 1st reply) and his contemporaries, and has currency today in the philosophy of action (see Alvarez 2010, pp. 3, 125 and *passim*).

⁵ This view is nowhere in Ryle's work, but has been defended elsewhere in the literature on practical knowledge. See, e.g. Carr 1981;1979.

⁶ This thesis has been defended in different forms by White 1982, ch 2; Moore 1997, ch.8; Stanley and Williamson 2001, Snowdon 2003, Bengson and Moffett 2012, among others.

⁷ Rumfitt 2003, p.159 and 2011, fn. 2, has attempted to indicate in slightly different terms how Ryle's concerns ran orthogonal to those of his neo-Intellectualist critics.

p.18). The dualism need not take a Cartesian guise: it opposes theory and practice; cognition and action. Cognition is construed as the contemplation or engagement of propositional content (Ryle 1945-6, pp.2-4)⁸, from which practical performances may ensue. But these performances are never direct manifestations of the relevant 'cognitive states'. They are not, e.g., expressions of intention or uses of knowledge, but are posterior effects of engaging the content of intention or knowledge.

Propositional knowledge is, in the picture Ryle is implicitly attacking, having facts registered somewhere accessible to the mind—stored in some mental archive. If knowing how to do things is really propositional knowledge, putting it into practice must mean bringing before the mind the relevant propositions and considering them before or as we act. If we wish to bake a cake, say, we must access the propositional truths about cake-baking and consult them (perhaps lock onto them in unconscious thought)—the mental analogue of pulling a cookery book off the kitchen shelf, finding the right recipe and consulting the instructions.

This form of Intellectualism, Ryle rightly argued, is absurd. But what is absurd is its characterisation of knowledge, not merely its characterisation of knowing *how*.

Consider knowing how first. Ryle observed that any given fact, maxim, or rule which a practical performance may be said to draw upon will: first, not *itself* indicate that it is to be drawn on in the present action or activity, in preference to indefinitely many others one may have at one's disposal—which is to say intelligence is required to draw upon the fact, rule or maxim in question at all (Ryle 1949, p.19); second, it will not indicate how an action which draws on this knowledge is to be performed, or in other words, how the fact, maxim or rule is practically applied even where it pertains to one-pattern procedures (e.g. tying clove-hitches) (Ryle 1945-6, p.8); third, though this may be no more than an expansion of the second point, being an item of knowledge which one must be able to draw upon repeatedly in indefinitely diverse situations, it must be general in nature, so it will not contain specifications as to how it must be applied in *this* case (Ryle 1949, p.20).

Pointing to the presence of some propositions underlying an intelligent performance is, therefore, insufficient to explain its author's knowledge how to perform. Those propositions do not have tucked into their contents an infinite set of clauses explaining how and when they are to be applied in every circumstance. So the reduction of knowing how to propositional knowledge, if that is construed as having propositions present in the mind, is plausible only by taking for granted that same variety of knowledge or intelligence—knowledge *how* to use or apply truths—, under whose control alone productive use can be made of the propositions in question. But this cannot be taken for granted, for people sometimes do produce facts when they are irrelevant, assent to rules but fail to follow them in practice, and understand technical principles in general but fail to see how they may be applied to the practical problem at hand (Ryle, e.g. p.1945-6, pp.2-6). Having a proposition before one is not knowing what it means, when it is pertinent or how it is to be applied in a given practical context. The Intellectualist of the sort I have been discussing

lacks resources to explain these possibilities in any terms other than the presence or absence of propositions in the mind, and this leads in short order to vicious regress. The knowledge how to apply propositions must be explained as possession of further propositions in one's mental archive. But if the first tier of propositions could not generate, by their bare presence in the mind, productive use of the same, why should the second tier? A further set of regulative propositions must be postulated, which again will only serve their purpose if consulted in connection with the previous tier they pertain to and properly applied, so that we must go on postulating tier behind tier of regulative propositions *ad infinitum*, each called in as a buttress for the set before (Ryle 1945-6, pp.6-7; 1949, pp.19-20).

Ryle's *reductio* argument reveals the absurdity of construing bare apprehension of propositional content as the antecedent condition of sophisticated action. But it does not show that knowing how is not propositional knowledge, for propositional knowledge cannot be understood as the bare possession of propositional content in the mind *either*: one counts as *knowing* a fact only if one can draw on that fact in thought, speech or action (Ryle 1945-6, p.16) Ryle's regress argument will apply equally to the dualistic Intellectualist conception of knowing *that*. I take it to be uncontroversial that propositional knowledge that *p* is drawn on in answering questions, such as the question whether *p*, or the question whether *q*, given that if *p* then *q*. When asked whether *p*, what ensures I will consult the file in which '*p*' is recorded, instead of consulting the innumerable other propositional truths which are accessible to me? And isn't answering a question as much a practical application of knowledge that *p* that, it now seems, I must have knowledge how to make, in addition to knowing that *p*? And is there any way of limiting in advance the range of possible contexts in which my knowledge may serve me, i.e. of limiting the range of possible questions, which my knowledge that *p* might be called upon to address? Without the buttressing of some further know-how, it seems my knowledge that *p* is *entirely* idle. But if the extra knowledge needed to put the knowledge that *p* into action is also propositional, and in turn construed as consisting in propositions stored in the mind, we shall need an infinite amount of it before we can answer a single question (Cf. Ryle 1945-6, p.2).

What this shows is that knowing that *p*, just like knowing how to *V*, is not reducible to having '*p*' in a mental pocket (Cf. Kenny 1989, p.108); the dualism of cognitive apprehension of content and practical action leads inexorably to vicious regress. All *knowing* is a practical power directly manifest in what we do. But does all knowledge have a propositional "object"?

3. A Rylean Intellectualism

Powers and potentialities are defined by reference to their manifestations in action⁹. But knowing that, like knowing how, is indefinitely diverse in its realisations, which has seemed to stand in the way of providing a satisfactory characterisation of knowledge in these terms.¹⁰ My knowledge that the pub is due to close at 11 pm may be expressed when I order a last round of drinks at 10.30, when I advise a friend not to join us if they cannot arrive by 10.15 pm, and when I show frustration with the barman who attempts to usher us out at five to eleven. What fea-

⁸ Wittgenstein targets this kind of approach to the relationship between mental representations or 'content' and action throughout the *Philosophical Investigations*, and often by indicating, though much less explicitly and systematically than Ryle, how they lead to vicious regress, e.g. in connection with understanding an order (§451 and surrounding discussion) intending, and understanding a rule (§186-201; see also §213).

⁹ See Ryle (1949, ch. V) Kenny (1989, ch. V) and Hacker (2005, ch. 4) for further discussion of human dispositions and powers in general.

¹⁰ See Hyman 1999, p. and Kenny 1989, p. for discussion.

ture could be common to all of this behaviour, which distinguishes it as an expression of my knowledge?

John Hyman has argued that when knowledge that *p* is expressed in what we do, think or feel, the fact that *p* is the reason for which we do, think or feel what we do. Knowledge, then, is the ability to 'be guided by' the facts; more precisely to do things for reasons that are facts or truths¹¹. What we know are propositional factors, what our *knowing* involves is the ability to take those as reasons for action. Compare Ryle on knowing how:

When a person knows how to do things of a certain sort (e.g., cook omelettes, design dresses or persuade juries), his performance is in some way governed by principles, rules, canons, standards or criteria. (For most purposes it does not matter which we say.) It is always possible in principle, if not in practice, to explain why he tends to succeed, that is, to state the reasons for his actions. It is tautology to say that there is a method in his cleverness. But his observance of rules, principles, etc., must, if it is there at all, be realized in his performance of his tasks. It need not (though it can) be also advertised in an extra performance of paying some internal or external lip-service to those rules or principles. (Ryle 1945-6, p.8-9).

According to Ryle, what distinguishes a performance as an exercise of knowing how (as against a habit or brute capacity) is the presence of rules, principles etc. which govern it. These may always be stated in principle, and constitute the *reasons for which* someone who knows how does what he does, or does it in the manner in which he does it. These reasons are not *empirical* facts or truths, but normative factors.

To prevent Hyman's account of propositional knowledge covering what Ryle called knowing how, we could either appeal to the difference between (empirical) truths and normative factors (rules etc.), and deny that knowledge of the latter is propositional, or we could insist that we may identify as reasons for someone's action only those factors they could articulate in words themselves: reasons they could *give* in justification or explanation. Neither strategy sits well with either Hyman's account or Ryle's. Too much knowing *that* would be counted as non-propositional if knowing non-empirical truths or rules were disqualified (Hyman 1999, pp. 442-3), and Ryle was interested in the difference between knowing a rule in theory ('knowing that') and being competent to apply it in practice ('knowing how'), so the empirical/normative distinction would not map on well to his concerns. The second strategy fares no better. Like the idea that knowledge is the ability to answer questions, which Hyman explicitly rejects for this reason, the requirement that individuals be in a position to articulate what they know in words rules out the possibility that young children or animals ever have knowledge (*ibid*, pp.437-8).

Obviously enough that Ryle rejects the requirement too: we can give the reasons for a man's actions; what shows that they are his reasons is not that he states them but that he follows them in action. Ryle in fact allowed that the rules, canons and criteria applied by someone who knows how to *V* may be cited as the factors he *knows*. But he knows them in a distinctively practical way: e.g., someone who knows how to play chess "knows the rules in the ex-

ecutive way of being able to apply them." (1949, p.40; c.f. 1945-6, p.7).

If we follow Hyman's account of propositional knowledge, I think the conclusion that knowing how is one species of it is difficult to resist. But this does not threaten Ryle's distinction between *knowing* how and *knowing* that as powers or aspects of mind, marked in terms of differences in the way these powers are typically acquired and exercised. In Hyman's terms, we might distinguish ways of being *guided* by reasons. The fact that oil paint is more viscous than acrylic might be (one of) my reasons for imparting that same fact to someone else; my reason for encouraging a novice to work with acrylic before using oil paint; my reason for handling the pallet knife differently when I work with these two paints. Someone else might be sensitive to that reason in the first sense and not the last; yet another might be sensitive to that reason in the last sense but not the first.

The knowing how/ that distinction may be mapped to different ways of *knowing*, or being guided by, propositional contents¹². This means that neo-Intellectualists are right to insist that knowledge how has propositional contents, while Ryleans are right to insist that it is a markedly different power than is typically ascribed by the construction 'knows that'. If the difference between the "act" and "object" senses of the term 'knowledge' is kept in view, the dispute over practical knowledge appears more notional than substantive.

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11 In fact according to Hyman a reason always functions as an explanans, and an explanans must be correct or true. Thus reasons are facts or truths, and knowledge may be defined simply as the ability to do things for reasons. See Hyman 1999, p.442-3 and Alvarez 2010, ch. 2 on reasons and facts.

12 In outline this is the strategy of Stanley and Williamson's (2001) neo-Intellectualist proposal. They argue that 'knows how' is used to ascribe propositional knowledge, but that use of this construction signals in addition that the ascriber engages that knowledge under a distinctive 'practical mode of presentation' (p. 429). Unlike the Intellectualism derived from Hyman's account, their position is dualistic in the sense described above, and for this reason, I would urge that it remains vulnerable to Ryle's reductio arguments.

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The Unity of Logic and Politics in Wittgenstein's Criticism of Modern Civilisation: Some Aspects

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Abstract

Wittgenstein was in many ways an apolitical thinker. Some scholars have suggested on the basis of their readings of scattered individuals remarks by Wittgenstein on his times that he was politically conservative. Others have suggested that lessons for our political thinking can be drawn from individual elements of his philosophy. But with few exceptions discussion of Wittgenstein's work has failed to address the political dimension that lies, inextricably, as one aspect, at the core of his philosophical contribution. If we wish to understand Wittgenstein's philosophy fully the task to unearth its relevance for our understanding of politics lies, therefore, mostly before us. Here a small contribution to this end is offered by looking at Socrates (2), at the idea that economics is an exact science (3) and at some remarks in the pivotal mid-sections of the first part of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (4). There is a closing remark (5).

1.

Wittgenstein did not engage in public debate outside philosophy, nor did he discuss political matters much in his writings or with his friends. It may therefore seem natural that when Wittgenstein and politics has been discussed the perspective has been, so to say, *external*. Two things have been done. First, individual remarks by Wittgenstein on his times have been selected and considered in isolation from other parts of his thinking. Second, people have drawn individual ideas and arguments from Wittgenstein's work and used them for their own work in political theory. All of that is all right as far as it goes. But in it we may also miss the real adventure, namely the ways in which Wittgenstein's philosophical discussion of logic, meaning, mind and so forth is in itself always also an intervention in moral life and the political dynamics of the times.

2.

The idea that moral and political issues are one with conceptual and logical issues may not be so popular today but it has a proud history. The most important source for thinking about this matter is Socrates. In the *Apology* (38a) he makes a distinction between the philosophical examination of topics and the "examining of self and others". Philosophy on his understanding is an engagement in the latter activity by way of the former. Such Socratic philosophy is true politics in two senses. First, in the sense that placing words in our lives are ways of placing ourselves in community and hence, of engaging in and taking responsibility for the polity. If we want to put this technically we may say that Socratic philosophy contributes to the constitution of us, of who we are, that *it is a form of intervention in social ontology*. Second, Socratic philosophy is true politics in the following sense: If political action only deserves its name if it is action informed by eminent critical reasoning and if the highest form of critical reasoning is, as Socrates suggests, the kind of philosophical examination that Socrates practised, then action that is not informed by Socratic philosophising is not politics at all. If we want to put this point technically we may say that *Socratic philosophy is the epistemological condition for politics* if, or to the extent that, politics is a form of rational self-determination.

Hence, if it is true, as I believe it is and have argued elsewhere (Wallgren 2006), that Wittgenstein's later philosophy, especially the first part of his *Philosophical Investigations (PI)*, is a form of Socratic examination of self and

others we can expect it to be in itself also a political philosophy. The issue is huge. I will discuss it by way of just one example.

3.

Quite often these days, distinguished economists, who reflect in public on their role as professional experts and the value of their craft, make it a point to emphasise two things. First, that theirs is an exact science and second, that they will *not* speak about the environment.¹ In order to understand better what happens here let me introduce some assumptions and some conceptual tools.

When we take pride in expert identities, such as that of a professional of "the exact science of economics," we buy into an implicit commitment to what we may call *modern differentiationism*. The commitment will continue to work for me as a moral source (in the sense of Charles Taylor; see Taylor 1989) as long as differentiationism seems to me justified.

What I here call differentiationism is a cultural imaginary and ideal that has a long history in Western culture. Aristotle's separation between theoretical and practical reason is, arguably, the most important classical source. In modern times the theoretical idea that differentiation between spheres of reason is a form of the realisation of reason, and that such rationalisation is "progressive", has been realised institutionally, most famously through the separation of law, science and art as cultural spheres with autonomous standards of validation. Modern differentiationism is hugely important morally and politically because of how it shapes the life journeys available for individuals, for instance by setting conditions for how they may acquire public recognition, and through how it shapes our understanding of who has authority to speak of what.

What sustains the cultural success of "differentiationism"? For expediency, let me use a distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic justification. The extrinsic part has to do with the idea that differentiation has helped us to realise better than before economic and social objectives such as affluence, health and longevity. Intrinsic stands here for justification in terms of reason, the idea being that regardless of whether differentiationism is good for some other purpose it is good as one form of the realization of reason.

¹ I have witnessed this twice in the spring of 2013 only.

Now, let me go back to the economists who say, proudly, that their discipline is an exact science and who say, in the same breath, that they will not speak about the environment. Only in the context of differentiationist culture that is facing the new challenge of ecological limits to growth can we understand the subtext of the economists' announcement. By saying that they will *not* speak about the environment, the economists make it clear to their audience that even if they may believe that the economics discipline plays an important role in the quest for economic growth they acknowledge that its is controversial whether economic growth is really a good thing. For this reason the *economist withdraws from any discussion concerning the extrinsic justification of their discipline and their own claim to authority in public affairs*. The other side of the coin is that the economists are, nevertheless, still eager to uphold the authoritative status of their discipline. They now propose to do so by relying on intrinsic resources of justification only. And *that* is why they find it important to say that theirs is an *exact* science.

I see the withdrawal from the claim that we can provide extrinsic justification for the science of economics and its claim to authority in public debates as illustrative of a broader tendency in our times. Faced with the multiple crises of hunger, environment and finance proponents of modern differentiationism all tend to give up on extrinsic justification. Nevertheless, in the pride economists and others nevertheless take in themselves as experts we see that differentiationism continues to serve as a moral source for them. In the continued authority others allow economists to uphold in public debate we see that differentiationism also continues to have effects on how power is distributed in our societies. This resilience, this immunity to extrinsic criticism, is not justified unless differentiationism can be justified intrinsically. But can it be so justified?

The question of the legitimacy of an intrinsic justification of economics has two aspects: one is the question of the value of differentiated rationalisation for our moral orientation. This question has always been a key theme in culturally conservative and reactionary criticisms of modernity. Another is the question of rational standards, i.e., whether the differentiationist idea of separable spheres of reason with separable critical standards is a good idea in terms of reason. Arguably, there is no more precise and satisfying investigation of the latter question than what Wittgenstein offers in his later philosophy.

Recall now the economists' pride in the exactness of their discipline. The pride makes sense only against a complex background of cultural assumptions. The aspects that are most immediately relevant here are three: There is the factual claim that methodologically economics has been increasingly mathematised. There is the conceptual claim that mathematisation makes economics exact.² Finally, there is the moral claim that as economics derives more and more of the exactness of mathematics it derives something *special*, something that is worthy of respect. Why? Because, I suspect, of a long tradition, alive and authoritative today, that has made it natural to think that in the *formal or purely abstract disciplines*, in mathematics and logic, we come in contact with a kind of *true* exactness and *true* necessity *that is also at the core of what reason is*.

As economists who are differentiationists we do not need to ask questions about the core of reason. Those questions we can leave to *other* specialists, in this case to spe-

cialists in the philosophy of mathematics and logic. In the moral economy of modern differentiationism *they* are entrusted with caring for what exactly *we* (the economists) mean when we say that there is true exactness in mathematics such that the more economics can be mathematised the more it becomes exact, and hence, truly rational, and hence, a truly fine thing.

And what, exactly, do we mean if we say that there is true exactness in mathematics? More generally: what do we mean when we say that mathematics, and perhaps, behind it, logic, are at the core of reason and have a "crystalline purity" that give glory to everything that comes in contact with them, (including to economics, when it is mathematised)?

4.

Wittgenstein's *PI* and his later manuscripts on the foundations of mathematics have a fair deal of discussion of the concept of exactness. The theme plays an important role in the celebrated discussions of rule-following in the *PI*. There discussion of language and mathematics are closely integrated. But whether discussed jointly or separately, in the case of both language and mathematics one issue that Wittgenstein is incisively investigating is the idea that we can provide, with logical tools, a theoretical foundation for them. At a first glance a reader may get the impression that Wittgenstein's ambition is to show that this idea, including as a special case the idea that logical or mathematical exactness is an ideal that can serve as a paradigm or measure for all exactness, is false.

I think this is not right at all. Wittgenstein is not engaging in the game of true and false. His concern is with the worth of the idea he studies, especially with what promise it holds for us when we try to understand what reason is. Wittgenstein once summarised his own kind of objection to the idea that he argues for a rejection of the idea of foundations in a striking image. This is when he comments on Hilbert's remark that set theory as created by Cantor is a paradise. Wittgenstein says: "I wouldn't dream of trying to drive anyone out of this paradise. . . . I would try show you that it is not paradise -- so that you'll leave of your own accord. I would say: 'You're welcome to this: just look about you.'" (Wittgenstein 1976, 103)

How could anyone think that set theory is not wrong, that you are welcome to it, and that it is still not paradise? With his simile Wittgenstein suggests, as I believe, that many people have had a phantasy that there is such a thing as the foundations of mathematics that give to mathematics the unique exactness it has. It is part of this phantasy that it is thanks to the fine quality of these foundations that mathematics has a fine quality. When this latter phantasy is in place we get the notion that a science that provides us with the foundations of mathematics is a kind of super-science. This phantasy explains the moral hope that people have invested in set-theory and more generally, in their search for a correct theory of the foundations of mathematics. It also explains the heat of the debates (in Wittgenstein's times) between logicians, formalists and intuitionists about those theories. The heat comes from the phantasy that the one who gets the theory right gifts to the world the crown jewel in the house of reason.

On my view, as Wittgenstein's image of paradise suggests, his investigations of exactness in rule-following do not have the result that we see that there is no such thing as following a rule exactly right and hence, of exactness in mathematics, logic or language. But they invite us to a new

² For reasons of expediency I take it for granted that when people claim that economics is an exact science they think above all of its mathematical tools as the warrant for the claim.

world of reason. In this world the idea that exactness is a concept that has logical or mathematical exactness as the shining core that gives all exactness whatever value it has loses its grip on us. It is replaced with a world in which exact understanding of exactness may be only be reached if we give up the idea that we know, before we have began our study, what the idea of true exactness is and that true exactness is there, above all, in logic and mathematics. When this prejudice is given up we are free to ask afresh what true exactness is and free to ask whether true exactness may be there in many places in language and of many kinds. In this investigation we need not insist on a hierarchy between different kinds of exactness. It will be an open question whether exactness in mathematics is the crown jewel in the house of exactness.

If this question is left open the notion that economics, or any other practice, becomes better when it becomes mathematised changes its character for us. The original idea was that we say something that we can take pride in, something that can justify our identities as economists, when we say that economics is exact because it uses the exact tools of mathematics. If we see that we do not really understand what we say when we say this or why we say this, then saying that thing loses its attraction for us and we will no longer take pride in it. This change in self-understanding need not become a reason for us to change our way in life, e.g. by giving up our work as economists. But it will invite us and others to a new perspective on the authority of economics in our system of knowledge and power.

5.

Let me sum up: For Wittgenstein's discussion of rule-following in mathematics and language to be politically relevant the idea whether he proves or does not prove anything is not the issue. The important claim is that his later philosophy has the power to destabilise our confidence in the idea that in logic and mathematics we are in contact with eminent, true exactness.

This is not so because Wittgenstein does not leave mathematics as it is. It is because his philosophy may not leave our understanding of what the glory of mathematics is, including for instance of what mathematical exactness is, as it is. If Wittgenstein's philosophy may effect a passage of learning from a first stage in which we think that we are close to true exactness when we are in touch with mathematics and that true exactness is close to paradise, to another stage when we don't think like that about the claim of mathematics to exactness, mathematics has not changed but we have changed. If this happens the idea that economics becomes more exact than before, and therefore more intrinsically justified in terms of reason than before by becoming more mathematised, will lose its attraction for us.

The lesson I want to draw is by now surely obvious: I have claimed that intrinsic justification of differentiationism presumes the notion of spheres and hierarchies of reason and that it is a politically potent idea. To the extent that Wittgenstein's later philosophy destabilises our confidence in the validity of the hierarchy idea, and hence of the intrinsic justification of differentiationism it is, therefore, a political intervention (whether we want this to be the case or not).

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Changing Language, Changing *Lebensformen*: Politics and Education in Wittgenstein's Later Work

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Abstract

Wittgenstein's conceptual linkage between language games (*Sprachspiele*) and forms of life (*Lebensformen*) has long fascinated scholars of his later works. But how, and under what circumstances, do language games change? And what notion of agency results from our being embedded within ever-changing language games and their attendant forms of life? These questions have been undertheorized, and investigating Wittgenstein's remarks on this subject reveals that novel grammatical structures, as well as the appearance of new words and old words in new configurations, do shape the forms of life we live. How we learn, adapt to or come to understand such changes then provides a model for living amongst one another and formulating our political interactions. This essay excavates key passages that reveal the way in which language games change and how Wittgenstein's central use of teaching and learning examples helps us come to terms with such changes.

Existing scholarship is replete with efforts to find political content in Wittgenstein's writings, often seeking to label his work as conservative or liberal, constraining or emancipatory (Pitkin 1972, Nyíri 1982, Jones 1986, Lugg 1985, Diamond 1991, Pohlhaus and Wright 2002, Cerbone 2003, Robinson 2009). In effect, the question being asked is which political orientation most comprehensively labels any given work as a whole. I want to investigate, instead, what politically salient conceptual resources can be found in Wittgenstein's later efforts. Put another way, what can Wittgenstein teach us about our most basic political condition: that of living in the midst of our fellows and having to make decisions about our common fate. To find out, I turn to an oft-overlooked puzzle about how language games change, and thereby how the attendant forms of life that constitute our shared experience in which we act politically also change. Just as we cannot act politically in isolation, our language games cannot change by the intervention of one person alone.

While little of Wittgenstein's writing is ostensibly political, examining his remarks on how, when and in what contexts our linguistic concepts change can provide a starting point for a more convivial or sociable conception of our lived experience; a valuable reminder that we are bound up together in language as we are in politics. Returning to Wittgenstein's texts to bring forth the political salience of certain passages reveals the necessary linkages between, on the one hand, playing a common language game and sharing in forms of life, and on the other hand, acting in concert politically. This essay explores these linkages via two routes: first, the clues Wittgenstein offers us to explain changing language games; second, the centrality of teaching as a model of intersubjective interaction in Wittgenstein's writings.

Reading closely reveals a handful of remarks in Wittgenstein's work about how the grammar of language games and forms of life come to be combined in new ways, how new words and concepts get picked up and what effect that might have on our shared discourse. By bringing these clues together, one gets a fuller picture of the mutating qualities of language games, which itself raises further questions about our collective or individual agency within them and their role in defining the conditions for political action. In the *Blue and Brown Books*, Wittgenstein describes an instance when our understanding is arrested by a turn in a language game that we do not recognize. He explains:

We don't say that the man who tells us he feels the visual image two inches behind the bridge of his nose is telling a lie or talking nonsense. But we say that we don't understand the meaning of such a phrase. It combines well-known words, but combines them in a way we don't yet understand. The grammar of this phrase has yet to be explained to us (Wittgenstein 1960, 10).

It is precisely in such instances of novel grammatical constructions that our preconceived notions of meaning or even the rules of our language games can be momentarily thrown into doubt. Does this person's statement make sense and, if so, how? In such moments, when existing words we recognize are combined in new configurations, it is not a stretch to say that our form of life is also reconfigured, even if only at the margin or in a minimal way. Encountering a strange statement can lead us to ponder what the puzzling turn of phrase could mean, to develop an interpretation and to add to our linguistic or conceptual repertoire. Having considered the specific example Wittgenstein offers, we may have expanded our understanding of metaphoric language; had his example been one of a heretofore unrecognizable claim to political rights, we may have expanded our understanding of membership in a community. Stanley Cavell, in his well-known essay "The Availability of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy," references this same passage to suggest that considering grammar which has yet to be explained is a "new category of criticism" entirely. His hope is that "once we see that the grammar of an expression sometimes *needs* explaining..., we may be more accessible to the request to investigate the grammar of an expression whose meaning seems obvious" (2002, 55). Challenges to language games, then, have the potential to make us more receptive to novel, unique or heretofore excluded forms of life.

It is certainly the case that for novel linguistic combinations to take hold, a community of speakers has to pick them up. Helpfully, Wittgenstein also tells us that new words and concepts are introduced into language games all the time. In fact, any attempt to catalogue or index language games is not only futile but assumes that they are more stable than they are. Wittgenstein elaborates:

There are *countless* kinds... of what we call 'symbols,' 'words,' 'sentences.' And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once and for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and

get forgotten... Here the term 'language-game' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life." (Wittgenstein 2001, § 23)

It is perhaps no coincidence that this remark from the *Investigations* is where Wittgenstein introduces the term 'form of life' for the first time. Not only does he underscore the multiplicity of words and their combination, but he argues that the continual process of new language games being played (and old ones slipping away) is closely bound up with our forms of life, which also undergo continuous change. The flux inherent in language games and forms of life invites us to consider what it means that the conditions for the contestation or remaking of either are contained within themselves, or rather, between all of us. After all, it is the *players* of the language games (and those that *live* various forms of life) that either take a turn and change the game or are receptive to such change.

The last remark I want to bring to the fore appears in *Culture & Value*, wherein Wittgenstein evokes the power of new words being introduced into our conversations. He tells us that "A new word is like a fresh seed sown on the ground of the discussion" (Wittgenstein 1980, 2^o, my translation). This remark, metaphorically evocative as it is, once again underscores that new words come into existence all the time, but it further points to the possible effect of such an event. Fresh seeds hold the promise of new beginnings and unpredictable outgrowths that affect the very grounds for discussion. Here Wittgenstein seems to be pointing out the galvanizing, perhaps even unpredictable, effect that novel language can have on a topic of debate. What goes unsaid, but is worth saying, is that such a discussion happens between individuals that share a language game and thus participate in a common form of life. When such discussions are of a political nature, for instance about the proper role of the state or the duties of a citizen, this remark opens up a series of questions about how our available language shapes the contours of debate and how changes in that language can, in turn, change the debate.

Approaching the same set of issues from another angle, I wish to give Wittgenstein's use of teaching and learning examples their due; examples which in fact launch the *Philosophical Investigations*, and which can serve as a model for how we ought to engage with others that share our forms of life, precisely when new words, concepts and meanings are at stake. It is the case that our forms of life continually change, but how do we become aware of such changes?

In the opening passages of the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein invites us to ponder how we learn specific words, are taught to conceive of language in general, and train ourselves to deal with its mercurial qualities. The first section famously begins with a quotation from Augustine's *Confessions*, in which he describes how his elders "named some object, and accordingly moved towards something," through which Augustine "grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered" (Wittgenstein 2001, §1). Cavell, a notable scholar on this subject, has similarly paid attention to how the *Investigations* (and by extension the practice of philosophical investigation) begins. Cavell helpfully points out that "It [Augustine's quotation] contains assumptions or pictures about teaching, learning, pointing, naming – say these are modes of establishing a 'connection' between language and the world" (Cavell 1996, 266).

Wittgenstein explores the validity of Augustine's description of language, which relies on naming and a picture of language where "every word has a meaning" (Wittgenstein

2001, §1). Through the famous examples of the shopkeeper and the builders, the point is made that Augustine's picture of language is a partial one at best, fittingly describing only a subset of what language means or how it is used. Wittgenstein's anti-essentialist view of language is further explored by the introduction of the terms 'language games' and 'family resemblance' (Wittgenstein 2001, §7 and §23), but it is the prevalence of teaching and learning in these initial examples that acts as the reader's guide for engaging with language in its ever-changing applications.

In fact, there is a clear thread if one looks carefully: Augustine is recounting how his elders taught him language (or at least the meaning of certain words), and Wittgenstein queries how the shopkeeper came to learn what to do with the word 'red' and how the builder's assistant acquired the understanding to bring the corresponding slabs when the builder calls for them. In section 5, Wittgenstein adds 'training' to the list of teaching-related references, when he explains that a child uses constrained forms of language "when it learns to talk" (2001). "Here," he says, "the teaching of language is not explanation, but training," which is similar to Augustine's account of being trained (Wittgenstein 2001, §5). Already Wittgenstein's use of teaching as a concept is multivalent, but its centrality to his examples is hard to overlook. Instead of hunting for an immutable definition of language, Wittgenstein's selection of examples that foreground the *learned* nature of language highlights the flux inherent in linguistic constructions and the shared nature of us coming to grips with such change. Language is not one thing, nor is it stable; instead, shared language games come into existence by being continually taught, learned, played and reconfigured. Just like actual games, the way in which we conceive of language is itself variegated and we come to those meanings through some process of mutual, on-going teaching and learning.

Not only is it the case that meaning can only be said to accrue when language is used, but perhaps a more pointed way of putting this is that language itself is something that exists in the main or principally *between* people. This observation is in line with Wittgenstein's argument against private language (Wittgenstein 2001, §269-275), but again the point is expanded and actually presaged when we take the examples of teaching seriously: it is not just the meaning or use of language that is intersubjective, but how we come to have language at all. The highlighted passages, then, invoke questions of community and mutual relations and even raise larger issues about politics conceived as the condition of living amongst and being mutually interdependent with our fellows. Wittgenstein placed learning at the heart of his opening examples, perhaps, to provide a model for how to manage the unfolding revelations about language that the rest of the *Philosophical Investigations* reveal.

The salience for politics becomes apparent when the content of these examples is altered even slightly: from building blocks to categories that serve as the building blocks for society such as 'female' or 'immigrant.' In this context, teaching and training take on new valences, as fundamental to developing citizens or questioning the basic categories of our shared forms of life. It is instructive to consider how Wittgenstein would make sense of a father teaching his young son what the word 'man' ostensibly refers to by pointing to himself or the young boy learning about being a member of a community by observing his mother vote. Similarly evocative examples are not easily found in Wittgenstein's works, however, the point remains that he provides us with valuable insights on these questions nonetheless. He helps us to consider how changing

language games, closely associated with forms of life, are continually taught and learned, which introduces legitimate political questions about how our ever-shifting language structures our engagements with each other and our forms of life.

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Das (Selbst-)Bewusstsein und seine Grenzen. Baker, Nida-Rümelin und der Fähigkeitsbegriff

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Abstract

Zugänge zu Personen bzw. Subjekten von Erfahrung – also zu selbstbewussten bzw. bewussten Wesen –, die auf deren Erste-Person Perspektive bzw., im Fall von Subjekten, auf deren subjektive Perspektive abstellen, appellieren an die Intuition, dass das Fortbestehen dieser Perspektive, und nicht etwa die Erinnerung, für die Identität von Personen bzw. Subjekten ausschlaggebend ist. Dieser Intuition steht jedoch die Erfahrung entgegen, dass die Erste-Person Perspektive bzw. die subjektive Perspektive nicht durchgehend aktualisiert, also lückenhaft ist. Anhand der Theorien Lynne Rudder Bakers und Martine Nida-Rümelins zeige ich, dass diese Lücken eine Schwierigkeit für erstpersönliche bzw. subjektive Zugänge zur Identität von Personen bzw. Subjekten darstellen. Insbesondere der Rekurs auf den Fähigkeitsbegriff zur Überbrückung von Lücken im Selbstbewusstsein bzw. Bewusstsein erweist sich als Problem. Denn innerhalb des erstpersönlichen bzw. subjektiven Rahmens, den Baker und Nida-Rümelin sich selbst stecken, scheint kein geeigneter Träger für diese Fähigkeit zur Verfügung zu stehen.

1. Überblick

Zugänge zu Personen bzw. Subjekten von Erfahrung – also zu selbstbewussten bzw. bewussten Wesen –, die auf deren Erste-Person Perspektive bzw., im Fall von Subjekten, auf deren subjektive Perspektive abstellen, appellieren an die Intuition, dass das Fortbestehen dieser Perspektive, und nicht etwa die Erinnerung, für die Identität von Personen bzw. Subjekten ausschlaggebend ist. Dieser Intuition steht jedoch die Erfahrung entgegen, dass die Erste-Person Perspektive bzw. die subjektive Perspektive nicht durchgehend aktualisiert, also lückenhaft ist. Anhand der Theorien Lynne Rudder Bakers und Martine Nida-Rümelins zeige ich, dass diese Lücken eine Schwierigkeit für ihre erstpersönlichen bzw. subjektiven Zugänge zur Identität von Personen bzw. Subjekten darstellen. Insbesondere der Rekurs auf den Fähigkeitsbegriff zur Überbrückung von Lücken im Selbstbewusstsein bzw. Bewusstsein erweist sich als Problem für ihre Theorien. Denn innerhalb des erstpersönlichen bzw. subjektiven Rahmens, den Baker und Nida-Rümelin sich selbst stecken, scheint kein geeigneter Träger für diese Fähigkeit zur Verfügung zu stehen.

2. Baker

Baker sieht Personalität im Selbstbewusstsein begründet, genauer: in der Fähigkeit, sich selbst als sich selbst zu erfassen (*capacity to conceive of oneself as oneself*), d. h. sich selbst zu erfassen unabhängig von einem Eigennamen, einer Beschreibung oder einem drittpersönlichen Demonstrativum. Wer diese Fähigkeit hat, so sagt Baker auch, ist im Besitz der Fähigkeit zu einer Ersten-Person Perspektive. Was Personen von Nicht-Personen unterscheidet, ist also letztlich diese Fähigkeit zu einer Ersten-Person Perspektive.

Baker meint nun sogar, dass es für Personalität nicht nur nicht hinreichend ist, sich selbst anhand eines Eigennamens, einer Beschreibung oder eines drittpersönlichen Demonstrativums zu erfassen; es ist auch gar nicht notwendig dafür. Dies veranschaulicht sie am Beispiel des Soldaten Zazetsky aus A. R. Lurias Buch *The Man With a Shattered World* (1987). Zazetsky hat aufgrund einer Gehirnverletzung im zweiten Weltkrieg seine Erinnerung beinahe vollständig verloren und begibt sich in der Folge aus eigenem Antrieb auf die Suche nach seiner Geschichte.

Baker betont nun, dass der erinnerungslose Zazetsky nach ihrer Konzeption Person im vollen Wortsinn bleibt – selbst dann, wenn er sich aufgrund seines Erinnerungsverlusts weder anhand eines Eigennamens, einer Beschreibung oder eines drittpersönlichen Demonstrativums erfassen könnte. Denn auch in diesem erinnerungslosen Zustand könnte er sich weiterhin auf sich selbst als sich selbst beziehen. In der Tat setzt seine Suche nach seiner Geschichte eine funktionierende Erste-Person Perspektive in Bakers Sinn voraus: Nur weil Zazetsky sich auch nach seinem Erinnerungsverlust als sich selbst erfassen kann, ist er in der Lage, nach seiner Geschichte zu fragen; nur unter dieser Voraussetzung kann er überhaupt damit beginnen, sein einstiges Leben zu rekonstruieren. Baker schreibt:

What Zazetsky [sic] had lost was a coherent and comprehensible story of his life, of which he was the subject; but he had not lost his first-person perspective. Indeed, his quest to find out who he was presupposed a first-person perspective. For a first-person perspective is required in order to be in the position of searching for who one* [Der Stern markiert die Zuschreibung einer erstpersönlichen Referenz; dem Gegenstand der Zuschreibung wird also zugestanden, sich selbst als sich selbst zu erfassen.] is. (Baker 2000, 88)

Erinnerung ist für personale Identität also ontologisch irrelevant; die reflexive Selbstbezüglichkeit, die Zazetskys Suche nach seiner Geschichte voraussetzt, ist hinreichend für seine Fortexistenz.

Mein Ziel besteht nun darin, auf eine Schwierigkeit eingehen, die sich aus Bakers scheinbarer Gleichsetzung von personaler Identität und Selbstbewusstsein bzw. Erster-Person Perspektive ergibt. Diese Schwierigkeit besteht zunächst darin, dass es Zeiten gibt, in denen wir uns ganz augenscheinlich *nicht* als uns selbst erfassen. Man denke etwa an die Phasen der Bewusstlosigkeit, die Zazetsky nach seiner Verletzung durchmacht, oder an Phasen des traumlosen Schlafs. – Was geschieht in solchen Phasen? Zieht man unsere *aktualisierte* Erste-Person Perspektive als Bedingung für unsere Existenz heran, so müssen diese Phasen aus unserer Existenz hinausfallen. Das erscheint jedoch höchst kontraintuitiv, und so versucht Baker, diese Schwierigkeit zu umgehen, indem sie unsere Existenz bereits mit der bloßen *Fähigkeit* zu einer Ersten-Person Per-

spektive als gegeben sieht, wie wir schon obigen Zitaten entnehmen konnten. Doch damit scheint die Schwierigkeit nicht endgültig gelöst, wie ich in der Folge ausführen möchte. Ich konzentriere mich dabei auf die Frage nach dem *Träger* der Fähigkeit zu einer Ersten-Person Perspektive. – Was ist das Zugrundeliegende, dem diese Fähigkeit letztlich zukommt?

Die plausibelsten Kandidaten für die Rolle des Fähigkeitsträgers in Bakers Theorierahmen sind *Personen* einerseits und *Körper* andererseits. Deren Verhältnis zueinander bestimmt Baker als Nicht-Identität, genauer: als *Konstitution*, wobei ich auf eine genaue Ausfaltung der Konstitutionsrelation nach Baker verzichten muss. Unsere obige Darstellung von Bakers Personenkonzeption scheint nun nahezulegen, dass Personen als Träger der Fähigkeit zu einer Ersten-Person Perspektive zu favorisieren sind. Schließlich sagt Baker dort, dass die Fähigkeit zu einer Ersten-Person Perspektive Personen von Nicht-Personen unterscheidet. Das scheint zu implizieren, dass die Träger der Fähigkeit zu einer Ersten-Person Perspektive letztlich eben Personen sind. Ein solches Verständnis erweist sich jedoch als problematisch für Baker. Denn der Begriff der Fähigkeit wurde allem Anschein nach eben eingeführt, um Phasen ohne erstpönsliche Aktivität in unsere Existenz zu integrieren. Legt man nun der Fähigkeit zu einer Ersten-Person Perspektive die Person als Träger zugrunde, so scheint man sich im Kreis zu drehen. Denn es ist eben die Fortexistenz der Person in Phasen ohne aktualisierte Erste-Person Perspektive, die ursprünglich auf dem Spiel stand.

Auch Äußerungen Bakers an anderen Stellen legen eine abweichende Interpretation nahe. So wird etwa die Rede von der Fähigkeit zu einer Ersten-Person Perspektive von Baker folgendermaßen bestimmt:

An object *x* has the capacity for a first-person perspective at *t* if and only if *x* has all the structural properties at *t* required for a first-person perspective and either (i) *x* has manifested a first-person perspective at some time before *t* or (ii) *x* is in an environment at *t* conducive to the development and maintenance of a first-person perspective. Given this condition, a person can go into a coma without ceasing to exist, and a normal newborn human is (i.e., constitutes) a person. (Baker 2000, 92)

Was ist nun das „Objekt“, das in diesem Zitat als Träger der Fähigkeit zu einer Ersten-Person Perspektive fungiert? – Bakers Ausführungen suggerieren, dass es sich um den Körper handelt. Denn es scheint, als könnten die „strukturellen Eigenschaften“, die Baker nennt, nur dem Körper zugesprochen werden. Weiters drängt sich diese Lesart insbesondere angesichts von (ii) auf. Dort sagt Baker, ein normales menschliches Neugeborenes konstituiere eine Person. In der Tat schreibt sie sogar, es *sei* eine Person; doch erläutert sie den Ausdruck „is“ durch den Ausdruck „constitutes“. Der konstituierende Teil in der Konstitutionsrelation zwischen Person und Körper ist in Bakers Konzeption nun aber immer der Körper. Deshalb scheint (ii) zu dem Schluss zu führen, dass das Objekt, das als Träger der Fähigkeit zu einer Ersten-Person Perspektive dient, der Körper ist.

Vom Körper zu sagen, er sei der letzte Träger der Fähigkeit zu einer Ersten-Person Perspektive, scheint innerhalb des selbstgesteckten Rahmens Bakers jedoch ebenso problematisch, wie dies von der Person zu sagen. Denn insofern die Fähigkeit zu einer Ersten-Person Perspektive unsere Existenz in Phasen von Bewusstlosigkeit und fehlender erstpönslicher Aktivität garantiert und insofern

unser Körper dieser Fähigkeit zugrunde liegt, wird dadurch allem Anschein nach unser Körper zum eigentlichen Träger personaler Identität: Er ist es, so ist man versucht zu sagen, der als das Zugrundeliegende der Fähigkeit zu einer Ersten-Person Perspektive letztlich unsere Existenz aufrechterhält. Die Person, die die Erste-Person Perspektive aktualisiert und ausübt, scheint demgegenüber für unsere Existenz von untergeordneter Bedeutung.

3. Nida-Rümelin

Eine ähnliche Schwierigkeit lässt sich in Nida-Rümelins Theorie der transtemporalen Identität bewussteinfähiger Wesen konstatieren. Nida-Rümelin setzt nicht beim Begriff der Person an, sondern bei dem des Subjekts von Erfahrung. Ihr geht es also nicht um die typisch personalen Fähigkeiten wie Selbstbewusstsein, Selbstbezüglichkeit etc., sondern um das bloße Durchleben bewusster Zustände. Sie schreibt:

Bewussteinfähigkeit im hier gemeinten weiten Sinn setzt kein Selbstbewusstsein voraus ... Bewussteinfähig in diesem weiten Sinne ist ein Wesen schon dann, wenn es nur irgendetwas empfinden kann, auch wenn diese Empfindung noch sehr undeutlich und wenig differenziert ist ... Ein Wesen ist genau dann bewussteinfähig, wenn es ‚irgendwie ist, dieses Wesen zu sein‘ ..., oder wenn – wie man auch manchmal sagt – eine ‚subjektive Perspektive‘ vorliegt oder, anders gesagt, wenn es sich bei dem fraglichen Wesen um ein Subjekt von Erfahrung handelt. (Nida-Rümelin 2006, 17)

In ihrer Untersuchung der transtemporalen Identität solcher Subjekte wendet sich Nida-Rümelin gegen reduktionistische Theorien, die die Selbigkeit durch die Zeit von Subjekten auf körperliche oder psychologische Relationen zwischen Ausgangs- und Endsubjekt zurückführen wollen. Damit lehnt sie auch die Erinnerungsrelation zur Rekonstruktion von Subjekt-Identität ab. In der Tat beansprucht ihre Theorie Gültigkeit für die transtemporale Identität *aller* Subjekte, d. h. auch jener Subjekte, die zu Erinnerung gar nicht fähig sind. Erinnerungsverlust ist also auch in ihrer Konzeption kein ontologisches Problem. Die nicht-reduktionistische Theorie, die Nida-Rümelin den diversen Reduktionsversuchen transtemporaler Subjekt-Identität entgegenhält, klassifiziert sie als *Realismus*:

Nach der *realistischen Auffassung* transtemporaler Identität bewussteinfähiger Wesen ... ist die These des Reduktionismus falsch. Auch wenn alle transtemporalen empirischen Beziehungen beschrieben sind, die zwischen zu unterschiedlichen Zeiten existierenden Personen bestehen, ist damit noch nichts darüber gesagt, ob man es mit ein und derselben Person zu tun hat, und dieser Sachverhalt transtemporaler Identität muss in einer vollständigen Beschreibung der vorliegenden objektiven Verhältnisse erwähnt sein. (Nida-Rümelin 2006, 45)

Der objektive Sachverhalt transtemporaler Identität, von dem Nida-Rümelin spricht, lässt sich so formulieren, dass die zu verschiedenen Zeitpunkten existierenden Subjekte A und B genau dann miteinander identisch sind, wenn sie dieselben Erlebnisse haben. Diese Aussage ist freilich zirkulär und uninformativ, da die Selbigkeit von Erfahrungen die Selbigkeit ihrer Subjekte voraussetzt. Dieser Mangel an Informativität ergibt sich jedoch als direkte Folge von Nida-Rümelins Nicht-Reduktionismus: Die transtemporale Identität von Subjekten besteht eben in nichts anderem als ihr selbst, in keinen basaleren Relationen. Deshalb lässt

sich letztlich auch nichts Informatives über sie aussagen. – Wiederum wird klar: Erinnerung spielt in dieser Konzeption für die Frage der Identität keine Rolle. Ob sich das zukünftige Subjekt B an die Erfahrungen von A erinnern kann, ist hinsichtlich der Identität oder Nicht-Identität von A und B ebenso irrelevant wie die Frage, ob das vergangene Subjekt A die Erfahrungen von B antizipiert.

Die Kritik, die ich an Nida-Rümelins Theorie richten möchte, ist nun im Kern die gleiche wie oben in der Auseinandersetzung mit Baker. Wie die an Selbstbezüglichkeit gebundene Erste-Person Perspektive ist auch das bloße Bewusstsein lückenhaft. Was aber geschieht mit Erfahrungssubjekten während diesen Phasen, in denen sie keine Erfahrungen machen? Folgen wir Nida-Rümelins Theorie, so ist ein Subjekt A zu einem früheren Zeitpunkt genau dann mit einem Subjekt B zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt identisch, wenn A und B dieselben Erfahrungen machen. Dies garantiert aber nicht, dass das betreffende Subjekt in der Zwischenzeit, in der es nichts erfahren hat, auch existiert hat. Eben an diesem Punkt kommt nun wieder der Fähigkeitsbegriff ins Spiel. So spricht Nida-Rümelin, wie wir oben gesehen haben, anstatt von Subjekten von Erfahrung auch von *bewusstseinsfähigen* Wesen. Der Fähigkeitsbegriff soll also allem Anschein nach, ähnlich wie bei Baker, den kontraintuitiven Anschein von Lücken in der Existenz von Subjekten verhindern. Doch wieder stellt sich mit der Einführung des Fähigkeitsbegriffs sofort die Frage nach dem Träger der Fähigkeit zu Bewusstsein. Der Körper kann diese Aufgabe bei Nida-Rümelin nicht erfüllen, da sie, wie wir oben gesehen haben, körperlichen Relationen jede ontologische Relevanz für das transtemporale Fortexistieren von Subjekten abspricht. Also scheint nur das bei Nida-Rümelin dualistisch, also als nicht-körperliches Einzelding verstandene Subjekt als Träger der Fähigkeit zu Bewusstsein in Frage zu kommen. Dies ist jedoch ähnlich problematisch wie es die Zuschreibung der Trägereigenschaft für erstpersionliche Fähigkeiten an Personen im Falle Bakers wäre. Denn auch bei Nida-Rümelin hat der Fähigkeitsbegriff die Aufgabe, die Existenz von Subjekten von Erfahrung in Zeitpunkten zu sichern, in denen diese nichts erfahren. Man dreht sich also allem Anschein nach wieder im Kreis, wenn man die Subjekte, deren durchgehende Existenz auf dem Spiel stand, zu den Trägern der Bewusstseinsfähigkeit macht. Das dualistisch verstandene Subjekt scheint an das aktuelle Erleben bewusster Zustände gebunden; ein nicht-körperliches Subjekt, dem sämtliche Erfahrungen fehlen, scheint schwer vorstellbar. Und mindestens ebenso schwer vorstellbar ist es, dass dieses nicht-körperliche, bewusstseinslose Subjekt der Träger der Bewusstseinsfähigkeit sein sollte.

4. Fazit

Die vorgebrachte Kritik an den Theorien Bakers und Nida-Rümelins scheint mir die Grenzen von Konzeptionen aufzuzeigen, die die Identität von Personen bzw. Erfahrungssubjekten allein anhand ihrer Ersten-Person Perspektive bzw. ihrer subjektiven Perspektive, ohne Rückgriff auf Erinnerung, bestimmen wollen. Solche Konzeptionen können sich auf starke Intuitionen zu ihren Gunsten berufen. Wir sind geneigt, mit dem Fortbestehen unserer Ersten-Person Perspektive bzw. unserer subjektiven Perspektive auch *unser* Fortbestehen als gesichert anzusehen. Die Grenzen unseres Selbstbewusstseins bzw. Bewusstseins sind jedoch zugleich die Grenzen einer nicht bloß dispositional, sondern aktualistisch verstandenen erstpersionlichen bzw. subjektiven Konzeption von Personen bzw. Subjekten. Und die Annahme, dass unsere Existenz mit unserem Selbstbewusstsein bzw. Bewusstsein abbricht, scheint höchst kontraintuitiv. Dies erkennen Baker und Nida-Rümelin an, indem sie das Bestehen der bloßen *Fähigkeit* zu Selbstbewusstsein bzw. Bewusstsein als hinreichend für unser Fortexistieren ausweisen. Damit verlassen sie aber allem Anschein nach den erstpersionlichen bzw. subjektiven Bereich, den sie ihrem Anspruch nach als letztlich ausschlaggebend für unsere Identität erachten. Denn gehen wir bei der Rekonstruktion unserer Existenz allein von unserer erstpersionlichen bzw. subjektiven Perspektive aus, so scheint uns diese Existenz in Phasen, in denen wir bloß die *Fähigkeit* zu Bewusstsein bzw. Selbstbewusstsein haben, aber nicht *aktuell* bewusst bzw. selbstbewusst sind, unzugänglich zu sein. Und auch die Frage des Trägers der Selbstbewusstseins- bzw. Bewusstseinsfähigkeit scheint sich innerhalb von Bakers bzw. Nida-Rümelins erstpersionlichem bzw. subjektivem Theorierahmen nicht befriedigend lösen zu lassen. Das mag ein Hinweis darauf sein, dass eine vollständige Theorie der Identität von Personen bzw. Subjekten sich nicht ausschließlich innerhalb der Grenzen der Ersten-Person Perspektive bzw. der subjektiven Perspektive abspielen kann.

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Wittgenstein's Enactivism

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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that Wittgenstein can be read as a pioneer of enactivism. Despite obvious affinities between Wittgenstein's views and enactivism, there are three objections according to which Wittgenstein could not have been an enactivist. First, Wittgenstein has mainly been concerned with language, but many enactivists take language to be outside of the reach of their theory. Second, enactivists invent a new cognitive scientific terminology, which can be taken to clash with Wittgenstein's emphasis on not interfering with the actual use of language. And third, enactivism is a theory consisting of theses with an explanatory intent, which seems to run counter to Wittgenstein's method(s) of getting rid of theories, theses and explanations in philosophy. I argue that these objections can be met from a Wittgensteinian point of view. The resulting view throws new light both on Wittgenstein's thought and on enactivism.

1. Introduction

Enactivism is the thesis that (at least) "the vast sea of what humans do and experience is best understood by appealing to dynamically unfolding, situated embodied interactions and engagements with worldly offerings" (Hutto&Myin 2013:ix). It competes with orthodox intellectualistic theories which aim to explain human cognition by positing "the construction of internal representational models" (Hutto&Myin 2013:1). Enactivism promises to be a whole new approach to the human mind which fruitfully combines recent findings in cognitive science, social psychology and robotics in order to overcome problems more traditional conceptions of human cognition have been faced with (Wheeler 2005). At least at first sight, there seems to be strong evidence for taking Ludwig Wittgenstein to be a pioneer of enactivism. After all, like enactivists, Wittgenstein opposes classical representational theories of the mind and keeps on emphasizing the importance of activity, context, practice, skills and the external environment. However, there also seems to be evidence according to which Wittgenstein could not have been an enactivist: In contrast to Wittgenstein, enactivism has (mostly) not been concerned with language (cf. Hutto&Myin 2013:xviii), invents a new terminology, and constructs an explanatory theory consisting of radical theses.

In this paper, I will argue that, despite these appearances, Wittgenstein has been an enactivist, or can be fruitfully read so. In what follows, I will start with suggesting that Wittgenstein has held an enactivist account of language. Then, I will discuss the relation between ordinary folk psychological concepts and new cognitive scientific terms. And finally, I will discuss the objection from Wittgenstein's method(s).

2. Enacting Language

To begin with, a few more words on enactivism are needed. A rough way of spelling out enactivism is the following. A practically engaged agent experiences her environment as full of offerings she can interact with. For example, an agent who has to leave a building as fast as possible might directly perceive a doorknob as an offering for opening the door, and she might directly react to this offering by opening the door. Following Gibson (and Gestalt psychology), these offerings have become to be called "affordances". Gibson writes (1979:127): "The *affordances* of the environment are what it *offers* the animal, what it *provides* or *furnishes*". The idea is that the door-

knob has a practical meaning for the agent, and that, as Gibson (1979:127) holds "the 'values' and 'meanings' of things in the environment can be directly perceived." Against the background of her projects, skills and past experiences, a situation provides an agent with certain affordances she can directly interact with.¹

Now I wish to suggest that Wittgenstein has held exactly this view in regard to language. In PI 2, Wittgenstein famously offers an example of a basic way of using language:

A is building with building stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass him the stones and to do so in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they make use of a language consisting of the words "block", "pillar", "slab", "beam". A calls them out; B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call.

Here is an enactivist reading of what is going on. Worldly offerings, or affordances, do not only have to consist in physical states of affairs, like doorknobs. Rather, words and sentences can be affordances as well. The word "slab", uttered by A in the situation of building, is an affordance for B to bring a slab. Just like a doorknob is an affordance to open the door for a person leaving the building, the utterance of the word "slab" is an affordance to bring a slab for the person helping to build. Importantly, B can directly react to this affordance by bringing the slab.

So it is possible, simple and illuminating to read Wittgenstein's conception of language in PI 2 as an enactivist one: Embedded in the context of a certain situation, certain words or sentences have a direct practical significance for a person who can directly react to the utterance of the words or sentences.

Yet it might be objected that an enactivist account of language is not convincing, because most cases of language use are more complex than the example of PI 2, so that the invocation of representations is still needed in order to explain these more complex cases. However, seen as an exegetical point, this objection is not convincing. For, Wittgenstein stresses: "The origin and the primitive form of the language game is a reaction; only on the basis of this the more complicated forms can grow" (*Vermischte Bemerkungen*, p.493, my translation). In the opening paragraphs of the PI, Wittgenstein applies this idea. He holds that a paradigmatic case of language use is exemplified in

¹ To be sure, there are many different versions of enactivism. For a helpful overview, see Chemero 2009.

his more complex example of shopping in PI 1: "It is in this and similar ways that one operates with words". And in the paragraphs sequencing PI 2 Wittgenstein tries to work his way up from his analysis of PI 2 to his example of PI 1, again and again rejecting his interlocutor's insistence on introducing representations.

It suggests itself to transfer this enactivist reading to ideas like that a sign has life only in use (PI 432), and that "the meaning of a word is its use" (PI 43).

3. Folk Psychology and Cognitive Science

However, an important reason for thinking that Wittgenstein could not have been an enactivist is that enactivism makes use of new words like "affordances". But Wittgenstein, so the objection goes, would never have done that. After all, Wittgenstein insists that "[p]hilosophy must not interfere in any way with the actual use of language, so it can in the end only describe it. [...] It leaves everything as it is" (PI 124). Additionally, the objector might take enactivism's reliance on cognitive science to be problematic. For, it might be argued that it is the ordinary folk psychological words which pick out what is important. Cognitive science, it is said, can only investigate whether there are really the natural kinds the folk psychological terms seem to refer to (Stanley 2011:146ff.); and neuroscience, it is said, can only investigate the "neural preconditions" of powers which are individuated by folk psychology (Bennett&Hacker 2003:3). Thus, it might be argued from a point of view which might have been Wittgenstein's that enactivism's invention of new words is unnecessary.

In reply, it should be stressed that Wittgenstein can be read as holding a more complex view on the relation between ordinary folk psychological concepts and new cognitive scientific terms than the objection presupposes. Wittgenstein can be read as holding that what is important is the unreflective and pragmatic context of life in which words are used, which, however, is hard to bring into view: "The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden by their simplicity and familiarity" (PI 129, with translation change). As Wittgenstein holds, this all too familiar situational context is the background against which we use our words: "[T]he whole hurly-burly is the background against which we see an action, and it determines our judgment, our concepts, and our reactions" (Wittgenstein 1980, Vol.2: §629). In order to enhance human self-understanding, this background has to be investigated. Obviously, the ordinary words cannot easily be used for describing the background, because they are not made for describing the "unfamiliar-familiar" background of their own usage, but have their natural home in pragmatic contexts. In order to describe the background, Wittgenstein himself invents new words and metaphors.² And now it is natural to take enactivism's invention of new terms like "affordance" to be contributions to the Wittgensteinian project of bringing the all too familiar background into focus. Thus understood, enactivism does not contradict, but contribute to the Wittgensteinian project.

In addition, Wittgenstein can be understood as holding that folk psychology and cognitive science are (largely) unconnected: "The prejudice in favor of a psycho-physical parallelism is also a fruit of a primitive way of understanding grammar" (Wittgenstein 1980, Vol.1: §906, with translation change). By contrast, Wittgenstein holds: "I would like

to say: Psychology deals with certain aspects of human life. Or: with certain phenomena. But the words "thinking", "fearing", etc. etc. do *not* refer to these phenomena" (Wittgenstein 1980, Vol.2: §35). So, folk psychological notions like "thinking" and "fearing" should not be taken as (directly) referring to the psychological phenomena which are part of the unreflective background which is "most important for us". Thus, in order to investigate the background, it is not of much help to rely on folk psychological notions. Rather, it is more helpful for philosophy and cognitive science to find new conceptions. Consequently, it becomes intelligible how it is possible to leave our ordinary language as it is, and to still have reason for finding new helpful expressions in order to illuminate the background.

4. Explanations and Representations

Yet another reason for thinking that Wittgenstein could not have been an enactivist is that enactivism provides an explanatory theory with theses which have been called "radical" by some enactivists. But Wittgenstein, so the objection goes, would never have done that. For, Wittgenstein says: "All explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its place" (PI 109). What Wittgenstein is supplying are, he says, "not curiosities [...], but facts that no one has doubted, which have escaped notice only because they are always before our eyes" (PI 415).

In reply, it has to be stressed that Wittgenstein's method(s) cannot be understood as being directed against all kinds of illuminating general non-self-evident statements. For, Wittgenstein himself puts forward statements which are illuminating (e.g., concerning aspect-seeing), general (e.g., concerning the background), and (at least *prima facie*) non-self-evident (e.g., concerning the impossibility of a "transparent white"). Thus, Wittgenstein's methodological remarks must be understood as directed only against a particular kind of theory. Paul Horwich (2013:21) makes a helpful suggestion about the nature of this kind of theory: "In order to qualify as a theory (according to T[raditional]-philosophy) the constituting principles [...] must organize, unify and explain common-sense commitments". According to Wittgenstein, it would be a mistake to try to organize, unify and explain common-sense commitments and ordinary language. For, ordinary language has not been designed as an (imperfect) theory about the world, but rather has developed in the course of pragmatic interactions for practical purposes. So it is plausible to assume that Wittgenstein's methodology is directed only against theories which try to reconstruct common-sense commitments and ordinary language.

Now enactivism is not such a kind of theory. Enactivism does not mistakenly take the word "affordance" out of its ordinary usage and credits it with theoretical weight. Rather, "affordance" is not an ordinary term at all. And consequently, there is no danger of misunderstanding ordinary language and trying to explain common-sense commitments by the postulation of an underlying theory. Just like Wittgenstein, enactivism offers a broad illuminating description of the background of our activities.

However, it is Wittgenstein's and enactivism's opponent, representationalism, which can be understood as being misled by language. For instance, the representationalist Tyler Burge (2010:3) writes on the first page of his book: "Empirical representation is a type of representational state, occurrence, or activity. From here on, I often shorten 'state, occurrence, or activity' to 'state'." Seen from Wittgenstein's perspective, Burge got it wrong: for, it is dangerous to take the ordinary terms "representation" and

² For example, in his writings on the philosophy of psychology he introduces the terms "evidence experience" (*Evidenzerlebnis*), "meaning-seeing" (*Bedeutungssehen*), "aspect-blindness" (*Aspekt-Blindheit*), and "meaning germ" (*Bedeutungskeim*), to name just a few.

“state” out of their ordinary contexts, melt them, and then build an explanatory theory on them. In PI 308, Wittgenstein says:

How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and behaviorism arise? – The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states, and leave their nature undecided. [...] But that's just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. [...] (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that seemed to us quite innocent.)

Once the seemingly harmless term of a “representational state” has been taken up, language has gone on holiday.

It is a topic for another day to further develop this line of thought.

5. Conclusion

Despite all the common features, there is a point where Wittgenstein and enactivism aim at different things. Wittgenstein's aim is this: “The real discovery is the one that enables me to break off philosophizing when I want to.” (PI 133). Wittgenstein aims to be free from tormenting philosophical problems. And since, according to Wittgenstein, philosophical problems arise if one is entangled in one's own conceptual commitments (PI 125), Wittgenstein regards the adoption of a conceptual framework to be (at least potentially) problematic. Enactivists, by contrast, aim at knowledge about the mind in action, and construct a new conceptual framework to foster this aim.

However, before they have to part company in order to reach their ultimate destinations, Wittgenstein and enactivism can walk together for a long way. Enactivism can offer

a new perspective on key ideas in Wittgenstein's thought, and help to illuminate the background. And Wittgenstein's ideas can contribute to the development of an enactive account of language. To be sure, the aspects I have pointed to are only the beginning. For those working jointly on Wittgenstein and on enactivism, there are many more insights waiting to be discovered.

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Erkenntnis durch Erinnerung?

Mnemonik-Maschinen der Frühen Neuzeit

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Abstract

Als Methode zur Memorierung umfangreicher Texte bzw. komplexer Sachverhalte wurde die *Ars memorativa*, unter der Bezeichnung *memoria*, bereits in der Antike zu einem Teilgebiet der Rhetorik. Neben *inventio*, *dispositio*, *elocutio* und *pronuntiatio* (hat sie dort die Funktion, dem Redner zu ermöglichen, sich einen Text oder Sachverhalt möglichst genau einzuprägen. Um einen Text zu memorieren, empfehlen lateinische Rhetoriken sich im Geiste vertraute Orte, *loci*, vorzustellen und diese Orte im Geiste mit ausgefallenen Bildern zu besetzen, die für das zu Memorierende stehen, um den so entstandenen Weg dann in Gedanken jederzeit abschreiten zu können, wenn man sich an etwas bestimmtes erinnern möchte.

Spätestens zu Beginn der Frühen Neuzeit differenziert sich die Literatur zur Memoria in zwei formal wie inhaltlich eigenständige Traditionen, die sich mit Wolfgang Neuber und Jörg Berns terminologisch als „mnemotechnische“ und „mnemonische“ Linie fassen lassen. (Berns 1993) Während sich die im engeren Sinne mnemotechnischen Abhandlungen, in der rhetorischen Tradition des Memoriaverständnisses stehend, lediglich als heuristische Anleitungen zur Memorierung von Texten und Sachverhalten verstanden, versuchten die Vertreter der sog. Mnemonik die Kunst des Gedächtnisses zu einer Methode der universellen und übersinnlichen Erkenntnis, einer *scientia universalis*, auszubauen.

Aristoteles. Erinnerung als Vorstellungskraft

Eine der einschlagreichsten antiken Schriften zum Phänomen der Erinnerung, stellt Aristoteles' *De Memoria* dar. Wegweisend wurde Aristoteles darin erstmals formulierte konzeptionelles Unterscheidung zwischen Gedächtnis (*mneme*) und Erinnerung (*anamnesis*). Unter Gedächtnis versteht Aristoteles das „Verfügen über ein Vorstellungsbild (*phantasma*) als Bild (*eikon*) eines Gegenstandes, das der Vorstellungskraft (*phantasia*) unterliegt.“ (Aristoteles 2003, 89) Als Erinnern hingegen bezeichnet er zunächst das aktive Durchsuchen der im Gedächtnis gespeicherten Vorstellungsbilder das erst dann zur Ruhe kommt, wenn der gesuchte Gedächtnisinhalt gefunden ist: „Auf diese Weise pflegen wir nachzuforschen, doch auch, wenn wir nicht so suchen, stellt sich Erinnern ein, sofern die Rückbesinnung eine andere Bewegung ununterbrochen aufnimmt und ihr folgt. [...] Die Bewegungen folgen nämlich auch durch Gewohnheit aufeinander.“ (Aristoteles 2003, 91)

Aristoteles zufolge besitzen die sinnlichen Dinge, deren Vorstellungen wir im Gedächtnis gespeichert haben, die unheimliche Fähigkeit in uns auch gegen unseren Willen bestimmte Gedächtnisinhalte, gleichsam assoziativ, aufsteigen zu lassen.

Allerdings beinhaltet das Gedächtnis nicht die Dinge selbst, sondern lediglich deren Vorstellungen, *phantasmata*, bzw. Abbilder, *imagines*. Daraus, dass es auch die willkürliche oder unwillkürliche Erinnerung nicht mit den Dingen selbst, sondern lediglich mit deren Abbildern im Bewusstsein zu tun hat „ergibt sich, daß das Gedächtnis in demselben Teil der Seele angesiedelt ist, in dem sich auch die Vorstellungskraft (*phantasia*) befindet, und daß die eigentlichen Gegenstände des Gedächtnisses diejenigen sind, die unter die Vorstellungskraft fallen, mittelbar aber auch alle diejenigen Dinge, die ohne Vorstellungskraft nicht verstanden werden können.“ (Aristoteles 2003, 85)

Für unseren Zusammenhang ist es wichtig festzuhalten, dass Aristoteles die Inhalte des Gedächtnisses auf sinnliche Eindrücke zurückführt, die es in Form von Vorstellungen abspeichert, womit das Gedächtnis nicht nur als passiver Speicherort für Vorstellungen konzipiert wird, son-

dern auch als aktives Vermögen diese Vorstellungen zu produzieren, was das Gedächtnis in die Nähe der Vorstellungskraft rückt. Aber nicht nur das Gedächtnis wird von Aristoteles als aktives Vermögen beschrieben, sondern auch das Erinnern, dass er als unserem Willen entzogenen assoziativen Übergang von einer gespeicherten Vorstellung zur nächsten beschreibt: „Der Grund, warum sie [die Menschen] keine Macht über die Erinnerung haben, ist folgender: Wie jemand, der einen Speer geworfen hat, nicht mehr stehen kann, wie er will, so löst derjenige, der sich zu erinnern und einer Spur nachzugehen sucht, etwas Unkörperliches aus, worin die Erregung sich einprägt. [...] Hat die Bewegung einmal begonnen, kommt sie nämlich nicht so leicht zur Ruhe, bis das Gesuchte sich einstellt und die Bewegung selbst auf rechtem Wege ans Ziel gelangt.“ (Aristoteles 2003, 89)

Da sich das Erinnern Aristoteles zufolge als assoziativer Übergang von einem Gedächtnisbild zum nächsten, in gewisser Weise von selbst vollzieht, entsteht im Erinnerungsprozess unter den Vorstellungen eine eigentümlich spontane Ordnung: „Denn ‚im Gedächtnis haben‘ heißt Bewegungsfähigkeit in sich haben; und zwar wie gesagt derart, daß der Geist aus sich selbst und aus seinen eigenen Bewegungen heraus bewegt zu werden vermag. Man braucht dafür nur einen Ausgangsort zu nehmen. Deshalb scheint sich das Erinnern zuweilen über die Anordnung der Örter zu vollziehen. Der Grund liegt darin, daß man in diesem Falle schnell jeweils vom einen auf das andere kommt, z.B. von ‚Milch‘ auf ‚Weiß‘, von ‚Weiß‘ auf ‚Luft‘, von ‚Luft‘ auf ‚Feuchtigkeit‘, von ‚Feuchtigkeit‘ zur Erinnerung an den Herbst ...“ (Aristoteles 2003, 93)

In Bezug auf die zuletzt zitierte Aristotelesstelle ist es wichtig festzuhalten, dass die Erinnerung hier als eine Bewegung von einem Begriff zum anderen, d.h. als ein Schließen begriffen wird.¹ Das ist Aristoteles zufolge auch der Grund dafür, warum ein gutes Gedächtnis (also ein prallgefüllter Vorstellungsspeicher) nicht gleich auch gute Erinnerung (d.h. die Fähigkeit die richtige Vorstellung zu finden) bedeutet: „Daß diejenigen, die über ein vorzügliches Gedächtnis verfügen, nicht zugleich über ein außerordentliches Erinnerungsvermögen verfügen, haben wir

¹ Ein Gedanke, in dem die *Ars combinatoria* des Raimundus Lullus gründet.

schon gesagt. [...] Der Grund ist, daß es sich bei der Erinnerung um einen Syllogismus, d.h. eine Schlussfolgerung handelt. Denn wer sich erinnert, was er gehört, gesehen oder dergleichen sonst getan hat, zieht Schlüsse.“ (Aristoteles 2003, 97)

Natürlich handelt es sich auch in Anbetracht der von Aristoteles zuletzt gelieferten Beispiele nicht um logische Schlüsse, sondern vielmehr um ein Denken in Assoziationen, um ein Denken, dass mehr mit Phantasie zu tun hat, als mit Logik. Die eigentümlichen „Schlüsse“ der Erinnerung sind die Schlüsse einer alternativen Vernunft, die in der Lage ist, Zusammenhänge herzustellen, die dem gewöhnlichen rationalen Schließen verschlossen bleiben müssen. Wir werden sehen, wie dieser Gedanke von den neuplatonischen Mnemonikern der Renaissance fruchtbar gemacht worden ist.

Giulio Camillos Teatro della Memoria. Eine mnemotechnische Erkenntnismaschine

Das Christentum, das durch Paulus und Augustinus viele platonische Momente beibehält, übernimmt auch Platons Zweiweltenlehre mit ihrer Abwertung des Sinnlichen, verlegt die Ideen, das eigentliche Wesen der Dinge aber vom *topos hyperuranios* in den Geist Gottes. Die ewigen Urbilder Platons werden zu den ewigen Ideen Gottes. Der christlichen Tradition zufolge verwirklichte Gott seine Ideen zunächst vollkommen in der Schöpfung. Die Welt vor dem menschlichen Sündenfall stimmte mit der göttlichen Ordnung völlig überein. Die Schöpfung zu erkennen bedeutete in diesem paradiesischen Weltzustand zugleich die Erkenntnis der göttlichen Ideen. Mit dem durch die Ursünde, d.h. der Hybris sein zu wollen wie Gott, verursachten Sündenfall aber fällt gemäß christlicher Lehre nicht nur der Mensch von Gott ab, sondern die ganze Schöpfung. Mit der Ursünde fällt also nicht nur der Mensch, sondern auch die Natur, die der Mensch mit in den Abgrund reißt. Noch in seiner neuesten Ausgabe hält das *Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche* fest:

„Als Wirkung ... [des Sündenfalls] ist nicht nur das Leben der Menschheit in der Geschichte (Gen. 3,15), sondern auch der Lebensraum aller Geschöpfe durch den Fluch Gottes als Ausdruck seines Gerichtswaltens der Einwirkung von Unheilmächten ausgeliefert, so daß der Daseinsvollzug des Menschen im Zeichen einer quälenden Gegensätzlichkeit steht u. seine Anstrengung zum Erhalt des Lebens schließlich im Tod endet (Gen. 3,17ff.). In der Gewalttat dem Bruder gegenüber (Gen. 4) zeigt der durch den Sündenfall hervorgerufene Gerichtszustand der Welt seine Auswirkung auf das menschliche Zusammenleben [...] und stellt, weil die geschichtliche Entfaltung der Menschheit von der Verderbnis durch die Ursünde geprägt ist (Gen. 6,5) [...] den Bestand der ganzen Schöpfung in Frage.“ (Brandscheidt 2000, 1132)

Dieser Auslegung zufolge war das Buch der Natur als Zugang zu den Ideen Gottes, zur göttlichen Ordnung, zur Wahrheit für immer verschlossen, denn nach dem Sündenfall entsprach die Schöpfung nicht mehr der ursprünglichen göttlichen Ordnung der Dinge. Die Natur, wie sie sich unseren Sinnen darbietet, ist eine Verdrehung und Verfälschung der ursprünglichen Ordnung. Im Prolog zu der *Name der Rose* schreibt Umberto Eco's Mönch Adson, den ersten Korintherbrief zitierend, denn auch: „Videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate [wir sehen jetzt durch einen Spiegel in einem Rätsel (1. Kor. 13)], die Wahrheit verbirgt sich im Rätsel, bevor sie sich uns von Angesicht zu Ange-

sicht offenbart, und nur für kurze Augenblicke ... tritt sie hervor im Irrtum der Welt ...“ (Eco 1982, 17) In der Natur, wie sie uns in den Sinnen erscheint, sind die Dinge gleichsam durcheinander geraten und verwirrt. Die Beziehungen unter den Dingen, ihre Bezüge und Zusammenhänge, sind nicht mehr die, die Gott einst gestiftet hatte, sondern das Werk des Teufels, dessen griechischer Name, *Diabolos*, wörtlich „der Durcheienderwerfer, der Verwirrer“ bedeutet.

Bedeutet dies aber, dass es damit keinerlei Zugang mehr zur Erkenntnis der ursprünglichen Wahrheit gibt? Wenn in der Natur die einst von Gott gemeinte Ordnung durch den Sündenfall zerstört wurde und die sinnliche Erfahrung nur post-paradiesische Unordnung bietet, so muss nach einem anderen Weg gesucht werden, die verlorene Ordnung wiederzugewinnen. Wenn sie nicht in der Schöpfung wiederherzustellen ist, so kann man sich ihrer vielleicht erinnern. So jedenfalls lautet die Arbeitshypothese der frühneuzeitlichen Mnemonik.

Mit Bezug auf Raimundus Lullus bemerkt Wolfgang Neuber diesbezüglich: „Die Urteilskraft bedarf, weil sie durch den Sündenfall verdunkelt ist, also der Memoria.“ (Neuber 2001, 1060)

In einem eigentümlichen und für die Renaissance typischen Verfahren, vermengten Denker wie Giulio Camillo und Robert Fludd platonisches, aristotelisches und christliches Gedankengut und entwickelten so die Idee der Mnemonik als Universalwissenschaft. Der Vorstellung der Erinnerung als *clavis universalis* liegt die Idee zugrunde, dass durch die Anwendung der für die Erinnerung typischen Assoziationsmechanismen auf unser Wissen, die ursprüngliche Ordnung der Dinge vor dem Sündenfall wiederhergestellt werden könnte. In den Worten Umberto Eco's: „Die Mnemotechniken der Renaissance sind nicht mehr bloß Werkzeuge, sondern verstehen sich als kosmische Weisheit, als organische *imago mundi*.“ (Eco 1992, 85)

Die Aufgabe der Mnemonik besteht in der systematischen Wiedererinnerung der spezifischen ursprünglichen Ordnung. Denn was die Wirklichkeit ausmacht, sind dieser Theorie zufolge, weniger die Elemente aus denen sie besteht, als vielmehr die Beziehungen, in denen sie zueinander stehen. Die Erinnerung wird so primär als Vermögen betrachtet, die Dinge der Welt anders zusammenzudenken, als es die herkömmliche (gefallene) Vernunft tut. Hier wird die Aristotelische Idee der Erinnerung als besondere Art des Schließens, als andere Art des Denkens, in der Absicht aufgegriffen, ursprüngliche Zusammenhänge zwischen den Dingen wieder sichtbar zu machen, die durch den Sündenfall verschüttet, sprich vergessen wurden. Die Mnemonik zeigt auf, dass unsere Welt, unsere gewohnte Ordnung der Dinge nicht die einzig mögliche ist. Dem Vorhaben der Mnemoniker liegt die Einsicht zugrunde, dass die Beziehungen zwischen den Elementen der Welt, ihre Anordnung, d.h. „die Ordnung der Dinge“ eine andere sein könnte, dass die Taxinomien, die Kategorien des Gleichen und des Verschiedenen anderes bestimmt werden könnten. Um die Brüchigkeit gängiger Ordnung aufzuzeigen, zitiert Michel Foucault in *Die Ordnung der Dinge* (Foucault 1974, 17) Jorge Luis Borges' Bericht von einer *Chinesischen Enzyklopädie*, in der die Tiere wie folgt kategorisiert werden: „[...] a) Tiere, die dem Kaiser gehören, b) einbalsamierte Tiere, c) gezähmte, d) Milchschweine, e) Sirenen, f) Fabeltiere, g) herrenlose Hunde, h) in diese Gruppierung gehörige, i) die sich wie Tolle gebärden, k) die mit einem ganz feinen Pinsel aus Kamelhaar gezeichnet sind, l) und so weiter, m) die den Wasserkrug zerbrochen haben, n) die von weitem wie Fliegen aussehen.“ (Borges 1966, 212) Zu dieser Textstelle bemerkt Foucault: „Wenn wir eine re-

flektierte Klassifizierung einführen, wenn wir sagen, daß die Katze und der Hund sich weniger ähneln als zwei Windhunde, selbst wenn diese beiden gezähmt oder einbalsamiert sind, selbst wenn sie beide wie Irre laufen und wenn sie gerade einen Krug zerbrochen haben, von welchem Boden aus können wir es mit aller Gewißheit feststellen? [...] [G]emäß welchem Raum an Identitäten, Ähnlichkeiten, Analogien haben wir die Gewohnheit gewonnen, so viele verschiedene und ähnliche Dinge einzuteilen? Welche Kohärenz ist das, von der man sofort sieht, daß sie weder durch eine Verkettung a priori und notwendig determiniert ist, noch durch unmittelbar spürbare Inhalte auferlegt wird? Denn es handelt sich nicht darum Konsequenzen zu verbinden, sondern konkrete Inhalte aneinander anzunähern, zu analysieren, zu isolieren, anzupassen und zu verschachteln. Nichts ist tastender, nichts ist empirischer (wenigstens dem Anschein nach) als die Einrichtung einer Ordnung unter den Dingen.“ (Foucault 1974, 21)

Die Mnemoniken der Renaissance ordnen die Dinge unter Verwendung der eigentümlichen „Vernunft“, d.h. des eigentümlichen Schließens der Erinnerung, anders in der Annahme, dass diese andere Ordnung der ursprünglichen göttlichen Ordnung, d.h. der Wahrheit mehr entspreche als die Ordnung, die sich unseren Sinnen und unserer Vernunft darstellt.

Phantasie wie Erinnerung stellen alternative Beziehungsraaster, alternative „Verlinkungen“ zwischen den Dingen her, die den „vernünftigen“ Zusammenhängen unserer gewohnten Welt zuwiderlaufen und den Vertretern der Mnemonik zufolge „wahrer“ sind als unsere gewohnte Wirklichkeit. Die Mnemonik stellt nun den Versuch dar, die auf assoziative Vorgänge beruhenden Verknüpfungen, wie sie sich in der Phantasie, im Traum und in der Erinnerung unwillkürlich in unserem Geist einstellen, zu veräußern und zu mechanisieren. Die Mnemoniker wollen also die unbewussten Vorgänge in unserem Innern, wie sie im Traum, in der Phantasie und in der Erinnerung ablaufen und die hauptsächlich in einer völlig ungewohnten Verknüpfung der Weltelemente bestehen, außerhalb des menschlichen Geistes nachbilden, um so alternative Ordnungen systematisch herstellen zu können.

Eine der bekanntesten dieser *Seelenmaschinen* stellt das von Frances Yates in ihrem Standardwerk *Gedächtnis und Erinnern* ausführlich beschriebene *Teatro della Memoria* des Giulio Camillo (1480-1544) dar. (Camillo 1991; Bolzoni 1984)

Den Quellen zufolge, hatte Camillo zunächst die gesamten Schriften Ciceros gesammelt, der als Universalgelehrter galt und in dessen Texten man folglich hoffen konnte, das gesamte überhaupt zu erlangende Wissen, d.h. die ganze Welt, in Schriftform vor sich zu haben. Diese Textsammlung enthielt Camillo zufolge also alle Elemente, aus denen unsere Welt besteht, nur eben in der selben unsäglichen Ordnung, oder besser Unordnung, in die sie der Sündenfall versetzt hatte. Camillos *Teatro della Memoria* besteht nun folgerichtig in einem komplizierten Mechanismus, mit dessen Hilfe es möglich sein sollte, die Elemente der Welt, hier repräsentiert durch die Texte Ciceros, anders zu ordnen. Konkret handelte es sich dabei um eine Konstruktion aus unzähligen mit Figuren und Zeichen versehenen Kästchen, in denen Textfragmente Ciceros aufbewahrt wurden. Je nachdem, in welcher Kombination man diese Kästchen öffnete und die darin enthaltenen Texte zusammen las, ergaben sich neue Zusammenhänge. Ein kritischer Zeitgenosse Camillos berichtet: „Das Werk ist aus Holz, im Innern mit vielen Bildern versehen und voll von kleinen Kästchen; es gibt verschiedene Ord-

nungen und Zonen darin. ... [Camillo] hat für dieses sein Theater viele Namen, mal nennt er es einen gebauten oder gestalteten Geist oder Seele, mal sagt er, es sei mit Fenstern versehen. Er gibt vor, daß alles, was der menschliche Geist erfassen kann und was wir mit dem körperlichen Auge nicht sehen können, nachdem es durch sorgfältige Meditation gesammelt sei, durch gewisse körperhafte Zeichen in einer solchen Weise zum Ausdruck gebracht werden könne, daß der Betrachter mit seinen Augen sogleich alles begreifen kann, was sonst in den Tiefen des menschlichen Geistes verborgen ist.“ (Yates 2001, 124)

In seinem Theater versucht Camillo, die hermetisch-kabbalistische Tradition mit dem Christentum und der klassischen Gedächtniskunst zu vereinen. Doch wie hat man sich Camillos *Teatro* genauer vorzustellen? „Das Theater steigt in sieben Rängen oder Stufen an, die durch sieben Gänge, als Repräsentanten der sieben Planeten, unterteilt werden. [...] An jedem der sieben Gänge befinden sich sieben, mit vielen Bildern verzierte Bögen oder Tore. [...] Die imaginären Bögen sind seine [des Theaters] mit Bildern ausgestatteten Gedächtnisorte.“ (Yates 2001, 128)

Zur Bedeutung schreibt Camillo in seinem Traktat *L'idea del Teatro* selbst: „Salomon sagt im neunten Kapitel der Proverbien, daß sich die Weisheit selbst ein Haus gebaut und es auf sieben Säulen gegründet hat. Durch diese Säulen, die die beständige Ewigkeit bezeichnen, können wir die sieben Sefiroth der überhimmlischen Welt verstehen, die die sieben Maßeinheiten des Gefüges der himmlischen und niederen Welten darstellen, in dem die Ideen aller Dinge sowohl in den himmlischen wie in den niederen Welten enthalten sind.“ (Yates 2001, 128.)

In einer für die hermetisch-kabbalistische Tradition typischen Weise werden den Sefiroth, d.h. den sieben göttlichen Essenzen von denen die jüdische Kabbala spricht, die sieben Planeten des Zodiacus und die sieben jüdisch-christlichen Engel zugeordnet. Diese symbolisieren die sieben Grundideen oder Prinzipien, nach denen die Welt geordnet ist. Jedes dieser Prinzipien kennt nun Camillo zufolge unterschiedliche Ausformungen je nachdem, auf welchem „Rang“ der Schöpfung, d.h. in welchem Wirklichkeitsbereich es zur Anwendung kommt. Diese unterschiedlichen „Ränge“ sind, wie die sieben Grundprinzipien in Camillos Theater bildlich dargestellt, wobei die Bilder aus der antiken Mythologie genommen sind: „Camillos Theater stellt also das Universum dar, wie es sich von den Ersten Ursachen [den Prinzipien] durch die Stufen der Schöpfung ausbreitet.“ (Yates 2001, 131) Den Sektor, der die Wirkungen des Prinzips „Apollo“, d.h. der Sonne und des Lichts betrifft, beschreibt Yates wie folgt: „Zuerst erscheinen die einfachen Elemente der Wasser im Bankett-Rang [die mythologische Darstellungen eines Festmahls der Götter, das Camillo aus der Tradition übernimmt]; dann die Vermischung der Elemente in der Höhle; dann die Erschaffung des *mens*, des Menschen, nach dem Bild Gottes im Rang der Gorgonen-Schwester; dann die Vereinigung von Seele und Körper des Menschen im Rang von Pasiphae mit dem Stier; dann die gesamte Welt der menschlichen Tätigkeiten; seine natürlichen Tätigkeiten im Rang der Sandalen des Merkurs; seine Künste, Wissenschaften, Religion und Gesetz im Rang des Prometheus. In Camillos System gibt es zwar auch unorthodoxe Elemente [...], doch enthalten seine Ränge offenkundig Anklänge an die orthodoxen Schöpfungstage.“ (Yates 2001, 131)

Diese Darstellung spiegelt Camillo zufolge die Ordnung der Dinge wider, d.h. die Elemente der Wirklichkeit und die zwischen ihnen bestehenden Beziehungen, wobei den

bildlichen Darstellungen wohl die Macht von Talismanen zugeschrieben wurde, die es ermöglichen, die Wesenheiten als solche zu erkennen: „Ein solcher innerer oder imaginativer Gebrauch der Talisman-Bilderwerke konnte in der okkulten Version der Gedächtniskunst ein höchst geeignetes Vehikel finden. Wenn die in einem solchen Gedächtnissystem verwendeten grundlegenden Gedächtnisbilder die Kraft eines Talismans hatten oder eine solche ihnen zugeschrieben wurde, nämlich die Kraft, die himmlischen Einflüsse und den Geist in das Gedächtnis herabzuziehen, dann würde aus diesem Gedächtnis das Gedächtnis des ‚göttlichen‘ Menschen in enger Verbindung mit den göttlichen Mächten des Kosmos werden.“ (Yates 2001, 142)

Camillos „Gedächtnisbauwerk sollte die Ordnung der ewigen Wahrheit darstellen und in ihm sollte das Universum durch organische Assoziation aller seiner Teile mit ihrer zugrundeliegenden ewigen Ordnung erinnert werden.“ (Yates 2001, 129)

Zur Bedeutung von Camillos *Teatro della memoria* für das Verständnis radikalen Neuanfangs, den die Renaissance in ihrer Abkehr mittelalterlicher Denkformen bedeutet, schreibt Yates: „Geist und Gedächtnis eines Menschen werden jetzt als „göttlich“ angesehen und haben die Fähigkeit, die höchste Wirklichkeit durch magisch aktivierte Vorstellungskraft zu erfassen. Die hermetische Gedächtniskunst ist zum Instrument in der Bildung eines Magiers geworden, die imaginativen Mittel, durch die der göttliche Mikrokosmos den göttlichen Makrokosmos widerspiegeln kann, können dessen Sinn von einer höheren Warte aus erfassen, von jenem göttlichen Rang, zu dem sein *mens* gehört. Die Gedächtniskunst ist zu einer okkulten Kunst, zu einem hermetischen Geheimnis geworden.“ (Yates 2001, 144)

Zu den Maschinen die, im Stile Camillos *Teatro della Memoria* die Antworten auf alle möglichen Fragen enthalten sollten, zählen sowohl die parodistische Maschine aus *Gullivers Reisen* (vgl. Neuber 2001, 1066), wie die *Bibliothek von Babel* Borches', die alle möglichen Kombinationen aus Buchstaben und Leerzeichen enthält und so, unter Unmengen völlig unsinniger Texte, auch jeden überhaupt möglichen Text.

Die frühneuzeitlichen Mnemoniken haben so versucht, die ursprüngliche, verschüttete und vergessene Ordnung der Dinge, wie sie vor dem Sündenfall bzw. im Geiste Gottes besteht, wiederzuentdecken, d.h. eine andere, ursprüngliche Ordnung der Dinge aufzuzeigen und so zu wahrer unerschütterlicher Erkenntnis zu gelangen.

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Does Thought Happen In The Brain?

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Abstract

What is the nature of thought? Is thought linguistic and some kind of silent speech? Or is it pre-linguistic and some kind of association of ideas and images in the mind? Does it happen in the brain? I will focus on the last question, but also say something about the other two. I will present a simple thought experiment to show that thought must somehow happen in the brain. But then I will soften the impression this might give by pointing out what is needed to read those thoughts. Simply put, ontologically, thought is in the brain, epistemologically, it is not.

We all know that learning how to speak and think requires that we grow up in a society among people who already know how to do so. Without them such learning would not happen. Other people, other brains, and many cultural and bodily features are needed and involved in the process. But once we have learned how to do it, we can close our eyes and think by ourselves. Now imagine someone asks you what is the sum of 227 and 159. You concentrate and close your eyes and after some mental calculation you tell him the sum is 386. When asked the question, vibrations of air strike your ears. Your brain operates and after a while your mouth produces other vibrations of air that reach the ears of your interlocutor, who nods with a smile of satisfaction. The only thing that has happened in the time between the question (the air waves striking your ears) and the answer (your mouth forming other air waves) has been the operations in your body, especially in your brain. Nothing else has had any causal impact of relevance. A bird was flying by and your opponent was eagerly waiting. But this did not matter.

Such a simple thought experiment makes me think that the calculation happens not only in your "mind" as we say, but more specifically in your body, especially your brain. There are no ghosts, neither in your brain, nor outside. If you think the thought experiment is inappropriate because calculating is not thinking, we can imagine another thought experiment. A friend asks you whether you want to have dinner with him next Wednesday in such and such a restaurant. You think about your schedule for next week and whether you really want to have dinner with this friend and whether you like the restaurant for that occasion. After a few seconds, you give an answer. We can also imagine that this happens over the telephone and that you ask your friend to wait for a moment because you have to think. You close your eyes and think about the question for a minute and then reply. Also here, all that went on between the moment when the air waves struck your ears and the moment when your mouth formed other air waves were the operations in your body, especially your brain. Imagining the dinner is something that you can feel in your stomach. It affects your stomach and this affects your decision. The mere thought of seeing your friend again, and being seen with him, is something that you can feel inside of you. The feeling, and the thought, takes place in your whole body, including your fingertips. In any case, all that had a causal impact on the answer in that interval of time was happening in your body. Of course the temperature and general atmosphere in your office also had an influence. But also that was felt and dealt with in your body then.

Based on the above considerations, it seems to me that we can say that thought happens in the body, especially in the brain. But who can read and understand it? If some

smart neuroscientist were to look into your brain while you were adding the numbers or thinking about the invitation for dinner, would he be able to tell what you think? Could he tell what you were about to answer when you had made up your mind? Starting at the end, with your answer: If he had a graphic record of the air waves your mouth produced (1), together with a smart translation manual of such graphic records into written words (0), he could read your answer off in this way. If, moving closer to the thought process itself, he had a graphic record of your brain activities (2) that dictate the movements of your mouth, together with another smart translation manual of such graphic records into the kind of graphic record (1) mentioned above, he could read your answer as well. It is difficult for us to imagine what such graphic records would have to look like, but it is even more difficult to imagine how reading your thoughts in the middle of the process of thinking (3) would look like, because especially for this we do not have the appropriate words at all. They would have to be invented by cognitive scientists. Thoughts in the making are vague, momentary, and fleeting. Also the experimental data are not available so far. Maybe one day they will. Then the words will be invented, and mind reading will be possible to some degree and in some way. What is going on in the brain is very different from words and well-formed sentences as we have them now, and it is also different from what we now understand by "thought" (because we have very limited understanding of it so far). There is a long way from neuron firings to our present, everyday understanding of thought, be it in terms of words or images. If in the future more data are available and a new vocabulary has developed with those data, mind reading will be possible to some degree. But it will not be a mapping as we might expect it now, because at present time we do not have the words for such mind reading. At least so far we don't.

This brings me back to the other two questions raised at the beginning of this essay: Is our thinking linguistic and some kind of silent speech? Or is it pre-linguistic and some kind of association of ideas and images in the mind? Bennett and Hacker in *Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience* (2003) have argued that thought depends on language. A dog can be said to expect to be taken for a walk when it becomes excited because it hears his master come. But does this mean that the dog "thinks" it will be "taken for a walk"? I have my doubts here. Peter Hacker is more generous, or optimistic, here. He writes: "It makes perfectly good sense to say of a dog that it thinks something or other, as long as what it is said to think is something that can be manifest in its behavioural repertoire. A dog may now think that it is going to be taken for a walk – if it hears its leash being taken off the peg, it rushes excitedly to the door, wagging its tail and barking excitedly. But it cannot now think that it is going to be taken for a walk

next Wednesday.” (335). I think it is problematic, even without mentioning Wednesday, to say that a dog can think it will be “taken for a walk”, because our description uses the words “taken” and “walk” and I am not sure that dogs have comparable concepts. Bennett and Hacker think of a comparable behavioral repertoire and maybe I could accept this.

A similar problem can be seen in a passage from Wittgenstein in which he compares expectation to fulfillment, as well as the imagination of seeing to the actual seeing of someone coming into a room: “How does it look when he comes? – The door opens, someone walks in, and so on. – How does it look if I expect him to come? – I walk up and down in the room, look at the clock now and then, and so on. – But the one occurrence does not have the slightest similarity to the other! So how can one use the same words in describing them? – But perhaps I say as I walk up and down: ‘I expect him to come’. – Now there is a similarity at hand. But of what kind?” (PI 444, translation by Malcolm) Norman Malcolm in the essay “The Mystery of Thought” has commented on this passage. He says: “The similarity between the two lies in the language” (193), and he quotes Wittgenstein: “It is in language that expectation and fulfillment make contact” (PI 445). In PI 444 Wittgenstein also says, that “language abstracts” from the difference, for instance regarding expectation and fulfillment. I think this makes sense when the issue is about our human thoughts, expectations, and imaginations, because we humans have language and for us language can be said to abstract from differences. But dogs cannot speak. Hence I would not be sure about this way of relying on language to bridge the gap between our thinking “he comes” and a dog’s supposedly thinking “he comes”. Dogs cannot speak. They do not have a say in this.

Of course, in the passages quoted above, Malcolm and Wittgenstein are concerned with human thought in relation to language, not about animal thought. Malcolm concludes: “When we speak truthfully and without deceiving ourselves, the objects of our thought are what we say they are. There is no gap between our language and the objects of our thought, a gap that needs to be bridged by surrogates or mental intermediaries” (194). This I think makes sense in case we have words for our thoughts, such as “I expect him to come”. But it will be problematic when we think of human thoughts that are in the process of developing and where the words to describe them are not available. This is comparable to the situation when we think of what a dog might be “thinking”. In both cases, we lack data, insight, and vocabulary.

Instead of focusing on animals, let me introduce ways of thinking we humans sometimes entertain and that are also not easily translatable into words. Bennett and Hacker give useful examples here, namely from mathematical thought. They quote Einstein saying: “The words of the language, as they are written or spoken, do not seem to play any role in my mechanism of thought. The psychical entities which seem to serve as elements of thought are certain signs and more or less clear images which can be ‘voluntarily’ reproduced and combined” (338). Similarly, Roger Penrose writes: “Almost all my mathematical thinking is done visually and in terms of non-verbal concepts. ... Often ... there simply are not the words available to express the concepts that are required. I often calculate using specially designed diagrams which constitute a shorthand for certain types of algebraic expression. ... This is not to say that I do not sometimes think in words, it is just that I find words almost useless for *mathematical* thinking.” (ibid.) I agree. I myself used to be a professional mathematician before turning into a professional philosopher, and I agree with

Penrose’s description. I also imagine that architects and all kinds of handicraft workers, sportsmen, and musicians do not think in words but rely on visual and bodily concepts that we do not easily have words for in our everyday language. They use these concepts when they work and play intuitively, and these concepts are rooted in their body in relation to certain tools, instruments, and other forms of environment. These are know-how concepts that are imbedded in the life-worlds of these practitioners and we do not easily have words for them. Linguistic thoughts form only part of the world of thought. Of course taking things this way presupposes a wide notion of concept and thought, one that includes know-how concepts. I tend to subscribe to such a notion.

Bennett and Hacker argue that Penrose’s description of mathematical thought is “misleading” (345), because a mathematician still thinks in “universally accepted symbols” and concepts that have “rule-governed use” (ibid). I disagree. I believe that relying on symbols and their rule-governed use is not Penrose’s main point. Creative mathematical thought also involves foggy, imprecise, ambiguous, momentary, private diagrams and procedures for which we do not have rule-governed, fixed, and universally accepted symbols. It is here, in this fog, where I think inspiration takes place. How else should it happen? (See Wenzel 2001)

Coming back to the question of whether thoughts happen in the brain, or body, I would say, yes, they do. But I would immediately add that in order to understand them one needs to understand their use as well. One cannot just look into the body, or brain, from the outside and read the thoughts off there, without having the right translation manual, which in turn requires the proper words, which unfortunately we often do not have. Allow me to illustrate this with an analogy. To understand what a car is, you must know how it is used. If a car were transported into another world that has no gravitation, the people living there would have a hard time figuring out what a car is by just looking at it. The wheels in that world would be literally “spinning in the void”, if I may use metaphor, one McDowell uses to explain that concepts go “all the way out”. Concepts are rooted in perception and use. Similarly, cars must be driven on the road. Thoughts must be put into action. The handicraft worker has know-how, and the researcher in mathematics engages in non-standard operations. For this we often do not have the appropriate words, as we don’t have them for the thoughts happening in their brains.

The passage from Wittgenstein, quoted above, is about thoughts that can be expressed in words. But I think that for many of our thoughts and concepts we do not have suitable words. In this I assume a wide notion of what thoughts are. Furthermore, I imagine thoughts when they gradually unfold and develop. I think of the process of thinking. When doing research, mathematicians not only use formulas but also they often imagine things in idiosyncratic and non-standard ways, allowing variation, modification, vagueness, and indeterminacy, and even, momentarily, contradiction. Handicraft workers use their hands and they show us how to do things. Musicians and athletes perform and play for us to see and hear. This is how they express themselves. Words do not suffice. Bennett and Hacker say that the limits of thought are the limits of “behavioral repertoire” and “possible expression” (335). That is fine, but I wish to add that behavioral repertoire and expression do not need to be standard. They can be idiosyncratic. The same applies to thought, for instance as it occurs in a researcher’s mind. Supposing that “a concept is

an abstraction from the use of words" (339) makes the notion of a concept too narrow, at least to my taste.

In any case, it seems to me that, no matter how much one restricts thought to linguistic thought, it remains true that, on the one hand, thought *happens* in the body (brain) and, on the other hand, being able to read this kind of thought (in the body, and especially in the brain) requires an *understanding* of the use of the relevant concepts. Looking at the handicraft worker, the athlete, or the musician in order to understand what they think and what is going on in their minds, one must understand what they do. (Just as, in order to understand what a car is, one must know how to drive it in this world.) It will be difficult to come up with a translation manual from brain activity into words, because we do not have the right words to express how the activities of handicraft workers, sportsmen, musicians, or mathematicians are actually formed. Too many factors come in. We do not have words to express know-how thoughts. We often prefer to show what we mean. Nor do we have the words to express the process of inspiration in doing research in mathematics.

From such considerations we can see that it will be difficult to read brain activities. This applies to thoughts in general when they are in the process of being developed and formed. Talking about this does not belong to our rep-

ertoire. Thought is hidden, fleeting, complex and momentary. I think we could bring it out to some degree, but so far we do not have the words for such momentary processes. We only have the words for our everyday activities as far as we can make distinctions, plus the specialized vocabulary used by scientists and other specialists. But so far we neither have the words to describe brain activities nor the data of those activities. At least we have very little of this at the moment. Things will change, as our life worlds will change. Mind reading will have to become everyday, at least for some specialists. But that is for the future.

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A Note on Part II of Remarks on Frazer's "The Golden Bough"

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Abstract

In light of some text-critical observations on MS 143 (Part II of *Remarks on Frazer's "The Golden Bough"*) it is suggested in this paper that the thirteen loose sheets of MS 143 should be divided into two parts, which can be called "the frame" and "the central section", and that the latter can be viewed as belonging to Wittgenstein's late remarks on the philosophy of psychology.

Introduction

Ludwig Wittgenstein turned his attention to *The Golden Bough*, J.G. Frazer's masterpiece on the themes of anthropology and the history of religion, on two occasions: during the summer months of 1931 (MS 110) and most probably during a few weeks of his final working period of 1949 to 1951 (MS 143). His remarks on the work were collected and edited by R. Rhees, who published them in 1967 as *Bemerkungen über Frazer's "The Golden Bough"* in the journal *Synthese*. The published text is divided into two parts. Part I consists primarily of pages 313-322 from TS 211, while Part II consists of thirteen loose sheets that G.E.M. Anscombe found among Wittgenstein's belongings after his death. MS 143 is today in the keeping of the Wren Library, Trinity College, Cambridge.

In the following I will concentrate on Part II of the *Bemerkungen* and sketch one possible reading thereof, in which I seek to establish a link between the loose sheets of the central section (MS 143,4-10) and Wittgenstein's remarks on the philosophy of psychology, a theme of central concern to him in his final years. For the point I wish to make is that parts of Wittgenstein's late remarks on Frazer presuppose and belong to a context that differs markedly from that of anthropology and the philosophy of religion, which are often assumed to be the dominant concerns of both Part I and Part II. Let me begin with a text-critical clarification.

1. Varying sizes

MS 143 consists of thirteen non-paginated loose sheets of two different sizes. All the remarks on the loose sheets are written in pencil. Seven of the loose sheets are unfolded leaves from a lined notebook. Five of these are intact, full-size leaves (height 33 cm, width 21 cm), while the other two are half leaves. Of these seven sheets, all but one are covered in writing from top to bottom, front and back, thus amounting to thirteen pages of text (MS 143,4-10). Each of the remaining six loose sheets consists of half of one of the larger sheets (height 16.6 cm, width 21 cm), which has subsequently been folded down the middle, thus producing what looks like a small booklet with four smaller pages. The pages of these folded sheets hold amounts of writing that vary from a single remark at the top of a page to a full page of text. Six pages are entirely blank. Thus these folded sheets account for eighteen pages of text (MS 143,1-3,11-13), consisting of sketch-like remarks that appear to have been written in haste. The only indication of some principle of organisation in Part II is a number of references to the pages of the abridged edition of Frazer's *The Golden Bough*. These references are fairly evenly distributed, albeit with a notable scarcity around the middle of MS 143. In Rhees' 1967 publication (Part II of the *Syn-*

these edition) the loose sheets are arranged and reproduced according to Wittgenstein's references to Frazer, the first of which is to page 168 (MS 143,1), the last to page 681 (MS 143,13). One striking feature of MS 143 – a direct consequence of this ordering principle – is that the first three and the last three of the loose sheets are all of the same format, namely that of the folded sheets (MS 143,1-3,11-13), while the middle section is made up entirely of the larger, unfolded and mostly full-page sheets (MS 143,4-10). Corresponding to these differences in size is a difference in the content and style of the remarks; the remarks of the opening and concluding sheets are predominantly in the familiar sketch-like or fragmentary style of the *Bemerkungen's* Part I, whereas the text of the central section of Part II consists of a longer process of uninterrupted reflection, amounting to an extended and coherent enquiry. In other words, Part II of the *Bemerkungen* consists of two different types of texts, which are associated respectively with the different formats and styles of the loose sheets: the fragmentary, sketch-like remarks of the folded sheets and the longer, continuous enquiry of the full-page loose sheets. The content and themes of the two text parts differ accordingly. In the following I shall refer to the opening (MS 143,1-3) and concluding (MS 143,11-13) folded sheets as the *frame*, and the seven full pages as the *central section* of Part II (MS 143,4-10). This text-critical observation is also reflected in the frequently overlooked fact that, when Rhees published an English translation of *Bemerkungen* in *The Human World* (1971), he omitted the frame of Part II, publishing only the central section. A few years after that 1971 publication, Rhees wrote in a letter (now in the National Library of Finland, Helsinki) to K.L. Ketner: "When I was preparing this translation for publication I omitted one or two passages which had been published in the German text in *Synthese*, since they were less directly connected with the main theme than the others" (Rhees, 10.04.1973). In other words, Rhees was fully aware of the discontinuities in MS 143 and was himself inclined to isolate the central section from the frame.

2. Varying foci

In most treatments of *Bemerkungen* there is a clear tendency to ignore the distinctions between Parts I and II of the text and to regard them as single whole. Examples of this are legion. In consequence, the distinctive character and status of Part II as an independent manuscript tends to get neglected, with the loose sheets being reduced to "insertions to his earlier remarks". There are, however, a few readings that consider Part II as a separate and independent entity. These can be divided into two categories. *Firstly*, there are the harmonising interpretations, which assign a degree of independence to Part II, but which still regard the two parts as compatible. These include for example the reading by R. Bell, in which the author stresses

the fact that in Part II Wittgenstein maintains that magical practices, as exemplified for instance by the Scottish Fire Festivals, aim "at nothing at all; we just behave this way and then we feel satisfied" (BüF 237); they are "expressions of human life in all its paradoxicalness" (Bell 1978:122-123). Also in this category are F. Cioffi's view that Part II should be regarded as an elaboration of the familiar attempt at self-scrutiny that we find in Part I, the "attempt to unravel the web of associations wound round the subject by nature and the unavoidable conditions of humanity" (Cioffi 1981:234), and A. Motturi's so-called "anti-ismatic" reading, which maintains that, like Part I, Part II should be regarded as a tentative description of magical practices, an attempt at anti-ismatic thinking that excludes any attempt to form a theory or a general hypothesis about the Fire Festivals (Motturi 2003:208). *Secondly*, there are a number of readings that insist on a lack of continuity between the two parts, analyses that regard Part II as characterised by something new in Wittgenstein's treatment of *The Golden Bough*. Among those who hold this position, there is, however, no consensus on what the new aspect is. B.R. Clack's "morphological" reading, for example, notes that Part II stands out for its focus on the form and structure of the Fire Festivals. Wittgenstein's primary interest in Part II is to identify the formal characteristics of the Beltane Festival – its "physiognomy of terror", "its 'inner nature' – that creates such a sinister impression" (Clack 1999:144). For Rhees, on the other hand, the interesting thing is that Part II approaches the question of the invention of the rite from an entirely new angle. What matters here is no longer some principle which is "present in our own mind" (BüF 238), but the "surroundings of a way of acting". "To invent" a rite is akin to "inventing a language". Like language, a rite needs "an infinitely broader basis if" it is "to be preserved" (BüF 249). In Part II there is no reference "to the principle by which all these [magical] practices are ordered, which each of us has in his own mind, so that each could think out all possibilities for himself. He does speak in this second set of 'inventing festivals' or 'inventing ceremonies', but it is something different now" (Rhees 1971:27).

3. Like seeing a man

Turning now to the philosophical-psychological reading of the central section of *Bemerkungen's* Part II, I shall set aside the sketch-like remarks of the frame of Part II, which deal directly with Frazer's descriptions of homeopathic and contagious magic, with his intellectualism, and with his evolutionary account of magic and religion. What the central section sets out to do is map the grammar of a type of impression, namely the impression of the deep and the sinister which attaches to the practice of the Beltane Fire Festival. What Wittgenstein is concerned with here is a philosophical-psychological question about the nature of the impression and the rules or criteria of evidence that it presupposes. And the decisive *locus* in the grammatical description of this impression is the following remark: "When I see such a practice, or hear of it, it is like seeing a man speaking harshly to someone else over a trivial matter, and noticing from his tone of voice and facial expression that this man can on occasion be terrible. The impression that I receive here can be very deep and extraordinarily serious" (BüF 249). Here the dialogue with Frazer has receded into the background. Instead, space is given to an extended enquiry, which from a *general* perspective seeks to establish the grammar of the impression, *partly* by identifying the formal and structural characteristics of the Scottish Fire Festivals that are decisive in arousing in us an impression of something deep and dark, and *partly* by

clarifying the nature of the impression as based in "our own feelings and thoughts" (BüF 246). These two approaches are internally related. Seen from this perspective, the subject matter has little to do with anthropology or the philosophy of religion. The assumed horizon is rather Wittgenstein's late attempts to clarify the conditions or criteria that must apply for me to say "I know..." – meaning: I can determine or say something about – another person's feelings and psychological states. In this respect, one of the central and implicit questions behind the reflections of Part II is: When am I entitled to claim, and what is the point of departure for a meaningful assertion, that "I know" or "I have the impression" that a particular person is angry, anxious, sad or is expressing a sincere or genuine feeling? The question is essentially about the criteria for the meaningful use of psychological terms and the contexts in which they occur. It is questions relating to this area of language, observations and descriptions thereof, and the relevant rules of evidence, that form the primary concern of the central section of Part II. For here Wittgenstein is preoccupied with outlining the particular grammar that is operative in the tensions that exist between a ritual and our impression of this kind of practice. And the main question of the analysis is therefore: What is it that produces the impression of something deep and sinister in the Beltane Festival? In other words, in the analysis in Part II of *Bemerkungen*, the behaviour of another person, and the characteristics thereof, are replaced by the evidence of the ritual as such or by reports about the ritual of the Fire Festival and the rules that govern it. Here "evidence of the other person's behaviour – observer's impression" is equated with "evidence of the ritual's practices – observer's impression". Thus there is a relationship between, on the one hand, Wittgenstein's account of the experience of seeing that another person's "look was sinister and black", or that "he has a black look" (Z §506) or of having the impression that "he looked at me with a strange smile" (LWPP I,§377), and, on the other, the treatment of this theme in Part II of *Bemerkungen*, where the focus is simply shifted onto the rules of evidence behind the experience or impression of something deep or sinister that "attaches" to the Fire Festivals. Consequently, what is being equated here can be summed up roughly as follows: The way we relate to the Fire Festivals corresponds to the way we relate to another person. We look at the Fire Festivals in the way we look at another person. The Fire Festivals look at us the way another human being looks at us. The impression the Fire Festivals make on us is comparable to the impression we have when we say of someone "he has a black look".

4. Non-hypothetical, psychological evidence

The primary focus of the central section is thus Wittgenstein's interest in the impression as such, and the fact that something deep and sinister "attaches" to the Beltane Festivals. The interest is of a grammatical nature. Hence the questions are: What is the nature of the impression? What is it founded upon? What experiential frame does it entail? What kinds of judgement does the impression encompass? What kind of certainty lies in these judgments? Wittgenstein points out that the impression here is of an entirely different nature from the impressions and understanding of the Beltane Festival, which are grounded in what he summarily calls "*thought*" (BüF 251). Here Wittgenstein is thinking of the impressions or the forms of understanding that presuppose rules of evidence of a different kind from those that apply especially in connection with the use of psychological concepts, namely the impressions or the understanding that occur in connection with thought-

ful observation, interpretation, the framing of hypotheses, the making of inductive and deductive inferences, the assessment of probabilities and explanations of a historical-genetic nature. The type of impression that Wittgenstein seeks to illuminate in Part II of *Bemerkungen* is one that occurs in a context where the rules of evidence are of a different kind than those that apply to *thoughts*.

By distinguishing between impressions that are grounded in "thought" and impressions that are not grounded in an intellectual act or interpretation – namely those that are based on "non-hypothetical, psychological" (BüF 248) evidence – Wittgenstein presupposes and raises several central issues from the philosophy of psychology. These include assessments relating to "the phenomenon of immediate insight or impression" that arise in interpersonal relationships and not least in conjunction with the impression we have of other people's facial expressions. It is pointed out that the use of terms such as joy, anger, regret and sadness are not always based on a thoughtful observation or an interpretation of clear evidence of the respective emotion. "We see emotion." – As opposed to what? – We do not see facial contortions and make *inferences* from them (like a doctor framing a diagnosis) to joy, grief, boredom. We describe a face immediately as sad, radiant, bored, even when we are unable to provide any other description of the features. – Grief, one would like to say, is personified in the face" (Z §225). And one would like to add, in continuation of my suggested reading: the deep and the sinister is "personified" in the Fire Festivals.

Acknowledging these characteristics of the immediate impression and those of its contrary – the impression that has a basis in "*thought*" – the question arises: under what conditions do such impressions occur? What rules of evidence are applicable in connection with the immediate impression? What horizon or experiences do we have to assume as conditions for the impression? It is this latter question in particular that Part II of the *Bemerkungen* addresses by adducing that the impression of the deep and sinister is grounded in "our own feelings and thoughts" (BüF 246) and in "all the strange things I see, and have seen and heard about, in myself and others" (BüF 251). These two quotations from the central section of Part II of *Bemerkungen* presuppose, allude to, and thematize Wittgenstein's analysis of "rules of evidence", "imponderable evidence" (PUIIxi,228), "subjective certainty" (PUIIxi,225) and "Menschenkenntnis" (PUIIxi,227) – and hence also his analysis of practical reason or judgement, which is grounded in precisely the experience we have accumu-

lated from "our own feelings and thoughts" and from "all the strange things I see, and have seen and heard about, in myself and others" – that practical reason or judgement that is not acquired "by taking a course in it [Menschenkenntnis], but through 'experience'" (PUIIxi,227). It is this horizon of experience and the practical reason or judgement associated with it that Wittgenstein outlines in his analysis of "imponderable evidence" and "subjective certainty", and which he has in mind in the account he gives in *Bemerkungen* of the immediate impression of the deep and sinister in the Beltane Festival. In this fire festival, darkness is "personified" in the ritual actions, just as grief is personified in the human face. In both cases the impression arises as a consequence of our "Menschenkenntnis". "Indeed, how is it that in general human sacrifice is so deep and sinister? For is it only the suffering of the victim that makes this impression on us? There are illnesses of all kinds which are connected with just as much suffering, *nevertheless* they do not call forth this impression. No, the deep and the sinister do not become apparent merely by our coming to know the history of the external action, rather it is we who ascribe them from an inner experience" (BüF 249).

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Mathematics as modifying concepts

Wittgenstein's picture of a mathematics without propositions

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Abstract

In numerous passages in the Nachlass, Wittgenstein describes mathematical proofs as modifying or creating concepts. Crispin Wright and Felix Mühlhölzer develop a dilemma out of this idea: Since Wittgenstein does not allow for objective and normative rules governing the correct use of a concept, it seems impossible to conceive of a proof changing it.

I will argue that in carrying out a proof the mathematician is introduced into a new use of a concept directly without any reference to the proven proposition. Wittgenstein's emphasis on proofs as modifying concepts can thus be interpreted as consequence of his bigger project to argue for a picture of mathematics, as consisting mainly in proofs and techniques rather than propositions.

1 Proofs change or create concepts

Since an complete overview of the passages in which Wittgenstein describes proofs as modifying, changing or creating concepts is hard to give, I will just give a glimpse on some contexts in which he uses this expression. The conclusion can be drawn, that Wittgenstein did not use "concept modification" to denote one specific property of mathematical proofs. Quite on the contrary a variety of functions and roles of proofs can be subsumed under this expression. The following list gives a rough overview:

1. Proofs introduce new applications of concepts and establish new practices
2. Proofs convince me of something (through the introduction of new concepts)
3. Proofs establish new paradigms
4. Proofs create new signs
5. Proofs arrange the mathematical propositions in a system
6. Proofs create new connections of concepts

Each of these aspects would require deeper analysis, but for the aim of this paper, it is only important to ask briefly how they are connected with concept modification.

The picture of proofs modifying concept first emerges in MS 121 of 1938 where Wittgenstein analyses a demonstration of there being 100 marbles, by an arrangement of the marbles in 10 rows and 10 columns. He asks himself, why we would describe such a procedure as "unfolding the properties" of the 100 marbles, and comes to the conclusion that we should rather describe it as "Bildung eines Begriff" (creation of a concept). It seems that Wittgenstein uses this expression, to oppose the view that in a mathematical demonstration we unfold or discover properties of an abstract object. Instead of objects he speaks of concepts, and instead of properties he speaks of marks of concepts. (BGM I, §73). But, on might wonder, what changes in the concept of "100" through this demonstration? Wittgenstein gives a straight answer to this question: Through the arrangement of the marbles I get a new criterion of proving that there are 100 objects in front of me. Once I have done the demonstration I can apply the very same procedure in other circumstances with other objects, to check if there are 100 of them. Moreover, I will always recognise such an arrangement of objects in 10 rows and 10 columns, as 100 objects. What changes are the possi-

bilities of circumstances under which I can use the concept "100". Wittgenstein makes this very clear in the following passage:

"To give a new concept" can only mean to introduce a new employment of a concept, a new practice. (BGM VII, §70)

In Wittgenstein's view, mathematical proofs, directly change our mathematical practice and, furthermore, are themselves a part of mathematical practice. It seems that the convincibility of a proof is strongly connected to the fact that he practically introduces the use of a concept. By carrying out a proof, I practice a new use of a concept and this convinces me. When Wittgenstein speaks of the use or the application of concepts, he understands it as centrally rule governed. The proof, that convinces me, by introducing me into a new practice, must therefore establish new rules for the use of the concepts. In this way Wittgenstein describes proofs as establishing new paradigms. (MS 122 57r).

2 Wrights Dilemma

In (Wright 1980) Crispin Wright develops an important dilemma out of Wittgenstein's idea of concept modification". He starts with the common case, that we can prove a proposition in more than one way. In accord to Wittgenstein each of these proofs, should change the concepts which are contained in the proposition, and therefore change the proposition itself. At this point a substantial problem emerges, since in this case, I could never speak about the two proofs proving the same proposition. The continuing question is: In which way can we compare the use of a concept or a proposition before and after a proof to give an account in what a change has taken place? According to Wright, this seems impossible since Wittgenstein clearly rejects the possibility of objective rules and norms for the correct use of an expression, which would be needed to compare concepts before and after a proof. (Wright 1980, p.47) Wittgenstein understands rules as open an without any restrictions or normative constraints (Ramharter/Weiberg 2006, p.49). But if such objective rules are impossible, it is hard to see what sense to make out of the idea of proofs modifying concepts.

If there is no such thing as the determinate, objective pattern of use constituting the correct employment of a particular expression, then what is it which, if Wittgen-

stein is right, changes as the result of a proof? (Wright 1980, p.47)

The following dilemma appears: If we want to make sense out of the idea of "concept modification", we have to interpret the use of concepts as fixed and governed by normative rules, which then are object of change. But this implies that, inside the proof the application of our concepts has to conform with those rules and change them at the same time. Therefore the first strain of the dilemma leads to the impossibility to talk about proofs changing concepts, and the second strain leads to what seems like a paradox.

Felix Mühlhölzer tries to solve this dilemma by appealing to Carnap's idea of a "Bedeutungspostulat", which allows us to understand the change of a concept directly without any appeal to identity of concepts. He concludes that for Wittgenstein all mathematical propositions are such "Bedeutungspostulate", as they make us accept a mathematical proposition, as a new rule, which governs the use of the concepts involved in the proposition.

Nach Wittgenstein bringt uns ein mathematischer Beweis dazu, den bewiesenen Satz als Regel anzunehmen, und zwar als *neue* Regel, die die in dem Satz vorkommenden Begriffe regelt. Insofern fungieren mathematische Sätze als *begriffändernd*. (Mühlhölzer 2010, S.60)

To Wright's question: „In what has a change taken place?“ Mühlhölzer thus answers: A change has taken place, as we have accepted a new rule of concept-application in the form of the proven proposition. (Mühlhölzer 2010, S.60) This solves the supposed contradiction with the rule following considerations, as in this view the proof no longer changes the application of the concepts directly, but rather the „repertoire of rule-formulations“. In Mühlhölzer's view, a proof makes us accept a mathematical proposition as a rule of application and thus changes our concepts.

Before criticising Mühlhölzer's solution it is worthwhile to look at Wittgenstein's own consideration about the "2 proofs – 1 proposition" problem.

When two proofs prove the same proposition it is possible to imagine circumstances in which the whole surrounding connecting these proofs fell away, so that they stood naked and alone, and there were no cause to say that they had a common point, proved the same proposition. One has only to imagine the proofs without the organism of applications which envelopes and connects the two of them: as it were stark naked. (Like two bones separated from the surrounding manifold context of the organism; in which alone we are accustomed to think of them.) (BGM VII, § 10)

At this point Wittgenstein makes it very clear, that in his view the connection between a proof and the proven proposition is contingent, and merely established by similarities and connections in their use. This "organism of use" is therefore the link between proof and proposition and not vice versa the proposition the link between proof and use. It seems that Wittgenstein questions the classical hierarchy between proof and proposition, i.e. the view that a proof primarily brings us to accept a proposition.

Neither Mühlhölzer nor Wright meet this aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics. For Mühlhölzer the modification of the concepts is caused by the proven proposition and not by the proof alone. This stands in direct contradiction to some passages as the following:

Now what has the proved proposition got to do with the concept created by the proof? (...) The mathe-

matical proposition says to me: Proceed like this! (BGM VII, §72)

We could not ask for a better clarification. Wittgenstein explicitly contrasts the "proved proposition" with the "concept created by the proof", and asks what their connection should be. Therefore he must hold, that concept modification is entirely carried out by the proof alone, and the proposition comes in as a secondary device. Therefore we can conclude that Mühlhölzer's interpretation of proofs modifying concepts through the proven propositions cannot be in accord with Wittgenstein's view.

From this considerations it becomes clear, that Wittgenstein did not ascribe the concept modifying function to the proven proposition but to the proof itself. The mathematical proposition rather summarizes what the proof, by changing a concept, convinces me to do. In this sense the proposition functions like a label of the result of the proof. This point can be developed into a bigger interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics, which will form the last part of this paper.

3 Mathematics without propositions

In chapter one we have seen, that one reason for Wittgenstein to describe a proof as modifying concept is his view, that a proof does not primarily prove a proposition, but changes our practice. This change consists in an introduction into a new use of concepts. The proposition merely conserves this result and then functions as an instrument in our language game. This viewpoint becomes clear in various passages, like the following.

Der Beweis kann mit einem Satz endigen, braucht nicht mit einem Satz zu endigen. Der Satz, der sogenannte Satz, zeigt uns beiläufig an, wie der Beweis zu verwenden ist. (MS 122, 50v, 51r)

[The proof might end with a proposition, but it does not have to end with a proposition. The proposition, the so called proposition, casually shows, how to use the proof.]¹

Interestingly Wittgenstein describes the proposition as indication how to use the proof, and not vice versa. Again we see here, that he postulates a direct connection between proof and use, without any deeper need for a proposition. Wittgenstein's thus holds, that the proposition alone could not be applied, would have no place in a language game. The proof allocates the proposition in the language game and makes its use possible. But the proof is not just a tool which enables us to use the proposition, like a ladder which can be thrown away after usage. Quite on the contrary. In Wittgenstein's view the proposition is just a summary of what has been carried out in the proof. So the mathematical proposition is fundamentally dependent on the proof, while the proof contains all the relevant functions for mathematical practice. Is the mathematical proposition therefore dispensable? Does Wittgenstein really aim for a mathematics without any propositions?

If we follow the interpretation, that mathematical propositions are like labels for proofs, whereas proofs, through modifying concepts, carry out the actual mathematical work, it does not seem obvious that propositions can be easily dispensed from mathematics. After all, labels are an important device. However, they are not as essential as often described. Wittgenstein refers to these considerations in an insightful picture of proofs and calculations as

¹ Translation by the author

the proper building of mathematics, on which propositions are attached as facade:

Die Mathematik besteht aus Rechnungen nicht aus Sätzen.

Das heißt nun nicht, daß in der Mathematik nicht auch eine bloße Fassade ohne Haus Verwendung finden dürfe. Nur ist sie so ein Gebilde streng zu unterscheiden von der Fassade eines Hauses. (MS 121, 71v)

[Mathematics consists of calculations not of propositions. – This does not mean, that in mathematics a mere facade without a house must not be used. But such a construction must be rigorously distinguished from the facade of a house]²

The facade of a building is obviously an important part of it, since it provides its characteristic appearance. Therefore we can conclude, that in Wittgenstein's view, the propositions do belong to the "building of mathematics" because without them, mathematics would lose its characteristic appearance. The building however, consists of proofs and calculations which are often hidden behind the facade of propositions. It seems that, with this picture, Wittgenstein wants to attack the orthodox view, that mathematics consists mainly of propositions. That does definitely not entail, that our specific mathematical practice would manage without any propositions, since in our practice propositions do indeed play an important role. But this role can be described without clinching to the idea that propositions stand in the centre of mathematical theories. This however is no critique of mathematical practice but of the ways in which philosophers and mathematicians describe and interpret it, like the way mathematical textbooks are composed. Insofar Wittgenstein does not abandon the "descriptive" orientation of his philosophy. His critique does not turn against the ways in which mathematics is carried out, but against the ways in which it is commented and presented.

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² Translation by the author

The Other Explanatory Gap

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Abstract

Is human action just mere physical goings on? In this paper, I argue that the answer is ‘yes,’ in ontological terms, but ‘no,’ in epistemological terms. In much the same way that some philosophers of consciousness have argued that there is an *explanatory gap* when it comes to understanding qualitative states in strict physical terms, I argue that there is a similar explanatory gap when it comes to a physicalist rendering reasons and actions. Originally coined to capture the epistemic darkness we confront in our attempt to understand phenomenal experiences in purely physical terms, the idea has yet to be explored in the area of intentional states. I draw upon the work Donald Davidson and his intimations about the normativity of intentionality and its role in supporting psychophysical anomalism – the claim that there are no laws bridging our intentional states with states of our brain.

1. Two Explanatory Gaps

The notion of an explanatory gap when it comes to reducing *phenomenal* properties to physical properties has long been acknowledged, thanks to Levine’s appropriation of Kripke’s famous argument against psychophysical identities (Kripke 1980; Levine 1983, 2004). The notion of an explanatory gap when it comes to reducing *intentional* properties has not been considered at all. This essay shall present and defend that notion.

The reason that few have considered an explanatory gap in the case of intentionality comes down to the confidence many philosophers have regarding the functional characterizability, and hence, physicalistic reducibility of, the intentional. In fact, those who claim that they are working on the “hard problem” of consciousness typically assume that there is *no* troubling ontological or explanatory gap to consider in the case of intentional properties (see Chalmers 1996, 2010).

This assumption, however, is mistaken. To show this, I appeal to Davidson’s argument against psychophysical laws, and in particular, what Davidson calls the normative element of intentionality. Whereas Davidson’s conclusion is ontological, insofar as it is about the *existence* of psychophysical laws, mine in epistemological. On my view, intentionality has a normative element that precludes an explanatory reduction of the intentional to the physical, but this does not preclude the existence of psychophysical laws. In short, what Levine has done for Kripke’s argument against psychophysical identities, I do for Davidson’s argument against psychophysical anomalism.

2. The Role of the Normative Element in Davidson’s Anti-Reductionism

We are all perplexed by the mind-body problem because we cannot seem to grasp how mere physical facts can add up to an agent who performs intelligible actions, as opposed to a mere organism who reacts as a matter of reflex. For Davidson, the nature of the difference between the intentional and the physical has to do with the presence of a *normative element* in the intentional domain and the absence of such an element in the physical, and it is precisely this asymmetry that undergirds the argument for psychophysical anomalism.

Davidson expresses this idea in terms of the “constitutive ideal of rationality.” According to Davidson, we make sense of agents and their actions by attributing reasons

according to rules of rational coherence and consistency. We don’t make sense of physical systems by “rendering rational” the physical states or events that make up their behavior; such an endeavor would not make any sense for the plain reason that physical states do not have representational contents whose interconnections necessitate a network of (mostly) rational relations. Intentional states have a normative element in that they must rationally cohere with each; haphazard attributions of non-cohering intentional states are not ipso facto intentional states. But no such injunction is required in our attempt to understand the workings of a physical system. We make sense of physical systems by bringing their properties and changes under confirmable, counterfactual-supporting, regularities. The necessary presence of a rational network and the complete absence of such rational inter-relations forms the cornerstone of Davidson’s argument for psychophysical anomalism.

Here is my reconstruction:¹

1. Necessarily, if M is a mental predicate, then M is governed by the constitutive principles of rationality.
2. Necessarily, if P is a physical predicate, then P is governed by the constitutive principles of nomological regularity.
3. Necessarily, M and P are predicates that figure in a law only if M and P are governed by the same set of constitutive principles. (homogeneity)
4. But M and P are governed by different sets of constitutive principles.
5. Therefore, necessarily no mental predicate M and a physical predicate P can appear together in a law. (psycho-physical anomalism)

The argument is valid, assuming that the type of necessity invoked in the premises is consistent. Since (1), (2), and (3) characterize semantic principles, I take it that the type of necessity invoked here conceptual/logical rather than nomological/physical.

The pressing question concerns the third premise, which states that laws can feature only those predicates whose

¹ Henceforth, in the context of discussing Davidson’s reference to mental states, it will be understood that he is talking about intentional states. In the context of discussing Kripke’s reference to mental states, it will be understood that he is talking about phenomenal states.

conditions of application are drawn from the same homogenous domain. What are the considerations that motivate it? I appeal to Kim's 1985 reading of Davidson to draw them out. The basic idea behind Kim's reading is an intuition that is widespread among philosophers and non-philosophers alike: the prospect of making *rational* sense of why an agent acted a certain way on the basis of knowing what is happening in her brain just seems down-right odd. Indeed, it sounds like a category mistake. But why?

Here is one take on where these intuitions come from. Explaining actions, as opposed to mere reflexes, in terms of purely physical states presupposes a reduction of the intentional to the physical. Such a reduction would minimally involve a mapping of each mental state with a distinct physical (neural) state in the form of "bridge laws" that look like this: $(x)(Px \rightarrow Mx)$. Now, if bridge laws, on Kim's apt coinage, "transmit" the constitutive principles governing the reducing term to the term reduced, where this means that the constitutive principles that govern the application of P extend their boundaries to govern the application of M, then means the distinctly *non-rational* constitutive principles that govern the application of P would carry over to govern the application M. M would then no longer be attributed in a way that is sensitive to considerations of rationality, and with no such constraints, we risk global irrationality, which is tantamount to abandoning the very idea that we are dealing with an agent with a mind.

On this reading, Davidson bases his argument for psychophysical anomalism on the idea that psychophysical laws would force us to give abandon the very rationality constitutive of mentality. Short of eliminating mentality, we must deny psychophysical laws. Or must we?

3. Retreating from the Ontological Towards the Epistemic

From the idea that mental ascriptions would be formulated on the basis of non-rational or a-rational principles, Davidson infers that the relations between the mental ascriptions *could no longer* honor the constraints of rationality, and from this concludes that mental ascriptions cannot mean what they ought to mean under non-rational conditions of application. This inference, however, begs the question. How? Because the claim that mental ascriptions would no longer honor the constraints of rationality within the context of a lawlike statement of the form $(x)(Px \rightarrow Mx)$ is just to claim that there can be no psychophysical laws. But for all we know, a mental ascription made on the basis of the constitutive principles of rationality may quite harmoniously coincide with the one that could be made on the basis of a law-like statement of the form $(x)(Px \leftrightarrow Mx)$. It is possible that mental ascriptions formulated on the basis of non-rational principles could still express rational relations among mental states. Insisting that they can't just is to assume that psychophysical reductions are not possible, which is the very issue at stake.

While Davidson's argument may have failed to establish the ontological thesis that there are no modally significant psychophysical correlations, there is still a significant epistemological question about why mental ascriptions made non the basis of nonrational constraints can still end up globally more or less rational. To draw this out, I shall argue that there is an explanatory gap when it comes to reducing the intentional to the physical comparable to the one Levine articulates on his reading of Kripke's skepticism about psychophysical identities.

What does it mean for there to be an explanatory gap? In the context of intertheoretic reductions, the gap consists in the lack of an *a priori* entailment of the mental concept by its reducing physical concept. If materialism is true of mental properties M, then M supervenes upon physical properties P. That is, the following supervenience conditional is true: $(x)(Px \rightarrow Mx)$. In a full explanation of M in terms of P, there is an *a priori* entailment of M by P. Fleshing out the details of the *a priori* entailment of the reduced by the reducer is what much of scientific progress is about. According to Levine, while Kripke may not have succeeded in denying the existence of psychophysical identities, he has nonetheless succeeded in demonstrating that there can be no conceptual analysis of the phenomenal in terms of the physical. There is no conceptual analysis because we can always ask: "why does the firing of C-fibers result in pain, as opposed to an itch or hearing middle-C." This is because no amount of examination into the nature of C-fibers will explain how or why it plays the role of pain, unlike in the case of heat and mean kinetic energy. There, the understanding of how mean kinetic energy works gives you the story about how it satisfies the causal role of heat so that once we understand mean kinetic energy, there is no further open question.

In Davidson's case, the nature of the explanatory gap is different. I think the most intuitive way of arriving at it is by entertaining a little vignette. Suppose you are learning how to play a game of regular checkers. Not being familiar with the rules, you consult a rulebook to help plan your next move. Unbeknownst to you, the book you grab is a rulebook for Chinese checkers – a completely different game. Nonetheless, you play regular checkers perfectly. Now if this actually happened, it would be quite remarkable. It would be remarkable because there is no reason to expect that following the rules for chess would enable legal moves in a game of checkers (or vice versa). Indeed, there is every reason to expect that it would utterly hinder one's game of checkers.

By Davidson's lights, this is the curious situation with psycho-physical correlations: "If by absurdly remote chance we were to stumble on a ... true psychophysical generalization, we would have no reason to believe it more than roughly true" (1970, p. 216). And I gather that Davidson says this because he thinks that the governing rules of ascribing mental states differ from those concerning the ascription of physical states. If the applications of mental and physical concepts are governed by different constitutive principles, then it really would be a mystery why a given physical state should correspond to a mental state that makes rational sense. The chess-checkers vignette is admittedly disanalogous in certain respects, but it is effective in rendering the oddness of the idea of psychophysical laws. Just as it would be a cosmic coincidence that someone playing by the rules of checkers should manage to play legal moves throughout a game of chess, by Davidson's lights, it is a cosmic coincidence that someone trying to attribute mental states strictly on the basis of her non-rationally related neural states would end up with a system of mental states that are rationally coherent.

Conclusion: Psycho-Physical Anomalism and the Other Explanatory Gap

The explanatory gap, in the case of Davidson's psychophysical anomalism, is quite similar to the one Levine attributes to the Kripkean denial of psycho-physical identities in one respect, but different in another. They are similar in that we have no idea *why* they hold; that is, for any psy-

cho-physical supervenience conditional of the form, $(x) (Px \rightarrow Mx)$, we can always wonder why *that* particular conditional is true – why *that* mental type M is necessitated by *that* physical type P. They are similar, then, in that the physical facts underdetermine the mental facts. How the underdetermination is manifest, however, differs between phenomenal properties and intentional properties.

For phenomenal properties, the underdetermination comes in the form our capacity to conjure up cases of inverted spectra and absent qualia. For intentional properties, the underdetermination comes in the form of the possibility of different but equally coherent life narratives for actions of an agent (nonequivalent truth theories for the agent's language).

Mind and matter, on Davidson's picture, form two independent conceptual domains and we, as thoughtful creatures, not only have the capacity to think in terms of both, but are such that we participate in both. We are minded clumps of matter. But when we use the framework of one to describe the phenomena belonging to the other, there is the threat that we distort the nature of the subject matter we wish to understand: either we intentionalize matter or we mechanize intention. Attributing intentionality to matter is something that science has taught us to outgrow; we no longer attribute anger to thundering clouds, the act of forgiving to rainbows, or punishment with droughts. Some of our most significant scientific breakthroughs have been significant precisely because they have advanced theories that eliminate postulated intentional entities. But we can-

not talk ourselves into mechanizing intention, as the deliverances of that enterprise may fail to have anything recognizably mental in it. Interestingly, this is both what the dualist as well as the eliminative materialist anticipate in the face of materialist reduction. While they disagree about the existence of irreducible mental properties, they both agree that they are irreducible. Davidson's and Kripke's anti-reductionist arguments furnish the vocabulary to articulate the basis for the skepticism about their reducibility.

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Retention versus Storage: An Agentive Approach to Memory Systems

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Abstract

Cognitive science and artificial intelligence seek to reveal the underlying architecture of the brain and/or intelligence in order to develop certain models for simulating its faculties. Yet, it attempts to achieve this by employing terms that are comprehensively borrowed from the computer-based terminology. That is to say, the representative tools (computer-based terminology) used for simulation and modeling are represented as the real structure of the target system (brain/intelligence) itself. In this paper, we claim that it is not enough to explain the function of memory in an agentive system by using the metaphor of *storage*, since *storing information* is a computer-based terminology that is not completely proper for understanding the agentive aspects of memory. We will give the description of the role of memory in cognition and analysis of memory in machine intelligence. We will explain five features of machine memory which are necessary for developing an agentive manner in machine intelligence.

Memory is a capacity to reactivate and/or reconstruct internal representations. Memory plays an essential role in an agentive system since an agentive system must be able to use past experience to act adaptively; this adaptation is possible by inference and memory is an *informational source* for inference.¹ As a result of this, memory is an "experience-dependent adaptive change in behavior." The agent acquires knowledge and improves his knowledge by learning and practice. Memory has a constructive function in this improvement since memory is "organized knowledge, which grows and becomes better organized" (Charniak and McDermott 1985: 610). Memory has a function as a means of data preservation, not knowledge acquisition. This cognitive capacity includes encoding, storing, consolidating, and retrieving of information. In addition, memory is important for the conscious awareness of facts and events.

In our opinion, it is not enough to explain the function of memory in an agentive system by using the metaphor of *storage*, since *storing information* is a computer-based terminology that is not completely proper for understanding the agentive aspects of memory. Ben-Zeev (1986) considers the metaphor of *storage* as a substantive approach to memory. He uses the term "retaining" instead of the term "storing."² He claims that organization should be an inherent property of memory; and he mentions the significance of the relations and organization among the various items. Therefore, he proposes a relational approach to memory, which can be seen as an agentive interpretation of memory.

Memory is an important element for agentive behavior. In a memory system, a close link exists between encoding the information and agentive behavior. The content of memory-guided behavior is determined by the way information is encoded. A memory system should include different stages of encoding such as stimulus (an agent's

sensory perception of its environment) and representation (the agent's internal state of cognitive processes). In an agentive situation, encoding is a process by which stimulus and representation lead to an alteration of the cognitive structure.³ Encoding has a constitutive role for the formation of memory structures in which "each event and concept has a unique internal representative, and the internal representatives have different degrees of associations to each other depending upon how frequently they have been contiguously activated" (Wickelgren 1972: 20). An agent does not memorize events as an objective recording of a tape. However, encoding (i.e., operations and processing of an event) has an impact on its performances and experiences. How an event is encoded determines how information is represented. How information is represented determines how the content of cognition is formed. How the content of cognition is formed determines the capability of an agent's behavior. That is the main reason we argue that there is a close link between encoding and agentive behavior.

1. Memory in Machine Intelligence

Memory is composed of distinct systems. Memory is not a unitary entity, and multiple systems of memory exist. Interactions between memory systems are significant for understanding many aspects of cognition. In artificial intelligence (hereafter, AI), we need multiple memory systems.⁴ The way data (information) are computed determines the content of each memory system. In machine intelligence, there can be various (and alternative) ways of dealing with information that is already encoded and stored. Therefore, we need multiple memory systems in order to use different forms and types of information effectively in varying contexts. We can introduce memory systems in six major groups: episodic, semantic, procedural, dynamic, working,

1 Lehnert (1979: 82) considers memory as a prerequisite for the inferential capability in machine intelligence: "Before we can arrive at a viable theory of inference, we must first establish a theory of memory representation. Inference processes are manipulations of information in memory. It is therefore necessary to have a theory of memory representation in order to specify inference processes. We need to know how information is encoded in memory before we can seriously tackle the processes that manipulate that information."

2 Ben-Zeev sees a major difference between the terms of storing and retaining: "Storing and retaining are two different forms of keeping. A storage place is usually understood to be a passive container for holding something. Retention is an active capacity for preserving something. What is stored is actually separated from the storage itself. What is retained may be conceptually distinguished, but it is not actually separate, from the retention form" (1986: 291).

3 In a memory system, encoding is the process in which the internal representation of an event and the relation between events become possible. Encoding is discussed under different issues in a memory system. Wickelgren (1972: 19) states these issues as follows: "the modalities of memory, the similarity functions defined over the pairs of events, the dimensions of similarity spaces and the loci of events in these spaces, the associative or nonassociative nature of any memory modality, the coding of events and associations of events making use of previously learned cognitive structures, and, finally, the number of traces within any one modality."

4 Rolls (2007: 345) defines memory systems as "dissociable brain systems involved in different types of learning and memory." This definition implies that "our concept of what the different memory systems are at a cognitive or behavioral level can be guided by an exact knowledge of what is computed in each neurally defined memory system in the brain, and how it is computed."

and heuristic. We argue that machine intelligence should include all these memory systems in an organized structure.⁵

Episodic and semantic memories are parts of declarative memory that provide a way to model the external world. Episodic memory is a recollection of previous experiences from an agent's past. Semantic memory is general knowledge of facts and concepts. Procedural memory is the acquisition of skills or procedures. Procedural memory is a performance-dependent system that allows an agent to learn to interact with the environment.⁶ Dynamic memory is an open-ended system in which there is no need for a special location in order to store new information.⁷ Working memory is a limited-capacity system that allows an agent to perform certain computational procedures such as arithmetic, playing chess, and planning. Working memory can be useful for the performance of expert systems. Heuristic memory is a system with a significant role in recognition models. Recognition models are important elements in certain cognitive skills.

In computer science, memory is considered to be an internal storage model.⁸ We argue that memory should have certain additional functions in machine intelligence. In machine intelligence, memory should be more than an internal storage representational system. Each cognitive capability (e.g., perception, learning, and memory) of machine intelligence should be considered in an agentive manner. In that sense, a memory model in AI should provide an appropriate framework for the agentive behavior of machine intelligence. Sanders (1985: 517) describes the general agentive conditions for memory in machine intelligence:

Such a machine, if it can be designed, would *not* be storing information about the significance of different stimuli. As is the case with humans, it would *leave* the information where it was found: in the environment. Instead of having to link stored significances with a virtually infinite array of indifferent stimuli, it would have parsed the stimulus environment into a handleable array of things, features, and events whose significance is intrinsic to the parsing. It would not do this once and for all, but would continue to refine its definition and

resolution of the environment in the light of further activity *in* the environment.

Ideally, such a machine could be set to work, initially, with *no* instructions about the appropriate stimuli to react to. It would only have instructions to parse on an exploratory and experimental basis.

2. An Agentive Memory Model

A memory model should be developed in terms of an agentive manner. In our opinion, this type of a memory model should have at least the following five features:

1- *Active Memory System*: In some memory models, we get the impression that we lock up knowledge in our minds. Information is recorded in specific locations; to remember something is an ability to recall the recoded information from its specific location. This kind of an idea for memory is not true. In a memory system, the organization of knowledge is very important and the interaction between organized-knowledge and new inputs is the most essential point. For instance, Young (1978:12) describes memory as an active system:

Memories are physical systems in brains, whose organizations and activities constitute records or representations of the outside world, not in the passive sense of pictures, but as action systems. The representations are accurate to the extent that they allow the organism to represent appropriate action to the world.

In our opinion, working memory models play a crucial role in the construction of an active memory system in machine intelligence. Greene (1987: 39) considers working memory a necessary element in the interaction between new and old information: "Working memory is thought of as being a working space in which new inputs can be received and information from long-term memory can be retrieved." Working memory models can be useful for machine intelligence to learn to recognize which old information in memory is most analogous to the present problems.

2- *Frame Representations*: To store information in a specific location is a mechanical process. In machine intelligence, we should develop a representational system that categorizes information in the memorizing process. We call this representational system *Frame Representations*. The role of *Frame Representations* is to work on the organization of general knowledge both in semantic hierarchies (meaning) and computational features (mechanical).

3- *Perception*: Memory requires perception and vice versa. Therefore, perception is the basic source of new inputs for the memory system in machine intelligence. Perception provides new sensory inputs that update the knowledge organization of the memory system.

4- *Associative Information Structures*: The categorization of information in *Frame Representations* is not sufficient for knowledge-organization in a memory system. We also need an associative memory system in which an artificial cataloging system is replaced with a dynamic, user-centered associative web of trails. In Bush's (1991) famous article "As We May Think," the Memex Machine is an example of associative memory. According to Bush, the human mind does not simply classify and store information: The human mind "operates by association. With one item in its grasp, it snaps instantly to the next that is suggested by the associations of thoughts, in accordance with some intricate web of trails carried by the cells of the brain"

5 For instance, Engelkamp (2001) describes this organized-structure as a system-oriented approach.

6 Engelkamp (2001: 50) describes the difference between declarative memory (episodic and semantic) and procedural memory as follows: "The procedural system is the phylogenetically oldest system. It allows acquisition of stimulus-response connections. Information on this level is prescriptive for behavior. The organism has no awareness of this kind of information. Information of the semantic and episodic systems is on the contrary descriptive, and persons may be aware of information from these systems, although in different forms. In both systems, external information (among others) is represented internally. In the semantic system, this information is not context-specific, whereas in the episodic system, there is additional information represented about the circumstances under which external information was acquired in space and time."

7 Schank mentions the significance of dynamic memory systems for learning and new understanding: "Our memories change dynamically in the way they store information by abstracting significant generalizations from our experiences and storing the exceptions to those generalizations. As we have more experiences, we alter our generalizations and categorizations of information to meet our current needs and to account for our new experiences...Our dynamic memories seem to organize themselves in such a way as to be able to adjust their initial encodings of the world to reflect growth and new understanding" (1999:2). Schank also argues that dynamic memory has an essential role in language learning.

8 Warnock (1987: 8) gives the definition of memory used in computer science: "The computer scientist uses 'memory' to mean the physical system which allows for the setting up of a particular program. In a digital computer, for example, items of information are stored in particular locations, as answers to questions arranged by the program. The system works by the locations being found in order, very fast. The information from each location is then sent to a central processor, where the calculations are carried out. What information goes into any location is of course determined by the programmer. But there are also computers that, to a certain extent, provide their own programs, in that they can scan or search their environment for information of a certain kind, and locate each piece of information they find at a particular point."

(1991: 101). We argue that in machine intelligence, the organization and retrieval of information can be made by associative systems. Associative systems are "patterns formed of several distinct items and their attributes which are conditioned by their simultaneous or successive occurrences" (Kohonen 1977: 2). An agent can acquire the ability to adapt to its environment by an associative memory system.

5- *Encoding*: There is a difference between a computer memory system and a human memory system since they are built out of different stuff. However, a common ground can be found for the two distinct memory systems. For instance, Winograd (1975) offers a metaphor for computer memories in which human and machine memory structures are conceptualized in a functionalist approach. Encoding actions as lists of symbols and situating them in a hierarchical form gives machine intelligence an organizational capability.

These five features constitute a methodological way to combine different memory systems (i.e., episodic, semantic, procedural, dynamic, working, and heuristic) in an agentive memory system in machine intelligence.

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The question of the essence of language: an inferentialist reading of Rhees' critique of Wittgenstein

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Abstract

The paper discusses Rush Rhees' critique of Wittgenstein, concerning the question of the essence of language. While Wittgenstein, in *Philosophical Investigations*, keeps on insisting that there is no such thing as the essence of language (*PI*, § 65), Rhees, in "Wittgenstein's Builders", argues for the opposite: that there has to be something in language to be called its essence, and sees this crucial element in "discourse", "dialogue" or "conversation". The present analysis reveals these aspects of Rhees' reflections to be parallel to Robert B. Brandom's more recent inferentialist project. Accordingly, such semantic stances as essentialism, propositionalism, holism and inferentialism – characteristic of Brandom's conception – are also ascribed to that of Rhees', along with the claim that the core of language constitutes the inferentialist "game of giving and asking for reasons".

In § 65 of *PI* Wittgenstein articulated his widely known view that there is no such a thing as the essence of language:

Instead of pointing out something common to all that we call language, I'm saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common in virtue of which we use the same word for all – but there are many different kinds of *affinity* between them. And on account of this affinity, or these affinities, we call them all "languages" (Wittgenstein 2009: 36)

The affinity Wittgenstein speaks about here is the sort of similarity that can be called "family resemblances" between different "language games" (§ 66-67). Thus, there is no one specific game, or function, that would be essential for language, on virtue of which it can be named "language". Various language games, like games in the ordinary sense of the word, are not covered by any common definition, nor do they share any joint constitutive content. Instead, they are connected far less strictly, being akin to each other in a way the family members are: they all do not have to manifest one characteristic feature, but still are somehow similar to each other. On the same basis, what we call "language" comprises a variety of different dimensions and activities, none of which plays a special, essential role. In § 18 of *PI*, this matter has been captured by a suggestive simile; Wittgenstein writes:

Our language can be regarded as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, of houses with extensions from various periods, and all this surrounded by a multitude of new suburbs with straight and regular streets and uniform houses (Wittgenstein 2009: 22).

As it is impossible to answer the question: "how many houses or streets does it take before a town begins to be a town?" (Wittgenstein 2009: 22), it is also unworkable to determine which and how many games it does take before language begins to be a language.

The urban analogy of § 18 can be interpreted – for example after Harald Johannessén (Johannessén 2008: 67) – in the following way. The pursuit of the essence of language resembles the search for the downtown of such an old city. Our quest for it could proceed gradually by discarding its particular quarters, streets, parks and houses, in hope of discovering its true core. Similarly, the philosophical pursuit of the essence of language consists in progressively tearing different language games off, as to get

to such a game that is constitutive of the language and thus can be regarded as its essence. This would be an *autonomous* language game, possible to be played out while, assumingly, not playing any other. Wittgenstein's answer suggests that in both cases, the city and the language, there is no way to get to the core.

In addition, it seems that Wittgenstein's words ought not to be interpreted to mean only that an autonomous, complete, essential language game does not exist; it also means that many various, even if primitive, language games are autonomous, still none constitutes the linguistic essence. For, at the beginning of § 18, he emphasizes:

Don't let it bother you that languages (2) and (8) consist only of orders. If you want to say that they are therefore incomplete, ask yourself whether our own language is complete – whether it was so before the symbolism of chemistry and the notation of the infinitesimal calculus were incorporated into it (Wittgenstein 2009: 22).

Some examples of such primitive but complete language games would be – while following Wittgenstein's suggestions – a language consisting only of imperatives (§2, §8), of orders and reports in battle (§ 19), or "of questions and expressions for answering Yes and No" (§ 19) (Wittgenstein 2009: 22), or even Augustinian naming language of § 1. Yet, to repeat, the game that would constitute the real essence of language cannot exist.

*

One of the first polemics with the above Wittgenstein's view was given by Rush Rhees in his "Wittgenstein's Builders" (Rhees 1959), whereas his wider critical reflections from the years 1957-1960 and 1967 (mostly from 1957, the year of Rhees working on "Wittgenstein's Builders") was published posthumously, in 1988, by Devi Z. Phillips under the title *Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Discourse* in 1988 (Rhees 2006). The present analysis of Rhees critique will refer just to the latter.

Rhees disagrees primarily with Wittgenstein's alleged abuse of the metaphor of games in his thinking of language, and claims that the author of *PI* was himself seduced by this picture of language, never being able to get out of it (Rhees 2006: 151). Therefore, he states, Wittgen-

stein regarded language as “a family of games”¹ (Rhees 2006: 116, 151). What is then wrong with such a view? First, the metaphor, when pushing too far, misleadingly suggests that „saying something”, or „understanding something”, is somehow similar to “a move in a game” – to simply our complying with some, more or less formal, rules of this game. Second, the picture of a family of games does not guarantee the *unity of language*, i.e. the mutual understanding of what we say, our capability of following conversation, our partaking in the same linguistic activity or “game”, speaking the same language.

The matter concerning lack of analogy between playing a game and speaking a language Rhees encapsulates, in the essay “What is Language”, in the following way:

If someone learns to speak, he does not just learn to make sentences and utter them, nor to react to orders either. He learns to say something. He learns what can be said; he learns – however fumblingly – what it makes sense to say. This is an accomplishment over and above being able to work together. It is not just an addition to the technique, as you might learn to operate a new tool. And to do this, he must learn how remarks hang together, how they may bear on one another. This is something different from learning general rules or general principles – even though it does not go without that.

And because he learns to speak, and he learns what can be said, he can go on speaking and go on learning (...). And the being able to go on is not like being able to continue a series, say, or being able to do further multiplications. This is not the same as learning the meaning of particular expressions, although it is impossible *without* that (Rhees 2006: 29).

From the above quotation one can infer that speaking a language assumes a sort of *unity* that exceeds the family resemblances between different language games, therefore language cannot be aptly described as a family of games. Moreover, because Rhees stresses the importance of what he calls “conversation”, or “discourse”, and emphasizes the fact that to say something goes closely with understanding what is being said, one concludes that according to Rhees, *pace* Wittgenstein, language has an essence: this essence is “conversation”, “discourse”. He states this explicitly in a passage from “Wittgenstein's Builders – Recapitulation”:

Not all discourse is conversation, but I do not think there would be speech or language without it. And if there were someone who could not carry on any conversation – who had no idea of answering questions or of making any comment – I do not think we should say he could speak (Rhees 2006: 161).

Then, although Rhees is aware of many different functions, or games, of language, he singles one of them out, the conversation, which can be regarded as a center – to recall Wittgenstein's simile of *PI*, § 18 – which other language games and functions are adjacent to, similarly to the way quarters of a city are built on its downtown.

*

When speaking about conversation as the essence of language, one can go on and ask on what basis is the unity of

discourse, or of language, secured. And it seems that it can only be revealed through the analysis of the conditions of discourse possibility, through examining what makes conversation possible, authentic or real (Rhees 2006: 33–62).

Certainly, Rhees claims, the unity in question cannot be ensured neither by formal, logical relations between sentences, nor by “external relations” between expressions – analogical to rules that are in effect in a game. Rather, such a unity is secured by “internal relations of remarks people make to one another in a conversation” (Rhees 2006: 161), which should be understood as “connexions of meaning” (*ibidem*) of remarks that “hang together” and “bear on one another” (Rhees 2006: 29).

In another passage (essay “Signals and Saying Something”) Rhees makes one more interesting observation about meaning:

Where you talk of meaning, you can talk of other things that might be meant or might be said. And this belongs to understanding, somehow. Not that you need think of any alternatives; generally you do not. But understanding what is meant, or knowing what is meant: if you are said to “know something” then it is “something” which allows for such alternatives (Rush 2006: 100).

Therefore, an utterance, or a sentence, means something only in the context of something else, namely, another sentence. It makes sense only in possible, alternative connections with some other things that might be said.

In addition, Rhees seems to implicitly assume that participants in conversation have to make inferences – in relating different remarks to one another, in grasping the consequences of particular sayings and reasons for them. Still, he resists speaking explicitly of inferences, presumably due to the fact that by talking of inferences he mostly meant only *formal* ones – recall that Rhees himself, after Wittgenstein of *PI*, refused the view that the unity of language comes down to logical form of propositions and formal relations between them. Thus, he generally avoids using the term “inference”. One can justifiably assume that Rhees did not know, at least did not use, the terms “informal inference”, and particularly “material inference”² – the latter to be the main concept of inferentialism. Yet, to repeat, he implicitly allowed them. For he writes (in “Wittgenstein's Builders – Recapitulation”):

If people are speaking together, then the significance of this or that remark is not like the significance of a logical conclusion. But the remarks they make have something to do with one another; otherwise they are not talking at all, even if they are uttering sentences. And their remarks could have no bearing on one another unless the expressions they used were used in other connexions as well (Rhees 2006: 158).

In view of that, supposing participants in conversation relates different remarks or expressions to one another, and they use these expressions in connections with many other expressions, they simply make inferences, albeit not formal ones (based on logical form), but material ones – based only on conceptual content.

1 In fact, according to Rhees, Wittgenstein attempted to complement the concept of “game” with such concepts as “customs”, “institutions” or “forms of life”, yet remained totally preoccupied by the metaphor of games (Rhees 2006: 176).

2 In inferentialism, it is assumed that inferences may be based only on the content of expressions used in discourse: e.g. from “Pittsburgh is to the west of Princeton” to “Princeton is to the east of Pittsburgh”, from “Lightning is seen now” to “Thunder will be heard soon” and plenty of others. These inferences are believed to be good as they stand, irrespective of the possible enthymematic premises they could be supplemented with and of any logical form they might be afterwards arranged in (Brandom 2000: 52–55).

To sum up, four particular views can be ascribed to Rhees' philosophical stance: (1) *Essentialism* – the view that language has its essence; in Rhees such an essence is conversation, or discourse. While language having many various function, the function constitutive of it, the one which all other language games depend on, is conversation. (2) *Propositionalism* – the semantic position claiming that the basic items of meaning are sentences, not sub-sentential entities (e.g. names). As the essential game is discourse, in which the key functions are commenting something, answering questions, asking questions etc., one can infer that the elements to play fundamental, indispensable role are just sentences. (3) *Semantic holism* – the view that there are no separate and independent items of meaning, but, conversely, each item is tied with some other ones; each remark in conversation is somehow semantically connected with some others. Where Rhees says that when making a sentence, some other possible alternatives are available (Rhees 2006: 100), he manifests a holistic stance. (4) *Inferentialism* – the position claiming that meaning is conferred on linguistic expressions on virtue of their use in actual or possible inferences; and the inferences in question are not principally based on formal logical schemas, but depend primarily on the content of expressions deployed in them. In other words, these inferences are not formal, but rather material ones.

The four above stances are also general characteristic features of today's inferentialism in the philosophy of language as presented by Brandom (Brandom 1994, 2000).

The conclusion that flows from the present considerations is that Rhees' essentialist critique of Wittgenstein, as to the alleged analogy between language and games, can be interpreted in an inferentialist spirit. It also suggests a tentative, but plausible, claim that Rhees' agreeing on "conversation" to be the essence of language – along with his propositionalism, holism and implicitly assumed inferentialism – leads him inevitably to accepting Brandom's "game of giving and asking for reasons" (Brandom 2000: 189-196) as the downtown of linguistic activity.

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